these operations upon which this study tends to concentrate. Whereas inadequate information may exclude smaller peacekeeping operations from being examined in detail, they remain important nevertheless, as they too, contribute to the content of the overall motivational-mix. Table 1 lists the peacekeeping operations that Canada has participated in between 1945 and 1978.

A

THE OFFICIAL RATIONALE FOR CANADIAN PARTICIPATION
IN INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING:
A COMPARISON OF THE TRUDEAU ADMINISTRATION
AND THE INTERNATIONALIST ERA

by .

Gordon W.V. Jansen, B.A.,

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A thesis submitted to the Faculty of
Graduate Studies and Research in partial
fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts
in International Affairs

The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs

Carleton University

Ottawa, Ontario

Canada

(December 1978)

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CANADIAN THESES
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TITLE OF THESIS/TITRE DE LA THÈSE THE OFFICIAL RATIONALE FOR CANADIAN PARTICIPATION IN
INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING: A COMPARISON OF THE TRUDEAU
ADMINISTRATION AND THE INTERNATIONALIST ERA

UNIVERSITY/UNIVERSITÉ CARLETON UNIVERSITY

DEGREE FOR WHICH THESIS WAS PRESENTED/
GRADE POUR LEQUEL CETTE THÈSE FUT PRÉSENTÉE MASTER OF ARTS

YEAR THIS DEGREE CONFERRED/ANNÉE D'OBTENTION DE CE DEGRÉ 1979

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ABSTRACT

The object of this thesis is to determine whether the apparent reversal in the basis of Canadian foreign policy decision-making, that was suggested by the 1970 Foreign Policy Review, has altered the official rationale for Canadian participation in international peacekeeping activities. The "motivational-mix" of the "Pearsonian internationalist" and the "Trudeauvian nationalist" eras of Canadian external affairs are described and the differences and similarities compared and contrasted.

The evidence suggests that, on the surface, many elements of the motivational-mix have remained the same but the underlying rationale for the motives has changed in most instances. Some elements of the internationalist motivational-mix do not occur in the motives of the Trudeau administration, while others, which remain, are perceived from a changed point of view and pursued in a different fashion.

The alterations have come about primarily in response to the evolution of the peacekeeping principle, the Canadian peacekeeping experience, the changing relationship between the superpowers and the transformations in the composition of the international system.

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CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION

Canada's post-World War Two foreign policy, until the end of Lester Pearson's prime ministership, has generally been regarded as "internationalist". When the present Prime Minister, Pierre Trudeau, assumed office in 1968, he announced that the government would conduct a "thorough and comprehensive review of our foreign policy... We shall seek a new role for Canada and a new foreign policy..."¹ The dominant theme in Canadian foreign policy after 1968 was to be "Trudeauvian nationalism" rather than the "Pearsonian internationalism" that had developed since 1945.²

Ten years have passed since Pierre Trudeau came to power, and eight since the foreign policy papers³ were released. It is clear that there have been many changes in Canadian foreign policy. At the same time, however, many foreign policy actions have remained. Participation in international peacekeeping activities is one of these.

The "Trudeauvian nationalism" that replaced "Pearsonian internationalism" as the basis of Canadian foreign policy holds that motives for participation in international affairs

are based upon narrower, self-centred reasons. Canadian foreign policy is the "extension abroad of national policies."⁴ The internationalists, on the other hand, maintain that Canada "should exercise its rights and responsibilities not in its own special national interests, but for the good of the UN as a whole, and the peoples of the world the UN represents..."⁵ Considering this apparent "reversal" in the basis for making Canadian foreign policy, this study seeks to answer the following questions: In the light of the fact that many of the substantive manifestations of Canadian foreign policy have remained (in this case, peacekeeping participation), have the motives for participation in international peacekeeping been altered? And in what way have they been altered?

Essentially, this study observes and then compares the motives for participation in international peacekeeping of the Trudeau administration and those of the previous Canadian administrations that, generally speaking, embraced the "internationalist" attitude towards Canadian external relations. The internationalists comprise the governments of Prime Ministers St. Laurent, Diefenbaker and Pearson. Obviously, these three administrations are not identical as far as foreign policy behavior is concerned. But since

none questioned the existing basis of their foreign policies, nor undertook to review it in the same way that Prime Minister Trudeau's government has done, they will be considered, for the purposes of this study, to be advocates of the internationalist approach to global affairs.

The development of the concept of peacekeeping grew out of the inability of the United Nations Security Council to establish effective collective security as the UN Charter envisaged it. Enforcement of the peace under Article VII of the Charter became impossible soon after the United Nations came into being. The creators of the concept of peacekeeping - the interposition of disinterested military forces or observers in areas of conflict, authorized by the international community - turned to Article VI of the Charter, which deals with the pacific settlement of disputes, and away from the enforcement aspects of Article VII. While most peacekeeping operations have been organized through the United Nations, there have been several, authorized by other bodies or agreements, that have been in the spirit of Article VI if not the letter and, as such, these also are considered in this study.

While the term "motive" does not pose difficulties

concerning its definition, the way in which motives are observed needs some clarification. Motives are inherently subjective and may only be inferred from statements and actions of those involved. As such, individual motives can not be readily "quantified" and hence this study does not attempt to rate the relative importance of individual motives. Observation, therefore, reveals a "motivational-mix" - an array of motives - affecting a particular situation. It immediately becomes apparent that, in many instances, different motives are used by individuals to explain the same action. This, of course, depends upon the context in which the motives are articulated, and to some extent, upon the kind of audience being addressed.

A search for the motives for Canadian participation in international peacekeeping must use an approach which involves both the international and national levels in world affairs. It can not be assumed that the reasons for Canadian interest in and the motives for participation in international peacekeeping can be accounted for entirely within the external environment or, for that matter, entirely within the internal environment. This study, therefore, observes the motives for Canadian participation in peacekeeping in the contexts of the three "spheres"

within which Canada's policies in international affairs are contained.

The broad international perspective is referred to as the "Systemic Sphere". The motives within the Systemic Sphere deal with Canada's membership in the international community as a whole. Canada's criteria for participation in peacekeeping would therefore relate to the United Nations, the organization which has usually been responsible for peacekeeping and maintaining world peace and security in general, and to the global confrontation between East and West that emerged during and after the Second World War.

The second sphere, which is a sub-system within the Systemic Sphere, is called the "Regional Sphere". The Regional Sphere considers a more narrow range of international interaction. Canada's perceptions of the need for the North Atlantic Alliance were different from the perceptions of, for example, the need for the United Nations. The Alliance was meant to signify

a new spiritual unity of purpose in the free world. The alliance must be a sign that the North Atlantic nations are bound together not merely by their common opposition to totalitarian Communism but also by a common belief in the values and virtues of our Western civilization, and by a determination to work for the promotion of mutual welfare. 6

Regional in the sense used in this study is not restricted to geographical regions, but includes the commercial, cultural and historical "regions" to which Canada belongs. The Commonwealth, therefore, also a sub-unit of the overall Systemic Sphere, is included as part of the Regional Sphere as it too embodies a different set of Canadian perspectives from those of general international relations:

The Commonwealth is not a political unit. It is not an alliance. It has no common policy... But [its members] have, none the less, a community of interests on matters that really count.... Within the Commonwealth... we are seeking... to establish and maintain friendship, understanding and co-operation between Asia and the west...7

Bilateral relations with other states, within the Western alliance, the Commonwealth and elsewhere, also tend to exhibit rationale for interaction different from the Systemic Sphere and as such, these are also included within the context of the Regional Sphere.

The third level, the "Domestic Sphere", involves issues that focus upon Canada and Canadians, apart from relations with others. While not necessarily a discussion of domestic "policy", the domestic sphere concentrates on the peacekeeping motives which relate to the internal political

situation. The decisions to participate in peacekeeping are motivated by the varying relationships of the government with Parliament, the Canadian public and other interests which both affect and are affected by peacekeeping policy.

It is evident that, in some instances, the three spheres are interrelated, which tends to create situations where single motives, most notably the pursuit of influence and prestige, are associated with more than one sphere. By peacekeeping, the Canadian government might seek to gain or sustain influence and prestige in the United Nations, within NATO or with the Canadian public, simultaneously. In cases such as this, the discussion concerning these motives will necessarily be distributed over all levels, but an effort is made not to be redundant.

Chapter Two examines the basis for Canadian participation in peacekeeping in the "internationalist era", from the immediate post-War years until the end of Prime Minister Pearson's administration in 1968. It is recognized that this "era" consists of several periods. The differences in these periods have contributed to certain trends in the motivational-mix but it is observed that these trends

merely imply shifts in the ~~emphasis~~ and priorities given to specific elements with the same motivational-mix, the overall basis for the formation of foreign policy remained constant.

The Third Chapter examines the alterations of the attitudes towards international peacekeeping that developed during the evolution of the peacekeeping concept and the reaction to the many problems that were encountered. Prime Minister Trudeau came to power at a time when the peacekeeping concept was being severely tested in international and domestic arenas because of the inability of the global community to come to grips with the political problems associated with the undertaking of such activities. At the same time, there were many technical and operation-specific problems which plagued both the international community as well as Canada - as Canadians have been major contributors to virtually all peacekeeping operations.

In addition to the difficulties experienced by specific peacekeeping missions and the deadlocked debate in the United Nations over the formulation of peacekeeping guidelines, the new Canadian leadership had different ideas concerning international peace and security and the

Canadian peacekeeping role. As a result, while maintaining the commitment in principle to participation in international peacekeeping, the Trudeau government, in its Foreign Policy Review, articulated a certain wariness towards future Canadian peacekeeping commitments and a definite distaste for playing roles and pursuing influence in international affairs that peacekeeping participation had come to imply during the latter 1960's.

Chapter Four assumes the same format as Chapter Two and considers the motives for participation in international peacekeeping during the Trudeau administration from 1968 until approximately October 1978. Chapter Five serves as a summary to compare and contrast the "two" motivational-mixes that arise out of the previous Chapters. The conclusions attempt to answer the questions posed at the outset as well as to assess future considerations and motives regarding both new and existing Canadian peacekeeping commitments.

The study endeavors to blend narrative and analysis based upon the foreign policy statements of Canadian leaders and their representatives, as well as official government policy publications. Other communiqués, interviews and

correspondence have been gathered from both present and former Canadian leaders and officials. The study, due to the nature of the sources, considers only the official government reasons for peacekeeping participation. The "motivational-mix" approach is not able to identify primary motives as to do so would necessitate a systematic investigation of the decision-making process regarding the making of Canadian peacekeeping policy. The conclusions expressed in the paper, therefore, do not reflect a definitive explanation of Canadian government motivations but rather an evaluation of the overall official rationale for Canadian participation in international peacekeeping.

Secondary sources and other observers' evaluations of the motives of the leadership are also valuable because of their expertise, and in some cases, direct participation in the decision-making process with the leadership in question. Background material is drawn from the considerable volume of literature that exists concerning Canadian foreign and defence policy, peacekeeping and the United Nations.

Not surprisingly, the larger peacekeeping operations have generated the most information and therefore it is

these operations upon which this study tends to concentrate. Whereas inadequate information may exclude smaller peacekeeping operations from being examined in detail, they remain important nevertheless, as they too, contribute to the content of the overall motivational-mix. Table 1 lists the peacekeeping operations that Canada has participated in between 1945 and 1978.

Table 1

CANADIAN PARTICIPATION IN
UNITED NATIONS AND OTHER
PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS:
1945-1978

NAME	FROM	TO
United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization - UNTSO (Middle East)	1948	Present
United Nations Military Observer Group India-Pakistan - UNMOGIP	1948	Present
International Commission for Supervision and Control in Indochina - ICC	1954	1972
United Nations Emergency Force UNEF (Middle East)	1956	1967
United Nations Observer Group in Lebanon - UNOGIL	1958	1958
United Nations Operation in the Congo - ONUC	1960	1964
United Nations Temporary Executive Administration - UNTEA (Indonesia)	1962	1963
United Nations Yemen Observation Mission	1963	1964
United Nations Force in Cyprus - UNFICYP	1964	Present
United Nations India-Pakistan Observer Mission - UNIPOM	1965	1966
International Commission for Control and Supervision - ICCS (Vietnam)	1972	1973
United Nations Emergency Force - UNEF (Middle East)	1973	Present
United Nations Disengagement Observation Force - UNDOF (Middle East)	1974	Present
United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon - UNIFIL	1978	1978

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CHAPTER TWO

THE INTERNATIONALIST ERA: 1945 TO 1968

INTRODUCTION

The Canadian approach to international affairs in the immediate post-war years was defined by the Canadian contribution to the war effort of the Allied powers. Two concepts came to define the Canadian perspective of both Canada's status, rank or position in the global hierarchy and Canada's method of or approach to accomplishing various tasks. These concepts are, of course, those of "middle power" and "functionalism".

The functionalist principle in Canada grew out of the belief that after World War Two the international system should not be divided into two groups: great powers and everyone else. Functionalism, here, must be distinguished from the theory of functionalism sometimes used in international relations connected with building a peaceful and prosperous state-system by solving problems through the establishment of appropriate international institutions dealing with specific economic or social issues. From this functionalist theory, however, is derived the functionalism in the Canadian context: "those states best qualified by

resources and experience to make a constructive contribution to the solution of economic and social problems ought to play a commanding role in whatever international institution is related to deal with them."¹

It was Prime Minister Mackenzie King who was at the forefront of the Canadian movement to establish the functionalist principle in international affairs and in particular, in the United Nations. His emphasis centered not only on socio-economic affairs, but peace and security affairs as well. The first major test of Mackenzie King's functionalist principle was the election of non-permanent members to the first UN Security Council. In 1944 Prime Minister Mackenzie King argued that:

in determining which states should be represented on the [Security] Council with the great powers, it is, I believe, necessary to apply the functional idea. Those countries which have the most to contribute to the maintenance of the peace should be most frequently selected. The military contribution actually made during this war by the members of the United Nations provides one good working basis for a selective principle of choice.²

The term "middle power" was meant to distinguish Canada from not only the great powers, but also from lesser powers which had neither the capabilities nor inclination

to contribute to global affairs. The middle power concept was hence an adjunct to the functionalist idea in that middle powers were states which could contribute substantially to international peace and security as well as to socio-economic functions, but not as much as could great powers.

It is important to emphasize that neither of these two concepts indicates any "role". Canada, by expounding the functionalist principle and the middle power thesis in the United Nations, sought simply to ensure Canada was allowed "to participate in the process of peacemaking in the manner to which she was entitled by the contribution of her armed forces to the Allied victory."³ But although Canadian leaders did not "seek" any particular role in international affairs, the "role" tended to seek Canada.⁴

This role was conceived out of the stalemate of the Cold War. The middle powers found themselves cast as mediators. Middle powers "filled the role of intermediary because while they did not have sufficient interests or power to be threatening, they did have sufficient military and diplomatic resources to mediate conflicts."⁵ Peacekeeping was a by-product of this

mediatory role. It was

an effort to cope as well as possible with the dangerous situations that flared all over the world during a period of great power disunity. It was, in fact, the United Nations groping, with lesser powers as its agents, to take advantage of the elemental but tacit consensus which did not exist among the great powers.⁶

THE SYSTEMIC SPHERE

Canada, as a middle power, asserting the functionalist approach to international affairs, serves as the basis for this investigation of Canadian peacekeeping motives. The peacekeeping concept has been applied to three areas of global politics: the East-West conflict, the process of decolonization and the institution of the United Nations itself. Canada's point of view has conceived participation in these areas as both a responsibility and a right.

In the context of the East-West conflict, peacekeeping participation is viewed as part of the responsibility for maintaining a stable international system where the preoccupation of the Canadian leaders was to prevent a major breakdown of international order.⁷ Canada, being a supporter of the political status quo, sees advantage and hence responsibility in maintaining a peaceful international environment in order to pursue its other interests, such as trade. Sydney Smith and Howard Green, Ministers of External Affairs in the Diefenbaker government and Paul Martin, Minister in the Pearson

government, all submitted the same argument: Canada peacekeeps as a responsibility to help maintain international peace and security, and, in particular, to keep the superpowers out of direct conflict.⁸

The feeling of responsibility or duty to maintain peace and security in the international community was generally directed at and through the United Nations. There was at the same time, however, the motive of preserving and building the United Nations as an institution, that is "systems maintenance". At the outset, "systems maintenance" was the promotion of the United Nations as a collective security organization. When collective security proved to be unworkable due to the lack of consensus among the permanent members of the Security Council, the Korean War being a unique and extraordinary event, the lesser powers turned to the General Assembly both to circumvent and to overcome a deadlocked Security Council. From this inventive systems maintenance - inventive because the UN Charter did not specifically deal with this kind of situation - grew the

idea of the "fire brigade": "the activity of several of the lesser powers [including Canada] to help maintain the institution of the United Nations by preventing superpower conflict from evolving into a confrontation, which would destroy the UN."⁹ The fire brigade idea merged into to concept of "middle power peacekeeping" and thus, peacekeeping as this paper has defined it.

In a speech concerning Canada's role in the crisis surrounding the invasion of Egypt by Britain, France and Israel, Mr. Pearson said that the main object of the Canadian position "was to bring the United Nations into the picture to search for a settlement under our obligation as signatories to the Charter."¹⁰ Part of Mr. Pearson's concern was the credibility of the power of the United Nations to protect small states from the aggression of others, especially the great powers. The smaller states, he felt, must not perceive the UN as an instrument of aggressive great powers. While this point resembles the United Nations' role in the process of decolonization, Mr. Pearson perceived the subtle difference when in the House of Commons, he emphasized that the United Nations must also protect the state of Israel from the potential threat to its existence -

'threatened not by the colonial powers, but by its neighbours.¹¹

Preserving the viability of the United Nations was a major motive of the Diefenbaker government in sending Canadian military personnel into the Congo under the UN flag. In his memoirs, Mr. Diefenbaker recalled

that should [the operation in] the Congo fail, the future effectiveness of the United Nations in dealing with emergency situations involving peace and security would be jeopardized. Any loss of confidence in the United Nations' ability to fulfill one of its primary functions would inevitably be reflected in other areas of United Nations activities. The cumulative effect could be that the United Nations might then become totally discredited as a body dedicated to co-operative international action.¹²

The concept of functionalism emphasized middle power rights as well as responsibilities. In 1947, then External Affairs Minister, Louis St. Laurent, outlined the Canadian attitude toward these rights in a speech concerning Canada's election to the United Nations Security Council for the first time.¹³ By striving to improve international consultative machinery, his argument went, Canada would increase the relative influence of the

middle powers, giving them more input into the decision-making process. In pulling its own weight, Canada would thereby earn and, at the same time, exercise its right to be heard on matters of international peace and security.¹⁴

Canadian motives for peacekeeping and hence maintaining international peace and security must also be viewed from the perspective of Canada as a member of the Western Alliance. Without being critical, as John Warnock seems to be, an argument can be made defending the proposition that peacekeeping in Canadian foreign policy is "fully consistent with the Canadian role as a supporter of the Western Alliance."¹⁵ Canada, in this sense, participates in peacekeeping in order to help fend off the advance of world Communism. This motive remained a part of Canadian policy until at least the change of Liberal leadership in 1968. The 1964 White Paper on Defence has stated the case quite clearly:

[The] Communist countries can be expected to continue to promote expansionist aims by measures short of all-out war. Tensions will persist....Communist pressure, including

the active fomenting and support of so-called 'wars of liberation' in less-developed areas may well continue and intensify. In such areas, instability will probably continue in the decade ahead and call for containment measures which do do lend themselves to Great Power or Alliance action. The peacekeeping responsibilities devolving upon the United Nations, can be expected to grow correspondingly.¹⁶

It has been maintained that no peacekeeping operation can be instituted without a superpower consensus.¹⁷ It is also held that no peacekeeping operation has been instituted without the active support of the United States.¹⁸ This being the case, it is further argued that:

peacekeeping serves the interests of the United States as the world's leading conservative power. In fact, the US, with Canada's assistance, used the UN in Palestine, Suez, the Congo and elsewhere to gain influence at the expense of its European "allies" as well as its Communist opponents.¹⁹

The superpowers, although they may be excluded from direct participation in peacekeeping, are ~~not inactive~~. The fact that the United States has supplied the majority of financial support, air lift, supply, logistics and even weapons for many of the United Nations peacekeeping forces, demonstrates a far greater interest in the outcome of the

operation than the Soviet Union.²⁰ Canada's interest in peacekeeping in this context then tends to coincide with the interests of the United States. The coincidence of interests, however, does not necessarily indicate that Canada participated in peacekeeping as a follower of American policy. The other Canadian motives affirm that peacekeeping was a Canadian interest for many reasons.²¹

A review of the 1964 Defence White Paper noted a further motive for peacekeeping participation, this time defining peacekeeping within the North-South context: "What Canada has to offer marginally in Europe, it could offer decisively in those wide areas of the world where the threat is not just Communism, but post-colonial chaos."²² Peacekeeping, as it was viewed in the context of the decolonization issue, was interpreted in two ways: first, peacekeeping was one method of the United Nations to become directly involved in the decolonization process and second, due to the first interpretation, members of the peacekeeping forces had to be free of any association with a colonial past. The former assertion is supported in a speech by Paul Martin in November 1963 in which he stated that the Canadian decision to meet peacekeeping requests

was based on Canada's fundamental objective of preserving the peace and reducing international tension in the contexts of both the East-West and the North-South.²³

The latter interpretation implies, more than it asserts, that peacekeeping is a reaction to the conflicts associated with decolonization. Canada is involved in the Middle East, said Sydney Smith at the General Assembly in 1958:

where otherwise no Canadian interests exist other than which flow from normal cultural and commercial intercourse.... But as a middle power we do, however, have a very direct interest in the preservation of international peace and security and promotion of understanding between nations. It is a manifestation of that interest that Canada participates in UNEF, UNTSO and UNOGIL.²⁴

The leaders of the Pearson government supported the same principle. Many of Mr. Martin's speeches affirm the position that peacekeeping was part of the process of decolonization and that Canada's peacekeeping role derived from the fact that Canada had no colonial past.²⁵ Lester Pearson also viewed peacekeeping as one aspect of the decolonization process in his speeches regarding the establishment of a permanent United Nations stand-by force.

To organize such a force, Pearson said (a force which would of course, include Canada), "would require a number of middle powers whose credentials and whose motives are above reproach."²⁶ Pearson believed, as did many others, that the basic principle of "middle power" peacekeeping meant that peacekeepers were to have no colonial history or colonial motives, and since the establishment of peacekeeping operations was to date restricted to the Third World, it was by implication meant to promote the decolonization process.

The International Control Commission (ICC*) in Indochina, established in 1954, serves as a good example of peacekeeping motivated by both a desire to prevent superpower conflict and as an ingredient in the decolonization process. The feeling of responsibility to the general international community, to Canada's allies, France and the United States, and to the countries in Indochina, was strong. The Canadian reception to the invitation to participate was less than enthusiastic, but, argued Lester Pearson, there was no disposition to evade the responsibility "which may, however, turn out to be as onerous as it certainly was unsought."²⁷

*To avoid confusing the ICSC of 1954 with the ICCS of 1972, the 1954 Commissions are referred to collectively as the ICC.

An additional motive, according to Arnold Smith, then Canadian Ambassador in Moscow, was the threat that France wanted to use American atomic weaponry in Indochina - a suggestion that would necessarily have directly involved the United States. The threat of the fall of the French government was also of great concern. There was a fear that the assumption of power of a more nationalistic government would have continued French involvement in Indochina and prolonged the colonial war.²⁸

The Canadian government's motives concerning its participation in the Congo operation similarly reflected the concern to prevent or at least contain post-colonial chaos. The UN Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjold, conceived the peacekeeping mission as one of preserving the viability of an African nation suffering from post-colonial collapse. Prime Minister Diefenbaker's position that he did not want to be involved in a "Cold War situation in Africa"²⁹ acknowledges his belief that peacekeeping was to help in the process of decolonization and not to take sides in the East-West conflict.³⁰

The establishment of the Cyprus peacekeeping force was widely believed to be motivated out of Alliance

commitments. But that the government leaders, and others in the foreign policy-making system, conceived the Cyprus situation in wider terms is much less obvious. Mr. Martin's five reasons for Canadian involvement in the Cyprus force³¹, tend to gloss over another motive - the fear of Soviet expansion in the Mediterranean area. Although related to alliance commitments, it is not directly connected to the specific intra-alliance conflict. Western leaders were concerned that the Soviet Union was attempting to convince Cypriot President, Archbishop Makarios, to allow a Soviet naval base to be established on the island. This resulted in considerable pressure on Canada from the British to help establish a stronger "Western" presence in Cyprus.³²

The motive of enhancing or sustaining international prestige and influence is one which is attributed to all political leaders, but rarely admitted to by any. In that a certain amount of influence is mandatory for a nation to survive in the international system (and this applies more so to nations lacking in "hard" influence, such as a strong and persuasive military), the pursuit of prestige and influence must be considered to be an aspect of the motivational-mix.³³

Canadian influence and prestige developed, along with the middle power thesis, out of the breakdown of great power co-operation shortly after the war ended which "made the position of Middle Powers more important than it otherwise would have been."³⁴ Combined with this "inflated prestige" of the middle powers generally, individual Canadian prestige and influence in the United Nations was also substantial, due to the Canadian ability to negotiate compromises in times of crisis.³⁵ The growth of Canada's prestige and influence in the United Nations, however, with all due respect to the many other Canadians involved, was to a large extent because of the personality of the Canadian External Affairs Minister, Lester Pearson. In a reference to the representatives of middle powers generally, but obviously aimed at Lester Pearson personally, John Holmes maintains that it was a

combination of remarkable men with appropriate national backgrounds and opportune circumstances which has made for effective middlepowermanship.³⁶

A "Canadian" image was thus developed which attracted strong public support.

By 1955, however, Lester Pearson had reached the summit of his (and Canada's) influence. The events surrounding the 1956 Suez Crisis and the establishment of the United Nations Emergency Force was the last time that Canada used its accrued prestige and influence that it had gained from World War Two.³⁷ Up to and including the 1956 peacekeeping operation, Canada was requested to participate in such operations because it already had acquired influence and prestige in the world community. After that time, a decline is witnessed in the relative influence and prestige Canada possessed. It is during this decline that Canadian leaders turned to the "influence and prestige" motive as one of the rationale for peacekeeping participation.

The relative decline of Canadian influence and prestige in world affairs was caused by many factors. At home, the general election in 1957 brought to power the Progressive Conservative Party and broke the long Liberal tradition. The Canadian leaders so much involved in international affairs, notably Lester Pearson, no longer represented the Canadian people. The Canadian economy, which experienced a resource boom in the post-war years, began to slow down, directing the primary attention of Canadian leaders towards domestic and economic affairs.

Internationally, the post-war rehabilitation of Europe began to exhibit positive results. The re-building of Germany began to accelerate and Italy too, began to emerge as a country of greater importance. In 1957, the Treaty of Rome was signed establishing the European Community. As Europe regained its political, economic and military strength, and the Cold War grew more serious, the focus of global politics shifted towards Europe. Soon, Britain and France would emerge from the disgrace of Suez. Canadians were thus finding themselves more removed from the centre of global politics.

The technological revolution thrust the rocket age upon the international scene with the launching of Sputnik in 1957. The threat of rocket attack from the Soviet Union brought Canada into closer military integration with the United States - the North American Air Defence Agreement (NORAD) was signed in 1958. The superpower confrontation seemed to become more pronounced, climaxing in the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962.

The newly formed Afro-Asian countries began to join the United Nations in large numbers and a situation was created where Canadian influence, as measured relative to

the number of members of the international community, began to diminish.

In essence, as the Cold War confrontations grew more tense, Canadian military policies fell more in line with those of its ally, the United States. And, as the number of countries in the international system grew, and the "non-aligned" Third World emerged, Canadian influence was "watered down" as Canada had become one of the many lesser powers. The combination of closer military integration with the USA, along with the decline of relative importance due to an increase in international actors, further decreased Canada's influence and reputation as an "independent" member of the global community.

But while Canada's influence in world affairs declined³⁸, public demand for an active role in international affairs increased, and naturally Canada's political leaders responded by stressing in their speeches the Canadian ability to display strong leadership and initiative.³⁹ There is little doubt that the actions of the Diefenbaker government in this regard also had an effect on Canada's loss of prestige in international affairs. A major source of the decline which arose from within the Diefenbaker government was the repeated emphasis by the

Prime Minister and his Ministers of the importance and popularity of Canada in world politics, which had the result of compromising Canada's credibility regarding these very capabilities.

Although there is some disagreement as to the extent to which Mr. Diefenbaker affected Canada's decline in international affairs, there is a general consensus that his propensity to include international issues in his hustings oration and to oversell Canadian initiatives in the UN and elsewhere, created unrealistic expectations on the part of the Canadian public and outright scorn by some individuals in the international community. The Prime Minister's negative contribution to Canada - United States relations, for example, is particularly well known. It is clear that a major objective of the Liberal government which returned to power in 1963 was to restore Canada's lost prestige and influence.

A hint of the Liberal government's attempt to restore lost prestige by being a mediator and a peacekeeper is revealed in an interview in December 1964 with External Affairs Minister Martin. Mr. Martin indicated that Canada should vigorously pursue a policy of maintaining a good

name by being effective in projecting Canada as a witness and fair interpreter of international realities transcending Canada's own special interests.⁴¹

This vigorous pursuit was partly responsible for the content of the 1964 White Paper on Defence. Peacekeeping was formally integrated into Canada's defence policy and hence into Canadian foreign policy. The result, many observers mistakenly believed, was that the future Canadian military contribution to global peace and security was to be limited to United Nations peacekeeping: "The force structure [Minister of National Defence, Paul] Hellyer is creating is geared for peacekeeping.... Peacekeeping is to be the 'raison d'être' of the Canadian Armed Forces."⁴²

What becomes apparent in the actions and beliefs of the supporters of the Pearson government, and in particular Paul Martin, is that the "role" of peacekeeper was now assumed to be a Canadian role and not just a middle power role; that Canada, being a respected and objective member of the international community and having past peacekeeping experience, had the required prestige, influential reputation and experience to perform that task.

Peacekeeping, it was maintained, required a "helpful fixer" image, and in return it perpetuated that image. The process was circular: in order to be a peacekeeper, Canada needed a good reputation. Since it was one of Canada's major foreign and defence policy objectives to participate in peacekeeping, the reputation that was "lost" during the Diefenbaker years had to be regained. One way to regain it was to try to participate in peacekeeping operations, thereby receiving a sort of ex post facto good reputation.⁴³

THE REGIONAL SPHERE

International peacekeeping in the context of the regional sphere involves Canadian motives within the various non-global organizations to which Canada belongs, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Commonwealth. Also included are Canada's bilateral relations with other states, in particular its allies and Commonwealth friends: the United States, Great Britain, France, India and Pakistan, for example. Peacekeeping can be treated as fulfilling alliance commitments (which is partly in the systemic sphere), maintaining or strengthening intra-alliance or intra-organizational relations, or as developing and sustaining more narrow bilateral relations with states, either within the various regional organizations or without.

Due to the limitations of Canadian power in the immediate post-war years, Canada had two roles in world affairs: first, an executor of basic policies worked out by the great (Allied) powers; and second, a compromiser attempting to find a middle road which powers with different views would be prepared to accept.⁴⁴ The necessity of carrying out the first role and the

ability of Canadian representatives to portray the second, were combined with the two main factors which made it possible for Canada to undertake peacekeeping obligations. Notwithstanding that functional reasons, such as technical capability of the Canadian military to undertake such operations, were also a major influence, these politico-strategic factors are:

1. the existence of a nuclear deterrent and the relative security Canada enjoys under the American umbrella;⁴⁵ and
2. the maintenance of public ambiguity of the Canadian position due to the belief in "quiet diplomacy" which also aids in creating compromises.⁴⁶

Canada accepted membership in the International Control Commissions in Indochina even though the agreement was not under the auspices of the United Nations, out of a feeling of responsibility to the international community, but also from other sources - in this case, influence from the United States and from other members of the Atlantic Alliance.⁴⁷ Canada therefore accepted the task in order to maintain alliance unity in the face of a perceived Communist threat in Southeast Asia.

Canada's concern for global peace and security during the Suez Crisis in 1956 was obviously sincere. But Canada's

foremost concerns were the unity of the Atlantic Alliance and of the Commonwealth. Norman Robertson, then Canadian High Commissioner in London, in a cable to Ottawa before the Anglo-French invasion of Egypt had taken place, warned that:

[it] is clear that every possible effort must be made to prevent a chain of developments which would result in Anglo-French military force being exerted against Egypt in a way which would split the Commonwealth, weaken the Anglo-American alliance, and have general consequences which would benefit nobody but Moscow.⁴⁸

As it turned out, this "chain of developments" did come about and the result was nearly catastrophic. But by striving not to label openly Britain and France as aggressors, Canada (in the person of Lester Pearson), was able to maintain the illusion of neutrality in the issue. By thus enabling Mr. Pearson to act as a mediator, Canada saved face for its allies and prevented the drifting apart of both the Commonwealth and NATO.⁴⁹

The opposition of Egyptian President Nasser to the use of Canadian combat troops, due to the fear that Canadian policy might later veer towards that of the "West" or even Great Britain,⁵⁰ reinforces the proposition that Canada was

acting in the interests of the cohesion of the Western Alliance as much as those of general global peace and security.⁵¹

The Cyprus conflict, which erupted in 1964, involved Canada primarily because of Canada's position within the Western Alliance. To deal with the perceived threat to the southern flank of NATO from the Soviet Union, Canadian (and American) leaders were concerned with patching up the rift that had grown between Greece and Turkey, and between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. The willingness of Paul Martin to involve Canada in any potential peacekeeping undertaking seemed to be matched only by the encouragement from the United States.⁵²

In January, 1964, the United Kingdom suggested that a force comprised of NATO members be instituted to quell the Cypriot factions and to help relieve the tensions between Greece and Turkey. The opposition of Cypriot President Makarios and the Soviet Union to such a plan persuaded the British to turn to the United Nations. Canada had been requested to participate in the NATO force and in light of the specific circumstances of the Cyprus issue, the Canadian government would have preferred a NATO peacekeeping

force to a United Nations force.⁵³

Canada's peacekeeping participation also tends to be motivated by a desire to sustain, change or alter direct bilateral relations, especially regarding the United States. The peak and subsequent decline of Canada's influence and prestige in global affairs after 1956 has been briefly outlined above. As this decline coincided with Canada's closer military integration with the United States, it simultaneously brought out public demands for greater independence in Canadian foreign policy. Thus, Canada's dilemma: "to be at once a loyal member of the Western Alliance, and an unattached middle power with considerable freedom of action."⁵⁴ Independence has, in fact, become one of the most important and controversial issues in the making of Canadian foreign policy, so much so that "the anxiety about national independence has become almost a neurosis."⁵⁵

Once again, the Suez Crisis, and the actions of Lester Pearson are illustrative of the genesis of the independence aspect of peacekeeping participation. By supporting neither the Americans nor the British and French on the UN resolution that condemned the invaders as

aggressors, by being extremely successful in bringing these two parties to an agreed course of action, and by making the peacekeeping force a collective, middle power operation under the control of the UN Secretary-General, Mr. Pearson set the mould which would guide both subsequent Canadian foreign policy and future UN peacekeeping operations:⁵⁶

1. United Nations peacekeepers were to be objective and disinterested states openly supporting neither side in the conflict; and
2. peacekeepers were to be able to convince the superpowers that they were far enough outside the Cold War to be acceptable.

In other words, peacekeepers had to have sufficiently neutral, objective and independent foreign policies. While the mediation efforts by Mr. Pearson were successful as far as instituting UNEF was concerned, he did have difficulty convincing the Egyptians that Canada was independent enough actually to contribute troops to the force.

The appointment by the Secretary-General of Canadian General E.L.M. Burns as Commander of UNEF did not, however, meet with any opposition from Egyptian sources, presumably due to General Burns' personal reputation and the fact that he was transferred from an already existing peacekeeping force in the Middle East - UNTSO.⁵⁷

The Egyptian objections to Canada because of the similarity of the Canadian and British uniforms seemed reasonable to General Burns, but he maintained that the possibility of mistaken identity of Canadian by anti-British Egyptians was a risk that should be taken. The General believed the real reason for Egyptian objections, as stated earlier, was the fear that Canadian policy might later shift from its present "neutral" position in regard to the control of the Suez Canal.⁵⁸ After several weeks of negotiation, President Nasser agreed to admit Canadian administrative and transport personnel but not combat troops.⁵⁹

The Diefenbaker administration which assumed power at about the same time as the beginning of Canada's decline in prestige and influence, began to feel the pressures to produce policies that were more "Canadian", as the obviously Canadian initiatives of the early and mid-1950's were not being equalled by that government. The signing of the North American Air Defence Agreement with the United States, caused Canadian journalist and political analyst, Charles Lynch, to warn that:

our credentials as a voice of sanity
and compromise become somewhat eroded
in the eyes of many when we channel

our policies more and more through NATO, more and more through Washington, and refrain from playing our traditional constructive role in the UN.⁶⁰

Others, like James Minifie, argued that Canada should adopt a neutralist policy and withdraw from both NATO and NORAD in order to guarantee a more independent foreign policy:

Neutralism means the return of Canada to independent status and therefore the opportunity to merit a receptive hearing once more in the United Nations. Canada could not begin to fulfill its potential role as long as its initiatives were frustrated by policy directives laid down in Washington... a universal role which has been blurred and blunted by over-close association in regional military alliances.⁶¹

The argument of the two gentlemen cited above was that Canadian independence was being diminished by adherence to the North Atlantic Alliance and in particular to United States military policy. But although these ties could weaken Canada's influence and "encourage the suspicion that she was a satellite, Canada's close association with the United States and membership in the Commonwealth tended to enhance relative strength"⁶² at the same time.

In keeping with the middle power concept and the principle of functionalism, Canada sought a guarantee for its independence through participation in international organizations.⁶³ Peacekeeping, being an activity of one international organization (the United Nations), served the practical level of the pursuit of Canadian independence through its contribution to the development of effective international machinery.⁶⁴ Paradoxically, while several of the peacekeeping operations that Canada took part in were closely associated with Canada's alliance interests, the principle of peacekeeping was still viewed as a means of expressing independence in foreign policy, simply because the great powers, and in particular the USA, could and should not do it.⁶⁵ Peacekeeping, Mr. Martin maintained, was the only distinctive Canadian contribution to international organization and global security⁶⁶; and a distinctive role in international organizations was needed to counterbalance the influence of the United States.⁶⁷

The Canadian position regarding the "troika" method of peacekeeping is a case in point. Canadian leaders viewed Canada's participation in the ICC, not as a representative of the Western Alliance, but as custodian

of an international agreement. Canada's first concern therefore must be to see that the agreement is faithfully observed and peace is maintained.... [Canada's only interest is] as a responsible member of the international community..."⁶⁸ Canada opposed the "troika" because the "neutral" member was forced to be an arbiter while the others were to advocate the positions of their respective blocs.⁶⁹ Canadian leaders did not want peacekeeping to be a function of bloc representation as this would bring Cold War politics into peacekeeping and, by being forced to act in the interests of the "West", Canada would suffer a loss of independence.

The unification of the Canadian Armed Forces, begun in 1964, was hailed by some observers as an indication that the government intended to concentrate on one military role, that is, international peacekeeping. While these observers were not entirely accurate, it is clear that peacekeeping had assumed an official priority in Canadian defence planning, even though it was more of a psychological priority.⁷⁰ The psychological priority of peacekeeping in relation to NATO and NORAD commitments does indicate however the

government's desire to shift Canada's military policies away from the Atlantic Alliance and the United States, toward the United Nations. This would be in keeping with the principle of counterbalancing the influence of the United States by playing an active and distinctive role in international peace and security in the United Nations.⁷¹

The pursuit and support of a United Nations stand-by force by the Canadian government was also based on the premise that Canada sought an alternative to its alliance commitments through the United Nations. In the early 1960's many members of the attentive public tended to support the idea of a stand-by force as media reaction to the Diefenbaker government's hesitation to volunteer troops for the Congo operation demonstrates:

Canada should take the lead at the UN in organizing an independent, multinational, multiracial police force for service in the Congo.... Our money is better spent on UN peacekeeping than on maintaining our present subservient role in the North American Air Defense System.... The real Canadian contribution to peace should be in the international forum not alliances.⁷²

A week later, as the Congo Crisis became more serious, the Toronto Globe and Mail reported that "here is the second

chance to form the permanent international police force which Canadian leaders - Mr. Diefenbaker among them - have long urged."⁷³

The degree to which the Canadian government, especially the Liberal government of Prime Minister Pearson, promoted the establishment of such a force is evident from the references to a stand-by force in literature coming from Ottawa and elsewhere. The House of Commons Special Committee on Defence devoted an entire chapter of its 1965 report to the establishment of an international police force⁷⁴, and Canadian leaders authored articles in newsmagazines and journals which stressed the need for such a UN force.⁷⁵

The developments within the Atlantic Alliance after 1956 were considered to be major causes of the desire to seek extra-alliance alternatives. The 1956 crisis illuminated the lack of consultation that existed among Alliance members. The near split of NATO in 1964 over the Cyprus issue and the withdrawal of France from military participation in the Alliance in 1966, has lead to the assertion that "it is hardly surprising... that in the past ten years [i.e. from 1956 to 1966] Canada should have

sought to pursue its international commitments perhaps even at the expense of its regional defense arrangements".⁷⁶

If it is argued that Canada participates in peacekeeping in order to pursue independence in foreign policy, the events surrounding the expulsion of UNEF from Egypt in 1967 support this argument, albeit in a negative fashion. In May 1967, President Nasser ordered UNEF to withdraw from Egypt. The UN Secretary-General, U Thant, had little political choice but to concur with the order. The Canadian argument, even though it was a legal one and not intended to be of a political nature, challenged the sovereignty of the Egyptian government. Because Canada was on the same side as the Americans and the British on the issue, the Egyptian President now perceived Canada to be siding with the American and British political interests, his main concern of 1956. "Pearson's focus on the UN blinded him to the conflict between Egypt and Israel".⁷⁷ Canada's neutrality and objectivity were called into question by President Nasser.

The Egyptian President's opinion that Canada sided with the "imperialists"⁷⁸ may have been confirmed when American President Johnson made a special trip to Canada to confer

with Prime Minister Pearson on the Middle East situation. The two leaders discussed the desirability of keeping a UN presence in the Middle East, but Mr. Pearson explained that he had "no UNEF rabbit to pull out of the hat this time."⁷⁹ That was on May 26. Three days later, the Canadian contingent was specifically ordered to leave Egyptian soil within forty-eight hours.

Despite the setbacks, however, the Pearson government was convinced that Canada should continue to participate in UN peacekeeping, as well as peacekeeping operations authorized elsewhere. Peacekeeping is not a "vestigial" Canadian interest, announced Paul Martin in August, 1967.⁸⁰ Undoubtedly, Mr. Martin believed that although the reputation of Canadian independence and objectivity was broken in the Middle East, it still held everywhere else in the world.⁸¹

THE DOMESTIC SPHERE

Within the domestic sphere lay further motives which, although closely linked and often equated with motives in the other spheres, can be separately associated with the desire to participate in international peacekeeping. Motives arising from the domestic sphere are essentially those motives which actual relations with other countries or organizations.

Personalities, of Canadian leaders and other Canadian representatives have had considerable effect on the Canadian peacekeeping policy and on the post-war development of Canada's foreign policy in general. Canada's prestige and influence, of course, derived from its participation in two world wars, but it was more than that. "The rapid growth of Canada's stature was inextricably associated with [Lester Pearson's] position as one of the most respected foreign ministers of the post-war era."⁸²

The concept of middle power and the principle of functionalism was to a significant degree shaped and developed by the Canadian representatives in the early years of the United Nations. Middlepowermanship could not have occurred on its own:

To see the underlying factors that made UNEF possible is not to depreciate the efforts of Lester Pearson and other representatives who came to be known as the "fire brigade", or the role of the Secretary-General and the Secretariat. "Factors" by themselves do not stop wars; they have to be assessed and manipulated by human beings. If courage, persuasiveness, diplomatic skill, imagination and personal prestige had not existed in the right quarters at the right moment in 1956, the resulting drift and confusion would have required more than a UNEF to remedy them.⁸³

The impact that Canadian representatives had on the substance and the style of Canadian foreign policy during the early-1950's was very significant, if not crucial.

Lester Pearson, in the mid-1950's, "came to personify Canadian foreign policy in the minds of many at home and abroad."⁸⁴ The Canadian public liked the policies and style of Canadian representatives in the Department of External Affairs, and the public subsequently pressed for them when they were not forthcoming:

Undoubtly, ordinary citizens felt some satisfaction at the way Canada helped out with the problems of the fifties and wanted to see this continue. It opened up the glamorous prospect that, while other nations remained heavily armed and deterred one another from going to war, Canada could concentrate its energies on the nobler work of keeping the peace.⁸⁵

Many have interpreted the desire of Canadians to "concentrate on the nobler work of keeping the peace" as the altruistic aspect of Canadian foreign policy - "concerned with such values as international co-operation, world peace and global economic development, both as ends in themselves and as a means of defining and expressing a distinctly Canadian personality on the international scene."⁸⁶ A distinct Canadian personality usually means distinct from the United States, which has already been observed and referred to as the desire for an independent foreign policy. There is a subtle difference, however, between wishing to be different from someone else in particular and wishing "[to make] a contribution to the international community which gives [a country] a purpose in the world that justifies [its] existence."⁸⁷

Canadians made the object of their foreign policy, remarked Robert Osgood, the promotion of international well-being, because they "naturally" see the world only in altruistic terms.⁸⁸ Since peacekeeping was viewed by the Canadian public only in altruistic terms,⁸⁹ the government therefore reinforced the public desire for an altruistic foreign policy by pursuing the peacekeeping role:

We need a chivalrous theme for our international relations - something to live and labour by until peace and prosperity or something more like it than the present state of affairs emerges.⁹⁰

After the election in 1957, which put the Progressive Conservative Party under John Diefenbaker, on the government side of the House of Commons, changes in the global picture and within Canada tended to threaten the Canadian self-image. Canadian leaders during the Diefenbaker years came under increasing pressure to produce policies that could be presented as demonstrations of Canadian importance and popularity. Concern for the Canadian self-image created a situation where Canadians were more easily "persuaded to support policies that do more for [their] egos than for [their] more vital interests."⁹¹

The Diefenbaker government's motives for entering into a commitment in the Congo were, in part, a desire to demonstrate Canada's national identity by sharing in the praise and enhanced status which Canada had earlier acquired as a result of the Suez role. The "peacekeeping ethic" was still in the growing stage and Mr. Diefenbaker wanted to prove he could be just as good an internationalist as

his new opponent, the Honorable Leader of the Opposition.⁹²

The media, in fact, showed considerable impatience when the government hesitated to make an immediate pronouncement to offer Canadian troops to serve in the Congo operation. Editorials reflected a strong desire to preserve the national self-image that peacekeeping had created:

Has Canada fallen back so far from the position it took in the UN four years ago, the position which brought [Lester Pearson] the Nobel prize? This is time for the Canadian government to seek not to shun responsibilities. In the light of Canada's past record at the United Nations, in the light of Canada's present status as a respected middle-power, we should not hide from the Congo crisis, or turn our backs on the opportunity it presents.⁹³

The arguments concerning public image motives are substantiated when one reads previous speeches by Mr. Diefenbaker's External Affairs Ministers, Howard Green and Sydney Smith. Mr. Smith was extremely impressed by the Canadian reputation at the UN and he boasted of the "growing prestige of Canada".⁹⁴ Later, Mr. Green expounded the great Canadian leadership qualities to an audience in Toronto: "...for no nation is there a greater challenge

in world affairs or a greater opportunity for leadership than there is for our own Canada. We can perhaps give finer leadership than any other nation."⁹⁵

The return to power of the Liberal Party in 1963, brought back many of the personalities who were associated with the peak years of Canadian influence and prestige during the early and mid-1950's. In trying to regain the prestige that had been lost during the Diefenbaker administration, the Pearson government "obsessively pursued the mirage of peacekeeping forces as though trying to relive the great days of 1956."⁹⁶ The role that was now seen as a uniquely Canadian role had become an important part of the "Canadian conceit"⁹⁷ and Canadian leaders were "tempted into smugness"⁹⁸ in their promotion of the Canadian peacekeeping role. Because of the many other motives for participation in peacekeeping however, the influence of the self-image motive is tempered somewhat:

Peacekeeping in Canadian foreign policy can be understood in terms of the search for areas of flexibility, discretion and therefore perhaps a kind of independence. It can not simply be dismissed as a misguided desire to appear internationally virtuous.⁹⁹

The emphasis that Paul Martin gave to peacekeeping in Canadian foreign and defence policy reflected both the motives of responsibility, which he obviously sincerely believed, and, in part, an opportunity to be as successful as was his Prime Minister.¹⁰⁰ It must of course be recognized that it was Mr. Martin's philosophy that Canada should always become involved in all matters involving international peace and security. This explains, to a great extent, his promotion of Canada as a peacekeeping nation because it was his view that peacekeeping was Canada's most effective military contribution to peace.

The 1964 Defence White Paper and the emphasis in it on the peacekeeping role, reflects the political usefulness of a popular role for Canada to play in international politics. Peacekeeping, if observed simply as a popular foreign policy activity, would tend to enhance government popularity if it were officially identified with foreign and defence policy priorities:

Most of the so-called middle power nations that have been, and remain, the mainstays of traditional peacekeeping, succeeded over the years in identifying their core foreign policy with peacekeeping, using it to express a unique contribution to international peace and co-operation, and in building a domestic political support for continued international activism and visibility.¹⁰¹

The expulsion of UNEF from Suez had the opposite affect on the perception of the Canadian image. While Canada's image abroad and at the United Nations was little effected by UNEF's eviction,¹⁰² the effect on Canada's self-image was considerable. In the House of Commons on May 19, 1967, Mr. Martin stated that:

It will be a matter of great regret, I am sure to everyone in this House and to Canada to see the United Nations Emergency Force disbanded..., because we recall with pride that this force was set up as a result of the initiative, action and imagination of the present Prime Minister of Canada.... I mention the contributions made by the Prime Minister to indicate how very strongly Canadians feel about the consequences of yesterday's actions and its implications regarding the whole concept of [United Nations] peacekeeping... to which this country dedicates so much of its foreign policy.¹⁰³

While the media continued to define peacekeeping as a role which aided the national self-image - "more than adherence to any alliance, [peacekeeping] is a role which is attractive to most Canadians and which may even help to generate a deeper sense of national purpose and unity"; it lamented the image lost by the abrupt termination of that role:

The crisis of confidence is especially serious for Ottawa, which is increasingly stressing peacekeeping as one of our major functions in the world, and which is adapting our armed forces partly to make them more effective in this role. 104

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The motives for Canadian participation in international peacekeeping, from the end of the Second World War until 1968, in the minds of Canadian leaders and of the majority of the attentive Canadian public, have been consistently perceived within the concept of Canada as a middle power promoting the functionalist principle. Louis St. Laurent spoke of both of these ideas in the late 1940's and his words remained the principle underlying the formation of Canadian foreign policy during the entire period under consideration:

A small power is in a sense by its very smallness relieved from much of the responsibility which participation in decisions involves, and which the implementation of such decisions requires. At the other extreme, the great powers can protect their positions [in the United Nations] with the veto. A "middle power" such as Canada, however, is in a different position. Its economic strength and political influence are of importance, and its prestige is high. The material and moral contribution which Canada can make to collective action, as the last two wars have shown, is significant.... We believe that special responsibilities within the framework of the [United Nations] Organization should be entrusted to those nations which have the means and the will to make the greatest contribution to the solution of the special problem in hand, and that is not because of any selfish interest in the application of the principle involved. It is because we wish to see the greatest possible measure of achievement,

believing, as we do, that the interests of our country can best be served by that which best serves the whole community of nations. 105

On behalf of the international community as a whole, Canada participated in peacekeeping in order to help prevent small conflicts from proliferating into larger conflicts and hence directly involving the superpowers in the hostilities. Peacekeeping, as it was seen in the context of the United Nations, was motivated by a desire to maintain the viability of the institution because the Organization was seen to be an integral part of the preservation of international peace and security as well as a key part of many other international activities.

One of these other activities was the process of decolonization. Helping in the peaceful transition from colonial rule to independence was seen as a major function of the UN. Peacekeeping, as it evolved, aided this process by interposing a United Nations presence either to physically separate conflicting parties (UNEF), to help support a fledgling regime until it could function on its own (ONUC), or to simply observe the transfer of power from the colonial rulers to the new independent regime (UNTEA).

From the point of view of Canada as a member of the Western Alliance and a supporter of the politico-military status-quo, peacekeeping was motivated by a desire to prevent sudden and/or violent changes in the international system. In this instance, peacekeeping was motivated partly to prevent conflict, or restore peace to areas of conflict, and to impede the spread of Communism - Communism being seen as the root of the conflict because it was dedicated to the overthrow of the existing political status-quo.

A further motive for Canadian participation in peacekeeping was the desire to maintain or enhance Canada's international prestige and influence. Canada, not being a great military or economic power, found it necessary to seek other methods to influence friends and other members of the international community. One way was to promote Canada as an honest, objective and loyal member of the global village and the various alliances and other organizations to which Canada belonged. Peacekeeping was perceived as one method of demonstrating objectivity, loyalty and honesty.

Regionally, Canada's rights and responsibilities were

also stressed. Canada's various regional commitments motivated the country to participate in peacekeeping to help mend intra-alliance conflicts, to develop and sustain the institution of the Commonwealth, and to sustain good relations individually with its major allies and friends, most notably the United Kingdom, France, India and the United States.

Paradoxically, Canadians were also motivated to participate in peacekeeping in order to seek alternatives to alliance obligations. Peacekeeping was seen as an activity by which Canada could be distinguished from other countries - particularly the United States. Peacekeeping and the promotion of a permanent United Nations military force were to function as an alternate method of promoting collective security. At the same time, by seeking to be distinctive and "independent" from its allies, Canada could further develop its reputation, influence and prestige vis-à-vis other members of the international community.

Canada has participated in peacekeeping activities, in part, as a result of the deep personal commitment to the United Nations and to peace and security by the Canadian leaders. Lester Pearson, Paul Martin and others were very

much personally involved with Canada's international activities and, to a great extent, these men came to personify Canada and Canadian foreign policy. Their actions proved to be very popular with the Canadian public and the public demanded similar activity from subsequent leaders.

That peacekeeping was an important part of Canada's national interest, but was seen primarily in idealistic terms, fed the Canadian public's appetite for an altruistic foreign policy. Canadians liked to see their leaders get acclaim and applause for actions which were unselfish and which benefitted everyone else as much as they did Canadians. The Canadian self-image which resulted from these kinds of actions came to form the major part of the Canadian national identity; and as it applied to the regional sphere, independence. Canadians needed and wanted something of their own to be proud of, and the role of international peacekeeper served that purpose.

There are several trends which can be brought out of the overall study. Canada has participated in international peacekeeping due to the principle that Canada should exercise its rights and responsibilities as a member of the

United Nations, as a member of the international community in general and of the "West" in particular, and as a member of regional organizations. The need was seen to preserve international peace and security, to preserve institutions, to promote the policies of alliances and to promote Canada as a nation-state within the international system and the various sub-systems.

A trend which emerges after the establishment of peacekeeping in 1956 and the role Canadians played in it was the promotion of Canada as an influential member of the international community in order to stave off the failing prestige and influence that was brought on by other factors. Many of the external factors, particularly the recovery of Western Europe, the increase in the total number of nation-states and the changes in the strategic and technological environment, had a net effect of diluting relative Canadian power and influence in world affairs. Internal factors, such as the weakened Canadian economy and the replacement of the post-World War Two Canadian leadership, further induced the decline in Canada's influence abroad. The trend was intensified when the Liberals regained power because they perceived a further loss of prestige and influence - caused by the pretentiousness of the previous Conservative government. Moreover, the role of peacekeeper was fused to

the principles of Canadian foreign policy, making peacekeeping a "Canadian role" to which was also linked the major portion of the Canadian self-image.

The year 1956 was also the turning point for a similar trend, but on a different level and seen from a different point of view. The role of peacekeeping, being a military role different from that undertaken in Canada's alliances, and one which Canada's major ally and neighbour was not allowed to play, was perceived to be an alternative to the influences of Canada's alliance partners and their subsequent influences on Canadian foreign policy. The reduction of international influence caused a greater reliance on Canada's military allies, which were also Canada's major commercial partners. This, in turn, provoked a reaction whereby the Canadian public and its leadership sought counterbalances in the United Nations to offset Canada's dependence. The causes of the desire for an independent foreign policy were similar, if not identical, to those which caused a need to promote the enhancement of Canadian influence and prestige. The former were indeed prerequisites for the latter.

NOTES

1. J. Eayrs: In Defence of Canada: Peacekeeping and Deterrence, p. 162.
2. Exerpt from a statement in the House of Commons by Prime Minister Mackenzie King, August 4, 1944, in: R.A. MacKay (ed): Canadian Foreign Policy 1945 - 1954: Selected Speeches and Documents, p. 5.
3. J. Eayrs: In Defence of Canada, op. cit., p. 196.
4. "We did not seek any prominent or special role at the UN in those early years, but the role often sought us. Certainly we did not back away from responsibilities reasonable for a country in our position in the circumstances that then existed. Nor did we over-emphasize our importance in discharging them." Quoted in: J. Munro and A. Inglis (eds): Mike: The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson, V. 2, p. 136.
5. J. Holmes: Canada: A Middle Aged Power, p. 35. Donald Gordon views the same situation of middle powers in a rather cynical way: "Canada since World War II, has tended to worship the myth of middle-powermanship. With a kind of aggressive modesty, [Canadians] have admitted that limits on population resources, and military strength have made major power pretentions unrealistic and so have sought to salvage chauvinistic satisfaction from the espousal of an inbetween position which is not quite major and certainly not minor." D. Gordon: "Canada as Peacekeeper", in J.K. Gordon: Canada's Role as a Middle Power, p. 51.
6. J. Holmes: The Better Part of Valour, p. 68.
7. Denis Stairs refers to this concept as "systems modulating". He refers to the Canadian activities within the United Nations as "systems maintenance". "The Foreign Policy of Canada", in Rosenau, Thompson and Boyd: World Politics: An Introduction, p. 195.

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8. P. Martin: Canada and the Quest for Peace, p. 51 and letter to the Author, April 27, 1978. See also H. Green: Department of External Affairs Statements and Speeches (SS) 61/16, Media Interview, November 14, 1961 and S. Smith: SS 58/35, Speech to UN General Assembly, August 19, 1958. Most observers, in fact, maintain that Canada's responsibility to prevent superpower confrontation and to promote peaceful relations among states was its primary motive for participation in peacekeeping. See example, R.G. Riddell: SS 48/40, Speech at Mount Holyoke College, June 22, 1948; E.L.M. Burns: Interview, April 27, 1978; A. Smith: Interview, April 19, 1978; G. Ignatieff: Letter to the Author, April 20, 1978; J. Holmes: Letter to the Author, April 27, 1978; And J. Holmes: The Better Part of Valour, op. cit., p. 66.
9. D. Gordon: "Canada as Peacekeeper" op. cit., p. 53.
10. Quoted in: R. Reford: Canada and Three Crises, p. 102.
11. L. Pearson: SS 56/35, Speech to House of Commons, November 27, 1956.
12. J. Diefenbaker: One Canada: The Years of Achievement: 1957-1962, pp. 127-8
13. "Each member [of the Council] should exercise its rights and responsibilities not in its own special interests, but for the good of the United Nations as a whole, and the peoples of the world the United Nations represents... To the upmost of our ability and in full consciousness of the weaknesses of the machinery with which we will have to deal, Canada undertakes to live up to this principle and try to justify this trust." L. St. Laurent: SS 47/15, Speech to UN Security Council, October 1, 1947.
14. Similar arguments are made by: A. Smith: Interview, April 19, 1978 and J. Diefenbaker: SS 61/12, Testimony to the House of Commons Committee for External Affairs, September 11, 1961.
15. J. Warnock: Partner to Behemoth: The Military Policy of a Satellite Canada, p. 269.

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16. P. Hellyer: White Paper on Defence, March 1964, p. 11. See also: P. Martin SS 64/20, Speech to Atlantic Treaty Association, Ottawa, September 15, 1964.
17. By, for example, D. Gordon: "Canada as Peacekeeper", op. cit., p. 56, and J.K. Gordon: "Prospects for Peacekeeping", International Journal, Spring 1971, p. 383.
18. The Soviet Union has not opposed the establishment of any peacekeeping operations, in either the General Assembly or the Security Council. The Soviets have favoured the major operations in principle only, however, as it has refused to pay for any of them. See for example: P. Dobell: "The Dangers of Remodelling the UN's Security Function", International Perspectives, July/August 1972. And J. Warnock: Partner to Behemoth, op. cit., p. 272.
19. G. Stevenson: "For a Real Review", Current Comment #2, 1970, p. 11. The internationalism espoused by the Canadian government in the immediate post-war era was in reality, argues Jack Granatstein, "co-operation with the United States disguised as multilateralism". "Canada and Peacekeeping: Image and Reality", Canadian Forum, August 1974, p. 15.
20. "A peacekeeping force whose men and commanders are drawn from small states but whose equipment, means of transportation and weapons are provided by a major power, has, within the international competition, a meaning quite different from that which the champions of international neutralization and 'vacuum filling' would like to reserve to international force". Quoted from Taylor, Cox and Granatstein: Peacekeeping: International Challenge and Canadian Response, p. 59.
21. It is noteworthy however, that Lester Pearson's original idea concerning UNEF was to use US troops for the operation. He changed his position when the Americans indicated it would be an unwise manoeuvre. Munro and Inglis: Mike V. 2, p. 282.

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22. L. Beaton: "The Canadian White Paper on Defense", International Journal, Summer 1964, p. 368. This quotation in itself supports the previous argument concerning peacekeeping as the struggle against the spread of Communism. John Kirton, like Beaton, defines peacekeeping in this way. In his view, peacekeeping is a process of inventing and affirming the right of the United Nations to be involved - Peacekeeping worked when it had Canada, acting through the United Nations, to restrain the unilateral assertiveness of the Western European imperial powers in order and thereby to hasten the process of decolonization. Letter to the Author, May 10, 1978.
23. P. Martin: SS 63/23, Statement in House of Commons, November 28, 1963. This particular statement referred to the Yemen operation, UNYOM. Many of the newly emergent excolonial countries viewed peacekeeping during the latter 1950's in the same manner as did Canada: "By means of caucusing their strength in the General Assembly, they seek to exploit their strength in the one political forum where they enjoy a voting majority. The massive support from African and Asian nations to UN peacekeeping has occurred at a time when the UN has been largely given over to assisting in the process of decolonization, and the Organization's involvement was justified by the according higher priority to self-determination than to domestic jurisdiction." Quoted in Taylor, Cox and Granatstein: Peacekeeping, op. cit., p. 28.
24. S. Smith: SS 58/35, op. cit.
25. For example: "Canada has taken an active part in almost every United Nations peacekeeping operation since they began. We are a middle power, as the phrase goes, neither colonial nor yet aggressively anti-colonial, neither too strong nor too weak. So when the UN fire alarm sounds, it happens that Canada is usually asked to go." P. Martin: SS 64/14, Speech at Wayne St. University, Detroit, June 18, 1964.

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26. Quoted in: Taylor, Cox and Granatstein: Peacekeeping, op. cit., p. 48.
27. Press Release: July 28, 1954. Quoted in P. Bridle: "Canada and the International Commissions in Indochina, 1954 - 1972", Behind the Headlines, October 1973, p. 10.
28. A. Smith: Interview, April 19, 1978.
29. R. Preston: Canada in World Affairs, 1959 to 1961, p. 266 and J.G. Diefenbaker: One Canada, op. cit., p. 126.
30. Analysis of the events show that the conflict only became a serious Cold War conflict when the UN troops failed to expedite quickly the evacuation of the Belgian forces which resulted in the ensuing appeal to the Soviet Union by Prime Minister Lumumba.
31. The reasons were:
 1. An urgent need for co-operation to preserve peace in Cyprus.
 2. The future of the United Nations is at stake.
 3. NATO participation obligates Canada to do its utmost to prevent intra-alliance conflicts which may expose NATO's southern flank".
 4. Cyprus is a member of the Commonwealth and therefore can not be ignored.
 5. The human suffering of the Cypriots due to the conflict.

Quoted from: P. Martin: SS 64/11, Speech to UN Association of Canada, May 4, 1964.
32. While Arnold Smith notes that the British were concerned about the Soviet threat, Lester Pearson's view was that the American anxiety centred around alliance unity and the conflict between Greece and Turkey. The American anxiety, however, must have been created by the apparent Soviet intentions. The absence of this concern in Pearson's Memoirs may indicate a more positive viewpoint on the part of the Americans (and Pearson himself) in that the best counter to the Soviet threat was a secure and united southern flank. E.L.M. Burns has stated that although it was evident that the Soviet Union supported

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32. Makarios, that country realized that a stabilized Eastern Mediterranean area would be in its long term interest and therefore supported the Security Council Resolution to establish UNFICYP.
Sources: Munro and Inglis: Mike V. 3, pp. 134-5.
A. Smith: Interview, April 19, 1978, and E.L.M.
Burns: Interview, April 21, 1978.
33. The capability to influence others, argues Paris Arnopoulos, is based greatly upon the personal skills of the diplomats, especially regarding smaller states. Since the function of a diplomat is to convince, the influence a diplomat has relates directly to the extent he can project and attain for his country its various interests and objectives.
P. Arnopoulos: "Consultation and Conciliation", International Journal, Winter 1974-75.
34. Munro and Inglis: Mike V. 3, op. cit., p. 134.
35. D. Masters: Canada in World Affairs, op. cit., p. 182.
36. J. Holmes: "Is there a Future for Middlepowermanship?", in J.K. Gordon: Canada's Role as a Middle Power, op. cit., p. 17. Granatstein agrees, and has written: "Wherever Pearson went, Canadians took pride".
J. Granatstein: "Canada and Peacekeeping", op. cit., p. 15.
37. J. Bayrs: Canada in World Affairs: October 1955 to 1957; p. 8; and J. Granatstein: op. cit., p. 15.
38. A natural and probably unavoidable decline, argues P. Lyon: Canada in World Affairs, 1961 - 1963, p. 3.
39. "The apparent desire to emulate the successes of Lester Pearson by Prime Minister Diefenbaker led his government to suggest on a number of occasions that United Nations forces should be interposed in areas of tension", such as the Formosa Straits and Berlin; none of which were successful nor, considering the circumstances, wise. T. Lloyd: Canada in World Affairs, 1957 - 1959, p. 155. R. Reford offers a review of the Formosa issue of 1958 in: Canada and Three Crises, op. cit., pp. 52-70.

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40. For commentaries on the effects of Mr. Diefenbaker's actions on Canadian prestige and the loss of prestige generally, see:

P. Lyon: The Policy Question, Chs. 5, 6.
P. Newman: Renegade in Power: The Diefenbaker Years, Ch. 19.
T. Lloyd: Canada in World Affairs, op. cit., pp. 244-247.
41. P. Martin: SS 64/36, Media Interview, December 23, 1964.
42. J. Granatstein: "All things to All Men: Triservice Unification", in S. Clarkson (ed): An Independent Foreign Policy for Canada?, p. 41. The priority of peacekeeping in the 1964 White Paper was, in fact, itself an illusion - a psychological priority at best. In substantive terms, the defence of Canadian territory was the first priority. See the list of priorities outlined on p. 24 of the White Paper.
43. It is recognized that the pursuit of prestige and influence is also closely related to domestic politics and as such, it will be discussed further under that heading.
44. D. Masters: Canada in World Affairs, op. cit., p. 212.
45. J. Holmes: "Is There a Future for Middlepowermanship?", op. cit., pp. 22-24; and D. Stairs: "The Foreign Policy of Canada", op. cit., p. 195.
Peter Dobell maintains that Canadian acceptability for peacekeeping was "because of, rather than in spite of, its NATO membership although trust and respect beyond the Alliance have also been important."
P. Dobell: "Dangers of Remodelling the UN's Security Function", International Perspectives, July/August 1972, p. 8.
46. D. Gordon: "Canada as Peacekeeper", op. cit., pp. 67-70.

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47. Donald Masters argues that while Canadian foreign policy at the time was one of caution, outside forces such as the US, Great Britain, the UN and NATO tended to push Canada into action. He lists the ICC as a primary example. D. Masters: Canada and World Affairs, op. cit., pp. 80-85.
48. Quoted in R. Reford: Canada and Three Crises, op. cit., p. 88.
49. It is interesting that Mr. Pearson did not mention the concern for the Atlantic Alliance in a speech to the House of Commons on November 27, 1956 (SS 56/35). He cited as the Canadian motives the threat to world peace, the threat to Israeli sovereignty and the strain the conflict placed on the Commonwealth.
50. E.L.M. Burns: Between Arab and Israeli, p. 200.
51. H. Nicholas maintains that as no preparations were made in Europe in reaction to the threat to world security, neither the Warsaw Pact countries nor NATO saw the Anglo-French invasion as a threat to their vital interests. The US and the Soviet Union in fact, were "on the same side" in the Security Council debate. H.G. Nicholas: "An Appraisal", in Falk and Mendlovitz (eds): The Strategy of World Order V. 3 The United Nations, p. 541.
Tareq Ismael argues that Canada's interest in the Middle East problem per se was non-existent. The Canadian government held little interest in the early stages of the crisis and became active only when the actual invasion took place and the threat to the Commonwealth and NATO emerged. It was Canada's desire to solve the NATO and Commonwealth problems, Ismael says, not the Middle East problem. T. Ismael: "Canada and the Middle East", in Lyon and Ismael (eds): Canada and the Third World, pp. 246-250.
52. The US saw Canada as one of the few countries with the capability to send in proper troops quickly. Also, the UN Secretary-General, U Thant, was limited to small NATO countries and West European neutrals, due to the Treaty of Guarantee which stipulated that

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52. Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and the UK must all agree to the size and composition of the peacekeeping force. J.K. Gordon: "The UN in Cyprus", International Journal, Summer 1964, p. 338
53. Taylor, Cox and Granatstein: Peacekeeping, op. cit., pp. 171-2.
54. Ibid., p. 57. Alastair Taylor's observations on this subject have lead him to conclude that "when ideological tensions are greatest, as during the Stalinist post-war period, international political behavior closely approximates [the concept of superpower-client relationships in a bi-polar system]. But as the Cold War unfreezes, centrifugal forces reassert themselves, with the result that alliances become unstuck as clients seek greater independence." (p. 21) The implication for peacekeeping is that as ideological rigidities relax, organizations such as the UN are able to seize more opportunities to assume responsibilities for international peace and security.
55. P. Lyon: The Policy Question, op. cit., p. 51.
56. At the UN General Assembly, Pearson said of the new force (UNEF) he was creating: "The organization of a force from other than the members of the Security Council is bound to be a task of great complexity and difficulty. We are breaking new ground, we are pioneering for peace." (SS 56/32, November 7, 1956).
57. This presumption is substantiated by General Burns who said his personal acquaintance with President Nasser greatly influenced Nasser's lack of objection to him.
58. E.L.M. Burns: Between Arab and Israeli, op. cit., pp. 200-1. He writes that he only learned of the ironic choice of the Queens Own Rifle Regiment later on.
59. Indian representatives have generally been given credit for convincing Nasser to accept a Canadian contingent. See: Munro and Inglis: Mike V. 2, op. cit., pp. 302, and Taylor, Cox and Granatstein: Peacekeeping, op. cit., p. 130.

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60. Quoted in: T. Lloyd: Canada in World Affairs,
op. cit., p. 283.
61. J. Minifie: Peacemaker or Powder Monkey: Canada's
Role in a Revolutionary World, p. 72
62. R. Preston: Canada in World Affairs, op. cit., p. 18.
63. P. Martin: SS 67/5, Speech at Michigan State
University, East Lansing, Michigan, February 25, 1967,
64. Ibid. Martin places in the "wider context" disarmament
negotiations and the formulation of peacekeeping
guidelines.
65. That is, in the sense of direct participation, although
the UK participates in UNFICYP.
66. P. Martin: SS 64/20, op. cit. Peacekeeping was
"distinctly Canadian" agreed the 1964 Peacekeeping
Conference held in Ottawa: Taylor, Cox and
Granatstein: Peacekeeping, op. cit., p. 91. "What
Canada has to offer marginally in Europe, it could
offer decisively" through peacekeeping, says Leonard
Beaton: "The Canadian White Paper on Defence",
op. cit., p. 368. "Canada was prominent in peacekeeping
to a degree impossible to attain in any other field
of military endeavor.": Colin Gray: Canadian Defence
Priorities: A Question of Relevance, p. 106.
67. P. Martin: SS 67/12, Speech at Columbia University,
April 26, 1967. Participation in peacekeeping to
express independence of the United States is not
peculiar to Canada. M. Sørensen and N. Haagerub
point out that this is the very reason why Denmark
participates in UN peacekeeping. In Sørensen and
Haagerub: Denmark and the United Nations, p. 60.
68. Speech by P. Martin in Toronto, February 18, 1965.
Quoted in A. Blanchette (ed): Canadian Foreign Policy
1955-1965: Selected Speeches and Documents, p. 314.

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69. P. Martin: SS 67/13, Speech at Columbia University, April 27, 1967.
70. NATO and NORAD were higher priorities simply due to their ongoing nature, while peacekeeping was ad hoc at best. The 1964 White Paper in fact, denotes the Atlantic Alliance as Canada's major defence activity outside Canada: "It is impossible to state in categorical terms exactly where and how our forces will be required and allocated in the decades ahead. However, our major defence contribution for some time will continue to be participation in collective defence arrangements, mainly the North Atlantic Treaty Organization." White Paper on Defence, op. cit., p. 21
71. Mr. Pearson's view of a distinctive foreign policy however, was not necessarily identical with an independent foreign policy. Foreign policy, he said in 1957, "Must be Canadian, based on Canadian values and interests... and not necessarily an independent policy." Mr. Pearson equates independence in the sense used here with the isolation of the inter-war period. L. Pearson: SS 57/2, Speech to House of Commons, January 14, 1957.
72. Toronto Globe and Mail, July 14, 1960.
73. Ibid., July 20, 1960.
74. House of Commons: "Special Studies Prepared for the Special Committee of the House of Commons on Matter Relating to Defense", Supplement, 1964-65, Ch. 5.
75. For example: L. Pearson: "The Force of the United Nations", Foreign Affairs, April 1957; and "A New Kind of Peace Force", MacLeans, May 2, 1964.
76. Taylor, Cox and Granatstein: Peacekeeping, op. cit., p. 61. See also: J. McLin: Canada's Changing Defense Policy 1957-1963: The Problems of a Middle Power in Alliance, for a review of the changing Canadian defense policy during these years.

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77. T. Ismael: "Canada and the Middle East", op. cit., p. 254.
78. According to A. Westall in the Toronto Globe and Mail, May 29, 1967.
79. Munro and Inglis: Mike V. 3, op. cit., p. 146.
80. P. Martin: SS 67/27, Speech to the Directors of the Canadian National Exhibition, Toronto, August 26, 1967.
81. As Granatstein has proposed. Taylor, Cox and Granatstein: Peacekeeping, op. cit., p. 183. The Globe and Mail announced immediately after the expulsion that "there is no reason to believe Canada will not be acceptable as a peacekeeper in other areas... Our welcome will depend on... the extent to which we have an independent foreign policy." May 30, 1967.
82. J. Holmes: The Better Part of Valour, op. cit., p. 5.
83. H. Nicholas: "An Appraisal", op. cit., p. 541.
84. D. Masters: Canada in World Affairs, op. cit., p. 215.
85. T. Lloyd: Canada in World Affairs, op. cit., p. 241. Terence Keenleyside prefers interpreting the public demand as an "elite public opinion in Canada which was broadly supportive of an activist outward-looking foreign policy." Letter to the Author, May 26, 1978.
86. G. Stevenson: "For a Real Review", op. cit., p. 8. The pragmatic side of Canadian foreign policy, he writes, tends to focus on the reality of Canadian-American relations.
87. J. Holmes: The Better Part of Valour, op. cit., p. 73.
88. Quoted in P. Dobell: Canada's Search for New Roles, p. 145.
89. For example, peacekeeping was promoted in the media as being a "crusade" and a "noble cause" for Canada. Toronto Globe and Mail, July 22, 1960.

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90. J. Holmes: "Is There a Future for Middlepowermanship?", op. cit., p. 14.
91. P. Lyon: The Policy Question, op. cit., pp. 41-2. Lloyd reflected the circular affect of the public demand for visibility and the Diefenbaker government's promotion of it: "The willingness to make bold speeches fitted the desire of Canadians to see their country play a larger role on the international scene, and so the domestic response probably encouraged the new approach." Canada in World Affairs, op. cit., p. 11.
92. B. Thordarson: Telephone Interview, May 1, 1978. The same position is maintained by: T. Keenleyside: Letter to the Author, May 26, 1978; A. Smith: Interview, April 19, 1978 and T. Lloyd: Canada in World Affairs, op. cit., p. 5: "While Canada's prestige lasted it gave Canadians the satisfaction of belonging to a country that was playing an important part in the world. The subsequent decline in international influence may have cost the country no more than a loss of a sense of psychological exhilaration."
93. Toronto Globe and Mail, July 20, 1960. There were other reasons however, for the delay in the Canadian announcement to send troops, such as the confusion as to what kind of troops were needed and their availability. R. Preston: Canada in World Affairs, op. cit., p. 266.
94. "It is a tribute to the Canadian people: it is a recognition of the growing prestige of Canada: it is a realization of the fact that Canada seeks peace without any ambitions for territorial expansion or selfish domination of other peoples." S. Smith: SS 58/7, Speech to Churchman's Seminar, Ottawa, February 12, 1958.
95. H. Green: SS 59/43; Speech to Empire and Canadian Clubs, Toronto, December 26, 1959.
96. G. Stevenson: "For a Real Review", op. cit., p. 16.

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97. P. Lyon: Interview, April 20, 1978. *
98. J. Holmes: The Better Part of Valour, op. cit., p. 73.
Charles Taylor, in stronger terms, has written that
the pursuit of peacekeeping serves only to "bolster
our own self-righteous image." Snow Job: Canada,
The United States and the Vietnam War 1954 to 1973,
p. 192.
99. D. Cox: "Canada as Peacekeeper", op. cit., p. 195.
100. B. Thordarson: Interview, May 1, 1978. General Burns
maintains that no responsible Canadian in
government or the military would maintain that
peacekeeping is done to promote a Canadian image.
But he admits that Paul Martin was an exception.
Martin may also have been concerned with the
promotion of a Canadian role as a great peacekeeping
nation and himself as the one who was making it work.
E.L.M. Burns: Interview, April 21, 1978.
101. L. Fabian: "Towards a Peacekeeping Renaissance",
International Organization, Winter 1976, p. 159.
102. P. Lyon: Interview, April 19, 1978 and A. Smith:
Interview: April 19, 1978.
103. House of Commons: Debates, 27th Parliament, May 19, 1967,
V. VI, p. 418.
104. Toronto Globe and Mail, May 22, 1967.
Peyton Lyon recalls that being singled out by Egypt
was not widely publicized outside Canada. This tends
to reinforce the position that Canada's self-image
was damaged more seriously than Canada's international
image. Lyon: Interview, April 19, 1978.
105. L. St. Laurent: Speeches to the House of Commons,
April 1948 and to the UN General Assembly, January
1946. Quoted in: R.A. MacKay (ed): Canadian Foreign
Policy 1954-1964, op. cit., pp. 98, 133.

CHAPTER THREE

THE CHANGED PERCEPTION OF PEACEKEEPING AND THE FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW

INTRODUCTION

Foreign Policy for Canadians, the result of the most extensive review of Canada's foreign policy ever undertaken, seemed to indicate that a major revision was taking place.

The new government of Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau appeared to be withdrawing the country into a "new isolationism"¹, focussing foreign policy on Canada's national interests and turning away from the "Pearsonian internationalism" of the past.² "Canada," the Review stated, "...must act according to how it perceives its aims and interests. External activities should be directly related to national policies pursued within Canada, and serve the same objectives.... Foreign policy is the extension abroad of national policies."³

The Review outlined the government's basic national aims:

that Canada will continue secure as an independent political entity; that Canada and all Canadians will enjoy enlarging prosperity in the widest possible sense; and that all Canadians will see in the life they have and the contribution they

make to humanity something worthwhile
preserving in identity and purpose.⁴

The six policy themes were then outlined which "broadly speaking, the totality of Canada's national policy seeks [to do]."⁵ The new priorities for the seventies, the Foreign Policy Review maintained, "should be based on a ranking of the six policy themes which gives highest priorities to Economic Growth, Social Justice and Quality of Life policies."⁶

Although the Foreign Policy Review sustained Canada's commitment to the principle of peacekeeping, it was clear that the government of Prime Minister Trudeau wanted to approach participation in specific operations with greater caution than had been exercised by the previous Liberal government. The "demotion" of peacekeeping was inferred from the demotion of the peace and security theme to a second tier in Foreign Policy for Canadians. The more cautious approach derived from the government's hesitancy to base policy "on the assumption that Canada can be cast as a 'helpful fixer' in international affairs";⁷ Canadians should not

assume that this kind of active role in all areas of international relations will be beneficial, desired or even welcome.

Foreign Policy for Canadians indicated that Canada's response to future peacekeeping requests would be decided upon "in each instance in the light of the government's assessment of whether the UN can play a useful role."⁸ The subsequent Defence White Paper of 1971 similarly stated that the government would consider future peacekeeping participation only if "the operation holds the promise of success and Canada can play a useful role in it."⁹

What were the reasons for the apparent "demotion" of peacekeeping in Canadian foreign policy and the more cautious approach towards participation in it? A subsequent question is: In what way are the reasons for a change in policy emphasis related to the motives for participation in peacekeeping examined in the previous chapter? If such a relationship can be established, it might then be predicted that the motives for participation in peacekeeping of the Trudeau government are different from previous Canadian governments. It might otherwise be

postulated, that, in spite of the "shift towards a more nationalist, self-centred approach to world affairs"¹⁰ that was inferred from the Foreign Policy Review, the policies of the Trudeau government regarding peacekeeping have remained much the same as previous Canadian governments.

To examine the reasons for the changes in emphasis of the peacekeeping policy, the subject is subdivided into two general areas. The two areas observe essentially the same phenomena, but from different points of view: first is the alteration of the attitude towards peacekeeping within the international context. The long debate in the United Nations had reached a stand-off and peacekeeping seemed to have lost favour internationally. Second, from the point of view of the Canadian leadership, there was a growing reticence to participate in peacekeeping due to past problems and failures which had been experienced. In addition, Mr. Trudeau's personal philosophy, which had the strongest influence on the outcome of the Foreign Policy Review as a whole¹¹, was very dissimilar to those of previous Prime Ministers and hence Trudeau's perception of the "Canadian peacekeeping role", for example, was very different.

INTERNATIONAL DISILLUSIONMENT

"International institutions which had been the focus of much of Canada's policy were troubled by internal divergences and by criticism about their continuing relevance in new world situations."¹² This statement, made in Foreign Policy for Canadians, attempts to summarize the United Nations' difficulty in remaining involved in the maintenance of international peace and security, as it was increasingly unable to deal with the problems of war and peace in the world. The Organization, during the 1960's, was suffering through a crisis of confidence, a decline in credibility and creeping irrelevance as it was "increasingly being bypassed by its members as they confronted the central problems of the time."¹³

The problems of the United Nations, insofar as peacekeeping is concerned, date back to 1956 and the establishment of UNEF. Although the United States and the Soviet Union concurred that a force authorized by the General Assembly would be better than no peacekeeping force at all¹⁴, the Soviets considered UNEF to be illegal because it was not established by the Security Council, and therefore refused to support it financially.¹⁵

The long and frustrating debates over peacekeeping authorization and finances were compounded by the establishment of the UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC). By 1961, the costs incurred by UNEF and ONUC combined were \$140 million - almost twice the amount of the entire UN regular budget.¹⁶ Tensions nearly reached a breaking point in 1962. In that year, the General Assembly passed a Canadian resolution to have the International Court of Justice give an advisory ruling on the applicability of Article 19 of the Charter to peacekeeping arrears.¹⁷ The Court's advice ruled in favour of applying the sanctions called for under that Article. The ruling, although recognized as not legally binding, served to create an impasse, and the parties on all sides hardened their attitudes which made compromise that much more difficult to achieve.¹⁸

By January 1964, the Soviet Union had accumulated the stipulated two-years arrears and France came into the same category in January 1965. To avoid the alienation of the Soviet Union and its possible secession from the United Nations General Assembly, that body, in February 1965, organized a Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations - the Committee of 33 - to undertake "a comprehensive review

of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects, including ways of overcoming the present financial difficulties of the Organization."¹⁹ In September of the same year, the General Assembly agreed that the loss-of-vote sanction should not be applied and that the financial difficulties of the Organization should be solved through voluntary contributions by member states.²⁰ This method, used for financing the UN force in Cyprus, has run into many difficulties as well, primarily because of the few number of nations who actually contribute to the voluntary fund.

The peak of international disillusionment occurred in 1967 when UNEF was expelled from Egypt. The decline in UN confidence was particularly notable in the United States.

[United Nations-United States] relations turned sour during the Article 19 crisis and became increasingly abrasive during the late Johnson years over... the UN role in the Arab-Israeli crisis.... The Secretary-General's abrupt withdrawal of UNEF and the pro-Arab bias of certain UN resolutions alienated opinion in the Administration, Congress and the public.²¹

The role of the United Nations in official and public opinion had been greatly reduced by the pre-occupation of the American government with the Vietnam War and domestic

problems, and resulted in the Nixon Administration's emphasis on "damage limitation" rather than "institution building".²² Since peacekeeping could not function without the active moral and financial support of the United States, it is not surprising that other Western countries similarly grew cynical about the capability of the United Nations to keep the peace.

The cynicism of the United States also grew out of the inability of the Committee of 33 to achieve progress on peacekeeping guidelines. The Committee remained deadlocked until 1968 when a smaller working group was formed by the four major powers and four smaller powers - France, United Kingdom, United States, Soviet Union, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Mexico and Egypt. In order to circumvent some of the major problems of authorization, control and financing of peacekeeping operations, the working group undertook to consider first only military observer missions authorized by the Security Council.²³

By the end of 1969, some agreement had been reached by the working group, but the deadlock persisted over the key issues of the roles of the Security Council and the Secretary-General, the day-to-day role of the Secretary-General and

the Military Staff Committee, and financial arrangements.

The General Assembly, by 1972, had assumed an attitude of forbearance on the peacekeeping guidelines issue. The debate centred around not only political and legal problems of finances but on the basic interpretations of the UN Charter itself.²⁴ Because no pressing need for a new peacekeeping force had arisen, there was no desire to precipitate a direct American-Soviet confrontation on the issue. The members of the General Assembly, therefore, made no demands for progress on the guidelines debate. As a result, the issue indicated strong signs of paralysis and the international scepticism was such that there was much doubt whether a cure could be found for it.²⁵

While the debate over peacekeeping ground on between East and West, the process of decolonization continued and the nationalism of the new states developed and grew. The Third World countries were beginning to perceive peacekeeping as no longer aiding in the decolonization process, but as "neo-colonialist" and increasingly maintaining the international status quo rather than aiding in its change.²⁶

The major factor contributing to Third World opinion was the growing shift of peacekeeping authority from the General Assembly towards the Security Council, as well as the growing tendency of the Americans and the Soviets to act unilaterally, without fear of the other's intervention. The era of detente, which "unofficially" began after the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, had created an atmosphere in which both the Americans and the Soviets see advantages in ensuring that no other country reaches "superpower" status. The 1963 Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty were two major steps contributing to the consolidation of American and Soviet supremacy in the nuclear weapons field.²⁷

The process of detente has also led to American co-operation in allowing the Soviet Union to have greater input into the business of peacekeeping. Not only does this co-operation moderate the Soviet pressure for Security Council supremacy in peacekeeping, but it also allays the Soviet Union's opposition to peacekeeping's tendency to support the status quo. For example, while the Soviet Union became hostile over the actions of the Secretary-General and the exclusion of Soviet participation in the peacekeeping forces in the Congo, and the Middle East, it raises no objection to the Cyprus force where Soviet

participation is also excluded, because the force remains under the authority of the Security Council.²⁸

The co-operation on the part of the United States was due also to the growing unwieldiness of the General Assembly. The growth of the Third World and the tendency of those countries to oppose the "Western" position and American-backed proposals and initiatives, especially over the Middle East issue, has compelled the US to turn away from the General Assembly in considering issues dealing with peace and security.

Linked to the growing detente between the superpowers is their tacit consensus not to raise objections to unilateral "police actions" in their respective areas of influence. The lack of direct Soviet involvement in Vietnam, unilateral American intervention in the Dominican Republic and similar Soviet action in Czechoslovakia, increased the pessimism of other nations, especially those in the Third World, regarding the ability of the UN General Assembly to protect their interests as opposed to the interests of the superpowers. The general result was a loss in the credibility of the UN to deal with peace and security functions as outlined in the Charter.²⁹

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The problems that have beset individual operations have been an additional ailment in the conduct of peacekeeping. Although minor compared to the greater problems discussed above, disillusionment on the part of the contributing countries was emphasized by technical, logistic and other day-to-day difficulties experienced in the field. UNEF was accepted reluctantly by the Arabs and not at all by Israel, and the lack of freedom of movement plagued the operation throughout its lifetime. The quagmire of ONUC stemmed basically from a lack of political direction - attempted neutrality forced to take "aggressive offensive action to be able to continue with its mission."³⁰ UNFICYP was barely preserving peace in Cyprus, due greatly to its lack of manpower in relation to the breadth of the conflict.³¹

Many of these problems were created by the larger problems of authorization, control and finance of the missions, but the "ad hoc-ness" of the entire peacekeeping concept seems to have made even minor difficulties inevitable. Nevertheless, they were further problems which compounded the already complex and intractable issue.

CANADIAN DISILLUSIONMENT

The doubts and disillusionment about international peacekeeping felt in the United Nations and in other parts of the world were also felt in Canada. Canadian feelings were thus affected on two counts because of the emphasis on peacekeeping in the making of Canadian foreign and defense policy:

The discrepancy between a defence policy geared for UN service and a UN which has put peacekeeping low on a list of priorities may well be a source of disillusionment. Already one suspects, the awareness that in large measure, Canada is powerless to influence UN actions must have given Canadian decision-makers some sober thoughts about the emphasis they should place on peacekeeping in their external policies.³²

Canada's commitment to peacekeeping during the 1960's, when compared to international attitudes towards peacekeeping, had become "excessive in relation to the probable demand."³³ Canada's preparations for peacekeeping duty were lavish in contrast to past experience in participation. Canadian combat troops, for instance, which are on stand-by for UN duty, have been used in only one peacekeeping operation, in Cyprus. All others have been specialized personnel or officers for observation purposes.

Canada's over-commitment led to the commitment of Canada's prestige in playing the peacekeeping role.³⁴ Paul Martin's "compulsive habit of taking a stand, of rendering judgement and of assuming some kind of role on all conceivable international issues,"³⁵ combined with the self-image of mediator and peacekeeper, led to the destruction of that very role.³⁶ The destruction exposed the myth concerning the Canadian peacekeeping role. It became clear after 1967 that the rationale for playing the peacekeeping role had rested on false assumptions and Canada's success at playing the role was dependent upon very special circumstances.³⁷

The capability to play the mediator role as Canada had successfully done in 1950's and to a lesser extent in the 1960's, was to a great degree, also due to the Canadian "innocence" in international affairs. But during the 1960's, "in no time at all, [Canada] became one of the world's older nations... The appeal of youth and chastity which a new country enjoys is a waning asset. As it lurches through a decade of active diplomacy, even a lesser power steps on toes and injures feelings."³⁸

During the 1950's and 1960's, Canada's domestic

environment also underwent extensive changes. The growth of massive social, cultural and economic programs caused an expansion of the decision-making community in domestic as well as foreign policy. The result was "the development of a domestic environment for Canadian foreign policy decision-making far more complex than the one which decision-makers were accustomed to in the 1950's."³⁹

Canadian leaders are now forced to expend greater effort to defend themselves in the face of increased domestic pressures.

It follows that in the attempt to rationalize existing policies in order to satisfy or overcome these pressures, political leaders would redefine the basis of their policies so as to closer identify them with the existing public attitudes. Of course, errors in judgement on the part of government may alter policies where no alteration was necessary to placate domestic demands. One such error was the demotion of the peace and security theme made in the 1970 foreign policy White Paper. Many observers questioned the rationale given in the Foreign Policy Review for the alterations in foreign policy priorities.⁴⁰ The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence concluded in its report to the House concerning the foreign

policy papers that: "peace and security should be accorded 'a high priority, equal and not subordinate to economic growth'".⁴¹

It is evident that the government's increased emphasis on socio-economic issues does correspond to an increasing public concern for these issues, especially vis-à-vis the United States. As far as peacekeeping is concerned, however, there was no discernable public pressure to alter Canadian peacekeeping policy. There may have been a public desire to approach participation in peacekeeping more cautiously than in the past, but there did not seem to be any inclination to change existing peacekeeping policies in any substantive way. Gallup polls in 1970, in fact, indicate continued strong public support for the establishment of a United Nations peacekeeping army - presumably with Canadian participation in it.⁴²

It must be concluded, therefore, that there was little apparent disillusionment on the part of the Canadian public with Canada's peacekeeping policy or with peacekeeping in general. The impact of Canada's peacekeeping experiences did, however, have a rather large impact on the individuals

involved in their day-to-day operation. The International Control Commissions in Indochina are most illustrative of this.

The ICC itself had four basic short-comings.⁴³ The mandate was too large and it was misinterpreted by its critics as being more than simple "observation"; there was no continuing political authority which would act on the reports that were submitted; there was an extreme lack of co-operation between the parties to the Geneva agreement and the members of the Commissions; and finally, no agreement was ever made on how to end the hostilities. In sum, the realities of Vietnam defeated the ICC: the irresistible force of the Communist determination was pitted against the immovable opposition of the South Vietnamese to any union of the Vietnams. As a result, "each party did everything possible to strengthen its own position and to ensure against the day when the agreement might break down."⁴⁴

Complicating the already formidable factors confronting the ICC were the problems the Commissions faced among its members. While the Canadians viewed their participation as objective members of the international community and opposed the "troika" principle of bloc representation, the

other members, Poland and India, tended to be biased: Poland supported North Vietnam and India waffled, not taking a stand of any kind. Canada was therefore forced to argue the case of the South Vietnamese and the Americans in order to try and keep the Commissions relatively even keeled. The rule of unanimity and the inability of all three contributors to reach consensus on its reports, prevented any action that might have been taken even if the political authority to which the reports were sent (that is, the Geneva Convention) was able to take action.⁴⁵

The ICC experience had considerable negative impact upon the members of the Department of External Affairs. Over the more than a decade and a half that the ICC was in existence, scores of Canadian diplomats had been posted to Indochina. An attitude of extreme sadness and frustration had developed in External Affairs over the futility of the ICC and the Department was

virtually unanimous in opposing a new Canadian involvement on almost any terms. Still proud of their performance under almost impossible conditions and still largely unrepentant of their hard-line views, they were determined that Canada should not suffer further humiliation at the hands of Communists and weak-willed neutralists.⁴⁶

The Canadian military was also disappointed with the ICC experience, but was better able to cope with the failure because it viewed the Commissions in a more narrow, technical way. The political failures of the ICC were separated from its relative success as a purely military operation, given the extreme difficulties encountered along the way. The more narrow, and to some extent, more positive outlook, left military officials much less hesitant to return to Indochina than the officials in the Department of External Affairs.⁴⁷

Despite the imbroglio into which ICC deteriorated, the Canadian government refrained from withdrawing. The reasons were two-fold. First, Canadian leaders were concerned that by withdrawing, Canada would appear to be responsible for an escalation of hostilities in Indochina.⁴⁸ Second, Canadian leaders continued to see value in Canada's role as a member of the ICC in that it enabled Canadians to act as intermediaries, and to a certain extent, interpreters, between the North Vietnamese and the Americans. During 1964 and 1965, for example, the Canadian Commissioner carried a total of five messages to Hanoi from the United States government. Between 1964 and 1968, the Canadian government attempted to use the Commission as a vehicle for

bringing all the parties closer together in order to convince them to allow the Commission to carry out its mandate. The responses to these initiatives, however, were unenthusiastic.⁴⁹

The final breakdown of the ICC came in 1972, during the Trudeau administration, when the Indian government recognized the government of North Vietnam. As a result, the Indian contingent was ordered to leave South Vietnam. The confusion and lack of mutual confidence among all the members of the Commission was now such that it was impossible to function.

The reorganization of the Canadian Armed Forces, begun in 1964, was an attempt to rationalize the difficulty of performing a variety of military roles within a limited budget. The flexibility and mobility of this "new look of unification"⁵⁰ were to enable the two Canadian-based brigades to be equally trained and equipped for NATO or United Nations duty. The European theatre, however, requires combat mobility, not tactical redeployment or multitasking mobility that UN forces need. By 1968, the airlift capability available for the forces stationed in Canada was adequate for the kind of deployment and mobility that

peacekeeping required but insufficient for a mobile NATO force.⁵¹

It was clear to the new government leadership that the restrictions placed on the breadth of the Canadian military commitments, caused by Canada's limited resources, necessitated further changes in order to make all of Canada's military efforts worthwhile. It is significant that the (brunt) of the results of this re-evaluation fell on that aspect of Canada's military commitment which had been given a higher priority than peacekeeping; that is, the NATO cuts that were announced by Prime Minister Trudeau in 1969.⁵² Peacekeeping capability was left unmolested by the Review.

A year before the announcement by Prime Minister Trudeau of his intention to undertake the foreign policy review, the Pearson government had undertaken a similar review, although it was limited to the Department of External Affairs. The "Robertson Review" concluded that "an unrealistic public faith in peacekeeping had resulted in an 'aberration' in Canada's attitudes towards such activities."⁵³ This review, however, recommended no changes in existing Canadian peacekeeping policy. But

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while the Pearson government saw no need to alter Canada's peacekeeping policies, the attitudes towards peacekeeping generally of the then Canadian leadership had undergone significant changes. By 1967, even Mr. Martin was predicting that:

The Canadian government will be bound to give more searching examinations to requests for assistance if it is not satisfied that the mandate provides sufficient guidelines for the conduct of troops on the ground.... If in Canada's judgement, the peacekeeping role is not consistent with the Canadian conception of a just settlement or national interests, we should not hesitate to decline or terminate Canadian participation.⁵⁴

There is no doubt that Pierre Trudeau had the greatest impact on the final results of Foreign Policy for Canadians. This is because the Prime Minister, "far more than most Western leaders, came to power with a coherent and painstakingly developed political philosophy... He... operates not by instinct or improvisation, but by a constant reference to an elaborate philosophical framework."⁵⁵ It was this framework upon which Foreign Policy for Canadians was based.

Mr. Trudeau's perception of Canada's most immediate problem was that of national unity. Although he is not a

"nationalist", Trudeau's view of the nation-state and sovereignty emanate from an internal point of view - national sovereignty was threatened not so much by external threats, but by the possibility of severe civil disorder, caused in part, by the lack of national unity. However, national unity was also the major preoccupation of former Prime Ministers, including Mr. Pearson and Mr. Diefenbaker.⁵⁶ The difference is that Pierre Trudeau believes foreign and domestic policy should issue from the same source - foreign policy is the extension abroad of national policies. Previous Canadian Prime Ministers conceived a basic separation between national and international policies.⁵⁷

The contrasting styles of Prime Minister Trudeau and his predecessors also reflect the differences in political philosophies. Mr. Trudeau's conception that members of the Department of External Affairs had talents badly needed in the domestic sector of government has resulted in a large number of foreign service being transferred to senior positions in other departments.⁵⁸ These transfers, the inception of the Policy Analysis Group (PAG) and the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS), along with the Prime Minister's more collegial method of Cabinet

scrutiny, indicate his belief that domestic policy should be fully integrated with the formation of foreign policy.

Prime Minister Trudeau's conception of functionalism - the "pragmatic willingness to tackle each problem on its own merits, without reference to dogma or ideology",⁵⁹ clearly reveals his point of view concerning "role" and "role playing". Mr. Trudeau saw no "special role" for Canada in international affairs as did External Affairs Minister Martin during the early and mid-1960's.⁶⁰ Even though Mr. Martin seemed to have changed his opinion somewhat by 1967,⁶¹ he still believed that Canada should pledge automatic commitment to peacekeeping, despite the difficulties associated with it.⁶²

It was Mr. Trudeau's belief that a careful scrutiny of an issue must be made before declaring what Canadian policy will be and what role Canada intends (or is able) to play in that issue. Mr. Martin, on the contrary, tended to assume that the role of peacekeeper, and to a lesser extent, mediator, would be automatic; the way and the extent to which the issue affected Canada and Canadian interests were calculated in relation to the role.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

In the final analysis, the main aims of Foreign Policy for Canadians were to place foreign policy in a conceptual framework consistent with the political philosophy of the new Prime Minister, to give the public a better understanding of the underlying rationale of foreign policy decision-making and to indicate the future trends which the government predicted for the 1970's.

The usefulness of peacekeeping, on the whole, continued to be recognized by the international community generally, although there was considerable cynicism regarding its future. Canada too recognized the importance of the peacekeeping principle as is evident from the support for peacekeeping in both the foreign and defence policy White Papers.

A more cautious attitude towards specific peacekeeping operations was developing within Canada before Mr. Trudeau ordered the Foreign Policy Review. Even Paul Martin was beginning to realize that the Canadian government may have become too eager. Many of the changes that did result regarding peacekeeping policy were a result of evolution and almost certainly would have occurred anyway, even if

Mr. Pearson himself had remained in office and had the review never been held.

The tone and conceptual framework of Foreign Policy for Canadians was provided by the political philosophy of Prime Minister Trudeau, but the policies and policy changes were the result of the transformations in the external environment and a change in attitudes in the domestic environment. The domestic changes occurred almost entirely within the leadership and the bureaucracy. The public attitude towards peacekeeping did not alter substantially - peacekeeping and the peacekeeping role remained popular activities. Even the Vietnam experience, although American involvement was strongly opposed, solicited no alterations in existing policy. The public, in fact, supported a return to Vietnam in 1972.⁶³ This seems to be because the Canadian public continued to view peacekeeping as an altruistic pursuit rather than an activity which affected, and was affected by, more narrow interests.⁶⁴

The subsequent "conditions" for participation in future peacekeeping operations that were outlined by the Trudeau government were based upon the inadequacies of the

past Canadian experiences. The conditions for Canadian participation in the ICCS, outlined by External Affairs Minister Sharp, reflected the problems of the old ICC:⁶⁵

1. All parties in the conflict must be party to the new agreement. Neither the US nor South Vietnam were parties to the 1954 accord.
2. There must be a continuing political authority to report to and to assume responsibility for a peace settlement. This was one of the major items missing in the Geneva Agreement of 1954.
3. All parties must agree to Canadian participation. This was to assure the image of impartiality and not to imply a "troika" style Commission.

Participation in UNEF II was based on six conditions related to the past Canadian experience in the first UNEF and other UN operations, and to some extent, the ICCS as well:⁶⁶

1. There must be a threat to international peace and security. This "condition" has been present in all past peacekeeping operations.
2. There must be a reasonable expectation of a political settlement. This reflects the problems associated with "open ended" mandates and the problems of peacekeeping's perpetuation of the status quo.
3. The force will be responsible to a political authority. (i.e. the Security Council). This was one of the failures of both UNEF I and the ICCS.

4. The parties to the conflict must accept all the force members. This is to ensure impartiality and prevent a repeat of the 1967 experience where Canada was expelled from Egypt.
5. There must be freedom of movement for the force and a clear mandate. This was a major source of difficulty for the UNEF throughout its lifetime.
6. There must be acceptable and reasonable financial arrangements. Finances were the perennial problem of all major UN peacekeeping operations.

The government did not intend to change the foreign policy of Canada as much as to "eradicate what [was] regarded as the 'romantic' view of Canada's international role."⁶⁷ The "romantic" view of peacekeeping implied that participation produced an enhanced reputation in global affairs because peacekeeping was a "noble" pursuit. The many failures and frustrations that were experienced in peacekeeping led to the obvious conclusion that: "The work of peacekeeping is not glamorous. It is costly. It is frustrating. It does not inspire gratitude..."⁶⁸

The only change in peacekeeping policy that related to the motives for participating in peacekeeping was that concerning the pursuit of influence and role-playing. The Canadian government would no longer participate in

order to "pursue the role":

Roles and influence may result from pursuing certain policy objectives- and these spin-off can be of solid value to international relations - but they should not be made the aims of policy. To be liked and to be regarded as good fellows are not ends in themselves; they are a reflection of but not a substitute for policy. 69

This alteration was a combination of two things: first, was the Prime Minister's conception of functionalism and the resulting degree to which Canadian power and influence could be wielded in international affairs. Second was the fact that peacekeeping no longer enhanced prestige and influence - in fact, the opposite case was true. The government did not wish, therefore, to participate in peacekeeping under these circumstances.

In the final analysis, the Foreign Policy Review asked: "Why should Canada peacekeep?" The answer was that Canada should peacekeep if it is in the national interest to do so. The national aims and the policy themes were the closest approximation that could be made to encompass the entirety of Canada's international relations and it was concluded that peacekeeping was indeed in the national interest. The Review outlined the motives in principle for

future Canadian participation in peacekeeping. But only the subsequent outputs of Prime Minister Trudeau's foreign policy and the specific circumstances surrounding individual peacekeeping operations, can reveal the entire motivational-mix.

NOTES

1. J. Granatstein: "Canada and Peacekeeping: Image and Reality", Canadian Forum, August 1974, p. 16.
2. "... the main purpose of the papers was to rationalize the marked shift in emphasis... a shift towards a more nationalist self-centred approach to world affairs." P. Lyon: "The Trudeau Doctrine", International Journal, Winter 1970-71, p. 20.
3. Canada: Department of External Affairs: Foreign Policy for Canadians (FPC), pp. 8-9.
4. Ibid., p. 10.
5. Ibid., p. 14. The themes are: foster economic growth; safeguard sovereignty and independence; work for peace and security; promote social justice; enhance the quality of life; ensure a harmonious natural environment.
6. Ibid., p. 39.
7. Ibid., p. 8.
8. Canada: Department of External Affairs: United Nations Foreign Policy for Canadians (UNFPC), p. 17.
9. Canada: Department of National Defence: Defence in the 70's, p. 40.
10. Lyon: "The Trudeau Doctrine", op. cit., p. 20
11. According to Bruce Thordarson: "The Canadian Foreign Policy Review 1968-1970: A Study of Foreign Policy-Making in the Trudeau Administration", MA Thesis, Carleton University, Ottawa, 1971.
12. FPC, p. 7.
13. R. Gardner: "Can the UN Be Revived?", Foreign Affairs, July 1970, p. 660.

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14. This is supported by the fact that the Soviet Union did not oppose any of the General Assembly resolutions which concerned the establishment of the force. That is, UNGA Resolutions 997 to 1002 (1956) 1st Emergency Session, inclusive.
15. And also, writes E.L.M. Burns, because the Soviets were "left out" of UNEF's planning and implementation: "Looking back, one feels that perhaps the Soviets have some grounds for their hostility to the UNEF and Congo forces, in which neither they nor their allies were allowed to participate, or to have any real voice in the direction." "Problems and Prospects for Peacekeeping Forces", in: I. Head: This Fireproof House, p. 63.
16. P. Lyon: Canada in World Affairs 1961-1963, p. 286. The deficit was calculated to be \$94 m. for the two forces - still higher than the UN budget of \$72 m.
17. Charter of the United Nations, Article 19: "A Member of the United Nations which is in arrears in the payment of its financial contributions to the Organization shall have no vote in the General Assembly if the amount of its arrears equals or exceeds the amount of the contributions due from it for the preceding two full years..."
18. Lyon: Canada in World Affairs, op. cit., p. 290. For a detailed explanation of the positions of the various countries, see: W. Barton: "Who Will Pay for Peace? The UN Crisis", Behind the Headlines, April 1965.
19. UNGA Resolution 2006 (XIX) February 18, 1965.
20. Canada: House of Commons: Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence (SCEAND): Proceedings, May 21, 1970, Issue No. 31, p. 10.
21. Gardner: "Can the UN Be Revived?", op. cit., p. 661.

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22. Ibid., p. 672. Garth Stevenson views the diminution of the UN's reputation and influence as deriving from a general malaise. The institution was experiencing many other problems besides those dealing with peace and security and peacekeeping. Three which he discusses are the structure and procedures of the Organization, economic development and multinational corporations. Stevenson admits that the American perception of the UN was more seriously damaged than that of Canada; the Canadian response being a "declining interest" rather than "outrage". "Canada and the United Nations", in: Hilmer and Stevenson: Foremost Nation, pp. 154-155.
23. UNGA Resolution 2451 (XXIII) December 19, 1968. The reason for the choice of only observer missions was that they were inexpensive in comparison to large UNEF-like operations and therefore led to less conflict over their financial arrangements. The range of authority of observer missions was considerably smaller than large missions which also precipitated less Security Council conflict. As John Gellner has put it: "they were still in the realm of the possible". "International Peacekeeping: Does it Have a Future?", International Perspectives, September/October 1973, p. 24.
24. M. Goldblatt: "The Long, Frustrating Quest for a Peacekeeping Formula", International Perspectives, July/August 1972, p. 14. "Until the present time, Henry Wiseman wrote in early 1972, 'the UN glove hid a limp fist as peacekeeping manifests moral, circumscribed legal and restricted use of military force', hence limiting peacekeeping's effectiveness in the first place. Political issues clash with basic principles, he writes, and the result is pessimism on all sides. 'Peacekeeping: Début or Dénouement?', Behind the Headlines, February 1972, pp. 1, 6.
25. Some peacekeeping supporters were not so sceptical after the failures of 1967 and the guidelines debate. Jack Granatstein remained extremely optimistic. Although the UNEF withdrawal has shaken the confidence in

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25. peacekeeping, he wrote, the need for it can only increase, "All Things To All Men: Triservice Unification" in: S. Clarkson: An Independent Foreign Policy for Canada?, p. 141.
26. Some supporters of this position point out that while white nations contributed to ONUC, no non-white nations contributed to UNFICYP. Wiseman: "Peacekeeping: Début or Dénouement?", op. cit., p. 3.
27. The Non Proliferation Treaty (1968) was also influential in completing the break between Moscow and Peking and also in contributing to the independent action on the part of the European powers to develop more friendly relations with the East bloc. André Fontaine: "From Cold War to Détente", International Perspectives, November/December, 1975, pp. 10-11.
28. H. Wiseman: "Peacekeeping: Debut or Denouement", op. cit., p. 3.
29. Similar positions are presented by John Warnock: Partner to Behemoth, p. 287; Wiseman: "Peacekeeping..." op. cit., p. 6; and J. Eayrs: "Future Roles for the Armed Forces of Canada", Behind the Headlines, April 1969, p. 8.
30. E.L.M. Burns: "The Problems and Prospects for Peacekeeping Forces", op. cit., p. 65.
31. Thompson and Swanson: Canadian Foreign Policy: Options and Perspectives, p. 88. For a detailed review of the technical problems of peacekeeping operations, see: R.J. Hill: "Command and Control Problems of UN and Similar Peacekeeping Forces", DND Operational Research Division Report # 68/R5, April 1968.
32. D. Cox: "Peacekeeping in Canadian Foreign Policy", in: Clarkson: op. cit., pp. 195-196.
33. J. Eayrs: "Future Roles for the Armed Forces of Canada", op. cit., p. 8.

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34. Ibid., p. 15.: "to become, as did Canada with UNEF and to a lesser extent UNFICYP, the critical contributor, is to invest the nation's prestige with the outcome of the operation."
35. H. von Riekhoff: "Recent Evaluation of Canadian Foreign Policy", Round Table, January 1972, p. 66.
36. "There is nothing more fatal for a country with a sense of pacificatory mission than to declare itself as a professional mediator." J. Holmes: "Is there a Future for Middlepowermanship?", p. 18.
"We can only maintain our fitness for mediating by bearing in mind that mediating is something that has to be requested, not offered, much less thrust upon contenders who have not asked for it." B. Fraser: "Mediator or Busybody", p. 12.
Both articles in: J.K. Gordon: Canada's Role as a Middle Power.
37. C. Gray: Canadian Defence Priorities: A Question of Relevance, p. 107. Also, Bruce Thordarson has written that: "The grandiose ambitions that had resulted from the 1956 Suez crisis... led to the myth that Canada could play a middle power role in acting as a world peacekeeper." Trudeau and Foreign Policy: A Study in Decision Making, p. 117.
38. J. Holmes: The Better Part of Valour, p. 14. By this statement, Holmes seems to imply that Canada's good reputation was based on the fact that Canada did not have enough experience in international affairs to develop a bad reputation.
39. D. Stairs: "Publics and Policy Makers", International Journal, Winter 1970-1971, p. 234.
40. Such as P. Lyon: "The Trudeau Doctrine", op. cit., pp. 19-43.
41. House of Commons: Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence: Fourth Report Concerning Foreign Policy for Canadians, June 1971, p. 5.

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42. "It has been suggested that the UN establish a peacekeeping army of 100,000 men. Do you approve?
Approve - 64% Disapprove - 21% Undecided - 15%
CIPO Data: Poll No. 344, November 1970.
43. See: P. Bridle: "Canada and the International Commissions in Indochina, 1954-1972", Behind the Headlines, October 1973, pp. 20-24.
44. Ibid., p. 12.
45. "It is the Canadian government's view that India and Poland consistently refused to allow the Commissions to perform their prime responsibilities..." Ibid., p. 25.
46. C. Taylor: Snow Job: Canada, the United States and the Vietnam War 1954-1973, p. 144.
47. Lt-Col. G.R. Harper: Interview, May 30, 1978.
48. Arnold Smith: Interview, April 19, 1978.
49. Bridle: "Canada and the International Commissions...", op. cit., pp. 18-19. Most notable of these initiatives were the "Ronning Missions" during 1966 which "brought offers of Canada's good offices as a means of initiating direct peace talks." (Note 23) These missions, however, came to naught. In proposing that Canada act as a go-between, there was no intention to actually mediate any peacetalks. The intention, says Bridle, was merely to start a dialogue between the contending parties.
50. J. McLin: Canada's Changing Defense Policy 1957-1963, p. 199, Note 26.
51. D. Cox: "Canadian Defence Policy", Behind the Headlines, November 1968, p. 31.
52. For a detailed examination of the NATO decision see: Thordarson: "The Canadian Foreign Policy Review", op. cit., Ch. 5.

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53. Quoted in Thordarson: Trudeau and Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. 27. The Robertson Review also admitted that objectivity in foreign policy - one of the basic criteria for acceptability in peacekeeping - was becoming more difficult to achieve on most issues. Munro and Inglis: Mike: The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson, V. II, p. 149.
54. P. Martin: Canada and the Quest for Peace, pp. 15, 31. Charles Taylor views these speeches as mere rhetoric, however. He maintains that Martin remained adamant regarding Canadian participation in peacekeeping, and on existing Canadian foreign policy generally: "For five years, Martin had kept firm control over foreign policy, refusing to make concessions to public opinion (especially over Vietnam) and resisting policy changes or reviews by younger Ministers such as Trudeau, and even, on occasion, by Pearson himself." Snow Job, op. cit., p. 140.
55. G. Radwansky: Trudeau, p. 119.
56. Mr. Pearson's "co-operative federalism"; Mike, op. cit., V. III, p. 239 and Mr. Diefenbaker's One Canada. Mr. Pearson's memoirs, while he was Prime Minister are, in fact, almost void of references to foreign policy outside of United States relations.
57. For example: "We shall never discharge our national responsibilities by ignoring our continental and international responsibilities, by pretending that national policies can ensure our progress - or even our survival." L. Pearson: Department of External Affairs: Statements and Speeches, (SS) 66/22, Speech to American Society of Newspaper Editors, Montreal, May, 19, 1966.
58. Peter Dobell fails to determine whether the move was deliberate on the part of the Prime Minister, or an accident, caused by the downgrading of the External Affairs Department. Canada's Search for New Roles, pp. 20-21.
59. Radwansky: Trudeau, p. 21.

NOTES

60. When asked if Ottawa has a "special role" for Canada to play on the international chess board, as one of the top secondary powers, Mr. Martin replied:
"Certainly....The middle and smaller powers, for the most part, want to play a role beyond their frontiers. We have a store of friendships, of affinities, of practicalities, of unselfish acts, all creating what we might call a good name, that we have formed over the years. Our international policy will be effective in the measure that we know how to be witnesses and fair interpreters of international realities transcending our special interests. I think we should pursue our task without impatience but with vigour." Martin: SS 64/36, Media Interview, December 23, 1964.
61. "Canada does not have a pre-destined role....Canadian foreign policy must reflect national interests."
Martin: SS 67/18, Speech at Waterloo Lutheran University, May 22, 1967. Significantly, this was before the expulsion of UNEF and the Six Day Middle East War.
62. See: Martin: SS 67/27, Speech to Directors of the Canadian National Exhibition, Toronto, August 26, 1967. Mr. Martin's position, even after the 1967 Middle East War, contributed to Canada's "over-commitment" discussed earlier in this Chapter.
63. CIPD Data, Poll Number 358, March 1973 (See Table 2, Chapter 4).
64. See: P. Dobell: Canada's Search for New Roles, Ch. 8.
65. Secretary of State for External Affairs: Statement:
Speech at the University of Winnipeg, February 21, 1974.
66. M. Sharp: SS 73/23, Statement in the House of Commons, November 14, 1973.
67. Thordarson: Trudeau and Foreign Policy, op. cit., pp. 189-190.
68. House of Commons: SCEAND: Proceedings, May 21, 1970, p. 29.
69. FPC, p. 8.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE TRUDEAU ADMINISTRATION: 1968 TO 1978

INTRODUCTION

The foreign policy of the Trudeau administration, like Canadian administrations since the Second World War, purports to be based on the principle of functionalism.

The Foreign Policy Review of 1970 perceived Canada's most effective contribution to international affairs to be the "judicious application abroad of talents and skills, knowledge and experience, in fields where Canadians excel or wish to excel."¹ Canada's contributions to the international community should be based on a pragmatic and realistic evaluation of Canada's capabilities in any one field of endeavor.²

While these pledges to the principle of functionalism are consistent with past Canadian foreign policy rhetoric, the concept upon which they are based has been altered. The generalization of the conception of middle power status by the Canadian government, and in particular, by the Pearson administration, had resulted in misinterpretation of the principle of functionalism. The perception of a standard role for a "middle power" had led to the

overemphasis of Canadian policy on issues which Canada, in fact, had little impact and underemphasis on issues which Canada had considerable impact.

In order to re-establish the concept of functionalism, and thereby to also increase the efficiency of the allocation of resources for the expedition of Canadian foreign policy, the government of Prime Minister Trudeau sought to narrow the scope of Canada's international relations and focus upon those policy objectives where Canada could be most effective:

We must, as a country of our size, determine where we can be effective. We must determine a rather selective list of foreign policy goals and objectives... It would be quite unreasonable for us as what has been called a middle power (and I'm not sure what that word means), to be involved in all issues... and in a real sense to spread ourselves so thin that we would not be effective anywhere.³

The middle power thesis had become complicated as well by the evolution of a "double entendre".⁴ Middle-sized during the 1950's assumed the added connotation of mediator. The generalization of the theory cast Canada as the "helpful fixer" and as a result, pursuit of the middle power concept made pursuit of the helpful fixer role automatic. While the Foreign Policy Review admitted that

roles "may result from pursuing certain policy objectives", it emphasized that "they should not be made the aims of policy".⁵

The concept of middle power in the 1970's, therefore, necessitated a reappraisal. Some analysts, such as Alex Inglis, maintain that Canada remains a middle power, but the perspective is now economic rather than political.⁶ James Eayrs discards the term entirely and writes that Canada should instead be a "foremost power", that is, "most notable or prominent", as the term "middle" had become meaningless.⁷

Against the background of the rejuvenated middle power thesis and the reassertion of functionalism, combined with the tendency to approach participation in international affairs with a more cautious attitude (as has been concluded in the previous chapter), the motives for participation in peacekeeping during the administration of Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau are examined. As in Chapter Two, observations are made within the contexts of the three spheres of international relations: the systemic sphere, the regional sphere and the domestic sphere.

Canada's relation to the systemic sphere during the Trudeau administration remains much the same as it did in the past: Canada continues as a member of the United Nations, of the Western Alliance, and of the developed world. Within the regional sphere, Canada maintains an important relationship with the United States and Western Europe through bilateral and alliance channels. The Commonwealth also persists as an important aspect of Canadian diplomacy. Added to these existing relationships, however, are new associations which the Trudeau government has nurtured and developed, such as relations with nations in the Arab world. The domestic sphere, as has already been noted in Chapter Three, has become much more complex and Mr. Trudeau's style of decision-making is considerably different from that of Mr. Pearson and Mr. Diefenbaker. The factors within this sphere are structurally similar to those examined earlier, albeit more numerous and more complex.

The withdrawal from the International Commission for Control and Supervision (ICCS) and the later, short-term involvement in the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), created notable precedents in Canadian peacekeeping policy: Never before had Canada unilaterally withdrawn from a

peacekeeping role. It is for this reason that this chapter contains a section dealing specifically with the reasons for the Canadian decisions to withdraw from these peacekeeping forces.

The new peacekeeping missions which have been undertaken during the Trudeau administrations are less numerous than before.⁸ There are, however, peacekeeping missions that have continued into the 1970's and since they all are subject to the Trudeau government's foreign policy, the motives for continuing Canadian participation in them will be equally as valuable as those motives pertaining to new peacekeeping operations.

Briefly, the peacekeeping operations which will be examined in most detail are the following: the International Commission for Control and Supervision in Indochina (ICCS), the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF II), the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). Other, smaller operations are discussed but will not be examined in detail. United Nations Disengagement Observation Force (UNDOF), situated on the Golan Heights in the Middle East, for example, is considered to be an

offshoot of UNEF and Canada's current contribution to United Nations Military Observer Group India-Pakistan (UNMOGIP), is very small.

THE SYSTEMIC SPHERE

The Canadian attitude towards maintaining international peace and security has undergone substantial revision in the manner in which it is articulated. As a result of the Trudeau government's greater concern for socio-economic issues, peace and security is now viewed not only in politico-military terms but in economic terms as well: "It is now apparent that the principal concerns of most members of the United Nations are, in fact, economic... although they manifest themselves in a variety of troubling ways including open conflict."⁹

While international conflict is seen more in economic terms, support for peacekeeping does remain partly within the context of the East-West confrontation. The 1971 Defence White Paper, Defence in the 70's, indicated that there has been an "increased willingness to attempt to resolve East-West issues by negotiation,"¹⁰ such as SALT, MBFR, the Four Power Talks on Berlin, and other arms control talks. It further maintained that Canada's

overriding defence objective must... be the prevention of nuclear war by promoting political reconciliation to ease underlying causes of tension, by working for arms control and disarmament agreements, and by contributing to the system of stable mutual deterrence... Canada's military role in international

peacekeeping helps to prevent the outbreak or spread of hostilities in other areas of tension, so that underlying political problems can be settled through negotiation or a process of accomodation, and so that the possibility of great power involvement is minimized.¹¹

Reiterated by subsequent leaders and other observers, this position has remained part of the underlying foundation of Canadian efforts in global peace and security activities throughout the Trudeau administration.¹²

What External Affairs Minister Don Jamieson has referred to as "a new dimension in international affairs"¹³ has been the emergence of the North-South dialogue. During the period of post-war decolonization, the concern for peace and security centred around great power confrontation resulting from the breakdown of the peaceful transfer from the colonial to the national power. As the decolonization process drew to a close in the latter 1960's, the threat in the Third World, as perceived by Canadian leaders, no longer originated in the Soviet Union but in the Third World countries themselves, who "steadily [fall] farther and farther behind in their search for a decent standard of living."¹⁴ Security is no longer conceived in purely military terms:

It is the question of rich and poor, of poverty and inequality, in short, of economic security.... It is clear that all of us must be prepared to do our share to reverse the trend toward growing economic disparity in the world. Unless we can move rapidly beyond the stage of vigorous debate to practical measures to overcome this trend, economic insecurity may become perpetual and violent reaction, confrontation and conflict inevitable.¹⁵

Mr. Jamieson later cited Canada's participation in Middle East peacekeeping as an attempt to ease conflict in an area where the dimension of the East-West conflict has merged with the North-South, and in a sense, doubled the need for efforts to keep the peace.¹⁶

The desire to contain or thwart local conflicts before they escalated and involved the superpowers has applied to all peacekeeping operations that the Trudeau government has taken part in. In outlining the conditions that Canada would press for in accepting any new peacekeeping role in Indochina, External Affairs Minister, Mitchell Sharp, declared that "Canada's purpose for participation in any new supervisory machinery, despite the conspicuous lack of success of the old ICC, would be to bring the war to an end.... We have no other interest."¹⁷

Linked to the new perceptions of the North-South dialogue is the altered attitude toward the conduct of peaceful change. It has been argued that Canada, as a member of the Western Alliance, was a supporter of the status quo. Peacekeeping, as it tended to support the international status quo, was supported by the Western states and no East bloc states. In Chapter Three, it was indicated also that the Third World countries, during the 1960's, grew suspicious of peacekeeping for the same reason. Because of the "altered reality" of the United Nations caused by the growth of the Third World, it is argued that Western countries, including Canada, must alter their own policies in order to reflect the new international situation.¹⁸

The "altered reality" of the international system combines with the Trudeau administration's "North-South" perception of international conflict and hence, alters the perception of peacekeeping. The result has been a shift in the rhetoric concerning Canadian peacekeeping policy. It is recognized that Canadian leaders have always emphasized the importance of peacemaking after peacekeeping has been established. The Trudeau government's perception that peacekeeping is a reaction to North-South conflict,

however, leads it to emphasize the need to alter the existing economic conditions as well as political conditions in order to establish peace.

The peacekeeping operation in Cyprus, which had considerable East-West motivations originally, is also perceived by the Trudeau government to be partly within the North-South context. As a result, the East-West motives are down-played considerably. The motivations for participation in the Cyprus peacekeeping force that related in the past to Canada's alliance commitments are now referred to as "the disruptive effect on our friends in the Mediterranean area."¹⁹ In most instances, no connection is made between UNFICYP and NATO at all.²⁰

Although the Trudeau government has de-emphasized the East-West motivations for participating in peacekeeping, these motives do continue to bear upon Canada's peacekeeping decisions. In a speech regarding the Middle East issue, the Parliamentary Secretary for the External Affairs Minister, Fernand Leblanc, told a Canadian audience in 1977 that the Canadian government "considered the issues on their own merits without automatically exposing the positions of either party."²¹

But before Canada makes its decisions, he said, the positions of others are considered first - namely the United States, Great Britain, Germany as well as Israel. This indicates that while the Trudeau government considers Canadian Middle East policies to be of an independent and non-partisan nature, it is fully aware that many "Western" interests are also Canadian interests and therefore Canada also must consider the general welfare of the Western Alliance when such policies are made. In a more direct sense, the Canadian government's willingness to be "balanced" by Poland in the UN Emergency Force has resulted in Canada being the "Western" member and representing the Western point of view.²²

The same argument holds for Canadian involvement in the International Commission for Control and Supervision in Indochina. The Canadian government believed that "without Western participation... it did not seem possible... that the Commission could meet the Canadian criteria for objectivity."²³ Canadian participation therefore was seen as a balance, as Canada would tend to offset the biased positions of the Eastern bloc representatives, Poland and Hungary.

Rights and responsibilities connected with support for the United Nations as the organization most responsible

for international peace and security have been an additional motive of the Trudeau government for participation in international peacekeeping:

No country has been more consistent than Canada in supporting the principles of the United Nations. We do not have to apologize for our record here or for the attitude of the Canadian people in accepting responsibilities for peacekeeping, for leadership in the North-South dialogue and for making a fair contribution to all UN initiatives. Canada and Canadians have earned the right to be heard.²⁴

The Canadian government remains prepared to participate in peacekeeping because "the United Nations will expect Canada to continue to provide advice and assistance in the peacekeeping of the future."²⁵ The Trudeau government's prediction that future peacekeeping demands would be fewer in number was because the government considered that the kinds of conflicts likely to occur in the near future "would not readily lend themselves to UN intervention."²⁶ While this has generally been the case, the kinds of conflicts that do call for UN intervention have continued to occur, and the Canadian government has responded in each case, in compliance with its UN commitment. For example, in the Middle East Canada participates in peacekeeping said

External Affairs Minister MacEachen, in 1975, not only as it is "indispensable to the peace of the area but because it is in the Canadian interest to strengthen the capacity of the United Nations to help preserve international peace and security."²⁷ Likewise, Canada's interest in Cyprus and the Greek-Turkish dispute, said the Canadian Ambassador to the United Nations, William Barton, in 1977, continues to derive "primarily from our membership in the United Nations and our readiness to assist the organization to maintain peace and security."²⁸ The Canadian government continues to renew its participation in UNFICYP's mandate because UNFICYP plays an important role in lessening the tensions on the island "with the effect of improving the atmosphere for a negotiated settlement."²⁹

The government indicates its disappointment, however, that the improved atmosphere has not yet led to significant progress in achieving a political solution. The lack of progress in negotiations have created much frustration and "Canada's patience is fast running out..., the problem can not continue in its present interminable and indefinite way."³⁰ While some reports maintain Canada

would welcome a peacekeeping commitment in Southern Africa just to have an excuse to pull out of Cyprus,³¹ there has been no threat to do so, which in turn, strengthens the argument cited above regarding the necessity to support Alliance unity by remaining in Cyprus.

The 1975 session of the UN General Assembly resulted in near open hostility when the Assembly passed its resolution equating Zionism with racism.³² At this time, it was evident that the United States had reached its lowest-ever point of UN support.³³ The Canadian government attitude throughout this time, however, remained stalwart:

The value of the contribution by the UN to peace... has been considerably diminished in the eyes of many Western nations, particularly the United States and Canada, by the war of words that has gone on in the General Assembly.... Irrespective of what we think of this aspect of UN concern... continued UN involvement is indispensable.³⁴

This commitment to the United Nations peace and security functions is similarly voiced in the periodic renewals of the UNEF mandate and, most recently, for the Canadian role in the UN Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). Canada participates in this latest peacekeeping operation,

testified Don Jamieson to the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, because we are needed and because "peacekeeping '[is] one of the most effective operations of the United Nations.... The Canadian government is determined to do its part in ensuring the success of one of the most difficult peacekeeping ventures the UN has undertaken. It is a challenge we can and should accept."³⁵

The motive of attempting to acquire or maintain influence in international affairs is one which the Trudeau government said would not be an aim of policy - but it could be a result.³⁶ The rhetoric concerning Canadian leadership, influence and prestige has been at a low level since 1968, but one can still see instances where this motive applies. Although not a "leader", Liberal backbencher Ralph Stewart argued in October 1973 that Canada must remain neutral in the Middle East issue as it was the only way Canada can sustain its prestige in the world.³⁷ In general, the attitude of government leaders and members of the foreign service on the issue of Canadian influence and peacekeeping tends to be stated in negative rather than positive terms:

We may not be able to influence Cypriots or Syrians if we try, but we can not influence them if we do not try.... A decision to continue support of peacekeeping should be made in the light of our ability to increase our capability to influence other powers in the process of peacemaking.³⁸

Supportive of this assertion is Allan MacEachen's statement made in Cairo during his Middle East visit in January 1976. Canada's new role, he said, is to be a "carrier and explainer of policies.... Both Israelis and Arabs can see that Canada is not without influence even in Washington."³⁹

The notion of sustaining or gaining prestige and influence in international affairs seems to be closely linked with the Canadian "image" as perceived by other countries. The Canadian International Image Study, conducted by Peyton Lyon and others, has revealed that significantly more members of the foreign elite perceive Canada to be a peacekeeper than do members of the Canadian foreign policy elite.⁴⁰ The persistence of a peacekeeper image has thus created a problem for Canadian leaders. The foreign policy of Prime Minister Trudeau dictates that a peacekeeping commitment should not

be entered into until it can be determined that the particular operation will benefit both Canada and the international community as a whole. Past participation and continuing support of the peacekeeping principle have made Canadian services valuable to the peacekeeping effort. A refusal to participate when requested would create an embarrassing situation not only for Canada, but for other countries as well, especially if Canada's participation were favoured by the United States, and more so if Canada were also supported by the Soviet Union.⁴¹ A refusal to participate may in turn harm Canada's credibility in international politics, thus creating problems for Canadian diplomats in other areas of international affairs. Mitchell Sharp voiced this concern in testimony before the Committee on External Affairs and National Defence in March 1973.⁴²

The problem of Canada being placed in an awkward position, according to Mr. Sharp, occurred again during the debate in the Security Council regarding the make-up of the second UNEF in October/November 1973. Mr. Sharp maintains that Canada, having been requested to participate by the Secretary-General, was in a way compelled to participate because it had strongly advocated

the establishment of such a force in the first place. He in fact blames the Secretary-General for not having looked around very hard for other possible contributors. He does admit, however, that the Secretary-General is restricted in choice because other states either lack the necessary experience or are simply unwilling to participate.⁴³

The Security Council resolution of March 1978⁴⁴ which instituted UNIFIL was passed in a remarkably short period of time - about fifteen minutes. Canada, a member of the Council, favoured the resolution and by doing so, put itself again into the position which Mr. Sharp referred to concerning UNEF. The Soviet Union did not indicate any interest in the establishment of the force, which contributed to the speed of the passage of the resolution. Nor did the Soviets question the make-up of the force (which includes France). The resultant "Western" lean^{of} UNIFIL had made it difficult to decline and the United States government would have been not only embarrassed but angry if Canada had refused outright to participate.⁴⁵

THE REGIONAL SPHERE

The Trudeau administration's motives for participation in international peacekeeping within the regional sphere reflect Canada's existing strategic, geographical and commercial position in the "regions" to which it belongs. The United States, being the most important country in Canada's international relations - economically, militarily and politically - assumes the central position in Canada's regional concerns. Canada's primary policies therefore are to maintain and enhance relations with the United States.⁴⁶ Canada-United States relations were at the forefront of the Canadian willingness to become involved in the International Commission for Control and Supervision in Indochina.

In order to study the motives concerning Canadian participation in the ICCS in Indochina, which began operation in 1973, it is necessary to return to 1968 when the decision was made to begin talks in Paris between the combatants. At that time, the Canadian government realized that given these new prospects for peace in Indochina and Canada's record and experience for cease-fire supervision in the area, "the possibility that [Canada] might again be invited to participate in such a body could not be dismissed."⁴⁷ In 1970, the Canadian government agreed on the conditions by which any new Canadian participation in a

supervisory role would be judged. Thus, long before the old ICC officially ceased to function, the decision to consider renewed Canadian participation in the most controversial and troublesome peacekeeping force that Canada had ever taken part in, had been made.

By 1970, however, Canada had more interests involved in the Vietnam conflict than in 1954, and the motives for participation in the new Commission must be observed with these added interests in mind. Canada's interests were three-fold: first, as in 1954, "Canada's long established interest in effective promotion of international peace;" second, Canada's long and frustrating membership in the original Commissions; and third, "our neighbourhood with the United States."⁴⁸ Canada's overriding concerns, according to External Affairs Minister Sharp, were to end the war in Vietnam, to achieve the withdrawal of foreign troops, to exchange prisoners-of-war, and to promote a reduction of the violence.⁴⁹

The motivational-mix concerning the Vietnam war and the ICCS is a complex one. Moral judgements as to what are "good" policies and what are "bad" policies have been made on all sides. While Charles Taylor, for example, finds

fault in the Canadian government's desire to avoid harsh confrontation with President Nixon and to "win a few points for good behavior;"⁵⁰ Mitchell Sharp sees no fault in admitting that Canada's prime motive was to help get the United States out of Vietnam.⁵¹

Despite the unavailability of information regarding the progress of the Paris Peace Talks, and the resultant ignorance of the ultimate conditions Canada would be confronted with, the government was sufficiently sure of its commitment that preparations were begun by the military long before official acceptance had been given by the Cabinet. Prime Minister Trudeau was convinced that Canada would be playing some kind of role and therefore it was his (and Mitchell Sharp's) strategy to ensure that if the mandate was not a successful one, Canada would get in and out of the commitment as fast as possible.⁵²

On March 27, 1973, the original expiry date of the Canadian mandate, the government announced a renewal of Canada's commitment. Even though it was obvious that the ICCS was not fulfilling its entire mandate, "the situation, while serious, was nevertheless an enormous improvement over

that existing before the cease-fire. American and Vietnamese prisoners-of-war were being released and, the last of the United States forces in Vietnam would soon depart."⁵³

The government's decision to extend Canada's commitment a second time (that is, until July 31, 1973), reflects again both the concern to preserve amiable relations with the United States and to promote a peaceful settlement in Indochina. Pressure to remain in the force was exerted upon the Canadian government by Dr. Henry Kissinger, who was reportedly concerned with the success of the peace talks scheduled for June.⁵⁴

Rights and responsibilities within, and hence the commitment to the various regional organizations to which Canada belongs, have also contributed to the motivational-mix for contributions to peacekeeping operations. Periodic announcements of the renewal of the Cyprus peacekeeping force for example emphasize Canada's connection with the Commonwealth. Absent, however, as was discussed earlier, are references connecting peacekeeping to Canada's

responsibilities within the Atlantic Alliance, particularly in Cyprus. The government's rationale for this behavior is linked to the underlying desire to promote Canada as an independent nation and to preserve the Canadian image of a supremely gifted peacekeeper - an image that can be separated from that the partner of the United States.⁵⁵ Statements by government leaders affirm that it is a foreign policy priority to encourage the trend towards the Canadian "fact" in North America, to maintain a foreign policy distinguishable from that of the United States.⁵⁶

Rhetoric that existed in abundance during the Pearson-Martin years, however, is not used by members of the Trudeau administration. This seems to be due mostly to the connection made between an independent foreign policy and the tendency towards "role playing" that was criticized in the Foreign Policy Review. The Trudeau government's rhetoric concerning role playing is almost non-existent,⁵⁷ and therefore the connection between peacekeeping and independence is rarely directly made by government leaders. However, examination of the Trudeau government's policies in the Middle East since 1973 leads one to conclude that

the government wishes to promote Canada as an autonomous nation in spite of its connections with Western Europe and especially the United States. Participation in peacekeeping in the Middle East area is very closely linked with these efforts. The tendency for this attitude to "spill-over" into, for example, the Cyprus issue and UNFICYP is not unreasonable and, in fact, should be expected given Canada's attitude towards the purposes of United Nations peacekeeping in general and the present government's perception of the sources of international conflict in the Third World. Where Canada could not avoid a direct link between peacekeeping and the United States (that is, in Vietnam), special efforts were made to ensure that Canada did not technically "represent" the Americans and that once the withdrawal of US troops and exchange of prisoners-of-war were accomplished, Canada would not prolong its presence by remaining in Vietnam.

The Trudeau government has always maintained that Canada's approach to the Middle East problem is impartial. In 1969, Mitchell Sharp argued that:

Our essential objective is that all states there should be enabled to live in peace and security, free from the threat of war or territorial encroachment... The best role Canada can play is that of an understanding, compassionate and objective

observer, ready to assist if and when there is a specific task for us to undertake at the instance of both sides.⁵⁸

The government's intentions, however, were at the time based on false assumptions because Canada's role in world affairs was "essentially defined by the reference to the USA and Europe."⁵⁹ Canada's approach to the conflict in the Middle East was biased because Canada could not see the situation in terms which permitted an unbiased approach. Canada's neutrality and objectivity were, in the final analysis, based on "disinterest rather than a balance of motivations."⁶⁰

The Middle East War of 1973 and the subsequent OPEC oil boycott and price hikes changed the situation dramatically. The concurrent debate regarding Canadian membership on the new UNEF, and the Canadian status regarding the oil boycott, brought out statements by the Canadian External Affairs Minister concerning the "independence" of Canadian policy - that Canada does not represent anyone except the international community as a whole.⁶¹ The struggle of Canadian representatives to ensure Canada's involvement in UNEF was paralleled by the discussion between Canadian and Arab representatives in

Ottawa, New York and Washington concerning the applicability of the oil boycott to Canada.

Energy Minister Donald MacDonald was also quick to publicize Canadian neutrality in the war shortly after the oil cutbacks were announced.⁶² Several days later, while Canada's stand-by troops waited in Edmonton for a request from the Secretary-General to participate in the peace force, Mitchell Sharp voiced his puzzlement over the oil issue. He was reported to have said that there would be no reason to reduce the oil supply to Canada, as Canada is friendly with both Arabs and Israelis.⁶³ Mr. Sharp said later that he did not know why the Arabs were including Canada among other Western countries in the oil disruptions and refuted the charge that the Arab stand on oil and peacekeeping was because Canada was "less than neutral" on the Middle East issue.⁶⁴ By implication, Mr. Sharp was saying that Canada's foreign policy was not like that of the United States (and other Western countries) and, not only should the Arabs exclude Canada from the oil boycott, but there should also be no objections to Canadian participation on the peacekeeping force that was being set up.⁶⁵

It is not being proposed here that Canadian leaders were attempting to participate on the peacekeeping force in order to be seen as neutral or impartial and thereby excluded from the oil boycott. Rather, because the two events were taking place simultaneously, the Canadian arguments of neutrality and objectivity were applied to both situations so as to compromise neither.

The most significant result of the 1973 Middle East War's impact on Canadian diplomacy was the declared Canadian policy to strengthen and expand Canada's relations with this region of the world.⁶⁶ Canadians, admitted Mr. MacEachen in Cairo in 1976, for too many years had perceived modern Egypt in terms of the conflict that has marked the recent history of the Middle East. The purpose of Mr. MacEachen's visit to the Middle East in January, 1976 was to improve bilateral relations with the Arab states and to promote Canada's new role as a "carrier and explainer of policies."⁶⁷

This "balanced approach" to the Middle East problem later defined by External Affairs Minister Jamieson as: "not [committing] ourselves so strongly to one side or the other as to [lose] our effectiveness in terms of talking

to them as friends,"⁶⁸ has won for Canada a good reputation and some influence in the region. But whereas this approach is the main objective of Mr. MacEachen's policy of expanding Canadian/Arab relations, Mr. Jamieson accounts for Canada's objective reputation not by the expansion of Canadian diplomacy in the Middle East, but by Canada's peacekeeping record: "[the reputation] stems from the fact that we have... been the Number One peacekeeping country in the world..."⁶⁹ It is evident, then, that Canada's goal is to maintain a reputation of impartiality in the Middle East. Canada's peacekeeping record is used by the Trudeau government as both a promoter and a result of this policy of projecting objectivity and balance, and hence a reputation for independence in foreign policy.

Maintaining an "objective" policy, of course, enables Canada to remain a strong supporter of Israel as well as to be friendly with the Arab states. Mr. MacEachen even admitted his surprise upon learning, during his visit to the Middle East, that the Arab states did not demand that Canada take steps to alter its existing Middle East policies.⁷⁰ There had already been a change in Canadian policy, however, after the 1973 war. Previous Canadian

rhetoric had always emphasized the rights of the Israeli "state" and the Arab "states" to exist in peace. Since 1974, a concern for "people" rather than countries can be discerned. In the United Nations General Assembly in November 1974, Mr. MacEachen spoke for the first time about "legitimate concerns of the Palestinians" and the possibility of a Palestinian "state".⁷¹ This change in Canadian policy obviously reflects the change in the demands of the Arab states after the 1973 war, and is one substantive result of the Trudeau government's policy to develop more amiable relations with the Arab countries.

THE DOMESTIC SPHERE

The Trudeau government continues to participate in peacekeeping because although "it is accepted that the high tide of peacekeeping has passed... the Canadian public is reluctant to face the end of a rôle which has contributed much to the Canadian reputation."⁷²

Preservation of the Canadian self-image as supremely gifted peacekeepers gives Canadians a sense of identity. This motive of maintaining a self-image underlies all other motives.⁷³

The withdrawal in 1967 of the Canadian UNEF contingent from Egypt had a traumatic affect on the minds of the Canadian public and the Canadian military.⁷⁴ The anger voiced in the Canadian media and elsewhere was directed not against the government's foreign policy, but against the United Nations Secretary-General and the Egyptian government.⁷⁵

Despite the Trudeau government's pronouncements in 1968 that there was "public disenchantment" with existing Canadian foreign policy, public support for Canadian participation in international peacekeeping has remained at a constant level throughout the Trudeau administration. Public opinion polls (see Table 2) have revealed that,

TABLE 2
CANADIAN INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC OPINION DATA:

- Poll Number 307, April, 1964:

Do you approve of Canadian troops participating in a Cyprus peacekeeping force?

Approve - 54% Disapprove - 32% No opinion - 14%

- Poll Number 344, November, 1970:

Do you favour the establishment of a United Nations peacekeeping army?

Approve - 64% Disapprove - 21% No opinion - 15%

- Poll Number 358, March, 1973: ***

Do you approve of a renewed Canadian participation in a Vietnam peace force?

Approve - 53% Disapprove - 39% No opinion - 8%

- Poll Number 360, July, 1973:

Do you approve of the Canadian decision to withdraw from the ICES?

Approve - 84% Disapprove - 9% No opinion - 6%

- Poll Number 362, November, 1973:

Do you approve of Canadian participation in a new Middle East peacekeeping force?

Approve - 55% Disapprove - 29% No opinion - 16%

SOURCES: CIPO Opinion Polls, Social Science Archive, Carleton University.

*** P.V. Lyon: Letter to the CANADIAN FORUM, October 1974.

despite the trauma of the UNEF expulsion and the failure of the ICC in Indochina, a majority of the Canadian public favoured a return to Vietnam. That an overwhelming majority of Canadians supported the withdrawal of Canadian troops from the ICCS is most certainly due to the large amount of publicity from government sources highlighting the unworkability and the futility of the Commission. The government's "open mouth" policy was in part meant to accomplish this very result: to create support for the withdrawal from an initially popular peacekeeping operation.

Continuing public support for Canadian participation in peacekeeping derives from the position that Canadians want to sustain a self-image of a peacekeeper. The government, in its desire to maintain public support by promoting the peacekeeper self-image, tends to react "habitually" to peacekeeping opportunities in such a way that the image is sustained. Former Canadian Ambassador to the United States, Marcel Cadieux, feared that "Canadian leaders might well react to a request for a new peacekeeping role in Indochina like an old racehorse to the track, and be unable to restrain themselves from having another run."⁷⁶ During the 1973 Middle East

hostilities as well, Canada "habitually" applied the same strategies that were developed during previous Middle East crises: that is, Canada prepared to participate and awaited a confirmation in the form of a request from the UN Secretary-General, thereby demonstrating to the Canadian public, and to the rest of the world as well, that the government wished to perpetuate the image of a country ready, willing and prepared to be a peacekeeper.

Implicit in the proposition that the Canadian government reacts habitually to peacekeeping opportunities is the extent to which the Canadian government feels that Canada's participation in any peacekeeping operation is essential to its success. Members of the House of Commons, Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, in the Committee's report on the 1970 Foreign Policy Review, stated outright that:

For Canada now to lose heart, and to reduce its interests in peacekeeping would be an abdication of responsibility. No other country could fill the gap thus opened - and the development of effective peacekeeping would be set back with incalculable, but certainly disastrous, effect.⁷⁷

Government policy later reflected this feeling, although phrased in less direct terms. Marcel Prud'homme, MP, in a 1974 speech to the Special Political Committee at the UN, argued that the success of peacekeeping depended on the availability of trained personnel and that the demand for geographical representation may make it difficult to find adequately trained personnel. He implied that Canadian participation is necessary to the success of peacekeeping because, if Canada were to be excluded for reasons of geographical balance, peacekeeping operations might fail.⁷⁸

Former Chief of Defence Staff, General Dextraze, testified before the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence in 1977 concerning the Canadian logistics contribution to the Middle East peacekeeping forces. He maintained that:

In the eyes of the people concerned and responsible for these decisions, it has been considered... that we should be there.... With the type of operation that has to be performed, and with the type of training that we have, we probably are the best for this type of operation.⁷⁹

The 1973 Middle East war marked a turning point in the

fortunes of peacekeeping and an alteration in the government's promotion of the peacekeeper image. Until this time, disillusionment on all sides was rife and the early 1970's promised a bleak future for the peace and security functions of the United Nations. The ICCS was organized outside the auspices of the UN, despite the efforts by Canada to include the world body in the negotiation process. Canada's approach to participation in the ICCS was one of a necessary but unwelcome chore. Several months later, however, the attitude of the government towards peacekeeping was quite different. UNEF promised a chance to have Security Council backing of peacekeeping with the Soviet Union's support (rather than the usual abstention), as well as a financing agreement that would be fairly shared by all members of the UN. The government's reaction to UNEF was the opposite of its reaction to the ICCS. When it seemed that Canada might not be included in UNEF II, "there was near panic in the upper echelons of the government.... It reacted with a certain amount of horror at the thought that the world was going to be able to get along without us."⁸⁰ The government instructed its representatives in Cairo and the United Nations to go flat out to make sure Canada was not left out. In our eagerness to get in, Peyton Lyon

maintains, we nearly humiliated ourselves. There were also accusations in the House of Commons that Canada was "preaching for a call" and that "Cabinet could not have withstood a rejection or lack of invitation,"⁸¹ despite the fact that both opposition parties had previously urged the government to participate. In contrast, External Affairs Minister Sharp argued that Canada had not been seeking participation in the force, but that the UN Secretary-General was in fact pressing for a Canadian contribution.⁸²

The cause of the government's desire to be included in the UNEF was, in part, the impact of party politics in the House of Commons. The 1972 federal election resulted in a minority Liberal government. As a result, the Liberals were very sensitive to the continuing support of the New Democratic Party. Both the New Democrats and the Conservatives made repeated urgings for Canada to take the initiative to help restore peace to the Middle East area. On one occasion, before the Security Council resolution calling for a cease-fire, Heath MacQuarrie (Conservative MP for Hillsborough) urged government leaders to exercise Canada's "moral leadership" to get the UN Security Council to put an end to the war. "I am sure,"

Mr. MacQuarrie said a few days later,

that all the people of Canada would want us (i.e. parliament) to indicate that this country is prepared to make some efforts and indeed, some sacrifices if, under the proper auspices and with reasonable hope for success, the kind of [peacekeeping] force the Minister mentioned should be set up.⁸³

These exhortations in the House of Commons by the opposition parties for Canadian participation in the peacekeeping force seem to be contradicted by their later accusations regarding the Liberal government's over-zealous desire to become involved. The accusations, however, related to the issue of an independent foreign policy and not to support of the Canadian peacekeeping role per se. The opposition parties argued that the government's enthusiasm coloured the Canadian record of an impartial peacekeeper:

Are we now there as the surrogate of western interests, necessitating the involvement, objectionable to many, of Polish troops...? While no one doubts the importance of [the peacekeeping] role, would the issue of balance have arisen if Canada had not insisted?... Canada should be prepared to serve when asked. Canada has no business begging to serve.⁸⁴

The trade motive, until October 1973, had little impact upon Canada's peacekeeping decisions. Since that time, it has become a major issue regarding Middle East peacekeeping, as most of the world's oil supply is situated in the Persian Gulf region. The oil-rich states, having used oil as a tool of diplomacy during the October War, have since become major participants in the conduct of world politics and commerce. As a major trading country, Canada peacekeeps in order to help maintain peace in the Middle East area. Uninterrupted commercial intercourse with all countries in the Middle East region ensures that the Canadian economy is not adversely affected.⁸⁵ Related to this motive are the interests of Canada's major allies and friends in Western Europe and Japan, which are critically dependent upon Middle East oil:

There was concern to help reduce tension in the Middle East in order to bring about a lifting of the Arab oil embargo, which was damaging the Canadian economy as well as those of other states and which had the potential of straining Canada/US relations.⁸⁶

THE WITHDRAWAL FROM THE ICCS AND UNIFIL

The symbolism of the Canadian withdrawal from the International Commission for Control and Supervision in Vietnam was far more significant for Canadian foreign policy than for the conflict in Southeast Asia: "The country which had taken part in more post Second World War peace-preservation efforts than any other, and had been the prime mover in the organization and execution of international operations of that kind, had given up."⁸⁷ The withdrawal reflected the Trudeau government's policy to refrain from participating in ill-conceived peacekeeping operations with little or no chances of success.⁸⁸

The "open mouth" strategy that the government used during Canada's involvement in the ICCS was meant to publicize the many problems that the government experienced with the peacekeeping operation. Its object was to acquire the best possible terms of reference for Canadian participation; to attempt to influence the parties to the Paris agreement to make the Commission work; and to present an image of the Canadian participation and of the Commission itself to the Canadian public and Parliament in order to make withdrawal from the Commission less painful at home. The strategy of withdrawal was meant to convince the

public and Parliament that the role was not worthwhile in this situation and that, in fact, it detracted from the Canadian reputation as a peacekeeper.

Ostensibly, the reasons why the Trudeau government decided to terminate Canada's participation in the ICCS were because the cease-fire was not being adhered to, and the investigative powers of the Commission were being thwarted by both the lack of freedom of movement and non-co-operation among the Commission members themselves. These problems are almost identical with those of the old ICC, from which the Canadian government did not withdraw. The withdrawal marks a shift not in Canada's commitment to the principle of peacekeeping, as some observers have maintained,⁸⁹ but rather a shift away from the previous practice "which was to carry on for what ever it might be worth, even after it was concluded that nothing of substance could be achieved. This time such sober appreciation of the situation was accompanied by the decision to stop further attempts at doing the patently impossible."⁹⁰

It is necessary to link Canada's withdrawal from the ICCS to Canada's motives for participation. While these

motives had little direct impact on the actual decision to withdraw, the timing of the decision did. According to the proposition that the government's open mouth policy was meant, in part, to bring over at least the NDP in order not to lose the vote in the House of Commons to terminate Canadian participation, the timing of the announcement of the actual withdrawal date had to wait until the members of the New Democratic Party were convinced that Canadian usefulness in Vietnam was at an end.⁹¹ The NDP's Douglas Rowland, who accompanied Mr. Sharp to Vietnam March 13 to 18, returned duly convinced. The Progressive Conservative Party had refused to send a representative to Vietnam. Mr. Rowland later testified that his "experiences in Vietnam had convinced [him] that the prospects for peace are minimal, that the prospects for the ICCS carrying out its functions under the agreement... are virtually non-existent."⁹² Mr. Rowland announced that the position of the NDP was to extend Canada's participation for a further ninety days and then withdraw whether a replacement country had been found or not. This recommendation concurred with Mr. Sharp's March 27 announcement.

A second reason for the timing of the withdrawal

announcement was what Mr. Sharp referred to as the "two sides of credibility": On one hand, Mr. Sharp maintained, Canada strove to assert its credibility by establishing the point that

we were to serve as an impartial and objective observer and reporter.... On the other hand we do not want to act in such a way that people will say, "Oh well... Canadians did not like the way the game was played so they got the ball and bat and went home".... We have to be careful that we neither destroy our credibility by staying nor destroy it by removing ourselves.⁹³

Canada's reputation, Mr. Sharp purports, depended upon how Canada handled its withdrawal. This strongly supports the position that Canadian leaders wanted to preserve the Canadian image of an objective peacekeeper for the sake of international as well as domestic political expediency.

The decision to extend Canadian participation in the ICCS for a further 30 days (that is, until July 31) demonstrates again the government's concern for its credibility as well as its reaction to pressure exerted by the United States. By implication, Mr. Sharp also paid heed to the Canadian credibility regarding the extent of

its commitment to peacekeeping - for both the United States government and for the Canadian public.

The interim force in Lebanon, organized in March 1978, has a background quite different from that of the ICCS and UNEF. Contrary to both, there was no debate regarding the necessity of an East-West balance - the Soviet Union, in fact, conveyed little interest in the issue at all. Several months earlier, the Canadian government made it known that Canada was willing to consider participation in a future Lebanon peacekeeping force if one were proposed,⁹⁴ but Mr. Jamieson said in the House of Commons later, that "insofar as we have been able to determine, it is unlikely that we will be asked to participate... because of the large number of Canadian forces already in the Middle East region."⁹⁵ The Secretary-General, however, being hard pressed to find another contributor, requested that Canada take part.

The time limit of six months set by the Canadian government reflects its assessment that, due to the large number of Canadian communications and other logistics personnel already serving with the United Nations in the

Middle East, the Canadian Armed Forces would be over-taxed if more troops were supplied or if they stayed longer.⁹⁶ At the same time, the probable success of the operation was in doubt due to the lack of co-operation of all the combatants in the zone of conflict. As such, not all of the Canadian government's "conditions" for participation were satisfied. A temporary Canadian commitment was therefore made because while the government was satisfied that enough of Canada's conditions were met to justify a contribution, the lack of capability necessitated a maximum six month mandate.⁹⁷

The factor which permits the Trudeau government to consider short-term peacekeeping commitments lies again in the government's perception of the sources of international conflict in the Third World. The government's decisions to withdraw from both the ICCS and UNIFIL reflect the belief that, because conflicts in the Third World are not always Soviet inspired, a Canadian withdrawal would not be a defeat for the West and a victory for the East as previous Canadian administrations had believed.⁹⁸

In the case of the ICCS, the motives connected with Alliance interests were short-term, i.e. get the United

States out of Vietnam, and as such, when the task was accomplished, the Canadian government felt Canada's services were no longer required. UNIFIL involves no overt East-West motives at all, as witnessed by the absence of Soviet interest in the force's authorization or content. Because the Canadian government felt that no Western interests were at stake, the Canadian contribution was short term only.

Only the Cyprus peacekeeping force continues to involve Alliance motives, even though government leaders do not refer to them in the United Nations. As such, while the government remains disappointed at the lack of progress to find a political solution to the underlying problems, and at the fact that the force itself is some \$50 million in debt,⁹⁹ the government does not withdraw or even threaten to withdraw.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Canadian participation in international peacekeeping during the Trudeau administration has been conceived out of the functionalist principle whereby Canada takes part in international activities commensurate with its capabilities, its opportunities, its constraints and its interests. Although the term "middle power" is still widely used, it does not connote exactly the same meaning to the leaders of the Trudeau government as it did to the leaders of previous Canadian governments. "Middle Power" is not generalized as it was in the past. In accordance with the functionalist principle, Canada is a middle power in some respects, a small power in other respects and a great power in still others.

The functionalism of the government of Prime Minister Trudeau attempts to focus on the issues where Canada is most influential and effective - that is, socio-economic issues. But, although peace and security was originally rated at a lower priority than other themes, its emphasis "primarily depends on the extent to which it is challenged or has to be used at any given time to safeguard national interests."¹⁰⁰

External challenges to Canada's peace and security emanate from two basic sources maintain present Canadian leaders. They come from the traditional confrontation with the Soviet Union and associated Cold War conflicts and economic disparities out of the antagonisms caused by economic disparities in the Third World. Military security and economic security are perceived to go hand in hand in the pursuit of international stability and human betterment.

The Trudeau government has exercised Canada's rights and responsibilities as a member of the international community when these challenges to peace and security have arisen. Canada has participated in peacekeeping in response to conflagrations which have threatened to expand and thereby generalize conflicts, especially if direct military intervention by the superpowers is threatened. The threats made by the Soviet Union and the response by the United States during the 1973 Middle East crisis confirmed that superpower conflict was imminent at that time. The Middle East conflict and the resulting oil embargo highlighted the Trudeau government's parallel concern over economic security and the maintenance of military security.

Canada supports the United Nations by attempting to enhance that organization's role in the maintenance of international peace and security. In doing so, Canada also enhances the ability of smaller countries (including Canada) to make their own contribution to international well being, as well as exhibit their individual and collective "independence" of the superpowers. By actively participating in peacekeeping and promoting an image of objectivity and fair-mindedness, Canadian leaders seek to gain recognition for autonomous decision-making. In turn, this would advance the Canadian "fact" not only in North America, but in international affairs generally.

Notwithstanding that the Canadian government views Canada's approach to international peacekeeping as being independent and impartial, it is recognized that the Canadian contribution to some peacekeeping operations is meant as a "balance". Government leaders believed that neither UNEF nor the ICCS could act impartially without Western representation, which therefore implies that Canada's Western point of view would offset the "biased" orientation of the other contributors.

Canada has participated in peacekeeping to sustain

or enhance intra-alliance unity and good will. Canada's continued involvement in UNFICYP and short-lived part in the ICCS demonstrate the willingness to peacekeep in order to avoid a deterioration in the relations among Canada's friends and between Canada and its friends.

Canadian influence, according to the Trudeau government, is modest. Even though the pursuit of influence and prestige is not a stated objective of the government, it still is a necessary ingredient to the practice of diplomacy and peacekeeping does provide "international brownie points", as one Department of External Affairs official has maintained.¹⁰¹ The evidence suggests that the influence and prestige motive is mainly used by the Trudeau government in a negative way. That is to say, Canada participates in peacekeeping in order not to lose prestige or the reputation that Canada has gained from past participation. At the same time, government leaders insist that Canada will only participate in peacekeeping if there is a chance it will be successful. Canada does not want to be part of a failure. This is usually voiced in the context of other Canadian motives, such as the promotion of peaceful negotiations and the cessation of hostilities, but the

desire to avoid the fate of UNEF I and the ICC also indicates that there is some propensity to avoid embarrassment, at home and abroad.

The establishment of the peacekeeping forces in the Middle East in 1973-1974 marked a turning point in the government's promotion of the Canadian peacekeeping role. The national and international pessimism regarding the future of peacekeeping during the 1960's and early 1970's brought to an end the government's promotion of the role because of its seeming futility: "The work of peacekeeping is not glamorous. It is costly. It is frustrating. It does not directly assist narrow Canadian national interests."¹⁰² After 1973, due to greater consensus within the Security Council regarding the establishment of peacekeeping, it has become easier to institute and the viability of successful peacekeeping operations has increased. Peacekeeping is again in vogue and, in the face of continuing public support for the peacekeeping role, the rhetoric connecting peacekeeping and a Canadian role in international affairs has returned.

In July 1975, External Affairs Minister MacEachen spoke to a Canadian audience on his observations that Canada has become recognized as the peacekeeper "par excellence" due to Canada's past record of participation and hence has gained a reputation for objectivity and professional competence.¹⁰³ By March 1978, the External Affairs Minister, now Don Jamieson, is saying that it is difficult to know what role Canada should play in areas such as the Middle East. But every time the issue is examined, he says, the conclusion has been that peacekeeping is the most appropriate role: "The conclusion has been that it is something that not only fits our capabilities as Canadians, but is it something that also fits our character as Canadians."¹⁰⁴ The effects of this motive result in the promotion of a national identity which aids in the promotion of, for example, an independent foreign policy and ultimately, the Trudeau government's primary goal, national unity.

The Canadian government's past willingness to take part, and the reputation Canada has gained from participation in peacekeeping has, however, led to a dilemma for Canadian leaders. Because of its support for

the principle of peacekeeping, Canada has always voted in favour of establishing peacekeeping operations (in the instances in the UN where Canada could vote). Canada's support for the principle of peacekeeping has implied to other countries, as well as for individuals like the UN Secretary-General, support for active participation and hence Canada is always asked to participate by contributing troops.

The problems that the leaders of the Trudeau government face in the light of requests to participate in the ICCS and in UNIFIL reflect a dilemma. On one hand, Canada's commitment to the principle of peacekeeping, combined with other more specific motives, compel Canada to take part. On the other hand, the obvious futility of the operation, or, in the case of UNIFIL, the lack of an adequate capability on the part of the Canadian Armed Forces, have posed doubts as to the usefulness of a Canadian contribution. The situation, as summarized by Mr. Jamieson, "comes back to the question of whether we want to help under the best conditions we can establish, or simply wash our hands of the whole matter."¹⁰⁵ The result, in the final analysis, has been to do both: to participate, but only on a temporary basis.

NOTES

1. Canada: Department of External Affairs: Foreign Policy for Canadians (FPC), pp. 18-19.
2. Mitchell Sharp, former Minister for External Affairs, qualified this principle to a certain extent by indicating that Canada's contribution to the UN will be based not only on Canada's capabilities but also those of the UN: The Canadian "yardstick ought to be the capacity of the UN to perform the functions which are its proper responsibility and on which there can be at any time a reasonable measure of agreement." Department of External Affairs: Statements and Speeches (SS) 68/15, Speech to the General Assembly, October 9, 1968.
3. D. Jamieson: SS 78/2, Speech to the Empire Club, March 2, 1978, Toronto. Hence the altered priorities of FPC giving more emphasis to socio-economic issues and less to peace and security.
4. As suggested by J. Holmes: Canada: A Middle Aged Power, p. vi.
5. FPC, p. 8.
6. A. Inglis: "The Changing World of 1950 - 1975", International Perspectives, November/December 1975, p. 7.
7. J. Eayrs: "Canada's Emergence as a Foremost Power", International Perspectives, May/June 1975, p. 24.
8. The most obvious reason is a shorter time period - ten years as opposed to the twenty from 1948-68. Many of the other reasons are reviewed in Chapter Three.
9. D. Jamieson: Secretary of State for External Affairs: Statement, Speech to the UN General Assembly, September 26, 1977.
10. D. MacDonald: Defence in the 70's, p. 4.
11. Ibid., pp. 6-7.

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12. For example: A. Inglis: "Peacekeeping and Peacemaking Should be Reviewed Together", International Perspectives, January/February 1975;
J. Holmes: Letter to the Author, April 27, 1978;
D. Jamieson: Statement, September 26, 1977, op. cit.
In Mr. Jamieson's statement, he said that Canada responded to peacekeeping requests "because we believe this to be a significant way to contribute to world peace." He stated that while the greatest problem is direct superpower confrontation, he also blames small states for causing conflicts, which "are all the more reprehensible when they risk or even invite the escalation of East-West tensions."
13. D. Jamieson: SS 78/2, op. cit.
14. (Quoting PM Trudeau in the media in 1968.) B. Thordardson: Trudeau and Foreign Policy: A Study in Decision Making, p. 70.
15. D. Jamieson: Statement, Speech to the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, September 20, 1977.
16. D. Jamieson: SS 78/2, op. cit.
See also:
W. Barton: SS 77/12, Speech to UN Security Council, June 15, 1977.
R. Stanbury: Canadian Delegation to the United Nations: Communique, 76/49, Speech to UN General Assembly, December 6, 1976.
A. MacEachen: SS 75/12, Speech to the Canada-Israel Committee, April 30, 1975.
A. MacEachen: SS 74/16, Speech to the UN General Assembly, November 20, 1974.
17. M. Sharp: "Weighing a New Peacekeeping Role", International Perspectives, January/February 1973, p. 17.
18. J.K. Gordon: "Specific Policies Must Reflect a Return of a Global Perspective", International Perspectives, September/October 1976, p. 6.
19. S. Rae: Canadian Delegation to the United Nations Communique, 75/27, Speech to the General Assembly, November 13, 1975.

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20. The subsequent Canadian Ambassador to the UN, William Barton, does not mention this aspect at all in his statements regarding the renewals of UNFICYP. See, for example, SS 77/20, November 8, 1977 and Communique 76/38, November 11, 1976. Both Speeches to the UN General Assembly.
21. F. Leblanc: SS 77/12, Address to a Public Affairs Seminar, June 15, 1977.
22. The public debate, however, centred on geographical representation, not on political representation, but as John Saywell admits, "the precedent is now set - Canada should expect to be seen by others as a representative of NATO". Canadian Annual Review of Politics and Public Affairs - 1973, p. 255.
23. W. Dobell: "A Sow's Ear in Vietnam", International Journal, V. 29, Summer 1974, p. 360.
24. D. Jamieson: Statement, September 26, 1977, op. cit.
25. Canada: Department of External Affairs: United Nations Foreign Policy for Canadians (UNFPC), p. 7.
26. Ibid., 16.
27. A. MacEachen: SS 75/12, op. cit.
28. W. Barton: SS 77/20, Speech to UN General Assembly, November 8, 1977.
29. Ibid.
30. Report of statements made by External Affairs Minister Jamieson to Greek and Turkish leaders in Cyprus, June, 1978, in Ottawa Citizen, June 26, 1978.
31. Ibid.
32. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3379 (1975), November 10, 1975.
33. C.V. Svoboda: "Recap of the 30th General Assembly: A Demonstration of Resilience", International Perspectives, May/June 1976, p. 16.

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34. W. Barton: Communique 77/7, Speech to the UN Association of Canada, May 13, 1977.
35. D. Jamieson: Statement, Testimony to the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defense, April 13, 1978.
36. FPC, p. 8.
37. Toronto Globe and Mail, October 17, 1973.
38. A. Inglis: "Peacekeeping and Peacemaking...", op. cit., p. 34.
39. S. Scott: "MacEachen Finds His Policy Acceptable in the Middle East", International Perspectives, May/June 1976, p. 4.
40. See Table 3: "Elite Conceptions of Canadian Roles" from the Canadian International Image Study.
41. H. Wiseman: "Peacekeeping: Début or Dénueement?" Behind the Headlines, February 1972, p. 12.
42. Canada: House of Commons: Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defense (SCEAND): Proceedings, Issue # 7, March 21, 1973, p. 27. Further explanation of Mr. Sharp's testimony is found on p. 159.
43. M. Sharp: Telephone Interview, May 17, 1978.
44. United Nations Security Council Resolution 425 (1978), March 19, 1978.
45. Lt-Col. G.R. Harper: Interview, May 30, 1978.
46. Thus maintains External Affairs Minister Jamieson: SS 78/2, op. cit.
47. M. Sharp: "Vietnam: Canada's Approach to Participation in the International Commission for Control and Supervision, October 25, 1972 - March 27, 1973", p. 2.
48. Ibid., p. 4.
49. Ibid., p. 6.

Table 3
Elite Conceptions of Canadian Roles*

	United Nations	Law of the Sea	NATO	East West Relations	North America	GATT	Commonwealth	Francophone	AVERAGE
	Foreign N = 93 Canadian N = 425	Foreign N = 78 Canadian N = 362	Foreign N = 84 Canadian N = 336	Foreign N = 76 Canadian N = 340	Foreign N = 78 Canadian N = 351	Foreign N = 74 Canadian N = 329	Foreign N = 79 Canadian N = 368	Foreign N = 75 Canadian N = 353	Foreign N = 75 Canadian N = 353
LEADERSHIP ROLES	11% 10%	32% 67%	7% 5%	7% 11%	1% 7%	4% 19%	10% 18%	12% 17%	10% 24%
Leader	6 6	9 43	1 2	3 4	1 2	4 9	4 32	4 19	3 14
Initiator	5 4	23 24	6 3	4 7	1 5	4 10	6 6	8 18	7 10
ACTIVIST ROLES	62% 54%	13% 4%	13% 9%	39% 33%	3% 3%	5% 7%	29% 28%	21% 27%	23% 19%
Community Builder	3 4	7 2	4 2	- 4	1 3	2 2	5 8	4 11	3 5
Mediator	20 21	5 2	4 2	23 14	- -	4 4	9 9	3 3	8 4
Communicator	3 3	- -	5 1	9 12	2 -	1 1	8 4	8 3	5 3
Peacekeeper	33 23	- -	- 3	7 3	- -	- -	1 1	1 -	5 4
Aid Donor	3 5	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	6 6	5 13	2 3
PASSIVE ROLES	22% 26%	7% 4%	53% 50%	10% 20%	40% 47%	25% 32%	52% 31%	47% 13%	27% 27%
Former Organization Maintainer	4 5	4 3	47 38	9 16	39 44	14 20	41 16	4 10	20 19
Democracy Follower	18 17	3 1	11 12	1 4	1 3	11 12	11 15	- 3	7 8
Democracy Follower	2% 5%	22% 22%	20% 28%	18% 26%	30% 29%	22% 36%	2% 2%	15% 15%	17% 20%
Self-seeker	- 1	19 21	- 5	- 4	26 21	15 27	1 1	8 12	8 11
Follow-up	2 4	3 1	20 23	18 22	13 8	7 9	1 1	7 3	9 9
OTHER	- 1%	- 1%	1% 3%	1% 2%	5% 9%	2% 5%	1% 1%	5% 4%	2% 3%
No Particular Role or No Answer	2% 7%	27% 1%	7% 4%	25% 7%	12% 3%	43% 12%	5% 1%	43% 3%	20% 3%
	93% 100	101 99	101 99	100 99	100 98	101 100	99 102	100 99	

* Percentages of all mentions. For a description of the 71 members of the foreign elite, and the 303 members of the Canadian elite, see Chapter 5. The relevant interviews were conducted between May 1975 and January 1976. Differences from 100% are due to rounding.

NOTES

50. C. Taylor: Snow Job, op. cit., p. 179.
51. M. Sharp: Telephone Interview, May 17, 1978.
52. Lt-Col. G.R. Harper: interview, May 30, 1978; and C. Taylor: Snow Job, op. cit., p. 156. Advance preparation was also necessary because the military, says Col. Harper, being a large and complex organization, needs ample lead time in order to efficiently plan and put into operation any action, especially one which involves the use of personnel not normally members of the same unit.
53. M. Sharp: "Vietnam...", op. cit., p. 24.
54. New York Times, May 31, 1973.
55. P.V. Lyon: Interview, April 20, 1978. That is, Canada's self-image as well as international image.
56. A. MacEachern: "The Challenge of Continuity: Directions for Foreign Policy", International Perspectives, November/December 1975, p. 63.
57. The rhetoric does, however, seem to be returning as peacekeeping regains its "good" reputation. See Conclusion to this Chapter.
58. M. Sharp: SS 69/20, Speech to House of Commons, November 19, 1969.
59. T. Ismael: "Canada and the Middle East", in: P. Lyon and T. Ismael (eds): Canada and the Third World, p. 266.
60. Ibid., p. 271.
61. M. Sharp: SS 73/23, Speech to House of Commons, November 14, 1973.
62. Ottawa Citizen, October 19, 1973.
63. Ibid., October 26, 1973.
64. Toronto Globe and Mail, November 1, 1973.

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65. While accepting Polish membership on UNEF, Mr. Sharp and the Americans believed that no Warsaw Pact state could be objective, thereby implying again that Canadian policy was sufficiently independent of the United States whereas Poland's was not independent of the Soviet Union. Toronto Globe and Mail, November 3, 1973.
Contrary to this view, Arnold Smith maintains that Poland desires to participate in peacekeeping in order to demonstrate its independence from the Soviet Union. Even in this sense, however, a parallel can be deduced regarding independence in Canadian motives. Arnold Smith: Interview, April 19, 1978.
66. A. MacEachen: SS 76/1, Statement to Press in Cairo, Egypt, January 12, 1976.
67. Quoting A. MacEachen in S. Scott: "MacEachen Finds His Policy...", op. cit., p. 24.
68. D. Jamieson: SS 78/2, op. cit.
69. Ibid. (emphasis in original)
70. Which, in turn, may indicate that Canada's policy is perceived to be relatively balanced even by the Arab states. The extent to which Canada's role in the area as a peacekeeper contributes to the Arab perception is unclear and merits future investigation. It is, however, beyond the scope of this study.
71. A. MacEachen: SS 74/16, Speech to General Assembly, November 20, 1974.
72. P. Dobell: Canada's Search for New Roles, p. 135.
73. P.V. Lyon: Interview, April 20, 1978.
74. Lt-Col. Harper: Interview, May 30, 1978.
75. For example, the Toronto Globe and Mail of May 19, 1967, reported that Mr. Martin had publicly criticized U Thant. On May 22, one Globe editor noted that the "peacekeepers were stepping back but they still remained our best hope."

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76. Quoted in D.C. Thomson and R.F. Swanson: Canadian Foreign Policy: Options and Perspectives, p. 118.
77. House of Commons: SCEAND: Report, Issue # 31, May 1970, p. 29.
78. M. Prud'homme: Communiqué 74/32, Speech to the Special Political Committee, November 15, 1974.
Mr. Sharp maintains that the Secretary-General obviously counted Canada as critical to the success of UNEF by the pressure the Secretary-General put on the Soviets to allow Canadian participation.
Interview, May 17, 1978.
79. House of Commons: SCEAND: Proceedings, Issue # 8, March 15, 1977, pp. 28-29.
80. P.V. Lyon: Interview, April 20, 1978.
81. The accusations were made by Claude Wagner in the House of Commons. House of Commons: Debates, November 14, 1973, pp. 7802-7803.
82. Mr. Sharp: Telephone Interview, May 17, 1978.
83. House of Commons: Debates: October 22, 1973, p. 7075.
See also: October 15, 1973, p. 6857 and October 16, 1974, pp. 6927-6934, for further instances.
84. Ibid., November 14, 1973, p. 7802.
85. Canadian commercial ties with the Arab Middle East have grown substantially since 1973. See L.A. Delvoie: "The Growth of Economic Relations of Canada and the Arab World", International Perspectives, November/December 1974.
86. T. Keenleyside: Letter to the Author, May 26, 1978.
87. J. Gellner: "International Peacekeeping: Does It Have A Future?", International Perspectives, September/October 1973, p. 23.
88. In February 1973, Mr. Sharp announced in the House of Commons that: "if we are likely to be drawn again into an exercise of futility and frustration, as the previous Commission had become, we shall decide to withdraw," Quoted from M. Goldblatt: "Canada's Role in Vietnam", International Perspectives, March/April 1973, p. 48.

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89. "Mitchell Sharp was less committed in principle to the virtues of peacekeeping; and readier to be deterred by their shortcomings." W. Dobell: "A Sow's Ear in Vietnam", op. cit., p. 392.
90. J. Gellner: "International Peacekeeping..." op. cit., p. 23.
91. The Trudeau government, in fact, counted on the success of the open mouth policy to stay in power. William Dobell maintains that the Progressive Conservatives opposed Canadian participation on the ICCS and because "the opposition's role is to oppose... the number of things that could go wrong in Vietnam made it too valuable an issue to sacrifice to non-partisanship. The opposition had declined to accompany the Minister to Vietnam, and the NDP, holding the balance of power in the House, became nearly indispensable." W. Dobell: "A Sow's Ear In Vietnam", op. cit., pp. 363-365, 388.
92. House of Commons: SCEAND: Proceedings, Issue # 7, March 21, 1973, p. 14.
93. Ibid., p. 27.
94. According to External Affairs Minister Jamieson: Debates, March 17, 1978, p. 3873.
95. Ibid., March 21, 1978, p. 3970.
96. W. Barton: Communique 78/4, April 20, 1978, Speech to Fifth Committee.
97. Debates, April 18, 1978, p. 4602-3.
98. C. Taylor: Snow Job, op. cit., p. 35.
99. D. Jamieson: SS 77/17, Speech to the UN General Assembly, September 26, 1977.
100. FPC, p. 32.
101. N. McDonnell: Interview, May 4, 1978.

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102. House of Commons: SCEAND: Report, May 1970, op. cit.,
p. 29.
103. A. MacEachen: SS 75/25, Speech to United Nations
Seminar, July 4, 1975.
104. D. Jamieson: SS 78/2, op. cit.
105. Debates: May 4, 1978, p. 5142

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION

The motives for Canadian participation in international peacekeeping during the "internationalist" era, from the end of the Second World War to the end of Prime Minister Pearson's administration, and during the Trudeau era, from 1968 until the present, have been observed. The task of this chapter is to compare and contrast the "motivational-mixes" of the two eras and to attempt to draw some conclusions about differences or similarities that are apparent. Further, this chapter attempts to make some suggestions as to why changes in Canada's motivational-mix have occurred and to offer some prognostications regarding future Canadian attitudes towards international peacekeeping.

Canadian foreign policy, during the "internationalist" era as well as during the Trudeau era, is based upon the premise that Canada is a middle-sized power whose government believes that the principle of functionalism should dictate what Canada's foreign policy should be and how it is to be achieved. But while the nomenclature has remained the same, the underlying conception of the two terms, middle power and functionalism, has changed considerably.

The functionalism espoused by the internationalists was based on the belief that Canada's contribution to global peace and security ought to be commensurate with Canada's contribution to the Allied victory in the Second World War. The technical and military strength that Canada possessed at the end of the war was considerable. It was felt by the Canadian leadership that an active Canadian presence in both peace and security as well as socio-economic areas would ensure that Canada's interests and opinions were voiced and also that the great powers would not therefore be able to ignore Canada in deciding international issues.

The government of Pierre Trudeau, whose experience is removed from the impact of World War Two, believes that Canada's contribution to global security, and Canada's foreign policy in general, ought to be based upon how Canadians perceive their aims and interests and that foreign policy should be directly related to national policies pursued within Canada. The Trudeau government's belief that "what Canada can hope to accomplish in the world must be viewed not only in the light of Canadian aspirations, needs and wants but in terms of what is, from time to time, attainable"¹, indicates a more modest and pragmatic approach

to global affairs. The negative point of view concerning former Canadian governments' tendencies to emphasize roles and influence in foreign policy was an attempt to eliminate the notion that Canada's position as a middle power meant that Canada ought to play the "traditional middle power role" of a peacekeeper or "helpful fixer" in international affairs. Contrary to the "internationalists", the Trudeau administration does not perceive a specific role for Canada (particularly that of a helpful fixer), because it would imply "a reactive rather than active concern with world events, which no longer corresponds with international realities or the Government's approach to foreign policy."²

While the Trudeau government agrees with the internationalists regarding the importance of peacemaking after peacekeeping has been established, it limits peacemaking activities to "more actively [finding] ways of moving negotiations in the right direction."³ It attempts to stay away from mediating or a direct involvement in the actual negotiating process. Occasions where the internationalists offered Canada's "good offices" to mediate conflicts in areas where Canada already served as a peacekeeper or where Canadian leaders thought it might be beneficial, often did more to harm Canada's eligibility for

undertaking such activities than it did to benefit it. Paul Martin's "solution offering" regarding the expulsion of UNEF in 1967, for example, was "a very effective way of being declared persona non grata in a peacekeeping force."⁴

In the Systemic Sphere, as this paper has defined it, the Trudeau administration differs quite substantially from the internationalists on several elements of the motivational-mix. During both eras, Canadian leaders have consistently maintained that Canada participates in international peacekeeping in order to preserve international order and prevent superpower confrontation. However, the underlying conception of the sources of conflict in the areas where peacekeeping has been instituted, that is, in the Third World, has altered. It has been observed that conflict in the Third World, as perceived by the internationalists, was caused by the expansionist ambitions of the Communist countries, primarily the Soviet Union. Peacekeeping then, was instituted to restore peace locally in an area of conflict, and also to thwart Communist expansion.

The Suez crisis of 1956, while precipitated by Britain,

France and Israel, created a chain of events that Canadian leaders felt would benefit no one but Moscow. The Cyprus peacekeeping force of 1964 was instituted in part because of concern over the consequences of a potential Soviet naval expansion into the Mediterranean area. The peacekeeping force in the Congo was motivated partly in order to prevent the Soviet Union from gaining a foothold in sub-Saharan Africa. That the Soviet Union was left out of the process of establishing and participating in UN peacekeeping forces altogether indicates that the peacekeeping concept was, on the whole, meant to serve Western interests and not those of the East. (The Congo force was established by a decision of the Security Council, as was the Cyprus force, but no East bloc member was ever asked to contribute a contingent or to have a voice in their direction).

Due to the growing feeling of detente and hence the reduction of the perceived Soviet threat, together with the increasing need for global economic and social reforms, the Trudeau government sees conflict in the Third World as inspired by basic economic disparities:

International co-operation in the post-war period has created a considerable momentum in the drive to reduce world poverty, and if this momentum is lost there could be a significant impairment

in the relationships between the more industrialized and the less-developed nations of the world with serious, perhaps tragic, consequences for world peace and order.⁵

Canadian involvement in Cyprus, according to the leaders of the Trudeau government, is primarily due to Canada's membership in the United Nations and the Commonwealth whereas the peacekeeping force's connection with the Western Alliance is notably de-emphasized. The insistence by the Trudeau government that peacekeeping forces be authorized by the United Nations Security Council demonstrates the desire to ensure Soviet involvement in the direction of peacekeeping, and hence indicates the government's belief that peacekeeping should be in harmony with Soviet interests and not in opposition to them. The Canadian government participated in the ICCS even though it was outside the United Nations in part because both superpowers concurred that the United Nations would be an unsuitable forum. This of course is part of the larger issue regarding the necessity of superpower consensus before any action can be undertaken on issues of international peace and security. The altered American perception regarding the usefulness of the General Assembly in promoting peacekeeping contributed substantially to the United States'

reversion to Security Council supremacy.

The change in perception regarding the sources of international conflict in the Third World has had subsequent repercussions on other motives within the Systemic Sphere. The desire to preserve the institution of the United Nations persists in what has been referred to as "systems maintenance". The efforts of the United Nations during the internationalist era of Canadian external relations were focussed upon easing conflicts that resulted from the dislocation caused by the decolonization process and the threat to the newly emerging, ex-colonial countries from the Communists. The leaders of the Trudeau administration take the view that the decolonization process is over and the North-South dialogue has begun, with a resultant shift towards concentrating on socio-economic issues and development and away from politico-military issues that formerly prevailed.

The Trudeau government continues, however, to perceive an East-West context in peacekeeping. While maintaining that Canadian participation is based upon an impartial or objective view point, and that Canada does not represent any particular side or country, Canada continues to consider

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the positions of its allies before any "political" decisions are made regarding areas where Canada participates in peacekeeping. At the same time, the position that certain peacekeeping operations would not be impartial without a Canadian or at least a Western contingent, further indicates the Trudeau government's perception that peacekeeping in part, remains within the East-West context.

The pursuit of influence and prestige in the Canadian motivational-mix for peacekeeping participation during the internationalist era arose out of the relative decline of Canadian influence in relation to the rest of the members of the global system during the latter 1950's and 1960's. The generalization of the middle power role in international affairs and the propensity to base decision-making upon the premise that peacekeeping was a uniquely Canadian role in international affairs, led the internationalists to base the Canadian reputation in international affairs upon peacekeeping participation - hence making peacekeeping both the cause and the result of Canada's reputation for impartiality and objectiveness. The rhetoric concerning Canadian leadership and mediatory qualities both by the Diefenbaker and Pearson governments created the situation where, in the final analysis, the prestige of Canada was

dependent upon the success of peacekeeping.

The UN ordeal in the Congo, the abrupt termination of the peacekeeping role in the Middle East in 1967, coupled with the growing number of seemingly insuperable problems that peacekeeping had encountered over the years, has caused the Trudeau government to attempt to broaden the basis upon which the impartial Canadian reputation is judged, especially in the Middle East. Peacekeeping participation, however, continues to bestow a good reputation in international affairs as is noted by the Trudeau government's reluctance to decline peacekeeping requests, even though it is argued by government leaders that the success of the operation is in doubt or that Canada's manpower capabilities no longer meet the requirements of the job. Argued in the converse, a refusal to participate in peacekeeping when requested, as was pointed out in the cases of the ICCS as well as UNIFIL, might compromise the Trudeau government's credibility regarding its peacekeeping commitment. In this way, the influence and prestige motive is used in an opposite sense by the Trudeau government than it was by the internationalists. While the internationalists wanted to enhance Canadian influence and prestige by participating in peacekeeping,

the Trudeau administration desires to avoid the loss of prestige that non-participation might bring about. Part of this problem is caused by the international peacekeeper image that persists in the perceptions of many members of the international community, which the Trudeau government, the evidence suggests, wants to retain.

On the regional level, the internationalists as well as the Trudeau administration conceive Western alliance unity to be of significant value. But whereas alliance unity per se is not directly referred to by the Trudeau government in the peacekeeping context, as it was during the internationalist era - Suez and Cyprus being the most significant examples - the Trudeau government does admit that before decisions are made on Canadian policy in areas where Canada participates in peacekeeping activities, as was mentioned earlier, the positions of Canada's allies are considered first. Emphasis, however, is placed upon bilateral relations rather than upon the unity or strength of the Western alliance as a whole. The Canadian motives for participation in the ICCS, for example, were particularly directed toward preserving Canada's relations with the United States and not as a result of a need to protect the Western alliance or preserve the unity of the alliance.

Also, the Cyprus force is motivated by concern for Canada's "friends in the Mediterranean area" and not directly connected with the alliance itself, as it was originally by then External Affairs Minister, Paul Martin.

Independence in foreign policy has been a consistent motive in Canadian peacekeeping policy since its inception. As an alternative to Canada's military alliances, peacekeeping participation (particularly United Nations peacekeeping) is seen as a military activity to which Canada can contribute without being directly identified with the Western alliance, and especially the United States. International organizations, being the guarantors of Canada's independence, became the focus of Canada's independent foreign policy during the internationalist era, and since peacekeeping was seen as the most distinctive contribution Canada could make to international peace and security, peacekeeping within international organizations became identified as the foundation for an independent Canadian foreign policy. The Canadian role in Suez, although highly "alliance" motivated, confirmed the connotation of the independent middle power role in the United Nations.

Disillusionment regarding the value of peacekeeping

participation in the enhancement of Canadian foreign policy, on the part of the Trudeau government, brought about its decreased emphasis in the priorities of Canadian foreign and defence policy. The "official" demotion was contained in Foreign Policy for Canadians in 1970 and the 1971 White Paper on Defence, Defence in the 70's. At the same time, the Trudeau government wished to discard the conception that peacekeeping was a uniquely Canadian role, but it retained the notion that peacekeeping participation exhibited an image that could be separated from Canada's place in the Western Alliance.

Cognizant of the dangers of basing a reputation for an independent foreign policy upon peacekeeping alone,⁶ the Trudeau government has since attempted to broaden the base of Canada's "independent" reputation by expanding its relations with countries which, in the past, had generally been neglected, particularly the Arab countries in the Middle East. The government feels that a policy based upon a balance of interests rather than a lack of interest would better promote Canada's ability to be effectively independent in its point of view. Canada's new role in the Middle East, Mr. MacEachen said in 1976, is to be "a carrier and explainer of policies."⁷

The most visible manifestation of the expansion of Canada's relations with the Arab Middle East during the Trudeau administration has been the establishment, between 1973 and 1976, of embassies in Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Saudi Arabia and Iraq, as well as numerous trade missions.⁸ The Trudeau government has attempted to diversify the foundation of the independent Canadian foreign policy in other areas as well; the establishment of the "contractual link" with the European Community being the most obvious example.

In order to ensure that Canada's participation in international peacekeeping remains "independent", the Trudeau government has made a "condition" of participation that all parties to the particular conflict must accept the Canadian contribution. The insistence that all four parties to the Paris agreements regarding the Vietnam war formally invite Canada to participate in the ICCS was an attempt to down-play the charges that Canada merely represented the interests of the United States. The fact that Canada was primarily interested in United States relations, and in getting the Americans out of Vietnam, was to have no bearing upon the way Canadians would conduct themselves in the carrying out of the ICCS mandate.

Canadian motives within the Domestic Sphere also underwent revisions when Prime Minister Trudeau assumed office. The impact that Canadian leaders have had on the evolution of Canadian foreign policy has been substantial. Canadian foreign policy during the internationalist era was as much identified with the personality of Lester Pearson as the present government's foreign policy is identified with the personality of Pierre Trudeau. But the major impact that these individuals have had upon Canadian foreign policy concerned style rather than substance. The pragmatic inventiveness of Lester Pearson in 1956 regarding the Canadian peacekeeping role had, by 1967 become dogma. In effect, the middle power peacekeeper/mediator role was a myth: "Pearson's triumph in 1956 then has to be seen as the last hurrah of the golden age of Canadian diplomacy rather than as the beginning of a new era of influence."⁹ The theory of Canadian foreign policy, after 1956, fell behind the reality:

By the time theorists had begun to define a middle power role for Canada, based upon the record of honest brokerage, culminating in Suez 1956, the effectiveness of the role was already being challenged by new alignments of the powers and shifting patterns in the UN.¹⁰

The object of Pierre Trudeau in the Foreign Policy

Review was to reinstitute the pragmatic elements of Canadian foreign policy. The approach to the peacekeeping role was to change, but the role itself was to remain a major component of Canadian foreign policy activities. The alterations in Canada's approach to peacekeeping participation centred on the differences in political philosophy of Prime Minister Trudeau and the traditional internationalists, particularly Paul Martin. To Pierre Trudeau, a foreign policy based upon national interests meant that Canada would not be automatically obliged to participate in peacekeeping because of its relatively minor impact upon the over-all affairs of global peace and security. To Paul Martin, on the other hand, the middle power role automatically placed Canada in the role of peacekeeper and, as such, Canada was compelled to react to all issues regarding global peace and security. Although Paul Martin's speeches tended to grow more cautious by 1987, the evidence suggests that he had no intention of altering his basic philosophy.

The resultant behavior of the internationalists, perpetuated the Canadian self-image that was created in 1956. The peacekeeping role was perceived by the general public to be a "noble effort" and an altruistic activity which created

a distinctive Canadian personality." The motives of the Diefenbaker government for participation in the Congo, were partly the desire to sustain the Canadian national identity that resulted from the Suez role in 1956. The Martin-Pearson years heightened the promotion of the image and even formalized the peacekeeping role in Canada's official defence policy.

The public disenchantment in peacekeeping espoused by the Trudeau government in the 1970 Foreign Policy Review was, in reality, the disenchantment on the part of the leadership. The many problems and frustrations that peacekeeping participation had caused led to the Trudeau government's perception that peacekeeping no longer promoted a beneficial national identity and, as a result, peacekeeping as a Canadian defence policy priority was "demoted". The withdrawal from the ICCS marked the Trudeau government's attitude towards participating in futile peacekeeping ventures. The fact that Canada participated in the first place, as well as the timing of the withdrawal, however, related to the necessity to convince the public and Parliament that Canada should withdraw. In the final analysis, this motivation derived from the desire to remain in power in the light of a minority government situation in the House of Commons.

In the presence of continued public support for Canadian participation in peacekeeping, the Trudeau government has demonstrated that it, like the internationalists, also wants to project an image of a country ready, willing and prepared to be a peacekeeper. The frantic activity of Canadian diplomats during the October, 1973, Middle East crisis, in order to ensure that Soviet objections did not force the exclusion of Canada from the proposed United Nations Emergency Force, signifies not only the desire to reassert an independent Canadian foreign policy in the Middle East, but also to recoup the international and domestic image "lost" in 1967.

The less dogmatic approach to the Canadian peacekeeping role during the Trudeau administration has curtailed the tendency of Canadian representatives during the internationalist era "to be overly legalistic or to display missionary zeal in pursuit of goals"¹¹ which, in a sense, created Canada's over-commitment in performing peacekeeping activities. But while the zeal has diminished, the self-image that peacekeeping created has remained. With the more successful record that peacekeeping has acquired since 1973, the government has begun to reassert the notion that peacekeeping is a Canadian role

and that not only Canadian talent, but also the Canadian character, is most suited to play the peacekeeper role.¹²

The motive of trade had little relevance to the internationalists as peacekeeping participation necessitated an absence of major interests in a particular conflict except for a general concern for global peace and security. Since 1973, the government has realized that Canadians for too many years have perceived the Arab Middle East "in the terms of the conflict that has marked the recent history of the [area]".¹³ Canadian policy henceforth is to consolidate and extend bilateral relations with all the countries in the Middle East region,¹⁴ which, in effect, means creating interests in the area. Although the government maintains that it has no "immediate political interests in the Middle East conflict"¹⁵, Canada's trade interests in the Middle East have grown substantially. While peace in the Middle East is not directly related to the security of Canadian oil imports (most of Canada's oil imports come from the Caribbean area), the large impact that the oil-rich states now have upon the present world economy is substantial and hence can directly affect Canada's economy. This is also consistent with the Trudeau government's perception of the equal importance of economic

and military security in international affairs.

The withdrawal of Canada from the ICCS in 1973 marked a watershed in the history of peacekeeping and of Canadian foreign policy. It signified that peacekeeping is no longer primarily within the East-West context and that a Canadian withdrawal would not be contrary to the interests of the West and, as a result, benefit the East. This is not to say that the East-West aspect is ignored by the Trudeau government. The timing of Canada's withdrawal from the ICCS was important not only for domestic reasons and the international credibility of the Canadian peacekeeping commitment, but also for strategic reasons such as United States military policy.

The withdrawal from the Interim Force in Lebanon indicates a similar perspective on the part of the Trudeau government, although the immediate reasons for withdrawal were not the same as those regarding the ICCS. That Canada has not withdrawn from the Cyprus peacekeeping force, despite the long standing financial burdens and the day-to-day problems associated with the force, indicates a continuing concern for Western alliance unity in the East-West context. But although the government refrains from threatening to withdraw, government leaders have indicated

that Canada should be "more forceful in our reminders to those directly engaged in negotiations that our participation in peacekeeping has its limits."¹⁶

Although the main purpose of this study is to determine what changes have occurred in the Canadian motivational-mix, some investigation is necessary in order to ascertain why these changes have or have not come about. From the observations previously made, it has been concluded that the alteration in the perception of peacekeeping on the part of the Trudeau government was not caused primarily by the impact of the new Prime Minister. Although Mr. Trudeau's influence had the most impact upon the decision to review Canada's foreign policy and the overall results of that review, the evolution of the peacekeeping principle itself determined to the greatest degree how Canadian attitudes also evolved. The Prime Minister served as a catalyst, but the changing perceptions regarding peacekeeping and the traditional Canadian middle power role were apparent before Mr. Trudeau came to power. Even Mr. Martin had realized by 1967 that Canada may have become over-committed to peacekeeping. The changes in the approach to peacekeeping and peacekeeping policy itself, undoubtedly would have occurred even without the influence of Prime Minister Trudeau.

International disillusionment over the primacy of the United Nations in areas of peace and security, and over the authorization, control and financing of peacekeeping operations came about, generally speaking, as a result of the Cold War. The Soviet Union and its allies were left out of the decision-making process regarding the establishment and direction of peacekeeping for the basic reason that peacekeeping was meant, in part, to support the interests of the West and oppose the spread of Communist influence. Due to the growth of the Third World, and the subsequent problems this has created for the United States in the United Nations, the lack of success of most major peacekeeping missions (that is, the lack of political negotiation and agreement that would make peacekeeping forces no longer necessary), and the seeming futility of peacekeeping in light of the many organizational and day-to-day problems that were experienced, the international community in general, including Canadians, grew pessimistic about the value of peacekeeping as a useful method of preserving international peace and security.

The arrival of the era of detente was brought about by the perception of both superpowers that their interests in many areas were, in fact, similar, and therefore there was a

need to act in conjunction rather than in opposition. As such, peacekeeping has become more important to the interests of the Soviet Union, and as a result, peacekeeping can no longer be used as a vehicle to oppose Soviet interests. The perception of the Trudeau government that conflict in the Third World is no longer precipitated by Soviet expansionism and that peacekeeping is in the interest of the Soviet Union as much as the United States, reflects the evolution of Soviet-American relations during the latter 1960's and early 1970's.

The more cautious approach to Canadian participation in peacekeeping has arisen from the past Canadian experience. The "conditions" guiding the Canadian government's decisions to participate are related to inadequacies experienced in previous peacekeeping missions - especially those peacekeeping operations which have been re-instituted after the demise of the original mission, that is, the ICCS and UNEF. The tendency to question Canadian participation in peacekeeping has eliminated the dogmatic "middle power role" conception that had grown as a result of Canadian activities during the 1950's, but it is clear that the decision-making community in Canada had already begun to question Canadian involvement before the Review was ordered, and was, in fact, one

reason why the review was ordered.

Despite the cautious, pragmatic approach of the government of Pierre Trudeau regarding peacekeeping participation, however, the relative international success of peacekeeping after 1973, combined with the continuing basic public support for the Canadian peacekeeping role, has created indications that the Trudeau government's motives for peacekeeping have returned to the promotion of an idealistic and unique Canadian activity. Peacekeeping as a role which fits Canada's capabilities as well as character¹⁷ brings back the same kind of rhetoric that was prominent during the internationalist era and was disavowed by the Trudeau government when it came to power in 1968.

Although Prime Minister Trudeau is not a traditional Canadian internationalist, his actions and, at times, his rhetoric, come close to resembling one:

In Canada, we have employed space, resources and the skills of a peace-loving, highly educated people to create a society that is, increasingly, the envy of every other in the world. But we can not disregard our responsibilities beyond our borders.... To turn inward is not a feasible course for Canadians. Economics would not permit it.... Politics would not permit it.... Ethics would not permit it.... Canada is not an island

unto itself, anymore than are Canadians. We are dependent on others as they are on us. Our acts can not be designed to enhance ourselves to the detriment of others. Equally, however, we can not permit others to exploit us whether by audacity or malice.¹⁸

In 1975, External Affairs Minister Allan MacEachen wrote that "one is struck more by the continuity than by the elements of novelty in any retrospective survey of Canadian foreign policy."¹⁹ On the surface, it can be seen that his comment is indeed valid regarding peacekeeping participation. The motivational-mix for participation in international peacekeeping will, however, continue to evolve as the future requirements of the international system evolve, as well as the perceptions by the Canadian leadership of that international system. Future Canadian considerations for participation in peacekeeping and the motives connected with them will relate substantially to the future use to which peacekeeping may be put. Alteration in the role of peacekeeping may change radically in the near future. New opportunities for peacekeeping-like observation and supervision functions may accompany future international agreements or situations where disputes have not yet become open military conflict. Peacekeeping in Namibia, for example, may involve civilians or civilian

police rather than military personnel. Any future Law of the Sea agreement will certainly necessitate some sort of dispute pacification machinery or control system. In fact, direct Canadian interests may exclude future Canadian participation, if peacekeeping does assume a role in Law of the Sea.

It is difficult to determine future Canadian intentions regarding its existing peacekeeping commitments. Increased violence in the Cyprus conflict, such as occurred in 1974, precipitated a heightened Canadian interest and, for a time, the number of Canadian peacekeepers on the island was increased. Although the Trudeau government has announced that the Canadian commitment in Cyprus has its limits, it has neglected as yet to explain exactly what those limits are. The Canadian government would, realistically, only withdraw from Cyprus with the concurrence of the United States and Great Britain and only if a suitable replacement country could be found, which does not seem likely in the near future.

As the "peace talks" continue in the Middle East after the events at Camp David, the Canadian government will find little reason for terminating prematurely its commitment in that area of conflict. Here too, however, future

developments will determine the future Canadian attitudes and predicting events in the Middle East, as recent events have demonstrated, is a most speculative venture.,

NOTES

1. Canada: Department of External Affairs: Foreign Policy for Canadians (FPC), p. 6.
2. Ibid., p. 8.
3. A. MacEachen: Department of External Affairs, Statements and Speeches (SS): 75/25, Speech to a UN Seminar, Mount Allison University, July 4, 1975.
4. D. Cox: "Peacekeeping in Canadian Foreign Policy", in: S. Clarkson (ed): An Independent Foreign Policy for Canada?, p. 196.
5. International Development (FPC), p. 8.
6. "Canada's 'traditional' middle-power role in the world seemed doomed to disappear after the United Nations ordeal in the Congo, in face of peacekeeping frustrations in Vietnam, following the collapse of the UN Emergency Force (UNEF) in 1967". Quoted in: FPC, pp. 7-8.
7. S. Scott: "MacEachen Finds His Policy Acceptable in the Middle East", International Perspectives, May/June, 1978, p. 4.
8. L.A. Delvoie: "The Growth in Economic Relations of Canada in the Arab World", International Perspectives, November/December, 1976, p. 30. Canada had only two embassies in the Arab Middle East before 1973, in Cairo and Beirut.
9. J. Granatstein: "Canada and Peacekeeping: Image and Reality", Canadian Forum, August 1974, p. 17.
10. J. Holmes: The Better Part of Valour, p. 14.
11. P. Bridle: "Canada and the International Commissions in Indochina 1954 - 1972", Behind the Headlines, October 1973, p. 26.
12. D. Jamieson: SS 78/2, Speech to Empire Club, Toronto, March 2, 1978.
13. A. MacEachen: SS 76/1, Speech to Press in Cairo, January 12, 1976.

14. A. MacEachen: SS 76/6, Speech in Jerusalem, January 19, 1976.
15. A. MacEachen: SS 76/1, op. cit.
16. A. MacEachen: SS 75/25, op. cit.
17. D. Jamieson: SS 78/2, op. cit.
18. Canada: Prime Minister: Notes for Remarks made by Prime Minister Trudeau to the Canadian Jewish Congress, Toronto, June 16, 1977. Peyton Lyon, in response to an article by Jack Granatstein lamenting the fact that "the internationalism of 1948 and the idealism of 1956 has been superceded by the neo-isolationism of 1968" and Granatstein's disillusionment with the current state of the Canadian peacekeeping role, writes that "Trudeau's foreign policy is a lot better than the Trudeau Doctrine.... Support for Canadian participation in international activities, especially those sponsored by the United Nations, is probably much steadier than [Mr. Granatstein] imagines." Letter to the Canadian Forum, October, 1974, in response to J. Granatstein: "Canada and Peacekeeping: Image and Reality", op. cit.
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