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**LA THÈSE A ÉTÉ
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An Econometric, Ecological Analysis of Communal
Politics in Belgium: 1932-1974

By

Frederic W. Borgatta

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree of Master of Arts.

Department of Political Science

Carleton University

Ottawa, Ontario

October 21, 1980

The undersigned recommend to the Faculty
of Graduate Studies acceptance of the thesis

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COMMUNAL POLITICS IN BELGIUM: 1932-1974

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Abstract

The purposes of this paper are both to answer the question "Why did communal parties arise in Belgium?", and to explain the variation in Belgian communal party support during the period 1932 to 1974. A structural communal politics model is developed that contains the following arguments.

Differential modernization increases differential social mobilization, controlling for the effect of segmented pluralism. In turn, differential social mobilization increases communal party support. Differential social mobilization also decreases interbloc migration. Increasing interbloc migration is hypothesized to decrease segmented pluralism, increases in which, decrease communal party support.

Time-series analysis revealed that increasing support for communal parties increases the differential in modernization between the communal groups. Although other factors such as declining differential social mobilization and segmented pluralism serve to modify, and diminish this result, Belgian politics will continue to remain unstable, as the political parties use the communal question as a means to obtain votes.

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Purpose and Introduction

The purpose of this essay is to provide an empirically-based explanation of the rise of linguistic-federalist parties in Belgium from 1932 to 1974. This will consist of an econometric time-series analysis of socio-economic and electoral data. A summary of the contents of this paper follows.

The approach in Chapter One will be to outline issues and key developments in Belgian electoral history and, in particular, the rise of the linguistic-federalist regional parties and federalist politics. Two appendices to Chapter one summarize the historical evolution of the linguistic-federalist parties, and outline the current party programmes by issue-area.

A theoretical model which explains the political behaviour described in Chapter One, follows in Chapter Two. It will be argued that by taking the concept modernization, in the economic and social mobilization sense, and adapting it to the study of communal politics case, one can then obtain an of the underlying processes of change, and their effect on the bases of support for communal parties. A set of behavioural hypotheses conclude the Chapter.

A review of the literature on Belgian politics follows in Chapter Three. This literature has focussed on an analysis of the social cleavages in the system and the success of the practice of elite accomodation in translating these cleavages into party support. It will be argued that

I

(there has been very little attempt in the literature) to apply a general explanatory model of the changes in Belgian electoral behaviour over time.

The measures used to operationalize the concepts of the model are found in Chapter Four, followed by a presentation of the quantitative confrontation of the hypotheses with the data in Chapter Five. A commentary on what the results of the analysis can tell us about using a general set of explanations to predict political change is found in this latter chapter.

The conclusion to the study is found in Chapter Six. In it, an examination is made of what the explanations discussed in Chapter Five mean in terms of the support for the linguistic-federalist political parties in Belgium. Various scenarios about likely future political change are put forward on the basis of that discussion.

Three addenda follow the conclusion. The first outlines the criteria used to evaluate the statistical equations. The second presents a methodology to interpret the fitted models, and the third presents the results of tests of the residuals to determine the degree to which the assumptions of statistical theory are met in this study.

Chapter One

Belgian Electoral History And The Phenomenon of Linguistic- Federalist Party Politics

1.1 Cleavage⁽¹⁾ Formation in 19th Century Belgian

State-Building

Before statehood in 1839, the area of Europe now designated as Belgium consisted of nine provinces which were under Austrian, and then French, rule before the Congress of Vienna in 1815, when they were ceded to the Dutch. These provinces were linguistically divided between a numerically larger Flemish (middle-level Dutch) speaking population and a smaller, French-speaking one.⁽²⁾ They were almost entirely Catholic in denomination, but divided in religious practice between 'clericals' and 'secularists'.⁽³⁾ They were

⁽¹⁾We shall follow Urwin's definition of social cleavages in this paper. He defines social cleavages as "boundaries separating differing core bases of electoral support for...political parties." (1970:321)

⁽²⁾These provinces consist of primarily Flemish-speaking Flanders (Limburg, East and West Flanders, Antwerp and part of Brabant); French-speaking Wallonia (Liege, Luxembourg, Hainaut, Namur and part of Brabant). Although Brussels was predominantly Flemish-speaking and located in the Flemish part of Brabant province, French was exclusively used for administrative purposes. (Zolberg, 1978:109) According to an 1842 census, the population as a whole was 61 percent Flemish-speaking and 38 percent French-speaking. (Zolberg, 1974:182)

⁽³⁾For the remainder of this paper, the term 'clerical' will mean those individuals who are practicing Catholics and who favour the Church as an agent of socialization in the field of education. The term 'secular' will refer to those who are nominally Catholic, but oppose the involvement of the Church in education. In general, the label 'clerical' in Belgium is used to describe a practicing Catholic, while the label 'secular' is applied to those who are seen as

politically dominated by a French-speaking elite, drawn from both Flemish and Walloon linguistic origins, which was seriously divided between conservatives who were defenders of the old Church order and local privilege, and a liberal bourgeoisie who wanted progressive reforms.

During the Austrian rule, this elite was descended from groups that were formed around the ideological positions of those who were called 'Statists' and those who were called 'Vonckists'. The Statists were the established political class and defended both their traditional political dominance in provincial assemblies or Estates, and an economic system based upon an oligarchic organization of guilds against the reforms being conducted by the Austrians.

Following a policy of deconcentration, [the Austrians] launched a most earnest attempt to establish a centralized "police and bureaucratic state" in Brussels, at the expense of the entrenched indigenous ruling strata in the many regional centers.... Albeit Catholic, the Austrians sought to rationalize Church organization in a manner congruent with administrative needs. (Zolberg, 1978:102)

This reorganization involved the creation of state-controlled secondary schools, and the use of a secular language -- in this case French -- as the language of instruction. The Vonckists on the other hand, as members of the professional groups and higher level businessmen,

being a non-practicing Catholic. These terms came to be used as spatial referents to describe as well the linguistic division of the country.

welcomed the Church and Estate reforms but opposed the despotic, even if enlightened, Austrian king. (Lorwin, 1966: 149) In 1789, these two groups, for different reasons, but with a common purpose, united in opposition to sweep out the Austrian king and then attempted to form a 'decentralized, oligarchic, federal republic'. (Lorwin, 1966:149)

This loose amalgam of conservative Catholics and bourgeois Liberals really represented one of the first oppositions by local political classes to a rationalizing central government in Belgian history. (Zolberg, 197:103) Their unity was short-lived however, as riots broke out when the Statists quickly began quarrelling with the Vonckists by accusing them of being enemies of the Church. Given this state of civil strife, the Belgian provinces were easy prey for the Austrians who simply reconquered them. Shortly thereafter, the Austrians were conquered by the French and thus the Belgian provinces came under French administration. With the Congress of Vienna in 1815, these provinces were placed under a Dutch administration.

In 1827, the Catholics and Liberals joined again to promote statehood in opposition to the Protestant Dutch king when he actively suppressed Catholic seminaries, and required Dutch as the official language of the Belgian provinces, even though it had become customary to officially use the French language. The introduction of the Dutch language among the administrative cadre was however, limited.

While the Flemish language had become the official one, this fact had little significance for the Flemish who feared that their faith would be suppressed by the Protestants. The French-speaking elite resented the suppression of their language, and the liberal bourgeoisie were offended with the restrictions of freedom of the press, and of association. (Lorwin, 1966:150) Thus, immediate and historical factors contributed to form a coalition of the Liberal and Catholic elite which, in an extraordinary display of co-operation, and aided by the mass public, united in opposition to the Netherlands. During a violent revolution in Brussels, these two elites formed a National Congress which proclaimed the independence of Belgium in 1831, and quickly established a constitutional monarchy, and a parliamentary form of government within a unitary state.

The establishment of the new state as a protection for Belgian linguistic and religious freedom did not, however, prevent the new Kingdom from imposing its own brand of linguistic domination on its linguistically diverse population, as the Dutch had attempted earlier. In the new constitution it was declared that French was to be the official language of government, administration and education beyond the primary school level,^(*) even though,

(*)Linguistic preferences at the primary level could be decided by the parent, regardless of the dominant language of the province in which one lived. To be sure, if one wanted to have one's children educated in Flemish, one was more likely to satisfy that desire in a Flemish-speaking province, than in a French-speaking one.

as noted earlier, Flemish-speakers constituted the numerical majority in the country. Language was simply not an issue as long as the politically significant component of the population was small. (Heisler, 1974:191-193). Consensus on issues of language was easily achieved since, after all, the state was formed not as the product of linguistic rivalries, but rather by two competing ideological groups, Catholics and Liberals, who opposed an outside authority deciding provincial concerns.

Indeed, the preservation of the self-interests of the political elite was maintained by a 'regime-censitaire' voting system which kept the level of political participation artificially low, since only those who were above a certain tax level were permitted to vote. This meant that only approximately 1 percent of the population had this right. The crucial issues of nation-building, and the development of a national culture were debated by only a tiny fraction of the population at large, many of whom were quite prepared to assimilate towards the Francophone centre anyway.

Because the Flemish language was regarded at that time as little more than a rustic curiosity by the state's administrators, a stratification system developed which was based not only on income (which affected everyone), but also on language which affected the Flemish only. Therefore the costs of membership in the Belgian system were differentially distributed according to these two criteria.

They were to affect Belgian politics in a radical way, first in the last quarter of the 19th century with the formation of a socialist Workers' Party, and later on into the 20th century with the rise of regionally-based language parties.

1.1.1 Party Formation and Competition

The ideological disputes which had characterized the Belgian provinces prior to statehood in 1830 were formalized, and reinforced, by the increased competition between an at first slowly organizing Catholic Party, and a rapidly organizing Liberal Party, both of which worked towards forming a loyal clientele around the issue of Church-State relations. The competition over the relative roles of the Church and State in education between these two parties came to dominate political life by transforming the secular-clerical debate into a basis for party alignment. (Heisler, 1974:191; Urwin, 1971:324-5).

These disputes centred on the issue of education between the anti-clerical Liberal Party which supported a state-dominated educational system, and the Catholic Party which advocated a Church-dominated system. The 'schools war', as the election battle of 1884 came to be known, resulted in a victory by the Catholic Party over the Liberals who had dominated Parliament since its inception in 1831. The Catholic victory meant that Church instruction in the schools would receive government support, as long as the Catholic Party was able to obtain absolute majorities in

Parliament -- something it could do until the end of WW1.

Between 1884, and the subsequent election in 1894, dissidents in both the Catholic and Liberal parties agitated for an extension of the suffrage. (Rowies, 1978:3) This agitation reflected the demands of a newly-formed Workers' Party which wanted social reforms and the elimination of the electoral inequality created by the 'regime-censitaire' system. It was felt that participation in government, as a means of defending worker interests, could then act to ameliorate the negative aspects of the Industrial Revolution. (Urwin, 1971:327; Rowies, 1979:6) In 1893, after much bickering and many violent strikes, the suffrage was extended, and the Workers' Party was able to seek an electoral base in the election of 1894. (In that election, the first under universal male suffrage, the Workers' Party obtained 24 out of 152 seats, surpassing the Liberal Party by 4 seats.)

In 1900, proportional representation was introduced to replace the single-member plurality voting system. The Catholic Party wanted to support the declining, but relatively moderate, anti-clerical Liberals as a buffer between itself and the overtly anti-clerical and increasingly powerful Workers' Party which, by that time, had become second only to the Catholics in seats in Parliament. This action helped the Liberal Party regain some of its former strength, and hence modified the electoral impact of the Workers' Party. (Smith, 1974:71)

1.1.2 Clouds of Linguistic Discontent On the Eve of the 20th Century

By the mid-19th century, language had become a symbol of the economic and cultural differences between Francophones and Flemings. To Francophones, the French language was a symbol of dominance and culture, while certain influential Flemish intellectuals argued that their language was seen as a symbol of subordination by Flemings and Francophones alike. (Zolberg, 1974:199-200)

Flemish groups began to agitate for the use of Flemish in administration and education, and for the transformation of the unitary state into a federal one. (Rowies, 1977:4) In spite of both the clerical-secular debate, and the 'regime-censitaire' voting system, they managed to attract enough dissident members of the elite, particularly from the Liberal Party, to form a Flemish party; an albeit short-lived one, however. (Rowies, 1977:4)

After the introduction of universal male suffrage in 1893 however, those espousing the goals of the Flemish movement were elected both in the traditional parties, particularly in the Catholic party, and in specific party guise when they obtained two seats, on the average, in each election until the beginning of WW1. (Rowies, 1977:8) But, unlike the Workers' Party which was hugely successful in obtaining legislative responses to its demands, the impact of Flemish activism was limited by the abstract nature of their demands for political action, and the polarization

within their own camp on the comparatively clear-cut, but as yet unresolved, clerical-secular issue.

The process of fiercely competitive party formation, based on religious and class issues, buried the more subtle problem of the economic inequality associated with specific linguistic groups, in this case the Flemish. In spite of the attempts by some Flemish intellectuals to politicize their ethnic counterparts with Flemish issues, they were simply not apparent enough to a rural, agricultural Flemish populace. Flemish activists were asking for an equal distribution of the costs of membership in Belgian society. Even among upwardly mobile Flemings, the legitimacy ascribed to the Francophone Brussels centre was such that the overwhelming urge for identity (by most Belgians, Flemish or French) was basically towards it as the model by which norms and values were judged. In a rapidly expanding economy in 19th century Europe however, subtle issues of nationhood were not, as yet, politically viable.

Even though various statutory changes were enacted between 1860 and 1894 -- the period of greatest Flemish activism -- they were essentially cosmetic in effect, since they only dealt with the use of Flemish in minor administrative activities. The exception was in the extension of the right to use Flemish in the secondary schools in Flanders.

These modifications concerning the use of the Flemish language showed that the traditional parties were mildly

sensitive to Flemish needs, but mainly on administrative, and not on basic institution-building grounds of the conflict-regulating type, such as the party system, or through forums of regional expression and opposition. This seemed to be true as long as the major parties did not have to contend with a visibly rising electoral competitor, such as they had to with the Workers' Party. In that case, the major parties not only had to introduce universal suffrage, but also had to fundamentally revise the electoral system. Belgium's elites had yet to confront the challenges to the new state's identity, which it was to face in the 20th century, arising from conflict between the linguistic cultures of the country.

By the close of the 19th century, Belgian politics had witnessed a sharpening of the division between clerical and secular concerns to which the issue of language and its spatial referent, regional economic disparity, took a back seat. The Flemish movement was simply not politically significant enough, since the success of the Catholic and Liberal parties, in politicizing the electorate with the religious issue, left little room for the abstract issues of nationhood that were beginning to surface among the Flemish.

1.2 The Rise of The Linguistic Parties in the Twentieth Century: Challenges to the Nation-Building Centre

1.2.1 The Interwar Period

The salience of the ethnic cleavage, was manifested politically as a result of the overt discrimination experienced by Flemish soldiers from Francophone officers in WW1. In 1919, these soldiers formed the first of the regionally-based linguistic parties called the Frontspartij (or The Frontist's Party, as they were in large part veterans who fought in the front lines in WW1). In the tradition of Flemish activism described earlier, they called for a Flemish constitution or, at least, a Flemish council, and the administrative separation of Flanders (including Brussels-capital) from Wallonia. After the 1932 election, the Frontist's became known as the Flemish National Union (VNV), and by continuing to advocate federalist constitutional changes, they experienced significant electoral success in the Flemish provinces, largely at the expense of the Catholic Party.

In 1928, the Frontist's obtained an initial victory in the form of a law which gave linguistic parity to the use of Flemish in the armed forces. In 1932, several further changes were enacted. Legislation was passed which specified the exclusive use, in each language region, the language of that region in administrative matters. In Brussels, both Flemish and French were to be used depending upon the language chosen by an individual citizen. (Senelle, 1974:57)

Following the principle of unilingual language usage in each language region, save Brussels, another law was passed that year concerning language usage in education at the primary and secondary school levels. As for Brussels, legislation provided that the mother-tongue would decide the language in which the child would be taught, and obligatory instruction in the second national language. (Senelle, 1974:59)

At the university level, the state university at Ghent was made entirely Flemish in 1930, and shortly thereafter, programmes in Flemish were offered at the University of Louvain. In 1935, a law was passed to ensure the use of the official languages in the courts, and in 1938, the use of both official languages was required by senior officers in the armed forces. (Senelle, 1974:464)

These changes however, did not diminish the increase in support for the VNV. By 1936, the effect of this loss of support, from both the Liberal and Catholic parties, mainly from the latter, to the VNV in the Flemish provinces, was such that it caused acute community strains in the as a result of electoral threat posed by the VNV.

In addition to the formation of the Frontist's in 1919, the Communist Party was formed in 1925 as a splinter group of the Worker's Party. By 1939, the VNV and the Communist Party (the latter in a minor way) had become part of the political landscape and the Workers' and Liberal parties had each declined in strength. Starting with 5 percent of the

Flemish vote in 1919, the VNV had reached a high of 19 percent in 1939.⁽⁵⁾ The Catholic Party had declined from 45 percent in 1919, to 41 percent in 1939. The 1936 election represented the lowest point for that party when it obtained 38 percent of the Flemish vote.

The Worker's Party was consistently the second most successful electorally, in the period 1919 to 1939, during which time its support varied between 25 and 21 percent. In Wallonia, the Workers' Party declined by roughly the same proportion as had the Catholic Party in Flanders, while the French wing of the Catholic Party remained roughly at 25 to 27 percent, dipping to 20 percent in 1936.

1.2.2 Post World War II Politics

In the first election after the war in 1946,⁽⁶⁾ the VNV did not field any candidates in the Flemish ridings. The VNV was reeling from the purges against their alleged collaboration with the Germans who had encouraged their

(5)The reader is directed to Figures 1.1 and 1.2 for a graphical presentation of the votes and seats obtained for each party, by region and for the country from 1919 to 1974. A fascist flash-party, the Rexists, allied with the VNV during the 1932 and 1936 elections. This and other minor parties are excluded from the graph. This means that total party support will not add to 100 percent.

(6)It should be noted that although the Communist Party is usually a minor party, obtaining on the average one to four seats in parliament, it shared power, however, in 1946 as a member of the Socialist-Catholic coalition. This was due in large part to the popular support it received for the prominent role it played in the Belgian resistance during WW2. It is now called the Kommunist Partei (KP) in Flanders, and the Parti Communiste (PC) in the rest of the country.

PERCENT PARTY SUPPORT (NATIONAL) 1919-1974

Source: Annuaire Statistique
1932-1976

FIGURE 1.1

REGIONAL POPULAR VOTE 1919-1974

FIGURE 1:2

regional aspirations as an occupation strategy. (Lorwin, 1966:170) In the perception of Francophones at the time however, who carried with them memories of similar Flemish collaboration with the Germans during the First War, the entire Flemish region was implicated with the activities of the VNV. The indiscriminate purges which ensued left the Flemish with the bitterest sense of antipathy towards Francophones in subsequent years. The antipathy between Flemings and Francophones was dramatically reinforced by the results of the 1947 census which raised questions concerning its scientific status as a means of obtaining information on linguistic distribution in the country.

The census showed that the population of Flemings living in the outskirts of Brussels had declined from the previous census in 1930. Since the census was used to define regional boundaries, this meant that the size of the Flemish region was declining since Brussels, which had become predominantly French-speaking, was located in a Flemish arrondissement. Furthermore, Brussels was attracting increased Walloon immigration, while Flemish immigration was declining. Although Brussels was the capital, it really reflected the linguistic preferences of the French minority of the country.⁽⁷⁾ An important linkage of identity and land was crystallized by the Flemish in this

⁽⁷⁾While there are no reliable language statistics after 1947, the census showed that Brussels was approximately 80 percent Francophone. (Heisler, 1974:190)

debate -- a significant factor not in national identity, but in ethnic identity, something which the Francophone population was to emulate twenty years later as part of their political aspirations.

The net result was that the language question was permanently dropped from the census. Francophones and Flemings argued that if the Flemish and French regions were fixed in size, any question related to language in a subsequent census would be meaningless. (Meynaud, 1966:98)

One immediate political consequence of the first census results was that it helped facilitate the return of the Flemish national movement to politics in the 1949 election, albeit with limited success: it obtained only 1 percent of the Flemish vote.^(*) (In 1954, the final official census results were released, and later, in 1960-61, when the decennial census system was renewed, it was decided to permanently drop a language usage question in it.) In 1954, and after a series of name changes, the VNV reorganized and called itself the Volksunie (VU) or National Christian Union. Composed of former VNV members and dissident members

(*) In 1950, the VNV did not field any candidates in order to support the ruling Catholic Party in their efforts to win a majority in a national referendum to decide on the return of King Leopold III, who was very sympathetic to Catholic demands, from exile. (Lorwin, 1966:168) That year represented the first of two peaks in electoral support for the CVP/PSC when it obtained 45 percent of the national vote--higher than in any election since 1919. In the regions, it obtained 55 percent of the Flemish vote, as compared to 38 percent and 28 percent in Wallonia and Brussels, respectively.

of the CVP/PSC,⁽⁹⁾ it advocated both a federalist state, consisting of the Flemish region (including Brussels) and Wallonia, and greater regional economic development for Flanders. In spite of its predominant support from former members of the CVP, the VU presented itself as a secular party.

The issue of church-state relations in education which had dominated 19th century Belgian politics flared again in 1954, due to the policies of the Catholic government between 1950-54, and in the 1958 election. For the first time since WW2, the government was dominated, at that time, by a Liberal-Socialist coalition which sought to increase the level of secularization in the schools, as it had traditionally attempted, through the construction of more 'public' schools. The CVP/PSC wanted greatly increased subsidies for Church schools as a balance to the Liberal-Socialist coalition policy. In the fight over this issue, the CVP/PSC received its second electoral peak when it won the 1958 election with 47 percent of the national vote. The net result was that a compromise was reached between it and the other two smaller parties, in the form of parity in school funding in exchange for a cession of some of the

⁽⁹⁾After the Second World War, the Catholic Party renamed itself the Christelijke Volkspartij (CVP) or Christian People's Party in Flanders and the Parti social-chretien (PSC) elsewhere. In addition, the Workers' Party changed its name to the Belgische Socialistische Partij (BSP) or Belgian Socialist Party in Flanders, and the Parti socialiste belge (PSB) elsewhere.

Church's privileges in education. (Urwin, 1970:325) This election marked the end of the Church-State feud in political life, as it showed that the vagaries of the electoral market could be reduced, if the major parties tacitly agreed not to fight over certain issues--in this case religiosity.

After the 1958 education pact, all the major parties began to suffer losses to regional parties which were formed in the 1960's in addition to the VU. The CVP/PSC declined substantially from 47 percent in 1958 to 32 percent in 1968, rising slightly to 36 percent in 1977. As well, the Socialist Party declined from 36 percent in 1958 to 27 percent in 1977. In 1961 the Liberal Party⁽¹⁰⁾ shed its anti-clerical garb as a vote-getting strategy, since it had been losing substantial amounts of support in recent elections. This strategy had only short-run benefits however: its support increased from 12 percent in 1961 to 22 percent in 1965, but declined thereafter to the pre-1961 level (averaging approximately 15 percent of the national vote). This lacklustre performance continued in spite of a decision in 1968 to emulate the CVP/PSC by splitting into autonomous linguistic wings.

(10) By this time, the Liberal Party officially called itself the Parti Liberal de Progres (PLP) in Wallonia, the Parti Liberal in Brussels, and the Partij voor en Voortuitgang (PVV) in Flanders.

1.2.3 Language Problems Since 1961

In 1963, laws were passed which extended and thus strengthened, the 1932 language legislation in administrative and educational matters. These changes involved a tightening of administrative language usage in the unilingual regions, and in the Brussels arrondissements. As far as education was concerned, the 1932 legislation was reaffirmed, and the question of education in Brussels was extended through funding and standardization of schooling at all levels in Brussels-capital.

Probably the most important of the 1963 changes was that the former Brussels arrondissements were split into three administrative districts thereby enabling a fine-tuning of the bilingual character of the city and, as well, to restrict the expansion in the size of Brussels-capital into the surrounding unilingual Flemish countryside. (Senelle, 1978:23) instruction was to be decided by the mother-tongue of the parents.

The linguistic debate over the administrative division of the country, between 1963 and 1971, fostered the rise of two additional parties: the Rassemblement Wallon (RW) in Wallonia, a name given to a re-organized group of dissident members of the PSB who left in 1961, and the Front Democratique des Francophones (PDF) in Brussels in 1965.

The PDF advocated a regionally autonomous Brussels area, so that it would cease being a pawn between the Flemish and Walloon regions. Among its concerns were the

problems of Francophones in Brussels and the rejection of linguistic parity in the agglomeration. (This latter issue was associated with the desire by the Flemish wings of the parties to extend the use of the Flemish language in education and local government.) The PDP demanded the attachment of the peripheral communes to the bilingual regime in Brussels and the establishment of an agglomeration council.

From the 1971 election to the present, the PDP have joined forces with the RW, in order to create a unified Francophone front. The RW represented dissatisfied Socialists who felt that the party had not done enough in promoting regional development in Wallonia, and which also had not fulfilled the federalist aims of the Socialist Party ideology. (Quevit, 1979:10)

Since 1965, the effect on the traditional parties of the combined vote of the linguistic parties has been dramatic. On a national basis, the combined vote ranged from 9 percent in 1965 to a high of 23 percent in 1974; finally levelling off to 19 percent in 1978. The effect is much more apparent, however, when an examination is made of party rankings in the regions. In Flanders, the VU has been in third place behind the CVP and BSP since 1968, with the PVV and KP lagging behind in fourth and fifth place respectively. In Wallonia, the RW climbed to second place behind the Socialists in 1968, falling to fourth place in 1978. In Brussels, the PDP climbed to first place in 1971

with 38 percent of that city's vote and has, since then, maintained that position. (See Figure 1.2.)

1.3 Party Configurations and Programmes: A Comparison⁽¹²⁾

Across Issue-Areas and Party Support

The unitarist and federalist parties will be compared across the issue-areas of community relations, education, state intervention in the economy, religion and socio-economic policies. In addition, the support for the parties will be compared in terms of their voter profiles. This will clarify current areas of political competition.

1.3.1 Relations between the Linguistic Communities

As the first of the traditional parties to re-organize into autonomous linguistic wings, the CVP/PSC supports constitutional changes for the decentralization of the political system. Like the PVV/PLP and the BSP/PSB, the CVP/PSC favour a regionalisation of the country but within a unitary framework. This regionalisation involves the creation of autonomous regional institutions, but the CVP/PSC are divided as to how many regions there ought to be. The Flemish wing of the party advocates a two-region system whereby Brussels would become part of the Flemish region; the French wing prefers a three-region system with an autonomous Brussels area.

The PVV/PLP, on the other hand, are much more traditional in their view of the distribution of political power, and are still at the stage of asking how much power

⁽¹²⁾See Appendix 2 for a tabular presentation of the material contained in this section.

ought to be devolved. The Brussels Liberals, feeling the pressure of the FDP, tend to be more pro-federalist in orientation.

The BSP/PSB differ from the other two traditional parties in terms of the way in which they initially refused to ascribe any legitimacy to the federalist or regionalist parties. They felt that in the interests of worker solidarity, it was much more important to remain united as a party, and as a country, than to devolve. Like the CVP/PSC and the PVV/PLP, the BSP/PSB have felt pressure from the regional components of the party, especially the Brussels federation, to at least devolve into regional wings. This they did, in the fall of 1978. The Flemish wing tends to side with the CVP's view of national unity, while the French wing tends to support the federalist view of the RW and the FDP. (Frognier, 1978:120-25)

The federalist parties are as opposed over the nature of federalism as the unitarist parties are over regionalism. The VU seeks a dualistic federalism consisting of Flemish and French-speakers only. This means that Brussels region would have no special status as a separate region in its own right. Furthermore, the VU want to ban the use of French anywhere in the Flemish region. The opposite position is taken by both the RW and FDP. Given that Brussels is predominantly French-speaking, the FDP and RW seek a three-region federalism, of which Brussels would be a part, so as to maintain French influence there.

1.3.2 The Roles of the Church and State in Education

On the whole, the issue of Church and State in education is still predominantly a traditional party one. Given that the CVP/PSC have had to share power, in recent elections, with the BSP/PSB and the PVV/PLP, both of which have been traditionally anti-clerical, the CVP/PSC has sought the equal financing of clerical and secular schools by government, as well as subsidies for the construction of clerical schools. Again, the issue of religious financing is cross-cut by the issue of language.

The financing of clerical schools usually involves Flemish students, the parents of whom are the CVP's biggest supporters. On the other hand, and in an attempt to lure clerical voters, the PVV/PLP have advocated the equal treatment for all educational institutions, regardless of religious orientation. The BSP/PSB go a slight step further, by arguing that there should be a centrally administered, and thus uniform, educational programme. The federalist parties, quite simply, see the problem of the language communities as much more important than the funding of clerical or secular schools, an issue-area they perceive as contributing nothing to their support. (Rowies, 1978: 10)

Dovetailing with the issue of the relative role of Church and State, is the issue of abortion on demand. As expected, the CVP/PSC are against it, while the BSP/PSB seek its decriminalization; they are also vehemently opposed to the CVP/PSC on this issue. (Rowies, 1978:10) The PVV/PLP are

also in favour of decriminalizing abortion. The federalist parties, consistent with their views on education, do not recognize the importance of the religious cleavage, but nonetheless support the liberalization of the abortion laws.

1.3.3 The Role of the State in the Economy

Prognier (1974: 471-478) has been able to dichotomize all the parties into left-right groups. On the left, the BSP/PSB seeks to nationalize the resource sectors, and supports the increased incidence of worker-controlled enterprises. In addition, it seeks an increase in the level of public services, particularly in the health field.

The VU is most like the BSP/PSB in its economic policies; it too favours the nationalization of the energy sector by dividing it into a set of holding companies. In addition, it seeks greater market protection for small businesses. In keeping with its linguistic orientation, it is concerned with obtaining better information of the linguistic composition of public and private enterprises. The PDF and the RW are very similar to the orientation of the BSP/PSB and the VU, but emphasize greater economic development for Brussels and Wallonia.

On the right wing of the economic spectrum, both the CVP/PSC and the PVV/PLP are similar in orientation. They both prefer a minimum involvement by the state in the economy, balanced budgets, and increased worker productivity. All the parties favour some form of minimum guaranteed

annual income, with the CVP/PSC emphasizing a negative income tax.

1.3.4 Political Competition

While nationally based, support for the CVP/PSC is located more in Flanders than in Wallonia or Brussels. This support consists largely of lower white-collar groups, workers, and farmers who see themselves as either working- or middle-class and as one would expect, are overwhelmingly clerical in practice. (Hill, 1974: 48-49)

In a national survey conducted in 1968, Delruelle notes that in terms of party support, the Liberals seem to attract the largest proportion of its support from white-collar and professional groups. According to the results of the survey, these groups see themselves as middle-class; they are also dichotomized between practicing and nonpracticing Catholics, and between Flemish and Francophone support.

Since 1954, the VU's support reflects a cross-section of occupational groups, except farmers who tend to support the CVP/PSC. In fact, aside from the Liberal Party, it attracted more of the professional groups than the other parties. It does however attract more clerical than secular support and its strength is almost exclusively concentrated in Flanders; it receives less than 10 percent support in Brussels. (Prognier, 1975: 474, 483), (Hill, 1974: 35)

The PDP's support is exclusively concentrated in Brussels and, as one would expect in a capital city, is

largely white collar and professional in the composition of its occupational support, and predominantly secular in religious practice. The RW's electoral support comes from Wallonia and Brussels and reflects a cross-section of occupational groups, but with both a secular and a leftist orientation. (Prognier, 1974: 474, 483) The Communist Party's support is found more in Wallonia and in Brussels than in Flanders, and its electoral makeup appears to come from a cross-section of the occupational groups, except farmers.

1.4 Regionalism or Federalism?: Recent Constitutional and Structural Changes

The nature of the linguistic debate changed, during the early 1970's with the achievement of major constitutional changes completed in late 1970. The reforms completed at that time recognized constitutionally the four linguistic regions which were defined in the 1932 and 1963 legislations, and the existence of three cultural communities. Under article 59-B of the constitution, the principle of cultural autonomy for the French and Dutch (Flemish) cultural communities was entrenched so that each cultural group could decide for itself on most cultural and linguistic matters, (Senelle, 1978:160) These community councils would be able to pass decrees that had similar legal force, in areas of community jurisdiction, as did Parliament on national matters. (Due to its small size, the German-speaking cultural council was to be an advisory body only. (Senelle, 1978:174)) These cultural councils could decide on the use of language in administration, education, and industrial relations in the cultural community concerned. (Senelle, 1978:168)

Moves to regional decentralization were started in 1974 with a law creating three regional councils, Flemish, Walloon and Brussels, and were to have jurisdiction in matters of national policy that could be regionally differentiated. Although the intended purpose of the 1974 legislation was to effectively decentralize some of the

operations of the central government to the three regions, this regionalization has not yet been fully implemented, with new proposals for permanent regional councils being partially implemented by legislation in 1980 for Flanders and Wallonia but not for Brussels. It is worth noting however that, over time, the cultural councils have acquired additional functions, mainly in health services and welfare administration, but it is still too early to evaluate the progress of regionalization under the present set of changes, as the vagaries of political coalitions reduce the rate at which various aspects of regionalization can be brought into the constitution.

Most importantly however, the proposed creation of these cultural and regional councils by the traditional parties, as a response to demands for greater regional autonomy by the linguistic parties, meant two things. One, the creation of extra co-optive bodies in which the federalist parties could participate, if they were successful electorally, meant that the traditional parties were prepared to devolve power away from the centre to the regions. Two, this strategy also meant that the traditional parties hoped to recapture some of the support that they had lost to the linguistic parties. Since there existed new structures by which the regions and the regional parties could be represented, it could be inferred that the traditional parties hoped that the voting public would accept this decentralization as a solution to the language

problem. This would mean a realignment of party choice on grounds other than that of language, so that the party elites could direct voter support as they had in the past.

The relationship between cultural and economic autonomy and the size of the Brussels area, however, has not yet been resolved, and was the basic issue behind the dissolution of the government in 1977, and 1978. The coalition of the CVP/PSC, BSP/PSB, VU and FDP/RW, was unable to secure the two-thirds vote in Parliament needed to pass the constitutional amendment which would have dealt with the problem.

As a further example of the extent to which the language issue continued to fragment parties, even as late as 1978, the VU lost two out of six seats to a new, radical Flemish Party called the Vlaams Bloc (VB) who were dissatisfied members of the VU, because of the latter's willingness to compromise with the FDP concerning the fixing of the Brussels area in size.⁽¹³⁾ (The Economist, December 23-29, 1978:32)

From 1919, in muted form, and in particular from 1958 to the present, the debate in Belgian politics has become a tiresome one concerning the form of the devolution of power from the central government to the linguistic regions. Although Prognier (1977:110) has divided the political

(13) See both Appendix 1 which summarizes the regionalization of the political parties and also Appendix 2 which presents their current Party platform by issue-area.

parties into 'Federalists' and 'Unitarists', it is now more accurate to call them 'Federalists' and 'Regionalists' for the following reason:

La 'régionalisation' est une solution du genre celle qui est proposée par le gouvernement: elle consiste à aménager l'Etat unitaire en donnant aux communautés une large autonomie en matière culturelle et en opérant une certaine décentralisation qui doterait les régions d'un réel pouvoir politique, tout au moins au niveau réglementaire ou décisionnel.⁽¹⁴⁾ (Ladrière, 1970:12)

Thus the unitarist parties concede a certain level of decentralisation, but at the same time seek to maintain their national power base.

For the same reasons as the unitarist parties, the linguistic parties can increase their power base if they no longer have to compete nationally. The question of federalism can be seen in this sense as really a tug-of-war between the unitarist-regionalist and linguistic-federalist parties, each manoeuvring to protect its self-interests. The unitarist parties have devolved into linguistic wings as a strategy to upstage the regionally-based linguistic parties, and to ensure continued electoral support.

In conclusion, it is evident that linguistic politics, in one form or another, has a tradition going back to the

(14) "Regionalism" is a solution of the type proposed by the government: it consists of changing the form of the unitary state by giving the regions enough autonomy in cultural matters in effecting a limited decentralisation which would endow the regions with a real political power, at least at a regulatory or decision-making level."

mid-19th century. Nineteenth-century Belgium was concerned with the politics of penetration: what role does government play alongside that of other institutions? Twentieth century Belgian politics is now the politics of identity: am I a Belgian, Fleming, Walloon or Bruxellois? What accounted for this shift? What factors permitted the rise in support for the Flemish linguistic parties and later their Francophone counterparts? Why did issues of land become interwoven with the politics of identity and penetration?

While no explanation has been attempted for these fundamental shifts in Belgian politics, certain key historical factors can be pinpointed as contexts for subsequent analysis. First, the extension of universal (albeit only male) suffrage in 1896 meant that the opportunity for greater political mobilization was now available. This immediately gave the Workers' Party its great leap forward, as an important actor, into the political arena. The second important factor was the restructuring of the electoral system from single-member plurality constituencies to proportional representation. A multiplicity of political interests could now find expression, even if only in opposition. This action allowed the issue of language to surface. Other factors were the uneven costs of membership in the political system. The end of the Church-State feud in 1958 helped weaken the religious cleavage as a basis of party support. The ongoing disputes over both the territorial size of Brussels capital, and its

role as the symbolic Francophone centre to Flemings, was compounded by the inability of the traditional parties to understand, or know how to deal with, ethnic-linguistic issues. All these factors contributed to the rise of the linguistic-federalist parties.

The questions of why and how this opposition formed however, cannot be answered without further information. It is apparent that while these structural and contextual factors contributed to engendering an enormous range of political behaviour, we must seek behavioural hypotheses for its explanation. The development of a behavioural model which will intervene between the important contextual factors mentioned above, and the rise of the politics of identity in present-day Belgium, follows in Chapter Two.

Appendix 1Evolution of the Regional-Linguistic Parties

pre-1919: The party system in Belgium is composed of the Catholic Party, the Liberal Party and the Socialist Party. As well, a minor Flemish Party representing Flemish interests such as a federalist state, language rights etc., contested elections from 1865 to 1913.

1919: The formation of the Flemish Frontists' Party.

1932: The Flemish Frontists' Party reorganizes and calls itself the Flemish National Union. (VNV)

1954: The VNV reorganizes into the Popular Union (VU).

1961: The Liberal Party drops its anti-clerical ideology. A Walloon linguistic party, known as the Popular Walloon Movement, splinters from the Socialist Party.

1965: A Brussels linguistic Party forms and calls itself the Democratic French Front (FDF), and the Popular Walloon Movement reorganizes under the title of the Rassemblement Wallon (RW).

The Communist Party splits into relatively autonomous linguistic wings, but under the limited rubric of the Central Committee.

1968: Liberal Party splits into autonomous linguistic wings.

The Flemish Socialist in Brussels run their own lists.

1972: The FDF and the RW join forces in the Brussels arrondissement.

1978: The formation of the radical Flemish Activist Party (VB).

Appendix 2Capsule Summary of Current Party Programmes by Issue Area

Issue-Area	CVP/PSC	PVV/PLP
Community Relations	initially reluctant to discuss issue, have been forced to by regional wings of the party; supported constitutional changes for power decentralization and now favours moves towards regionalism but divided over number of regions needed	party has recognized right of the regions to become autonomous in order to arrive at solutions to each region's problems; disagreement over where direction of power should go between Flemish and French wings
Education	wants state to treat clerical schools equally in financing as with secular schools and to provide subsidies for construction of clerical schools	supports equal treatment for all educational institutions regardless of religious orientation
State Intervention	conservative: minimize state intervention in economy	supports capitalist economy with reduction state intervention in economy; balanced budgets
Religion	against abortion	open to clerical or secular support
Socio-Economic Policies	no real wish to question existing economic system; have a minimum income with out taxes below a certain income level	seeks minimum guaranteed income, national pension system but want individual to support himself with greater effort; increase wages of white and blue-collar workers

Issue-Area	BSP/PSB	VU
Community Relations	initially believed in worker solidarity to defend worker interests; more important than regional autonomy; national leadership forced to split party into linguistic wings and now supports moves towards regionalism	wants a dualistic federalism: Flemish-French only; wants to ban French-speakers from Flemish region
Education	supports pluralistic schools under a uniform, official educational programme	problem of regions more important than funding of clerical or secular schools
State Intervention	nationalize resource sectors, control marketing and distribution of resource goods, increase public services such as in health care	nationalization of energy sectors into holding companies; more protection for small business
Religion	as a secular party it wants to decriminalize abortion and is strongly opposed to CVP/PSC on this issue	not an important cleavage: regions more important; supports abortion
Socio-Economic Policies	improve working conditions; make income distribution more equitable; worker control of enterprises	better information on which people are hired and working in public and private enterprises

Issue-Area	PDP	RW
Community Relations	PDP-RW want to temper VU's dual federalism in favour of a three region federalism so as to maintain French influence in Brussels	same as PDP
Education	religious aspect of education is subsumed to regional problems	same as PDP
State Intervention	wants to see greater protection of Belgian market economy against foreign control	same as PDP
Religion	favours liberalization of abortion laws	same as PDP
Socio-Economic Policies	greater control in administration of both private and public enterprises	same as PDP, more regional economic development

Issue-Area	KPB/PCB
Community Relations	supports three region federalism; linguistic lines can be drawn from the results of a referendum
Education	national educational instruction; mixed schooling
State Intervention	increase involvement of public sector in collective services, greater control over the economy
Religion	supports abortion for those who want it
Socio-Economic Policies	minimum guaranteed annual income; more equitable distribution of income

Source: (Rowies: 1977)

Chapter Two

A Model of Social Mobilization, Socio-Political Cleavages and Communal Politics

2.1 Level of Analysis and the Study of Communal Politics

The rise of the linguistic-federalist parties and the consequent decentralization of the traditional unitarist parties into regional wings were explored in the previous chapter. It was found that the key component of Flemish federalist grievances was the assertion that upward mobility among Flemings was impeded by a regionally-based stratification system. A Flemish party, the VNV, sought substantial political autonomy for the Flemish region. This attempt at a redistribution of power led to a francophone backlash which resulted in the creation of francophone federalist parties. Together, the linguistic-federalist parties argued that the resolution of the linguistic problem was to physically separate the cultures into unique and autonomous regional territories. The debate over what was to be the relationship between these territories and a central government became the subject of much concern for all the political parties as access to power was dependent on their ability to gain votes by the resolution of linguistic-regional issues in parliament. These issues have important analytical implications.

Because the regions are not politically autonomous, bargaining over regional issues must take place at the

national level so that every regional issue automatically has a national component to it. Indeed, national issues are almost always regional ones. This means that the unit of analysis is regional while the level of analysis is national.⁽¹⁾ A concept definition is required that will subsume regional interest aggregation and indicate the impact that this may have on the society as a whole. In addition, it must also imply a feedback effect from outcomes decided in political contests fought at the national level to other issues in the regions. For this purpose, the concept communalism is satisfactory.

[Communalism] ... refers to the political assertiveness of groups which have three distinguishing characteristics: first, their membership is comprised of persons who share a common culture and identity ... second, they encompass the full range of demographic (age and sex) divisions within the wider society and provide 'for a network of groups and institutions extending throughout the individual's life-cycle'; and, third, like the wider society in which they exist, they tend to be differentiated by wealth, status, and power. Communal demands and conflict are politically distinctive in that they may reflect a desire for separation and may threaten or alter the political boundaries of the wider society. (Melson and Wolpe, 1970:1112)

⁽¹⁾This analytic problem resembles the 'ecological fallacy. Inferences will be incorrectly specified if statements about the regions are inferred from behaviour observed at the national level. The correct specification of this problem involves the use of between region differences as the method by which national level evidence derived from and feeding back to the regions may be obtained.

The linguistic-federalist parties are the organizational expression of communal politics in Belgium. They changed the focus of politics from nation-building integration to a regional re-definition of the political system. The principle dependent variable of this study will, therefore, be the development of competitive communally-based parties and their attempt to re-distribute the basis of power within the system. The remainder of this chapter will necessarily be rather abstract so that those factors which contribute to the formation of communal divisions within a political system, and ultimately to the establishment of communal politics, can be defined. These factors together will be called a communal politics model.

2.2 Social Process: The Interrelationship of Modernization, Social Mobilization and Communal Politics

The development of communal politics in Belgium, as it has been previously described and defined, can be seen as a process

by which major clusters of old, social, economic and psychological commitments are eroded or broken and people become available for new patterns of socialization and behaviour. (Deutsch, 1961:494)

While this is the definition that Deutsch gave to social mobilization,⁽²⁾ the development of communal politics can be seen as a variant of the social mobilization model. As the latter predicts variation in political stability during a process of political development, communal political behaviour can be placed under the general conceptual rubric of political stability. The way in which political stability or national unity will be affected will depend upon the way in which a process of modernization results in the social mobilization of the individuals of a traditional society.

The concept modernization usually refers to

(2) Social mobilization has also been used to examine the variation in such diverse political dependent variables as coups d'etat (Jackman, 1978); political instability (Huntington, 1968) (Heisler, 1976); political violence (Gurr, 1970) (Hibbs, 1973); mass society (Kornhauser, 1959); democracy (Coulter, 1975); political participation (Lerner, 1964) (Weiner, 1971) (Inglehart, 1978); ethnic politics (Esman, 1978) (da Silva, 1975) (Lijphart, 1978); political development (Deutsch, 1961); communal politics (Melson and Wolpe, 1971) (Enloe, 1978).

the process of social change in which development is the economic component. Modernization produces the societal environment in which rising output per head is effectively incorporated. For effective incorporation, the heads that produce (and consume) rising output must understand and accept the new rules of the game deeply enough to improve their own productive behaviour and to diffuse it throughout their society. (Lerner, 1968:387)

Deutsch (1961:493) assumes that changes in social mobilization, in the short run, are due to changes in modernization. In the long run, social mobilization will, in turn, come to act as a predictor of modernization such that, over time, the processes of modernization and social mobilization are reciprocally causal in their relation to one another.

While Deutsch does not make explicit the concept social process, some comments on it are necessary at this point. Social process is an approach which focusses mainly on socio-economic behaviour rather than on the structure of the social or political system through the relation of "one pattern of action to another pattern of action." (Huntington, 1971:309) Social processes, such as social mobilization, are deemed to be related to a long-term pattern of modernization as nations become politically developed.

Another aspect of the model is social structure which is the obverse of the social process approach. Cultural and institutional networks are examined in order to determine

their behavioural consequences as they define the pattern of memberships in the system. Examples are social stratification and any efforts at re-stratification there may be. For the purposes of this essay, the basic assumption is that these patterns are behavioural in-form and are subject to change; in turn, individuals collectively and behaviourally define structure through their allegiances.

Knowing the social processes percolating within a society at a given time can help determine any changes in the social structure. The reverse is true as well: social processes do not occur in a vacuum, but rather within the context of the social structure. While social process and structure are thus closely linked, it is implicitly assumed that process and structure can be observed independently of one another. One without the other however, would yield an incomplete model which would lead to incorrect conclusions.⁽³⁾

The components of the model must also reflect the nature of change in these patterns in time. Because a change in process may take time to effect a change in structure and vice versa and thus will involve time lags, simultaneous political change is ruled out.⁽⁴⁾ The length of

⁽³⁾The reader is referred to Appendix 4, section 4.2.1, for a technical discussion of this matter.

⁽⁴⁾It is usually assumed that one factor may be both jointly affected by and affect another factor. Hoid (1961) argues that it does not make sense to predict that reality behaves that way. He argues that reality works recursively: one

these lags is, however, as much an empirical as it is a theoretical question. In sum then, the social mobilization model assumes that changes in process and structure qualitatively and quantitatively vary according to the historical context,⁽⁵⁾ and the stage of economic development a country happens to be in at any given point in time. (Deutsch, 1961:493)

2.2.1 The Cultural Milieu and Social Mobilization

Social mobilization, or the changes in the norms and values which occur when a society is exposed to modernity, induces a change in the range of human needs that impinge upon the political process. New wants, such as improved education and health care, are perceived which require collective satisfaction. An ever-increasing proportion of the population will demand government services, and hence an increase in the capability of government. Ultimately, increased political participation will ensue as a result of the growth in the number of organizations, such as interest groups and political parties, which arise⁽⁶⁾ to assist individuals in voicing these demands. The smoothness of the

factor sets off a chain of events in other factors in such a way that the next factor includes it and the previous one. That is, causality is unidirectional. Unless time is specifically brought into the model, an argument in favour of simultaneity of social process does not follow.

⁽⁵⁾For the purposes of this essay, the historical situation of interest will be that associated with a process of nation-building.

⁽⁶⁾For a detailed discussion on the notion of organization as a response to change, see Olson (1965); and Frohlich and

transition from a traditional to a modern way of life is a function of the rapidity at which these demands arise, the sensitivity of government to the changing needs of its constituency and the cultural homogeneity of a society. (Deutsch, 1961:498-502)

If, during a period of rapid transition, the government cannot provide services quickly enough to meet the rapidly increasing demands placed upon it, the development of allegiances to nation-building values will lag behind the rate of change in the economic and psychological commitments of individuals. Because it is unlikely, even in periods of economic growth, that government resources will be sufficient to satisfy all new demands, inequalities may arise or become exacerbated. This will lead to the dissatisfaction of the disadvantaged. The success of government in responding to these demands will determine its success in deflecting dissatisfaction away from itself as an institution.

If, however, the government is insensitive to the changing needs and values of its constituency, competition and conflict will arise from other political actors which are seen to provide services to match changing expectations. (Deutsch, 1961:501-502) This competition could take the form of external intimidation, internal regionally-based defiance, or internal danger across the national social

Oppenheimer, 1978).

structure. When government delivery of services corresponds to the demand for them, on the other hand, assimilation will be attainable and those factors which contribute to regime instability, such as alienation and frustration, need not arise.

In a culturally homogeneous society disparate primordial loyalties do not compete with nation-building symbols. Instability will arise, not as a result of the clash between cultures and government, but rather because of the latter's response time, and the consequent development of inequality. If government responds to a rapid social mobilization process, it may

promote the consolidation of states where peoples already share the same language, culture and major social institutions (Deutsch, 1961:501)

In a culturally plural society,⁽⁷⁾ on the other hand, disaffected political actors can use primordial symbols to

⁽⁷⁾Melson and Wolpe (1970:1115) use the Anderson (et al) (1967:17) definition of cultural pluralism as "the existence within a state of solidarity patterns, based upon a shared religion, language, ethnic identity, race, caste, or region, which command a loyalty rivaling, at least in some situations, that which the state itself is able to generate."

A slightly different, but more general view, is provided by Enloe. (1973:33) She argues that "when interethnic contact is governed by stable rules and expectations that serve the interests of all actors without diminishing their respective ethnic distinctiveness, we say that a 'plural society' exists." What is suggested from both views is the inherent fragility of the relationship between governed and government and between groups themselves. The potential for communal politics arising from the breakdown of these "solidarity patterns", or a change in expectations, will be part of the focus of this chapter.

compete with other nation-building actors which will, in turn, promote national disunity. The extent to which the government recognizes this plurality of loyalties, and attempts to accomodate it in a process of integration, will determine the level of instability present in the system at a given point in time. Since social mobilization increases the interaction between governed and government, and focusses attention on the language and channels on which these communications are carried, this same process

may tend to strain or destroy the unity of states whose population is already divided into several groups with different languages or cultures or basic ways of life. (Deutsch, 1961:501)

2.3 Culturally Heterogeneous Societies and the Rise of Communal Politics: Differential Modernization and Social Mobilization

According to Lipset and Rokkan (1966:41), in culturally heterogeneous societies,

nation-building invariably generates territorial resistances and cultural strains. There will be competition between potential centers of political control; there may be conflict between the capital and areas of growth in the provinces; and there will be unavoidable tensions between the culturally and economically advanced areas and the backward periphery.

In the usual social mobilization process model, the effect of culture on political stability is defined in terms of its residual political relevance after the effects of modernization and social mobilization have been demonstrated. A society is or is not politically divided along cultural lines. In this section, an attempt will be made to extend the social mobilization process model into a communal politics model by showing that a society consisting of only one politically relevant culture could evolve into a society with more than one of these cultures through the differential modernization and differential social mobilization of the various communal groups.

Incorporation of a comparative space component allows a geographic element to play a role in the model by delineating the distribution of behaviour, due to process and structure, in space. The changes in process and

structure by individuals will be aggregated into meaningful ecological units so that the correct level of inference is obtained. Thus the effect of spatial distribution of process and structure, according to these aggregates of individuals, can be evaluated.

In simple terms, differential modernization arises from an uneven spatial distribution of modernization. Certain geographically grouped individuals may experience more modernization than another group for such diverse reasons as ready access to coal and iron ore deposits or access to shipping ports, etc. This implies that social mobilization would be spatially maldistributed as well. In homogeneous societies therefore, inequalities will occur within groups, while in heterogeneous societies, inequalities will occur between cultural groups, and may be compounded if the cultures are spatially segregated.

If it is assumed that the pattern of modernization within a hegemonic cultural entity includes the acculturation by status aspirants from other cultural entities to it, there remains a proportion of the population that is not acculturated and not modernized. A stratification system can be thought of as consisting of two levels: those open to modernization and mobilization (whatever their cultural orientation) and those who are not.^(*) Tension will arise between assimilationists and, for

(*) This theoretical aggregation does not eliminate the horizontal layers of the stratification system from a

want of a better term, nationalists, and between the dominant and subordinate cultures, as they compete for the scarce resources of modernity.

It does not mean however, that the subordinate group itself will be in complete harmony on the issue of assimilation, since it is likely that intra-group tension will arise and sustain conflict between assimilationists and non-assimilationists.⁽⁹⁾ Politically, this means that sub-national values may seriously compete with national ones, as the latter may have been defined by some culturally hegemonic group. In the short run, there will be no competition as such between culturally-defined groups since members of subordinate cultures will initially perceive little cost in acquiring membership in a dominant culture, and hence, its reward system.

In the long run however, there will be two sources of tension. First, there will be resistance to acculturation

theoretical schema, but shows that a stratification process can be useful as a metaphor for change as well. Apter (1965:126) argues in essentially the same way, with the proviso that joining the modernization stratification system or not is a matter of choice. But, it may also be argued that individuals may not have any choice in the matter, even if they would like to participate in the modernization process.

⁽⁹⁾Apter (1965:126-127) argues a similar point. Weiner (1971:167) argues that modernization affects the extent to which individuals can enter politics by changing the structure of the stratification system. This occurs by the creation of new social groups. These two factors create a stratification based on status, since achieving power is a matter of status acquisition. Government policy therefore, is not so much a question of what is decided as who decides it. This leads to the kind of cultural or ethnic stratification referred to in the text.

from some members of the recipient culture who fear increased competition. Second, there will be increased difficulties and therefore costs of assimilation for the remaining members of the subordinate culture, as the recipient culture loses its ability to absorb increasing numbers of the newly socially mobilized. This will result in a drive, by the subordinate group membership, to acquire a less costly modernization.

This drive will result in a competition for the existing pattern of power distribution and may come not from primordial loyalties per se, but from differences in modernization which are equated with membership in one cultural group as opposed to another. When an alignment of things cultural with things modern harden as a result of tensions, it is simply not worth the increasing cost to individuals to acquire the values of another cultural group. Then, there will occur a bifurcation of the previously homogeneous mobilizers from both the subordinate and dominant cultures, into distinct cultural or communal entities which will give rise to communal political behaviour.

In the situation where there is no territorial separation, there may arise ethnic consciousness which will create ethnically competitive political blocs. On the other hand, where cultural groups are spatially defined, the focus of political organization which the non-assimilationists are most likely to espouse is regional nationalism. The

organizational expression of this goal is the communal political party.

In order to preserve its hegemony in the face of rising communal parties, the government party bloc, over the very long term, will begin a process of intervention to redress grievances by increasing the modernization and social mobilization of a disadvantaged group. One group gets the rewards of re-distribution which leads to the desire by other groups, including the hegemonic one, for re-distribution as well. This process becomes cyclic in nature in that there will be an increase in the demand for government involvement as the previously disadvantaged group becomes increasingly socially mobilized. This cycle will lead to a continual search for comparative advantage by competing groups (and possibly help in the creation of new ones), all of which look to government, not only for services, but also for mediation.

If communal parties, representing the disadvantaged group(s), are able to reduce the differentials between culturally subordinate and dominant groups, they will be successful politically, and the expression of the communal party mode of political discontent will have been reinforced. In relative terms, therefore, there will be a decrease in the rapidity of the rate of modernization of the previously advantaged group. When government fails in its redistributive task -- a hopeless spiral of competition increases the likelihood of this outcome -- a search for a

political re-definition is inevitable and the communal basis of politics increases in scope.

The important implication of these arguments is that even if government attempts to reduce the differences between groups, the combined forces of modernization and social mobilization among the previously disadvantaged group will allow it to take-off socio-economically and politically in the same way as the formerly hegemonic group. Over time, the relative decline in the political influence of this latter group may result in the same kind of communal activism that characterized the forces which led to the rise of subordinate groups. In other words, a political learning model may be operative here — it pays to advance communally-based demands. These considerations reflect a long-run phenomenon however, since changing norms and values resultant from a process of social mobilization are multi-generational. This means that the level of differential modernization will increase since each communal party will see it to its advantage to increase the modernization of their communal group. From the point of view of the political system however, a desire for political re-definition will continually occur as long as relative differentials exist, no matter how small and in whose favour.

In essence then, the social process component of the model includes differential modernization, differential social mobilization, the formation of new oppositions and

communal politics. The theory to this point contains a number of axioms and propositions, not all of which can be tested empirically. But, a subset of hypotheses, presented in the next section, can parsimoniously summarize all the direct and indirect links of the model thus far.

2.3.1 Working Hypotheses of the Social Process Component of the Communal Politics Model

In this section, both a verbal and a formal representation of the hypotheses will be offered.

H1: When absolute⁽¹⁰⁾ differential modernization in the previous time period moves from one level to the next, the absolute differential social mobilization in the current time period (ADSMt) will move positively from one level to the next by an amount to be determined empirically.

Formally,

$$ADSM(t) = a + b^1ADM(t-1)$$

H2: In the short run,⁽¹¹⁾ when absolute differential social mobilization in the current period (ADSMt) moves from one

⁽¹⁰⁾The absolute quantity of differential modernization and social mobilization is important because it is the total discrepancy in the system that affects politics, and not the thresholds resultant from a cardinal comparison between groups. The comparison is assumed to be ordinal: "They have more than us", or "They have access to opportunity where we do not." This result is compounded in unitary societies since political outcomes are decided at the national level. Although federal societies have sub-national structures to deflect the differences away from the system level itself, the spatial segregation of dissatisfied cultures will become politically relevant, and result in the same kind of disequilibrium as would occur in a unitary system.

⁽¹¹⁾Short and long run is an aspect of obtaining an

level to the next, it will positively affect the support for communal parties in the current period (SCPt) from one level to the next by an amount to be determined empirically.

Formally,

$$SCP(t) = a + b^2 ADSM(t)$$

H3: When the support for communal parties in the previous period (SCPt-1) moves from one level to the next, the absolute differential modernization of the current period (ADMt) will move positively from one level to the next by an empirically determined amount.

Formally, this can be re-stated as

$$ADM(t) = a + b^3 SCP(t-1).$$

H4: When absolute differential social mobilization in a previous time period (ADSMt-1) moves from one level to the next, absolute differential modernization in the current period (ADMt) will move positively from one level to the next by an empirically determined amount.

This hypothesis can be formalized as

$$ADM(t) = a + b^4 ADSM(t-1)$$

Collecting the formally stated hypotheses yields the following social process aspect of the communal politics model.

equilibrium in the political system. By equilibrium is meant the absence of change in the support for communal parties when the levels of differential modernization and differential social mobilization are zero. The short run refers to processes in which there is no expectation of realising an equilibrium, and long-run refers to the expectation of reaching an equilibrium.

$$\text{ADSM}(t) = a + b^1 \text{ADM}(t-1)$$

$$0 \quad \text{SCP}(t) = a + b^2 \text{ADSM}(t)$$

$$\text{ADM}(t) = a + b^3 \text{SCP}(t-1) + b^4 \text{ADSM}(t-1)$$

2.4 Social Structure: Political Cleavages and Communal Politics

This fairly simple process model is modified by changes in the social structure induced by the differential social mobilization process. By social structure is meant the distribution, within a political system, of individual attributes, each of which creates a focus for the cohesion of memberships within a group, and the basis for a barrier or cleavage for the exclusion of individuals not sharing those traits. Differential social mobilization changes the relationships among the attributes of social structure.

Earlier, the relationship between differential social mobilization and social structure was established by the argument that changes in social process occur within the context of the social structure, and vice versa. This section seeks to expand on the relationship between differential social mobilization and social structure, and between social structure and support for communal parties. This gives rise to a discussion of the implication of the interaction of differential social mobilization and social structure on communal politics. Before proceeding further, the social structure model of politics derived from the earlier literature will be presented.

2.4.1 Segmented Pluralism and Communal Parties

One major view of politics is that political parties mirror the social structure, or the cleavages within a

system. (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967: 1-64) Within the context of political stability, theorists have argued that when cleavages reflect social memberships which either mutually coincide with one another, or are cross-cutting in nature, the pattern of regime stability is affected. (Dahl, 1961; Eckstein, 1965) If, for example, a society is divided into religious and class memberships, political stability will obtain if these cleavages are cross-cutting in character. In other words, individuals may be divided by membership in either a Socialist or a middle-class union, but are united by membership in the Catholic church. Cross-cutting one membership with that of another minimizes disunity since exclusive partisanship is reduced. "Cross-cutting then, is the extent to which individuals who are in the same group on one cleavage are in different groups on the other cleavage." (Rae and Taylor, 1970:92) (Rae and Taylor (1970:19) argue however, that the cross-cutting hypothesis of political stability is trivial unless it takes into account the extent to which groups are fragmented by the component cleavages.)

Alternatively, if all the cleavages coincide with or are reinforced by one other, attachments are fewer, and thus society can be described as divided into mutually exclusive camps. For example, all middle class workers are also Catholic Party voters, and are separated from all lower class workers who vote for the Socialist Party. The possibility of compromise between groups is substantially reduced which, in turn, will promote greater political

conflict.

Since the cleavages in a society are neither perfectly cross-cutting nor perfectly reinforcing, theorists have introduced another category of cleavage structure which combines these two extreme patterns in the concept segmented pluralism. According to Lorwin (1974: 33), segmented pluralism

serves as one historic model of the attempt to reconcile religious and ideological diversity with civic cohesion.

For example, although a factor such as class, religion, or language may divide a society into reinforcing segments, each segment will contain a multiplicity of overlapping memberships. Stability arises through the practice of cooperation among elites of various segments. This kind of political bargaining is commonly referred to as the practice of consociationalism.⁽¹²⁾

Consociational democracy is seen as one political outcome of segmented pluralistic societies. (Lijphart, 1978:20) The practice of accommodation arose as an institutional adaptation to essentially divisive social forces.

[T]hose democracies with subcultural cleavages and with tendencies toward immobilism and instability ... are

⁽¹²⁾See Lijphart (1968) for the first presentation of the consociational argument and McRae (1974) for a theoretical extension of it, with applications, to the smaller West European democracies and Canada.

deliberately turned into more stable systems by the leaders of the major subcultures. (Lijphart, 1968:20)

While Deutsch focussed on the responsiveness of government to social change, Lijphart examines the conditions for responsive government in the face of segmented pluralistic societies, ignoring social change. He argues (1968: 75) that

the leaders of the rival subcultures may engage in competitive behaviour and thus further aggravate mutual tensions and political instability, but they may also make deliberate efforts to counteract the immobilizing and unstablizing effects of cultural fragmentation.

A major limitation of the segmented pluralism model is that it is static. It provides a description of cleavages in a society at a moment in time but it does not predict cleavage change through time. Although Lorwin (1974: 57) and McRae (1974: 7) use the term ontzuiling, a Dutch word to describe the process whereby segmented pluralism declines, they do not state under what conditions it would occur, and what would be its likely outcome.

If a political system is based upon the cleavage structure within it, as is assumed by the previous literature, how then does political behaviour change, if the cleavages do not? The answer must be that cleavages must change in kind and salience. What motivates this change? As the theory of social mobilization had to be extended in order to account for the social process component of

communal political behaviour, so the segmented pluralism model has to be extended in order to account for the social structure component.

The social process component of the communal politics model shows how differential modernization arises and what the implications are for political behaviour within culturally plural societies. It is now necessary to show that new cleavages may arise and come to dominate old ones as a result of the dynamics of differential modernization.

2.5 Differential Social Mobilization, Cleavage Change and Communal Politics

While a society may reflect the values of a dominant culture, and in this sense may be seen as a culturally homogeneous society, the process of differential social mobilization can transform that society in such a way that the dominant culture will no longer be considered legitimate for the transmission of nation-building values. Not only will competition for the scarce rewards of modernization occur, but those same rewards, once distributed, will enable individuals to control their own cultural destiny and challenge the nation-building values associated with a dominant cultural group. Traditional cleavages may fall by the wayside as voluntaristic behaviour begins to supercede the traditional other-worldly orientation of unmodernized peoples. The differential process of social mobilization will cause a decline in the traditional, but non-cultural memberships, and a rise in a membership that more fully reflects the identity of that particular group.

If differential economic development and social mobilization induce a cultural transformation, then any political realignment in membership patterns will be modified by the current cleavage structure, and the degree to which individuals are fragmented by it. The membership of one cleavage may exert more influence than another; indeed, the differential process of social mobilization may make cleavage groups more alike. For example, in a period

of modernization, as individuals become more secular, a cleavage based upon religiosity may decline. Or, a class cleavage, based on an employer-worker dichotomy, may be replaced by a white-collar/blue-collar conflict, as more of the population becomes better educated and technology replaces manual skills. The important consequence of these realignments is that the increased political salience of new membership patterns will increase the likelihood of political instability in a number of ways.

Political instability may arise when certain cleavages no longer cross-cut one another and are the result of a new overriding cleavage based on some other changing alignment such as an attachment to language, for example. In this case, group membership is linguistic and may, in the short run, yield a new reinforcing cleavage structure. In the long run, the overlapping memberships may re-appear, but only within that linguistic segment. Melson and Wolpe (1971:1125) similarly argue that

under social mobilization, individuals move into new kinds of occupational and other social roles, and become differentiated by socio-economic and ideological criteria [such as issue-awareness]. New kinds of social identities and conflicts emerge ... [which] may or may not cross-cut the lines of communal cleavage.

Therefore, differential social mobilization will fundamentally challenge the traditional cleavage fabric by introducing into it not only differing rates of change among groups, but also changes in kind. When memberships arise

which provide a new basis of division within a society, such as one of ethnicity, the politics of elite cartels may decline as the fight for political survival increases. This will be true only if elites cannot reduce conflict through elite accommodation, and if this method of conflict reduction is perceived as only a stop-gap solution anyway.

Successful elite accommodation arises when the cleavages are well-defined, and a hierarchy is built within the cleavage group to enable the elite both to articulate their clienteles' interests, and authoritatively distribute their decisions back to that clientele. This means that when cultural differences result in communal political behaviour, the salience of elite-client interactions will decline as the clear, but unbargainable issues of communal politics transcend the ability of decision-makers to authoritatively resolve communal disputes; these issues do not leave the elites with anything to distribute. When a cross-cutting cleavage changes to a reinforcing one, the "rules of the game" become zero-sum.

An additional, but implicit assumption in the consociational literature is that societies are economically homogeneous; in otherwords, economic cleavages do not reinforce socio-cultural cleavages. An important result of the differential modernization and social mobilization processes is that they produce just such an outcome. Therefore, there will be a breakdown in consociational bargaining because elites will no longer have the ability to

allocate decisions through the cleavage membership after it has become differentiated.

Barry (1975: 501-502) notes that when there is no history of solutions to deal with communal identification, cultural identifiers will demand different, non-traditional responses from government. The implication of this argument is that when communal competitive behaviour is strong enough to surmount any efforts to counteract the de-stabilizing effects of cultural fragmentation, willing or otherwise, political instability may ensue.

The segmented pluralism model moreover, provides no indication as to the cultural cleavage pattern in a system as it begins to reinforce other cleavages, since a differential process of social mobilization

among communal groups [will] exacerbate communal conflict by multiplying coincident social cleavages. (Melson and Wolpe, 1971: 1115)

If differential social mobilization differently affects cultural groups, new within group memberships will reinforce the communal cleavage rather than cross-cut it. When a deprived group finally experiences modernization, the creation of new opportunities will reinforce the membership groupings within that group as well. (This process may be compounded if these groups are spatially distributed.) This means the communal parties will arise which will represent the interests of the coincidental communal groupings. Thus, a political opposition, based on cultural orientations, may

seek to transform the existing political structure in order to decrease the traditional kind of pluralism which subsumed the new cleavage.

Thus, it can be argued that if differential social mobilization promotes the formation of communal parties in a culturally heterogeneous society, then differential social mobilization will interact with changing cleavage group memberships. This interaction would be a function of the differing intensities of fragmentation between groups, and the crystallization within groups, (Rae and Taylor, 1970:3) both of which imply changes in time.

A unitary state may not be the appropriate political structure to diffuse the conflict arising from the development of coinciding cultural segmentation, and will require the devolution of power and hence an administrative de-centralization. Lorwin (1974:44) argues that

federalism offers a different sort of pluralism than does [segmented pluralism]; it recognizes diversity in territorial space, although that diversity may correspond ... with religious and linguistic diversity. Segmented pluralism calls for representation of diversity, within the same space, as well as for ties of voluntary association between members of competing blocs across internal boundaries.

A practical consequence of this argument is that if the political system has devolved into communal groupings, the incidence of coincident communal cleavages will increase, as long as there continues to exist an absolute differential in

the level of social mobilization. This means that if the salience of cleavage group membership is declining, the support for communal parties will increase and vice versa. These arguments permit the presentation of a set of hypotheses concerning the linkages just discussed.

2.5.1 Working Hypotheses Derived from the Social Structure

Aspect of the Communal Politics Model

H5: When absolute differential social mobilization in the current time period (ADSM_t) moves from one level to the next, segmented pluralism in the current time period (SEGPL_t) moves positively from one level to the next by an empirically determined amount.

Formally stated,

$$\text{SEGPL}(t) = a + b^5 \text{ADSM}(t)$$

H6: When the level of segmented pluralism in the current period (SEGPL_t) moves from one level to the next, absolute differential social mobilization in the current period (ADSM_t) will move positively from one level to the next by an empirically determined amount.

Formally stated,

$$\text{ADSM}(t) = a + b^6 \text{SEGPL}(t)$$

Hypotheses H5 and H6 posit simultaneous change between SEGPL and ADSM. In order to distinguish their reciprocal effects, a restriction on the values of b^5 and b^6 is required in order to allow subsequent estimation. The restriction is that the rate of change in one is not the same as the rate

of change in the other.

Formally stated,

$$b^5 = \frac{1}{b^6}$$

H7: When the level of segmented pluralism in the previous time period (SEGPLt-1) moves from one level to the next, given a specific level of the current period's absolute differential social mobilization (ADSMt), the level of support for communal parties in the current period (SCPt) will move negatively from one level to next by an empirically determined amount.

Formally,

$$SCP(t) = a - b^7 SEGPL(t-1) + b^6 ADSM(t) * SEGPL(t-1)$$

H8: When the level of support for communal parties in the previous time period (SCPt-1) moves from one level to the next, segmented pluralism in the current time period (SEGPLt) will move negatively from one level to the next by an empirically determined amount.

Formally stated,

$$SEGPL(t) = a - b^6 SCP(t-1)$$

Hypotheses H7 and H8 posit feedback between SEGPL and SCP. In order to keep their reciprocal effects separated, the restriction that b^7 and b^6 are not equal is imposed.

Formally,

$$b^7 = \frac{1}{b^9}$$

Collecting the formally stated hypotheses results in the following social structure component of the communal politics model.

$$ADSM(t) = a + b^6 SEGPL(t)$$

$$SEGPL(t) = a + b^5 ADSM(t) - b^9 SCP(t-1)$$

$$SCP(t) = a - b^7 SEGPL(t) + b^8 ADSM(t) * SEGPL(t-1)$$

2.5.2 Subsidiary Aspects of the Social Structure Component

Finally, because the process of differential social mobilization involves new physical contacts between modernizing and newly modernizing individuals, the transformation of cleavages has a physical dimension as well.

[I]n areas relatively untouched by migrations and changes in social structure, traditional hierarchies and values might remain unchallenged.
(Lorwin, 1974:41)

Therefore, if a society is divided into communities, it is of interest to determine the salience of these cleavage lines when peoples are affected by a process of social mobilization. The differential process of mobilization implies that this physical movement of people across communal borders may increase at an increasing rate over time.

H9: When absolute differential social mobilization in the

current period (ADSMt) moves from one level to the next, the inter-bloc migration will move negatively from one level to the next by an empirically determined amount.

Formally stated,

$$IBM(t) = a - b^{10}ADSM(t)$$

But when migration does occur

increased sectional contacts may tend to dissipate differences among a people, increased contacts among diverse ethnographically conscious groups appears more apt to cement and reinforce the distinctive sense of uniqueness.
(Connor, 1978:29)

H10: When the current period's inter-bloc migration (IBMt) moves from one level to the next, the current period's segmented pluralism (SEGPLt) will move negatively from one level to the next by an empirically determined amount.

Formally stated,

$$\text{SEGPL}(t) = a - b^{11}\text{IBM}(t)$$

2.6 The Complete Formal Communal Politics Model

In sections 2.2 and 2.4, it was argued that while social process and structure are independently observed, they are theoretically interdependent. Changes in the level of social process are modified by the social structure and vice versa. Thus, by joining all the formally stated hypotheses, a complete formal communal politics model can be presented.

$$ADSM(t) = a + b^1ADM(t-1) + b^6SEGPL(t)$$

$$ADM(t) = a + b^3SCP(t-1) + b^4ADSM(t-1)$$

$$IBM(t) = a - b^{10}ADSM(t)$$

$$SEGPL(t) = a + b^5ADSM(t) - b^8SCP(t-1) - b^{11}IBM(t-1)$$

$$SCP(t) = a + b^2ADSM(t) - b^7SEGPL(t-1) + b^9ADSM(t) * SEGPL(t-1)$$

This final model⁽¹⁴⁾ is pictorially demonstrated with all of the hypothesized linkages⁽¹⁵⁾ in figure 2.6.1.

(14) It should be noted that each hypothesis represents the partial derivative of the individual variables of a set of simultaneous equations. The hypotheses thus form a model consisting of equations which depend upon a set of independent variables some of which are determined within and without the model. For further details see the discussion in Appendix 4, especially sections 4.1 and 4.4.

(15) Note that the plus (+) sign attached to b^9 does not imply any specific hypothesized direction; it is the only sign in the model that does not. It is simply assumed that while the effect is additive, its direction is an empirical question.

Figure 2.6.1

A Pictorial Representation of the Communal
Politics Model

The diagram is to be read and understood in the following manner. Each arrow represents a specific hypothesis drawn from the formal model as presented above. For example, ADM in the previous time period $t-1$, is positively associated with ADSM in the current period t . ADSM in the previous period $t-1$ positively feeds back into ADM in the current period t . The " t " to the upper left of ADSM therefore represents the current level of ADSM as it is affected by the earlier value of ADM as indicated by " $t-1$ " at the upper right of ADM. Similarly, ADSM in the current period " t ", as indicated below ADSM, is positively associated with the current level of SEGPL at time " t " as indicated to the upper left of SEGPL. This procedure is easily extended for each parameter of the formal model.

Chapter Three

A Review of The Previous Literature on Belgium

The previous literature which examined the Belgian political system can be divided into two major areas. First, support for political parties is viewed as a function of the cleavage patterns within the system. Second, given a specific cleavage pattern, political stability is examined in terms of the capability of government to mediate between pluralistic segments of the system, i.e., the degree to which political elites engage in consociational practices. The implication of consociationalism for traditional party support is also examined. These approaches will be studied in the following review.

3.1 Degrees of Cleavage Institutionalization and The Segmented Pluralism Model

Urwin (1970: 320-340) attempted to apply the Lipset and Rokkan model of cleavage formation to Belgium by mapping

the historical emergence of social cleavages in Belgium, and the extent of their transformation into party oppositions and the consequent strains upon the party and political system.
(Urwin, 1970:321)

Lipset and Rokkan (1967: 1-60) argue that party systems are a direct result of the cleavage segments within a political system as they arose from the conflicts which resulted from the 'Industrial' Revolution, and a so-called 'National

Revolution'.

The Industrial Revolution produced conflict between landed interests and a rising commercial class, and later, conflicts between owner/employers and workers. This Revolution also acted as a catalyst in compounding the effects of the National Revolution.

As a central culture engaged in a process of nation-building, conflict arose between it and territorially distinct provinces or peripheries, concerning matters of ethnicity, language, or religion. The National Revolution also produced, in many cases, conflict between a mobilizing, centralizing nation-state, and the Church which perceived a threat to its traditional rights and privileges.

Each party system, and the basis upon which political parties can be understood, is seen by Lipset and Rokkan as the result of these two revolutions, as they were modified by the historical experience of each nation-state. Contemporary political behaviour is affected by these revolutions in that current party alignments can be traced to the moment when conflictual divisions "froze", after the period of universal suffrage, around the cleavages of religion and class.

Urwin finds that the Lipset and Rokkan model does not adequately fit the Belgian situation since there is no clear polar clustering between working-class and middle-class parties. If anything, class membership does not appear to be a good predictor of party choice. (Urwin, 1970:321) He argues

that an intervening linkage between the affects of the National and Industrial Revolutions, and thus the way cleavages become translated into party alignments, is through a process of institutionalization.⁽¹⁾

The relationship between cleavage institutionalization and party leaders, in terms of conflict resolution, comes about by the existence of institutionalized cleavages when they form "boundaries separating differing core bases of electoral support for the major political parties." (Urwin, 1970:321) Thus, when "salient cleavage lines have not been translated or have been translated weakly into party oppositions ..." (Urwin, 1970:321), party leaders can then exacerbate, or reduce the conflicts arising from this social differentiation, to the extent that they can claim to represent the interests of a particular social group. In this context then, the conflicts in Belgium politics can be understood as the result of the success of the institutionalization process in translating social cleavages into party support, and the openness of party elites to new forms of social strains.

3.1.1 The Degree of Institutionalization Of Religion, Class and Communalism in Belgium

Urwin argues that religion has become an

⁽¹⁾ Institutionalization is the process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability...." (Huntington, 1968:12)

institutionalized cleavage because party leaders were able to resolve conflicts between clerical and anti-clerical attitudes over the issue of the relative roles played by the Church and the State as agents of socialization in the education system. Once this issue was resolved in 1958, whereby parity was given in the form of equal funding of Church and State schools, the issue of religion was no longer a zero-sum game; neither the Church nor the State emerged as victors, but legitimacy was given to both. Through a process of compromise, the political parties had institutionalized the Church-State conflict into support for the political regime.

Social class is seen as a semi-institutionalized cleavage since the rapid assimilation into support for the regime was achieved through the extension of the suffrage in 1894, and the introduction of major reforms in the conditions of work. These actions helped to diffuse much of worker discontent. Economic issues were thus resolved through mediation between the party leaders, rather than fought as full-blown electoral issues in order to minimize any adverse electoral consequences therefrom. But social class remained semi-institutionalized because economic problems were related to communalism, a non-institutionalized cleavage.

The rise of the communal parties is seen as the by-product of the institutionalization of religion and class as sources of conflict. Because the linguistic divisions

were outside the realm of national unity, as conceived by the traditional parties who had advocated the maintenance of the unitary state, these divisions were principally expressed in areas where the major parties were organizationally weak. (Urwin, 1970:332)

As a general rule, each party sought to maintain their support through an extensive political and social organizational network, the outcome of which was a party-based political socialization. In effect, these networks reinforced the internal party hierarchy and, as well, facilitated group representation politically.

Urwin (1970:340) argues that as long as the religious and class issues remained sources of conflict, linguistic difficulties would remain subsumed to the organizational efforts of the major parties around religious, and later, class concerns. Social class was linked to communal issues by the fact that the Flemish-speaking region had become economically inferior to the rest of the country. Thus, the spatial linkage of economic activity with language groups had prevented the full institutionalization of class issues which surfaced as the key political problem. In addition, the settlement of the religious question

loosened the bonds tying the individual to the [Catholic or Socialist] party. The result has been a certain state of disorientation, or even anomie. (Urwin, 1970:340)

The political vacuum this created was filled by

economic issues related to unbalanced regional economic expansion ... which ... [was] related to the linguistic issue. (Urwin, 1970:340)

Urwin has identified the interplay between the increasing organizational orientation of politics, and the role played by political leaders in resolving disputes in Belgium. To some extent, these leaders have been able to institutionalize conflict into support for the regime. But, as Urwin (1970:340) notes, the present linguistic crisis

has been aided by a condition of ontzuiling, the disintegration of the pattern of vertical stratification ... [This] process ... has taken place within the completely institutionalized dimension of religion.

Some comments on Urwin's explanation for the nature of political conflict in Belgium are in order here. First, Urwin's approach to the analysis of Belgian politics reflects the dominant approach in the literature. It describes the centrifugal forces in modern Belgian history, and alerts the researcher to the ways in which a society can become fractionalized by the degree to which it can deflect conflict away from the political system itself, through the institutionalization of social conflict. Unfortunately, rather than focussing on socio-political change itself, Urwin prefers to examine its outcomes, and the extent to which party leaders can accommodate new

demands. Thus, Urwin's work underlines the necessity to move beyond a functional view of politics, to a behavioural one, so that the reasons behind the specific communal party behaviour, and the form that it has taken over time, can be understood. For example, what has caused a process of ontzuiling to take place? By focussing on social cleavages the analysis becomes reduced to a description of which social cleavages are important at any given time, rather than the root causes behind how they might change. Use of the Lipset and Rokkan model however, has prevented such a development.

Urwin has overlooked the essential points of why, and how, societies experience change, and its implication for politics. In the context of Belgian politics, why were the linguistic parties able to erode the bases of support for the traditional parties, and why did the traditional party leaders fail to satisfactorily deal with the dissatisfaction these parties expressed?

3.1.2 Segmented Pluralism and The Consociational Politics Model

In the same vein as Urwin, Lorwin (1966; 1974a; 1974b) and McRae (1974) analyse the nature of consociational politics in a segmented pluralistic Belgium. They assume that segmented pluralistic societies are stable through the ability of segment elites in compromising with, and thus accommodating, one another over policy issues. The assumption

here is that political parties have a vested interest in compromise within such a system in order to maintain their electoral support. This means that present elite accommodation is based upon a history of accommodation which becomes part of the 'political rules of the game'. (Lijphart, 1968:122) Both authors however, agree that consociational democracy is the factor of unity in segmented plural societies. Finally, there is the implicit assumption as well that political parties are important in yielding policy compromises, and also, as noted in Chapter Two, the assumption that societies are economically homogeneous.

The model which has been offered in the literature is essentially this: if societies are heterogeneous in culture, institutionalization of these cleavages through the party system is obtained when the elites of these parties mobilize these respective cleavage group memberships in their favour, thus allowing the party elites to ensure stability through compromise which in turn, reinforces party support. Within the context of the Belgian situation, Lorwin (1974b:180) argues that religious disputes were reflected by segmented pluralism in the form of those who supported Church education, and opposed by those who favoured state education. The parties were organized on the basis of this duality.

"Class conflict was partly represented and partly absorbed in the [segmented pluralist] system..." (Lorwin, 1974b:180), since the attitudes of socialist workers also

reflected the secular or state domination of the educational system. Thus, until the settlement of the religious issue with the Pacte Scolaire, the issue of class, in the form of demands for increased participation and resolution of poor working conditions, became contained within the segmented pluralist system. Lorwin (1974b:181) however indicates that

[l]inguistic claims were long kept within bounds by the political parties, but they were too long denied legitimacy. After World War One, these claims repeatedly erupted outside the party system or beyond its capacity to handle them effectively.

The question is this: why should language conflicts not be contained within the segmented pluralistic system when in fact, there was a spatial linkage with clericalism in Flanders and secularism in Brussels and Wallonia and thus language was implicitly part of the political parties' composition? If the assumption that ideologies are aligned with the social segments on which parties are based, then the conclusion one must come to is that the political parties would not give recognition to the linguistic oppositions because of the unfavourable attitude they held towards the legitimacy of the unitary state.

Moreover, the practice of elite accommodation, and the mobilization of various electoral clienteles, meant that the consociational system was inherently inflexible when issues were not clear-cut; ie., along ideological lines, and when they challenged the essence of state organization. Indeed, the very nature of the linguistic conflict meant that the

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traditional hierarchy, through which party decisions were disseminated, was not oriented to accomodating such tensions.

By ignoring the role cultural activism has in potentially transforming a homogeneous culture into a heterogeneous one, Lorwin (1974b: 197) mistakenly places the decline of segmented pluralism in Belgium on the shoulders of the linguistic oppositions because they refuse to accept the legitimacy of the traditional models of conflict resolution. Even though he emphasizes the role of elites in conflict reduction, he paradoxically places the blame for a lack of such reduction on the linguistic oppositions. In so doing, he inadvertently underlines the theoretical point argued in the previous chapter, that differentials in social mobilization can prevent elites from distributing collective goods because the linguistic oppositions do not leave them anything to distribute.

But if segmented pluralism "recognizes diversity within a territorial space," what would account for this perception? The conclusion one comes to is that the political elites could not bridge the gap this perception created since by focussing on issues which did not deal with national unity, they could insure their political continuance. The linguistic oppositions arose because the government, headed by the traditional parties, would not relinquish their power to the regions, and thus lose the ability to diffuse linguistic political support on a

national basis. Lorwin (1974b:198-9) argues that while ideologies have receded in Belgium, with the institutionalization of the religious and class cleavages, these pillars stand as a bulwark against the linguistic tensions, thus insuring the continuance of consociational politics in Belgium.

Lorwin does not provide an explanation of changes in party support, of the impact the linguistic parties made on the social bases of the party system, or even of their continued existence. In sum then, segmented pluralism and its constituent, elite accommodation, may have described Belgian politics in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, and are important variables which go into an explanation of the rise of linguistic parties in Belgium, they are only part of an explanation. The forces which go into changing party support, and the reaction of government to political and social change, can only come from outside such a model, such as in the theoretical unification argued in chapter two.

Segmented pluralism has been advocated as an historical process, but it really is useful only in describing the social strains in a society, and the method by which political parties and government respond to them in specific historical periods. They become theoretically important when social change models can be linked to a segmented pluralist model to see how one affects the other since both limit the effects of the other.

Lorwin's model, moreover has virtually dominated the Belgian literature, and its implicit regime-maintenance focus has prevented a full recognition of the processes of change which have come to dominate the political system. Cleavage analysis is only useful when it can be linked to societal change which show how these cleavages change over time, and hence on the support for political parties.

3.1.3 Bureaucratic Institutionalization of the Linguistic Cleavage

Taking an entirely different perspective, Heisler (1974) argues that the linguistic cleavage has been institutionalized, de facto, in the system by the increasing array of bureaucratic mechanisms designed to deal with the problem. In this respect, he shifts the emphasis from political parties as effective media of channeling conflicts to the policy output side of government.

He assumes that, on the input side, political parties are no longer seen as being effective policy producers, and instead, focusses on the "decisionmaking sub-system, the norms and processes through which outputs are legitimated, and the structures and processes through which outputs are implemented and converted into outcomes." (Heisler, 1974:187)

"Because the political parties could not handle the linguistic conflict as they had other conflicts, they are no longer important in analysing how linguistic tensions may be ameliorated. He cites three factors (1974:198, 205, 207)

which have contributed to their present demise.

First, the economic democratization of the Belgian economy has meant that government increased its role as a source of regional policy outputs. Secondly, the lack of a desire on the part of the linguistic parties to enter into an accommodative arrangement with the traditional parties, in order to arrive at political solutions between these two ideologically opposed forces, and thirdly, the inability of the traditional parties to obtain the two-thirds majority in Parliament necessary to pass constitutional amendments.

Government has taken on an increased importance, as evidenced by the 40 to 50 percent of the central government's expenditure now appropriated for functional tasks administered in a regionally distinguished manner. (Heisler, 1974:214) Through the advocacy of greater regional representation in the Brussels power centre, the effect of an increased bureaucracy has been to minimize the importance of parties in yielding political solutions. At present, all government departments are linguistically and regionally organized and therefore, the effective institutionalization of the linguistic cleavage has been attained.

But an important assumption behind the institutionalization of social cleavages is that it is the route chosen to ensure stability. If the bureaucratic structures have displaced the parties as sources of stability, why has the linguistic conflict continued to persist, in spite of the fact that attempts are now being

made to introduce greater regionalization into the system? Heisler does not provide an answer.

It may be conjectured that as long as the traditional parties continue to advocate the legitimacy of the unitary state, even in regional guise, the linguistic parties, which want complete devolution of power to the regions, and hence increase their political power, will continue to remain intractable. It was argued previously moreover, that a reasonable strategy of the communal parties, given a unitary political system, will be to maximize differences between the communal groups in order to maintain their power. Therefore, it is not the bureaucracy which acts as a medium of institutionalization, but rather the willingness of the traditional parties to work within a federal state, even if increased attention is paid to the bureaucracy as a locus of outputs.

In conclusion, the argument in this section has been that the earlier literature on Belgium has inadequately conceptualized the linguistic problem through the use of segmented pluralist models since there is no explanation for why and how social strains change. By emphasizing elite accommodation, authors have failed to account for how it might fail as a method of ensuring national unity.

If what the authors discussed in this section is correct, we would expect that cleavages would correlate strongly with party choice in Belgium. In addition, if elite accommodation is the rule, one would also expect that

cleavages would form the basis of that accommodation in parliament. In order to test these assertions, the following section consists of a review of the empirical studies conducted on Belgian politics. The first part reviews studies on the electoral patterns, while the second is concerned with the parliamentary cleavages and accommodation.

3.2 Empirical Studies of Social Cleavages, Party Choice and Elite Accommodation

3.2.1 Social Cleavages and Party Choice

Within the cleavage school of analysis, the majority of the empirical work to date has consisted of election studies based on cross-sectional survey data obtained between 1968 and 1973. Since the utilization of advanced political research tools has been relatively recent in Belgian political science, these analyses consist of largely bivariate cross-tabulational work with very little usage of controls for other variables. The purpose of this section is to document the work conducted thus far.

Hill (1974: 29-108) examined support for the parties at various points in time by analyzing them from the electoral data and inferring the stability of party identification over time. He finds that voters are very stable in their electoral choices, except among the regional parties where voters tend to slip between them and their traditional cousins. That is, support for the VU waxes and wanes between it and the PSC/CVP; the loss in traditional support has been strongest in the 1960's. The VU is susceptible to losses on religion, while the francophone parties are more susceptible to losses on class.

Based upon a national sample obtained in 1968, Hill analyzed the relationship between religiosity, class, occupation and party choice. He finds that the issue of language is confounded by region in that each linguistic

region is virtually homogeneous in composition (except Brussels-capital), so that all political groups within these regions share the same linguistic concerns, and thus the salience of language is reduced.

Insofar as a regional effect is to be detected in electoral behaviour, it is the product of the distinctive concatenations of structural variables influencing spatially concentrated populations. (Hill, 1979: 79)

While correct in noting the importance of space as a variable, he ignores the divisive cross-regional affect that differences in language produce. To account for language, region was introduced as a control variable in all analyses. Since Belgium is religiously homogeneous, differences are noted between secular and clerical voters. The dominant influence in Flemish electoral behaviour is clericalism while francophone electoral behaviour is secularist. Hill finds that the relationship between occupation and party choice is extremely weak, since support for the CVP/PSC dominates the cell distribution among all occupational groups, except professionals, which tend to vote for the regional parties and the Liberal party.

Hill (1974:98) suggests that the correlational weakness between occupation and party choice is due to the cross-cutting influence of religion and language. This means that religiosity is an intervening variable which ought to increase the magnitude of the relationship. The relationship between occupation and party choice however, remained the

same. Hill (1974: 99) concludes by noting that

the differential distribution and saliency of linguistic parties in the regions, together with the preeminence of religious conflict in Flanders and class conflict in Wallonia make region a significant influence in Belgian electoral behaviour. Yet the influence of language is inferior to that of religiosity or class, and the contextural factors relating to the nature of conflict in the regions reflect the primacy of the religious and class variables...It is the competing attraction of these dimensions of political choice that reduces the impact of any one social-structural variable and produces the pattern of weak statistical relationships observed....

In a later survey, Prognier, (1976a,b) examined the relationship between a left-right variable in terms of measuring a philosophical-ideological dimension in Belgian politics and party choice. He found that the majority of respondents were located just to the left and right of centre. The largest left of centre support was in Wallonia, and right of centre support in Flanders; the regional parties were located approximately near centre. The implicit assumption is that the traditional religiosity and class dimensions are no longer sources of political conflict, but are part of the standard electoral baggage voters bring with them to the polls, thus reflecting in part, the increased role of issues in contemporary Belgian politics.

3.2.2 The "Image" School of Belgian Politics

DeRidder et al (1978) conducted public opinion surveys and interviewed members of the Belgian parliament in order to examine the effects of cleavages on the Belgian political system. Using the notion of "images of politics" they outline three of political importance.

The first image concerns the appearance of cleavages as structural, and relatively stable, components of the system. This view reflects the segmented pluralism - accommodation model of Belgian politics.

The second image modifies image one in terms of the decline in the quantity of demands transmitted from the segmented cleavage base to the parties themselves. The segments have become equally non-political as political in function. In this view, intra-elite bargaining coincides with inter-elite bargaining, since the party base is no longer as homogeneous as it was previously, and thus the potential for change in the political system is greater in the short run.

The links in the cleavage structure are looser, and the parties serve a dual role in the institutionalization of cleavages and as instruments for the partial processing of divergent views.
(DeRidder et al, 1978:88)

Arguing against the monolithic character of cleavages as Lorrain characterized the political system, DeRidder et al argue that a third image consists of dropping the assumption "of a clear-cut set of cleavage-based demands (and) their

automatic transmission." (1978:88) The control of the elite of each segment is weak, and the elite are likely to harness support on key issues, rather than attempt to achieve inter-elite compromise. Thus, this image suggests that political parties are no longer agents of institutionalization, but rather serve as coalition partners to ensure political power.

They sought to examine these three images in terms of the mass perceptions of cleavages, and the members' of parliament perception of them, the various issue-areas, and how the political parties classify themselves by cleavage and issue-area. They show that there is congruity between the way in which the public and their M.P.'s perceive the traditional cleavage lines in Belgium. This congruity however, is based not on the segmented pluralist first-image perspective, but rather on the way in which cleavages are seen to fluctuate and, at times, relate to specific political issues.

Rather than describing the differences between parties in terms of the cleavages they reflect, issues have replaced this traditional political form, in favour of brokerage politics. Parties no longer attempt to get a particular cleavage segment to support their policies. Thus, on the basis of the evidence, DeRidder et al conclude that cleavages are an inadequate characterization of the Belgian political system.

The second image is seen as being more appropriate for

analysis, but that the evidence shows the inadequacy of the assumption of clear-cut cleavages, and thus a greater segmentation of Belgian society. The third image is seen as most promising, since issues have come to play a greater role in party alignment than cleavages. Their evidence shows that Belgian society is more open to the type of politics that would characterize the federalist states in which religious and class cleavages act as symbols of a loose party alignment, rather than as steadfast predictors. The major problem with their analysis however, is that they do not give any attention to why cleavages are no longer the most salient way of analysing Belgian politics, and do not offer a reason as to why issues should now play a prominent role in predicting political behaviour.

Frognier (1978: 109-132) finds that social cleavages do not represent a fruitful mode for analysing party behaviour, and discovers that, depending on a party's social perspective on any given issue, M.P.'s will align themselves differently than one would expect from a traditional cleavage perspective. In a coalition-style cabinet, different issues will yield different party alignments. For example, Frognier finds that the linguistic cleavage divides parties along various issue-areas. In terms of the state intervention in the economy, Flemish M.P.'s are more likely to support less intervention than Wallonian M.P.'s. Frognier suggests that Parliament is not divided according to the elite accommodation model based on distinct cleavages, but

rather fluidly changing according to an individual M.P.'s decision on a given issue-area as the basis for a coalition with other parties.

Finally, Dierickx (1978: 133-160) confirms the findings of DeRidder and Prognier when he finds that the issue-areas of the role of the state in the economy, and linguistic issues, dominate current party configurations. He finds that parliament has more a "coalition culture rather than a consociational culture." (1978:157) The issue of language serves to align members of parliament on other issue-areas and thus the possibility of confrontation politics is more likely than accommodation politics.

All three students of current Belgian politics conclude that the old-style cleavage analysis is not very well suited to an understanding of contemporary Belgian political styles. The issue of language presents a problem because it cannot be clearly categorized as to whether it is a cleavage or an issue that can be politically resolved. At minimum however, one could infer that the traditional cleavages have declined in importance relative to the issue (cleavage) of language, in the sense of language cross-cutting issues as a potential source of division or political instability. There seems to be an implicit recognition that the issue of language has served to diminish the old-style political accommodation, but no indication is given as to why they would expect a decrease in its importance.

In conclusion then, the literature on Belgian politics

can be divided into two groups. The first falls into the federalist analytical mode in which political and electoral behaviour is the product of cleavage alignments and parliamentary elites engaged in consociational behaviour. It was argued that this form of analysis could not account for the logical problem of a decline in cleavages and with it, a decline in consociationalism. The recent work from the empirical studies indicates that some Belgian writers conclude that cleavages are only a symbolic source of alignment, and that issues determine public orientations to parties. The attitudes of parliamentarians are issue, rather than cleavage, based.

Both sets of writers however, have difficulty in placing the linguistic conflict in their models. The former through static analysis, and the latter through a lack of a theoretical reason as to why issues have come to play the dominant rôle in politics. Both groups have not adequately conceptualized the communal politics problem in terms of changing patterns of behaviour over time, by ignoring the reality of ecological comparisons behind Flemish and Francophone rivalries in Belgian politics.

The next chapter details the measures used for an empirical application of the communal politics model described in Chapter two. A presentation of the outcomes of the confrontation between the theoretical model developed there, and the data, follows in Chapter five.

Chapter Four

Measures and Data

4.1 General Measurement Remarks

Unless otherwise stated, all the data were obtained from the Annuaire Statistique de la Belgique from 1930-1975. These cut-off points were chosen in order to use all the reliable and complete series of data available. Later data were not available, and earlier series were incomplete, unreliable, or nonexistent. The elections between the years 1932 and 1974 yield 13 potential observations. Of these, the 1946 and 1949 observations were deleted because the communal parties did not field candidates in those elections. Thus, they can be considered as true missing observations, thereby bringing the total number of observations for analysis to eleven.

In order to obtain measures that reflect the differential components of the theoretical concepts, the data that were available, provincial aggregates, had to be further aggregated to yield distinct communal groupings. To eliminate the confounding effects of communal population size on the measures of differential modernization and social mobilization, all measures were divided by population size according to the procedures outlined below.

Since it is theoretically important that the data be bisected into Flemish and French-speaker components, and since a language question has been omitted from the census

since 1947, earlier census data, listed in Table 4.1, were

Table 4.1

Language Spoken Most Frequently or Uniquely

Census Year	Flemish	French	Total
1910	3220662 (53.2%)	2833334 (44.8%)	6053996
1920	3185100 (52.7%)	2850825 (47.2%)	6035925
1930	4135568 (54.1%)	3513321 (45.9%)	7648889
1947	4475187 (55.6%)	3568564 (44.4%)	8043751
	Mean = 53.91 %	Mean = 44.07%	
	Std. dev. = 1.29%	Std. dev. = 1.26%	

used to obtain this division.

From 1910 to 1947, the distribution of Flemish and French speakers remained relatively constant, in spite of the effects of the First and Second World Wars. Since the available data for the study covers the years between 1930 and 1974, only the census of 1930 and 1947 will be used to determine the linguistic distribution in the population. This yields a mean Flemish percentage of 54.8 and a mean French percentage of 45.1. Subsequent per capita measures will rely on this base proportion which is assumed to be constant over time. (Bilingual and trilingual speakers were

ignored because it was necessary to have as distinct an understanding of the linguistic split as possible. This injects an error of only ± 1 percent into the linguistic proportions used.)

Finally, where the data are only available as provincial aggregates in the Annuaire Statistique, Brabant province, which contains the Brussels region was divided into Flemish and Francophone components according to the

Table 4.2

Brabant ProvinceLanguage Spoken Most Frequently Or Uniquely

Census Year	Flemish	French	Total
1910	603507 (61.1%)	382947 (38.8%)	986454
1920	561565 (54.8%)	426912 (43.1%)	988477
1930	597007 (51.3%)	512844 (48.6%)	1109851
1947	556253 (51.3%)	527722 (48.6%)	1083975
	Mean = 55.73%	Mean = 44.18%	
	Std.dev.=4.23	Std.Dev.=4.23	

data shown in Table 4.2.

The table indicates that Flemish speakers declined by 10 percentage points and French speakers increased by the same

amount. As in the previous case, the average for 1930 and 1947 will be used as a means of obtaining a distribution for Brabant province that is assumed to be constant over time. According to the data, that province's average population, for the period 1930 to 1947 was 51.3 percent Flemish, and 48.6 percent French speaking, again ignoring bilingual and trilingual speakers.

4.2 Measures of Differential Social Process

4.2.1 Absolute Differential Modernization

A conceptual equivalent to modernization is economic development. Based upon the available data, Zolberg (1974:77) used the consumption of steam horsepower per capita as a measure of economic development. Berry (1961: 113) affirmed the use of this kind of measure when he performed a factor analysis of economic development variables. One dimension which emerged was energy consumption per capita. While there are other dimensions to economic development, only energy consumption, measured in millions of megawatt hours, was available from Belgian sources.

In order to obtain a measure which reflected the absolute levels of differential economic development between Flemings and Francophones, provincial data were aggregated into linguistic regions. Each regional total was then divided by the regional population according to the procedures outlined in section 4.1. Differences were calculated between linguistic regions and the absolute value of that result was taken.

The following formula describes absolute differential economic development for the period 1932 to 1974, controlling for regional population.

$$\frac{\text{Flemish Energy Consumption (t)}}{\text{Flemish Population (t)}} - \frac{\text{French Energy Consumption (t)}}{\text{French Population (t)}}$$

This formula describes a ratio level variable for which a zero result means that there is no differential between linguistic regions.

The earliest electrical energy consumption data, by province, were available only from 1934. In order to derive an estimate for the period 1930-33, regional electrical consumption from 1934 to 1945 was regressed on national energy consumption data. This procedure resulted in the following regression estimates:

Flemish Energy

$$\text{Consumption} = .6171 + .2796 \text{ National Consumption}$$

$$R^2 = .5131 \quad (.1045)$$

French Energy

$$\text{Consumption} = .3447 + .5455 \text{ National Consumption}$$

$$R^2 = .9041 \quad (.189)$$

An estimate of the regional energy consumption was obtained by substituting the national level energy consumption data for the 1930-33 time period, and then solving each equation for the missing period. These regional data were then divided by their respective populations to give a per capita difference measure.

4.2.2 Absolute Differential Social Mobilization

According to Deutsch (1961: 495), social mobilization can be measured in terms of, among other variables, communications, education, and urbanization. Given the available data, the education dimension was employed here.

Education

Deutsch suggests using university enrollment as an indicator. The absolute difference in university enrollment is given by:

Flemish University	French University	
Students (t)	-- Students (t)	

Total University Enrollment (t)		

This measure describes a ratio level variable, since a zero value implies no difference between Flemings and Francophones.

Since the data were broken down by language groups only from 1952-1974, the data for the period from 1930-51 were estimated by regressing each language group enrollment on total enrollment from 1952-1974, and then solving the equations for 1930-51. The regression estimates are as follows.

$$\text{Flemish Enrollment} = -3389.9 + .5106 \text{ National Enrollment}$$

$$R^2 = .99 \quad (.174)$$

$$\text{French Enrollment} = 3388.7 + .4896 \text{ National Enrollment}$$

$$R^2 = .99 \quad (.165)$$

This method of estimation however, has the shortcoming of overestimating the number of Flemish university students studying in the Flemish language. This is due to the fact that many Flemings continued to go to universities in French-speaking Brussels and Wallonia during the 1930's. Although Ghent University became entirely Flemish in 1930,

and programmes were offered in Flemish at the University of Louvain, and thus a student body could build, it is still necessary to be cautious about the 1930 period estimates. There is no one way in which this problem can be rectified, except with the assumption that the overestimate is assumed to be constant for the estimating period, and will not seriously affect the rate of change in the variable over time.

4.3 Measures of Social Structure at the Aggregate Level

When attempting to devise measures of social structure at the aggregate level, ie., at the linguistic level for this analysis, and defined in terms of segmented pluralism, certain unique measurement problems arise. According to the literature, there are three dimensions to segmented pluralism: class, religiosity and language.

Class, as measured by subjective class identification, has been shown to be a poor predictor of party choice at the individual level; it is therefore not included in the measurement process. On the other hand, union membership can be seen as a surrogate measure of class segments. (Hill, 1974: 35) Belgium however, has the highest union membership, across occupational and religious categories, of any country in western Europe: approximately 70 percent of the working population is unionized. There is therefore, insufficient variation within the measure for it to be a useful indicator of segmented pluralism.

Language data were not available after the 1946 census, so it had to be excluded as a variable as well. This leaves religiosity as a measure of segmented pluralism.

4.3.1 Religiosity

While Belgium is a religiously homogeneous country, differences in religiosity gave rise to specific social cleavages. The problem becomes one of measuring the cleavages due to religiosity at the aggregate level. Since the level of analysis of this study is national, and since

the religious cleavage is expressed by varying degrees of religious adherence across Belgian society, an aggregate measure was obtained by the ratio of marriages to divorces as shown.

$$\frac{\text{marriages}(t)}{\text{divorces}(t)}$$

While imperfect, such a measure does tap changing patterns of religious salience and, by implication, changing group memberships.

In order to be certain that, indeed, this measure was not confounded with language differences, the data were disaggregated into linguistic components, and an ordinary T-test of significance revealed that there was no statistically significant difference in the means of the Flemish and Francophone marriage/divorce series.⁽¹⁾

4.3.2 Interbloc Migration

Before proceeding with a discussion of a measure of interregional migration, some definitions concerning internal migration are necessary. A migrant is defined as "a person who moved from one political area to another." (Shyrock and Siegal, 1975:618) In Belgium, the political area is defined as the arrondissement, or electoral

⁽¹⁾In a strict sense, the use of current values for both marriages and divorces is incorrect. It may be argued that lagging marriages with respect to divorces makes more sense, but this approach makes use of information — the average time from marriages to divorce — that is not relevant to this study and, in practical terms, requires much more computation.

district. When moving, an individual has to report to the local authorities, and thus reasonably accurate statistics on internal migration are collected by them.

An in-migrant is defined as a person who enters a migration-defining area by crossing its boundary from some point outside the area, but within the same country.... An out-migrant is a person who departs from a migration-defining area by crossing its boundary to a point outside it, but within the same country. (Shyrock and Siegal, 1975:618) Total internal migration then, is the sum of in-migrants and out-migrants. (While this sum does represent double counting, we are interested in it only as an index.)

A measure of the movement across linguistic blocs in Belgium, is obtained in the following way.

$$\frac{(\text{Total Migration}(t) - \text{Within Region Migration}(t))}{((\text{National Pop.}_{t-1} + \text{Pop.}_t)/2)} * 100$$

Total migration is the total internal migration in Belgium for year (t). Within-region migration is the sum of total internal migration for each linguistic region. The annual data were obtained by summing the diagonal of a matrix of migrant departures and arrivals for any given year (t). This figure, when subtracted from the total internal migration, gives the total between linguistic region migration.⁽²⁾

⁽²⁾It should be noted that while the data series were

In order to obtain a rate measure, the between-region migration was divided by the population at risk, i.e., that population that is likely to be included in the numerator. The effects of births, deaths, and emigration, can be controlled if the the average of the population at risk of this period and last period is taken. (Shyrock and Siegal, 1975:619) (It should be noted that for the Brussels arrondissement, the data were distinguished between Flemings and Walloons by summing only regionally located migration reporting stations.)

4.4 Communal Party Support.

In order to obtain a measure of the support for communal parties over time, and give maximum variation, the following measure was used.

$$\frac{\text{Vote for (VU + PDP + RW) } t}{(\text{Vote for (CVP/PSC) + (BSP/PSB) + (PVV/PLP) + (KP/PC)) } t}$$

The numerator is the sum of the vote for the communal parties, and the denominator is the sum of the vote for the traditional parties. A brief application of the communal politics model developed in Chapter two, in terms of the above measures, follows.

obtained from the Annuaire Statistique, a computer tape was made available to the author from the Belgian Archives for the Social Sciences, Louvain-La-Neuve, Belgium. The data covered the period between 1948 and 1974, and helped shorten considerably the computation time for this measure.

4.5 Some Observations on Socio-Economic Change in Belgium:

An Empirical Summary of the Measures

The differentials in modernization and social mobilization had their roots in 19th century Belgium with the development of a hegemonic French speaking communal culture. In terms of modernization, as measured by energy consumption per capita, absolute rates of growth favoured French speakers in Wallonia in the 19th century, and continued to do so well into the mid-20th century.

In 1936, there was a 2.1 to 1 ratio of energy consumption in favour of French-speakers. From that point, the differential between Flemish and French speakers declined to about zero in the 1950's, and increased again, this time in favour of the Flemings. By the 1970's, there was a 1.77 to 1 ratio of energy consumption in favour of the Flemish -- a complete reversal in economic fortunes in under fifty years. A second economic indicator, relative unemployment, stood at a 19 percent difference in the rate of unemployment against the Flemish in 1932, as opposed to a .56 percent difference against the Walloons in 1974.

In terms of differential social mobilization, as measured by university enrollment, the data indicate that even until the late 1970's there continued to exist a disproportionate number of French, as opposed to Flemish, speakers registered in universities. The gap is however, narrowing rapidly. For example, in 1932 there was an estimated difference of 60.4 percent in favour of French-

speaking enrollment, as opposed to a 3.5 percent difference in 1974, a decline of 56.9 percentage points in 42 years.

Cleavage group memberships are changing. As measured by the marriage-divorce ratio, the secularization of Belgian society is on the increase. In 1932, the ratio was 24 marriages per divorce. By 1974, the ratio was 7 marriages per divorce, a decline of approximately 71 percent.

The communal conflict has affected the flow of individuals between geographically delineated communal boundaries. Before the Second World War, 3 migrants in 100 were crossing communal boundaries. By 1974, a 100 percent increase was evident: 6 migrants per 100 were crossing these boundaries.

In political terms, the period of the thirties was marked by the rise of a communal party in Flanders, the VNV, and the division of the Catholic party into linguistic wings. The ratio of communal party to traditional party support stood, on average, at .08 to 1, compared to an average of .13 to 1 for the post-war period, a gain of 62.5 percent.

In the post-war period, ~~communal party strength~~ waned substantially, and revived in the 1960's and seventies to the point where the communal parties have been part of government since 1968. During the period beginning with 1961, the average ratio stood at .21 to 1, a 600 percent increase over the pre-1960's period. Associated with this increase was the split, by all the non-communal parties,

into linguistic wings. In order to determine the relationships among these measures, an examination of the quantitative aspects of the communal politics model developed in Chapter two, follows.

Chapter Five

A Quantitative Analysis of the Communal Politics Model

5.1 A Brief Review of the Hypotheses of the Communal Politics Model

This chapter will consist of an interpretation of the quantitative results from the point of view of the theory developed in Chapter 2.⁽¹⁾ For the interested reader, an addendum, entitled Appendix 4, is provided which contains tests of the statistical estimating assumptions. (A discussion of these quantitative results, within the context of Belgian politics, will be found in Chapter 6.) In order to bring the subsequent analysis of the model back into the context of the theoretical basis of this paper, a brief review of the hypotheses tested now follows.

It was argued that as absolute differential modernization (ADM) increased in level from a previous time period to a current one, the absolute level of differential social mobilization (ADSM) would increase from the previous to the current time period as well. In addition, when the effect of absolute differential modernization (ADM) in the previous period on absolute differential social mobilization was controlled, an increase in the level of segmented pluralism (SEGPL) would increase the level of absolute differential social mobilization (ADSM), since segmented

⁽¹⁾The statistical theory behind the techniques used to achieve these results is discussed in Appendix 3.

pluralism (SEGPL) represented the social context within which change in social process would occur.

With increases in absolute differential social mobilization in a previous time period, the level of absolute differential modernization (ADM) in the current period would increase as well because of the effect of feedback from the level of absolute differential social mobilization. The current level of absolute differential modernization would also increase, controlling for the effect of the previous period's absolute differential social mobilization, with an increase in the level of support for communal parties (SCP) in a previous time period.

Because changes in social structure must take place within the context of changes in social process, an increase in the level of segmented pluralism is a function of an increase in the current level of absolute differential social mobilization, all other factors, such as inter-bloc migration (IBM) and the support for communal parties (SCP), being equal. When these latter variables are held constant, an increase in the level of support for communal parties will decrease the level of segmented pluralism.

When the effects of the previous period's communal party support, and the current level of absolute differential social mobilization are held constant, an increase in the movement by individuals across territorial blocs (IBM) will decrease the level of segmented pluralism. Indeed, the level of increase in inter-bloc migration is a

function of the level of increase in the current period's absolute differential social mobilization.

The current level of communal party support is a function of the level of decrease in absolute differential social mobilization, itself dependent upon the level of segmented pluralism. Holding the effect of the current period's absolute differential social mobilization constant, an increase in the level of segmented pluralism in the previous period, given the current level of absolute differential social mobilization, will decrease the level of the support for communal parties.

By allowing the current level of absolute differential social mobilization to interact with a previous period's level of segmented pluralism, current levels of communal party support can be predicted. When the previous period's level of segmented pluralism is held constant, the effect of an interaction is to modify the current level of change in communal party support when the current level of absolute differential social mobilization increases from one level to the next. The same process occurs when the current level of absolute differential social mobilization is held constant. In other words, a change in levels of communal party support is a function of the changes in social process, given a certain level of social structure, and changes in social structure, given a certain level of social process.

5.2 Criteria for the Evaluation of the Fit of Both the Equations in the Model and their Coefficients

The estimates of the parameters of the communal politics model are evaluated using four criteria. These are the goodness of fit and the F-test of the equation as a whole; the standard error of the regression estimate; the standard errors, the percent standard error (the mean of the dependent variable divided by the standard error the fitted model) and the signs of the individual coefficients themselves. (In principle, there might be an interesting interpretation of the constant, in practice, it is difficult to do so here, because data transformations, in order to correct problems noted below, make it difficult to do so.) Tests of the functional form of the relations will be considered as well. These will consist of the usual F-test for the significance of an additional variable in the model. The traditional R^2 will act as the summarizing statistic of the fit of the model in terms of explained variance, adjusted for the number of parameters in the model. (Note that this will be symbolized as R'^2 .)

The standard error of the regression can be interpreted as the average error in predicting values of the dependent variable. The standard error will be expressed as a Z-score such that n percent of the cases fall within ± 2 standard deviations about the regression mean. The standard errors of the coefficients express the variance about the estimated coefficient and are assumed to approximate a T-

distribution.⁽¹⁾ Thus, only a small number of tests are needed to draw conclusions about the confrontation of the data and the hypothesized model. Secondary to these tests however, are tests of the assumptions of the classical linear regression model. Given the simultaneity of some of the hypotheses presented earlier, the method of two-stage least squares is used for their estimation. (For a detailed discussion of this method, see Appendix 3.)

Although the data are population data, as measured here, they shall be treated as sample data for the purposes of hypothesis testing. In a strict sense, since the data are indeed population in level, it is not necessary to add an error term in the statistical expression of the hypotheses.

⁽¹⁾See Kmenta, (1971: Chapter 6) for a mathematical treatment of these topics.

5.3 Estimation Results of the Fitted Model

5.3.1 Tests of the Hypotheses about Variation in Absolute Differential Social Mobilization (ADSM)

Table 5.3.1(a) summarizes the results of the test of the hypotheses concerning variation in absolute differential social mobilization. For the purposes of this study, the most important results are presented in the following tables under the headings "correct sign", "elasticity", and "percent standard error".

Looking at Table 5.3.1(a), in the column entitled "Regression Coefficient and Standard error", it is immediately apparent that the coefficients of the model are either smaller than, or just about equal to, their standard errors. This means that the hypotheses of no relationship ought to be accepted.⁽²⁾ The fact is that the regression coefficients are statistically insignificant, although both they and the average elasticities, as indicated in the fourth column, are in the predicted direction, and the associations are strong and significant. This is confirmed by the F-statistic, and the reasonable percent standard error.⁽³⁾ These results suggest that the model was estimated with an inappropriate functional form, since there exists a strong linear relationship between the independent

(2) A rough rule of thumb states that if a coefficient is twice its standard error, the coefficient is considered statistically significant at any conventional level.

(3) Note that a discussion of the summary statistics occurs in Appendix 3.

Table 5.3.1(a)

Variation in Absolute Differential Social Mobilization

$$ADSM(t) = a + b^1SEGPL(t) + b^2ADM(t-1) + e(t)$$

Hypothesized Model

	Regression Coefficient and Standard <u>Error</u>	T- <u>Statistic</u>	Average Elasticity and Confidence <u>Interval</u>	Correct <u>Sign?</u>
Segmented Pluralism (SEGPLt)	.525 1.51	.34	.57 ±3.06	yes
Absolute Differential Modernization (ADMt-1)	.139 .12	1.12	2.2 ±3.53	yes
Constant	-.08 .065	-1.23		.

Summary Statistics

$R^2 = .81$ $p = .89$ (.13)
 $F_{2,7} = 20.63$ $p < .05$ Geary Runs Test $p > .05$
 $D.W. = 1.18$
 $S.E.E. = .088$
 $\%S.E. = 34.62$

variables. This condition is described by the term multicollinearity. (Maddala, 1977:123) A different functional form can help disentangle these regressors. Alternatively, the selected regressors may, indeed, be incorrect.

The former supposition is confirmed by an examination of the estimated residuals, as shown in Figure 5.3.1. They

display a steep bend, indicating that a more appropriate

Figure 5.3.1

Hypothesized Model Residuals (Expressed as Standard Deviations) Over Time

functional form would contain a polynomial term.

From an a priori perspective, it is difficult to determine which of the independent variables should be transformed. By regressing the dependent variable onto each of the independent variables, however, and examining the resulting estimates, an appropriate functional form can be determined. It turns out that squaring the segmented

pluralism (SEGPlt) variable, and adding it to the estimating equation, improves both the fit, and the significance of the coefficients.

Table 5.3.1b summarizes the results of the experimentation with this new model. All the coefficients are very large in terms of their standard errors. The confidence intervals associated with the average elasticities are smaller than the elasticities themselves. This indicates that they too, are significant, as well as being in the predicted direction. The percent standard error was reduced from 34.6 percent to 23.1 percent, a gain of 9.5 percentage points. These results are confirmed by an F-test used to determine the significance, in terms of the R^2 , of the addition of the SEGPlt² term to the model.⁽⁴⁾ The value of the F-statistic, with 1 and 6 degrees of freedom, is 9.73, a result significant at the conventional .05 level. An examination of these results, in light of the theory, follows.

On average, a 10 percent increase in ADMt-1, holding the effect of SEGPlt constant, will increase ADSMt by 9.4 percent, when last year's level of ADMt-1 is held constant, a 10 percent increase in SEGPlt will, on average, increase

⁽⁴⁾The appropriate F-statistic is obtained by

$$\frac{R^2_q - R^2_k}{1 - R^2_q} \cdot \frac{N - Q}{Q - K}$$

where Q refers to the model with the additional term, and K the original model (Q>K). (Kmenta, 1971:370-1)

ADSMt by 68 percent. When both SEGPLt and ADMt-1 additively affect ADSMt, any prediction of the level of ADSMt will, on average, be incorrect by only 23.1 percent. Alternatively, approximately 95 percent of all the cases will fall within ± 23.1 percent of their actual value. These results, summarized in Table 5.3.1b, confirm the basic hypotheses

Table 5.3.1(b)

Variation in Absolute Differential Social Mobilization

Fitted Model

	Regression Coefficient and Standard T- <u>Error</u>	<u>Statistic</u>	Average Elasticity and Confidence <u>Interval</u>	Correct <u>Sign?</u>
Segmented Pluralism (SEGPLt)	12.28 3.17	3.8	6.8 ± 4.7	yes
SEGPL(t) ²	-38.63 10.14	-3.8		
Absolute Differential Modernization (ADMt-1)	.21 .087	2.4	.947 $\pm .907$	yes
Constant	-1.04 .29	-3.5		

Summary Statistics

$R^2 = .91$ $p = .8$ (.31)
 $F_{3,6} = 31.33$ $p < .05$ Geary Runs Test $p > .05$
 $D.W. = 2.15$
 $S.E.E. = .059$
 $\%S.E. = 23.08$

$$ADSM(t) = a + b^1 * SEGPL(t) - b^2 * SEGPL(t)^2 + b^3 * ADM(t-1) + e(t)$$

presented.

In addition, it is clear from these results that the effect of social structure, in the form of segmented pluralism, on changes in the level of ADSMt is much more profound than the effect of ADMt-1. This is true in spite of the fact that all the variables in the model were significant and in the predicted direction.

The quadratic nature of the correct functional form allows us to draw a further conclusion about the effect of SEGPLt. Increasing values of SEGPLt increase ADSMt, but at a decreasing rate. This means that SEGPLt exerts less influence on ADSMt over time, as the latter reaches some crest,⁽⁵⁾ i.e., the point at which the rate of change in ADSMt is zero. After that, increasing values of SEGPLt decrease ADSMt. In terms of the model, this result means that a changing social structure induces cycles in the degree to which changes in social process increase or decrease over time, controlling for the effect of ADSMt-1.

(5) By using the calculus, one possible interpretation is as follows. Taking partial derivatives of the fitted model yields the following slopes.

$$\frac{dADSMt}{dSEGPLt} = 12.28 - 76.26SEGPLt \quad 5.1$$

$$\frac{dADSMt}{dADMt-1} = .21 \quad 5.3$$

The latter slope has already been interpreted in terms of its functional form. The former, on the other hand, can be analysed further. Setting equation 5.1 equal to zero, and solving for SEGPLt gives

These two findings, about the relative effects of SEGPLt and ADMt-1, and the effect of the quadratic nature of SEGPLt's influence, are additional to the deductively grounded findings, and may be incorporated into the theory as hypotheses for future testing.

5.3.2 Hypotheses about the Variation in Absolute Differential Modernization (ADMt)

The results of the tests of the hypotheses concerning variation in ADSMt, are summarized in Table 5.3.2. On average, a 10 percent increase in ADSMt-1 increases ADMt by 5.1 percent.

When SCPt-1 increases, on average, by 10 percent, ADMt increases by 5.1 percent. There will be only a 35.7 percent average error when both ADSM(t-1) and SCP(t-1) are additively used to predict values of ADMt. This indicates that in 95 percent of the cases, predictions of the value of ADMt will fall within ± 35.7 percent of their actual values.

As expected the SCPt-1 coefficient empirically reinforces the theoretically derived argument that supporting communal parties generates increasing absolute differential modernization. If the SCPt-1 coefficient had

$$12.28 - 76.26 \text{SEGPLt} = 0$$

$$\text{SEGPLt} = .182$$

By the second derivative test, this value is a relative maximum. This means that when SEGPLt is at a relative maximum, the rate of change in ADSMt is zero.

Table 5.3.2

Variation in Absolute Differential Modernization

$$ADM(t) = a + b^3ADSmt-1 - b^4SCP(t-1) + e(t)$$

Fitted Model

	Regression Coefficient and Standard <u>Error</u>	T- <u>Statistic</u>	Average Elasticity and Confidence <u>Interval</u>	Correct <u>Sign?</u>
Absolute Differential Social Mobilization (ADSmt-1)	1.84 .958	1.92	.51 ±.507	yes
Support Communal Parties (SCPt-1)	4.09 1.14	3.4	.71 ±.38	yes
Constant	.088 .673	1.31		

Summary Statistics

$R^2 = .88$
 $F_{3,6} = 35.38$ $p < .05$
 $D.W. = 1.96$
 $S.E.E. = .174$
 $\%S.E. = 35.7$

$p = .89$ (.137)
 Geary Runs Test $p > .05$

been negative, it would have indicated that the political system was tending to some kind of communal equilibrium since the communal parties would have accomplished their main task. In the voter's mind, subsequently, they would have come to compete alongside the traditional parties. A positive coefficient indicates that communal party competition is acting to continuously keep the political

system in disequilibrium by inducing government to redress differentials in an asymmetric fashion. One group gets more than another, which in turn creates communal rivalries and thus sets in motion a cycle of discontent. From the point of the model however, the positive coefficient makes the model unstable, to the extent that there is no longer any stabilizing factor built in that could be affected by processes internal to the model. In other words, a reduction in the modernization differential would have to come from politicians behaving in a non-zero sum way.

5.3.3 Tests of the Hypotheses about Variation in Interbloc Migration ($IBM(t)$)

As expected, when this period's $ADSM(t)$ increases by 10 percent, $IBM(t)$ decreases by .15 percent, a result that is not significantly different from zero, even though the predicted direction of the coefficient is correct. When the effect of the $ADSM(t)$ is evaluated in terms of its ability to make predictions about the level of $IBM(t)$, there will be, on the average, 24.8 percent error in the predicted level of $IBM(t)$.

When an examination of the residuals was made, there appeared to be a cyclical component to them which suggested the possibility of a functional form of the $ADSM(t)$ variable that was a higher-order polynomial. It turns out that a polynomial of degree four adequately fits the $IBM(t)$ data, but this is substantively meaningless. Therefore, the null

hypothesis of no relationship is accepted. These results are

Table 5.3.3

Variation in Inter-Bloc Migration

$$IBM(t) = a - b^5 ADSM(t) + e(t)$$

Fitted Model

	Regression Coefficient and Standard <u>Error</u>	T- <u>Statistic</u>	Average Elasticity and Confidence <u>Interval</u>	Correct <u>Sign?</u>
Absolute Differential Social Mobilization (ADSMt)	-.014 .121	-.12	-.036 ±.177	yes
Constant	.247 .034	5.1		

Summary Statistics

$R^2 = -.1$
 $F_{2,7} = .11$ $p < .05$
 $D.W. = 1.79$
 $S.E.E. = .067$
 $\%S.E. = 24.8$

$p = .09$ (.31)
 Geary Runs Test $p > .05$

summarized in Table 5.3.3.

5.3.4 Tests of the Hypotheses about Variation in Segmented
Pluralism (SEGPL)

It was hypothesized that variation in segmented pluralism is a function of the level of absolute differential social mobilization in the current period $ADSM(t)$, the level of last period's inter-bloc migration

IBM(t-1) and the level of support for communal parties in the last election SCP(t-1). The results are summarized in

Table 5.3.4

Variation in Segmented Pluralism

$$\text{SEGPL}(t) = a + b^6 \text{ADSM}(t) - b^7 \text{IBM}(t-1) - b^8 \text{SCP}(t-1) + e(t)$$

Fitted Model

	Regression Coefficient and Standard <u>Error</u>	T- <u>Statistic</u>	Average Elasticity and Confidence <u>Interval</u>	Correct <u>Sign?</u>
Absolute Differential Social Mobilization (ADSMt)	.087 .041	2.1	.165 ±.152	yes
Inter-Bloc Migration IBM(t-1)	-.022 .067	-.33	-.038 ±.22	yes
Support for Communal Parties SCP(t-1)	-.23 .082	-2.8	-.16 ±.11	yes
Constant	.096 .018	5.3		

Summary Statistics

$R^2 = .81$ $p = .3 (-.31)$
 $F_{3,6} = 13.38$ $p < .05$ Geary Runs Test $p > .05$
 $D.W. = 2.08$
 $S.E.E. = .016$
 $\%S.E. = 11.7$

Table 5.3.4.

On average, a 10 percent increase in the level of ADSM(t) will, as expected, increase the level of SEGPL(t) by

1.4 percent, holding the effects of $IBM(t-1)$ and $SCP(t-1)$ constant. A 10 percent increase in $IBM(t-1)$, holding the effects of $ADSM(t)$ and $SCP(t-1)$ constant will, on average, decrease the level of $SEGPL(t)$ by .38 percent. While the predicted direction of the effect of $IBM(t-1)$ is correct, it is statistically insignificant at the 95 percent confidence level. Although the data are population data, ~~thus~~ ordinary tests of inference are technically ~~superfluous~~, they are useful reminders that the evidence must be evaluated carefully.

As expected, a 10 percent increase in $SCP(t-1)$, holding the effects of $ADSM(t)$ and $IBM(t-1)$ constant, will decrease the average level of $SEGPL$ by 1.6 percent. When all factors are controlled, the average level of $SEGPL(t)$ is .096 as compared to the simple mean of .147. This indicates that without the effects of $ADSM(t)$, $IBM(t-1)$ and $SCP(t-1)$, the level of $SEGPL(t)$ would be 53 percent higher than otherwise would be the case. When all factors are considered, in terms of their total additive effect on the average level of $SEGPL(t)$, there will be an average error of 11.7 percent.

5.3.5 Tests of the Hypotheses about Variation in Support for Communal Parties ($SCP(t)$)

It was previously argued that predictions about the level of $SCP(t)$ could be adequately provided by simply knowing the current level of $ADSM(t)$ and the previous level of $SEGPL(t-1)$ as they interact with one another. For

example, predictions about $SCP(t)$ would depend upon the level of $ADSM(t)$ given the level of $SEGPL$ at $t-1$. As expected, this model proved adequate, and is summarized in Table 5.3.5. There was a slight modification of the time

Table 5.3.5

Variation in Support for Communal Parties

$$SCP(t) = a - b^0 ADSM(t) - b^1 SEGPL(t-1) + b^{11} ADSM(t) * SEGPL(t-1) + e(t)$$

Fitted Model

	Regression Coefficient and Standard <u>Error</u>	T- <u>Statistic</u>	Average Elasticity and Confidence <u>Interval</u>	Correct <u>Sign?</u>
Absolute Differential Social Mobilization ($ADSM_{t-1}$)	-1.604 .248	-6.4	1.67 ± 1.93	yes
Segmented Pluralism ($SEGPL_{t-1}$)	-5.8 1.1	-5.5	-1.38 ± 10.69	yes
$ADSM(t-1) * SEGPL(t-1)$	10.82 1.63	6.62		
Constant	1.42 .194	5.3		

Summary Statistics

$R^2 = .70$
 $F_{3,6} = 8.41$ $p < .05$
 $D.W. = 2.49$
 $S.E.E. = .054$
 $\%S.E. = 45.3$

$p = -.59$ (.25)
 Geary Runs Test $p > .05$

period specification for $ADSM$ to $ADSM_{t-1}$ instead of $ADSM_t$.

When the level of $ADSM$ increases by 10 percent, given the previous level of $SEGPL$, $SCP(t)$ will decrease by 23.7 percent. When the level of $SEGPL(t-1)$ increases by 10 percent, given the previous level of $ADSM(t)$, the average level of $SCP(t)$ will increase by 15.8 percent. When both factors are used to make predictions about the level of $SCP(t)$, there will be an average error of 45.3 percent.

5.4 Deductive and Inductive Aspects of the Quantitative Results

On the whole, the hypothesized model withstood the confrontation with the data. Most importantly, the hypothesized model of support for communal parties did very well against the 1932-74 data. There was only one major re-specification of the functional form of the model, and one major and two minor hypotheses failed completely.

In terms of the strength of the relationships, the best was the model that predicted communal party support. There, the size of the T-values were very large, although the percent standard error was relatively high. The model with the lowest percent standard error was the model that predicted variation in SEGPL, followed by the IBM model. Some shortcomings should however, be noted.

The hypothesis that communal party support would reduce absolute differential modernization over time, while failing in terms of its direction, yielded new insights. The hypothesis of absolute differential social mobilization and inter-bloc migration, failed completely. Where IBM was used as an independent variable, the data could not justify rejecting the null hypothesis of no relationship.

In addition, there were some oddities associated with the elasticity confidence intervals. In some cases, while the estimated regression coefficient was correct, and had confidence intervals that contained the same sign for both the upper and lower bounds, the same was not true when the

coefficient was transformed into an elasticity. This result is due partly to the computing formula, and partly to the inherently non-linear nature of the data being fitted to what are mainly simple linear models.

From an inductive perspective, the data analysis procedures produced some interesting results. While there were many confirmations of the hypotheses, there were some that were not confirmed, and had to be modified.

The major change was in the functional form of the model predicting variation in absolute differential social mobilization. It was found that additional statements about the effect of segmented pluralism on absolute differential social mobilization could be made. These results can be incorporated into future hypothesis testing with new data, to determine if, in fact, this functional form is resilient to different data analyses. In terms of the time lags, all the hypothesized lags were maintained, except for a small change to ADSM from a current to a lagged affect when used as a predictor of support for communal parties.

5.4.1 Observations on the Model as a Whole

Since the model tested here is more than the sum of its parts, an examination of the model as a whole follows. The analysis affirms the crucial role of differentials in social process, within the context of social structure. Comparing the elasticities across equations, several modifying effects emerge. Social process has, by far the most

important influence. It contributed the most to the variation in the dependent variable, except where changes in social structure are concerned. In this case, support for communal parties modifies the contrary influence of social process.

There is an inherent instability in the system that arises from increases in the support for communal parties due to increases in differential modernization. Although the model, as constructed in Chapter 2, was built with the idea that the signs of the coefficients should be pointed in a direction that would not make the system explode, i.e., lead to ever greater values of a variable, the data would simply not allow this to happen. This is not so much a problem of the model per se, but a problem in the real world. Thus, in some cases, political forces act to accentuate the possibility of instability, even though forces of social process serve to diminish such influence.

5.4.2 Other Modelling

As noted above, the estimated model is only relatively stable. Additional work with the estimated results would involve quantitative assessments of its stability, and its ability to achieve an equilibrium.

The econometrics, and to some degree, the sociological literatures (see Kmenta, 1971: Chpt.13, or Blalock, 1977: Chpt.4) imply that sophisticated model-building includes tests of a model's specification, in terms of an intensive

examination of the estimated coefficients. While space does not permit such a procedure here, future work, particularly of either a forecasting or replicatory nature, should include such tests.

Other additional work on the model would include additional variables. Such variables as the proportion of government expenditures on regions containing sizeable communal entities would indicate government's responsiveness to social change. An environment variable, such as foreign economic penetration would indicate the extent to which it can modify the capability of government to distribute collective goods.

The problem, as it presently stands, is circumscribed by two factors. First, more conceptual work needs to be done in order to improve the theoretical basis of concepts of social change, particularly where the theoretical specification is at the aggregate level. Much work on political behaviour, as noted earlier, emphasizes process at the expense of structure, or vice versa. Even this paper, which attempts to resolve this limitation, is operationally weak at the social structure level. As it stands then, these missing variables rest in the area of implied causal paths, to be unearthed for real-world testing at some future point.

Severe data problems compound the limitations of the literature. At some future point, when better operational definitions, and more data are available, these problems can

be resolved. In spite of these concerns however, a discussion of what the model has accomplished in terms of conveying more information about Belgian politics follows.

Chapter Six

The Dynamics of Belgian Communal Party Support,

1932-74: Conclusions

This essay began with a question: "Why did communal parties arise in Belgium?" By the 1930's, as shown in Chapter One, a Flemish communal party, the VNV, had obtained, on average, 5.5 percent of the national vote, and approximately 10 percent of the Flemish vote. By 1939, they experienced a post-war peak of 18 percent of the national vote.

From the second World War to the present the VNV, which became the VU, increased their national vote share by 400 percent from 2 percent in 1949 to 10 percent in 1978. By 1965, two francophone communal parties had been formed: one in Brussels called the Front Democratique des Francophones (FDF), and one in Wallonia called the Rassemblement Wallon (RW). Their electoral success was striking. By 1978, the FDF was the number one party in Brussels, and the RW was number four in Wallonia. Together, the communal parties accounted for approximately 24 percent of the national vote by 1978. The changes in social process and social structure in Belgium contribute a great deal in understanding the dramatic electoral changes just outlined.

As Flanders modernized more fully, the differences in social mobilization between Flemings and Francophones, declined between 1932 and 1974. A 10 percent decrease in the

differential levels of energy consumption, is associated with a decline in the differential levels of university enrollment by a rate of 9.4 percent per annum. In turn, and only when given time to work its way through the socio-economic system, a 10 percent decline in the differential level of university enrollment, is associated with a decline in the average level of differential energy consumption by a rate of 5.1 percent per annum.

When social structure is included in this calculus, it turns out that decreases in traditional cleavage group memberships in Belgian society as a whole, decrease the differences in social mobilization between Flemings and Francophones. A 10 percent decrease in the ratio of marriages to divorces is associated with a reduction in the average level of the differential university enrollment by a rate of 68 percent per annum. Although declines in the communal differences in university enrollment were accompanied by reductions in the marriage-divorce ratio at an average rate of approximately 17 percent per annum, it is clear that the relationship between changes in social process and structure, while contemporaneous, is profoundly asymmetrical. When the fabric of Belgian cleavage group memberships changed, the changes in social mobilization were greatly increased, and helped Flemings break out of their traditional self-image.

The consequences for the communal parties were such that as the differences in social mobilization declined

their support increased. A 10 percent decrease in the differences in university enrollment between Flemings and Walloons, is related to increases in support for all the communal parties at an average rate of approximately 17 percent per election. As segmented pluralism declined, communal party support increased as well. For example, a 10 percent decline in the ratio of marriages to divorces is associated with increases in support for all the communal parties, at a rate of approximately 14 percent per election. What effect did this increase in support for the communal parties have on reducing the differences in modernization between Flemings and Walloons?

Curiously, as the support for communal parties increased by 10 percent from one election to the next, the differences in modernization between Flemings and Walloons increased by a rate of 7.1 percent per annum. This means that while the declining differences in social mobilization, and the changes in cleavage group memberships helped increase communal party support, the differences in modernization were increased by rising communal party support. Where the differences in university enrollment between Flemings and Francophones helped decrease the differential level of energy consumption, at a rate of 5.1 percent, the support for the communal parties increased it by 7.1 percent. In real terms therefore, and given the joint presence of a declining differential social mobilization, and increasing communal party support, the differential

energy consumption grew at a net rate of 2 percent, a substantially smaller, but still highly significant amount.

An examination of the differential modernization data reveals further insights. By 1954, the differences in energy consumption between Belgium's communal groups had declined to almost zero. At that point, the support for the only communal party, the VNV, was only 2 percent of the national vote. After 1958, the Flemish developed at a faster rate than the Francophones, such that by 1974, there was almost a 76 percent difference in the quantity of per capita energy consumed by Flemings as opposed to Francophones. By 1974, there were also two more communal parties, both of which sought to defend Francophone interests. It seems therefore, that increasing the political competitiveness of the system augmented communal differences, rather than alleviating them, by inducing a factor of disequilibrium into the system. This means that Belgian politics will be in a constant state of upheaval resulting from the destabilizing effects of increased communal party support, and increased differential economic development.

The system thus appears to be caught in a vicious circle. While declining differences in social mobilization, and a changing pattern of segmented pluralism jointly increase communal party support, there appears to be no one factor that will stabilize the situation, until the differentials in social mobilization are zero, and the changes in social structure cease. At that point, one would

expect that communal party support would decline dramatically, and hence the differential in modernization would decline as well. That outcome would occur under four different scenarios.

In the first scenario, Flemings would feel secure enough to permit government aid to Wallonia without conditions (i.e., Flanders would not have to get anything in return) — a highly unlikely possibility. A corollary to this is the situation where the differences between Flemings and Francophones might be redressed, but through generally adverse economic conditions. In this case Flanders would experience a negative net increase in economic growth, and the support for the communal parties would probably decline, as support shifted to the traditional parties who were perceived as being more efficacious in effecting macroeconomic solutions.

Under scenario two, however, the political system would radically change, in response to the demands of the communal parties, to a purely federal system whereby each region would have greater influence in its economic decision-making. The possibility of this outcome is remote, since at present, the major parties perceive a substantial loss of political power in a federal system. Thus the present unitary state, with some regionalization, helps ensure the survival of the traditional parties.

The third scenario is the most extreme. In it, the Belgian political system ruptures completely into two or

three entities. Flanders would become a separate state, including the Flemish part of Brussels environs, and Brussels and Wallonia would form a new state as well. (Brussels could also be totally separate.) At that point, economic conditions are completely independent of internal communal rivalries.

A fourth scenario is probably the most realistic. It is assumed here that no one political actor is completely interested in resolving the communal problem, for to do so would mean alienating too many voting groups. Since the segmented pluralist system is declining, the electorate has become highly fractionalized. In all probability, the system will continue to remain unstable, because political actors have incorporated such instability into their expectations of the political system's behaviour.

While the differences in social mobilization are declining, the impetus of slowly widening differentials in modernization will maintain a constant sore in the body politic, much in the same manner that one learns to live with a painful inflammation which, while very uncomfortable, is not fatal. The only problems for Belgium, under this scenario, are both the increased importance of government as an actor, and its increased vulnerability to foreign economic and political manipulation.

The Belgian government, and its political masters are consequently, in an all too familiar situation. Government is needed to help resolve some of the communal difficulties

since historically, it has been the focus of the attention of the Flemish communal groups who saw it as a practicing agent of francophone inequality. Francophones now see it as a pawn of the Flemish and, at the same time, also the means to redress some of their economic difficulties. Unfortunately, such desires have taxed the state's capability to generate the necessary flow of money, which always seems to be sought as a solution to the communal problems.

Appendix 3

Statistical Requirements of a Communal Politics Model

3.1 A Structural Communal Politics Model

It was argued in Chapter Two that the communal politics model must reflect the interdependence of social process and structure in time and space. It was assumed that the relations within the model are jointly determined and that all the relationships are needed for determining the values of the dependent variables in the hypotheses. Thus, the model can be thought of as set of simultaneous equations.

While the model can predict which variables should be included and what the direction of the relationships ought to be, it is an empirical (and to some extent an intuitive matter) as to the time lags involved for variables to respond to changes in other variables. The functional form of the relations is also as much an empirical matter as it is a theoretical one, although there is a limited rationale in the event a non-linear result should appear.

The variables in the model are divided into two types: endogenous and predetermined. While endogenous variables are those being explained, they can also act as explanatory variables. Predetermined variables are those whose values are independent of any relation within the model. Predetermined variables include endogenous variables which have been lagged n periods in time and purely exogenous variables. Not all endogenous and predetermined variables

will have effect in each equation: an a priori zero restriction has been placed on the coefficients of some of these variables as they appear.

3.2 Statistical Implications of the Structural Model

In single equation estimation it is assumed that the explanatory variables are truly exogenous and that there is one-way causation between the dependent variable and its regressors. This is not the case where dependent and independent variables are jointly determined. The implication is that the OLS assumption of independence between the independent variable and the error term will not be satisfied. The OLS estimates will be biased and inconsistent⁽¹⁾ since the OLS procedure will underestimate the variance of the parameters.

Another estimation procedure must be utilized to overcome this bias in a system of jointly determined variables. In order to determine the nature of the bias and the appropriate procedure to resolve it, the identification

(1) Bias in a coefficient yields an estimate whose mean is not the true mean of the population. It will be smaller or larger than is really the case and hence the the researcher will make an incorrect decision concerning the estimate's statistical significance. Asymptotic inconsistency refers to the idea that if the sample size tended to infinity, the estimate is considered inconsistent if its value does not collapse on the point of the true value of the population parameter. Consistency is related to the bias and the variance of an estimator in that as sample sizes approach infinity, bias and variance tend to zero. For a mathematical treatment of these ideas, see for example, Kmenta (1971, Chapter 6).

of the parameters of the model in which the individual relationships are embedded is required.

3.2.1 Identification of Parameters With Linear Variables

Identification of an equation within a system of equations means that each parameter has a unique solution through the requirement that each equation be linearly independent of the other. Identification of a model means that no one equation contains an identical combination of regressors appearing in some other equation. For example, if we said that social mobilization is determined by economic development and vice versa, we would not be able to decide whether the estimates of the equations are unique unless some other information was introduced that would enable the identification of the correct variable in the equations. In sum, we cannot be sure which is the social mobilization or the economic development function.

When OLS estimation occurs what is really being estimated is a hybrid function of the two social mobilization and economic development forces. The solution is to specify additional factors which are theoretically meaningful and that will distinguish between the two equations.

The identification of parameters gives rise to the paradoxical position of identifying equations by what they do not contain, but which are contained elsewhere in the model. (Blalock, 1969:64; Koutsoyiannis, 1977:349) Put more

formally, identification is said to exist for a system of equations if it can be proved that their statistical form is unique.

Identification can be determined by a so-called order condition method. This method involves a counting rule for the number of variables included and excluded from an equation. While this is considered a necessary but not sufficient condition, it is the method most often used because it is easy to compute. A necessary and sufficient condition for identification will be explored in section 3.2.3.

3.2.2 The Order Condition

By this condition, an equation is defined as being identified when the number of variables excluded from an equation is equal to or greater than the number included less one.⁽²⁾ In symbolic terms, let

G^* = the total number of endogenous variables in the g th equation; (G = the total number of endogenous variables in the model)

K^* = the total number of predetermined variables in the g th equation; (K = the total number of predetermined variables in the model)

$K^{**} = K - K^*$

⁽²⁾One is subtracted from the equation because the coefficient associated with the dependent variable is one. This is referred to as a normalised variable. (Maddala, 1977:235)

For the model presented in section 2.6, $G=5$, and $K=5$. Thus, if $(K^{**} \geq G^{*} - 1)$, identification has been achieved. An equation is said to be underidentified if $(K^{**} < (G^{*} - 1))$. This means that the equation's statistical form is not unique and the parameters are therefore inestimable. An equation is just-identified if $(K^{**} = (G^{*} - 1))$. In the case where $(K^{**} > G^{*} - 1)$, the equation is said to be overidentified. While there is a unique solution to the parameters, in this situation it is possible to obtain multiple solutions of the equation. In other words there is more information than is necessary. Based upon the equations in section 2.6 above, the order condition for the communal politics model, presented below, shows that the equations within it are over-identified.

	K^{**}	$(G^{*} - 1)$	Conclusion
Equation 1	4	1	over-identified
Equation 2	3	0	"
Equation 3	5	1	"
Equation 4	3	1	"
Equation 5	3	0	"

3.2.3 The Rank Condition

As mentioned previously, the order condition is only a necessary condition for identification. The rank condition mathematically establishes the statistical uniqueness or non-uniqueness of each equation. The former method is used

in addition to the latter because it aids in determining the choice of statistical technique when an equation is either just identified or over-identified.

The rank condition for identification is determined as the result of the following operations:

a) Form a matrix of all the coefficients in the model including in each equation a zero restriction on the excluded variables. (See below.) E's represent coefficients of the predetermined variables, and B's represent coefficients of endogenous variables. The structural model is thus presented as a matrix of all the coefficients in the model when each equation is set equal to its error term.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1	1	0	0	$-B^{11}$	0	0	$-E^{12}$	0	0	0
2	0	1	0	0	0	$-E^{21}$	0	0	0	E^{22}
3	B^{31}	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
4	B^{41}	0	0	1	0	0	0	E^{42}	0	E^{43}
5	0	0	0	0	1	E^{51}	0	0	E^{52}	0

where variables numbered

1,6 = $ADSM(t)$ and $(t-1)$

2,7 = $ADM(t)$ and $(t-1)$

3,8 = $IBM(t)$ and $(t-1)$

4,9 = $SEGPL(t)$ and $(t-1)$

5,10 = $SCP(t)$ and $(t-1)$

Row numbers refer to the equation number.

b) Strike out the equation for identification and form a matrix of the remaining coefficients. Where there occurs a non-zero coefficient in the first equation, the columns below it are struck out in order to form a matrix of those

coefficients not contained in that equation but which are contained in the others. This process will result in a matrix containing fewer elements than in the structural matrix. The resulting matrix needed to identify equation (1) is

$$\begin{array}{ccccccc}
 2 & 1 & | & 0 & 0 & -E^{21} & 0 & | & 0 & E^{22} \\
 3 & 0 & | & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & | & 0 & 0 \\
 4 & 0 & | & 0 & 0 & 0 & E^{42} & | & 0 & E^{43} \\
 5 & 0 & | & 0 & 1 & E^{51} & 0 & | & E^{52} & 0
 \end{array}$$

A determinant⁽³⁾ of order $G-1$ is calculated from this matrix.

c) In this case, a determinant of order $G - 1$ can be obtained since the 4×4 matrix between the partition lines yields a non-zero determinant. Thus the rank⁽⁴⁾ for equation 1 is $G - 1 = 4$ which is equal to the number of equations in the model minus one. This procedure is repeated for each equation of the model. It turns out that it is possible to obtain a rank of four for each of the equations analysed in

(3) The determinant of a matrix is the sum of all the different products which can be formed from the elements of a square matrix. The order of the determinant refers to the size of the square matrix in which it is being calculated: a three column by three row matrix has an order three. A non-zero determinant of order $G-1$ must be formed from at least one square submatrix (minor). If the determinant is equal to zero, it means that the equations represented within the matrix are not linearly independent of one another. This means that when a regression analysis is performed on the data, it will be impossible to obtain the coefficients associated with the variables in the model.

(4) The rank of a matrix refers to the order of the largest minor yielding a non-zero determinant. An n -square matrix is called singular if its rank 'r' equals n , i.e., the determinant equals zero. This is the reason why it is necessary to form a matrix of order $G-1$.

this manner. On the basis of the rank condition, all equations in the model are properly identified.

3.2.4 Identification of Non-linear Models

In the case of equations which are functions of some non-linear variable, such as a polynomial equation, the extra variable is included in the matrix of coefficients which was formed earlier in order to tally the order condition and compute the rank condition. If the variable is a predetermined one, it is counted as an extra predetermined variable. If it is endogenous, it is counted as an extra endogenous variable. As long as one assumes that the parameters are linear, this form of identification is valid, even if the variable itself is non-linear.⁽⁵⁾

⁽⁵⁾The situation of intrinsically non-linear models will not be considered here. For a further mathematical treatment, see Maddala (1977: 228-230) or Fisher (1966: 127-167).

3.3 Estimation of Parameters: Choice of Method

Because the model to be tested is an over-identified one, and because three of the five equations depend upon at least one other equation in the model, the statistical technique used must overcome the simultaneous equations bias, and provide unique estimates of the parameters. There are two possible approaches from which to choose.

First, those that estimate equations singly and thus conserve degrees of freedom in small samples by using the same sample for each equation. Such techniques are two-stage least squares (TSLS) and limited information maximum likelihood (LIML). Second, those that estimate equations as a system and is appropriate generally for large samples. These are three-stage least squares, and full information-maximum likelihood techniques.

The second set of techniques was eliminated immediately because they demand large samples—something not available in this study. In the first case, the maximum likelihood technique was eliminated because it is computationally burdensome. Since the LIML and TSLS techniques have the same estimator properties, the equations were estimated with TSLS.

3.3.1 Two-Stage Least Squares Estimation (TSLS)

As was shown earlier, OLS estimates of simultaneous equations are biased and inconsistent because the source of this bias has a systematic component to it from both the

error term and the endogenous variables which are determined by the predetermined variables in the model. It can be shown, via the reduced form equations which express each endogenous variable solely in terms of the pre-determined variables in the model, that the error is a function of the other errors in other equations.

In TSLS an estimate of this component is obtained by regressing each endogenous variable on all the predetermined variables in the system using OLS. An estimated value of the endogenous variable (Y'), based upon the previous regression is calculated. The new value Y' is then used as an explanatory variable in the structural equation containing that endogenous but explanatory variable. The structural equation is then re-estimated using OLS.

It should be noted, that while in small samples the estimate is still correlated with the error terms of the structural equation (although to a limited extent compared to using OLS) and thus the estimate is still biased, this correlation disappears as the sample size increases, thereby making the estimates asymptotically consistent. If it is assumed as well that there does not exist any discernible autocorrelation pattern, the TSLS estimates are asymptotically consistent and efficient.

3.3.2 A Note On Autocorrelation In Simultaneous Models

Since time-series variables tend to move together over time, the likelihood that the assumption of non-correlated

residuals will be met is slim. Correlated residuals produce biased coefficient estimates. In order to correct this bias and thus preserve the assumption that the residuals are independent, an estimate of the size of the correlation among the error terms has to be obtained. If a first-order autoregressive model is assumed, the error in the period $e(t)$ is a linear function of the error in the previous period $e(t-1)$ and some random effect $u(t)$. This can be represented as

$$e(t) = e(t-1) + u(t) \quad (3.1)$$

In order to specify the error term correctly then, the variables of the equation are first-differenced (the present value of a variable is subtracted from its previous value to form a new variable) and multiplied by the residual correlation coefficient, p . (I.e., the correlation between the error at $e(t)$ and the error at an earlier time $e(t-1)$.) Subtracting from this equation the previous equation lagged one period will yield an equation that, when estimated by OLS, will contain unbiased and efficient parameter estimates. For example, let

$$Y(t) = a + bX(t) + e(t)$$

and

$$Y(t-1) = a + bX(t-1) + e(t-1)$$

Multiplying the latter equation by p , and subtracting this result from the first equation gives

$$Y(t) - pY(t-1) = a(1-p) + b[X(t) - pX(t-1)] + e(t) - pe(t-1) \quad (3.2)$$

From (3.1)

$$u(t) = e(t) - pe(t-1)$$

we can write (3.2) as

$$Y(t) - pY(t-1) = a(1-p) + b[X(t) - pX(t-1)] + u(t) \quad (3.3)$$

In this paper, the Hildreth-Lu scanning technique was utilized in combination with TSLS to correct for autocorrelation. This procedure substitutes a value for p ranging from -1 to $+1$ in equation 3.2, and then selects a value of p which yields the smallest estimated standard error for the equation.

The traditional Durbin-Watson test of the null hypothesis that there is no autocorrelation in the residuals is inapplicable in this study because the sample size is smaller than the value associated with the smallest degrees of freedom reported in the probability tables used for evaluating the Durbin-Watson statistic. A simple, yet reasonably powerful test was substituted which, with the significance of the autocorrelation coefficient, was used to test the departure from randomness in the pattern of the residuals.

This test, called the Geary test, is a modification of the traditional runs test and simply involves counting the positive and negative values of the residuals, comparing the result against a probability table, (Habibagahi and Pratschke, 1972:180) and concluding with a decision about the randomness of the runs. The null hypothesis of no autocorrelation would be rejected if the probability associated with the distribution is not due to chance and

accepted if otherwise.

It should be noted that the Geary test is less powerful than the Durbin-Watson test in large samples. In small samples, Habibagahi and Pratschke (1977:184) show that it has roughly the same power as the Durbin-Watson test. This means that the test would be able to discriminate equally well situations which might lead to accepting a null hypothesis which is in fact false. In the analysis section of the paper, Chapter 5, both the significance of the correlation coefficient of autocorrelation and the corrected equation from the Hildreth-Lu procedure are presented and tested with the Geary test.

3.4 A Methodology for the Interpretation of Coefficients and Functional Form of the Model's Relationships

The hypotheses presented in Chapter Two were restricted in the range in which the coefficients they were representing could vary. That is, a relationship was deemed to be a positive or a negative one. This restriction can also be represented with the calculus. Given the equation

$$Y(t) = a + b^1 X^1(t) + e(t) \quad (3.4)$$

we can say that

$$\frac{dY(t)}{dX(t)} = b^1 \quad (0 < b^1 < \text{inf.})$$

Simply stated, the derivative of $Y(t)$ with respect to $X(t)$ (ie., the rate of change in $Y(t)$ due to a unit increase in $X(t)$) is equal to b^1 , subject to the restriction that the permissible range of values of b^1 is greater than zero, ie., it is positive but less than infinity.) This result can be easily extended to the multivariate case, simply by taking partial derivatives. For example, given

$$Y(t) = a + b^1 X^1 + b^2 X^2 + e(t)$$

the partial derivatives of $Y(t)$ are

$$\frac{dY(t)}{dX^1(t)} = b^1 \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{dY(t)}{dX^2(t)} = b^2$$

This process can be easily extended to the nonlinear case. Two types shall be considered here: a polynomial of some specified degree and an equation containing an interaction term.

3.4.1 Polynomial Models

Let

$$Y(t) = a + b^1X(t) + b^2X(t)^{(2)} + e(t) \quad (3.5)$$

(Note that the raised characters are not powers but only superscripts. When a superscript is enclosed within brackets, it is to be interpreted as a power.) How is the effect of X on Y to be interpreted? Taking derivatives of (3.5) yields

$$\frac{dY(t)}{dX(t)} = b^1 + 2b^2X(t) \quad (3.5a)$$

In other words, the rate of change in $Y(t)$ is some linear function of each value of $X(t)$.

Since equation 3.5 represents a first-degree polynomial, predicted Y' values will correspond to the parabolic shape of the data. In order to determine whether the curve is U-shaped or an inverted U-shape, equation (3.5a) is set equal to zero and solved for $X(t)$. This gives

$$b^1 + 2b^2X(t) = 0$$

$$X(t) = -\frac{b^1}{2b^2} \quad (2b^2 \neq 0)$$

In order to determine whether this result will yield a minimum or maximum value of Y' , the second derivative of (3.5a) is calculated. If the result is positive, Y' will be at a minimum. If the result is negative, Y' will be a maximum. Since the second derivative of 3.5a is $+2b^2$, Y' will be a maximum when $X(t)$ equals

$$-\frac{b^1}{2b^2} \quad (2b^2 \neq 0)$$

Thus, the Y' values will be U-shaped. It is important to note that when nonlinear models are evaluated, all the coefficients associated with any X_i have to be evaluated together.

3.4.2 Models Containing Interaction Terms

Hypothesis nine from Chapter two suggests that a plausible functional form to predict values of support for communal politics is one in which the equation contains a multiplicative interaction term of differential social mobilization and segmented pluralism. (Only the multiplicative model will be considered here.) Let

$$Y'(t) = a + b^1X^1 + b^2X^2 + b^3(X^1X^2) + e(t)$$

Taking derivatives of $Y'(t)$ with respect to X^1 gives

$$g(X^1) = \frac{dY'(t)}{dX^1(t)} = b^1 + b^3X^2$$

and

$$h(X^2) = \frac{dY'(t)}{dX^2(t)} = b^2 + b^3X^1$$

Both $g(X^1)$ and $h(X^2)$ are linear functions of X^2 and X^1 respectively and have a common slope equal to b^3 . Equating the functions $g(X^1)$ and $h(X^2)$ to zero gives

$$X^1 = -\frac{b^1}{b^3} \quad \text{and} \quad X^2 = -\frac{b^2}{b^3}$$

Thus, when X^1 and X^2 are equal to either one of these

values, Y' will be at a minimum. Interestingly, a comparison can be made of the effect on Y' for high values of X^1 when X^2 is low and vice versa.

3.4.3 A Unit-Free Interpretation of the Coefficients

Very often however, values of X and Y are measured in different units. In order to obtain a unit-free interpretation of the coefficient, the slope must be transformed slightly so that it can be expressed as a function of the ratio of the mean of the x ($\bar{x}$) and y ($\bar{y}$) variables respectively. This is a procedure that has been used extensively in econometrics, but has recently been given application in sociology. See Stolzenberg (1978:1-33).

In the case of equation 3.1, the first derivative is multiplied by the ratio of x and y . This procedure is called transforming the first-derivative into an average elasticity (E_a).

$$E_a = b(t) \cdot \bar{X}/\bar{Y} \quad (\bar{Y} \neq 0) \quad (3.6)$$

The resultant quantity E_a is to be interpreted as follows. A 10 percent increase in the average value of X increases (or decreases) the average value of Y by E_a percent. In addition to the ease with which coefficients are interpreted, a ranking of elasticities within equations allows a comparison of the relative impact of each independent variable on the dependent.

Point elasticity (E_p) is obtained in the same way as E_a

except that each value of X and Y is used instead of the means:

$$E_p = b \cdot \frac{X}{Y} \quad (3.6a)$$

Again, the result can be extended to the multivariate nonlinear case. If one wanted to obtain the average elasticity the mean of X would be substituted for X and using the same formula (equation 3.2a) as before, the average elasticity is

$$E_a = \frac{b^1 \bar{X} + 2b^2 \bar{X}^2}{\bar{Y}} \quad (3.7)$$

$(\bar{Y} \neq 0)$

Because the coefficients of the equations were estimated with an autocorrelation correction factor, the point elasticity formula has to be modified in the following way:

$$E_p = \frac{[b^1 (X(t) - pX(t-1)) - 2b^2 (X(t) - pX(t-1))^2]}{(Y(t) - pY(t-1))} \quad (3.8)$$

where p equals the autocorrelation coefficient such that $(-1 \leq p \leq 1)$ and $(Y(t) - pY(t-1)) \neq 0$

Point elasticity is obtained by using individual values of $X(t)$, $X(t-1)$ and $Y(t)$, $Y(t-1)$ in the above formula. Note also, that average elasticity is obtained in the same way, substituting the means instead of the individual values of X .

In the case of an equation containing an interaction

term,

$$E_a = \frac{b_{ij}\bar{X}_{ij} + b^3\bar{X}_{ij}^{(2)}}{\bar{Y}} \quad \text{for } i, j = 1, 2, \dots, k, i < j$$

and

$$E_p = \frac{b_{ij}X_{ij} + b^3X_{ij}^{(2)}}{Y} \quad \text{for } i, j = 1, 2, \dots, k, i < j$$

The discussion of the results of the estimated equations in Chapter 5 is in terms of elasticities.

Appendix 4 .

Analysis of Residuals

The purpose of this section is to present the results of the tests of the assumptions of the least-squares regression model. This procedure is undertaken in order to be certain that the theoretical statements flowing from the estimates can be stated with confidence.

It is assumed that for ordinary least squares the residuals are normally distributed with a mean of zero, the residuals are uncorrelated with the independent variables in the model, (the assumption of nonstochastic independent variables) the residuals do not contain a trend (the assumption of nonautoregression) and the assumption that the variation about the zero mean does not depend upon large or small values of the independent variables, (the assumption of homoskedasticity), and finally, the residuals across equations are uncorrelated. (The test for this is also a test of the assumption of nonstochastic regressors.) In addition, it is also assumed that the regressors are not linearly related to one another, and that there are more observations than regressors for estimation.

Each assumption will be dealt with in turn. Where these assumptions are known to be violated, either on a priori, or on empirical grounds, generalized least squares is the term used to describe the modifications to the ordinary least squares technique that ensure that these assumptions can be maintained.

4.1 Test of Normality in the Residuals

The purpose of this assumption is to allow significance testing of the estimated regression coefficients to proceed with the use of the normal table. Since regression theory assumes that the statistics are random variables with normal distributions, normally distributed error terms are seen as the operational test of regression theory in this regard.

For this purpose, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov chi-square statistic (K-S Z) is used.⁽¹⁾ This statistic tests the hypothesis that the residuals represent a sample drawn from a specified theoretical distribution, in this case, the normal one, and may easily be obtained from the SPSS package. (Nie, et al; 1979:72-4)

K-S Z is a goodness-of-fit test such that if the statistic is sufficiently large, the decision rule requires the rejection of the hypothesis that the two distributions are the same. In other words, the smaller the value of the K-S Z, the better.

The results of applying this test to the equations in this model Table 4.1. As can be seen all of the null hypotheses may be accepted, and thus it is safe to use confidence intervals based on the normal table.

4.2 Test of The Assumption of Homoskedasticity

The assumption of homoskedasticity requires that

⁽¹⁾See Blalock, (1974: 262-265) for a description of this test.

Table 4.1

Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test of Residual NormalityADSMt Residual

TEST DIST. - normal (mean =	0.0	std. dev. =	0.0483)
Cases	Max(Abs Diff)	Max(+ Diff)	Max(- Diff)
10	0.1813	0.1813	-0.1258
K-S Z	2-Tailed P		
0.573	0.898		

ADMt Residual

TEST DIST. - normal (mean =	0.0	std. dev. =	0.1542)
Cases	Max(Abs Diff)	Max(+ Diff)	Max(- Diff)
10	0.1548	0.1548	-0.1295
K-S Z	2-Tailed P		
0.489	0.970		

IBMt Residual

TEST DIST. - normal (mean =	0.0	std. dev. =	0.0641)
Cases	Max(Abs Diff)	Max(+ Diff)	Max(- Diff)
10	0.2763	0.1229	-0.2763
K-S Z	2-Tailed P		
0.874	0.430		

SEGPLt Residual

TEST DIST. - normal (mean =	0.0	std. dev. =	0.0137)
Cases	Max(Abs Diff)	Max(+ Diff)	Max(- Diff)
10	0.1783	0.1783	-0.1200
K-S Z	2-Tailed P		
0.564	0.908		

SCPt Residual

TEST DIST. - normal (mean =	0.0	std. dev. =	0.0448)
Cases	Max(Abs Diff)	Max(+ Diff)	Max(- Diff)
10	0.2150	0.2150	-0.1558
K-S Z	2-Tailed P		
0.680	0.744		

variation about a zero mean is independent of the values of the independent variable in the equation from which the residuals are obtained. In other words, there should be no

systematic component to the distribution of the residuals that would be explained by any of the independent variables. This means that the estimated coefficients will have the property that they contain the least variance.

In order to be certain that this assumption is met in this study, the method of rank-order correlations, is used to evaluate it.⁽²⁾ These results are presented in Table 4.2. As can be seen, none of the correlations are statistically significant at the .05 level of probability.

4.3 Test of the Assumption of NonAutoregression

This assumption states that the residual should not be correlated with earlier values of itself. In other words, each estimated residual is independent of all others through time. The purpose of this assumption is to ensure that the error associated with a prediction at one point in time, is not correlated with any other prediction error in previous or future time periods. For example, in predicting support for communal parties, it is important to be certain that the

(2) Koutsoyiannis, (1977: 185) suggests this procedure as a simple, yet effective test for the assumption of homoskedasticity. The reason simply, is that the correlation between the residuals and the regressors will always be zero under OLS since the sum of the product of the error term and each regressor is zero. This result is derived from the computations required to minimize the size of the residuals in performing the regression calculation. If the absolute value of the residual is used, as is the case with the Spearman rank-order correlation coefficient, then a correlation coefficient can be used to evaluate the homoskedastic assumption, since the sum of the product of the error term and the regressor will not be equal to zero.

Table 4.2
Rank-Order Test of Homoskedasticity

Independent Variables			
ADSMt Residual	ADMt-1	SEGPLt	SEGPLt-1
	.43	-.369	-.236
	(10)	(10)	(10)
	p=.107	p=.147	p=.255
ADMt Residual	ADSMt-1	SCPt-1	
	-.468	-.139	
	(10)	(10)	
	p=.086	p=.35	
IBMt Residual	ADSMt		
	-.036		
	(10)		
	p=.467		
SEGPLt Residual	ADSMt	IBMt-1	SCPt-1
	-.018	.236	-.066
	(10)	(10)	(10)
	p=.48	p=.125	p=.42
SCPt Residual	ADSMt-1	SEGPLt-1	ADSMt-1*
	.054	.212	SEGPLt-1
	(10)	(10)	.236
	p=.441	p=.278	(10)
			p=.255

variation in that support can be attributed solely to the variation in absolute differential social mobilization and segmented pluralism, and not to a time-related "noise" variable from earlier observations.

It is generally accepted however, that autoregressive residuals are most often likely to occur in time-series analysis since the present value of a variable is the sum of the addition from last period to this, plus the value of the

last period. What is essential for proper specification of a regression model, is to model the relationship between the current and last period's data.

The Geary runs test tests the assumption that once the error term has been properly modelled, there will exist "noise-free" residuals. That is, the null hypothesis of a zero autocorrelation coefficient, ρ , is accepted if the number of runs, (each run being a set of like signs) given the number of observations, is shown to be statistically random. For the purposes of this paper, any runs value between 4 and 7 lies within the acceptance region of the normal curve, and thus is statistical evidence that the null hypothesis can be accepted at the .05 significance level. Table 4.3 summarizes the test results. It is clear that the assumption of non-autoregressive residuals has been

Table 4.3

Geary Runs Test

<u>Residuals Signs</u>	<u>Dependent Variable</u>	<u>Number Of Runs</u>	<u>Accept Or Reject Ho?</u>
+ - - - + + + - - +	ADSMt	5	accept
- - - + - + + + + +	ADMt	4	accept
+ - - - + + + - + -	IBMt	6	accept
+ - - + + - - - + -	SEGPLt	6	accept
- + - + + - - - + -	SCPt	7	accept

satisfied.

4.4 The Assumption of Uncorrelated Error Terms Across Equations

Quite simply, this assumption ensures that the error associated with each fitted model is random and generated by properly specified equations. This assumption is easily

Table 4.4

Correlation Matrix of Across Equation Residuals

	ADM (t)	ADSM (t)	IBM (t)	SEGPL (t)
ADSM (t)	-0.3670 (10) P=0.148			
IBM (t)	0.1900 (10) P=0.261	0.3958 (10) P=0.129		
SEGPL (t)	0.4187 (10) P=0.117	-0.1850 (10) P=0.304	0.3686 (10) P=0.147	
SCP (t)	-0.0490 (10) P=0.445	0.2956 (40) P=0.204	0.1321 (10) P=0.358	0.3504 (10) P=0.160

tested by constructing a correlation matrix of the error terms, and examining the significance of each of the resulting correlations. Table 4.4 presents these results. As can be seen, the estimated equations of the model are independent.

4.5 Multicollinearity

Multicollinearity arises when "strong interrelationships among the independent variables ... (make it) difficult to disentangle their separate effects on the

dependent variable." (Maddala, 1977:183) Since a degree of multicollinearity usually exists among a set of regressors, statisticians and econometricians have focussed their attention on the degree to which multicollinearity causes substantially large variances and covariances of the estimated regression coefficients. Since these types of variances can occur in situations other than in those due to multicollinearity, it becomes a problem of measuring its degree. (Kmenta, 1971:389)

Interdependence of the regressors raises the problem of specification. If they are chosen on the basis of specific a priori grounds, multicollinearity can be seen to be a sample, and not a population question, since it is assumed that the appropriate relations would have been modelled in the population. Even if there are no such relations in the population among the regressors, some relations will occur in the sample. (Kmenta, 1971: 380)

As far as specifically testing for multicollinearity, there seems to be some agreement in the literature that by using a combination of the R^2 , both the F and T-tests, and judgement, can its degree be determined. (Kmenta, 1971:389-90; Maddala, 1977:185; Koutsoyiannis, 1977:242-246) These procedures consist of regressing each regressor on all others and examining the resulting R^2 and the size of the F-statistics. If both are high, this is considered evidence for the existence of multicollinearity. Table 4.5 summarizes the results of these procedures.

Table 4.5

Test of Multicollinearity

Regressors	R ²	F-Statistic	Degree of Multicollinearity
ADSMt-1, SCPt-1	.14	1.54	low
ADMt-1, SEGPLt	.18	2.00	low
ADSM, (IBMt-1, SCPt-1)	.37	2.41	low
IBMt-1, (ADSMt, SCPt-1)	.28	1.62	low
SCPt-1, (IBMt-1, ADSMt)	.14	0.67	low
ADSMt-1, SEGPLt-1	.05	0.52	low

4.6 The Assumption of Number of Regressors Smaller than the Number of Observations

In order to ensure that the statistical equations used to estimate the parameters of the hypothesized models contain the appropriate degrees of freedom, the number of observations should exceed the number of regressors by at least one. In this study, this assumption was satisfied, and

Table 4.6

Test of Degrees of Freedom

Dependent Variable	No. of Regressors	No. of Observations
ADSMt	3	11
ADMt	3	11
IBMt	1	11
SEGPLt	3	11
SCPt	3	11

is summarized in Table 4.6

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