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STATUS POLITICS IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

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A thesis submitted to
the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
Carleton University
in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

Department of Political Science
Carleton University
Ottawa Ontario Canada

October 1978

The undersigned recommend to the Faculty of Graduate
Studies and Research acceptance of the thesis

STATUS POLITICS IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

Submitted by Ziad Salim, M.A., in partial fulfillment
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

.....*John H. Sigler*.....
Thesis Supervisor

.....*R. E. Bedeian*.....
Chairman, Department of
Political Science

Carleton University
October 1978

ABSTRACT

This thesis examines status politics as a basic concept in understanding state behavior in the international system. Two models of stratification are developed: (1) absolute status, and (2) status inconsistency with status mobility serving as an important link between the two. An extensive literature review provides a critique of recent applications of status and status inconsistency theory, as derived from the sociological literature, to the study of international behavior. The major problems in status inconsistency theory are emphasized in order to justify a reformulation of the theory which is both internationally specific and empirically testable.

The reformulated version of status inconsistency is based on the strict adherence to Johan Galtung's structural theory of aggression, both in the operationalization of the concepts and in the method of testing. Power, Development, and Prestige are used as the basic status dimensions. Aggression, defined as "a drive toward change," is operationalized as the degree of change in the international system advocated by UN delegates in speeches during the debates in the Sixth and Seventh UN Special Session of 1974 and 1975 on the New International Economic Order (NIEO). Status mobility

and participation are used as control variables in testing for relationships between status and status inconsistency and aggressive behavior.

Status profiles and status positions are constructed using two different sets of data: (1) an objective data set based on GNP and GNP per capita as indicators of Power and Development and office-holding success in the UN as an indicator of Prestige, and (2) a subjective data set constructed from replies to a mailed questionnaire sent to UN delegations. Replies were received from 65 (57%) of the 114 delegations polled. The empirical tests are directed at answering the question whether aggression is more likely to occur in positions of status inconsistency or in absolute status positions. The basic findings are as follows:

1. Nations with high status in Power and Development were supporters of the status quo and in the debates for the establishment of the NIEO they exhibited a low drive towards change.
2. Nations with low-status levels exhibited high drives towards change, especially nations with low status in Power.
3. Nations who were ranked mobile on Power between 1965 and 1974 had a consistently higher drive towards change than the non-mobile, although nations mobile on Development and Prestige did not differ significantly from non-mobile nations.
4. Status inconsistent nations exhibited a higher level of drive toward change than status consistent nations, and the relationship was more significant statistically in the case of perceived status than in the case of objective status.
5. Nations with a greater measure of inconsistency demonstrated a higher level of aggression than those with a lesser measure of inconsistency.
6. Status inconsistent nations had lower participation levels than status consistent nations.

In general, all three of the tests indicate that status profile (i.e., status inconsistency) seems to exhibit greater explanatory power than absolute status positions, especially when status is based on self-perception.

Strict comparability between the objective and subjective data sets, however, is not possible, and problems encountered in both measurement and testing are discussed as a guide to further research on status politics in understanding state behavior in the international system.

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For all these, and more, I am grateful to all of them. Needless to say, they are not responsible for the defects and other shortcomings of this thesis.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

There are many images, if not types, of politics; "power politics," "class politics" and "status politics," to name a few. "Power politics," however, is by far the most entrenched of our images of politics, and nowhere is this image more prevalent than in international politics. So much so that not only are the politics of nations thought to be power-related but even the nations themselves, the units we study, are called "powers." We give them labels which run from "superpowers" to "middle powers" and "minor powers." The grip of the concept of power and power politics in international relations is so strong that Berenice Carroll (1972: 585-616) once described the phenomenon as "the cult of power."

That international relations scholars see power wherever they look is understandable. However, the explanation of this phenomenon goes beyond the simple suggestion that the field has been "colored Morgenthau."¹ The ubiquity

¹The expression is adopted from J. Handelman, J. Vasquez, M. O'Leary and W. Coplin, "Color it Morgenthau: A Data-based Assessment of Quantitative International Relations," paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, New York, March 1973.

of power also has something to do with the nature of power itself and the international system in which it operates. The international system is a system in which power is diffused, or to use the term made popular by Kaplan (1957), the international system is "sub-system dominant." Its diffusion not only increases the visibility or the probability of power being "seen" but also it increases our concern as we are only familiar and comfortable with power that is concentrated, or with power in a system that has "nerves," to use Deutsch's (1966) famous formulation. This is a standard response, based on our collective historical experience whereby our social system has survived only in so far as power has been "wrested." The obsession with the wresting of power, or with controlling and managing it, becomes virtually irresistible, especially once we have assumed that the nature of power itself is essentially "evil."

That the image of international politics as "power politics" is not necessarily "correct" has been a subject of so-called "great debates" (Knorr and Rosenau, 1969). The debates, however, not only left the issue unsettled but also the field of international relations "divided": between "power theorists" and other theorists, between "idealists" and "realists," between "traditionalist" and "behavioralists," and between "theorists" and "empiricists" (Singer, 1972). Even the behavioralists, who purport to study behavior or behavior writ large, have not been able to escape the

"power of power." Of all the independent variables that the behavioralist scholars of international relations have used, over half of them constitute "indicators of national power" (Vasquez, 1976: 181). The use of power, according to Vasquez (1976: 183), has been the "most popular research strategy" in spite of the fact that "taken together, the national power variables do not perform well."

The image of international politics as "status politics," however, has not been as entrenched as that of international politics as "power politics." This is understandable because status, in most instances, has been regarded only as an accessory to power, an ornament, a symbol or a fruit of it. Its possession is a sign of "culture" and "sophistication" and its pursuit is viewed as an indoor sport of the few. Status has never been viewed as "evil" because it has never been, like power, caught in "naked" form.

The low exposure that status had received in international relations, though understandable, is not necessarily justifiable. This is so especially since great minds in social science have pointed to the relevance of status in the international system and demonstrated its importance in the understanding of the underlying dimensions of not only nations' but also individuals' cooperative and conflict behavior. Etzioni (1962: 21) called our attention to the linkage between "international competition for prestige"

and "peaceful coexistence" and the "probability of war" between the superpowers based on this competition; Lagos (1963) revealed that the race for economic development was a reflection of a desire to reduce "atimia" or loss of status; Galtung (1964a) suggested that the "drives towards change" are a function of "rank disequilibrium" or status inconsistency; Horowitz (1972) analyzed many aspects of the relationship between the "Three Worlds" (US, USSR, and the Third World) in terms of status; Dore (1975) believed that foreign policies of many nations (especially those of Japan, China, Mexico, and Middle Eastern nations) revolved around the concern for "international standing," "status gap," and "status deprivation." Rosecrance, et al. (1974: 19, 24) actually found that "absolute level of status" exhibited a "stronger association" with amount of cooperation and conflict behavior than absolute power.

None of these scholars, however, dominated the field of status politics as Morgenthau did with power politics. Although Galtung can be credited for the "popularization" of the status inconsistency theory in international relations, or Lagos for being the first to systematically treat status in the international system, their names are not synonymous with status politics. The absence of a "father figure" in status politics perhaps explains further the relative under-exposure of status politics in the field of international relations.

An examination of textbooks most popularly used in the field of international relations courses across North America (Rosenau, 1977) revealed a glaring omission of status politics (see table 1.1). Although the concept of "prestige" appears in most of the books, the concept is not discussed within the context of international stratification or treated as one of the dimensions of status but as an integral part of power and power politics. Morgenthau (1960: 72), who probably set the tone for the discussion on "prestige" in the international relations literature, in fact titled one whole chapter of his book as "The Struggle for Power: Policy of Prestige."

In the textbooks, only Holsti (1972), Morgan (1972) and to some extent Puchala (1971) pay serious attention to the relevance of status politics in the international system. Of these, only Morgan discusses the various empirical studies which have appeared in the field, e.g., those of East (1972) and Wallace (1971). An edited handbook purporting to summarize the field of international relations at the time (Greenstein and Polsby, 1975) dedicated only two paragraphs to status, i.e., a reference to "status inconsistency." "The role of prestige or status," lamented Romagna (1977: 10), "has been insufficiently recognized in the theoretical literature, the emphasis having almost always been on the material aspect of power."¹

¹Apparently thirty years ago, Morgenthau (1960: 72) himself launched a similar complaint. He claimed that

Table 1.1 Mentions of Status and Status-related Concepts
in Rosenau's (1977) 26 International Relations Text Books

Text Books Authors	Yes No	Concepts Mentioned	Frequency in Paragraphs
Van Dyke (1968)	yes	status*, prestige*	11
Crabb (1968)	no		-
Deutsch (1968)	yes	prestige*	2
Organski (1968)	no		-
Palmer & Perkins (1968)	no		-
Schuman (1969)	no		-
Jordan (1970)	no		-
Coplin (1971)	no		-
Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff (1971)	yes	Morgenthau's prestige*	1
Duchacek (1971)	no		-
Legg & Morrison (1971)	no		-
Puchala (1971)	yes	prestige*, status	15
Sprout & Sprout (1971)	no		-
Axline & Stegenga (1972)	no		-
Bobrow (1972)	no		-
Holsti (1972)	yes	rank, stratification	10
Modelski (1972)	yes	rank concordance, stratification	1/2+ table
Morgan (1972)	yes	status inconsistency	10
Spanier (1972)	yes	prestige*	1
Edwards (1973)	no		-
Frankel (1973)	yes	prestige* (and power discrepancies)	1
Hartmann (1973)	no		-
Hopkins & Mansbach (1973)	yes	rank	1
Morgenthau (1973)	yes	prestige*	1 chapter
Rosecrance (1973)	yes	stratification	1
Stoessinger (1973)	no		-

*power context only

However, this trend is slowly being reversed. Recent books tend to dedicate more pages to status-related ideas. Even a veteran like Deutsch is adopting the language of status politics and internalizing some of its assumptions.¹ Robert Angell (1973: 441), in his study of national support for world order (NSWO), used the concept of "a sense of status" as one of his independent variables and found support not only for the idea of "status comparison" but also for the relevance of "the reference group" notion. Furthermore, the empirical results of status inconsistency research are now being reported in the newer textbooks. Those of Sullivan (1976) and Haas (1974), for example, spend a considerable number of pages on the examination of the empirical results of status studies. In Haas (1974), we find concepts like "rank concordance," "rank disequilibrium," and "rank equivalence" appearing in more than five paragraphs and in Sullivan (1976), the concepts of "rank," "status," "stratification," "status

"modern political literature [circa 1948] has suffered from the predominant theoretical and practical concern with the material aspect of power" and has not given enough "recognition" to "the policy of prestige."

¹We quote, as an example: "Individuals in many countries look to other nations for cues about the status of their own people and country and indirectly about their own worth as persons. This may hold even more strongly for disadvantaged minorities within a country: subject to status deprivation both as individuals and as a group, they may look to a contest between their group and others as a source for increasing their self-respect. Beyond any other rational purpose, ethnic politics and world politics may turn into status politics" (Deutsch and Senghaas, 1975: 231).

inconsistency," and "status-field" appeared in more than twenty-seven paragraphs. In fact one whole chapter was dedicated by Sullivan (1976) to the discussion of "status politics" in international relations.

Nor has the call for a closer examination of status politics in the form of empirical test fallen on deaf ears. Empirical studies of Romagna (1977), Midlarsky (1975), Rosecrance et al. (1974), von Riekhoff (1974), Ray (1973), East (1972) and Wallace (1971) bear testimony to the growing response. Even the broader aspects of status involving prestige hierarchy, status mobility and status conformity have also been empirically analyzed, albeit by a handful of scholars (Singer and Small, 1973; Galtung et al., 1972; East, 1969; Gilbert, 1970; Heintz, 1975).

Progress notwithstanding, it will be some time until the science of international politics manages to reduce its preoccupation with "power politics." But, if this field is to respond to international problems in their totality, not only must it change but it must also begin to pay attention to the "non-power consequences of the international system and their effects on international conflict."¹ The politics of global shortage, oil crisis, equitable sharing of the world's resources or North-South relations as a whole

¹The expression is adopted from Chadwick Alger's "Non-Resolution Consequences of the United Nations and Their Effects on International Conflict," Journal of Conflict Resolution 5 (1961):128-145.

certainly cannot be resolved through the customary use of power alone. We suspect, the international politics of the future will be increasingly marked by the pursuit of the "shadow" of power or the "reputation for power" as Morgenthau (1960: 75) put it. The "reputation for power," of course, is Morgenthau's definition of "prestige," an important element of "status politics" and a clever use of it, many believe, is the highest manifestation of power. Unravelling the complexity of status politics, therefore, will be the major goal of this thesis.

To achieve this goal, we will attempt to do the following: 1) to examine critically the sociological underpinnings of the concepts of status and status inconsistency as employed in recent research in international relations; 2) to "apply" systematically, on a conceptual level, some of the relevant ideas of status politics (i.e., community, society, stratification, dimensions of stratification, absolute status, status mobility and status inconsistency) in the international system in order to see if a large scale system of this kind, whose units are both individual and organizational, is amenable to status analysis; 3) to explore the various manifestations of status politics in this system and to generate testable hypotheses from them; 4) to test empirically these hypotheses in the setting of the United Nations, which can be seen as a "microcosm," where nations of the international system deliberately set out to deal with

the problems of international inequality and differential status "distribution."

Specifically, an attempt will be made to ascertain the relationship between status (defined in terms of absolute status, status mobility as well as status inconsistency) and "aggression." Aggression, which Galtung (1964a: 95) has defined as "a drive towards change," will be conceptualized not only as a drive towards change within the system, i.e., the various aspects of the international system, but also as a drive towards change of the system, i.e., as change involving the various institutions and "rules of the games" of the system (Galtung, 1974: 33). Nations' positions on the proposals contained in the resolutions for the establishment of the New International Economic Order (or NIEO henceforth) will be used as the operationalized definition of aggression. This operationalization is consistent with the non-destructive, assertive and change-oriented sense that Galtung (1964a) has used and with the general pattern of most empirical research of status inconsistency in Sociology. The focusing on the change-oriented aspect of the UN politics is appropriate for this study because the struggle for the NIEO will determine the character of the international system to come, or at least as a start towards that end.

With status politics as the explanatory nexus, we expect nations' support for the NIEO and the specific

proposals contained therein to be a function of either their absolute status positions, their relative mobility, or the profiles of their status positions in this hierarchy (or status inconsistency). The concept of status itself will be defined operationally in terms of statistical measures as well as perceptions. Statistical measures such as GNP (total), GNP per capita, and "office-holding success" in the UN will be used to operationalize status in objective sense. The perceptions of nations' representatives in the UN with regards to the status of their nations will be used to operationalize status in its subjective sense. The results of tests linking status with aggression will determine which status theory can better "explain" the relationship between status politics and aggression. The results of the tests using both sets of data will also be compared to ascertain the role of perception in status theories.

The empirical study undertaken in this thesis differs significantly from those existing in the literature. Most existing tests of status in international relations have only tested the status inconsistency part, ignoring the "interdependence" between this theory with status mobility and absolute status. Our empirical study, however, will test all these notions together and not just status inconsistency in isolation. In addition, the importance of perception in status inconsistency has been much discussed but seldom operationalized or put to the test. In this sense

the empirical study presented in this thesis is both original and comprehensive. This point will become clear in chapter 4, where the theoretical and methodological justification of the empirical study is presented. The actual results of the tests will be reported, analyzed, and summarized in chapter 5. In the conclusion, the various implications of this study will be explored.

In chapters 2 and 3, the remaining concerns of this thesis will be discussed: clarification of concepts and review of the literature in chapter 2, the conceptual application of the ideas of status politics in international relations in chapter 3.

The concept clarification and the review of the literature, the conceptual application of the ideas of status politics in international relations, and the actual empirical tests of its major propositions are then the three areas to be examined in this thesis.

CHAPTER 2

CONCEPT CLARIFICATION AND REVIEW

What is Status Politics?

The central idea of status politics, according to Bell (1961: 111), is that "groups that are advancing in wealth and social position (groups on the rise) are often as anxious and politically feverish as groups that have become déclassé." These groups, which have lost their social positions, "seek more violently than ever to impose on all groups the older values of a society which they once represented." These downwardly mobile groups will seek to maintain the norms and values with which they are familiar. Among these groups, "status anxieties could be expected to be especially acute, and immersion into [the class of destination] and its institutions strongly resisted" (Parkin, 1971: 54). These anxieties arise from the sense of loss, especially of the privileges to which they were once accustomed. To those rising in the social hierarchy, entering a new environment can be equally anxiety-producing. The upwardly mobile not only have to face tremendous adjustment problems (due to unfamiliar norms, values, and rules of conduct) but also may actually face animosity from the groups being joined or being displaced due to perceived

"status threats" (Lipset, 1964: 309). The upwardly mobile (will tend to overcome these anxieties by a collective attempt to conform (or often overconform) through emulation, re-socialization, or even anticipatory socialization of some kind.

As both the nouveau riche (or upwardly mobile) or the déclassé (or downwardly mobile) tend to emerge simultaneously in the system, status politics may become not only "feverish" as Bell stated, but perhaps even vicious. The increased tempo of status politics itself is often more than sufficient to account for societal instabilities of one kind or another, especially during periods of dramatic economic changes. Depression, for example, produces a large number of social units who have lost at least one of their social positions (power, wealth, or prestige) while prosperity produces a large number of social units with improved standing in any one of the social dimensions. In the first instance the societal change produces social groups commonly known as "déclassé," "old aristocracies," "impoverished noblemen," "the dispossessed," "the old gentry," and so on (Hope, 1972: 25; Hagopian, 1974: 95; Abel, 1972: 283), while in the second instance, the social change produces a new crop of "nouveau riche," "parvenus," "new men of power," "social climbers," "wealthy member of a subject race," "nouvelle bourgeoisie," and so on (Hope, 1972: 25; Hagopian, 1974: 95; Bohlke, 1967: 223). The intensity of status

politics in this regard is attributable to the fact that periods of depression (especially) and prosperity tend to be either abrupt or short-lived (so that any of the emotional responses accompanying status loss or status gain tend to be cumulative). The new styles of life, the new work experience and the new level of rewards, new rules of conduct entail a quite fundamental readjustment for most of those accustomed to the status and privileges of the group they come from. To many, the experience can become a "status shock." They seek to cushion this "shock," therefore, by either competing for more privileges consistent with their newly gained prosperity (cf. Packard, 1959) or participating in "political movements" whose appeal is "status resentments" (Lipset, 1964: 308-309).

The nature of political movements in which the nouveau riche and the déclassé have historically participated is not limited to the "irrational" and "scapegoating" types as suggested by Lipset (1964: 309). As most theories of revolutions (great or small) have used status politics as one of the explanatory variables, these groups are obviously capable of participating in large-scale social change.

Brinton (1952: 279), for example, painted a typical revolutionary group as one whose status along certain dimensions is rising while their claims to other, parallel types of status are being frustrated (in Bell, 1968: 51). The explanation of the English revolution of 1648 by Tawney (1963)

also revolved around the idea of resolving "the status inconsistency between the strong collective economic positions of the gentry and their social and political subordination to the titled nobility" (in Hagopian, 1974: 96; emphasis mine).

Barrington Moore (1966: 16), who has examined all major revolutions (French, Russian, Chinese) indicated that "sections of society that had been losing out due to long run economic trends do much of the violent 'dirty work' of destroying the ancien régime" The study of revolutions, according to Hagopian (1974: 97), "gives partial confirmation to the hypothesis that 'radicals from the upper class are individuals who do not receive the social prestige or recognition which is commensurate with their economic position'."

But the "radicalism" of status politics does not have to come solely from the "upper class" as the hypothesis stated by Hagopian indicates. Lipset (1960: 127) in fact suggested that radicalism can arise out of every level of social strata. But the very terms "déclassé" and "nouveau riche" imply "falling" as well as "rising" of two separate groups. The groups which are more likely to fall are, of course, the upper and middle classes, and the groups more likely to rise are the middle and lower classes. As both the falling and the rising social groups are likely to end up in the middle and the middle class itself can be both "victim" of either falling or rising, the role of the middle

class in the radicalism of status politics is therefore prominent because it is here that the disgruntled déclassé and nouveau riche tend to cluster. The déclassé and nouveau riche are, of course, nothing more than the status inconsistencies, i.e., the individuals or groups that have either lost or gained a new power, a new wealth, but not prestige. That this type of individual or group will not take this "inconsistency" lying down but will increase his effort to equilibrate the ranks is the central idea behind status politics.

In summary, status politics, therefore, is a struggle to increase or to maintain real status (Anderson and Zelditsch, 1964: 112), or at least to reduce the probability of what Lagos (1963: 30) called "atimia," or the loss of status. The actual manifestations of status politics may vary from innocent "status seeking" (cf. Packard, 1959) to participation in "irrational political movements whose appeal is the not uncommon resentments of individuals or group who desire to maintain or improve their social status" (Lipset, 1964: 308) or even large-scale social revolutions.

The Inconsistency Notion and Other Related Theories

The notion that inconsistency of status (or rank, or any human attributes including cognitions) is intolerable has a very deep-rooted psychological and sociological tradition. Evidence for this can be seen even in our

day-to-day lives when we feel compelled to explain ourselves when we appear inconsistent in our arguments, presentation of ideas, or in the way we behave. Consistency is "rewarded" while inconsistency is "punished," so to speak. People around us expect consistency because it is seen as a "virtue" and demand resolution of any inconsistency. Consistency, in other words, is not only seen as a virtue but also as being "correct," "right," "acceptable" and "rational" (Zajonc, 1969: 194; Gross, 1964: 543).

The psychological and sociological pressure towards consistency is indeed widespread. Sumner (1907: 5-6) had long noticed the existence of what he called "strain towards consistency" in social mores especially in North America. Berelson-Steiner (1964: 663-664) in fact indicated that "strain towards consistency" is part of the image of a "behavioral science man." Whether or not the origin of this pressure is "human nature" or simply the product of socialization process (in the sense that it is only peculiar to a specific social class, region or culture) is almost impossible to ascertain.

But in Western societies the pressure towards consistency must be real and widespread in that it has led to so many theories in the social sciences. All these theories basically have one thing in common: that inconsistency is intolerable (for individuals), dysfunctional (for societies) and, in general problematic, because of its tension-producing,

conflict-generating, and uncertainty-creating potentials.

Almost every field of social science has at least one theory based on the idea of inconsistent something or other.¹ Even the "dismal" science of economics contains the equilibrium concept. The "imbalance growth model" of economic development (Hirschman, 1963) is one such example. History in general, and diplomatic history in particular are not immune from the inconsistency "epidemics" either. War and imperialism, for example, have been explained in terms of discrepancy of power and "status" (Langer, 1935, 1969). Not only are the explanations of early European revolutions tied in with the important roles of the status inconsistencies (Tawney, 1963; De Tocqueville, 1955; Barber, 1955; B. Moore, 1966) but also the explanations of some specific historical incidences. Barrington Moore (1966: 16), for example, has indicated that "among the regicides" in the English revolution, there was "a preponderance of poorer gentry." One of the four factors

¹This phenomenon extends even to the field of systems theory. An analogy between status inconsistency and entropy is credible in the sense that an inconsistent rank profile is also the case of "high disorder and information." It is no coincidence that Galtung found no problem analyzing the same conflict from both structural theory (1964a) and entropy (1968b). Young (1969) had analyzed stratification in terms of "modern systems theory." Zipf's (1949) "principle of least effort" can also be used to explain why inconsistency is strain-producing (i.e., because the formation of self-image is more energy consuming when one's rank profile is inconsistent). The widespread use of the equilibrium concept in the American scene has been treated in Russett (1966) and the use and misuse of it by Machlup (1967).

indicated by Abel (1972: 283-284) as being responsible for the "Hitler movement" was social discontent by those "who were in power before and during the War [WW I]--the military, the conservatives, the big landowners, and the industrialists, . . . who were suddenly and precipitously thrown down from their seats of power." These groups, of course, are the status inconsistencies par excellence, whose place in the "structural" theory of revolution has been formally recognized (Galtung, 1974).

"Novel" social problems associated with the underdevelopment of the newly independent countries too have been diagnosed in terms of status inconsistency. Nettl and Robertson (1968: 176) suggested that international development reflects a collective attempt to reduce "atimia" by the rank disequilibrated nations in the international system in general and in the UN in particular. One of the reasons for the emergence of Latin American Free Trade (LAFTA), according to Milensky (1973: 177), was "a pervasive sense of loss of status" and regional integration might offset the "regional atimia." The process of development within countries too has been thought to be motivated by groups "whose status [is] no longer respected" (Hagen, 1968, in B. Moore, 1966: 169). Radicalism of leaders of developing countries has also been explained by Hoffer (1963) in terms of status inconsistency. Examples are many: one of them was offered by MacKie (1974: 20) in the explanation of the "revolutionary nationalists"

in Malaya (or now Malaysia) as being due to their "low origin but were journalists and teachers with no chance of advancement under colonial administration."¹ Even the high rate of corruption in Africa (McMullan, 1961) and in Indonesia (Palmier, 1969) has been explained as a function of leaders' discrepancy in wealth and power (mostly having great power and little wealth). Area experts, too, have adopted the inconsistency notion to explain instability or "political pathology" e.g., in Southeast Asia (Leifer, 1974). It was no exaggeration when Hope (1975: 322) stated that "status inconsistency is generally accepted and widely used." It has become, according to Hope (1975: 322), "part of the standard intellectual equipment."

But status inconsistency's biggest problem is its multiple identity: too many names used for it and too many parallel concepts exist in other fields. In psychology, we find the terms "dissonance," "incongruity," "imbalance" and "disequilibrium" being used to express psychological concepts. In sociology, the terms "status integration" (Gibbs and Martin, 1964), "status crystallization" (Lenski, 1954),

¹The leaders were Ibrahim Ja'acob and Ishak bin Haji Mohammad who were leading the Kesatuan Melayu Muda in 1937. But a similar conclusion was also arrived at by Lasswell and Lerner (1966) about the revolutionary elites of both Chinese Communist and Kuomintang (they had high income, high family prestige, high education but low power). As to the radicalism of China itself ("which adheres to the most radical form of communism") was attributed by Landheer (1966: 8) to China's "status lag" ("because it had the greatest lag between actual and projected status").

"rank disequilibrium" (Galtung, 1964a), "stratification inconsistency" (Bohlke, 1967) and "dimensional consistency" (Geiger, 1971) have been variously used. Status inconsistency, according to Doreian and Stockman (1969: 56), suffers from an overdose of "sociological nominalism."

In psychology, the three cognitive consistency theories, namely the "structural balance principle" (Heider, 1958), "attitude congruity principle" (Osgood and Tannenbaum, 1957) and "dissonance formulation" (Festinger, 1957) are not only related with one another but also have some "informal and formal continuities" with status inconsistency theories (Taylor, 1973: 1193). This structural continuity has been suggested by others as well (Geschwender, 1967; Galtung, 1964a; Gleditsch, 1970a). The so-called role-theory which assumes that self-role congruence can lead to a more convincing and effective role enactment while self-role incongruence can create "a state of tension and cognitive strain" or "can mediate as a factor leading to less efficient role performance" is also one version of the inconsistency notion. As Sabin and Allen (1968: 525) stated it, "status inconsistency is a special case of self-role incongruence." The concept of "role strain" (Goode, 1960), therefore, is isomorphic to status inconsistency.

In sociology, status crystallization (Lenski, 1954), status integration (Gibbs and Martin, 1964), certain formulations of social mobility (Jackson and Curtis, 1968) and

the Blau-Davis principle of structural effects (Blau, 1960) are all called "social consistency theories" by Taylor (1973: 1192). The same observation is shared by Blalock (1967) when he treated all of them together and pointed out their similar methodological dilemma (i.e., the presence of the "identification problem" in all of them). Furthermore, status inconsistency has also been suggested as a special case of or related to Merton's "mode of adaptation" matrix (Schweiker, 1968: 535). In fact Merton (1937) explained almost all forms of social deviance (anomie, ritualism, retreatism and rebellion) in terms of inconsistency between values ("cultural goals") and norms ("institutionalized means"). Widespread though it may be, the use of inconsistency in sociology, the separation between various inconsistency notions, especially between clusters of "cognitive consistency" theories and those of "social consistency," have been achieved, not only terminologically but in substantive terms as well. One reason is that "theories of 'cognitive consistency' have received considerable empirical support but theories of 'social consistency' have not fared well" (Hornung, 1977: 624).

The use of the inconsistency notion is also widespread in political science (political sociology, political development and international relations). The various uses which can be identified in political science have been spawned by the functionalist school which essentially maintains that structural imbalance of any kind causes tensions and strains

in society. Under this heading, we can subsume Levy's (1967) and Smelser's (1966) version of structural imbalance (which hypothesizes that when the process of structural differentiation proceeds unevenly, structural imbalance becomes a source of conflict) and Ogburn's (1964) "cultural lag" notion (which occurs "when one of the two parts of culture which are correlated changes before or in greater degree than the other part does"; in Appelbaum, 1970: 67). Johnson's (1967) model of revolutionary change (or "multiple dysfunctions" model of revolution) is also functionalist and cultural lag in orientation as it predicts revolutionary situations to occur "when values and the environment are no longer synchronized" (Cohan, 1975: 126-127). Eckstein's "theory of stable democracy" (1961) explains political stability in terms of the "congruence of authority patterns" and Huntington's (1968) "lead-lag model" or "balanced development" approach predicts internal instability based on the lag between institutional reforms vis-à-vis material improvement and political participation. Gurr's (1970) and Feierabend and Feierabend's (1966) "relative deprivation and rising expectation" model is basically a more specific reformulation of "lead-lag" model of social change (Tilly, 1973: 433). In an article especially intended to demonstrate the interdependence of several theories of social movements, Geshwender (1968: 135) indicated that relative deprivation and status inconsistency are related in the sense that status inconsistency serves as

"a non-temporal condition which also produces [this same] state of mind that tends to be expressed in revolutionary or other protest activities."

The crux of these models has been stated succinctly by Cutright (1963: 260): "those nations which show marked discrepancies in levels of development between institutional sectors and overall modernization, the potential for mass movements, political change, and revolutions appear to be most likely, for these latter phenomena can be interpreted as attempts to restore or achieve equilibria." It is for this reason that all theories which predict potential doom based on the gap between development dimensions have been labelled as "gap theories" by Holsti (1975).

The proliferation of these gap theories appear to have been "independent" of the empirical results which have been rather mixed and inconclusive. Although Sofranko and Bealer (1972: 53) concluded that "the functionalists' argument that imbalance causes tensions and strains and eventually disruptions appear credible," Hibbs (1973: 62) after examining many versions of the structural imbalance hypotheses on the one hand, concluded that none of them were able to explain political violence. Hibbs wondered "why these models did so badly [in empirical tests] given the impressive theoretical base from which they were derived."¹

¹One possible answer can be gleaned through the tests of status inconsistency in Sociology: Orum (1974: 184) suggested that research on inconsistency which uses an additive

The various imbalance models, not to mention the status inconsistency and other status inconsistency-related theories, have caught the attention and excited the imagination of the international relations scholars too. The various roles attributed by Barrea (1973: 275) to the "counter-core area" or the "intermediate power" which "holds a high place within certain hierarchies and a lower middle place in others" in the process of federalism is one example of the various uses of status inconsistency. Even Heider's structural balance had not escaped the attention of the international relations scholars: Hopmann (1967), Lumsden (1970) and Healy and Stein (1973) actually empirically tested this notion on international conflict and found support for the theory. The so-called "U-R theory" (Uncertainty-Reduction theory) is also based on the same assumption as inconsistency theories, i.e., that uncertainty, like inconsistency, is not only intolerable but also unmanageable, thus reduction is necessary (Jenkins, 1975; Midlarsky, 1975). Choucri and North's (1968: 39) model of lateral pressure, which asserts that "the origin of international violence can be located in differential rates of growth in national attributes and capabilities" is also related to status inconsistency in its assumptions. Lastly, the whole

model (Sofranko and Bealer did) consistently found support for the theory while those using rigorous statistical control of the "interactive effect" (as Hibbs did) did not.

status-field literature of Rummel (1977) is essentially a less "complicated" version of status inconsistency as it relies solely on the idea of absolute differences between ranks of nations' attributes as a "social force" capable of explaining behavior of nations.¹

{ Of the four "statements" identified by Phillips (1974: 185) as "capable of meeting Levy's challenge" (i.e., "the article or the book in which are to be found highly generalized propositions with explicitly worked out deductive interdependencies among them"), two of them (Rummel's Status-Field and Galtung's Rank Theory) have elements of the inconsistency notion in them.² That is quite an achievement for an idea whose status, according to Collins (1975: 51), "seems to be fading" in the field from which it came (i.e., Sociology).

In the next section we will trace the development of status inconsistency in sociology more closely.

Status Inconsistency in Sociology

The notion that inconsistency of status can lead to behavioral or other forms of "disorders" is not new in Sociology. The idea has been suggested by many sociologists for years (De Tocqueville, 1955; Sorokin, 1927; Edwards, 1927).

¹The complete structure of Rummel's status-field theory is given in appendix A.

²The other two are Richardson's "arms races" and Axelrod's "utility theory" (Phillips, 1974).

Articles by Benoit-Smullyan (1944) and Hughes (1945), however, systematically entertained the idea and stipulated possible disorders if status holders failed to reach "equilibration" of their status positions.

The first empirical test of the status inconsistency notion was undertaken by Adams (1953) where he suggested that consistency in status would minimize conflict and enhance performance in groups. Although the result of the test supported the relationship between consistency and "social" performance, it failed to do so for the postulated curvilinear relationship between consistency and "task" performance. This study, however, did not appear to have generated much interest. It was not until Lenski's test one year later that the debate and controversy started in earnest.

Lenski (1954) suggested that because the traditional notion of status failed to explain behavior fully, the "non-vertical dimensions of social status" must be examined to account for the unexplained variance. He used the dimensions of income, ethnicity, education and occupation to express the degree of "crystallization" of status. It is the degree of "crystallization" of individual's status measured objectively in terms of the dispersion of inverted ranks scores around the means that he used to account for tendencies of liberalism and Democratic vote. In spite of the controversy, especially methodological, Lenski's work (1954, 1956) spawned a host of further studies attempting to link the

concept of status inconsistency to anomie, suicide, radical prejudice, partisan choice, social unrest, right-wing extremism, pro-integration sentiments and many more. On the whole, the controversies revolve around the findings (too many social phenomena were being explained), the formulations (the fact that there are so many versions of them), and the methodology (it is virtually impossible to partial out the status inconsistency effect from the main status effect itself).¹

The range of behavior associated with status inconsistency has no consistent pattern. Extremism of the left and of the right, commitment to social change and isolation, greater sense of opposition and lack of sense of political participation have all been found to be associated with status inconsistency. Even high instances of flying saucer sighting have been found to correlate with status inconsistency (Warren, 1970). All these findings clearly pose difficulty in terms of theory construction. The existence of a number of formulations, or the fact that so many types of status inconsistency can be constructed out of possible dimensions of social stratification, adds more problems. Lenski's 1954 formulation (i.e., status inconsistency as deviation from the mean scores) differs from the formulation

¹For the earliest exchanges on these issues, see Kelly and Chamblis (1966), Malewski (1966), Mitchell (1964), Lenski (1964) and Bialock (1966, 1967).

that conceptualizes status inconsistency as deviation from the regression line (Alschuler, 1973; Hope, 1975) or even with those who simply define status inconsistency as absolute differences between two or more status scores. Whatever formulation is used, however, as long as some forms of arithmetical or mathematical functions are performed between two or more status scores as the operationalization of status inconsistency, the formulation suffers from the problem which Blalock (1966) has called the "identification problem." This can be explained by the fact that when the third variable is a mathematical function of the other two, it is virtually impossible to separate the interaction from the additive effects. In an additive model each variable affects the dependent variable independently of the other; hence one can simply add together their effects. In an interaction model the effect of each variable depends on the other (Kriesberg, 1973: 72).

In spite of the controversies (or perhaps because of them), empirical studies flourished. The following list will summarize some of the findings of the earlier empirical studies available:¹

¹The volume of studies which exist on status inconsistency makes it virtually impossible to provide an exhaustive and systematic review. The review provided here does not claim to be such. It is intended as a general exposure to the complexity of the issues and, through the lists of findings, to provide an overall impression on the range of behavior associated with status inconsistency. Other information (such as status dimensions used, operationalization, methods of analysis) has been deliberately excluded to highlight this point. Although there are wide range of techniques used, the choice of status dimensions, unlike the study of status inconsistency in international relations, have been rather uniform (involving the use of an SES index, plus-minus either race or religion).

<u>Authors</u>	<u>Dates</u>	<u>Status Inconsistency Correlates</u>
Fenchel et al.	1951	exhibits greater amount of status striving
Lenski	1954	votes Democrat and holds liberal views
Lenski	1956	joined fewer voluntary organizations
Goffman	1957	favors extensive change in power distribution
Clark	1958	disharmonious and reduced productivity
Sayles	1958	disharmonious and reduced productivity
Exline & Ziller	1959	significant incidence of interpersonal conflict
Lipset	1959	belongs to left-of-center party
Jackson	1962	psychological symptoms of stress
Tuckman & Kleiner	1962	higher incidence of schizophrenia
Adams	1963	functions less harmoniously with others
Landecker	1963	lacks "class status consciousness"
Geschwender	1964	Negro Revolt
Jackson & Burke	1965	shows psychological symptoms of stress
Vanderzanden	1965	Klan members
Abrahamson	1966	high symptoms of emotional ill-health
Hyman	1967	less job satisfaction (especially when low rank highly visible)
Lenski	1967	Left voting (in Australia, UK, Canada, US)
Rush	1967	"Right-wing" extremism
Trow	1967	favors "position restructuring"

There were several studies which uncovered negative evidence and in many ways were responsible for the various controversies generated. Kenkel (1956), who claimed to have replicated Lenski's 1954 study, found that status inconsistencies did not differ in their political attitudes from the non-status inconsistencies; Brandmeyer (1965) found no

relationship between status inconsistency and political orientation; Kelly and Chamblis (1966) concluded that status inconsistency was not a good predictor of political attitudes. Studies of non-political phenomena (e.g., prejudice and other forms of social relations) also failed to find support for status inconsistency hypothesis: Treiman (1966) claimed that status inconsistency per se had no effect on "anti-Negro prejudice." Bauman (1968), in fact, discovered that, as a whole, the status inconsistent had more "satisfactory social relations" than the status consistent.

In spite of the negative evidence, the research continued unabated. The following list indicates the more recent studies and their findings:

<u>Authors</u>	<u>Dates</u>	<u>Status Inconsistency Correlates</u>
Bell	1968	"high radical rejection of non-violence" (for Congress of Racial Equality members)
Fauman	1968	favours more desegregation
Geschwender	1968a	isolation and individual unrest
Segal & Knoke	1968	tends to vote Democratic
Kirkham et al.	1969	"political murder"
Richard	1969	Negro doctors more liberal
Smith	1969	increased partisanship
Eitzen	1970	rightist and Wallace supporters
Warren	1970	high instance of flying saucer sighting
Wilkinson	1970	all 9 assassins were status inconsistent
Kirk	1971	vote Democrat and hold liberal views
Segal & Knoke	1971	related to political party choice
Warren	1971	related to "riot behavior"
Eitzen & Bair	1972	more schizophrenia-related

Midlarsky & Midlarsky	1972	"helping behavior"
Nachmias	1973	greater opposition (to Israeli leadership)
House	1975	more stressful life (for the "underloaded")
Hornung	1977	predicts accurately high level of stress in status inconsistent

Of course some negative evidence has also surfaced from the more recent studies. In an article boldly titled "Effects of Vertical Mobility and Status Inconsistency: A Body of Negative Evidence," Jackson and Curtis (1972: 712) claimed that they have disconfirmed not only studies of others but also their own earlier work. They maintained that "different results are a function of different methods used" and "mobility and inconsistency effects almost always disappear when the main effect of rank dimensions are rigorously controlled." Orum (1974) concurred with Jackson and Curtis (1972) and suspected the fact that status inconsistency researchers who used the additive model consistently found support for status inconsistency. Orum's own study (1974: 185) indicated "very little support for a link between status inconsistency and political unrest." Laumann and Segal (1971: 55) maintained that their data "clearly provide a basis for rejection of a general status inconsistency phenomenon" as they found no relationship between status inconsistency between ethno-religious status and education with political attitudes and participation. Eitzen (1972-73),

in another study, also found no support for the suggested link between status inconsistency and consistent and persistent political attitudes either of the left or of the right.

"It is the socio-economic status that appears to be the crucial variable" (Eitzen, 1972-73: 548).¹ Portes (1972: 361) tested status inconsistency in Chile and found no relationship between it and "political opposition to the status quo" and change-oriented movement. Finally, Olsen and Tully (1972) dismissed status inconsistency as a variable because it only explained less than 1% of the variance in the preference for change.

Negative evidence notwithstanding, the idea of status inconsistency has refused to die. Unlike old soldiers, social science theories neither die nor fade away. Instead, they continue to walk among us and make more converts. Only in the physical sciences do theories die. The road to scientific progress in this area is literally littered with discarded theories. Believers of flat-earth theory and "simultaneous creation" are now their ghosts. One is reminded of a statement by Niels Bohr, the famous Danish physicist, that "the opposite of a correct statement is a false statement, but the opposite of a profound truth may well be another profound truth." That status inconsistency has "a tenacious

¹Back to square one: Kelly and Chamblis (1966) had actually concluded this way some six years earlier.

foothold in the literature of social stratification" (Knoke, 1972: 25) may be an indication of "another profound truth" or simply "one of the most important fundamental ideas about modern society" (Meyer and Hammond, 1971: 99) whose resolution must be constantly sought.

Recent analyses by Hope (1975) and Hornung (1977) indicate that the effort is still being vigorously made.

Status Inconsistency in International Relations

The easy conversion of the international relations scholars to the idea of status inconsistency is perfectly understandable since a parallel notion of status inconsistency has been in existence in the literature of diplomatic history for years (Langer, 1935). The fact that most empirical tests of the theory (including one of the earliest) came out of the COW Project, a project directly examining diplomatic history, was no coincidence. Furthermore, the international relations scholars, given the nature of their discipline which is more multidisciplinary and "eclectic" than others, appear to warm easily to any "new" idea, and status inconsistency is no exception. The existence of the various theories related to it (or "sister theories") noted earlier made the transition even easier.

These facts notwithstanding, there was a three year lag-time between the first systematic exposure of the theory (i.e., in Galtung's 1964 article called "A Structural Theory

of Aggression") and the first empirical test (Fossum, 1967). Even then, it was tested on the behavior of nations not significantly emphasized in Galtung's article (i.e., the intrapunitive "coup d'état"). For the first acknowledged test of Galtung's theory (Wallace, 1971)¹ there was a lag-time of seven years. Since Wallace's 1971 article, many more articles, books and Ph.D. theses have appeared on the scene,² indicating a not so discouraging publication record for a theory that has taken considerable beating in the field where it emerged.

Substantively, however, it is a different story. In spite of the confidence of some of its practitioners,³ the empirical tests of status inconsistency in international

¹See the summary of Wallace's article in the Journal of Peace Research (1971) in which the editor acknowledged the test as "partial verification of Galtung's hypothesis." For the first acknowledgement of the face validity of his theory, see Galtung (1968a) where he recognized Rummel's "Research Communication" (1967) as an empirical test providing such evidence.

²Several Ph.D. theses have been written on this subject: Midlarsky (1969); East (1969), Wallace (1970), Ray (1974), Gochman (1975) and Romagna (1977). Wallace's and Midlarsky's theses have been published as books (Wallace, 1973; Midlarsky, 1975). For other theses appearing out of DON project, see Hilton (1973).

³Wallace (1974: 174) stated confidently that "so potent were differential mobility and status inconsistency that they jointly accounted for as much as 72% of the variance in the magnitude of international war from 1815 to 1964."

relations still have to answer the same questions raised earlier in the sociological review: what effects did the various formulations have on the "successful" tests on war (Romagna, 1977; Midlarsky, 1975; East, 1972; Wallace, 1971), on coup d'état (Fossum, 1967), and on overall foreign policy behavior (Choi, 1973)? Why did the theory almost always fail to explain its dependent variable when tested on the unit level (Romagna, 1977; von Riekhoff, 1974; Ray, 1973)? Why did the variance drop significantly when rigorous or partial control of Blalock's identification problem is exercised (Midlarsky, 1975; von Riekhoff, 1974)?

The fact is that the tests of status inconsistency in international relations have not been able to contribute to the resolution of the problems of status inconsistency and other "contending theories" which have plagued researchers in Sociology.¹ This can be seen from the fact

¹What we mean by "contending theories" are theories that some scholars have thought to be competing with or contradictory to status inconsistency in terms of the predicted behavior. As status inconsistency is generally thought to predict "aggression" and other "agonistic" tendencies, status inconsistency, therefore, is thought to be competing with "cross-pressure" (Lipset, 1967: 471; Segal, 1969: 355; Wallace, 1973: 8-11) which predicts indecision and withdrawal (especially in voting behavior), with "cross-cutting cleavages" (East, 1972: 316) which predicts structural stability, and with "criss-cross" (Galtung, 1964a: 99) which also predicts the same stability. We feel it is the "cross-pressure" theory that is truly competing with status inconsistency because both theories predict unit behavior and of the kind not unlike each other in some instances (e.g., status inconsistency too has been linked to isolation and withdrawal. See Geschwender, 1968a and Lenski, 1956). Status inconsistency and "criss-cross" or "cross-cutting cleavages,"

that students of status inconsistency from Sociology have not publicly commented on the status inconsistency research in International Relations, which, incidentally, has gone on for more than ten years. The flow of ideas has been one way and there has been no cross-fertilization of research findings. That is why the empirical tests of status inconsistency in international relations, in replicating the status inconsistency research in sociology, have adopted not only the essentials of the theory but also its problems. In addition, more controversy has been added by the test on the so-called "system level."

There is no doubt that indiscriminate and somewhat superficial borrowing has contributed to what Midlarsky (1975: 123) called "contradictory findings" where the state of the theory is in neither "complete validation" nor "rejection." This can be seen from the results of the empirical tests.¹ Using ranks on power and development, Rummel (1967: 198) informally suggested that his findings

however, merely appear to contradict each other. In reality they are more likely to complement each other as Coser (1956: 79) has suggested in the sense that the individual level conflict predicted by status inconsistency on the unit level becomes stabilizing on the system level. The most important point to realize here is that status inconsistency is a theory of behavior on and of unit level (individual) while criss-cross and cross-cutting cleavages are theories of system or structural stability. These later theories simply deny that unit level conflict has an additive effect on the societal level.

¹To assist the review, consult the summaries of the status inconsistency test in table 2.1.

Table 2.1

EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF STATUS INCONSISTENCY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1967-1977)

Author	Temporal Domain	Spatial	Levels of Analysis	Independent	Variables Mediating	Dependent	Operationalisation	Methods of Analysis	Findings	Variance Explained	Comments
1. Robertson & Tudor (1966)	1960	Third World	System	Total Rank, Rank Dis-equilibrium	None	None	Power Base, Standard of Living, GNP	Regression	TR-RD linear, "Rank Divergence" important	None	Statistical clarification of concepts: when spatial domain enlarged (from 55 plus Europe) TR-RD became curvilinear
2. Fossum (1967)	1907-1966	Latin America	National	Rank Dis-equilibrium	None	Coup d'Etat	Size and Wealth	Percentage Distribution	IM-G-Poor had high Coup's	None	Method severely criticized by Hermes (1969), parallel to Blalock's "identification problem"
3. Wallace (1971)	1820-1964	Central System	System	Status Inconsistency	None	War	Power minus diplomatic importance; War=COM data	Bivariate (Goodman-Kruskal) with 5, 10, 15 lags	SI-War supported	From $R^2=.56$ to $.71$ for 15-year lag	Belled by JFR as "partial verification of Galtung's hypothesis"
4. Zantner (1970)	1964-1966	67 nations	National	Status Inconsistency	Perception	Influence Attempt	GNP minus diplomatic importance	Multiple Regression	SI-Influence=non-linear	claimed "high"	Summary of "forthcoming" book: Status and Influence Attempt in International Politics
5. East (1972)	1948-1964	Global	System	Status Inconsistency	None	War	Power, Wealth, Prestige (Rank-order correlations)	Pearson's Product-Moment	SI-War supported	R^2 from .25 to .40	First attempt at a three-dimensional approach, but power and wealth added together
6. Wallace (1972)	1820-1964	Central System	System	Status Inconsistency	Alliance, IO, arms expansion	War	Same as Wallace (1971)	Dependence Analysis	No spuriousness; SI-War remained strong	$R^2=.30$; SI-Alliance=.20; SI-IO=.65	Claimed to be "improvement" over Wallace (1971) as mediating variables controlled
7. Ray (1973)	1815-1970	Europe	National	Status Inconsistency	Hobility	War	Power minus Diplomatic importance (squared)	Pearson's r, Multiple Regression	SI-War not supported	Low	Replication of Mdlarsky (1969); differentiated war involvement from war initiation
8. Von Righoff (1974)	1815-1965	Central System	National	Status Inconsistency	None	War	Same as Wallace (1971) but SI squared	Pearson's r, Canonical	Bivariate significant; multi-ambiguous	Overall $R^2=.10$	Sought to replicate Wallace (1971) and methods claimed improved
9. Rosecrance et al (1974)	1870's	Europe	System & National	Power (balance), Status Inconsistency	None	Conflict-Cooperation	25 variables of Power plus diplomatic importance	Bivariate	SI-Conflict-Cooperation unsupported	R^2 from 0 to .18	Basically test of "power theories"; SI being one of "power theories"
10. Mdlarsky (1975)	1870-1945	Global	National	Status Inconsistency	None	War	"Average" of Achievement-Ascription	Step-wise multiple regression	SI-War supported (but qualified)	High	Many "new" variables; part of a book; uncertainty-reduction concept introduced
11. Rosema (1977)	1815-1950	Great Powers	System & National	Rank Dis-equilibrium	Perception, foreign policy	War	Same as Wallace (COM oriented)	Bivariate and Regression	System level SI-War unsupported; national level no	R^2 from .35 to .55	Importance of perception stressed and conceived within foreign policy & general systems models

offered "empirical confirmation of Galtung's structural theory of foreign conflict." He found "the international rank disequilibrium" (high economic development and low power capability) was associated with "high foreign conflict" while "low rank disequilibrium" with "high political stability." When he tested "status disequilibrium" on the dyadic level, using a multiple index of development and power, Rummel (1972b: 108) found no support for the proposition. His colleague at DON (Choi, 1973: 51), however, claimed that his study (which tested status-field theory on the US-USSR dyad) "well confirmed" the status-field theory, in which the relationship between "status disequilibrium" and conflict was one of the propositions tested. Using a similar formulation (i.e., the use of multiple index of power and status, instead of development, with 28 indicators used and measures of conflict-cooperation as the dependent variable), Rosecrance et al. (1974: 28) indicated there was no "demonstrable relationship between conflict and the disparity between power and status at either the national or systemic level." Midlarsky (1975: 187), however, using a different formulation (i.e., status inconsistency as "the rate of change" of the variables and the "mean status inconsistency score for the 75-year period") found the frequency of war (as opposed to the duration and intensity) was the most strongly predicted by status inconsistency. The "gap" between "ascribed" (diplomats received) and "achieved" (GNP, population,

railroad, telegraph/telephone, mail, and urbanization) was found to be strongly related to the onset of war.¹ Wallace (1971) and East (1972) who used still other formulations also found support for the status inconsistency-war hypothesis. But Wallace operationalized status inconsistency as "the sum of the differences" between ascribed and achieved ranks while East used the rank correlation between the two rank-orders of the two time-points. Wallace's formulation was later adopted by von Riekhoff (1974) and Romagna (1977), while Ray (1973), who sought to replicate Midlarsky (1969), adopted his formulation as well. Except for Midlarsky (1975), all these later studies not only tested the theory on unit or national level, but also found no convincing support for the status inconsistency-war hypothesis on this level.²

The testing of the status inconsistency theory on the system level by Wallace and East, however, appeared to be an "innovation" in the sense that this had not been tried in sociology before. Wallace tested the theory on the international system level for a methodological reason, to avoid

¹Gochman (1976: 551) questioned Midlarsky's findings and formulation: "... because of the way in which the data are aggregated [each state's total number of war involvements is correlated with its mean status inconsistency score for the 75-year period], it is impossible to determine whether status inconsistency leads to war, war to status inconsistency, or, indeed, if they are temporally proximate."

²The differences in formulations (and in fact techniques of analysis, and indirectly, results) may have produced different "schools" of status research in international relations. We suggest this possibility in table 2.2.

Table 2.2

"SCHOOLS" OF STATUS INCONSISTENCY AND INTERNATIONAL STRATIFICATION RESEARCH

Theory	Alternate Concepts used	Principal Research Locations	Scholars Involved "Spiritus rector"	Theoretical Concerns	Main "Ideological" Concerns	System Focus (Foot)	Conceptualization	Data Sources	Methodology
I. Status Inconsistency	status discrepancy	University of Michigan	J.D. Singer M.D. Wallace M. East M. Mdlaarsky von Riekhoff Romagna	war (frequency, involvement, proneness, magnitude), and diplomatic importance	system stability, arms race, IO, IIO and IIMO	"Central" system, European and also global	Power (size), wealth, "status" or prestige	COV (Correlates of War), OS Naval Research	quantitative (bivariate, multivariate, regression, dependence, etc.)
II. Rank Theory	structural theory, rank disequilibrium	Scandinavia (Oslo), and also Latin America	J. Galtung E. Fossum G. Hernes Gleditsch Reintson Väyrynen Schwartzman Aranjo	"aggression," structural violence, rank-dependent inter-actions (East-West, media network, airlines, etc.)	disarmament, development, imperialism, "positive" peace	global system, also Latin America, Far and Near East	Power, wealth, prestige	multiple sources	quantitative (mostly bivariate; matrix analysis, also regression).
III. Status-Field	Relative-status, Model I, Model II	University of Hawaii	R.J. Ruesch Sang-Woo Rhee Chang-Yoon Choi Vincent et al. (Florida), Tomlin (Carleton)	all behavior (especially foreign conflict behavior)	implications for US foreign policy	global system, US-related dyads (US-China, US-USSR) and region (Africa)	Power and wealth (No prestige)	DON (Dimensionality of Nations) and other events data	quantitative (multivariate statistics; factor analysis; canonical and dependence).
IV. Eclectic "Schools"	Atlas	Latin America	O. Lagos	International stratification	international development	global and Latin America	Power, wealth and prestige	multiple	non-quantitative
	Stratification	Rutgers University	Horowitz	sociological analysis	international development	"Three Worlds" (US, USSR, Third World) global	Power, wealth and prestige	none to speak of	non-quantitative
	Rank divergence	England	Robertson Tudor, Mettlt	sociological analysis	modernization		Power and wealth (No prestige)	multiple	regression
	Status Disequilibrium	Switzerland, Latin America	P. Hantz Schwartzman Alschuler	sociological analysis, macro-systemic linkages	development	"macro-system" (global)	Power, Prestige	multiple	multivariate statistics
	Status discrepancy	Cornell University	Rosenance Alexandrov, Healy, Stein	quantitative diplomatic history	cooperation-conflict	European system	Power, "status"	SAP (Situational Analysis Project)	bivariate statistics

Blalock's identification problem, while East did so for a theoretical reason, mostly to avoid "the psychological assumptions" such as tensions, frustrations, and anger, commonly associated with the logic of status inconsistency theory. In so doing, however, they both failed to recognize the change in the theoretical structure. Whereas the status inconsistency hypothesis refers to a unit behavior (an individual or a group), the test of status inconsistency on the international level merely relates one systemic factor (the degree of status inconsistency) with another systemic factor (the amount of violence or war).¹ This formulation now sounds like what Galtung (1966) calls "the criss-cross hypothesis." As status inconsistency and criss-cross is the systemic derivative of the proliferation of the status inconsistent units in the system, the term "the degree of status inconsistency in the system" actually refers to the degree of criss-cross in the system. But the key word here is the number of status inconsistent units, not the amount based on the arithmetic (Wallace, 1971) or correlational (East, 1972) calculation of the status inconsistency scores. It is possible to have two systems with equal "degree of

¹This is also consistent with Morgan's observation when he stated that Wallace and East "don't try to test them" (i.e., the status inconsistency explanations). "They simply want to see if status discrepancy and war in the entire system seem to be related" (Morgan, 1972: 291). Ray (1973: 37) also maintained that "system level and national level analyses are not alternative ways of looking at the same question. They can be completely independent of one another, not just because the findings concerning variables on one level may not be reflected on another level, but because ideas which are tested on the two levels are clearly distinguishable."

status inconsistency" as operationalized by Wallace (1971: 27-28) but one based on larger number of units with small differences in rank scores and the other based on a small number of units with large differences in rank scores. The former system is the one that captures the essence of Lenski's (1954: 412) speculation of system-level instability based on the status inconsistency hypothesis on unit level, and not the latter, because Lenski stated that "a society with a relatively large proportion of persons whose status is poorly crystallized [i.e., a society with a large number of status inconsistencies in our terminology] is a society which is in unstable condition." Of course, it is possible that the two types of system (one based on the amount of status inconsistency as operationalized by Wallace, and the other based on the number of status inconsistent units in it) can overlap as might have been the case with either Wallace's or East's data. If this was the case, this means that the test of status inconsistency at the international level was truly "innovative" in the sense that it is important to know whether a status inconsistent unit will engage in aggression or whether a system which is full of this type of unit is capable of withstanding the aggregate and cumulative impact of their individual aggressions. Wallace's and East's studies, taken at face value, indicate that the system cannot: but this is contrary to the criss-cross hypothesis (not the concept!) which denies that individual aggressions have

additive and cumulative impact on the system. Even if they do, however, they tend to "knit the social system together" rather than tear it apart (Coser, 1956: 80).

Romagna (1977: 30) who was perplexed by his finding of strong correlation between status inconsistency and war on the systemic level but weak on the "actor level" suggested that the system level relationship could be dismissed as "spurious" and the concept of state as actor should be abandoned in favor of "opening up the black box" as a means of discovering the other variables (among them perception) as possible linkages between status inconsistency and war. Romagna's suggestion (i.e., dismissal of the system level test) is unwise in view of the importance of such a test. Furthermore, an actual test of the spuriousness problem had been carried out by Wallace (1972) himself and found no support. After controlling "alliance aggregation," "international organizations growth," and "armed forces expansion" in the international system, Wallace (1972: 62-63) found the "fear" of spuriousness "groundless" and the status inconsistency-war relationship "remains strong."

On the intuitive level, however, scholars have continued to agree and disagree, almost oblivious to the empirical results. Modelski (1971: 48) maintains that "it is not status inconsistency which explains war but rather the strains which a particular status system, one based upon war-making achievement, imposes upon the world at large."

Russett (1970: 91), taking the reverse position, suggests "that when an individual or nation ranks high on achievement of certain 'objective' values, but remains fairly low on deference values like affection and respect, the situation is very unstable, and the individual or nation may resort to violence in order to redress the imbalance." "The loss of prestige," suggested Etzioni (1962: 22), may lead to "intensive and widespread feelings of aggression." Wars of 1870, WW I, WW II, and even the Korean war, according to Midlarsky (1975: 106-109) all "exhibit the phenomenon of status inconsistency prior to the occurrence of conflict." Even on the Middle East, "no analysis would be complete or safe," maintained Dore (1975: 206), "if it did not take into account the status gap as well as the power gap between Israel and its Arab neighbors."

The lack of fit between intuitive explanations and the empirical results may not reflect a lack of communication among scholars but rather a reflection of the continuous intuitive appeal of the status inconsistency notion. There are many reasons for this, but as one "convert" puts it, "part of the excitement of working in this area [i.e., status inconsistency] is the way in which status inconsistency spills across the artificial boundaries of social psychology, political science, stratification, and even historical process" (Knoke, 1972: 25). It is for this and other reasons that status inconsistency is "intuitively more appealing" (Portes, 1972: 767).

Analytical Problems of Status Inconsistency

One of the most immediate effects of status inconsistency's great intuitive appeal is its proliferation. Since the notion of status inconsistency involves concepts like status, dimensions (of status), actors (who experience the status and its inconsistencies) and mobility (where the ranks of actors on this status and its dimensions tend to move up and down over time), one could conceivably construct a complex typology of status inconsistency based on these various components. Status inconsistency between so-called "achieved" and "ascribed" status is one example which immediately comes to mind as it is based on the simple difference of two different types of status levels, or two different types of status dimensions.

When the effect of the movement of the actors on any of these statuses and their dimensions is taken into account, one could have many more types of status inconsistency: upwardly mobile status inconsistency, downwardly mobile status inconsistency, and the "progressive" or ever-widening status inconsistency. On the basis of the speed of this movement, as suggested by von Riekhoff (1974: 16), one can have "creeping" status inconsistency (based on the gradual decrease or increase of ranks) and "sudden" inconsistency (based on the sudden drop or loss of status). In the international system, this sudden status inconsistency type may in fact be just as frequent as the creeping type as the

consequence of war (civil or inter-nation), secession (Pakistan), major economic crises (Britain), or a breakthrough in technology (China, India, with their nuclear explosions).

There is also the possibility that inconsistency may be a function of levels of analysis. This "cross-level" inconsistency was more common in the last decade when "The Lion of Judah" (Haile Selassie) was still roaming the African desert and "The Great Leader of the New Emerging Forces" (Sukarno) was presiding over "a nation of coolies and a coolie among nations" (terms quoted in Weinstein, 1976: 260). This "Chinese box" model of inconsistency (Galtung, 1966a) refers to a multi-step, whole-and-part cross-level-status inconsistency which involves leaders, nations, regions, continent, and the entire race. A perfectly consistent nation in this term would be a small and unknown nation, led by an obscure leader, part of a "dark" continent, and a member of the underdeveloped Third World.

The overwhelming number of status inconsistency types that can be formulated based simply on the components of this theory constitutes one of the problems of systematic research in this area.

The other lies in the nature of the relationship between status inconsistency and whatever the behavior stipulates. Although the theory has been presented as a "structural" theory (Galtung, 1964a), meaning that behavior can be accounted for directly from the positions of social units

in the social hierarchy, the empirical constraints can still be found both within the actor and within the system in which the social interaction takes place. Most analyses of status inconsistency have ignored these aspects of the theory, especially the "systems" aspect. This is due mainly to the failure to appreciate the "systemness" of status inconsistency theories, or the system theoretic nature of status theories in general (Young, 1969). The notion of status itself assumes the existence of a (social) system, whose (social) units are interdependent, ordered in a hierarchy, share a set of value assumptions, follow certain interaction patterns, which over time tend to stabilize. The term 'status' itself, in other words, is only relevant in a system context because the ranks of the (social) units are determined in a system-wide comparison (Sullivan, 1976: 177). The nature of the system, therefore, is an intervening variable which should be taken into account in testing the "if status inconsistency, then aggression" hypothesis. Galtung (1964a: 98) himself stipulated one such systemic condition when he stated that ". . . these extreme forms of aggression are unlikely to occur unless . . . the culture has some practice in violent aggression."

The other important component of values in terms of status inconsistency is the rules which determine the bases of stratification. If the system is essentially "ascriptive," for example, in the sense that important dimensions of

stratification are determined on the basis of status that one is born with (Galtung, 1966a), or "irreversible" (Foladare, 1969: 53), then the relevance of achievement is downplayed. In this type of system either the amount of status inconsistency will be down to the minimum (as mobility channels hardly exist) or if it is high, the equilibrium mechanisms will not be easily available as equilibration can only be accomplished through the ascriptive channel, which is, by definition, fixed and unchangeable. In a system where the achievement criteria are prevalent, the incidence of status inconsistency will tend to be high, but at the same time the equilibrium mechanisms will also tend to be readily available. The effect of status inconsistency in the two systems will therefore be substantially different.

The value assumption noted above is very closely related to the mobility characteristics of the system in the sense that a mobility-oriented system will also have achievement as one of its important stratification values. Status inconsistency occurs because the social units desire mobility and the system itself institutionalizes conditions of mobility as one of its essential structures. The degree of mobility, therefore, affects status inconsistency not only in a direct way as discussed earlier in the sense that it helps produce it (Hartman, 1974: 719; Bloombaum, 1964) but also indirectly by increasing the frustration of the status inconsistent if mobility is low and reducing it if mobility is high. The

higher the level of frustration, the more likely the aggression will be extreme.

The status inconsistency+aggression hypothesis is closely linked to the "frustration-aggression" hypothesis. Aggression is stipulated to occur because the social unit who has the inconsistent status profile senses his inconsistency as a spiritual and material deprivation based on the norms of justice or sense of fairplay and is inconvenienced in terms of the differential treatment he receives. All these can lead to stress and strain and he will try to resolve the inconsistency by accelerating his drive for equilibration. One of the mechanisms for equilibration is mobility but when he feels his attempt to move is blocked he will become frustrated. It is this frustration that leads to aggression. "This is where the minds of men enter," stated Galtung (1964a: 96) and "a theory of aggression should combine the idea of frustration with the idea of perceiving aggression as a possible way out of the frustrating situation" for "disequilibrium is a reservoir of initiative [of both positive and negative aggression] unless it is frustrated" (1964a: 114).

The tests of status inconsistency, both in sociology and international relations, rarely make this point explicit. Most of them posit not only a straight and direct linkage but also a causal relationship between status inconsistency and war (in international relations) or other behavior (in sociology). One of Geschwender's chief complaints against

status inconsistency literature, according to Alschuler (1973: 102), is that status inconsistency is being used as "a structural characteristic predicting behavioral consequences without an explicitly stated social-psychological theory of motivation to account for these predictions." Of course, the theory that was never made explicit was the Frustration-Aggression theory of Dollard et al. (1944) or Berkowitz (1962). The negligence runs in two directions: first, for failing to state the linkage between status inconsistency and frustration-aggression theory and, secondly, for assuming that every frustration always leads to aggression. Komarovsky (1973: 652) has in fact warned against "the danger of using a psychological assumption (frustration) in sociological analysis (frustration-aggression) without recognizing that frustration does not always lead to aggression." Frustration, in other words, could also lead to "resignation and retreat" (Komarovsky, 1973: 652), "withdrawal" (Berkowitz, in Davies, 1973: 245), "submission, dependence and avoidance" (Larsen, 1973: 13).

Galtung himself was certainly no less cognizant of this problem because he stated (1964a: 95) that "whatever the external conditions leading to aggression are, they probably have to pass through the minds of men and precipitate a perception with a high emotive content before they are acted out as aggression." None of the tests of status inconsistency in international relations thus far has dealt with this condition. East (1972) was aware of the psychological aspect of this

theory and decided to test it on the systemic level for that reason (i.e., the difficulty of operationalizing its psychological conditions). Tanter (1970: 8) was also aware of the importance of perception in general but his operationalization of it in terms of "systems types" was far from satisfactory.

But frustration has been operationalized in systemic terms. Two precedents exist in psychological studies, namely those of Hovland and Sears (1940) and Morse and Allport (1952) where social units' sense of frustration was implied from the condition of economic depression in the system. The possibility of the use of this approach had also been suggested by Berkowitz (1969: 6) himself and Yates (1962).

However, it is the study of the relative deprivation theory in comparative politics that has been able to take clues from the above psychological literature. As has already been stated, relative deprivation is a "sister theory" of status inconsistency and does have some psychological assumptions built in its theoretical structure. One of those is the stipulation of frustration. Feierabend and Feierabend (1966, 1972) estimated this "systemic frustration" by using economic development indicators (i.e., the ratio between the rate of social mobilization or social want formation and economic development or social want satisfaction). This approach would later be followed by Huntington (1968), Gurr (1970) and Terrel (1971). A different approach, undertaken by M. Haas (1968: 221-222) would operationalize the notion of

"system stress" and "system strain" by the use of straight indicators, i.e., "system stress" as measured by "unemployment and rate of industrialization" and "system strain" by "homicide, suicide and alcoholism."

The sources of error for such studies, however, are still far too numerous even if we know all the effects of the systemic constraints (i.e., system size, system types, system values, degree of mobility, the level and types of interaction and communication in the system), as the "within-actor constraints" (or the psychological environment) which these studies attempt to capture are still elusive. In fact the studies which used systemic indicators as measures of frustration failed to uncover any significant relationship between systemic frustration, i.e. stress and strain, with external aggression and conflict (M. Haas, 1968: 243; Feierabend and Feierabend, 1972: 137). We do not know why under a certain systemic condition a given type of status inconsistency is perceived by the social units as being frustrating or stressful even though "explanatory models" for this problem exist in the literature.

Galtung (1964a: 100) himself mentioned three reasons why we expect frustration and aggression to be high in the status inconsistent group: 1) the differential treatment already mentioned; 2) relative deprivation; 3) the principle of self-righteousness, that is, that "balanced rank" is a matter of right and justice. Rummel (in Hilton, 1973) also

offered three possible explanations for the linkage between status inconsistency and frustration and conflict: 1) status and distance as "social forces"; 2) cognitive dissonance (which "produces a strain" and "frustration"); 3) the uncertainty notion (which can produce "incongruent expectations," thus misperception and conflict). Galtung's "differential treatment" and "relative deprivation" are standard sociological explanations of unsatisfactory social relations while his "norms of justice" take into account the systemic value (norms) as perceived by the social units. Rummel's uncertainty notion is derived from the social-psychological explanation (Jackson, 1962) which attributes frustrating social relations to conflicting status cues (Homans, 1961: 249).¹ Rummel's "cognitive dissonance" is also psychological, derived from Festinger's (1957) famous work.

As can be seen, the mechanisms used to explain the frustration and aggression span the entire spectrum of "man-milieu" linkage.² The first cluster is the intra-personal

¹As explained by Hyman (1967: 395): "Homans hypothesizes that the simultaneous holding of high and low ranks creates doubt in others as to the reality and legitimacy of the individual's high rank. Homans calls this the lack of social 'certitude'. Also says Homans, we tend to feel a sense of uneasiness and embarrassment when we encounter a person whose ranks are inconsistent, since we do not know whether to approach him as one of relatively high or relatively low rank."

²For a good discussion on the various psychological explanations of status inconsistency, see Lachenmeyer (1968: 82-84).

psychological explanation in the sense that the individual himself cannot tolerate the inconsistency of his status. The emphasis here is in the inconsistency itself and the comparison made is of the intra-personal type: the individual compares one of his rank with another in situ and does not like the inconsistency he sees. This inconsistency is said to be tension-producing and the individual will try to reduce it, both in its causes and its consequences. This particular type of explanation is closely linked with Festinger's cognitive dissonance theory. The second cluster is social-psychological in origin. Status inconsistency produces frustration and tension because it interferes in the process of the establishment of the self-concept (Cooley, 1902; Mead, 1934). The differential stimuli due to the different levels of status produce an "unstable self-image." An unstable self-image has the effect of producing stress and strain. The whole status confusion (Jackson, 1962) and uncertainty notions fall within this cluster. The third cluster is sociological in the sense that the frustration experienced by the individual is not just a function of his own survey of his rank but the result of his encounter with one or two "relevant others" or in joining a group. He stakes his claim to a membership (e.g., a social club) on the basis of his high ranks but he is treated or "mistreated," whatever the case may be, on the basis of his lower ranks. This "differential treatment" (or differential mistreatment, for that matter)

which he receives is stressful and socially frustrating (Galtung, 1964a). The fourth cluster is systemic in the sense that the source of stress and strain comes from the fact that the values and norms prevailing in the system at large fail to apply, or are seen as failing to apply to the status inconsistent individuals. This is the basis of the explanations which stipulate "the norms of justice" (Galtung, 1969: 75), "expectancy congruence" (Sampson, 1969), "distributive justice" (Homans, 1961), or "equity theory" (Adams, 1965).

In real life we can expect some interplay among these explanatory models, which explains why it is so difficult to predict precisely the route that status inconsistency-aggression linkage is going to take. There is no doubt, however, that unless we are clear about the type of inconsistency we have defined, the systemic constraints we have identified, and the psycho-sociological explanatory models we have assumed to operate to account for the feeling of frustration, we cannot fully construct an empirical model of status inconsistency. A model which relies solely or largely on "cognitive dissonance" as the psychological mechanism to account for frustration must come to terms with the role of perception in the internalization of status inconsistency. A model of status inconsistency which relies on the sociological mechanism (i.e., the "differential treatment" notion) to account for the source of frustration, on the other hand,

perhaps can downplay the role of perception in the model because we can expect the inconsistency of status positions and the effects on the unit's social life to be strong enough by themselves to "force a correspondence between his objective situation and his subjective perception of it," as Galtung put it (1964a: 99). It cannot, however, ignore the system size, the level of social interaction, and the degree of social units' participation in the system. The system size must be "small" enough so that the inconsistent units cannot opt for isolation (in which case the effect of the "differential treatment" disappears) and the level of interaction is high and random enough to sharpen the effect of such differential treatment. Social units that interact together and participate in the same activities are more likely to experience all the psychological and sociological effects of status inconsistency than those that do not because it is within these social contexts that a "social comparison process," rank comparison and differential treatment syndrome are likely to place. If at the same time we have carefully chosen a set of status dimensions that are both salient and visible (e.g., race and occupation which Lenski [1954] included in his original study) to base our status inconsistency on, then the social unit can be expected to be forced to perceive his predicament at all levels and in all directions. It is for this reason that Galtung confidently claimed his theory to be a "structural theory" in spite of his keen awareness of the role of

psychological constraints, especially perception, or that Lenski (1954) in his original piece could ignore perceptual data.

Most tests of status inconsistency both in sociology and in international relations, especially the latter, have chosen to draw a direct empirical linkage between status inconsistency and behavior without realizing the importance of coordinating the choice of the inconsistency type, the explanatory model, the systemic components and the psychological constraints expected to work in the theory.

In our empirical study, however, a serious effort will be made to deal with these key linkage problems.

CHAPTER 3

STATUS POLITICS AND STRATIFICATION IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

World Community

The relevance of status politics in the international system is predicated on the idea that the international system itself is beginning, if not has already begun, to resemble domestic societies in most of its important structures, institutions and rules. That this is thought to be true can be seen by the prevalence of the use of society-specific concepts such as "community" (Mazrui, 1976), "society" (Alger, 1963), "social system" (Ogburn and Nimkoff, 1958: 525; Väyrynen, 1971: 100) and "social-political system" (McGowan and O'Leary, 1971: 2) to express the world of nations. The use of these concepts have become acceptable because, in part, there has been "a remarkable concurrence of the ideology of economic development and interdependence" (W. Moore, 1966: 481) and a steady growth of so-called "international regimes" (Keohane and Nye, 1977: 5) in the international system. These and other developments have led many to refine their terms even further: McLuhan (McLuhan and Fiore, 1968) called the international system a "global village"; Brzezinski (1970) called it the "global city." Whatever the images may be,

Luard (1976: 52) modestly stated that the international system is indeed "not so dissimilar to smaller societies" that sociologists have examined.

But to say that the international system at this point exhibits elements of both community and society is "banal," according to Inkeles (1975: 467). The spatial interdependence, the "international division of labor" (Mazrui, 1976: 292; Galtung, 1971), the declining time-space distances, the exponential growth of channels of communication and their users (both in the physical and symbolic sense) all point to the validity of the concept "community" to describe the international system. The consensual ideal of development, the value ideal of equal sharing (though not yet in reality), the concern for collective survival, Quality of Life, the environment and the eco-system all testify to the growing sense of "societalness" of the international system. According to Parsons (1961: 129), "a genuine consensus at a certain level of values" exists in the international system.¹ Mazrui (1974: 43) in fact suggests that "a shared culture has already emerged on a world scale." What he calls "pieces of world culture" exists: international law, the Bible, computer technology, the plays of William Shakespeare, the symphonies of Ludwig van Beethoven, and the modern school

¹For a less enthusiastic and contrary argument see Lampert, Falkowski and Mansbach (1978).

(Mazrui, 1974: 43). To these perhaps we may add the airline and its airports, Xerox and Muzak. To balance the too Westernized features suggested by Mazrui, we might also mention Bermuda shorts, safari jackets, batik patterns, Transcendental Meditation and so on. On the more serious side, however, are the growing numbers and frequency of contacts among nations through the various international governmental and non-governmental organizations (and conferences) which, according to Alger and Brams (1967: 662), provide far more contacts than the bilateral and traditional diplomatic ties. That both of these organizations and the conferences they organize have grown lately in exponential terms testifies to their growing importance. Walbek (1973: 1) in fact considered the growth of international organizations as the "most dynamic element of international political culture." He (1973: 5) maintains that "international political culture" exists in the international system and points to "international laws, treaties, agreements, diplomatic practice, public debate and parliamentary diplomacy" as some of its more important institutional features.

These institutions have provided not only the infrastructural bases of participation and contact in the international system but also the psychological bases for a personal identification with both one's country and a world society. The two sentiments, of course, need not be mutually exclusive. Gustave Lagos (1975: 71), who revealed a strong

identification with his country's atomic status was also the first scholar to develop a keen appreciation of the stratification nature of the international system, and this feeling was developed, as he claimed, through his participation in "international meetings and negotiations."

The growing "societalness" of the international system, however, is far from the degree of "societalness" found in domestic societies especially when the "normative and consensual phases of group existence" (Wirth, 1968: 16) are considered. There is no doubt that the degree of its evolution has reached a level that warrants societal analysis. This evolution has been long in the making, much longer than the interdependence "school" would have us believe. The idea itself has been discussed in the literature of international relations for a long time, starting with the debate between "global society" and "international anarchy" paradigms so well chronicled by Lijphart (1974), followed by the various debates over the years on the "demise of the territorial state" (Hertz, 1961), linkage politics (Rosenau, 1969), the "sovereignty at bay" (Vernon, 1971), the growth of non-territorial actors and the transnational politics model (Nye and Keohane, 1972). Wilbert Moore (1966: 481) in fact maintained that treating the world as a singular system is "one of the oldest themes in Sociology" which, according to Moore, began with Sorokin and others. The idea of the international system as a society, thus deserving societal analysis, is an idea whose time came a long time ago.

Horowitz (1972: IX), who analyzed the international system in terms of "the sociology of three worlds" (US, USSR, and the Third World) justified his societal analysis because "three worlds are no less than three persons." Parsons once suggested that the international system can be viewed as a "two-party political system in embryo, with the non-aligned nations as voters" (in Nettl and Robertson, 1968: 142).

Nye (1973) in fact already called UNCTAD as "the poor nations' pressure group." Nettl and Robertson (1968: 161) themselves analyzed the entire process of modernization in the international system in terms of a "stratification model" because, as they argued, most aspects of national system are also present in the international system and warrant the same kind of analysis: the UN and UNESCO can be viewed as "agents of socialization" into the system; the international law and diplomacy as a set of complex symbols, concepts and methods to govern the international interaction; industrialization as the shared value being pursued; "revolution of rising expectation" as a "cultural phenomenon"; and the religious "cleavage" (Christian-Non-Christian), the ideological "cleavage" (East-West) as some of the elements of the social structure.

Other structural elements, such as "social classes" and other "factional groups," also exist in the international system. Myrdal (1957: 3-4) in fact used the terms "economic upper-class of nations," "lower class" and even "middle class"

in describing the rich and the poor nations of the world. These economic "classes" of nations also tend to exhibit structural and interaction characteristics of their societal counterparts. The "upper-class of nations," for example, interact closely together in the manner consistent to what Galtung (1968b) described as the "Iron Law of Social Interaction": movement of goods and services are highest among themselves; consultation is most often among members of the Group of 10; they belong to such exclusive "clubs" as OECD, EEC, NATO, Atlantic Triangle, Group of Six, Seven, Ten, Comecon etc. These clubs are the suburban and country-club equivalents in the international system. These groups of "upper-class nations," like their societal counterparts, even have their own favorite charitable organizations dispensing foreign aids (AID, SIDA, CIDA, ODA and so on) not unlike the Salvation Army of the international system.

Even a semblance of "class consciousness" and a form of "class struggle" are slowly developing in the international system. If the upper-class nations have grouped themselves for a long time, the lower-class nations too are beginning to do so. To counter the Group of Nine or Ten, the poor nations have established their own "Group of 77" to deal effectively with the MNCs, the business arms of the upper-class nations; they have established their own "producers cartels" of which OPEC is one of them. In fact, "a trade union of the poor nations" is already past the talking stage

(Nyerere, 1972: 7). Of course, the slowness of the growth of "class consciousness" of the poor nations is also consistent to similar developments on the societal level, where the class consciousness of the "ruling class" or the "bourgeoisie" arrived long before the "proletariat" reached the same point. If the class consciousness of the proletariat finally arrived as a result of some structural changes in the society (e.g., the end of enclosure in England which released the peasants from the bondage of their feudal lords, drove them to the urban centers, and brought them into contact with one another for the first time), the continuing shrinkage of the global system through increased tempo of the communication revolution will probably bring the same consciousness to the poor nations as this would increase not only the solidarity but also the process of "invidious comparison" (Horowitz, 1972: 20), (It is in this sense that the increased global communication and its consequential expansion of mutual knowledge and reduced distance has been called the "most important and fateful fact in the world today"; Patel, 1964: 119).

Fateful because this development and others mentioned earlier will either change the world into a society with "class antagonism," "class struggle" and increasing stratification, or a community with an "emerging structure" (Inkeles, 1975) and a growing interdependence of interests and goals.

International Stratification

Although the community features of the international system are salient, the stratification features are no less visible. The international system, being both a system of nations and a system of individual human beings can be expected to be both "hierarchicus" (Dumont, 1970) and stratified.

Not only that the international system is hierarchical but there are indications that the characteristics of the international system hierarchy do not seem to depart very much from those of other systems. According to Mazur (1973: 513), status orders in established human groups typically have seven common characteristics: 1) consistent ranking of power, influence and prerogatives; 2) stress symptoms exhibited by low-ranking members; 3) tendency to act with near-peers; 4) high-ranked members participate more; 5) high-ranked members perform service and control functions; 6) rank is based, in part, on "external" attributes; 7) status rank usually established and maintained without physical fights or overt gestures of threat or submission. (These characteristics have also been found in chickens, primates; tree shrew, lemur, squirrel monkey, baboon and macaque, chimp and gorilla.) The international system hierarchy appears to share most of these attributes.

Empirical studies exist to substantiate the close parallels between all the systems mentioned and the international system hierarchy. The international system has a

Table 3.1
Mazur's Status Behaviour Progression along the Primate Series
(with Status Behaviour of Nations added)

Status characteristics	Chicken	Primates					Nations
		Tree Shrew	Lemur	Squirrel Monkey	Baboon & Macaque	Chimp & Gorilla	Man
1. Consistent ranking of power, influence and prerogative	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
2. Stress symptoms in low-ranked members	yes	yes (also in high-ranked)	?	?	yes	?	yes
3. Tendency to interact with near-peers	doubtful	doubtful	?	yes	baboon: ? macaque: yes	perhaps	yes
4. High-ranked members participate more	no	perhaps	?	perhaps	yes	chimp: perhaps gorilla: yes	yes
5. High-ranked members perform service and control functions	no	doubtful	doubtful	perhaps	yes	yes	yes yes
6. Rank based on "external" attributes	no	?	?	?	baboon: ? macaque: yes	?	mixed
7. Status gestures	overt threats; physical attacks	overt threats; physical attacks	overt threats; physical attacks	overt gestures; physical attacks; little observable deference	overt gestures; occasional physical attacks; observable deference	subtle gestures; usually non-agonistic; deference & high tolerance	subtle gestures; usually non-agonistic; deference & high tolerance

* "showing the flag," "gunboat diplomacy," "ultimatum," etc.

** wars and other armed confrontation.

*** diplomatic protest and break-down, intervention, etc.

consistent ranking of power, influence and prerogatives (Bernstein and Weldon, 1968); stress symptoms tend to be exhibited by low-ranking nations (Feierabend and Feierabend, 1966, 1972; Gurr, 1970); most interactions in the international system are between nations of similar ranks (Galtung, 1964a, 1966b; Galtung and Ruge, 1965; Reinton, 1967; Kegley and Wittkopf, 1976); high-ranked nations participate more (East, 1969); high-ranked nations also perform service and control functions (this system is in fact institutionalized in the UN, with the Security Council arrangement); rank attributes in the international system are based on both "internal" and "external" characteristics (Midlarsky, 1975: 187; Korany, 1976: 101). Only in the case of the seventh characteristic can we not say for sure that the international system is identical to other hierarchies across species because status-rank is usually established and maintained with physical fights and overt gestures of threat and submissions. This last point makes the international system a "biataxic" society¹ because not only is the distribution of the desirables, such as power, wealth and prestige, determined by violence or the threats thereof,² but also the "culture of violence" still exists.

¹The term "biataxy" has been borrowed from Andreski (1954).

²The word "violence" here is perhaps more applicable to Galtung's (1970b) "structural violence" than to the other types of violence.

In general, we are struck by the stability and widespread nature of the international system hierarchy. The stability of this "greasy pole of nations" or "Jacob's ladder" as Small (1977: 28) and Spiegel (1972: 20) respectively called it and the widespread nature, i.e., the extent of this hierarchy and how it replicates itself in all forms of international interaction, has been a subject of continuous fascination, especially by Scandinavian peace researchers.

The evidence is not only that the international system is hierarchical but that even its regional systems seem to replicate this rank-order (Reinton, 1967; Galtung et al., 1972; Zimmerman, 1972). Most organizations to which nations belong (IOs), whether of the IGO, INGO or transnational varieties, are not only stratified but apparently have also become more so in recent years (Väyrynen, 1970: 297, 305). It is in this sense that Bernstein and Weldon (1968: 173) concluded that the international system not only had a definite hierarchical structure but that the international system "ranks at the top of a hierarchy of systems." As such, all social hierarchies tend to reinforce one another. "There is some evidence," maintained Väyrynen (1971: 93), "indicating that inter-nation interaction tends to be cumulative, i.e. exogeneous, objective ranks measured by different interaction variables tend to give the same ordering of nations." In terms of the influence structure, the nature of the international system is "highly stratified" (Kegley and

Wittkopf, 1976: 291). Information flows too (both globally and regionally) are "hierarchical in nature" (Sigler, 1969: 385). Nations are even stratified on the basis of scientific productivity (as measured by the number of Nobel laureates; Cole and Cole, 1973: 45).

The pervasive nature of rank in human systems is precisely the reason why the study of stratification in and of the international system has slowly been gaining ground. Two current foci of empirical research, according to Doran (1975: 211), are the nature and dimensions of regional politics and hierarchical relations among states. Spiegel (1972: 250) argued that "the key measure of the future direction of international politics will be the manner in which the present complex international hierarchies evolve."

Scholars who have studied the various aspects of the international stratification are convinced that "rank [and rank difference] of nations are much more powerful variables in the explanation of the amount and nature of interaction than e.g. governmental structure, social and political similarities or attitudes" (Väyrynen, 1971: 94). "Hierarchy is important in the present period," agreed Spiegel (1972: 16) and "it is the position of each state in the international hierarchy which determines in large measure the way in which it acts and the way in which it is treated by other governments" (Spiegel, 1972: 40). Weede (1977: 77) suggested that this logic extends even to behavior involving "military

allocation decisions and ratios." "Social rank," concluded Larsen (1973: 6), "is the root cause of most conflict within and between nations."

While we do not go all the way with Larsen, we have shown that indeed stratification in and of the international system is pervasive and cumulative. It corresponds to the degree and extent of stratification in other systems, both humans and non-humans in nearly every aspect, and tends to replicate itself both within and across systems. The emphasis here is on "tends to" because in some other areas (which have not been empirically established) the correlation may not be perfect. In other words, in spite of the evidence cited here, the extent of the cumulativeness of the international stratification still remains to be studied empirically.

Dimensions of International Stratification

In the previous section, given the limited objective of merely trying to show the extent and the degree of stratification in and of the international system, the terms "hierarchy" and "stratification" were used interchangeably. In this section the term "stratification" will be defined more specifically and its dimensions in the international system will be elaborated.

Though hierarchy and stratification have been used interchangeably in many places in the literature, there is a difference, which is by no means slight. A hierarchy is a system of rank-ordering in the sense that some social

units are defined as being higher or lower than the others because these social units have more or less of the values intersubjectively regarded as desirable. In a social system where height is regarded as desirable, the hierarchy will rank the population according to this height, with the tallest being at the very top of the rank. But if these social units with varying heights are also rewarded by the system either with wealth or prestige on the basis of this height, the system is not only hierarchical but also stratified. Stratification, in other words, entails "unequal rewards accorded to functionally differentiated positions" (Moore, 1969: 287).¹

We speak of a society being socially stratified when the

¹The perspective is "functionalist" in the sense that it comes from the famous but controversial position espoused by Davis and Moore in 1945. However, we do not maintain that the differential reward is necessary consequence of "functionally differentiated positions" or that differential reward is necessary because these "functionally differentiated positions" vary in their "functional importance" and "difficulty" and therefore differential rewards must be used to fill them up. We feel, as does Rueschmeyer (1977: 5) that all these occur as a function of "power struggle, control and domination." This is especially true for the stratification in the international system (Rueschmeyer, 1977: 5), where the occupation of the differential positions is not functionally originated in the sense that it is based on the criteria of efficient task-performance or other needs of division of labor. The division of labor in the international system does not serve the criteria of efficient task-performance or positive integration but it serves as the instrument of control and domination. The division of labor in the international system is a "hierarchical division of labor" according to Mazrui (1976: 292) because "the developing countries are being sentenced to a life of primary goods production indefinitely while the Western hemisphere is industrialized and diversified."

hierarchy of social positions corresponds with the hierarchy of social rewards. It is in this sense that stratification of any kind is regarded as a source of exploitation (Galtung, 1964a: 97) or synonymous with social inequality (Tumin, 1967: 12). Hierarchy itself is not necessarily "evil" because theoretically at least it is possible to have a hierarchy which is not "functionally rewarded" at the same time.¹ The fact that hierarchy is ubiquitous perhaps means that it would be difficult if not impossible to eliminate (because of the possibility of it being the "evolutionary biogrammar" of social organizations), but stratification perhaps can be eliminated.²

¹One is of course reminded here of the theoretical possibility of establishing a system promised by Marx where "to each according to his needs and from each according to his ability." In this system, the hierarchy of ability does not correlate with the hierarchy of rewards; though the system is hierarchical, it is not stratified.

²To summarize the differences again: in the popular use a distinction is not usually made between hierarchy and stratification. A dictionary (The American Heritage, N.Y., Dell, 1970), e.g., defines hierarchy as "a body of entities arranged in a graded series, according to rank" while stratification as "formation of strata." Stratum itself was defined as "level in a hierarchy." While this use is consistent to the use here for hierarchy, for stratification, it is not. In the use above the term stratification is distinguished from hierarchy only by the fact that the units in a hierarchy are arranged in terms of gradation while those in a stratification in terms of strata, levels or layers. Except for the absence of the idea of inequality in this use, it is by no means unadopted in some sociological literature. What is also important to focus here in terms of status politics is the term strata itself, which is the root of the term stratification. The dictionary use above is somewhat accurate in the sense that a stratum is a level in a hierarchy, consisting of units with similar level of "power, wealth, and prestige."

The international system is both hierarchical and stratified at the same time. Its hierarchy, according to Wallace (1973: 4) resembles "the pecking order amongst chickens in a barnyard." Given the "anarchy, wars, the struggle for power" or the overall "culture of violence" in the maintenance of this hierarchy, the system looks more like what Svalastoga (1965: 8) called "a predatory rank order," because the top ranks are the ones possessing the greatest kill-ratio. Its stratification too, though not absolute, virtually guarantees that "the rich get richer and the poor get poorer."

The existence of rich and poor nations in the system of international stratification indicates that wealth, as in most other social stratification, is also one of its major dimensions. "Economic development would easily win approval as a relevant criterion by which to grade nations" (Barbera, 1973b: 15). The importance of this dimension has also been pointed out by many who have examined the various aspects of the international stratification (Vasquez, 1976: 180; Shin, 1969: 948; Vincent, 1968: 927). This consensus in fact spills into the international system as a whole. "There is . . . a rough consensus on the criteria which determine rank, and these criteria include not only power . . . and conspicuous wealth but also . . . prestige" (Dore, 1975: 202). This consensus, according to Orban (1972: 11) is not just "rough" but "comparatively well-founded" because "the archives of all

[international] system members are crammed full of reports of diplomats, military, and naval attaches, and even journalists on the power and status of states" (Small, 1977: 32). Diplomats, military attaches, and other trained observers, according to Schroeder (1977b: 74) seem to display "a rather remarkable consensus on what the status and reputation of the various powers were at different times." One reason for this is that "a major characteristic of the contemporary international system is the tendency for national elites to focus on a fairly wide range of sociocultural characteristics of other national societies, rather than simply on their 'power-attributes'" (Robertson and Tudor, 1968: 52).

These "sociological characteristics," according to Dore (1975: 202) are formed by "even peripheral members" of the international community, and "there is a consensus . . . concerning which are top-rank nations and which are lower-rank nations." This is so because "most rank indicators are computed and supplied by governments themselves" (Morgan, 1972: 177).

Empirical and experimental studies on the status of nations corroborate most of these observations. Most of these studies produced "quite high positive correlations between objective and subjective statuses of nations" (Väyrynen, 1971: 94). Shinn (1969: 945), in an experiment using students discovered that "the perception of power and

the objective measures of power (size of nations, level of development and percentage of national resources dedicated to the military) are very close." Saaty and Khouja (1976: 41), using "expert judgement to devise a scale of world influence," concluded that a close correspondence was obtained between "judgemental outcome of economic and military strength with the real figures" (GNP, trade and military expenditure). Galtung et al. (1972: 94) also obtained a correlation of .93 between "the subjective image of stratification in Latin America" and the objective index of stratification (involving wealth, size, social structure and race). In a similar study by Alcock and Newcombe (1970: 339), almost the same level of correlation was obtained (r of .85) between "rank of nations based on GNP and rank-order of nations based on the perception of power." The relevance of these rank variables (size, wealth, GNP, military and so on) is not unrelated to the perception of them (Araujo, 1968: 47). From research on the subject (international stratification), according to Eide (1970: 15), "people do, consciously or unconsciously, rank their own and other countries according to what may roughly be called their level of civilization." One of the relevant criteria cited by Eide was size or power.¹

¹There are also incidences and anecdotes to chronicle the existence, the relevance and the accuracy of the perception of ranks among nations and their representatives. Gleditsch (1970: 20) stated: "An argument which applies to nations more than to individuals is that with the improvement of international statistics, national decision-makers become

Galtung et al. (1972: 92) also regarded "size, wealth, social structure and race" as important dimensions of international stratification. He later collapsed these into what he suggested as being "the important ones," i.e., size (power) and development (Galtung et al., 1972: 93). These two dimensions, power (as measured by GNP total) and development (as measured by energy consumption per capita) are also those which Rummel (1972a: 101) suggested as the "important status dimensions." In general, these two dimensions are recognized by many others as well (Schwartzman et al., 1966; Reinton, 1969).

increasingly aware of their own nation's exact position in the distribution on the rank variables (emphasis original). An example: Japan was reported to have used an argument in its trade negotiations with the United States in the early 1969 that 'we are only number 19 in GNP per capita' (hence we still need protective trade barriers). Presumably, the US negotiators had just pointed out that Japan was just overtaking West Germany to become number three in GNP." This kind of exact placing of one's country's position in the international hierarchy is not strictly limited to "decision-makers" but also to ordinary journalists. Peter Cook (1976: 9) reported in the Citizen that Canada had just overtaken the UK and Italy in GNP total and its rank had just moved from 7th to 5th and that this is "having an impact on this country's status in the world economy." The full quotation may be in order here: "The rise of the Canadian economy from seventh to fifth in the western world may not mean much to most of us (though the Japanese made much of their elevation into second place a few years ago). But in the international arena, it would give Canada considerably more clout." He then continued: "France next! After catching Italy and Britain the next economy in line would be that of France." (Note: Japan's preoccupation with rank as reported by Gleditsch above is confirmed by Cook and the importance of GNP total as the summary index of national power is substantiated here as well. Also, still in Canada, when Levesque was asked by De Borchgrave in an interview in Newsweek (December 5, 1977: 55), if Quebec would be viable if independent, Levesque answered: "More so than the majority of the UN members. In terms of GNP, Quebec would rank 23rd in the world. In per capita income, number 11." (Also note the importance of the GNP as a summary measure of "viability," thus power and development!)).

Although East (1973: 564) identified both size (power) and development, he believed size was the more important. This is also consistent with Spiegel's (1972: 93-94) idea that power is the important dimension of international stratification while economic and political development are assumed to be closely related to power. Orban (1972: 11), however, contrary to Rummel, who ignored the prestige dimension, believed that power and prestige are the two dimensions into which other dimensions (educational level, urbanization, income per capita, industrialization, military power and population) are reducible. Russett (1970: 90), borrowing from Lasswell's "value-inventory," identified these dimensions as: 1) wealth, 2) enlightenment, 3) well-being, 4) skill, 5) Power, 6) Respect, 7) Rectitude, 8) Affection. One to 4 correspond to Development, 5 to Power, and 6 to 8 to Prestige. Still more broadly defined are those dimensions identified by Eide (1970: 15), where "the relevant criteria of rank of nations" are "size and power, political maturity and efficiency, education and science, and material civilization in general." Väyrynen (1971: 101) presented "level of socio-economic development, military capability, and prestige" as the "three criteria that determine the actors' positions in the international system." Lastly, as a result of an experimental study, Wish, Deutsch and Biener (1970: 371) concluded that "political alignment and ideology, economic development, geography and population, and culture and race"

are the "underlying dimensions used to characterize nations." They claimed that these dimensions were the same or parallel to those identified by Sawyer (1967) and Rummel (1967, 1969).

Of all the dimensions mentioned, Power, Development, and Prestige appear as the most commonly cited ones. Power and Development are mentioned in every instance while Prestige was suggested often enough to accept its importance as well. Furthermore, the choice of Power, Development, and Prestige is also consistent with the established dimensions of power, wealth and prestige identified in previous societal analyses of social stratification (Bendix and Lipset, 1966).

In the next three sections, the specific definitions, measurements, precedents, rationales, and validities of the three dimensions of international stratification will be discussed at length.

Power

"Attempts to measure the power of nations, individually or in groups, are exceedingly difficult and inexact whatever approach is used" (Cline, 1975: 5). Russett (1970: 93) states that the definition of power "has not been solved either analytically or empirically." Students of power are divided in their sense of optimism or pessimism about the definition and measurement of power. Some would argue that "it cannot really be measured effectively" (Sullivan, 1976: 177) while others would say it is simply "undefinable" (Rosecrance et al., 1974: 11). According to Hoffmann (1975a:

183), "almost everyone agrees with Raymond Aron that power is not quantifiable" and its perception can be "misleading" and "fleeting" (1975a: 184). In spite of this sense of pessimism, "statistical data about something called power have . . . become commonplace in quantitative studies of international politics" (Goldmann, 1977: 11). "Virtually everything may function as 'power base elements' for at least one actor to at least some extent in relation to at least one other actor and under at least some circumstances" (Goldmann, 1977: 10). "Lists of elements of power could go on forever" (Sullivan, 1976: 159).

In an examination of the "features of power," Robert Dahl (1968: 406) uncovered at least seven ways power has been used: 1) power as attribute, not relation; 2) power as magnitude; 3) power as relative; 4) power as potential (to act); 5) power to pursue goals, not to control the system; 6) power as resources (and not "causes"); and 7) power as having it, not exercising it. Power as "relation" and not as a single property is commonly associated with Lasswell and Kaplan (1950: 75), and should be analyzed primarily as it is exercised, rather than as an attribute (Midlarsky, 1975; 1974: 397). Power as a means and power as putative as opposed to actualized power is attributed to Knorr (1975: 9). Of course, there is also power as probability of influencing the other actor (Weberian, in Dahl, 1968: 406), or of ability to increase disorder elsewhere in the system (Deutsch, 1966: 110-120).

Denis Sullivan (1963), who examined the use of the concept of power in international relations literature, found at least seventeen definitions of power (in Alcock and Newcombe, 1970: 335). Considerably more have come into existence in recent years, and this is not only due to individual differences in orientation but also due to the perception that the basis of power itself in the international system has changed in light of the oil and food crises.¹ One definition of power that has been offered strictly on the basis of this claim is Brucan's (1975: 63) "new type of power" called "systemic power" which he defined as the ability to affect the system and to cause disturbances in that system: for example, oil. This "new type of power" reduces the "relative weight of military power" in favor of "the economic, technological and politico-diplomatic components." Though this definition is claimed to be power in relational terms, it is defined only in relation to the system as a whole, not vis-à-vis another actor.

Of course this is not new. Deutsch's conception of power in cybernetic and probabilistic terms is also a

¹Recognition of this fact has led at least one journal to dedicate the entire issue on the topic of power--again: see Foreign Affairs 56, 1 (October 1977). Also see International Journal 30 (Spring 1975), where several noted scholars reanalyzed "modern power." Responding to the various crises in the international system lately and the growing interdependence among nations, Hart (1976: 289), like Brucan (1975), also claimed that his conception of power as "control over events" is "the best approach to the measurement of power in contemporary international politics."

definition of power vis-à-vis another system or the system as a whole, i.e., the probability of a system maintaining its own low entropy (coherence, order) by introducing high entropy (incoherence, disorder) elsewhere (1966: 110-120). This idea was adopted and adapted by Midlarsky (1974: 398; 1975: 16) when he conceptualized power also in probabilistic terms and defined it as the ability to effect a reduction of environmental uncertainty and the exercise of it as the actual reduction of that uncertainty. Brucan's conception is only different vis-à-vis the other relational idea of power where it is defined specifically as "the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his will despite resistance" (Dahl, 1968: 406). In its "simplest definition" (Hoffmann, 1975a: 188), "A's power is the ability of A to make B do something B would have preferred not to do or to make B do something B was hesitating to do or to stop B from doing something B would otherwise have done." Applied to the international arena, such power can be defined "simply as the ability of the government of one state to cause the government of another state to do something which the latter otherwise would not choose to do--whether by persuasion, coercion, or outright military force" (Cline, 1975: 8). Power in this sense refers to "those factors that enable one entity to threaten sanctions vis-à-vis another" (Ferris, 1973: 6) or "to influence the behavior of other nations" (Organski, 1968a: 416; Brown, 1973: 288).

But Brown (1973: 289), though agreeing with Organski's version of power, also generalized about power as "the overall store of influence." This is somewhat consistent with Simon's (1968) power as "resource" or "influence base." These conceptualizations of power differ from the relational notion of power in the sense that they do not specify the power-targets. Power in this sense is often referred to as "power as capability"--capability to wage war or the ability to coerce (Cline, 1975: 8), capacity to act (East and Winters, 1976: 366), or "as something that an actor can hope to bring into play in a range of future situations" (Knorr, 1973: 14), which are unspecified. As a whole, this type of power is "an aggregate of political resources" (Cox and Jacobson, 1973: 4), "a gross national strength" (German, 1960), "gross attributes of power" (Sullivan, 1976: 160), or "the IQ of the state" (Spiegel, 1972: 40). Power in this sense is neither "influence" nor "force" but "the mean" between the two (Schwarzenberger, 1970: 6).

The distinction between power in relational terms and power as capability, though widely practised, is not quite warranted, at least not if the two uses are assumed to be mutually exclusive. The separation of the two uses is a false dichotomy because every concept, in the final analysis, is relational, or better, comparative, in the sense that its existence and its meaning is established only in relation to other things (concepts, actors, environment, or specific

situation). Defining power in terms of quantity instead of relation, however, has the advantage of being usable in more than one occasion. If power is defined as a relation, on the other hand, it becomes synonymous with "outcome," thus renders it "useless" in explaining the outcome itself (Shinn, 1969: 938). "As Blalock has noted, had physicists adopted a definition of power in terms of a relation peculiar to a particular situation, the term would have lost all value as a scientific concept, for generalization would have become impossible" (Shinn, 1969: 938).

Opting for a definition of power as a quantity, however, also has its problems: identifying the relevant "power bases" and weighing their worths is not easy, especially in the absence of a relevant "power theory."

These problems notwithstanding, international relations scholars have not been discouraged from identifying the relevant power bases. Organski (1968a: 416) suggested that "economic development, population size, social mobility and political mobilization" are the "major determinants of national power." Russett (1970: 93) listed "population, GNP, energy consumption, central government's expenditures and revenues, military expenditures and military personnel" as the relevant indicators. Spiegel (1972: 40) adopted a list that apart from "will as motivational power" looks like a combination of Organski's and Russett's (capacity as material power, force as military power, plus achievement and potential). A study

of power by Fucks (1965) also used a three-dimensional index of power based on population, steel and energy production (in Morgenstern et al., 1973: 30). Cline (1975: 11) advanced a formula of national power called "power macrometrics" or $P_p = (C+E+M) \times (S \times W)$ which is based on perceived power (Pp), critical mass (C) which is population plus territory, economic capability (E), military capability (M), strategic purpose (S) and will to pursue national strategy (W). This additive and multiplicative model of national power competes with Shinn's (1969: 947) claim that a "multiplicative model of power" based on population, GNP and military strength or $P = (Pop)(GNP)(Milt)$ is much "better" than the additive model, $P = Pop + GNP + Milt$.¹ Saaty and Khouja (1976: 42-45), who used computer models to arrive at "an index of world influence," claimed that "human resources, wealth, trade, technology and military strength" are relevant, and of these, power based on military strength is most "influential." Rosecrance et al., (1974: 11) who tested the various existing "power theories" used, unabashedly, twenty-five variables ranging from

¹In spite of the difficulty with identifying and weighting the relevant power bases, international relations scholars are apparently not shy about this pseudo-precision. In the same tradition as Cline (1975) and Shinn (1969), Cox and Jacobson (1973: 20) invented a "micro-power" formula (i.e., power of individual office holder, such as for the UN or other IOs):

$$P \pm A = C, \text{ where } P = \text{position in office,} \\ A = \text{personal attributes, and} \\ C = \text{capacity of individual actor}$$

demographic, educational, financial, fiscal, military, transactional, economic to trade figures.

As can be seen, all these scholars found no difficulty in identifying "the relevant power bases." The problem of "weighting," though inescapable, was ignored. In Schroeder's (1977b: 72) words, the (SAP) procedure of isolating all power variables then not weighting "hopelessly distorts the result by considering all the factors of equal importance" and "is patently wrong" (Schroeder, 1977a: 12). In the absence of a clear theory about the relative "weight" of the indicators of power, to insist on constructing a multiple index and to enlarge the number of indicators simply because they are there is untenable. We cannot be confident about an aggregate of numbers on whose separate existence a similar confidence cannot be bestowed.

There are only one or two of these indicators of power which we can have some degree of confidence in. The presence of military strength in virtually every one of the conceptualization of national power indicates that this indicator of power is overwhelmingly thought of as most important. The theoretical origin of this apparent consensus is the preoccupation with coercive power itself, which has been found to be crucial in conflict among nations, especially the violent varieties. Given a different set of theoretical preoccupations, the consensus would no doubt decrease. This is what is meant when we speak of the choice (of indicators) being dictated by our theoretical objective.

The analysis of the international system in societal sense or the analysis of the international stratification with its attendant "status politics" is not an analysis of war, or even of a "power struggle" in the sense that power serves as both an end in itself and a means to its acquisition. The dominance of the coercive component of the power bases therefore should be examined in view of our different theoretical concern and research objectives. In its place we must try to find an indicator of power that reflects the theoretical consideration of "status politics" and stratification analysis in general. Stratification implies power as a positional property, or a "structural" one (Goldmann, 1977: 9) in the sense that power is derivable from a position in a structure (i.e., stratification itself). Power in this sense means "the control or property of desired goods by some units" (Heintz, 1972c: 127). Power in this sense is not an expression of coercive strength (though it may have such consequences) but that of a "desirable." It is something which is both desirable and necessary, and not something which is only necessary. Power as economic resources applies to the former, while power as military strength applies to the latter.¹

¹The assumption that military strength is only necessary and not desirable is based on the observation that the desire for disarmament, total or partial, has been a constant and ideal goal professed by most nations. The increase of armament spending is nearly always rationalized, and seldom, if ever, pursued as an ideal.

Power in stratification analysis implies rank and is perceived as such. Our choice of indicator for this kind of power must have the ability of being perceived as a kind of "summary" of a nation's strength, or as "the generalized capacity," as Parsons (1960: 41) put it. The conception of power as "having it," as a "resource base," as the "overall store of influence" or "influence base," as "capability," as "capacity to act," as "gross national strength" (GNS?) or even as the "IQ of the state," seems to suit our purpose best and GNP (total) seems to be the best summary index of such power. GNP is the best overall "ranker" of nations (American Behavioral Scientist, 1964: 30).

We believe the perception of power in international stratification, though it can be accurate, is seldom more accurate than the perception of it as a power ranking ("Japan as 3rd, Canada as 5th, Quebec as 23rd" and so on). "It seems rather paradoxical," stated Doreian and Stockman (1969: 52), "that methodologists have devoted a great deal of effort to obtaining metric scales from what is intrinsically non-metric data, whereas . . . the actors often do precisely the reverse," i.e., perceiving these figures in rank terms. The selection of a single overall summary measure indicating gross power as rank is a response to this insight and to the theoretical assumption of stratification analysis.

But the choice is also a response to well-established precedents in the literature about the use of GNP (total) as a measure of national power (Davis, 1954; Hitch and McKean, 1967; Velut, 1967; Organski, 1968b; Tanter, 1970; Galtung et al., 1972; Levy and Obrecht, 1972; Spiegel, 1972; Cox and Jacobson, 1973; Midlarsky, 1975; Kelly, 1976; and many others). The number of scholars using GNP measure of power vindicates Alger's (1968: 69) statement that GNP is a "popular measure" of power. Scholars seldom fail to discuss the "complex measures of power" but they nearly always fail to live up to their own pronouncements. Spiegel's (1972: 116) study of international hierarchy is one such example, where he suggested several material and non-material aspects of power but then settled on GNP. Sullivan (1976: 178) noticed this discrepancy in the literature and stated that "... although many pay lip service to the more nebulous aspects of power--morale, will, character--few researchers have used these aspects in any scientific sense. Even those who advocate their consideration and inclusion in studies of power fall back on gross, observable measures." Organski, said Sullivan, "suggests six determinants of power--population, political development, economic development, national morale, resources and geography--but admits the impracticality of using all six." Instead, Organski suggests GNP because it "constitutes perhaps the best overall index of power" (in Sullivan, 1976: 178).

The overall confidence in GNP is understandable. GNP correlates positively with all the other indices of power (Finsterbusch, 1973a: 426). Organski and Kugler (1977: 1349) claimed that their measure of power (GNP) correlated at .95 with the multidimensional measures of power used by Singer, Bremer and Stuckey (1972). An examination of 20 indicators of power measures by Kerstin Petren of the Swedish Institute of International Affairs came up with GNP having the highest "average correlation with the variables already in the cluster" (Goldmann, 1977: 11). In the DON correlation tables, GNP correlates at .90 with defense expenditures (in Weede, 1977: 64) and at .89 in Alcock and Newcombe (1970: 339). Even when "perception of power" is considered, as by Alcock and Newcombe (1970: 339), the rank-order of nations based on GNP and the rank-order of nations based on "perception of power" has an r of .85 (significant at .002 level).

The use of a single gross summary measure of power such as GNP is certainly not a perfect solution. It does show, however, that we are not hypocritical about its use. We do not suggest that "power is complex," suggest a dozen measures, then turn around and use the simplest indicator with ease. We are saying, however, that the perception of power, for the purpose of stratification analysis, is generally both naive and simple. We believe, therefore, that GNP captures this spirit. The strength of this measure lies in that it stands somewhere between power being

"undefinable" (Rosecrance et al., 1974: 11) and power being "virtually everything" (Goldmann, 1977: 10).

Development

Development can be viewed as an end-state or as a process. Development as an end-state, however, has as many meanings as there are users. One can define development as a quantity (high economic growth, high GNP per capita, high in all socio-economic indicators, or high in the overall Quality of Life) or in distributional terms (high income equality, fair access to various socio-economic institutions, balanced growth or "bridging the gap"). Development can also be defined in "structural" terms: the extent the socio-economic structure has moved from labor-intensive to capital- and technology-intensive, from high agricultural content to low agricultural content in the GNP or in the employment structure, from low industrial to high industrial content in both GNP composition and employments structure, and from traditional-ascriptive to modern, achievement-oriented psycho-cultural orientation (McClelland, 1961). Development as an end-state, to quote Galtung (1970a: 375), can either have all "the elements of dream in it" (e.g. "liberation", "humanism") or some degree of mundaneness to it (e.g. "clean water by 1980", or "a vine and a fig tree in every farm").¹

¹For the various places where development as "liberation" and "humanism" is discussed, see Goulet (1975) or Elliot (1971). Development as "clean water by 1980" was

Development as a process, however, is much more intractable and may even have some elements of nightmare in it. It is a complex, unpredictable and often brutal process. A historical analysis of this process indicates that it is a slow and tortuous one (Rostow, 1960).

For a dimension of stratification in stratification analysis, however, neither these theories of development nor the process itself will be dealt with. We are merely looking for a convenient "image" of development by which we can compare nations on their overall level of achievement. Development as a dimension of international stratification must by its very nature be an end-state. Development as a dimension of international stratification is simply a summary of ranked end-states and a snapshot of the whole process, and not a moving picture. Development in this sense is merely an overall image of the differential capability of societies to distribute wealth (goods and services) among their population. Development "reflects the capacity of a society to function for the well-being of its members over the long run"

(McGranahan, 1972: 97). It is "an image by which one arranges and orders one's thinking about development, even if not very consciously or deliberately. A conceptual model of development is usually a metaphor and in the last analysis usually

based on the slogan coming out of the Habitat Conference (Vancouver, 1976) and is championed by Barbara Ward. "A vine and a fig tree in every farm" is an adaptation from a speech by Hoover (1938: 157).

incorrect for that reason" (McGranahan, 1972: 95). But in "the developing world," according to Walinsky (1963: 5), "false illusions are still pervasive" so that "the task of defining development is a 'pseudo-task' because it will continue to be abstract, vague, and at the same time still enjoy the greatest esteem in the minds of men" (Geiger, 1971: 61).

A definition of development, therefore, is either "ideological," false, or ideologically false. A definition of development as an end-state always presumes and assumes an acceptance of a certain value preference.¹ Therefore, a definition of development with too many built-in sub-dimensions, and a measure with too many indicators either assumes or presumes too much or is seeking "security in numbers." As with power, one cannot feel secure about an aggregate measure based on measures which separately do not enjoy as much confidence.

"In the world of today," said Galtung (1970: 379), "the concept of development is still largely one-dimensional, GNP and GNP per capita-oriented." This is still true because when a leader is asked to describe and summarize his country's

¹Although terms like economic growth, industrialization or modernization are more "value-explicit" (to use Rosenau's expression; 1976b: 3) and more easily measurable, the term mostly used by nations is development. It is this term which was used constantly by the delegates in their speeches during the NIEO debates and GNP per capita was the most frequently mentioned indicator of development.

or other's development he comes up with GNP per capita whether the image is true or false.¹ And this is what status politics, stratification analysis, and the theory of status inconsistency intend to capture; not the "true" meaning of development (which probably does not exist in the first place) as derived from a statistical analysis (e.g., factor analysis) but as it is captured, perceived or even misperceived in the minds of the actors in the system. What we want to capture, in other words, is development as an "image" as McGranahan (1972: 95) said, or as a generalized profile, and as a salient summary of a development rank. The picture may be false but, as Walinsky (1963: 5) pointed out, "false illusions" are still pervasive in much of the developing world." Not only in the image of development are there a lot of false illusions, but apparently even development itself has been pursued "not to assuage popular economic expectation" but "to bring diplomatic influence and prestige to the nation" (Holsti, 1975: 830). So "small, poor nations buy airlines, maintain standing armies and miniature airforce, although they can ill afford and little need them" (Rummel, 1977: 212).

¹Upon Mondale's return from a trip of consultation with allied leaders around the world, the late Hubert Humphrey was reported to have told him: "My Goodness. That was quite a sight for me to watch on television. Here you were leaving in day time. Johnson always made me leave at midnight." Humphrey then went on that "he never got to a developed country. They always had to have a low per capita income in order to go there" (Citizen, February 23, 1977: 47). (Also note how development is associated with GNP per capita.)

Development as a dimension of international stratification is essentially a concept with a component of "false consciousness" in it--nations agree wholeheartedly on its desirability and importance, agree very little on what it should contain, but usually have one or two short-hand, convenient notions about it. When asked to describe it, they opt for the simplest, the most salient, the most overused index possible--and in most instances, it is the GNP per capita. This can be explained and understood as a function of "invidious comparison" or "demonstration effect" and the effectiveness of the economic socialization process in the international system, "thanks to the dominant role still played by economists in [development] planning" (Goulet, 1975: XIII). What has been called "GNP-ism" may even be a real "ideology," and "growthmania" a real "sickness," but "no other social goal is more strongly avowed than economic growth" (Galbraith, 1967) and "no other test of social success has such nearly unanimous acceptance as the annual increase in the GNP" (in Goulet, 1975: 253).

But there is more to the preoccupation with the GNP than meets the eye. There are numerous precedents for the choice of a unitary and gross index of development, such as GNP per capita (Alker and Russett, 1965: 219; Gillespie et al., 1969: 16; Shinn, 1969: 948; Gleditsch, 1970: 19; Harbison et al., 1970: 1; Heintz, 1972: 18; Cox and Jacobson, 1973: 40; Gidengil, 1978: 53, and many others). Galtung (1966a: 188)

stated that GNP per capita was "perhaps the most important dimension for ranking nations today." Furthermore, GNP per capita is a "famous" index (Harbison et al., 1970: 2), the "most popular" (Finsterbusch, 1973b: 58), "conventional" (Meier, 1976: 8), and a "very convenient indicator" (Seers, 1972: 91). "Politicians," according to Seers (1972: 91), "find a single comprehensive measure useful, especially one that is at least a year out of date."¹

"This does not mean that Gross National Product is just nonsense; it means that it is frequently used in a way that makes nonsense out of it" (Jenkins, 1970: 34). One of these ways that make nonsense out of it, ironically enough, is to use it as the actual measure of a "true" development because "it does not measure wealth or well-being" (American Behavioral Scientist, 1964: 30), and says nothing about the distribution of the wealth. It means only, if it means anything at all, "economic development" (Radetzki, 1973: 39) in a cautious and tentative way possible as "GNP is calculated in most countries by something like witchcraft" (American Behavioral Scientist, 1964: 30).² The "proper" way of using

¹In the analysis of status politics here we are dealing with "politicians," and not economists. So the choice of GNP per capita, again, is quite to the point.

²This shows the weakness of GNP per capita if it is used in the way it is intended to, i.e., to measure "true" development. As a prestige item, however, it underscores its importance because it will even be "cooked" to obtain an image, a good image if possible, by nations. Its use as a measure of the development dimension of the international stratification is therefore justifiable.

the GNP per capita, therefore, in terms of stratification analysis, is the "improper" way, that is, to use it not as the "true" measure of development but as the "false" measure of it (i.e., as has often been misperceived by nations' leaders).

In spite of the difficulties,¹ the GNP still retains

¹Radetzki (1973: 39-40) also added the problems of GNP as being "difficult with countries with a high subsistence sector, and is unreliable due to various exchange rates." In a review of Russett's et al. World Handbook of Political and Social Science Indicators, the American Behavioral Scientist (ABS) listed eight "weaknesses" of GNP: 1) it does not measure wealth or well-being; 2) it is confounded by currency differences; 3) GNP does not show differences in industrial organization; 4) it is plagued by omission of many non-monetary services; 5) by vast differences in living cost between hot and cold climates; 6) by the differences in the social cost of surviving in high GNP country; 7) by the differences in pricing, processing and inventorying; and 8) by the differences in internal distribution among social strata of GNP activities. In addition, GNP figures do not distinguish between "good and bad," i.e., between the production of food or the production of poisons (Morgenstern et al., 1973: 30).

In spite of these problems, strong defenders exist. One of them is Immanuel (1974: 64): "The most reliable and direct measurement of it [i.e., development], which is at the same time the simplest and easiest (in my view, this is no disadvantage) is GNP per head of population.... But even if this objection [about Kuwait having GNP per capita of around \$10,000] were well-founded, I should not alter my definition. For even if it broke down in the case of Kuwait, it would still be less bad than any of those that are offered in its stead--less bad, for example, than a definition, which, on the basis of the relative growth of manufactures makes Portugal, Chile, Mexico, Iran, Singapore, Ecuador or Malta, countries that are more highly developed than Greece, and Spain, a country nearly as highly developed as Australia and New Zealand. It would be less bad, too, than a definition which, on the basis of their exports of primary products makes Holland, Denmark, Sweden, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and even the USA, countries less highly developed than Japan. It is certainly less bad than a definition which uses the concept of 'domination' by foreign capital in general and

"some vestigial influence" (Goulet, 1975: XIII) and "continues to be the most important and commonly used measure of development" (Radetzki, 1973: 40). "Even when they give lip-service to other dimensions of development, many economists continue to subordinate all non-economic factors to the principal requirements of their growth model" (Goulet, 1975: XIII).

Downgrading "economic growth" (identified to be strong from 1971 to 1975 by Haq, 1976: 20) is only "trendy" (Streeten, in Helleiner, 1974: 65) and has become "less relevant" only among the most developed nations (Heintz, 1976: 178). Only half a dozen years later "public thinking seems to have swung around to the opposite corner" (McGillivray, 1977: 29).¹

The swing around of the public attitude has been brought about by the severe unemployment problem in most developed countries, thought to be related to the alleged zero-growth economic philosophy and excessive environmentalism.

multinational corporation in particular to make Canada the least highly developed country in the world, because it is the one most dominated by foreign-owned firms, and India the most highly developed country in the world because there is less foreign investment there than anywhere else.... In fact, however, the 'Kuwaiti' objection is not well-founded. It neither contradicts nor weakens a definition of development based on the GNP for the simple reason that neither the citizens of Kuwait nor even its Emirs actually appropriate this GNP. They allow the greater part of it to become merely so many book-entries--which in the long run, is just to make a gift of it to foreigners."

¹Even in Canada, according to McGillivray (1977: 29), the Prime Minister (Trudeau) and his cabinet, known to have publicly denounced "the worshippers at the temple of the Gross National Product," have now joined the worshippers.

The sustained use of the GNP measures by scholars are perhaps unrelated to the philosophical switch, but study after study indicates that the numerous attempts to construct alternative development indicators (e.g., McGranahan et al., 1972; Terleckyi, 1973) by incorporating all or some of the Quality of Life indicators such as "flush toilets per capita" (Ebert and Young, 1971: 120) are no less problematic. "The reason is that alternative indicators usually reflect a still narrower sector of reality. Furthermore, after long use, we are fairly familiar with the weakness of GNP measures, while newly constructed development indicators may hide deficiencies not yet discovered or fully understood" (Radetzki, 1973: 40).

Finally, GNP has a good overall intercorrelation record with most of the other development indicators. It has a correlation of .89 with the 18 indices of development ("original") and .95 with the adjusted and transformed index of development used by McGranahan et al. (1972: 151). GNP per capita also has average correlations of .95, .94, and .96 with Finsterbusch's (1973b: 61) Development Index, Telephones per 10,000 in population and Taylor's Economic Development Factors. In Rummel's (1972: 448-467) Dimensionality of Nation's report, GNP was shown to correlate at .86 with its "rival" indicator, energy consumption, and at .90 with telephones per capita, an indicator claimed by Caplow and Finsterbusch (in Barbera, 1973b: 24) as "the most valid"

and "reliable" measure of development. A similar level of correlation (.95) with energy consumption was also reported in Sawyer (1967: 162). The discrepancy between GNP per capita and energy consumption is "never fundamental--there is at least a certain level of interchangeability" (Galtung, 1972: 48). In Heintz (1972b: 19) GNP per capita has "the best correlation" with all dimensions of development: at .74 with "standard of living" (food expenditure and life expectancy), .86 with "productivity" (energy and industrial output), .83 with "education" (literacy, primary pupils, secondary and higher education), and .70 with "urbanization." GNP per capita even has a correlation of .73 with the broadly expanded Adelman and Morris index of social and political development (Radetzki, 1973: 48). On this basis, Radetzki concluded that GNP per capita was associated with "fairly broad-based social and cultural changes." "Within wide margins of uncertainty," claimed Myrdal (in Radetzki, 1973: 40), "the increase in material income per capita can serve as an indication of the movement of the entire social system." Given an overall objective of stratification analysis--which is to capture the overall image of the entire social system based on its development dimension--even such a wide margin is still tolerable in adopting the GNP per capita as the measure of the development dimension. This choice is consistent with Ebert and Young's (1971: 138) suggestion that "in the final analysis the choice should be based on theoretical considerations."

In spite of the generally favorable view of development as GNP per capita, the differences in perspective regarding the "best" measure of development will no doubt continue. As stated at the beginning of this section, it is a matter of ideological perspective. But beyond that, perhaps "the perfect indicator" not only can never be found but "is not to be found" (American Behavioral Scientist, 1964: 29). But "if nothing better can be found, the per capita national income will continue to be used" (McGranahan et al., 1972: 10). "To the dismay of the purist," said Meier (1976: 5), "but not to the surprise of the development practitioners-- it is difficult to give one precise meaning to 'economic development'. Perhaps it is easier to say what 'economic development' is not."

The proliferation of the sense of dissatisfaction with development as GNP is the product of this phenomenon-- a "gap" in our knowledge mentioned by Meier--and the critics of GNP have used this to the fullest. A criticism of development as GNP often reveals how much more we do not know about development than how much we know. Development as a dimension of international stratification, fortunately, does not have to be embroiled in this controversy. Although we do not know for sure the proper or improper place of GNP in development, we do know that nations' leaders do use it as the name tag for development. It is in this sense that we claim development as one of the dimensions of the international stratification.

Prestige

"The international scene today," said Lerche and Said (1970: 224), "displays vast competition for prestige."

Prestige is the "third great reward men seek," according to Lenski (1966: 38) and the drive for it was considered to be one of the "certain universal drives" by Aristotle. This drive, according to Aristotle, is capable of "disposing people to seek change" (in Bluhm, 1965: 131). "Prestige is a most useful invention for obtaining change," stated Young (1970-71: 276) and "in its most efficacious form, charisma, it can undo nations, religion, and armies." When applied to international relations, however, the term "prestige" is somewhat blurred. Rosecrance et al. (1974: 13) considered "status" as "equivalent to reputation," and he meant "prestige." Wallace (1972: 52) and Rummel (1977: 215) in fact used both terms in one breath, i.e., "prestige status," and Rummel defined it as "a sentiment and feeling." Rummel (1977: 215) defined status itself, however, as "a generalized evaluation associated with a pattern of attributes." It is a "halo effect," and a "convenient bundle of evaluation of its occupant." This use of status is shared by many: as a "composite of unit's ranks" (Jackson and Curtis, 1968: 114), as "the way nations are ranked," or as "the evaluation of the rank" (Gilbert, 1970: 15). So what Rummel meant by "prestige status" as "sentiment and feeling" is basically prestige itself, and status is the

way social units are ranked, based on the distribution of prestige.

The use of the term prestige in international relations, in other words, is not only multitudinous but also appears to be a "distant cousin" of prestige as used in the stratification literature. Rummel's use is very close to the use of it in this literature, but that is because Rummel was actually writing on status politics in the international system. Lerche and Said (1970: 224) suggested at least seven meanings of prestige: to be well-thought of, favorably identified, respected, feared, admired, loved and emulated. Morgenthau (1960: 80) thought of prestige as "reputation for performance and power." This is perhaps the origin of Rosecrance's use of prestige as "equivalent to reputation." Keohane (1966: 34) defined prestige as "the esteem in which a state is held by other [UN member] states, apart from its physical power resources." Nuechterlein (1976: 225) held national prestige to be "the degree to which a state cares how other states view it, i.e., whether it is perceived as being trustworthy, realistic in pursuit of goals, maintaining political support at home etc." Russett (1970: 90) borrowed three of Lasswell's "value-inventory" items, i.e., Respect, Rectitude, and Affection as "deference-values" which are "accorded to a unit by others."

These uses appear to be somewhat different from those originating in sociology. The meaning of the concept

of prestige in international relations seems to be "independent" of the dimensions of stratification (that is why "to be loved, feared, cared" entered into the notion). The use of the term prestige in sociology, although it may be expressed in terms of esteem, respect, deference and so on, is never very far from the influence of the other two dimensions of social stratification (i.e., power and wealth). Prestige, according to Hope (1972: 15, 21) is "deference-entitlement" and should be understood as a particular form of social power and advantage that is of a symbolic rather than an economic or political character. Prestige, in other words, is "the "respect" accorded by others or the "image" others form of us (Lenski, 1966: 38). These sentiments are expressed in interaction with others (Korany, 1976: 101). Only Freud (1960: 17) defines prestige as a "mysterious" and "irresistible power," as a sort of domination exercised over us by an individual, a work or an idea. Prestige, according to Freud (1960: 17), "entirely paralyzes our critical faculty and fills us with wonderment and respect."

In spite of the "mysterious" nature of Freud's conceptualization of prestige, measures of prestige abound, both in sociology and in international relations. In stratification study in sociology, prestige is operationalized in terms of subjective evaluation and arrived at through an analysis of results of survey research (e.g., occupational prestige scale). This prestige hierarchy is so well established,

across both time and space, that it has been called "one of the great empirical invariants in Sociology" (Marsh, 1971: 214).¹

In international relations, the amount of prestige attached to a certain position can be established along the same line, namely survey research. Rosecrance et al. (1974: 13) in fact recognized the validity of this approach and made a suggestion to this effect: "In so far as status is equivalent to reputation, it might be measured by obtaining the views of national leaders about their and others' standing." But the difficulty in obtaining these "views" led the Situational Analysis Project (SAP) researchers (Alexandroff et al., 1977: 52) to settle on the widely used Singer and Small (1973) measures of prestige (i.e., the rank-order of nations on their diplomatic recognition and representation scores).

Others have used different measures of prestige. Cox and Jacobson (1973: 438), for example, measured prestige (with the help of judges) by "the degree of autonomy or independence of a state's foreign policy." The intellectual underpinning of this measure can be traced to Etzioni's (1962: 24) "nature of its [a nation's] policy," Keohane's

¹Only recently has this "great invariant in Sociology" been questioned, for example, by Penn (1975) after he discovered a low correlation between occupational prestige in the US and Czechoslovakia ($r=.30$, which is one-third the size of the customary findings of the same correlations between the US and other countries).

(1966: 34) "a nation's foreign policy attitudes" and Lerche and Said's (1970: 224) "reputation for astute diplomacy." But these are only some of the so-called "bases" of prestige: to continue, Etzioni (1962: 24) also suggested a nation's "basic characteristics"; the nature of its political structure, its economy, its culture, its technology, its military potential, the values of those who grant prestige and so on. Keohane (1966: 34) also added "domestic political system and popularity of a nation's leadership." Lerche and Said (1970: 224) listed, in addition to the one already mentioned above, military strength, high standard of living, advanced cultural and technological level and a dedication to "abstract principles" such as freedom and justice.

These measures of "prestige" are obviously of recent origin, or rather can be regarded as measures of prestige for modern nations. Viewed in historical context, some may not have been relevant in some period. Luard (1976: 202) suggested that "success in war" was a "mark of status" in the 19th century (which explains the exclusion of Turkey, "the Sick man of Europe," or China, "the Sick man of the Orient"), "territory" in ancient China and "artistic achievement" in ancient Greece (so although Sparta could defeat Athens in Peloponnesian war, it could not boast of sculptors, writers and philosophers).

But even when we are not plagued by the problem of evaluation of the measures of prestige, we are not yet home free. Even the most widely used measure based on "the number

of diplomatic recognitions accorded a state by other powers" and "the number of diplomats accredited to a foreign capital" is far from satisfactory. Schroeder (1977a: 15) in fact called it "almost worthless." The users themselves seem to agree (Alexandroff et al., 1977: 52):

There is no truly satisfactory measure of international status. Those that have been used by investigators (number of diplomatic recognitions and size of diplomatic representation) have great deficiencies. . . . /and/ they appear to be negatively correlated with each other, so that no composite measures could be devised.

This and other weaknesses humbled even the men who devised it: "Wary of claiming too much for our indicator, we called it diplomatic importance and not status in our second paper on the subject" (i.e., Singer-Small, 1973; /Small, 1977: 32/).

There is an indicator of prestige which has been largely ignored in the literature, even in the literature of status, in spite of the relative freedom from the above criticisms and the existence of some precedents for this indicator. Jacobsen (1969: 27), for example, used "elected position" as a "status indicator." Cox and Jacobson (1973: 20) also used "election to an important office" as one of the measures of prestige. But more important than these precedents is the fact that in most of the literature of status in sociology, the very notion of prestige is itself closely connected to "the incumbency of a role" (Hope, 1972: 23) or to the "perquisites of office" (Hagopian, 1974: 78). Hagopian added (1974: 86) that "the capacity to hold office has sometimes been at the core of status rank."

In the UN and other organizations, for example, officeholding is perceived to be very important by nation-states' delegations. Elective offices have served the purpose of rewarding those members that most faithfully adhere to the norms of the organizations (Volgy and Quistgard, 1974: 180). This particular use of officeholding is what Galtung (1968a: 275) called the use of "formal structure as a system of rank compensation." It is a means of "closing the status gap" or "atimia," according to Gregg (1965: 147). Being elected to a particular position (in the UN) has been called a "success" (Weigert and Riggs, 1969). Since prestige often depends highly on "success" (Freud, 1960: 17; Hewitt, 1970: 16; Nuechterlein, 1976: 255), the link between officeholding and prestige is clear.

Offices (in the UN), in other words, are both a symbol of prestige and a reward for participation in and contribution to the system (Gregg, 1965: 147; Volgy and Quistgard, 1974: 183), or for making the material and emotional "investment" (Homans, 1961) in the organization. Of course, the conceptualization of prestige as "reward" has a strong tradition in sociology (Homan, 1961; Zelditsch and Anderson, 1966: 252; Kimberly, 1966: 29; Geschwender, 1967; Moore, 1969: 287; Eitzen, 1970) and has also been suggested as such in the study of status inconsistency in international relations (Romagna, 1977: 10).

The importance of the UN offices can be seen by the intensity of the struggle to obtain them. "A perusal of the critical records of the General Assembly provides considerable evidence to indicate that many delegations expend a significant amount of resources and energy in their pursuit of vacated positions" (Volgy and Quistgard, 1974: 180). Some countries are in fact getting increasingly more vocal in their demands for specific offices (Citizen, Feb. 10, 1976:68).¹ This is not surprising as "the positions [in the UN] are highly coveted, and nations consider it an honor to obtain them" (Newcombe, 1975c: 259). Elective offices are "eagerly sought as badges of prestige" (Weigert and Riggs, 1969: 1) and are "indicators of prestige" (Newcombe, 1975c: 259).

Elective offices in the UN also vary in the amount of influence and prestige they command (Volgy and Quistgard, 1974: 186). Elective offices have very low or no correlation with the index of power as measured by GNP total and development as measured by GNP per capita (Volgy and Quistgard, 1974: 190) as opposed to diplomatic importance which correlates highly and strongly with indicators of power (Tanter, 1970: 13).² Also voting for an office is generally on the basis of

¹In this report, a certain Mrs. Poston (US diplomat) was accusing Waldheim of "transforming the UN staff into national contingents wrestling for power and money."

²Recall Rummel's (1977: 215) rejection of the use of prestige as one of the dimensions of stratification is based on his assumption that prestige is linearly dependent on power and development.

support for a nation, not for an individual (Newcombe, 1975c: 254). In fact, even the prestige of the incumbents seems to depend more on the "importance," "reputation" and other attributes of their nations rather than the other way round.¹

So there is an alternative to "diplomatic importance" as a measure of prestige in the international system, especially when one is examining behavior of nations in a more specific domain such as the UN. The weakness of this measure is only its UN-specific context. Its functional equivalence does not exist in the whole system outside of the organizational context, while the functional equivalence of diplomatic importance in the UN (i.e., size of missions and rank of the staff) cannot be used because these two variables are internally determined by the nation-states, based on budget considerations, importance of the UN in their eyes and so on, unlike elective offices which are "accorded" by others or the system. The latter captures the concept of prestige better than the former because of the emphasis on "accorded."

Mobility within the International Stratification

The importance of identifying the dimensions of international stratification is based on the fact that mobility takes place along these dimensions. The importance of mobility

¹An examination of 15 "influential persons" in UNCTAD by Nye (1973: 358) indicated that out of 15, 10 had their "influence" attributed to the "importance" and "reputation" of their countries and only 6 had it based on their "personal" attributes.

itself, on the other hand, rests on the notion that status inconsistency is both created and rectified through mobility, upward and downward. To ascertain the level of status politics in the international system ("feverish" or "vicious"), therefore, we must examine the degree of mobility in that system. But the analysis of nations' mobility in the international system has not been as extensive as that of individuals or groups within societies.

In one of the rare studies of mobility of nations in the field, East (1969: 125) found that the most highly mobile nations had the lowest participation (as measured by IGO membership) and the least conflict, while the least mobile had the highest participation and the most conflict. But within the highly mobile group of nations, more participation in international conflict was exhibited by the upwardly mobile nations and less by the downwardly mobile ones. Unfortunately, there is no study linking mobility of nations with the desire for change in the international system. What we do know about this relationship comes from the study of intrasocietal mobility.

Part of the reason for this unfortunate state may be our lack of confidence in the isomorphism of the idea of individual mobility and that of a nation. Galtung (1968a) has suggested that some degree of structural correspondence may indeed exist, not only in mobility but also in other aspects of status politics between individual and national

levels. Eight years before, a prominent Dutch professor of International Law had actually suggested the need to treat "state mobility" as a "sociological concept" (Landheer, 1960) but he failed to kindle the imagination of the international relations scholars because Landheer had couched the article in international-legal language and to a great extent had equated mobility with a territorial expansion rather than with a vertical movement in the international hierarchy. As pointed out by Heintz (1973:13), the term mobility is a space-time phenomenon but for nations it is largely a movement in time, not space. As the 20th century has reduced the possibility of spatial or "horizontal mobility" for nations, the concept of "state mobility" as conceptualized by Landheer has become less prevalent or relevant.¹

Genuine differences between individual and national mobility, of course, exist (Heintz, 1973: 12-13): national mobility involves a small number of units (± 155); the mobile units are identifiable by names; mobility of nations is not

¹It is precisely because of the elimination of the horizontal mobility that the pressure for a vertical one is more intense in the international system than in the societal level. In the latter, when vertical mobility is blocked, very often horizontal mobility of some kind (urbanization, suburbanization and even emigration) is undertaken. Of course, emigration too as a form of horizontal mobility has been reduced sharply in this century, at least when compared with levels of the 17th and 18th centuries, when whole nations were created by this process: Australia often by the "downwardly mobile" (i.e., the criminals and the undesirables of the UK) and the US often by the "upwardly mobile" (the frustrated aristocrats and adventurers).

only perceived as a unit's movement on a scale but also as a change in its relative position vis-à-vis other units; and national mobility is zero-sum. In national mobility, it is possible that a position occupied by one nation becomes threatened by the upward mobility of another nation (and this is particularly true for the top ranks in the system) and since the visibility of nations' relative positions is very high,¹ national mobility constitutes not only a pressure to move upward but also a struggle to resist falling. It is at once stressful and competitive.

As a whole, however, the vertical mobility of nations and that of individuals are comparable phenomena. Individuals may be mobile in terms of their changing positions on the various status dimensions--income, occupation, and education--nations may be mobile according to their changing national income, modernity of the occupational structure, level of education and level of urbanization (Alschuler, 1973: 115; italics original). The vertical mobility itself can therefore be defined as the upward and downward movement of a unit (an individual or a nation) through the channels of the structure (Heintz, 1973: 11) or as "the overstepping of the thresholds separating sets of parameters which define hierarchical regions within the system" (Orban, 1972: 10).

¹"France next!," reported Cook (1976: 9) in Citizen of Canada's "status in the world economy," and "after catching Italy and Britain, the next economy in line would be that of France."

Heintz's definition is identical to that of East (1969), i.e., mobility being defined simply as a movement, up and down the hierarchy, regardless of the threshold, while Orban's definition is closer to the operational definition of Lipset and Bendix (1959) who defined mobility in terms of a movement across class or status barriers (e.g., from manual to non-manual or blue to white collar jobs).

In spite of the various ways of defining mobility and the existence of the problem of isomorphism, reference to nations' mobility abounds in the literature of international relations. We say "reference" to mobility because most of these studies failed to come to grips with the two problems mentioned. Most of the findings on mobility therefore were incidental to their main concerns (i.e., the study of power and development). This fact notwithstanding, the findings are still useful: almost all of them tell us that there has been little or no mobility in the international system in the past few decades and even century.

This piece of information is important because it reveals something about the rate of mobility in the system, a key concept in the linkage between mobility and change. It has been suggested that a "closed system" or a system with very little mobility will be conducive to high intensity of conflict (Dahrendorf, 1959: 605). This idea is also central to Galtung's (1964a: 99) proposition that "aggression" or "drive towards change" is greatest when there is little or no

mobility in the system. Non-mobility itself, in other words, is a form of generalized mobility-blocking. The simulation study by Silver (1973: 621) indicated that there was high intensity of conflict in systems of low mobility.¹

To understand the mechanism of change in the international system, therefore, we must also know how much mobility there has been over the years.

An examination of sixteen available studies of the international system and its various aspects (such as power or capability distribution, development, influence and "prestige") reveals very little or no mobility in the international system for the periods of 1950 to 1970. This is the conclusion reached by Caplow (1973: 53) after examining the level of development for 66 countries between 1950 and 1965. In terms of economic development, he said, "there is an immutable hierarchy of development among nations," and the rank-order of nations is "relatively fixed." Using the same indicators, Barbera (1973a: 10) ascertained that there was no mobility at all for the years of 1913 through 1952. When "power" and "prestige" were used as indicators, "there was little mobility evident for the years 1950-1964" (East, 1969: 123). "In general," said Addo (1976: 24), "we can say

¹Actually Silver (1973: 621) found that not only low mobility but also high mobility systems were productive of high conflict intensity. This result, therefore, complicates Galtung's hypothesis in terms of blocking as a mediating variable.

that nations tended to occupy pretty much the same rank-positions in 1970 as they did in 1960; . . .". Väyrynen (1970: 292) concluded that "power distribution" in the international system had not changed notably during the 15-year period between 1951-1966. - "Gross military power" and "position attributes" too have been "relatively stable" (Weede, 1977: 77), as has the "influence network": there has been "little temporal fluctuation" for the years between 1964-1967 (Kegley and Wittkopf, 1976: 285). When the number of countries examined is smaller, mobility was even more absent: "among countries whose rank-scores on power and development are above the mean, there is a marked stability in rank-ordering for the periods of 1960-1965" (Choi, 1973: 122). An examination of 39 countries of their GNP (total and per capita), "prestige" and "influence" indicated that mobility was almost nonexistent in the periods of 1950-1967 (Cox and Jacobson, 1973: 40). They found the rank correlations of nations' ranking for 1950-1967 to be all very high (Kendall's tau of .73 for 1950-1967, .81 for 1958-1967 and .88 for 1950-1958). Using Fucks' index of national power (energy, steel production, and population), the rank-orders of 16 countries for the period of 1960 and 1970 were virtually the same (Spearman's Rho of .98), except for the meteoric rise of Japan (in Morgenstern et al., 1973: 33). Spiegel (1972: 53-54) came up with the same conclusion, that is, except for the dramatic rise of Japan, the hierarchy of the top members of the system

had changed very little (Spearman's Rho of .93 for 1957-1963 and .72 for 1963-1970).¹ For the eight major powers, Singer, Bremer and Stuckey examined "capability distributions" or "CON" (involving demographic, industrial and military dimensions) for the period of 1820 to 1960 and their figures indicated little change in the concentration of such capabilities. In diplomatic ranking of nations from 1922 to 1964, only four nations (UAR, Japan, USSR and India) had broken into the top ten and all fell at the bottom of the ladder while the US, and the top five European nations (France, UK, Italy, Germany, Belgium) had remained about where they were in 1922 (Alger and Brams, 1967: 652). Two studies of the same dimension by Singer and Small (1966, 1973) also concluded that "by and large, the major powers always cluster at the top . . . the more peripheral actors systematically fall into the lower quintiles" (1973: 598) and the system as a whole was marked by "a remarkable constancy in rank orderings" (1966: 275).²

This past decade has only witnessed a handful of countries able to open the mobility gate. The most dramatic rise has been exhibited by China, Japan, and West Germany,

¹The rank-order correlations for Fucks and Spiegel were not in the original but calculated here for our own purposes.

²All these observations seem to fit the picture of intrasocietal mobility as well. "Historically," according to La Pierre (1965: 388), "individual mobility, both spatial and social, seems to have been the exception: and periods of high mobility seem to have been both rare and brief."

Table 3.2 DEGREE OF MOBILITY IN INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

Studies by	Year of Studies	Spatial Domain	Temporal Domain	Mobility	Degree of Mobility
Weede	1977	Global	1955-1967	none	-
Addo	1976	Africa	1960-1970	none	-
Kegley & Wittkopf	1976	Global	1964-1967	little	-
Barbera	1973a	Global	1913-1952	none	-
Caplow	1973	Global	1950-1965	none	-
Choi	1973	Global	1950-1965	little	high in lower half
Cox & Jacobson	1973	N=39	1950-1967	almost none	Rho's well above .70
Singer & Small	1973	Global	1950-1970	little	-
Singer et al.	1972	N=8*	1820-1960	little	-
Spiegel	1972	N=7*	1957-1970	little	Rho's also above .70
Väyrynen	1970	Global	1951-1966	none	-
East	1969	Global	1950-1964	little	-
Alger & Braus	1967	Global	1922-1964	virtually none	-
Fuchs	1967	N=16*	1960-1970	virtually none	Rho's .98
Reinton	1967	Latin America	1959-1963	none	-
Singer & Small	1966	Global	1815-1940	none	-

* major powers

while the positions of the UK and Canada, according to Cox and Jacobson (1973: 40) have been on the decline. A tremendous downward mobility was also exhibited by the Latin American nations (East, 1969: 124-125). In terms of who had been mobile, Choi's (1973: 122) finding indicated that there has been "shifting of rank-ordering among the Third World countries" but it is only among themselves and "none is sufficient to trespass the Western-dominated international status structure."

The general lack of mobility means that the perception of the monopoly of the international power structure in the world by the major powers as articulated by Castro (1972) does have a real substance. More importantly, however, the shifting ranks seem to have occurred only within the "status barriers" or, as observed by Kegley and Wittkopf (1976: 285), only within the ranks of the major and middle powers but none or little across the middle to the major power ranks. The smaller ones, according to Kegley and Wittkopf (1976: 285), "are almost all out." If this observation is right, the source of the biggest frustration appears to be within the middle group, or the nations around the bottom of the major powers or the top of the so-called Third World.¹ A

¹Interestingly enough, studies of primates also reveal similar trend: tensions and antagonism are greatest in the middle-ranking males (of rhesus monkeys), who are continuously striving to move up in the dominant hierarchy (Wilson, 1975: 289).

reasonable hypothesis might be that these nations include Brazil, Mexico, Iran, Algeria, India, Indonesia and the oil-producing Arab and African countries.

The frustration within the ranks of the Third World appears to have two sources: within the very mobile, for their inability to push through the status barriers and, among the rest (especially the downwardly mobile ones), for being overtaken in their ranks. The middle group in the international system is thus the reservoir of Galtung's "rank disequilibrium" nations, but not because there has been no mobility in the system at all, but because the rate of mobility has been "intermediate," to quote Svalastoga (1965: 139). The demand for a restructuring of power and economic relations in the international system as embodied in the NIEO is therefore classic status politics. "The challenge to the global status quo of wealth and power is a challenge by states made on behalf of states" (Tucker, 1977: 61), and not "a hangover from British Socialism" as Moynihan had suggested (in Haq, 1976: 144).

In summary, the following hypotheses can be suggested: nations' mobility in the international system had been low in the past decade (1965-1974); the least mobile were the top and the bottom-ranking nations, while the most mobile are in the middle group; mobility has been within, and not between "status barriers"; the degree of mobility is related to the system-wide drive towards change: the more mobility, the

less the drive towards change; the upwardly mobile will exhibit less drive towards change than the downwardly mobile; as mobility tends to be greatest in the middle group, the effect of mobility on this group is towards a reduced militancy so that, if mobility is high in this category or even in the system as a whole, the middle-ranking nations will exhibit a drive towards change lower than either the low-ranking or the high-ranking nations.

Status Politics in the International
System: Evidence

The lack of mobility in the international system indicates that the important means of "balancing" or "equilibration" of status is extremely limited. The manifestation of status politics in this system, therefore, can be expected to be not only "feverish" but perhaps even vicious.

As stated in chapter 2, one of the most important manifestations of status politics is that groups which have lost their social positions "seek more violently than ever to impose on all groups the older values of the society which they once represented" (Bell, 1961: 111). This form of status politics connotes a politics of status quo maintenance, or more accurately, a status quo restoration: a policy that endeavors to explain and justify things as they are"

(La Pierre, 1965: 2) or to preserve a situation as it is (Duchacek, 1966: 198). In international politics, this type of policy is pursued by a nation "for the preservation of the power it already has" (Morgenthau, 1960: 90).

But status quo politics is only one side of the coin of status politics. The other side is the status politics of challenging that status quo which manifests itself in a commitment to a reordering of some or all of society's values and norms. This commitment is expected to be pursued in no less feverish and vicious way than the politics of status quo maintenance, especially by those that have been deprived of corresponding privileges in ascriptive status areas. This is essentially the crux of status politics, or as Bell (1961: 111) stated, when speaking of the politics of the déclassé and the nouveau riche, the "central idea."

The literature on radicalism and social movements as a whole, however, is less clear cut on this "central idea," or as to who or which status groups are more prone to pursue the above status politics (cf. Lipset, 1960). Lipset (1960: 127) in fact suggested that every status group is capable of producing its own version of political extremism--of the left, center and right. Even the middle class, according to Parkin (1968)--the group praised by classical writers from Aristotle (1966: 1) to De Tocqueville (in Nisbet, 1966: 184) for its sense of moderation and stabilizing influence--is capable of political radicalism of one sort or another. There is little disagreement, however, as to the role of the upper class in status quo politics. After examining a wide range of available studies on social stratification, Berelson and Steiner (1964: 461) asserted that "those who

benefit from the stratification system are more likely to accept it--the top tends to rationalize, solidify the system." "Upper class environment," according to Milbrath (1965: 7), "tends to produce status quo defenders."

Studies in international relations also provide ample support for the idea that the high-status nations are the status quo-oriented ones. Rummel calls this an "axiom" (Status Quo Axiom): that "high-ranking nations support the current international order" (in Hilton, 1973: 34). Tanter (1970: 9) supported the proposition and he found "the powerful and satisfied nations" lead the established international order. Clark et al. (1971) indicated that the LDCs tend to "load" high on "system change dimensions" while the industrialized ones, lower or less--meaning that the big industrial nations would prefer to keep the world as it is (in Newcombe, 1975b: 147). This conclusion is generally shared by Todd (1971: 302) who found that the more economically and politically developed a state, the more it supported the status quo. After examining the voting patterns at the UN, Alker and Russett (1965: 280) claimed that "great powers tend to protect their rights and privileges." They added that "Eastern states are more revolutionary while Western states are more interested in preserving the status quo" (Alker and Russett, 1965: 277). Vincent (1968: 930) found delegates of developed countries have "static attitudes" (i.e., do not want to see the UN changing). Walbek's

(1973: 47) extensive study on the "verbal political culture" in the UN also provided more evidence that "advanced nations tended to be more accepting of the 'status quo' in their verbal behavior" (also see Newcombe, 1975c: 215).

So prevalent is the view that status quo politics is regularly exercised by the strongest that in the UN itself the superpowers have been accused of "freezing the international power structure" by "depoliticizing" the organization. The superpowers, according to Castro (1972: 164-165), the former Brazilian ambassador to the UN, have constantly added "new tasks" (e.g., non-proliferation, population control, environmental monitoring, narcotics control and so on) to the UN as a means of "depoliticizing" it.

But the maintenance, or the "freezing" of the international power structure has also gone, at times, beyond depoliticization. Various forms of violent behavior have also been committed, especially by the high-status nations, in the name or in defense of the status quo. Although the empirical evidence is not unanimous on the violent nature of the defense, most studies have tended to support the observation that war and other violent change in the international system have largely been the exclusive monopoly of major powers (Modelske, 1971: 47; Wallensteen, 1973: 115). In the period between 1945 and 1970, according to Modelske (1971: 58), nearly two-thirds or 42 out of 67 wars can be associated with the Great Power participation. This observation

is also shared by two leading "peace researchers" (Quincy Wright and J. David Singer; in Modelski, 1971: 46), Dahl and Tufte (1973: 126) and by other empirical studies using aggregate data on foreign conflict behavior (cf. Feierabend and Feierabend, 1972: 170; East, 1969: 115).

It was, therefore, no coincidence that it was Castro (1972), the Brazilian ambassador to the UN, a representative of one of the most "mobile" and "status inconsistent" of the Latin American nations who made the charge of big power depoliticization and freezing of the international power structure. It is from this kind of nation that the logic of status politics draws on heavily for its prediction of a feverish and vicious challenge to the status politics of the high status nations, although the empirical evidence, not intuitive suggestions, for the linkage between status inconsistency and war and violence in the international system is still inconclusive.

Based on this and previous discussions on the nature of status politics, we can draw two major testable hypotheses: nations with high status are supporters of the status quo and therefore will exhibit a low drive towards change in the international system; conversely, nations with low status

¹Possible "noise" has been suggested in the relationship between big power politics and war and conflict, especially by events data studies; some of these "noises" are level of participation, military participation ratio and so on (see McGowan and Shapiro, 1973: 95-97).

will exhibit a high drive towards change; nations with medium status level will exhibit a drive towards change at the level somewhere between those of the high and low status nations. In "contradiction" to the above hypotheses, we can also advance the status inconsistency hypothesis: status inconsistency is related to drives towards change in the international system in the sense that status inconsistent nations will exhibit greater drive than those that are not: aggression, in other words, tends to arise in the social positions of status inconsistency.

Other sub-hypotheses derived from the above hypotheses will be systematically presented in the empirical section of the thesis. These sub-hypotheses constitute those derivations when some or all the versions of status inconsistency and its possible mediating variables (such as status level, degree of mobility and level of participation) are considered.

CHAPTER 4

THE EMPIRICAL STUDY: THEORY AND RESEARCH PROCEDURE

A Theoretical Statement

The international system is a multidimensional status system based on power, development, and prestige. The dimensions of power and development are differentially distributed in the system; some nations are ranked higher while others lower. Differential ranking in the system also entails differential advantage and prestige. Under these conditions, nations seek to improve their positions in the rank system by a manipulation of their "achieved" dimensions or by demanding change in the rules of the system to affect their "ascribed" dimensions. The struggle for a change in the overall ranks is called "status politics." Status politics can reach a "feverish" level because of both the rigidity of most status dimensions in the international system and the uneven nature of their "growth" patterns. Nations, therefore, tend to have inconsistent status profiles. The degree of this inconsistency varies from nation to nation. The variation in status profile and status level produces an interaction pattern in the system which, as predicted by the "Iron Law of Social System," tends to be rank-dependent. The existence of the ideology of equality, however, tends to produce a counter-

interaction pattern or mitigate the structural effect of rank-dependence. The mixed criteria will have the effect of producing differential and inconsistent evaluation. This is the source of "differential treatment" in which interaction tends to be unsatisfactory and frustrating. It is predicted that, under this condition, the inconsistent nation will seek to either change the interaction pattern or change the rules which determine this pattern. This drive towards change is called "aggression." The means of aggression for the status inconsistencies, however, may vary from the simplest (verbal protest) to the most complex or extreme (war). This extreme form of aggression will not be pursued unless other means of compensation and rationalization have been tried and the system has some practice in violent change. The degree of the drive towards change itself, on the other hand, will be affected by the status level, the configuration of the status inconsistency, degree of individual and system mobility and the level of participation. This is so because the higher-status nations tend to be the status quo supporters, while mobility and participation tend either to dampen or exacerbate the drive towards change (in the direction of increased conservatism if the rate is sufficiently high, and in the direction of increased radicalism if the rate is significantly low). The low rate of mobility and the relatively rank-dependent nature of nations' participation in the international system makes it "ripe" for status politics

in general and status inconsistency aggression in particular.

With all the assumptions, corollaries and theorems, the entire statement can be presented as follows:

Assumption 1: The international system is a stratified system based on status.

Definition 1: Power, Development, and Prestige are the dimensions of status in the international system.

Definition 2: Power means resource or "influence base" (Simon, 1968).

Definition 3: Development refers to the differential capacity of nations to allocate goods and services among their populations.

Definition 4: Prestige means "reward" accorded by others in the system, as a function of material and emotional "investment" in the system (Homans, 1961).

Assumption 2: The international system is not only stratified but also that this stratification is multidimensional.

Corollary 1: Nations can rank high (low) on one dimension, but low (high) on another.

Definition 5: If a nation ranks high (low) on one dimension, but ranks low (high) on the other, that nation has a status inconsistent profile.

Definition 6: When the ranks on Power and Development are higher than the rank on Prestige, the inconsistent nation is under-rewarded; when the reverse, it is over-rewarded.

Assumption 3: Status is a scarce value (Heintz, 1972).

Assumption 4: Nations desire high status on all dimensions.

Corollary 2: Once obtained, nations strive to maintain their status.

Theorem 1: Status Quo Theorem: The higher the status position, the more satisfied the nation and the more it will support the system.

Corollary 3: Nations desire to "balance" their status dimensions.

Theorem 2: Status Inconsistency Theorem: Nations with inconsistent status profile will seek to "balance" their status dimensions and will aggress if blocked.

Definition 7: Aggression means a drive towards change.

Definition 8: Change means the observed differences in social phenomena at two points in time and refers to both change in and of the system.

Definition 9: "Blockage" means no or low individual mobility or a low degree of mobility in the system.

Definition 10: Mobility refers to the vertical, upward and downward movement of nations through hierarchical channels (Heintz, 1973: 11).

Theorem 3: Mobility Theorem: Mobility tends to either dampen or exacerbate the drive towards change; towards status quo support if upward, towards aggression if downward or blocked.

Drive Towards Change as Aggression

Although status politics, as stated by Bell (1961: 111), can reach a "feverish" level, and the empirical evidence has shown that violence has been undertaken either by the déclassé, nouveau riche or the high status nations in pursuit of status politics in the international system, there is no necessary or sufficient correlation between violence and status politics. The dominance of war as a dependent variable, as mentioned at the beginning of this thesis, is peculiar to international relations (Coplin et al., 1973: 74; Vasquez, 1976: 192).

If the field of international relations has been dominated by "power politics," the empirical studies of status politics in international relations have been overwhelmingly concerned with the violent manifestation of power politics, namely war and other conflict behavior. The studies by Romagna (1977), Midlarsky (1975), von Riekhoff (1974), Ray (1973), East (1972) and Wallace (1971, 1973), which came out of the Correlates of War or COW project, all examined the relationship between status inconsistency and war. War is also one of the foreign conflict behaviors examined by the status studies coming out of or affiliated with the Dimensionality of Nations or DON project (Rummel, 1972b; Rhee, 1972; Choi, 1973; Vincent et al., 1973; Tomlin and Buhlman, 1977). The status studies produced by the peace researchers from the Scandinavian "school," however, have examined the various aspects of the

international system (Reinton, 1967; Gleditsch, 1967, 1970 ; Väyrynen, 1970; Galtung et al., 1972; Hveem, 1973; Goldman, 1977); one of the most controversial outputs was a study of coup d'état by Fossum (1967), yet another study of conflict, albeit on a domestic level. The recent flow of research reports from the Situational Analysis Project or SAP (Rosecrance et al., 1974) also have focused mainly on war and among major powers only. Very few have examined other issues of international relations: modernization (Robertson and Tudor, 1968); international development (Heintz, 1972); mobility consequences (interaction, participation, conflict-cooperation behavior) of international stratification (East, 1969); and conformity to international norms (Gilbert, 1970; Jarvard, 1968; Heintz, 1975). We found no study that had looked at the problem of change in the international system using status variables (absolute status, status mobility, or status inconsistency) as the explanatory nexus of change or as a means of identifying change agents in the international system. Only a small number of studies on change behavior of nations exists in the field (cf. Friedheim, 1965; Jacobsen, 1969; Todd, 1971; Korany, 1976; Wish, 1977).. This is surprising when "international politics," according to Russett (1975: 86), "have changed greatly in recent years" and that "change is perhaps the most constant feature of our time" (Rosenau, 1976b: 231).

This study will join the modest number of studies of change in the international system above. In the process, however, it will not only extend the utility of status variables to the study of change (where they rightly belong)¹ but it will also fill an important gap in the literature on status in international relations, which thus far has been almost exclusively concerned with violent change. The use of status variables in the explanation of change, furthermore, will enlarge the repertoire of intellectual tools available to us for the understanding of this complex behavior.

In keeping with the theoretical assumptions of this study, the empirical test of status inconsistency should not be on war but on "a drive towards change." An excellent example of such a drive in recent years is the debate on the establishment of the New International Economic Order in the UN during the VI and VII Special Sessions. This debate, which was undertaken by nations with an idea of bringing about change in and of the international system, represents the most suitable empirical domain for the status inconsistency theory reformulated here. As the contents of the speeches made by the various national delegates would indicate

¹The emphasis here is on change behavior of nations as it is the study of this aspect of change that is relatively poor. The study of system change or the international system transformation (from one system model to another) using systemic variables is by no means rare. The works of Kaplan (1957), Rosecrance (1963), or Singer's Correlates of War project come readily to mind for this kind of study.

the degree of their drives towards change, the operationalization of aggression in terms of this verbal behavior is therefore appropriate for the theory.

This approach is "novel" in the sense that status in general or status inconsistency in particular has not previously been tested on the change-orientation of nations. The examination of the change-orientation itself, in the UN or elsewhere, however, is not new (Graber, 1969, 1970; Friedheim et al., 1970; Todd, 1971; Korany, 1976; Wish, 1977). Some of these studies in fact involved the study of change-orientation through the examination of nations' verbal behavior in the UN and UN-related organizations (Graber, 1969, 1970; Friedheim et al., 1970; Todd, 1971). The approach being suggested here, therefore, constitutes an attempt to combine not only status and change but also status, change, and the verbal behavior within the so-called "verbal culture", in the UN. As such, this study is both "new" and "old": to the extent that it is "old," it shares most of the assumptions of the studies cited.

Implicit in all these studies is the importance attached to the verbal behavior of nations. Graber (1969), for example, maintained that words may accurately foreshadow actions and may coincide with national perceptions, which are crucial for other nations to know (in Newcombe, 1975c: 197). Moreover, words may have action consequences and also may tell how a nation wants to be perceived. "This is true

even if it disseminates or tries to hide its own real perception and motives" (Graber, in Newcombe, 1975c: 197). As Franck and Weisband (1971: 118) stated, "though there is frequently a disparity between what governments say and what they do, what they say is generally to be regarded as part of what they do--and, at times, the more important part."

The importance of verbal behavior has long been recognized, because "there is an intimate and mutually interactive relationship between thought, language and behavior" (Frank, 1973: 26; italics original). According to Frank (1973: 24),

words have an existence, a function, stimulus properties of their own. Not only do words act as cognitive reflections, conscious communication, of wholly independent acts, they can themselves determine the nature and direction of future acts. . . . there is a one-to-one correspondence between physical behavior and linguistic behavior.¹

The degree of correspondence which is assumed to exist between words and action is the basis for treating verbal behavior as behavior with policy. "We assume, though we recognize the problems, that it makes sense to interpret public speeches as national public statements" (Walbek, 1973: 9) and those in the UN in particular as "national public foreign policy orientation" (Walbek, 1973: 10). In fact they can be viewed as actual policies (Walbek, 1973: 13) because

¹On these bases, Frank (1973: 27) called his approach "the theory of verbal kinesics": "verbal" because it deals with "language use" and "kinesics" because the "language use" in question is "isomorphic" with "behavioral propositions."

they are used to influence other nations.¹ This view is supported by Hoffmann (1968: 63-64) when he stated that ". . . verbal policies are indeed policies and tantamount to acts in-so-far as they affect an opponent's understanding of a nation's attitude and reactions." In short, "the distinction between acts and verbal policies is losing its usefulness" (Hoffmann, 1968: 63).

In no other place has such a distinction so completely lost its usefulness as in the UN. Verbal behavior in the UN (debates and speeches) has been called variously as the "chief instrument of persuasion" (Pedersen, 1961: 261), "an important part of the complex signals for influencing others" (Franck and Weisband, 1971: 7), "policy-in-use" and "policy-in-action" (Walbek, 1973: 14), "primary source of information" (Walbek, 1973: 75), and "an actual tool for the solution of international conflict" (Graber, in Newcombe, 1975c: 197). All these are "true" to a large extent because as stated by Walbek (1973: 15),

most nations of the world participate in debates, and since the General Assembly deals with a variety of issue-areas, public statements are not confined to one problem area of international politics and are more likely to reflect the comprehensive public view of national actors, their priorities and concerns and their policy statements across all issue-areas.

¹The theoretical underpinning of this approach, according to Walbek (1973: 12) is Levi's (1970: 3) definition of foreign policy as "the government's definition of a state's international objectives combined with a plan of action to reach them."

UN speeches "are often scrutinized carefully by key government officials in the countries concerned and they can affect relations for a long time to come" (Pedersen, 1961: 261). They are usually drafted by those who either determine policy or are primarily concerned with carrying it out (Pedersen, 1961: 262). As such, "even the dullest opening speeches at the GA contain a warning signal" (Holmes, 1975: 20).

Even when compared with nations' other behavior in the UN (such as voting), as opposed to comparing them with nations' behavior outside the UN, the debate is still regarded by many as being the more important.

The debate then, is the thing, not the resolution that punctuates it. The debate is addressed not only to policy-makers, but also to people elsewhere. . . the mobilization of opinion through debate is not a matter to be dismissed lightly, for the words spoken in the GA penetrate everywhere the spoken word can be heard (Townley, 1968: 61).

Compared to roll-call voting, the scope of the issue-areas covered by the debates are more "representative" of the overall issues affecting the international system. Roll-call votes in the GA, according to Alger (1973: 227), "are skewed samples in which East-West, colonial and border conflicts are highly represented, with economic, social, human rights, and legal questions rarely decided by roll-call vote." When votes are taken in the GA, show of hands is used 62% of the time and roll-call 38% (Alger, 1973: 227). Wittkopf (1975: 179) added that roll-call votes as data "do

not provide information on the nuances of behavior that are so much a part of foreign policy, and do not provide information on the intensity of nations' conviction on different issues." When applied to issues related to the NIEO, "large number of issues were resolved by consensus" (Smyth, 1977: 586). In fact all the resolutions in the Sixth and Seventh Special Sessions (3201-S-VI, 3202-S-VI, and 3362-S-VII) except two, on the credentials of the South African delegates (3200-S-VI and 3361-S-VII) were passed without votes. Smyth (1977: 586) then concluded that studies of roll-calls in the General Assembly are "not very fruitful."¹

It is for this and other reasons already mentioned that we decided to pursue an approach in which nations' desire for and drives towards change will be examined in their verbal behavior in the UN General Assembly debates on the establishment of the NIEO. The choice of this approach is consistent with the theoretical structure of the status inconsistency we are testing here and is reflective of the

¹The weakness of voting as behavior and roll-call data as its indicators is perhaps responsible for the decline in number of voting studies in recent years. Dixon (1977: 73) reported that for the years 1970-1975 the publication of such studies declined from 44% to 32% (as compared to the earlier findings of Alger). The decline, however, apparently is not an isolated phenomenon. The number of IO, UN, and assemblies studies also declined by a substantial margin (Dixon, 1977: 68, 71, 72). These findings, and the "general decline in interest among students and foundations on UN studies" have apparently caused "some alarm" among the specialists in the field of IO (Hoffmann, 1975b: 171). In view of the fact that "our knowledge of UN is still fragmentary" (Newcombe, 1975c: 323) the concern is obviously well founded.

idea of aggression in both the broad and the narrow sense. The structure of the empirical linkage between status inconsistency and behavior in sociology, for example, is not necessarily status inconsistency-violence. Of the 38 empirical studies reviewed in chapter 2, only seven can be (tenuously) linked to violence (Geschwender, 1964; Vanderzanden, 1965; Rush, 1967; Bell, 1968; Kirkham et al., 1969; Wilkinson, 1970; Warren, 1971), while the rest to "the restructuring of power relationship" (Goffman, 1957; Trow, 1967; Nachmias, 1973) and to a form of "liberalism" (Lenski, 1954; Lipset, 1959; Lenski, 1967; Fauman, 1968; Segal and Knoke, 1968; Richard, 1969; Kirk, 1971). Galtung's definition of aggression, which was based on the examination of most of these empirical studies in the first place, is far removed from war or other violent behavior, and when it is, he qualified it twice, both of which are based on within-system constraints. Aggression needs not be "negative and problematic," according to Galtung (1964a: 95) but can also be seen "as the driving force in history, as the motivational energy that moves mountains." "Aggression," he would later add (1969: 76), "should not be identified with violence, whether it is extra-punitive or intra-punitive, but rather with certain types of basic changes (in environment or self)." Clearly, Galtung had in mind a definition of aggression that embodies both the broad and the narrow sense, or the assertive non-violent and the destructive or "agonistic" aspects.

But nations verbal behavior during the NIEO debates is not totally devoid of aggression in the narrow sense either because the context of some of the speeches in the debate resemble a "fight" where the weapons are words instead of guns. The analogy is not overstretched. Many observers have used terms that are reminiscent of those coming out of the definitions of aggression in the narrow sense. Claude (1965), for example, viewed the UN as the "battle ground" for nations' collective attempt at legitimization and other policy pursuits (Walbek, 1973: 19). The debate, according to Walbek (1973: 16) is "utilized by nations to verbally attack enemies, to present grievances and to vent verbal abuse and frustration" (my emphasis). Expression of intolerance and ill-will, opposition and dissent is "more frequent in public debate" (Walbek, 1973: 28, 60). Nations do not hide their true positions in debate. "With respect to public verbal behavior, there was a surprising amount of verbal conflict and dissension in debate" (Walbek, 1973: 70).

In the broad sense too the debates on the NIEO reflect a genuine drive for change as some of the members (e.g., the Third World) "violently denounced the world economic structure" (Gerin-Lejoie, 1976: 9). As Cooper (1977: 84) had said, "... some of the calls for a new international order suggest that 'if you don't deliver, ... we'll injure you' in some way." Led by Algeria and Iran, two countries, like Brazil, we strongly suspect to be status inconsistent

in the world, they strive "to challenge the basic premises of the established international economic order and the institutions embodying them" (Gosovic and Ruggie, 1976a: 640). (For the contents of the NIEO, see appendix B.) The challenge is not only restricted to the "established international economic order" but often to the UN body itself. Recall Castro's (1972) charge of how the UN itself has been used by the superpowers as an instrument of "freezing" the international power structure. Lest we forget, the UN itself has also been partially responsible for the feeling of status inconsistency experienced by many nations because of its ideology of equality superimposed on an otherwise highly stratified international system. In fact it is superimposed on itself as well, a body, which according to Jacobsen (1969: 35) is not equal in many of its "characteristics" when based on delegation size, mission size and elective positions. This means that status inconsistency has been severely felt by nations in both the international system as a whole and in the UN in particular. The call for the NIEO can therefore be suggested as the logical conclusion of the increased status inconsistency experienced by nations.

In spite of the frustration, nations do not necessarily seek to destroy the UN itself (maybe the international system itself is viewed as the bigger culprit for their inconsistencies than the UN). Whoever the guilty party is, they in fact rely on the UN to fight the "atimia" and use the UN

setting as an important arena of status politics. Revolutionary nations (China, Vietnam) and revolutionary political groups (such as the PLO) in fact seek admission to the UN as a valuable form of status compensation. The appeal of using UN behavior as "aggression" lies precisely in the fact that the UN, in terms of status politics, is both challenged and relied upon to "correct" the imbalance in the international system.

In summary, it is evident that there is more than sufficient ground to indicate the desirability, if not the validity, of the test of status theories on the "aggressive" behavior of nations in the UN. The importance of verbal behavior, the isomorphism or the strong linkage between verbal and non-verbal behavior, the apparent use of verbal behavior as "policy-in-use" (Walbek, 1973: 14), the substantive relevance of debates in the UN, the universal nature of nations' participation in them, the superior nature of debates when compared with nations' other behavior in the UN, the conceptual proximity between debates and aggression as "drive towards change," the more than symbolic confidence nations have in the UN's ability to confer status rectification and status compensation, all seem to justify the approach suggested here.

UN as a Spatial Domain

In the theoretical sense, the use of the UN as the setting for the empirical tests of status theories is consistent with many of the prerequisites of status politics. First of

all, the UN is not only a face-to-face interaction system but is also a high interaction system. The test of theories like status inconsistency in this type of spatial domain eliminates what we call the top-dog bias associated with the "central" system or major power actor selection. In contrast, the universal approach to actor selection made possible by the use of the UN as a spatial domain is consistent with the theoretical assumptions of the "reference group theory" (Merton and Rossi, 1966) and "social comparison process" (Festinger, 1966), the two bases for the "differential treatment" and "stress and strain." The universal actor selection as a whole also has been found to be quite "successful" in hypothesis testing, at least of the negative interaction types (Vasquez, 1976: 196).

The use of the UN itself, a face-to-face interaction system, keeps the system at the level of a "small social system" in spite of the universal nature of the memberships. In a system of this nature, the "invidious comparison" tends to be intense, and not only because of the face-to-face nature of the interaction but also because of the great probability that the system-wide membership and the reference group membership will overlap, in the sense that a member will view the UN members as a whole as the context for social comparison, and not just a small reference group within it.

But the UN as a face-to-face interaction system probably contributes more to the "invidious comparison"

process than any other institution. "Differential evaluation and prestige assignment do not take place in a social vacuum" (Hewitt, 1970: 18). The UN, according to Alger (1965: 542), "expands the number of nations as well as the number of issues of which delegates can be aware," thus increasing the knowledge that nations have of each other's status positions. Empirical studies indeed indicate that delegates not only become more knowledgeable but also tend to view the UN as an important source of information (Alger, 1965: 531). This is because diplomats in the UN have (and feel they have) more contacts with diplomats from other nations: they communicate more orally and more informally than those in national capitals (Alger, 1965: 528, 531). In fact they also tend to communicate without regard to diplomatic rank and there is more contact across ranks than there is in national capitals (Alger, 1965: 530). Alger's findings were consistent with an earlier finding by Best (1960), who, using questionnaires also found out that 86% of UN diplomats had more contacts with diplomats from other nations than they would have in national capital diplomacy. In addition, 82% were more likely to communicate orally than in writing, 82% thought diplomatic relations in the UN less formal and 91% even found it easy to communicate with unfriendly countries (in Newcombe, 1975c: 307). All these indicate that the interaction pattern in the UN is not only high, face-to-face, and informal but is also less rank-dependent. For these reasons, Jacobson (1967: 579) called the UN "clublike."

Not only do these characteristics of interaction increase mutual knowledge and comparison but they also expand the cognitive worlds of the delegates. Alger (1963: 422) found out that delegates in fact tend to see the world as a single system. This is consistent with our theoretical assumption in which we view the UN as not separate, but an integral part of the world (Alger, 1976: 60). The UN, in our view, is a "realistic representation of the present day world" and constitutes "a mirror of the world around it" (Alker and Russett, 1965: 2). Moreover, the General Assembly itself, according to Newcombe (1975c: 288) is "a good mirror of international relations in general."

The emphasis here is on the word "mirror" because we do feel that in many areas (even in the formal structures) the UN does reflect the international system. In spite of the egalitarian principle (as reflected in the institutionalization of one-nation-one-vote in the GA), other aspects of the formal structure reflect the de facto hierarchy in the international system (the superpower reality by the Security Council, the differential level of economic development by the differential rates of assessments and contributions). But whether or not the "mirror" is really "good" to reflect conditions in the international system as a whole, we feel, for our purpose, it is good enough to warrant the assumptions we make in this study, i.e., that the UN is a valid setting for the debates on the establishment of the New International

Economic Order. Whether or not the actual struggle for the new order will be fought there, or even will be successfully fought with the help of the UN itself is a different matter. This is where the question of the UN being a "good" or "bad" mirror of the international system is important.

For the purpose of status inconsistency suggested here, the UN must not be viewed only as an independent actor in the system (i.e., as a supranational actor along with all the others), or as merely one of the structures of the international system (in the sense of a body so constituted to fulfill a certain task designated by the system members) but also as what Alger (1965: 544) called "a microcosm" of the international system. In other words, the UN is not only part of the international system (i.e., the macrocosm) but also is a replication of it in the sense that the UN too is a stratified system based on status and that its status dimensions are also multidimensional involving power, development and prestige.¹

Viewed in this manner, the UN as a spatial domain is dynamic because it captures all the UN-related interactions

¹Power and development are actually both macro- and micro-dimensions as both indicate ranking of nations in the international system and the UN itself. Prestige, when operationalized in terms of office-holding in the UN will be micro only because it is derived from and applicable within the UN system only. Empirically, however, it may correlate with other measures of prestige derived from or in the international system because of system inter-dependence.

initiated by individuals in the names of their nations in and from the international system. The interactions captured here therefore have both the micro-macro linkages and the psycho-systemic linkages. This spatial domain is not only dynamic but also realistic. After all, neither the international system nor the UN are merely systems of nations. In the empirical sense, both are also systems of individuals, or rather, can only be, in the final analysis, systems of individuals. The use of the UN as a spatial domain, therefore, captures the "systemness" of the international system and the UN both in the abstract or symbolic and empirical senses. Pictorially, this spatial domain can be presented as follows:

A,B,C = static spatial domain

x,y,z = dynamic spatial domain

(x.y.z) = our spatial domain

Rummel's "Elite Corollary," which states that "a nation's elite identify with their [nations'] rank and status configuration" (Corollary 3) will serve as the analytic underpinning

of this spatial domain, because we assume that the individuals representing their nations not only internalize their nations' attributes but also act on their behalfs. In Rummel's (1977: 219) words, "the elite corollary enables us to apply individual level sociological propositions at the nation level to understand how national statuses influence international behavior."

Furthermore, there are grounds for believing that delegates of nations in a forum such as the UN are more likely to internalize their nations' attributes than others in other places, and that a discrepancy between their personal positions and those of their nations are less than in other arenas. Alger, for example, in a private communication (November 28, 1978), claimed that "delegates know their countries, particularly with respect to power, level of development or other forms of prestige ranking." "Most resolutions," according to Kay (1970: 41), "are drafted in New York on the basis of guidelines approved by national governments with the right of final approval being held by the home government." Resolutions, speeches and votes, with a few exceptions, are "based on national instructions" (Alker and Russett, 1965: 218). "The bulk of decisions of a delegation that is under strict instructions from its government are taken at home, not by delegations" (Baehr, 1970: 26). Most nations receive strict instructions and "only small states" (Alker and Russett, 1965: 219) or "delegates of DC" (Jacobson, 1967: 594) are sometimes the exception. As a whole, delegates "act in close coordination

with a state department or foreign office and under instructions of their home governments" (Pedersen, 1961: 256). Fifty percent of responses to Jacobson's (1967: 594) questionnaires indicated that the positions of their countries were made "on the basis of instructions from their national capitals." With respect to public positions, according to Walbek (1973: 63), individual differences (across members of the same delegation) seem to be minimal. "The members of national missions," according to Alger (1965: 540), "are extensions of national bureaucracies."

An analysis of status inconsistency conceptualized within the UN as a spatial domain, therefore, analyzes not only the abstract international system or the concrete UN system but both in their dynamic best.

In summary, the place of the UN system as a spatial domain in the overall theoretical structure is as follows:

Assumption 5: The UN is a "microcosm" of the international system.

Corollary 4: The UN is also a stratified system based on status.

Corollary 5: The UN status is also multidimensional.

Corollary 6: The dimensions of status in the UN are the same as those of the international system:
Power, Development, and Prestige.

Definition 11: Power and Development are macro-dimensions while Prestige is a micro-dimension.

Assumption 6: The UN is also an interaction system among nations in which nations exhibit differential levels of participation.

Corollary 7: Nations interact in the UN through their representatives.

Corollary 8: Elite Corollary: These representatives internalize their nations' status and act on behalf of their nations.

Perception and the Empirical Test
of Status Inconsistency

Status inconsistency theory has been called a "structural theory" by Galtung (1964a) because we infer behavior of social units from their objective status positions in the social structure. Perceptions of the social units themselves of their social positions are either ignored in this approach or are not built into the analysis (Tudor, 1969: 216). That this can be done or has been done in many empirical tests of status inconsistency in sociology and international relations is not entirely the result of an unawareness of the implication of the theory. An empirical test of the relationship between structural properties of a society with a phenomenon within it without taking individuals' perception into account is one of the oldest research traditions in Sociology (cf. Durkheim's Le Suicide, 1897).

That this research tradition has been adopted in international relations especially in the empirical tests of

status inconsistency, however, goes beyond the fact of mere existence of precedence in Sociology. The basis for assuming the existence of the perception of ranks in stratification analysis in the international system can be found in many writings of diplomatic historians and scholars of international relations: "The archives of all [international] system members are crammed full of reports of diplomats, military, and naval attaches, and even journalists on the power and status of states" (Small, 1977: 32).

Diplomats, military attachés, and other trained observers, according to Schroeder (1977b: 74) seem to display "a rather remarkable consensus on what the status and reputation of the various powers were at different times." This "remarkable consensus," according to Dore (1975: 202) applies "even [to] peripheral members" of the international community, and "there is a consensus . . . concerning which are top-rank nations and which are lower-rank nations." This is so, according to Morgan (1972: 177), because "most rank indicators are computed and supplied by governments themselves."

The existence of status perception is not limited only to the ranks of nations but also extends to their status inconsistencies. "If one reads the political statements of the early leaders for independence of the Third World, such as Nehru, Sukarno and Nkrumah, this assumption [that nations perceive the discrepancy between their expectations and achievements] seems not at all unrealistic" (Smyth, 1977: 590).

Smyth's suspicion is in fact supported by an examination of Nehru's foreign policy or India's in general. India's foreign policy, according to Korany (1976: 103), was motivated by other factors as well as by the desire "to get her status and prestige enhanced." Explaining the deterioration of India-US relations, Nayar (1975) stated that "such relations have not been the result of personal animosity or affection by specific leaders but must be examined in the context of the dynamic interaction between two fundamental but opposed driving forces: the persistent Indian aspiration to be a subject of international politics, while lacking the capabilities therefor"

India, of course, is not the only developing country imputed to have such motives. "In the past, others have looked down on us," said Chairman Mao in 1958, "now let us do something for them to see" (in Dore, 1975: 194). Sukarno and most Indonesian leaders, according to Weinstein (1976: 260), were obsessed by the label "a nation of coolies and a coolie among nations." During Sukarno's politics of "Konfrontasi" against Malaysia (especially during the period of 1962-1963), the Philippines, under Macapagal, imposed its own territorial claim in Sarawak, according to Pettman (1975: 59) in order to "build up Philippine's prestige internationally." In a strong speech by its ambassador to the UN, later published in International Organization (1972: 158-166), Brazil attacked the so-called "Superpowers" and accused them of "freezing the

international power structure." Ambassador Castro even attacked the United Nations' preoccupation with population control claiming that "Brazil's population of 95 million people require a demographic growth in line with their needs for full use of their natural resources and effective occupation of their territories" (Castro, 1972: 163; my italics).

This sort of status preoccupation of course is not restricted to members of the Third World. It is the European countries that have had the longest history of status politics. Kennan (1960), according to Midlarsky (1975: 110), had detailed "how the Soviets and Weimar Germans were often snubbed by Western diplomats in the post WW I period and the possible embittering effect on these persons." The discriminatory treatment of the Japanese at the 1922 Washington Naval Conference, too, suspected Midlarsky (1975: 110), "may be another example of this type of behavior" (i.e., "the status inconsistency behavior"). Japan's foreign policy from 1870 to the 1940s, according to Dore (1975: 203) was motivated by "a dominant concern with Japan's international status. The drive to remove the unequal treaties . . . was about inequality and pride and not about tariff autonomy; it was the refusal of the Western powers to accord Japan full great power status."

Insights from empirical studies also tend to corroborate these historically derived observations. Using students, Schwartzmann et al. (1966: 237-238) concluded that "gaps between ranks" were perceived, and that the gap between

perceived disequilibrium and disequilibrium from objective ranks "corresponds quite well." Fossum (1967: 233), who empirically tested the status inconsistency in Latin America, though less confident about matters of perception ("we cannot confirm empirically that such disequilibrium is perceived"), believed, however, that "it is not unnatural to assume that it is felt." The "feeling" of status inconsistency, from the evidence above, appears to be "felt" more strongly by the leaders or those representing the countries. A study of 1965 world's foreign ministers by Modelski (1970: 152) indicated that the majority of them (10 out of 18) agreed that "there are significant differences in status between the Foreign Ministers of 'great', 'middle' and 'small' powers" and that these differences were "very important" or "important" (11 out of 14) "in the dealings between Foreign Ministers."

Lagos, who pioneered stratification analysis in the international system (Lagos, 1963) and at the same time had some experience in such "dealings", expressed his own feeling on the effect of status inconsistency in the international system in the following way (Lagos, 1975: 71):

My first real appreciation of the stratified international system grew out of personal encounters as a Latin American and a Chilean participating in international meetings and negotiations. These personal experiences, which became the psychological basis of my theory of atimia, had shown me that by the mere fact of my belonging to an under-developed country and region of the world, the characteristics of the real status of that country and that region--dependence, a sense of inferiority, generalized atimia--

were somehow, consciously and subconsciously transmitted and ascribed to me. In other words, through an undefinable process, involving a sort of irrational fatalism, the characteristics of the national-regional group to which I had belonged from birth became my own.

Vivid though Lagos's testimony may be, one cannot use "personal experiences" as "the psychological basis" of a theory. They can only serve as illustrations and not a substitute for an empirical evidence. As Tudor (1969: 212) stated it, "unless the subjective perception of stratification by the actor is also part of the theory, any explanation of social action on the basis of stratification has something of a magical air to it." The weakness of Galtung's theory, according to Tudor (1969: 216) is that it has not incorporated the subjective component into his theory. Not only should this be done but also "if the incongruence of status is to give inconsistent stimuli [and thus the accompanying frustration] the incongruent status factors should be perceived by the same people" (Malewski, 1966: 305).

For this reason we sent questionnaires to 114 UN missions to ascertain their perceptions of their nations' ranks even though the intuitive, historical, and empirical bases for assuming the existence of the influence of perception in the analysis of status inconsistency in the international system are strong. This assumption is in fact even more valid in the

analysis of "the dealings" between nations' representatives in the UN because we can expect the awareness of status and status inconsistency to be more heightened in this arena; this is due, to some extent, to close face-to-face personal contact among nations' representatives (cf. Alger, 1965).

These representatives (i.e., the ambassadors or any of the senior officers) were asked to rank their nations on a three-point scale (High, Medium, Low) along the dimensions of Power, Development, and Prestige:

Nations in the world and in the United Nations have been ranked high, medium or low in terms of their power, development, and prestige. Whatever your conceptions of these three terms are, what do you feel is the appropriate level to express the rank of your country in each of these items (your answers need not be of the same level in every item):

<u>Rank on Power</u> <u>(in the world)</u>	<u>Rank on Development</u> <u>(in the world)</u>	<u>Rank on Prestige</u> <u>(in the UN only)</u>
High	High	High
Medium	Medium	Medium
Low	Low	Low

This question is broad, as it is intended to capture the broadest meanings of the concepts of power,

development, and prestige, consistent with the meanings of these terms in the stratification analysis. The wording of "whatever your conceptions of these three items are" is meant to encourage response; but it is also intended to capture the perception of ranks and the meanings of the terms power, development and prestige as they perceive them. Although power, development, and prestige may assume different meanings for different people, the data obtained are essentially comparable because all of them have one common denominator (i.e., perceived power, perceived development, and perceived prestige).

We feel reasonably confident that the above manner of interpreting perception is sufficiently responsive to the need of incorporating perception into the empirical test and theory of status inconsistency as Tudor (1969: 212) suggested.

Together with the use of the UN as a spatial domain and a trichotomization of ranks instead of a discrete rank-score, as the operationalized measure of status, we feel the role of perception in the empirical test of status inconsistency is adequately represented here.

A Methodological Note

The hypothesis of status inconsistency in the literature of international relations has been stated in at least three different ways depending on the levels of analysis.

On the "original" nation-state (or actor or unit) level, it has been stated as follows: "the greater the inconsistency between a nation's capabilities and the reputational status accorded it in the international system, the greater the likelihood that it will engage in conflict behavior" (Wallace, 1970, in Ray, 1973: 8); "the more status inconsistent a state is, the more war-prone it will be" (Ray, 1973: 21); "the greater the overall status inconsistency which a major power experiences, the greater will be its international war involvement" (von Riekhoff, 1974: 7); "the greater the status inconsistency experienced by a nation, the greater the number of wars engaged in by that nation" (Midlarsky, 1975: 111); "rank disequilibrium causes aggression" (Romagna, 1977: 9).

On the international system level (i.e., the "modified" level), the hypothesis has been expressed in this manner: "the more status inconsistency that exists in the international system, the greater will the severity and magnitude of war be" (Wallace, 1971: 27); "the greater the amount of status discrepancy in the system, the more violence in the system" (East, 1972: 301); and "the greater the level of rank disequilibrium, the greater the aggression or 'drive towards change'" (Romagna, 1977: 8).

On the level of analysis exclusively used in the status-field theory, i.e., on the dyadic relationship, the status inconsistency hypothesis has been reformulated (as appeared in theorem 7 or the Conflict theorem) in the following way: "Two nations' status incongruence is correlated with their mutual status-dependent conflict behavior" (Rummel, 1977: 254).

Apart from the different types of dependent variables assigned to the hypothesis (e.g., conflict behavior, war-proneness, war involvement, number of wars, aggression, severity and magnitude of war, violence, "drive towards change," and status-dependent conflict behavior), on the basis of the theoretical linkage (between status inconsistency and aggression), these hypotheses are not homogeneously stated. The majority of them (Wallace, 1970, 1971; East, 1972; Ray, 1973; von Riekhoff, 1974; Midlarsky, 1975; Romagna, 1977) stated the linkage in terms of "the greater . . . the more," while Rummel (1977) simply stated it in terms of a "correlation." Only Romagna (1977: 9), for the purpose of his actor-level test, stated the theoretical linkage strongly in causal terms.

In the review of status inconsistency (chapter 2) we discussed the various reasons why the three levels of analysis were selected. While the actor or unit-level and the dyadic level hypotheses were entertained by Galtung (1966a), the system level was, as we said earlier, an "innovation" in

this field, which Galtung himself rarely entertained (and when he did it was only in terms of a criss-cross theory, and not status inconsistency; Galtung, 1966). While Galtung (1964a) stated the theoretical linkage between status inconsistency and aggression on a very low theoretical threshold, the hypotheses reviewed here expressed such linkage in a manner that represents a problem and reflects a misunderstanding of Galtung's original formulation.

Galtung (1964a: 98) simply stated the hypothesis this way: "Aggression is most likely to arise in social positions in rank disequilibrium." This hypothesis, closely examined, neither indicates "the greater . . . the more" nor a causality. It merely says that aggression is more likely to arise in social positions in rank disequilibrium, as opposed to the other social positions, namely the absolute top-dogs or the absolute under-dogs. The theoretical concern to be solved in Galtung's hypothesis is the "where" question, i.e., the location of the potential aggressors in the hierarchy (Galtung, 1964a: 98). The hypothesis neither concerns itself with the "when" question, (which Galtung thought had been "solved" by Davies' theory of relative deprivation, 1962) nor the "why" question, as expressed by the causal statement. The hypothesis merely attempts to substantiate if it is true that rank disequilibrium position indeed constitutes "a pool of potential suicides, radicals, aggressors, or innovators" (Rummel, 1977: 203). As Galtung (1964a: 104) stated it,

"the theory would predict disproportionately great rank disequilibrium among radical politicians, among criminals (especially those who are engaged in crimes against property), among leading revolutionaries and leaders of change-oriented groups in general, and among very bellicose nations."

Galtung never claimed that rank disequilibrium causes aggression, and we see no reason for disagreeing with him. Based on a careful reading of his article (1964a), his "causal model," if there ever was one, would have to be more complex than the straight $RD \rightarrow A$ as stated by Romagna (1977: 9). Galtung's concerns for the systemic and psychological constraints indicate this point. In fact in one place (1964a: 115) Galtung actually disclaimed the strength of the theory somewhat: "rank disequilibrium is, of course, not a necessary condition for aggression . . . it is hardly a sufficient condition either--."

To insist on testing a "causal model" (Tanter, 1970; Wallace, 1972; Midlarsky, 1975; Romagna, 1977) is to ignore the complexity of the theory and the problems of unlimited scope conditions. Furthermore, a causal model will have to deal with the overall methodological problems associated with status inconsistency, especially the identification problem, which Hornung (1977), Kriesberg (1973: 74) and others (Jackson and Curtis, 1972: 704) think have no methodological solutions. Blalock himself, according to Richard (1969: 29), "although he proposed four alternative resolutions

to the identification problem, none of these was entirely satisfactory from his [Blalock's] point of view." Even if the existence of status inconsistency effect can be ascertained, the form of such effect is difficult or impossible to determine (Jackson and Curtis, 1972: 704). Furthermore, some of the problems of separating the status inconsistency effect are not only related to the "main effect" but also to the separation of the effect of mobility (Broom and Jones, 1977: 824). To insist on entertaining a causal model of status inconsistency, given all these notes of caution, is to insist on engaging in what Jones and Singer (1972: 12) called "a drive towards premature explanation" as many aspects of status inconsistency have not been clarified.

We must, therefore, fall back to clearing the theoretical "underbrush" and testing the theory as originally stated by Galtung (1964a). This can be achieved only when we treat the concepts (of status and status inconsistency) "conservatively" in the sense of keeping in mind the theoretical restrictions rather than the statistical possibilities. The customary operationalization of status inconsistency in terms of the differences (straight or squared) between two or more ranks on dimensions is an example of an operationalization with the statistical consideration in mind. This type of operationalization permits "causal" statements in statistical terms about the relationship between status inconsistency and aggression, but it does so without dealing

with the identification problems noted earlier or with the links between status and status inconsistency with the "psychology of status" (Hyman, 1968) because the perception of status inconsistency itself is less likely to be a function of subtraction of two or more ranks. There is an indication that social units with inconsistent status do not define their positions based on one status (Berger et al., 1972: 252), which is what averaging or subtracting of ranks implies. "Individuals do not average (their own or others') disparate ranks If status inconsistency were psychologically dispensed with in this fashion, it should not be disturbing for individuals" (Jackson, 1962: 480). Instead, individuals are reminded of their inconsistencies mostly by the "differential treatment" they receive.

Their image of inconsistent status is more likely to be a "synthesis" of the three dimensions of status, and this image is more likely to be a "profile" than an abstract mathematical function. The conceptualization of status inconsistency in terms of a "profile" is not only faithful to the Gestalt origin of status inconsistency (Wrightsman, 1972: 14), i.e., that status itself (or the "whole"), of whatever profile, is "more than the sum (or subtraction) of its part," but also builds upon earlier ideas which have appeared in the literature about "status profiles" (Nagi, 1963; Broom, 1965: 431; Doreian and Stockman, 1969).

To construct such status profiles, trichotomization of the data is an important part of the methodology. By trichotomization, we mean a division of countries in each of the dimensional hierarchies into groups of equal size. In a system with three dimensions (Power, Development and Prestige) and a three-way division with topdog (T), middle-dog (M) and underdog (U) breakdowns, there are 27 status profiles in total: three of them status consistents (TTT, MMM, UUU) and 24 of them status inconsistent involving various combinations of T, M and U:

Status consistents (SC): TTT, MMM, UUU.
 Status inconsistents (SI): TMU, UMT, TMT, MTM,
 MUM, UMU, TUT, UTU,
 TUM, UTM, MTU, MUT,
 TTU, TUU, UTT, UUT,
 TTM, TMM, MTT, MMT,
 MMU, MUU, UMM, UUM.

Although some information is lost in a construction of status profiles in the above manner, it is still consistent.

with Galtung's "rule": when trichotomizing, according to Galtung (1967: 391-392), "a good rule is to settle on three values," and when dividing the data "divide into three parts of approximately the same size." "The loss of information involved in the grouping" of data in the above manner, according to Gleditsch (1970: 19), "is no loss at all, since the empirical distribution of rank variables is not what determines the interaction, but the unit's perception of the distribution." "A particularly relevant argument for a small number of values," emphasized Gleditsch (1970: 19), "is the well-known observation that no individual can discriminate between as large a number of different ranks as continuous measurement implies" (emphasis original). Trichotomization, in short, especially in the analysis of status inconsistency, is much closer to the perceptual world than any other technique of identifying actors in status theories and is consistent with the intuitive way we describe nations in the international system and with the intuitive way, we suspect, individuals perceive their national status. Although we have "evidence" that some nations (USA, Japan, Canada) and at least one subnational actor (Quebec) are capable of placing themselves in the hierarchy in terms of absolute rank scores, this knowledge is still highly differential.

More importantly, however, the theory we are employing only differentiates the levels of aggression between status consistent and inconsistent groups, or to some extent between

some of the profiles within the second group (i.e., "over-rewarded-under-rewarded" or "positive-negative" and topdog-underdog status inconsistencies). Beyond these, status inconsistency as a theory, in its present form is incapable of differentiating the differences in the levels of aggression between most of the 24 status inconsistency profiles, let alone discriminating one degree of aggression level from another when status profiles are constructed from discrete rank scores rather than from trichotomized rank positions as advocated here and elsewhere (cf. Galtung, 1967; Gleditsch, 1970; Rummel, 1977: 218; East, 1969). But even if status inconsistency theory itself, or the statistics used, can discriminate the subtle difference between one level of aggression from another, with more than three values (of status levels), "the present state of social science theory sets a limit as to how valuable it [i.e., the correlation] actually is," even though more "nuances" in such correlation can be caught (Galtung, 1967: 392).

Thus, to speak of a "causal" relationship between status inconsistency and aggression is premature given all the possible status profiles that can be produced even when ranks are merely trichotomized and given the various levels of aggression each profile is likely to exhibit but the theory is incapable of differentiating. "Clearing the underbrush" is perhaps a more appropriate activity at this juncture because even with this the question of "where in the social positions" the aggressors tend to locate does get answered.

Hypotheses

Based on the theoretical statement, theoretical structure and the discussion in chapter 3, the following hypotheses have been extracted and will be tested in this study (H1 designates hypotheses of absolute status, H2 of mobility and H3 of status inconsistency):

- H1.1: Nations with high status (in either Power, Development or Prestige) are supporters of the status quo and therefore will exhibit a low drive towards change in the international system.
- H1.2: Conversely, nations with low status (in either Power, Development or Prestige) will exhibit a high drive towards change.
- H1.3: Nations with medium status levels (either in Power, Development or Prestige) will exhibit a drive towards change at a level between those of the high and low status nations (lower than that of the low status nations but higher than that of the high status ones).
- H2.1: Mobility is nearly always partial (one or two dimensions at a time). As such, the level of mobility in the international system varies depending on the dimensions of international stratification. Under the impact of the "egalitarian principle," we expect the level of mobility in Prestige to be higher than in either Power or Development.
- H2.2: The least mobility is at the top and bottom of the hierarchy while the highest is in the middle.
- H2.3: Mobility has been more within status groups than between or across them.
- H2.4: When mobility does occur, we expect its influence on the drive towards change to be as follows:
 - a. Mobility is related to system-wide drives towards change; the mobile nations will have a lower drive towards change than the nonmobile ones.
 - b. The upwardly mobile will exhibit less drive towards change than the downwardly mobile.

- c. If mobility is high in the middle rank or in the system as a whole, the middle-ranking nations will exhibit a drive towards change lower than either the high-ranking or low-ranking nations.
- H3.1: Status inconsistency is related to drives towards change in the international system in the sense that status inconsistent nations will exhibit greater drive than those that are not: aggression, in other words, tends to arise in the social positions of status inconsistency.
- H3.2: Status inconsistent nations that are over-rewarded are less aggressive than those that are under-rewarded.
- H3.3: Status inconsistent nations with large inconsistencies will have greater drive towards change than those with small inconsistencies.
- H3.4: The relationship between status inconsistency and drives towards change is expected to be influenced by status level, mobility and participation:
- a. Status inconsistent nations with high status level will exhibit less drive towards change than those with low status level.
 - b. Status inconsistent nations which also experience mobility will have less drive towards change than those experiencing no mobility.
 - c. Status inconsistent nations with a high level of participation will exhibit a high drive towards change; status inconsistent with low participation will exhibit a relatively low drive.

Operationalization of Variables and Concepts

There are three variable clusters for the empirical tests: the independent variables (ranks and status levels on power, development, and prestige, system mobility and status inconsistency), the dependent variable (aggression or a drive towards change) and the expected "mediating" variables (status levels, individual mobility and participation). The

rationales for the selection of the operational measures for these variables have all been presented in the earlier discussions.

These variables and concepts will be operationalized as follows:

System size: The maximum number of nations in the analyses will be 114, the system size based on the number of nations who actually participated in the debates for the NIEO and interacted with one another during the two special sessions (1974 and 1975). In other words, we define our system size as an interaction system (in accordance with Assumption 6) and not as the actual number of nations in the international system. This choice is not only dictated by this theoretical perspective but also by the simple fact that we have data on aggression for only 114 nations.

Power and Development: The dimension of Power will be measured by total GNP (in constant US \$) and the dimension of Development will be measured by GNP per capita (also in constant US \$).

Prestige: The dimension of Prestige is measured by "office-holding success" as defined and operationalized by Gregg (1965).¹ The names of the "important offices" and the scales of their importance are as follows (Gregg, 1965: 150;

¹Gregg's (1965) scales and procedures have been used by Weigert and Riggs (1969) and, more recently, by Volgy and Quistgard (1974: 186-187), who added the International Court of Justice to the list and suggested that the scales were "fairly reasonable."

Volgy and Quistgard, 1974: 186-187):

The President of the General Assembly	10
Non-permanent Security Council Members	5
Chairmanships of the Main Committees	5
The President of the General Assembly, Special Sessions	4
The Vice-President of the General Assembly	3
Economic and Social Council Members	3
Members of the International Court of Justice	3
Chairmanships of the Main Committees, Special Sessions	2
Vice-Chairmanships of the Main Committees	2
Rotating Secretaries of the Trusteeship Council	2
Rapporteurs of the Main Committees	2
The Vice-President of the General Assembly, Special Sessions	1
Vice Chairmanships of the Main Committees, Special Sessions	1
Rapporteurs of the Main Committees, Special Sessions	1

Status Level: Each of the dimensions of Power, Development and Prestige will be trichotomized into parts of equal size, with the highest part representing the high status level or "topdog" (T), middle part representing medium level or "middledog" (M) and the bottom part representing the low level or "underdog" (U). In a system of 114 nations, the topdog status group will occupy ranks from 1 to 38, the middledog from 39 to 76, and the underdog from 77 to 114. In a system not evenly divisible by three (e.g., N=97 for 1965 Prestige), the extra actor, or the 65th will be assigned downward (based on the assumption that "falling" is easier than "climbing" in the social hierarchy). In case of a tie around the cut-off points (i.e., 38th and 76th for N=114 or 32nd and 64th for N=97), to retain the rule of equal

(status group) size, tied actors will be "broken" by examining the internal components of their status. Most likely (or as in fact is the case), the ties will occur in the Prestige dimension, in which case ties can be broken by comparing the identity of the "important offices" held based on the scales already constructed by Gregg (1965: 150), so that a score of 5, for example, acquired through the occupation of non-permanent Security Council seat will be defined as being more "important" than a similar score derived from any combination of either 4+1 or 3+2. When it becomes absolutely necessary, the Singer and Small (1973) rank-order will be used as a tie-breaker.

Mobility: Nations' mobility will be identified by comparing nations' status levels in both periods (i.e., 1965 and 1974). If a nation's status level in Power, for example, was middledog (M) in 1965 and remained middledog (M) in 1974, this nation was not mobile for the period examined. If the status level was middledog (M) in 1965 but topdog (T) in 1974, this nation would be mobile (upward). If in 1974 its status level was underdog (U) instead, it would be downwardly mobile. In either direction, however, its mobility would be low (M $\leftrightarrow$ T or M $\leftrightarrow$ U) but would have been high if its status level in 1965 was U and in 1974, T (U $\leftrightarrow$ T). This type of mobility will be labelled "class" mobility (for lack of a suitable term), meaning, a movement across "status barriers" or, realistically, categories (from M to T, M to U, U to T,

etc.). It is possible for nations to move from one rank to another (from, say, 20th to 22nd) but remain within the category (in this case, T status group). This also represents nations' mobility, but only a rank mobility.¹ System mobility, on the other hand, will be indicated by the number of nations experiencing either "class" or rank mobility or by the size of the correlation between status-orderings of the same dimension at two points in time, for example, between Power rank-orderings of 1965 and Power 1974. The exact calculation is actually 1-r: if the correlation is unity, the system mobility is zero, but if less than unity, mobility is present, and the smaller the correlation size, the greater the system mobility (East, 1969; Cox and Jacobson, 1973).

Status Inconsistency: This concept will be operationalized in terms of "status profiles." In a system of three trichotomized dimensions involving Power, Development and Prestige, these profiles will range from UUU (the lowest) to TTT (the highest). An inconsistent status profile refers to any profile with at least one dimension with different status level (from UUM, UMM to MMT, MTT). These status inconsistencies are over-rewarded if Prestige is higher than either Power or

¹In the calculation of "class" and rank mobility, the effect of increased system size (from 97 in 1965 to 114 in 1974) will not be controlled. We will identify ranks of nations (i.e., in Prestige) in 1974 based on N=114 and in 1965 on N=97. We feel that increased system size is one of the legitimate "causes" of mobility either in the international system or within societies.

Development in the status profile; under-rewarded if Prestige is lower than either Power or Development. Status inconsistencies with large inconsistencies are those whose U's and T's status levels coexist in their status profiles (e.g., UUT, UMT, etc.). When U and T do not coexist in the status profiles, these status inconsistencies have low inconsistencies (e.g., UUM, MMT, etc.).

Aggression: Aggression is conceptualized as the degree of status quo or non-status quo statements in nations' speeches during the debates for the NIEO. Nine issue areas have been identified in these debates and all constitute the structural and non-structural dimensions of the international economic order (see also appendix C): 1) symbols (of the international economic order), 2) resource management and allocation, 3) regulation of the MNCs, 4) reform of the monetary system, 5) aid, 6) trade restructuring, 7) energy allocation and management, 8) food and agriculture, and 9) industrial development and technology transfer (Smyth, 1977: 587). Nations positions on these issues will be scaled from 1 (representing the least drive towards change) to 8 (representing the most drive towards change).¹ A score of

¹Smyth (1977: 591) described his procedures as follows: "The statements of each delegation for each session were coded for each of the nine issue areas mentioned earlier. The scale of ratings ranges from a minimum of 1 (representing the most conservative stance, favorable to existing arrangements, especially toward private enterprise and the free market system of trade), through more reformist positions from 2 to 4, to radical reforms from 5 to 7. Statements especially

• zero is given when no statement was made on any of the issues. Aggression or drives towards change will then be operationalized as Mean Aggression Scores (or MAS), which are constructed by adding together all scores (0 to 8) on all possible issue areas (9 in total) divided by the number of issue areas actually commented on. A nation which commented on 5 issue areas and scored 3 (on issue 1), 6 (on issue 3), 7 (on issue 4), 2 (on issue 6) and 8 (on issue 9) would have a MAS of 5.2 (which

rejecting the existing system out of hand were ranked 8. For example, positions on natural resources were ranked as follows: 1 - Proposals to exploit new resources of raw materials, primarily advanced by importing developed nations, and for a special fund to be established for this purpose; i.e., to make capital available for private enterprise to intensify exploration for resources. 2 - Proposals to organize markets and regulate stocks to ensure consumers' access to the raw materials needed by their economies. 3 - Promotion of consumer-producer cooperation through mutual consortia and negotiation to protect the interests of both. 4 - Promotion of processing of raw materials by the producer countries in order to reap a greater proportion of the benefits of their national resources. 5 - Acceptance of the principle of national sovereignty over the disposition of a country's resources, and consequently the right of a national government to regulate, control, or nationalize foreign exploitation of its state's raw materials. This position often included the idea that a state ought to treat, and be permitted to treat, these raw materials as a diminishing resource--i.e., capital which should earn not only present income but future wealth. 6 - The interests of resource producers should be guarded against the competing interests of consumer states to exploit them by paying the cheapest prices possible for raw materials. 7 - Producer associations (cartels) should be formed for raw materials in addition to oil and copper, and these should cooperate to safeguard their interests against consumer states. 8 - Consumer states that have exploited producer states in the past should be made to pay compensation for past exploitation." The aim of this "ranked scale," according to Smyth (1977: 597), is "to provide issue rankings for each participating delegation in order to compare relative militance or moderation ..." and "to rank delegations according to the most extreme statements they had made on each issue they had covered in the debate."

is 3+0+6+7+0+2+0+0+9:5). Since there were two special sessions (1974 and 1975) and the same issues were debated, the actual calculation of MAS will be based on scores from both sessions.

Participation: Following Alger (1968, 1969), Weigert and Riggs (1969) and Keohane (1969), mission's and delegation's size will be used to measure "institutional" participation (static, infra-structural kind) and the number of issue areas commented on by the delegates in their speeches during the NIEO debates will be used to measure "behavioral" participation.¹

These operationalizations will be adhered to in the analyses of objective data. In the analyses of perceptual data, the concepts of status level, Power, Development, and Prestige will be operationalized in terms of self-perception.

Data Description

All data for the independent variables have been collected for two time points (1965 and 1974).

Data for Power and Development (i.e., total GNP and GNP per capita) have been taken from World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1965-1974 (Washington, D.C., US Arms

¹ Although the first measures are rather "structural" in nature, they are necessary for the purposes of "status comparison," "differential treatment" context, and as the structural basis of equilibration attempt. The second measure is expected to tap the verbal and emotional aspect of participation. The two measures ("institutional" and "behavioral"), however, will not be combined in the analyses but the two sub-measures of "institutional" participation (i.e., delegation and mission size) will, as the figures in both instances represent real people (i.e., in absolute numbers).

Control and Disarmament Agency) and for cross-checking; The World in Figures (London: The Economist, 1976). Data for Power and Development are complete for 1974 but not for 1965. Total GNP and GNP per capita for 11 countries (Bahrein, Bangladesh, Botswana, E. Guinea, Guyana, Mauritius, Qatar, Singapore, Swaziland, United Arab Emirates and Yemen Arab Republic) are not available so estimates of these figures will be made based on average growth rates of the years 1965 to 1972. (The growth rates figures were obtained from the World Bank Atlas, Washington, D.C., 1974.) The estimates of the GNP per capita will be made using the "compound interest" formula, calculated backward: $FV = PV(1+i)^n$, where FV is "future value" (or GNP per capita of the latest year available), PV is "present value" (or the 1965 GNP value sought for), 1 is a "constant," i is the growth rate and n, the length of period between 1965 and the latest available year. For estimates of GNP total, the estimated GNP per capita is multiplied by the population size of 1965.

The rank-order of nations based on these GNP figures, especially those of the development dimension, is reasonably accurate. When the 1974 GNP per capita figures are correlated with the broadly defined Physical Quality of Life Index (Overseas Development Council, Washington, D.C.), the correlation is .64 (significant at .001 level). When the status categories themselves are checked against the development categories adopted by the same institution, the mutual

inclusion ratio is between 79% and 94%: 85% of our top-dog category in the development dimension, for example, is included in ODC's "Developed Countries" (1974), or 94% in its "High Income Countries" (1977); 79% of our middle-dog category in the development dimension is also included in the ODC's "Third World" (1974) or 76% in its "Middle Income Countries" (1977).

The names of "important offices" and the nations occupying them are collected for five years in a row: 1961-1965 for the 1965 time point and 1970-1974 for the 1974 time point.¹ Office-holding figures for the following 17 countries are not available, however, as they did not join the United Nations until the years indicated in brackets: Gambia, Singapore (1965), Barbados, Botswana, Guyana (1966), E. Guinea, Mauritius, Swaziland (1968), Bahrein, Bhutan, Oman, The People's Republic of China, Qatar, United Arab Emirates (1971), East Germany, West Germany (1973) and Bangladesh (1974). The names of offices held by various

¹The aggregation of figures for five years in a row with 1965 and 1974 as terminal years is dictated by the fact that on a yearly basis the scores are not sufficient to reflect "the distribution" of prestige as some of the important offices have terms that run for more than one year and some countries may have just completed a term in that particular year or the year before. Even though countries do get elected again (reflecting the strength of this measure), the tacit "principle of rotation" (the weakness of this measure) often comes into play. A five-year aggregation in this instance is intended to capture the "experiential" aspect of prestige since prestige evaluation is less likely to be year-bound in this sense. In a similar analysis, Weigert and Riggs (1969: 4) also aggregated their data for a five-year period.

nations were identified from the Yearbook of the United Nations (New York: Office of Public Information, 1960 through 1974). When Gregg's (1965) scales are applied to these data, the rank-order of nations has a correlation of .60 with Singer and Small's (1973) 1965 rank-order based on "diplomatic importance." This correlation is as large as that obtained between GNP per capita and the Physical Quality of Life.

Data for the dependent variable (i.e., aggression) were acquired from Smyth (1977) but the substance of the debates can be found in Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixth Special Session and Seventh Special Session, Plenary Meetings, Verbatim Records of Meetings, 9 April - 2 May 1974 and 1-16 September 1975. To test the reliability of Smyth's data, three speeches from three countries (the only ones given by each in the Seventh Special Session, 1975) were isolated and coded according to Smyth's procedure and scales: Cambodia's (representing the most radical), Singapore's (one of the most conservative) and Finland's (the "moderate"). Although the exact titles of the issues identified are not comparable, this is not critical to the data because in our operationalization all scores from all issues are added together to form the dependent variable and in the actual analysis these scores are treated as ordinal. With respect to this (i.e., Mean Aggression Scores or MAS) and the number of issues identified the two results are highly comparable (see table 4.1).

Table 4.1 Reliability Test of Smyth's Data

Countries	Issue-Areas									N of Issues Identified
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	VIII	IX	
								MAS		
				</						

Issue Areas:

I	Resources	VI	Trade
II	MNCs	VII	Energy
III	Symbols	VIII	Agriculture
IV	Monetary Reform	IX	Industrialization
V	Aid		and Development

1-8: Aggression Scales (See Appendix C)

Data for "institutional" participation have been collected from Delegations to the United Nations (1974-1975) and Permanent Missions to the United Nations (1974). Data for "behavioral" participation were extracted from Smyth's data by counting the number of issue-areas commented upon by each nation's speaker (or as identified by Smyth).

Data for perceptions of status were obtained from responses to the questionnaire sent to 114 permanent missions at the UN between November 1978 and January 1979. Table 4.2 indicates the response rates.

Table 4:2 Questionnaire Response

N of countries ("population")	114	
N of letters sent out	114	
Positive responses	63	55%
Other responses:		
declined to respond 1		
returned to sender 1	2	2%
Total coverage	65	57%

From the first wave of letters, 33 (or 29%) of the questionnaires were returned and from the follow-up letters, another 32 questionnaires (or 28%) were returned, bringing the total to 57%. This is considerably higher than Modelski's (1970: 147) return of 16.7% from foreign ministries around the world and well above the usual return for such questionnaires. As Miller (1977: 79) indicated, "response rates to mailed questionnaires are typically low, usually not exceeding 50%."

3

There is no clear-cut systematic bias between the respondents and the non-respondents or between the first respondents and the second respondents except in so far as the first respondents (vis-à-vis the second) and the respondents (vis-à-vis the non-respondents) seem to consist of countries well known in the literature and repeatedly mentioned in this thesis as having unusual interest in status, suffering from some form of atimia or status complex of one kind or another.¹

In some characteristics the returned sample is quite representative of the total "population" but in others, some biases exist. Geographically, most regions of the world are well represented: North America (3.5% vs 1.7% in the "population"), Latin America (17% vs 15%), Europe (21% vs 22%),

¹First respondents: Japan (cf. Dore, 1975: 203), UK, France (atimic according to Lagos, 1963: 25), Canada (marked by the proliferation of debates on its "middle-power," "middle-aged," or "foremost" status), Brazil (cf. Castro, 1972: 163), South Africa (the international pariah), Uganda (the status seeker?); second respondents: India (most status-conscious according to Nayar, 1975), Pakistan-Bangladesh (the downwardly and upwardly mobile), Indonesia (cf. Weinstein, 1976: 260), Saudi Arabia (the nouveau riche) and other nouveau riche OPEC members (half of whom are represented in the returned sample).

This observation, i.e., that first respondents or respondents as a whole tend to have some special interest or concern with the subject being asked, is a confirmation of a similar insight long noticed in societal analysis (cf. Edgerton, Britt and Norman, 1947: 444).

The rest of the respondents are as follows: USA, Ivory Coast, Haiti, Belgium, Netherlands, Poland, Italy, Philippines, Turkey, Sweden, Australia, Qatar, Greece, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Libya, Venezuela, Cuba, Singapore, Israel, New Zealand, Hungary, Yemen, Syria, Ethiopia, Chad, Swaziland, Ghana, Denmark, Afghanistan, Dominican Republic, Finland, Barbados, Equatorial Guinea, Malta, Colombia, Sri Lanka, Ecuador, Norway, Nepal, Zambia, Jordan, Mauritius, Oman, Guatemala, Uruguay, Peru, Tanzania, Costa Rica, Cameroon, Tunisia.

Asia (29% vs 29%), Africa (22% vs 31%) and Oceania (3% vs 1.7% in the "population"). Ideologically, the socialist countries are slightly under-represented (8% vs 12% in the "population"). In the status origins, the distribution based on objective status is quite representative. Based on perceived status, however, the underdog status is over-represented in the Power dimension, under-represented in the Prestige dimension and it is only in the Development dimension that all status groups are somewhat evenly represented (see table 4.3). The overall problem of "over-ranking," in other words, is generally the phenomenon of the Prestige dimension. Of the 34 ranks "incorrectly" identified (in the sense of being differently ranked from those in the objective data), 30 (or 88%) is due to "over-ranking." Similar phenomenon in the Power dimension involves 90% (or 37 out of 41) "under-ranking" while only 67% (or 12 out of 18) is attributed to the same phenomenon in the Development dimension. Overall, the Development dimension is the most "correctly" identified (i.e., with 71% correspondence between perceived ranks and the statistically derived version).

It is in the distribution between status consistents (SC) and status inconsistent (SI) that these data have some serious weakness, at least in terms of analysis; the SC group (as self-perceived) is too small (N=8, with the ratio 7:1 between SI and SC, as opposed to 2.5:1 ratio in the "population"). However, with N=63 there are still enough

Table 4.3 Status Distribution in the Returned Sample

Status Groups	Population			Returned Sample		
	Objective Data			Objective Data		
	Pv	D	Pr	Pv	D	Pr
Topdogs	38 (33%)	38 (33%)	(33%)	26 (41%)	24 (38%)	26 (41%)
				5 (8%)	15 (24%)	14 (70%)
Middledogs	38 (33%)	38 (33%)	38 (33%)	22 (35%)	24 (38%)	17 (27%)
				24 (38%)	34 (54%)	16 (25%)
Underdogs	38 (33%)	38 (33%)	38 (33%)	15 (24%)	15 (24%)	20 (32%)
				34 (54%)	14 (22%)	3 (5%)

countries in which to test types of status inconsistency (large-small status inconsistency, status inconsistency between PW-Pr, D-Pr and so on). Furthermore, a time lapse of three years between the years of the NIEO debates and the year the questionnaire was administered must be taken into consideration although all major status and prestige-changing events in the past three years have affected mostly countries which happen not to have responded to the questionnaire:

Sadat's peace overture (Egypt), Southeast Asian conflict

(Cambodia) and, more recently, Iran's upheaval (Iran).

Lastly, we tried to "validate" the UN diplomats' responses with those of foreign students in Ottawa; the result here is not clear cut either, although it confirms two important observations, already arrived at through the comparison between objective and perceptual data: 1) that the Development dimension is the best identified dimension and the Power and Prestige dimensions are the most controversial (65% or 11 out of 17 ranks on Power, 82% or 14 out of 17 ranks on Development, and 29% or 5 out of 17 ranks on Prestige were "correctly" identified by the students); 2) in spite of these, 76% (13 out of 17) of status profiles (i.e., whether they are SCs or SIs) were "correctly" stated.¹ From this

¹The same questionnaire as sent to the UN was administered to the 25 nationalities among the student population at Carleton's School of International Affairs and Political Science Department. Seventeen of these

test and from the analysis of objective data it appears that the UN perceptual data, when compared with the objective data, are systematically under-ranked in the Power dimension and systematically over-ranked in the Prestige dimension. This, ironically enough, may be attributed to the importance attached to the Prestige dimension by nations in the United Nations and in the world as a whole.

Statistical Techniques

The purpose of the tests is to see if the status inconsistencies as a group have a higher drive towards change than the status consistents as a whole. It is to ascertain, as Galtung (1964a: 98) put it, "where in the social positions aggression is most likely to arise" and not whether aggression is "caused" by status inconsistency or any other status configurations. The latter question is believed by many to be methodologically unanswerable (cf. Kriesberg, 1973: 72) or if it is, the answer is fraught with methodological problems (cf. Blalock, 1967, 1966; Galtung, 1969: 75). The empirical tests to be undertaken here, in other words,

(United States, Canada, United Kingdom, Netherlands, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Japan, South Africa, Belgium, India, Israel, Ethiopia, Uganda, Zambia, Ghana, Peru) have counterparts in the data coming from the UN, thus the students' and the UN diplomats' answers were compared on how they ranked their countries.

will not attempt to establish the empirical link between status and status inconsistency with aggression (in causal terms) but to establish the linkage between status (consistent or inconsistent) nations and their aggressive behavior (in correlational terms). Given the two groups of nations, we are interested in establishing whether or not a difference exists in their Mean Aggression Scores (or MAS) and, secondly, if this difference is statistically significant.

The answers to this and other questions formulated in the same manner (such as the differences in MAS between over-rewarded and under-rewarded, mobile or non-mobile, high-participating or low-participating status groups) can be established by any statistic which deals with comparison of (group) means as its central function, such as z-test, t-test or analysis of variance. These parametric statistics, however, require interval level data, an assumption which our operationalized measure of aggression cannot rigorously meet. Furthermore, tests such as the t-test, which would have been just as appropriate as any for our theoretical concern, require other assumptions as well: approximately similar sample size, normal distribution of population and homogeneity of variances. Although a violation of these assumptions, in some instances, leaves the test relatively unaffected (Downie and Heath, 1974: 173), the assumption of interval data cannot be satisfactorily met by our study. Therefore, we resort to the nonparametric alternative to the t-test.

For all tests which involve a comparison of aggression scores (or MAS), the Mann-Whitney U-test will be used for two groups and the Kruskal-Wallis H-test for three groups.¹ Both of these tests require only ordinal data and they do not require normality of distribution or homogeneity of variances of the groups under study (Downie and Heath, 1974: 265). The Mann-Whitney U-test is a nonparametric alternative to the t-test (Roscoe, 1969: 175) and is a "powerful" and "excellent" substitute for such test (Downie and Heath, 1974: 268). It is almost as powerful as the t-test, having, according to Roscoe (1969: 175), about 95% "relative power" with "typical research samples."² The Kruskal-Wallis H-test is also a nonparametric statistic and is an alternative for a one-way analysis of variance (Freund, 1967: 323). This test, according to Downie and Heath (1974: 271) is a "powerful nonparametric test," and "is most appropriate for more than two samples and is considered one of the most sensitive nonparametric tests" (Garson, 1971: 152).

¹In the actual calculation, it is the ranks of the MAS that are used. But (MAS) scores will accompany all tables as they are not only useful for visual comparison but also because indirectly it is the size of these scores that we are actually comparing (see Freund, 1967: 320-321).

²The "power" of a statistical test refers to the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis when it is actually false. "Power" is equal to 1 minus the probability of making a Type II error, or $1 - \beta$ (Downie and Heath, 1974: 260). Type II errors consist of not rejecting the null hypothesis when it should be rejected while Type I errors consist of rejecting the null hypothesis when it is actually true.

In an experimental design, the test about mean differences involves a "drawing" of two "random samples" from "the same parent population," a "subjection" of each to a "different experimental treatment" and a comparison of both on "a single criterion" (Roscoe, 1969: 175). Our tests, however, do not involve any "experimental treatment" of the groups. What we do then is to "designate one of the groups as a control group" (Roscoe, 1969: 175), so that, stated in terms of our research problem, the procedure involves the identification of two (or three) groups (e.g., status consistent and status inconsistent), depending on the hypotheses, from the "same parent population" (i.e., the 114 nations for which we have aggression scores) and the comparison of the two on a single criterion (i.e., the levels of the Mean Aggression Scores). For two groups, the Mann-Whitney U-test will be used to test the statistical significance of the difference between MAS of two groups and Kruskal-Wallis H-test for a test involving three groups.

The Mann-Whitney test is calculated by this formula:

$$U_1 = N_1 N_2 + \frac{N_1 (N_2 + 1)}{2} - ER_X \quad \text{and}$$

$$U_2 = N_1 N_2 + \frac{N_2 (N_1 + 1)}{2} - ER_Y \quad \text{for } N \leq 20,$$

$$U_1 - (N_1 N_2 / 2)$$

$$z = \frac{U_1 - (N_1 N_2 / 2)}{\sqrt{\{N_1 N_2 (N_1 + N_2 + 1) / 2\}}} \quad \text{for } N > 20,$$

where N = number of units in group(s),
 R_x = sum of ranks of group x,
 R_y = sum of ranks of group y.

The Kruskal-Wallis test is calculated by this formula:

$$H = \frac{12}{N(N+1)} \left[\frac{\sum R_i^2}{N_i} \right] - 3(N+1),$$

where N = number in all groups combined,
 R_i = sum of ranks in i groups,
 N_i = number in i samples.

When $N > 20$, U significance is read from z table; when less, from U table (significant when U obtained is equal or less than U in table). Similarly, when $N > 5$, H significance is read from χ^2 table, with $df = (k-1)$.

The significance level will be set at a maximum of .05 (for a two-tailed test) or .025 (for a one-tailed test). As most of our hypotheses are unidirectional in nature, one-tailed tests will be used most often. This level of significance has been chosen because, apart from being a customary one (Downie and Heath, 1974: 166), it is also appropriate for our "sample" size. More importantly, it is consistent with our theoretical concerns, especially status inconsistency. We are more interested in preventing Type I errors (i.e., errors of rejecting the null hypothesis when it is actually true) because we are mostly concerned with what we have stated earlier as the proliferation of "intuitive explanations" of status inconsistency; status inconsistency

theory is not a theory on the frontiers of human knowledge or even a "new" theory which should be treated with caution, but one that has proliferated beyond control.

The .05 significance level (for two-tailed) or .025 (for one-tailed) will apply to other tests as well (such as tests on absolute status level and status mobility). The tests of absolute status levels (T,M,U in any dimension) and aggression will involve the Kruskal-Wallis H-test. In addition, Kendall's tau correlation coefficients will be consulted from the matrix which will be constructed to examine the overall relationships among the variables (Aggression, "behavioral" participation, Prestige 1965, Prestige 1974, Development 1965, Development 1974, Power 1965, Power 1974, delegation size and mission size). Kendall's tau is chosen for theoretical reasons already stated, i.e., that we have decided to interpret our data in no higher than ordinal terms consistent to the spirit of status theories and to the manner by which we believe nations perceive their positions in the international hierarchy. Methodologically, we chose Kendall's tau over Spearman's rho because some ties appear in the data especially in the Prestige and "institutional" participation data. Kendall's tau, furthermore, "is preferred by many statisticians over [Spearman's] rho" (Downie and Heath, 1974: 120), although they are interpreted in the same manner. The size of the correlations, however, tend to be smaller in size than that of Spearman's rho.

The analysis of the degree of "class" mobility in the system (or system mobility) will be implemented through direct frequency counts, i.e., that we will count the number of countries experiencing mobility in each status group (top-dog, middle-dog and under-dog) and total up the number in each dimension (Power, Development and Prestige). This will be done by consulting the "master" table (table 5.3), which contains all information on mobility. The significance of the distribution of numbers (in this case in a 3x3 table) will be read from the levels of their contingency coefficients, C , a statistic which requires no assumption about the population distribution, and is applicable to data that are normal or skewed, continuous or discrete, nominal or ordinal (Downie and Heath, 1974: 203). The degree of rank mobility in the system will also be established by frequency counts with the significance of the distribution to be read from the same statistics or χ^2 for a smaller table.

CHAPTER 5

THE EMPIRICAL STUDY: TESTS AND ANALYSES

Tests of Hypotheses: Objective Data

- H1.1: Nations with high status (in either Power, Development or Prestige) will exhibit the lowest drive towards change.
- H1.2: The low status nations will exhibit the highest drive towards change.
- H1.3: The medium status nations will exhibit such drive at the level between those of the other two status groups.

First of all, we divide the nations into three equal status groups based on ranks and the Mean Aggression Scores of each group is calculated. We then test the above hypotheses against the null hypothesis of no difference in the levels of aggression of the three status groups ($MAS_T = MAS_M = MAS_U$). The null hypothesis can be rejected if the H value (of Kruskal-Wallis H-test) obtained is equal or larger than 7.82 (i.e., the minimum χ^2 value which must be obtained for .025 level of significance and 2 degrees of freedom). Table 5.1 summarizes the results of the test. As can be seen, the levels of aggression of the three groups in either Power, Development, or Prestige dimensions are all different. Only in Power and Development, however, are these differences statistically significant and in the same dimensions is the order of MAS as predicted ($MAS_T < MAS_M < MAS_U$). The difference in the level of aggression appears to be greater between the topdog and

Table 5.1 Status Levels and Aggression

Status Levels	N	MAS	Min χ^2 at .025, 2df	H obtained	Signifi- cance
High Pw (T)	38	4.44	≥ 7.82	16.36	.001
Medium Pw (M)	38	4.99			
Low Pw (U)	38	5.47			
High D (T)	38	4.33	≥ 7.82	18	.001
Medium D (M)	38	5.41			
Low D (U)	38	5.16			
High Pr (T)	38	4.92	≥ 7.82	2.92	.30
Medium Pr (M)	38	4.95			
Low Pr (U)	38	5.03			

the other two lower groups in the Development dimension and between the underdog group and the other two higher groups in the Power dimension. In fact, in the Prestige dimension, the difference in the levels of aggression between the two higher groups (T and M) virtually disappeared while the difference between these two groups and lower one were considerably reduced. Though the order of aggression levels in Prestige is still as predicted, the differences among the levels of aggression are not significant.

These findings are consistent with the figures revealed by the Kendall's correlation coefficient matrix (table 5.2): the relationships between Power, Development and Prestige with aggression are all negative (indicating lower aggression with greater status or the "proper" order of MAS size) but the relationships are only significant (at .001 and .002) in

Table 5.2

CORRELATIONS COEFFICIENTS MATRIX
(Kendall's tau)

Variables	Aggression	Particip. (Behav.)	Prestige 1965	Prestige 1974	Develop. 1965	Develop. 1974	Power 1965	Power 1974	Delegat. Size	Mission Size
Aggression										
Particip. (Behav.)	-.02**									
Prestige 1965	-.16*	.14*								
Prestige 1974	-.06**	.22	.40*							
Develop. 1965	-.17	.17	.25*	.12						
Develop. 1974	-.18	.19	.25*	.09**	.89					
Power 1965	-.20	.27	.45*	.43	.42	.39				
Power 1974	-.21	.28	.43*	.39	.43	.43	.92			
Delegat. Size	-.08**	.29	.26*	.36	.28	.27	.54	.53		
Mission Size	-.07**	.24	.27*	.41	.19	.18	.54	.55	.49	

* N = 97

** not significant at .05

Power and Development (-.21 and -.18) and not in Prestige (-.06, with significance level of .18). Minor discrepancies exist only in the order of MAS in the Development dimension (M>U>T instead of U>M>T as in other dimensions) and the size of the Kendall's tau and the H values in Power and Development dimensions which are reversed (-.21 and -.18 vs 16.36 and 18). But both discrepancies are insignificant because the difference in MAS size between medium Development and low Development levels is much smaller ($5.41 - 5.16 = .25$) than that between high Development and medium Development levels ($5.41 - 4.33 = 1.08$). This "gap" alone accounts for most of the variance in the Development dimension in the Kruskal-Wallis test, which in turn explains the larger H value obtained. We therefore reject the null hypothesis of no statistically significant differences in the size of MAS among the status groups in the Power and Development dimensions but we accept the null hypothesis in the Prestige dimension.

- H2.1: The level of mobility in Prestige is (expected to be) higher than those in either Power or Development.
- H2.2: The least mobility is in the high and low status groups and the most is in the middle.
- H2.3: Mobility has been more within "status barriers" (or categories) than between or across.

To test these hypotheses, simple frequency counts and cross-tabulation tables will be used. Distinctions will be made between "class" mobility (M_C) and rank mobility (M_R). As before, we rank countries in Power, Development and Prestige dimensions and we divide the nations into three equal size categories (T, M, U). The hypotheses will be tested against

the null hypotheses of no difference in the amount of mobility in any dimension ($M_{pw} = M_D = M_{Pr}$), any status levels ($M_T = M_M = M_U$), or between "class" mobility and rank mobility ($M_C = M_R$). For a 3x3 table, contingency coefficient C will be used to test the goodness of fit and χ^2 for the smaller table (i.e., in "class" mobility). In both instances, .05 level of significance will be maintained.

First of all, as can be seen from the size of the rank-order correlations in the correlation matrix (table 5.2), there is a variation in the degree of mobility, in this case rank mobility, in the dimensions of international stratification. The least mobility occurred in the Power dimension, where the correlation between rank-orders of Power in 1965 and Power in 1974 nearly approached unity (.92, significant at .001 level), indicating that ranks of nations in 1965 and in 1974 were virtually unchanged. The second largest correlation is between Development in 1965 and Development in 1974 (.89, significant at .001 level), indicating that little mobility took place here as well. The rank-order correlation between Prestige of 1965 and that of 1974, however, showed the smallest albeit significant correlation (.40, significant at .001 level), indicating that the greatest amount of mobility occurred along this dimension. But since this dimension is a micro-dimension specific to the UN system (but certainly with some correspondence in the prestige hierarchy in the international system as a whole) this mobility represents rank mobility in

Table 5.3 RANKS, STATUS PROFILES, AND MOBILITY

	Ranks 1974			Ranks 1965			Rank Mobility			Profiles 1974			SC/SI	Profiles 1965			"Class" Mobility		
	Pw	D	Pr	Pw	D	Pr	Pw	D	Pr	Pw	D	Pr	SC/SI	Pw	D	Pr	Pw	D	Pr
USA	1	4	3	1	3	2	0	-	-	T	T	T	SC	T	T	T	0	0	0
USSR	2	23.5	1	2	20	2	0	-	+	T	T	T	SC	T	T	T	0	0	0
JAPA	3	19	8	4	22	7.5	+	+	-	T	T	T	SC	T	T	T	0	0	0
WGER	4	5	73	3	4	*****	-	-	*	T	T	M	SI	T	T	*	0	0	*
FRAN	5	10	5	5	10	4	0	0	-	T	T	T	SC	T	T	T	0	0	0
CHIN	6	84	17	7	79.5	*****	+	-	*	T	U	T	SI	T	U	*	0	0	*
ENGL	7	21	3	6	15	2	-	-	-	T	T	T	SC	T	T	T	0	0	0
ITAL	8	26	13	8	23	5.5	0	0	-	T	T	T	SC	T	T	T	0	0	0
CANA	9	6	55.5	9	6	44.5	0	+	-	T	T	M	SI	T	T	M	0	0	0
BRAZ	10	50	31	14	54	14	+	+	-	T	M	T	SI	T	M	T	0	0	0
INDI	11	102	27	10	101	17	-	-	-	T	U	T	SI	T	U	T	0	0	0
POLA	12	28	3	11	27	9	-	-	+	T	T	T	SC	T	T	T	0	0	0
SPAI	13	33	10.5	15	31	41.5	+	-	+	T	T	T	SC	T	T	M	0	0	+
NETH	14	13	49.5	12	13	22.5	-	0	-	T	T	M	SI	T	T	T	0	0	0
AUSS	15	14	24	17	14	13	+	0	-	T	T	T	SC	T	T	T	0	0	0
EDER	16	20	82.5	15	19	*****	-	-	*	T	T	U	SI	T	T	*	0	0	*
SWED	17	3	17	13	2	72.5	-	-	+	T	T	T	SC	T	T	U	0	0	+
MEXI	18	46	27	20	44.5	22.5	+	-	-	T	M	T	SI	T	M	T	0	0	0
BELG	19	11.5	17	18	12	57.5	-	+	+	T	T	T	SC	T	T	M	0	0	+
CZEC	20	22	36.5	19	18	22.5	-	-	-	T	T	T	SC	T	T	T	0	0	0
ROMA	21	32	55.5	22	32	17	+	0	-	T	T	M	SI	T	T	T	0	0	-
ARGE	22	38	12	21	33	5.5	-	-	-	T	T	T	SC	T	T	T	0	0	0
AUST	23	17	40	24	16	50.5	+	-	+	T	T	M	SI	T	T	M	0	0	0
SAFR	24.5	42	104	25	36	72.5	+	-	-	T	M	U	SI	T	T	U	0	0	0
IRAN	24.5	49	64	32	57	68	+	+	+	T	M	M	SI	T	M	U	0	0	+
DENM	26	7	75.5	23	7	17	-	0	-	T	T	M	SI	T	T	T	0	0	-
SAUD	27	15	104	54	40	85.5	+	+	-	T	T	U	SI	M	M	U	+	+	0
YUGO	28	41	14	27	46	31	-	+	+	T	M	T	SI	T	M	T	0	0	0
TURK	29	55.5	75.5	29	58	44.5	0	+	-	T	M	M	SI	T	M	M	0	0	0
HUNG	30	29.5	24	26	26	50.5	-	-	+	T	T	T	SC	T	T	M	0	0	+
NORW	31	11.5	36.5	28	9	31	-	-	-	T	T	T	SC	T	T	T	0	0	0
FINL	32.5	18	21	30.5	17	49	-	-	+	T	T	T	SC	T	T	M	0	0	+
BULG	32.5	29.5	61	34	30	22.5	+	+	-	T	T	M	SI	T	T	T	0	0	-
VENE	34	35	31	30.5	28	7.5	-	-	-	T	T	T	SC	T	T	T	0	0	0
INDO	35	101	9	33	106	53.5	-	+	+	T	U	T	SI	T	U	M	0	0	+
GREC	36	34	34	38	34	15	+	0	-	T	T	T	SC	T	T	T	0	0	0
NIGE	37	61	21	35	77	68	-	-	+	T	U	T	SI	T	U	U	0	0	+
NZEA	38	16	49.5	37	11	47.5	-	-	-	T	T	M	SI	T	T	M	0	0	0

Note:

1. The positions of US and USSR in Prestige (1974) is only separated by a marginal three-point office. The US position in this dimension is tied with England and Poland in 1974 and with USSR and England in 1965.
2. Scandinavian countries and Canada did not do well in the Prestige dimension in spite of their impeccable reputations in the system.
3. Although Indonesia and Nigeria "improved" their positions in the Prestige dimension,

	Ranks 1974			Ranks 1965			Rank Mobility			Profiles 1974			SC/SI	Profiles 1965			"Class" Mobility		
	Pw	D	Pr	Pw	D	Pr	Pw	D	Pr	Pw	D	Pr	SC/SI	Pw	D	Pr	Pw	D	Pr
PORT	39	36.5	92	41	42	85.5	+	+	-	M	T	U	SI	M	M	U	0	+	0
PHIL	40	79.5	7	42	76	29	+	-	+	M	U	T	SI	M	M	T	0	-	0
CCLO	41	66	40	43	68	31	+	+	-	M	M	M	SC	M	M	T	0	0	-
EGYP	42	78	55.5	39	75	11	-	-	-	M	U	M	SI	M	M	T	0	-	-
PERU	43	54	21	44	52	22.5	+	-	+	M	M	T	SI	M	M	T	0	0	0
THAI	44	83	88.5	45	86	85.5	+	+	-	M	U	U	SI	M	U	U	0	0	0
ISRA	45	25	104	47	21	68	+	-	-	M	T	U	SI	M	T	U	0	0	0
PAKI	46	99	31	36	109	12	-	+	-	M	U	T	SI	T	U	T	-	0	0
ALGE	47	60	42	49	59	53.5	+	-	+	M	M	M	SC	M	M	M	0	0	0
KUWA	48	1	92	50	1	85.5	+	0	-	M	T	U	SI	M	T	U	0	0	0
BANG	49	105	104	40	104	*****	-	-	*	M	U	U	SI	M	U	*	0	0	*
IRAQ	50	53	45	52	53	41.5	+	0	-	M	M	M	SC	M	M	M	0	0	0
MALY	51	57	70.5	51	56	85.5	0	-	+	M	M	M	SC	M	M	U	0	0	+
IREL	52	27	73	48	25	19	-	-	-	M	T	M	SI	M	T	T	0	0	-
LIBY	53	23.5	88.5	55	24	57.5	+	+	-	M	T	U	SI	M	T	M	0	0	-
MORO	54	75	85.5	53	74	39	-	-	-	M	M	U	SI	M	M	M	0	0	-
CUBA	55	55.5	104	46	47	68	+	-	-	M	M	U	SI	M	M	U	0	0	0
SING	56	31	104	63	38	*****	+	+	*	M	T	U	SI	M	T	*	0	0	*
ZAIR	57	94	61	58	93	85.5	+	-	+	M	U	M	SI	M	U	U	0	0	+
GHAN	58	76	38	57	72	10	-	-	-	M	M	T	SI	M	M	T	0	0	0
LESA	59	44	6	62	44.5	85.5	+	+	+	M	M	T	SI	M	M	U	0	0	+
TUNI	60	62	45	68	67	26.5	+	+	-	M	M	M	SC	M	M	T	0	0	-
SRI L	62	86	55.5	61	84	26.5	-	-	-	M	U	M	SI	M	U	T	0	0	-
GUAT	62	64	82.5	65	65	53.5	+	+	-	M	M	U	SI	M	M	M	0	0	-
IVOR	62	58	79	69	62	53.5	+	-	-	M	M	U	SI	M	M	M	0	0	-
SYRI	64	69.5	55.5	66.5	73	62	+	+	+	M	M	M	SC	M	M	M	0	0	0
ECUA	65	69.5	34	66.5	71	22.5	+	+	-	M	M	T	SI	M	M	T	0	0	0
URUG	66	48	10.5	56	37	36	-	-	+	M	M	T	SI	M	T	M	0	-	+
DOMI	67	59	92	73	66	85.5	+	+	-	M	M	U	SI	M	M	U	0	0	0
ZAMB	68	63	34	59	51	85.5	-	-	+	M	M	T	SI	M	M	U	0	0	+
SUDA	69	97	17	60	91	36	-	-	+	M	U	T	SI	M	U	M	0	0	+
KENY	70	91	17	71	95	85.5	+	+	+	M	U	T	SI	M	U	U	0	0	+
ETHY	71	109	55.5	64	111	39	-	+	-	M	U	M	SI	M	U	M	0	0	0
LUXE	72	9	104	70	5	62	-	-	-	M	T	U	SI	M	T	M	0	0	-
TANZ	73	98	82.5	76	103	85.5	+	+	+	M	U	U	SI	M	U	U	0	0	0
JAMA	74	47	40	74	43	68	0	-	+	M	M	M	SC	M	M	U	0	0	+
UGAN	75	93	67.5	72	90	85.5	-	-	+	M	U	M	SI	M	U	U	0	0	+
UAE	76	2	85.5	99	29	*****	+	+	*	M	T	U	SI	U	T	*	+	0	*

their "success" cannot be linked with the general OPEC prestige for certain as only 5 out of 10 (three were not UN members in 1965) improved their positions in 1974.

4. There has been a general decline in the Prestige dimension of the Third World nations that used to play leadership roles in the early 60's (Nasser's Egypt, Nehru's India and Nkrumah's Ghana). The same can be said of the Latin American nations as in fact noticed by East (1969).
5. A new crop of Third World countries, on the other hand (e.g., Zambia, Kenya, Sudan,

	Ranks 1974			Ranks 1965			Rank Mobility			Profiles 1974			SC/SI	Profiles 1965			"Class" Mobility		
	Pw	D	Pr	Pw	D	Pr	Pw	D	Pr	Pw	D	Pr	SC/SI	Pw	D	Pr	Pw	D	Pr
AFGH	77	108	70.5	75	110	47.5	-	+	-	U	U	M	SI	M	U	M	-	0	0
COST	78	51	67.5	83	50	33.5	+	-	-	U	M	M	SI	U	M	M	0	0	0
CAME	79	82	49.5	79	81.5	62	0	-	+	U	U	M	SI	U	U	M	0	0	0
MADA	80	89	64	77.5	83	57.5	-	-	-	U	U	M	SI	U	U	M	0	0	0
NEPA	81	106	55.5	80	105	85.5	-	-	+	U	U	M	SI	U	U	U	0	0	+
SENE	82	77	24	77.5	70	36	-	-	-	U	U	T	SI	U	M	M	0	-	+
ALBA	83	65	104	81.5	55	68	-	-	-	U	M	U	SI	U	M	M	0	0	0
BOLI	84	85	49.5	84	85	39	0	0	-	U	U	M	SI	U	U	M	0	0	0
JORD	85	71	88.5	85	64	33.5	0	-	-	U	M	U	SI	U	M	M	0	0	-
CYPR	86	40	67.5	87	35	62	+	-	-	U	M	M	SI	U	T	M	0	-	0
MONG	87	61	55.5	81.5	41	85.5	-	-	+	U	M	M	SI	U	M	U	0	0	+
HATT	88	96	45	88	94	44.5	0	0	-	U	U	M	SI	U	U	M	0	0	0
GABO	89	36.5	104	94	48	85.5	+	+	-	U	T	U	SI	U	M	U	0	+	0
GUIN	90	95	29	89	96	44.5	-	+	+	U	U	T	SI	U	U	M	0	0	+
CAMB	91	110.5	104	86	102	85.5	-	-	-	U	U	U	SC	U	U	U	0	0	0
OMAN	92	52	104	109	81.5	*****	+	+	+	U	M	U	SI	U	U	U	+	0	+
QATA	93	8	104	92.5	6	*****	-	-	+	U	T	U	SI	U	T	U	+	0	+
SLEO	94	92	45	91	89	85.5	-	-	+	U	U	M	SI	U	U	U	0	0	+
LIBE	95	79.5	82.5	100	78	28	+	-	-	U	U	U	SC	U	U	T	0	0	-
TOGO	96	87.5	104	96	88	68	0	+	-	U	U	U	SC	U	U	U	0	0	0
MALI	97	113	64	92.5	112	85.5	-	-	+	U	U	M	SI	U	U	U	0	0	+
MALT	98	39	88.5	104	49	85.5	+	+	-	U	M	U	SI	U	M	U	0	0	0
CHAD	99	107	79	90	100	85.5	-	-	+	U	U	U	SC	U	U	U	0	0	0
MAUS	100	67	67.5	97	69	*****	-	+	+	U	M	M	SI	U	M	U	0	0	+
DAHO	101	100	45	95	99	57.5	-	-	+	U	U	M	SI	U	U	M	0	0	0
LAOS	102	104	104	102	108	85.5	0	+	-	U	U	U	SC	U	U	U	0	0	0
GUYA	103	68	77	98	60	*****	-	-	+	U	M	U	SI	U	M	U	+	0	+
BURU	104	112	27	101	113	85.5	-	+	+	U	U	T	SI	U	U	U	0	0	+
MAUR	105	87.5	73	105	79.5	85.5	0	-	+	U	U	M	SI	U	U	U	0	0	+
BARB	106	43	104	110	63	*****	+	+	+	U	M	U	SI	U	M	U	+	0	+
SOMA	107.5	110.5	61	103	107	62	-	-	+	U	U	M	SI	U	M	U	0	-	+
BOTS	107.5	72	104	112	98	*****	+	+	+	U	M	U	SI	U	U	U	+	0	+
BAHR	109	45	104	106	39	*****	-	-	+	U	M	U	SI	U	M	U	+	0	+
YEYE	110	103	79	107	97	85.5	-	-	+	U	U	U	SC	U	U	U	0	0	0
S/AZ	111	73	104	111	87	*****	0	-	+	U	M	U	SI	U	U	U	+	0	+
EGUI	112	74	104	108	61	*****	-	-	+	U	M	U	SI	U	M	U	+	0	+
BHUT	113	114	104	114	114	*****	+	0	+	U	U	U	SC	U	U	U	+	0	+
GAMB	114	90	104	113	92	*****	-	+	+	U	U	U	SC	U	U	U	+	0	+

Tanzania, Algeria, Iran, Jamaica) appeared to be on the rise as they became outspoken on the issues of the new international economic order or NIEO.

the UN only. (The exact identity of nations experiencing mobility in this and other dimensions can be visually examined from table 5.3.)

When we examine the number of nations with upward mobility sign (+) and downward mobility sign (-) in "class" mobility (from table 5.3), we find that the number of mobile nations in each dimension is also in the same order as that indicated by the rank-order correlations of Kendall's tau: $M_{Pr} > M_D > M_{Pw}$, thus the null hypothesis of no difference in the degree of mobility in each dimension of international stratification must be rejected. The exact figures can be seen from table 5.4.

This table also indicates the different levels of mobility attainable in "class" mobility and rank mobility. Whereas in "class" mobility only a handful of nations were mobile in Power, Development, and Prestige (4%, 11%, and 43% respectively), the size of these figures is considerably larger in rank mobility (86%, 90%, and 100% in Power, Development, and Prestige respectively). The order of these percentages too is still unchanged, i.e., $M_{Pr} > M_D > M_{Pw}$. So hypothesis H2.3 is more plausible than its null version.

If we examine the figures from the sub-total of table 5.4, we can identify the status memberships of these mobile nations. Table 5.5 indicates that most mobility has been experienced by the middle level status group. However, we need to know if the share of mobility of this status group

Table 5.4 Distribution of Mobility

Mobility	Direction	Pv	"Class" Mobility D	Pr	Pv	Rank Mobility D	Pr
Yes	+	2 (1.7%)	6 (5%)	26 (27%)	44 (38.6%)	38 (33%)	38 (39.2%)
	-	2 (1.7%)	7 (6%)	16 (16%)	54 (47.4%)	65 (57%)	59 (60.8%)
No	Sub-total	4 (3.5%)	13 (11%)	42 (43%)	98 (86%)	103 (90%)	97 (100%)
	0	110 (96.5%)	101 (89%)	55 (57%)	16 (14%)	11 (10%)	0 (0%)
	Total	114 (100%)	114 (100%)	97 (100%)	114 (100%)	114 (100%)	97 (100%)

Table 5.5 Status Memberships of Status Mobility

Status Groups		"Class" Mobility			Total	Rank Mobility			Total
		Pw	D	Pr		Pw	D	Pr	
Topdog	(T)	1	2	12	15	32	32	35	99
Middledog	(M)	2	4	19	25	36	36	35	107
Underdog	(U)	1	7	11	19	30	35	27	92
Total		4	13	42	59	98	103	97	298

is statistically different from that based on random distribution alone. To avoid cell values of less than 2, we add up all mobility figures across dimensions. In this case we take the total of "class" mobility, so that we have the mobility figures for the topdog group equal 15, middle status group equal 25 and underdog group equal 19 (i.e., observed frequencies). If random chances alone had prevailed, the distribution would have been approximately 1/3 each, i.e., 19.66 or rounded up to 20 (i.e., as expected frequencies). When we calculate its χ^2 , this distribution is not significantly different from what is expected to occur by chance alone (it has a χ^2 of 2.54, far below 7.82, the minimum value of χ^2 for .05 level of significance with 2 df). When the distribution of rank mobility among status groups is examined (again from table 5.5), the distribution is not significantly different from what is expected from random

chances alone either. ($C = .06$, not significant).¹ To conclude this part of the tests, we must accept the null hypothesis of no difference in the level of mobility experienced by status groups but reject the null hypotheses which suggest no difference in the level of mobility in any dimension or that "class" mobility and rank mobility are not significantly different in size.

H2.4: When mobility does occur, its influence on the drive towards change will be as follows: a) mobile nations will have lower drive towards change than the non-mobile ones; b) the upwardly mobile will have less drive towards change than the downwardly mobile; c) if mobility is high in the middle group or in the system as a whole, the middle status nations will exhibit a drive towards change lower than either the high or the low status nations.

First, we will examine the overall effect of mobility on nations' level of aggression. By this we mean to what extent the MAS of mobile group differs significantly from those of the non-mobile one. As before, we will keep the distinction between "class" and rank mobility. In "class" mobility, only those occurring in the Prestige and Development dimensions will be examined as "class" mobility in terms of

¹The rank mobility table is taken from table 5.5. This table has a χ^2 of 1.05. With 4 degrees of freedom, this value is not significant at .05 level. C then is calculated from this χ^2 following this formula:

$$C = \sqrt{\frac{\chi^2}{N + \chi^2}}, \text{ where } N \text{ is number of all units.}$$

In a 3x3 table C has an upper limit of $\sqrt{(k-1)k}$ or $\sqrt{2/3}$ or .82. But when χ^2 is significant, so is C .

Power is too small to be statistically meaningful (see tables 5.4 and 5.5). In fact, even in the Development dimension, where the non-mobile is much larger than the mobile (103 vs 13), a random sample of non-mobile ($N=13$) was drawn from the non-mobile group. The standard procedure was followed, i.e., the "population" was numbered consecutively and cases were drawn as their numbers appeared in the table of random numbers (Roscoe, 1969: 134-135). The statistical result, whenever samples of these kinds are drawn, must be interpreted as merely suggestive, and not definitive. We may get a strong correlation purely by chance (Freund, 1967: 360). The Mann-Whitney U-test will be utilized here and the significance level of .025 (one-tailed) will be maintained as all hypotheses are unidirectionally stated.

Table 5.6 "Class" Mobility in Prestige and Aggression

Status Profiles	N	MAS	Min z at .025	z obtained	Significance
Mobile (±)	42	4.97	≥1.96	.16	not significant
Non-Mobile (0)	55	4.62			
Mobile upward (+)	26	5.08	Max U, ≤132	U=189	not significant
Mobile downward (-)	16	4.80			

Table 5.7 "Class" Mobility in Development and Aggression

Status Profiles	N	MAS	Max U at .025	U obtained	Significance
Mobile (±)	13	4.70	≤45	61.5	not significant
Non-Mobile (0)	13*	5.54			
Mobile upward (+)	6	5.02	≤ 6	16.5	not significant
Mobile downward (-)	7	4.43			

*Random sample

As can be seen, the statistics failed to show any significant results in both tables. In other words, there is no significant difference in the levels of aggression between mobile and non-mobile nations. Neither does the distinction between upward and downward mobility succeed in uncovering any significant difference in the levels of aggression between the two groups. Even the "direction" of the size of MAS levels is somewhat "incoherent." In the Prestige dimension, we note that the mobile group has a slightly larger MAS than the non-mobile one (contrary to our theoretical prediction) and when we "break" the mobile group into mobile upward and mobile downward, the MAS level of the mobile upward is again larger than that of the mobile downward, indicating the opposite of the predicted direction. In the Development dimension, however, the picture is somewhat consistent to the prediction made by the hypotheses

(i.e., the conservative effect of mobility). The mobile group has a lower MAS than the non-mobile but, again, the upwardly mobile (of which we also stipulated a conservative effect) exhibited higher MAS.

Before we say more on this subject, however, we must examine other figures, especially those revealed by rank mobility (see tables 5.8, 5.9 and 5.10). As in tables of "class" mobility, nearly all failed to show acceptable levels of significance, except for the difference between mobile and non-mobile groups in the Power dimension. But this was the result of drawing a random sample from the mobile group as the size of the non-mobile group was too small.

Table 5.8 Rank Mobility in Power and Aggression

Status Profiles	N	MAS	Max U at .025	U obtained	Significance
Mobile (+)	16*	5.56	≤ 75	60	.001
Non-Mobile (0)	16	4.29			
Mobile (+)	16*	5.33	≤ 75	66	.01
Non-Mobile (0)	16	4.29			
Mobile upward (+)	44	5.04	$z \geq 1.96$	$z = .34$	not significant
Mobile downward (-)	54	5.05			

*Random samples

Although the Mann-Whitney U-test is thought to be insensitive to variation in sample size (Downie and Heath, 1974: 265), N of 98 and 16, or 6 to 1 is too large for meaningful comparison.

Table 5.9 Rank Mobility in Development and Aggression

Status Profiles	N	MAS	Max U at .025	U obtained	Significance
Mobile (+)	11*	5.06	≤ 30	44	not significant
Non-Mobile (0)	11	4.51			
Mobile upward (+)	38	5.00	$z \geq 1.96$	$z = .35$	not significant
Mobile downward (-)	65	5.02			

*Random sample

Table 5.10 Rank Mobility in Prestige* and Aggression

Status Profiles	N	MAS	Min z at .025	z obtained	Significance
Mobile upward (+)	38	5.08	≥ 1.96	.33	not significant
Mobile downward (-)	59	4.89			

*No non-mobile in this dimension

As we were surprised by the strong statistical significance obtained, we drew another sample and the result was the same though the significance level was somewhat reduced. What is important to note here, however, is the "direction" of the size of the MAS which is beginning to show some pattern, i.e., in most cases (7 out of 10) the mobile and the mobile upward show higher drives towards change than the non-mobile and the mobile downward. The significance test obtained in

the Power dimension (where the mobile is significantly higher in MAS than the non-mobile in two samples) serves as supporting evidence for the conclusion. As a whole, therefore, the null hypothesis of no difference cannot be rejected as only one of the tests was statistically significant and even in this the direction of MAS size was the reverse of what was predicted by hypotheses H2.4a and H2.4b.

It remains now to examine hypothesis H2.4c, where the level of aggression of the middle group, under the condition of high mobility in the middle group or in the system as a whole, is predicted to be less than those of either the topdog or the underdog group. Stated differently, in the dimension of Prestige, where both conditions are satisfied (and as indicated by tables 5.4 and 5.5), the MAS level of the middle group should be lower than those of the top and bottom groups. The null hypothesis of no difference ($H_0: MAS_M = MAS_T = MAS_U$) will be tested by the examination of Table 5.1 once again:

Status Levels	N	MAS	Min χ^2 at .025, 2df	H obtained	Significance
High Prestige	38	4.92	≥ 7.82	2.92	not significant
Medium Prestige	38	4.95			
Low Prestige	38	5.03			

The table indicates not only that the differences in MAS of the three groups are not statistically significant, but the middle group in fact has a slightly larger MAS than the high

Prestige group, though still smaller than that of the lower Prestige group. Mobility, in other words, does not seem to dampen aggression but perhaps even aggravates it (i.e., radicalizing effect), consistent with the conclusion we arrived at earlier. An examination of the dimension second to Prestige in the level of mobility (i.e., Development) also indicates that the highest level of aggression is recorded by the middle group: .5.41, compared to 5.16 and 4.33 for the lower and higher status groups (see table 5.1). The null hypothesis must therefore be accepted.

- H3.1: Status inconsistent nations will exhibit greater drive towards change than those that are not;
- H3.2: The under-rewarded status inconsistencies will be more aggressive than the over-rewarded status inconsistencies;
- H3.3: Status inconsistencies with "large" inconsistencies will be more aggressive than those with "small" inconsistencies.

Hypothesis 3.1 represents an attempt to uncover the overall behavioral implication of being status consistent or inconsistent in the international system. The two hypotheses that follow represent an attempt to "break" the status inconsistency idea into its types to examine to what extent the behavioral implication uncovered in the overall "relationship" continues to hold.

As before, all the rules of hypothesis-testing presented previously will apply here: a significance level of .025 must be attained for one-tailed tests (as we are interested in not just rejecting the null hypothesis of no significant difference in the levels of MAS between status

consistents and status inconsistent but also in whether or not the MAS level of status inconsistent group is significantly greater (as predicted by the theory) than that of the status consistent group, that of the under-rewarded status inconsistent than that of the over-rewarded and that of the "large" inconsistency group greater than that of the "small" inconsistency group.

Table 5.11 Status Inconsistency and Aggression

Status Profiles	N	MAS	Min z at .025	z obtained	Significance
SC	33	4.81	≥ 1.96	1.80	not significant
SI	81	5.03			

The table indicates that although the MAS levels of status consistent (SC) and status inconsistent (SI) groups are different (the significance level is slightly less than .05 for the one-tailed test), and the MAS level of the status inconsistent group is slightly larger than that of the status consistent group, the edge that the SI group has over the SC group in MAS level is not significant at the level we designate for the rejection of the null hypothesis (i.e., .025 one tailed).¹ When we

¹When the 1965 status profiles (SC and SI) are related to levels of aggression of 1974 (i.e., the idea of "lag" in a loose sense), the levels of aggression between the two groups are not significantly different from one another either (z value of .17, insignificant), although the "order" of MAS size is similar to that obtained in the 1974 status profiles, i.e., MAS of SI 1965 (4.98) is slightly larger than that of SC 1965 (4.94).

"break" the status inconsistent group into types (i.e., over-rewarded and under-rewarded status inconsistent), the level of significance stayed about the same with the z value dropped slightly to 1.65.

Table 5.12 Over-rewarded and Under-rewarded
SI and Aggression

Status Profiles	N	MAS	Min z at .025	z obtained	Significance
Over-rewarded SI	40	5.30	=1.96	1.65	not significant
Under-rewarded SI	41	4.77			

Although the table is not significant, it is important to note here the MAS size of the over-rewarded is larger than that of the under-rewarded status inconsistent, parallel to the findings in the mobility tests where the mobile and the mobile upward also had larger MAS than those that were not mobile.

Table 5.13 "Size" of Status Inconsistency
and Aggression

Status Profiles	N	MAS	Max U at .025	U obtained	Significance
Pw-D, large	6	5.57	=5	15	not significant
Pw-D, small	6*	5.26			
D-Pr, large	22	4.28	Min z=1.96	z=.29	not significant
D-Pr, small	50	5.05			
Pw-Pr, large	7	4.32	Max U=8	U=19.5	not significant
Pw-Pr, small	7*	4.74			

*Random samples

When we "break" the status inconsistent group differently, i.e., based on the size of their inconsistencies (and we operationalized "large" as when T and U coexist and "small" when they do not), the level of significance attained in every dimension are all insignificant. The size of MAS of each group compared does not show any consistent pattern: in status inconsistency between Power and Development (PW-D), the status inconsistent with "large" inconsistencies seem to be more aggressive than the status inconsistent with "small" inconsistencies while in status inconsistency between Development and Prestige (D-Pr) and Power and Prestige (Pw-Pr) the size of MAS is reversed, i.e., the smaller the size of the inconsistencies the larger the levels of MAS. Though this is as predicted by our hypotheses, the differences in MAS levels are all insignificant. We will therefore accept all the null hypotheses in these tests, but will comment further in the next section on hypotheses H3.1 and H3.2 (i.e., hypotheses about status inconsistency in general and its over- and under-rewarded versions) as the size of their z values obtained in both tests were somewhat larger than those in the previous tests involving mobility and status inconsistency.

H3.4: The "relationship" between status inconsistency and aggression will be influenced by status level, mobility and participation such that: a) status inconsistent nations with high status level will exhibit less drive towards change than those with low status level; b) status inconsistent nations which also experience mobility will have less drive towards change than those experiencing no mobility; c) status inconsistent with high level of participation will exhibit high drives towards change and those with low participation will exhibit relatively low drives towards change.

To test hypothesis H3.4a, we shall continue our discussion of the previous hypotheses (i.e., H3.1 and H3.2). As stated already, the relationships between status inconsistency and its over- and under-rewarded versions with aggression registered somewhat larger levels of significance than the other tests of comparable structure (cf. mobility). In this section we shall try to test hypotheses H3.4a while at the same time elucidating the statistical results produced by the tests of H3.1 and H3.2.

As indicated in the previous tests involving absolute status levels, status levels in Power and Development registered the most satisfactory levels of significance. In both Kendall's tau and the Kruskal-Wallis H-test, status levels in Power and Development recorded levels of significance of .001 or better with aggression. Table 5.14 shows the distribution of status-consistents and status-inconsistents based on "status origins."

Table 5.14 Status Origins of Status Consistency and Inconsistency

Status Levels	SC	%SC	%Total	SI	%SI	%Total
High Status	18	55%	16%	20	25%	18%
Medium Status	7	21%	6%	31	38%	27%
Low Status	8	24%	7%	30	37%	26%
Total	33	100%	29%	81	100%	71%

Table 5.14 indicates that 18 or 55% of status consistent members are high status nations whose low level of aggression has already been established. In the status inconsistent group, on the other hand, 61 or 75% of its "members" are of medium or low status nations, whose high levels of aggression have also been established. We suspect, therefore, the high level of aggression recorded by the status inconsistency-aggression statistics is attributed to status levels.

Indeed, when we "control" for the status levels in either Power or Development (i.e., by comparing the levels of MAS of the status consistent and inconsistent within the status groups in either Power or Development), the statistical significance of .05 (one tail) or .10 (two tail) obtained between status profiles (SC and SI) and aggression disappeared.

Table 5.15 Status Profiles (with Status Levels in Power controlled) and Aggression

Status Profiles	N	MAS	Max U at .025	U obtained	Significance
SC Topdog	18	4.48	≤ 112	174	not significant
SI Topdog	20	4.40			
SC Middle + Underdog	15	5.00	≤ 64	100	not significant
SI Middle + Underdog	15*	5.03			

*Random sample

Table 5.16 Status Profiles (with Status Levels in Development controlled) and Aggression

Status Profiles	N	MAS	Max U at .025	U obtained	Significance
SC Topdog	18	4.48	≤ 112	166	not significant
SI Topdog	20	4.19			
SC Middle + Underdog	15	5.20	≤ 64	73.5	not significant
SI Middle + Underdog	15*	5.15			

*Random sample

The tables indicate not only the levels of significance disappeared but the MAS size between status consistent and status inconsistent became reversed (i.e., $MAS_{SC} > MAS_{SI}$), though the difference is still insignificant. Consistent with the overall relationship between status level and aggression, however, the MAS level of the status consistent topdogs (SC Topdog) remains smaller than that of the status consistent middle- and underdogs. The same is true in the status inconsistent group, i.e., the MAS of the status inconsistent topdogs (SI Topdog) are lower than the MAS of the status inconsistent middle- and underdogs. The influence of status level is indeed very clear cut.

When we reversed the control procedure (i.e., by comparing the status levels of the status inconsistent alone), the significance level attained by status inconsistency with

high, medium and low Power or Development and aggression became even more pronounced.

Table 5.17 Status Levels in Power (with Status Profiles controlled) and Aggression

Status Levels	N	MAS	Min χ^2 at .025, 2df	H obtained	Significance
Topdog	20	4.40	≥ 7.82	10.7	.01
Middle-dog	31	4.94			
Underdog	30	5.55			

Table 5.18 Status Levels in Development (with Status Profiles controlled) and Aggression

Status Levels	N	MAS	Min χ^2 at .025, 2df	H obtained	Significance
Topdog	20	4.19	≥ 7.82	9.4	.01
Middle-dog	31	5.45			
Underdog	30	5.17			

As can be seen, the significance level attained is not only high but the order of MAS levels is the exact replica of those attained in the tables of Power and Development and aggression (table 5.1).¹ We can conclude, therefore, that the null hypothesis of no influence of status level on aggression is less plausible than its alternative hypothesis (H3.4a).

¹Similar tables for the Prestige dimension need not be analyzed as this dimension has no or weak relationship with aggression (see tables 5.1, 5.6, and 5.10).

The influence of mobility on status inconsistency and aggression (H3.4b), however, is not clear cut, exactly as depicted by the overall relationships between mobility and aggression analyzed earlier. When we "break" the status inconsistent group into mobile and non-mobile nations, and the mobile ones into mobile upward and mobile downward, the differences in their respective levels of aggression are not statistically significant at our predetermined level (.025, one tail). This is true of "class" mobility as well as rank mobility.

Table 5.19 Mobile-Non-mobile (in Prestige) Status Inconsistents and Aggression

Status Profiles	N*	MAS	Min z at .025	z obtained	Significance
SI, Mobile (+)	32	5.06	≥ 1.96	.23	not significant
SI, Non-mobile (0)	34	5.00			

*Total = 66 because N in Pr 1965 = 97 (i.e., 66=97-33SC+2 missing countries).

Table 5.20 Mobile upward-downward SI and Aggression

Status Profiles	N	MAS	Max U at .025	U obtained	Significance
SI, Mobile Upward (+)	19	5.36	≤ 72	80	not significant
SI, Mobile Downward (-)	13	4.62			

Table 5.7 (i.e., "Class" Mobility in Development and Aggression) can also be used to examine the influence of "class" mobility on status inconsistency-aggression as all cases in the table happen to be status inconsistent as well. Again, the statistics were not significant.¹ Especially worth noting from all these tables, however, is the order of the MAS levels which is always higher for the mobile and mobile upward (SI) but lower for the non-mobile and mobile downward (SI), consistent with the overall pattern of mobility influence discussed earlier.

In rank mobility, only one table (table 5.8) showed a significant statistical level, i.e., in the difference between the levels of aggression of rank-mobile and non-rank-mobile nations in the Power dimension.

Table 5.21 SI with and without Mobility in Power and Aggression

Status Profiles	N	MAS	Max U at .025	U obtained	Significance
SI, Mobile (±)	8*	5.41	≤ 13	17	not significant
SI, Non-Mobile (0)	8	4.51			

*Random sample

¹N of class mobility in Power is too small to merit a table; the same in rank mobility where all the statistics are insignificant.

Table 5.21, too, indicates that the MAS level of the mobile status inconsistent is higher than that of the non-mobile status inconsistent, but the significance level is still larger than .025 for a one-tailed test. We can conclude, therefore, that the influence of mobility on aggression is not as predicted by our hypotheses but in the direction consistent with its overall influence on aggression established earlier (i.e., a radicalizing influence), especially in the Prestige dimension. As nearly all tables were not significant, however, this influence is at best suggestive.

We can now examine the effect of participation on status inconsistency. To do this, we break the status inconsistent into high participators (P, or those ranking from 1 to 57) and low participators (p, or those ranking from 58 to 114), in both "behavioral" and "institutional" participation. We are testing the hypothesis against the null version of no difference in the levels of aggression between high and low participating status inconsistent ($H_0: MAS_P = MAS_p$). The significance of the difference in the levels of MAS between the two groups can be read from table 5.22.

As can be seen, neither of the measures of participation influence the levels of aggression of the status inconsistent group. There is no significant difference in the levels of aggression between status inconsistent nations

Table 5.22 Status Inconsistency, Levels of Participation, and Aggression

Participation (Behavioral)	N	MAS	Min z at .025	z obtained	Significance
High	41	5.28	≥ 1.96	1.03	not significant
Low	40	4.78			
Participation (Institutional)	N	MAS	Min z at .025	z obtained	Significance
High	36	5.04	≥ 1.96	.30	not significant
Low	45	5.03			

that are high participators and low participators, although the figures indicate that the high participating status inconsistencies have a slight edge over the low participating ones in the levels of their aggression, consistent to the order predicted by the hypothesis.

The "relationship" between status inconsistency and participation itself, however, is more revealing. Studies of status inconsistency in domestic societies (cf. Lenski, 1956) have established links between status inconsistency and "voluntary participation," and the conclusion was that the status inconsistent social units tended to be less participatory in their social relationships (e.g., joined few voluntary organizations, attended meetings infrequently and even when joining and attending, their sense of enjoyment was not high).

Our finding of no significant "relationship" between status inconsistency and aggression raises the question of whether the status inconsistencies do not aggress because they do not participate much in the affairs of the system (in this case the UN) or because they do play a large part in the system. Table 5.23 seems to suggest the former in that the status inconsistencies not only have lower aggression but also lower participation as well.

Table 5.23 Status Profiles and Levels of Participation

Status Profiles	N	Participation (Behavioral)	Min z at .025	z obtained	Significance
SC	33	7.12	≥ 1.96	.006	not significant
SI	81	6.80			
Status Profiles	N	Participation (Institutional)	Min z at .025	z obtained	Significance
SC	33	43.36	≥ 1.96	1.86	not significant
SI	81	28.65			
Status Profiles	N	Delegation Size	Min z at .025	z obtained	Significance
SC	33	31.25	≥ 1.96	2.74	.005
SI	81	19.70			
Status Profiles	N	Mission Size	Min z at 1.96	z obtained	Significance
SC	33	12.21	≥ 1.96	1.20	not significant
SI	81	8.93			

Table 5.23 indicates that in both types of participation the status inconsistent nations have lower mean participation than the status consistent, marginally in "behavioral" participation but by sizable margins in delegation size, mission size and the combined measure of the two, and statistically significant in delegation size. (Significance level in "institutional" participation or the combined measure based on delegation and mission-size is between .05 and .025, one tailed, and, for mission size alone, slightly larger than .10).

Although we can conclude that levels of participation do not increase or decrease the levels of aggression of the status inconsistent, levels of participation do seem to vary according to status profiles. But the possibility of spuriousness cannot be ruled out here either, because of the nature of the distribution of status levels in the status consistent and inconsistent is such that the status consistent are more topdog dominant (18 out of 33) while status inconsistent are under- and middledog dominant (30 and 31 out of 81). Furthermore, the correlations (Kendall's tau), as revealed by the matrix (table 5.2), between Power, Development, Prestige and Participation tended to be both high and positive: .53, .27, .36 with delegation size; .55, .18, .41 with mission size; and .28, .19, .22 with behavioral participation respectively (all significant at .001 level). Although the influence of absolute status on participation is strong,

we can still expect the order of the levels of participation of the status inconsistent and consistent to be the same, i.e., that the status inconsistent will have lower overall participation than the status consistent, especially with respect to delegation size.

In the next section we will test the hypotheses again on data based on perception, except hypotheses H2.1 through H2.4 and H3.4b, for which we have no such data.

Tests of Hypotheses: Perceptual Data

The purpose of the empirical tests in this section is to replicate the previous tests on data based on perception. In other words, we wish to ascertain whether the "relationships" between status and aggression obtained with the objective data also hold when status itself is operationalized in terms of the actors' (or more accurately, their formal representatives') own self-perception.¹ The empirical tests will follow the same procedures, the same operationalization, and the same order of appearance of the hypotheses as in the tests with objective data.

- H1.1: Nations with high status (in either Power, Development, or Prestige) will exhibit the lowest drive towards change.
- H1.2: Nations with low status will exhibit the highest drive towards change.
- H1.3: Nations with medium status will exhibit a drive towards change at the level between those of the other two groups.

¹Unless otherwise specified, all mention of status in this section refers to the perceived status as operationalized above.

To test these hypotheses, all countries having the same levels of status (in each dimension) will be grouped together to form the topdog (T), middledog (M), and underdog (U) groups. The hypotheses will be tested against the null-hypotheses which state that there is no significant difference in the levels of aggression (or the MAS scores) of the three groups (or $MAS_T = MAS_M = MAS_U$). The null-hypotheses will be rejected if the Kruskal-Wallis H-tests indicate H values (or χ^2) which are equal or larger than 7.82. These figures represent the minimum size of χ^2 which must be obtained for a .025 level of significance with 2 degrees of freedom. But because the topdog group in Power and the underdog group in Prestige are too small for a meaningful three-way comparison (as table 5.24 indicates only 5 topdog countries in Power and three underdog countries in Prestige), only the test on the Development dimension will be read from the χ^2 table. In the case of Power and Prestige dimensions, the significance tests will be read from the results of Mann-Whitney U-tests (or the z values when N is larger than 20) because the three groups will be collapsed into two: the small size topdog group will be combined with the middledog group in the Power dimension and the small size group will be combined with the middledog group in the Prestige dimension. The null-hypotheses will be rejected if the z values obtained are larger than 1.96 (i.e., the minimum z value necessary for the rejection of a null-hypothesis under the Mann-Whitney U-test with N larger than 20).

Table 5.24 STATUS PROFILES OF NATIONS*

	Percentual			SC/ST	Objective			SC/ST	NAS
	PV	D	Pr		PV	D	Pr		
1.	T	T	T	SC	T	T	T	SC	1.90
2.	T	T	T	SC	T	T	U	SI	2.00
3.	T	T	T	SC	T	T	T	SC	3.06
4.	T	T	T	SC	T	T	T	SC	3.85
5.	T**	M	M	SI	M	M	U	SI	5.00
6.	M	M	U		T	M	U	SI	1.50
7.	M	M	M	SC	U	U	M	SI	2.50
8.	M	T	T		T	T	M	SI	2.85
9.	M	T	T		T	T	T	SC	3.60
10.	M	T	T		T	T	M	SI	3.80
11.	M	M	T		T	T	T	SC	4.00
12.	M	M	M	SC	T	U	T	SI	4.00
13.	M	T	T		T	T	T	SC	4.20
14.	M	M	T		M	U	T	SI	4.25
15.	M	U	T		M	U	U	SI	4.28
16.	M	T	T		T	T	T	SC	4.28
17.	M	M	M	SC	T	M	M	SI	4.36
18.	M	T	T		T	T	T	SC	4.38
19.	M	M	M	SC	T	T	T	SC	4.50
20.	M	M	T		T	M	T	SI	5.00
21.	M	M	T		T	U	T	SI	5.14
22.	M	T	T		U	T	U	SI	5.17
23.	M	M	T		T	T	T	SC	5.30
24.	M	M	T		T	M	T	SI	5.36
25.	M	T	T		T	T	T	SC	5.66
26.	M	M	T		M	U	T	SI	5.71
27.	M	M	T		M	T	U	SI	6.00
28.	M	M	T		T	T	T	SC	7.00
29.	M	M	T		M	M	U	SI	7.22
30.	U	M	T		M	T	U	SI	2.40
31.	U	M	M		M	T	U	SI	3.40
32.	U	M	T		T	T	M	SI	3.67
33.	U	M	M		T	T	T	SC	3.86
34.	U	U	M		U	U	U	SC	4.00
35.	U	U	M		M	M	M	SC	4.50
36.	U	U	M		M	U	M	SI	4.50
37.	U	U	M		U	U	U	SC	4.50
38.	U	M	U		U	M	U	SI	4.50
39.	U	M	T		M	M	U	SI	4.55
40.	U	T	T		U	T	M	SI	4.60
41.	U	U	T		U	U	M	SI	4.66
42.	U	U	M		M	M	U	SI	4.66
43.	U	T	T		T	T	T	SC	4.78
44.	U	M	M		U	M	U	SI	5.00
45.	U	M	M		U	M	U	SI	5.00
46.	U	M	T		U	M	U	SI	5.00
47.	U	M	T		M	M	M	SC	5.50
48.	U	U	T		M	U	M	SI	5.50
49.	U	U	T		M	U	M	SI	5.54
50.	U	M	T		M	M	T	SI	5.55
51.	U	T	T		T	T	T	SC	5.57
52.	U	U	T		U	U	M	SI	5.66
53.	U	U	T		M	M	T	SI	5.75
54.	U	M	T		U	M	U	SI	5.80
55.	U	M	T		U	M	M	SI	5.87
56.	U	M	M		U	M	U	SI	5.90
57.	U	M	U		M	M	U	SI	6.00
58.	U	M	M		M	M	T	SI	6.00
59.	U	U	T		M	M	T	SI	6.10
60.	U	U	T		M	U	U	SI	6.28
61.	U	M	T		U	M	M	SI	6.50
62.	U	U	T		U	U	M	SI	6.56
63.	U	M	T		M	M	M	SC	6.66

22 45 29 44 N "correctly" identified

35 71 46 70 % "correctly" identified

* Names of countries are not provided because of the confidentiality we promised.

** Of all the ranks that are "incorrectly" identified, this country's rank on Power is the most puzzling especially that the ranking itself, as indicated by the accompanying letter, appeared to have been done by the top personnel in the mission.

Table 5.25 Status Levels and Aggression

Status Levels	N	MAS	Min z at .025	z or χ^2 obtained	Significance
High Pw (T)	5)	3.16)	= 1.96	z obtained 2.70	.005
Medium Pw (M)	24)	4.59)			
Low Pw (U)	34	5.13			
	29	4.34			
High D (T)	15	3.98	Min χ^2 = 7.82	χ^2 obtained 10.12	.01
Medium D (M)	34	4.94			
Low D (U)	14	5.19			
High Pr (T)	44	4.92	Min z = 1.96	z obtained 1.60	Not significant
Medium Pr (M)	16)	4.48)			
Low Pr (U)	3)	4.00)			
	19	4.40			

As can be seen from table 5.25, the size of the MAS scores of all the groups in each dimension is not only different but also significantly different in the Power and Development dimensions. It is only in the Prestige dimension that the result is not statistically significant and that the order of the MAS size is the reverse of the scores in the objective data. This means that those nations having high status in Power and Development are more likely to have lower levels of aggression than those with either medium or low status; those nations with high status in the Prestige dimension are more likely to have high levels of aggression than those with either medium or low prestige. In general, therefore, these findings are similar to the results of the analyses of objective data, i.e., that lower status is associated with higher aggression only in the

dimensions of Power and Development but not in the dimension of Prestige.

What is not similar to the results obtained in the objective data, however, is the large size of the differences between MAS scores of the topdog group and the underdog group in both Power and Development dimensions: $5.13 - 3.16 = 1.97$ in Power and $5.19 - 3.98 = 1.21$ in the Development dimension. These figures are much larger than the size of similar "gaps" obtained in the objective data: $5.47 - 4.44 = 1.03$ in Power and $5.16 - 4.33 = .83$ in the Development dimension. This fact alone may account for the high levels of statistical significance obtained in the two dimensions when perceptual rather than objective data are used.

Without actually performing the test (as the size of the topdog group is too small), the difference in the levels of aggression between the topdog and middledog groups or between topdog and underdog groups in the Power dimension appear to be sufficiently large for statistical significance. In contrast, when a test of the difference in the MAS scores between the middledog and underdog groups in the Power dimension is actually performed (as the size of both groups is large enough), this test is not significant (table 5.26). This indicates that the significance level obtained in the previous table (table 5.25) is due largely to the extremely low level of the MAS score of the high status group compared to the other two lower status ones.

Table 5.26 Status Levels (Power) and Aggression

Status Levels	N	MAS	Min z at .025	z obtained	Significance
Medium Pw (M)	24	4.59	= 1.96	1.81	Not significant
Low Pw (U)	34	5.13			

This phenomenon becomes clearer when the same two-group comparison is performed in the Development dimension, where the size of each status group is comparable.

Table 5.27 Status Levels (Development)
and Aggression

Status Levels	N	MAS	Max U at .025	U obtained	Significance
High D (T)	15	3.98	= 164	140	significant
Medium D (M)	34	4.94			
High D (T)	15	3.98	= 59	57	significant
Low D (U)	14	5.19			
Medium D (M)	34	4.94	= 151	233.5	not significant
Low D (U)	14	5.19			

This table (table 5.27) indicates that even though in the three-way comparison (table 5.25) the differences in the levels of aggression among the three groups are statistically significant, most of these are accounted for by the large difference in the levels of aggression between the topdog group vis-à-vis the other two lower status groups and not between the two lower status groups themselves.

This finding does not lead to a full acceptance of the null-hypothesis; we will accept the null-hypothesis only in the Prestige dimension but we will reject it in the Power and Development dimensions. This is another way of saying that although lower status is associated with higher aggression (in Power and Development), this is more so in the upper than in the lower cases. These results, incidentally, were also obtained in the objective data analyses except the phenomenon seems to be more pronounced when perceptual data are used. The next series of tests will shed more light on this issue.

H3.1: Status inconsistent nations will exhibit a greater drive towards change than those that are status consistent.

First of all, as stated in the section on Data Description, the status consistents are under-represented in the returned sample. There are only eight such cases out of the total of 63 countries (also see table 5.24). So the first test will be performed on data where the size of the status consistent group is only eight. To facilitate better comparability, a random sample of eight countries will be drawn from the remaining 55 cases, which are, at the same time, status inconsistent countries.

Table 5.28 Status Inconsistency and Aggression

Status Profiles	N	MAS	Max U at .025 one-tailed	U obtained	Significance
SC	8	3.27	= 13	7	.005
SI*	8	4.63			

*Random sample

First of all, the sample of status inconsistent drawn is representative as can be seen by the size of their MAS score, which is 4.63. This figure does not depart very much from the overall MAS size of the status inconsistent as a group, which is 4.98, or with the overall MAS size of the total sample, which is 4.77. We can reject with some confidence, therefore, the null-hypothesis of no significant difference in the levels of aggression between status consistent and status inconsistent because the difference in the MAS scores of the two groups is unusually large and the significance level is extremely high.

But a sample is a sample and there is always a slight chance of drawing a non-representative one (Freund, 1967: 360). So we retest the same hypothesis on types of status inconsistency which are close analytically and operationally with the way status inconsistency was operationalized above (i.e., where the size of status inconsistent sample equals eight). In a three-dimensional analysis, status inconsistency, as indicated in the section on Operationalization of Variables and Concepts, is any status profile with at least one status level different from the rest. Disaggregated, or stated in two-dimensional analysis, status inconsistency is simply any profile with one status level different from the other (or where T, M or U coexist in one status profile). We can then test the hypothesis again where status inconsistency is defined in terms of two status profiles; one based on Power and

Prestige (with N=10) and the other based on Development and Prestige (with N=37).

Table 5.29 Status Profiles (Pw-Pr) and Aggression

Status Profiles	N	MAS	Max U at .025	U obtained	Significance
SC (Pw-Pr)	10	3.67	= 23	15.5	.005
SI* (Pw-Pr)	10	5.10			

*Random sample

Table 5.30 Status Profiles (D-Pr) and Aggression

Status Profiles	N	MAS	Min z at .025	z obtained	Significance
SC (D-Pr)	26	4.20	= 1.96	3.23	.005
SI (D-Pr)	37	5.16			

As can be seen, both tables demonstrate significant differences in the aggression scores between status consistents and status inconsistent. The levels of significance are as strong as the one obtained in table 5.28, where status inconsistency is operationalized in three-dimensional terms. When compared with the results obtained in the objective data analysis (table 5.11) this level of significance is also much stronger (.005 vs .05, both one-tailed), although in both data the aggression scores of status inconsistent were shown to be higher than those of status consistent. However, based on the weakness of the significance test in the objective data (which is far below the designated level of .025 one-tailed),

we accepted the null-hypothesis in the objective data analysis, but we will reject it here. The level of significance is far too strong to have occurred merely by chance.

This "relationship" in fact still holds even when the same kind of "control" procedure as undertaken in the objective data analysis is administered here (i.e., by comparing the difference in the levels of aggression among the three status groups within the status inconsistency group alone). The assumption of this control procedure is that if the level of significance obtained earlier in the test involving comparison between status consistent and inconsistent groups (table 5.30) had been "influenced" by status levels, the results of the following two tables (tables 5.31 and 5.32) should also be significant. Table 5.31 shows the difference in the levels of aggression between two status groups within the status inconsistency group defined in terms of Development and Prestige; table 5.32 shows the differences in the levels of aggression among the three status groups within the status inconsistency group defined in terms of Power, Development, and Prestige.

Table 5.31 Status Levels in Development (with Status Profiles, D-Pr, controlled) and Aggression

Status Levels	N	MAS	Max U at .025	U obtained	Significance
Medium D (M)	23	5.15	= 98	152	Not significant
Low D (U)	14	5.18			

Table 5.32 Status Levels in Development (with Status Profiles, Pw-D-Pr, controlled) and Aggression

Status Levels	N	MAS	Min χ^2 at .025, 2df	H obtained	Significance
High D (T)	11	4.44	= 7.82	4.60	Not significant
Medium D (M)	30	5.09			
Low D (U)	14	5.18			

As can be seen, both tables indicate that the differences in the levels of aggression of all the status groups within the status inconsistency group alone are not significant, meaning that within the status inconsistency group there is no significant difference in the levels of aggression among the status inconsistent whether they have high, medium, or low status. In other words, the size of the aggression scores of the status inconsistent is relatively "homogeneous." This can also be seen from the distribution of status levels within this group (tables 5.31 and 5.32); whereas in the objective data the status inconsistent group is characterized by a relatively equal distribution between middle and low status groups, in these data the middle group is much larger than the lower status group (23 out of 37 or 62% and 30 out of 55 or 55%, as compared to 31 out of 81 or 38% in the objective data); thus extreme mean aggression scores of either size (extremely small or extremely large) are minimal.

We will now move to the testing of other types of status inconsistency.

- H3.2: The under-rewarded status inconsistencies will be more aggressive than the over-rewarded ones;
- H3.3: Status inconsistencies with "large" inconsistencies will be more aggressive than those with "small" inconsistencies.

First of all, the over-rewarded vs. under-rewarded status inconsistency cannot be tested statistically here as nearly all the inconsistencies in the perceptual data are of the over-rewarded variety (out of 55 status inconsistencies, 51 are over-rewarded and only 4 under-rewarded: Ivory Coast, South Africa, Swaziland and Guatemala). This imbalance in the distribution is explainable in terms of the systematic "over-ranking" in the Prestige dimension alluded to earlier. Since over-rewardedness was defined as any status profile "with Prestige higher than either Power or Development," the systematic over-ranking resulted in high incidence of over-rewarded status inconsistency. But the MAS scores of the two groups indicate a higher aggression score for the over-rewarded status inconsistencies (5.04 for the over-rewarded and 4.25 for the under-rewarded), exactly as indicated by the objective data analyses.

The distribution between "large" and "small" status inconsistencies, however, is relatively balanced so that hypothesis H3.3 can be tested:

Table 5.33 "Size" of Status Inconsistency and Aggression

Status Profiles	N	MAS	Min z at .025	Z obtained	Significance
SI (large)	22	5.31	= 1.96	2.12	Significant
SI (small)	33	4.76			

Consistent with the prediction made by the hypothesis, not only is there a difference in the levels of aggression within the status inconsistent group when the "size" of this inconsistency is used as the independent variable but also the more aggressive is the one with "large" (therefore more salient and visible) status inconsistency. The z-value of 2.12 is sufficiently large to allow for the rejection of the null-hypothesis which states no significant effect of size of status inconsistency on the levels of aggression of this group.

But this null-hypothesis can only be rejected when status inconsistency is defined in terms of the profile between Development and Prestige (D-Pr). No such table can be constructed for status inconsistency defined in terms of either Power and Development or Power and Prestige as the size of either group (N=10) is too small for further breakdowns. Moreover, it must be borne in mind that a similar break-down (based on the "size" of status inconsistency) in the objective data resulted in findings contrary to that

obtained here. Significantly, however, nearly all the hypotheses called here "status inconsistency hypotheses" have been supported and supported with some strength. We will return to this point again after we have tested the last cluster of these hypotheses (i.e., status inconsistency hypotheses when "mediated" by status level and participation).

H3.4a: Status inconsistent nations with high status levels will exhibit less drive towards change than those with low status levels.

To test this hypothesis, we will consult tables 5.31 and 5.32 once again because in these tables, not only are the differences in the levels of aggression between and among status groups shown but also that these status groups were drawn exclusively from the status inconsistent category. Our assumption is that if there is a difference in the levels of aggression between status inconsistent with higher status and the status inconsistent with lower status, both tables should be significant.

The tables (tables 5.31 and 5.32), however, indicate the reverse: although status inconsistent with higher status do tend to show lower level of aggression than those with lower status, the difference in their levels of aggression is not significant. Of course, this is consistent with the overall homogeneity of aggression scores of the status inconsistent in general established earlier. To a large extent, in fact, this is also consistent with the results of the analyses of hypotheses 1.1 through 1.3 (on the effects of

status levels as a whole on aggression) where we also demonstrated that status levels only succeeded in showing some effect on the differences in the levels of aggression between and among various status levels in the Power and Development dimensions and not in the Prestige dimension. Even on a one to one basis, the significance level attained in a three-way comparison disappeared; what is left can be attributed to the unusually lower MAS scores of the topdog groups. We can conclude, therefore, that status levels do not have any serious effect on the "relationship" between status inconsistency and aggression/although they do affect the levels of aggression of the various status groups in the Power and Development dimensions.

H3.4c: Status inconsistent nations with high level of participation will exhibit higher drive towards change than those with low level of participation.

First of all, the distribution of countries in terms of levels of participation is very representative. The distribution in the "population" (N=114) is well replicated both within the status inconsistency group and in the sample as a whole, even though the operationalization of high and low participation is based on N=114 (as indicated in the previous section, high participators were "those ranking from 1 to 57" and low participators as "those ranking from 58 to 114").

As can be seen from table 5.34, neither "behavioral" nor "institutional" measures of participation influenced the

Table 5.34 Status Inconsistency, Level of Participation and Aggression

Participation (Behavioral)	N	MAS	Min z at .025	z obtained	Significance
High	28	4.86	= 1.96	1.20	Not significant
Low	27	5.11			
Participation (Institutional)	N	MAS	Min z at .025	z obtained	Significance
High	26	5.03	= 1.96	.12	Not significant
Low	29	4.93			

levels of aggression of the status inconsistent group. In other words, there is no significant difference in the levels of aggression between status inconsistent nations that are high participators or low participators (i.e., the difference in the MAS scores between the two groups is negligible).

This finding is also consistent with the result of similar tables in the objective data analyses.

The same thing, however, cannot be said about the relationship between status inconsistency and participation itself. In the objective data analyses, all the relationships (except for that between status inconsistency and delegation size) were insignificant. In the perceptual data, however, they are all significant, except for that between status inconsistency and mission size.

Table 5.35 Status Profiles (D-Pr) and Aggression

Status Profiles	N	Behavioral	Min z at .025	z obtained	Significance
SC	26	8.42	= 1.96	2.05	significant
SI	37	6.17			
Status Profiles	N	Institutional	Min z at .025	z obtained	Significance
SC	26	45.65	= 1.96	2.86	significant
SI	37	26.97			
Status Profiles	N	Delegation	Min z at .025	z obtained	Significance
SC	26	33.53	= 1.96	2.91	significant
SI	37	18.16			
Status Profiles	N	Mission Size	Min z at .025	z obtained	Significance
SC	26	12.11	= 1.96	1.76	Not significant
SI	37	8.51			

The "direction" of participation, however, is consistent with that uncovered by the objective data in the sense that lower participation tends to associate with inconsistent profile.

Except for the relationship between status profile and mission size, all the tests are also significant. Stated differently, in every instance of participation in the UN, the status inconsistent nations participate significantly less than their consistent counterparts.

In conclusion, it can be said that, as a whole, the perceptual data have not revealed anything that is essentially new. They have, however, strengthened most of the relatively weak relationships uncovered originally by the objective data. This is especially true with respect to the relationship between status inconsistency and aggression and participation. The overall trend of the findings, however, is unmistakably pointing in the direction of greater support for the relationship between status inconsistency and aggression. But whether or not this result can be attributed solely to the role of perception cannot be said for certain. In the next section we will try to analyze this point and summarize the findings.

Analyses and Summary of Findings

First of all, the effect of perception, as indicated in the section on Perception and the Empirical Test of Status Inconsistency is either to "facilitate" aggression (in the sense of increasing its probability) or to increase its scope. In our empirical tests, either one of these effects may have come into play: not so much in reversing the findings uncovered by the objective data but in increasing the levels of significance of the "relationship" between status inconsistency and aggression. Whereas the "relationship" between status inconsistency and aggression established by the objective data was (also) strongly and successfully "partialled" out by status levels, the same relationship was weakly or

unsuccessfully explained by status levels in the perceptual data. This finding alone can perhaps be suggested as evidence not only for the aggression-facilitating but also aggression-enhancing effect of perception.

This effect can be more effectively demonstrated if the returned sample is not biased in favor of either topdog or underdog groups because the first group, as indicated by both objective and perceptual data analyses, tends to depress the level of aggression while the second tends to "impress" it. In table 3.2 in the section on Data Description we showed that the sample was indeed skewed considerably in the dimensions of Power and Prestige, with underdog bias in the Power dimension and topdog bias in the Prestige dimension. It is for this reason that there are only 10 cases of status consistencies involving Power and Prestige and only 8 cases when status consistency is defined in terms of perfect correspondence among all the three dimensions.

But this is not the case apparently in status inconsistency based on the discrepancy between Development and Prestige, the major type tested in the empirical study where a closer ratio to the same distribution in the "population" exists (SC cases = 26, SI cases = 37). When the number of objective status consistency and status inconsistency cases are extracted from the same sample, the same ratio is faithfully replicated (i.e., SC = 25, SI = 38). This is due to the fact that the overall distribution of status groups based on the Development

dimension in the returned sample is the most "representative" of them all.

This condition then makes it possible to compare the differences in the levels of aggression between objective status consistency and objective status inconsistency groups in the returned sample with the differences in the levels of aggression between the perceived status consistency and perceived status inconsistency from the same sample. If the effect of perception is indeed consistent with the theoretical prediction, the difference in the levels of aggression between perceived status consistency and status inconsistency groups should be significant but not in that between objective status consistency and status inconsistency from the same sample. The following table, when compared with table 5.30, indicates just that (i.e., that table 5.36 is not significant).

Table 5.36 (Objective) Status Profiles
(D-Pr) and Aggression

Status Profiles	N	MAS	Min z at .025	z obtained	Significance
SC	25	4.74	= 1.96	.75	Not significant
SI	38	4.79			

Table 5.30 (Perceived) Status Profiles
(D-Pr) and Aggression

Status Profiles	N	MAS	Min z at .025	z obtained	Significance
SC	26	4.20	= 1.96	3.23	.005
SI	37	5.16			

When we compare the levels of aggression between two status inconsistency groups (i.e., one perceived and the other objectively derived), the result is the reverse (i.e., the U value obtained is so close to the required level that for all practical purposes the table can be regarded as significant).

Table 5.37 SI (perceived) vs SI (objective)
in D-Pr and Aggression

Status Profiles	N	MAS	Max U at .025	U obtained	Significance
SI (Perceived)	12	5.37	= 41	42	Significant
SI (Objective)	13	4.25			(narrowly)

This table not only indicates that the difference in the levels of aggression between perceived status inconsistency and objectively derived status inconsistency is significant but also that the status inconsistency with the higher MAS score is the perceived status inconsistency. This is rather convincing given the relatively equal size of each group and the relatively large difference in their MAS scores ($5.37 - 4.25 = 1.12$).^{*} This difference (i.e., 1.12), one might suggest, is the result of perception because the

^{*}The two groups are isolated from the 13 cases of status consistents which are both perceived and objectively derived and the 25 status inconsistencies which are also both perceived and objectively derived. The remaining cases (N=25) are those whose status inconsistencies are either perceived but not objectively derived or objectively derived but not perceived.

status profile (i.e., status inconsistency) is "controlled" for and the difference between the two groups is (only) in the perceived and non-perceived aspect.

The use of the word "suggested" is intentional because the statistics used are not properly equipped to handle such a task. But even if other "sophisticated" statistics had been used, the conclusion would still have to be tempered with caution as "even if the existence of status inconsistency is ascertained, the form of status inconsistency effect is difficult or impossible to determine" (Jackson and Curtis, 1972: 704). So is the case of the effect of perception on status inconsistency.

The place of perception in the theoretical structure of ~~status inconsistency~~, however, is far less difficult to ascertain than the effect of perception in the empirical test of status inconsistency. There is a strong consensus that perceived status inconsistency is essential to the theory: "Whatever the external conditions leading to aggression are," according to Galtung (1964a: 95), "they probably have to pass through the minds of men and precipitate a perception with a high emotive content before they are acted out as aggression." "Galtung," according to Doreian and Stockman (1969: 54), "is among the very few who make their motivational assumptions clear."

Actually, there are a few more. International relations scholars associated with status inconsistency

studies have seldom failed to stress the importance of perception in the analysis of status inconsistency.

Von Riekhoff (1974: 1) in fact defined the very term 'status inconsistency' itself as "a condition which occurs when a social unit occupies a perceptibly different rank position on two or more significant hierarchies of values" (my emphasis). Although it is not clear to whom the inconsistency should be perceptible, the stress on perception is nevertheless instructive. "A discrepancy between the status ascribed to a nation by others and its achieved status should not be related directly to the behavior of its leaders," according to Tanter (1970: 1). "They have to perceive that status inconsistency as an unacceptable state of affairs for their behavior to be affected" (Tanter, 1970: 1). Relating the conclusion of his study, Romagna (1977: 45) stated that "status discrepancy is not, at the actor level, a good predictor of foreign policy behavior. Perceived status discrepancy does appear to be an important factor [at least] in explaining German foreign policy in the post-Bismarckian Imperial period" (my emphasis)..

The fact that the actual empirical tests of the above studies fall short of their theoretical ideals is due only to the difficulty of collecting perceptual data (for a temporal domain that extends so far back in history) and to the problem of justifying the so-called "Elite Corollary": who should be designated as the perceiver? Although our

empirical study managed to handle the first difficulty (due to the contemporary nature of our temporal domain) it is far from being non-controversial with respect to the second point.

But this controversy is not solvable by the construction of objective data either. The lack of correspondence between the status ranking based on either system suggests this. As we indicated in the section on Data Description, the Development dimension had the highest level of correspondence, but not so with Prestige and Power dimensions. This may be due, first of all, to the lack of validity in selecting a single indicator to reflect a concept as opposed to multiple indicators as suggested by many in the literature. Status inconsistency is particularly prone to this problem because the size of status inconsistent nations in the system can vary too easily depending on the nature and number of the indicators selected. But as Etzioni and Lehman (1967: 8) suggested, "a perfect coincidence between a social concept and its operational definition is unlikely" because "most measures in social sciences are fractional measurements and it is difficult to construct an operational definition that covers a concept in all its ramifications and dimensions" (1967: 7): "combining several indicators to form a single index yielding a single score may be as misleading as failing to uncover a sufficient number of dimensions or indicators" (Etzioni and Lehman, 1967: 4). "Combining national attributes with each other," Vasquez (1976: 186) maintained, "does not guarantee

an improvement in predicted leverage" and "the strategy of combining a large number of attributes does not work." The cut-off points used to create the concepts of topdogs, middledogs, and underdogs status groups therefore may be the real culprit. As Doreian and Stockman (1969: 53) stated, "to simply take objective rankings as if they apply universally is to violate the data, and the theorists may be led to create classes of consistents and inconsistent when they might not exist." We may have done just this by adopting trichotomization as the technique for solving the problems posed by cut-off points.

The distribution of cases in the perceptual data in each dimension suggests that, if these data are truly representative of the same distribution in the international system, the distribution of status groups in the system should be far from being equal in size (which is what trichotomization implies). The distribution of status groups in the three stratification dimensions indicates a model of "pyramid of influence" (Deutsch, 1974: 52) in the Power dimension (T=5, M=24, U=34 or 5:24:34 ratio), "bulging middle-class" model in the Development dimension (T=15, M=34, U=14 or 15:34:14 ratio), and "inverted pyramid" in the Prestige dimension (T=44, M=16, U=3 or 44:16:3 ratio). If the latter is exotic, the "pyramid of influence" (the Power model) and the "bulging middle-class" (the Development model) do have some theoretical correspondence in the social science

literature (i.e., the elite model and the expanding middle-class of the post-industrial society).

When we project any one of the models into the status distribution in the "population" (i.e., by using each distribution ratio as the criterion), the Power model "improves" the number of "correctly" identified status levels in the Power dimension by nearly double (from 35% to 79%), the Development model by only 8% (from 71% to 79%) and the Prestige model by 13% (from 46% to 59%). These figures confirm that the Development dimension is the best identified and that trichotomization technique for cut-off points is a reasonable approximation for this dimension. When each one of these models is applied on the other dimensions (or applied against each other), the number of cases "correctly" identified dropped for each model. This may suggest that not only is the international system multidimensional (three-dimensional hierarchy) but also that each hierarchy is somewhat independent of each other in terms of its status group criteria (i.e., in terms of what is defined as topdog, middledog and underdog). This is encouraging for the approach we adopted in this thesis, where we deliberately shied away from the concept of total rank and other forms of summation of individual rank of each dimension. Consistently, throughout the whole of the empirical studies we treated each dimension as analytically separate.

Empirical findings on mobility in the objective data analyses also tend to confirm the existence of separate status group criteria in each dimension. The lack of mobility in the dimensions of Power and Development is consistent with the "pyramid of influence" and "bulging middle-class" models of the international hierarchy. In the Power dimension, for example, a "significant" (or large jump across "status barriers") upward mobility was experienced only by two nations (Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates), both of which are members of the financially powerful OPEC group. In the Development dimension, although the degree of mobility was somewhat larger than that which occurred in the Power dimension, it is nevertheless less "significant"; the movement tended to be the rank mobility rather than "class" mobility version and, of the latter, it tended to be a movement of the lower status to the middle-status group, hence "bulging" middle-class (see tables 5.4 and 5.5). Only in the Prestige dimension does some degree of "fluidity" exist--hence the "inverted pyramid." Not every country in our population has been rank-mobile in Prestige during the years examined, though not all have experienced the more rigid version, i.e., class mobility. The reasons, no doubt, can be attributed to a "complex" interplay of the "egalitarian principle," "principle of geographical equity and rotation" and "bloc politics" orchestrated by the two superpowers in the UN. Table 5.3 shows some of the effects of these factors, where

countries like Poland, Romania, Bulgaria or Czechoslovakia occupy topdog position in this hierarchy along with their Western "counterparts" such as Venezuela, Brazil, Philippines or Liberia, especially the last two, known in the literature as the Americans' favorite "compromise" nominations. We suspect that this kind of politics may have declined somewhat (notice, for example, Liberia falling from 28th to 82nd) as each of the superpowers have had "disciplinary" problems with their own respective satellites, but not disappeared entirely as the new power bloc in the UN (e.g., OAUPEC) is using the small but experienced Lebanon as their version of "compromise" or "proxy" nominations for important offices.

So the image of the international stratification portrayed by the perceptual data and the mobility aspect of objective data together is apparently less coherent than that portrayed by the objective data alone. Instead of a three-dimensional hierarchy with a uniform size of status groups as portrayed by objective data, we have a three-dimensional hierarchy but with a distinct status group criterion in each dimension: rigid, "elitist" hierarchy in the Power dimension; "elitist" but less rigid and with some movement in the lower and middle-status groups in the Development dimension; and extremely "fluid," top-heavy hierarchy in the Prestige dimension. The "correlation" between status inconsistency and aggression revealed (weakly) by the objective data and (strongly) by the perceptual data is therefore, in some

measure, a reflection of this topsy-turvy international system seeking some kind of order and equilibrium. The strength of this "correlation" as indicated by the perceptual data is, to some extent, due to the effect of perception as a "facilitator" and "enhancer" of aggression in the status inconsistency group.

For convenience, we will summarize the findings point by point as they appear in the hypotheses (when data sources are not identified, the findings are applicable in both instances):

- 1.1 Nations with high status in Power and Development were supporters of the status quo and in the debates for the establishment of the NIEO they exhibited a low drive towards change. Nations with high position on Prestige exhibited lower drive towards change when objective data is used to measure Prestige but higher when perceptual data is used. In both instances, however, the level of their drive towards change was not significantly different from those of the medium and low positions in Prestige.
- 1.2 Nations with low-status level exhibited high drive towards change, especially those with low status in Power. In the Development dimension, this group of nations exhibited a considerably higher drive than the high-status nations, even though in the objective data their level of aggression was slightly lower than that of the middle group. In the Prestige dimension, however, this observation is not true.
- 1.3 Nations with medium-status level did fall in between in their level of aggression. Only in the objective data and in the Development dimension, however, is their level of aggression, while still significantly higher than that of the high-status group, not significantly lower than that of the low-status one.
- 2.1 The strong "relationship" between Power and Development with aggression is reinforced by the rigidity of these two dimensions. The least mobility (both in "class" and rank mobility) was recorded in the Power dimension, followed by the Development dimension. The hierarchy of nations (i.e., their relative rank-order) in these two dimensions did not change significantly in the period

between 1965 and 1974 though most nations shifted ranks up and down one or two notches. The highest record of mobility was registered in the Prestige dimension, where the number of nations experiencing changes in their status group memberships and rank positions were large, and larger than in the other two dimensions.

- 2.2 In numerical terms, the least mobility was experienced by the high-status group, followed by the low-status one. The middle group was the most mobile either in terms of "class" or rank mobility but its percentage "share" of mobility was not significantly different from that predicted on random chances alone. In other words, the number of nations experiencing mobility in the middle group was not, in the statistical sense, significantly larger than those in the high and low-status groups.
- 2.3 As predicted, mobility has been more within "status barriers" than between or across them.
- 2.4 The influence of mobility on the levels of aggression, however, was not clear cut:
 - a. Mobility was not related to drives towards change in the sense that mobile nations (on Development and Prestige) did not have significantly higher drive towards change than the non-mobile. Only those nations rank-mobile in Power had significantly higher drive towards change than the non-mobile.
 - b. The upwardly mobile did not have less drive towards change than the downwardly mobile; in fact, the upwardly mobile had consistently higher drive than the downwardly mobile.
 - c. In the Prestige dimension (and to some extent in the Development dimension as well), where mobility in the system as a whole and in the middle group specifically was high or relatively high, the middle group did not score a lower level of aggression. The direction was reversed, consistent with the findings in 2.4a and 2.4b above, i.e., that mobility breeds more desire for change rather than dampens it.
- 3.1 Status inconsistency is related to drives towards change in the sense that the status inconsistent nations did exhibit larger drives towards change than the status consistent ones. This is true in both data except that the strength of this "relationship" is considerable in the perceived data and only marginal in the objective data (the significance level is less than the designated .025 level but higher than .05, one-tailed test).

- 3.2 The over-rewarded status inconsistencies were more aggressive than the under-rewarded, consistent with the pattern found in mobility; not only were the more mobile more aggressive but also the over-rewarded status inconsistencies.
- 3.3 The levels of aggression between the inconsistent nations with "large" inconsistency (i.e., those in whose status profiles both U's and T's coexist) and the inconsistent nations with "low" inconsistency (i.e., those not having U's and T's coexist in their profiles) are not significantly different from one another in the objective data. In the perceived data, however, not only is the difference significant but also the status inconsistencies with "large" inconsistency, as predicted by the hypothesis, had a higher level of aggression than those with "small" inconsistency.
- 3.4 The "relationship" between status inconsistency and aggression can be said to be influenced only by status levels (in Power and Development) but not by mobility and participation:
- The relationship which existed between status inconsistency and aggression was influenced by the status levels in Power and Development; significantly in the case of objective data and insignificantly in the perceptual data. Absolute status levels in Prestige did not influence the level of aggression of the status inconsistent group.
 - Consistent with the overall relationship between mobility and aggression, degree of mobility did not influence the level of aggression of the status inconsistent group either.
 - Lastly, participation itself (either the "behavioral" or "institutional" variety) also failed to influence the levels of aggression of the consistent and inconsistent nations. The level of participation itself (especially with respect to one of the components of "institutional" participation, i.e., delegation size) was strongly differentiated by status profiles in the objective data analysis. In all measures of participation (except mission size), the status inconsistencies had consistently lower participation thresholds than the status consistents; significantly in the perceived data and insignificantly in the objective data.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

At the beginning of this thesis we defined our task as an attempt "to unravel the complexity of status politics in the international system." To achieve this task we employed a theoretical approach and a research strategy which, in many cases, were different from the prevailing ones. Instead of going with the main current, i.e., a causal model of status inconsistency and war, we decided to adhere as strictly as possible to the original but rather broad Galtungian interpretation of status politics. Consistent with this approach, we decided to use a three-dimensional model of international hierarchy involving Power, Development and Prestige; instead of a military-oriented notion of power we utilized a generalized notion symbolized by the GNP figures; instead of a multi-indicator operationalization of development we used a single indicator strictly based on GNP per capita; instead of using "diplomatic importance" as a measure of prestige, we introduced office-holding success in the United Nations; instead of using war and other violent conflicts as measures of aggression we used a broader notion of this concept, specifically as a generalized drive towards change.

in the international system; instead of using the battlefield as the spatial domain, we used the relatively placid General Assembly hall; and lastly, instead of relying entirely on statistical techniques to construct status profiles, we supplemented them with a technique involving human perceptions. Together, all these techniques went as far as one could go in bridging the man-milieu linkage for a study of this kind. The use of the United Nations as a spatial domain captured man's milieu in its interactive form and the soliciting of the perception of nations' representatives in this domain is as much as anyone could reasonably do to "bring the men back in" (Homans, 1964: 816).

The results of all these efforts have been revealing. Most of the major propositions of status inconsistency theory have been confirmed and, more importantly, confirmed by data much more in tune with the requirement of this theory (i.e., data based on perception). Relationships that were simply suggested by the objective data assumed a more clear-cut posture in the perceptual data. In the process, however, we failed to unravel the complexity of status politics in the international system. We may have succeeded, in fact, in demonstrating its complexity. We failed, too, in taking the heat off the current debate on the nature and the role of status inconsistency theory itself in international politics. We succeeded, rather, in putting more fire into the debate because we are now in a position to say that not just any

status inconsistency is related to aggression but, rather, perceived status inconsistency, or status inconsistency based on perceived status.

The implications of these findings are obvious. As a "structural theory of aggression," status inconsistency theory is too structural. Of course, there is nothing inherently wrong about a theory being too structural as long as it seeks to explain system behavior itself on systemic level à la Wallace (1973). When it comes to the explanation of unit behavior (e.g., the status inconsistent itself), not only is the theory unable to do so in the manner Wallace operationalized it, but also there are simply too many unit level variables left unaccounted for. It is for this reason that Galtung (1969) disagreed with Hernes (1969) when the latter tried to show the problem of the theory where the explanation of behavior is to be accounted for simply by the "interaction" of the two structural variables (size and development). Galtung (1969) added three "mechanisms" that would really explain the linkage between structural conditions (status inconsistency) and aggression (unit behavior). Galtung (1969: 75) made the distinction between "the variables constituting the disequilibrium" (or Power, Development and Prestige in our terms) and the "mechanisms" or "causal factors" which make for "the conversion of rank disequilibrium into aggression." He identified three of these factors: "the availability of a resource (the high rank), the relative

deprivation that is built into the system, and norms of justice (1969: 75; italics original).

In his 1964a article, in fact, Galtung also added perception and sense of frustration as other important causal mechanisms. However, Galtung not only failed to build all these variables into his model (Doreian and Stockman, 1969: 62-63), but his position in this area is in fact ambiguous: on the one hand he lauded the structural nature of the theory (Galtung, 1964a: 96) but on the other suggested all kinds of psychological and social mechanisms to account for the aggression. From his debate with Hernes (1969) it appears that he does intend the tester of the theory to operationalize these mechanisms at least on the second step of the test and not simply by a statistical manipulation of the structural variables. He obviously thinks of the "structural theory of aggression" as a two-step operation: an analysis of the overall correlation between the structural variables and aggression and a causal model where his three mechanisms plus frustration have to become the integral parts. This explains his dissatisfaction with psychological theories of aggression such as the frustration-aggression theory of Dollard et al. (1944) which Galtung (1964a: 96) thinks sees man as "a self-sufficient unit" or as "his own cause." But his solution (at least in terms of others' interpretation of his theory) may have swung too far to the other extreme; making the theory too structural to be meaningful on the unit level where it really counts both

in terms of a strict theoretical explanation and relevant policy implications.

But the theory is too structural in yet another sense: the structural concepts (i.e., the differences in status levels as sources of tension, strain and frustration) and the behaving units (i.e., those that are supposed to experience the structurally induced emotions) are too far apart to be bridged by a simple subtraction of one rank against the other.

The error is not only in the "subtraction" but also in the nature of the rank dimensions which simply have not been clarified: "The number of dimensions along which a nation can be ranked is legion" and to test it "the theory will require much speculation about relevant disequilibria"

(Galtung, 1964a: 105; my emphasis). For a theory which is claimed to be based on "a multidimensional approach"

(Galtung, 1966a) and makes no firm commitment as to what constitutes the "multidimensions" from which the notion of status profiles are to be derived, the consequence can be disastrous especially when "it is only a question of time and research imagination to dig up a rank-disequilibrium".

(Galtung, 1964a: 105). Under these circumstances, "the theory is incomplete" (Box and Ford, 1969: 197).

The two empirical studies presented in this thesis demonstrate both the limitations of a status inconsistency defined strictly as a "structural theory of aggression" and the potentials when at least part of its psychological

environment is incorporated into its empirical operation; extracting three relevant dimensions out of a "legion" of them and "speculating about relevant disequilibria" produced test results that were far from consistent; employing a "research imagination to dig up a rank-disequilibrium" produced one too many imagined rank-disequilibrium. Using perceptual data, on the other hand, relieved us from most of these problems because perceptual data provide their own standards. The number of "imagined rank-disequilibria" cannot be one too many in this instance because every one of them is based on what the actor himself perceives. That the results were rather coherent, as we suggested earlier, may have had something to do with perception. But this is far from saying that Status Inconsistency-Perception-Aggression is the more valid model for status inconsistency. Our empirical tests did not test this model in the strictest sense of the word but, even so, we feel the more valid and in fact more workable model of status inconsistency for international relations is what we tested here, i.e., (Perceived) Status Inconsistency-Aggression. It is very difficult to recreate or to ascertain the perception of status inconsistency for any particular point in time but, as our data indicate, it is not too difficult to construct status inconsistency based on perceived status. The relatively high rate of return to our questionnaire, in spite of the "sensitivity" of the question for some countries, testifies to this. A more systematic interview could probably

unearth more motivational kinds of questions (such as the psychological bases of the perception of ranks themselves). This would not convert status inconsistency into a psychological theory (which is what Status Inconsistency+Perception+Aggression tends to imply) but will go far enough in terms of softening its image as a "structural theory" devoid of human dimensions. With this model we will succeed not only in "bringing men back in" but perhaps even "putting some blood in them" (Homans, 1964: 816).

The (Perceived) Status Inconsistency+Aggression model will achieve perhaps more than just the softening of status inconsistency's rigid structural image; it will, for example, also move it away from its metatheoretical status which some have maintained (cf. Blalock, 1967: 791) to a pretheory level, or perhaps even to a theory level. As it now stands, even the so-called "testable" propositions and coherent theoretical structure which Phillips (1974), for example, maintained exist, are still based on conflicting if not "untrue" psychological and sociological assumptions, as charged by Box and Ford (1968: 198).

Somewhere along the line the notion of inconsistency became a theory to end all theories and to explain all things. In the process, to quote the over-used cliché, it explains nothing. The theory faces a terrible dilemma: should its practitioners stick to its "original" formulation (Lenski, 1954: 405) as a theory that "would be capable of accounting

for some of the variance in political behavior which is left unexplained by traditional methods of stratification analysis" but face the sticky methodological problems of identifying the magnitude of the inconsistency component or, proclaim the theory to be "the structural theory of aggression" (and/or "revolution") à la Galtung (1964a; 1974) but run the danger of being no more than a "meta-theory," or a "folk theory" whose survival is independent of empirical verifications? Based on our analyses, both of the objective as well as perceptual data, the two positions appear to be irreconcilable. Although in most instances status inconsistency explained aggression independently of (absolute) status levels, in other instances the relationship appeared to have been far from mutually exclusive. Galtung himself, who was more inclined to make status inconsistency a general "structural theory of revolution" (Galtung, 1974), appeared to have been unaware of his own earlier pronouncement which had implications to the same effect (i.e., that the relationship between status inconsistency and aggression is impossible to partial out): "If the data show a positive interaction effect this does not necessarily mean that the rank disequilibrium mechanisms have been operating, or vice versa: if they have been operating there may nevertheless be no positive interaction effect or even a negative one" (Galtung, 1969: 75). Galtung, in fact, seemed to suggest that the whole attempt to partial out the "interactive effect" of status inconsistency through the

manipulation of the "variables constituting the disequilibrium" as undertaken by Hernes (1969) or as the debates in sociology about the "identification problem" have been trying to solve (i.e., how much of the variance in the dependent variable is explainable in terms of status inconsistency) is misleading because of the above reasons.

In the long run this means that intuitive explanations of aggression and other forms of conflict derived from the status inconsistency notion will continue to prevail. The best we can hope for, as our empirical studies imply, is a continuous "refinement" of the intuitive explanations, so that in this context it is perhaps safe to say that (perceived) status inconsistency does have some correlation with aggression, especially when this later concept is defined as a drive towards change and operationalized within a face-to-face high interactive spatial domain. With respect to status politics in general, it is still valid to state that such politics is relevant, if not in the international system as a whole, at least in the UN system. The importance attached to the Prestige dimension itself, as indicated by the fact that 70% of the respondents claimed to have high prestige, is one evidence confirming the intuitive explanation. It is no coincidence that 54% and 22% of them did not hesitate to admit that they had low status on Power and Development respectively but only 5% of them admitted to having low prestige. (Thus 71% of status inconsistent in the objective

data and 44% in the perceptual data are due to Prestige.) Furthermore, not one country ranked itself as status inconsistent on the underdog level. Of eight members of the perfect status consistents, four of them were absolute topdogs and the other four are absolute middledogs. No country (in our returned sample) apparently could conceive itself of being a status consistent at the lowest rung of the international hierarchy. Not only is it important not to be at the bottom, but it appears it is even more important not to be at the bottom in all dimensions of the hierarchy. The "fluidity" of the Prestige dimension (especially in the UN) affords that opportunity.

But this kind of prestige "achievement" cannot be expected to be the "means to economy in the use of power" (Dore, 1975: 203) or as the "reputation for power" that Morgenthau (1960: 75) spoke of. The very pursuit of this type of status politics is an indication of the lack of "substance" to the prestige. So Saudi Arabia, one of the most powerful members of one of the most powerful groups in the international system (i.e., OPEC), courted by the developed countries and touted openly as a "new" economic "power," exhibited one of the least aggressive behaviors in the NIEO debates (MAS score of 2.00; see table 6.1). This power claimed its overall status not only to be high but consistently high (status profile, TTT).

Status inconsistency theory would explain this lack of radicalism on the part of Saudi Arabia on the basis of its self-perceived status as a status consistent, and a topdog status consistent at that. Status politics in general would explain Saudi Arabia's high and consistent status as the result of a deliberate if not concerted effort on the part of the privileged at cooptation of the nouveau riche of the international system as a whole. This is part of the overall status politics unfolding in front of our eyes, which included the debates on the NIEO.

In its ideal form, the change envisioned by the NIEO is one that would not only drastically revamp the economic structure and relations among states but also has as its ultimate goal the improvement of the living conditions of the average man. Many people, however, question the seriousness of the proponents of the NIEO on this point. The NIEO, according to Martin (1976: 30), "is an attempt by two groups of thieves to reach agreement on the formula for dividing their loot." Hirsch (1976: 531) in fact would go so far as to suggest that like the Holy Roman Empire ("neither holy, nor Roman, nor an empire"), the NIEO, too, is neither "new," nor "international," nor "economic," nor "order." Even if the NIEO can be successfully brought to fruition, according to this view, the most that would change would be the relationship between a group of countries (so-called the South) and another group of countries (so-called the North) or, at best,

the relationship between one state to another, while the important relationship between the various peoples and their own respective governments, where both the bulk of the exploitation and the source of true improvement can occur, would not be significantly affected. The politics of the NIEO, according to this view, is no more than a politics to improve the standing of two opposing status groups, or some members within them, precisely the kind of politics played under the heading of status politics. As we defined it at the beginning of this thesis, the change that status groups would normally try to bring about in status politics is a collective attempt to restructure the system to bring about an improvement of status of one group, or to maintain the old status of the other. The NIEO, from this perspective, is nothing more than status politics in the international system played to its logical conclusion.

The success of this politics depends not only on the proper understanding of the character of the NIEO struggle but also on the quality of radicalism of the status inconsistent themselves as a group. As we said earlier in the analysis, they appeared to be "homogeneous" as a group, especially in their levels of aggression. But it is conceivable that their radicalism is only a verbal radicalism or only a radicalism in goals but not in means or only in means but not in goals. Whichever it is, an international economic order brought about by this group may have a special character whereby an

institutional guarantee for its success exists because an inconsistent status very often means either insufficient resource but enough militancy or sufficient resource but not enough militancy. Beyond this, however, "not much can be said in terms of policy implications" of status inconsistency, "a principle so general," as Galtung (1964a: 112) put it.

Perhaps "not much should be said /either/ as long as the principle has not been confirmed for a variety of strategically placed tests" (Galtung, 1964a: 112; my emphasis). Fifteen years later, although tests have been undertaken, they have been neither "strategically placed tests" nor "a variety." Empirical tests by East, Wallace, von Riekhoff, Ray, Midlarsky, Romagna and Gochman have used approximately the same formulations and the same data-base. Although our tests here can properly be called "strategically placed tests" (at least because of the UN as the empirical domain), they are far from being "a variety." We have only added one more item to that "variety" because we have tested status inconsistency on behavior operationally different from the usual interpretation of aggression.

We believe more studies of status politics in the international system should be undertaken so that we can have not only more "variety" but also a more solid and coherent foundation upon which to base our policy suggestions and to refine our "intuitive explanations." While what we have done so far has barely made a dent on the image of international

politics as "power politics," it has gone a long way toward providing more empirical bases for status politics in the international system.

APPENDIX A

THE THEORETICAL STRUCTURE OF STATUS-FIELD THEORY

Axiom 1 (Status-field Axiom): International relations is a field consisting of all nations, their attributes and interactions, and their complex interrelationships through time.

Axiom 2 (Attribute-Behavior Space Axiom): The international field comprises a Euclidean attribute space defining all the attributes of nations and a Euclidean behavior space defining all nation dyadic interactions.

Theorem 1 (Finite Dimensionality Theorem): A finite set of linearly independent dimensions generate attribute and behavior spaces.

Axiom 3 (Stratification Axiom): International relations is a stratified social system.

Theorem 2 (Status Theorem): Status dimensions are a subset of attribute space dimensions.

Definition 1 (Status Definition): A status dimension (of attribute space) is a continuum involving virtually universal international consensus as to which end is better or more desirable. An ascribed status dimension is one on which nations cannot alter significantly their relative status in a generation. An achieved status dimension is one on which nations can so alter their location. A nation's rank is its total status on the status dimensions.

Corollary 1 (Status Measurement Corollary): Status is a continuous variable.

Definition 2 (Status Dimensions Definition): The international status dimensions are economic development and power.

Theorem 3 (Position Theorem): Nations are located as vectors in attribute space and as vectors of nation dyads in behavior space.

Corollary 2 (Status Position Corollary): An attribute space position defines a nation's relative status.

Theorem 4 (Mobility Theorem): Nations desire upward mobility.

Theorem 5 (Equilibration Theorem): Nations having unbalanced statuses desire to balance them.

Corollary 3 (Elite Corollary): A nation's elite identify with their rank and status configuration.

Definition 3 (Rank Definition): The rank of i is $\alpha_1 s_{i1} + \alpha_2 s_{i2}$, where α_1 and α_2 are positive parameters and s_{i1} and s_{i2} are nation i 's economic development and power statuses, respectively.

Definition 4 (Joint Rank Definition): The joint rank of two nations, i and j , is $\alpha_1(s_{i1} + s_{j1}) + \alpha_2(s_{i2} + s_{j2})$, where α_1 and α_2 are the positive parameters in Definition 3.

Definition 5 (Status Disequilibrium Definition): A nation's status disequilibrium is $\pm \alpha_1 s_{i1} \mp \alpha_2 s_{i2}$, where α_1 and α_2 have different signs.

Definition 6 (Status Incongruence Definition): The status incongruence of two nations i and j is $\pm \alpha_1(s_{i1} - s_{j1}) \mp \alpha_2(s_{i2} - s_{j2})$, where α_1 and α_2 have different signs.

Corollary 4 (Status Distance Corollary): Status incongruence between nations i and j is the distance vector between their status vectors on a status dimension.

Axiom 4 (Attribute Distance Axiom): Between nation attribute distances at a particular time are social forces determining dyadic behavior at that time.

Axiom 5 (Status Dependence Axiom): Some behavior dimensions are linearly dependent on status.

Definition 7 (Status Role Definition): The status dependent behavior dimensions define a nation's status role.

Definition 8 (Status Behavior Definition): The status dependent behavior dimensions delineate status behavior.

Axiom 6 (Rank Behavior Axiom): Status behavior is directed toward higher ranking nations and the greater a nation's rank, the more its status behavior.

Axiom 7 (Status-Quo Axiom): High rank nations support the current international order.

Theorem 6 (Cooperation Theorem): The higher the joint rank of nations i and j , the more cooperative their behavior. That is, $CO_{i \rightarrow j} = -\alpha_{i1}d_{i-j,1} - \alpha_{i2}d_{i-j,2}$, where $CO_{i \rightarrow j}$ is a behavior space cluster of highly intercorrelated cooperation vectors.

Axiom 8 (Dominant Status Axiom): Nations emphasize their dominant status and the others' subdominant statuses in interaction.

Corollary 5 (Dissonance Corollary): Status disequilibrium causes cognitive dissonance.

Corollary 6 (Status Link Corollary): Common statuses between nations provide them with similar interests and a communication bridge.

Corollary 7 (Uncertainty Corollary): The more two nations are status incongruent, the more their relationships are uncertain and the more incongruent their expectations of each other's behavior.

Axiom 9 (Economic Development Status Axiom): The more similar in economic development status, the more nations are mutually cooperative.

Theorem 7 (Conflict Theorem): Two nations' status incongruence is correlated with their mutual status dependent conflict behavior.

Theorem 8 (Economically Developed Conflict Theorem): For economically developed actors, status dependent conflict behavior $CF_{i \rightarrow j} = \alpha_{i1}d_{i-j,1} - \alpha_{i2}d_{i-j,2}$.

Theorem 9 (Economically Underdeveloped Conflict Theorem): For economically underdeveloped actors, status-dependent conflict behavior $CF_{i \rightarrow j} = -\alpha_{i1}d_{i-j,1} + \alpha_{i2}d_{i-j,2}$.

Theorem 10 (Economically Developed Status Behavior Theorem): The status-dependent cooperation and conflict behavior of high economically developed nations to others is a function of their power incongruence, that is $CO_{i \rightarrow j} + CF_{i \rightarrow j} = -\gamma_2 d_2$, where CO is nation i to j cooperative behavior, CF is conflict behavior, γ_2 is a positive parameter equaling $(\alpha_2^* + \alpha_2)$, and d_2 is the i - j incongruence (distance vector) on the power status.

Theorem 11 (Economically Underdeveloped Status Behavior Theorem): The status-dependent cooperation and conflict behavior of economically underdeveloped nations to others is a function of their economic development incongruence, that is $CO_{i \rightarrow j} + CF_{i \rightarrow j} = -\gamma_1 d_1$, where CO is nation i to j cooperative behavior, CF is conflict behavior, γ_1 is a positive parameter equaling $(\alpha_1^* + \alpha_1)$, and d_1 and i - j incongruence (distance vector) on the economic development status.

Theorem 12 (Status Time Theorem): The status-dependent behavior of nation i to j at time t is linearly dependent on their status distance vectors at time t .

Theorem 13 (Behavior Dependence Theorem): Behavior space is a subspace of attribute space.

Source: R. J. Rummel, Field Theory Evolving (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1977).

APPENDIX B

DECLARATION ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER

We, the Members of the United Nations,

Having convened a special session of the General Assembly to study for the first time the problems of raw materials and development, devoted to the consideration of the most important economic problems facing the world community,

Bearing in mind the spirit, purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations to promote the economic advancement and social progress of all peoples,

Solemnly proclaim our united determination to work urgently for

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER

based on equity, sovereign equality, interdependence, common interest and co-operation among all States, irrespective of their economic and social systems which shall correct inequalities and redress existing injustices, make it possible to eliminate the widening gap between the developed and the developing countries and ensure steadily accelerating economic and social development and peace and justice for present and future generations, and, to that end, declare:

1. The greatest and most significant achievement during the last decades has been the independence from colonial and alien domination of a large number of peoples and nations which has enabled them to become members of the community of free peoples. Technological progress has also been made in all spheres of economic activities in the last three decades, thus providing a solid potential for improving the well-being of all peoples. However, the remaining vestiges of alien and colonial domination, foreign occupation, racial discrimination, *apartheid* and neo-colonialism in all its forms continue to be among the greatest obstacles to the full emancipation and progress of the develop-

ing countries and all the peoples involved. The benefits of technological progress are not shared equitably by all members of the international community. The developing countries, which constitute 70 per cent of the world's population, account for only 30 per cent of the world's income. It has proved impossible to achieve an even and balanced development of the international community under the existing international economic order. The gap between the developed and the developing countries continues to widen in a system which was established at a time when most of the developing countries did not even exist as independent States and which perpetuates inequality.

2. The present international economic order is in direct conflict with current developments in international political and economic relations. Since 1970, the world economy has experienced a series of grave crises which have had severe repercussions, especially on the developing countries because of their generally greater vulnerability to external economic impulses. The developing world has become a powerful factor that makes its influence felt in all fields of international activity. These irreversible changes in the relationship of forces in the world necessitate the active, full and equal participation of the developing countries in the formulation and application of all decisions that concern the international community.
3. All these changes have thrust into prominence the reality of interdependence of all the members of the world community. Current events have brought into sharp focus the realization that the interests of the developed countries and those of the developing countries can no longer be isolated from each other, that there is close interrelationship between the prosperity of the developed countries and the growth and development of the developing countries, and that the prosperity of the international community as a whole depends upon the prosperity of its constituent parts. International co-operation for development is the shared goal and common duty of all countries. Thus the political, economic and social well-being of present and future generations depends more than ever on co-operation between all members of the international community on the basis of sovereign equality and the removal of the disequilibrium that exists between them.
4. The new international economic order should be founded on full respect for the following principles:
 - (a) Sovereign equality of States, self-determination of all peoples, inadmissibility of the acquisition of territories by force, territorial integrity and non-interference in the internal affairs of other States;
 - (b) The broadest co-operation of all the States members of the international community, based on equity, whereby the prevailing

disparities in the world may be banished and prosperity secured for all;

- (c) Full and effective participation on the basis of equality of all countries in the solving of world economic problems in the common interest of all countries, bearing in mind the necessity to ensure the accelerated development of all the developing countries, while devoting particular attention to the adoption of special measures in favour of the least developed, land-locked and island developing countries as well as those developing countries most seriously affected by economic crises and natural calamities, without losing sight of the interests of other developing countries;
- (d) The right to every country to adopt the economic and social system that it deems to be the most appropriate for its own development and not to be subjected to discrimination of any kind as a result;
- (e) Full permanent sovereignty of every State over its natural resources and all economic activities. In order to safeguard these resources, each State is entitled to exercise effective control over them and their exploitation with means suitable to its own situation, including the right to nationalization or transfer of ownership to its nationals, this right being an expression of the full permanent sovereignty of the State. No State may be subjected to economic, political or any other type of coercion to prevent the free and full exercise of this inalienable right;
- (f) The right of all States, territories and peoples under foreign occupation, alien and colonial domination or *apartheid* to restitution and full compensation for the exploitation and depletion of, and damages to, the natural resources and all other resources of those States, territories and peoples;
- (g) Regulation and supervision of the activities of transnational corporations by taking measures in the interest of the national economies of the countries where such transnational corporations operate on the basis of the full sovereignty of those countries;
- (h) The right of the developing countries and the peoples of territories under colonial and racial domination and foreign occupation to achieve their liberation and to regain effective control over their natural resources and economic activities;
- (i) The extending of assistance to developing countries, peoples and territories which are under colonial and alien domination, foreign occupation, racial discrimination or *apartheid* or are subjected to economic, political or any other type of coercive measures to obtain from them the subordination of the exercise of their sovereign rights and to secure from them advantages of any kind, and to neo-colonialism in all its forms, and which have established

or are endeavouring to, establish effective control over their natural resources and economic activities that have been or are still under foreign control;

- (j) Just and equitable relationship between the prices of raw materials, primary products, manufactured and semi-manufactured goods, exported by developing countries and the prices of raw materials, primary commodities, manufactures, capital goods and equipment imported by them with the aim of bringing about sustained improvement in their unsatisfactory terms of trade and the expansion of the world economy;
- (k) Extension of active assistance to developing countries by the whole international community, free of any political or military conditions;
- (l) Ensuring that one of the main aims of the reformed international monetary system shall be the promotion of the development of the developing countries and the adequate flow of real resources to them;
- (m) Improving the competitiveness of natural materials facing competition from synthetic substitutes;
- (n) Preferential and non-reciprocal treatment for developing countries, wherever feasible, in all fields of international economic co-operation whenever possible;
- (o) Securing favourable conditions for the transfer of financial resources to developing countries;
- (p) Giving to the developing countries access to the achievements of modern science and technology, and promoting the transfer of technology and the creation of indigenous technology for the benefit of the developing countries in forms and in accordance with procedures which are suited to their economies;
- (q) The need for all States to put an end to the waste of natural resources, including food products;
- (r) The need for developing countries to concentrate all their resources for the cause of development;
- (s) The strengthening, through individual and collective actions, of mutual economic, trade, financial and technical co-operation among the developing countries, mainly on a preferential basis;
- (t) Facilitating the role which producers' associations may play within the framework of international co-operation and, in pursuance of their aims, *inter alia* assisting in the promotion of sustained growth of world economy and accelerating the development of developing countries.

5. The unanimous adoption of the International Development Strategy for the Second United Nations Development Decade was an impor-

tant step in the promotion of international economic co-operation on a just and equitable basis. The accelerated implementation of obligations and commitments assumed by the international community within the framework of the Strategy, particularly those concerning imperative development needs of developing countries, would contribute significantly to the fulfilment of the aims and objectives of the present Declaration.

6. The United Nations as a universal organization should be capable of dealing with problems of international economic co-operation in a comprehensive manner and ensuring equally the interests of all countries. It must have an even greater role in the establishment of a new international economic order. The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, for the preparation of which the present Declaration will provide an additional source of inspiration, will constitute a significant contribution in this respect. All the States Members of the United Nations are therefore called upon to exert maximum efforts with a view to securing the implementation of the present Declaration, which is one of the principal guarantees for the creation of better conditions for all peoples to reach a life worthy of human dignity.
7. The present Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order shall be one of the most important bases of economic relations between all peoples and all nations.

*2229th plenary meeting
1 May 1974*

APPENDIX C

ISSUE AREAS

RESOURCES

1. Exploit new sources; fund resource development
2. Organize markets; regulate stocks
3. Producer-consumer cooperation
4. Processing by producers
5. National sovereignty over diminishing resources
6. Producer-consumer confrontation
7. Cartels (producers' organizations)
8. Compensation for past exploitation

MULTINATIONAL (TRANSNATIONAL) CORPORATIONS

1. Positive evaluation
2. Cooperative national regulation
3. Code of conduct
4. International regulation
5. Compensatory strategy to strengthen national firms (public/private)
6. Transfer processing/manufacturing to LDC's
7. Nationalization
8. Nationalization without compensation

SYMBOLS (LAUDATORY CONTEXT)

1. Free enterprise
2. Détente, world peace, cooperation
3. GATT system
4. World Bank, IMF
5. UN System-ECOSOC
6. UNCTAD
7. New International Economic Order; Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States
8. Group of 77; nonaligned nations

MONETARY REFORM

1. Reorganize IMF for liquidity and balance-of-payments control
2. Special fund for UNCTAD or IMF to stabilize prices of raw materials
3. Voting reorganization: recognize oil nations and power
4. Special IMF buffer stock financing—compensatory
5. Special IMF fund for development
6. SDR's to be linked to development
7. Voting on equitable bases (1 nation—1 vote IMF reorganization)
8. SDR's for development as compensation for past exploitation

AID

1. Private investment and more bilateral
2. More of existing bilateral
3. Grants instead of loans
4. More to MSA's
5. More untied bilateral
6. More multilateral through established institutions/international development strategy
7. Multilateral new funds, controlled by LDC's
8. Denunciation of aid, or aid for past exploitation

TRADE

1. Free trade, eliminate barriers
2. Nondiscrimination on basis of kind of economic-political system
3. Commodity agreements—producer and consumer
4. Negotiate nondiscrimination against LDC manufacturers/processing
5. Nonreciprocal tariff slashes for LDC's
6. Promote trade between developing countries
7. Indexing of LDC prices of exports with DC prices of exports
8. Denunciation of market as exploitative

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OF / DE

ENERGY

1. Assure supply, access
2. Develop new sources, kinds (International Energy Fund)
3. Producer-consumer dialogue
4. Permanent national sovereignty over resources
5. Equitable pricing compared to alternative sources
6. Diminishing resources—priced, produced accordingly
7. Prices to compensate for past exploitation
8. Nationalization

AGRICULTURE

1. Food information—early warning
2. Bilateral food aid; technical aid
3. Food aid target—10 million tons per year
4. IFAD/other new multilateral technical and aid institutes
5. International system of national grain reserves to aid MSA's
6. Multilateral grants for food aid
7. Prevent aid from becoming surplus dumping
8. Food price controls—within means of LDC's

INDUSTRIALIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT

1. Private investment and transfer of technology
2. Reploy uncompetitive DC industries to LDC's
3. Private industries to LDC's in conformity with development plans
4. Special MSA/landlocked country programs
5. International Industrialization Institute—exchange technical information—multilateral
6. UNIDO to promote industrial cooperation, technical transfers
7. UNIDO to become a specialized agency
8. Self reliance—go it alone

Source: Douglas C. Smyth, "The Global Economy and the Third World: Coalition or Cleavage?" World Politics 29 (July 1977):584-609.

Appendix D: DATA

Pw 74 = Power 1974 (000) Pr 65 = Prestige 1965
 Pw 65 = Power 1965 (000) Part B = Participation
 D 74 = Development 1974 ("Behavioral")
 D 65 = Development 1965 Deleg = Delegation Size
 Pr 74 = Prestige 1974 MIs = Mission Size
 MAS = Mean Aggression Scores

Countries	Pw 74	Pw 65	D 74	D 65	Pr74	Pr65	PartB	Deleg	Miss	MAS
1. U.S.A	1.270.000	954.000	5.980	4.920	46	45	17	108	50	3.06
2. U.S.S.R	722.000	464.000	2.870	2.010	49	45	10	85	78	4.10
3. Japan	406.000	182.000	3.690	1.840	34	35	12	63	25	1.90
4. W. Germany	350.000	247.000	5.610	4.200	8	-	6	50	25	2.80
5. France	265.000	164.000	5.000	3.370	43	42	13	86	16	3.85
6. China	202.000	134.000	220	179	25	-	13	28	42	7.38
7. England	175.000	140.000	3.110	2.580	46	45	7	48	20	4.28
8. Italy	143.000	93.300	2.580	1.790	28	38	9	31	9	4.20
9. Canada	123.000	79.000	5.480	4.010	13	9	13	71	12	2.85
10. Brazil	85.000	38.900	802	472	20	26	7	28	23	5.00
11. India	71.600	55.500	116	109	22	20	7	36	15	5.14
12. Poland	69.100	42.800	2.050	1.370	46	34	7	25	10	4.00
13. Spain	63.500	36.100	1.800	1.130	30	10	7	28	7	4.47
14. Netherland	60.800	40.100	4.510	3.260	14	18	5	40	8	3.80
15. Australia	55.300	36.000	4.190	3.190	23	29	12	24	10	4.50
16. E. Germany	54.300	36.900	3.210	2.170	5	-	10	22	11	4.50
17. Sweden	52.000	39.000	6.380	5.040	25	1	13	44	11	4.38
18. Mexico	51.600	29.500	892	691	22	18	9	25	17	4.66
19. Belgium	47.700	31.400	4.870	3.320	25	4	10	20	8	3.60
20. Czechoslovakia	43.600	30.700	2.970	2.180	18	18	3	22	13	5.66
21. Romania	39.300	20.600	1.870	1.080	13	20	9	26	8	5.10
22. Argentina	33.300	22.800	1.310	1.020	29	38	6	29	13	5.00
23. Austria	29.100	18.200	3.860	2.520	17	6	10	27	11	4.60
24. S. Africa	28.000	17.600	1.120	897	0	1	2	5	5	1.50
25. Iran	28.000	11.000	807	420	11	2	9	29	17	6.11
26. Denmark	27.900	19.700	5.400	4.070	7	20	8	23	6	4.60
27. Saudi Arabia	24.700	3.190	4.090	769	0	0	2	19	9	2.00
28. Yugoslavia	24.500	13.400	1.160	688	26	14	11	43	10	5.36
29. Turkey	23.700	12.700	604	406	7	9	14	30	15	4.36
30. Hungary	21.300	15.200	2.030	1.490	23	6	7	19	11	3.86
31. Norway	19.400	13.100	4.870	3.530	18	13	7	37	7	5.57
32. Finland	17.600	11.400	3.770	2.510	24	7	14	41	8	4.78
33. Bulgaria	17.600	9.400	2.030	1.150	12	18	7	19	7	4.85
34. Venezuela	17.300	11.400	1.410	1.230	20	35	5	22	11	7.00
35. Indonesia	16.300	9.450	119	85	33	5	12	28	16	4.00
36. Greece	15.600	8.650	1.670	1.010	19	23	3	19	7	5.30
37. Nigeria	15.000	9.170	247	188	24	2	11	24	15	5.73
38. New Zealand	13.300	8.850	4.050	3.340	14	8	9	15	5	3.67

<u>Countries</u>	<u>Pw 74</u>	<u>Pw 65</u>	<u>D 74</u>	<u>D 65</u>	<u>Pr74</u>	<u>Pr65</u>	<u>Part8</u>	<u>Deleg</u>	<u>Miss</u>	<u>MAS</u>
39. Portugal	11.400	6.810	1.340	755	2	0	4	22	7	6.00
40. Philippines	10.900	6.644	252	205	35	15	4	23	15	4.25
41. Colombia	10.600	6.230	425	333	17	13	4	14	14	5.50
42. Egypt	9.650	7.260	270	247	13	31	4	22	24	2.75
43. Peru	9.640	6.150	639	530	24	18	10	16	12	6.10
44. Thailand	9.490	5.120	233	163	3	0	13	21	7	4.77
45. Israel	9.370	4.870	2.780	1.890	0	2	10	18	15	3.40
46. Pakistan	8.560	8.960	125	77	20	30	7	24	9	5.71
47. Algeria	8.350	4.550	525	382	16	5	12	30	10	6.75
48. Kuwait	8.260	4.130	9.360	8.470	2	0	10	22	7	6.40
49. Bangladesh	7.910	6.600	99	104	0	-	7	20	5	4.28
50. Iraq	7.210	3.940	674	494	15	10	5	29	9	4.40
51. Malaysia	7.050	4.000	578	424	9	0	4	16	7	4.25
52. Ireland	6.630	4.600	2.170	1.600	8	19	3	21	4	3.00
53. Libya	6.180	2.650	2.870	1.640	3	4	9	24	8	6.00
54. Morocco	5.510	3.490	304	258	4	11	7	26	8	5.57
55. Cuba	5.490	4.950	604	629	0	2	9	37	25	7.22
56. Singapore	4.560	1.628	2.020	855	0	-	5	11	4	2.40
57. Zaïre	3.240	2.170	148	137	12	0	11	29	11	5.54
58. Ghana	3.110	2.330	302	297	17	32	9	13	11	4.55
59. Lebanon	3.100	1.770	925	691	36	0	8	14	8	6.00
60. Tunisia	2.780	1.520	497	335	15	17	6	23	6	6.66
61. Sri Lanka	2.700	1.830	200	165	13	17	11	10	3	5.54
62. Guatemala	2.700	1.590	469	346	5	5	3	11	8	6.00
63. Ivory Coast	2.700	1.390	560	370	6	5	1	32	6	5.00
64. Syria	2.690	1.550	377	292	13	3	6	13	8	4.50
65. Ecuador	2.630	1.550	377	301	19	18	9	19	6	5.55
66. Uruguay	2.620	2.400	868	883	30	12	3	14	8	5.00
67. Dominican Republic	2.570	1.240	532	339	2	0	3	14	16	4.66
68. Zambia	2.450	2.060	494	538	19	0	4	31	8	5.75
69. Sudan	2.410	1.990	138	147	25	12	2	19	9	2.50
70. Kenya	2.330	1.280	173	127	25	0	10	16	15	5.20
71. Ethiopia	2.270	1.630	82	74	13	11	6	10	4	4.50
72. Luxembourg	1.910	1.380	5.380	4.160	0	3	2	8	2	2.00
73. Tanzania	1.810	1.120	126	99	5	0	7	24	9	6.28
74. Jamaica	1.800	1.200	891	695	17	2	4	27	4	4.75
75. Uganda	1.710	1.270	157	148	10	0	4	23	11	5.50
76. United Arab Emirates	1.560	209	7.210	1.926	4	-	13	21	5	4.69

Countries	Pw 74	Pw 65	D 74	D 65	Pr74	Pr65	PartB	Deleg	Miss	MAS
77. Afghanistan	1.540	1.140	83	76	9	8	3	14	3	4.66
78. Costa Rica	1.530	813	789	546	10	13	4	14	10	6.50
79. Cameroon	1.470	916	235	177	14	3	3	15	16	6.66
80. Malagasy Rep.	1.310	1.030	177	171	11	4	8	16	8	7.00
81. Nepal	1.160	907	95	90	13	0	6	14	6	5.66
82. Senegal	1.120	1.030	271	306	23	12	4	23	6	6.50
83. Albania	1.090	836	453	449	0	2	9	11	4	6.66
84. Bolivia	1.060	678	207	164	14	11	6	6	5	4.83
85. Jordan	961	666	375	349	3	13	5	10	5	5.80
86. Cyprus	777	556	1.170	936	10	3	6	9	5	5.50
87. Mongolia	725	836	518	767	13	0	5	13	5	5.60
88. Haiti	722	523	145	130	15	9	2	11	21	2.50
89. Gabon	689	289	1.340	616	0	0	3	18	6	6.00
90. Guinea	628	446	146	126	21	9	10	15	6	5.30
91. Cambodia	565	648	76	105	0	0	2	12	8	7.50
92. Oman	529	100	711	177	0	-	11	12	4	5.90
93. Qatar	480	159	5.390	3.402	0	-	6	17	2	5.17
94. Sierra Leone	471	353	154	149	15	0	6	27	8	6.50
95. Liberia	439	238	252	180	5	16	6	40	5	4.50
96. Togo	433	256	198	151	0	2	5	12	5	6.40
97. Mali	389	328	70	73	11	0	11	11	3	5.18
98. Malta	381	195	1.190	612	3	0	4	12	6	5.00
99. Chad	370	381	91	115	6	0	2	15	2	4.50
100. Mauritius	364	237	414	310	10	-	8	6	2	5.87
101. Dahomey	362	275	124	116	15	4	3	10	4	6.33
102. Laos	328	210	101	80	0	0	3	14	3	5.00
103. Guyana	316	237	400	374	7	-	7	16	4	7.00
104. Burundi	284	221	72	69	22	0	4	18	5	5.75
105. Mauritania	254	186	198	179	8	0	5	16	5	4.60
106. Barbados	250	87	970	357	0	-	6	10	3	5.00
107. Somalia	230	203	76	81	12	3	6	13	3	4.50
108. Botswana	230	61	348	111	0	-	4	10	2	5.75
109. Bahrain	216	125	907	679	0	-	9	12	4	5.44
110. Yemen Arab Rep.	182	169	111	134	6	0	8	9	3	4.00
111. Swaziland	157	62	338	176	0	-	10	10	4	4.50
112. Equatorial Guinea	98	106	317	394	0	-	2	4	2	5.00
113. Eritrea	80	45	60	62	0	-	3	12	5	4.33
114. Gambia	68	46	175	140	0	-	3	11	0	5.00

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