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**CONFLICT AND IDENTITY:
PALESTINIANISM AND THE POLITICS OF BEING**

by

DEIRDRE COLLINGS, B.A.

**A thesis submitted to
the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfilment of
the requirements for the degree of**

Master of International Affairs

The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs

Carleton University

Ottawa, Ontario

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The undersigned hereby recommend to the Faculty of
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ABSTRACT:

The international salience of entrenched 'ethno-nationalist' mobilization, such as the Palestinian intifadah, poses an urgent challenge for both academics and practitioners. Within the field of International Relations, the World Society paradigm, which emphasizes identity as the key to understanding all forms of social conflict, is an intuitively appealing starting point to examine ethnically-based conflict. However, World Society's generic approach is found to be inadequate, and perhaps misleading, as an analytical tool for exploring this specific form of inter-group conflict. This study rejects the reductionist tendencies that are latent in the World Society paradigm to focus on a question which Burton's generic approach does not address: what are some of the historical and social conditions that cause individuals to band together, and to mobilize, in a specific form of identity-group? As such, this paper conducts an interdisciplinary theoretical exploration to derive a broad conceptual framework that will offer insight into the process of collective identity formation and mobilization. This analytical framework is then applied to the specific case of Palestinian identity formation and mobilization over time. Implications for both theory and practice are discussed with respect to the future of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and with respect to ethno-nationalist conflict in general.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

	PAGE
Abstract	ii
Acknowledgements	iii
Table of Contents	iv
 INTRODUCTION	1
 CHAPTER 1: OF CONFLICT AND IDENTITY	11
1.1 Of Realists, Radicals and Pluralists	12
1.2 World Society: The Burtonian View	15
1.2 A Theoretical Method	16
1.2 B Of Human Needs and Conflict	20
1.2 C Problem-Solving: The Analytical Method	27
1.2 D Summary Observations	30
 CHAPTER 2: IDENTITY NEEDS: OF GENES, MIND, AND CULTURE	32
2.1 Identity Needs: Genetic Drives?	33
2.2 Burton and Sociobiology: False Prophecies?	35
2.3 Azar and Burton: Of Genes and Cross-Level Confusion	52
 CHAPTER 3: OF 'US' AND 'THEM'	61
3.1 Ethnicity: Primordialists vs Situationists	64
3.2 Individual Identity and Social Group Identification	76
 CHAPTER 4: ETHNO-NATIONALISM: THE STRUCTURING OF IDENTITY-GROUPS	94
 CHAPTER 5: PALESTINIANISM AND THE POLITICS OF BEING	129
5.1 Introduction and Overview	131
5.2 Pre-1948: The Great Rebellion -- National Identity?	137
5.3 1948-1967: The Period of Palestinian 'Burial' and 'Non-Existence'	157
5.3 A Exiled in Arab Lands	165
5.3 B Internal Factors for Palestinian Refugee Non-Integration	168
5.3 C External Factors of Refugee 'Otherness'	171
5.3 D The Process of Palestinianism	175
5.3 E 'In Prison' in Palestine: Fragmentation and 'Terminal' Arabism	188
5.3 F The Process of Arabism	193

TABLE OF CONTENTS -- II

5.4	Post-1967: Palestinian Mobilization and Restoration to Self	198
5.4 A	"Min al-Dakhil": 'From the Interior	212
5.5	Post-1982: The Waning and Waxing of Palestinianism	223
5.5 A	Impact of 1982 -1987: Prelude to the <u>Intifadah</u>	229
5.5 B	1987: "The Shaking Off"	239
5.6	<u>Summary</u> : The Process of Palestinianism	246
CHAPTER 6:	CONFLICT AND IDENTITY: PALESTINIANISM AND THE POLITICS OF BEING	249
6.1	Palestinianism and the Politics of Being: Implications	249
6.2	Conflict and Identity: <u>Summary</u> and Perspective	264
REFERENCES		272
APPENDIX:	'SIGN-POSTS' OF PALESTINIANISM	283

INTRODUCTION

What is it that shapes and energizes rebellion such as the Palestinian intifadah¹ which burst into world-view in 1987?

'Ethno-nationalist'² uprisings are of increasing and bloody salience on the global scene as both the theorists and practitioners of International Relations are becoming aware.³ However, this learning process is a difficult one because it challenges certain assumptions which are well entrenched in both theory and practice. Thus, a typical power paradigm analysis of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (pre-intifadah) contended that the conflict had stabilized. Because the Israelis were in control, the status quo (with its no-peace, no-war stalemate) would continue:

Nor is a civil war between Palestinians in the occupied territories and Israel likely, contrary to some recent arguments. After 20 years of 'pacification' by Israeli troops, the West Bank Palestinians have not been left with the necessary

¹. The intifadah is the Palestinian 'ethno-nationalist' uprising which has now (1988) been ongoing for over a year, and which has mobilized every sector of the Palestinian population of the Occupied Territories, with strong involvement by the Israeli-Palestinians within Israel proper.

². It should be noted that throughout this paper single quotes are used to emphasize certain words or concepts. This technique reflects a concern for discourse analysis and is employed to alert the reader to possible ambiguity of meaning in terminology. For example, classification of a conflict as ethno-nationalist may be imposing certain meanings on the interaction which are unwarranted and/or obscure. As this paper emphasizes, rather than classifying a conflict as ethnic and then attempting to describe its features, it is perhaps more fruitful for analysts to examine why this classification was chosen.

³. Note the latest development in the Middle East, which finds the United States holding official talks with the PLO after thirteen years of stalwart non-recognition.

leadership, weapons or resolve (el-Khazan, 1987: 158).

el-Khazan's analysis leads him to the conclusion that Israel's security is unlikely to be seriously challenged because the powerless Palestinians have been coerced into submission by Israeli power. Because of Israel's monopoly of force, the status quo is likely to persist.⁴

The children who throw stones in the face of soldiers' bullets are not in themselves a threat to the security of Israel (although their actions may catalyze changes which do become a threat to the Israeli perception of security). However they do challenge the traditional way of thinking about the individual and the nature of social order.

Traditionally, power, coercion and authority have been considered effective means of social control -- a view which is grounded in the belief that 'human nature' is the source of all problems and that the the function of institutions and structures is to control members of society. When these traditional notions are transposed into the international arena, they engender faith in the state and in deterrence as a means of ensuring control and social order.

Although the state-centric view is a valuable lens through which to

⁴ Of course, Palestinians under occupation would query, "What status quo?" Just because state boundaries have remained 'stable' since 1967 (thus giving the impression of a status quo) does not mean that inter-group relations 'on the ground' have remained constant.

understand certain forms of international behaviour, this view becomes confounded when conflicts such as popular uprisings erupt which leave the state and authorities 'powerless' in terms of effective long-term control. Thus, when a population continues to strike and to throw stones despite policy-makers' forceful attempts to deter such actions, this anomaly suggests that social conflict at the sub-state level requires a re-thinking of traditional assumptions about the nature of conflict behaviour.

In recent years, John Burton (1979) has conducted just such a reassessment which resulted in his formulation of the World Society paradigm. By refocusing the understanding of conflict at the level of the individual, Burton renders insights which challenge the practitioner's unquestioning reliance on theories which propose that conflict be controlled or 'managed' through force and which seek to settle conflicts within existing structures and definitions of the problem.

Burton's approach, which considers identity to be the linch-pin for understanding social conflict, is intuitively most appealing as an avenue for exploring the roots of conflict involving ethno-nationalist mobilization in general and the intifadah in particular. For example, the following words, written by a Palestinian who grew up 'in exile', seem to sum up the Palestinian subjective essence that underpins their collective mobilization:

That which has been taken away from us was not only our homeland; that which has been given to us was not only destitution. From us was taken a part of our essence as human beings...I want

to regain that essence of my worth as a human being (Turki, 1972: 149).

When considered from the perspective of conflict and identity, this thought contains many clues with respect to understanding certain obscured elements of the Middle East conflict and other 'ethno-nationalist' conflicts that embroil the world today. It offers insight into questions such as: why this conflict has protracted; how, despite all odds, Palestinian national identity has consolidated and mobilized; why the current intifadah was, in fact, predictable; and why prescriptions for 'managing' this insurrection through force will probably be unsuccessful in restoring stability (let alone 'peace') to the region.

Burton's focus on identity, it would seem, is on the right track. However, despite the explanatory potential of Burton's approach to understanding social conflicts, this richness is perhaps undermined by certain assumptions which Burton invokes to buttress claims concerning generic conflict theory. As this paper will detail at length, Burton's focus on the common underlying process (frustration of identity-needs), which gives 'homology' to the perceived variation of conflict behaviour, tends to impoverish the analytical usefulness of the World Society approach for deriving insight into specific forms of conflict manifestation. For example, emphasis on the generic process of all conflict tends to preclude comprehensive analysis of the observed form of conflict behaviour known as ethno-nationalist mobilization. That is, Burton has couched certain of his 'generic' propositions in a way that precludes analysis which explores the general process of conflict with

respect to the specific developmental interplay of both history and structure. Ethnic identity and mobilization are assumed to be areas sui generis, rather than structured forms of the general process, which, if they are to be understood, require comprehensive contextual analysis.⁵

In light of the above, this present study is an interdisciplinary exploration which attempts to contextualize Burton's general approach to conflict. This contextualization is developed within a broad theoretical understanding of the complex interplay of psychology, sociology, geography and political ideology that underlies ethnonationalist mobilizations such as the Palestinian intifadah. Specifically, this paper will selectively explore theories that relate to the way in which internal psychological processes of the individual are structured by the environment such that a specific form of collective identity (Palestinianism) has both coalesced and mobilized over time. Such an investigation requires some consideration of the interplay of the different levels of analysis; rather than focusing only on the level of

⁵. It is in this way that Burton's approach tends to underestimate the structural constraints of certain conflict situations. For example, Burton's prescriptive process for resolving conflicts (i.e., problem solving, which involves face-to-face interaction of the parties to the conflict in an ahistorical and symmetrical environment) places emphasis on the psychological barriers to conflict resolution which must be overcome. As such, problem solving is grounded in the belief that the conflict can be redefined as non-zero-sum, once the 'false consciousness' of material interests (which are scarce) are extricated from psychological 'identity needs' (which are the 'true' basis of conflict, and which are additive). The potential poverty of this approach as an analytical method is that it can really only consider identity as a structure, rather than as a process which has been structured by history. In this way, a Burtonian perspective of the intifadah may well bypass consideration of the multifarious matrix which enfolds the parties to the conflict and which both shapes and limits their perceptions, actions and reactions.

the individual, or the group, or the state, or global structural elements, this study hopes to give some sense of the process by which these different levels interact.

The theories which shall guide the central understanding of this paper are as follows: Epstein's (1978) notion that both internal and external processes fashion the expression of an individual's need for self-esteem into a specific form of terminal group-identity expression; Tajfel's social identity theory which emphasizes the importance of relative comparison in the assessment of group worth (i.e., inter-group competitive comparison) and that the legitimacy of this relative worth is perceived by way of the dominant ideology within a social system; Ross' (1980) developmental scheme which considers asymmetrical power relations as integral to the historical development of collective group identity and mobilization; and Portugali's (1988) radical analysis of nationalism as a hegemonic ideology and as a 'generative world order'.⁶ Many of the notions in Horowitz's (1985) comprehensive study on ethnic groups in conflict support the exploration conducted in this paper (although this paper is concerned more with the specific form of ethno-nationalist conflict).

While not purporting to gather all of these elements into a coherent 'theory', this study will only sketch the aspects of the mutual inter-

⁶. The basic thrust of Portugali's perspective is that nationalism, as a hegemonic ideology, has legitimized the marginalization of peoples who did not conform to nationalist order parameters and thereby has 'enslaved' the marginalized to both adopt and fight for its order principles (which tether people to nations and nations to states).

play of these various elements. The scope of the topic is large, hence much of what is written is intended to be suggestive rather than definitive.

The purpose of conducting this exercise is to derive a conceptual approach which will offer some insight with respect to only one factor involved in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, namely the process of Palestinian identity-formation and mobilization. The general thesis derived in this paper is that mobilized Palestinian identity is emergent; the social ontology of Palestinianism was catalyzed by their collective marginalization and subordination (which resulted from the "enfoldment" of their society by the generative order of nationalism which functioned to shape their experiences and structure the process of their collective identification) such that the Palestinian need for 'landhood' (now 'statehood') is integrally related to their perceived collective identity needs. As such, this thesis calls into question the Burtonian view of communal conflict resolution which, if developed to its logical conclusion, would consider Palestinianism to be a primordial structure such that Palestinian 'needs of being' can be severed from Palestinian 'needs of having'.

By way of addressing this specific task, three general conceptual problems will also be discussed:

1. The 'level of analysis' problem -- this paper will emphasize the necessity for cross-level integration, but will also

critique approaches which tend to equate different levels of analysis, rather than analysing how the different levels articulate and interact.

2. The conceptual confusion (and conceptual short-hand) which tends to refer to identity and identity group formations (e.g., 'nationalism') as immutable structures, rather than as malleable processes which external context can structure in specific ways.

3. The 'Janus-faced' problem of nationalist ideology and order -- although nationalism functions as a major source of conflict (by legitimizing and structuring the subordination of human beings by other human beings), nationalism also is perceived by its victims as the solution to their problem (because of its role in structuring both the experiences and identity-processes of its victims).⁷

To this end, Chapter One provides a more comprehensive overview of the conceptual and theoretical elements embodied in John Burton's World Society approach to conflict. Chapter Two analyzes and critiques certain conceptual underpinnings of Burton's theory, and of the Azar-Burton model of Protracted International Conflict. The critique focuses on the primordialist formulation of the "identity needs" concept and pin-

⁷. Elaboration of the first two conceptual problems is found throughout Chapters 1-3. The third 'problem' is the basis for Chapter Four, and is discussed more fully in the Implications section of Chapter Six.

points its weaknesses with respect to biology (i.e., micro level) and structure (i.e., macro level).^{*}

Having rejected the primordialist position, Chapter Three focuses on strengthening the concept of identity needs from the situationalist perspective with special attention to the articulation of intra- and inter-group processes. This attention is focused specifically on the question of ethnic-identity processes and mobilization. Chapter Four attempts to consider these notions of identity processes and inter-group dynamics in the context of nationalist hegemonic ideology and global structure. The purpose of Chapter Four is to examine how general identity processes become contextually structured to result in a particular form of group expression, i.e., the emergence and mobilization of an ethno-nationalist group.

Chapter Five is a selective analysis of the ontogeny of Palestinian identity and mobilization which is informed by the preceding theoretical perspective. The emphasis in this section is to achieve an illustrative sense of the way in which nationalism as a generative order affected the very 'being' of those who lived in Palestine, and how this interaction functioned to structure the process of their collective

*. Within the literature on ethnic identity, there is a debate between two schools of thought: the primordialists and the situationalists. The primordialists consider ethnic identity to be an a priori form of group attachment, whereas the situationalists consider ethnic identity as a variable requiring explanation. The latter school suggests that understanding of the emergence of this particular phenotype of collective group identity requires contextual consideration of history and structure.

identification, mobilization and conflict goals.

Chapter Six briefly considers the implications of Palestinian consciousness for the future of the conflict itself with specific consideration of what it means to be 'enslaved by nationalism'. This discussion is followed by a short summary and perspective.

The emphasis in this paper on conceptual clarification is both deliberate and vital. The necessity for this emphasis is alluded to in the following commentary by one of the dispossessed:

I sit here and read articles and books and quotations and I listen to commentaries and debates that want to prove to me that I am not really a Palestinian...They want to convince me that I really had no national consciousness as a Palestinian; that my emotional fixation on Palestine was misplaced;

They can explain to me that I have no rights in Palestine, that I am a southern Syrian or an Arab or whatever...name they choose for me...but they cannot explain to me the causes of my existential discontent (Turki, 1972:153).

It is towards an understanding of this problem that this thesis is directed. As such, the goal is not to marshal facts to prove who or what the Palestinians are, but to attempt to explore the essence of the 'existential discontent' which colours the reality and perception of being Palestinian. For it is this discontent that manifests itself as a political reality and which therefore should be understood.

CHAPTER ONE:
OF CONFLICT AND IDENTITY: THE PARADIGMS OF
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Since 1960, the Third World has played host to 90% of the world's violent conflict events -- both domestic and international (Azar and Moon, 1984: 104). Much of this violence is considered to be increasingly of the 'ethnic' or cultural variety (Connor, 1973; Said and Simmons, 1976; Ross and Cottrell, 1980). It would appear that 'identity' is a crucial concept to consider when exploring the issues of peace and conflict.

Within the field of International Relations, there have been three major approaches employed to advance understanding of conflict behaviour: Realism, Radicalism and Pluralism (Banks, 1984). More recently, a specialized variant of the 'pluralist' perspective -- the 'World Society' or 'Conflict Resolution' paradigm -- has entered into this debate largely under the tutelage of John Burton (e.g. 1979, 1986, 1987). Burton's approach is central to the research undertaken in this paper because the World Society paradigm "directs attention to the Palestinians as party principals in the Middle East conflict... a focus it took many years for Western observers and mediators to obtain" (Burton, 1979: 178). However, before probing Burton's view of the world, the approaches to conflict embodied in the other three paradigms will be briefly summarized.

1.1 OF REALISTS, RADICALS AND PLURALISTS:

In essence, realists, radicals and pluralists all pledge allegiance to the superordinate goal of world order and security. However, this common goal is defined in very different ways within each paradigm. For the realists, security is best achieved through a system of sovereign states; for radicals, equality and justice are the key; for pluralists, freedom of the individual is of utmost priority. Each approach structures its respective analytical framework on the basis of its core value. Thus, each paradigm generates different conceptions of the causes of and recipes for dealing with conflict.

Realists consider states to be the only actors of import on the international scene. As such, the realist paradigm focuses on conflict that results when the stability of the status quo balance is disrupted due to the failure of adequate diplomacy and defence. Believing that 'non-war' is as close to 'peace' as this world can expect to achieve, realists are satisfied with a stable status quo and seek to contain change. Realism tends to offer prescriptions for the prevention and management of inter-state conflict and is therefore not very helpful for exploring the causes of sub-state conflicts that appear premised on ethnonationalism.

The pluralist approach to conflict is perhaps the most difficult to characterize because of its multifarious manifestations. For the purpose of this paper it is suffice to note that pluralists look 'below' and

'above' the level of the state -- i.e., at the individual, interest group, and transnational levels -- to consider these influences on the international system as a whole.

Pluralists place much greater faith than realists in the possibilities for social and international cooperation, by emphasizing the cross-cutting ties which bind together the interstate community. Although most pluralists, like realists, consider power to be the central determinant for dealing with conflict, pluralists look to the "fundamental legal principles of a social order" (Alker and Biersteker, 1984:25). As such, they accept neither the inevitability nor the wisdom of the current status quo of non-war/non-peace but believe firmly in the possibility of peaceful change through learning and understanding.

Although ethno-nationalist conflict is well within the 'view-finders' of this paradigm, it tends to be inadequate in terms of elucidating the origins of conflict situations. The pluralist prefers to focus on the future because "there have been atrocities and injustices committed in the past on both sides" (Groom, 1975), and nothing will be solved by dwelling on atrocities. The pluralist, therefore, looks optimistically for avenues of future conciliation by focusing on overcoming the psychological barriers that perpetrate conflict situations.

Radicals consider ahistoricism to lead to a very superficial view of the conflict dynamic, a view which underestimates the coercive/structural elements of society and merely "obscures the framework in which

all present and future actions take place" (Tooze, 1984). To radicals, focusing one's efforts on attitudinal change is merely tinkering about the edges. Real change, for radicals, can only occur if one understands the structural limits which are integral to the present and which exacerbate the psychological dimensions of conflict processes.*

Because they are concerned with 'justice', radicals are perhaps the most concerned with understanding the origins of conflict, hence their focus on the historical processes which allowed for the creation of the problem in the first place. As Elia Zureik elucidates, most radical theory endeavors to distinguish between the "manifest" (intended) and the "latent" (unintended) functions of social processes (Zureik, 1979). Thus, analysis should not assume that reality is as it appears, but should seek to extricate hegemonic ideology from the interpretation of events such that 'latent' ramifications are revealed.

Radicals consider conflict to be asymmetrical (with one party to the conflict being a subjugated 'victim') and are therefore very much concerned with explaining issues such as repression (i.e., asymmetrical injustice) which are so often an integral part of ethno-nationalist conflict. Believing in the possibility of profound peace (i.e., security

*. The methodology of dialectical structuralism (see page 17) which is integral to Radical analysis focuses on the historical processes which have structured (and obscured) the context of the present such that some issues are never discussed and some actions are never considered. A dialectical analysis tends to "challenge the legitimacy of the existing world order... Conceptually, dialectical theories have typically contrasted actual (dominant, imposed) structures of world order with emergent alternatives that may or must supercede them" (Alker and Biersteker, 1984:125).

based on equality and justice), radicals criticize existing structures and processes in their quest for transformative change.

1.2 WORLD SOCIETY: THE BURTONIAN VIEW

John Burton's theory of society, which is considered the fourth paradigmatic wave in International Relations, appears to intertwine elements of the liberal/pluralist and radical school,* and focuses on identity as the key to understanding conflict.

Burton suggests that our understanding of conflict has been greatly limited by unquestioned assumptions about power and the nature of society. Thus, he considers the historic process of conflict in the world to reveal a clash between institutional values and 'human needs', a clash perpetrated by the illegitimacy of authority structures, whose actions were/are justified by the prevailing belief in 'society first' as necessary for social order. Social conflict, therefore, is a function of 'deviant' social structures.

*. In essence, World Society derives from the pluralist core value of "freedom of the individual." However, by defining this freedom in terms of 'human needs', this value does not uphold a faith in liberal 'democracy' (i.e., majority rule) but demands, in essence, satisfaction of the radical core value of justice and equality. While employing a methodology which mimics that of dialectics to derive his theory, Burton's process for conflict analysis (Problem Solving) retreats to the liberal camp of ahistoricism and psychology. All of these observations and their ramifications (both positive and negative) are explored in detail below.

Although World Society is certainly welcomed as an alternative and insightful perspective for understanding conflict behaviour, it loses some of its critical worth when Burton (1986) claims to have uncovered the generic 'truth' of conflict behaviour. Certain elements of Burton's claims (especially as they relate to ethnic identity and conflict) will be scrutinized in Chapter Two, but first the World Society paradigm will be outlined in terms of: A] theoretical method, B] theoretical substance, C] analytical method and D] summary overview.

1.2 A: World Society: Theoretical Method

Burton begins from the position that there are many anomalies that stand outside the dominant theories of International Relations which cannot be explained, understood or predicted within their respective frameworks. Burton argues that these failures of fit have often in the past been dismissed as minor exceptions (e.g., ethnic conflict) so that they could be ignored without affecting the basic picture of the world. The driving force of Burton's approach lies in the pursuance of the source of these anomalies to reveal that, what initially appears to be a small contradiction, requires, in reality, a significant shift in vision.

Burton deduces his theory by scrutinizing the relationship between theory, society and social change. He conducts this theoretical inquiry by employing a deductive methodology which superficially resembles a dialectical approach -- that is, which appears to operate through the

prism of the "logic of dialectics." However, as the following discussion will contend, Burton's 'dialectical' insights are extremely circumscribed and in fact, more a function of liberal beliefs than of radical analysis.

Four elements which characterize the methodology inherent to a dialectical analysis are:¹⁰

1. Wholeness: "The ascent from the specific to the general and back to the specific by relating the process of interactions of the elements in a given system (i.e., society)."
2. Historicism: "Historical character of social phenomena which is reflected in that (a)...the system of social relations of a given socio-economic formation is historically conditioned and (b) all the categories and laws of this system are also historically conditioned."
3. Motion: Events must be analyzed in connection with other events in their movement and development.
4. Contradiction: Phenomena should be studied in their development on the basis of contradictions, i.e., analysis is geared towards discovering the "primary contradiction for the purpose of social and political action."

With respect to "wholeness," Burton borrows from the work of Paul

¹⁰. This summary is taken from Ahsan et al., (1987). For development of these ideas see, for example, Elster (1978).

Sites (1973)¹¹ in his consideration of the nature of society and of social change. Thus, Burton's approach focuses on behaviour at the level of the individual and ascends to the level of the group (i.e., society) to examine the structures of power and authority (which are themselves a product of prevailing ideologies) which transcend this interactive relationship. In so doing, Burton questions traditional and popular theories about the nature of society (such as the individual in society is aggressive) which resulted in the institutionalization of law-and-order coercive constraints (e.g., the state) as the main mechanism of social control of the individual.

By examining the historical record, Burton cites examples of how popular ideologies (i.e., 'the locus of power lies with authorities'; 'it is legitimate for authorities to use violence to maintain legal norms, institutions and structures') were translated into structural systems such as "slavery, feudalism, tribal elite rule, majority tribe rule and modifications of these as industrialization developed" (Burton, 1979). These systems required the individual to adapt because the dominant ideology legitimized the structure.

With respect to "motion," Burton suggests that the forms of social

¹¹. Much of Burton's conception of social order, social change, power, authority, deviance, and conflict are borrowed from Sites' 1973 work (which in turn is an amalgamation of many different theorists' work in the areas of psychology and sociology). Burton's main contribution lies in his refinement of certain concepts, his application of these to the study of International Relations, and his innovative notion of Problem Solving as an alternative to traditionally based bargaining and negotiation methods for dealing with conflict.

structure which have existed in the past should not be considered as 'static' stages, but are better analyzed in connection with each other. Thus, when these events (i.e., feudalism, slavery etc.) are considered in terms of historical process, they expose a contradiction. That is, the structural changes which have occurred throughout social history (i.e. abolition of feudalism, abolition of slavery, emancipation of women, the post-war independence movements) reveal the contradiction inherent in the notion that 'power' is an institutional property because it denies the latent 'reality' that effective power is more often possessed by the individual (and by the identity group).

For Burton, therefore, the primary contradiction inherent in the social order exists between the structure of authority (which places coercive constraints on the individual) and the individual's 'drive' to fulfill his/her social 'needs' (which are often at odds with institutional values, and therefore coercively denied). What should be noted here, and will be detailed at length below, is that Burton's conceptual concern for the 'deviant' structures of world order and his human needs alternative, are tethered by a very limited sense of both history and structure. Thus, what appears to be a 'dialectical' concern for structure is in fact a concern which is guided heavily by liberal (as opposed to radical) concerns for human liberation (and a liberal interpretation of history with respect to the reasons for structural

change).¹²

In essence, however, Burton rejects the notion that institutionalized power is fundamental to social harmony. Although it does not deny the realities of power, Burton's approach calls for a greater consciousness of the limit of the effectiveness of power because the history of social change suggests that power elements are constrained by greater societal influences. Thus, by Burton's analysis, it comes as no surprise that great powers prove ultimately to be impotent giants who are capable of destroying smaller states but incapable of resolving conflicts (e.g., U.S. defeats in Vietnam, Iran, and Lebanon, and the Soviet stalemate in Afghanistan). Burton posits that, regardless of the degree of coercive power an authority may possess, social stability will not be realized unless certain individual requirements are met.

1.2 B World Society: Of Human Needs And Conflict

The core value underpinning the World Society model is that of individual freedom -- a condition which can only be attained through the satisfaction of "human needs." This core value is derived from theories

¹². This creates a major problem for Burton, which is best evidenced by his attempt to incorporate Galtung's (1969) notion of 'structural violence' into his paradigm. Burton, in the final analysis, pays mere lip-service to the far more systemic structural constraints which are implied in Galtung's radical perspective. Indeed, the limited notion of structure in Burton's paradigm (which stems from his liberal concerns re institutional constraints on individual freedom) is effectively revealed via his faith in the Problem Solving Process as a vehicle for conflict resolution (i.e., a process which gives primacy to psychology and does not adequately deal with questions concerning the need for structural change).

of behaviour developed in the fields of social psychology (e.g. Maslow, 1954) and sociology (Sites, 1973), and is further supported by Burton's 'radical' insights which reveal the anomalies of the power paradigm¹³. This approach suggests that individuals seek to fulfill a set of deep-seated universal needs which are linked to the definition and preservation of identity.

For clarification, it is useful to examine the proposed relationships among human behaviour, human values and human needs. An individual's values are the template for his behaviour. Burton (following Sites, 1973) suggests that values may not be limited to those which have been successfully internalized through the (cultural) socialization process. Rather, values -- although often given expression in the form of cultural norms -- are inextricably linked to more fundamental and universal human needs. Although needs are universal (a-societal), individuals generally attempt to use the norms of a particular society to gratify these needs. Culture, therefore, is a tool which individuals use to gratify their basic human needs. The differing norms and values of different cultures shape the individual's world and help to "make sense of it from a need gratification point of view" (Sites, 1973:15). This interaction results in different behavioural manifestations of these universal 'drives'. However, as Paul Sites elucidates:

¹³. Burton also attempts to conceptually couch this notion of "human needs" in the 'proof' of sociobiology -- in a tentative fashion in his 1979 work, and in more blatantly deterministic terms in his 1986 article. The conceptual weakness of Burton's biological allusions is a key area of contention in this paper, and will be taken up at length in the sections to follow.

... an individual will stop using the norms of his group if the using of these norms does not provide enough control for need gratification and if there is present a higher possibility for ...need gratification from pursuing another course of action (Sites, 1973:18).

As both Sites and Burton observe, the occurrence of societal 'deviance' and 'rebellion' illustrates that individuals will go outside the acceptable way of behaving if their human needs are not being adequately fulfilled by social/cultural norms and institutions. Society, therefore, does not control the behaviour of the individual but does provide a set of norms which the individual learns through the interaction process and which can be used to fulfill basic needs. Human behaviour, therefore, emerges out of the interaction between situational variables and the pursuit of basic needs (which are universally human). The behavioural manifestation of these needs may or may not coincide with the values and norms of a society, depending on how conducive the latter are to the attainment of needs.

World Society and Social Order

The World Society paradigm shifts emphasis away from institutions and towards the individual and identity group as the starting point for understanding social order. Thus its central premise is that the basic needs of individuals must be fulfilled if they are to become functioning and cooperative members of society and for social order to prevail. As Burton declares: "the efficient and harmonious functioning of society (as distinct from its integration) is not explained by coer-

cion or by shared values, but by the development and functioning of its component parts" (Burton, 1979:59).

The ontological human needs which are thought to compel both conforming and/or deviant behaviour are related to the individual's quest for identity.¹⁴ Burton's model stipulates nine basic needs, eight of which are derived from Sites (1973): a need for response and consistency of response, a need for stimulation, a need for security, a need for recognition, a need for distributive justice, a need to appear rational and to develop rationality, a need for meaning in response and a need for a sense of control (Burton, 1979:72-73). The 'need' which Burton adds to Site's list is "role defence" defined as "the protection of needs once they have been acquired" (Burton, 1979:73). Burton tends to umbrella all of these needs under the label "identity needs" or "role". Thus, Burton sees an individual's behaviour to be shaped by his attempt "to secure a role and to preserve a role [read identity] by which he acquires and maintains his recognition, security and stimulation" (Burton, 1979:73). The crucial question concerning the origins of these needs shall be critically explored in detail in Chapter Two of this paper.

¹⁴. Because of the relationship between social norms/ values and human needs, it is evident that in the World Society paradigm there is no such thing as human deviant behaviour. Rather 'deviance' is merely a label bestowed upon those whose needs are being frustrated by the institutional system (i.e., those who are compelled to go outside social norms to fulfill their needs) by those whose needs are being met within the institutional system (i.e., those whose conformity to social norms is a function of their needs being adequately satisfied). This distinction is tethered to the notion of structural violence and structural power and shall be elaborated further below.

Because human violence and conflict are considered to result from institutional structures and authorities which prevent individuals or identity groups from pursuing the fulfillment of their needs, legitimacy of authority is the central tenet of a peaceful world society. It is important to note that "legitimacy" in Burtonian terms does not mean 'legitimized' authority in the sense of the majority-approved (which is the definition of legitimacy in liberal-democratic and classical realist terms). Because of Burton's focus on individuals as equals (i.e., a melding of the radical and pluralist core values), authority is considered to be legitimate only if its raison d'etre is to work towards the fulfillment of the needs and goals of all individuals that it represents.

World Society and Conflict

The thwarting of needs inevitably leads to conflict at either the individual or group level. The response of those in authority is the crucial factor in deciding the fate of those conflicts...because true conflict resolution is addressed to those primordial needs which are not negotiable (Burton, 1979).

Burton suggests that all high levels of conflict -- in all forms, from the family to interstate -- have some common features when they touch upon the needs and values that are an inherent part of the human and social organism. Burton posits that the various manifestations of anomalous human behaviour (i.e., deviance, violence and war) are all garnered by a common underlying process (frustration of needs) which gives homology to the perceived variation of behaviour. The notion of universal human needs gives conceptual coherence to this intuitively

appealing 'generic' theory of conflict:¹⁵

There is something in common between the behaviour of the individual who defies social norms because of his inherent needs that must be satisfied, and the behaviour of social groups that are prepared to defy the wider society, even at great cost, in the pursuit of their goals. In neither case can there be settlement imposed by courts or by the state (Burton, 1979).

Central to Burton's conception of conflict and conflict resolution is the distinction between conflicts over interests, which are negotiable, and conflicts over non-negotiable needs. Burton suggests that 'conflicts of interests' are prefaced on the belief that conflict arises out of competition for scarce resources. While recognizing that resources are not infinite, Burton posits that when conflicts are defined in terms of scarce resources, this definition only describes the manifest symptoms of a latent problem:

War is a tactic to achieve interests or needs. Frequently conflicts are defined in terms of tactics and the underlying interests or needs remain beneath the surface...In industrial relations, wage demands sometimes disguise dissatisfaction with management. Wages are then negotiated instead of working conditions. In international relations, disputes over territory or boundaries sometimes relate to anxieties over security or values attached to ethnic identity, and are negotiated or give rise to wars without the underlying problems being addressed (Burton, 1979).

For Burton, bargaining over symptoms will not 'resolve' a conflict in the long-run if the hidden causal factors remain untreated. Rather,

¹⁵. Critical discussion of Burton's "generic/genetic" claims and their implicit ramifications will be pursued at length in Chapter Two.

the resolution of conflict requires processes that reveal hidden motivations and intentions so that underlying issues, which usually remain hidden in power-bargaining situations, become clear. Burton's theory, with its focus on thwarted identity needs as the underlying 'virus', contends that most conflicts need not be ensconced in zero-sum terms: "Identity is not a scarce product. Nor is security. On the contrary, the more one experiences it, the more there is available for others" (Burton, 1979).

Thus, many conflicts -- like those over sovereignty and territory -- parade in the guise of zero-sum terms. The apparent intractableness of such struggles, however, may be more a function of the core value of the hegemonic ideology than a function of objective reality. Thus, Burton would argue that the Westphalian system is a cultural system which defines the needs of security and identity in the institutional vehicle of the state. It is this manifest definition of social organization and security which causes conflict to be viewed as zero-sum. In essence, however, the parties to these conflicts often share a core concern for security and identity -- a shared problem which can allow for a positive sum resolution, if the latent reality of their joint predicament is shorn of its ideological definitions. Burton sees this 'false consciousness' as the key obstacle to overcome if conflict resolution is desired.

1.2 C Problem Solving : The Analytical Method

Burton places heavy emphasis on linking his generic theory to praxis, so much so that conflict analysis for specific situations is subsumed within his proposed framework for conflict resolution. Thus, any analysis of a conflict situation is to be undertaken by the parties themselves in structured meetings, called problem-solving workshops, that may be characterized as a form of group psycho-analysis.

The problem-solving process requires face-to-face communication between (among) the parties to the conflict in the presence of an 'objective' panel of conflict resolution experts. These experts, according to Burton, should not be knowledgeable of the conflict itself, but should be proficient in the knowledge of general conflict processes. The purpose of this panel is to facilitate the conflicting parties to explore their own attitudes, perceptions and (latent) goals and those of their adversaries:

A facilitator...seeks to help the parties arrive at a common definition of their relationships, define their separate goals clearly and through facilitated analysis, discover options which meet the needs of all (Burton, 1979:125).

Conflict resolution, therefore, is a process of mutual discovery designed to change the subjective nature of the definition of a conflict situation and to encourage the self-conscious revelation of underlying needs and shared goals. Ideally, the parties involved will descry that what initially appears to be a zero-sum confrontation can be transformed into a mutually beneficial relationship by way of superordinate values.

Problem solving is advocated as a peaceful alternative to both the power-paradigm form of praxis, which requires coerced or compromised settlements, and to certain radical approaches which call for structural change through violent revolution.¹⁶ It is construed as a practical framework with the potential to engender the resolution of conflict: a profound, self-sustaining peace achieved through mutual agreement of the parties involved.

Through problem solving, Burton has attempted to create a process which will reveal dialectical-type insights (an analytical goal of the radical school) via a pluralist-type method which focuses on psychological barriers in an ahistorical and symmetrical environment. This cross-paradigm endeavour, although intuitively appealing, harbours some major contradictions that hold potentially grave consequences.

For example, Burton contends that in order for third party facilitators to be neutral, they should not be 'experts' on the history of the conflict. Yet, Burton also asserts:

It is the role of the third party to ascertain which parties are those that are most directly concerned, and to arrive at a tentative schedule of analysis that will ultimately take into account all parties and issues... Structuring communication between parties is an important role, requiring some tentative analysis and perhaps some tentative judgements regarding the nature of the conflict and its probable origins (Burton, 1979:119).

In order to fulfill this bill, it would seem that third party facilitators must indeed be informed expert on the history of the

¹⁶. It is important to note that many radical writers do not call for violent revolution as the only means for change, but call for revolution through evolution -- with 'intellectuals' holding great responsibility for enhancing "critical consciousness" (Gramsci, 1971), to highlight the latent contradictions of reality, thereby speeding up the process of change. This is, in essence what dialectical analysis is all about (e.g., Chomsky, 1983; Said, 1979). Burton's problem-solving approach is a more limited and structured form of this same process.

conflict, and that much prior critical analysis is necessary if judgements of this nature are to be undertaken. As the Arab-Israeli-Palestinian conflict so vividly illustrates, even a task as seemingly simple as determining which parties are to be included in the problem-solving process requires in-depth knowledge of the historical events and processes of that conflict. This 'oversight' on the part of Burton reaches magnified proportions when he contends that all analysis of conflict can be accomplished by the parties themselves within the exploratory confines of the problem-solving environment.

Furthermore, Burton's notion that conflict arises out of thwarted identity needs is prefaced on the assumption that the power relationship between the two groups is asymmetrical:

All of these lists of needs are made from the point of view of the 'inferior' in relationships: attention is directed to the individual's struggle for security, control, identity, etc. (Burton, 1979:73)

However, Burton never fully confronts the implications of this fundamental component of the conflict process. Rather, he tends to caricature the structural components of conflict situations (thus, structure is confined to a very limited definition, namely, the structure of authority) while over-emphasizing biological suppositions concerning the nature and process of identity needs.¹⁷

¹⁷. This is perhaps the fundamental criticism integral to this paper and will be explored at length below.

Burton attempts to deal with this problem of 'inequality' (a concern of the radical paradigm) by incorporating Galtung's (1969) concept of "structural violence" as a contributing factor to conflict involving the thwarting of identity needs. However, this concept is borrowed devoid of the dialectical analytical method which gives it meaning. As such the notion of 'structural violence' is poorly integrated within the theoretical framework of the World Society paradigm, and receives mere lip-service in the ahistorical and symmetrical environment of problem-solving praxis. The problems with problem-solving as a means to resolve a protracted conflict (such as that between Palestinians and Israelis) will be considered further in Chapter Six.

1.2 D World Society: Summary Observations

Burton's theory challenges the ideological underpinnings of the power-paradigm. Burton suggests that conflict be understood in terms of human needs, with deviant social structures (i.e., 'illegitimate' authority structures) as the root cause of conflictual and 'rebellious' behaviour. Two questions immediately spring to mind: [a] What does this conclusion mean? and [b] How is it derived? Burton appears more interested in tackling the former question (thus his emphasis on problem-solving and praxis) than in fully explaining the latter. However, unless the latter can be answered satisfactorily, the former loses its 'power' and relevance.

The derivation of the World Society paradigm can be seen as a three-

part affair: 1. Burton focuses on a collection of questions which are anomalies that stand outside the explanatory power of the dominant paradigm in IR (realism), 2. Burton then supplies conceptual strategies for addressing these questions -- patterns of reasoning that help to explain those problems which had previously seemed resistant to explanation and 3. He then offers a general (generic) view about the origins and processes of conflict in society at all levels. Although Step One is an essential starting point for expanding human knowledge and understanding, it is evident that Step Three is derived from Step Two. Thus, the concept of "universal and ontological identity needs" becomes the crucial issue on which turns the validity of Burton's 'generic' claims.

From this perspective, the fact that Burton conceptually couches the notion of human needs in the 'proof' of sociobiology is a matter for critical scrutiny -- a matter made more pressing by Burton's 1986 article on "Generic Theory" which carelessly equates the terms "generic" and "genetic". This article has sparked the beginnings of a critical academic debate (cf., Burton, 1986; Avruch, 1987; Burton, 1987). This paper will extend the boundaries of this debate, because of its fundamental implications for what the World Society paradigm has to say about ethno-nationalist conflict (and its resolution).

CHAPTER TWO:
IDENTITY NEEDS: OF GENES, MIND, AND CULTURE

This chapter will focus on a critical analysis of Burton's reliance on genetics and sociobiology as 'proofs' to buttress his conception of universal human needs (and 'generic' conflict). Although not intended to deny the richness, nor trivialize the subtleties of Burton's model, this discussion will highlight why Burton's biological carelessness (which he relegates to a mere matter of semantics) is a crucial area of contention -- especially when one attempts to apply his 'generic' theory to understanding ethno-nationalist conflict. This critique is not geared towards nihilism, but towards refinement, clarification, and a quest for limits. Thus the discussion will explore the 'proposition' of identity needs as genetic (in all its inherent contradiction) and then will proceed to demonstrate how such incautious allusions become grossly magnified and misconstrued when they are generalized across levels into notions such as a "drive to ethnic identity" (cf. Azar, 1986 and discussion to follow). This analysis comprises four main components:

Section 2.1 is a statement of the problem.

Section 2.2 will examine the concept of sociobiology and its relation to, and implications for, Burton's theory.

Section 2.3 will examine how genetic and generic assumptions serve to be confusing and reductionist in cross-level perspective [i.e., the intervening structural variables which distinguish the levels of conflict analysis (individual, group, nation, state) become de-emphasized].

Section 2.4 will summarize the critique, and suggest that the notion of universal human needs does not necessarily demand genetic suppositions.

2.1 IDENTITY NEEDS: GENETIC DRIVES?

Avruch and Black (1987) conduct a critical examination of Burton's Generic Needs Theory (1986) and conclude that as Burton constructs it, the model is "fraught with logical and conceptual difficulties" (Avruch and Black, 1987:95). Their criticisms center mostly on the veracity of the needs themselves (i.e., the needs are "nowhere defined, empirically determined or quantitatively expressed") and the related problem of the origins of these basic needs:

Where do these needs come from? And why those particular needs and not others? From what theory are these deduced? Seemingly it is a compound of geneticism, sociobiology and stimulus-response behaviourism. Each is insufficient: together they make a jumble (Avruch and Black, 1987:91).

Burton considers Avruch and Black's accusations to be of small consequence to his model: "...the argument whether human behaviour is genetic or cultural is of little importance from the view of the theory of conflict resolution" (Burton, 1987:97). While Burton grounds his ideas heavily in the 'proof' of sociobiology, he also quotes Sites to the effect that such proofs are not required:

In using the need concept we must ever be conscious that we are operating at an abstract conceptual level and that in the last analysis the actual basis of the need is tied up with certain psycho-physiological processes which are in interaction with the environment and which are not at this point in our scientific development directly observable.

...if we find that men have certain anxieties and perhaps engage in bizarre activity under conditions of insecurity, we might fruitfully posit the need for security and see where it leads us, if we find or observe the same thing when individuals

are alienated or seem to lose their identity, we might talk about the need for identity (Sites, 1973:8).

For Burton, the fact that certain processes are not directly observable should not prevent concepts from being derived deductively. Thus the validity of the need concept should be judged on its ability to enhance understanding and explain human activity (Burton, 1979:66-7). As Burton's rebuttal indicates: "The important conclusion is that universal patterns of behaviour exist -- for whatever reason -- making possible a generic approach to conflict resolution, across cultures and across social levels within cultures" (Burton, 1987:97). On the surface, this statement seems fair enough. However, Burton's reliance on sociobiology and genetic drives takes the concept of human needs out of the abstract conceptual level and into a concrete, and potentially misleading 'reality'.

The question arises as to why Burton is insistent on grounding his theory in ambiguous biological suppositions. As the discussion below elaborates, at least two interrelated reasons are evident: 1. 'objectivity' and 2. 'genericity.' Drawing on a theory (supposedly) derived from the biological sciences gives greater credence to Burton's interdisciplinary claims that World Society represents the culmination of a thought shift which has transcended all traditional disciplinary bounds. Further, by claiming that identity needs are "genetic," Burton implies that his approach is "generic" and value free. Such a belief results in more theoretical guise than gain, with the awareness of the limits of the perspective becoming lost in the belief that the essence

of reality has been discovered. The danger of such false consciousness is that 'solutions' which World Society offers become cast as objectively desirable and natural. However, if the paradigmatic lens of World Society reveals a truth but not the truth, its solutions may contain within them seeds of further discontent -- seeds which lie outside the 'sites' of this paradigm.

2.2 BURTON AND SOCIOBIOLOGY: FALSE PROPHECIES?

Citing scholars such as Ardrey (1966) and E.O. Wilson (1975), Burton clearly believes that sociobiological suppositions "give strong support to the list of needs and desires put forward by Sites" (Burton, 1979: 74). As such, Burton seems to accept Wilson's theory of sociobiological human motivations and the idea that "human needs can be determined by taking account of evolutionary influences" (Burton, 1979: 74). The implications of this are perhaps more far-reaching than Burton is aware.

Burton's 1979 book is scattered with reductionist biological references such as: "...the individual in society will pursue his needs and desires (some of which may be programmed genetically and may include some elements of altruism)" (Burton, 1979: 77); and, "...[role derelence] ...is a need for which biological evidence is available, for it explains the behaviour of dominant members of packs and the main fighting within species that takes place" (Burton, 1979:73). When such statements are followed through to their logical conclusion, their implicit determinism

results in reductionist anthropomorphism.¹⁰

Perhaps these references -- made in 1979 -- could be overlooked because sociobiology at that time was still a recent arrival on the intellectual scene, and the ramifications of "appealing to recent ideas about the evolution of animal behaviour in order to advance grand claims about human nature and human social institutions" (Gould, 1986:148) had not yet been critically scrutinized. However, as it has developed since, sociobiology has drawn much deserved criticism. This is not to say that all studies conducted under the name of sociobiology have been faulty, nor that a human sociobiology will not one day come into being, but as Kitcher points out:

A serious human sociobiology needs help from many fields. If it is to be achieved, it will have to draw on the work of evolutionary theorists, behaviour geneticists, developmental biologists and psychologists, sociologists and historians, cognitive psychologists and anthropologists. Any resultant discipline would be a real synthesis. But it is hard to synthesize when some of the contributors to the union are yet to be formed (Kitcher, 1985: 436-7).

Thus, in 1986, at a time when evolutionary theorists were moving away from the grand claims of early human sociobiologists, Burton's attempts to define human behaviour in biological terms were becoming

¹⁰. It is beyond the bounds of this paper to detail the poverty of these biological assumptions. The interested reader should refer to Kitcher's (1985) comprehensive analysis and to Gould (1981; 1986).

more entrenched¹⁹ -- i.e., basic human needs are "generic and genetic" -- albeit couched in more cautionary terms:

We are aware that universal, ontological and even genetic goals may suggest biological reductionism, a view that human conflict behaviour can be reduced to biological explanation. But that is neither our intention nor our belief. Though we feel that basic human needs are everywhere the same, and therefore have a biological base, their expression across time and space may be radically different, depending on psychological, anthropological, sociological, economic, political and other imperatives that may be prevailing...(Burton and Sandole, 1986: fn. 343).

This passage is a fair enough attempt by Burton to deflect criticism about his intentions. However, the question whether such a waiver rids Burton's theoretical construction of its biological determinism remains. To address this question, a two-part investigation is necessary: 1. to (briefly) explore the method and problems inherent to sociobiology and 2. to relate this to what it is that Burton is attempting to accomplish.

Burton refers to sociobiology as if it were an established empirical body of knowledge which provides 'scientific' support for the concept of human needs. Such a position, however, is far from the case, as Kitcher(1985) elucidates:

¹⁹. Burton's references would not need to be so critically scrutinized except for the fact that he uses biology to underscore his claims to deriving a generic theory of conflict, and a generic method to deal with all conflict.

Friends of sociobiology see the "new synthesis"²⁰ as an exciting piece of science, resting soundly on evidence and promising a wealth of new insights including some that are relevant to human needs. To critical eyes, however, the same body of doctrine seems a mass of unfounded speculation, mischievous in covering socially harmful suggestions with the trappings and authority of science (Kitcher, 1985: 8).

Kitcher's in-depth analysis assiduously demonstrates the dangers inherent to the confused thinking which construes sociobiology to be an "undifferentiated mass of studies all equally well supported" (Kitcher, 1985:135). In essence, sociobiology is a motley conglomeration encompassing: methodologically impoverished conjectures which proclaim the inevitability of certain human behaviours, blatantly reductionist anthropomorphisms, a few solid studies on animal behaviour and a very few careful theoretical analyses that suggest a possible evolutionary process that allows for the 'natural selection' of general human propensities such as intelligence (i.e., Dawkins, 1982).

Sociobiology of the E.O. Wilson variety attempts to explain the origin of specific adaptive behaviours (i.e., aggression, spite, xenophobia, conformity and 'upward mobility') by way of natural selection. To this end, sociobiology begins with the Darwinian imperative that "individuals are selected to maximize the contribution of their own genes to future generations" (Gould, 1981:326). As Gould succinctly notes:

²⁰. The term "new synthesis" refers to E.O. Wilson's (1975) claim to creating a new behavioural discipline --sociobiology -- which was supposed to synthesize Darwin's theory of evolution and certain elements of population genetics in order to explain the evolution and nature of animal (including homo sapiens) social behaviour.

When they identify a behaviour that seems to be adaptive in helping an individual's genes along, they develop a story for its origin by natural selection operating upon genetic variation influencing the specific act itself. These stories are rarely backed by any evidence beyond the influence of adaptation (Gould, 1981:326).

However, in order for these "Darwinian histories" to have evolutionary merit, they must do more than account for the way in which characteristics of organisms promoted their fitness. These stories of natural selection must also elucidate the underlying process by which gene frequencies changed (such that the presence of the evolved characteristic allowed the organisms which possessed it to leave a greater expected number of off-spring): "For the acceptable Darwinian history, it will be supposed that there is a genetic model that underlies it" (Kitcher, 1985: 55).

The problem with this, of course, is that the present state of knowledge about genetics and the mechanisms of behaviour is grossly underdeveloped, rendering hopeless the strong confirmation of an "ambitious" (i.e., human-oriented) Darwinian history, for the time-being (cf., Kitcher, 1985:134). Thus, E.O. Wilson's (1978) attempt at sociobiological confirmation of the human propensity for warfare is easily revealed as a proposition based on "vulgar" reductionism in terms of reasoning and evidence (Kitcher, 1985).

Shaw (1987) has recently detailed a similar ambitious Darwinian history concerning the innateness (and inevitability) of ethnic antagonism and warfare. Shaw's work appears more difficult to dismiss

because it is grounded in a carefully constructed mathematical proof. Employing Hamilton's model of kin-selection (inclusive fitness),²¹ Shaw attempts to explain how genes and the process of natural selection could interact to favour hostile 'out-group' behaviour. Thus Shaw's internally coherent mathematical formulae allow him to deduce the notion that "nepotistic altruism" is a major cause for "humanity's propensity for conflict/warfare" (Shaw, 1987:26). Goldstein (1987) summarizes Shaw's perspective:

Humans form themselves into ethnic or 'kinship' groups sharing a genetic stock. Genetic relatedness increases solidarity and internal order within a group. Human behaviour is cooperative and even altruistic within a group; and competitive and hostile toward other groups. In-group cooperation and out-group enmity are explained by inclusive fitness (groups that can mobilize to prevail in conflict would have better prospects for longterm survival and reproduction). And the individuals may 'rationally' sacrifice themselves for the sake of preserving their genes in other members of the group (Goldstein, 1987).

Goldstein points out that Shaw's argument is not a new one and that Shaw ignores past critiques concerning the 'abuse' of Hamilton's concepts, to merely "repeat sociobiological premises that are both scientifically questionable and politically charged" (Goldstein, 1987: 33).

Indeed, despite the internal coherence with which Shaw constructs his argument, the biological reductionism of his conclusions is

²¹. Hamilton's model demonstrates how related individuals are not limited to the predisposition to maximize their own (Darwinian) fitness, but may also become predisposed to maximize the 'inclusive fitness' of those who share a common gene pool (i.e., "kin," cf. Hamilton, 1975).

inevitable, given his fundamental assumptions and his failure to consider alternative explanations. This latter oversight is perhaps the most relevant to this study for it highlights how understanding of behavioural phenomena (such as conflict) can be curtailed by resorting to convenient explanations which replace complex social analysis with suppositions about genetic propensities. As Kitcher articulates:

Suppose...that a certain form of human behaviour... is prevalent in Homo sapiens. Are we entitled to conclude that there has been a history of selection in which genes promoting the behaviour have replaced hypothetical ancestral genes? Or is it possible to claim, without invoking some mysterious cultural force, that the behaviour has become prevalent because of the history of human culture?

We can only view intertribal warfare as evidence for innate human aggression by supposing that the behaviour of the group reflects directly the propensities of the participants. If warfare is seen in the context of an intricate arrangement of social institutions, traditions, and present needs, then there is no reason to think of intertribal battles as signaling our native thirst for violence against strangers...(Kitcher, 1985: 203).

Burton's theory of conflict does not display the determinism inherent to Shaw's propositions and Burton would disagree vehemently with Shaw's conclusion that violent conflict is innately incipient. However, despite the fact that Burton's approach is much more biologically subtle (considering behaviour to result from an interaction of genetic and cultural processes ²²) it tends, in the final analysis, to give analytical weight to innate propensities at the expense of a more critical examination of the interactive psycho-social process of group

²². In his 1986 article, Burton attempts to distance himself from accusations of biological reductionism by clarifying that his model suggests that conflict arises from the interplay of universal innate drives which are socio-culturally frustrated. This contention will be examined in detail shortly.

formation.

It is now appropriate to consider the sociobiological-type rationale that Burton employs to justify the intertwining of the terms 'generic' and 'genetic'. If the concept of human needs is to be given genetic credence, then an evolutionary Darwinian history must be constructed and the underlying genetic processes of selection explained. One can scrutinize Burton's work in vain for such fundamental theoretical validation. Nowhere in his discussion on human needs does Burton attempt to address the question of what prompted selection for these propensities over the course of hominid evolution. What is supposed to be adaptive? Struggles for identity among individuals? Struggle for social acceptance among peers? What are the potential costs of such struggles? How do they relate to inclusive fitness? How do drives to accommodate identity needs relate to reproductive success and the underlying gene frequencies? Where are the hypotheses and proofs such that Burton's 'genetic' claims may be vindicated? Burton's references to Wilson suggest that perhaps Wilsonian sociobiology may have developed these proofs. This is certainly not the case. Similarly, Sites' extensive development of the 'needs' concept is in psycho-social terms; there is no consideration of either evolution or genes.

Before one can profess to be articulating a generic/genetic theory of one form of human behaviour, the very important evolutionary questions which these terms raise must be adequately addressed. So, how does Burton construct his case to vindicate his genetic proclamations?

It would appear that Burton's major tactical device is to appeal to the constancy of human behaviour under diverse cultural conditions. Thus, his observation that history reveals a latent drive for independence across both time and space leads him to posit that this seemingly universal phenomenon must be related to something which is supra-cultural, and therefore must be innately human, and therefore must be genetic. This final conclusion does not necessarily follow directly from the others.

Even if one accepts Burton's postulate that human needs are universal, this may only reveal that the societies which humans have achieved thus far may share some common condition which, if this did not exist, would render the notion of specific identity groups meaningless (e.g., 'ethnic identity' would no longer be necessary²³ -- a scenario not possible if it is a product of genetic drives, except through further genetic evolution). Alternatively, one may posit that the nature of being human (i.e., a self-conscious and biological being with great cognitive capacity) has prompted this universally apparent tendency (this is obviously, not tied to a specific genetic propensity for 'needs').

Extrapolating from the way in which Burton constructs his paradigm, it would seem that Burton follows a sociobiological logic which assumes

²³. It is important to note that this criticism is only valid because of Burton's apparent acceptance of ethnic groups as a preferred phenotypic expression of genetic identity needs. This notion is critically tied to the discussion on nationalism in Chapter Four.

that genes for human needs must have been selected over the course of human evolution. Thus, human needs must have maximized fitness across so large a range of human environments that there are buffer systems that prompt humans to pursue these needs "even when conditions are far from propitious. If we attempt to create a social system in which human needs are not met, there will be genetically based feelings of resistance" (Kitcher, 1985).

Because Burton's sociobiological conclusions are not derived from a careful consideration of the evolutionary history and mechanisms involved, his sociobiological logic is open to the following very elementary problem. Human needs are assumed to have evolved by natural selection to maximize an individual's fitness such that these needs will be pursued despite the social or coercive constraints to the contrary and despite the loss of fitness which would likely be incurred (i.e., reproductive capacity curtailed through internment or through death). This raises an evolutionary contradiction which begs analytical explanation: if social pressure is such that previously selected fitness maximizing drives (assumed) have now become actions that will jeopardize the individual's fitness (i.e., those that pursue their needs regardless of circumstances will likely be restricted by society so as to leave fewer offspring, while those that do not blindly pursue these needs will not be restricted and leave more offspring), how is it that, over time, natural selection is continuing to maintain this behavioural propensity?

To raise this contradiction is not to suggest that a Darwinian history and a corresponding genetic model could not be constructed to account for this seeming anomaly; it is merely to highlight that such an account has not been so constructed. Thus the biological underpinnings of Burton's paradigm are revealed as an unsubstantiated leap in faith.

In this light, it is interesting to examine what it is that Burton is suggesting. Burton's generic thesis is that conflict occurs when underlying human propensities are frustrated by deviant social structures. If these propensities are genetic, they (must) have been selected for, which means that the hominid environment -- which must have at one time been in congruence with these genetic propensities, such that they were adaptive -- has changed faster than the process of natural selection has been able to operate. Thus, we are left in the position that our genetic propensities have become maladaptive given the changed environment, and so causing much violence and dissidence in the world.

It is quite evident that Burton is not attempting to explain how our present behaviour has been selected, but desires to delve into "hitherto unappreciated causes of human action" (Kitcher, 1985: 289). That is, Burton is optimistic that once we understand how we work we will be "able to adjust our society in the direction of our ideals" (Kitcher, 1985: 291). However, even this goal, if it is premised on 'genetic' truths, requires rigorous evolutionary proofs as infrastructure on which to build conclusions.

Burton's declamatory proposition that his theory is "generic and genetic," fosters the appearance that a biological 'truth' about human behaviour has been deduced. However, this truth is constructed on borrowed sociobiological notions which explain neither where identity needs come from, nor why they were selected, nor under what conditions. While not denouncing the worth of Burton's values and insights, it is important to note that the concepts he borrows are devoid of the methodological rigour that is mandatory if these concepts are to have any meaning.

Unperplexed by this oversight, Burton then proposes that the social-structural environment must be changed to realign itself with these human underlying propensities. However, nowhere does he develop a coherent evolutionary argument that demonstrates why certain of his proposed solutions to our maladaptive present²⁴ will mollify our genetic propensiities.

Obviously, Burton's notion of World Society is not based on recreating conditions of our evolutionary past which are more in harmony with our 'proven' genetic propensities. Rather his whole paradigm is prefaced on a vision of a more humane future -- a blueprint for which

²⁴. For example, Burton has suggested "zonal systems" (Burton, 1984), "rehousing in kinship groups," and shunting our identity needs into "identification with football teams"(Burton, 1979) To cite these examples, which appear quite ludicrous out of context, is not intended to denigrate Burton's fundamental belief in the process of problem solving which allows for creative solutions which arise out of the interaction process. However, it is to raise the question: Would rehousing in kinship groups really resolve communal conflict? Or is the emphasis on kinship a deduction based on misguided assumptions?

Burton infers a genetic propensity. World Society, therefore, is neither an 'objective', nor empirically supported 'truth' (given our present state of knowledge), but is a preferred end-state which is very much a value-laden preference. This critique is not to deny the worth of Burton's perspective as a valuable lens through which to view conflict situations, it is merely to indicate that the extent of his theoretical claims is perhaps premature. At worst, it may be posited that Burton's quest for generic theory to explain conflict behaviour is conducted at the expense of understanding important cross-level differences.

To sum up the discussion thus far, Burton's explanation of conflict behaviour is intuitively appealing because it posits an underlying mechanism (the pursuit of needs) which, through interaction with the socio-cultural environment (i.e., various proximate mechanisms, of which, Burton stresses authority structures to be most relevant), leads to the observed behaviour:

The interaction between these base and super-structure elements leads to what we witness and deal with in conflict situations... The larger and more complex the community, the more likely it is that its members are unable to fulfill the need (more or less) directly; instead, they attempt to do so through some metaphorical representation of it. Conflict may involve, therefore, not a clash of basic needs as such, but a clash of metaphors--culturally determined ways in which needs are expressed (Burton and Sandole, 1986: fn.343).

The appeal of Burton's argument is that the posited underlying mechanism offers a unity of explanation for behaviours which initially

seem unconnected (deviance, violence and war) and makes seemingly irrational actions appear as rational responses to the situations of the actors. However, the way in which Burton presents his theory serves to focus undue attention on the underlying process of all conflict, while underemphasizing the structural and historical components necessary for analysing specific conflict manifestations (i.e., levels) and situations. Thus, Burton admits (in a 1986 clarification) that socially frustrated needs are manifested in differing phenotypic (cultural) expressions: although the starting point is universality, the end point is heterogeneity.

This clarification is not without analytical and theoretical implications; for conflict analysts and practitioners are really no further ahead to posit genetic homology if phenotypic variation is the only saliently perceived 'expression' of human interaction. Practitioners cannot deal with genes -- they must deal with the concrete manifestation of these universal needs in all the various forms they take. For the practitioner, "it is no great consolation to know that there was universality before culture and nurture got to work to present him with his daily fare of very different looking problems" (Groom, 1984:202).

Burton, of course, offers the practitioner a tool which is more sensitive to the problem of cultural context than the theory itself-- the process of facilitated problem solving. The important question which arises is: Can the problem-solving process, with its ahistorical

and psychological focus, adequately deal with the structural architecture which encapsulates the present conflict situation and sets limits on future action?

It is not fair to accuse Burton of being 'non-structural', for his theory posits that it is deviant social structures which frustrate human needs. But herein lies the crux of the entire problem: 1) Burton has a very limited conception of what 'structure' means -- tending to cast it in domestic terms -- as illegitimate authority structures that frustrate primordial identities and 2) Burton identifies this limited notion of structure as the frustrating element across all levels of conflict. With the structural element thus specified, the following analytical investigations are circumvented: 1) the need to consider the intervening variables which operate at different levels and 2) the need to analyse the historical process in light of structural antecedents and contextual specifics (a need which is common to both the radical/ structural school of IR, and of evolutionary biologists).

Thus Burton may be accused of 'generically' sliding back and forth between claims about groups and claims about individuals which stretch the limits of his notion of process (both theoretically and analytically) such that understanding is impoverished. For example, consider the conceptual confusion and antithetical biological implications of these 1986 statements:

At the superficial level of personal, cultural and national differences of behaviours and interests, conflicts are win-

lose [fair enough]. It is upon revelation of the ultimate goals -- the universal, ontological, and even genetic goals of individual and group identity and development -- that the problem may be defined more accurately...

The individual... operates through an identity group, a primordial attachment, and will use all means available, regardless of social consequences, in the pursuit of these needs. The individual and identity groups will develop different tactics and means according to circumstances, including different patterns of behaviour and cultures, to pursue these common needs. This is generic and genetic. (Burton and Sandole, 1986:338-339).

Crucial questions leap out of these statements. Identity groups are primordial attachments? Does this mean that identity groups are genetically programmed? Is Burton suggesting that communal (ethnic) identity groups are a biologically programmed form of human community? Perhaps these inferences are merely a result of careless phrasing on Burton's part (although this appears doubtful). The point is, Burton does not demonstrate nor even ask the question of how individual drives for identity become manifested in the formation of identity-groups.²⁵ The ramification of such carelessness is that if a conflict between two identity-groups is classified as an ethnic conflict then, by Burton's logic, these ethnic ties are primordial. The question of "why ethnic identity" is precluded.²⁶

²⁵. This is the essential flaw which mars Burton's biological logic, which undermines his invocation of the notion of 'structural violence' and which will quite conceivably weaken the effectiveness of problem solving as a conflict resolution process for protracted ethno-nationalist conflict.

²⁶. Such an approach is potentially much more biologically sound for it demands consideration of how the behaviour of groups is a reflection of the propensities of the participants.

It is now evident how the biological reductionism of Burton's position fosters the paradigm's downplaying of structural features of a conflict situation. Ethnicity becomes treated as an area sui generis, and the need to account for this form of mobilized collective identity in terms of structural context (and individual propensities) is bypassed, such that all that is considered necessary is a "description of its consequence" (cf. Wolpe, 1975).

The above discussion, which calls into question Burton's cross-level generic claims, is integrally related to Burton's misguided invocation of the notion that human needs are genetic. Thus as Avruch and Black contend, if conflict behaviour is considered to be a function of genetic and cultural processes, the analytical weight given to each input must be addressed: "Otherwise, it is tempting to lean implicitly towards the genetic, pan-human, universal inheritance in order to establish 'generic claims'" (Avruch and Black, 1987:99).

Indeed as detailed above, it would appear that the fundamental conceptual importance of 'needs' to be biologically based and to be "inevitably pursued" is to vindicate the 'generic' nature of Burton's theory. While pursuit of theory is a meritorious endeavour, it can lead to impoverished explanation if postulates concerning a generic process are upheld at the expense of understanding the contextual processes and structures of conflict situations, and the related cross-level differences. Thus, the posit that "needs will be pursued" can be misconstrued as a teleological explanation for the socio-political mobilization of an

'ethnic' group; a 'drive to identity' occurs because group-identity has been frustrated by illegitimate authority structures. Such an explanation mars the contextual subtlety of the processes which awakened this drive and shunted its energy into a particular phenotypic expression (that of ethnicity). Unable to ask the question "why ethnic identity" this perspective is left in the uncompromising position of assuming that there must be a genetically programmed ethnic identity need. In fact, this is exactly the garden path down which Edward Azar (a colleague of Burton) is forced to tread, as I shall discuss in the next section.

2.3 AZAR AND BURTON: OF GENES AND CROSS-LEVEL CONFUSION

Edward Azar's theory of Protracted Social Conflict (PSC) is rich in elementary analysis and explanatory potential of the structural and identity dynamics of communal conflicts (i.e., Azar, 1978). However, in exploring Azar's work, it is evident that his earlier endeavours place a heavier emphasis on structural elements of conflict than his 1986 statement of "Protracted International Conflicts: Ten Propositions." The reason for this change is Azar's adoption of Burton's notion of "drive to identity." Azar's incorporation of the concept of identity needs is a potential boon to Burton's theory because Azar's perspective helps to give analytical specificity to Burton's posited general process with respect to its manifestation at the level of inter-group conflict. Thus, Azar provides contextual credence to Burton's generic theory. However, Azar seriously weakens his own theory by borrowing the underdeveloped biological assumptions which Burton invokes.

Azar and his associates developed the analytical concept called "protracted social conflict," (PSC), in an attempt to better understand the escalating violence in the Third World (e.g., Azar and Cohen, 1980; Azar and Farah, 1981). Azar defined PSC as a result of economic and technological underdevelopment which combines with unintegrated social and political systems to produce "structural violence" (a concept borrowed from Galtung). These inequalities are overlaid with communal cleavages of deep-seated racial, ethnic and religious hatreds:

Political and economic inequality across different ethnic identities within a national boundary and ideological domination of one ethnic group by another tend to become the primary cause of the protracted conflict (Azar and Moon, 1984: 115).

PSCs are characterized by extensive hostilities with ongoing sporadic outbreaks of open warfare that fluctuate in frequency and intensity such that fundamental grievances remain unaddressed as conflict becomes the modus vivendi: "PSCs... tend to generate, reinforce and intensify mutual images of deception...the conflict becomes an area for redefining issues rather than adjudicating them...the conflict process itself becomes the source rather than the outcome of policy " (Azar, 1984:89).

It is important to note that even in his earlier writings, Azar did not explicitly consider the process of the origins of conflict situations or the origins of group-identity. Rather his detailing of PSC was more a description of why conflicts protract. Thus, the elements of protracted conflicts were described with respect to situational contex-

tualities, where hostilities were enhanced by the overlay of ethnic (communal) identity cleavages.

In some of his earlier works (i.e., Azar and Cohen, 1980), Azar was most pessimistic about the prospects for managing, let alone resolving PSC because of their entrenched manner. However, by 1984 Azar was positing avenues for dealing with the "challenge of transforming conflict systems":

A careful analysis of societal structure and community-specific social relations is essential if linkages between economic growth, social peace and PSC are to be understood ... Only the elimination of the roots of victimization will ultimately reduce outbreaks of violence and create conditions for stable and long-term peace (Azar, 1984: 96-97).

In a 1986 article, Azar was confident that PSCs could, in fact, be managed through the dual process of "facilitation and development diplomacy" (Azar and Moon, 1986). Facilitation was aimed at conflict resolution through problem solving, which was to provide momentum towards a conflict breakthrough. Development diplomacy was geared towards transforming the structural violence in the system. While the adoption of Burton's notion of problem solving may be considered a practical boon to PSC theory, the theory also becomes logically undermined through its inheritance of Burton's tendency towards genetic reductionism.

As mentioned above, even in his earlier works Azar was implicitly leaning towards the assumption that identity (or ethnic) groups were

'objective entities' without exploring analytically the relationship between the structural violence he described and the formation of individuals into collective entities. However, after Azar's incorporation of Burton's ideas, this implicit tendency becomes explicitly evident and leads to a questionable theoretical argument.

Thus, in a 1986 collaborative work (Azar and Burton, 1986a), Azar contributes a chapter which lists ten propositions that characterize Protracted International Conflicts. Centerpiece to this new version of PSC is Burton's underdeveloped concept of human needs. Downplaying his previous notion that considered conflict in situational contextualities, Azar adopts the notion of "identity needs" in which violence erupts when the "drive to identity" is frustrated by denial.

Azar's new synthesis (PIC) -- of 'human needs' with PSC -- is a great conceptual liability because it expresses the source of conflict in metaphysical and innate terms. The real "source" of conflict becomes the denial of ontological drives. Azar's stated "drive to identity" sounds like some mystical Ur-template which must be expressed and which, if frustrated, will result in inevitable violence or conflict. Further, Azar has fallen into a teleological trap whereby ethnic conflicts now become explained via an ethnic identity need. As Azar plainly states:

...the study of ethnicity and the drive for ethnic identity enables us to understand the nature of conflict generally. It is the denial of human needs, of which ethnic identity is one, that finally emerges as the source of conflict" (Azar, 1986).

By this line of reasoning, it is no longer possible to explore the fundamental behavioural/biological and psychological question concerning how individual 'drives for identity' become manifested in the formation of identity-groups. Rather, ethnic groups exist because individuals have a genetic predisposition towards ethnic identity. It is apparent that Azar has unwittingly construed a genetically deterministic argument which would do justice to the most reductionist form of sociobiological thinking. Indeed, Azar's "drive for ethnic identity" appears to approach the sociobiology of Shaw (1987).

Azar's reductionism is merely the further development of certain unfounded concepts which are well-entrenched in Burton's writing. For example, Burton suggests that socio-biological drives come to the fore when the ethnic community is threatened (Burton, 1979:81) and that individuals have a "felt need to form kinship and ethnic communities that arises out of identity, security and recognition needs" (Burton, 1979:164). Thus, Burton suggests that "ghettos" should not be considered as places where minorities are required to live but where they chose to live because of a felt need. Perhaps the following passage brings to the fore the subtle issue on which the critique of this paper turns:

The 'ghetto' is merely the physical or living expression of one form of community, kinship groupings being another. There is a strong preference by those concerned to live within their community, in a geographical as well as a social sense...

The tragedy associated with ethnic communities living in the one area is not that they live in the one region and keep to themselves to a large extent; their tragic circumstances are in

fact mitigated by the opportunity to live together. Their deprivation is due to discrimination against them by the wider society, limited employment, housing and educational opportunities and such factors that do not necessarily arise out of the 'ghetto' as such. Given a wider environment in which there is no discrimination...the tendency will be to work and ultimately to live in the wider community (Burton, 1979:165-6).

The perspective of this paper is in total agreement with this statement. However, by this very statement Burton is (perhaps unwittingly) pointing a finger in the direction of the process of group formation. Thus, one could extrapolate that identity-groups coalesce not because there is a "felt need to form kinship and ethnic communities" (i.e., a drive to ethnic identity that is genetically programmed) but that identity-groups coalesce because of the structural violence (i.e., discrimination etc.) of the wider society -- structural violence which is experienced on the individual level, because the individual is outwardly defined as a member of an ethnic group.²⁷ It is important to note the subtle but very important difference on which this argument turns. While the former argument posits that groups will rebel because the ethnic community is threatened, the latter approach demands analytical investigation of the whole relationship between individual identity and group-identity formation with respect to larger social-structural features. Rather than positing away the question "What is ethnic identity?", the latter approach considers this a crucial avenue to explore if one is to come to a better understanding of the phenomenon of 'ethno-nationalist' mobilization.

²⁷. If this argument appears somewhat confusing at this point, it shall be clarified in detail in chapter three.

For example, with respect to understanding a protracted conflict such as that between the Israelis and the Palestinians, is it enough to suggest that the conflict is not over an objective conflict of interest (land) but is over identity needs which have been denied?

Viewing this conflict in terms of identity holds potentially rich insights but also runs the risk of assuming the identity-groups in question to be a priori givens and by extension, assuming that their frustrated identity needs are an a priori source of conflict. If the concept of identity is to be a useful lens through which to view group conflict situations, then it would appear important to consider historically the process of identity formation and mobilization of the parties to the conflict (i.e., to investigate what form the group-identity takes and to explore this with respect to the relation of individual personal identity with group identity).

Thus, to deal with just one part of the conflict equation, it is not enough to say that "the Palestinians are rebelling because their identity needs are frustrated." To do so is to cast Palestinian identity as something which is mystically engraved deep in the Palestinian psyche and which drives these people to expression of their group identity. Further, this explanation circumvents the entire historical process through which this identity was forged at the group level.

As this paper will argue, a much richer understanding of the relationship between conflict and identity must begin by investigating

such areas as: what the process of Palestinian identity formation has been, how this process relates to Palestinian mobilization, and how both of these elements relate to the observed conflict over interests (land). More specifically, is the conflict over land merely a clash of metaphors, or is the land question integrally related to the social ontogeny of group-identity as it has coalesced?

Burton's theoretical approach has highlighted the possibility that deviance, terrorism and war all share certain underlying features. However, the posited common process (denial of human needs) has not been articulated clearly enough nor comprehensively enough to substantiate claims of generic theory. Further, searching for substantiveness in the obscurity of sociobiology, genes and epigenetic rules is both limiting, confounding and perhaps unnecessary.

For human needs to be universal, it is not mandatory that such needs be genetic. Rather, an argument which posits the universality of needs (such as social recognition, meaning, status) may well turn on notions of very general human propensities, such as: the general structure of the human brain (i.e., the way in which we are physiologically 'wired' such that our cognitive capacities shape our psychological processes and perceptions, the fact that as individual cognitive beings we must objectify our physical environment and the individuals within it and/or the more existential notion that concerns the universal human consciousness of our own mortality). Genetic reductionism need not enter the picture. Rather, the explanation that is really necessary is one which

connects individual propensities to social patterns -- i.e., the mind/culture continuum and the structures which transcend this. In fact, Paul Sites' elaboration of the human needs concept is much more in line with this approach with his focus on needs as emergent propensities which arise out of the interplay of psycho-sociological variables in the development of the individual:

It should be emphasized that our discussion of needs has been only for the purpose of demonstrating that the individual, because of these needs must be considered as the starting point in any attempt to demonstrate how society is possible...We are saying that, given the dynamics of the socialization process in all societies, certain needs emerge. We would see these needs as forced out of the dynamics of the process if the biological organism is to become human and operate within a society (Sites, 1973:28).

Sites' approach grounds the human needs concept in the social ontology of the individual with the individual acquiring a psychological 'need' to identify with others and to construct an identity. It is Burton who confounds this conception of ontology by injecting it with premature genetically reductionist suppositions. The stage is then set for other authors, such as Azar, to fall deeper into the quagmire which Burton began by inferring such impoverished notions as a "drive to ethnic identity." The result is that individual and intergroup processes are cast as isomorphic and it is no longer possible to explore the very important articulation between the psychological (micro) and sociological (macro) processes of intergroup relations. It is this articulation which shall be explored in the chapter to follow.

CHAPTER THREE:
OF 'US' AND 'THEM'

If I am I simply because I am I, and thou are thou simply because thou are thou, then I am I and thou are thou. But if I am I because thou are thou, and thou art thou because I am I, then I am not I and thou art not thou (Rabbi Medle of Kotzk, cited in Leslie 1971:145).

Burton may well be spearheading the way to a much more profound understanding of human conflictual behaviour than presently exists, but this goal has yet to be attained. This chapter attempts to present a more dynamic perspective than John Burton offers concerning the relationship of identity to intergroup conflict. Special attention is focused on the interplay of psychological and socio-structural processes, and the interaction of individual propensities to group behaviour. By so doing, the question of "why ethnic identity" will be alluded to, although these insights are admittedly far from comprehensive. However, in direct contrast to Burton's approach, the importance of historical and contextual analysis are highlighted as the key to understanding the emergence and mobilization of ethnic identity.

The following exploration is guided by two of Burton's recommendations: that conflict be analyzed at the level of the identity group; and that there is a need for the study of identity as a concept (Burton, 1987). Burton's latter recommendation suggests an enormous and elusive task -- for it requires the examination of many different levels of psychological and sociological phenomena, all of which are dynamic,

interrelated and contextually sensitive.²⁸ Such a comprehensive task is well beyond the bounds of this paper, which shall merely attempt a necessarily superficial analysis of the dynamic of Palestinian identity formation and mobilization.

Burton's notion of "identity groups" is useful because its un-specificity has the potential to circumvent reductionist debates which polemically claim that either 'class' or 'ethnicity' is the 'true' basis for collective identification. Burton's model is also helpful because it suggests that the articulation of psychological mechanisms with social-political factors can lead to minority group marginalization and rebellion. However, as the critique developed in Chapter Two suggested, Burton's model is weak in at least two interrelated areas: the model does not move comprehensively from the psychological to the sociological level of intergroup relations and the model lacks specificity with respect to the proximate mechanisms of group identity expression such that the contextual dynamics of certain forms of group conflict (i.e., ethnic conflict) remain unexplained.

The first 'weakness' is manifested in a precarious form of 'short-hand' which equates the psychological processes of individuals with that of groups. This engenders the appearance of a biologically reductionist argument that posits genes for group identity and also fosters the second weakness: the underemphasis of the importance of structural variables which bind the form of group identity expression. Thus,

²⁸. For starters, such a study would require consideration of identity at the following interactive levels: 1. intra-personal (mind-self); 2. inter-personal (i.e. group formation; individuals of different groups); 3. intra-group; 4. inter-group; 5. group-larger society- world. Transcending the psycho-social dynamics of these levels are various levels of structure: 1. structure of the self (cognitive); 2. structure of the group; 3. structure of the social/cultural environment (present and historical); 4. structure of the larger social order. This listing does not pretend to be complete, but is included to demonstrate the very complicated task of deriving a truly 'generic' theory of identity and conflictual behaviour.

Burton's model precludes analytical consideration of the specific concern of this paper, namely the origin of ethnic group identity and the process of ethno-nationalist mobilization. Instead this whole issue is bypassed by positing an innate drive to ethnic identity (which, to be fair, is stated much more blatantly by Azar than by Burton). It would seem the amorphous notion of "identity groups" has been given a much more specific template.

If we take to heart the idea implicit in Burton's term "identity group," identity becomes cast as a malleable concept.²⁹ As such, ethnic identity is only one among a number of possibilities that individuals may cast as their primary referent in terms of self and that may form the foundation of group identity.²⁹

If ethnic identity is truly considered to be neither given nor innate, then crucial questions for analysis become how and why this particular collective sense of identity has become an issue of such bloody and contemporary salience: i.e., the "way in which ethnicity so often comes to be intricately interwoven with questions of dominance, hierarchy, and social stratification" (Epstein, 1978:xii). Such an exploration must also consider the contextual dynamics of individual and group identity processes, as Taylor and Moghaddam (1987) elucidate:

The need is for theories that discuss the psychological processes affecting the individual but that simultaneously take into account the role of group structure and the role that the dynamic of group relations play in the psychology of the individual (Taylor and Moghaddam, 1987:xiii).

With these important considerations in mind, this chapter will attempt a selective exploration of literature on identity, group identity, and ethnicity to further clarify the conceptual backdrop for

²⁹. Of course both Burton and Azar would agree with this statement -- but the ramifications of this important point are obscured in their writings as 'genes' and 'drives' are introduced into the discussion.

the study of Palestinian identity to follow.

Sections 3.1 and 3.2 will consider the concept of ethnicity and its relation to individual identity, identification, and group mobilization. An analytical framework developed by Ross (1980) will be introduced in this section -- to set the stage for the discussion in Chapter Four, which will consider ethnicity in relation to nationalism, the state and its political 'resurgence' in the post-colonial world. This 'sectioning' of the concepts of identity, ethnicity and nationalism imposes distinctions which are artificial because in both historical reality and in the dynamics of ongoing conflicts, these categories often overlap. However, for exploratory purposes, this segregation has been invoked to more clearly consider the articulation of micro- and macro- level processes which interact in the complex reality of conflict situations and to better answer the questions of "why ethnicity" and "why ethnic conflict?"

3.1 ETHNICITY: PRIMORDIALISTS VS SITUATIONALISTS

The literature which seeks to understand the continued salience of ethnic phenomena is dominated by an ongoing debate between the 'primordialists' and the 'situationalists'.

The first school emphasizes the "deep-seated irrational and atavistic allegiances" of ethnic 'in-groups' and considers group boundaries to be 'objectively' (ascriptively) discernible by outside

observers. Ethnic group bonding is considered to be unconscious and primary with blood ties, shared descent, language and culture creating an "indelible stamp impressed on the psyche" of an individual that results in an "inalienable attachment" (Foon, 1986). Alternatively, the situationalists consider ethnic identification to be a peripheral loyalty which can be "readily manipulated in a rational way for pursuing political and economic goals" (McKay, 1982:306). Thus, ethnic group boundaries are malleable and permeable such that an individual may consciously emphasize or de-emphasize his ethnic affiliation in accordance with the situation. In addition, identity is discerned to be a multi-leveled phenomenon: "Ethnic group membership may depend more upon rituals of social acceptance and subjective identification, than upon irreversible criteria of an ascriptive nature" (Richmond, 1987:3).

McKay (1982) suggests that the primordial perspective is useful for understanding the emotional basis of ethnicity and the tenacity of ethnic bonds. However, he discards its utility as a comprehensive theoretical explanation of ethnic phenomena because its "psychological reductionism" renders it unable to "account for social change, and its disregard for political and economic influences" (McKay, 1982:310). Olzak (1985) has further pointed out that the primordial perspective on ethnicity is problematic because "the majority of ethnic movements are fundamentally 'new', making claims to ethnic traditions and cultural traditions that are mythical and no longer exist" (Olzak, 1985:67). Indeed, numerous cross-cultural studies have revealed that the notion of 'shared descent' is not the reality but the myth of common descent.

Smith (1986a; 1986b) elucidates how the 'myth of ethnic descent' provides a common symbolic referent embodying "powerful ties of belonging and sentiments of collective dignity and self-respect, through which multitudes of otherwise rootless and homeless and fragmented individuals can find a worthy historical location and destiny" (Smith 1986b). In short, the myth of common descent stores sacred and valued memories and sentiments which help to forge a consciousness of 'peoplehood' within the group. The myth helps to explain the past, present and future of the group -- giving a sense of both continuity and purpose to life.

This descriptive perspective points in the direction of micro-level explanation, with allusions to the individual and to the psychological functions of ethnic group formation.³⁰ However, Smith's analysis, which is of the situationalist school, does not comprehensively consider how the alluded to individual 'needs' articulate into group-level functions. Thus, Smith considers that the main purpose of the ethnic myth is to act as a tool for elites to summon the people to mobilize for political (nationalist) action.³¹

³⁰. It is important to note that such an approach, which alludes to the dynamics of individual psychology, is not incompatible with the notion of a universal human propensity to seek membership in social groups -- a propensity which may well have some form of biological underpinning (but which is a general individual propensity -- not a specific 'drive to ethnic identity'). Smith's description also leans towards an existentialist explanation with respect to this 'need' (i.e., to foster a sense of purpose to life).

³¹. The discussion of ethnic nationalism is to be taken up in Chapter Four, but as already mentioned, it is evident how the concepts of identity, ethnicity and nationalism are integrally intertwined.

Such 'interest-group' type explanations are labelled as reductionist by other scholars who consider the term 'ethnic' to be invested with broader social significance. For example Epstein (1978) states: "...to describe an ethnic group as having interests is one thing, to define it in these terms is something quite different" (Epstein, 1978:96). To this effect, Epstein notes the "powerful emotional charge that appears to surround or to underlie so much of ethnic behaviour" (Epstein, 1978:112). Likewise, as Horowitz (1985) has observed, to consider ethnic groups as interest groups which are manipulated by politically motivated leaders, does not explain why the "followers follow."

It is interesting to consider where John Burton fits in to this 'primordial' vs 'situational' debate. Burton's concept of identity groups appears to fall into the 'situational' camp -- Burton considers the identity group to be self-defined (and then held together by way of "role-defense" -- cf., Burton, 1979:74). However, Burton's inadequate consideration of the level of analysis problem together with his biologically reductionist notions relegates him more firmly in the 'primordialist' camp, a position which Azar clearly picks up on with such phrases as a "drive to ethnic identity." As such, the human needs approach circumvents investigation of the process of identification and group formation and can thereby propose that 'interests' and 'identity needs' are analytically separable.

As Burton's stance highlights, it would appear that the primordial vs the situationalist debate embodies many of the same issues already

raised in this paper with respect to the interaction and articulation of individual propensities and group behaviour (i.e., the psychological and sociological elements). The perspective of this paper considers that the debate should not be cast in 'either/or' terms -- rather, both perspectives have merit, with the task being to consider how these polemical positions are intertwined. Certainly, conflict often erupts when the lines of ethnic cleavage coincide with nascent class divisions (cf. Azar, 1978) yet, as Epstein elucidates:

Then there is the question of how far a group is tied to a temporal definition of its interests. It seems evident that over considerable periods of time the interests of a group may change, yet the group itself persists. Interests thus become a variable, and group the constant, immediately suggesting that there must be some prior factor present by reference to which the group must be defined -- unless the survival of the group is itself to be regarded as an interest...(Epstein, 1978:94).

For Epstein, it is the "sense of separateness that lies at the heart of the matter, and that has to be explained and not explained away" (Epstein, 1978:95). It is evident that the relationships among identity, ethnicity and conflict involve a complex interaction of internal and external variables -- with both psychological and socio-structural features. Any approach which considers only one of these levels, at the expense of the other, is in danger of confusing an aspect of the phenomenon with the phenomenon itself.

The analysis of Barth (1969) is a major landmark in the literature on ethnicity because it points in the direction of the articulation of the different levels and processes at work in ethnic behaviour. Barth

considered an individual's identity and social affiliations to be comprised of many different levels (i.e., social, economic, political etc), which comprise a hierarchy of mutually reinforcing loyalties. The particular identity that is stressed is a function of the social context. The ethnic group, therefore, is but one form of affiliation -- a category of ascription and identification by the actors themselves and therefore a potential vessel for organization.

Barth tempers this situationalist stance with the 'affective' acknowledgment that the ethnic focus of identity may be of great relevance to an individual's behaviour which pervades the whole of his/her social life or this focus may be a locus of self that is relevant only in limited sectors of activity. Thus, Barth's position, which stresses the ethnic boundary as the essential element for investigation, directs attention towards questions such as why and how ethnic identification is generated and transmitted and how it persists, transforms and even disappears over time.

More recently, Horowitz has articulated the importance of understanding boundary change as vital to the understanding of ethnic conflict:

Group boundaries are made of neither stone nor putty. They are malleable within limits. The mutability of boundaries does not mean that ethnic affiliations are merely "strategic" -- that they can be called forth whenever it is convenient to do so in the quest for competitive advantage or can be willed into being in the service of economic interest. On the other hand, boundaries do change...What is necessary therefore, is a sense of the mutability of group boundaries and yet their dependence

on antecedent affinities that are not easily manipulated. To overemphasize the one is to mistake the basis of conflict... (Horowitz, 1985: 66).

Ross (1980) has constructed a conceptual scheme by which the process of ethnic mobilization can be analyzed. The emphasis of Ross' model is on the transformation of a sociological group (which is outwardly definable) into a psychological group (which is self-defined) and on the historical and structural features that shape this process. As such, Ross' model nicely transcends the objective-subjective debate concerning the definition of ethnicity by providing a dynamic bridge between the two.³²

Ross' theoretical position is situational in that he considers ethnicity to be a contextually malleable phenomenon and only one form of collective identity:

...ethnicity is best seen as only one form of collective identity, and...different forms of collective identity have different cognitive, evaluative and affective meanings for those who hold them. Collective identity, therefore is the generic concept and ethnicity is one of the special forms subsumed by it. Various forms of collective identity are likely to emerge at different stages of societal development and intergroup relations. As ethnicity is only one form of collec-

³². It should be noted that Ross' model is a central building block to the framework employed in this paper. It has been used by other scholars to consider the subordination and mobilization of Israeli-Arabs (Lustick, 1980), as well as that of Soviet Jews (Ross, 1980a). The essence of Ross' approach, when taken in light of certain modifications which will be developed in Chapter Three and Chapter Four of this paper, provides a useful tool to begin to understand the dynamics of Palestinian identity -- over class, space and time.

tive identity, the mobilization of ethnic consciousness is but one out of several options that is available to the members and most particularly the elites of various collectivities (Ross, 1980:6).

Once again, the notion that ethnicity is only one form of identity group is also articulated by Burton. However, Ross' model is much more 'true' to this notion because of its focus on explaining the process of group identification, and 'phenotypic' expression, by way of a situational analysis. Ross' approach, while sensitive to the affective dimension of self-identification by a group of individuals who consider themselves to be different, does not take this as evidence of some form of primordial disposition. Rather, Ross' framework seeks to understand how and why the psychological 'cathecting' of group members occurs.

Briefly, this model purports that "collectivities can be placed in to a progression of identity modes... a developmental progression in which most groups move from a communal stage to an ethnic (mobilized) stage by way of a subordinate minority situation" (Ross, 1980:18). Although this scheme may seem somewhat deterministic, Ross stresses that 'step progression' is not always required, but depends on external forces (Ross, 1980:18).

The communal stage is when a group is objectively definable (i.e., a sociological group as opposed to a psychological group). To suggest that the communal form of collective identity is more sociological than psychological is merely to emphasize that, because of the lack of external impingement, group identity is not a major issue: "Group

identity and self-identity is...something that is often taken for granted." However, as Ross emphasizes, this is not to contend that communal groups do not differentiate among groups of people. Rather, "there is great concern for differentiation along the lines of kinship, age, economic function and ritual status. Differentiation along lines of encompassing peoplehood, however, is generally absent" (Ross, 1980:7-8).

The transformation from a communal group to a subordinate minority group occurs by way of sustained interpenetrative contact with external groups where 'contact' is "inherently exploitive and lacking in reciprocity" (Ross, 1980:9). The minority or subordinate stage, therefore, is when a group identity is not endogenously defined, but is exogenously imposed and coercively enforced by a dominant group. This notion of labelling indicates that the minority is a victim of the structural violence inherent in the system which it cannot control. As such, the subordinate group "cannot determine the nature of its relationship to the majority [nor] determine the nature of its own identity" (Ross, 1980: 9). The label is enforced by the dominant group, as both a social control mechanism -- to buttress their more powerful position -- and to alleviate any psychological dissonance caused by the actions required of dominant group members in order to dominate (i.e., to stereotype and dehumanize "them"). The labelling process often leads to the "minority internalizing an image of itself as inherently inferior" (Ross, 1980:9). This negative self-image persists until external circumstances allow for minority self-redefinition (in positive terms) and group

mobilization.³³

The ethnic stage, therefore, is when group members (now a psychological group) seeks to attain an altered group status by redefining their collective group status: "This change of collective identity involves the removal of the stigma associated with the previous subordinate identity because the new identity is to be defined by the group itself and not imposed upon it" (Ross, 1980:6-14).

As noted above, the group mobilization stage of Ross' model does not necessarily manifest itself as an ethnic phenotype. Rather, ethnicity is but one option that a group may exercise in its effort to improve its position (other options being class, religion or transnational ties to a more powerful foreign protector).³⁴ The vital point is that, whatever phenotype the mobilized form of collective identity takes, during the subordinate minority stage "its basic role and identity has been chosen for it, not by it" (Ross, 1980:10). However, Ross considers it vital to differentiate ethnicity from other forms of collective identity:

One other option available to the minority group is that of its mobilization into an ethnic group. Ethnicity differs from class, region, religion etc., all of which are objective characteristics around which a group can mobilize. Rather it is a shared belief in peoplehood. It does not really matter if this sense of peoplehood has any verifiable genetic basis. What is important is that the members of an ethnic group differentiate themselves from others because they believe that they are

³³. For example, witness in the United States the redefinition of image from the imposed label 'nigger' to the 'Black is beautiful' slogans of the mobilized rights' movement of the 1960's.

³⁴. Individual strategies may also be pursued as a means of throwing off the imposed subordinate status, however these are often blocked by the social control mechanisms of the dominant group (i.e., which prohibit both social mobility or assimilation).

unique. Ethnicity, in this sense is more of a subjective reality than an objective characteristic (Ross, 1980:15).

It would seem, therefore, that ethnicity is a special case of collective mobilization -- one which is perhaps more powerful and tenacious than other modes of group-identity. This is because, in a situation of unequal power, the dominant group (us) chooses phenotypic markers to differentiate itself from the subordinate group (them).³⁵ These delimiters then act as politically and socially salient phenomena, which aid in the continued subordination of the minority group:

Physical differences may seem permanent and immutable, as part of the scheme of things. Their meaning, however, is socio-political not biological. It is part of the imposed inferiority and self-image of a subordinated group. When the structural conditions that maintain this subordination change, the importance of physical delimiters may change as well (Ross, 1980:11).

The notion of labelling of the subordinate group by the dominant group nicely incorporates both the socio-structural and psychological-

³⁵. It is vital to highlight that Ross does not adopt a reductionist 'race relations' explanation for ethnic phenomena. He points out that phenotypic differences or similarities are not the primary catalyst for the engendering of 'racist' policies. Rather, phenotypic diacritica only become salient when they are chosen by the dominant group. Thus, "the politics of race are, in reality, the politics of dominance and subordination in the minority stage" (Ross, 1980:10-11). This position shall take on added significance in the discussion developed in Chapter Four, which will suggest that on the level of world order, the diacritica for legitimacy, and therefore dominance, was the organization of one's group into a 'nation', which legitimized rights to territory (i.e., a state). Those groups not so organized were ideologically 'delegitimized' in terms of both identity and rights to place and thus fell victim to subordinate status by those more powerful 'imperialist' nations.

afrective dimensions of ethnic conflicts. The concepts of self-image, categorization and social dominance are key to the discussion below.

Ross' approach demands analysis which follows in the dialectical tradition (as outlined in Chapter One) and which alludes to the need for a cogent consideration of the role of ideology in the manipulative socialization and self re-definition of groups. As such, this model, with its attention to contextual complexities and the interplay of psychological and sociological variables, is potentially capable of yielding rich insights about the question "why ethnicity." However, Ross' approach suffers from possibly two weaknesses, one at the micro-level and one at the macro-level.

Firstly, at the micro-level, the model has been critisized for a lack of explicit consideration of the psychological processes at the individual level of group identification. As Svensson(1980) states:

The major limitation of this otherwise most persuasive perspective is its focus on the role of ethnicity in mediating between a collective group (of a particular type) and the outside society. It largely ignores the role of ethnicity as mediating between the individual and the collectivity (Svensson, 1980:69).

However, it should be noted that Ross' perspective does not preclude consideration of psychological processes at the individual level. Rather, as the exploration below reveals (Section 3.2), certain theories which consider identity processes at the micro-level are quite compatible with Ross' group-level perspective.

The second area of weakness concerns Ross' lack of consideration of world hegemonic ideology and its relation to ethnicity as a powerful phenotype for political mobilization. Although Ross' model infers the need for the consideration of the role of ideology in the subordination and self-redefinition of groups, it does not explicitly consider the impact of ideology as a structuring force of dominant-subordinate relations.³⁶ This discussion shall be elaborated further in Chapter Four to follow.

3.2 INDIVIDUAL IDENTITY AND SOCIAL GROUP IDENTIFICATION

Clearly the understanding of interethnic conflict will require some agreement not only on the meaning of terms but on a consequent model development that transcends many levels of analysis. It is, however, an article of faith -- not to mention logic -- that such an analysis must begin at the individual level, with one's perception of oneself and others. For unless an individual perceives that his or her interests are in conflict with the interest of others, communal opposition cannot occur (Landis and Boucher, 1987:25).

³⁶. Ross emphasizes the importance of transitional periods (such as modernization), the centralization of authority, and the social control capabilities of state-building elite as precipitating factors in the formation of subordinate minority groups: "new groups are drawn into a polity through the expansive actions of an assertive majority and are given a fairly well-defined place in a growing system of social stratification with specific steps taken to insure their compliance" (Ross, 1980:11). Obviously, these proximate processes of control and imposition of inferior status are vital to understanding the creation of minority groups. However, this alone does not adequately explain how 'dominant' groups' actions were/are legitimized, nor how whole groups of peoples were 'delegitimized' such that the policies of domination and subordination were/are actively pursued. Similarly, although Ross elucidates that ethnic demands, if not accommodated by the state, will escalate to calls for autonomy or secession -- he does not explain why ethnic desires are so often territorially cathected. These two very important points are reconciled in Chapter Four, which considers the historical impact of world hegemonic ideology and its relation to national identity and subordinate status.

To begin the understanding of intergroup conflict from the level of the individual is to return to the notion which both Paul Sites (1973) and John Purton (1979), among others, have emphasized -- that of "human needs." To do so does not imply acceptance of 'objective' and biologically deterministic positions which suggest that these needs are genetic, nor does it require invocation of the careless shorthand which blurs the distinction between individual propensities and group behaviour (as in Azar's "drive to ethnic identity"). Rather, to do so is to acknowledge that this notion of human needs is an intuitive assumption which has been deduced from psychological observation, and that the sociobiological (not genetic!) explanation of this propensity (which is required if the notion of human needs is to be ultimately vindicated) has yet to be derived.³⁷

Such a position, instead of bypassing issues of identification and mobilization, directly anticipates questions such as: a) how does the individual propensity of 'human needs' manifest itself in the process of group formation and mobilization? and b) how does this process relate to the phenotype of group-identity and to inter-group conflict?

Epstein (1978) notes that among the various psychological approaches to identity (i.e., Maslow, 1954; Erikson, 1968; Tajfel, 1974), there is a general consensus that the issue of self-esteem lies at the core of

³⁷. It should also be understood, that the notion that individuals possess psychological propensities which favour social bonding, should not be cast as the answer to the more fundamental evolutionary question concerning why homo sapiens is a social animal.

ego-identity: "self-esteem grows to be a conviction that one is learning effective steps towards a tangible future, and is developing into a defined self within a social reality" (Epstein, 1978:45, quoting Erikson, 1968). As such, the identity formation of self involves a process which is central to the individual but also requires social interaction:

...the perception of self...takes shape in response to the presence and reaction of others...there is no sense in "ego" where there is no "thou" (Epstein, 1978:102)

...identity formation then, is intimately bound up with the social context within which the person grows up and matures (Epstein, 1978:45).

Epstein also indicates that closely tied to self-esteem is the notion of autonomy, or the individual desire to seek security in an insecure world: "the capacity to master one's environment and to express oneself in ways that win the approval of those who most immediately surround one" (Epstein, 1978:45). Such a position approximates Sites' (1973) developmental perspective of identity which he grounds in the notion of control and which posits that individuals come together to form groups out of a common desire to satisfy their individual needs (cf. Sites, 1973: 61). However, acceptance of this assumed general psychological propensity of the individual indicates neither a) the specificity of group phenotype (i.e., does not translate into a propensity for ethnic identity) nor b) how this relates to inter-group conflict. Rather, these questions are begged.

With respect to point a), as already noted, many scholars have

contended that an individual's identity needs can be and often are satisfied at different levels of group identities and that no individual has a single identity, rather "as members of a society each of us carries simultaneously a range of identities just as each of us occupies a number of statuses and plays a variety of roles" (Epstein, 1978:100; see also Goffman, 1963).

Related to this is point b), which suggests that when members of Group A are engaged in intense conflict with members of Group B, then individuals' identification with their groups must have become the overriding locus for self-identification. That is, the group identity becomes the individual's "terminal identity [the primary identity] that embraces and integrates a whole series of statuses, roles and lesser identities" (Epstein, 1978:101). Of importance to note is that if we accept ego-identity to be at the core of the self, then it is understandable how group allegiances -- when they have become 'terminal'-- are likely to be bound by powerful affect. With respect to ethnic conflict then, the focus for investigative analysis becomes why and how ethnic identity has become the terminal identity of individuals.

The notions raised above are reflected in various social-psychological definitions of intergroup behaviour. Taylor and Moghaddam (1987) suggest that intergroup relations involve human interaction where individuals perceive themselves as members of a social category, or are perceived by others as belonging to a social category:

...it is...possible for an individual to be influenced by the mere fact that he or she is identified with a particular social category. Just ask any member of a visible minority group how often he or she has received treatment obviously directed at his or her group identity rather than his or her role position or individual personal characteristics, (Taylor and Moghaddam, 1987:6).

This definition clearly articulates into the analytical scheme developed by Ross (1980) which holds categorization and domination as key precursors to the mobilization of group identity (and conflict). Indeed, a recent social-psychological theory -- social identity theory (e.g., Tajfel, 1978) -- appears to lend theoretical support for Ross' analytical framework.

Social identity theory, which was derived from the interpretation of a series of laboratory experiments involving (artificially induced) small group formation and interaction, is an extension of the widely accepted notion that individuals are motivated to attain a positive social identity. Tajfel's (1978) experiments suggest that when this 'motivation' is placed in the context of groups, the implication is that individuals desire to 'belong' to groups that are positively evaluated. Thus, if we accept that individuals desire a feeling of self-worth and belongingness and therefore, that the ego-identity depends heavily on social affiliations, it intuitively follows that "a threat to those affiliations produces anxiety and defense" (Horowitz, 1985:181). Such a conceptual extension helps to explain the participation of non-elites in inter-group conflict (i.e. why the followers follow) -- not only because of narrow group interests but because of the psychology of

"invidious comparison" (Horowitz, 1985: 181).

Tajfel's experiments demonstrated an easily evoked tendency for individuals to cleave into groups based on very casual differences. These new collectivities then made inter-group comparisons leading to behaviour on the basis of the new group identity. In interpreting his findings, Tajfel suggests that the observed tendency to categorize and discriminate is a fundamental biological property of humans -- not of the genes, but of the mind (i.e., the way human perceptual mechanisms are structured):

The categorization process has the function of organizing in fundamental ways the information we acquire from the environment. People actively select information from the environment and simplify the task of processing it by ignoring certain dissimilarities and giving priority to, or exaggerating, certain similarities between objects (Taylor and Moghaddam, 1987:64, summarizing Tajfel, 1982).

This perceptual 'short-hand' has been posited as the mechanism which facilitates social stereo-typing and by extension, the rigidity of group labels, as De Bono (1985) clearly points out. Tajfel and Turner (1979) suggest that this fundamental property of the mind melds with the individual propensity to desire a positive social identity, to effect the tendency towards inter-group comparison and competition: "People make social comparisons between their own group and other groups in order to determine the extent to which their own group provides them with a distinct and positive social identity" (Tajfel and Turner, 1979).

Social identity theory predicts that individuals will mobilize for social change when the processes of group membership and inter-group comparison lead to an inadequate or negative social identity for group members. Depending upon the cognitive alternatives that are perceived from such a dissatisfying situation, either individual or group action will be taken to improve social identity. This, of course, approximates the (already outlined) approach of Ross (1980), albeit from a more detailed perspective of the psychological underpinnings of mobilization of the individual. Further, the allusion to group, with "inadequate" or "negative" social identities links into the psychological processes of Ross' subordinate minority stage where a negative group image is imposed from without. Once again, the socio-structural interplay of dominance and subordination surface. That is, competition and conflict arise when dominant groups wish to maintain their social and psychological advantage, and subordinate groups desire change in the inter-group situation (i.e., change desired by group members, such that their social identity -- and concomitantly their ego-identities -- can be comparatively improved).

Of interest here is to note that John Burton approaches a similar articulation of this dynamic in his derivation of the concept of "role defense" (i.e., pertaining to authority roles which, because they involve status, are "positional goods" and are not additive like 'needs'). Burton realized that "role defense" could pose major obstacles for conflict resolution through problem solving (cf., Burton, 1979). However, because of his belief in the notion that identity needs are

additive -- i.e., that 'needs of being' are not in short supply but that the greater security of identity for one means greater security of identity for all -- Burton felt that the 'problem of role defense' was not insurmountable once false consciousness had been purged through problem solving.³⁰

Burton's position on this matter belies both Tajfel's experiments and theoretical interpretation which suggest that social identity is only meaningful through social comparison such that at the group level, it is the relative position of groups that is important. It follows that perhaps identity needs are not additive -- except in the stage prior to group cleavage and psychological bonding. As Horowitz summarizes:

The powerful pull of group loyalty, the quest for relative ingroup advantage, and the willingness to incur costs to maximize intergroup differentials are all findings that have

³⁰. Burton devotes a whole chapter of this 1979 book to the "problem of role defence," in which he admits: "Whether problem-solving techniques, as distinct from violence, are relevant in overcoming role defence is finally an empirical question. Experience to date would suggest that they are not. However historical experience is only that which has occurred within a power orientation" (Burton, 1979:157). It is important to note that Burton's conception of 'role defence' is circumscribed as a problem related only to the scarcity of authoritative roles. This implies that Burton considers only authoritative roles to be "positional goods" -- i.e., roles which are relational in terms of status, and therefore much coveted. Once again, this highlights Burton's limited conception of structure (i.e., authorities), which does not encompass the more systemic relational status of groups (i.e., the 'role defense' of a 'people'). Tajfel's position points to a much more pervasive problem, and casts even more doubt on the process of problem solving for resolving deep-rooted conflict -- it is no longer enough to change the 'values' of authorities, but requires systemic structural change. This problem is compounded when taken in context of Ross' framework, which points to the relationship between structural subordination, individual identity needs and the role of group identity which has been collectively 'redefined'(cf., discussion below).

significance for ethnic group relations...Social groups can only be evaluated comparatively. This produces intergroup competition quite apart from whether there is any rivalry for material rewards. Groups aim at distinguishing themselves from others, on some positively valued dimension (emphasis added, Horowitz, 1985: 146).

Burton, of course, would argue that awareness of this observed tendency could be overcome through rational self-consciousness. Perhaps this is possible, but it should be emphasized that there is a vast gulf that separates the notion that 'individuals have identity needs', from the notion that 'individuals have the desire to acquire a positive identity' -- when the notion of positive is cast in relative terms.

Tajfel's approach once again approximates that of Ross' in discussion concerning the cognitive prerequisites for the mobilization of the disadvantaged group. Firstly, it depends on whether the individual perceives social mobility or social change as possible (i.e., reflecting opportunities for individual strategies to improve ego-identity) and secondly, the related point concerning the perceived 'fairness' (legitimacy) of the intergroup situation and hierarchy.³⁹ These

³⁹. The question of perceived legitimacy is the core tenet of Burton's approach as well, with emphasis on the perceived legitimacy/illegitimacy of authority structures in the system. It is important to note the much broader interpretation of the concept of legitimacy which is implied in both Tajfel's and Ross's approach. Legitimacy is not here restricted only to authority structures, but to the much broader arena of the relationship between groups. Of course, the notions of dominance and subordination which are integral to the latter two approaches suggest that one group may exercise 'authority' over another, but a much more pervasive perspective of legitimacy (and systemic structural violence) is invoked. This helps to better explain the intense affective and protracted nature of certain inter-group conflicts, as well as the question "why do the followers follow."

variables point towards the reason for the tenacity of group conflicts where phenotypic or systemic markers are chosen as the delimiting boundary of group inclusion/ exclusion: individual exit from a disadvantaged group (disadvantaged as perceived through social comparison) is not an option if the group is defined by such markers as skin colour or sex.⁴⁰ Thus, mobilization of individuals along group lines arises when the social system in which an individual lives is subjectively perceived as rigidly enforced:

...[the individual believes] that he is enclosed within the walls of the social group in which he is a member; that he cannot move out of his own into another group in order to improve or change his position or his conditions of life; and that therefore the only way for him to change these conditions (or for that matter, to resist the change of these conditions if he is satisfied with them) is together with his group as a whole, as a member of it rather than someone who leaves it (Tajfel, 1974:5-6).

It is important to note, that Tajfel has, at this point, generalized his experimental findings at the small group level (where all members are in interactive contact such that individuals experience satisfaction

⁴⁰. Important to note here, is that Tajfel, among others, contends that given the contextual constellation, an individual strategy for alleviating a negative social (and thereby ego) identity is via ingroup comparison -- i.e., to attempt to achieve a 'positive' identity relative to other group members. This process alludes to a very important mechanism for understanding ingroup factionalization, as well as for operationalizing Barth's notion of the different levels of an individual's identity (i.e., a 'group-identity' may be cohesive at a political level, but may be internally differentiated along social lines). This notion is probably relevant to all collectivities -- an essence which is often masked when employing the terms 'nation' or 'ethnic group', which seem to denote internally cohesive units -- and is easily demonstrated in the case of Palestinian identity, especially because of the dispersed nature of the 'ingroup'.

of ego-identity needs through this contact) to the level of large groups (such as ethnic, racial or gender groups where 'members' are not in direct interactive contact with all other members). The question then arises as to how the boundaries of the ingroup were delimited, for it would seem that the sense of 'we'-ness was not fostered solely by individuals coming together to increase their respective self-esteems (through positive in-group contact). That is, when analyzing larger group phenomena, we must consider how the "significant social category" to which an individual perceives himself to belong, acquired its significance (i.e., why would a Palestinian living in Canada feel immediate ingroup affiliation for a Palestinian whom he has never met?). This process, which directs attention towards socio-structural differentials in the system, is somewhat skirted by the social identity perspective.

However, I would suggest that, just as Tajfel's perspective has helped develop the psychological processes lacking in Ross' framework, so does Ross' more socio-structural oriented approach aid in bridging this socio-structural gap. Thus, Ross' developmental analysis highlights the importance of socio-structural inequality -- a subordinate (sociological) group is labelled such that group identity and subordinate status is imposed.⁴¹ As such, this labelling would affect

⁴¹ Ross' perspective, in and of itself, does not fully bridge this socio-structural gap. The immutability of group boundaries, in terms of their structure, is also influenced by world hegemonic ideology (i.e., nationalism -- see discussion in chapter four) which casts 'objective' cultural characteristics as immutable, 'scientific' indicators of group boundaries.

individual psychology first (such that an individual has a label placed upon his head and is then judged by those more powerful not by his individual worth but by the label) and would eventually aid in the psychological cathecting of group identity, such that the group becomes rendered 'ripe' for mobilization. Thus, the knowledge of shared common experience (i.e., of subordination because one has been categorized as a group member) leads to ingroup cohesion, despite the lack of intimate contact (although communication is still required to affirm the commonality of experience and of 'we'-ness).⁴²

Alluded to in the above general discussion of group identity formation and inter-group conflict are certain notions of import to the issue of ethnicity. Indeed Horowitz (1985), in his comprehensive study on ethnic conflict, draws heavily on Tajfel's social identity theory to explain the psychological underpinnings of ethnic conflict:

In the real world of ethnic relations...group worth remains enduringly uncertain. And group worth is important, for self-esteem is accorded to groups of which one is a member -- the more so for memberships central to personal identity...The assessment of collective worth proceeds by comparison. In the modern state...the sources of ethnic conflict reside above all, in the struggle for relative group worth (Horowitz, 1985: 143).

⁴². This point is nicely illustrated by the Palestinian experience. With the period from 1948-1967 resulting in severe lack of communication between the 'Palestinians' of the West Bank and Gaza, and the 'Israeli Arabs' within the greenline, the sense of perceived 'we'-ness of these two groups was questionable at best. Indeed, as my illustrative casestudy will detail, the 1967 reunification of these communities led to much differentiation of a social nature (i.e., 'us' and 'them'). Although these distinctions are still somewhat evidenced, the sense of 'Palestinianness' and common psychological solidarity among the different groups, has risen dramatically.

Also noted was the way in which this psychological process articulates into the larger socio-structural environment such that differentials of power between groups can lead to ascription of group-identity and status. In this way, group-identity can become the overriding "terminal" identity for the individual (i.e., the 'label' through which the individual is reacted to or judged by the social system) and, therefore, a key locus for group mobilization.

Collectivities based along ethnic lines are considered to be especially vulnerable to this interaction based on labelling and stereotyping because of the phenotypic markers which delimit group boundaries and facilitate ascription and imposition of inferior status.⁴³ Epstein (1978) provides a telling anthropological illustration of this process (which is captured in analytical form in Ross' model). Thus in Epstein's description of the formation of ethnic consciousness in the Tolai of New Guinea, he notes that both internal and external perceptual processes were involved:

The group designation itself was the work of outsiders, but the Tolai adopted it as their own because, presumably serving in a context of polyethnic interaction as a useful signalling device, it also aptly expressed their awareness of the bonds that drew them together and separated them from others. Feeding into this nascent sense of ethnic identity was not simply an appreciation of cultural distinctiveness; there was also a heightened consciousness of shared experiences following the imposition of alien rule and of their own position of advantage within the

⁴³ Again, the term 'phenotype' is employed here to include any physical, linguistic or socio-cultural marker that the dominant group chooses.

wider colonial society (emphasis added; Epstein, 1978:50).

As Epstein's illustration suggests, the 'cathectic' bonding of a group is grounded internally in the individual's need for a positive identity and externally in the contextual history of the group. When these external influences involve hierarchical stratification and subordination based on a phenotypic differentiation and buttressed by a legitimizing ideology, these categories "quickly become 'social facts'... increasingly taking on a life of their own, from which it may be extremely difficult to escape":

Identity...always involves a measure of choice, but here it operates within severe constraints ...[such that] the persistence of ethnicity owes more to the pressures from without; in so far as people interact and compete with one another in terms of ethnic categories, the extent to which they adhere to customary beliefs and practices becomes irrelevant; one's response to those of another group is apt to be governed by negative stereotypes...the fact that a set of 'external' categories is being constantly employed is likely to prompt a response from within, leading to a stress on, or attachment to, some forms of behaviour that will come to serve as symbols of exclusiveness; these in turn will intensify and reinforce the sense of identity (Epstein, 1978:110).⁴⁴

Indeed Epstein suggests that, if the diacritica of an ethnic group are closely inspected, often these customs/practices or symbols of solidarity reflect the group's relation with the wider society: "In such ways, the external world enters into the formation of identity at

⁴⁴. The "symbols of exclusiveness" do not necessarily have to be behavioural only. Depending on the historical context of the situation, symbols can also take the form of material objects, the most significant of which is territory. This discussion is expanded in Chapter Four.

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its very roots..." (Epstein, 1978:103).

As the above discussion suggests, to answer the question "why ethnicity" requires both a contextual and historical analysis, for relations between groups have a history and the present is often influenced by the institutions and ideologies of prior generations: "The history of slavery in the United States is likely to be relevant to the present relations between blacks and whites in this country" (Taylor and Moghaddam, 1987:188). Similarly, one may posit that the history of European colonialism and imperialism in the Middle East, as well as the history of anti-semitism in Eastern Europe, are likely to be relevant to understanding the present situation between Arabs, Israelis and Palestinians. Taylor and Moghaddam (1987), in their survey of social-psychological perspectives on intergroup relations, have found that many theories neglect to explicitly incorporate such an historical and developmental perspective.

As the second chapter of this paper highlighted, John Burton's generic approach to conflict is weakened by this same lack of attention to the developmental processes in intergroup conflict. Thus, Burton, via positing a common process (frustration of needs) to underlie all forms of high-level conflict, lumps together everything from family to industrial to ethnic to inter-state conflictual interaction. Although Azar picks up on the structural and affective components of ethnic conflict, as well as the observation that such clashes tend to protract, he does not adequately explain why or how these elements interact. This

leaves the question "why ethnic identity?" to be by-passed, as ethnicity becomes in and of itself a need.

As this chapter has delineated, Burton's development of his generic theory fails to deal adequately with either the historical or the proximate variables which intervene at the differing levels of conflict. Thus, the discussion has implicated that to 'be' a Palestinian, or to 'be' a Jew must be considered as a very different level of 'being' than to 'be' a dissatisfied industrial worker. While the latter's 'being' is not wholly at stake in a labor-management pursuit, the former identities, in terms of both historical and present day realities, hold much potential consequence for individuals who ascribe (or were ascribed) to these labels. Thus the 'ethnic' label has the potential to affect all other aspects of the individual's being (and identity) in terms of freedom, personal potential and social relations for example. An ethnic group member cannot 'quit' very easily and the consequences of this 'inescapable' membership are often direct and personal.

This chapter suggests that the "affective" component of ethnicity need not be cast as some form of primordial allegiance which is genetic, but may be explained through the mind continuum of the individual. Thus, the individual has a need for a positive social identity -- a need which can be thwarted when a situation of historically developed power differentials (structural violence) has led to the ascriptive labelling and domination of the group to which this individual phenotypically belongs. As individuals discover that the social system

interacts with them on the basis of an imposed group label and not on the basis of their qualities as individuals, the process of psychological identification with this group intensifies. In this way, the self-esteem of ego-identity becomes inextricably linked to the status of the group and to the desire to improve group status (i.e., to organize and mobilize to throw off the inferior 'identity' and status imposed by the dominant group).⁴³

This simplified outline of the interaction between both psychological and sociological variables in the formation of "terminal" group identity (such as ethnicity) suggests that 'conflicts of being' may be integrally entangled with 'conflicts of interests'.

What this socio-psychological approach has so far failed to address are questions concerning why ethnic conflict has become so prominent in the latter half of the twentieth century and why these ethnic boundaries have been imbued with such political and territorial strategic significance. Social identity theory raises this issue in part through the notion that the mobilization of groups for conflict depends upon their perception of the legitimacy of the social system. However, this notion then begs the question, "from where does an individual get his/her perceptions of legitimacy and stability?" Social identity theory suggests, in passing, that the answer to this question involves

⁴³. The process of minority subordination can also lead to individual strategies to restore positive self-identity, such as denial of affiliation with the group (where phenotypically possible). For clarification and detailed discussion of this phenomena see: Epstein, 1978; Horowitz, 1984; Ross, 1980; Sites, 1973; Taylor and Moghaddam, 1987.

ideology: "the dominant ideology will influence the perceptions that people have in terms of legitimacy and stability" (Taylor and Moghaddam, 1987:83).⁴⁶ Taking this hint as a valuable lead, the next chapter will switch scales to consider, from a (circumscribed) historical perspective the role of the dominant ideology of the Westphalian system and its influence with respect to ethnicity as a political and national force.

⁴⁶. In other words, relative group worth is evaluated with respect to the 'dominant ideology'. This raises an absolutely crucial point for understanding ethnic conflict for it implies that the dominant ideology acts to structure perceptions concerning the legitimate status of groups and, therefore, acts to structure the process of group formation and identification. This point will be clarified in the following chapter.

CHAPTER FOUR:

ETHNO-NATIONALISM: THE STRUCTURING OF IDENTITY-GROUPS

I did not understand the events of Kristalnacht in 1938. I was stunned. I could not understand why they smashed my Uncle's windows. I did not understand why my father said I must leave for Holland at once. I did not feel I was Jewish first...I was a German. It was they who turned me into a Jew (Zvee, of Kfar Masaryk in Israel, 1985).

What is a man worth
Without a homeland
Without a flag
Without an address
What is a man worth?
(Mahmud Darwish, "Letter from
Exile")

The preceding discussion suggests that the locus of group identity is a malleable and situationally dependent phenomenon. As such, identity groups which mobilize along ethnic lines are exercising one of several alternative loci of group identity. Ethnicity, therefore, is a dependent variable which requires historical and contextual analysis for its explanation.

To take this particularist position is not to belie the observation that ethnic phenomenon share certain general features which demand a generalized explanation. For example, numerous scholars have noted that ethnic affiliations are often territorially cathected, politically latent, and have emerged as a resurgent force in the latter half of the twentieth century (e.g., Horowitz, 1985; Connor, 1973; Smith 1971; Ross 1980; Richmond 1987; Epstein, 1978).

Richmond (1987), in a recent overview of the major social science paradigms that have dealt with ethnic nationalism, indexes approximately nine different 'approaches' in the literature.⁴⁷ The complex diversity of this subject, which is revealed by Richmond's review, did not prevent him from drawing the conclusion that: "ethnic nationalism must also be ... distinguished from other forms of ethnic mobilization by its territorial referent" (Richmond, 1987:17). As such, the focus of this paper shall be restricted to a very selective exploration of the historical inter-relatedness of political ethnicity, nationalism and the territorial imperative of the global order.⁴⁸ This discussion will attempt to address the issue which social identity theory raised but did not pursue -- namely, the structuring influence of world hegemonic ideology on peoples' perceptions of legitimacy -- with a view towards integration.

It is insightful to preface this discussion by re-introducing an issue raised earlier, with respect to John Burton's conception of the

⁴⁷. These are: biosocial theories; modernization theories; Marx-ian/Leninist; internal colonialism; ethnic pluralism; micro-social theories; systems theories and multivariate models; development and modernization; power, authority and legitimation; militarism and war.

⁴⁸. This discussion does not propose to equate the politicization of ethnicity with ethnic nationalism. Certainly not all 'mobilized' ethnic groups aspire to national territorial independence or statehood. Rather, the exercise of 'ethnic power' is often conducted within the existing constitutional system of a state -- as exemplified by manifestations such as: the 'ethnic vote'; 'affirmative action programs'; lobbies for special privileges/ status of the group; and the concept of 'sovereignty association' (cf., Richmond, 1987). However, often secession or territorial independence is the central goal of mobilized ethno-nationalist groups -- as certainly was/is the case for Zionist Jews and Palestinian Arabs (hence the focus of the discussion to follow).

relationship between identity and conflict. Perhaps the central tenet of Burton's 'generic' paradigm is the notion that identity needs are separable from material interests, and often at odds with institutional values:⁴⁹ "There has been little attempt to differentiate in order to evaluate them, goods for having and goods for being" (Burton, 1979:103).

Burton suggests that it is quite possible that 'objective' conflicts of interests are more often than not 'false consciousness', i.e., 'goods for having' are merely metaphors of conflict -- tactical devices which mask the identity needs goal which lies at the true basis of conflict. Thus, the whole purpose of the problem solving process is to 'exorcise' this false consciousness via the differentiation of tactics (material interests) from goals (human needs) so that the shared nature of the superordinate goal is realized and conflict resolution may proceed. To support his argument, Burton employs an illustration drawn from industrial conflicts:

An industrial conflict can take the form of demand for increased wages; but the real and experienced cause of the demand may be an altered differential in wage structures, giving rise to status claims. Status claims require quite different responses. Scarcity of material resources by itself is a reason, not for conflict, but for cooperation (Burton, 1979:102).⁵⁰

⁴⁹. This notion has been termed 'central' to Burton's perspective, because it is integral to the whole notion of the utility of problem solving as an avenue for conflict resolution at the international level.

⁵⁰. This particular passage implicates certain of the core features which were elucidated in chapter three of this paper: status as the core psychic need of the individual; the relativity of comparison by which status is assessed; and the need for structural change if the underlying 'goal' (over which the conflict is waged) is to be satisfied.

This passage nicely encapsulates Burton's insight that the underlying basis of conflict rests in deviant institutional structures which thwart the individual from pursuing/satisfying his identity needs. However, Burton 'generically' extends his 'industrial worker' observation (i.e., that seemingly 'objective' conflicts of interests are merely incompatible metaphors) to the level of inter-state conflict. As such, Burton's critique of the power paradigm turns on this notion of the differentiation of 'needs for being' and 'needs for having':

For there to be an objective conflict of interests, there would need to be [for example]...a common goal involving a scarce resource, such as acquisition of a particular territory ...Such a conflict of interests gives rise to a win-lose situation: the gain of one party is equal to the loss of the other and where compromise is possible it leads to some degree of dissatisfaction (Burton, 1979:103).

Burton suggests that this perception of territorial conflict (i.e., as a situation of incompatible goals) is a construct of the hegemonic ideology of realism which presupposes resource scarcity and which upholds the value of the state as the (legitimized) key to world order and security: "The problem at issue has arisen out of systems of thought: it is not a real problem" (Burton, 1979:114). Thus, the world-wide perception that conflicts over territory are zero-sum has no basis in 'objective reality':

Frequently goals appear to be incompatible because there is a confusion between goals and tactics...however possession of territory ...is a tactic designed to secure a goal: it is not itself a goal. The goal is a relationship that guarantees security. Territory is finite and conflict over possession is a win-lose conflict but the security which the tactic is designed to secure is not of a given size... Security like other social

goods is not finite...The arguments in a communal conflict revolve around tactics (Burton, 1979:103).

Burton cites the conflict over the Golan Heights as evidence of such a situation, suggesting that the shared security concerns of Israelis and Syrians could lead (via recognition of this shared superordinate goal) to the redefinition of conflict goals and the reduction of the strategic importance of territorial concerns (i.e., eliminating the 'objective' appearance of the conflict). This is perhaps a fair enough proposition; however it is important to note that Burton presents his example as an inter-state conflict over territory. This form of conflict is not necessarily the same thing as an inter-nation conflict over territory -- that is, the conflict over the Golan is not directly comparable to the conflict that enfolds Israelis and Palestinians over Israel/ Palestine.³¹ For, in the latter case, the observed conflict over territory is not linked only to strategic concerns but is also integral to the historical ontogeny of group identity and group legitimacy such that Palestinians perceive that their needs of being are intimately tied to needs of having.³²

With respect to this point, it is insightful to turn to Horowitz

³¹. The conflict over the Golan more closely approximates the Israeli/Palestinian conflict when it is considered from the perspective of the 'Golanese' (i.e., The Druze whose lives are affected by the occupation) versus the Israelis (rather than Syria versus Israel). For an example of the Golanese perspective, see Ashhab, 1986.

³². Portugali (1988) derives a radical theory which supports this statement. Thus, nationalism is analysed as the hegemonic ideology which has structured world order (and the perception of legitimacy). This important idea will be integrated into the discussion to follow.

(1985), whose comprehensive study on ethnic conflict presents a view which stands in direct contrast to Burton's suggestion that territory be viewed as a material and strategic metaphor, a metaphor which is unrelated to identity needs. Thus, Horowitz suggests that when it comes to ethnic conflict and identity, "symbols have substance," for at least two inter-related reasons: a) symbolism acts to solidify group membership and identification and b) symbolic claims (e.g., territorial claims with land as the symbol) are integrally related to group status and group worth (cf., Horowitz, 1985: 185-226).

With respect to a), Horowitz contends that the symbolism of ethnic conflict is central because it offers a powerful vehicle for group boundary delimitation and group solidarity which simultaneously masks intra-group differences:

... 'sons of the soil' evokes the sanctity of the home against intrusion. The larger principles in which a demand is cast provide justification and render it more difficult to deny the validity of the demand. The pursuit of conflict through symbols thus obscures their segmental character by linking them with universals and simultaneously avoids running afoul... of differences (Horowitz, 1985 :218).

Burton probably would concede that a metaphor acts as a unifying symbol but he would also argue that this metaphor masks what is really at issue -- individual human needs. Such a position, however, perhaps belies the notions which were developed in Chapter Three of this paper.

Consider Horowitz's observation of symbolically-facilitated group solidarity in light of Ross' developmental model of identity-group formation. Thus,

(1) if group-identity has come to be the overriding source and terminal locus of personal identity (i.e., via the external imposition of subordinate minority status);

and

(2) if group members have discovered that the only route open to fulfill their individual needs for a positive social identity is via internal redefinition of their collectively ascribed status;

and

(3) if the solidification of group identity has been through common identification with shared experiences (such as 'dispossession') and the shared symbolic goals which embody the positive redefinition of the group (i.e., 'the return' and 'the homeland'); ⁵³

then

(4) it may be posited that attempts to reveal the metaphor (i.e., the group's attachment to the land) as false consciousness, would be akin to severing the bond that holds the identity of the group together. From the individual's perspective, this would be met with much resistance, because group identity has become the overriding source of self-definition (via the systemic subordination of the group and the process of mobilization). Thus to deny the group is to deny the self, which would

⁵³. For example, for the Palestinians, the imposition of subordinate status was intimately connected to the fact that they lived in the territory of Palestine. It is therefore not surprising that the essence of being Palestinian has been tied to the powerful symbols of the return, and of the land. This argument is detailed at length in Chapter Five.

be antithetical to the identity-needs of the individual.⁵⁴

This hypothetical sequence links in to point b] above, which suggests that symbolic claims are tethered to the status claims of a group. Thus, Horowitz (1985) notes that ethnic politics should be viewed through the prism of status claims:

Status discontents ...appear when the prestige accorded to a group is less than group members believe is merited. Since social recognition affects self-esteem, much political behaviour aims at bringing objective (or official) recognition into harmony with subjective or aspiration recognition (Horowitz, 1985 :219).

When this socio-psychological observation is placed in the context of a world in which the nation and the state are the two dominant political organizational concepts, the link which binds identity and territory becomes clearer: "Status discontents flow...from a challenge to self-esteem or to place in territory" (Horowitz, 1985: 219).

The chasm which separates Horowitz from Burton is further highlighted by their differing emphases with respect to the concept of 'legitimacy'. As alluded to earlier, Burton's discussion of legitimacy

⁵⁴. Of course, this 'explanation' does not yet elucidate why land or territory is so often cast as the central symbol. This very important aspect requires a radical analysis which looks at the structuring impact of world hegemonic ideology, i.e., Portugali (1988) and Said (1979). See below.

is restricted largely to authority structures.⁵⁵ By contrast, Horowitz (like both Tajfel and Ross) presents a much broader social interpretation of legitimacy, considering it to be intimately linked to inter-group competition for relative group worth: "The contest for group worth and the contest for group legitimacy are not wholly separate: as I have said, the two join together in a politics of entitlement" (Horowitz, 198:213). In this sense territory, and 'having' territory, become integrally entangled with 'human needs': "To understand the concept of group legitimacy, it is necessary to link it to ownership. Legitimacy goes to one's rightful place in the country. To be legitimate is therefore to be identified with the territory" (Horowitz, 1985: 201).

The above discussion clearly illustrates the limits of Burton's 'generic' perspective with respect to explaining ethnic conflict. Burton's insight that the statist structuring of the world is a product of ideology leads him to perhaps underestimate the structural realities which this ideology has created. Burton suggests that conflict resolution is possible when conflict situations are redefined, such that needs of 'being' are separated from falsely induced needs of 'having.' In so doing, Burton invokes a conceptual separation of territory (i.e., the state) from identity-needs (i.e. the nation). This separation is further evidenced by the fact that although Burton considers the belief

⁵⁵. Burton's notion of legitimate authority is not in the democratic sense of legitimacy via majority vote, but rather in terms of authorities which facilitate all individuals of a society to fulfill their respective identity needs

in the state to be false consciousness (and a source of conflict), he also states that "manifestations of nationalism have biological origins and protective functions" (Burton, 1979:80)³⁶. Thus, nationalism is a product of 'objective' biology, whereas states are a subjective ideological construct.

Burton's terminological confusion, in this regard, results in the position that the nation, as a psycho-socio-biological entity, can be analytically separated from the material-institutional construct of the nation-state (except in the 'rare' case when they coincide). Such an aspatial and ahistorical treatment of the relationship between identity, nation and territory leads Burton to what Portugali (1988) would term a "conceptually erroneous" separation of the material and the spiritual and to an impoverished view of communal conflict.³⁷

Portugali (1988) notes that most social theory tends to exhibit a "causal mechanistic separation between the material and spiritual domains; [which results in a] disregard for socio-spatial relations and [the] consequent misconception, or underestimation of the role of nationalism in the existing social order" (Portugali, 1988:152).

³⁶. This is an example further to the discussion of Chapter Two re: the confusion invoked by Burton's careless biological suppositions.

³⁷. What Burton is aware of, but does not adequately deal with, is the larger picture -- that the 'redefinition' of a conflict situation would involve not only the context at hand, but the restructuring of the entire world order. Once again, the problem of Burton's belief in 'ends' leaves him bereft of the 'means' to properly address structural constraints.

Indeed, Portugali's dialectical scrutiny of the relationship between ideology and social order was prompted by his concern for the failure of most social theory to adequately explain conflictual relations between 'ethno-nationalist' groups (such as the Israelis and Palestinians).³⁰

While Portugali does not deny that many valuable insights have been derived from various analyses of the evolving relations between Israelis and Palestinians, he suggests that when considered in a more comprehensive historical perspective, it is evident that many of these interpretations tend to obscure some of the most "elementary facts":

...an interpretation of the relations in terms of ethnic conflict in a plural society obscures the fact that one is observing a nationalistic struggle for national self-determination. Similarly, interpretations in terms of class conflict in a capitalist society overlook the fact that war and state action were not the consequence of class relations, but rather the starting point and framework for their development (Portugali, 1988:152).

Portugali observes that much of this oversight arises in part from the essentially "aspatial or ageographical" tendencies of social theory as a whole: "economic and sociological theories were developed as if social and economic processes took place 'on the head of a pin' " (Portugali, 1988:160).

³⁰. Portugali's analytical approach was, in fact, specifically derived via "an attempt to build a theoretical framework for a study of Israeli-Palestinian relationships" (Portugali, 1988:151). It will be obvious that Portugali's historically focused perspective buttresses many of the propositions already elucidated in the previous chapters of this paper.

Portugali conducts a holistic consideration of the historical evolution of social theory and its impact as a structuring force of world order. His analysis demonstrates that the advent of modern, industrial scientific society accelerated the "dialectical tension between the emerging mechanistic-scientific world view...and the holistic social reality and world view which predominated in pre-industrial European society" (Portugali, 1988:159). The new ideological synthesis which arose was nationalism, which Portugali elevates to the level of a generative social order.

Thus, Portugali argues that the ideology of nationalism has come to predominate all other events or configurations (i.e., the "implicate" social order) ⁵⁹. Thus, all other events are "subjected to the newly established order state or they are 'slaved' by the order parameter":

...nationalism became the generative order in modern society, first in the sense that world society was, and still is, 'forced' to organise according to its order principles and second, in the sense that other major social orders, such as capitalism and communism accept (i.e., were enslaved by) its principles (Portugali, 1988:154).

Although the essence of nationalist ideology was/is essentially

⁵⁹. Integral to Portugali's approach is the notion of "implicate social relations" : "society...(indeed reality)...must be conceived of as an undivided whole, in an ever-evolving movement...social entities such as nation, class and...the human being itself are not 'building blocks' independent of each other, but 'social events' -- inseparable from each other and from their wider spatio-historical context. They are inseparable in the sense that each social entity enfolds all other entities and society as a whole" (Portugali, 1988:153). This statement sums up the basic elements of the logic of dialectics (cf., page 17).

'socio-spiritual', its role as generative order renders it inseparable from the material, territorial-institutional entity of the nation-state: "a given social configuration (i.e., social order) has a material content and an informational content. Thus nationalism can be seen as a generative social order, with the nation-state as its material content...and the ideology of nationalism as its informational content" (Portugali, 1988:155). The implicate relations which intertwine the material with the spiritual are revealed in the 'core doctrine' of nationalist ideology which holds that the unity of people, territory and government is a 'natural' structuring of the world.⁶⁰ Nationalism, therefore, is cast as a hegemonic ideology which simultaneously structures the geo-political organisation of the globe and engenders 'false consciousness' by presenting "social constructs such as territorial homeland, nation and nation-state as 'natural' and 'eternal'" (Portugali, 1988:155).

Portugali suggests that the ideology of nationalism (and by

⁶⁰. Portugali lists nine separate properties of the nationalist doctrine:

1. Humanity is naturally divided into nations.
2. Nations can be objectively ascertained.
3. The only legitimate type of government is national self-government.
4. The primary condition of global freedom and harmony is the strengthening of the nation-state.
5. For freedom and self-realization, people must identify with a nation.
6. Loyalty to the nation-state overrides other loyalties.
7. The nation-state's sole obligation is towards its co-nationals.
8. Nations can only be fulfilled in their own territory, with their own state and government.
9. The nation-state -- the unity of people, territory and government -- is the genuine unit within and through which people conduct their social, economic and cultural affairs.

implication, the nation-state) underwent space-time diffusion from its European point of origin to the rest of the world (largely through colonization). This process involved the 'enslavement' of competing order parameters as more and more socio-cultural groups were exposed to nationalism as a generative order: "They were 'exposed', firstly, to the informational content of nationalism, and secondly to the dialectics of space" (Portugali, 1988:156).⁶¹

Portugali draws on Smith's (1971) analysis to describe how this process of enslavement occurred. Thus, social groups that were outside the historical evolution of this dominating political-cultural entity (i.e., "groups who could not fit or conform with the newly emerging generative social order") were delegitimized, and made conscious of their ethno-cultural uniqueness:

Such minority groups were confronted with a crisis: either to assimilate in the new social entity by giving up their cultural heritage (and they were not always welcomed by the recipient group), or to preserve their cultural tradition by conforming with the new generative order, that is, by claiming and struggling for their own national self-determination, with their own territory, government and state...they had no choice but to be enslaved by the newly emerging order parameter (Portugali, 1988:156).

This perspective appears equally applicable to the situation which confronted both Palestinians and East European Jews. Thus Portugali suggests that the emergence of Palestinian national (internal) identity

⁶¹. Portugali's observation is relevant to Edward Said's (1979) discussion on the manifest ideology of imperialism and its latent consequences (see below).

was catalyzed by external forces -- when an external nation-state defined Palestine as a spatio-political entity. This process caused the Palestinians to respond by "bringing to the fore socio-cultural traits (such as common language, territory, religion and common enemy) which 'scientifically' prove the existence of their nation as a natural-legitimate entity" (Portugali, 1988:157).⁶² Inherent in this explanation are many of the notions which have already been discussed in this paper (i.e., Epstein's notions of internal and external processes; Ross' developmental and interactive approach, with its key concept of the imposition of identity upon subordinate minority groups; and Horowitz's notions regarding the inter-relatedness of group legitimacy and group worth).

Portugali suggests that the non-assimilation and persecution of the Jews in Eastern Europe is likewise best understood as a function of their delegitimization and 'enslavement' by the ideology of nationalism:

...despite their global spatial dispersion and their deep involvement in their countries of residence, the Jews were extracted from their native countries in order to be enslaved by nationalism -- the emerging generative social order -- that is, to be conscious of, and develop, their own 'natural' ethno-

⁶². Knight (1982) eloquently captures this essence: "Whereas a socially cohesive group once defined its territory, in time politically bounded territory came to define the people; there was a transference in emphasis from group to territory" (Knight, 1982: 516). As shall be detailed below, pre-Zionist Palestine found the socially cohesive group to define its territory regionally (largely at the village level). The beginnings of Palestinian national identity emerged out of the interaction with Zionism (which brought with it the latent reality of nationalism as a generative order) and did not take root fully until after the events of 1967. (This very simplified account shall be more subtly dealt with in Chapter Five).

national distinctiveness, their own 'natural' territory and their own 'scientific' government (Portugali, 1988:157).

Indeed, the nationalism of the Jews reveals the latent relationship that is often ignored between the spiritual and material (i.e., territorial/institutional) components of nationalism. Although the Jews possessed all the 'spiritual-cultural' criteria to be a self-determined nation, they lacked the required material basis: "Thus emerged the 'Jewish Problem' of a nation without a territory, and thus the name Zionism -- the name of the ancient homeland" (Portugali, 1988:157). Portugali further points out that, even for Jewish socialists and Marxists, the goal of a national territory became the central Zionist goal (albeit, as a precondition for the socio-economic revolution of the Jewish people).⁶³

Portugali's perspective, therefore, argues that the "...Moloch of

⁶³. An important point which Portugali elucidates in this regard is the complicated relationship between social theory as a whole (i.e., liberalism/Marxism) and nationalist ideology. Thus, the two rival perspectives share an acceptance of the core doctrine of nationalism, albeit from different rationales: "Marxist-Leninists, as a temporary necessary stage until the nation-state will wither away by itself; Liberals as an organizational framework to supply the socially needed public goods, in the face of 'market failure' " (Portugali, 1988:160). Moreover, nationalism as an ideology designates a logical political interrelationship amongst already existing socio-cultural entities (ethnic-national group, state, science), but is ambiguous with respect to the internal structuring of self-determined societies. As such, it can enfold other political ideologies -- liberalism, capitalism, socialism, and Marxism -- as "supporting ideologies" which structure the internal socio-political-economic order of the national society. Because of this ambiguity, social theory does not tend to examine the 'rightness' of the nation as the proper unit to enjoy self-government: "...nationalism as a generative order enslaves liberalism/Marxism and at the same time hides and flourishes behind their propoganda" (Portugali, 1988:162).

nationalism is...a human creation;...humanity is not naturally or divinely divided into nations...nations do not have natural territories...and the state is not the sole precondition for human freedom" (Portugali, 1988:163). This observation dovetails into the situationalist notions which were developed earlier with respect to the formation of group identity, i.e., the symbolic significance of 'cultural markers' which typify a given identity group can often be revealed as historically emergent through both external and internal processes. Nationalism, therefore, is not an inevitable locus for group identity (or strategy for group re-definition) but must be "the political product of a particular set of circumstances, and hence contingent" (Knight, 1988:11). However, Portugali's analysis would suggest that in order to make sense of the 'particular' (i.e., Palestinian identity/nationalism), it must be analyzed in relation to the general -- in terms of how the ideology of nationalism legitimized and rationalized the particular latent social relations which emerged.

The above discussion alludes to three important notions which shall be further explored below: 1. Nationalism as an ideology which structures the dynamic baseline of power relations and social change (i.e., as a generative order); 2. The implicate relation between territory and identity which nationalism reifies; 3. The innovative diffusion of nationalist ideology and its relation to colonialism and the emergence of post-colonial conflict defined in ethno-nationalist terms.

The concept of nationalism as a 'generative order' is interesting because it provides perspective on an apparent 'anomaly' which Walker Connor captures in the title of a 1972 article called "Nation-Building or Nation Destroying?". Connor's question aptly offsets the antithetical conceptions of 'legitimacy' which nationalist ideology has nourished -- that of existing states and that of national movements opposed to existing states. As Anderson summarizes:

The first route [to achieve legitimacy] is primarily political in that the state's political boundaries pre-date the formation of a national community; and the state is the main agency in creating or attempting to create a culturally homogeneous nation within pre-existing borders [e.g., France and England, and former colonial territories where "the state provided the initial territorial context,"]...

...nationalisms within the state territory... [are] the second route... Here the boundaries of the nation pre-date those of the state... and the absence of appropriate state boundaries means that cultural criteria are particularly important in delimiting the national territory (Anderson, 1988:22).

Connor's question is directed against the (formerly) dominant perspective of modernization theory which is enfolded by the ideology of nationalism and which considers sub-state claims to peoplehood as atavistic and temporary. As Richmond summarizes:

The modernization theory of nationalism links culture to nation and nation to state. It assumes that the economic and technological processes of industrialization facilitate communication and promote social mobilization. While the transition from earlier forms of social organization to modernity may generate conflict based on ethnic attachments the eventual outcome is generally regarded as a few centralized states, each based upon a single culture and a unitary system of education and communication (Richmond, 1987:7).

Modernization theory is basically the 'nation-building' perspective of social order which fully assumes the diacritica of 'legitimacy' to be peoplehood, place and self-determination, and which assumes nation-states to be the evolutionary apex of social order. In this way, nationalist ideology is used by those empowered by the status quo to rationalize resistance to change. As Anderson clarifies: "...states, or rather the ruling groups in control of them, wish to appear to speak for a single united nation rather than for sectional or regional interests, in order to achieve legitimacy and popular acceptance from the population of the whole state territory" (Anderson, 1988: 21). In this way, 'nationalism' is guised as 'natural', when in fact it is actively pursued (i.e., it is both state-sponsored and state-created).

To contrast this status quo, integrationist perspective, Walker Connor argues for the legitimacy of "ethno-nationalism" -- those 'nations' which have yet to achieve statehood and which are kept in check by the control of state-building forces (thus the term "nation-destroying"). It is important to note that an 'ethno-nationalist' perspective also fully accepts the dictates of nationalist ideology--its opposition is directed against the status quo because the status quo denies ethno-nationalists legitimacy (i.e., legitimacy as defined by the generative order of nationalism).

Connor's approach suggests that (ethnic) nations are latently 'real', and become manifest through the contagion of the idea of self-

determination. Thus, the concept of the self-determination of nations links ethnic identity to the idea of political legitimacy.

Although the present-day transcontextual universality of ethnic mobilization implies an 'ethnic imperative', Connor demonstrates the inaccuracy of this perception by highlighting that ethnonationalism is not universal with regards to time: although ethnic groups have an ancient history, their self-awareness did not emerge until the 19th century. At this time, the notion of 'popular sovereignty', which fostered a change in ideology such that the sanction to rule was transferred from above to from below, catalyzed the diffusion of the "idea" of national self-determination.

Connor's approach considers nationalist ambitions to arise out of the diffusion of this idea because it legitimized the notion of power to the people and therefore had the appeal of mass support. Through the popularization of this notion, it was raised to a universal level of generalization such that it became the justification for nationalist movements and the catalyst for those not yet underway.

Connor's perspective suggests that ethno-nationalism has caught on essentially because of its popular appeal. Thus, he emphasizes the importance of the self-consciousness of nationhood: "a nation must be an idea, as well as a fact, before it can become a dynamic force" (Connor, 1973:3; quoting Barker, 1927). As such, "a nation is a self-differentiating ethnic group. A prerequisite for nationhood is

popularly held awareness or belief that one's own group is unique in a most vital sense...the essence of the nation is a matter of attitude" (Connor, 1972:33-36).

By this perspective, it would seem that nationalism is primarily a matter of psychology and the diffusion of ideas. Although Connor does suggest that ethnic consciousness requires both intra- and inter- ethnic communication before the "contagion" of the national idea can result in the psychological bonding of "us" (cf., Connor, 1973), this 'communication' need not involve any form of contact (or oppression):

Though knowledge of the aliens and their foreign ways is indispensable to national consciousness, first-hand knowledge is not. Awareness of the existence of other cultures can be acquired by way of the spoken or written word ...as well as by actual contact (Connor, 1973:4).

Connor appears to approach the 'primordialist' position when he suggests that psychological bonding of ethnic group members is catalyzed by the "awareness" of "shared customs, attitudes and beliefs," which results in a "feeling of sameness and oneness, a sensation of kinship" (Connor, 1973:4). Although passing reference is made to more structural antecedents of nationalism ("The urge to cast off a foreign yoke is influenced by the degree to which the yoke is felt" Connor, 1981), his analysis does not really address the interplay of structure and ideology. Thus, while Connor considers group differentiation to be a subjectivist (self-defining) process, he does not really examine the objective conditions which contribute to this psychological bonding.

This 'weakness' has been pinpointed by Hechter (1975) who develops a radical analysis of the development of ethno-nationalist consciousness from the perspective of internal colonialism:

The antecedent causes of cultural differentiation between groups sharing close geographical proximity have seldom been satisfactorily explored by social scientists from a theoretical perspective ...

...what is problematic in complex society are the social conditions under which individuals band together as members of an ethnic group (Hechter, 1975: 34-37).

While Hechter does not deny the validity of Connor's 'subjectivist' analysis, he would argue that it is incomplete as an explanation of group differentiation and mobilization because it fails to explore the "social conditions under which individuals bind together as members of an ethnic group."

It is on this point that the difference between Connor's approach and the approaches of both Portugali(1988) and Ross (1980) becomes clear. Connor's subjectivist approach to the process of group formation (i.e., in terms of the phenotype of the group) posits that nationalist movements arise essentially out of the diffusion of an idea with mass appeal. By contrast, Portugali posits that the diffusion of nationalist ideology resulted in the structural subordination (i.e., delegitimization and persecution) of social groups which were 'outside' the dominant political-cultural entity and which were thereby 'enslaved' by the new generative order (i.e., they could either attempt 'assimilation' or, especially when this avenue was externally barred, 'national mobilization' as strategies to regain personal self-esteem and/or group

legitimacy).

Ross' (1980) developmental model seems to provide a bridge between these two perspectives. Connor's subjectivist approach clearly fits in to Ross' third stage (i.e., ethnic mobilization, which entails the positive redefinition of group identity). However Ross' second stage (i.e., subordinated minority) speaks to the structural asymmetry of social relations which catalyzes the transformation of a sociological group into a psychological group. As such, both Ross and Portugali propound that objective conditions of subordination (i.e., structural hierarchy) precede and catalyze the subjective "mass appeal" of ethnic/national identity.⁶⁴

When contrasted to that of Portugali or Ross, Connor's approach appears to underestimate the coercive forces involved in the process of the 'diffusion' of the idea of self-determination. For example, recall that Portugali's perspective suggests two integral elements of the 'diffusion' of nationalist ideology: exposure to its informational content and, secondly, to the 'dialectics of space'. Connor really only addresses the first element. Consideration of the second demands a much more structural analysis of ethnonationalism in terms of the dominant/subordinate social relations which are engendered by a world order underpinned by the dictates of nationalist ideology. This latter

⁶⁴. It is important to note in this regard, that the perspective of this paper does not suggest the "mass appeal" of an ethnic/nationalist strategy be strictly related to its utility as an organization for rational strategy -- i.e., an ethno-national movement is not reducible to a form of elite-manipulated interest-group politics (cf. below).

perspective considers dominant groups to be those who emerged with states (and who engaged in nation-building to ascertain their legitimacy) and minorities (either sub-state, or peoples of the colonized world) to be those who were defined as individuals/groups outside this order parameter. Minorities became enfolded by the structure of nationalist order such that they were 'delegitimized' and subordinated, and were 'forced' to re-establish legitimacy via a claim to 'nationhood'. When taken in context of the arguments presented earlier, the impact of this delegitimization could (depending on the given constellation of proximate variables) be felt at the individual level of personal self-esteem (i.e., Horowitz, 1985), especially when the basis of individual/group social comparison is enfolded by the dominant ideology's definition of legitimacy (i.e., Tajfel, 1979).

The force behind nationalism as a generative order, therefore, lies not so much in its appeal, as in the essence of its ideology (which links people to nations and nations to territory) manifested in the asymmetry of power relations between dominant and subordinate groups. Anderson (1988) makes the important observation that ideologies "may be seen in purely subjective terms, as 'all in the mind', but they persist and have plausibility because they have a partial, albeit often very limited basis in material reality" (Anderson, 1988:2). The 'basis in material reality' on which nationalist ideology rests lies in both the perceptual and the experiential realms.

Perceptually, nationalist ideology is buttressed by the propensity

of the human mind to organize the external world through the discrimination and categorization of objects: the discernible phenotypic/cultural differences of humans allow categorization such that 'nations' (or ethnic groups) appear to be the 'natural' divisions of the human species. Thus, "symbols of cultural distinctiveness [are assumed] to describe social reality, when in fact these symbols must be invested with meaning to be employed in political mobilization. ...Nationalist ideology...erroneously assigns meaning to symbols which might otherwise lack contemporary significance" (Rawkins, 1984:92). Nationalism's territoriality is also given perceptual credence by the capacity of landscapes to be infused with meaning in terms of identity, self-esteem and history:

...territory is the receptacle of the past in the present. The nation's unique history is embodied in the nation's unique piece of territory -- its 'homeland', in the primeval land of its ancestors, older than any state, the same land which saw its greatest moments perhaps its mythical origins. The time has passed but the space is still there (Anderson, 1988:24).

The perceptual relevance of territory is enfolded by the experiential reality of nationalist territoriality through the structuring of power relations. Thus, territory becomes the material manifestation of social control by the reification of power relations, "making them appear more real and 'natural'":

Territoriality can also displace attention from the actual relations of power yielded by dominant groups, as in the neutral sounding 'law of the land'. More generally territoriality involves a 'fetishism of space'...whereby relations between social groups and classes are obscured by being presented as

being presented as relations between areas or regions or a relationship with areas or regions... Belonging/not belonging to a particular territory is a lowest common denominator in social terms...(Anderson, 1988:26).

When taken in context of Portugali's perspective, the process and consequences of external delegitimization of subordinate (non-organized-into-nation) groups provided the concrete reality of experience through which the ideology of nationalism became, in essence, a self-fulfilling prophecy. Thus the material reality of experience (i.e., becoming colonized) gave plausibility to the 'correctness' of the ideology of nationalism (i.e., that membership in a nation along with territorial sovereignty are required for personal freedom, personal 'legitimacy', and a positive sense of self-worth). As such, nationalist identity which emerges out of a shared common experience of external subjugation is not an artificial, institutional concoction but is a sense of people-hood which is felt at the core of the individual's being (i.e., Fpstein's notion of terminal identity):

...ethnic separatist groups seek through separation...the restoration of a degraded community to its rightful status and dignity, yet it also sees in the status of a separate political existence the goal of the restoration and the social embodiment of that dignity (Knight, 1982:526; quoting Smith, 1979).

It is with this point that we return to Burton's conception of the separation of identity needs and material interests. Burton observes that the desire for territory and sovereignty is an ideologically-concocted means to an end (i.e., fulfillment of identity needs) and not an end in itself. Without disagreeing with this statement, the

above discussion has suggested that the legitimacy of these means lies not only 'in the mind', but in the reality of historical experience, which has integrally intertwined identity needs and the need for place.

To further support the above discussion, it is helpful to explore Edward Said's discussion of 19th century European imperialist ideology which parallels Portugali's notions concerning the implicate relations between territory and people:

Imperialism was and still is a political philosophy whose aim and purpose for being is territorial expansion and its legitimization. A serious underestimation of imperialism, however would be to consider territory in too literal a way. Gaining and holding an imperium means gaining and holding a domain, which includes a variety of operations, among them constituting an area, accumulating its inhabitants, having power over its ideas, people and of course, its land, converting people, land and ideas to the purposes and for the use of hegemonic imperial design; all this as a result of being able to treat reality appropriatively. Thus the distinction between an idea that one feels to be one's own and a piece of land that one claims by right to be one's own (despite the presence on the land of its working native inhabitants) is really nonexistent, at least in the world of nineteenth century culture out of which imperialism developed (Said, 1979:73).

Writing specifically about the Palestinian experience, Said develops a cultural thesis exploring the ideological mechanisms which provided the moral justification and legal legitimation for the exploitation of the periphery (i.e., the native Palestinians) by the center (European

Zionist settlers).⁶³ His explanation of this process lies in the contradiction between the 'reality' and the ideological interpretation of that reality: "...the struggle between Palestinians and Zionism is a struggle between a presence and an interpretation, the former constantly appearing to be overpowered and eradicated by the latter" (Said, 1979: 9).

The logic which fuels the power of 'interpretation' over 'presence' stems from the ideological hegemony of 19th century European imperialism -- the political philosophy which was grounded in the dominant ethos of the mission civilisatrice and the corresponding notion of inequality among races and cultures:

Among the supposed juridicial distinction between civilized and non-civilized people was an attitude toward land, almost a doxology, which non-civilized people supposedly lacked. A civilized man...could cultivate the land because it meant something to him...on it accordingly...he created, he accomplished, he built. For an uncivilized people, land was either farmed badly (that is inefficiently by Western standards) or it was left to rot (Said, 1979).

⁶³. On this, it is important to recall that the Zionist ascent to the 'center' was catalyzed by their prior existence in the 'periphery'. Thus, Portugali analyzes both the Jews and the Palestinians from the perspective of being outside the legitimate order and, via persecution, struggling to conform to the nationalist order by 'proving' themselves to be a nation, and making claims to territory (the Jews through ancient ancestral claims, the Palestinians through both ancestral claims and present inhabitance). As such, international support for Zionist claims to Palestine were facilitated, in part, through the acceptance of the existence of a Jewish nation despite their global diaspora and cultural variation. No doubt the claim to nationhood was hideously abetted by Hitler -- where international awareness that Jews were persecuted as a people, legitimized their claim to peoplehood and, by definition, to a 'homeland'. Zionism was not so much an off-shoot of imperialism (although this was also a factor) as it was the result of the hegemonic perception of legitimacy which nationalist ideology engenders.

If Said's remarks are considered in context of Portugali's perspective, it becomes clear that the 'distinction between civilized and non-civilized people' is an ideological off-shoot of the social order dictated by nationalism. Thus, 'non-civilized' peoples were those who were outside the order parameter (i.e., were not established nations) and consequently had no legitimate 'rights' to land, or to place. Maxime Rodinson (1973) clearly captures this interpretation when he speaks of Zionist indifference to the Palestinian natives:

...there can be no doubt that if the ancestral homeland had been occupied by one of the well-established industrialized nations that ruled the world at the time, one that had thoroughly settled down in a territory it had infused with a powerful national consciousness, then the problem of displacing German, French, or English inhabitants and introducing a new, nationally coherent element into the middle of their homeland would have been in the forefront of the consciousness of even the most ignorant and destitute Zionists (Rodinson, 1973:39).

Imperialism -- a 'natural' manifestation of nationalism's precepts of legitimacy -- imposes an a priori delegitimization of non-nationalized peoples and thus strips them of their rights to place. For those who were thusly 'enslaved' by the experiential reality of subordination, the consequences were not only exploitation but also the awareness of a 'sense of backwardness' (in comparison to the 'advanced' imperialist power). As Horowitz elucidates:

...the sense of backwardness is a profoundly unsettling group feeling. It means that strangers are 'wrenching from one's own people mastery over their own fates'. To entertain such a feeling is for group members to be subject to anxiety-laden perceptions of intergroup relations and to pressure to end the state of backwardness by transforming their personal qualities.

At the same time, the unflattering images of group characteristics generated by the comparison give rise to powerful efforts to use the political system for the confirmation of group worth. An effort to understand the politics of group comparison must begin with the subjective quality of group sentiment (Horowitz, 1985 :167).

This point is connected back to the earlier discussion with respect to legitimacy, group status and individual self-esteem. It also clearly articulates the psychological processes involved in Ross' (1980) third stage of ethnic mobilization (i.e., where the externally imposed and internalized subordinate image is redefined by the group in positive terms) and relates this mobilization explicitly to the political goals of post-colonial societies.⁶⁶

Although Horowitz clarifies in detail the way in which colonial rule transformed and structured inter-group relations (and perceptions of group status) it suffices to note that politics became the essential vehicle of group status because the state became the ultimate allocator of prestige, and because the state, as arbitrator of ethnic relations became the "focal point for ethnic claims. ...The imprimatur of government is therefore indispensable to satisfactory ethnic status..." (Horowitz, 198 :217).⁶⁷

⁶⁶. Recall that Ross' (1980) perspective defines ethnicity specifically in politically mobilized terms.

⁶⁷. Of course Horowitz's comments easily mesh with Portugal's notion of the combined diffusion of both ideas and structures which 'enslaved' the rest of the world to conform to a nationalist order parameter.

By integrating the notion of group status into this discussion, it is suggested that neither the process of imperialism nor post-colonial ethno-nationalisms can be properly understood via class analysis alone. Thus the process of subordination is not considered to be driven by economic determinism such that ethnicity is relegated to an epiphenomenon of a class struggle. Rather, 'subordination' involves social and psychological (as well as economic) realms because the subordinate culture/society is delegitimized as a whole, i.e., subordination transcends internal class differences. The perspective presented here, therefore, does not consider ethnic/nationalist strategies to be strictly related to their utility as an organizational vehicle for rational (interest-based) goal-attainment (i.e., an ethno-national movement is not reducible to a form of elite-manipulated interest-group politics).

This is not to deny that elites and leadership play an important role in sparking and channeling the energy of the masses during ethnic mobilization.⁶⁶ Nor is it to deny Weber's observation that nationalism, by providing a common consciousness, can transcend class divisions within a state and thus be an effective vehicle for control (especially of

⁶⁶. Ross' (1980) model specifically considers the quality of leadership to be a vital proximate variable influencing the transformation from the subordinate minority stage to the mobilized group.

the working class).⁶⁹ Rather, it is to suggest that Weber's observation concerning the unity which nationalism invokes should be considered as equally relevant to both the internal process of nation-building, and to the external process of domination (i.e., imperialism) of entire societies which were delegitimized by the order parameter of nationalism (i.e., delegitimization involved the negation of the entire society, irrespective of class differences). Indeed, as Anderson (1988) notes, Weber was aware that part of the appeal of nationalism lies in its inherent relationship to the status of the group:

Part of its appeal, as Weber was aware, was that the nation is a type of status group, where, unusually, the status 'superiority' is available to the lower orders in the national community if its nationalism claims superiority over other nations...and...as ...in the case of social imperialism, it can offer economic as well as psychological rewards. Racism similarly can offer status 'superiority' to the bottom as well as the top of an ethnically defined community and, not surprisingly, ideologies of national and racial superiority sometimes go hand in hand (Anderson, 1988:36).

⁶⁹. Anderson's (1988) comments are worthy of note in this regard: "...why is nationalism effective in furthering class interests?... Nationalism's ability to unite people with conflicting class interests is geographically-based in the most general sense that people who share the same territory frequently have at least some interests in common simply by virtue of spatial proximity. This degree of commonality may in fact be very partial, but it can be inflated by dominant groups so as to obscure fundamental conflicts of interest. Less abstractly, nationalism has a partial basis in the political fact...that subordinate groups may achieve real benefits from independent statehood, and it has a basis in spatial aspects of economics and culture" (Anderson, 1988:30). By the perspective developed in this paper, this statement would be modified slightly to suggest that, for those 'native' people's who are without a state, the "interests in common," and hence nationalist cohesion, attain greater perceptual and experiential significance via the external domination incurred upon the natives because they lived in this piece of territory.

By adopting the 'situationalist' position that 'objective' circumstances catalyze the formation and structure the 'phenotype' of group identity and mobilization, it is not intended to deny the subjective reality of the sense of peoplehood. Similarly, in accepting Portugali's arguments that nationalism is false consciousness in no way belies the subjective reality of national identity and its relationship to the individual's self-esteem.⁷⁰ Given that nationalist ideology has generated world order, it has created in its wake historical identity groupings which were fashioned out of the self-negating experiences of rejection, labelling and subjugation by dominant groups in the outside world.

As earlier chapters have stressed, therefore, the emotive and non-rational nature of national movements must be considered in relation to the need for positive self-identity of the member nationalists. Ethno-nationalist movements, through the appropriation of history and the articulation of the 'myth of ethnic descent', imbue elements of a culture with symbolic meaning to foster the bonding of individuals--who were not organized in the way which the established order demanded--to the group. Bonding occurs because membership in the 'group' offers the delegitimized individual (with an imposed and internalized negative

⁷⁰. Indeed, as alluded to earlier, nationalisms which emerged through traumatization (i.e., whose sense of political and emotional peoplehood was mobilized through external domination and subordination) such as that of the Jews and of the Palestinians have far more 'legitimate' (legitimate in the Burtonian sense, as a necessity for the individual member's sense of positive self-identity and security) claims to nation and need for place than do those people (with states) who conform to the dominant order.

self-identity) both a history and an identity which restores the individual's sense of self-worth. Thus, membership in the group acts as a psychological coping mechanism to combat subordination. Group membership becomes a vehicle through which 'legitimacy' can be internally restored to the individual via the external mobilization of the group (in a form considered 'legitimate' by the established social order, i.e., as a 'nation').⁷¹

To attempt to summarise the exploration of group formation and mobilization which this paper has undertaken, the following integrative propositions are suggested:

1. Individuals strive to attain a positive social identity, which can become 'terminally' linked to identification with a group (i.e., Tajfel, Epstein).
2. Group identity is likely to become an individual's terminal identity when it is negatively imposed from without. That is, an individual's identification with a group will become primary when he/she is ascribed to a group (on the basis of birth, or because his society lies outside the dominant global order parameter) and is then treated (by other groups, or the dominant society as a whole) on the basis of this ascription and not on the basis of individual attributes or potential (i.e., Ross, Portugali).
3. Individuals whose lives are governed by their ascription to a sociological group which is structurally marginalized (socially, economically and psychologically), will come to identify psychologically with group members through the shared trauma and symbolism of subordinate status (i.e., Epstein, Ross, Portugali).

⁷¹. It should be carefully noted that group mobilization has the potential to achieve much more than psychological catharsis: mobilization potentially may achieve the alteration of those structural conditions which are perceived to have effected subordination in the first place, (i.e., the intifadah, while of great psychological significance, may catalyze the eventual realization of Palestinian statehood)

4. Group formation and mobilization involves both external and internal processes and is precipitated by a history of imposed (relative) subordinate status. This subordination, in turn, implicates an asymmetrical social/economic/political structure (Epstein, Ross, Horowitz, Portugali).
5. Ethno-nationalist mobilization is not driven by primordial drives. Rather, through external subjugation (which catalyzes a common consciousness) and the attempt to redefine group status, cultural 'markers' are imbued with positive symbolic significance (Epstein, Smith, Ross).⁷²
6. Ethnic nationalism should be distinguished from other forms of nationalism by its territorial referent (Richmond; Portugali). Identity needs and territorial interests, in this sense, are perceived to be inseparable.
7. A situationalist explanation of a particular ethno-nationalist mobilization should be developed in historical relation to the diffusion of nationalism as a generative order -- in terms of both its informational content and its material structuring of reality (Portugali).

The significance of these propositions for understanding the process of group identity formation and mobilization will be explored in the following chapter on Palestinian identity. Due to constraints of length and time, this exploration will not attempt to validate the individual propositions. Rather the emphasis will be on the ontogeny of Palestinian ethno-nationalist mobilization with a view towards highlighting the inter-connective process that enfolds all seven of the above propositions.

⁷². It should be noted that this proposition specifically rejects Durkheim's notion of accepting "social facts as things" such that the "objective criteria of culture are treated as constituting concrete reality, and as carrying their own meaning" (Rawkins, 1984:92). Rather, following Epstein (1978), the salience of cultural diacritica for political mobilization are seen as emergent symbols which must be invested with meaning.

CHAPTER FIVE:

PALESTINIANISM AND THE POLITICS OF BEING

Every Palestinian is born with a problem which he shares with other Palestinians. It is both subjective and objective: subjective in the sense that it concerns his existential being, and objective because it is the result of a number of historical and socioeconomic facts (Moughrabi, 1977:68).

The goal in this chapter is to examine the emergence and evolution of Palestinian identity in terms of the concepts and propositions developed earlier. In so doing, certain complexities of the Palestinian experience which emerge from the specific history of the Palestinians will be highlighted. What follows, then, is a cursory exploration of the way in which the displaced Palestinians have become psychologically shackled to a piece of land and to each other. More specifically, the process of Palestinian identification and mobilization will be examined in order to concretely illustrate the latent relationship between identity-needs and land which has been nurtured by the generative order of nationalism. Given the theoretical concerns of this paper, Palestinian nationalism will not be explored from the perspective of elite driven politics.⁷³ Rather the narrow identity-framework employed here shall focus specifically on elucidating Horowitz's question: "Why do the followers' follow?". As such, the narrow goal will be to arrive at a clearer understanding of 'Palestinianism' (i.e., the process and meaning

⁷³. Studies elucidating the role of elites in Palestinian politics -- a most useful perspective to highlight certain aspects of the collective identity -- have already been comprehensively conducted (e.g., Muslih, 1988).

of Palestinian identity).

It is anticipated that this analysis will furnish insights about certain dimensions of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict itself, which are relevant both in theory and in praxis.

Although the perspective of this paper demands the analysis of identity in terms of the interplay of both external and internal processes, the emphasis here will be on internal processes. That is, the analysis to follow will focus on the subjective essence of Palestinianism: on the existential reality of being Palestinian, as perceived by Palestinians.⁷⁴

This chapter will not present a compendium of 'objective' facts that 'prove' the structural subjugation and subordination of Palestinians: 'empirical' analyses of the Palestinian 'objective' situation have been conducted in other works, some of which will be referenced in the following pages. Rather, the external events which have impinged upon and altered the Palestinian interpretation of reality will be referred to in summary fashion, merely as 'signposts' in the ongoing process of identity-evolution (Appendix 1). The purpose is to present history as the Palestinians see it, for it is this perception which is a political reality -- a political fact -- and one which should be entertained by

⁷⁴. The rationale for this particular lens is found in the aforementioned quote by Horowitz: "An effort to understand the politics of group comparison must begin with the subjective quality of group sentiment" (Horowitz, 1985: 167).

anyone interested in the diminution of conflict in this region.⁷⁵

5.1 INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

The following question is raised when trying to understand the coherence of Palestinian national identity...across ghourba and time: Where did their shared experience intersect at a common center that they ... place in Palestine?

We distort the question as we ask it, since we are endowing the Palestinian experience with a structure when in fact it is a process. Had the Palestinian experience had a structure, then this structure would have disintegrated -- with the third generation born in exile -- by force of time and the stress of socialization in host countries. The Palestinian experience has been, all along, a process -- a process of relatedness that is transmitted, both physically and metaphysically, from father to son, from generation to generation (Turki, 1981:377).

Of the formidable difficulties which impinge upon a study such as this, perhaps there are two which are outstanding: firstly, the ephemeral and multifarious nature of identity and, secondly, the intricate complexity of factors which besiege Palestinian social and political history.

With respect to the first complication, the preceding conceptual exploration has suggested that the process of coping with imposed minority subordination can lead to a variety of individual or subgroup responses to restore positive self-identity: 'ethnic' mobilization (or nationalism) is not an inevitable response to subordination. Rather,

⁷⁵.The sources for the study are defined by this goal and, as such, will be drawn mostly from Palestinian voices, or from secondary sources based on Palestinian views.

depending upon external circumstances (most notably the degree of control exercised by the more powerful group), various strategies to deal with the material and psychological dissonance of negative status may be pursued, for example: the denial of affiliation with the 'inferior' group (where this is phenotypically possible) or intra-group differentiation to enhance relative status.⁷⁶ The latter of these can be especially prevalent when already existing intra-group cleavages (such as class and religion) provide potential identity-groups which are alternative to the 'nationalist' group.

Adding to the possibilities for the variation of response of individuals and sub-groups within the collectively defined minority is the second problem -- namely, the consequences of the 1948 dispersion of the Palestinians to different geographical locations. Thus, with the 1948 founding of the State of Israel on 78% of the historic land of Palestine, approximately 60% of the 1.4 million Palestinian Arab population became refugees⁷⁷:

Between 83% and 93% of the inhabitants of the areas now occupied by Israel were uprooted and sent into exile. Most of the refugees crowded in with the original residents of the Gaza Strip, under Egyptian administration, and of the West Bank, which was formally annexed to Jordan in 1950, while additional numbers settled in Syria, Lebanon, and Transjordan, or even farther afield (Sayigh, 1987:28).

⁷⁶. Evidence of this is found in the intra-Palestinian social discrimination such as in the post-48 period between Gaza refugees and the original occupants of Gaza.

⁷⁷. Statistics quoted are drawn from Sayigh (1987).

In the wake of the 1967 war, when Israel occupied the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, a second round of concentrated dispersal occurred. Approximately 300,000 persons, many refugees for the second time, fled to Jordan:

The whole of Palestine was now under occupation ... Israel ruled over 1.5 million Palestinians: 1 million inhabitants of the so-called 'Occupied Territories' of the West Bank and Gaza, and 0.5 million 'Israeli Arabs' in Israel proper. By 1986 the captive population had grown to 2 million, with another 2.5 million Palestinians in the Diaspora (Sayigh, 1987:29).

Even though most of those uprooted were dispersed within the 'Arab world', there was abundant (negative) intra-Arab social differentiation between host and refugee.⁷⁸ The different geographical subgroups of Palestinians were exposed to a barrage of differing legal ('external') conditions in each Arab host country -- most of which were restrictive -- which, in turn, shaped a variety of 'internal' (identity) responses.

These complications are compounded because of the Palestinian relationship to the broader Arab national question and the dynamic role which Palestinians played in intra-Arab politics -- a role which was both manipulated by Arab states' self-interests and which was reciprocally appropriated by Palestinian self-interest to manipulate the support and behaviour of Arab states.⁷⁹

⁷⁸. Even within areas of historic Palestine itself, intra-Palestinian discrimination was evidenced, "since some Palestinians lived in camps while others lived outside" (Kossaifi, 1980:13).

⁷⁹. See, for example: Sayigh, (1987); Aruri and Farsoun, (1980); Smith, 1986.

will be considered to correspond (with the appropriate modifications) to three respective stages in Palestinian history. Thus, if one looks very broadly at the historical sweep of the events and crises which permeate Palestinian history, it is possible to discern the emergence and (on-going) transformation of the collective Palestinian identity.

In pre-Zionist Palestine, the overriding terminal identity of the individual was more regional and 'cathected' to the village or tribe, within a larger sense of Arabism and Islam; up until 1948, the seeds of Palestinian particularism were planted by the ideology of nationalism and the Zionist encounter. However, collective terminal identity along the lines of encompassing Palestinian-peoplehood was absent.

In the period after the 1948 crisis, the common experience of imposed collective subordination (regardless of geographical location) precipitated a collective identity-crisis (as evidenced by the name which the Palestinians give to this time -- the period of 'burial' and 'non-existence') and further forged both Palestinian differentiation from their 'Arab brethren' and the self-perception of Palestinian solidarity.

The 1967 defeat of the Arab armies, coupled with the heroic stance of Palestinians at the Battle of Karamah, precipitated a positive re-definition of Palestinian identity (which they call the period of 'rebirth') such that they collectively reasserted psychological control over their destiny and embraced a strategy of collective mobilization to

Although these multi-faceted variables cause the empirical study of Palestinian sociology to defy neat analysis, they in fact work in favour of the identity-framework which shall be explored here. Thus, despite the fragmentation of the experiential reality of Palestinians as a people and despite the infinitude of individual and subgroup identity-driven 'responses' to this variegated Palestinian reality, there clearly emerges a process of psychological collective identification and of collective mobilization along the lines of national identity. As Nakhleh and Zureik elucidate:

This geographical heterogeneity and dispersal, however, are counteracted by shared aspirations for liberation and self-determination. Regardless of geographical boundaries, place of origin, occupation, class interests and religion, Palestinian communities, on the whole, seem to share a cohesive world-view, incubated successfully during the last thirty years. With regard to the shape of their future, they have developed their own self-definition which unites them. While they might (and do) differ concerning the content and final thrust of the self-determination idea, they share in the imperativeness of self-reliance, the precariousness of their state, and they have developed an amazingly uniform perception of self (Nakhleh and Zureik, 1980:11).

What is of interest here is this striking historical process of identity consolidation -- the enfoldment of thousands of individual experiences into the self-definition of Palestinianism which has transcended the factionalization of class, religion and ghourba (Arabic for 'exile'), and which has mobilized the nation.

The analysis shall be largely framed by the developmental model put forth by Ross (1980) with its three stages of identity mobilization: communal, subordinate, and 'ethnic'. Very roughly, these three stages

attempt to throw off the realities of subordinate status. This mobilization has continued to propel behaviour, despite various externally imposed efforts to control or traumatize its national expression (i.e., the 1982 invasion of Lebanon). Such efforts have caused the momentum of action to wax or wane accordingly but have not and will not be able to prohibit its eruption. Indeed the present-day intifadah is the latest - and perhaps most pervasive -- expression of this same identity-driven process.

It is imperative to clarify that such 'slotting' of the emergence and transformation of Palestinian collective identity is not to obscure the dynamism and fluidity of the internal process of group identity-formation as it articulates with external circumstance. It is not something which has happened neatly or in linear fashion but is a pattern which has emerged from a halting, vacillating process. That a pattern has in fact emerged, is a function of the structuring of this process by the manifest and latent functions of the hegemonic ideology of nationalism. Thus, actions carried out through the prism of nationalism were inflicted upon the people who lived in Palestine thereby caused their delegitimization, and legitimized the dispossession, the persecution and the oppression of the pockets of Palestinians in exile. In this way, the latent consequences of nationalist ideology structured the cohesive essence of 'Palestinianism' as the following passage from Turki (1981) suggests:

If being needs to interact with other being to achieve self-definition, consider the ontological realities that offered

themselves to Palestinians following their exodus from Palestine: statelessness, outsideness, alienation, oppression, exclusion, destitution and the rest of it. All of which triggered the emergence, ultimately, of a struggle for national liberation -- surely the ultimate expression of man's dialogue with history...

All the past and existing, as well as conceivable, values in the life of a Palestinian derive from his struggle as a Palestinian. Being a Palestinian more than being an Arab, Man, an intellectual, a Muslim or Christian, a professional, an ideologue, and the rest of it, is the subsystem that is in a leading positional value in the Palestinian human identity (Turki, 1981:380).

In this way, the ideology of nationalism also acts to structure the 'existential discontent' of Palestinians, both focusing and mobilizing their solidarity on a common symbol and a common goal -- Palestinian statehood.

This hypothetical interpretation will be explored further in the cursory examination of the subjective reality of Palestinian historical experience that follows. The necessity for brevity limits the depth of this analysis but should allow for the illustration of the broad interplay among identity needs, collective mobilization and the 'dialectics of space' which have engendered the emergence of Palestinianism and which underpin the essence of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

5.2 PRE-1948: THE GREAT REBELLION -- NATIONAL IDENTITY?

Palestine and the Palestinian people each becoming an extension of the other, transiting together across the three great stages of their modern history. The Arabs of Palestine. The refugees of Palestine. The Palestinians of Palestine. Mythically, al-Mojahedeen, al-Moattreen, al-Fedayeen. Literally, the fighters

of the faith, the oppressed wanderers and the sacrificers for the people. (Turki, 1973: 7).

The Great Rebellion which shook the Palestinian countryside throughout 1936-1939 certainly demonstrates a mass mobilization of the populous. Although the protest was 'national' in that all sectors of the Palestinian population took part and although sectors were united in their opposition to the Mandate policies and Zionist intentions, this should not be misconstrued as an action propelled by a sense of Palestinian national collective identification. Although Zionism (being a movement that was born of, and was now striving to conform to, the 'order' dictated by nationalist ideology) infringed upon all those who lived in Palestine as a collective, the threat was not clearly perceived in these terms. Rather the perceived 'threat' was conceived variously as a threat to 'Arabism' and/or to Islam. Appropriately, the superordinate basis for identity-group mobilization tended to be either Muslim^{oo} and/or pan-Arabism.

This response must be understood in historical context. The pre-48 period was witnessing the beginnings of the enfoldment of the region and of established social relations by the order of nationalism. However,

^{oo}. Mobilization based on the Islamic concept of jihad did not exclude Christian interpretation nor Christian participation. For explanation of this rather complex issue see Johnson (1982). An interesting corollary to Portugali's thesis of nationalism as a generative order is that state-centered nationalism has enfolded and enslaved the social order of Islam. Although this proposition would require a comprehensive study in its own right, it could be supported by some of the insights elucidated in Johnson's (1982) study, Islam and the Politics of Meaning in Palestinian Nationalism.

the territorially bounded 'national' identity-group was historically meaningless in this area, with individual status and 'terminal' identity being experienced in various sub-regional and stratified social groupings. Thus, while the common opposition of the population often gave the appearance of unity, "class differences and their accompanying divergences in perspective made for different definitions of appropriate action. The goals were identical but the means to the agreed upon ends were varied" (Johnson, 1982:35). The fragmentation which characterized the response to the common threat of Zionism can be interpreted as a function of the dual properties which the order of nationalism embodies -- the informational content (i.e., spiritual and 'scientific') and the 'dialectics of space' (i.e., material). Thus, the traditional cleavages within Palestinian Arab society were exacerbated through the vacillating process of enfoldment by the nationalist order; while the elites tended to be exposed to and to work within the informational content of the ideology,^{*1} the peasants were exposed to the manifest realities of the 'dialectics of space'.^{*2}

In 1516, Palestine became a province of the Ottoman Empire but this did not interrupt the essential Arabism with which it had become infused

*1. For the elites, the informational content of nationalism tended to underpin the 'scientific' basis of the Arab nation -- hence the focus on pan-Arabism, which was nurtured by opposition to Ottomanism in the wake of the Young Turk's Revolution (i.e., for Turkish statehood).

*2. Thus, as will be elaborated, it was not until the experience of dispossession and subordination in exile (after 1948) that the elite class experienced the reality of the dialectics of space and that the peasant class came to identify with the informational content of nationalist ideology.

by the end of the seventh century. Palestinian society was predominantly Arabic speaking and was comprised mainly of Sunni Muslim with a numerical minority of Christians, Druze, Jews and Shi-ite Muslims. By the early stages of Zionist immigration to Palestine (after 1882), approximately 64% of the indigenous populous were village farmers (most of whom were tenants on land belonging to feudal landlords). In addition, there was a "respectable Palestinian intellectual and professional class [and] the beginnings of small industry," (Said, 1979:12).

Although there was awareness of inhabiting the province of Palestine, identity-groupings did not tend to be inclusive or exclusive on the basis of this administrative territorial boundary. There was no overriding sense of Palestinian particularism. Rather, as one Palestinian explains: "We were the Arab representatives in Palestine" (Zommo, 1988).

Until 1948 they did not constitute a group possessing any sort of crystallized ethnic identity...Actually, the differences between the Palestinians and the bordering peoples of the region were less obvious than the differences within the Palestinian population itself. This was so despite the fact that from World War I onward certain indications of a separate political identity began to be obvious, based on the Palestinians' particular historical experience of their struggle against the British Mandate on the one hand and the Zionist Movement on the other (Haidar, 1982: 1).

Thus pre-48 Palestinian society was divided vertically and horizontally and was characterized by noticeable regional differences and stratifications that held both social, economic and political significance. Cohesiveness was maintained through an inverted pyramid of

relations whereby the broad base of the population was connected, via a class of notables, to the Ottoman administration.⁸³

For the individual, then, self-esteem would be tied to one's place and role within this very rich social fabric. The renowned intra-communal rivalries (be they based on membership in clan or village) may be considered as manifestations of various forms of terminal identity-groups vying for relative status. Status definition (and therefore rivalry) tended to be intra-class. The notables vied for communal leadership roles and for positions within the Ottoman administration; the peasants, besides social allegiance, tended to derive status from their villages -- which were extremely particularistic.⁸⁴ Thus, although the "broadest identifications tended to be religious...within this cultural community socioeconomic divisions were paramount in determining relationships" (Miller, 1985:16).

It was during the nineteenth century that the generative order of nationalism began to enfold the dynastic organization of the Ottoman

⁸³. As Miller (1985) notes: "The villager who needed help in negotiating government demands turned, directly or indirectly, to notable patrons [who] were members of... families that had achieved wealth, distinction, and power in the empire. Their position was based on control over land and access to government offices, both secular and religious. Such prominent families usually lived in the cities... Political and economic relationships thus remained embedded in layers of the community defined by family, religion and region."

⁸⁴. Sayigh (1979) comprehensively presents the reasons for the tenacity and overriding preeminence of the peasants' personal identification with the village. With respect to the status and rivalries of the elites, Johnson (1982), gives a succinct overview.

Empire. It is evident that the process began with the spread of the informational content of nationalism which catalyzed an "unsuccessful attempt to make the concepts of an Ottoman nation and a vaguely defined Ottoman fatherland the foci of political loyalty" (Muslih, 1988:78).⁵⁵ This unity was eroded in the wake of the Young Turk's Revolution in 1908 when Turkish national particularism invoked a similar response among the Arabs. The biography of Musa Alami is revealing on this account:

From this time onwards Faidy Alami's [Musa's father] diwan, and similar gatherings all over the Arab provinces, were the scene of endless discussions about the future of the Arab people.-...some of the younger ones, especially students from Constantinople who had seen the Young Turks' racial policies in operation, were more inclined to heed the ideas of Arab Nationalism...: if the Turks wanted an all-Turkish Empire, they argued, how could the Arabs with their proud heritage, remain second-class citizens in it? Thus were sown the seeds of a definite movement for the liberation of the Arabs from Turkish domination...(Furlonge, 1969: 38).

Arab nationalism (which was based on a perceived sense of ethnic unity given coherence through the 'scientific' informational content of nationalist ideology) was dealt a blow at the end of World War I as territorial divisions were imposed by Mandate Authorities. From the Arab perspective, this division was artificial, for there was no 'natural' identity between culture and the new state boundaries. The

⁵⁵. Muslih, (1988) points out that although the Arabs had a distinct awareness of their ethnic and cultural uniqueness within the Ottoman enclave, this did not strain their bond to the idea of Ottomanism mainly because of the common overriding identification with Islam. The biography of Musa Alami, a Palestinian notable of the early 20th century, suggests that the loyalty to Ottomanism also stemmed from perceived racial equality within the empire (cf., Furlonge, 1969).

imposed government by territory, instead of government by community, meant that traditional social organizational conceptions (i.e., of local community embedded in a larger cultural affinity) had to be vastly altered: "The general population of Palestine...were now faced with the need to redefine their community as more extensive than the immediate environment but more limited than an empire" (Miller, 1985:4).⁶⁶

With the pan-Arab ideal concretely sundered, the Arab political elites (in Palestine, Iraq and Syria) were now faced with two forces: "the push of Arab nationalism and the pull of local nationalism" (Muslih, 1988:84). For the Arabs in Palestine, Zionism meant that the pull of 'local' conditions was radically different from that within the boundaries of Syria or Iraq. However, the push of pan-Arab nationalism meant that Zionism was often perceived as a threat to Arabism, and not

⁶⁶. It is in the light of the 'scientific' designation of 'nation' that we can perhaps make some sense of the seemingly perverted slogan of the Zionist movement which was uttered by Golda Meir: "There are no Palestinians." Thus, by 'scientific' and 'objective' indicators, the Palestinian Arabs were culturally part of the Arab nation at the time of the Zionist incursion. Thus according to (the false consciousness of) nationalist doctrine, the Palestinian Arabs could (should) live in the 'Arab State', with assimilation being no problem. Because the Palestinians were not organized as a nation, their claims to territory were negated, and their rights as human beings were severely circumscribed. The phrase which Herzl popularized -- Palestine was a 'Land without a People' -- is a perfect example of the interpretation of reality through nationalist ideology. Those anti-Palestinians, who presently pursue the erroneous argument that Palestinian national identity is merely a 'myth' created for political convenience, are also operating through this ideological lens (identity is considered to be a primordial 'structure' with no regard for identity as a process). Underlying this argument is the notion that Palestinian claims to the land are illegitimate because Palestinians are not a 'real' nation or were not a 'real' nation at the time of their dispossession. The sterility and 'false consciousness' of such an interpretation of reality is highlighted by the perspective in this paper.

just as a threat to 'Palestinians'.

Although there was considerable popular feeling against Jewish immigration to Palestine in the early part of the Mandate (both inside and outside Palestine -- see Sulaiman, 1984), that opposition took a variety of forms which tended to coincide with social, economic and educational factors. This variation in response was, in part, related to the differential impact of Zionism on the different segments of the society.

Muslih (1988) details elite perceptions of the Zionist threat during the early part of the Mandate and suggests that, in fact, there was a generational split. The older generation (who had been loyal Ottomans) conceived of Zionism as a direct danger to Palestine in particular (that is, to the traditional hegemony of their leadership in this area) and hence favoured Palestinian 'nationalism' as an appropriate response.⁶⁷ The younger generation (who saw the chance 'to climb the political ladder' in Syrian-Palestinian unity) "championed the cause of Arab nationalism, believing that the victory of the new ideology would not only secure Arab unity and independence, but also prevent the implanta-

⁶⁷. The 'Palestinian' strategy favoured by the traditional elite should not be viewed as a new and revolutionary form of national consciousness. Rather, this strategy was the epitome of conservatism, in that the elite were acting to conserve their traditional position at the top of the pyramid of local authority. Thus, their function would remain the same as it had in the Ottoman Empire -- they would continue to act as the intermediary between the population and the government, with the only difference being that they now would report to British (mandate) officials as opposed to Ottoman officials.

5.3 C External Factors of Refugee 'Otherness'

...with the establishment of camps, the 'otherness' of the Palestinians was concretized in a particularly humiliating way. Now they were marked out as 'different' by a special identity (refugee), special areas of residence (camps), special restrictions on movement, special schools and -- most humiliating of all -- U.N.W.R.A. rations. Their ambiguous status as transients whose stay became ever more permanent, crystallized around the stereotype of 'refugee.' Gradually their abnormality came to be accepted as their special fate (Sayigh, 1979:126).

For a variety of reasons, the host countries decided to deal with the influx of refugees by housing them in camps or shelters. This decision alone laid the foundations for spacial isolation and social differentiation. Furthermore, social-structural differences between Palestinian society and that of the three principal host countries added greatly to the isolation of the refugees. Palestine's fellahin were predominantly Sunni Muslim, with a much lesser representation of Christian and Druze and a small number of Bedouin. In Jordan, the bulk of the population was nomadic or semi-nomadic Bedouin.¹¹⁷ In Syria and Lebanon, the peasant class was predominantly composed of minority sects other than Sunni (especially Shi-ite, Druze and Maronite Christian). As Sayigh (1979) elucidates:

...the majority of the refugees found themselves cut off by religious differences from their fellow peasants. In the

¹¹⁷. Hamid (1988) whose parents were from the region of Haifa, but who took refuge in the West Bank in 1948, and fled to the East Bank in the wake of 1967, relates how the Jordanians were perceived as extremely backward in the eyes of the Palestinian refugees. It was very humiliating for the 'more advanced' Arabs of Palestine, from their highly organized villages, to become refugee 'tent dwellers' and to be ruled over by bedu tribesmen (cf. also, Aruri and Farsoun, 1980; Mishal, 1978).

mass of people (Johnson, 1982:57).

The 'pressure which choked the mass of people' was largely the socioeconomic fallout incurred by British administration policies in conjunction with the Zionist settler regime.⁹⁰ It was the peasants, more than any other segment, who were first exposed to the 'dialectics of space' inherent in the order of nationalism: "Land sales, expulsion from their land, alienation in urban areas, and abject poverty in the slums of the cities put an intolerable weight of oppression on them... expulsion of peasants meant not just the end of their means of livelihood, but the collapse of a world-view"(Johnson, 1982:51).⁹¹ Palestinian Arab workers also experienced problems because the exclusivity of Jewish labour policy meant that as immigration increased, so did Arab unemployment (cf., Zureik, 1979).

Thus, through their own harsh experience, the Palestinian peasants came to the same conclusion that their leaders had arrived at through ideational analysis of Zionism and exposure to the informational content of nationalism. However, 'nationalism' as a concept was not within the world-view of the peasant. Any embryonic sense of national selfhood within the popular consciousness was still superseded by subregional cross-cutting ties in an overall sense of Islam: "Palestinian society at

⁹⁰. For discussion of these socio-economic consequences of Mandate policies and Zionism see Zureik, 1979; Miller, 1985; Sayigh, 1979.

⁹¹. See also, Miller, 1985. Miller details that in reaction to this material and psychological incursion, peasants acted in a variety of ways in order to pursue individual self-interests (i.e., to increase position and esteem of the self, or of sub-groups).

this point was still one with little sense of itself" (Johnson, 1982: 99).

The peasants' frustration and desperation prompted their participation as the backbone of the militant resistance and popular uprisings which occurred sporadically throughout the 1920s. Early acts of resistance were catalyzed by evictions which indicates that "what they feared, and with reason, was the intrusion into their relationship with the land of a group with closer access to Government than themselves" (Sayigh, 1979:45). However, the Wailing Wall demonstrations of 1920 and rebellion of 1929 were slightly different. Both had peasants as major participants but their mobilization en masse was orchestrated by the elites who acted through the manipulation of Islamic sentiment with respect to the religious significance of the Muslim Holy Place.⁹²

Johnson's (1982) excellent analysis demonstrates how the urban elite intertwined Islamic and nationalist symbols to mobilize the populace for their own ends: "The 1920s...saw an attempt by the Palestinian [notables] to use Islamic belief and institutions to further their own brand of Palestinian nationalism...they pursued narrow class interests

⁹² Sulaiman, (1984) notes that it was not until after the 1929 Wailing Wall disturbances (the al-Buraq events) that the wider Arab public (i.e., in the rest of Arabia) began to express concern for the fate of Palestine. It was at this time that various Islamic societies and papers took up the cause, "arousing Arab public opinion, on the grounds that the holy places in Palestine were in danger" (Sulaiman, 1984: 47). No doubt this attention had been focused by the Mufti (al-Husayni) of Jerusalem's intensive information campaign, which had stressed this very issue, targeting audiences outside Palestine in the hope of rousing support and of enhancing his personal status and international prestige.

brand of Palestinian nationalism...they pursued narrow class interests to the exclusion of wider national concerns, and used Islam as a major means to their ends" (Johnson, 1982:29).⁹³ Johnson's analysis of the evolution of the symbolic content of Islamic ideation in Palestinian political culture finds that, at this time, the elites were employing Islamic symbolism in a way which was directed more towards the Islamic elite of other countries rather than to the Palestinian peasant population. However, after 1929, this tendency was gradually transformed such that Islamic concepts became infused with a more truly populist expression. This transformation was to provide the ideological basis

⁹³. Thus a Palestinian interviewed by Sayigh reveals that the Mufti of Jerusalem, Hajj Amin al-Hussayni, had more influence among the masses because of the religious factor: "The Hajj's men used to mobilize people by telling them that those who sold their land sold their religion, or that Jews were atheists. The villagers responded to slogans like these more than city people. The peasants were the ones who fought" (Sayigh, 1979:55). Similarly, Johnson, (1982) notes the power imbued to al-Hussayni through the Supreme Muslim Council, because of their complete control over all mosque personnel in the country. The mosque personnel served as the primary interpreters of ongoing events and therefore "served as a major ideological lens through which the largely illiterate population...comprehended the world. The Friday sermon...often played the role of not only interpreting events in the country but making explicit the religious duties of the populace with regard to those happenings. This was a powerful tool in the hands of the traditional elite and provided a ready means of mobilizing the people...(Johnson, 1982:18). This elite domination through nationalism is an example of how class interests can be served by nationalism (see Anderson, 1988; and discussion in Chapter Four).

for sustained mass participation in the Great Rebellion of 1936-1939.⁹⁴

The period from 1929-1939 saw accelerated upheaval on the economic and political front for the Arabs who lived in Palestine. It is estimated that, by 1931, 20,000 peasants had been expelled from the land which was sold out from underneath them, and many others who were left with very small tracts of land found it impossible to support themselves (al-Kayyali, 1979:290). The sub-elites of Palestine found themselves in an "economic wasteland: peasants without land and workers without jobs. These tensions, and the sense of frustration and alienation that they fostered, found no outlet and little prospect for resolution within the existent socio-political framework of Palestinian Arab society" (Johnson, 1982:35).

The result was a growing disaffection with the traditional ruling

⁹⁴. Johnson considers the elite use of the Islamic idiom to be in the form of an "elaborated code" of meaning. Elaborated codes are characteristic of social organizations with weak boundaries where the group has little influence over the individual. However, this elaborated code of Islamic ideation gradually shifts away from elite monopoly of this code -- beginning in the period after 1929 -- to the "restricted mode," which is characterized by highly communalized symbols where "'we' rather than 'I' is emphasized" (Johnson, 1982:96). The restricted mode of symbol and metaphor suggests a highly cohesive group with strong boundaries and definition in which the group has a powerful influence over the individual. The notion of the restricted code is highly relevant to this study for it is clear that over time, the Palestinian 'code' (Palestinianism) has become exceedingly condensed and implicit, and reflects the growing solidarity of Palestinians as a social group. Johnson's study demonstrates this process by showing the highly restricted use of Islamic symbolism in the post-67 nationalist idiom. In a more general sense, both Fawaz Turki and Edward Said (among others) have ascertained the 'irreducibly private' meaning (i.e., understandable only by Palestinians) of many events in the Palestinian experience.

class as it became clearer to the disenfranchised that their 'leaders' had been pursuing selfish interests, "to the detriment of those for whom they spoke" (Johnson, 1982:99).⁹⁵ As such, during the 1930s, a slowly emerging sense of popular solidarity began to take hold: "This emergent identity erupts among various classes in the rebellion of 1936-39 which if not specifically anti-notable in ideology, can be interpreted, especially among the peasantry, as a vote of no-confidence in that class's ability to lead an effective resistance to occupation" (Johnson, 1982: 99).

It was this slowly emerging popular consciousness that was catalyzed into action by the words and deeds of the Muslim cleric and exiled Syrian, Shaykh Izz al-Din al-Qassam.

After being chased out of Syria by the French, Qassam began to organize the displaced persons who had taken refuge in the shanty-towns outside of Haifa. Qassam called for a jiḥād, a holy war, to fight off both the British and Zionist settlers. However, Qassam was equally critical of the traditional Palestinian leadership: "He was contemptuous of the conservatism of the Arab Executive and he criticized the Supreme Muslim Council for spending money on mosques rather than on weapons" (Lesch, 1979). Qassam's platform found many willing ears among those who had been victimized by the 'dialectics of space', but it was Qassam's martyrdom, in 1935, which "had an immediate, unforeseen and

⁹⁵. See also Sulaiman, 1984 for ample evidence that this 'disaffection' with the class-centered interests of the Palestinian effendi was widely reflected in the Arab poetry of this time.

extremely profound impact on the Palestinian masses, and served as a catalyst for the revolt against the British" (Johnson, 1982:32).⁹⁶

Johnson's analysis of Qassam's impact with respect to mass mobilization is insightful with respect to the conceptual framework which this paper has derived. Thus Johnson casts Qassam's appeal in terms of his ideological leadership of a 'redemptive social movement' -- a movement which proposes a redefinition of existing oppressive conditions and contains strategies to alter those conditions by engaging in a process geared to the "restoration of socio-cultural integrity" (Johnson, 1982:31).⁹⁷ This process clearly approximates Ross' developmental model of identity-based mass mobilization.⁹⁸ As such, it is worthwhile to quote Johnson at length with respect to his interpretation of the mobilization of Palestinians by Qassam's call to Jihad for the homeland:

...the reasons for the effectiveness of an Islamic vehicle for this redemptive process are clear. There is no doubt that the idea of national interests -- even the idea of nation itself--

⁹⁶. Although many Palestinian historians do not clearly link the influence of Qassam with the start of the 1936 rebellion (which did not erupt until a year later), both Johnson (1982) and Porath (1974) consider his influence to be central. In more concrete terms, Johnson observes that both stages of the Great Rebellion (in 1936 and again in 1937) were sparked by provocative actions committed by close followers of Qassam.

⁹⁷. The term 'redemptive' is highly fitting here because the Arabic concept fida (redemption) was increasingly used by Palestinians at this time as a self-description of their political activities (cf., Johnson, 1982).

⁹⁸. The main difference between the two approaches is that the Johnson's framework is selectively religious whereas the Ross framework is much more general, and suggests that the locus of mobilization is usually a function of the definition of that locus by the more powerful oppressor (cf. Chapter Three).

was foreign to the Palestinian peasant. The very name 'Palestine' was new and uncomfortable, as witnessed by the references to 'Southern Syria' as an appellation for the country in this and earlier periods.

Ties of faction, clan and religion remained of great importance to the mass of Palestinians...these...had no utility as a symbolic armature on which to mold an ideology for mass resistance...Islam, however, was highly appropriate; faced with a foreign enemy of two different religions who sought domination over the second holiest land of the Faith, Islam provided the cultural categories, in the conceptual field of jihad to encompass and organize resistance. Qassam's creed demanded popular resistance as a matter of conscience, indeed morality, for the Muslim population. The way to redemption -- to the restoration of personal and cultural integrity and stability-- lay in participation in the jihad... The fractured society of Palestine in this era found renewed articulation in Islam for it wove together the greatest number of threads in the lives of those who were the most oppressed (emphasis added; Johnson, 1982: 58).

Thus Qassam's movement married the concepts of struggle for the faith and struggle for the homeland. In this way, Qassem's movement provided a sense of purposeful collective action for those who had been victimized by the 'dialectics of space': the individual was given the idiom through which self-esteem could be restored. This idiom was populist Islam and was much more powerfully relevant to the situation of the masses than either kin, faction or secular nationalism.

Johnson considers Qassam's movement to mark a "turning-point in the nature of Palestinian politics" -- a "cultural and historical juncture" (Johnson, 1982:31). Indeed, Qassam's lasting significance is found in the contextual meaning with which he infused the Islamic term jihad. Thus, the Egyptian poet Ahmad Muharram in 1939 considers that the revolt in Palestine had clarified the intent and meaning of the word jihad:

Palestine! you have taught other countries the literature of Jihad; which so far was obscure.

Thus the book you have written is unique of its kind
(Muharram, in Sulaiman, 1984:71).

If considered in the framework developed in this paper, the semantic transformation of this Islamic term from a meaning only relevant to social relations to one in which social relations and territory are intertwined clearly exemplifies the process of enfoldment of the Islamic order by the generative order of nationalism.

An in-depth analysis of the events and the eventual denouement of the Great Rebellion are not necessary for the purposes of this overview. It is sufficeient to note that the uprising began with spontaneous outbursts which were undirected by the elites. The peasants both led and carried the revolt, although it was marked by strong cooperation between the guerillas and the villagers.** The violence and unrest was not in the interest of the urban elite whose status was often intertwined with the government and yet they could not disaffiliate themselves from the rebellious masses that they were supposed to represent (cf., Abboushi, 1977). Thus, the traditional leadership 'ran to catch up' -- to try to control that which they had no part in catalyzing (except in the negative sense of disaffection). The elites were therefore forced to unify "in order to present a semblance of unity to

** . For example, by mid-1938, the towns people had traded in their Turkish headgear (the tarbush) for the peasant kufiyah. "This was partially a symbolic recognition of the nature of the revolt by townsmen (sic) and a show of solidarity, partially a means of camouflaging peasants from the eyes of the authorities and partially an imposition of the peasant rebels on the townsmen" (Johnson, 1982:51).

the Mandate administration and to their own people" (Johnson, 1982:52). Thus serious rifts were blanketed with the formation of the unified Arab Higher Committee which called for a 'national' strike in order to involve all sectors of the populace in action designed to put pressure on the British to change their policies with respect to Jewish immigration. However the fallacious unity of the Arab Higher Committee led to elite infighting over rebellion tactics which, when combined with the powerfully persuasive methods used by the British to crush the revolt, finally quelled the resistance after three tumultuous years:

In the end, it lost a great deal of support from those who had been its prime-movers -- the peasantry. Responsibility for this loss of support was put squarely on the shoulders of the faction leaders...Though beginning as a populist revolt, its death came about as a result of attempts to exploit it by the elite for their own ends -- ends which ultimately served no one (Johnson, 1982:52).¹⁰⁰

To conclude the overview of this period in the evolution of Palestinian identity, it is suggested that the 1936 Arab Revolt was not a

28. The Revolt became increasingly chaotic after the British imprisoned or exiled any political leadership which had been in existence (i.e., by 1937). Then, after the first 'armistice' (which had been negotiated via a request from Arab leaders outside Palestine), a solution was announced by international authorities: partition of the country. This was perceived in Palestinian eyes as a completely ludicrous non-concession and the violence became more uncontrolled and intense. It would appear (but would require another study to 'prove') that in the face of total frustration, and inability to act effectively in the totally asymmetrical power relationship, the "rebellion gradually turned inward...Arabs began shooting Arabs" (Abboushi, 1977:4). Though part of this intra-aggression resulted from the repressive measures employed by the British authorities, it was also a function of rebel bands aligning themselves with the factional infighting of the elites. This latter behaviour could be interpreted as the attempt by sub-groups within a subjugated populace to enhance self-esteem through intra-populace comparison and rivalry (cf., Horowitz, 1984 and earlier chapters of this paper).

state-centric 'national' movement (i.e., it was not focused by a sense of shared Palestinianism) but was rather a popular rebellion. The masses were mobilized psychologically through the perceived idioms of Arabism (i.e., waged by the Arab nation) and Islam (i.e., in order to protect the 'Holy Land').¹⁰¹

It is clear that any sense of 'national' allegiance among the masses was conceived in the non-exclusive framework of Arab identity.¹⁰² Furthermore, it was suggested that those whose space became bounded and mandated were experiencing the imposition of organization demanded by the order of nationalism. The enfoldment of the traditional web of social relations by this 'generative' order resulted in its differential impact on certain sectors of the society. The elites tended to work within the informational content of nationalist ideology (hence, their belief and faith in the Arab nation and desire for pan-Arab territorial unity), whereas the mass of the populace was exposed to the expulsion and/or negation incurred by the 'dialectics of space'. Thus, although the newly imposed 'order' (in conjunction with British imperialism and

¹⁰¹. This combination of 'nation' and 'territory' -- the two essential elements of nationalist ideology and order -- were the only two which were comprehensible within the world-view of the masses (and the elites) at the time. Although the imposed boundaries were 'false' in terms of the socio-cultural perceptions of the natives, the experience of territorial dispossession necessitated and precipitated a much more manifest 'territoriality' than was previously known under Islamic organization (or the dynastic organization of the Ottoman Empire).

¹⁰². This perception was, of course, also reinforced by the vigorous vocal support provided by the other Arab states and by the participation in and rebel leadership of the Revolt by Arab volunteers which "swarmed" into Palestine from Syria and Iraq at the start of the uprising (and again in 1948).

Zionist settlement) incurred 'national' traumatization, it was not clearly perceived as such nor reacted to in such terms by those being most affected.

The 1936 revolt did plant the seeds of Palestinian particularism-- even if only in the form of bequeathing later generations with the 'myth' of the Mojahideen as the first demonstration of resistance which was carried on the backs of the those who lived in Palestine (even though it was cast as a pan-Arab and Islamic cause). However, it was not until the next stage in Palestinian history -- expulsion in 1948 and exile in Arab lands (with the attendant process of collective intra-Arab discrimination) -- that identification with Palestinianism gradually began its ascent to terminal consciousness among the dispossessed.¹⁰³

¹⁰³. With respect to Ross' framework, it would appear that identity groupings within the land of Palestine were indeed organized along communal lines. However, external factors (Zionist immigration/colonization and the British Mandate) bombarded these traditional group boundaries, inflicting various degrees of subjugation on different sectors of the population. This differentiation functioned to exacerbate the factionalization of the society (i.e., the 'us' and 'them' polarization was not clearly defined). However, as shall be suggested in the section to follow, the imposition of territorial boundaries in this period acted to structure and impose the template of group identity boundaries which would emerge. This process of collective identification required the incubation of exile, when collective subjugation became more clearly defined as particular to Palestinians (rather than to 'Arabs' or to 'Muslims' or to 'peasants').

5.3 1948-1967: THE PERIOD OF PALESTINIAN 'BURIAL' AND 'NON-EXISTENCE'

In the year 1948 Israel became a state and I became stateless. For the next twenty-five years Israelis were building a nation and I was inhabiting a world of nothingness in which I experienced no halcyon period, no moment when my very essence as a man was not negated and my very rights as a human being were not dismissed. In 1948 the world applauded the creation of a Jewish homeland in Palestine. I was a Palestinian, and the Jewish homeland was being established in my country, at the cost of displacing me and creating in us all a nation in exile (Turki, 1973:23).

I have spent a restless part of my growing-up years trying to define my status in this world of nothingness that I have been forced to inhabit; I have searched for human and political resolutions for the reciprocal nexus that binds the political to the existential in my reality (Turki, 1973:23).¹⁰⁴

In 1948, with the founding of the state of Israel, the Arabs who lived in Palestine experienced the first hijra -- the first flight en masse from their homes and homeland -- to become dispersed throughout the Arab world, within the new Israeli state, and elsewhere. For many, this marked the beginning of life in exile.

¹⁰⁴. The perceptions of Fawaz Turki are relied upon rather heavily in this section. This should be considered justifiable given the illustrative purposes of this paper. Turki, himself, suggests: "Though I am the product of a specific Palestinian experience -- not shared by every man and woman of my generation -- of growing up in a refugee camp in Beirut, living in the slums of the city, acquiring a street education and then criss-crossing the Arab and Western worlds in a rootless and frenzied hope of escaping the intolerable pressure simply of being-- the experience itself is none the less cogently Palestinian. Every Palestinian, whether experiencing the terrors of third-class citizenship in Israel, the persecution of military rule in Jordan, or the exclusion from the mainstream of...most of the Arab world, was driven by the same force, motivated by the same tension, devastated by the same anguish. It was a strikingly...communal experience that cut across class lines" (Turki, 1973:4). In addition, George Hismeh stated in a review of Turki's 1972 work: "...both the author and the reviewer share many of the experiences and incidents mentioned in the book" (Hismeh, 1972). Edward Said (1988) also affirms the underlying commonality of experience shared by Palestinians everywhere.

This paper suggests that the period from 1948 to 1967 corresponds to Ross' (1980) second stage in the process of identity group mobilization, i.e., the subordinate minority stage (which implies objective and psychological subordination of the less powerful 'group' corresponding to a negative status which is imposed from without). Although 'subjugation' (and mobilization) is observable prior to 1948, and certainly continues after 1967, it is during the 1948-1967 period that the diacritica for subjugation become more manifest and result in a clearer definition of the locus for group identification (and eventual mobilization).

As such, the critical point of the 1948-1967 period is that the individual's experience was such that the psychological seeds for identification with Palestinianism (as a terminal identity) were planted during this time. This process of identification may seem like quite an incredible feat, given that geographic dispersion was now added to the traditional sectarian/ class rifts which had characterized the social relations of pre-1948 Palestine. Dispersion meant that the pockets of Palestinians in exile were not exposed equally to a common oppressor, i.e., the manifest source of the oppression of Palestinian refugees tended to vary as a function of the policy of host governments. Thus, with respect to the notion of 'us' and 'them', the 'thems' were all different, a situation which would suggest little basis for a cross-region 'cathectic' bonding of 'us'. However, as the theoretical exploration of this paper has suggested, the refugees from the land of Palestine were collectively subject to the latent and systemic 'common

oppression' of the generative order of nationalism. It was this 'order' which structured their collective marginality (by dictating the actions of Israel and of the Arab regimes) and in so doing, acted to structure the process of individual/collective identification and group boundary formation of the Palestinians.

The conceptual notions of this paper indicate that the subordinate minority stage of (eventual) Palestinianism should reveal itself in the interactive relationship among three different levels: micro (i.e., individual self-esteem), middle (i.e., group status) and macro (i.e., the dominant ideology of the system which filters the individual/group's perception of status and legitimacy). More specifically, Palestinians should perceive that their individual and collective experience of this time contained the following elements:¹⁰³

1. Subjugation (in both 'objective' and psychological terms) is experienced by the individual and perceived to result from ascription to the subordinated group.

Like many Palestinian kids...I grew up with violence and exclusion and alienation as I grew up with my skin. I grew up knowing and resenting the fact that I was the member of a persecuted minority. I grew up to be reminded every day, as it were, that I was a Palestinian, as if sensing there was something wrong with my identity. And I grew up to become more Palestinian than I had been when I left Palestine, (Turki, 1973:24).

2. The group identity (Palestinian) is infused with externally imposed

¹⁰³ After each of the 'elements' listed, there follows a supporting quote which indicates that this 'condition' was indeed experienced and/or perceived on the part of Palestinians. Because 'Palestinianism' is considered to be first embraced by those 'in exile', most of these supporting quotes are taken from 'exiled' sources.

negative connotations.

Identity -- who we are, where we come from, what we are -- is difficult to maintain in exile. Most other people take their identity for granted. Not the Palestinian... It is not only that we are regarded as terrorists...we are known for no actual achievement, no characteristic worthy of esteem, except the effrontery of disrupting Middle East peace... There are no Palestinians. Who are the Palestinians? 'The inhabitants of Judea and Samaria'. Non-Jews. Terrorists. Troublemakers. DPs. Refugees. Names on a card. Numbers on a list (Said, 1986: 16 and 26).

3. Individuals engage in efforts to shore off this label and negative identity (i.e., strategies which involve attempts to buttress self-esteem through methods which do not involve group mobilization).

The pressure of being a Palestinian, of being a child growing up in an absurd world, becomes intolerable...It is unbearable to be different from others. I come home one day affecting a Lebanese accent, I do that, driven by an inner force, to tell the world, to tell the heavens, that my world was too painful. I want in on theirs...(Turki, 1973:10).

4. Likewise, sub-groups attempt to enhance their status within the subordinated group (i.e., unable to escape the negative label imposed upon their group by more powerful external groups, sub-groups pursue intra-group differentiation in order to enhance relative status).¹⁰⁶

...the host populations labelled them [the refugees] as inferiors... Even within the Palestinian population of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, residence in the refugee camps was a sign of lowermost status. One of the accepted ways of insulting a man in those areas was to say that 'he looks like a refugee' (Haidar, 1982:10).

5. There emerges a growing perception of the link between the individual/group's negative status in the world and the loss of land -- between identity and territory (i.e., the 'spiritual' and 'territorial' components which are melded together in the hegemonic ideology of nationalism).

If I was not a Palestinian when I left Haifa as a child, I am

¹⁰⁶. This process is based on Tajfel's Social Identity Theory and the notion of relative status.

one now. Living in Beirut as a stateless person for most of my growing up years, many of them in a refugee camp, I did not feel I was an Arab, a Lebanese, or...a "southern Syrian." I was a Palestinian. And that meant that I was an outsider, an alien a refugee and a burden. To be that, for us, for my generation of Palestinians, meant to look inward, to draw closer, to be part of a minority that had its own way of doing and seeing and feeling and reacting...

Mine is an existential problem having to do with the yearning for my homeland, with being part of a culture, with winning the battle to remain myself, as a Palestinian belonging to a people with a distinctly Palestinian consciousness (Turki, 1972:8).

For the Arabs who remained under Israeli rule, these six indicators of subordinate status are also highly evidenced; however, subjugation was experienced (and perceived) as stemming from the collective status ascribed to 'Arabs', (i.e., not to 'Palestinians') which resulted in intensified Arab identification. This process of divergent collective and self-perception of the original inhabitants of Palestine (and their descendants) clearly illustrates the notion of identity as an internal process which is highly responsive to external impingements such as subordination imposed by a more powerful group.

The defeat of 1948 was considered a tragedy (ma'sa) "not only for the Palestinians, but for the whole Arab world, and by some even for all

of Islam" (Sulaiman, 1984:88).¹⁰⁷ Nationalism was still largely voiced in non-state centric terms with Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir (Nasser)'s pan-Arab sentiment dominating the Arab political scene. As Nasser's prestige reached an all time high (largely as a function of external events such as the 1956 aggression against Egypt by the 'imperialist powers' of Israel, Britain, and France, and the 1958 experiment in Egyptian-Syrian unity), Arab masses, including the Palestinians, had high hopes that Palestine would be liberated by Nasser's efforts.¹⁰⁸

What was the meaning of 1948 for the Palestinians? In concrete terms, the bulk of the native inhabitants of Palestine became penniless refugees largely because many had fled their homes with only the clothes on their backs. They assumed that they would return once the

¹⁰⁷. Political ramifications resounded throughout the Arab world: Syria was plagued by a series of coups d'etat; King Abdullah of Jordan was assassinated in Jerusalem; the prime minister of Lebanon was killed during a state visit to Amman; King Farouk of Egypt was overthrown, the monarchy abolished and replaced by a military junta lead by Colonel Nasser; the Iraqi royal family was assassinated. Sulaiman (1984) notes that: "It is clear from the names of those who led these coups and revolutions that they were all officers who had participated in the fight of 1948 and had tasted the bitterness of defeat" (Sulaiman, 1984: 89). While certainly it would be worthwhile to explore these upheavals using the concepts developed in this paper, such a monumental task is not attempted here. Rather, it is merely suggested that the enfoldment of the region by the generative order of nationalism -- with the artificial imposition of territorial boundaries resulting in the development of 'national security states', probably contributed to this intense socio-political unrest.

¹⁰⁸. Palestinian faith in pan-Arabism gradually diminished as the latent contradiction between organic Arabism and the reality of the state system became more manifest. As Mustafa Zommo, a Canadian Palestinian from Gaza relates, "We thought for sure that Nasser and the Arabs would win it for us. This was a mistake I think"(Zommo, 1988).

hostilities were over.¹⁰⁹ In 'spiritual' terms, the Palestinian people found themselves "suddenly in exile...afflicted by defeat, hunger and humiliation, repudiated by men, despised by host countries and forgotten by the world, left to live as pariah refugees, their disinherited souls empty of hope and devoid of meaning" (Turki, 1972:16). As the experiences of one 1948 refugee caused him to state: "[in] twelve hours we had been changed from dignity to humiliation" (in Sayigh, 1979:85). Sayigh (1979), based on her extensive interviews with camp residents in Lebanon, summarizes the impact of 1948 on the 'Generation of the Disaster' (i.e., those who fled Palestine in 1948):

Apart from the harsh conditions of the first few years, there was the psychological trauma of separation from homes and property. The village -- with its special arrangement of houses and orchards, its open meeting places, its burial grounds, its collective identity -- was built in to the personality of each individual villager to a degree that made separation like an obliteration of the self. In describing their first years as refugees, camp Palestinians use metaphors like 'death', 'paralysis', 'burial' and 'non-existence' ...Thirty years after the Uprooting, the older generation still mourns, still weeps as it recalls the past. The passion of their attachment is shown in the way the old people make their children to promise to re-bury their bodies in Palestine, after the return. The same word hajj, is used for visits to Palestine/Israel as for the pilgrimage to Mecca (Sayigh, 1979:107).

This citation suggests that the profound psychological impact of dispossession and negation of identity was perceived through the

¹⁰⁹. Many refugees locked their doors and pocketed the key, fully expecting to return to their homes. Indeed, there has arisen almost a 'key cult' among Palestinians, as these keys -- now symbols of the native rights to Palestine -- are passed on to the generations born in exile. (Zommo, 1988; Shehadeh, 1986). For Palestinian perception of the events of 1948 and the flight from Palestine, see Sayigh, 1979: 64-98; Chacour, 1984.

individual's cathexis to his/her specific home/village and the land of Palestine.¹¹⁰ In the wake of their loss of home and homeland came a barrage of material and psychological difficulties which were to become imprinted in innumerable different ways on the lives of individuals who had once been the majority in the land of Palestine. Although there was not yet a shared sense of collective Palestinian consciousness, there was an awareness that, as individuals and sub-groups, they had been collectively subjected to the 'dialectics of space'. Thus, despite the traditional reality of social fragmentation and despite the new reality of geographical dispersion, the shared perception of alienation precipitated the convergent forging of a collective Palestinian consciousness; having no place was to become the defining characteristic of who they were. This collective identity came to transcend the barriers of class, distance and differences of biography between exiles. In this way, Palestine was to become the nexus of Palestinianism.¹¹¹

¹¹⁰. An integral point revealed by Sayigh's citation is the subjective meaning of the 'Return'. To the generation of 1948, the 'Return' was grounded in the memory of specific material possessions which were usurped (i.e., homes, lands, orchards, etc.). Although connected to the aspects of status and dignity, the Return was conceived in concrete terms -- return to their homes and villages, and way of life. However, this concept of the Return was transformed through the process of alienation which became manifest in exile. For the generation born/brought up in exile, the Return became stripped of material memory allowing the metaphysical meaning to be increasingly salient: "All of us speak of awdah, 'return' but do we mean that literally, or do we mean 'we must restore ourselves to ourselves'?" (Said, 1986:33). The transformation of meaning in the concept of the Return (and its relation to statehood) shall be discussed further below.

¹¹¹. As the order of nations and states came to solidify the social order of the region, the goal to Return to Palestine became more concretely perceived as the Return to a Palestinian state.

The Palestinian poet, Yusuf al-Khatib writes:

By the end of the disaster year [1948]...the earth took two forms in the eyes of the Palestinian Arabs: "prison" and "exile." "Prison included all land which came under the Israeli flag, while "exile" included all lands elsewhere (al-Khatib, 1968).

Sulaiman (1984) notes that these words by al-Khatib "should not be underestimated, since [they] encapsulate a feeling which, since 1948, has been increasing among Palestine Arabs wherever they live" (Sulaiman, 1984:118). It is the growth of this feeling of alienation (i.e., perception of being a subordinate minority) which will be explored below -- beginning with those "in exile" and followed by those "in prison."

5.3 A Exiled in Arab Lands: The Mask of pan-Arabism and the Reality of States

The irony of my plight was that as I grew up my bogeyman was not the Jew ...nor was he the Zionist...but he was the Arab. The Arab in the street who asked you if you'd ever heard the one about the Palestinian who... The Arab at the Aliens Section who wanted you to wait obsequiously for your work permit, the Arab at the police station who felt he had a carte blanche to mistreat you, the Arab who rejected you and most crucially, took away from you your sense of hope and sense of direction...To the young Palestinian, living and growing up in Arab society, the Israeli was the enemy in the mathematical matrix; we never saw him, lived under his yoke, or, for many of us, remembered him. Living in a refugee camp and going hungry, we felt that the causes of our problem were abstract, and causes of its perpetua-

tion were real (Turki, 1972: 53).¹¹²

It was suggested in the pre-1948 segment of this paper, that the Arabs of Palestine did not have a cohesive sense of overriding Palestinian particularism. The Palestine problem tended to be perceived as an Arab problem -- a view that was probably reinforced by the battle of 1948 which involved the participation of external Arab armies and was ensconced in pan-Arab rhetoric. The cultural appeal of Arab nationalism served to mask the Palestinian victimization of this period and continued in the post-48 period to permeate the nascent boundary of Palestinianism:

For a long time after 1948 -- for many until 1967 -- faith in ultimate Arab victory continued to exercise a pacifying effect on the Palestinian masses, creating a mood of patient, loyal waiting rather than one of anger and action. From the beginning, the 'Arabization' of the Palestinian struggle had always carried the danger that the delusion it gave of strength would deflate the Palestinians' own capacity for struggle (Sayigh, 1979:68).

Although the subordinate plight of the Israeli-Arab was

¹¹². Turki's bitterness at the Arab world in general is perhaps more pronounced than in the mainstream of Palestinian opinion. Palestinian hostility towards their 'Arab brethern' tended to be more reserved for the Arab regimes than for the 'Arab man in the street'. However, social discrimination was much more intense in Lebanon (where Turki grew up) than in the other Arab states (cf., below), and Turki's life history (e.g., 1972:41), proffers telling personal incidents which obviously provoked his anger and his perceptions. Also of import here is Turki's reference to the young Palestinian. There was, very clearly, a generational split with respect to identity -- the younger generation who were born or grew up in exile most definitely identify more closely with Palestinianism than their parents who had lived in Palestine. This point is critical to the whole notion of identity as a process, and will be elaborated more fully in the discussion to follow.

officially recognized, that of the exiled refugees was culturally disguised. For outside observers, especially those working within the 'scientific' view of nationalist ideology, the cultural unity of 'Arabia' suggested that the easiest 'solution' to the Palestinian problem would be to settle the refugees in the various Arab states. As Turki bitterly recounts:

...at that time, someone dubbed us 'the Arab refugees' and argued that the Arab refugees were Arabs anyhow; they shared with other Arabs their language, culture and traditions. And like the hungry peasants who were urged to eat cake in the absence of bread, we were to be resettled in underpopulated regions in host countries...

...What people did not know and understand, and what people still do not know and understand, is that for us to have done that would have been for us to negate our very essence...(Turki, 1973:23).¹¹³

In fact the majority of Palestinian Arabs were considered and considered themselves to be 'aliens' in their Arab countries of refuge. Indeed, modern Palestinian poetry is replete with this theme, suggesting that "any argument that the Palestinian refugees would gladly and easily settle in other Arab countries but for the evil schemes of their leaders and politicians is a misrepresentation of the genuine feeling of Palestinians" (Sulaiman, 1984:119).

¹¹³ Suggestions that the 'Arab refugees' be resettled in Arab lands impose a structure upon identity, rather than looking at identity as a process of being and becoming. In so doing, such arguments totally negate the human element of the Palestinian tragedy, and the psycho-social and material reality of post-1948 which nurtured the process of Palestinianism.

The reason for the firm desire not to be resettled in Arab lands is intimately linked to the whole process of the growth of Palestinianism. As such, both internal and external 'factors'¹¹⁴ are involved. A cursory examination of certain of these elements shall help to clarify both the nature of Palestinianism as a process and as an identity which was to become the basis for group mobilization in 1967.

5.3 B Internal Factors for Palestinian Refugee Non-Integration:

Although we lived in Arab states, we looked upon our situation there not only as temporary but as being in the ghourba, an alien country. The ghourba is now part of the mythology of the Palestinian psyche, difficult to isolate and identify, but in those years directly after 1948 the word meant simply to be physically outside one's homeland. As the years rolled by, the ghourba acquired added, mystical significance of meaning not only to be detached from Palestine, but also from the mainstream of things that governed other men's lives. The ghourba meant to have the painful experience of being an alien in an alien place -- whether this was an Arab country adjacent to Palestine or elsewhere in the world (Turki, 1973:24).

The class-based differences which had characterized pre-1948 Palestine continued to differentiate Palestinian experience in exile. Many of the urban Palestinians, because of their skills and previous trade connections, managed to 'fit in' to their new situation, more or less, and to build new lives for themselves. The initial adaptability of the urban skilled and intelligensia was further salved by their ideological belief in Arabism (i.e., the informational content of

¹¹⁴. It is critical to note that the internal and external 'factors' discussed are not discreet entities, nor are they related in a cause-effect pattern. Rather they are interactive processes which become increasingly interdependent and complex over time.

nationalism).¹¹⁵ However, as previously elucidated, "it was absolutely out of the question for the huge peasant class of Palestinians to forget its roots in the land, and to settle elsewhere. The fact that they had been displaced by violence only increased their determination to return" (Sayigh, 1979:124).

In the period immediately following 1948, the refugees considered no alternative to their predicament other than the return to their homes and livelihood. Thus, they opted to suffer in refugee camps for what they anticipated would be a temporary interim until such time as they could 'Return'. Because the exodus from Palestine tended to be en masse (i.e., whole villages), the pattern of camp settlement also contributed to the incubation of eventual Palestinianism -- large parts of the same village would settle in a camp, thereby enabling the continuation of Palestinian-village relationships and values. Thus, the "social

¹¹⁵. The degree to which the urbanite exiles 'fit in' became increasingly diminished as a result of the socio-political processes of the years following 1948 and especially after the rise of Palestinianism in 1967. Those who managed to secure material wealth were not as physically victimized as those who were relegated to the camps, nonetheless, they were/are subjugated to what both Turki and Said have called "persecution by permits" as well as to 'structural violence' (which prohibits any political status to protect their economic achievements) and the resulting psychological stigma of alienation and negation (cf., Sayigh, 1977). There is a plethora of evidence that the Palestinians view their problem not as an essentially socio-economic problem (although it is this in part) but as an existential problem which transcends the chasm of class. Thus, Suliaman (1984) cites evidence from the writings of four different Palestinian writers who have found material security in the United States, Iraq and the Gulf States, but who all lament their status as exile and refugee. Individual Palestinian citations which testify to an overriding concern for the restoration of dignity through the Return (i.e., statehood) rather than for material concerns can be found in: Sayigh, 1979; Moughrabi, 1977; Kuroda, 1972; Epp and Goddard, 1976; Said, 1979, 1986, 1988; to name but a few.

structure of each camp was in itself effective in shutting its residents off from the outside world" facilitating both seclusion and social isolation (cf., Haidar, 1982:10).

The internal feeling of 'difference' was also augmented by the psychological havoc to self-esteem which displacement incurred:

A major factor in the early social isolation of the refugees was their own sense of loss and shame, which made them turn inward, shunning contact with non-Palestinians who at best did not share their abnormality and at worst would taunt them with having sold their country or fled in cowardice (Sayigh, 1979:125).

As Sayigh's citation alludes, the 'turning inwards' was largely facilitated by the hostility of the external environment, which imposed a negative stigma upon the label refugee -- a stigma which the Palestinians, because they shared the same social values as their hosts, initially internalized (cf. Haidar, 1982).¹¹⁶

¹¹⁶. Testimonies by the generation who were exiled, typically resound with depression concerning their lot after 1948 -- indicating a low self-esteem, and a tendency towards despondency which inhibits the will to mobilize (cf. el-Khateeb, 1988). This first generation was caught up in the idyllic memories of past life (in Palestine) and the desire to Return to this state of affairs. The wounds to self-esteem were deepened by the "fundamental difference in definition" between the self-image of the 'exiles' and the imposed definition of 'refugee' which was bequeathed to them by their 'Arab brethren': "To themselves, the Palestinians were a people who had struggled, and who would have resisted expulsion if they had not been starved of arms; at worst they were victims of an imperialist Zionist alliance too powerful for them, or any other Arab people to defeat. But to many other Arabs, the refugees were a burden and a problem, as well as a reminder of national humiliation" (Sayigh, 1979:108).

5.3 C External Factors of Refugee 'Otherness'

...with the establishment of camps, the 'otherness' of the Palestinians was concretized in a particularly humiliating way. Now they were marked out as 'different' by a special identity (refugee), special areas of residence (camps), special restrictions on movement, special schools and -- most humiliating of all -- U.N.W.R.A. rations. Their ambiguous status as transients whose stay became ever more permanent, crystallized around the stereotype of 'refugee.' Gradually their abnormality came to be accepted as their special fate (Sayigh, 1979:126).

For a variety of reasons, the host countries decided to deal with the influx of refugees by housing them in camps or shelters. This decision alone laid the foundations for spacial isolation and social differentiation. Furthermore, social-structural differences between Palestinian society and that of the three principal host countries added greatly to the isolation of the refugees. Palestine's fellahin were predominantly Sunni Muslim, with a much lesser representation of Christian and Druze and a small number of Bedouin. In Jordan, the bulk of the population was nomadic or semi-nomadic Bedouin.¹¹⁷ In Syria and Lebanon, the peasant class was predominantly composed of minority sects other than Sunni (especially Shi-ite, Druze and Maronite Christian). As Sayigh (1979) elucidates:

...the majority of the refugees found themselves cut off by religious differences from their fellow peasants. In the

¹¹⁷. Hamid (1988) whose parents were from the region of Haifa, but who took refuge in the West Bank in 1948, and fled to the East Bank in the wake of 1967, relates how the Jordanians were perceived as extremely backward in the eyes of the Palestinian refugees. It was very humiliating for the 'more advanced' Arabs of Palestine, from their highly organized villages, to become refugee 'tent dwellers' and to be ruled over by bedu tribesmen (cf. also, Aruri and Farsoun, 1980; Mishal, 1978).

cities of both Syria and Lebanon, the population was predominantly Sunni Muslim; but even here Palestinians were cut off from their fellow Sunnis by the still profound class barriers dividing peasants from city people (Sayigh, 1979:126).

Thus, the bulk of the refugees from Palestine villages now found themselves camped on the periphery of modern Arab cities. Lacking the means for their traditional form of livelihood (land) and lacking the skills to enter the urban labour market, their economic integration into the host countries was largely barred:

Dwelling in the midst of relatively developed urban populations, they were treated as inferiors because of their sub-human living conditions [the tents of the camps] and their rural origins. The attitude was so demeaning that, for example, the residents of Sidon in southern Lebanon termed the Ayn al-Hilwa refugee camp a "zoo." There were many stories in Lebanon of children who asked their parents to buy them a "Palestinian" (as a pet)...(Haidar, 1982:10).

Socio-economic structural barriers were buttressed by the official policy of the Arab host countries. For a variety of complicated reasons, the Arab states, themselves, were reluctant and/or unable to absorb the overwhelming number of refugees from Palestine.¹¹⁰ The most profound reason of all was that the Palestinians posed a monumental threat to the various Arab regimes which were each attempting to consolidate their authority in the new order of imposed state boundaries. Although the 'refugees' of post-1948 were not (for the most part)

¹¹⁰. For example, Turki (1972:35-38) suggests that resettlement was either economically impossible (e.g., Egypt), politically difficult (i.e., Syria -- due to the instability of government), socially antagonistic (i.e., Lebanon, with its precarious balance of sectarian loyalties), or geographically doomed (i.e., Jordan).

'Palestinianized', they were highly politicized (a condition of their experiences in Mandated Palestine), causing them to 'incite' the host populations in a way which was often antithetical to the host regimes' goal of stabilization. Consequently, the 'Palestinians' found themselves facing official discrimination and often severe restriction at the hands of the Arab regimes:

Palestinians have been almost as harshly repressed in parts of the Arab diaspora as under Israeli occupation. But two vital distinctions must be made. First, it needs to be remembered that Israel was the origin of the Palestinian dispersion; it was their expulsion from Palestine/Israel that transformed the Palestinians into the 'Jews' of the Arab world, a 'people without a country', both victims and threat; their oppression followed logically from their situation as a highly politicized minority opposed to any stabilization of the status quo. Second, the Palestinians have been the target of attack by regimes, not by the Arab masses [¹¹⁹]. More than Jews in Europe, Palestinians in the Arab world have the possibility of joining with fellow Arabs in a struggle that remains predominantly Arab nationalist, anti-imperialist and radical (Sayigh, 1979:101).

In addition to this internal threat, the actions of exiled Palestinians often exacerbated external threats to the various Arab regimes and

¹¹⁹. Sayigh's analysis was conducted in 1979. It should be noted that the 'masses' in Lebanon -- i.e., the Shi'ite population -- have become highly disaffected with the Palestinians who remain in Lebanon as is evidenced by the various sieges of Palestinian refugee camps during 1985-1988 by the Shi'ite Amal militia [see for example, Cutting, (1988), whose testimony indicates that the 'hatred' of the camp residents was not limited to the militia men but was also evidenced in the villages surrounding the camps]. Of course, this disaffection was a function of the Israeli invasions into Lebanon (to retaliate against the Palestinians) which victimized the Shi'ite population almost as much as it did the Palestinians.

states -- most notably the threat (and reality) of war with Israel.¹²⁰ Pragmatism directed the Arab host-governments to preempt destabilization through the internal repression of radical activism and through the control of the 'non-nationalized' camp populations.

Aruri and Farsoun (1980) have detailed the experience of Palestinians exiled to Arab countries. They show that, although the numerical strength of the various Palestinian communities varies from country to country, the common denominator which all share is the status of political minority (even in Jordan, where the Palestinians form over 60% of the population) -- a status which is evidenced in terms of 'objective conditions':

The persistent and complex minority status of Palestinians in Arab host countries is unchanged by their varied population ratios, occupational structure, educational level, class structure or economic integration. Palestinians have become 'minorities' with the dismemberment of Palestine and remain so in the context of the continuing Palestine-Zionist conflict, the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the local and regional interests of Arab regimes. In other words, although Palestinians in Arab countries are objectively not ethnic minorities, they are treated by the regimes with suspicion and largely as subjugated minorities who are denied full freedom of action (Aruri and Farsoun, 1980:142).

It is not necessary for this present study to reiterate the contents of Aruri and Farsoun's analysis. It is sufficient to note that to

¹²⁰. Increasingly during this period and especially after 1967, the threat became that of Israeli retaliation (i.e., military punishment meted out on the territory of the Arab host state in question). The Israeli invasions of Lebanon in 1978 and 1982 are the most obvious examples of the costliness of Palestinian-led activism to the host country and regime.

varying degrees, the host governments invoked restrictions upon the exiles from Palestine which delineated them as circumscribed or subjugated socio-political minorities.¹²¹ Aruri and Farsoun's analysis of Palestinian status in this period exactly approximates Ross' (1980) subordinate minority stage -- i.e., the "minority status" of the Palestinians was not a function of size but of power:

...the Palestinians in the Arab host countries are a 'minority' in so far as they are typically subordinated to the 'majority' and do not have the ability or power to freely make their own collective decisions, have less wealth, less prestige, and much more restricted life chances than the Arab 'majority' (Aruri and Farsoun, 1980:113).

5.3 D The Process of Palestinianism:

The experience of the refugees at the hands of their 'Arab Brethren' greatly facilitated the awareness of Palestinianism as a terminal identity. With respect to their first consciousness of being Palestinian, Sayigh's (1979) survey of camp residents in Lebanon found nearly all respondents to feel the negative imposition of this identity "through specific experiences of marginality" (i.e., through various forms of social or psychological persecution) although a minority attributed their identity to the socialization received in the family

¹²¹. For additional sources documenting the persecution of Palestinians in Arab lands see: Cleveland, 1986 (general); Johnson, 1982 (general); Haidar, 1982 (general); Rubenberg, 1986 (general); Smith, 1986 (general); Epp and Goddard, 1976 (general); Ghabra, 1987 (Kuwait); Sayigh, 1979 (Lebanon); Cossali and Robson, 1986 (Gaza); Ryan and Hallaj, 1983 (Jordan); Mishal, 1978 (Jordan/ West Bank).

and community (Sayigh, 1977:24). It was this experience of collectively imposed subordination which began to psychologically transcend and override many of the intra-group identity barriers such as class. Thus, the individual's experience of exploitation "seems to them to arise primarily from the fact of being Palestinian": "what gives them solidarity is less a developed class consciousness than their common insecurity as Palestinians" (Sayigh, 1979:122; emphasis added).

The transformation of identification which brought Palestinianism into focus as the terminal identity-group of those in exile is evidenced in innumerable ways. Here, only two examples shall be presented for illustrative purposes: the first draws on the process of political marginalization which occurred in Jordan during this period and the second relates the highly revealing personal experience of Fawaz Turki as a boy in Lebanon.

Jordan was the only Arab country to grant the refugees 'full civil rights'. However, this privilege was not metted out collectively but individually in the attempt to integrate the exiles into the life of the country. Because of their numbers and their superior education, the Palestinians became the numerical, economic and technical force of the state, however, they remained a 'subordinated minority' because 'power' lay in the hands of the politically influential -- the King and his Bedouin Army. The King's actions -- in terms of his annexation of Palestinian territory and his overtures to Israel [e.g., the Rhodes land transfer deal, where the King turned over a substantial tract of

'Palestinian' land to Israel (cf., Mishal, 1978:23)] -- caused him to be perceived by exiles from Palestine as an accomplice to their marginalized fate. Hence, throughout the period since 1948, there has been an ongoing tension between actions taken in the interest of the state of Jordan and actions desired by the Palestinian citizens of Jordan who want to Return (and, in the post-48 period, wanted no compromise with Israel). As this contradiction works itself out (a process which is ongoing still today), Palestinian particularism becomes more manifest.

For example¹²², in the 1950's, Palestinians in Jordan did not form an exclusivist identity-group. It was during this time that politicized intellectual elites from Palestine joined ranks with their Trans-Jordanian counterparts to form a pan-Arabist liberal opposition to the Jordanian monarchy (i.e., against its conciliatory position vis-a-vis Israel). However, during the 1960's, as the 'order of state-centric nationalism' solidified in the region, the native Jordanian opposition was drawn into the political power structure of the state as technocrats. This resulted in driving a wedge between the Palestinians and Trans-Jordanians who had previously articulated their interests without respect to communal differences.

As the Jordanians became 'nationally' co-opted, the Palestinians became communally isolated. For the 'internal' reasons noted above, the

¹²². Once again, the 'example' provided here is presented in extremely telegraphic form. Readers are referred to Aruri and Farsoun, (1980) or Mishal (1978) for a more comprehensive treatment of the complex detail of these events.

Palestinians could not so easily shed their commitment to "oppose Israel's backers, who also were the backers of the Jordanian monarchy." This exacerbated their collective isolation, even as it acted to prohibit their access to political power within the Jordanian state and to target 'Palestinians' as fair game for repressive measures by reason of state.

Thus, although the pan-Arab opposition of the 1950s cut across regional ties, by the 1960s the "regional lines were drawn so precisely ...that opposition in the Hashemite realm became synonymous with the word 'Palestinian' " (Aruri and Farsoun, 1980:125).¹²³ These political occurrences and their ramifications were necessarily reflected in the self-perception of the opposition:

In the early 1960s, there was a reversal of the pan-Arab trend, as the Palestinian identity became an increasingly important factor in political behaviour in the West Bank, casting a shadow on the Jordanian as well as pan-Arab option (Mishal, 1978:76).

The above example could be interpreted within the context of this paper as evidence of the collective marginalization of Palestinians (through their stateless exclusion from the generative order of nationalism) which, through the common experience of subordination, fosters individual identification with Palestinian identity. Said (1988)

¹²³. Aruri and Farsoun go on to demonstrate that acts of political opposition in the 1960s in Jordan were "strictly Palestinian affairs. And it was the absence of the East Bank Factor [i.e., Jordanian nationals] from the opposition movement which paved the way for the massacre of September 1970" (Aruri and Farsoun, 1980:125).

captures this notion in his perception of the relationship between Arabism, Palestinianism and the reality of states:

We all know that we are Arabs, and yet the concept, not to say the lived actuality, of Arabism...is fast disappearing, cut up into the cautious defensiveness of relatively provincial Arab states, each with its own traditions -- partly invented, partly real -- each with its own nationality and restricted identity...

...we are Arabs, but it is the process of nationalization that excludes us: Egypt is for and by Egyptians, Iraq is for and by Iraqis, in ways that cannot include Palestinians whose immense national revival is a separate phenomenon. Thus, we are the same as other Arabs, and yet different. We cannot exist except as Arabs, even though 'the Arabs' exist otherwise as Lebanese, Jordanians, Moroccans, Kuwaitis, and so forth...(Said, 1986:34-35).

The second example of the external-internal process of Palestinianism focuses on an incident from Turki's autobiography which captures in microcosm the subjective reality of experience which leads to collective particularism. In the 1950's, Turki was given respite from his 'street education' by spending four years in a missionary-run school for refugees. During this time he joins the boy scouts and becomes:

...entranced by the idea of going on a camping trip to Cyprus that the group is organizing. For three months I make preparations to save money. I take to peddling chewing gum in the evenings again. The enchantment of the trip grips my senses. I tell the people at the camp. I tell the whole world. I am a fourteen year-old child, a boy scout, going on a camping trip to Cyprus. I am no different from other children. The tension in what this means transforms me, rules my life for three months... (Turki, 1973:8).

However, Turki and three other boys are not allowed to go. They are informed that "because [they] are Palestinians and refugees" -- because

of their stateless status -- they have no valid travel documents:

We stayed behind. I did not then understand the significance of it all other than that we were "different." We were apart, outside and beyond the reach of what other people took for granted. A subtle nuance was added to the consciousness of our culture, our Palestinianess. A schism was slowly forming in the nexus that linked us to those around us. We were going through a metamorphosis in our national psyche. We were looking at ourselves in the mirror of our Arab history, and the mirror was cracked (Turki, 1973a:24).

Besides clearly elucidating the process of imposed Palestinian differentiation, Turki (elsewhere) uses this incident to reveal the internal process of second generation Palestinian identification with the land of Palestine:

The four of us stay behind. The other kids go. We return to Palestine...Haifa now means more to me than it did to my father. It is more graphic in my mind than in his. Its image more...engulfing to me as I grow up to acquire a past of my own. . (Turki, 1973:8).

It is insightful here to explore briefly three interrelated elements which Turki's incident has touched upon: 1. The tension between the negative imposition of identity (Refugee) and the self-defined positive image (Returnee), 2. The increased importance of the Land on which this Return was focused and 3. The generational split with respect to the desire and energy to rebel as a group (i.e., to mobilize). This trio is crucial for glimpsing the interplay of group identification, territory, and the eventual mobilization of Palestinianism which was to occur in 1967.

Firstly, it is evident that Turki's negative experience was a function of his being a stateless Palestinian refugee (and was perceived as such). Through an infinitude of individual experiences such as this one, the term 'Refugee' was to acquire a private and hated meaning in the 'collective consciousness' of those who were ascribed to this status. For example, Jabra I. Jabra, a Palestinian novelist, notes:

...when anyone used the word 'refugee' with me, I was furious... On the day the Israeli state was declared I knew that the dislodged population was to be deliberately called 'refugees', that the horrific political and human issue would be so twisted that the maximum response it might elicit from a then weary world would be some act of charity, if at all (Jabra, 1979: 77-78).

Such an interpretation clearly approximates Ross' notion of 'labelling' in a situation of asymmetrical power relations in order to facilitate the control and domination of the 'subordinate' group by the more powerful group. Once again, Turki (1973) provides insight:

We began to accept the image that the outside world has acquired of us. There are words that enter our language and become naturalized. They enter our consciousness. They are written in capital letters. They narrate a whole story of a crushed people in exile. They tell of the tension inherent in the confusion of the ghourba. Refugee is no longer a word that means someone who sought refuge in a neighbouring country to wait for the guns to fall silent, for the war to end, to return to his homeland. Refugee became a loaded word that carried images you wanted to block out of your mind... (Turki, 1973:10).

However, the negative stigma which external experience bequeathed to the Refugee label was internally redressed through the notion of the Return. Thus, the generation who had lived in Palestine -- who could

still remember the feeling of non-exclusion and of belonging to an accepted social order -- believed 'reintegration' (with the human race) would only come through the Return and instilled this hope in their children, who had known only alienation:

Wait till we Return my father says. Only when we Return will we and the cosmos be restored to our preordained course... (Turki, 1973:11)

...the social structure of the Palestinian family, whose atmosphere engendered a deep and constant hope for the return to Palestine, and the official discrimination against the refugee himself, created pressures that served to perpetuate the notion in the mind of the young Palestinian that he was the member of a minority, thus enhancing his Palestinian consciousness. In his home a Palestinian child, whether born in Beirut, Amman, Damascus, would be instructed to identify himself as a Palestinian from Haifa or Lydda or any other town that had been his parents' birthplace, and his own experience would constantly remind him of this... (Turki, 1972:39).

Thus, the external experience of imposed pariahdom reinforced the image of Palestine as the place where positive identity would be restored. In the Cyprus example cited above, Turki metaphorically alludes to this process: when the Lebanese boys go to Cyprus, the four Palestinians 'Return to Palestine'. Elsewhere Turki reveals that as a boy, he used to dream of the day he would Return to Haifa "where no one would say two-bit Palestinian, because everyone would be a Palestinian" (Turki, 1972:56).

The identity of the Returnees was becoming metaphysically intertwined with the Land of Palestine -- a cathection which follows from the individual's perception that the source of all troubles springs from the fact that he (or his forebearers) once lived in the land called

Palestine. From this beginning followed dispossession, persecution, alienation and all the other inflicted negations which, although experienced at a very personal level, were also the collective experience of all others who shared victimization by birthright. As Said (1979) suggests: "In adversity and exile, national groups in nuce become national groups in fact." Thus, although the Palestinians were not (and are not) socially homogeneous, the experience of shared tragedy has provided the nexus for psychological group-identification such that: "...the principal tenets of Palestinian identity...are built upon the need for the repossession of the land and for the realization of Palestinian statehood" (Said, 1979:148). If meaning is to be derived from the suffering that the individual experiences, it cannot be severed from its Palestinian focus: "what else does the world exist for except for Palestine...For to what end is all this suffering, this sustained, neverending suffering, being borne by Palestinians if not for this end?" (Turki, 1983:10):

Because I have lived outside my country since the age of eight, Palestine has ceased to me to be a mere geographical entity. It has become a state of mind. The embodiment of my consciousness and totality of my being.

Hence, when I speak of wanting to return, I am not talking about regaining my right to live in Haifa; I am talking about regaining the right to do it, the right to regain my sense of self-worth. Embedded in the very nature of the struggle of the Palestinian people is the rejection that they be relegated to a state of national limbo, that they do not 'exist', that Palestine is not their country, that they are not human beings (Turki, 1973:25).

Given the above discussion, it is not surprising that Palestinianism

was to crystallize around statelessness and was to mobilize around the desire to 'negate the negation' of this collective trauma.¹²⁴

The power of the Return, as a psychic desire to balance the miserable reality of the pariahdom, became increasingly salient to the second generation of Palestinians -- the generation which was to become

¹²⁴. Recall the tenets of Tajfel's social identity theory whereby the individual attains a positive sense of self-worth from belonging to a group which enjoys a positive status relative to other groups. The perception of relative status is influenced by the dominant ideology of the social system, i.e., groups will mobilize to improve their relative status with reference to the dominant ideology (cf., Chapter Three). Now consider that inter-Arab differentiation crystallized around the imposition of state boundaries -- a social order that was a function of the hegemonic ideology of nationalism. Consider also that Palestinian alienation and negative exclusion in Arabia was perceived as a function of expulsion from their land. From an inter-Arab perspective, it follows that Palestinian mobilization would focus on statehood -- the 'legitimate' criterion that would improve their relative status in the Arab world (and indeed in the global order as well). It is in this light that the intensity of Palestinian attachment to the land -- especially that of the generation born in exile -- becomes comprehensible: Palestinian 'topophilia' cannot be dismissed as mere sentimental yearnings or archaic attachment. Rather the collective and structural subordination of individuals exiled from their homes in Palestine resulted in Palestinianism as a terminal identity and caused the Land of Palestine to articulate with Palestinianism at the base-level of the individual's self-esteem. Such an interpretation highlights the contradiction in John Burton's fundamental tenet of Problem-solving -- i.e., that identity needs can be separable from material interests such as territory. The analysis of the Palestinian case so far suggests that the rise of Nationalism as a generative order structured the marginalization of a sociological group (who were not organized along nation-state lines) thereby structuring the psychological process of group-identification -- a process whereby individual and collective negation fostered an intensive sense of collective identity (i.e., Palestinianism). This process of collective identification found its positive locus in the Land of Palestine, for in a global order which systemically legitimizes land (statehood) as the condition for existence, only the Return to Palestine could 'negate the negation' of imposed pariahdom.

the vanguard of mobilization.¹²⁵ It is not surprising that the 'revolution' of identity (and mobilization) occurred after two decades of "burial" and "non-existence" of the Palestinians as a people. Although there are important external factors which catalyzed the Revolution of 1967, there is also a vital internal factor. The 1948-1967 time lapse precisely coincides with the growth of a new generation which was born not of Palestine but of the camps -- a generation which was not cushioned by memories of past existence but was bequeathed only the negativity of being a 'refugee':

...for the parent generation, identity was not a problem. Whatever their suffering in the ghourba, they knew where they belonged. For the children, who only knew Palestine from their parents' descriptions, uprootedness took on a deeper, more bitter dimension. All they had ever known was the camps. The parents could remember what it was like to be citizens in their own country; their children had only known what it was like to be 'strangers', 'refugees', 'different' in the countries of others. Childhood experiences of hostility from Lebanese neighbours had imprinted on many of them a sense of exclusion, almost of pariahdom. For camp Palestinians of this generation the Revolution brought a new identity which they eagerly grasped: Palestinian, struggler, revolutionary...

Instead of being part of a despised, marginal group of 'displaced persons' Palestinians now adopted en masse the role of vanguard of the Arab revolution, strugglers against imperialism... This conscious adoption of a 'struggle-identity' encompassed Palestinians of all ages in the camps (Sayigh, 1979:166).

¹²⁵. Thus, Turki notes that his first act of violence was provoked when his paradigm of the Return was in "danger of being undermined," i.e., when UNWRA began to plant trees in the camps this action seemed to indicate that their stay there would be more permanent. Turki and the other children pulled up the trees by their roots. There are numerous incidents of similar acts of protest against either resettlement or making the camps permanent settlements (e.g., Mishal, 1978). Uprooting of UNWRA trees during this period also occurred in the camps of the Gaza Strip (Cossali and Robson, 1986:14).

As Turki elucidates, the Palestinianism of the generation which was born or grew up in exile did not begin with the remembered dispossession of 1948; "rather, the metamorphosis in our national psyche and the controlling images of our active mythology occurred when we had already acquired a past of our own" :

It occurred when the Palestinian, from the isolation of his world, asked another world that stood with its back to him: who am I and what am I in the scheme of things that seemed to govern other people's lives but not mine? When a Palestinian became aware, along the evolutionary continuum of his consciousness, of that delicate correlation between his political reality and existential concerns, of that pitch in reality that bound him to his forefathers' past, the question ceased to bristle with self-pity and acquired historical acumen. For the Palestinian proceeded to ask not who am I, but who are we? Not what is my, but what is our place in history? (Turki, 1973:3).

As the above discussion suggests, the individual and collective experience of imposed subordinate minority status in Arab lands precipitated the discovery of Palestinianism in exile. It was, to a degree, an identity which was imposed from without -- a label which was internalized through the experience and process of alienation from the rest of the Arab world. It was an identity which became 'terminal' for the individual because being identified as a Palestinian meant being exposed to a barrage of negative life experiences. Yet, even as Palestinian particularism ascended to terminal consciousness through negative experiences, so too did it become an identity which demanded to be infused with positive worth and as such would become the locus of group

3

MICRO

mobilization:¹²⁶

Dispersion had both centrifugal and centripetal effects upon Palestinian social structure and consciousness. It did not create unity, but it did create a pressure for unity as a means of changing a situation that was intrinsically threatening. In no region of the dispersion could a Palestinian feel completely secure or free. Nowhere could he enjoy full equality with nationals, except on terms of unconditional loyalty to the regime. The preservation of separate Palestinian purposes and identity became suspect, dangerous, involving penalties that ranged from loss of employment, to imprisonment, deportation and death (Sayigh, 1979:101).

In accordance with the theoretical framework developed earlier, it is not surprising that the contradiction inherent in the negative status (and daily reality) of being a 'refugee' catalyzed the active rejection of this imposed subordinate status through the redefinition of the term 'Palestinian' as a 'freedom-fighter', 'a revolutionary', 'one who struggles'. It is this process of collective redefinition and mobilization which will be explored shortly. Firstly, however, the identity processes of the Arabs in Israel will be briefly considered.

¹²⁶. That is, as the self-esteem of ego identity becomes inextricably linked to the collective (subordinate) status of the group (through external ascription), the individual's sense of positive self-worth is negated. This 'identity-crisis' stimulates a need to derive meaning from the situation, leading to a variety of individual strategies to restore positive self-worth and, as these become increasingly prohibitive, to a desire to alter individual status through the redefinition of group status (via group mobilization to throw off the inferior 'identity' and status imposed by the dominant groups).

5.3 E 'In Prison' in Palestine: Fragmentation and 'Terminal' Arabism

In Israel after 1948 the Palestinian's horizon was supplied by Zionist legality...

The irreducible reality for these Palestinians was their precarious presence on the land inside a state that considered them to be an unwelcome, but temporarily unavoidable, nuisance. The fundamental stability of their lives comes from the land or, paradoxically, from the absence of any viable legitimacy for their tie to the land as non-Jews inside Israel (Said, 1979: 126;130).

After the Palestinian exodus in the wake of 1948, only 20% of the native Arab population remained within the newly established borders of the Jewish state (i.e., 156,000 of 700,000 original inhabitants of the 1948 borders). Adding to this drastic numerical depletion was the socio-structural transformation of this newly created minority Arab population; the elite/urban population had almost completely left.

Nakhleh (1975) suggests that the demoralization of being suddenly subject to alien rule, combined with the new minority status and exacerbated social fragmentation, inhibited the formation of both corporate solidarity and national-territorial identity. Rather, "sectarian tension within the Arab minority worsened in the immediate post-48 period" (Sayigh, 1977:186).

Just as the collective terminal identity of those in exile was a function of internal and external processes, so too was the enhanced Arabism of those who remained. Internally, those who remained after 1948 continued to work within the framework of Arab nationalism:

Strictly Palestinian nationalism has not caught on very strongly among the Arab minority in Israel, probably because they did not share the same experiences with the refugees. Arab nationalism, on the other hand, never disappeared from among the Arab minority in Israel, and has become a more powerful strategy for responding to life with the Israeli Jewish people in an imposed Zionist state. Israeli Arabs, especially middle peasants, have always thought of themselves as part of an Arab nation with which they strongly identify (Kanaana, 1975: 17).

Unlike their exiled compatriots who underwent political Palestinianization in Arab lands, Israeli-Arabs were largely insulated from the negative Arabism of exile. As such, 'Pacification' through 'Arabization' lingered on for a much longer time within the State of Israel itself.

Externally, Arabism was nurtured and reinforced through exposure to the processes of the Zionist nationalism of the Israeli state. Thus, although the Israeli regime did not employ the term 'Arab' (rather other labels such as 'Non-Jews' were employed), it did employ means which often resulted in the communal isolation of Israeli-Arab citizens -- i.e., because these means were tailored to Jewish national goals as opposed to Israeli national goals. This external treatment articulated with the already internally 'cathected' sense of Arabism to enhance Arabism as the locus for terminal self-definition.

For example, the vacuous political infrastructure of the Arab population that remained on the land "enabled the Israeli government in the first years of statehood to look upon the Israeli 'Arab problem' merely from a security and military point of view" (Weimer, 1983:34).

Although the Israeli-Arabs were bestowed Israeli citizenship in principle, in practice this democratic overture became subjugated to the nuances of 'scientific' nationalism.

Through their very presence, the Palestinian Arabs were perceived (and circumscribed) as a potential threat to the security of the Israeli state and as 'beings' who were antithetical to the Zionist goal of a Jewish state. As such, they were placed under Israeli military rule (until 1966) which greatly restricted their freedom of movement.¹²⁷ This then, was the beginning of the process by which the actions of the Israeli government were to define the borders of Arab status and Arab identity within Israel.

Numerous studies have analysed and demonstrated the subordinate socio-structural position of the Arabs in Israel [e.g., Nakhleh (1975), al-Asmar (1975), Jiryis (1976), Lustick (1979), Zureik (1979), Zureik (1980)]. It is not within the bounds of this paper to comprehensively review the 'objective indicators' of Israeli-Arab subordination which these studies clarify. Rather, for illustrative purposes, only two analyses shall be briefly mentioned.

¹²⁷. Those whose movement was so restricted perceived the 'security measures' to result in much more serious consequences than mere stationary inconvenience: "Palestinians [sic] interpreted them as various measures that facilitated the expropriation of land. Due to military rule, most Palestinians were not able to reach their land and cultivate it for many years. Land that remained uncultivated for a certain period of time then became subject to confiscation. As a result, the independent Palestinian economy was destroyed, and Palestinians became totally subordinated to the Zionist economy" (Fattah, 1987:8).

Zureik's (1979) sophisticated study, The Palestinians in Israel, focuses on the effects which Zionist settlement imposed on the structure of relations between Arabs and Jews in Israel. His analysis reveals how the manifest doctrine of 'Zionism' (with its three Jewish-specific tenets: 'conquest of Land', 'conquest of Labour' and 'produce of the Land'), resulted in the process of latent underdevelopment of Palestinian society (i.e. "objective exploitation") through economic and class transformation. Zureik supports his thesis that "Jewish settlement in Palestine resulted in the land expropriation and social class distortion of Arab peasantry," by demonstrating that the economic development of the Jewish sector was "accompanied by a corresponding underdevelopment and stagnation of the Arab sector" (Zureik, 1979:5). What Zureik's analysis effectively reveals is that the structural relations in Israeli society are such that the historical and ongoing political/economic domination/ exploitation of the Arabs in Israel is buttressed and legitimized in the socio-cultural sphere and that this interplay tends to be mutually reinforcing. How does this 'theoretical orientation' reflect itself in the lives and identity processes of those so affected? An Israeli-Arab explains:

You find discrimination in identity cards. All Jews have a card, a type A card. Why does the Arab living in Israel twenty-two years still have identity card B? And discrimination in business! An Arab businessman cannot import from outside directly: he has to buy whatever he needs from a Jewish big store. There is discrimination among employees... (Ne'Meh Sima'an, in Epp and Goddard, 1976: 75).

Zureik's theoretical orientation is derived from theories of

"imperialism" and "internal colonialism," and his analysis is enriched by adding the socio-cultural dimension of 'Zionist' collective exclusion. As such, Zureik's study can be interpreted within the framework of this paper by considering that the justificatory ideology which legitimates the regional marginalization and subordination of Israel's Arab population (i.e., Zionism) is, in its generic form, the ideology of nationalism. Thus, as Edward Said articulates:

Palestine has been replaced by an Israel whose aggressive sense of itself as the state of the Jewish people fuels the exclusivity of a national identity won and maintained to a great extent at our expense. We are not Jews, we have no place there except as resident aliens, we are outsiders, (Said, 1986:34).

In other words, the status of an Arab individual in Israel is not a function of that individual's abilities or meritocracy but, rather, is dependent firstly upon his/her imposed ascription to the Arab collective and secondly upon his/her demonstrated loyalty to the Israeli regime:

...a powerful system of patronage and co-optation was utilised by the Zionist apparatus of the state (including the Zionist party machines) in order to reward and punish the Arab citizens of the state. This implied that social mobility and career rewards were governed not by ... universalistic criteria but by loyalty to what appears to them to be alien Zionist institutions (Zureik, 1980:60).

In this way, political quiescence of the subordinated minority was achieved. For those individuals who were in a position to be co-opted into Israel's state apparatus (i.e., most often these individuals were

either the traditional notables or members of groups which Israel chose to bestow with special status, for example, the Druze and certain Christian groups), self-esteem (status) became integrally linked to loyalty to the state. For those for whom co-option was not an option (i.e., the bulk of the Muslim Arab populace), political abeyance was assured through a "highly effective system of control" (Lustick, 1979).

Lustick (1980) employs Ross' (1980) framework to consider the process of identity among the Arabs in Israel. His analysis demonstrates the structural, institutional and programmatic elements which have facilitated and continue to reinforce the collective subordination and passivity of the Arab minority. Lustick identifies the three fundamentals employed in collective control: fragmentation (through differential treatment policies directed at reinforcing and exacerbating traditional internal rifts, which inhibits any movement towards collective action), dependence (i.e., Arab reliance on Jews for economic and political resources) and the above mentioned co-option.

5.3 F The Process of Arabism

My land is confiscated because I am an Arab. I am humiliated and despised because I am an Arab...If you are beaten, tortured, humiliated and imprisoned because you are an Arab, your feeling of Arab nationalism will certainly be increased (Baransi, 1982).

Although the status of the Israeli-Arabs in the post-48 period most certainly corresponds to Ross' subordinate minority stage, the comprehensive control systems which were institutionalized by the Israeli

government acted to inhibit any collective movement towards mobilization at a regional level. These control systems added another dimension to the complexity of Israeli-Arab(-Palestinian) identity.¹²⁸

The 'Arabism' of post-48 Israeli-Arabs necessitated the incorporation of the special and peculiar circumstances of living under Israeli rule. Thus, those who remained were 'Israelis', but they were not Jews and therefore not really 'Israelis'; they were Arab yet they were shut off from the Arab world;¹²⁹ they were not in manifest exile yet they were in 'internal exile'; they lived on the land, yet every day they experienced the dialectics of space through piecemeal expropriation of their land by non-Arabs.

It is significant that the first 'national' political movement of the Israeli-Arabs (Usrat al-Ard) had as its symbolic focus the Land of Palestine. Thus, like their compatriots in exile, Land was attaining a key role in defining the collective political identity of the subordinated group. However, the Israeli-Arabs were not longing for the 'Return'; rather, they were acting out of a steadfast determination to

¹²⁸. For example, Baransi tells of the racial discrimination against Arab workers such that those "who obtained work permits were obliged to change their Arab names to Jewish ones to avoid being insulted in this way. For example, a man whose name was Muhammad became Moshe, Ali became Elie, and so on -- you would not find a single Arab worker with an Arab name" (Baransi, 1982 :15). Baransi also notes that this Israeliization changed after 1967 -- after contact with the West Bank and Gaza.

¹²⁹. Indeed as Baransi (1981) and Haidar (1982) elucidate, there was quite a sense among Israeli-Arabs that the rest of the Arab world considered them to be 'collaborators' with the Israeli state: "the Arabs outside called us 'the Jews' Arabs."

remain on the Land. Mahmoud Darwish, a Palestinian poet who lived in Israel, metaphorically captures this union of identity and land:

Contemptuous wound
My homeland is not a suitcase
And I am not a traveller,
I am the lover, and the land the beloved.
(Darwish, 1973:390).

Founded in 1958, Usrat al-Ard was a movement which "served to catalyze the discontent of the native community inside Israel...[by] attempting to work within Israeli hegemony to develop an independent Palestinian Arab presence" (Said, 1979:129). The aim, therefore was not 'liberation' per se but a mobilized demand for equality that reflected a concern for the "Palestinian's right to be in Palestine" (Said, 1979:129).¹³⁰ Although this movement incorporated the term 'Palestinian' in its constitution, this term was not perceived as a particularist collective identity but was perceived to assert the Arab right to Palestine. As Baransi clarifies, the name Usrat al-Ard ('Family of the Land,') was chosen to symbolize the "links of the Palestinian Arab with his land and his country, this attachment to the land being the typically Palestinian characteristic of the Palestinian Arab in the occupied Arab territories" (Baransi, 1981:19).

Thus, this glimmering of a 'Palestinian' nuance in the Arab-Israeli

¹³⁰. Said considers the failure of this movement (which was outlawed through Israeli legislation) to demonstrate the "impossibility of equality for non-Jews in Israel." Significantly, the lack of impact that this movement achieved, resulted in Al-Ard becoming "the first Palestinian Arab political group to call for a separate Palestinian state" (Said, 1979:130).

psyche was not out of a sense of psychological Palestinianism but, rather was in relation to their sociological status on the Land. The movement was, above all else, a "pan-Arab group which believed in Arab unity and Nasserism" (Kiwani in Smith, 1978:16). As Mansour Kardoush, one of the leaders of the Al-Ard movement of the early 60's reveals, "If you asked a Palestinian in Israel at that period to describe his identity, he would say an 'Arab'" (quoted in Fattah, 1986).

This collective perception of Arabism was not merely a function of the negative internalization of the Israeli-imposed label. Rather, it was an identity locus buttressed through the Israeli-Arabs limited exposure and contact with the external Arab world. In essence, the Arabs of Israel were unaware of the plight of their fellow refugees in exile who in many ways shared the experience of alienation, albeit at the hands of the Arab regimes as opposed to the Israelis. Thus, as Haidar's (1982) study shows:

They thought the Palestinians had been received with sympathy and understanding, and that they were being treated even better than the native citizens. This feeling was enhanced by the rise of revolutionary and pseudo-revolutionary regimes in certain Arab countries (Haidar, 1982:20).

In this way, vicarious 'relief' from the negative status ascribed to Israeli-Arabs was achieved through the continued faith in ultimate salvation at the hands of their 'Arab brethren'. From 1953 on, this hope was almost exclusively focused on Nasser's pan-Arab rhetoric which was "illegally and eagerly" listened to on the radio by Israeli-Arabs (Fattah, 1987).

In this way, Nasser's pan-Arabism infused the term 'Arab' with positive meaning and countered the negative meaning that 'Arab' had acquired through circumscribed Israeli definition. Pan-Arabism was, for

the Israeli-Arabs, therefore, the key to the 'negation of the negation' both psychologically and potentially in reality:

...Arab nationalist sentiments are generally stronger among members of the Arab minority in Israel than any other group in the Arab world. Every oppressed minority has a strong psychological need to identify with a larger group to which it can anchor itself in the struggle against the oppressors and as a defense mechanism against feelings of inferiority and insecurity... Arab nationalism...reject(s) the degradation of the second-class citizenship to which Zionism, by definition, assigns them (Kanaana, 1975: 17).

From 1948-1967, Israeli-Arabs perceived themselves as Arabs and were treated as such by the government. The notion of Palestinianism did not impinge upon the collective conscious of the Arab masses in Israel:¹³¹ "They did not distinguish between Palestinian and Arab, and generally used the term, "Arab" rather than "Palestinian" (Haidar, 1982).

As the earlier section suggested, it required the reality of alienation 'in exile' -- in Arab lands -- for Palestinianism to acquire significant meaning as a collective terminal identity. After 1967, when the Israeli-Arabs were suddenly reexposed to the larger Arab world, a sense of Palestinianism began to infiltrate their consciousness of self.

¹³¹. Significantly, Palestinianism was noticeable among a very limited sector of the Israeli-Arab population -- that of the writers and poets, such as Mahmoud Darwish, who undoubtedly achieved greater exposure to the intellectual ideologies of the time (i.e., nationalism in its state-centric sense). These intellectuals, who were called the 'resistance writers', were among the first Palestinian writers to confront Zionism (cf., Sulaiman, 1984)

5.4 POST 1967: PALESTINIAN MOBILIZATION AND RESTORATION TO SELF

After we died,
after they prayed over our bodies
and buried us...
... the Fath¹³² came to us
like a beautiful rose sprouting from a wound,
like a spring irrigating salty deserts.
And so we, all of a sudden, tore off our shrouds
and rose from the dead.
(Qabbani, 1968).

I think [my] happiest moment was the birth of the
resistance movement, and the manifestation of this
birth in Karameh, (Raja Farraj, West Bank
Businessman).

The revolution gave me the answer to who I am,
(Fedai in Lebanon, in Sayigh, 1979).

June 1967. Another Arab-Israeli war. Within days the Arab armies suffer a stunning defeat. Israel occupies large segments of Arab territory -- including the West Bank and Gaza strip. Three hundred thousand Palestinians flee their homes as Israeli troops advance. In this, the second hijra, most take refuge in Jordan's East Bank. For the million who remain in the 'Occupied Territories,' Israel is now their new 'them'.

As already suggested, the period of 1948-1967 inflicted the experiential reality of subordinate minority status on those who had once lived in Palestine. This process of encompassing social isolation

¹³². "Fath" refers to al-Fatah, the main group of Fedayeen (Palestinian fighters) in the Palestine Resistance Movement (PRM), led by Yasir Arafat. al-Fatah was to become the predominant group in the umbrella organization known as the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) which also is headed by Arafat.

and negation in turn nurtured the internal identity process of Palestinianism.

However, by the mid-1960's, a number of Palestinians had acquired both the education and skills that allowed them to escape the camps because of the great demand for skilled labour by the newly rich oil producing Arab states. This 'success' prompted a change in self-perception of the downtrodden 'Refugees'-- for it was a concrete contradiction to their imposed marginalization:

They began to see themselves in a new light. They began to see themselves as "chosen" among the Arabs; they became aware of their important contribution to the advancements which were taking place in the Arab world. This new perception had in it a recognition of the pride resulting from the demand of the oil-producing countries for skilled Palestinian labour, the large number of educated persons within their ranks, and the important strides made by their members in the academic and commercial worlds (Haidar, 1982: 14).

This glimmering of internal self-redefinition was both augmented and given manifest expression in the wake of the events of 1967. As the Arab states nursed their wounds, the Palestinian Revolutionary Movement (PRM) mobilized into action and, in so doing, wrested psychological control of Palestinian identity from its external subjugators. No longer listless Refugees, the actions of the PRM redefined Palestinians as Revolutionaries struggling for justice and so 're-dignified' their status in the eyes of the Arab world. To be a Palestinian was no longer internally perceived as a stigma but, rather, as a source of pride and self-worth.

The process of Palestinianism was to gain great momentum, especially after 1968 as individual Palestinians everywhere now found positive meaning in this collective identity. Individually, they still suffered because they were Palestinian but Palestinianism, itself, was becoming the paradigm which gave positive meaning to that suffering. It is this process which will be explored briefly below in two parts -- focusing firstly on the mobilization of those 'in exile' and secondly on the interactive impact of this on the identity of those 'in prison' (which now includes the Occupied Territories).¹³³

al-Fath, the first independent Palestinian guerilla group,¹³⁴ was conducting border raids into Israel as early as 1965. Although these incursions were met with "mass joy" in the Refugee camps (and caused many young men to join the PRM's ranks, cf., Sayigh, 1979), they did not instigate mobilization of the masses as a whole. Nasser of Egypt still loomed too large and most Palestinians vested their hope in the words of this powerful figure and in the strength of the Arab world. The

¹³³. Obviously, mobilization of the population derives not only from an internal will to restore one's self-esteem but also from external conditions which allow for that margin of manoeuvrability necessary for the communication (and organization) of the masses. For the most part, discussion of these external conditions lies outside the bounds of this paper. For an analysis of the role of communication in facilitating the cohesion of Palestinian identity, see Shinar (1987).

¹³⁴. Prior to 1967, al-Fath was independent from the PLO which at that time was sanctioned and controlled by the Arab states. Fatah was the largest of the various clandestine cells of "extra-legal, grass-roots" movements which made up the PRM (the "authentic Palestinian consciousness"). In 1969, following the tremendous popular support for the PRM which ensued after the Battle of Karamah in 1968 (see below), Arafat became the new chairman of the PLO. However, it was not until after the chaotic upheaval during the Jordanian civil war that the PRM became effectively subsumed into the PLO structure (cf., Sayigh, 1987).

trouncing of 1967 shattered the illusion of an Arab solution to the Palestinian problem. The Palestinians were now to come into their own:

...the strategy of armed struggle [was to have] far more impact on the Palestinians themselves than on its intended target...At an early stage, immediately after 1967, armed struggle seemed to turn the Palestinians nearly overnight into the vanguard of the Arab struggle against Israel. It helped restore a sense of dignity to a people whose self-respect had been demolished by their expulsion by Israel and subsequent suppression by the Arab regimes (Khalidi, 1987:11).

Much like the 'Disaster' of 1948, the impact of the 1967 al-hazimah ('Defeat') resounded in many different forms throughout the Arab world. For the Palestinians, the Defeat crystallized nearly twenty years of latent doubts concerning the "sincerity of Arab intentions in their regard" (Johnson 1982:64). The inertia of hopelessness and the leadership void were soon to be countered through the assertion of Palestinian identity by way of the PRR and their battle at Karameh on March 21, 1968.

The Battle of Karameh involved a stand-off between 300 Palestinian guerrillas and a 15,000-strong Israeli force. For thirty-two hours the Palestinians, armed with only simple weapons, managed to hold off the troops that had overrun three Arab armies. This act of steadfast Palestinian defiance both devastated the myth of Israeli invincibility and became the symbolic turning point for Palestinian mass mobilization:

A people needs only one event, one galvanizing encounter that brings together the vision of their inner world and the possibilities of the outer world, for this process to become irreversible. For this generation of Palestinians, the battle

of Karamah -- or more correctly, the spirit of Karamah provided such an encounter. Karamah became a myth, a watershed, that entered our consciousness and acquired its own capital letter, just like Refugee had done before it. Only Karamah was the antithesis of Refugee...It...opened up the possibility where existential and political realities came together in an exquisitely aligned bond...

The alienation, the exclusion, the crisis of identity, the rejection of the self, shattered the very soul of Palestinians in exile; but with the trip from Karamah, with its continuing and predictable trials and tribulations, its ebb and flow, there was a return of the native to his native self (Turki, 1973:15,16,17).

Turki (1972) clearly elucidates the way in which the steadfast heroism of the fedayeen gave both meaning and structure to the positive consciousness that his generation had been groping for: "In a very short time the term Palestinian became identified not with the downtrodden refugee living in abject poverty, but with the young dedicated freedom fighter" (Turki, 1972: 108). The following passage, in which Turki describes the impact of the resistance movement on the Palestinian psyche, reveals not only the 'rebirth' of the Palestinian will to resist (i.e., to actively cope with the circumstances, rather than to passively submit) but also the connection of this newly redefined identity to the ideological commitment of the struggle for justice:

Then it came about that we could not wait to be freed, and we broke out. With freedom from bondage came freedom of the spirit. Came humanity. A return to pride. A feeling of our place. A defiance. An exhilaration. A wonder. An awakening. A rebirth. Came a feeling that we were not the wretched natives of the earth. That we were not alone. That we had brothers and sisters fighting in Vietnam, in Africa, in South America, in the United States...

I...went up to the rooftops to shout to the world that I was a Palestinian. I was no longer alone, hiding, shamefaced, embittered. I belonged to a people who shared their travails and

their accomplishments with a commonwealth of men and women across the world who like them struggled to remove the leaf covering the nakedness of imperialist oppression. I was a Palestinian and the name had a cadence to it (Turki, 1972:154).

It was this redefinition of self -- the collective rejection of subordinate status that the revolution and fedayeen embodied -- that mobilized the solidarity of Palestinian nationalism and provided the 'blueprint' from which the personal meaning of Palestinian suffering was to be derived. And so was cast that integral component of Palestinian self-definition which is called 'samidun', meaning steadfast in the determination to resist and to reject subordination.¹³⁵

The reason that the resistance of the fedayeen resounded so loudly in the inner essence of Palestinians is that their ideological commitment to struggle resulted in manifest action. No longer the object of history, the Palestinian now became history's subject "acting upon it in order to make it suit his needs and his changing reality" (Moughrabi, 1977:74). This new action-oriented self-image succeeded in the fedayeen establishing a measure of self-rule for camp populations in Jordan,

¹³⁵. The name 'samidun' was not used as a concept of self-definition before 1967. However, the catalyzing example of Palestinians 'standing fast' at Karamah -- in the face of a far superior foe -- was to become the symbolic essence of Palestinianism. The concept of 'samidun' is vital because not only does it incorporate a positive 'trait' with which Palestinians can identify, it also provides the individual with a blueprint for action -- i.e., it provides the formula through which the Palestinian individual can cope with the daily hardships of being a Palestinian. For Palestinian fighters, 'samidun' dictates steadfastness in battle; for Palestinian civilians living in bombed-out camps in Lebanon, it means steadfastly refusing to give up hope for the Return and for Palestinians under Israeli occupation, it means staying on the Land.

Syria and Lebanon. For illustrative purposes, the effects of the PRM successes in Lebanon shall be outlined:¹³⁶

The effects of this autonomy [which the fedayeen achieved by wresting control of the camps from the fist of the Lebanese *deuxieme bureau*], even after it was ended or limited, lingered on elsewhere, providing the Palestinians for the first time in decades with a somewhat vicarious sense of empowerment and autonomy. Even Palestinians living at a distance from Lebanon were deeply moved as they saw the Palestinian flag, Palestinian fighters and Palestinian institutions resisting overwhelming odds in Lebanon (Khalidi, 1987:11).

However, the restoration to dignity and to the new found social liberation and political freedom which the period of self-rule bestowed upon camp residents was not without consequence. Rather, the latent contradiction between Palestinianism and the Arab regimes became more brutally manifest.

The new found autonomy of the Palestinians and the actions of the fedayeen were viewed as an unacceptable threat by the Lebanese Government (especially because of the deep popular support for the fedayeen by the oppressed sectors of Lebanese society, i.e., the Shi'ite population of the South). Consequently, the oppression of the camps became more

¹³⁶. Lebanon is chosen as the illustrative focus to provide continuity, based on the discussion of the events of 1982 which is to follow. In addition, as Khalidi notes: "...what goes on in Lebanon has an impact far beyond its effect on the 400,000 or more Palestinians living there. Lebanon is significant in the broader arena of Palestinian politics because the core of the modern Palestinian national movement was based there for 12 of the last 20 years. The names Sabra and Shatila, like Tal al-Za'atar before it, have acquired a powerful resonance in the Palestinian political vocabulary" (Khalidi, 1987: 11). See discussion below.

overt, as the Lebanese Army attempted to repress the armed element which was within. In 1969, this repression took the form of Lebanese authorities besieging the Palestinian camps:¹³⁷

In 1969 there were many battles between us and the Lebanese Army, and that is when we saw the villagers rise against the Army. I remember particularly Majdel Silm, where the Army put a force estimated at brigade size around the town to besiege a group of a hundred fedayeen. The population made a demonstration against the Army, protecting the fedayeen with their own bodies. This is the incident I consider the most expressive of fusion between us and the masses at the time (A Palestinian fighter in Sayigh, 1979:157).

That the civilian masses were willing to expose themselves to personal danger to defend the 'cause' of the fedayeen is a definite indicator of their commitment to the positive rebirth of Palestinianism. This commitment may be viewed as the collective coping strategy through which the masses -- having been subject to decades of personal stress imposed upon them because they were Palestinian -- now turned to derive meaning from the hardships which had been thrust upon them. The 'dead' and the 'buried' now found personal meaning in the will to resist -- coping became adaptive and action-oriented. Palestinianism was now an identity to uphold or to defend until death.

In essence, the Revolution catalyzed a psychological normalization of the Palestinian psyche: "The Palestinian felt after the Revolution that he's living like a normal person again after a life of humiliation.

¹³⁷. The sieges of 1969 were the first of many that were to plague the Palestinians in Lebanon, the most recent of which being the 1985-1988 sieges of the Camps by the Shi-ite militia (see below).

The camps now are like fortresses, where in the past people had nothing to do but die under these zionco roofs" (A Palestinian from Bourj al-Barajneh, quoted in Sayigh, 1979:164).¹³⁰

As the 'people without a land' attempted to regain their legitimacy in a world of bounded states, their self-proclaimed 'samidun' became more essential: "the more pressure the Palestinians produced in pursuit of their national goals, the more counter-pressure was applied against them, and the more they drew conflict toward them" (Said, 1979:222). This 'counter-pressure' applied variously by the Jordanians, the Lebanese, the Syrians and the Israelis erupted in murderous violence directed at its Palestinian targets (sometimes also spilling over to

¹³⁰. The psychological impact of this process cannot be underestimated for it largely explains the enormous capacity of the Palestinian to cope with loss -- especially personal loss. As one observer notes: "It's something incredible...I have seen with my own eyes people dying every hour, in Baddawi and Tel al-Za'ter. Their capacity for sacrifice is something extraordinary" (Quoted in Sayigh, 1979:181). This capacity to face great adversity and to persist in 'being' may be seen as the experiential essence of Palestinian identity. This essential capacity is something obviously not comprehended by those policy-makers who suggest that the intifadah be 'dealt with' by brutal repression.

resident nationals in the area).¹³⁹ For example, consider the following incidents: the 1970 "Black September" purge of Palestinian fedayeen and citizens alike, waged by the Jordanian monarch; the 1975 civil war in Lebanon, in which the Palestinians became embroiled and which resulted in the siege and massacre at Tel Za'atar (a Palestinian refugee camp), committed by Lebanese Christians, but fully backed by the Syrian regime.

Although such 'counterpressure' probably was applied in the belief that Palestinianism could be deterred, its effect was exactly the opposite. Whereas the previous oppression of 'structural violence' was not clearly perceived by its victims, the graphic brutality of collective massacre lead to a heightened awareness of group boundaries. As

¹³⁹. Sanbar (1982) elucidates the complexities of the Palestinian-Arab matrix in his discussion of Palestinian strategy as embodied in the concept tawrit. Thus, tawrit means "to act so as to 'implicate' the other, to get him more deeply involved and, by extension, to forcefully persuade him [to join in the fight on your behalf]" (Sanbar, 1982: 296). Tawrit is the "direct descendant of the clannish war waged by partisans of the armed resistance against the British Mandate and the Zionist movement in Palestine," which in exile, was transformed from inter-village alliances into the entire Palestinian people becoming the 'clan' with the various Arab communities and nations becoming the "support forces to be pulled into battle" (Sanbar, 1982: 297). This reliance upon Arab solidarity was necessitated by the territorial vacuum of Palestinian reality such that Palestinians "had no other means of survival and development other than to enmesh the various relationships, often contradictory, of different external territorial dependencies" (Sanbar, 1982: 296). Thus Palestinian actions within host countries were directed towards nudging the host populations into solidarity with their cause (a goal which did not require much effort), so as to elicit active participation on their behalf (a goal which resulted in inflicting tremendous cost upon the Arab 'support forces', which became embroiled in the various battles for Palestinian rights). Thus, the age-old strategy of tawrit became stalemated by the new element in the equation -- reason of state. Thus, "Arab regimes, grasping its (tawrit) intention...focused all their efforts to steadily close down their borders to the fedayeen; in this way, the physical terrain essential to the workings of such a mechanism was eliminated" (Cf., Sanbar, 1982:296-297).

Hamid (1988) reveals: "Jordan's actions subdued the population, but it did not de-Palestinianize us. If anything it strengthened our Palestinian feelings." In essence, these events increased the Palestinian sense of isolation from the Arab world and strengthened the Palestinian sense of self (experientially in Lebanon and Jordan, and vicariously in Israel and the Occupied Territories);¹⁴⁰

There are events in Palestinian history that are perceived by Palestinians to embody within them the collective tensions of their entire nation. The loss of home and homeland in 1948, the shock of the second exodus of 1967, the grief of Black September in 1970, and the profound solitude of Tel Za'atar in 1976 may speak of a history gone fearfully awry...but they also speak of events that are ingrained in the Palestinian spirit... (Turki, 1981:371).

Another event which would graphically underline the essential isolation of the Palestinians was the Arab-Israeli war of 1973. This war was perceived to demonstrate the lack of intention on Israel's part to forfeit her five-year occupation of the Territories as well as to confirm the lack of power and will on the part of the Arabs to effect this forfeit through force.¹⁴¹ This contributed to the perception that the PLO was now primarily charged with the responsibility for the restoration of Palestinian land -- a perception which was ratified at

¹⁴⁰. Shinar (1987) notes, based on a content analysis of the West Bank Press, that "major Palestinian events" such as Black September are "used by the Palestinian press to emphasize questions of identity."

¹⁴¹. Abu-Lughod (1986) notes: "For the occupants and former residents of the West Bank and Gaza, who had up to then hoped for eventual liberation, the 1973 war marked the turning point at which their exile or oppression began to change from a 'temporary' to a 'more permanent' condition" (Abu-Lughod, 1986:34).

the March 1974 Rabat Summit when the Arab world formally approved PLO claims to the West Bank while denying those of Jordan.

In addition, the fallout from 1973 enhanced Palestinian perception that they were being 'sold out' by yet another of their Arab brethren. Faith in Nasser's rhetorical pan-Arab vision was irreparably unyoked by Sadat's historical pro-Egypt action¹⁴² -- the inherent contradiction of the former was made manifest in the actions of the latter. Thus, the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty, which was to ultimately evolve out of this war (the Camp David Accords) formalized the priorities of state-centric nationalism while highlighting the marginalization of stateless Palestinians:

The Camp David accords, viewed by Palestinians as a gesture of contempt to their national sensibility...hit a sensitive chord in the historical consciousness of Palestinians. They were, in their blatantly contemptuous dismissal of Palestinian rights, the Balfour Declaration, or the partition of Palestine or the exodus of 1948 all over again. History was repeating itself. It was as if, after sixty years of struggle by three generations of Palestinians, it was all in vain (Turki, 1980:21).

Camp David clearly indicates that 'reason of state' was gaining ascendancy in Arab political affairs. The two converging vectors of nationalist ideology were beginning to consolidate: nationalism as cultural autonomy was being demonstratively welded to bounded space.

¹⁴². This 'unyoking' was part of a process already put into action by Nasser himself, through his acceptance of the terms of the Roger's Peace Plan. Even though Israel did not accept this plan, Nasser's acceptance implied recognition of Israel as a 'fact'. Sanbar notes: "Nasser's death soon thereafter helped to save his image" (Sanbar, 1982: 294).

This structural consolidation acted to structure the goals of Palestinianism: just as Palestinian cultural autonomy emerged as a function of territorial dispossession, the political survival of this identity now necessitated Palestinian statehood to consecrate the legitimacy of Palestinian identity. Thus, relative to the conditions for legitimacy embodied in the hegemonic order of nationalism, Palestinian statelessness meant that, as individuals and as a collective, they were subject to a "terrifying kind of international illegitimacy" (Said, 1982: 305). And, according to the conceptual framework developed in this paper, such illegitimacy resounds at the core of the individual's self-esteem.

Consider, therefore, the profundity of Yasir Arafat's spectacular appearance in 1974 at the United Nations General Assembly. Arafat's ascendancy to the UN was a symbolic step towards Palestinian reintegration with the human race. Almost, were Palestinians admitted into the legitimacy of global order; almost, was their collective status brought into alignment with the rest of the world's 'nations'; almost would they be able to achieve personal self-esteem through relative inter-group comparison. Reintegration was only 'almost' because Palestinians had achieved only one half of the criterion required by nationalist ideology for collective demarginalization; Palestinians were now recognized as a people but they no longer had a land. As such, "...the principle tenets of Palestinian identity...are now built upon the need for the repossession of the land and for the realization of Palestinian statehood..." (Said, 1979:150). Yasir Arafat and the PLO, in actions and words, address this Palestinian identity-need. In Burtonian terms,

therefore, the internal political legitimacy of Arafat and the PLO to represent the Palestinians is undeniable, not because they represent a majority consensus, but because they are striving to fulfill the individual Palestinian's restoration to self-esteem¹⁴³:

While witnessing throughout the world the debates as to whether the PLO represents the Palestinian people, fully, partially, or not at all, the PLO and the Palestinians could not help but smile because such representation does not flow from governments and embassies. It flows from the people themselves; they themselves have lived through it and have understood. Diplomatic recognitions are but recognitions of this primary truth (Sanbar, 1982: 299).

Arafat and the PLO gave both direction and structure to Palestinian identity as well as international recognition.¹⁴⁴ That this leadership was internally acclaimed by those it was said to represent (i.e., Palestinians everywhere) is evidenced by Palestinian support for the PLO inside both the Occupied Territories and Israel itself.

¹⁴³. It would appear that the outside world which denies/questions the legitimacy of the PLO often confuses Palestinian pluralism with Palestinian non-existence -- a confusion which is perhaps exacerbated by Palestinian statelessness.

¹⁴⁴. Although this recognition, during the late sixties and early seventies, was achieved through notorious acts of violence, it resulted in the dawning international awareness that Palestinians were not 'just Arabs' or 'just refugees': "...people didn't stop calling us the Arab refugees to start calling us the Palestinian people till we resorted to armed struggle...to remind the world that we exist and that we are aggrieved" (Turki, 1973:25). It is a sad statement on humanity that violence is so often the only way to 'tune in' the world.

5.4 A "Min al-Dakhil": 'From The Interior'

As alluded to above, Palestinian actions in the ghourba (and Arab counterpressures), impacted on the identity and actions of those on the 'inside'. For Palestinians newly under Israeli occupation, the events of post-67 encouraged mobilization along the identity lines which had been forged at the hands of their previous administrators.¹⁴⁵ For the Israeli-Arabs, 1967 ended their cultural isolation as the new territorial contiguity with the West Bank and Gaza meant the Arabs in Israel were now back in contact with the rest of the Arab world.

Palestinians under post-67 occupation engaged in sporadic but protracted protest which, especially after 1973, was loosely affiliated with the PLO leadership from 'outside'. However, right from the start-- even before the transforming influence of Karamah -- Israeli occupation was resisted. To paraphrase Turki, 'occupation' meant that Israel was no longer the abstract "enemy in the mathematical equation." Occupation meant Israel was now overtly perceived as being responsible for both the abstract root of the Palestinian problem and the concrete perpetuation

¹⁴⁵. al-Shuaibi (1979) notes that the year-long occupation of Gaza by Israeli forces in 1957-58 was a primary catalyst for the solidification of Palestinian particularism in the Strip: "In direct confrontation with the occupier, the particular identity of the Palestinians was driven home to them" (al-Shuaibi, 1979:78). It is probably significant that Fatah emerged as a militant political force one year after the Gaza occupation. Gamal El-Sourany, a resident of Gaza, recalls the effects of Israel's occupation: "Israel erased the name of Palestine and the name of the Palestinian people, our most precious possession. But we were determined to retain it, and we began in Gaza to use the name Palestine in everything and all our organizations...The talks regarding a Palestinian entity began at the Arab League in 1958" (in Epp and Goddard, 1976:128).

of Palestinian suffering. Having lived through a period of exile and alienation from Arabism, Palestinianism was already in place. The new situation of Israeli rule both enhanced the tenacity of Palestinian particularism and contributed to its mobilization (even as Israel adopted fierce measures to quell identity-driven resistance) ¹⁴⁶

In October 1967, prominent residents of the West Bank issued a document which formally rejected Israeli occupation and demanded a return to Arab sovereignty. In 1969, on the second anniversary of the occupation, a General Strike was observed throughout the West Bank. However, such acts of political protest posed no real threat to Israel's occupation (or international image). Through sophisticated and pervasive systems of control, Israel easily dissipated this ad hoc civilian protest and prevented the emergence of a movement, such as the PRM of the ghourba, which would be more explicitly challenging:

¹⁴⁶. Palestinianism is obviously anathema to Zionism in identity terms. Arabism is much easier for Zionists to tolerate from a moral perspective because it does not hack away at the roots of 'legitimacy' (as defined by the hegemonic ideology of nationalism) in the same way that Palestinianism does. From an identity perspective, one begins to better understand the intense suppression of Palestinian symbolism by the Israelis (artists have been jailed for merely incorporating the 'national colours' of Palestine (i.e., green, red white and black) into their art-work). The intensity of repression of Palestinian activism in the Territories is not primarily (from this perspective) a function of 'security' concerns, rather it is a function of Zionist mobilization to protect the core essence of Zionist identity. Such a perspective makes some sense of the otherwise incomprehensible acts of extreme violence committed against Palestinians in the Occupied Territories by some Israeli soldiers and settlers, acts which are not ordered by Israeli military strategists but which erupt almost spontaneously by individuals and groups. Because Palestinianism negates Zionism, Palestinianism cannot be tolerated. Note that the intolerance of this zero-sum equation is a function of identity being conceived of as a structure instead of a process.

The PRM formed no special committees to organise political action in the territories...In fairness to the PRM, the scale of Israeli repression was daunting; between July 1967 and February 1986, the Israeli Army and security services deported 2,061 people (including mayors, unionists, and political and social figures) to Jordan or Lebanon, detained or interrogated 250,000 others, and demolished 1,425 houses belonging to convicted or suspected PRM members (Sayigh, 1987:51).

While (for historical reasons) the West Bank tended to rely upon political resistance, Gaza fought back fiercely with arms. At first, Gazans thought Israeli occupation would be short-lived as it had been in 1957. However, as time passed with no indication of Israeli withdrawal, a guerrilla movement emerged and spread (cf., Lesch, 1985). Thus from 1968-1971, employing weapons that the Egyptians had cached before their retreat, "Palestinian guerrilla cells attacked Israeli forces almost daily and controlled the refugee camps by night" (Rabbani, 1988:36). Israel's response was pacification through repression, the effectiveness of which broke the backbone of the resistance by 1972 (cf., Cossali and Robson, 1986: 125).¹⁴⁷

¹⁴⁷. Abu Karim, a resident of Gaza acknowledges that the struggle of the Gaza fedayeen, who managed for three years to "hold their own against the Israelis," is still a great source of pride for Gazans "especially when you remember that the armed struggle never really got off the ground in the West Bank," (in Cossali and Robson, 1986:125). This perception alludes to both the extreme positive boost to (a subordinated) identity that active mobilization (resistance) provides, and to the process of intra-group comparison to enhance relative status of the sub-group. This latter point is especially relevant when one considers the far greater depravity of material living conditions in Gaza as compared with the West Bank. Therefore, in relative terms, the West Bankers are 'better off' than their Gaza counterparts. However, Gaza's status was (perceived to be) greatly enhanced through the honourable demonstration of 'samidun' by Gazan fedayeen, i.e., their active resistance makes them more 'true' to Palestinianism.

With the armed element either deported or jailed, pacification took a more subtle and pervasive form. Dayan opened up Israeli factories to Palestinian workers which would eventually relegate the bulk of occupied Palestinians to comprehensive economic dependency as they themselves were transformed into a migrant work force. In Gaza, for example, an estimated 70% of residents were dependent upon wages earned in Israel by 1986. Because of the insecurity and instability inherent to the day-labour system, "Gazan workers know that they are dispensable, so the emphasis is on personal and family survival rather than collective action at the moment" (Abu Talal, Gaza intellectual, in Cossali and Robson, 1986:58).

By 1973, the Territories had autonomously sprouted their own 'internal' affiliate of the PLO: the Palestine National Front. This clandestine umbrella organization acted to coordinate political mobilization 'inside' with Palestinian events 'outside' -- for example, Arafat's 1974 UN appearance. Mobilization took the form of strikes and demonstrations which "engulfed the entire West Bank and Gaza Strip for weeks at a time, sometimes spilling across the 'green line' into Israel and acquiring many characteristics of the current uprising [i.e., the intifadah]" (Rabbani, 1988:36). The Palestinian veneer of this mobilization elicited harsh measures from the authorities in an attempt to dissipate its influence. However, these measures were obviously not successful, as was evidenced by the municipal elections of 1976:

The PNF...fielded candidates in every locality and won a resounding victory. Despite widespread Israeli interference, including the

deportation of some nationalist candidates, PNF slates captured 18 of the 24 city councils ...and won in almost all the larger cities. Over the next few years the military government deposed the nationalist mayors one after the other, put others under town arrest and dissolved PNF-dominated councils...(Rabbani, 1988:37).

By 1978, the PNF was officially outlawed by Israeli legislation; however by this time it had already been largely absorbed into a successor organization, the National Guidance Committee (NGC). The NGC emerged out of concern for the Palestinian-negating implications of the Camp David Accords¹⁴⁰ and was effective in rallying local mass action to coordinate with PLO policies. Sayigh (1987) notes that the effectiveness of the PNF and the NGC in orchestrating Palestinian political action within the territories is evidenced by the "unending civil rest there and in the Israeli inability to effectively suppress the increasing political activism of the Palestinians living in Israel proper" (Sayigh, 1987:52).

It is important to highlight the effect of Israeli occupation on the internal psychological cohesion of Palestinians within the Occupied Territories. This is perhaps best illustrated by the feeling that, since 1967, Palestinian national identity has almost eradicated the previous discrimination in the Territories between 'original' inhabitants and 'refugees'. Although there still remains a latent sense that "those in the camps...bear the brunt of the occupation," the more widespread belief is that the "rigours of occupation have blurred the old distinc-

¹⁴⁰. For example, in experiential terms, the aftermath of Camp David resulted in accelerated land expropriation and settlement building by the Israelis in the Occupied Territories.

tion between refugee and non-refugee" (Cossali and Robson, 1986: 54,55).

Similarly, the class differences which segregate Gaza residents from each other have also been largely bridged despite the dependency incurred through occupation. As Abu Talal explains, the experience of working in Israel has not created a working-class identity:

Israeli employers are hated not primarily because they are exploiters, although of course they are, but because they are Israelis and occupiers. If there is going to be collective action, it is more likely to be over a political national issue than an issue of work conditions such as pay. We have the primary identity of a dispossessed people (in Cossali and Robson, 1986:59).

As alluded to above, collective political action tended to be effectively quelled because of the intense personal cost which often followed such demonstrations. Thus, although mass mobilization was limited through Israeli control, mass identity (Palestinianism) could not be controlled, as evidenced by sporadic eruption of massive protests.¹⁴⁹ With identity fuel in place, all that is required is an effective spark. For example, the affair of Bassam Shak'a, one of the 'PLO-mayors' of the West Bank, is illustrative. Shak'a was condemned to deportation in 1980 because of his Palestinian affiliations. However, when Israel attempted to follow through with his expulsion, the West Bank erupted in massive, 'snow-balling' protests -- order was only

¹⁴⁹. Rabbani (1988) notes that the number of protests in the Occupied Territories numbered 500 during the period 1977-1982. After the events of 1982 (see below) this number increased dramatically to between 3,000 - 4,450 per year. This trend has culminated in the continuous state of unrest embodied in the intifadah of 1987-1987.

restored by cancellation of Shak'a's deportation. Shak'a's triumphant return to Nablus imprinted the awareness that unified mobilization could achieve concrete results. As one of Shak'a's fellow mayors, Ibrahim al-Tawil commented during the euphoric reception given in honour of Shak'a: "Today, I'm glad Shak'a was arrested. It would have taken us three years of struggle to reach this kind of mass unity and elation. Today we can say that we've won" (in Shinar, 1987: 100).¹⁹⁰

The activism (and suppression) of the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories was not without impact on the identity-process of the 'Green Liners' (i.e., Israeli-Arabs):

The emergence of 'Palestinian' as a strong overarching identity [of the Israeli-Arabs] can be traced directly to the impact of Israel's ten year occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and the consequent exposure of Israeli Arabs to a strongly nationalistic mass of Palestinian Arabs with whom they could easily empathize (Lustick, 1980:78).

For many Israeli-Arabs, the shock and humiliation of Nasser's 1967 defeat evoked an immediate reaction of denial of their Arabism: "They

¹⁹⁰. Shak'a's case is an exception -- usually deportation orders against leaders are followed through, an obviously important 'weapon' held by the Israelis to limit mass mobilization. However, especially since 1978, a dense, grass-roots networking of various movements (for example, women's movements) began to emerge (Nashishibi, 1988). This grass-roots organization is perhaps the key to the sustained tenacity of mass resistance demonstrated during the intifadah. Whereas the motivation for such rebellion has been brewing for many years and has been focused on Palestinianism since 1967, it is the decentralized organization which has allowed for the present sustained mobilization (i.e., the intifadah does not mark a change in identity, in readiness to mobilize, or in communal feeling, it merely is indicative of a more comprehensive form of organization which has allowed for protest which is unprecedented in terms of scope, duration and intensity).

began to search for a 'new identity' which would emphasize their differentness from other Arabs; some even began to stress their 'Israeliness'" (Haidar, 1982:21). In fact, these 'shock conditions' presided over the union of the West Bank and Gaza with their 'Inside Israel' counterparts -- often resulting in a reciprocally negative impression of each other.

Haidar (1982) details this process of 're-acquaintance' at length. For example, the Israeli-Arabs were shocked at the poverty and 'social backwardness' of the inhabitants of the Occupied Territories (a perception influenced by the poverty of the camp inhabitants and their 'traditional' Arab lifestyles which had not been transformed by the 'modernizing' influences of Israeli society). Similarly, the Palestinians of the Occupied Territories were not favourably impressed with the Green Liners because of the latter's suspected 'collaboration' with Israel: "This impression was further strengthened by their use of Hebrew, in which the young Arabs were fluent; some even used Hebrew to accentuate their 'differentness'" (Haidar, 1982:26).

Cultural differentiation through language was further exacerbated when workers from the Territories entered into the Israeli job market:

Israeli-Arabs were more experienced in the Israeli work market than their counterparts from the territories...they often flaunted their 'superiority' by their use of Hebrew. They emphasized their ability to 'get along' (with the Israelis) while accusing the other Palestinians of ignorance. Moreover some were managers for their employers. Workers from the territories perceived these people as "collaborators" with the Zionist conquerors against their own people. These workers were perhaps treated unfairly by the Israeli-Arabs (Haidar, 1982:26).

Haidar's study goes on to list numerous other forms of socio-cultural discrimination which initially tended to prevent 'bonding' between Israeli-Arabs and Palestinians. However, as time went on, these social barriers were bridged through an increasing sense of political solidarity. This process was abetted internally by the Israeli-Arabs continuing sense of subordination within Israeli society and externally through a growing awareness of Palestinian alienation from Arabism:

The 'opening up' to Arabs in Israel of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and the whole Arab world beyond enabled the Arabs in Israel to become acquainted with the reality of the diverse differences and persistent quarrels among the various Arab regimes, as well as the discrepancy between their declared and their actual policies as regards the Palestinian question. It became clear that 'the Palestinian people are the black sheep of the Arab world', especially after the massacres of Palestinians at the hands of various regimes. In reaction, most of them, from being highly conscious of their Arab identity, became highly Palestinian-minded instead (Jiryis, 1979:33).¹³¹

In addition, Israeli-Arabs were positively impressed with the resistance to Israeli rule which was displayed in the Occupied Territories. The images of mobilization to protest discrimination were not lost on the 'Green Liners' and probably helped to catalyze the unprecedented mass mobilization of 1976 on "Land Day." On this day, tens of thousands of 'Green Liners' took to the streets to protest Israel's continuing land confiscations. The result was a near total general strike which

¹³¹. A'si (1986) notes that the "multiple labelling" of Israeli-Arabs "may have played a major role in creating an identity crisis among some of the Palestinians in Israel." A survey conducted in 1984 by the Palestinian social psychologist, Nadim Rouhana, found "0.5 % of these Palestinians described themselves as Israeli; 18.2 % said they were Israeli-Arabs; 7% said they were Arabs; 6% said they were Israeli-Palestinians; 11% said they were Palestinians and 57% called themselves Palestinian-Arabs" (A'si, 1986:1).

instigated Israeli reprisals leaving six demonstrators killed. Even more than the act of mobilization itself, the Israeli response resulted in Land Day becoming an annual event which is commemorated not only within Israel but within the Territories as well. In essence, Land Day symbolized the changes which had accumulated through the years in the life of the Israeli-Arabs. Israeli reaction to the protest blatantly revealed the latent contradiction of the position of Arab 'citizens' within the Israeli state. When combined with the knowledge of 'Black September' and 'Tel Za-atar', this double-barreled alienation heralded a transformational process in their self-perception, in their relations with the Israelis and in their attitudes towards other Palestinians. Thus:

After 1948, [Land Day] was the first event in which a deep sense of shared fate developed between the Palestinians of both sides of the Green Line. Each felt closer to the other than ever before. When the Israeli Arabs declared a general strike, Palestinians in the territories and elsewhere supported them in force. The reaction of the Israeli authorities convinced all, but particularly the Arabs within the Green Line, that they were all being subjected to the same treatment (Haidar, 1982:29-30).

The recognition of mutual subordination brought together Palestinians from both sides of the Green Line, such that 'social' differentia-

tion was bridged by an ever-growing sense of national solidarity.¹⁵²

To sum up thus far, post-67 Palestinianism functioned as an interactive process whereby the mobilization (and repression) of those 'in exile' catalyzed the perceptions and actions of those 'in the interior'. Although mobilization heralded Palestinian self-redefinition, this psychological 'coup d'etat' could not insure effective control over the material conditions which continued to be imposed upon Palestinian reality (a failure fueled by the asymmetry of power relations between the stateless and the states). However, positive self-redefinition meant Palestinianism became a value in and of itself -- a value which articulated at the heart of self-esteem and, as such, elicited fierce loyalty even in the face of powerful control mechanisms designed to repress the 'radical' mobilization of 'non-state' entities.

As counter-pressure by reason of state grows more blatant, the latent contradiction between those who have states and those who do not becomes more manifest and the boundaries of identity become more circumscribed. Palestinianism comes to transcend internal differences of class and geographic discontinuity and results in terminal identification with co-nationals. However, herein lies the Palestinian

¹⁵². Rouhana's (1982) 'identity-poll' of Israeli-Arabs which asked them to rank themselves in perceived closeness of lifestyle, social status and political status relative to other groups (i.e., West Bank Palestinians, Gaza Palestinians, Sephardim and Ashkenazi), found that they felt closer politically, socially and in lifestyle to West Bank and Gaza Strip Palestinians than any of the Jewish groups. In all areas of comparison, the order of closeness was constant: West Bank Palestinians first, Gaza residents second, Sephardim third and Ashkenazi last (see, A'si, 1986:14).

predicament. Although the subjective unity of Palestinian identity is focused on the common identity goal of 'Return ourselves to ourselves,' the variegated objective reality of Palestinian existence reflects itself in intra-group differences on tactics to achieve this goal.¹³³ Both of these elements (unity of identity and diversity of tactics) became highly exacerbated following the chaotic events of 1982.

5.5 POST-1982: THE WANING AND WAXING OF PALESTINIANISM

To Palestinians everywhere, the siege of Beirut became the most monumental event in their modern history -- even more monumental than the dismemberment of, and exodus from, Palestine in 1948 (Turki, 1983: 7).

In 1982, Ariel Sharon directed the Israeli invasion of Lebanon-- ostensibly to assure 'peace for Galilee' via the annihilation of the PLO's stronghold in Beirut. This attack against Palestinian forces in exile was launched (by most Israeli accounts) as part of a "larger

¹³³. It is worthwhile that even the 'radical' political ideologies which fueled the intellectual end of the Palestinian revolution appear to have been gradually enfolded by reason of state -- even though theoretically, the value of the state is antithetical to the value of justice. However, intra-Palestinian differences abound with respect to the conceptualization of this state, both in terms of the political nature of this state (i.e., democratic, socialist, religious) and in terms of its boundaries (i.e., from a totally provincial Palestinian state in all of Palestine, to the mainstream PLO-platform of pre-1973 which called for a secular, democratic state in all of Palestine, to Arafat's increasingly obvious endorsement of a Palestinian douala (mini-state) in the West Bank and Gaza). The douala is accepted by the majority of Palestinians everywhere, except for those living within the bounds of Israel proper. For further discussion with respect to certain implications of this, see the Implications section of Chapter Six.

strategy to break resistance in the West Bank and Gaza..." (cf., Graham-Brown, 1983).¹³⁴ In effect, however, this military 'solution' only served to exponentially aggravate Israel's political problem. Once again, repressive actions of the dominant group strengthened Palestinianism: by blatantly depicting Israel as the common direct oppressor of Palestinians 'in exile' as well as 'inside', the invasion of 1982 inadvertently buttressed the subjective solidarity of both groups. As a Palestinian survivor in Bourj al-Barajneh said of an Israeli bombing attack, "Don't worry, it's all vitamins for our nation" (in Turki, 1988:14).

The brutal assaults were met with great tenacity by those under attack (Giannou, 1984:87). The 'enemy' was historical and much more clearly defined than had been the case in Arab-Palestinian clashes (such as Black September). However, the Palestinians defending their positions in Beirut fully expected the other Arab states to answer Israel's 'knock on the door' of this Arab capital. For a complexity of reasons, no such Arab response was forthcoming (cf., Sanbar, 1982; Turki, 1983; Sayigh, 1987). Once again, the Palestinians were made painfully aware that Arabism offered little protection from Palestinian persecution.

¹³⁴. The 1982 invasion signified the latent Israeli acknowledgment that the PLO is the internally legitimate leadership of the Palestinian nation. The Beirut strategy was grounded on the premise that Palestinian 'political resistance' inside the Occupied Territories was merely a function of external agitation by this leadership. There was obviously little comprehension that the rejection of occupation on nationalist grounds flowed from the existential reality of the people themselves.

Despite the asymmetry of forces and the massive carnage which precipitated their military defeat, the PLO managed to remain 'samidun' for 88 days -- resistance which, as Arafat emphasized, was longer than the Arab regular forces managed to sustain in 1967. This Karamah-like tenacity of PLO resistance allowed them to emerge from the siege with their political dignity intact (cf., Stork, 1983). However, the net result was the evacuation of the PLO from Lebanon. As the heart of the Palestinian movement in exile was decentralized and scattered once again, a qualitative change was precipitated in Palestinian politics:

Politically, it is important to note that Palestinian activity is now mainly directed toward and focused on the interior, whereas until the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the problems and politics of the exterior were what mattered most (Said, 1986:52).

In essence, this change would eventually demonstrate that the *raison d'etre* of Sharon's strategy incurred an antithetical backfire.

In the wake of the Israeli invasion and the PLO evacuation, various forms of psychological terror were perpetrated against the remaining Palestinian civilians with the aim of sparking their mass exodus from Lebanese territory (cf., Stork, 1983). Enter the notorious massacres of Sabra and Shateela, where between 1,000 - 3,000 Palestinian camp residents were slaughtered by the Lebanese Christian Phalange:

The massacres were like the deadly aftershock of an earthquake, in which all remaining structures, in this case psychological, are destroyed, and the survivors, still reeling from the original blow are devastated anew (Stork, 1983: 3).

However, for various reasons, the Palestinian civilians remained and the memory of Sabra and Shateela became yet another bloody idiom which was "irreducibly Palestinian" and which strengthened the particularism of Palestinians everywhere (see discussion below).

From 1982 on, the besiegement of the Palestinians in Lebanon never really ceased but has continued as a "slow rolling pogrom," with acts of terror committed by Israelis, by the Lebanese Army and, more recently, by the Amal militia. The most demoralizing of all the attacks against Palestinians in Lebanon were those which arose out of the chaos of 1983, when Syrian-backed Palestinian dissident forces besieged the camps in an attempt to wrest control from Arafat's Fatah. As the on-site Canadian doctor, Chris Giannou observes:

In the Tripoli area the biggest problem was one of morale. People believed that the fighting was superfluous; that they were living a nightmare; that some day they would wake up and it would be as if none of this had taken place. They were not fighting people they could easily identify as the enemy and they could not readily accept the fact that, whatever difference there may be between Palestinians, a Palestinian born and brought up in the misery of a refugee camp would shell and bomb those same camps, or take up arms against fellow Palestinians. For them this was the highest form of treason (Giannou, quoted in Schaar, 1984:28).

When considered in relation to the perspective developed in this paper, it is conceivable that the psychological poverty of intra-Palestinian aggression was perhaps more traumatic than the magnitude of horrors incurred by the Israelis or the Phalange. No meaning could be established in the face of Palestinian fighting Palestinian -- for

meaning had been cast in collective terms. It is significant, therefore, that camp residents under siege displayed intense hostility to their Palestinian captors and even mounted active resistance (cf., Schaar, 1984). The Palestinian masses made very plain their unrelenting support for Arafat's leadership and their extreme dislike for the dissidents who had betrayed both the cause and the meaning of Palestinianism: "The memory of Palestinian fighting Palestinian was still an open wound in the minds of many and they swore never to repeat such a catastrophe" (Cutting, 1988:34).

The traumatic rift which this internecine war gouged in Palestinianism was mended by yet another bloody external assault waged against the Palestinians in Lebanon. This assault took the form of a fierce series of sieges against the camp populations as a whole -- regardless of internal political affiliations -- which was orchestrated by the Shi'ite Amal militia (with full Syrian approval). Once again, external undifferentiation of Palestinians prompted internal bridging of factional tendencies. Beginning in May 1985, various sieges have been launched with varying degrees of intensity and duration. As of November 1987, five separate sieges have been documented with the number of casualties for this period estimated as 2500 killed and 6000 wounded (George, 1987).

The first siege of 1985 was launched by Amal in the hopes of gaining control of the camps. Official Amal communiques suggested that their actions were prompted by fears that PLO fighters were reestablishing

their strongholds in Lebanon. Palestinian sources maintain that this accusation was falsely grounded, albeit a new core of camp-born shebab (left behind in the 1982 evacuation) were now old enough to take up the armed struggle.¹⁵⁵

Although the Palestinians were caught by surprise, were outnumbered, outgunned and "completely surrounded from the first shot," they successfully turned back the Amal onslaught. Perhaps the greatest sustained factor in the tenacity of the resistance was the incredible boost to morale resulting from the closing of the Palestinian ranks to face the 'enemy' as a united front.¹⁵⁶ Once again, the way lay open for deriving meaning from collective coping -- thus fueling the will to resist and remain 'samidun'.

¹⁵⁵. "We must make it very clear that we didn't have fighters in the [sense] of someone who has received military training outside. All our fighters were sons of the camp, new militias that hadn't been trained under the resistance movement... We had a handful of trained fighters but the majority were secondary students. Perhaps 80% were fighters using arms for the first time. These were not even the reserves of the resistance movement, they were reserves of reserves. This is because we had no plan to fight. These young men, most of them fighting for the first time, amply proved their steadfastness and their military capacities" (Testimony of a member of the Popular Committee of Shateela, quoted in Anonymous, 1985).

¹⁵⁶. The account of Dr. Swee Ang is revealing on this account: "...I was in the camps in 1985 and I witnessed the unity of the camp people. Not factions fighting against each other, but a united people intent on defending themselves against the invaders to the last man. The Arabic word 'wahad' -- meaning 'one' or 'united', dominates conversations at all levels, among the hospital staff, in the camp committees, in the women's committees, everywhere. Thus though the camps of Sabra, Shatila and Bourj al-Barajneh were surrounded by tanks and shelled for 40 days and nights, the camps held out and the enemy was exhausted and had to call for a ceasefire. If we call the events of 1982 the 'crucifixion' of Palestinian resistance, the events of 1985, three years later, could be likened to the 'resurrection'" (Ang, 1987:13).

5.5 A Impact Of 1982 - 1987: Prelude To The Intifadah

Impact in Exile:

The surrounding scene looks like something from the Apocalypse. The woman, her head wrapped in a scarf, her baby in her arms and another child between her legs, provides almost a living image of the tragedy of the Palestinians. But when we tell her this, she says, "What tragedy?" shrugging her shoulders...
...she kept smiling..."Nothing will stop me from smiling. As Abu Ammar [Arafat] says, 'Mountain, this little gust of wind is not going to shift you'. My house is destroyed? in that case, to hell with my house! I'm not going to get upset over a little thing like that... (Nassib, 1983:379).

What was the impact on Palestinianism of the post-82 violence and chaos in Lebanon? For survivors of the sieges, it is apparent that their traumatic experience only served to increase their identification with Palestinianism. For example, the following passage is based on an interview with a resident who remained in the Sabra camp after 1982. It clearly indicates that just as he has experienced intense personal crisis because he is a Palestinian, so too does he draw strength by 'Palestinianizing' such crisis, by casting it in a collective context:

'Leave? To go where?' The question keeps coming back, punctuating the story of his life's wanderings. The question always comes back without an answer, obsessively, as if in itself it explained his determination to stay put, 'at home', in his wretched hut built on the corner of an alley in the Palestinian camp of Sabra. 'What are they calling us? The refugees? The aidun (The 'returners' -- i.e., those who are going to return to Palestine), the...the...what was it? The revolutionaries? Yes, the revolutionaries. But above all, above all the samidun (the resisters, or more precisely, 'those who do not retreat'). Note that well. Write 'the samidun.' That is what we are. Leave? To go where? (Nassib, 1983:367).

The speaker was a refugee from 1948. He had fled to Jordan and lived in a camp there until Black September. He had come out alive and fled again to Lebanon: "Lebanon had been his last refuge, his last chance...unless allowed back to Palestine... 'Now [he says] all we have left is to show them what the Palestinian people are made of'" (Nassib, 1983: 369). Thus, the brutal chaos of post-1982 Lebanon neither eliminated nor deterred Palestinian nationalism. Rather, it became yet another event in the historical continuum of Palestinian oppression that buttressed the individual's allegiance to Palestinianism:

Behind the fearful nobility of Palestinian resistance to the siege [1982] is a richer more eloquent statement: National struggle has now become the mainspring of Palestinian existence, a daily currency of rational exchange, a tense of reality in the grammar of their process of human renewal, more intimately enfolding than their own skin. Palestinians always go on, leaving their failed history behind. They always pick up, reassembling themselves as they do so and proceed afresh (Turki, 1988: 201).

Thus Palestinianism imbues the suffering of the individual with meaning by placing this suffering in context of the collective experience of Palestinian history. As such, the trauma of the present is transcended through knowledge of past oppression, past resistance and collective faith in a future goal. It is in this way that ego identity-needs and collective purpose translate into political consequence.

In this light, it is insightful to consider the significance of the pro-Arafat behaviour of camp residents in Lebanon during the 1983 internecine war. Most of the camp residents were 1948 refugees from the

Galilee (i.e., inside the 1967 borders of Israel). As such, their homes, their property and their memories are not in the West Bank or Gaza. One might expect that these personal 'interests' would cause camp residents to reject the idea of a douala (i.e., a mini-state in the Occupied Territories). One would expect the residents to support the dissident groups whose radical ideology demanded the Return to all of historical Palestine and to reject Arafat's moderate stance which, since 1978, endorsed the notion of douala. How then, does one explain the camp residents' outrage at the dissident forces and their demonstrated support for Arafat?

From an identity perspective, the answer is clear: the psychological desire to uphold the unity of Palestinianism (and the leader who had given it meaning) was stronger than the materially-grounded desire to Return to one's possessions. The Return to Palestine, itself, had (through the negation of exile) become more important than the Return to one's house.¹³⁷

This point is absolutely crucial for it pinpoints the intersection of theory and behaviour -- of identity-needs, perceptions, hegemonic ideology and political behaviour. Thus, the terminal identity of the individual had come to rest in the collective identity of Palestinianism and, via the hegemonic ideology which structures the perceptions of social identity (through relative inter-group comparison), Palestinian-

¹³⁷. Discussion which supports this interpretation of events has been presented earlier [cf., Section 5.3 D]

ism, in order to be fulfilled, requires acceptance into the global order of humanity by way of statehood. The complex of vectors in this inextricable process is captured in the following passage by Turki -- a refugee from Haifa -- as he explains that the dialectic of his 'existential discontent' does not require that he be given back his family home but it does require the catharsis of statehood:¹³⁰

As a Palestinian, the prospect of an end to my isolation [by accepting a West Bank Palestinian state] from the mainstream of other men's ordered activities and purposes exercises an intensely strange fascination on my mind. I am lured by the agony of wanting, now, in my own lifetime, the chance to know what it feels like, how the experience would sense in my brain, to be, for the first time since I was a child, the citizen of a country, a native of a land that is my own, all my own, with hills and mountains, and children in brick houses, where I could sit with my people, no longer menaced, no longer destitute (Turki, 1973: 15).

Impact in the Interior:

The flawed logic of Sharon's Lebanon strategy was clearly revealed by the repercussions that resounded in the Occupied Territories. Displacement from Beirut may have resulted in denting the structure of Palestinianism, but the process of Palestinianism was merely enhanced:

Public demonstrations in all Palestinian occupation took place during the invasion. On July 31, 1982, thousands took to the

¹³⁰. The douala is upheld by almost all Palestinians in exile and in the Occupied Territories. The one regional sub-group that opposes the Palestinian state is the Israeli-Palestinians inside pre-1967 Israel (see discussion below).

streets in Nazareth. In mid-August 1982, some 150 public institutions in the West Bank published a manifesto against the war in Lebanon. The most widespread and effective strikes occurred...in the aftermath of the Sabra and Shatila massacre, calling for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon and the resignation of the government...The strike affected all Palestinian villages and towns, and was much more pervasive than the Land Day strike in March 1976 (Nakhleh, 1983:22).¹³⁹

Of course, Israel's answer to this 'internal' disturbance was pervasive repression. As the injuries of protesters mounted within the Territories, the perception of solidarity of Palestinians inside with those outside only increased. This sentiment was expressed shortly after the invasion by the mayor of Nablus, Bassam Shak'a:¹⁴⁰

All of the Palestinians are living one battle, inside and outside. We are facing one enemy and we have one mind and aspiration. This is our reaction to the attacks against the Lebanese and Palestinian people. Everyone feels that the confrontation -- the cause -- is one. We are living the battle minute by minute...we are confronted by a parallel Israeli policy which aims to annex the land and remove its people...Our people will fight the battle even more strongly after the battle of Lebanon. So I believe that our unity is deeper and the PLO is in greater control (Shak'a, in Bishara, 1982).

¹³⁹. It is noteworthy that the invasion of 1982, and the massacres at Sabra and Shateela are marked annually by massive protests, strikes and marches throughout Gaza, the West Bank, East Jerusalem and, to a lesser degree, within Israel proper (see for example, Al-Fajr, 1987). These dates are marked by those under occupation as an occasion to demonstrate the widespread rejection of occupation and its consequences. The mounting tension which drives the demonstrations against occupation are largely a function of the contradiction between the manifest appearance of a 'status quo' and the latent reality of Israel's policy of 'creeping annexation' (Shehadeh, 1988).

¹⁴⁰. Shaka'a was finally removed from office by the Israelis on March 5, 1982 (recall earlier discussion re Israeli attempts to depose Shaka'a, and his reinstatement through mass protest).

Israel's policy obviously backfired with respect to inducing Palestinians of the interior to relinquish their Palestinianism. However, the profundity of this error was initially disguised by the inertia and despondency in the 'interior' that followed in the wake of the PLO evacuation and the demoralization of Palestinian fighting Palestinian. As Dr. Nabil, an intellectual from Gaza, states:

It is unlikely in the present climate [post-1982] that any of the existing societies in Gaza could become a form of organised opposition to the occupation. It's not just a question of restrictions imposed by the authorities, although this is the most crucial factor. What's happened here, especially since Lebanon and the split in the PLO, is that there is an increasing sense of desperation. Such a situation is not necessarily a politicising one. Lack of confidence has led people to concentrate more and more on their own interests. We find we're all alone, and if we don't look after ourselves then no one else will (in Cossali and Robson, 1986: 135).

Dr. Nabil's insight is vital, for it alludes to the qualitative change that was to take place in Palestinian politics. Not only did the dismantling of the PLO in Lebanon turn the eyes of those in exile towards the Palestinians "already there" (i.e., in Palestine), it also turned the eyes of those "already there" unto themselves. This transformation brought into focus the necessity for struggle from within and added momentum to the growing emergence of 'grassroots' committees within the Territories (Nashishibi, 1988). These committees emerged to deal with the exigencies of occupation. As Samir, a young activist in Gaza relates, the people under occupation could no longer wait for unity from the outside or for a miracle to come from without: "I'd dearly

love the backing of the leadership outside, but if they can't agree among themselves we must go ahead on our own. It'll be more difficult but I don't think we have the luxury of an option" (in Cossali and Robson, 1986: 149).

It was these grassroots committees that served to institutionalize that essence of Palestinianism called 'samidun' and, in so doing, provided a coordinating function that helped to structure individual outlets of mobilization. As such, the disarray of external political leadership that followed the Lebanon invasion set in motion the transferral of the structure of the Palestinian struggle from the leaders outside to the people inside.

Despite this process of grassroots transformation, the factionalism of the exterior still functioned to stifle unity on the inside. Two events helped to bridge these intra-Palestinian division: the Amal sieges in Lebanon and the 18th PNC in Algiers.

What was the impact of Amal's besiegement of Sabra and Shateela and the incredible tenacity of camp resistance? Firstly, the fact that the attackers were Amal Shi'ite militia -- former Palestinian revolutionary allies -- was a shock to the Palestinians (cf. Anonymous, 1985). The impact was to further the psychological isolation of the Palestinians and to weaken the revolutionary idiom of Palestinianism as a liberation movement aligned with all the oppressed of the earth. Once again Palestinians were made to realize that they do not blend easily into the

catch-all identity of 'Arab', nor even of 'revolutionary,' but were first and foremost Palestinians.

Secondly, Syria's role in the camps war (along with the fact that camp Palestinians were collectively under siege -- regardless of their political affiliations) precipitated the closing of Palestinian ranks within the camps: "In the end, this forced both sides (pro- and anti-Arafat) towards a united stance in spite of their political differences" (Khalidi, 1987:12). This was a great political and psychological boon to Palestinians everywhere because it symbolized the recovery of a truly national struggle: "This was symbolized by the name given to the 18th Palestine National Council in Algiers in April, 1987: 'Session of the Steadfastness of the Camps and the Masses of the Occupied Territories'" (Khalidi, 1987:12; see also, Bishara, 1987).

Related to this is the tremendous political gains which the PLO and Arafat scored because of the situation in the camps. For the first time in UN history the PLO, itself, submitted a resolution to the Human Rights Commission condemning the Camps War (instead of submitting it by way of another Arab state). The resolution was endorsed and greatly bolstered Arafat's credibility and international standing (cf. George, 1987:7).

Thirdly, the resistance of the camps had a tremendous impact on Palestinian nationalism in the occupied territories and certainly was a major psychological factor behind the intifadah:

Lebanon's significance for the entire Palestinian political arena is evident from the boost that the PLO's defense of the camps over the winter of 1986-87 gave to Palestinian nationalism in the occupied territories. This period has witnessed intense agitation in the West Bank and Gaza in solidarity with the Palestinians in the camps of Lebanon...(Khalidi, 1987:12).

...No leadership which aspires to direct the fortunes of the Palestinian people can afford to ignore what happens to the Palestinians in Lebanon. The covers, editorials, and lead articles of the three main Palestinian weeklies...as well as many others... exhibit an overwhelming preoccupation with the situation in the camps in Lebanon (Khalidi, 1987:12).

The east-Jerusalem daily, al-Fajr, reports of numerous "spontaneous demonstrations," protests and peace vigils throughout the West Bank and Gaza strip in "solidarity with the Palestinians in the refugee camps in Lebanon" (e.g., al-Fajr, 1987a; al-Fajr, 1987b). Various campaigns also were initiated in the occupied territories to collect donations for the camps under siege. The paper notes that "many volunteers have come forward to help" (Al-Fajr, 1987b). In addition, numerous statements were issued in solidarity with those under siege which condemned both Amal's actions and the silence of the other Arab regimes. For example, statements were put forth by seven different institutions that included the Arab Medical Society, and various associations of engineers, lawyers, labour unions and women's groups. Women's groups of the West Bank issued international appeals to women of all Arab and Islamic countries.

Many prominent figures and institutions also put forth statements. Of these, one which was most significant was sent to UNWRA with the dual

purpose of demanding the lifting of the siege and of highlighting the grievances of the people of the occupied territories. Obviously, the two conditions are perceived to be integrally interconnected as is evidenced by this juxtaposition found within the communique: "...the tragic situation which our Palestinian people live through in refugee camps in the occupied territories and in the diaspora" (al-Fajr, 1987b).

One begins to sense the reciprocal interrelatedness of the process of Palestinianism. While the Palestinians in Lebanon coped with dire conditions by viewing their situation through the meaning of Palestinianism, their steadfastness in the face of oppression highlighted the grievances of those Palestinians in the Occupied Territories and provided them with an inspiring role model of collective resistance. No doubt, the intifadah gleaned much of its strength through the demonstration effect of the resoluteness of the Palestinians in Lebanon. Giannou (1988) notes that the two and a half years of 'samidun' displayed by Palestinian civilians in the camps under the hideous conditions of siege sent a clear message to the Palestinians of the Territories: "resistance is possible, even against tremendous military asymmetries." Indeed, the young, untrained shebab, who valiently defended the camps, no doubt functioned as role models for the "Children of Stones" who lead the intifadah.

5.5 B 1987: "The Shaking Off"¹⁶¹

They dazzled the world...
 With nothing in their hands but stones...
 (From "The Children of Stones,"
 Nizar Qubbani, 1987).

In 1987, the youth of Gaza, for the first time in such a massive manner, challenge the Israeli military, armed with nothing but stones. The very next day, a refugee camp in the West Bank (Balata) explodes with 'stoning' youth. The intifadah has begun.

The mass mobilization of every sector of the Palestinian population in the Territories and many of those inside Israeli proper has been ongoing now for over a year. In a way, the political challenge that the Palestinians have mounted with their fearless defiance -- although it is obviously rooted in the history of their experience -- is the time-lagged response of Palestinianism to Sharon's strategy in Lebanon. While Sharon was busy routing Palestinian structures 'in exile', the process of Palestinianism was 'coming home to roost'.¹⁶²

It is not within the bounds of this paper to explore indepth this

¹⁶¹. Intifadah, by literal translation means 'shaking off'. This is perhaps more indicative of the momentum behind the mass mobilization (i.e., to shake off the occupation) than the standard translation of 'uprising'.

¹⁶². This interpretation of events is further supported by analysts who believe that the timing of the uprising was influenced by Sharon's decision to move his residence into the old city of Jerusalem. The outrage with which Palestinians greeted this provocation was exacerbated by the fact that it was not just a Jew, but that it was Sharon who was 'settling' on Palestinian territory (cf., Keller, 1988).

latest chapter in Palestinian history.¹⁶³ Rather, the identity-mobilization which underpins this political action will be briefly mentioned.

Firstly, it is important to note that, contrary to the interpretation of certain analyses, the intifadah is neither driven 'from above', nor deterrable by force. It is first and foremost a mass mobilization 'from below':

It is a pure misapprehension to believe that the widespread uprising was led by a nucleus of activists which has attracted the support of the masses. In fact it is rooted in the frustrations, personal, political and economic of the past two decades, that left no other recourse except revolt...occupation for Palestinians symbolized a syndrome of dispossession, uprooting and displacement that reduced them to a sub-human level (Hassassian, 1988:5).

The uprising was not orchestrated by the PLO from outside despite Israel's implied belief that this was the case. Mossad's 1988 assassination in Lebanon of Khalil el Wazir (Abu Jihad, a mainstream PLO leader in exile) was most likely orchestrated in the belief that, if the leadership is deterred (eliminated), the masses will soon succumb. Again, this policy was a continuation of the same perspective which gave birth to the 1982 invasion of Lebanon and, like in Lebanon, the policy totally backfired. As one analyst notes: "In his martyrdom, one of the most powerful PLO leaders became more dangerous an enemy of Israel than he had been in his life" (Ghilan, 1988). And, as Zommo confirms: "The killing of Abu Jihad only brings the outside closer to

¹⁶³. For a more in-depth look at the intifadah, see Kuttah, 1988a; Kuttah, 1988b; Rabbanni, 1988; Sigler, 1988; Stork, 1988; Tamari, 1988).

the inside -- it draws the PLO into the people, and the people into the PLO" (Zommo, 1988). These interpretations are supported by the behavioural reactions of the Palestinians inside. Far from quelling the intifadah, the occasion of Abu Jinnad's martyrdom was marked with accelerated protests and acts of defiance by Palestinians of the interior along with their vocal affirmation of the unity of Palestinians and the PLO.¹⁶⁴

The momentum of the intifadah, then, is not sustained by interest-oriented 'instigators' but by the existential discontent of the populace. What started out as spontaneous rebellion was given structure and cohesion by grassroots organizations and the decentralized, unified leadership. The 'legitimacy' of this leadership is evidenced by the continuation of the intifadah despite the thousands of 'leaders' who have been jailed and the hundreds who have been 'martyred.'¹⁶⁵

¹⁶⁴. This unity is embodied in the coordinated working relationship between local leaders of the interior with PLO leaders in exile--a relationship realized in the Unified Leadership of the Uprising. Another very important factor inducing the unification of Palestinian factions, both inside and outside, was a function of the Israeli policy of massive incarceration of activists. The levelling experience of prison brought together activists from the various parties and prompted collaboration that continued upon release (cf., Sigler, 1988; see Stork, 1988). Indeed, the prison experience is considered to be the fundamental training ground -- the "university" -- of the shebab.

¹⁶⁵. The almost daily announcements of Israeli officials concerning the successful termination of the intifadah are obviously formulated on Realist precepts -- i.e., that deterrence should deter. The Palestinian answer to these announcements (i.e., more mass strikes, more protests, more stone-throwers risking life and limb) highlights the poverty of the Realist paradigm with respect to explaining these events and with respect to formulating effective policy to deal with them.

The intifadah, therefore, represents the discontent of the masses with the negation of occupation. Some analysts have suggested that this popular uprising has returned the conflict to what it was in 1948, "a communal conflict between the Jewish and Arab peoples for a homeland on the same small bit of territory" (Meron Benvenisti in Sigler, 1988). While on the surface this observation may appear valid, the entire preceding discussion on the historical ontogeny of Palestinianism illuminates the error in this supposition.

The psychologically-unified Palestinian uprising of 1987 is not directly equatable to the sociologically-coherent Arab rebellion of the 1930's and 1940's. The mass uprising of 1987, unlike its predecessor, is reinforced by over forty years of historical experience which have focused both the identity and the specific goals of the mobilized. The population is no longer working under the auspices of tawrit nor is it being distracted by the influence of competing leaders, identities and goals. Unlike the Arabs of Palestine who sought refuge in Arab lands from the terror of 1948, the Palestinians of 1988 will not be budged by bullets, beatings or incarceration. As Mahmoud, a twenty-year old, full time participant in the Uprising confirms:

This uprising is only the first major round...In a year or two there will be another uprising and then yet another until we force the Israeli occupiers out (in Doumani, 1988).

The intifadah does not represent Arabs fighting for a homeland, but Palestinians fighting for Palestine. As such, it signifies the culmina-

tion of a protracted, ethno-nationalist mobilization of the first order: the process of identity mobilization which was waxing in the 'exterior' in 1967 and which Israel attempted to squelch in 1982, has pervasively erupted in the interior. The exigencies of 'wandering for forty years' have clearly forged a nation whose terminal goal is restoration to legitimacy through statehood. It is no longer a matter of leaders and followers for the two have become intertwined. As one young shebab put it, "We are the PLO." Similarly a resident of the West Bank, writing a year before the uprising, reveals the Palestinian terminal sense of national identity and the cohesive determination which underpins Palestinian mobilization:

To me, as, I think, to many others living under occupation, the PLO is a symbol which represents the very natural national desire of my people to be free on our own soil. As such, the PLO does not communicate through telephones. It has a direct line to people's hearts. We want to be free. It is simple. The PLO symbolizes for us this basic desire. The 12-year and 14-year old youths who were murdered at Balatta refugee camp while challenging with their still-soft bones fully armed soldiers, did not risk death because Arafat phoned the night before and told them to. They came out, essentially, because they are human beings... (Nusseibeh, 1986: 16).

And finally, with respect to the ultimate goals which energize the intifadah, Stork (1988) on a recent field trip to the Territories, found "remarkable Palestinian unanimity around the two-state formula." This goal has been unequivocally stated by the Unified Leadership of the Uprising and in the now-famous June 1988 document written by PLO spokesman Bassam Abu Sharif, and was most recently endorsed with majority backing at the November 1988 meeting of the exiled Palestine

National Council. As already considered at length, this desire for statehood is more than mere metaphor but articulates with the whole process of Palestinian identity at its very roots. Just as nationalism has functioned to structure the psychology and reality of the indigenous population of Palestine, so too has it structured the goals of their identity-needs. Thus, having already wrested subjective control over Palestinian identity through national mobilization, statehood is now perceived as the means to achieve objective control over the circumstances which impinge upon the collective. That is, Palestinian statehood is conceived as legitimizing Palestinian restoration to dignity and as providing the final refuge from the oppressive conditions of statelessness.

Thus, for the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories and for the Palestinians in exile, a Palestinian douala is perceived as the vehicle to reconcile the subjective and the objective, the existential and the political, the process and the structure. Statehood is perceived as the liberating structure which would finally free the Palestinian from that nebulous warp of statelessness and from the burden of his identity. As Hamid, a former refugee in Jordan states:

It does not matter that I have material comforts...My identity has been taken from me, and I don't feel right inside. If there were created tomorrow a Palestinian state, I do not know for sure if I would move there, but I know that even if I did not, I would finally feel right inside. I would be a Palestinian with a state, I would finally be equal, and if I was still subjected to discrimination in Jordan, then I would have a place to go

(Hamid, 1988).¹⁶⁶

Thus, the acceptance of the douala by exiled Palestinians can be understood in terms of identity and relative inter-group comparison. However, the two state 'solution' to Palestinian existential discontent is not without internal contradiction -- a contradiction which is most manifest to the Israeli-Palestinians.

The Uprising has sparked unprecedented unrest among Israeli-Palestinians:

...the uprising is significant...because it involved not only the West Bank and Gaza, but, for the first time, full participation of Israel's Arab citizens in the Galilee and elsewhere. The general strike on December 21 was unprecedented. It was a signal to the Israelis that if they continue along this road, then they will have to deal not only with the Arabs of the territories, but with "their" Arabs as well (Tamari, 1988:27).

Herein lies the rub: whether Israelis do or do not accommodate the douala goal of the Uprising, they will ultimately have to deal not only with "their Arabs" but also with the other sources of injustice which, to date, have been overshadowed by the preponderance of nationalist concerns on both sides.

¹⁶⁶. Parallel sentiments were expressed by Mostafa Zommo (the Canadian from Gaza) during a personal interview. He did not think that he would move to a Palestinian state, but the very knowledge of the existence of a Palestinian state would ease the burden of being Palestinian.

5.6 SUMMARY: THE PROCESS OF PALESTINIANISM

The Palestinian ...has acquired a great measure of contempt for the linearity in the Western empirical paradigm that refuses to recognize that in the conjugation of the verb to be there is always a state of being and becoming, (Turki, 1980:40).

This selective historical overview provides an illustrative sense of the analytical richness of Ross' three-stage identity mobilization model and the way in which imposed subjugation and inequality are related to the historical development of group identity. Clearly, Palestinian entity-consciousness is emergent with history and circumstance witnessing the psychic transformation of the pre-Zionist natives of Palestine from communal groups, to a subjugated collective, to a mobilized (but still dominated) ethno-nationalist identity-group. This exploration of Palestinian identity, then, suggests that Palestinianism is not a structure but a process that has been 'structured' by a history of collective domination.¹⁶⁷

As this overview has indicated, Palestinianism is not something that has been created primarily by self-interested leaders or which flows

¹⁶⁷. Any proposed 'solutions' which do not fully consider the historical process of Palestinian 'becoming', cannot be effective approaches to conflict settlement. Specifically, this refers to arguments grounded on historical moments such as: 'Jordan is Palestine'; 'A two-state solution was rejected in 1948'; 'A West Bank state was rejected in 1967'; 'There were no Palestinians in 1948'. Such structured snap-shots of history cannot be transported across time, imposed upon present reality and then marshalled as excuses for continued abuse of the people who call themselves Palestinian. Palestinianism and its goals cannot be cast as immutable structures, nor can they be divorced from history as a process.

from governments and embassies or which has been instilled only through flag-waving and anthem inculcation. Rather, Palestinianism has emerged primarily as a collective terminal identity of those individuals who could not/would not escape the peculiar and negating history which has impinged upon their lives because, once, they lived in a land called Palestine. Palestinianism, therefore, is an essence which "flows from the people themselves; they have lived through it and have understood" (Sanbar, 1982: 299).

Thus, the Palestinian sense of terminal identity does not exist in a void. It emerged out of the matrix of relationships incurred by the enfoldment of world order by nationalism (as the hegemonic ideology which has structured the global and social order both physically and psychologically). Palestinianism, as the collective culmination of individual identity-processes, was structured by this order both physically and psychologically.

Through experiencing the victimization wrought by the material manifestation of nationalist ideology (i.e., through marginalization, dispossession and statelessness), the identity processes of all those who had once lived in Palestine converged to terminate in the psychological cathection of a nation. Thus, Palestinianism functioned to alleviate the negation of not belonging to a nation, of being 'outside' the global order, of being a non-entity as an individual.

However, belonging to a nation is only one half of the nationalist

equation. In order to be legitimate the nation must have a state. And, according to the conceptual framework developed earlier, the self-esteem of individuals who comprise a subjugated collective such as the Palestinians is terminally cathected to the legitimacy and status of the group. It is in this way that identity-needs of the individual underlie ethno-nationalist mobilization and that identity-needs are perceived to be intertwined with territory and statehood.

CHAPTER SIX:

CONFLICT AND IDENTITY: PALESTINIANISM AND THE POLITICS OF BEING

6.1 PALESTINIANISM AND THE POLITICS OF BEING: IMPLICATIONS

Given the state of consciousness which underpins the present day mobilization of the majority of Palestinians, what are the implications for the future of the conflict itself? This is a difficult question to answer, given that the foregoing analysis stressed only one aspect of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (e.g., Palestinian identity) at the expense of others (i.e., the ontological process of Israeli-Jewish identity, larger global frameworks, etc). However, despite its limitations, this analysis allows for some indication of certain complexities of the conflict which are perhaps not readily evident.

A central implication is embedded in the Janus-faced duality of nationalist ideology: i.e., nationalism is both a "'plan' of what should be...and a 'false consciousness' which obscures human vision from the real conditions of existence" (Portugali, 1988: 155). Thus, just as the generative order of nationalism functioned to legitimize the human victimization experienced by the native inhabitants of Palestine, so too are these victims then 'forced' to combat their victimization by organising according to nationalist order principles. That is, the experience of marginalization, dispossession and exile structured the identity-processes of individuals to result in collective mobilization which is predicated on the belief that self-esteem and alleviation of

oppression can only be achieved through Palestinian self-determination and statehood. This goal was not the original intellectual force behind the Palestinian revolution.

Originally, as discussed in Section 5.4, the revolutionary goal was conceived as liberation from oppression -- a goal which was based on the value of 'justice' and never embodied the specific form of ethnocentric 'statehood' and certainly not of a douala. However, through the manifest reality of exposure to a fierce and uncompromising Zionist ethnocentrism¹⁶⁶ and the immediacy of adopting some tangible strategy to halt the ponderous weight of Israeli military occupation (in which the dialectics of space is of overwhelming concern to those so occupied), the goal of collective liberation became pragmatically streamlined to 'national' liberation as realized through the goal of Palestinian statehood.

Unfortunately, this goal of statehood is, in and of itself, a 'value' and one that is potentially quite different from the value of 'justice' that underpins the notion of liberation. Thus, the cruel irony of the Palestinian 'need' for national statehood (like the Zionist 'need' before it) is that achievement of this goal functions to legitimize the ideology and the system which initially caused their collective human suffering in the first place.

¹⁶⁶. It is important to remember that Zionist ethnocentrism itself, evolved out of the horrific collective persecution of the Jews and has become even more thoroughly entrenched by way of its institutionalization in the form of Israel and by the consequent conflict dynamic.

So here is raised a dilemma with respect to the prognosis for the future of the conflict: although human rights were abused because a sociological group's organization did not conform to the national-territorial mode, the attainment of national-territorial rights does not offer an inherent guarantee that the human rights of group members will be restored. Although the above exploration of the ontogeny of Palestinian national identity has suggested the process by which Palestinians have become tethered to each other and to the land of Palestine, uncovering the roots of this cathecation does not automatically produce an easy formula for the resolution of conflict. A Palestinian state would solve the maturation problem of Palestinian identity but would it necessarily solve the conflict itself? Consider the following insight:

Devotion to certain values is translated into commitment to an organization that seems to be the propitious instrument, whether the only one or the best, specially capable of defending these values and bringing about their victory...The organization must also...present its members with a doctrine, which its intellectuals strive to elaborate. This doctrine determines a programme: the goals to be aimed at, the stages to be set, the paths and means by which to assure this advance in a hostile or indifferent world (Rodinson, 1983: 29).

Palestinianism, which is a process originally dedicated to collective liberation (and to the restoration to self-esteem of group members) has, through enfoldment by nationalist organization and ideology, determined that the prime instrument to advance and to ensure these justice-based values is through Palestinian independence and statehood.¹⁶⁹ Here

¹⁶⁹. Thus, the role once played by anti-Palestinianism in creating and perpetuating Palestinian particularism has been taken over by Palestinianism itself.

is raised the perplexing dilemma: Is the state goal an appropriate road (in a world of nations and states) to achieve a cause predicated on justice? Or has the tangible objective of statehood been fashioned from the ideology and the organization that were instrumental in creating the affront to justice in the first place? If the latter statement is true, has commitment to this tangible objective come to overshadow the values of justice that the realization of this objective is supposed to serve?

If we return to the conceptual notions of Chapter Four, i.e., that nationalism is false consciousness and that the state is not the sole precondition for human freedom, then it would appear that, in theory, conflict resolution would be better served by a process dedicated to moving beyond false consciousness and not to reinforcing the system which has given rise to it. Rodinson's (1983) insights, which were derived from a radical analysis of the 'Jewish problem' and Zionist manifest values and goals, would appear to be equally applicable to the 'Palestinian problem':

Logically, the 'Jewish problem', the relations of tension between Jews and others, can be fully 'resolved' in only one of two ways, leaving aside the radical solution worked out by Adolf Hitler: either through the withering away of specifically Jewish characteristics, leading to total assimilation and to the disappearance of Jewish specificity itself, or through the establishment of a perfectly harmonious society. The first perspective now seems far off. The second, to say the least, is not right around the corner. But in any case it seems clear that any struggle for a more rational and more just society brings us closer to this ideal. It may at least be asked of the Jews that they not place themselves on the wrong side, that they not impede this struggle...

The moral necessity is to demand respect for the legitimate collective rights of a religious or secular community when it

exists, but not to maintain it, recreate it, or reinforce it when impersonal social factors (and not brutal constraint, force and persecution) cause it to wither (Rodinson, 1983: 117).

On the surface, therefore, it may appear that the Burtonian process of problem-solving (which is intended to get to core values by exposing metaphors) might be a useful avenue to explore with respect to moving the conflict beyond goals which appear to be constructs of the false consciousness of nationalist ideology (and therefore recipes for more conflict and not less). However, for a host of reasons (some of which are discussed elsewhere, e.g., Section 6.2), a process which is geared towards 'redefining' the territorially based identity goals (metaphors) of an ethno-nationalist group (whose collective sense of self was historically structured by marginalization resulting from enfoldment by the generative order of nationalism) is unlikely to succeed unless the external environment which molded the 'terminality' of ethno-nationalist ideology over other group ideologies is radically transformed.¹⁷⁰

In this regard, it is insightful to consider Burton's suggestion for ameliorating and resolving inter-ethnic conflict:

¹⁷⁰. It is revealing to consider Galtung's lament with respect to what the Jews (and by the same token, the Palestinians) could have become: "The Jews could have become the first really non-territorial nation, a trans-national organization...not with the aim of becoming a territorial one, one more nation-state in the old tradition, but with the aim of becoming an increasingly non-territorial, International Jewry... a trans-national cementing force in a world community -- and the world community badly needs such forces" (Galtung, 1971: 175). The problem with this, as has been alluded to in the overview of Palestinian identity-formation, is that who, in a world that believes in the value of territorial nations and states with no higher authority, can guarantee the safety of International citizens, as individuals, and as a collective?

The probability is that closer social and functional relationships between ethnic communities within states is more likely once each community has an identity of its own, than it is when attempts at integration are made...On a wider plane, cooperation among tribal groups in African states could probably be accelerated by secession and the creation of separate states more than by coercion by central authorities dominated by one of the communities. Federal systems cannot easily be imposed; federations occur as the result of a long process of functional cooperation (Burton, 1979: 166).

Without denying the intuitive good sense of what Burton is suggesting, it is important to consider on what grounds Burton has come to this 'solution'. His 'solution' which is based on ethnic secession and protection is firmly grounded on his biological suppositions concerning identity-needs.¹⁷¹ That is, his solution is based on a belief in an ethnic-identity need and not on an analysis of the process of identity formation. This ignores the whole thesis of this paper which considers the formation of a mobilized group identity as a process of historical development tied to inequality, subjugation and ideology. This interpretation of Burton's position (i.e. that it severely overlooks the structural violence that has shaped ethnic-identity mobilization) is supported when considered in context of the analysis of A.J.R. Groom (1975) who is also of the World Society persuasion. Thus Groom (in an

¹⁷¹. This has been clearly elucidated in the earlier chapters, but as a vivid reminder, consider this statement: "That there are socio-biological needs serves to explain the persistent demand for independence of nations and for identification of groups within states. These manifestations of nationalism have biological origins and protective functions" (Burton, 1979: 82). Furthermore, Burton suggests that human needs can be satisfied "through their expression in ethnic identity and the security and recognition that this can give" (Burton, 1979). This understanding belies the notions developed in this paper, which directs attention to ethnic differentiation and boundary formation arising out of subjugation and minority status, which suggests that the ethnic label can be a major source of personal insecurity.

analysis which is very helpful with respect to outlining certain of the psychological elements involved in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict) suggests that inter-party functional relationships based on crosscutting ties may be helpful as a "conflict prophylactic" by creating superordinate goals between the parties. Groom's logic may seem reasonable enough, but then he continues:

The linkages between Palestinians and the Israelis engendered by the occupation would, in any other circumstances, be most helpful...While the occupation has strengthened their [Palestinians of the Occupied Territories] utilitarian links with Israel, since many of them now earn a living in the Israeli economy, especially in the building industry, the fact of occupation gives salience to their linkages with Palestinians in the unoccupied Arab territories (Groom, 1975: 45;50).

Such an interpretation of the nature of the 'functional' relationship between the Israeli economy and the migrant Palestinian workers would seem to seriously ignore the asymmetries and exploitation inherent in this relationship.

It is in attempting not to fall into this sort of reductionism that we are led back to the factors on which this paper's subjective treatment of Palestinian ontology has been based but which were not in themselves analysed, i.e., the subjugating 'objective' problems that are evidenced in the asymmetrical relationships of this conflict. These forms of structural inequalities -- as both the Ross model and Portugali's thesis predict -- have been integral to the coalescing and mobilization of the Palestinian subjective essence.

If we take peace between Palestinians and Israelis to mean the absence of both direct violence (i.e., military occupation, repression, etc.) and structural violence (i.e., economic domination, and other forms of exploitive interaction),¹⁷² then, will the perceived goal of Palestinian mobilization, which appears to have become focused in territorial terms alone, be a step on the road to peace? Will statehood, in and of itself, ensure a "modicum of justice" for the Palestinian people (to borrow Edward Said's (1979) term)?

For example, suppose that a two-state condominium were achieved.¹⁷³ Statehood, alone, would allow for some territorial control of the Palestinian population which may alleviate the exigencies of Israeli military occupation. However, merely acquiring territorial control does not automatically translate into socio-economic control nor does it eradicate the roots of exploitation that are presently being overshadowed by the pressing problem of nationalist persecution.

There would still be structural violence between the two parties, with Israel (increasingly since 1967) at the 'core' and the Palestinian

¹⁷². In borrowing Galtung's (1971) definition of 'peace', it is essential to also borrow his waiver: "Obviously, this is a much broader condition than the absence of these two forms of violence between Israelis and Arabs -- there can be both kinds of violence within and between the [Palestinians] and the [Israelis]...But we shall continue in the tradition of limiting the discussion to the special case of Israeli-Palestinian violence" (Galtung, 1971: 192).

¹⁷³. Even the achievement of Palestinian statehood appears highly unlikely when viewed from a global politico-economic framework such as Chomsky (1983) employs to explain the United States-Israel "rejectionist front."

state at the 'periphery' [i.e., the supplier of raw materials, limited agricultural products and a migrant labour force (which despite the level of education and skill of its members, is required to take unskilled jobs), and a 'dumping ground' for Israeli manufactured goods]. Certainly state control may be able to alleviate some of this through institutional means. However, as Salim Tamari has concluded, "the quest for Palestinian national self-determination acquires a more complex dimension when the future of the occupied territories is viewed in the context of socio-economic developments...How the Palestinian national movement will resolve this dilemma remains to be seen" (Tamari, 1980: 107). It would be no easy task to transform the dependency relationship into one of interdependence. Galtung's analysis is helpful:

...with the developmental gap that exists, horizontal trade would be artificial and could only be brought about by a normative commitment that does not exist; whereas vertical trade would be 'economic' but in all likelihood add to the conflict material that is already more than high enough (Galtung, 1971: 195).

A further consideration is that statehood implies not only control over territory, but also control over people who inhabit that territory. We have seen quite clearly how the interaction of psychology, ideology and material circumstance has pushed both Palestinian identity and actions along the road to 'enslavement' by the Westphalian system of nations and of states. However, according to Charles Tilly and others, the Westphalian state was born in war; it is a war-making institution. That is, it is the only institution with a legitimate monopoly on the use of coercion and of force, including death, in the interest of

'stability'.

Although Palestinian rebellion is, at its roots, dissenting against the oppression of this coercive system that has so victimized Palestinians as a collective, it would appear that their perceptions have been structured such that they now believe that they need their own legitimate coercive apparatus, i.e., it is acceptable for Palestinians to oppress Palestinians in the name of the state because this is internationally legitimate. Will the new government of Palestine, no longer the harbinger of Palestinian human needs, be forced to become a 'legitimator' of the system?

This is a question which is central to Khalil Nakhleh's (1980) appeal to Palestinian intellectuals. Surveying the dynamics of Palestinian revolutionary ideals as they have collided with pragmatism, Nakhleh concludes:

This discussion has demonstrated the contradictory nature of the intellectual functions pertaining to the Palestinian struggle. Certain categories of Palestinian intellectuals are instrumental in the production of a guiding consciousness for the revolution, while, simultaneously, they act as managers of legitimation for the status quo whose transformation was purported to have been the goal of the consciousness they produced in the first place (Nakhleh, 1980: 195).

Thus, will the pragmatic politics of 'being' cause the quest for "justice" to be forsaken for a Palestinian state? Once again, Rodinson's insights (which are derived from an analysis of the Zionist value/goal process) are revealing:

Once they hold power over a country, even those governments most devoted to the cause of their people...very soon convince themselves that the administration, defence, and the progress of the country in question cannot be effectively pursued without resorting to means contrary to their own supreme values...The deeper reasons for deviation from the ideal [values] that originally motivated commitment [to statehood] lie in the dynamic characteristics of organization and ideology, in the requisites of maintaining them defending them and extending their influence...(Rodinson, 1983: 30;33).

Indeed, this is the very premise on which Heller (1983) conducts his realist analysis (which does not arise out of a concern for the 'rights' of Palestinians, but rather for the security of Israeli sovereignty) that results in the proposal to 'settle' the conflict by way of an independent and sovereign Palestinian state under the leadership of the PLO. Thus, Heller assumes that the creation of a Palestinian state will 'normalize' the Palestinian condition and that the Palestinian leadership, with its newly vested interest in the preservation of the state, will become a normal actor (i.e., will have a vested interest in combating extremism within its ranks). In this way, Palestinians will be the ones to 'legitimately' suppress Palestinians who are still seeking justice.

By focusing on the false consciousness of national justice (i.e., demands for settlement by way of Palestinian statehood), the more radical goal for collective justice for all those who were victimized by this conflict is subsumed. This can be a recipe for civil war, as Palestinian authorities are forced to 'control' the more radical elements of Palestinian society whose injustices are not solved by statehood.

Perhaps it is the fate of the Arabs (Palestinians) who are citizens of Israel that is key to highlighting the latent contradiction in the manifest goal of Palestinian statehood.¹⁷⁴ Once again, Nakhleh's critique is insightful by revealing that certain Palestinian intellectuals who, in an attempt to deal within the system, have advanced a theory of struggle which is "not advanced at all; it postulates the divisibility of the Palestinian people into Palestinians and Arabs of Israel." This strategy, in effect, is premised more on the goal of ending military occupation and oppression than on the "formulation of a comprehensive ideology for the entire Palestine question" :

...following the pattern of international dominance, these intellectuals fell into the trap of relegating 500,000 Palestinians to Israel 'proper', thus defining them outside the heart of the Palestine question. In that sense, military occupation succeeded again in forcing the fragmentation of the consciousness of the Palestinian struggle (Nakhleh, 1980: 192).

Thus, in practice, a Palestinian douala will most likely be an

¹⁷⁴. Shammass (1988), a Palestinian citizen of Israel, is greatly concerned about how a two-state solution would affect his rights as a human being. Thus, with Israeli compromise in favour of a Palestinian state would come the finality of borders and the final endorsement of Jewish exclusivity in the Israeli state. This would relegate the Israeli-Palestinians either to inescapable second-class acquiescence (with no hope for future equality) or to the vanquishing trauma of "transfer" (cf., Shammass, 1988; Lustick, 1980): "In practical effect, this very likely means that the state of Israel will have every right to deprive me of my political rights inside its jurisdiction, arguing that I am able at any time to pursue my national fulfillment next door...Palestinians throughout the world, including the Arab states will face the same reproach" (Shammass, 1988).

oppressive departure from the original goal of 'liberation'.¹⁷⁵ In detailing his concerns about the 'morning after' such a state is created, Shammass draws insightful parallels between the Zionist national goal and that of the Palestinians. For example, will not the Palestinian state, which is to be the territorial refuge for the Palestinian people, also have to invoke a law similar to the Zionist Law of Return? Does this contingency not mean that the State of Palestine will in fact be the State of the Palestinian People, thus requiring invocation of many of the same chauvinistic policies that Israel, as the State of the Jewish People, found it necessary to impose?¹⁷⁶

Many Palestinians, having suffered the latent consequences of Zionist manifest goals, are adamant in their condemnation of such ethno-nationalist protectionism and are confident in their ability to avoid it:

The Palestinian people -- which has had its society destroyed by a movement claiming to achieve national liberation...--

¹⁷⁵. 'Liberation' here does not mean "throwing the Jews into the sea" but, rather, in its ideal form, means the creation of a democratic and secular entity where all inhabitants of the region may enjoy equal rights "without the exclusive domination of one category of the population over another" (Nakhleh, 1980: 194). Although this was the ideal that underpinned the original PLO call for a democratic and secular state in all of Palestine, it was an ideal that was premised on religious equality and did not really take into account the fact that Zionists (especially in their secular form) consider themselves to be a national collectivity and not a religious collectivity. For further discussion see Rodinson, 1983.

¹⁷⁶. Obviously, the parallel is not identical in that the Palestinians are not forced to deal with indigenous natives who are non-nationals and who would have to be dispossessed. Yet there are similarities, especially if one considers the status of Israeli 'settlers' in the Occupied Territories.

wishes no negative form of self-determination or liberation for itself. Its bitter national experience has bred in it a respect for civil and human rights abrogated by others. The Palestinian vision therefore is predicated upon democracy and justice, upon dignity and community. It is neither about conquest nor about a narrowly defined ethnic nationalism...(Said et al., 1988).

Although this is undoubtedly the manifest intention of Palestinian self-determination, given the intensity of Palestinian traumatization and the immediacy of the need for a national refuge, will the Palestinian State be able to avoid latent chauvinism?

The above discussion has indicated some of the problems that enfold the issues of Palestinian identity and mobilization and future of the conflict itself. Above all, it is evident that although nationalist ideology bequeaths a 'plan of what should be' it does not proffer a blueprint for the internal determinants of this plan (i.e., the domestic nature of the nation-state) nor does it specify just how a state would overcome all of the problems experienced by the stateless. Palestinian statehood as a goal does not offer any solutions nor guarantees with respect to the problems of economic conditions, internal domestic equality, the fate of the Israeli Palestinians, the fate of the ghourba whose homes were in Jaffa, or whose homes no longer exist.

In summary, the dilemma posed by the generative order of nationalism is perplexing in terms of conflict abatement, let alone resolution based on justice. On the one hand, nationalism functions to structure the experiences and identity-processes of its victims such that restoration of self-esteem is perceived as possible only through ethno-national

mobilization and statehood. On the other hand, it masks the latent consequences of pursuing this goal. Thus, despite the problems inherent to Palestinians solving their victimization through statehood, the preceeding exploration of Palestinianism has shown that as long as Palestinians continue to be subjugated and dominated, attempts which factor Palestinian statehood out of the equation -- by way of either deterrence, or problem 'redefinition' -- are not likely to effect Palestinian de-mobilization.

Does this dilemma mean that the goal of statehood which drives Palestinian mobilization will inevitably result in more conflict and not less? This answer to this question is highly dependent upon the many other influences that factor into this conflict. However, from a strictly 'identity' viewpoint, although a Palestinian state will result in neither profound peace nor collective liberation, it might allow for a limited peace. It could do so if the state settlement were carefully constructed as a disassociative technique designed for the "purpose of institutionalizing conflict resolution, not only for institutionalizing separation" (Galtung, 1971). Thus, the many elements which embroil and perpetuate this conflict will not be solved piecemeal -- settlement must be pursued with a view towards a comprehensive 'settlement'. This is neither a simple nor tidy task, but it is perhaps a necessary one.

Should disassociation bring some form of stability to the region (a condition which is contingent upon the successful handling of the problems listed above), this may provide the necessary precondition for

the conflict's victims (on both sides) to 'see beyond' the false consciousness of nationalism in order to move beyond it. That is, once the existential discontent of Palestinian statelessness (in a world of nations and of states) is settled, perhaps the way will be open for the surfacing of other 'problems' which had hitherto been masked by the overriding urgency of nationalist concerns. After the perceptions of those who call themselves Palestinians, or Israelis, are no longer overwhelmingly focused on violations or threats to their national rights, perhaps then will the latent violations/constraints to their human rights become more manifest.¹⁷⁷

The problem with this is that the very nature of the state (unless it is 'run' by exceedingly visionary and insulated statesmen) makes it

¹⁷⁷. It is essential to note that this suggestion which, on the surface, sounds much like Burton's recommendation for 'ethnic security' so that functional ties can be effected, is fundamentally different from Burton's biological ethnicity that needs protection. Rather, this approach suggests disassociation which, if it leads to conflict reduction, may result in the 'de-terminalizing' of 'ethnic' or 'national' identity, such that the other sources of injustice, which this collective identity masks, will be brought into consciousness. This approach fits in with the notion that the identity-needs of individuals require positive self-esteem, are malleable, and are assessed in relational terms. Thus, if identity and the process of group identification is based on the hegemonic ideology of a social system then, once the terminality of national identity is no longer pressing (i.e., negative status is alleviated through state-hood), other sources of status discontents (read 'injustices') will become more apparent. 'De-terminalization' is, however, only possible if the institution of statehood does not rigorously reinforce parochial nationalism. Contrary to Burton, therefore, this approach affirms that there is nothing which dictates that ethnicity and/or nationalism are biologically grounded collective phenotypes that satisfy identity goals. Rather, they have become an overwhelming source of terminal identity by way of the hegemonic ideology of nationalism which bestows 'legitimacy' upon groups organized along national lines and which delegitimizes those that are not.

in the state's interest to institutionalize ethno-nationalism despite the contradiction this poses for the interests of the people. In this light, the goal of 'liberation' may be better served through the continuation of the intifadah rather than through the realization of Palestinian statehood.

The intifadah has served to graphically highlight certain of the contradictions within Israel that have hitherto been masked by nationalism. Thus, in reaction to the intifadah, the Israeli constituency has swung to the 'right'. As parochial ethnocentrism and religious fanaticism become more pronounced, the contradictions inherent to a state theoretically grounded on religious ethnocentric exclusivity become more manifest -- to the Israelis (especially those of the secular variety), to the American Jewish people, and to the world at large. However, the cost of sustaining this path of struggle in human terms is monumental to both the Palestinians and the Israelis.

In order to be truly resolved, the 'Palestinian problem', much like the 'Jewish problem' before it, requires struggle towards a more just and rational society. However, this goal must be balanced with the extreme costs of waging such a struggle in a world that believes in nations and in states, and that legitimates violence to uphold the status quo.

6.2 OF CONFLICT AND IDENTITY: SUMMARY AND PERSPECTIVE

The theoretical perspective of this paper evolved out of the search for a 'framework' to guide understanding of the origins and resilience of 'ethno-nationalist' mobilizations in general and that of the Palestinians in particular. John Burton's World Society paradigm, which emphasizes identity as the key to understanding all forms of social conflict, provided an intuitively appealing point of departure for this exploration.

However, upon closer scrutiny, this generic approach to conflict appears to be inadequate as an analytical tool for explaining specific conflict manifestations and levels: the emphasis on generic conflict processes is such that the 'identity-needs' concept becomes teleologically tied to 'genes' at the expense of complex social analysis.

As the previous discussion suggests, genetic genericity tends to inadvertently equate the psychological processes of individuals with those of groups, thereby ignoring and perhaps underestimating the importance of structural variables that bind the form of group identity expression. Analytically, the richness of the notion 'identity-group' is impoverished as it becomes cast as a structure -- an ethnic-identity group is explained by way of an "ethnic identity need." When this is combined with a pluralist emphasis on ahistoricism, there is no analytical margin left to explore the process by which the 'identity-needs' of individuals are historically structured into a particular

phenotype of collective expression, i.e., investigation of the question "why ethnic identity" is precluded.

The problem with this oversight is that it leads to the notion that territory is only a metaphor of conflict -- a tactic which is designed to secure the real goal of a "relationship that guarantees security." The real problem that underpins social conflict, then, is the frustration of identity-needs (such as a threat to the "values attached to ethnic identity"). Therefore, if the real problem (ethnic identity needs of being) were addressed, the tactical conflict over territory (needs of having) would absolve itself.

In this way, 'resolution' of inter-communal (national) conflict is proposed through the process of extricating 'needs of being' (which are "additive" and positive sum) from metaphorical 'needs of having' (which are zero-sum). Problem-solving is considered as a means to such a resolution because it is designed to facilitate the development of shared superordinate values (based on non-negotiable 'needs of being'), and to reveal the false consciousness of 'needs of having'.

Burton couches his faith in the problem-solving approach to conflict resolution with a rather important qualifier: "Whether or not there are objective conflicts of interest is, finally, an empirical question" (Burton, 1979: 116). The exploration conducted in this paper suggests that perhaps Burton's waiver merits careful contemplation. By posing the question that Burton bypasses, i.e., "why ethno-nationalist identity",

this paper has entertained questions concerning some of the social conditions that cause individuals to band together in a specific form of identity-group.

It is upon consideration of the historical emergence of an 'ethno-nationalist' group that it becomes clearer that perhaps certain of Burton's conflict resolution precepts are incomplete. For example, it may be misleading to condone nationalism (or ethnicity) as an 'objective' function of biology and to condemn statehood as a 'subjective' metaphor requiring redefinition. As the Palestinian experience suggests, it is important to understand what it is that groups are mobilizing for -- which is perhaps not so obvious as it may seem.

Indeed, certain of the notions raised by this exploration call into question the likelihood of problem-solving as an effective means for resolving a protracted struggle which is already in progress (such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict). Very briefly, at least three issues prove challenging: the relational nature of social identity, the asymmetrical power relations of the parties in conflict, the antithetical requirement that a 'need' for territory be revealed as false consciousness.^{17*}

^{17*}. For clarification with respect to why this is antithetical, refer to the discussion on page 100. This paper has considered all three of these elements to be integral to group identity formation and, by extension, to group 'identity-needs'. It is important to note that group identities which have emerged by way of subordinate status have perhaps acquired collective needs which are very different from those purported to be generic individual human needs. This is a problem that Burton does not really address.

Thus, Tajfel suggests, that inter-group identity needs are relational and therefore not additive (as conflict resolution by problem-solving requires). If we accept Tajfel's findings, it would suggest that inter-group conflicts represent a conflict over "positional (status) goods" and therefore may not be amenable to a strategy of enhancing everyone's rewards.¹⁷⁹ As already discussed, Burton was quite concerned with the 'problem' of "positional goods" (a problem he considered limited to authority positions only) because of the difficulties that "role defense" poses for conflict resolution (cf., p. 83).

The second area of contention is that problem-solving, with its ahistorical and symmetrical focus on the psychology of the conflict, provides no real way to deal with the asymmetrical relationships involved in ethno-nationalist conflict¹⁸⁰ in terms of impact and structure. Granted, problem-solving is supposed to by-pass issues buttressed by 'power', but will analytical blindness to these concerns

¹⁷⁹. Although this 'relative comparison' aspect of identity-group relations is grounded in 'empirical' experiment, this does not mean that an objective propensity of human behavior has been discovered. Perhaps the 'propensities' which Tajfel's experiments have demonstrated are not human 'essences' but are related to the confines of the present structure of social relations and perceptions. Thus, although this tendency may presently be operational (thereby confounding attempts to 'resolve' certain forms of ongoing conflicts by problem-solving) this should not leave us without hope that in a transformed system, group identity needs might become 'additive'. The creative challenge, then, is to explore what, if any, social transformation may achieve this condition and by what means such a transformation could be effected.

¹⁸⁰. Assuming one accepts the conceptual approach adopted by this paper.

render them impotent?¹⁰¹

The third problem (i.e., that territory is separable from group 'needs of being') has been directly challenged by this study. Thus, this thesis suggests that (false consciousness aside), in ethno-nationalist conflict, the experiential, existential and territorial all merge into a formidable, mobilizing nexus. Thus, the Palestinian's felt 'need' for Palestine derives not only from a 'security' concern but also from concerns about identity and group legitimacy. As Portugali would uphold, to obscure the link between group identity and territory (in a world in which the nation and the state are two dominant political and social organizational concepts) is possibly to misdirect understanding of this form of conflict.

It would appear that Burton's preferred end-state (i.e., a world in which states are no longer necessary) obscures the more pervasive structural realities which ensconce many group conflicts at the international level. Thus, problem-solving might be most effective in a world that accepted the tenets of World Society and was structured accordingly. Granted, Burton is attempting to show that the present structuring of the world is not 'natural' and is a major source of conflict; however, this still leaves unanswered the perplexing questions

¹⁰¹. To take an obvious example -- suppose the parties involved in the problem-solving process managed to derive shared superordinate values -- how will this, in and of itself, change the asymmetrical structure of the relationship? On a practical level, how will these superordinate values be imparted to all the other group members -- a difficult task if we consider identity-groups not to be primordial, value-sharing structures.

concerning how the present structure is to be dealt with in ongoing conflict situations.¹⁰²

The international salience of entrenched ethno-nationalist conflict poses an urgent challenge for academics and practitioners alike. While the former must wrestle with understanding the complex vectors which have merged in its eruption, the latter are faced with managing the 'destabilizing' forces that ethno-nationalism wields. As the Palestinian example has suggested, ethno-nationalism is a force which is a perplexing political reality -- in human terms and in terms of international security and stability.

It would appear that ethno-nationalism is very difficult to 'treat', let alone 'cure', after it has been set in motion. As the earlier discussion suggests, neither the 'Balkanization' of the globe, nor state repression, nor problem 're-definition' (in the absence of structural change) are likely to 'de-mobilize' ethno-nationalist movements, let alone solve the conditions that have given rise to their mobilization. Are we therefore left helpless as the powerful reality of 'false consciousness' drives groups of people to kill and to die in the 'margins' of this earth for their own legitimate place? This question, and the problems which lie behind it, require urgent attention.

¹⁰². Such a pessimistic prognosis is not meant to denigrate the usefulness of problem-solving encounters as a vital companion tool for exploring protracted conflicts. Certainly there is great scope for problem-solving's utility in terms of raised consciousness and generational learning. In addition, problem-solving has great potential as a vehicle to achieve pre-negotiation 'breakthrough' (cf., Kelman, 1982).

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APPENDIX:

SIGNPOSTS OF PALESTINIANISM

1936	'The Great Rebellion'	Arab Popular Uprising Against British Colonial Rule (Masses rallied by call to <u>Jihad</u>)
1948	Deir Yassan	Massacre of Palestinian Villagers
	The Dispersion (Founding of the State of Israel)	Common experience of dispossession /occupation
1965	PLO's first commando raid into Israel	Was met with mass approval and 'joy' in the refugee camps ¹
1967	Arab Defeat in Third Arab- Israeli war	Indication of the weakness of the Arab states
	Israeli Occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip	Communication lines re- opened between Palestin- ians 'outside' and 'inside'
		Israel became perceived as the common oppressor of a large segment of the Palestinian population: those living 'inside' the greenline, and those in the Occupied Territories

¹. See Sayigh (1979:151).

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SIGNPOSTS OF PALESTINIANISM -- CONTINUED

1968	Battle of Karameh	PLO guerrillas successfully resisted the Israeli assault on the refugee camp in Jordan's East Bank
		The status of the Palestinians rose greatly in the eyes of the Arab world
1969	'Liberation' of Camps in Lebanon	PLO commandos wrested control of camps from the Deuxieme Bureau
1970/1	Black September	King Hussein's crushing of the Palestinian Revolutionary Movement in Jordan
1973	Arab-Israeli October War	Resulted in the perception that the PLO was now principally responsible for the restoration of the Occupied Territories
1974	The U.N.	Arafat's appearance
1976	Tel Za'atar	Syrian-backed massacre of Palestinian camp residents in Lebanon by the Christian Phalange
1982	Lebanon invasion	Israeli attempt to flush Palestinian Resistance from Lebanon
	Sabra and Shatila	Massacre of Palestinian Camp Residents by Lebanese Christian Phalange

SIGNPOSTS OF PALESTINIANISM -- CONTINUED

1985-87	The Siege of The Camps	Syrian-backed sieges of the Palestinian camps in Lebanon by the Amal Shi'ite militia
1987	18th Palestine National Congress in Algiers	The closing of the political ranks within the PLO
1987-88	The Intifadah	National mobilization of Palestinians in the Occu- pied Territories, (against the Israeli occupation) with participation by a large number of 'Green Liners'
1988	Arafat's Appeal to the United Nations	
1988	United States holds official talks with the PLO	

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