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Citizens of Europe: Democracy, Gender and the European Union

by

Tobi C. Davidge

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies
and Research
in partial fulfilment of
the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts
Department of International Affairs

Carleton University
Ottawa, Ontario
November 2nd
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Abstract

This thesis investigates the implications for democratic theory and practice of the conjunction of European integration and women's growing democratic expression. Both the scale and scope of democracy in Europe are shifting at the same time. Democracy is expanding from the nation-state to an emergent transnational polity and at the same time women in Europe are claiming their rightful position as full and equal partners in decision-making. This thesis begins the delicate task of breaking down the territorial and gendered boundaries which have prevented democratic theory from expanding in tandem with democratic practice. It argues that liberal readings of democratic theory do not adequately capture the democratic transformations underway, and must be supplemented by participatory and demonstrative models of democracy. An account of the position of women in the European Parliament and the use women make of European institutions to advance their democratic claims is given using this theoretical framework.

coincidence. Three factors can account for their convergence. First, Europe provides a focus for breaking down the dichotomy between domestic politics (democracy), and international relations (anarchy). As has been suggested by Hoskyns (1994) and Walker (1992), breaking down notions of politics and democracy in the international realm opens up space within which feminists can challenge notions of politics and democracy through the discourse of gender. Not surprisingly, challenges to one of the dichotomies shaping democratic theory -- domestic/international, public/private, and male/female -- leads to the questioning of others, or at least to a less comfortable association with an arbitrarily divided world. Second, the European Union is the only democratic institution which has been created in Europe since women have gained the vote. Women have *always been* citizens of the European Union. As a result, women have influenced the EU's institutions and continued democratic development directly rather than acting as critics of a long-standing democratic system. Finally, the transnational scope of the women's movement (Buckley and Anderson 1988:6, Margolis 1993: 379, Ashworth 1982: 125) has prepared women in Europe and elsewhere for politics in the international arena.

This thesis will be divided into five chapters. The first two will review democratic theory, and the last three will apply that theory to the case of the European Union. The European Union will be shown to demonstrate a serious challenge to the way we think about, and participate in, democratic politics. However, an emergent transnational democratic space does not entail that the inclusion of women will follow on naturally. While arguing that women have

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Introduction

[A] term that means anything means nothing. And so it has become with "democracy", which nowadays is not so much a term of restricted and specific meaning as a vague endorsement of a popular idea.

Dahl 1989:2

Democracy is not static. Yet many recent democratic theorists have developed a "model" of democracy designed very much to be assembled, practiced, and claimed as an entry certificate to membership in the society of free states. Francis Fukayama has even proclaimed liberal democracy's triumph and "the end of history" owing to the joint collapse of the Soviet Union and the almost immediate election of leaders to the governments of its Eastern European empire.¹ Such claims and such models of democracy rob democratic discourse of its theory, describing democracy itself -- much as Fukayama now describes the world -- as a concept that has attained its final form. Further, they deny the history of democracy -- a history of contested rights, revolutions, and recent change. This thesis starts with the assumption that democratic theory must be adapted in order to "catch up" to the democratic practice of its most recent democratic citizens, women, in democracy's newest territorial formation, the emergent transnational polity of the European Union.

In order to do so, we must first unpack the concept of "democracy". As Arblaster has noted (1994: 2), Fukayama refers to the United States and the United Kingdom as "democratic" examples

¹ See Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man 1992.

before either had introduced the principle of universal suffrage, or the US had abolished slavery. Individuals within groups previously excluded from democratic practice and denied access to government, however, are now influencing the institutions to which they were grudgingly and only recently granted admission. This insertion of an entirely new class of democratic citizen affects the very notion of democracy itself. The recent acceptance of women into the democratic process -- which has doubled the number of citizens within each democratic state -- has affected institutions and cultures, and has contributed to the continued feminist theorization of democracy. It will continue to do so. Even if it were the end of *history*, it is certainly not the end of *hers*.

The fact that democracy is gendered is not the only limit to the democratic imagination. Democracy is also state-bound. International systems are considered anarchic, bipolar or hegemonic, but are rarely evaluated as democracies. Few would argue, for example, that the United Nations, or its affiliated bodies are truly democratic. The *absence* of democracy among states of the UN -- even though an obvious effort has been made to mimic democratic methodology in international institutions - - is rarely questioned by democratic scholars. Democrats might advocate the extension of democracy to all countries of the globe but they do not begin to question why their interest and advocacy stops at the borders drawn on maps.

The overcoming of these two exclusions may be unfolding in the course of European integration. Two democratic transformations -- one, a transformation from national democracy to transnational

democracy, and the other the slow transformation from masculine notions of democracy and citizenship to a form of democracy in which women can effectively argue for true equality -- are proceeding in Europe simultaneously. Both transformations challenge us to alter the very questions we ask ourselves about what democracy is, and when the term may be appropriately applied to political systems.

This study seeks to explore the point of convergence between the two most recent changes to the scale and scope of democracy: the expansion of democratic processes beyond the nation-state, and the continuing process of incorporating women into democratic structures as full and equal citizens. It is written more than 2500 years after democratic models were first developed in Athens (Held 1993b: 259); fifteen years after the first Parliamentary assembly was directly elected in what was to become the European Union² (Vido; 1980: 2); and a scant sixteen years after one member of the current Union, Portugal,³ embraced the principle of universal

² The European Union (EU) became the official term of address for the former European Community with the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. It had gone through several name changes previously. The original institution of what was to become the EU, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECS) was generally referred to as part of the European Economic Community (EEC), along with Euratom, after the Treaties of Rome came into effect in 1957. In 1965, following the Merger Treaty, the official term for the agencies became simply the European Community (EC). This paper will use the term "European Union", except where other institutions are specifically referred to, or in quotations.

³ Although Portugal is a particularly good example of late democratization in Europe, it is not particularly lagging in its concessions to women. Indeed no state in the European Union embraced universal suffrage before Finland in 1908. Following that women gained the vote in Denmark in 1915, Germany in 1918, Sweden and Austria in 1919 (women in Austria had had the vote in the principalities of Austria, Bohemia and Steiermark from 1861 to 1888), the Netherlands and Luxembourg in 1919, Ireland in 1922, the United Kingdom in 1928, Spain in 1930 (although they were rarely able to exercise that right until 1977, after the fall of Franco and Fascism), France in 1944, Italy in 1945,

suffrage (Mossuz-Lavau 1988: 45). Besides being the geographical location of changes to the scale and scope of democracy, the geography of the European Union also provides -- in and of itself -- a useful study of women's political actions at the sub- and supra-state levels. As Hoskyns has remarked (1994: 225),

[f]ocusing on the EC as an arena for study is immediately helpful in this respect since, uniquely as an international organization, it straddles the boundaries between the domestic and the foreign. At such it incorporates some of the characteristics of a domestic political system while retaining the essence of international politics. Thus, the EC system is centrally involved in the regulation of international processes, in the ordering of different interests at the international level, and in the aggregation of power between states. But it does this in ways that make it marginally easier for domestically organized groups to experience and become involved in transnational politics. It is therefore a useful test case both for seeing how gender issues are handled in such a complex organization and for using "gender lenses" to view international processes at work.

It is for these reasons, as well as the EU's particular focus on women's equality (in the workplace), that the European Union deserves investigation as a focus of democratization beyond the nation-state, and the position of women within it.

The fact that challenges to the scale and scope of democracy are proceeding simultaneously in Europe is more than mere

Belgium in 1948, and Greece in 1952 (Mossuz-Lavau 1988: 45; Kaplan 1992: 16, 131). Thus Europe began the process of post-war integration that would eventually lead to the formation of the European Union at a time when many European states were still new to the introduction of women as political citizens, and some had not even extended the vote to them. The history of both these processes -- European integration, and women's emancipation -- is often dealt with separately, but this thesis will seek, in part, to explore their relationship.

coincidence. Three factors can account for their convergence. First, Europe provides a focus for breaking down the dichotomy between domestic politics (democracy), and international relations (anarchy). As has been suggested by Hoskyns (1994) and Walker (1992), breaking down notions of politics and democracy in the international realm opens up space within which feminists can challenge notions of politics and democracy through the discourse of gender. Not surprisingly, challenges to one of the dichotomies shaping democratic theory -- domestic/international, public/private, and male/female -- leads to the questioning of others, or at least to a less comfortable association with an arbitrarily divided world. Second, the European Union is the only democratic institution which has been created in Europe since women have gained the vote. Women have *always been* citizens of the European Union. As a result, women have influenced the EU's institutions and continued democratic development directly rather than acting as critics of a long-standing democratic system. Finally, the transnational scope of the women's movement (Buckley and Anderson 1988:6, Margolis 1993: 379, Ashworth 1982: 125) has prepared women in Europe and elsewhere for politics in the international arena.

This thesis will be divided into five chapters. The first two will review democratic theory, and the last three will apply that theory to the case of the European Union. The European Union will be shown to demonstrate a serious challenge to the way we think about, and participate in, democratic politics. However, an emergent transnational democratic space does not entail that the inclusion of women will follow on naturally. While arguing that women have

successfully grasped opportunities presented by the movement toward European integration, this thesis also identifies significant limitations against which European women continue to contend. The very complexity produced by the interaction between two democratic transformations unfolding simultaneously in the European Union underscores the urgent need to re-imagine the democratic ideal under contemporary social and economic conditions. The experiences of women in the European Union demand that democratic theory now follow their practice.

Chapter One: From Democratic Deficit to Democratic Dilemma

A study of women as democratic citizens of the European Union must necessarily review the democratic theory which is available to guide it. This is not a simple task. Traditionally, democratic theory has provided little insight into democracy in the international arena, or women as democratic citizens. What theory does exist, exists on the margins of political studies and the social "sciences", and has often been developed by theorists from disciplines such as international relations and women's studies. It is this work, however, which is increasingly driving democratic debate towards profound change. The barriers which exist between women and men, the personal and the political, national and international relations, are the very barriers which have confined democratic theory and kept it from questioning those elements of political life which are not democratic as defined in orthodox political discourse. Broadening our definition of democratic politics could help us to understand the (un)democratic politics of women's roles in the home, the way international banking is regulated, the negotiation of international environmental accords, or the position of women as full democratic citizens in the emergent transnational polity of the European Union -- the narrower focus of this paper.

Most investigations into democracy in the European Union, for instance, have suffered from a lack of democratic theorization beyond the nation-state. As R. B. J. Walker notes (1993: 142), "literature on democracy now assumes gargantuan proportions. Yet

to search this literature for insight into what democracy can possibly be given the structures of modern *world* politics is to come up with exceptionally meagre pickings". Responding to our inability to conceive of democratic relations among states as well as within them (Held 1993b: 266), Connolly has gone further to remark that "the democratic ideal itself has been colonized by the state" (1991: 201). He does not go quite far enough. Although correct in his suspicion of the link between democracy and the state, he fails to recognize democracy's powerful connection to one form of state in particular: the modern nation-state. Contemporary social and economic conditions, this thesis argues, are prompting a partial decolonization of the democratic ideal. This current transformation in democratic structures, institutions and citizens is particularly striking in the emergent transnational democratic politics of the EU. This chapter argues that the representative conception of democracy, though today widespread, arose out of historically contingent conditions which are even now in the process of passing away. Thus, the picture of democracy in the EU provided by such representative theories is at best incomplete. This chapter will argue, following Dahl (1994), that rather than a democratic deficit, the EU is best characterized as a legitimate response by citizens to a genuine democratic dilemma.

In order to begin analyzing democracy in the European Union this chapter will first unpack the notion of the alleged "democratic deficit", which some have argued has been created in Europe as the result of the formation of the EU. Second, it will critically examine the theory of representative democracy which informs such

calculations. Third, it will look more closely at external influences which are affecting the democratic control of the nation-state both in Europe and abroad, arguing that European integration is a legitimate response to an acute democratic dilemma. It will conclude that the case for perceiving democracy in the European Union as a positive response to a difficult dilemma is strong enough to warrant a challenge to state-bound notions of democracy, and the study that forms the body of this thesis.

Defining the Democratic Deficit

Most studies to date of democracy and the European Union have focussed on what has been termed Europe's "democratic deficit". The "democratic deficit" has been defined as the "gap between the powers transferred to the Community level and the control of the elected Parliament over them" (Williams 1991: 162). Theorists of the "democratic deficit" are concerned with institutional accountability to the public. They argue that in the European Union power is transferred away from the national parliaments of member states and to the European bureaucracy rather than the European Parliament (Williams 1991: 159). The resulting "deficit" of democracy is apparent in the European Parliament's lack of power or control compared to that of the European Commission or the Council of Ministers, both unelected bodies. It is useful here to describe each of the above-mentioned European institutions in turn.

The powers of the European Commission far outnumber those of the Parliament in Europe. The Commission initiates and

implements policy, proposes legislation, and is responsible for bringing member states to the European Court of Justice for failing to conform with European law (Leonard 1994: 33). European Commissioners are unelected, but are expected to be "loyal to the Community as a whole" (Williams 1991: 161). Commissioners, however, are often accused of representing national, rather than European interests, owing to the fact that they are frequently awarded their position by their home states as part of a career devoted to national government (Williams 1991: 162). Appointed legislative bodies, such as the Commission, exist in many democratic governments, such as the bicameral legislature of Canada. The ability of the European Commission to propose legislation, and to bring member states to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) for failing to abide by European law, however, gives it considerably *more* powers than the European Parliament, the only elected body involved in the decision-making process in Europe.

The Council of Ministers, arguably the most powerful of the Union's organs (Leonard 1994: 40), is also implicated in the purported "democratic deficit" of the EU. The Council of Ministers, actually several different Councils around issue areas (for example, Agriculture), is made up of national representatives, many of whom are experts in their fields. It is the final decision-making body in the EU's legislative process (Commission 1993: 5). Criticisms of the Council include the fact that the Council of Ministers is the final legislative authority; that each "Minister" has the ability to exercise a

veto over issues of "fundamental national importance"⁴, and the fact that it meets in closed session, subverting public scrutiny (Williams 1991: 156).

It is the lack of power of the European Parliament, compared to the other European institutions, as well as national Parliaments, that is of the greatest concern to theorists of the democratic deficit. Those powers which the EP does possess are best described as "negative": it can reject the yearly budget proposal in total, but it cannot increase it or propose amendments⁵; it can dismiss the Commission as a whole, but remains unable to either appoint or dismiss individual Commissioners⁶; it can reject or amend proposed legislation, but it cannot propose legislation itself. Support for legislation by the EP in no way guarantees that it will be accepted by Council. The European Parliament has gained powers of late, including a second reading of proposed legislation, and the ability to propose amendments and block legislation. These cooperation and co-decision rights were granted in the Single European Act and the

⁴ The veto power of the Council was the result of the Luxembourg compromise of 1966. A veto is no longer permitted on matters concerning the formation of the single market, which are now decided by majority vote. (See the "Treaty on European Union, Together With the Complete Text of the Treaty Establishing the European Union", known as the "Maastricht Treaty" in the Official Journal of the European Communities, Vol. 35, C224, August, 1992).

⁵ When the European Parliament rejects the budget as it did in 1979, and 1984 immediately following the European elections, the European Union continues to operate on a month to month basis following the previous year's budget until a new budget is approved. For this reason the rejection of the budget is considered a protest measure and not an effective legislative function.

⁶ For the first time in its history the European Parliament threatened to veto the entire Commission proposed by Jack Santer. The European Parliament was concerned that new candidates from Denmark, Sweden and Finland were insufficiently prepared, and that Irish Social Affairs Commissioner, Pádraig Flynn, would not pay enough attention to issues of equality for women (Munchau 1995: 12). The Commission has since been approved.

Maastricht Treaty, and further increases to the powers of the European Parliament seem sure to be one of the major issues at the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference for treaty revision (Committee on Women's Rights 1995). Even with its increased powers however, the European Parliament remains constrained and often overshadowed by the unelected European Commission and Council of Ministers.

Clearly, there is a *prima facie* argument for the conclusion that the European Union embodies a "democratic deficit". It is useful, however, to remember the aforementioned lack of theorization regarding structures of democracy beyond the nation-state. In comparing the functions, power, and structure of the European Parliament to national Parliaments, notions of the democratic deficit fail to conceive of a democratic structure unique to a transnational government, or at all affected by the vast change to the scale of that representative assembly. In describing the European Commission and Council, those concerned about the democratic deficit take no account of the form and effect of protest or lobbying by citizens to those bodies. The "democratic deficit" is indeed a calculation worthy of our concern, but it is at best incomplete. It is founded on the relatively recent theory of representative democracy, and, as such, suffers from this theory's inherent limitations.

The Limits of Representative Theories of Democracy:⁷

Arguments concerning the democratic deficit often rely on the unspoken premise that democracy is best described as a particular form of political representation. The fact that the word democracy leads to visions of the ballot box, free and universal elections, and the competition of many leaders for political power speaks to the success that representative theories of democracy have enjoyed in claiming the democratic ideal as their own. However, equating democracy with one particular image of representative institutions is misleading and narrow. This is true for two quite distinct reasons: first, such an identification obscures the contested boundaries and content of democracy as it has evolved under shifting political and economic conditions; secondly, such an identification is incomplete because the theory of representative democracy, even as articulated by its most powerful advocates, excludes those sites of political activity and expression most pertinent to the advancement of women as full and equal members of the polity.

Representative democracy has evolved out of a long historical process. For the purposes of this paper, the story of democracy begins in Athens over twenty-five hundred years ago. Thucydides' statement that (1972: 148), "future ages will wonder at us, as the present age wonders at us now", accurately predicted the future influence of the democratic ideal, as embodied in Athenian governing

⁷ Representative theory is also called competitive, procedural and liberal democracy.

structures. Thucydides, in the famous funeral oration of Pericles (1972: 145), describes democracy as an Athenian may have,

[l]et me say that our system of government does not copy the institutions of our neighbors. It is more the case of our being a model to others, than of our imitating anyone else. Our constitution is called a democracy because power is in the hands not of a minority but of the whole people. When it is a question of settling private disputes, everyone is equal before the law; when it is a question of putting one person before another in positions of public responsibility, what counts is not membership of a particular class, but the actual ability which the man possesses. No one, so long as he has it in him to be of service to the state, is kept in political obscurity because of poverty. And, just as our political life is free and open, so is our day-to-day life in our relations with each other. We do not get into a state with our next-door neighbor if he enjoys himself in his own way, nor do we give him the kind of black looks which, though they do no real harm, still do hurt people's feelings. We are free and tolerant in our private lives; but in public affairs we keep to the law. This is because it commands our deep respect.

Several distinctive features of Athenian democracy are evident from this brief extract: the highly participatory nature of politics in Athens; the intertwining of the public and private world of the Athenian citizen; the redistribution of wealth necessary for the proper functioning of the system; and, lastly, the importance of law as a defining feature of democratic governance. Less visible, but nonetheless important, was the exclusion of women, slaves, and children from the citizenry of Athens.

Modern representative institutions are very different from democracy as it appeared in Athens. Indeed, to the Ancient democrat, our political representatives are the only people involved

enough in national politics to claim the title "citizen". The profound lack of participation demanded of modern citizens would have been considered antithetical to their democratic principles (Held 1987: 23). While some may consider the passing of a more participatory system of governance with regret, and others applaud the shift to purportedly more stable representative institutions, the more important question remains to be asked: what was the cause of this change in the content of the democratic ideal?

Dahl (1994: 25) cogently argues that it was the shifting scale of polity from the city to the nation-state that decisively altered the nature of democratic governance. In order to follow, democratic institutions -- faced with a population too large to fit into the most elastic Agora -- took on different forms. Far from constituting an ideal and timeless model of democracy, this reading holds that representative theories of democracy merely describe democratic forms pertaining at the particular geopolitical juncture that inaugurated the modern age.

Niccolo Machiavelli, writing in the Renaissance period which marked this geo-political shift, provides insights into the theoretical origins of what was to become representative democracy. As a political theorist, Machiavelli is more commonly associated with an appreciation of the exigencies of power politics than with the advocacy of democracy. However, as Held notes (1987: 47) "by the standards of his day he was...a democrat; that is, he conceived of political participation in broader terms than simply the involvement of the wealthy and/or noble in public affairs." Speaking of the

those who are not voting, or with those who substitute or enhance that particular right of citizenship with lobbying, work within social movements, direct appeals to government, or protest to communicate their desires. Neither representative democracy, nor the theory of the "democratic deficit" is sufficient to analyze democracy in the EU, as a new and evolving political sphere.

From Democratic Deficit to Democratic Dilemma

Representative theories of democracy provide a narrow conception of the emergent possibilities of transnational democratic politics in the European Union, leading to pessimistic discussion of the so-called "democratic deficit". Recently, democratic theorist Robert Dahl has provided a more wide-ranging and nuanced framework for understanding the changes taking place which allow us to speak of democracy in the EU. Following Dahl's work, this thesis will argue that it is more useful to think in terms of democratic dilemmas than democratic deficits.

Robert Dahl argues that the history of democracy can be divided into three transformations. The first was a transformation from "the idea and practice of rule by the few to the idea and practice of rule by the many" (Dahl 1989: 10), which marked the transition from aristocracies, oligarchies, and monarchies to democracies in the Greek city-states (Dahl 1994: 25). The second transformation, discussed above, was from the scale of the city-state to the nation-state (Dahl 1989: 1-2); a transformation which was further accompanied by a shift in democratic theory and practice

activity between newly emerging states and empires. The parallel development of state and market affected democratic theory, as the work of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill was later to show. The free market and the free vote are inherently connected (Held 1987: 67). In fact, Fukayama's "end of history" is not just the result of democracy's triumph over authoritarianism and state socialism, it is the result also of the growing hegemony of liberal economics. While "[a] liberal revolution in economic thinking has sometimes preceded, sometimes followed, the move toward political freedom around the globe" (Fukayama 1992: xiii-xiv), there can be no doubt that they are two sides of the same coin: one showing the head of *homo politicus*, the other that of *homo economicus*.

The representative models of democracy upon which calculations of the democratic deficit are based are not as timeless and universal as some of their proponents suggest. Indeed, I have attempted to illustrate how the nature of democracy has been contingent on the historically shifting scale of the polity. It remains to be shown that representative theories are too narrow to provide an adequate lens through which to evaluate the democratic gains made by women in the course of European integration. In order to do so, we turn to the work of the economist, turned influential political theorist, Joseph Schumpeter (Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy: 1943). Schumpeter, building on the work of the previous theorists of protective democracy, provided the formulation which has come to dominate our concept of democracy. Through critically examining Schumpeter's contribution to democratic theory, we will expose the limits inherent in representative theories of democracy.

These limits illustrate the need to move beyond such representative theories of democracy in analyzing the changing status of women as democratic citizens of Europe.

The greatest change Schumpeter made in describing and defining democracy was to advocate the protection of the polity from the threat of an *over-active* citizenry, as well as the populace's right of protection from government. Schumpeter's goal -- to offer an alternative to the 'classical' model of democracy -- follows from Plato's critique that Athenian democracy marginalized the wise (Held 1993b: 263).⁸ Participatory forms of democracy, misrepresented as 'classical' by Schumpeter (Held 1987: 171), were linked during the time of Schumpeter's writing to "popular politics" of a kind that could produce Hitler's Nazi Germany (Ryan 1983: 40; Pateman 1970: 2; Held 1987: 165).⁹ In contrast to arguments for a participatory culture of democracy, Schumpeter advised democracy as political *method*.

To that end Schumpeter advocated a system of free competition for votes based on the principle of consumer choice in the free market (Miller 1983: 135; Pateman 1970: 4). As he states (1943: 271),

⁸ Plato's ship parable is the best description he gives of the dangers of a powerful and active populace (Plato 1942: 190-1).

⁹ The fear of political participation causing political upheaval has of late been replaced by a fear of it causing economic hardships. The Trilateral Commission issued a report which spoke of the "ungovernability" of democracies in 1975. The democratic public was said to generate too many demands on the economy, thus causing inflation (Cox 1994: 51). The populace, left to its own devices, is still considered something of a threat in contemporary democratic discourse.

In economic life competition is never completely lacking, but hardly ever is it perfect. Similarly, in political life there is always some competition, though perhaps only a potential one, for the allegiance of the people. To simplify matters we have restricted the kind of competition for leadership which is to define democracy, to free competition for a free vote.

Those who were to compete for votes were a specialized class of democratic citizens, politicians. Implicit in Schumpeter's work is the assumption that they are more able than the general citizenry to make political decisions (Miller 1983: 141). The vote's ability to protect the state and the wise from uneducated and potentially disruptive participatory influences, was also paired with its ability to protect that same class from abuses of power by politicians.

For Schumpeter, voting was the populace's guard against abuses of political power (Pateman 1970: 14; Miller 1983: 133-4). As Schumpeter emphasized (1943: 272), "it should be observed that in making it the primary function of the electorate to produce a government (directly or through an intermediary body) I intended to include in this phrase also the function of evicting it". Democratic involvement in political decision-making was thus confined to the voting process. Where a leader proved unsatisfactory the populace might deny their re-election. During tenure of office however, the representative and the represented were not required to communicate for the purposes of validating political decisions, a process which might have made them less able to pursue their goals effectively.

Democracy thus became a model of the protection of the state from the populace, and of the populace from the state solely through

the mechanism of the vote. Voting was to be used to entrust political power, and also to withdraw that trust. Voting as a method of democratically validating representation further allowed for the elimination of almost all the practical limits to the size of democracy (Held 1993a: 20).

Representative democracy as defined by Schumpeter and his followers, however, left much democratic theory out of the new democratic equation. First, those elements of society unable to vote were not of concern. In this, Schumpeter followed at least one element of ancient 'classical' political thought.¹⁰ He believed that the exclusion of women from politics did not invalidate democracy (Pateman 1983: 205). The *will of the majority* and not the *common will* expressed through the election of leadership contenders was enough to legitimate government. As Schumpeter defined it, the "principle of democracy ... merely means that the reins of government should be handed to those who command more support than do any of the competing individuals or teams" (Schumpeter 1943: 273). The number of votes cast for competing leaders, and not the number of votes cast full stop, is what is of interest according to his version of democratic procedure. Second, Schumpeter's standard for democracy allows for governments to be labelled democratic as

¹⁰ From Thucydides to Machiavelli and beyond, the history of democracy until quite recently has been one of citizens who are exclusively male (see Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 1972; Niccolo Machiavelli, The Discourse, 1970 and The Prince, 1961; and Hanna Pitkin Fortune is a Woman, 1984). Ironically Plato, democracy's critic, was interested in the participation of women in his ideal and exclusive ruling class of Guardians (See Plato's Republic, 1942, particularly p. 145-50). Schumpeter may have followed Plato's critique of participatory politics, but not his prescribed alternative.

long as their decision-making procedure is representative. As Guttman has it (1993: 129), "[b]y Schumpeter's own standards ... Stalinist Russia would have been democratic if members of the Communist Party would vote". Furthermore, the social, political, and economic will expressed in communities, trade unions, churches and other organizations are not considered democratic by representative theory, which focuses exclusively on the institutions needed to make states democratically accountable, and the populace accountable to the state. Finally, the tendency of representative democrats to focus on the voting procedure, rather than the election procedure, as the legitimizing element of democratic politics serves to mask issues concerning access to funds and media, party politics, and propaganda. This neglect often leads to the removal of education and transparency from the concept of the "educated" vote, and, more importantly, to disguise who does the educating.

Having described the democratic deficit, and representative democracy, it is easy to enumerate their theoretical linkages. The democratic deficit is exclusively concerned with the EU's institutions, and the ability of European citizens to control them. While this is one of the most important elements of current democratic theory, it, like representative democracy, ignores vast segments of society participating in the polity beyond the ballot box. It does not ask how and where they are able to do so, or what informed their decision to participate.¹¹ The "democratic deficit" does not concern itself with

¹¹ It has already been noted that representative theory fails to take account of those who do not vote. That is particularly important in the case of Europe where in countries where voting is not required (such as Britain) voter turnout has been particularly low, and where large numbers of residents and migrant workers are denied access to the political process altogether.

those who are not voting, or with those who substitute or enhance that particular right of citizenship with lobbying, work within social movements, direct appeals to government, or protest to communicate their desires. Neither representative democracy, nor the theory of the "democratic deficit" is sufficient to analyze democracy in the EU, as a new and evolving political sphere.

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away from participatory systems and towards political representation (Dahl 1994: 25). Recently, Dahl has gone further, adding a third transformation to his analysis of democracy. The third transformation to democracy -- the current transition from the democracy of nation-states to transnational democratic structures -- is evident in the continuing integration of the EU (Dahl 1994: 26-7).

Dahl has described this third transformation as a possible response to a democratic dilemma. Democratic dilemmas, he states, are present "wherever and whenever the societies and economies within democratic states are subject to significant external influences beyond their control" (1994: 24), and a democratic solution beyond former territorial boundaries is sought.¹² As Dahl shows, democracy in the European Union is in part a reaction to the declining ability of states to exercise democratic control over their national economic, political and physical environments (1994). Held explains the situation states now face (1993b: 265),

[t]he very idea of consent through elections, and the particular notion that the relevant constituencies of voluntary agreement are the communities of a bounded territory or state, becomes open to question as soon as the issue of national, regional, and global interconnectedness is considered and the nature of a so-called "relevant community" is contested.

The dangers of democracy becoming "a political ghetto confined to the territorial state" (Connolly 1991: 215), are twofold. First,

¹² The resolution of such a democratic dilemma during the Renaissance period, a time when city-states could no longer control external political and economic influences, was thus responsible for the second democratic transformation to the scale of the nation-state in Europe.

"outcomes of democratic decisions often affect other democratic states" (Held 1993a: 27). Second, many current problems facing the world, including economic, environmental and political issues, can only be addressed at a global level (Burnheim 1985: 4); a level at which there is no institution that can claim even an approximately democratic structure.

Perhaps the clearest example of a global issue greatly influencing the state, but by no means accountable to any national population, is the international economy. As Cox has it, territorial boundaries actually encourage state leaders to compete for economic factors, not necessarily for the votes of their own citizens (1994: 48):

[g]lobal production is able to make use of the territorial divisions of the international economy, playing off one territorial jurisdiction against another so as to maximize reductions in costs, savings in taxes, avoidance of anti-pollution regulation, control over labour, and guarantees of political stability and favour.

Although Cox is quite radical in his critique of the internationalization of the economy and the problems it produces for the state, other international political economists are also taking note of the influence international economic markets have on the actions of states. Underhill finds "that there is an intimate and reciprocal connection between the control of significant resources in the market economy and the exercise of political power, *even in democratic societies*" (1994: 18, my emphasis). Helleiner has also begun to describe the control globalized finance has over states as a constraint on their political autonomy (1994: 173). In many ways it is "no longer appropriate to discuss national sovereignty in the context of

the international economy; where national economic decisions are closely tied up with international decisions" (Pillinger 1992: 144).

Theorists of the democratic deficit argue exclusively on the basis of the powers which are lost by democratically elected parliaments to non-democratically selected supranational bodies as a result of European integration. Following Dahl, one might better reserve the term "democratic deficit" to designate a more general condition: the waning power of democratic nation-states vis-a-vis market forces in the face of globalization. Joining the European Union is a choice some states have made in order to address this shifting global balance of authority/market relation.¹³

Theorists of the democratic deficit would contend that the choice made has had negative effects for democracy in Europe. This position may be too simplistic. Dahl uses Denmark's decision over the ratification of the Maastricht treaty to argue against such pessimistic readings of European integration (1994: 23-4),

Maastricht presented citizens and leaders (in a country like Denmark, for example) with a fundamental democratic dilemma: They could choose to preserve the authority of a smaller democratic unit (Denmark) within which they could act more effectively to influence the conduct of their government, even though some important matters might remain beyond the capacity of that government to deal with effectively. Or they could choose to increase the capacity of a large political unit to deal more effectively with these matters, even if their ability to influence the government in a democratic

¹³ In particular, those states which have joined since the creation of the European Economic Community (EEC), and association whose goals were somewhat removed from the more purely security concerns which prompted the first European Community, the ECSC.

fashion were significantly less in the larger unit (the EU) than in the smaller unit (Denmark).

Europeans, it might be said, are losing national democratic control over forces that now exceed the grasp of their states. The question facing them is whether the EU addresses their democratic concerns. This issue, and the democratic dilemma which European states face in deciding whether to participate in European integration or not, is re-examined every time new treaties are drafted, referenda are held, and new states deliberate as to whether or not to join the Union. Hence, although the European Union is a less democratic polity than its member states, the fact that it offers new opportunities to address increasingly transnational issues, and that it exists in concert with, and not replacing, a system of functioning nation-states must be considered positive. This leads us to the conclusion that the European Union is best investigated as a new form of, and opportunity for, democracy rather than simply a threat to it.

Summary:

The term "democratic deficit" does not do justice to the complexity of the shifting texture of democracy in the transnational structures of the European Union. Its limits are to some extent inherent in the narrow representative theory of democracy on which it rests. In addition, however, theorists of the "democratic deficit" betray a lack of sensitivity to the declining ability of nations to exercise control over international matters which affect the lives of their citizens.

Under such conditions, acceding to transnational structures can be seen as a legitimate response to a difficult "democratic dilemma" facing the citizens of European states: what is the appropriate trade-off between democratic control over government, and the capacity of that government to further the interests of its citizens? The complexity of Dahl's 'democratic dilemma' would, in the opinion of this author, warrant a study of transnational democracy in Europe. And yet, there is a second issue which concerns us here: how have the shifting parameters of democracy in Europe affected its women citizens? If Europeans, as a whole, are faced with a democratic dilemma, European women are faced with two: a decision over whether to pursue their democratic aims through traditional, and male centered institutions of democracy, or only through alternative democratic fora. A description of their particular choices and decisions as democratic citizens of the EU is the focus of the next chapter of this thesis.

Chapter Two: Beyond Representative Democracy

The phrase "one man, one vote" is in many ways a sadly descriptive definition of current democratic practice. More men than women are interested in "politics"¹⁴, vote, and are elected to democratic legislatures. The first wave of feminism, whose aim was to secure the principle of universal suffrage, won that battle, while at the same time pointing to the inadequacies of liberal democracy to fully address the gendered inequality of citizens. As Arblaster states (1994: 97),

[t]he revival of the women's movement since the 1960s bears witness to the failure of women's suffrage in itself to achieve substantive equality between the sexes, or even to abolish some of the more blatant forms of discrimination against women enshrined in much traditional law and practice.

Feminists today are faced with the task of once again arguing for change to the scope of democracy. Responding to the perceived failure of the suffragist movement however, feminists today are more interested in *where* women engage with democracy and for *what* purpose, rather than with the formerly exclusive emphasis on *who* can vote.

In chapter one it was argued that representative theories of democracy provide only an incomplete framework through which to analyze the emergence of a transnational democratic polity in

¹⁴ Different definitions of politics, however, result in different levels of interest from women. The issue of how politics is defined, and how women "self-censor" their political interests is treated further in this chapter.

Europe, and the advancement of women within it. In this chapter, two alternative conceptions of democracy will be put forward: first, the participatory tradition in democratic theory will be examined, with special attention being paid to the way in which feminist scholars have used this theoretical tradition to highlight their concern with the democratization of the private sphere. Second, the conception of democracy implicit in the political practice of the women's movement will be explored as a potentially radical alternative to notions of democracy bound to the territorial state. Finally, it will be argued that these alternative images of the democratic ideal can only supplement, not replace, the more familiar notions of representative democracy.

Participatory Democracy and the Politics of the Private Realm

Phillips (1994) has called the situation women face in democracies today a "market place paradigm", pointing to the fact that women participate in a democratic system, and choose from political options, whose range has been decided previously by men. In order for women to break out of that paradigm they must first examine the forces which keep them from engaging with democracy on their own terms. Participatory democracy forms one tradition of political thought which feminist scholars have drawn upon in their attempts to pursue such a re-visioning of the democratic ideal. Importantly, feminists have found it necessary to move beyond this tradition in order to emphasize issues of power and inequality existing in what had previously been considered the non-political private sphere.

Participatory models of democracy preceded representative ones in both theory and practice. Greek democracies were highly participatory for the privileged group of men active in all areas of public life. Later participatory theorists, including Rousseau, J.S. Mill, and the early functionalists, looked back on the Athenian example to provide insight into the theorization of a democratic system that would situate the person in community, allow for the democratization of the workplace, and provide an educative function for democratic citizens.

Democracy, for participatory democrats, is an organic social process. The theory is based on "the central assertion that individuals and their institutions cannot be considered in isolation from one another" (Pateman 1970: 42). For Rousseau, the expression of the general will of a community as a whole is communicated through ongoing social dialogue (Ryan 1983: 45), unlike representative politics which are based on the amalgamation of several different individual wills during election time. For G.D.H. Cole the lack of social dialogue in representative institutions meant not only that the general will was neglected, but also the wills of many individuals, and thus that true democracy were lost. Government, Cole stated (1920: 22), "is not democratic if, as in most forms which pass for democracy today, it involves the substitution of the will of one man, the representative, for the wills of many, the represented". For a system to be truly democratic, participatory democrats argue, there must be a *social* construction of public policy, which allows for a common view to be formed, and then asserted.

The democratic community, again following Greek democratic lines, was meant to be formed in all spheres of life. In contrast to representative theorists, participatory democrats advocate the enlargement and further democratization of the public sphere. Participatory democrats believe that increased participation in all areas of civil society develops the individual and psychological qualities necessary for a democratic populace. As Pateman states, the development of citizens (1970: 42),

takes place through the process of participation itself. The major function of participation in the theory of participatory democracy is therefore an educative one, educative in the very widest sense, including both the psychological aspect of the gaining of practice in democratic skills and procedures.

Ongoing democratic participation in the public sphere is meant to foster a sense of community and concern for the welfare of fellow citizens while at the same time providing opportunities in which to practice and learn the requirements of citizenship. Recent participatory democrats, in particular the guild socialists, have focused on the democratization of industry and the workplace as the most important site of participatory democracy. The feeling of empowerment, and the common feeling of citizenship fostered in participatory industry, they claim, would serve to make better citizens and personally committed workers.

This account of participatory democracy has proceeded thus far with no mention of women. Indeed, the history of participatory democracy is as negligent on this score as representative models, if

not more so. Rousseau did not believe women fit for public life; Mill saw reason for women's political involvement, but did not question the lack of participation of women in the decision making of the home; the guild socialists ignored that segment of the economy which was not financially remunerated -- namely women's work in the household -- as a site for political action. It is thus unsurprising that feminist scholars have found it necessary to push their concerns beyond the confines of the participatory tradition. Still, feminists have found participatory democracy theoretically useful in three ways: first, as a theory which advocates and promotes an active community of citizens who attempt to put their common will ahead of individual interests; second, as a theory which provides an outline for a critique of the sexual division of labour as disempowering; and, most clearly, as a theory of educative democracy which supports the feminist concern that women need to experience democracy in all spheres of life in order to engage with national democratic institutions as effective citizens. Participatory democratic theory in that way closely parallels the feminist appeal for a broader "mode of organizing society at all levels: in the family, the workplace, the community and the state" (Jones 1990: 788).

The most important contribution which participatory democracy makes for feminist theory is its questioning of the common liberal division of the public sphere into sites of democracy (representative assemblies) and non-political sites of social organization (the economy). Feminist participatory democrats would request that it go further, demanding that the site of "everyday life", the "private" realm, become a focus of political theory. The

gendered division of the world into public and private spheres has long been one of the major focii of feminism as a whole. It "is central to almost two centuries of feminist writing and political struggle; it is, ultimately, what the feminist movement is about" (Pateman 1989: 118). It was briefly noted in the previous chapter that the theorization of democracy has proceeded with little concern over the denial of rights of citizenship to women in what were nevertheless referred to as democratic states. The history of the absence of women from democratic discourse is more than one of benign neglect. Beginning with the democracies of Ancient Greece, and leading right into the 20th Century, women have not only been *excluded* from politics, they have been *confined* to the de-politicized private sphere.

The dichotomy of the public (male) and the private (female) spheres has affected democratic theory in two ways. First, it has enabled democracy to develop in thought and practice beyond the reach of women's voices. Following from that, it has also caused those issues concerning the private realm, associated with women, to remain un-politicized. Child care, conjugal rights, violence against women, and the sexual division of labour, are still generally considered to be personal issues, not appropriate for public debate. In 1987 a Eurobarometer poll found that 24% of men and 39% of women in Europe never discussed politics with friends. When asked whether they discussed "big social problems" such as human rights, poverty, and equality of the sexes however, only 20% of men, and 22% of women replied never (Mossuz-Lavau 1991: 5). Women, it would seem, are interested in "politics", but are less certain than men

that their concerns are truly political. This poll would further suggest that women are more willing to self-censor their political concerns than are men. Democracy's (dis)ability to develop without female involvement until relatively recently has affected the scope of what politics is considered to be, and the confidence of newer democratic citizens to challenge those limits.

Besides a gendered definition of politics, there is yet another division between private and public which non-feminist theorists of democracy too often ignore. That is, the question of where the economy is situated. As Dean shows, civil society is divided to contain the realm of economic relations separately from the private (1992: 125), "civil society itself is split into public and private spheres. Here the state and the economy (i.e. the domain of paid employment) are juxtaposed to that of personal life, home, and family". The economy's link to the public rather than the private sphere has greatly affected women. Workers are assumed to be those engaged in paid employment, leaving the significant economic contribution of women in the household uncounted. In addition to the devaluation of women's work in the domestic sector, women's work outside the home is undervalued. Pateman explains (1989:8):

women in paid employment are likely to be in the low-status, low skilled jobs that are associated with low political participation. Even in professional occupations, women are concentrated at the lower ends of the occupational hierarchy.

Women's (dis)connection to the realm of paid employment, and their link to the unpaid servicing of the home has profound implication to their status as citizens, and their relationship to the

state. As Pateman has it, "paid employment has become the key to citizenship, and the recognition of an individual as a citizen of equal worth to other citizens is lacking when a worker is unemployed" (Pateman 1989: 184). Men are expected to be workers and soldiers and women are expected to be mothers and care givers. As Phillips has it (1993: 98), "the political settlement .. legitimate[s] the sexual division of labour". Working is linked to citizenship entitlements (Phillips 1993: 98), and women, confined to the unpaid or underpaid sectors of the economy, find it difficult to assert their worth as full citizens.

Feminist arguments concerning democratic theory have tended to focus on the public/private dichotomy which often serves to confine women to the private sphere, and which demands that those women who do enter the public sphere do so in male form. As Pateman states (1989: 196-7), without profound changes to the way citizenship is perceived, women who wish to become full citizens are forced to "become (like) men". The feminist slogan "the personal is political" serves to remind us that the public/private divide is not as clear as we are led to believe. It stresses that the private realm is a public concern, and that the relations which serve to confine women to the household, the bed, and the front office must be challenged publicly to claim full status as equal democratic citizens. This review of participatory and feminist democratic theory suggests that the analysis of democracy and gender equality in the emergent transnational polity of the European Union must move beyond the narrow confines of representative theory to include issues of

participation in the economic sphere, as well as equality in the private realm more broadly.

Social Movement Democracy

The study of social movements has recently become popular amongst international relations scholars seeking non-state actors which impact on the course and texture of world politics.¹⁵ The non-national character of social movements, their impact on the shared cultural meanings outside of formal political institutions, and their periodic effectiveness, makes the concepts of democracy implicit in their practice an important element in understanding the conjuncture of the European integration and the advancement of the position of women within this newly-emergent democratic space.

Drawing upon the field of sociology, social movement theory provides innovative conceptualizations of citizenship, civil society, and the state for the theorization of democracy. Indeed, social movement theory has questioned the traditional dichotomization of state and civil society with "[p]rocesses of fusion... [being] observed not only at the level of global sociopolitical arrangements, but also on the level of citizens as the elementary political actors" (Offe 1985: 817). In terms of citizenship, the study of social movements points to the existence of overlapping social affiliations -- ie. of citizen as environmentalist, mother, person of colour, and Canadian -- as well

¹⁵ See, for example, the contributions to "Special Issue: Social Movements and World Politics," Millenium vol. 23, No. 3, Winter (1994). For social movement research originating in the discipline of sociology see "Special Issue: Social Movements" Social Research Vol. 52, No. 4, Winter (1985).

as pointing to the inadequacy of official representative-bureaucratic political institutions and channels to reflect such complexities (Offe 1985: 820).

It is the way social movements practice their politics however, which has had the greatest influence on new theories of democracy. Although, as Walker contends (1994: 675), "modern political discourse still largely equates all political identities, whether of class, race, gender, religion, humanity or planet, with citizenship, with the fusion of universality and particularity in the legitimate authority of the sovereign state," social movements are challenging the state and its economy as the main political stage. As Cohen has it (1985: 667),

[i]nstead of forming unions or political parties of the socialist, social democratic, or communist type, they focus on grass-roots politics and create horizontal, directly democratic associations that are loosely federated on national levels. Moreover, they target the social domain of "civil society" rather than the economy or state, raising issues concerned with the democratization of structures of everyday life and focusing on forms of communication and collective identity.

The democratic theory implicit in the practices of social movements might be understood to emphasize what I shall term "demonstrative democracy". Social movements seek to dis-assemble the compartmentalized social relations and state-centred dynamics which distinguish "modern" civil society. In order to do so, they often employ demonstration and protest techniques in order to mobilize public attention (Offe 1985: 830). Further, they re-define sites of political action by engaging in "everyday democracy"

(Melucci 1989). Method is message for them: "the very forms of the movement -- their patterns of interpersonal relationships and decision-making mechanisms -- operate as a "sign" or "message" for the rest of society" (Melucci 1989: 5). Nowhere is this more true than in women's movements which seeks to "demonstrate" or "prefigure" desired future social relations (Pateman 1989: 201).

Demonstrative democracy is particularly important for women's movements and other groups interested in the politics of social identity.¹⁶ As Kitschelt states (1993: 27), for such groups,

means and ends, processes of mobilization and objective, cannot be clearly differentiated. To a large extent, the objective of the movements' practices is embodied in the process itself. In such groups, not only the orientation toward point decisions but the interdependence between process and goals inhibit instrumental organization in ways instituted by parties and interest groups.

¹⁶ Tourraine believes that identity-based movements such as those rooted on gender, youth, ethnicity, and ecology are attractive alternatives in our world of social domination (Kaplan 1992: 2-3). As he states (Tourraine 1988: 111),

[t]he specificity of the social conflict in a programmed society resides in the fact that the ruling class appears to hold sway over all social life, a state of affairs that prevents the dominated from speaking and acting from the stronghold of a social and cultural autonomy. They are forced, then, to oppose social domination in the name of the only thing that may escape it, namely nature.

At its extreme, the appeal to nature results in arguments based on biological difference that are dangerously parallel to those arguments previously used to justify domination, as is sometimes the case with radical ecofeminist discourse. In fact, the women's movement -- and most ecofeminists -- have most often argued against the nature argument, stating that the *idea* of women's differentiated nature is socially constructed in a patriarchal and mechanistic "civilization" (Kaplan 1992: 2-3).

Women's movements has often acted as a testing ground for non-hierarchical social relations (Phillips 1991: 2). Consciousness-raising and consensus building mechanisms were built into its decision-making framework. Women are encouraged to speak about every facet of their lives, including what would elsewhere be considered too "personal" and "private" to be worthy of public debate. Not wishing to speak for anyone else -- as they have been spoken for so often in other political and social situations -- feminists have often developed laborious methods to (hopefully) reach consensus decisions.

By putting principles of participatory democracy into practice, and in extending them to incorporate all areas of social life and concern through what I have termed "demonstrative democracy", however, women have also tested the limits of both theories. Phillips (1991: 126-70) and Siriani (1993: 294) have identified a number of problems which the women's movement has faced including wasted expertise, false consensus, enforced sisterly virtue, informal dominance, manipulation, and the lack of a body which can claim to be truly representative of women. While the women's movement has gone far in extending democratic principles to include women, and in encouraging women to become involved in politics more generally, it has also demonstrated the limits of extended participatory democracy. Rather than advocating one system of democracy over another, I will now suggest that the existence of several different sites and forms of democracy, with varying requirements from participants in terms of time and commitment necessary, is a benefit for women as democratic citizens.

Beyond "Pateman's Dilemma"¹⁷

It is difficult to speak of one coherent feminist response to the current status of women in democracies. Feminist critiques of current practice, and suggested alternatives to it, are as varied and many as feminisms themselves.¹⁸ Liberal, socialist, radical, marxist, and eco-feminisms¹⁹ often have different, overlapping, and at times conflicting comments on democracy. Not surprisingly, the successes and failures of liberal democracy in incorporating women as full and equal citizens since women gained the vote causes the most debate amongst feminist democrats. Carole Pateman's work, by far the most complete and sustained effort to analyze democratic theories and practices through a feminist lens, can be seen to embody that debate. Dean (1992: 122) has called that tendency in her writing "Pateman's Dilemma": "while she would like to argue for a politics that stresses sexual difference and rejects the strategies of liberal feminism, her theory gives no reason for the superiority of either". Pateman, like each woman, is faced with theoretical and practical choices over how democratic politics must change to fully accommodate her sex, and how to respond to the limited yet important changes liberal democracy has provided thus far. In judging Pateman in terms of the superiority of one feminist theory and by setting up the choice as

¹⁷ The title of this section is taken from Mitchell Dean's article, "Pateman's Dilemma" a Review Essay in Theory and Society, 21, 1992, pp. 121-30.

¹⁸ See Norris, Pippa Politics and Sexual Equality 1987, pp 13-28, for a discussion of the various theories of feminism.

¹⁹ Often these groups themselves can be further broken down, ecofeminists for example, are divided into liberal, marxist, radical and socialist camps (Merchant 1990: 104).

a dilemma however, Dean falls into the same trap as much feminist democratic literature: chiefly, presuming that all women must make, and should make, the same decision when faced with what is itself a democratic choice -- a choice between varying methods of political expression. In fact, the concept of choice between competing theories and practices of democracy is itself patriarchal in the depiction of democracy -- a malleable socio-political ideal -- in a win-or-lose paradigm. In this sense the challenge of deconstructing the patriarchal baggage the concept of democracy now carries is quite enough, without adding to it the goal of recommending a reconstruction based on a prefabricated political construct.

Following recent work by Phillips (1991, 1994) and Kitschelt (1993), I would argue that women must move beyond "Pateman's dilemma" if they are to enjoy the benefits of democracy and citizenship "in the kitchen, the nursery ... the bedroom" (Pateman 1989: 222) *and* in the legislature. Women are best served by engaging in a variety of democratic fora, while working towards democracy's comprehensive change.

Summary:

Women, having been introduced to pre-made systems of democratic theory and practice exceedingly late in the history of democratic politics, are just beginning to challenge the divisions which keep them from claiming full citizenship; to explore alternative theories for insight into where an extension of democracy may be most of benefit; and to practice their own style of democratic social relations

and power politics as democratic persons within the women's social movement. Although no comprehensive theoretical or practical alternative to liberal representative democracy seems imminent, the addition of alternative and vibrant democratic systems outside of the liberal framework is clearly of benefit to women. As Kitschelt states (1993: 28):

in the 1980s and 1990s advanced industrial democracies exhibit qualitatively new patterns of democratic politics and an increasing differentiation of the avenues of political involvement. This new configuration, however, indicates less a polarization of different modes of participation and democratic decision making than the opportunity for a new complementarity.

The gains made by women in the workplace or through the demonstrative effects of the women's movement, added to those of marginal but increasing representation of women by women in liberal democratic institutions, represent women's ability to participate as democratic citizens in ways which demand that we broaden our concept of citizenship, participation, politics, and democracy itself. Women today increasingly have choice when it comes to where, when and how they want to express their democratic will; that choice should be seen less as a dilemma and more as an opportunity.

Women have gained representation in liberal democratic institutions, most notably in non-national legislatures. They are beginning to experience the democratically educative and empowering benefits of engaging in paid employment and are increasingly demanding equal rights as equal workers with an eye to

reducing a remaining source of gendered hierarchy. They have explored alternative social structures that allow them to articulate their needs as women through the women's movement. And, they have tested the various limits of alternative sites of political action. Liberal, participatory and demonstrative democratic politics make different demands of democratic citizens, and are of varying benefit to women depending on the issue at hand. Women benefit from having the choice of how to express their democratic will. As will be shown in the following chapters of this paper, the women of the European Union are proving that a plurality of democratic fora is in their best interests.

Democracy's current transformations are embodied in the European Union and women's development as full democratic citizens. As Walker has it, challenging the familiar distinction between the internal politics of nation-states and their relations to one another bears a striking resemblance to the challenge facing women in their fight against patriarchal discourse and political organization. He states (1992: 197-8),

[i]t may be true that even the most radical of democracies stops at the door marked "national security," but those recesses of civil society in which women have their place cannot even claim rights to enter the estate. The silencing and depoliticization of women can be understood in terms of the marginalization of women's place and women's time, but so in turn can the authoritative voice of sovereignty be understood in terms of valorizations of the merely domestic, the merely reproductive, the merely nurturing, the explicitly passive voice of women.

New challenges to established traditions of democracy will need to reflect on the boundaries not only between states, but between people, and the gendered divisions which constrain political participation. Borders do more than divide the democratic polity within the state from the non-democratic anarchy outside, they also extend throughout the state dividing "legitimate politics" from "soft issues". Both these kinds of divisions will be seen to be under challenge from the democratic transformations sketched out in this thesis.

Chapter Three: Women and the European Union

Thus far we have investigated two of the most enduring and important limits to democratic theory: first, its limit in scale to the confines of the territorial state and, second, its limit in scope to gendered notions of politics and citizenship. It has been suggested that the European Union provides a focus for challenges to both these limits to democracy. The remainder of this thesis will thus explore the European Union as the site of a simultaneous transition from state-bound and gendered models of democracy to a transnational polity with democratic structures which appear at first glance to be developing in ways that are more responsive to women's democratic voice.

The European women's movement and the creation of the European Union have developed not only in the same European space²⁰ but also in the same historical context. The ideal of a peaceful and harmonious Europe and the aim of universal suffrage both found renewed favour, hope, and development, in the post-war era -- an era of reconstruction that proved suitable for the re-launch of European feminism and the creation of a nascent European-wide polity. That two such profound changes to the European political climate proceeded in tandem leads one to suspect that the European women's movement and European integration have impacted on each other. These suspicions are both confirmed and complicated when the women's movement and the development of the EU are

²⁰ This paper focuses almost exclusively on Western European feminism, rather than Eastern European feminism.

investigated more closely. The remainder of this chapter is divided into two sections. The first will investigate western European feminism, its coherence, and its complexities. The second will investigate the common history of the women's movement and the European Union. Tracing the history of interaction between the European women's movement and the movement toward European integration is essential in order to assess the democratic position of women in the EU.

The European Women's Movement

To speak of a European women's movement is to speak of the continent-wide struggle of women for equality, a struggle which has manifested itself at different times and in different ways depending on the circumstances women have found themselves in. The complexity of the issues women face, coupled with the sheer variety of private experiences and national situations, leads to a history in Europe of many women's movements working toward the same goal, at different speeds, and sometimes with different tactics. Given that "the women's movement in each country fashions itself to meet its particular situation" (Margolis 1993: 385), this chapter will review the various European women's movements before returning to the subject of the movement as a whole, and its relationship to the European Union.

Britain

The women's movement in Britain followed the traditional transition from a "first wave" suffragette movement to a broader and more complex "second wave" of women's liberation in the 1960's (Lovenduski 1986: 73). The history of the women's movement in Britain, however, has been complicated by two factors: the strong socio-political role of trade unionism in British politics; and second, what Gelb has termed Britain's political opportunity structure (Gelb 1987: 286).

Trade unions and the women's movement in Britain, although often working toward the same goals -- higher pay, improved working conditions, etc. -- have until quite recently been at odds. As Ruggie has it (1987: 252),

[f]rom the beginnings of trade unionism in Britain, women were pitted against men, setting the stage for the diverging development of their interests and movements. As improving technology broke down heavy and complex production into menial tasks, employers preferred to hire women, both because of the lower wages required and also as a toll against men who were forming unions, illegally and contentiously.

As a result women and men's unions were separate, with most women remaining un-unionized until after WWII when segregated unions began to break down (Ruggie 1987: 252). Even then union membership did not guarantee equal representation. An early Trade Union Congress (TUC) resolution on equal pay for equal work (1888), was not used until the 1950s to press for those rights. In fact, it was

not until Britain faced EU membership that a commitment to the principle of equal pay for equal work was actively sought by the unions. Even then, this change only occurred once the newly formed National Women's Advisory Committee of the TUC had taken up the cause (Ruggie 1987: 253).

The difficulty women had in getting their interests represented by unions in Britain was particularly damaging as the TUC and the early Labour Party were synonymous, the TUC having founded the Parliamentary Labour Party in 1899. As the Labour Party was in fact a trades union party, and not a socialist party, the most likely parliamentary advocate of women's rights was cut off for the better part of a century. The links between the unions and the government (or opposition), and the difficulties that this produced for the women's movement, was only one of several parts of the political opportunity structure in the UK that has worked to the disadvantage of the women's movement. Gelb points to several factors which have contributed to the isolation of the women's movement from potential allies (1987: 267): political centralization, the small size and narrow social background of political elites, a history of poor grass-roots lobbying, and a party system of social integration rather than individual representation (Gelb 1987: 268).

Although there are several women's organizations currently active in the UK, these factors have prevented the movement from gaining the type of prominence and success in lobbying which has characterized the women's movements of several continental European countries.

Ireland

The history of the Irish women's movement has been affected and constrained by two factors: the division of the island and the Irish into the sovereign South and the British governed North²¹; and the prominence of the Catholic church. The former has often led to the overshadowing of women's issues by what are considered more pressing political concerns (McCafferty 1984: 350-1). The latter has proven a consistent and complicated opponent, most notably around the issue of abortion. Furthermore, the arguably theocratic Irish state²² has greatly affected not only the women's movement, but also the very development of democracy in Ireland, as the link between church and state has long been recognised as a threat to democracy.²³ It is not surprising therefore that the Irish women's movement has coalesced and remained vigilant around this most pressing issue: recognizing the source of their constitutional conundrum, a public meeting in 1970 was held to boo "Church and State" (McCafferty 1984: 352).

A discussion of the women's movement in Ireland, and thus necessarily of abortion, is scarcely complete without reference to the referendum of 1983 in which the public was asked to vote "yes" or "no" to the following question (reprinted in Jackson 1986: 54):

²¹ The only exception to British law governing Northern Ireland is not surprisingly in the area of abortion, which is illegal in Northern Ireland, although readily available over the Irish Channel (Morgan 1984: 346).

²² The Irish state constitutionally outlaws not only abortion but also contraceptives except for married couples -- and for them it remains difficult to obtain.

²³ See comments on Machiavelli in chapter one of this paper.

[t]he State acknowledges the right to life of the unborn and, with due regard to the equal right to life of the mother, guarantees in its laws to respect and, as far as practicable by its laws, to defend and vindicate that right.

Women responded in outrage, and Parliamentary Deputy Monica Barnes of the governing party, Fine Gael, stated (quoted in Jackson 1986: 54),

We are now in the third Act of a lunatic farce, where politicians have voted to present to the people of this country the wording of an Amendment to the Constitution that is deliberately vague, ambiguous, and downright dangerous. What has divided doctors, lawyers, churches, and politicians will now be put for the people to vote "yes" or "no" on and an attempt will be made to claim that this is democracy.

The women's movement was not prepared for such a battle and quickly began an Anti-Amendment Campaign. It was joined by Methodist and Protestant churches, the Jewish community, some members of the teaching, legal, and medical professions, students' unions, the Irish Congress of Trade Unions, the Women's committee of the Labour Party, and other left-wing groups such as People's Democracy, Revolutionary Struggle, Socialist Worker's Movement and the Democratic Socialist Party. In favour of the referendum and a "yes" vote were the Fianna Fail party (the official opposition), the Irish Nurses' Organization, the majority of senior maternity hospital consultant obstetricians, Bishops of the Irish Church and most lay Catholic organizations such as Opus Dei and the Knights of Columbus (Jackson 1986: 54-5). The referendum was held and passed by a

vote of 67 to 33, with a sizeable split between urban and rural voters.²⁴ Although the referendum amounted to a setback for the women's movement in Ireland, it also had the unexpected benefit of having forced mass organization in Ireland, and clearly identified the front-lines of the feminist battle. As Jackson concludes (1986: 62) the referendum,

has thrown to the forefront the apartheid conditions of life for women in so far as their reproductive capacities are concerned. It has demonstrated the gynocidal consequences of bans on women's control of their reproductive capacities. It has demonstrated the crucial and pivotal character of fertility, sexual and body control in women's struggle for emancipation. It has laid the basis for clarifying the patriarchal character of political control over women in Irish Society.

France

The women's movement in France has had a vibrant history. According to Kaplan (1992: 161), this should not come as a surprise,

[t]he French are a nation unusually experienced in political upheaval and in overthrowing monarchies and governments. French history is also about the only national history that has a fairly unbroken record of exceptional women scholars, scientists, and revolutionaries.

Even for France, however, the second wave of the women's movement proved extraordinary.

²⁴ In Dublin the votes were Yes: 51.6% to No: 48.3%, whereas the Roscommon rural area voted 83.8% in favour and only 16.2% against (Jackson 1986: 57).

Sharing the stage with the anti-Algerian war movement of the early sixties, and the student uprising of 1968 (Kaplan 1992: 163-4), the second wave of the feminist movement in France was profoundly intellectual. The writings of such feminists as Simone de Beauvoir, Helene Cixous, Luce Irigaray, and Julia Kristeva remain topics of contemporary feminist debate and scholarship (de Beauvoir 1984: 232; Kaplan 1992: 163-5). Beyond publication, the second wave also used a variety of public protests to shock and otherwise publicize the situation of women and women's equality (de Beauvoir 1984: 233).

From 1970 to 1974, for example, the *Feministes Revolutionnaires* used public protest as a vehicle to express lesbianism and advocate women's political separatism (Kaplan 1992: 166). Other women's groups, notably *Choisir*, a group committed to furthering the cause of abortion rights and women's protection from rape, concentrated on media coverage of exemplary cases, the most famous of which involved a girl of 17 being defended for aborting a fetus which had been the result of a rape by a schoolboy. The rapist never stood trial, and publicly denounced his victim for *her* actions (Sauter-Bailliet 1981: 415-6; Kaplan 1992: 167). Perhaps most remembered, however, are the actions that aimed directly at French symbols of masculinity, most notably the placing of a wreath for the unknown wife at the tomb of the unknown soldier (Batiot 1986: 93; Kaplan 1992: 167).

Recently, France has been described as entering a third-wave of women's movement action, involving government itself pressing for legislative change to further women's equality. Whether one

accepts this as a feature of the women's movement *per se*,²⁵ the recent egalitarian focus of the French government is laudable. Under Mitterand, measures included the creation of a Ministry of Women's Rights²⁶ (Kaplan 1992: 171) and more importantly, increasing the funding available for women's programmes by ten times. Moreover, in the field of employment a number of important changes were made, and comprehensive employment by gender statistics began to be collected. Perhaps most successful was the French government's plan to avoid the ghettoization of women in the part-time sector. As a result of government action and interest, France today boasts one of the lowest percentages of women in part-time work (17% of all working women) (Kaplan 1992: 173).

*The Netherlands*²⁷

The fight for equality between women and men began in the Netherlands around 1860,²⁸ and in 1884 the Association for Women's Suffrage (De Vereniging voor Vrouwenkiesrecht) was

²⁵ Kaplan prefers to re-define it as a phase of women's rights legislation, as it does not involve pressure and protest from outside of the state apparatus.

²⁶ For a review of the history of the state of women's policy and practice in France see Morgan 1984: 227-232.

²⁷ The Netherlands is often paired with Luxemburg and Belgium in studies of the women's movement in Europe. Unfortunately, references to Belgium and Luxembourg are few and far between (see Kaplan 1992; Lovenduski 1986; Morgan 1984; Dahlerup 1986 and the Special Issue on Women's Liberation in Europe and North America published by the Women's International Quarterly in 1981).

²⁸ This date is somewhat contested. Hogeweg-de Haart, for her part, traces the history back to the 1800s, beginning around the publication of Mary Wollstonecraft's *A Vindication of the Rights of Women*. Hogeweg-de Haart defines this period as the "precursor to the women's movement" (1978: 19-23) before beginning her study of the first wave's beginnings in the 1860s.

founded (Hogeweg-de Haart: 24-7). The 1887 revision of the constitution which sought to dissuade such action by explicitly denying the vote to women "not only increased the vigour of the resistance but also the zest for more liberty, for the vote, and for better conditions for women" (Kaplan 1992: 151). Women gained the vote in 1919.

In 1940 the Netherlands was occupied by the Nazis, and women played an important part in the resistance movement. After the war, the Dutch started an aggressive programme of industrialization in order to re-build a shattered economy, and, importantly, to make up for revenues lost after decolonization (1949-1975) (Kaplan 1992: 152). In defiance of the "reserve army" theory of women's employment, however, women's participation rates in the formal economy did not rise appreciably between the turn of the century and 1970.

The second wave of the Dutch women's movement is believed to have started with the publication of Jok Kool-Smits article, "The discontent of women" (*Het onbehagen bij de vrouw*) in 1967 (Kaplan 1992: 153). Many feminist organizations flourished in the 1970s, beginning with the rise of *Dolle Mina*, a group whose name became synonymous with feminism (Lovenduski 1986: 84; Kaplan 1992: 154). One of the most noteworthy protests occurred in 1970 when women gatecrashed a conference of gynecologists with slogans written across their bellies. The action brought attention to the prominence of illegal abortions (estimated at 10,000 to 15,000 per year) (Outshaarn 1986: 75; Kaplan 1992: 155).

In the mid 1970s, partly in response to requirements to comply with EU directives, the Dutch government began to implement a number of equality programmes, and created a Committee on the Status of Women. Since then however, there have been calls of co-option of the movement into mainstream politics (Lovenduski 1986: 84). The success of the movement should not go unnoted, however, "Dutch attitudes to women and gender issues are now amongst the most egalitarian in Western Europe" (Kaplan 1992: 160).

Germany

It is often forgotten that the German women's movement had an impressive beginning (see Kawan and Weber 1981: 421-6). Even under the repressive Bismarck regime, both socialism and socialist women's organizations flourished in Germany. By 1902 a German suffrage movement had begun (Kaplan 1992: 105). In 1918, the vote was won and from then until 1933 there was a proliferation of feminist publications and organizations in Germany (Lovenduski 1986: 101; Kaplan 1992: 106). With the rise of Hitler in 1933, however, all that came to an end, and there was a return to a "Kinder, Kuche, Kirche (children, kitchen, church) mentality" (Kaplan 1992: 107).

The effects of Nazism on women's status and organization is beyond dispute. It left a residue of apolitical women (Lovenduski 1986: 101), and of misogyny (Kaplan 1992: 107). According to Kaplan though, it was the profound break with the past -- the

beginning anew from zero hour -- which had the biggest impact on the women's movement (1992: 108). The history of the vibrant first wave was forgotten in the case of West Germany and, worse, was appropriated and claimed as the history of East Germany alone. The second wave was thus divided by the same wall of ideology that separated the two Germanies, one forced to start from scratch, and the other fighting to create a version of communism which would respond to its female citizens.

The second wave of the women's movement in West Germany began to ferment in the late 1960's, around the time of the first economic adjustment since the post-war boom, but it was not until 1971 that it began to coalesce (Kawan and Weber 1981: 427-9; Kaplan 1992: 111-4). The first major event was the public announcement by over 300 women that they had aborted -- a punishable crime. Abortion and contraception dominated feminist discourse through the 1970s. In 1975, however, a political amendment on abortion was defeated. Far from pushing the movement to protest more loudly and organize more widely, as defeats had done in other European countries, it led to the dispersion of the movement (Kaplan 1992: 114-5).

Women's centers and refuges, and a growth in consciousness-raising self-help groups continued, however, and helped pave the way for a third phase in the movement (Kaplan 1979-82). Again, abortions provided the main focus for debate, but this time the issue was joined by concern over peace and disarmament (Kaplan 1992: 117-8). It is partially due to this re-focusing that the Greens, the "anti-party", became a strong element in women's organizing and

consciousness, a trend which has thus far continued (Lovenduski 1986: 101-3). In fact, Lovenduski argues persuasively that the Greens, with their focus on environmental *and* lifestyle issues, may be of "considerable significance for West German feminism" (1986: 103).

In the case of East Germany recent history could not be more different. Within the GDR women enjoyed new rights amounting to increased independence, forthrightness, initiative, career ambition and confidence in equality. By far the most substantial changes to the position of women were made in the interest of a large and active workforce. Even there however, women remained unequal; while they made substantial inroads into many formerly "male" professions, men did *not* venture into the realm of "female" work. In the home those socially defined relations were exacerbated, with the personal/political divide remaining strong (Einhorn 1981: 436). Fortunately despite these continued inequalities women in the GDR profited from increased participation in the workplace, in the party -- owing to the role of the DFD, the official and only women's organization in the GDR -- and in the unions. In fact, the reunification of Germany has given some women reason to recall with fondness their status in socialist Europe, as compared to that of the prospering capitalist Germany today²⁹.

²⁹ This topic will be reviewed in greater detail in the conclusion of this paper.

Austria

Although Austria was formed at the end of WWI (1918), it was not until the 1970s that its creation amounted to real changes to the situation of women. When change occurred, it did so dramatically: the abortion law was repealed, a family law decreeing equality between the sexes was passed, and maternity leave was made available (Kaplan 1992: 131-3) -- all top-down legislative measures which may in part be responsible for the lack of grass-roots organizing to date (Bernard and Schlaffer 1984: 72-3). In terms of a women's social movement, however, little has developed. Although Kaplan contends that there was indeed a women's movement in Austria, she is forced to highlight its co-option into government and the workers party rather than describe its autonomous development. Further, she finds that Austria has produced no feminist mass movement due in part to a catholic, authoritarian, and traditional family structure (Kaplan 1992: 137).

Spain

Feminist groups in Spain began to appear only after Franco's death in 1975, a time when most European countries were experiencing their second wave of women's movement activity (Rague-Arias 1981: 471-2). Despite this late start, by the time of the first elections in 1977 feminists had succeeded in making women's issues part of each party's platform, and twenty women were elected, including feminist leaders, to the first Parliament (Falcon 1984: 633, Kaplan 1992: 201-

2). Spain's active women's and feminist organizations have been instrumental in expanding knowledge about the situation of women and equality (Rague-Arias 1981: 476; Kaplan 1992: 207-9).

Portugal

Between Portugal's period of "semi-feudal slumber" and the rise of Salazar's dictatorship, Portugal had experienced sixteen years of history as a republic -- a time in which women played a significant role (Kaplan 1992: 181; Morgan 1984: 572-3). No real women's movement, however, can be said to have existed before the fall of Salazar's regime, and the democratization of the country. Equal rights for men and women were written into the 1976 constitution and women's right to vote was reinstated (Lovenduski 1986: 105). Since then, a number of women's groups have worked to further equality in the workplace and in society with success, particularly after Portugal's entry into the EEC, and the government's commitment to improve the status of women. Kaplan describes Portugal as a learning society, where "[f]inding a voice, be it expressed in literature, in politics, in social concerns, or in women's issues, is a formative process that cannot be completed overnight" (1992: 190). For that reason it is likely that the development of a strong women's movement will be part and parcel of the development of a stable democracy in Portugal.

Greece

The first large scale meeting to discuss the status of women in Greece took place in 1898, and the first wave of the women's movement lasted until 1936, when King George II returned, gave power to his Prime Minister, Ioannes Metaxes, and led the nation into a period of violent dictatorship (Kaplan 1992: 213). Not surprisingly, women's organizations were purged and banned. They were not to reemerge until the end of the Nazi occupation.

Even then they did not last long. This time, women's movements were outlawed by a new American-sponsored dictatorship. As Kaplan states (1992: 215),

[w]omen's organizations were crushed and prohibited, women again were imprisoned or forced into exile and their publications were burnt. One writer bitterly noted that women at least had equality in suffering, in torture, exile, and imprisonment. In Trikeri alone there were 5000 women in the local concentration camp.

Papadopoulos was finally put under arrest in 1974, and the women's movement began again in earnest in 1975, largely spearheaded by Margaret Papandreou, the wife of then Prime Minister Andreo Papandreou, and supported by the new constitution which guaranteed the elimination of discriminatory laws and became a central focus for groups interested in developing better equality, social and maternity rights for women (Morgan 1984: 274; Kaplan 1992: 219). Since then the movement has coalesced around issues of rape, abortion, and the dowry system (Lovenduski 1986: 104). With help from EU pressure to conform to equality standards, the women's

movement has succeeded in inducing the government to implement a host of equality measures designed to help the situation of women in employment.

Italy

Italy, according to Kaplan, has undergone four distinct phases of women's movement activity since the late 19th century. The first (1870-1922) was a classic first wave of suffragette action which lasted until Mussolini gained power (1992: 232). The second (1922-1946) formed a part of the resistance movement, and advocated on behalf of women in the face of severe repression and fascist attack (Kaplan 1992: 234). The third phase (1946-1968) occurred after the first post-war struggles, and involved women in a period of diffuse organization. The final phase (1968-1983) involved, finally, the realization that mainstream parties and political movements would not prove an adequate vehicle for the women's rights campaign. It prompted a renewed attack on the misogynist fascist discourse which remained intact, and the culture and economy of violence (most notably in Sicily) which was considered a measure of *omerta* (masculinity) (Kaplan 1992: 241-4). Although this latter phase expanded into a mass movement, it faced nothing short of "gender warfare" (Kaplan 1992: 248). Perhaps because this era was one of violence and formidable opposition, the radical feminism of the late eighties which was gaining favour in other countries such as the Netherlands never really gained ground in Italy (Lovenduski 1986: 87-8).

Sweden

Compared to women in the countries of Southern Europe, Scandinavian women have enjoyed a history of almost unbroken support. Sweden is no exception and was in fact the first nation in Europe to pass laws on women's rights (Kaplan 1992: 67). The first wave of Sweden's women's movement occurred in the late 19th century and was concerned with the same issues that initially brought women together in so many other European countries. The fact that gains were made in those areas *before* the end of that century speaks of the unique history of much of Scandinavia: divorce by mutual consent and the vote were granted, and a husband's guardianship over his wife and children repealed (Kaplan 1992: 67).

Women's groups and issues have enjoyed wide support in society and in government since then. It is that "success", coupled with the Swedish model of group-centred policies, however, that has effectively stopped the women's movement from ever producing a second wave (see Lovenduski 1986: 98-9). In fact, a hostility to an individualist, self-help style of politics has amounted to a profound distaste for what is perceived as US-styled feminism, as opposed to women's liberation issues (Lovenduski 1986: 98-9).

Denmark

The roots of the Danish women's movement run similarly deep to those of Sweden, beginning in the 1850s and 60s and developing into

a first wave by the 1880s. Rights took longer to achieve though, and it was not until 1915 that Danish women gained the vote (Morgan 1984: 183; Kaplan 1992: 78).

Unlike Sweden, Denmark did enjoy a second wave of its women's movement. During the early 1970s it manifested itself in active and direct protest; during the 80s in a proliferation of women's groups and centers; and most recently in a period of "professionalism" which continues to this day (Kaplan 1992: 78). This professionalism has amounted to an increase in women's direct work within government and industry to achieve their aims. Beyond that the women's liberation movement in Denmark, an anti-capitalist and thus anti-EU group with a vision of participatory democracy, has begun to enjoy success (Dahlerup 1986: 222-3). It was this element of the women's movement which was instrumental in producing a negative vote in Denmark's first referendum over the issue of accession to the Maastricht Treaty.

Finland

As in other Scandinavian countries the first wave of the women's movement in Finland began in the late 19th century (Morgan 1984: 220). It was helped indirectly by the nationalist movement which had no entrenched history of male dominance in government (Kaplan 1992: 83-4). A second wave movement also flourished briefly in Finland although it did so without ever successfully bridging with pre-existing women's organizations in the country. Prominent in Finnish women's politics is their close relation to political parties

(Jallinoja 1986: 158-178), a tendency which is no doubt partly responsible for the popular notion that the fight for women's equality must involve men as well (Kaplan 1992: 85-6).

A Continent-wide Movement?

As has been shown, national women's movements have been present in all member states in the European Union although for different purposes, and with varying results. How then is it that we speak of a European-wide movement? In many ways the answer to that question involves the description of a movement itself. As Walker explains, social movements are phenomena (1994: 673),

that are explicitly at odds with the spatial framing of all ontological possibilities, of greater and lesser, higher and lower, inner and outer, that have made it so difficult to envisage any form of politics other than that associated with the modern state and its self-identical subjects.

Borders are ignored, they fluctuate and change. One may well ask if it is any more correct to speak of a national women's movement in the absence of a nation-wide organization, and the presence of a myriad of feminist groups varying from state to state, city to city, refuge to refuge, campus to campus? Several factors illustrate that it is not.

First, the various women's movements often learn and build on one another's experiences. Perhaps the greatest example of the cross-fertilization of ideas is in the publication of articles, women's journals, and the growth of a European women's press. Beyond this

tangible sharing, protest, court cases and legislative victory also spawns interest and emulation elsewhere (Shaw 1994: 658), leading de Lourdes Pintasilgo to find that the evolution of women in Portugal "has a lot to do with women elsewhere" (1984:578).

The second and related reason is that the women's movement returns continually to the same issues as a source of struggle. Abortion is perhaps the best example of a continent wide issue, remaining as it does the focus of some debate even in most countries which have legalized it. The four reasons Batiot enumerates for the position that abortion has had as a mobilizing issue have nothing to do with nationality and everything to do with gender: all women may be faced with the choice of whether or not to remain pregnant; the experience is exclusive to women; the immediacy of the decision is a "natural privilege", women being the first to know of their own pregnancy; and presented as a choice, feminists have negated the status of "subordinate object" and claimed themselves "responsible subjects" (1986: 94-5). This commonality is clearly worldwide. Moreover, the gains made by one movement will have effects on others, not least to the women who cross borders to access safe abortions in Europe every year. With the advent of a free market and the proclamation of the free movement of people, this situation is all the more prevalent in the European Union.

Third, women come together to press for change in each others homes, communities and countries. Perhaps the best example of this is continent wide. In 1978 Choisir, the largest French women's organization at the time, combined with the European movement to ensure that women would win political representation during the

first European Parliament (EP) elections (Sauter-Baillet 1981: 413-5). While no Choisir candidate won a seat in that Parliament -- owing in part to their inability to be registered as an official party -- 16.3% of the Parliamentarians elected were women, a fact that is partially attributable to the work of the European women's movement.

Finally, there is some indication that the European women's movement is responding to European integration by developing new forms of expression, and organizing on a continent-wide scale. In 1990, for example, the European Women's lobby was formed by women's organizations in all member states (De Groote 1992: 49; Hoskyns 1991: 67).³⁰ The Lobby's main goal is to actively press for women's rights at all levels of European politics. In order to change society in Europe, such that it will support and encourage the development of women as full and equal democratic citizens from an early age, the Lobby concerns itself with extending the nature of the equal opportunities debate beyond the workplace. As Collins states, due to the limits of equality legislation directly linked to Article 119, equality policy and programmes only become visible to the majority of European citizens in their mid- to late twenties, by which point most beliefs and values concerning gender roles are already formed

³⁰ The European Women's Lobby is a democratic organization made up of four delegates representing each member state of the EU (Norman 1994: 74-5). The method used to select delegates varies from country to country. In the United Kingdom, for example, it was agreed that the four seats would be divided equally between England, Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales (Norman 1994: 74-5). The Dutch, however, divide their seats according to varying types of women's organizations: one going to a feminist network, one to ethnic minority women, one to traditional women's groups, and one to women's health organizations. In Germany the leading women's organization, the Deutsche Frauenrat, is less willing to part with control, and will not allocate seats to women's groups which are not associated with its network. The Lobby now has a committee to deal with complaints and requests for representation (Hoskyns 1991: 68).

(Collins 1995). In order to expand the nature of the equality debate in Europe, the Lobby advocates policies which encourage more women in decision-making positions; treaty revisions in 1996 which will add the principle of equality to that of subsidiarity; new programmes to deal with the problems of violence against women in Europe; and a greater focus on women in situations of social exclusion and poverty (Collins 1995). Working in concert with the Committee on Women's Rights of the European Parliament, and women's organizations at the local, national, and European levels, the Lobby works to attain these goals.

Women's movements are a part of recent European social history. Other common historical factors have also affected the development of the European women's movement, and of European integration, not the least of which are the first and second world wars and the programme of reconstruction, continued industrialization then de-industrialization which followed. These forces, which have impacted on the women's movement, its successes, failures and idiosyncrasies, have done the same to the process of European integration. This combined history of shared time and space has had effects on the European women's movement, as seen above, as well as on the European Union. Like two plays being performed on the same stage in tandem, they sometimes bump into one another. They confuse the plot line. They fight to be heard. More interestingly, sometimes the plays are cross-fertilized. This is what has been happening in Europe. The effects leave some cause for celebration, and some cause for concern.

European Integration

The movement toward European integration has affected the success of European women's movement, and vice versa. For instance, direct political pressure exerted on states after or at the point of accession to the European Union has contributed to the success of national women's movements in obtaining desired equality legislation in countries such as Britain, Portugal, and Greece. Furthermore, Article 119 of the Treaty of Rome, the primary basis of subsequent European gender equality legislation, can only be understood as an "historical accident" (Vallance and Davies 1986: 73) arising out of the conjuncture of the second wave of European feminism and moves toward European integration. Prior to negotiations leading up to the signing of the Treaty of Rome establishing the EEC, the French women's movement had succeeded in pressing the French government to introduce national equal pay legislation (Kaplan 1992: 169). During the negotiations leading to the Treaty of Rome, French industrialists sought to ensure that similar legislation would be enacted throughout the EEC. As the European Parliament states (1981b: 16),

[t]he article was not originally included in the Treaty in order to improve the position of women. Competition was a more important consideration. Since the Treaty was intended to bring about a common market (as stated in article 2), the parties to the Treaty endeavored from the outset to remove differences in social and economic practices between member states which had the effect of inhibiting competition within the community. The low, sometimes very low, wages of large groups of women workers was one such difference and the article was

principally intended to provide the Member States with protection against unfair competition from each other which might arise from it.

It was this concern over France's economic competitiveness, and not over the welfare of European women, which lay behind the drafting of Article 119 of the Treaty of Rome. However, the inclusion of this article resulted in the creation of a Treaty base from which women in Europe have continued to argue for further equality measures.

While post-war economic recovery once kept gender issues off the political agenda (Buckley and Anderson 1988: 3), this agenda has since been closely related to the situation of women in the workplace. One of the successes of the second wave of European feminism was in politicizing the labour market as a site of democracy. As Kaplan states (1992: 274),

[w]hen the second wave movements erupted, one of the first questions feminists asked was how women could be liberated from their present yoke and become people (citizens) with a sense of autonomy, self-determination and freedom. Unequivocally, the answer was and still is that women need an independent income in order to make independent decisions.

Recognizing the benefits of the European Union as a friend of women in the area of employment, the European women's movement is increasingly attempting to engage in euro-employment discourse.

Women are gaining significant rights as citizens of Europe. Since the formation of the European Economic Community, and the drafting of Article 119, they have been able to argue for equal rights through a variety of fora. The European Union, as a transnational

polity, involves women more directly in policy-making than do many member states. As an institution, the EU have also provided more equality provisions than have been introduced in most member states.

Summary:

The European Union, and women as its citizens, are developing in tandem. Article 119 however, is best understood as both limiting and liberating for women. The development of women as workers in Europe has direct consequences on the development of women as empowered European citizens. The effects can be positive as well as negative depending on the types of work women are hired to perform, for example, whether they have positions of responsibility, and are given an adequate income -- even in female dominated employment sectors -- to lead independent as well as productive lives. Furthermore, Article 119 does little to address the formal work-home dichotomy. Women may leave the home more often to work, but once there, European politics, just as national politics, turns a blind eye to remaining inequalities, injustice and abuse. Whether a profound societal transformation is possible within the European Union, which is above all an economic institution, remains to be seen. Perhaps it is only as economic integration leads to further social and political integration, that the nature of citizenship itself in Europe will be tested. Until then, through the representative institutions of the European Union (the European Parliament) the courts, Commission programmes and institutions, women's enterprises, and

the women's movement, women in Europe will continue to refine and expand their rights within the confines of Article 119. It is to a more detailed analysis of the status of women within the most institutionalized of such democratic fora that we now turn.

Chapter Four: Women and the European Parliament

The first chapter of this thesis suggested that the European Union is best understood as a solution to the democratic dilemma which states confront in the face of increasing globalization, rather than as the source of a "democratic deficit". The second then argued that the dilemma faced by women choosing between a male-dominated form of political expression, and alternative political discourses is a false one. It argued that women are best served by the existence of a variety of democratic fora, one being representative democratic institutions. Chapter three of this paper outlined the histories of the European women's movement and of the movement toward European integration to illustrate how they have affected one another. This chapter will now investigate one site of their interaction at an institutional level: the European Parliament (EP).

This chapter is thus a review of transnational representative democracy in Europe, and an examination of the position of women within it. While democratic theorists have used the phrase "democratic deficit" to describe the European Union, feminist democratic scholars continue to use it to describe the imbalance between men and women in decision-making positions, particularly in representative legislatures (Phillips 1994; Women of Europe 1993c). The importance of women representatives in democratic legislatures is best described by Lovenduski (1986). As she states (1986: 207-8),

[n]o one would argue that business, by being engaged in the same process as labour, adequately could represent labour's interests. Neither will an argument hold that either side of the sexual division of labour is able adequately to represent the other. The core of women's interests is comprised of their disadvantaged position in the division of labour within the family, and for as long as that division persists it is sufficient reason for insisting that women's interests may be represented only by women.

The real "democratic deficit" in Europe, "caused by the under-representation of women in ... decision-making bodies" (Women of Europe 1993c: 2) is just beginning to be addressed. Nicole Fontaine, Vice-President of the European Parliament refers to politics as a "citadel largely defended by men" (quoted in Women of Europe 1993c: 2). This chapter will trace the history of one attempt to conquer that citadel: the attempt to achieve equality between male and female representatives to the European Parliament.

A mere increase in the number of women elected to democratic legislatures, however, is not enough to warrant claims of victory for the women of Europe. Far too often, the willingness of political parties to fill posts and seats with token women is accepted as illustrative of their commitment to women's concerns and equality. This tokenism is often accompanied by a related phenomenon: the ghettoization of women into the so-called caring roles of democratic politics, as advocates and critics of government education, health, and welfare policy. Such outcomes only serve to reproduce society's gendered roles at an institutional level. This chapter attempts to provide a nuanced assessment of women's representation in the EP which takes these concerns into account.

It will be argued here that the EP provides an important but limited venue for women's democratic development and expression. To do so it will firstly describe changes to the number of women Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) since the parliament has been elected. Secondly, it will assess the status of women within the EP through an analysis of gender representation within the parliamentary committee structure. Finally, it will illustrate how women MEPs have positively contributed to the gender equality debate in Europe.

Women's Representation to the EP

This section asserts that women are gaining increasing representation through the European Parliament and that this development is positive for European women. Pessimists argue that women are comparatively well-represented in the EP due to the fact that it lacks legislative and spending powers. However, a cautiously optimistic assessment is more plausible. The pessimist's explanation is only partially accurate, and its relevance is declining.

In terms of representation, the feminization of the EP appears to be proceeding at a steady rate. Not only are there proportionately more women elected to the European Parliament on average than to national Parliaments in Europe,³¹ but the percentage of women MEPs has been increasing over time. Moreover, before the creation of the democratically elected European Parliament, women were

³¹ The percentage of women elected to the European Parliament is greater than the percentage elected to EU member states' national legislatures in all but Denmark Sweden, Finland and the Netherlands (Unicef 1995:41).

rarely appointed to the Common Assemblies which the EP replaced: women stand a much better chance of serving the European Union from elected posts than from appointed ones. The Common Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community is the best example of the dismal record of appointing women to European bodies; from 1952 to 1958 only one woman out of a total of 78 members was appointed. From 1958 to 1972 the Parliament of the Six³² had 5 women members out of a total of 142. Immediately preceding the first elections in 1979, the Parliament of the Nine had 11 women out of 198 members (Vido 1980: 2). While the percentage of women in the Parliament actually dropped from 18% to 16.3% after the first elections (Mossuz-Lavau 1988: 48), 67 women joined the Parliament of 410, signalling a significant increase in the number of women's voices heard in the corridors of European institutions.

Table 4.1 and 4.2 depict the broad changes to the number of women in the EP beginning with the first election. In 1994 it shows that 25.6% of elected MEPs were women, the highest level yet. With the addition of the appointed members from Austria, Finland and Sweden the percentage of Women MEPs in the Parliament rises to 27.8%. Although Parliamentarians are not at the time of writing elected from those states, given the record of women's equality, at least in the Nordic countries, they may be expected to stay at the same level or even rise. This is one period of enlargement that will

³² The original six members of the EEC were France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. They were joined by Britain, Ireland and Denmark in the 1970s to form the nine, and by Greece, Spain and Portugal in the 1980's to form 12 (Buckley and Anderson 1988: 7). In 1994 they were joined by Austria, Finland and Sweden to form the present 15.

see an increase in the number of women involved in decision-making posts in Europe.

Any increase in the number of women active in representative politics, it might be said, is good. But celebrating the fact that women hold a minority of seats and cabinet posts only underlines how far the drive toward gender equality remains incomplete. The more important question is *why* have women found themselves increasingly successful in elections to the European Parliament? Answering this question will provide some firmer ground in assessing the importance of the transnational representative institutions of the EU in furthering the interests of European women.

Those who are skeptical of the significance of the dramatic increase in women elected to the EP rather than national parliaments do not have far to look to confirm their suspicions. This pessimism is often cast in the form of the democratic deficit argument: the European Parliament has little power compared to national parliaments. As Lovenduski has it, the high proportion of women in Strasbourg reflects "the relatively lesser powers of the European than the national assemblies rather than a link between internationalism and the promotion of women" (1986: 209).

This argument may be both right *and* wrong. The low profile of the European Parliament due to the lack of legislative powers cannot be excluded as a possible cause of the higher proportion of women elected to it than to most national parliaments. The low stakes involved in elections to the European Parliament creates a situation of weak legislative competition, a situation in which women are found more likely to run for office (Norris 1993: 315, 331). In

the European Union weak legislative competition has played a particularly important role, as the lack of developed partisan politics has enabled more 'out' groups, including women, environmentalists, and (unfortunately) far-right minority parties, to gain office. While accurate as far as it goes, the situation is more complex than this simplistic argument would suggest. There are as many as five further structural factors which have been linked to women's electoral success more generally, and to the EP in particular.

The first of these is the simple fact that many new Parliamentary seats have been created. Women were able to put themselves forward for a number of seats that were newly created, not newly vacant. Besides the increase in the number of seats, the fact that new seats have no tradition of male candidature, or of single party dominance, increases the likelihood of women running for, and winning seats in the EP (Vallance and Davies 1986: 10-11). For women, the fact that these seats existed in a newly-created democratic legislature might have made them even more appealing, as women are relatively new democratic citizens themselves.

A second structural element leading to increasing numbers of women in the European Parliament is the list electoral system. In all member states excluding the UK and Ireland (who continue to elect fewer women than the European average to the EP) this is the electoral system that applies. Through it, parties draw on the lists submitted to the public in order to make up numbers of representatives equal to the percentage of votes the party received at election time (ie. a party receiving 25% of the vote in a country

Table 4.1:

	Women/ Total, 1979	Women as % 1979	Women/ Total, 1984	Women as % 1984	Women/ Total, 1989	Women as % 1989	Women/ Total 1994	Women as % 1994
Lux.	1/6	16.6%	1/6	16.6%	3/6	50%	3/6	50%
Den.	5/16	31.2%	6/16	37.5%	6/16	37.5%	7/16	43.8%
Bel.	2/24	8.3%	4/24	16.7%	4/24	16.7%	8/25	32%
Grc.	na	na	2/24	8.3%	1/24	4.2%	4/25	16%
Port.	na	na	na	na	3/24	12.5%	3/25	12%
UK	11/81	13.6%	12/81	14.8%	12/81	14/8%	15/87	17.2%
Ire.	2/15	13.3%	2/15	13.3%	1/15	6.7%	3/15	20%
Ger.	12/81	14.8%	16/81	19.7%	26/81	32%	34/99	34.3%
Fr.	18/81	22.2%	17/81	20.9%	18/81	22.2%	27/87	31%
Sp.	na	na	na	na	9/60	15%	21/64	32.5%
It.	11/81	13.6%	8/81	9.8%	10/81	12.3%	10/87	11.5%
NL	5/25	25%	7/25	28%	7/25	28%	10/31	32.3%
Total	67/410	16.3%	75/434	17.3%	100/518	19%	147/567	25.6%

Table 4.2:

	Women Total, 1979	Women as % 1979	Women/ Total, 1984	Women as % 1984	Women/ Total, 1989	Women as % 1989	Women/ Total 1994	Women as % 1994
Aus.	na	na	na	na	na	na	7/21	33%
Fin.	na	na	na	na	na	na	10/16	63%
Swe.	na	na	na	na	na	na	10/22	45%
Total	na	na	na	na	na	na	174/626	27.8%

na: not applicable. During those years the states had not yet joined the EU.
 Sources, Tables 1 and 2: Mossuz-Lavau 1988: 48, European Women's Lobby
 1994d European Parliament "Grey Book" 1994, and "Grey Book
 Supplement" 1995.

with 100 representatives would send the first 25 candidates on its list to the EP). In this system a party which puts forward a homogeneous list, is often faced with criticism. An absence of women compared to men on a list is much more visible than an absence of women running for a party across hundreds of ridings (Phillips 1991: 80). In addition to this "logic of choice" which encourages parties to assemble a balanced ticket, Norris (1993: 314) identifies two more reasons a party list electoral system tends to benefit women. The first is strategic: parties which wish to develop affirmative action programmes for women, provide them with candidate training, and financial assistance, find it easier to do so where there are regional lists of candidates and not one "chosen" candidate. Finally, the list electoral system has a tendency to increase the number of seats which change hands frequently, and thus improves the chances for under-represented groups to gain access through electoral competition. In addition to the simple list electoral system, during recent European elections Denmark, Holland and Germany have expanded the list system to allow for voter preference³³: by allowing voters to change the order of the candidates on the ballot, effectively choosing their first place, second place, third place candidates, rather than merely one. In such systems women often "move up the list" (Vallance and Davies 1986: 36-7), demonstrated by the fact that the member states in question consistently send *more* women to the EP than the European average.

³³ The preferential list electoral mechanism is one form of electing members by proportional representation. The distinctive feature of this system is that electors not only cast a vote in favour of a party's list of candidates, they are also given the opportunity to rank that party's list in accordance with their own preferences (see Jackson and Jackson 1993: 326-7).

Linked to the list system of voting is the issue of quotas. As Phillips states (1991; 80),

where elections are organized through party lists there is considerably more scope for dictating sexual composition. It becomes possible to set a minimum quota for each sex in the winnable positions, or, even more ambitiously, to put men and women in alternate order on the list and produce parity in the final results.

The issue of quotas remains a topic of some debate in the European Parliament as well as elsewhere (European Women's Lobby 1994a: 2). Whether or not quotas are a desirable change to electoral politics, however, they are already in use in European elections and warrant consideration here. The Green Party has already decided on a quota of 50% for women candidates (European Parliament 1994: 92), and in the 1994 elections 12 out of 23 of its elected members, or just over 50%, were women. This trend continued in its executive, where 3 out of 5 positions went to women, including the co-presidency to Ms. Claudia Roth (European Parliament 1994: 92). While the Green Party holds a relatively small proportion of EP seats, their use of the quota system would seem to have affected gender composition of the EP. While the use of quotas undermines any argument that the contested seat went to a woman because she was the best candidate, and not the chosen gender, it does allow for one firm conclusion to be drawn: in the constituencies in which the Greens were successful, party preference and not gender preference was the main criterion for electoral success. Given that compared to national parliaments the electoral politics of the European Parliament is rather underdeveloped, this feminist finds that conclusion heartening.

The fourth structural element implicated in the positive electoral returns vis-a-vis women candidates for the European Parliament is more directly related to the European Union's political culture and structure. Recognizing the need for greater parity in decision-making bodies, the Commission of the European Communities has become involved in projects to get more women elected to the European Parliament. In the 1994 election, for example, it funded a campaign to that effect, urging more women to run for office, and more Europeans to vote for them. The campaign developed by the British firm Saatchi and Saatchi, entitled "Vote for Balance between Women and Men", was widely used throughout the European Union prior to the June elections (Women of Europe 1993c: 2). The campaign's graphic, composed of the symbols for women and men merged in one circle, was coupled with slogans such as "Can you imagine a world with 81% men and 19% women?", "Can you imagine a world with 81% fathers and 19% mothers?", and "Can you imagine a world with 81% Romeos and 19% Juliets?", and "Why does 81% of the Parliament have to shave every morning?" (European Women's Lobby 1994a: 3). Campaign materials are now made available to women candidates involved in national elections, and will be used again for future European elections.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, changing attitudes regarding women in politics have contributed to the increasing gender parity of the European Parliament. Trends in Eurobarometer polls show that more people make no distinction between representation by a woman or a man in the European Parliament than ever before. Similarly, an overwhelming majority disagree with

the statement that politics should be handled by men rather than women (Mossuz-Lavau 1988: 54-5). It would seem that the increasing number of women in the European Parliament, and the increasing belief that women are capable of such a legislative function go hand in hand. This has important implications regarding Europe's political culture which is now showing less of an affinity to traditional political culture and more of the characteristics of an egalitarian society.³⁴

The increasing representation of women to the EP is a positive sign for the progress of women as full democratic citizens in the European Union. It does not result, as the pessimists claim, solely from the lack of power of that institution, and the European Union compared to national governments more broadly. Clearly the situation is complex. I would argue that on balance it is a positive one.

Women's increasing share of seats in the EP, and the broader benefits of having women involved in European politics at *any* level deserve consideration. First, women are gaining experience in legislative politics at the European level and Europeans are gaining the experience of having constituency interests represented by women. As we have seen, this educative function, emphasized by participatory and demonstrative theories of democracy, has already led to a greater acceptance of women in elected office in European political culture. Furthermore, the proportion of women in the EP is *increasing*, a trend which is continuing even while the European Parliament gains new power. This is exactly opposite to what one

³⁴ See Norris and Lovenduski (1993).

would expect if the pessimists' explanation of women's participation in the EP were true. While the initial reasons for parties running women in European elections, and the public electing them may well have had to do with the perceived "second class" status of the European Parliament compared with national parliaments, this inferiority is fading, just as women's representation is increasing. Finally, women parliamentarians have an important function in participating in the creation and development of the EU's first democratically elected institution. As they push for women's rights and for the further democratization of the European Union, they help to create a Europe that is, and will be, more responsive to women's concerns.

Gender Representation Within Parliamentary Committees

While one may be cautiously optimistic that the increasing proportion of women elected to the EP is a positive development, it does not necessarily follow that once elected women play a prominent, or even proportionate role in EP decision making. One way of assessing the gendered structure of the EP is to review the status of women in parliamentary parties and committees. Three key questions stand out: first, are women playing a role in EP parliamentary committees commensurate with the proportion of female MEPs? Secondly, are the contributions of women MEPs segregated into areas of policy traditionally regarded as feminine, such as health and social policy, as opposed to "masculine" areas such as defence or economic affairs? Thirdly, are women fully

represented on those committees which concern issues over which the EU has legislative authority, or are they confined to those committees which can simply generate opinions and reports? The answers to these questions will allow us to assess the position of women within the transnational democratic forum of the EP.

In order to answer these questions, the committees of the EP have been divided into functional areas. Women's representation will be analyzed first in EP party groupings, then in committees dealing with foreign and defence policy, economic affairs, social and regional affairs, procedural issues (including intra-EU affairs), and internal and legal affairs. Key indicators of the position of women in these committees will be the proportion of women MEPs in the total membership, and in the executive membership³⁵.

Two broad sets of hypotheses should be articulated in advance of turning to the empirical data. Those who see the new transnational democratic forum as intrinsically favouring women, labelled here the "optimists", would expect the proportion of women in each committee to approximate the proportion of women MEPs in total, and that any deviations from this norm would appear randomly. By contrast, those who believe that transnational European institutions would merely reproduce the gendered divisions of national societies, the "pessimists", would expect that women are represented in lower than proportionate numbers on either those committees dealing with functional areas typically considered masculine (foreign and defence policy, economic affairs,

³⁵ The fact that membership in EP committee executives is small should lead one to treat these figures with some care.

internal and legal affairs), or those committees which deal with issues in which the EP has some legislative competence. The optimist would hypothesize that women have attained prominence as well as presence in the parliamentary committees, as indicated by the proportion of women in executive positions approximating the proportion of women in the committee itself. The pessimist would expect women to be not as prominent in executive positions as their presence on parliamentary committees would warrant.

We begin with a review of women in EP political parties. Graph 4.1 depicts the percentage of women in various parliamentary political groupings, and breaks down party composition into executive and non-executive members.³⁶ As seen from graph 4.1, in three out of nine parties women are prominently represented in their executives, ie at an equal or higher proportion than the percentage of women MEPs in that party. Furthermore, these parties, the Group of the Party of European Socialists (PSE), the European People's Party (PPE, or Christian Democratic Group), and the Green Group (V), hold 2-3 of the seats in the European Parliament (see Graph 4.2). Moreover, in the PSE, women hold both the President's and the treasurers seat, two of the most powerful positions in the executive itself (Grey Book 1994: 86). Women members of the European Parliament appear to be an important part of party politics, and are prominent in running the European Parliament itself.

³⁶Non-attached parties (NI) do not elect executives.

Notes: 1. All figures refer to 1994 European Parliament

2. Political Groupings are as follows: *PSE*=European Socialists; *PPE*=European People's Party (Christian Democratic Group); *ELDR*=European Liberal Democratic and Reformist Party; *GUE*=Confederal Group of the European United Left; *FE*=Forza Europa; *RDE*= European Democratic Alliance; *V*=Greens; *ARE*=European Radical Alliance; *EDN*=Europea of Nations Group; *NI*=Non-attached.

Source: European Parliament "Grey Book"

Women's committee membership is a more complicated area. We begin with a breakdown of women serving on committees related to Foreign and Defence Policy. As the pessimistic hypothesis predicted, women are under-represented in this area, and make up less than 25.6 % of every committee concerned with Foreign Policy and defence. This finding needs to be qualified in two ways, however. First, women are more prominent than is proportionately representative on two executives, those of the Foreign Affairs,

Security, and Defence Policy (C1), and Human Rights (SC1B). The latter could be attributed to the fact that the women's movement has typically been affiliated with human rights concerns, and has actively supported them.

Notes: 1. All figures refer to 1994 European Parliament

2. Political Groupings are as follows: PSE=European Socialists; PPE=European People's Party (Christian Democratic Group); ELDR=European Liberal Democratic and Reformist Party; GUE=Confederal Group of the European United Left; FE=Forza Europa; RDE= European Democratic Alliance; V=Greens; ARE=European Radical Alliance; EDN=Europea of Nations Group; NI=Non-attached.

Source: European Parliament "Grey Book"

The prominence of women MEPs on the executive of the committee on Foreign Affairs, Security, and Defence Policy, the largest and most important committee in this area, is noteworthy however, and weakens the case of the pessimists. Furthermore, women are under-represented on two committees where one might expect to have strong women's interest: the committee on security and disarmament

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(SC1A), in which one might have expected women to represent the politics of peace which have been broadly affiliated with the

Notes: 1. All figures refer to 1994 European Parliament

2. Foreign and Defence Policy Committees are as follows: C1=Committee on Foreign Affairs, Security, and Defence Policy; SC1A=Subcommittee on Security and Disarmament; SC1B=Subcommittee on Human Rights; C13=Committee on Development and Cooperation.

Source: European Parliament "Grey Book."

women's movement; and on the Committee on Development and Cooperation (C13), where women from the Women's Committee, who have been very much involved in the EU's aid programme debate and have advocated for a strong 'women in development' component of EU aid, might have wished to serve. It would seem that although the average percentage of women to men in the area of Foreign Affairs and Defence Policy is low, a closer look at committee composition and in particular executive composition complicates the pessimists expectation that women will be under-represented in typically "male" areas concerned with external relations and security affairs.

The area of Economic Affairs is similarly complicated.

Notes: 1. All figures refer to 1994 European Parliament

2. Economic Policy Committees are as follows: C4=Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs and Industrial Policy; SC4=Subcommittee on Monetary Affairs; C5=Committee on Research, Technological Development and Energy; C6=Committee on External Economic Relations.

Source: European Parliament "Grey Book"

Again, women are under-represented in this typically male-defined area. A closer look at committee and executive composition makes the conclusions seem a little brighter though. The main committee in this policy area -- the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs and Industrial Policy (C4) -- is almost exactly representative of women's composition of the EP. Although no women serve on its executive, the executive of its sub-committee on Monetary Affairs (SC4) is made up of two thirds women (The President and one Vice-President). The executive of the subcommittee on Research, Technological Development and Energy (C5) is made up of half

women, with total committee membership just narrowly missing the 25.6 % mark.

The situation in Committees concerned with Social and Regional Policy is, not surprisingly, even more positive (see graph 4.5). Six out of nine committees in this policy area are at least proportionately representative of women. Moreover, of these only two fall below that distinction when it comes to the issue of executive composition. The pessimists' case is strengthened, however, by the fact that women are under-represented on the committee for Agriculture and Rural Development (C2), an important committee given the EU's responsibilities in this area (Jacobs and Corbett 1992: 94). The fact that the three committees that fall below the 25.6 % mark, Agriculture and Rural development, Regional Policy (C9), and Transport and Tourism (C10), are all more regionally-oriented than the others and that women are over-represented in the primarily social committees also confirms the pessimists' hypothesis. Most obvious of course is the predominance of women on the Women's Rights Committee (C19) which has only two male members. If the lack of men on the Women's Rights Committee denotes a general lack of interest in its proceedings, this is one case in which a strong representation of women can hardly be considered a victory.

Committees concerned with internal workings of the EP and EU (Procedural Committees) (see Graph 4.6) and with Internal and Legal Affairs (see Graph 4.7), illustrate women's membership which broadly approximates the average pertaining for the whole EP. In both cases percentages hover around the 25.6 % mark, including executive membership, thus supporting the hypotheses of the

optimists. In two important committees, however, women's representation on the executive is poor. The first is the Committee of Budgets (C3), which has traditionally had a high profile because it

Notes: 1. All figures refer to 1994 European Parliament

2. Social and Regional Policy Committees are as follows: C2=Committee on Agriculture and Regional Development; C6=Committee on Social Affairs and Employment; C9=Committee on Regional Policy; C10=Committee on Transport and Tourism; C11=Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Consumer Protection; C12=Committee on Culture, Youth, Education and the Media; C17=Committee on Fisheries; C19=Committee on Women's Rights; CT=Temporary Committee on Employment.

Source: European Parliament "Grey Book"

covers an area in which the European Parliament has real powers (Jacobs and Corbett 1992: 94). Women are under-represented in its membership as well. In the second case, that of the Committee on Petitions (C20), another high profile but more specialized committee, women are well represented on the body of the committee even though executive representation is nonexistent. These findings appear to accord with the expectations of the pessimist. Yet the

picture is not so simple. In another important and very specialized committee, the Committee on the Rules of Procedure, The Verification of Credentials, and Immunities (C18), women are prominent in the executive (50%), yet are under-represented amongst the membership.

As has been shown, despite a lower ratio of women to men in areas of Foreign and Defence Policy and Economic Affairs, and some high profile committees in other areas, women broadly approximate 25.6% of committee membership, as expected by the optimistic hypotheses.

- Notes: 1. All figures refer to 1994 European Parliament
 2. Procedural Committees are as follows: C3=Committee on Budgets; C15=Committee on Budgetary Control; C16=Committee on Institutional Affairs; C18=Committee on the Rules of Procedure, the Verification of Credentials and Immunities; C20=Committee on Petitions.

Source: European Parliament "Grey Book"

Notes: 1. All figures refer to 1994 European Parliament

2. Internal Affairs and Legal Issues Committees are as follows:

C7=Committee on Legal Affairs and Citizens' Rights; C14=Committee on Civil Liberties and Internal Affairs.

Source: European Parliament "Grey Book"

Interestingly, women make up more than 25.6 % of the executive in areas of Foreign and Defence Policy and Economic Affairs, areas in which their total committee membership is low, and less than their total committee membership numbers in areas of Social and Regional Policy and Internal and Legal Affairs, areas in which their committee membership is proportionately high. It would seem that with the European Parliament, there is a tendency to "balance out" the number of women represented by either electing more or less of them to executives. However, the distribution of committees by the percentage of women sitting on them reveals that, on balance, women are slightly under-represented in the EP parliamentary committee structure.

Notes: 1. All figures refer to 1994 European Parliament

Source: European Parliament "Grey Book"

Once elected to the European Parliament, it would seem that women are finding an environment in which some of the inequality of wider society is reproduced. In that sense, the pessimists' predictions are borne out. Furthermore, there are some indications that committees with high proportions of women are concentrated in areas of traditionally "feminine" concerns, such as social policy. Also, there is some indication, though it is by no means conclusive, that women are under-represented on high profile committees. However, these pessimistic findings are by no means unqualified. Women are far more prominent in many areas than the pessimists would predict. Executive membership in the party system is significantly higher than numbers alone merit, particularly in the two largest parties the

Source: Author's calculations.

PSI and PPE. While committee membership illustrates some traditionalist tendencies, there seems to be an internal balancing mechanism in the EP which leads to higher percentages of women in executive positions of committees with poor female representation and vice versa.

Women MEPs and the European Equality Debate

Although women's dramatic success in elections to the European Parliament is not an unqualified accomplishment, women's increasing membership in the EP is blurring the arguments of the sceptics, and disproving assumptions about the aptitude of women for life in politics. Women MEPs are using their position to alter conceptions of women in politics: they are slowly but steadily proving the

stereotyping which led to their initial success wrong. Put simply, the more women given the opportunity to demonstrate their aptitude in European politics, the more women are elected to those positions. While the mere election of increasing numbers of women to the EP goes a long way towards conquering the citadel mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, it barely begins to address gendered concepts of democracy and society unless these representatives are involved in the European equality debate. In practice many are.

Immediately after the first election of the European Parliament an Ad Hoc Committee on Women's Rights was set up. The Committee was entrusted with doing preparatory work "in cooperation with the Commission of the European Communities and on the basis of an outline report drawn up by the Commission, for a Parliamentary debate on the position of women in the European Community" (European Parliament 1981a: 19). Mrs. Hanja Maij-Weggen became the committee's rapporteur on the 22nd of January 1980. Its subsequent report has become popularly known as the Maij-Weggen Report. The introduction of women's rights to Parliamentary debate served to begin what has become a Parliamentary trend -- one of protecting and extending women's rights in the European Union.

Besides the creation of an Ad Hoc Committee on Women's Rights -- which continues today as the Committee on Women's Rights, chaired by Nel van Dijk -- other factors led to the visibility of women in the European Parliament. Simone Veil, an MEP from France, was the first President of the newly elected Parliament following a vote on 17 July 1979 (European Parliament 1981a: 19). Already a high profile politician in France, Mme. Veil used her Presidency to

highlight the situation of women in Europe, a role she continued to fulfill during France's recent tenure of the Presidency of the European Council (Committee on Women's Rights 1995).

More importantly however, the Committee on Women's Rights provides a focus for women in Europe to lobby for equal rights. As Vallance states (1988: 139),

women in the Parliament have provided a focus for the equality campaign: they could be pointed to by those in the Commission who wanted action as indicative of an enduring political commitment to women within Parliament, and they have been a rallying point for lobbying by those outside the institutions of the EEC.

In response to concern over the number of women serving on the European Commission for example, the European Parliament's Socialist Group threatened to veto a Commission which did not include more women (European Women's Lobby 1994a: 1-2). Partly in response to this, the current Commission includes five women, up from only one -- Christine Scrivener -- previously (Women of Europe 1994: 1). The new Commissioners are Ritt Bjerregaard (Environment and Nuclear Security), Emma Bonino (Consumer Policy and the European Community Humanitarian Office), Edith Cresson (Science, Research, Development and Human Resources), Anita Gradin (Immigration, Internal and Legal Affairs and Financial Control), and Monika Wulf-Mathies. Two of the new Commissioners, Anita Gradin and Monika Wulf-Mathies, have already set up a group interested in equality of opportunity for women and men, which includes Commissioners Padraig Flynn and Erkki Liikanen (Women of Europe 1994: 1).

Women MEPs, however, are not just *women's* MEPs. They are elected to represent their constituencies, the issues they highlighted during their campaign, and their parties' political platform. This over-riding aspect of their role as European Parliamentarians should be noted, for it is as representatives to the Europe-wide legislature, and not more narrowly as women representatives to that institution, that women MEPs are elected. Again, evidence presented earlier in this chapter points to women's active participation in all committee areas, and to the fact that they are largely accepted by their peers, be it in their parties, committees, or working groups, as important partners and leaders in the European Parliament.

Summary:

This chapter has applied the lenses of representative democratic theory to the European Union, and asked whether the emergence of a supranational representative institution in Europe has benefited women as democratic citizens. It has found that while women are making tremendous inroads into the European Union's representative body, the European Parliament, these successes must be somewhat qualified. On balance, the increase in women's participation must be seen as a benefit, and elected women MEPs are making a great contribution to the European equality debate. However, the EP as a body appears to reproduce some of the gendered structures of national societies from which its members are drawn. Most importantly, this chapter has argued that women's representation to the EU has had a profound educative role, and their work there has

served to further women's rights in Europe through demonstrating women's aptitude for electoral politics.

Women's increasing representation in the European Parliament is a positive development, yet it cannot be said that the emergence of a nascent transnational representative democratic space in Europe has immediately rectified the exclusion of women in European democratic practice. Nor is it the only site through which women press for change, and express their democratic will. In fact, as argued in the first two chapters of this paper, representative theories of democracy and representative models of democratic practice are incomplete, they have often done a profound disservice to women, and they are in need of a revised partnership with other theories and models of democracy in order to allow for a study of women as democratic citizens. The remaining chapter of this thesis will review the situation of women in the European Union from a participatory democratic perspective.

Chapter Five: Women, European Law, and European Employment Policy

The previous chapter looked at the situation of women and democracy from a purely representative democratic framework. For reasons discussed in chapter one of this paper, representative theory provides only a narrow conception of democracy, and more specifically, of women as democratic citizens. This chapter will now attempt to further the study presented in chapter four, by using participatory democratic theory to inform an investigation of women, democracy, and employment in the EU.

Participatory theory, with its focus on the work place as an important site for the education of democratic citizens, and as a critique of the sexual division of labor, is particularly suited to the study of women and democracy in the European Union. As a result of Article 119 of the Treaty of Rome, equality policy in the EU has focused almost exclusively on women and employment, one of the key issues for feminist participatory democrats. While Article 119 was based solely on a national competitiveness argument, it has provided a vehicle for policy on women's equality. As the EU's recent Green Paper states (1993: 9):

[i]t is an example of how on the basis of legal rights complemented by positive actions, the Community has been able to make an active contribution and to stimulate a response to a major issue of a progressive society.

As a result of the concentration of EU policy on the situation of women in employment, however, women's rights and opportunities

in the European Union are closely tied to economic growth and development.³⁷ Women are not just the recipients of equality policy in the EU. Their very participation in the economy also affects how well it will be financed.

For Europe, striving to compete in an increasingly internationalized economy, women's employment can be seen as both a threat and an opportunity. The European Union already has reason to worry about job creation and employment patterns: in 1993 only 60% of the working age population in the EU was at work, compared to 70-74% in comparable economies such as the United States and Japan (Green Paper 1993: 17). Moreover, job creation is not keeping pace with demographic changes to the number of people seeking full-time work. Between 1985 and 1991 Europe created nine million jobs, but unemployment dropped by only three million (Green Paper 1993: 17). It is women, now seeking full-time work in greater numbers than ever before, who are primarily affected by these trends, with women's unemployment rates remaining stubbornly high compared to those of men across all age groups (Green Paper 1993: 55). Ironically, it is also women who represent one of Europe's greatest hopes. The European Union itself recognizes women as a "reserve of energy and talent which has not so far fully expressed itself because of past discrimination...It is not without significance, for example, that the majority of new small enterprises

³⁷ Strong European economies facilitate the integration of women for reasons relating to the financing of equal opportunity programmes, the education and training of women, and the ease with which the economy can incorporate a mass of newly self-defined unemployed.

set up in the 1980's were initiated by women" (Green Paper 1993: 25).

This chapter seeks to assess the complicated issue of women, employment, and democracy in the European Union. It is divided into three sections. The first will look at the legal route toward equality in the work place for women and men in the EU. The second will examine the policy route to the same objective, specifically in terms of equal opportunities measures. The third and final section will investigate two case studies of women, employment, and equality: one, an investigation of the Center for Research on European Women (CREW), and the second an assessment of employment patterns and the state of the equality debate in Britain. It will be shown Europe is now at an important crossroads on the path toward further integration. Women's rights and opportunities in the work place, and thus their ability to develop as full and active citizens of the EU, hang in the balance.

The Legal Route

There are two ways in which the legal route toward furthering equal opportunities for women in the work place also leads to women's development as democratic citizens of the European Union. First, as discussed in chapter two of this paper, women's broader participation in the economy and society has an educative and empowering function. Owing to the Treaty base of equality legislation in the EU, the legal route is an important avenue for furthering women's development as equal workers, and hence equal

citizens. Second, the legal system is an important element of democratic governance and women's use of the legal system in the European Union to pursue clarification and expansion of their rights warrants consideration as democratic expression in itself. European law and the European Court of Justice (ECJ) can be seen to have provided an alternative avenue through which individuals and states in Europe can test the effectiveness of European legislation and force its further refinement, thus expressing their democratic will. Furthermore, the women of Europe have often used the court system to publicize the benefits, and limits, of a European legal system.

This section will briefly describe the nature of European law, and the structure of the ECJ. It will then describe the major directives which have resulted from refinements to European law. Finally, it will describe the Defrenne and Marshall cases as examples of women's use of the ECJ to test the limits of equality legislation and provoke the creation of further legal directives to the benefit of women. It will be shown that the legal route to equal opportunities fulfils the dual function of providing institutional avenues for the refinement of equality legislation and a forum through which women can engage in the equality debate directly.

European law is a unique legal system. It is the first international legal system to which state nationals have access, and which is both independent from and binding on its member states (Remuet-Alexandrou 1987: 1). Although European law is meant above all to complement and be complemented by the national law of member states, it is autonomous with respect to "national law, its status as part of the national legal order and its supremacy over

rules of national law" (Kovar 1983: 109). The written sources of European law include the treaties -- the Treaty of Paris (1951), the Treaties of Rome (1957), the Merger Treaty (1965), the Luxembourg Accord (1966) (Vallance and Davies 1986: 88), and the more recent Maastricht Treaty (1992) -- and Directives which are secondary sources of legislation. In addition, Council decisions form part of the legal system, although they may not be used as the basis of legal cases, and more general legal principles and traditions form an unwritten yet important source of European law (Remuet-Alexandrou 1983: 1).

The European Court of Justice is the body responsible for implementing Community law, hearing cases, and offering preliminary advice to national courts. It is made up of 15 judges appointed for six year terms (Buckley and Anderson 1988: 9). Individuals access the European Court of Justice through their national courts, which then refer issues of European law back to the ECJ. When a case is referred to the ECJ, the decision taken is binding on the case in question, but does not create precedent in the national law which is concerned (Buckley and Anderson 1988: 9). Member states can also be taken to the ECJ by the European Commission for failing to live up to Treaty agreements, and for failing to convert European Union directives into national law by a specified date.

There are at the time of writing six directives which deal with equality policy. Each has built on the basic principle of "equal pay for equal work" laid down in Article 119. These directives are set out below (Buckley and Anderson 1988: 7; Green Paper 1993: 88;

Remet-Alexandrou 1987: 6, 36, 75-6, 84; Directive 75/117/EEC : 19;
Weiner 1990: 567-8),

European Directives Concerning Women

Directive 75/117/EEC of 10 February 1975: Commonly referred to as the Equal Pay Directive, this directive was passed in order to ensure the harmonization of laws in the Member States relating to the principle of equal pay.

Directive 76/207/EEC of 9 February 1976: Often called the Equal Treatment Directive, this directive expanded the scope of equality legislation to include equal treatment with regards to access to employment, vocational training, working conditions, and dismissal. In addition, this directive also states that positive discrimination measures meant to redress inequalities between the sexes are not contrary to the principle of equal treatment.

Directive 79/7/EEC of 19 December 1978: This directive guarantees the progressive implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women in matters of social security. Its scope includes statutory schemes which provide protection against sickness, invalidity, old age, accidents at work, and occupational illness. It applies to social assistance where it is a supplement of or replacement for such schemes.

Directive 86/378/EEC of 24 July 1986: This directive extends the principle of equal treatment for men and women to occupational social security schemes. The benefits of collective agreements, company insurance schemes, and self-employment operations fall between statutory social security measures and private insurance contracts and, as such, were not fully covered under Directive 79/7/EEC.

Directive 86/613/EEC of 11 December 1986: This directive concerns equal treatment for self-employed men and women, and the protection of self-employed women during pregnancy and motherhood.

Directive 92/85/EEC of 19 October 1992: This Directive introduces measures to encourage improvements in the health and safety at work of pregnant workers, workers who have recently given birth and who are breast-feeding.

Together with Article 119 of the Treaty of Rome, these six directives have provided the legal framework for equality between women and men in the EU. Women have used the court system to refine elements of equal pay legislation, and to press more generally for equal treatment as citizens of the European Union. Often their cases have led the European Union to pass further legislation in the form of directives, or to the legal clarification of existing legislation. One of the best examples of women's use of the ECJ as a forum through which to express grievances, request refinement of legislation, and redefine the position of women in the European labour market are the Defrenne cases.

Ms. Defrenne first brought a case before the Belgian Conseil d'État in 1970. Having been retired at the age of forty, following Sabena Airline's policy on the age of female cabin crew, she asked that Belgium annul Article 1 of the Royal Decree of 3 November, 1969 which allowed air hostesses to be excluded from the pension schemes available to most cabin crew (Remuet-Alexandrou 1983: 91; 1987: 117).³⁸ The Belgian Conseil referred the case to the ECJ, asking "[d]oes the retirement pension guaranteed under the terms of the social security financed by contributions from workers and by State subsidies, constitute a consideration which the worker receives

³⁸ The service of air hostesses before the age of forty was eligible for a general, and not the more generous "special" pension scheme. Furthermore, seniority pension was denied to female cabin crew members, as it could only be claimed at the age of sixty (Remuet-Alexandrou).

indirectly in respect of his employment from his employer?" (quoted in Remuet-Alexandrou 1987: 117). The ECJ found that the concept of pay in Article 119 did not include social security schemes.

The second time the case came before a court the Belgian *Cour de Travail* again asked the ECJ for preliminary rulings. Chief among these was the question of whether Article 119 introduced directly into domestic law the principle that men and women should receive equal pay for equal work. The ECJ replied that Article 119 has direct effect, and that the principle of equal treatment is incorporated into national law with the ratification of the EEC Treaty, and does not necessitate later national legislation (Remet-Alexandrou 1987: 118). Article 119, however, was found not to allow retroactive claims to pay. This condition "seems to have been moved by pleas of Ireland and the United Kingdom that claims to back pay based on Article 119 could have disastrous economic effect in those countries" (Wyatt and Dashwood quoted in Weiner 1990: 587). As Defrenne had been pursuing compensation for arrears in salary, allowance on termination, and pension, her case was unsuccessful once again. Defrenne appealed a third and last time in 1977 (Defrenne III 149 77). This time the Cour de Cassation went to the ECJ to ask whether Article 119 guaranteed equal working conditions for men and women. Although the ECJ found Defrenne's claims outside the scope of Article 119, it did elevate freedom from sex discrimination to the status of a fundamental right (Weiner 1990: 565).

The Defrenne cases are a good example of women's use of European law as a democratic forum through which to argue for equality rights. First, the case was brought to the Court by Belgian

lawyer Eliane Vogel-Polsky³⁹ who had set out explicitly to test whether women could claim that Article 119 of the Treaty of Rome had direct effect (Vallance and Davies 1986: 75). The case thus demonstrates the ability of a woman to use the ECJ for the express purpose of testing, and ultimately expanding the limits of European equality legislation. Second, the case led to the decision that Article 119 has what is known as "direct effect".⁴⁰ After the Defrenne decision women could claim that Article 119 of the Treaty of Rome was incorporated into national law through treaty accession, and did not require independent national legislation (Remuet-Alexandrou 1987: 119). Women thus gained rights as *European* citizens. Finally, during the third and last attempt at an appeal, the Defrenne cases led to the elevation of freedom from sex discrimination to the status of a fundamental right. To that effect the court stated (Defrenne v. Sabena Airlines III, quoted in Weiner 1990: 565),

³⁹ Eliane Vogel-Polsky now serves as Belgium's expert at the Women in Decision-Making Network (Women of Europe 1994c: 3).

⁴⁰ The principle of direct effect allows for an individual to claim rights without a national government having passed European legal principles independently into national law. In other words, an individual can claim rights as a European citizen, regardless of limits to those claims formerly present in national law. The principle was first recognized in *Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen* in 1963. In its decision the European Court of Justice clarified that, "it is the very concept of the common market and its substantive consequences which provide the basis for the direct effect of community law...the inherent logic of a common market suggests that its rules must be addressed directly to individual citizens" (Kovar 1983: 139). The principles under which the principle of direct effect can be claimed were later laid down in the case of *Van Duyn v. Home Office*, 1974: in order for the principle of direct effect to hold a provision must impose clear and precise obligations upon member states, be unconditional, and leave member states with no discretion concerning its implementation. While Article 119 is considered to have direct effect, the directives which are related to it are not (Vallance and Davies 1986: 90-1).

respect for fundamental personal human rights is one of the general principles of Community law, the observance of which [the ECJ] has a duty to ensure. There can be no doubt that the elimination of discrimination based on sex forms part of those fundamental rights.

While Defrenne actually lost her case on three subsequent occasions, the purposes of Eliane Vogel-Polsky and of European women more generally were served.

One more case deserves particular mention here. The case of *Miss Marshall v. Southampton and South West Hampshire Area Health Authority* effectively put Britain's legislation regarding retirement policy on trial. Miss Marshall had been employed by the Health Authority until the age of sixty-two, at which time she was dismissed on the grounds that women were required by law to retire at the age of sixty, rather than at sixty-five, as was the case for men (Remuet-Alexandrou 1987: 134). The British Court put two questions to the ECJ: first, did her dismissal violate the Equal Treatment Directive; and, second could she rely on the directive in a national court notwithstanding the UK's Sex Discrimination Act (Weiner 1990: 572)? The Court found in Miss Marshall's favour on both counts (Case C-271/91). Both women and men in Britain now reach the age of retirement at sixty-five.

European law has provided women with an important avenue through which to press for their rights as European citizens. The Court itself has often proven sympathetic to this cause. As Banks states (1991: 76),

[t]he Court has built fruitfully on the basic legal texts, as regards to both substantive and procedural rights. It

cannot be pretended that all the problems have been solved; the cases which continue to come before the court bear witness to the myriad of difficulties which remain. However, if the record so far can be taken as a presage for the future, there is every reason to think that new challenges will be met with considerable judicial vigor and ingenuity.

Despite this history of Court sympathy to issues of women's equality however, the legal route toward democratization of Europe -- through the expansion and protection of women's rights as equal workers, and importantly, through the establishment of a forum in which women can fight for the refinement of equality law and publicize its utility to women in Europe -- is limited.

The difficulties facing women who choose to pursue cases of European law include, but are not limited to: the cost involved in bringing a case to court, the widely varying national legal systems which may or may not encourage women to attempt a legal case; and the inability of many immigrants in Europe to use national courts for fear of adversely affecting their applications for citizenship, or their tentative position in European society. In addition, and linked intimately to the fact that gender equality in Europe has been limited to the employment sphere, the legal route can only respond to women as workers. Without improved legislation, which in turn demands greater democratization at a representative level, the court cannot serve to advance and protect women as whole citizens.

The Equal Opportunities Route

In addition to the legal route, the equal opportunities route also provides a framework for advancing the rights of women as workers. It is particularly important to a study of women and participatory democracy in the European Union as the history of the Equal Opportunities Route points to the EU's ability and willingness to expand its narrow focus on equal pay to a wider programme of employment rights issues (Lovenduski 1986: 282).

The Equal Opportunities approach is best described as a broad framework through which women can engage with European institutions which have been entrusted with the role of expanding equality in Europe, and through which women's enterprises and organizations argue for the further acceptance of women as full and equal citizens. Both the Equal Opportunities Unit of the European Commission (formerly called the Women's Bureau) and the Social Action Programmes will be shown to have demonstrated the Commission's willingness, often under pressure from the European Parliament and various women's organizations, to consider so-called "women's issues" as an essential element in the further integration of the European Union.

The Equal Opportunities Unit of the Commission is part of Directorate B (Employment and Labour Market) and of Directorate-General V (Employment, Industrial Relations and Social Affairs), and is involved in developing and implementing Equal Opportunities policies for the Commission (Commission 1992: 1). The Equal Opportunities Unit has been most successful as a research body,

highlighting the need for new programmes and legislation at both the national and European level. The fact that so much intra-institutional lobbying is required in order to promote women's rights in the EU decision-making structure is an indication of the inefficiency if not deficiency of the EU's democratic structure, as well as the unlikelihood of these issues being raised in the EU commission and Councils without a body there to promote them at every opportunity. Nonetheless, the Equal Opportunities Unit is functioning, and does make a difference.

The area of childcare services and women's employment is a case in point (Hoskyns 1992: 26). The concern for the link between childcare options and the ability of women to take up paid employment was expressed during the European Union's first Action Programme. A lack of evidence at that time and the fact that childcare issues overlapped with national family policy however, kept concrete policy and programmes from being developed. By 1986, partly as a result of research by the Unit, evidence was available to firmly link childcare to women's employment. As a consequence the European Childcare Network, which produced a comprehensive report in 1988, was established (Hoskyns 1992: 26).

In addition to having established an Equal Opportunities Unit, the Commission has also embarked on a series of Social Action Programmes. In each of the Programmes the Commission has tried, with the cooperation of its social partners -- including the European Parliament's Committee on Women's Rights, and the Advisory committee on Equal Opportunities -- to facilitate "progress towards the achievement of equality between men and women" (Commission

1991: 161). The goals of achieving equality between men and women, and of creating an internal market are linked in the Third Action Programme which concentrated on the situation of women in the economy. As it states, "Europe will undoubtedly have a need for more qualified workers and women's participation in employment could be decisive" (Commission 1991: 161). In order to facilitate women's involvement in the creation of the internal market, and its long term success, the Third Action Programme identified four main areas of action: a greater emphasis on social dialogue, a greater priority on childcare, a new emphasis on women and decision-making and an emphasis on the integration of women into the economic and social spheres (Pillinger 1992: 132).

As well as having a role in the development of EU culture and policy concerning women and the work place, the Action Programmes also touch on and respond to international issues. The Third Action Programme, for example, led to a resolution on women and the development process. As Pillinger states (1992: 140-1):

[a]lthough going beyond the direct remit of the single market, this initiative was influenced by a growing global women's lobby and has led to the setting up of a women and development office in the Commission.

Given that the European Union is a significant source of development funding, especially in the Lome countries, this resolution, and the creation of a WID (Women In Development) office in the Commission signifies both a commitment to women's issues, and the power of international pressure to affect the course of EU policy on women.

Perhaps the best indication of the EU's sincerity in promoting the equality of women and men is found in their balance sheet. In fact, programmes designed to encourage the development of women in the media, promote education regarding EU policies on women, and encourage the promotion of women to decision-making roles are both encouraged and funded. The Green paper states that (1993: 10): "there is an explicit commitment that the principle of equal opportunities for women and men should be respected in the implementation of actions financed by the ESF [European Social Fund]".

In many ways the willingness of the Commission to finance equality programmes for men and women through the ESF, to extend itself to encompass Equal Opportunities and Women in Development Units, and to structure its goals in comprehensive programmes of action, is a result of frustration, more than insight. Women and employment are recognized as an important part of the internal market. National governments, however, have been less willing to extend social welfare and development powers to the EU, than they have economic ones. In short, the Commission has been doing what little it can for women in Europe without a clear mandate from its member governments. In contrast, the next section of this paper will evaluate women's ability to take advantage of EU structure and policy.

Case Studies: CREW and Working Women in the United Kingdom

Law and policy will do little to encourage the women of Europe to participate as equal democratic citizens unless they are put into practice. They sometimes are. Moreover, it is women themselves who are at the forefront in the promotion of equality policy and programmes to their own benefit. That is not always easy, especially in a country such as the UK where national difference (and difficulty) concerning the implementation of EU policy, and indeed abstention from the Social Charter, has made it harder for women there to claim the benefits of EU citizenship than their sisters across the waters. In fact, Britain threatens to remain an island of inequality in a sea of convergence.

This section of the paper will show two examples of how women have fared in the European Union during its transition to a fully integrated market economy. It will be shown that women have the opportunity to develop as citizens of Europe along participatory democratic lines, but that not all women will be able to do so with equal ease or success. It will be divided into two sections: first, an investigation of CREW, a consultancy founded and run by women and concerned specifically with equal opportunities and training; and second, a review of the situation of women in the UK, and their attempts to reap the benefits of Union membership in a country that is still debating that principle.

CREW

CREW, the Center for Research on European Women is an example of participatory democracy at work. This is by design and not merely accident. CREW see their role in Europe as more than a vehicle for economic equality. Fatoula Ionnidis (1995), argues that CREW furthers the democratization of Europe. Economically dependent women in lower status and lower paying jobs, she states, are not empowered in the political realm. European democracy is threatened by such a lack of economic equality and independence (Ionnidis 1995). Essentially CREW, which was founded in 1980 by a group of European women, puts those principles to work as an independent European consultancy, research, and information center which is linked to business and unions in Europe and works closely with the European Union as well as the OECD and the ILO.

CREW's area of expertise is women in the workforce, and specifically the education and training of women and the promotion of enterprise creation that will enable women to take advantage of emerging developments in the European economy. Brussels-based, CREW has been well placed to profit from, and advocate the further development of equality programmes in the EU. Under contract from the European Commission it has been involved with a number of programmes and projects to promote equal opportunities; to consult on the design of infrastructure that will encourage the greater mobility of women in the labour force; and education and training schemes to encourage women to train themselves for the newly emerging European economy.

Since 1988 for example, CREW has been involved in the implementation of the IRIS programme of the European Union, one element of the NOW programme of equal opportunities whose aim it is to "help women take full advantage ... of the positive effects expected from economic growth and technological development" (Commission 1991: 173). CREW's work on women's training and IRIS has been described as "immensely successful" (Pillinger 1992: 72). That success is mostly based on CREW's unique women-centred approach, which caters to women's unique needs, rather than simply applying previous training systems designed for men to women (IRIS 1994b: 18). CREW has found for example, that training schemes rarely take account of women's full schedules including child-rearing and household work. This double day shift makes after work programmes difficult for women to participate in without flexible time arrangements or child-care facilities. In addition, women are often intimidated by men in technological classes and have a tendency to under-perform. IRIS believes that (IRIS 1994b: 18),

[b]y organizing women-only training, by changing the training context and content, by taking trainees as the starting point and by broadening the definition and scope of vocational training, successful deliverers of women's training have demonstrated the effectiveness of an alternative approach. It is different in its breadth, its approach to trainees, the materials it uses, the methods it has developed, the interaction between trainers and trainees and among trainers.

CREW's women to women approach to training, implemented through the IRIS programmes is only one of the ways that CREW and IRIS have led to the increased supply of vocational training for women in

Europe. Their success has led the Women's Rights Committee of the European Parliament to advocate the continuation of the IRIS programme, with increased funding. IRIS is now in its second stage of operations, and follows three primary objectives: to promote equal opportunities and give the training of women greater visibility; to develop and improve vocational training for women; and to establish links across Europe for that purpose (Dury 1995: 4)

CREW, which is involved in programmes which improve the status of women, and lead to greater security and remuneration in the labour market, is involved in the democratization of the work place, and thus of society. Furthermore, it promotes equal opportunities and publicizes existing EU programmes through its CREW reports, and its IRIS information sheets (Pillinger 1992: 72). CREW was also instrumental in the setting up of the European Network of Women (ENOW) which advocates on behalf of women in Europe for the extension of women's rights (Pillinger 1992: 72).

CREW is above all an example of women who are participating in the creation of a more responsive and egalitarian European Union for women. As such they are both an *example* of participatory democracy at the European level, as well as its advocates. CREW's continuing work with the EU speaks of the willingness of some elements of the EU's institutional structure -- the Commission, and the European Parliament -- to further women's rights.

Unfortunately, success is not as forthcoming for women's groups who must rely more on the implementation and interpretation of Union principles and programmes by national governments. One example of the limits of the European Union as a promoter of women's

equality in the workforce and thus of women as participatory democrats, is the situation of women in the UK.

Working Women in the United Kingdom

Thus far this chapter has concentrated on legal, institutional and policy factors which exist in the European Union to further the cause of equality in the work place between men and women. It has also demonstrated the ability of women to use the EU to their benefit, through the court system, lobbying, and in the case of CREW, the development of a women's consultancy which is putting participatory democratic theory into practice and profiting as a result. This section of the chapter will now look at one member-state, the UK, to determine whether the EU has caused a noticeable difference in the lives of working women. To do so it will concentrate on the issues surrounding Europe's transition to a Single European Market with particular reference to Britain by looking at one example of the UK's implementation of EU employment policy -- the Equal Pay Directive of 1975 (75/117/EEC, 10 February 1975), and by quantifying (and qualifying) the gains women in Britain have made over the last decades in terms of gaining paid employment. It will be shown that the transition to a Single European Market is potentially threatening to women as workers without social policy to accompany it. Further, it will be argued that as most new jobs being created for women are part-time, the potential to empower women as workers, and thus as citizens through increased participation in the work place, is severely undermined.

There are three main macro issues currently affecting employment statistics for women in the United Kingdom. The first is the worldwide trend of increasing numbers of women seeking work. In Britain this trend manifests itself in a most startling projection: by the year 2000 the total labour force is expected to grow by around 1.1 million with most net additions coming from women between the ages of 25 and 54 (Lindley and Wilson 1992: 17). What this means is that despite substantial growth in employment, and the growing numbers of persons involved in government sponsored training, enterprise and employment schemes, by the turn of the century unemployment is likely to reach about 1.5 million in the UK (Lindley and Wilson 1992: 17). Secondly, there is a growing fear in Europe that without social cohesion -- brought about for example, through the implementation of the Social Charter from which Britain has abstained⁴¹ -- competition between EU member states to attract foreign investment will lead wages to be bargained down to their lowest common denominators (Lindley 1992: 5). Finally, in the UK there has been an abrupt about face concerning equality policy. Although the UK had adopted measures early on in an effort to promote equal pay for men and women, most notably with the Equal Pay Act of 1970, since then a change in economic policy has had the opposite effect. As Meulders, Hecq and Plasman have it (1992: 167), by 1979,

⁴¹ The reasoning behind the UK's refusal to sign the Social Charter is best described by Pillinger who argues that the principles enshrined in the Charter went "against the grain of the UK's thinking on the regulation of pay and trade union rights. It had not spent over ten years deregulating the labour market to have this imposed at the European level" (1992: 126).

[a] wholesale strategy was...set in motion tending to demolish the edifice of protection in employment, and its immediate effects were felt especially in the sphere of pay. In addition to open encouragement to quit the labour market, we can point to a reduction in the number of wage inspectors and other officials concerned with non-wage aspects of employment and to subsidies for projects providing cheap labour.

In fact, this latter factor in determining women's employment patterns in the UK has led Pillinger to study Britain's implementation of the EU Equal Pay Directive (1975), and to find that "there are problems in relying on national goodwill to implement policies with the spirit in which they were intended to take effect" (Pillinger 1992: 102). Unlike Article 119 of the Treaty of Rome, which has had direct effect since the Defrenne cases, directives must be implemented through national legislative channels. In the case of the 1975 Equal Pay Directive and the UK, this process took until 1984 to complete, and only then under considerable pressure from the European Commission (Pillinger 1992: 102-3). In fact, in 1981 the Commission took the UK to the ECJ (case 61/81), where the Court found that Britain's Equal Pay Act (1970), which Britain had argued was effective in providing women with the right to equal pay, was insufficient (Pillinger 1992: 102-103). The UK was ordered to establish an authority that could determine equal value, ensuring that the decision on what constituted equal pay could not be left in the hands of the employer. Although the UK eventually passed the Equal Pay Amendment Act in 1983 women's organizations, which along with the Commission had been instrumental in bringing pressure to bear against the government (Pillinger 1992: 104-5),

were left somewhat dissatisfied with a situation in which bonuses and other special payments would be difficult to defend under equal value claims (Lloyd 1985). As Pillinger concludes, women's rights were improved as a result of pressure from the Commission and various women's organizations to improve the situation of women at work in Britain, but remain unable to affect whether the UK "meets not only with the letter of EC law but also with the spirit of it" (Pillinger 1992: 109).

Whether or not the UK's minimalist approach to conforming to EU equality standards leads to profound gains for women as workers, and thus as democratic citizens, is another matter. Even if, as Cecchini predicted in his 1988 report, the completion of the Single European Market leads to the creation of 1.8 million jobs in the medium term, and women are among those who gain employment, there is reason to be concerned with what type of job is created for whom from both an economic and democratic perspective. As Meulders, Hecq and Plasman state (1992: 158),

[c]oncerning the types of job that will come into being, we have little information as to their whereabouts and sectors, whether they will be full-time, part-time, fixed-term or open-ended, what qualifications will be required, what social security protection they will enjoy, what remuneration they will attract, etc. An answer to these questions is of vital importance especially for women's employment.

In fact, women do not seem to be making radical gains in the field of employment. Women's earnings as a percentage of men's, for instance, have been slow to rise in Britain (see Table 5.1).

Table 5.1: Women's hourly earnings as a percentage of men's, 1984-1991

	%
1984	73.5
1985	74.0
1986	74.3
1987	76.3
1988	75.2
1989	76.5
1991	78.2

Source: Pillinger 1992: 113;
 Department of Employment (UK) 1994, New Earnings Survey

Pillinger attributes such meagre results of equality legislation and policy to the small number of successful equal value cases, and the low impact they have had on collective bargaining (1992: 113). In addition, the fact that women are often engaged in part-time, rather than full-time work has had a significant impact on their earnings.

Indeed, any celebration of women's increasing share of the total workforce must be qualified if the increase results primarily from the creation of part-time positions. In fact, it does, as illustrated by graph 5.1. While some women actively seek part-time work in order to complement a schedule that includes child-rearing and domestic responsibilities (Green 1992: 35), it is primarily due to the labour market's continued downgrading of women's skills, the difficulty of finding child-care facilities, and a lack of generous parental leave policies which lead women to accept part-time and temporary (contract) employment (Meulders, Hecq, and Plasman 1992: 160). The problems with part-time employment go beyond direct remuneration, however. Often part-timers are denied the right to redundancy payments, and work fewer hours than required

to qualify for sickness and unemployment benefits (Meulders, Hecq, and Plasman 1992: 165).

Source: Central Statistical Office, *Social Trends 25*, 1995: 69.

More importantly from a participatory democratic perspective, though, women who return to work often experience downward occupational mobility and are often confined to lower status occupations (Lindley 1992: xv); women in part-time work are often employed in the service industry (Maruani 1992: 15); and, in most European countries more women remain unemployed than men, as is shown in table 5.2 (Maruani 1992: 24).

This tendency for women to remain second-class workers, can only serve to reinforce their common portrayal as second-class citizens. Even in Britain, where female unemployment rates remain below those of men, women often remain in low-paying, low-status posts which require skills below their capabilities.

Women in Britain have gained from the UK's membership in the EU. They have new rights which are protected by the European legal system. Still, these quantitative gains must be qualified by the fact that women remain the subjects of workplace discrimination. They may well find work -- indeed, are more likely than women in other EU states, save for Denmark, to do so -- but it is often not the type of work they are seeking, or are qualified to perform. European fears of social dumping may so far be unheeded, but British women's development as citizens of Europe is stunted by their inability to claim equality in the workplace. Unfortunately, Britain seems uninterested in furthering this cause through immediate compliance with European Law, or the acceptance of principles of social harmonization in the EU.

Table 5.2: Unemployment Rates in Europe (Annual Averages)⁴²

	Lux 12	Belg	Den	IRG	Gr	Sp	Fr	Ire	It	Lux	Nld	Port	UK
Men													
1983	8.7	8.6	8.2	6.2	5.8	16.2	6.3	14.6	5.8	2.6	11.1	5.3	11.9
1984	9.4	8.4	7.4	6.1	6.0	19.4	7.9	16.3	6.2	2.4	11.0	6.5	11.9

⁴² It should be noted that official figures for women's unemployment can be inaccurate, or at least strongly affected by the definitions chosen. For instance, women actively seeking to re-enter the labour market after raising children are often excluded from such official statistics (Pillinger 1992: 17-18).

1985	9.4	7.5	5.6	6.1	5.6	20.3	8.4	17.5	6.3	2.1	9.2	6.7	11.7
1986	9.2	7.4	4.0	5.2	5.1	19.2	8.5	17.5	7.1	1.8	8.4	6.4	11.8
1987	8.6	7.5	4.5	5.1	5.1	16.8	8.3	17.4	7.0	1.8	7.5	5.1	10.8
1988	7.8	6.7	5.5	4.9	4.9	15.0	7.7	17.0	7.2	1.5	7.2	3.9	8.7
1989	7.0	5.4	6.8	4.3	4.6	12.9	7.0	16.1	7.2	1.3	6.5	3.4	7.2
Women													
1983	11.8	19.0	10.5	8.0	11.7	20.8	10.8	16.5	14.4	5.3	14.7	11.8	9.9
1984	12.7	19.3	10.2	8.6	12.1	23.3	12.3	18.0	15.2	4.4	14.9	11.9	10.6
1985	13.0	18.4	9.1	8.7	11.7	25.2	12.6	19.7	15.7	4.3	12.8	11.7	11.0
1986	13.0	18.5	7.4	8.1	11.6	25.2	12.8	19.9	16.7	4.0	13.4	10.9	11.0
1987	13.0	17.6	7.0	7.9	11.4	27.7	13.3	19.3	16.1	3.9	14.0	9.2	9.9
1988	12.6	15.2	7.6	7.9	12.5	27.5	12.8	18.9	17.0	3.1	12.8	7.9	8.3
1989	11.7	13.3	8.6	7.4	12.4	25.2	12.4	18.8	16.9	2.7	12.1	7.1	6.7

Source: Maruani 1992: 24

While Britain is alone in its out and out refusal to cooperate in the formation of social policy in the European Union, it is not in its history of women's gains in the workforce. In fact, the tendency for women to work in part-time employment, and with less job-security than men is a European trend (Maruani 1992: 40). What does this signify for the democratization of Europe? The conclusions, unfortunately, are dim. In the case of part-time work, Kaplan states (1992: 33).

clearly, part-time work is no way to economic independence or out of traditional female caring roles. It is designed to supplement income as a measure of necessity or to provide additional family income. For the employer it guarantees a cheap labour force, fine-tuned to immediate production and labour needs.

Beyond women's tendency toward part-time work they are also generally in lower status, lower-paying jobs, despite their education and qualifications. This is clearly not the type of situation which leads to work place empowerment, and the development of

democratic skills such as a willingness to express opinions and believe in your personal ability to make a contribution to your environment and community. Far from it, these are precisely the situations in which women (again) are taught to question themselves, and to see themselves as less deserving due to being "less productive" than men.

Summary:

It is useful to return here to the concept of participatory democracy as described in Chapter 2 of this paper. There we learned that participatory democracy is the most ancient form of democracy, based on the fostering of an active and equal community of citizens, and their education in all spheres of social life. This classically Greek form of democracy was later embraced by the Guild Socialists among others, who argued for the education of the citizenry and their equal participation in decision-making in industry in addition to the polity, as opposed to their passive part in the expansion of the economy. Three main issues thus recur in any current discussion of participatory democracy: the democratic community, the education of democratic citizens, and the position of people in the workplace.

Clearly in the case of the European Union only one of those issues is a focus of continued discussion and action. In fact, there is very little said at all about the creation of a transnational democratic community except when the issue of symbols of citizenship such as passports is raised, or the issue of education in the home, the workplace, the polity and society is discussed by the feminist

movement. Rather it is the workplace, and women's place in it, that is most closely scrutinized, and most hotly debated as a concern for democracy in Europe. In essence, Article 119 of the Treaty of Rome has been too successful, in that it has succeeded in framing discourse about women's equality solely in terms of the realm of paid employment.

This has profound implications for the status of women in European democracy for two reasons. First, it disempowers women and the EU from actively engaging with issues concerning the "private" lives of women -- childbearing and rearing, division of household labour etc. -- which keep women from developing as active citizens. Second, it points to the importance of the workplace as a site of participatory democracy, the remaining inequality therein, being at least partially responsible for keeping women from creating or becoming active members of a democratic community themselves.

Whether it be through the court system, through equal opportunities programmes, or through women's creative responses to the formation of the EU as in the case of CREW, the democratization of Europe for and by women is constrained by the dichotomization of the world into private/public, national/international spheres. In those areas where women are most in need of imaginative and forthcoming appraisals of inequality and democratic disempowerment, the EU -- which has shown at the very least its interest in precisely these areas through its funding of studies, programmes and campaigns -- is cut off from participating in the

creation of a European-wide social policy to match the economy it supports.

In the realm of paid-work the situation of women points to changes occurring in the economy and their effect on the creation of an active, participatory *and* female workforce. As Pillinger states (1992: 11), there are a number of "social and economic factors ... [which] affect women's access to employment", including continued sex segregation, the number of women involved in atypical forms of employment, lower pay rates, the vulnerability of women's employment, domestic and childcare responsibilities, and the inflexibility of the labour market. The trend for part-time employment opportunities for women to grow, while full-time work decreases, for example, means that if current trends continue more women will be employed as part-timers than full-timers years before the same will be said of men. The effects of such a transition will have a profound impact on the state of democracy in Europe. First, in the workplace two classes of workers, one a mobile decision-making class and the other a lower routine and service worker class will have been created. As the Guild Socialists formerly, and feminists of late have pointed out, a two tiered class-system in the workplace leads more often than not to a two-tiered system of citizenship. Moreover, the under-valued work of women outside the home seems to have an effect on the valuation of non-paid work in the home as well. A study in Europe in 1971 found that 71% of husbands who did *no* domestic work had wives in blue collar jobs, further confirming the correlation between a woman's pay, her occupational prestige, and her position in the home (Kaplan 1992:

39). Despite ECJ support to equality in the workplace, Commission funding of equality programmes, and women's own involvement in the feminization of the marketplace and society it would seem that the position of women in the workplace -- arguably the main site of participatory democracy at the European Union -- is a precarious position indeed.

Conclusion: Democratic Developments

Democracy in Europe is currently undergoing two profound transformations. The first is to the scale of democracy, as it moves from being a state-centered concept and practice to one with decidedly continental overtones. The second is a transformation in scope as women struggle to claim their rightful place as full and equal citizens in the emerging European polity. What these two transformations point to, perhaps more than anything else, is democracy's status as an ideal continuing its development. Throughout history the only constant in democratic thought has been change. The end of democratic history is certainly not near.

Still, theories of democracy, their pet political institutions and proponents, remain incredibly stubborn. Witness our current infatuation with liberal democracy's ballot box, and the host of political leaders and thinkers who are slaves to what amounts to a fairly recent fashion. Participatory democracy, with its ancient roots, has fallen out of favour. Newer concepts of democracy implicit in the politics of social movements are often dismissed as unsophisticated and unworthy competitors to a supposedly timeless tradition. If this thesis has succeeded, however, it is precisely in questioning the notion that democracy is without a history, and that theories of democracy stand in competition with one another. For women in particular, no one theoretical tradition has successfully responded to their needs as new citizens or accurately described their experiences, let alone left them room to be active participants in the continued development of democratic thought. Rather, women have been

asked as relative newcomers to the practice of democracy to choose between competing concepts, institutions, candidates and parties -- the *competition* itself a lasting vestige of a male-centered approach to political participation.

A study of women's active involvement in democratic politics as citizens of the European Union leads us to look at several different sites of action, and to several different styles of participation in political life. Women are involved in representative politics as part of the electorate and more and more as candidates themselves. They are learning the value of active participation in the workplace to the fostering of a sense of self-worth and equality even if more often than not these remain ideals to be fought for. They are discovering the power of activism by using the potential of social movements to imagine more ideal futures and demonstrate women-friendly social and political relations. In short, women in the European Union benefit from a variety of democratic fora.

Of course, the gains made by women across these diverse avenues of democratic action have been by no means equal. First we might look to gains made in representative institutions such as the European Parliament (EP). These gains have been striking, yet mixed. On the one hand, more women are elected to the EP than to many national parliaments in Europe. The argument that dismisses such advances on the grounds that women are only elected due to the EP's lack of powers has been shown to be too simplistic. Nevertheless, it has been found that women arrive to the EP to find some of the gender divisions in their national societies reproduced in its decision-making apparatus. While the findings on gender

representation on EP committees are somewhat discouraging, women have on the whole gained greater acceptance in European-wide representative bodies than the pessimists might have predicted. And this influence is growing.

Participatory theory is useful in highlighting one of the great obstacles facing women as they seek to carve out political space as independent and equal citizens: the lack of equality in the workplace. Without the real autonomy provided by secure earnings and the sense of self-worth found in paid employment, the status of women as full and equal citizens is undermined. It is true that looking at the EU through participatory lenses shows up some concrete gains made by women in the European context: women have used European law to press equal opportunity claims at a national level; and organizations associated with the EU, such as CREW, have made great strides in focusing attention of overcoming barriers to women's full participation in the workforce. However, projections of labour market trends appear to confirm that the proportion of temporary or insecure part-time jobs will continue to rise, and that women will continue to be disproportionately represented in such employment. The experience of women in Britain suggests that in the absence of European-wide social strategies to address this trend, the efforts of the European Union and the use of its legal system to press for equal opportunities will ultimately fail to reduce an important source of gendered inequality in the emergent transnational democratic polity of the EU.

Determining the extent to which demonstrative democracy and the European women's movement have advanced women's status as

full citizens is more complex. Assessing change in the symbols, attitudes, and shared meanings embedded in civil society, the register in which demonstrative democracy operates, is inherently problematic. Still, the European women's movement appears to have engineered a seismic shift in the prominence of women and women's issues in European politics. Furthermore, women who pursue representative avenues to democratic expression have found that some of their greatest gains have been in the educative and demonstrative effects of such participation. The interplay of European political institutions and the transnational women's movement should also be considered. As has been shown, the European Union has provided a focus for women's political activity and a means through which gains by national women's movements can be diffused to other member states, as the origins of Article 119 in the Treaty of Rome so clearly illustrate.

It might be argued that the situation of women in Europe is less one of flux between incompatible forms of democratic practice, and more the emergence of a new style of political involvement, one particularly suited to politics beyond (and below) the nation-state. This raises the important question of whether the addition of a transnational layer of political institutions in itself has provided women with greater scope to advance their interests. In one sense it clearly has, as the conjuncture of social movement pressure, European Commission lobbying, and the demands of European Law have made concrete gains possible in such countries as Britain, Portugal, and Greece. However, there is a second manner in which European politics, where the principles of continentality *and*

subsidiarity co-exist and support one another, has advantaged women. Although outside the narrower scope of this thesis, it is important in conclusion to note that with the accession of nation-states to the EU and the creation of the European market, the regional level of political organization has grown in prominence. Pillinger (1992: 143-4), for one, believes that there is now,

more scope for women's representation at the regional level, particularly since women are more likely to be affected by shifts in mobility than men. However, there is more likelihood that women will be well placed to network and develop strategies at the local or regional level, than exists at the national or European level. Indeed, it is at these levels that women are beginning to network and organize, and they too are keen to be at the center of regional development and decision-making.

The emergent transnational polity of the European Union has not only enabled women to press successfully for concrete democratic gains, but it has also opened up new regional opportunities for representation and issue-oriented mobilization.

Not all women, it must be remembered, are impressed with the opportunities the European Union offers. The Nordic countries, for example, have been disappointed with the record of the EU concerning women's rights and equality. Speaking at a European Union summit of government leaders on the 9th and 10th of December 1994, Swedish Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson remarked that the small number of women present -- one, Swedish Foreign Minister Hjelm-Wallen -- made him feel like he'd "return[ed] to the old days" (CREW 1994b: 15). They were old days that the women's

movement in Sweden had foreseen. In fact, the "No" campaign's portrayal of the EU as an undemocratic, bureaucracy-driven threat to neutrality, employment, welfare, women's equality and high environmental standards was most effective among women and the young, who were prominent among "No" campaigners and voters in that country (Carnegy 1994).

The "No" campaign ran a similar, and it would seem more effective, campaign in Norway and won. Women in Norway were very concerned with the possible effects of European Union membership, specifically with regard to parental leave policy (Women of Europe 1994: 3), and the possible threat to Norway's public sector -- where 20% of the workforce are women -- from the EU's "philosophy of the free market" (Barber 1994). In the end, women's decisive vote (Women of Europe 1994: 3; Carnegy and Fossli 1994), was cast in favour of remaining outside of the European Union. Norway, through democratic debate, was forced to find in favour of national autonomy in the face of the democratic dilemma which globalization poses. Women weighed the uncertain economic effects of remaining outside the EU against the unknown effects on women's employment and empowerment of EU membership, and voted decisively against joining.

Unlike Norway, Austria, Sweden, and Finland, women in East Germany were not given a choice of whether or not to join the EU. They were given the clear-cut choice of whether or not to join Germany, one of the strongest economies in Western Europe. Unfortunately the benefits of unification have proven rather gendered. Women in East Germany had generally positive

employment prospects before unification. Since unification, however, women have been returning to the "hearth" as they are squeezed out of the labour market (Dempsey 1994). Employment statistics in the former GDR have been looking more and more dim. Before the fall of the wall, more than 920,000 people worked in Agriculture. That number has fallen to 210,000. In manufacturing the numbers employed dropped from 3.17 million to 1.29 million in 1992 (Dempsey 1994). Resulting unemployment is hitting women hardest of all (Einhorn 1991: 17), leading the Judith Dempsey of the Financial Times to quip (4 May 1994) that "with the exclusion of women -- the size of the labour market in eastern Germany will...[n]ever correspond to West German or Western European levels."

Accompanying this shift is a broader societal shift to the way women are treated and portrayed. Einhorn (1991: 17) has found a re-birth of the myth of women as wives and mothers as dependents and sexual objects.⁴³

To be sure, the situation of women in the former GDR was not entirely rosy either. Although equal pay for equal work legislation was passed in 1946 and over 80 % of children under the age of three were guaranteed placement in creches (Einhorn 1991: 21), women only ever earned 66-75 % of men's pay, and these jobs were often concentrated in the "female" industries of textiles, retail, service, secretarial, cleaning, teaching and medicine (Einhorn 1991: 20).⁴⁴ In fact, the double burden of family and working life was particularly

⁴³ Accompanying the latter is an increase in pornography (Einhorn 1991: 17).

⁴⁴ As the teaching and medical profession were opened up to women in many state socialist countries, they were devalued in status and remuneration, and fewer men were willing to work in them (Einhorn 1991: 20).

laborious in East Germany where women were seen as workers *and* mothers *and* wives (Einhorn 1991: 19).

All the same, the hope and dreams of the East German women's movement have not become realities since Unification. Even the most prominent women in the democratization campaign in the GDR have found that their efforts go un-acknowledged. Almost all East German government ministers are now men. In terms of parliamentary representation of women, numbers have fallen from a high of 33.3 % to 9-10 % in the first democratically elected parliament, leading the new political structure to be characterized as a "male democracy" (Einhorn 1991: 16-19). What women in the former GDR are discovering is what those of Western Europe did some time ago. Representative democracy is not enough, and participatory democracy is not particularly forthcoming. As Einhorn has it (1991: 22), women in the former GDR are faced with,

the growing realization that a political democracy and democratic rights are such by no means synonymous with political representation or with having a voice. This is an especially bitter realization, given that one of the main issues behind the final collapse of state-socialist regimes was people's resentment at not being taken seriously or given the space to operate as autonomous political subjects. There is thus a growing a feeling of *plus ça change...*

The experiences of women in Norway and the former German Democratic Republic point to democracy as a continually developing body of theory and practice. The successes and failures of one country's political processes will necessarily affect the desires of its

citizens to try another. Hence women in Norway have clung to a state which has proved itself a frontrunner in the institutional support of women's equality and independence, and women in the former GDR have found that economic growth is not guaranteed for everyone in a re-united Germany, and social equality is even more difficult to find. These tentative reactions to democracy in the European Union should be remembered. They remind us to think about what democracy is, and what we would like it to be. Democratic transitions are not necessarily emancipatory, and democratic decisions are not always considered socially just.

That is particularly important to remember in the case of the European Union. States, faced with economic globalization, are coming together in a variety of ways around the globe, but nowhere as completely, and with such symbolism of democracy, as in the EU. Whether or not the European Union is any more willing or able to legislate in the face of global deregulation than individual states remains to be seen. Whether or not this is advisable at all, or necessary on a continent-wide level rather than through international agreements between all states is an issue which is hotly debated. The experiences of women in the European Union, however, show that some thought as to how citizen-workers are going to be incorporated into larger economic bodies is crucial. That thought might begin with a thorough and comprehensive review of what we mean when we talk about democracy and free-market capitalism being compatible; about how share-holder democracy vs. workplace democracy fit into established concepts of democratic theory (or not);

and about how employment status and pay affect the status of citizens, most particularly women and immigrants.

Women's experiences as citizens of the European Union demand that we think about these questions and others as we enter a new stage in democracy's development. Using established theories of democracy together in order to broaden the image of a transnational and hopefully more women-friendly democratic polity -- as this thesis has done -- is only the first step in such a project. Having found that women do benefit from the co-existence of various democratic fora, but to different degrees, and in the case of participatory democracy, with great room for concern, the development of democratic theory demands that we look further into the dichotomies of public/private (economy) and public/private (personal) in order to assess the impact each has upon the other. Before the construction of a democratic theory capable of responding to politics beyond the nation-state, and to women as founding partners in new democratic transformations, there is yet more questioning and de-constructing to be done.

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