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TITLE OF THESIS/TITRE DE LA THÈSE  THE POLITICS OF DISARMAMENT

CANADA AND THE TENTH UNITED NATIONS
SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT

UNIVERSITY/UNIVERSITÉ  CARLETON

DEGREE FOR WHICH THIS THESIS WAS PRESENTED/
GRADE POUR LEQUEL CETTE THÈSE FUT PRÉSENTÉE  M.A.

YEAR THIS DEGREE CONFERRED/ANNÉE D'OBTESSION DE CE DÉGÎÈRE  1979

NAME OF SUPERVISOR/NOM DU DIRECTEUR DE THÈSE  P. M. MONROE

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The Politics of Disarmament
Canada and the Tenth United Nations
Special Session on Disarmament

by

Gerald R. Skinner

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A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of
Graduate Studies and Research in Partial
Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts
in International Affairs

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Abstract
As its title suggests, this study is a narrative analysis of the dynamics of arms control and disarmament negotiations in a United Nations setting, with special reference to Canadian disarmament policies.

The first chapter sets the stage by providing the necessary historical and institutional background to the UN Special Session on Disarmament, and the negotiating structures and procedures which the United Nations actors used. The next three chapters examine in turn the three major negotiating groups, the Eastern European, the Neutral and Non-Aligned, and the Western European and Others. These chapters treat the objectives, informal negotiating patterns and internal structures of each of these groups.

The following chapter, The Canadian Dimension, places the Canadian role at the Special Session within the context of Canadian disarmament policies. The chapter then outlines the evolution of Canadian Government thinking on the Special Session, reviews significant influences on Canadian policy formation, and traces the development of Canadian arms control and disarmament initiatives in that forum.

All these chapters are prefatory to the two central chapters on the actual substance of the negotiations. These two chapters deal with the actual process of negotiating the final document. They draw together the various elements laid out in the preceding chapters and show how apparently irreconcilable differences over questions of principle and substance were accommodated through the negotiating process. Arms control and disarmament proposals tabled at the Special Session are examined from the perspective of each of the three negotiating groups. The effects of the process of the negotiations on the text of the final document is illustrated. The first of these
two chapters deals with the Preamble and Introduction, and the Declaration of the final document; the second chapter addresses the final document's Programme of Action.

The last, short chapter suggests some conclusions by measuring the achievements of the Special Session against the goals set for it. Evidence that the United Nations system may work against progress in some areas is summarized. The proposition is advanced that the Special Session, being secondary to the national security and other concerns of states, had a limited effect on actual arms control and disarmament negotiations, and was characterized more by development than by disarmament issues.

The study raises a number of fundamental questions. Among them, whether the three-cornered competition within the General Assembly advances the cause of arms control and disarmament, whether the Canadian role is as effective as it might be and whether the United Nations offers the best avenue for ensuring progress.
The Politics of Disarmament

Canada and the Tenth United Nations
Special Session on Disarmament

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Preface

There is only one arms control agreement extant which has withstood the test of time. That is the Rush-Bagot Convention of 1817, which placed limits on armed vessels in the Great Lakes. Even some of its provisions were suspended, by mutual agreement, to permit Canadian warships in the Great Lakes for the Centennial celebrations. Canada's association with arms control and disarmament, therefore, is long-standing.

This study grew out of a general interest in the problem. As I sought to inform myself, I developed some conceptual difficulty with the term "arms race". "Arms race", to me, suggests an untenable model, as if the "race" had a definite beginning and a precise end, that it had something to do with speed, and that the object of the "race" was not national security, not perhaps even national survival, but to "win". To win what has never been clear. It also leaves out of account certain key concepts (such as deterrence) which are fundamental to NATO defence strategies. It does appear in this text, however, since the term is generally accepted in the disarmament vocabulary, and does convey a valuable idea -- weapons competitions and their link to security -- which otherwise might be lost.

This study makes a distinction between arms control and disarmament. Arms control is the means by which
qualitative or quantitative restrictions are placed on the further acquisition of weapons and weapons systems; disarmament is the process by which there are actual reductions in weapons stockpiles. It is also pertinent to quote Hans Morgenthau's definition: "While disarmament is the reduction or elimination of armaments, arms control is concerned with regulating the armaments race [his term] for the purpose of creating a measure of military stability."* But whatever the exact definition, the evidence suggests that the arms control measures should be well-established before the latter is contemplated. Some of the world's most prominent disarmament experts dispute this view, regarding arms control as a diversionary tactic to focus public attention away from the crux of the matter, namely disarmament. At this stage, I see little possibility for disarmament, but considerable hope for arms control. I also believe that Canada has a valuable role to play, both in the political aspects of negotiating agreements, and in the technical aspects of carrying them out, especially in the vital field of verification and control.

Finally, this study reflects no one's views but my own. In some places, they may parallel Canadian Government positions, but in other places they may not. The facts in this study, however, belong to themselves and stand on their own merits.

Introduction

This study sets out to explain why a "final document" adopted by the United Nations General Assembly sitting in Special Session turned out the way it did. The "final document" dealt with arms control and disarmament, the product of the Tenth Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly, which met in the spring of 1978. The results of the Special Session, as evidenced by the final document, were inconclusive in terms of progress towards disarmament -- and perhaps equally inconclusive as a verdict on the degree to which the United Nations was an appropriate venue for dealing with such matters. The central issue, then, focuses on whether agreement on significant arms control and disarmament measures can be reached within the broad international (and public) forum of the United Nations. In some respects, this study is as much about the United Nations as about arms control and disarmament. There is a Canadian role, of course, in both.

Here, it might be useful to take a step back before proceeding further and set out some of the fundamental characteristics of the United Nations milieu which in one form or other appear and reappear throughout the following chapters.

The articulation of the collective will of the United Nations takes the form of a General Assembly Resolution, itself a product of the sustained effort of a group of like-minded
states who have coalesced around a common issue or initiative. (In formal terms, this very often is manifested by cosponsorship of a draft resolution.) Success or failure at the United Nations is not necessarily measured by the relationship of each delegation to this or that resolution. For the United Nations as a whole, every debate and every resolution passed will add to -- or detract from -- the credibility of the United Nations system according to the degree to which it reflects reality and is capable of realization. In this regard, national speeches can be directed as much to audiences at home as to fellow delegations, and can serve a variety of purposes, not all of them compatible with strengthening the United Nations system. The general quality of a given General Assembly Resolution and the manner in which it was passed are very often the outward signs of the potential for effectiveness of the United Nations General Assembly in the outside world.

The expression of collective will of the General Assembly requires compromise, finding the lowest common denominator of agreement amongst the widest number of delegations and raising it to the highest possible level of agreement. The word "politics" in the title of this study refers to this process. It can be rendered exceedingly convoluted since the legal fiction of the sovereign equality of all states (hence, one state, one vote) is so resolutely upheld. Procedural matters can often be found to prevent substantive debate on the question at hand, and reaching compromise on the wording
of a draft resolution can alter its original intent almost beyond recognition. In addition, a group of determined states can block the formation of consensus and compromise by insisting that the draft resolution in question be adopted unchanged by roll-call vote. This latter procedure, which often calls into play the "automatic majority" of the Non-Aligned states, seemed almost certain to be employed at the Special Session on Disarmament. Any resolution issuing from the Special Session on that basis would have represented no more than the collective views of those who passed it and not the view of the General Assembly as a whole. Many delegations, including the Canadian, believed that obtaining consensus on the final document was as important for the United Nations system as for disarmament.

If every United Nations delegation acted alone and stood on the perogatives and deference international practice accorded the state it represented, the result would be chaos. In many national constitutions, there is no written provision for the existence of political parties. In the United Nations Charter there is, likewise, no mention of the major United Nations groupings. In both instances, informal arrangements were necessary if the system was to work at all. This study, therefore, also concerns the objectives and internal negotiating patterns of the three General Assembly disarmament groupings -- the Eastern European, Non-Aligned and Western Groups.
The title of this study, "The Politics of Disarmament", suggests yet another consideration in play at the Special Session, beyond those within United Nations structures and processes for dealing with the subject under debate. The vocabulary of arms control and disarmament, and the occasion of the Special Session, were sometimes employed for purposes other than their original, and supposed, intention. As we shall see, the developing countries' obsession with creating a New International Economic Order came close to obscuring the stated ends of the Special Session.

Equally significant is the episode of the "neutron bomb", since the issues it raised, and the unhelpful atmosphere it created dogged the proceedings of the Special Session from the beginning. It illustrates well the complexities of "open" disarmament debates. For this reason, and because of the effect it had on the proceedings of the Special Session, it should be borne in mind.

The issue was over the apparently imminent American decision to replace its tactical nuclear warheads in Europe with a new, "cleaner" device which caused relatively little collateral damage and left little residual radiation, but killed through an intense neutron bombardment. The acquisition of this nuclear warhead, known as an enhanced radiation weapon (ERW), was put to the US Congress for consideration in 1977, and was the subject of a detailed arms control impact statement later that year. A number of military consider-
ations commended the acquisition of this warhead, but an
equal number appeared to argue against it.²

Whatever its merits or otherwise,³ the debate which
surrounded the warhead came close to disrupting the Special
Session itself. The debate, which was triggered by the appar-
ently clumsy handling of the issue in the USA (the weapon's
production was submitted to the US Congress as a routine
budgetary request) was seized upon by the Russians as an
opportunity for a campaign against a nuclear weapon which,
in true capitalist fashion, "destroyed people but not property".
The emotional appeal of the Soviet campaign was such that
resolutions tabled at the Lisbon Inter-Parliamentary Union
Congress and at the Helsinki Socialist International Confer-
ence received considerable support.

The campaign culminated with the introduction by
the Soviet Union of a "Draft Convention on the Prohibition of
the Production, Stockpiling, Deployment and Use of Neutron
Weapons" in March 1978 at the CCD in Geneva.⁴ Mr. Brezhnev
followed up the advantage the Soviet Union had gained in the
debate by proposing that a treaty be signed on the subject.
The American President responded that the Soviet Union "had
no use for" an enhanced radiation warhead and termed Brezhnev's
offer to forego building one "of no significance at all" given
the fact that the warhead was designed to offset the Soviet
preponderance in tank forces in Europe.⁵
By the time the Special Session was nearing its conclusion, however, much of the heat had dissipated from the debate and Foreign Minister Gromyko gave it only passing reference in his statement before the General Assembly.

It will remain an open question whether an announcement by the President in April that the USA had decided to "defer its decision" on the production and the deployment of this warhead had in effect spared the Special Session from an ultimately unproductive and possibly even destructive debate. But in terms of the Special Session, the effect was clear. The issue of enhanced radiation warheads had been removed from the public domain of the General Assembly by the apparently mutual consent of the two major protagonists, and the issue died. At the same time, there seemed to be satisfaction on the part of the Soviet authorities that their own political purposes had been served by the public outcry against the warhead, and that there was little to be gained in pursuing the matter further. Thus, in the consciousness of the participants, the Special Session was very much a public platform, and its subject matter was inevitably shaped accordingly. This too was a significant factor in determining the outcome of the Special Session, and is reflected in this study.

* * * * * *

This study is a narrative analysis of the dynamics of arms control and disarmament negotiations in a United Nations setting, with special reference to Canadian disarmament policies.
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The Annexes include Conference Room Paper No.20, the badly-bracketed negotiating text from which the final document emerged. It underlines the magnitude of the problem facing the UN negotiators. The other documents in the Annexes serve as a basis for the comparison of the Western and Canadian positions against the final text.

Finally, there is no separate chapter on the outcome of the negotiations on the Machinery section of the final document. Besides being a subject unto itself, and only indirectly relevant to the substance of the issues under discussion at the Special Session, its history and the complexity of the issues involved would require a separate volume. Where it is called for, however (as in efforts to encourage France to participate in the Geneva talks), issues related to disarmament mechanisms are duly noted so that this study is complete.
FOOTNOTES

1 Authoritative American version, as contained in the arms control impact statement, is found in Additional Arms Control Impact Statements and Valuations for Fiscal Year 1978, Committee on International Relations, US Congress, 1 December 1977 (95th Congress, W70 mod. (3) Lance Warhead.


4 Documents CCD/559, 10 March 1978; and CCD/PV.778-9, 19 March 1978, pp.7-29 (USSR and USA reply).


Chapter I

The United Nations Setting and the Final Document

In his inaugural statement before the Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Tenth Special Session on Disarmament, the Secretary General, Kurt Waldheim, noted that the United Nations could not be expected to function on the basis of the United Nations Charter and international law unless major progress was made in the field of disarmament. "The Special Session", he said, "should be a turning point in efforts to promote real and substantial measures aimed at achieving the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control".¹ On one level, this study is an assessment of the degree to which the Special Session met the goal set for it by the Secretary General; on another level, it is an analysis and critique of the various forces in play within the United Nations milieu which advanced -- or hindered -- the cause of arms control and disarmament.

The Special Session might be regarded as a process which had as its immediate objective the production of a final document on the basis of the broadest possible measure of support from UN members, particularly the "militarily significant" states. The final document, and the character of the debate which took place during the five sessions of the Preparatory Committee (where most of the substantive discussions took place) cast a long shadow behind them and
many of the issues under discussion had been present even at the inception of the United Nations. Most national positions had already been set before the Special Session convened, and there appeared to be little compelling reason for change, despite the commonly-agreed wisdom that the early conclusion of significant disarmament measures was a matter of vital urgency. Under these circumstances, the Special Session would see the tabling of a great number of proposals, but no significant reorientation in national policies either toward the UN as an instrument for disarmament or toward the process of disarmament negotiations itself.  

Precursors of the Special Session

The outcome of the Special Session, and consequently the influences brought to bear on shaping the final document, were intimately linked to three major international gatherings, or more correctly, sets of gatherings. Together, they determined the major themes of the final document and provided a foretaste to the debates. They were the Sixth and Seventh UN Special Sessions, the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference and ongoing multilateral disarmament discussions, particularly the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva.

Sixth and Seventh UN Special Sessions

These two Special Sessions (held in 1974 and 1975 respectively) presaged the Tenth Special Session and its
final document in two important respects. Firstly, the form of the resolutions, and to some extent, their content, issuing from these Special Sessions had established the precedents upon which the pattern of negotiation, and even the actual shape of the final document was based. These earlier Special Sessions both produced a Declaration and a Programme of Action. Secondly, they dealt with a broad range of economic themes aimed at establishing a New International Economic Order. Third World preoccupations at the Special Session on Disarmament were to reflect, perhaps naturally enough, the issues which had been raised at these earlier meetings. The effect was that a common Third World view emerged that disarmament should be subordinated to, and put in the context of, the objectives of the earlier Special Sessions.

The experience of regular sessions of the UN General Assembly on North-South issues, moreover, was not particularly encouraging, and linking these issues to disarmament issues did not augur well for the outcome of the Tenth Special Session. At UNGA XXIX in 1974, a draft *Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States* had been put to the vote, section by section. The document as a whole was adopted, given the Third World's overwhelming UN majority. But any practical effect it may have had was ruled out by the Third World's unwillingness to permit any of the document's more unacceptable features to be modified so that Western countries would be
able to agree to it through consensus. The concern therefore was that a final document on disarmament could be produced which would recall the fate of the UN Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States. In the Canadian explanation of vote to UNGA XXIX, the matter was put as follows:

To sum up, Mr. President, it is a matter of considerable disappointment to my delegation that...it was not possible to reach agreement on a Charter which engaged the general support of the international community. In view of the manner in which this document has been adopted, I must make clear, Mr. President, that in the view of my delegation, the document cannot be considered as a basis for the evolution of international law in the controversial areas where the Charter did not gain general acceptance.5

The Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference

In many respects, the debates of the NPT Review Conference of 1975 were to be repeated at the Special Session, with the same splits along North-South lines. It might be useful to review the main issues. The way they unfolded in debate at the Special Session is examined in later chapters.

Up to its entry into force on March 5, 1970, 98 countries had signed the NPT, of which 51 had also ratified it; before the Review Conference, the Treaty had attracted 83 full parties together with 23 signatories which had not yet ratified.6 Unfortunately, numbers, in this case, were of less significance than the identity of states which were either not yet full parties to the NPT or which had not yet subscribed to the Treaty. Foremost among the latter were China, France and India.
The NPT divides nuclear proliferation into its horizontal and vertical aspects, the first dealing with the spread of nuclear weapons to countries not yet possessing them, and the second to the multiplication and technical improvement of nuclear weapons systems by nuclear weapons states. The Treaty allocates responsibilities in the field of the prevention of nuclear proliferation to states according to their nuclear weapons status. Other multilateral instruments in the field of arms control are either instruments of general prohibition, such as the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, or of general regulation, such as the Outer Space Treaty. The NPT, however, is an instrument of differential prohibition and regulation, making a clear distinction between nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapons states.

The Indian nuclear explosion (a "peaceful nuclear explosion") of May 18, 1974, a year before the NPT Review Conference, set the scene for the NPT Review Conference itself and raised some fundamental questions which continued to reverberate during the debates of the Special Session. Chief among them was the question of the validity of the proposition upon which the NPT rested, namely that the number of nuclear weapons states should not increase. A directly related question, and equally troubling, was whether the Treaty was somehow rendered less valid (or perhaps had failed) now that there were six nuclear weapons states rather than five. The same arguments
that were put by the Indian Minister of Defence in March 1970 -- before the Indian nuclear explosion -- were to be repeated at the Review Conference and again at the Special Session:

We can never agree to signing the NPT which does not take into account all vertical proliferation and which does not take us even a step further towards stopping the mad race in increasing the nuclear arsenal of the superpowers and those who belong to the nuclear club. 

A major criticism of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, itself a symbol of the iniquities imposed upon the world by the economically advanced states, rested in what many in the Third World regarded as its discriminatory features. They argued that the policies of the nuclear weapons states, and their failure to live up to their Treaty obligations to pursue "in good faith" negotiations toward the cessation of a nuclear arms race and proceed to nuclear disarmament, had removed the obligation for non-nuclear weapons states to support the Non-Proliferation Treaty. In short, it was up to the nuclear weapons states to move first.

The Final Declaration of the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference was achieved only after the Conference had reached what seemed an insurmountable impasse. Following a feverish night of consultations, Mme. Thorrsen, the President of the Conference, proposed her own draft text which was, by the narrowest of margins, accepted. The hairbreadth victory at the NPT Review Conference and the bitterness of the debate did not bode well for prospects of consensus on a final document at the Special Session.
Ongoing Discussions

Issues ranging from general and complete disarmament to nuclear-weapons-free zones had appeared regularly on the agenda of the UN General Assembly since at least 1961. Generally speaking, there appears to be a correlation between the divisiveness of the subject under debate, and where it was discussed. The most heated and protracted exchanges tended to take place along North-South lines, with either the UN or the CCD -- large multilateral fora -- being the venues. East-West topics, particularly those related to nuclear arms control or reductions in conventional weapons, took place in more restricted fora -- the trilateral Comprehensive Test Ban talks in Geneva, the SALT, and the MBFR talks in Vienna. In the Special Session's final document, agreement amongst the East-West protagonists came relatively easily, and mutually-acceptable wording was arrived at fairly early in the day. The rather contrary experience along the North-South axis is illustrated by one area of contention involving the UN-CCD relationship, which carried into the Special Session itself: the disarmament/development issue.

In 1969, when the General Assembly declared the 1970's as a Disarmament Decade, the resolution generated little controversy except in one respect: paragraph 6 recommended that "consideration be given to channelling a substantial part of the resources freed of measures in the field of disarmament to promote the economic development of develop-
ing countries...". Most OECD countries (that is, the developed world) expressed reservations about the wisdom of linking two such disparate phenomena as disarmament and development and argued that these two goals should be pursued on separate tracks. This problem was further complicated by the fact that the Disarmament Decade overlapped the Second UN Development Decade, and there was some concern that the Group of 77 (the Third World countries) would attempt to coordinate the objectives and activities of the two Decades.

At UNGA XXXII, Resolution 31/68 called upon the CCD to adopt a "comprehensive programme dealing with all aspects of the problem of the cessation of the arms race and general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control". In the spring of 1977, the CCD discussed this negotiating agenda at length, with several Third World members proposing a comprehensive work programme, the purpose being to lead to the official UN goal of General and Complete Disarmament. In the CCD, it became clear that one of the purposes of reaching a comprehensive programme was to set it alongside an equally ambitious programme aimed at restructuring the pattern of international economic relations to the advantage of developing countries. It appeared that a similar, and not very productive, debate was about to threaten the Special Session, and stand in the way of achieving a mutually-agreed final document.
While matters related to how the final document and its early drafts actually looked on paper are largely technical, they were instrumental in giving shape to the framework within which the negotiations on matters of substance were to develop. Equally important were the drafting techniques and negotiating procedures adopted by the delegations. (Procedures for United Nations debates are formalized and codified; procedures for negotiations are not.) To a significant extent the substantive issues in the disarmament debates were rendered amenable to negotiation in consequence of such technical matters. In this way, form affected substance, and technique was often as much a factor as intrinsic merit in the resolution of issues under discussion in the final document. Technique, the dividing line between negotiation and debate, and how it related to the form of the final document, are examined below.

Resolution 31/189B of 21 December 1976, in reflecting the decision of the General Assembly to hold a Special Session on Disarmament, also invited all member states to "communicate to the Secretary General their view on the agenda and all other relevant questions...." (paragraph 3). Written replies from 61 states were received. The 54-member Preparatory Committee, established by the same resolution, began work on the basis of these replies, and on the basis of the views of the delegations who took part. In 1977, the Preparatory Committee was able to recommend to UNGA XXXII a provis-
ional agenda on the Special Session from which the main elements of the final document derived:

(i) Review and appraisal of the present international situation, in the light of the pressing need to achieve substantial progress in the field of disarmament, the continuation of the arms race, and the close inter-relationship between disarmament, international peace and security and economic development;

(ii) Adoption of a declaration on disarmament;

(iii) Adoption of the Programme of Action on disarmament;

(iv) Review of the role of the UN in disarmament and the international machinery for negotiations on disarmament including, in particular, the question of convening a world disarmament conference.

By the time of the Third Session of the Preparatory Committee in January 1978 it was generally agreed that the main elements of the principal document of the Special Session should be:

(a) Introduction and Preamble;
(b) Declaration on Disarmament;
(c) Programme of Action;
(d) Machinery for disarmament negotiations.

It was further agreed, although not specifically spelled out, that the final document would be adopted as a resolution of the General Assembly. In practice, this meant that what the General Assembly actually did was to approve the Report of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Tenth Session. The Report, of course, contained the final document. In the Report, however, the final document, as eventually agreed, was preceded by some 12 pages of preambular material which neatly divided into: draft resolutions put to the Special Session, but not put to the vote; communications from national delegations to the Secretary General; and the brief report by the rapporteur on the proceedings of the Preparatory Committee.
Negotiating the Final Document

The Preparatory Committee, which sat five times before the opening of the Special Session on Disarmament, was charged with the responsibility of producing a draft final document. The draft would be considered by the Special Session itself, with the final document emerging as a result of discussions which would be held during the course of the General Debate. The actual draft document, at various stages of its production, was tabled before the Ad Hoc Committee (the Committee of the Whole), which met concurrently with the sittings of the General Assembly.

Technique of Negotiation

Effectively, the Ad Hoc Committee was the highest authority for the actual work done by the Preparatory Committee; the former included all 149 members of the United Nations, whereas the latter was composed of 54 member states, selected according to the principle of equitable regional distribution. The production of the final document, although described as a "drafting exercise", was in fact a particular form of multilateral negotiation on the basis of a written text. As such, organizational solutions were sought, wherever possible, to problems of substance. This meant that the negotiating procedures in the United Nations were intimately connected to the organizational techniques of problem-solving: sub-groups and "non-groups" composed of delegates whose authorities were particularly interested in specific questions formed
and dispersed according to requirements. These small groups were able to avoid some of the public posturing which hampered the work of the larger committees. Even so, these sub-groups and "non-groups" found that the process of drafting/negotiation was slowed to a considerable extent by the inability of many members of the Third World or smaller delegations to keep pace with the progress of discussions which, because of the proliferation of committees and sub-groups, were very costly in terms of manpower.

Many, particularly from smaller or newly independent countries, suffered from a number of handicaps. The first among them was their general unpreparedness and lack of mastery of the subject at hand. For example, many were unable to participate with anything but the most rudimentary knowledge in the drafting process related to non-proliferation, the specifics of which were highly technical. In some instances, this general problem was compounded by an evident lack of staff work and the absence of instructions from headquarters. Consequently, many delegations focussed their energies on a few "pet" arms control or disarmament issues, and lost sight of the general rate of progress on the document as a whole.

The disadvantage suffered by these delegations (which ultimately affected the progress of negotiations) was exacerbated by the parallel series of meetings on negotiating strategy and tactics held by each of the three major UN groups,
modelled, for the purposes of the Special Session, after the East, West and Non-Aligned groups in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. Within each group, running concurrently with the negotiations at the United Nations, were separate discussions aimed at reaching common group positions. Of the three groups, the Non-Aligned, given its vast disparity of membership and sometimes conflicting goals, had the greatest difficulty speaking with a common voice.

**Technique of Drafting**

Drafting proceeded on the basis of working documents supplied by national delegations. By the end of the third session of the Preparatory Committee, the three major UN groupings had each produced separate, common texts (corresponding to the four elements of the final document) to which most members of each group subscribed. To these collective documents were added submissions by individual delegations. The Secretariat tabled, in February 1978, three comparative tabulations (or concordances) comprising all the proposals submitted to the Preparatory Committee up to that time.

Beginning with the third session of the Preparatory Committee, delegates worked to transform the concordances into a single, bracketed document and then to reduce the number of brackets. By the end of the fifth session of the Preparatory Committee the heavily-bracketed Conference Room Paper No.20 (see appendix) was produced, representing the final level of agreement reached in the Preparatory Committee.
Throughout the various stages in the production of the final document, negotiations and drafting progressed sequentially by chapter. The general pattern was to work by a process of elimination, from those issues where suitable compromise wording could be found with a minimum of difficulty to those issues where seemingly irreconcilable and rigidly opposing national positions had been taken.

The most difficult issues, some Non-Aligned delegates suggested, could be resolved through direct negotiations of the "highest authorities" (either foreign ministers or prime ministers) participating in the General Debate. It was generally recognized, however, although rather late in the day, that such a proposition was not practicable or perhaps not even desirable. In the end, the final document was negotiated by professional diplomats, and on the Western and Eastern sides, by specialists in disarmament negotiations. With a few notable exceptions (such as the Mexicans and the Swedish) Non-Aligned delegations relied upon their New York (and, in some instances, where they were represented on the CCD Geneva) missions to supply the necessary manpower.

As such, the final document contained the strengths and weaknesses — that might be expected to emerge from such a group. In one respect the final document represented a triumph of the diplomatic method. It was a masterful achievement in squaring circles and successfully reconciling opposing national positions, all the while preserving consensus.
For example, the lengthy preambular section, despite its apparently superfluous appearance and its clumsy presentational aspect, was in fact to prove to be the key -- or rather the solution -- to avoiding the impasse which threatened the success of the Special Session. It was used as a device to ensure that all national proposals, no matter how distasteful to some other delegations, were somehow reflected in the results of the Special Session without being in the final document itself. Only in this manner was it possible to reach consensus. Inasmuch as consensus was "bought" through this diplomatic technique, it is reminiscent of the appendix of the Non-Proliferation Treaty which contains a series of clarifications, reservations and explanations by various signatory states on this or that article of the Treaty.

Among major weaknesses, however, was the document's general literary indigestibility and the fact that the price paid for agreement, in many cases, was objectivity. If the purpose of the document was to focus attention of significant sectors of policy-making or policy-influencing national élites in various countries on disarmament problems, the purpose of the final document was probably achieved. From the point of view of the professional negotiators, the success of the Special Session would be measured by the degree to which they would be able to achieve an acceptable text which could be adopted by the General Assembly on the basis of consensus, and which could be shown to represent progress.
FOOTNOTES


2 As will be seen later, however, the decision of the French Government to play a more active role in disarmament might be counted as an exception.

3 In the Sixth Special Session, document SP VI 3201.

4 In the Sixth Special Session, document SP VI 3302.

5 External Affairs: The North-South Dialogue: Some basic documents "Explanation of Vote on Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States (December 1974)".


8 For text of Final Declaration, see NPT/CONF/35/I/Annex 1.

9 UNGA Document, Resolution A/2602E(XXIV).

Chapter II

The Eastern European Group

The Eastern European Group was distinguished from the other two groups by the overwhelming influence of one of its members. Proletarian internationalism, the theoretical basis of relations among socialist states, was enforced by the Soviet Union, which ensured that unanimity of view was matched by uniformity of action. The collective policy of this Group was Soviet policy. On questions of substance, negotiation or compromise was neither necessary nor desirable. Poland was nominated as the Group's coordinator, probably because of Poland's past association with Eastern European disarmament initiatives in central Europe, including the Rapacki Plan.

Since the lines of debate at the Special Session tended to develop along North-South lines, the Eastern European Group was in some respects isolated, but also insulated, from many points at issue. The Soviet and Eastern European delegates were able to capitalize on this strategic advantage.

Perspectives on Soviet Disarmament Policy

In Soviet negotiating philosophy, the venue seemed as important as the topic in determining the approach. A public gathering demanded a public approach. This rule was established early. On March 10, 1922 G.V. Chicherin wrote a seminal letter to Lenin outlining a "broad pacifist programme" that the Bolshevik authorities were to put forward at the Genoa International Economic Conference, the first appearance of the Soviet State at a
The objectives for the Soviet delegation drafted by Chicherin and approved by Lenin set the tone for Soviet negotiating behaviour in open fora ever since:

(a) The participation of "all colonial peoples" on an equal footing.

This recommendation was heavily underlined by Lenin. It appeared at the Special Session as Soviet support for "democratization" of certain aspects of the arms control and disarmament process.

(b) A World Congress to follow the Genoa Conference.

One of the Soviet objectives was to treat the Special Session not as an end in itself but as a stepping stone to a World Disarmament Conference. Chicherin was an early exponent of Soviet unwillingness to leave "important international matters" to the League of Nations.

(c) General reduction in Armaments.

This concept, which Chicherin did not elaborate, formed the basis of Soviet policy at the Geneva Disarmament Talks in the inter-war period and is reflected in contemporary Soviet proposals for "General and Complete Disarmament".

(d) Appeal to Western liberal elements.

In open assemblies, the Special Session included, this last point ranked among the most important in Soviet political strategies. The benefit of this approach was put by Lenin:

"...in all bourgeois countries there are trends which might be called pacifist...it is this section of the bourgeois camp which is advocating a number of pacifist proposals and is trying to outline something in the nature of a pacifist policy....It would be a bad merchant indeed who was unable to appreciate this distinction in the bourgeois camp, between militarist and pacifist and by shaping his tactics accordingly, achieve practical aims."  

In the field of disarmament, and in many other fields as well Soviet diplomacy has been aimed at strengthening the influence of liberal elements in Western societies. Through the use of pacifist or reformist platforms, Moscow has consistently appealed to the "party of peace", in modern parlance, the doves.
The Soviet authorities, ever since Genoa, appear to have treated Third World aspirations and Western liberal opinion as important factors in the substantive issue at hand, disarmament. This is illustrated by the Soviet activity leading to the convening of the Special Session. For example, the Declaration of the World Peace Council (a Soviet-sponsored body) announced that "it is the task of the Peace Movement to mobilize world public opinion to ensure that the Special Session achieve its full potentialities. On the other hand, the debates of the Special Session should help to strengthen the struggle for disarmament and lasting peace." The Declaration went on to support in detail numerous proposals, mainly originating from Eastern European or Non-Aligned countries.

As a corollary to the proposition that the Soviet Union was in the vanguard of the peace movement, Soviet spokesmen have made efforts to show that the only obstacles to General and Complete Disarmament lie in the Western camp. For example, B.N. Ponomarev, whose Party responsibilities on the Central Committee included relations with Western Communist parties, in speaking to the Socialist International Annual Meeting in Madrid in October 1977, announced that:

Nobody who remembers the events of the past thirty years can deny that the NATO countries, chiefly the USA, are the initiators and pacesetters of the arms race.\(^6\)

The thesis that "world public opinion" could determine the course of disarmament efforts was put by a Novosty publication:
The experience at Geneva (i.e., the CCD) shows clearly that only the will of the peoples can force the imperialists to accept general and complete disarmament and the economic program of disarmament.7

Whether, in fact, "world public opinion", or even "domestic public opinion", particularly in Socialist countries, has any effect on "imperialist" behaviour, let alone on Soviet behaviour, is an open question. From the perspective of Soviet objectives in its strategy in public debate, the demonstrability of the proposition did not matter; what mattered was that it be believed.

Soviet Approaches to Disarmament

It is sometimes assumed that Soviet goals on disarmament matters remain unchanged independent of whether the forum is open or closed. The point made by Lenin, quoted earlier, was that multilateral fora are not so much arenas for negotiation, as for debate. Thus, in the General Assembly in particular, Soviet representatives have tended to adopt tactics designed to win debates. This approach is based on the Soviet appreciation of the realpolitik of arms negotiations and explains why the SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) and the CTB (Comprehensive Test Ban) discussions have taken place outside the United Nations context, in closed discussions, where posturings are without effect, and negotiations can be conducted in earnest. The Soviet negotiators, and Western ones too, would have it no other way. In some instances, such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) has played a role in "multilateralizing" agreements already reached in principle by the
by the major negotiating parties. Treaties agreed to are deposited with the United Nations.

With this background, it is quite understandable why Soviet representatives in the General Assembly have frequently advocated eye-catching but unenforceable legalistic agreements, as opposed to agreements on restrictions on military capabilities. The Soviet "non-first use" formulae on prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons have invariably been put forward when the light of publicity is strongest but never in private bilateral talks.

One Soviet publication came close to recognizing the principle behind this negotiating practice. In public fora, publicity was all:

...Ces dernières années l'Assemblée Générale de l'ONU a adopté plusieurs résolutions importantes tendant à limiter et à réduire les armements, à prohiber les moyens d'extermination massive, à approfondir et à consolider la détente internationale. Ce sont là des acquis considérables. Il convient toutefois de mettre l'accent sur une tâche pressante consistant à appliquer dans un esprit de suite ces décisions de la communauté internationale. Là aussi, l'opinion publique, tous les partisans de la sauvegarde de la paix et du désarmement ont un grand rôle à jouer.

The Soviet view of the General Assembly as a disarmament forum is more specifically illustrated by two draft resolutions, introduced by Mr. A.A. Gromyko, the Soviet Foreign Minister, to the autumn session of UNGA XXXII: Declaration on the Deepening and Consolidation of International Détente, and Resolution on the Prevention of the Danger of Nuclear War. The Declaration held that the existence of opposing military blocs impeded détente (the Russians had suggested repeatedly the dis-
sion of such blocs) and asserted that détente was inhibited from further development through the existence of racist régimes and the continued exploitation of colonial peoples. The Resolution called for a treaty on the non-use of force, and called for the establishment of, wherever possible, nuclear-weapon-free zones.

These two draft documents had little to do with disarmament. In the case of the Declaration, furthermore, Soviet officials were aware that the worst thing that could happen to détente would be the dissolution of NATO, which would inevitably create an unstable and unpredictable situation in Europe. The Resolution was a non-sequitur and a red herring, but popular amongst many Non-Aligned delegations nonetheless. The "Gromyko proposals" were quietly withdrawn, once the desired effect had registered on the Third World targets. Western delegations had been manoeuvred into the tactically-undesirable position of opposing apparently constructive initiatives enjoying broad support.

The Special Session in the East-West Context

On April 25, 1978 the Soviet delegation tabled a Statement in the Preparatory Committee which put forward the official Soviet objectives for the Special Session. The Statement reiterated Mr. Gromyko's promise that the Soviet Union would go to the Special Session with "concrete proposals and with a desire to achieve concrete results". Specifically, the Statement indicated that:
...the search for mutually-acceptable solutions, both in the Declaration and in the Programme of Action, based on consideration of the political realities of the present day, will not only make a positive contribution to the current disarmament talks but will also help the international community to progress from disarmament talks to real achievements in the field of disarmament.  

This passage shows the link which exists in Soviet thinking between events transpiring outside the United Nations context and those within it. The debates at the Special Session had little if any effect on East-West relations.

Two major East-West exchanges took place when the Preparatory Committee was in session. The first exchange was initiated by President Carter's address at Wake Forest University on March 15, in which the American President confirmed that the bilateral negotiations (which had then hit a number of snags) would continue towards achievement of a SALT agreement on the basis of maintaining acceptable strategic equivalence of nuclear weapons. "While assuring our military capabilities", the President said, "we shall seek security through dependable verifiable arms control agreements where possible". The Wake Forest speech indicated that the American administration was not prepared to make unilateral concessions in spite of threats about harming détente. The conciliatory Soviet reply, which appeared in Pravda on March 28, 1978 left no doubt that major arms control issues would be decided on an exclusively East-West basis:

Détente became possible because another approach was chosen: in a complex situation the two sides began looking for understanding on principal crucial problems of relationships between them. This approach proved a success. A series of major agreements were
concluded; they have proved exceedingly important
for the further development of relations between
the Soviet Union and the United States and for
improving the international situation as a whole. 12

The second exchange, initiated by a speech delivered
by President Carter at Annapolis in early June, addressed Third
World aspects of East-West relations. The American President
stated that the policy of détente was "central to world peace"
and challenged the Russians "to pursue cooperation instead of
confrontation". The main purpose of the speech was to reaffirm
the viability of the strategy of deterrence even while the SALT
was in progress. In a significant passage, however, the SALT
was "decoupled" from American concern about Soviet intervention
in Africa, although the President said that tensions there could
complicate the process of reaching arms control agreements. The
Soviet reply appeared in Pravda on June 17 and made a major issue
of what was termed the "general reluctance" of the Carter admin-
istration to enter into serious negotiations on arms control
issues.

These bilateral exchanges, while reflecting a general
slowdown of Soviet-American rapprochement on various arms control
issues had little, if any, effect on the outcome of the Special
Session, which was transpiring simultaneously. Notwithstanding
accepted wisdom at the Special Session, what happened in the field
of East-West arms control in the real world was hermetically
sealed from the debates on the East River. Even there it was
agreed that the Soviet and American representatives would between
work out appropriate wording for the SALT section of the Programme.
of Action. This was done privately and smoothly, without the participation of other United Nations delegations or "world public opinion".

From this perspective, short-term Soviet goals at the Special Session were not necessarily consonant with, and did not always run parallel to, broad and more long-term Soviet goals. Beginning, for instance, with the "Peace Programme" adopted by the Twenty-Fifth Congress of the CPSU, long-range Soviet policy is concerned with reaching appropriate accommodation with the Americans on vital arms control issues. The Russians evidently had decided that the Special Session could make only a limited contribution to that goal, and that it was better suited to Soviet purposes in other areas. The Soviet delegation at the Special Session acted accordingly.

Soviet Objectives at the Special Session

The formal Soviet objectives put before the Special Session emphasized the positive contribution it could make to securing progress in the field of arms control and disarmament:

....the Soviet Union supported the idea of a Special Session devoted to disarmament because it believed that, if suitably prepared, the session could contribute substantially to the solution of disarmament problems. It was necessary to end the absurd competition regarding armaments, and the Soviet Union for its part was prepared to take all necessary measures to that end, provided that the other parties to the negotiations were also prepared to make their contribution.

....The Special Session of the General Assembly should provide a useful international form for consideration of the existing situation with regard to disarmament. Views could be exchanged
and the principal trends could be outlined, and the Session could conclude with the adoption of a final political declaration setting out agreed views on the question of disarmament. The adoption of such a document would undoubtedly be an important contribution to the task of disarmament.¹⁴

Actual Soviet performance at the Special Session suggested that the Soviet Union pursued objectives inspired by the spirit of Chicherin's early letter to Lenin, namely:

(a) demonstrating before Non-Aligned countries that the Soviet Union and her allies remained the exclusive repositories of disarmament initiatives, and was the "party of peace";

(b) conversely, demonstrating that their peace initiatives fell short of realization through Western (and Chinese) obstructionism;

(d) defeating, or at least putting at a disadvantage, Western countries and China in the debates;

(d) associating Soviet policies with Third World aspirations.

These interlocking objectives were, in their turn, affected by two broad Soviet concerns. The first was to ensure that détente, which the Russians defined in East-West terms, was not jeopardized by the interjection of Third World considerations, which the Soviet authorities considered irrelevant. "Third World considerations" in the form of Soviet intervention in Africa had already been "decoupled" from the SALT by President Carter at Annapolis. Other considerations, summed up as the "North-South Dialogue", perhaps the major theme at the Special Session, was peripheral to Soviet concerns. In general, the Soviet representatives and their Eastern European colleagues
were anxious to avoid being caught in the cross-fire.

The second concern was that the present United Nations system should be "contained" and that the *status quo*, particularly in regard to existing institutional mechanisms for East-West accommodation remain unchanged. This meant that the Eastern European Group was reluctant to countenance a greater United Nations role either in the East-West sphere, or in the more narrow context of disarmament. The paramount Soviet goal at the Special Session was "damage limitation".

The mutually-supporting nature of these objectives is illustrated by the Soviet approach to a proposed World Disarmament Conference, a popular Third World issue, on the one hand; and, to the other, the Soviet opposition to restructuring the co-chairmanship arrangement of the CCD. These two organizational questions symbolize the Soviet ambivalence on "democratizing" the UN disarmament system. These examples also demonstrate how Soviet tactics on UN disarmament matters took into account Third World aspirations, all the while keeping Third World efforts to influence substantive issues at arms length.

**World Disarmament Conference (WDC)**

On September 6, 1961 the First Non-Aligned Conference in Belgrade issued a Declaration urging the convening of a World Disarmament Conference (WDC) and calling for adequate Non-Aligned representation at all disarmament talks held under UN auspices. The Soviet Union seized the cause as its own, and took the position that the Special Session on Disarmament should be considered
as a stage preparatory to the convening of a WDC.¹⁶

Among Western liberals, the case for a WDC was effect-
ively put by Sean MacBride, the former Assistant Secretary-
General of the United Nations, in his Nobel lecture of 1974:

...the major nuclear powers have the right to veto
all decisions of the Security Council; in addition, out of the 138 Member States only a few have been very active on disarmament. The impression has been created that it is so complex that it must be left to the big powers...¹⁷

This general sentiment was echoed, with some elaboration, in a Soviet working paper submitted to the Preparatory Committee which emphasized that the Conference "should become a forum that will make it possible to proceed from the declaration and recommend-
ations adopted by the General Assembly to practical action leading to agreed disarmament measures and meaningful decisions."¹⁸

Actual Soviet motivations, however, were based on rather different considerations. From a Soviet point of view, calling for a World Disarmament Conference made a certain degree of sense. It was justified in terms of doctrine. The first international conference on disarmament held in the twentieth century was called in Moscow in December 1922. Only six states attended: The RSFSR, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia and Finland (the later irony was that each was invaded by the Soviet Union). In a message of greetings to participants, the Soviet Government declared that it "cannot but be and will always remain the most vigorous advocate of disarmament".¹⁹ Such initiatives, therefore, have long been sanctioned by Soviet history.

The more immediate and practical reason for seizing
this Third World initiative as its own was that the Soviet Union could attract a good deal of Non-Aligned support, while at the same time it could bend the original idea to its own purposes. This had the additional tactical advantage, as the Soviet working paper unintentionally revealed, since if the Special Session were assigned a transitional or preparatory role, a number of substantive matters, inconvenient to the Russians, could be shunted aside for discussion at some indeterminate future date. China, furthermore, had previously announced her opposition to a World Disarmament Conference and the Soviet authorities, through their sponsorship of the WDC, aimed at isolating China.

**CCD Co-chairmanship Arrangement**

The Soviet position against the abolition of the Soviet-American co-chairmanship arrangement of the CCD appeared uncharacteristic, given the apparently democratic motivations of the USSR on the question of the WDC. Any change, in fact, seemed out of the question, given unreserved Soviet opposition:

In the course of the work of the Preparatory Committee there has also appeared to be a desire, if not to demolish, at least to carry out a reform of the machinery for disarmament talks which is not called for by considerations of substance. It should not be forgotten that agreement in the field of the limitation of the armaments race and of disarmament depends above all on the political will of States, on their determination to participate in achieving agreement. It would hardly be correct, in the field of disarmament, to follow the practice which is widespread in the United Nations, whereby efforts to solve complex problems are replaced by the creations of new organs which make no progress towards the solution of problems of substance but only give the appearance of activity.
On this issue the Soviet position was close to being at odds with aspirations of the Non-Aligned countries, most of whom were bent on institutional reform and a greater voice in the disarmament process. For many Third World countries "democratizing" this process had three major elements: (a) universal participation in appropriate negotiations; (b) openness in negotiating procedures and ready access to information, including regular reports by negotiating parties to the UN and other bodies; and (c) the principle of sovereign equality around the negotiating table. The Third World countries accordingly looked to the two superpowers to give up their "anachronistic" positions as co-chairmen in the Geneva talks for the sake of greater democracy. (Western countries also wished a change in the CCD co-chairmanship arrangement, mainly because France had made it clear that she would not participate in the negotiations so long as the co-chairmanship arrangement prevailed.) Nevertheless any change in the organizational structure of the CCD would have been largely symbolic. But the symbolism of continuing the existing system was as important to the Russians as was changing it for the Non-Aligned.

The Soviet authorities understood very well that the CCD had only limited functions insofar as disarmament negotiations were concerned. The Soviet approach to the question of reform of the CCD, however, underlines the fact that Soviet arms control negotiators, while giving due attention to the hierarchy of Soviet objectives vis-à-vis the Third World were prepared, under certain circumstances, to sacrifice them for the sake of retain-
ing what they believed to be adequate levels of Soviet control over both closed and open disarmament forums.

Patterns of Soviet Behaviour

In terms of broad Soviet priorities on arms control matters and the East-West relationship, the Special Session was in second place. But since the UN General Assembly represented a world audience, the most senior figures in the Soviet hierarchy became involved in the elaboration of the Soviet position at the Special Session. The Soviet tactical style was reminiscent of that of a chess game, where each move was related to the developing pattern on the board, and to each other individual piece. The Soviet tactical style is illustrated by three Soviet initiatives, two within the confines of the Special Session, and one outside it.

Tabling of the USSR Working Paper of February 2, 1978: The purpose of this document was to put the Special Session into a wider East-West framework but without doing harm to the exclusivity of the détente process. As such, it was intended to present a wide spectrum of East-West concerns and to gain maximum support in the General Assembly for Soviet policies. The major features of the Working Paper were:

-- a reference to President Brezhnev's Sixtieth Anniversary Appeal for a simultaneous cessation by all states of the production of nuclear weapons (this proposal already appeared in the Eastern European Group's draft Programme of Action;
-- a link to past Assemblies of the UN: the document referred to the Gromyko proposals\textsuperscript{22} submitted at UNGA XXXII and drew particular attention to the draft Declaration on the Deepening and Consolidating of International Détente;

-- a link to the Soviet "Peace Programme": The Soviet disarmament proposals elaborated at the Thirty-First and Thirty-Second Sessions of the General Assembly had been approved by the 24th and 25th Congresses of the Soviet Communist Party\textsuperscript{23} as the "Peace Programme". They had been tabled earlier on September 28, 1975 in a "Memorandum of the Soviet Union on Questions Ending the Arms Race and Disarmament".

The main features of the "peace programme" were incorporated into the Soviet draft \textit{Programme of Action}. It had five major features: (i) nuclear disarmament should involve all nuclear weapon states; (ii) foreign military bases should be dismantled; (iii) nuclear-weapon-free zones should be established; (iv) there should be a prohibition of the development of new weapons of mass destruction; and (v) there should be negotiations leading to a treaty on the non-use of force. In each of these proposals was a hidden difficulty: The first proposal, for example, that all nuclear weapons states should participate in nuclear disarmament negotiations was not feasible, given the consistent refusal of France and China to participate in the CTB talks. Some suspected that this proposal was advanced to let the Russians off the negotiating hook in Geneva, because if it were accepted as a principle there could be no talks on a test ban since there would be no
quorum. Equally, the Soviet authorities were aware that "dis-
mantling military bases" was unacceptable to the NATO Alliance,
given the dispersed nature of the territories it was supposed to
defend, while the Soviet strategic position would remain untouched.
Non-use of force treaties did not deal with disarmament, however,
laudable their intentions may have been, and there was no commonly-
agreed definition about what a "new system of mass destruction"
meant. That left nuclear-weapon-free zones on which there was
at least some room for discussion.

The intended effect of the Working Paper was to demon-
strate to the Third World audience the positive nature of Soviet
disarmament initiatives. Yet, many delegations felt that it was
no more than an invitation to adhere to a non-enforceable declar-
ation of good intentions, like the Soviet draft Resolution,
tabled during the General Assembly's regular session:

The nuclear weapon states, in view of their
special responsibility as Permanent Repres-
entatives of the Security Council, should
always exercise restraint in their mutual
relations, show a willingness to negotiate
and settle differences by peaceful means, and
do all in their power to prevent conflicts
and situations which could exacerbate inter-
national tensions.24

The Working Paper also reached beyond the immediate
United Nations context, and incorporated Soviet proposals which
appeared in other open East-West fora, the Belgrade Review Confer-
ence of the CSCE25 and the disarmament talks in Geneva. The
Review Conference was held in parallel with the meetings of the
Preparatory Committee, and the indifferent reception which the
Soviet disarmament proposals received at Belgrade did not prevent
their reappearance in the Soviet Working Paper, unchanged, and in the knowledge that they would almost certainly be rejected. They were:

(i) a proposal for a treaty banning non-first use of nuclear weapons;

(ii) an agreement not to enlarge existing political and military groupings in Europe;

(iii) an agreement not to conduct military exercises involving more than, say, fifty to sixty thousand men.

One of the more spurious passages of the Working Paper attempted to link disarmament to human rights (the priority item on the Western agenda at Belgrade) by associating disarmament with "mankind's ultimate right to life", in an effort to sidetrack the Human rights issue. The Belgrade proposals in the Working Paper were not acceptable to Western countries because: (i) any "non-first use" formula was incompatible with the NATO doctrine of "flexible response"; and proposal (ii) was evidently aimed at embarassing the Alliance as it began tentative discussions with the Spanish authorities. Ceilings on military exercises were also unacceptable because NATO required larger scale manoeuvres than did Warsaw Pact forces, given the substantial number of troops in reserve on the other side of the Atlantic.

The reference in the Working Paper to the Geneva Disarmament talks was in relation to the trilateral efforts to reach preliminary agreement on a comprehensive test ban. The Working Paper reiterated the Soviet preparedness, first announced by
Brezhnev, to reach agreement on a moratorium covering peaceful nuclear explosions, which would be coupled with a ban on all nuclear weapons tests for a definite period. This was the one positive element in the *Working Paper*, buried under a welter of questionable proposals. Contrary to the desires of some members of the General Assembly, however, none of the partners in the trilateral talks wished to introduce the United Nations into their private discussions.

Brezhnev's "Komsomol Speech": This speech, delivered on April 25, 1977 to the League of Communist Youth of the USSR, was a major landmark in the development of the Soviet approach to the Special Session. Its main feature, castigating the West over anti-Soviet accusations in regard to Africa and elsewhere, overshadowed what Soviet officials in New York and elsewhere regarded as "positive elements", and which they feared were ignored or overlooked by Western countries. In particular, the speech contained the first official Soviet reaction to the Vance visit to Moscow the same spring on the SALT. It also presaged the way the Soviet Delegation would play its final hand at the Special Session -- and opened the way for the possible attendance of Brezhnev himself.

At the heart of the Komsomol speech was an appeal to end any further quantitative and qualitative build-up of arms and armed forces of "states with a large military potential":

Specifically, we appeal for a discussion of a programme, for implementation over a certain limited period, consisting of the following measures: a halt to the production of nuclear
weapons in all their forms; a halt to the production and ban on all other types of mass destruction weapons; a halt to the creation of new forms of conventional arms of large destructive power; a renunciation of expanding armies and increasing conventional weapons by the Permanent Members of the Security Council and by countries connected with them through military agreements.  

Brezhnev made it clear that first priority should be given to the first item on the list he had introduced. Besides the impact this speech was calculated to have on the deliberations of the Special Session, its import lay in the fact that for the first time the Soviet Union assured non-nuclear-weapon states that they would not be attacked by Soviet nuclear weapons. This was to turn out to be one of the major achievements of the Special Session. On May 26, 1978, the day of the main Soviet address to the Special Session, the Soviet Foreign Minister tabled the relevant sections of the "Komsomol Speech" as a communication to the Secretary General.  

Whatever the practical efforts Brezhnev's words may have had on the proceedings, they did convey the impression of intense Soviet interest and concern that the Special Session be successfully concluded.

The decision against Brezhnev's attendance at the Special Session can only be a matter of speculation. It is probable, however, that factors related to his uncertain health, uneven progress in the SALT and CTB talks, and the fact it was known that President Carter would not attend all contributed.

The Gromyko Keynote Speech: Foreign Minister Gromyko's address at the United Nations gathered together all the Soviet
initiatives which had been put to the Special Session up to that point, from the tabling of the Soviet draft Programme of Action in September 1977 through the "Komsomol Speech" in April 1978. It repeated, almost verbatim, the Brezhnev proposals. It advertised the negative security guarantee issued by Brezhnev as a measure supportive of non-proliferation. The guarantee was specific, and the "renunciation of production" of nuclear weapons was a reference to the NPT:

From the rostrum of the UN Special Session, our country declares that the Soviet Union will never use nuclear weapons against those states which renounce production and acquisition of such weapons and do not have them on their territories.\(^{28}\)

Gromyko also linked the security guarantees idea with a Non-Aligned concept, the nuclear-weapon-free zone. He said in effect that the USSR would not attack with nuclear weapons Non-Aligned states which were counted within such zones.

At the same time, the Gromyko speech took pains to capitalize on the natural affinities many of the Non-Aligned representatives believed existed between their countries and the Soviet Union. Two items in particular appeared ready-made for appropriate exploitation. One related to the "neutron bomb" and the furor surrounding it, and the other, the scheduled NATO Heads of Government meeting in Washington that June. That the meeting followed on the heels of the Special Session was happenstance, but given the strong anti-NATO views held by many of the Non-Aligned, the Soviet Foreign Minister was able to accuse, with good effect, Western countries of hypocrisy:
Coincidental with the work of the UN Special Session on Disarmament in New York, another kind of Session, that of the NATO Council, will be held a short distance away from here. Represented at that Session will be a number of States on whose behalf statements are being made here in favour of disarmament and what are the items on the agenda of the NATO Session? There is no secret about it, they deal with a further buildup of military preparations projected into the 1980's.

* * * * * * *

Soviet practices at the Special Session, then, invite contradictory conclusions. The Soviet approach, characterized by very tight orchestration, beginning with the tabling of the Eastern European drafts in the autumn, and culminating with Brezhnev's "Komsomol Speech", the contents of which were repeated by Gromyko, indicate the close attention which the leading members of the Soviet hierarchy gave to the Special Session. The actual contents of the Soviet initiatives, however, did not seem to justify the high level from which they were announced. From the Western point of view, Soviet credibility at the Special Session was not high, given the openly transparent (in Western eyes) intent of many of the Soviet initiatives. From the Non-Aligned point of view, many of the Soviet proposals held a good degree of attraction (as indeed was intended) and a significant number of Non-Aligned delegations were prepared to support them (even if they realized that either they were unacceptable to Western countries or unworkable or both) for the sake of putting Western countries on the
defensive. Of the three major groups, the Eastern Europeans came closest to treating the Special Session as purely a forum for debate, and of little practical moment in the field of disarmament -- although of great consequence in the ideological struggle between East and West for the Third World.
FOOTNOTES


6 B.N. Ponomarev, For Cooperation in the Struggle against the Arms Race, for Disarmament, pamphlet issued by the Soviet Delegation to Socialist International Meeting, Madrid, October 15-16, 1977.

7 Ivanov, Konstantin, and Boris Batsanov, What disarmament will give to developing countries, Novosty Press Agency Publishing House, ca. 1969, p.108.


9 UNGA XXXII First Committee Document A/C.1/32/1.12.

10 Document A/AC.197/114 of 25 April 1978, "Statement by the USSR in connection with the completion of the work of the Preparatory Committee for the UNSSOD".


13 UNGA Document A/RES/S-10/2, paragraph 52.


18 UN Document A/AC.187/98 - date?


23 These proposals are reprinted in Programme of Further Struggle for Peace, Novosti News Agency, Moscow, 1976.


27 UN Document A/S-10/AC.1/4 "Letter from Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR addressed to the Secretary General", 26 May 1978.

Chapter III

The Non-Aligned Group

Non-alignment is defined by negatives. Not belonging to alliances, abjuring and even condemning them, subscribing to what they regard as neither capitalist nor communist solutions to the welter of problems which beset them, members of this Group share as many differences as similarities. As a result, within the United Nations setting, lines of common agreement were often tenuously drawn. This lent to the Non-Aligned Group's negotiating style a certain brittleness of position, a narrowly circumscribed flexibility and perhaps even a rigidity not so evident in the other two groups. (For the purposes of this study, the terms "Group" and "Movement" are used interchangably. The Non-Aligned Group, of course, is the Non-Aligned Movement's United Nations membership.

The Eastern Group was united in consequence of Soviet power; the Western Group because of common interests and outlooks. The lingua franca of the Non-Aligned Group was developmental economics. In the eyes of many Third World countries the Special Session was the logical and necessary extension of the Sixth and Seventh Special Sessions, both aimed at restructuring the world economic system for the creation of a New International Economic Order (NIEO).

The Special Session on Disarmament was no exception to the generalization that almost regardless of the topic under discussion, the United Nations climate is dominated by
the Third World's drive to restructure the world's economic system. The New International Economic Order represented at once a goal, a symbol and an overriding priority -- and not at all a subject discussed in the cool, dry language of economics. Rather, it stood for the redress of grievance, real, but often exaggerated.

In many respects, even without the two causes which were fundamental to Non-Aligned Solidarity -- Palestine and racial justice -- Arabs and Africans in particular are tied together by a common awareness that in order to succeed, vis-à-vis developed countries, solidarity on NIEO issues is of cardinal importance. Thus, it was axiomatic "that the dominant interest of a large majority of states participating in the Special Session process was not primarily strategic, or a fortiori conventional arms control, but in economic and social development of the poor countries". ¹

At the United Nations, non-alignment could also be defined by an anti-Western bias which was not necessarily reflected in the foreign policy of any single Non-Aligned state. The disarmament resolutions of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Movement emanating from the Colombo Conference on June 27-28, 1978, while not reflecting (at least not officially) the foreign policy of any Non-Aligned country, revealed much of the generally-held sentiment on disarmament:

The efforts exerted to bring about a fruitful turn to the deliberations of the UN Special Session on Disarmament reflected the interest shown by wide
sectors of international public opinion concerning the achievement of this task. On behalf of the half of humanity inhabiting Asia and Africa, the AAPSO supports the resolutions of this Special Session of the United Nations and strongly protests against the new manoeuvres of the United States and other NATO militarists, who hinder and sabotage détente.²

It may be unfair of course to treat a resolution of the AAPSO, an institution under heavy Soviet influence, as exemplary of Third World pronunciamento. Yet the frustration and perhaps even outrage which inspired this language was real enough, given the long history of thwarted efforts of Non-Aligned countries to realize progress in the field of disarmament. As we shall see, however, whether those countries were interested in disarmament for its own sake is another matter.

The anti-Western rhetoric of Non-Aligned countries in public assemblies, besides being a prerequisite of "membership in the club" may be as much a product of economic as ideological factors. The moral satisfaction among Non-Aligned countries seemed to derive from berating their "former colonial oppressors" -- particularly on a subject like disarmament -- is quite understandable. Yet it was the Western countries, they knew, which were the source of developmental largesse. The Eastern European countries might be included in the New International Economic Order, but almost as an afterthought: "North-South" meant, in effect, "West-South". Western countries, moreover, were sufficiently responsive to Third World moral persuasion
for it to have value where it would be lost on the
Russians.

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The idea of the UN General Assembly's Special Session
on Disarmament was first advanced at the First Conference of the
Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries held at
Belgrade in 1961: the United Nations session, or a world disarm-
ament conference, it was envisaged, would set in motion the pro-
cess of general disarmament. The concept of a Special Session
was further refined at the Non-Aligned Foreign Ministers' Con-
ference in Lima in August 1975. The proposal was echoed at the
30th General Assembly in 1975, both in general debate and in the
First Committee. It was then endorsed by the Fifth Summit Con-
ference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries
at Colombo in August 1976. Finally, the 31st General Assembly
endorsed by consensus the convening of the Special Session by
Resolution 31/189B.

The Special Session, being the initiative of the 90-odd
Non-Aligned states at the United Nations, was profoundly, per-
haps even decisively, influenced by the weight of numbers of
the Non-Aligned Group but also by its preoccupations with
economic development. No initiative by either East or West
could be taken without reference to its possible impact on
Non-Aligned members, and its probable "saleability" in that
quarter. This tended to distort the actual nature of the
East-West dialogue as it was diffracted through the Non-Aligned economic prism.

**Non-Aligned Negotiating Structures**

Within the UN system the five major geographical groupings -- the African, Asian, Eastern European, Latin American and Western European and Others -- normally served as the basis upon which the business of the General Assembly was conducted, particularly on organizational questions. For the Special Session, however, three primary negotiating collectivities emerged based on political and economic criteria, as opposed to geographic ones. The African, Asian and Latin American groups coalesced into one larger group, as had occurred for the Sixth and Seventh UN Special Sessions on North-South issues. This amalgamation of delegations into a Third World "super-group" symbolized the determination of the developing countries that the Special Session would be treated clearly in the context of attaining a New International Economic Order.5

Another perspective is put on the Non-Aligned initiative to hold the Special Session by the Third World role at the NPT Review Conference. Those Non-Aligned states attending the Review Conference objected in varying degrees to the Non-Proliferation Treaty because of the unequal obligations it imposed. They complained that it favoured the nuclear weapon states, meaning, in Non-Aligned eyes, the industrialized West.
The unspoken but widely-shared belief was that economic advance proceeded on zero sum principles: that economic progress on the part of some was obtained at the expense of the many. As a corollary, any restraint on the transfer of nuclear technology was inherently unjust and morally reprehensible. The general attitude behind this belief, with its highly emotional content, dogged deliberations at the Special Session and acted as a brake on achieving a good understanding between the First and Third Worlds on non-proliferation issues.

Leadership within the Non-Aligned Group on disarmament questions was determined by three major factors: (a) institutional considerations; (b) expertise and weight; and (c) the position of each country within the Movement.

(a) Institutional Considerations: Sri Lanka, by virtue of her position as Chairman of the Coordinating Bureau (and as host to the Colombo Summit) acted as principal spokesman for the Non-Aligned at the Special Session. Sri Lanka's moderate policies were in large part responsible for ensuring sufficient flexibility and compromise within the Non-Aligned caucus to enable the final document to be adopted by consensus.

Within the United Nations structure, by common agreement, Yugoslavia provided the President of the Special Session (since the Yugoslav representative was currently President of UNGA XXXII). An Argentine was Chairman of the Preparatory Committee. Rapporteurs of the Preparatory Committee were success-
ively an Egyptian and an Algerian. Of eight Vice Chairman, four were representatives of Non-Aligned countries — Nigeria, Iran, Yugoslavia and the Bahamas.

In addition, the Colombo Conference had formally nominated "disarmament coordinators" from amongst their members, based on factors related to interest, particular expertise or weight. As a consequence of these factors, an "inner circle" of representatives of ten states dominated the Non-Aligned tactical and strategic thinking: Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, India, Malaysia, Nigeria, Peru, Sri Lanka and Yugoslavia. Of the fifty-four members of the Preparatory Committee, twenty-six were Non-Aligned.

(b) Expertise and "Weight": All Non-Aligned countries had participated — or at least had the opportunity to participate — in the debates of the First Committee during regular sessions of the UN General Assembly. A dozen Non-Aligned countries were represented in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva, and over time had developed a considerable degree of expertise on disarmament subjects, particularly India, Yugoslavia, Iran and Argentina. Other Third World countries who were members of the CCD but not members of the Non-Aligned Movement, such as Pakistan and Mexico, also wielded considerable influence in the Third World, Pakistan because of her religious and
political affinities with the Arab states, and Mexico because of her influence in Latin America. 8

Membership in the CCD alone, however, was no guarantee of leadership on disarmament questions. Some countries, such as Burma, which had even participated in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, the CCD's predecessor, never did develop sufficient expertise or interest to lay claim to that role. Egypt, also represented in the CCD and before that in the ENDC, did develop a good command of the issues involved but military preoccupations within its own region tended to work against any activist role in Geneva (the same was also true, but to a lesser extent, of India and Pakistan). Yet Egyptian leadership in the Arab world, and in the Non-Aligned Movement assured a pivotal role for Egyptian representatives at the Special Session. The Algerians, too, played a leading role since their country was host to the Summit in 1973 which shifted the emphasis within the Movement to economic purposes.

(c) Position within the Movement: Over ninety countries claimed to be non-aligned, out of some 149 United Nations states. Within a United Nations setting, with its jealously-guarded legal fictions about the sovereign independence of states, diversity, inevitable in such a group, was often in danger of spelling disunity. Where it did not the result was often an uneasy compromise. No Non-Aligned state, quite understandably, was prepared to subordinate its own national interests to general principles governing the
Movement as a whole. This accounted for Non-Aligned inflexibility on certain issues, since the process of negotiation and compromise within the Group had reduced the margin for further accommodation to a minimum.

To a remarkable degree leadership of the Movement within and outside the United Nations rested with its founders, Yugoslavia, Egypt and India. Ghana and Indonesia lost their early leadership roles when Nkrumah and Sukarno were removed, in both cases by coup. A new second echelon leadership emerged represented by countries such as Algeria. Significantly, of these first- and second-rank countries within the Non-Aligned leadership, few have signed and fewer still have ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Yet these same countries are "threshold" nuclear powers. One of them, India, has crossed it. Given the nature of the leadership, therefore, and their apparent inflexibility on the Movement's positions, plus the Movement's economic preoccupations and its general attitude towards non-proliferation, chances for reaching accommodation with the other two negotiating groups seemed remote.

Divergent Objectives

The ability of the Eastern European countries to employ substantive proposals such as that of the World Disarmament Conference as tactical devices for their own purposes was rendered even more effective by the fragmentation of Non-Aligned opinions and objectives on anything but the broadest issues. At the time of the Special Session, all of the world's military conflicts
were in, and among Third World countries -- Ethiopia and Somalia, Angola and Zaire, Vietnam and Cambodia, to name three. The heated debate over Cuba's non-aligned credentials added to the Movement's divisiveness, especially given the prospect of Cuba acting as host to the 1980 Non-Aligned Summit:

The Belgrade meeting in July, just after the Special Session concluded, only exposed the sharp differences among its membership. The issue of principle over the meaning of non-alignment became entangled with the ostensibly procedural one of the date and place of the Summit, since Cuba had become a symbol of an interpretation of non-alignment which some members openly rejected and many others viewed with obvious unease. 12

To this source of fractiousness within the Movement a series of Third World rivalries with heavy military overtones (even if they were not shooting wars) both complicated and confused Non-Aligned efforts to speak with a common voice at the Special Session. Foremost among these rivalries were India/Pakistan; Brazil/Argentina, and Iran/Saudi Arabia. The two former rivalries possessed a scarcely hidden atomic dimension and the latter confrontation involved the massive acquisition of conventional arms.

These rivalries and conflicts were reflected in the texts of many disarmament proposals submitted by individual Third World delegations. The nature of the barbs pointed at their rivals was occasionally obscure to the unknowing. Thus, the Pakistani delegation submitted a proposal on declaring the Indian Ocean a "Zone of Peace" which it knew was unacceptable to the Indian Delegation, and Israel put forward a suggestion for the
Immediate conclusion of a peace treaty with the Arabs, knowing full well it would be rejected out of hand.  

The heated dispute within the Movement over redefining the purposes of non-alignment "under present international circumstances" was even further complicated by the presence of a relatively cohesive group of oil-rich Third World states -- the Organization of Petroleum-Exporting Countries (OPEC) -- whose interests diverged in many respects from those of the rest of the Movement. The OPEC countries, as members of the Non-Aligned Group, acted as moderating counterweights to many of the potentially destructive anti-Western disarmament proposals. The mariage de convenience between OPEC and OECD countries and the symbiotic relationship derived from the energy-industrial technology equation was an indispensable bridge across which consensus was eventually built between the First and Third Worlds. A significant and influential section of the Non-Aligned Movement and Western countries had interests which ran parallel on a number of items related to Western security on the one hand; and on the other, issues related to the North-South transfer of conventional military technology.

Political, ideological and other factors added to the Movement's disunity. We have seen that the Belgrade Conference marked the further development of rival ideological strains within the movement, and brought into sharp focus rival interpretations of what the Movement was about. These ranged from the traditional concept of strict autonomy put forward by the
Yugoslavs, to the Cuban notion that the world was divided between imperialist and anti-imperialist forces with the Non-Aligned members of the anti-imperialist camp.  

A third school of non-alignment supported the Algerian proposition that while 'Non-Aligned countries do not have to be identified with either of the great power blocs, this did not mean that they were located equidistant between the two. For reasons of ideology and historical experience, the Algerians argued, the Non-Aligned countries were closer to the socialist bloc.  

All these conflicts of identity and interest within the Non-Aligned Movement meant that reaching a common negotiating position at the Special Session was much less a matter of rationally choosing the best alternative from a number of options than a process of narrowing down those alternatives which would command the broadest possible support -- or which cause the least objection. Thus, since no Non-Aligned state was considered to be a nuclear-weapon state, the burden of the Special Session was expected to be on nuclear disarmament, when it was not on developmental economics. Many good ideas perished in consequence. Conversely, since every Non-Aligned state was vitally interested in maintaining its own security (to put the best light on it), each was firmly resistant to any proposal restricting, except in the longest possible term, conventional arms acquisitions. The final document reflects this asymmetry.

Despite these obstacles, common positions were eventually found, the broad outlines of which were promulgated at
the Colombo Summit Conference\textsuperscript{17} and submitted to the Special Session's Preparatory Committee, after appropriate elaboration, as the formal Non-Aligned negotiating text.\textsuperscript{18} The positions contained in these documents were reaffirmed in the Communiqué of the Havana Meeting\textsuperscript{19} of the Coordinating Bureau in early June.\textsuperscript{20} (The collective Non-Aligned assessment of the results of the Special Session were contained in the documents issued at Belgrade.)\textsuperscript{21}

In the face of the many divisive tendencies the theme which commanded the highest measure of agreement was, therefore, bound to be economic. The Algiers Summit of 1973 infused into the Movement, through the adoption of this theme, a renewed sense of direction and purpose, and this too was reflected in the Havana Communiqué which was explicit about the connection between developmental economics and disarmament:

\begin{quote}
The Coordinating Bureau affirmed that there was a direct link between détente, disarmament and development. It stressed that effective measures of disarmament should release huge resources now devoted to the wasteful arms race for use in the promotion of economic and social development particularly of the developing countries. The Bureau was convinced that the deepening and broadening of détente would contribute to the process.\textsuperscript{22}
\end{quote}

Pakistan, although not a member of the Non-Aligned Group, tabled for consideration for inclusion in the Declaration a refinement of this proposition. It was commonly held in the Third World that "the disproportion in military strength and power between the industrialized (read: Western) countries is an element in the existing inequitable world political and economic order".\textsuperscript{23}
The negotiating process on the final document revealed a number of objections to these ideas ranging from doubts about the degree to which the analysis behind them was supported by reality, to concerns about their practical consequences if the ideas were actually accepted. The Pakistani thesis, for example, if followed to its logical conclusion, meant that any reordering of world economic relationships in favour of the Third World should be accompanied by a parallel transfer of military power. In sum, the Non-Aligned approach to the problem of disarmament sprang from the Third World's determination to move toward the realization of a New International Economic Order as part of its efforts to rectify the frequently supine state of their members' economies. With the exception of East-West nuclear subjects, economics-related issues were counted among the few items where general agreement could be found and where a joint position could be maintained.

In United Nations practice, military alliances are not considered as a factor in deciding organizational questions. The Non-Aligned Group, being a coalition of three other UN groupings to begin with, suffered from the absence of a major military alliance within its perimeters to lend to its internal deliberations greater focus to the security and military implications of the arms control debate.24

Non-Alignment, the Cold War and Détente

Because the Algiers Summit of 1973 added such a strong economic thrust to the Movement, the Non-Aligned Group at the
Special Session was almost identical in membership to the organizational expression of the Third World economic aspirations, the "Group of 77", as manifested in other UN fora, such as UNCTAD, the Second Development Decade Preparatory Commission and the Second Economic Committee of the UNGA. To a great degree, the commonly-shared experience as a negotiating bloc on economic subjects compensated for the potential lack of cohesiveness on the political-military issues addressed at the Special Session.

The underlying Non-Aligned view of how détente affected the security interests of the Third World, and hence the broad Non-Aligned position on disarmament and its relationship to development rested on three fundamental theses promulgated at the Algiers Summit.

1. While progress towards East/West détente was welcomed it could not amount to a mere shifting of confrontation from one area to another. Peace is indivisible, détente will remain precarious if it does not take into consideration the interests of other countries.

2. Henceforth the relevant differences in the world would be increasingly economic rather than ideologically political; they would be between the rich and the poor, the industrialized and the developing, the North and the South.

3. International security could not be maintained unless it included "an economic dimension which guarantees to all countries the right to implement their development programmes, free their economic aggression and any other form of economic pressure". Non-Aligned countries "should take joint action at the United Nations with a view to expanding the organization's (UN) security system to include economic security."

On the basis of this evidence it can be plausibly argued that the effects of détente removed a significant degree of the pol-
itical raison d'être of the Non-Aligned Movement. This phenomen-
enon was noted by an Indian scholar almost a decade ago:

The capacity of the Non-Aligned states to influence the big powers has declined...due to the détente in East-West relations and desire of the United States and the Soviet Union to decide international issues on a bilateral basis. This has come to pass because the Non-Aligned nations have come to depend on them more than ever, in view of their disputes with their neighbours.27

The effects of détente on Non-Aligned attitudes towards disarmament are complex. Through a logic of its own (and hinted at in Professor Rachman's passage) détente may have been indirectly responsible for Third World countries' determination to pursue with renewed vigor their own regional arms races. In a speech before the United Nations, the Ambassador of Singapore made this point: "...the big countries of the Third World, whilst preaching at the nuclear powers to disarm, have not the slightest intention of curbing their own appetite for conventional weapons."28 To this might be added that in some instances this appetite shows signs of encompassing nuclear weapons as well.

A Coalescence of Purposes

The shifting patterns of conflict and cohesion within the Non-Aligned Group are reflected in the nature of the proposals it tabled at the Special Session and in the negotiating stance of each Non-Aligned delegation. Where these patterns indicated a common direction, the weight of numbers of this Group acted as a groundswell beneath the debates which determined in large part their outcome. To a casual observer the Non-Aligned Group dis-
played a remarkable degree of solidarity. This solidarity was most evident in the discussions on the Declaration of Principles where the subject matter tended to be abstract. It was less visible when concrete items in the Programme of Action were discussed. On some items such as those pertaining to nuclear disarmament by the superpowers, or the transfer of resources to the Third World, solidarity was complete; on others, such as the meaning of Zone of Peace it ceased to exist.

Against this background, the draft documents collectively submitted by the Non-Aligned Group rested on commonly-shared "core" objectives. These derived from the broad features of non-aligned disarmament philosophy and "style" discussed earlier. Among the chief themes were:

(a) The Omnibus versus the Incremental: Generally speaking, the Non-Aligned delegations chose to interpret the 1961 USA-USSR Joint Statement of Agreed Principles which stated that the ultimate objective was to achieve General and Complete Disarmament (GCD) as being capable of realization within a definite time limit of short duration. The Soviet and American drafters however originally intended that GCD be considered as a goal which should act as a guide to the negotiations, as a sort of benchmark against which progress would be measured. 29

Throughout the 1970's Western countries, while reiterating their commitment to GCD, maintained that the desired goal could only be approached through a strategy of building block-by-block, that is, gradually and incrementally. Non-Aligned countries, however, maintained (with some justice) that too much
attention was being given to partial and collateral measures and that such measures had failed to bring GCD any nearer. Indeed, upon the initiative of the Non-Aligned members, the General Assembly had instructed the CCD as early as 1970 to draw up a comprehensive programme but with inconclusive results.

The Non-Aligned Group regarded the Special Session as an opportunity to work out just such a comprehensive programme, the achievement of which would be set within a time-bound framework -- and on a maximalist basis.

The Non-Aligned draft Declaration appeared unbending on this point:

...implementation of the Programme of Action should be in an agreed sequence with each measure and stage carried out within the specified time limits, the entire process being completed not later than the end of the next decade.

This passage was aimed at the superpowers but it was most unlikely that even Non-Aligned states themselves could agree to its terms if it were ever translated into reality. The slow, measured process in the SALT and the procedural and other difficulties which hampered any visible progress at the MBFR talks underlined the illusory foundations of any initiative to construct comprehensive time-bound programmes.

Apparently indifferent to experience and the effects that this broad ideological position could have on those actually involved in disarmament talks (there were no such talks among Third World states themselves) the Non-Aligned Group suggested during the Preparatory Committee that such a comprehensive programme might be constructed sequentially, in the following order:
1. Nuclear Weapons
2. Chemical Weapons
3. Incendiary Weapons
4. Other weapons of mass destruction (undefined)
5. Conventional Weapons
6. Reduction of Armed Forces

According to this sequence, Third World countries would be absolved of any responsibility to undertake any disarmament measures themselves until the very last stages. At the same time, however, they would possess the right to oversee the disarmament process up to that point, according to the principle that "all states have the right and duty to contribute to efforts in the field of disarmament and to participate in disarmament negotiations on an equal footing". 34

(b) "Democratizing" the Disarmament Process: The Non-Aligned Group, therefore, was for maximum participation of their members in the negotiations, on the not unreasonable grounds that this was the only way that their interests could be promoted. In general, they also supported the Wilsonian concept of "open covenants openly arrived at", insisting, for example, that the partners in SALT report regularly on progress to the UN General Assembly. (The fact that making public each stage of these most difficult negotiations could retard rather than advance progress was discounted.) As an integral part of this general approach the Non-Aligned Group demanded a greater role for the United Nations in the disarmament process. 35

In their different ways, both the Western and Eastern groupings too had declared themselves in favour of greater participation in the disarmament process. Western countries, for instance,
were anxious that France and, if possible, China participate in the deliberations of the CCD. Eastern European countries, at one point, stipulated that the full participation of all nuclear weapon states was a precondition to substantive talks on such nuclear weapons issues as the conclusion of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). In maintaining this position, the Eastern Europeans were aware that China had made it clear that it had no intention of attending any such talks; and that France, in principle, was opposed to them.

The relationship of a strengthened UN role to the programmatic, comprehensive approach to disarmament favoured by the Non-Aligned Group was spelled out:

The Special Session of the General Assembly should also contribute toward strengthening of the role of the United Nations and its overall involvement in the field of disarmament and disarmament negotiations. In this respect it should promote and elaborate a programme of priorities and measures whose...implementation would bring about...nuclear disarmament leading to general and complete disarmament under effective international control.36

"Democratization" of the disarmament process was pursued as a goal not only because of what the Non-Aligned Group saw as its inherent justice, but also because of the general belief that only through moral suasion, imposed by weight of numbers and the authority of the United Nations, would progress toward disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament, be obtained. (This view in fact is held not by the Non-Aligned countries alone.) The major difficulty with the "moral suasion" argument was that it overlooked the fact that in the calculations of governments
required to operate in the real world of competitive interstate systems, considerations of national security invariably took precedence over the pressure of "world public opinion". The UN resolutions against Israel, for example, have made little if any difference to that country's policies, and the net results of these resolutions may in the long run undermine the credibility of the General Assembly by demonstrating its inability to deliver.

(c) **Disarmament by Declamation - The Hortatory Approach:** The Non-Aligned Group, besides displaying a weakness for oratorical flourishes in their draft, accorded positive value to recrimination as a means through which moral pressure could be exercised. The Review and Appraisal section of the final document was included largely at the Non-Aligned Group's insistence. The original Non-Aligned wording suggested that the present state of affairs "was the cause and consequence of great power rivalry", and asserted that international peace and security "cannot be sustained by military alliances and doctrines of strategic superiority or of deterrence". Whatever the analytic merit of this position, it ran directly counter to two cardinal essentials—the maintenance of the Alliance and the strategy of deterrence—upon which the NATO countries depended for their common defence. 37

The hortatory approach adopted by the Non-Aligned would have been relatively harmless had it been confined to declaratory sections of the final document. However, it also appeared in the more substantive, action-oriented sections, often as proposals
for declarations of intent. This tended to draw attention away from concrete disarmament measures to morally-satisfying but ephemeral measures, such as an Indian attempt to ban the stockpiling and deployment of nuclear weapons through an international declaration that the possession of such weapons was unlawful, and their use "a crime against humanity". Proposals for declarations renouncing non-first-use of nuclear weapons often fell into the same category.

As the debates of the Special Session progressed, it was tempting to believe that one of the Non-Aligned objectives appeared to be scoring moral points rather than achieving progress towards real disarmament measures. Thus, an additional danger posed by this evident approach was that it cast doubt on prospects of obtaining a final document on the basis of consensus.

(d) Shared Tactical Attitudes: Lying beneath common purposes and approaches to disarmament was a shared Non-Aligned philosophy about what the Special Session should achieve and the tactics which should be adopted to ensure success. It did not at the time appear that the Non-Aligned Group considered the achievement of consensus a goal in the way Western countries did. The Non-Aligned Group considered, for example, the Sixth and Seventh Special Sessions (on the NIEO) successful, although in Western terms, they were less than that. The final documents were promulgated only with a long list of Western reservations attached. And in the case of those sessions, it was the Western countries who were supposed to implement the results.
The Non-Aligned Group's view of the relative importance of achieving consensus in turn affected the attitudes of individual Third World delegations towards the negotiations. They appeared indifferent to the damaging effects lack of consensus could have on an action-oriented Programme, particularly if among the dissenters were those on whom the primary responsibility for its implementation rested.

The difficulty therefore was that the Non-Aligned countries were conscious of their numerical strength and determined that their maximalist views be uncompromisingly reflected in the final document. This consciousness threatened to reduce their will to negotiate and increased their temptation to "apply the pressure of the eleventh hour" (with its implied threat of the risk of failure of the Special Session) to induce many to finally accept Third World positions.

Reality and Illusion

The defensive postures which Western countries frequently found themselves holding was largely the consequence of a tactical alliance between the other Groups. This was the case in the debate over the holding of a World Disarmament Conference and was equally true in a variety of other issues, such as non-first-use, the "neutron bomb", non-enforceable bans on the prohibition of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction and "Zones of Peace". On other issues, such as a proposal to disband military alliances, Non-Aligned and Eastern European positions also coincided. The Non-Aligned and Eastern European
representatives were aware that each used the other as a tactical foil to put the Western countries at a disadvantage as the occasion demanded. But even in the hot-house world of "UN-ery" (as the British representative called it) the adversary-dependency relationships the Eastern European and Non-Aligned Groups had developed separately with Western countries ensured that once the game of debate was over, measures were eventually adopted which reflected a greater degree of general acceptability than seemed possible at the time.

The erroneous assumption is sometimes made that debates within the United Nations represent the totality of the world political scene in microcosm, and accurately reflect it. The process of East/West accommodation, summed up as détente, however, has taken place outside the UN, beginning with Chancellor Brandt's Ostpolitik, the Moscow and Warsaw Treaties, the Three-Power Agreement on Berlin, and even the CSCE and the Helsinki Final Act. This is equally true of arms control agreements which have accompanied the détente process, from the Partial Test Ban Treaty to the SALT I agreement. The United Nations, in these cases, has acted as a repository of accommodations already reached and of agreements already achieved. Despite Non-Aligned aims and aspirations to the contrary, the General Assembly of the United Nations is not structurally equipped to be more than a forum for debate. It is not an appropriate avenue for negotiations although talks have occasionally been held under UN auspices, and its resolutions, while not possessing the power
of sanction have sometimes been used to good effect by negotia-
tors elsewhere.

In light of these realities, the radical behaviour of many in the Non-Aligned Group on disarmament questions during the Special Session takes on a different aspect. The Special Session on Disarmament was a forum for debate rather than a forum for action, the judges being states members of the United Nations and the home governments. From the evidence, Non-Aligned delegations quite clearly distinguished between collective principle (enunciated by the Non-Aligned Group) and individual practice (that is, the actual policies practiced by each member state). The UN setting by its nature favoured declarations of collective principle — that is, after all, what United Nations resolutions are all about. The Non-Aligned Group's emphasis on economic over security issues and its pursuit of evidently unrealistic and apparently uncompromising positions bear witness, therefore, to the Group's understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of the United Nations system and its own position within it.

2 International Conference on the tasks of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Movement for further consolidation of the role of AAPSO, Colombo, Sri Lanka, 27-28 June 1978, Resolution No.9: Disarmament


4 At UNGA XXXI and despite the Non-Aligned resolution calling for the Special Session, the USSR also tabled a resolution on convening a World Disarmament Conference. The Non-Aligned, recognizing that the adoption of such a resolution would exclude Chinese participation in the Special Session (China had opposed drafting the Special Session as a transitional step to the WDC), sought to restrict any further discussion of the WDC until after the Special Session. By way of compromise, the Special Session agenda contained a phrase about "considering the question of convening a WDC". This phrase was not sufficiently offensive to prevent China from attending the Special Session.

5 This is not the place to examine in detail the major features of the North-South dialogue. Basic documents relating to establishment of a NIEO are the two documents issuing from the 6th and 7th Special Sessions: Declaration, Programme of Action on the Establishment of a NIEO (UN General Assembly Resolutions 32/01 and 32/02 SP.VI) and Development and International Economic Cooperation (UN General Assembly Resolution 32/62 SP.VII). Other basic texts include the communiqués issued by the Conference on International Economic Cooperation (CIEC) and the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, issued as Resolution A/9946 of 9 December 1974, at UNGA XXIX.

6 This term, a good one, is borrowed from Homer A. Jack, A Citizen's Guide to the UN Special Session on Disarmament, WRCP Pamphlets, New York, 1978

7 To confuse matters slightly, it might be noted that members of the Preparatory Committee were chosen, after appropriate consultation in each of the prime regional groups on the basis of geographic (as opposed to political or economic) representation as follows: Africa - 14; Asia - 11; Eastern Europe - 6; Latin America - 10; WEO - 13. The Third World outnumbered East and West 45 to 19. Eastern Europe asked for increased representation but was defeated in the attempt (A/31/475 Official Records).
8 The Mexican Ambassador, Garcia Robles, was in large part responsible for the creation, by treaty, of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America, the Treaty of Tlatelolco, 1967.

9 The term "non-alignment" was first used in the Final Communiqué of a meeting between Tito and Nasser at Brioni in 1956.


13 As another example, Pakistan suggested that the Declaration contain a passage indicating that "the primary responsibility for progress towards General and Complete Disarmament rests on those powers with the largest number of nuclear and conventional military arsenals and on other militarily significant states" (Pakistani Working Paper A/AC.187/91 of 24 January 1978). This proposition was in fact aimed at scoring points against India which, Pakistan maintained, was the only "militarily significant" state in the region.


15 For one interpretation of the various ideological strains in non-alignment, see Leo Mathes, Non-Alignment: Theory and Current Policy, Dobbs Ferry: Oceana 1972.

16 The criteria for membership in the Non-Aligned Movement rested on five principles. The principles were so broad as to exclude practically no-one who was not a member of NATO or the WPO:

(1) The country should have adopted an independent policy based on the co-existence of States with different political and social systems and on non-alignment or should be showing a trend in favour of such a policy.

(2) The country concerned should be consistently supporting the movements for National Independence.

(3) The country should not be a member of a multilateral military alliance concluded in the context of Great Power conflicts.
(4) If a country has a bilateral military agreement with a Great Power, or is a member of a regional defence pact, the agreement or pact should not be one deliberately concluded in the context of Great Power conflicts.

(5) If it has conceded military bases to a foreign Power, the concession should not have been made in the context of Great Power conflicts.


19 A military coup prevented the Coordinating Bureau from meeting where it was originally intended, in Kabul.

20 Submitted as a Note Verbale dated 2 June 1978 from the Permanent Representative of Cuba to the United Nations, addressed to the Secretary General, document A/33/118 of 7 June 1978.


24 There were of course minor alliances of various military or political significance, such as the Unified Arab Military Command, but they could not be considered in the same category as NATO or the WPO.

25 The Group of 77 comprises about 95 members. Its name derives from the Joint Declaration of 77 Developing Countries at the Conclusion of the First Session of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 1964.

26 Précis quoted from "The Non-Aligned Movement" by C.B. Svoboda in International Perspectives, January/February 1977.


28 Bloomfield & Cleveland, Disarmament and the UN.
29 The authoritative version of the the debate over GCD is given in United Nations and Disarmament, United Nations, New York, 2 volumes, 1976.

30 ibid., p.17.

31 Resolution 2661C(XXV) of 7 December 1969.


35 Of particular concern to the Non-Aligned was that the relationship of the CCD to the UN was not clearly defined although the practice was that the CCD submitted annual reports to the UN but it was not answerable to it.


37 There was, furthermore, provision in the Charter for alliances: in this sense, the Non-Aligned Group was disagreeing with the Charter.

38 In some instances (such as the Helsinki Final Act) the concluding documents were submitted to the UN.

39 The possible exception to this rule of course is the device of the "Uniting for Peace" resolution, used to overcome the impasses in the Security Council.

40 For example, the Panmunjom Talks which ended the Korean War, or the recent talks on Namibia.
Chapter IV

The Western European and Others Group

The United Nations General Assembly does not and perhaps should not reflect perfectly the world events which transpire outside it. As an arena for debate, the General Assembly is often the scene of confrontation which may exist in the world beyond the East River only in very muted form. Western countries often played out a role developed for them by the Non-Aligned countries through years of UN debate, that of representatives of the last vestiges of colonialism, and of economic imperialism. Some Western countries, particularly the more "visible" ones seemed so inured to playing this rôle that they seemed to accept it as a price to be paid for seeking progress toward agreement on disarmament issues. The result was that, with the exception of a few subjects such as non-proliferation, the Western stance at the Special Session tended to be defensive.

Despite any scepticism they may have had, Western countries regarded the Special Session as an opportunity for the General Assembly to discuss in the largest international gathering devoted to the subject since 1932, disarmament matters with a view to instilling a greater impetus toward concrete measures. Because Western ideas tended to be practicable and realistic, the Western Group left itself open to the fatal accusation of lacking imagination. This was recognized by the Western experts themselves. Speaking before the Socialist International Conference on Disarmament in Helsinki, April, 1978, the American Dis-
armament Ambassador to the United Nations, Mr. James Leonard, registered "a certain measure of disappointment"...
in the area of security policy, of defence and disarmament, I have not observed any very useful contributions coming from Europe.... what bothers me is a passivity, an apparent lack of ferment, an apparent lack of novel ideas and approaches. And most of all I am bothered by an almost automatic reaction of concern here in Europe to any innovative approach which might from time to time be suggested by one or another American". 1

If Ambassador Leonard's criticisms about Western European behaviour on disarmament issues were accurate, they did little to explain it. The generally conservative approach to disarmament issues lay with the built-in paradoxes of NATO strategic concepts and doctrine. Nor were the foreign policies of Western countries equipped to deal with the symbolism and ritualistic aspects of the Special Session debate. As a result Western countries' approach on the public stage of the Special Session was cautious, conservative and unimaginative.

There were two exceptions. One, and only a partial exception, was the USA which would count on its vast world influence. The other, which was prepared to turn the polemical atmosphere at the Special Session to its own advantage, was France.

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Western Caucus: Structure and Style

In the Western Group, organizational considerations, both within and outside the United Nations were instrumental in
determining the broad approach. At the Special Session the term "Western Group" was applied to those countries who were members of the NATO Alliance, Australia, New Zealand and Japan. These countries shared similar economic characteristics as well as interests and goals. In various ways all were woven into the Western fabric of defence.²

The Western Group was also composed of industrialized democracies which, given the effects of their domestic public opinions on the conduct of their foreign policies, added special considerations in the formation of their disarmament policies. These considerations were not shared by most Third World countries and not by any Eastern European country.

At the Special Session the Western Group did not include those European countries outside the Alliance (such as Austria) or certain "borderline" cases (such as Malta).³ The type of armed neutrality practised by Sweden also precluded her membership in the Western caucus. The Group consisted of the representatives of nineteen states, the "inner core" of which was determined by membership in the CCD. The Western caucus was generally referred to as the "Barton Group", named after the Canadian Ambassador who acted as chairman. (Ambassador Barton "brought" his group with him and then enlarged it when he was appointed Ambassador to New York after his tour in Geneva as the Canadian CCD Ambassador there.) A number of other "Western" groups, or groups in which Western interests were heavily represented, also made their presence felt within the Western caucus.
Besides the Alliance (discussed separately) these groups were:

(a) The Nine: Representatives of the nine EEC countries met separately to coordinate their policies and tactics on UN subjects under discussion. The Nine represented a separate group within the Western caucus.4

(b) The Nordics: Nordic countries too met separately to coordinate their policies and influence decisions of the Barton Group. Thus, although Sweden was not a member of the Western caucus, she was able, as co-sponsor with Denmark and Norway of the proposal for a study5 of the link between disarmament and development, to gain Western support.6

(c) OECD: This group, representing the Western industrialized world, does not meet separately at the UN. Attitudes reflecting OECD concepts and positions in the North-South dialogue were, however, clearly reflected in the collective stance of the Barton Group on a number of disarmament issues, particularly those with economic implications.

(d) "The London Club": The London Club had membership which extended beyond Western countries and symbolized Western and Eastern European cooperation in preventing nuclear proliferation. Named after its venue, the Nuclear Suppliers Club laid down "fundamental principles for safeguards and export control...to nuclear transfers to any non-nuclear weapon state for peaceful purposes".7
The London Club, a far more exclusive body than the IAEA (which included both suppliers and recipients of nuclear materials and technology) was the unnamed target, along with the NPT, of Third World complaints about discrimination. The concern about non-proliferation shared by the technologically-advanced countries of both East and West as manifested by the London Club was in large part responsible for the achievement of an acceptable outcome of the non-proliferation section of the Final Document.

The Economic Dimension

The Non-Aligned and Eastern European Groups had nothing to compare with the way in which the Western Group was organized within itself. The EEC, despite its flaws and numerous blind alleys, did look to the ideal of European political union. The consultative process within the Nine was an important vehicle which ensured that the potential for conflict amongst Europeans over policy was moderated before it reached the discussion stage in the Western caucus as a whole. The Non-Aligned countries had no single equivalent of the EEC as an integrative mechanism; their common positions on the NIEO, and their common declarations issued at Non-Aligned summits could not be counted, since they involved very different institutional arrangements. Parallel economic organizations, such as the ECLA or the ASEAN, were in the rudimentary stages of development, compared to the EEC.
Within the COMECON, the Eastern European equivalent of the EEC, the integrative process (on the political level at least) appeared well ahead of that of the European members of the Atlantic Alliance. But Eastern European trans-national structures and modes of behaviour precluded any genuine consultative process on policy matters.

There is no immediate association between the organizational aspects of economic relations within each Group and each Group's collective approach to the Special Session. But the Special Session was, above all, about a reordering of the international economic system, at least in the eyes of the Third World. In this sense the Western economic presence, primarily as the OECD but sometimes as the EEC, was felt throughout practically all the debates. In the economic vocabulary of the Special Session, two major aspects of disarmament warrant special attention: the North-South dialogue, and the complex problems associated with the development, and transfer, of Western technology.

The North-South Aspect

As we have seen, Non-Aligned countries regarded the Tenth Special Session as the logical extension of the Sixth and Seventh Special Sessions on the creation of a New International Economic Order. It has been noted that the Third World countries themselves held different -- and sometimes opposed -- concepts about the meaning of this elusive term. All seemed generally agreed, however, that much of the Third
World malaise was attributable to a "lopsided, asymmetrical interdependence of unequal partners". 8

On the eve of the first meeting of the Special Session Preparatory Committee, the Conference on International Economic Cooperation (CIEC) terminated inconclusively. The "Group of Nineteen" developing countries participated in order to implement the recommendations of the Seventh Special Session. The major charge brought against industrialized countries by the Group of Nineteen was that they lacked any "meaningful spirit of cooperation" and did not possess the "political will" to restructure the world economic order. 9

The proximity of the CIEC to the Special Session was strengthened by the fact that many of the major players were the same, 10 and there was a natural tendency to continue the unfinished CIEC debate at the Special Session. This tendency was reinforced by the fact that beneath the vocabulary of disarmament lay the grammar of developmental economics. The teams, being the same, played the same game and pursued the same objectives as before.

Technology

Technology and the qualitative aspects of armaments was a fundamental ingredient of the East-West strategic relationship, symbolized by the SALT. Yet the East-West aspects of this vital problem were overshadowed at the Special Session by other concerns expressed by the Third World majority. Given Third World preoccupations, furthermore, this aspect of East-West military confrontation did not become a major subject of debate. 11
by extension the technology of weapons and its relationship to arms competitions in other parts of the world was not addressed in any detail at the Special Session.¹²

The Special Session made no progress in refining commonly-held notions about further development and elaboration of weapons technology, and its relationship to the maintenance of Western security. There appeared to be no comprehension, let alone sympathy, on the part of the Third World representatives that Western countries relied on their technological advantage to offset Eastern superiority in numbers. The Third World countries, moreover, appeared oblivious to the fact that if the military balance in Europe were to be maintained, nuclear disarmament would destroy any hope of a North-South transfer of resources. That is, nuclear disarmament in Europe would consume prodigious amounts of funds as Western European governments would try to compensate for their strategic disadvantage by acquiring greater quantities of non-nuclear arms to meet the continuing threat posed by the overwhelming numerical superiority of the conventional armed forces of the Soviet Bloc.

At the same time, however, recent technological advances, primarily in the form of laser targeting systems and the refinement of PGM's (precision guided munitions), already held the potential of providing a credible conventional weapons alternative to the defence of Europe by nuclear means. In this instance, a further development of conventional weapons technology has the effect of raising significantly the nuclear
threshold in Europe, thereby reducing the probability of early employment of tactical nuclear weapons.

Western spokesmen, moreover, were generally unenthusiastic about discussions on placing restrictions on qualitative improvements on strategic delivery systems. Western, primarily US, reluctance was related to the fact that the disposition of the cruise missile was one of the subjects under active negotiation at the SALT. Because of this paradox -- that technological innovation has the effect of reducing the chances of a conventional war escalating to nuclear levels or, if it did, of reducing the amount of damage -- Western countries at the Special Session frequently appeared to be hesitant to accept any qualitative brake on armaments. In many instances, appearances did match reality, but not for the reasons supposed by many of the Third World countries. The debate over technology made Western countries frequently appear uncooperative, indeed intransigent.

Access to (as opposed to use of) Western technology was another major theme at the Special Session. Here, the debate had two main threads: (a) nuclear proliferation; and (b) weapons transfer.

(a) Non-Proliferation: In the United Nations debate over technological transfers, measures to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons were claimed by many Third World countries to be an attempt to restrict their economic development. Of the plethora of nuclear treaties extant, only one directly affected the Third World -- the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The burden of obligations under
the Treaty was unequally distributed between nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states, which included the entire non-aligned world, and the failure of the Western countries to "facilitate...the fullest possible exchange of equipment and materials and scientific and technological information for the use of nuclear energy" was a cause of Third World bitterness which persisted throughout the Special Session debates.

(b) Weapons Transfers: The dependency/adversary relationship between industrialized and developing worlds was never in sharper focus than on this question. A number of proposals were put forward aimed at restricting conventional arms transfers but all of them foundered in consequence of lack of support. The issues were complex. The North-South relationship, as practiced by individual states, frequently contained a large weapons transfer component. Although the "buying-influence-with-guns" model of North-South relations was popular during the Special Session's debates, it obscured as much as it clarified. In some instances such as in post-Vietnam South East Asia, weapons transfers were effected as a means to strengthen national governments in order to provide a modicum of stability to the area. The "merchant of death" theory was equally unhelpful in that while Western companies did sometimes make profits from arms sales to the Third World, sometimes they did not. In any event, these sales were carefully scrutinized and approved by national governments who weighed political and other factors before permitting such sales. In the case of NATO countries, exports restrictions were also imposed for certain categories of weapon and country.
The effects of the oil crisis and the circulation of petrodollars on international weapons transfers lies beyond the scope of this study. It might be noted, however, that the quadrupling of oil prices was in large part responsible for the Western initiative (proposed by the French President) to hold the CIEC, just as Western economic weakness was a factor contributing to its inconclusive results. Many Western countries, particularly the Europeans, looked to weapons transfers as one means (among many) of stabilizing outward cash flows, and of turning an "inverse dependency relationship" into a mutually advantageous one.

The Military/Security Dimension

Quite obviously, disarmament is a topic which engages national security in the military sense as well as in the economic sense. Perhaps not so obviously, the official proceedings of the Special Session gave no hint that military alliances figured in the arms control process. Since the Western caucus contained members outside the Alliance, however, Western positions at the Special Session were not necessarily Alliance positions. The consultative role of the Alliance on disarmament matters has been spelled out in a number of NATO communiqués. The Harmel Report to the North Atlantic Council (annexed to the Foreign Ministers Communiqué of December 13-14, 1967) stated that

...as sovereign states the allies are not obliged to subordinate their policies to collective decision. The Alliance affords an effective forum and clearing house for the exchange of information and views; thus each Ally can decide its policy in
light of close knowledge of the problems and objectives of others.

This general Alliance approach was fully in play during the Special Session where the separate initiatives of Western countries tended to support philosophies behind collective Western texts.

Thus, discussions in NATO Headquarters on the subject matter of the Special Session were part of the ongoing consultative process of the Alliance. The construction of common Alliance positions as a result of this process added a further element to cohesion of the Western caucus, and the concerns held by NATO members in the caucus were generally shared by the rest of the group.

Western countries tended to treat arms control and disarmament matters primarily as security issues, as opposed to economic or developmental issues. The effect was to lend to the Special Session debates an impression that they were proceeding on a number of different levels of comprehension at once. Thus, the Western approach to arms control and disarmament issues, with its East-West emphasis, was the logical consequence of Western security interests and concerns. Within the NATO Alliance, the Harrel Report of 1967 on the future tasks of the Alliance in effect recommended that European security and arms control issues be "multilateralized" (as opposed to their continued bilateralization, as in the McCoy-Zorin Declaration of Joint Principles, 1961) by engaging all members of the Alliance in efforts at East-West military accommodation:

The Alliance can... pursue the search for progress towards a more stable relationship in which the
underlying political issues can be solved. Military security and a policy of détente are not contradictory but complementary. Collective defence... is the necessary condition for effective policies directed towards a greater relaxation of tensions. The way to peace and stability in Europe rests in particular on the use of the Alliance constructively and in the interests of détente (para 5).

This recommendation in the Harmel Report set the stage for the promulgation of the Alliance invitation to the WPO to commence multilateral arms reduction talks for central Europe. The "Reykjavik Signal" of 1968, as the NATO invitation to the talks was called, also outlined four principles which have been followed by Western arms control negotiators ever since.

(a) Mutual force reductions should be reciprocal and balanced in scope and timing.

(b) Mutual reductions should represent a substantial and significant step, which will serve to maintain the present degree of security at reduced cost, but should not be such as to risk de-stabilizing the situation in Europe.

(c) Mutual reductions should be consonant with the aim of creating confidence in Europe generally and in the case of each party concerned.

(d) To this end, any new arrangement regarding forces should be consistent with the vital security interests of all parties and capable of being carried out effectively.

During the Special Session these principles, when applied outside Europe, met with continuous resistance, opposition and misunderstanding, not only from many Third World countries (plus, of course, from the WPO) but also from a significant section of the Western public which argued for unilateral disarmament measures as a means to "build confidence" between East and West and who rejected the concept of "parity" — that is, that at the
end of the negotiating process neither side should be left with an overall superiority of forces. Eventually, however, most of these principles did appear in one form or other in the Final Document.

In the light of these general principles, Western reaction to apparently constructive approaches proposed by others is more easily understood. (Here, it might be noted that it took six years and the threat of Western non-participation in the CSCE talks for the WPO to respond to the Reykjavik Signal.) From a negotiating standpoint the major difficulty with the Western disarmament principles is that their logic demanded measures that dealt with the reduction or control of the actual units of military competition, namely weapons, and this was perhaps one of the most unpopular themes at the Special Session.21

Alternative approaches, often sponsored by the Non-Aligned or Soviet or Eastern European delegations frequently were based on the persuasive and attractive premise that capabilities are not a guide to intentions and therefore it was more profitable to construct the legal framework to restrict the use (rather than the existence) of weapons and armed forces. The Soviet proposal for a universal treaty on the non-use of force in international relations is a case in point.22 It repeated verbatim the non-use of force commitment in the Charter and therefore added nothing, but omitted Charter language on the collective right of self-defence and on enforcement.

From the Western point of view, besides being irrelevant, declaratory or legalistic resolutions on the use of military
forces also "put the West at a disadvantage since parliamentary control and public opinion would tend to enforce such restrictions whereas inhibitions did not exist in the East."\textsuperscript{23} -- and it might be added, in most parts of the Third World as well. The net result of Western reservations about these alternative approaches however was to make Western countries appear opposed to what seemed to many perfectly reasonable and indeed useful measures.

This tactical handicap was exacerbated by certain elements of NATO strategic doctrine which on the surface appear to cast doubt on allied intentions. Indeed certain central elements of the doctrine were skillfully exploited by the Eastern Europeans who worked them to the Alliance's disadvantage. Among them were the twin concepts of "flexible response" and "deterrence".

Essentially the doctrine of "flexible response" meant that as a part of its broad deterrence strategy the Alliance was resolved to "keep its options open" on whether and when to use tactical nuclear weapons in Europe in the event of an attack.\textsuperscript{24} In the Special Session setting it was very difficult for the Alliance to accept any of the "non-use" and "none first use" proposals on nuclear weapons, whatever their source. The impression was therefore created that the Alliance was somehow in favour of the use of nuclear weapons in any conflict (but it should also be noted that uncertainty was also a component of the deterrence strategy). The controversy over the neutron bomb and the complex Western language on negative security guarantees did nothing to dispel this impression.
The broad strategy of deterrence, however effective its application may have been on maintaining Western security and of assuring East-West military stand-off, found neither sympathy nor understanding in the ranks of most Non-Aligned countries. The Ottawa Declaration, which incidentally defined those issues within Alliance competence for consultations, reaffirmed the validity of the strategy.

In their draft Declaration the Non-Aligned Group singled out the philosophy of deterrence as "not being conducive to the maintenance of world peace".

But the major Western handicap at the Special Session may have been the fact that the Alliance existed at all. All Non-Aligned countries were, as a matter of principle, opposed to military blocs and in favour of their dissolution. This stand applied more to NATO than to the Warsaw Pact. The fact that if the Alliance actually were dissolved, Europe, and particularly the FRG, would almost certainly consider remilitarization as a means to guarantee its own security (while the dissolution of the WPO would have no appreciable effect on Eastern European military power) was a secondary consideration. NATO represented an alliance of the old imperial powers and in this sense was associated with the vestiges of colonialism. In the eyes of many of the less sophisticated in the Non-Aligned Group, the presence of Japan, Australia and New Zealand, all non-NATO countries, in the Western caucus, merely confirmed the militaristic intent of those countries, most recently shown by Australian and New Zealand participation on the US side in the Vietnam conflict.
Western Approaches and Objectives

Western approaches at the Special Session were never as precise as those of the Eastern Europeans nor as broad as those of the Non-Aligned. Inasmuch as members of the Western caucus called their shared concerns objectives (and they did not) these objectives existed on a number of different levels. The first level related to the Special Session itself, particularly how it should be approached. One extreme school of thought, for example, believed that it should be written off even before it was held, given its low chances of success. At the opposite extreme were those who were tempted to hope that the Special Session could mark a dramatic turning point in the melancholy history of disarmament. The second level was composed of common Western strategic concerns (discussed in the previous section) and of how these concerns, translated as Western interests, might be preserved in the United Nations setting. The third level was defined by the common goal of maintaining a collective Western approach to specific problems within the Western caucus.

(a) The First Level: Consensus

As an operating principle, consensus meant compromise and in the emotionally-charged atmosphere of the Special Session compromise by no means could be taken for granted. Some in fact argued vociferously against it.

Western countries were not confident that the Special Session would produce the advertised results, and only when they
were faced with a fait accompli did they rally behind the resolution establishing it. To many Western countries past experience suggested that the Special Session would provoke bitter debate and polemic, and the production by a number of countries of "non-negotiable", unrealistic lists of demands incapable of being met. These fears, moreover, were reinforced by the concern that the Special Session could damage the United Nations system, which depended upon its credibility for its effectiveness. Only through the achievement of consensus on the Final Document could the credibility of the General Assembly be maintained. This, therefore, was the overriding Western objective.

This concern was expressed clearly, but politely, by the French Delegation:

The French Government considers it desirable that the Assembly should at its Special Session attempt to reach generally acceptable consensus on questions to be considered. A decision on the subject of disarmament which does not enjoy the approval of a very large majority and does not command the support of the principal countries which might have to implement it, will remain without effect and may even have adverse effects. 27

In their own dispositions, the Non-Aligned and Eastern European delegations did not refer to the desirability of consensus. As deliberations in the Preparatory Committee threatened impasse, there were private discussions amongst members of the Western caucus about whether a "damage limitation operation" might be launched to reduce the negative repercussions the Special Session could have on the credibility of the General Assembly. Some consideration was also given to the desirability of launching a simultaneous "rescue operation" to save those parts of
of the Special Session worth the effort.

(b) The Second Level: Security

In the Western view the maintenance of a stable, strategic military balance was essential for the Western security, which in turn was a precondition for further progress in détente and disarmament. Western approaches to the East-West arms and security relationship and Western approaches to the Special Session were not the same. The former, however, is related to the management of the security relationship through a process of negotiation; the latter is concerned with the orchestration of Western positions and initiatives in a debate. Western disarmament objectives at the Special Session were framed accordingly.

Western leaders recognized that they were "faced with the dilemma of having to meet the moral and political demands for arms limitation while at the same time maintaining a full effective deterrent to war". The Special Session was a crystallization of this dilemma. There, security and deterrence figured little in the debate except as objects of opprobrium.

(c) The Third Level: Collectivity

That a common Western approach to arms control and disarmament matters had already developed in other forums greatly smoothed the way for the production of joint Western draft texts on the Declaration, Programme of Action and Machinery sections of the Final Document. Besides having the obvious advantage of presenting the basic Western position on a number of issues, these documents also were used as the means by which proposals of individual delegations could be put to the General Assembly carrying
the greatest possible weight -- assuming that the rest of the
Group were prepared to support them. Solidarity within the group
moreover was not intended to be monolithic. The USA and France
(see below) did not associate themselves with the Western texts
although they participated fully in the consultative process.

The accommodation of divergent national interests occasion-
ally demanded mutual adjustments to achieve agreement on certain
issues. The Group, for example, had some difficulty reaching
appropriate wording for strengthening non-proliferation safeguards
although other matters, such as the question of the deployment of
tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, on which Western dissension
was popularly supposed to exist, was not at issue. 29

The Western Documents

The joint Western texts were therefore based on common
defence policies, the product of consultations within the Alliance
and in other defence arrangements. These policies were translated
into a disarmament vocabulary through shared experiences and inter-
est as they had emerged from the regular debates of the First
Committee, the negotiations in Geneva (CCD) or Vienna (MBFR) or
other international gatherings (such as in London on safeguards
arrangements, or in Belgrade on the military aspects of détente,
including CBMs). To this broad, common base was the impact on
disarmament policy of domestic public opinion which, while not
decisive in the formation of specific policies, was taken into
account by the policy-makers in the democracies. The effect of
"world public opinion", despite the prominent role accorded to
it by the United Nations collectivity, had little, if any, influence on the formation of Western disarmament positions. (This contrasted to the calculated effect many Eastern European disarmament proposals were intended to have on it.)

From this point, the sequence in the formation of Western documents progressed from the preparation of interdepartmental drafts at the national level (and in most cases from discussions with national non-governmental organizations) to their further refinement by discussions within The Nine (in the case of the Europeans) and within NATO, and finally their melding together through the give and take in the Western caucus in New York. At this stage of the process, provision was made for any substantive change in national positions consequent upon the discussions to be put ad referendum to capitals for final approval. Besides giving the collective Western stance shape and dimension, it allowed The Nine to speak to the Western Group and to the Special Session as a single political entity, a practice carried over from the CCD. The significance is that The Nine was commonly understood to be an economic entity; in the case of the Special Session, and as a matter of common policy, it had taken on security functions as well, and in the absence of a NATO spokesman at the Special Session, acted effectively as a substitute.

Indeed, The Nine speaking to the Special Session through their representative summed up the basic philosophy behind Western documents:

Among the principles which should be regarded in the Declaration on Disarmament, The Nine attach special importance to the direct interrelationship
between disarmament and national security including the inherent and balanced right of states to individual and collective self-defence. Properly verified disarmament, by enhancing stability, itself contributes to the security of all nations. Measures of arms control and disarmament should satisfy the need for balance to ensure that the security of all states involved is enhanced and that no state or group of states can gain unilaterally military advantages at any stage in the disarmament process. For this purpose it is imperative that disarmament agreements should provide for adequate and effective measures of verification. The goal is greater security at a lower level of armaments and military forces.31

These Western concepts, expressed by Mme. Østergaard, the Danish Minister, were spelled out in detail in Western documents. The Western draft Declaration, despite a 7-paragraph preambular chapter (inserted for the double reason of tailoring it to UN resolution language and of meeting part way the preoccupations of the UN majority for declaratory language) was very businesslike. The chapter on "Major Principles Governing Relations Among States", for instance, contained only two paragraphs, one referring to obligations set down in the Charter and the other, on confidence building measures. By contrast, the Non-Aligned Group's draft text devoted some five or six chapters to the same subject, and the Eastern European draft text was almost as long.

The Western draft Programme of Action, in common with the draft texts of the other two major negotiating groups, outlined immediate measures for negotiation, including further SALT agreements and the desirability of the early conclusion of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. These and other measures besides (such as an agreement on a Chemical Weapons Treaty) were all
already under active negotiation, and this left the Western Group open to the complaint that where prescription was needed, it supplied only description.

There was one broad area where Western countries did maintain the initiative, but because it impinged on the defence policies of others, progress was not rapid. The Western Programme of Action placed great emphasis on further measures to strengthen international confidence, particularly through various steps aimed at enhancing the principle of "transparency" in the arms control process. The Non-Aligned and Eastern European Groups' reactions to these proposals were unenthusiastic. Through a feedback effect, Western resolve not to compromise its security interests in the face of this reluctance was strengthened rather than reduced as debates in the Special Session progressed.

The Western draft texts were eventually cosponsored by ten countries. Among those in the Western caucus who did not cosponsor were New Zealand, Greece, the USA and France. New Zealand declined to cosponsor because of her stand on a moratorium on nuclear weapons testing. Instead, her delegation sponsored, in company with a group of Non-Aligned states and Australia, a "working paper" on the CTB supporting the moratorium concept (A/AC.187/102). Greece, given her dispute with Turkey and her military withdrawal from the Alliance, also did not associate herself with the Western text. Turkey cosponsored the Declaration but not the Programme of Action. For essentially technical reasons the United States decided to remain apart from the Western texts. France and the United States, however, were special cases.
France

France had withdrawn from the military command structure of NATO and had consistently refused to take her seat at the CCD on the grounds that it was dominated by the Soviet and American co-chairmen. As a nuclear weapon state she had traditionally opposed all measures aimed at curbing the spread of nuclear weapons (she had not signed the NPT) and had refused to accede to other nuclear arms control agreements such as the Partial Test Ban Treaty. Her position was based on her independentist military approach to deterrence and her opposition to what she regarded as the essentially unstable nature of the military relationship between the two superpowers. 32

French policy, however, was undergoing considerable change. By the early spring of 1978 a series of pronouncements 33 by the French Prime Minister and President signalled that France was prepared to break her self-imposed exile on disarmament matters. They appeared in the United Nations as a number of disarmament proposals. 34 Why France chose the Special Session as the occasion to part with her traditional policies is unclear. Internal considerations unrelated to the Special Session may have had an influence however since on the eve of the Spring elections, the ruling French coalition had been under left-wing criticism for not being more active on disarmament issues.

Whatever the reasons, on February 23, 1978 France tabled in the Preparatory Committee four specific proposals, namely (a) reform of the international negotiating machinery, in effect signalling the conditions under which France would be prepared
to participate in the CCD or its successor body; (b) establishment of a UN observation satellite agency, a "confidence-building" measure; (c) establishment of an international fund for disarmament and development, including a tax on "the over-armed"; and (d) establishment of an institute for research on disarmament. A month earlier, on January 25, France had proposed a "European Conference on Disarmament", which would proceed independently of the MBFR negotiations, the area of negotiations proposed being from "the Atlantic to the Urals" (on this, a Soviet representative noted that French Bonapartism was threatening to cut the USSR in half).

The most impressive feature of the French proposals was their analytical framework. The concept was for one part of the world, the USA, Europe and the USSR, to be designated a "zone of deterrence" (where a nuclear balance exists and must continue but where conventional forces are dangerously imbalanced) and the rest of the world as a "non-nuclear weapon zone" (where the problem was one of conventional imbalance and the need to preserve its non-nuclear character). But equally, the French proposals were aimed at puncturing conventionally-accepted balloons. Thus, the French turned on its head the accepted notion of funds saved by disarmament measures going to development by arguing that this penalized the disarmers and favoured the overarmed states. It was better, the French suggested, to impose a tax on those who had too much already.

It may be an open question whether the French expected their proposals to be accepted, let alone implemented. Their
effect, and probably their intent, was to blunt the edge of much of the rhetoric coming from Non-Aligned and Eastern European quarters. Inasmuch as the French proposals indicated a return of France to the world of disarmament discussions they were welcome. The French proposals, even in the eyes of the French themselves, furthermore, were compatible with overall Western objectives.35

The final word on French intentions however came not at the Special Session but after it when France, in line with her active participation in that gathering,36 followed through in September 1978 by cancelling a contract for the supply of a nuclear reprocessing plant to Pakistan. The significance of this decision in light of French policy to become a key link between the developed and developing world was that it paved the way for possible French acceptance of the NPT and marked, on the part of the French President, "a contradiction of fundamentalist Gaullist policies"37 and a new stage of productive relations with the other major nuclear technology exporter states.

United States

That the Soviet-American dialogue on arms control issues -- particularly on SALT -- transpired well away from the Special Session was exemplified by the public exchanges between President Carter (Wake Forest University and Annapolis speeches) and the Soviet reply (Komsomol speech). It is equally significant that neither President spoke before the Special Session. In the American case the uncertain state of the SALT mitigated against it, and President Brezhnev's parlous health was probably a factor in his non-attendance. Neither President Carter nor Secretary Vance
the most senior American official directly concerned with SALT, it was thought, could deliver a concessionary speech at the Special Session at a time when the SALT negotiations were entering a crucial stage. The American keynote speech, therefore, was delivered by Vice President Mondale.  

While the Vice President's speech unveiled no dramatic new American initiative, it did not indicate American lack of interest in arms control. Quite the contrary. The issue was of intense personal concern to the American President who, in his early days of office, had inadvertently set back progress towards SALT II by moving too far too fast. He had suggested "deep cuts" in the nuclear arsenals of the superpowers of "fifty percent or more". President Carter's decision not to proceed with the production of the B-1 bomber and to defer the development of the MX missile were regarded by the American administration as "significant contributions to lowering the tempo of the arms race" and as a signal of American intentions underlined with concrete action.  

The Administration also sponsored the Non-Proliferation Act (which prevents nuclear exports for whatever purpose to countries who had not signed the NPT) and announced its intention to reduce its exports of conventional arms by eight percent in the 1978 fiscal year. Both these actions took place without external prompting. 

Since the major American step on arms control measures took place outside the United Nations Special Session, the Vice President was left with little to put to the General Assembly.
He announced a four-point initiative on peaceful nuclear cooperation, involving loans and preferential treatment of Third World countries party to the NPT. The Vice President also offered American good offices in providing "technical assistance" (i.e., satellite reconnaissance information) in monitoring any military disengagement agreements which might be concluded. Nevertheless, the modesty of these proposals and difficult American wording on negative security assurances plus the absence of American cosponsorship of the Western document, all contributed to the general feeling among many participants, particularly the Non-Aligned, of American disinterest in the proceedings.

From the American perspective the Special Session was regarded as "one step in a very long and arduous process", and like the Soviet approach, the American approach did not place the Special Session as high on its list of foreign policy priorities as many, particularly the Non-Aligned, would have liked.

As a footnote, lines of communication between the State Department, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), and the Pentagon were complex, not only because of the normal problems inherent in interdepartmental coordination but also because each Agency worked within the checks and balances system of presidential government. President Kennedy had established the ACDA as a counterweight to the Pentagon, and bureaucratic reasons impaired the American delegation's ability to react quickly to fast-breaking situations. White House intervention was apparently reserved for the more substantive arms control issues. The SALT, the achievement of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and non-proliferation
ranked first, second and third in American arms control preoccupations. The Special Session, if not further down the list, was to the side.
This examination of the three major Groups at the Special Session suggests that each was operating at a different level, both in terms of understanding and objectives, than the other. The paramount concerns of the Non-Aligned Group were economic: disarmament, particularly conventional disarmament, was not an end in itself, but a means to the ultimate goal of further economic development. The Eastern European Group, not directly involved in the North-South relationship, was content to identify itself as much as possible with Third World aspirations, while at the same time to preserve a fully-orchestrated, conservative treatment of the subject matter of the Special Session.

The Western Group came closest to accepting the Special Session at face value. The realization of Western purposes was rendered exceedingly difficult by certain built-in aspects of the Western approach to disarmament. First, in a world where realism is often equated with pessimism, the realistic (in the sense of realizable) objectives set out by Western countries had little appeal to Third World states, who were impatient for progress and who, for various ideological reasons rooted in their colonial experiences, held Western countries primarily responsible for what they considered the present deplorable situation. Second, as we have seen, NATO strategic doctrine was hardly suited to win points in the debates on disarmament at the Special Session.
Its principles, no matter how effective they were in maintaining a stable East-West relationship, particularly in Europe, ran counter to the general sentiment at the Special Session, where the link between security and disarmament had been relegated to a place secondary to the link between disarmament and development.

In some respects, the positions adopted by each of the three Groups were predetermined: the Western Group, by common Alliance positions; the Eastern European Group, through the "Peace Programme" elaborated by two Congresses of the CPSU, and the Third World Group, by the Non-Aligned Summits, especially since Algiers. Inconclusive annual debates in the CCD and in the First Committee had fine-tuned many national positions in advance, and the international atmosphere augured poorly for anything more than modest success. There was an evident Soviet-American stand-off in the SALT, and an East-West impasse in Vienna; the Belgrade CSCE Review Conference ended with an inconsequential Final Communiqué. Turbulent events in the Third World -- from the Horn of Africa to Namibia and Rhodesia, from Indochina to the Middle East -- all contributed to reducing the probability of the Special Session's attainment of some kind of breakthrough. The hard lesson was that progress (or otherwise) is determined by political and other relationships among states and groups of states. Weapons build-ups were merely symptomatic of larger problems, even though in some instances the buildups had become problems in themselves. In its own way, each Group demonstrated its understanding of this basic principle. The result, however, was that the Special Session had less to do with disarmament than many might have believed or imagined.
1 Text of speech circulated by the USA Delegation to the UN, Socialist International Conference on Disarmament, Helsinki.

2 Besides NATO there was ANZUS and the Japan/USA Mutual Defence Treaty of 1951.

3 It will be recalled that the Maltese Prime Minister, Mr. Mintoff, signed the Helsinki Final Act as an equal partner. By this precedent Malta is considered a "Western European country".

4 At the time of the Special Session Canada and the EEC were engaged in difficult negotiations over Canada's insistence on strengthening the international régime of nuclear safeguards. A measure of immediacy was added to the negotiations by the FRG's decision to supply Brazil with a nuclear processing plant. The Canadian and German positions within the Barton Group on non-proliferation, therefore, were hardly identical and in varying degrees other members of the Nine support their European partner.


6 Chairman of the study group was Madame Inge Thorsson, Swedish Under Secretary of State for External Affairs.

7 From the Nuclear Suppliers Group "Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers" (undated), London.

8 For an analysis, see Jahangir Amuzegar "A Requiem for the North-South Conference": Foreign Affairs, October 1977, pp. 136 ff.


10 The Group of Nineteen was composed of Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Cameroon, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Iran, Jamaica, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zaire and Zambia. The West, the Group of Eight, included Australia, Canada, EEC (one unit), Japan, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and USA.

There were, however, a number of proposals put forward to limit further development of weapons technology and the conclusion of a CTB was based on the assumption that such a treaty would prevent further perfection of nuclear weapons. Proposals, including one by Canada, were also put forward to ban flight-testing of new strategic delivery systems. Discussion on the proposed ban on test flights, however, was evaded by the superpowers at the Special Session because it was under active discussion at the SALT.

Christopher Bertram, op. cit., page 6 points out that the "traditional objectives of East-West arms control had been three: "to reduce the likelihood of war by increasing stability; to reduce the damage of war if war does break out; and to reduce the economic costs of preparing for war". Technological advance, contrary to conventional wisdom, it could be argued, therefore, can be a positive contribution to the first two objectives.

Non-Proliferation Treaty, Article IV, paragraph 2.

cf. for example, the Japanese proposal that there be regional conferences aimed at restricting arms transfers.

The complexity is particularly acute in the Middle East. See "International Guarantees with special reference to the Middle East" by Alan Dowty, David Carleton and Carlos Scharf, Eds., The Dynamics of the Arms Race, Croom Helm, London, 1975, p.215 ff.

For example, Soviet arms transfers to Egypt in 1960, and to India in the 1970's. The pattern is similar, but more complex, in the case of Western arms shipments to Iran and Saudi Arabia, the major difference being the decisive factor of oil.


One notable exception was on the issue of a Comprehensive Test Ban. The NZ Delegation, supported by the Australians, tabled a suggestion that pending the conclusion of a CTBT there be a moratorium on nuclear testing. The Alliance position was that such a moratorium would add little to progress and in fact could impede efforts to obtain a Treaty.


In this sense it should be noted the MBFR talks are not about disarmament or arms control at all but about disengagement and redeployment of European theatre forces.
22 Adopted as UNGA Resolution 31/9 of 1976. Most Western countries abstained.

23 "Détente and Disarmament" by Weigand Pabsch in NATO Review, October 1977, p.11.

24 "Flexible response" as a NATO doctrine is enunciated in the Communiqué from the Nuclear Planning Group, Bonn, October 10-11, 1968.

25 In this connection the members states of the Alliance affirm that as the ultimate purpose of any defence policy is to deny to a potential adversary the objectives he seeks to attain through an armed conflict, all necessary forces would be used for this purpose. Therefore, while reaffirming that a major aim of their policies is to seek agreements that will reduce the risk of war, they also state that such agreements will not limit their freedom to use all forces at their disposal for the common defence in case of attack. Indeed, they are convinced that their determination to do so continues to be the best assurance that war in all its forms will be prevented.

27 French reply to the Secretary General in response to UNGA Resolution 31/89B, on the question of holding a UN Special Session on Disarmament, Document A/AC.187/23 of 25 April 1977.


29 A useful résumé of possible sources of tension within the Alliance of particular relevance to the UN Special Session is given in Gerald Wright NATO in the New International Order, CIIA Behind the Headline Series, Toronto, No.4, 1978

30 A description of this process is found in the British White Paper on the UN Special Session on Disarmament, July 1978, HMSO, page 10.

31 Views of The Nine, statement by Madame Lise Oestergaard, Danish Minister without Portfolio, UN Special Session on Disarmament, New York, 25 May 1978.

32 The authoritative version of French military strategy and its relation to disarmament is given in Defense Nationale, Paris, Juin 1978 "Conférence par le General Mery, chef d'etat major des armées a l'institut des hautes études de defense nationale et au centre des hautes études de l'armement, lundi, le 3 avril 1978".

33 Transmitted to the United Nations as a Communiqué issued by the Office of the President on French Disarmament Policy, Document A/AC.187/90.
34 French Disarmament Proposals, document A/AC.187/103.

35 Le Monde, le 3 juillet 1978, "Le désarmement, la France et les Supergrands".

36 The French thought the UN Special Session on Disarmament important enough, however, to warrant President Giscard's attendance.


38 Vice President Mondale's speech before the Special Session on Disarmament, Office of the Vice President's Press Secretary, 24 May 1978.

39 Ambassador Leonard's speech before the Helsinki Socialist International Conference.

40 This case of "unilateral disarmament", or disarmament by example, met no response from the other side.

41 Vice President Mondale's speech.

42 The details of this initiative are contained in Ambassador Young's Statement to the Ad Hoc Committee of the UN Special Session on Disarmament on 9 June 1978, Press Release US/UN-59/78 9 June 1978.

43 USA letter to the Secretary General, document A/AC.187/17 of 22 April 1977.
Chapter V

The Canadian Dimension

Canada occupied a unique place within the Western Group. The Canadian Ambassador was Western Caucus chairman, which meant that special responsibilities rested on Canada not only to ensure the best possible coordination of Western positions, but also to seek within the caucus the highest level of common agreement.

In several respects, Canada was ideally suited for this role. As the second North American partner in the Alliance, Canada's military presence in Europe symbolized the fact that NATO was more than the organizational expression of an American security guarantee to Europe. Canada had special responsibilities on NATO's northern flank, particularly in Norway. These responsibilities, among other reasons, made for a close Canada-Norway working relationship at the Special Session. The Canadian commitment to Europe, furthermore, anchored Canadian strategic perceptions firmly within the Alliance framework and, by extension, within Western thinking. Canada, furthermore, was a major Western power (and, potentially, a major military power) which had by choice not become a nuclear weapons state. This was not for altruistic reasons, but because "going nuclear" was unnecessary. The NORAD agreement was based on an integrated approach to North American strategic defence. The Americans supplied the nuclear umbrella, the Canadians the hinterland. In Alliance
terms, while Canada's contribution of men and material to NATO was important, the strategic buffer of space -- and hence, time -- which Canada provided was an integral component of the Western strategic calculations.2

Membership within the Alliance brought Canada many benefits (including an entrée into the EEC, which, in a different context, was described as a "contractual link"). Not least among them was that Alliance membership obviated the need for heavy defence expenditures. The relatively "low profile" of the Canadian armed forces was a Canadian advantage at the Special Session which many, particularly Third World delegations, interpreted as proof of Canada's honest intentions.

Of all Western countries, therefore, Canada was particularly well-suited to speak to Third World delegations. As a Western interlocutor, she was in a position to interpret and explain Western concerns to them where others might be ignored, or their explanations dismissed. This further enhanced the Canadian position in the Western Group. Within it, and within the broader forum of the Special Session itself, Canada was able to pursue her own objectives without arousing the suspicion of the majority that she was acting out of ulterior motives. Her good credentials played an invaluable role in the Western effort to achieve consensus on the final document -- particularly on the question of non-proliferation.
Canada's definition of her role at the Special Session was also shaped by the historical experience of successive Canadian policymakers on disarmament subjects, and the concomitant evolution of a Canadian "disarmament philosophy". Other factors moulded the definition as well -- Canada's efforts to act as a bridge in the North-South dialogue, and her stake in the United Nations system were foremost among them.

Besides reviewing those factors which have contributed to the development of Canadian disarmament philosophy at the United Nations, the following pages trace the evolution of Canadian Government thinking on the Special Session, and the initiatives Canada undertook. The interplay of the public and private "disarmament community" in Canada is also examined. Pragmatism and realism, developed through experience, was emblematic of the Canadian approach.

The Canadian Experience: the Nuclear Example

The decision taken in the early postwar years to adopt the United Nations as a major focal point in the conduct of Canadian foreign policy stemmed from the belief of Mr. L.B. Pearson, then acting under the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. Louis St. Laurent, of how the Canadian voice might be most effectively heard on the international stage, and Canadian influence optimized. As the chasm between East and West widened, the shortcomings of
the United Nations as a means to bridge it soon became evident. As the 1940's turned into the 1950's, military preparedness seemed to offer a better chance for maintaining security and stability in Europe than did disarmament.

These early experiences at the United Nations and outside it played a formative role in determining Canadian attitudes to the Special Session, despite vast differences between the world of the 1950's and the world nearly thirty years later. Nowhere was the early influence on Canadian attitudes towards the United Nations as a disarmament forum more evident than in the Canadian experience in trying to strengthen the international non-proliferation system.

As a partner with Britain and the United States in the Manhattan Project, Canada offered two important resources -- uranium from the Eldorado mines, and sanctuary, at Chalk River, where a heavy-water-moderated research reactor was built and achieved criticality in 1944. The Hiroshima bomb traumatized the world, and gave Canada a legacy of guilt from which she has never fully recovered. Some twenty years later, on May 18, 1974 Canada received a second atomic shock, with the Indian nuclear explosion at Rajasthan.

The Hiroshima (and Nagasaki) devices dramatically altered Canada's strategic perceptions of herself as a
secure island of peace which dealt with the outside world exclusively on her own terms:

...the fact that it was regarded as one of the three 'atomic powers' at the end of the war thrust upon Canada a sudden and somewhat uncomfortable new status in world affairs. With this new status came the realization that in a postwar nuclear world characterized by a global Soviet-American struggle, Canada would be exposed to new and lethal dangers because of its geographic position.

The psychological impact on Canada of the Rajasthan explosion was severe. In one blow, India had shattered Canadian assumptions about a "special relationship", based on mutual trust, which existed between India and Canada, and brought an end to a good deal of Canadian idealism about the Third World. The Indian nuclear explosion also put in sharp relief fundamental questions about the desirability of unrestricted technological transfers from North to South, which until then Canada had taken almost as given. From that point on, the Canadian attitude to the Third World became more circumspect.

Between Hiroshima and Rajasthan, Canada had developed into a major world supplier of nuclear power and technology. As a nuclear supplier, Canada's early efforts to control the further proliferation of nuclear weapons through the United Nations were not rewarded. On the eve of the Cold War, in 1946, the Baruch Plan, put forward by the United States and supported by Canada, proposed that nuclear energy
be put under international control for exclusively peaceful purposes. It failed. Even the creation of the UN Atomic Energy Commission, the first act of the General Assembly, was soon followed by the unproductive and interminable East-West debates which dogged the 1950's. These early efforts to employ the United Nations as an instrument to "multilateralize" arms control established a pattern which has persisted ever since.

If thwarted in its early efforts at the diplomacy of United Nations disarmament, Canada was nevertheless an active participant in succeeding disarmament bodies as compositions, names and locales changed. The merger of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments in 1952 into an Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Commission, the direct predecessor of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, saw Canada, along with France, the Soviet Union, the USA and the UK as members of the core subcommittee. But despite bewildering and constant institutional change, progress on actual arms control and disarmament matters within these bodies has not been encouraging.4

The sum total of their experience in these bodies has given Canadian negotiators a certain realistic cast of mind in disarmament negotiations, a realism interpreted by some as either cynicism or pessimism. Fundamental Canadian
objectives in these negotiations have changed little since the former Canadian Ambassador at Geneva, Mr. George Ignatieff, wrote:

The aims of Canada at Geneva have been pragmatic and have had to recognize the limitation imposed on Canadian initiative which results from being an ally of the US, both in Europe as well as for purposes of North American defence:

(a) active participation in the negotiations in the forum which had been created for this purpose;
(b) identifying specific issues which might be ripe at any time for initiatives in the negotiation of arms control of disarmament agreements;
(c) seeking to modify proposals put forward by others, especially by the two superpowers, in such a way as to be most helpful in finding practicable compromises;
(d) helping to use the Geneva Conference machinery and the United Nations General Assembly (to which the conference reports) in order to gain public understanding of the issues involved in arresting and ending the arms race.  

Canadian Disarmament Philosophy

The pragmatic approach advocated by Ambassador Ignatieff took as its point of departure the state of relations between the two superpowers, a reality over which Canada, in the perception of her officials, had little influence and even less control. Nevertheless, with the advent of détente there appeared, as General Burns observed, "a break in the pattern of the early sixties of increasing armaments and increasing stress [which] came seven months
after the Cuban crisis\(6\) opening the door for greater Canadian opportunity.

The "break in the pattern" led the way to the Partial Test Ban Treaty and the "Hot Line" agreements, both of 1963. The conclusion of the Outer Space Treaty the same year was considered a personal achievement of Mr. Howard Green, the External Affairs Minister, who had worked tirelessly towards its end. But Mr. Green's commitment to disarmament led him to advocate measures with little reference to the Alliance, or sometimes to such practical matters as verification. On this account, scholarly opinion has not always been kind. Professor Lyon writes:

> Had the situation \(\text{under Mr. Green}\)\(7\) endured, Canada's effectiveness in the disarmament field would have been seriously weakened; not only would Canada have been less able to influence the Western negotiating posture, but once it was clear that the Americans were not taking the Canadians into their confidence, the interest of the neutral and Communist delegations in their Canadian contacts would have diminished.\(8\)

Whatever might be thought of Mr. Green's stewardship, it did represent a period when disarmament ranked very high indeed in Canadian foreign policy priorities. The legacy of Howard Green in Canadian disarmament policies is, however, properly the subject for another study.

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The convoluted way détente developed was also a major element in determining the Canadian approach to disarmament in those formative times. Ringing declarations, and sweeping disarmament proposals, such as those presented by Premier Khrushchev, and American counter-proposals were designed more for effect than progress. Indeed it was not until the beginning of the SALT that arms control became a subject for serious discussion between East and West.

Sometimes reality intruded upon disarmament discussions in New York and Geneva. On June 27, 1960, for example, the five Eastern European delegations to the Geneva Conference of the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament withdrew in the aftermath of the U-2 incident and the subsequent cancellation of the Paris Summit. In the confusion which followed at the United Nations, the Eastern Europeans accused Western countries of avoiding the question of General and Complete Disarmament, and Western countries charged that the Eastern Europeans were avoiding the question of verification and control.

The sixties had posed two fundamental problems of disarmament philosophy: one, the role of the United Nations in the disarmament process; and the other about the means by which disarmament measures should be pursued -- step-by-step, or by giant leaps. The answers which suggested themselves to Canadian policymakers were for a cautious approach to the Special Session.
In the William Clayton Lectures to the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Lester Pearson observed that public discussion of diplomatic issues prior to negotiations is not always productive of good results...there are occasions when it should be attempted; and there have been occasions when it has made subsequent agreement easier. The General Assembly of the United Nations has shown how this technique can be applied to clarify issues and mobilize international opinion, either as a prelude to negotiation or as the only possible substitute for negotiation when it is not possible.

These thoughts, perhaps better than any other, summed up the reserved attitude of Canada to the United Nations Special Session on Disarmament. Although Canada was one of the co-sponsors of the resolution which set up the Special Session, Canada was not confident about its achieving any substantive results. Pearson was not of course addressing himself to the Special Session, yet the problems he raised about diplomatic method lay at the heart of Canadian hesitations.

The first problem concerned the relationship between public and private diplomacy. The Canadian negotiating experience suggested that, in order to be effective, private discussion was a *sine qua non* to real progress. In his same address, Pearson warned against diplomacy by "loud-speakers" or by insult which, in the latter days of UN public debate, seemed to be more the rule than the exception. Even as Cold War polemics were replaced by the North-South debate, the one was often as bitter as the other, and experience
in the First Committee suggested that a United Nations setting was not necessarily conducive to progress. The second problem related to the slippery, and occasionally dangerous, transition between discussion and negotiation. While Canadian officials recognized that there would indeed be negotiation involved in the production of a UN document which would be issued at the end of the Special Session, they were concerned that many countries, particularly in the Non-Aligned Group, wanted the Special Session to serve not only as a platform from which to condemn the East-West arms race, but also as a venue to draw up a comprehensive and detailed scheme of General and Complete Disarmament: that is, that the Special Session should be a negotiating forum.

This problem was inextricably linked to the third problem -- the "Omnibus-Incremental" question. In 1970, a group of Non-Aligned countries submitted in First Committee a draft resolution to which was annexed a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament similar in substance to that which three of them -- Mexico, Sweden and Yugoslavia -- had earlier submitted to the Geneva Disarmament Talks. This Comprehensive Programme, which aimed at the attainment of General and Complete Disarmament, was passed by role-call vote. The resolution disappeared into UN archives, without practical effect. Yet, UN resolutions on General and Complete Disarmament have had a history reaching back to the USA-USSR Joint Declaration
of Principles of 1961. In the same year that the Non-Aligned countries had submitted their draft Comprehensive Programme to the First Committee, the General Assembly had reaffirmed General and Complete Disarmament as its primary goal. The relevant Resolution, entitled Declaration on the Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of the United Nations, read in part:

"We call upon all Governments to review the determination to make concrete progress towards the elimination of the arms race and the achievement of the final goal -- General and Complete Disarmament under effective international control." 12

Within this context, Canada, like other Western countries, regarded General and Complete Disarmament as a long-term objective, and hoped that others would not press too hard for its immediate realization. On the other hand, if the Special Session were to identify a number of the most promising avenues for the pursuit of concrete arms limitation measures and steps towards real disarmament in the immediate, foreseeable future, it could indeed have value. Canada, therefore, decided that the wisest course of action was to support the Special Session strongly and to play as active a role as possible. In doing so it was recognized that the Special Session would produce an elaborate Declaration of Principles (which would not necessarily be very helpful to the arms control and disarmament process) and a Programme of
Action inevitably containing a number of unrealistic features.

Canada also recognized that there was no certainty that major
Canadian concerns -- notably those related to non-prolifer-
ation -- would be adequately taken into account in the Final
Document.

Canadian Objectives

Canadian objectives were divided between those
short-term, immediate goals which were the subject of Canad-
ian public statements (the "formal" objectives) and those
long-term, broader goals which underlay Canadian thinking
(the "informal" objectives). The "formal" objectives were
summarized by the Under-Secretary of State for External
Affairs, Mr. A.E. Gotlieb, on January 19, 1978 during a con-
sultative meeting with private Canadian disarmament experts
on the Special Session. His ideas and those of his officials
subsequently formed the guidelines for the Canadian Govern-
ment's position on the goals to be pursued at the Special
Session:

One of the principal Canadian goals at the Special
Session will be a broad measure of consensus on a
programme of action identifying major arms control
and disarmament measures on which negotiations
should be vigorously pursued in the next few years.
Top priority objectives in the Canadian view include:

(1) the achievement through the Strategic Arms
Limitation Talks (SALT) between the United
States and the Soviet Union of measures to
curb and to reduce the nuclear confront-
ation between the two major nuclear powers
in both its quantitative and qualitative
dimensions;
(2) the banning of nuclear tests in all environments;

(3) the strengthening of the international non-proliferation system;

(4) measures for verifying military expenditures to permit agreements on effective and balanced reductions in such expenditures to free resources for other social and economic purposes without adversely affecting security; and

(5) measures to curtail the conventional arms races taking place in many parts of the world, including as soon as possible agreed restraints on transfers of weapons starting with those of the most destabilizing nature.\[\text{13}\]

The only hint of Canada's informal objectives in this list is given in the first paragraph, which refers to the Canadian goal of achieving "a broad measure of consensus on a programme of action". This meant that Canadian officials were concerned about preserving the credibility of the United Nations system; as a corollary, they also sought to preserve and, if possible, enhance Canadian influence within the United Nations system.

(a) \textit{Preservation of the credibility of the UN System}. The Canadian determination to seek consensus in the midst of potential confrontation reflected a genuine desire that the Special Session succeed. Canada was aware that should consensus break down as a result of the pressures of negotiation, and the Final Document be adopted by a divisive vote rather than consensus, the practical outcome of the Special Session would be put in doubt. The prospect of not achieving consen-
sus was very real, and there was no provision for consensual procedures in the General Assembly. Canadian officials were concerned that should consensus fail on such a crucial issue as disarmament and arms control, the credibility of the UN system could suffer. Indeed, Canadian concern about the apparent desire of many countries to break a cardinal rule of diplomacy by setting goals beyond reasonable possibility of attainment, was expressed by Don Jamieson at UNGA XXXII:

If we are to make progress here, there must be an end to the sterile debates of recent years where the outcome is always a foregone conclusion. If the vitality of open debate is not restored to the United Nations, then increasingly the important decisions affecting the fate of mankind will be made elsewhere and this organization and most of its agencies will wither into insignificance and, eventually, un lamented oblivion.14

In the Canadian view, therefore, the achievement of consensus was associated with the preservation of the credibility -- and therefore the effectiveness -- of the UN system. For this reason, Canada harboured reservations about whether the Special Session, at least in the terms envisaged for it by some, was in the best interest and capabilities of the UN General Assembly.

(b) Enhancing Canadian influence within the United Nations System. The goal of enhancing national influence at the United Nations is not as Machiavellian as it might first appear. The realization of this goal was an adjunct to Canadian efforts to
foster its disarmament goals, particularly on non-proliferation items.

Speaking before the First Committee on October 27, 1977 Ambassador R. Harry Jay attempted to inject realism into the overblown expectations appearing in the rhetoric of many:

Of course, such a broadly based forum [The Special Session] cannot itself undertake the negotiation of specific measures and treaties. These will require intensive efforts in the appropriate negotiating bodies, including particularly the Geneva Disarmament Conference which we now have good ground to believe may be about to enter upon a period of renewed activity and importance. The Special Session could also provide us with an opportunity for a broad reassessment of the problems and the opportunities and of the interrelationship between disarmament, international peace and security, and economic development.15

The implication of this carefully-weighted language was clear enough to listeners in the First Committee. Canada did not wish to see the Special Session on Disarmament coopt the functions of disarmament bodies already in place, such as the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, to which Mr. Jay was also Canadian Ambassador. The Canadian determination to exercise and reinforce the influence it wielded within the United Nations was accordingly reflected in Canadian efforts to prevent the Special Session from "getting out of hand". If the UN's credibility was damaged through the adoption of measures impossible of realization, Canada's moderating influence within the organization would count for little.
Internal Factors

How various internal pressures and influences contributed to the formation of Canadian policies lie beyond the scope of this study. Still, it is useful to recall that the Canadian public reaction against the Indian nuclear explosion reinforced the Government's resolve to pursue a strong non-proliferation policy -- and this was a major element in the Canadian approach to the Special Session. Other internal factors having a bearing on Canada's conduct at the Special Session might be roughly categorized as (a) "Interest Groups; (b) the "Intellectual Elite"; and (c) the Press.

(a) Interest Groups

The number of groups within Canada seized of the Special Session was considerable. Some were large and well-established. The United Nations Association in Canada submitted to the Government resolutions passed by the National Policy Council which set out specific measures for the Canadian Government to take at the Special Session. The Council endorsed Canada's non-proliferation policies, but advocated a "freeze" on the plans to spend $2.5 billion on a new fighter aircraft. Other groups, such as the Niagara Peace Movement, advocated the proscription of nuclear weapons and the immediate implementation of General and Complete Disarmament. Still other groups, such as "Operation Dismantle", advocated a "global referendum" on disarmament, and persuaded the Town
Council of Richmond Hill, Ontario, to endorse it. Some groups chose to express their views through publications. The Canadian Peace Research Institute (which had Mr. Trudeau on its Board of Directors from 1962 to 1965) suggested a global scenario for disarmament by 1982, whereby total disarmament would be accomplished by ten consecutive ten per cent annual reductions on all military budgets. Project Ploughshares, another Canadian group which was supported by a number of church groups, introduced *A Time to Disarm*, intended to stimulate discussion in Canada on the Special Session. It advocated "unilateral initiatives by each of the superpowers" to disarm, and the suspension of Canadian nuclear exports.

Some of the ideas put forward were serious and thought-provoking. Others were less so. Almost without exception however they shared two common characteristics: first, they ignored or overlooked the key link between arms control and security; and second, they tended to treat weapons buildups as the cause, and not the effect, of international tension. In the case of the East-West military relationship, for example, no group addressed Soviet intentions as part of the problem.

(b) **The Intellectual Elite**

The number of people within Canada who are concerned with arms control and security is very small. Smaller still is that portion of the intellectual elite -- university pro-
fessors, writers and other knowledgeable opinion leaders —
who address the subject on a regular basis. There is no
university course in Canada which focusses exclusively on
disarmament, and strategic studies is still in its infancy.
Consequently, of all public issues, disarmament is one of the
least informed.

The attitude of the Canadian intellectual elite
towards disarmament in general and the Special Session in
particular might best be seen in this light. The idealism
of the Sixties, the euphoria induced by the early promise of
détente, and the revulsion provoked against "military solu-
tions" brought on by the Vietnam tragedy and later by the
coup in Chile, all contributed to an anti-militarist ethos,
upon which intellectually-fashionable anti-NATO, anti-Bomb
sentiments rested. As the Sixties gave way to the Seventies,
the Vietnam War sputtered to a close, economic difficulties
beset Western countries, and the high expectations about
détente held by many intellectuals faded. A succession of
monetary and energy crises, triggered by the coordinated
activities of an international association of oil-producing
Third World states, OPEC, undermined commonly-held Western
assumptions about the developing countries, and about the
extent of Western responsibility towards them. In Canada,
moreover, intellectuals' energies were directed elsewhere,
towards the great debate over the future of the country.
As a result, gatherings in Canada on the Special Session were generally poorly attended, and many of the groups which advocated its causes were much of larger organizations which had flourished in the past, and then had declined. The public platform, in short, had been abandoned to small "special interest" groups, or to individual Canadians who believed for one reason or other, that they had a special contribution to make to the formation of Canadian disarmament policies.

There were, however, a number of exceptions to this pattern. Chief among these was a Symposium on the Dangers of Nuclear War, which was organized by the Canadian Pugwash Group, under the sponsorship of the Royal Society of Canada. Held on the eve of the Special Session, its guests included G. Arbatov of the Soviet Canada-USA Institute. Lord Zuckerman, the former Chief Scientific Adviser to the British Government, Dr. Frank Barnaby, the Director of SIPRI, and Mr. McGeorge Bundy, the former US Presidential Adviser for National Security. Prominent Canadians included Prime Minister Trudeau, Lt. General E.L.M. Burns and Mr. George Ignatieff.

Universities as well displayed a certain interest in the Special Session, and special seminars or symposia were set up to address the subject. One of the largest and most ambitious was held under the auspices of the Norman Paterson
School of International Affairs in January 1978, to which a cross-section of members of parliament, public servants and academics were invited. The Discussion Paper prepared by the former Director of the Disarmament Division of the UN Secretariat, Mr. William Epstein, focussed responsibility on the superpowers and advocated measures of "psychological disarmament". Those several proposals in the Epstein paper where consensus was reached at the seminar were already accepted Canadian disarmament policies. The results, therefore, were inconclusive.¹⁹

Scholarly research, let alone publications, on the Special Session were few. Given its polemical style, the Discussion Paper could not be put into the category of disciplined intellectual activity. Other scholarly works, such as the rather confused paper Arms Control and Disarmament: A Short Review of a Thirty-Year History and its Impact on Nuclear Proliferation,²⁰ could not be considered as Canadian despite the fact that it was issued by the Carleton School of International Affairs, since it was written by a visiting American professor. That left a scattering of articles in the editorial pages of the national newspapers²¹ and the occasional article in International Perspectives.²² Nothing appeared in either the International Journal or Etudes Internationales. Disarmament and the Special Session, in short, had not seized the collective imagination of the Canadian intellectual elite.
(c) The Press

In the days leading up to the Special Session press coverage was light. Some stories emphasized the paradox presented by the juxtaposition of the Special Session and the NATO Summit, which was scheduled in Washington just after it. Other stories displayed a wariness about the whole enterprise. The Canadian press was preoccupied with more immediate events -- the crash of the Soviet nuclear-powered satellite Cosmos 954 in Canadian territory, Soviet intervention in Africa and the "neutron bomb".

Other articles on the Special Session, however, revealed a certain weariness with the United Nations shared by a great number of Canadians, and a certain realism about the foundations upon which peace rested. Typical was an editorial which appeared in the Ottawa Journal:

The meeting of NATO Heads of Government is more important to maintaining the peace of the world than the Special Session of the United Nations on Disarmament....This is not to write off the UN meeting. Given the UN's record and proclivities to turn its most serious sessions into fruitless propaganda battles, the surprising thing is that so many nations have taken the disarmament meetings so seriously. Mr. Trudeau and everyone else who addresses the UN Special General Assembly knows that decisions taken by the Soviet Union and the United States -- the two crucial countries in arms control and disarmament matters -- are not going to be taken in public and under pressure from Mr. Trudeau or anyone else....The best that the Special Session can hope for is to raise the level of the world's consciousness of both the dangers and the cost of the arms race, and to
give it a push to the many-levelled arms limitation task already underway. The worst is more of the tedious, unproductive propaganda encounters of East against West, North against South, non-nuclear powers against nuclear powers, industrialized against non-industrialized countries....

This perceptive editorial summed up most of the major issues of the Special Session, and put into focus what might be expected of it. The larger proportion of other editorial comment followed suit. What was interesting was that, in contrast to many other issues, the Canadian press and the Canadian Government's view of the Special Session were in fundamental agreement, while activist "peace" groups received a relatively poor hearing in the press, little sympathy in Canadian intellectual establishments, and indifference from the general public.

The interest with which the Canadian public, or sectors of that public, address a given issue is not necessarily consonant with the issue's actual importance. The Canadian Government attached considerable importance to the Special Session, as did a number of prominent Canadian politicians. Part of the reason was based on concern about the credibility of the United Nations. But another part of the reason was based on an appreciation of the intrinsic importance of the issues involved. The Department of External Affairs, Parliament and the Prime Minister all shared this concern, if in different ways.
The Department of External Affairs, through the
Canadian missions in New York and Geneva, as well as through
the Arms Control and Disarmament Division in Ottawa, had
been involved in the issues as part of the pursuit of Can-
ada's overall policy objectives. The Canadian Reply to the
United Nations Secretary General on its views on whether to
hold the Special Session was drafted within the confines of
the Department, after consultations with other interested
departments, such as the Department of National Defence.
It was decided, however, that since the Special Session was
essentially a public forum, to open up the Canadian approach
by encouraging greater public participation.

This was done in three ways. The first was to
appoint a Coordinator for the Special Session, Ambassador
Kenneth Williamson, whose task was to "ensure that close
contact is maintained with interested groups and individuals
by a variety of means: personal contact, participation in
meetings and discussions with consultative panels composed
of individuals and experts in the field". In practice,
this meant that Williamson was put in the potentially-
ambivalent position of acting as a governmental contact-
point but without advocating specific disarmament measures
himself, or without artificially creating a "disarmament
movement" in Canada. Second, as part of Williamson's man-
date, two major "consultative sessions" were held in the
Department of External Affairs to which outside experts in the field were invited. Like the outcome of the Carleton Symposium, arguments for and against linking disarmament and arms control to broader issues of national security prevented the formation of consensus except on those ideas which were already part of established government policy, such as non-proliferation. As the third leg of this approach, a number of the private experts who had attended the consultative sessions, plus a number of interested members of parliament, were invited to participate in the Canadian Delegation to the Special Session. This was in accordance with past Canadian practice in other international gatherings, such as the Law of the Sea Conferences, and was perhaps the most effective means of ensuring a good understanding of Departmental - and Governmental - positions and policies.

Parliamentary interest in the Special Session was displayed, naturally enough, in the Debates, and by the participation of several parliamentarians in the Canadian Delegation. One day of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence was given over to discussing the Special Session with representatives from the Department of External Affairs. The issue of the "neutron bomb" (as opposed to the Special Session per se) was foremost in many parliamentarians' minds. Here it should be noted that the Chairman of the Committee, Mr. Marcel Prud'homme, was a member of the Delegation to the Special Session.
In the Debates, Mr. Jamieson noted the role Canada played in the Special Session,28 and a suggestion was put forward that a subcommittee of the Standing Committee be set up to review Canadian policies towards the Special Session.29 The general feeling of Parliament, however, was summed up by Mr. Douglas Roche, one of the members of parliament most interested in the Special Session:

We find not only a lack of information, a lack of public opinion on the subject throughout our country, but that whatever opinion there is tends to be sceptical of what the United Nations session is capable of achieving. This scepticism is not unfounded when one considers the Soviet arms buildup, for example, or when one considers the presence of Cuban troops in Africa.30

The Prime Minister's interest in the Special Session apparently sprang from his intellectual attachment to disarmament, perhaps harking back to his former executive membership in Dr. Alcock's Peace Research Institute. That his interest was sustained and continuing was evidenced by his attendance at the Toronto Pugwash Conference. Against this was balanced his evident scepticism of the United Nations: his early UN experiences as a backbencher on the Canadian Delegation had not impressed him then, and he had never chosen to address the General Assembly as Prime Minister.

His decision to address the Special Session was probably based on other factors as well. The four-point programme in his "strategy of suffocation" was, he no doubt
believed, a positive contribution to the proceedings. There was, moreover, a relationship between the Special Session and the Washington NATO Summit. Both were concerned with security. At the latter, the Prime Minister was to argue for a greater NATO role in disarmament. In the Prime Minister's view the two gatherings were not contradictory, but complementary.

**Canadian Contribution**

The Canadian Delegation played a leading role in achieving consensus through synthesis. During the eleventh-hour negotiations, for example, and aimed at reaching a mutually-acceptable text on non-proliferation and safeguards, the Canadian Delegation produced wording from the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation meeting in Washington (quoted earlier) which bridged the apparently impassable gap between those who could and those who could not accept references to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and safeguards.

By virtue of the Canadian chairmanship of the Barton Group, as well as other factors, including the North American role that Canada played in the North Atlantic Alliance, Canada's representatives were able to capitalize on this inherently strategic advantage. Indeed, the Western draft Declaration was by-and-large the product of Canadian efforts to find the highest common denominator of agreement amongst like-minded countries. Success in achieving universally-agreed wording on non-proliferation was almost entirely the result of Canadian efforts.
In the Canadian reply to the Secretary General on what the Special Session ought to achieve, the success would be measured by the "extent to which the member states can reach agreement on the contents of...a final document as its principal instrument". What was remarkable about the text of the Final Document was how closely it paralleled the suggestions contained in the Canadian reply. This may have been because the Canadian text was produced with a clear appreciation of the elements of the possible within a United Nations setting. The Canadian ideas presented in the reply were incorporated in the Western draft text, thence by negotiation into the Final Document. Specific suggestions put forward by Canada appearing in the final text included:

(a) a description of the relationship between horizontal and vertical proliferation without making the strengthening of efforts to prevent the former mechanically dependent upon rolling back the latter;

(b) a recognition of the "fundamental importance" of SALT, and an implicit recognition of the inutility of insistence on open negotiations;

(c) a recognition of the fact that the conclusion of a CTB was an important element in strengthening the non-proliferation regime;

(d) a formula for the application of nuclear-weapon-free zones as a useful measure in appropriate areas of the world.
There were however a number of areas where Canadian suggestions were not adopted in their original form, most of them related to the area of conventional armaments and arms control. Among those measures were:

- call for the establishment, under the auspices of the UN Secretary General, of an international register of conventional arms transfers and urge all Member States to submit information concerning such transfers;

- call for more openness among Member States on expenditures for military purposes, recommend compilation and publication, under the auspices of the Secretary General, of military expenditures by Member States and urge all Member States to supply information on their national military expenditures to the Secretary General on an annual basis;

- call for conferences between both recipients and suppliers to restrain arms transfers on a regional basis;

- call for regional arms control conferences to address local conventional arms races and to secure agreed measures of restraint.

Muted success in the realization of these initiatives, however, was compensated for by two major initiatives undertaken by Canada during the sessions of the Preparatory Committee itself, one relating to negative security guarantees
Chapter VII

The Final Document: II

The Programme of Action was the culmination of all the themes of the Special Session. Unlike the Declaration, an abstract document, the sense of immediacy and completeness with which the Programme of Action was permeated added a dimension of difficulty to the negotiations on the final text, given the divergent interests (including national security considerations) of UN Members. As a consequence, the Programme of Action was bound to be a complex and occasionally contradictory document. It did, however, address the entire spectrum of arms control and disarmament issues, roughly according to whether the subject was nuclear or non-nuclear.

The contentious issue of which approach to adopt -- already encountered in negotiations on the Declaration -- either a step-by-step approach to the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament or an approach which would have the Programme of Action a global blueprint leading, according to a fixed timetable, to general and complete disarmament -- was dealt with by a presentational device. The Programme of Action was effectively divided into two parts: Immediate and Short Term Measures to Halt and Reverse the Arms Race (Chapters A to G inclusive), and A Comprehensive Programme for Disarmament (Chapter H). By the measure of the number of chapters alone, the Programme of Action, as it finally emerged, was a document spelling out "specific measures of disarmament which should be implemented over the next few years". The construction of a Comprehensive Programme was turned over to the Committee on
superpowers, subject to adequate safeguards;
(c) as a second stage, extending the "cut-off"
to include, through negotiations, all
states and all explosive materials, regardless of purpose;
(d) budgetary restrictions on the development
and deployment of new strategic weapons
systems.

* * * * * * *

Canada's place in the disarmament scheme of things
was therefore clear. Her membership in NATO, and her role
within the Western caucus indicated that in Canadian thinking
security interests and disarmament were inextricably linked,
and that "declarations of intent" alone were inadequate.
Besides her role in the MBFR talks and in the CCD, Canada's
interest in arms control extended to preventive (as opposed
to reductive) measures mainly in the field of non-proliferation,
where Canada, through her own expertise and resources,
exerted special leverage. This leverage was exercised in
the councils of the IAEA, but also in the London Club and
in the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE)
conference then underway in Washington. The question of
non-proliferation was one of the central issues which placed
Canada so clearly on the northern side of the North-South
debate. At the Special Session, all these factors contributed
to the formulation of the Canadian approach.
The Canadian approach, then, went through a logical progression of stages. The first, the Canadian Reply to the Secretary General, outlined the Government's aims and purposes at the Special Session. The second stage encompassed Canadian consultations within the Western caucus and in NATO, and the production of the joint Western draft documents on the Declaration, Programme of Action, and Machinery. The third stage was marked by the Prime Minister's speech at the Special Session, and the tabling of the four-point "strategy of suffocation", which was annexed to the final document as it eventually emerged. Other national contributions were also annexed, on the understanding that they were to be taken up at the next regular session of the General Assembly. The Canadian approach was characterized by pragmatism and realism, the actual degree of which can be measured by a comparison of what the Canadian Reply suggested as a possible outline for the final document, and the final document itself. The similarities are remarkable.
FOOTNOTES

1 Here it should be noted that the Canadian role as "caucus chairman" was not carried into the formal structure of the Special Session itself. Norway and Australia, as the two Western vice-presidents of the Preparatory Committee, fulfilled this role. Canadian activities as coordinator and, to a lesser extent, as orchestrator, took place offstage.

2 With technological advances, particularly in surveillance satellites, the Canadian strategic time/space buffer is less important than it once was.


4 For a summary review of present UN disarmament bodies, see *Existing Structures and Machinery for Disarmament Negotiations*, Background Paper prepared by the UN Secretariat, Document A/C.187/31 of 5 May 1977.


12 Resolution 2627(XXV) of 24 October 1970.

13 Quoted from a letter to Mr. & Mrs. B. Schmitz, Saskatoon, from Allan N. Lever, Executive Assistant to the Secretary of State for External Affairs.
14 *Statements and Speeches*, No. 77/17; published by Information Services Division of the Department of External Affairs, p. 2.


16 "Positions and Proposals carrying the consensus of the National Policy Council to be submitted for the consideration of the Canadian Delegation to the United Nations Special Session on Disarmament" of 18 February 1978.

17 *Venus Has No Arms*, brief prepared by the Niagara Peace Movement for presentation to the UN General Assembly Tenth Special Session on Disarmament.


20 Milton Leitenberg, Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University, Ottawa, April 1978.

21 "Step to World Security"; address to the Fall Convocation of Trent University, The Globe and Mail, Wednesday, 2 November 1977. Polanyi argued for an International Atomic Weapons Authority to provide objective reports on the deployment of nuclear weapons.


23 for example, "FET and NATO", the Toronto Sun, 30 June 1978 and "L'OTAN vent se renforcer; L'ONU parle de désarmement" by Jean Pelletier in *La Presse*, 27 May 1978.

24 External Affairs analysis of Canadian press coverage of the Special Session is given in the annex.


28 *Hansard*, Friday, 30 June 1978, p. 6911.
29 Hansard, 20 December 1977, p.2070. The suggestion was that of M. Louis Duclos (Montmorency).


31 External Affairs Communiqué: "Notes for an address by the Rt.Hon. Pierre Elliot Trudeau before the Tenth Special Session of the UN General Assembly, Friday, 26 May 1978.

Chapter VI
The Final Document: I

Of the four major sections of the final document -- Introduction, Declaration, Programme of Action and Machinery -- the section entitled "Declaration" and the document's prefixes -- the Preamble and Introduction -- caused the least difficulty in achieving consensus. Unlike the Programme of Action and Machinery, the Declaration and Introduction were not intended to be binding commitments on the part of states to particular courses of action. On the contrary, they represented the broad philosophical (and moral) foundation upon which the Programme of Action was to rest. The Declaration, like other United Nations declarations (such as the Universal Declaration on Human Rights), was intended to be a statement of general principles and, as such, did not possess legal authority or sanction. By their nature, these documents allowed for a certain degree of flexibility in interpretation which was not found in the much more specific sections of the Programme of Action and Machinery. The absence of specifics and legally-binding commitments together were instrumental in enabling the negotiating process to move forward relatively smoothly.

Preamble

The Preamble set the tone for the final document, and allowed for the final document to be adopted as a resolution. The three preambular paragraphs listed, in descending order of priority, the concerns of the United Nations in the field
of arms control and disarmament, beginning with the survival of humanity (the ends) and with a reference to an increased role for the United Nations in these efforts (the means). Like the Declaration itself, the text of the preamble was heavily influenced by Non-Aligned philosophies. This accounted for the prominence of themes relating to the New International Economic Order, the relationship between disarmament and development and General and Complete Disarmament (GCD).

While the Western and Eastern groupings generally accepted these themes there were, however, differences in interpretation. Both, for example, regarded GCD as the ultimate goal of the disarmament process, whereas during negotiations the Non-Aligned grouping tended to insist that GCD was the process itself, the ultimate goal being the transformation of world economic relationships in favour of the Third World.

These fundamental differences in approach were to colour the deliberations until the conclusion of the United Nations Special Session on Disarmament, and were responsible for the acrimony of the debate on the final document's more substantive parts.

The Eastern and Western protagonists adopted a flexible approach toward Non-Aligned positions on the declaratory parts of the final document, given the latter's sensitivity on questions related to Third World ideology. This flexibility, however, was part of a negotiable quid pro quo in the Programme of Action, where the Non-Aligned would be expected to make some concessions of their own. In the event, wording on most
sections of the Preamble was agreed by the end of the fifth session of the Preparatory Committee, and was subsequently adopted with little debate during the Special Session itself.²

B. Introduction

The construction of the ten-paragraph Introduction did not figure in the work schedule of the Preparatory Committee; its existence owed much to the fact that many Non-Aligned countries were dissatisfied with what they believed was the absence of many useful ideas from the Review and Appraisal sections of the Declaration as it had appeared in draft form at the end of the fifth session of the Preparatory Committee.³ The compromise between those who wished a relatively crisply-worded Declaration (East and West) and one containing more literary embellishments (the Non-Aligned) was the inclusion of an introduction which, while part of the final document, was not part of the Declaration itself. In this manner it was possible to include concepts or ideas important to some of the more dogmatically-inclined Non-Aligned delegations which would have caused difficulties, or would have been simply unacceptable to other delegations if they were included in the Declaration. The assertion, for instance, that

...the question of general and complete disarmament is of utmost importance and that peace, security and economic and social development are indivisible and Members of the UN have therefore recognized that the corresponding obligations and responsibilities are universal....(paragraph 5)

rests on a series of undemonstrable propositions, including
the indivisibility of peace and security, \(^4\) and economic and social development.

The Introduction, therefore, served the functional purpose of compromise, and while distasteful to some on aesthetic or intellectual grounds, did no damage to national policies and positions. It was included for the sake of achieving concessions on other more substantive points at issue. The final version emerged on June 14\(^5\) in a sub-drafting group chaired by the Mexican Ambassador, Mr. García Robles, who had been one of the most active Non-Aligned representatives at the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference.

Several uncompromising versions of the Introduction had been floated earlier by some of the more radical Non-Aligned, but the contentious language was unacceptable to their more moderate Non-Aligned colleagues. The text, as it finally appeared was modelled in large part on an attempt by Ambassador Ortiz de Rozas, the chairman of the Preparatory Committee, to break the threatened impasse within the Non-Aligned group itself over how far the Non-Aligned draft text should go.\(^6\)

The Introduction served one other purpose. It defined the goals of each section of the final document, and therefore acted as a preface. According to the Introduction, the aim of the Declaration was to review and assess the existing situation, outline the objectives and priority tasks and set forth fundamental principles for disarmament negotiations (paragraph 8). The Programme of Action which had as its goal "the final
objective" of general and complete disarmament under effective international control was aimed at "agreement on specific disarmament measures selected by common accord as those on which there is a consensus to the effect that their subsequent realization in the short term appears to be feasible". The longer term goal, GCND, would be achieved by "a comprehensive disarmament programme" which would be prepared "through agreed procedures" (paragraph 9). The establishment of deliberative and negotiating organs and reaching agreement on appropriate organization and procedures "was the purpose of the fourth, and last, section of Machinery" (paragraph 10).

Declaration

The Declaration was divided into three parts:

(a) Review and Appraisal (paragraphs 11-18)
(b) Goals and Priorities (paragraphs 19-24)
(c) Principles (paragraphs 25-42)

The process of negotiations on the Programme of Action was in large measure determined by the speed of progress in reaching agreed principles then under negotiation for the Declaration. Consequently, the line between the two documents was not always clear. Indeed, in some instances there was considerable controversy on where a particular arms control measure should be placed. Assigning it to "Principles" in the Declaration, for example, would lend it more weight and authority but did nothing concrete to bring it about unless it was also
inserted in the Programme of Action. As a result, many of the "principles" retained a certain action-oriented quality (for instance, paragraph 32, which calls upon the nuclear-weapon states to issue non-use assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon states). The imprecise dividing line between the Declaration and the Programme of Action was a deliberate result of efforts to assign proposals and measures to various sections of the document in such a way as to achieve the broadest measure of support.

Review and Appraisal

The fifteen-paragraph Review and Appraisal section of the Declaration was intended to provide a general assessment of the origins, costs and possible consequences of the present situation. Except for a few contentious items (see below) preliminary general agreement was reached at referendum to capitals on the larger part of this chapter before the opening of the UNSSOD. A complicating factor, however, was that the section had to reflect, either directly or indirectly, an exceedingly broad range of national positions; in more specific terms, the contents of the "Review and Appraisal" had to be compatible with (or, at least, not repugnant to) national speeches -- even the most radical or unhelpful -- about to be delivered in the General Debate.

The differing positions on the origin of the worldwide build up of arms is illustrative. Fully reflecting on
their own preoccupations, the Non-Aligned explanation for this situation was that "...the arms race...is both the cause and result of Great Power rivalry [which] impedes the realization of the objectives of the UN Charter, especially those relating to the respect for sovereignty, the refraining from the threat or use of force against territorial integrity or political independence of any State...." The Eastern countries laid the blame elsewhere: "...the actions of the enemies of détente and disarmament and the interests of the military industrial complex are pushing mankind into a new and ever more dangerous and destructive spiral of the arms race." 8

The Western group considered the apportioning of blame to be a sterile exercise and whatever the result, unlikely to command universal agreement. Instead, Western countries proposed that the Review and Appraisal chapters be fused with the introductory paragraphs and presented as preambular to the Declaration:

2. Considering the devastation of mankind by wars and the urgent need to make every effort to remove the scourge of war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples...

4. Bearing in mind the complexity and importance of the problem of disarmament which affect the vital security interests and territorial integrity of all states;... 11

Western countries, however, were reconciled to the fact that some form of blame-laying in the final document was unavoidable, given the importance the Non-Aligned attached to
this function. Western countries also had reservations about the degree to which Non-Aligned wording actually reflected reality. The Western group reconciled itself to living with a watered-down, Non-Aligned explanation of the origin of the arms race, provided agreement on the final document on the whole was achieved. Like the Western countries, the Soviet Union and its allies gave greater weight to the Programme of Action but accepted the concept of Great Power rivalry in the final document.

There was, however, one area where Western (and Eastern) flexibility did not apply. The original Non-Aligned wording carried an implied threat that failure to achieve measures of vertical proliferation ("failure" being defined by the Non-Aligned themselves) would result in further horizontal proliferation:

"...failure to halt and reverse the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race, to reassure the non-nuclear-weapon states about their security, and to ensure universality and non-discrimination in the régime of non-proliferation, increases the danger of the spread of nuclear weapons...."\(^{10}\)

In the end, the Non-Aligned agreed to withdraw this passage in return for Western agreement to include a reference to the danger to peace of "racist régimes" introduced by the Ghanaian Delegation.\(^{11}\)

Goals and Priorities

The six paragraphs, outlining goals and priorities, were intended to place in perspective and to assign relative
weights of importance to the range of arms control and disarmament issues addressed in the final document. It was intended that the way in which this was done would affect the structure of the Programme of Action. At the outset, a good deal of discussion within the Preparatory Committee centered on the issue of "prioritization", much of it fruitless. At the root of the difficulty lay the fact that the word "priority" had two different meanings. The first related to chronological order, or the sequence in which certain actions should be taken; and the second to the relative importance of a given measure.

Textual negotiations centred on four key issues:

(1) Whether nuclear and conventional disarmament measures should be undertaken consecutively or concurrently;

(2) Whether GCD should be a long-term or a short-term goal, and whether it should be achieved through a comprehensive Programme of Action or step-by-step (i.e. an incremental approach, with the Programme of Action outlining practical and realizable steps towards this goal to be taken in the foreseeable future);

(3) Whether the pursuit of economic development in Third World countries should take precedence over international efforts to strengthen the non-proliferation régime;
(4) Whether a Soviet suggestion for a Treaty on the Non-Use of Force was in fact a disarmament measure and, if so, whether it should be assigned a high priority.

The negotiation of this section was marked by Non-Aligned efforts to give preponderant emphasis to nuclear disarmament. These efforts were at variance with Western and Eastern attempts to reflect a greater balance between nuclear and conventional disarmament measures. Many Non-Aligned representatives held that nuclear disarmament should come before conventional disarmament measures were undertaken and according to a fixed schedule culminating in general and complete disarmament. Indeed, it was argued that the General Assembly had already accepted this position when it adopted its Declaration on the Occasion of the 25th Anniversary of the United Nations. It read, in part:

"...we look forward to the early conclusion of future agreements of this kind (i.e. SALT I) and to moving forward from arms limitation to a reduction of armaments and to disarmament everywhere, particularly in the nuclear field, with the participation of all the nuclear powers. We call upon all Governments to renew their determination to make concrete progress towards the elimination of the arms race and the achievement of the final goal -- GCD under effective international control."

Eastern and Western countries, however, interpreted this resolution differently, and insisted that GCD as a process should not be confused with GCD the goal, arguing that nuclear disarm-
ament and conventional disarmament efforts should proceed together. As a result of Non-Aligned pressure, the disproportionate emphasis on nuclear disarmament was to persist into the final document. But suitable wording was found which recognized the responsibility of all states (and not only the nuclear weapons states) in the disarmament process, the price extracted by the Non-Aligned negotiators being a long proviso about legitimate security interests.

These negotiations on disarmament measures should be conducted with particular emphasis on armed forces and conventional weapons of nuclear weapons states and other militarily significant countries. There should also be negotiations on the limitation of international transfer of conventional weapons based, in particular, on the same principle, and taking into account the inalienable right of self-determination and independence of peoples under colonial and foreign domination and the obligations of States to respect that right, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States (paragraph 22).

The dispute over whether the Programme of Action should be a blueprint for GCD according to a fixed timetable or should be treated as a practical programme capable of realization "over the next few years" was finally resolved in favour of the latter approach, but not without considerable opposition from the Non-Aligned who took the position that without the moral pressure of the United Nations Organization and without the imposition by the United Nations of set timetables, little progress would be accomplished.
The confused debate over whether economic development should take precedence over non-proliferation concerns was complicated by a number of factors. First among them was that there is no relationship between the international régime of non-proliferation and economic development, once safeguards commitments are accepted. The reasons upon which this fact of life rests are largely technical and were not understood by many of the negotiators from the developing countries. An equally significant factor was that in some cases the technical aspects of producing weapons-grade material were understood perfectly well. Some Non-Aligned, particularly among those who had not signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty, employed the formula "unrestricted access to nuclear technology" as a method of preserving their own nuclear weapons option. The question of non-proliferation versus economic development was not resolved in the Declaration and was left for the Programme of Action.

The Soviet suggestion for a treaty on the non-use of force bore some resemblance to "the Gromyko proposal" put forward in September 1971. It was relatively easily dealt with, and the Soviet Delegation accepted the argument that since the concordance was prepared by the Secretariat, where it appeared in the final document was flexible. It was agreed that the suggestion for the treaty might properly be discussed in the Programme of Action.
Principles

In their submission, Western countries suggested that there be two chapters, one on Major Principles Governing Relations Among States, and the other on Principles Governing Disarmament Negotiations. The former contained two paragraphs, one reaffirming the principles of the UN Charter, particularly those contained in Article XI. Western countries held that the Charter was the supreme arbiter of relations among states, and that it was gratuitous to repeat Charter language in the final document. The other chapter reaffirmed the commitment of all states to undertake confidence building measures (CBMs). This latter concept was taken from the Helsinki Final Act. The chapter on principles governing disarmament negotiations was more specific (see below) but as a result of Non-Aligned insistence, the section on Principles emerged as a declaration of relations among states, which paralleled to some extent concepts found in the Helsinki Final Act and repeated those found in the United Nations Charter.

Given the close relationship of these two documents to the section on "Principles" in the Declaration, it was possible to reach agreement fairly readily. In addition, it was also possible to highlight a number of general principles relating to disarmament negotiations. Amongst the most significant were:

(a) the universality of responsibility for disarm-
ament measures according to each state's field of competence and concomitant universality of the ability of individual states to contribute to multilateral negotiations directly affecting each state's national security;

(b) undiminished security for all partners in disarmament negotiations but at lower force levels and costs;

(c) verification as an integral part of the disarmament and arms control process.

The labyrinthine aspects of disarmament negotiations can be illustrated by these three principles. The first principle -- that of universality -- is in effect a rephrasing of the Non-Aligned concern about "democratising" the negotiating process. The precise wording of this principle, as it emerged in the final document had two separate sources, the Preamble of the Helsinki Final Act, where the responsibility of all states in the region of negotiation was recognized, and the Political Declaration of the Fifth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, Colombo, of 1976.18

The principle of undiminished security at lower force levels and cost originated from the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) Talks and reflect East-West agreement, being a concept related to measures aimed at the reduction of conventional weapons and forces. This subject did not enjoy high
Non-Aligned priority. Indeed the original concept belonged to NATO. 19

The principle of verification as an integral component of the arms control and disarmament process, while accepted in general terms by all, symbolized the single major stumbling block in the way of a great number of disarmament proposals. The fact that it had been recognized as a major disarmament principle at all represented a victory. So important was the practical aspect of verification that it warranted a separate chapter in the Programme of Action.

Among other principles that were discussed were the perennial themes already found in the Preamble and Introduction, of disarmament and development, non-proliferation, and the role of the UN in the disarmament negotiating process. These are discussed under separate headings. One particular Non-Aligned initiative cause a special problem. Following the speech of the Indian Prime Minister, Mr. Desai, on June 9, the Indian Delegation introduced a resolution which, if it were adopted as a principle, would have had the General Assembly declare that:

(a) the use of nuclear weapons will be a violation of the Charter of the United Nations and a crime against humanity;

(b) the use of nuclear weapons should, therefore, be prohibited pending nuclear disarmament. 20
This wording had already found its way into the draft Declaration (even if it were bracketed) and India and a group of like-minded Non-Aligned states showed no inclination to withdraw it.

The Indian proposal caused several difficulties for NATO countries who depended upon the possession and deployment of nuclear weapons as an integral part of the deterrent strategy of flexible response. It was accordingly unacceptable to condemn the very thing upon which their security rested. The Eastern European countries too would have been put in the invidious position of being required to condemn their own military policies. The Indian draft resolution, furthermore, had little to do with disarmament, but had much to do with what Western countries sought to avoid: condemnatory statements of little practical consequence.

The concern that the matter be put to a vote was real, for it most certainly would have passed given the preponderant majority of Non-Aligned countries who were prepared to support it. Since all nuclear weapons states would have voted against it, the resolution would have been worthless, and perhaps even more destructive to efforts to achieve consensus in areas where the possibility of agreement on practical measures was in sight.

In the end, the Indians withdrew the draft resolution for the sake of consensus and after intensive bargaining, which included an agreement that the item be placed on the agenda of UNGA XXXIII.
FOOTNOTES


2. Here it might be noted that the greater majority of speeches given in the General Debate were effectively national interpretations of the Preamble and Introduction, ranging from the realistic (e.g. the FRG, document A/S-10/PV.5) to the wildly radical (e.g. Kampuchea, document A/S-10/PV.24).

3. Conference Room Document No.20

4. The concept of the "indivisibility" of peace had, however, already been adopted as accepted usage by the UN through a series of resolutions (e.g. resolutions on indivisibility of peace in the Middle East 3413(XXX) and 31/61).


7. UN Document A/AC.187/55/Add.1

8. UN Document A/AC.187/81

9. UN Document A/AC.187/87

10. Conference Room Document No.20

11. Western objections were four-fold: (a) South African policies of apartheid were a red-herring as far as world disarmament was concerned; (b) Non-Aligned condematory language could complicate Western efforts, then in progress, to reach agreement with South Africa on Namibian independence; (c) the unsavoury history of Resolution 3379(XXX) equating racism and zionism; and (d) the lack of any empirical evidence that racist régimes (obnoxious as they might be) were inherently more aggressive than any other régime.


13. See, for example, the Danish view of nuclear vs conventional disarmament in Report of the Preparatory Committee to the UNSBOD, Vol.VII, p.64, paragraph 70.
14. An understanding of the relationship (or lack of it) between non-proliferation and economic development requires a knowledge of the operation of the nuclear fuel cycle, the various processes involved, and their relationship to the production of weapons-grade fissionable material. See On Things Nuclear: The Canadian Debate, Peter G. Meuiller, CIIA, Toronto, 1977.

15. First introduced by Foreign Minister Gromyko at UNGA XXXII as the annex to A/32/242 of 7 December 1977 as "Deepening and Consolidation of International Détente and Prevention of the Danger of Nuclear War".

16. UN Document A/AC.187/87


18. Fundamental texts of the Colombo Conference Political Declaration, Colombo, 1976. Combining the two wordings was important, for the Colombo document implied that responsibility for the conduct of disarmament negotiations and the implementation of arms control agreements rested first (in the temporal sense) with the nuclear weapon states. Until that time, non-nuclear weapon states, while they had a right to participate, in effect, as overseers in arms negotiations, held no responsibility for their implementation, particularly if any such measures affected themselves. The Helsinki Final Act point to the right and responsibility of all states in the arms control and disarmament process.

19. First appearing in the Declaration adopted by the Foreign Ministers and Representatives of countries participating in the NATO Defence Programme (the official NATO invitation to the MBFR Deliberations, "Reykjavik Signal" 25 June 1968).

Chapter VII

The Final Document: II

The Programme of Action was the culmination of all the themes of the Special Session. Unlike the Declaration, an abstract document, the sense of immediacy and completeness with which the Programme of Action was permeated added a dimension of difficulty to the negotiations on the final text, given the divergent interests (including national security considerations) of UN Members. As a consequence, the Programme of Action was bound to be a complex and occasionally contradictory document. It did, however, address the entire spectrum of arms control and disarmament issues, roughly according to whether the subject was nuclear or non-nuclear.

The contentious issue of which approach to adopt—already encountered in negotiations on the Declaration—either a step-by-step approach to the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament or an approach which would have the Programme of Action a global blueprint leading, according to a fixed timetable, to general and complete disarmament—was dealt with by a presentational device. The Programme of Action was effectively divided into two parts: Immediate and Short Term Measures to Halt and Reverse the Arms Race (Chapters A to G inclusive), and A Comprehensive Programme for Disarmament (Chapter H). By the measure of the number of chapters alone, the Programme of Action, as it finally emerged, was a document spelling out "specific measures of disarmament which should be implemented over the next few years". The construction of a Comprehensive Programme was turned over to the Committee on
Disarmament which, by the decision of the Special Session, replaced the CCD:

Negotiations on general and complete disarmament shall be conducted concurrently with negotiations on partial measures on disarmament. . . . the Committee on Disarmament will undertake the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament. . . . in order to ensure that the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control becomes related. . . . (Programme of Action, Chapter H).

Nuclear Disarmament

International debate in open fora on nuclear disarmament has tended to generate more heat than light, the aspirations and concerns of many countries being often thwarted by the private nuclear dialogue of the superpowers. Indeed, the distinction between debate and negotiation was not always fully appreciated by many who felt that the nuclear powers were playing atomic dice with world security. The results of this frustration have frequently come through contentious UN resolutions passed by divisive vote, ranging the nuclear weapon states and their allies on one side and non-aligned countries on the other. The negotiating-cum-drafting process on nuclear disarmament at the Special Session was no exception. In several respects the debate at the Special Session was a continuation of the debate begun at the NPT Review Conference in 1975.

The debate had three major interlocking themes, centering on: (1) nuclear arms control and nuclear disarmament of the nuclear weapon states; (2) the relationship between horizontal and vertical proliferation, especially the relevance
of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the respective obligations, of the contracting (and non-contracting) parties; and (3) the relationship between peaceful and military nuclear technology (i.e. the nuclear aspect of the disarmament and development debate).

In the final document, these themes were interwoven with recommendations for specific disarmament measures, beginning with the SALT and ending with nuclear safeguards (non-proliferation).

From another perspective, the nuclear section of the final document could be divided into verifiable, that is, enforceable, provisions (as a general rule, either sponsored or supported by Western countries) and provisions involving intrinsically non-verifiable, un-enforceable declarations of intent. In the latter category were included non-use and non-first-use provisions and proposals for nuclear-weapon-free zones.

**Enforceable Measures**

The first priority assigned by the Programme of Action in disarmament negotiations was to nuclear weapons, the goal being "a comprehensive, phased programme within an agreed time frame whenever feasible for the progress and balanced reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery leading to their ultimate and complete elimination at the earliest possible date". Specifically, the Special Session was able to reach agreement on cut-off provisions, a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, a Moratorium on
Nuclear Testing, and on the SALT.

Cut-Off or Freeze Provisions

In their draft Programme of Action, Eastern European countries called for the cessation of the production of nuclear weapons and a stop to the further development of nuclear weapons technology. The weakness of this proposal lay in that it contained no provision for verification and was therefore un-enforceable; the Non-Aligned countries, however, thinking along the same lines, proposed a freeze on the quantitative and qualitative aspects of nuclear weapons development and the cessation of the production of nuclear weapons and fissionable material for weapons purposes. Unlike their Soviet counterparts, the representatives of the Non-Aligned countries appeared to underestimate the importance -- and difficulty -- of achieving agreed verification measures, particularly in respect to the qualitative dimensions of nuclear weapons development. The Western proposals suggested that there be negotiations with the objective of reducing and eventually eliminating nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. The Non-Aligned countries in particular found this wording unacceptable because it represented "no step forward from commitments already undertaken in the Non-Proliferation Treaty". The final text fused Non-Aligned proposals with Western concepts, linking the qualitative cut-off proposals with an expression of urgency that negotiations proceed, and the need for adequate verification measures.
The intractability of this subject and the difficulty of persuading nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states alike to take mutually agreed practical steps toward nuclear containment (the undertaking contained in the Non-Proliferation Treaty aside) is illustrated by the Canadian suggestion that there be negotiations on a treaty prohibiting the use of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other explosive purposes. The Canadian suggestion envisaged that parties to the agreement would conclude IAEA-administered full-scope safeguards agreements similar to requirements set down by the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The proposal held the advantage that it avoided the discriminatory aspects of the NPT, the cardinal point upon which many of the Non-Aligned non-signatories rested their criticism of the non-proliferation system. The suggestion, however, was not adopted primarily because the Non-Aligned countries objected to the proposal's blanket nature (it encompassed all fissile materials and therefore would have eliminated any prospect of producing fissionable materials for ostensibly peaceful nuclear explosions) and because the Soviet Bloc countries were unwilling to contemplate any international verification system on their nuclear fuel facilities.

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

The projected comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty (CTB) was in effect a type of "freeze" provision, aimed at preventing further qualitative improvements to nuclear weapons. It also held other advantages: the conclusion of a CTB would
that the nuclear weapon states were living up to their obligations under the Treaty. 4

One of the major dissatisfactions with the Treaty, was the asymmetrical nature of obligations under it. With this primary objection to the NPT lessened, others might be encouraged to adhere to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. By this chain reaction effect, therefore, the conclusion of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty could represent a significant step forward in the prevention of further horizontal proliferation.

It was understood at the Special Session that the working out of appropriate language on the CTB chapter of the final document was the prerogative of the participants at the trilateral talks on the subject in Geneva -- the USA, the USSR and the UK. Drafting the final text appeared relatively simple since a number of significant obstacles on matters of substance had recently been removed, particularly those relating to peaceful nuclear explosions and verification measures. At UNGA XXXI the USSR tabled a draft CTB treaty which made provision for on-site inspection 5 and had later made two additional fundamental concessions: (a) all nuclear weapon states need not participate in a CTB for it to come into force; and (b) peaceful nuclear explosions would be included in the ban. 6

Opposition to the wording came from a number of different quarters. In line with well-established policies, the French and Chinese, for different reasons, were against the
supported by Australia, was dissatisfied with what it considered to be feeble language in the draft. The New Zealand Delegation accordingly attempted to strengthen it:

The broadest possible application of the comprehensive test ban treaty should be ensured through its early signature and ratification by as many states as possible.

Many countries, including a good number of Western countries, harboured doubts whether even this wording, mild as it appeared in making a case for universal adherence to a CTB, would allow the French and Chinese not to actively object. From a practical point of view, of course, a CTB treaty to which the three major nuclear weapon states adhered would be a significant achievement even if it did not include French and Chinese adherence. The New Zealand Delegation was persuaded to withdraw its wording, and the French and Chinese allowed the item to be adopted by consensus.

In order to maintain their own national positions, however, the French and Chinese at the closing of the Special Session "disassociated" themselves from this article but consensus was preserved:

La France considère comme errore de poursuivre l'arrêt des expériences puisse favoris un gel qualitatif des armements nucléaires...l'arrêt des expériences n'apporte donc, à lui seul, aucune contribution déterminante à la prévention de nouveaux types d'armes ou à la non-prolifération.7

The final source of opposition was the strong opinion held by Non-Aligned countries and indeed other countries such as New Zealand and Australia, against nuclear weapons testing. Many
Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zones (NWFZ)

Early versions of the nuclear-weapon-free zone were the Rapacki and Gomulka plans, both of which envisaged a withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Central Europe. The Treaty of Tlatelolco aimed at establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America.

Many Non-Aligned countries expressed an interest in the idea but carried differing views on its precise meaning into the Special Session. The lack of agreement among themselves consequently worked against the construction of stronger wording in the Final Document. The broad Non-Aligned definition, however, contained two fundamental parts: prohibition of the introduction or stationing of nuclear weapons within the zone; and prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against states in such zones.

Eastern European countries, although they were slow in adhering to Additional Protocol II to the Treaty of Tlatelolco (providing for undertakings on non-use of nuclear weapons against members of the Latin American nuclear-weapon-free zone) indicated general agreement with the concept of NWFZ but linked it to a call for the withdrawal of foreign military bases, as did some Non-Aligned countries.

Western countries believed in general that the zonal concept of disarmament, as expressed for example through the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones in appropriate areas of the world, should be encouraged.
some nuclear weapon states expressed different views. The "different views" were based on objections already noted: that the proposal for a moratorium applied to nuclear weapon states only and did not take into account peaceful nuclear explosions. In addition, while it may have had some beneficial effect on restraining vertical proliferation, its influence in restraining further horizontal proliferation could by no means be taken for granted, since any country deciding to explode a nuclear device need, according to the terms of the proposal merely designate it as "peaceful."

The common Western view, moreover, was that since President Brezhnev had announced on November 2, 1977 the preparedness of the Soviet Union to include peaceful nuclear explosions in the area of discussion for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, wording in the final document which did not specifically refer to a ban on all nuclear explosive tests could only be considered as a step in the wrong direction.

SALT

The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks occupy a unique place in the history of international negotiations, and represent by far the most important arms control operation in existence. The talks raise the most complex problems, both in the political and technical senses. The SALT talks are "motivated by the realization that common survival in the modern world depends on stabilizing the strategic relationship between the two superpowers at lower levels of force, and by an awareness that a balance will not be found in the continuation of a
nuclear arms race that increasingly absorbs valuable productive resources. 13

Because the process of SALT was of necessity bilateral, they were often a cause for frustration on the part of those who felt "left out" of the talks and who deplored what they regarded as an inexcusably slow rate of progress. As a consequence, the UNGA annually debated resolutions submitted by the Non-Aligned appealing to the two governments to bear in mind the necessity and urgency of reaching an agreement, and inviting the two governments to keep the UNGA informed, in good time, of the results of their negotiations. 14 The nuclear weapon states argued that bilateral negotiations were not within the purview of the General Assembly, and should therefore proceed along the lines set by the parties concerned.

Besides the fear that the process of negotiating on an appropriate SALT text for the final document would degenerate into yet another UNGA debate, there was also the concern that the Non-Aligned, many of whom felt that the most effective contribution they could make to progress in SALT was to apply as much pressure as possible on the two negotiating powers, were planning to insist that certain deadlines and targets related to SALT be imposed by the UNGA. There was also the possibility that a resolution could be attempted which linked limitations or reductions in strategic arms to the number of countries which had ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty, as had been attempted by the Non-Aligned countries at the NPT Review Conference. 15
Indeed Mexico and Pakistan did submit draft resolutions which called for "10 to 40 per cent" of reductions in the nuclear weapons stockpiles which would be coupled to a five-year moratorium on any qualitative improvements in strategic nuclear weapons systems.

The common interest of the SALT negotiating parties and their allies was instrumental in the production of an East-West text alternative to the one put forward by the Non-Aligned. The alternative text contained an improvement over both the earlier Eastern and Western wordings on SALT:

It (SALT II) should be followed promptly by further strategic arms limitations negotiations between the two parties, leading to agreed significant reductions of and qualitative limitations on, strategic arms.

This passage introduced into the deliberations a valuable concept -- that of the SALT as being a process leading to "the ultimate establishment of a world free of such weapons". Before, the SALT had usually been discussed in terms of arms limitations, as opposed to arms reductions. As such, the joint East-West text was sufficiently attractive to the Non-Aligned for them to be persuaded to accede to it, and consensus was again maintained.

Non-Enforceable Measures

Generally speaking Western countries regarded verification and enforcement as touchstones to any effective arms control measure. Another approach and one more amenable to agreement (since it did not require grappling with specifics) related to declarations of intent, favoured by many Non-
Aligned and typified by the many Soviet Bloc initiatives. Western countries were concerned that declarations of intent confused illusion with reality, and did not represent concrete progress at all, since they were based, perforce, on faith. A "non-first-use" pledge, for example, needed to be broken only once for the pledge to be rendered useless. Yet, inasmuch as declarations of intent could reassure the non-nuclear-weapon states in their own security against nuclear attack, the broad concept of declarations of intent was accepted by Western countries as a useful adjunct to efforts to contain further horizontal proliferation. The Programme of Action dealt with a variety of declarations of intent; most pertaining to non-use and non-first-use. Proposals for nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones of peace, while not classed as declarations of intent, nevertheless required an act of faith -- and trust -- for their existence since they could be neither verified nor enforced. Non-use and non-first-use provisions ("negative security assurances") attracted the greatest amount of attention, given the coincidence of Soviet and Non-Aligned views on the subject; nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones of peace proposals received less attention because the Non-Aligned could not agree amongst themselves on any detailed meaning of these terms.

**Non-Use and Non-First Use**

Prohibitions embodied in formulae for non-use and non-first-use of nuclear weapons appear at first glance to flow from the same concept; but they are in fact substantially different. The first is generally related to the non-use of force
provisions of the UN Charter, and the second to the "negative security assurances". The former is a much more diffuse concept than the latter.

Non-Use

The prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons was explicitly associated with the renunciation of the use of or threat of use of force, as set down in the UN Charter, first appears in 1972, when the Soviet Foreign Minister submitted a draft resolution on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. At UNGA XXXII, the Russians were still persisting: the operative paragraph of their draft resolution read:

All states should observe the principle of the non-use of force or the threat of force in international relations involving both nuclear and conventional weapons and enter into negotiations covering the conclusion of a treaty to that effect.

The idea attracted considerable support, enough that by the time the Non-Aligned submitted their own draft Programme of Action, a version of a non-use formula appeared in it. The bracketed negotiating text also showed the relationship between non-use and negative security guarantees:

Nuclear weapon states should renounce [In a legally binding form] the use [or threat of use] of nuclear weapons [against states which have no nuclear weapons on their territories] [against States not parties to the nuclear security arrangements of some nuclear powers].

Besides the general objections noted above, Western representatives disliked the non-use formulations because in effect they added nothing to the Charter provisions concerning non-use of force. In addition, Western representatives were aware of the
Soviet objectives to put the West at a propaganda disadvantage by condemning in effect the rationale behind NATO strategic thinking which did not rule out, in certain circumstances, the use of nuclear weapons.

Unlike many other parts of the final document, the paragraph which finally emerged bore visible scars of the battles over its wording:

"...all states and in particular nuclear weapon states should consider as soon as possible various proposals designed to secure the avoidance of the use of nuclear weapons, the prevention of nuclear war and related objectives, where possible, through international agreement..."18

**Negative Security Assurances**

The concept of a negative security assurance is heavily nuanced with differing definitions employed by nuclear weapon states reflecting real differences in strategic policies.

A negative security assurance is an assurance by a nuclear weapons state to other states that it will not use nuclear weapons except under certain specified conditions. Besides the non-proliferation aspects of negative security assurances (see below) many non-nuclear-weapon states had been critical of nuclear weapon states party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty for not giving assurances to non-nuclear-weapon states that they need not fear nuclear attack. A 1968 Security Council resolution offering assistance, as provided for in the Charter, to any non-nuclear-weapon state attacked by nuclear weapons was not considered adequate. At the same time the Non-Aligned/non-nuclear-weapon states had rejected any form of positive security guarantee (such as had been given
to NATO members by the USA) as inappropriate to their non-aligned status.

Canada played a leading role in urging its nuclear allies to offer appropriate negative security assurances, and was primarily responsible for having this concept included in the Western draft Programme of Action:

Assurances as appropriate, by nuclear weapon states, designed to increase the confidence of non-nuclear-weapon states in their own security from nuclear attack.

This formula permitted such guarantees to be made either individually or collectively. Non-Aligned countries, while they welcomed these assurances took the position that such assurances should be made legally binding in a form of a treaty.

One of the substantive results of the Special Session was that all nuclear weapon states issued one kind or other of "negative security assurance" -- including China, which simply announced that "it would not be the first to use nuclear weapons". General de Gaulle had made such an undertaking on the part of France, and this commitment has been reaffirmed by the French Representative. The two most crucial formulae were those announced by the USSR and the USA.

The Soviet formula was first introduced by the Soviet Premier at UNGA XXXII. It was subsequently rephrased by President Brezhnev in his "Komsomol Speech":

The Soviet Union declares unambiguously: we are against the use of nuclear weapons; only extraordinary circumstances and aggression against our country or its allies by another nuclear-weapon "power, can compel us to resort to this extreme means of self-defence.19
Since the American world security system is at once more varied and dispersed than the Soviet and only partly dependent on formal alliance structures, the USA’s negative security assurance was more complex:

The United States will not use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon state party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, or any comparable internationally binding commitment not to acquire nuclear explosive devices, except in the case of an attack on the United States, its territories or armed forces, or its allies, by such a state allied to a nuclear weapons state or associated with a nuclear weapons state in carrying out or sustaining the attack.20

This statement was made by Secretary of State Vance on June 12, 1978 and was repeated by Vice President Mondale during the General Debate. The rather awkward phrasing contained a number of significant themes. Among them was the American desire to encourage recalcitrant states to join the Non-Proliferation Treaty; another theme was to allow the USA to preserve strategic flexibility in areas where there was no extant treaty commitment. Finally, it left to the judgement of the US authorities whether a non-nuclear-weapon state conducting an attack was "associated with" a nuclear weapons state.

Like all declarations of intent, the negative security assurances suffered from the serious weakness that they need be broken only once for the results to be disastrous. This is a point that Prime Minister Trudeau made in his speech to the UNSSOD: the declaratory approach to disarmament was "no substitute for real disarmament measures".
Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zones (NWFZ)

Early versions of the nuclear-weapon-free zone were the Rapacki and Gomulka plans, both of which envisaged a withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Central Europe. The Treaty of Tlatelolco21 aimed at establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone, in Latin America.

Many Non-Aligned countries expressed an interest in the idea but carried differing views on its precise meaning into the Special Session. The lack of agreement among themselves consequently worked against the construction of stronger wording in the Final Document. The broad Non-Aligned definition, however, contained two fundamental parts: prohibition of the introduction or stationing of nuclear weapons within the zone; and prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against states in such zones.

Eastern European countries, although they were slow in adhering to Additional Protocol II to the Treaty of Tlatelolco (providing for undertakings on non-use of nuclear weapons against members of the Latin American nuclear-weapon-free zone) indicated general agreement with the concept of NWFZ but linked it to a call for the withdrawal of foreign military bases, as did some Non-Aligned countries.

Western countries believed in general that the zonal concept of disarmament, as expressed for example through the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones in appropriate areas of the world, should be encouraged.
Zones of Peace

The concept of a zone of peace was an extension of the idea of a nuclear-weapon-free zone. The USA and the USSR jointly submitted wording pertaining to the Indian Ocean, and the Non-Aligned countries had called for the withdrawal of foreign military bases from areas where "zones of peace" were established. In the case of the Indian Ocean, this call referred to the USA facility on the island of Diego Garcia.

Reaching consensus on this issue was further complicated by difference of view within a given region on the terms of reference of a "zone of peace". In the case of the Indian Ocean, the concept was a subject of bitter dispute between India and Pakistan. The solution, eventually, was to adopt a modified version of the Soviet-American wording. Because there was general agreement in principle among the three groups on the broad NWFZ concept (which had been debated in the United Nations for years) suitable wording, often based on previous UN resolutions, was also found to apply to each area of the world where conditions suggested that the application of the concept might be possible.

Non-Proliferation

Of all the difficult issues before the Special Session the question of "non-proliferation" gave rise to the most heat debate. It stood at the nexus of almost every concern expressed by Non-Aligned representatives. Reaching a satisfactory conclusion (meaning a reaffirmation of the non-nuclear-weapon
states not to proliferate) represented for Western "nuclear-capable" states (including Canada) the litmus test of whether the Special Session would be a success or failure.

Paragraphs 63 to 69 of the Programme of Action, although ostensibly dealing with the problem in all its aspects, effectively concentrated on its horizontal dimension, the vertical dimension having been dealt with in previous paragraphs.

The debate over non-proliferation threatened to widen even further the gulf separating the nuclear haves from the nuclear have-nots; the developed from the developing worlds. Indeed, the Third World's idealism on nuclear questions dissolved on the subject of strengthening the international safeguards system. At the heart of the dispute was how to reconcile the prerequisites of effective safeguards and non-proliferation guarantees with what many Non-Aligned countries considered their "inalienable right to unrestricted access to nuclear technology" for peaceful purposes, the latter being left to the definition of the Non-Aligned countries themselves.

That these aims were not in fact contradictory and could be reconciled if non-nuclear-weapon states agreed to make binding non-proliferation undertakings backed up by the acceptance of comprehensive safeguards administered by the IAEA was not publicly countenanced by any Non-Aligned country, although, of course, many had signed the NPT. There was, however, vociferous opposition to this formula on the part of several Non-Aligned representatives, on the grounds that the "imposition"
of safeguards would represent an encroachment on national sovereignty. 24 Equally, the nuclear supplier states were not disposed to accept language which allowed for "unrestricted access" to nuclear technology.

On this issue Soviet and Eastern European positions coincided with those of Western countries, and if anything, were even more firm. The Eastern European wording on non-proliferation did not suffer from the inevitable results of compromise found in the Western text, which was weakened in consequence of finding mutually-agreed wording within the Western group. The Soviet draft stipulated that "the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons should be made effective and truly universal; the IAEA system of safeguards should be strengthened in every possible way; the broad international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, which plays an important role in the development of national economies of states, should not be permitted to become a channel for the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices." 25

The debate on non-proliferation eventually focussed on the resolution of a basic question: which came first, nuclear restraint or economic development? -- or whether to highlight in the Programme of Action either the NPT and IAEA safeguards or "inalienable rights of access" and "non-discrimination". Indeed, some draft texts actually proposed to stand the concept of non-proliferation on its head, making nuclear technology a common human resource, like air. For example:
Guaranteed unlimited rights and opportunities for all states to make peaceful use of nuclear energy on an equal basis and without discrimination; guaranteed expansion of research in this and with a view to applying the achievements of nuclear science for the development of all countries. 26

The Non-Aligned draft was hardly better. Its full reference to obligations to prevent horizontal proliferation read: "prevention of proliferation of such nuclear weapons and systems". The word "such" referred to existing nuclear weapons; that is, to those held by the nuclear weapon states. Some Third World countries (for instance, Pakistan) chose to refine this concept even further, introducing a subliminal reference to the preeminence of national sovereignty:

All states have the right to develop, acquire, transfer and use, without hindrance, nuclear technology for peaceful purposes and to determine their peaceful nuclear programmes in accordance with their priorities, needs and interests.... 27

A bridge was finally built, shaky but standing, across the divide by the adoption of language which had been worked out for the Final Communiqué of the Organizing Conference of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation. 28 This conference, attended by a broad spectrum of countries, announced that:

...effective measures can and should be taken at the national level and through international agreements to minimize the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons without jeopardizing energy supplies or the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. 29

This wording, adopted almost verbatim in the Programme of Action, was coupled with other wording found in the Final
Communiqué of the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference and a reference to a General Assembly resolution (No.32/50) on transfers of nuclear technology and proved just sufficient to allow a suitable reference to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and to the necessity to prevent nuclear proliferation. It was a close thing, and the Final Document contains no reference to IAEA safeguards or to the necessity of strengthening the international safeguards régime. Inevitably, the "inalienable right" of access to nuclear technology and the "non-discriminatory" basis of preventing future nuclear weapons proliferation appears in the final text.

Other Issues

Although the chapter on Other Weapons of Mass Destruction appeared immediately after the chapters on Nuclear Disarmament, this placing reflected neither the importance nor the time this item attracted during the debate. Indeed, this chapter represented more of a "status report" on a series of "collateral" arms control and disarmament measures and negotiations peripheral to the issue of nuclear weapons.

There were two areas of difficulty: the Eastern European countries insisted that there be a reference to the prohibition of "new weapons of mass destruction" although in previous United Nations' debates they were unable to provide satisfactory definitions of what was meant by "new". Western reservations were based on the fact that it was difficult to ban something which did not exist or had not yet been identified: the compromise was to adopt a British suggestion that
the phrase "new types of weapons of mass destruction based on new scientific principles and achievements" be included (Paragraph 75). The British wording was intended to make clear that such weapons would not, for example, encompass such items as enhanced radiation warheads or the cruise missile, both of which were based on extant technology.

The second difficulty was that France, in line with her general policy, objected to any reference to any treaty controlling nuclear weapons, for example, the Outer Space Treaty or the Seabed Treaty. For different reasons, but with the same result, China also objected. Representatives of both countries, however, did not object to the formation of consensus on this chapter, although, as part of the consensus procedure, both countries did register reservations on this point.

A separate chapter on studies, information, education and training also appeared in the Programme of Action but led to little controversy or debate; while the studies appearing in the Final Document reflected the preoccupations of United Nations member states, the very volume of activity during the preparatory sessions and the Special Session itself meant that little time was left for thorough airing of various proposals put forward. Consequently, all three United Nation's groupings pressed for UN studies in accordance with their own sets of priorities. The most significant ones which were adopted were:

(i) Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies;

(ii) The interrelationship between disarmament and development; and
(iii) The interrelationship between disarmament and international security.

The significance of these recommendations was muted by the fact that while the studies and information activities were advocated by the United Nations as a whole -- that is, by the ensemble of representatives of the world community -- their full potential impact was restricted only to Western countries or to countries which possessed the necessary internal conditions to allow the relatively free dissemination of information and which permitted open debate.

**Non-Nuclear Disarmament**

Despite the vast range of subject matter and issues encompassed by the general category of "non-nuclear disarmament" it received disproportionately little attention during the Special Session, except in areas where Third World countries were particularly interested. The general disinterest of the Non-Aligned in pursuing in depth problems related to the disarmament of conventional forces was based on a double argument: (a) conventional weapons did not represent the same danger to humanity as did nuclear weapons; and (b) nuclear disarmament should, therefore, have the highest priority and should precede conventional disarmament.

Since any discussion of disarmament in the conventional field directly affected their own military requirements, many Third World countries were much more reticent on the subject of conventional arms than on nuclear weaponry. The Third World countries spent, generally speaking, a larger part
of their GNP's, on defence than did industrialized countries. Paradoxically, it was only in Central Europe, where NATO and Warsaw Pact forces are involved, that there are any talks (MBFR) in progress aimed at reducing levels of conventional forces. Yet, as the Non-Aligned representatives constantly pointed out, of the roughly $400 billion spent annually on armaments, the greater part was related to the East-West confrontation, and the larger part of that on conventional (as opposed to nuclear) weapons.

Given the strong, and almost universally-shared disinclination amongst the Non-Aligned to address problems related to reductions of conventional military forces and equipment, the debate tended to lapse into patterns established at previous regular sessions of the UNGA. Specifically, discussions focussed more on the economic benefits of disarmament by the "militarily significant states" than on the possible advantages to be gained from actual disarmament measures undertaken by all.

Military Aspects

The military aspects of conventional disarmament, the actual process of controlling or reducing armies and weapons, was considered under four broad headings, and of these, only the former two had a direct bearing on disarmament measures:

- regional disarmament
- arms transfers
- confidence building measures
- particularly inhumane weapons

Regional Disarmament and Arms Transfers

Proposals for regional disarmament measures were closely connected to proposals for restraint on arms transfers, particularly as they applied to Third World countries.

Western countries held the position that there was not a single arms race, but a series of arms races, and it was important for regional measures to be pursued. The Japanese tabled a specific proposal on first steps to be taken for regional disarmament measures, beginning with studies on conventional weapons transfers and voluntary restraints by the superpowers on arms transfers. As part of the Western group, the Japanese also proposed the convening of regional conferences and the establishment of watch-dog committees under UN auspices.

Eastern European countries confined themselves to deploring the present situation and suggesting that "practical steps" should be taken, and that foreign military bases and foreign troops should be withdrawn.

The general attitude of the Non-Aligned to proposals for measures of conventional disarmament in their regions was generally unfavourable. On the question of restraint on arms transfers, for instance, many of the principal Non-Aligned countries apparently regarded suggestions coming from Western sources attempts to impose a system of discrimination
on recipient states similar to that imposed on nuclear recipient states by the Non-Proliferation Treaty. 37

Proposals concerning the Indian Ocean served as an example of the inability of Third World countries, in many areas, to reach broad measures of agreement among themselves. As we have seen, the Indian representatives had dismissed a Pakistani formulation on defining the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace. 38 Despite (or perhaps because of) the inability of Indian Ocean littoral countries to reach agreement on the matter, by June 1977 the first USSR/USA working group meeting on Indian Ocean Arms Limitation was held in Moscow, with the objective of beginning the process of superpower military disengagement and arms restraint in that area of the world. 39

The contentious issue of dismantling military bases was not included in the Programme of Action since the Eastern European and Non-Aligned sponsors know, from past experience, that such suggestions were unacceptable to Western countries and, as such, could not be agreed to by consensus. It should be noted, of course, that while Non-Aligned countries deplored the existence of military bases in principle, many of them in practice were quite prepared, for reasons specific to their area, to countenance the presence of foreign bases and troops.

The dénouement was virtually identical to previous debates in the First Committee. During a debate at UNGA XXXI, on a Japanese regional disarmament proposal on arms transfers, the Pakistani Delegation moved that it be "improved" by including a reference to the 'right of peoples to acquire arms for
self-determination and to defend their national independence'. The compromise required the deletion of the Japanese proposals (which were uncomfortably specific for many Non-Aligned delegations) and the addition of a passage on the legitimate right of states to self-defence:

These measures should take into account the need of states to protect their security, bearing the inherent right of self-defence embodied in the Charter of the United Nations and without prejudice to the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples in accordance with the Charter. 41

Confidence Building Measures and Particularly Inhumane Weapons

These two issues took up little time in debate or drafting, primarily because the proposals related to them were well-known and understood, and had been the subject of discussions within and outside the UN fora. Of the three subparagraphs on confidence building measures, the first, on improving communications between potential adversaries so as to avoid misunderstanding, was borrowed almost verbatim from the Helsinki Final Act. The second, on "assessing the implications" of further weapons development on disarmament efforts was an oblique reference to the practice established by President Kennedy for the US Arms Control & Disarmament Agency to issue to Congress, as appropriate, Arms Impact Statements 42 on new weapons developments on arms control measures. The idea of the public release of national statements was, of course, not popular with many Third World and Eastern European delegates, since their own régimes did not permit open internal debate on such issues. The general provisions was, however,
eventually adopted after the original wording (which made such assessment obligatory) was diluted to make the conduct of such assessments merely "desirable".

A Soviet proposal that there be agreement on not to expand opposing military alliances through the admission of new members did not, however, appear in the final text. The proposal, which had mischievous intent, was aimed at embarrassing NATO countries, who were in the preliminary and exploratory stages of dialogue with Spain after its restoration of democracy. The Russians, however, did not insist and the proposal was withdrawn.

The third sub-paragraph (Paragraph 91(iii) dealing with the report of the Secretary General on the Economic & Social Consequences of the Arms Race was also a perennial subject of UN debate. The idea of such a report was a good one and had been proposed in 1969 by U Thant. He proposed a study of the economic and social consequences of the arms race "to create a fuller understanding of the needs and possibilities for reordering our priorities in the decade of the 1970's. An experts' report was duly prepared. In 1971 the UNGA had decided to keep the subject under review and it has remained on the First Committee and UNGA agendas ever since. This fact is recorded in the Final Document.

It was probably wise for the Special Session to simply refer to the fact that in 1979 there would be a UN Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or
to Have Indiscriminate Effects. The subject of inhumane weapons was a highly emotional one, and had been brought to a head during earlier gatherings on the subject which again tended to pit Western developed countries against the non-aligned LDC's since more often than not the point at issue was weapons technology. The experience of the Viet Nam conflict also coloured the debates, and many Non-Aligned delegates were determined that the use of napalm should be outlawed. While this matter appears in the final text without extensive debate, the bitterness it had generated in past discussion exacerbated -- and created another emotional dimension -- to North/South debate on other issues.

**Economic Aspects**

The general concern of many countries to strengthen the non-proliferation system was matched by an equal determination of other countries to focus the attention of the Special Session on developmental problems. In its most extreme form, the mutually complementary propositions were that: efforts at non-proliferation were plots against Third World aspirations; and that the East-West military competition was being run at Third World expense. The unproductive and emotional debate over inhumane weapons was merely a symptom: closer to the source of this problem lay the Non-Aligned dissatisfaction about the magnitude of military expenditures, particularly in the West, when compared with Western aid efforts to the Third World. The Non-Aligned dissatisfaction focussed on two basic aspects of the issue: (a) reduction of military budgets and
armed forces and (b) the relationship between disarmament and development.

Reduction of Military Budgets and Armed Forces

Paradoxically, the high priority accorded to this item by Western countries was not shared by the Non-Aligned group. An obvious aspect of this problem was that the Western developed countries had visible and transparent national budgets which are challenged and defended in open debate; many Non-Aligned and all Eastern European countries did not share this characteristic. Eastern European countries, therefore, were in favour, in principle, of such measures, but in practice obstructed any attempt aimed at their realization by means of greater openness in reporting and comparing actual military expenditures.

As a matter of principle, Non-Aligned countries were for reductions in military budgets and armed forces, and announced their preparedness to support Western suggestions concerning them. Despite the fact that reductions of military budgets could release resources for the benefit of development, Third World countries, however, showed little enthusiasm for reductions in their own military budgets, which on the average are more than double that of Canada in relative terms.

Eastern European countries accepted the idea of budgetary reductions but showed great reluctance to agree to the logical first step -- that is, the establishment of an effective and reliable international system for reporting, comparing and authenticating military budgets and expenditures, since such a
system would require at the outset greater transparency of national budgets. Indeed, Eastern European countries did not accept the idea that any reduction in military budgets would be subject to verification and accordingly opposed a Western and Swedish proposal for a pilot test of a system of standardized reporting of military expenditures.

Western countries on the other hand did not believe it useful to insist on specific percentage reductions (such as the Soviet Bloc countries suggested) until the actual system for authenticating such reductions is developed. Establishing appropriate means of verification, therefore, was crucial as a method of ensuring confidence in the mutual and reciprocal process of reducing military budgets.

Suitable compromise wording was eventually found. Significantly, it did not mention that a UN experts study on the question noted that "use of a standardized accounting format for military expenditures will probably first fulfill its functions as a confidence building tool since the improved information available through published budgets reduces the fear of underestimating military forces of other States and the tendency to overcompensate."

The final word belonged to the Eastern Europeans, who referred to a letter deposited by the Soviet Delegate at the previous UNGA. It said: "In the view of the Soviet Union, the efforts of states must be directed not towards abstract research which does not produce practical results, but towards the implementation of genuine effective measures to reduce
military budgets." The message, evidently, was clear: neither the Non-Aligned nor Eastern European representatives were interested in pursuing substantive disarmament measures in a UN setting if their own countries were directly affected. It was agreed, nevertheless, that the Secretary General appoint an ad hoc panel of budgetary experts to develop and refine a standardized reporting instrument.

**Disarmament and Development**

In statistical terms, the world's military budget equals the annual income of 1.8 billion people in the 36 poorest countries; developed countries spend 20 times more for their military programmes than for economic assistance. Channelling funds, therefore, from destructive or constructive purposes was an idea whose time seemed to have come. Indeed, UNGA Resolution No.2602E(XXIV) of 1969 declared the 1970's the Disarmament Decade and recommended that:

> Consideration be given to channelling a substantial part of the resources freed by measures in the field of disarmament to promote the economic development of developing countries.

The great theme of Disarmament and Development, which, along with the great debate of non-proliferation, while it was interwoven with practically every other subject under consideration, only moderately reflected in the Programme of Action the importance the Non-Aligned attached to it.

Part of the problem was that because the implications behind the concept of a link with disarmament was so vast and controversial that "disarmament and development" did not readily fit into any specific chapter: the establishment of
such a link was more a question of adopting a certain philosophy than undertaking a specific measure. Despite the symmetrical elegance of the concept behind channelling funds from destructive to constructive purposes -- and its moral appeal -- it left a number of difficult and practical questions unanswered.

First among them was the fact that the logic excluded the Non-Aligned themselves from the disarmament/development process, and absolved them of any responsibility. Throughout the five Preparatory Committee meetings and earlier, the Non-Aligned had shown their unwillingness to see any restraint on their acquisition, production or transfer of conventional weapons. The link between disarmament and development existed in their eyes only in the North/South optic. The Non-Aligned countries, furthermore, appeared to be indifferent to the pre-eminently practical question of whether the very concept of linkage was acceptable to those countries who would be the actual donors if it were actually put into effect.

Western countries, therefore, approached the idea with caution, even if they were not opposed in principle. They held the view, generally unpopular in the Third World, that Third World countries themselves had an obligation to participate in the disarmament process and to reduce their expenditures for the sake of their own development. The Eastern European representatives generally avoided discussion of the topic, partly because it was good tactics to stay out of the North/South lines of fire, and partly because their
involvement could lead to inescapable obligations.

That the debate was not more heated was in large part due to fortuitous circumstance. At the end of August 1977 the Nordic countries had proposed that there be an in-depth study undertaken under UN auspices, of the relationship between armament/disarmament and development. The UNGA, which passed a resolution to that effect decided that the Special Session itself should determine the terms of reference for such a study. The Ad Hoc Group of government experts approached by the Secretary General to work out a framework and terms of reference presented its report for the approval of the Special Session. Insofar as the chapter Disarmament and Development was concerned, therefore, the Special Session, by tacit mutual agreement, chose not to undercut the results of a study before it began and confined itself to approving the report of the Ad Hoc Group.

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With this, deliberations on those sections of the final document dealing with substantive matters came to an end. Other questions, such as where to place formally-tabled individual national contributions in the final document, and questions relating to machinery (a United Nations Disarmament Commission was established; and the CCD was replaced by a Conference on Disarmament having an expanded membership) were not resolved until well into the eleventh hour.
FOOTNOTES

1 UN Document A/S-10/23, Programme of Action, Paragraph 50.


3 The USA and the UK had accepted voluntary IAEA verification teams on their peaceful facilities; the Soviet Union, however, had consistently refused to participate in the IAEA safeguards system.

4 Article VI of the NPT contains an obligation on the part of the nuclear powers "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament".

5 UN Document A/AC.1/31/9, Article II, paragraph 3.

6 These concessions were contained in Brezhnev's speech to a combined meeting of the Supreme Soviet and the Central Committee on the 60th Anniversary of the USSR, 2 November 1977.

7 UN Document A/S-10/PV.27

8 Condemnatory language had usually been rejected out of hand by those conducting nuclear weapons tests and resolutions had generally been passed with either negative or abstaining votes by nuclear weapon states, e.g. UNGA Resolutions 31/66 and 31/89 of 14 December, 1976.

9 UN Document Amendment A/S-10/AC.1/L.13 (Japan) to draft resolution A/S-10/AC.1/L.10 (India).

10 Article VI of the Non-proliferation Treaty provides for PNEs.

11 This indeed is the major weakness of the Treaty of Tlatelolco - it allows for PNEs.


14. For example, UNGA Resolutions 3184A(XXVIII) of 18 December 1973 and 2932B(XXVII) of 29 November 1972.


20. UN Document A/S-10/PV.5


23. This wording is inspired by Article IV of the NPT which reads in part "nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable rights of all the parties to the Treaty to develop, research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination....

24. Particularly the "nuclear threshold" states, Brazil, Argentina, India and Pakistan.

25. UN Document A/AC.187/82

26. UN Document A/AC.187/78, Romanian draft Programme of Action

27. UN Document A/AC.187/91, Pakistani draft Programme of Action

28. Note Verbale from USA Permanent Representative to the Secretary General of 27 October 1977.


31. According to SIPRI, however, roughly 25 million people have been killed in military conflicts since the end of World War II.

32. For exact statistics, see World Armaments and Disarmament, SIPRI Yearbook 1979, Stockholm.

33. UN Document A/AC.187/96

34. UN Document A/AC.187/86

35. UN Document A/AC.187/82

36. The exception, it might be argued, was a Latin-American zone where 8 countries in the region had adjoined the Declaration of Ayachucro of 1974, which announced intent of declaratory states to restrain from conventional weapons build-ups.

37. A/S-10/PV.

38. Indian PM Desai's speech reported in Disarmament Times of 12 June 1978. A UN resolution had declared the Indian Oceans as a zone of peace (Resolution 2832(XXVI) of 6 December 1971).

39. Another reason why these talks were possible was because of advances in military technology. American nuclear-armed submarines with missiles of improved range and guidance systems not longer needed to patrol the Indian Ocean to be within striking distance of the Donyetz Basin.

40. Official records, UNGA XXXI.

41. Paragraph 81 of Programme of Action. Essentially the same proviso added to Paragraph 83.

42. We have seen in the case of the neutron bomb controversy how such statements can backfire.

43. UN Document A/AC.187/98

44. Here it might be noted that the USSR was a habitual cosponsor of UN resolutions calling for the dismantling of military blocs; many non-aligned linked such initiatives to the withdrawal of foreign military bases (A/AC.187/55.Add.1)
45. UN Document A/9191 of 22 May 1970.

46. UN Resolution No.2831(XXVI) of 16 December 1971.

47. UN Document A/S-10/23, Paragraph 84.


49. See, for example, UNGA Resolution No.3434(XXX) Napalm and Other Incendiary Weapons and all aspects of their possible use.

50. See, for example, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, 33 No.2, pp.17-21, February 1977. "The nuclear issue and international security" by K. Subrahmanyan. The author argues that the NPT is an attempt to control nuclear technology in the Third World.

51. UNGA Resolution A/32/194

52. At UNGA 32 the USSR introduced a proposal (A/32/72 of 27 April 1977) which suggested that all Permanent Members of the Security Council reduce their military budgets by 10 per cent and to allot at least 10 per cent of the funds thus released for assistance to developing countries. The Soviet proposals did not, however, suggest how the base budgetary figure from which the percentage reduction would be drawn should be obtained. The proposal, nevertheless, attracted widespread support, even from relatively sophisticated Western NGOs.


54. Witness, for example, the fate of the Japanese draft resolution at UNGA 32 on restraints on the transfer of conventional weapons, cited earlier. Japanese letter to the UN Secretary General of 13 December 1977 (Document A/AC.187/86).


Chapter VIII

Conclusion

The preceding chapters have dealt with the way in which common agreement was reached at the Special Session on the text of a complex and controversial document. Canada's relationship to UN disarmament issues, and the Canadian contribution to the outcome have also been treated. The evidence suggests that the reason the final document turned out the way it did was based as much on factors unrelated to disarmament and arms control as on those which were. For example, the United Nations structure, procedures, modus operandi -- and even the atmosphere created by the occasional wild card, such as the neutron bomb controversy -- all played a part.

This study has raised, but has not answered, a number of fundamental questions. Among them, whether the three-cornered competition within the General Assembly advanced the cause of arms control and disarmament, whether the Canadian role was as effective as it might have been, and whether the United Nations offers the best recourse for ensuring progress. Of such questions, no assessment is ever final. But the remaining pages offer some concluding thoughts.

The Three Negotiating Groups

In terms of perceptions and objectives, each group differed from the other. On many arms control issues, the Western European and Others Group and the Eastern European Group positions were closer together than to the Non-Aligned Group. The paramount concerns of the Non-Aligned Group were
economic: disarmament, particularly conventional disarmament, was not an end in itself, but a means to the ultimate goal of further economic development through a reallocation of the resources of the industrialized world. The Eastern European Group, not directly involved in the North-South aspects of the debate, was content to identify as much as possible with Third World economic aspirations. At the same time, the global Soviet military presence did not figure as an important element of Non-Aligned concern. Given the dominant role of Non-Aligned countries at the UN, for large portions of the Special Session, the Russians and their allies were consequently hors de combat. There was, as a result, an occasional air of unreality about the debates.

Under such circumstances, collective, rational and factual analyses of the causes and effects of weapons build-ups and proposals for realizable, realistic courses of action were rare commodities. Highest common denominator politics tended to substitute for truth. This is not necessarily a bad thing, should the ends justify it. In a number of instances, however, the final document came close to being set adrift from reality: in the eyes of some, matters of principle took precedence over the possibility of their realization. Whether this attitude added to, or detracted from, the credibility of the United Nations system is another question.
The Western Group came closest to "playing the game" of disarmament at the Special Session, even though the dice were heavily weighted against it. But not as heavily as might be supposed, for whatever the tone of Third World rhetoric, the developing countries implicitly recognized the strong links of interdependence which bound them and the industrialized West together. In any event, and with barely a murmur of protest, the Western Group accepted the role assigned to it: that of defendant in the dock, the accused. The achievement of Western purposes was rendered exceedingly difficult by Western concepts of arms control, and by their relationship to security and how best to maintain it.

First, as we have seen, the realistic (in the sense of the realizable) objectives set out at the Special Session by Western countries had little appeal to the Third World states impatient for progress, and who, for various ideological reasons rooted in their colonial experiences, held Western countries primarily responsible for what they considered the present deplorable situation. This general attitude smothered a number of good Western ideas at birth. To some Third World states, Western concern about verification as the key to effective arms control agreements seemed pedestrian, and an obstruction to progress -- if not a device manufactured to avoid it.
Second, NATO's strategic concepts were hardly suited to win points in the debates on disarmament at the Special Session. The principles on which they rested, no matter how effective they were in maintaining a stable East-West military relationship, ran counter to the general sentiment at the Special Session, where the link between security and disarmament had been relegated to a place secondary to the link between disarmament and development.

In some respects the behaviour of the three groups, and the positions they adopted at the Special Session had already been determined before it convened: the Western Group, by common Alliance positions; the Eastern European Group, through the "Peace Programme" set out in two successive Congresses of the CPSU; and the Third World Group, by the Non-Aligned Summits, especially since Algiers. In addition, inconclusive annual debates in the CCD and in the First Committee had fine-tuned many national positions in advance, and the international atmosphere augured poorly for anything more than modest success. There was an evident Soviet-American stand-off in the SALT, and an East-West impasse in Vienna. The Belgrade CSCE Review Conference had ended with an inconsequential Final Communiqué. Turbulent events in the Third World -- from the Horn of Africa to Namibia and Rhodesia, from Indochina to the Middle East, all contributed to reducing the chances of the Special Session
becoming a turning point of even modest proportions in the long and complex history of international efforts at disarmament.

The Special Session, through the behaviour of its participants, underlined the hard lesson that progress in the field of arms control and disarmament is possible only once certain political and other conditions are met, and that argument, moral suasion, and international debate do not affect military structures of states. Weapons build-ups are symptomatic of larger issues, even though in some instances they have become issues themselves. In their own way, the actions of each Group were in accord with this basic principle. The result was that the Special Session had less to do with disarmament than many might have believed or imagined.

The Canadian Role

Canada had both interest and expertise in both disarmament and the United Nations. Canada had the technical competence and diplomatic wherewithal to move the outcome of non-proliferation debate in the right direction. In its baldest terms, the Non-Aligned Group recognized that without the cooperation of the "Nuclear Club" in London, of which Canada was a leading member, no transfer of nuclear technology would be possible, notwithstanding the rhetoric about the "inalienable right" of access to such technology. The decision of France, shortly after the Special Session, to cancel
its agreement to supply Pakistan with a nuclear-fuel reprocessing plant because it refused to accept adequate safeguards underlined this fact.

The Canadian influence at the Special Session was magnified by Canada's role in the Western military alliance. The Alliance added a degree of weight to Canada's words which they otherwise would have lacked. At the same time, the Alliance provided the necessary ballast for Canadian ideas, and as we have seen, Alliance influence, as expressed through the Western Group was instrumental in their appearance in the final document. Finally, the Alliance served as a point of reference for Canadian disarmament proposals, for the process of NATO discussions and contacts ensured that security considerations of the Alliance as a whole were taken into account. Canadian initiatives were entertained seriously because it was understood that they had been the subject of extensive consultation within the Alliance, particularly with the NATO nuclear weapon states.

Given these advantages -- plus the fact that the Barton Group was the orchestrator of the Western caucus -- the question arises whether it was possible for Canada to have done more. The answer is probably not. The non-proliferation section of the final document was a Canadian victory, and a testament to Canadian negotiating skill. An alternative course of action would have been to adopt a "third world" stance at the Special Session, by demanding
the imposition of deadlines, of tabling lock-step programmes of disarmament, and of insisting on the immediate transfer of resources from disarmament to development. Besides being a utopian reflex, it would have cost Canada the high regard it enjoyed within the Alliance and with other Western partners, and thereby would have undercut the potential for an effective Canadian role at the Special Session. Action based on an estimation of the possible may not be dramatic, but it is effective.

The Forum of the United Nations

This study has distinguished between negotiation and debate. If the debates at the Special Session had little, if any, effect in progress towards arms control and disarmament, the negotiations which successfully concluded with agreement on a final document does represent progress of sorts. But then, negotiation is aimed at achieving agreement, whereas debate is not. The bifurcation of negotiation and debate at the Special Session (as indeed at all United Nations sessions) was a factor contributing to the Special Session's ambivalent results. And the question remains whether the United Nations is the most appropriate framework within which progress should be sought on arms control and disarmament matters. A balance sheet of the Special Session gives an equivocal answer.

Of the positive features of the Special Session, the fact that a final document was achieved at all is a cause
for satisfaction. That it was achieved by consensus is a cause for celebration. Had the final document been passed by way of majority vote, with the Third World ranged on one side, and the developed countries on the other, the outcome (like those of the Sixth and Seventh Special Sessions on North-South economic relations) would have to be counted as a failure, and the credibility of the United Nations system further undermined. If consensus were to have fissured on North-South lines, this would have in effect absolved the nuclear weapon states of any moral responsibility to adhere to a document they would have no doubt voted against. Consensus was achieved, furthermore, through the participation of all countries, including all nuclear weapon states -- the USA, the UK and the USSR -- and China and France. The process of consensus ensured a document reflecting more moderation and realism than might have been expected under the circumstances.

The more unhelpful draft resolutions were avoided, although they appeared as part of the negotiated solution, in the Preface of the Final Document, namely:

- the Iraqi resolution calling for a boycott on military and nuclear collaboration with Israel;¹

- the Indian draft resolution condemning the use of nuclear weapons in any circumstances as "a crime against humanity";²

- a Ghanian resolution on the acquisition of nuclear weapons by racist régimes and the consequent threat to peace.³
The consensus procedure moderated the declaratory approach favoured by the Non-Aligned (and, for different reasons, by the Eastern Europeans) by balancing it against practical measures favoured by Western delegations capable of attainment in the foreseeable future. Whatever the significance of achieving consensus may have been, however, its effects on actual arms reductions measures is unproven. Victory was in the production of a document which all could accept.

If the final document's practical applicability was by no means apparent, it still did represent a diplomatic feat of synthesis. Somehow, the essential was achieved -- to mold into a single document not only the results of the five preparatory sessions, summed up in the Report of the Committee (which also contained a heavily-bracketed final document) but also the new ideas set forward by government leaders in the course of the General Debate.

On the negative side of the ledger, the failure of Presidents Carter and Brezhnev to attend must be counted among the most significant items (although whether their attendance - or non-attendance - should be put in the same category as achieving something substantial may be a moot point). Scanty media coverage disappointed some, and was occasionally inaccurate or silly. The Disarmament Times, a daily NGO newspaper published during the Special Session, devoted more column-inches to the personality of one of the
American delegates, the actor, Paul Newman, than to any other subject. (He was, incidentally, mobbed by delegates not seen at any other time of the Special Session when he appeared in Plenary.) The failure of the Special Session to endorse some imaginative proposals, for example, those of the Secretary General, and the fierce resistance of many Third World countries to accept, as a matter of principle, any restraints on their own military capacities must be counted as negative features. No progress was made in modifying the rigidly pro-nuclear policies of France and China. But perhaps the most significant failure of the Special Session was that it did not change any policy of any government on the subject of arms.

Still, expecting concrete progress may be looking for too much. The results of the Special Session were, in the final analysis, a positive contribution to the United Nations system: in the final document, it established a visible yardstick on the basis of universal agreement by which future progress would be measured.

**The Larger Issues**

This study has shown how each of the negotiating groups had before it its own conception of the dynamics of arms competitions. In addition, each had its own version of how to achieve security.

If arms reductions are ever to occur, it is probable that they will be undertaken according to the following sequence:
(a) gradual establishment of political and military stability between rival states or rival groups of states; the working out of a mutually-acceptable modus vivendi;

(b) the creation of a wide spectrum of confidence-building measures;

(c) initial steps toward arms control; by agreement, ceilings on the acquisition of weapons and the growth of armed forces;

(d) first steps toward disarmament.

This sequence, or scenario, has more-or-less reached stage (c) in the East-West dimension; in many other parts of the world, stage (a) is still far from being realized. It is a closed system: that is, progress towards relaxation of tensions (after which would follow arms control and disarmament, assuming of course such steps would not be destabilizing, or reduce confidence, or increase tensions) is determined by factors within the relationship itself, and not by outside elements. At its most basic level, this means that it is unlikely that under present conditions the United Nations General Assembly could impose arms control or disarmament measures on any party, no matter how many resolutions it passes. On the other hand, parties who have already reached agreement on this or that measure may choose to use United Nations auspices as the depositary instrument of their agreement, or could chose to use the United Nations venue for their talks.
In open forums such as that provided by the United Nations, therefore, there is a built-in distortion in any arms control or disarmament debate. If for no other reason, the triangular relationship of the three negotiating groups ensures that this is so. Third World concerns are of marginal relevance to East-West issues of détente and arms control, but the very nature of the United Nations places Third World countries front stage centre. If the substance of East-West accommodation, political or military, took place only within its framework, progress, it could be argued, would be even slower.

The United Nations has had a peripheral role in the achievement of major arms control agreements. Accords such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty, or the Partial Test Ban Treaties, have been worked out elsewhere, and then put to the United Nations. Similarly, the CTB talks and the SALT transpire only amongst the parties directly concerned. These considerations do not detract from the United Nations, but they do put into perspective the limits of that institution's potential. To expect too much is to do the United Nations a disfavour.

In the last analysis, the success or failure of the Special Session can only be measured by time. The hope is that the final document represents not an end, but a beginning.
FOOTNOTES

1 Document A/S-10/AC.1/L.1, rev.1
2 Document A/S-10/AC.1/L.11.
3 The resolution was withdrawn before it was formally tabled. A similar resolution was circulated at UNGA XXXII: Resolution 32/105F.
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Note verbale dated 27 April 1977 from the Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General.

The Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and refers to the Secretary-General's note of 28 January 1977 in which he requested the views of the Government of Canada on the agenda and all other relevant questions relating to the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, and has the honour to transmit herewith the views of the Canadian Government.
REPLY BY CANADA TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS
PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPH 3 OF RESOLUTION 31/187, ADOPTED ON
21 DECEMBER 1976, CONCERNING THE SPECIAL SESSION OF THE
GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON DISARMAMENT

Canada continues to regard the United Nations as the principal forum in which to focus world attention on the need to limit and reduce the levels of military forces, armaments and expenditures and for an exchange of views among Member States on arms control and disarmament issues. Canada also recognizes the important catalytic role that the United Nations can play in encouraging and preparing the ground for, the pursuit of arms control and disarmament in fora appropriate for negotiating specific agreements. Accordingly, Canada co-sponsored and welcomed the unanimous adoption by the General Assembly of resolution 31/189B (XXXI) on the convening of a special session of the General Assembly on disarmament in 1978 and intends to participate actively in the preparations for the special session and in its deliberations. Canada's objective is to make the special session as productive and as constructive as possible: its hope is that this international forum may reach a meeting of minds on a broadly based co-operative approach to the issues involved and thus infuse a new sense of shared purpose in arms control and disarmament endeavours.

Canada is of the view that the deliberations of the special session should lead to the adoption of a basic final act or political declaration. Indeed, the success of the special session will depend on whether and the extent to which Member States can reach agreement on the contents of such a final document as its principal instrument. A basic document failing short of common consent or lacking the support of those Member States which are most significant in terms of arms control and disarmament would detract from the significance and the value of the special session and undermine the international co-operative approach to arms control and disarmament questions that the session should be concerned to foster. Accordingly, Canada believes that, from the outset, all Member States should commit themselves to the goal that the political declaration or final act of the special session should reflect the broadest possible agreement.

The preparation of a final document that will meet with general agreement will be the most onerous task of the special session. In order to facilitate this achievement, it seems desirable that work begin just as soon as possible and be pursued as a matter of the highest priority through to the end of the special session. In particular, Canada considers that the preparatory committee for the special session should, at the beginning of its second series of meetings in May 1977, set up a drafting sub-committee to begin work on a collective approach to the elements of a final document and that the work of this sub-committee should continue during the series of meetings of the preparatory committee in July and September of 1977. It may also be found desirable for the results of the work of this drafting sub-committee to be included in the progress report which the preparatory committee is to make to the thirty-second session of the General Assembly pursuant to operative paragraph 6 of resolution 31/189B, so that Member States wishing to do so may offer their comments in the First Committee. Thereafter the drafting sub-committee of the preparatory committee should convene during any meetings of the preparatory committee in 1978 and, if necessary, between such
meetings and the start of the special session to produce a working draft of a final document for consideration by the special session.

Aside from the crucial necessity of approaching the final document of the special session on a co-operative basis from the outset and in view of its achievement, Canada has an open mind regarding other forms of agreement that the special session may decide upon with regard to other aspects of its work. If the special session can also reach full agreement on, for example, general principles relevant to arms control and disarmament, a programme of specific measures, mechanisms for negotiations or priorities, these should be included formally in an appropriate way in the final document of the special session. Any such supplementary proposals that cannot be endorsed on the same basis as the final document, however, should, in the Canadian view, have a different status from that document.

In order to make the fullest possible use of its potential, the special session should not be a mere stepping-stone to some other plenary forum but a plenary consultation on arms control and disarmament in its own right. On the other hand, Canada considers that if efforts to agree on a final document of the special session in 1978 meet with success, it would probably be desirable for a further special session on disarmament to be convened, after an appropriate interval, to assess progress in implementing this new co-operative approach to arms control and disarmament questions that Canada hopes will be enshrined in the final document of the special session next year.

Purely as an illustration and in order to facilitate earliest consideration of the possible elements of a final document, Canada is including with this reply a very tentative thematic outline of some of the major topics that a final document of the special session might seek to address, together with some provisional notes on possible treatment. This outline is not intended to be complete. Rather, it represents an attempt to begin the process of thinking about the possible content of a final document that could meet with general acceptance. Canada will welcome consideration of all other suggestions for inclusion in a final act of the special session submitted in the spirit of a determined search for general agreement.

Possible final document - thematic outline

I. Introduction

The document might contain several preambular paragraphs that would:

- recognize that all nations must be concerned with international security and with the essential part to be played in its enhancement by arms control and disarmament measures in the fields of both nuclear and conventional weapons;
recognize that enormous expenditures on a world-wide scale for arms and military forces absorb material and human resources from the peaceful economic and social development of all countries;

emphasize that the United Nations is and should remain the principal forum enabling all States to review and discuss proposals in the area of arms control and disarmament, to express their concerns regarding threats to international security arising from the development and deployment of armaments, and to inform and develop world public opinion on these issues.

II. Nuclear arms control and disarmament

Under this heading the document might:

- recognize that the danger of nuclear warfare remains a grave threat to the survival of mankind requiring thorough-going, balanced and effective measures to curb and reverse the nuclear arms race;

- note the importance of the linkage between efforts to deal with nuclear weapons proliferation in the vertical dimension and in the horizontal dimension and affirm the need for balanced progress in both areas in order to enhance international security on an equitable basis.

A. Nuclear weapons

- emphasize the fundamental importance of the strategic arms negotiations between the two major nuclear weapon Powers;

- express the conviction that the successful conclusion of agreements on nuclear arms control between the two major nuclear Powers should be followed up by efforts for the control and eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons;

- assess the progress in these negotiations to date;

- urge the two major nuclear weapon Powers to intensify their efforts to reach further agreements to curtail the strategic nuclear arms confrontation in both its quantitative and its qualitative dimensions.

B. Nuclear testing

- reaffirm the conviction that the cessation of nuclear testing would be a useful step toward controlling the development and proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities;

- recall the stated aim of the Original Parties to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time;
- assess the progress to date in achieving a cessation of nuclear testing;
- urge the achievement of an effective underground test ban between the two major nuclear Powers immediately;
- emphasize the need for such a bilateral ban to be given a broader base through the achievement of a Comprehensive Test Ban and call for intensified efforts in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to achieve such an agreement.

C. The peaceful uses of nuclear energy

- recognize that effective international safeguards and controls are essential in order to ensure that the peaceful application of nuclear energy will not lead to further proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;
- stress the importance of strengthening international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy through the collaboration of States receiving and supplying nuclear technology, facilities, equipment and fuel;
- assess the achievements to date in the International Atomic Energy Agency and among supplier States in strengthening the régime to ensure that international co-operation in the uses of nuclear energy is employed only for peaceful purposes;
- call for creation of new mechanisms for consultation and co-operation among both supplier and receiver States to seek agreement on collective measures to avoid the dangers for international security inherent in the development of an international plutonium economy.

D. Nuclear-weapon-free zones

- express the conviction that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones can contribute to the security of members of such zones and to the prevention of proliferation of nuclear weapons;
- assess the progress to date in achieving such zones;
- urge non-nuclear weapon States to initiate regional discussions with a view to the establishment of such zones where appropriate;
- urge all nuclear weapon States to extend their co-operation in the creation of such zones and to enter into binding undertakings never to employ nuclear weapons or the threat of use of such weapons against States that have entered into a binding agreement establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone encompassing their territory.

/...
III. Other weapons of mass destruction

Under this heading the document might:

- recognize that weapons of mass destruction other than nuclear weapons—such as chemical and biological weapons and any weapons developed in the future which have characteristics comparable in destructive effect—are of special concern, second only to nuclear weapons because of their indiscriminate, widespread and inhumane effects;

- call on all nations to adhere to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction and to the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare;

- reaffirm the objective of reaching early agreement on the effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their elimination from arsenals of all States and assess the progress to date;

- call for intensified efforts in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to achieve agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and for their destruction.

IV. Conventional arms control and disarmament

Under this heading the document might:

- assess the efforts of member nations collectively to limit the conventional arms race and the transfer of conventional arms.

A. Confidence-building measures

- call for the establishment, under the auspices of the United Nations Secretary-General, of an international register of conventional arms transfers and urge all Member States to submit information concerning such transfers;

- call for more openness among Member States on expenditures for military purposes, recommend compilation and publication, under the auspices of the Secretary-General, of military expenditures by Member States and urge all Member States to supply information on their national military expenditures to the Secretary-General on an annual basis.
B. Regional approaches

- call for conferences between both recipients and suppliers to restrain arms transfers on a regional basis,
- call for regional arms control conferences to address local conventional arms races and to secure agreed measures of restraint.

V. Resources for peace

Under this heading the document might:

- recall General Assembly resolution No. 2605 (XXIV) of 16 December 1970 in which it declared the decade of the 1970s the Disarmament Decade and envisaged a link between the Disarmament Decade and the Second United Nations Development Decade;
- urge Member States to intensify their efforts to ensure the world resources freed by disarmament are devoted increasingly to the satisfaction of the economic and social needs of humanity, particularly in the developing countries.

VI. Further special session on disarmament

The document might:

- recommend that a further special session on disarmament be held in ... to assess the progress in negotiating effective arms control and disarmament measures.
Tenth special session
AD HOC COMMITTEE OF THE TENTH
SPECIAL SESSION
Agenda item 11

ADOPTION OF A PROGRAMME OF ACTION ON DISARMAMENT

Canada: amendments to section III (Programme of Action)
of the Draft Final Document

1. Add the following separate paragraph at the end of subsection C.1(a)
/Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT)/ on page 27:

"Agreement by the two major nuclear powers to prohibit the flight-testing
of new strategic delivery vehicles could serve as one means to curb the
qualitative dimension of the strategic arms race to the extent that
compliance with such prohibitions can be verified by national technical
means."

2. Add the following separate paragraph after the second paragraph, in
subsection C.1(c) /Nuclear disarmament/ on page 27:

"An agreement should be sought by the two major nuclear powers to cease
production of additional fissionable material for nuclear weapons purposes.
Such an agreement would require agreement on adequate verification
arrangements including the acceptance of full-scope safeguards."

3. Parallel to paragraph 2 above, the following separate paragraph should also
be added to subsection C.1(g) /Non-proliferation/ on page 33:

"If an adequately verified agreement can be reached between the two
major powers to cease the production of fissionable material for weapons
purposes, a multilateral treaty prohibiting the production of fissionable
material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices should be
negotiated as soon as possible. Such a treaty, to which nuclear-weapons
and non-nuclear-weapon States might adhere, would provide a common basis for
the acceptance of full-scope safeguards."

78-13742
4. In subsection C.4 /Reduction of military budgets and expenditure/ on page 37, after the first paragraph, add the following separate paragraph:

"Limiting and then progressively reducing, on an agreed and verifiable basis, spending on new strategic nuclear weapons systems, including their research and development, by the major nuclear powers would be a further means of curbing the qualitative dimension of the nuclear arms race. Such agreements on restraint or reduction will require full openness in reporting and full effectiveness in authenticating military budgets."
UNITED NATIONS DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE
MAY 23-30
ANALYSIS OF CANADIAN PRESS COVERAGE

News

Prime Minister Trudeau's participation served as the focal point for Canadian newspaper coverage of the opening week of the United Nations Disarmament Conference, May 23 to 30.

Apart from the Prime Minister's intervention, coverage was sparse. Even where the reporting did go beyond this, it was to some extent a function of the fact that there was a sizeable Canadian press corps in New York for the Trudeau visit. For instance the London Free Press carried a quite extensive story on page 3, by John McHugh, about French President Valery Giscard d'Estaing's speech a day before Mr. Trudeau's.

There were a fair number of advance situational, setting the conference against the background of the $400 billion being spent yearly for armaments, but emphasizing the odds against this particular meeting doing anything concrete to relieve the burden.

"Hopes Dim for Disarmament Break", was the headline put on a curtain-raiser by John Walker of Southam News Services, printed in the Calgary Herald.

Several papers, in their news coverage as well as in their editorial columns, drew attention to the incongruity of the Disarmament Conference opening just one week before the Nato Summit in Washington which was to call for increased Western defence spending. Lise Bissonnette of Le Devoir wrote about Mr. Trudeau's transformation from "a dove to a hawk" in a one-week period on the international scene.


By comparison, coverage given to other world leaders, such as Vice-President Mondale and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, was relatively slender. In most cases they ended up on the inside pages or were crowded out altogether.

...2
Editorial Comment

It was all, or nearly all, tied to the Prime Minister's speech. Most of it was favorable -- contrary to some of the comments in the foreign press, notably the London Daily Express and the Washington Post.

An exception to the rule was the London Free Press, which found Mr. Trudeau's exposition "unexceptional". The Prime Minister had offered little more than "some common-place observations on the perils of unrestricted military spending and some impractical suggestions for reform".

The Citizen said Mr. Trudeau was correct in stating that Canada had become the first country to divest itself of nuclear weapons. But if Canada's example were followed by West European countries, the foundation might be laid for a new conflict because the balance of terror would be upset.

Mr. Trudeau's four-point "strategy of suffocation" of the nuclear arms race made more sense. It would deter development and production of new nuclear arms..."an excellent place to start".

The Ottawa Journal called it "a thoughtful, constructive speech, with some usefully specific proposals". The Journal also commented on the significance of the meeting itself: "Given the United Nations' record and proclivities to turn its most serious sessions into fruitless propaganda battles, the surprising thing is that so many nations have taken the disarmament meeting so seriously".

The Edmonton Journal called it a good speech but -- like some other papers -- denounced the Prime Minister's "hypocrisy" in pointing moralistically at other nations while Canada enjoys U.S. nuclear protection.

Other Editorial Samplings:

Vancouver Sun -- "Prime Minister Trudeau's plan to de-escalate the international nuclear arms race through what he calls a 'strategy of suffocation' is an interesting and positive concept."

Montreal Gazette -- "The Prime Minister's call for a strategy of 'suffocation' in the laboratories of applied weapons research...is a logical one that could provide thought for the Assembly's further deliberations."

Globe and Mail -- "Mr. Trudeau touched the essential bases: the need to stop, in the laboratory, the development of new weapons systems; the need to keep in check the production of existing weapons systems; the need to freeze the materials and the technology from which new weapons are developed..."
Montreal Star -- "Prime Minister Trudeau's suggestion in the U.N. debate to suffocate the arms race in the laboratory stage of weapon development is consistent with diverting man's inventiveness to other, peaceful purposes."

The columnists were equally kind to Mr. Trudeau. Richard Gwyn of the Toronto Star wrote that the Prime Minister "may just have offered the U.N. what this sadly ineffectual organization most needs -- a measured diagnosis of the causes of the arms race and a tactical prescription for a cure."

W.A. Wilson of the Montreal Star described Mr. Trudeau's statement as "a new, thoughtful and searching analysis of one of the world's most intractable problems."

In another column, after both the Disarmament Conference and the NATO conference were over, Mr. Wilson noted that public criticism of Mr. Trudeau had been generated by "some unnecessary references to nuclear weapons."

"Some of the officials involved in the preparation of Mr. Trudeau's two speeches were not anxious to include the passages that subsequently drew fire and the insistence on having them there was apparently political", reported Mr. Wilson.

Southam columnist Charles Lynch wrote that Mr. Trudeau's speech "raises shades of dear old Howard Green" -- the Diefenbaker-era External Affairs Minister who made disarmament and arms control a personal crusade.

"Compared to Howard Green, Pierre Trudeau is very much a Johnny-come-lately at the disarmament table."

Postscript: The Toronto Sunday Star (Ron Lowman) reported that Mr. Trudeau had ignored his defence experts' advice that the neutron bomb is a much less horrible weapon than present atomic bombs. The newspaper quoted an unnamed Ottawa source. In his speech Mr. Trudeau commended President Carter's decision to postpone production of the neutron bomb, but avoided taking any stand for or against it.
APPENDIX

Papers Included in the Survey

Vancouver Sun
Calgary Herald
Edmonton Journal
Regina Leader-Post
Saskatoon Star-Phoenix
Winnipeg Free Press
London Free Press
Toronto Star
Toronto Sunday Star
Toronto Globe and Mail
Ottawa Journal
Ottawa Citizen
Le Devoir
La Presse
Montreal Star
Montreal Gazette
Halifax Chronicle-Herald
PREPARATORY COMMITTEE FOR THE SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY DEVOTED TO DISARMAMENT

Working document containing a draft declaration on disarmament:
Australia, Canada, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Federal Republic of, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
DRAFT DECLARATION ON DISARMAMENT

WORKING DOCUMENT

I

Introduction

The States Members of the United Nations who met in New York from 23 May to 28 June 1978 to attend the United Nations special session on disarmament,

1. Recalling their solemn obligation enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State;

2. Considering the devastation visited on mankind by wars and the urgent need to make every effort to remove the scourge of war and to take measures to safeguard the security of all peoples;

3. Considering the importance of the adherence by all States to existing multilateral treaties on arms control and disarmament;

4. Bearing in mind the complexity and importance of the problems of disarmament which affect the vital security interests and the territorial integrity of all States;

5. Recognizing that all States must be concerned with the maintenance and strengthening of international security and with the essential part to be played in its enhancement by arms control and disarmament measures in the field of both nuclear and conventional weapons;

6. Noting that enormous expenditures on a world-wide scale for arms and military forces absorb material and human resources from the peaceful economic and social development of all countries;

7. Convinced therefore that arms limitation and disarmament can make a major contribution to furthering international peace and security and to the economic and social advances of mankind;

Declare as follows:

II

GENERAL OBJECTIVES

1. The ultimate goal of disarmament negotiations is to ensure the survival of mankind and the elimination of the possibility of war through the strengthening of international peace, security and stability.
2. To this end agreement should be reached on a comprehensive and integrated programme of action designed to ensure that:

(a) Disarmament is general and complete under strict and effective international control;

(b) Such disarmament is accompanied by the establishment of reliable procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes and that effective arrangements are undertaken for the maintenance of peace and security in accordance with the principle of the United Nations Charter.

General and complete disarmament shall permit States to have at their disposal only those non-nuclear forces, armaments, facilities and establishments as are agreed to be necessary to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens and in order that States shall support and provide agreed manpower for a United Nations peace force.

3. A further goal is to release resources in order to facilitate efforts to attain a more just world order which will eliminate present inequalities in the world community and to ensure that a significant portion of the resources freed by disarmament are devoted to the satisfaction of the economic and social needs of humanity, particularly in developing countries.

III

MAJOR PRINCIPLES GOVERNING RELATIONS AMONG STATES

1. States Members of the United Nations reaffirm their commitment to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. Of particular relevance in this context are those principles relating to their obligations concerning international collective security, peaceful means of settlement of disputes and non-intervention in the internal affairs of other States.

2. States Members of the United Nations affirm their commitment to undertake confidence building measures for the purposes of relaxing international tensions.

IV

PRINCIPLES GOVERNING DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS

1. In order to promote disarmament efforts, it is important to secure the active participation and support of all States and particularly the nuclear-weapon States, and of other militarily significant States, for disarmament negotiations.

2. Arms control and disarmament measures will be most effective when it is apparent to all States concerned that the measures are in their interests and represent concrete progress towards the goal of enhanced security and peace. To ensure that all parties are convinced that their vital interests have been sufficiently protected it is important that negotiations should be conducted on the
basis of a consensus about the objectives of the measures and, wherever possible, the terms of any agreements eventually adopted.

3. All measures of disarmament should be balanced to ensure that the security of all States is safeguarded and that no State or group of States can gain military advantage at any stage. The goal is undiminished security at a lower level of armaments and military forces.

4. This implies the graduated reduction of manpower and armaments to agreed levels, coupled with other necessary measures to ensure that an over-all balance is achieved which is judged by all parties to be satisfactory for their own security.

5. Progress in the arms control and disarmament field is dependent upon agreement on effective methods of verification. A combination of several methods of verification should be employed, including, as appropriate, international inspection and control in order to achieve the necessary assurances that a certain arms control or disarmament measure is being observed by all parties.

6. Negotiations on limited measures of disarmament should not preclude negotiations on a treaty of general and complete disarmament.

V

GENERAL MEASURES OF DISARMAMENT AND PRIORITIES

1. Multilateral disarmament measures dealing with specific issues including those on a regional basis, should be undertaken as soon as possible as a contribution to progress, step by step, towards the ultimate objective of achieving general and complete disarmament:

(a) Nuclear weapons and non-proliferation

No State can regard itself as immune from the tragic consequences of a global war fought with nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. The common vulnerability of States makes it essential that they should plan an effective role in the achievement of international peace and security and share in the responsibility for the achievement of effective arms control and disarmament measures. Nuclear-weapon Powers and other militarily significant States have particular responsibilities in this regard.

Eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons in the context of general and complete disarmament is the most important challenge of our time since the dangers of nuclear warfare remain a grave threat to the survival of mankind. Partial agreements on nuclear arms control and, in particular, universal adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty can make a vital contribution to progress towards this goal. Efforts to curb and reverse the nuclear arms race must include measures to prevent both horizontal and vertical proliferation. There must be progress in both areas in order to enhance international security.
The establishment under appropriate conditions of nuclear-weapon-free zones could contribute to strengthening the security of all members of such zones and to the prevention of proliferation of nuclear weapons.

While recognizing the inalienable right of all States to develop research, production and the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and to enjoy the benefits thereof, as well as the importance of strengthening international co-operation in that field, it is also essential to ensure through the application of appropriate international safeguards, in particular, those of the International Atomic Energy Agency, that the peaceful application of nuclear energy will not lead to further proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

States must ensure that the régime of non-proliferation is strengthened, as a minimum, by the application of internationally agreed controls to international transfers of nuclear material, equipment and technology.

(b) Chemical weapons

The effective prohibition and elimination of weapons of mass destruction other than nuclear weapons, and in particular chemical weapons, and of any future weapons based on new scientific principles which have characteristics comparable in destructive effects, are of great importance.

(c) Conventional weapons

Most of the world's military expenditure is being devoted to the acquisition and maintenance of conventional military power. This absorbs essential material and human resources. All States should make all possible efforts parallel to those in the field of nuclear disarmament to halt this diversion of resources and to achieve concrete measures for their reallocation from military to civilian purposes. To this end it will be necessary to intensify research on how best to achieve this goal.

The increasing build-up of conventional arms in many parts of the world involves a potential risk of heightening military tension and endangering international peace and security. The unabated international transfer of conventional arms should be brought under control.

Reduction of military budgets in all countries on an assured basis could provide undiminished security at a lower level of armaments, help to reduce international tensions and also lead eventually to the release of resources both nationally and internationally for economic and social development.

These objectives and principles are hereby declared to constitute the guidelines for the Programme of Action on Disarmament.
Draft programme of action

Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: working paper

I. GENERAL

The States Members of the United Nations at the eighth special session of the General Assembly solemnly affirm that their ultimate goal is general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. They recognize that this goal requires an increase in international confidence and security to remove the incentive for States to acquire weapons and to encourage them to reduce these from present levels. The States Members therefore believe that a serious world-wide disarmament strategy must be accompanied by a greater and sustained effort to eliminate the sources of tension and injustice in the world and to increase the effectiveness of international machinery in the United Nations and elsewhere for the peaceful settlement of disputes; to uphold the international rule of law; and to promote the political, civil, social and economic rights of man. This strategy should take into account not only the quantitative but also the qualitative aspect of disarmament, and should result in the release of resources for the satisfaction of the economic and social needs of humanity particularly in the developing countries.

This programme of action sets out in chapter II priority negotiations for completion over the next few years. In addition it proposes concurrent measures and studies to prepare the way for future negotiations and for progress towards general and complete disarmament. It gives practical effect to the principles set down in the Declaration on Disarmament. A prerequisite for a successful disarmament strategy is the adherence of all States to existing arms control and disarmament agreements.
II. IMMEDIATE MEASURES OF ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

1. In the nuclear field, in which the nuclear-weapon States have a particular responsibility, the realization of the central objectives of preventing both horizontal and vertical proliferation by:

The halting and the reversal of the nuclear-arms race in its quantitative and qualitative dimensions; especially by a second strategic arms limitation agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union, to be followed urgently by further strategic arms negotiations with the objective of reducing and eventually eliminating nuclear weapons;

The earliest conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty banning all nuclear explosions in all environments, which should be adhered to as soon as possible by all States, particularly all nuclear-weapon States and should contain verification provisions giving maximum confidence that no party would conduct clandestine tests;

Further measures to develop an international consensus on the strengthening and consolidation of the nuclear-non-proliferation régime, based primarily on adherence of all States to the NPT and on the system of safeguards of the IAEA. Measures to be pursued should include assistance to the IAEA in its attempts to strengthen its safeguards system; the application of IAEA safeguards on all source and special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities; agreement on adequate standards for the physical protection of nuclear materials; study and possible development of alternative and more proliferation-resistant nuclear technologies; an examination of the possibility of giving a suitable international character to appropriate nuclear-fuel-cycle operations, and to effective measures for the control of plutonium in civil nuclear programmes; and support for the work currently being undertaken in the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation. These measures should be designed to facilitate international access to the use of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes and take account of the particular needs of the developing countries in this area, as well as to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons;

The establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones suitable to specific conditions in the regions concerned through agreement between all States in the region and with effective co-operation from nuclear-weapon States.

2. Assurances, as appropriate, by nuclear-weapon States designed to increase the confidence of non-nuclear-weapon States in their own security from nuclear attack.

3. Other weapons of mass destruction:

A convention prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and regulating their destruction;

A convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons;
Continuing review of the question of new weapons of mass destruction based on new scientific principles with a view to consideration of agreements on the prohibition of any new weapons which may be identified.

4. Conventional weapons and armed forces:

Agreements or other measures on a bilateral, regional and multilateral basis for placing restrictions on the production, transfer and acquisition of conventional weapons;

Conventions prohibiting or limiting the future use in armed conflict of certain conventional weapons which may be indiscriminate in their effects or may cause unnecessary suffering;

Agreements or other measures on a regional basis, aiming at strengthening peace and security, in particular urgent efforts to contribute to a more stable military relationship in Europe.

5. The measures listed above should form part of a balanced programme of disarmament and provide for adequate verification including, if appropriate, the possibility of on-site inspection. Verification provisions should be so designed as to ensure the effectiveness of agreements and to enhance mutual confidence.
III. THE FURTHER STRENGTHENING OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND CONFIDENCE

In addition to undertaking the specific arms control and disarmament tasks described above, the States Members of the United Nations, in order to strengthen international confidence and deepen the dialogue between those involved in defence matters in different countries, should:

1. Support the Secretary-General in his efforts further to strengthen the expertise and capability of the United Nations to play its essential role as a catalyst in the disarmament process;

2. Encourage the further discussion and development by the CCD of a comprehensive programme for disarmament;

3. Publish detailed information about their armed forces, and the total value of their arms production and of their transfers of arms to other countries;

4. Supply full information on military budgets using the method shortly to be finalized through a pilot study by the Secretary-General for the standardized reporting of such budgets as a step toward verified and balanced reductions in military expenditure;

5. Assess the possible implications of military research and development for existing agreements as well as for further efforts in the field of arms control and disarmament;

6. Seek to restrain the world-wide build-up of conventional weapons, utilizing all means which could lead to bilateral, regional, and multilateral measures of control, limitation and balanced reduction of such armaments;

7. Accept adequate provisions of international control as appropriate to facilitate the conclusion and effectiveness of disarmament agreements;

8. Stimulate public awareness of disarmament issues by:

   Publicizing the final documents of the special session, in particular through non-governmental organizations, mass media and educational systems,

   Facilitating public access to information on disarmament questions,

   Improving mechanisms for the dissemination of relevant United Nations publications, and

   Encouraging study and research on disarmament;

9. Take the following actions to increase confidence between States bilaterally, regionally or world-wide:
To inform States, on a regional basis, and in accordance with regionally established criteria, 21 days or more in advance about their intention to carry out major military movements or manoeuvres;

To invite observers from States on a regional basis to manoeuvres and encourage military visits and exchanges of all kinds on a reciprocal basis;

To improve communications between Governments, particularly in areas of tension, by the establishment of "hot lines" and other methods of reducing the risk of conflict due to misunderstanding or miscalculation.
IV. STUDIES TO FACILITATE FURTHER MEASURES

In order to facilitate further steps in disarmament and parallel measures to promote international peace and security, the Secretary-General is requested to carry out studies relating to:

1. The strengthening of the security role of the United Nations in peacekeeping and the peaceful settlement of disputes to enable it to anticipate and resolve international crises;

2. Ways of limiting the build-up of conventional weapons, regionally and throughout the world, taking into account all relevant aspects, inter alia:
   - The international transfer of conventional weapons;
   - The possibility of reciprocal limitation of the level and types of conventional weapons;
   - The proposal for a United Nations register of weapons transfers;

3. The relationship between disarmament and development to be initiated as soon as possible after the special session. The terms of reference of this study should be on the basis of the report of the ad hoc group of governmental experts;

4. All regional aspects of disarmament, including further measures designed to increase confidence and stability as well as means of promoting disarmament on a regional basis;

5. The possible contribution to confidence-building among States of technical measures such as demilitarized zones, zones of limited forces and surveillance and early warning systems which could be used as appropriate in areas of tension; and on the use of some of these measures in the verification of arms control agreements.

V. IMPLEMENTATION

All States undertake to work toward the fulfilment of this programme, and to respect agreed measures relating to it. The General Assembly should examine its implementation, as appropriate, taking account of the recommendations on disarmament machinery made later in the final document.
DRAFT RESOLUTION EMBODYING A DRAFT FINAL DOCUMENT OF
THE SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY DEVOTED
TO DISARMAMENT

The General Assembly,

Alarmed by the threat to the very survival of mankind posed by the existence
of nuclear weapons and the continuing arms race, and recalling the devastation
inflicted by all wars,

Convinced that disarmament and arms limitation, particularly in the nuclear
field, are essential for the prevention of the danger of nuclear war and the
strengthening of international peace and security and for the economic and social
advancement of all peoples, thus facilitating the achievement of the new
international economic order,

Having resolved to lay the foundations of an international disarmament
strategy which, through co-ordinated and persevering efforts in which the United
Nations should play a more effective role, aims at general and complete disarmament
under effective international control,

Adopts the following Final Document of this special session of the General
Assembly devoted to disarmament.

NB: In the following text the bracketed sections indicate
wordings under negotiation or dispute.
C. /Principles/

Negotiations and measures in the field of disarmament shall be guided by the fundamental principles set forth below.

1. All States Members of the United Nations reaffirm their commitment to and strict observance of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and further developed in the Declaration on Friendly Relations of the United Nations and other instruments of international law, in particular the non-use of force or the threat of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of any State, non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of States and the peaceful settlement of disputes/having regard to the inherent right of States to individual and collective self-defence/.

2. In accordance with the Charter, the United Nations has the primary role and responsibility in the sphere of disarmament. In order effectively to discharge this role and facilitate and encourage all measures in this field, the United Nations General Assembly should be kept appropriately informed of all steps in this field, whether unilateral, bilateral, regional or multilateral, without prejudice to the progress of negotiations, on a strictly voluntary basis, as arranged with other parties to the negotiations/.

3. All the peoples of the world have a vital interest in the success of disarmament negotiations. Consequently, all States have the duty to contribute to efforts in the field of disarmament. All States have the right to participate on an equal footing in disarmament negotiations which have a direct bearing on their national security. While disarmament is the responsibility of all States, the nuclear-weapon States have the primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament, and, together with other militarily significant States for halting and reversing the arms race. It is therefore important to secure their active participation.

4. The adoption of disarmament measures should take place in such an equitable and balanced manner as to ensure the right of each State to security and that no individual State or group of States may obtain advantages over others at any stage. At each stage the objective should be undiminished security at the lowest possible level of armaments and military forces.

5. /An acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations for nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States should be strictly observed./

6. Disarmament and arms limitation agreements should provide for adequate measures of verification in order to create the necessary confidence and ensure that they are being observed by all parties. The form and modalities of the verification to be provided for in any specific agreement depend on and should be determined by the purposes, scope and nature of the agreement /and should allow for the widest possible participation of all parties/, directly or through the United Nations system in the verification process and for the right of access

       /14/ Agreements should provide for the participation of parties in the verification process and for rights of access to all relevant information (Text proposed by Australia).
If it is desired — which is imperative — that the purposes and principles of the Declaration should be upheld by corresponding actions, it was essential to take steps of specific disarmament measures, selected by common accord as those on which there is a consensus to the effect that their implementation in the short term appears to be feasible. There was also a need to establish procedures for watching over the fulfilment of the obligations thus assumed, on the one hand, and, on the other, for ensuring the preparation, painstakingly negotiated, of a comprehensive disarmament programme which, passing through all the necessary stages, should culminate in general and complete disarmament under effective international control. That is the purpose of the Programme of Action.

Although the decisive factor for achieving real measures of disarmament is what it is customary to call the "political will" of States, and especially of those possessing nuclear weapons, a role that is in no way insignificant can also be played in this matter through the existence and effective functioning of an appropriate international mechanism or machinery. Consequently, the two kinds of organs required to that end, the deliberative and the negotiating organs, which are presently in existence or might be established, should have the most appropriate organization and procedures in order to obtain from them the constructive results sought. The fourth and last section of this Final Document has been prepared with that end in view.

II. DECLARATION

A. [Review and appraisal]

1. [Removing the threat of a world war is the most acute and urgent task of the present day.] Mankind today is confronted with an unprecedented threat of self-extinction arising from the massive and competitive accumulation of the most destructive weapons ever produced. Existing arsenals of nuclear weapons alone are more than sufficient to destroy all life on earth. [Failure to achieve concrete results in the field of nuclear disarmament is a major factor increasing the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons.] Yet the arms race continues. Military budgets are constantly growing, with enormous consumption of human and material resources. The increase in weapons, especially nuclear weapons, far from helping to strengthen international security, on the contrary, now weakens it. The vast stockpiles and tremendous build-up of arms and armed forces and the competition for qualitative refinement of weapons of all kinds to which scientific resources and technological advances are diverted, pose incalculable threats to peace. This situation both reflects and aggravates international tensions, sharpens conflicts in various regions of the world, hinders the process of détente, exacerbates the differences between opposing military alliances, jeopardizes the security of all States and increases the threat of nuclear war. [Failure to halt and reverse the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race, to reassure the non-nuclear-weapon States about their security and to ensure universality and non-discrimination in the régime of non-proliferation increases the danger of the spread of nuclear weapons.]

2. Since the end of the Second World War, unresolved conflicts of national interests, uncertainty and distrust among States, combined with rivalry among major Powers on a global scale, the actions of the enemies of détente and disarmament and the interests of the military industrial complex, and an unprecedented technological revolution in weaponry have resulted in a massive and
The arms race, particularly in its nuclear aspect, runs counter to efforts to achieve further relaxation of international tension, to establish international relations based on peaceful coexistence and trust between all States, and to develop broad international co-operation and understanding. The arms race impedes the realization of the purposes and is incompatible with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations especially respect for sovereignty, refraining from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or the political independence of any State, peaceful settlement of disputes and non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of States. It also adversely affects the rights of peoples freely to determine their systems of social and economic development, and hinders the struggle for self-determination and the elimination of colonial rule, racial or foreign domination or occupation.

3. Enduring international peace and security cannot be built on the accumulation of weaponry nor be sustained by military alliances, doctrines of strategic superiority or a precarious balance of deterrence. Genuine and lasting peace can only be created through the effective implementation of the security system provided for in the Charter of the United Nations and the speedy and substantial reduction of arms and armed forces, by international agreement and mutual example leading ultimately to general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

4. Since the process of disarmament affects the vital security interests of all States, they must all be actively concerned with and contribute to the measures of disarmament and arms limitations, which have an essential part to play in maintaining and strengthening international security. Therefore the role and responsibility of the United Nations in the sphere of disarmament, in accordance with its Charter, must be duly recognized and strengthened.

5. It is essential that not only Governments but also the peoples of the world recognize and understand the dangers in the present situation. In order that an international conscience may develop and that world public opinion may exercise a positive influence, the United Nations should increase the dissemination of information on the arms races and disarmament with the full co-operation of Member States.

6. In a world of finite resources there is a close relationship between expenditure on armaments and economic and social development. Military expenditures are reaching ever higher levels, the highest percentage of which can be attributed to the nuclear-weapon States and [their allies] [major military alliances] with prospects of further expansion and the danger of further increases in the expenditures of other countries. The hundreds of billions of dollars spent annually on the manufacture or improvement of weapons are in sombre and dramatic contrast to the want and poverty in which two thirds of the world's population live. This colossal waste of resources is even more serious in that it diverts to military purposes not only material, but also technical and human resources which are...

2/ The accumulation of weaponry by opposing military alliances, doctrines of strategic superiority and a fragile balance of deterrence provide, at best, an uncertain and precarious basis for international peace and security (United States proposal as alternative to first sentence of para. 3).
urgently needed for development in all countries, particularly in the developing
countries. Thus, the economic and social consequences of the arms race are so
detrimental that its continuation is obviously incompatible with the implementation
of the new international economic order, based on justice, equity and co-operation.
Consequently, resources released as a result of the implementation of disarmament
measures should be used in a manner which will help to promote the well-being of
all peoples.

7. Disarmament has thus become an imperative and most urgent task facing the
international community. No real progress has been made so far in the crucial
field of the reduction of armaments. However, certain positive changes in
international relations in some areas of the world provide some encouragement.
Agreements have been reached that have been important in limiting certain weapons
or eliminating them altogether, as in the case of the Convention on the Prohibition
of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and
Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, 10/ and excluding particular areas from
the arms race. The fact remains that these agreements relate only to measures of
limited restraint while the arms race continues. These partial measures have done
little to bring the world closer to the goal of general and complete disarmament
which has not been actively pursued for more than a decade/ which has been
virtually ignored for more than a decade/. [For more than a decade there have been
no negotiations on a treaty on general and complete disarmament.] The pressing need
now is to translate into practical terms the provisions of this Final Document and
to proceed along the road of binding and effective international agreements in the
field of disarmament.

8. [Removing the threat of a world war is the most acute and urgent task of the
present day.] [Mankind is confronted with a choice: we must halt the arms race
and proceed to disarmament or perish.]

B. [Goals and priorities]

1. The ultimate objective of the efforts of States in the disarmament process is
general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

The principal goals of disarmament are to ensure the survival of mankind and
to eliminate the danger of war, in particular nuclear war, to ensure that war is
no longer an instrument for settling international disputes and that the use and
the threat of force are eliminated from international life, and to ensure
international security by other means/.

Progress towards this objective requires the conclusion and implementation of
agreements on the cessation of the arms race and on genuine measures of disarmament.

2. Among such measures, [The highest priority must be given to] nuclear
dismament and the prevention of nuclear war [are of the highest priority]. To
this end it is equally imperative to remove the threat of nuclear weapons, to halt
and reverse the nuclear arms race by [stopping the production of nuclear weapons
and] progressive reduction of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems until
their total elimination has been achieved, and to prevent the proliferation of

10/ See General Assembly resolution 2826 (XXVI), annex.
nuclear weapons on a universal and non-discriminatory basis, without infringing on the sovereign rights of States, or hindering international co-operation and the peaceful uses of nuclear technology. 11/

3. Along with these, agreements or other effective measures should be adopted to prohibit or prevent the development, production or use of other weapons of mass destruction. In this context, an agreement on elimination of all chemical weapons should be concluded as a matter of high priority.

(4 or 5). Further international action should be taken to prohibit or restrict for humanitarian reasons the use of incendiary and other specific/certain/ conventional weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects. 12/

(5 or 4). Together with negotiations on nuclear disarmament measures, negotiations on the limitation and balanced/reduction of armed forces and of conventional weapons, including the production and international transfer of such weapons, should be carried out with particular emphasis on armed forces and conventional weapons of nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant countries, taking into account the need of States to protect their security.

6. Collateral measures both in the nuclear and conventional fields, together with other measures specifically designed to build confidence, should be undertaken in order to contribute to the creation of favourable conditions for the adoption of additional disarmament measures and to further relaxation of international tension. Among these measures, consideration should be given to the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions, security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States and the conclusion of regional agreements on the reduction of armed forces and armaments. 13/ These measures should include the conclusion of the treaty on the non-use of force in international relations. 13/

11/ Among such measures the highest priority is nuclear disarmament and, to this end, it is imperative to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race, prevent the further proliferation of nuclear weapons and reduce progressively nuclear weapons, together with their delivery systems, until the total elimination of nuclear weapons has been achieved.

At the same time, other measures designed to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war and to lessen the danger of the threat or use of nuclear weapons should be taken (alternative proposal by the United States of America to para. 2).

12/ (4 or 5). There should also be further international action to prohibit or restrict for humanitarian reasons the use of certain conventional weapons including any which may be deemed to have indiscriminate effects or cause unnecessary suffering (suggestion by the United States of America to be placed with conventional weapons).

13/ For consideration depending on the outcome of the negotiations in the Programme of Action.

-21-
C. Principles

Negotiations and measures in the field of disarmament shall be guided by the fundamental principles set forth below.

1. All States Members of the United Nations reaffirm their commitment to and strict observance of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and further developed in the Declaration on Friendly Relations of the United Nations and other instruments of international law, in particular the non-use of force or the threat of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of any State, non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of States and the peaceful settlement of disputes, having regard to the inherent right of States to individual and collective self-defence.

2. In accordance with the Charter, the United Nations has a primary role and responsibility in the sphere of disarmament. In order effectively to discharge this role and facilitate and encourage all measures in this field, the United Nations General Assembly should be kept appropriately informed of all steps in this field, whether unilateral, bilateral, regional or multilateral, without prejudice to the progress of negotiations, on a strictly voluntary basis, as arranged with other parties to the negotiations.

3. All the peoples of the world have a vital interest in the success of disarmament negotiations. Consequently, all States have the duty to contribute to efforts in the field of disarmament. All States have the right to participate on an equal footing in disarmament negotiations which have a direct bearing on their national security. While disarmament is the responsibility of all States, the nuclear-weapon States have the primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament, and, together with other militarily significant States for halting and reversing the arms race. It is therefore important to secure their active participation.

4. The adoption of disarmament measures should take place in such an equitable and balanced manner as to ensure the right of each State to security and that no individual State or group of States may obtain advantages over others at any stage. At each stage the objective should be undiminished security at the lowest possible level of armaments and military forces.

5. An acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations for nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States should be strictly observed.

6. Disarmament and arms limitation agreements should provide for adequate measures of verification in order to create the necessary confidence and ensure that they are being observed by all parties. The form and modalities of the verification to be provided for in any specific agreement depend on and should be determined by the purposes, scope and nature of the agreement and should allow for the widest possible participation of all parties, directly or through the United Nations system, in the verification process and for the right of access.

Agreements should provide for the participation of parties in the verification process and for rights of access to all relevant information (Text proposed by Australia).
to all relevant information/. Where appropriate, a combination of several methods of verification as well as other compliance procedures should be employed.

7. The use or threat of use of force including nuclear weapons contrary to the Charter of the United Nations is indefensible under any circumstances. The renunciation of the use or threat of force is of great importance to ensure more favourable conditions for halting the arms race and it should become a norm of international life. Any State using nuclear and thermonuclear weapons is to be considered as violating the Charter of the United Nations, as acting contrary to the laws of humanity, and as committing a crime against mankind and civilization. The use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States which have renounced the acquisition and use of such weapons is indefensible under any circumstances. To that end the nuclear-weapon States must give legally binding assurances to such non-nuclear-weapon States.

8. Taking into account the distinction to be made between zones where nuclear weapons are an element of the general equilibrium and zones where its introduction would constitute a dramatic factor of imbalance. The creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones constitutes one of the most effective disarmament measures that can and should be initiated by the non-nuclear-weapon States. The nuclear-weapon States should undertake wherever possible legally binding obligations to respect the status of nuclear-weapon-free zones, to refrain from contributing in any way to the performance in the territories forming part of the zone of acts which involve a violation of such statutes and to refrain from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against the States included in the zone provided that such zones are genuinely free of nuclear weapons, that relevant agreements contain no loopholes and fully correspond to the generally recognized norms of international law. The establishment of zones of peace in various regions of the world can also contribute to the strengthening of security and promotion of friendly relations among States within such zones and international peace and security as a whole.

9. Disarmament, relaxation of international tension and the strengthening of international peace and security are directly related to each other. Progress in any of these spheres has a beneficial effect on all of them; in turn, failure in one sphere has negative effects on others.

10. There is also a direct close relationship between disarmament and development. Progress in the former would contribute greatly to the realization of the latter and vice versa. Furthermore, development through disarmament has an increased beneficial effect on the strengthening of international peace and security, and it should be actively pursued. Therefore, a substantial part of the resources released as a result of the implementation of disarmament measures should be devoted to economic and social development of all nations and helping bridge the economic gap between developed and developing countries. The release of resources resulting from these measures should increase the capacity of developed countries to provide support to developing countries in their efforts towards accelerating their economic and social progress. There is a close relationship between the level of resources devoted to armaments and those required for development.

11. Measures of disarmament shall not be construed in such a way as to hamper/should be consistent with the exercise of the inalienable right of all States
Without discrimination to develop, transfer, acquire or use nuclear technology, equipment or materials for peaceful purposes and to determine their peaceful nuclear programmes in accordance with their national priorities, needs and interests. Such measures must not hinder the strengthening of international co-operation in that field. In order to ensure that the peaceful application of nuclear energy does not lead to further proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, access to such technology, equipment and material and its application for peaceful purposes should be subject to universal, standardized and non-discriminatory international safeguards agreed upon by supplier and recipient States. Appropriate national and international measures, including in particular the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system to cover all relevant nuclear activities of non-nuclear-weapon States applied through the International Atomic Energy Agency on a non-discriminatory basis and without jeopardizing the respective fuel cycle policies of various countries or international co-operation, agreements and contracts for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy which should be fulfilled in good faith in accordance with their terms and provisions.

12. In disarmament negotiations should be given to measures of nuclear disarmament of the highest priority. In this connexion, the limitation and reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments should also be an important objective. In disarmament negotiations high priority should be given to measures of nuclear disarmament. Nevertheless, while the principles of disarmament are everywhere the same, the practical application should be adapted to the diversity of specific situations and the variety of regional contexts.

13. Negotiations on partial measures of disarmament should be conducted concurrently with negotiations on more comprehensive measures and should not preclude negotiations for general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

14. Qualitative and quantitative disarmament measures are both important for halting the arms race. Efforts to that end must include negotiations on the limitation and prevention of the qualitative improvement of armaments, especially weapons of mass destruction and the development of new means of warfare so that ultimately scientific and technological achievements may be used solely for peaceful purposes.

15. In order to help create confidence among all States and to agreements with disarmament implications, should fully comply with the provisions contained therein all States should accede to relevant existing international agreements which are non-discriminatory and in which they have negotiated with the active participation of all States aimed at limiting the arms race and achieving disarmament. In addition, every effort should be made to facilitate and achieve the widest possible adherence to existing international agreements which have been approved by consensus by the United Nations General Assembly.

16. The maintenance of foreign military bases and the presence of foreign military troops on the territory of a State without its consent represents a permanent threat to the establishment of genuine and effective national and regional security and therefore to the strengthening of international peace and security. In the process of general disarmament, it is appropriate to consider
measures that could provide for the dismantling or conversion to peaceful use of military bases and facilities wherever they might be located.

17. In order to create necessary conditions for successes in the disarmament process, all States should strictly abide by the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and display a constructive approach to negotiations and the political will to reach agreements and refrain from actions which might in any way adversely affect efforts in the field of disarmament.

18. Since prompt measures should be taken in order to halt and reverse the arms race, Member States hereby declare that they will respect the above-stated objectives and principles and make every effort to carry out the Programme of Action set forth in section III below.

III. PROGRAMME OF ACTION

A. Objectives/General and complete disarmament

Progress towards the goal of general and complete disarmament can be achieved through the implementation of a programme of action on disarmament, in accordance with the goals and principles established in the Declaration on Disarmament. The present Programme of Action contains priorities and measures in the field of disarmament that States should undertake as a matter of urgency with a view to halting the arms race and to giving the necessary impetus to efforts designed to achieve genuine disarmament leading to general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

B. Priorities

The present Programme of Action enumerates the specific measures of disarmament which should be implemented over the next few years, as well as other measures and studies to prepare the way for future negotiations and for progress towards general and complete disarmament.

Priorities in disarmament negotiations shall be: nuclear weapons; other weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons; conventional weapons, including any which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects; and reduction of armed forces.

Negotiations on all the priority items should be conducted concurrently.

C. Immediate and short-term measures to halt and reverse the arms race

1. Nuclear weapons

Nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of civilization. It is essential to halt and reverse the nuclear-arms race in all its aspects in order to avert the danger of war involving nuclear weapons. The ultimate goal in this context is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. To this end steps should be taken urgently to stop the build-up of nuclear arsenals, to reduce stockpiles of nuclear weapons and to halt further development of production of new types of nuclear armaments. The nuclear-weapon States
particularly the two leading nuclear-weapon States\slash bear a special responsibility for realization of these tasks.

Alternative 1
\slash Measures of nuclear disarmament will require parallel progress in the limitation and reduction of the armed forces of States and of their conventional weapons.\slash \slash In turn\slash

Alternative 2
\slash Real progress in the field of nuclear disarmament could create an atmosphere which could contribute to progress in conventional disarmament.\slash and vice versa.\slash

Alternative 3
\slash Progress in the limitation and reduction of the armed forces of States \slash nuclear-weapon States and their allies\slash and of their conventional weapons could contribute to progress in nuclear disarmament.\slash

(a) \slash Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT)\slash

Alternative 1
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America should strive to conclude at the earliest possible date the agreement they have been pursuing for several years in the second series of the strategic arms limitation negotiations (SALT II) \slash which should provide for meaningful reduction in their deployment of nuclear weapons and a moratorium on the testing and refinement of new kinds of nuclear delivery systems\slash. The Governments of both countries should transmit in good time the text of this agreement to the General Assembly and should initiate promptly the third series of such negotiations (SALT III) intended to conclude another agreement including significant reductions \slash from 10 up to 50 per cent in their deployments of strategic nuclear weapons\slash and important qualitative limitations \slash such as a five-year moratorium on any qualitative improvement of their strategic nuclear-weapons delivery systems\slash as a step towards the complete, total destruction of the existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons and the consolidation of a world truly free of such weapons.

Alternative 2
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America should adopt without delay all relevant measures for the effective implementation of the agreement they have concluded as a result of the second series of the strategic arms limitation negotiations (SALT II) the text of which has been transmitted by them to the General Assembly. The Governments of both States should also initiate promptly the third series of such negotiations (SALT III) intended to conclude another agreement including significant reductions \slash from 10 up to 50 per cent in their deployments of strategic nuclear weapons\slash and important qualitative limitations \slash such as a five-year moratorium on any qualitative improvement of their strategic nuclear-weapons delivery systems\slash as a step towards the complete, total destruction of the existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons and the consolidation of a world truly free of such weapons.

Alternative 3
There should be the earliest possible conclusion of an agreement in the second strategic arms limitation negotiation between the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics and the United States of America to be followed promptly by further
strategic arms limitation negotiations between the two parties leading to agreed
[significant] reductions and qualitative limitations.

(b) [CTB] 15/

The cessation of nuclear-weapon testing by all States would be in the supreme
interest of mankind. This would make a significant contribution to the aim of
ending the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and the development of new
types of such weapons and of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, as
part of the process of nuclear disarmament. To this end the negotiations now in
progress on a "treaty prohibiting nuclear-weapon tests, and a protocol covering
nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes which would be an integral part of the
treaty", should be concluded urgently and the result submitted for full
consideration by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament with a view to
the submission of a draft treaty to the General Assembly.

The broadest possible application of the [comprehensive nuclear-test-ban
treaty] 15/ should be ensured through its early signature and ratification by as
many States as possible.

(c) [Nuclear disarmament]

It is essential to start negotiations with the aim of achieving agreement on
the simultaneous cessation by all States of the production of nuclear weapons, the
development and production of new types of nuclear weapons with simultaneous
undertaking by nuclear Powers to begin gradual reduction of the stockpiles of
nuclear weapons and their delivery systems and to proceed subsequently to their
complete elimination. As an immediate step towards this aim an agreement should
be concluded on the mutual renunciation of the production of nuclear-neutron
weapons.

As a first step in nuclear disarmament, there should be agreement to halt
the build-up of nuclear arsenals and to begin the reduction of stockpiles of
crude nuclear weapons.

The two leading nuclear Powers should:

(a) As a first step, declare:

(i) A moratorium on the development, production and deployment of new types
of nuclear weapons,

(ii) A halt to the build-up of their stockpiles of nuclear weapons;

(b) Reach an early agreement for mutual, balanced and significant reduction
of their stockpiles of nuclear weapons and a freeze in the qualitative improvement
of such weapons and their delivery systems.

15/ The official title of the treaty to be inserted when available.
Negotiations should be urgently undertaken concerning the following measures to bring about a binding commitment by the nuclear-weapon States for:

(a) The cessation of the qualitative improvement of existing nuclear weapons and delivery systems;

(b) The cessation of research and development of new types and systems of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery and guidance;

(c) The cessation of the production of nuclear weapons and of fissionable material for weapon purposes;

(d) A time-bound programme for the balanced reductions of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and of their delivery systems leading to their complete elimination.

All States should also take steps to ensure the prevention of the proliferation of such weapons and systems.

Further negotiations should be pursued with the objective of reducing and eventually eliminating nuclear weapons and their delivery systems.

The nuclear-weapon States should, jointly or individually:

(a) Undertake not to embark on any new installations of nuclear weapons in the territory of these States;

(b) Withdraw their existing nuclear-arms deployments from the territory of other States;

(d) Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of the outbreak of nuclear war

The most efficient guarantee against the danger of nuclear war and use of nuclear weapons is nuclear disarmament and complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

Since the use of nuclear weapons would cause indiscriminate suffering and destruction to mankind and, as such, is a crime contrary to the rules of international law and the laws of humanity, as long as nuclear weapons exist threatening the security of all States, particularly the non-nuclear-weapon States, the following measures will be taken:

- A convention on the non-use of nuclear weapons should be urgently concluded.

- Nuclear-weapon States should renounce in a legally binding form the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against States which have no nuclear weapons on their territories/ against States not parties to the nuclear security arrangements of some nuclear Powers/.

- Nuclear-weapon States should undertake, jointly or individually, not to be the first to use nuclear weapons.

Alternative 1 Strict implementation of the principle of non-use of force in international relations can be realised through full compliance with the Charter of the United Nations.
Alternative 2

It is important to ensure the non-use of force in international relations and the permanent prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. Speedy conclusion of the treaty to this effect would effectively prevent the use of nuclear as well as conventional weapons.

So long as nuclear weapons exist and bearing in mind the potentially devastating results of nuclear war to belligerents and non-belligerents, the nuclear-weapon States have special responsibilities to do everything possible to avoid the risk of the outbreak of such a war, and it is incumbent upon them in particular:

- To maintain and whenever necessary to improve their existing organizational and technical arrangements for guarding against the accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons under their control;
- To conclude appropriate bilateral agreements on the prevention of accidental nuclear war;
- To exercise restraint in their mutual relations, to negotiate and settle differences by peaceful means and to prevent conflicts and avoid situations which may exacerbate international tensions;
- To give appropriate assurances to increase the confidence of non-nuclear-weapon States in their own security from nuclear attack, in particular by committing themselves not to use nuclear weapons except in self-defence under Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations in circumstances of an actual armed attack on themselves, their territory, their armed forces or their allies;
- To rededicate themselves to the principles of the Charter, and to work for their observance by all States in order to reduce the danger of any conflict leading to nuclear war.

Together with the measures for the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament all possible measures specially aimed at preventing the danger of an outbreak of nuclear war should be taken and for this purpose:

All States should act in such a way as to avert situations which could cause a dangerous aggravation of relations between them and avoid military confrontations which could lead to a nuclear war, making full use to that end of the possibilities of the Security Council in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

The nuclear-weapon States, in view of their special responsibility as permanent members of the Security Council, should always exercise restraint in their mutual relations, show a willingness to negotiate and settle differences by peaceful means and do all in their power to prevent conflicts and situations which could exacerbate international tensions.

Those nuclear-weapon States which have not yet done so should conclude agreements with other nuclear-weapon States concerning measures to diminish and avert the danger of nuclear war and to prevent the accidental or unauthorised use of nuclear weapons, and those nuclear-weapon States which have concluded such agreements with each other should improve and develop such measures.
(e) /Nuclear-weapon-free zones/

The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned, or through unilateral declarations, constitutes an important disarmament measure, provided that such zones are genuinely free from nuclear weapons, that relevant agreements contain no loopholes and fully correspond to the generally recognized norms of international law.

The process of establishing such zones should be encouraged with the ultimate objective of achieving a world entirely free of nuclear weapons.

Alternative 1

With respect to nuclear-weapon-free zones, the nuclear-weapon States are called upon to give undertakings, in particular:

(a) To refrain from introducing nuclear weapons in such zones;

(b) To refrain from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against the States of such zones.

Alternative 2

The nuclear-weapon States can make an important contribution to the greater effectiveness of nuclear-weapon-free zones by agreeing to respect their status and, in particular, by undertaking an obligation to refrain from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against the States included in such zones. Therefore the nuclear-weapon States are urged to respond sympathetically to proposals for their co-operation in connexion with these zones.

In appropriate cases, the effectiveness of nuclear-weapon-free zones could be enhanced by the dismantling of all foreign military bases and by not subjecting any State in the region to acts of aggression.

In the light of existing conditions, the following measures are especially desirable:

(a) Adoption by the States concerned of all relevant measures to ensure the full application of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Tlatelolco); 16/

(b) Signature and ratification of the Additional Protocols of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Tlatelolco) by the States entitled to become parties to those instruments which have not yet done so;

(c) In Africa, where the Organization of African Unity has affirmed a decision for the demilitarization of the region, the Security Council shall take appropriate effective steps whenever necessary to prevent the frustration of this objective;

(d) The serious consideration of the practical and urgent steps required for the implementation of the proposal for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East where all parties directly concerned have expressed their support for the concept and where the implications of nuclear-weapon proliferation are acute;

(e) All States and parties in the region of Parties to the nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia should consider taking steps to implement the objective of keeping their region free of nuclear weapons. In the meantime, no action should be taken by them which would retard the establishment of the nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region. All States and parties in the region Parties to the nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region should accept the application of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards over their nuclear facilities on a non-discriminatory basis. The United Nations should continue to encourage measures to establish the could keep the establishment of the nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region under review.

(f) Zones of peace

Alternative 1
Where all States in a region agree to establish a clearly defined zone of peace, involving mutual restraint on their military activities, the strengthening of confidence, as well as methods of peaceful settlement of disputes, under conditions to be determined in conformity with international law, and with which outside Powers can be associated, such a zone could

Alternative 2
The establishment of zones of peace under appropriate conditions in various regions of the world taking into account the characteristics of a region can also contribute to strengthening the security of States within such zones and should be conceived of within the framework of international security as a whole.

It would be of great importance to establish a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean that would be free from great-Power rivalry and great-Power military presence as well as the presence of nuclear weapons. The great Powers in this context are urged to agree at an early date to reduce the nuclear-arms race in the region with a view to eliminating altogether the military presence and rivalry from the region.

Alternative 1
While the General Assembly takes note of the consultations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, these two Powers and other major maritime users are called upon to work towards the elimination of foreign military presence and rivalry from the Indian Ocean.
Alternative 2  

Negotiations which have been initiated between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, based on a staged approach with a view not to increase their current military presence and to move on promptly to negotiations on reductions, should continue and lead to early and positive results. This would be a significant contribution to enhancing stability in the Indian Ocean.  

Alternative 1  

The littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean at their forthcoming meeting should consider measures for the implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace.  

Alternative 2  

In this connexion Member States note the proposal to hold a conference on the Indian Ocean with a view to considering such a zone of peace.  

Alternative 1  

The concept of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace also includes the necessity for mutual restraint on the part of the littoral and hinterland States.  

Alternative 2  

The littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean, at their forthcoming meeting, should, inter alia, reach agreement on measures such as a commitment to settle outstanding disputes by peaceful means, the renunciation of nuclear weapons and the maintenance of a reasonable military balance among themselves, in order to promote conditions of security within the Indian Ocean region.  

Consultations regarding all aspects of the zonal concept should take place with the participation of all States concerned with a view to the early convening of a conference on the Indian Ocean to establish such a zone, the status of which should/could be inspected by all States particularly by nuclear-weapon States and major maritime users.  

It would be desirable to create other zones of peace wherever feasible and particularly in South-East Asia and the Mediterranean.  

The nuclear-weapon States should enter into negotiations with a view to reaching agreement on the withdrawal of ships carrying nuclear weapons from certain areas of the world's oceans and on other possible measures to limit the nuclear-arms' race in those areas.  

Maritime zones of peace should not present obstacles to freedom of navigation on the high seas and in the air or conflict with the right of innocent passage under the law of the sea.  

(g) Non-proliferation  

It is imperative, as an integral part of the effort to halt and reverse the  

17/ General Assembly resolution 2628 (XXVI).
arms race, to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. This involves obligations and responsibilities on the part of both nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States, the former undertaking to stop the nuclear-arms race and to achieve nuclear disarmament by urgent application of measures /to stop vertical proliferation/ /to stop the development and further production of nuclear weapons and to achieve nuclear disarmament through the reduction and elimination of existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons/ /as set out in the relevant sections of this Programme of Action/ /and all States undertaking the necessary measures to prevent the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons/.

Further measures should be undertaken jointly by the nuclear-weapon States and the non-nuclear-weapon States to develop an international consensus on /additional/ ways and means to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons /on a universal and non-discriminatory basis/ /including agreed measures to strengthen /and consolidate/ the nuclear non-proliferation régime /in conformity with the principles of independence and sovereignty of States/ /based primarily on adherence of all States to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons /and on the system of safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency/.

To this end: 19/

Steps should be taken to ensure that all /nuclear facilities/ /source and special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities/ /of all States/ are placed under agreed and appropriate international safeguards /arrangements/ /applied through the International Atomic Energy Agency/ /on a universal, standardized and non-discriminatory basis/.

/Steps should be taken by the nuclear-weapon States for a binding commitment to halt and reverse the nuclear-arms race leading towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons, to stop the refinement of nuclear weapons and the production of new systems of such weapons /and to undertake not to use nuclear weapons/ /which would lead to the removal of the threat of use of nuclear weapons/.

All /peaceful/ nuclear facilities /in all States/ /source and special fissionable material/ which are not presently subject to international inspection and control should be brought under the International Atomic Energy Agency system of safeguards.

Alternative 1 /Universal adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should be encouraged. All States should be urged to ratify the Treaty or at least to abide by its provisions and objectives/.

Alternative 2 /All States could be encouraged to commit themselves to the goal of non-proliferation through possible adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, nuclear-weapon-free zones or the International Atomic Energy Agency system of safeguards/.

18/ General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII), annex.
19/ Order of these paragraphs is to be determined.
Alternative 3

Steps should be taken to create the necessary conditions to facilitate universal adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

The International Atomic Energy Agency should be assisted in its attempts to strengthen its safeguards system in evolving a standardized system of safeguards to be applied on a universal and non-discriminatory basis.

Agreements should be reached on adequate standards for the physical protection of nuclear materials.

Alternative and more proliferation-resistant nuclear technologies should be studied with a view to their development.

The possibility of giving suitable international character to appropriate nuclear fuel cycle operations, and to effective measures for the control of plutonium in civil nuclear programmes should be examined and

The work currently being undertaken in the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluations should be supported.

Alternative text for preceding three paragraphs

These non-proliferation measures should be designed to enable not hinder the exercise of the inalienable right of all States to apply and develop as embodied in article IV of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons/their programmes for the peaceful use of nuclear technology for economic and social development, in conformity with their priorities, interests and needs, and to have access to and be free to/ acquire technology, equipment and materials

for the peaceful use of nuclear energy taking into account the particular needs of the developing countries and to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear-explosive devices.

Substantive and timely measures should be devised in order to guarantee to all States the exercise of their inalienable right to develop under appropriate internationally agreed safeguards and through an increased international co-operation research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and to enjoy the benefits thereof.

An international programme should be considered/International programmes should be supported under the auspices of the United Nations system, for the promotion of transfer and utilization of nuclear technology under appropriate and agreed international safeguards applied on a universal, standardized and non-discriminatory basis for economic and social development, especially of the developing countries in accordance with taking into account the principles approved in General Assembly resolution 32/50.
International agreements and contracts for the transfer and development of nuclear equipment, material and technology for peaceful purposes should be implemented faithfully in accordance with their terms and provisions.

2. Other weapons of mass destruction

All States should adhere to the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare. 20/

All States which have not yet done so should consider adhering to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction.

The complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and their destruction represent one of the most urgent measures of disarmament. Consequently, conclusion of a convention to this end, on which negotiations have been going on for several years, is one of the most urgent tasks of multilateral negotiations. After its conclusion, all States should contribute to ensuring the broadest possible application of the convention through its early signature and ratification.

A convention should be concluded prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons.

In order to help prevent a qualitative arms race and so that scientific and technological achievements may ultimately be used solely for peaceful purposes, effective measures should be taken to prevent the development of new types of weapons of mass destruction based on new scientific principles. Negotiations should be pursued aimed at working out an agreement on the prohibition of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction. Specific agreements could be concluded on particular types of weapons of mass destruction which may be identified. This question should be kept under continuing review.

Alternative 1

The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament should keep under review the question of the need for a further complete prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques. In the meantime States not party to the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques 21/ should consider the possibility of acceding thereto.

Alternative 2

Steps should be taken to amend the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques in order to ensure the exclusively peaceful use of such techniques without any exception. In the meantime States not parties to the Convention should consider the possibility of acceding thereto without prejudice to their sovereign right to

21/ General Assembly resolution 31/72, annex.
make such accession subject to the reservations or interpretative declarations they may deem advisable.

Further measures should be taken to ensure the exclusively peaceful use of and to avoid an arms race on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof. To achieve this goal:

All States, particularly those possessing nuclear weapons or any other types of weapons of mass destruction, that have not yet ratified or acceded to the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, shall consider doing so, without prejudice to any reservations or interpretative declarations they may deem advisable to formulate.

Multilateral negotiations should start promptly to consider further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof with a view to working out a new agreement on complete demilitarization of that environment, taking into account the proposals made during the Review Conference of the Parties to the above-mentioned Treaty and any relevant technological developments.

Measures should be taken to prevent an arms race in outer space in accordance with the spirit of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies. To this end, the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space should address itself to this question and report about its discussion to the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session. Accordingly, appropriate international discussions may be held to this end.

3. Conventional weapons

Together with negotiations on nuclear disarmament measures, the limitation and gradual reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons should be resolutely pursued within the framework of progress towards general and complete disarmament. In particular, the strengthening of security in Europe at a lower level of military potential by agreements on mutual limitation and reduction of armaments and armed forces would achieve a more stable military relationship there and constitute a significant step towards the attainment of general and complete disarmament. Current efforts to this end should be continued most energetically. Agreements or other measures should be resolutely pursued on a bilateral, regional and multilateral basis with the aim of strengthening peace and security at a lower level of forces bearing in mind the inalienable right of all States to preserve their self-defence as embodied in the Charter of the United Nations, and the need to ensure balance at each stage, by the limitation and reduction of armed forces and of conventional weapons, including the international transfer of such weapons, taking into account the need of States to protect their security. Such measures might include:

22/ General Assembly resolution 2660 (XXV), annex.
23/ General Assembly resolution 2222 (XXI), annex.
Regional and multilateral conferences where appropriate conditions exist with the participation of all the countries concerned for the consideration of different aspects of conventional disarmament;

Consultations among major arms producer and supplier countries, in particular the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, and between them and recipient States, on measures

Alternative 1 \textit{of restraint, including international transfer of conventional weapons}\;

Alternative 2 \textit{to restrain the conventional arms race}\;

Alternative 3 \textit{of restraint on the production and international transfer of conventional weapons}\;

on a voluntary or agreed basis, with due regard to the security of recipient States;

\textit{Dismantling of military bases in foreign territories and withdrawal of foreign troops from such territories};

\textit{Negotiations on the prohibition of the development, production and deployment of new types of conventional weapons and new systems of such weapons}.\footnote{Particularly inhumane weapons}

The United Nations Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Lethal or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, to be held in 1979, should seek agreement on the prohibition or restriction of use of \textit{napalm and other incendiary weapons as well as use}\ of certain conventional weapons including any which may cause unnecessary suffering or which may have indiscriminate effects, \textit{such as those the primary effect of which is to injure by fragments not detectable by X-ray, incendiaries, landmines and booby-traps, certain small-calibre projectiles and certain blast and fragmentation weapons}\ in the light of humanitarian and military considerations. All States are called upon to contribute towards carrying out this task as provided for in General Assembly resolution 32/152.

4. \textit{Reduction of military budgets and armed forces}\;

Freezing and gradual reduction of military budgets of States on an agreed and verifiable basis, particularly those of nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States would be one of the most effective means of curbing the arms race.

\textit{The General Assembly should establish, at its thirty-third session, a committee in which the two major nuclear-weapon States and other States engaged in substantial military expenditure would participate, with a view to the committee's submitting to the General Assembly, no later than at its thirty-fifth session, a report containing a data-presentation system which would allow a minimum of uniformity in the measurement of military budgets.}
The two major nuclear-weapon States should formulate a joint declaration (or similar separate declarations) in which they would undertake, as soon as the General Assembly had approved the report proposed in the preceding paragraph, to reduce by 10 per cent their military expenditure and to devote a considerable part of the savings to the promotion of the economic and social development of the developing countries.\footnote{A/32/194, paras. 104-106.}

The Secretary-General should organize a pilot test of a system for the reporting of military expenditures by States, drawing on the recommendations on a standardized reporting instrument by the intergovernmental Group of Budgetary Experts \footnote{A/32/194, paras. 104-106.} with the participation of States representing different \textit{economic}, \textit{military} budgeting and accounting \textit{systems};

The Secretary-General should appoint an \textit{ad hoc} panel of budgetary experts, under the aegis of the United Nations, to give guidance to States supplying the required data, to analyse the results of the pilot test, to refine further the system and to develop recommendations for larger-scale application of the reporting instrument;

The Secretary-General should submit a progress report to the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session;

The General Assembly should at its thirty-fourth session consider establishing a committee with the participation of major military States to consider the recommendations of the \textit{ad hoc panel}.

The reduction of armed forces of States to levels necessary for the maintenance of internal order and fulfilment of obligations of States with regard to the safeguarding of international peace shall take place within the context of general and complete disarmament.

\section{Implementation of disarmament agreements}

States should accept, as appropriate, adequate international provisions for verification to facilitate the conclusion and effective implementation of disarmament agreements.

In this context all aspects of the problem of verification should be further examined and more efficient methods and procedures in this field be considered.

Progress in the technology of observation by satellite should be made beneficial to the international disarmament efforts. Information useful for the strengthening of security and confidence which can be obtained in this way should be placed at the disposal of the interested States. The establishment of an international observation satellite agency should therefore be taken into consideration. The purpose would be the collection of data obtained by satellites in fields directly affecting security and the verification of disarmament agreements. The Secretary-General is requested to seek the views of Member States with respect to the functions and structure of such an agency and to submit these views and an analysis thereof to the General Assembly at its thirty-third session.
Furthermore, the possibility of establishing an international disarmament organization as the operational framework for the implementation of international arms control and disarmament agreements should be considered. The Secretary-General is therefore requested to seek the views of Member States with respect to the functions and structure of such an international disarmament organization and to submit these views and an analysis thereof to the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session.

E. Other measures to strengthen international security and to build confidence

In order to facilitate the process of disarmament, it is necessary to take measures and pursue policies to strengthen international peace and security and to build confidence among States. For this purpose, the following measures should be undertaken:

- Reaffirmation by States, where appropriate on a regional or bilateral basis, of their obligation, as embodied in the Charter of the United Nations;
- A solemn pledge by States strictly to observe the principles of non-use of force or threat of force in any form against the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of States which would contribute to the creation of a climate of confidence among States;
- Early conclusion of a treaty on the non-use of force in international relations;
- Prohibition of the establishment of new foreign military bases and stationing of troops in foreign territories;
- Withdrawal of foreign troops and dismantling of foreign military bases;
- The dissolution of military blocs;
- Not to extend the existing military alliances by admitting new members.

Submission by States of reports to the United Nations on their military budgets using the method shortly to be finalized through a pilot study by the Secretary-General for the standardized reporting of such budgets as a step towards verified and balanced reductions in military expenditure.

Arrangements could be made, on a regional or bilateral basis, and in accordance with regionally agreed criteria, providing for prior notification of major military manoeuvres, refraining from conduct of such manoeuvres above agreed level and for exchanges of observers to military manoeuvres and other kinds of exchanges, on a reciprocal basis, of military personnel by invitation.

An undertaking not to make shows of strength or concentrate armed forces near the frontiers of other States, except on the basis of mutual agreement.

The prevention of attacks which take place by accident, miscalculation or communications failure by taking steps to improve communications between Governments, particularly in areas of tension, by the establishment of "hot lines" and other methods of reducing the risk of conflict.
Publish detailed information about their armed forces, and the total value of their arms production and of their transfers of arms to other countries./

States should assess the possible negative implications of their military research and development for existing agreements as well as for further efforts in the field of arms control and disarmament.

F. /Disarmament and development/

In view of the relationship between expenditure on armaments and economic and social development and the necessity to release real resources now being used for military purposes to economic and social development in the world, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries /as well as the need to promote the establishment of the new international economic order, inter alia, as a means to facilitate the process of disarmament/:

The Secretary-General should, with the assistance of a group of qualified governmental experts appointed by him, initiate an expert study on the relationship between disarmament and development. The Secretary-General should submit an interim report on the subject to the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session and submit the final results to the Assembly at its thirty-sixth session for subsequent action. /at its second special session devoted to disarmament./

The expert study should have the terms of reference contained in the report of the Ad Hoc Group on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development appointed by the Secretary-General in accordance with General Assembly resolution 32/88 A of 12 December 1977. It should investigate the three main areas listed in the report, bearing in mind the United Nations studies previously carried out /and giving special emphasis to the third of these areas, namely "conversion and redeployment of resources released from military purposes through disarmament measures to economic and social development purposes"/. /The group should also study the contribution which the establishment of the new international economic order could make to the process of disarmament. /

The disproportion between the sums allocated for expenditure on armaments and the sums devoted to aid to developing countries is unacceptable. It can scarcely be denied that the situation in which the world finds itself today is one of over-armament. The most heavily armed States have a particular responsibility in this regard.

In this respect it would be appropriate to establish an international fund for disarmament and development financed on a voluntary basis by the most significant military Powers./

G. /Studies and information/

1. /Studies/

In order to facilitate further steps in disarmament and other measures aimed at promoting international peace and security, the General Assembly requests the

25/ If the decision is taken to hold such a session.
Secretary-General, with appropriate assistance from governmental experts, to carry out studies relating to the following subjects:

- The strengthening of the security role of the United Nations in peace-keeping and the peaceful settlement of disputes to enable it to anticipate and resolve international crises;
- Ways of limiting and reducing the build-up of conventional weapons with the aim of promoting peace and security, regionally and throughout the world, taking into account all relevant aspects, including, inter alia, the need for over-all balance of the level of nuclear and conventional armed forces at each stage, membership of military alliances, and bilateral defence treaties, and the relative levels of indigenous production of armament, such as:
  - Alternative 1: The international transfer of conventional weapons;
    - The possibility of reciprocal limitation of the level and types of conventional weapons;
    - The proposal for a United Nations register of weapons transfers;
  - Alternative 2: Reduction in the level of production of conventional weapons;
    - The international transfer of conventional weapons and its economic implications for suppliers and recipient countries;
    - The possibility of reciprocal limitation of the level and types of conventional weapons;
    - The proposal for a United Nations register of weapons transfers;
    - Means to ensure over-all balance among the States concerned.

Regional aspects of disarmament, including means of promoting disarmament on a regional basis as well as further measures designed to increase confidence and stability.

The possible contribution to confidence-building among States of technical measures, such as demilitarized zones, zones of limited forces and surveillance and early warning systems which could be used as appropriate in areas of tension; and on the use of some of these measures in the verification of arms control agreements.

Arms control and disarmament implications of the relationship between threat perception, security outlook and defence capabilities in various regions of the world; an analytical approach to identify and suggest possible solutions for, inter alia, socio-psychological barriers to disarmament.

All aspects of verification and control of arms limitation and disarmament measures.

2. Information

In order to mobilize world public opinion on behalf of disarmament, the
specific measures set forth below, designed to expand the dissemination of /objective/ information about the arms race and the efforts to halt and reverse it, should be adopted:

1. Governmental and non-governmental information organs and those of the United Nations and its specialized agencies should give priority to the preparation and distribution of printed and audio-visual material relating to the danger represented by the arms race as well as to the disarmament efforts and negotiations on specific disarmament measures.

In particular, publicity should be given to the final documents of the special session.

2. [The Governments of all States are requested to hold annually, beginning from 9 May, an international week of disarmament.]

3. To encourage study and research on disarmament, the United Nations Centre for Disarmament should intensify its activities in the presentation of /substantive/ information concerning the arms race and disarmament, /based on studies prepared by the Secretary-General with the assistance of government experts/ /directed principally towards government officials, academic circles and other sectors./

4. [Throughout this process of disseminating information about the developments in the disarmament field of all countries, there should be increased participation by non-governmental organizations concerned with the matter, through closer liaison between them and the United Nations /Centre for Disarmament/./]

H. /Comprehensive programme for disarmament/

/Implementation of these priorities should lead to general and complete disarmament under effective international control, which remains the ultimate goal of all efforts exerted in the field of disarmament. Negotiations on general and complete disarmament shall be conducted concurrently with negotiations on partial measures of disarmament. With this purpose in mind, the following measures shall be taken as a matter of urgency:

(a) Elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament measures which would lead to the attainment of general and complete disarmament;

(b) Establishment of a special committee of the United Nations for the elaboration of the comprehensive programme of disarmament measures to be submitted to the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session in 1980 at the latest.

The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, as soon as it has undergone the reforms envisaged in the guidelines comprising section IV of this Final Document, will undertake the preparation of a comprehensive programme of disarmament encompassing all measures thought to be advisable in order to ensure that the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control becomes a reality in a world in which international peace and security prevail and in which the new international economic order is strengthened and consolidated. The comprehensive programme should contain appropriate procedures
for facilitating the co-ordination of all disarmament negotiations, regardless of where and in what form they are conducted, and for ensuring that the General Assembly is kept fully informed of the progress of the negotiations so that it can properly perform its functions, including an appraisal of the situation when appropriate and, in particular, a continuing review of the implementation of the programme. The said programme should be completed by 1 March 1981 at the latest and should immediately thereupon be submitted, as a draft, to the Secretary-General of the United Nations so that he may transmit it to Member States and to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament.

A second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament will open at the end of May 1981, its main objective being to consider and adopt the comprehensive programme of disarmament prepared in accordance with the provisions of the preceding paragraph.

The process towards general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control should be accompanied by the establishment of reliable procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes and in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations effective arrangements for the maintenance of peace and security, including renewed efforts to supplement by means of appropriate guidelines the arrangements concerning the United Nations peace-keeping operations. Studies and/or negotiations should be undertaken with a view to recruiting a permanent United Nations police force (Article 43 of the Charter) and establishing an international organ to supervise the application of disarmament agreements in force.

General and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control shall permit States to have at their disposal only those non-nuclear forces, armaments, facilities and establishments as are agreed to be necessary to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens and in order that States shall support and provide agreed manpower for a United Nations police force.

I. Guidelines for implementation

All States, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, are called upon to contribute to the implementation of the Programme of Action;

Specific measures of the Programme of Action shall be implemented by individual States or groups of States which may conduct, for this purpose, bilateral or multilateral negotiations and shall inform the United Nations of the results thereof;

These measures shall be implemented in accordance with the above-mentioned priorities, bearing in mind the necessity to conduct, whenever possible, parallel negotiations on several measures with a view to reaching agreement on each of them as soon as possible;

Implementation should be in an agreed sequence, by stages, with each measure and stage carried out within specified time-limits, the entire process being completed not later than the end of the next decade;
Implementation of disarmament measures should be facilitated by the speeding up of the process of resolving outstanding problems and disputes which threaten international peace and security. This should include application, where appropriate, of the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.

The present Programme of Action has a twofold purpose. First of all, it enumerates a series of specific disarmament measures which have been selected because there is a consensus on the need and advisability of making every possible effort to implement them within a period of not more than three years, it being felt that realistically and objectively, there is a reasonable likelihood that such efforts will succeed. Secondly, the Programme of Action seeks to establish suitable procedures for monitoring compliance with the commitment thus made and for conducting serious negotiations on the preparation of a comprehensive programme of disarmament. In the light of the foregoing, the States participating in the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament undertake to do everything in their power, in good faith, to ensure the implementation, during the period from June 1978 to May 1981, of the measures set forth in the following Three-year Disarmament Plan:

The agenda for the thirty-third, thirty-fourth and thirty-fifth regular sessions of the General Assembly should include an item permitting the Assembly to review the manner in which the Three-year Disarmament Plan is being carried out and to make any appropriate recommendations resulting from that review.

(Author's will provide appropriate introductory language)

A second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament should be convened in 1982.

A preparatory committee for the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament should be established by the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session.

Towards this end a world disarmament conference shall be convened in the year .... A preparatory committee for the world disarmament conference, composed of nuclear-weapon States members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and other States on the basis of the principles of equitable, political and geographical representation, should be established by the General Assembly at its thirty-third session.

All States undertake to work towards the fulfilment of this programme and to respect agreed measures relating to it. The General Assembly should examine its implementation, as appropriate, taking account of the recommendations on disarmament machinery made later in the final document.
Office of Public Information

Final Document of Assembly Session on Disarmament

(23 May - 1 July 1978)

UNITED NATIONS
The General Assembly held its Tenth Special Session Devoted to Disarmament from 23 May to 1 July at United Nations Headquarters. Before the session ended, the Assembly adopted by consensus on 30 June a Final Document consisting of an Introduction, a Declaration, a Programme of Action, and recommendations concerning the international machinery for disarmament negotiations.

The text of the Final Document reads:

The General Assembly.

Alarmed by the threat to the very survival of mankind posed by the existence of nuclear weapons and the continuing arms race, and recalling the devastation inflicted by all wars,

Convinced that disarmament and arms limitation, particularly in the nuclear field, are essential for the prevention of the danger of nuclear war and the strengthening of international peace and security and for the economic and social advancement of all peoples, thus facilitating the achievement of the new international economic order;

Having resolved to lay the foundations of an international disarmament strategy which, through co-ordinated and persevering efforts in which the United Nations should play a more effective role, aims at general and complete disarmament under effective international control,

Adopts the following Final Document of this special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament:

I. INTRODUCTION

1. Attainment of the objective of security, which is an inseparable element of peace, has always been one of the most profound aspirations of humanity. States have for a long time sought to maintain their security through the possession of arms. Admittedly, their survival has, in certain cases, effectively depended on whether they could count on appropriate means of defence. Yet the accumulation of weapons, particularly nuclear weapons, today constitutes much more a threat than a protection for the future of mankind. The time has therefore come to put an end to this situation, to abandon the use of force in international relations and to seek security in disarmament, that is to say, through a gradual but effective process beginning with a reduction in the present level of armaments. The ending of the arms race and the achievement of real disarmament are tasks of primary importance and urgency. To meet this historic challenge is in the political and economic interests of all the nations and peoples of the world as well as in the interests of ensuring their genuine security and peaceful future.

2. Unless its avenues are closed, the continued arms race means a growing threat to international peace and security and even to the very survival of mankind. The nuclear and conventional arms build-up threatens to stall the efforts aimed at reaching the goals of development, to become an obstacle on the road of achieving the new international economic order and to hinder the solution of other vital problems facing mankind.

3. Dynamic development of detente, encompassing all spheres of international relations in all regions of the world, with the participation of all countries, would create conditions conducive to the efforts of States to end the arms race, which has engulfed the world, thus reducing the danger of war. Progress on detente and progress on disarmament mutually complement and strengthen each other.

4. The Disarmament Decade solemnly declared in 1969 by the United Nations is coming to an end. Unfortunately, the objectives established on that occasion by the General Assembly appear to be as far away today as they were then, or even further because the arms race is not diminishing but increasing and outstrips by far the efforts to curb it. While it is true that some limited agreements have been reached, "effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament" continue to elude mankind's grasp. Yet the implementation of such measures is ur-
gently required. There has not been either any real progress that might lead to the conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international control. Furthermore, it has not been possible to free any amount, however modest, of the enormous resources, both material and human, that are wasted on the unproductive and spiraling arms race, which should be made available for the purpose of economic and social development, especially since such a race “places a great burden on both the developing and the developed countries.

5. The Members of the United Nations are fully aware of the conviction of their peoples, that the question of general and complete disarmament is of utmost importance and that peace, security, and economic and social development are indivisible and have therefore recognized that the corresponding obligations and responsibilities are universal.

6. Thus a powerful current of opinion has gradually formed, leading to the convening of what will go down in the annals of the United Nations as the first special session of the General Assembly devoted entirely to disarmament.

7. The outcome of this special session, whose deliberations have to a large extent been facilitated by the five sessions of the Preparatory Committee which preceded it, is the present Final Document. This introduction serves as a preface to the document which comprises also the following three sections: a Programme of Action and recommendations concerning the international machinery for disarmament negotiations;

5 While the final objective of the efforts of all States should continue to be general and complete disarmament under effective international control, the immediate goal is that of the elimination of the danger of a nuclear war and the implementation of measures to halt and reverse the arms race and clear the path towards lasting peace. Negotiations on the entire range of these issues should be based on the strict observance of the purposes and principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, with full recognition of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament and reflecting the vital interest of all the peoples of the world in this sphere. The aim of the Declaration is to review and assess the existing situation, outline the objectives and the procedures and tasks set forth fundamental principles for disarmament negotiations.

9 For disarmament, the arms and purposes of which the United States proclaims, to become a reality it was essential to agree on a series of specific disarmament measures, selected by common accord as those on which there is a consent reached and that their realization in the short term appears to be feasible. There is also a need to prepare through agreed procedures a comprehensive disarmament programme. That programme, passing through all the necessary stages, should lead to general and complete disarmament under effective international control. Procedures for reaching one consensus on the implementation of the obligations thus agreed should also be agreed upon. That is the purpose of the Programme of Action.

10. Although the decisive factor for achieving success of disarmament is the “political will” of States, and especially of those possessing nuclear weapons, a significant role can also be played by the effective functioning of an appropriate international machinery designed to deal with the problems of disarmament in various aspects. Consequently, it would be necessary that the two kinds of organs required to this end, the negotiating organs, the appropriate organization and procedures that would be most conducive to obtaining constructive results. The fourth and last section of the Final Document has been prepared with that end in view.

II. DECLARATION

11 Mankind today is confronted with an unprecedented threat of the extinction arising from the destructive and competitive accumulation of the most destructive weapons ever produced. Existing arsenals of nuclear weapons alone are more than sufficient to destroy all life on earth. Failure of efforts to halt and reverse the arms race in the nuclear arms race increases the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Yet the arms race continues. Military budgets are constantly growing, with enormous resources being devoted to the development and testing of new and dangerous nuclear weapons.

13. Enduring international peace and security cannot be built on the accumulation of weaponry by military alliances, nor is it sustained by a dangerous balance of deterrence or doctrines of strategic superiority. Genuine and lasting peace can only be created through the effective implementation of the security system provided for in the Charter of the United Nations and the speedy and substantial reduction of arms and armed forces, by international agreement and mutual example. In addition, the United Nations and the other organs should continue to implement the measures necessary to block the arms race and allow for disarmament.

12. The arms race, particularly in its nuclear aspect, runs counter to efforts to achieve further relaxation of international tension, to establish international relations based on peaceful coexistence and trust between all States, and to develop broad international co-operation and understanding. The arms race impedes the realization of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, especially respect for sovereignty, refraining from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, peaceful settlement of disputes and non-interference in the internal affairs of States. It also adversely affects the rights of peoples freely to determine their systems of social and economic development, and hinders the struggle for self-determination and the elimination of colonial rule, racial or foreign domination or occupation. Indeed, the massive accumulation of armaments and the acquisition of armament technology by racist regimes, as well as their probable acquisition of nuclear weapons, present a challenging and increasingly dangerous obstacle to a world community faced with the urgent need to disarm. It is therefore essential for all purposes to prevent any further acquisition of arms or armament technology by such regimes, especially through strict adherence by all States to relevant decisions of the Security Council.

14. Since the process of disarmament affects the vital security interests of all States, they must all be actively concerned with and contributed to the measures of disarmament and arms limitations, which have as an essential part to play in maintaining and strengthening international security. Therefore, the role and responsibility of the United Nations in the sphere of disarmament, in accordance with its Charter, must be strengthened.

15. It is essential that not only Governments but also the peoples of the world recognize and understand the dangers in the present situation. In order that an international conscience may develop and that the world public opinion may exert a positive influence, the United Nations should increase the dissemination of information on the arms race and dismantlement of armament technology.
armament with the full co-operation of Member States.

16. In a world of finite resources there is a close relationship between expenditure on armaments and economic and social development. Military expenditures are reaching ever higher levels, the highest percentage of which can now be attributed to the nuclear weapon States and most of their allies, with prospects of further expansion and the danger of further increases in the expenditures of other countries. The hundreds of billions of dollars spent annually on the manufacture and improvement of armaments are in sombre and dramatic contrast to the want and poverty in which two-thirds of the world's population live. This colossal waste of resources is even more serious in that it diverts to military purposes not only material but also technical and human resources which are urgently needed for development in all countries, particularly in the developing countries. Thus, the economic and social consequences of the arms race are so detrimental that its continuation is obviously incompatible with the implementation of the new international economic order based on justice, equity and co-operation. Consequently, resources released as a result of the implementation of disarmament measures should be used in a manner which will help to promote the well-being of all peoples and to improve the economic conditions of the developing countries.

17. Disarmament has thus become an imperative and most urgent task facing the international community. No real progress has been made so far in the crucial field of the reduction of armaments. However, certain positive changes in international relations in some areas of the world provide some encouragement. Agreements have been reached that have been important in limiting certain arms or eliminating them altogether, as in the case of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction.

18. Removing the threat of a world war — a nuclear war — is the most acute and urgent task of the present day. Mankind is confronted with a choice: we must halt the arms race and proceed to disarmament or face annihilation.

19. The ultimate objective of the efforts of States in the disarmament process is general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

The principal goals of disarmament are to ensure the survival of mankind and to eliminate the danger of war. In particular, the nuclear war, to ensure that war is no longer an instrument for settling international disputes and that the use and threat of force are eliminated from international life, as provided for in the Charter of the United Nations.

Progress towards this objective requires the conclusion and implementation of agreements on the cessation of the arms race and on genuine measures of disarmament taking into account the need of States to protect their security.

20. Among such measures, effective measures of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war have the highest priority. To this end, it is imperative to remove the threat of nuclear weapons, to halt and reverse the arms race until the total elimination of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems has been achieved, and to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

At the same time, other measures designed to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war and to lessen the danger of the threat or use of nuclear weapons should be taken.

21. Along with these agreements or other effective measures should be adopted to prohibit or prevent the development, production or use of other weapons of mass destruction. In this context, an agreement on elimination of all chemical weapons should be concluded as a matter of high priority.

22. Together with negotiations on nuclear disarmament measures, negotiations should be carried out on the balanced reduction of armed forces and on conventional armaments, based on the principle of undiminished security of the parties with a view to promoting or enhancing stability at a lower military level, taking into account the interests of all States to protect their security. These negotiations should be conducted with particular emphasis on armed forces and conventional weapons of nuclear weapon States and other militarily significant countries. There should also be negotiations on the limitation of international transfer of conventional weapons, in particular, on the same principle, and taking into account the inalienable right to self-determination and independence of peoples under colonial or foreign domination and the right of States to protect their security, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States, as well as the need of recipient States to protect their security.

23. Further international action should be taken to prohibit or restrict for humanitarian reasons the use of specific conventional weapons, including those which may be excessively injurious, cause unnecessary suffering or have indiscriminate effects.

24. Collateral measures in both the nuclear and conventional fields, together with other measures specifically designed to build confidence, should be undertaken in order to contribute to the creation of favourable conditions for the adoption of additional disarmament measures and to further relaxation of international tension.
ing and reversing the arms race. It is therefore important to secure their active participation.

29. The adoption of disarmament measures should take place in such an equitable and balanced manner as to ensure the right of each State to security and that no individual State or group of States may obtain an advantage over others. At each stage the objective should be to diminish security at the lowest possible level of armaments and military forces.

30. An acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations for nuclear and non-nuclear States should be achieved.

31. Disarmament and arms limitation agreements should provide for adequate measures of verification satisfactory to all parties concerned in order to create the necessary confidence and ensure that they are being observed by all parties. The form and modalities of the verification to be provided for in any specific agreement depend upon and should be determined by the purposes, scope and nature of the agreement. Agreements should provide for the participation of parties directly or through the United Nations in the verification process. Where appropriate, a combination of several methods of verification as well as other compliance procedures should be employed.

32. All States, and in particular nuclear weapon States, should consider various proposals designed to secure the avoidance of the use of nuclear weapons, and to the prevention of nuclear war. In this context, while noting the declarations made by nuclear weapon States, effective arrangements, as appropriate, to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use of or the threat of use of nuclear weapons could strengthen the security of those States and international peace and security.

33. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of agreements or arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the zone concerned, and the full compliance with those agreements or arrangements, thus ensuring that the zones are genuinely free from nuclear weapons, and respect for such zones by nuclear-weapon States, constitute an important disarmament measure.

34. Disarmament, relaxation of international tension, respect for the right to self-determination and national independence, the peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the strengthening of international peace and security are directly related to each other. Progress in any of these three spheres has a beneficial effect on all of them, as failure in one sphere has negative effects on others.

35. There is also a close relationship between disarmament and development. Progress in the former would help greatly to the realization of the latter. Therefore resources released as a result of the implementation of disarmament measures should be devoted to economic and social development of all nations and contribute to the bridging of the economic gap between developed and developing countries.

36. Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is a matter of universal concern. Measures of disarmament must be consistent with the inalienable right of all States, without discrimination, to develop, acquire and use nuclear technology, equipment and material for the peaceful use of nuclear energy and to determine their peaceful nuclear programs in accordance with their national priorities, needs and interests. Bearing in mind the need to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, international cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy should be conducted under agreed and appropriate international safeguards, possibly in a non-discriminatory basis.

37. Significant progress in disarmament, including nuclear disarmament, would be facilitated by parallel measures to strengthen the security of States and to improve in general the international situation.

38. Negotiations on partial measures of disarmament should be conducted concurrently with negotiations on more comprehensive measures and should be followed, by negotiations leading to a treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

39. Qualitative and quantitative disarmament measures are both important for halting the arms race. Efforts to this end must include negotiations on the limitation and cessation of the qualitative improvement of armaments, especially weapons of mass destruction and the development of new means of warfare so that ultimately scientific and technological achievements may be used solely for peaceful purposes.

40. Universality of disarmament agreements helps create confidence among States. When multilateral agreements in the field of disarmament are negotiated, every effort should be made to ensure that they are universally acceptable. The full compliance of all parties with the provisions contained in such agreements would also contribute to the attainment of that goal.

41. In order to create favourable conditions for success in the disarmament process, all States should strictly abide by the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, refrain from actions which might adversely affect efforts in the field of disarmament, and display a constructive approach to negotiations. The political will to reach agreements are certain conditions for success in disarmament, in particular at different levels, the early and successful completion of which could contribute to limiting the arms race. Unilateral measures of arm limitation or reduction could also contribute to the attainment of that goal.

42. Since prompt measures should be taken in order to halt and reverse the arms race, Member States hereby declare that they will respect the above stated objectives and principles and make every effort faithfully to carry out the Programme of Action set forth in section III below.

III. PROGRAMME OF ACTION

43. Progress towards the goal of general and complete disarmament can be achieved through the implementation of a programme of action on disarmament, in accordance with the goals and principles established in the Declaration on disarmament. The present Programme of Action contains priorities and measures in the field of disarmament that States should undertake as a matter of urgency with a view to halting and reversing the armaments race and to giving the necessary impetus to efforts designed to achieve genuine disarmament leading to general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

44. The present Programme of Action enumerates the specific measures of disarmament which should be implemented over the next few years, as well as other measures and studies to prepare the way for future negotiations and for progress toward general and complete disarmament.

45. Priorities in disarmament negotiations shall be nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons, conventional weapons, including any which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects, and reduction of armed forces.

46. Nothing should preclude States from conducting negotiations on all priority items concurrently.

47. Nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of civilization. It is essential to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race in all its aspects in order to avert the danger of involving nuclear weapons in armed conflicts. The ultimate goal in this context is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

48. In the task of achieving the goals of nuclear disarmament, all the nuclear weapon States, in particular those among them which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, bear a special responsibility.

The process of nuclear disarmament should be carried out in such a way, and requires measures to ensure that the security of all States is guaranteed at progressively lower levels of nuclear armaments, thus ensuring the relative qualitative and quantitative importance of the exist-
ing arsenals of the nuclear-weapon States and other States concerned.

50. The achievement of nuclear disarmament will require urgent 

government of agreements at appropriate stages and with adequate measures of verification satisfactory to the States concerned for:

- cease of the qualitative improvement 
- development of nuclear-weapon systems;

- cease of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, and the production of fissile material for weapons purposes;

- a comprehensive phased pro-

gramme with agreed time-frames, 

whenever feasible, for progressive and balanced reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, leading to their ultimate and complete elimination at the earliest possible time.

51. Consideration can be given in the course of the negotiations to mutual and agreed limitation or prohibition, without prejudice to the security of any State or any types of nuclear armaments.

52. The cessation of nuclear-weapon testing by all States within the framework of an effective nuclear disarmament process would be in the interest of mankind. It would make a significant contribution to the ultimate aim of ending the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and the development of new types of such weapons and of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In this context the negotiations in progress on a "treaty prohibiting nuclear-weapons tests, and a protocol covering nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, which would be an integral part of the treaty," should be concluded urgently and the result submitted for full consideration by the multilateral negotiating body with a view to the submission of a draft treaty to the General Assembly at the earliest possible date.

All efforts should be made by the negotiating parties to achieve an agreement which, following General Assembly endorsement, could attract the widest possible adherence.

In this context, various views were expressed by some of the nuclear-weapon States that, pending the conclusion of this treaty, the world community would be encouraged if all the nuclear-weapon States refrained from testing nuclear weapons. In this connection, some nuclear-weapon States expressed different views.

52. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America would consider at the earliest possible date the agreement they have been pursuing for several years in the second series of the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT II). They are invited to transmit in good time the text of the agreement to the General Assembly. It should be followed promptly by further strategic arms limitation negotiations between the two parties, leading to agreement on specific reductions and, if necessary, on qualitative limitations on strategic arms. It should constitute an important step in the direction of nuclear disarmament and ultimately of establishment of a world free of nuclear weapons.

53. The process of nuclear disarmament described in the paragraph on this subject should be expedited by the urgent and vigorous pursuit by a successful conclusion of ongoing negotiations and the urgent initiation of further negotiations among the nuclear-weapon States.

54. Significant progress in nuclear disarmament would be facilitated by parallel political or international legal measures to strengthen the security of States and by progress in the limitation and reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments of the nuclear-weapon States and other States in the regions concerned.

55. Real progress in the field of nuclear disarmament could create an atmosphere conducive to progress in conventional disarmament on a worldwide basis.

56. The most effective guarantee against the danger of nuclear war and the use of nuclear weapons in nuclear disarmament and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

57. Pending the achievement of this goal, for which negotiations should be vigorously pursued, and bearing in mind the devastating consequences which nuclear war would have on belligerents and non-belligerents alike, the nuclear-weapon States have special responsibilities to undertake measures aimed at preventing the outbreak of nuclear war, and of the use of force in international relations, subject to the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, including the use of nuclear weapons.

58. In this context, all States and in particular nuclear-weapon States should consider as soon as possible various proposals designed to secure the avoidance of the use of nuclear weapons, the prevention of nuclear war and related objectives, where possible through international agreement and thereby ensure that the survival of mankind is not endangered. All States should actively participate in efforts to bring about conditions in international relations among States in which a code of peaceful conduct of nuclear and international affairs could be agreed and which would preclude the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

59. In the same context, the nuclear-weapon States are called upon to take steps to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The General Assembly notes the declarations made by the nuclear-weapon States and urges them to pursue efforts to conclude as appropriate effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

60. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements directly arrived at among the States of the region concerned, constitutes an important disarmament measure.

61. The process of establishing such zones in different parts of the world should be encouraged with the ultimate objective of achieving a world entirely free of nuclear weapons. In the process of establishing such zones, the characteristics of each region should be taken into account. The States participating in such zones should undertake to comply with all the obligations, purposes and principles of the agreements or arrangements establishing the zones, thus ensuring that they are genuinely free from nuclear weapons.

62. With respect to each nuclear-weapon State in turn are called upon to give undertakings, the modalities of which are to be negotiated with the competent authority of each zone, in particular:

(a) to respect strictly the status of the nuclear-weapon-free zone;

(b) to refrain from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against the States of the zone;

63. In the light of existing conditions, and without prejudice to other measures which may be considered in other regions, the following measures are especially desirable:

(a) Adoption by the States concerned of all relevant measures to ensure the full application of the Treaty of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) by the States entitled to become parties to those instruments which have not yet done so;

(b) In Africa, where the Organization of African Unity has affirmed a decision for the denuclearization of the region, the Security Council shall take appropriate effective steps whenever necessary to prevent the frustration of this objective.

(d) The serious consideration of the practical and urgent steps, as described in the paragraphs above, required for the implementation of the proposal to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East in accordance with the relevant General Assembly resolutions where all parties directly concerned have expressed their support for the concept and where the danger of nuclear-weapons proliferation exists. The establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East would greatly enhance international peace and security Pendum
ing the establishment of such a zone in the region, States of the region should 
solely declare that they will refrain on a reciprocal basis from producing, 
aqueering, or in any other way, possessing 
nuclear weapons and nuclear ex 
pliative devices, and from permitting 
the stationing of nuclear weapons on 
their territory by any third party and 
agree to place all their nuclear activi 
ties under International Atomic Energy 
Agency safeguards. Consideration 
should be given to a Security Council 
role in advancing the establishment of a 
Middle East nuclear-weapon-free zone.

States in the region of South 
Asia have expressed their determina 
tion of keeping their countries free 
from nuclear weapons. No action should be 
taken by them which might deviate 
from that objective. In this context, the 
question of establishing a nuclear-weapon-
free zone in South Asia has been 
debated in several resolutions of the 
General Assembly which is keeping the 
subject under review.

The establishment of zones of 
peace in various regions of the world, 
under appropriate conditions, to be 
clearly defined and determined freely 
by the States concerned in the zone, 
taking into account the characteristics 
of the zone and the principles of the 
Charter of the United Nations, and in 
conformity with international law, can 
contribute to strengthening the 
security of States within such zones 
and to international peace and 
security as a whole.

In this regard, the General 
Assembly notes the proposals for the 
establishment of zones of peace, inter 
also in:

(a) South-East Asia where States in 

the region have expressed interest in 
the establishment of such a zone, in 
conformity with their views;
(b) Indian Ocean, taking into ac 
count the deliberations of the General 
Assembly and its relevant resolutions 
and the need to ensure the mainten 
ance of peace and security in the 
region.

It is imperative as an integral 
part of the effort to halt and reverse 
the arms race, to prevent the proliferation 
of nuclear weapons. The goal of nu 
clear non-proliferation is on the one 
hand to prevent the emergence of any 
additional nuclear weapons States be 
side the other five nuclear-weapon 
States, and on the other progressively 
to reduce and eventually eliminate 
nuclear weapons altogether. This in 
volves obligations and responsibilities 
on the part of both nuclear-weapon 
States and non-nuclear-weapon States, 
the former undertaking to stop the 
nuclear-arms race and to achieve dis 
armament by urgent application of 
measures outlined in the relevant 
paragraphs of this Document, and all 
States undertaking to prevent the 
spread of nuclear weapons.

Effective measures can and 
should be taken at the national level 
and through international agreements 
to minimize the danger of the prolifera 
tion of nuclear weapons without 
jeopardizing energy supplies or the 
development of nuclear energy for 
peaceful purposes. Therefore, the 
nuclear-weapon States and the 
nuclear-weapon States should jointly 
take further steps to develop an intern 
ational consensus of ways and 
means, on a universal and non-
discriminatory basis, to prevent the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Full implementation of all the 
provisions of existing instruments on 
non-proliferation, such as the Treaty 
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons and/or the Treaty for the 
Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in 
Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) 
by States parties to those instruments 
will be an important contribution to 
the end. Adherence to such instru 
mints has increased in recent years 
and the hope has been expressed by 
the parties that this trend might 
continue.

Non-proliferation measures 
should not jeopardize the full exercise 
of the inalienable rights of all States to 
apply and develop their programmes 
for the peaceful use of nuclear energy 
for economic and social development in 
conformity with their priorities, inter 
ests and needs. All States should also 
have access to, and be free to acquire 
technology, equipment and materials 
for peaceful uses of nuclear energy, 
taking into account the particular 
needs of the developing countries. In 
ternational co-operation in this field 
should be under agreed and appro 
appropriate international safeguards 
provided through the International Atomic 
Energy Agency on a non-discrimina 
tory basis in order to prevent ef 
fectively proliferation of nuclear 
weapons.

Sale of such weapons and decisions 
in the field of the peaceful uses 
of nuclear energy should be respected 
without jeopardizing their respective 
agreements and contracts for the 
peaceful use of nuclear energy 
providing that agreed safeguard me 
sures mentioned above are applied.

In accordance with the prin 
ciples and provisions of Resolution 
32/50, international co-operation for 
the promotion and utilization of nuclear technology for 
economic and social development, es 
pecially in the developing countries, 
should be strengthened.

Efforts should be made to con 
clude the work of the International 
Atomic Energy Agency 
strictly in accordance with the objectives set 
out in the final communiqué of its 
Organizing Conference.

States should adhere to 
the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poison 
os or Other Gases, and of Bac 
teriological Methods of Warfare.

States which have not yet 
done so should consider adhering to the 
Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production and Stock 
piling of Bacteriological (Biological) 
and Toxin Weapons and on Their 
Destruction.

States should also consider the 
possibility of adhering to multilateral 
agreements concluded so far in the disarm 
ament field which are mentioned 
below in this section.

The implementation and effective 
prohibition of the development, produc 
tion and stockpiling of all chemical 
weapons and their destruction repres 
sent one of the most urgent measures of 
disarmament. Consequently, con 
clusion of a convention to this end, on 
which negotiations have been going on 
for several years, is one of the most ur 
gent tasks of multilateral negotia 
tions. After its conclusion, all States 
should contribute to ensuring the 
broadest possible application of the 
convention through its early signature 
and ratification.

A convention should be 
concluded prohibiting the development, 
production, stockpiling and use of 
radiological weapons.

In order to help prevent a qua 
litative arms race and so that scientific 
and technological achievements may 
ultimately be used solely for peaceful 
purposes, effective measures should be 
taken to avoid the danger and prevent 
the emergence of new types of weapons 
of mass destruction based on new 
scientific principles and achieve 
ments. Efforts should be appropriately 
pursued aiming at the prohibition of 
such new types and new systems of 
weapons of mass destruction. Specific 
agreements could be concluded on 
particular types of new weapons of 
mass destruction which may be 
identified. This question should be kept 
under continuous review.

The Committee on Disarm 
ament should keep under review the 
need for a further prohibition 
of any or other use of 
uclear weaponization techniques 
in order to eliminate the dangers to 
mankind from such use.

In order to promote the peaceful 
use of and to avoid an arms race on the 
sea-bed and the ocean floor and the sub 
soil thereof, the Committee on Dis 
armament is requested— in consulta 
tion with the States parties to the 
Treaty on the Prohibition of the 
Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and 
Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the 
Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor or the 
Subsoil Thereof, and taking into 
account the proposals made during the 
1977 Review Conference and any 
relevancy technological developments to 
proced promptly with the cons 
ideration of further measures in the 
field of disarmament for the pre 
vention of an arms race in that envi 
moment.

In order to prevent an arms race 
in outer space, further measures should 
be taken and appropriate inter-
national negotiations be held in accordance with the spirit of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies.

81 Together with negotiations on nuclear disarmament measures, the limitations, and gradual reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons should be resolutely pursued within the framework of progress towards general and complete disarmament. States with the largest military arsenals have a special responsibility in pursuing the process of conventional arms reductions.

82 In particular the achievement of a more stable situation in Europe at a lower level of military potential on the basis of approximate equality and parity, as well as on the basis of diminishing the security of all States with full respect for security interests and independence of States outside military alliances, by agreement on appropriate mutual reductions and limitations on the use of nuclear weapons, to the strengthening of security in Europe, and constitute a significant step towards enhancing international peace and security. Current efforts to this end should be continued most energetically.

83 Agreements or other measures should be resolutely pursued on a bilateral, regional, and multilateral basis with the aim of strengthening peace and security at a lower level of forces, by the limitation and reduction of armed forces and of conventional weapons, taking into account the need of States to protect their security, bearing in mind the inherent right of self-defense embodied in the Charter of the United Nations and without prejudice to the right of equal rights and self-determination of peoples in accordance with the Charter, and the need to ensure balance at each stage an undiminished security of all States. Such measures might include those in the following two paragraphs.

84 Bilateral, regional and multilateral consultations and conferences where appropriate conditions exist with the participation of all the countries concerned for the consideration of different aspects of conventional disarmament, such as the initiative envisaged in the Declaration of Ayacucho in 1974 by eight Latin American countries.

85 Consultations should be carried out among major arms supplier and recipient countries on all types of international transfers of conventional weapons, based, in particular, on the principle of undiminished security of the parties with a view to promoting or enhancing stability at a lower military level taking into account the need of all States to protect their security as well as the inalienable right to self-determination and independence of peoples under colonial or foreign domination and the obligations of States to respect that right, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly and Co-operation Among States.

86 The 1979 United Nations Conference on the Prohibition of the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects should seek agreement, in the light of humanitarian and military considerations, on the prohibition or restriction of such weapons, including those which may cause unnecessary suffering and which may have indiscriminate effects. The conference should consider specific categories of such weapons, including those which were the subject of previous conducted disarmament.

87 All States are called upon to contribute towards carrying out this task.

88 The result of the Conference should be considered by all States and especially producer States, in regard to the question of the transfer of such weapons to other States.

89 Gradual reduction of military budgets on a mutually agreed basis, for example, in absolute figures or in terms of percentage points, particularly by nuclear weapon States and other militarily significant States would be a measure that would contribute to the curbing of the arms race, and would increase the possibilities of realization of proposals being used for military purposes to economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries. The basic for implementing these proposals has to be agreed by all participating States and will require ways and means of its implementation acceptable to all of them, taking account of the problems involved in assessing the relative significance of reductions as among different States and with due regard to the proposals of States on all the aspects of reduction of military budgets.

90 The General Assembly should continue to consider what concrete steps should be taken to facilitate the reduction of military budgets bearing in mind the relevant proposals and documents of the United Nations on this question.

91 In order to facilitate the conclusion and effective implementation of disarmament agreements and to create confidence, States should accept appropriate arrangements for verification in such agreements.

92 In the context of international disarmament negotiations, the problem of verification should be further examined and adequate methods and procedures in this field be considered. Every effort should be made to develop appropriate methods and procedures which are non-discriminatory and which do not unduly interfere with the internal affairs of other States or jeopardize their economic and social development.

93 In order to facilitate the process of disarmament, it is necessary to take measures and pursue policies to strengthen international peace and security and to build confidence among States. Commitment to confidence-building measures could significantly contribute to preparing for further progress in disarmament. For this purpose, measures such as the following and other measures yet to be agreed, should be undertaken.

1. The prevention of attacks which take place by accident, miscalculation or communications failure by taking steps to improve communications between Governments, particularly in areas of tension, by the establishment of "hot lines" and other methods of reducing the risk of conflict.

2. States should assess the possible implications of their military research and development for existing agreements as well as for further efforts in the field.

3. The Secretary-General shall periodically submit reports to the General Assembly on the economic and social consequences of the arms race and its extremely harmful effects on world peace and security.

94 In view of the relationship between expenditure on armaments and economic and social development and the necessity to release real resources now being used for military purposes to economic and social development in the world, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries, the Secretary-General should, with the assistance of a group of qualified governmental experts appointed by him, initiate an expert study on the relationship between disarmament and development. The Secretary-General should submit an interim report to the Assembly at its thirty-fourth session and submit the final results to the Assembly at its thirty-sixth session for subsequent action.

95. The expert study should have the terms of reference contained in the report of the Ad Hoc Group on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development appointed by the Secretary-General in accordance with General Assembly resolution 32/88 A of 12 December 1977. It should investigate the three main areas listed in the report, bearing in mind the United Nations studies previously carried out. The study should be made in the context of how disarmament can contribute to the establishment of the new international economic order. The study should be forward-looking and policy-oriented and place special emphasis on both the desirability of a reallocation of following disarmament measures and of resources now being used for military
purposes to economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries and the substantive feasibility of such a reallocation. A principal aim should be to produce results that could effectively guide the formulation of practical measures to reallocate those resources at the local, national, regional and international levels.

96. Taking further steps in the field of disarmament and other measures aimed at promoting international peace and security would be facilitated by carrying out the work of the Secretary-General in this field with appropriate assistance from governmental or consultant experts.

97. The Secretary-General shall, with the assistance of consultant experts, appointed by him, continue the study of the interaction between disarmament and international security and submit it to the thirty-fourth session of the General Assembly, as requested in resolution A/RES/32/87C.

98. The thirty-third and subsequent sessions of the General Assembly should determine the specific guidelines for conducting studies, taking into account the proposals already submitted including those made by individual countries at the special session, as well as other proposals which can be introduced later in this field. In doing so, the General Assembly would take into consideration a report on these matters prepared by the Secretary-General.

99. In order to mobilize world public opinion on behalf of disarmament, the specific measures set forth below should be adopted to increase the dissemination of information about the arms race and the efforts to halt and reverse it. Should be adopted:

100. Governmental and non-governmental information organs and those of the United Nations and its specialized agencies should give priority to the preparation and distribution of printed and audiovisual materials relating to the danger represented by the arms race as well as to the disarmament efforts and negotiations on specific disarmament measures.

101. In particular, publicity should be given to the final documents of the special session.

102. The General Assembly proclaims a week starting 24 October, the day of the foundation of the United Nations, as a week devoted to the objectives of disarmament.

103. To encourage study and research on disarmament, the United Nations Centre for Disarmament should intensify its activities in the presentation of information concerning the arms race.

104. Throughout this process of disseminating information about the developments in the disarmament field of all countries, there should be increased participation by non-governmental organizations concerned with the matter, through closer liaison between them and the United Nations.

105. Member States should be encouraged to ensure a better flow of information with regard to the various aspects of disarmament, to avoid dissemination of false and tendentious information concerning arms, and to concentrate on the danger of escalation of the arms race and on the need for general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

106. With a view to contributing to a greater understanding and awareness of the problems of the arms race and of the need for disarmament, Governments and governmental and non-governmental international organizations are urged to take steps to develop programmes of education for disarmament and peace studies at all levels.

107. The General Assembly welcomes the initiative of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization in planning to hold a world congress on disarmament education and, in this connexion, urges that organization to step up its programme aimed at the development of disarmament education as a distinct field of study through the preparation, inter alia of teachers’ guides, textbooks, readers and audiovisual materials. Member States should take all possible measures to encourage the incorporation of such materials in the curricula of their educational institutions.

108. In order to promote expertise in disarmament in more Member States, particularly in developing countries, the General Assembly decides to establish a programme of fellowships on disarmament. The Secretary-General, taking into account the proposal submitted to the special session, should prepare guidelines for the programme. He should also submit the financial requirements of 20 fellowships at the thirty-third regular session of the General Assembly, for inclusion in the regular budget of the United Nations bearing in mind the savings that can be made within the existing budgetary appropriations.

109. Implementation of these priorities should lead to general and complete disarmament under effective international control, which remains the ultimate goal of all efforts exercised in the field of disarmament. Negotiations on general and complete disarmament shall be conducted concurrently with negotiations on partial measures of disarmament. With this purpose in mind, the Committee on Disarmament will undertake the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament encompassing all measures, including those specific to the arms race and of the need for disarmament. Governments and governmental and non-governmental international organizations are urged to take steps to develop programmes of education for disarmament and peace studies at all levels.

110. Progress in disarmament should be accompanied by measures to strengthen international institutions for maintaining peace and the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means. During and after the implementation of the programme of general and complete disarmament, there should be taken, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter, the necessary measures to maintain international peace and security, including the obligation of States to place at the disposal of the United Nations agreed manpower necessary for an international peace force to be equipped with agreed types of armament and material for the use of this force should ensure that the United Nations can effectively deter or suppress any threat or use of arms in violation of the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

111. General and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control shall permit States to have at their disposal only those non-nuclear forces, armaments, facilities and establishments as are agreed to be necessary to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of the inhabitants and in order that States shall support and provide agreed manpower for a United Nations peace force.

112. In addition to the several questions dealt with in this Programme of Action, there are a few others of fundamental importance on which it is necessary to achieve a consensus, because of the complexity of the issues involved and the short time at the disposal of the special session. It has proved impossible to reach satisfactory agreements on these matters. For those reasons, they are treated only in very general terms and, in a few cases, even not treated at all in the Programme. It should be stressed, however, that no number of concrete approaches to deal with such questions emerged from the
exchange of views carried out in the General Assembly which will undoubtedly facilitate the continuation of the study and negotiation of the problems involved in the competent disarmament organs.

IV. MACHINERY

113 While disarmament, particularly in the nuclear field, has become a necessity for the survival of mankind and for the elimination of the danger of nuclear war, little progress has been made since the end of the Second World War. In addition to the need to exercise political will, the international machinery should be utilized more effectively and also improved to enable implementation of the Programme of Action and help the United Nations to fulfill its role in the field of disarmament.

In spite of the best efforts of the international community, adequate results have not been achieved in the existing machinery. There is, therefore, an urgent need that existing disarmament machinery be revitalized and forums appropriately constituted for disarmament deliberations and negotiations with a better representative character.

For maximum effectiveness, two kinds of bodies are required in the field of disarmament – deliberative and negotiating. All Member States should be represented on the former, whereas the latter, for the sake of convenience, should have a relatively small membership.

114 The United Nations, in accordance with the Charter, has a central role and primary responsibility in the sphere of disarmament. Accordingly, it should play a more active role in this field, and in order to discharge its functions effectively, the United Nations should facilitate and encourage all disarmament measures. Bilateral, unilateral, regional, or multilateral initiatives should be duly informed through the General Assembly, or any other appropriate United Nations channel reaching all Members of the Organization. Of all disarmament efforts outside its scope, without prejudice to the progress of negotiations.

115 The General Assembly has been and should remain the main deliberative organ of the United Nations in the field of disarmament and should make every effort to facilitate the implementation of disarmament measures. An item entitled Review of implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session shall be included in the provisions of the agenda of the thirty-third and subsequent sessions of the General Assembly.

116 Draft multilateral disarmament conventions should be subjected to the normal procedures applicable in the law of treaties. Those submitted to the General Assembly for its consideration should be subject to full review by the Assembly.

117 The First Committee of the General Assembly should deal in the future only with questions of disarmament and related international security questions.

118 The General Assembly establishes, as successor to the Commission, a body for the purpose of a General Assembly to which all Members of the United Nations are invited to participate. This Committee is composed of all Members of the United Nations.

The General Assembly decided that:

(a) The Disarmament Commission shall be a deliberative body and a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly, the function of which shall be to consider and make recommendations on various problems in the field of disarmament and to follow up the relevant decisions and recommendations of the special session devoted to disarmament. The Disarmament Commission should, inter alia, consider the elements of a comprehensive programme for disarmament to be submitted as recommendations to the General Assembly and, through it, to the negotiating body, the Committee on Disarmament.

(b) The Disarmament Commission shall function under the rules of procedure relating to the committees of the General Assembly with such modifications as the Commission may deem necessary and shall make every effort to ensure that, in so far as possible, decisions on substantive issues be adopted by consensus.

(c) The Disarmament Commission shall report annually to the General Assembly. It will submit for the consideration of the Council the recommendations of the General Assembly to the Committee on Disarmament to appoint the Secretary-General of the United Nations, following consultations with the Committee on Disarmament, to appoint the Secretary-General of the United Nations, to appoint the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and to consult with the Committee and its Chairman in organizing the business and timetables of the Committee.

(d) The Secretary-General shall furnish such experts, staff and services as are necessary for the effective accomplishment of the Commission's functions.

119 A second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament should be held on a date to be decided by the General Assembly at its thirty-third session.

120 The General Assembly is conscious of the work that has been done by the international negotiating body that has been meeting since March 14, 1962 as well as the considerable and urgent work that remains to be accomplished in the field of disarmament.

(a) The General Assembly is deeply aware of the continuing requirement for a single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum of limited size taking decisions on the basis of consensus. It attaches great importance to the participation of all the nuclear-weapon States in an appropriately constituted negotiating body.

The General Assembly welcomes the agreement reached following appropriate consultations among the member States during the Special Session of the General Assembly. Devoted to Disarmament. The Committee on Disarmament will be open to the nuclear-weapon States and to other States to be chosen in consultation with the President of the thirty-third session of the General Assembly. That the membership of the Committee on Disarmament will be reviewed at regular intervals. That the Committee on Disarmament will be convened in Geneva not later than January 1979 by the country whose name appears first in the alphabetical list of membership, and that the Committee on Disarmament will:

(a) Conduct its work by consensus.

(b) Adopt its own rules of procedure.

(c) Request the Secretary-General of the United Nations, following consultations with the Committee on Disarmament, to appoint the Secretary-General of the United Nations, to appoint the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and to consult with the Committee and its Chairman in organizing the business and timetables of the Committee.

(d) Rotate the chairmanship of the Committee among all its members on a monthly basis.

(e) Adopt its own agenda taking into account the recommendations made to it by the General Assembly and the proposals presented by the members of the Committee.

(f) Submit a report to the General Assembly annually, or more frequently as appropriate, and propose its formal text to the relevant documents to the Member States of the United Nations on a regular basis.

(g) Make arrangements for interested States, if so requested by the Committee, to submit to the Committee written proposals or working documents on measures of disarmament that are the subject of negotiation in the Committee and participate in the discussion of the subject matter of such proposals or working documents.

(h) Invite States not members of the Committee, upon their request, to express views in the Committee when the particular concerns of those States are under discussion.

(i) Open its plenary meetings to the public unless otherwise decided.

121 Bilateral and regional disarmament negotiations may also play an important role and could facilitate negotiations of multilateral agreements in the field of disarmament.

122 At the earliest appropriate time, a world disarmament conference should be convened with universal participation and with adequate preparation.

123 In order to enable the United
Nations to continue to fulfil its role in the field of disarmament and to carry out the additional tasks assigned to it by this special session, the United Nations Centre for Disarmament should be adequately strengthened and its research and information functions accordingly extended.

The Centre should also take account fully of the possibilities offered by United Nations agencies and other institutions and programmes within the United Nations system with regard to studies and information on disarmament. The Centre should also contact with non-governmental organizations and research institutions in view of the valuable role they play in the field of disarmament. This role could be encouraging also in other ways that may be considered as appropriate.

124. The Secretary-General is requested to set up an advisory board of eminent persons, on the basis of their personal expertise and taking into account the principle of equitable geographical representation, to advise him on various aspects of studies to be undertaken under the auspices of the United Nations in the field of disarmament and arms limitation, including a programme of such studies.

125. The General Assembly notes with satisfaction that the active participation of the Member States in the consideration of the agenda items of the special session and the proposals and suggestions submitted by them and reflected to a considerable extent in the Final Document have made a valuable contribution to the work of the special session and to its positive conclusion.

Since a number of those proposals and suggestions, which have become an integral part of the work of the special session, selected to be studied more thoroughly, taking into consideration the many relevant comments and observations made both in the general debate of the plenary and the deliberations of the Ad Hoc Committee, the Secretary-General is requested to transmit, together with this Final Document, to the appropriate deliberative and negotiating organs dealing with the questions of disarmament all the official records of the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, in accordance with the recommendations of the Assembly which may adopt at its thirty-third session some of the proposals put forth for consideration of the special session of the Assembly are listed below:

(a) Text of the decision of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party concerning Romania's position on disarmament and, in particular, on nuclear disarmament, adopted on 9 May 1978 (A/S-10/AC.1/14);

(b) Views of the Swiss Government on problems to be discussed at the tenth special session of the General Assembly (A/S-10/AC.1/2);

(c) Proposals of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on practical measures for ending the arms race (A/S-10/AC.1/44);

(d) Memorandum from France concerning the establishment of an International Satellite Monitoring Agency (A/S-10/AC.1/11);

(e) Memorandum from France concerning the establishment of an International Institute for Disarmament Research (A/S-10/AC.1/8).

(f) Proposal by Sri Lanka for the establishment of a World Disarmament Authority (A/S-10/AC.1/9 and Add.1);

(g) Working paper submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany entitled "Contribution to the arms control verification of a comprehensive test ban" (A/S-10/AC.1/12);

(h) Working paper submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany entitled "Invitation to attend an international chemical-weapon verification workshop in the Federal Republic of Germany" (A/S-10/AC.1/13);

(i) Working paper on disarmament submitted by China (A/S-10/AC.1/17);

(j) Working paper submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany concerning zones of confidence-building measures as a first step towards the preparation of a world-wide convention on confidence-building measures (A/S-10/AC.1/20);

(k) Proposal by Ireland for a study of the possibility of establishing a system of incentives to promote arms control and disarmament (A/S-10/AC.1/21);

(l) Working paper submitted by Romania concerning a synthesis of the proposals in the field of disarmament (A/S-10/AC.1/23);

(m) Proposal by the United States of America on the establishment of a United Nations Peace-keeping Re- serve and on confidence-building measures and stabilizing measures in various regions, including notification of manoeuvres, invitation of observers to manoeuvres, and United Nations machinery to monitor and promote such measures (A/S-10/AC.1/24);

(n) Proposal by Uruguay on the possibility of establishing a poli-morgical agency (A/S-10/AC.1/25);

(o) Proposal by Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Federal Republic of Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America on the strengthening of the security role of the United Nations and on the peaceful settlement of disputes and peace-keeping (A/S-10/AC.1/26 and C corr.1 and 2);

(p) Memorandum from France concerning the establishment of an International Disarmament Fund for Development (A/S-10/AC.1/28).

(q) Proposal by Norway entitled "Evaluation of the impact of new weapons on arms control and disarmament efforts" (A/S-10/AC.1/31).

(r) Note verbale transmitting the text signed in Washington on 22 June 1978, by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, Peru and Venezuela, reaffirming the principles of further and total disarmament with respect to the limitation of conventional weapons (A/S-10/AC.1/34);

(s) Memorandum from Liberia entitled "Declaration of a new philosophy of disarmament" (A/S-10/AC.1/35);

(t) Statements made by the representatives of China on 22 June 1978 on the draft Final Document of the tenth special session (A/S-10/AC.1/36).

(u) Proposal by the President of Cyprus for the total demilitarization and disarmament of the Republic of Cyprus and the implementation of the resolutions of the United Nations (A/S-10/AC.1/39);

(v) Proposal by Costa Rica on economic and social incentives to halt the arms race (A/S-10/AC.1/40).

(w) Amendments submitted by China to the draft Final Document of the tenth special session (A/S-10/AC.1/L2 to L4, A/S-10/AC.1/L7 and L8).

(x) Proposal by Canada for the implementation of a strategy of suffocation of the nuclear arms race (A/S-10/AC.1/L6).

(y) Draft resolution submitted by Cyprus, Ethiopia and India on the urgent need for cessation of further testing of nuclear weapons (A/S-10/AC.1/L11).

(z) Draft resolution submitted by Ethiopia and India on the non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war (A/S-10/AC.1/L10).

(AA) Proposal by the non-aligned countries on the establishment of a Zone of Peace in the Mediterranean (A/S-10/AC.1/L7 para.72).

(BB) Proposal by the Government of Senegal for a tax on military budgets (A/S-10/AC.1/L7 para.101).

(CC) Proposal by Austria for the transmission to Member States of working paper A/18570 and the ascertainment of their views on the subject of verification (A/S-10/AC.1/L7 para.112).

(dd) Proposal by the non-aligned countries for the dismantling of foreign military bases from foreign territories and withdrawal of foreign troops from foreign territories (A/S-10/AC.1/L7 para.113).

(ee) Proposal by Mexico for the opening, on a provisional basis, of an Ad Hoc account in the United Nations Development Programme for use to development the funds which may be released as a result of disarmament measures (A/S-10/AC.1/L7 para.141).
126. In adopting this Final Document, the States Members of the United Nations solemnly reaffirm their determination to work for general and complete disarmament and to make further collective efforts aimed at strengthening peace and international security; eliminating the threat of war, particularly nuclear war; implementing practical measures aimed at halting and reversing the arms race; strengthening the procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes; and reducing military expenditures and utilizing the resources thus released in a manner which will help to promote the well-being of all peoples and to improve the economic conditions of the developing countries.

127. The General Assembly expresses its satisfaction that the proposals submitted to its special session devoted to disarmament and the deliberations thereon have made it possible to reaffirm and define in this Final Document fundamental principles, goals, priorities and procedures for the implementation of the above purposes, either in the Declaration on the Programme of Action or in both. The Assembly also welcomes the important decision agreed upon regarding the deliberative and negotiating machinery and is confident that these organs will discharge their functions in an effective manner.

128. Finally, it should be borne in mind that the number of States that participated in the general debate, as well as the high level of representation and the depth and scope of that debate are unprecedented in the history of disarmament efforts. Several Heads of State or Government addressed the General Assembly. In addition, other Heads of State or Government sent messages and expressed their good wishes for the success of the special session of the Assembly. Several high officials of specialized agencies and other institutions and programmes within the United Nations system and spokesmen of 25 non-governmental organizations and six research institutes also made valuable contributions to the proceedings of the session.

129. The General Assembly is convinced that the discussions of the disarmament problems at the special session and its Final Document will attract the attention of all peoples, further mobilize world public opinion and provide a powerful impetus for the cause of disarmament.
ANNEX "H"

CHRONICLE OF DISARMAMENT EVENTS
covering the period of the UN
Special Session on Disarmament

1977 - Meetings, Conferences and Negotiations

February 3 - April 15
Mutual and balanced force reduction
talks in central Europe (MBFR), Vienna

February 7-11
Preparatory Committee for the Treaty
on the Prohibition of Emplacement of
Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of
Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the
Ocean Floor and the Subsoil Thereof,
(Sea-Bed Treaty), Geneva

February 15 -
April 29
Spring session of the Conference of the
Committee on Disarmament (CCD), Geneva

February 21-25
Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts on
Seismic Events, Geneva

February 28 -
March 11
Group of Consultant Experts on the Eco-
monic and Social Consequences of the Arms
Race (ESCAR) and Military Expenditures,
New York

March 21-31
Tenth session of the Standing Consultative
Commission on SALT, Geneva

March 28-30
Brezhnev-Vance Consultations on SALT,
Moscow

March 28-30
First session of the Preparatory Com-
mittee for the Special Session of the
General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament
(UNSSOD), New York

April 4-8
Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament
Conference (WDC), New York

April 10-14
Iran Conference on the Transfer of Nuclear
Technology, on the question of utilizing
nuclear energy, Shiraz/Persepolis

April 14-
June 10
Fourth session of the Diplomatic Confer-
ence on the Reaffirmation and Development
of International Humanitarian Law Applic-
able in Armed Conflicts, Geneva
April 18-22: Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean, New York
April 25-29: Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts on Seismic Events, Geneva
May 2-13: IAEA International Conference on Nuclear Power and its Fuel Cycle, Salzburg
May 9-13: USSR-USA Working Group meetings on chemical and radiological weapons, Geneva
May 11 - December 16: Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), Geneva
May 9-20: Second session of the Preparatory Committee for UNSSOD, New York
May 12 - December 15: MBFR Talks, Vienna
May 31 - June 3: Intergovernmental Group of Budgetary Experts on the Reduction of Military Budgets, Geneva
June 13-19: USSR-USA Working Group meetings on comprehensive test ban and non-proliferation, Washington
June 22-27: USSR-USA Working Group meeting on Indian Ocean arms limitation, Moscow
July 4-8: Group of Consultant Experts on ESCAR and Military Expenditures, Geneva
July 5 - August 30: Summer session of the CCD, Geneva
July 7-18: USSR-USA Working Group meeting on chemical weapons (CW), Geneva
July 12: USSR-USA Working Group meeting on comprehensive test ban (CTB), Geneva
July 13-27: USSR-UK-USA consultations on CTB, Geneva
July 25 - August 31: Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts on Seismic Events, Geneva
August 2-29  USSR-USA Working Group meeting on radiological (RW) and on other new weapons of mass destruction (NWMD), Geneva

August 8-19  Intergovernmental Group of Budgetary Experts on the Reduction of Military Budgets, Geneva

August 16-25  USSR-USA Working Group meeting on CW, Geneva

August 31 - September 9  Third session of the Preparatory Committee on UNSSOD, New York

September 12-16  Ad Hoc Committee on WDC, New York

September 19 - October 6  Ninth consultative meeting of the Contracting Parties to the Antarctic Treaty, London

September 19 - October 14  Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean, New York

September 20 - November 4  Eleventh session of the Standing Consultative Commission on SALT, Geneva

September 20 - December 21  32nd regular session of the UN General Assembly, New York

September 26-30  21st General Conference of the IAEA, Vienna

September 26-30  USSR-USA Working Group meeting on Indian Ocean arms limitation, Washington

September 26 - October 28  USSR-USA Working Group meeting on CW, Geneva

September 27 - October 25  USSR-USA Working Group meeting on RW and other NWMD, Geneva


November 4-21  Twelfth Session of the Standing Consultative Commission on SALT, Geneva

December 6-10  USSR-USA Working Group meeting on Indian Ocean arms limitation, Bern
December 12-16  First meeting of the Technical Coordinating Committee of INFCE, Vienna

December 14-19  Preliminary exchange of views between USSR and USA on the international arms trade, Washington

1978 - Meetings, Conferences and Negotiations

January 9  Resumption of SALT, Geneva

January 10  Start of USSR-USA Working Group meeting on CW, Geneva

January 23 - March 21  USSR-UK-USA negotiations on CTB, Geneva

January 24 - February 24  Fourth session of the Preparatory Committee on UNSSOD, New York

January 30  Resumption of MBFR Talks, Vienna

January 31  Start of Spring Session of CCD, Geneva

February 6    Start of USSR-USA Working Group meeting on RW and other NWMD, Geneva

February 7-17  USSR-USA Working Group meeting on Indian Ocean arms limitation, Berne

February 27 - March 2  International Non-Governmental Organizations Conference on Disarmament, Geneva

February 27 - March 10  Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts on Seismic Events, Geneva

February 27 - March 16  Special consultative meeting of Contracting Parties to the Antarctic Treaty, Canberra

March 13-22   Ad Hoc Group on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development, New York

March 13-24  Ad Hoc Committee on WDC, New York

March 22  Thirteenth session of the Standing Consultative Commission on SALT, Geneva
1977 - Other Noteworthy Events

March 1
The Swedish Delegation to the CCD submits a draft treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in all environments (CTB), which contains transitional arrangements.

March 31
The USSR and the USA announce bilateral discussions on several questions of arms control and disarmament, including meetings between experts. Working groups are set up on a series of topics.

April 7
President Carter announces the establishment of an international nuclear fuel cycle evaluation programme (INFCE).

April 27
President Carter asks Congress for legislation leading to strengthened non-proliferation controls, inter alia, by requiring that recipients of US nuclear exports submit all their nuclear activities to IAEA safeguards. Existing agreements for nuclear cooperation will be re-negotiated to meet the new standards.

May 18
The Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (ENMOD) is opened for signature and ratification by Governments.

June 22
Joint Declaration on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons by Brezhnev and Giscard d'Estaing.

July 5
The UK joins the USA and the USSR in negotiations on a CTB.

September 27
Gromyko announces that under an arrangement with the USA and the UK, the USSR would suspend nuclear weapon tests.

October 4
President Carter says that the USA is willing to go as far as possible, consistent with its security interests, in limiting its nuclear weapons. On a reciprocal basis, the USA is willing now to reduce these weapons by 10 percent, 20 percent or even 50 percent.

October 10
Soviet and British Foreign Ministers sign an agreement on the prevention of the accidental outbreak of war.
November 2  Brezhnev says that his country is prepared to reach agreement on a moratorium covering nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes along with a ban on all nuclear weapon tests for a definite period.

1978 - Other Noteworthy Events

January 11  Fifteen States advise the Director-General of the IAEA of the principles and detailed guidelines they will follow when considering nuclear exports.

February 21  Australia informs the Director General of IAEA that it will be applying the same criteria.

February 23  For the first time, France submits disarmament proposals.

March 8  The final document is adopted at the CSCE Review Conference.

March 10  President Carter signs the United States Non-Proliferation Act.
1977

April 21-22   Spring NATO Disarmament Experts Meeting, Brussels
October 4-5   Fall NATO Disarmament Experts Meeting, Brussels

1978

January 17   Special NATO Disarmament Experts Meeting to discuss UN Special Session on Disarmament, Brussels
May 2-3      Spring NATO Disarmament Experts Meeting, Brussels
May 30-31    NATO Ministerial Meeting, Washington