THE ISSUES OF REFUGEES AND FORCED MIGRANTS
THROUGH THE LENS
OF THE RUSSIAN POLITICAL ELITE

By

JEROME RUAULT, B.A.

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Professor Joan DeBardeleben, Director
European and Russian Studies

Professor J. DeBardeleben, Supervisor
ABSTRACT

In early 1993, post-Soviet Russia saw its first laws on forced migrants and on refugees come into force. Realizing the inadequacy of both laws to Russian reality, the government submitted two bills which were enacted in 1995 for the Forced Migrant Act and in 1997 for the Refugee Act. The analysis of the amendments reveals that both acts set stricter criteria as bases to accept or reject claims, reduce the state assistance to claimants and status holders, and enhance the state power to interrupt the processing or withdraw both statuses. The results of a content analysis of the Russian political discourse on issues of refugees and forced migrants from 1992 to May 2000 show that security and the Eurasianist form of Russian identity are not present enough, as expected, in the discourse to explain the amendments. Yet, Russian politicians insist on the central role of the state in this field.
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INTRODUCTION

In 1951, the members of the United Nations adopted the Geneva Convention on Refugees in an effort to harmonize measures taken by the governments to solve the situation of millions of people that World War II forced to emigrate. Originally, the Convention was considered to be a response to a temporary crisis that would disappear as war-stricken countries would be rebuilding. However, by adopting the Protocol in 1967, the signatory parties to the Convention acknowledged that they needed a permanent instrument to assist them in dealing with continuous flows of asylum seekers.

As an offspring of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation strove to adhere to most treaties and conventions governing the international community. Thus, in 1993, the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol came into force on Russian territory. This move occurred at a moment when numerous former Soviet citizens were turning to Russia to escape from ethnic conflicts, discriminatory policies or economic crises plaguing other former Soviet republics. These continuous in-flows of refugees, a phenomenon that the Soviet Union had never officially known, prompted the Russian government to create the Federal Migration Service (FMS) in June 1992, and to adopt the Refugee Act (Zakon o bezhentsakh) and the Forced Migrant Act (Zakon o vynuzhdennykh pereselentsakh) in February 1993, both more or less in accordance with the Convention and the Protocol.

Quickly, the Russian authorities realized that the institutions in place to deal with immigrants were not adequate. For instance, some provisions of the Refugee Act and the
Forced Migrant Act were in contradiction with other Russian laws, the government had insufficient resources to provide as much assistance as defined in the laws and there was an acute lack of coordination between government agencies involved in the process. To remedy this situation, the government took two main steps. In the first place, the Duma adopted amended versions of the Forced Migrant Act in 1995 and of the Refugee Act in 1997 in an effort to take the Russian reality into account, but at the expense of the commitment to abiding by the Convention and the Protocol. In the second place, President Vladimir Putin signed a decree in May 2000 "liquidating" the FMS and transferring its functions to the Ministry of Federation Affairs and of National and Migration Policies.

The problem at the core of this research project is the overhaul that the Russian legislation pertaining to refugees and forced migrants experienced in the mid-1990s. Indeed, the Russian government then submitted bills on refugees and on forced migrants making the granting of these statuses more difficult. Why did a state willing to assume its heritage of superpower and become - or remain - a full-fledged member of the international community decide to rethink its commitment to upholding the provisions of the Convention and the Protocol? Why did a state considering itself to be the leader of the post-Soviet space and championing EU-like integration efforts set stricter rules for asylum seekers, including for those who come from "fellow" newly-independent states?

A modest examination of the literature on migration in Russia revealed two prevailing elements examined by scholars: the relationship between (inter-)national security and migration, and the direct impact of migration flows on Russia and its
response to them. Building upon these analyses, the study addresses the problem by examining the connection between changes in the relevant legislation and the political discourse of the Russian political elite on refugee and forced migrant issues over a period starting with the creation of the FMS in June 1992 and ending with its disbandment in May 2000.

This project will touch the vast domain of policy-making. Over the years, social scientists trying to make sense out of this complex phenomenon have developed or used several theoretical perspectives, such as the systems approach, functionalism/rationalism, the organizational theory, neo-marxism, the approach of policy networks/policy communities, the state-centred approach, the neo-corporatist theory, and others. Drawing on the systemic approach, the model of this research will take a closer look at the inputs of a subsystem of the political system, the political elite, into the making of policies relating to refugees and forced migrants. The choice of the political elite can be explained by two reasons: firstly, their proximity to the decision-making process, but above all by their function of receiving and sorting out demands for decisions from other social actors. In other words, the political elite reflects the demands and values of society to some extent.

The research will focus on two components of the discourse of the political elite: national security and Russian identity. The first chapter explains why the author identified these two concepts as potential explanatory factors of the changes in both laws. National security has always been a critical issue on the Russian political scene, in particular since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The prominence of this theme in a
Russia clinging to its superpower status and the "securitization" of refugee issues in the Western world justify the choice of national security as an issue influencing the making of policy in the field of immigration. As for the concept of Russian identity, the collapse of the USSR gave Russians an opportunity to resume their thinking on their distinctive identity which had been interrupted since the advent of Marxism-Leninism in 1917.

According to the first hypothesis, the Russian Federation would have toughened its legislation on refugees and forced migrants as they would consider these migrants as threats to Russia's national security. In this manner, the Russian authorities would have followed their West-European counterparts, which consider asylum seekers as a potential security threat, and adopted strict legal frameworks to deter asylum seekers from coming to Russia. Such a move entailed a less "orthodox" implementation of the relevant international conventions by Russia.

The second hypothesis focuses on effects that the evolution of the Russian identity has had on the debate over migration issues since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Between June 1992 and May 2000, Russian identity has been influenced by the struggle between the Westernophile and Eurasianist schools of thought. To put it simply, while the Westerners defend the "Europeanness" of the Russian people, liberal democracy, market economy, and the break from the Soviet era, the Eurasianists remain attached to Russian history, balanced political, cultural and economic relations with both Europe and Asia, the fight against American hegemony and express their reluctance to systematically apply Western recipes to Russia.

The verification of both hypotheses relies on a quantitative content analysis which
examines the presence of the security and identity themes in a sample of the Russian political discourse on refugees and forced migrants. The corpus is composed of interviews, statements and speeches in Russian given by Russian politicians between June 1992 and May 2000. The second chapter provides an explanation for the choice of this approach and a detailed description of the parameters of the content analysis.

An analysis of the amendments brought to both the Refugee Act and the Forced Migrant Act follows the chapter on methodology. The reader will not become familiar with all the amendments, but with the main patterns. The aim of this chapter is to draw a general picture of the changes that the reader will bear in mind while reading the actual content analysis.

Following the analysis, the conclusion will try to summarize the findings of this study and examine post-FMS developments in the field of refugees and forced migrants, notably in the context of the so-called anti-terrorist operation in Chechnya and of the September 11th terrorist attacks.
CHAPTER 1. Security and Identity in the Political Discourse

This chapter is an attempt to describe on what basis the author of this study originally chose the concepts of security and identity to help explain the direction of the reforms of the Russian laws on refugees and forced migrants. This being said, the reader should not at this stage expect an in-depth analysis of the relationship(s) between security and identity on one side, and immigration on the other. Given the wide scope of each concept, a review of the literature will firstly identify their different components and secondly identify how each concept relates to the issue of immigration. This review will then lead to the development of indicators for each concept that will be used to verify the two hypotheses central to this thesis.

1.1 Security in the Political Discourse

This subchapter serves several purposes. First of all, a review of the literature will shed light on the different dimensions of security. For each dimension, the review will explore its importance in the field of immigration firstly in the context of industrialized countries and then in the Russian context. This stage will focus on the influence of immigration over the dimensions of the security of the receiving country.

Secondly, the analysis of the dimensions of security also aims at identifying indicators to be used in this study to detect the presence of the security concept in the political discourse. These indicators will be further developed at the same time as the
theoretical framework in Chapter 2.

1.1.1 Security: A Concept With Several Dimensions

Defining the concept of security is not an easy task given the numerous meanings that the word has. For example, the Canadian Oxford Dictionary lists eight different definitions. However, one can anticipate their limits considering the length and the complexity of documents such as The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (35 pages) or Russia's National Security Concept (23 pages). Finally, there is no need to elaborate on the profusion of research based on a large number of approaches.

The approach taken to circumvent this obstacle consists in finding a definition characterized by its comprehensiveness as well as its precision. Such a definition was found in a publication edited by Barry Buzan, a research professor of International Studies at the University of Westminster, a project director at the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI) and a member of the School of Copenhagen, who divides security into five dimensions, namely economic, environmental, military, societal and political (Buzan 1998). Without going into details, the following table provides the main elements of every dimension.
Table 1.1 The Five Dimensions of Security

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security Dimensions</th>
<th>Threatened Object</th>
<th>Securitizing Agent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>Administration/State</td>
<td>Individuals/Trade unions/Immigration/State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental</td>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>Activists/NGOs/State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>State</td>
<td>State/Lobbies</td>
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<td>Societal</td>
<td>Identity</td>
<td>State/Political figures</td>
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<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>Sovereignty</td>
<td>State</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Buzan et al. 1998.

The following paragraphs briefly examine each dimension, in particular how they may be affected by immigration in both the Western and Russian contexts.

_Economic Dimension_

Opinions on the impact of immigration on an economy are varied. For some, immigration may contribute to the development and the improvement of economic and social conditions (Perna Oct. 2001). For example, countries like Canada, Germany and even Russia recognize immigration as a way to solve the crisis in the labour force and, by extension, the declining population growth they have been facing since the end of the post World War II "baby boom." For countries such as Canada and the United States of America, immigration represents a fundamental element of their history and their national identity.

However, for others immigration may help perpetuate stagnation of the economy and inequality within the population. Thus, leaders of certain mainstream political parties in Western countries have portrayed immigrants, mainly from third world countries, as a social or economic burden. Western societies often react negatively to
immigrants because of the costs the latter are believed to impose on the host economy. Large numbers of newcomers are thought to create a substantial economic strain on housing, education, and health programs. Finally, more often than not, a significant part of public opinion criticizes immigrants for their vulnerability to criminality or their dependence on welfare allowances.

Prior to the 1970s economic crisis, European countries suffering from a shortage in the labour force had kept their doors wide open to immigrants mainly from Asia and Africa (Vitkoskaya Oct. 2001: 7). Thus, former colonial powers welcomed many citizens from their former colonial empires. However, Europe started looking differently at that flow when the effects of the economic crisis were felt, in particular on the labour market (Loc. cit.). Gradually, host societies grew more and more hostile to immigrants, viewing them as illegitimate competitors on the labour market and abusers of the welfare state. Over time, some governments, in particular in Western Europe, under pressure from their constituencies, recognized the negative effects of immigration and began to restrict the in-flow of immigrants as well as the rates of family reunions (Loc. cit.).

In Russia, the relationship between immigration and the economic dimension of security can be illustrated by the fate of migrant workers from China. With estimates varying from 200,000 to 5 million, these Chinese come to Russia, in particular to the Russian Far East, to work in the numerous low-tech, labour-intensive farms (AP 14 Aug. 2002). According to Vilya Gelbras, a Russian expert on Chinese migration to Russia, Russian farmers hire Chinese workers because they are better suited for the small farms mushrooming in today's Russia than their Russian counterparts who are more used to
working in Soviet-style huge farms (Loc. cit.). Yet, these continuous in-flows raise concerns among the Russian population, which leads to occasional racist attacks or voicing a fear that the Far East may become part of China. In this case, although the Chinese immigration has an economic raison d'être, the danger that it poses, spills over to other security dimensions.

*Environmental Dimension*

According to Rasa Ostrauskaite, the analysis of environment as a security issue is a relatively recent process, as it dates back only to the end of Cold War (Ostrauskaite Dec. 2001). In fact, in light of the massive destruction of the environment all over the planet, more and more societies realize that the traditional forms of national sovereignty are challenged by the effects of ecological interdependence. This change of attitude was prompted notably by the depletion of the ozone layer, the worsening pollution of rivers and seas, and Chernobyl-like catastrophes, which completely ignored borders.

Extending its thinking on security to environmental risks, scholars of the School of Copenhagen divide environmental threats into three categories:

(1) threats to human civilization from the natural environment;

(2) threats from human activity to nature when changes made may pose existential threats to at least some parts of human civilization;

(3) threats from human activity to nature without any danger of creating any existential threats (Buzan et al. 1998: 79-80).

Rasa Ostrauskaite notes, however, that environmental issues are difficult to relate
to security as their causes and effects differ in time and space (Ostrauskaite Dec. 2001). As the discussion of the Kyoto agreement in Canada currently shows, politicians find it hard to endorse comprehensive solutions to environmental problems, in particular when they have an unknown economic impact, or to convince their constituents of the threatening nature of environmental degradation. As a matter of fact, it takes time to get society to act on environmental protection in the same way as it takes time for nature to undo human destruction.

The last three or four decades have provided plenty of examples in which environmental catastrophes induced flows of emigrants. Yet, the impact of immigration over the environmental security of the receiving country is difficult to determine given that it can usually be observed in the long run only. For example, uncontrolled immigration over a long period of time may lead to over-population and may consequently result in a faster expansion of urban areas and agricultural production than a natural population growth would demand. This scenario would fall under the second category of environmental threats.

In the Russian context, a lack of political will and of financial resources as well as the extent of the damages to the environment force environmental protection out of the list of priority tasks undertaken by the State. In addition, the current Russian leadership appears willing to endanger the environmental security of the country even more. For example, in July 2001, President Putin signed into law amendments to the legislation authorizing the import of spent nuclear fuel despite the overwhelming opposition of public opinion as revealed by several polls (Bellona 11 July 2001). Therefore, one can
wonder how important environmental security is for Russia's policy-makers.

**Military Dimension**

There is no need to elaborate on the military dimension of security. This dimension was born with the concept of security. Furthermore, the monopoly of force that Weber defined as a core characteristic of the modern State sets the military dimension high on the political agenda of most countries.

As a result of its involvement in two conflicts in Chechnya as well as the recurrent terrorist attacks in its urban centres, Russia has seen the reinforcement of controls over foreigners and non-Slavic Russians, in particular following the 1999 apartment bombings. This insecure climate has prompted the deployment of additional Interior Ministry troops in Russian cities and forced the authorities of several cities, in particular Moscow, not to abolish the *propiska*¹ system as required by several decisions of the Constitutional Court. Refugees and forced migrants have been particularly targeted by the identity checks conducted by these troops.

The impact of immigration over the military dimension of security can also be observed in the aftermath of the September 11th attack throughout the world. By abusing the US immigration procedures, a dozen men were able to mastermind and carry out a

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¹ The *propiska* system is a system inherited from the Soviet times, under which every Russian citizen and foreigner living in or visiting Russia must register with the local authorities.
terrifying terrorist attack in the heart of the greatest military power. As a result, many countries have reformed their legislation pertaining to immigration. In Canada, the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act that came into force in July 2002 stipulates in Section 34(1c) that "A permanent resident or a foreign national is inadmissible on security grounds for ... engaging in terrorism" (Canada Nov. 2001).

In many countries, notably in the USA and Russia, recent terrorist attacks have triggered a reform of their national security conception. For example, the United States has introduced the concept of "pre-emptive strikes" which authorizes the USA to act against emerging threats (USA Today 20 Sept. 2002). In Russia, the debate over a new national security policy started following the hostage-taking crisis at the Moscow Dubrovka theatre in October 2002.

Societal Dimension

This dimension has a particular importance given that the contemporary international system is built on the concept of the nation-state. According to S. Cattles, the director of the Centre for Asia Pacific Social Transformation Studies at the Universities of Wollongong and Newcastle, Australia, immigration plays a role in the slow erosion of traditional boundaries between languages, cultures, ethnic groups and nation-states (Castles 2000). Therefore, it constitutes a challenge not only to the nation-states' capacity of integrating "alien" elements, but also to the distinctiveness of their national identity and political institutions. Migration tends to be deemed as a problematic and unpredictable phenomenon that must be kept under control, curbed or even thwarted
(Loc. cit.).

In a paper presented at the Spring 2001 International Studies Association conference, Jennifer Ramos, who was then representing San Francisco State University, explains the consideration of immigration as a security issue by the fact that societies often perceive immigrants as a threat to their distinctiveness from other societies (Ramos Spring 2001). With their own language, their culture and their social background, immigrants are seen as undermining host societies from the inside.

Russia's past provides a few illustrations of the impact of immigration (or more correctly in this case migration) on the societal dimension of security. For example, Estonia and Latvia saw their respective native population shrink over years as ethnic Russians or Russian-speakers were subtly encouraged by the Soviet authorities to settle in these two republics. When the USSR collapsed, these two republics had inherited a significant Russian-speaking minority which had virtually no connection with the Latvian or Estonian national identity. This historical legacy mainly explained the introduction after their independence of strict requirements for obtaining Latvian or Estonian citizenships, notably regarding the command of the native languages.

In today's Russia, the relationship between immigration and the societal dimension should be considered in keeping with the fact that Russia is a federation. By definition, a federation consists of several components which, in the Russian context, may have distinct identities, whether ethnic or civic. Given the heterogeneity of the Russian Federation, immigration is unlikely to pose the same danger to Russia's societal security as to a relatively more ethnically-homogeneous country. However, one cannot
really determine whether immigration is a danger to Russia's societal security as long as Russian identity has not been defined. This issue will be addressed in the second part of this chapter.

*Political Dimension*

Immigrants have been emerging as significant political actors exerting their influence on both the domestic political scene of their host country and the relations between the latter and their country of origin (Perni Oct. 2001). In some countries, migrants or their offspring tried to influence policies in the fields of immigration, international development and international trade. In others, the migrant communities critical of their country of origin, lobby their host government to put pressure on the leadership of the country they left. For example, the Cuban community in the United States clearly plays a key role in the definition of the policy towards Castro’s regime.

Also, a country with large communities of immigrants may see expressions of their opposition to the regime of their country of origin as a threat to its foreign policy interests. For example, many Chinese immigrants voice their anti-Beijing opinions whenever a Chinese leader visits a Western country, in particular the USA or Canada, although the latter's governments try to avoid direct confrontation with Beijing. Such an opposition may sometimes constitute a source of domestic disorder that puts host countries before difficult options: repressing high-profile opposition and preserving bilateral relations or allowing expressions of opposition and damaging bilateral relations.
The reader should now have a sense of the importance of immigration to different dimensions of security and which may affect national security conceptions in Russia as well as in Western countries. As outlined in the introduction to this chapter, indicators need to be developed in order to verify the hypotheses of this study. Is the division of the security concept into five dimensions a useful basis on which such indicators can be elaborated? The answer is negative for two principal reasons. First of all, the number of dimensions as well as their respective scope and complexity mean that the theoretical framework would include too many indicators. The limited resources available for this study preclude such a complex theoretical framework. Secondly, these dimensions are only part of the meaning of the security concept. Yet, they do not explain what makes an economic, environmental, military, societal or political issue a security issue. It is this missing link which will make possible the designing of suitable indicators for this study. Aware of this missing link, social scientists, in particular the School of Copenhagen have developed the concept of securitization which will be addressed in the next section.

1.1.2 Definition of Securitization

Defenders of the securitization approach claim that issues included in the political agenda of a country can be located on a continuum ranging from non-politicized (the state is not involved), through politicized (issues addressed in public policies) to securitized (issues framed through a security prism) (Perni Oct. 2001).

According to Professor Barry Buzan, there are two critical elements in the definition of “securitization,” namely existential threat and emergency measures (Buzan
et al. 1998: 24). Existential threat implies that the survival of the whole system is at stake if one does not tackle the threatening issue. Furthermore, because the threat is existential, any action in this regard takes priority over any other actions.

The element of emergency measures means that steps taken to deal with the issue may infringe upon the rules of the regime governing society, whether it is democratic or not. For example, a government may choose to suspend fundamental rights or rule through executive orders. In this study, the mentioned rules refer to those rules which govern liberal-democratic societies. While noting the on-going debate over Russia’s democracy, this study simply postulates that Russia is a liberal democracy.

According to Ole Wæver, a professor with the political science department of the University of Copenhagen, securitization is essentially a speech act drawing on the security vocabulary by which a public figure presents a particular issue as a threat regardless of the actual danger that the issue poses (Wæver 1996: 107). Such a process legitimizes the use of any means to remedy the threat (Loc. cit.).

The development by scholars of the concept of securitization is simply the reflection of the importance that the security theme has taken over years in the international political discourse. Brief reviews of the debate on immigration in the European and Russian contexts reveal that governments tend to approach this issue by associating it with security, in particular since the end of Cold War. Therefore, an attempt to explain the 1990s reforms of the Russian legislation on a dimension of migration, that is on refugees and forced migrants, would not be complete if it did not consider the process of securitization as a possible explanation. In addition, its definition
through two specific concepts, existential threat and emergency measures, is compatible with a manageable theoretical framework.

The search for explanations of these reforms led to another theme often mentioned in the contemporary Russian political discourse: Russian identity.

1.2 Russian Identity

Even though Russian identity has been the topic of hundreds of theses, few are able to provide a universally accepted definition of who Russians are or what it means to be Russian nowadays. However, this lack of definition does not mean that there has not been any academic research in this regard.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the issue of identity has not let any aspect of the political discourse escape its grip. Indeed, in parallel with the building of a new regime, Russians have been reflecting on how to rebuild their identity by looking at the West, at the East, at their Soviet past and at their pre-Soviet past. The debate over identity in Russia spills into many different fields of politics: foreign policy, defense, religion, education, social programmes, and of course citizenship. Given its prominence in Russian political discourse, identity appears to be a legitimate concept to consider in an attempt to understand policy-making in the field of refugees and forced migrants.

Logically, identity is the core element of one of the two hypotheses explaining changes in the reform of the refugee/forced migrant legislation in Russia. The limits of
this study impose the development of a definition of Russian identity built on a small number of precise components. The following pages present the results of a literature review on the Russian identity theme. Its goal is to reduce the concept of Russian identity to a small number of components corresponding to thematic categories of a content analysis.

According to Professor Vera Tolz, the Associate Director of the European Studies Research Institute of the University of Salford (UK), there are five principal conceptions of the Russian nation in contemporary intellectual circles: Eastern Slav identity, language identity, ethnic identity, civic identity and union identity (Tolz 1998: 995). Her categorization provides a useful framework for organization of this discussion.

Eastern Slav identity or Neo-Pan Slavism

For supporters of this conception, the Russians are a nation “mandated” to unite all eastern Slavs on the basis of a common origin and culture (Tolz 1998: 995-996). This is a downscaled version of the 19th century Pan-Slavist project due notably to Nikolai Danilevskii and Rostislav Fadeyev. The 20th century version of the union would only include Russians, Ukrainians and Belorussians, while the 19th version comprised all Slavs, from the Czechs to the Russians through the Serbs. However, czarist Russia did not adopt this philosophy and remained loyal to a balance of power, the principle structuring the then international system which was centred on Europe (Ray 1995: 5). The Pan-Slavists never succeeded in convincing the czars of 19th century Russia to support their cause. Nowadays, the stillborn union between Russia and Belarus
passionately championed by Alexander Lukashenka, the president of Belarus, appears to based on a revival of this dream, on a more modest scale. Similar to Russian czars, Boris Yeltsin and later Vladimir Putin gave conflicting messages to Minsk, sometimes even showed a cold shoulder. As a matter of fact, their attitude reflects a certain indifference of the Russian people to this project. Still, the stalemate came to a peak on 21 August 2002 when the Belarusian president found “offensive and unacceptable” the proposals put forward by President Putin (RFE/RL 21 Aug. 2002). During a bilateral meeting in Moscow, the Russian president proposed Belarus’ incorporation into the Russian Federation under the current Russian constitution (Loc. cit.).

As far as Ukraine is concerned, Russians seem to care more about Crimea and the presence of millions of Russian speakers than the difficulties encountered by the Catholic Ukrainian-speakers living in Lviv. Indeed, Russians find it hard to accept the present that Khrushchev offered Ukraine in 1954, as the regular statements made by the popular mayor of Moscow, Yurii Luzhkov, on this question reveal. Aside from Russia's export of gas, the agreement on the former Soviet fleet in the Black Sea and Ukraine's membership in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Russo-Ukrainian relations have remained disappointing, considering their unique cultural and historical bonds. As a matter of fact, President Kuchma's foreign policy seems to be oriented to the West as when he declared Ukraine's plan to join NATO (Kuzio 10 June 2002).

Obviously, the troubled relations between Belarus and Ukraine on one side, and Russia on the other, though premised on cultural and historical bonds, are mainly affected by politics. There are no signs that Moscow wants to somehow unite its fate to
Kiev following the Neo-Pan-Slavist idea. This conception of Russian identity does not play a significant role in the contemporary Russian political discourse. Therefore, its contribution to explaining a change in policies appear quite limited.

Language identity

For supporters of this conception, the Russian nation is a community of Russian speakers. In other words, the Russian language could become a tool to unify peoples. This conception was quite popular in the 1930s when Stalin encouraged the russification of the Soviet peoples. At that time, the Communists described Russian as the privileged means to access the Marxist-Leninist truth. Where russification failed, the conversion to the Cyrillic alphabet was imposed on peoples such as the Moldovans, the Azeris, the Tatars and Central Asians. Only the Armenians and the Georgians were able to resist this forced conversion. However, their resistance relied on unique languages with specific alphabets dating back to the fifth century AD (WorldLanguage.com n.d.a; Ibid. n.d.b).

Today, Russian remains the lingua franca in the former Soviet space for several reasons. First of all, many Soviet successor states have an influential Russian minority such as Ukraine and Kazakhstan where Russian has de jure or de facto official status. Furthermore, a large part of their population was educated in the Soviet institutions, which means that they were taught Russian. Finally, the Russian Federation has emerged as a regional power and an attractive market. All these trends resulted in the alienation of Russians from their language similar to what happened with English. In other words, the link between the Russian language and the Russian identity has grown weaker and
weaker over years. Therefore, this conception of Russian identity cannot be a satisfactory tool to understand policy-making in Russia.

*Ethnic identity*

Supporters defining their Russian identity on a ethnic basis consider the Russian people united by common blood. As in many countries, the ethnicity-based conception has been "hijacked" by far right parties and groupings. These include Zhirinovskii's Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR), Aleksandr Barkashov's Russian National Unity (RNU), and Pamyat, an organization popular in the perestroika years which gradually disappeared from the political stage².

Following the 1993 and 1995 parliamentary elections, the ethnocentric propaganda of the LDPR appealed to the Russian electorate as the vote tallies demonstrated. Yet, this appeal gradually lost its intensity and the LPDR saw its popularity fall back to its pre-1993 level. In 1999, the wave of terrorist attacks in Moscow and Volgodonsk and the ensuing so-called anti-terrorist operation in Chechnya worsened the racial prejudice that many Russians adopted towards Caucasians. In 2002, media also reported attacks conducted in Moscow markets by skinhead squads and injuries caused by booby-trapped anti-Semitic signs. Despite the large number of such instances, mainstream political parties and above all current rulers do not endorse

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² For an up-to-date and exhaustive list of extremist groups in Russia, please consult the Website of the Russian think-tank Panorama at http://www.panorama.ru/works/patri/index.html.
chauvinistic and racist messages and condemn their manifestations, whether in words or in acts. Sometimes, political figures such as President Putin may resort to xenophobic insults, but these have more to do with emotions than official political statements, let alone guiding principles of policy-making. Even Zhirinovskii understood that: despite a few cosmetic outbursts, he had to tone down his anti-Semitic rhetoric to survive politically. Besides, the adoption of such a stance by politicians in power does not make sense politically in the Russian federal context. An ethnocentric state policy would contradict the centre’s efforts to strengthen the loyalty of its constituents. Therefore, although this conception is present in Russia’s political discourse, its mobilizing capacity is usually marginal and brief, and tend not to be used to legitimize policy orientations.

Civic identity

From this perspective, the Russian³ nation embraces all citizens of the Russian state regardless of their ethnic and cultural background. The ethnic identity of citizens belongs to their private sphere or defines a regional political unit, such as the republic in the Russian Federation. In other words, Russian citizenship amounts to a loyalty to federal political institutions and the federal Constitution. The French thinker Ernest Renan went further by defining this loyalty as a “daily plebiscite” (Renan 11 Mar. 1882). In return, the State considers all citizens equal before the law and eligible to the same services. Unlike the ethnic identity, the civic identity implies that anyone may become a

³ In this phrase, the Russian word for “Russian” would be “rossiiskaya".
member of the nation providing s/he meets defined conditions. Likewise, a citizen may lose his/her status or part(s) of it if s/he does not fulfill the inherent duties, such as abiding by the laws. This conception is influenced by Western theories on nationalism (Tolz 1998: 995-996).

The political discourse existing in this context lays the emphasis on the Constitution and the laws, the citizens' duties, equality, the flag, etc. In the Russian context, this theme appears occasionally in speeches or articles addressing the survival of the young federation. For example, Valerii Tishkov, director of the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, and former head of the State Committee on Nationalities (1992), claims that federalism is viable if it rests on a civic nation (Tishkov 1997: IX). The archetype of this nation is the United States of America with its society built on the melting-pot principle. Therefore, this conception has a strong Western flavour, in particular from the Russian point of view, and tends to be associated with market economy and US-oriented foreign policy. Supporters of this conception in Russia, usually labelled 'Westerners,' had an opportunity to rule Russia in the first part of the 1990s. For example, Yegor Gaidar served as deputy prime minister and prime minister from 1991 to 1994, Andrey Kozyrev as foreign minister from 1990 to 1996 and the already mentioned Valerii Tishkov as head of the State Committee on Nationalities from March to October 1992. However, their political domination gradually diminished as issues such as the failure of the transition to market economy, NATO's enlargement and the war in Chechnya moved to the top of Russia's political agenda. Finally, their era came to an end in January 1996 with Kozyrev's replacement by EvgeniiPrimakov. Given that the decline
of the Westerners roughly coincides with the reforms of the laws on refugees and forced migrants, which took place respectively in 1997 and 1995, the declining support for the civic identity in the Russian political discourse could be an element to consider to explain the nature of the reforms. Yet, the decline of this conception is likely to partly explain the reform especially if another conception gradually took precedence. The assumption taken by this study, as outlined in the following section, is that the Union identity gradually became the key conception of the Russian identity as the civic identity was declining.

*Union identity*

The Russians are defined as a people who are imperial by nature or whose existence is centred on fulfilling their mission to create a supranational state. From this perspective, also known as the Eurasianist school of thought, a common existence within one state lay the foundations for a multi-ethnic state (Tolz 1998: 995-996).

The concept of Eurasia was first introduced in the 1920s by the eponymous movement of the diaspora and revived in post-Soviet Russia (Agadjanian 2001). In particular, some Communists claimed that the Soviet people (*sovietskii narod*) embodied the Eurasian idea best (Tolz 1998: 996). Today’s Eurasianism or Neo-Eurasianism is a “formula of identity” characterized by its opposition to the West, including its political model, and its incorporation of Turkic-Muslim minorities into an empire-like state (Agadjanian 2001). One of its main supporters, V. Aksyuchits, defines the Russian nation as the “political and spiritual gathering (*sobor*) of the Russian peoples, whose core is
represented by the strategic union of the Slav and Turkish peoples, of the Orthodox and Islamic civilizations" (*Loc. cit.*). According to Egor Stroyev, the former president of the Council of Federation, a position ranking number three in the Russian state structure, Russia symbolizes "the core of Eurasian civilization, the point of anchorage of the unique synthesis of Eastern Christendom and Islam" (*Loc. cit.*). Inherent to the Eurasianist empire-like state is also the notion of balance: balance between Asian and European civilizations, between Slav and Turkish peoples, between Christianity and Islam. In reality, the balance is quite imperfect, as ethnic Russians have a leading role in this state. Nevertheless, their role consists in maintaining this balance or Russia at an equal distance between Europe and Asia. Everything drawing Russia towards a single direction is perceived by Eurasianists as a threat. That's why for example, many of them denounced Kozyrev's foreign policy as too Westernophile. Likewise, some Communists blamed Gorbachev's foreign policies and nationalism of certain peoples (Balts, Georgians, etc.) for the collapse of the best example of a Eurasian state: the USSR.

Two elements emerge as the main components of Eurasianism: opposition to the West's domination of the world, and communality (*sobornost*). The anti-Western element does not need much elaboration, given its omnipresence in the contemporary Russian discourse. It manifests itself through a variety of phenomena, notably opposition to a western-style market economy, promotion of an economic and political Russian third way, and criticism of US hegemony. Aware of the difficulty to operationalize such a variety, this study instead focuses on two core components of the anti-Western element of Eurasianism, namely independence and isolationism. At first glance, the difference
between both categories looks slim, but a closer look reveals a key distinction. Isolationism means an absence of involvement into other countries’ affairs as well as the absence of others’ involvement into one’s affairs. Usually, the influence of other countries is portrayed as corruption, parasitism or threat. As far as independence is concerned, the focus is on the course of action, on the decision. Other countries may express their views and advocate their policies, but the Russian leadership has the final say. Since the collapse of the USSR, both elements are necessarily anti-Western as Russia is no longer in a position to confront the West (USA) directly and is subject to frequent attempts by the West to interfere in its internal affairs.

Regarding *sobornost*, the analysis of the “Russian Idea” enables a better understanding of this concept. Indeed, several authors have examined the Russian Idea while analyzing Eurasianism (Torbakov 24 Mar. 2000; Baron 2000; Wagner n.d.; Moiseev 1997). According to the Russian philosopher Arsenii Gulyga, the Russian Idea was conceived by the famous 19th century Russian writer Fyodor Dostoievskii. For Olga Volkogonova, doctor in philosophy of Lomonosov University, it is a “philosophical-historical myth on Russia” (Volkogonova n.d.). Today, the contemporary Russian Idea is perceived as an appeal to national renaissance and the preservation of a material and spiritual rebirth of Russia (Gulyga n.d.).

Communality is the expression of a determinate type of social relations which are the results of the spiritual evolution of Russian society (NEB 1997). These social relations imply the strengthening of one’s personal responsibilities vis-à-vis society/community; the dependence of one’s well-being and its security on the well-being
of society and its security. Through communality, society abides by the fundamental values of the Russian civilization, that is justice, national autonomy and patriotism (Loc. cit.). Arsenii Gulyga goes even further by describing the concept as "the organic unity of the community and the individual" (Gulyga n.d.).

For Michael Urban, *sobornost*' is "a mystical notion whereby the (vicariously) assembled people (*sobor*) are united by an apprehension of religious truth that moulds them into a community united in harmonious variety. This community has a unique and universally valid mission to perform in the world and, consequently, constructs for itself the Russian state in order to realize it" (Urban fall 1994).

The spiritual dimension of *sobornost*' makes reference to a long evolution that the gathered people has been going through for centuries. In order for this study to fully capture the concept of communality, it will be analyzed through two indicators: communality and traditions.

According to Alexander Agadjanian, Neo-Eurasianism also promotes an authoritarian form of statehood (*gosudarstvennost*): ideocracy (Agadjanian 2001). For Neo-Eurasianists, this strong state can take the forms of a monarchy, a dictatorship or an "enlightened democratic patriotism". The latter is a blend of progressive social technologies imported from the West, Russian historical traditions and the socially-oriented market economy specific to Russia (NEB 1997). Alexander Agadjanian draws a link between this Eurasianist concept and the changes brought under Vladimir Putin’s presidency (Agadjanian 2001). Obviously, authoritarianism appears to be the main characteristic of statehood for the Eurasianist school of thought. However, the two
concepts are not synonymous, as Russia’s history shows. First of all, Peter the Great ruled in an authoritarian way with his look constantly to the West. More recently, President Boris Yeltsin tried to introduce Western-style democracy and market economy in Russia while resorting to force at periods of crisis. His foreign policy went through roughly two phases, a pro-West one under Andrey Kozyrev’s leadership and a more balanced one under Evgenii Primakov. Under President Putin, the need to join the World Trade Organization and become a full-fledged member of the G8 prompted Moscow to line up its stances with Western countries, especially with the United States. Yet, his domestic policies have brought about criticism especially regarding the ruthless repression in Chechnya, the freedom of the press and the restoration of the Kremlin’s domination over the federation subjects. For all these reasons, authoritarianism does not seem to automatically relate to Eurasianism and, therefore, cannot be used as an indicator.

As a conclusion, Eurasianism emerges as a conception of the Russian Idea to which Russian politicians, including prominent ones, often make reference. This study will look at how this conception has influenced the making of policies in the field of refugees and forced migrants. In order to do so, Eurasianism was divided into four components: independence, isolationism, communality and traditions.

This chapter was an attempt to explain why security and identity were identified as factors expected to explain the reforms of Russia's legislation addressing the issues of refugees and forced migrants. The first part demonstrated how immigration has emerged as a potential or actual challenge to a country's national security. This evolution has
prompted governments to convert immigration into a security issue, a process called "securitization." The definition of this process around the concepts of existential threat and emergency measures will be the basis of indicators used to detect the presence of security in the Russian political discourse. With respect to the identity factor, its omnipresence in the post-Soviet Russian political discourse makes it unavoidable to consider when dealing with policymaking. The discussion of several conceptions of Russian identity revealed the Union identity as the most politically significant identity advocated by key members of the Russian political elites at the same time as the reforms of the laws discussed in this study. A closer look at the Union identity enabled the identification of four indicators that will be used in the analysis of the Russian political discourse.
CHAPTER 2. Theoretical Framework

2.1 Problem

The problem at the core of this research study is the overhaul that Russia’s legislation pertaining to refugees and forced migrants experienced in the mid-1990s. At that time, the Russian government submitted separate bills on refugees and on forced migrants to the Duma, making the granting of these statuses more difficult, as chapter 3 will show.

A limited examination of the literature covering the questions of refugees and forced migrants in Russia reveals three elements which are most frequently examined by scholars: The roots of inter- and intranational migration, the evolution of migration flows as well as their direct impact on Russia and the state response to them. However, the literature review also shows an inadequate attention to exploring the connection between changes in Russia’s legislation pertaining to refugees and forced migrants, and the evolution of attitudes of the Russian political elite towards these issues. This research analysis attempts to address this deficiency by studying this connection, in particular by analyzing how the discourse of representatives of the Russian political elite is related to changes brought to the relevant legislation over a period starting with the creation of the Federal Migration Service in June 1992 and ending with its disbandment in May 2000.
2.2 Nature of the Study

This study focuses on policy-making, a complex mechanism that social scientists have tried to analyze using a number of theoretical perspectives. Drawing on the systems approach, the theoretical model of this research examines the inputs (or demands) of a subsystem of the political system, the political elite, into the making of policies relating to refugees and forced migrants. Pursuant to this approach, the study focuses on inputs and to a lesser extent on outputs, but does not explore the mechanism of conversion of inputs into outputs.

The choice of the political elite can be explained by two reasons: Firstly, its key role in the decision-making process, but above all by its function of receiving and sorting out demands for decisions from other social actors or subsystems. In other words, the political elite somewhat captures the demands and values of society, while having vested interests which do not necessarily correspond to the interests of other social components. However, there is little doubt that the main interest of the political elite is to protect their grip on power, which, in a democratic context, incites them to listen to and, in some cases, realize their constituents’ demands.

2.3 Preliminary Hypotheses

According to the first hypothesis, the Russian Federation would have adopted stricter rules towards refugees and forced migrants as a result of the political elite’s
“securitization” of the issue of migration. In this manner, the Russian political elite would have imitated some of their European counterparts, who present immigration as an “existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure” (Buzan et al. 1998, 24). Such a move usually entails a more “law-enforcement” approach to immigration and, in the field of refugees, a less orthodox implementation of the “asylum-friendly” international conventions.

The second hypothesis concentrates on the impact that the evolution of Russian identity has had on the discussion over migration issues since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The critical review of different conceptions of Russian identity featured in the previous chapter identified the Eurasianist conception or the Union identity as the one most likely to have an impact on the discourse over refugees and forced migrants. Thus, the second hypothesis suggests that changes in legislation could have been influenced by the progressive prevalence of the Eurasianist school of thought over the more Western civic identity approach over the 1990s.

At this stage of the research process, the relationship between both hypotheses can be tentatively described as explanatory. In other words, the analysis may show that the first hypothesis (securitization) is a consequence of the second hypothesis. The Eurasianists would have perceived refugees and forced migrants, most of whom come from Northern Caucasus, Transcaucasia and Central Asia, as a threat to Russia's Eurasian identity. The threat would be the result of Russia's inability of "incorporating" the flow of refugees and forced migrants into its society in such a way as to preserve the Eurasian balance.
The study concludes with an epilogue putting in perspective the results and developments subsequent to the disbandment of the Federal Migration Service (FMS) in May 2000 and the transfer of its responsibilities to different ministries. Indeed, two facts are worth taking into account. Firstly, the FMS was disbanded less than two months after Vladimir Putin, an ex-KGB agent, was elected president. Secondly, this decision was made while thousands of Chechens were fleeing a so-called "anti-terrorist operation" in their homeland and taking refuge in neighbouring Ingushetia. Thirdly, the tasks of the Service were transferred to the Ministry of Federation Affairs and of National and Migration Policies, and then to the Interior Ministry. Similarly to the laws on refugees and forced migrants, security and Russian identity seem to have had an input in the fate of the FMS.

2.4 Method of Analysis

As indicated previously, the attitude of the Russian political elite towards refugee and forced migrant issues is the independent variable of the theoretical model. However, in order for the concept of political elite, as broad as it may be, to remain within the scope of this study, this concept was limited to federal officials, and members of the Duma and of the Council of Federation, since the inclusion of republican, regional and local officials would require large-scale research, which would go beyond the currently available resources. Furthermore, Article 89 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation confers the power of granting political asylum on the president who delegated it to the
specialized federal state organs (Russia 12 Dec. 1993). Therefore, one can assume that debates critical to decision-making in the field of refugees and forced migrants occur for the most part among political actors involved at the federal level. Yet, this does mean that the voices of republics and regions have no place in these debates. They may be heard at the Council of Federation, which was made up of presidents of republics, governors, and speakers of republican or regional parliaments until late 2000, and since then of appointed representatives of the legislative and executive powers of each subject.

2.4.1 Documentary Research

The documentary research consisted in combing the minutes of every parliamentary session of both lower and upper chambers held from 1997 to 2000 posted on the Web sites of the respective Information Network of both chambers. This stage also involved scouring every issue published between 1992 and 2000 of Russian-language periodicals available either at Carleton University's library (Rossiiskaya Gazeta, Nezavisimaya Gazeta) or on the Internet (Rossiiskaya Gazeta, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Obshchaya Gazeta, Novaya Gazeta, Nevskoye Vremya and Izvestiya). Finally, searches were also conducted in the Internet through Aport.ru, an search engine in Russian, by using the following queries ("bezhenets" or "vynuzhdennyi pereselenets") and ("duma" or "prezident" or "direktor" or "gubernator" or "predsedatel"). To be part of the corpus, a material had to make at least one reference to the word "bezhenets" (refugee) or the word "vynuzhdennyi pereselenets" (forced migrant). However, a few texts with implicit references were also added. In addition, a material had to feature interviews, speeches,
quotations of political actors defined previously or be signed by them. Only the selected articles signed by political actors, their answers to questions asked during interviews, their speeches and quotations serve as the corpus of the content analysis. Since the focus of this study is on the Russian political elite, the corpus does not incorporate any statements of a political figure rephrased by the author of the material, questions asked by an interviewer, or comments by the author of the material. In total, the corpus consists of 23 documents, which represents 14,094 words or analytical units. The list of selected materials is provided in Appendix 1. Although freedom of the press is going through a difficult time in Russia since Vladimir Putin’s election, the list of consulted information sources shows an effort to keep a balance between governmental (Rossiiskaya Gazeta) and pro-governmental sources on the one hand, and sources known to be more critical of the Kremlin (Obshchaya Gazeta, Novaya Gazeta, Izvestiya), on the other.

2.4.2 Content Analysis

The most suitable methodology for this research would have been individual interviews with or the sending of questionnaires to a representative pool of members of the Russian political elite selected on the basis of their involvement in debates over refugee and forced migrant issues. These interviews or this questionnaire would have been designed with the aim of identifying the values, the ideology and the principles underlying amendments brought to the refugee and forced migrants acts. For obvious reasons, such a large-scale research project was not realizable.

However, the benefits of globalization, notably in the field of
telecommunications, enable the overcoming of the constraints inherent to this research study, as more and more media sources from all over the world become available in libraries or on the Internet. Therefore, the alternative is the collection and analysis of written texts featuring interviews, speeches and quotations of members of the Russian political elite.

The choice of content analysis draws on several of its characteristics or to be more accurate, on the main material of its research: language. On the one hand, content analysis has been developed on the assumption of M.A.K. Halliday, a linguist, that "all linguistic usage encodes representation of the world" (Stubbs 1996: 130). Robert De Beaugrande, another linguist, adds a nuance to Halliday's statement by saying that language is a "system integrated with speakers [or writers] knowledge of the world and society" (De Beaugrande 1996). The language system provides resources which speakers can use in different ways; it is the choice made within this system that conveys a message (Stubbs 1996: 69). In other words, this research study is built on the axiom that by using language, whether orally or in writing, human beings reveal elements of their own values, principles and beliefs. Yet, observers of political life may challenge this axiom by arguing that politicians sometimes endorse values or principles just for the sake of gaining support. Although there does not seem to be any ideal method to flag these cases, an effort to contextualize the results, notably by looking at the political allegiance of the political actor and of the publication will help determine the weight of a statement in the whole debate over refugee and forced migrant issues.

On the other hand, the choice of content analysis is also in relation to the fact that
language is itself a social practice that actively reproduces and transforms society (Ibid.: 90). In other words, content analysis recognizes a link between language and the evolution of society, and therefore to policies and legislation that regulate its existence.

A third reason justifying the choice of content analysis is related to our first hypothesis: securitization of migration. Referring to language theory, Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde define the process of securitization as essentially a “speech act” (Buzan et al. 1998: 26). The important element in this process is the use of a discourse centred on the theme of security by political actors, in particular a government, to convince that an issue has become a threat to the state and its population, and to justify the adoption of extraordinary measures.

More concretely, content analysis, as defined by Jarol B. Manheim and Richard C. Rich, is “the systematic counting, assessing, and interpreting of the form and substance of communication” (Baxter-Moore, Terrance Carroll and Roderick Church 1994: 247). According to Robert Philip Weber, content analysis is a research method with defined procedures which enable to draw valid inferences from message about its sender(s), the message itself or the audience of the message (Weber 1990, 9).

Therefore, to be complete, a study of discourse has to examine the context of a text (Stubbs 1996: 53; Fowler 1985: 75). This context includes the author of the text, the date of its publication, institutions related to the studied texts (Ibid. 1996: 60), and expected readers (Ibid.: 83). J.L. Lemke refines this definition by adding the circumstances in which texts were written or spoken and the circumstances in which they were read or heard (Lemke n.d.).
The present research study recognizes the limits of content analysis which the relevant literature mentions. For example, due to its recent creation, content analysis still lacks universally recognized methods for codifying texts, developing indicators and interpreting results (Stubbs 1996: 121). To make up for this lack, the analysis of the selected texts will be conducted on the basis of a few simple techniques whose validity is recognized by a number of scholars specialized on linguistics and content analysis.

Codification

Inspired by Robert Philip Weber's step-by-step method to adapt content analysis to particular research studies, a coding scheme was developed and tested. Analytical units can be divided into two components: lexical words which express meaning and grammatical words which relate lexical words to each other (Weber 1990: 71). Likewise, Gunter Kress links language to ideology at both the lexical and grammatical-syntactic levels (Kress 1995: 30). For these reasons, this research study conducted its content analysis by examining both lexis and grammar. The coding scheme defines how the lexical and grammatical-syntactic units of the selected texts should be categorized.

In this study, there are two basic analytical units: the word and the phrase, knowing that in some cases, a word makes sense in a phrase only. Drawing on the context when it is necessary to understand the meaning, every word and phrase was recorded in different mutually exclusive categories gathering words and phrases with similar meanings and connotations. The recording and categorizing of units are based on connotative categorical equivalence: textual units are considered to be categorically
equivalent if they mean or suggest similar meanings, ideas, or connotations. In the cases of pronouns, they were recorded in the category corresponding to the unit(s) they referred to.

In cases of polysemic words, Robert Philip Weber recommends classifying each word, word sense or phrase in the category it most clearly belongs to. He also suggests dropping words with significant ambiguity from the category and if necessary from the analysis (Weber 1990: 36).

With a view to reducing biases in the process of categorizing units, a colleague was asked to randomly select a few texts and categorize units following the defined rules. The results were compared with the author’s and results harmonized whenever the comparison revealed a mistake.

Categories

Categories created for this study are divided into three groups, one relating to the hypothesis of securitization, another relating to the hypothesis of identity and the last one called "new categories."

The first two categories were developed following a process explained in chapter 1. The securitization group of categories consists of threat [ugroza], protection/defense [zashchita/oborona] and emergency [neotlozhnost']. The category defense/protection was added to the categories identified in Chapter 1 as they will capture threats serious enough to warrant protection and/or defense. Because this study hypothesizes the prevalence of the Eurasianist conception of identity, the group of categories consists of the following
concepts: Traditions [traditsii], community [sobornost'], isolationism [isolatsionizm], and independence [nezavisimost'].

The results of the analysis prompted the development of new categories to provide not only a more comprehensive picture of the political discourse on refugees and forced migrants, but also avenues for further research on this topic. The new categories were developed after identifying the most common themes and the most common syntactic patterns found in sentences containing either the word "bezhenets" (refugee) or the phrase "vynuzhdennyi pereselenets" (forced migrant). One should add that all these themes have more occurrences than the categories relating to the hypotheses. These new categories were divided into two groups: the syntactic group and the thematic group. The identified syntactic patterns, also called indicators, include:

- plural: when refugee or forced migrant appear in their plural forms;
- singular: when they appear in their singular form, and
- subject: when either of them is the subject of a sentence.

The thematic group includes the following topics: Pravitel'stvo [government], Yuzhnaya Rossiya [Southern Russia], Kolichestvo [quantity], My/oni [We/they], Pomoshch' [assistance], Zakon [law] and Priznanie [recognition]. As the reader can note, the relationship between the hypotheses and these categories is less clear.

Use of Statistical Tools and Interpretation

The next step is the interpretation, which could be defined as the translation of the meaning and syntax of texts into some other abstract analytical or theoretical
language (Weber 1990: 70). In order to do so, a few techniques found in the literature were used.

The content analysis of this study was divided into three stages. The first stage consisted in examining the texts of the sample. Every statement was divided into analytical units, which in turn were compared to the eight thematic categories. The results of this part of the analysis, called text analysis, will be addressed in subsection 4.1. For each category, a basic statistical analysis was conducted by means of the mean, the mode, the standard deviation and the chi-square. For more on these tools, please see *Social Statistics. An Introduction Using MicroCase* by William Fox, a professor of sociology at Skidmore College in upstate New York. In addition, in an effort to contextualize every occurrence, the political orientation of the political figure identified in a text was determined, essentially by means of the *Who's Who in Russia* database set up by the Centre for Russian Studies of the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI). Thus, every political figure is either defined as government/pro-government or opposition. Similarly, the media publishing the texts of the sample was systematically determined as government-controlled or independent from the government. This information was usually found on the Website of the source. The results of each category are therefore analyzed in relation with these two variables called political orientation and media control.

The second stage (subsection 4.2) focuses on the context or collocations of the declined forms of the phrase “vyuzhdennyi pereselenets” (forced migrant) and of the word “bezhenets” (refugee). The context analysis of the sample identified 123 sentences
with either of them or with both of them. To avoid confusion, these sentences will be referred to as collocations following the practice in the literature on content analysis.

The collocation or context technique entails the analysis of particular words in the sentences or sections of sentences where they appear. Words occur in characteristic collocations which reveal the associations and connotations they can have and therefore the assumptions they imply (Stubbs 1996: 172). Collocation, defined by Firth as "the company a word keeps" can also be referred to as "semantic prosody" (Ibid.: 173). For the purpose of this study, the context of a word is arbitrarily limited to 10 words before and 10 words after. This limit may be expanded to one or two words to include the beginning or the end of a sentence. Collocations can be analyzed from different perspectives such as their themes and syntactic patterns. With respect to syntax, the analysis of a collocation may encompass the voice, the tense and the aspects of verbs, modality words, the cases of nouns and pronouns, sentences with more than one clause, the identification or omission of the agent(s), the identification or omission of the effect(s) of an action, or, in other words, causalities.

The third stage corresponds to the context analysis of the new categories. This stage includes neither text analysis nor detailed statistical analysis as it is not central to this study. The objective pursued is to explain what the hypotheses developed for this study are unable to elucidate. The analysis mainly identifies the number of occurrences, and the number of texts with occurrences, and examines the impact of political orientation and media control on the results. The reader will note that the results of the syntactic categories are presented in the third stage although their analysis is not
collocation-based. However, these categories were developed at the same time and for the same purpose as the other seven new categories. In addition, the category subject can be recorded only by analyzing whole sentences with refugee and/or forced migrant.

Limits

Several weaknesses have to be taken into account. First of all, the number of selected texts or corpus is quite small. Secondly, the selection includes texts of the same type. For example, all the analyzed texts are speeches, interviews or quotes of politicians dealing with refugee and forced migrant issues. Frequencies of certain words and patterns of use of these words lose significance if one cannot compare the frequencies of the same words in texts of another type. Thirdly, this study tries to explain the changes in the laws on refugees and forced migrants by examining the presence of two themes - securitization and Eurasianism - in the political discourse. The study tries to identify the patterns of their presence, but does not shed light on the cause/effect link between these two themes and the changes. In particular, several texts included in the corpus were published after the reforms were enacted. The assumption is that the content of the political discourse on refugees and forced migrants did not change drastically between 1992 and 2000 because there was no significant renewal of the Russian political elite over this period. Finally, the last weakness touches the difference between refugees and forced migrants which was disregarded in the content analysis. This decision was made after observing that references to refugees are concurrent with references to forced migrants to such an extent that some politicians use both interchangeably.

In sum, the reader must bear in mind these weaknesses when s/he considers
generalizing the findings of this study. At best, the findings may help orient future research on policy-making in Russia in the field of refugees and forced migrants.
CHAPTER 3. Evolution of the Legislation

This chapter identifies and categorizes the main changes brought to both the Refugee Act and the Forced Migrants Act. The designated categories are expected to give the reader a simple picture of the multiple changes brought to both acts. The reader will find the laws in the List of Cited Sources under the entry "Russian Federation."

The Russian legislation draws a distinction between a refugee and a forced migrant which has no equivalent in international law. Essentially, the difference between both statuses lies in the citizenship of the claimant. The refugee status may be granted to non-citizens of the Russian Federation (RF), while the forced migrant status may be conferred to either citizens of the Russian Federation or citizens of the former Soviet Union entitled to RF citizenship. Although no provisions of the Forced Migrant Act restricts its scope to ethnic Russians, Cristiano Codagnone, a research associate with the Centre for European Migration and Ethnic Studies based in England, claims that this distinction is Russia's partial recognition of its responsibilities towards ethnic Russians living in the near abroad (Codagnone Nov. 1998). According to Codagnone, Russia adopted the Forced Migrant Act as it could not afford to allow the repatriation of all ethnic Russians from the former Soviet republics (Loc. cit.).

3.1 The Refugee Act

Adopted on 19 February 1993, the Refugee Act was implemented between 20
March 1993 (Pilkington 1998: 36) and 3 July 1997, when an amended Refugee Act came into force (DRC Apr. 1999). This chapter categorizes the main changes brought to the 1993 Refugee Act into four types: restrictions, relaxations, expansions and definitions/codifications. This subchapter describes a number of amendments selected by examining the clauses which address the definition of a refugee; the procedures to obtain, lose or be deprived of refugee status; the rights and duties inherent to the status; and the procedure of deportation. In this reform, the legislator restricted the eligibility to the refugee status, reinforced state controls over asylum seekers and refugees, added grounds to have one's status revoked, reduced and clarified the responsibilities of the state organs, notably in terms of assistance with social integration, and detailed procedures vaguely outlined in the 1993 Act.

Without going into details, the determination process for refugee status is divided into two steps: the preliminary examination of the claim (formerly registration) followed by the substantive determination of the claim (formerly examination). This order is important to bear in mind when reading this chapter.

3.1.1 Restrictions

Compared to the 1993 Refugee Act, the 1997 Act features modified and new provisions which restrict the scope of the law in general. Thus, a number of amendments touch upon the definition of a refugee. For example, the 1997 definition recognizes persecution only and no longer acts of violence as a reason to leave one's country of citizenship or country of permanent residence (hereafter country of origin). Compared to
acts of violence, persecution has a more restrictive meaning since it implies, among other things, repetition and serious harm. With respect to grounds for persecution, the 1997 Act no longer includes language in its list. Although there is no evidence in the literature, language-related persecution is likely to be covered by other grounds such as race or nationality.

Both acts define exclusion clauses, that is circumstances under which a person may not have his or her refugee status claim processed. In the case of crimes punished by international law, while the 1993 Act excludes individuals who intentionally perpetrated these types of crimes, the 1997 Act refers to individuals for whom there are serious reasons to believe that they perpetrated these types of crimes. In other words, the authorities no longer need evidence that an individual committed a crime, but well-founded suspicions. In addition, a specific reference to war crimes was added to the list of crimes punishable by international law which automatically makes an individual ineligible for refugee status. Exclusion clauses also include other serious crimes beyond those defined in international law. Unlike its predecessor, the 1997 Act no longer requires serious crimes to be premeditated. The authorities suspecting an asylum seeker of serious crimes will no longer have to spend their scarce resources proving preméditation.

Refugee status is no longer granted for an indefinite period of time, but for an initial period of three years. After three years, the federal migration services re-evaluate cases every year by taking into account the circumstances in the country of origin on the basis of which the refugee status was granted originally. The 1997 Act adds a
requirement for refugees to register every year with the federal migration services and report any change in their status and any plan to change address or to leave Russia.

Clearly, these changes mirror an effort by the Russian authorities to exert a better control over the population of refugees in Russia. The protection afforded to asylum seekers is subject to regular reassessments and implies a partial surrender of freedom to the authorities.

Both acts have provisions regarding the loss and the deprivation of refugee status. Several reasons justifying the loss of refugee status were added in the 1997 Act. Thus, the refugee status may be lost as a result of:

* the granting of permanent residence in the Russian Federation;
* the granting of citizenship of another country;
* the voluntary return to or settlement in the country the refugee fled because of the fear of persecution on grounds recognized by the Act;
* changes in the conditions in the country of origin as a result of which the refugee can no longer refuse to avail him/herself of the protection of his/her country of origin.

This expanded list of reasons corresponds to the “cessation clauses” defined by the Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, which the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees published “for the guidance of government officials concerned with the determination of refugee status in the various Contracting States” (UNHCR Jan. 1992). Interestingly, the Act makes the recognition of
refugee status more difficult to obtain, but defines the loss of status in accordance with the refugee-friendly UNHCR guidelines. Yet, the restrictive provisions on deprivation mitigate the effects of this correspondence.

Similarly, new circumstances leading to the deprivation of refugee status were added in the 1997 Act. A refugee will be deprived of his/her status as a consequence of:

* being sentenced for a crime committed in Russia;

* the production of forged documents to support his/her claim;

* the violation of any provision of the present Act.

These new circumstances have a very large scope. First of all, the lack of definition of crime in the act introduces a zero tolerance towards refugees convicted of any crime. Secondly, if the authorities discover at any point that the claimant adduced forged documents in support of his/her claim, they can invalidate the granting of the status whether or not the reasons why the refugee left his or her country were legitimate. One can easily imagine a situation where a person has no other choice but to use a forged passport to leave his/her country of origin. Finally, the last provision means, for example, that any refugee who failed to register with the authorities may be deprived of the status.

In sum, restrictions imposed lie at all the stages of the process: at the registration, and during and after the processing.

Both acts have provisions which specify the tasks of various state bodies with respect to refugees and refugee status determination procedure. Several tasks specified in Article 7 of the 1993 Act do not appear in the 1997 Act such as:

* the provision of a list of sites for permanent residence recommended by the
federal migration services with a description of living conditions and employment opportunities;

* assistance in joining a housing cooperative or in acquiring an individual house or apartment;

* the granting of fiscal incentives and subsidies to companies which hire refugees;

* registration of a refugee as unemployed if s/he is proven to be unable to find employment regardless of his/her date of arrival in Russia;

* the provision of places in institutions of social protection on a priority basis to the elderly or the disabled who arrive alone;

* the payment of pensions and allowances in conformity with Russian legislation;

* assistance in obtaining compensation from the authorities of the country of origin for health-related harm, loss of salaries and loss of property.

Although no reports have been found on the realization of these tasks, one can imagine the amount of resources required to implement them. Russia’s budgetary situation certainly had an impact on the review of tasks assigned to state bodies.

However, such modifications were made at the expense of refugees’ capacities to integrate into Russian society. In other words, the new act may push refugees to the margins of Russian society, including crime and eventually the loss of their status, given the zero tolerance for crime outlined in the act.
3.1.2 Relaxations

Amendments made to several provisions of the 1993 Refugee Act were also meant to relax specific rules. Legislators also introduced in the 1997 Act the possibility of filing a claim for refugee status after the entry into the territory of the Russian Federation. Under the 1993 Act, an individual in this case had to leave the Russian territory to file a claim. This amendment may have been intended to curb the number of aliens illegally staying in Russia by allowing them to report to the authorities and initiate the application.

While in the 1993 Act an individual could no longer stay in a temporary accommodation provided by the state after receiving refugee status, the 1997 Act allows refugees to reside in state-provided temporary accommodation or other places identified by the federal migration services.

In the 1997 Act, the state bodies are no longer required to develop and realize programmes of assistance for refugees jointly with, and with the agreement of, public associations and non-governmental organizations. However, the act makes reference to cooperation of federal state bodies with public associations and other organizations to provide assistance to refugee status claimants, refugees and their family, and individuals who were granted temporary asylum.

3.1.3 Expansions

Several new rules which appear in the 1997 Refugee Act may be considered to expand its scope. For example, the 1997 definition of refugee recognizes citizenship as a
motive for persecution and makes a specific reference to stateless persons as a category of individuals who may be recognized as refugees. Throughout the text, the 1997 Act mentions the members of the refugee status claimant's or the refugee's family, an element which was missing in the 1993 Act. Therefore, rights granted to a refugee claimant or a refugee are extended to members of his/her family.

As explained previously, both acts divide the refugee status determination process into two stages: in the 1993 Act, the first stage is called registration, while in the 1997 Act it is called preliminary examination. The second stage does not have any particular name in the 1993 Act, while the 1997 Act refers to substantive determination of a claim. While both acts stipulate that the second stage must be completed within three months, the 1997 Act adds a possibility to postpone this deadline by no more than three months. Given the limited resources allocated to the federal migration services, the implementation of this provision may prove problematic, especially with respect to the fairness of the determination process. With many more resources, the Canadian immigration authorities can barely process a claim within six months.

The 1997 Act provides for new rights granted to the refugee status claimant whose claim was deemed admissible as a result of a preliminary examination. For example, the claimant has the right to:

* receive information on his/her rights, duties and the refugee status determination procedure;

* receive a cash lump sum of an amount which may not be lower than the minimum wage;
* receive admission to a centre of temporary accommodation;

* protection inside the centre of temporary accommodation;

* medical and medicinal assistance as defined in laws of the Russian Federation and its subjects;

* assistance in finding professional training or employment;

* request the end of the examination of his/her claim.

The 1997 act also provides for new rights to an individual who has received refugee status. Thus, a refugee is entitled to:

* the services of an interpreter;

* information on his/her rights and duties;

* assistance in obtaining all the documents necessary to enter Russia if s/he is outside Russia;

* protection from the Interior Ministry during his/her stay in the temporary accommodation centre;

* housing provided by the temporary settlement housing stock as long as the refugee does not acquire, receive or rent another place;

* medical and medicinal assistance on the same level as Russian citizens;

* work or start a business on the same level as Russian citizens;

* social protection on the same level as Russian citizens;

* assistance in finding a school for his/her children;

* application for travel documents to exit the territory of the Russian Federation;

* application for permanent residence in Russia;
* leave Russia and settle in another country.

In sum, the new Act grants a number of rights that Russian citizens have. These rights such as the right to employment, health care and social assistance play a critical role in the integration of a refugee into the Russian society.

The 1997 Act extends the right not to be deported against one's will to refugee claimants and to individuals who have lost or have been deprived of refugee status, as long as the circumstance(s) on which the status was granted prevail(s) in the country of origin. This raises the question of the fate of these individuals in Russia. The act does not mention their right to apply for temporary or permanent residence, let alone citizenship. However, one can wonder how the Russian immigration authorities would process a claim for permanent residence filed by an individual who lost his/her refugee status.

Both acts provide for judicial and administrative avenues for appeal. Under the 1997 Act, individuals may file complaints not only about decisions, but also about actions and non-actions of federal executive organs, executive organs of federation subjects, local self-governments and any officials involved in the realization of the Act. Refugee claimants, refugees and individuals who have lost or have been deprived of refugee status, and filed an appeal continue to have the rights attached to their respective status.

In Article 12, the 1997 Act introduced the new concept of temporary asylum. This temporary protection can be granted to foreigners or stateless individuals under the following circumstances:

* although the individual has grounds to be recognized as refugee, s/he files a
request for a temporary stay in Russia;

* an individual has no grounds to be recognized as refugee, but cannot be deported on humanitarian grounds. The subjective dimension of the word “humanitarian” is worth noting here. Neither the UN Convention nor the UNHCR handbook defines this term, which gives leeway to the authorities on how to interpret this provision.

As refugee claimants and refugees, the individual who is granted temporary asylum may not be forcefully returned to his/her country of origin. The act does not specify other rights attached to this status. Unlike claimants whose claims were deemed admissible as a result of the preliminary review, the individual enjoying temporary asylum is not entitled to the lump sum. Temporary asylum may be lost or withdrawn for grounds specified in the act. Although this new provision may be a proof of the legislators’ good intentions, its implementation obviously is far from meeting expectations, as no temporary asylum had been granted between the adoption of the act in 1997 and April 1999 (DRC 1999: 4).

3.1.4. Definitions and Codifications

In many cases, the 1997 Refugee Act specifies or even defines procedures and concepts that sometimes were not or were only vaguely mentioned in the 1993 Act.

While Article 1 of the 1993 Act is devoted to the definition of refugee, Article 1 of the 1997 Refugee Act provides the definition of additional concepts, namely refugee status claimant, temporary asylum, accommodation for refugee status claimants and
temporary settlement housing stock.

Details have also been added to the refugee status determination procedure. For example, Article 4 of the 1997 Act requires every claim for refugee status to be submitted in writing. The 1997 Act describes the steps to follow in cases of individuals who were forced to illegally enter the Russian territory. It also defines the functions of every state organ involved in the filing of refugee status claims, in particular the federal migration services, the customs offices or the branches of the Interior Ministry.

In case of a claim filed with a Russian embassy or consulate, the latter is no longer required to transmit the claim to the federal migration services, but may perform the preliminary review of the claim within one month.

The individual whose claim is deemed admissible to substantive determination receives a certificate from the corresponding decision-making state organ. The 1997 Act describes the information indicated on the certificate and states that the certificate is necessary for registration with a territorial branch of the Interior Ministry for the duration of the substantive determination process. The certificate is also required to receive housing in a centre of temporary accommodation.

While there are no details on the grounds not to register an application for refugee status in the 1993 Act, Article 5 of the 1997 Act lists grounds to reject a refugee status claim at the preliminary examination stage. Thus, a claim is deemed inadmissible if:

* criminal proceedings have begun against a claimant for a crime committed on the territory of the Russian Federation;

* the claimant already had a refugee claim rejected because the definition of
refugee was not applicable to his/her case, providing that the conditions in his/her country of origin have not changed between the date of rejection and the filing of a new claim;

* the claimant already had a refugee claim rejected in another country party to the 1951 United Nations Convention and the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugee providing that the applied procedures do not violate the legislation of the Russian Federation;

* the claimant is also a citizen of a third country where s/he has the right to stay without having a well-founded fear of becoming a victim of persecution as outlined in Article 1;

* the claimant arrived from another country where s/he had an opportunity to apply for refugee status;

* the claimant left his/her country of origin on different grounds from those outlined in Article 1 and does not want to return for fear of being punished for illegal exit or other violations of this country's legislation;

* the claimant was compelled to illegally cross the Russian border and did not file a refugee status claim with the appropriate authority and within the prescribed deadlines;

* the claimant refuses to provide information on him/herself and the circumstances of his/her arrival on the territory of the Russian Federation;

* the claimant is married to a Russian citizen and is eligible for permanent residence in the Russian Federation;
* the claimant already received the authorization for permanent residence in the Russian Federation.

In Article 7, the 1997 Act makes a distinction between the assessment of a refugee status claim and a decision rendered on such a claim. Therefore, a decision may be taken on a claim only after assessing it, which reduces the chances of unfair decisions. An individual recognized as a refugee receives a certificate. Unlike the 1993 Act, the 1997 Act provides a description of the document and the information it contains. The same act declares the certificate as valid everywhere on the Russian territory. This amendment addresses a frequent problem that refugees encountered in the past: many were accused of illegally staying on the Russian territory as the local authorities would not recognize the validity of documents issued by the federal migration services. From now on, these officials will be in violation of the law.

In some specified cases, both acts require an individual to leave the territory of the Russian Federation. Thus, according to the 1993 Act, an individual must leave Russia if his/her refugee claim has been rejected and if s/he waived his/her right to appeal. However, no details were provided on this procedure, in particular how much time the individual was given to exit Russia. In the 1997 Act, such an individual must leave Russia within one month upon request from the federal migration services.

Only the 1997 Act specifically provides for a procedure of deportation. Thus, the following categories if individuals should be deported:

* individuals whose refugee claims were denied to go through substantive determination, were rejected as a result of substantive determination, and
individuals who lost or were deprived of their refugee status, providing that they did not use their right to appeal and refuse to leave voluntarily;

* individuals mentioned previously whose appeals were unsuccessful and who refuse to leave voluntarily;

* individuals who lost or have been deprived of temporary asylum;

* family of the above-mentioned individuals.

Deportation orders are executed by the Interior Ministry while the Foreign Ministry is mandated to verify that these orders have been duly carried out. This addition is important as it fills a major loophole of the 1993 Act: without any defined procedure of deportation, rejected refugee claimants were forced into illegality and therefore at the mercy of local authorities.

This subchapter highlighted the main differences between the 1993 Refugee Act and its 1997 amended version. Overall, the 1997 Act makes it more difficult to qualify for the registration of a claim, to be deemed a refugee and to keep this status. For example, the refugee status is granted for three years and subject to annual reassessment afterwards. This feature has no equivalent in international standards. However, the Canadian legislation provides for the cessation of refugee status if the reasons for which an individual sought refugee protection have disappeared. The 1997 act also sets higher standards on the timely filing of a claim and on a claimant's or refugee's involvement in criminality. Thus, the untimely filing of a claim may be a reason to deny its preliminary examination, while in Canada, such an element would be considered while examining the well-foundedness of a fear of persecution. Another key feature of the new act pertains to
the benefits that refugees receive to facilitate their social integration: their number has been decreased. In terms of expansions, the legislator introduced the concept of temporary asylum for those whose claim does not fall within the definition of refugee. The act also grants refugees a fundamental right in international standards: the right to apply for permanent residence in Russia.

In practice, the implementation of the 1997 Act, deemed by the US Committee for Refugees as "complex" (US Committee for Refugees Sept./Oct. 99), has led to a dramatic decrease in the number of claims processed by the Federal Migration Service (FMS). According to the same committee, the FMS registered 510 refugees in 1998, compared to 5,741 in 1997, 19,824 in 1996, 46,409 in 1995, and 85,811 in 1994 (Loc. cit.).

3.2 The Forced Migrant Act

The introduction of the status of forced migrant reflects the distinction that the lawmaker drew between far abroad aliens - from outside the former Soviet space - and near abroad aliens, in particular members of the Russian minorities in former Soviet republics. Thus, only Russian citizens and former Soviet citizens eligible to Russian citizenship may be granted forced migrant status.

Adopted at the same time as the Refugee Act, that is, on 19 February 1993, the Forced Migrant Act came into force on the following day and was amended on 22 December 1995 (Pilkington 1998: 36). This subchapter describes and comments on the
main differences between the 1993 and 1995 acts. With a view to drawing a simple picture of these differences, they were categorized in restrictions, expansions and codifications.

The reform of the 1993 Act consisted mainly in toughening eligibility criteria, strengthening state control over forced migrants during and after the processing of their claims, adding grounds to have one's status withdrawn, better distributing the responsibilities among state organs, rationalizing the assistance afforded to forced migrants and imposing uniform procedures to all stakeholders.

As for the refugee status, the determination process for forced migrant status is divided into two steps: the registration of the claim and the examination of the claim.

3.2.1 Restrictions

The following amendments were found to make it more difficult to qualify for forced migrant status, to obtain it and not to lose it. They also cancelled some rights afforded to registered claimants or recognized claimants or assorted them with new conditions.

The main difference between both acts lies in the fact that the status of forced migrant is no longer granted for an indefinite period. Under the 1995 Act, the migration authorities grant the status for a term of five years which can be extended only under exceptional circumstances. In other words, the forced migrant status becomes a temporary protection which disappear with the integration of the beneficiaries into society. In addition, recognized forced migrants have the obligation to report to the
authorities every year.

In both acts, the status of forced migrant may be granted to Russian citizens and citizens of the former Soviet Union under defined conditions. In the 1995 Act, the legislators enlarged the scope of the law to include foreign citizens who have legally established their place of permanent residence on the territory of the Russian Federation. Furthermore, citizens of the Russian Federation and of the former Soviet Union must meet new conditions. For example, to be recognized as a forced migrant as defined in the 1995 Act, a Russian citizen must have left his or her place of permanent residence and moved to the territory of another subject of the Russian Federation. In other words, an individual who fled to another area of the same subject does not qualify for forced migrant status.

While the 1993 Act requires an ambiguous connection between persecution for political opinions, and a hostile campaign against an individual or a group of individuals and massive violations of public order, a cause-effect link must be demonstrated to qualify for the 1995 Act notion of forced migrant. This change significantly complicates the substantiation of a claim based on such a persecution and clearly disadvantages claimants unable for some reasons (poor education, post-traumatic disorder) to give complete testimonies, whether their claim is genuine or not.

Put together in a separate article (Article 2), the number of exclusion clauses was increased and their scope enlarged in the 1995 Act. For example, an individual is not eligible for the status of forced migrant if s/he has no admissible reasons to explain why s/he had not applied within 12 months after his or her leaving their place of residence.
Serious crimes committed by a claimant no longer have to be premeditated. Another exclusion clause states that a request for forced migrant status is deemed inadmissible if the applicant left his or her place of residence on economic grounds or as a result of a famine, an epidemic, an extraordinary situation of a natural or human-made nature. The addition of this provision is a response to the 1993 Act loopholes that led to the recognition of forced migrants who fled their residence on these grounds.

In designing the new act, legislators suppressed a number of rights that had been granted to individuals with a registered forced migrant claim and recognized forced migrants. For example, permits allowing registered claimants or recognized forced migrants to live in a temporary accommodation centre for forced migrants are no longer automatically issued, but only to those who cannot find a place of temporary or permanent residence in Russia by themselves. However, the act does not specify what minimal steps the authorities expect claimants and forced migrants to take in their search for housing.

Modifications to several rights may be explained by the need to relieve the state budget of the burden that these rights were causing. For example, the right of registered claimants and recognized forced migrants to travel and have their luggage carried to their location of temporary residence was cancelled and replaced by a right to assistance with the travel and the transport of luggage. Likewise, recognized forced migrants lost specific rights. For example, they are no longer entitled to assistance in settling in a location of temporary residence and to an allowance given by the federal government. In one case, the legislators changed the law to prevent fraud: to avail his/herself of the right to free
food, recognized forced migrants with an incapacity to work must produce a medical certificate proving their condition.

The 1995 Act sets new obligations to claimants of forced migrant status. Medical examinations are automatically performed while previously, health care authorities had to make a request. This change shows that immigrants are perceived as potential threats to Russia's health care system and the health of Russian society. However, none of the acts indicates what happens should a medical examination reveals a poor medical condition.

Unlike the 1993 Act in which a claim of forced migrant status could be based on any kind of information, the 1995 Act restricts its scope to reliable information. Yet, the Act does not define what reliable means, which leaves room for interpretation and incidentally misuse. Along the same lines, a forced migrant who is deprived of the status because s/he provided false information or fraudulent documents, has to reimburse funds received for personal transport, transport of luggage or assistance with finding employment.

In a change likely to deter some claimants from appealing a decision not to register their claim, the 1995 Act revoked the dispensation from covering administration costs in case of appeal. Therefore, such claimants must pay fees associated with the processing of their claim.

Recognized forced migrants who decide to change the location of their residence must have their name removed from the files of the territorial migration services before they leave and report to the territorial migration service closer to their new residence
within one month. Although the 1995 Act does not state if the authorities may refuse to register a recognized forced migrant, this “tracking system” is similar to the “propiska” system which allows the Russian authorities to control movements of every individual stepping or living on the Russian territory.

In both acts, there are provisions assigning tasks to corresponding state agencies or departments. A number of tasks defined in the 1993 Act no longer appear in the 1995 Act. For example, relevant state authorities are no longer required to pay a scholarship to recognized forced migrants attending professional training or retraining. Likewise, the relevant state authorities are no longer obliged to grant additional tax breaks and other compensations to firms, institutions and organizations hiring recognized forced migrants. Such changes are likely to have an impact on the capacity of recognized forced migrants to settle down and integrate in society.

A provision in both acts addresses the relationship between state bodies and non-governmental organizations involved in the processing of claimants and registered forced migrants. Unlike its predecessor, the 1995 Act restricts the assistance provided by state authorities to public associations helping forced migrants to two specific activities: settlement and search for employment.

The 1993 Act makes a reference to the assistance fund for forced migrants which the federal government was required to create in order to guarantee acceptable living conditions and compensate forced migrants for their expenditures on settlement. Under the 1995 Act, this fund is replaced with a housing fund for temporary settlement of forced migrants. Recognized forced migrants also lose their right to live in an
accommodation provided through the fund mentioned earlier in case of an absence of
more than six months without credible reasons. This amendment reveals the state’s
determination to crack down on abuse of its assistance.

The 1995 Act adds new reasons to lose or to be deprived of the status of forced migrant:

* a forced migrant who loses Russian citizenship;
* if a recognized forced migrant has been found guilty of a crime;
* if a recognized forced migrant has wilfully submitted fraudulent documents
  which were used to grant the status.

As for the refugee status, these amendments significantly expand the scope of
loss/deprivation clauses. A forced migrant pronounced guilty of any crime will be
deprived of his/her status. One important difference from the refugee status lies in the
fact that a forced migrant needs to have wilfully adduced fraudulent documents in order
for the state to vacate his/her status.

3.2.2 Expansions

Expansions are amendments to the 1993 Act that enlarge the scope of the forced
migrant status or add rights to registered claimants and recognized forced migrants.

Under the 1995 Act, a forced migrant must have left his or her residence, but the
act does not specify if it means permanent or temporary residence. This provision makes
it easier for a claimant to qualify, as a place can be recognized as residence after a short
period of time. Under the 1993 Act, a claimant had to prove that s/he left his or her
permanent residence.

In addition to Russian citizens and citizens of the former Soviet Union, the forced migrant status may be granted to stateless people permanently residing in Russia. This provision is important for individuals who are unable to document their nationality, whether they forgot, lost or got rid of their identity or travel documents.

A number of articles pertain to new rights or expanded rights afforded to both registered claimants and recognized forced migrants. As opposed to what the 1993 Act specifies, rights are granted to a registered claimant and to members of his or her family. For example, the Russian authorities must pay a lump sum to every member of a family with a registered claim, and not only to the individual whose claim was registered. Besides, the 1995 Act sets a minimum for the lump sum, namely no less than the minimal wage set by federal law. The 1995 Act specifically provides for free access to health care and medication in state and city health care institutions. It also extends the right for free transport (people and luggage) to the location of temporary residence to the following categories of registered claimants and recognized forced migrants: families of pensioners and/or invalids, single parents with offspring under 18 - under the 1993 Act, the latter category was single mothers with offspring under 3. Unlike the Refugee Act, a recognized forced migrant may no longer lose his or her status when s/he obtains citizenship of another country.

New tasks were assigned to state agencies or departments. For example, the 1995 Act requires executive bodies of the federal state and of the subjects to provide orphans and children without parents' care with a place in a child institution. It also requires
relevant state authorities to provide recognized forced migrants in need of better housing
conditions with subsidies for the building or acquisition of housing. It also obliges
relevant state authorities to assist recognized forced migrants in organizing small
settlements, in building housing units, in developing technical and social infrastructures
and creating jobs in small settlements. These obligations show that the state is ready to
provide initial assistance to recognized forced migrants so that they can settle down and
then live without further state assistance.

Limits were added to the powers of state agencies over recognized forced
migrants. For example, a provision states that a recognized forced migrant may not be
resettled to another settlement without his or her consent. It also stipulates that the
inaction of private authorities and officials of these authorities may be the basis for an
official complaint. In other words, a state official may no longer hide behind his or her
inaction to avoid responsibility.

Regarding relations between the state authorities and public associations
providing assistance to forced migrants, the 1995 Act gives these organizations the
possibility to participate in the making of proposals regarding the main orientations of
state policy on forced migration. In parallel, state authorities must guarantee the
observation of the rights and legal interests of public associations providing assistance to
forced migrants.

3.2.3 Codifications

The number of days assigned to migration authorities to accept or refuse the
registration of a request for forced migrant status was reduced from five to three. In this way, it cuts the time during which claimants stay with almost no rights and ignore whether they can stay or must go back.

Several changes were introduced not only to document decisions rendered by the authorities, but also to guarantee the uniformity of documents and their validity across Russia. While the 1993 Act made no reference to any document certifying the registration of a claim, the 1995 Act stipulates that a registration certificate is issued or sent once the registration of a claim has been accepted. The format and the rules of issuance are defined by the federal government. With this certificate, the claimant receives the rights and duties defined by law, wherever s/he is in Russia. Regardless of the final decision rendered on a claim, a notice is now issued or sent in writing to the claimant while such a notice was issued or sent in case of a negative decision only under the 1993 Act.

To make sure that certificates issued to recognized forced migrants are accepted by every state department and all over the Federation, the 1995 Act specifically states that certificates issued to recognized forced migrants are valid throughout Russia.

In cases of deprivation of forced migrant status, the 1995 Act provides for a notice to be issued or sent to a forced migrant within five days after s/he has been deprived of the status. This notice indicates the reasons and provides details on the appeal procedure. These adjustments regarding documents respond to lack of consistency between state agencies dealing with forced migrants in the past. Many claimants and recognized forced migrants were struggling with bureaucracy because procedures and
documents had not been clearly defined in the law.

The 1995 Act improved the accountability of state agencies by requiring them to examine written requests from recognized forced migrants and reply to them following a procedure and within deadlines defined by legislation of the Russian Federation.

In case of loss or withdrawal of the status, the 1995 Act specifies that certificates are declared non-valid by appropriate migration services. Moreover, the individual has to leave the accommodation provided by the housing fund for temporary residence of forced migrants.

Legislators added a provision pertaining to the roots of forced migration. Thus, subjects of the Russian Federation which allow forced migration flows into their territory on grounds stipulated in Article 1 must take measures jointly with federal authorities to eliminate the causes of these flows.

To sum up, the 1995 reform of the Forced Migrant Act resulted in more stringent criteria of eligibility to the status notably in terms of crime, health condition and timeliness of the filing of the claim. In addition, the five-year validity of the status, the requirement to report annually to the authorities and the expanded clauses on status cessation gives the state a better capacity to manage the population of forced migrants. The lawmaker also strove to improve the efficiency of the process notably by setting a maximum processing time (three days for the registration) and by binding all state organs to accept documents issued by the migration services. Finally, the reformed act orients the state assistance to vulnerable forced migrants (elderly, single-parent families,
disabled) and to the settlement phase of the forced migrant's life.

According to the US Committee for Refugees, the implementation of the new act coincided in 1996 with a 32 per cent decline in forced migrant registrations compared to 1995 (US Committee for Refugees 1997).

### 3.3 Conclusion

The examination of the changes brought to both acts revealed a few similarities. Having a claim for refugee or forced migrant status registered by the competent authorities is more difficult under the amended laws. In both new laws, the lawmaker has reinforced the screening function of the registration by adding new clauses to the exclusion clauses defined in the United Nations Convention.

The harm that claimants allegedly experienced or fear in their country of origin must fit stricter definitions. As a matter of fact, the reference to persecution in the refugee definition is in line with the UN Convention. Recognized refugees and forced migrants must abide by more stringent rules to avoid losing their status, in particular as far as criminality is concerned. Similarly to exclusion clauses, the Russian government inserted more cessation clauses in both acts than the UN Convention provides for. Refugees and forced migrants also rely on less assistance from the state and enjoy most rights that common Russian citizens enjoy. Finally, both new acts tackle the inefficiencies that almost paralyzed the Russian migration system in the early 1990s.

If the government's intention was to curb the number of applications for refugee
and forced migrant statuses, then the statistics provided by the US Committee for Refugees indicate that the goal was met. Interestingly, this evolution seems to affect refugees as much as forced migrants, that is individuals culturally and historically closer to the Russian Federation.
CHAPTER 4. Explanation of the Changes to the Laws

As it was outlined earlier, this study tries to provide an explanation of the changes in the laws on refugees and forced migrants by means of a content analysis divided into two stages. The first stage, the text analysis, consists in examining texts featuring statements of various length given by Russian political actors. Every statement was divided into analytical units (words or phrases), which in turn were classified into two groups of categories - threat, defense/protection, emergency for the securitization group, and communality, traditions, isolationism and independence for the identity group. Statistical indices were calculated taking the text as the reference unit. The results of this part of the analysis will be described and interpreted in subsection 4.1. The second stage, the context analysis, presented in subsection 4.2, focuses on the context or collocation of the declined forms of the phrase “vymuzhdennyi pereselenets” (forced migrant) and of the word “bezhenets” (refugee). As a reminder for the reader, a collocation is a sentence containing the word 'refugee', the phrase 'forced migrant' or both. The context analysis comprises two stages: one using the securitization and identity category groups and the other with new syntactic and thematic categories developed after examining every collocation. The interpretation of the results of both text and context analyses will try to determine whether and how these categories selected as a sample of Russian political discourse in the field of refugees and forced migrants can explain the amendments to the
Refugee Act and the Forced Migrant Act.

4.1 Text Analysis

This stage of the discourse analysis examines the presence of the themes in the 23 texts of the corpus. The structure of this subsection reflects the division between the securitization and identity themes. For each text, statistical indices such as the number of occurrences of each theme, the average occurrence of each theme for the whole corpus and the statistical significance were calculated. In addition, the political orientation of the politicians featured in the texts and the political allegiance (media control) of the media was recorded in order to refine the analysis.

4.1.1 Category Group on Securitization

_Ugroza (threat)_

The category _Ugroza_ has the largest score (121) of the analyzed sample. This category is present in 17 texts, which is more than half the sample. The text with the largest number of occurrences is a long comment by Dmitrii Rogozin, a pro-government (Yurii Korgunyuk 26 Apr. 2000) Duma member and leader of the faction Congress of the Russian Communities (Kongress russkikh obshchin) also serving as the deputy chair of the Duma Committee on Nationality Affairs.

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* The raw data for each text of the corpus are presented in Appendix B.
The low standard deviation indicates that the score of every text is close to the mean, which, in this case, is 7.1 units per text for an average total of units of 612.8 per text. According to Table 4.1, the Ugroza theme is among the topics mentioned by both state officials/pro-government public figures and opposition members when they express their views on refugees and/or forced migrants. Yet, opposition members do not mention it as often as state officials/pro-government public figures.

Table 4.1 Ugroza vs. Political Orientation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ugroza</th>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Pro-Government</th>
<th>Opposition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>80.0</td>
<td></td>
<td>69.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td></td>
<td>30.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(10)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(13)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

χ² = 0.34; DF=1; n. s. (p>.05)

Conversely, according to Table 4.2, materials published by Russian media considered to be independent from the government make more references to the Ugroza theme than the pro-government periodicals.

Table 4.2 Ugroza vs. Media Control

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ugroza</th>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Independent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>57.1</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(14)</td>
<td>(9)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

χ² = 5.23; DF=1; p<.05

One possible explanation for this result could be that media coverage of this theme is more a decision of the editors than a true reflection of this theme's presence in
the discourse of Russian political actors. In this case, chief editors of independent media
tend to select more materials which deal with refugees and/or forced migrants, as well as
threats than their counterparts working with government-controlled media.

At this stage of the analysis, one can conclude that both categories of politicians
featured in the corpus tend to include the notions of threat in their views on refugees and
forced migrants. However, there is no evidence at this stage that refugees and forced
migrants are perceived as threats in the Russian political discourse.

Zashchita (protection)/oborona (defense)

The theme Zashchita/oborona has the second largest total score (80) of this study.
Twelve texts include references to this theme, which is slightly more than half the
corpus. The value of the standard deviation (0.2) indicates that scores vary significantly
around the mean (6.7 units per text). The largest score of this category can be found in an
interview with the first deputy health minister published in 1999 by the government-
owned newspaper Rossiiskaya Gazeta. Table 4.3 indicates no major differences between
government/pro-government public figures and opposition members as to the use of this
theme: in both cases, the proportion of those mentioning this theme is fairly similar.
Table 4.3 Zashchita/oborona vs. Political Orientation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Zashchita/oborona</th>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Pre-Government</th>
<th>Opposition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>61.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(10)</td>
<td>(13)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$\chi^2 = 0.006; \ DF = 1; \ n. s. (p > .05)$

One of the findings of Table 4.4 indicates that independent media have more references to this theme than the state-controlled media. Therefore, as for Ugroza, the presence of this theme in the media seems not to be due to politicians, but to people in charge of determining the content of the media.

Table 4.4 Zashchita/oborona vs. Media Control

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Zashchita/oborona</th>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Independent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>77.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>22.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(14)</td>
<td>(9)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$\chi^2 = 1.77; \ DF = 1; \ n. s. (p > .05)$

The lower score of protection/defense compared to the score of threat shows that some threats do not require protection or defense. Therefore, it may be a sign that Russian politicians do not necessarily view refugees or forced migrants as serious threats. Instead, they may allude to protection or defense afforded to refugees or forced migrants against certain threats (involvement in criminality).

Neotlozhnost' (emergency)

This theme has a small total number of scores with seven occurrences scattered
over four texts. The text with the largest number of occurrences (4) is an interview with President of Ingushetia Ruslan Aushev published in 2000 by the independent bi-weekly *Novaya Gazeta*. This finding is no surprise in light of the limited assistance that Ingushetia could provide to Chechen displaced persons as a result of the so-called "anti-terrorist operation."

While keeping in mind the small number of occurrences, Table 4.5 shows that government officials and pro-government public figures appear more likely to include this theme in their discourse on refugees and forced migrants than opposition members. This trend may be nothing more than the result of an arbitrary choice in relation to President Aushev's political orientation. Although he is a state official, he has criticized the Kremlin several times in particular regarding their handling of the Chechen conflict. Whatever it might be, compared to the two previous themes, *Neotlozhnost* is a theme that political actors rarely mention in the refugee/forced migrant context.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4.5 Neotlozhnost' vs. Political Orientation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Neotlozhnost'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$\chi^2 = 1.95; \ DF=1; \ n. s. (p>.05)$

According to Table 4.6, media control seems to be a minor factor to explain the occurrences of the *Neotlozhnost* theme. Although independent media are more likely to mention this theme, both types of media tend not to make reference to this theme.
Table 4.6 *Neotlozhnost* vs. Media Control

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Neotlozhnost</strong></th>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Independent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>22.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>85.7</td>
<td>77.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(14)</td>
<td>(9)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ \chi^2 = 0.24; \text{ DF}=1; \text{ n. s. (p}>.05) \]

In sum, the emergency theme seems to be mentioned mostly in relation to the Chechen conflict. Politicians may invoke urgent measures to solve the Chechen crisis, including the fate of the Chechen displaced persons, but do not see apparently the same emergency in dealing with the situation of refugees or forced migrants in general.

*Conclusion*

In total, the sample contains 208 units that were classified in the securitization category, which amounts to 1.45 % of the total number of units. This category was found in 17 out of 23 texts. In comparison, the number of units derived\(^5\) from "bezhenets" or from the phrase "vynuzhdennyi pereiselenets" found in the sample reaches 123, that is 0.87 % of the whole sample. Assuming that the latter percentage is considered to be a benchmark in this study, the securitization category is consequently a major theme in the sampled texts.

Among the three themes of the security category, threat and protection/defense

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\(^5\) Derived forms of "bezhenets" and "vynuzhdennyi pereiselenets" have different endings. In Russian, nouns, adjectives and pronouns change their endings in relation with both their number and their function in a sentence.
are the most frequent ones mentioned in the texts of the corpus. While government and pro-government figures appear more likely to mention the threat theme than opposition members, references to the protection/defense theme do not appear to be influenced by the political orientation of the speaker or writer. With respect to media control, independent media appear more likely to mention both themes than government-controlled media. There can be two explanations for this trend: either politicians adjust their discourse to the medium they talk to or government-controlled and independent media deliberately focus on these themes. Finally, the apparent absence of correlation between the scores of the threat and protection/defense categories may be an indication that politicians do not view refugees or forced migrants as a serious threat. The context analysis will pursue this avenue of research.

As for the Neotloznosti theme, its small number of occurrences reveal that actions in the field of refugees and forced migrants tend to be described in the sampled texts as an emergency only in the Chechen context.

The variety of scores among the three categories of the securitization group seems to demonstrate that the refugee and forced migrant issues have not been fully securitized in the Russian political discourse. Therefore, there is no evidence so far that security has had a major influence on the reform of the Refugee Act and the Forced Migrant Act.
4.1.2 Category Group on Russian Identity

*Sobornost’ (communality)*

With 60 occurrences scattered among 16 texts, this category is the most represented of the identity group in the corpus. The text with the highest score is an official statement authored by Gennadii Zyuganov, the Secretary General of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF). This result is hardly surprising, given the ideology on which this party is built. The number of occurrences vary significantly from text to text.

According to Table 4.7, the political orientation of political actors seems to have little influence over the presence of this category in a text. This category is equally represented in the texts of both types of political actors.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sobornost’</th>
<th>Government Pro-Government</th>
<th>Opposition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>70.0</td>
<td>69.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>30.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(10)</td>
<td>(13)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$\chi^2 = 0.001; \ DF=1; \ n.s. (p>.05)$

Unlike political orientation, media control shows a significant influence over the presence of this theme in a text. While in the case of state-controlled media, the number of texts with occurrences is equal to the number without occurrences, all the texts
published in independent media do have occurrences. In other words, there is a strong association between independent media and the occurrence of the communality theme in the studied sample.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sobornost'</th>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Independent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(14)</td>
<td>(9)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

χ² = 3.73; DF=1; n. s. (p>.05)

Despite its relatively low score, the communality category appears among the significant themes of this corpus as it is found in almost as many texts as the threat category.

Nezavisimost' (independence)

This category has a small number of occurrences (7) and appears only in two texts. The text with the largest number of occurrences is a comment by Dmitrii Rogozin cited earlier with respect to the Ugroza category.

As shown in Table 4.9, political orientation does not seem to be a relevant factor to explain this theme’s occurrences. Furthermore, the small number of occurrences makes any relationship not statistically significant.
Table 4.9 nezavisimost' vs. Political Orientation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>nezavisimost'</th>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Pro-Government</th>
<th>Opposition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td></td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>90.0</td>
<td></td>
<td>92.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(10)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(13)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

χ² = 0.04, DF=1; n. s. (p>.05)

Similarly to what was previously noted, the numbers are too small to draw any conclusions on the influence of media control over the presence of this category in texts.

Table 4.10 nezavisimost' vs. Media Control

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>nezavisimost'</th>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Independent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>92.9</td>
<td>88.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(14)</td>
<td>(9)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

χ² = 0.11, DF=1; n. s. (p>.05)

In light of these results, the independence theme does not seem to be associated with the themes of refugees or forced migrants.

*Traditsii (traditions)*

Although it has more occurrences than the previous theme, the *Traditsii* theme is present in three texts only, that is hardly more than the *nezavisimost'* category. The text with the most occurrences is the comment by Dmitrii Rogozin with a score of 14.

According to Table 4.11, opposition figures appear more likely to mention this theme than government officials or pro-government public figures, although numbers are
small.

Table 4.11 Traditsii vs. Political Orientation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Traditsii</th>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Pro-Government</th>
<th>Opposition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td></td>
<td>23.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>90.0</td>
<td></td>
<td>76.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(10)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(13)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$\chi^2 = 0.67; \ DF=1; \ n.s. (p>.05)$

Table 4.12 Traditsii vs. Media Control

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Traditsii</th>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Independent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>44.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>55.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(14)</td>
<td>(9)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$\chi^2 = 7.56; \ DF=1; \ p<01$

Notwithstanding the small numbers, Traditsii is a theme slightly associated with opposition figures, but significantly associated with independent media.

Izolatsionizm (isolationism)

The text analysis did not find any occurrences of this category in the texts of the sample. There does not seem to be any relationship between it and the theme of refugees
and forced migrants.

**Conclusion**

Out of 14,094 units, only 85 belong to the identity category, which is equal to 0.60%. These 85 units are scattered among 16 texts of the sample. The comparison with the 0.87% benchmark could indicate that the identity theme is a relatively minor theme in the texts of the sample. This result would question the importance of the Eurasian conception of the Russian identity in the political discourse on refugees and forced migrants.

However, despite a low score, the Sobornost’ category was found in 16 out of 23 texts. Although its relationship with the refugee/forced migrant remains unclear, communality is an issue that Russian politicians tend to have in mind when expressing their views on refugees or forced migrants.

**4.1.3 Results of Text Analysis: General Conclusion**

This first stage of analysis reveals how the developed categories are represented in the texts of the sample. Threat is the category with the largest score throughout the sample and appears in the largest number of texts. The second larger total of scores also belongs to a category part of the securitization group, namely Protection/Defense. Thus, four times out of five, Russian politicians expressed their views on refugees and forced migrants while talking about threats. However, they raised issues of protection and defense slightly less frequently. With its small numbers, the third theme identified as an
element of the securitization discourse is not significantly related to the issues of refugees and forced migrants. Therefore, at this stage of analysis, the discourse on refugees and forced migrants appears not “fully” securitized according to the School of Copenhagen’s definition. However, security appears to be a concern for many Russian politicians when they raise the issue of refugees and forced migrants, but they do not seem to see any urgency in acting in this field.

With respect to the category group on identity, the text analysis revealed a small number of occurrences. Therefore, the Eurasian conception of the Russian identity appears to have at this stage of the study a marginal presence in the Russian political discourse on refugees and forced migrants. One should note though that communality appears in almost as many texts as security issues.

The main objective of the following stage is to get closer to identifying the links between the themes captured in the categories and the refugee/forced migrant issue by concentrating on sentences containing the terms “refugee” and/or “forced migrant”.

4.2 Context Analysis

The context analysis of the sample produced 123 sentences with either the word “bezhenets,” the phrase “vyuchenennyi pereselenets” or both. To avoid confusion, these sentences will be referred to as collocations following the terminology used in content analyses.

As was outlined earlier, the same categories as the ones based on the hypotheses -
hypotheses categories - were used for the analysis of the context of the two units “bezhenets” and “vymuzhdennyi pereselenets” with their declined forms. This part of the context analysis is dealt with in subsection 4.2.1. However, the limited explanatory value of the results obtained with the hypotheses categories prompted the development of other categories to provide a comprehensive picture of the context of these units. The new categories were developed after identifying the most common themes and the most common syntactic patterns found in the collocations.

4.2.1 Hypotheses Categories

4.2.1.1 Category Group on Securitization

_Ugroza (threat)_

The category _Ugroza_ was found in seven collocations scattered across six texts. While its frequency per word reaches 0.87%, its frequency per collocation is 5.69%. However, only six texts have collocations with a unit belonging to this category compared to 17 texts with at least one such unit. The text with the largest number of collocations with the _Ugroza_ category is an interview of Sergei Khetagurov, the president of the Federal Migration Service published in _Novaya gazeta_. This finding is consistent with the text analysis for this category: the text with the largest number of occurrences of this theme also features a pro-government political figure.

However, according to Table 4.13, the political orientation of the speaker or writer has a barely noticeable influence on the presence of the _Ugroza_ category in a
collocation. Government officials and pro-government political figures tend to talk about refugees or forced migrants while referring to threats slightly more than opposition figures. This trend confirms the finding of the text analysis for this category.

Table 4.13 Collocations with *Ugroza* vs. *Political Orientation*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Government Pro-Government</th>
<th>Opposition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>90.7</td>
<td>96.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(43)</td>
<td>(80)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(\chi^2 = 1.60, \ DF = 1; \ n. s. (p > .05)\)

As indicated in the following table, collocations found in texts published by independent media seem more likely to have units belonging to the *Ugroza* category.

This finding is also in line with the observation made for this theme in the text analysis.

Table 4.14 Collocations with *Ugroza* vs. *Media Control*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Independent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>97.4</td>
<td>89.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(77)</td>
<td>(46)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(\chi^2 = 3.65, \ DF = 1; \ n. s. (p > .05)\)

In light of the small number of occurrences obtained of the threat category, the context analysis failed to provide more explanation on the relationship between the threat theme and the refugee/forced migrant issues. There is no evidence in the corpus of a
systematic association of refugees and forced migrants with threats in the Russian political discourse.

*Zashchita/oborona (protection/defense)*

Out of 123 collocations, 7 had a reference to the *Zashchita/oborona* category, which amounts to 4.88%. These collocations were found in five texts, which is less than the text analysis (12). The text with the largest number of collocations with this category is an official statement by Gennadii Zyuganov, secretary general of the KPRF.

Table 4.15 shows that government officials or pro-government political figures are slightly more likely to combine both themes of refugees/forced migrants and protection/defense in the same sentence. The text analysis had not revealed any influence in this regard.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Zashchita/oborona</th>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Pro-Government</th>
<th>Opposition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>93.0</td>
<td></td>
<td>96.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(43)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(80)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

χ² = 0.62, DF=1, n. s. (p>.05)

Media control appears to have a small influence on the number of collocations containing a reference to the *Zashchita/oborona* category. As indicated in Table 4.16, independent media have more such collocations, which corresponds to the result of the text analysis.
Table 4.16 Collocations with Zashchita/oborona vs. Media Control

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Zashchita/oborona</th>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Independent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>97.4</td>
<td>91.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(77)</td>
<td>(46)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(\chi^2 = 2.32; \ DF = 1; \ n. \ s. (p > .05)\)

Being smaller than the numbers obtained for the Ugroza category, the numbers for the Zashchita/oborona category confirms the lack of systematic association of refugees and forced migrants with security.

*Neotlozhnost' (emergency)*

No collocation had any reference to this category. The context analysis had revealed a small number of scores which made this factor a relatively irrelevant one in this study.

**Conclusion**

On the whole, the results of the context analysis for the securitization group both confirm and contradict the results of the text analysis. Thus, both Ugroza and Zashchita/oborona categories are the most frequently represented of this category group in texts and in collocations. Furthermore, government officials and pro-government figures appear slightly more likely to mention these themes when they talk about refugees and forced migrants. However, scores obtained for this category in collocations remain
too small to go further than the finding of the text analysis, i.e. a partial securitization of the issue of refugees and forced migrants. The securitization is partial for three reasons: firstly, because out of the two concepts identified in Chapter 1 - existential threats and emergency measures - only the concept of former can be detected in the texts of the corpus; secondly, references to both concepts are most of the time not in the same sentences as references to refugees or forced migrants. As a consequence, no particular relationship between security and the refugee/forced migrant issue could be identified.

4.2.1.2 Category Group on Identity

*Sobornost' (communality)*

The *Sobornost'* category was found in 14 collocations scattered among seven texts. More than one out of every ten collocations make reference to this category. These results make it the most common of the hypotheses categories in collocations. Thus, the context analysis seems to establish a clearer link with refugee/forced migrant issues than the text analysis did. The text with the largest number of such collocations (5) is the same as the text with the largest number of references to this category identified in the text analysis, that is the official statement of the KPRF secretary-general. Again, the significant presence of the communality theme in this text reflects the ideology of the KPRF.

Political orientation seems to have a small influence on the presence of this category in a collocation. A government official or a pro-government figure has slightly
more chances to refer to this category in a sentence on refugees or forced migrants. This result is in relative contradiction with the finding in the text analysis, which had not found any significant relation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sobornost'</th>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Pro-Government</th>
<th>Opposition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td></td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>86.1</td>
<td></td>
<td>90.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(43)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(80)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$\chi^2 = 0.44; \ DF = 1; \ n. \ s. \ (p>.05)$

Table 4.18 shows that the independence of a medium is linked to the reference to the Sobornost' category in a collocation. This result confirms what was found in the text analysis for this category.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sobornost'</th>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Independent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>19.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>93.5</td>
<td>80.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(77)</td>
<td>(46)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$\chi^2 = 4.87; \ DF = 1; p<.05$

The context of “vynuzhdennyi pereselenets” and “bezhenets” does not make any references to the following identity categories: nezavisimost' (independence), traditsii (tradition) and izolatsionnizm (isolationism). For the latter, the context analysis is no
different from the text analysis: it was not found at all in the sample. While *nezavisimost’* was a category with a small number of scores in the text analysis, the *truditsii* was fairly well-represented.

**Conclusion**

As in the text analysis, the *Sobornost’* category is the most frequent of the category group on identity in collocations. Furthermore, this category became the most common of all the hypotheses categories in collocations while it was ranked third in the text analysis. Yet, the frequency of references to *Sobornost’* remains low since it is not even present in half of the collocations. In addition, the small scores obtained for the other dimensions of the Eurasianist identity is inconsistent with the expected impact of this form of identity on the changes in the laws.

The results for the hypotheses categories do not confirm the “lead” that the threat and protection/defense themes of the securitization category group had taken in the text analysis over the Russian identity themes. However, the context analysis failed to establish a clear relationship between the security and identity themes, and the refugee/forced migrant issues. Security and the Eurasian form of Russian identity as defined in this study appear to be marginal components of the Russian political discourse on refugees and forced migrants. Therefore, the results of the content analysis seem to infirm the two hypotheses: neither security nor the Eurasian form of Russian identity clearly explains the changes brought to the laws on refugees and forced migrants.
4.2.2 New Categories

Given the lack of explanatory value of the hypotheses developed at the beginning of this study, two groups of new categories were created for this stage of the context analysis, namely a syntactic group and a thematic group. Both groups were developed after identifying the most common themes and the most common syntactic patterns found in the 123 collocations. The analysis based on the new categories will not feature as many statistical indicators as for the hypotheses categories. This peculiarity reflects the secondary importance of this part of the content analysis. In order words, it simply supplements the analysis on securitization and identity and provides avenues for further research.

4.2.2.1 Syntactic Group of Categories

The examination of the collocations revealed the following most obvious syntactic patterns:

- Plural: references to refugee and/or forced migrant in the plural form;
- Singular: references to refugee and/or forced migrant in the singular form;
- Subject: reference to refugee and/or forced migrant as subject of a sentence.

The first two categories will be analyzed together as they pertain to two dimensions of the same concept. Basically, the number (plural/singular) of every word derived from "bezhenets" and of the phrase "vymuzhdennyi pereselenets" was recorded at every occurrence. The reader may note that unlike the subject category, the number category is not based on collocations per se. However, both categories are based on
syntax and were developed to supplement the analysis on securitization and identity. These similarities outweigh the distinctive feature of the number category.

**Plural/Singular**

The word "bezhenets" and the phrase "vyzhdennyi pereselenets" appeared in plural in 95 out of 123 occurrences, which amounts to 77.2%. These occurrences were found in 19 texts, in particular in the presentation given by the opposition Duma member Zh. M. Lozinskaya at a Duma plenary session where 26 occurrences had plural forms. Singular forms were found in 17 occurrences, that is 14% of the total, scattered among 6 texts. The largest number of singular forms were observed in Ms. Lozinskaya’s presentation with 12 such occurrences. However, this result may not be very indicative as this text has by far the largest number of occurrences (42).

According to table 4.19, only opposition members used the singular form of "bezhenets" and "vyzhdennyi pereselenets," while government officials or pro-government figures did not.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Opposition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Plural</td>
<td>93.0</td>
<td>68.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singular</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>21.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(43)</td>
<td>(80)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$\chi^2 = 11.55$, DF=2, p<.01
According to Table 4.20, government-controlled media seem to make slightly more references to "bezhenets" and "vymuzhdennyi pereselenets" in the singular form than independent media.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Independent</th>
<th>( \chi^2 = 6.44; ) DF=2; p&lt;.05</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Plural</td>
<td>74.0</td>
<td>82.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singular</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>46</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A wide variety of interpretations may apply to these findings given the numerous functions that plural and singular fulfill in languages in general. However, one particular function seems to be beyond contention: while plural is used to generalize, singular conveys a more individualistic perspective. Thus, pluralization of these terms by pro-government politicians or state officials may be explained by the "policy-maker perspective" that they take when they talk or write about refugees and forced migrants. A policy-maker is expected to develop principles and rules based on general information such as trends and statistics, therefore finds it difficult factoring in the individual dimension of any phenomenon. By taking this perspective, pro-government politicians or state officials tend to dehumanize refugees and forced migrants, and turn them into a masse characterized by its size and movements. This tendency may also be observed in Russia's first concept of national security adopted by the government in December 1997.
In this document, the term "migration" is associated with "massive" (Vitkovskaya Oct. 2001: 48). Such a perception of migration may partly explain the restrictions added to the amended Refugee Act and Forced Migrant Act. For instance, restrictions on the eligibility to the refugee or forced migrant statuses and the temporary granting of these statuses indicate, among other things, a will to keep control over the number of refugees and forced migrants.

The use by opposition members of the singular may be simply a way of distinguishing themselves from the pro-government politicians or state officials. As a member of the opposition unspoilt by the constraints of governance, a politician may have more opportunities to dwell on the fate of individuals or on the human aspect of a phenomenon.

Subject

This category indicates whether “bezhenets” and “vymuzhdennyi pereselenets” are used as subject of a verb.

Out of 123 collocations, 6 collocations had either part of speech used as the subject of a verb, which amounts to 4.88%. In other sentences, that is most of the time, refugees and forced migrants are described as targets or objects of an action. The text with the largest number of such collocations could not be identified since the latter are rather equally spread among four texts.

As shown in Table 4.21, political orientation has no influence on whether or not “bezhenets” and “vymuzhdennyi pereselenets” are used as subject of an action.
Table 4.21 Subject in Collocations vs. Political Orientation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Pro-Government</th>
<th>Opposition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>95.4</td>
<td>95.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(43)</td>
<td>(80)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$\chi^2 = 0.008; \ DF = 1; \ n. \ s. \ (p > .05)$

According to the following table, independent media are slightly more likely to refer to refugees and forced migrants as subjects of an action, although numbers are very small.

Table 4.22 Subject in Collocations vs. Media Control

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Pro-Government</th>
<th>Independent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>97.4</td>
<td>91.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(77)</td>
<td>(46)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$\chi^2 = 2.32; \ DF = 1; \ n. \ s. \ (p > .05)$

A possible interpretation of these results is that being recognized as a refugee or forced migrant implies in the mind of both categories of politicians the loss of decision-making or rather the transfer of this faculty to the host authorities. Given that such a deprivation places the refugee and forced migrant population under the authorities' control, the presence of such a syntactic pattern in the political discourse is in line with changes in the laws, notably the ones requiring these immigrants to regularly report to the authorities.


Conclusion

The context analysis of the syntactic group of categories indicate that refugees and forced migrants are referred to most of the time in the plural form and as targets or objects of an action. One possible conclusion drawn from these findings is that refugees and forced migrants are perceived in the Russian political discourse as anonymous members of a masse deprived of their capacity to make decisions independently from the authorities. Legislation adopted in this context is bound to restrict the eligibility criteria to refugee or forced migrant status, increase the background verification of candidates and toughen the control over refugees and forced migrants.

4.2.2.2 Thematic Group of Categories

The examination of the 123 collocations revealed the following five most recurrent themes: Pravitel’stvo (government), Yuzhnaya Rossiya (Southern Russia), Kolichestvo (quantity), my/oni (We/they), Pomoshch’ (assistance), Zakon (law) and Priznanie (recognition). A theme was selected when it was found in a minimum of 15 collocations, that is in more collocations than security and identity themes were found.

Pravitel’stvo (government)

This category comprises every reference to a federal, republican, regional or local state institution in collocations. It was found in 25 collocations, which makes it the most frequent category encountered in collocations. An interpretation of these results could be that the government has an important role - probably the main one - to play in the field of
refugees and forced migrants.

According to Table 4.23, opposition members are slightly more likely to include this category in a sentence on refugees and forced migrants. Such a difference may be interpreted as a reflection of the attention than the opposition pays on the government’s involvement or lack of involvement in this field.

Table 4.23 Collocations with *Pravitel’svo* vs. Political Orientation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><em>Pravitel’svo</em></th>
<th>Government Pro-Government</th>
<th>Opposition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>22.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>83.7</td>
<td>77.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(43)</td>
<td>(80)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ \chi^2 = 0.67; \text{ DF}=1; \text{ n. s. (p}>.05)\]

Collocations with references to the government are more numerous in independent media than in government-controlled media. This may be a sign that independent media give more space in their pages to opposition members, at least as far as refugee/forced migrant issues are concerned.

Table 4.24 Collocations with *Pravitel’svo* vs. Media Control

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><em>Pravitel’svo</em></th>
<th>Government Pro-Government</th>
<th>Independent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>17.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>90.9</td>
<td>82.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(77)</td>
<td>(46)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ \chi^2 = 0.39; \text{ DF}=1; \text{ n. s. (p}>.05)\]
The Russian political discourse sets the government at the centre of the debate over refugees and forced migrants. As a matter of fact, one may draw a parallel with certain changes to the Refugee Act and the Forced Migrant Act which define new tasks to be fulfilled by state bodies, stricter state control over would-be or recognized refugees or forced migrants, a more limited involvement of the non-governmental organizations and more uniform procedures across federation subjects.

_Yuzhnaya Rossiya (Southern Russia)_

This category includes every reference to southern Russia, including northern Caucasus. There was a reference to southern Russia in 20 collocations, that is 16.3% of the total of collocations. These collocations are scattered among eight texts. The text with the largest number of such collocations is a commentary by Dmitrii Rogozin, a pro-government Duma member.

According to Table 4.25, this category is somewhat related to government officials and pro-government figures. The latter tend to refer to southern Russia more often than opposition members when they talk about refugees and forced migrants. This finding should not cause any surprise given the instability and several wars in the region that require massive state presence and incidentally "produce" significant flows of refugees and forced migrants. In 1999, with respectively 35% and 16% of the refugees registered with the Federal Migration Service, Georgia and Azerbaijan were the number 1 and 2 refugee-producing countries for Russia (US Committee for Refugees 2000a). Furthermore, 600,000 civilians were displaced as a result of the "anti-terrorist operation"
in Chechnya in 1999 (Loc. cit.). It is worth mentioning that the government granted the forced migrant status only to the few civilians who agreed never to return to their homes in Chechnya (US Committee for Refugees 2000b).

Table 4.25 Collocations with Yuzhnaya Rossija vs. Political Orientation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yuzhnaya Rossija</th>
<th>Government Pro-Government</th>
<th>Opposition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>67.4</td>
<td>92.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(43)</td>
<td>(80)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$\chi^2 = 12.90; \text{ DF}=1; \ p<.001$

Unlike the previous table on political orientation, the government, through its media, does not mention southern Russia as often as independent media.

Table 4.26 Collocations with Yuzhnaya Rossija vs. Media Control

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yuzhnaya Rossija</th>
<th>Government Pro-Government</th>
<th>Independent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>26.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>89.6</td>
<td>73.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(77)</td>
<td>(46)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$\chi^2 = 5.21; \text{ DF}=1; \ p<.05$

The relatively frequent presence of this theme in the collocations with refugee(s) or forced migrant(s) should be related to the findings for the securitization category. Thus, since Russia set foot in the Caucasus and despite the independence of the three Transcaucasian states, this region has always been plagued by instability and constitutes a challenge to the Kremlin. Furthermore, there is an anti-Caucasian prejudice widespread
among ethnic Russians, in particular since the 1999 bomb attacks in Moscow. Therefore, a reference to southern Russia implies a reference to conflict, and incidentally to threats to national security. Thus, security appears to have a more important place in the Russian political discourse on refugees and forced migrants than the results on the securitization categories showed.

Količestvo (quantity)

The units which comprise this category are either quantitative values or words such as quantity, amount, etc. A total of 19 collocations (15.4%) in 10 texts have references to quantities. This score is in keeping with the preponderance of references to refugee and forced migrant in plural. Politicians, in particular policy-makers, tend to quantify phenomena to facilitate the development of policies and the monitoring of their implementation.

According to Table 4.27, quantification is particularly noticeable among government officials and pro-government figures. One could argue that opposition members may stay away from figures and instead use the human/emotional side to denounce the government policies and woo voters.

Table 4.27 Collocations with Količestvo vs. Political Orientation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Količestvo</th>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Pro-Government</th>
<th>Opposition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>67.4</td>
<td>93.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>80</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\( \chi^2 = 14.83, \ DF=1; p<.001 \)
Surprisingly, independent media seem to make more references to quantities than government-controlled media.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kolchestvo</th>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Priv-Government</th>
<th>Independent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td></td>
<td>23.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>89.6</td>
<td></td>
<td>76.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(77)</td>
<td>(46)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$\chi^2 = 4.02, \text{ DF}=1, \text{ p}<.05$

The finding for this category is not a surprise. Statements given by politicians are bound to contain figures and sums. Actually, the surprise may be in the fact that most pro-government politicians or state officials do not mention quantities when they talk about refugees or forced migrants. This may question their capacity to design policies in touch with the real situation of migrants as well as to follow up on the implementation of these policies. No wonder then that the lawmakers adopted in 1993 the laws on refugees and forced migrants known for their vague or contradictory provisions, which led to a messy implementation, in particular a chronic underfunding of the FMS. In light of the controversy around the actual number of refugees and forced migrants in Russia, the disbandment of the FMS and the allegations of fraud made vis-à-vis its past directors, neither the 1997 Refugee Act nor the 1995 Forced Migrant Act seems to have improved this situation.
My/oni (we/they)

This category is made up of all the forms of we and they. There are 18 collocations (14.6%) which make reference to the we/they category in the sample. Out of 23 texts, 9 have such collocations. The reader may understand this category in several ways. For example, this distinction could mean we, the government and they, the refugees and forced migrants. Or, it could refer to we, the Russian citizens and they, the refugees and forced migrants, although the latter are in theory actual or would-be Russian citizens. In this case, it could be we, the Russian citizens and they, the refugees and displaced Russian citizens.

As shown in Table 4.29, this distinction seems to be drawn more by government officials and pro-government figures than opposition members. Nothing indicates in the data which of the two possible explanations applies here.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>My/oni</th>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Pro-Government</th>
<th>Opposition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td></td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>76.7</td>
<td></td>
<td>90.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(43)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(80)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$\chi^2 = 3.94; \ DF=1; p<.05$

According to Table 4.30, media control does not seem to be a factor in the occurrence of the we/they theme in collocations.
Table 4.30 Collocations with *Myoni* vs. Media Control

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Verbs</th>
<th>Government/Pre-Government</th>
<th>Independent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>15.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>85.7</td>
<td>84.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(77)</td>
<td>(46)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$\chi^2 = 0.02; \ DF=1; \ n.s.$ (p>.05)

The presence of this theme in the collocations, in particular those drawn from pro-government or state official statements, insinuates the particular place that politicians are ready to grant to refugees and forced migrants in the Russian society. One should note that almost half of the collocations with the we/they theme contain the phrase forced migrant(s). In other words, the status of forced migrant, which may be granted to Russian citizens, tends to exclude a displaced Russian citizen from the Russian "we". The presence of such a theme in the political discourse may be compared with the limited rights given in the legislation to refugees and forced migrants and the reduced assistance (compared to the 1993 laws) offered to them to integrate into society.

*Pomoshch* (assistance)

This category includes all the forms of assistance (food, funds, housing, health care, etc.) afforded to refugees and forced migrants. Units classified in this category were found in 18 collocations (14.6%) scattered among in seven texts. This is the only new category with a clear humanitarian dimension.

According to Table 4.31, opposition members make slightly more references to assistance than government officials and pro-government figures. There may be two
conflicting explanations for that. First of all, opposition members may find that the
government does not help refugees and forced migrants enough. Or, they may criticize
the government’s over-spending on assistance provided to these people.

Table 4.31 Collocations with Pomoshch’ vs. Political Orientation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pomoshch’</th>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Pro-Government</th>
<th>Opposition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td></td>
<td>18.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>93.0</td>
<td>81.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(43)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(80)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$\chi^2 = 3.14; \ DF=1; \ n. \ s. \ (p>0.05)$

The question of assistance seems to slightly polarize media as indicated in Table
4.32. Independent media are slightly more likely to feature collocations mentioning the
assistance theme.

Table 4.32 Collocations with Pomoshch’ vs. Media Control

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pomoshch’</th>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Pro-Government</th>
<th>Independent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td></td>
<td>17.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>87.0</td>
<td>82.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(77)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(46)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$\chi^2 = 0.45; \ DF=1; \ n. \ s. \ (p>0.05)$

The results for this category should qualify those of the previous category,
we/they. Indeed, even though refugees and forced migrants may not enjoy the same rights
as full-fledged Russian citizens, Russian politicians seem to recognize their need for
some assistance. In this regard, both laws on refugees define the various forms of
assistance afforded to the eligible individuals, although the mid-1990s reforms reduced the amount of assistance.

_Zakon (law)_

There are 17 collocations (13.8%) with mention of this category scattered in four texts of the sample. Surprisingly, opposition members are the ones who link the refugee/forced migrant issue to the law more than government members or pro-government figures. Again, one can imagine more than one possible explanation. The opposition may express its satisfaction with the law, which would seem unexpected, may demand a reform of the law or may criticize the manner in which the government enforces it. A closer look at the collocations indicates that opposition members tend to criticize the enforcement of the law.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Zakon</th>
<th>Government Pro-Government</th>
<th>Opposition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>17.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>93.00</td>
<td>82.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(43)</td>
<td>(80)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$\chi^2 = 2.59; \ DF=1; \ n.\ s.\ (p>.05)$

Government media appear more likely to tie the refugee/forced migrant issue to the law.
Table 4.34 Collocations with Zakon vs. Media Control

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Zakon</th>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Pro-Government</th>
<th>Independent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>80.5</td>
<td></td>
<td>95.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(77)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(46)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$\chi^2=5.54;\ DF=1;\ p<.02$

Despite the presence of this theme in only four texts, a few remarks may be worth making. The fact that opposition members are more likely to associate the refugee/forced migrant issue with the law may reflect the situation that prevailed in Russia until Vladimir Putin introduced his dictatorship of the law. The Duma would adopt laws that would contradict others, be too vague or whose implementation the government found it hard to finance. For instance, many refugees were detained as the militia would not accept the identity documents issued by the FMS. Likewise, the FMS never received enough resources to process claims in the time frame required by the law. Therefore, a reference to the law by a pro-government or a state official may not have had the exemplary value as it has in today's Russia.

The presence of such a theme in the 1990s Russian political discourse may have found an echo in the amended Refugee Act and Forced Migrant Act. Thus, as illustrated in Chapter 3, the lawmaker tried to improve the value of the law by removing a number of contradictions, thoroughly describing procedures and clearly matching the tasks to adequate state bodies.
Priznanie (recognition)

This last category consists of all the units referring to the granting of the refugee or forced migrant status. It is present in 15 collocations (12.2%) scattered in four texts of the sample. This new theme can also be understood as a dependence on the government. Refugees and forced migrants must be recognized so by the government, which means at the same time that the government may cancel this recognition in circumstances defined in the legislation.

According to Table 4.35, opposition members tend to mention this aspect more often than government officials and pro-government figures. One explanation may be that opposition members comment on how the Federal Migration Service grants the refugee or forced migrant status.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priznanie</th>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Pro-Government</th>
<th>Opposition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td></td>
<td>17.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>97.7</td>
<td></td>
<td>82.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(43)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(80)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\( \chi^2 = 6.00; \ DF=1; \ p < .02 \)

Government-controlled media are the only ones to make reference to recognition in their publications on refugees and forced migrants.
The recognition of the refugee or forced migrant issue is a marginally significant theme in the Russian political discourse on refugees and forced migrants since it is found in four texts only. The significant presence of the government and law categories in the same discourse suggests that the government relying on the law is at the centre of the recognition process. In this regard, Russia does not differ from other countries with a refugee determination system based on the United Nations Convention and Protocol.

**Conclusion**

The thematic new category group features themes that are more present in collocations with refugees and forced migrants than the hypotheses categories. The context analysis reveals the strongest relationship between refugees/forced migrants and the government. This characteristic is confirmed by the large number of occurrences of the law and recognition themes. In other words, refugees and forced migrants seem to be first and foremost political issues, and only partially security issues as the frequency of the Southern Russian category indicates. Another finding of the context analysis pertains to the dependence of refugees and forced migrants on the government and the distinction
between Russians citizens, and refugees and forced migrants. In the Russian political
discourse, refugees and forced migrants would receive a limited, conditional and
temporary membership in the Russian society from the government. This translates into a
law with restrictions on the eligibility to refugee and forced migrant statuses, a temporary
granting of both statuses, and a permanent requirement to report to the authorities.
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

At the heart of this study were two hypotheses. First of all, the Russian Federation would have toughened its legislation on refugees and forced migrants as they would consider these migrants as threats to Russia’s national security. Secondly, changes in the legislation could have been influenced by the struggle between the "Westernophile" and the Eurasianist school of thoughts.

The text analysis of the three themes of the security category group revealed that the categories Ugroza and Zashchita/oborona are the most frequent ones mentioned in the texts of the sample. While government and pro-government figures appear more likely to mention the Ugroza theme than opposition members, references to the Zashchita/oborona theme do not appear to be influenced by the political orientation of the speaker or writer. With respect to media control, independent media appear more likely to mention both themes than government-controlled media. As for the Neotlozhnost’ theme, its small number of occurrences show that actions in the field of refugees and forced migrants are not described publicly as an emergency.

The context analysis of the category group on securitization confirms the findings of the text analysis. Both Ugroza and Zashchita/oborona categories are the most frequently represented of this category group in texts and in collocations. Furthermore, government officials and pro-government figures appear slightly more likely to mention these themes when they talk about refugees and forced migrants.

These results demonstrate that the securitization, as defined by scholars of the
School of Copenhagen, of the refugee and forced migrant issues in Russia is not complete since the emergency dimension is relatively absent from the Russian political discourse on these issues.

With respect to the category group on identity, the text analysis showed that the Sobornost' category is the most common one in this group. However, overall this group has a smaller number of occurrences than the category group on security.

The context analysis produced a surprising result. Not only is the Sobornost' category the most frequent of the category group on identity in collocations, but also the most common of all the hypotheses categories in collocations while it was ranked third in the text analysis. In particular, Sobornost' seems to be a dimension that politicians, regardless of their orientation, include in their speeches or writings on refugees and forced migrants. Interestingly, this trend seems to be publicized most of the time by independent media. The reader should note that the other categories of the identity group have negligible occurrences.

Thus, among the themes developed for this study, threat, protection/defense and communality appear to be the most significant themes that Russian politicians mention when they address the issue of refugees and forced migrants. At least two explanations are possible. On the one hand, the massive arrival of refugees and forced migrants may be perceived as a threat to the preservation of the Sobornost' principle in Russian society. On the other, the communality principle would be a response to the threat posed by refugees and forced migrants to Russian society.

The context analysis of the "new" categories adds a nuance to the finding on
threat, protection/defense and communality. Thus, it reveals that the strongest relationship is between refugees/forced migrants and the government. This characteristic is confirmed by the large number of occurrences of the law and recognition themes as well as the plural category. According to the results of the syntactic group of categories, refugees and forced migrants tend to be referred to as targets or objects of an action. In sum, refugees and forced migrants seem to be first and foremost a state issue, and by extension a political issue. The first chapter made reference to a continuum developed by Orietta Perni according to which issues evolve from non-politicized through politicized to securitized (Perni Oct. 2001). The main conclusion of this study can be based on this continuum. The Russian political discourse on refugees and forced migrants has reached the “politicized” stage, but not the “securitized” yet.

However, more recent developments in Russia show that this discourse is evolving. Thus, in a 17 May 2000 ukaz, President Putin ordered the disbandment of the Federal Migration Service which had been founded in 1993 (Radio Rossii 11 July 2000). Its functions were transferred to the Ministry for Federation Affairs, and the Nationalities and Migration Policies (Id. 11 July 2000). According the independent Russian newspaper Nezavisimaya Gazeta (NG), the FMS was plagued by corruption and embezzlement, especially when its chief was Tat'yana Regent (Avrapetova 9 June 2000).

Aleksandr Blokhin was appointed as the minister for federation affairs and national and migration policies in January 2000 (IEWS 15 June 2000). Former secretary of the Supreme Soviet's committee on the development of local government, he then became the director of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs department on regional relations
and finally served as ambassador to Azerbaijan (Loc. cit.). Mr. Blokhin is described as a politician loyal to President Putin (Loc. cit.).

According to Mr. Blokhin, its ministry had to carry out several priority tasks in the field of refugees and forced migrants, namely a census of migrants, an analysis of available state resources, and the creation of a unified database on forced migrants, guest workers and refugees from "hot spots" (Belasheva 26 July 2000).

In October 2001, President Putin decided to dissolve the Nationalities and Migration Ministry and transfer the refugee and forced migrant portfolio to the Interior Ministry (Abdullaev 4 Apr. 2002).

In February 2002, President Putin issued a decree establishing the Federal Migration Service (FMS) within the Interior Ministry (Abdullaev 4 Apr. 2002; RFE/RL Newsline 27 Feb. 2002).

The Service is headed by Colonel General Andrei Chernenko who acts also as a deputy interior minister (Abdullaev 4 Apr. 2002). Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty indicates that Col.-Gen. Chernenko has spent his entire career with the state security organs (6 June 2002). With an academic background in journalism, Andrey Chernenko worked in 1995 as a deputy minister for nationalities and regional policy and director of the information and public communications directorate of the Interior Ministry (Popova 27 Feb. 2002). In 1998, Chernenko was appointed as deputy minister of interior in charge of personnel (Loc. cit.). Before his February 2002 appointment, Chernenko headed the Federal Service of State Messengers (Loc. cit.).

According to Col.-Gen. Chernenko, the FMS has three priorities: control of
migration flows, regulation of work-related migration and the question of refugees/forced migrants (Prima News 3 Apr. 2002). Speaking on the tasks of the FMS, President Putin insisted on “work[ing] for securing the inflow of qualified cadres, which Russia needs“ (RFE/RL Newsline 27 Feb. 2002). Its mandate also includes the coordination of the implementation of immigration policies by federal and regional branches of the Interior Ministry, the preparation of legislation on the problem of refugees and displaced persons and the process of refugee and forced migrant claims (RFE/RL Newsline 27 Feb. 2002).

In 2001, the Interior Ministry granted refugee status to 236 persons, a figure in line with the decline from 277 persons in 2000, 382 in 1999, 510 in 1998 and 5,751 in 1997 (USCR 2002).

In late 2001, the Interior Ministry had reportedly no clear procedure as to refugee status determinations (Loc. cit.). Inefficient bureaucracy prevented large numbers of asylum seekers from gaining access to asylum procedures during 2001 as well as obtaining identity documents (Loc. cit.). In Moscow, officials reportedly placed asylum seekers on an asylum pre-registration waiting list, but did not issue them identity documents confirming that they were asylum seekers with pending claims (Loc. cit.). Asylum seekers with these documents were not eligible to the basic protections or social benefits guaranteed in the refugee law (Loc. cit.).

Regarding the status of forced migrants, 625,639 individuals with such a status were registered with the Interior Ministry in late 2001, which amounts to a 30 per cent decrease from 880,000 in late 1999 (Loc. cit.). Unnamed observers explained this downward trend by the larger numbers of forced migrants from the far abroad who
acquired Russian citizenship and therefore lost their status (*Loc. cit.*). The US Committee for Refugees notes that the Russian authorities have almost systematically denied displaced ethnic Chechens the forced migrant status despite their eligibility to it pursuant to the Law on Forced Migrants (*Loc. cit.*).

A last remark to conclude this study. As the majority of countries, Russia has been affected by the consequences of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attack on New York. Quickly, the Russian leadership, building on its experiences in Chechnya, joined the efforts to fight terrorism and like many of its foreign counterparts, adopted a security-centred, even security-obsessed rhetoric. In many instances, this rhetoric was translated into tougher legislation on crime and immigration, and restriction of fundamental rights. The Russian political discourse on migration did not avoid this trend. For example, on 21 May 2002, Andrei Chernenko announced that the Interior Ministry was to introduce a new immigration card obligatory for all foreigners permanently residing in Russia (*RFE/RL Newsline* 21 May 2002). The Interior Ministry needs this document to track all movements of foreigners around the country (*Loc. cit.*). On 28 June 2002, Andrei Chernenko stated that illegal immigrants in Russia have formed in some regions "ethnic communities that have begun to displace the indigenous population..." and accused them of "supplying members to criminal organizations" (*RFE/RL Newsline* 1 July 2002).
APPENDIX 1: CORPUS


Rossiiskaya gazeta. 30 September 1999. “Bezhentsy trevozhnogo vremeni.”


APPENDIX 2: RAW DATA


- Featured political figure: Tat'yana Regent, Director of the Federal Migration Service (government)
- Independent media
- Size of the excerpt: 96 words
- Occurrences of themes identified in the text analysis: Ugroza 1 (occurrence)
  Sobornost' 4

- Occurrences of themes identified in the 4 collocations: Plural 4
  Quantity 2


- Featured political figure: Tat'yana Regent (government)
- Independent media
- Size of the excerpt: 364 words
- Occurrences of themes identified in the text analysis: Ugroza 2
  Sobornost' 1

- Occurrences of themes identified in the 4 collocations: Plural 4
  Subject 2
  We/they 2
  Quantity 1


- Featured political figure: Tat'yana Regent (government)
- Independent media
- Size of the excerpt: 785 words
- Occurrences of themes identified in the text analysis: Sobornost' 4

- Occurrences of themes identified in the 2 collocations: Plural 2
  Quantity 1

1st Excerpt
- Featured political figure: Tat'yana Regent (government)
- government media
- Size of the excerpt: 1784 words
- Occurrences of themes identified in the text analysis:
  Ugroza 4
  Zashchita/oborona 3
  Neotlozhnost' 1
  Sobornost' 11

- Occurrences of themes identified in the 11 collocations:
  Sobornost' 2
  Plural 11
  Subject 1
  Quantity 6
  We/they 4
  Law 1
  Southern Russia 1
  Government 3
  Assistance 1

2nd excerpt
- Featured political figure: Zh. M. Lozinskaya (opposition, parliamentary group Power of the People)
- Government media
- Size of the excerpt: 170 words
- Occurrences of themes identified in the text analysis:
  Ugroza 1
  Sobornost' 2

- Occurrences of themes identified in 1 collocation:
  Sobornost' 1
  Plural 1
  Government 2
  We/they 1
  Assistance 1

3rd Excerpt
- Featured political figure: V.S. Nikitin, Communist Party of the Russian Federation (opposition)
- Government media
- Size of the excerpt: 137 words
- Occurrences of themes identified in the text analysis: Zashchita/oborona 1
- Occurrences of themes identified in 0 collocation: n.a.

4th excerpt
- Featured political figure: T.M. Butkeev (Russian Regions parliamentary group, opposition)
- Government media
- Size of the excerpt: 104 words
- Occurrences of themes identified in the text analysis: Zashchita/oborona 3
- Occurrences of themes identified in 0 collocation: n.a.

5th excerpt
- Featured political figure: N.G. Bindyukov (Communist Party of the Russian Federation, opposition)
- Government media
- Size of the excerpt: 47 words
- Occurrences of themes identified in the text analysis: Sobornost' 1
- Occurrences of themes identified in 1 collocation: Plural 1
  Law 1

6th excerpt
- Featured political figure: G. I. Raikov (Russian Regions parliamentary group, opposition)
- Government media
- Size of the excerpt: 63 words
- Occurrences of themes identified in the text analysis: None
- Occurrences of themes identified in 1 collocation: Singular 1
  Recognition 1

7th excerpt
- Featured political figure: Y. I. Poldnikov (Communist Party of the Russian Federation, opposition)
- Government media
- Size of the excerpts: 972 words
- Occurrences of themes identified in the text analysis: Ugroza 12
  Zashchita/oborona 1
  Sobornost' 1
- Occurrences of themes identified in 10 collocations: Ugroza 1
  Plural 10
Informatzionnyi kanal Gosudarstvennoi Dumy RF. 11 March 1997. Dnevnoe zasedanie. «Stenogramma plenarnogo zasedaniya gosudarstvennoi dumy RF»

1st excerpt
- Featured political figure: Zh. M. Lozinskaya Zh. M. (Power of the People parliamentary group, opposition)
- Government media
- Size of the excerpt: 1989 words
- Occurrences of themes identified in the text analysis: 
  - Zashchita/oborona 3
  - Sobornost' 4
  - nezavisimost' 1

- Occurrences of themes identified in 42 collocations: 
  - Sobornost' 2
  - Zashchita/oborona 1
  - Plural 30
  - Singular 12
  - Subject 2
  - Recognition 12
  - Law 30
  - Government 12
  - Assistance 6
  - We/they 5

2nd excerpt
- Featured political figure: S. V. Svinin (Communist Party of the Russian Federation, opposition)
- Government media
- Size of the excerpt: 28 words
- Occurrences of themes identified in the text analysis: none
- Occurrences of themes identified in 1 collocation: 
  - Plural 1
  - Recognition 1

3rd excerpt
- Featured political figure: A. N. Mikhailov (Communist Party of the Russian Federation,
opposition)
- Government media
- Size of the excerpt: 75 words
- Occurrences of themes identified in the text analysis:  
  Ugroza 1  
  Sobornost' 1

- Occurrences of themes identified in 1 collocation:  
  Ugroza 1  
  Sobornost' 1  
  Plural 1  
  Singular 1  
  Southern Russia 1

4th excerpt
- Featured political figure: Y. P. Kuznetsov (Liberal Democratic Party of Russia,  
opposition)
- Government media
- Size of the excerpt: 109 words
- Occurrences of themes identified in the text analysis:  
  Sobornost' 3

- Occurrences of themes identified in 1 collocation:  
  Plural 1

Korochenko, Igor. 31 August 2001. “Moskva i dal'she budet podderzhivat' opolchentsev.”  
[Accessed 22 June 2002]

- Featured political figure: Vladimir Putin (prime minister)
- Independent media
- Size of the excerpt: 534 words
- Occurrences of themes identified in the text analysis:  
  Ugroza 8  
  Zashchita/oborona 5  
  Neotlozhnost' 1  
  Sobornost' 1

- Occurrences of themes identified in 1 collocation:  
  Ugroza 1  
  Plural 1


- Featured political figure: Gennadii Onishchenko (first deputy health minister)
- Government media
- Size of the excerpt: 214 words
- Occurrences of themes identified in the text analysis:  
  Zashchita/oborona 14  
  Ugroza 17
- Occurrences of themes identified in 5 collocations:  
  Plural 5  
  Southern Russia 4  
  Quantity 1  
  Assistance 2  
  We/they 2

Orlov, Pyotr. 10 September 1999. “Gostepriimstvo khorosho, no i zakon nuzhen.”  

- Featured political figure: Yurii Biragov (first deputy director of the Federal Migration Service)  
- Government media  
- Size of the excerpt: 48 words  
- Occurrences of themes identified in the text analysis: none

- Occurrences of themes identified in 1 collocation:  
  Plural 1  
  Government 1  
  Recognition 1


- Featured political figure: Sergey Khetagurov (director the Federal Migration Service)  
- Independent media  
- Size of the excerpt: 930 words  
- Occurrences of themes identified in the text analysis:  
  Ugroza 10  
  Zashchita/oborona 5  
  Sobornost' 2

- Occurrences of themes identified in 9 collocations:  
  Ugroza 2  
  Sobornost' 2  
  Plural 9  
  Law 2  
  We/they 2  
  Southern Russia 2  
  Quantity 2  
  Government 1

- Featured political figure: Ruslan Aushev (President of Ingushetia, opposition)
- Independent media
- Size of the excerpt: 1398 words
- Occurrences of themes identified in the text analysis:
  - Ugroza10
  - Zashchita/oborona 3
  - Neotlozhnost' 4
  - Sobornost'

- Occurrences of themes identified in 8 collocations:
  - Ugroza 1
  - Zashchita/oborona 1
  - Plural 8
  - Subject 2
  - Quantity 1
  - Southern Russia 4
  - Assistance 2
  - We/they 1


- Featured political figure: Dmitrii Rogozin (Duma member, deputy chair of the committee on nationalities, president of the Congress of Russian Communities, pro-government)
- Independent media
- Size of the excerpt: 2504 words

- Occurrences of themes identified in the text analysis:
  - Ugroza 46
  - Zashchita/oborona 26
  - Traditsii 14
  - Sobornost' 4
  - nezavisimost' 6

- Occurrences of themes identified in 5 collocations:
  - Ugroza 1
  - Zashchita/oborona 1
  - Plural 5
  - Southern Russia 6
  - Quantity 1
  - Government 1
Rossiiskaya gazeta. 30 September 1999. “Bezhentsy trevozhnogo vremeni.”

- Featured political figure: Valentina Matvienko (deputy prime minister)
- Government media
- Size of the excerpt: 33 words
- Occurrences of themes identified in the text analysis:
  
  Ugroza 2
  Zashchita/oborona 1

- Occurrences of themes identified in 1 collocation:
  
  Ugroza 1
  Zashchita/oborona 1
  Plural 1
  Southern Russia 1
  Government 1
  We/they 1


- Featured political figure: Ruslan Aushev (President of Ingushetia, opposition)
- Independent media
- Size of the excerpt: 713 words
- Occurrences of themes identified in the text analysis:
  
  Ugroza 11
  Zashchita/oborona 7
  Traditsii 1
  Sobornost' 1

- Occurrences of themes identified in 7 collocations:
  
  Plural 5
  Singular 1
  Assistance 2
  Government 3
  We/they 2
  Quantity 1


- Featured political figure: Gennadii Zyuganov (Communist Party of the Russian Federation, opposition)
- Independent media
- Size of the excerpt: 506 words
- Occurrences of themes identified in the text analysis:
  - Ugroza 2
  - Zashchita/oborona 5
  - Traditsii 3
  - Sobornost' 17

- Occurrences of themes identified in 8 collocations:
  - Zashchita/oborona 2
  - Sobornost' 5
  - Plural 8
  - Singular 1
  - Assistance 4
  - Law 2
  - Government 2
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3. IMMIGRATION

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_____ 21 November 1997. Utrennee zasedanie. «Stenogramma plenarnogo zasedaniya gosudarstvennoi dumy RF»

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5. RUSSIAN IDENTITY


