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CONDITIONS FOR SECURITY REGIME DEVELOPMENT
IN POST-COLD WAR INTERACTIONS:
RUSSIA AND UKRAINE

by

NATALIE LUBA MYCHAJLYSZYN, B.A. (Hons.)

A thesis submitted to
the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfilment of
the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

Norman Paterson School of International Affairs

Carleton University
Ottawa, Ontario

October 22, 1993

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The undersigned hereby recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research acceptance of this thesis, submitted by NATA
LIE LUBA MYCHA
JLYSZYN, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

Maureen Appel Molot, Director
The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs

Professor B. Tomlin, Supervisor
Abstract

Security regimes in the international system have developed between states and in regions in order to manage and prevent conflict. However, it is understood that the right conditions must exist in order for a security regime to develop. Of growing interest and concern in the field of international security is the interaction between Russia and Ukraine. The relations between these two largest of the former republics of the Soviet Union have deteriorated since the abortive coup attempt in August 1991 over such disputed issues as territorial claims, distribution of the Black Sea Fleet, protection of ethnic minority rights, and the pace of nuclear dismantlement. The reinforcing impact of these disputes has worked to develop the situation into one that potentially threatens regional security and stability. This thesis examines the extent to which the conditions necessary for security regime formation are present in the interaction between Russia and Ukraine.
Acknowledgements

I would like to acknowledge Professors Brian Tomlin and Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone for their supervision and advice during the thesis process.

I would also like to acknowledge my family, friends, and, especially, Dennis for their continued support and understanding.
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Chapter One

1. Introduction

The end of the Cold War has profoundly disrupted the international system and has introduced new challenges for the security community. For a period of almost fifty years, the study of international security in the West was preoccupied with the threat posed by the Soviet Union. However, the entire regional Soviet Communist system that commanded all of eastern Europe and Russia fell victim to changes in the international political economy, to its own imperfections and corruption, to nationalist forces, and disappeared, seemingly overnight. The East-West confrontation was relegated to the history textbooks. The period of euphoria and celebration that accompanied the end of the Cold War was brief, however. A new enemy in the form of uncertainty and instability has replaced the Soviet empire and the old international system, built to contain communism, was no longer relevant. As a result of these changes, western security scholars are now challenged to examine, to understand, and to explain the new forces at play.

To meet this challenge and to help manage the new reality, there has been an increased search for theories that would explain the new situation. Existing theories are modified and new ones are developed. In the process, an interesting question has arisen regarding the utility of security research conducted during the Cold War. In particular, one wonders whether these theories can be applied to situations of conflict in the post-Cold War era.
The concept of security regimes in the international system is one such theory that evolved during the Cold War period. Nurtured by such scholars as Robert Jervis, Alexander George, and Janice Gross Stein, the security regime was viewed as a tool for conflict management and prevention. The theory postulates that security relations between adversaries are regulated on the basis of a set of principles and norms in an effort to build confidence and resolve disputes in a peaceful manner. As a Cold War theory, it is an appropriate candidate for renewed interest in its applicability and bridging qualities regarding old theories and new situations.

The post-Cold War era has been dominated by new situations, new actors, and new conflicts. However, no event demonstrates the new challenges facing the security community more accurately than does the collapse of the Soviet Union and its consequences. One consequence in particular has been the subject of growing concern and interest to the field of international security - the interaction between Russia and Ukraine. Since the abortive coup attempt against President Mikhail Gorbachev in August, 1991, tensions between these two largest of the former republics of the Soviet Union have grown over various issues at dispute, including territorial claims, the division of the Black Sea Fleet and of the former Soviet military forces, and the pace of nuclear dismantlement. The mutually reinforcing events of the impact of these disputes have worked to develop into a potentially threatening security situation which may affect the stability of the whole region.

An interesting research question is thus raised on viewing the interaction between Russia and Ukraine through the prism of security regime theory. It must be
stated at the outset that a security regime as defined above does not exist currently between Russia and Ukraine. But it is of great interest in the context of the testing of the security regime theory whether a prerequisite set of conditions or circumstances exist in Russo-Ukrainian relations in order for a security regime to develop. Therefore, our research question focuses on the potential for a security regime developing in the interaction between Russia and Ukraine. This thesis undertakes an examination of the conditions for security regime formation and the extent to which these may exist in the interaction between Russia and Ukraine, in order to assess the potential for the development of a security regime between these two countries. Thus, this thesis will focus on the following research question:

Do the conditions necessary for the formation of a security regime exist in the relations between Russia and Ukraine, and to what extent?

The conditions which need to be present may be summarized as follows: 1.) mutual interests of high value, 2.) mutual responsiveness, 3.) shared desire to curb the security dilemma, 4.) political leadership, 5.) high costs of warfare, 6.) no advantage to defecting, 7.) great powers must want a security regime, and 8.) a decomposability of the issues.

The present Chapter will provide a comprehensive examination of the theory of security regimes. In Chapter Two the conditions for security regime formation will be examined and the methodology of the research will be outlined. In Chapter Three the external validity of these conditions will be assessed. This assessment will involve the application of the identified conditions for security regime development to determine their generalizability and their validity.
Chapter Four will analyze the interaction between Russia and Ukraine in terms of the conditions identified in Chapter Two. Our aim there will be to determine whether, amid the disputes that dominate the relations, there are conditions that might indicate the potential for a security regime forming between Russia and Ukraine. In Chapter Five conclusions will be drawn about the prospects for the formation of a security regime between these two former Soviet republics.

The value of this research lies in several areas. First, a preliminary list of conditions for security regime formation will be established, drawn from the theoretical and empirical literature on security regimes. Second, this research is important in the context of determining the applicability of Cold War theories to post-Cold War situations. Third, it offers a framework for examining inter-state relations according to a set of conditions for security regimes.

Certain limitations about the research must also be stated. The research does not imply that any inter-state relation with these conditions present will necessarily lead to the formation of a security regime. It simply identifies the proper conditions under which security regimes may develop. Furthermore, this research is not intended to predict the course of events between the two largest former republics of the Soviet Union. In the end, it merely offers an opportunity to better understand the quality of the interaction between Russia and Ukraine, within the context of security regime theory.
II. Theory of Security Regimes

Because the conditions for security regime formation are the focus of this research, it is essential that the concept of security regimes be firmly understood. This section will explore the characteristics, the objectives, and the development of regimes in the international system. The analysis will undertake to show the importance for an interaction to have the proper set of security regime conditions by linking these elements of a security regime to the appropriate condition. The security regime is but one type of international regime featuring the specific issue of security in its dynamics and the rather limited attention paid to the study of security regimes in the literature means that this analysis will necessarily draw from the more comprehensive body of literature on international regimes.

Security regimes have been defined as "those principles, rules and norms that permit nations to be restrained in their behaviour in the belief that others will reciprocate. This concept implies not only norms and expectations that facilitate cooperation, but a form of cooperation that is more than the following of short-run self-interest." They are structured forms of cooperation among state-actors on a security issue based on specific codes of conduct, governed by well-defined rules and principles formally accepted by the concerned parties. This definition reflects the security regime's membership in the family of international regimes. In their most basic form, international regimes have been commonly defined as "implicit, or explicit, principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area." The principles of a regime are
identified as the beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude; norms are the standards of
behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations; rules are the specific
prescriptions or proscriptions for action; and decision-making procedures are the
prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice. 4

In essence, regimes are one of many variables determining the behaviour of
states in international relations. A comprehensive security regime manages the entire
security relationship between states, while a partial regime manages one issue in an
conflictual interaction. Examples of these issues include confidence-building
measures, self-help conflict regulation, multilateral arms control, and crisis
management and prevention. 5

The characteristics of international regimes are broad and ambiguous to reflect
the broad and ambiguous results of studies on regimes. Theorists have emphasised
various aspects of the concept of international regimes. For instance, some argue
that regimes and international relations are one and the same, while others contend
that regimes are distinct from general international conduct on the premise that
principles and norms influence state behaviour. Still others argue that regimes are
not necessarily forms of cooperation or institutions, nor do they affect order and
stability because they are simply a "conjunction of convergent expectations and
patterns of behaviour or practice." 6 A regime can also be characterized by a sense of
pleasure and satisfaction from acting on the basis of converged expectations;
however, it has been cautioned that this characterization may serve to overemphasize
the importance of convergent expectations as part of regimes. 7 At the same time,
regimes have also been characterized as institutions. Indeed, regimes characterized as such encompass a set of rights and entitlements and behavioral prescriptions that are often the essence of institutions. Given that international regimes are shaped by recognized practices consisting of easily identifiable roles, coupled with collections of rules or conventions governing relations among the occupants of these roles, it is not surprising that they have been characterized as institutions.¹⁸

The literature on security regimes has assigned several additional characteristics to security regimes. This wide, yet consensual assortment of characterizations may include stability, interdependence among parties and across policy issues,⁹ collective expectation of what constitutes permissible and impermissible behaviour,¹⁰ an expected payoff calculation,¹¹ a mutual acceptance of the norm of non-intervention,¹² and a tripwire to indicate a violation of regime rules.¹³

The character of security regimes is unique in comparison with other issue-specific international regimes, and for good reason. From one perspective, security itself is necessary before one may seek other values. At the same time, security is an area where a small mistake can lead to devastating results.¹⁴ "Not only is security the most highly valued goal because it is a prerequisite for so many things, but the security area is unforgiving."¹⁵ As a result, security regimes have a distinct nature as they reflect such critical challenges to security as the indistinguishability of offensive and defensive motives, greater competitiveness, the involvement of higher stakes, and the higher degree of uncertainty as a result of the difficulty in detecting defections.¹⁶
At the same time, it is interesting to note that security regimes have not commonly featured an institutional character. This may explain in part the lack of attention that is paid to the study of security regimes.

The previous characteristics of security regimes reflect the conditions under which a security regime forms. For instance, a mutual acceptance of the norm of non-intervention would not be possible without the condition that mutually compatible values are present in the interaction. By the same token, a regime characterized by an expected payoff calculation and a tripwire to indicate a violation of regime rules develops out of conditions reflecting no payoff advantage in defections and mutual responsiveness.

Following its unique characteristics, the primary objective of security regimes is unique in its purpose to manage and prevent armed conflict. The literature on security regimes has examined several angles of this objective. Prominent among these features have been the control of a security dilemma, the promotion of de-escalatory measures, the coordination of interdependent decision-making, the regularization of new patterns of behaviour and expectations, the creation of a stable and predictable environment, and the management of state conduct. Other benefits of security regimes identified in the literature include lessening tensions, reducing uncertainty, limiting the anticipated harmful effects of unrestrained competition, diffusing arms races, preventing crisis instability, constraining opportunities for use of military force, and ending interstate and intrastate
conflict. The weight of conflict management as an objective of security regimes is demonstrated in the following criticism:

"that we have failed to capture the nuances and subtleties of the benefits conferred by informal security regimes, and that if a 'regime' can address the twin perils of detection and defection, so endemic in international security, it can be a creative tool both in the analysis and the improvement of conflict management."

Similar to characteristics, these objectives of security regimes also reflect the importance of having the proper conditions in order to form a security regime. In particular, the strength of political leadership is critical to preventing crisis instability and the management of state conduct. At the same time, a shared desire to curb the security dilemma is a condition for controlling the security dilemma, limiting the anticipated harmful effects of unrestrained competition, and diffusing arms races.

This treatment of objectives leads into an examination of how security regimes function to manage conflict. The methods used by security regimes to realize these objectives are similar to those generally employed by international regimes. Indeed, there have been various approaches to the study of international regimes and their functions. One approach focuses on the regime as a function of utility maximizing states, whose power interests determine the behaviour of states in international relations by influencing the regime. This action results in the regime institutionalizing state inequalities where common interests are thus realized at the expense of the weaker states. A regime has also been known to function through voluntary coordination of state behaviour in non-zero-sum situations on the basis of an agreement. This occurs because of the perception maintained by the states in
question that such a regime offers a higher optimal outcome than otherwise available. A regime also functions according to patterns of behaviour which generate convergent expectations and expectations of punishment for defection. This function explains the effects and anticipated consequences of the behaviours of participating states.

Security regimes may arguably function according to a voluntary coordination of behaviour in non-zero-sum situations on the basis of an agreement. One reason for this view is that viable solutions to conflicts between states are approached in an integrative manner. Integrative solutions occur when states involved in a dispute have different priorities and make trade-offs accordingly; a settlement is reached which reflects the interests of both parties. Disputes that are approached in a distributive manner lead to unresolved conflict. The mutual interests of an integrative approach can be significant in determining the principles, rules, norms, and decision-making procedures according to which both states can expect the other to behave. Under the terms of the security regime subsequently developed, it is understood that defection results in punitive action.

Security regimes also function by way of inspecting and monitoring compliance with regime agreements. This serves the purpose of “meet[ing] a significant part of the felt need to protect oneself against future threats, and so make cooperation more feasible.” This function is essential to detecting defections from the security regime’s code of conduct. This function can be realized through monitoring agencies that promote cooperation and deal with verification, enforcement, and non-compliance.
Confidence-building mechanisms are another function of security regimes. These mechanisms have an added feature of creating incentives for future collaboration. Dispute resolution mechanisms are one form of confidence-building mechanisms that may be employed in the security regime, "adopted by the parties to manage any ambiguous behaviour associated with the implementation of their agreements." These mechanisms function by forestalling a resort to the use of force and can build on earlier confidence-building mechanisms. Given that confidence-building mechanisms were earlier identified as an objective, it is clear that they have a multiple role as they can also be a means by which a security regime functions.

Institutions similarly play a multiple role in security regimes. In addition to being a characteristic, they may be also be a function of security regimes. Institutions facilitate the coordination of state behaviour by formulating the procedures by which the principles, rules, norms, and decision making procedures are implemented. It follows that governments must be committed to knowing the rules and procedures of the regime in order to make the institutional function, if applicable, more effective. Indeed, institutions are particularly useful when they bind parties to verification procedures that are "specific, unambiguous, and reciprocal in nature."

The role of institutions in security regimes is particularly applicable in self-help arrangements that seek to limit the influence of external actors. However, situations may exist that require the use of a third party in order to regulate the
behaviours of the participants. Security regimes can function through third parties as they provide credibility to the emerging patterns of the security regime through mediation, confidence-building measures, technical assistance, and diplomatic support. During this process, the actions of the third party reduce incentives for defection.

Security regimes also function to minimize the perceptions of vulnerability by the participating states. This can be accomplished by making guarantees that defection will be detected and punished. Minimizing vulnerabilities may also involve a mutual adjustment of behaviour, implying an element of coordinating and ordering behaviour in order to generate the "norms" of regimes.

In order to be effective, these functions of security regimes must be based on the proper conditions. For instance, security regimes are often based on a contract or a treaty, either multilateral or bilateral, as a method of codifying and regulating the expected behaviour of participating states. Such agreements serve to reduce and avoid competition among the states, remove existing or potential sources of conflict, and reduce the costs and the risk of uncertainties that may lead to conflict. A capability for mutual responsiveness is a condition for the monitoring and confidence-building functions. At the same time, influential third parties must either support the security regime or, at the very least, not take action that would otherwise hinder its functions.

The analysis of the functions of international regimes leads into a review of the processes by which regimes are formed. However, it is important to note the
difficulty in developing security regimes. "Not only are they more difficult to create, they are more fragile, less resistant to change, and more easily destroyed." The literature has attempted to explain their formation based on several factors and, accordingly, the rise of international regimes can occur for a variety of reasons. One explanation points to the development of regimes through the egoistic self-interests of actors determined to maximize one's own utility function. In this instance, the decision to develop a regime is a rational decision that is reached after the calculation of a cost-benefit analysis reveals that cooperation and regime formation is in the interests of the state. The expected outcomes resulting from the coordination of behaviour are more optimal than the outcomes without coordination.

A "prisoners' dilemma" situation provides such incentives for a state to cooperate and collaborate in order to maximize its own interests. The criteria by which the cooperative arrangement is judged to be acceptable is based on the expected results arising from the payoff structure. As has been explained by several authors, the preference ordering for states interacting under these conditions is such that both states will prefer to cooperate rather than the first state defect while the second cooperates, both defect, or the first state cooperate and the second defects. If they both prefer to defect, conflict and confrontation is likely to occur. Thus, cooperation occurring under the prisoner's dilemma is the product of the recognition that security is interdependent.

The power distribution in the international system has also played a theoretical role in the process of regime formation. This explanation is premised on the
concepts of hegemonic power and the process of imposed regimes. A hegemon's behaviour is motivated by an assessment of how certain action taken serves its purposes. An explanation of regime formation based on hegemonic behaviour focuses on the hegemon's capability of manipulating the payoff structure in the system. An essential assumption of this explanation is that this payoff structure is a determining factor of state behaviour. In altering the payoff structure, the hegemon has determined the rules of the game and has influenced the behaviour of other states. Subsequently, the hegemon enforces compliance with these regulations by way of coercion or by providing public goods in an ordered system. The role of a hegemon can also facilitate regime formation by intervening into domestic political reforms and institutionalizing security cooperation with confidence building measures.

In addition to the imposition of regimes by hegemons in the international system, other processes by which regimes are formed have been identified. Bargaining and negotiation is one, while spontaneous development is another. This latter process is prominently featured in regimes that govern such issues as language and the economic market. One interesting attribute of spontaneously developed regimes is the lack of imposing restrictions while benefits are simultaneously generated. International regimes have also developed through usage and custom. Usage implies regular patterns of behaviour based on actual practice, and custom refers to long-standing practice. These two factors work to reinforce those regimes under which state conduct was initially observed for individual interests. As a
result, convergent expectations may arise out of repetitive behaviour and a regime is subsequently formed.

One feature of the development of regimes which must be singled out is that regimes are not necessarily the product of a conscious act.⁴³ In fact, regimes may arise out of a learning process. This process involves the acquisition of new information which subsequently alters beliefs, creates new expectations for behavioral patterns, influences norms and thus points to a move toward regimes. The learning process of regime formation does not occur spontaneously but arises incrementally and reciprocally. At the same time, this introduces a temporal variable in that the learning process and internalization of norms requires a period of time. Similarly, knowledge has also been used to explain the development of regimes. Convergent expectations of behaviour are arrived at as a result of knowledge which "creates a basis for cooperation by illuminating complex interconnections that were not previously understood."⁴⁴ Knowledge can serve as a common guide to policy and to regularize state behaviour if it commands a level of consensus and is widely accepted by decision makers.

The previous processes by which security regimes develop depend on certain conditions. These would include the presence and involvement of a hegemon in order for a regime to be imposed, a treaty or a contract to formalize the agreement arising out of bargaining and negotiations, mutual responsiveness in the form of explicit consent to bargain and negotiate, to learn and to acquire knowledge.
As has already been outlined, the right conditions and the proper set of circumstances must exist in order for a security regime to develop between or among states. In order to assess the prospects for the development of a security regime between Russia and Ukraine, the conditions for the development of a security regime must be identified. This task will be undertaken in Chapter Two.
Chapter 1 - ENDNOTES


4. Ibid., p. 2.


7. Ibid., p. 495.


21. ibid.


24. ibid., p. 459.


31. Haggard and Simmons, "Theories of International Regimes," p. 500.


36. ibid., p. 215.
37. ibid., p. 218.


42. ibid., pp. 15-16.

43. Haggard and Simmons, "Theories of International Regimes," p. 503.


45. Young, "International Regimes," p. 111.

Chapter Two

1. Conditions for Security Regime Formation

The study of the conditions for security regime development suffers from a lack of a readily available registry of those necessary circumstances favouring the development of a security regime. Every scholar of security regimes has employed his or her own inventory of the required tools. As a result, there has been little consensus among scholars about these conditions. The absence of such a registry is not necessarily bad because it allows for continued research and refinement of the conditions. Indeed, some scholars have built on and expanded the conditions used by others. After having reviewed the conditions identified in the theoretical and empirical literature on security regimes, this chapter undertakes to contribute to the research by compiling a list of conditions necessary to the formation of security regimes. The list of conditions catalogued will then serve as a measure against which the specific hypothesis of this thesis can be tested.

In a 1957 research project studying security-communities, Karl Deutsch et al. initiated a preliminary list of conditions essential for the development of a pluralistic security-community. Defining a security-community as "one in which there is real assurance that the members of that community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in some other way," and a pluralistic one involving states who "retain the legal independence of separate governments," the authors of the project looked at historical cases of security-communities dating from before World
War II to determine the circumstances under which these developed. They identified two conditions essential for the formation of a pluralistic security-community.\(^2\)

The first condition was a compatibility of major values relevant to political decision-making. Such compatibility was based on the definition of major values as those which seem to be of major importance in the domestic politics of the units concerned. This means that no value will be considered important in the relations between political units unless it is important within each of them, and is also considered important in their common relations.\(^3\)

As security regimes themselves function to prevent or to reduce the likelihood of conflict between states, it is clear that incompatible goals and values would hinder the development of a security regime. An example of a major value used in the project by Deutsch et al. is the prevention of nuclear war. Although the United States and the Soviet Union advocated contradictory and incompatible political, economic, and social systems, both valued the importance of preventing a nuclear war from occurring. This value was relevant in several instances of political decision-making in Washington and Moscow.

The second condition identified by Deutsch et al. was mutual responsiveness. This condition was defined as a capacity "to respond to each other’s needs, messages, and actions quickly, adequately, and without resort to violence."\(^4\) This capacity was determined by the political and administrative capabilities of the states in question, capabilities which favoured mutual communication and consultation. Although there was a temptation to link a level of
predictability with mutual responsiveness, mutual predictability was another method used by states to respond to each other.

Since the publication of the above study, other scholars have added new theoretical dimensions to the concept of security regime development. Some of these reflected elements found in the conditions laid out by Deutsch while others put forward additional circumstances. Expanding on Deutsch's first condition, several authors focused on the presence of mutual interests in the interaction between states in security regime development. However, there are various interpretations of these interests. Robert Jervis and Janice Gross Stein, for instance, referred to a shared value of mutual security and cooperation. They saw this mutual interest arising out of a common aversion to war and a need to control internal instability. Liisa North and Tim Drahim also mention a mutual aversion to war as a condition influencing the security regime forming in Central America. In fact, they expand this condition further to include regional concerns as a shared interest when the de-escalation of conflict in the area was a common concern.

Charles Lipson added a mutual interest in the future as another condition for security regime development. States come to the realization that interaction with one another is likely to continue and, therefore, place a high value on "the long haul." This compatible value of the future is closely linked to Alexander George's view that the interdependence of states is a mutual interest and an incentive for cooperation. In analyzing the security regime operating between the United States and the Soviet Union, George pointed out that both states were capable of imposing a great amount
of damage onto the security interests of the other state, creating a situation of "tightness" or mutual vulnerability. At the same time, he noted that the more central an issue was in the interaction between the superpowers, the greater was the incentive for the United States and the Soviet Union to cooperate. Therefore, their interdependence was a condition of the security regime which developed between them. Using Lipson's argument, both states had a stake in continuing a cooperative relationship into the future.

Another interest shared by states before developing security regimes was outlined by Fen Hampson who identified the value of maintaining a mutually acceptable status quo as a condition. This factor echoed that of Jervis and Stein who noted that in order to preserve the security regime the states in question must not challenge the status quo and seek security through territorial expansion.

Much like the first condition, the second condition identified by Deutsch, that of mutual responsiveness, was reflected in the theories postulated by other scholars and particularly in Lipson's research on security regimes. Lipson's assertion that states require a capacity to monitor and to react to each others decisions was similar to the explanation used by Deutsch. Applying Deutsch's explanation to that of Lipson, capabilities and communication processes are an integral element of the capacity to monitor and to react to each other's decisions. It is critical to note, however, that where the theory of security regimes refers to their monitoring role, a capability to monitor is required before it can be implemented. Stein explores this condition deeper in her analysis of security regimes and concluded that the detecting
capacity for defections from the principles, rules, and norms of a regime is a critical condition for security regime development.¹³

This review of conditions for security regime formation was further advanced by reviewing other conditions determined since the publication of the 1956 study. One condition in particular that was singled out by several authors was that of a shared desire among the states in question to curb the security dilemma. In particular, George attended to this condition in his assessment of the circumstances under which a security regime formed between the United States and the Soviet Union.¹⁴ A security dilemma describes the interaction between states that is characterized by a high level of suspicion and distrust, a high level of uncertainty and misperception, and an indistinguishability between offensive and defensive forces. Under these circumstances, unilateral action taken by State A to increase its security is perceived by State B as a threat. State B reacts by taking unilateral action to increase its security, which is perceived by State A as a threat. A cycle of action-reaction dominates their interaction and continues until, quite possibly, war erupts.

Other authors incorporated specific elements of the de-escalation of the security dilemma as conditions in empirical studies of security regimes. In analyzing the interaction between Egypt and Israel, Brian Mandell noted the presence of a security dilemma and a desire of the actors to control it as a condition for the formation of a security regime in the period from 1973 to 1979.¹⁵ In particular, a heightened fear of surprise attack due to a close proximity of the adversary's forces
was instrumental to breaking the cycle of action-reaction. Hampson concurred with this observation.16

With respect to the security regime between the United States and the Soviet Union, George expanded on his conditions by noting that unilateral action to meet security threats was perceived by the actors to be insufficient and too expensive. States were therefore motivated to curb the security dilemma to avoid an occurrence of a unilateral action. Jervis also referred to the high risks involved in undertaking unilateral security policies based on distrust and misunderstanding.17

Other elements of the security dilemma have been singled out as reasons for states wanting to curb the spiral. For instance, Lipson, Jervis, and Stein pointed to a failure to distinguish between offensive and defensive forces as a condition for security regime development.18 There is a high risk of misperception involved under these circumstances. Stein's remark that a situation where offensive weapons are less expensive and more accessible than defensive weapons may also be a motivating factor for states wanting to curb the security dilemma and can be viewed as a corollary.19

Since a security regime represents a conflict management system, the opposite of a security dilemma, it is critical that states want to manage their conflict for a security regime to develop. Of course, a security regime is not the only method by which to manage conflict. However, in terms of a security dilemma, conflict is less likely to occur under conditions of trust and confidence, norms and expectations, and rules which govern inter-state conduct - all factors found in a security regime.
Robert Keohane focused on the "demand" aspect of regime formation. He applied micro-economic theory to the question of why regimes form and determined that changes in the characteristics in the international system alter the opportunity costs to actors regarding various courses of action, resulting in a change in behaviour. This change in behaviour disrupts the current supply of regimes and causes a demand for a new regime to regulate the new behaviour of the actors.

Scholars also pointed to effective political leadership as a condition for security regime development. For instance, George contended that top-level leadership commitment and skill influenced the development of the US-Soviet security regime. He listed several functions performed by political leaders in Washington that were critical to achieving a security arrangement with Moscow. These included prioritizing the agenda, ensuring proper management of the policy-making process, deciding what agreements were acceptable, strengthening the adversary’s incentives to cooperate, developing an adequate policy coalition to support decisions, and legitimizing decisions to all segments of the political process.

In looking at the developing security regime in Central America, North and DRAINmin supported George’s assessment of the importance of political leadership. They pointed to the election of new leaders in El Salvador (José Napoleón Duarte), Guatemala (Vinicio Cerezo), and Costa Rica (Oscar Arias) on peace platforms as significant in the formation of a security regime in the region. They maintain that the "regional political leadership changed sufficiently to permit the emergence of a
new correlation of political forces that favoured accommodation and settlement. Stein also notes the importance of political leadership in expressing values of peace.

The high cost of warfare between the actors is another condition examined since Deutsch's study for security regime development. This cost may be perceived by the states during a war or when armed hostilities have not yet taken place. Jervis looked at a situation where a war has not occurred and maintained that war must be perceived as costly before a security regime can develop. He argued that the greater the costs involved in pursuing war against an adversary, the greater an incentive to cooperate. These costs can be measured in several ways and can include the unpredictable and uncontrollable events that occur during a war in addition to predictable domestic economic and social costs of war. George looked at the high fiscal costs of security as an incentive to regulate behaviour among adversaries. According to George, the United States and the Soviet Union experienced fiscal constraints prior to pursuing strategic arms control in the mid-1970s. In particular, the United States was dealing with the costs of the Vietnam War and with the threat of inflation. The Soviet Union was interested in shifting resources from the military to the civilian industries.

The high costs of warfare have also been defined as a "hurting stalemate" that occurs in the process of a war. A hurting stalemate has been described as a perception among the actors that neither stands to make further gains by continuing the conflict. As a result, the costs of continuing the conflict increase. North and Diamin pointed to the presence of a hurting stalemate among the parties.
involved in the war in Central America. This hurting stalemate was realized in the form of high costs of militarization and conflict escalation, a disruption in the social fabric of the population resulting in a significant number of displaced persons, and the impact of the war on the development of the countries. There was also a tangible cost to continuing the war estimated in crop losses, destruction of infrastructure, capital flight, diversion of resources and personnel to military functions, and emigration. In examining the interaction between Egypt and Israel, Mandell also noted the presence of a hurting stalemate as a condition to the development of a security regime. The actors perceived that warfare was no longer a viable method of security. This perception resulted from a recalculation of the costs and benefits of sustaining the conflict in the present form.

From a theoretical perspective, Lipson regarded small differences in the payoffs for cooperation and defection as a condition for security regime development. In particular, he saw cooperation between adversaries to be more likely when unreciprocated cooperation brings acceptable penalties. He made his argument by considering the opposite: "if one player, by defecting, can reap rewards by placing the other player at an immediate and overwhelming disadvantage, then there is little hope for stable, extensive cooperation." As a result, if there is no advantage to defecting, adversaries have a greater incentive to develop a security regime and still receive payoffs. Other scholars attributed a temporal dimension to this argument. Stein, for example, maintained that the benefits of long-term
cooperation must be greater than the benefits of short-term defection in order to provide an incentive to develop a security regime.\textsuperscript{33}

Jervis also identified as a condition for security regime formation that the great powers want a regime.\textsuperscript{33} As influential third parties, it is significant to ensure that the great parties want a regularized environment which conforms to their interests. An underlying facet of this argument is that the powers are satisfied with the status quo.

George added the decomposability of the issues prominent in the interaction between the actors as another condition for the development of security regimes. He argued that breaking up a big problem into smaller components makes the issues more manageable.\textsuperscript{34} As a result, some issues may be easier to resolve when they are considered separate from the bigger picture. "Modest initial successes, in turn, may create incentives, conditions, and procedures for tackling more difficult components later on."\textsuperscript{35} George remarked that the overwhelming process of strategic arms control between the United States and the Soviet Union was managed in this fashion. The decomposability of the issues in the Central American conflict lent itself to the actors arriving at a solution; this was evident in the simplicity of the Central American security arrangement.\textsuperscript{36}

It would be misleading to leave the reader at this point with the impression that the foregoing eight conditions are the only ones referred to in the theoretical and empirical literature on security regimes. Numerous other conditions were put forth by various scholars. Deutsch's study listed several other conditions found in the
development of security-communities. One of these conditions was that there was a balance in gains or a compensation of flows of communication and transactions in some valued service or opportunity made by each territory. This condition was similar to that of expectations of stronger economic ties and may be closely linked with another condition with respect to the superior economic growth of one of the units. Another condition was the broadening of the political, social or economic elite in order to facilitate the process of creating a security-community. The project was also concerned with the mobility of persons among the main political units as a condition for security-community formation. There was also a presence of unbroken links of social communication, either horizontally between the territories or vertically between different social strata. These were found as either ethnic groups or as economic interdependencies. Two other conditions were addressed in the project. These included a wide range and multiplicity of different communications and transactions and a frequent interchange of group roles."

Other scholars have focussed on the role of institutions as a condition for security regime formation. Oran Young, for instance, postulated that institutions are required in order to administer the regulation of behaviours. Treaties have also been included as conditions for security regime formation. In particular, they have been a condition for regimes that develop from bargaining and negotiation and serve as "conscious efforts to agree on their major provisions, explicit consent on the part of individual participants, and formal expression of the results." A hegemon has been presented as another condition for security regime formation. The hegemon imposes
a regime and "overtly and explicitly articulates institutional arrangements and compels subordinate actors to conform to them." The hegemon can also be influential in forming a regime through less overt means, such as through some combination of coercion, cooptation, and manipulation of incentives.  

The role of time as a condition for security regime formation has been in dispute. George, for instance, contended that a sense of time urgency will compel states to cooperate and pursue a security arrangement. On the other hand, Lipson postulated that the luxury of time is a condition for security regime formation and for taking the interaction onto a more cooperative level.  

Having reviewed the conditions identified in the theoretical and empirical literature on security regimes, the analysis will now turn to compiling a list of conditions necessary for the formation of security regimes. This list will then serve as the basis for testing the specific hypothesis.

II. Methodology

This thesis concerns itself with those conditions deemed necessary to the development of security regime formation. The value in compiling a generalized catalogue of conditions for security regime formation is strengthened by focussing on those conditions determined to be essential. As a result, the conditions identified in the preceding section will serve as the basis for developing an initial list of necessary conditions. A test will then be conducted in Chapter Three to determine that those conditions selected are indeed valid and generalizable.
The criteria according to which the conditions will be selected are based on that used in the study by Deutsch et al. In their study, helpful conditions were deemed to be those that were absent when a security-community formed; a condition was considered necessary if a regime did not occur in its absence. Although these criteria revolve around detecting the absence of conditions, the literature on security regimes provides the relevant information and allows the initial cut to be made.

Accordingly, the other ten conditions discovered by Deutsch et al. for security regime development have been determined to be only of a helpful calibre. The empirical and theoretical literature also attests to various instances where regimes have formed in the absence of certain conditions. In arguing that regimes can develop spontaneously, Young claims that hegemons are not a necessary condition for regime formation. Indeed, the states of the Mediterranean Sea formed a regime without the involvement of a hegemon. A hegemon may be helpful in forming a regime in situations where it can alter the payoff structures and manipulate the incentives of others to form a regime.

By the same token, treaties and institutions are also determined to be helpful conditions for regime development. As the results of bargaining and negotiation, treaties serve to formalize the regulation and restraint of behaviour by states that, in fact, may have been ongoing prior to the conclusion of a treaty. At the same time, states who are not party to the treaty may still follow its provisions. While reminding ourselves that not all issues lend themselves to regulation by treaty, a treaty is certainly helpful (and may be strongly recommended) to forming a security
regime between adversaries who display a level of mistrust and consequently require that their behaviour be formally regulated by the terms of a treaty. An institution serves a similar helpful role with respect to formalizing the terms of a regime. Indeed, an institution may be more significant in the functioning of a regime, after it has developed. While institutions are more common in multilateral situations, they are rare in bilateral relations. Since the role of time itself is in dispute as a condition for security regime development, it cannot be considered to be an essential condition.

Through a process of eliminating the above helpful conditions for security regime development, we are left with the following list of conditions:

1.) mutually compatible interests of high value
2.) possession of the capability for mutual responsiveness
3.) shared desire to curb the security dilemma
4.) a political leadership that can effect the necessary policies
5.) appreciation of the high costs of warfare
6.) no advantage to defecting
7.) great powers must want a security regime
8.) decomposability of the issues involved in the conflict

Because these eight conditions have not yet been determined to be either helpful or essential for security regime development, we must first establish their quality. This will be conducted in the next chapter. To do so, each of the above eight conditions
will be examined in the context of security regimes that have already developed. To avoid any bias in the analysis, those security regimes already referred to in the empirical literature, i.e. in Central America, between Egypt and Israel, between the United States and the Soviet Union, will not be considered. These regimes were already accessed as sources for security regime conditions. Furthermore, since this thesis is concerned with examining an interaction for the presence of a pre-determined list of necessary conditions, it is important for the purposes of this thesis to examine security regimes from the same perspective.

As a result, two other security regimes have been selected. These are the security regimes between Finland and the Soviet Union and between Japan and the Soviet Union. These two regimes have been selected based on the specific criterion that they are bilateral. Multilateral security regimes also exist. However, the catalogue of conditions necessary for security regime development is being compiled to examine bilateral security regimes. Furthermore, these two regimes have also been selected for reasons of comparability; the specific interaction addressed in this thesis is between Russia and Ukraine and involves a great power, a smaller power, nuclear weapons, and geographic proximity. Because no security regime exists between Russia and Ukraine, it was necessary to find comparable interactions in order to confidently analyze the hypothesis of this thesis. That the USSR is one of the actors was also a consideration and will provide an interesting comparison with Russia.
It is important to keep in mind while assessing the presence of these conditions in the interaction of Russia and Ukraine, between the Soviet Union and Finland, and between the Soviet Union and Japan that the security regimes between the United States and the Soviet Union, between Egypt and Israel, and in Central America were not comprehensive security regimes. They were instead partial regimes that featured a particular aspect of their conflict. Regardless of whether the outcome is a comprehensive or a partial regime, however, the proper set of circumstances must still exist for a security regime to develop.

The criteria according to which these eight conditions will be determined to be necessary or helpful will not be based on that used in the study by Deutsch. These are not useful at this time because they involve examining failed security regimes. For the purposes of this thesis, the above eight conditions will be considered essential to security regime development if they are found in the interactions between Finland and the Soviet Union and between Japan and the Soviet Union, keeping in mind that they may be simply helpful.

It must also be mentioned that the presence of these conditions will be examined at any time during the interaction. Of course, it is expected that they would be present before the security regime actually develops. However, the process through which a security regime itself forms can occur over a short or long period of time - witness the security regimes between Finland and the Soviet Union and between Japan and the Soviet Union. Finland's security regime with the USSR developed over a span of a decade after the conclusion of World War II. On the
other hand, one may argue that the security regime between Japan and the Soviet
Union developed despite the sporadic appearance of the conditions throughout their
interaction. Ultimately, any of the conditions may become more pronounced during
the period of development and are not necessarily restricted to the period before a
regime has formed.

The presence or absence of each condition will be indicated according to
specific factors. The presence of the first condition, mutually compatible interests of
high value, will be indicated by the compatibility of those states’ security interests
and policies which impact on each other at the time of the interaction. If these
policies allow the other state to realize its security interests, the interests of the states
will be determined to be compatible. The factor indicating the second condition,
mutual responsiveness, will be the presence of political and administrative structures
which allow the states to communicate and consult with each other and are of a
substantive nature to contribute to the development of a security regime. The third
condition, a shared desire to curb the security dilemma, will be present in the
interaction if the security policies of both states restrain the security dilemma and
build confidence in their relations. Based on a clear delineation of power, the
presence of effective political leadership, the fourth condition, will be indicated by
the ability of the political leadership to influence policy and decision-making despite
domestic opposition. The stated perceptions of the political leaders that war against
the other state is of a greater cost than failing to achieve their national interests will
indicate the presence of the fifth condition, the high costs of warfare. The sixth
condition, no advantage to defection, will be present if avenues other than a security regime offer a lower payoff than the payoff for a security regime. The payoffs will be measured according to the amount of security provided without compromising the state’s security interests. A defection will be considered to be an action that places the other state at a disadvantage. The seventh condition, the great powers want a security regime, will be indicated by the presence of action and statements expressing their desire for one to develop in the interaction in question. As one of the superpowers during the Cold War, the United States will be the focus of this condition. The final condition, a decomposability of issues, will be indicated by the number of issues and sub-issues involved in the interactions.

This thesis intends to examine the extent to which the conditions necessary for security regime formation are present in the interaction between Russia and Ukraine. Those conditions of the list of eight that are determined to be necessary in Chapter Three will be applied to the examination of the interaction between Russia and Ukraine in Chapter Four. It is impossible to predict whether or not a security regime will develop between these two former republics of the Soviet Union. However, the thesis can conclude the likelihood of one forming based on the extent to which the necessary conditions are present. At the most basic level, if all the necessary conditions are present, then the likelihood of a security regime forming is better than if none of the conditions existed.

On another level, it is important for the purposes of establishing a catalogue of necessary conditions that a security regime does not currently exist between
Russia and Ukraine. As a result, it may be possible in fact to determine the degree to which those eight conditions are necessary for security regime development. In other words, those conditions that are found in the interaction between Russia and Ukraine ultimately might be helpful conditions if a security regime fails to develop in their interaction.

Thus, the following chapter will examine the interactions between Finland and the Soviet Union and between Japan and the Soviet Union to establish the extent to which the above eight conditions were essential for the development of these security regimes. Although the first two conditions on the list have already been determined to be necessary in the study by Deutsch et al., they will be included in this process and measured against the same criteria as the other six conditions in order to strengthen the analysis and the conclusion.
Chapter 2 - BNDNOTES


2. Ibid., p. 66.

3. Ibid., p. 123.

4. Ibid., p. 66.

5. Ibid., p. 67.


22. Ibid.


31. Ibid.


35. Ibid.


39. ibid., p. 100.

40. ibid.


42. Lipson, "International Cooperation," p. 17.


45. ibid., pg. 365.
Chapter Three

A catalogue of conditions for security regime development is a valuable contribution to the field of international security. However, it is critical to first establish the validity and generalizability of such a list. One can accomplish this by confirming the presence of the identified conditions in security regimes not subjects of previous analysis of security regime formation, from which the identified conditions were drawn. Two security regimes are of particular interest for the purposes of this thesis. They are the Soviet Union and Finland and the Soviet Union and Japan. Despite being bitter enemies, these countries managed their security interests during the Cold War era according to a set of principles, rules, norms, and decision-making procedures. These two cases provide the necessary level of comparability with the interaction between Russia and Ukraine being addressed in this thesis. They, too, involve a great power, a smaller power, nuclear weapons, and geographic proximity. Of special interest is the inclusion of the USSR in the two selected cases and the comparisons with the behaviour of its successor states.

This chapter examines the interactions between the Soviet Union and Finland and between the Soviet Union and Japan for the presence of conditions necessary for the development of their security regimes. The examination will be informed by the conditions for security regime formation as determined in Chapter 2: 1.) mutually compatible interests of high value; 2.) mutual responsiveness; 3.) shared desire to curb the security dilemma; 4.) effective political leadership; 5.) high costs of
warfare; 6.) no advantage to defection; 7.) great powers must want a security regime; 8.) decomposability of the issues.

The goals of this chapter are two-fold. The first goal is to determine that the eight conditions are necessary for the development of security regimes. The second goal is to establish that these conditions are generalizable and can be applied to other cases. These tasks will be based on a formula stating that those conditions are necessary and generalizable if they are present in both cases. In its conclusion, this chapter will have established the validity of these eight conditions and allow for an examination of their presence in the relations between Russia and Ukraine.

I. Condition No. 1

The first condition, mutually compatible interests of high value, was present in both case studies. In the interaction between the Soviet Union and Finland, national security interests were mutually compatible with those of the adversary. Indeed, a more compatible match may be difficult to find. Finland’s security was premised on good relations with the Soviet Union while the USSR’s security was based on sympathetic neighbouring governments, including Finland.

Finland’s national security was based on a foreign policy to develop and maintain Soviet confidence in its northeastern neighbour across ideological boundaries. Finland felt threatened by the Soviet Union’s insecurity and its search for a sphere of influence in the aftermath of World War II. The Helsinki government in 1944 believed that "once the Soviet Union was satisfied that its
primary strategic interests in the direction of Finland were safeguarded, Finland's independence and way of life could be secured. Finns hoped that Finnish security could best be attained by removing the Soviet threat and achieving good relations with the Soviet Union.

The search for Finnish security with respect to the Soviet Union was reflected in increased cooperation with its adversary and refrainment from action perceived by Moscow as hostile to its interests and security. This interest was realized in the 1948 Treaty of Mutual Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between Finland and the USSR. The treaty formalized Finnish sensitivity to Soviet fears of an enemy attack through Finnish territory. Article 1 of the treaty reaffirmed Finland's commitment to defending its territory in the event or threat of a foreign invasion, while Article 2 confirmed Finland's request for assistance from the Soviet Union upon consultations to determine that such a threat exists. In these circumstances it appeared to be in the Finnish as well as the Soviet interest to fix some kind of security arrangement between the two neighbouring countries, which already in peacetime would remove Soviet doubts about Finland's likely behaviour in time of crisis or hostilities in the Nordic region. Finland's vulnerability towards Soviet security concerns regarding the West was a significant reason for Finland declining an invitation to join the Nordic Council in 1952. Finland was aware of the Soviet Union's suspicions that the Nordic Council was a union of the Nordic countries under US leadership. Finland's position on this issue characterized the cautious anticipatory approach adopted by Finnish leaders in the first post-war decade.
in the formation of policy which had a regional Nordic dimension. In other
instances, Helsinki also refused aid from actual or potential enemies of the USSR
and rejected assistance under the Marshall Plan. At the same time, Finland’s security
interests regarding the USSR resulted in a sense of caution if not silence in publicly
opposing Soviet behaviour and policies. This involved self-imposed and sometimes
government-imposed restrictions on free expression in the press, in publishing and
other kinds of communications to avoid irritating Moscow.

The security interests of the USSR were compatible with those of Finland.
The Soviet Union was obsessed with establishing a sphere of influence consisting of
sympathetic, if not allied, governments along its western border. The 1939-1940
Winter War between Finland and the Soviet Union, which continued from 1941 -
1944, demonstrated the threat posed by Finland’s hostility toward Soviet security.
Indeed, at Yalta in 1945, Stalin indicated to the Allies that he would not tolerate
hostile governments on the border with the Soviet Union. Soviet insecurity about an
invasion was based on an absence of natural or permanent borders with its
neighbours, including Finland. By having sympathetic neighbouring countries,
Moscow felt that a Western attack against Soviet territory could be prevented or that
valuable time could be gained in preparation of a counter-attack. The USSR felt
threatened by Finland because it was geographically vulnerable to a direct attack by
its neighbour and also because an adversary could potentially use Finland to launch
an attack against the Soviet Union, as Germany had attempted during World War II.
Furthermore, the Soviet Union was not confident about Finland’s ability to defend
itself against potential aggressors. As a result, Moscow was determined to eliminate such fears by effecting some measure of control over Finland. "One of the more enduring themes in Russian strategic thinking for some centuries has therefore been the belief in the necessity of establishing some control, however, incomplete, over Finland in order to prevent it from becoming a launching-point for an attack on Russia."10 As a result, Moscow established Soviet military bases on Finnish territory, particularly in the Gulf of Finland, and received territorial concessions as part of the peace settlement.11 The 1948 Treaty eliminated a need for a harder policy toward Finland; "Soviet leaders felt assured, especially after 1948, that the soft sphere was workable and that by devices of indirect influence the desired results could be achieved."12

Closely linked to the above interests in national security were the mutually compatible interests in Finland's neutrality. Finland wanted to maintain its neutrality to avoid being drawn into conflicts between the great powers and being their "pawn." With indications soon after the end of the war of an emerging political competition between the United States and the Soviet Union, Finland decided it was not going to get caught in the middle and stepped away from any commitment to either side. For Helsinki, neutrality was defined as Finland avoiding military alliances and staying out of conflicts between the blocs. "Finland as a member of an anti-Soviet alliance would always be in the position of a forward base which, in the event of a conflict, would be the first to be overrun, and yet would not be able to affect the decisions concerning war and peace."13 Finland was concerned about war breaking
out between the West and the Soviet Union, and how the Soviet Union would treat Finland to secure its position."

"The dilemma that the Finns face is that the closer they come in a conflict situation to the Soviet side the more likely it is that they will simply be included in hostile action from the Western side; while on the other hand if the Soviet leaders once feel that there is anything the least unreliable in the Finnish attitude, retaliation from the Soviet side will occur."

Soviet interests in Finland's neutrality were directly linked with its security. The Soviet perception that it was vulnerable to an attack from Finnish territory caused it to take action that ensured Finland would never be under the influence of an adversary. In particular, Finnish neutrality provided some assurance that Finland would not enter into any sort of relations that would make an invasion of the Soviet Union more likely. Indeed, the Soviets emphasised Finnish neutrality under the policy of peaceful co-existence as a means of maintaining the neutrality of the Nordic countries. "Moscow has strived withal, however, to foster an image of a 'reasonable', 'restrained', 'cooperative', and even 'benevolent' great power coexisting with its little neighbour, instead of a dominating, imperialistic, hegemonic 'big brother'".

At the same time, Finland's neutrality was possible because of its secondary position in Moscow's list of priorities. Not only was Finland of secondary importance compared to eastern and central Europe, but Sweden's neutrality on Finland's eastern border served as an additional buffer against foreign invasion. The 1948 Treaty made Finland's position clear. Unlike the harsher and more intrusive terms established with Hungary and Romania, the terms of Helsinki's treaty with
Moscow did not make Finland into a satellite state of the USSR. Although Finland accepted a bilateral arrangement with the Soviet Union, it was not placed directly in the Soviet bloc."

Indeed, Finnish neutrality and the limited military obligations set forth in the 1948 treaty are complementary "for the neutrality of Finland, if it is respected, enhances the Soviet security by reducing dangers and stabilizing the situation on the north west frontier. Finnish neutrality also assures the Soviet Union that her neighbour would offer no encouragement to potential enemy forces expecting aid as they struck at the USSR through Finland." The preamble to the treaty confirmed Finnish desire to remain outside great power conflicts. As a result, the treaty bound the Soviet Union and Finland to preventing an attack of Finland by ensuring its neutrality. Therefore, others had to be convinced not to consider an invasion of Finland because the more credible the neutrality, the less necessary were military commitments.

An analysis of the interaction between Japan and the Soviet Union also reveals the presence of mutually compatible interests of high value. These interests were found in the area of national security and were perceived in a manner compatible with the adversary. After the end of World War II, Japan’s security was pursued through a policy of withdrawal. The post-war government minimized its involvement in international politics and, instead, concentrated on rebuilding Japan’s economy, thereby separating politics from economics." "The Japanese developed an attitude which assumed that nothing could happen to the country if the nation kept a low
profile, and concentrated on economic issues." Japan was in a position to pursue this policy because the United States assumed responsibility for Japanese national security. By maintaining a US presence in the region and a US commitment to a global market economy, Japan's security was assured. "Comprehensive security was a sensible policy for a highly vulnerable state with a superpower protector and a limited military establishment constrained by constitutional prohibitions against overseas deployments."

The security interests of the Soviet Union were compatible with those of Japan in the period after World War II. Moscow's security interests were primarily focused in Europe, and not in Asia. Indeed, bilateral relations with Japan were a secondary concern to the larger East-West conflict. Japan was considered only within the context of its security alliance with the United States. When Japan concluded the Treaty of Security and Cooperation with the US, relations between the USSR and Japan became a function of relations between the US and USSR.

Japan and the Soviet Union also shared an interest to normalize relations with one another. Their efforts resulted in the 1956 Joint Declaration that re-established diplomatic relations and ended the state of war between them. Japan was interested in normalizing relations to allow discussion with the Soviets on several issues of dispute, including the repatriation of Japanese POWs, fishing rights, and territorial claims. In particular, Japanese officials realized that the USSR was a close and powerful neighbour with which it had to coexist and normalizing relations assisted the coexistence. Furthermore, Tokyo needed Moscow's support for Japanese
membership in the United Nations; on two previous occasions, the USSR had vetoed Japan's application. For the Soviets, normalizing relations with Japan represented a small, yet significant, effort at weakening Washington's hold on Tokyo. At the same time, it provided an opportunity to improve anti-Soviet sentiments in Japan that had carried over from World War II.

Japan and the Soviet Union also developed compatible interests in strengthening their economic relations. In the aftermath of the 1970s oil crisis and rising protectionism in the United States and Western Europe, Japan's dependency on resources implied that it could not afford to alienate major resource suppliers. The Soviet Union, with its largely untapped resources in Siberia, was a major source for Japan's raw material needs. "So, Japan has pursued a kind of rolling economic security, maximizing markets and sources of supply, being as non-provocative as possible militarily to neighbours, and becoming economically indispensable by virtue of its technological superiority."

The USSR was interested in strengthening economic relations because of its inability to establish a political or strategic relationship with Japan. Moscow perceived an opportunity to reach political objectives through economic means. Such means entailed promoting development in Siberia and the Soviet Far East as the basis for long term cooperation and creating a greater Japanese stake in maintaining a position of equidistance from major powers. Economic benefits were also a factor. Lacking the equipment and technology to develop Siberia on its own, Moscow sought long-term credits for advanced and better quality machinery from Japan in return for
Tokyo's access to Soviet raw materials. It also exerted a great amount of effort to get Japanese assistance on development projects in Siberia, and especially energy resource development. The Soviets emphasised the economic ties particularly during the 1970s. Recognizing the strength of the profit motive, Moscow pressured Japanese business industries (one of the larger lobby groups in Japan) for contributions to Siberian development.

II. Condition No. 2

The second condition, a capacity for mutual responsiveness, was also found in the interactions between the Soviet Union and Finland and between the Soviet Union and Japan. Despite involving fundamentally different political and ideological systems, the interactions demonstrated an administrative and political capability of communication and consultation.

Administratively, Finland had the capability to communicate with Russia based on its political structure. It not only had the capacity to respond to the needs of the USSR because it remained socially and politically intact at the end of the war, but fundamentally the Finnish president determined the country's foreign relations, while the foreign minister carried out the actual communication. Indeed, non-partisans who were trusted by the Finnish leadership filled the position of the Foreign Minister to support the new policy toward the Moscow. At the same time, the government structure responded to Moscow's needs by muting any criticism in the
press towards the Soviet Union, thereby strengthening its confidence in Finland and contributing to the development of the security regime.

With regards to consultation in their interaction, the 1948 Treaty included a provision that, in the event of a perceived threat, Finland and the USSR would hold consultations on what action should be taken to remove the threat. In fact, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev sought to activate the provision during the 1961 Note Crisis in reaction to a growing West German naval presence in the Baltic Sea.\textsuperscript{46} Finnish President Urho Kekkonen met with the Soviet leader to discuss the perceived threat and assured him that a threat did not exist and, therefore, that no action was necessary.\textsuperscript{7}

At the same time, the interaction between Finland and the Soviet Union indicated that Moscow was politically capable of communicating with Helsinki and responding to its needs. This was particularly evident when it settled on Finland's terms for the 1948 Treaty. These terms included the declaration of Finland's neutrality, the deployment of Finnish troops only on Finnish territory, and the receipt of Soviet military assistance upon consultations.\textsuperscript{48} Indeed, Finnish negotiators were surprised at the leniency of the Soviet negotiators when the Soviets agreed to a final version that was almost identical to the Finnish draft.\textsuperscript{9}

The interaction between Japan and the Soviet Union also displayed mutual responsiveness. Although Japan's political system was completely restructured as a consequence of its defeat in World War II, over time it developed the capacity to communicate with the Soviet Union. Indeed, despite the dissolution of the Allied
Council of Japan following the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty, the Soviet mission in Tokyo was retained in order to "keep abreast of developments in Japan and to confer with various groups and individuals." Furthermore, the Soviet Union and Japan established embassies in the other country as stipulated in the 1956 Joint Declaration.

At the same time, the interaction revealed the presence of a capacity to consult with one another. This is evident in the numerous visits paid to each other to resolve the Kuriles Islands issue. In fact, Moscow and Tokyo exchanged notes during the 1960 negotiations on the Kuriles Islands and held almost annual visits from 1964 until 1973. Although the issue remains unresolved, other discussions regarding the normalization of relations and fishing disputes were successful, indicating that these consultations were of a substantive nature and contributed to development of a security regime.

The Soviet Union and Japan also had the capacity to monitor the other's military activities in the region through electronic communications and monitoring systems. For instance, Japan was able to monitor air and sea traffic in the Sea of Okhotsk and allowed Tokyo to eavesdrop on the USSR. Significantly, Japan located six radars on Hokkaido island, across the strait from the disputed Northern Territories.
III. Condition No. 3

The third condition, a shared desire to curb the security dilemma between the states, was present in both case studies. With respect to the interaction between Finland and the Soviet Union, there is evidence that these two countries followed security policies which intended to restrain the dilemma and helped to build confidence in their relations. Recognizing that its security was intimately linked with the USSR, Helsinki sought to alleviate Soviet distrust of Finland. This goal was evident in Helsinki's consistent behaviour over a long period of time,\(^4\) strict observance of its agreements with Moscow, avoiding suspicion by staying out of great power conflicts, and completion of reparation payments by 1952.\(^4\)

Furthermore, Finland's post-war internal politics revealed a greater tolerance of leftist organizations and trade union movements.\(^4\) The Finnish Communist Party was legalized and played a role in Finland's government.

Soviet security policy focused on maintaining the status quo in relations with Finland. Moscow was interested in preserving domestic political stability and preventing a hostile government from coming to power. Indeed, relations with Finland complemented the Soviet policy of co-existence during the 1950s; "The Soviet leaders can point to Finland and say that here is a fine example of two countries with different social systems existing side by side."\(^4\)

Because Finland was geographically removed from Europe, there was no inclination on the part of Moscow to change the status quo and bring Finland closer into its sphere of influence.
Japan and the Soviet Union also displayed a desire to curb their security dilemma. This desire was present when Tokyo indicated that it had no intention of joining a perceived entente forming in the Far East against the Soviet Union. "Japan's fundamental desire is to deal with the Soviet Union on a self-confident and, at the same time, unhostile manner." To this end, Japan was cautious about the impact its globalization policy would have on the Soviet Union. Although Japan participated in the sanctions against the Soviet Union in protest of the 1979 invasion of Afghanistan, a total degeneration of relations did not occur as is evident in the increased Japanese-Soviet trade in 1980-82.

Moscow's policies toward Tokyo also indicated a desire to restrain the security dilemma. For instance, the Soviet Union sought to prevent a situation from developing that would force Japan to rearm. Since 1972, it has criticized Japan less often due to continued criticism proving counterproductive to improving relations with Japan. In particular, the Soviet Union's heavy-handedness in the region provided the security relationship between US and Japan with a purpose.

The same policies to restrain the dilemma with Japan were present during the Gorbachev era which brought with it an awareness that military means to counter threats in Asia had been counterproductive. This awareness was indicated by Gorbachev's statement that "the Soviet Union should end its past emphasis on military measures, which have proved to be counterproductive, and, instead, should use political means, including arms control, to create a more secure external environment." At the same time, these policies introduced confidence into the
interaction between the two states, particularly when the USSR pledged not to use nuclear weapons against Japan in return for Tokyo’s assurance of strict adherence to its non-nuclear principles: banning Japanese production and possession of nuclear weapons, and the introduction of such weapons into Japanese territory. Furthermore, in 1986, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze offered an agreement on confidence-building measures that would include mutual notification of military exercises.

IV. Condition No. 4

The fourth condition, effective political leadership, was found in both interactions. Not only was there a clear delineation of power, but the political leaders showed a strong ability to influence policy and decision-making, even in the face of domestic opposition. As the Finnish president from 1946 until 1956, Juho Kusti Paasikivi consistently, and unpopularly, advocated a policy of a conciliatory attitude toward Russia and later the Soviet Union. "Throughout his political life Paasikivi had shown a solid understanding of Russia's strategic interests." Paasikivi's convictions were based on the belief that concessions toward the Russian and later Soviet regimes were necessary, even if it meant conceding Finnish territory and sovereign rights, in order to gain Finnish autonomy. Indeed, as early as 1943, Paasikivi was advocating a policy of good neighbourliness with the Soviet Union for the post-war era as the basis for preservation of Finland's neutrality and independence. By the 1950s, Paasikivi won over the confidence of the Soviet
government with his policies and was awarded the Order of Lenin. Wanting to strengthen Paasikivi's position, the Soviets showed that his policies were fitting by returning Porkkala in 1956 and officially referring to Finland as a neutral country. 

"In the Soviet view Finland was a friendly country under Paasikivi; indeed, by 1948 Moscow had already marked him as the indispensable man in the soft sphere system and one whom Stalin respected and trusted."  

Paasikivi was able to translate his convictions into Finnish policy toward the USSR despite opposition due to a clear delineation of power. In particular, the President took over responsibility for Finnish foreign policy from Parliament in order to overcome party disputes that could otherwise jeopardize these radical policies. Furthermore, he declined participation in the Marshall Plan despite the approval of the Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee. More significantly, the Finnish president authorized the 1948 Treaty with the USSR notwithstanding that the majority of Parliament and Cabinet was opposed to it. The ability to influence policy was extended to Finnish society. For instance, any criticism in the press of the Soviet Union and its policies were muted to avoid offending Moscow. The Communist party was also legalized. "In this the Finnish political system showed a willingness to adapt itself to Soviet wishes, i.e. to accept the inevitability of Soviet interference and to try to forestall it." 

Based on a similar conviction, the political leadership of Urho Kekkonen demonstrated the same ability to influence policy and decision-making, thereby continuing the Paasikivi line; "it has been customary to speak of a Paasikivi-
Kekkonen Line in Finnish foreign policy, the one a natural continuation of the other. Although Kekkonen had been a strong Finnish nationalist and an anti-Communist during the Winter War and opposed the 1940 peace with Moscow, once Germany began to lose the war, Kekkonen began to support the need for a policy of good neighbourliness towards the "hereditary enemy," Russia. In fact, Kekkonen's ability to influence policies is demonstrated in his undertaking controversial domestic policies for the benefit of Moscow in order to silence doubts about Finland's new foreign policy orientation. "The Russians had come to rely on Kekkonen as their anchorman and the genuineness of Soviet feeling towards him was expressed not only personally by Khrushchev but also by ... Leonid Brezhnev."  

Japan's leaders also demonstrated an ability to influence policy and decision-making that was possible due to a consistent delineation of power. For instance, Japan's first prime minister, Yoshida, influenced the post-war doctrine based on minimal involvement in world politics while concentrating on economic growth, i.e., separating politics from economics. The success of his policies are evident in the speed of Japan's economic development. Japanese Prime Minister Suzuki Zenko influenced softer policies against the USSR than those initiated by his predecessor in response to Soviet action in Afghanistan, and gradually lifted trade sanctions and the suspension of personal exchanges "almost to the point where the situation has returned to that which existed before the Afghan incident took place." He was also influential in reviving such economic projects with the Soviet Union as timber resource development, Sakhalin offshore oil and natural gas development, and coal
production in Southern Yakutsk. Indeed, as the Japanese negotiator during the fishing negotiations with the Soviets in the late 1970s, the experience had "shaped Suzuki's perception of the Soviet Union as a country that Japan cannot get along with, but cannot afford to antagonize either."  

Without a doubt, the Soviet Union has consistently shown the presence of strong political leadership. For instance, Stalin was in full command of his leadership and removed any opposition to his policies. Indeed, this can be said of subsequent Politburo designs until the early 1980s. Khrushchev himself was removed from the Soviet leadership when he appeared to have lost the confidence of the other political leaders. At the same time, there was a clear delineation of power that permitted the leadership to influence those policies and decision-making which contributed to the development of security regimes with Finland and Japan without domestic obstacles.

Mikhail Gorbachev's leadership reinforced the presence of this condition particularly in the interaction with Japan. In a dramatic departure from previous policy, the Soviet leader conducted a new style of foreign policy intended to present the USSR as a lesser threat through arms control initiatives and military cutbacks. His "New Thinking" contributed significantly to the process of curbing the security dilemma with Japan by reducing the threat the USSR posed for the island nation. For instance, Soviet troop cuts were announced in 1988 at the same time that Moscow officially acknowledged the existence of a dispute with Japan over the Kurile Islands. This acknowledgement was followed by intimations of returning Habomai
and Shikotan and of a possible compromise on the two other islands, such as joint sovereignty or a free economic zone."

V. Condition No. 5

The analysis of the fifth condition, the high costs of warfare, could not be determined from any stated perceptions from the political leaders that war was of greater cost than failing to achieve the national interests of the state. Regardless, one can infer from the interactions that because war would prevent the states from realizing their interests, it carried a higher cost. With respect to the interaction between the Soviet Union and Finland, the costs of warfare played a significant role in ending the Continuation War in 1944. The war had developed into a hurting stalemate whereby continuing the conflict would not improve the position of either country. In particular, Finland could no longer rely on Nazi Germany for external support, who had begun its descent towards defeat, nor could it rely on domestic support. By 1943, domestic opposition to the ongoing war against the Soviets was growing." Furthermore, the economic and social costs of continuing the war was weakening Finland; its economy was paralyzed with the allocation of all available manpower to the war effort." The costs for the Soviet Union of continuing the war against Finland were also high. Moscow placed a higher priority on fighting the war against the Germans in Europe and on the race against the Americans for Berlin. As a result, Soviet forces were needed in eastern Europe to strengthen the effort.
In the post-war period of their interaction, of greater importance is that a war would undermine Finnish and Soviet security interests in Finland's neutrality. As pointed out earlier, any conflict involving Finland would set in motion the 1948 Treaty with the Soviet Union and compromise its neutrality. Finnish neutrality was assured as long as no one attacked it. Once there was an attack against Finnish territory, Helsinki would be obligated to consider a joint military defense with the Soviet Union, thereby terminating its neutrality.

The cost of war in the interaction between Japan and the Soviet Union also carried a price higher than the states failing to realize their national interests. For instance, war would draw Japan closer into the international community and profoundly impede Japan's security interests of withdrawal. Of greater importance regarding this condition is Japan's constitution which prohibits it from maintaining a national army and from waging a war. At the same time, war would distract Moscow away from its primary interest of security in Eastern Europe. Indeed, Japan was firmly in the Western bloc where the Cold War alignment was concerned and was of critical importance to United States security interests in Asia. Therefore, any armed conflict against Japan would have certainly led to the direct involvement of the US, ensured through the Japanese-US security agreement. War would also directly impact on the process undertaken to normalize relations between Japan and the Soviet Union and fundamentally prevent the two states from realizing this interest.
VI. Condition No. 6

The two case studies indicate that, in the estimation of the states, avenues other than a security regime offered a lower payoff than the payoff for a security regime and, therefore, there was no advantage to defection. The payoffs in these options involved a compromise in the state's security interests, whereas a defection would place the other state at a disadvantage regarding its security interests.

In the first instance, Finland's option of joining the Western political, economic, and security institutions would be considered a defection because it would place the Soviet Union at a considerable disadvantage. However, there was no advantage to this option for Finland because it would compromise its security interests of developing good relations with the Soviet Union and maintaining a position of neutrality. Any defection on Finland's part to the Western bloc would have seriously compromised its security since such action would reinforce Moscow's insecurity. "The relationship with an ally might be too close and lead to the reduction of Finland to a satellite status. In addition, it is clear that the Finns want to keep their channels open to all powers."

There was a high probability of Moscow interpreting such action as hostile. Regardless, Finland was not willing to depend on the West because these countries were either too far away to deliver any military assistance on time or they simply were not interested.

In the second instance, the Soviet option of changing Finland's status to a satellite state, similar to that of Eastern Europe, would place Finland at a clear disadvantage and prevent it from realizing its security interests. This action would
have strengthened the Soviet Union's cordon sanitaire across the continent.

Furthermore, it would have provided Moscow with another opportunity to
demonstrate the ideological success of communism over capitalism. However, this
option offered no advantage for the Soviet Union because it compromised its security
interests regrading Finland's neutrality. At the same time, any hostile aggression
against Finland would have revived Finnish resentment toward the Soviets and risk
the security arrangement developing, thereby forcing Finland into the hands of the
West. Furthermore, if Finland was forcibly included in the Soviet sphere of
influence similar to that experienced in eastern Europe, the West might be provoked
into pulling the other Scandinavian countries into its sphere and intensifying the
situation in northern Europe to a level that the Soviet Union wanted to avoid.

"Stalin seems to have believed that while a military subjugation of Finland might be
possible, it would not be worth its cost: to swallow Finland may be one thing, but to
digest it quite another."

The presence of this condition in the interaction between Japan and the Soviet
Union is less clear because of a lack of options pursued by the states. Indeed, Japan
was already under the military protection of the United States. As a result, one
might instead infer that to defect in this interaction and place the other state at a
disadvantage signified war. However, similar to the argument used regarding the
high costs of warfare, this defection offers a low payoff and seriously compromises
the security interests of Japan and the Soviet Union.
VII. Condition No. 7

The presence of the seventh condition, the great powers want a security regime, could not be determined based on the actions and statements expressed by the United States that it desired a security regime in these two interactions. One might instead infer from its policies and interests at the time that the United States was a silent bystander whose primary concern regarding these interactions was that its own security interests were not threatened. Indeed, American security policy was based on containing Soviet expansion. Despite numerous objections to the "Finlandization" policy, Washington regarded Finland as part of Moscow's sphere of influence. Indeed, the US appeared to accept Soviet policy in the area as long as its interest in the security of the Nordic countries was not threatened. On the other hand, the United States had a greater stake in the interaction between Japan and the Soviet Union. As a result, it was more concerned with preventing Soviet influence of Japan than the development of a security regime in that interaction. Therefore, although these security regimes coincided with American security interests, one cannot claim that this indicated its desire for the security regimes to develop.

VIII. Condition No. 8

Based on the number of issues and sub-issues involved in the interaction, the presence of the sixth condition, a decomposability of the issues, was weaker between Finland and the Soviet Union and stronger between Japan and the Soviet Union. The relations between Finland and the Soviet Union focused fundamentally on two issues:
the larger question of security for Finland and the Soviet Union and the smaller question of Soviet confidence in Finnish neutrality. Despite Finland’s position of neutrality and its declaration to stay out of great power conflicts, Moscow could never be certain that Finnish forces were able to withstand an attack from a potential aggressor. It needed to be assured of some method by which it could become militarily involved in the event of such an attack. At the same time, this method could not compromise Finland’s neutrality, which was central to the USSR’s security interests. As a result, the 1948 Treaty between Finland and the Soviet Union allowed for consultations to decide the existence of a threat to Finland’s security and the course of action to be taken.

This condition was especially prominent in the interaction between Japan and the Soviet Union. The larger question of normalizing relations was divided into several smaller components. The first component was the repatriation of Japanese nationals. According to Tokyo, some 370,000 Japanese POWs remained unaccounted for when the USSR stopped repatriation in April 1950. The Japanese government wanted to settle the issue of the remaining POWs before normalizing relations with the USSR; on the other hand, Moscow wanted to settle this question after relations were normalized. The second component was the question of Japanese fishing rights. In 1956, Moscow created this issue by restricting Japanese access to fishing in Soviet waters. This action was intended to force Tokyo into participating in negotiations to resume diplomatic relations with Moscow. The question of normalizing relations can also be divided into a third component - the
Kuriles Islands. The resolution of this issue was strongly perceived by Tokyo as a necessary step before relations with the USSR could be normalized. Although this issue remains unresolved, the resolution of the two other issues together with a compromise to continue negotiations on the Kuriles Islands enabled Japan and the Soviet Union to conclude the 1956 Joint Declaration.

IX. Conclusion

Each of the eight conditions have been analyzed for their presence in two interactions which developed into security regimes. The results reveal that four of the conditions were found in both interactions. These are mutually compatible interests of high value, mutual responsiveness, a shared desire to curb the security dilemma, and effective political leadership. Three other conditions showed a weak presence in both interactions according to the indicators used to determine their presence. These were the high costs of warfare, no advantage to defection, and the great powers desire a security regime. One condition, the decomposability of the issues, was present only in one interaction. As a result of these findings, this chapter has fulfilled its two tasks. First, it has determined four conditions as necessary for the development of security regimes on the basis of the criteria set out in Chapter Two. Second, the validity and generalizability of the eight conditions have been established. This catalogue can now be applied to the assessment of the extent to which the conditions necessary for security regime development are present in the relations between Russia and Ukraine. All eight conditions will be analysed in order
to draw comparisons among the three cases. This assessment will be conducted in the following Chapter.
Chapter 3 - ENDNOTES


5. Allison, Finland's Relations With the Soviet Union, p. 35.


8. Ibid. Since then, the term "Finlandization" has been used to describe the process of voluntary restraints on domestic and foreign policies in order to meet Soviet approval.

9. The Winter War began when Soviet forces invaded Finland in November 1939 in reaction to Helsinki's refusal to concede territory to its eastern neighbour. Following the Nazi German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941, Finland declared war on the USSR in an attempt to recover territory lost during the Winter War. This attempt was assisted by the German army.


22. Ibid.


26. Ibid., p. 28.

27. Ibid.


29. Ibid., p. 33.


31. Ibid.


33. Ibid.; Ha, "Moscow's Policy Toward Japan," p. 70.

35. ibid., p. 139.


37. Karvonen, "High-Level Foreign Policy Coordination," p. 142.


42. Simon, "Is There a Japanese Regional Security Role?" p. 43.


44. Vloyantes, *Silk Glove Hegemony*, p. 45.


49. Ha, "Moscow's Policy Toward Japan," p. 65.

50. ibid., p. 66.


52. ibid., pp. 48-49.
53. Ibid., p. 49.


57. Ibid., p. 58.


59. Karvonen, "High-Level Foreign Policy Coordination," p. 139.


67. Ibid.

68. Ibid., p. 10.


70. Wvorinen, *Finland and World War II*, p. 34; Karvonen, "High-Level Foreign Policy Coordination," p. 139.


75. At the same time, Finland was not an occupied country after the war since the Finnish armed forces expelled the remaining German soldiers themselves. As a result, the Soviet army was not present on Finnish territory to have made a satellization process similar to that undertaken in Eastern Europe possible.


77. Lukacs, "Finland Vindicated," p. 56.


79. ibid.
Chapter Four

The interaction between Russia and Ukraine has been a source of great concern for the security community. For the last two years, these two former republics of the Soviet Union have disputed among other issues territorial claims, division of the Black Sea Fleet, deeper integration of the Commonwealth of Independent States, and control over nuclear weapons. Efforts to resolve the disputed issues often failed since agreements reached were too weak and easily violated. However, one wonders whether a security regime might develop between Russia and Ukraine to regulate their security relations according to a set of principles and norms in order to build confidence and resolve disputes in a peaceful manner. Although a security regime does not exist, we wish to investigate whether their relations indicate a potential for its development. In the process of determining such a potential, this chapter will analyze the extent to which the necessary conditions for security regime formation exist in the interaction between Russia and Ukraine. Although only the first four conditions of the following list were identified in the previous chapter as necessary, all eight will be analyzed in order to provide comparability among the three interactions. These conditions are as follows:

1.) mutually compatible interests of high value; 2.) mutual responsiveness; 3.) shared desire to curb the security dilemma; 4.) political leadership; 5.) high costs of warfare; 6.) no advantage to defection; 7.) great powers must want a security regime; 8.) decomposability of the issues. At the same time, the analysis will put forward
the proposition that the interaction between Russia and Ukraine is more likely to develop a security regime if the four necessary conditions are present. If none of the conditions are present, then such a development is unlikely.

1. Condition No. 1

The high value interests of Russia and Ukraine do not appear to be mutually compatible. Instead, they fundamentally oppose each other. As a result of the Soviet Union's collapse in 1991, Russian security interests have focused on overcoming its vulnerability by restoring a centre of authority in Moscow over the former Soviet Union including Ukraine and maintaining its great power status in the international system. On the other hand, Ukrainian security interests have been influenced by a desire to firmly establish the country's independence as a subject of international law with its own national identity and to have little, if anything, to do with Russia as a central authority.

These interests are prominent in the security policies pursued by Russia and Ukraine since the latter declared its independence from the Soviet Union on August 24, 1991. One policy that reflected this interest was the creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) on December 8, 1991 and Russian attempts to institutionalize it as a permanent union. The CIS was intended to replace the USSR in all economic, political, and military aspects and to ensure continued ties between Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus - the three republics forming the basis of the old Russian empire. Indeed, Russia used the CIS as a forum to promote and realize
its policy of "Russia first" in these aspects. In particular, Russian President Boris Yeltsin called for closer integration and cooperation among CIS members in foreign policy.

As a body intended to replace the former empire, the CIS was the continuation of attempts initiated by Gorbachev’s Moscow after the failed coup in August, 1991 of reformulating the political structures of the Soviet Union in a manner which recognized the sovereignty of its republics, including Ukraine. Before the CIS was created, the old centre in Moscow repeatedly warned the republics that the dissolution of the union would result in coups, inter-ethnic conflict and nuclear exchanges. Indeed, Ukraine’s participation in any union was necessary for Russian prosperity. Ukraine’s agricultural industry produced one-quarter of the USSR’s grain, one-quarter of its meat products, one-quarter of its coal, and half of its iron ore.

The CIS was also intended to be a forum where the members could establish common policies on nuclear weapons, armed forces, and defense policies. The armed forces of the former Soviet Union would remain intact under these measures and, therefore, continue to provide security to Russia and the other republics with limited logistical and operational disruptions. At the same time, the old and, more importantly, the new centres in Moscow were concerned about the threat of inter-republic conflict with the division of the army among the newly independent republics. Of greater importance was the Soviet armed forces link with the empire and the historic role it played in its creation. To counter any threat to its security
from domestic disputes and regional conflict, Russia proposed a CIS collective security pact and a joint security space including members of the CIS.9

Russian policy of claiming ownership over the Black Sea Fleet also reveals its value of security by restoring a centre of authority in Moscow and particularly maintaining its great power status.9 Moscow had originally stated that the Black Sea Fleet was subordinate to the Joint Military Forces of the CIS in order to prevent its division. Any division of the fleet would weaken its ability to defend the Black Sea coast. However, the policy changed to reflect different circumstances and Russia came to argue that the fleet was in fact Russian and subordinate to the Russian Defense Ministry.10 The Black Sea Fleet, headquartered at Sevastopol on the Crimean peninsula in Ukraine, has long been a symbol of Russian greatness and power since its inception during the rule of Catherine the Great and is an important link to Russia's imperial heritage. As stated by Russian President Boris Yeltsin himself, "the Black Sea Fleet was Russian, is Russian, and will always be Russian."11 Not only does the modern fleet provide Russia with a global presence and strategic linkage to the Mediterranean, but the fleet is also argued to be a vital component of Russia's security forces.12 Indeed, the Black Sea Fleet is so important to Russia that when its interests were threatened by Ukraine, President Yeltsin cancelled a meeting with the visiting Japanese foreign minister and completely ignored the Middle East Peace Talks in order to deal with the crisis.13

Russian policy with respect to the Black Sea Fleet has led to Moscow's renewed interest in reclaiming Crimea as Russian territory. Once part of the Russian
republic, Crimea was transferred by Nikita Khrushchev to Ukraine in 1954 in honour of the three hundred year union between Russia and Ukraine. Negotiations have already taken place on strengthening economic ties between Russia and Crimea. To substantiate ownership over the fleet, the Russian parliament first called for a review of the 1954 transfer of Crimea from Russia to Ukraine, then annulled the transfer because of its illegality, and more recently declared Sevastopol to be a Russian city. Former Russian Vice-President Aleksandr Rutskoi has been especially active in promoting Russian interests with respect to Crimea and, in particular, to the right of Crimea to hold a referendum on independence.

Russian attitude toward Crimea is also a reflection of Moscow’s concern for Russian minorities in Ukraine and throughout the former Soviet territories. The collapse of the Soviet Union resulted in millions of Russians finding themselves outside the Russian republic and as ethnic minorities in newly independent republics. For instance, Russians constitute 43% of the Crimean population, and 22% of the entire Ukrainian population. The legacy of the Soviet empire is such that the Russian population is often resented by titular ethnic groups and subsequently subjected to discriminatory citizenship policies. As a result of this concern, Moscow has undertaken policies that ensure the protection of Russian minorities in Ukraine and throughout the former Soviet Union by restoring its dominance over those areas where Russians reside. One such policy was embodied in the June 1992 declaration to deploy the Russian army to areas of ethnic fighting where Russians are without protection. Indeed, the protection of Russian minorities is a component of the new
Russian military doctrine. More recently, Russia has attempted to establish a sphere of influence over the former Soviet Union in order to protect Russian minorities. That these Russian minorities could be used to recreate the centre is noted in a reference to them as "our pied noirs" by an adviser to President Yeltsin.

The policy of the Russian government to assume the Soviet Union's international roles in arms control negotiations and on the Security Council of the United Nations provides further evidence of Russian security interests on overcoming its vulnerability by achieving great power status in the international system. While Russia succeeded the Soviet Union in such arms control agreements as the July 1991 START I agreement with the United States and the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) agreement, it was also involved in bilateral negotiations with the US that led to the January 1993 START II agreement. As the successor to the Soviet Union, Russia also assumed command over all former Soviet armed forces in Russia and beyond the borders of the former Soviet Union. Indeed, this policy extended to all military matters and involved personnel swearing an oath of allegiance to Russia.

When the CIS central military command collapsed, the strategic troops were subordinated to the Russian Defense Ministry. Russia also claimed ownership over Soviet property abroad, such as embassies, trade missions, and consulates. Because the vast majority of the Soviet Union's institutions were located in Russia, the government has claimed them also and has used them in the Russian reform program.
The Russian policy of controlling all the nuclear weapons of the former Soviet Union is another example of Moscow's fundamental security interest in maintaining a great power status. Indeed, it is the position of the Russian government to eventually have all the nuclear weapons transferred to Russia, thereby denying control to the two other republics with strategic nuclear weapons, Ukraine and Kazakhstan.28 Because the status quo is such that nuclear weapons remain outside Russian territory, Moscow has attempted to assert control over the nuclear weapons through a single command in the CIS structure. At the same time, however, Moscow has de facto launch control by maintaining operational control over the nuclear weapons.29 To further substantiate its position, Russia has succeeded the Soviet Union to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty as a nuclear power.30

In complete opposition to Russian interests, Ukrainian security policies have reflected its interests of confirming the country's independence and an identity which distinguishes it from Russia and the former Soviet Empire.31 Indeed, Anatoliy Zlenko, the Ukrainian foreign minister, stated in an address to the Centre for Strategic and International Studies that Ukraine's foreign policy priority is its national security.32 This objective is significant given Ukraine's three-hundred year subordination to the Russian and Soviet empires and the negative impact of this experience on the Ukrainian national identity. Even now, a majority of Russians regard the Ukrainians as inferior and refer to their neighbours to the south as the "Little Russians" and as members of the same cultural group without a distinct identity and a legitimate claim for a separate state.33 This interest is prominent in
Ukraine's policy toward the CIS and strongly influenced Kiev's decision to join the CIS. Ukraine viewed the CIS as a temporary arrangement that would destroy its ties with the USSR and secure Ukrainian independence. Until the USSR no longer existed, Kiev felt that the centre would never take its independence seriously. To reflect this interest, Ukraine has used the CIS as a forum to realize its objectives and to impress its independence upon the centre in Moscow. For instance, Ukraine only observes those agreements concluded under the auspices of the CIS that support Ukrainian independence. Other proposals which were perceived to infringe upon its sovereignty have been either amended or rejected.

Furthermore, Ukraine opposed deeper integration of the CIS and, particularly, its defense and political structures. It did not participate in the Joint Armed Forces of the CIS, and strongly objected to the creation of a CIS peacekeeping force and a collective security arrangement. Kiev's attitude in rejecting any permanent structure of the CIS is reflected in repeated warnings that it would leave the CIS and in failing to send an appropriate Ukrainian representative to meetings. Instead, Ukraine has expressed its preference for bilateral relations.

Ukraine's policy of creating a national armed force also reflected its interest of independence. For Kiev, a national army was symbolic of the Ukrainian nation's independence from both the old and new centres in Moscow. At the same time, a Ukrainian army, subordinate to Kiev and completely withdrawn from the Soviet command, sent a clear message to the centre that it was serious about its independence. Every country has the right to defend itself and, indeed, one of the
parliament’s first orders of business was to pass legislation on the creation of a Ukrainian national army. Kiev also established the Ukrainian Defense Ministry and appointed Major-General Konstantin Morozov as its first defense minister with President Kravchuk as the commander-in-chief. As a newly independent state intent on quickly asserting its independence, Ukraine was concerned about the presence of almost 1.5 million Soviet troops on its territory. Indeed, fears of another hard-line coup attempt in Moscow and the role of the Soviet army were a driving force in establishing a Ukrainian army almost immediately. As a result, Kiev took possession of the Soviet army located on Ukrainian territory and began to transform it into the Ukrainian armed forces. The initiative began in October 1991 when Ukraine took control over all border troops and the Ministry of Internal Affairs troops. This was followed by initiatives taken in January 1992 that required officers and troops to take an oath of allegiance to Ukraine; those who refused were expected to leave the country because they were considered to be foreign troops. By the end of January 1992, the Ukrainian deputy defense minister, Lieutenant General Ivan Bizhan, reported that 270,000 soldiers had already taken the oath of allegiance. Any equipment controlled by the officers and commanders of the military sectors became the property of Ukraine.

Ukraine’s policy to establish an independent national armed force also involves the development of a Ukrainian navy based on the former Soviet Black Sea Fleet. Ukrainian claims to the entire fleet were voiced shortly after the December 1991 independence referendum. Kiev bases its demands on geographic entitlement:
not only does Ukraine border on the Black Sea, but the fleet is also headquartered in
Sevastopol on the Crimean peninsula in Ukraine. To this end, Kiev appointed Rear
Admiral Boris Kozhin as Commander of the Ukrainian Navy. Those ships whose
sailors declared their allegiance to Ukraine were considered the property of the
Ukrainian navy. In response to Ukraine's demands, Admiral Igor Kasatonov was
removed as commander of the Black Sea Fleet and replaced with a Russian-Ukrainian
group of officers.

Ukraine's position on the Black Sea Fleet has caused Kiev to ensure that
Crimea remains a part of Ukraine and that Crimean politicians do not take action that
would lead to Crimea joining Russia. Kiev's efforts are assisted in part by the
Ukrainians and Tatars, who constitute 11% and 25% of the Crimean population,
respectively, who want to stay with Ukraine. Kiev has sought a basis for their
loyalty by supporting the return of the Crimean Tatars from exile and efforts to build
new homes for them. As a result of the policy to keep the Crimean peninsula under
its jurisdiction, Kiev declared illegal Crimea's May 5, 1992 declaration of
independence. Instead, it reached an agreement with the Crimean government that
allowed it greater autonomy and a republican status within Ukraine. Kiev's policy
regarding Crimea also takes into consideration other ethnic minorities located on
Ukrainian territory and the threat to Ukrainian territorial integrity should they all seek
independence.

Ukraine's policy of acceding to international agreements in its own right is
another reflection of its interest to confirm the country's independence and a distinct
identity from Russia and the former Soviet Empire. This policy impresses upon the international community that Ukraine is an independent subject of international law. As an independent state, therefore, Ukraine ratified the CFE agreement on July 1, 1992 that was concluded by the Soviet Union. As well, Ukraine is a member of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council with other states of NATO and the former Warsaw Pact. Most importantly, Kiev insisted that Ukraine accede to a START I protocol agreement before the accord could be applied to the former Soviet nuclear weapons on its territory.

Ukraine also has pursued a policy of gaining recognition from the West in order to fulfill its interest of establishing a distinctly Ukrainian identity. Although many Western countries did formally recognize Ukraine's independence and establish diplomatic relations with the new state, Ukraine was not receiving the degree of attention that might be paid to a country of its size and geopolitical importance. As a result, Ukraine has taken extreme measures to remind the West of its existence. Such measures include halting the transfer of tactical nuclear weapons to Russia for destruction in March 1992 and more recently delaying the ratification of START I and the NPT.

Ukraine's security interest in confirming independence from Russia has been at the core of its policies to control the nuclear weapons located on its territory and to claim ownership. That these weapons are the property of Ukraine was underscored when their transfer to Russia was halted. Although Ukraine intends to become a non-nuclear country, for reasons of sovereignty it has claimed possession of these
nuclear weapons until they are disarmed. Over the last two years, however, control of the weapons has become a matter of degree. While it acknowledged that these nuclear weapons were under the jurisdiction of the CIS Joint Strategic Command, Kiev initially had a consultative veto over their launch. This control soon developed into an administrative control of the delivery systems and a possible operational control. By July 1993, the Ukrainian parliament voted to keep some of the nuclear weapons and not to disarm the weapons until it received financial compensation and security guarantees from Russia and the United States that the weapons would not be used against it. Indeed, the Ukrainian prime minister, Leonid Kuchma, suggested that Ukraine should temporarily become a nuclear state.

II. Condition No. 2

In terms of the condition of mutual responsiveness, the interaction between Russia and Ukraine has limited administrative and political capabilities of communication and consultation. Although the presence of these capabilities might suggest that this condition exists, a closer examination indicates that they lack sufficient substance to be of any meaning to the development of a security regime.

In the first instance, the relationship between these two countries features numerous summits and meetings for the purposes of communication and consultation. These have occurred at various levels including presidential and prime ministerial. Indeed, both Presidents Yeltsin of Russia and Kravchuk of Ukraine have pledged to resolve their problems through discussion and round-table meetings. However,
these summits have been held on an ad hoc basis and have met with questionable success. Despite the three presidential summits at Dagomys, Yalta, and Moscow regarding the Black Sea Fleet over the last two years, the resulting agreements have not been observed.\textsuperscript{45} It has been noted that the purpose of these summits was not to resolve any problems but merely to diffuse tensions.\textsuperscript{46} The June 1993 agreement to divide the entire Fleet in half has been criticized as vague and, at the time of this writing, the problem remains unsolved.\textsuperscript{47}

Secondly, the interaction has shown a capability of communicating in multilateral forums such as the CIS. The CIS was established to provide consultations and to manage the collapse of the USSR; however, the consultative capacity of "the world's largest fig leaf"\textsuperscript{44} has been overshadowed by Russian dominance in the process. This has resulted in a lack of comprehensive agreements and points to the failure of the CIS to function effectively as a consultative group.\textsuperscript{48} The capability of the CIS to provide consultations has also been hampered by the absence of Ukrainian representatives at some meetings.\textsuperscript{70} At the same time, the CIS has also been criticized for holding irregular meetings while trying to establish its base.\textsuperscript{71}

Thirdly, a consultative capability exists in the relations between Russia and Ukraine which governs the launch of the former Soviet Union's nuclear weapons. Specifically, in the event of a nuclear launch, the Russian president is to consult with the Ukrainian president, who has the right to veto a decision to use the nuclear weapons located in Ukraine. Although a special communication line links the leaders
of these two countries for this purpose, there are no other practical means by which President Kravchuk could effectively use this veto. As noted by a Ukrainian parliamentarian, Serhei Kolesnyk, "Today, we only have a gentleman’s agreement and nothing else. The rockets can still fly from our territory without our approval. All Yeltsin has to do is not to pick up the phone and call." Furthermore, this interaction is noted for its incapacity to monitor the dismantling of nuclear weapons.

Fourthly, the Russian foreign ministry lacks the capability to effectively monitor relations between Russia and Ukraine. While Russia was one of the first countries to recognize Ukrainian independence and the two countries have since established diplomatic relations, it was a full year after the coup when Russia announced that it was establishing embassies in the former Soviet Union. With the Russian embassy in Kiev staffed by one person and operating out of a hotel, such an arrangement is not capable of providing effective communication. In fact, the Russian foreign ministry has yet to establish a process by which Moscow could monitor relations with Kiev. Since the foreign ministry initially left this responsibility with the CIS structure, it does not have its own system of handling crises with the former republics to compensate for the failure of the CIS.

Finally, the interaction between Russia and Ukraine is dominated by harmful nationalist elements that discourage effective consultation and communication. This aspect is particularly prominent in Moscow circles. Indeed, "mainstream Russian political thought and public opinion in general have found it inordinately difficult to come to terms with the notion of Ukraine’s existing in any context other than a
As a result, this viewpoint hampers Moscow’s capability of relating to Kiev as an equal and in a productive manner. In an interview with Nezavisimaya Gazeta, January 30, 1992, President Kravchuk himself made the following comments:

We have grown accustomed to the fact that there is a centre and that in some degree the centre is defined by Russia. And the Russians are psychologically used to thinking that everything else is part of Russia. And now they cannot overcome this barrier and continue to act as if that centre still existed. We must tell them sternly and concretely - and that is what we are doing - that there is an independent Ukraine, an equal, full-fledged state that defines its policies by itself and can live with others in friendship only on these principles.

The Russian foreign minister has stated that the protection of Russian minorities is a priority for Moscow and ensures intervention in Ukrainian domestic politics. In fact, a proposal that would have the Russian ministry monitor relations with Ukraine and the other CIS states through a Commonwealth office carries the implication that these countries are second-class and not entitled to a truly foreign status. At the same time, there are fears that this CIS office would be dominated by Russian nationalists and emphasize policies toward the protection of Russian minorities. Russia’s inability to develop a satisfactory security guarantee toward Ukraine is due to this hegemonic attitude as well.

III. Condition No. 3

A shared desire to curb the security dilemma is not present in the relations between Russia and Ukraine. A review of this interaction indicates that although both countries have stated policies that would restrain the security dilemma and build
confidence, the implementation of these policies are not viable under present circumstances. Rather than confront the sources of the security dilemma, Moscow and Kiev have made statements and taken action that perpetuate the cycle.

This aspect of their interaction is dramatically demonstrated in Ukraine’s policy to become a non-nuclear state, which was first announced in its July 1990 sovereignty declaration and reiterated in the August 1991 declaration of independence. To this end, Ukraine signed the May 1992 START I protocol which commits the country to dismantling the 130 missiles on its territory covered by the 1991 treaty and to destroying the other 46 missiles, allowing it to accede to the NPT as a non-nuclear state. This policy addressed Russia’s concern about the newly independent republics becoming nuclear powers and threatening regional security. As a result, it was a significant base upon which to build confidence between the two adversaries.

However, the implementation of this policy has proven to be dubious as the interaction between Russia and Ukraine intensified. The current environment is one in which Ukraine’s security is threatened by Russian imperialism. Therefore, Kiev finds itself in a position which does not allow it to relinquish the nuclear weapons on its territory without risking its security. Although Kiev followed through with the removal of the tactical nuclear weapons to Russia for dismantlement, it did not do so without first suspending their transfer. Equally disturbing in this context is Ukraine’s failure to fulfil its obligations regarding the elimination of strategic nuclear weapons from its territory. The ratification of START I by the Ukrainian parliament
has been repeatedly delayed while the NPT may not be considered at all, ultimately putting Ukraine's nuclear-free policy in question. As noted by Ukrainian parliamentarian Mykhailo Batih,

I think it is obvious that the political situation has changed dramatically since we first declared that Ukraine would get rid of all its nuclear weapons. This was before anyone in Russia made territorial claims on parts of Ukraine and before Yeltsin's request for special military authority over the whole former Soviet Union. In today's situation it would be naive to rush into this without considering our security interests.

Similarly, Ukraine's military doctrine focuses on the principles of a defensive-defense and a non-nuclear status. This doctrine can be viewed at two levels. First, the implementation of a defensive-defense strategic doctrine would certainly contribute to confidence-building in Ukraine's interaction with Russia by making its adversary feel more secure about Ukraine's military intentions and capabilities. However, given that many of the weapons located in Ukraine can have an offensive as well as a defensive purpose, this strategy is practically problematic to implement.

Second, it is important to note that the doctrine has targeted as threats those countries that "have territorial claims on Ukraine, intend to intrude in its domestic affairs, and instigate unions intended to counteract Ukrainian national political and economic interests." It is evident that the doctrine has been specifically formulated with Russia in mind. While the question of Ukraine's non-nuclear status has been addressed above, it is critical that the Ukrainian parliament has rejected the military doctrine on the grounds that it closes the door on a nuclear option. The Russian military doctrine is equally to blame for perpetuating the security dilemma. It
directly threatens Ukraine's security by providing the protection of Russian ethnic minorities residing outside Russia. Similarly, the Russian army is sanctioned to act as a peacekeeping force in disputes involving the republics of the former Soviet Union.

The recent positions taken by Moscow and Kiev to negotiate the division of the Black Sea Fleet is another example of unviable policies that otherwise would restrain the security dilemma and build confidence in their interaction. The division of the Black Sea Fleet would help to create an environment of understanding from which could evolve more viable policies to curb the security dilemma. However, the feasibility of this policy is questionable given the numerous actions taken by both Russia and Ukraine to improve their individual positions on the matter and secure the entire fleet for themselves. For instance, in January 1992 Ukraine was allocated the non-nuclear share of the Fleet. Soon after, Ukraine argued that the entire Fleet would fall under its jurisdiction once its nuclear weapons were removed. During the April 1992 "war of decrees," Presidents Yeltsin and Kravchuk issued decrees placing the entire Black Sea Fleet under their respective jurisdictions. Indeed, while Russia and Ukraine were negotiating the status of the Fleet, personnel of the Black Sea Fleet either continued to swear allegiance to Ukraine or raised the Russian St. Andrew naval flag on their vessels to indicate allegiance to Russia."

Further evidence arguing against the feasibility of the Black Sea Fleet division is provided by the Russian military's and the Black Sea Fleet naval command's opposition to this policy.* This argument is based on the military's perception that
the division of the fleet would detrimentally affect its combat capability, thereby placing the security of the Black Sea and the southern flank at risk. Indeed, many of the Black Sea Fleet personnel themselves oppose its division and have undertaken unilateral action on several occasions to indicate their preference that the Fleet remain unified. Indeed, the Russian Defense Minister, Pavel Grachev, reacted to the June 1993 Black Sea Fleet agreement by stating his preference for a united Fleet."

At the same time, the interaction between Russia and Ukraine is heavily influenced by strong distrusts of nationalism among their populations and military forces. While the Black Sea Fleet has become a symbol of Russian imperialism or Ukrainian independence, under such circumstances these governments have been unable to effectively divide the Black Sea Fleet without the support of their citizens and military. "This point is underlined in light of the fact that both parliaments must ratify the most recent arrangement to divide the Fleet equally between Russia and Ukraine and which allows the Russian portion basing rights at Sevastopol in Ukraine. Given the Ukrainian parliament’s reluctance to ratify the START I and NPT treaties, ratification of this agreement may prove equally difficult."

These examples of policies that cannot be implemented under present circumstances include Russia’s willingness to provide security guarantees to Ukraine." Ukraine has demanded a Russian guarantee that neither nuclear nor conventional weapons will be used against it." However, the history between Russia and Ukraine is one of such animosity and distrust that it is unlikely any Russian security guarantees would be credible enough for Ukraine. Indeed, these guarantees
offered by Russia do not satisfy Ukraine’s security needs. Not only would the guarantees be put into effect after Ukraine has ratified START I and the NPT, but security would be guaranteed by Russia within the context of the CIS framework. At the same time, such guarantees ultimately involve the hard-line Russian military establishment. Since the Russian military is a significant proponent of the imperial view and would not consider relinquishing its claim to Russian imperial territories, it is unlikely that this policy can be viable.

The absence of a shared desire to curb the security dilemma is also evident in the statements and actions of Russia and Ukraine that perpetuate the security dilemma rather than restrain it. On the one hand, both countries have fed the cycle of mistrust and suspicion by accusing each other of ill intentions. On the other, the security dilemma has been advanced by Russian and Ukrainian unilateral actions.

The accusations are rooted in the fears of and sensitivities toward the adversary. For instance, Moscow has repeatedly accused Kiev of trying to become a nuclear power through the "back door" and alleged that it was playing "political games" by delaying ratification of the START I and NPT treaties. It is also suspicious about Ukraine’s intentions to establish a national army, arguing that armed forces of the size planned indicates aggressive motives. Similarly, Moscow has become critical of Kiev’s recent proposal to create a collective security system that excludes Russia. The Russian defense minister threatened Ukraine with "unspecified action" to resolve the crisis over the nuclear weapons.
For its part, Kiev's suspicions about Moscow's motives were underscored in the initial period following Ukraine's independence when it was reported that a nuclear strike against Ukraine was discussed.\textsuperscript{104} Perceiving Russia's attempts to dominate the post-Soviet era as proof of its imperial ambitions, Ukraine is particularly sensitive to statements made in official Russian circles to reclaim Crimea.\textsuperscript{105} It points to a memorandum from the chair of the Russian parliamentary commission on foreign affairs in which it was suggested that territorial claims to Crimea be used to pressure Ukraine on the matter of the Black Sea Fleet.\textsuperscript{105} At the same time, Ukraine has accused Russia of violating CIS agreements by trying to place the nuclear weapons in Ukraine under the command of the Russian Defense Ministry.\textsuperscript{107} Kravchuk himself has blamed Russia for provoking the crisis over the Black Sea Fleet,\textsuperscript{108} while one of his advisers has bluntly admitted that the Russian leaders cannot be trusted.\textsuperscript{109}

Actions taken by both states also indicate that neither is looking to curb their security dilemma, and instead reinforce the hostile perception of the adversary. This is particularly evident in the Black Sea Fleet dispute when, during periods of crisis, one country's action was countered by the other as occurred in April 1992, July 1992, and May 1993. Russia reacted to Ukraine's decrees that placed the Black Sea Fleet under Ukrainian jurisdiction by issuing its own decree that the Fleet was Russian. Indeed, the commander of the Black Sea Fleet deployed armoured personnel carriers into Sevastopol following reports of a pending Ukrainian attack on the city.\textsuperscript{110} The desertion of a vessel from the Black Sea Fleet to Ukraine provoked
Russia to claim ownership over the rest of the Fleet.\textsuperscript{12} Ukraine responded to the overwhelming number of vessels flying Russian naval flags with further delays on START I ratification. That these actions were undertaken while both sides agreed to refrain from taking unilateral action until the status of the Fleet could be settled emphasises the absence of this condition.

Similarly, Russia has informed the United States of its preference to modify the 1990 CFE treaty, which restricts the number and type of armed forces deployed in Europe, in order to deal with new threats to its security.\textsuperscript{13} That this revision would allow Russia to increase deployment and military pressure on Ukraine reinforces the Ukrainian perception that Moscow refuses to take its independence seriously. This action echoes the Soviet military orders for manoeuvres in Ukraine three days before the December 1991 referendum on independence.\textsuperscript{14}

In January 1992, Ukraine took control over the communications network of the former Soviet armed forces as part of its development of an independent national army.\textsuperscript{14} Furthermore, Ukraine has acted unilaterally when it took control over strategic missile bases and strategic bombers, thereby reinforcing Russian suspicions about Ukraine's intentions to become nuclear-free and perpetuating the security dilemma. In fact, Russian orders that refuelling tanks from the Uzin strategic base in Ukraine be flown to Russia were rejected by Ukraine, fearing that the aircraft would not be returned.\textsuperscript{15}
IV. Condition No. 4

The interaction between Russia and Ukraine is devoid of effective political leadership. Fundamentally, both countries lack a clear division of power between the executive and legislature and, as a result, are experiencing a power struggle between these two branches. The government’s search for control and a weak parliamentary system complicate this already confusing set of events. Although the struggle has substantially influenced the economic reform programs of Russia and Ukraine, in the process of playing out the power struggle, each of these groups has contributed to the tense relations between Russia and Ukraine. In any event, the political leaders of these two countries have been unable to influence policies and decision-making because of these challenges to their authority.

The parliamentary dimension of this challenge is centred primarily on the weak parliamentary system in these countries. In the first instance, the Russian and Ukrainian parliaments are dominated by conservative deputies. Elected in the 1990 republican parliamentary elections conducted prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union, these deputies ran as reformed communists in order to retain their positions. Their legitimacy to legislate in a new political environment is consequently called into question. As representatives of the communist order and old ideas, they have not only blocked passage of legislation necessary to implement the government reform programs, but have also supported parliamentary resolutions with negative impact on relations with the adversary.
In the second instance, the nationalist deputies in the parliaments have become a small force that cannot be ignored. The nationalists base their support on the growing nationalism in Russia and Ukraine. However, the nationalists in Russia and Ukraine differ in their parliamentary alliance with the reformed communists. In Russia, the nationalists support the resurrection of the former Russian empire, echoing the calls of the reformed communists to bring back the Soviet empire. On the other hand, the Ukrainian nationalists are strong supporters of Ukrainian independence and oppose the reformed communists attempts to establish closer ties with Russia. Catched in the middle are the reform-minded moderate democrats who have allied with the political leadership of the two countries. They have come under criticism from the reformed communists for proceeding with reforms too quickly and from the nationalists for their slowness.

The real struggle over leadership is fought between the parliaments and the presidents. Because of the dominance of the reformed communists, the parliaments in both countries have largely opposed the moderate political leaders. As a result, the parliaments have attempted to wrest power away from the executive and give themselves the primary leadership role. Arguing that the presidential offices are leaning towards dictatorships, the parliaments have threatened to take back the extra powers that were earlier granted to the presidents. This action has raised concern that the parliaments, once empowered, would pass the type of legislation that appeals to the hard-line deputies.
To overcome the ineffective parliamentary system and undermine their opponents, the presidents of Russia and Ukraine have sought to strengthen their offices by introducing presidential rule and ruling by decree. Similarly, in June 1993, President Kravchuk decreed that he is the head of the cabinet, removing Kuchma from that position. Having been democratically elected, both Presidents Yeltsin and Kravchuk have turned to referendums to strengthen their hand in the struggle against parliament. Yeltsin also created a Security Council to advise him on matters of security. The Security Council, whose members are appointed by the President himself, have been granted such power that their decisions are final and are to be implemented accordingly.

Fundamentally, the Russian presidential office has also become a battleground between moderates and conservatives. This has involved challenges to President Yeltsin's authority from his former vice-president, Alexandr Rutskoi. Rutskoi has based his criticisms on the failing Russian economy, thereby gaining support for his anti-reform beliefs from former communist deputies in parliament. Indeed, he has proposed reinstatement of state control over the economy. At the same time, he has criticized President Yeltsin's constitutional drafts, accusing him of establishing a dictatorship. Consolidating his support among conservative parliamentary deputies, it comes as no surprise that he has announced his intentions to run for president when such elections are held.

While this condition focuses on political leadership, the role played by the military in the interaction between Russia and Ukraine lends itself to analysis.
Indeed, the military institution has not been spared and is also showing signs of weakness in its leadership. The split echoes that found in the political institutions between the reformists and conservatives. While the younger officers have largely supported reforms, the higher ranking officers, such as generals, oppose attempts to divide the military structure. Although the Russian defense minister, Pavel Grachev, has pledged neutrality in the struggle over Russian political leadership, one cannot be certain that conservative military leaders would find it in their interest to act and back the hard-line players. Indeed, having been promised by President Yeltsin that the Soviet army would remain unified with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the military leaders feel betrayed by his approval for an independent Ukrainian military force.13 The lack of leadership in the military reinforces the increasing problem of low morale in the military. The situation in Russia is critical where soldiers are returning home from abroad to a poor economy and no housing. The economic reforms have affected military supplies and, therefore, military training. Corruption has also become pervasive in the military, further affecting its leadership capability.

On the other side, Ukraine’s military force has neither fully matured nor developed the strength of loyalty required in order to provide security. Given that the Ukrainian economy did not prosper as initially believed, many of the soldiers are now questioning the wisdom of voting for independence and taking the oaths of allegiance to Ukraine in order to avoid being sent to what was then a worse economic situation in Russia.
Although having a greater impact on economic reforms, the lack of political leadership has had serious implications for Russo-Ukrainian relations. Due to ineffective leadership, statements have been made and actions have been taken by individual actors which have provoked the adversary. For instance, Rutskoi has strongly advocated the claim that Crimea is Russian territory, despite President Yeltsin's efforts to treat the question as an internal matter to be settled by Ukrainian and Crimean authorities. The Russian parliament has aggravated the situation by passing a resolution claiming the Crimean city of Sevastopol, headquarters of the Black Sea Fleet, as Russian.

The officers of the Black Sea Fleet have also failed to cooperate in order to resolve the dispute regarding the status of the fleet. The commander of the fleet, Admiral Igor Kasatonov, has objected to its division, arguing that its combat capability would be seriously affected. At the same time, almost two hundred Black Sea vessels provoked the situation by raising the flag of the Russian navy despite efforts by Presidents Yeltsin and Kravchuk to resist unilateral action regarding the status of the fleet.

By the same token, a pro-nuclear lobby in the Ukrainian parliament has taken control of the dispute regarding the nuclear weapons on Ukrainian territory. Regardless of the repeated assertions by President Kravchuk and the Ukrainian foreign minister, Anatoliy Zlenko, that Ukraine intends to become a non-nuclear state, the parliament has delayed ratification of the START I and NPT treaties. A similar fate awaits other agreements concluded between Moscow and Kiev, including
the June 1993 agreement to divide the Black Sea Fleet. Of greater importance regarding the lack of effective leadership on the nuclear question is the recent resolution passed by the Ukrainian parliament that Ukraine is a nuclear power.

The internal political instability is a great cause for concern in Moscow and Kiev because of the implications for their relations should the moderate leadership be replaced by a hard-line ruler. As a result, Kravchuk has voiced his support for Yeltsin in the struggle against the hard-liners, Rutskoi and Khasbulatov, who are on record for making imperial statements towards Ukraine. As Russian foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev stated during the March 1993 constitutional turmoil. "The danger of revanchism exists both in domestic and foreign policy." Indeed, one prominent leader of the Ukrainian nationalists stated, "If Rutskoi replaces Yeltsin, he will swallow Ukraine in one day."

V. Condition No. 5

There is an absence in the interaction between Russia and Ukraine of a perception that war against each other is of greater cost than failing to achieve their national interests. Although Moscow and Kiev have indicated that war is not a desirable consequence, neither has offered to modify its interests in exchange for peace. President Kravchuk himself has stated, "Our failure to survive would be coupled with conflicts, large-scale conflicts, confrontation between great forces, as it happened in Yugoslavia. This might become a serious problem for the whole world.... A lot of human lives would be lost." Sergei Baburin, an influential hard-
line politician in Moscow, threatened the Ukrainian ambassador to reunite with
Russia or face war.136

Indeed, there is a sense of expectation arising out of their statements that
armed conflict between Russia and Ukraine will occur and that it is only a matter of
when. In the months following Ukraine's August 1991 independence declaration, the
former Soviet army chief of staff stated, "The more separate the armies, the more
real the danger of inter-republic conflicts."137 More recently, Russian officials have
proposed a pre-emptive strike against Ukraine over the nuclear weapons dispute.138
This echoes reports that President Yeltsin discussed a nuclear attack against Ukraine
shortly after its independence. Furthermore, the head of Ukraine's parliamentary
committee on foreign affairs reacted to the July 1993 Russian parliamentary claim to
Sevastopol as "tantamount to a declaration of war against Ukraine."139

While the danger of a nuclear war erupting is recognized by both parties, the
possibility of a low-level conflict is not ruled out. Given that the formation of the
Ukrainian armed forces is still in a developmental stage and may not be fully
prepared to withstand armed aggression, Ukraine is vulnerable to an attack from
Russia. "It is already clear that promoters of the republican armed forces are
scarcely acquainted with the real costs of maintaining a modern army that is up to
European standards, and there is every reason to suppose that neither Ukraine nor,
for that matter, any other former member of the Socialist camp will be able to sustain
a defense burden proportional to that of Western Europe."140 This aspect of their
nation-building process is important to keep in mind while considering the top
priority placed by Moscow on the protection of Russian minorities throughout the 
former USSR; fears that their rights are being violated in Ukraine are being used to 
justify the use of force.¹⁴¹

VI. Condition No. 6

The analysis of the sixth condition, no advantage to defection, is incomplete 
due to the absence of a security regime with which to compare the payoff structures 
of options under consideration by Russia and Ukraine. However, a partial analysis 
based on the assessment of these options indicates that the interaction between Russia 
and Ukraine includes options with high payoff structures. The payoffs were 
measured according to the amount of security they potentially offer without 
compromising the state’s security interests. The options were identified as those 
avenues other than a security regime between Russia and Ukraine. In the end, one 
can speculate that based on their current security interests these options offer 
considerable advantage compared to a security regime while placing the other at a 
disadvantage.

Russia’s options have focused primarily on integration of the former Soviet 
Union and establishing good relations with the West, particularly the G-7 nations. 
These options directly address its security interests of recreating the centre of 
authority in Moscow and maintaining its great power status. As a result, they offer a 
high payoff and place Ukraine at a disadvantage. For instance, reunification with the 
former Soviet Union would put Ukraine in an unfavourable position to develop as a
fully independent state and would recreate the links with the empire that it is trying to break. At the same time, by playing out its role as the great power, Russia eclipses the presence of the other former republics and draws international attention away from them at a time when they are seeking to establish a place for themselves on the international stage.\(^\text{142}\)

Similarly, Ukraine’s options also reflect its security interests of establishing its independence and having as little as possible to do with Russia. Although relations with its immediate neighbours began to develop after its sovereignty declaration of July 1990, with independence these efforts have focused more on security matters and have targeted the countries of the Visegrad Triangle - Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary.\(^\text{143}\) In fact, Kravchuk’s interest in becoming a member of the Visegrad Triangle was evident in his comment that a square is a more perfect shape than a triangle.\(^\text{144}\) In recent months, Ukraine has proposed a new security arrangement for east and central Europe to fill the security vacuum left by the collapse of the USSR and the demise of the Warsaw Pact.\(^\text{145}\) Of great significance regarding this proposal is the exclusion of Russia from its membership list. This is not surprising, however, since the proposal conforms to Ukraine’s interest of breaking its ties with Russia and the former empire. Therefore, this option provides Ukraine with a high payoff and places Russia at a disadvantage since Moscow would be prevented from integrating the former Soviet Union. In the final analysis, the options for both Russia and Ukraine compromise the security interests of the other.
VII. Condition No. 7

As the remaining superpower in the post-Cold War era, the preference of the United States concerning a security regime will serve as the indication of great power orientation in the analysis of the seventh condition. This does not imply that other states do not qualify as great powers, but simply that due to its hegemonic role in the international system, the United States commands greater influence. At the same time, one can confidently state that the US has had the largest presence in the interaction between Russia and Ukraine with respect to security matters. Ultimately, the statements made by Washington indicate that although it would prefer that Russia and Ukraine resolve their differences, a security regime has not been offered as the end-goal.

The United States' interpretation of Russo-Ukrainian relations is seriously influenced by its relations with Russia. Indeed, Washington has had as much difficulty as Moscow in adjusting to the new situation in the former Soviet Union. As a result, it continues to relate to the region in much the same way it did toward the USSR and focuses its attention on Moscow and Russia at the expense of the other newly independent republics. Inadvertently, it is supporting continued Russian dominance in the region by maintaining such a focus.

Indeed, Washington has demonstrated its inexperience in dealing with Ukraine and its insecurities as an independent state existing next to its historic adversary. This inexperience is evident in the expectation of Ukraine's dismantling its nuclear weapons while Russia is allowed to maintain its nuclear system. Similarly,
Washington strongly opposed the halt in transfer of tactical nuclear weapons to Russia for dismantlement, arguing that there was "no reason to believe Russia's public pledge to destroy the arms would not be carried out."\textsuperscript{146} And the offer of considering a security dimension rather than a NATO type security guarantee between US and Ukraine was defended by Washington because a security guarantee would complicate future cooperation with Russia on world security problems.\textsuperscript{147}

At the same time, Washington is concerned with the interaction between Russia and Ukraine insofar as its interests are protected. Fundamentally, American interest in Russo-Ukrainian relations focuses on the dispute over control of the nuclear weapons located on Ukrainian territory.\textsuperscript{148} In essence, Washington opposes Kiev's efforts to take control over the weapons because of the destabilizing effect on regional and global security.\textsuperscript{149} Indeed, there are concerns that Ukraine's inability to adequately and securely control the weapons on its territories could lead to the availability of nuclear weapons and material on the blackmarket, theft of nuclear weapons by terrorists or radicals involved in regional conflicts, and even to an accidental or unauthorized launch.\textsuperscript{150} Secondly, the US is concerned about the impact of Ukraine's becoming a nuclear power on the disarmament process; its non-nuclear status is necessary for the implementation of STARTs I and II.\textsuperscript{151} Thirdly, Washington has serious concerns that the relations between Russia and Ukraine might deteriorate into an armed conflict involving nuclear weapons.

As a result of its perception and its own interests in the nuclear dimension, the United States has pursued a resolution to this dispute based on Ukraine giving up its
nuclear weapons and attempted to influence its behaviour to this end. In fact, Washington withheld recognition of Ukraine after its independence referendum until it was satisfied that Kiev would fulfil its intentions of becoming a non-nuclear state, indicating early on that Ukraine's relations with the US would be shaped by Kiev's attitudes towards its nuclear weapons. The US also used economic aid to influence Ukraine into fulfilling its commitment to become a non-nuclear state; Secretary of State James Baker declared in April 1992 that US aid was subject to Ukraine resuming the transfer of tactical nuclear weapons to Russia.

Although the newly-elected Clinton administration used economic coercion against Ukraine in the initial period, it soon changed its strategy into one emphasising the "carrot" rather than the "stick." Washington realized that economic pressure on Ukraine was ineffective if there was no economic leverage to be used in the first place. Instead, such pressure was strengthening the argument of the nuclear lobby in Kiev that the US was concerned about its relations with Russia and was only interested in Ukraine for its nuclear weapons. As a result, the argument continued, Ukraine was forced to provide its own security against Russian imperialism through its nuclear weapons.

The new approach was based on Washington mediating between Russia and Ukraine to resolve their disputes. During a visit to Kiev in May 1993, Strobe Talbott, the US ambassador-at-large to the former Soviet Union, stated after a meeting with President Kravchuk: "We told our Ukrainian hosts that the US would like to try to find a way to serve as a facilitator in the complex relations that exists
between Ukraine and Russia, if that is acceptable to both states."**134** US officials commenting on the proposal perceived it as beneficial to inject a level of trust between Moscow and Kiev, especially when continued delays in ratification of START 1 were aggravating a sense of distrust in Moscow.**134** All the while, however, Washington seeks only to realize its own interests regarding the dispute.

**VIII. Condition No. 8**

In terms of the condition regarding a decomposability of issues, the interaction between Russia and Ukraine focuses on a minimum of six security issues. As a result, it is evident that the final condition is present in their interaction. The first issue is the protection of ethnic minorities. Russia has a stronger interest in this question given that eleven million ethnic Russians live in Ukraine.**135** At the same time, Ukraine is sensitive to their presence and that, if their rights are not respected, this issue may lead to Russian interference in its domestic affairs.**136** The second issue is territorial claims. Although this topic has primarily focused on Crimea in Ukraine, it is important to remember that it can easily threaten larger areas of Ukraine due to the presence of a high number of ethnic Russians living in the industrialized regions of eastern and southern Ukraine whose loyalty to Kiev cannot be assured. The third issue is the degree of CIS integration. Russia is looking to develop closer ties among the members of the CIS states, while Ukraine, fearing any attempts to resurrect the former Soviet Union or the Russian empire, opposes such moves.
The fourth issue in the interaction between Russia and Ukraine is the distribution of the property of the Soviet military. Although Russia has reluctantly acknowledged Ukraine's efforts to establish an independent armed force, it has resisted Kiev's taking possession of the former Soviet Union's military equipment, personnel, and training schools in order to do so. On the other hand, Ukraine insists that it has legitimate claims to these items given that, during its membership in the Soviet Union, it contributed to their development. The fifth issue is the division of the Black Sea Fleet which involves both the Crimean question and the division of the Soviet military. The final issue is the control and ownership of the nuclear weapons located on Ukrainian territory. In order to provide security against feared Russian aggression, Ukraine claims ownership over the weapons and essentially has become a nuclear power. Because Russia still maintains the operational control over these weapons, it argues that these weapons belong to Russia.

IX. Summary

In the analysis of conditions for the development of a security regime, this chapter has shown that none of the four necessary conditions is present in the interaction between Russia and Ukraine at the present time: these two countries have incompatible security interests with respect to one another; the interaction shows no capability of responsiveness; the parties lack a desire to curb the security dilemma; and there is an absence of effective political leadership in both Moscow and Kiev. At the same time, three of the remaining four conditions were also absent:
the interaction lacks a perception of a high cost of warfare; both countries have options available to them other than a security regime; the policies of the United States as the great power do not attest to its desire for a security regime forming. The final condition, a decomposability of issues, is the only one present in the interaction between these two former republics of the Soviet Union. The next chapter will draw conclusions about the potential for the development of a security regime in future relations between Russia and Ukraine.
Chapter 4 - ENDNOTES

1. The other former republics of the Soviet Union were invited to join, but their participation was a secondary consideration for Russia to the involvement of Ukraine.


7. Former Army Chief of Staff General Vladimir Lobov said, "The more separate the armies, the more real the danger of inter-republic conflicts." Quoted in "Soviet Army on Defense, in the Ukraine," The New York Times, November 12, 1991.


10. The policy changed for a number of reasons. According to Ukraine's definition of strategic forces as nuclear weapons, Kiev could have taken control of the fleet once it had had all its tactical nuclear weapons removed. As a result, Russia acknowledged that the Black Sea Fleet was no longer subordinate to the CIS command since it was not a strategic force, leaving the door open for Moscow to lay claim to it. Second, the CIS was increasingly losing its credibility as a joint military structure since more newly independent republics were forming their own national military forces. Therefore, rather than allow Ukraine to take control of the fleet, Russia claimed the fleet as its own.


17. On July 9, 1993, the Russian parliament designated Sevastopol to be a Russian city. This followed the parliament's decree on December 5, 1992 that the status of Sevastopol be examined. "Ukrainian Government Protests Russia's Claim to Sevastopol," The Ukrainian Weekly, December 13, 1992, pp. 1, 9.


19. For instance, the citizenship law of Estonia denies Estonian citizenship to any Russian whose residence in the country has been dated after 1939. In Ukraine, citizenship is granted according to the principle of territoriality and not ethnicity.


21. In February 1993, President Yeltsin stated that Russia is entitled to "Special powers as the guarantor of peace and stability in this region." Quoted in "Russia, Ukraine Stalemated in Arms Talks," The Christian Science Monitor, March 8, 1993.


Union in foreign affairs before it collapsed indicates the importance placed on this policy.

27. These institutions were largely financial and include the Soviet state bank. "A House of Cards," Maclean's, December 16, 1991, p. 16.

28. At a May 13, 1993 CIS meeting of defense ministers, Russia rejected a proposal that would have reversed earlier decisions and place the nuclear weapons under a joint command involving the non-nuclear states in addition to creating a joint armed forces. The Russian Deputy Defense Minister was quoted as saying, "Nuclear arms should belong to a particular state. Russia is internationally recognised as the successor of the Soviet Union in this sphere and it has sole rights." "CIS Defense Ministers Fail to Agree on Nuclear Arms," Reuters wire service, May 13, 1993.


31. In a referendum held on December 1, 1991, Ukrainians overwhelmingly approved of independence from the Soviet Union. However, it is important to note that Crimea, a region heavily populated by ethnic Russians, voted 56% in favour with a 50% voter turn-out.

32. "Zlenko, Brzezinski Address Ukraine's Role in International Community," The Ukrainian Weekly, October 18, 1992, p. 4.

33. Szporluk, Roman, "The Soviet West - or Far Eastern Europe?" East European Politics and Societies 5:3, p. 475.

34. In the days surrounding Ukraine's independence referendum, the President of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev, warned Ukraine of the implications of its independence and of its failure to sign the draft union treaty intended to redraft relations among the republics of the USSR. Indeed, the Ukrainian parliament rejected the union treaty on December 7, leading to the creation of the CIS on December 8, thus effectively destroying the USSR.


36. Those agreements amended by Ukraine include the declaration first establishing the CIS, while it rejected the CIS collective security agreement of June 1992, the CIS charter of November 1992, the treaty on an economic consultative committee of October 1992, the creation of CIS inter-parliamentary assembly. With respect to the May 1993 draft for an economic union of the CIS, Kravchuk expressed his concern.

37. More pointedly, Kiev did not send its defense minister to the CIS military meeting on June 15, 1993 which discussed the future of the joint military command.


39. As stated by Ukraine’s Minister of Defense, Major-General Konstantin Morozov, "The people of Ukraine need to know that we are a real state with our own army." Quoted in "Ukrainians Set Plans in Motion for Independent Army," The Financial Times, October 12-13, 1991.


42. During the coup, Kravchuk was asked to comply with the new leaders or face the Soviet army. Blair, Bruce, "Lighten Up On Ukraine," The New York Times, June 1, 1993.

43. Konstantin Morozov, the Ukrainian Defense Minister, in fact ordered 6,000 army and air force officers who did not take the oath of allegiance to leave Ukraine. "6,000 Officers Ordered Out of Ukraine’s Armed Forces," The Edmonton Journal, June 12, 1992.


47. Luciuk, Lubomyr, "Fight For Crimea Shows Russia’s True Nature," The Ottawa Citizen, April 2, 1992. It is important to note, however, that a Tatar separatist movement led by Mustafa Dzhemilev has developed which has helped to bring
Crimean and Kiev interests together with respect to maintaining the peninsula's territorial integrity.


49. The Crimean parliament subsequently rescinded the declaration and placed a moratorium on the independence referendum that was to be held on August 2 that year.


51. Kiev has in mind such ethnic groups as the Hungarian population in Trans-Carpathia, the Romanian population in Bessarabia and Bukovyna regions, and the Russian population in eastern and southern Ukraine. These regions came under the jurisdiction of Ukraine as a result of border changes from World War II. "Crimean Give and Take," *Time*, June 8, 1992, p. 24.

52. The Ukrainian foreign minister, Anatoliy Zlenko, stated that approval of START and the NPT ensures Ukraine's acceptance by the international community. "Ukrainian Foreign Minister Defends START Against Nationalists," Reuters wire service, June 3, 1993.


54. The North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) has been viewed as a face-saving device that indirectly associates the former Warsaw Pact countries with NATO until a more permanent security framework can be arranged.

55. Kiev asserted that as a sovereign state, Ukraine has a right to be an independent part of the arms control process, implying that a foreign country will not make its decisions. "Ukraine Delivers Nuclear Arsenal," *The Globe and Mail*, May 7, 1992.

56. A "Ukrainian" identity in this context is based on territorial, rather than on ethnic, principles.

57. Despite numerous assertions that Ukraine will honour the START treaty, ratification has been consistently delayed since Ukraine signed the START protocol in May 1992 which obligated it to ratify the agreement as soon as possible. "Soviet

58. Statements made by Ukrainian parliamentarians in March 1992 attest to this policy. Ihor Derkach: "Ukraine will remain a nuclear state." Serhei Kolesnyk: "We don't even have access to the bases or people who deal with the weapons." Quoted in "Ukraine Seeks To Get Control Of Nuclear Arms," The Wall Street Journal, March 26, 1992.


60. The consultative veto implied that the CIS command could not launch weapons from Ukraine without Kiev's approval. CIS armed personnel manned the weapons.

61. In March 1992, a Ukrainian air force general assumed control over a division of strategic bombers despite the agreement that the delivery systems were controlled by the CIS. "Ukraine Controls Nuclear Bombers," The Financial Times, March 19, 1992. Although Ukraine claimed administrative control, it maintained that the warheads remained under the operational control of the CIS. Administrative control was asserted by having the weapons manned by Ukrainian personnel who have sworn allegiance to Ukraine. Operational control is based on expert reports that Ukraine could develop its own system of launch codes. This view is shared by Russian officials. See "Ukraine: Learning to Love the Bomb?" Chicago Tribune, March 24, 1993; "Is Ukraine Reaching For Control Over Nuclear Arms?" Washington Post Foreign Service Wire Service, June 3, 1993; "Ukraine Pursues Missile Control," The Washington Times, June 10, 1993; "Nuclear Neighbours Keep the Fences Up," The Washington Times, June 11, 1993; "Ukraine to Keep Nuclear Arms For Up to Two Years," The Financial Times, June 12-13, 1993.

62. In effect, Ukraine's ownership of the nuclear weapons would be acknowledged if an agreement was reached on financial compensation for the fissile material in the warheads. As stated by Ukrainian parliamentarian Dmytro Pavlychko, "If we do not say that these weapons are ours, then we have no right to exchange these weapons for security guarantees and compensation." Quoted in "Ukraine Claims Ownership of Nuclear Weapons," Reuters wire service, July 2, 1993. The START I treaty applies to the destruction of 130 of the 176 nuclear missiles on Ukrainian territory. Although Ukraine signed the 1992 protocol in which it pledged to become a non-nuclear country, it has become ambiguous about the fate of the remaining 46 missiles. In July 1993, there were reports that the warheads to be removed from the SS-19s covered by START I would remain in Ukraine. "First Ukrainian Strategic Missiles Being Dismantled," Reuters wire service, July 16, 1993. See "Ukraine
Seeks Security Guarantees, Compensation Before Ratifying START,” The Ukrainian Weekly, November 15, 1992; “Ukraine to Keep Nuclear Arms for Up to Two Years,” The Financial Times, June 12-13, 1993. As described by Oleh Bilorus, the Ukrainian ambassador to the United States, “We want a guarantee that the powers will never use nuclear weapons against Ukraine, never resort to conventional force or the threat of force, will abstain from economic pressure in a controversy and respect our territorial integrity and the inviolability of borders.” Bilorus, Oleh, “Ukraine Needs Protection,” The New York Times, February 11, 1993. More recently, President Kravchuk asserted that the remaining forty-six SS-24 missiles are not covered by the START treaty at all. “Ukraine Says SS-24s Not Included in START Treaty,” Reuters wire service, July 30, 1993.


65. The Dagomys agreement stated that both sides would not take unilateral action regarding the Black Sea Fleet until a final settlement on its division was reached. However, Russia took issue on the continued practice of some sailors taking the oath of allegiance to Ukraine and, therefore, announcing those vessels as the property of Ukraine. At the same time, it is interesting to note that the first summit meeting held at Dagomys did not occur until June 1992.


67. Yet another inter-state commission is to be set up to implement the agreement. A similar commission was established after the Yalta summit to consider how the Black Sea Fleet could best be divided between Russia and Ukraine but was not successful and broke down in April 1993 due to both Russia and Ukraine continuing to lay claim over the Fleet outside of the negotiations. At the same time, the agreement is vague on such aspects as the terms under which the Russian Navy can lease Sevastopol and dual citizenship for the sailors. "Russia, Ukraine Reach Accord Over Black Sea," The Wall Street Journal, June 18, 1993. A September 1993 agreement concluded at Massandra between Kiev and Moscow, however, stipulates that Russia owns the entire Black Sea Fleet.


69. The meeting of March 20, 1992 is notable for its failure to produce agreements on the Black Sea Fleet, the composition of the CIS armed forces, and nuclear weapons.

71. This criticism comes from former Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev in "Chained Together by the Past," The Globe and Mail, March 27, 1992.


73. The CIS was responsible for forming a monitoring committee. The absence of this committee directly led to Ukraine halting the shipment of tactical weapons to Russia for dismantlement in March 1992 until the process could be monitored. The transfer resumed on the Russian guarantee that the weapons will be destroyed and under the supervision of Ukrainian personnel.


75. Although it has been common practice for embassies in Kiev to operate out of hotel rooms until a more permanent location can be found, it is interesting that for some time Russia did not have a permanent building, indicating a lack of commitment on its part toward relations with Ukraine. In fact, the Russian ambassador, Leonid Smoliakov, is reported to have informed East European diplomats that their embassies in Kiev would soon become consulates once more.


77. Crow, Suzanne, "Russia's Relations with Members of the Commonwealth," RFE/RL Research Report 1:19 (May 9, 1992), p. 9. At the same time, Russia inherited the foreign ministry organization from the Soviet Union which also had ignored the republics because they were not foreign.


81. ibid., p. 24.
82. Ukraine wants the security guarantees enshrined in a multinational agreement and covering nuclear and conventional threats, respect for territorial integrity, and a commitment not to use pressure against it. At the same time, Russia wants Ukraine to accept the security guarantees after it has ratified START I. "Ukraine considers Security Guarantees Insufficient," RFE/RL Daily Report, June 1, 1993.

83. The primary reason for Ukraine pursuing a nuclear-free status did not involve addressing Russian concerns. Instead, Kiev sought the non-nuclear option in order to gain international political and economic support for independence, especially from the United States. At the same time, this policy was strongly influenced by the presence of an anti-nuclear sentiment in Ukraine as a result of the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear reactor disaster. A final reason for pursuing this policy was the impact of a nuclear force on Ukraine's financial commitments. See Lewis Dunn, Containing Nuclear Proliferation, Adelphi Papers No. 263 (Winter 1991), p. 15; Victor Batiouk, Ukraine's Non-Nuclear Option, UNIDIR Research Paper No. 24, (United Nations: United Nations, 1992), p. 11.

84. Kiev halted the transfer of these weapons because of suspicions that Russia was redeploying the weapons rather than destroying them.


86. The December 1992 deadline for ratification of START I was not met by Ukraine. Ukraine is demanding financial compensation from the West and from Russia for the dismantled nuclear weapons it owns.


89. Ibid., p. 18.


93. In "Ukraine Seeks Talk on Fleet," *The Washington Times*, May 31, 1993, the Ukrainian foreign minister was quoted as saying, "This ... undermines the basis for possible future agreements on dividing the fleet."


96. Previous attempts to resolve the issue have fallen victim to nationalist sentiments and misunderstandings. "Presidents of Russia, Ukraine Agree to Split Black Sea Fleet," *The Washington Post*, June 19, 1993.


100. Ukraine wants to take these guarantees to the Ukrainian parliament before START I and the NPT can be ratified. By guaranteeing Ukraine's security in the CIS framework, Russia's offer has provoked Ukraine's negative reaction since Kiev has consistently resisted placing its security under the responsibility of the CIS.


105. "L’Ukraine veut des garanties pour sa sécurité," Le Devoir, April 29, 1992; "Ukraine's Leader Says Russia Still Has 'Imperial Ambitions,'" The Washington Post, June 18, 1992. Boris Tarasiuk, the Ukrainian deputy foreign minister, has accused Russia of reasserting its hegemony in the region by claiming that only it can ensure the safety and maintenance of the nuclear weapons in Ukraine. "Ukraine says Nuclear Fears are Unfounded," The Financial Times, March 5, 1993.


109. Handelman, Stephen, "Russian, Ukrainian Relations Turn Sour," The Toronto Star, March 20, 1992. This sentiment was echoed by Dmytro Pavlychko, head of Ukraine's parliamentary Foreign Relations Committee in his statement, "The issue of Ukraine transferring its nuclear weapons to Russia -- this is impossible. We do not trust Russia," quoted in Associated Press wire service, April 5, 1993.


115. It was also reported that an anti-aircraft unit was placed on alert in the event that they may try to leave Ukraine. "Friction Rises as Ukraine and Russia Clash Over Ex-Soviet Armed Forces," The New York Times, March 3, 1992. This rejection follows the defection of six pilots and their tactical bombers to Russia. "Maintain Military, Soviet Chief Urges," The Globe and Mail, February 19, 1992.
116. It was believed that communist candidates would be voted out of office.

117. This opposition in Ukraine is in contrast with the alliance between the communists and the nationalists to back independence in return for power. "Unholy Alliance of the Heart Robs Ukraine of its Head," The Financial Times, June 16, 1992.


119. Some Yeltsin allies, however, have attempted to dismiss Khasbulatov as the parliamentary speaker for undermining the parliamentary process. RFE/RL Daily Report, June 28, 1993.

120. The sociological service of the Russian congress conducted a poll, revealing that 55.4% of the deputies believe that the parliament, not the president, should be granted greater powers. "Yeltsin Fends Off No-Confidence Vote - But Just Barely," The Toronto Star, April 7, 1992.


122. The Ukrainian parliament did take back from the prime minister the power to rule by decree. At the same time, it denied President Kravchuk’s request to be given this power and to eliminate the position of prime minister. "Ukraine MPs Back Prime Minister," The Financial Times, May 22-23, 1993.


125. Both Yeltsin and Kravchuk are the first popularly elected presidents of their respective countries. The Russian referendum held in April 1993 provided Yeltsin with the legitimacy to proceed with political reforms. Ukraine had planned to hold a similar referendum; however, it has since been cancelled.

127. It is important to note Rutskoi's support among military leaders and other conservative and nationalist groups.


129. "Rutskoi to Form Opposition; Stripped of Last Powers," RFE/RL Daily Report, May 14, 1993. President Yeltsin cannot dismiss Rutskoi who was popularly elected as vice-president in 1991 alongside Yeltsin. However, prior to his arrest in October 1993 for treason, Yeltsin weakened Rutskoi's position by taking away responsibilities and privileges.


134. Their military doctrines include the principles of rejecting war or the threatened use of force as state policy. See Mihalisko, Kathleen, "Defense and Security Planning in Ukraine," RFE/RL Report on the USSR 3:49 (December 6, 1991), p. 19; McMichael, Scott, "Russia's New Military Doctrine," RFE/RL Research Report 1:40 (October 9, 1992), p. 46. The viability of these doctrines has been discussed in the section analyzing Condition No. 3.


138. "Ukraine's Trio of Crises," The Washington Times, June 4, 1993. This fear is heightened in light of reports that Ukraine may soon have the ability to retarget the nuclear weapons on its territory and aim them towards Russia. "Ukraine Dangers Rising," The Washington Times, June 20, 1993.


143. With the 1993 division of Czechoslovakia into the Czech republic and Slovakia, the Visegrad Triangle has since become a "square." For simplicity, the paper will continue to regard this informal arrangement by its former label. In any case, Ukraine independently concluded treaties with Poland and Hungary in 1990 recognizing existing borders. Such obstacles as minority rights remain in the relations between Ukraine and Romania that have prevented the conclusion of similar treaties, although cultural and economic ties have been established. In 1991, Ukraine and Hungary concluded a friendship and cooperation treaty, while the next year they concluded an agreement on military cooperation. In April and May 1992, Ukraine and Czechoslovakia signed an arms supply agreement and a treaty on good-neighbourly relations and cooperation. A similar treaty was concluded between Ukraine and Poland in May 1992. More recently, Ukraine and Poland have signed military agreements. See Natalie Melnyczuk, "Ukraine Develops an Independent Foreign Policy," RFE/RL Report on the USSR 3:43 (October 25, 1991), pp. 22-23; Bohdan Nahaylo, "Ukraine and the Visegrad Triangle," RFE/RL Research Report 1:23 (June 5, 1992), p. 29.


145. This security arrangement involves the Baltic states, Belarus, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Ukraine. It would be based on consultations and contact, rather than on a fixed structure. It is intended to supplement the CSCE process and fill a security void until a firmer arrangement within the NATO structure could be finalized.


148. American Senator Richard Lugar was quoted at a congressional briefing regarding nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union as saying, "Our number one priority should be the safe, prompt dismantlement and destruction of the nuclear weapons." Quoted in "Sens. Lugar and Nunn Assess Nukes in Former Soviet Union," The Ukrainian Weekly, December 13, 1992, p. 2.


151. As quoted by an American official, "START 2 is not going anywhere until START 1 is ratified by everyone and everyone joins the NPT as a non-nuclear state," in "You’d be Nervous Living Next to a Bear," The Economist, May 15, 1993, p. 21.


154. "US to Press Ukraine on Nuclear Issue," The Christian Science Monitor, April 5, 1993. The Clinton administration also refused to set up a meeting with the Ukrainian Prime Minister Kuchma and Clinton because of Ukraine’s delays in ratifying START 1 and NPT.


157. Although four and a half million ethnic Ukrainians live in Russia, they are significantly overwhelmed by the size of the Russian population and have been integrated into Russian society and culture. "Ukraine’s Not a Kid Brother Anymore," The New York Times, June 20, 1993.

158. In contrast, there are no indications that the Ukrainian government is willing to interfere in Russia’s domestic affairs to ensure the protection of ethnic Ukrainians living in Russia.
Chapter Five - Conclusion

This thesis set out to establish a list of conditions necessary for the formation of a security regime and to determine the potential for a security regime developing between Russia and Ukraine. This final chapter draws conclusions about the potential for the development of a security regime between these two countries. At the same time, it compares this interaction with those between Finland and the Soviet Union and between Japan and the Soviet Union for similarities and differences. The chapter also reviews the list of conditions established by this thesis. Finally, it addresses the applicability of this theory to post-Cold War situations.

The interaction between Russia and Ukraine indicates that at this time the conditions necessary for a security regime do not exist and, therefore, the relationship shows no potential for the development of a security regime. According to the criteria laid out in Chapter Two, a security regime is unlikely due to the absence of the four necessary conditions. The security interests of these two countries fundamentally contradict one another and prevent each from realizing its own interests. The interaction shows no capability of meaningful communication and consultation. There is no indication that the states want to restrain their security dilemma; instead, these two countries have perpetuated the cycle of action-reaction that reinforces perceptions of mistrust. Finally, the interaction lacks effective political leadership in both Moscow and Kiev.
Although the remaining four conditions were found to be unnecessary for the development of security regimes, they were included in the analysis because of their presence in the literature. As a result, the relations between these two former republics of the Soviet Union fail to indicate the presence of an awareness of the high cost of warfare among the political leaders. Russia and Ukraine both perceive advantages in defecting and putting the other at a disadvantage. Of interest also is the absence of the desire of the United States for a security regime to develop between Russia and Ukraine. In contrast to the absence of the previous conditions, the interaction reveals a rather strong presence of the final condition, the decomposability of issues.

A comparison of the results among the three case studies will now be undertaken and will focus on the behaviours of the Soviet Union and Russia, assuming that they may be treated as constant factors in these case studies. At the same time, a comparison of the other actors of the dyad, i.e., Finland, Japan, and Ukraine, will be conducted. In the first instance, it is interesting that the Soviet Union and Russia both hold similar security interests based on having unhostile borders. Finland and Japan, however, either catered specifically to this interest or happened to hold a compatible security interest. Given that Ukraine’s security interests directly oppose those of Russia, one might suggest that these interests could be adjusted in order to strengthen the likelihood of a security regime developing. In fact, the process of accommodating Moscow’s interests may have already begun. In September 1993, Russia and Ukraine concluded yet another agreement on the Black
Sea Fleet. The terms of the agreement, however, clearly favour Russian concerns. Not only does Moscow get control of the entire Black Sea Fleet, but Kiev also agreed to the complete dismantlement of the strategic nuclear weapons located on Ukrainian territory.

Secondly, the interactions demonstrate that communication and consultation are important conditions to the formation of a security regime. However, those involving Finland and Japan indicate that such activities must be meaningful and successful in order to influence the development of security regimes. It must also be noted that progress in this area did not occur overnight and reflect years of trial and error. As a result, a similar process might be currently taking place between Russia and Ukraine where success cannot be expected until considerable time has passed.

Thirdly, the interactions between Finland and the Soviet Union and between Japan and the Soviet Union underline the greater importance placed on securing Moscow's trust and gaining its confidence than on Finland and Japan feeling secure. Indeed, Moscow attempted to restrain the security dilemma not necessarily by controlling its own actions but by making certain that a hostile government did not come to power in Finland. With respect to Japan, however, the situation was much different given the American military presence. As a result, Moscow was more concerned with avoiding provocative action. Under Gorbachev, the Soviet Union pursued a more direct course of cutting its military in order to make Japan feel more secure. This condition is noticeably absent from the interaction between Russia and Ukraine, suggesting that Kiev must make a greater effort in making Russia feel more
secure. At the same time, Russia must also take responsibility and control its actions to prevent a hostile government from coming to power in Kiev.

Fourthly, it is evident that effective political leadership plays a significant role in the development of security regimes. Therefore, it is critical that the leadership problems in Moscow and Kiev be resolved as soon as possible and that effective leaders be put in place in order that they may influence policies and decision-making essential to settling the disputes with the adversary.

Fifthly, the secondary status which Moscow attributed to Finland and Japan contributed to the high cost of warfare in their interactions. Fundamentally, its values for these two countries did not carry as high a price as war. On the other hand, because Ukraine is of primary importance to Russia, the analysis suggested that war would be a price worth paying in order to realize these interests. As a result, the cost of war must be raised in this interaction in order that a security regime form.

Sixthly, it is important that the Soviet Union had no advantage to defection in its interactions with Finland and Japan. At the same time, however, it is interesting that although Finland also did not have an advantage, the analysis indicated that Japan did not have options available to it short of war. Since a security regime formed in its interaction with the Soviet Union despite the weak presence of this condition, one might put less emphasis on it. However, one cannot completely disregard the absence of this condition from the interaction between Russia and Ukraine based on the inference that war carries an affordable price in their relations.
That the United States showed no explicit interest in the development of a security regime in all three interactions is of great interest and can be explained by the fact that the Soviet Union, or Russia, was involved in these interactions. Most importantly, Washington considers Ukraine to be part of Moscow's sphere of influence, much like Finland. Although Japan was not in that sphere of influence, Washington's concerns regarding these interactions are focused more on protecting its own interests and less on the development of a security regime. Finally, where the Soviet Union or Russia is concerned, the number of issues in its interactions makes no difference in the formation of security regimes.

A closer examination of the analysis of the conditions suggests a few interesting conclusions. In the first instance, the role of political leadership cannot be emphasised enough. Not only is it significant in its own right, but it was also shown to have influence over other conditions. Significantly, these conditions include the compatibility of mutual interests and a shared desire to curb the security dilemma. Without the proper leadership in place, the appropriate interests and policies for security regime development are not introduced. Paasikivi, for instance, was influential in changing Finland's security interests and pursuing policies that allowed a security regime to form between Finland and the Soviet Union.

Secondly, the conditions and the indicators need further refinement. For example, information on conditions one, mutually compatible interests, and three, a shared desire to curb the security dilemma, and on one and six, no advantage to defection, often overlapped, particularly in the interaction between Russia and
Ukraine. This suggests that the theory needs to distinguish between interests and policies in order to strengthen its analytical utility. At the same time, determining the high cost of warfare involves many different variables, only one of which was analyzed here, the perception of the leaders. As a result, the condition cannot be analyzed properly in the context of security regime development. In addition, a problem surfaced in the analysis of the presence or absence of advantages to defection. Since a security regime does not exist in the interaction between Russia and Ukraine, there was nothing to which the options and defection payoffs could be compared. Therefore, the applicability of this condition to assessments of the potential for security regime development is questionable and might only be useful in interactions known to develop security regimes. Furthermore, a more comprehensive explanation of the condition regarding the great powers is necessary. The theoretical explanation of this condition is somewhat vague on whether a great power desires a comprehensive or a partial security regime. At the same time, it is important to remember that the indicators used in this thesis may be wrong and others may produce different results.

Finally, the applicability of the theory of security regime development to post-Cold War situations is limited. This framework in its current form offers an inadequate treatment of nationalism, whose importance has elevated to dangerous heights in the post-Cold War system. Although nationalism plays a significant role in the interaction between Russia and Ukraine, it was not given the attention it deserved under the theoretical framework of security regime development. Although this
framework provides the basis for examining inter-state relations in a new environment and offers an opportunity to better understand the quality of the interaction between Russia and Ukraine, this particular interaction cannot be entirely understood according to the conditions of security regime development. Rather than dismiss the theory outright, further research is required on additional conditions in order to take account of a transformed international system and the role of nationalism in inter-state relations.

Ultimately, this thesis has developed a basic formula according to which the potential for security regimes can be determined in interstate interactions. Further research on the conditions and their indicators is necessary in order to strengthen the utility of this framework. Although one cannot predict the course of events between Russia and Ukraine, this analysis suggests that it is unlikely that at this time a security regime will develop in their interaction.
APPENDIX A

DECLARATION OF THE FORMATION OF
THE COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES

We, the heads of state of Byelorussia, Russia and Ukraine:

NOTING that talks on the preparation of a new union treaty have reached a dead end and the process of the secession of republics from the USSR and forming the independent states has come to reality;

STATING that the shortsighted policy of the centre has led to a deep political and economic crisis, to disintegration of the economy and catastrophic decline of the living conditions of practically all the sectors of the population;

TAKING into account growing social tension in many regions of the former USSR, which have led to ethnic conflicts and resulted in numerous victims;

ACKNOWLEDGING the responsibility before our people and the world community and the growing necessity of practical implementation of political and economic reforms;

HEREBY declare the formation of a Commonwealth of Independent States, about which the parties signed an agreement on December 8, 1991.

The Commonwealth of Independent States, consisting of the Republic of Byelorussia, the Russian Federation and Ukraine, is open to all member states of the former USSR, as well as to other states who share the aims and principles of this agreement.

The member states of the Commonwealth intend to conduct a policy aimed at reinforcing international peace and security. The guarantee fulfilment of international obligations from treaties and agreements of the former USSR and insure unified control over nuclear weapons and their nonproliferation.

Stanisavl Shushkevich,
Chairman, Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Byelorussia

Boris Yeltsin,
President, Russian Federation

Leonid Kravchuk,
President, Ukraine

December 8, 1991, Minsk

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