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CARLETON UNIVERSITY
Department of Sociology and Anthropology

**Masks of Domination:
The Deployment of Morality in a Turkish Village**

**A Dissertation Submitted to
Carleton University, Faculty of Arts
In Candidacy for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy**

**By
Suzan M. Ilcan**

Ottawa, Ontario

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Masks of Domination: The Deployment of Morality
in a Turkish Village

submitted by

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in partial fulfilment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Chair, Department of Sociology and Anthropology

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September 1993

Abstract

This thesis investigates the relationship between morality and social relations in a rural Turkish society. Specifically, I reveal how the villagers of Sakli make use of the values of tradition, ancestral history, solidarity, reciprocity, harmony, unity, etc. as elements of a moral struggle aimed at overcoming and overpowering the other in social life. In the spheres of class and gender relations in general, and more specifically in the arenas of village identity, descent and kin relations, domestic economy, household composition, marriage and religious practice, I show how moral discourses serve as clever disguises and subtle expressions of the aims of domination.

Sociological conceptions of morality customarily take the view that moral codes represent aspects of everyday 'reality' or they conceive of immorality as that which morality makes use of as a means to its own aggrandizement. Instead, I show how these legalistic and functionalistic explanations overlook the fact that the origins of morality are different, and indeed opposite, from the values expressed by moral claims. I therefore hold in suspense the notion that morality characterizes social reality and focus on the utility of moral claims in constructing, advancing and masking relations of domination and subordination. Employing a genealogical approach to morality, I show how moral claims, rather than preserving, defending or protecting something, emerge from a dissatisfaction with a state of affairs or course of events. It is this context of disjunction -- brought about through the 'coming up against' a superior force -- that moral discourse develops its strategies aimed at appropriating the other in a system of meaning (rather than just eliminating that which opposes it). In this way, morality is a form of domination that attempts to subsume people into a system of governance, i.e., making them 'subjects' to these meanings and thereby incorporating them into its beliefs. Morality is able to accomplish this by seducing people to believe in its goals and speak and act its 'truths.' In rural Turkish society, social relations are replete with battles for governance. These power struggles incite moral discourses to the point where all that is cherished as sacred and immutable is appropriated and transformed as a means and a disguise for the projects of morality.

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Table of Contents

Abstract	i
Acknowledgements	ii
List of Tables	v
Map of Sakli	vi
Preface	vii-xiii
Introduction	1
Chapter 1: Theorizing Morality: The Conceptual Framework	7-19
Chapter 2: The Phenomena of Morality	20-39
2.1 Morality as "Repression" in the Islamic Context	20
2.3 Forces of Constraint as Productive	33
Chapter 3: The Discursive Production of Morality	40-85
3.1 A Divided Morality	40
3.2 The Motive Behind Morality: Forces of Constraint	53
3.3 Methodology and the Study of Morality	71
3.4 The Method of Genealogy	73
3.5 Towards a Re-contextualization of Morality	83
Chapter 4: The Moral World of the Village	86-121
4.1 The Village	86
4.2 Local Residents and Population	93
4.3 The Social Construction of Village Identity	96
4.3.1 Social Location	98
4.3.2 Gender	101
4.3.3 Social Class	108
Chapter 5: The Deployment of Descent: The <i>Kök</i> Construct	122-139
5.1 Descent	122
5.1.1 The <i>Kök</i> Construct	122
5.1.2 Village Descent Groups	125
5.2 Morality and Descent Groups	129
Chapter 6: Kin Terminology	140-158
6.1 Introducing the Problem	140
6.2 Formal Analysis of Kin Classification	141
6.3 Themes of Kin Terminology	146

Chapter 7: The Domestic Economy	159-201
7.1 Social Transformation and Rural Migration in Turkey	160
7.2 Approaching the Problem of Migration	164
7.3 Agricultural Relations and Migratory Processes	169
7.3.1 Discontinuities within Subsistence Agriculture and Seasonal Migrant Labour	175
7.3.2 The Order of Hierarchy: Gender and Small-Scale Agriculture	181
7.3.3 Marginal and Near Landless Farming Sectors	191
Chapter 8: Households, Headship and Hierarchy	202-230
8.1 The Constitution of Households	202
8.1.1. Headship and Hierarchical Relations	204
8.2 Household Composition	209
8.2.1 Single-Generational Households	213
8.2.2 Two-Generational Households	214
8.2.3 Three- or Four-Generational Households	219
8.3 A Moral Regime: Household Organization and Processes	225
Chapter 9: Marriage and the Deployment of Alliance	231-275
9.1 The Problem of Endogamy	232
9.2 The Ideals of Spouse Selection	238
9.3 Residence After Marriage	250
9.4 Marriage Patterns	257
9.4.1 Close and Distant Kin Marriages	259
9.4.2 <i>Mahalle</i> and <i>Komsu</i> Marriages	266
9.4.3 Village Marriages	270
9.5 Behind the Face of Endogamy	273
Chapter 10: The Morality of Magic	276-301
10.1 Sorcery and Islam	277
10.2 Sorceric Practice in Sakli	288
Conclusion	302-310
Appendix A: Pronunciation Table	311
Bibliography	312-329

List of Tables

Table 1: The <i>Aile</i> and Kin Terminology	142
Table 2: Household Composition	211
Table 3: Marriage Patterns in Sakli	258
Table 4: Residence by Type of Marriage	266
Table 5: Residence Prior to Marriage by Kin/Non-Kin Types (as a percent of total marriages)	271
Table 6: Residence Prior to Marriage by Kin/Non-Kin Types (as a percent of clan marriages)	272

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Preface

At the beginning of this project, one of my research objectives was to study moral/social relations and institutions in a rural Turkish society, with a view to construct a theoretical framework that addressed the themes characteristic of these relations. In order to embark on a project of this nature, I required a complex and flexible research plan: a plan that would facilitate the ethnographic method and the process of producing data. As a result, the research process comprised many aspects, with each plan designed to suit the demands of the research site and the people within it. It is to this discussion that I shall now turn.

The context within which one does community-based research, whether this be in a 'developing' society or in an urban or rural environment, affects the means and the procedures of conducting research. Turkey's cultural and political milieu, for instance, influenced the way I could study and research social relations. First of all, choosing to live and work in Turkey required me to improve my knowledge of the language and my familiarity with this society's general systems of beliefs. In working towards this goal, I took grammar lessons and increased my working vocabulary before leaving for Turkey in the late summer of 1988. After arriving, I further acquainted myself with their 'uses of language' and with the styles of communication and modes of gesture.

Secondly, awareness of the Turkish state's historical and political role in everyday social life sensitized and alerted me to certain ethical and political issues that many researchers and activists confront in 'third world' economies. In the early days, from my

detached position in Canada, I could only estimate how this might affect the research process. Upon arriving in Turkey, however, I realized that the on-going civil war in the eastern parts of Turkey, the state's right-wing policies, the omnipresence of the military in everyday life, and the growing polarization of social classes, among other things, persuaded me to establish contact with professional researchers in Turkey. I met several sociologists and anthropologists at the Middle East Technical University who later became significant resource people. Their expertise and knowledge of rural peoples and their on-going research in Turkey proved to be extremely important in developing my awareness of the problems associated with studying rural people, culture and politics.

Prior to receiving formal authorization to conduct research in Turkey, I visited over forty villages in the central and north-western part of the country before deciding upon Sakli as the research site. Very little research has been done in this geographic area, especially in the context of studying moral relations and institutions. On this basis, I approached Sakli's *muhtar* (village head) for permission to live in the community. Having his approval, I moved from my temporary residence to the village.

Located in the province of Zonguldak, Sakli is a fairly large and expansive mountainous community. Its population is just under six-hundred. The majority of Sakli's households, comprising a total of eighty-seven, engage in subsistence farming. Landlords, however, own the majority of land in the area and rent portions of this land to local and nearby residents. Most village peasants are poor, with some unable to adequately feed all of their members from subsistence farm produce, and others unable to afford basic health care or secondary education for their children. As a consequence,

a significant number of males temporarily leave the household to engage in migrant labour. This seasonal out-migration has manifold effects for social and community relations.

Villagers' connection to the 'outside' world is limited and varied. The community of Sakli does not have its own market place where they sell or buy fruits, vegetables, materials, clothing, rugs, household wares, etc. Although villagers require many of these products, they must travel to the nearby town to purchase them. This is usually a day's venture for one or two household members, since transportation to and from Sakli is irregular. The other kinds of connections people have to other towns or cities is through seasonal or temporary migration for paid employment. Such employment compels many male migrants to move to cities (within or outside of Turkey) for select periods of time, and only on occasion do their family members and friends visit them. Aside from the connections villagers have to other towns and cities, whether this be through markets or paid work, they also have links to the 'formal' Turkish state.

All of Sakli's residents are Sunni Moslems. During the last decade, the Turkish state has taken initiatives to ensure that young school children are taught basic Islamic principles and moral codes. It is common for government educators (including those working in Sakli) to teach religion to all primary level students. The state also supports rural religious awareness on a broader scale by sponsoring the construction of village mosques and paying a clergy to serve local and nearby communities. This is the case in Sakli as well.

Sakli residents view their world as a closed and protected one. Receiving formal permission to both live and work in the community does not ensure their trust. A common experience of many researchers in the field is that some people mistrust 'outsiders.' In the early days of my stay in Sakli, some thought that I might be a government spy hired to report on the illegal clearing of forests for farm or fuel use. Playing up my Turkish ethnic background, having a Turkish research assistant and having Turkish friends and relatives visit me in the village, helped overcome their uncertainty of me. I also received the invaluable support of the local *imam*, community midwife and doctor. Within a short period of time, villagers came to believe that I was there solely to learn about their way of life, not to divulge their 'secrets.' In accepting me, they incorporated me into their 'protected' world as their guest (*misafir*), involved me in their activities, and made me privy to their culture and daily affairs.

In keeping with my theme of studying moral/social relations, I surveyed all Sakli households, asking its members questions about their family background and relations, kin practices and work processes. Although this survey furnished invaluable social and genealogical information, more flexible strategies were essential to the fieldwork agenda. Specifically, this demanded a shift in methodology, from information gathering (where the focus is on asking the right questions) to interaction (where the focus is on process, and listening and responding to the subjects' viewpoints and concerns). In fact, during my work in Sakli, extensive and detailed knowledge was produced on various social, historical and political relations and dynamics. Such data were, in large part, derived

from lengthy, unstructured group interviews, oral histories, and daily discussions and interactions with villagers and key informants.

In addition to following field work protocol, and abiding by certain ethical and political guidelines, there is also a method for conceptualizing social relations. In this particular research project, the method of genealogy is of central importance. Genealogists, from the Foucaultian or Nietzschean frame of reference, are interested in studying the connections and relations between people by locating the origins (i.e., the power struggles) of those relations. As I argue later in the thesis, this method acknowledges that there is a difference between the modes of people's explanations of their connections to others and the power relations within which these explanations emerge in the first place. In other words, the moral discourses people use to connect themselves to, or measure themselves against, others, do not disclose the underlying relationship between discourses and power contests. Everyday moral rhetoric only marks the site of contested relations; it does not specify the nature of the power struggles that lie beneath them. In revealing their 'reality' of life, work and duty, villagers give many reasons for why they are connected and related to one another and what they value about these relations. And, it is at this level that their justifications, and the uses to which these are put, are central to my investigation of morality in Sakli.

Simply to analyze how these people understand their relations with others, what they judge as appropriate and inappropriate, good or bad, right or wrong, would be to take these claims as rationalizations and defences of their way of life. However, there is always the potential problem of being caught up in the reasoning people give for why

they think and act the way they do. It is often the case, for example, that they take their explanations as the causes of their behaviour. In an effort to avoid any functional explanations for 'the way things are or should be,' it was essential that I 'distance' myself from their discursive 'truths': that is, in researching moral relations I separated the origin (power relations) from the purpose (moral discourses). This 'distancing' permitted me to pursue a sociological analysis of their social 'reality' and power struggles, instead of simply conceptualizing moral/social relations as completely balanced, devoid of conflicts and hierarchy.

Having studied and been a part of their way of life for some time, I found that their moral claims did more than just speak about preserving or defending a way of life that was orderly and stable. There are other social forces behind morality and there is an essential connection between discourse and power. When villagers make use of the values of tradition, history and solidarity they do so as part of a moral struggle directed at overpowering others in everyday life. In the sphere of social class relations (where the focus is on landlord-peasant relations), in the arena of kinship (where the concentration is on gender, generation and genealogy) and in the area of religion (where the attention is on the relationship between Islam and sorcery), I present moral discourses as strategic masks and expressions of the forces of domination.

The central theme of this project shows that moral claims emerge out of resistance (force relations), and therefore, they do not preserve, defend or protect anything. And, further to this, I claim that moral discourses are able to manipulate others by getting people involved in its beliefs, and therefore making them moral subjects at the same time.

It is for these reasons that I analyze morality as a form of domination and this is the theoretical basis upon which I depict Turkish social relations as fraught with the struggles for governance.

In an effort to document and interpret the experiences of Sakli women, men and children, I have lived with them on a daily basis and worked with some of them in the fields and in their homes, but I have not really lived as they live. However, I have shared some of their battles not only in their world but in mine as well. In exposing the politics of everyday life in Sakli, I can say that I learned much about the politics of 'doing' research and of life in general.

Introduction

This thesis investigates the phenomena of morality in rural Turkish society. I show how a domain of morality is constructed and made use of by members of a small community, located in the mountainous region of north-western Turkey.

It is common to view morality as a uniform set of religious beliefs that appear whenever an underlying sense of order is interrupted, challenged or threatened. Many take morality at face value, assuming its aims are conservative, traditional and oriented toward protection and defence. To apply this perspective, we must adopt the position that society is essentially a consensus of values founded on an impulse to unity -- a familiar point in the treatment of morality and study of non-western rural culture.

The employment of a discursive or genealogical approach to the problem of morality takes the point of view that the origin of morality is different from the aims and purposes alleged in its claims. This distinction is necessary to avoid the erroneous positions that simply accept moral claims (values and ideals) as descriptive or representative of reality. Such 'legalistic' perspectives, in effect, defer to the authority of the text or tradition, adopt authoritarian dogma and preconceived juridical ideals as 'explanations' of social phenomena, and reduce discord and discontinuity to mere deviations.

The term morality, as I employ it, is not synonymous with Islamic laws and codes, nor do moral practices result or even necessarily conform to Islam's juridical standards. Instead, moral practices and claims are taken as discursive phenomena, suspending the problem of whether morality represents the 'truth' of social life, or whether social action corresponds to any preconceived ideals. This framework focuses on the uses to which morality is put in everyday life, and the contrivances and designs implemented to produce 'reality'.

I advance a view of morality based not on the unity it claims to represent, but on the power relations it dissimulates in a society infused with force and resistance. My conception of power does not accept the notion of unity of origin or of application. The exercise of power takes many forms, is started at several levels and spreads throughout all institutions. The first part of this dissertation addresses the problem of morality and its relation to power. Morality is depicted as a central feature of power relations since it arises in the context of domination, disguises the values of domination and constitutes its subjects. In this specific context, chapter one provides the conceptual framework and the fundamental theoretical arguments advanced in the dissertation. Following this, chapter two assesses various approaches to the study of morality, including both functionalism and the repression-thesis, and argues for a discursive understanding of the

phenomenon of morality. Chapter three articulates the relation between morality, power and domination from a social constructionist perspective.

In the second part of the dissertation, I take the empirical exercise of power as the starting point to illustrate the "deployment of morality." In chapter four, after introducing various historical and social aspects of the community, I focus on the meaning of village identity. By subverting the links between identity and spatial location, I show how identity is constructed and put to use in power struggles within the village. Identity is a site where people's actions are evaluated, constrained and put into moral discourse. In short, I argue that identity is variable, embedded in a domain of dominant and subordinate relations, and deployed to promote the idea of standing in a single context.

Chapter five deals with the way in which village groups discern ancestral history and deploy descent (*kök*). I show that the claim of common ancestry is a moral value that is imposed upon a variety of relations. Instead of conceiving descent as an unbroken line with the past, or symbol of tradition, my argument is that descent establishes the appearance of law-like regularities within social relations. The value of descent lies in its capacity to cover over rank and status differentials between groups, and establish hierarchies between village neighbourhoods, lineages and clans.

Chapter six highlights the way people perceive and classify their kinship universe. I present Turkish kinship terminology as a system of values that aims toward the ideals of kindred, by reducing diverse social relations to an equivalence of meaning. In particular, I show that those deemed part of the kin circle are subsumed by forces of domination. Behind the establishment of kin titles, there is a hierarchy based on age and gender power differentials.

Chapter seven identifies changes in the form of domination that result from the incorporation of seasonal migrant labour into a subsistence economy. I argue that seasonal migrant labour is not merely an external force, exerting influence in Sakli's domestic economy. Seasonal migrant labour is deployed within existing social relations, and so constitutes a moral regime whose value is determined in its efficacy in struggles against landlord control and in the promotion of gender hierarchies. By reducing the necessity of sharecropping, and allowing land to be rented for subsistence production, such strategic relations lessen the landlords' direct supervisory control over the labour process. Simultaneously, since many men engage in season wage labour, much of the burden of subsistence production falls to women, and older men have replaced landlords as supervisors of subsistence labour. Under the pretence of using seasonal migrant labour as a means to preserve and defend a 'traditional subsistence economy,' agricultural work has become largely 'feminized.'

Chapter eight outlines the social, cultural and economic significance of the household unit, and the moral practices that result in its formation and transformation. I argue that households are central in inculcating moral sentiments that define the value of 'tradition.' Specifically, Sakli's households are not rigid organizations or structures, but sites of moral discourse directed toward keeping property, blood ties and kin together. Behind the values of solidarity, I show how people are subjected to authoritarian regimes, gender divisions and age hierarchies. These power relations are central to the constitution of households and their network of relations. Deaths, out-migration, inheritance, marriage and residence patterns are factors that modify household composition and alter the dynamics of power.

Chapter nine develops further the characteristics and variety of marriage and residence practices in Sakli. Marriage is of a moral character, comprising the ideals of harmony, charity, reciprocity and inter-dependency. These moral claims give marriage alliances the appearance of stability and unity. Rather than a means to preserve the integrity of kin or maintain solidarity among groups, marriages figure as a discursive 'deployment of alliance.' In marriage negotiations and arrangements, I show that the values associated with the 'union' of people disguise the processes of subjugation and legitimate the forms of domination inherent in them.

Chapter ten deals with the problem of religious morality in Sakli. While Islam is often credited as the single voice and overarching principle governing social relations in Middle-Eastern societies, in this final chapter I argue that everyday religious morality is neither defined by, nor limited to, one fixed system of laws or codes. Nor is Islam seen as self-reliant in either forming or informing this morality. Beyond Islamic principles, there exists a wealth of 'unofficial' thoughts and actions that emphasize a type of practice whose aims formal Islam does not authorize. Finding 'appropriate' brides, creating love spells and charming the world, are ways in which sorcery overcomes dissatisfaction and strives beyond the present. As with any other form of morality, sorcery does not perpetuate, justify or safeguard anything; it simply aims to subvert other forces to its command.

Chapter 1: Theorizing Morality: The Conceptual Framework

The purpose of this chapter is to provide a synopsis of the issues developed in the thesis. In what follows I will define and link together the concepts both relevant and necessary to the study of morality, leaving aside the substantive dimensions of the problem for later chapters.

Morality is a socially constructed system of beliefs that arises from a perceived dissatisfaction with a state of affairs or course of events. In passing judgment on this state of affairs, moral claims determine their value. Moral claims comprise value-judgements about a state of affairs 'presumed to exist,' and point to an alternative state of affairs that 'ought to exist'. The judgment that things ought to be other than what they are, or that there is a separation between what is and what should be, is the germ of all moral declarations. What stands behind every moral claim, then, is the aim to go beyond this disjunction and to leave this (its origin) behind. The idea that 'one ought to act in such and such a way' or that 'things ought to be like this' expresses the desideratum of morality, its 'ideal' or 'truth'. Moral truths comprise an array of values and beliefs that are taken for truth and guide the action of members by circumscribing arenas of obedience and duty.

Moral truths (aims, directives) spring from the bud of dissatisfaction, and say 'no' to life. When this 'no' is framed in discourse of ideals, it says 'yes' to values, with an aim to preserve and protect them. In the exhaustion of battle, morality develops its denial of life as a means of conserving, not life but, values and aims, i.e., its truth claims.

Approaching the study of morality at the level of its "meaning" (either as preservation or denial) does not, however, strike deeply into the matter; it simply takes morality at its word. The words of morality are the costume in which the intention of domination parades. This original state (or statement) is not simply the expression of dissatisfaction, it is, as Nietzsche puts it, our desire to overcome the world (1967a:182).

All states of beliefs, comprised by moral claims, arise not out of some internal inertia of logic of development, but from resistance. The belief in the factuality of something (or the considering of something 'as if' it were true) is a phenomenon resulting from an encounter with a "superior force."¹ The inability to move forward and shape things according to one's intentions and aims, is the inability to subdue a stronger force. For example, the value of "freedom" emerges when one's action meets resistance; it is at this point when we become

¹ An inferior force offers little resistance.

dissatisfied with the present state of affairs. The aim lurking behind morality is essentially the desire to overcome opposition.

The inability to overcome something actively leaves the potential of moral judgment, of speaking rather than acting. Assessing something (an idea or action) as bad, immoral or unjust is the result of measuring it against a moral ideal of some kind.² Moral judgements, then, derive from reflection on positions of opposition, subjugation or constraint. What is significant about this evaluative process is that meanings are attached to things or events (i.e., beliefs) that cannot be otherwise transformed. Consequently, moral claims tend to ascribe value to the position of subordination and find value in the subject of domination. Moral evaluation is, in Nietzsche's words, "an exegesis, a way of interpreting" (1967a:148).³

Morality is a form of 'governance' in the Foucaultian sense of the term. Just like the body is regulated by many distinct regimes (rhythms of work, rest,

² In western society, for example, homosexuality and abortion are judged as immoral from the perspective of familial or religious ideals.

³ In the context of understanding the "development of humanity", Foucault discusses the importance of interpretation. He argues that interpretation is the appropriation of a system of rules used to "impose a direction, to bend it to a new will, to force its participation in a different game, and to subject it to secondary rules". And, on these grounds, he concludes that the development of humanity is a series of interpretations (1977:223-224). I approach the 'development of morality' similar to the way Foucault conceives of the 'development of humanity'.

holidays, fashion, diets, etc.), so are subjects produced and patterned by moral regimes. Action is characterized by an open field of possibilities, a multiplicity of ways of behaving, the prospect of several reactions and the capacity of adopting diverse comportments (see Foucault, 1983:219). In Foucault's terms, power is characterized as an action upon the action of others, which structures the possible field of the actions of others (Ibid., 219). In Nietzsche's terms, morality is a form of power that is 'reaction' (action on an action) and comprises the manner in which spontaneous actions (events) are adjudicated according to superimposed laws of value and meaning. The origin of morality is always the same, the act on the action of another, but the resistance that follows from such relations of force delimits a broad range of possible effects.

Far from simply preserving or denying the world, morality (which is essentially a reaction) aims at the incorporation of superior (spontaneous)⁴ forces. The aim of moral domination (governance) is the discursive transformation of opposing forces, to make them speak its truth (value its directives and aims). More than just ascribing value to the position of subordination, moralities also claim for themselves the right to impose their definition of the situation on others. In this way, morality claims for itself the standard of evaluation. This technique of domination is typical of the subordinate whose 'resistance' is never just a way

⁴ Spontaneous forces are forces that just occur; there are no laws, no rules and no universal meaning that govern or influence them.

of preserving something, but a 'force' which aims to compel others to adopt the subordinate point of view as the law and its values as the measure of all events. Morality never merely aims at preserving or defending, it aims to overcome.

This commanding component of morality is similar to Weedon's (1987) view of the relationship between discourse and resistance. She makes the point that the most powerful discourses have firm institutional bases (in the law, in medicine, social welfare, education, family) and are under constant confrontation. In reference to British social welfare she argues that "... in Britain today, the role of social welfare provisions in defining the 'nature' of the unemployed and how they should be treated is a site of contest between the competing interests of punitive and compassionate welfare provision. Similarly, the implications of social welfare policies for women, as wives and mothers and as 'autonomous', liberal-humanist individuals is another site of contradiction. The lack of discursive unity and uniformity on these questions means that the individuals whom social welfare policies seek to govern have available ... the discursive means to resist the implications of existing social policies" (Ibid. p. 109). Weedon's field of force relations (i.e., social institutions) are sites of discursive conflict over how subjectivities and social relations should be constituted and socially controlled. Morality works in much the same way.

Morality transforms its own subjection into a means of further domination.⁵

Discursive domination requires making subjects of new interpretations, where prior aims and ends are transformed and redirected, and in which all previous meaning and purpose are obliterated. As Foucault (1985) says, "moral action involves a relationship with the reality in which it is carried out, and a relationship with the self. The latter is not simply 'self-awareness' but self-formation as an 'ethical subject,' a process in which the individual delimits that part of himself that will form the object of his moral practice, defines his position relative to the precept he will follow, and decides on a certain mode of being that will serve as his moral goal" (Ibid. p. 28). Moral domination thus calls for the formation of moral subjects.

Power relations extend far beyond the rudimentary and heavy-handed elimination of opposition. Once power annihilates an inferior force, power ends, since there is nothing left to show it as superior. Power can also manifest as forms of domination, which is both denial and preservation of opposing forces. This form of domination involves putting things into the service of aims and ends. It involves relations of servitude not through direct action, but through direction and the dispersion of values. Morality aims not at the elimination of opposing forces, but at their appropriation, eg. by making them equal to itself (equally

⁵ Consider for example, Foucault's (1965) discussion of the centrality of confinement and the variety of meanings accorded to it in the history of madness.

impotent), holding difference in contempt as anything that might stand out, over against the crowd. Moral values are forces of constraint centred on meaning. Forces of constraint are discursive phenomena that result from the belief in superior forces and are aimed at their overcoming and incorporation. The techniques employed to accomplish this centre around the deployment of moral points of view, and are directed to compel acceptance of this perspective as its standard.

Moral evaluation is nothing more than a form of the desire to dominate (to overcome resistance) expressed as judgement. When the possibility for acting is supplanted, the possibility for judgement remains as a critical means of control. This control takes the form of assessing meaning. While all actual overcoming (transformation and change) results from the action of moving forward, moral-linguistic (discursive) transformations arise out of constraint. Morality as a form of domination, aims to overcome resistance (or, in Foucault's terms, "the aim ... is the power effect as such" (1983:211), i.e., having no aim external to itself. It carries out this effect by institutionalizing the inability to change things and making constraint a central moral value.⁶ Techniques of constraint manifest in the dispersal and inculcation of social values. Moral discourse transforms

⁶ The idea that constraint becomes something to be valued or striven for, bears resemblance to Foucault's notion of enslavement: the enslavement of the self by oneself (1985:79).

relations of force and resistance into values, such that the passivity and resistance to change become aims (values) devised by morality itself. Moral value-judgements are, however, mere interpretations; the aims devised by morality originate elsewhere.

The force of morality resides in the capacity to re-evaluate the position of subordination, to make it into an ultimate value, and to employ this as a means to dominate others. Equality, familiarity, reciprocity, obedience, custom and tradition are all discursively constituted forms of domination.

Equality is a means to eliminate hierarchy -- the form in which relations of domination and subjugation manifest. But the process of making equal is not a defensive measure aimed at keeping others at bay or maintaining things as they are. It is a form of domination aimed at the incorporation and appropriation (not simply the elimination) of anything which stands out, over against the crowd. It is the desire to dominate, cast in the language of moral valuation that despises difference and turns tolerance of difference⁷ into one of the highest virtues.⁸ The

⁷ All hierarchies (orders of rank) are based on difference.

⁸ An interesting point on the issue of equality is advanced by Weedon (1987). She argues that in a society where gender inequalities "inform the production and regulation of female and male subjects", liberal discourses of equality can work against women's interests and so, it is important to identify whose interests this discourse may serve (Ibid., 111).

formation of marriage and kinship alliances in Sakli, for example, fosters a sense of equality.

The value of familiarity rests upon the ability to express something new in the language of something old, to put things in their predetermined place and, moreover, to maintain a particular order in the world. Familiarity is premised on the extent to which new things are comparable with old. Techniques of comparison or extension evident in Turkish kin terminology make distant kin more familiar, attempting to eliminate hierarchies among them.

Reciprocity is a form of equality as it assumes every action has an equivalent and can be paid back. The meaning or moral determination of action is its interpretation as a payment in kind for something already done or the hidden intention to claim a reward in the future. Further to this is the creation of the moral subject who is made the subject of such aims. The creation of subjects involves evaluating action according to a system of purposes and positing a subject for that purpose. The values of protection in Sakli, for example, are not simply ways to maintain the integrity of the community, but are means of subjecting (over-powering) others in a moral regime.

Obedience is simply the inability to exert power and so one is made subject to the purpose of another (or subject to a system of purposes, i.e., morality). Obedience is an effect of a process of compulsion in which subjects are

constituted in a discourse of purposes, aims, ends or reasons. In obedience, one is 'subjected' to a purpose or aim that is interpreted either as 'law,' duty or as 'choice'. It is always force that compels action, however, not obedience or duty. Sakli's kin terminology, for example, attempts to constitute moral subjects by appropriating everyone into a system of values and expectations, and so to determine the meaning of social relations.

From the moral viewpoint, continuity or regularity in events suggests the workings of a law, a manifestation of custom or the expression of tradition. Law and tradition are manifestations of the value ascribed to a continuity with the past and the unbroken chain or sequence of events. In all cases, continuity results not from the inner workings of a law, nor from obedience, but to the persistent deployment of power relations. Islamic law and tradition, for example, are simply metaphors for the desire to dominate since they superimpose values on events and grant them (causal) significance. In other words, law and tradition are the formalization of the 'conditions' necessary for the preservation of a moral community (Nietzsche, 1967a:118) and reflect the value accorded to preservation. Law and tradition display the moral value of defending, shielding and protecting. These moral norms are, however, techniques of constraint that judge the attributes of subordination as valuable and stress the value of service. Legal discourse formalizes the values of obedience, equality and reciprocity as the conditions

necessary for the preservation of the community. As such, legal discourse represents the position of being unable to do things differently because of compulsion by a superior force, and the codification of this position as a system of values. Legal discourse delineates the value of constraint.

In moral discourse, actions are judged by the purposes they serve. The distinguishing feature of a moral judgment is the non-discrimination of origin and purpose. The moralist believes that showing the purpose of a thing explains its origin. Problems of history are exhausted in a discourse of values, that is, in a discourse of serving aims and ends. For example, as a way to differentiate the people of Sakli, the uses of history (especially the importance of descent) affirm distinctions between social classes. Relations of domination, within the sphere of morality, occur as appropriation taking place at the level of cultural values. Granting things a purpose is an interpretation that highlights some (epiphenomenal) features at the expense of others.

Things can only have value in relations of domination or hierarchy; where the higher order decides the value or aim of the lower, compels it toward a goal, and puts it into service. Every consideration of value is a consideration of utility to another, stronger force. Values are designed to maintain a particular form of domination. For example, descent (*kök*) in Sakli is deployed to discriminate clan from lineage and one neighbourhood from another, while characterizing these

groups as moral enclaves. Purpose and utility then become constructs of domination and symptoms of the fact that something has been taken over into a system of purposes and imposed on it the character of a function. Foucault (1978) refers to such a system of purposes as confinement. He argues that since sexuality serves particular aims, it confines. In his words: "Sexuality was carefully confined; it moved into the home. The conjugal family took custody of it and absorbed it into the serious function of reproduction" (Ibid., 3). Determining the purpose or reason is more than simply describing what happened; it is fundamentally different from the event itself. Valuation is a form of taking over and deciding meaning through the deployment of a discourse. While morality denies hierarchy, it makes use of it as a means to dominate.

Power is a relational construct. It cannot be possessed, held or given (Bordo, 1989:15; Weedon, 1987:113; Foucault, 1978). It can only exhibit itself, on the one hand, as force, and on the other, as resistance. While force, like morality, only manifests against resistance⁹, morality is a special case of the 'effect' of force, appearing in an encounter with a superior force. The sustained expression of power relations, which is the continual domination of one force by another, is seen as the working of a law only through moral 'interpretation' and the over-determination of meaning. Force is that which compels compliance of

⁹ Metaphorically, resistance is the chemical catalyst which brings power relations to light (Foucault, 1983:211).

another force, and can only be expressed at the expense of the other. Domination is an expression of power relations that attempt to overcome another force, not to the point of its elimination but through incorporation and appropriation. One effect of the exercise and extension of power is the incorporation of alien forces. Morality is the transformation of the effect of power into purposes, values and aims. It also seeks to incorporate difference into itself, to overcome that which opposes it by making it equal to itself.

Therefore, the constitution of morality is not explained simply as a system of laws that aim entirely at the prohibition or repression of unwarranted behaviour; nor is it conceived solely as a series of commands arising out of a juridical force. One interprets events 'as if' they followed from obedience, or as if commands were being carried out. Law is a metaphor for the persistence of force relations, where things cannot be other than they are, not because of some natural expression of law, but because of the inability to overcome. Laws and moral codes do not so much result in the establishment of moral practices; they are consequence of moral phenomena having emerged and the context of this emergence having been forgotten. The dominion of morality over practical relations stems from the ability to create meaning and have it transcend its original context. In this way, morality is nihilistic in that it says it wants to overcome or change the world (see especially Nietzsche, 1967a; 1967b).

Chapter 2: The Phenomena of Morality

The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the principles that inform and form morality and the dominion by which moral "ideals" are built. I begin by exploring and appraising traditional conceptions of morality within an Islamic context to examine three central themes. First, I illustrate that morality is a discursive phenomenon in that there is a process or a method by which moral practices and claims emerge. Second, I advance that morality is not a unitary idea or organization: it divides and "spreads" into all kinds of areas of social life, never confining itself to one "truth" or domain of existence. Thirdly, I show that there is a motive behind morality. By inciting and inducing morality to judgment, this motive -- forces of constraint -- fosters the production of moral claims and circumscribes the form and domain of morality.

2.1 Morality as "Repression" in the Islamic Context

When we hear the term morality, we usually think of the norms and values that influence social behaviour, attitudes and desires. This understanding of morality refers to a set of rules of action that are suggested to individuals and groups through the intermediary of countless prescriptive institutions such as religion, the family, the educational system, the state, etc. It is sometimes the

case that these rules are clearly set forth in a coherent doctrine¹⁰ and are often employed to define, explain and delimit the domain of moral practice. It is in this context where law is granted the status of the subject of social life -- the subject that says 'no' -- and where social action is turned into an analysis of the behaviour of law and its effect.

In the Islamic context, some study morality by taking the actions of groups and comparing these with the rules and values prescribed by Islamic legal codes. Much of this literature defines Islam as a doctrine of imposed duties, laws and

¹⁰ The moral foundations of Islamic thought have long been represented and extensively debated in theological and philosophical discussions concerning Islam. For a review of Koranic laws or moral codes and contemporary interpretations of Islam see Esposito, J. Islam: The Straight Path. New York: Oxford University Press, 1988:3-36 and 116-161; For a detailed study of the hadith literature see Guillaume, A. The Traditions of Islam: An Introduction to the Study of the Hadith Literature. Beirut: Oxford University Press. 1966; For a phenomenological approach to Islamic philosophy and history see Hodgson, M.G.S. The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in a World Civilization. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1974; For a study of Islamic theory and knowledge see Qadir, C.A. Philosophy and Science in the Islamic World. New York: Routledge. 1988:1-104; For an excellent discussion of the historical development and philosophical underpinnings of Islamic thought and the "science" of Islam see Rahman, F. Islam (Second Edition). Chicago: University of Chicago Press. For a provocative and theologically compelling approach to death under Islam see The Islamic Understanding of Death and Resurrection. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1977:1-98.

traditions,¹¹ excluding from the analysis the range of 'unorthodox' beliefs and activities that prevail in Islamic society (Tapper and Tapper, 1988:70).

Many political-economists¹² consider Islamic law as definitive in determining the norms and values of sexuality (Afshar, 1987:77-78;¹³ Bauer, 1985; Rassam, 1980; Youssef, 1976; Sedghi, 1976¹⁴), marriage practices (Afshar,

¹¹ As a religion, Islam is most widely connected to lawful and accepted behaviour (Esposito, 1988:75). Its "morality" is often understood as requiring total commitment, inner purity and regular performance of ritual. As Loeffler (1988) argues, defining Islam's morality in this way "can be used to justify or assess the subjugation of women or used as a work ethic or a formalism which classifies ritual as more obligatory than agricultural work. It can be taken as disapproval of secular education because of its threat to traditional mores or as a request for it as a means to better the human condition" (Loeffler, 1988:246).

¹² There is some innovative work, focusing on the day-to-day practices of Islam, that sets aside the view that social relations are strictly governed by Islamic formal tradition (Abu-Lughod, 1986; Loeffler, 1988). But as yet, there are few detailed studies on the construction of morality from a post-modern perspective.

¹³ Arguing that Islam is more than a belief system, Afshar (1987) asserts that it is "a way of life and Muslims are expected to run their lives according to Qoranic injunctions" (1987:70). In terms of sexuality, she says that Islamic ideology in Iran "prescribes total innocence, chastity and modesty for young girls, who are expected to cover themselves from top to toe, cast their eyes down at all times and be shy and retiring" (1987:78).

¹⁴ In her study of women in Iran, Sedghi (1976) argues that Islam institutionalized male domination in both marriage and sexual relations. She claims that the "enslavement of women through marriage" is supposed to serve as a way to fulfil men's sexual desires (1976:221). In her words, "[i]n the Koran, monogamy is the rule for women, polygamy the practice for men. The number of wives was to be restricted to four; Muhammad, under 'special revelation,' married many more times. Islam provided for men who had not had that particular revelation: the system of *sigha*, or temporary marriage, was introduced. The *sigha* could last from one minute to ninety-nine years - and so differs little from prostitution" (1976:221).

1987:75-77; Beck and Keddie, 1978:25¹⁵; Sedghi, 1976:220-222¹⁶), educational and property rights (Zamiti-Horchani, 1984), domestic relations (Stiehm, 1976:231)¹⁷ and the inequality between women and men in their work patterns and social experiences.¹⁸

In the Turkish context, Islamic law (Shari'a)¹⁹ and moral codes²⁰ are

¹⁵ Although Beck and Keddie (1978) do point illustrate some practices that do not originate in Islamic moral codes, they nevertheless argue that women's status and marriage customs are linked to Koranic legislation (1978:25-28).

¹⁶ In an appraisal of Iranian women, Sedghi (1976) argues that the negative view of women and their inferior status is attributed to Islamic social and marriage relations. As she says, "Islam ... gave women private property rights and simultaneously *privatized* them as property, for the institution of marriage makes the female the 'property of her husband, who having in fact paid for her, regards himself as entitled exclusively to her services'" (1978:220-221).

¹⁷ In a study of Algerian women, Stiehm (1976) argues, "[l]egally, domestic relations have been governed by Muslim or Koranic law for many years. Just as the native and Arabic cultures require the subordination and seclusion of women, so the Koran makes its clear that women are inferior" (1976:231-232).

¹⁸ For a review of some well-known works concerning gender inequality and subordination under Islamic law or ideology see: H. Afshar (ed.), Women, State, and Ideology: Studies from Africa and Asia. Albany: State University of New York Press. 1987; L.B. Iglitzin and R. Ross (eds.), Women in the World: A Comparative Study, 1976; L. Beck and N. Keddie (eds.), Women in the Muslim World, London: Harvard University Press. 1978.

¹⁹ Theoretically, the Shari'a was derived from four main sources: the Koran, the Sunna or the tradition of the Prophet, the consensus of qualified jurists, and analogical deductions from theses (for more on this, see John Esposito, Islam: The Straight Path. New York: Oxford University Press, 1988; Alfred Guillaume, Islam. Great Britain: Penguin Books, 1954).

²⁰ In the Koran, for example, there are many moral rules and regulations that Muslims are encouraged to follow with respect to marriage, inheritance, sexuality,

assumed to correlate directly with the development of moral society.²¹ Conclusions about the nature of polygyny, inheritance, gender, family, and property relations in this culture are largely deduced from the Koran. Coşar (1978) conceives the tradition of Islamic rule as a determining factor in women's subservient role compared with men (Ibid., 129).²² Similarly, in Magnarella's (1973) study on family law in rural Turkey, social norms (prescribed by Turkey's new family law) are associated with the development of a new morality in the community. In Vergin's (1985) examination of social change and family in Turkey, Koranic ideals are responsible for re-shaping familial structures and values; the Koran regulates matrimonial settlements between spouses based on a separate ownership of property, influences the organization of the household based on agnatic and patriarchal lines, and authorizes polygamous arrangements while recommending monogamous marriages (Ibid., 572-573). Delaney's (1984) investigation of the theory and symbolism of Turkish kin relations illustrates how

procreation, and gender relations (see especially, Sura:IV).

²¹ Prior to the establishment of the Turkish republic in 1923, Islamic law (Shari'a) under the Ottoman empire was considered to provide Muslim people with a framework to interpret their experiences and to guide their behaviour and desires towards specific ends. Even once the republic was formed and inaugurated a western legal code, Islamic legalism was often viewed as dominating every-day morality.

²² Coşar (1978) argues that there are social taboos (residues from Islamic culture) that prevent "the Turkish emancipated woman from playing as active a social and political role as her Western counterpart does" (1978:138-139).

Islam penetrates every aspect of life, as villagers justify their practices, customs, and beliefs of social origination on the grounds of Muslim principles (Ibid., 343-346).

The dominance of religious discourse prevails even in the more phenomenological literature on everyday social practice in Islamic society. In a study of religious belief in a Persian village, Loeffler (1988) argues that southern Iranian peasant activity is not strictly subjected to elaborate religious socialization because individuals are seen to assert their own autonomy of thought. Loeffler, nevertheless, conceives peasant practices as reflecting either similarities to, or deviations from, Islamic law and norms (Ibid., 256). On the one hand, he makes the point that Islamic core rituals (the Five Pillars of Islam) are "not adapted to peasant existential situations" (Ibid., 14) and on the other hand, he argues that there are peasants who "understand their work and moral selves" (Ibid., 262) based on Islamic beliefs and values. Although Loeffler correctly points out the contradictions between Islam and everyday social activity, he still takes Islamic legal and moral codes as the mechanism that defines the intricacies and patterns of everyday morality. Like others (Gellner, 1969; Geertz, 1968), Loeffler's study does not completely escape the governance of religious and legal discourse.

These studies reveal that everyday moral practices are disciplined by an Islamic regime. At a very general level, this approach assumes that values (i.e.,

Islamic laws) which interpret specific social behaviours are also sufficient to explain the origin of those behaviours. The values codified in law are taken as if they were the cause of social activity in the first place. It is further assumed that laws are context-free and therefore represent timeless values; as they provide no conception of the conditions and circumstances that provoke meaning and foster the development of moral practices. It is taken for granted that Islamic moral codes profoundly affect the "reality" of social practice because the moral-repressive standpoint is adopted as an explanation. As Foucault (1978) suggests, the more telling standpoint is not to assume we are repressed, but to pose the question, why do we say we are repressed? It is more important to reveal the processes of domination than to describe its effects.

This "repression-thesis" is problematic in two ways: first in its understanding of the Islamic religion, and second in its analysis of social relations. Since many view everyday moral practices as reflecting the laws, rites and dogmas of Islam,²³ they fail to question to whom Islamic morality is speaking

²³ There are studies, however, which emphasize the importance of morality at the level of social reality, without taking into consideration Islamic moral codes. Duben's work in Sex Roles, Family and Community in Turkey (Kağıtçıbaşı, ed., 1982:73-99) speaks of the existence of a morality that is produced from a system of cultural rights, duties, obligations, and reciprocities found within the "kinship idiom" of urban Turkey. Morality, in this context is conceptualized from a particular and existing system of social cohesion, belief, and practice. Here, the constitution of morality does not stem from the historical conditions and circumstances that give rise to it, but from the structure of social relations, particularly those of family and kin organization.

or from what it is distinguishing itself. Everything about this morality, and the many ways it reveals itself, carries with it a hidden character: it fails to disclose important elements of its growth and the forces that incite its very development. For this reason, Islamic "truths" can not be accepted as "given". The work of many feminists and political economists has called Islamic doctrine into question and re-evaluated its interpretations of gender and class.

To pursue a study of Islamic morality, one must go beyond folkloric accounts. This might include, for example, the historical fashion by which western traditions have depicted or misrepresented Islam as a religion. Based on a textual method of analysis, Said (1978) illustrates the misrepresentation of Islam by Christian scholars (Ibid., 60-61) who show Islam as hostile to European Christianity (Ibid., 91) and politically oriented rather than spiritually guided (Ibid., 151).²⁴ He views Islamic ideas, cultures and history in terms of the forms of power contained in them (Ibid., 5) and uncovers the intellectually created and transmitted roots of Orientalism.

The repression-thesis simplifies the Islamic religion, and is only interested in social relations as moral effects. Consequently, this standpoint has several

²⁴ Said's (1978) work, however, remains peripheral to an understanding of the early development of Islamic morality. This is largely because Said's goal is not to analyze the Islamic method of "truth" from within the context of pre-Islamic or Islamic historical circumstances. Rather, he is more concerned in illustrating how conflicts and divisions between Islam and Christianity and the east and the west are discursively developed, sustained and continually reproduced.

limitations in its analysis of social relations. First, it is too concerned with matching moral practices with principles derived from religious ideals. Simply correlating these ideals with specific activities and behaviours produces a limited and narrow characterization of social relations and the nature of domination. If the social environment and the relations contained therein are categorized simply along the lines of religious moral codes, the arena of social forces within which morality resides is ignored. While Islamic law is viewed as an arm of repression and the singular moral form, the discursive construction of societal values and norms remains a largely unrecognized and unacknowledged field of inquiry.

Secondly, the view that social activity is under the control of Islamic law assumes that moral practices manifest themselves through religious law and its prescriptions. From this standpoint, it is presumed that people take custody of the law, internalize it and absorb it into their everyday activities. This perspective views society as a model of Islamic law, since it is thought that Islam produces and enforces a particular type of society. Consequently, social action can only be valued in its consequences since it is recognized by reference to divine commands and models (providing action with aims and purposes), as if social action had something to do with salvation. Far too much emphasis is placed on eternal values projected into the 'beyond' which Islamic morality says it aims. I propose a more direct approach, one that attends to patterns of domination and

the persistence of the desire to dominate in everyday social relations and practices.

I further intend to study the construction of moral forms of social organization which fall outside the parameters of formal Islamic codes. Some literature on family structure, sexuality, gender and production relations restricts the study of morality to Islamic ideologies. Islamic values are presumed to form either the only (or the primary) discourse of motivations for everyday social action. Other practical ideologies are assumed to be ineffective, as moral interpretations, where society is defined only by law. Because it is held that Islamic ideals are fundamental to the perpetuation of certain practices, lifting the legal regime and instituting a new set of social values and beliefs is seen as central to ending moral domination. Some studies link changes in social or moral views to Atatürk's modernization doctrine (Starr, 1984; Petek-Salom and Hukum, 1986).²⁵ Coşar (1978), for example, argues that the proclamation of the republic, the abolition of the sultanate and caliphate, the separation of religion from the state, the adoption of Western law, and liberal capitalism, improved attitudes toward Turkish women (especially those women who were able to use the rights granted to them by Atatürk) (1978:138). Petek-Salom and Hukum's (1986) study

²⁵ Beck and Keddie (1978:14) recognize that Atatürk's family reforms of the 1920's and 1930's (eg., outlawing polygamy and a husband's right to unilateral repudiation of his wife, establishing civil marriages, etc.) have not been carried out since some prohibited family traditions still occur.

of women's emancipation after the Atatürk period suggests that many moral and legal changes improved the position of Turkish women in politics, work, and education (1986:99-102). Such perspectives fail to consider the volume and variety of informal moral discourses, and so underestimate the magnitude of the problem; forms of domination extend far beyond the weighty words of the Islamic text. I would further argue that simply transforming value systems (for example, from Islamic to nationalistic) is exchanging one form of domination for another, since any value system aims to dominate difference.

As already indicated, it is important to avoid the conclusion that society is made possible simply by "saying no" to certain forms of action. This claim derives from the standpoint of morality, where the value-judgments levied against certain actions are taken as explanations of their origin. The biggest denial of morality is not the denial of action, but the denial of context, which ranks action in terms of functionality and utility (i.e., in terms of its value). It is therefore important to document the construction and assembly of moral practices from a standpoint that is critical of values. That is, it is essential to show the context from which moral claims result, the procedures employed in producing what are moral, acceptable, and good, and the various institutions and groups that are a part of this process.

Morality is a discursive practice by which the values that form a hierarchy (or form of 'government' or domination) become taken for truth. Discursive practices are, in Foucault's words, "a body of anonymous historical rules always determined in the space and time that have defined for a given period and for a given social, economic, geographical or linguistic area, the conditions of operation of the enunciative function" (1972:117). Discourses consist in technical processes, in patterns of behaviour and activity, and as Foucault says, "in forms for transmission and diffusion, and in pedagogical forms which, at once, impose and maintain them" (Foucault, 1977:200). The 'historical rules' (regularities and patterns) of a discursive practice could, for example, have produced a text of sexuality's history during the Victorian era, and are specific to a given time, space and culture.

The adoption of a discursive approach defers the categories of truth/falsity as it suspends the problem of epistemic justification and the concern over whether morality is true, endorsed, or even appropriate. The purpose of this study is to show that morality is socially constructed, and that it is a method for producing "truths," born of, and employed in, systems of domination. Thus, this study describes the procedures and practices associated with its 'rule'. Morality is not evaluated from within its own value standpoint, but in terms of the variety of discursive elements that can come into play in various techniques of "constraint".

The repression-thesis suggests that "constraint" is exercised negatively, through forms of prohibition, i.e., it says "no" to what are illicit actions, behaviours and practices. Rather than assume that constraint is negative, this study argues that the repression-thesis is inadequate for capturing the productive aspect of the forces of constraint. The forces of constraint produce and compel the "truth" of something, and do not merely describe it. It is in this sense that morality exhibits a desire to dominate, to appropriate other forces, and therefore, to grow stronger. It is this force, manifest in moral claims, which aims at domination through the creation and dispersal of meaning.²⁶ Forces of constraint must be understood as a productive network that runs through moral practices, much more than as a negative force whose function is repression.²⁷

The important point is that morality is not merely the imposition of constraint but a force that grows out of constraint, and attempts to establish that

²⁶ For example, that a great number of people living in Sakli come to believe in parentally approved marriages as the most valued, persuades us that there are less valuable and worthy marriages. It tells us that highly valued moral practices address and speak to other and different practices.

²⁷ As Foucault (1972) remarks in Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, "sexuality is far more of a productive product of power than power was ever repression of sexuality. I believe that it is precisely these positive mechanisms that need to be investigated, and here one must free oneself of the juridical schematism of all previous characterisations of the nature of power. Hence a historical problem arises, namely that of discovering why the West has insisted for so long on seeing the power it exercises as juridical and negative rather than as technical and positive" (1972:120-121).

position as an ultimate value. In line with Foucault's (1972; 1978) idea of power, forces of constraint are part of morality: morality relays and exhibits constraint, while undermines, destroys, or reinforces it. The forces of constraint perpetually manifest morality and, conversely, morality constantly induces the effects of constraint. Any given practice never reveals itself as either good or bad, such revelations belong to the sphere of morality and are matters for interpretation. Moral claims attempt to speak the truth of action, and so to situate it in an arena of discourse. These forces of constraint are productive (not repressive) since they incite, arouse, and lure things into domains of meaning (functionality, utility and purpose, aims, etc.).

2.3 Forces of Constraint as Productive

The repression-thesis views Islamic law and moral codes as socially constraining everyday practices, since they compel people to act and think in particular ways. Islamic law is strictly prohibitory, not creative or productive. There are, however, other approaches that view constraint as maintaining, rather than suppressing, social activity and practice. Functionalist analyses, for example, focus on the benefits and strengths of forces opposing morality. In this approach, immorality is not only produced by morality but it serves, renews and maintains it.

Some scholars argue that deviance (immoral action) serves to reinforce pre-existing collective sentiments (Durkheim, 1982; Simmel, 1955; Abu-Lughod, 1988). In The Rules of Sociological Method, Durkheim (1982) purports that immorality is "normal" because it is impossible for any society to exist without it. Defined as an action that offends certain collective feelings, immoral behaviour is thought to be productive or necessary to society. As Durkheim advances, "[i]n any society, for actions regarded as criminal to cease, the feelings that they offend would need to be found in each individual consciousness without exception and in the degree of strength requisite to counteract the opposing feelings" (Ibid., 99). Durkheim sees crime as linked to the basic conditions of social life, and argues that crime is useful to society; crime is indispensable to the normal evolution of morality and law. This analysis leads Durkheim to conclude that sociology is a science of "social facts",²⁸ since the generality of phenomena

²⁸ According to Durkheim (1982), ways of thinking, acting, and feeling possess not only the remarkable property of existing outside the consciousness of the individual but they are imposed upon and constrain the individual. A person's will to conform to ordinary conventions, for instance, is never felt as constraining; it is only constraining when the individual resists the norm. Only by resisting the norm does the power invested in the norm assert itself on the individual. It does this through constraint and surveillance (1982:50-52). The division between the norm and its opposition is a "social fact" for Durkheim because the whole idea of division, representing the most general relations that exist between things, depends upon social conditions (1915:29-30). In Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, Durkheim shows how the social division between the sacred and the profane, as the elementary form of religious life, constitutes religious beliefs and rites as "social facts". These social facts are thought to grant society a physical, intellectual and moral superiority over the individual.

are taken as the criterion of their normality (Ibid., 100-104). The same method of analysis is applied to his study of religion (1915). He argues that religion is a unified system of beliefs and practices organized around sacred things (those things set apart and forbidden) and by these means, unites into one moral community (church) (1915:62). For Durkheim, morality "makes use" of immorality

Similarly, constraints to conventional morality are seen to strengthen its norms, values and beliefs. In Veiled Sentiments: Honor and Poetry in a Bedouin Society (1988), Abu-Lughod explores how Bedouin morality - as a code of honor revolving round the values of autonomy - serves to rationalize social inequality in a society that upholds the equality of agnates and the autonomy of individuals. She argues that although Bedouins express the sentiment of moral honour in the public realm, they show disfavour of it in the private domain of poetry. In understanding poetry as a means toward given ends, she says that:

many poems explicitly request help or care, invoking other relationships between the helpless and the powerful; for example, some appeal for medical treatment... some supplicate God. At the minimum, poetic confessions of weakness seek to disarm those more powerful individuals perceived as inflicting pain or attacking the poet (Ibid., 243).

In poetic discourse people confess their weakness, vulnerability, and resistance to social ideals (Ibid., 207) which, according to Abu-Lughod, reinforce the moral code of honour found in the public domain. By exposing this other side of

experience in poetry, people impress onto others their conformity to the code of honour by poetically expressing socially unapproved values (Ibid.245-246).²⁹

Likewise, Simmel (1955) argues that when the social group enters an antagonistic relation with something outside it (eg. war), this conflict tightens relations among group members and intensifies the group's unity in consciousness and in action (1955:91). As he claims, a state of conflict "pulls members so tightly together and subjects them to such a uniform impulse that they either must completely get along with, or completely repel, one another" (1955:92-93). In this mechanistic view, Simmel understands the act of conflict as having a positive or negative effect on social integration.³⁰ He assumes that social integration or solidarity is "given" and views everything in relation to this end. He reasons, for example, that war or conflict outside the group "is sometimes the last chance for

²⁹ In Bedouin culture, Abu-Lughod (1988) argues that ordinary, everyday discourses are informed by the values of honour and modesty; poetic discourse is one of defiance, of freedom from domination of the system, and of a declaration of autonomy (Ibid., 252-253). She suggests that poetry functions as an art that allows for a certain creativity, in the sense that it may be used in times of defiance. Additionally, poetry functions to remind people "of another way of being and encourages, as it reflects, another side of experience" (Ibid., 259).

³⁰ Simmel (1955) argues that conflict contains something both positive and negative, and that these aspects are integrated; they can be separated conceptually, but not empirically (Ibid., 14). He advances that conflict functions to resolve divergent dualism for the purpose of achieving some kind of unity (Ibid., 13); unity is understood to mean the consensus of interacting individuals. In his empirical analysis, Simmel refers to different types of conflict, such as conflict in intimate relations and conflict as a threat to a group (Ibid., 45-50).

a state ridden with inner antagonisms to overcome these antagonisms, or break up definitely" (1955:93). In his analysis of conflict and group formation, he argues that "[c]onflict may not only heighten the concentration of an existing unit, radically eliminating all elements which blur the distinctness of its boundaries against the enemy; it may also bring persons and groups together which have otherwise nothing to do with each other" (1955:98-99). Thus, Simmel searches for external things (war, the Catholic Church) to describe the level of social cohesion.³¹

All three of the above positions illustrate the productive character of immoral forces, since these forces are viewed as necessary in the constitution and perpetuation of morality. In Durkheim's work, activities that pervert the norm (deviance, illnesses, suicides, etc.) come to reinforce collective sentiments. In Abu-Lughod's study, beliefs and practices that work against public morality (borne in the private domain of poetic discourse) enhance public moral honour. Lastly, in Simmel's work, external or outside conflict potentially tightens or loosens a group's social cohesion. Within functionalism, the so-called immoral forces are taken into service by morality. Through this service they come to take on meanings, since it is in this context that meaning is decided. Serving morality

³¹ This perspective fails to explain the development of social processes from within and to see that any system of relations, whether these be capitalist, religious or familial, is already grounded in conflict.

exhausts the meaning ascribed to these immoral forces as morality exhausts itself in their elimination. Clearly, functionalism surpasses the simple negativism of the repression-thesis, since it puts immorality to use, places it into service, makes immorality signify the presence of moral forces, and compels that which opposes it to function within a system of values (eg. maintaining and preserving boundaries, perpetuating a hierarchy). It is also clear, however, that functional treatments of morality do not view it as conditioned, i.e., responding to circumstances not of its own making. The focus should be on those conditions that force morality into action (or more appropriately to reaction, reflection and judgement).

While the functionalist approach offers something different from the repression-thesis, especially in terms of understanding the forces of constraint in productive rather than negative terms, this perspective nevertheless remains inadequate for several reasons. Functionalism assumes that both moral and immoral forces derive from an original and unconditioned principle of unity and all exercises of force attempt to regain or reaffirm that initial position. Thus, origin and aim are the ³²same, persisting unchanged across time and space, and

³² In many ways this approach echoes Weber's rational perspective on the social world. Weber is well-known for positing ideal types and his four types of "social action" are illustrative of this (1978). It is on the basis of establishing an ideal that there can be deviations from the ideal. All things falling outside of the ideal are judged according to whether or not they contain aspects (or varying degrees) of this ideal. Much like the repressive approach, having an ideal (i.e.

requiring no conditions for emergence. In this sense, all exercises and relations of force are no more than ways to manifest and reinforce a consciousness of collectivity (an impulse to unity, or Nietzsche's "herd instinct"). While unity may be the aim established by moral claims, and the ultimate value to which it is motivated, positing unity as the precondition for moral claims invokes an obvious teleological reference. It is therefore important to determine the context for the emergence of moral claims as different from the reasons purported for their origination. Morality is a discursive phenomenon, born of constraint and the inability to act, that transforms constraint into values. Unity is only a form of this power relation, and a value ascribed to a particular hierarchy.

The following analysis questions the nature of moral homogeneity and uniformity, and re-assesses the functional relationship between constraint and morality. This discussion is grounded in a re-articulation of the relation between power, domination and the phenomena of morality.

Islamic moral code) acts as the rule upon which all things are measured and given value. Establishing an ideal construct is what allows or permits Weber (and even scholars of the repression thesis) to develop the fundamental task of comparative work. According to Weber, the more sharply and precisely the ideal type is constructed or the more abstract and unrealistic it is, the better able it is to perform its functions in formulating terminology, classifications and hypotheses (1978:21).

Chapter 3: The Discursive Production of Morality

In this chapter, I develop three main themes in the study of morality -- as an organization of procedures for the propagation and persistence of meaning. First, I will show division as the central core of moral phenomena, rejecting the notion that morality is a single harmonious and homogeneous phenomenon. The development of this theme shows the conditions and circumstances involved in the production of moral claims. Secondly, to explain the occurrence of division, I argue that the forces of constraint incite morality to movement. Thirdly, I show how morality deploys itself through techniques of constraint, comprising a range of motives and aims. Morality employs an arsenal of interpretations and meanings to institute its 'rule'. It is in this formation of such discursive 'principles' that morality establishes itself as a practical force. Let us now discuss these major themes in greater detail.

3.1 A Divided Morality

Morality is not unitary in its conception or organization. Our conceptions of unity imply the integration of a variety of aspects into a whole that then works or functions smoothly; the supposed agreement on the part means that there is nothing to divide, undermine, challenge or overturn it, at least from within. A

unity exists as a stable network of ideas or practices, and so constitutes an order of things. Similar to what is taken for granted about an organization, the notion of unity assumes a harmonious joining and a seamless consolidation of its parts or elements. Consequently, there can be no double or hidden meaning behind a unitary organization: it reveals itself completely.

But the idea of unity could also presuppose division. Functionalists would agree with this point. They suggest that division is produced by, and necessary to the maintenance of, solidarity or collective consciousness. In functionalism, unitary organizations (collectivity, morality, society, etc.) show division by generating deviance or opposition; however, this split is thought of as functional to the whole and thus the unity remains unfractured. For example, in Elementary Forms of the Religious Life (1915), divisions are an elementary and fundamental aspect of religious practice and of society generally. In establishing religious beliefs and rites³³ as social facts, Durkheim argues that they possess a "property

³³ Durkheim conceives of religion as a system of parts (myths, dogmas, rites and ceremonies). This system cannot be defined except in relation to its parts (1915:51). These parts (i.e. religious phenomena) are classified into two fundamental categories that separate thought from action: beliefs (states of opinions) and rites (modes of actions). Beliefs and rites consist of representations and actions, respectively, and they cannot be confused with organic or psychical phenomena. They are "social facts" in the sense that they do not have the individual as their substratum, but only society (1982:52). In order for these social facts (beliefs and practices) to exist, however, they must have a well defined social organization; or they must be constituted in a collective fashion because for a phenomenon to be social, it must be stripped of all extraneous elements. In other words, beliefs and rites are socially determined if they are identifiable through the

of resistance" in the sense that they do not easily succumb to the forces of change and transformation. This "property of resistance" is the *sacred in relation to the profane* or the mould into which people are forced to cast their beliefs and actions. The *sacred in relation to the profane* constitutes collective beliefs and practices through imposition. Since all social phenomena must be treated as things, as real phenomena that express certain ideas and behaviour (1982:69-70), Durkheim argues that religious beliefs represent one common characteristic: they presuppose a classification of all things (real and ideal) that people think into two opposed groups, generally designated by the words profane and sacred (1915:52). Thus, the divisional attributes of things or ideas are not just necessary for society but are logical manifestations of morality or society.

Divisions are not produced by morality, nor do they maintain morality. Division is a necessary pre-condition of morality: it is the 'what' to which morality speaks; it is the 'substance' of its discourse. The term division should not be understood as the establishment of contradiction. Division simply relates to the field constituted by the interplay of forces in the struggle over power, and the forms of domination that emerge from it. Morality knows only the products, results and forms of these events. It ascribes to them a value that it then seeks

power of external coercion which is exerted (or is capable of exerting) upon individuals. This power of external coercion is in turn recognizable because of the existence of some pre-determined sanction, or through the resistance that the fact opposes to any individual action that may threaten it (1982:56-57).

to circulate and promote in all events and circumstances. In this economy of meaning, morality is a double-edged sword; it is the meaning of domination and the domination of meaning. Unity is not, therefore, the origin of morality but it is the meaning derived from the effects of force, and consequently a value deployed to appropriate opposition. Let us examine this phenomenon in more detail.

That morality (or a "regime of truth") can be interpreted without having divided characteristics is shortsighted. What is thought of as a unitary concept covers over many things. Social organizations, like family, religion or the economy, only "appear" or present themselves as unitary. In rural Turkish society, for example, the unitary appearance of the community hides all sorts of hierarchies based on descent, gender and reputation. Unity does not grow out of division, but takes these dividing forces and subordinates them to its meanings -- it makes them function within a system of functions. It is the character of all forms of domination not to eliminate opposing forces, but to make use of them. Consequently, the 'community' is not stable, but continually ordered by morality.³⁴

³⁴ In their critique of the family, Barrett and McIntosh (1982) argue that the "appeal of the family" has to do with what it supposedly offers to society, such as: a range of emotional and experiential satisfactions not available elsewhere; its claim to be the most supportive and rewarding means of having and raising children; and, its appearance of being naturally given and socially and morally desirable (Ibid., 21-27). They disagree with this misleading and romanticized image of the family and advance that the family is an agency of class placement and an efficient mechanism for the creation and transmission of gender inequality

This is not to say that the community or the family is weakened because of these divisions; the point is that divisions are integral to it (see also Barrett and McIntosh, 1982:21; Duffy, 1988:111³⁵).

Our conceptions of the unitary connote fixed, stable and unchanging states of being and definitions of the situation. A fixed position can and does exist only in a state of isolation from other things. Involvement is impossible, and therefore change is impossible since stability can produce nothing. Any given unity must therefore always embody a series of fixed, secure conceptions of the world, and comprise meanings that are always singular and out of time. The moral community's dominance over meaning stems from the forces of constraint.

If we said, for example, that everyday morality in Turkish society is repressed by Islamic law, then we might as well say that community activity, behaviour and belief are pre-determined phenomena; such a view would leave no room to understand morality's transition and transformation and the institutions

(Ibid., 29). Similar to the point that I have made about the myth of unitary concepts, Barrett and McIntosh claim that the usage of the term family "underlies the many contradictions in analyses of household, sexuality and kinship, and is the root of the apparently inexplicable failure to develop a systematic understanding of these arrangements" (Ibid., 85).

³⁵ In her criticism of the image of Canadian families, Duffy (1980) argues that family life is often characterized by conflict. As she says, "[i]nequalities between husband and wife and child and parent interfere with the possibilities for intimacy and affection ... power inequality continues to plague many families. With surprising frequency this inequality erupts in violence and abuse..." (Ibid., 111).

and groups that are a part of this process. While it might be easier to adopt the limited frame of reference of morality, and categorize things according to its meanings (i.e., viewing every-day morality under the domination of Islamic legal codes), this serves only to create a definitive understanding of the world. In Nietzsche's words, "[t]he doctrine of being, of things, of all sorts of fixed unities is a hundred times easier than the doctrine of becoming, of development" (1967a:291).

It is not the purpose of this study to assess the unity of morality, nor to question or challenge this position. The purpose is to analyze the phenomena that have been taken as the truth of morality, to illustrate what morality dissimulates, and to underscore the advantages gained by it. The point is not to examine morality's internal form but to investigate: what makes it appear unitary? the principles that inform or form morality, the background against which morality stands out, and the domain by which moral "facts" are built. This approach to morality is similar to how Foucault approaches the discourses on madness in the sense that they, like morality, aim to create and perpetuate the truth of something, to create the sense that something is being described, that something is being attacked, and that something is being defended. As Foucault (1972:32) remarks,

...the unity of the object 'madness' does not enable one to individualize a group of statements, and to establish between them a relation that is both constant and describable. There are two reasons for this. It would certainly be a mistake to try to discover

what could have been said of madness at a particular time by interrogating the being of madness itself, its secret content, its silent, self-enclosed truth; mental illness was constituted by all that was said in all the statements that named it, divided it up, described it, explained it, traced its developments, indicated its various correlations, judged it, and possibly gave it speech by articulating, in its name, discourses that were to be taken as its own. Moreover, this group of statements is far from referring to a single object, formed once and for all, and to preserving it indefinitely as its horizon of inexhaustible ideality...

No matter how rigid and stable morality appears at the level of meaning, it achieves this integrity only by encompassing and appropriating that which resists it. This is why unity (or morality) is comprised of difference and why it appears as if these differences grow out of itself. As Foucault shows in Madness and Civilization (1973), the so-called unity of madness is the result of the superimposition of a discourse on a primal division between reason and unreason and the attempt to confine the latter (both in actuality and at the level of meaning).³⁶ In his words, "madness appears as the only reason for confinement whose profound unreason it symbolizes" (1973:227).³⁷ Thus, there are

³⁶ In his introduction to Michel Foucault's Language, Counter-Memory, Practice, Donald Bouchard (1977:20) says that Foucault follows a well-known procedure: a procedure that focuses on the myths of unitary concepts for the purpose of showing the differences of times and the disunity of concepts in history.

³⁷ Foucault (1973) shows how madness was transformed in the course of the eighteenth century. Although slow, this change took place within the space of confinement wherein madness was firmly linked. Madness became the central symbol representing the world of confinement and the object of all of its measures. As he says, "[n]o medical advance, no humanitarian approach was responsible for

justifications and defences that construct, shape or undermine morality's "truths". To describe the meaning of morality, these goals must be considered because they are platforms (the soil) from which moralities develop.

There is never just one interpretation of morality; there are countless discourses and techniques that comprise it. While it speaks of stability and unity, morality "spreads" its discourse of unity and stability into all areas of social life; it never just confines itself to one domain of existence. As a (reduced) form of the desire to dominate, morality actively seeks out 'immoral' forces to appropriate them, to turn them toward other aims and ends. This process of development is what gives morality its discursive existence. We can locate, for example, different practices (ideas, symbols, images) that constitute morality by looking at how various social institutions and groups make use of it. This conception of morality is similar to how Bordo (1989:15) defines power in the context of the body and the reproduction of femininity. As she states:

we must first abandon the idea of power as something possessed by one group and levelled against another, and we must think instead of the network of practices, institutions, and technologies that sustain positions of dominance and subordination within a particular domain ... We need an analytics adequate to describe a power whose central mechanisms are not repressive, but constitutive ... We need an analysis of power "from below" ... the mechanisms that

the fact that the mad were gradually isolated, that the monotony of insanity was divided into rudimentary types. It was the depths of confinement itself that generated the phenomenon; it is from confinement that we must seek an account of this new awareness of madness" (Ibid., 224).

shape and proliferate, rather than repress ... [that] generate and focus our energies, construct our conception of normalcy and deviance.

Since morality aims neither at unity nor stability, but for power and dominance, we can uncover a variety of competing, contradictory and undermining beliefs and practices on which morality's truths are based. In this regard, I have in mind an approach similar to Foucault's description of sexuality's truth.

In The History of Sexuality, Foucault illustrates the confession, a valued Western technique for inciting the individual to reveal the "hidden truth" about him/herself, as the original location for telling the "truth" of sex. He argues that the confession transforms a sphere of activity into a discursive domain, through its articulation (in a language of sexuality) in the practice of penance. He shows how the effects of this ritual, always unfolding in a power relationship, spreads to other institutions and relationships and gives sex its discursive existence.³⁸ The procedures of the confession, for example, have been distributed throughout the scientific arena: through a clinical codification of the inducement to speak, through the postulate of a general and diffuse causality, through the principle of a latency intrinsic to sexuality, through the method of interpretation, and through the medicalization of the effects of confession (Foucault, 1978:57-67). For

³⁸ In a similar fashion, Valverde (1985) asserts that the act of confessing is the central genre which women use to talk about sexuality. As she says, "we seem to believe that we can just 'tell' our sexual story, forgetting that perhaps in the 'telling' we are also constructing our experience (Ibid., 20).

Foucault, western society produces discourses on sex by adapting the procedure of confession to the rules of scientific discourse.³⁹ Sexuality's "truth" is constituted in all kinds of domains (medicine, family, penal law, etc.) that are not themselves explicitly sexual ones.

Not only does Foucault describe sexuality's discursive meaning, but he shows it as breaks and ruptures in the history of confinement that puts the conventional meanings of action in doubt. From Foucault's standpoint, the most representative element and assignable feature of scientific discourse are "archaeologically" related to the procedure of confession. Conceiving a split between scientific discourse and the confession is central to his approach to

³⁹ While there may be a need to establish some historical basis to identify sexuality's "truth", Foucault's linking of the procedure of confession with the procedure of scientific discourses raises a couple of queries. Foucault makes no attempt at understanding the conditions and circumstances under which the confession emerged, grew, transformed or established itself or the contradictions and inconsistencies that hide behind the confession. Foucault sees no need in calling for a critique of the confession. Instead, the confession is treated as though it developed out of nothing and suddenly appeared as a ritual of discourse, giving way to a new beginning in the irruption and proliferation of scientific discourses. Additionally, his discussion of the confession has not addressed or included feminist concerns of sexuality. In Feminism and Foucault: Reflections on Resistance, Bartkowski remarks: "[t]he confession of which Foucault speaks at length is an attempt to give voice to the resistance: yet what we (readers/confessors) hear are not the voices of women, children, homosexuals, perverts, but the voice of power as it institutionalizes, rationalizes, domesticates, and suppresses those very discourses by which it shores itself up" (1988:45).

history.⁴⁰ Foucault views history as a series of divisions, ruptures, and transformations that serve as a basis for the deployment of new and varied discourses. He rejects the notion that history is a single pattern of continuities, traditions, unities, or that it constitutes a series or a singular collection of

⁴⁰ Foucault's linking of the procedure of confession with the procedure of scientific discourse is largely drawn, and further expanded, from Nietzsche's rejection of causalism, 'identical cases', and of the origination of things, as well as from his critique of the genealogists of morals (whom Foucault renames as the historians). Nietzsche's main point is that there can be no point of union between the origin of something and its utility; the two are distinct and separate phenomena. As he claims, "[t]he form counts as something enduring and therefore valuable; but the form has merely been invented by us; and however often 'the same form is attained', it does not mean that it is the same form - what appears is always something new, and it is only we, who are always comparing, who include the new, to the extent that it is similar to the old, in the unity of the 'form'" (Nietzsche, 1967a:521). In parts of the On The Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche raises the issue of the origin and purpose of punishment. He claims that the genealogists of morals have always confused the purpose of punishment, revenge or deterrence, with the origins of punishment. For Nietzsche, the cause or the origin of something and its eventual utility are separate from one another because the purpose of something is always reinterpreted to new ends, taken over, transformed, and redirected by some power superior to it (1967a:521). The concept of punishment always contains within it a whole synthesis of meanings and utilities of all kinds and this is precisely why no certainty of meaning can be attributed to the concept of punishment. In other words, the utility of something means nothing regarding its origin; the utility or purpose of something only tells us that a will to power has become master of something less powerful and imposed upon it the character of a function (1967a:76). It is quite evident here that there are striking similarities between the way Foucault addresses the procedure of the confession and the way Nietzsche interprets the purpose of punishment. The procedure of the confession did not cause the proliferation of scientific discourses, just as punishment did not cause the purposes of punishment. The procedure of confession was simply taken over (by the knowledge/power relation) and transferred to the procedure of scientific discourses. Any point of comparison between the two is due entirely to the phenomena of their use as opposed to their genesis.

meanings. The silent beginning of the confession, for instance, served only as a beginning of the emergence of scientific discourse. The confession was not a ritual of discourse that constituted scientific discourse; it was a break, division or rupture in history that brought to the forefront a new history. This is why the new scientific discourse is not seen to originate from the incorporeal or silent beginnings of the confession; the confessional ritual only represented (as a symbolic accident) the historical discontinuity between the present and the past. Foucault makes no attempt to posit an infinite continuity of "regimes of truth" because, for him, every moment of discourse must be received "in its sudden irruption; in that punctuality in which it appears, and in that temporal dispersion that enables it to be repeated, known, forgotten, transformed, utterly erased, and hidden..." (Foucault, 1972:25).

Foucault's discontinuous and archaeological history is generally analogous to Nietzsche's (1967a;1983) presentation of history. Similar to Foucault, Nietzsche makes the assumption that all protracted things are difficult to see as a whole because the history of all things has grown up in a power relationship that subsequently attaches different meanings to these things. This is especially revealing in his criticism and treatment of history (Nietzsche, 1967a; 1983). Secondly, Nietzsche, like Foucault, breaks up "history". Nietzsche does not treat history as a search for "logical semblances" or "identical cases" (1967a:521).

Instead, he explores the hidden and opposing conditions and circumstances that constitute the meanings of things. By contrast, Foucault treats history as a search for uncovering the regularity of a discursive practice (1972:145). For both scholars, changes in meaning are due to a superimposition of discourses on breaks, leaps, compulsions and disasters in history. This is why history cannot be established as continuous series of unities.

Based on Foucault's approach to history, this study rejects the idea of a unitary morality. A unitary organization does not consolidate and incorporate its constituent parts into a seamless whole: this is merely the ideal embodied within the organization. Functional theorists may disagree with this reasoning, since to them division and difference are derivative of a primal unity. This is partly because they cannot postulate the relations that transform or undermine any given organization. An analysis of the constitutive factors and techniques involved in the discursive production of moral practices is central to the inquiry. Such an approach is at the heart of Foucault's method, which is discussed at greater length later. In Foucault's (1972:38) words,

[i]t will never be possible to constitute the ensemble of discourses on madness as a unity, even by restricting oneself to a given country or period. With the prisons there would be no sense in limiting oneself to discourses about prisons; just as important are the discourses which arise within the prison, the decisions and regulations which are among its constitutive elements, its means of functioning, along with its strategies, its covert discourses and ruses, ruses which are not ultimately played by any particular person, but

which are none the less lived, and assure the permanence and functioning of the institution. All of this has to be brought together and made visible by the historian. And in my view this task consists rather in making all these discourses visible in their strategic connections than in constituting them as unities, to the exclusion of all other forms of discourse.

Behind the appearance of morality, the forms of unity it values and propagates as its truth, are the forces that bring it into being and the forces it uses to grow and expand. In what follows, I argue that there is a motive behind morality that orders and arranges morality; it forms morality as a set of beliefs and practices and it establishes its appearance as "truth".

3.2 The Motive Behind Morality: Forces of Constraint

The purpose of this section is to show the methods responsible for the production of moral values and beliefs. The most important aspect of morality is the manner in which it is constituted; that is, the way in which it creates its truth. Any moral system advances beliefs on the licit and illicit, good and evil, true and untrue, or right and wrong. It is these sorts of claims that make a social arrangement a moral one. As part of its method, it is important to understand the context within which morality emerges, and within this context it is essential to understand that there is a motive behind morality.

The question one might ask is why would there be a motive behind morality? Is not the motive of morality, morality itself? Why does morality

require a motive to begin with? In answering these questions the most important point is that morality does not stand on its own, without outside properties, influences and activities. What we believe to be moral never derives from morality itself; there is always a context (i.e., relations and circumstances) from which morality manifests.⁴¹ This is similar to what Said (1978) advances about the cultural framework of Orientalism. As he says, "[b]ecause Orientalism is a cultural and a political fact, then, it does not exist in some archival vacuum; quite the contrary, I think it can be shown that what is thought, said, or even done about the Orient follows (perhaps occurs within) certain distinct and intellectually knowable lines (Ibid., 13). It is therefore essential to keep in mind that moral claims and truths are invented: they are invented by us. This is precisely why morality must place itself in a conditional relation to something. It expresses something of the condition of its "existence": the circumstances under which it prevails and the advantages it procures. This "something" is what is called the

⁴¹ In The Will to Power, this point has been made quite clear by Nietzsche in his rejection of the "thing-in-itself" (1967:552-569).

motive, aim or drive of morality.⁴² This motive, as argued later, is the constraint relation from which morality derives discursive meaning.

A problem with both the repression-thesis and functionalism is that the motive behind morality is conceived far too structurally and rigidly. The repression-thesis, on the one-hand, perceives Islamic law or tradition as comprising the motive that defines and controls people's ideas and behaviour. This type of reasoning presumes an orientation of continuity with the past, where the conditions of action and the aims of action are made equivalent or undifferentiated. There is no other aim than the aim of law as evidenced by the presumed passivity of the social group living under Islamic moral codes. People or social relations are shown to obey the demands of Islamic law as the dominant and pervasive form of agency.

Functionalists, on the other hand, tend to conceive morality as endowed with motives, since it has the hidden potential (through 'its' deviations) to either

⁴² I am not confining the meaning of motive (intentionality) to the strict phenomenological sphere. Motive is related to the method by which "knowledge" is produced. According to Deleuze (1986:109), Foucault's major achievement was the conversion of phenomenology into epistemology or intentionality into discourse. Deleuze illustrates this point by saying: "[f]or seeing and speaking means knowing [savoir], but we do not see what we speak about, nor do we speak about what we see; and when we see a pipe we shall always say (in one way or another): 'this is not a pipe', as though intentionality denied itself, and collapsed into itself. Everything is knowledge, and this is the first reason why there is no 'savage experience': there is nothing beneath or prior to knowledge. But knowledge is irreducibly double, since it involves speaking and seeing, language and light, which is the reason why there is no intentionality."

reinforce or alter social norms and values. The problem with this understanding is that the motives of morality act as means toward a predetermined end. For example, in the Durkheimian tradition, immorality (deviance, crime, suicide) affects and conditions morality by reinforcing the collective consciousness. Similarly, in Simmel's work the motive of social integration requires seeking out conflict to affirm community solidarity. In functionalism, the motive behind morality is to produce its opposite for the purpose of strengthening and maintaining some primordial unity: the aim of morality is the celebration and reification of community.

Clearly in either the repression-thesis or in functionalism, morality is merely symptomatic of the existence of a unitary form of organization, or is a useful means of its preservation or maintenance. The idea that morality represents 'something' is evident in both approaches, but whether that 'something' is a unit⁴³, or whether unity is merely something promoted by morality in its attempt to dominate meaning, is the central problematic of this study. The repressive or functional conception of morality fails to view morality as connected to, and constitutive of, other things.⁴³ Morality is a concept or organization that

⁴³ Michel Foucault links morality to the experience and constitution of the subject. In The Use of Pleasure: The History of Sexuality (1985), he studies the sexual morality of pagan and Christian antiquity and focuses on the rich historicity by which the individual is summoned to recognize him/herself as an ethical subject of sexual conduct and desire. In terms of understanding this subjectification, Foucault examines how the experience of sexuality becomes defined from classical

is constantly being created. It is in a state of change and movement; it can never just represent one thing. Morality grows up in a particular kind of environment and it is this environment that conditions morality. In MacDonell's words, "[n]o ideology (no practical system of actions, meanings, and beliefs) exists by itself: ideologies take shape in relation to each other" (1986:101).⁴⁴

There are several scholars who illustrate the importance of a motive behind truth, belief or desire (Valverde, 1985; Foucault, 1972, 1978; Nietzsche, 1966, 1967a, 1967b). This motive is shown to direct itself toward creating something different from "truth" itself. These studies show "truth" as a phenomenon of power relations. It is this motive behind "truth" that works to divide, oppose and define it.

Greek thought and transformed through Christian doctrine. For Foucault, the breaks and ruptures in history always come to constitute some new reality or constructed "truth" which, in turn, bring about the creation of an inventive and different subject, morality, or discipline (Foucault, 1972:175). Thus, Foucault analyzes how the moral subject is influenced by, and transformed from, discourses and practices (Foucault, 1978, 1983).

⁴⁴ Diane Macdonell's Theories of Discourse: An Introduction presents an interesting analysis of the relationship between ideology and subjectivity. The argument that ideologies take shape antagonistically, through conflicts and struggles which intersect various institutions (including the apparatuses of the state) lacks an account, she says, of the part discourses have in subjection. In her words, "[t]o posit a single and general mechanism, which can be the essence of all subjection, would not help to supply this omission, for it would lead us into idealism. Instead, an advance can probably be made if we turn to historically existing modes and procedures of subjection and find out what place discourse has within them" (1986:102).

In Sex, Power and Pleasure (1985), Valverde stresses the institutions of sexuality (sexology, pornography, Christian sexual ethics, etc.) that define sexual desire and eroticism in ways that oppress women. In disagreement with the idea that erotic male power (such as in some pornography and violence) upholds patriarchy by constituting it as sexy, she argues that whenever there is eroticism there is power. In her words, "it is not power itself that is inherently bad, but the way in which power gets used by one gender against another, and by one individual against another. In our society, both economic and erotic power are used to exploit people (Ibid., 43). Thus, power aims toward making some stronger than others, by establishing a hierarchy of sexual meanings and relations. So it is necessary to think about the power relations involved in initiating 'eroticism' and institutionalizing it as such. This process is important to Valverde's conception of how erotic power "motivates" sexualized "truths" while resisting them.⁴⁵

⁴⁵ Valverde (1985) argues for an approach to sexuality which does not "presuppose a rigid opposition between necessity and freedom, but rather sees sexuality as an open terrain in which the powers of the state, of the scientific and moral establishment, and of the sexist ideology of male-defined pleasure are constantly meeting *resistance* from individuals and groups. The experiences of such individuals and groups gave them a starting point to challenge the ideas of power of those who have created the oppressive institutions" (Ibid., 19).

In Discipline and Punish (1979), Foucault argues that systems of punishment are situated in a 'political economy' of the body.⁴⁶ Moving beyond the history of the body as needs, appetites, or as a location for the attack of viruses, Foucault advances that the body is directly involved in a political field. In his words, "power relations have an immediate hold upon it [the body]; they invest it, mark it, train it, torture it, force it to carry out tasks, to perform ceremonies, to emit signs" (1979:25-26). Thus, there is a motive behind disciplining bodies and this motive is the power relation.⁴⁷ Similarly, in The History of Sexuality (1978), the drive behind the knowledge or the "truth" of sex is the relations of power; power is always exercised with a series of aims and objectives, its existence dependent on a multiplicity of points of resistance, and

⁴⁶ Foucault's account of the body is unable to address some central feminist concerns surrounding the discipline of "gendered" bodies (Bordo, 1989; Bartky, 1988). As Bartky (1988) remarks, "Foucault treats the body throughout as if it were one, as if the bodily experiences of men and women did not differ and as if men and women bore the same relationship to the characteristic institutions of modern life. Where is the account of the disciplinary practices that engender the 'docile bodies' of women, bodies more docile than the bodies of men?" (Ibid., 63-64).

⁴⁷ Foucault also discusses in Discipline and Punish the important mechanism of the Panopticon as a machine which produces homogeneous effects of power. In other words, the Panopticon can be put to use for a variety of different motives. As he says, "[t]he Panopticon functions as a kind of laboratory of power. Thanks to its mechanisms of observation, it gains in efficiency and in the ability to penetrate into men's behaviour; knowledge follows the advances of power, discovering new objects of knowledge over all the surfaces on which power is exercised" (1979:204).

its intentionality and non-subjectiveness characterized by tactics that become connected to one another (1978:93-96). Here, the aim works to indicate or intend what "the truth" ought to be. The motives involved in producing the "truth of sex", for Foucault, are related to the emergence of discourse(s) and the inter-relationship between discourse(s) and power/knowledge: discourses could be both the instrument and the effect of power/knowledge, the transmitter, producer, underminer, and exposer of power/knowledge, and the tactical element operating in the field of force relations (1978:101-102).

In Beyond Good and Evil and On the Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche questions all religious and moral assumptions by not only looking for the inconsistencies and contradictions contained in them but by granting these anomalies a necessary condition in the production of "truth" itself.⁴⁸ In examining what is considered good and evil, Nietzsche traces the "origination" of the values associated with them: the conditions and circumstances under which they grow, evolve and transform. He uncovers not only the hidden value and 'secret' of the growth of good and evil; he shows how this hidden value opposes and contradicts the presumptions of good and evil. In Nietzsche's investigation of phenomena (Christian beliefs, human activity, the powerful, the impotent, good, evil, etc.), the

⁴⁸ As he states, "one has hitherto never doubted or hesitated in the slightest degree in supposing "the good man" to be of greater value than "the evil man," of greater value in the sense of furthering the advancement and prosperity of man in general" (1967b:20).

aim of "truth" always works to preserve its own opposing forces (hidden contradictions), creating or manifesting the "will to power" (1967a,b).

There are purposes or aims in producing the truth of something or in creating morality. In Valverde's work, erotic desire (or the 'will to power') asserts itself at the time that it creates a submissive desire. Similarly, in Foucault's work the motives behind sexuality's discursive existence are the power relations that traverse it. These disciplinary power/knowledge relations are responsible in executing the production of sexuality, the sexual subject⁴⁹, and the discourses that both sustain and are sustained by these relations.

These studies show "truth" as the point where meaning becomes anchored in one position or function, that the motive behind truth is the desire to dominate, and that "truth" is constantly compelled or aimed at something else. This motive, or what can be called the forces of constraint, extols the virtues of "reality" and assails those who prevent its "truth" from being stationary and fixed. The forces of constraint behind morality always turn against what prevents morality from

⁴⁹ There is a vast literature that focuses on the making and identity of the subject, of which I cite only a few. See Irene Diamond and Lee Quinby (eds.), Feminism and Foucault: Reflections on Resistance. Boston: Northeastern University Press; Colin Gordon, "Birth of the Subject", Radical Philosophy, No.17 (Summer), 1977, pp.15-25; Julian Henriques, et al., Changing the Subject: Psychology, Social Regulation and Subjectivity. London: Methuen, 1984; E. Ann Kaplan, Motherhood and Representation: The Mother in Popular Culture and Melodrama. London: Routledge; Clare O'Farrell, Foucault: Historian or Philosopher?. London: The MacMillan Press, 1989; L. Martin, H. Gutman, and P. Hutton (eds.), The Technologies of the Self. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1988.

certainty. From this point of view, moral practices are not repressed, since the motive behind morality aims toward inciting, inducing and seducing others to speak its truth.

The forces of constraint are manifest in morality and there can be no separation between them and morality. There are no forces of constraint without the correlative constitution of a domain of morality, nor any morality that does not presuppose and constitute constraint. In short, it is not the behaviour and activity of people that produce a domain of morality, but the inter-locking relationship between the forces of constraint and morality. This relationship involves social processes and struggles and it is this that circumscribes the form and domain of morality.⁵⁰

There are several assumptions that this study advances about morality. First, morality would be meaningless if it were freed from all relationships.⁵¹ The essential point is that morality endures because there are many beliefs and practices that surround it, form it, and give it a discursive meaning. Without these conditions and circumstances, morality would not be productive. Morality,

⁵⁰ This argument is similar to Foucault's approach to power-knowledge relations in Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (1979:27).

⁵¹ This argument has been made by Nietzsche in his rejection of the "thing in itself". He makes the point "[t]hat things possess a constitution in themselves quite apart from interpretation and subjectivity, is quite idle hypothesis: it presupposes that interpretation and subjectivity are not essential, that a thing freed from all relationships would still be a thing" (1967a:302-303).

or the "considering-something-true" (Nietzsche, 1967a), takes many different forms, involves different individuals, social groups and institutions, and addresses much more than one aim. Foucault's discursive approach to sexuality and madness illustrates the conditions necessary to the constitution of "truths" or "facts". Instead of accepting "truth" or morality at face value, it is more appropriate to be concerned with analyzing "truth games". In this context, Foucault (1985) raises several interesting questions about the relationship between individuals and how they identify themselves:

What are the games of truth by which man proposes to think his own nature when he perceives himself to be mad; when he considers himself to be ill; when he conceives of himself as a living, speaking, labouring being; when he judges and punishes himself as a criminal? What are the games of truth by which human beings came to see themselves as desiring individuals? (Ibid., 6-7).

The question that should be posed is; how, and in what way, does morality's "truth" manifest, and how do people become its 'subjects'? This latter question does not assume that morality is a "thing" or a "fact" that exists out there, with rules and a life of its own. This would be analogous to arguing that family ideologies are caused by the existence of the family. The forces of constraint can be conceived as the general aspect of moral practices. In what follows, I show how morality manifests itself through the deployment of techniques.⁵²

⁵² In latter chapters, morality is shown as a specific technique of constraint in rural Turkish society.

3.2 The Deployment of Morality: Techniques

It is the concern of this section to outline the distinguishing features of moral claims. Implicit in this approach is the assumption that there is nothing inherently absolute or "true" about morality. Instead, there are many things - beliefs and practices - that morality claims to uphold either because they are true or valuable. These claims do more, however, than just describe a state of affairs or represent a moral ideal, they constitute a form of power relations.

Moral claims manifest only against resistances, i.e., against that which resists incorporation and equalization; they aim toward the domination of such counter-forces through the deployment and delimitation of a field of meaning. Morality is a form of power relations. In this sense it aims not merely at preservation and maintenance of a position, but aims to grow stronger. The suggestion that morality strives only to defend and preserve itself is nothing more than an interpretation promoted by moral understanding. Continuity and regularity in social relations are values resulting from techniques of using history, language, rationality, causality, etc., in the face of the forces of change and transformation.

Morality is a technique because it defines how people should behave and act and what they should deem as good or bad. This moral constraint derives its success through a variety of discursive forms and so forms an entire field of

relations. The ultimate aim morality dissimulates is the development of the conditions of domination, i.e., making moral subjects. It is in the sphere of constituting subjects, through the production and transformation of values, that morality exhibits a most economical exercise of power.

In Discipline and Punish (1979), Foucault traces the many historical lineages of the relation between power and the subject. He argues that while discipline, like other types of power relations, aims at producing 'subjects' of power, he argues that discipline is far more economical than other forms of power in that it aims to "make individuals." Disciplinary power derives its success through (1) hierarchical observation, (2) normalizing judgement and (3) the examination. In the first, continuous and functional surveillance of individuals are the means by which disciplinary power became an "integrated" system: it was organized as a multiple, automatic and anonymous power. In Foucault's words, "[t]hanks to the techniques of surveillance, the 'physics' of power, the hold over the body, operate according to the laws of optics and mechanics, according to a whole play of spaces, lines, screen, beams, degrees and without recourse, in principle at least, to excess, force or violence" (1979:177).

In the second, normalizing judgement involves five distinct operations. It refers individual actions to a whole field of comparison; it differentiates individuals from one another; it measures the abilities and levels of individuals;

it introduces the constraint of conformity; lastly, it traces the limit that defines difference in relation to all other differences. In Foucault's terms, "[t]he perpetual penalty that traverses all points and supervises every instant in the disciplinary institutions compares, differentiates, hierarchizes, homogenizes, excludes. In short, it *normalizes*" (1979:183).

In the third, the examination combines the techniques of an observing hierarchy and those of a normalizing judgement. The examination pins down each individual in his/her own peculiarity and grants each individual their own status and feature. This examination "assures the disciplinary functions of distribution and classification, maximum extraction of forces and time, continuous genetic accumulation, optimum combination of aptitudes, and, thereby, the fabrication of cellular, organic, genetic and combinatory individuality" (1979:192). The examination forms each individual as the effect and object of power. In elaborating this idea, Bordo (1989) argues that there is such a thing as a feminized "examination" where female bodies are disciplined and "normalized," and become "docile bodies" (i.e., bodies whose energies are externally regulated, subjected, transformed and improved). Women undergo this kind of subjugation in a society that upholds and celebrates a particular view of physical attractiveness. In her words,

[t]hrough the exacting and normalizing disciplines of diet, make-up, and dress - central organizing principles of time and space in the

days of many women - we are rendered less socially oriented and more centripetally focused on self-modification. Through these disciplines, we continue to memorize on our bodies the feel and conviction of lack, insufficiency, of never being good enough. At the farthest extremes, the practices of femininity may lead us to utter demoralization, debilitation, and death (1988:14).

Similar to the techniques deployed in "disciplining" individuals, Foucault shows how there are techniques employed to constitute both sexuality and the sexual subject. In The History of Sexuality, Foucault (1978) questions the usual conjectures about sex: that sex is condemned to prohibition, non-existence, and silence or, generally, that sex is repressed. Rather than merely accept these ideas about sex, Foucault unravels its presuppositions, locating the conditions and circumstances that produce them. Foucault points out that there are various processes and techniques that give rise to the discourse on sex, and he considers these techniques responsible in forming the "truth" of sex and the sexual subject.⁵³ Foucault claims that in western society, the procedure for producing the "truth" of sex is not drawn from the experience and knowledge of pleasure (*Ars Erotica*) but stems from the telling (obligations to confess the secret) of it. Paradoxically, the obligation to conceal sex was based on admitting, through various discursive procedures, the secret of sex.

⁵³ The term "subject" for Foucault has two meanings: "subject to someone else by control and dependence, and tied to his own identity by a conscience of self-knowledge" (1983:212). As he remarks, both of these meanings suggest a form of power which subjugates and makes subject to.

In the deployment of techniques that constitute "sex", Foucault argues that the boundaries of speaking of sex became enlarged and regulated only because administrative and managerial techniques were employed for producing a wider quantity and regime of discourses, special knowledges, analyses, and injunctions about sex (1978:23-26). These discourses were interlocking, hierarchized and articulated around a cluster of power/knowledge relations. For Foucault, the mechanisms of power/knowledge were responsible - not in consigning sex to a hidden existence but - in creating ideas of sex that exploit sex as "the secret" (1978:35) and that "categorizes the individual, marks him by his own individuality, attaches him to his own identity, imposes a law of truth on him which he must recognize and which others must recognize in him" (1983:212).

As with Foucault, others illustrate the centrality of techniques in the production of "truth". Bordo's (1989) work explains how the "truth" of femininity is constructed. She argues that there are techniques that discipline and "normalize" the female body, such as the social promotion of traditional gender relations and aesthetic ideals for women. In her words, she says that "femininity itself has become largely a matter of constructing, in the manner described by Erving Goffman, the appropriate surface presentation of the self. We no longer are told what "a lady" is or of what femininity consists. Rather, we learn the rules directly through bodily discourse, "through images which tell us what

clothes, body shape, facial expression, movements, and behaviour are required" (Ibid., 17).

In line with both Foucault (1978; 1983) and Bordo (1989), Nietzsche shows that what we take for truth and meaning, are value-laden conventions that conceal other counter-values. At the horizon of all that is considered true are the processes employed to ensure the continuation and propagation of this 'truth,' such as: systematic arrangements, regulative articles of belief (Nietzsche, 1967a:530), artful plans, secret purposes, impositions of regularity upon chaos, inferences, and generally, the power to order, simplify, falsify, artificially distinguish, and classify phenomena into definite categories (Nietzsche, 1967a:288).

In a study of the uses of history, for example, Nietzsche (1983) argues that history has been appropriated for a variety of uses to a variety of aims. He suggests that there are three approaches to history: the monumental, antiquarian, and the critical. Monumental history is a conception of the past that focuses on, and forgets, certain aspects to make what might be dissimilar (in the present) look similar (from the point of view of the past). In Nietzsche's words, "[m]onumental history deceives by analogies: with seductive similarities it inspires the courageous to foolhardiness and the inspired to fanaticism; and when we go on to think of this kind of history in the hands and heads of gifted egoists and visionary scoundrels, then we see empires destroyed, princes murdered, wars and

revolutions launched and the number of historical 'effects in themselves', that is to say, effects without sufficient cause, again augmented" (1983:71).

In contrast to monumentalism, antiquarian history is a conception of historical events that are worthy of reverence, while those viewed as new and evolving are rejected. This use of history "only knows how to *preserve* life, not how to engender it; it always undervalues that which is becoming because it has no instinct for divining it - as monumental history, for example, has" (1983:75). As a side remark, this type of history is similar to the legalistic approach in that this approach refuses to acknowledge different or new social practices that lie outside the path of Islamic moral codes. Lastly, another way of regarding the past is to approach it critically by judging it and condemning it, in order to do away with it (1983:76).

The "truth" of history in the Nietzschean sense is not just something there, that might be found or discovered, but something created and made use of. This leads Nietzsche to the conclusion that all "truth" is mere interpretation and not truth itself: the world is only seen to be logical because we have created this way; it is an apparent world -- a world viewed according to values (1967a:305), not a "real" world.

Foucault's examination of discipline and sexuality, Bordo's (1989) analysis of the "correct" body and femininity, and Nietzsche's treatment of history and

morality entail an analysis of the techniques involved in constituting "truths". They do not approach what is considered the "truth" (discipline, sex, femininity, history) as though they were absolute. Nor do they arrive at any conclusions concerning the legitimacy or the falsity of these assumptions. Their intention is not to prove or disprove that this or that is true. We are already aware that there are procedures used to produce the "truth" of morality, history, sexuality, etc. For Foucault, a discursive, confessional based procedure was employed to manifest the "truth" of sex and it was this mechanism that was brought into play in power relations. In the work of Nietzsche, the procedure of schematization was employed to bring about the "truth" of something, with the result of this denial of truth/being as a "will to power".⁵⁴

3.3 Methodology and the Study of Morality

Foucault and Nietzsche share many themes in their analysis and approach to the phenomena of power relations, and the manifold forms domination and subjection take throughout history. Both advocate a critical re-evaluation of the unities making up our systems of belief and the organizations and institutions that arise from them, to bring them into line with our knowledge about the extent and

⁵⁴ For some cases, it might be useful to trace the "origin" of the procedure used in producing "truth", as Foucault has illustrated, and to examine the contradictions, inconsistencies, and opposing characteristics that might infuse the production of "truth", as Nietzsche has done.

nature of domination. At the centre of this re-evaluation is a genealogical method.

Foucault, on the one hand, is concerned with dismantling or deconstructing the notion of a continuous history by unmasking all forms of discourse (regimes of truth), as they exist and are embodied within a power/knowledge relation. The purpose of this approach is to show the means by which the subjects of power are constituted historically (Foucault, 1978, 1979). Foucault's treatment of the "truth" of sexuality, in The History of Sexuality, focuses on the techniques employed in the production of discursive phenomena. Discourses are seen to function as a mechanism and technique of power/knowledge relations and the effect of these relations is the constitution of the subject and of his/her subjection.

Nietzsche, on the other hand, examines the presuppositions of particular ideas or certainties by tracing their transformations in meaning and determining the counter-values motivating these "truths" (1967a). Similar to Foucault, Nietzsche reveals an array of meanings attached to our taken-for-granted realities, but does this by conceiving the processes (negating, ordering, inventing, forgetting, etc.) of producing the "truth" as a form or a manifestation of the one will which characterizes all events, the "will to power" (1967a). Both Foucault and Nietzsche profess a profound anti-structuralism, in that, as genealogists, it is not a matter of placing everything on the same level, but of recognizing the

different levels (of power relations and meaning). While Foucault is nevertheless interested in the phenomena of power and the forms of domination, he would be more likely to view these as effects of the breaks or ruptures that relativize the historical event, and stimulate the production of meaning on an entirely different level. The task of the genealogist is to trace the lines of connection between similar and disparate meanings, as relations of power not relations of meaning (see Foucault, 1980:114). Genealogy does not trace the development of unities, be they species, races, peoples, etc. What makes the history of human relations intelligible is not their connection on the level of meaning, but "the intelligibility of struggles, of strategies and tactics" (Foucault, 1980:114).

Like Nietzsche, Foucault opposes dialectical initiatives on the grounds that they fail to treat critically the problem of unities. In this regard, the method of genealogy approaches the problem of *origin* not as the place of the identity of things, but as a ground of dispersion, disparity and difference. In this regard it is important to recognize the significant effect Nietzsche has had in the development of the Foucaultian thesis, and it is to this the discussion now turns.

3.4 The Method of Genealogy

Foucault's main problem is to develop a method for understanding the occurrence of historical events. He questions the linking of events (writings,

utterances, knowledges, practices, etc.) to one another. In turning away from the idea that occurrences can be periodized or ranked, compared and symbolized with one another, Foucault recognizes the incidence of interruptions, breaks, and discontinuities in historical phenomena. He rejects the common notion that history traces a line from one event to another, or that such a 'lineage' possesses either causality or tradition as its means of articulation. Foucault advances, instead, a history characterized by division and transformation. There is no one cohesive principle or total history that is common to all the events of a period (1972:3-9).

The "genealogical" approach Foucault adopts⁵⁵ shows how historical events are rebuilt, reshaped, and thus separate and distinct from one another. In the same fashion that an archaeologist studies the layers and tiers of the earth, Foucault describes the disconnected "slices" of historical phenomena and uncovers the whole interplay of differences. As he remarks, "the history of thought, of knowledge, of philosophy, of literature seems to be seeking, and discovering, more and more discontinuities, whereas history itself appears to be abandoning the irruption of events in favour of stable structures" (Ibid., 6).

⁵⁵ The term "genealogy" is discussed by Foucault in, especially, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," in Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews, ed. Donald F. Bouchard (trans.), Bouchard and Sherry Simon (Ithica, N.Y., 1977).

The genealogical method specifically attempts to define the various discourses (on madness, sexuality, etc.) in their expression; that is, the objective is to point out the disunity of ideas within history (Ibid., 21-63). His method systematically describes a "discourse-object" in its many irregularities and diverse meanings, avoiding altogether the identity of discursive practices as a unity or a continual development (Ibid., 139-140). The aim is an investigation of forms of knowledge (at the level of their material unveiling) composed of restricted sets of effective oral or written utterances. The purpose is to delineate these discourses as constituting a specific order of historical reality. In Foucault's words, the problem is to show:

... in what way the set of rules that they put into operation is irreducible to any other; to follow them the whole length of their exterior ridges, in order to underline them the better. It does not proceed, in slow progression, from the confused field of opinion to the uniqueness of the system or the definitive stability of science; it is not a 'doxology'; but a differential analysis of the modalities of discourse (Ibid., 139).

This approach, however, restricts Foucault to a particular focus and intellectual concern. First, Foucault dismisses the ideas of development, evolution and progression, for these assume continuity. In The History of Sexuality, Foucault (1978:11) defines the regimes of power-knowledge that sustain the discourse on human sexuality, instead of conceiving sexuality's meaning as a continual and progressive link between all the discourses that produced it. From

the genealogical standpoint, it is futile to show the meaning of something by looking for it from within itself, as if it were something internally stable, homogeneous and unified. In his words (1983:211):

... to find out what our society means by sanity, perhaps we should investigate what is happening in the field of insanity... And what we mean by legality in the field of illegality... And, in order to understand what power relations are about, perhaps we should investigate the forms of resistance and attempts made to dissociate these relations... As a starting point, let us take a series of oppositions which have developed over the last few years: opposition to the power of men over women, of parents over children, of psychiatry over the mentally ill, or medicine over the population, of administration over the ways people live.

Thus, his genealogy cannot depict history as a series of factual successions (see also Fraser, 1989:19).⁵⁶ This is particularly why Foucault examines the basis upon which sequences are "affirmed, posited, arranged, and distributed in the space of knowledge" (1970:219).

Secondly, and following Nietzsche, the genealogical method rejects teleologies, totalities, influences, or original conditions, for these would identify a principle of coherence in historical occurrences. For example, in Discipline and Punish, Foucault (1979) is not interested in showing the original or initial

⁵⁶ In Unruly Practices: Power, Discourse, and Gender in Contemporary Social Theory, Nancy Fraser offers insight into understanding Foucault's genealogical method. She points out that this method represents a break with semiology and structuralism in the sense that culture is not understood in terms of a system of signs. Instead, the genealogy conceptualizes culture as practices, wherein these practices are instituted historically and are therefore based on interpretation or "historically instituted practices" (1989:19).

development of "punishment", since this would assume that various forms of punishment follow from one another. Instead, he illustrates the power technologies exercised in punishing and disciplining the body: from marking it (torture), giving it signifying qualities (fears of torture), and leaving traces of it (bureaucracies). As Foucault (1979:182-183) states,

... the art of punishing, in the regime of disciplinary power, is aimed neither at expiation, nor even precisely at repression. It brings five quite distinct operations into play: it refers individual actions to a whole that is at once a field of comparison, a space of differentiation and the principle of a rule to be followed. It differentiates individuals from one another, in terms of the following general principle: that the rule be made to function as a minimal threshold, as an average to be respected or as an optimum toward which one must move. It measures in quantitative terms and hierarchizes in terms of value the abilities, the level, the 'nature' of individuals. It introduces, through this 'value-giving' measure, the constraint of a conformity that must be achieved. Lastly, it traces the limit that will define difference in relation to all other differences...

These methodological restrictions move Foucault's analysis away from establishing a "collective consciousness" in the Durkheimian tradition, from positing ideal types in the Weberian tradition, and from advancing a "community of meanings, symbolic links, an interplay of resemblance and reflexion..." (Foucault, 1972:22). This is why historical events (sexuality, discipline, the "order" of things, etc.) must be treated in their dispersion and eruption or in the

context of discontinuity (see also Fraser, 1989:20). An important feature of this method is the treatment of opposition and contradictory phenomena.

Discontinuities and divisions cannot reconcile themselves into unity. Foucault does not attempt to resolve, for example, sexuality's many irregularities by placing them into some coherent unity. Contradictions and breaks are neither appearances to be overcome, nor secret principles to be uncovered. They are objects to be described for themselves, without any attempt being made to discover from what point of view they can be distributed, or at what level they can be revolutionized (Foucault, 1972:151). Foucault's method is analogous to describing the state of contradiction before it gets resolved (i.e., it is independent of the problem of, or the potential for, resolution).

Foucault's approach focuses on the locus, the spaces of conflict, and the similarities, not the dialectical manifestation of things. Contradictions are seen as a space of multiple dissensions and as phenomena that must be described. The anomalies implicit in a particular discursive practice are analyzed from the point at which they are constituted. This moves the analysis toward defining the forms that these contradictions assume, the relations that they have with each other, and the domain that they govern. This is why Foucault maintains that the genealogical approach holds a discourse in its many irregularities, all the while suppressing the theme of a contradiction (1972:155-156). In his criticism of

dialectics, Foucault comments by saying that "[d]ialectic' is a way of evading the always open and hazardous reality of conflict by reducing it to a Hegelian skeleton..." (Foucault, 1972:114-115).

Although others have shown Nietzsche's intellectual influence in Foucault's work (Bouchard, 1977:18; O'Farrell, 1989:33-34; Fraser, 1989:19), Foucault clearly develops these methodological principles to a far greater extent. This is one reason Foucault develops the idea that history is not a series of events but a series of ruptures, viewing history in this way enables Foucault to restate the problem of the 'will to power'; the content Nietzsche employs in his treatment of Christianity. In Language, Counter-Memory, Practice, Foucault (1977:142) challenges other genealogical solutions to the problem of morality:

What is found at the historical beginning of things is not the inviolable identity of their origin; it is the dissension of other things. It is disparity... [T]he search for descent is not the erecting of foundations: on the contrary, it disturbs what was previously considered immobile; it fragments what was thought unified; it shows the heterogeneity of what was imagined consistent with itself (1977:142-147).

In this statement Foucault sides with Nietzsche's genealogical method and its treatment of the problem of origination.

In Nietzsche's (1967a) central work, that of The Will to Power, he advances a method of re-evaluation of the aphorisms of morality, i.e., its 'sayings' and values. For Nietzsche, it is the value of these values that must be brought

Resolution test chart showing patterns of vertical and horizontal lines with numerical values: 1.0, 1.1, 1.25, 1.4, 1.6, 1.8, 2.0, 2.2, 2.5, 2.8, 3.2, 3.6, 4.0, 4.5, 5.0, 5.6, 6.3, 7.1, 8.0, 9.0, 10.

MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS
STANDARD REFERENCE MATERIAL 1010a
(ANSI and ISO TEST CHART No. 2)

into question, and so he attempts an exegesis or critical commentary on their meaning. The problem, as he sees it, is that the semblance of unity purported by morality (as its central value) covers the fact that the meaning ascribed to events change over time. This leads him to search for the origin of these values, to the discovery of their genealogical connections, and the process that leads to transformation. Clearly what Nietzsche has in mind is not a genealogy that further proves the continuity of present values with the past, but, one that recognizes that values change and this change cannot be accounted for at the level of values. In his words,

[c]hristianity, the revolution, the abolition of slavery, equal rights, philanthropy, love of peace, justice, truth: all these big words have value only in a fight, as flags: not as realities but as showy words for something quite different (indeed, opposite!) (1967a:80).

That change has nothing whatever to do with values as such, leads to the search for the origin of values as effects and perspectives of power. In effect, then, his study of the phenomena of morality leads into a genealogy of the forms and effects of power.

In speaking of morality, Nietzsche disagrees with the notion that "by their fruits ye shall know them". Instead, he says of every morality, "[i]t is a fruit by which I recognize the soil from which it sprang" (Nietzsche, 1967a:257). He argues that everything now regarded as immoral was once praiseworthy in a master morality (1967a:272). Therefore, the adversaries of good and evil do not

spring from a common place; they are values constructed in different contents, with different aims and perspectives. In The Will to Power, he further argues that present Christian values and teachings contradict the early Christian movement. The meaning of Christianity in the ecclesiastical sense was based on an indifference to dogmas, cults, priests, and the church. In the early development of Christianity, Nietzsche locates an emancipated Judaism and an established anti-paganistic value system. The paradox was that Christian teaching contained within itself an anti-Christian belief system: "things and people instead of symbols; history instead of eternal facts; forms, rites, dogmas instead of a way of life" (1967a:159).

Everything that is considered true, according to Nietzsche, develops through a process of affirmation: a process of incorporating and subsuming that which is outside itself into order to affirm itself. This he views as the force of the negative forms of the "will to power". For example, "slave morality" directs its view of itself, not by focusing on itself but, by looking outward. It affirms itself by seeking out its opposite (the negation, or the "imaginary revenge") and bringing this other into itself. In On The Genealogy of Morals, "slave morality from the outset says No to what is 'outside', what is 'different', what is 'not itself'; and this No is its creative deed" (1967b:36).⁵⁷ Thus the procedures invented to

⁵⁷ In The Genealogy of Morals, this is what Nietzsche terms the "inversion of the value-positing eye" (1967:36).

create the "truth" of morality are based on an inversion and a reversal of their original determination. What lies as the basis of truth is its opposite and this is precisely the driving force behind truth. In other words, the motive triggering the production of truth, for Nietzsche, is the negative value of truth or the "will to power". In his words,

[a]ll "purposes", "aims", "meanings" are only modes of expression and metamorphoses of one will that is inherent in all events: the will to power. To have purposes, aims, intentions, will in general, is the same thing as will to be stronger, will to grow - and, in addition, willing the means to this (Nietzsche, 1967a:675).

For Nietzsche, the "will to power" is the core of all life no matter how clever the mask or dressed up its presentation.⁵⁸

While it is evident that Foucault does not posit anything like Nietzsche's "will to power," he acknowledges the "power relations" that constitute the site for the production of moral, ethical and ontological truths. In broader terms, Foucault's approach views phenomena such as deviance, madness and sexuality as outgrowths of many occasions and circumstances that constitute divisions, ruptures and breaks in the history of meaning. Changes in, or contests over,

⁵⁸ This sentiment is reflected in Nietzsche's Beyond Good and Evil (1966). As he says, "[r]efraining mutually from injury, violence, and exploitation and placing one's will on a par with that of someone else - this may become, in a certain rough sense, good manners among individuals if the appropriate conditions are present... But as soon as this principle is extended, and possibly even accepted as the fundamental principle of society, it immediately proves to be what it really is - a will to the denial of life, a principle of disintegration and decay" (Ibid., 203).

meaning signal both a break and a deployment of discourses that speaks to it. The determination of meaning is one consequence of such historical transformations. While these transformations constitute shifts in the centres of power (and therefore comprise a change in the perspective on values in the Nietzschean sense) there is not the sense in Foucault of a "will" behind these events. Transformations in power relations are described as matters of chance and circumstance ("events"). If this reduces the desire to interpret the will to power as a "subject of history" then all the better. And, if everything is decided by chance, then, there is no grand origin that unifies all events, nor is there a need to establish one a priori to create a single uniform line of descent. Foucault establishes genealogy as the task of tracing a multiplicity of lines of descent from a multiplicity of sites (beginnings).

3.5 Towards a Re-contextualization of Morality

My study of morality in rural Turkish society describes the discursive context in which morality develops and makes moral subjects. Theorizing morality in this way does away with the idea that wherever moral claims emerge we should assume a totalizing context, or that there is some external and repressive force structuring social practices. Similarly we should not accept that

morality simply fosters reintegration of the community in the face of external threats, or that morality traces a line of tradition.

This study of morality rejects both the repression-thesis (Islamic law and moral codes) and functionalism (the perpetuation of a tradition), emphasizing instead the formation of networks of social practices and the interrelationship of constraint and moral discourse. The purpose is simply not to categorize moral practices by showing how they are "constrained" by an Islamic regime or to show how they are a juridical and negative representation of collective sentiments. Morality is conceived as something separate from simple adherence to Islamic law. The objective is to describe the social construction of morality in terms of the manifold forces of constraint. The forces of constraint bring about morality's "reality" in the sense that they incite the production of moral claims. These forces are the processes found in the making of morality, which take shape either through struggle, conflict or transformation. They are the effects of divisions and inequalities and have a productive role whenever they come into play (Foucault, 1978:94).

In what follows, morality is shown to be embodied in a variety of everyday practices (village, gender and class formations, kinship, marriage and household arrangements) as an array of techniques culminating in the interplay of force relations. In this regard, I take as my archive all the aphorisms perpetuated in

Sakli, i.e., all those expressions deployed to make you feel as if you were standing in a context. I will show that there is no need to have recourse to such totalizing techniques as Islamic law to perpetuate a semblance of order. Beneath such weighty techniques (which could only be partial in their effect) there exist a variety of more economical micro-techniques that characterize morality's dispersal and diffuseness.

Chapter 4: The Moral World of the Village

Rural Turkey is a mixture of small towns and villages. According to official statistics, there are over 36,000 villages in Turkey (Keyder, 1983b:45; Sirman, 1988:70). Most of these communities contain less than one thousand people. Agriculture in Turkey is centred around these communities where small land holdings predominate (Akçay, 1985:11). This chapter outlines some key historical, social and economic aspects of the community of Sakli, and the forces that serve to shape village identity.

4.1 The Village

The community of Sakli is in the mountainous, northwestern region of Turkey. It is some three-hundred and fifty kilometres north of Turkey's capital city, Ankara, in the province of Zonguldak. Zonguldak, with a population exceeding 1,100,000, comprises one city, nine towns, and just over 775 villages. Out of the total eligible working population over the age of 12 (717,508), just over one-half are reported to be economically active. Over 56 percent of this population (204,595) is engaged in agricultural work while the remainder is in production-related work (27%), service-related work (7%), scientific and technical work (5%), clerical work (4%), and in administrative and managerial work (under

1%) (SIS, 1989). The inhabitants in the province of Zonguldak are largely subsistence farm workers, and many male farmers are absorbed in mainly seasonal, and to a lesser degree permanent, wage labour.

The overwhelming majority of Sakli residents are subsistence farmers, with some male farmers working seasonally as wage labourers in nearby towns or in Zonguldak's coal mining industry. Wheat and corn are the main agricultural produce in this area, and its nearby villages. Most farming households have gardens (*bahçe*) in which they plant fruits and vegetables (such as beans, tomatoes, lettuce, cucumbers, and zuchinni) and many own some cattle, sheep, and/or poultry.

The approach to the village from the mountain road brings the visitor to its boundary. Past this boundary, at the entrance to the village, there is an old and large cemetery⁵⁹ (*mezarlık*) surrounded by wheat fields that, during the summer months, are quite dry and in need of water. On the same road one finds the first neighbourhood to the right, and to the left, a road leading to Sakli's four other neighbourhoods. From this point, one can see a white-washed home and women often working on the porch, clothed in long colourful dresses, with white scarves loosely tied around their heads. In the enclosed yard, there is a dark

⁵⁹ The landlord neighbourhood, however, has a private cemetery located inside its own district and at the very top of the mountain. They are proud to say that only "our people" ("bızim insanlar") are buried there.

wooden shed without a door, and chickens and dogs rooming around the garden entrance way.

The village's immediate appearance hints at its impoverished character. Village streets are unpaved and dusty (or muddy, depending on the time of the year) and most buildings are small and homogeneous. Fences generally encircle each house, keeping pets and chickens from wondering and unwanted animals from entering. Most houses are one-story buildings constructed of plastered and whitewashed cement brick. They usually contain two or three rooms and a sitting room (*salon*). The sitting room is where people entertain their guests. It also serves as a bedroom for three or four people, a place where women sew and knit, or a room where men meet and drink privately. There is usually a small compact kitchen at one end of the house. Poorer homes have toilets separate from the main house though most have running water. Village homes have been connected to electricity since 1979, but its supply is irregular, leaving many without electricity at night.

On the left-hand side of the main road, there are two small white brick school houses and another smaller house (to house the local teacher) situated nearby. Across from these buildings lies the bustling village meeting place, consisting of one coffee house (*kave eve*) and a small store (*bakkal*) (which had just recently opened). During the year, many village men and boys spend part of

their day at the coffee house playing backgammon, discussing local village issues, and watching T.V. and all those who pass by. Women are not permitted to participate in these events; it is thought that women should stay at home and tend to the fields and their domestic concerns.

The coffee house and the small store are the extent of shops in the community. There is no place in the village to buy fresh fruit or vegetables. During the winter months villagers must go to the town market (40 minutes by bus) to purchase such goods. While the local landlords have cars of their own, villagers who travel any distance, either to visit relatives or attend market bazaars and clothing stores, rely almost exclusively on an intermittent bus service operated by the local *muhtar* (village head).⁶⁰

Other, more official, buildings in the village include a primary (*ilk*) school (opened in 1968) and a "middle" (*orta*) school (established in 1979). The middle or secondary school is too small to accommodate all the village children.⁶¹

⁶⁰ The *muhtar* is elected by community members, both women and men. His formal responsibilities include: recording births, deaths, and marriages in the community (for which he is paid a small salary from the government). He is also the person one consults concerning village matters. For example, it was through him that I received formal permission to do my research in the community. At an informal level the *muhtar* tries to settle community disputes and problems. For the past few years, the *muhtar* in Sakli has been a landlord. Even though many villagers prefer someone else, they are often forced to vote for a landlord because of their economic dependence.

⁶¹ This middle (*orta*) school has a total of 101 students who are from Sakli (33) and nearby communities (68). The major subjects taught include: Turkish,

Community members are raising money to build an extension, and most households - except the landlord families - have made donations. The village has no high school. Since transportation to town is irregular and infrequent, those wishing to attend high school must move to the town, requiring the parents to rent an apartment for them. Given the expense involved in setting up another household, only children from wealthier families can afford such an education. As a result, only a few boys, and even fewer girls, receive high school diplomas. Girls, it is said, do not need higher education because they are destined to marry, have children, and work for their family's household. Farming families rarely can afford to send their sons or daughters to high school. Children from farming families are most likely to receive a high school education when they have relatives, working in Germany, sending money home.

Itinerant school teachers live in government-owned houses in the village. There is also a health house (*sağlık evi*), a small two-room medical building staffed by a young male doctor, a mid-wife, and another man who does odd jobs (cleans, makes tea, replenishes medical supplies). Villagers only visit the centre

geography, foreign language (German or Arabic), mathematics, history, religion, and agriculture. There is a strict gender division in education; just over seventeen percent of the entire student population are made up of females.

in emergencies, that is, when searching for relief from 'ills' that traditional healing practices have failed to redress.⁶²

Next to the health house is a lodge for government-appointed personnel such as: the mid-wife and her family, the local doctor and his/her family, and any other "official" person who may require housing.⁶³ There are cold running water and electricity available in each of these dwellings. Heat, during the fall and winter months, comes from a wood stove, the wood for which is generally collected by the renters themselves. Since I was a guest (*misafir*), many villagers were kind enough to supply me with local forest wood to last a few days at a time, and local neighbours gave me homemade flat bread, vegetables, or fruit periodically throughout the year. It is a common tradition for local villagers to look after the needs of temporary residents, such as the mid-wife⁶⁴, the doctor, and I.

⁶² Local residents believe 'western' medicines' curative power comes in the form of injections. Local residents mainly request such injections when they suffer from emotional or physical anguish. For example, a young women named Yadigar had a fight with her husband. In order to relieve her frustration at her husband's behaviour she said the doctor will "bana iğne verecek" ("give me a needle").

⁶³ With permission from the town mayor and the *muhtar*, a small-size apartment in this building was made available to me while I carried out my research.

⁶⁴ The midwife said she received food and wood from villagers her first year in the village.

Compared to other villages in closer proximity to the town, Saklı has a fairly short history; it is less than four hundred years old.⁶⁵ Under Ottoman rule⁶⁶ and long before the formation of the Turkish republic in 1923, Saklı was inhabited by a few subsistence farming families. With the arrival of three large land-owning families and their farm slaves some two hundred and fifty years ago, a peasantry developed and worked under the landlord (*ağalık*) system. The landlords gradually cleared the local forest and the peasant population began to work as sharecroppers (see the chapter on descent for more on the landlord system). At this time, landlords controlled all of the land in the area, they owned over 250 sheep, and employed village shepherds, servants, barbers, and garden keepers. Because of rapid industrialization in the early 1920's and the availability of wage employment in urban centres, the *ağalık* system weakened and underwent enormous transformation. As large portions of land were sold by landlords to peasants, the predominance of sharecropping gradually declined. Cultural remnants of landlord-peasant relations, however, continue to pervade community life and organization.

⁶⁵ The social and economic history of the village stem from oral histories conducted during the field research stage.

⁶⁶ The Ottoman Empire was an Islamic state and it had absolute ownership of all land. These lands were called *mira* (crown) lands and they belonged to the Sultan (see Akçay, 1985).

The present inhabitants of Sakli have little knowledge of village history. They do, however, profess to know about the villagers who first arrived in the community four hundred years before. Some say that these occupants set up approximately twelve households (*hane*), in the same location where the oldest village neighbourhood (Tellaloğlu) is presently established. Community members claim that these families built the first mosque (*cami*), in the same spot as the one frequented today. Stories are often told about a cave (*mağara*) in the hills behind Tellaloğlu, where some of these early settlers disappeared. They say that a spell (*büyü*) cast by those living in and around the cave caused this misfortune. Today, disasters and sickness are still believed to be the result of forces, such as evil spirits and spells cast by village enemies.

4.2 Local Residents and Population

In Sakli, there are 567 villagers living in eighty-seven households. This population consists entirely of Islamic (Sunni) people. Most of the adult population, especially the elderly, is illiterate and most are unable to read the Koran. For information about the religion and its customs, villagers rely on knowledge gained from their parents and grandparents, and from the preaching of the local religious leader (*imam*).

The population distribution by sex is even. Most local residents were born in the village (82%) and the remainder in nearby villages and cities in Turkey. Only one person in the village was born in Germany. Of the marriageable population (over the age of 15), 75.3 percent are married, 20.9 percent are single, and less than 4 percent are widowed or divorced. The small number of widowed people reflects the commonly held expectation that an adult should remarry when their spouse dies. This is especially the case for young women and men and less the case for older or retired persons. In terms of age, 35.8 percent are fifteen years old or younger, 11.5 percent are between sixteen and twenty, 26.6 percent are between the ages of twenty-one and forty, and 17.3 percent are between forty-one and sixty. Less than 9 percent of the population is over the age of sixty.

In the past five years, the size and characteristics of Sakli's population have remained relatively unchanged. Within the last twenty years, however, long-term and permanent out-migration has resulted in the relocation of approximately twenty-five families (or some of its male members) to Germany in search of work in the coal mines and other industries. Often these families maintain residence in the community, and most return to the village after working in Germany for a lengthy period. These people, called *Almancilar* (Germans) by local villagers, are the wealthiest of all farming households. While residing in Germany, they often send remittances to their relatives and many have large extensions on their

village homes. When ever one sees a house with more than one storey, people generally assume the owners work or have worked in Germany.

Besides those families engaged in wage work abroad, there are families that have permanently migrated to the city of Zonguldak for work in factories or coal mines. Zonguldak houses the biggest state-mining company in Turkey, employing over 50,000 workers from Turkey's central regions. Families that move to Zonguldak rarely return to Sakli, though many of its members still maintain bonds with relatives and neighbours, and often spend their holidays in the village. There are also subsistence farmers who work in the coal mining industry on a seasonal and part-time basis. Few of these men maintain permanent residence in the city of Zonguldak, since the work schedule is every second month. This type of employment began in the early 1900's, when the state-owned coal mining industry provided opportunities for wage labour.⁶⁷

The above analysis of the village provides a broad sketch of some historical, social and economic aspects of this geographical location and its residents. The remainder of this chapter focuses on the phenomena of Sakli's identity and its foundations. The fact that a large group of people live in the

⁶⁷ Berberoğlu (1982) documents the consolidation of the Turkish state's role in the national industrialization process during the early 1930's. In addition to nationalizing Zonguldak's coal mining operation and dozens of other mines and factories, the state also took over the main railways, utilities, transportation and port facilities (Ibid., 34-35).

same geographical space should not trick us into supposing they are joined by some primal sense of identity. Identity and the sense of morality are values superimposed on an array of force relations. They do not conceal the presence of a unity, but aim to establish hierarchy. Divisions based on social location, gender and social class constitute the site for the deployment of this identity construct.

4.3 The Social Construction of Village Identity

A sense of relatedness and identity⁶⁸ is an important value for local residents of Sakli. Membership in a village carries certain advantages when one is looking to harvest crops, borrow money, or when one wishes to influence important community matters. In the following analysis, I conceive identity as a value, as something villagers wish to establish for themselves and for the community in which they belong. I emphasize the variability of 'identity' by illustrating how its 'meaning' is dependent on the context of its use and on the fact that it is made use of. In a variety of social practices, I show how the meaning of 'village identity' is made to function as a form of domination.

⁶⁸ In a study of Bedouin society, Abu-Lughod (1988) claims that ancestral blood links people to the past and binds them in the present. Blood is considered essential to the definition of cultural identity (Ibid., 41) and acts "as a means of determining social place and the links between people" (Ibid., 49). These people (Awlad'Ali) conceive of themselves in terms of tribes or units defined by consanguinity or ties to a common patrilineal ancestor (Ibid., 50). In my study, however, the construction of cultural identity goes beyond that of blood or origination.

There are a variety of techniques employed to promote village identification, that is, to promote the feeling of standing in a single, totalizing context. One important technique deployed is the discrimination of villager from non-villager by comparison. Techniques of comparison are judgements of difference, discriminating those inside the unity from those on the outside. They delimit what is moral from what is immoral (good from bad, permitted from forbidden) and so constitute the boundaries or limits that mark these distinctions as opposites (and thereby making unity more compelling). It is, therefore, through judging difference that the apparent unity of the village manifests itself.

For morality, discord is functional; it is forced to serve as a display of moral integrity and lack of variability. In this way, dissension constitutes a site for the deployment of the value of identity and integration, also playing a pivotal role in fostering a sense of the necessity of such values. Discordance is made to function within a system of purposes and, in other contexts, it can be appropriated in the service of new purposes, aims and ends.

Three aspects of village identity are social location, gender and class differences. Far from constituting a unity,⁶⁹ it is shown that these differences

⁶⁹ Unity, identity and singularity are discursive techniques that evolve out of the forces of constraint. Constraint is a double-sided term used to denote sites of force and resistance, where force only manifests against resistance, and where resistance is the effect of an encounter with a superior force. Morality is an arena of judgement that speaks to such divisions within the field of force relations, determining both the language and meaning of constraint. The value accorded to

comprise some of the force relations that traverse village life. These forces are wellsprings of the social conventions that decide the value of social action. They form the context from which to understand the truth to which morality strives and the forces of constraint that are its motives. The values accorded to resistance are their appropriation and placement in a hierarchy. Force relations that incite moral judgement are simultaneously ordered, arranged and classified by it, that is, they are appropriated by morality at the level of meaning, and are given a place in a system of meaning. Yet the systems of boundaries valued by moral discourse do not constitute a single unified field of judgement. In short, moral systems aim not at the preservation of a presupposed unity, but at manufacturing a hierarchy or form of domination.

4.3.1 Social Location

Social location is one important criterion for establishing whether one can count as a particular type of villager. The semblance of local "villagers" is based on the deployment of difference in forming both insider and outsider. The unique moral character of the Sakli villager is determined by this comparative technique. Definite characteristics are ascribed to people who come from this

'constraint' in the sphere of moral judgement is, in one sense, very telling of its origin, as are the values of defence, preservation and the necessity of maintaining boundaries.

village. Sakli is considered a close-knit and industrious community, while other communities are thought to be dispersed and heterogeneous. Sakli is often compared to other villages that are not as safe (*emin*) or as clean (*temiz*). It is common for local residents to speak negatively of those communities where there are higher instances of bride or property theft (*kiz kaçırma* or *gizlilik*), poor transportation to the local town centre, and extreme clashes between landlords and farmers.

While these factors are important in demarcating the boundaries of village identity, other forces can come into play and change these determinations. For example, a woman from a nearby village married a man from Sakli and took up residence in the village. This woman faced ridicule and social exclusion as she failed to meet the ideals of mothering or "womanly" behaviour. It was said that she did not "properly" handle, feed or take care of her children. It is not so much what this woman allegedly did that resulted in her isolation from other local members. Rather, her inappropriate behaviour was interpreted as a consequence of her strange (*acayip*) natal village and family affiliation. The term *acayip* is frequently employed by villagers to denote immoral, strange, unfamiliar, odd or foreign ideas and behaviour. Even someone residing in Sakli can be deemed an outsider when they cross the bounds of traditional gendered behaviour.

Not only is one's village compared with other villages to figure out who are insiders and outsiders, but the village of Sakli is compared to non-villages. Those who come from the city, for example, are considered different from those who live in a village. City dwellers from Istanbul or Ankara are judged to be more worldly and wild (*yaban*) and tend to live under fewer rigid social restrictions. Characteristics such as these are never praised since villagers value tradition and believe that traditional customs should prevail. Children from the city who marry and establish residence separate from the parents are considered among those deficient in moral constraint and guidance. In addition, itinerant merchants who frequent the village are considered to have no origin or roots and therefore lacking in moral guidance. These people are often referred to as "living without a book" (*kitabsız yaşıyorlar*).⁷⁰

By comparing their own village with other villages and cities, villagers develop moral ideas about what forms a Sakli resident. The ideals of the moral community centre around the values associated with constraint. Moral actions are seen to stem from the imposition of restrictions, while immorality is associated with a lack of constraint. The value of constraint, or lack of it, is a notable

⁷⁰ In an Anatolian village, Delaney also notes that distinctions are drawn between village and city dwellers. The idea of a village, she claims, "evokes a range of responses from city people. A few evince a sentimental nostalgia for the simple peasant life and its rich ethnic lore, but most display horror for the lack of manners, danger, and the filth they believe to exist there" (1984:255).

feature in the moral over-determination of the meaning of action and in the advancement of hierarchy between communities. The value of constraint is also a significant aspect of other spheres of moral determination. This is especially so in the gendered ranking of reputation and status within the village.

4.3.2 Gender

A further persistence of the moral rank of village membership is achieved through differentiation by way of 'en-gendering' values. Determining morally acceptable behaviour of village women involves the appropriation of gender in discourses of protection and vulnerability to outside forces. The construction of the notion of vulnerability parallels the value accorded to constraint. The dispersion of such values is displayed in the further connotation of openness and closedness.

Village values in Sakli are significant in determining the manner in which gender is put into discourse, and how it is represented. This gendered discourse repeats and refines the value differentials of city and village life. Women from the city are thought to dress more openly (*açikli*) and therefore to be sexually active before marriage. City women are often called *açık* or 'open' women: they do not cover their heads with scarves, they wear clothing that show their legs, they travel around (*geziyor*) too much, and they voice their opinions in public

domains. Village women, in contrast, are considered as *kapali* or 'closed', 'covered' or 'shut': they wear appropriate head scarves, they dress in clothes that cover most of their bodies, they work and visit in socially approved locations, and they remain quiet in public spheres.

The perceived 'openness' of city women not only makes them vulnerable to unknown or unfamiliar men, but it is thought to undermine the status and reputation of their male counterparts. Since it is believed that it is the responsibility of a man to control the way a woman (especially a wife, daughter, or daughter-in-law) behaves and dresses, city men are considered weak (*zayıf*, lit. thin) and unmanly (*adamsız*) in that they allow "their" women to behave in western or foreign (*yabancılik*, lit. strange, unfamiliar)⁷¹ ways. As an illustrative example, I befriended a local teacher - educated in Ankara - living in a nearby town. She is married to a man from the city who owns a small factory close to several local villages in the province of Zonguldak. Her husband employs some villagers in this factory. Once, this school teacher planned a visit to Istanbul and, on her way there, she stopped at her husband's factory to deliver some papers. She was wearing shorts and the local factory employees, from that day onwards, showed a great deal of disrespect to her husband. They talked behind his back

⁷¹ It is interesting to note that the Turkish word *yaban* means wild or wilderness, and therefore a person from the wilderness (*yabancı*) could be said to be uncontrollable.

and balked at his orders. They did this because they believe only a western-type man (meaning someone without morals) would allow his wife to dress in such a manner.

In part, it is through the values of womanhood that a man's reputation and honour (*namus*) is maintained. The local *imam*, for instance, was interested in marrying a primary school teacher who recently moved to the village. Since this woman did not cover her head, family and community members felt that if the *imam* married her, his reputation would be harmed and the village status undermined. They never married.

In Sakli, it is considered inappropriate for women to leave their homes or to work in the fields without proper "protection." Women and young girls who travel unaccompanied in their own village are less-respected than those who travel with others. Women often say that if you travel alone, men will "throw words" (*laf atacak*) at you. Thus, it is expected that when females visit neighbours, walk to school, and travel to farm fields, they do so in the company of a group of females and sometimes male relatives and neighbours. In Sakli, a woman walking by herself is considered vulnerable, and protection takes on a distinct gendered meaning. Parallel to this, Delaney (1984:298) reveals the importance of the experience and interpretation of protection in her ethnographic account of a western Anatolian village:

... to enter the street is to enter the wild area of the village, comparable at a different level to the wild area outside the village. As men are the only legitimate wanderers outside the village, so too are they the legitimate occupants of the street. Women's place is in the home, 'men make outside relations.' A woman enters the street unprotected and open to contagion, namely the potential mixing of the sexes. In order to signify that she is 'covered' she dons another, larger, and more enveloping scarf that covers not only her head but also the breasts ... Women hesitate at their gates to see who is around.

It is essentially women, not men, who are thought to be in need of protection. Women must be "protected" from all things and activities that could cause much shame (*günah*) to their superiors, i.e., husbands, brothers, male relatives, certain in-laws, etc. Similar links between female protection and family dishonour are outlined in Kandiyoti's (1987) analysis of female sexuality. As she says, Turkish women who do not abide by the expectations associated with 'female sexual purity' can "bring shame and dishonour to the male members of a whole community, lineage, or family. Strict external constraints are placed on women, which may range from total seclusion and veiling to severe restrictions of their movements and their access to public places" (Ibid., 326).⁷² The moral ideals associated with women's behaviour do not, however, just affect the

⁷² Kandiyoti (1987:325) argues that there are a variety of people who see themselves responsible for protecting women's appropriate sexual conduct, including: parents, siblings, close and distant relatives, and neighbours. See her article, "Emancipated But Unliberated? Reflections on the Turkish Case", *Feminist Studies*, 13:2 (Summer 1987).

reputation of women and their relatives; they spread into, and affect the meaning of, other social domains.

In Sakli, the values of protection disseminate into the sphere of neighbourhood reputation and agricultural work. The expectations placed upon controlling women's behaviour do not mean that all women confine themselves to the home or the fields, or that women are always accompanied by others when it is socially required. Although the ideals of protection are perceived as normative, there are women who visit other people's home late at night (by themselves) and frequent the homes of married men when their wives are absent. In this context, some *mahalle* men are considered untrustworthy because their wives are known to travel about (*geziyor*) the village too much. Moreover, just as "unprotected" women are thought to tarnish a man's reputation, these same women are also thought to colour a neighbourhood's social standing. Some neighbourhoods, for example, are considered better than others. One *mahalle* (neighbourhood), in particular, is thought to be populated by untrustworthy women, due in large part to the way these women (allegedly) act.

Although women traditionally labour in the fields, on either their own or their relatives' land, the play of openness and closedness, of vulnerability and defense, prevails. While their household property is geographically enclosed and considered a private sphere, the necessity of moral boundaries over-rides the mere

presence of physical boundaries. For example, it is common for a group of women and young children to work the fields under the watchful eye of male kin. The male kin, especially the elders, typically sit in the shade, drink tea and shout commands at the women in an attempt to organize the farming process. While apparently supervising the labour process, less obvious and perhaps more significant is their aim in providing protection for female kin, their young, themselves and the community in general. This process of protection forms the frame of moral values within which agricultural production takes place. Labour relations within the village are centred in large part around the perpetuation of these values.

When moral values (primarily the value of constraint) are deployed to constitute the meaning of other relations, they also establish a hierarchy within the community. It is here that the 'form' of domination becomes transformed into a means of domination. Clearly the values of protection and vulnerability are a means of subjecting (over-powering) others by appropriating them within a system of aims and purposes. It is this process that makes up a moral regime.

This moral regime covers everyone in the community. As a female researcher in the community, local villagers would not permit me to walk by myself, especially after dusk. They considered me as a resident of their village and under their protection. Since my research required me to gather information

on all households, there was always someone accompanying me⁷³ from one household to another. When I left someone's home, I was escorted by at least two or three other people. During the day light hours these people were often women and children, and during night hours I had to be accompanied by men. These walks were fruitful in collecting information on a variety of issues, such as: local community politics, sexuality, agricultural work, etc. The type of information discussed, however, was affected by the presence of men. In the company of men, I was not permitted to speak about sexuality, child births and religious cleaning rituals; for such inquiries had the potential of tarnishing my reputation and therefore hindering my research. The meaning of gender and its form of domination within the village affected the research process primarily because it dictated the questions I could ask, and of whom, and the ways I should behave in the presence of others.

A further means of differentiating people in a hierarchy of values comes in the form of their position as subjects of history. As discussed below, history is made use of to fix the meaning of class distinctions. When constituted in the discourse of morality, the value of history has its utility in affirming distinctions

⁷³ The person who often assisted in gathering survey information was a friend and an undergraduate student from Ankara; Gülen lived with me on an intermittent basis (during the late spring and summer months). In addition to her company, local neighbours and even small children would sometimes 'tag along' during my research and travels in Sakli.

between landlords and farmers, a distinction stemming from the problem of origin. In this discourse, the differing origin of farmer and landlord is taken as the central justification for the current structure of economic relations and inequality.

4.3.3 Social Class

Landlord households occupy the highest plateau in Sakli, overlooking the expanse of peasant neighbourhoods (*mahalle*). This site allows the landlords to oversee the utilization of their vast landholding that have been cleared of the forest that surrounds them. The topographical arrangement of the community's households reaffirms in the peasantry a sense of control the landlords exercise over the area, and serves to distinguish the two classes. While there is a definite territorial boundary differentiating villager from landlord, naming conventions also mark this division. Although most of the peasants are engaged in farming, they do not necessarily call themselves farmers (*çiftçi*). They identify themselves as villagers (*köylü*) (see also Hiltner, 1960). Furthermore, landlords never refer to themselves as villagers but call themselves "ağalar" (lit. "landlords"). While this linguistic division may be thought to represent either territorial or economic relationships, the problem is more complex than this. The constitution of community identity and the distinctions that mark the boundaries of moral

behaviour, revolve around the way in which these two groups deploy history. Here, history becomes a technique used to compare and contrast the two groups, and thus outlines the parameters of their obligations to one another.

Landlords in the community believe themselves to be a separate and distinct lineage, i.e., a group whose members trace their descent from a known ancestor and who know the genealogical connections to that ancestor. Villagers, in contrast, do not know with any precision from whom they descended. Groups who believe themselves descended from a common ancestor but do not know the genealogical connections are clans. Landlord families often exaggerate about knowing precisely who their ancestors are and are boastful of this perceived identity and sense of history. Often, they look with disdain at the villagers who "do not know who their relatives are."

In an ethnographic account of Bedouin culture, Abu-Lughod (1988) shows how identity is formed by social differentiation. She comments by saying that:

[t]his tribal social organization is another point on which the Awlad'Ali proudly differentiate themselves from their Egyptian neighbours, whom they disparage as a "people" (sha'b) - meaning that the Egyptians are not organized tribally, do not know their roots, and identify with a geographic area or, worse, with a national government. The importance of blood in social identity is apparent in their identification of Bedouins by family, lineage, and tribe (Ibid., 50).

The Bedouin process of identification is analogous to the way Sakli landlords identify themselves, in the sense that they too separate themselves from others (i.e., villagers) in many significant ways.

Villagers' connection to their origin is perceived only in general terms. They share a sense of history to the extent that they share a common ancestor. Often this ancestor is forged in mythical or heroic proportions. Making use of a reduced history by valuing a fragmentary past, as villagers do, simplifies the aim of overcoming difference. The value of forgetting lies in the ability to make things of dissimilar origin, similar. This formation of alliances is grounded in the ability to foster a sense of equality, and so to construct an identity with the other. In this utilization, history becomes a great equalizer. Behind the goal of equality, however, is a system of power relations, in which the value of equality takes on a specific state of significance (it has value only in a fight). The purpose underscoring equality and identity is not the elimination of difference, but its appropriation in a system of meaning; this merely produces an artificial sense of equality. What the aims of equality and identity oppose is that which stands out, over against the crowd.

By contrast, landlords share an elaborated history, and can trace, with great precision, a particular line of descent to their ancestry. This use of history seems to reflect less the aim of appropriation, than the aim of preserving what has

already been appropriated. These values, however, are deployed in response to an expansionist peasant moral discourse, to resist assimilation by it and counter its influence. Moral claims that establish their privilege are values highly prized by the landlords.

In Sakli, history and the problem of origination is a site where force relations are put into moral discourse. It is at this level that history forms a terrain where meaning is deployed and contested, where genealogy and identity are put to use and made to function within larger systems of meaning and value, and where the struggle for dominion and governance takes place.

The division between villager and landlord centres on the problem of origin. This discourse of origins marks a boundary between the two groups and is used to define appropriate moral conduct for the respective groups and their inter-group relations. Among other things, the moral divide prevents intermarriage between the two groups. For villagers, their aims override, to a large extent, the importance of an exact descent connection with their would-be spouses. For example, it is common for a villager to marry a next door neighbour despite this person's origin. Landlords believe that there is too much intermarriage between villagers and that they select marriage partners without knowledge of their "real" reputation or background. The landlords' respect for their apparent preference for both class and lineage endogamy would make a

villager an impossible choice for a spouse. Landlords are proud to say that "their men" (*bizim erkekler*) and "their women" (*bizim kadınlar*) marry members from either their own lineage or from other reputable landlord families living outside Sakli.⁷⁴ In this way the landlords impose moral constraints and dissociate themselves from village clans.

Based on the reputation villagers have concerning their perceived historical origins, landlords typically disparage other characteristics of villagers' lives. Besides demeaning their marriage practices, landlords often regard villagers as dirty (*pis*) and like animals (*havanlar*) since "they all eat from one bowl with their fingers." Landlords, on the other hand, see themselves as civilized (usually equated with western culture): they eat with cutlery, use plates, do not sit on the floor when they eat, and dress "respectively". Landlords also regard themselves as industrious (*çalışkan*), whereas villagers are considered lazy (*tembel*). It is their lazy temperament that is seen as the source of their impoverishment (*fakirlik*), lack of education (*okumamış*), and backwardness (*gerilik*).

The landlords' neighbourhood is the most economically and politically powerful neighbourhood in the village. About two hundred and fifty years ago,

⁷⁴ Wives of landlords have, however, a different feeling about leaving their natal families and marrying men from outside their home villages. They often say how little influence they have over who they marry. One landlord's wife responded by saying, "what choice do I have, it is obligatory (*mecbur*).". Although landlords contend that in the past they married within their lineage, contemporary findings suggest that class endogamy is their preference (see chapter 9).

three families from the Bolu and Bartın regions of Turkey established an *ağalık* or landlord system in Saklı -- a system of economic relations common to Turkey then.⁷⁵ Under this system, local villagers were compelled to work as sharecroppers for these new landlords. Until the early 1920's, agricultural production was largely under *ağalık* control, deciding how the peasants farmed the land, what crops they harvested, and the proportion of produce the sharecroppers could keep for themselves. The *ağalık* system is a central feature of this descent group's history.

The *ağalık* system was responsible for maintaining a well-trained and a compliant farming population. Landlords employed a variety of means to exert their influence over the peasantry. As the village population grew (especially in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries), the three landlord families divided responsibility for different village neighbourhoods. Non-compliance with landlord demands could result in villagers being beaten, killed or having their homesteads burned to the ground. As one elderly woman said, "*onlar bize*

⁷⁵ For a review of some of the literature on Turkish landlords see: Akçay, A., "Traditional Large Land Ownership and its Transformation in Two Southeast Villages", Unpublished M.A. Thesis, Middle East Technical University, February, 1985; Keyder, C. "The Dissolution of the Asiatic Mode of Production," Economy and Society, Vol.V, No.2., 1976; Keyder, C. and H. İslamoğlu, "Agenda for Ottoman History," Review, Vol.1, No.1, (Summer), 1977; Meeker, E.M., "The Great Family Ağhas of Turkey: A Study of a Changing Political Culture," in R.T. Antoun and I. Harik (eds.), Rural Politics and Social Change in the Middle East, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1972.

yemedeler" (lit. "they ate us"), meaning that they took everything from us.⁷⁶ This is an important moral expression in Sakli. The verb "to eat" ("*yemek*") means to spend, to corrode, to consume or to use up. Not only do peasants use this term to describe their state of exploitation but they also use it to describe other injustices. For instance, several young women said that their husbands "ate their gold" ("*altınlarım yemedi*"), meaning that their husbands sold or exchanged the gold jewellery they received as bride price. In another context, an older woman explained the reason her family was poor by saying that her many children had "eaten" her money ("*benim para yemediler*").

In further describing the magnitude of villager exploitation, another elderly person recalled the extent of the landlord's control:

Onlar imece yaparlardı. Akşamdan söylerlerdi, 'yarın bana çift süreceksin' diye. Kimse itirazedemezdi. Herkes gidecek ağaya, çift sürüverecek. Ertesi gün bir ağaya, daha ertesi günü diğerine, böyle çalışılındı. Bir hafta arka arkaya ağaya sürüvereceksin. Imeciye de çok bakarlardı. O zaman insanlarına çok bakarlardı.

They made us work communally. In the evening, they would say 'you will farm for me tomorrow'. No one would object. Everyone

⁷⁶ It is interesting to note that the verb "to eat" is often employed to express notions of exploitation. Scott (1985:187), for example, argues that Malaysian peasantry often use this verb in daily conversation. As he says, "the one [verb] most often heard in daily conversation and the one with the richest connotation -- is the verb "to eat" (*makān*). To get a salary "to eat a salary... to collect interest is "to eat interest"... to take bribes is "to eat bribes" ... to betray one's friends is "to eat one's friends"... to drive someone hard is "to eat their bones", to exploit another is "to eat their sweat"... the metaphor is used not only by the poor to describe what is done to them by the powerful but is used by the rich to describe demands for loans and charity pressed on them by the poor."

would go to the landlord and farm together. The following day one landlord and after that another, this is how you worked. One week after another you worked and they watched over us. Then, they really watched the people.

This type of control extended beyond the agricultural sphere, however, as landlords exercised power over all aspects of village life. Villagers had to ask the landlord's approval of their daughter's or son's marriage partner. If a male villager expressed the desire for his daughter to marry someone not approved by the landlord, the marriage never took place. Even the appropriate bride-price payment was negotiated between the groom's father and the landlord. Often, villagers could not afford to pay the bride-price and relied on their landlord to help them financially. In addition, villagers were compelled to pay part of the bride-price money (usually half) to the landlord upon the marriage of their children. In situations when a landlord wanted a villager's son to marry another villager's daughter and the father refused to give his daughter in marriage, the landlord could use physical force to enforce his will. As one older resident said, "[s]en bana kızını vermediğin için, seni döverdi" ("for not giving your daughter [in marriage], he [the landlord] beat you"). In an attempt to preserve the serf system, landlords approved only marriages between those families that were compliant and forbade marriages between "good" households and those with whom they had conflict.

During the late 1800's until the 1920's, a few peasants rebelled⁷⁷ against this oppressive system by forming marriages without the consent of the landlords. A type of marriage known as *kız kaçırma* (lit. girl kidnapping) emerged to curb landlord control and avoid the landlord's marriage "tax".⁷⁸ A villager could accomplish this by "carrying away" a woman to a cleric (*imam*), usually one living outside the community. One elderly village man recalled his experience of *kız kaçırma*:

Ağbimin karisi kaçirdik kız, kendim eşimi de kaçirdik... En az 200-300 T.L. arasında başlık parası lazımdı. Bu başlık parasını bulup da kızın babasına vermek mümkün değildi. İkincisi de ağalardı; 3-4 tane ağa vardı. Ben adamın kızını gidip istediğim zaman, ağaya da para vermek zorundaydım. 50-100 T.L. para vermek gerekiyordu. Onlar da para vereceksin ki, o ağa kızın babasına gidip ve diyecek. Eğer, bunu demezse, o adama bir gözükürlerdi, o adam kızını vermezdi. Durum böyle.

My older brother's wife was a kidnapped girl, my wife was kidnapped... At the very least, one needed around 200-300 T.L. for bride price money. It was impossible to pay this bride-price money

⁷⁷ Scott (1985) makes an insightful point concerning the over-emphasis (in some literature) given to peasant "rebellions". He claims that peasant struggles have been misplaced in the sense that too much concern has focused on these types of uprisings, when in fact they are few and far between. It is more important, according to Scott, to understand *everyday* forms of peasant resistance - "the prosaic but constant struggle between the peasantry and those who seek to extract labour, food, taxes, rents, and interest from them" (Ibid., 134).

⁷⁸ In Sakli, the current meaning of "girl kidnapping" is not the same as its previous meaning during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, i.e. it is no longer thought of as an act of resistance against the power exercised by landlords. The practice today is perceived as a strategy used by the young to resist familial authority and domination. See chapter nine for more detailed information on this kind of marriage practice.

to the girl's father. The landlords came first; there were three to four landlords. Whenever I wanted a man's daughter [in marriage], I was forced to pay money to the landlord. 50-100 T.L. was the amount of money required. Once you gave this money, then the landlord would go to the girl's father and tell him. If you didn't tell [the landlord first], the girl's father would not give her [in marriage]. This was the situation.

While the landlords exerted control over village marriages, Sakli villagers responded with alternate techniques. In other situations, some peasant families reacted to the demands of the *ağalık* system by clearing small plots of land from the forest without the landlords' consent. This enabled them, if they did not get caught, to increase their harvest without increasing the share owed to landlords. Others simply stole from the landlord's granary what they thought was rightfully theirs. The landlords, for their part, developed countermeasures of their own, making it difficult for peasant families to steal or hide produce. They closely surveyed the peasantry during the harvesting season and often employed other villagers as spies (*hafiye*) to report on those who did not comply. By the late 1930's, a nearby Turkish coal mining industry provided employment for many male peasants. With the introduction of wage labour (outside the village) and the establishment of the Turkish republic, the stronghold of the *ağalık* system was clearly reduced.⁷⁹ However, since village farmers owed large sums of money to

⁷⁹ Turkey declared its political independence, as a Republic, in 1923. For a discussion of the decline of the Ottoman Empire and the formation of the Turkish State see especially B. Berberoğlu (1982), Turkey in Crises. Zed Press: London.

landlords for the purchase of animals, access to land, bride-price expenditures, land taxes, food, etc., it was common for landlords to take a villager's coal mining salary in repayment. As one villager recalled:

Madende çalışıyordum. Ağalar sizin onlardan aldıklarınız için, onlara olan borçlarınız için, sizin paranızı gelip madenden alıyorlardı.

I worked in the coal mine. Whatever you obtained from the landlords, they took back; for having received loans from them, they took the money you made from coal mining.

With the introduction of wage labour in the community, a new form of debt-peonage emerged alongside the more traditional relation of serfdom. As one older villager put it:

Mecbursun ağanın toprağını işlemey, çünkü okuzunun biri onun. Zaten borçun var, mecbursun borçun varken ağaya hizmet etmeyen. Borçun varken mecbursun onlara kölelik yapmaya.

You were forced to farm the landlord's land because the oxen were theirs. Besides this, you had loans and when in debt to them you are obliged to provide services. You are forced to be their slave when you are in debt.

Villagers experienced their domination not only in the moral discourse of landlord and tenant, but also in the language of creditor and debtor. While landlords view their position of domination in line with the continuity of tradition, this relation has undergone many transformations. In this sense, "tradition" is a continuous effort to frame relations according to meanings that further the aim of domination.

The reputation of the landlord lineage centres on the divisions originating in the *ağalık* system. Landlords employ many strategies to form their relations

within the village following what they perceive as their tradition. The burden of constraint imposed by the landlords, however, has never passed without attempts to counter with techniques to neutralize landlord claims. These techniques, born out of resistance, rely on 'immoral' means to further 'moral' aims. The practices of *kiz kaçırma* and the practice of seasonal out-migration and wage labour are strategies employed with the aim of getting out from under landlord control.

Concluding Remarks

The meaning of village identity is a discursive phenomenon that emerges in relations of force and resistance. Rather than presupposing a single unified set of social relationships as the foundation of the meaning of village life, the meaning of village life is taken as a contested domain rife with intersecting and competing moral claims, all of which aim toward domination; the underlying motive inciting its production. Moral claims arise out of resistance and the forces which limit action, but they do more than merely describe the limits and boundaries of action. All more claims emerge out of a dissatisfaction with a state of affairs and therefore also aim toward overcoming such limits. In this way, morality constitutes a form of domination that aims toward the appropriation of action, making it serve new aims and ends.

The constitution of village identity centres around the deployment of comparative generalizations. The continuous effort to decide the meaning of village life encompasses a field of moral values that shape as well as rationalize people's perspective of the world. At the level of meaning, village life appears as a homogeneous system of values and beliefs, as if there were only one context. At the same time, however, this identity dissimulates its own set of divisions, aims and techniques. Gender and social class are some phenomena that are coloured, used and transformed in the production of moral claims. Inside the village, there are things that must be avoided, there are people whom one must fear, and ideas that one must guard against. These sentiments are not only revealed as gendered and social class boundaries; they are also manifest in the manner of descent reckoning and in the conventions of descent and household relations.

It would be a mistake to assume that in the struggle against immorality that immorality would be finally vanquished from the village life. An immoral world, a world of difference and foreignness is an essential part of morality. As with any system of domination, the aim is not to eliminate opposing forces, but to subject them to other aims and ends. Morality maintains its dynamic character through subduing and making use of immoral forces and means in pursuit of moral values. Villagers are constantly comparing and ranking themselves, and

using "others" as the negative point of reference such that "otherness" becomes an integral part of the meaning of villager. Village life thrives on a certain dose of internal tension, hierarchy and force relations. The semblance of community is a moral ideal defined and delimited by the very things in which it opposes or distances itself. Further to this point, the discussion will now turn to an elaboration of the phenomena of descent within the village and the deployment of kin terminology.

Chapter 5: The Deployment of Descent: The *Kök* Construct

5.1 Descent

This chapter further develops the phenomena of descent in Sakli. Descent is reckoned in patrilineal terms. Members who trace their descent to, and share the name of, a common male ancestor make up a descent group. In everyday village life, ancestral names and connections are also used to constitute a moral regime. Rather than defining a homogeneous group, one that traces a line of continuity between present expectations and past behaviours, the notion of descent has variable meaning. Those subsumed by the descent construct are constrained by the belief that fixed principles govern social relations and determine appropriate ways of thinking and acting. The 'subjects of descent' identify themselves with the 'values of constraint.' In this regard, the *kök* construct is used to include people in a system of values that distinguish 'original' members from those of other origins, and orders these distinctions in a hierarchy.

5.1.1 The *Kök* Construct

In rural Turkish society descent plays an important role in determining connections with outsiders. As a researcher in Turkey, I was constantly asked to provide villagers with information regarding my origins, such as: where I come

from, my marital status, who my father is and where he lives. There is no doubt that one's historical background provides a context from which to establish a general sense of reputation and obligation.

Identifying origins involves the determination of one's *kök* (lit. root or origin) -- the term primarily used to discuss descent in the village of Sakli. It is reckoned exclusively through a chain of father-child linkages. More specifically, *kök* refers to the *ata* (father-ancestor) or *dede* (grandfather) from whom one traces descent. Who are *kök* and who are descendants is independent of one's genealogical position. People trace descent to and from their patrilineal ancestors. For example, the *kök* of one's mother is traced through her father and his father but one's own *kök* would never be traced through one's mother. One traces one's *kök* through one's father and his father (see also Delaney, 1984:182-184). The same rule of reckoning applies to everyone. In the village of Sakli, community members maintain that any two people who share a common ancestor are kin because they descended from a common *kök*. Although other studies (Casson and

Özertuğ, 1974) argue that the *kök* construct in Turkey reflects a cognatic⁸⁰ principle, this is not so in Sakli.

When collecting genealogies, informants listed kinsfolk according to their father's family and ancestors, not their mother's family and her relatives. There is no term to denote matrilineal descent. Individuals are permanently included in their father's *kök* and never in any other. Although a woman may leave her father's village and live all her life many miles away, she is always counted in her father's *kök* (see also Casson and Özertuğ, 1974:351 in their discussion of *sulale*).⁸¹

Among villagers, genealogies are generally superficial and the chain of father-child links - which anchor them to their past - rarely extends beyond the third ascending generation (see also Sirman, 1988; Delaney, 1984; Casson and Özertuğ, 1974; Stirling, 1965). Often, villagers have no idea who their distant

⁸⁰ Cognatic descent refers to a series of ancestral links that can be male or female, or any combination of the two. In contrast, patrilineal or agnatic descent refers exclusively to a series of ancestral male links (i.e., through the ancestor's son, his son's son, etc.). In Casson and Özertuğ's study of descent in a central Anatolian village, they make the point that while descent is reckoned in terms of a patrilineal descent construct, "no patrilineal descent groups are ever actually formed in the village" (1974:351). In Sakli, however, descent is reckoned patrilineally and there is the existence of clearly identifiable descent groups.

⁸¹ Though married women reckon descent in this fashion, they are nevertheless more closely tied (ideologically, economically and socially) to their husband's family and relatives than with their natal family. In chapter nine, I show that once a family loses a daughter in marriage, they give up their "rights" to the daughter's reproductive and productive labour.

ancestors are, and are at most only aware that they come from a common ancestor. Although villagers say that they trace their descent from a common agnatic ancestor, the *kök* construct lacks specificity as a genealogical device. Perhaps more important to everyday village life is not the actual continuity with the past, but the belief in the continuity with the past and the utility of this belief. While the *kök* construct does not describe descent group identity as such, it nevertheless is made to play a significant role in descent group relations.

5.1.2 Village Descent Groups

Since the importance of history and tradition (*kök*) in constituting social class differences has already been addressed in connection with landlords, the following discussion primarily centres on village clans and their conception of descent.

Members of clan-based descent groups believe they share a common ancestor. These hypothetical figures and mythical heros are, metaphorically, their eternal and omnipresent neighbours, whom they make reference to in many different ways. They refer to these ancestors as "*bizim kök*" (lit. "our ancestors"). This term is also employed to explain many necessary day to day activities in the village, such as farming techniques, child rearing practices, dress codes, etc. When asked why they do things in this manner, they say "*bizim kök her zaman*

böyle yapar" ("our ancestors always do it like this"). Thus, the term "*bizim kök*" describes customary ways of acting and thinking and makes it seem as though a rule were being followed, rather than establishing precise genealogical connections to patrilineal kin.

Members in each descent group generally share many things beyond the common name associated with their *kök*. They share and exchange labour and goods and lend each other money.⁸² Most members do not hold property in common, nor do they inherit property based on the *kök* construct. They do, however, share economic and social obligations with each other, and sometimes these ties are reinforced through marriage bonds. According to Stirling (1960), Turkish descent groups are activated in two social contexts: feuding and cooperating. Based on my study, however, descent group identification is much more pervasive than this. Stirling's study does not adequately connect the notion of common descent with the notion of perceived tradition and custom.

Many descent group members live in the same neighbourhood or *mahalle*. The term *mahalle* means quarter or district. In Sakli there are five *mahalle* of which each is primarily composed of members of the same *kök*. Moreover, all five neighbourhoods are called by different surnames: Tellaloğlu, Balcioğlu,

⁸² In the ethnographic literature, it is maintained that patrilineal descent groups in Turkey are significant social units. For more on this see: Stirling, 1965; Robinson, 1964; Spencer, 1960, Erdentuğ, 1959.

Tabakoğlu, Kolcuoğlu, and Malikoğlu (pseudonyms). The suffix *oğlu* means son and thus the surname Tellaloğlu, for instance, means the son of Tellal. Of the total village population, 44.4 percent live in Tellaloğlu, 24.9 percent live in Tabakoğlu, 20.8 percent live in Kolcuoğlu, 5.6 percent live in Balcioğlu, and 4.2 percent live in Malikoğlu. The first four *mahalle* (comprising over 95 percent of the total village population) consist of subsistence farmers and/or wage workers. The last neighbourhood, Malikoğlu, consists of three inter-related landlord families. There are no subsistence farmers within the landlord lineage or in Malikoğlu.

Not every person resides with their "authentic" descent group for their entire life; some move to other communities, regions and countries and live with other people who may come from different descent groups. In Sakli, the intermingling of descent members with non-descent ones mainly emerges from the practice of virilocality.⁸³ For example, while there is a dominant lineage in the landlord neighbourhood, some of their daughters-in-law come from lineages outside the neighbourhood and the village (since it is morally unacceptable for

⁸³ The practice of uxorilocality (or *dahmat geldi*) contributes to the bringing about of more than one descent group in a *mahalle*. It is a practice that only occurs, however, in clan-based *mahalles*, not in the lineage-based *mahalle*. See chapter nine for more on uxorilocality.

any member (male or female) to marry into a village clan).⁸⁴ These daughters-in-law, therefore, formally belong to other lineages. Although not to the same extent, this phenomenon exists within the village clans in that some married women originate from other clans. Therefore, not all village clan (and lineage) members descend from the same ancestor. In practical and general terms, however, these women are taken as if they are "genuine" lineage or clan members, just as they are subsumed under the rubric of the household name.

The claim of a common ancestry shared by all members of the group is not a reality of life in Sakli, it is a moral value superimposed on a variety of relations. The fact of living in the same *mahalle* often confers upon non-original members similar obligations, while according them less status than "original" clan counterparts. Common ancestry covers over a hierarchy of values which places non-original clan members, including both daughters-in-law who come from other clans and grooms who live uxori locally,⁸⁵ in subordinate positions. The ideal of

⁸⁴ Landlord families expect their sons to marry women from their own lineage or from other landlord families.

⁸⁵ While there is a dominant descent group in each of these four *mahalles*, there are other peripheral clans as well. The only way to account for the presence of other clan groups within the same *mahalle* is through the practice of uxori locality. All peripheral clan groups within a *mahalle* originate with a uxori local groom. Marriage between a clan member and offspring from such households constitutes a marriage between two descent groups. These are often referred to as neighbour or *komşu* marriages.

a common origin and shared ancestry helps to establish a hierarchy within *mahalles*, just as it does between the *mahalles* within the community.

5.2 Morality and Descent Groups

All five neighbourhoods have a clear sense of ancestral history (i.e., *kök*) that serves as a standpoint from which to order, arrange and classify their moral universe. This context also works as a viewpoint to pass judgement on members of other *mahalle*, just as if they formed a single descent group. Some *mahalles* are considered wealthier, more powerful or homogeneous than others. *Mahalle* ideals are generally deployed to define one's social ranking. Notions of prestige, economic standing, marriage patterns and territorial location constitute the central divisions around which moral boundaries are drawn between the *mahalles*.

Those who reside in the neighbourhood of Kolcuoğlu, for example, are considered as poor and *acayip* (strange or unpredictable) by those who live in other *mahalles*. Kolcuoğlu's reputation is indicated by the specific shape of this *mahalle's kök*. Many who live in other neighbourhoods believe that this *mahalle* contains too many first-degree paternal cousin marriages compared to other neighbourhoods, and this is thought to result in an inferior *kök*. Genealogies collected in the field confirmed the disproportionate number of close kin (*yakin*

akraba) marriages⁸⁶ in Kolcuoğlu, which, ironically, makes Kolcuoğlu closest to the ideal of a homogeneous descent group.

The local *imam* believes that these marriages are healthy and do not degenerate the blood lines.⁸⁷ As he said, "if deformed (*sakat*) children were the result of blood marriages, then it would be written in the Koran". In spite of this, villagers from other neighbourhoods believe this type of marriage to produce children prone to be *deli* (lit. crazy) or "slow learners". The label is generally applied to people who act in socially unacceptable ways and exhibit wayward behaviour. Having seen televised reports showing the deformities (*sakatlikler*) of children from first-degree cousin marriages, many community members explain Kolcuoğlu's higher number of *deli* children as a problem of "blood." Kolcuoğlu's *kök* determines its moral character and is used to distinguish its rank in the hierarchy of neighbourhoods.

Kolcuoğlu's perceived "outsideness" contributes to its dishonour and ridicule. Kolcuoğlu is located on the village's periphery. This fact, in combination with its lack of village surveillance and its sporadic interaction with

⁸⁶ As discussed in chapter nine, close kin marriages are those that primarily take place between first-degree cousins and between immediate affinal members (i.e. ZHuB, ZHuZ, BWZ, BWB, etc).

⁸⁷ In further illustrating this point, the imam gave reference to all sorts of people in the village who are deformed and whose parents are not blood relatives. He believes it is God's will (*kader*) to have these types of children.

other village members, places Kolcuoğlu "outside" the moral constraints of village life. Other *mahalles* in Sakli are criss-crossed with well-worn foot paths that people traverse daily -- in going to farm plots, common meeting places, water fountains (*çeşme*), etc. In contrast, Kolcuoğlu's peripheral location reduces the occasion for people to pass through it. As a result, other community members do not inspect or investigate the day to day activities of this *mahalle* as they peruse other, more central *mahalles*.

When travelling to Kolcuoğlu to conduct household interviews, villagers from the surrounding neighbourhoods alerted me to its "strangeness" and always insisted that someone should accompany me. Many villagers recalled one event in particular. They told of a violent murder that took place in Kolcuoğlu in the early 1980's. Upon the death of his father, an older son refused to share the family's inheritance with his younger brother. In retaliation, the younger brother shot and killed his older brother and sister-in-law, for which he is now serving a life sentence in prison. While similar acts of retaliation have occurred in other *mahalles*, their effect in slandering neighbourhood reputation was limited. The prevalence of first-degree cousin marriages, "*deli*" children, an inferior *kök* and

a lack of community surveillance, tend to enhance the strangeness (*acayıplik*) of Kolcuoğlu and its members.⁸⁸

In contrast to the Kolcuoğlu neighbourhood, the three remaining clan-based *mahalles* are more highly regarded by local villagers. The largest and oldest neighbourhood, Tellaloğlu, boasts the only *cami* or mosque in the area. This neighbourhood, once renowned for its warmth and friendliness, has since been coloured with the reputation of being inhospitable (*soğuk*, lit. cold). Since this locale contains the highest proportion of seasonal workers in the coal mining industry and the highest proportion of males working in Germany, most villagers believe this to have disorganized (*karişik*) the neighbourhood. The influence of "outside" forces account for Tellaloğlu's changed attitude toward others.

Several villagers told of an incident that occurred in the late 1970's, showing how disruptive it is for men to work for long periods of time away from home. A woman whose husband lived and worked in Germany for four years was believed by many to have had an on-going affair with another villager named Ahmet. On the day that her husband arrived in the village, Ahmet shot and killed the woman with his hunting rifle. It is a common perception that when men

⁸⁸ Even the local community mid-wife (*ebe*) will not deliver babies in Kolcuoğlu without being accompanied by another person, and even then refuses to stay more than one hour.

leave the village for extended periods of time, social order "goes to pieces" (*"batmak"*).⁸⁹

Besides the general disruption that stems from seasonal male out-migration, as evidenced in other areas of Turkey (see also Abadan-Unat, 1982; Gitmez, 1979; Yasa, 1979, Magnarella, 1979), there are other kinds of events that are thought to stem from the lack of male (primarily husband) "protection." The one important phenomenon, in this context, is that wives may have "affairs" with local landlords (usually at the insistence of the landlords). Women say they do this out of the need to ensure continued access to the land they sharecrop or rent, or to subsidize the household income (since their husbands sometimes fail to send remittances home).⁹⁰ In so saying, these women frame their experience of landlord domination in a discourse of purposes and aims. This discourse transforms the meaning of their relationship with the landlord into one of economical reciprocity. While they perceive their activity as parallel to that of

⁸⁹ Etymologically, the word *batmak* is derived from the word *bati*, which means western or occidental. Interestingly, "westerners" are considered by many to be immoral.

⁹⁰ Employment income and consumption patterns are important aspects of migration, at both national and internal levels (see Kağıtçıbaşı, 1985; Yasa, 1979; Keleş, 1976)). In Sakli, some married men who seasonally work in Istanbul do not send money to their family members on a regular basis. Consequently, those women who are left behind without sufficient income are placed in positions that might require them to engage in various kinds of informal, paid employment.

the landlord's, they also attempt to rationalize it, which in turn masks the effects of domination.⁹¹

Protection, or lack of it, is not just connected to the sphere of women; it gives meaning to both their households and *mahalles*. Local men are expected to guard their households, especially their female members, giving protection a double-edged significance. On the one hand, men are important in defending the household and the neighbourhood from all immoral forces that originate outside it. Yet, on the other hand, men are central in shielding against the improprieties caused by the "inherent waywardness" of women. In both cases, however, vulnerability takes on a gendered significance that is further interpreted as a lack of constraint.

Each *mahalle*'s reputation centres on the value of constraint. Constraint is the site around which moral claims are constructed. While constraint does not represent some perturbed sense of unity, it measures the inability to overcome a superior force (i.e., resistance), and the meaning and value granted to that position. Also, it is a form of the desire to dominate (to overcome resistance) which lives vicariously through discursive regimes, spreading meaning throughout

⁹¹ Chris Weedon (1987) makes the important point that the meaning of experience plays a central role in determining one's social position. She contends that meaning varies and, as a consequence, action can take many forms and have many effects (Ibid., 79-80). Similar to Weedon, I have shown that some Sakli women experience their subordinate position and activity as something which is necessary, if not obligatory (*mecbur*).

other relations. The moral boundaries and interpretation of social relations within each *mahalle* speak to the value of constraint. For Tellaloğlu, its reputation results in disrepute since other neighbourhood members discursively constitute it as such.

By contrast, the district of Tabakoğlu, the second largest, is perceived (by residents living in other neighbourhoods) as a well-knit sub-community and its members are considered generous. This generosity is thought to be linked to its traditionally-based hospitality. Compared to other *mahalles*, Tabakoğlu's members are less likely to be employed in "outside" seasonal or permanent wage labour. Because its members are "less easily influenced by outside forces," long-standing customs (*adetler*) are thought to prevail. This perception marks Tabakoğlu's members as bearers of traditional ways of thinking and acting (its *kök*). Patterns of behaviour that are taken as traditional (i.e., as if a rule were being followed) are highly valued, and are significant factors in deciding Tabakoğlu's moral standing among the other neighbourhoods. In this instance *kök* serves to defend communal values with the 'force of tradition.'

The smallest *mahalle*, Balcioğlu, is the only one where everyone has the same surname. This could be because: it is the youngest neighbourhood, it is located on the periphery of the community, it comprises only four households, and it holds in high esteem anything that preserves the line of descent. But the

most significant factor in determining the composition of Balcioğlu is its relationship with other neighbourhoods.

Although it is on the periphery of the community, Balcioğlu is never regarded with the same disdain as Kolcuoğlu. Many villagers pass by Balcioğlu, either on their way to farm plots or to visit the nearby health house (*sağlık evi*). The conclusion based on community scrutiny and regular investigation, is that these neighbours do not hide things or act in "strange" ways. The local landlords, on the other hand, regard this *mahalle* as unruly (*azili*) because Balcioğlu's residents do not rent or sharecrop landlord lands. In local gossip (*dedikodu*) circles, there are events of less than harmonious relations between landlords and the residents of Balcioğlu. In one such incident, a resident of Balcioğlu who was known to talk behind the landlord's back, suffered the great misfortune of having his family's fields mysteriously set on fire. Many villagers believed the landlords to be responsible. In a related incident, a Balcioğlu man and a landlord "exchanged words" in the local coffee house. After this, the man's barn was burned to the ground.

The worth or importance of a piece gossip is the extent to which it rests on the tacit judgment that a moral value has been defiled, undermined or

questioned.⁹² Gossip about the landlords tells of the difference between them and the position of the villagers and frames this difference in moral terms. Gossip does not serve to produce anything; it merely expresses the belief in a state of affairs (i.e., relations of force and resistance) coupled with the values and aims of overcoming this state (or taking it over into a system of purposes). Others (eg. Kennedy, 1986:129; Scott, 1985:282) advance that gossip serves or produces something. In rural Greek society, Kennedy argues that those viewed as gossips are excluded from consideration for friendship. Gossip, then, produces something negative. Scott (1985) argues that gossip in Malay society is a form of symbolic resistance against the wealthy and is thus a productive activity. As he says,

... gossip achieves the expression of opinion, of contempt, of disapproval while minimizing the risks of identification and reprisal. Malicious gossip symbolically chips away at the reputations of the rich in Sedaka in the same fashion that anonymous thefts in the night materially chip away at the property of the rich. The overall impact on the structure of power of this nibbling away is not very appreciable. But it is one of the few means available to a subordinate class to clothe the practice of resistance with the safe disguise of outward compliance" (Ibid., 282-283).

⁹² In Greek rural society, gossip is thought of in negative terms. Dubisch (1986) argues that when women spend too much time outside of the home, not only are their domestic responsibilities neglected but their outside activity may be thought of as "polluting and destructive behaviour, such as illicit sexual activity or gossip (the pollution of words), which can disrupt social relations and damage a family's reputation" (Ibid., 200). In my study, however, gossip is a form of domination.

The point missed in these views is that relations of force and resistance (i.e., power) and the processes of domination take place at many different levels, as well as the fact that resistance is more closely associated with the origin of gossip than its purpose. What is clothed in a moral discourse of resistance, restraint and preservation is the desire to overcome and to be stronger. After all, morality grows out of a dissatisfaction with the state of affairs and so would not aim to preserve it (or would preserve it as a value to turn it into an advantage in the struggle for power).

Although Balcioğlu is integrated into the community's surveillance system, its rivalry with the landlord lineage hinders this *mahalle's* ability to form marriages with other groups and neighbourhoods in the community. Fearing reprisals and general ill will between themselves and their landlords, other neighbourhoods distance themselves from Balcioğlu in one significant way: villagers do not believe Balcioğlu residents to be good or valuable marriage partners for their children and never "send" *gelin* to this neighbourhood. As a result, Balcioğlu residents say that they are forced to bring in brides from the outside -- usually maternal kin of the women living in this *mahalle* -- or have their daughters marry paternal cousins from within the *mahalle*.

Whether descent is an unbroken line of continuity with the past (*kök*) or a symbol of the unity with tradition, is less important than the uses to which

descent and the perceptions of tradition are put, and the system of values and aims within which they are made to function. The utility of such notions of the past is to make one feel as if fixed principles govern relations between people, that is, as if rules are being followed. Behind these terms lay an array of force relations around which a discourse on descent is launched. *Kök* is deployed to discriminate clans from lineages and to distinguish one from another. It is used to characterize the nature of these groups as moral enclaves, as well as to define general parameters of social and economic exchanges between them. The divisions, transformations and changes that characterize life in Sakli, when raised to the level of discourse, are interpreted within the value framework of tradition, and as deviations from its ideal. The significance of these notions of tradition lies not so much in its accuracy in depicting the past but in its value in constituting moral frontiers (organized on the value of constraint), and in establishing a hierarchy among these groups.

There are other significant ways in which local villagers deploy descent reckoning in the constitution of day to day moral relations. In this context, it is important to examine kin terminology, for it outlines what types of relationship are most noteworthy and valued in the discourses on kin.

Chapter 6: Kin Terminology

6.1 Introducing the Problem

In much of the anthropological literature on descent, there is concern over how and under what conditions descent groups employ specific terms addressing consanguines and affines. The use of kin terms in Turkey has sparked much debate. Some have analyzed kin terminology as reflecting social classes (Pierce, 1964:83) or social structures (Casson and Özertuğ, 1974:348), as mirroring the rights and duties held among kin (Stirling, 1965:98-117), and as matching the workings of the 'segmentary lineage system' (Spencer, 1960:47-48).

This study approaches the use of kin terminology differently. I argue against the idea that it determines a fixed set of social relations within the village. Kin terminology does not describe social reality, but constitutes "a set of values on the basis of which people's actions could be judged"⁹³ As such, kin terminology aims to establish a system of rank among various positions, as it classifies them in a hierarchy of moral expectations. As a system of moral values, kinship points beyond the present state of affairs toward the ideal of

⁹³ In his study of Greek culture, Just (1991) argues that kinship is unable to determine what kind of quality these relationships would be and is incapable of indicating with which individuals they would be formed. As he says, "[o]utside the household the real bases for cooperation, loyalty, amity, and trust lay elsewhere. Kinship was their cover" (Ibid.:115).

familiarity, glossing over any inherent conflicts associated with such an arrangement. Kin terms constitute moral subjects by appropriating everyone into the system of values and expectations, and so to determine the meaning of social relations within the village; that is, to establish the feeling of standing in a shared or common context. Techniques of 'familiarization' strive toward reducing the dissimilarities (formal or terminological equality) between villagers while establishing an internal hierarchy among its members.

6.2 Formal Analysis of Kin Classification

Much of the information about kin reckoning was obtained through extensive discussions with many household members and several key informants. The complexity of kin terminology in Sakli is due to the general character of descent group reckoning. This complexity can be best illustrated by examining the kin terms used to refer to those in the primary reproductive units (*ailé*) and outside these units. Kin terms are listed in the first column (nos. 1-33) and the positions designated by these terms are listed in the next two columns of Table 1. Kin positions are listed in standard kin type notation: the symbols for primary consanguines are F (father), M (mother), B (brother), Z (sister), S (son), D (daughter), H (husband), W (wife), and the symbols for the superordinate primary consanguines where sex distinctions are neutralized, are Pa (parent), Sb (sibling),

Table 1: The *Aile* and Kin Terminology

	Terms	Positions	Extensions
<u>Primary Consanguines and Affines</u>			
Ego's Father's <i>Aile</i>	1. baba	F	
	2. anne	M	
	3. abla	older Z	
	4. abi	older B	
	5. kız kardeş	younger Z	
	6. kardeş	younger B	
	7. koca	H (Ego)	
Ego's <i>Aile</i>	8. oğlu	S	
	9. kız	D	
Ego's Spouse's Father's <i>Aile</i>	10. kara, eşe	W (Sp)	
	11. kaynana	SpM¹	
	12. kayınbirader	SpB	
	13. görümce	HZ²	
	14. baldiz	WZ	
	15. kaynata	SpF	
<u>Secondary Consanguines and Affines</u>			
	16. ninne	grand-M	<i>PaPaM, SpPaM³</i>
	17. dede	grand-F	<i>PaPaF, SpPaF</i>
	18. yenge	BW, PaBW	<i>SpFBW, SpFFBW</i>
	19. enişte	ZH, PaZH	<i>SpFZH, SpFFZH</i>
	20. gelin	SW	<i>ChSW, ChChSW</i>
	21. guvey, dahmat	DH	<i>ChDH, ChChDH</i>
	22. amca	FB	<i>PaFB, SpFB</i>
	23. amca çocuğu	FBCh	<i>PaFBCh, FBChCh, SpFBChCh</i>
	24. hala	FZ	<i>PaFZ, SpFZ</i>
	25. hala çocuğu	FZCh	<i>PaFZCh, FZChCh, SpFZChCh</i>
	26. dayi	MB	<i>PaMB, SpMB</i>
	27. dayi çocuğu	MBCh	<i>PaMBCh, MBChCh, SpMBChCh</i>
	28. teyze	MZ	<i>PaMZ, SpMZ</i>
	29. teyze çocuğu	MZCh	<i>PaMZCh, MZChCh, SpMZChCh</i>
	30. yiğen	SbCh	<i>SbChCh</i>
	31. torun	ChCh	<i>ChChCh</i>
	32. elti	HBW	<i>HFBSW</i>
	33. bacanak	WZH	<i>WMZDH</i>

¹ **Bold** = Close Kin (*Yakin Akrabalar*)² When Ego is Wife³ *Italics* = Distant Kin (*Uzaktan Akrabalar*)

Ch (child), and Sp (spouse). Elements of Turkish kin terminology (given in Table 1) are based on material gathered in the north-western region of Turkey, also the findings of Sirman (1988), Delaney (1984) and Casson and Özertuğ (1974).

Before going further, the term *aile* should be clarified. This term denotes the basic reproductive unit of a mother and her children. In Turkish society, only men "have" *aile* -- comprising his wife and her children⁹⁴ -- whereas women typically consider themselves as members of their father's *aile*. As Delaney (1984:190) points out, members of the *aile*, be they one's father's, husband's, or one's own *aile*, are not considered or referred to as kin. While the *aile* enables kinship, in the sense that 'relatives' are at least once removed from the *aile*, the *aile* itself does not contain any kin. The *aile* also does not serve to constitute a household, nor determine whom one should marry, nor where one should reside after marriage. What the *aile* represents, if it represents anything at all, is the value of constraint. When taken with the principle of bilateral kin reckoning, the *aile* determines whom one cannot marry, i.e., ego is not permitted to marry his children, any member of his father's *aile*, any member of his mother's father's *aile*, nor any member of his grandfather's or grandmother's father's *aile*, etc.⁹⁵ One is forbidden, in other words, to marry one's grandparents, parents, siblings,

⁹⁴ The *aile* that ego produces serves as the link between F's and SpF's.

⁹⁵ The relation between the *aile* and marriage is discussed extensively in chapter nine.

parents' siblings or grandparent's siblings (see also Delaney, 1984). In practice, Sakli residents impose no other kin-based restriction on spouse selection.

In Sakli, the basic terminological divisions are between primary consanguines and affines and secondary consanguines and affines (see Table 1). Primary consanguines and affines include ego, ego's father, ego's father-in-law, and members of their *aile*. The terms used to address these positions are not used to address any other position. So, for example, if ego marries his FBD, his FB will no longer be referred to as *amca* (a term applied equally to PaFB and SpFB), but will be called *kaynata* (a term applicable only to one's SpF). The FB, in turn, no longer refers to his SbCh as *yig'en*, but as *gelin*. If the SpF was from a different descent group (i.e., not the FB's), the term *kaynata* still applies. Thus, the potential for grouping together non-descent kin with primary consanguines overrides any distinguished terminological position, including that of descent. It is therefore important to bear in mind the difference between descent and kin reckoning.

In the most general sense of the term, *akraba* (or *akrabalar*, the plural form) includes those conventionally understood as related by 'blood' or marriage, excluding primary consanguines⁹⁶ (eg., F, M, B, Z, D, S). While ego's SpF and

⁹⁶ In the village Delaney (1984) studied, as in other areas of Turkey, people generally say that *yakin akrabalar* are the brothers and sisters of one's parents and those whom they marry. As she remarks, "[t]his relationship is described, not in terms of blood (consanguinity), but in terms of *kardeş* [brother]" (Ibid.: 190-191).

his *aile* are primary affines (i.e., no terminological extensions are applied), they are also considered relatives. Within the category of *akrabalar*, each person in Sakli classifies his or her blood or affinal relatives either as close (*yakin*) or distant (*uzak*). Ego's close or near relatives (*yakin akrabalar*) include, for example, aunts, uncles, first-degree cousins, sibling's spouse, child's spouse, spouse's parents and siblings, while ego's more distant relatives (*uzaktan akrabalar*) include grandmothers' siblings, spouse's mother's father's affines, great grand children, etc.

Yakin akrabalar are consanguines and affines once removed from ego's primary consanguines. The closest *akraba* are the brother's or sister's of one's parents and their spouses, and those who marry ego's siblings. For example, ego's uncle and his wife along with ego's aunt and her husband are *yakin akraba*, as are ego's brothers/sisters-in-law.

The further one goes in attempting to trace the kin connection, the more distant (socially and culturally) are these relatives. Those distant kin (*uzaktan akrabalar*) can either be related by blood or marriage, and comprise an outer circle of relatives several steps removed from ego (see also Delaney, 1984:187-192). For example, ego's grandfather's brother/sister and their spouses are classified as distant relatives.

6.3 Themes of Kin Terminology

Three main themes (generational, genealogical extension, and gender) run through the internal structure of this classification system. The following analysis shows that kin terms provide a means to constitute a changing pattern of moral ideals used to determine kin members' reciprocal expectations. In this way alone does kin terminology figure as a parallel to the deployment of the *kök* construct in reckoning descent.

The generational standard borne by the Turkish kin classification system restricts reckoning to five generations: those of ego, ego's grandparents, parents, children and grandchildren. There are no kin terms specific to second- and third-degree cousins, nor are there distinct terms for cross or parallel relatives beyond the first-degree.⁹⁷ Because of this five generational limit, rural Turkish kin terminology offers only a narrow range⁹⁸ of connections between people. In much the same way that descent reckoning lacks depth as a genealogical device, knowing kin terminology does not enhance the ability to show exactly how people earn their status as kin.

⁹⁷ In everyday kinship discourse, the same terms are used by female and male speakers for "niece" and "nephew".

⁹⁸ In a village in western Turkey, Sirman (1988:88) also notes that kin terminology is narrow in scope in that links are known only through the third ascending generation.

Beyond ego's spouse's father's *aille*, kin terminology (nos. 16-33) is extended to more than one position. These positions are comprised of terms for ego's, and ego's spouse's, close and distant kin (secondary consanguines and affines). For example, the term for *teyze* (MZ) extends to ego's PaMZ and ego's SpMZ, the term *gelin* denotes not only ego's son's wife but ego's grandson's wife and ego's great grandsons' wife, and the term for MB (*dayi*) is extended to distant kin, such as ego's PaMB and ego's SpMB. People covered by these terms are treated "as if" they were close kin -- anyone called *teyze* is treated as a mother's sister.

Primary consanguines and affines aside, kin terminology has less the character of a code, responsible for translating kin terms into an organized system of kin positions, than it has the character of a moral value, where kin terms are made use of to bring remote connections into familiar contact. Duben makes a similar argument concerning the wide application of kinship terms in urban Turkey. He asserts that "[o]utside of the realm of actual kinship, in the public arena, such terminology is used ... for the purpose of evoking such a kinship morality or simulating it as much as is possible in the situation at hand, for there are often no other social rules upon which to establish such relationships" (Duben,

1982:92).⁹⁹ Moreover, at the level of values, kin terminology acts to reduce the myriad of different kin connections to a uniformity and equivalence of meaning, while placing each in a status hierarchy.

The extension of *yakin* kin terms to *uzaktan akrabalar* enhances ties of kinship.¹⁰⁰ For all practical purposes, terminological extensions augment the perceived quality and quantity of kin, giving each *aile* an avenue from which to produce *yakin akrabalar* through means other than procreation or marriage. This form of kin reckoning establishes formal links of familiarity and close descent-like connections between discrete *aile*.

The major break in this terminological system comes between primary consanguines and affines and secondary consanguines and affines. The terms that designate, for example, one's mother or one's husband's sister are not applicable to any other person or status (see also Casson and Özertuğ, 1974).¹⁰¹ Should a

⁹⁹ Duben adds that the strategy of extending kinship may not always work to establish such relationships. Various other devices are employed, such as the *tanidik* (mutual acquaintance) method. "That is, the name of a relative of the recipient of the request or a mutual friend of the parties is invoked so that they will be obliged to relate to each other in other than formal, impersonal terms, so that the request, let us say, will be evaluated "as if" it were one coming from an actual [kin]" (1982:92-93).

¹⁰⁰ This terminological extension parallels the lack of specificity entailed in the *kök* (discussed in chapter five).

¹⁰¹ In a study of an Anatolian village, Casson and Özertuğ's advance that kinship reckoning and social structure are based on bilateral principles (1974:351). While bilaterality may be significant at the level of kin reckoning, this should not

son marry, his wife and her children (his *aile*) could be said to be included in his father's *aile* (as in Delaney, 1984:190-191), but this 'inclusion' depends on residence not kin terminology. The *aile* depicted in Table 1 (nos.1-15) are the three constituting egos' primary consanguines and affines. Ego's father's *aile* (nos. 2-7) comprises his wife and their five children, including ego. Their son's *aile* (nos. 8-10), comprises his son, daughter and his wife.¹⁰² Position number 15 is ego's father-in-law, while numbers 10-14 constitute his *aile*.¹⁰³ The specific terms to refer to a spouse's father's *aile* discriminate its members from ego's, and ego's father's, and from other close kin. Not applying extended terms to a

be assumed to reflect the social structure. Some studies (Sirman, 1988; Delaney, 1984) have shown the central importance of patrilineality at the level of Turkish kinship and social organization. Delaney (1984:196) makes a valuable point by saying that "their [Casson and Özertuğ's] argument was mounted to disprove the general view that Turkish social structure is patrilineal which they assumed would be evidenced by the existence of both patrilineal descent groups and reflected in terminology. Since there were no descent groups in the village they studied, and since the terminology system is bilateral, they conclude that social structure, by which they mean households, is formed on the basis of bilateral principles, specifically the centrality of the married pair and the 'equivalence of spouses'".

¹⁰² This is not meant to suggest that a couple only has one son. In the many cases where couples have more than one married son, there would be more than one *aile* produced.

¹⁰³ In this illustration, ego's spouse is included in both her husband's *aile* (from his point of view), and in her father's (from her point of view). Also, the term for sister-in-law depends on who is speaking. A husband calls his WZ *baldiz* while a wife calls her HZ *görümce* (see *infra*).

spouse's father's *ail* suggests that this group of people have special significance in everyday life.

Certain kin titles do not translate into positions of high esteem. The terminological bracketing of in-laws through the deployment of special terms, serves to exclude them. If these terms were meant to be inclusive then consanguine *ail* terminology would suffice (eg. referring to SpF as *baba* (F) and not *kaynata*). Instead, in-laws are not terminologically included in the sphere of primary consanguines, nor are they included in the system of secondary terms that apply to consanguines and affines equally. Thus, while it is common for a husband and wife to 'share' terms for their secondary consanguines¹⁰⁴ and affines (see also Casson and Özertuğ, 1974:365), both use distinct terms to refer to their respective primary consanguines and affines. Ego, for example, would never refer to SpM as *anne* (the term for mother).

The extensional 'equality' which characterizes the terms applied to secondary kin, and formally eliminating any distinction or hierarchy among them, is carried over into the sphere of primary consanguines and affines in the following way: both ego and his/her spouse refer to their respective in-laws with the same terms. For example, ego refers to his spouse's mother as *kaynana*, just as his spouse refers to his mother as *kaynana*. This equality of kin and equality

¹⁰⁴ For example, ego, as well as ego's wife, refers to ego's FB as *amca* (see line 22, Table 1).

of in-laws is, however, only one dimension of the terminological system. Just as secondary relations are differentiated terminologically as either close or distant kin, though they may share the same kin term, so too are primary kin distinguished as either members of the patrilineal *aile* (i.e., either ego's or ego's father's *aile*) or as in-laws. Everywhere an identity is established, it is organized by hierarchical divisions of status, respect and influence, and is used to subsume people into a system of values, aims and purposes.

While a *gelin* refers to her in-laws with the identical terms her husband uses to refer to her primary consanguines, this 'equality' of in-laws is only superficial. The esteem and sphere of influence of a *gelin's* consanguines are markedly different from her husband's.¹⁰⁵ The social position of a young, married woman is different from that of her husband, in that she is subordinate to both her husband and his agnates. Part of this subordination is attributed to her parent's and older sibling's inability to influence or control what happens to her after marriage. As Sirman (1988:93) notes: "... upon marriage the control of a woman is totally transferred to her husband and his family. This puts a strain on the affinal tie since any intervention by the bride's parents in the running of everyday affairs is immediately translated into a public statement about the reputation of

¹⁰⁵ This situation is reversed if the husband is a *dahmat geldj*, making the phenomena of social ranking and spheres of influence dependent on residence practices (to be discussed *infra*). So when discussing the 'meaning' of such relations it is important to consider 'who is speaking.'

the groom's family". The more thorough the reduction in status of husbands' in-laws, the more influence he and his family can exert and the more thorough the domination of a woman by her in-laws.

Despite the centrality of affinal links in forging many kindred associations, agnation remains the dominant principle in social relations. As Sirman (1988) says, "[p]eople are born into paternal households, take their father's name, and are inserted into village social networks based on their father's position. The dominance of the agnatic tie is reinforced by the fact that men are considered heads of households and that women, on marriage, come to live in their husband's house, which is often built into the husband's father's compound (Ibid.:88-89)." What makes relations of subordination even more seductive is that they appear 'as if' they were just as meaningful as consanguineal ties. The principles of agnation work to mitigate the importance of affinal kin, thereby reducing their influence.

While strategies of kin extension enhance the perceived breadth of the kin circle, they tend to down-play the inequalities between men and women. The inclusion of a woman into a new *aile* usually consists in a change of residence in addition to a shift in the terminological frame of reference. Since a son generally resides in his natal household after marriage, a *gelin* is expected to provide a great deal of home and agricultural labour to her husband's household. In

comparison to their husbands, women have little control over the household labour process or its finances, never inherit or manage property, and have less freedom of movement both within and outside the village. In a study of Bedouin society, Abu-Lughod (1988) also noticed that despite what the Koran advocates about property entitlement, women are nearly always dependents. As she states, "[i]n practice, women rarely own productive property, either land or animals, and they give up their share of the inheritance to their brothers" (Ibid.:284).¹⁰⁶

The inherent gender bias in kin terminology is especially apparent in the terms ego employs to distinguish his/her paternal and maternal relatives. Ego's MB and MZ, for example, are referred to differently than ego's FB and FZ. Kin terminology allows, but does not determine, status differentials. The classification of maternal and paternal kin expresses some important features of Turkish patrilineal culture not reflected in kin terminology.¹⁰⁷ For instance, there is no

¹⁰⁶ It is, however, assumed that should they return to their natal homes that their brothers will care for them and support them.

¹⁰⁷ A poem that expresses the importance of a father in a child's life is often mounted and hung on the wall. It is written and translated below:

Çocuklar Babaları Ne Düşünürler?
(What do Father's Children Think About)

6 Yaşında: Babam her şeyi biliyor
10 Yaşında: Babam çok şey biliyor
15 Yaşında: Ben de babam kadar biliyorum
20 Yaşında: Şu muhakkat ki babamen öyle
pek fazla bir şey bildiği yok
30 Yaşında: Bir şere de babamen fakrını
sor sam fena olmiyacak

Age 6: My father knows everything
Age 10: My father knows a lot
Age 15: I know as much as my father
Age 20: For certain, there is not much
that my father does not know
Age 30: If I asked my father something wicked
nothing bad would happen

other term employed to address ego's father's brother except *amca*. This term, however, addresses men with whom ego does not share kinship. Older men are addressed as *amca* by younger women, men and children. This term, and not the term referring to the MB (*dayi*), shows respect to men older than the speaker, suggesting obligations similar to those that one has to one's real father's brother. Others (Stirling, 1965:170; Sirman, 1988) argue that there is little difference between these two kin positions. Sirman says that "[t]he FB is not distinguished sharply from MB or any other elder kinsman; respect and authority are embedded in all relations between elder and younger people" (1988:104). My study shows, however, that there are marked differences between these two kin positions.

Similarly, the term *teyze* (MZ) addresses older women. *Teyze* is the term used to denote closeness and familiarity, whereas the term *hali* (FZ) is reserved to address those whom one wishes to show respect. Villagers therefore perceive their relationship to their mother (and her relatives) and father (and his relatives) differently (see also Delaney, 1984:192).

A further distinction is drawn between spouses' sisters. The term *görümce* (HZ) implies more status and respect than the term *baldiz* (WZ). *Görümce* is derived from the word *görüm* which means look, and *görümce* refers to a woman

40 Yaşında: Ne de olsa babam bazı şeyleri biliyor
some things
50 Yaşında: Babam her şeyi biliyor
60 Yaşında: Ah, babam hayatta olsaydı
da kendisine danışabilseydim!

Age 40: What ever happens, my father knows
Age 50: My father knows everything
Age 60: Oh, if my father was alive
I would be able to confer with him.

(along with other close kin) sent to look for and inspect prospective brides for her brother's sons. In contrast, a WZ has less influence in spouse selection for her sister's son.

Another illustration of the gender bias built into kin terms is reflected in the term *kardeş* (meaning brother). The only way to differentiate a brother from a (younger) sister is to place *kız* (girl) in front of the term *kardeş*. The term meaning sibling-like is *kardeşce* (lit. in a brotherly fashion), and is often extended to non-kin to affirm their familiarity. Local merchants, waiters, bus drivers, etc. often refer to many of their customers as *kardeşim* (lit. my brother).¹⁰⁸ In addition, as Delaney points out:

Women who wish to commemorate their close friendship declare they are *ahret kardeşi*¹⁰⁹ (sisters in the next world); whoever

¹⁰⁸ Duben (1982) argues that it is common for Turkish kin terms (including those of *kardeş* (B), *abi* (older B), *yenge* (BW)) to be used "outside the realm of 'actual' kinship" for the purpose of evoking kin-like relationships (Ibid.:92) and structuring social interactions (Ibid.:93). This process bears some resemblance to the way Sakli villagers are involved in creating a broader kin universe.

¹⁰⁹ This intensity of closeness and friendship is also illustrated in Magnarella's (1974) study of Susurluk, where he examines the significance of these relationships. He notes, as do Sirman (1988:95) and Delaney (1984), the importance of friends establishing "spiritual links" between one another through the institution of *ahiret* kin. In his words, "[t]he word "*ahiret*" derives from a root meaning "other world" or "afterlife". *Ahiret* designates especially close friends, who are considered inseparable in this world and the next. If only one attains heaven, he has the right to intercede with Allah for the other. The institution which elevates friendship from the secular, worldly level to the sacred, spiritual level was customarily established in a simple ceremony following a communal meal. After all had eaten, the two friends rose and announced that they were entering an *ahiret*

precedes can intercede for the other. Similarly, men who have been best friends from childhood declare *kardeşlik* (brotherhood) to exist between them... At the same time, men often call other men *kardeş* as terms of address to indicate equality... (1974:207).

The term *kayın* refers to brother-in-law and part of this word is extended to denote ego's SpM (*kaynana*) and ego's SpF (*kaynata*).¹¹⁰ Extending the terms for brother beyond the limits of the *aile* is a way to project to others the sense of respect accorded to male members in patrilineal descent groups.

Kin terminology does not constitute a fixed set of positions, but a system of values. These values, when taken as if they described reality, constitute a set of moral standards against which the actions of members are evaluated. However, since morality does not describe reality but in effect points beyond the present state of affairs, it is argued that morality comprises techniques of extension which aim toward the ideal of familiarity. From the centrality of the *aile*, this moral discourse spreads outward, incorporating more distant relatives into the project of familiarity in an ever broadening 'kin enclosure.' Behind this enclosure lies an extensive hierarchical order. Those who are taken in (seduced) as equal partners

relationship. They exchanged gifts, and guests congratulated the two and offered best wishes" (1974:168).

¹¹⁰ Ego's sex, however, has no influence on terms given for grandparents, parents, maternal and paternal uncles and aunts, and cousins (*kuzen, amca (hala, dahi, teyze) çocuğu*). Ego's sex has no obvious influence on any terms given for his/her immediate consanguines or affines since gender bias at this level is far more subtle.

in the project of familiarization, find themselves subsumed in a complex relation of domination for which kin terms act as a cover.

Kin terminology does not ascribe to each position a singular meaning. To determine the moral significance of kin terminology it is necessary to trace this ambiguity to its source. This discourse of kin is founded on certain discontinuities, and it is these that are responsible for the multifaceted character of kin positions. The divisions that comprise kin terms (i.e., the splits between patrilineal *aile* and its relatives, between in-laws, and the further distinction between *yakin* and *uzaktan* relatives) all stem from the fundamental power relation between the principles of patrilineality and affinal relations. This division constitutes a field for the deployment of further terminological strategies whose purpose is to appropriate affinal relations into the aims of patrilineality by superimposing on them a discourse of familiarity.

No doubt there is a relationship between gender inequality in kin terminology and gender subordination in rural Turkish culture. We shall see that gender hierarchy also exists in marriage, inheritance, social mobility, and general codes of behaviour. Before developing further the practical deployment of kinship networks, the formation of household alliances, and the special significance that marriage practices have in these regards, the following chapter

will outline the central features of Sakli's domestic economy and the phenomena of rural out-migration.

Chapter 7: The Domestic Economy

The purpose of this chapter is to provide a descriptive profile of Sakli's main economic activities, particularly subsistence farming and seasonal migrant labour, and to discuss these activities in the context of the relations of domination and subordination governing village life. Specifically, this chapter sheds light on patterns of seasonal migration in Turkey's north-western countryside. Most studies argue that rural out-migration is either an adaptation to persistent unemployment or a phenomenon resulting from pressures and counter-pressures in the social relations of production. These approaches tend to overlook the specific features of rural culture in determining conditions for seasonal migration and its effects on community organization.

The approach taken here focuses on the inter-relationship of subsistence production, migrant labour and gender relations. The introduction of migrant labour reduces the peasants' necessity of sharecropping for landlords and so has the effect of overcoming the landlords' control over production and many other aspects of village life. Local villagers understand migrant labour as a means of preserving their traditional farming practices. But the tradition of subsistence production changed with the introduction of seasonal migrant labour, since subsistence production became largely the responsibility of women. I show,

therefore, how notions of 'preserving tradition' constitute a moral regime that disguises the aims of 'feminizing' subsistence agriculture and subordinating women to male migrants.

7.1 Social Transformation and Rural Migration in Turkey

Although rural out-migration is nothing new in the history of capitalism, it has generated new contradictions and effects in developing and industrial societies generally. While these effects have also intruded into the community of Sakli, the cultural context within which these patterns develop serves to shape them in particular ways. State policies, rural class structure and household formation all play an important role in determining the overall organization of rural out-migration in Turkey.¹¹¹ A brief history of migration patterns in rural Turkey will show the importance of these factors.

Before the end of the second world war, only a small proportion of Turkey's population was engaged in formal wage labour.¹¹² Out of a total of twenty million, 80 percent lived in the countryside, with the greatest number

¹¹¹ For more on rural out-migration in Turkish agriculture see: Sirman, 1988; Ertürk, 1988; Keyder, 1987, 1983b; Aydin, 1986; Kandiyoti, 1984; Seddon and Marquillies, 1982; Berberoğlu, 1982; Kiray, 1976; Stirling, 1965.

¹¹² In the 1940's, the Turkish state fostered rural out-migration by allowing rural peasants to serve part of their term of mandatory military service in coal mining.

working as small-scale farmers. Of those who worked in urban retail trades, the majority were self-employed. Even in manufacturing, just over one-third of the workers were self- or family-employed, while only approximately 400,000 worked as wage labourers (Keyder, 1987:118).

In the last thirty years, Turkey has experienced a major population shift from rural to urban (Ayata, 1986:82; Duben, 1982:74). After 1950, rural-urban migration accelerated sharply (Danielson and Keleş, 1985:27; Berberoğlu, 1982:71). Between 1950 and 1960, the population of the four largest cities increased by 75 percent (Keyder, 1987:137). Normal population increases in urban centres are inadequate explanations for this radical demographic change. The phenomenon of rural out-migration is commonly used to explain this population growth. These factors include: the development of an international and internal market demand, the importation of foreign technology (particularly that of agricultural machinery) and capital, and the concomitant rise in the polarization of social groups (in both the countryside and in urban centres).

While the international economic system conditions rural transformation in industrializing countries,¹¹³ nation states also play a role in this process. In

¹¹³ Such an explanation is common. Dependency theorists have long emphasized the international system, as opposed to the internal characteristics of particular societies, as the key variable (along with the interaction of political and economic forces) for understanding the form that "development" takes in industrializing countries (see Frank, 1967; Wallerstein, 1974).

Turkey, the state's role in the formal economy expanded in the 1920's as it entered various branches of local industry to develop infrastructure, establish banks and regulate commerce (Berberoğlu, 1987:126-28).¹¹⁴ From 1950 to 1980, state policies encouraged increases in the use of land under cultivation (at over 66%), the use of tractors (from 10,000 in 1950 to 450,000 in 1980), and the use of fertilizers (Keyder, 1983b:35). This industrial expansion in agriculture, however, primarily affected those areas where few households controlled large land holdings. In the community of Sakli, this type of industrial expansion did not take place. While certain social features have changed dramatically, Sakli's agriculture is still dominated by labour-intensive, subsistence production¹¹⁵ and has remained this way throughout this period of industrial expansion. Although migrant labour is a factor in the subsistence economy of Sakli, agricultural

¹¹⁴ In 1954, for instance, the state introduced a law to attract foreign capital "with virtually no restrictions on amount or type of investment, and allowed it to enter into joint ventures with Turkish companies" (Berberoğlu, 1982:68). With Turkish compradors becoming extensively involved in joint ventures with national monopolies and big landlords in agriculture, the demand for wage labour became a characteristic of agricultural production, especially in some geographic areas where the majority of land belonged to a small number of farming households. It was these areas that were targeted for increased mechanization by the state and this was achieved through external funds (aids and grants) from the U.S. (Keyder, 1983a:141). The implantation of particular state policies allows and permits the intervention of foreign capital in Turkish agriculture.

¹¹⁵ Subsistence agriculture is a kind of survival production wherein farmers produce mainly for their own consumption requirements. Many changes have resulted in the creation of a new form of "subsistence production", i.e. subsistence producers and migrant labourers.

produce (eg. wheat and corn) are rarely sold for cash and there is a definite normative practice against doing so. For these reasons, I refer to Sakli's agriculture as subsistence production.

Processes of rural change have advanced at different speeds and have taken different forms, depending on geographic and historical circumstances. In areas where most of the land is controlled by landlords, the transformation of "feudal" landlords into capitalist farmers, and sharecroppers (*ortakçi*) into wage labourers are well under way (Kiray and Hinderink, 1968). The transfiguration of sharecroppers into wage labourers may be, occasionally, attributed to the wider availability of credit, which helped introduce machinery and other labour-saving technology and made large-scale land reclamation possible (especially during the 1950's) (see Keyder, 1987:128). In areas where land is distributed more among farming households, the passage to modern farm technology and production for the market is accomplished via the concentration of land in the hands of medium and large-scale farmers.

Many agricultural communities in Turkey have undergone drastic transformation because of several factors, including the introduction of mechanization and cash cropping and market dependency. Consequently, many farmers lost ownership or access to land (Akçay, 1985:152; Kandiyoti, 1977:63; Kiray and Hinderink, 1968:503), and either became wage labourers for

commercial agriculturalists or relied on migrant labourers for farm production (see Sirman, 1988).

There are some villages, however, that have not met with these kinds of 'developments', such as those communities in which households own (or access) small and marginal size plots of land and do not engage in mechanized agriculture¹¹⁶ or cash-cropping to any great extent (see Kandiyoti, 1984:26; Kandiyoti, 1977:61-63). As a way to make ends meet, or to alleviate pressure toward land dispossession (Bazoğlu, 1984:4), some villagers engage in seasonal migrant employment (Ertürk, 1988a:23; Keyder, 1983:37-38; Özbay, 1979; Kandiyoti, 1977:63). This is the situation in Sakli. Before we address this matter further, it is important to discuss briefly theories of migration movements. This will provide a context for my approach to the problem of seasonal migration and the role households play in this process.

7.2 Approaching the Problem of Migration

The following discussion examines two perspectives of rural migration and places particular emphasis on re-assessing their principal assumptions in the context of change and seasonal migration in rural Turkey. The purpose of this section is to show that more attention needs to be given to the role that household

¹¹⁶ In a central Anatolian village, the mechanization of agriculture displaced labour and consequently left many underemployed (Delaney, 1984:319).

organization and gender relations play during social struggles and economic transformation.

Undeniably, rural out-migration is a central feature of "developing" agricultural societies. Two distinct and opposing modes of analysis can explain this phenomenon. The first position views migrants as individuals who adapt in particular ways to changing circumstances. Studies of migration, especially within the neo-classical tradition, have analyzed levels and patterns of migration by reference to "push" and "pull" factors (Danielson and Keleş, 1985; Karpát, 1976; Lee, 1966). The major "push" factors, or reasons that compel groups to migrate, are poverty, low income, the lack of educational and medical facilities (Danielson and Keleş, 1985:33; Karpát, 1976:20), and the absence of sufficient arable land to support a growing rural population (Danielson and Keleş, 1985:33). A particular pattern of 'societal values' are responsible for creating the inertia of change. Logically, the major "pull" factors that attract individuals to new areas include the opportunities for employment and higher income and the availability of educational and medical facilities (Karpát, 1976:20), which are said to foster the realization of these new societal values, i.e. better training and education, and therefore greater social and economic prospects, a higher standard of living, etc.

As with modernization theory, this framework views rural depopulation and the persistence of unemployment and underemployment as a consequence of

traditional economic stagnation (Fernandez-Kelly, 1983:206). It is assumed that rural out-migration contributes to the strengthening of basic conditions and strategic factors necessary for a "take-off" in development (Penninx, 1982:782). Despite this type of analysis within the international migration literature, greater recognition should be granted to specific cultural features and circumstances which form the context for rural out-migration, rather than emphasizing rural-urban differences in income and socio-economic advantages.

A comprehensive framework for understanding rural migration and the variety of migration patterns cannot be adequately realized within the traditional migration literature. One problem with dominant explanations of population movement is that peasants and workers are understood to respond to imbalances in the geographical distribution of the factors of production. They suggest that labour migrates from places where capital is scarce and labour is plentiful, to places where capital is abundant and labour is limited. This analysis downplays or ignores the uneven distributions of land, the polarization of social classes and the social divisions of work within and between households. Thus, progress in migration theory can be attributed to the linking of migration to larger social processes - especially in Marxist and feminist analyses - and applying ideas of international division of labour (Bach and Schraml, 1982:323-324) and household

and gender divisions (Hammam, 1986:158-159; Fruzzetti, 1985:42; Fernandez-Kelly, 1983; Henn, 1984:10-12).

The second position in the literature on rural migration builds upon a Marxist framework. Within this perspective, population movements are seen to correlate with pressures and counter-pressures in the social relations of production. By emphasizing the interaction among social classes, this approach considers the mechanisms by which social, economic and political forces directly and indirectly affect the demand for labour and the associated forms of labour recruitment and remuneration (see also Wood, 1981:339). Within this framework, studies on rural migration focus on how capitalist penetration in agriculture (especially through mechanization and commercialization) generates increased economic differentiation within rural populations. Some regard this development as creating a small land-owning class and a growing agricultural proletariat (Lenin, 1899; Kautsky, 1899). It is generally agreed that the penetration of agriculture by capital forms class groupings that cause rural displacement and force many household members to seek permanent or seasonal wage work in urban centres (Long, 1984:4; Melhuus, 1984:65; DeWind, 1979:157). Enhanced by the vulnerability and relative inefficiency of small-scale agriculture, high levels of permanent and seasonal migration confirm that a process of peasant

decomposition is occurring in agriculture (see also Ayata, 1986:82; Hann, 1985:109).

Although much more compelling and insightful, traditional Marxist contributions to migration theory are open to criticism. There is one main area that the traditional proletarianization thesis needs to take into serious consideration: i.e., the impact of factors other than class relations on the rural out-migration phenomenon. Specifically, this perspective emphasizes the transformation of some farmers into wage labourers and overlooks the role of farmers in agriculture. Consequently, there is often a failure to consider the household's role in deploying strategies that organize labour, establish co-operative relations, arrange household composition, etc. In a changing economy, analysis of these strategies is not meant to ignore the forces external to agricultural communities and households. My point is that households are involved in a complex system of social relationships, including methods of inter-household organization, patterns of paid and unpaid work and specific forms of gender relations. Simply reducing some household members to economic class positions underplays the significance of other social arrangements central to rural economies. As Scott (1985:43) states:

Class, after all, does not exhaust the total explanatory space of social actions. Nowhere is this more true than within the peasant village, where class may compete within kinship, neighbourhood, faction, and ritual links as foci of human identity and solidarity.

Beyond the village level, it may also compete with ethnicity, language group, religion, and region as a focus of loyalty. Class may be applicable to some situations but not others; it may be reinforced or crosscut by other ties; it may be far more important for the experience of some than of others.

More attention should be given to the conditions under which social and economic forces revolutionize household organization and labour routines in the Turkish countryside (see also Sirman, 1988; Kandiyoti, 1984:19; Kiray and Hinderink, 1968:514). As in other 'developing' rural economies, factors other than class relations affect both the nature, extent and content of rural out-migration and subsistence agriculture (see Abu-Lughod, 1988:73-74; Long, 1984:6; Bourque and Warren, 1981:35).

7.3 Agricultural Relations and Migratory Processes

Many advocates of the proletarianization thesis assume that capitalist penetration in agriculture creates a powerful bourgeoisie and a growing working class. In rural Turkey, however, processes of capitalist penetration in agriculture have not brought about a homogeneous capitalist sector with a well-defined bourgeoisie and a clearly recognizable proletariat. The majority (75 to 80%) of Turkish agricultural households own and control the means of production (i.e., small to medium sized plots of land; see Aydin, 1986:8; Akçay, 1985:11) and

their production efforts are geared toward both household subsistence and market production¹¹⁷ (see also Keyder, 1983b:45).

At a general level, out-migration in rural Turkey depends on the inter-relation of household organization, land distribution and the type of agricultural production. The form that production takes is either cash-cropping, subsistence production or combinations of both. Agriculture in Sakli, however, is restricted to a distinct type of subsistence production. In the following discussion, I give an account of Sakli's economic activities and land distribution patterns and provide an analysis of its domestic economy and the social forces affecting seasonal migration.

Sakli's labour-intensive subsistence agriculture, together with household reproductive labour, are significant economic activities. Based on my survey of land use, the agricultural output of farming households reveals that over 90 percent of all arable (*arazi*) plots are allocated equally to wheat (*buğday*) and corn (*misir*) (mixed in with some string beans (*fasulye*)). Household members plough the land in late September, plant wheat in October and harvest (*biçim*) it in mid-

¹¹⁷ This does not mean, however, that these agricultural workers are not "exploited" by capital. Some studies convincingly illustrate that peasant surplus is appropriated by capital through the sale of agricultural products (Chevalier, 1982, 1983; Vergopoulos, 1978; Bernstein, 1977). In the face of all of this, it is important to recognize that capitalist relations of production do not always have a universal character and the appearance of pre-capitalist social relations does not necessarily constitute a mode of production.

July. The land not seeded with wheat is ploughed during the months of April and corn is planted at the end of May and generally harvested in early September. Depending upon the amount of land one owns or shares, two to four weeks in June is spent hoeing (*çapa*). Moreover, during the peak of the agricultural season, many long hours in August and September are consumed cutting, collecting and carrying wood for the winter, with over two tons required for the average size household.¹¹⁸

Another important economic activity in Sakli is non-commercial animal farming. Most households raise chickens, from five to twenty, with an average of about eight per household. Cows are also raised in many households, but their numbers are low, less than three per household on average. Sometimes cattle holding is a form of insurance in times of hardship. As milk and yogurt are staples of village diet, sheep husbandry is a feature of some households. Milk products are used for consumption needs, with a small proportion sold to other communities and exchanged with local villagers. There are only two households in the community involved in the production and sale of honey.

¹¹⁸ Nearly all farming households use firewood for heat. Sometimes coal is used but this is only the case for landlord households and for those few people who have retired from work in German industries. One ton of coal costs close to 200,000 T.L. (1990 figure) which is equivalent to two-thirds of the total monthly income a coal miner receives.

Land distribution among farming households is fairly even. Of Sakli's eighty-four farming households (excluding landlords), only a few (10.7%) are near landless (under six *dönüm*), some (22.6%) are marginal farmers (between six and ten *dönüm*) and the majority (66.7%) are small-scale farm owners (eleven to fifty *dönüm*).¹¹⁹ The average household in Sakli owns, or has access to,¹²⁰ approximately fourteen *dönüm*.¹²¹ One *dönüm*, equivalent to just under one-quarter of an acre, is considered the amount of land that one person could work in a day. The average size household (containing between six and eight members) requires at least twelve to sixteen *dönüm* for basic subsistence needs.

By contrast, landlords own the greatest proportion of land in and outside the community -- over two thousand *dönüm* (about 500 acres). This figure is a rough estimate as it is very difficult to gain accurate information on land

¹¹⁹ In the small-scale farming category, 71.4% of these households own (or have access to) between 11 and 25 *dönüm*.

¹²⁰ Access to land, in this context, refers only to that land which is shared with other relatives (*akrabalar*) and, therefore, does not include the additional land that households rent or sharecrop. Generally, though, access to land can result from sharing and inheriting natal property, renting or sharecropping. These are the common means of gaining access to land in rural Turkey (see also Sirman, 1988:254).

¹²¹ There are some households that have no formal land of their own but this does not mean they are landless. Sons who reside neolocally, traditionally share access to, and work on, their father's land.

ownership (see also Delaney, 1984), especially from landlords.¹²² Knowledge derived from oral histories and interviews suggest that much of the landlords' land was obtained through the clearing of forest. None of the landlords, however, have reported this matter and official land ownership records remain inaccurate. Statistical data available in the mayor's (*kaymakum*) office in the nearby town show landlord families owning far less than the above figure.

Approximately 65 percent of all *dönüm* owned by landlords is arable and is currently rented (or sharecropped) to villagers in Sakli¹²³ and nearby communities. Of all land brought under production in Sakli (1450 *dönüm*), about 20 percent is rented or sharecropped to local villagers; the remaining 80 percent is either owned by village households or shared among close or nearby kin (*akrabalar*) and neighbours (*komşular*). Land rental arrangements are quite different from earlier practices. Before the 1920's, sharecropping was far more prevalent than land rental relations, and villagers divided their labour between their own small gardens (*bahçe*) and the lands they sharecropped.

¹²² I collected information on land ownership and access to land (share cropping and renting from landlords) from all Sakli households. Additionally, each household member provided me with detailed information on their relatives' land holdings (or access to land) in and outside of Sakli. My estimates of landlord landholding are based on this data.

¹²³ Approximately one-quarter of this arable land is rented or sharecropped by Sakli villagers.

The gradual transformation of the economy outside Sakli changed village labour patterns. During the 1930's and 1940's, many male farmers seasonally migrated to the city of Zonguldak for work in the coal mining industry. This seasonal migration accelerated until the 1970's.¹²⁴ In terms of rural out-migration today, approximately 85 percent of all village households have (or have had) members (predominately males) who work as seasonal wage labourers in Turkey (57%) or work on a more permanent basis in German industries (28%).¹²⁵ The steady decline in sharecropping coincides with an increase in patterns of rural out-migration.

¹²⁴ It was also during this period when some villagers (approximately twenty-five households in all) permanently migrated to other areas in Turkey or to Germany. For information on the long-term migration of Turkish residents see, for example: N. Abadan-Unat (1982) "The Effect of International Labour Migration on Women's Roles: The Turkish Case." In Sex Roles, Family and Community in Turkey. Kağıtçıbaşı, C. (ed.). Indiana University Press pp. 207-234; A. Gitmez (1979) Dişgoç Oyküsü, Ankara, Maya Matbaacılık Yayıncılık Ltd. Sti; R. Keleş (1976) "Regional Development and Migratory Labour." In Abadan-Unat, N. et.al. Migration and Development, NUFFIC, IMWOO, Ankara, Ajans-Türk Press; M. Kiray (1976) "The Family of the Immigrant Worker." In Abadan-Unat, N., ed., Turkish Workers in Europe, 1960-1975, Leiden, E.J. Brill; A. Kudat (1975) "Structural Changes in the Migrant Turkish Family." In Krane, R.E., ed. Manpower Mobility Across Cultural Boundaries. Leiden, E.J. Brill; P.J. Magnarella (1979) The Peasant Venture, Tradition, Migration and Change among Georgian Peasants in Turkey. Schenkman Publ. Co; S. Paine (1974) Exporting Workers: The Turkish Case, Cambridge University Press.

¹²⁵ My analytic focus is seasonal migration, and an investigation of permanent migrants, especially those who live and work in Germany, is beyond the scope and resources of this project.

7.3.1 Discontinuities within Subsistence Agriculture and Seasonal Migrant Labour

Sakli has long been characterized by its subsistence based production. The farmers contend that the land in the area is not conducive to cash crop production, and that the absence of market production is related to their inability to produce beyond subsistence needs. While the land is not very fertile (despite the recent introduction of fertilizers) and without proper irrigation, land productivity alone cannot account for the absence of cash-cropping. Other mountainous communities surrounding Sakli also only engage in subsistence production.

Landlords, for their part, blame the lack of productivity not on the land, but on an increasingly 'unreliable' (*güvenilmez*) peasantry, who squander their energies on wage labour instead of agricultural responsibilities. The local landlords often voice their dissatisfaction at the turn of events leading up to seasonal out-migration, exclaiming that the coal mining industry "ruined" (*batirdi*) agriculture. Sharecropping once supported the landlords' control over the peasantry, and established their status as overseer of the production process. The arrival of large-scale wage labour transformed landlord-tenant relations, decreased the landlords' cost of managing their landholdings, altered their influence in the labour process, and fundamentally restructured the meaning of "subsistence production" in Sakli.

In explaining both the existence and persistence of subsistence economies, some contend that village and household relations are governed by non-capitalistic principles (Skar, 1984; Bradby, 1982). In a study of inter-household co-operation in Peru, Skar (1984) argues that beliefs about collaborative work forms, money and produce are important elements restraining capitalist growth in the village economy. In the community she studied, nearly all village men had been involved in wage labour relationships for some time. Despite this, Skar contends that the significance of non-wage work exchanges reveals that social relations are unaffected (directly or indirectly) by monetary values. She documents the existence of strong beliefs against the selling of subsistence produce for money, adding that agricultural produce is given as gifts of friendship or as a repayment for specialized services (Ibid., 94-95). Skar argues, as does Bradby (1982:121), that money from wage labour does not necessarily express the values associated with capitalist production relations.

A similar kind of argument could be advanced about Sakli, i.e., that domestic and moral relations inhibit the development of cash-based production. There is some empirical evidence to support such a generalization. For example, it is considered *ayip* (shameful) to sell to another villager something that required no cash expenditure in its production (see also Sirman, 1988:83). Villagers would never sell a cow, sheep, or any domestic produce to another villager, nor would

into question, and so he attempts an exegesis or critical commentary on their meaning. The problem, as he sees it, is that the semblance of unity purported by morality (as its central value) covers the fact that the meaning ascribed to events change over time. This leads him to search for the origin of these values, to the discovery of their genealogical connections, and the process that leads to transformation. Clearly what Nietzsche has in mind is not a genealogy that further proves the continuity of present values with the past, but, one that recognizes that values change and this change cannot be accounted for at the level of values. In his words,

[c]hristianity, the revolution, the abolition of slavery, equal rights, philanthropy, love of peace, justice, truth: all these big words have value only in a fight, as flags: not as realities but as showy words for something quite different (indeed, opposite!) (1967a:80).

That change has nothing whatever to do with values as such, leads to the search for the origin of values as effects and perspectives of power. In effect, then, his study of the phenomena of morality leads into a genealogy of the forms and effects of power.

In speaking of morality, Nietzsche disagrees with the notion that "by their fruits ye shall know them". Instead, he says of every morality, "[i]t is a fruit by which I recognize the soil from which it sprang" (Nietzsche, 1967a:257). He argues that everything now regarded as immoral was once praiseworthy in a master morality (1967a:272). Therefore, the adversaries of good and evil do not

A resolution test chart featuring various patterns of horizontal and vertical lines of increasing frequency. Each pattern is accompanied by a numerical value indicating its resolution. The values include 1.0, 1.1, 1.25, 1.4, 1.6, 1.8, 2.0, 2.2, 2.5, 2.8, 3.2, 3.6, 4.0, 4.5, and 5.0. The patterns are arranged in a grid-like fashion, with some patterns having horizontal lines and others having vertical lines, and some having both.

MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS
STANDARD REFERENCE MATERIAL 1010a
(ANSI and ISO TEST CHART No. 2)

they allow me to buy kindling or yogurt from them, insisting instead that the goods be received as gifts (*he liye*). There is also an expectation of reciprocity in such gift giving relations but, the extent that each action will find its equivalent is not subject to any universal criterion, standard or measure. Occasionally, villagers will sell a cow or sheep to someone outside the community, but this only occurs when money is required and other avenues of raising it (eg. loans from relatives, neighbours or landlords) have been exhausted. This "anti-profit" sentiment could explain why subsistence agriculture survives, but such a view presents some problems.

The suggestion that certain village principles and practices resist capitalist penetration or maintain a tradition of subsistence agriculture is functionalist. Such arguments mistake the purpose to which something is put, with its origin (i.e., they over-determine meaning and imagine contradictions where there are only differences). While there are seasonal migrants or wage labourers in subsistence economies, it must be recognized that a culture of wage work intrudes into the economy's monetary relations, consumption patterns, labour routines, etc. Subsistence production, therefore, should not be thought of as a fixed "tradition" that could be shielded from, or unaffected by, this kind of transformation. The content of subsistence production is more enigmatic than this.

While the "survival of subsistence production" thesis describes important aspects of social relations (such as household organization patterns, gender divisions of labour, cultural values, etc.), it exaggerates the opposition or distance between capitalist relations of production and all other forms of production, thereby downplaying the complexity of subsistence production. Although the proletarianization thesis reveals much about how class differentiation restructures the organization of land holdings and the demand for labour, it still fails to consider how household and gender relations are included in economic transformation.

In this study, subsistence production and migrant labour are treated differently. I contend that the transition from subsistence production to the combination of subsistence production and seasonal migrant labour, introduces many discontinuities in Sakli's tradition. Since it no longer possesses its original connotation (men and women subsisting off the land while sharecropping for landlords), subsistence production must therefore be viewed in a new context. Furthermore, it is essential to bear in mind that 'traditional' labour practices (such as subsistence production) do not originate in opposition to capitalism. In many instances, migrant labour allows peasants to get out from underneath landlord domination and construct a unique form of subsistence production. As discussed later, the characteristics of contemporary subsistence relations (eg. gendered

division of labour, necessity of labour and non-labour exchanges, etc.) emerged as an effect of the weight of political and economic control by landlords over the peasantry.

Subsistence production relations are not simply features of farming, but they arise in the context of landlord domination and the attempt of peasants to overcome their subordination. The degree to which we can confer upon these relations the label of 'traditional practice,' depends on the extent to which we view the social circumstances which determine their character as unchanging. But these circumstances have already changed, from dependence on sharecropping, to a majority of households farming inherited land and using migrant labour to supplement their subsistence. As well, there are marginal farming households that rely on migrant income exclusively to pay ground rent. Only a small minority (near landless) continue to sharecrop for the landlords. This turn of events has reduced greatly the political, economic and social control of the landlords, and introduced a 'less disciplined' peasantry. The landlords envision them to be less disciplined because the labour process is no longer overseen by them, since overseeing is not a requirement of the new set of social relations (i.e., freeholding and rental relations).

The forces of capitalist penetration have proletarianized the population (at least to the extent that most households engage in seasonal migrant labour), but

these new economic values have been incorporated into an already existing system of purposes (i.e., the aim to overcome landlord domination). Migrant wage labourers do not just simply adopt a working class outlook or ideology, the value of their labour should also be understood as a break from previous relations of domination and subordination.

Migrant labour finds a home in Sakli because of its value in overcoming landlord domination within the village. In the moral arena, value centres on a thing's (phenomena or relation) utility in a fight, or its service in overcoming what opposes it -- the measure of its value is, therefore, the extent to which it brings an increase in power (the ability to overcome domination) (see Foucault, 1979). Since the meaning or value of something is dependent on the context of its use, migrant labour is not simply valued as such. In Sakli, income from wage labour is not used to provide households with their basic needs. Instead, the overwhelming majority of households continue to rely solely on subsistence farming. The extent to which migrant labour draws the population out from under the landlords' system of domination is the real measure of its value.

Also, the significance of migrant labour seems to contradict the values of subsistence agriculture, in that subsistence values apparently stand opposed to the ideals of wage labour relations. The language of contradiction, however, merely hides the force relations (i.e., the relations of domination and subordination). The

coordination of these two systems of value (wage labour and subsistence) lies in the force relations that underlie them. Wage labour, while it is made use of in the struggle against the dominion of the landlords, also serves, as we shall see, in the promotion of a gendered hierarchy.

The relevance and value of subsistence relations emerges not from the aim of preserving tradition, that is, the way one might protect a relic. The apparent perpetuation of tradition hides an extensive gendered division of labour that corresponds to the introduction of migrant labour, where women and young children are converted into subsistence farmers, and older men the overseers of this labour process. Thus, it is important not only to consider the factual introduction of wage labour, but to show how this force is introduced and used in the existing system of social relations. That is, it is vital to assess the ways in which migrant labour is appropriated and made to operate within a system of aims and purposes. The following discussion of Sakli's domestic economy elaborates on these themes.

7.3.2 The Order of Hierarchy: Gender and Small-Scale Agriculture

In the community of Sakli there are a variety of strategies that small-scale subsistence households employ both to sustain an adequate level of subsistence agricultural output, beyond maintaining wage relations based on seasonal rural

out-migration. Most important, these households set up strict gender divisions of labour, also employing extra-household and non-labour exchanges as ways of organizing its subsistence economy.

In small-scale farming households, as well as in marginal and near landless households, there is a distinct gender hierarchy in both paid and unpaid employment. Before their participation in seasonal migrant labour, men spent more time labouring with their wives and relatives in subsistence agriculture. Today, most men have virtually withdrawn from labour intensive agriculture. Usually one or two male household members (a husband or a young married or unmarried son) work as seasonal migrants, while other household members (women and young children) are forced to take responsibility for the bulk of agricultural work.

When men do participate in agriculture, their involvement is generally restricted to certain tasks. If they are not working as migrant workers, men take part in agriculture only during the peak ploughing and harvesting seasons. Furthermore, they are largely responsible for work associated with mechanized activities (in some clearing, ploughing and threshing operations) and for supervising the labour process. In mechanized threshing operations, men feed the wheat into the machine while women and young children pack the threshed wheat. In ploughing the fields, men generally lead the oxen (*öküz*) while women

follow behind and shake clumps of soil from the roots of weeds that have been rotated.

Young boys also contribute to agricultural production. Boys, especially those under the age of twelve, take part in agriculture work until they are old enough to find other jobs or to work with their fathers. Instead of farming with their sisters or female relatives, some boys are persuaded to attend formal educational training. After a day of schooling, boys often play with their male friends and relatives (especially during the winter months) or help their father or uncle clear the fields, re-build houses or barns, paint and upgrade fences (especially during the spring and summer months). Overall, men predominate in mechanized agriculture, restoration work, commercial transactions and migrant labour. It is considered unmanly, however, for a male to do traditional "female work" -- the mundane and time-consuming work of labour-intensive farming and gardening, pickling, collecting wood or corn cobs for heating and cooking, preparing daily meals, tending to children, sewing and repairing clothes, knitting socks and sweaters, and caring for the elderly.

Women do most of the agricultural work, including the labour-intensive operations of ploughing, hoeing, planting, weeding, and the caring and feeding of animals. Even the labour-intensive harvesting of wheat (*buğday*) and corn (*misir*) is mainly undertaken by women, although the mechanized threshing of wheat

(*harman makinisi*) absorbs the labour of two men and one group of women.¹²⁶

A woman's work is rarely recognized by either younger or older men as embodying any skill or expertise. Although prized as traditionally significant and essential to agricultural production, manual tasks are viewed as labour that women are inherently suited. Often when men talk about those who work with agricultural machines, they refer to the skill (*ustalik*) and experience that this type of work requires, contrasting it with the lack of skill involved in labour-intensive agriculture. Women's attitude toward agricultural labour is different from men's. They claim that it takes a great deal of training to become a good farmer. In showing their high regard for this work, many older women express their desire someday to have a physically strong (*kuvvetli*) daughter-in-law (*gelin*) to take over their farming chores. As in other parts of rural Turkey, older married women gain more social status and respect when they withdraw from agricultural labour and become restricted to performing tasks inside the home (see also Kandiyoti, 1984:25).

The strict gender division of labour in paid employment is another significant theme of the existing gender hierarchy. While most households have at least one or two members working as seasonal migrants, it is significant to note

¹²⁶ One man lifts the wheat bundles onto the machine's platform and the other feeds them into the machine. The group of women, ranging from four to six, bundle all the threshed wheat and move each bundle away from machine, into separate piles.

that it is men who are the migrants, not women. It would be culturally impossible for a woman to travel by herself to seasonal wage work, without a husband or brother accompanying her. In Sakli, it is considered inappropriate for women to work outside the village, as it is believed that a woman's duty is to look after her family and the fields. Local villagers consider the household environment as the "safest" place for women: it is a site thought to shield women from the immorality of unrelated men or 'disruptive' women.

A woman's restricted mobility is associated with the regulatory discourses on "protection". It is thought that women should be shielded from unknown or untrustworthy men, since these men have the potential to take sexual advantage of them and cause much shame to husbands and relatives. Even when women enter the forest to cut, collect and carry wood, they are thought to be in need of protection. As one young married man said, "*Kadin yalnız gitmez, yanında birisi lazım. Ya erkek kardeşi, ya kocası, ya da komşusu*" ("A women cannot go [to the forest] alone as someone must be with her: either her brother, husband or neighbour"). The appeal to constrain women's movement occurs in other Turkish farming communities. In a study of a western Anatolian village, Delaney (1984) remarks:

... to enter the street is to enter the wild area of the village, comparable at a different level to the wild areas outside the village. As men are the only legitimate wanderers outside the village, so too are they the legitimate occupants of the street. Women's place is in

the home, 'men make outside relations.' A woman enters the street unprotected and open to contagion, namely the potential mixing of the sexes...

The only exceptions to the constraint on female wage employment are the fifteen young, unmarried women who work part-time in the village's newly established (i.e., 1989) carpet weaving factory. This work is labour intensive and the pay is extremely low. On the one occasion when I visited this work place, there were girls as young as ten years old working there, most of whom quit school to earn extra money for their households. Other south-western Anatolian carpet factories also employ young females to produce hand-made carpets (Kandiyoti, 1984:26). Such strict gender divisions in paid employment leave women and young children economically and ideologically dependent upon husbands and fathers.

Reciprocal labour arrangements also characterize agricultural production. Most households, in varying degrees, count on close and distant relatives and neighbours for additional aid during the farming cycle, especially during hoeing and harvesting operations. These groups are an organized system of labour exchanges for harvesting without the transfer of cash (see also Kandiyoti, 1984:26) and comprise local female villagers, mainly those from one household, and their close relatives and local neighbours. For example, the hoeing (*çapa*) of land, the harvesting of wheat and corn and the carrying of goods are often done by a group of people from different households and sometimes from different

neighbourhoods (*mahalle*). These exchange relations, however, should not be seen as a pure advantage to any household. Based on my observations and extensive interviews with local residents, household members are expected to offer their services (especially labour) to those who help them. And, it is considered shameful (*ayip*) to not contribute one's labour to relatives and neighbours during the farming cycle. Likewise, when I aided households with the ploughing and hoeing (*çapa*) of plots and gardens, in return, they supplied my meals for the day and gave me fresh fruit and homemade flat bread to take home.

Labour exchanges in rural Turkey are shown to be important in mobilizing access to production requirements and in reducing the vulnerability of small-scale production units increasingly faced with market competition, low product prices, and high input costs. For example, in the cotton producing economy of Tuz, Sirman (1988) argues that both village and migrant labour are central factors in cash cropping. As she says,

Peasant producers in Tuz are able to rely on two different sources of labour to meet these needs. The first of these resources, unpaid household labour, is ultimately limited by the labour power available within the household. However, through various forms of labour exchange mechanisms... neighbours and kinsmen within the village (or in neighbouring villages) are transformed into an important source of unpaid labour... The second type of labour used is based on paid labour and therefore necessitates the outlay of cash. Use of paid labour increases the monetised costs of production and the amount of accumulated capital and/or credit required by the enterprise... (1988:299).

Other studies further document the importance of extra household labour. In examining the degree of flexibility shown by households undergoing economic change in Turkey, Kiray and Hinderink (1968:517) found that households rely on non-waged patterns of mutual help when the outside environment does not provide them with other possibilities for adjustment. In the Turkish cotton cultivating economy of Tuz, Sirman (1988) illustrates the importance of extra-household labour and non-labour exchanges. She states that:

[w]omen often 'help' one another in executing horticultural tasks. Although a general reciprocity is the norm there is no strict calculation of labour; payment of any fee is out of the question ... The same type of cooperative labour can be observed in the execution of other 'domestic' tasks such as the preparation of *bulgur* (cracked wheat), pasta, tomato and pepper paste. Furthermore, women borrow freely from each other small items of consumption ... (Sirman, 1988:82).

Reciprocal labour transactions have important social implications beyond purely productive functions [eg. lessening the household's dependence on money, market relations and wage labour (see also Skar, 1984:93)]. Reciprocal arrangements disclose a system of co-operative strategies, sentiments and aims, and at the same time conceal the subordination of women, restricting them to supportive or 'reproductive' roles. In Sakli, similar to other nearby communities, women are not encouraged to earn income from the sale of agricultural produce or from the sale of their labour-power. The relegation of women to agricultural work and women's inability to gain entry into money and wage labour relations reflects the

general polarization between men and women and the way women are disciplined into subordinate positions. Therefore, reciprocal relations are a form of governance, even though the ideal of reciprocity assumes that every action has an equivalent and can be paid back.

Sentiments of co-operation are central to temporary non-labour transactions within the village.¹²⁷ Villagers expect people to share material wealth with others, to borrow what they do not have, to give away what they do not need, and they contend that such collaboration is part of their tradition. With the exception of those farm implements and animals acquired through sale or inheritance, borrowing is often the only way for small-scale households to access the necessary means of production in agriculture. One older village woman, for instance, owns a plough (*pulluk*) drawn by two oxen; she lends it to other households for land preparation and, in return, receives some farm produce. Another household owns the community's only *harman makinisi* (threshing machine) and lends this to other villagers after the wheat is harvested by hand. Some of this wheat is processed by the threshing machine and some is used for

¹²⁷ There is a vast literature on inter-household exchanges of which I cite only a few: Sirman, 1988; Delaney, 1984; Glavinis, 1984:50-54, Starr, 1984; Skar, 1984:88-92; Brading 1977.

fodder. Only a few households pay 10,000 T.L.¹²⁸ an hour for this machine; the rest give the machine owner some of the wheat harvested.

As with reciprocal labour arrangements, co-operative non-labour transactions and the value attributed to traditional subsistence practices disguise relations of domination and subordination in Sakli. Glavanis (1984:51) argues that the value of co-operation lies in making households less dependent on the market or wage labour and in maintaining subsistence production. But any over-emphasis on the functions of co-operation ignores the context of subsistence production and the fact that borrowing carries with it an expectation to return *something* (not necessarily in kind) at *some point*. Since villagers seldom accept cash in exchange for the loan of farm implements or animals, the burden of paying back the 'debt' falls to the labour of women (not wage earning men). Borrowing therefore tends to further the labour demands of the subsistence workers, in this case women, as it is their labour or produce that is expected to repay the debt. The moral value of co-operation is thereby brought into the service of force relations. This theme of feminization of subsistence production is taken up again in a discussion of marginal and near landless households.

¹²⁸ In 1989, one Canadian dollar was equivalent to approximately 1500 Turkish Lira.

7.3.3 Marginal and Near Landless Farming Sectors

Every village household engages in subsistence production in one way or another and most generally depend upon migrant income. Households in the small-scale sector rely on migrant income, with virtually very few of them renting lands and none engaged in sharecropping. However, households in the marginal and near landless category still have economic ties to landlords through rental and sharecropping arrangements. Of the total number of households, 40.6 percent either rent (31%), sharecrop (3.6%), or employ some combination of sharecropping and renting (6%) in their subsistence production. Only marginal landholding and near landless households employ these types of agricultural arrangements. The money to support this sector's land rental practices comes from seasonal (or permanent) migrant wage income.¹²⁹

Based on household data collected on land access and ownership, a significant relationship exists between the amount of land households own (or access) and the degree to which they rent or sharecrop additional land. The more land households own or have access to, the less likely they are to rent or sharecrop land. Those households that neither rent additional land nor sharecrop (59.4%) own or access an average of 21.9 *dönüm*, those that rent additional land

¹²⁹ This money could come from a father, son or close relative working in another part of Turkey or in Germany, or it could come as pension income (180,000 T.L. monthly) from twenty or more years of working in Zonguldak's mining industry.

have an average of 14.7 *dönüm*, those that both rent additional land and sharecrop have an average of 12 *dönüm*. Households that only sharecrop to supplement their agricultural production either own or access only 6 *dönüm* of land on average. These near landless households do not rent any land; they only sharecrop. When compared to small-scale farming households, marginal landholding and near landless households are in the disadvantaged position of still struggling to 'free' themselves from landlord domination.

There are significant differences between sharecropping and renting. Keyder (1983a) makes the argument that sharecropping and land rental practices (in Turkish agriculture) are equivalent since both are "payment for the land, which is regularly extracted from the output" (Ibid., 131). However, this view does not apply to the village. In Sakli, unlike the calculation of the fee for sharecropping, payment for rented land comes neither as produce nor its cash equivalent. Therefore, the fee charged for letting land has nothing to do with the amount of labour-time expended on it in production, nor is it tied to the amount of produce extracted from it. Ground-rents are monetary transactions, and the origin of the money, that is, the quality, type and skill of labour it represents, is irrelevant to the transaction. It is extremely rare for a household in Sakli to sell its 'surplus' produce to pay ground-rent. Most often this surplus is either stored or exchanged for other goods (eg. corn for potatoes). The money for renting land

comes from seasonal migrant labour. Conversely, it is the absence of a cash nexus that differentiates renting from sharecropping relations, since with sharecropping the calculation of the fee for land use is directly tied to the labour process as a proportion of the produce. As a result, landlords are able to indirectly supervise the labour process by imposing quality controls on the product. This ability to 'supervise' the labour process without observing each individual action serves to produce a 'disciplined' labour force (that is, promoting in the workers a 'belief' in being continuously judged and evaluated even when actual judgements are only occasional; see Foucault, 1979).

Compared to migrant labour strategies in the small-scale sector, households with marginal land holdings (between six and ten *dönüm* of land) respond to their situation differently. These households are generally unable to subsist from their small plots and engage more frequently in seasonal rural out-migration. Mostly, these households depend on two or more of its members for migrant income. If young, unmarried sons are unable to find work in the coal mining industry or in other city-based factories, they will often work close to the community. Some seasonally work in the nearby town as waiters, sales clerks or lumber workers and some young women work in the small carpet-weaving factory.

Migrant labour not only facilitates industrial labour demands, but constitutes a workforce that can be called upon during peak demand and let go

during slack periods. Sakli men who are employed in Zonguldak's coal mining industry, work six months of the year (i.e., one month on, one month off). Non-remunerated labour performed by women and young children is essential for subsistence agriculture and permits male villagers to engage in seasonal migration more frequently. Since urban seasonal employment is poorly paid, usually under 300,000 T.L. monthly, it does not enable members of the marginal sector to abandon subsistence production or to migrate permanently to urban centres.

While Kandiyoti (1984:26) argues that marginal landholdings encourage male, rural out-migration and the "feminization of agriculture", I would have to add that in Sakli this situation has also compelled many households to rent additional land from local landlords. In fact, marginal farming households account for most rented land in Sakli. From the perspective of landlords, this situation allows them to exert control over a farming population that is still dependent upon them. Additionally, when these households are cash poor, they often rely on landlords for financial aid, creating a debt-peonage relationship between themselves and landlords. In return for lending them money landlords expect villagers to do more than just pay back their debt. They are often expected to work in the landlord's gardens, bring goods from the market to them, visit the landlord's household when a member in it is sick or dying, and side with them on political and community matters. In addition to this, landlords have also

been known to "steal" villagers' livestock as a form of payment on delinquent accounts.

There are a limited number of marginal farming households that both rent and sharecrop from landlords. These households have more members than the average size household (i.e., 6.7 members). Ranging between eight and eleven members, these households generally cannot meet their subsistence needs with the land they have or with the migrant income they earn. Beyond renting land, they also sharecrop land and are compelled to remit up to one-half of the produce to the landlord.

Only a few marginal farming households resort to strategies other than relying upon migrant labour or the renting or sharecropping of additional land. There are two households that have turned to the production and sale of honey. These households produce between eight and twelve hundred kilos of honey annually, with one kilo selling at T.L. 6,000. Most of this produce is sold to nearby villages. Using their own land, the women and young children in these households also engage in subsistence agriculture and during the harvesting season they rely on other kin and neighbours for assistance.

Compared to small-scale and marginal sectors, there are only a few households that fall into the near landless category. Just over 10 percent of all Sakli households own (or have access to) between one and five *dönüm* of land.

These households contain at least two seasonal migrant labourers. The women and young children in these households often offer their labour to other local neighbours and kin (especially those who are too old to work the land) in exchange for some of the agricultural produce, such as corn and wheat flour, vegetables and fruits.

Only a couple households have access to less than one *dönüm* of land -- which is used to plant a small garden. Based on household interviews, their virtual landlessness is a consequence of internal household struggles. Household conflicts (between fathers and sons, between brothers, and even between mothers and daughters-in-law) sometimes result in married couples establishing neo-local residence. Once a married couple leaves the virilocal household and begins their own household, the conflicts that initiated the split make access to land difficult. Based on oral histories, neo-local residence can occasionally force a member to engage in wage labour on a year round basis. It is typical for these kinds of households to leave the village permanently for nearby towns or cities. Tense relations with close family members, combined with restrictions to land use, provide little incentive for young adults to remain in the village.

Although complete landlessness is not prevalent in Sakli, about 20 percent of Turkey's total rural population is landless¹³⁰ and sometimes men, women and

¹³⁰ Sirman (1988:260) also notes that in the Turkish village of Tuz, 17.6% of its households are landless.

children must participate in seasonal wage work (Kandiyoti, 1984) (see, Keyder, 1983:47 for a conflicting view). Some studies illustrate the impact that commercialized agriculture has on forcing households to sell what little land they have and work as wage labourers for capital-intensive farming operations or as seasonal migrant workers in cotton plantations (Sirman, 1988) or construction operations (Vergin, 1985). In situations such as these, kin relations no longer help to determine use-rights to land or to organize subsistence agricultural production. Landless households rarely depend on an extensive kinship network since they have little need to share and exchange agricultural labour and products with consanguines, affines and neighbours.

There are some studies that document the way households consolidate landholdings to prevent landlessness. In cash-cropping areas, especially mandarin agriculture in the Aegean region of Turkey, the consolidation of land holdings through marriage arrangements prevents the household from losing access to land. As Starr remarks, "...cash cropping agriculture and the transformation of the class structure made marriage within the village a way to consolidate landholding for middle and upper strata peasants" (1984:112). Insufficient access to the means of production (i.e., land) is generally seen to compel household producers to sell their labour for wages (see Deere and Leon deLeal, 1985:350-351). The consolidation of land holdings mitigates this effect. Manipulating marriage

patterns is a way in which economic and social alliances are deployed against the encroachment of outside forces.¹³¹ According to Starr (1984), these consolidations make the monopolization of land by a few individuals impossible and favour the emergence of a large group of producers who use non-wage family labour to eliminate or reduce the household's reliance on seasonal wage or migrant income.

General studies of small-scale cash-cropping do not specifically represent social relations in Sakli. For example, kin and gender divisions of labour in mechanized and labour-intensive agriculture are often viewed as a means to prevent household members from turning to wage labour and from relying on permanent or seasonal migrant income. According to Sirman (1980) for example, in some cash-cropping areas of Turkey, strict gender divisions of labour are key preventive measures (in Kandiyoti, 1984:26). Similarly, Fernandez-Kelly (1983:208) focuses on how kinship and gender provide an indispensable scaffold for refining and understanding migration. Some studies have found that male out-migration is lower where cash crops predominate and higher where subsistence agriculture exists (Hamman, 1986:170; Fruzzetti, 1985:42).

My findings point to a certain coherence between migrant labour and subsistence production, showing that they need not be always considered

¹³¹ In some areas of eastern Turkey, there are strategies deployed to keep property within the family. One way is when a brother marries his brother's widow, a common tradition among small land-owning (Kurdish) households (Aydin, 1986:85)

contradictory. Nor is it necessary to assume, as evident in the 'survival of subsistence agriculture' thesis, that discord (i.e., between capitalism and subsistence production) releases an impulse to unity or collective sentiment responsible for banding people together and forging alliances in the face of opposition. Rather than illustrating the conditions under which the force of a preconceived unity manifests itself, I show how the discursive deployment of all values (including the ideal of tradition) is made use of in an arena of domination and subordination. While some of the best examples of the relationships between household strategies and wage labour relations are found in small-scale subsistence agriculture, other studies support the notion that the practice of rural out-migration supports a feminization of agriculture in rural Turkey (see Aydin, 1986; Kandiyoti, 1984; Vergin, 1985).

In addition to Sakli, in the Black Sea region (an area characterized by the cultivation of labour-intensive crops such as tea, tobacco, hazelnuts, rice) men also seasonally migrate for wage employment, leaving women responsible for agricultural production. In south-eastern Turkey (characterized by the production of vegetables and fruit for the market and grains for home consumption), the agricultural cycle leaves some household members (mainly males) unemployed (Aydin 1986:241). Studies from other nations find that the increasing internationalization of capital generates a new division of labour in which young

women become migrant wage earners (Beneria and Sen, 1986:149; Bryceson, 1985; Mather, 1985). In this literature, attention is given to the discrimination of female urban migrants in wage employment (Bryceson, 1985:141; Arizpe and Arranda, 1986) and to the cultural values that govern this work (Mather, 1985:173-177). These studies illustrate that differential participation of men and women in migratory processes reveals how both gender and kinship relations intervene in rural out-migration.¹³²

Concluding Remarks

In Sakli, wage labour is introduced into a context already ordered into a system of domination based on ties of sharecropping. For those subject to this domination, migrant labour alleviates the direct supervisory control of the landlords. The proceeds of wage labour, however, are turned back into the production process as if to maintain the very system of bondage it was responsible for mitigating. But the tradition villagers contend it maintains has long since changed. Instead, it is women who are responsible for subsistence production, an operation couched in a discourse of tradition where women are charged with the practice of upholding traditional values. This phenomenon

¹³² In some cases, the areas of movement accessible to either men or women are defined (Lorber and Farrell, 1991:309; Fernandez-Kelly, 1983:212; Sharma, 1980:82).

reasserts a form of dominion of men over women, making women 'subjects' of a tradition that in turn confines them. The external forces of capitalism (its 'pushes' and 'pulls'), therefore, fail to contradict or supplant Sakli's 'tradition' of subsistence production. Migrant wage labour is itself a central means of subsistence production, allowing villagers to rent the land necessary to 'carry on the tradition.' This deployment of 'tradition' only appears to buttress vulnerable points or defend Sakli from 'outside' influences. Therefore, far from simply being obedient to the forces of capitalist penetration, residents of Sakli are also able to transform and subordinate these forces to different ends.

Chapter 8: Households, Headship and Hierarchy

Similar to Sakli's domestic economy, the household is an important site for the deployment of moral claims. Under the claim that households help 'keep things together,' and follow a 'natural' cycle of growth and transformation, lies a will to subsume people within a system of governance under the influence of a male head. This process of domination is achieved by placing different values and expectations on males and females. Residence and inheritance patterns differentially emphasize the permanence of males in the household and the temporary status of their female counterparts. Internal differences and hierarchies, not natural processes or impulses to unity, account for household composition, organization and transformation.

8.1 The Constitution of Households

Turkish society is undergoing rapid social change from a rural agricultural society to an increasingly urbanized and industrial society. Often, the organization and constitution of households are directly affected by these changes. In urban centres, the household is predominately nuclear. Household members no longer depend on agricultural production for their subsistence or income, nor do they rely on non-immediate kinsfolk for economic support. In addition to the

rise in nuclear formed households, single-parent and co-residential households are present in urban centres of Turkey today. By contrast, households in Sakli still depend on kin ties and bonds and the sharing or pooling of labour.

Many have attempted to solve the problems of household definitions, boundaries and composition (eg. Sirman, 1988; Smith, Wallerstein, and Evers, 1984; Friedman, 1984; Staugh, 1984; Wong, 1984). Although the household is a form of social grouping that is difficult to define, some central criteria can distinguish a household from other social units. Households are generally considered central to the perpetuation of traditional values and sentiments, including the values and sentiments of kinship and marriage, and often support certain forms of property relations, especially those of inheritance.¹³³ Household members are usually close consanguines, sharing some familial bond or tie, and occupying specific positions that entail certain rights and obligations based on age and gender. In rural Turkish society, more respect and honour are given to those older in age, and strong economic bonds stem from one's paternal kin. These internal hierarchies are reflected in everyday household social relations and in property inheritance patterns.

¹³³ Approximately ninety percent of all peasant landholdings is inherited: the remaining 10 percent stems from purchase or forest reclamation.

8.1.1. Headship and Hierarchical Relations

A household head is responsible for establishing a household and advancing its interests. Each head is expected to raise a "respectable" family, manage the labour of its membership and make all major decisions concerning general household affairs. They are responsible for the household finances; they finalize wedding arrangements for their marrying offspring, and reprimand those who go against their demands. The household head does not ordinarily accept orders, advice or criticism from others. In Sakli, household heads are generally men, though there are a few exceptions. Fathers (or husbands), in particular, often hold such dominant positions. According to Sirman, "the father occupies the central position of household head, and his wife and children are relegated to subordinate positions. Age and gender are the main criteria that define who is subordinate to whom; thus, girls are subordinate to boys, children are subordinate to parents, and the wife is subordinate to her husband" (1988:110).

The household head controls the financial situation of his married sons and daughters-in-law, dictates when and where the son will work (i.e., wage or agricultural employment), and is often the one to grant permission (*izin*) for the couple to go to the market or to town. In a study of a central Anatolian village, Delaney also notes the household head's control. As she says:

The father's authority, besides representing the house and making decisions about its management, manifests itself in the concept of

izin (permission) ... Young men need the *izin* of their father to go to town, but girls and women need it to go anywhere. Youth are allowed more freedom to walk around the village; their place is in the village but outside the home, therefore they need *izin* to leave the village. On the other hand, a women's place is in the home; they need *izin* to leave it" (1984:209).

All major decisions concerning what the son is permitted to do are decided by the male head of the household, as long as he resides with his natal family. In the community of Sakli, it is virtually impossible for a woman, however stable her situation, to live in a household without a male head; women are thought to be continually in need of surveillance and regulation (see Smart [1992] for more on the regulation of women).

The household head's wife is responsible for major non-financial matters in the household. This is common in rural Turkish society; women's roles and duties are largely confined to daily, household-related work, while men are more often engaged in delegating agricultural work, controlling the household's economic and financial matters, and travelling and labouring outside the village. The household head's wife is in charge of regular household routines. She delegates responsibility to other female members for the household's chores (eg. laundry, cooking, bathing younger children, attending to the small garden, helping the mother's kin with agricultural work) and directs their progress. She is also responsible for ensuring the appropriate behaviour of her daughters and her *gelin*

in the presence of relatives and visitors, and to govern their associations with others.

This hierarchical division of labour can, however, produce a great deal of conflict between a mother-in-law and her *gelin*. It is expected that a *gelin* will show respect to her mother-in-law, and abide her wishes. Respect is shown by soliciting for advice, listening instead of speaking too much, imparting intimate information, and visiting her mother-in-law's relatives. It is considered *gunah* or shameful for the daughter-in-law to show disrespect to her husband's mother. Disregard for her mother-in-law is taken as a show of disrespect for her husband, and this is always a very critical matter.

For instance, on one afternoon a woman asked her mother-in-law if she could visit her natal family (about one mile away). The mother-in-law's response was no, saying that there were too many things to be done in the fields. After an argument between the two, the daughter-in-law was forbidden to see her natal family for the next three months because of her behaviour toward her mother-in-law. In another situation, a woman asked her mother-in-law if she could take her son to the village doctor, since the son was sleeping too much, complained of headaches, did not eat, and had a fever. The mother-in-law decided that the boy should not visit the doctor because community and family members would think that the daughter-in-law made her son sick. It is common for both mothers and

fathers to blame the *gelin* should her child become ill. A sick child often suggests that the mother is a poor parent.

Because of the daughter-in-law's age, gender, and the fact that she is an "outsider," her status is considerably lower than her husband and his parents. As Kandiyoti (1987) argues,

the critical relationships in the household are between in-marrying women [and members of] the male-headed household. A girl comes to her husband's household, as her title *gelin* [literally, the 'one who comes'] indicates. In her own socialization as a little girl, it is made quite clear to her that she will have to leave her house of origin and go to *el* (strangers) ... Within the household there is a clear hierarchy whereby the newest bride is subordinated to her mother-in-law as well as all the sisters-in-law with more seniority. Childbearing, especially of a male child, gives her fuller acceptance in her husband's family, and, finally, when her father-in-law dies she establishes her separate nuclear household and come into her own. However, the apex of her influence comes when she in turn has grown sons who bring her brides .. (Ibid., 331).

Additionally, because of her social status, she is expected to defer to her husband's older sisters and brothers should they live in the same household. Moreover, if this young married woman is the second *gelin* in the household, she has less seniority than the first. This is because the first daughter-in-law is usually older and more experienced in household chores and farming work; typically, she has also borne a child and that accords her higher social standing.

The older a person becomes, the more status s/he gains (see Sirman, 1988). This fact is tempered by gender, however, since it is always the case that a son

is considered more valuable than a daughter. A son is someone who will protect the family, pass on its traditions (such as its name and reputation), bring the desired daughter-in-law, and inherit the family property. By contrast, daughters are encouraged to marry early and move to their spouses' natal family. Because of their "temporary" membership, daughters are accorded less status than more permanent household members.

This division of labour notwithstanding, households are not rigid organizations or structures. Variations in size and composition of households are due to several factors. Deaths, along with out-migration, inheritance, marriage,¹³⁴ and residence patterns¹³⁵ all influence household composition, which in turn affect

¹³⁴ Although it is through marriage that households begin the initial stages of formation, this does not mean that marriage always leads to the formation of a household. Often a married son, living with his natal family, does not establish a separate household for some time. It is rare for a household to develop without the presence of a married couple. With the exception of five single-parent households, all households in Sakli contain at least one married couple. Furthermore, women are encouraged to marry between the age of sixteen and twenty-one while men generally marry between the age of eighteen and twenty-three. Procreation is inextricably tied to marriage: it is socially unacceptable for a couple to wait to have children (see also Delaney, 1984).

¹³⁵ The place where a couple resides after marriage is also an important criteria in the constitution of households. In rural Turkish society, a newly married couple is expected to live in the groom's household for a long period. Virilocality is the most common type of residence after marriage. When a son and his nuclear family leave the natal household and set up separate labour and financial arrangements, a new household is constituted. This should not be taken to mean that households units are autonomous and isolated from other family-based units. As previously mentioned, inter-relationships and cooperative strategies are common between most households, as additional household labour and non-labour exchanges are required

changes in the household's internal hierarchy. These factors influence the household's social and economic practices, such as the amount of land under production, marriage contracts, kin ties and bonds, and the labour process. Thus, to recognize the important transitions that take place over time (especially in terms gender and property relations), it is important to view the household as a constant process of transformation and as a site for the further perpetuation of relations based on domination and subordination.

8.2 Household Composition

In the community of Sakli, there is a total population of 567 people forming eighty-seven households. Most of these households are extended family units, containing three or four generations. These households usually comprise a father, mother, sometimes a grandparent, a single son/daughter, and one or two married sons and their nuclear families. With an average of 6.8 members per household, 63 percent of households have between five and nine members, close to 20 percent contain less than four members, and just over 17 percent accommodate more than ten members. The incorporation of a new *aile* (usually a son's wife and her children) into an existing household is a significant factor

at certain times in the agricultural and family-life cycle. This conception of household underscores the importance of ties to other households through kinship, marriage, and cooperative and reciprocal arrangements (see also Long, 1984:19; Evers, 1984:30; Skar, 1984).

in its extension and growth, and the main reason that most households comprise more than a single generation.

Many factors contribute to changes in household composition. Increases in household size are mainly the result of the incorporation of *gelin*. Since residence held after marriage is predominately virilocal, it is common for a wife to live in her husband's natal household. In fact, 95 percent of all village households contain two or more women residing virilocally. Other increases in household membership are due to the expectation that *gelin* will produce many grandchildren for the virilocal household. Therefore, the potential for expansion and growth is due to the household's ability to appropriate the reproductive labour of their *gelin*.

Increases in household membership may be offset either by people dying or leaving the household.¹³⁶ Deaths account for 22 percent of those members no longer present in the household. Most village households have had members who have moved elsewhere, either to set up a new household in the village or to establish residence in another village or town. Permanent relocation is the major factor counterbalancing increases in household membership, accounting for 70 percent of all ex-household members.

¹³⁶ When asked about members who once lived in their household, a total of 234 people were reported as not presently in the household. This data covers a period of just over thirty years and includes those who have either permanently or temporarily left the household or died.

Table 2: Household Composition

Type of Household	N	Percent of Type	Percent of Total
1. Single Generation:			
Parents, no children	6	100.0	6.9
Sub Total	6	100.0	6.9
2. Two Generations:			
a. Parents + unmarried children (NF)	28	93.3	32.2
b. Mother + unmarried Ch	1	3.3	1.1
c. Mother + unmarried D + HuBD	1	3.3	1.1
Sub Total	30	100.0	34.4
3. Three or Four Generations:			
a. Parents + 1-2 S & NF	15	29.4	17.4
b. Parents + S's NF + GrPa	3	5.9	3.4
c. Parents + D's NF	6	11.8	6.9
d. Parents + D-in-law & Ch	2	3.9	2.3
e. Nuclear family + S's NF	12	23.5	11.1
f. Nuclear family + S's NF + FB	1	2.0	1.1
g. Nuclear family + HuPa	3	5.9	3.4
h. Nuclear family + GrCh	3	5.9	3.4
i. Nuclear family + HuFB	1	2.0	1.1
j. Nuclear family + HuB's NF or Hu's unmarried Sb + HuM and/or HuFW	2	3.9	2.3
k. Mother + unmarried D + GrCh	1	2.0	1.1
l. Mother + S's NF	2	3.9	2.3
Sub Total	51	100.0	58.7
TABLE TOTAL	87		100.0

Those who move permanently out of the household do so for a variety of reasons. On the one hand, women leave to marry either local or nearby villagers, and some leave with their husbands to find work outside the village. Approximately 36 percent of daughters who have left their natal households have moved away from the village to towns or cities in Turkey or Germany, compared to 63.3 percent who have moved to another household in the village (22.4%) or near the village (40.9%). On the other hand, 87.3 percent of the men who have permanently left the household have done so in search of paid work outside the village and sometimes to establish a new household there. Only 12.7 percent have moved to another household in the village.

While both males and females leave the household in equal numbers, and most (55%) are between the age of sixteen and thirty-five, their residence patterns differ markedly; that is, women tend to stay with their in-laws and work as subsistence farmers while their husbands migrate for permanent wage employment. As often happens, several years pass before women reunite with their husbands, if indeed they do at all.

Those who temporarily relocate (excluding seasonal migrant labourers) comprise only eight percent of those who are absent at present. In some cases, these people are young men who leave for 18 months of mandatory military service. In other situations, wives leave temporarily to visit their husbands in

Germany or other areas of Turkey. Only when accompanied by husbands or fathers do women leave temporarily.

Village household composition comprises three main types: single generation, two-generational, and three- or four-generational households. Most households in the village (58.7%) contain at least three or four generations, 34.4 percent are two-generational, and just under 7 percent comprise only a single generation (see Table 2).

8.2.1 Single-Generational Households

In Sakli there are just six single-generational households, containing only a married couple with no other family members. These couples are of retirement age and were once extended family units. In the last ten years, these households had at least one married son, his family, and the husband's parents, living with them. Thus, these households were once multi-generational. Due to the death of the husband's parents and the permanent out-migration of their married male children and daughters-in-law, these households have been reduced to two-person households.

A distinguishing feature of single-generational households is the relatively small amount of agricultural land they own, usually under ten *dönüm*. This amount of land is insufficient to sustain an extended household, and is one reason

their male children migrate to urban areas in search of wage employment. It is generally the case that their female children have left their household upon marriage.¹³⁷

These married couples (with the help of neighbours and relatives) are only able to care for their own small gardens. Since they are now too old to plant and harvest subsistence crops, they allow other relatives to use their land. Often, the husband's younger married brother and his wife and children are given access to this land. In return for the land, the husband's brother and his wife supply the household with food stuffs such as, wheat and corn flour, as well as additional garden vegetables and fruits. If, however, the male head of the household does not have any brothers nearby or if there is a conflict between them, then the land is farmed by local villagers in exchange for part of the produce. Moreover, children who once lived in the household will sometimes provide additional support to the family by sending home money from their work outside the village.

8.2.2 Two-Generational Households

The other form of non-extended households in Sakli is a two-generational unit. Two-generational households comprise either a nuclear family (one married

¹³⁷ Compare, for example, no. 3c, in Table 2, several three-generational households containing daughters who marry and continued to reside (along with her NF) with their natal family.

couple and their unmarried offspring) or single parent units (eg. a mother and her unmarried offspring). Of all households in the village, twenty-eight (or 32.2%) conform to the nuclear type (Table 2). The married couples in these households are young, ranging from the ages of thirty-two to forty-five. The husband in this type of household is often the oldest of all his brothers, as it is customary for the elder son to leave the natal household and establish his own residence.

Many of these households have been "nuclear" for only a short period. Sometimes, a couple will set up their own household after residing virilocally for an extended period. In other cases, these households were once extended and have since changed. Approximately five years ago, most of these households had one or more relatives living with them, making them three- or four-generational units. Typically, both of the husbands' parents resided in the household; only one household had not been recently extended.¹³⁸

In general, however, factors that contribute to the formation of two-generational households include: the death of relatives (primarily the husband's parents) (46%), the migration of some of its members to other countries or

¹³⁸ The circumstance of this latter household was due in large part to the family producing only one son who has since migrated to another region for permanent wage employment.

regions of Turkey (26%), and neolocality, mainly because of overcrowding (23%).¹³⁹

Nuclear households tend to have larger land holdings than single-generational households. On average, nuclear families own (or access) between ten and twenty-five *dönüm* of land. Usually the land is shared with the husband's brothers and their families and/or with households in the same *mahalle*. Besides having access to family or neighbour land, some households also rent land from the landlords. Nuclear households with large numbers of children and insufficient land holdings often rent land or work as sharecroppers to meet their family's needs.¹⁴⁰ Additionally, most households have one *dönüm* of garden land, and at least one cow (*inek*), one or two calves (*dana*) and up to a dozen chickens (*tavuk*). When household membership is very small (three or four), it is common for them not to have any cows. In situations such as these, neighbours owning cows give these households milk and yogurt in exchange for labour during the

¹³⁹ Another, less pervasive, form of nuclear household composition results from members working outside the village and living in the village only temporarily. People in this sub-grouping (3%) reside in the village during the spring and summer months or just on holidays. These households do not engage in intensive agricultural production for their livelihood. Most of the men in these households work in seasonal, wage-earning jobs outside the village. It is common to find men and even young male children working in the coal mining industry in Zonguldak.

¹⁴⁰ See chapter six for a detailed discussion of renting and sharecropping practices in Sakli.

harvesting and planting seasons. In one neighbourhood, a prominent sorcerer offers his magical services to a neighbour in exchange for milk products.

In spite of their small numbers and their small land holdings, nuclear two-generational units rely heavily upon kin extended networks. These units and their kin share foods stuffs, clothing, property and labour with other kin members, and financially support one another during crises. They also exchange information and make decisions concerning suitable and promising mates for their single kinsfolk, and share ideas about planting, harvesting, and the purchase and sale of farming tools.¹⁴¹

Nuclear (two-generational) households do not constitute the normal form of household composition. Fluctuations in household membership alter household composition and change it from extended to nuclear, and sometimes to single-generational. At other times, household composition is transformed from single-generational to nuclear, and often returns to the extended household form.

¹⁴¹ Only two, two-generational households do not correspond to the nuclear pattern. The first of these households (Table 2; 2.b) only recently became a single parent, female-headed household as the result of the death of the woman's young husband. There is a general expectation that this young woman will re-marry, and subsequently move to her new husband's natal household, taking her four young children with her. The other single parent, two-generational household (2.c) emerged because of the murder of a man and his wife by the man's brother. This household was once a multi-generational household, comprising parents and their two sons' nuclear families. With the death of the parents, followed by the shooting deaths of one son and his wife, and the subsequent incarceration of the other son, this household was left with only the incarcerated son's wife, her young daughter, and the murdered couple's unmarried daughter.

While there are certain conditions that account for the presence of single and two-generational households, there are a variety of factors that serve to reconstitute and transform these households further. Single-generational households are often incorporated into other households upon the death of a spouse. For example, a husband, upon the death of his spouse will generally relocate to either a brother's or son's household (where there are women to cook and clean for him). Should the husband die, the wife is likely to relocate to her son's household, even if this should mean relocating to another village or even an urban centre. In either case, the incorporation of these new household members results in both the break up of the single-generational unit, and typically in the transformation of another kind of household. The assimilation of a grandparent into a nuclear household, for example, transforms this household into a three-generational unit.

The composition of nuclear households can change further when they incorporate one or more *gelin*. While these households lose female offspring through marriage, it is expected that their sons, once they reach the appropriate age, will marry and bring their brides to the natal household for an extended period (see also Kandiyoti, 1987:331). As previously mentioned, it is anticipated that the new couple will produce grandchildren within one year of their marriage (see also Delaney, 1984). Bringing in brides extends the household's composition,

increases its pool of labour, transforms traditional gender relations, and enhances its inter-household alliances. Supporting an extended household, however, is seldom easy. Costly bride prices and the addition of more household members tend to weigh heavily against a household's land and financial resources. These internal pressures lead to the deployment of several countervailing strategies (eg. encouraging older, married sons and their families to move elsewhere)¹⁴² which, in their turn, facilitate either the reconstitution or reduction of household membership.

8.2.3 Three- or Four-Generational Households

Extended family organization (three or four generations) is the most common type of household composition in the village of Sakli, representing about 59 percent of all village households. If we consider that extended family units once characterized many single and two-generational households mentioned above, then extended composition is by far the most pervasive type of household organization. In comparison to single and two-generational households, three- and

¹⁴² Strategies such as seasonal or permanent rural out-migration serve to alter household composition at the same time as they financially support land rental practices which enable the extended unit to supply for its membership. Neolocality within the village reduces overcrowding in the extended household unit and accounts for the establishment of some of Sakli's nuclear households. At the same time, however, sons who reside neolocally continue working their natal household land and therefore continue to support the needs of its members as well as their own.

four-generational households own or have access to more land. Many households in this category have access to between fifteen and fifty *dönüm* of land. As with two-generational households, this land is shared among all the fathers' male siblings and their families. When there are few brothers or when other male siblings no longer live in the village, the land is farmed with the help of distant relatives and neighbours (mainly females). In the cases when landholdings are insufficient to provide for household subsistence (under five *dönüm*), these households resort to sharecropping from landlord families.

Within the three- or four-generational category, the most common type (29.4%) consists of parents with their married son (or sons) and his *aile* (Table 2; 3.a). Variations of this type include: the presence of additional family members such as a grandparent (5.9%; 3.b), the presence of a married daughter (instead of a married son) and her nuclear family¹⁴³ (11.8%; 3.c), or the presence of a daughter-in-law and her children (3.9%; 3.d). In other cases, these households comprise a nuclear family plus their married son and his *aile* (23.5%; 3.e). A further variation on this type is the inclusion of the father's brother (2.0%; 3.f).

Over 62 percent of all three- or four-generational households contain at least one married son and his family (Table 2; categories 3.a,b,e,f & k). These

¹⁴³ The presence of a son-in-law in his wife's natal household refers to a uxori-local residence practice, discussed at length in the following chapter.

households comprise as many as fifteen people. It is common in Middle Eastern society to have one's son and his family live in the same household with his parents, or with his parents and their unmarried offspring¹⁴⁴ (see also Abu-Lughod, 1988; Sirman, 1988; Kandiyoti, 1987; Delaney, 1984). This type of cohabitation practice is organized around the principles of patrilineality and agnatic solidarity. However important affinal and cognatic kin are economically and socially, kinship bonds are established predominately through male lines.

Several (17.7%) three- and four-generational households comprise a nuclear family and relatives (Table 2; 3.g to 3.j). These relatives are typically the male's kin, not the female's, and are either the household head's parent, grandchild, uncle, his married brother and his nuclear family, or his unmarried siblings. There are a variety of reasons to explain why these types of households emerge.

In the first case (Table 2; 3.g), the household may have had both the husbands' parents living with the nuclear family. Upon the death of one parent the other (usually the mother) continues to live with them, and so the household still maintains its extended character. Or, as previously mentioned, it is common, upon the death of a spouse, for the remaining spouse in a single-generational household to take up residence in their son's household. This change in residence transforms the son's household from nuclear to three-generational.

¹⁴⁴ It is very uncommon for a woman to be the head of these households (as in Table 2; 3.k) or any household for that matter (see also, no. 3.l).

In the second situation (Table 2; 3.h), a nuclear family will have their grandchild living with them regularly. When both a son and daughter-in-law reside and work outside the country, in Germany, often the son's parents will take complete responsibility of the children until they return from abroad. Sometimes the grandchild will live up to ten years with her grandparents, and sometimes her young uncles and aunts. These households tend to be wealthy in comparison to other three- or four-generational households, as the grandchild's parents contribute financially to the household's maintenance.

It is uncommon for a nuclear family to have a parent's sibling living with them. Nevertheless, this does occur. In such cases (Table 2; 3.i), the husband's FB resides with the household because he is aged, widowed and has none of his own children residing in the village. Usually this elder uncle is treated as a grandfather.

The final case comprises two of the three landlord households in the village. While one landlord household is single-generational (one couple with no children) the other two are multi-generational. One of these two households comprises a nuclear family along with the husband's brother's nuclear family, the husband's mother and her *kuma* (fellow wife -- the husband's father's first wife). The other household comprises a nuclear family, the husband's unmarried siblings and the husband's mother. In both cases, the husband's father has died, and

control of the household has passed to the son(s). In the former case, two brothers have continued to share residence, property, income, foodstuffs, and all other household resources. In the latter case, the husband's brother is still too young to marry and share in the responsibilities of running the household, though it is expected that he will at some point (upon which their household will resemble the other extended landlord household). His sisters are too young to marry into other landlord lineages (or marry close or distant relatives), and so remain in the natal household. Based on oral histories, this household type (i.e., two married brothers and their *aile*) is peculiar to landlords, since they face none of the dilemmas other villagers confront, such as overcrowding and limited financial and landed resources. Also, this strategy of brothers sharing a common residence is thought to help the lineage maintain its landholdings intact.

Finally, there are three female-headed households, comprising 5.9 percent of Sakli's three- or four-generational households (Table 2; 3.k and 3.l). One of these households contains a widowed woman, her unmarried daughter, and her grandchildren, while the other two comprise a widowed woman and her son's nuclear family. In the former case, the woman's son and his wife have migrated to urban centres for wage employment. Often this couple's children are left in the husband's natal household, pending their return to the household. In the latter case, despite their husband's death and the presence of a married son and his

family in the household, these women maintain their authority over household affairs. Since they have held the same residence their whole married life, their governance of household affairs remains very much in force. The case is very different for widows who, upon the death of their husband, relocate to their son's neolocal residence. This move constitutes a break in the continuity upon which her traditional authority was grounded, generally resulting in subordination to her son's authority.¹⁴⁵

Female-headed families (whether this is a mother, sister or daughter) are not socially accepted unless this is a result of the death of the male head. It is inappropriate for a woman to reside in a home without a husband, father, brother, or married son, since this is thought to enhance their vulnerability to the influence of outside forces, such as unknown or unrelated men. Even under conditions when couples divorce (very rare in this community) the wife will generally return to her natal family with or without her offspring, rather than live in her in-law's household without a husband.¹⁴⁶ Thus, out of the total number of households in

¹⁴⁵ The mother will maintain her authority over her *gelin* since disrespecting one's mother-in-law is always treated as an affront to one's husband.

¹⁴⁶ Compare, for example, household configuration 3.d (Table 2) where a daughter-in-law and her children remain in her husband's father's household even though her husband is not present. In these cases, the husband has migrated either to Germany or Zonguldak in search of wage employment, and to reside for several years at a time. In these instances, his wife and children are expected to maintain residence in his family's household.

Sakli, there are few (3.0%) comprising only a mother and her unmarried children. This basic reproductive unit or *aile* rarely constitutes a household on its own; it is usually located within a broader moral regime.

8.3 A Moral Regime: Household Organization and Processes

Although constantly changing, households provide key infrastructural support for the perpetuation of traditional values. What households represent, therefore, is not persistence in form or organization, but assemblages of moral values and ideals. Specifically, households centre round a discourse of unity and of 'keeping things together.' In village discourse, a household (*hane*) is said to comprise a family (or families) that lives, eats and shares resources under one roof, with its members working to protect and support one another. This theme of solidarity extends to blood, marital relations and land. That is, people who share the same blood, have common affinal ties, and own or access the same family plots are considered to have parallel interests and goals.

While gravitating toward the ideal multi-generational complex, household structure constantly reverts to single- or two-generational units as household membership changes. The ideals of forging a unity in landed property relations, and of maintaining intimate contact with those linked by blood and marriage, lead to the prevalence of three- and four-generational units.

At the same time, however, these household ideals dissimulate a complex of power relations, which serve to underscore the fact that these unities are premised on an order of rank by age and gender, and that these disciplined hierarchies promote the internal tension and struggle that invariably lead to disintegration. For example, parents expect their sons to marry and bring in brides to their natal households by the age of twenty-two or twenty-three. Bringing in brides changes household composition, increases membership, and gives more prestige to the household (i.e., the mother now has a daughter-in-law to take responsibility for agricultural work and other duties and to 'bring' her grandchildren). Eventually, this process will transform household composition further. When these new families grow too large and prove to be a burden on household resources, or when conflicts develop between members of the extended family unit, they sometimes move and establish their own nuclear households. By contrast, parents expect their daughters to marry and leave the household when they are about nineteen or twenty. However, since the labour of women is central to subsistence production, parents are unlikely to 'give their daughter away' when there are no other women (*gelin* or other daughters) to replace her labour. It is only when the household has ensured its supply of subsistence labourers, primarily through the *gelin* brought by their sons, that parents 'give away' their daughters. Thus, what on the surface appears as a natural (i.e., law-

like) and rhythmic cycle of household transformation is more aptly characterized as a series of breaks and ruptures. Changes in household size, structure and organization are not simply responses or adaptations to changing circumstances, but the contrary forces included in its domain.

The unity of the household is supposedly formed on the basis of keeping property, blood ties and family relations together. But this merely connotes a will to subsume as many members as possible under relations of domination. Multi-generational households are a means to an extensive internal hierarchy, characterized by the subordination of household members to the ideals of tradition (unity, cooperation, solidarity, etc.). Keeping landed property intact is a discourse that masks the deployment of age and gender hierarchies and the dominion of the household head in these relations.

Ownership and control of property are deemed important in the continuity of the household unit. Properties (including homes, farm lands, technology, etc.) are transferred to following generations only at the death of their owners,¹⁴⁷ and, in Sakli, most of the land held by village farmers was acquired through inheritance. Children, according to Turkish law, are to inherit equally three-fourths of a dead parent's property, while the remaining one-fourth is to be given

¹⁴⁷ As previously mentioned, married couples who establish neo-local residence may continue to share access to household properties but are never granted formal ownership before the death of the household head

to the surviving spouse (Sirman, 1988:124). The wife's one-quarter share of this property exists only on paper; she has little say over the use and working of the land. Transfers of property to surviving daughters are rare. In practice, the property of a deceased father is divided equally among his surviving sons. These gendered inheritance practices contrast with Starr's (1984:112) enthusiastic proclamation that women in Turkey have more often and more successfully exploited legal avenues to win access to their rightful landholdings. As she puts it: "I can unequivocally state that less than fifty years after the introduction of European Civil and Criminal codes in Turkey, women in the Bodrum region were reaping the benefits of laws of equality. They were able to hold land titles in their own names". Notwithstanding the latter statement, merely brandishing formal titles does little to overturn the entrenched "protectionism" pervading rural Turkish society.

Age and gender hierarchies are constitutive in organizing property entitlements and framing social relations. In property transfers, it is the older son who takes charge of distributing the property to all of his brothers, though the division is sometimes less than equal. Since they are differentially encouraged to marry and move away from the natal household, daughters rarely gain ownership or access to this property. It is males, not females, who inherit most

of the property in Sakli.¹⁴⁸ Much village discourse centres around property inheritance patterns.

In Sakli, rationalizations are given for gendered property arrangements. Villagers often say that if daughters or sisters inherited family property a considerable fragmentation of land would result. They claim that the woman's husband or father-in-law would end up taking control over the land, since it is traditional that the household head or eldest son manages household properties. Likewise, others claim that women do not need to own property (such as land, buildings or machinery) since it is a man's responsibility to care for his *aile*; in order for him to do this, they say he should own the property. As a result, only those few women who live uxori locally (see Table 2; 3c) are granted some access and managerial control over family property. In these cases, residence after marriage is the determining factor.

¹⁴⁸ This finding contrasts with Sirman's study (1988) of a Turkish cotton-producing village where she finds that women do inherit property. She does illustrate, however, that this ownership is sometimes surrendered as in Sakli. As she remarks, "a sister may relinquish her right to a share of the house in return for a larger portion of the kitchen gardens ... Sisters married far away may sell their share to one of their siblings, or rent the land to a brother for a favourable price after the division of property has taken place" (Ibid., 124).

Concluding Remarks

Households figure as the central institution involved in the process of instilling moral sentiments and defining the values of 'tradition.' These values are important in determining one's moral standing in the community. Every household member is ranked in relation to other members, in the sense of being ascribed more status, given more respect and granted more honour. This rank extends outward from the household to the community as a whole. The value of keeping the kin circle and its possessions together constitutes a site for the continual constitution of an order of rank based on household, gender and age relations. This complex of moral claims delineates an intricate network of relations of domination aimed primarily at women in the community as well as those who come and those who leave. Marriage and residence practice in Sakli further reproduce the conditions for the deployment of these moral claims and is taken up in the following chapter on marriage.

Chapter 9: Marriage and the Deployment of Alliance

In the previous chapter I argued that households are sites of moral discourse that espouse the ideal of 'keeping things together.' What these discursive sentiments disguise is the domination and subordination of household members. In the present chapter I argue that marriage practices are organized around the ideals of maintaining the unity and security of the 'endogamous' group. This discourse on endogamy conceals the fact that the practice of marriage is a moral regime.

Endogamy is claimed to foster the continuity with tradition, preserve blood ties, support group alliance and solidarity, minimize conflict, and act as a barrier against the unstructured unknown. Empirical findings, however, do not support the notion that this society is endogamous. I therefore emphasize the character of endogamy as a 'discursive fact,' serving as a rationalization for the processes of governing social relationships. Behind the veil of endogamy lie authoritarian relations that aim to exert control over the productive and reproductive labour of in-marrying spouses, especially daughter's-in-law. I show the importance of women and their incorporation into subordinate positions in the household.

To further explicate the relationship between marriage and endogamy, I will outline briefly the nature of spouse selection in the village and illustrate the

patterns of residence of married couples. The second part of this chapter examines the types of marriages that take place in Sakli, the occurrences of each type, and the extent to which each conforms to the norm of endogamy.

A number of methods were used to collect the information presented in this chapter. Information on marriage arrangements for each married couple living in the village was collected as part of a village-wide survey. To obtain a record of previous marriage patterns, a historical account of all marriages over ten years was produced. Oral histories on village marriage customs and traditions were carried out to provide information on the intricacies of marriage negotiations, the people involved, or the conflicts that underscored or emerged from these alliances. This information has proven useful in supplying the social context for the various types of marriage practices that occur in the village. Finally, while much of this investigation is based on data collected from Sakli, other studies on marriage in rural Turkish society will be used to expand these findings.

9.1 The Problem of Endogamy

Many scholars classify Middle Eastern marriages as endogamous. In Middle Eastern culture, spouse selection is undertaken and controlled by members of the household, and all aspects of the arrangement are negotiated by them. Couples generally have little to do with the process. Many argue, therefore, that

marriages are a means households employ to maintain solidarity and alliance (Abu-Lughod, 1988:59-60; Delaney, 1984; Fischer, 1978:198; Magnarella and Türkdoğan, 1973:1628). This being the case, pre-existing connections between groups of kin-associated households or members of residential alliances would constitute the 'group' of people from which a spouse would be selected. The impetus and reason for endogamy is that such 'corporations' hold things in common, and have a collective interest in 'keeping things together.'

Since the function of marriage is primarily to maintain the integrity of the kin or close residential enclosure (kin or residential endogamy), patrilineal parallel cousin marriages serve as an ideal or standard by which many Middle Eastern marriage alliances are measured (see also Delaney, 1984; Tapper, 1982:387). In contrast to this view, some contend that marriages forge new alliances between households (Sirman, 1988; Vergin, 1985:572). Here, the aim of marriage is the expansion of the group through the recruitment of outside members. Such 'exogamous' strategies¹⁴⁹ are said to counter uncertainty and unpredictability in the social environment through the incorporation of the other into a domain of familiarity.

¹⁴⁹ In a brief discussion of the historical development of Turkish marriage patterns, Vergin (1985:572-573) argues that Central Asian nomads (from which the Muslim Turks originated) were exogamous during the pre-Islamic period.

While the preference for endogamous marriage strategies in rural Turkish culture is well documented (Delaney, 1984; Kağıtçıbaşı, 1982; Meeker, 1976; Bates, 1974; Magnarella and Türkdoğan, 1973:1628), conceptions of endogamy remain largely focused on the norm of patrilateral parallel cousin marriages. In fact, most authors are concerned with the causes, meanings and implications of patrilateral parallel cousin marriages, and understand these in strict economic or political terms (see also Vergin, 1984:573; Tapper, 1982:387). The popular position is that FBD-FBS marriages function to maintain land, labour, and political alliances within paternal kin groups, and so form a singular and all-encompassing marriage strategy.

There are, however, different views of endogamy. Some authors include in their construction of endogamy a wider range of marriage practices, beyond FBD marriage (Delaney, 1984:118; Pitt-Rivers, 1977).¹⁵⁰ This literature points to the positive and harmonizing effects of endogamy, guaranteeing the loyalty, ethical behaviour, and honour of the group (Autoun, 1968:693; Pitt-Rivers, 1977:166). In a recent study of kinship structure in rural Turkey, Delaney (1984) argues that the theory of procreation -- in which the man gives the seed-child and

¹⁵⁰ It is in this broader context that endogamy is shown to reflect and embody a moral character, such as symbolic codes of honour (Pitt-Rivers, 1977:166; Bourdieu, 1977:44; Antoun, 1968:693) and procreation (Delaney, 1984:118).

the woman is the field that nurtures it -- contributes to an unconventional understanding of Middle Eastern marriage practices. As she remarks,

"[a] marriage between patrilateral parallel cousins is an attempt neither to alienate the female land nor to have an alien... as mother of children. The seed and the field have both come from the same source. In Bourdieu's terms 'it is the marriage most perfectly consistent with the mythico-ritual representation of the sexual division of labour'" (1984:120).

Delaney (1984:124) argues that an endogamous marriage is a strategy motivated by the desire to keep the productive and reproductive resources within, and for the benefit of, the group. She approaches and understands the preference of endogamy in a "positive" light, emphasizing endogamy as a significant feature in the cohesion and stability of the group. But this language of reasons and aims fails to distinguish the taken-for-granted meanings of endogamy and the uses and purposes to which it is put.

The rhetoric on endogamy signals a belief in the permanence of social tradition or in the preservation of 'blood ties' (see Vergin, 1985:572). In Sakli, villagers say they place considerable value on the close relations existing between households, and so marriage between close kin (*yakin akrabalar*)¹⁵¹ and closely connected households should be the preferred practice. Villagers claim that they discourage relations (particularly marriage) between people with no strong kin or

¹⁵¹ Close kin comprise all those non-*aile* consanguines and affines one removed from the *aile* along the patriline (see chapter six for more on this).

village connection and point to the necessity of regulating the movement of unmarried children, especially daughters. Emphasis upon arranged and approved marriages attests to the moral character accorded marriage in Sakli, in that only marriages with familiar or "inside" members should be sanctioned by Sakli villagers. In this way, a sense of continuity in the social relations is fostered, and the belief that people under the cover of endogamy are closely connected to each other and their past is supported. Villagers in Sakli hold in esteem, things, events, or ideas believed to preserve a sense of social and historical familiarity. Households that reinforce social and economic alliances with one another through bonds of marriage, come to understand their interests, concerns and history as something held in common. This discourse of endogamy constitutes a desire for continuity in the cultural environment, and a means of defense against the unexpected, unpredictable and unknown.

The preference for endogamy is more than a marriage practice that aims to preserve (defend) or enhance either the economic, political or emotional (sentimental) solidarity of a group of people. It is more than a definite scheme within which community members organize themselves and their households. While endogamy authorizes the formation of stable bonds between households, in practice it merely covers over authoritarian relations both within and between households. Such a regime forms the fertile soil upon which this system of moral

relations develops. In its full discursive deployment, endogamy serves to distort and misrepresent this context and so establishes false characterizations as its truth. The structures of family authority, gender divisions and virilocal residence patterns are inextricably tied to this system of endogamy.

Analyzing marriage practices as either endogamous or exogamous leads us into a discourse of functions, aims and purposes, fostering a rationalization (over-determination of meaning) of marriage strategies. These concerns direct us away from an investigation of force relations. The alternative to this (pervasive) point of view would be to adopt a more empirical perspective on power relations. This would consist in:

taking forms of resistance against different forms of power as a starting point ... so as to bring to light power relations, locate their position, find out their point of application and the methods used. Rather than analyzing power from the point of view of its internal rationality, it consists in analyzing power relations through the antagonism of strategies (Foucault, 1983:211).

In what follows, I argue that endogamy is a strategy of alliance that serves neither to keep the group together, nor preserve tradition, nor to expand the protective confines of groups' boundaries. Endogamy is the cover for a series of force relations that have no other aim than the imposition of a form of domination.

9.2 The Ideals of Spouse Selection

The overwhelming majority of marriages in Sakli are arranged by parents and their close kin. Marrying couples have little to do with this process. Households prepare in advance for incoming brides, well before any formal negotiations commence. The husband's parents usually have some money and gifts set aside for the new bride, and since couples often reside with the groom's family for a prolonged period, accommodations must be arranged. In some situations, the couple's home is too small for another couple and their future children, and so, before any negotiations, another floor or an addition is built on the house.

In western society, romantic attachments between marrying couples characterize our understanding of the matrimonial relation. We often think that marriage is likely to involve a unitary relationship in which the spouses look to each other for support and companionship (see also Luxton, 1988:245) -- at least this is the cultural ideal presented in the media, movies and novels. Discourses of romance shape and structure the meaning of relationships and the expectations people have of them. These ideologies, what Duffy (1988) refers to as the

"culture of romance", are thought to lock women into their traditional role in the home.¹⁵² In her words,

From a very early age, women are socialized into the culture of romance. Fairy tales, television, magazines, films and books tell women that they will achieve not only personal fulfilment but ecstasy and transcendence once they form a romantic relationship with the right man ... As a result, most women devote a considerable part of their life to the pursuit of love. Cosmetics, aerobics, clothes, fashion magazines, even plastic surgery are employed to create an attractive and desirable image (Ibid., 114).

In Sakli, romantic attachments between unmarried youth are not valued. Love or romance is expected to come after marriage and, even then, it is not considered necessary to the relation. Actually, marriages are generally not the affairs of a man and woman who want to be joined in marriage. There are always two households involved in the marriage of a couple. Only when households establish an association with one another will an exchange (marital or otherwise) occur between them. People are considered suitable marriage partners because their families are considered compatible (*uygunluk*). They say that these marriages both maintain and improve social and economic ties.

Matching reputations and similar economic backgrounds are the grounds upon which an agreement to a marriage is reached, and the manner of assessing

¹⁵² Duffy (1988) also advances that discourses of romance are tied to the "cult of maternalism". In her words, "[o]nce married, women find that motherhood is increasingly emphasized. Glamorized and romanticized by the media, motherhood appears to offer women a meaningful, life-long enterprise around which to build their lives" (Ibid., 115-116).

this compatibility is crucial for marriage arrangements. Since marriage is considered a critical social, cultural and economic investment, permission of the kin group is an important factor in its formation. Thus, strategies of spouse selection are believed to ensure a suitable marriage.

Spouse selection strategies are thought to minimize conflicts between households. Marriages do not take place between households with long-standing conflicts, or where there is a potential for conflict. For example, poor relations between a household and the landlords often colour a household's reputation in the community. In one instance, a household with questionable relations with their landlord had its house razed by fire, by a man working for the landlord. Fearing reprisals, villagers are reluctant to affiliate themselves with these households. In other cases, parents known to treat their *gelin* poorly also develop bad reputations, thus reducing their ability to bring in more *gelin*.

An important part of spouse selection is looking for and screening probable brides. This search is initiated by married women on the groom's side and finalized by the groom's father. There was one situation where a group of women, some of them my next door neighbours, were driven in secret to a nearby village to visit the home of a potential bride. It is common for these women to visit a potential bride's home on several occasions. Villagers often claim that the more difficult it is to obtain the promise of a daughter in marriage (*söz kesmek*,

lit. to cut the promise), the greater the success of the marriage arrangement.¹⁵³ No information about an upcoming marriage is made public until an agreement (*söz*) is reached between the bride's family and the groom's family (for more on Turkish marriage negotiations see: Sirman, 1988; Delaney, 1984; Magnarella, 1969; Erdentuğ, 1959).

In the search for a bride, women's informal marriage negotiations tend to be influential. Local women are very active in the search for brides and tend to seek out women with whom they can get along. Sometimes they are unable to find an "appropriate" bride in the village, requiring their search for someone living outside (usually in one of the two villages that boarder Sakli, or in any of the half dozen within a five-kilometre radius). Another reason to turn toward neighbouring villages is that households are reluctant to give their daughter to those with bad standings among local landlords. With their female relatives and neighbours, these women turn their attention to nearby village households with reputable members.

¹⁵³ Villagers say that if the bride's parents immediately agree 'to give' their daughter in marriage (*hemen de aldik*, lit. we got her right away), then the marriage is expected to be a poor one. When a young married woman expresses her unhappiness with her husband or with her virilocal household, the husband explains her dissatisfaction as a consequence of her parent's instant agreement to the marriage. The significance of receiving the promise over a period of visits is thought to give both the groom's household and the *gelin* more prestige in the community.

With the professed aim of achieving social parity between the parties involved (i.e., sharing similar economic backgrounds and interests) households constantly employ strategies to allay inter-household conflict. The deployment of such strategies is a way to manage and even reduce their potential at the level of marriage arrangements. There are households that have different economic and social positions. Some households are wealthier than others, some are more crowded than others, and some have more integrity than others. These differences are all considered during the marriage negotiation process.

A potential spouse, especially a woman, may not appeal to the needs, aims and interests of the household. In such cases, parity in social standing is seen as an important measure guiding the choice of spouse (see also Sirman 1988). Sirman argues that this standing "is a mixture of social, personal and economic attributes and the balance struck is a combination of all these different attributes" (1988:115). Social standing can even mitigate the importance of central moral values. "A relatively well-off, older man may marry a divorcee even though virginity is highly prized for a bride, a poor villager will look for a bride among Kurds, or gypsies, and a man with a physical handicap may marry an orphan (öksüz)" (Ibid., 1988:115). In Sakli, a widowed man with children, for example, would likely marry someone from a very poor and overcrowded household, or a woman with a tainted reputation, and never a young woman with a 'clean' (*temiz*)

reputation. Further, since the man already has children, his new bride would be expected to have more children, and tend "someone else's." The onerous duties that would befall the young bride would be unacceptable to her parents. Unless the man can offer significant bride-price to obtain such a bride, parents claim they would never give their daughter to him.

Social standing aside, what appears most important in the selection of a bride are her characteristics in relation to the type of household she will marry into. Many older women in the village have particular ideas of what type of woman they want their sons to marry. For those small and poor households, heavily involved in farming, the type of woman preferred is one reputed to be a hard worker who looks physically strong. A *gelin* with these sorts of traits is considered beneficial to the economic and social maintenance of the household. As an elderly woman said, "what good is a bride if she cannot work on the land or do the housework, she is useless (*yaramaz*)."¹ A younger, married woman expressed similar sentiments:

Once iyi birisi olsun diyoruz. Kendimizden açgözlü kız istemiyoruz, kendimizden iyi olacak. Bazılar böyle düşünüyorlar, gelin güzel olsun. Ama, kendimizden iyi iş yapacak -- kız, tarlada çalışacak.

Before anything else, we want a good person. We do not want a greedy girl; she has to be good for us. Some [people] think that the *gelin* should be beautiful. But for us, she will do good work -- the girl will work in the fields.

In other situations, a household composed of many members may look for an obedient and acquiescent women who can get along well with its members. In such cases household maintenance and farming abilities are given less weight in the assessment of a woman's suitability as a *gelin*. Still, in different circumstances, the groom's mother will judge a potential daughter-in-law based on the cleanliness and general appearance of her natal household. One older woman told me that she wanted her son to marry a distant cousin's daughter, but, upon visiting the woman's home, she decided against it because the house was unkept, it smelled, and the food served was not tasty. To the groom's mother, this meant that any woman from this household would be a poor housekeeper. It is important that there be an effort to match the personality of the bride with the type of household she will marry into. As Sirman (1988) puts it: "a large household may need a docile and submissive woman able to get along with people, while another may look for an efficient person capable of managing the house and the fields" (Ibid., 115). Thus, there is an endeavour to match the reputation of the woman with the social the economic requirements of the household she will marry into.

Many village parents prefer to have their daughters marry particular kinds of men. Due to the high level of inflation (at over 75% annually) and the economic instability of agriculture, families favour wage labouring men for sons-

in-law. Since wage labour is viewed as more secure than farming, they feel their daughter would "enjoy a better life" than the one she is accustomed. It is very rare, however, for such brides to enjoy any specific advantages. They often work in the fields with their husband's relatives, as they did in their natal family household. Moreover, since wage labour jobs require men to migrate seasonally to towns and cities for employment, the wives of these men often live under the complete supervision of their in-laws for long periods of time. This can generate a great deal of tension between the woman and her affines, since disputes between the mother-in-law and the *gelin* are common in such circumstances, as are cases of forced sexual relations with the fathers-in-law.¹⁵⁴

The age of the couple is also a significant consideration in spouse selection. In Sakli, as in other rural areas of Turkey (see Vergin, 1985:571), there is usually little age difference between spouses. During the early 1900's, however, there existed far more marriages between younger women and older men. Many of these marriages were among close and distant kin members. If a family was looking for an appropriate relative for their son, they would choose a woman substantially younger than their son, even if older females were

¹⁵⁴ Incest between a woman and her father-in-law was much more common during the 1970's. This was mainly because transportation from the city to the village was very poor and, consequently, these women's husbands were unable to return home for long periods at a time. Women subject to this treatment have no where to turn. They don't talk about it to natal family members for fear they will be blamed, as has happened in situations where a woman confided in her husband.

available. The reasoning villagers give for choosing younger daughters-in-law is the belief that younger women are more respectful of their husbands. Younger women have lower social standing than older women, are afforded less respect, and are granted less authority.

While a person's social standing, reputation, age and household background are important aspects in spouse selection, these ideals do not inform every marriage. Marriage practices such as *kiz kaçırma* (lit. "girl kidnapping" or elopement) clearly work against the values of arranged marriages and parental approval. *Kiz kaçırma* is thought to reflect the weakness of the group and the immorality of the young. While practised in other areas of rural Turkey (see Sirman, 1988; Bates, 1974; Kudat, 1974; Sertel, 1971), in Sakli it rarely involves the actual abduction of women (though it is always made to sound as if it did).

Kiz kaçırma is a figurative term for a marriage made without familial sanction. Such marriages mainly occur when parents want their daughter to marry a man whom she does not wish to marry. From the perspective of the daughter, eloping with another man is the only way to escape an arranged marriage. In other situations, it occurs because of a romantic attachment that exists between the couple. In any case, the practice of *kiz kaçırma* is never considered upright or loyal. Unarranged marriages show disrespect to one's parents and elders and are immoral. As Sirman (1988:119) remarks, the parents

of the bride "feel dishonoured since the act shows that they have not raised a dutiful daughter."

Since it stands outside the moral horizon, *kiz kaçırma* undermines the control of the endogamous group. It is often met with severe sanctions. Between 1984 and 1989, there were fourteen *kiz kaçırma* cases in the community of Sakli.¹⁵⁵ Of these cases, five families have relinquished contact with the newlywed couple. This makes it difficult for the couple to remain in the village. These young couples are compelled to move to nearby towns and cities. Women often leave without their trousseau (*çeyiz*), clothes, and other belongings; as for the men, they lose access and even legal rights to family property.

Opposing activities and beliefs are inevitable since they are the ground from which morality springs. Morality occupies the breaks and ruptures in community life; it is upon these divisions that the discourse of endogamy is superimposed. The values and virtues that foster keeping relations within the group and preserving group identity, should not obscure the fact that they cover a complex of force relations based on age and gender, which together form an extensive order of rank. Clearly, the occasion of *kiz kaçırma* incites the production of many moral claims because it challenges the importance of parental

¹⁵⁵ This information was derived from oral histories and interviews with key informants.

authority and the virtues of endogamy. Parental authority is made even more important when the residence of the couple after marriage is considered.

Another form of socially sanctioned marriage is sister exchange (*değiş tokuş*). This marriage practice accounts for 3.4 percent of the total number of marriages in Sakli. In Turkish, *değiş* means to exchange something for something else or to barter for something, and *tokuş* means to collide. In this marriage practice, a household exchanges (residentially) a daughter for a daughter-in-law. These marriage arrangements are thought to be very complementary: if the daughter works in the field or in the home without sufficient breaks or is treated poorly, then it is common for the daughter-in-law to be dealt with in the same way. Meeker (1976:412) argues that this 'reciprocal' character makes *gelin* from sister exchanges more difficult to control (in Sirman, 1988:60).

Although the ideal of reciprocity may be something that households aspire toward, the premise of equality in 'sister exchange' does not necessarily mitigate against harsh treatment at the hands of in-laws, nor does it guarantee positive relations. One woman told me about her experience of 'sister exchange.' She explained that while working in the field (*tarla*), her father-in-law and her husband's two older sisters made her labour for long hours without any water. In explaining why this happened, she said her in-laws were punishing her because they had heard from a neighbour that their daughter, her brother's wife, was

improperly treated. While they may be equitable and foster reciprocity between households, these types of exchanges mask the subordinate position of women. Similarly, Rubin (1975) argues that the 'exchange of women' within kinship systems expresses the subjection of women.

Kinship systems do not merely exchange women. They exchange sexual access, genealogical statuses, lineage names and ancestors, rights and people - men, women, and children - in concrete systems of social relationships. These relationships always include certain rights for men, others for women. "Exchange of women" is a shorthand for expressing that the social relations of a kinship system specify that men have certain rights in their female kin, and that women do not have the same rights either to themselves or to their male kin (Ibid., 177).

As with other types of marriages, women enter their virilocal households with "rights" that are tentative and conditional.¹⁵⁶

Değiş-tokuş marriages are found especially among poor and over-crowded households. Similar to patrilateral parallel cousin marriages, there is no *başlık* payment involved in sister-exchange marriages. In earlier years, when bride-

¹⁵⁶ In a similar vein, bride-price is often touted as a symbolic payment to the father for his labour in rearing the bride (Delaney, 1984), as compensation for the loss of female labour (Erdentuğ, 1959) or for the trousseau (Stirling, 1965), and as a way to pay for matrimonial costs (Magnarella, 1969; Stirling, 1965). In Sakli, the son's parents usually give the in-coming bride gold bracelets, chains, coins, or earrings as part of her price. No money is transferred from the groom's household to the bride's household; these 'gifts' are considered a 'bride's property' and are used to show to others 'her price.' In many cases, however, these gifts rarely remain the bride's property for any length of time. They are sold whenever her in-laws or her husband need extra cash.

prices were controlled and taxed by the landlords, sister exchanges were much more common. One elderly man explains this phenomenon:

Eskiden, çok başlık parası vardı. Bir tek anne hakkı diye 400-500 lira para veriliyor, onu da herkes ödeyebiliyor. Halk kendisi yaptı bunu böyle. Mesela bir iki kız evlendindim ve başlık almadım. Eskiden güç yoktu. İnsanlar ödiyemiyorlardı. Başlık parasından kurtulmak için. Mesela, iki kardeş anlaşıyordu, sen benim kızım al, ben de senin kızını alayım diye. Birbirimize başlık parası vermeyelim, sadece ağalar 50-100 lira para verelin diyorlardı. Eskiden böyle çok olurdu.

Years ago, there was a lot of bride-price. There would be no option but to pay 400 to 500 lira for this and everyone would have to do it. The people, themselves, made it this way. For example, I would marry off [my] two daughters and not take bride-price [money]. Years ago, there was no co-operation and so people did not pay [the bride price]. One could save by not paying the bride-price. For example, two brothers would agree, [and they would say] you take my daughter and I take your daughter. Both of them agreed that there would be no bride-price payment; they agreed only to pay 50-100 lira to the landlord. Years ago, there were a lot of these [sister-exchange marriages].

As a last point, *değiş-tokuş* is never practised in the reverse: a son is never residentially exchanged for a son-in-law. While the residence practice of *dahmat geldi* may resemble this marriage practice, there is no reciprocal exchange of a son; households only give away their sons when conditions force them to do so.

9.3 Residence After Marriage

Of the three types of residential practices, virilocality is the most common in Sakli, accounting for 94.6 percent of newly married couples. Thus, most newly

married couples are expected to live with the groom's natal household for an extended period (see also Kandiyoti, 1987; Vergin, 1985; Sirman, 1988; Delaney, 1984; Casson and Özertuğ, 1974). This type of residence pattern reinforces agnatic kinship, the value of masculinity, and produces inequalities between men and women. Loizos and Papataxiarchis (1991) argue that marriages in Greece are characterized by three distinct post-marital residence patterns (virilocal, uxorilocal, and neolocal). In their discussion of virilocality they assert that: "[p]roperty, names and reputations are basically under male control and are transferred from fathers to sons. Women are in a classic state of muteness, as they are 'reduced' to their reproductive biology, and they have two crucial but limiting roles: effective housekeeping and bearing sons" (Ibid., 9).

Virilocality promotes the continuity of men's identification with their natal household, and privileges their social and economic rights. Virilocal women, on the other hand, experience a dislocation from their natal kin-based identity and privileges. This often works to the advantage of their in-laws, since restricting visiting rights to the women's natal household is one way to control a *gelin's* behaviour.

For the couple, there are both advantages and disadvantages in living with the son's parents. Virilocality may provide the couple with some immediate economic security and protection. They are provided with food and a place to

live, but must work very hard to maintain this privilege. Upon marriage, sons will either continue to work their father's land, or will find seasonal wage labouring jobs in nearby towns or cities. Their wives are expected to help maintain the household and work the fields. The newly wed couple also faces many social expectations related to their behaviour in the household. Both age and gender are particularly important in this regard.

Once a woman moves to her husband's natal household she is expected to side with her in-laws during times of political crises or community turmoil. Even if a woman's natal family requires her assistance, whether this is in the field, in the home, or to discuss some important matter, she is to first ask permission (*izin*) from her in-laws to do so. It is expected that once a woman leaves her natal household, her familial duties are to her husband and his family primarily.

In neolocal situations, a couple will establish their residence separate from their natal households. A couple forms a neolocal household only when they have developed an economic base separate from the virilocal household, and this generally occurs after extended periods of virilocality. Neolocality is not practiced by newly married couples. When the virilocal household becomes too crowded or there is too much conflict among its members, it is customary for the oldest brother and his family to establish separate residence.

Neolocal residences are generally established in close proximity to the natal household, though sometimes the couple moves outside the village. Neolocality might be thought to form a more equitable relation between husband and wife, since in the neo-local household the wife escapes the subordinate position that comes with her virilocal membership. But, since property inheritance is patrilineal, the neolocal household's economic base is largely controlled by men. This economic control extends to other spheres of life as well. Wives of neolocal households are subject to many restrictions, even limitations on visits to their natal household. This is especially the case if the residence they establish is far from the location of their natal households.

In Sakli, a small number (5.4%) of all newly married couples reside uxorilocally. Although it is unusual to find a son-in-law (*dahmat*) living with his wife's natal family, this does happen. Terminologically, a virilocal groom is referred to as a *dahmat* or *güvey*, while a uxorilocal groom is referred as a *dahmat geldi* (lit. 'a groom who came') or as *iç güvey* (inside groom). Families that either 'bring in' a son-in-law or 'give away' a son, are rare. Of all village households in Sakli, six contain a daughter and her family living with her natal

family (see Table 3). In two other village households, *dahmat geldi* were raised to the position of household head because of their wife's parents' death.¹⁵⁷

Uxorilocal residence establishes a symbiotic relation between the couple's natal households. A household that 'brings in' a groom contains no sons. Since this society places different values on males and females, it makes sense that a "sonless family" would compensate for this 'loss'.¹⁵⁸ Among the wealthier village households, the lack of a son can be redressed with the practice of *dahmat geldi*. Instead of receiving *başlık* (bride price) as reimbursement for the loss of a daughter to another household, these sonless families suspend the bride price and

¹⁵⁷ Oral histories and discussions with key informants are the best ways to determine the presence of a *dahmat geldi* in this historical sense, since, in terms of household composition, these households appear just like many others (i.e., a husband, wife and their married son(s) and his family).

¹⁵⁸ The lack of male children is always considered as something negative and undesirable for all villagers, including landlord families. For example, on the grounds that his first wife did not bear a son, one landlord married a second wife (*kuma*). Not too long after they married, this second wife gave birth to a male child. The first wife and second wife live together in the same house, and since the second wife is younger, she defers to the first wife, especially in front of visitors, neighbours and when her husband is present. There has been very little research published on bigamy in rural Turkey (see also Vergin, 1985:572). Since bigamy is prohibited under Turkish family law but permitted under religious law, the second wife is married in a religious (not civil) ceremony. Since there are still many religious ceremonies performed in Turkey, Vergin (1985) believes that the practice of bigamy may be more popular than we are aware. As she says, "a religious marriage consists of two acts: an obligatory civil marriage ceremony prescribed by the lay state and a religious wedding that is optional but dictated by the peasants' religious conscience. However, 15% of marriages in Turkey are religious ones that are not followed by an official civil wedding, and there is every reason to believe that a large number of these involve a *kuma*."

take in a groom. The more male offspring there are, the more prestige accrues to the family, since it is the male who inherits, advances and perpetuates household identity.

In contrast to the bride's household, the groom's natal household typically comprises many male children and their *aile* (daughters-in-law and grandchildren). The combined effect of overcrowding and the fact that the household often cannot afford the bride-price and bring in another *gelin*, may lead their unmarried son(s) to marry and establish residence elsewhere. Because these families are unable to accept additional *gelin* into their home, sonless families often become prime candidates in marriage negotiations.

From the perspective of a married woman, uxorilocal residence allows her to maintain close ties with immediate family members and with those relatives and friends living in close proximity. As a consequence of remaining in her natal household and village, she does not have to abide by her affinal members or even have much contact with them. It also permits her to keep shared access and management of family property.¹⁵⁹ One interesting feature of this residence

¹⁵⁹ In Greek society, uxorilocality also allows women to have more direct links to the management of property. Loizos and Papataxiarchis argue that since "property and names are transferred through gendered lines ... women often get the lions share of family property and dominate in the administration of these properties as well as in the arrangement of marriages." (1991:9). In Sakli, however, formal ownership of land remains in the hands of men, though women who live uxorilocally generally have a say in its administration.

pattern is that young married women can maintain close ties with their mothers. The uxorilocal groom, on the other hand, has much to endure. Ties to his natal household are weakened, and contacts with relatives are strained as he is encouraged to befriend his affinal kin.

A *dahmat geldi* is not well respected in the community. He is expected to speak quietly, lower his head in public and follow other people's orders (especially his affinal kin). Villagers often emphasize the inferior status of a *dahmat geldi* by poking fun at him behind his back. Because of his economic dependence upon his wife's family, he is often compared to a status below that of a *gelin*.

An implication of *dahmat geldi* practice is the formation of peripheral clans within the *mahalle*. Each *mahalle* is dominated by one large clan (comprising 60 to 70 percent of the households on average), all sharing a common ancestor and a name. Upon the death of his wife's parents, a *dahmat geldi* invariably rises to the status of household head. The household's clan connection is altered because he and all his offspring share the name of his father, and reckon their ancestry along his patriline. Over a long period, the infrequent practice of *dahmat geldi*, when taken together with marriages, deaths, and neolocality, can dramatically change the clan composition of the *mahalle*. In the *mahalle* of Tabakoğlu, for

example, the Tabak clan now comprises only 16.7 percent of households, while the Kocadayi clan comprises 29.2 percent of all households in the *mahalle*.

The existence of peripheral clans in the *mahalle*, changes in the clan composition and, as I will show, non-descent group (*komşu*) marriages within a *mahalle*, all involve the presence of uxori-local grooms at some time or another. The occurrence of *komşu* (neighbours) in the *mahalle* chronicles a history of uxori-local residence practices in Sakli, and so *komşu* marriages all have some historical links to those 'grooms who come.'

9.4 Marriage Patterns in Sakli

Of the 364 adults (over the age of fifteen) living in Sakli (on either a permanent or seasonal basis), 274 (75.3%) are married, 76 (20.9%) are single, and fourteen (3.8%) are widowed. The married population in the village comprises 126 couples and 22 women whose spouses have migrated to other areas in search of seasonal employment. The single adult population has an average age of 19 years, while the average age of Sakli's married population is 44.1 years. Couples in the village have an average of just under four (3.9) children.

The measure of endogamy is the extent to which marriage alliances are formed within kin groups or residential groups (eg. marriage alliances formed within the *mahalle* or within the village). These two broad types of endogamy

Table 3: Marriage Patterns in Sakli

Type of Marriage	N	% of Type	% of Total
Close Kin (<i>Yakin Akrabalar</i>) Marriages			
Close Consanguines			
Parallel Cousins ^{1st degree}			
FBS/FBD	3	6.7	2.0
MZS/MZD	6	13.3	4.1
Cross Cousins ^{1st degree}			
FZS/MBD	12	26.7	8.1
MBS/FZD	3	6.7	2.0
Subtotal (Consang./Close Kin)	(24)	(82.8)	(16.2)
Close Affines			
HuB/BW	1	2.2	.7
BWZ/ZHuB	2	4.4	1.4
StFS/FSStD	1	2.2	.7
StMB/ZStD	1	2.2	.7
Subtotal (Affines/Close Kin)	(5)	(17.2)	(3.4)
Subtotal (Close Kin/Kin)	(29)	(64.4)	(19.6)
Distant Kin (<i>Uzaktan Akrabalar</i>) Marriages			
Parallel Cousins ^{2nd degree}			
FFBS/FBSD	2	4.4	2.0
Cross Cousins ^{2nd degree}			
FZSS/FMBD	1	2.2	.7
FMBS/FZSD	1	2.2	.7
FFZS/MBSD	1	2.2	.7
FFZSS/FMBSD	3	6.7	2.0
Other <i>Uzaktan</i> ^{2nd or 3rd degree}			
Unknown Links	8	17.8	5.4
Subtotal (Distant Kin/Kin)	(16)	(35.5)	(10.8)
Total Kin (<i>Akraba</i>) Marriages	45	100%	30.4
Non-Kin Marriages			
Total Non-Kin Marriages	103	100%	69.6
Total Sakli Marriages	148		100%

are not mutually exclusive. To determine if there are patterns of endogamy, and to specify what form of endogamy dominates, the following discussion will survey the specific character of marriage alliances in Sakli.

9.4.1 Close and Distant Kin Marriages

Out of all married women in the eighty-seven households surveyed, only 30.4 percent have married into close or distant kin households. Most (69.6%) have married into non-affinal and non-consanguine households (See Table 3.1). Traditionally, marriageable partners consisted mainly of patrilineal kin and near kin. Before the 1930's, many village marriages were between the father's close and distant relatives.¹⁶⁰ Many marriages today are between those who fall outside the immediate kin circle. In practical terms, the ideal of traditional endogamous practice (i.e., patrilineal parallel cousin marriages) is extremely rare, accounting for only 6.7 percent of kin marriages, and only 2 percent of all marriages in Sakli. Even when we include all second degree patrilineal parallel cousins (FFBS/FBSD) and second degree patrilineal cross cousins (FZSS/FMBD, FFZSS/FMBSD, FMBS/FZSD),¹⁶¹ these marriages comprise only 22.2 percent of

¹⁶⁰ The data covering the period prior to the 1930's were produced by oral histories and interviews with local residents.

¹⁶¹ Some respondents knew only that they were related through a grandfather, but did not know if it was their father's or mother's father (eg GrFZS/GrFZSGrD).

all kin marriages, and only 7.4% of all marriages. Thus, the popular idea that marriages in the Middle East are formed between the FBS-FBD does not hold for Sakli nor other parts of Turkey (see also Sirman, 1988; Vergin, 1985; Delaney, 1984:125).

While only 6.7 percent of *akraba* marriages in Sakli are between the children of two brothers, there are some interesting features to this type of marriage. For example, all three FBS-FBD marriages are between households living in the same *mahalle*, and usually next door to one another. Aside from the fact that these households have close contact with each other and share a variety of things (especially land, tools and labour), a marriage between these households symbolically represents the value placed on the continuity of family relations. Since all patrilineal parallel cousins know each other for their entire lives, they are thought to have similar values and compatible personalities. As a result, the marriage is not thought to provoke tensions between the households. Also, marriage between the children of brothers is inexpensive, and so is especially valued among poorer households. Data obtained from oral histories suggest that few patrilineal parallel cousin marriages involve the payment of bride-price or *başlık*.¹⁶²

¹⁶² In many instances, bride-price payments can be costly, relative to annual household income. Depending on the type of marriage, bride-price payments range anywhere from 500,000 to 4,000,000 T.L. (1 CDN.\$= 1500T.L.; 1988 figures). Considering that the average wage earner in 1988 only made 150,000 to 250,000

More common than FBS-FBD marriages are marriages between sisters' children (13.3% of *akraba* marriages and 4.1% of total village marriages).¹⁶³ It is important to note however, that landlord families account for the majority (four of six) of these marriages. All the landlord marriages are either first degree matrilineal parallel cousins, cross cousins of the FZS-MBD type, or distant maternal kin. This reflects their emphasis on both lineage and village exogamy, as the preference to marry members of other landlord families, outside the village, takes over any impetus to maintain the integrity of the lineage. Since it is unlikely for maternal relatives to live within the village, this choice marks the landlords' preference to either have their daughter's marry out, or have the *gelin* come from outside.

Landlord marriage practices are significant at the level of village politics. In an attempt to differentiate themselves from village clans and maintain their political effectiveness, landlord families claim they engage in certain kinds of exogamous marriage practices that prevent local villagers from becoming affinally related to them. While their marriage strategy may aim to 'preserve' their identity as a group, they are constantly bringing 'new' blood into their lineage and, in

T.L. per month, bride-prices tend to strain familial financial resources.

¹⁶³ This figure is based upon data I collected on marriage practices over a ten year period (between 1979 and 1989). These data showed that, of the 131 marriages between 1979 and 1989, 4.6 percent were between sisters' children.

effect, never actually preserve anything. Therefore, the weight of their political standing is ranked above the apparent importance of tradition or the desire to preserve the patrilineage connection between its members.

Among the village clans, first degree cross-cousins are the preferred types of *akraba* marriage, accounting for one-third (i.e., $26.7 + 6.7 = 33.4\%$) of all *akraba* marriages and 10.1 percent¹⁶⁴ of all village marriages. These cross-cousins come from the same village but from different neighbourhoods (*mahalle*). Because the dominant residence pattern is virilocality and a single patrilineal clan dominates each *mahalle*, it seldom happens that a female sibling with children (an *aile*) resides in the same locale as her brother. It is therefore unlikely for someone to live in the same *mahalle* as their MB or FZ. By contrast, it is very likely for brothers to live in the same *mahalle*, and, therefore, for patrilateral parallel cousin marriages to be *mahalle* marriages. All three FBS/FBD marriages in the village were *mahalle* marriages.

Close kin marriages comprise all those non-*aile* consanguines and affines once removed from the *aile*. The only close consanguines one can marry are one's first-degree cousins (see also Delaney, 1984), since they are not included in any *aile* traced through the patriline, and are once removed from ego's grandfathers' *aile*. Thus, marriages between first degree cousins (parallel and

¹⁶⁴ This proportion was closely paralleled by data which showed that 7.7 percent of marriages in the last 10 years were of this type.

cross cousins) account for all close consanguine marriages, and 82.8 percent of all close kin marriages (Table 3).

Close affines constitute the remaining 17.2 percent of close kin marriages. Close affines include ego's father-in-law and members of his *aile*. The main context for this marriage pattern is the re-marriage of a surviving spouse upon the death of the other. For example, one woman married her mother's second husband's son, and another married her husband's second wife's brother. In another case, a young man married his dead older brother's wife. This was considered appropriate because the household was crowded and very poor. Since the household could not absorb any more members, such as another bride, the young man might have been forced to marry a woman and move to her family's house, becoming a *dahmat geldi* (uxorilocal groom). Since these types of marriages are looked upon as dishonourable for the man, the younger brother married his brother's wife and both continued living in his natal household. These marriage patterns do not transgress the restrictions on close kin marriages since the break in the affinal tie places these marriage partners beyond restricted *aile*.

The only other type of close affine marriage is referred to as *kardeşler* (lit. 'brothers'). *Kardeşler* marriages occur when two brothers from one household marry two sisters from another household. In Turkish kin terminology, men married to sisters refer to each other as *bacanak* and women married to brothers

refer to each other as *elti*. In Turkish, *bacanak* means the husband of one's wife's sister and *elti* means the wife of one's husband's brother. While there was no prior kin tie between the couple in the first marriage, both of the couples making up a *kardeşler* marriage are considered close affinal marriages. Both couples are therefore included in the category of affinal marriage (i.e., BWZ/ZhuB).

When a household gives away or "sells"¹⁶⁵ a daughter to another household, there is a general concern over how the daughter will be treated. In cases when families, on either the daughter's or the son's side, are 'pleased' with the first arrangement, then sometimes the arrangement is repeated: another daughter will marry her sister's husband's brother, and so constitute a *kardeşler* marriage. Since these types of arrangements seldom occur, it is difficult to make any generalizations. However, the positive aspect of these marriages is that the two *gelin* in the household are sisters.¹⁶⁶ This relationship is believed to reduce the tensions that might otherwise occur between them.

Close kin (*yakin akraba*) marriages, including cross or parallel cousins and those few between close affines, are the most common type of kin marriage,

¹⁶⁵ When parent(s) speak of "giving away" their daughter in the future tense, they say that they will sell (*saticak*) her, and if they have already "given her away", they say they have sold (*satik*) her. Part of this word (*sat*) is used in everyday market transactions and relations, i.e., to sell (*satmak*), sale (*satim*), salesperson (*satici*).

¹⁶⁶ Relations between sisters are generally very amicable, and it is uncommon for these ties to be broken upon marriage (see also Delaney, 1984:231).

accounting for 64.4 percent of *akraba* marriages, and 19.6 percent of total marriages in Sakli. Distant relative (*uzaktan akraba*) marriages encompass those relatives more than one step removed from ego's *aile*, and one step removed from the *aile* along the patriline. These marriages include second degree cousins, such as grandparent's sibling's children and grandchildren. This category also includes those villagers who know their partners to be *uzaktan* but were unable to specify some or all of their connections¹⁶⁷ (17.8% of distant kin marriages). These marriages make up the remaining 35.5 percent of *akraba* marriages, and 10.8 percent of all marriages in the village (Table 3).

In the *uzaktan akrabalar* category, many marry their second or third degree cousins (two or three removes from ego). Several people in this category, however, are unable to specify the exact genealogical connection to their spouse, knowing them to be only distant relatives. Therefore, it is very difficult to say with any certainty what type of distant kin marriage is the most popular.

While kin marriages account for about 30 percent of all marriages in Sakli, the overwhelming majority (69.6%) of marriages take place between non-affines and non-consanguines. This tendency to marry non-kin members suggests that kin exogamy is the normal form of marriage within the village. It is important

¹⁶⁷ Some respondents knew, for example, that they were great-grandparent's siblings' great-grandchildren (3rd degree cousins), but were not able to trace the links. Others knew only that they were "*uzak*."

to note, however, that endogamy is not only expressed in terms of kinship. Residence also plays a significant role in determining the extent to which marriages are endogamous.

9.4.2 *Mahalle* and *Komşu* Marriages

While most married couples are born and raised in Sakli, the majority of married women are not originally from the same *mahalle* as their husbands.

Table 4: Residence by Type of Marriage

Spouses Natal Residence by Kin/Non-Kin	N	% of Type	% of Total
Within Village			
a) Same <i>Mahalle</i>			
Close/Distant Kin	18	50.0	12.2
Non-Affines/Non-Consang	18	50.0	12.2
Subtotal (% of village)	(36)	(29.8)	24.4
b) Other <i>Mahalle</i>			
Close/Distant Kin	19	22.4	12.8
Non-Affines/Non-Consang	66	77.6	44.6
Subtotal (% of village)	(85)	(70.2)	57.4
Subtotal (Village Marriages)	(121)	(100%)	(81.8)
Other Village			
Close/Distant Kin	8	29.6	5.4
Non-Affines/Non-Consang	19	70.4	12.8
Subtotal (Other Village Marriages)	(27)	(100%)	(18.2)
Total Marriages	148		100.0

Mahalle marriages are, nevertheless, significant since they comprise just under one-quarter of all marriages (see Table 4).

Natal residence patterns of *gelin* highlight the extent of village and *mahalle* endogamy in Sakli. Women whose natal households are outside Sakli, and have moved into the village upon marriage, account for only 18.2 percent of Sakli's population of married women (see Table 4). The vast majority of the married female population (81.8%) comes from natal households within the village, although only 29.8 percent of these women have natal households in the same *mahalle* as their marital household. These *mahalle* or *komşu* marriages occur between couples whose parents are both neighbours and friends, and occur just as frequently as kin marriages within the *mahalle*. It is typical to find, for example, the parents in one household wanting their child to marry a neighbour's child, since neighbours are thought just as important as 'real' kin in maintaining bonds of alliance between village members. In support of Delaney's (1984:232) argument, there is little difference between relatives and neighbours in terms of the links and commitments they have to each other.

Like patrilineal parallel cousin marriages, *komşu* marriages are thought to comprise highly compatible and predictable bonds. Since neighbours live close to each other and share many things with each other, they are confident in the other household's reputation and the personality traits of its members. For these

reasons, two neighbours are keen to maintain the bonds that already exist between them, and continue the usual labour arrangements for farming the lands. Many villagers claim that whatever benefits accrue from *akraba* marriages, similar gains emerge from *komşu* marriages. In fact, *komşu* marriages are symbolically thought of as *akraba* (either close or distant) marriages. In other words, those who marry their neighbours do so as if marrying real (öz) *akraba*.

Neighbours take on responsibilities and obligations comparable to those of real kin, such as: assisting in many day-to-day activities, loaning money, sharing farming tasks, leaving their children in each others' care, and other similar activities and exchanges (see also Sirman, 1988:84). These households often have instituted credit systems and shared labour practices in place before the marriage.

There are some *mahalle* that contain more *komşu* marriages than others. In the second largest neighbourhood of Tabakoğlu, for example, marriages between neighbours are more frequent.¹⁶⁸ Conversely, the largest and oldest *mahalle* of Tellaloğlu has fewer *komşu* marriages.¹⁶⁹ Villagers of Tabakoğlu

¹⁶⁸ There is only slight variation on this general theme. For example, in Balcioğlu all (n=4) the *mahalle* marriages were between kin and this *mahalle* has a high percentage (70 %) of households belonging to the same clan. By contrast, in Tabakoğlu, 65 percent (n=7) of *mahalle* marriages are *komşu*, and the dominant clan in this *mahalle* comprises only 30 percent of all households. There are far more peripheral clans in Tabakoğlu than in any other neighbourhood.

¹⁶⁹ When we consider only *mahalle* marriages, Tellaloğlu has almost equal numbers of *akraba* (n=10) and *komşu* (n=11) marriages.

attribute this to the fact that their neighbourhood has more households relying on subsistence agriculture and fewer residents employed in wage labour. By way of contrast, Tellaloğlu contains the most seasonal wage labourers and the most labourers who have worked, or who are working, in Germany. Since subsistence agriculture is not as popular and intensive in Tellaloğlu, ties among its members are felt to be not as strong. As a result, people in Tellaloğlu are considerably more mobile since they are less tied to the land than other neighbourhoods. Because of this, women tend to have more contact with their natal families, especially those women who come from outside the village, and therefore establish a wider range of contacts than the women in other neighbourhoods. In terms of marriage practices, it is no surprise to the people of Tabakoğlu that there are more 'outside' women marrying into Tellaloğlu; it is a consequence, so they say, of wage labour and the 'liberties' enjoyed by their women. Since the women of Tellaloğlu are believed to be less socially restricted and are often seen travelling about, much discussion is also generated about the sexual affairs they have with other local men.

Villagers believe that wage labour contradicts the social relations of subsistence agriculture. They claim that this paid labour causes a break down in traditional ties and bonds (that is, as if *komşu* marriages were traditional -- as if a rule were being followed) and produces an unwarranted degree of openness,

excesses of social mobility, and licentious sexuality. Clearly, beliefs in 'tradition' are articulated whenever there is dissatisfaction with a state of affairs or course of events. In this context, tradition takes on a double meaning: on the one hand, it is tied to the values of subsistence production and, on the other, to the constitution of female sexuality. Since subsistence agriculture has already been 'feminized' (see ch. 7), tradition is further 'engendered' in the discourse of sexuality.

9.4.3 Village Marriages

If we extend the notion of endogamy to village marriages, we see that most marriages in Sakli (44.6%) occur outside the *mahalle*, but within the village, between members with no kin affiliation (see Table 5). While other criteria play a role in the selection of spouses, it seems that residence, when couched in terms of village membership, is the most significant form of 'endogamous' practice.

Table 5 displays all possible combinations of endogamous marriage practice, and shows the proportion of marriages in each combination as a proportion of the total number of marriages in Sakli. While the largest proportion of marriages occur within the village, between non-affines and non-consanguines, the smallest proportion occurs between distant kin, who come from outside the village. All the cases of close or distant kin marriages involving women from

outside the village are attributed to the landlords in Sakli (for reasons already discussed).

Table 6 highlights the extent of exogamous practices among Sakli villagers, excluding members of the landlord lineage since their marriage patterns are markedly different from the clans. Among village clans, a small proportion (13.6%) of marriages are exogamous, that is, when members marry non-consanguines and non-affines from outside the village. What is apparent in Table 6 is that 'exogamous' marriages (i.e., non-consanguines and non-affines from outside the village) comprise the second largest category of marriages among villagers. What is also evident in Table 6 is that since membership in the group can be defined either in terms of kinship, residence or some combination thereof, 'endogamy' in Sakli has many faces. In terms of kin marriages, a few villagers

Table 5: Residence Prior to Marriage by Kin/Non-Kin Types
(as a percent of total marriages)

Location	Tot Pct (n)	Close Kin	Distant Kin	Non-Aff/ Non-Cons	Row
In Mahalle		6.1 (9)	6.1 (9)	12.2 (18)	24.3 36
In Village		8.8 (13)	4.1 (6)	44.6 (66)	57.4 85
Outside Village		4.7 (7)	.7 (1)	12.8 (19)	18.2 27
Column Total		19.6 29	10.8 16	69.6 103	100.0 148

marry people who are close relatives (15.7%), and an even smaller proportion marry distant relatives (10.7%). In terms of residence, a significant proportion of all marriages take place between members who share the same *mahalle* (25.7%), and half of these are between non-kin (12.9%). While 'village' marriages account for 60.7 percent of all marriages, the vast majority within this category are non-kin (47.1%).

What these data suggest is that, about half of all marriage 'alliances' take place between households that do not have any close association. That is, villagers do not tend to marry those either genealogically or residentially closest to them. The preponderance of 'village' marriages seem to negate the argument that marriage functions to preserve close ties, to 'keep things (such as tradition, kin groups, property or wealth, labour pools) together', or that marriage is a line of defence against external forces. It seems that non-affinal and non-consanguine

Table 6: Residence Prior to Marriage by Kin/Non-Kin Types
(as a percent of clan marriages)

Location	Tot Pct (n)	Close Kin	Distant Kin	Non-Aff/ Non-Cons	Row
In Mahalle		6.4 (9)	6.4 (9)	12.9 (18)	25.7 36
In Village		9.3 (13)	4.3 (6)	47.1 (66)	60.7 85
Outside Village		---	---	13.6 (19)	13.6 19
Column Total		15.7 22	10.7 15	73.6 103	100.0 140

'fellow' villagers are the best choice when surveying suitable *gelin*. This marriage pattern is endogamous in name only -- in the same way that the 'village' is a name ascribed to a 'group' simply because they share the same geographical space. 'Endogamy' does not simply signify a group, nor the need to keep relations within it. What is important is why people say that they are endogamous or relatives (eg. "*biz hep akrabayiz*", lit. "we are all relatives") and to discern the value this 'discursive fact' has in the complex of social relations.

9.5 Behind the Face of Endogamy

While the theme of endogamy pervades marriage practices in the village, the belief that Middle Eastern endogamy is governed by the norm of patrilateral parallel cousin marriages (i.e., FBS-FBD) runs counter to the results of this study. FBS-FBD marriages are very rare in the community of Saklı. The findings of this study show that the practice of endogamy is not confined by the ideal of patrilateral parallel cousin marriages, nor is it limited simply to the preservation and maintenance of the descent line. Despite the existing rhetoric on endogamy, I have shown that villagers with no kin ties are far more common as marriage partners than are patrilateral cousins.

Marriage practices in Saklı are believed to maintain close bonds among village households. Yet marriages extend beyond members of the kin group, to

A resolution test chart featuring various patterns of horizontal and vertical lines. The patterns are arranged in a grid-like fashion, with some patterns being larger and more prominent than others. Numerical values are placed next to the patterns, indicating the resolution or frequency of the lines. The values include 1.0, 1.1, 1.25, 1.4, 1.6, 1.8, 2.0, 2.2, 2.5, 2.8, 3.2, 3.6, 4.0, 4.5, 5.0, 5.6, 6.3, 7.1, 8.0, 9.0, 10.0, 11.2, 12.5, 14.0, 16.0, 18.0, 20.0, 22.5, 25.0, 28.0, 32.0, 36.0, 40.0, 45.0, 50.0, 56.0, 63.0, 71.0, 80.0, 90.0, 100.0, 112.0, 125.0, 140.0, 160.0, 180.0, 200.0, 225.0, 250.0, 280.0, 320.0, 360.0, 400.0, 450.0, 500.0, 560.0, 630.0, 710.0, 800.0, 900.0, 1000.0, 1120.0, 1250.0, 1400.0, 1600.0, 1800.0, 2000.0, 2250.0, 2500.0, 2800.0, 3200.0, 3600.0, 4000.0, 4500.0, 5000.0, 5600.0, 6300.0, 7100.0, 8000.0, 9000.0, 10000.0, 11200.0, 12500.0, 14000.0, 16000.0, 18000.0, 20000.0, 22500.0, 25000.0, 28000.0, 32000.0, 36000.0, 40000.0, 45000.0, 50000.0, 56000.0, 63000.0, 71000.0, 80000.0, 90000.0, 100000.0, 112000.0, 125000.0, 140000.0, 160000.0, 180000.0, 200000.0, 225000.0, 250000.0, 280000.0, 320000.0, 360000.0, 400000.0, 450000.0, 500000.0, 560000.0, 630000.0, 710000.0, 800000.0, 900000.0, 1000000.0, 1120000.0, 1250000.0, 1400000.0, 1600000.0, 1800000.0, 2000000.0, 2250000.0, 2500000.0, 2800000.0, 3200000.0, 3600000.0, 4000000.0, 4500000.0, 5000000.0, 5600000.0, 6300000.0, 7100000.0, 8000000.0, 9000000.0, 10000000.0, 11200000.0, 12500000.0, 14000000.0, 16000000.0, 18000000.0, 20000000.0, 22500000.0, 25000000.0, 28000000.0, 32000000.0, 36000000.0, 40000000.0, 45000000.0, 50000000.0, 56000000.0, 63000000.0, 71000000.0, 80000000.0, 90000000.0, 100000000.0, 112000000.0, 125000000.0, 140000000.0, 160000000.0, 180000000.0, 200000000.0, 225000000.0, 250000000.0, 280000000.0, 320000000.0, 360000000.0, 400000000.0, 450000000.0, 500000000.0, 560000000.0, 630000000.0, 710000000.0, 800000000.0, 900000000.0, 1000000000.0, 1120000000.0, 1250000000.0, 1400000000.0, 1600000000.0, 1800000000.0, 2000000000.0, 2250000000.0, 2500000000.0, 2800000000.0, 3200000000.0, 3600000000.0, 4000000000.0, 4500000000.0, 5000000000.0, 5600000000.0, 6300000000.0, 7100000000.0, 8000000000.0, 9000000000.0, 10000000000.0, 11200000000.0, 12500000000.0, 14000000000.0, 16000000000.0, 18000000000.0, 20000000000.0, 22500000000.0, 25000000000.0, 28000000000.0, 32000000000.0, 36000000000.0, 40000000000.0, 45000000000.0, 50000000000.0, 56000000000.0, 63000000000.0, 71000000000.0, 80000000000.0, 90000000000.0, 100000000000.0, 112000000000.0, 125000000000.0, 140000000000.0, 160000000000.0, 180000000000.0, 200000000000.0, 225000000000.0, 250000000000.0, 280000000000.0, 320000000000.0, 360000000000.0, 400000000000.0, 450000000000.0, 500000000000.0, 560000000000.0, 630000000000.0, 710000000000.0, 800000000000.0, 900000000000.0, 1000000000000.0, 1120000000000.0, 1250000000000.0, 1400000000000.0, 1600000000000.0, 1800000000000.0, 2000000000000.0, 2250000000000.0, 2500000000000.0, 2800000000000.0, 3200000000000.0, 3600000000000.0, 4000000000000.0, 4500000000000.0, 5000000000000.0, 5600000000000.0, 6300000000000.0, 7100000000000.0, 8000000000000.0, 9000000000000.0, 10000000000000.0, 11200000000000.0, 12500000000000.0, 14000000000000.0, 16000000000000.0, 18000000000000.0, 20000000000000.0, 22500000000000.0, 25000000000000.0, 28000000000000.0, 32000000000000.0, 36000000000000.0, 40000000000000.0, 45000000000000.0, 50000000000000.0, 56000000000000.0, 63000000000000.0, 71000000000000.0, 80000000000000.0, 90000000000000.0, 100000000000000.0, 112000000000000.0, 125000000000000.0, 140000000000000.0, 160000000000000.0, 180000000000000.0, 200000000000000.0, 225000000000000.0, 250000000000000.0, 280000000000000.0, 320000000000000.0, 360000000000000.0, 400000000000000.0, 450000000000000.0, 500000000000000.0, 560000000000000.0, 630000000000000.0, 710000000000000.0, 800000000000000.0, 900000000000000.0, 1000000000000000.0, 1120000000000000.0, 1250000000000000.0, 1400000000000000.0, 1600000000000000.0, 1800000000000000.0, 2000000000000000.0, 2250000000000000.0, 2500000000000000.0, 2800000000000000.0, 3200000000000000.0, 3600000000000000.0, 4000000000000000.0, 4500000000000000.0, 5000000000000000.0, 5600000000000000.0, 6300000000000000.0, 7100000000000000.0, 8000000000000000.0, 9000000000000000.0, 10000000000000000.0,

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include those outside the *mahalle* and even outside the village. Endogamy takes on a variety of meanings, since inclusion in the 'group' through marriage projects far beyond the boundaries of close and distant kin. Marriages, as a result, are more than strategic alliances between households. Endogamy is important only if the group that defines its boundaries can be determined by means other than formal definitions. Since there is no way to fix the meaning of the group, endogamy is taken not as an empirical fact, but as a discursive 'deployment of alliance.'

The general pattern of marriages suggests that endogamy is a moral value among Sakli villagers, comprising the ideals of harmony, mutual interdependence and reciprocity among close-knit households. This deployment of alliance helps to maintain the appearance of group stability and solidarity, since most villagers believe they are related to one another and support the ideals of endogamy. Furthermore, as illustrated, endogamy merely disguises the dominant and subordinate relations prevailing in the processes of marriage.

The discourse on endogamy clearly authorizes a complex set of authoritarian relations based on age and gender. The aim of domination is especially evident in spouse selection initiatives, residential patterns, and in the general expectations of people included in the household unit. Behind the value of endogamy, marriage relations are forged by bringing brides into household

systems of domination, and putting them to work as houseworkers, subsistence farmers, and reproductive units. Under the guise of subjects in the 'deployment of alliance,' these *gelin* are made subjects of the aims and ends of older and more respected household members. This is why, in the search for the appropriate *gelin*, the features of her natal household figure in the decision, not as illustrative of their potential to form a close(r) association of households but, only as far as they show the woman to be a potentially dutiful subject. As we shall see in the next chapter, managing these internal divisions requires the deployment of further strategies.

Chapter 10: The Morality of Magic

In previous analysis, I have illustrated how a moral regime, including village identity, common descent, kin terminology and marriage, is deployed and made to function in relations of domination and subordination. In this final chapter, I show how villagers engage sorcery to challenge the 'forces of tradition.'

A striking feature of social relations in a north-western Turkish society occurs in the sphere of religious life. While many have only understood religious life in the context of Islamic legal codes, I argue that this focus is narrow and excludes a whole range of less 'official' beliefs and activities. Sorcery emphasizes a type of religious practice whose aims and purposes are not authenticated by, nor do they emanate from, the absolute authority of God. The value and meaning of sorceric practice originate in dissatisfaction, that is, from an unwillingness to be determined by a 'course of events,' no matter who authorizes them or how they are interpreted (eg. the will of God, the 'force' of tradition, fate). Having come up against a superior force (i.e., having experienced resistance) a client projects aims beyond the present determinations, and takes these aims and values to a sorcerer who then manipulates the forces of determination to do the client's bidding. To alter what is 'written', encoded, or otherwise decided, sorcerers often borrow the 'will of Islam' (eg. Koranic prayers)

in support of other aims and purposes, such as: finding 'appropriate' brides and grooms, arranging marriages and casting love spells. In so doing, sorcerers 'inscribe' another authorial voice and intention in the sacred texts of Islam.

10.1 Sorcery and Islam

In many Islamic societies, sorcery has been a cultural tradition for centuries, and began long before the coming of the Islamic faith (Bürgel, 1988; Eliade, 1985). Early Islamic thought and particularly the Koran aimed to eliminate the practice of sorcery. While the Koran speaks profusely of idolaters and sorcerers and contains other revelations about satanic and demonic forces, sorcery is condemned in Koranic discourse (Sura II:30-31). The idea that people should manipulate the supernatural forces is neither approved nor accepted within Islamic doctrine.¹⁷⁰ Studies of morality in the Islamic context often take morality to mean a belief in the attribution of all power and will to one supreme force, and

¹⁷⁰ Even movements (eg. Sufi and Qarmati) that espoused versions of Islam that differed from orthodox Islam were declared heretical and outlawed (Ahmed, 1989:144-145).

either ignore or give little significance to sorcery (Qadir, 1988¹⁷¹; Rodinson, 1972; Smith and Haddad, 1981¹⁷²).

In the study of Middle Eastern cultures, conceptions of the domain of morality are therefore often limited to the play of Islamic legal codes -- considered as central forces governing all aspects of social and political life. Even the moral boundaries of sexuality (Beck and Keddie, 1978; Stiehm, 1976), marriage (Afshar, 1987; Youseff, 1976), property rights (Zamiti-Horchani, 1984) and gender relations figure either as Koranic injunctions or as proclamations derived from Koranic jurisprudence.

¹⁷¹ In a discussion of Islamic theory of knowledge, Qadir (1988) briefly mentions magic in the context of what Muslim philosophers consider as useful knowledge. As he says that, "Muslim philosophers have distinguished between useful and useless knowledge and among the useful they have included [worldly] sciences like Medicine, Physics, Chemistry, Geography, Logic, Ethics, along with the disciplines dealing specifically with religious knowledge. Magic, Alchemy and Numerology are counted among the useless branches of knowledge" (Ibid., 14).

¹⁷² Smith and Haddad (1981) do not mention the role of sorcery or magic in the context of understanding death in Islam, even though sorcery is talked about extensively in the Koran and in other works. They do, however, recognize the many manifestations of belief in communication between the living and the dead. In their discussion of the cult of saints, they point out that "[t]he dead are reported in a variety of ways to be cognizant of the living and through the media of dreams and other appearances are often felt to be able to communicate their desires and directives to those still alive on this earth" (1981:183). They attribute such practices to Muslim worshippers who seek intercession from local saints in mundane and theological matters, especially the saints (beyond-the-grave intermediaries) observed in modern Egypt (1981:187).

The deterministic attributes of Islamic thought is extensively debated in theological and philosophical literature.¹⁷³ Much of this literature regards Islam as prescribed duties, laws and traditions, often excluding from the analysis a wide range of 'unorthodox' beliefs and activities that prevail in Islamic society (Tapper and Tapper, 1988:70). Sunnism, the most significant and mainstream segment of Islamic thought in Turkey, is characterized by the importance accorded to a literal interpretation of the Koran and the tradition, and by the primary role of the Law (the shariat). In effect, for Sunni theology, morality and the law are inseparable. Its laws derive from interpretations of the Koran; the sunna or tradition (based on the activities and words of the Prophet); the *ijma* (or consensus of the testimonies of the Companions of Mohammed and their heirs); and *ijtihad* (personal reflection on issues where the Book and the sunna are silent) or analogical reasoning (Esposito, 1988; Guillaume, 1966; Rahman, 1966). These interpretations describe

¹⁷³ For a review of some of the moral concerns raised in theological and philosophical discussions on Islamic thought, see: Esposito, J. Islam: The Straight Path. New York: Oxford University Press, 1988:68-115; Guillaume, A. The Traditions of Islam: An Introduction to the Study of the Hadith Literature. Beirut: Oxford University Press. 1966; Hodgson, M.G.S. The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in a World Civilization. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1974; Qadir, C.A. Philosophy and Science in the Islamic World. New York: Routledge. 1988; Smith, J.I. and Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad. The Islamic Understanding of Death and Resurrection. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1981.

a hegemonic¹⁷⁴ or "scientific" Islam (see Rahman, 1966 for more on the historical development of science and Islam).

The Koran endorses many moral claims of appropriate and acceptable behaviour, among which are extensive rules and regulations regarding gender and kin relations, dowries, divorce and idolatry. In terms of marriage prohibitions, the Koran says:

ye are forbidden to marry your mothers, and your daughters, and your sister's daughters, and your mothers who have given you suck, and your foster-sisters, and your wives' mothers, and your daughters-in-law which are under your tuition, born of your wives unto whom ye have gone in ... and the wives of your sons who proceed out of your loins; and ye are also forbidden to take to wife two sisters ...(Sura IV:75, Trans. by Sale).

The Koran sets forth the essential rituals and moral duties obligatory for all Muslims, including, for example, prayer, alms-giving, fasting and pilgrimage (Esposito, 1988:90-95; Guillaume, 1954:66). In terms of property inheritance, the Koran advocates that:

every one kindred [is] to inherit part of what their parents and relations shall leave at their deaths... men shall have the pre-eminence above women, because of those advantages wherein God hath caused the one of them to excel the other, and for that which they expend of their substance in maintaining their wives (Sura IV:77, Trans. by Sale).

¹⁷⁴ Leila Ahmed (1989) argues that the constitution of orthodox Islam served particular interests and goals. As she puts it, "orthodox Islam - its laws, its traditions, and its view of history - is the product in the main of the middle and upper classes of the early and Classical epoch (632-1250), and represents their values, culture, and interests" (Ibid., 144).

These are prescriptive and moral guide lines that Muslims should follow (see also Rahman, 1982:141).

Islamic dogma attributes all power and will to one supreme force. As Smith and Haddad (1981) argue, [i]n the Islamic conception, God as the Creator and Originator of all things has not only ultimate but sole authority over the beginning, duration, and final dispensation of all things ... His omnipotence, His freely determined mercy and compassion, His guidance, and His justice are the ultimate determinations of the affairs of this world and the next (1981:2). Thus, Islam presupposes surrender and submission to this singular will (Sonn, 1991:218), whose principal edicts and sacred knowledge are received from without. The conditions of life are created by Islam and are either experienced or undergone by its subjects. Thus, in theological terms, the Koran outlines a series of mystical visions that happened to the subject (Mohammed in this case) and so warranted the theological conclusions that there are objective religious truths needing only to be described or told. Historically, according to Bürgel (1988:2), the active production of knowledge:

in the shape of Aristotelianism was eliminated and replaced by an Islamicized 'wisdom of illumination,' ... Galenic medicine was superseded by a religious medical system developed on the base of the Koran and the Hadith, the so-called 'prophetic medicine,' and ... Aristotelian logic as an independent reference system based on autonomous rationality was called heretical, even though it was used willingly and skilfully in jurisprudence and theology.

Mohammedian 'illuminations' were received over a period of twenty-two years (610-632).¹⁷⁵ These revelations, the groups of words uttered by Mohammed as inspired by God, form what was called a 'recitation'. They were taken down in his lifetime on a variety of materials and were collected and grouped into *suras* or chapters and became known collectively as 'The Recitation', in Arabic as *al-quran*, and later in English as Koran (Esposito, 1988:9; Rodinson, 1972:83).

There is, however, no uniform or singular pattern of social behaviour that could be said to be described, without exception, by Islam. Its traditional laws and moral codes are not exhaustive of everyday life. The intricacies of Islamic "truths," or what I call *conventional Islamic morality*, carry with them a

¹⁷⁵ The prophetic mission of Mohammed was launched after several ecstatic experiences, which in some sense constitute the prelude to the revelation (Eliade, 1985:63-65). Revelations were in turn preceded by long periods of "spiritual retreats" in caverns and other solitary places. In Sura (LIII:507) it is said that Mohammed received revelations by God directly. "It is no other than a revelation, which hath been revealed unto him. One mighty in power, endued with understanding, taught it him: and he appeared in the highest part of the horizon. Afterwards he approached the prophet, and drew near unto him; until he was the distance of two bows' length from him, or yet nearer: and he revealed unto his servant that which he revealed". Mohammed had seen God a second time near a lote-tree: "his eyesight turned not aside, neither did it wander: and he really beheld some of the greatest signs of his Lord." In other cases, Mohammed received revelations through dreams. In one vision Mohammed acquainted his companions for their encouragement. "When thy Lord caused the enemy to appear unto thee in thy sleep, few in number; and if he had caused them to appear numerous unto thee, ye would have been disheartened and would have disputed concerning the matter; but God preserved you from this... (Sura VIII:173). Still, in other cases, revelations were received through the Angel Gabriel (Sura, LXXIV:559).

superficial character, and cannot be accepted as 'given.' In addressing this point,

Loeffler (1988:246) argues that:

... Islam has to be understood as the totality of all symbolic forms considered Islamic by people regarding themselves as Muslims; i.e., as an essentially unbounded complex of symbols and principles which on most any issue offer a wide range of possible, even opposing conceptions, meanings, attitudes, and modes of thought, each formulated with sufficient fluidity to allow ever more spinoffs, elaborations, and interpretations.

There are, however, some innovations in the study of Islam that shift the focus to the practical deployment of Islamic principles (Sonn, 1991b;¹⁷⁶ Lambek, 1990; Tapper and Tapper, 1988; Loeffler, 1988; Abu-Lughod, 1986; Eickelman, 1985; Rosen, 1984). Lambek (1990), for example, explores the role of texts and textual authority in the Islamic society of Mayotte (Comoro Islands, East Africa). Although he recognizes Islam as a text-based religion, he shows how this text becomes socially relevant through enunciation, citation, acts of reading, reference and interpretation. As he says, "[u]nless we view Islam in practice as well as in structure we cannot account for its relation to social organization of power, for the manner in which it both constitutes order and is in turn continuously regranted the authority to do so" (1990:23). While the "practised versions of Islam" (Tapper and Tapper, 1988:88) express the everyday moral world, more detailed

¹⁷⁶ In her compelling discussion of the perceived link between Islamic fundamentalism, radicalism and terrorism, Sonn (1991b:292) argues that domestic and historical issues and the region's self image(s) must be recognized in order to understand connections between Islam and politics.

and ethnographic analysis need to consider the role of Islamic heterodoxies, i.e., magic and sorcery, especially in the context of power relations.

Islam, defined strictly, is not self reliant in either forming or informing everyday morality. The Islamic standpoint ignores the context within which morality is deployed and the force relations that determine its meaning. Over-emphasis on Islamic jurisdiction and jurisprudence leads one to underestimate the degree of discordance in social relations (or views discord as a deviation). In reality, discontinuities and contests over authority are the *raison d'être* of moral claims, since these are the 'things' to which moral discourse speaks, and constitute its referential content (context). Ahmed argues that hegemonic Islamic claims emerged in a struggle. As she says, the "restoration of historical complexity shows incontrovertibly that the hegemonic version of Islam has always been contested, and makes clear also that the challenge and debate between versions of Islam is not about a transcendent and 'God-given' Islam but about the clashing ideologies of different classes and about who, historically, had the power to make laws and construct the edifice of official belief and culture" (1989:145). Although Ahmed (1989) acknowledges the power relations associated with Islam, her framework does not consider how other, less conventional heterodoxies might impinge on this 'official' culture. In this regard, I will explore the character of formal Islam from the standpoint of sorcery as practiced in Sakli.

Islamic codes represent the 'forces of tradition,' the value of continuity with the past and the emphasis on subservience to the will of another. Islam assumes that the world is a created and ordered in a continuity of events, and all that one can do is to describe, interpret and follow the system of laws which govern that order. In Islamic mysticism, reflection and contemplation are central activities; change is the province of divine intervention (miracles) and is both unknowable and unpredictable. Orthodox Islam says that every act is, in essence, God's will. Individuals, therefore, cannot act in the realm of spirit,¹⁷⁷ they can only obey its commandments. Islam strives to secure a standardized normative system based on the elimination of difference and the establishment of a value consensus. The Islamic notion of pre-destination (Smith and Haddad, 1981:22¹⁷⁸; Watt, 1948) serves to reinforce this overarching value, determining a singular path or vision of the future for its followers.

¹⁷⁷ Lambek (1990) argues that the core of Islam does not rest on belief but centres on an act (largely through words) of submission. In this context, Islam is seen as a "hegemonic ideology" with sacred texts providing the final authority and baseline reference to people's actions.

¹⁷⁸ Against the idea that there is "human free will" under Islam, Smith and Haddad (1981) argue that "[e]ven though some verses of the Qur'an apparently suggest an understanding of human free will, the dominant picture is that the affairs of mankind, like all other matters, are completely under God's control. In the traditions this picture is even clearer, and one is hard put to find any *hadiths* supportive of human prerogative" (1981:22).

By contrast, sorcery takes the form of opposition to these traditional imperatives, favouring instead a form of voluntarism that contests authority. Voluntarism, referring to the capacity for one to change events and circumstances according to one's will, assumes that nothing is given in advance or predetermined and that there is no fixed principle commanding the universe. Thus, sorceric practice counters Islam at the level of voice, emphasizing a type of knowledge authenticated by the sorcerer's command over outward things, not a knowledge emanating from the will and oneness of God (Esposito, 1988:6-7).

Historically, sorcery was so powerful that for centuries Islam led an unflagging struggle against it (Bürgel, 1988:2). As a pre-Islamic religious activity, sorcery (or what is often called Arab "paganism")¹⁷⁹ constructed a way of dealing with the world. It was organized around a philosophy and practice that conceived a multifaceted social environment subject to the play of many spiritual and natural forces, indeterminate and therefore changeable. In the sorceric world, ordinary and extraordinary events betray no fixed meaning, nor are they reduced to the singularity of a common cause. Since nothing is created or subject to any determinate fate, every phenomenon is endowed with a potential for change, and one can recruit these potential forces to further one's own aims and ends (see also

¹⁷⁹ The ancient history of Arabia is particularly important with regards to sorcery. Practices and beliefs inconsistent with Islamic monotheism, for instance, have their root in Arabia and are often referred to as paganistic (Guillaume, 1954:8).

Lambek, 1990:27; Loeffler, 1988:172-173). This makes it possible for the sorcerer to enlist even the will of Islam in support of subjective intentions. The power of Koranic prayers in performing magic is a central theme in Loeffler's (1988:172-173) study of Islamic practice in a Shiite Iranian village.

Sorcery is characterized by a belief in change and that the value of action is measured in terms of the intentions it embodies. This is why people go to the sorcerer: their intentions are expressed through the sorceric relation. With the aim of altering what is written, encoded or otherwise decided, sorcery aims to 'liberate' the individual from the confinement of tradition, the laws of continuity, and the overarching structure of Islam. Sorcery is an individually motivated activity, and in the ecclesiastical sense, it is anti-Islamic in essence: emphasizing motivation and self-discovery instead of pre-determination, final judgements, rites, rules and regulations. Within this moral system of aims and purposes, it is important to recognize that sorcery is essentially anti-authoritarian (see also Lambek, 1990:30-31). In fact, Rolands and Warnier argue that sorcery acts as a 'levelling mechanism,' that allows the powerless to influence situations that would otherwise be beyond their control (1988:123-125). As with morality, the inability to overcome a superior force often leads to the deployment of moral-discursive regimes, where the aim of domination is played out at the level of values and meaning. It is important to recognize, therefore, that the opposition of sorcery to

Islam is a discursive fact and that this opposition dissimulates an array of empirical force relations within the village of Sakli.

10.2 Sorceric Practice in Sakli

In 1925, all religious, quasi-religious and therapeutic institutions in Turkey were officially censured by the State, and the practice of *büyü* (sorcery) was outlawed (Öztürk, 1964:348).¹⁸⁰ In spite of many prosecutions and punishments, sorcery (often now called *muska* instead of *büyü*) still exists in Turkey.¹⁸¹ It is a central feature in understanding everyday religious action and pervades the lives of villagers living in Sakli.

While many people in Sakli engage in sorcery, the formal practice of sorcery involves a social relation between a recognized sorcerer and a client

¹⁸⁰ Very little extensive work has been done on sorcery in rural Turkey. There are studies, however, which have recognized the importance of sorcery at local and practical levels (Delaney, 1984; Öztürk, 1964). For example, in an ethnographic study of a small Anatolian village, Delaney (1984) alerts us to the belief in sorcery. In describing villagers' perception of communities, she notes that they "will say of a village that is *misafirperver* (hospitable) or *misafirperversiz* (inhospitable) that it seems to be under a spell (*büyü*) (Ibid., 246). In the context of describing how some women deal with arranged marriages, Delaney makes reference to a young woman who went "crazy" after marriage and this was attributed (by local villagers) to a spell that was cast upon her (Ibid., 127).

¹⁸¹ Some villagers regularly employ the term *büyü*, while most refer to sorcery as *muska*, irrespective of whether this practice involves the casting of "good" or "bad" spells. Persons who cast spells are referred to as *hoca* (lit. religious teacher) and those who undue spells are referred to as *cinci* (meaning the one who does the devil's work).

requesting a spell. There are five official sorcerers in the village. While anyone can perform sorcery, there are many requirements that must be met to become a recognized sorcerer. First, the person must be Moslem and have a "good" understanding of the Koran. In Sakli, the local *imam* is a well respected, self-proclaimed sorcerer; however, the dominant sorcerer in the village is an elderly man who had earned his reputation through many years of practising his craft. Secondly, while the practice of sorcery is not restricted to men, only men are viewed as "official" sorcerers. Thirdly, sorcerers are usually elder members who have earned the respect of others in the community.

The sorcerer must be familiar with the sorceric text and read and recite the Koran. This fact is important since to cast spells the sorcerer is required to produce an amulet (also called *muska*) consisting of one or more verses or prayers from the Koranic text written on a piece of paper, clothing or another substance. For centuries highly religious men (*hoca*) had monopolized the skills of reading and writing which allowed them to establish contact with the powers of the spirit world (Öztürk, 1964:352). While there is nothing officially "Islamic" about sorcery, in the hands of one trained in sorcery, reading and writing from the Koran allows one to put these spiritual forces to work in all sorts of ways. As one sorcerer said:

Herkes muska yaptırabilir. Tek bir şart var: Muska yaptırıcak kişinin Müslüman olması lazım. Aslinada İslam'da muska diye bir

şey yoktur. Ama okunmak vardır. Mesela bir mülk suresi okuyan kişi şu kardar devci bulur ... Ama İslam'a göre yanlıştır. İnsani dinden çıkarır, yani. İslam'a göre böyle muska yapmak sakıncalıdır. Anyone can perform sorcery. There is only one condition: the person performing sorcery must be Moslem. There is nothing fundamentally Islamic about sorcery, but there is about reading material. For example, a person reads a short sura [chapter in Koran] about religious merits, written acts of worship ... From the Islamic point of view, it [sorcery] is wrong because people profit by it. Sorcery is objectionable from the Islamic point of view.

All sorcerers work with a sorceric text. There are a variety of sorceric texts that, according to key informants, are written either in Arabic, or in both Arabic and Turkish. These texts vary in content as well. While some have strict guidelines on the use of Koranic prayers in the casting of spells, others are less specific in the way Koranic verses are used. Since the production and employment of these texts are illegal in Turkey, sorcerers keep these books hidden. Village sorcerers rarely lend these texts to anyone and under no circumstances do they give them away.

An experienced sorcerer has many techniques. Often sorcerers cast spells over material objects, such as a person's belongings (eg. clothes) and they may use these objects to cause a victim to be sick or well, sad or happy, poor or rich. An Imam told of a spell he used to dissolve an unauthorized marriage between a young couple. He said:

Kız kaçırmak için, bir tatlı, gofret gibi, bunların üzerine bazı dualar okunuyormuş. Bir de muska yapılacak kızın iç çamaşırlarından, birine mesela fanilasına yazılıyormuş dua. Ayrıca 3 tane de muska

yaziliyormuş. Bu muskalardan, bir tanesi kizin basacağı bir yere, bir tanesi oğlanın kendisinde kaliyormuş, bir tanesi de hiç kimsenin ayal basamayacağı bir yere konuyormuş. Kız dışarı çıktığı zaman o büyülenmiş olur. Ye artık, ne yemek ye, ne içer, ne di iş yapar, halsizleşir, hastalanır.

For a kidnapped girl, sometimes prayers are recited over a sweet cookie. In performing a spell, a prayer is written on the girl's underclothing, for example, on an undershirt. Three separate spells [prayers] are written. One of these is put in an area where the girl steps, one stays with the boy, one is put in a place that does not belong to any family. The spell begins when the girl leaves the house. Finally, whatever is eaten, whatever is drank, whatever work is done, results in a weakening, a sickness [affecting the son-in-law].

The request for this spell came from the father of the 'kidnapped' woman.

The same sorcerer told of a love spell (*muhabbet muskasi*) a woman wanted cast on her husband. In situations like this, the sorcerer inscribes a prayer from the Koran on a piece of paper. After writing it, he breathes on it. In order for this type of breathing to have any supernatural powers, the sorcerer must 'remove himself from this world and only worship God.' The paper is then folded seven times into the shape of a triangle, wrapped in white cloth and pinned to the woman's undergarment. Another piece of paper, with a prayer inscribed from the Koran, is given to the woman. She is told to place the paper in a large jug of water and secretly have her husband drink this water for seven consecutive days. It is believed that the water will absorb the curative power of the writing. If, however, the husband is made aware of the curative powers in the water, the love spell is immediately broken.

Loeffler also documents the use of Koranic prayers in the performing of spells. A local 'fundamentalist' in his study site used prayers (*du'a*) to protect animals against wolves. As he said, "[i]t consists of two pieces from the Qur'an, the sura *va'sh-shams* [sura 90] and the verse *ayat ul-kursi* [sura 2/255-257] which the Prophet himself told us are good for this purpose. These are said over a pair of scissors or a jack knife, then you blow on it and snap it shut, and you define the region and time period for which the *damband* [prayer] should work" (1988:173). Likewise, in a study of texts and magic among Mayotte (Islamic) villagers, Lambek (1990) argues that swallowing written Koranic prayers is a direct way of infusing the body with the sacred liturgy or what he calls "a textualization" of the body. As he says, "[w]earing Koranic verses and astrological symbols sewn into amulets and tied around the neck or waist forms a kind of continuous 'illocutionary' act, though the purification or protection is accomplished through a statement in writing rather than in speech."

As a way to explain a course of events that is beyond anyone's control, villagers often say "*Allah yazmıŝ*" or "God has written it so." Sorcery, however, takes 'what is written' and uses it to modify destiny and to alter the course of events in one's favour (see also Loeffler, 1988:172-173; Lambek, 1990:27). It is a means to control spiritual forces and overcome the constraints imposed from

without. Sorcery is believed to ward off the "evil eye", cure diseases,¹⁸² soothe pain, protect fields from drought and wild boars, incapacitate a person from consummating a marriage, and punish those who hurt you. Additionally, misfortunes such as unemployment, adultery, marital conflict, impotence, and many other "disgraces" are believed to be attributed to the influence of an amulet (*muska*) hidden in one's house, or to the influence of a sorcerer hired by an enemy.¹⁸³ This enemy may be a neighbour, a relative, a spouse, an in-law. When, for example, village women complain of being depressed and extremely unhappy, they suspect a village enemy (such as an in-law) of placing a spell on them.

Depending upon the type of spell requested, a sorcerer costs between 5,000 and 500,000 T.L., which is expensive considering that the average wage-earning peasant makes less than 300,000 T.L. monthly. If, for example, a family cannot find a suitable wife for their son, they often go to the sorcerer. Enlisting the help of a sorcerer in bride searches is costly and inflates the total cost of 'bringing in' a bride. One sorcerer commented by saying:

¹⁸² In a study of the relationship between sorcery and mental illness in Turkey, Öztürk (1964) documents the relationship among folk interpretations of mental illness, sorcery, the evil eye, and magic.

¹⁸³ Evans-Pritchard, in his study of magic in Azande society, also found that there were good and bad magic. See his "Witchcraft (mangu) amongst the Azande", Sudan Notes and Records, Vol. 12, 1929.

Adam oğlunu evlendirecek, ama oğlu için bir kız bulamamış. Bana geliyor, "filancanın kızın bana yapırır" diyor. Ben de karşılığında 200-300 bin T.L. istiyorum ... Bu para karşılığı yapar.

A man's son will marry, but a girl has not yet been found for him. He [the father] comes to me and says, 'how much will it cost to get a girl?' I say I want 200-300 thousand T.L. ... It's worth this much money.

Although a sorcerer is skilled at casting spells, he has little effect in mitigating the influences of spells cast by other sorcerers. Only *cinci* (lit. demons) can remove spells cast by a sorcerer. Typically, *cinci*'s are old *hocas* and they are believed to be well trained in talking to demons. *Hocas* are the "priests" in the Moslem religion. In the past, according to Öztürk, they were the religious teachers. For many centuries, *hocas* were trained and educated in religious schools called *medresehs*. When these schools were abolished, with the establishment of the Republic, *hocas* were trained through apprenticeship. They are considered to have *keramet*, a supernatural power to heal and to strengthen (1964:353).

There is only one *cinci* in Sakli, though there are others in nearby villages. To become a *cinci*, one must go through an elaborate right of passage. A village sorcerer explained part of the process:

3 gün oruç tutacaksın. 3 gün akşamı, namaz kılmaya başlayacaksın. Namaz kılarken, gece bir yılan gelecek. Sana selam verecek. Sen namazi bozup da ona selam vermeyeceksin. Bir süre sonra o kendiliğinde gitecek. Sen yine namaz kılmayı devam edeceksin. Bir süre sonra ejderha gelecek, 7 başka ejderha gelecek. Sana "selamun aleykum" diyecek. Sen yine namazını bozup ona selam

vermeyeceksin. Bir süre sonra o kendiliğında gitecek. Yine namaz kılmayı devam edeceksin. Bu sefer yaşlı, beyaz saçlı, beyaz sakallı bir adam gelecek sana "selamun aleykum" diyeceksin. Sen namazını bitirmek için selam vereceksin ve "aleykum selam" diyeceksin. Sana adam diyecek ki "Ey zat, benden ne dilersen dile". Sen de "butun olayları bilmek istiyorum" diyeceksin. O zaman cinci olacaksın.

You will fast for three days. On the night of the third day, you will start to pray. While you are praying, a snake will come in the night. It will greet you. If you stop praying, the snake will not greet you. Some time later it will go. Still, you will continue praying. Some time later a dragon will come, then seven different dragons will follow. They will say to you "peace be with you". Again, if you stop praying, they will not greet you. Some time later, they will go. Still, you will continue praying. This time, an old, white haired and bearded man will come and say "peace be with you". You will finish your prayers and you will greet him and say "peace be upon you". The man will say "person, whatever you request from me, say so". You will say "I want to know about all phenomena". Then you will become a 'cinci'.

There are, however, less formal ways of performing sorcery. Putting pork fat on household materials, or tying a piece of hair or clothing on a tree branch located in a sacred place are ways in which people engage sorcery at an informal level. The *turbe* is one such sacred place, believed to be the burial place of an ancient and powerful sorcerer. Villagers employ this form of sorcery to cure ailments and diseases. For example, if you tie a piece of your child's clothing to a tree, while reciting a Koranic verse and walking around the burial ground, your child's illness will be alleviated.¹⁸⁴ Informal sorceric practice is also used to

¹⁸⁴ In this society, young married women (especially those who live in their virilocal households) are discouraged from taking their children to visit the community doctor. It is believed by many older women and men (especially the

increase virility and fertility, impede the progress of unwanted pregnancies, soothe emotional ills, protect their tradition (by controlling, for example, the outcome of bride searches) and for other purposes as well. Such 'informal' sorcery is mainly the domain of females; it is common for women to place spells on others via the rituals associated with *turbe* or sacred spaces. Community members frequently make pilgrimages to this sacred place to engage the assistance of spiritual forces. While the informal practice of sorcery is the province of women, village men claim sorcery works best when performed by a male. In this society there is a strong tendency to attribute sorceric powers to men, and downplay women's role in the process (although many women participate).

Although sorcery plays a role in many aspects of village life, it is central in establishing or arranging marriages, creating love spells, and dealing with 'unruly' spouses. Since arranged marriages are common in Sakli (as in other areas of Turkey; see Sirman, 1988:116; Vergin, 1985; Olson, 1982:48; Fallers and Fallers, 1970:251), it is typical for a father to place a spell upon the woman he would like his son to marry, especially if her family is reluctant to agree to the marriage. In other cases, young unmarried women may place love spells on men they wish to marry. Should they not want to marry the person chosen by their parents, they may cast an evil spell on their chosen partner. In one situation, a

child's paternal grandparents) that such visits cause other people to gossip about the family, especially about the mother's inability to tend to the child's needs.

young woman was told by her parents that they arranged for her to marry her MBS (cross-cousin). She responded by saying that she did not want this; but her parents were adamant. Later that day, the young woman visited a local sorcerer. The sorcerer cast a spell upon the young cousin she was supposed to marry, and the young woman was then satisfied that the marriage would not take place. The woman has since married another man.

Conversely, when faced with an unapproved marriage, it is common for a parent to go to a local sorcerer and ask him to cast a spell on the son-in-law. This spell is believed to harm the son-in-law or, at least, make him leave his wife.

A sorcerer recalled what happened in another situation of *kız kaçıрма*:

Bir kız kaçırdı. Bu imam dahmatına büyü (esma) yapmış. Beş gün sonra, çocuk hastalandı, yavaş günden güne erimeye başladı. Büyü yaparken de bir sabunun üzerine yazıyorlar duayı, sonra kuyununcine atıyorlar. Bu sabun su da eridikce, büyü yapılan kişi de eriyecek... Benim bir düşmanım varsa, ona bir kötülük yapmak istiyorsam, ne yapıyorum, gidiyorum hocaya. Veriyorum 40-50 bin T.L. büyü yaptırıyorum. Kimse de bilmiyor benim ona kötülük ettiğimi.

A girl was kidnapped. An imam placed a spell on the son-in-law. Five days later, the child became sick and slowly died. While doing the spell, a prayer is written on the face of the soap and then thrown into a well. This soap dissolves in the water and the person - for whom the spell is cast - dissolves [passes away]... If I have an enemy, and if I want something bad to happen to him, what do I do? I go to the hoca. I give 40 to 50 thousand T.L. to cast this spell. No one will know that I caused something bad to happen to him.

While it is routine for villagers to visit the local sorcerer to stop an unauthorized marriage, it is also common for parents to intervene after the marriage. In one situation, a couple was having difficulty 'consummating' their marriage and the son's parents believed that one of their village enemies had placed an amulet or a spell (*muska*) in the room. After failing to find an amulet in the room, they told the young couple to move to another room that was considered safer. Soon after the move, the couple presented a sheet stained with blood to the groom's parents.¹⁸⁵

In another incident, a man living in one neighbourhood arranged for his son to marry a nearby neighbour. Soon after the marriage, to help pay for the bride-price, the son went to Istanbul to find wage work. The daughter-in-law continued to live with her in-laws. Months passed with no contact between the young man and his wife. Upon noticing how worried his new *gelin* had become, Hasan went to the sorcerer to find out if someone had placed a *muska* on the son. The sorcerer said that someone in the village had placed a spell on the son, preventing him from finding work. It was soon after hearing this from the

¹⁸⁵ Virginity is highly valued in this society (see also Sirman, 1988; Delaney, 1984; Kandiyoti, 1977), and everyone is keen to make sure their *gelin* is a virgin. On the wedding night it is customary for a couple to consummate the marriage while the husband's relatives sit outside the bedroom door. For a woman not to be a virgin on her wedding night can have serious consequences; it is common practice to terminate the marriage and return the woman home to her parents (with or without her clothes).

sorcerer that Hasan received word that the son was laid off from work. Hasan took the bus to Istanbul and brought his son home to visit his wife, thinking that this might ease the tension between the couple. Upon their reunion, the young woman was lead to the belief that her husband had found another woman in Istanbul since he was not interested in "being intimate with her." She went to the sorcerer and asked him to place a love spell on her husband.

Sorcery provides a means to deal with problems villagers face, and to mitigate the fact that much of their life is decided, controlled or influenced by others; they often use *kader*, which in Turkish means destiny or fate, to explain the unexpected or the way things work or evolve. As with any form of morality, sorcery does not preserve, defend nor protect anything. It always aims beyond the present state of affairs or course of events. It is through sorcery that villagers attempt not only to manipulate their environment, but to dominate it. That is, the goal of sorcery is not to resist a superior force, but to overcome it through means other than violence. Sorcery 'expresses' the aim of domination, through the manipulation of meanings. At this level, sorcery exerts itself against Islam, or anything imposing itself as the 'last word' or 'final judgement,' by subduing its rigid, textualized meaning to a variety of other purposes. Sorcery is an important social and cultural practice that adapts the forces of domination and subordination

to other functions, and makes everyone 'equally' susceptible to the forces of *muska*.

Concluding Remarks

Islam, in its usual depiction, is viewed as a fixed set of overarching and moral principles, and there is a tendency within this formalism to presuppose that societies are orderly, and that this order stems from a fundamental underlying consensus. Consensus, however, explains little of the village life, as there are marked discontinuities that can be traced throughout the community. In effect, legalistic perspectives reduce these breaks and ruptures to mere deviations, and so defer to the authority of the text, and to fixed normative standards or preconceived juridical ideals. They further posit the presence of a singular and uniform system of religion that is said to shape social relations in all directions; as the 'text' was either merely a description of a state of affairs, or the code to this description. The reduction of social life to divine providence and the problem of salvation, diminishes the capacity to view the actors in this society as agents involved in a continual process of dominating and being dominated.

While Sakli's marriage and gender relations are entrenched in a discourse of normative imperatives, sorceric practices are shown to be countermeasures to these strategies of domination, as they can be employed to systematically deny

the 'Islamic' and 'traditional' basis of the community. The paradox of rural Turkish culture is that, 'while community virtues' are continually constituted out of an extensive system of power relations, they are also *charmingly* subverted.

Conclusion

This dissertation addresses the problem of the relationship between morality and social relations, taking the point of view that moral claims, in and of themselves, are ineffective as means of understanding and explaining social life. I hold in suspense the notion that morality describes reality, and focus on the utility of moral claims in constituting, furthering and disguising the processes of domination that characterize social relations in Sakli. Simply conceiving morality as a set of norms defined by Islamic legal and moral codes, leads one to the conclusion that social behaviour and activity originate in the words of Islam. From this perspective, it is an Islamic regime (a system of governance that affects and structures everyday social phenomena) that disciplines social beliefs, practices and customs. As a collection of repressive values, Islam forms the primal discourse of motivations for everyday social action and takes responsibility for assembling and executing a special type of moral order. This view presents Islamic directives as the most powerful and prevalent form determining the character and meaning of social relations.

While the 'repression-thesis' suggests that Islamic moral codes are ultimately responsible in constraining the way people think and act, another common point of view is that immorality serves to manifest, reinforce and defend

the moral integrity and unity of the group. This 'function-thesis' perceives immoral beliefs and activities as necessary to the maintenance of social order, and are generated out of moral society only to serve this purpose. Moral society generates this opposite attribute out of itself in order to set in motion the 'forces of constraint' in support of the moral norm. In functionalism, the forces that oppose morality (crime, deviance, suicide) are made use of to maintain society and 'solidify' communal sentiments.

Many consider morality a system of beliefs that makes a state of domination 'reasonable,' providing it with several explanations and rationalizations. This one-sided view perpetually places morality in the role of preserving or defending something. As I have shown, this 'functionalist' perspective reduces morality to its self-professed aims, takes morality as it appears, and fails to discriminate origin from purpose. Morality always aims 'beyond.' Its importance is measured, not by its value in providing security but, by its utility in force relations (i.e., in social relations of domination and subordination). To the extent that they are compelled to function discursively within relations of domination, the 'facts' or 'truths' of morality are values or ideals that hide the goals of 'overcoming' and 'subjecting.'

I have shown that morality is a discursive phenomenon directed at dominating meaning. Morality seeks to change the things that oppose and resist

its aims, while appearing to maintain or preserve social order. This lead to my claim that the cause or origin of morality is different from its values and aims. Since all moral claims arise from a perceived discontent with 'the way things are', morality comprises convictions about 'what is' and attempts to overcome this state by positing an array of values and beliefs that articulate 'what should be.' The cause of morality thus stems from dissatisfaction and its inability to change 'the way things are.' In an attempt to dominate the force that it comes up against, morality possesses a transformative character and thus never maintains anything. So, instead of viewing morality as repressed by Islamic law or immorality as maintaining moral society, I argue that morality is a form of domination since it attempts to subsume people into a moral-discursive regime and thereby make them subject to its own aims and ends. Any moral regime (or form of governance) requires people to believe in its ideals and foster its aims. Theorizing morality in this way counters the notion that wherever moral claims appear we should presume that there is a repressive force aimed at preserving social order.

In striving to dominate any force that opposes it (i.e., to overcome resistance), morality seduces people to believe in the aims of its project. This is the only way for morality to subdue another force and become stronger. When a group believes in morality's goals and speaks and acts its 'truth', its members

become subjected to morality's ends. Such a moral regime, however, entails the deployment of sophisticated techniques; ones that sometimes do not seem to rule or govern anyone or anything. For example, groups come to advocate moral ideals 'as if' they were a law, not realizing that the promotion of these ideals subjugates them. Even rationalizing or justifying the necessity of moral values (regarding beliefs as preserving tradition, enhancing the unity of the group, etc.) is simply another way of attempting to compel people to do what you want. Moral judgements and evaluations are beliefs interpreted either as 'law', 'choice', or 'duty', and direct the action of people by restricting them to spheres of conformity and responsibility. No matter what the disguise, the process of constituting moral subjects is a form of domination.

My view of morality as a form of domination is relevant to the study of social relations in rural Turkish culture. When researching aspects of any culture, we may often believe that social relations are regular or law-like, that groups are unified and oriented towards collective interests, that 'communities' stand for something or represent something in and of themselves, or that village life is cohesive and tightly organized. We may come to this understanding, not necessarily because we support the predominant eurocentric or idealistic view of rural existence but, because we take the rationalizations given for rural beliefs and activity as 'truth.' And in so doing, we end up appropriating the descriptions

of 'the way things are or should be' as the basis for sociological imagination, without adequately theorizing why people define and interpret social relations in this way.

In this study, social relations are characterized as relations of domination and subordination. The domination of landlords over peasants, of parents over children, of men over women, and of the old over the young, are just a few examples of the forms in which power struggles are played out. Relations of domination and subordination are relations between people in which the aim is to over-power the other, i.e., to bring them into conformity with your designs, without recourse to physical force. This tactic of domination aims to increase the strength and vitality of one's goals without the risk to life involved in physical conflict. Morality is the means by which this process of struggle ensues, since subsuming people as subjects of a project involves the constitution of a moral-discursive regime (a regime of truth). In this regard, many claims are brought into play in order to get the other to identify with the aims of morality.

The deployment of morality in social relations disguises the aims of domination by concealing them as 'tradition' relations, dressing them in the costume of 'unity,' and parading them around the uniform of 'continuity.' At one level, it could be argued that the stability of this appearance stems from the 'fact' that the people in these relations do not judge themselves to be in positions of

domination or subordination and are more inclined to display their relations as complimentary than conflictual. It is essential, however, to analyze relations not just at the level of what is said, but who is speaking and the broader system of power relations within which this occurs. For this study, the most pervasive feature of social relationships are power struggles and the moral regimes that form both the context and the means of power relations.

Beneath the mere semblance of repressive aims of power and functional interpretations, I have shown that social relations within the village of Sakli are replete with relations of force and the struggle for governance. The site in which these struggles take place is the arena of discourse, and the aim of discursive strategies is the dominion over meaning and the formation of moral subjects. This process of struggle often manifests in a discourse of competing moral claims, where history, reason, heritage and reputation are appropriated and transformed in moral discourse, to both further and mask the aims of domination.

In illustrating the constitution of moral regimes, I have revealed how villagers in Sakli employ a variety of techniques directed at overcoming resistance while promoting (rather than defending) a semblance of order. Typically, villagers make use of the ideas of history, continuity and tradition in force relations. *Kök*, for example, is said to represent and define the group by determining its relation to a common 'root'. But *kök*, beyond the necessity of

representing something or someone real, can be extended or retracted depending on the circumstances in which it is deployed. Its essence is less significant than the uses it serves, since it can be utilized to discriminate those within the same clan, differentiate between good and bad neighbours, and distinguish clans from village landlords. *Kök* is metaphorical in its content, and, as with any metaphor, its meaning is always dependent on the context of its use. In this regard, 'history, continuity, and tradition' are not merely 'things that happen,' but are employed to delineate and regulate the parameters of social relations. Both descent reckoning and kin terminology construct a discursive field of moral familiarity. Under the guise of producing alliances against uncertainty and maintaining predictable bonds with others, the process of familiarization aims to subordinate 'allies' to a hierarchy based on gender and age. The expansion of the kin circle by the appropriation of the other is a theme taken up again in terms of marriage and the household.

While marriage is said to be a strategy of alliance used to promote or defend reciprocal social, economic and historical ties between households, the data suggest rather that it is a site for the play of force relations. That is, marriage practices are only ostensibly endogamous. Villagers claim they marry those close to them, when in fact very few marriages occur among kin or neighbours. Marriage has more to do with the appropriation of suitable *gelin* into

the aims of virilocal household production and expansion. Despite the claim that households serve the functions of promoting stability and unity, and follow a natural cycle of change, households are not rigid, stable structures and increases in household composition are largely due to the household's ability to incorporate daughter's-in-law, and make use of their productive and reproductive labour. This theme of gender subordination surfaces again in the phenomena of 'engendering' production relations prevalent in Sakli's domestic economy.

Subsistence agriculture is promoted as a way of maintaining tradition, and is said to contradict wage labour relations. Since seasonal migrant labour allows some to get out from under landlord domination and supports a feminized farming sector, the meaning of subsistence production transforms; female subsistence farmers are made the subjects of a new form of domination. Rather than simply pressured or pulled by external economic forces, everyday social relations are the context in which the forces of domination and subordination get played out.

Spurred on by the forces of differentiation, division and discontent, villagers make use of those magical forces that attempt to command and redirect 'the way things are.' Like any other form of domination, sorcery articulates an unwillingness to accept everyday social domination and subordination and aims to overcome anything that stands counter to its goals. While sorcery is believed to overcome all other forces (i.e., 'natural', traditional, legal, etc.) by subsuming

them into its project, villagers still remain susceptible to the will of yet another force.

This dissertation contributes to the literature on domination and rural culture in several significant ways. First, I show the importance of in-depth fieldwork in overcoming preconceived notions about the 'rule of law' in understanding culture. Secondly, I have illustrated the centrality of competing discourses in the social construction of reality that promote the meanings around which we organize and judge our experience. Thirdly, I have shown how social relations in terms of household, marriage and residence practices, gender relations, domestic economy, and descent and religious systems, are infused with power relations, which are played out at the level meaning. And finally, I would emphasize the importance of taking seriously the 'subjects' we study, since we are all, in some way or another, subjected to the play of forces.

Appendix A: Pronunciation Table

The Turkish alphabet has 29 letters, 21 of which are consonants and 8 are vowels. They are pronounced in the following way:

a (ah):	a as in father
b (bay):	b as in brother
c (jay):	j as in job
ç (chay):	ch as in charm
d (day):	d as in domination
e (ay):	e as in beg
f (fay):	f as in family
g (gay):	g as in guest
ğ:	This letter has the sound of a [y] consonant
h (hay):	h as in household
i (ee):	This vowel has the sound of the letters [ee] in fee
ı:	i as in milk (no dot over the i)
j:	This letter has the sound of the letter s in pleasure
k (kah):	k as in kidnap
l (lay):	l as in law
m (may):	m as in mask
n (nay):	n as in neighbour
o (oh):	o as in block
ö:	This vowel has the sound of the French [eu]
p (pay):	p as in power
r (ray):	r as in riddle
s (say):	s as in sorcery
ş (shay):	sh as in shrine
t (tay):	t as in tax
u (oo):	u as in rule
ü:	This vowel has the sound of the letters [ew] as in flew
v (vay):	v as in victory
y (yay):	y as in year
z (zay):	z as in zero

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