German Identity in the Context of the European Union Enlargement
Eastward: A Step Closer to Germanness?

by

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ABSTRACT

In its quest for an “ever closer Union,” the EU is progressively building power in the sphere of politics, financing, security, and identity formation. This case study of German national identity explores the impact of intensified Europeanization on the (trans)formation and expression of notions such as national identity, consciousness, and the feeling of national belonging. For several decades, Germany has been hailed as an exemplary EU supporter with low levels of national attachment. However, an in-depth analysis of the German media narrative surrounding identity (trans)formation in the context of the EU eastern enlargement reveals surprising insights, which challenge Germany’s Europeanness, while German citizens increasingly appear to perceive German national identity and pride as positive concepts. This development has coincided with the rise of Euroscepticism in the EU. This master thesis explores a tenuous connection between these two developments and the factors at play.
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LIST OF ACRONYMS

AfD – *Alternative für Deutschland* (Alternative for Germany)
CDU – *Christliche Demokratische Union* (Christian Democratic Union)
CECs – Central European Countries
CFSP – Common Foreign and Security Policy
DVU – *Deutsche Volksunion* (German People’s Union)
EB – Eurobarometer
ECSC – European Coal and Steel Community
EC – European Commission
ECRI – European Commission against Racism and Intolerance
EMU – European Monetary Union
ENP – European Neighbourhood Policy
ESDP – European Security and Defense Policy
EU – European Union
fi – Flash Eurobarometer
FRA – European Agency for Fundamental Rights
FRG – Federal Republic of Germany
GDR – German Democratic Republic
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NPD – *Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands* (National Democratic Party of Germany)
SED – *Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands* (Socialist Unity Party of Germany)
SIT – Social Identity Theory
WWII – World War II
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Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION

1.1. Background

The issue of identity and its measurement presents a challenging task in the context of the EU, where identity is inextricably connected with the process of European integration as well as the ways in which the EU projects itself on the international arena. Given that the EU is an entity comprised of twenty eight member states (MSs), the common European identity is a supranational phenomenon that transcends national boundaries. The questions of emergence and/or existence of a common identity among Europeans, its relationship with already existing regional and national identities, and prospects for the development of a common European consciousness have gained renewed significance in the context of recent EU enlargements to the East (2004 and 2007).

A number of scholars argue that a common European identity has existed for centuries and therefore recent changes in the notion of European identity represent attempts to reconstruct the already existing version in order to reflect relatively recent transformations that took place throughout the continent (Garcia 1993; Thiesse 2007). Alternatively, others view recent EU expansion to the East as a catalyst that triggered the processes of building European consciousness and constructing European identity (Fligstein 2009; Spohn 2005). Yet another perspective suggests that the intensive process of European integration may result in the intensification of the feelings of national belonging and consciousness among the populations of the MSs (Smith 1992:55).

Despite the abundance of discussions around the emergence of a common European identity and the preconditions for it, as well as the factors that might facilitate or obstruct its development, surprisingly little has been said about the effect that the
process of Europeanization has had on existing national identities. The common European identity is often portrayed as a victim threatened by nationalistically driven pursuits of the MSs (Spohn 2005:3; Robyn 2005:8). Contrastingly, many scholars disagree that European identity constitutes a threat to national identities of the MSs by promoting a concept of multiple or hybrid identities, meaning that national and European identities can peacefully co-exist in enlarged Europe (Case 2009:126; Bruter 2005:155). Arguably, the promotion of a common European identity among Europeans is one of the tools used to enforce Europeanization (Spiering 2002:75; Kohli 2000:120). By pursuing this identity-building project, the EU often seems to refuse to acknowledge MSs’ concerns about the loss of their cultural identities. In my research, I intend to analyze the effect of the recent EU enlargements eastward on national identities, with a specific focus on Germany.

Germany presents an interesting case study for examining the issues of identity, as its citizens appear to eagerly espouse two seemingly contradictory identities: they identify both with the EU and with their own nation. Although the levels of citizens in Germany choosing to describe their identity as “exclusively European” were habitually low in the late 1990s – early 2000s (4-6 per cent on average in Eurobarometer (EB) 53-78 (2000-2012),¹ they readily included European identity together with their national one. Indicators for “national and European identity” and “European and national identity” for the 2000-2004 time period constituted on average 43 per cent and 9 per cent respectively (EB 2000-2012). Combined, these two options outnumbered the levels of “nation only” answers, constituting 38 per cent on average throughout the same time period (EB 2000-

¹ In order to avoid confusion, documents published by European Commission will be referred to by indicating their title and year of publication.
Generally, these figures for Germany were consistent with the EU average. These statistics contribute to the perception of Germany as an EU-friendly country (Hurrelmann 2008:195).

Regarding its commonly accepted EU-friendliness, however, Germany presents us with surprising findings when assessing the successes and failures of Europeanization. Traditionally, Germany is described as a promoter of European integration because it has “whole-heartedly embraced” the project of Europeanization and because of its government’s dedication to the support of the EU (Hurrelmann 2008:195; Kohli 2000:122). Judging from this image propagated in the literature published throughout 2000-2010, one would expect political leaders of Germany to most naturally strive to attain the goals of the project of united Europe and align their domestic policies so they would contribute to reaching an ever-closer Union of European states. In its turn, following the government’s lead, the population of Germany should readily identify with the EU and its values leaving their national identity behind. Some of the statistical data from Germany discussed in more detail below support these assumptions, with German national pride being the lowest in the EU and the majority of the population feeling like European citizens (EB 53-78 (2000-2012)). However, the current state of Europeanness in Germany is far from being harmonic and idyllic. Levels of self-identification with the EU in Germany have consistently been comparable with the EU average and never amongst the highest. With rather low levels of public support and approval of the EU common currency and enlargement policies, and more political groups and parties including anti-EU, anti-Euro or anti-Europe elements in their manifesto, Germany is not at all free from Euroscepticism (Busch and Knelangen 2002:84).
In the earlier stages of the process of European integration, the number of German citizens considering their country’s membership in the EU “a good thing” was consistently higher compared to the EU average (62 per cent in Germany compared to 53 per cent in the European Community (EC) in 1980 (EB 14 (1980:17-8)) and 73 per cent in Germany compared to 69 per cent in the EC-12 in 1990 (EB34 (1990:14)). However, in the early 2000s, on the eve of the 2004 accession of new MSs to the EU, the figures for Germany sank slightly below EU-15 an average and estimated 48 to 52 per cent in 2000-2002 (EB54 (2000:32-4); EB57 (2002:22-3)). The general satisfaction with their membership in the EU among the MSs dropped by almost 20 per cent at that time (from 69 per cent in 1990 to 50 per cent in 2000) (EB 34(1990:14); EB54 (2000:32-4; Busch and Knelangen 2002:85). Together with higher levels of disapproval of Germany’s membership in the EU, German citizens expressed higher levels of Euroscepticism in general demonstrated by the growing popularity of anti-Europe political parties (Spiering 2002:70).

This change in the levels of support for the EU was accompanied by an increase in the levels of the national pride in Germany. In 2002, German national pride rose by 4 per cent and reached 70 per cent (EB 57(2002:59)). Although this figure was still the lowest in the EU, this development was nevertheless significant for Germany, and this number ranked the highest for this country since 1980s when the question was first included in the Eurobarometer (EB17 (1982:26)). Moreover, according to the statistical data, this tendency is gradually growing stronger.

Historical analysis of the process of the identity-construction in Germany reveals interesting insights with regards to the development of both a nation-state and the

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2 For a more detailed analysis of these changes, see Chapter 3 Table 3.3.
European project in Germany. Placing the research within the framework of the eastern enlargement of the EU allows one to determine shifts in the Germans’ perceptions of the EU, Europeanization, and Germany itself. The majority of studies on German national identity in the context of the EU eastern enlargement seek to explore the ways German identity and memories of the past dictated their attitudes towards the last expansion of the EU and influenced the EU’s enlargement policy (Zaborowski 2006; Banchoff 1999). However, by focusing the research efforts on the investigation of the effect of the EU expansion to the East on German national identity, a newly emerged dedication to the construction of a stronger national identity within their nation as well as a slight change in perceptions of Germany and the EU can be observed (Kulish 2010; Soman 2013). The aforementioned change constitutes the ground for the research, which focuses on investigation of the nature of this perceptive shift, the factors that triggered it and its direction.

1.2. Research question

The process of Europeanization has gone a long way in Germany. While in 1991 the majority of Germans (51 per cent) admitted that they never felt European (EB 36 (1991:18)), twenty years later 77 per cent of respondents from Germany felt like they were “a citizen of the EU” (EB77 (2012:22)). Arguably, the increased visibility of the EU in the media, and personal experiences of the individuals with the EU, such as a single currency and free movement within the Schengen zone, are considered to be potential and interrelated sources for the increased psychological presence of the EU in the national mentality of the EU citizens in general and Germans in particular (Risse 2010:94-5). However, the situation appears to have changed at the time of the 2004/2007 EU
expansions eastward. The attachment to the EU had gradually lowered from 66 per cent in 2000 to 52 per cent in 2007, whereas the attachment to their country remained strong (87 per cent) (EB54 (2000:11-2) - EB68 (2007:67)). In 2003/4, the levels of national pride among Germans rose by 4 per cent, while the levels of identification with Europe only or with Europe primarily and then with the nation both fell by 2 per cent each (EB61 (2004:95)). Some authors noted that the levels of Euroscepticism in Germany expressed as dissatisfaction with Germany’s membership in the EU and disapproval of the EU policies exceeded levels of support for the EU (Spiering 2002:70).

The discrepancy between the commonly accepted position of Germany as a fierce promoter of the project of the “United States of Europe” and statistical data on the indicators related to this image provides a puzzle placed in the foundation of my research. Germany’s assumed Euro-friendly position cannot be regarded as a postulate unlikely to change. The new reality reveals that political leaders in Germany, like in any other MS in the EU, have second thoughts about Germany’s role and place in the EU and treat the project of Europeanization more cautiously than before.

The EU’s expansion to the East is the biggest enlargement in its history. It has changed the face of Europe, the structure of the EU, its political, economic and social functions, and its image on the international arena. Furthermore, it had the potential to alter the perception of the EU and its institutions by the citizens of the MSs, and the ways they perceive the EU and their own nations, therefore creating a need to investigate the impact of the EU enlargement on the perception of national identity within the MSs. In light of these considerations my research question is as follows:

How did the perception of the national identity in Germany change (if at all) in the period of the fifth enlargement, and what are the factors that may explain these effects?
The puzzle underlying the research question is twofold. First, low levels of public support for the enlargement project in Germany throughout its final preparatory stages in 2000-2004 and after its completion in 2004 until the present contradict Germany’s role as a long-term advocate for the fifth enlargement (Zaborowski 2006:104). On a larger scale, such a reaction from the general public in Germany challenges its alleged unreserved devotion to the project of European integration. Throughout the indicated time periods the levels of support for any further expansion of the EU were among the lowest in the EU-15 (EU53 (2000) - 61(2004)). In contrast, in the earlier stages of the accession negotiations with the candidate states, German political elites were eagerly supporting the project employing the most common argument of the shared European identity and cultural heritage between the EU-15 and the Central European countries (CECs) (107). It is therefore surprising to observe such an incongruity between Germany’s established role as a promoter of the eastern enlargement and low figures for public support for this project. Secondly, as one of the key-projects conducted by the EU and “co-initiated by Germany,” the process of enlargement caused the rise in general dissatisfaction with the EU and its policies among Germans, resulting in a disapproval of German membership in the Union among citizens and a more defensive attitude towards German national interests among political leaders (Busch and Knelangen 2004:84).

This lack of enthusiasm and support from the population is especially interesting in the case of Germany. In the light of the country's role in two world wars, along with Hitler's systematic persecution of the Jewish population in Europe, Germany tends to demonstrate low levels of national pride and weak attachment to their state because of their positive correlation with xenophobia and intolerance towards immigrants.
(Bergsieker 2010:152). Moreover, German experience of militarism and Nazism is often referred to as the ‘other’ in the history of Europe, - a phenomenon that has to be overcome and eradicated by means of European integration (Risse 2010:53). As a result, Germany actively promoted Europeanness as a way of “atonement for national wrongdoing” (Bergsieker 2010:152). Moreover, European identity in Germany was generally considered to be natural and typical whereas the demonstration of national belonging or national consciousness had negative connotations in the light of previous historical experience (Banchoff 1999:280). Therefore, the shift in attitudes towards Germany and the EU among both political leaders and the general public can indicate the emergence of new feelings of national belonging, national pride, and consciousness among Germans. This thesis explores possible explanations for the aforementioned discrepancies and transformations.

1.3. Hypothesis of the Research

Based on the perception of the EU as a multilevel governance structure, the emergence of European identity is often described as taking place in the context of declining national identities (Demossier 2007:58). Contrastingly, the neo-realist approach foresees a scenario whereby national identities would be transformed rather than replaced by European identity during the process of Europeanization, possibly resulting in an intensification of nationalistic feelings (Spohn 2005:4). Yet the functionalist school of thought predicts the Europeanization of national identities under the aegis of ‘unity in diversity,’ with European identity serving to preserve national and cultural diversity in the EU (Risse 2010:38). However, these approaches fail to adequately explain the shift in the attachment to the EU and their own nation, as observed among the German
population.

Taking into consideration the speed and the scope of the enlargement, I believe that a careful examination of the nature of the enlargement itself and Germany’s involvement in the process might explain this phenomenon. Therefore my research tests the hypothesis that in the past decade (namely 2000-2012) Germans have acquired a more positive perception of the concept of German national identity facilitated by the process of the EU eastern enlargement, among other factors. The changing image and meaning of Europe, as well as economic, political, socio-economic and cultural (historical and religious) transformations caused by the eastern enlargement, led Germans to re-evaluate their perceptions of Germany and the EU, which in turn precipitated a shift in their attachments to Germany and to the EU. The shift under scrutiny has taken place over time and this process is still ongoing, therefore the direction of the shift in perception as well as the factors responsible for it are a subject to change. Priority is given to the notion of a German national identity and its development, wherein the shift in the perception of a European identity in Germany, although observed, is not explored to the same extent. The interdependence of the fluctuations in the levels of national and European attachments among Germans could not be established. Therefore, it is impossible to state whether the positive or negative change in one form of attachment causes or influences the change in another in any way. To be more specific, to test whether the sense of Europeanness is weakening in Germany is not the main priority of my research. Although German European identity is discussed and examined, the focus of my research remains to test whether a national identity is gaining a more positive perception due to a more favourable environment for its development.
1.4. Proposed Explanations

A detailed analysis of available sources revealed several factors of a material and non-material nature that might have had a certain impact on the processes of self-identification and forming an attachment within the German population. Analysis of these factors is performed with the purpose of examining any changes in Germany’s position with regards to identity construction influenced by the 2004/2007 eastern enlargements. Moreover, historical analysis is employed in order to investigate the process of identity formation in Germany prior to the eastern enlargement, to determine the significance of historical memories in this process as well as their influence on domestic and international policy-making in Germany. The nexus and mutual impact of identity-politics and enlargement is explored (Sedelmeier 2003; Risse 2010). Overall, the factors taken into consideration and analyzed are as follows:

*Non-material factors (history and religion):*

German post-war history is inextricably connected to the process of the construction of German national and European identities. After its defeat in World War II (WWII), the German state was divided in two and the development of its common history and identity was interrupted. These factors play a major role when analyzing identity formation in Germany, the levels of national pride among its citizens and their willingness to self-identify with their country and/or Europe. A long-term division of the German state in 1945-1990 still influences the ways in which German citizens identify themselves in eastern and western regions (Burbank 2003:11). The history of Germany had and still has an impact on the choices of its political leaders both in domestic and European politics (Maier 1988; Fulbrook 1999).
The accession of CECs has to a certain degree brought back history to the EU (Risse 2010:209). The role of historical memories in the process of “widening” of the EU can be seen as twofold. On one hand, Germany eagerly used the enlargement to reconcile with countries such as Poland and the Czech Republic; on the other hand, the accession of these countries was perceived as contentious, given the events of WWII. As a result, I analyze Germany’s position towards the enlargement to determine the extent to which the latter was guided by memories of the past and employed as a means to reconcile with the East (Zaborowski 2006:105). I also assess the significance of Germany’s argument of shared cultural identity while selecting candidates for accession. Furthermore, I compare the images of the CECs, EU and Germany as promoted in German media (newspaper articles) prior to and after the enlargement with the purpose of identifying any shifts in messaging. One of the plausible explanations of a perceptive change in Germany is that Germans realized the lack of commonalities in cultural identities between eastern and western Europeans even before the enlargement took place (Fuchs and Klingemann 2002:20). This feeling, intensified by the enlargement, generated a shift in Germans’ perceptions of CECs and their attitudes towards the EU’s widening. With the purpose of testing this assumption, I examine a Central European identity and compare it to its Western European counterpart in order to determine the extent of commonalities between them.

**Material factors (economic, security and political factors):**

In order to test my hypothesis, I examine economic, political and security factors from two perspectives. Firstly, prior to enlargement, the potential benefits in the sphere of economics and security were used as one of the main arguments for the accession of the
CECs candidates (Sedelmeier 2003:4; Zaborowski 2006:105). Germany was considered to be one of the biggest beneficiaries from the eastern enlargement in terms of economic gains. Therefore, it is possible that anticipated economic benefits might have generated an increase in the levels of attachment to the EU among German citizens. However, on the other hand, the costs of the enlargement specifically for Germany could outweigh the benefits and cause fear of instability and changes in the minds of citizens. Moreover, enlargement has transformed the relationship between Germany and its closest neighbours. The CECs are no longer the recipients of policies but take active part and have a voice in policy-making. The prospect of this shift could generate fear of Germany losing its political weight in the EU, which would prompt foremost political elites to reassess the role of their state in the process of European integration.

From the socio-economic perspective the elimination of the old category of the “other” and its transformation to the category of the “other within” (Risse 2010:220) resulted in intensification of nationalistic feelings in Germany. Fearing the increase in immigration from the new MSs as well as outsourcing German businesses and companies to the East, German citizens have repeatedly named cuts in jobs and unemployment as one of their primary concerns. Moreover, already in 1997 the majority of the population (79 per cent) believed that Germany had reached its limits for immigration (Special Eurobarometer 113.1 (1997:7)). This tendency hasn’t recently changed, with more Germans growing overly protective of their job market and stating that it should be prioritized for German citizens only. Due to these sentiments, Germans might not be as welcoming to their new EU-fellows, generally assessing them as a threat (Risse 2010:222).
Explaining the Hypothesis

Considering the explanations proposed above, I hypothesize that eastern enlargement in the EU is one of the factors responsible for the shift in the Germans’ perceptions of Germany and its national identity, the EU and its project. This shift has a potential to affect the levels of attachment to the EU and Germany among the German population. More specifically, I hypothesize that the fifth EU enlargement served to strengthen a positive perception of the national identity among the German citizens. However, given the intensity of the process of European integration and other events taking place in the EU simultaneously with it in the time period under examination, it is not plausible to assume that the EU’s enlargement eastward is the single factor solely responsible for the perceptive shift.

Given that an examined shift is happening over time (namely 2000-2012), I analyze the initial state of German national identity in the beginning of 2000s as well as the factors that led to it by employing historical analysis of the identity-development process in the post-World War II era. General public support for the European project in addition to the dedication of political leaders to the long-term goals of European integration in Germany in the second half of the twentieth century facilitated the development of a strong attachment to Europe, its values and initiatives among Germans. However, as the project to reach an “ever closer Union” was slowly increasing in its scope and objectives by bringing in more MSs and striving not only for economic closeness but for a political unity, the perception of Germany with regards to its role in the project slowly began to change among its political leaders and general public. This shift in German dedication to the goal of “United States of Europe” was demonstrated in
a more defensive attitude towards German national interests and a more cautious approach to the process of European integration (Jefferey and Paterson 2003:72).

Despite the German government’s efforts involved in planning and implementing two key projects of the EU, namely the common currency and eastern enlargement, the general public in Germany felt little attachment to either of these initiatives. This fact signifies the gap in the orientation of the political elites and public support for Europeanization. The establishment of a single currency caused a lot of contradicting feelings among the German public. Although, in general the levels of support for the project were rather high (67 per cent in 2002 (EB57 (2002:75), and 69 per cent in 2008 (EB 69.3 (2008:20)), the numbers of respondents in Germany who felt more European by using a single currency (35 per cent) and “fairly attached to Euro” (27 per cent) were among the lowest in the EU (EB57 (2002:81-2)). With regards to the widening of the EU to include more MSs in future years, the number of German citizens opposed to the idea was among the highest in the EU starting with 43 per cent in 2002 and reaching 58 per cent in 2008 (EB 57 (2002:85) - EB68 (2008:124)). In the framework of my research I analyze the reasons that underlie this opposition.

1.5. Problems of Definition

While identity is generally perceived as a complicated and multidimensional issue imbued with ambiguity (Thiesse 2007:15), the majority of scholars seem to agree on the existing interconnection between culture and identity (Fligstein 2009, Karolewski 2010, Demossier 2007, Spohn 2005, Checkel and Katzenstein 2009) on one side and politics and identity on the other (Herrmann 2006, Bruter 2005, Demossier 2007). Therefore, much of the discussion on the issue of identity involves considerations of culture and its
elements, such as a common history, historical experiences, historical memories, national language, values and heritage. The inextricable link between identity and history places both notions in relations of interdependence with each other. Identity politics are influenced by historical events and in their turn also produce impact on political choices made by the state government. Politically, identity is defined as a citizen’s “sense of belonging to politically relevant human groups and political structures” (Demossier 2007:49). In light of a recent shift in the ways the EU projects itself at the international level, the concepts of culture and identity “have become politically charged” (49). The view that one cannot assess identity, either national or European, simply as a cultural phenomenon detached from the European integration project (Spohn 2005, Case 2007, Herrmann 2006) and the process of Europeanization (Demossier 2007, Grillo 2007) dominates the discourse on identity construction in the EU.

For the purposes of my research, “identity” is defined as a sense of belonging to and identification with a particular group, such as the nation (in the case of German national identity) or Europe and/or the EU (in the case of European identity). When analyzing the process of identity formation in Germany, I assess the role of German historical memories in the process, as well as look for references to both world wars, the Holocaust, expressions of guilt or need for reconciliation by the country's leaders and/or citizens used in the context of the enlargement process. I also examine the influence of identity politics on German political decisions, such as German involvement in the process of European integration, priorities and focus in the decision-making on the domestic and international levels, as well as German position with regards to enlargement.
In the case of German national identity, there is a historically influenced perception of the synonymy between the notions of national identity, pride, consciousness and nationalism. Expressing national pride is often regarded as a negative phenomenon because it is perceived as expressing nationalistic and xenophobic inclinations. The same misconception also applies in the case of patriotic feelings toward Germany. There is a thin line between patriotism and nationalism: the distinction between the two is predominantly based on the positive perception of the former, whereas the latter tends to carry a more negative connotation. The main difference between the two concepts, according to some sources, lies in the extent to which they balance exclusive and inclusive tendencies towards other cultures/nations. Nationalism, which relies on the notions of descent, race or cultural affiliation to determine the boundaries of belonging to a group, tends to demonstrate high levels of intolerance towards anything foreign to one’s culture (Blank and Schmidt 2001:3). Therefore, the opposition between “us” and “them” is central to nationalism and serves as its starting point.

Patriotism, on the other hand, serves as a “counter-concept to nationalism” and is defined as “a combination of “love of the country” and “attachment to national values based on critical understanding” (Blank and Schmidt 2001:3-4). Rooted in humanist and democratic values, patriotism exhibits high levels of tolerance for and inclusion of other cultures and their representatives. However, in their study on patriotism, Blank, Schmidt and Westle challenge the distinction between “good patriotism” and “bad nationalism” as non-existent since both notions promote the extolling of one’s nation compared to others (2001:3). “Blind” or unjustified patriotism that provides no reasons behind its expression or fails to explain its basis is considered to be nothing more than plain nationalism
(Bergsieker 2010:154). Given the difficulty of drawing a clear distinction between the two concepts, the act of expressing pride in belonging to one’s nation can be confused sometimes with expressing negative nationalistic views. In the context of Germany, such confusion is particularly noticeable. Nationalism and politically motivated extremist crime are not the focus of this research and are discussed only in the relation to the context of identity formation.

Within the past decade, German dissatisfaction with the EU has become increasingly noticeable. The tendency among German political leaders to prioritize German national interests over the goals of European integration and the fact that anti-Euro and anti-Europe political groups and parties are gaining more support among the population are considered to be some of the most prominent manifestations of German Euroscepticism (Spiering 2002:70; Knelangen and Busch 2002:85). With the growing number of MSs in the Union, the levels and the intensity of Eurosceptic sentiments also varies to a great extent. Taking into consideration the dissimilarities across the EU, Euroscepticism is usually separated into two types: hard and soft (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2002:3). In the case of Western Europe, however, it is possible to talk about “the idea of contingent or qualified opposition, as well as incorporating outright and unqualified opposition to the process of European integration” (7). However, with the CECs joining the EU, the meaning and expressions of Euroscepticism have also become more diversified.

Hard Euroscepticism is a more extreme opposition to the process of European integration, going so far as to express the desire to withdraw a country’s membership from the Union. This type of Euroscepticism is usually expressed on the political level
through anti-Europe or anti-Euro political groups and parties and involves a disagreement with and challenging of the key policies of the EU (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2002:7). Despite disapproval by the German public of some of the policies produced by the EU, namely the Euro, enlargement and the solutions to an economic crisis, it is generally considered that hard fundamental Euroscepticism is still not present in Germany.

*Alternative für Deutschland* (AfD) anti-Euro party is gaining more support among the public, however, this party declares itself as anti-Euro and not anti-EU. Given the scope and the nature of the project of Europeanization, it is natural for the EU and its MSs not to see eye to eye on one or several policy areas, especially where “the national interest is at odds with the EU’s trajectory” (7). Such disagreement is classified as soft Euroscepticism. A cumulative share of the vote for parties based on Euroscepticism in parliamentary elections for the lower Chamber in Germany counted among the lowest in the EU and constituted 8.4 per cent in 2001(23). However, due to the complications connected with the process of Europeanization, this tendency in Germany is subject to change.

**1.6. The scope of the research**

The research will focus on the time period from 2000 until 2012. This time period was chosen for examination due to the intensity of the activity of the EU directed at establishing itself as a relevant actor in the spheres of politics, security and stability, finances, economics and trade. The EU has gained more authority and more decision making power in the sphere of safety and security, by establishing new institutions and bodies such as Europol, FRONTEX, among others. One of the main priorities of the process of European integration, however, was dedicated to eastern enlargement. The role
of Germany in both projects and consequently its involvement in them was significant.

The focus of the research is on determining whether the shift in the attitudes of Germans towards their state and its participation in the project of Europeanization shown in statistics is also noticeable in general public discourse in the media. A more detailed timeline of events analyzed within the framework of this research is indicated in Chapter 5 (Table 5.1).

1.7. Theoretical framework

The nature of any collective identity, be it a national or European one, is multifaceted and contradictory. The multiplicity of theories advanced by scholars in an attempt to describe the notion of European identity highlights a general difficulty in fitting research into the framework of one school of thought. For the purposes of this research, identity is regarded as a socially and historically constructed phenomenon, which served both as an object and an actor in terms of history and political decision-making. The versatility of the notion of identity contributes to the complicated causal relationship between identity and politics, where it becomes increasingly problematic to establish whether identity is shaped by certain political decisions or whether politics are influenced by the identity of the actors involved or both. The constructivist school of thought is of particular relevance when considering the issue of the emergence and further development of national and European collective identities.

Constructivism maintains that any collective identity is a socially constructed formation (Gillespie and Laffan 2006, Karolewski 2010, Fligstein 2009). Every nation is “a social construction […] constituted by a rich legacy of remembrances” (Fulbrook 1999:12). Constructivist institutionalism emphasizes the role of the institutions and
interests in the process of identity formation and change (Risse 2010:88). Several other theories appear to share in this approach. From the neofunctionalist perspective, the process of European integration and their state’s participation in it inevitably affects the interests of citizens, potentially facilitating a change in the ways citizens identify themselves, and even causing a shift in their loyalties from exclusively national to the European level (89). However, being a phenomenon that is constructed over a long period of time, identity is susceptible to the influence by institutions (sociological institutionalism), elite discourse, media, education and other active and conscious mediums through which people change and form their identities (88-9). Thus, the images produced in the media, as well as their positive or negative evaluation of the events, policies, institutions, states and other actors, influence judgment on these matters and contributes to formation of a positive or negative impression among the population (Bruter 2005:28-9). Moreover, the growing visibility of the EU in the media, as well as an increased presence of the EU symbols in the everyday life of the EU citizens have had a positive impact on the levels of EU acceptance by the populations of the MSs (Risse 2010:91).

Cultural symbols and historical memories play a pivotal role in this process. Regarding Germany, the negative historical experience of National Socialism, WWII and the Holocaust undermined a natural development of a national form of collective identity, facilitating the destruction and deconstruction of feelings of national belonging, national consciousness and pride (Maier 1988:139; Fulbrook 1999:20). As explored later in my thesis, the definition of national identity based only on history and a dominant position in the German interpretation of history highlighting a negative legacy of the German nation
rather than its positive communal experiences, caused reluctance among Germans to self-identify with their nation. According to social identity theory (SIT) if the comparison between ingroup (such as the German nation) and relevant other categories (outgroups, such as neighbouring countries participating in the European Community project in 1950s) results in a negative outcome, then the ingroup will seek a more positive outgroup to self-identify with in order to boost their positive social identity (Mummendey 1998:260). As was discussed above, in the post-WWII era, Germany was regarded as the “Other” in relation to European commitment to peace and stability due to its militaristic and Nazi past (Risse 2010:53). Therefore, as a part of its “identity management strategy” (Mummendey 1998:260), Germany embraced the project of Europeanization to contribute to rehabilitation of its own positive image (Bergsieker 2010:152). SIT is applied to find potential explanations for the dedication of Germany’s leaders to the European integration project and high levels of self-identification with Europe among Germans.

From a constructivist standpoint, the concept of “othering” has become an important part of the discourse on European identity (Smith 1992:55; Kohli 2000:127). It is generally perceived as a vehicle for collective identity formation and overcoming crisis within the nationalism framework since the binary construction of “us” versus “them” enables the use of “blaming and scapegoating strategies” (Karolewski 2010:28). Practices of “othering” are often used in the process of nation and community building, and are crucial to defining European identity since they promulgate new understandings of culture and identity (Demossier 2007:55; Grillo 2007:79). The image of the “other” permeates the discourse on racism and xenophobia (Evans 2009; Knischewski 2009).
A socially constructed image, identity is particularly relevant in the context of the EU expansion to the East. The recent enlargement has brought to the forefront the complex nature of the relations between eastern and western Europe. While their Europeanness is rarely disputed, eastern Europeans are often perceived as migrants and foreigners by western Europeans (Checkel and Katzenstein 2009:217). These perceptions serve to undermine the sense of commonness in Europe and reinforce the sense of national belonging among western Europeans. My research tests this assumption by examining the rhetoric with regards to the CECs over time during the process of enlargement. I explore the references to the commonness between East and West used by German and European politicians while promoting and advocating the project, as well as shifts in their attitude to the CECs within the indicated time period (2000-2012). With regards to this issue, the focus of my research stays on the perception of the Central European states in Germany prior to and post enlargement.

1.8. Methodology and Research Activities

For the purpose of this qualitative study, I conducted a content analysis of a number of German newspaper articles and examined relevant statistical data to identify and discuss the effects of the fifth EU enlargement on views of national identity in Germany (if any), and the factors that may explain these effects. The content analysis is based on the constructivist theory of the influence of media on the construction of a positive or negative identification with the relevant group discussed in the media (Bruter 2005:28-9). I approach identity as a phenomenon that can be constructed and shaped through production of positive or negative images and likely to create a positive or negative impression among the audience, which later has a potential to influence their willingness
to self-identify or demonstrate belonging or attachment to the groups represented by either the nation-state or the EU in my research. More specifically, I perform a comparative analysis of media images in order to determine a perceptive shift towards German national identity over the time when the project of eastern enlargement was prepared, implemented and assessed with regards to its immediate consequences.

While performing a content analysis of German newspapers I examine the ways in which the media constructed and presented a positive or negative image of Germany, the EU and its institutions, CECs, and the enlargement among German citizens in the relevant time periods. The objective of this exercise was to test whether the newspapers in Germany contribute to strengthening of a positive perception of Germany and its national identity, as well as determine how the EU, CECs and enlargement are projected. For this purpose, I have selected three large German newspapers, namely Süddeutsche Zeitung, Die Welt (daily) and Der Spiegel (weekly). These publications represent different political leanings (Die Welt representing right, while Süddeutsche Zeitung and Der Spiegel being largely centre-left). To ensure the feasibility of the research, I developed a coding scheme to help to identify the most recurring themes in the debate on identity building in Germany in the relevant time frame, as well as developed a criterion for positive or negative evaluation of the newspaper statements on the subjects under scrutiny. More detailed description of my research activities in terms of media content analysis as well as the findings of this exercise are described in Chapter 5. The list of analyzed sources is indicated in Appendix 2.

More often identity in the media was discussed in a larger context of other events taking place in the sphere of economics and politics in the EU or Germany. Interestingly,
European identity did not appear as often as its German national counterpart. Low numbers of articles making the topic of identity their main focus on the one hand can mean that the topic of identity development in Germany is not as urgent as other topics concerning politics and economics. On the other hand, the fact that identity often appears in the discussions on politics and economics confirms the versatility of the notion of identity and its inextricable link to other spheres (Carey 2002:407).

With the purpose of determining the areas of research and finding possible explanations for the issue under examination, I analyzed a vast body of literature, represented by primary sources, empirical evidence and secondary literature relevant to my research. In order to determine any quantitative shift in German attitudes toward the European project, the relevant sections of the Eurobarometer were analyzed throughout 2000-2012. More specifically, I analyzed relevant data from Standard Eurobarometer surveys (issues 53-76) to examine the sections relevant for identity-related issues, such as “National and European identity,” “National pride,” “Pride in Being European,” “Attitudes to Enlargement,” “Attachment to the EU,” among others. For examining the data on enlargement I analyzed Flash Eurobarometer (issues 124, 132.1, 132.2, 140, 257) and Special Eurobarometer (issues 166, 255). Moreover, in order to explore levels of racism and xenophobia, attitudes toward immigrants and areas of potential discrimination toward non-Germans in the Federal Republic, annual Reports on Racism and Xenophobia, published by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), were examined within the same timeframe.

The analysis of the empirical data revealed certain limitations of such surveys, such as the Eurobarometer. The statistics on European and national pride and identity as
compiled through Eurobarometer surveys must be carefully processed and analyzed for multiple reasons. The Eurobarometer is a Europe-wide survey designed to address the most urgent issues on the European agenda, while demonstrating success of the European integration process and redeeming its current and potential downfalls. Considering the purpose of this survey, the way the questions are asked might bias respondents towards a certain answer. Another pitfall is the lack of definition, clarity and legitimacy behind the concepts of European pride and European identity as described in the Eurobarometer. For example the question if a respondent feels European does not explain what is meant by “European,” allowing respondents to base their answers on their own interpretation. This further increases the ambiguity of the data. The figures and findings retrieved in the process of surveying are placed in the Eurobarometer just as statistics together with a brief comparison to the former years if a change is observed. The increases/decreases in the figures are left without any explanation or interpretation and are not placed in a larger context.

Although the sampling methods, such as the quantity of the respondents overall and their distribution according to the MSs, gender, occupation, age, and other characteristics, are provided in the beginning of every issue, the results of the Eurobarometer cannot be considered reflective of the entire MSs population. Another concern is that, according to one of the sections of the Eurobarometer, the majority of the population knows very little about the EU and its institutions (EB66 (2006)). Thus when people comment on their attachment to the EU or indicate that they express pride in the EU, it is not clear what exactly is meant by these sentiments. Finally, the survey lacks consistency, which significantly complicates any attempts to analyze the development of
the concepts under scrutiny over time. The sections relevant to my research, such as sections on the European and national pride were not consistently included in all the issues. Some of the more recent issues provide data only on the European dimension and leave out national dimensions, making a comparison impossible.

In order to determine the degree of relevance assigned to the concept of European identity by EU institutions, and to see how the concept has evolved over time, I examined the Declaration on European Identity, 1973; Treaty on European Union (TEU), 1992; Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (TCE), 2005; and Lisbon Treaty, 2007. In order to confirm shifts in German national identity and European identity in Germany I turned to thematic studies on the Demography of Growing European Identity, and empirical surveys conducted by Emnid-Institut for Spiegel exploring identity in Germany post its reunification in 1990.
Chapter 2 CRITICAL LITERATURE REVIEW

After the 2004/2007 EU enlargements, the issues of European culture and identity “became more acute than ever before” (Demossier 2007:1). Given its unique supranational character, the EU represents an interesting case study for examining the relationship between national and transnational identities, be it one of convergence, co-existence, competition or even opposition. The recent EU enlargement to the East provides a unique opportunity for investigating issues such as the establishment of a common European space and fostering of a common European consciousness, successes and downfalls of Europeanization, and the effects these processes have at the national level.

This thesis therefore aims to test whether there has been a shift in German perceptions of German national identity and the process of Europeanization as depicted in the media, as well as the direction of this shift and possible explanations for it, related to the EU’s fifth enlargement. In order to determine the presence of a shift in attitudes toward the German national and European identity, I compared a vast body of literature on the emergence and development of German national and European identities, German involvement in the process of European integration, and I performed a media content analysis of statements relating to national identity, on the one hand, and the EU, on the other, both prior to and following the process of enlargement.

There is an extensive body of scholarly literature on the subject of national and European identities in the context of European integration in general, and enlargement specifically, in the English and German languages. In order to perform its analysis, I organized the secondary sources conceptually and thematically: (1) analyzing conditions
necessary for the emergence of European identity, sources of positive and negative identity, and identifying tools that the EU and MSs employ for identity construction; (2) analyzing the role of Germany in the process of the eastern enlargement of the EU, as well as evaluating the role of identity politics in the project; (3) analyzing “side effects” of enlargement and, more generally, European integration for Germany and the EU, namely increasing Eurosceptic and nationalistic tendencies. At this point, nationalism at both the nation-state and European levels is discussed in terms of its different types in Europe. Of particular interest are works that discuss the impact of EU enlargement on national identity and the influence of European integration on the ways in which Europeans identify themselves and define their political affiliations. This literature review chapter draws on both theoretical literature on the subject of European identity (Case 2009; Spohn 2005; Karolewski 2010; Thiesse 2007; Demossier 2007; Grillo 2007; Herrmann 2006; Checkel and Katzenstein 2009), and empirical studies on the topic (Fligstein 2009; Robyn 2005; Bruter 2005; Gillespie and Laffan 2006).

The discussion on European identity as presented in the scholarly sources under examination spans a variety of issues related to the subject. This multiplicity of opinions tends to generate fragmentation in the discussion. The review of selected readings revealed some gaps and inadequacies, as well as highlighted several issues requiring further consideration. Regarding the sources that rely on empirical research, the results are generally problematic and require further investigation for several reasons. The data came mostly from Western European countries, therefore creating the need to conduct similar research in Central Eastern Europe. Additionally the type of the questions in the analyzed surveys is helpful only insofar as they determine whether or not Europeans
associate themselves with the EU or the nation-state, and fail to analyze the extent or peculiarities of these attachments.

2.1. Conditions for the Emergence of a National and European Identity

Depending on how the authors view the relationship between European and national identity they take different approaches in predicting conditions for the emergence of the former. Spohn (2005:3) defines three options for analyzing European identity as it relates to national identity: as a weak addendum to strong national identities (based on the confederational intergovernmentalist conception of the EU); as an emerging power that will in the long run restructure existing national identities (based on the federal functionalist conception of the EU); and as part of the mix between national and European attachments (based on the perception of the EU as a multilevel governance structure) as a secondary phenomenon, or “European identity lite,” the product of the increased promotion of the EU in the media and public opinion (Risse 2010:87). These positions assume that European identity remains relatively weak as compared to stronger national identities (Smith 1992:62; Kohli 2000:126). Consequently, some authors insist that the building of European identity should follow a path of national identity (Fligstein 2009; Gillespie and Laffan 2006; Case 2009), while others claim that the emergence of European identity should not resemble that of national identity (Checkel and Katzenstein 2009; Karolewski 2010; Demossier 2007).

In the discourse on national identities, the latter are generally perceived as either historical constructions that are deeply rooted in the national and cultural heritage (Karolewski 2010; Case 2009), or as recent formations, the result of conscious thoughts

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3 Section 2.1 is partially based on the Critical Literature Review written as an assignment for EURR 5001 in December 2011.
and actions (Robyn 2005; Thiesse 2007). These perspectives exert significant influence on the development of varying perspectives on European integration. Based on these assumptions, Karolewski (2010:36) suggests two implications for collective identity in the post-national context. In cases where national identity is identified as constructed through political and economic actions as well as policies and development in the social sphere rather than merely a product of historical development, it cannot be replaced or superseded at the post-national level, and any other forms of collective identities beyond the nation-state will not be compatible (36-7). Another implication concedes the existence of collective identities strong enough to compete with national identity. However, in order to reach this level of competitiveness, collective identity must develop following the same path as national identity (37). This will lead to the formation not only of European identity as a national identity at a higher level, but also endow the EU with nation-state qualities. In the case of the latter, individual national identities will suffer as a result of, and be compromised by, European identity (37).

In the case of Germany, most authors agree that the definition of identity cannot be limited only to history (Maier 1988:151; Knischewski 2009:125). Historical memories of national wrongdoing in the Nazi era seem to overshadow the rest of German history and leave no foundation for the formation of a positive national identity (Fulbrook 1999:2; Bergsieker 2010:152; Annesley 1998). In fact, attempts to tie the notion of identity solely to history led to quite the opposite outcome and resulted in the rejection of national belonging and national consciousness among Germans, as well as the development of a sense of national shame and guilt based on the past. Moreover, the division of Germany into East and West in the post-war era further interrupted the
development of a sense of common identity. Although most authors focus their discussion on the aftermath of the National-Socialist era on German state development, some of the others reach further back and look for explanations for the lack of feeling of “German-ness” in German history in the 17th-19th centuries (Knischewski 2009; Maier 1988; James 1989). This period of German history cannot exactly be described as “common” or “shared.” Due to the high extent of territorial and political fragmentation in the era of the Holy Roman Empire and the German Federation, Germans did not develop a feeling of either political unity or significant cultural commonness (James 1989:10). Therefore, Germany is considered to be a “belated nation” (Knischewski 2009:125) and feelings of commonness and belonging in its population did not develop at a pace similar to other nation-states, such as France or Britain (James 1989:15). Based on these observations and considering Germany’s involvement in the European project, German identity in the post-war era is most often described as “Europeanized,” the one that developed according to European standards and was constructed in light of German involvement in the European project. German national identity is often referred to as German European identity (Banchoff 1999:268, 271). Participating in the European project generated a solid ground for the development of a positive identity in Germany, therefore its Europeanness was perceived as natural and justified.

There are two main perspectives with regard to the ways in which European collective identity can emerge in the nation-state. It remains unclear, however, where the case of Germany fits. Risse discusses the process of the Europeanization of national identities prompted by European integration and associated harmonization and convergence of all spheres in nation-states (Risse 2010:38, 88). He describes the process
as a gradual transformation of national identities to the point of their full amalgamation into their more powerful supranational counterpart (Spohn 2005:3). This process, however, does not imply complete negation of national belonging sentiments among the citizens of the MSs. On the contrary, this feeling of commonness would be reinforced at the higher (European) level due to the preservation of national cultural diversity among the MSs (Risse 2010:38).

Similarly, Case (2009:111) argues that the creation of a European identity depends on the strengthening of existing national identities, which become more European in the process. In her study, she sees United Europe not as a counter-weight to the nation-state, but instead as a construction of significant interest to the nation-state (111). European identity is therefore a part of national identity and not a threat to its existence. According to Case (2009:126), European identity emerges when a European dimension is added to the national consciousness; the two cannot be separated, as the one cannot replace the other.

While analyzing the formation and further development of European identity, the majority of authors refer to it as a form or an extension of national identity, building their assumptions on similarities between the two. Consequently, Fligstein (2009:135) analyzes the emergence of European national identity using Deutsch’s approach, whereby he argues that a positive sense of solidarity between groups is needed for a national identity to emerge. In doing so, Fligstein construes the EU as a nation-state and citizens of the EU as its nation. He repeatedly refers to European identity as “European national identity,” which also highlights his position on this matter. According to Fligstein (Fligstein 2009:136), European national identity “will arise from people who associate
with each other across national boundaries and experience that association in a positive way.” However, Fligstein proceeds to suggest that the basic conditions for the emergence of a common European national identity have yet to be met (Fligstein 2009:136). The lack, or even absence, of knowledge of the EU and its functions among the population poses a serious obstacle to attaining these conditions (149). Moreover, there is evidence that the level of support for creating a European nation is very low (Fligstein 2009:154; Checkel and Katzenstein 2009:217). Currently, the level of interaction or cross-cultural communication among citizens of different countries in Europe is insufficient for creating a “class alliance between elites and the members of the middle and working classes,” which is necessary for the emergence of a European national identity (Fligstein 2009:135). Accordingly, some authors believe that the EU will face significant obstacles before it develops a common identity, for it currently lacks all of the important prerequisites for the formation of a collective identity, such as common history, culture and, more importantly, language and demos (Calleo 2009:16; Risse 2010:38). Quite often, the discussion of a common European identity comes down to the question of the existence of a European people (demos) as a single entity and not as citizens of different European states (Karolewski 2010:61). Lack of mutual association among Europeans, and reluctance to trust both fellow Europeans and the decision-making institutions further impede the development of any form of common identity (Karolewski 2010:61; Risse 2010:44).

Demossier (2007:56) opposes the application of the models of national identity formation to the construction of European identity. He argues that, just because the models of constructing national identities worked so well in the past does not necessarily
mean that they will work for the creation of a supranational identity (Demossier 2007:56). Checkel and Katzenstein (2009:217) agree that the process of European identity building does not, and should not, resemble that of a nation-state. In any case, elements traditionally used to define national identity, such as historic territory, language, collective memories and history, mass political culture, common legal rights and duties (Thiesse 2007), along with political institutionalization and development of civil society, are still lacking at the European level (Demossier 2007:59).

Given the historical circumstances, the identity-building process in Germany does not fully fit under the nation-state scenario (Knischewski 2009:125). Therefore, it is hard to establish how the process of Europeanization proceeded in Germany in terms of the development of attachments to the nation-state and to Europe among Germans. On one hand, given a weak German national identity at the time of initiation of the European project, it is reasonable to assume its smooth and extensive Europeanization. On the other hand, such a position is challenged by the fact that national identity in Germany is gradually becoming stronger with the intensification and acceleration of the process of Europeanization within the past decade. This discrepancy is further investigated in my research.

2.2. Identity-Building Tools and Methods

Common history, language, and everyday communal experiences, as well as media, education, attachment to common symbols and values are considered to be powerful identity building tools in both the nation-state and the EU. The literature review has revealed the EU’s attempts to increase its presence in the everyday lives of its citizens. Firstly, in trying to create conditions for the emergence of European identity, the EU has
chosen to imitate the nation-state pattern (Neumann 1998:410), as is evident from the creation of the EU-specific symbols such as flag, anthem, bank notes, passport and a European national festival (Kohli 2000:121). Some authors view the introduction of a common currency as a substantial advancement in the development of the EU as a political entity (Herrmann 2006:119; Gillespie and Laffan 2006:143). These symbols serve as a reminder that European political and social environments are changing, and highlight the need for a shift in citizens’ self-perception and self-categorization (Robyn 2005:1; Gillespie and Laffan 2006:132). Empirical studies by Robyn (2005) and Bruter (2005:150) are particularly relevant in this context, since they address the significance of EU-specific symbols with respect to the question of “what it means to be Europeans.”

When analyzing to what extent (if at all) Europeans associate themselves with EU-symbols, the authors appear to arrive at the same conclusion, namely that although Europeans might take certain steps toward becoming more open to Europeanization, they still “keep their national cultures intact” (Robyn 2005:2). In the discussion on Germany, the presence of national symbols in everyday life is thought to signal the presence of national consciousness and the feeling of national belonging. The fact that Germans have avoided publicly displaying their patriotic feelings through the German national flag or anthem in the past, and do it more eagerly now, is considered a positive development in the German national identity (Iken 2010).

Secondly, both Germany and the EU are working to address the gap in citizens’ knowledge of themselves, their history, projects and institutions by increasing their visibility in the media and implementing changes in the education curricula (Smith 1992:63; Keating 2009). Risse (2010) and Bruter (2005) both point out that the presence
of the EU and the nation-state in the news and media in general influences the levels of national and European identity among the population. Depending on the connotation of the messages and the image created by the media, the levels of identification with, and loyalty to, the EU or to the nation-state could change dramatically.

Being one of the most effective instruments in the process of citizens’ identity formation, education also plays an important role in generating knowledge about the EU (Ertl and Phillips 2006; Keating 2009). Therefore, when the EU exercises its legal powers to add a ‘European dimension’ to the national education systems, and disseminate knowledge and raise awareness about the Union among its citizens, its primary objective is to secure support among the population (Keating 2009:136-141). Moreover, the EU increasingly uses education to promote the notions of shared cultural and normative values, a common past and a joint future under the aegis of a common European identity.

The question of the top-down character of the identity-building process resurfaces more in the context of European identity. Many scholars perceive identity building in the EU as a top-down process (Gillespie and Laffan 2006; Karolewski 2010; Demossier 2009; Bruter 2005). Creation of EU-specific symbols to supplement national symbols arguably constitutes an attempt by the EU to alter individual identities and sense of belonging in favour of greater Europe (Gillespie and Laffan 2006:143). In their works, Fligstein (2009), Robyn (2005), Gillespie and Laffan (2006), and Bruter (2005) examine whether the process of top-down identity building was accompanied by bottom-up initiatives undertaken by citizens. To this end, the authors analyze data provided by the Eurobarometer and other surveys. Although their respective objectives differ (Fligstein 2009) considers who feels European, Bruter (2005) – how European are Europeans,
Gillespie and Laffan (2006) – whether national identities are becoming Europeanized),
the authors arrive at similar conclusions: the existing gap between European elite and
mass opinion, resulting from limited abilities of most citizens to benefit from the process
of European integration, leads to a general view of Europeanization and European
identity building as a top-down and elite-oriented project. The process of the construction
of European identity acquires bottom-up features only when the benefits concerned
endow the identity with “situational” and “contextual” character (Fligstein 2009:155;

Among the other mechanisms that can arguably accelerate the process of building
a common European identity are the feelings of fear, anxiety and distrust. The sense of
belonging to Europe might in fact develop when it happens in reaction to threats posed by
the “other” (Checkel and Katzenstein 2009:213). Grillo (2007:79) identifies anxiety as a
powerful impetus for unity among Europeans. Threats “constitute substantial common
ground” (Grillo 2007:79) for all Europeans and help to encourage unity, which in turn
generates the feelings of safety and protection. Arguably, some political parties cultivate
the fear of the “other” to reinforce citizens’ feelings of commonness on both the EU and
national levels (Evans 2009; Fuchs and Klingemann 2002:19; Neumann 1999:405). The
annual reports on racism and xenophobia in the MSs of the EU conclude that the “other”
in some of the EU MSs, including Germany, is still largely defined in terms of race (not
Caucasian) and religion (not Christian) (European Commission 1997). However, the
attitudes toward any immigration are growing more and more hostile. Therefore,
immigrants from Central Europe, despite their alleged shared identity, are considered as
enemies and invaders (Checkel and Katzenstein 2009:217).
2.3. Germany and Enlargement

German involvement in the process of enlargement is mostly discussed as motivated by the prospect of economic benefits and a possibility to reconcile with the past while assisting the CECs’ accession. The authors agree that identity politics played a significant role in the process, mostly by prompting the accession negotiations with the Central European states based on the argument of a shared identity and values between those states and the “old” EU (Risse 2010; Zaborowski 2006; Neumann 1999; Miller 1999). Additionally, by implementing necessary reforms in the East and bringing those states in line with the Copenhagen criteria, the EU projected its liberal democratic political identity on the East (Risse 2010; Sedelmeier 2003). By focusing on the historical perspective, authors discuss Germany’s active interest in the enlargement project as dictated by the necessity to come to terms with its own past (Bergsieker 2010:152). Alternatively, from the economic perspective it is generally agreed that the process of enlargement was beneficial to Germany (Guerot 2005; Zaborowski 2006; Banchoff 1999). Only later did the side effects of enlargement on the economic sphere come to attention (Jeffrey and Collins 1998; Kaczmarczyk 2010; Canoy 2010; Kahanec 2010).

Interestingly enough, enlargement is discussed in relation to the rise of nationalistic sentiments and Eurosceptic tendencies in the MSs. The intensification of nationalism across the MSs as a result of enlargement is a significant concern among the authors. Despite the assumption that the process of European integration and further development of the EU as a supranational body has resulted in a decline of nationalistic and racist aspirations in Europe (Jenkins and Sofos 2009:9), the majority of evidence in the sources points to the opposite. When discussing the issue, authors generally agree that
while nationalism in Europe has changed its nature and character, its presence in the EU has grown (Kupchan 2009:1; Jenkin and Sofos 2009). As a result, the terms “European nationalism,” “supranationalism,” “European racism,” and “multiplicity of nationalism in Europe” heavily populate the discourse on European identity (Risse 2010:52; Suleiman 2009:66; Mitchell and Russell 2009:74; Karolewski 2010:61).

Kupchan (2009:3) argues that supranational nationalism has replaced its national level counterpart. However, not only did this shift fail to eliminate nationalist feelings among the members of the supranational community, it also unleashed “ethnic and nationalistic forces” (Suleiman 2009:66). Nationalism is intimately connected to the notions of national identity and national pride (Kupchan 2009:3). Therefore, the EU’s efforts to advance the process of Europeanization might give rise to nationalistic feelings of a new “European” kind (Risse 2010:52). While these feelings do imply pride in the EU, they also foster awareness of the differences between Europeans and non-Europeans, which runs counter to the cosmopolitan image of Europe and Europeans (52).

Another popular perspective shared by scholars is that the process of European integration has led to the intensification of racist tendencies and “othering” practices in Europe (Evans 2009; Mitchell and Russel 2009; Kupchan 2009:13). The construction of the image of the “other,” which is essential to the formation of a collective identity, the emergence of the concept of “Fortress Europe,” and significant convergence in immigration policies among the MSs have produced a backlash among some citizens and given rise to strong anti-immigration attitudes and xenophobia (Schöpflin 2009:40; Evans 2009:44-7). Democratic deficit in the EU is also of concern, since its perceived lack of accountability and credibility leads citizens to fear supranational decisions, and fuels
xenophobic nationalism and anti-immigration sentiments (Suleiman 2009:82). Although mostly directed at non-Europeans (Evans 2009:45), these negative sentiments are of concern when it comes to the immigrants from the post-enlargement states, the so-called “East-West movers” (Risse 2010:48).

This development is considered dangerous to Germany (Knischewski 2010:144-5), given its long-term attempts to avoid nationalism at all costs. Additionally, Germans, together with other West Europeans, feel unsure about economic stability and are over-protective of their jobs and goods toward the new citizens of the EU from the east. Tying together enlargement, rising unemployment, economic and social crisis in the EU, Europeans increasingly give in to Eurosceptic tendencies (Spiering 2002:70). Although Euroscepticism in Germany is not aggressive and is directed more toward disagreement with EU’s policies rather than fundamental opposition to the project of the EU in general (Busch and Knelangen 2002:84-5), the fact that it is present in most European countries in the EU is alarming.

Although many sources still refer to Germany as a prime example of Europeanness in the EU, Eurosceptic tendencies present there do not go unnoticed. Most sources connect the rise in Euroscepticism in Germany with the “developments in European integration” (Leconte 2010:180), and more specifically with the ongoing process of widening the EU and establishment of the Euro. Although party-based Euroscepticism in Germany is considered insignificant (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2002:9-12; Busch and Knelangen 2002:84), public opinion has grown increasingly dissatisfied with the EU and its projects. Alternatively, identity-related concerns on behalf of the MSs constitute “one of the core dimensions for popular Euroscepticism” (Leconte 2010:180).
The transformations and reforms on economic, political and cultural levels associated with the country’s participation in the process of Europeanization led some MSs to regard the EU as threatening their viability (Spiering 2002:70). Additionally, the EU is considered to be gaining more power in identity related politics depriving the MSs of influence in this sphere. Moreover, on some level, popular Euroscepticism becomes associated with nationalism in the MSs (Leconte 2010:184).

Relying on the ideas discussed above, my research focuses on national identity in Germany, including other elements connected to it, such as national pride, consciousness, and the feeling of commonness and belonging to the nation, among others. Therefore, the analysis of enlargement, although discussed from the perspective of its implications for both the material and non-material spheres, is analyzed in terms of its connection to the process of identity formation in Germany. More specifically, I analyze how identity politics, namely German national identity and European identity in Germany, were shaped and practiced by politicians during the preparatory stages of enlargement and what impact enlargement had on these identities upon its completion.
Chapter 3 GERMAN NATIONAL IDENTITY AND EUROPEAN IDENTITY IN GERMANY – SINCE 1945 UNTIL TODAY

3.1. German National Identity in the Post War Era

In wake of Germany’s role in the two World Wars, the issue of German national identity has been problematic. Perceived as an instigator of the conflicts and the Holocaust (Bergsieker 2010:152), treated as an outsider, or the “Other” by European states because of its militaristic and Nazi past (Risse 2010) and divided between four foreign ruling powers after the war, the once dominant and powerful German state had a difficult time re-claiming its identity. A careful examination of the ways in which German national identity evolved in the post-war era allows one to identify and analyze similar patterns in the current process of identity development in the country.

Due to an intricate connection between nationalism and national identity, as discussed in previous chapters, the existence and strength of German national identity, and more specifically German citizens’ willingness to identify as German, have been stigmatized as militaristic, extremist and ethnocentric (Burbank 2003:9). Struggling with extricating their love for their own culture from hatred towards other cultures, many Germans avoid expressing pride in their nation, lest it be interpreted as a demonstration of nationalism, racism and xenophobia (12). Such tendencies cause a high degree of confusion and ultimately deny the concept of “German patriotism” the right for existence (Knischewski 2009: 154).

According to the constructivist theory of identity formation and development, historical memories and the concept of the “Other” play a major role in the construction of a nation’s affiliation and identification with their state (Karolewski 2010). German historical memories serve as a constant reminder of Nazi atrocities – a part of German
history that cannot be avoided, making Germans particularly aware of their national history (Mardel 2008). This awareness is often accompanied by feelings of national shame and unhappiness stemming from belonging to or being associated with the German nation. Arguably, this exaggerated attention to the Nazi era has precipitated the so called Geschichtslosigkeit, or ‘lack of history,’ among Germans, and served to obscure other major developments and achievements prior to 1933 and post-1945 (Epoch Times Deutschland 2007). Vergangenheitsbewältigung is another term exceptionally characteristic of German culture and language, which stands for “coming to terms with the past” (Bergsieker 2010:152; Knischewski 2009:141). Therefore, Germans must not only learn and acknowledge their past, but also find a way to deal with it.

Germany represents a particularly interesting and unique case for identity studies in that the issue under scrutiny is not clear-cut. Lack of Nationalgefühl (national identity) among German citizens leads some scholars to assume that Germany has a “negative national identity,” a phenomenon associated with feeling embarrassed and ashamed of one’s nationality as a result of a major national wrongdoing (Bergsieker 2009:152). This deficit, however, should not necessarily be ascribed to the events in the beginning of the twentieth century, since some authors agree that Germany had been lacking a “national milieu” since as early as the 1600s (Knischewski 2009:126). By the end of the eighteenth century, Germany was divided into over 300 separate states, the phenomenon called Kleinstaaterei (multiplicity of small states) (James 1989:34). These states formed weak alliances among themselves only when the need to fight arose (34). The relations between the states were far from cooperation and mutual understanding and did not constitute enough foundation for political unity to form and develop (34).
of unity between the states in Heiliges Römisches Reich were a common language and some resemblance of a common cultural tradition (James 1989:9). Although, the lack of a common dominant literature and religion resulted in a cultural identity that was only superficial and not strong enough to secure unity among Germans (Knischewski 2009:126).

In 1815, after the Holy Roman Empire was defeated by France in 1806, German states formed Deutscher Bund, a confederation of 38 states dominated by Prussia and Austria. The German Confederation again was more of a “loose alliance of independent states” and lacked a common law system and effective political institutions (James 1989:37). Influenced by the examples of France and Britain and facing an “inevitability of the nation-state,” Germany, however, found itself missing basic components, such as political unity and institutions, by which to proceed according to the nation-state scenario (11). Their political and social institutions came short of “justif[ing] their national existence” (9).

The situation did not change much with the establishment of the German Empire (Deutsches Reich) in 1871. Social and political tensions, caused by the necessity to fight the enemies within the Empire, such as political Catholicism, for instance, as well as a growing gap between elites and wide masses, prevented the development of a common national identity. In order to sustain at least some unity, the government often used “othering” techniques directed at ethnic minorities and France. The idea that a nation was based on ethnic and cultural homogeneity and a common language became a centerpiece of a “German model” of a nation-state derived from the concepts of Volknation (common origin and descent) and Kulturnation (common language and culture) (Knischewski
Arguably, one of the roots of the “German question” (Knischewski 2009:125) lies in German states choosing to form a unity based exceptionally on the process of their economic development, which would later form and influence political and cultural consciousness (James 1989:3).

Therefore, the discussion on the post-war national identity in Germany is further complicated by the fact that there was hardly any common identity to begin with (Knischewski 2009:127). Germans constructed their national identity according to their impression of national identities from the neighbouring states, “over-schematic visions of what other people’s national identity represented to them” (James 1989:15). It appears, however, that German national identity has exhibited features of ethnic nationalism from 1912 on since only those able to demonstrate their German ancestry were deemed eligible for citizenship (Suleiman 2009:75; Knischewski 2009:128). This failure to distinguish between citizenship and national identity in this case has arguably led to a rather one-sided development of political national identity, which in turn became a pre-requisite for acquiring social and legal rights (Knischewski 2009:128). A reluctance to grant the same set of rights to immigrants and foreigners fostered the establishment of the dichotomy “us” versus “them” in the minds of citizens (127).

Immediately after World War II (WWII) Germany found itself politically, culturally, and economically constrained (Knischewski 2009:129). The same things German citizens used to take pride in, such as their country’s military power or achievements in sports, for instance, were now irrevocably tied to the notions of militarism and nationalism. Moreover, Germany was not only physically divided between four foreign nation-states (France, Great Britain, United States of America and the Soviet
Union), but also split into two political entities, the German Democratic Republic (GDR-East Germany) and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG – West Germany). This division of Germany had an important effect on how citizens and elites dealt with the identity issue. Ruled by the opposed regimes, the governments of both states used different identity-building techniques and therefore developed different approaches to the question of national identity. Although both GDR and FRG self-identified with Germany, the substance of what it meant to be German varied in East and West. Therefore, identifying oneself as German at this point became highly problematic, since the country was in ruins.

With their previous values in tatters, both East and West Germanies had to adopt and adapt to new values propagated and promoted by the regimes in power. The GDR developed according to the Soviet scenario: political power monopolized by the communist party (the Socialist Unity Party of Germany - Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands – SED), a centrally planned economy, secret police (Stasi) and state ownership. Upon the adoption of the Soviet proletarian slogan “Proletarier aller Länder vereinigt Euch! [Workers of the world, unite!],” the Soviet-backed government of East Germany proceeded to build a nation of workers based on the conditions of equality and protection by the state.

Meanwhile, the FRG was involved in the project of integration with West European states and adopted liberalism, representative democracy and the rule of law. West Germany did not make the decision to transition from militarism to liberalism in its internal and external policies, but rather was forced to do so out of necessity and under pressure from the Allied nations (Knischewski 2009:129). Arguably, the process of
European integration allowed West Germany the opportunity to reconnect with other European countries, while demonstrably breaking away from its recent history. The FRG eagerly expressed its support for the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) project. This enthusiasm can be explained in part by the fact that, having been already subordinated to three of the ECSC potential member states, Germany did not have to go through a painful process of relinquishing some of its sovereignty to a supranational body. Moreover, in the long run, Germany stood to benefit from being part of the ECSC, since it would enable it to gain back its position in Europe and the world alongside the rest of the MSs (O’Connell 2009:15).

The experience of living in East and West Germany varied substantially, leading to the development of different collective identities and forms of national attachment (Fulbrook 1999:20). According to Fulbrook (1999:21), both Germanies developed new “sub-national or quasi-national identities,” which were partial in nature, meaning that they were always viewed as parts of one common German identity. The next section aims to analyze the ways in which the developments of the post-war era affected a single German national identity, identify the differences between East and West Germany collective identities, as well as investigate if these differences still exist in the united Germany today.

3.2 National Identity in East and West Germany

Reunification of Germany in 1990 undoubtedly was a significant step towards the reconstruction and further development of a German national identity (Blank 2003:259). In the post-war period, Germany as a nation-state had experienced a complete deterioration of its national milieu. The fact of being divided into two separate states
ruled by two ideologically and politically opposing power blocs had profound
geopolitical and historical implications for the country (Penev 2007), since the
geographical divide arguably split the German nation as well.

Most naturally, German Nationalgefühl underwent some major transformations in
the post-war era. Geopolitical fragmentation deeply affected German national identity,
however, the precise nature of this metamorphosis is unknown. On one hand, Germany’s
division could have facilitated the emergence of eastern and western versions of German
national identity. Yet, on the other hand, it is possible to imagine that German national
identity ceased its existence upon separation. In this light, when we talk about eastern and
western German national identities, it is not clear whether we mean two completely
separate notions or notions artificially separated due to historical circumstances. It also
should be explored whether a feeling of commonness, of a common national belonging
and national pride existed all along among the citizens of East and West Germany and
was just waiting to be re-united. Alternatively, two identities could have developed
according to completely divergent patterns and into completely separate, maybe even
opposing, notions. Therefore, the main questions is: Are there two German national
identities or no German national identity at all?

_Vergangenheitsbewältigung in East and West_

During the Nazi era, the German state sought to instill a strong sense of national
belonging, pride and collective identity (Fulbrook 1999:2). After centuries-long
territorial, political and cultural fragmentation in Germany, the definition of what it
meant to be German was finally established along with a strong feeling of German
superiority towards all other nations in the world. After WWII and the Holocaust, this
version of German national identity was no longer possible. Moreover, any strong feelings towards the German nation and the slightest demonstration of national pride were considered shameful and dangerous. Patriotism in Germany had to be justified and was no longer taken for granted (Fulbrook 1999:3). With the defeat of Nazi Germany, its Nazi national identity, designed and established in racist terms (19), was made obsolete. Therefore, breaking with their Nazi past and reinterpreting their historical memories in a way that left room for feelings of national belonging among Germans had become a priority for the architects of the identity-building process in Germany in the post-war era (Penev 2007; Fulbrook 1999:2).

Although both East and West Germany shared a common past, the attitudes towards and interpretations of this past diverged substantially. In both states, the ruling elites employed historical memories for political purposes: in the West - to promote the goal of European integration and the rehabilitation of Germany in Europe; and in the East - to further distance themselves from the West and the Nazi past. As the events of the recent past in their entirety were too overwhelming, both regimes practiced selective reinterpretation, focusing on those aspects of the past that served their objectives.

East and West Germany processed their past and the legacy of Nazism in different stages. The process of Vergangenheitsbewältigung was handled differently throughout the time of separation of the state into two parts. In West Germany, dealing with the past commenced with an undisputed acknowledgement of the moral atrocities of the Nazi past and taking the full responsibility for its crimes. The first post-war generation of West Germans grew up with the feeling of guilt for the past (Penev 2007) and the crimes they technically did not commit, resulting in a largely negative national identity and the
feeling of shame associated with being German. Therefore, historical memories, which are often employed to nurture the feeling of national belonging among citizens (Smith 1992:60), served a totally opposite purpose in the case of West Germany. In the 1960s and 1970s, with the prospect of future European integration and cooperation looming large, West Germany promoted guilt acceptance and mourning as the best avenues for dealing and overcoming their shadowed Nazi past (Penev 2007). A rather significant development at the time was that Germany began identifying itself with values and goals of European integration such as human rights, liberalism and rule of law. These values came to fill the void that was created when the values of the Nazi ideology were dismissed as shameful and destructive. In 1980s, the process of coming to terms with the past in West Germany changed slightly and became more focused on detaching oneself from its burdens. While these attempts did not negate the acceptance of guilt and responsibility for the past, they signified a shift toward a positive national identity in West Germany. This period was also characterized by the selection of positive historical memories and learning as much about the Nazi era as about any other era in German history. The feelings of national belonging and the pride for Germany’s economic achievements in the post-war era were steadily growing stronger, and arguably, resulted in the gradual revival of national pride in Germany (Penev 2007; Fulbrook 1999:3).

The process of building a collective identity in East Germany took a very different form compared to the gradual shift from a collective shame associated with being German to a strong feeling of ‘German-ness’ (Fulbrook 1999:20) in West Germany. Meanwhile, the interpretation of history promoted by the ruling elites in East Germany was initially based on the complete denial of their participation in the Nazi past
and insistence on their detachment from its crimes and atrocities. In the time following the WWII, the authorities in East Germany insisted that the GDR should identify itself as a victim of the Nazi regime, the rhetoric that aligned it more with Central and Eastern European states. West Germany was represented as an oppressor and treated as an unfortunate episode in the history of the GDR. In 1970s and 1980s, this situation started to reverse slowly as both political leaders and citizens in East and West Germany seemed to agree on the importance of not only accepting or denying the past but also analyzing history in a more universal sense (Penev 2007). Such a shift led to the realization of a commonality of the German past and a common responsibility for it in both East and West alike. This attitude continued to grow and reached its apogee with the reunification of Germany in 1990 – the event that intensified nationalistic feelings among West Germans and the acceptance of the guilt among their eastern counterparts.

East or West - what is best?

The feelings generated in both states towards each other were largely based on the premises of “othering,” scape-goating and blame-shifting. Thus, both East and West Germanies promoted the image of each other as an enemy. In West Germany, the GDR state was considered an enemy of the democratic values of liberalism and rule of law, while its citizens were regarded mainly as communists. In light of the Cold War, it was easy for Germans in the western part to dissociate themselves politically from the East and its population since the latter was now ruled by the Soviet power. Contrasting, in East Germany the process of “othering” the westerners did not succeed to the same extent. The notion of a *Klassenfeind* (class enemy) reinforced by Soviet propaganda was fake and unnatural to East Germans and therefore did not alter their worldview to any
substantial extent (Fulbrook 1999:18). Although both regimes tried to cultivate the feelings of new national belonging and new citizenship in their respective states, West German citizenship preserved German values as it was based on inherently German traditions of ancestry and ethnicity, whereas its Eastern counterpart was a construct created by the Soviet regime in its attempt to establish a specific German Democratic Republican form of identity based on communism and antifascism. However, despite its efforts, the Soviet propaganda largely failed, reinforcing the feeling of “German-ness” among the citizens of GDR (20).

Although the leaders of East and West parts of Germany belonged to the opposite political systems, there is no evidence that the citizens of the FRG and GDR had negative feelings towards each other or treated each other as enemies. Interestingly enough, it was in East Germany that the notion of one undivided German nation was preserved to a larger extent. According to the nation-wide surveys, the overwhelming majority of easteners considered FRG to represent “the prototype for the higher-level category of ‘Germans’” (Mummendey 1998:263). Therefore, it came as no surprise that upon unification, East Germany was expected to assimilate to West German standards (262-3). Due to successful economic and political transformations conducted by the FRG, the people of the GDR regarded the former as an important point of reference and an example to follow. In this light, immediately after the fall of the wall East Germany accepted the need to be “politically liquidated and economically incorporated into the FRG” (262).

East and West Germany differed greatly in their experiences of life in the post-war period. As a result, the relations between the two states were rather unbalanced and
one-sided. West Germany was riding the wave of its post-war economic success and largely associated itself with European progressive methods and integration goals. The result was the growing gap between the attitudes of the government and the citizens. While the government launched Ostpolitik, as it felt obliged to help out their Eastern counterparts given the success and progress of their state, the population of the FRG largely lost any interest in their GDR counterparts. Contrastingly, East Germans still clung to the notion of a collective German identity, and consequently, took great interest in West Germany, its lifestyle and progress (Fulbrook 1999:21). Since the Soviet rule did not bring comparable progress or prosperity, the feeling of separation between two Germanies and the need for reunification was stronger in the East.

Notably, the nation-wide surveys and opinion polls demonstrate that even though contemporary Germany is politically united, there are still prominent regional differences between East and West. The two Germanies remain “vereint und verschieden [united and different]” (Harenberg 1991:10). Although both former FRG and GDR citizens admit that they belong to a larger category of Germans (Mummendey 1998:262), they still preserve their division into “Ossis [easteners]” and “Wessis [westeners].” Such a distinction led to “a highly salient East versus West categorization” (263) and resulted in East Germans feeling inferior compared to their western counterparts. In 1995, according to the empirical study conducted by Emnid-Institute by the request of Der Spiegel, 72 per cent of East Germans felt themselves as “Bürger 2. Klasse [second class citizens]” compared to the West (table 3.1).
Arguably, this perception of West Germany’s superiority and difficulties connected with the process of transition into the capitalist economy led to Ostalgie – a cultural phenomenon demonstrated by nostalgic sentiments for the GDR lifestyle. According to the Der Spiegel-survey mentioned above, five years after unification 15 per cent of the population in the East wished the GDR still existed, 19 per cent did not consider socialism to be “ein zum Scheitern verurteiltes System [a system destined to fail]” and 53 per cent admitted that the unification was going “worse than they had expected.” As demonstrated by the tables below, despite the absence of physical separation between East and West, easteners still perceived themselves as separated from the West mentally (67 per cent) and 15 per cent wished the Berlin Wall would have remained in its place. Although the number of citizens expressing nostalgic feelings for former GDR and dissatisfaction with the process of Wiedervereinigung [reunification] remains a minority, the percentage is still relevant (See table 3.2 below).
Table 3.2. Assessment of Reunification in 1995.

Q1: Do you think today it would have been better if reunification had not happen?*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes, 15</th>
<th>No, 83 %</th>
<th>*as % of all respondents from East Germany (% of &quot;Do Not Know&quot; is not given)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Q2: From your point of you, what is a general assessment of the reunification process five years later?*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Worse than expected</th>
<th>As expected</th>
<th>Better than expected</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>East Germany</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Germany</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*as % of all respondents from East and West Germany (% of "Do Not Know" is not given)


Interestingly enough, the Eurobarometer always provides data on Germany overall and then separately on East and West Länder. The empirical study by the Emnid-Institut reveals that East Germans tend to demonstrate slightly stronger self-identification with
their nation compared to their western counterparts (always 2-4 per cent stronger).
Contrastingly, more citizens from the West German Länder readily include the EU or Europe when naming their identity. This tendency can be explained by the fact that the FRG was involved in the process of European integration for forty years longer, whereas East Germany only joined it in the post-unification period in 1990. This difference in the levels of exclusive national belonging can also be explained by varying identity-forming techniques utilized by the ruling regimes. For forty years, political elites in the GDR did not cultivate the feeling of shame and guilt for the Nazi era and tried to focus on positive historical heritage to form a positive identity in their citizens. The blame for the Nazi regime was placed mostly on West Germany and interestingly enough, acknowledged by them (Fulbrook 1999:20). This guilt for history prevented West Germans from building a strong attachment to exclusively their nation and prompted them to include European element in their self-identification.

West Germany’s participation in the ECSC laid the foundation for the development of ‘post-national’ or supranational identity in Germany, characterized by low levels of national pride and national identification among Germans, readiness to affiliate with Europe and transnational organizations, indifference to national symbols, and support for joint security policies with other nation states (in this case, the ECSC MSs) (Knischewski 2009:131). As postulated by the social identity theory (SIT), one of the premises for developing any other type of a collective identity along with or instead of the national one, whether on a supranational or regional level, is an overall negative perception of the in-group due to the negative communal experience or shame. This feeling of shame leads to the quest to improve the situation by either joining a more positively assessed out-
group or bringing positive qualities into the in-group itself. By joining the European integration project, Germany realized both options: it joined the supranational body, which strove to promote peace and security in Europe. This purpose made the ECSC a distinctively better and more positively evaluated out-group and enabled Germany to improve itself by becoming a part of this positive effort.

Joining the European integration project, however, did not immediately increase levels of national pride and positive identity in Germany. These qualities did not develop uniformly across the country during the period from after WWII until the present. Different demographics across the country adopted varying approaches to dealing with the negative legacy of the past, and developed varying levels of Nationalgefühl.

Accordingly, the first post-war generation in 1950s lived in a state of denial, describing the Nazi era more as something they had witnessed rather than had been part of (Mardell 2008). The second generation, born in the period after 1970s, accepted the blame and the feeling of guilt and developed a strong sentiment of national shame for their past (Mardell 2008). As for Germany’s youngest generation born in 1990s, they have adopted a critical perspective on German history (Mardel 2008), and while they do not feel particularly touched by their country’s Nazi past, they do not necessarily take more pride in their nation when compared to previous generations (Kulish 2010). In fact, this critical regard for German history has generated discontent for their nation as a whole. This temporal variation in attitudes towards the past is further compounded by differences across regions. The older citizens of the former East Germany have generally assumed an observer position with regards to Nazism, treating it as something that happened to their Western counterparts. Contrastingly, the generation born in East Germany directly before
or after the fall of the Berlin Wall generally feel more shame for the National Socialist era than older generation of East Germans (Burbank 2003:11).

These often conflicting perceptions and attitudes are depicted in the media as having affected the development of German national identity in the post-war era, leaving the majority of German citizens unable to define the meaning of being German in a broader sense (Mardel 2008). When trying to answer the question of what makes them German, some citizens point to the locations of their birth and childhood, some refer to cultural stereotypes such as drinking beer and watching football, while others make references to their identification cards (2008), i.e., a purely legal status as citizens.

**Section 3.3. European Identity and European Integration in Germany**

The concept of European identity in Germany is more clearly defined compared to other forms of collective identity. With its origins in the post-war era, harboring the feelings of profound attachment and dedication to Europe has become the point of pride among Germans, setting an example for other MSs. Drawing on historical information, this section seeks to establish the reasons behind Germans’ strong affiliation with Europe and to identify, analyze and explain any recent shifts in this attitude.

According to the constructivist theory, any form of collective identity, be it group, regional, national or supranational identity, is constructed by the internal and external forces and circumstances (Katzenstein 2010:61). Moreover, identity of a group of people is more often than not defined via the means of externalization, which is the process whereby the group defines itself through comparison with other groups. Alternatively, in the context of a national collective identity, externalization refers to the process of placing one’s nation “within a [broader] international context” (Banchoff 1999:268).
Defining one’s position within a larger group always results in adoption of certain duties and responsibilities that correspond with the role chosen. In the case of Germany, the country’s determination to embrace the cause of European unity has developed into a long-term commitment to the promotion of and advocacy for deeper European integration.

Since the FRG was significantly more involved with the process of integration compared to the GDR, and imposed this position on the GDR in the post-unification period, the section will examine the identity development process in FRG in more detail compared to the process that took place in GDR. In the post-war era until the end of the Cold War, the process of European integration, initially oriented at preserving and maintaining peace and economic recovery, was perceived as primarily a West European initiative, undertaken by and for the West European states (Banchoff 1999:266). It was accompanied by a successful construction of West German European identity. Contrastingly, the Soviet regime’s attempts to construct East German communist identity did not succeed. Such different rates of success between the two identity-formation processes can be explained by the fact that, despite the ‘penetrated system’ of decision-making controlled by the Allies, the FRG enjoyed a certain degree of freedom when it came to deciding on the country’s future (Lodge 1975:416). As a result, Germany chose rather than was forced to engage in the European integration process. The reasons for making this choice will be explored at a later point in the section.

As discussed above, Germany’s role in historical events, such as the two World Wars, the Holocaust, and collapse of the Third Reich in 1945 had a profound influence on the country’s subsequent development as a state. As a result, the process of identity
construction became one of re-conceptualization of the notions of national pride, patriotism and belonging to a nation as shameful and destructive nationalistic concepts that were dangerous to Germans and their fellow-Europeans alike. Attachment to Europe and to its normative values and principles allowed Germans to fill the void left after the National Socialist version of national identity had been shattered. Having accepted the guilt for Nazi atrocities, Germans looked to European integration as the way to reconcile with its neighbours and to eliminate any sign of nationalism within the country (Banchoff 1999:273).

European integration became the focus of German foreign policy in 1950s, and remained such in the four decades that saw the German state separated and reunited again. More importantly, however, it proved instrumental in defining the development of self-identification among German citizens. Although in contemporary literature on identity formation there exists a view that the national identity shapes state actions (Sedelmeier 2003:3-5), in the case of Germany, however, this causal link is not particularly obvious. Germany’s passionate devotion to the promotion of the European integration postulates most certainly did facilitate the deepening of attachment and loyalty to Europe and its project among German elites. Prioritization of European interests over the national ones can serve as evidence for the German government’s pro-European orientation. With respect to the German population, however, such devotion appears rather difficult to determine and measure.

More importantly, it was the feeling of guilt and the need for reconciliation that originally encouraged German aspirations towards enhanced cooperation in Europe on issues of peace and security. Although it was anticipated that the European integration
would create and entrench the notion of European identity among the populations of European states, this process was most successful in the states already positively predisposed towards Europe and the EU. The question whether German commitment to European integration emerged first and then shaped German European identity or vice versa represents a classic case of ‘chicken or the egg’ dilemma.

Politically stable and economically progressive, Germany in the post-war era confidently rose to assume the position of “a contributor to Europe-wide stability” (Jeffery and Paterson 2003:59). Arguably, Germany needed the process of European integration for several reasons. Firstly, as discussed above, being at the forefront of the process of promoting and securing peace on the European continent allowed Germans to better deal with the ongoing process of coming to terms with their past. Secondly, according to SIT, Germans needed to find a more positive out-group to associate with, and whose positive values it could adopt and promote. In this sense, the process of European integration and cooperation served two purposes: enabling Germans to feel better about themselves, which allowed for the development of a more positive national identity; and reinstating Germany in the eyes of other MSs, thereby helping it regain trust and respect. More importantly, the process of European integration provided Germany with an opportunity to recover its political and economic strength, which would have been perceived as a threat had Germany remained outside of the European integration project (60).

Germany’s European policy and determination to promote the idea of European unity until it was finally realized in the form of a European Federation, or United States of Europe had significant implications for the development of national identity. German
national identity, at least in its western conception, is generally considered Europeanized or Europe-oriented (Jeffery and Paterson 2003; Banchoff 1999). Answering the question of whether this Europeanization of national identity in Germany implies replacement of German national identity with its supranational counterpart, requires that the levels of Europeanization of German national identity be analyzed separately for the representatives of elite groups and broader population. With regards to the latter, an empirical analysis of the survey data from Germany shows the lack of evidence of the existence of an exclusive European identity among German citizens.

As indicated in Eurobarometer, Germans demonstrate high levels of inclusive national identity, meaning their identity could include an affiliation or even a stronger attachment to the EU as a transnational body; however, the number of people who associate themselves exclusively with the EU is extremely low (4 per cent compared to 38 per cent for exclusive nationalists in 2002). In fact, the number of citizens identifying themselves exclusively with Germany has kept relatively stable since 1990 (38 per cent (EB33 (1990)). The number of inclusive nationalists (those who associate with Germany before the EU) has been relatively consistent with the numbers for other EU MSs throughout the last decade. Interestingly, Germany, at a relative stable level of 45 per cent, is not the state with the highest results for this indicator compared to 60 per cent in Italy and 50 per cent in France (EB60 (2002:27)). The number of exclusive nationalists in Germany, i.e. citizens who identify themselves only with Germany, reached 38 per cent in 2002, which demonstrates an increase of 4 per cent compared to previous years. Interestingly, Germans in East Germany exhibit higher levels of ‘German-ness’ than their
Western counterparts (45 and 36 per cent, respectively in 2002 and 50 and 35 per cent respectively in 2004) (EB60 (2002:24)).

Table 3.3. National Identity and Inclusive Identity in Germany Compared to the EU Average.4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Exclusive identity in Germany</th>
<th>EU average</th>
<th>Inclusive identity in Germany</th>
<th>EU average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>38 %</td>
<td>41 % (EC-12)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>38 %</td>
<td>40 % (EU-15)</td>
<td>45 %</td>
<td>47 % (EU-15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>38 %</td>
<td>41 % (EU-15)</td>
<td>46 %</td>
<td>46 % (EU-15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>40 %</td>
<td>46 % (EU-25)</td>
<td>41 %</td>
<td>41 % (EU-25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>39 %</td>
<td>39 % (EU-25)</td>
<td>40 %</td>
<td>46 % (EU-25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>39 %</td>
<td>38 % (EU-25)</td>
<td>42 %</td>
<td>49 % (EU-25)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources EB 33, 60, 61, 77

Political elites have generally shown consensus on the importance of European integration. International cooperation and partnership within the European political and economic union have been among German foreign policy priorities since late 1980s. In four parliamentary debates on the approach to European policy, also known as the Bundestag debates, German political leaders repeatedly identified the EU as a growing political union, and referred to Germany as a partner within a larger supranational entity, and not an independent actor (Banchoff 1999:272). Such a strong pro-European orientation demonstrates German embeddedness within the process of integration, along with its commitment to it (Jefferey and Paterson 2003:61). It also demonstrates that Europeanization is more likely to occur at the elite level (Kupchan 2009:77), and is more challenging for the population at large.

Germany has been largely defined by its successes and downfalls within the framework of European integration project. The country’s political supranational identity is reflected in the German Grundgesetz (Basic Law), naming “serv[ing] peace in a United

4 In Table 3.3 “inclusive identity” implies including both national and European identities in their self-identification, “exclusive identity” includes only national identity. Percentage for exclusive European identity and European first and then national identity are not indicated.
Europe” and “cooperat[ing] towards the realization of a United Europe project through the development of the EU” among Germany’s priorities in the international arena (Banchoff 1999:280). The fact that German political leaders make references to Germany first and foremost as European, and define its interests mostly in supranational terms demonstrates the dominance of a European(ized) elite-defined political identity in Germany. Inability to define their national interests, and lack of a national aspect in German policy-making often attract criticism from the increasing number of Eurosceptics and pro-nationalistic groups (Banchoff 1999:282; Spiering 2002:70). Overall, Europeanization of German national identity remains an ongoing political project undertaken and supervised by the country’s rulers.

**Euroscepticism in Germany**

Over the last decade a slight change has been observed in German perception of the EU and its role in the process of European integration. Ever since the 1950s, when the process of European integration commenced, German public opinion, elites and political leaders have always appeared generally supportive of German involvement in the European project. In fact, German dedication to Europeanization was seen as “exemplary” to other MSs (Busch and Knelangen 2004:83). However, the levels of German Euro-enthusiasm were not always consistently high. The levels of skepticism and pessimism toward European integration went up at the time of Eurosclerosis – the first European Economic Community crisis in the 1960s. However, by the end of the 1970s levels of support for the idea of a unified Europe in Germany were still above the average.

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5 Original citation as indicated in Banchoff (1999:280) is “Verhandlungen 1991:5822” (full citation: Verhandlungen des deutsches Bundestages. Stenographischer Bericht, Bonn (1991)).
among the MSs of the European Community and constituted 31 per cent (Busch and Knelangen 2004:84).

Currently, the progress of Europeanization in Germany is somewhat uncertain. Although Germany has remained committed to promoting further European integration despite recent turbulence in the EU and worldwide, its involvement has acquired a slightly different angle (Wendler 2011). After the unification, Germany was expected to make Ostpolitik its priority and to focus more on the widening of the EU rather than its deepening. However, it persisted on the path of deepening European integration instead. Moreover, Germany made the integration and restructuring of East Germany part of its European economic agenda (Jefferey and Paterson 2003:66). Arguably, this dependence on European aid and funds further amplified Germany’s obligations under the European integration project (Banchoff 1999:264, 280; Jefferey and Paterson 2003:66). Albeit being an adamant proponent of including Eastern European states in the Union at some point in the future, Germany chose not to focus on the EU’s enlargement during its presidency of the EU in 1994, but rather concentrated on monetary and security integration as its priorities (Banchoff 1999:259, 266). Therefore, despite internal changes in Germany’s political, economic and social structure, it remained relatively consistent in its approach to European policy.

Paradoxically, Germany’s role in two key projects of the EU, namely enlargement and monetary union, served as a trigger for skeptical attitudes among the general public and some political elites as well. Both of these projects were “co-initiated [and] politically encouraged by German governments” (Busch and Knelangen 2004:84) and although dissatisfaction expressed by the German public remains far from hard
Euroscepticism, the analysis of potential consequences and implications of these initiatives for Germany causes fear among its citizens and makes them doubt the benefits from their membership in the EU. Although Europe-wide opinion polls do not show a significant shift in German attitudes, however they do indicate that levels of German approval for the project of European integration are now below the EU average. As demonstrated in the table below, prior to 1990s the majority of German citizens considered their country’s membership in the EU “a good thing” (over 60 per cent on average). In early 2000 however, this number decreased to 48 per cent compared to 73 per cent in 1990. It also has sunk to 2 per cent lower the EU average.

**Table 3.4. Assessment of the Germany’s Membership in the EU.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A good thing</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither good nor bad</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A bad thing</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: EB 14, 24, 34, 44, 54, 57 (Busch and Knelangen 2002:85 (Table 1))

This shift in focus, whereby Germany has been trying “to reshape Europe to hold it more at arm’s length” (Jefferey and Paterson 2003:72) is arguably the result of the flaws of the Union itself rather than a sign of profound changes in German economic and geopolitical structure. The EU’s known deficiencies, such as democratic deficit and lack of accountability, combined with economic hardships and recession, have generated a rise of Euro-skeptical tendencies in many MSs, Germany included. The only difference was that in the mid-1990s, when some MSs started to voice their dissatisfaction with the EU, Germany was “the only one […] of all the greater powers in Europe” still favouring the
European project (Schwarz 1995:98). Although political parties in Germany have not yet exploited growing dissatisfaction with the European project expressed by public opinion, their devotion to the EU has given way to “a more cautious attitude” focusing more on “short term domestic successes [rather than] the attainment of longer-term targets of integration” (Busch and Knelangen 2004:84). A growing number of parties appear to include soft Euroscepticism as a part of their political agenda, such as the Party of Democratic Socialists and the Christian Social Party (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2002:10). The Left Party in Germany is notorious for its contestation of the EU norms and directives, and for openly expressing Euroscepticism (Wedler 2011:487). The newly formed anti-Euro party Alternative für Deutschland (AfD – Alternative for Germany) is directed precisely against the single currency project and not against the EU. Moreover, such parties as German People’s Union (DVU), Republicans, and the National Democratic Party (Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands - NPD) do not conceal anti-European sentiments and express hard politically-based Euroscepticism (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2002:10). However, these parties remain on the margins of political arena and one cannot extrapolate their attitudes to a larger German population.

A rise in criticism towards the EU has several implications for European identity in Germany. Firstly, the fact that the EU’s normative system is flawed serves to decrease its attractiveness as a positive out-group for Germans. This could potentially exacerbate nationalistic fervors and promote the rise of exclusive national identity in Germany, which is already evident in the opinion polls and surveys. Secondly, due to the increase in feelings of national belonging in Germany, the EU’s attempts to establish itself as a

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6 DVU merged with the National Democratic Party (Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands - NPD) on January 1, 2011.
primarily political Union may be construed as a threat to German state sovereignty, and therefore would fail to garner support from the majority of the population and political parties. Germany did not object to sacrificing a large part of its sovereignty at the time when it joined the ECSC, since it had little sovereignty to begin with, nor did it see it as problematic later on due to a widespread perception that lack of sovereignty demonstrated Germany-wide rejection of nationalism. However, the reunification of Germany has redefined the notions of nationalism and national identity in the country, infusing them with positive meaning. The next section will explore whether modern Germany has succeeded in redefining its national identity and suppressing racist and nationalistic attitudes among its population.

Section 3.4 Pride and Nationalism in Germany and the EU

National pride and the concept of nationalism

When discussing identity building, the link between the concepts of pride and identity gains particular significance. The level of national pride directly affects the level of affiliation and attachment to one’s nation, and provides the basis for the rise of nationalistic and patriotic feelings among the citizens. In the modern era of globalization, however, the concept of pride is no longer attached exclusively to the national milieu. Advocates of the project of Europeanization increasingly use the concept of pride to foster the common European identity among the citizens of the MSs. A powerful identity-building tool, pride is employed at both national and supranational levels to increase the attachment of citizens to their state or the EU, respectively. This section examines the concept of pride within the scope of a broader discussion on German and European national identities, in an attempt to define its main characteristics, investigate the
connection between national pride and the concepts of patriotism and nationalism, and identify in what ways (if at all) the feeling of pride affects the process of identity construction.

National pride can be general, as in feeling proud of the entire nation, or dimensional, meaning demonstrating pride only with regards to specific national achievements and areas of success. Levels of both can vary within one nation. Remarkably, dimensional pride is more prevalent, since it is generally more acceptable to be “dimensionally” proud of a nation’s strengths and accomplishments in particular spheres, rather than express a general feeling of pride based purely on the fact of belonging to one’s nation. However, general national pride comprises an essential component of any discussion on patriotism and nationalism (Bergsieker 2010:152).

The correlation between nationalistic aspirations and national pride was reinforced in the National Socialist ideology. In line with the Nazi interpretation of national identity, the concept of national pride, initially linked to demonstrating “blind” love to one’s nation, was imbued with attitudes of superiority and/or xenophobia and came to be associated with hatred towards other nations, feelings of dominance and fear of everything external to the German nation. Discussions on national pride inevitably feature the concept of “Other,” and juxtapose “us” to “them,” in such a way that one’s nation emerges in a positive light at the expense of the others. This positive image is then reinforced repeatedly to enhance the feeling of “we-ness” among the citizens (Bergsieker 2010:154). As Burbank states in her study, the attitudes towards other nations “should be seen as a component of national identity itself” (Burbank 2003:8).
“I’m proud to be German, aren’t I?” German Pride and Euro-Pride in Germany

As discussed in the sections above, for a long time Germans had been avoiding any demonstrations of national belonging and pride. After the war, any expression of pride in being German was stigmatized as nationalistic and xenophobic, and any dimensional pride of the country’s successes was immediately overshadowed by the shame of its Nazi past. This conscious rejection of national pride within the population was accompanied by absolute dedication to the project of European integration undertaken by the country’s leaders and aimed at preserving peace in Europe. For the same reasons they shied away from feeling proud of their state, Germans took pride in belonging and contributing to a successful out-group (the EU). Similar to the feeling of national belonging, the feeling of national pride among Germans was, to a high degree, Europeanized.

Among the generations that followed (1980s and later), the feeling of dimensional pride had significantly increased. Germans started to take pride in national technical and economic achievements, as well as to support the view that “it should be more acceptable to express pride in Germany” (Bergsieker 2010:159). Throughout the late 1990s and early 2000s the level of identification with Germany among Germans remained stable and exceeded the level of identification with Europe. After the World Cup in 2006, the level of national pride in Germany increased by 5 per cent and eight out of ten Germans openly expressed their pride in being German (EB66 (2006:24)). Notably, in that same year, the levels of regional and national belonging among Germans reached 90 per cent compared to 69 per cent for those identifying with Europe (EB66 (2006:38)). These indicators, interestingly enough, do not in any way put Germany at the forefront of European integration, and combined with the indicators of European identity in Germany
and the level of happiness from the country’s membership in the EU, are generally lower compared to the EU average (Spiering 2002:70) (Please, see table 3.5).

**Table 3.5. National and European Pride in Germany.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>National Pride</th>
<th>Pride in being European</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Proud</td>
<td>Not proud</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D</td>
<td>EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000/1</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(EU15)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000/2</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(EU15)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(EU15)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(EU15)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(EU25)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: EB 53, 54, 56, 57, 66.

These Eurobarometer results show that the feeling of national pride is becoming stronger among Germans. However, the link between being proud of one’s nation and being a nationalist is still present in Germany. In order to avoid reverting to nationalism while still acknowledging national efforts and accomplishments, German leaders have relied on the concept of European pride. German economic, technological and even military successes were acknowledged and approved within the limits of the European integration process. The variable of European pride was introduced in the Eurobarometer surveys in the mid-nineties. “Europastolz” (pride in being European) was at a stable 62 per cent for the EU as a whole (EB54 (2001:3)). In Germany, the majority of the population in 2001 readily admitted their pride in Europe (51 per cent indicated that they were ‘rather proud’ to be European) (2001). However, this indicator does not imply that people who expressed their pride in Europe gave preference exclusively to the EU and were not simultaneously proud of their respective nations. Moreover, in 2001 Germany’s result of 47 per cent for being “proud” or “rather proud” in being European was the lowest in the
EU-15. In the subsequent year, Germany with its 51 per cent was still far lower than the EU-average with the difference in 13 per cent.

Overall, the European dimension still does not possess the same or even a comparable degree of authority as its national counterpart, which suggests that the European construct is not ready to compete with (never mind replace) its national counterpart. European identity and European pride are generally perceived as additions to the EU membership package.

**Euronationalism**

European leaders have been promoting the images of the EU as a normative power, as a guarantor of European peace and economic prosperity. The EU has become a milieu where all European nations can be united in their diversity and equality. The concept of a “Fortress Europe,” with the EU borders secured from the outside turned the EU into an illusion of a safe haven, a guarantor of human rights protection, and made it a desirable destination for European and non-European states alike. Arguably, such desirability has contributed to the transformation of the EU into an exclusionist environment, open to fellow Europeans and suspicious towards the rest of the world.

Having identified the creation of one common identity as one of its the main prerogatives in the *Declaration on the European Identity* in 1973, the EU has set out to build European identity as if it were a nation-state, namely by inventing and promoting European symbols, currency, national day, etc. Striving for the “ever closer Union” and one European nation sparked a resurgence of defensive nationalistic tendencies across Europe (Spiering 2002:75). In its attempt to build a common identity on the European level, the EU overlooked the fact that nationalism at its core implies belonging to one
nation (Schöpflin 2009:38). Collective identity is one of the main prerequisites for nationalism, and by actively constructing the former, the EU simultaneously unleashed the latter (Jenkins and Sofos 2009:11).

While intended to eliminate racism and nationalism in the modern society, the process of Europeanization has triggered defense reactions from within the MSs (Kupchan 2009:13). Having attained prosperity economically, the MSs now wish to protect themselves from the outside. The European integration process intensified feelings of nationalism among Europeans, and made them less tolerant of their non-European counterparts (13). According to the annual Reports on Racism and Xenophobia in the Member States of the EU published by the European Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), some of the EU MSs have generally experienced “an upward trend in recorded racist crime” bringing the EU average to a higher indicator (FRA 2007). In Germany, the Eurobarometer opinion poll on racism and xenophobia published in 1997 identified 79 per cent of citizens as believing that their country had reached its limits for immigration, whereas 8, 34, and 26 per cent of the general population identified themselves as very racist, a little racist and racist, respectively (European Commission 1997). The figures for the EU-15 were rather comparable (9, 33 and 24 per cent, respectively) (1997). Racism and xenophobia in modern Germany are based on origin/nationality (56 per cent in 2009) or external appearance (19 per cent in 2009) (Peuker 2010:10). Discriminatory practices against the representatives of visible minorities resurface in the spheres of employment (38 per cent in 2008), housing and education (each 13 per cent in 2008) (31). According to the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) and FRA, the situation in most of the EU MSs
appears rather similar (ECRI 2009 and FRA 2007-2012). Comparison between all the MSs of the EU is, however, complicated by the fact that data on registered xenophobic and racist crimes are available only from 11 MSs and all of them have different legislative and criminal justice procedures with regards to this type of criminal offense (Awareness […] 2007).

Who is the “Other” in Germany and the EU?

As the EU continues its attempts to widen its reach and enhance its authority, its boundaries and the concept of the “other” become increasingly less defined (Fuchs and Klingemann 2002:20). Modern racism and nationalism in both the EU as a whole, and Germany in particular have been redefined and modified into “anti-immigration racism” (Evans 2009:44). Trapped in their “fortress mentality” (44), Europeans perceive immigration as a threat to their prosperity and integrity. Interspersing the immigration and “othering” rhetoric with emotionally charged imagery (45), and promoting inter-state cooperation on this matter, the EU added the issue of immigration to its agenda and made it the subject of supranational security. While doing so allowed the EU to further reinforce its position as an independent political actor, it also led to fierce anti-immigration demonstrations and clashes in the MSs.

In Germany, racist and nationalistic attitudes are primarily directed at immigrants from non-European countries. The Report on the Rise of Fascism and Racism postulates that the image of “Other” in the EU and in Germany still remains black with regards to race (Ford 1991:27). However, following the failure of its multiculturalism policy, Germany had to deal with a large-scale migration and settlement of temporary guest-workers from Eastern Europe as permanent residents (Mitchell and Russel 2009:64-5).
Interestingly, anti-immigration attitudes were already present in Germany as early as the 1960s, when the NPD launched the campaign under the slogan “stop immigration.” (Knischewski 2009:132). DVU and the Republicans (Die Republikaner) adopted a similar rhetoric a few years later, when they argued that uncontrolled influx of immigrants would destroy German national identity and therefore “Germany must be restricted to Germans” (Evans 2009:46-8). Grounded in the idea of citizenship based on descent, such rhetoric led to increased violence not only towards newcomers, but also towards the EU and German citizens of non-European origin (Mitchell and Russel 2009:74).

Growing Euroscepticism in the country has led citizens to debate whether the EU itself presents a threat to the German nation-state. Seeing Europeanization as “a dangerous experiment” (Spiering 2002:74), Eurosceptics express their dissatisfaction with the EU and their state’s membership in it (72). Some political parties oppose the project of Europeanization, with DVU, Republicans, the NDP and openly blaming the EU for increased immigration, economic hardships and unemployment, dubbing it as the “other” that threatens Germany’s stability and security. Therefore, despite the extraordinary effort applied to creating the feeling of Europeanness, the EU continues to be perceived as an out-group by some of the German population (72).

In light of the above, it is hardly surprising that Germany and the EU have been largely undecided with respect to the position of Central European countries (CECs) on the scale of ‘we-ness” versus ‘other-ness.” Associated with the enemy during the Cold War and left on the margins of the EU after the fall of the Soviet Union, CECs have only recently acquired full EU membership, and are having a hard time blending in. Despite
being European, the newcomers from the CECs are first and foremost immigrants in the
eyes of their western counterparts, who still perceive them as a potential threat (Jenkins
and Sofos 2009:45). The rise of unemployment is most commonly blamed on the
increased immigration. An attitude survey conducted by the German research institute
INFO in 2010 established that 14 per cent of interviewees blame unemployment on
foreign nationals residing in Germany. Even more (17 per cent) believe that German
citizens should be privileged in acquiring job positions compared to non-German
applicants (Peucker 2010:9). The next chapter will explore whether western populations
consider the CECs equally European, and whether the latest enlargement has affected the
image of the CECs and the development of national and/or European identity in
Germany.
Chapter 4 EASTERN ENLARGEMENT AND EUROPEAN IDENTITY

Section 4.1. How European are CEC?

Is There More than One European Identity?

The idea of a common European identity was one of the main driving forces behind the process of the EU’s eastern enlargement (Risse 2010; Sedelmeir 2003; Miller 1999). In their justifications for the speed and range of the fifth enlargement, political leaders of Central European Countries (CECs) and Western European states alike referred to the CECs’ accession as “returning to Europe” or “coming back home” after being “kidnapped” by the Soviet Union (Miller 1999:86-7). Such references implied a certain degree of commonness and familiarity between these two geopolitical regions in Europe that made the accession process relatively fast and smooth. However, in line with their devotion to the principle of “unity in diversity,” the EU’s understanding of the concept of a collective identity in Europe has demonstrated a shift from a unified identity to one that is more pluralistic and “diversity-sensitive” (Blokker 2008:258). Therefore, the question of whether there in fact exists a single uniform European identity, as opposed to an amalgamation of Eastern, Central and Western European identities, presents an interesting opportunity for investigation.

The notion of European identity is generally associated exclusively with the Western part of Europe. Demossier (2007:53-4) goes as far as to suggest that Western European identity will eventually become a common European identity, and the newcomers to the EU, CECs in particular, should aspire towards aligning their identity with the Western model. Moreover, the expectation is that the rest of Europe would also accept and adapt to this model (Blokker 2008:258). Interestingly, the Western states are
not the only ones propagating this idea: the majority of accession states have eagerly accepted to align their norms with the EU accession criteria, which are based on Western European values (Blokker 2008:258).

Consequently, there exist two major schools of thought with regard to Central and Eastern European states. According to one perspective, these states have always been European and consequently, their identities should not be in opposition to Western identity (Case 2007; Spohn 2005). The other school of thought argues that the CECs and countries in Eastern Europe have yet to become European, implying that the creation of identity in Europe outside the founding EU member states (MSs) is a work in progress (Demossier 2007; Herrmann 2006; Fligstein 2009). Checkel and Katzenstein (2009:217) consider the EU as both “the place of return and inescapable destination” for Central European states. Both CECs and Western European states share the perspective that by choosing to identify themselves as “Central” as opposed to “Eastern” Europeans, the CECs emphasize their closer connection to the EU and its values, and reinforce the feeling of commonness between themselves and the West. The Western European states refer to the CECs’ accession as “return[ing] to (as opposed to “joining”) Europe” (Blokker 2008:258). However, despite this shared perspective, relations between West, East and Central parts of Europe are laced with contradictions. On one hand, all of them are considered European, however on the other hand, people from CECs and Eastern Europe are sometimes perceived as migrants and foreigners by Western Europeans. Ultimately, these perceptions might undermine the sense of commonness in Europe and reinforce the sense of national belonging among the citizens of the MSs.
A broadly accepted consensus that Eastern Europe must undergo Europeanization and go through European integration to become European is challenged by historical analysis, which reveals that Eastern Europe has always been a part of Europe and embraced a set of common values (Case 2009:130). The opposition between East and West is rooted in the Eastern Europeans’ self-reflection, self-perception and self-categorization as distinct from their Western counterparts. Although Eastern Europeans consider themselves to have always been European, they acknowledge their difference from Western Europeans. This acknowledgement arguably generates a feeling of inferiority and urges them to align their values with Western norms (130). An alternative explanation for this everlasting dilemma of whether Central and Eastern Europe is in fact Europe, suggests that the opposition between East and West is a construct stemming from the “national elites’ desire to associate or dissociate their nation’s course with/from […] that of] their neighbors,” in order to achieve localized, generally national goals (111, 131).

A contrasting perspective foresees the creation of European identity in Central and Eastern Europe (Fligstein 2009:157-8). Specifically, it is suggested that the formation of European identity will take longer in the Central and Eastern European countries due to their limited opportunity to interact with Western Europe in a positive and effective way (158). This view reiterates the assumption that Western European identity stands for the entire European identity (Demossier 2007:54; Fligstein 2009:159).

Alternatively, there exists an integrated position on the correlation between Western European identity and its Eastern and Central counterparts. This perspective compares the two on integrational and progressive levels, as opposed to cultural and
civilizational levels. By differentiating between European civilizational and integrational identities, it becomes apparent that Eastern (and Central) European countries share the same cultural or civilizational identity; however, their integrational identity will have to transform and develop to the level that would match Western European identity (Spohn 2005:4, 10-1).

In any case, the eastern enlargement involves changes not only for Eastern Europe, but for the entire EU in terms of relations among the current MSs and the identities of their citizens (Spohn 2005:12). On one hand, eastern enlargement might strengthen national and regional identities due to the lack of accountability and authority in the increased EU. The institutional capacity of the EU would be weakened thanks to a high speed increase in the quantity of its members, and therefore the nation-state in the EU would appear as more trustworthy and reliable. On the other hand, upon the consolidation of the EU’s structure, the transnational integration framework could lead to suppression of nationalistic tendencies present in the European countries (12).

**Central European Countries (CEC) and Their Identity in Europe: The “Other” or “One of Us”?**

The notion of Central Europe, and the list of countries that self-identify as belonging to this region, remains rather undefined. If considered in geopolitical terms, the concept lacks a common centre, due to the multiplicity of centers in the region (Neumann 1999:144). In the discussions on Central Europe, the CECs come to be associated with the East European states. The terms “East Central Europe” and “Central and Eastern Europe” are used interchangeably, and often in juxtaposition to West European states and Western MSs of the EU. Contrastingly, despite the efforts of Central Europe to be recognized as similar to the West, the term “West Central Europe” is still non-existent. In
his attempts to define Central Europe, Ash united four states – Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland (Visegrad Group) and GDR - under the term “East Central Europe” (Neumann 1999:144). These four states arguably belong to the same geopolitical and cultural categories based on pre-1914 and post-1945 historical criteria: they have preserved main Western traditions, such as “Western Christianity, rule of law, some separation of powers, a measure of constitutional government,” and constitute formerly independent member states of the Warsaw pact that escaped direct Soviet rule (144). This classification includes both cultural (normative) and political aspects.

Alternatively, Central Europe seems to occupy a position “in between” East and West both in terms of geography and the levels of its political, economic and social development. With Germany largely perceived as the continent’s gravity center and Russia as a counterweight to Europe, Central European states are often seen as located in between Russia and Germany (Neumann 1999:144), and therefore inevitably inferior to Western countries’ in terms of progress in political and economic spheres. As a result, their Central Europeanness is used as an excuse for the Central European states’ poor performance when compared to their Western counterparts, – an “ideological compensation for backwardness” (Miller 1999:89).

As previously mentioned, the term “Central Europe” is often used to distinguish between the CECs and the East, and to position the former as being more European, based on the values and the identity traits they share with the West. This reluctance of CECs to be associated with the East in general, and Russia in particular, dates back to the 1950s. Notably, while negotiating the implementation of the project of European integration in Central Europe, the CECs turned to using “othering” rhetoric with respect
to Russia, arguing that “Russia [was] not of the West, whereas their own nations most emphatically [were]” (Neumann 1999:143). This rhetoric of dissociation from Russia constitutes a political tool serving a dual purpose. Firstly, it helped to instill a fear of the Russian other, therefore signaling acceptance of the European stereotype, and expressing a concern that association with backward Russia would obstruct and delay Central Europe’s aspirations for European integration. Secondly, it highlighted the need for support from the Western states in face of Russia’s proximity, and therefore potential influence (Neumann 1999:143).

In light of the enlargement, the notion of Central Europeanness has become politically and ideologically charged, and is often referred to as one of the reasons for rapid Western integration (Neumann 1998:401). Both leaders of CECs and their Western counterparts perceive the CECs’ exclusive Western orientation as supporting the notion of “coming back home” (Miller 1999:88). Interestingly enough, during the Cold War no distinction was made between Eastern and Central Europe, and the two regions were collectively referred to as “the socialist/communist enemy” posing a threat to European democratic values. In the late 1980s, however, a new rhetoric emerged, casting the term of Central Europeanness in a new light, and imbuing it with a sense of belonging with the West, and of sharing Western identity and history, until the CECs were regrettably “kidnapped” by the Soviet Union (Neumann 1998:402; Neumann 1999:86-7). This reformulation implied a certain closeness between Western Europe and the CEC, and was meant to facilitate the latter’s integration into a larger Europe. As a result, belonging to Central and not Eastern Europe has become a matter of prestige, a benefit, and a “ranking category” (Miller 1999:89; Blokker 2008:259).
The project of creating the concept of Central Europe is first and foremost a political project (Neumann 1999:146). With European integration looming ahead, the concept of Central Europe assumed increasingly political features and objectives. Confronted with inevitable deterioration of the Soviet Union, Central European states seized a chance to ‘transfer Central Europe from a phenomenon that [had] been historical into a political one” (155). For its part, Western Europe agreed to recognize the affinity of Central Europe and bring it to the forefront of the enlargement process, therefore transforming the region into a “magnet for Southeast Europe” and other countries, which would potentially want to join the EU (157).

The extent to which Western and Central Europe share the same values is still subject to debate, with some scholars arguing that even though both cultures stem from the cradle of Roman civilization, their common origins fall short of providing a sufficient ground for cultivating a common identity. The two regions co-existed and developed historically according to completely divergent patterns, and were influenced by very different circumstances and environments. Their identities formed independent of each other, while still exhibiting certain similarities to regions in their vicinity. Although fundamentally influenced by the same historical events, Western and Central Europe experienced these events and dealt with their consequences in a completely different manner. Arguably, historical values and traditions served to provide a foundation for a strong Western European identity, whereas in the East the process of identity formation was hindered by the Soviet socialism (Laitin 2002:55).

One of the reasons why the definition of Central Europeanness remains problematic in the discourse on European identity is due to the fact that the notion of
Central Europe does not have a solid foundation and “is being created in this discourse” (Miller 1999:87). Another complicating factor is that the term “Central Europeanness” had been largely absent in previous discussions on European integration, and only emerged in the period surrounding the end of the Cold War. Historical, geopolitical or even geographical definitions of Central Europe often refer to different concepts, and therefore fail to provide enough ground for creating a solid and singular definition. Moreover, it would be erroneous to presume that all countries that currently identify themselves as CECs share the same identity and exactly the same sets of norms and principles. As a geopolitical and cultural phenomenon, Central Europe has never been and most likely will not become homogeneous any time soon (Neumann 1999:144). However, this is also true in the case of Western Europe, whose assumed homogeneity has inspired debates on existence of a supranational identity in the region uniting Western states under the umbrella of a single concept. If this is indeed the case, and Central and Western Europe have in fact developed their own versions of Europeanness, two questions arise: firstly, the application and appropriateness of criteria on belonging and classification, and secondly whether these two types of Europeanness could be fused to form a common European identity.

Although European identity is now largely regarded as an amalgamation of multiple identities, the issue of a singular collective identity remains outstanding and confounded by whether heterogeneity is at all possible. If two versions of European identity, i.e., Central and Western European (sub-) identities, represent two components of a larger concept, they would ultimately have to blend together and become one and the same, in which case Central Europeanness would likely dissolve in its Western
counterpart. A more aggressive interpretation envisions Western Europe as an expansionist power, which would absorb Central European identity (Blokker 2008:261). Alternatively, if not brought to the same denominator, the two identities risk to undermine the concept of “unity in diversity” by taking “unity” out of it.

Arguably, having chosen to join Europe in the post-Cold war era, the CECs had to undergo a “redefinition” of their national identities to align them with European identity (Blokker 2008:260). This redefinition served to confirm the notion that Western and Central European states had always embraced the same values of “individualism, rationalism and cultural variety” (260). Interestingly enough, the process of re-defining Central Europe was driven primarily by civilizational and cultural aspects of identity. However, it ultimately became a tool for starting and facilitating the process of political and economic integration.

Section 4.2. Germany and EU Enlargement: German Enlargement Policy and its Role in the Fifth Enlargement

Deepening or Widening: Where Does Germany Stand?

Germany has been repeatedly described as the “keenest and most influential supporter of the eastern enlargement of the EU” (Zaborowski 2006:104). Undoubtedly, without German support for the CEC’s accession, the fifth enlargement would have transpired in a completely different fashion and at a much slower speed (Zaborowski 2006:104; Tewes 1998:121-2). Although perceived as an advocate for eastern enlargement by both CECs and Western states, Germany itself has never declared its full-time commitment to and unreserved prioritization of the EU widening project (Tewes 1999:122; Banchoff 1999:266). In fact, throughout major interstate and transnational changes, Germany has
maintained that its foremost priority was to deepen the process of European integration further (Tewes 1998:117-8; Banchoff 1999:259).

Tewes and Banchoff both examine the relationship between German European national identity and Germany’s actions with respect to foreign policy (Tewes 1998:177; Banchoff 1999:260). Arguing that (West) German national identity has been largely constructed in the context of the European integration project, both scholars credit Germany’s prior commitment to Europeanization for the country’s dedication to deepening the EU integration process. Although some priorities for German interstate and foreign policies have shifted following the country’s reunification in 1989 and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Germany remained dedicated to its “self-conception as an integration deepener” (Tewes 1998:117).

Faced with challenges of the post-Cold War and post-Soviet environment, Germany continued to support the implementation of the projects of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and European Monetary Union (EMU), as ratified in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty (Banchoff 1999:259, 264). Arguably, the collapse of the Soviet Union positioned Germany as the “premier power in Europe,” and created an opportunity for the state to establish itself as a “new regional hegemon” in relation to the newly independent CECs (265, 263). These major changes in the immediate geopolitical environment gave rise to new expectations for Germany by both CECs and West European states. Moreover, the Central European states expressly declared their orientation as Western, identifying Germany as “their main advocate on their way to a return to Europe” (Zaborowski 2006:106), which arguably created pressure for Germany to facilitate CECs’ accession.
Fully acknowledging the need for Germany’s support for Central Europe’s effort to join the EU, the CECs still feared that their over-dependence on Germany would result in their partial Germanization (Tewes 1998:122). However, this fear did not prevent them from using the argument that stressed their cultural and civilizational affinity on the basis of the nineteenth century perception of Mitteleuropa, and CECs being a part of the Habsburg Empire and therefore sharing similar values with Germany (Miller 1999; Blokker 2008). In addition, Germany’s reunification shifted the borders of Germany and the EU further eastward, thereby forcing Germany’s involvement with the issues of security and stability in the neighbouring regions. As a result, Western European states came to expect Germany to build relations and cooperate with the East, mostly for the security reasons, but also to expand its influence and reinforce its position in the changing European political landscape.

The very fact of Germany’s recent expansion to include its Eastern Länder also fuelled the perception of the country as a “proponent of the EU’s eastern enlargement” (Tewes 1999:117). Eastern states, such as Saxony, Brandenburg and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, having been recently liberated from the Soviet rule, shared geographical borders with Central European states, and therefore were well positioned to understand CECs’ issues and facilitate their integration into the EU (Jeffery and Collins 1998:88). Sharing a common border with the CECs, the former GDR states and Bavaria were bound to experience first-hand the repercussions of any issues facing their eastern neighbours, and therefore they expressed a keen interest in establishing and ensuring stability in the borderland regions (88). Based on their geographical location, history and culture, Eastern Länder would often refer to themselves as a “bridge to the East” (91),
which confirms their commitment to the CECs’ accession project, particularly those sharing a border with Germany.

In the late 1990s, Germany had yet to make widening of the EU its priority in the foreign affairs sphere. Expected to become an advocate for the enlargement, Germany had to accept conflicting roles of being both a deepener and widener of the EU (Tewes 1998:117). Notwithstanding a widespread speculation that Germany was the fiercest defender of the enlargement (Zaborowski 2006:104), Germany continuously pressed for a deeper integration, and either treated the enlargement as a secondary priority, or tried to integrate the two projects together. It never explicitly declared eastward expansion as its main priority, even during its presidency of the EU in 1994 (Tewes 1998:123-4; Banchoff 1999:266). However, Germany’s inevitable and significant involvement in the process of preparing for and implementing enlargement could lead to an intensification of German efforts with respect to the CECs’ accession to the EU. The next section provides a more detailed analysis of the reasons behind Germany’s commitment to promoting the eastern enlargement, and attempts to understand the role it played in the process and whose interests it represented.

**Eastern Enlargement: Pro and Contra for Germany**

Although Germany remained consistent in its preference for a deeper European integration post-unification, it still voiced its support and expressed interest in eastern enlargement, justifying it through both material and non-material factors. At first glance, Germany’s extensive involvement in the process of CECs’ accession to the EU might seem based on its desire to benefit materially from potential benefits associated with the widening of the EU. A closer look, however, reveals that non-material factors, such as
identity and historical memories, wielded a significant influence on Germany’s enlargement policy.

Germany’s support for the widening of the EU is often conceptualized in terms of the country’s economic, political and security self-interests (Sedelmeier 2003:5). Its geographical proximity to the Central European candidates for the EU accession has most naturally led to the establishment of close economic and trading relations between the two regions. Therefore, the accession of the Central European states stood to increase their cooperation with Germany in these areas. Arguably, despite the relatively balanced economic relations between the CECs and Germany, when compared to the former’s relations with their other Western neighbours, given Germany’s position as a more powerful economic player, closer cooperation between CECs and Germany would increase the former’s dependence on the latter (Zaborowski 2006:109).

During the preparatory stage of the accession (1990s), political leaders and elites described enlargement as beneficial for all actors involved. However, the description changed once the process of enlargement entered the technical stage. In the mid-1990s, Kohl’s government was pushing for a limited enlargement, which would include only Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary (Zaborowski 2006:107; Jeffery and Collins 1998:87). Eager to proceed with the project, Germany’s centre-right government at the time seemed to have underestimated the costs of and potential complications stemming from enlargement based on its relatively limited scope and promising economic and trade-related benefits. When a centre-left government came to power in 1998, Germany agreed to lend its support to an enlargement project of a much greater scope: accession of twelve candidates instead of the initial three. As a result, costs and benefits had to be
reevaluated for the EU in general, and Germany in particular, sparking growing concerns about potential economic implications of the project. With CECs going through a fast and abrupt change and appearing extremely unstable, major economic reforms were deemed essential both pre- and post-accession. Budgetary and financial reforms were dubbed a “German project,” following Berlin’s refusal to support the enlargement in their absence (Zaborowski 2006:110).

Moreover, the argument for the benefits from the increased common market, which was used to portray the enlargement as a win-win situation (Zaborowski 2006:109), backfired and sparked increasing concerns about multiple businesses relocating to the East. These concerns were particularly pronounced in the regions bordering on the CECs, such as certain Länder in the former GDR. Another concern was that increased cooperation between the two regions would potentially lead to a migration of labour force, mostly in the westward direction, therefore leading to unemployment in Western Europe. While regions constituting East German Länder largely referred to themselves as “bridges to the East” (Jeffery and Collins 1998:91), Bavaria in the Federal Republic was one of the most skeptically inclined towards enlargement, and advocated for the process to happen at a much slower speed or to be delayed altogether. Overall, German border regions insisted on longer waiting periods before the newly joined states could enjoy free labour movement, as well as a longer trial period for their economic integration. Bavaria in particular insisted on economically strengthening the German eastern border prior to enlargement, arguing that these regions were vulnerable (Zaborowski 2006:111).
Therefore, the German attitude towards enlargement in the 1990s, before the process actually began, changed from mostly enthusiastic to rather cautious. The German government stopped stressing the ultimate long-term benefits of the EU’s widening, and instead began focusing and calculating the short-term costs that it (and the EU) would incur. During this process, Germany fully acknowledged the risk that the costs, at least at the early stages, would exceed the benefits, which effectively weakens the argument for Germany being driven by economic self-interest in the matter (Zaborowski 2006:110).

From a political standpoint, Germany could use its new geopolitical position as an opportunity to expand its influence to the East, and create a community of like-minded states, therefore increasing Germany’s role in the decision-making process on the EU level (Zaborowski 2006:114). Interestingly, it was the West European states that expressed their concern with this scenario, since Central Europe feared Germanization primarily in economic and cultural spheres, rather than in the political domain (Tewes 1998:121-2). However, Germany refuted this argument by pursuing multilateral policies towards the accession candidates, involving them in initiatives on a multi-lateral versus bilateral level, and building a transnational network that included the prospective MSs (Banchoff 1999:265; Zaborowski 2006:114). Conscious of its past, Germany deliberately avoided any unilateral actions in its foreign policies and Europapolitik with respect to both Western and Eastern neighbours. The fact that political views and positions of Germany and CECs differed substantially both prior to and post enlargement, which is especially true in the case of Poland, demonstrates Germany’s lack of interest in controlling the policy-making process of its neighbouring states.
The one explicit self-interest that Germany pursued by supporting the eastern enlargement was the achievement and maintenance of stability and security in the bordering regions. The collapse of the Soviet Union allowed Germany to occupy a new position on the European continent, — the frontier state, *der Frontstaat* (Zaborowski 2006:111), of the European Economic Community (the future EU), directly exposed to the insecure and unstable environment represented by Central Europe at the time. While the imminent threat of the Soviet attack was gone, sharing borders with an unstable region would inevitably affect Germany’s stability and therefore undermine the well-being of the EU in general. To create a safe border region, Germany similarly chose a multilateral approach, whereby it focused on extending transnational initiatives to the CECs, introduced and established Western institutions in the region, and involved the CECs in cross border cooperation. The promise of enlargement acted as a tool for bringing stability to candidate states, since all of them had to fulfill the Copenhagen criteria, — the essential requirement for the accession. Moreover, since Central European states eagerly agreed to align their domestic policies with accession criteria, and to further promote democracy and the rule of law within their respective borders, it would be difficult to argue that the initiative was imposed on them by Germany. For its part, Germany sought to gain the following advantages in the process: firstly, it saw the moving of the EU’s border further to the east as an opportunity to relinquish its responsibilities of being a frontier state, and to transform Central European states from unsafe neighbours into secure and stable MSs. Secondly, by transforming its neighbourhood into a safe region, Germany looked to minimize the potential influx of immigrants from Central Europe post enlargement. While Germany undoubtedly had a
vested interest in seeking a secure neighbourhood, it was hardly the only state to benefit from these efforts to create a safe environment, since a secure border region would bring stability to the EU as a whole (Zaborowski 2006:111-112).

Geopolitical transformations of the 1990s enhanced Germany’s significance as an economic and political player. Located at the heart of Europe, Germany had to assume the role of a mediator between its eastern and western neighbours. It actively engaged in the negotiations between Central Europe and the EU, advocating for the former’s accession. However, as discussed above, Germany’s active involvement in the matter was not driven primarily by German self-interests. The argument that Germany’s support for enlargement stemmed solely from its expectations of material benefits is oversimplified. Therefore, a detailed analysis of non-material factors, such as cultural similarity, historical circumstances and shared identity, is appropriate and, in fact, may provide a more nuanced explanation of Germany’s behavior.

The argument that Central European states shared the same identity with the EU MSs resurfaced on multiple occasions during discussions on accession. Those making the argument did so primarily to distinguish between Central and Eastern Europe, and to justify the EU’s preference for the former. According to both parties, Central and Western Europe were culturally similar, shared the same set of values (i.e. democracy, rule of law and protection of human rights), and were firmly rooted in the traditions of Roman civilization and Christianity, and more specifically, Catholicism. It was based on these commonalities that the EU was now considering countries such as Poland, Czech Republic, and Hungary as prime candidates for the enlargement process. These countries differed profoundly from other candidates, in that the enlargement meant to bring them
“back home.” This preferential treatment is particularly obvious in Germany’s insistence on limited enlargement that would include Poland, Czech Republic, and Hungary under the centre-right government. The Kohl government justified this position in terms of “cultural closeness” with the aforementioned countries (Zaborowski 2006:118).

Contrastingly, Germany originally opposed the plan for Romania and Bulgaria to join the EU, arguing that no such closeness existed between itself and the two countries, and describing them as “culturally alien countries, to which Germany owed nothing” (118).

This rhetoric of obligation to Central Europe, especially Poland and Czech Republic, dominates German discourse on enlargement. Admitting its guilt for atrocities committed by the Nazi regime on the peoples of these states, German leaders saw the EU enlargement as a means to reconcile with Central Europe and subsequently, with Germany’s past. It was convenient for Germany and beneficial for both parties to reach a rapprochement through the European integration project, since it allowed Germany to alleviate the burden of its historical guilt, and Central Europe to obtain EU membership. The process of reconciliation was also facilitated by the fact that both parties were working on a common European project and shared the same interests.

When the government in Germany changed to centre-left in 1998 and subsequently conceded to full enlargement, the attitude toward the enlargement project among German leaders changed dramatically. The government voiced concerns over the costs of enlargement, and stressed the need for preparation and reforms. However, Germany’s decision to give priority to certain Central European states over others in a bid for reconciliation with the former, does not in any way imply that Germany would overlook its own interests in the process. The nature and quality of its relations with
Poland and Czech Republic demonstrate that Germany approached enlargement strategically and selectively. Although historically, Germany’s relations with both states were comparable, during the enlargement process, Germany invested a considerably larger effort in building a stronger relationship with Poland, its larger and more influential neighbour.

Whether it was material or not, Germany took a significant interest in EU’s eastern enlargement. The two sets of factors, as discussed above, were intimately interconnected and therefore, require a joint examination.

Section 4.3 Enlargement and its consequences

Throughout its history, the EU has gradually expanded, including more and more states and building a common area of economic, political and cultural cooperation. Undoubtedly, eastern enlargement is by far the biggest and the most important step in the development of the EU, both in terms of scope and implications. Unprecedented in its scale (accession of ten plus two states, all differing in size, cultural, political, and economic backgrounds), this widening exercise had multiple implications for all and every actor involved – states in Western and Eastern Europe, and the EU in general. These implications are both material and non-material in nature, and some have already materialized and are subject to analysis and discussion, while certain longer-term effects can only be speculated about at present. However, since other events took place simultaneously with enlargement, it would be difficult to determine whether certain changes were the result of enlargement alone, or were caused by the combination of enlargement and other factors associated with the ongoing process of European integration (such as deepening of the European institutional sphere, the establishment of a
monetary union, and the work on a common European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), to name a few), or were driven by global economic and geopolitical factors, such as economic crisis and military conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Given the interconnectedness of the material and non-material spheres, one cannot analyze one without the other. When it comes to identity, its formation, development, and transformations, material factors appear as important as non-material elements, such as shifts in culture and values (Smith 1992:56-7; Carey 2002:403). Although given its inherent abstractness, the concept of identity is foremost linked to the cultural and civilizational spheres, there exist multiple manifestations of identity that are intertwined, and therefore should be analyzed as a whole. Identity is a combination of its political, cultural, civilizational, religious, and geographical manifestations. Therefore, shifts in political, economic and social spheres often lead to the transformation of citizens’ identity. For instance, people who came to enjoy economic benefits of European integration, whether work or education related, tend to be more open to identifying themselves as European citizens (Fligstein 2008:121). Similarly, when European integration ranks high on the states’ political agenda and the countries’ political elites depict it as positive and beneficial, citizens of those states often eagerly embrace the European dimension as part of their identity. While the most recent EU enlargement yielded very tangible effects in material spheres, such as politics and economics, one must also analyze the impact of the process on non-material phenomena, such as identity.

**Implications for the Political Sphere**

Politically, the EU’s enlargement project was used as a tool to disseminate and reinforce liberal values in the newly acceded countries, many of which recently became free of
By promoting its values, the EU succeeded in reaffirming its image as a “promoter of human rights and democracy” (Sedelmeier 2003:6). Dedication to democracy, protection of human rights and the rule of law have not only become the ultimate goals of the European integration process, but also an intrinsic part of the EU’s identity. Moreover, attaining these objectives was one of the most essential requirements for accession to the EU. By incorporating these values into a set of political conditions for accession, the EU enhanced the process of identity creation in the new MSs:

By defining and spelling out the criteria for membership, the EU explicitly articulated the fundamental characteristics it ascribed to itself. Adherence to human rights and democratic principles became an increasingly central condition for the EU’s offers of aid, trade, and eventual membership to the CECs. (Sedelmeier 2003:7)

Risse argued that identity politics could provide a missing explanation for the eastern enlargement, where rationalist theories came short of doing so (2010:204-5). Taking into consideration that “overcoming divisions in Europe” was one of the initial objectives of European integration, it is not altogether surprising that Robert Schuman had extended the offer to the countries in Central and Eastern Europe to join European community when the latter were “freed from constraints, under which they live[d]” since as far back as 1963 (Risse 2010:206). Therefore, the project of a united Europe became a “moral duty” for the EU (207). “Respect for democratic principles and rights” was declared as both the ultimate goal of European integration and a condition for joining the EU, therefore making it impossible for the EU to deny its support for the CECs’ liberal aspirations, since doing so would contradict its own promises (Risse 2010; Sedelmeier 2003). As a result, the EU perceived a relatively smooth accession of the democratizing CECs as natural (Risse 2010:207), and saw it as both an opportunity to reaffirm the EU’s
image and to extend its collective identity further to the East. If Central European states wished to follow through with the process of accession and enjoy the potential economic benefits associated with the EU membership, they had to subscribe to the EU’s essential values and share in its identity (Risse 2010; Sedelmeier 2003). Consequently, it appears that enlargement eastward was first and foremost a political project, and every actor involved was aware of its political significance.

The political effects of the fifth enlargement were rather ambiguous. According to the Eurobarometer, one of the perceived advantages of the enlargement to the east was an increased EU weight in global politics (73 per cent of the population in the EU27 agree with this statement according to the Flash Eurobarometer (Flash Eurobarometer (fl)257 (2009: 20)). However, with newly admitted states no longer being consumers of policies but taking an active part in the process of policy-making, political weight is perceived to have shifted inside the EU as well. 65 per cent of Europeans agree that the EU has become more difficult to manage, and 73 per cent said enlargement would make it more difficult to make political decisions (fl257 (2009:30); fl132 (2002:39)). Regarding Germany, the loss of political importance in the EU is not one of the major concerns: while 29 per cent of the respondents believe that could become the case, Germany falls far behind Finland (51 per cent), Sweden (48 per cent), Denmark (45 per cent) and the EU average (31 per cent) (fl132 (2002:40)).

The implications of enlargement on the MSs’ national and supranational identities (both old and new) are twofold. Firstly, the process of the EU widening required that national identities be Europeanized and aligned with European standards. Both old and new MSs had to fulfill this requirement prior to the EU’s extension to the East, since the
EU was determined to ensure that old MSs observed and respect the values it sought to promote in the new MSs. As a result, the EU legally enforced liberal values and moved them to the top of its list of priorities. This has led to the promotion of liberal democracy in the accepted states (in 2010, 73 per cent of Europeans believed the enlargement has led to the spread of democratic values across Europe (fl 257 (2009:20))). Secondly, the CECs had to reassure the EU of their readiness for enlargement by demonstrating that they shared in its values and were prepared and willing to pursue democratization and liberalization, even if it meant changing their prior ways. Therefore, Europeanization was both a bottom-up (since the CECs participated in it voluntarily), and a top-down process (since the EU insisted on these changes in exchange for membership).

**Economic Factors**

Analysts generally exaggerated economic benefits and disadvantages of the enlargement (Fröhlich 2005:16-7). Anticipated economic advantages, such as expansion of the markets and free movement of labour and goods between old and new MSs, came with certain costs. For instance, Germany and France expressed their concern about the low cost of capital in the new MSs and effects it might have on their economies, as well as on the economy of the EU as a whole in the short run (18). What had seemed like an opportunity for both East and West alike turned out to be an issue for the two regions. Low taxes and the possibility of direct investment in the East allowed for the creation of more jobs in the region. However, combined with high taxes in the West, this development prompted a wave of outsourcing to the Central European MSs, inspiring fears of unemployment in the West. Meanwhile, many eastern companies found themselves unable to compete effectively with their Western counterparts, which in the
majority of cases resulted in their shutting down. Finally, the enlargement granted EU citizenship to the citizens of twelve new states, five of them sharing a border with the old MSs. As a result, all new citizens could now enjoy the four basic freedoms and rights outlined in the Maastricht Treaty, including the freedom of movement within the EU. Many Easterners used this opportunity to immigrate to Western countries in the hope of earning higher wages. Faced with the possibility of mass exodus from the East, citizens of the old MSs grew increasingly fearful that Eastern Europeans would inundate their job markets, taking away their jobs and bringing about unemployment and economic instability.

However, these concerns did not materialize to the extent feared by some Western citizens. Anticipating an increase in migration, the majority of old EU MSs placed a seven-year delay on free labour movement from the newly acceded countries, therefore eliminating the risk that their states would suffer an influx of work migrants after enlargement. Germany, in its turn, realized that it would be “unacceptable [for it] to finance unfair tax competition against itself,” and insisted on tax harmonization between old and new MSs prior to the EU’s expansion, refusing to approve the widening project until eastern states “re[thought] their tax policies” (Kiss 2005:81). Germany’s insistence on defending its national interests against potentially negative economic repercussions of enlargement signaled a significant shift in its role as an unequivocal promoter of European interests.

With respect to identity, economic changes and associated concerns served to diminish citizens’ confidence in economic stability post-enlargement, regardless of whether they resided in the old or new MSs. More importantly, citizens in some of the
EU-15 MSs came to regard their newly acceded fellow-citizens as invaders, naming increase in unemployment due to the immigration and outsourcing as one of their primary concerns (56 per cent agreed that enlargement contributed to job losses in their country in 2009 (fl 257 (2009:30)). Moreover, the respondents believed that the enlarged EU is more difficult to manage (65 per cent) and the existence of many different cultures and values within the EU has created difficulties (54 per cent) (2009). This dissatisfaction among the population of the EU generated a rift in their yet unformed unity, and obstructed the establishment of a common European identity. Arguably, the perceived need to protect their national economic interests and stability reinforced the feelings of national belonging among the citizens of the EU who increasingly blamed the enlargement for new economic challenges, and came to see the EU as a threat and the “other.” In Germany’s case, such shifts in popular attitude served to undermine German loyalty to the project of European integration, and prompted Germans to reassess their national and European identities. While 52 per cent of Germans regarded eastern enlargement as rather important to their country in 2003 (fl132 (2002:31), 72 per cent also realized that the enlargement would be very expensive for their state (2002). Moreover, upon completion of the accession process in 2010, 71 per cent of Germans were against any further enlargement of the EU and another 71 per cent suggested that there should be an alternative to normal membership with the EU offered to other candidate countries (EB73 (2010:222); fl140 (2003:77)). However, it is hard to establish whether this shift stems from a causal link between the rising German national identity and growing Euroscepticism or whether it demonstrates more of a temporary correspondence between the two.
Security Factors

As discussed above, both Germany and the EU used the creation of a secure and stable environment around them as an important argument in favour of the enlargement process. After the Soviet Union collapsed, the nature of the external threat changed from that of an invasion to one of instability in the West, and potential disruption and reversal of the already established and functioning systems of the EU. This new threat could take the shape of cross-border crime, smuggling of goods and persons, illegal migration, and military conflicts. Recognizing that these factors would directly impact Germany, the nation moved to promote eastern enlargement to ensure that a safe zone existed between itself and the unsafe East on its borders. However, security implications of enlargement were rather dubious: on one hand, enlargement did divest Germany of its responsibilities as a Frontstaat; on the other hand, however, it erased hard borders between Germany and Central Europe before the latter were able to fulfill the EU’s security standards.

Following their accession to the EU, the CECs similarly did not wish to bear the burden of being frontier states indefinitely, and became advocates for their non-EU neighbours and their European aspirations (Guerot 2005:56).

From a purely geographic perspective, eastern enlargement raised a question of how much further and on what basis the EU would expand. The opponents of further widening argue that the EU has already reached its institutional capacity, and point to the costs of the most recent enlargement to demonstrate that further widening would be not only unreasonable but also unattainable. If one considers the politics of identity, the question of where the EU ends has become increasingly contentious (Risse 2010:213), since the argument could be made for the EU to expand further so as to include states
such as Ukraine, for instance, based on the same criteria it used for the Central European states, namely a shared set of values and Ukraine’s commitment to continue its effort of democratization.

After the accession negotiations with the CECs candidates began, the EU was faced with the question of how to deal with its immediate neighbourhood, still consisting of the states that were not or would never be ready to become its members. The issue required a timely and integrated response from the EU, and gave rise to several initiatives (some more successful than others), such as the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), Action Plans signed with the bordering countries, and the establishment of a transnational institutional framework, among others. The possibility of further enlargements of the EU is highly debatable, with 71 per cent of Europeans believing full membership in the EU should be replaced with some kind of alternative relationship with candidate states in the future (fl140 (2003:77)). Immigration issues and stability at the EU borders should be taken into consideration prior to any further enlargement as well (25 and 17 per cent respectively) (fl257 (2009:36)).

According to public opinion polls, eastern enlargement is perceived as advantageous for the EU as a whole in terms of security and stability (in 2009, 58 per cent of respondents agreed it was the case (fl257 (2009:20)). Eastern enlargement is perceived as preserving EU security and stability as a whole and as having allowed progress in the fight against organized crime and illegal migration (58 per cent each). Contrastingly, as the results of the same survey demonstrate, at the same time 50 per cent of the respondents agree that enlargement has increased the feeling of insecurity across Europe (30). These contradictions in the perceptions of the enlargement with regards to
security issues indicate that despite its efforts to establish a reliable effectively functioning EU-wide security system, the EU is still not seen as a powerful security provider for its MSs. Moreover, the argument that security concerns were the sole or the most important driver behind the enlargement for both the CECs and old MSs lacks credibility, since the CECs joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), a well-established and reliable security actor, almost at the same time they joined the EU (Risse 2010:206).

The roles of both old and new EU MSs changed as a result of the enlargement. According to Guerot (2005:72), the old MSs were now faced “with the necessity to become an empire without will.” In order to protect this “empire” from the outside, it was no longer sufficient to develop and implement security methods solely on the nation-state level. Following the accession, the new MSs effectively became a borderland region, and therefore faced a number of security concerns, among other issues. The old MSs undertook the responsibility to build, promote and maintain security in the new MSs and their immediate borders. This project, however, is impeded by the fact that a lot of EU initiatives in the sphere of security, such as ESDP for example, require a transfer of responsibilities from the national level to supranational. This transfer would upgrade the EU’s role to that of an influential actor on issues of domestic and international security and a guarantor of the MSs’ safety. However, many MSs, new and old, considered this ‘upgrade’ as detrimental to their national sovereignty, and were reluctant to support it, thereby hindering cooperation efforts. Forced to reevaluate their past and new spheres of influence, the MSs felt ever more protective of their national interests. At present, the transfer of authority on security matters from nation-state to a transnational body is
incomplete, preventing ESDP from delivering on all of its objectives in an efficient and timely manner. The day when it would be able to take care of any security-related issues independently is still some time away.

Non-material factors

The concept of a shared identity served as both a driving force and a final destination for eastern enlargement. On one hand, identity politics dictated certain aspects of the enlargement, shaping and influencing the behaviour and relations of actors involved in the process. On the other hand, identity itself was affected by the widening process and its outcomes. Although the CECs gained admittance to the EU based on the arguments of shared European identity, their accession has made the EU more heterogeneous and diverse than it has ever been in its history.

Despite their taken-for-granted Europeanness (Neumann 1998:401) in reality the CECs have largely lagged behind in the process of European identity formation according to the Western assessment, due to their “more distinct national and historical features,” and reluctance to renounce aspects of their national sovereignty (Guerot 2005:55, Fuchs and Klingemann 2002:20). Moreover, the varying speeds at which different groups of MSs were integrating into the EU prompted a discussion of a “two-speed Europe” (EB66 (2007:200)), – the idea that would effectively allow some states an opportunity to implement the changes associated with the process of Europeanization at a much slower speed than the rest of the Union. If this idea were to gain acceptance and becomes an actual policy rather than an abstract notion, the EU would face further internal divisions. Overall, there exists some apprehension between the new and old MSs, since some new MSs, such as Poland, express “some profound uneasiness about Western culture,” and
consider the EU a threat to their national identity (Risse 2010:210), while older MSs consider that by being overly cautious and insisting on holding on to their old-fashioned values, the new members obstruct the EU’s progress to modernity.

Another important debate is the one surrounding the issue of history that the eastern enlargement arguably has brought back to the EU. From a historical standpoint, although the most significant events of the past century concerned the entire European continent, each country and each region had a different historical experience and played a different role in every historical event. In the aftermath of the World War II (WWII), Central European and Baltic states emerged as victims, whereas Germany, their main advocate in the process of the EU accession, was labeled a perpetrator. By using enlargement as a means to “break from their past,” Germany agreed to deliver on certain demands imposed on it by Central Europe (Kiss 2005:75).

At the early stages of the enlargement, it was depicted as a “win-win” situation for everyone involved (Zaborowski 2006:109). However, the process that intended to foster the members’ loyalty and affiliations to the EU through benefits to all, left all three groups of actors involved (Western, Eastern Europe and the EU as an entity) feeling like they emerged on the losing side (Guerot 2005:54). The old MSs found their responsibilities and costs increased, while the new MSs felt that they were treated as second-class members, and therefore could not enjoy the benefits of membership equally with their western counterparts (54). The EU, in its turn, was relentlessly criticized for the issues and failures of the enlargement process, and found its popularity waning among both the public and elites. Despite its efforts to become a “post-Westphalian superstate” with a unified authority and clear-cut common identity, the enlarged EU is
more akin to a “neo-medieval empire,” represented by overlapping authorities and multiple identities that are vaguely defined and multilevel (Kiss 2005:74).

**Enlargement and German Identity**

The decision to admit twelve new states to the Union, followed by its protracted implementation, took its toll on identities and affiliations in Germany. Although Germans still exhibit a strong inclusive identity (i.e., consider themselves both German and European at an average rate of 52 per cent in 2001), the changes in the proportions of certain indicators signify certain shifts in perceptions and loyalties of the German population. An analysis of these changes allows one to establish links between shifts in self-identification and shifts in German enlargement policies. However, the scope of this research project prevents the author from establishing whether this relationship is of a causal nature.

In 2002/3 two-thirds of the EU population, including Germany, agreed that the enlargement was “geographically and historically justified” and a “moral duty” of the EU (68 and 66 per cent respectively in Germany (f1132 2002:40)). Only a year later, when the eastern enlargement took place, the German population in particular exhibited a negative attitude towards eastern enlargement (56 per cent of the German population) and any further enlargement in general (with 36 per cent for and 60 per cent against). This negativity might be the result of the citizens realizing the costs of the enlargement to Germany. In 2004, the German population particularly feared the possibility of

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7 Interestingly enough, 2002 was the last year when Eurobarometer asked the citizens of the EU to assess their identity (issue 56:14). In subsequent issues, the survey focused more on the enlargement, and starting 2006 only the European identity aspect was included in the reports.

8 The question wording in F1132(2002): “I am going to read out a certain number of proposals, could you tell me if you rather agree: We have a moral duty to re-unite Europe after the divisions of the Cold War. […] New countries joining the European Union is, historically and geographically natural and therefore justified.”

9 The question wording in EB 62(2004:135): “Q36.4 What is your opinion on each of the following statements? Please tell me for each statement, whether you are for it or against it. Option: Further enlargement of the European Union to include other countries in future years.”
outsourcing to the new MSs whose costs of labour were below those of the old MSs (85 per cent in EB 62 (2004:24)).

Having experienced first-hand the integration of the Eastern Länder in early 1990s, German citizens thought it unfair for Germany to have to pay for the integration and economic development of the poorer MSs, so that they could join the Union on a level playing field. Unfortunately, no other MSs, even after the enlargement, could potentially replace Germany in its role as a major player and “economic locomotive.” Having accepted this reality, Germany moved to advance its economic interests, becoming not only a more powerful EU player, but also a significant independent actor to be reckoned with on the international stage. While this new role came as a surprise to both the EU and Germany, it did not explicitly undermine Germany’s dedication to the process of European integration. It continued to act as “a motor of European integration,” designing and implementing the projects for the benefit of itself and the EU, such as a project of tax harmonization (Guerot 2005).

As demonstrated in the Eurobarometer (issues 53 (2000) – 62 (2004)), the negative attitude towards enlargement grew stronger as the year of accession of the new MSs approached. In earlier issues of the Eurobarometer, 62 per cent of the EU15 population indicated that they did not consider “welcoming new member countries” to the EU a priority (EB54 (2000:68). Later on, the Eurobarometer increasingly focused on the questions of support for the eastern enlargement, in particular, and potential further enlargement, in general (EB 60-62(2003-2004)). It sought to discover citizens’ attitudes towards prospective member countries, criteria they used in making their assessment, and sentiments they felt towards the process of EU widening. Throughout this four-year
period, Germany’s population demonstrated levels of support for enlargement that were lower than average and among the lowest in the EU15 (35-36 per cent in Germany compared to the EU average of 50-53 per cent (EB 62 (2004:152)). After the accession of ten new MSs took place in 2004, support for admitting Romania and Bulgaria to the EU fell to 34 per cent compared to 49 per cent for EU25 (EB 67 (2007:188)). The numbers of German citizens’ who assessed the 2004 enlargement as having negative or positive repercussions for the EU were comparable (20 and 18 per cent, respectively) (EB 67 (2007:188)).

These fluctuations in the levels of support for enlargement in Germany appear to occur simultaneously with the changes in the center-left government’s enlargement policy, whereby it began to focus on the costs of the process that Germany would incur. About at the same time (2002), there was an increase to 68 per cent in the national pride indicator in Germany, which was still the lowest in the EU, but relatively high for Germany. There are multiple reasons that could explain these fluctuations. Firstly, Germany’s efforts to promote its national interests during the enlargement process imbued Germans with a feeling of “Germany first, and then the EU,” prompting them to reassess the ways in which they conceptualized their belonging and self-identification. Secondly, one of the primary concerns in the contexts of enlargement was Germany’s ability to protect the country’s most prized possessions, namely its economic well-being and cultural heritage. Thirdly, the rhetoric that accompanied the accession of the new MSs portrayed the EU as lending a helping hand to the candidate counties, thereby fostering a feeling of superiority among the old MSs who perceived themselves as generous hosts aiding the CECs in their quest to re-join Europe.
Interestingly enough, the EU never demanded that the citizens of its MSs give up their national attachments. As a result, European integration allowed for both “prolonging the nation state and substituting it” (Kiss 2005:75), and gave the citizens of each member country an opportunity to realize and analyze their national peculiarities in the context of Europeanness, so as to enhance their similarities and overcome their differences. In order to produce the level of commonness required to create the Union, each country had to adjust its national features by diluting some of them and exaggerating others. This process bore distinct “us” versus “them” features, “us” being a nation-state and “them” being the European community. Ideally, this analysis would conclude that “us” was a part of “them,” thereby transposing the initially national feeling of “we-ness” to the European or transnational level. However, as noted by Kiss, “the more Europeanized Germany was, the more “German” Germany seemed to be emerging” (2005:75). For the first time in several decades, German leaders started to speak on the behalf of Germany on its own and not as the agent of the EU, promoting their country’s interests and voicing its national concerns. All these changes are evident in increased levels of German exclusive national identity among the population, which reached their highest point of 40 per cent in 2002, albeit being still below the levels for inclusive national identity.

Cognizant of the limitations posed by statistical data as discussed in Chapter 1, I turned my research efforts to the analysis of German media sources, with the objective to discover evidence of changing attitudes towards the EU, Central European states and Germany through a careful examination of how they were portrayed in the media throughout the process of enlargement.
Chapter 5 CONTENT ANALYSIS OF GERMAN MEDIA

Section 5.1. Introduction to Media Content Analysis

An analysis of the empirical data on the subject of national and supranational identities in the EU reveals the existence of a debate surrounding the subject of a common European identity, its development and promotion, and the ways in which it relates to and is affected by national identities of the member states (MSs). However, empirical efforts to examine the effects of Europeanization in terms of identity appear rather one-sided and focus predominantly on exploring the notion of a common identity in the EU, the possible ways for its construction and strengthening, as well as speculations as to its future development. Meanwhile, the development of national identity and whether it is affected by Europeanization and in what way has been not explored as in depth.

The collection of examined academic sources on the subject of identity, although derived from extensive consultations with and/or studies of target populations with a goal of exploring certain attitudes, nevertheless can be subject to bias. Statistical data, such as EU-wide opinion polls, the Eurobarometer, as well as other surveys, used for the purposes of this research project, rely on the data collected from a certain group within the population, and therefore is often not representative of the opinion of the masses. Therefore, in an attempt to test whether a debate on the preservation and strengthening of national identity in the EU is indeed present on the EU MSs’ agenda, I decided to analyze German mass media during the time when the process of the eastern enlargement of the EU was in full swing, i.e., starting from its final preparatory stages in 2000, the accession of the new MSs in 2004 and 2007 and the analysis of its implications in the post-enlargement period (2005 until present).
The analysis of the newspaper articles undertaken is of a qualitative nature, requiring that statistical data must be supplemented by a content analysis, which aims to determine the change over time by comparing images produced by the media from the early 2000s to the present. The content analysis of German media assumes that influence is wielded by the media on the formation of opinions and attitudes among the population (Bruter 2005:29). On the one hand, media aim to reflect the most urgent issues in the community, while on the other hand, they seek to evaluate certain situations, and in doing so to construct positive or negative images that are intended to affect the citizens’ judgment and opinions about certain matters. Ultimately, mass media are a powerful vehicle for constructing citizens’ identity, affiliations and attitudes because they not only report on successes and shortcomings of the European project but also evaluate it, thereby influencing and gradually transforming mass opinions (29).

The media analysis provides another tool alongside of analysis of documentary materials and opinion surveys to explore my hypothesis that the eastern enlargement contributed to a change in Germans’ perceptions of their nation and the EU, prompting German citizens to view their identity more positively.

**Section 5.2. Media Content Analysis: Description of Research Activities**

I performed a media content analysis of select German newspapers in an attempt to analyze the change in images of Germany, the EU, eastern enlargement and Central European Countries (CECs), as they are portrayed in the media. For the purposes of this analysis, I searched the Factiva database using search terms that are relevant for the topics of German and European identities, the EU, and eastern enlargement. The search produced multiple results, which I organized in three separate groups, namely articles on
identity-related issues (German national and German European identity, as well as European identity in Germany), articles on enlargement and the EU (expectations associated with the enlargement project prior to 2004 and its consequences post 2004, as well as the image of the EU pre- and post-enlargement), and articles on European identity in the united EU before and after the widening to the East.

In order to further organize my search, I developed a timeline based on the analysis of empirical data and concentrated on specific time-periods (see Table 5.1). The majority of the analyzed articles were published between 2000 and 2013, the time period when the project of European integration was proceeding at a high speed. I also performed a search for the time period prior to 2000, but the few articles I found focused more on the integration of East German states into the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), on the differences and similarities between two regions and appeared to hold little relevance for the purposes of my research. In terms of enlargement, most of the articles under analysis are dated 2000-2005, when the media debates surrounded preparations for the eastern enlargement and attempts to predict its effects. Articles published at a later date (2006-2013) analyzed the aftermath of the enlargement, however, the main focus seemed to be more on the EU during and after the economic recession (2007-2009), whereas the enlargement was discussed only as a secondary factor.

Most of the articles on identity-related issues appeared around 2000-2002 as a reaction to the statement by the General Secretary of Christian Democratic Union (CDU), Laurenz Meyer, “I am proud to be German,” and after 2006 in light of Germany’s victory in the 2006 FIFA World Cup Championship. The selection of articles dealing with both identity and enlargement and discussing one as influencing the other or vice versa is
rather limited. Generally, articles focused on the political and economic effects of the enlargement, and described the EU, European integration, and Germany either in positive or negative terms. In order to demonstrate the changes in perceptions, I used individual statements as a unit of my analysis. I based my research on the assumption that negative images produced by the media would most likely generate negative associations among the audience and increase their reluctance to identify with the body/unit/organization that is being depicted negatively. Contrastingly, the presentation of belonging to either the national or supranational sphere as a positive phenomenon will encourage citizens to identify with it.

**Table 5.1. Timeline: Key Dates and Events.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Description of the event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>ENLARGEMENT</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>– signing association agreements with the Baltic states.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13/12/1997</td>
<td>– launching the EU enlargement process (Luxembourg European Council).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/03/1998</td>
<td>– accession negotiations began with six most successful states (Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovenia).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15/02/2000</td>
<td>– accession negotiations proceeded with the rest of the candidate countries (Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Romania and Slovakia).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16/04/2003</td>
<td>– Accession Treaty is signed in Athens.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/05/2004</td>
<td>– after the ratification procedures were completed, ten states officially joined the EU.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>– Bulgaria and Romania joined the EU.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>GERMAN NATIONAL AND EUROPEAN IDENTITIES</strong></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While I concentrated my analysis on three publications: *Die Welt*, *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (SZ) and *Der Spiegel*, I also performed a general search without specifying the name of the source in the search engine in order to demonstrate that the topics in question were
high on the media’s agenda in the relevant time periods. This general search produced several relevant articles. To minimize bias, I chose the sources that represent different sides of the political spectrum: Die Welt, its special Sunday edition Welt am Sonntag, its online edition Welt Online, and Hamburger Abendblatt, another newspaper based in Hamburg and published by the same company (Axel Springer AG), belong to the right (conservative) stream, while SZ and Der Spiegel represent the center-left (liberal) of the political spectrum. Die Tageszeitung (taz) and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), the publications analyzed as part of my general search, espouse left and centre-right views, respectively. All publications are available to the general public and appear daily, with the exception of Der Spiegel and Welt am Sonntag, which are circulated on a weekly basis.

Overall, I identified 67 articles as relevant to my research (23 from Die Welt, 17 from SZ, 14 from Der Spiegel, and 13 from the general search, including articles in FAZ, taz, Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik (Blätter), Passauer Neue Presse, Agence Europe, among others), and proceeded to analyze them according to a coding scheme that I developed specifically for this project (refer to Attachment 1). In total, I analyzed 367 statements, which were subsequently grouped according to topics and publications (please see the table 5.2 below for details).  

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10 All the information given in tables in this chapter was retrieved in the process of media content analysis from multiple sources described above throughout 2000-2013. Overall, 67 articles were retrieved using online search engine (Factiva). The titles of the articles were coded for citation purposes. More specifically “DW” stands for Die Welt, “SZ” –for Süddeutsche Zeitung, the articles from Der Spiegel are coded under “SPGL”, and the articles from general search are counted as „R“. The year of the publication of the article is indicated in brackets. Full bibliographical description of the articles and explanation of the codes are indicated under Appendix 2.
Table 5.2. The Distribution of Analyzed Statements According to the Publication, Positive/Negative Evaluation and Themes (2000-2013).

**Statements per Publication (number and percentage)**

- **Der Spiegel:** 85; 24%
- **Die Welt:** 120; 33%
- **SZ:** 73; 20%
- **General search:** 81; 23%

*as % of all statements

**Statements per Topic (number and percentage) *

- **Identity:** 296; 82%
- **Enlargement:** 64; 18%

*as % of all statements

**Positive and Negative Statements (number and percentage)***

- **German National Identity Positive:** 132; 36%
- **German National Identity Negative:** 85; 23%
- **European Identity Positive:** 20; 5%
- **European Identity Negative:** 53; 14%
- **Enlargement Positive:** 14; 4%
- **Enlargement Negative:** 50; 14%
- **CECs Positive:** 3; 1%
- **CECs Negative:** 10; 3%

*as % of all statements

**Positive and Negative Statements on Enlargements (number and percentage)**

- **Positive:** 14; 22%
- **Negative:** 50; 78%

*as % of all statements on enlargement
In addition, I discovered that certain articles, while not relevant to the topics in question, nevertheless included important statements on identity and enlargement. Since these articles could not be analyzed using the developed coding scheme, I evaluated these statements according to a positive/negative scale, which allowed me to establish whether they convey a positive or negative image of Germany, the EU, the CECs and enlargement, and to identify the source and the reason for a specific attitude. I used these evaluations to supplement my analysis. Given the number of statements relevant for my research, all articles were assessed either using the positive or negative scale or according to the coding scheme with the overall objective of establishing general themes and particular issues discussed therein. If one article contained multiple statements, each of
the statements was assessed separately. If one statement addressed several issues, it was broken down according to the number of issues addressed and each of the parts was assessed as a separate statement (please find sampling examples in the table 5.3 below).

When evaluating a statement according to a positive/negative scale, such factors as surrounding context, language and a message of the statement were considered.

Table 5.3. Samples of Multiple Statements and Their Positive/Negative Evaluation.\(^{11}\)

| Samples of Multiple Statements
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>From DW17-2006:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“Kommt man ein bisschen in der Welt herum, merkt man, daß uns oft ganz andere Eigenschaften zugeschrieben werden, als wir sie uns selbst geben. [When one travels around the world, one can notice that often completely different qualities are attributed to us, than we attribute to ourselves].” – [1]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Dort ist Deutschland ein Land, in dem alles funktioniert [2], das tolle Sportler hat [3] und besonders schöne Frauen [4], wo die besten Autos und Maschinen gebaut werden [2], wo es gute Ärzte und Lehrer gibt [5] [There is Germany - the land where everything functions, the land that has good athletes and especially beautiful women, where the best cars and equipment are built, where there are good doctors and teachers].”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[1] – Separate statement on German identity. Foreigners have a more positive image of Germany than Germans do themselves. The image of Germany from the outside is discussed with the purpose of strengthening German national identity. Given the context of the statement, image of Germany abroad is considered as a source of positive national identity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[2] – Separate statement on technological progress as a source of a positive national identity in Germany.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[3] – Separate statement on German achievements in sports as a source of a positive identity in Germany.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[4] - Separate statement on people in Germany as a source of a positive identity in Germany.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[5] - Separate statement on good professionals in Germany as a source of a positive identity in Germany.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From DW17-2006:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Wir sind Deutsche, aber zu unserem Land haben wir kein Verhältnis, wir haben kein Nationalbewußtsein [6], oft mögen wir uns selbst nicht einmal [6], jedenfalls trauen wir uns nicht, Deutschland zu lieben [6]. Wir verbinden keine positive Identifikation mit unserem Land [6]. Bei uns gab es den Holocaust [7]. Für den fühlen sich auch die nachgeborenen Urenkel noch verantwortlich, deshalb sind wir &quot;die häßlichen Deutschen&quot;, haben in den Jahrzehnten nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg [8] gelernt, alles abzulehnen, was allzu deutsch aussah [6], wurden gute Europäer [9]. [We are Germans, but we have no relationship with our country, no national consciousness, often we do not like ourselves, and do not trust ourselves to love Germany. We develop no positive identification with our country. Here we had the Holocaust. Because of that our great grand children born</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{11}\) See footnote 10.
After still feel responsible for it, because of that we are “nasty Germans,” and have learnt in the decades after World War II to reject everything that appeared too German, have become good Europeans.]”

[6] – Separate statements on the absence of national identity, the feeling of national belonging, national consciousness and rejection of everything connected with their country among Germans. The statements were counted separately but included as a source of negative identity in Germany.
[8] – Separate statement on guilt and responsibility for the crimes of the past (World War II).
[9] – Separate statement on German successful participation in the project of European integration. Assessed as a source of a positive European identity in Germany and negative national identity since it involves rejection of the national identity.

Although the newspapers under scrutiny belong to opposite sides of the political spectrum, my research demonstrated that there was no correlation between positive and negative images of the phenomena/events and the publications’ political orientation, but rather that these positive or negative attitudes were consistent throughout particular time periods, which allowed me to observe the change in attitudes over time. On this note, the amount of negative statements on German national identity prevailed in all sources under analysis throughout 2000-2001, whereas in 2006 the situation was reversed. Within the 2007-2012 time period, the quantity of positive statements on German identity gradually increased (see the timeline of the findings in the Tables 5.8 and 5.9).

**Section 5.3. German and European Identity in German Media**

A careful analysis of identity-related issues as presented in the German media revealed the existence of several relevant topics that were repeatedly discussed throughout 2000-2013. The discussion generally revolved around the ideas of national identity, pride, consciousness and belonging among Germans. The concept of a collective identity built around a nation-state was presented as relatively new and lacking foundation, whereby European identity among Germans was described as “typisch Deutsch [typically
Other topics under consideration included the absence of the feeling of national belonging among Germans, their reluctance to self-identify with Germany, and the way in which the country was perceived abroad. References were often made to historical memories, including the Third Reich, National-Socialist regime, Nazi crimes and atrocities, Adolf Hitler, the Holocaust, and the burden of guilt and responsibility that the German nation bore toward other European countries.

The most fierce debate revolved around the topic of German national identity and pride, with attitudes ranging from explicitly negative outbursts defying the phenomenon’s right of existence in the German population in 2000-2001 to a rather passionate support for the construction and promotion of the ideas of national belonging, patriotism and asserting German national interests in 2006-2013. The latter sentiments reached their high point in 2006-2007 and coincided with the 2006 FIFA World Cup Championship.

The undisguised national pride as expressed by the CDU General Secretary Laurenz Meyer in 2000 received a lot of attention in the media. His straightforward and unrepentant statement “Ich bin stolz, Deutscher zu sein [I am proud to be German]” was either vehemently condemned and criticized, or served as a launching pad for analytical discussions, which seemed to conclude that national pride was not in itself a bad phenomenon but had to be expressed in a more cautious way. In 2006-2007, however, the German media was celebrating the return of the feeling of national belonging and consciousness among the citizens in the wake of Germany’s victory in the 2006 FIFA World Cup. The euphoria wore off, giving way, in 2009-2013, to analytical examinations of the reasons underlying the absence of national identity in Germany, attempts to explain

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12 The title and the source of the articles are listed in Appendix 2.
the expressions and roots of negative and positive self-identification among Germans, and the conclusion that Germany needed a strong national identity. There is thus a shift from a rejection of national identity in Germany and the acceptance of the absence of the feeling of commonness among Germans as a common sense (2000-2001) to referring to the lack of German national identity as a negative phenomenon that has to be changed (2007-2009) to the realization that Germany needs a strong national identity and it has to be constructed (2009-2013). Overall, the latter is considered a positive development in the German national consciousness. The transformation of the ways German national identity and pride are depicted in the media is indicated in the table below (table 5.4).

**Table 5.4. Samples of Identity Statements (German National Identity) and Shift in Perceptions Overtime.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Samples of Identity Statements (German National Identity) And Shift Overtime</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>2001:</strong> „Ich bin stolz, ein Deutscher zu sein“. Wer das sagt, der müsste sich eigentlich mit der deutschen Geschichte auseinandergesetzt haben, sich mit ihr identifizieren. Wenn sich der Deutsche mit seiner Geschichte identifiziert, fragt man sich, inwiefern er in der Lage ist, „stolz“ auf diese Geschichte zu sein [“I am proud to be German.” Whoever says this, must have argued with the German history to self-identify with it. When a German self-identifies with his history, the question appears, how can he be in the position to be “proud” of this history].” (R9) <strong>Negative statement: German history is assessed as a source of negative identity among Germans.</strong> German national pride does not have a right of existence if it is based on their history.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2001:</strong> “Wirklich beunruhigend an der Debatte über den Nationalstolz der Deutschen ist, dass sie überhaupt geführt wird [What is really worrisome about the debate on national pride in Germany is that it is being held at all].” (R8) <strong>Statement is assessed as negative since the presence of debate on national pride is deemed as worrisome.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2001:</strong> “Ich bin stolz, Deutscher zu sein” könnte auch ersetzt werden durch: “ich bin stolz, blöd zu sein”, denn nach einem alten deutschen Sprichwort wachsen Dummheit und Stolz auf demselben Holz [“I am proud to be German” can also be replaced with “I am proud to be stupid,” because according to the old German saying pride and stupidity grow on the same tree].” (R11) <strong>Statement is evaluated as negative since national pride is compared to stupidity.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2006:</strong> “Wir verbinden kein positive Identifikation mit unserem Land. Bei uns gibt es Holocaust. [We have no positive identification with our country. Here there is the Holocaust.]”(DW17) <strong>The statement is given a negative evaluation due to tying the process of self-identification in Germany with the negative historical memories of the Holocaust. However, the absence of national identity is not accepted as a matter of fact, but rather is referred to as a negative phenomenon.</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2006: “Deutschland ist im Ausland sehr viel populärer als hierzulande. [Germany is far more popular abroad than here].“ (DW17) *Positive image of Germany from the outside can serve as a source of a positive identity in Germany.*

2006: “Die wenigsten Deutschen besitzen ein Nationalbewusstsein. Viele Deutsche haben immer noch ein gestörtes Verhältnis zu ihrer eigenen Geschichte. [Only few Germans possess national consciousness. Many Germans still have troubled relations with their own history].” (DW17) *The statement is evaluated as negative since the absence of national consciousness is blamed on negative historical memories.*

2007: “Wir haben unsere Identität verloren oder verleugnet. Wir wollten Weltbürger, Europäer, Bayern und Westfalen sein, nur nicht Deutsche. [We have lost or denied our identity. We would rather be the citizens of the world, Europeans, Bavarians, Westfaliaians, than Germans].” (R7) *German rejection of their Germanness is regarded as a negative phenomenon. The statement is evaluated as negative due to its indication of a negative national identity.*

2009: “Trotz unserer Geschichte sollten wir wieder stolz sein können, Deutsche zu sein. [Despite our history we should be proud to be German].” (SPGL1) *Positive statement indicating that national pride should be developed despite history.*

2010: “Die Selbstverleugnung, ja der Selbsthass vieler Deutscher ist Geschichte, ohne nun ins Gegenteil zu verfallen. [Rejection of self and self-hatred of many Germans belong to history, without now being an opposition].” (DW6) *Positive statement indicating the break with history and the reversal of the process of self-loathing among Germans.*

2012: “Das heutige Deutschland hat nichts gemeinsam mit Nazi-Deutschland. […] Europa erwartet eine leuchtende Zukunft unter deutscher Führung. [Germany today has nothing in common with Nazi-Germany. […] A bright future awaits Europe under German leadership].“ (SZ6) *The statement presents the change in the evaluation of Germany, its different approach to history. Germany’s important role in the process of European integration serves as a source of positive national identity.*

Throughout 2000-2013, media often used German history as a powerful argument against German national pride (55 per cent of all negative statements on German national identity referenced history as a source of a negative national identity (Table 5.5)). In the early 2000s, the Third Reich and Auschwitz were considered inextricable parts of German national identity. Alternatively, in 2009-2012, a new analytical approach to analyzing and interpreting German history was established. At that time, some authors of the articles insisted that while it was important to recognize blame and acknowledge responsibility, Germany had to move past its history and build a new positive identity. Public education
and interpretation of history were identified as significant sources for constructing a negative identity among the population.

Despite all the sources naming the Nazi past as a negative historical experience, there is a shift in the perception of German history in the media. In 2000-2001, the reminders of Germany’s Nazi past were used as an evidence that there should be no pride associated with being German, and that such inclinations gave rise to nationalistic feelings, resulting in hatred, xenophobia and intolerance towards other cultures and nations. A shift to historical analysis and interpretation in media discussions is evident from 2007 onwards. Although historical memories still played an important role in the debates on identity, they were now perceived necessary for strengthening identity rather than used as a reason for its deconstruction. The achievements of German artists, writers, philosophers and thinkers, as well as successes in cultural, economic and political spheres were pointed out with increasing frequency, suggesting a new understanding of history in Germany. In 2010-2012, media pronounced that Germany has to be proud despite its history and Nazi past and not entirely based on its history (SPGL1-2009; SZ6-2012; DW6-2010).

In contrast, media also drew attention to the one-sided and limited interpretation of German history propagated through the public education curricula, as well as the lack of knowledge about Germany among its citizens. The interest in German culture and history was associated with a demonstration of nationalism, and therefore was often avoided. The National-Socialist era (1933-1945) was covered most thoroughly in history courses at schools with the goal of developing and bolstering the feeling of guilt for the crimes committed in the past. According to the media, other periods in German history
before and after Nazism appeared to receive only cursory coverage in the public education curricula without any detailed analysis (DW1-2012). One of the studies published in *Die Welt* in 2012 pointed out that people who had not attended school in Germany tended to demonstrate more pride in German achievements and a better understanding of German history than students who had received their education in Germany (DW1). This lack of historical knowledge among Germans, as depicted in *Die Welt*, undermined the feelings of national belonging, and precluded awareness of collective achievements. Overall, the relationship between Germans and their past and history was assessed as “gebrochen [interrupted],” “misstraurisch [distrustful]” (SPGL2-2005), “gestört [disturbed]” (DW18-2009), causing “Selbstverleugnung [self-disownment]” and “Selbsthass [self-hatred]”(DW6-2010). The media seemed to suggest that Germans should be proud of their heritage and culture not because of their history, but in spite of it (SPGL1-2009).

Generally, analysis of German national identity in media revealed multiple sources of positive and negative identity among Germans (table 5.5 below):

**Table 5.5. Sources of Positive and Negative National German Identity.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sources of Positive German National Identity (all % are of all positive statements on German national identity)</th>
<th>Number of Statements</th>
<th>% from Positive Statements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cultural Factors:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Past</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nation/people/beautiful women</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good qualities of Germans</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German language</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tolerance towards other cultures/multiculturalism</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Othering” techniques towards other cultures/superiority of the German nation</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German national identity is no longer associated or replaced with European identity</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political Factors:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common values (such as protection of human rights, etc.)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good job of the political leaders</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany’s role in European integration</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Interestingly enough, some factors such as growing dissatisfaction with the EU, multiculturalism and the image of Germany abroad serve as sources of both negative and positive identities in Germany. On one hand, the social and democratic deficits in the EU in general increase the appreciation of a well-functioning democracy and social policy in

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic Achievements</th>
<th>16</th>
<th>12%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economics</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technology</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Other Factors:</th>
<th>19</th>
<th>14%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006 FIFA World Cup victory</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sports</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive image abroad</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traveling abroad</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traveling in Germany</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Total Positive Statements on German National Identity | 132 |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sources of Negative German National Identity</th>
<th>Number of Statements</th>
<th>Percentage from Negative Statements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Past/History/Historical Memories:</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Past/history</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Wars</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nazi crimes</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holocaust</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adolf Hitler</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-hatred</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guilt and responsibility</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unhealthy relationship with history</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpretation of history</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social factors:</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absent identity</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taboo/stigma connected with national pride/identity</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of knowledge (education)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avoiding to self-identify with Germany</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Aspect:</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German membership in the EU</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German support for Euro</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The poor job of domestic political leaders</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The rise of the right-wing groups/parties</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Sources:</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German policy of multiculturalism and its failure</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased immigration to Germany</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative image of Germany abroad</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Negative Statements on German National Identity</td>
<td>85</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Germany and prompts German citizens to self-identify with their state and not the EU as a whole. The policy of multiculturalism conducted by the German government since early 1990s on one hand, reinforces the aspect of tolerance towards other cultures and German self-image as open to other cultures and free of nationalistic tendencies. On the other hand, multiculturalism is believed to have resulted in increased immigration, which caused German citizens to fear for their loss of jobs. Overall, the negative references about German membership in the EU and its multiculturalism increased after enlargement in 2005-2009, and could also be caused by the economic crisis in the EU in 2008-2009.

National symbols, such as the flag, national colours and anthem, were often referred to as the most obvious indicators of a positive national identity (6 per cent of all positive statements on German national identity). The most references to the flag and national colours as the demonstration of national pride were made in 2006 due to the German victory in the FIFA World Cup Championship. The fact that German flags were being displayed publicly with increasing frequency was considered a demonstration of growing national awareness among citizens (DW5-2010; DW6-2010; DW8-2005). Similarly, the growing popularity of the German national anthem was also highlighted (DW5-2010). Some statements sought to promote German national pride by pointing out that Ludwig van Beethoven’s 9th Symphony in D minor and the lyrics based on Friedrich Schiller’s poem “Ode an die Freude [Ode to Joy]” were adopted as the EU’s anthem in 1975 (DW17-2006).

Among other significant sources of German positive identity (40 per cent of all positive statements on German national identity) were German common values, such as
democracy, protection of freedom and peace in Europe, human rights, and the country’s dedication to the European project. The German citizens’ efforts to be “good Europeans,” and the German government’s leading role in the European integration project were often proposed as reasons for being proud of Germany. Chancellor Angela Merkel and other prominent politicians, such as Gerhard Schröder, Joschka Fischer and Johannes Rau, among others, were often cited as expressing their pride and patriotic love towards Germany. The work of Angela Merkel both domestically and internationally served to bolster the citizens’ pride in their nation, especially in the eyes of other EU MSs.

Interestingly enough, the German media often used the opinions expressed by citizens of other countries with respect to Germany to promote the construction of a positive identity among Germans (8 per cent of all positive statements on national identity in Germany). A comparison of the images of Germany inside and outside of its borders revealed that the neighbours of the Federal Republic often had a far more favourable impression of it than its residents. The majority of foreigners were depicted as seeing Germans as a nation of reliable and responsible people with high levels of organization and no sense of humor (DW18-2009; SZ6-2012). Ironically, this description echoed cultural stereotypes about Germans, and was, in fact, similar to the ways Germans described themselves. Positive images of Germany abroad were often used throughout 2006-2007 as a means to promote an appreciation for Germany and acknowledge its virtues. Traveling abroad would give German citizens a different perspective of Germany since, on one hand, missing their homeland helped Germans recognize its positive characteristics, while on the other hand, the endorsement of their country by foreigners led them to similarly approve of their nation.
Another comparative analysis, which sought to measure the strength of national identities in other EU MSs, concluded that the feelings of national belonging in states other than Germany were definitely present and more prominently expressed (DW2-2004). “Othering” techniques were often employed to boost German positive identity. More specifically, an article in Die Welt sought to strengthen German national identity in the face of Islamisierung [Islamisation], spurred by the fear that failure to do so would potentially result in Germany’s invasion by the residents of the Islamic world:

Ohne positive Identität wird Deutschland spätestens Ende dieses Jahrhunderts Teil eines islamischen Kalifats sein [Without a positive identity, Germany will become a part of Islamic Caliphate at the end of this century at the latest]. (DW7-2006)

Additionally, another article in Die Welt used anti-American statements, such as “Antamerikanismus stiftet Identität [Anti-Americanism strengthens identity]” as a means for construction of a stronger national identity among Germans (DW16-2005). Generally, the media avoided explicitly depicting Germany as superior to other states, but rather suggested that it was such by describing other states as struggling, and immersed in nationalism and corruption, and expressing judgment or reproach about the situations in other MSs (DW19; SZ16-36; SZ17-37; R1-2003; A4-2010; A14-2012).\(^{13}\)

One of the most prominent indicators of negative national identity in Germany, which most often came to the surface while traveling abroad, was feeling ashamed of being German. Germans’ behaviour in other states and their attitudes towards them demonstrated their reluctance to be recognized as Germans. The fact that many Germans attempted to speak other languages, particularly English, without accent, and indicated Switzerland or Austria as their country of origin when their German accent was

\(^{13}\) Articles not included into content analysis but used for research purposes.
recognized, seemed to suggest that Germans “fühlen sich unwohl in ihrer Identität [feel uncomfortable in their own identity]” (DW17-2006). Negative feelings towards their own nation were also evident in reports of Germans’ desire to have been born as citizens of a different state (Great Britain, for example), or of overt admiration they expressed towards other cultures while dismissing German achievements (DW1-2012). These tendencies were discussed in the media as impediments to constructing a strong national identity among Germans. Feeling ashamed of their homeland should be overcome and therefore a positive image of Germany and Germans as seen by other states was highlighted multiple times.

Avoiding nationalism at all costs, the authors of the articles repeatedly stressed Germans’ “Weltoffenheit [openness to the world]” (DW6-2010) and “Fremdenfreundlichkeit [friendliness to foreign cultures]” (DW11-2012; DW1-2012).

With rare exceptions discussed above, most Germans are depicted as taking pride in their government’s policy of multiculturalism, and self-identified as “multi-kulti (SPGL7-2000; SZ8-2012)” and “kosmopolitisch” (DW6-2010).

Nationalism, according to some German sources, led to two World Wars and Auschwitz:

In der ersten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts hatte der europäische Nationalismus zu zwei verheerenden Weltkriegen und zum größten Menschheitsverbrechen, zu Auschwitz, geführt [In the first half of the 20th century, European nationalism led to two disastrous World Wars and to the biggest crime against humanity, to Auschwitz]. (SZ9-2012)

The German media often projected the feeling of shame and guilt for the Nazi crimes onto the supranational (European) level. As a result, European identity, according to some German sources, was “schuldbeladen [loaded with guilt]” (DW22-2011), and
nationalism in Europe was the force to blame for the two World Wars and the Holocaust (SZ9-2012). The explanation for this development was twofold: firstly, in the early 2000s, German European identity was regarded as the only positive form of self-identification among Germans; therefore the terms German and European were often used interchangeably. Secondly, the notion of European historical guilt was used to create a collective history of Europe, since the European nation was seen as needing one demos with a common history, if it were to gain more legitimacy. Given the variety of peoples that took part in the two World Wars and Holocaust, these events became tragedies of multinational scope, which seemed to justify their Europeanization. As was the case with German national identity, these events in European history were described in the media as sources for negative European identity, and tended to decrease the willingness of European citizens to self-identify with the EU.

At this point in the discussion on European identity, the media often draw a distinction between Europe and the EU (see table 5.6 for sample statements on European identity). The more detailed statement analysis revealed that while Europe is regarded positively and often referred to in cultural and civilizational terms, the EU often serves as a scapegoat for unsuccessful initiatives and projects, economic hardships and turbulence in the political sphere. In all sources under examination starting with early 2000 until the present, the common identity of the MSs’ citizens was referred to as European identity, and not the identity of the EU. Interestingly, while the European cultural project was described as a success in the post-enlargement time period in 2004-2007, the EU’s efforts to gain more authority in the economic and political spheres were perceived as a failure.
Table 5.6. Samples of Identity Statements (European Identity).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Statement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005:</td>
<td>“Nationale Identitäten sind demnach viel tiefer verankert als die sogenannte europäische Identität. [National identities are far deeper anchored compared to so called European identity.]” (SPGL2) Negative statement since it describes European identity as not as deep compared to its national counterparts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008:</td>
<td>“So sprach man von &quot;Vielfalt der Kulturen im Rahmen einer gemeinsamen europäischen Zivilisation&quot;. [It was talked about “diversity of cultures in the frame of a common European civilization”].” (DW15) Positive statement: European civilization (i.e. European civilizational identity) is multicultural and diverse.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012:</td>
<td>“Die europäische Identität ist im Jahre 2012 weit verbreitet, aber shallow. [European identity in 2012 is broad, but shallow.]” (SZ15) The statement evaluated as negative, European identity is described as shallow.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012:</td>
<td>“Europa hat seine Identität verloren [Europe has lost its identity].” (SZ12) Negative statement as European identity is described as missing or lost.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Despite the recognition of its multiculturalism, media sources depicted a strong European identity as inevitably depriving nation-states of substantial parts of their national identities and sovereignty (SZ10-2012). In some cases, the developed national identity was associated with nationalism and therefore had to be eliminated in a united Europe. This transfer of identity from the national to international level was depicted as natural and common sense in the media, on the assumption that a stronger and closer Europe was the ultimate purpose of all MSs. The development of a collective sense of belonging among Europeans, albeit at the expense of their national loyalties, was not described as something demanded by Europe, but rather as a willing sacrifice by the MSs for the greater good.

The idyllic image of the united Europe as projected in the media became somewhat blurred and distorted after 2004. In light of enlargement, the prospect of a safe and stable future in the EU grew increasingly elusive. Even prior to enlargement in 2003, statements of support for European integration were replaced by ones indicating a growing fear of a stronger and closer Europe. Right after the accession of ten MSs in
2004-2005, the EU was increasingly blamed for economic hardships, unemployment, poverty and other negative consequences of integration, which the MSs had to experience collectively. The image of the CECs also underwent a gradual change: previously seen as welcomed brothers sharing the same identity and dedicated to the same values (2001-2002), they were more frequently depicted as unstable and inconsistent partners, mired in corruption, unemployment, unstable economies and criminal activities, lagging behind the progressive West and posing an obstacle on the way to Europeanization because of their strong national identity, excessive national pride, and reluctance to give up even a small part of their sovereignty (DW1-2012; SZ9-2012).

In 2007-2009, the discussion of nationalism in different EU MSs, both old and new alike, received a lot of attention in the German media. In these debates, the difference in attitudes towards East and West was particularly evident: while French and Italian efforts to strengthen their national identities were described as soul-searching and seeking to recover their meaning in the world, the search for identity by Hungarians, Poles and Czechs was presented as nationalistic and destructive (A2-2009; A3-2007; A6-2009; A9-2009; A10-2007; A14-2012). These debates not only seemed to have prompted Germans to start their quest for national identity, but they also made it clear that Germans felt closer affinity with their fellow Western states, as opposed to the countries in Central Europe.

Overall, European and German national identities (both positive and negative) were portrayed by the German media as stemming from similar sources (see table 5.7). Common history, culture and shared values of democracy, human rights and protection of

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14 See footnote 13.
peace and stability on the continent were among the top reasons why German citizens chose to identify with the EU. The legacy of the EU and its authority as a global decision-maker appeared to similarly strengthen European identity. However, the content analysis also indicated that in 2003-2007, at the time when the EU assumed an increasingly prominent role as a transnational organization, the majority of citizens in Germany still failed to accord it the same status as a nation-state (DW13-2005). Germans gave little recognition to and often conflated European institutions and bodies. Moreover, European symbols, such as the flag, anthem and Europe Day were depicted as less popular compared to their national counterparts, confirming German and European citizens’ lack of knowledge and interest in history, origins and functions of the EU.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5.7. Sources of Positive and Negative Identity (European Identity).</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sources of Positive European Identity</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Factors:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tolerance towards other cultures/ multiculturalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Othering” techniques/ superiority to non-Europeans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Factors:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common values</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Declining national identity of the MSs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Euro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enlargement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Factors:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-threatening to national identities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Positive Statements on European Identity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sources of Negative European Identity</th>
<th>Number of Statements</th>
<th>Percentage from Negative Statements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Past/ History/ Historical Memories:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Past/ history</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Historical guilt</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Interestingly, sources of positive European identity, such as the common currency, Constitutional Treaty, and enlargement in the long run were increasingly represented as the reasons why most Europeans came to mistrust the EU and failed to identify with it. Among other factors that were cited as having undermined the unity among Europeans were nationalistic tendencies in the MSs, the rise of credibility of and support for anti-European parties in both national and European parliaments, social and democratic deficit in the EU, as well as the lack of accountability and clarity with respect to its institutions and the functions they were meant to fulfill (SZ1-2013; SZ 10-2012).

Although European identity was intentionally described as non-threatening to the MSs and their sovereignty, in his interview with SZ the Italian writer and philosopher Umberto Eco also presented it as rather “shallow” (SZ15-2012). Other sources describe European identity as exclusive, based on its roots in largely Christian values (DW22-2011). “Othering” techniques and demonstration of European superiority were used to boost the popularity and support for the EU among its citizens:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Aspect:</th>
<th>31</th>
<th>58%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Failures European integration project/ common currency</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-European tendencies (such as anti-Europe parties, soft and hard Euroscepticism)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat to national identities</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enlargement</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalism in the MSs</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Sources:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiculturalism</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic deficit</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social deficit</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fear of stronger Europe from the MSs</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Crisis</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Negative Statements on European Identity</td>
<td>53</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Europa [hat] eine negative, defensive Identität. Man sagt nicht "wir sind die Zivilisierten," sondern lieber "die anderen sind die Barbaren." Und weil man nicht weiß, wer man genau ist, möchte man wenigstens wissen, wer man nicht ist. Es ist schwer zu sagen, was einen Europäer ausmacht, aber es ist einfach zu sagen, dass
er kein Russe, kein Chinese, kein Moslem und kein Amerikaner ist. [Europe has a negative defensive identity. People do not say “We are the civilized,” but rather “the others are the barbarians.” Since people do not know exactly who they are, they want to at least know who they are not. It is difficult to say what defines a European, but it is simple to say that he is not Russian, Chinese, Muslim or American]. (DW11-2012)

The Muslim world and its values remain the primary “Other” for the EU, along with the US, whose indisputable position as a long-time global power-house distinguishes it from the EU.

The analysis of the German national and European identities in Germany reveals a change in the media’s perceptions of Germany and the EU. From “die häßlichen Deutschen [nasty Germans],” the instigators of two World Wars and the Holocaust (DW18-2009), Germans had transformed into “gute Europäer [good Europeans],” the nation that served as an example to others in that it was a country where everything worked. Being “antideutsch [anti-German]” was no longer considered au courant, and statements such as “Nie wieder Deutschland [No more Germany]” were relegated to the past (DW4-2008). Other media sources saw Germany as a savior (“Nur die Deutschen retten uns [Only Germans can save us]”), as a state capable of leading Europe to a better future, and gaining increasing influence in the Union (SZ6-2012). Although some authors were somewhat alarmed by this new powerful Germany (“Die Deutschen gelten in manchem als Vorbilder, aber Vorbilder machen manchmal auch Angst [Germans are considered in many respects as models, but models also cause fear sometimes]”), even they tended to agree that “Europa erwartet eine leuchtende Zukunft unter deutscher Führung [Bright future awaits Europe under German leadership]” (SZ6-2012).

In 2009-2013 the unreserved and “Typisch Deutsch [typically German]” (DW5-2010) loyalty to the project of European integration was shaken as Germans grew
stronger in their skeptical attitude towards the EU and Europeanization (SZ5-2012; 
SZ10-2012; SZ 6-2012; SZ 7-2012; DW5-2010). As in the other EU MSs, German anti-
European movements began to gain increasing power (SZ1-2013). And together with 
other European nations, Germany now sought to construct and reinforce its own identity 
faced with the pressures of globalization (DW17-2006). German identity made a 
comeback (“Wir haben wieder eine Identität in Deutschland [We again have identity in 
Germany]”), and needed to be further developed (DW21-2005). While in 2001, debates 
on German identity were called “beunruhigend [worrisome],” ten years later the absence 
and lack of development of a defined German identity was seen as even more alarming. 
In 2001, expressing pride in Germany was perceived as a sign of bad taste, or stupidity 
(“Ich bin stolz, Deutscher zu sein” könnte auch ersetzt werden durch: “ich bin stolz, blöd 
zu sein [“I am proud to be German” can be replaced with “I am proud to be stupid’”]
(R9-2001). In 2012, however, Germans were encouraged to have more faith in 
themselves and more love towards their Motherland. New Germany had been established, 
with a new identity that had nothing to do with Nazi Germany (SZ6-2012).

This change developed over time and was influenced by a lot of factors. Such 
events as Germany’s victory in the 2006 FIFA World Cup served as a major 
“Gemeinschafterlebnis [communal experience]” (DW6-2010) and a starting point for 
debates on a positive identity in Germany. The weakening of European identity also 
contributed to the development of German national identity. As discovered through 
media analysis, the EU enlargement in 2004/2007 qualifies as one of the relevant factors 
that might explain the change in the ways Germans perceive themselves and others (see 
the tables 5.8 and 5.9 below).
Table 5.8. Change in Negative/Positive Perceptions of German National Identity.

![Graph showing change in negative/positive perceptions of German national identity.]

Table 5.9. Change in Negative/Positive Perceptions of European Identity and the EU.

![Graph showing change in negative/positive perceptions of European identity and the EU.]

Section 5.4 Enlargement in German Media

Altogether, I found 64 statements on enlargement in 13 articles under examination, which I subsequently evaluated according to the positive/negative scale. The discussion on enlargement predominantly revolves around the predictions for the process’ potential implications for both East and West, and the analysis of its realized outcomes, both short-
term (2004-2005) and long term (2009-2012). Overall, negative consequences of the enlargement seem to outweigh its successes (50 negative statements versus 14 positive ones) (see Table 5.10 below).

**Table 5.10. Sample of Statements on Enlargement.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Samples of Statements on Enlargement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>2002:</strong> “Negative Assoziationen etwa kommen vor allem ostdeutschen Grenzlandbewohnern bei Umfragen zur EU- Erweiterung als Erstes in den Sinn. Sie stören sich an Schwarzarbeit, illegalen Einwanderern, Autodiebstählen und Prostitution. [In the surveys, negative associations with EU enlargement come to mind first of all to the citizens of East German border regions. They are disturbed by black labour market, illegal migrants, cars thefts and prostitution.]” (SPGL13) <strong>Negative statement as it discusses negative consequences of enlargement</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2004:</strong> “Der 1. Mai 2004 markiert eine historische Zäsur: Die europäische Teilung gehört der Vergangenheit an. Nun wächst zusammen, was historisch und kulturell zusammengehört. [May 1, 2004 marks a historical breakthrough. Division of Europe belongs to the past. Now what belongs historically and culturally together grows together.]” (SPGL14) <strong>The statement is assessed as positive as it describes enlargement as contributing to the cultural unity of Europe</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2012:</strong> Die große EU-Erweiterung […] sei überhastet gewesen. Die europäischen Institutionen seien nicht so umgestaltet worden, dass sie die heutige EU mit ihren 27 Mitgliedsstaaten erfolgreich führen könnten. [The big EU enlargement was too rushed. European institutions have not been restructured enough, to successfully lead the modern EU with its 27 MSs.]” (SZ3) <strong>The statement was assessed as negative since enlargement is described as not thought through</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Among the enlargement’s positive aspects as discussed in the German media from 2000 to May 2004 were the strengthening of Germany’s relations and cooperation with its neighbouring new MSs (R3-2000), especially between Germany and Poland, its biggest neighbour to the East. This cooperation was predicted as having potential to go beyond economics and trade, and concentrate on cross border security and crime prevention. The Central European states were depicted as still lagging behind Western Europe, but on the right track in their development and achieving success in their efforts to tackle criminality and instability, therefore posing little threat to the prosperity and safety of the EU upon accession. It was largely contended that European identity would benefit from the enlargement since the widening of the EU to the East would reunite the two regions.
that historically and culturally belonged together (SPGL14-2004). Germany was predicted to benefit from the enlargement both economically and in terms of its Vergangenheitsbewältigung [coming to terms with the past]. Germany’s close cooperation with Poland and the Czech Republic stemmed from “historisch[en] Gründen und eigen[en] Interessen [historical reasons and self-interests]” (R3-2000), and aided its reconciliation with the past. Moreover, a successful enlargement, bolstered by Germany’s efforts to promote a single currency and a common defense policy, served to confirm Germany’s reputation as a diligent promoter of European values on the continent and a driving force of the European integration.

The question of whether Germany had benefited from the enlargement to the East to the extent predicted, if at all, is at the heart of discussions on the issue. Back in 2003, the enlargement was called a “Glücksfall [lucky case]” for the German economy (SPGL14-2004), and according to the Bundesbank [Federal Bank], Germany incurred more positive outcomes compared to its fellow-MSs because of its direct investments and strong cooperation with the East even prior to the enlargement (SZ17-2004). However, debates on the pros and cons of the enlargement project for Germany were not void of doubt and pessimism. In May 2004, immediately after the enlargement, Germany was described both as a loser and a winner, since it faced increasing pressure to conduct a high number of reforms in order to integrate the eastern MSs (SPGL14-2004).

Post-2004, Osterweiterung [Eastern enlargement] seemed to cause a lot of unrest both in the West and in the East of the EU. Western MSs were worried about rising unemployment in light of the possibility of companies outsourcing production to the East attracted by the region’s cheaper labour force, as well as a possible increase in criminal
activities connected with immigration from the East (implying that eastern EU MSs would serve as transit states) and cross-border crime. The rhetorical question asked back in 2001: “Nichts Gutes aus dem Osten? [Nothing good from the East?]” (R5-2001) now resonated strongly with the concerns of the EU citizens, who experienced “Ängste, Sorgen, Furcht, Kleinmut, gemischte Gefühle und negative Assoziationen [fears, worries, unrest, cowardice, mixed feelings and negative associations]” with respect to the accession of the new MSs to the Union (SPGL13-2002). Upon accession, it became evident that the eastern system of values had less in common with the western one than was originally anticipated during the negotiations, and therefore posed an obstacle on the way to the smooth integration of the CECs. The reforms conducted in the West for the purposes of integration of the CECs were described as rather drastic: “Alte Welt neu erschaffen [new creation of the Old World]” (SPGL13-2002), “Die EU grundlegend verändern [substantial changes to the EU]” (SPGL14-2004). Having to conduct these reforms imposed pressure on the West (“Reformdruck”) that was already substantial in 2004 (SZ14-2012). With regards to Germany, the enlargement was compared to an earthquake (“Deutschland geht durch Erdbeben [Germany is going through the earthquake]” (DW19-2005)) that had shaken up the country’s foundation and could yield a different Germany should the intrusion of the “enemy from the East” proceed unchecked (DW19-2005) (see table 5.11 below).

In their turn, the CECs were cited as fearing that enlargement would fail to fulfill the basic democratic requirements, and foresaw no substantial benefits for the East (SZ3-2012). They were also described as concerned with a surge in illegal immigration from North Africa to the EU, since as members of the Union they too would have to deal with
this issue (SZ4-2012). Moreover, the CECs were referenced as fearful of being absorbed by the West ("Annexion statt Vereinigung" [annexation instead of unification], of "Neokolonialismus" [neocolonialism]) (R5-2001), and of losing their economic independence (R12-2003).

Table 5.11. Samples of the Statements on CECs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Analysis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>&quot;[…] dass aus dem Osten Europas kein Beitrag für den zivilisatorischen Fortschritt des Kontinents kommen kann. […] that Europe’s East (meaning CECs – O.S.) cannot bring any contribution to the civilizational progress of the continent.] (R5) Negative statement as the CECs are described as not useful to Europe.</td>
<td>2005: “Jetzt kommt aus dem Osten der Feind. [Now enemy from the East is coming.]” (DW19) Assessed as a negative statement since the East is perceived as a threat to the West.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The German media under analysis assessed the project of enlargement as a failure, since the EU came short of delivering on the promise to the new MSs of “des einigen, brüderlichen Europa [united, brotherly Europe]” (SPGL13-2002) by allowing larger and better developed states a more prominent role in the EU post-enlargement (SZ3-2012). In the face of this alleged inequality, the CECs felt like second-class members of the Union (R5-2001, SPGL13-2002), which further deepened the gap between the East and the West in the EU, and hindered efforts to construct a collective identity.

The German media presented the EU as also having second thoughts about the positive outcomes of the enlargement project. Although the eastern enlargement “adventure” (SPGL13-2002) brought an end to the separation between Europe’s eastern and western regions, it received overwhelmingly negative evaluations in retrospect. Conducted at a high speed ("überhastet “[rushed] (SZ3-2012)), the project was described as not leaving the EU institutions enough time to prepare to assist twelve new MSs in the aftermath of accession (SZ3). The old MSs were referenced as unprepared for the
changes, having underestimated the repercussions of the enlargement (SZ3-2012; DW19-2005).

The CECs had to start the construction of their identity anew after their exit from the communist block and the collapse of the Soviet Union. In light of the CECs still dealing with the legacy of their recent history at the time of the accession, Central European identity was considered only partially formed and underdeveloped. The German media under examination often mentioned the fear that attempts to merge it with the European identity would put the latter at risk of weakening even further (R5-2001). The predominant view in the analyzed articles at the time was that the enlargement had weakened European political identity (SZ3-2012), lowered its standards and credibility, slowed down the speed of the EU’s development, and made European identity too large to comprehend (SZ4-2012). Some media sources went as far as to blame the enlargement for causing the EU to lose its identity altogether (R7-2007; SPGL12-1999).

To conclude, the results of the content analysis indicate that the project of the EU eastern enlargement was perceived as delaying the realization of the ultimate objective of the integration, namely the creation of a united Europe. It was often described in the German media as an intrusive process, interrupting the natural development of national consciousness in the MSs (R5-2001). While the media sources under examination appear to agree that the 2004/2007 eastern enlargement did accomplish certain material tasks of Europeanization, such as bringing the MSs closer economically and politically, and increasing their dependence on each other and the EU, it failed to produce a stronger collective identity and foster unity among the MSs, which remain as far apart as ever (DW20-2004).
CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSION

The topic of identity building and development is multifaceted and multidimensional. Inescapable links between identity and culture, history, religion, as well as its inextricable connection to the world of politics, economics and social sphere, mean that identity cannot be analyzed as an isolated phenomenon which emerges and develops independently and is uninfluenced by other factors. Being a fluid construction, identity is prone to transformations under the influence of the environment where it exists and develops. Within the framework of this research, identity is regarded as a construction that does not appear and develop by itself, but rather is consciously and unconsciously shaped and fostered by history, political and economic factors, developments in the social sphere among others.

Bringing a supranational element into the discussion on identity building in Germany further expands the horizons of this research and enables one to establish the similarities and differences between the projects of fostering a collective identity at the nation-state and transnational levels. As both types of identity belong to collective identities, they demonstrate high degrees of similarities in their development. The argument that the EU has chosen to develop its identity according to the “nation-state scenario” is supported by the findings of this research (Jenkins 2009:125). Similar to the nation-state identity, feelings of Europeanness are constructed based on the common history and culture, attachment to European symbols and liberal values, dedication to the mission of protecting and spreading peace and stability on the continent, and the feeling of a common participation in the project of European integration. However, due to the multiplicity of the MSs in the EU and different levels in the attachments to national
identities there, the EU has yet to establish a common identity ready to compete and potentially replace the national one.

In the case of Germany Europeanness seemed to always prevail over national sentiments. European and national attachments there developed differently compared to other MSs. Ever since the start of the European project, political leaders of Germany eagerly implemented European initiatives and policies while the citizens demonstrated high levels of attachment to Europe. Rejecting national aspects of identity, belonging, and pride was considered normal and natural in the light of recent German history. Thus Germany was seen as an example to follow with regards to the European integration project.

Both identity-building and European integration projects, however, are a work in progress. Attachments of the citizens and priorities of political leaders in Germany have a potential to change. Comparative analysis of statistical data on Germany obtained from the Eurobarometer surveys and data discussed in the relevant secondary sources, allowed me to establish a decline in levels of support for Europeanization among the citizens of Germany. This tendency has been especially prominent throughout the past decade (2000-2012).

Searching for possible explanations for this change I determined that enlargement was an appropriate factor for analysis. The project of such a scope would undoubtedly impact German attitudes and the ways Germans form and express their feeling of national belonging. Additionally, the analysis of data on European and national identities in Germany revealed that although the levels of both stayed approximately the same throughout the analyzed time period, the levels of a national pride among Germans
increased by 4 per cent in 2004 and stayed at that level (EB61 (2004)). This fluctuation is far from being dramatic, however, in the light of German history, it constitutes a relevant ground for analysis.

A commonly accepted image of Germany as an EU-friendly, Europe-oriented state, where a feeling of a national belonging and consciousness were almost fully Europeanized, was challenged while investigating increasing levels of national pride and Euroscepticism in Germany. As my research revealed, in reality Germans, similar to citizens of other MSs, experienced dissatisfaction with the project of European integration. Consequently, when the speed and the scope of the project increased, so did the levels of disagreement with the policies in the EU. Therefore the research question underlying this thesis was based on the premises of this incongruity and aimed to determine whether the shift in the attitudes of Germans to Germany and the EU was present, and if so, what direction it was taking and under what circumstances. Given the data on hand, I hypothesized that there has been a positive shift in Germans’ perceptions of their national identity in the context of European enlargement to the East in 2004/2007.

The findings of a content analysis of the German newspaper articles published in three newspapers for the time period of 2000-2012, as well as a scrupulous analysis of the secondary sources investigating this issue, confirmed and supported the hypothesis under examination. This case study exploring the shift in perceptions in Germany presented a number of interesting and surprising insights into the attitudes of the German citizens toward their state and identity. Namely, the research revealed that the perception of the concepts of a national identity, pride, patriotism and national consciousness in Germany
has acquired a more positive direction. The era of hasty rejection of everything that has anything to do with their nation and its history has come to an end. It was replaced by Germans’ realizing that there is a huge gap in the place where their national identity should be. This absence of feelings of attachment to their nation is now perceived as wrong, as something that has to be fixed and developed. As recent as the early 2000s, however, any demonstration of national pride and patriotic love in Germany was severely judged and written off to racism and nationalism. Now Germans are contemplating how to make the feeling of national belonging stronger among the citizens.

The research revealed that one of the factors facilitating this shift is a change in the interpretation of German history based on a more analytical approach to it. Although responsibility for the National-Socialist crimes in mid-20th century is still acknowledged, it is however, analyzed rather than just accepted for a fact. This interpretive approach to history ceased deconstruction of a national agenda in Germany, creating a more favourable environment for developing a positive identification with their own state.

Placing the study in the context of the eastern expansions of the EU in 2004 and 2007 reveals more factors influencing a change in Germans’ attitudes. The study discussed and analyzed the ways Germans view and evaluate their immediate environment. By involving critical analysis of secondary sources and media, I gained a number of relevant insights into the shifts in German perceptions of the neighbouring CECs and the EU within the last decade. More specifically, in the time period under examination, the CECs states were mostly perceived as invasive and threatening rather than sharing the same identity with Germany. The enlargement and the process of European integration were given mostly a negative evaluation in the media. Interestingly,
rhetoric on the benefits from enlargement died out on the eve of the accession of the CECs and gave way to worrisome predictions of the consequences in the economic sphere. The EU, based on its image produced by German media, is currently experiencing a critical juncture. Although the visibility of the EU in the media is present and consistently high, it appears increasingly in negative contexts, and its policies and projects are mostly criticized. Moreover both German politicians and the general public are starting to question Germany’s membership in the EU, wondering about the meaning of the European project; consequently, Germany’s role in it has now changed.

The shifts indicated above have developed over time and are gradually becoming stronger. Taking into consideration the ongoing character of the EU widening project and further advancement of European integration, this issue is likely to remain and gain more prominence in future.

In the discussion on enlargement in the German media, a negative shift is observed throughout 2000-2012. Positive statements appeared more frequently in the early 2000s, along with comments on positive implications of enlargement mostly for the cultural and economic spheres, such as increased cultural closeness and immediate economic benefits. However, as the date of the accession of ten new MSs approached, the sentiments toward this event became more negative. The media revealed a great deal of anxiety and even worry associated with the process of enlargement. In general, media sources deemed enlargement a failure.

This case study of German identity did not establish any causal relationship between the factors involved in the analysis. Within the framework of this research, it is unfeasible to determine whether there is a correlation between increasing popularity of
German national identity and the strengthening of Eurosceptic tendencies in Germany. Rather this study has revealed that there is a high level of temporal correspondence, meaning two observed developments taking place simultaneously. Given a high level of interconnectedness between identity and political, economic and social spheres discussed throughout this paper, it is plausible to assume that they exercise mutual influence on each other.

In order to examine the issue stated under the research question, I conducted the following research activities: (1) analysis of primary sources and secondary literature on identity formation, history of Germany, identity in Germany, European integration and European identity; (2) statistical evidence was acquired and analyzed from empirical sources such as the Eurobarometer on the subject of European and national identities, European and national pride, attachment to the EU and support for its projects, attachment to the nation-state, expectations and fears connected with the enlargement, its implications and consequences and support for the general project of widening; (3) media content analysis of the newspaper articles on the subject of identity in the context of enlargement was performed. Formation and any development connected with German national identity was discussed and analyzed from historical, political, and economical perspectives. Figures indicated in empirical evidence and positions discussed in the secondary sources were compared for the time periods prior to the accession of the CECs and immediately after the process of enlargement was completed.

My case study on the shift in German perceptions of their nation and identity revealed a number of issues that can be further examined and investigated, such as relations between national and transnational identities in Germany, the importance of
historical legacies and the process of *Vergangenheitsbewältigung*, as well as mutual influence between German identity and the process of policy-making. Given the limited scope of my study and its focus only on the aspect of identity development during the enlargement process, some of the issues were mentioned and touched upon but not discussed in any great detail in order to preserve the general focus of the work. Moreover, my study relied mostly on macro-type surveys such as Eurobarometer, but future studies on the subject of national identity in Germany could benefit from data collected through personal interviews and surveys conducted on a smaller scale. Data collected through interviews, although limited to one segment of the population enables to explore certain aspects of the subject in a more detailed way, and endow the study with more focus. Individual-level data collected from the surveys of the study groups will further supplement and enrich data obtained through EU-wide surveys, due to its potential to reveal peculiarities and nuances often overlooked in the large-scale surveys.

This study offers quite rigorous analyses of multiple issues directly and indirectly connected to the subject of identity construction. Based on the extensive analysis of historical events, developments and aspects connected with political, economic and social spheres at the national (Germany) and transnational (the EU) levels, this thesis carries an interdisciplinary character. The findings of the research presented in this thesis are therefore relevant to further examining the development of the EU and the nation-state within the EU from various scholarly perspectives.
Bibliography

Primary Sources – Legal Documents


Newspaper Articles Not Included in The Content Analysis


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15 Code used for citation purposes within the paper is given in square brackets.


Secondary Sources (German)


**Secondary Sources (English)**


Hermann, Peter. “The New Round of European Enlargement – Changing or Fostering


APPENDIX 1

Coding scheme

General information
1. Number of the article
2. Source/Date/Number of Words
3. Relevance
4. Main subject: Enlargement OR Identity OR Both
5. - Does the article deal with identity-related issues? Yes/No (if yes, go to q5)
6. - Does the article talk about the enlargement? Yes/No (If yes, go to q17)

Identity Section
7. What identity is depicted in the article?
   A. German national  B. German European  C. EU European  D. Central European  E. Common European
8. If 5B or 5C or 5E is true, is European identity depicted as invasive/threatening to national identity? Yes/No
9. Is German national identity/pride regarded as a positive/ negative phenomenon? (Positive/negative statement)
10. In what context is German national identity/pride mentioned and discussed? (Sources of a positive or negative identity)
   • Pride/shame in being German
   • Historical memories (Nazi regime/Third Reich/the Holocaust) and their impact on German national identity? Do historical memories cause self-hatred/self-loathing/guilt in Germans?
   • What aspects of their country are Germans proud of (or should be proud in)?
11. Does the article mention the EU/European identity? Yes No
12. If yes, in what context and how is the EU/European identity described?

Enlargement and common European identity section
13. Does the article mention the CECs?
   A. in terms of enlargement? Yes  No
   B. in terms of identity? Yes No
14. Is enlargement depicted as a positive/negative event? (Reasons for positive/negative evaluations)
15. Overall are the CECs given positive/negative assessment? Why?
16. How is European identity described? In which contexts does it come up in the discussion?

Summary section
17. Overall what image do media convey A. of Germany? B. of the EU? C. of the CECs?
18. General comments on the article.
19. Important quotes.
20. General comments on publication.
APPENDIX 2
List of Articles Used for Content Analysis

Die Welt


Süddeutsche Zeitung


Der Spiegel


**General search**


