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Canadian Government Decision-Making and the Commitments to the Somalia Peace Operations in 1992

by
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A Thesis Submitted to
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Abstract

This thesis is the first critical examination of the Canadian government's decision-making in relation to its contributions of troops to the Somalia peace operations in 1992. An international assistance effort was mounted because all government in Somalia had collapsed, and the country was being ravaged by a mass famine, civil war and drought. Ottawa made three separate commitments. It joined a United Nations (UN) humanitarian airlift, a peacekeeping mission called the United Nations Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM), and a United States-led (US) peace enforcement coalition, the Unified Task Force (UNITAF).

The thesis's purpose is to determine why Canada got involved in the Somalia humanitarian crisis and internal war when it had no traditional interest at stake there. It seeks to answer three research questions: what interests did the government seek to advance by committing to the UN / US efforts; why did the UN mission run aground; and why did Canada and the international community move from peacekeeping in early 1992 to peace enforcement in late 1992? The main argument is that Prime Minister Brian Mulroney decided to contribute troops to UNOSOM and then UNITAF because the media had called attention to the Somalia crisis and he was feeling pressure to engage. The government also sought to support Canada's interest in multilateralism and, later, to smooth Canada-US ties.

Acknowledgements

This thesis could not have been written without the assistance of a large number of people. In particular, I would like to thank my parents, to whom I dedicate this work, for their generous and unfailing support during my doctoral studies. I am grateful to my brother, Glen, who provided encouragement when my energy was flagging.

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Vice-Admiral (ret'd) Larry Murray's help was essential. Admiral Murray helped me arrange interviews with high-profile figures such as United Nations (UN) Deputy-Secretary-General Louise Fréchette, Canadian Permanent Representative to the UN Ambassador Robert Fowler, and Deputy Minister of National Defence Jim Judd. He also spoke with me on several occasions. Without his help, this thesis would have been much less comprehensive. As with Dr. Hillmer, I wonder how I will ever be able to repay Admiral Murray for all the support he has provided.

I am also deeply grateful to Dr. Tom Vadney, my M.A. advisor at the University of Manitoba. At key points during my doctorate, he provided much needed council and support. I will not forget Dr. Vadney's assistance.

Many other people have helped me complete this project. I would like to thank Tim Addison for reading my chapter on the United States-led Unified Task Force; Paul Addy and David Cogdon for reviewing my Joint Staff chapter; Captain Al Balfour for

providing me with Joint Staff documents; Paul Addy, Anthony Anderson, Ernest Beno, John Bremner, Jim Gervais, Bruce Johnston, Mike Houghton, Robert Oakley, Mike O'Brien, Serge Labbé, Mark Moher and Edward Willer for agreeing to be interviewed on more than one occasion; Jim Cox for supplying unpublished documents related to the UN Operation in Somalia I; John de Chastelain for responding to three letters of questions; David Huddleston and Lou Cuppens for commenting on my Operation Relief chapter; Ted Kelly of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade for managing the excellent Informal Access process in such an unfailingly flexible and helpful manner; Mike O'Brien for responding to my many e-mails; Mohamed Sahnoun for driving from Wakefield, Québec to Ottawa so that I could interview him in person; and to everyone who spoke to me about the Somalia operations.

I am extremely grateful to everyone. I am lucky to have received so much assistance and co-operation. If I have forgotten anyone, I hope they will accept my sincerest apologies.

Finally, I would like to thank the Department of National Defence / Security and Defence Forum. Their generous doctoral fellowship, which I received in 2001-02 and 2002-03, enabled me to focus on completing my dissertation without being distracted by financial concerns.

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

Map Key

1 = Proposed CF Area of Operations, UNOSOM; 2 = CF Beledweyne Humanitarian Relief Sector, UNITAF

UN Map used with permission.

Introduction

This thesis presents a critical examination of the Canadian government's decision-making with respect to the contribution of troops to Somalia in 1992. Initially, Ottawa showed little enthusiasm for a role in the Horn of Africa. During the latter half of the year, however, Canadian interest in the crisis grew, and the expansion of the United Nations Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM) opened up room for the government to provide Canadian Forces (CF) personnel and capabilities. There were three commitments: to the United Nations (UN) humanitarian airlift in August; to UNOSOM in August; and to the United States-led (US) ad hoc peace enforcement coalition, named the Unified Task Force (UNITAF), in December.

This introduction discusses the government's Somalia-related decisions, the thesis's research questions and the resources used to examine the decisions, and the context in which the decisions were made. The thesis of the dissertation is that although Canada had no traditional interest at stake in Somalia, Progressive Conservative Prime Minister Brian Mulroney (1984-93) decided that Canada should contribute to UNOSOM and then UNITAF because the media had made the Somalia peace operations a high-profile issue and he was being pressured to engage. The government also sought to support Canada's interest in multilateralism and, later, to smooth Canada-US relations.

The first decision occurred in April-May 1992, when the UN asked Canada to contribute five unarmed military observers plus the chief military observer to UNOSOM, which was to be based in Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia. Ottawa refused, on the grounds that its personnel would be exposed to excessively high risk. The government's decision was profoundly influenced by the fact that the media was not scrutinizing the

multinational response to the Somalia crisis at the time. The Prime Minister did not intervene decisively in the government decision-making process to ensure that Canada engaged. Nor, owing to the limited prime ministerial interest, did the bureaucracy assign a high priority to a UNOSOM role. Another factor was that the credibility of UN-led multilateralism did not seem seriously threatened in April-May, because UNOSOM was just getting underway, and media criticism of the government and UN effort in Somalia was still muted.

Driven by mounting media attention and the realisation that the Somalia crisis was becoming a major international security issue, the Mulroney government suddenly decided to offer troops and aircraft in August to bolster the UN's expanding peacekeeping and famine-relief efforts. Ottawa provided these forces, without being asked, in order to get UNOSOM established as soon as possible. The government had become concerned once UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali and newspapers like The Globe and Mail and New York Times began to stress that the international community was neglecting Somalia while pouring resources into the effort to resolve the Yugoslav crisis. The Prime Minister wanted a more credible operation in Somalia so that Canada's and the international community's peacekeeping would be balanced. In addition, he approved Canada's UNOSOM commitment because he was optimistic that the mission would be successful, and he wanted to show Canadians that his government was doing something about the increasingly shocking reports of Somali suffering.

By December, it was clear that the UN operation was failing and that the entire relief effort was being undermined. The government contributed to the US-led UNITAF coalition to support US participation in multilateralism. Canada preferred to work within

broad-based and rule-bound bodies like the UN, but after the failure of UNOSOM there was no alternative to UNITAF. Canada welcomed the ad hoc coalition model in part because it was multinational in dimension.

The government was not troubled by UNITAF's peace enforcement mandate. Its commitment to the mission showed that, as a last resort, Canada was prepared to use force to ensure that the international community's will was effectively expressed. Ottawa did not see UNITAF as a break from traditional peacekeeping, but rather as an extension of established peacekeeping practices made necessary because of Somalia's disorder and over-abundance of weapons. Ottawa believed that Somalia's internal war required a more assertive multilateralism. For the government, indeed, UNITAF's robustness was inspiring because it suggested that the international community could organise powerful forces capable of grappling with complex humanitarian emergencies.

The thesis examines these decisions chronologically. For organisational clarity, political and military decision-making will be dealt with separately. The thesis seeks to answer three research questions: what national interests did the government seek to advance by committing to the UN / US efforts; why did the UN mission run aground; and why did Canada and the international community move from peacekeeping in early 1992 to peace enforcement in late 1992? The importance of this case study is clear when one reflects on the frequency of and tradition behind Canadian peace operation deployments, the large number of subsequent peace operations and interventions into internal wars and failed states, and the UN's replacement by ad hoc non-UN coalitions as managers of military peacekeeping. While focussed on the Somalia crisis, the thesis deals with a number of Canadian foreign and defence policy issues. These include the Mulroney

government's support of a strong UN-centred peace and security architecture, Canada and UN / US relations in the 1990s, the CF and the use of arms in the midst of civil war, and the role of ad hoc coalitions.

In its examination of Canada's Somalia decisions, this thesis relied on non-archival documents and oral interview transcripts. Records held by the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade were especially crucial. The Department's Informal Access arrangement allows researchers to examine primary source records not yet held by the National Archives of Canada. Scholars can view whole documents (not portions after censorship), while avoiding the often slow Access to Information screening process. For this thesis, twenty-one files held by the Department were examined over a three-month period. These files related to Somalia, UNOSOM and the UN.

The Department of National Defence (DND) does not have an Informal Access process. The Somalia Inquiry was extremely helpful in this respect, because it had made available in CD-ROM form all of the pertinent records that it received. A large number of Foreign Affairs and National Defence primary sources were thus made available. The CD-ROM, Information Legacy: A Compendium of Source Material from the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia (1997), was central to the writing of the thesis's military chapters (three, five, seven and nine).

A third area of primary research material was the formal Access to Information and Privacy process. Numerous such requests were made to Foreign Affairs, National Defence, the Privy Council Office (PCO), and the Canadian International Development Agency. Sometimes these requests resulted in the duplication of documents already available through the means above, but on other occasions – such as with memoranda to

the Prime Minister from the Clerk of the Privy Council – new and important information was brought to light.

A three-week research trip was made to UN headquarters in New York to gather primary sources and conduct interviews. A wide range of material not available in the published document book, The United Nations and Somalia, 1992-1996 (1996), was copied from the UN library's holdings. This included press releases of the Security Council, Secretary-General, and General Assembly, letters of the Council, verbatim records of Council meetings, and Special Emergency Programme for the Horn of Africa reports. The UN Oral History Collection was consulted, and face-to-face interviews took place with Ambassador Robert Fowler, Canada's Permanent Representative to the UN, Louise Fréchette, the UN's Deputy Secretary-General, and David Malone, President of the International Peace Academy.

Considerable effort went into augmenting the available written sources with oral interviews. Over the course of four years (1999-2002), interviews were conducted with key Canadian decision-makers in Ottawa, Hull, Toronto, Montréal, Kingston, Québec City, New York, Velika Kladusa (Bosnia-Herzegovina), Brigham (Québec) and Mountain (Ontario). Oral interviews were used to gather first-hand information about the government's engagement with the Somalia peace operations. Eighty-nine people were interviewed, most of whom were or are members of the Department of External Affairs and International Trade Canada (EAITC),[1] DND, PCO or the Prime Minister's Office (PMO). A complete list of persons interviewed is in the bibliography.

While foreign policy decisions were usually well documented, the discussions and negotiations that went into them were not always clear from available written records.

Interviews helped expand on and fill in gaps in the written record. A good example is Canada's decision to join UNITAF on 4 December 1992. This outcome is straightforward, but the reasons why Canada quickly dropped UNOSOM in favour of the enforcement mission, and why there was disagreement with this move, were not as clear. Interviews with decision-makers were crucial in coming to a full understanding of that issue. From the beginning, it was evident that memories can fail over time. However, this does not mean that oral records are invalid. Like archival documents, interview transcripts can be examined using the standard methods of historical criticism, such as cross-checking with other testimonies and comparing oral records with the available written documentation.

While interviewing, care was taken to ensure that questions were not 'loaded' or leading. No attempt was made to coax information from interviewees. Interviews included a number of questions that were common to other interviews, but the majority were tailored to the particular interviewee and his or her responsibilities during 1992-93. The person interviewed was always made aware of why he / she had been selected for an interview and was told who the researcher was and his institutional affiliation. The purpose of the interview – to gather information for a doctoral thesis – was made clear beforehand. About one-quarter of the interviews were tape-recorded, a method which was used only with permission. For the others, notes were taken on a laptop computer. Whether the transcript is based on notes or a verbatim record, it was transmitted back to the person for their review before being used.

The interviewees talked not only about the government's decisions with respect to Somalia, but also the context in which they were made. A key part of this context was

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[1] Renamed the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade in Fall 1993.

optimism that was felt by the government for the potential of the UN and peacekeeping now that the Cold War was over. This optimism remained despite the difficult nature of the crisis in Somalia, which involved famine, numerous unaffiliated bandits and armed factions still engaged in civil conflict, and no government whatsoever to impose order or cooperate reliably with third-party mediators. The world body was forced to experiment with a variety of techniques – diplomatic peacemaking throughout 1992, and peace observation, peacekeeping and peace enforcement in sequence – in the midst of an unfamiliar, unfinished internal war.

Canada was at the forefront of those countries urging the UN to exercise leadership in coping with the crisis's humanitarian consequences. Like some media commentators, Ottawa saw Somalia as a crucial test of the post-Cold War UN's effectiveness. However, the Somali factions would not respect the principles – consent, impartiality and non-violence – on which UN peacekeeping depended. The UN was unable to help Somalia as quickly as Canada and other nations wanted and expected.

The UN, with Ottawa in full agreement, grew more and more assertive in its dealings with Somalia in 1992. In December, the US, Canada, France, and other countries literally forced help on the country in accordance with UN Security Council resolution 794 (3 December). By joining the UN and US missions to Somalia, Canada shared in a surprising international willingness to push peace operations on the factions, some of whom did not want such involvement. Paradoxically, the government's determination to support multilateralism caused it to encourage UN involvement in a situation where the world body could only be discredited.

Mulroney believed in internationalism and desired to strengthen multilateralism. Internationalism has been the dominant Canadian foreign policy approach since the late 1940s and is commonly associated with Lester B. Pearson, the Secretary of State for External Affairs (1948-57), Nobel Peace Prize winner (1957) and Liberal Prime Minister (1963-68). Pearson defined internationalism as a constructive engagement with the world through multilateral institutions. He believed that participatory internationalism should be the central thrust of Canada's foreign policy because the country could no longer count on its geographic location to protect it from wars. Like other Canadian foreign policy makers, he thought that the great powers, if left to themselves, would try to manage world affairs on their own. Pearson believed Canada could cope with these problems using multinational organisations, which were seen as instruments of political interaction that facilitated the sharing of international decision-making.[2]

He further argued that Canadian sovereignty would be strengthened if Ottawa engaged in world affairs. This would enable Canada to balance its US, Commonwealth, La Francophonie and other connections. This balancing act was in the national interest because in few countries "are the requirements of interdependence so closely related to the maintenance of independence."[3] Ottawa employed internationalism not only to heighten Canada's external profile, but also to advance the national interest in global peace and stability. It was "more important," Pearson wrote, "to use your sovereignty to protect and advance your own legitimate interests by establishing relations of friendship,

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[2] Denis Stairs, "Choosing Multilateralism: Canada's Experience After World War II," Presentation to the North-South Cooperative Security Dialogue, Beijing, June 1982, CANCAPS Paper # 4, (Toronto: Canadian Consortium on Asia-Pacific Security, 1994) 2, 5.

[3] Lester B. Pearson, Mike: The Memoirs of the Rt. Hon. Lester B. Pearson, vol. 2: 1948-57, eds. John A. Munro and Alex I. Inglis, (Toronto: Signet, 1975) 37.

good-will, and agreement with other countries."[4] He thought that this policy was the right one because it had popular backing. Pearson noted that Canadians wanted their government to follow a policy tinged with idealism, one that inspired "hope for a better country and a more secure world,"[5] rather than a policy that was focussed on economic and trade concerns.

By the 1990s, the pillars of Pearsonian internationalism – nationalism, humanitarianism and multilateralism – represented not so much a policy as a bipartisan core set of principles.[6] The Nobel Prize, won by Pearson after the creation of the first UN Emergency Force (UNEF, 1956-67), became a national talisman.[7] Pearson's legacy remained influential. Mulroney was a Pearsonian who regularly quoted Pearson.[8] After the Cold War, the Mulroney government sought to participate in and strengthen international arrangements such as the UN, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the Commonwealth and La Francophonie.

Mulroney did so because he was a strong believer in multilateralism.[9] He saw it as something real, something more than just a counter to continentalism. According to Paul Heinbecker, the Prime Minister's speechwriter and the Assistant Secretary to Cabinet for Foreign and Defence Policy in mid-1992, the Prime Minister was a committed multilateralist because this type of activity provided Canada with a means to fulfill its

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[4] Pearson, Mike: The Memoirs of the Rt. Hon. Lester B. Pearson, vol. 2, 33.
[5] Pearson, Mike: The Memoirs of the Rt. Hon. Lester B. Pearson, vol. 2, 32.
[6] Andrew Cohen, "Pearsonianism," Pearson: The Unlikely Gladiator, ed. Norman Hillmer, (Kingston-Montréal: McGill-Queen's UP, 1999) 158.
[7] Norman Hillmer, "Peacekeeping: Canadian Invention, Canadian Myth," Welfare States in Trouble: Historical Perspectives on Canada and Sweden, eds. Sune Akerman and J. L. Granatstein, (Uppsala: Swedish Science P, 1995) 161, 165.
[8] Jim Judd, "Interview with Deputy Minister of National Defence Jim Judd," at NDHQ in Ottawa, Thursday 31 August 2000.
[9] According to Tom Keating, multilateralism refers to "multilateral diplomacy and to policies supporting the establishment and maintenance of institutions and associations that facilitate and support the practice of

"part of our collective responsibility for the good management of international relations [which] was in our interests." Mulroney was "a multilateralist," said Heinbecker. The Prime Minister "believed...in NATO, he believed a lot in the UN" and "in peacekeeping." Mulroney, Heinbecker noted, "thought it was an entirely appropriate role for Canada to get involved in UN peacekeeping and more aggressive UN Chapter VII operations."[10]

Preserving and building international confidence in multilateral organisations and tools was a priority for the government because they made it possible for Canada to pursue its internationalist agenda. Multilateralism enabled the Mulroney government to strengthen Canada's independent national identity and to prevent its diminution by continentalism. The sense existed, and was reflected in the 1986 report of the joint House of Commons and Senate Committee on Canadian external relations, that "Canadian independence...must be demonstrated to the international community."[11] Multilateral processes were also central to the Canadian understanding of politics. Canadians have long assumed that politics is about resolving conflicts, and that the task of politics is to identify and institute processes through which conflicts can be managed.[12]

Canada used multilateralism to enhance its influence on the world stage. Opportunities for state co-operation grew in the years after Pearson left office as Prime Minister. Brian Stevenson has argued that, from 1968-90, state interdependence, ad hoc multilateralism (such as summitry), the increase in the number of non-governmental

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multilateral diplomacy." See Tom Keating, Canada and World Order: The Multilateralist Tradition in Canadian Foreign Policy, 2nd ed., (Toronto: Oxford UP, 2002) 4.

[10] Paul Heinbecker, "Interview with Canadian Permanent Representative to the UN Ambassador Paul Heinbecker," Friday 16 August 2002.

[11] Independence and Internationalism, Report of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons on Canada's International Relations, (Ottawa: Queen's Printer for Canada, 1986) 33.

[12] Stairs, "Choosing Multilateralism," 6.

organisations, and the relative decline of US power since the Second World War had enhanced the potential for internationalism. This provided Canada with greater flexibility and new opportunities to play a role in world affairs. For example, Canada expanded its influence and complemented its close tie to the US by developing its bilateral and multilateral links with Latin American countries.[13] There were, it was true, fora like the UN where Cold War tension had stifled co-operation. This was disappointing for the government, which saw the UN as the world's leading multilateral institution, with a near-universal membership and a mandate to maintain international peace. Canada needed multilateral bodies like the UN because it could not address conflict by itself. According to Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark (1984-91), "powers our size have no choice but to work within international organizations." As a result, he said, "making the world work together has become the Canadian vocation."[14]

The Mulroney government wanted to improve conflict resolution mechanisms in order to influence the response to post-Cold War challenges like internal war. According to Geoffrey Pearson, effective multilateral security arrangements "would provide a means to exert influence on major allies and powerful neighbours as well as help to maintain peace."[15] For example, Ottawa vigorously supported the international efforts during the Yugoslav civil war that were aimed at "instigating and redefining new cooperative security arrangements" within the UN, NATO and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The government wanted to demonstrate the relevance of these

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[13] Brian Stevenson, Canada, Latin America, and the New Internationalism: A Foreign Policy Analysis, 1968-1990, (Montréal-Kingston: McGill-Queen's UP, 2000) 28, 46, 228-9.
[14] Joe Clark, "Canada's New Internationalism," Canada and the New Internationalism, eds. John Holmes and John Kirton, (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1988) 10.
[15] Geoffrey Pearson, "Canadian Attitudes to Peacekeeping," Peacekeeping: Appraisals and Proposals, ed. Henry Wiseman, (New York: Pergamon, 1983) 122.

bodies and ensure that they enabled Canada to make a constructive contribution to the international conflict management effort.[16] This thesis argues that a similar goal – supporting the UN and ad hoc multinational peace enforcement coalitions – was behind Canada's engagement in Somalia.

Multilateralism and peace were not geographically specific interests. It did not matter where peace was breached or whether Canada had trade interests in the area. The government's desire to support multilateral peace efforts drew Canada into conflicts where it did not need to get involved. Canada's multilateral associations and its interest in strengthening these institutions led policy makers to respond to crises that did not appear to involve national interests.[17] In the Balkans, Canada had little at stake except for a desire to strengthen the multinational response so that the fighting and human rights abuses would stop.[18] Somalia represented a similar case. Canada lacked hard economic interests in Africa, and with Somalia it had almost no relations at all. Somalia briefly became a foreign policy priority because of Canada's interest in multilateralism.

Canada's focus resulted in a shallow, limited engagement in Somalia. Ottawa wanted to maintain the integrity of multilateral processes and show Canadians that their country was being helpful. The UN, however, badly needed help with diplomatic peacemaking and Somalia's national reconstruction. The government avoided these roles because the Canadian media and public were pressuring it to send peacekeepers to do

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[16] Nicholas Gammer, From Peacekeeping to Peacemaking: Canada's Response to the Yugoslav Crisis, (Montréal-Kingston: McGill-Queen's UP, 2001) 5, 114.
[17] Keating, Canada and World Order, 168.
[18] Gammer, From Peacekeeping to Peacemaking, 55, 67; and Norman Hillmer and Dean Oliver, "The NATO-United Nations Link: Canada and the Balkans, 1991-95," A History of NATO: The First Fifty Years, vol. 1, Gustav Schmidt, ed., (Houndmills, Hampshire, England: Palgrave, 2001) 71, 346n2.

something about Somalia's famine, and it did not want to make the sort of sustained commitment required to build peace in Somalia.

The Mulroney government's Somalia decisions were made in the light of Canada's peacekeeping tradition. During the Cold War, peacekeeping had suited Canada's foreign and defence policy objectives. Over the years, it became a national fixation, as Canadians grew proud of Pearson's Nobel Prize and their country's unmatched peacekeeping record. With the expansion of peacekeeping into non-military fields like elections monitoring in the early 1990s, the UN and some scholars argued that the activity's usefulness to international reconciliation efforts was increasing. Ottawa's deployment of peacekeepers and peace enforcers to Somalia demonstrated that it shared and wanted to encourage this optimistic perception.

Canada's peacekeeping record has been the subject of mythmaking. Canadian nationalists glorify in Canada's superior moral character, which they say is behind the requests for blue berets. But in fact, Canada became a frequent peacekeeper because it was a medium-sized power, was part of the western alliance, and possessed capable armed forces. Interpositional peacekeeping missions such as UNEF enabled Canada to help control explosive situations so that the superpowers did not become involved. As Alastair Taylor noted in 1967, the "initiative progressively shifted" toward less powerful states and the pacific settlement of disputes through peacekeeping, a technique that "apparently requires maximal disengagement of the superpowers from the region of conflict."[19]

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[19] Alastair Taylor, "Peacekeeping: The International Context," Peacekeeping: International Challenge and Canadian Response, with David Cox and J. L. Granatstein, (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1968) 3-4.

UNEF was established to facilitate the French and British withdrawal from Egypt and diffuse mounting bipolar tensions. Canada contributed to UNEF to help its close allies, France and the UK, and to avert global war. Preventing a US / Soviet Union war was a vital Canadian national security objective, because if it occurred it would destroy the world. Similarly, Canada's other peacekeeping commitments up to 1970 were made to prevent regional conflicts from involving the superpowers, and to protect NATO's ability to deter or fight the Soviet Union.[20] This was the main objective, for example, behind its contribution to the UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC) in 1960 and the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus in 1964.

Canada's ability to serve as a representative of the west also led to Cold War peacekeeping roles. Canada's "pro-American, aligned position [was often] a reason for participation rather than a disqualification."[21] As Norman Hillmer has noted, Canada was not a disinterested or autonomous international actor, and in fact was viewed partly as a proxy by Washington and other western governments.[22] For example, when Canada committed to the Vietnam International Control Commissions in 1954 and 1973 and the second UNEF (1973), it did so as a western representative.

Despite these factors, the reason why Canada has peacekept so often has not always been clearly understood. The UN turned to Canada primarily because it had never been a colonial power and possessed a sophisticated military. As J. L. Granatstein and David Cox argue, Canada's non-colonial past and impartial reputation made it acceptable

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[20] Sean Maloney, Canada and UN Peacekeeping: Cold War by Other Means, 1945-1970, (St. Catherine's: Vanwell, 2002) xii-xiii, 246; and David Dewitt, "Canadian Defence Policy: Regional Conflicts, Peacekeeping, and Stability Operations," Canadian Defence Quarterly, (August 1991): 41, 42-3.
[21] David Cox, "Peacekeeping: The Canadian Experience," Peacekeeping: International Challenge and Canadian Response, with Alastair Taylor and J. L. Granatstein, (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1968) 60.
[22] Hillmer, "Peacekeeping: Canadian Invention, Canadian Myth," 160.

to most host nations, and the UN needed the mobile armed forces that Canada had and was willing to deploy on peacekeeping assignments.[23] Despite this, many Canadians preferred to believe that Canada's record of participation in every blue helmet operation until the UN Angola Verification Mission I (1989-91) was a reflection of their country's honest broker image. This was largely because peacekeeping made Canada appear noticeably different from the US, since it was "something we could do and the Americans could not."[24]

Canadian national interests help to explain the country's support of Cold War peacekeeping and the more dangerous and complex early 1990s operations. Peacekeeping enabled Ottawa to strengthen Canadian sovereignty. Cox, for example, noted that the activity "requires, and encourages, a display of independence" on the world stage.[25] This was also true after the Cold War. Ottawa believed that peacekeeping could still be used to advance Canadian interests. In addition, the government shared the international community's optimism regarding the ability of peacekeepers to foster world peace now that the UN was no longer constrained by the Cold War.[26]

But it was the Canadian national mythology that caused the country's love affair with peacekeeping to grow during the Cold War and intensify after it. Despite the increase in the number of risky and multifaceted internal operations to Namibia (1989-

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[23] Cox, "Peacekeeping: The Canadian Experience," 53-5; and J. L. Granatstein, "Canada: Peacekeeper – A Survey of Canada's Participation in Peacekeeping Operations," Peacekeeping: International Challenge and Canadian Response, with Alastair Taylor and David Cox, (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1968) 182-3.

[24] J. L. Granatstein, "Peacekeeping: Did Canada Make a Difference? And What Different Did Peacekeeping Make to Canada?" Making a Difference? Canada's Foreign Policy in a Changing World Order, eds. John English and Norman Hillmer, (Toronto: Lester, 1992): 231-32.

[25] Cox, "Peacekeeping: The Canadian Experience," 60.

[26] Allen G. Sens, Somalia and the Changing Nature of Peacekeeping: The Implications for Canada, A Study Prepared for the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services Canada, 1997) 120.

90), El Salvador (1991-95), Cambodia (1991-93), Yugoslavia (1992-95) and Somalia (1992-95), Canadian support for peacekeeping did not significantly decline. Canada contributed to all of these missions, partly because the myth that Canada invented peacekeeping made it difficult for Ottawa to say 'no' when new missions came along.[27] In addition, peacekeeping remained applicable to Canada's "self-congratulatory rhetoric about its traditions of kindliness, compromise and the negotiation of difference."[28] For too many Canadians and their governments, the cry 'send in the peacekeepers' had become a substitute for rational policy and thought.[29]

The government contributed to the second generation of peacekeeping without a clear understanding of the risks involved and without undertaking a foreign policy review to determine whether these engagements served Canadian interests. Peacekeeping was unsuited to the Yugoslav and Somali crises, notes Louis Delvoie, but Canada refused to pull back accordingly. Instead, the Mulroney government diluted Canadian foreign policy by making the case for humanitarian interventionism, and then it peacekept more widely than before, including in Africa.[30]

Africa had historically occupied a marginal place in Canadian foreign policy. The episodic nature of Canada's engagement in Somalia was a reflection of its approach to Africa since the 1960s. Ottawa wanted to expand Canada's trade with African nations, but economic opportunities remained limited. Aside from trade, Canada did not have another interest to advance in Africa. As a result, Canada directly engaged in Africa only

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[27] Hillmer, "Peacekeeping: Canadian Invention, Canadian Myth," 159-160, 168.
[28] Norman Hillmer, "Canadian Peacekeeping: New and Old," Peacekeeping 1815 To Today, proc. of the 21st Colloquium of the International Commission of Military History, 20-26 August 1995, (Ottawa: Canadian Commission of Military History, 1995) 543, 544, 546.
[29] Granatstein, "Peacekeeping: Did Canada Make a Difference?" 234.

when an opportunity emerged to support multilateralism. In this sense, its approach to Africa foreshadowed the government's decision-making with respect to the Somalia crisis in 1992.

Africa's place at the margins of Canadian foreign policy was in large part a reflection of the continent's importance as a trading partner. During the 1960s to late 1980s, the country's commercial exchanges with Africa totalled $CAD 40 billion, peaking at roughly $CAD 2 billion annually in the early 1980s.[31] In comparison, Canadian exports (not counting imports) to the US equalled $US 84 billion in 1989 alone.[32] In percentage terms, Africa's share of Canadian imports and exports was 1% and 0.9%, respectively, in 1969, 0.8% and 1.3% in 1979, and 0.9% and 0.8% in 1989. At those times, US markets were the source of 72.7%, 72.1%, and 66.1% of Canadians imports, and the recipient of 71.2%, 68.0%, and 73.3% of Canadian exports.[33] Dependence on the US markets needed to be offset with other trade sources. Africa, however, was no help in this respect.

Many African states were decolonialising by 1960, with fifteen (including Somalia) becoming independent that year. But Canada viewed their emergence through the ideological lens of a cold warrior. Like the rest of the west, Ottawa believed that the

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[30] Louis Delvoie, "Canada and International Security Operations," Canada and the New World Order: Facing the New Millennium, eds. Michael J. Tucker, Raymond B. Blake, and P.E. Bryden, (Toronto: Irwin, 2000) 24-25.

[31] EAITC, "Backgrounder – The Evolution of Canadian Economic Relations with African Countries," 1. Attached to EAITC, "Monique Laundry Reaffirms Canada's Commitment to Africa," News Release No. 33, (10 February 1992).

[32] United Nations (UN), "Canada – 3. Trade by Principal Countries of Origin and Destination (Value in Thousands of US Dollars)," 1989 International Trade Statistics Yearbook, vol. 1, Trade by Country, (New York: United Nations, 1991) 137.

[33] UN, "Canada – Value as Percentage of World Total," 1978 Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, vol. 1, Trade by Country, (New York: United Nations, 1979) 328; UN, "Canada – Value as Percentage of World Total," 1988 International Trade Statistics Yearbook, vol. 1, Trade by Country, (New York: United Nations, 1990) 140; and UN "Canada – Value as Percentage of World Total," 1989 International Trade Statistics Yearbook, 137.

Soviet Union might be able to foster anti-western attitudes in the post-colonial states if Canada did not show its support.[34] And yet Africa ranked lower on Canada's priority list than other regions, such as south-east Asia, because it was considered less threatened by communism.[35]

Canada's peacekeeping roles in the Middle East / Egypt with the UNEF I and II (1956-67 and 1973-79) and ONUC (1960-64) reflected its Cold War-dominated approach to Africa. Ottawa decided to peacekeep in 1956 to close the rift between the US and France and the UK, and to enable the latter to withdraw their forces from Egypt without further embarrassment. The government committed to the UN force in the Congo because of the public expectation that it should act and the fear that the Soviet Union might use the crisis to expand its influence.[36] Ottawa wanted to prevent both conflicts from escalating into big wars, and to protect the integrity of the NATO alliance.[37] In 1973, the second UN Emergency Force in the Middle East was created to contain a crisis that threatened to involve the US and Soviet Union. Ottawa committed to this operation because peacekeeping had become a highly popular national symbol.[38] In these cases, the fact that Canada engaged in Africa was accidental. Ottawa accepted these roles based on a concern for allies, nationalism and Cold War crisis management.

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[34] Robert Matthews and Cranford Pratt, "Canadian Policy Towards Southern Africa," Canada, Scandinavia and Southern Africa, eds. Douglas Anglin, Timothy Shaw and Carl Widstrand, (Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of Africa Studies, 1978) 165-6.

[35] Jules Léger, "Canadian Relations with an Awakening Africa," memorandum to Secretary of State for External Affairs Lester B. Pearson, DEA/12354-40, (9 December 1955). Cited from: Greg Donaghy, ed., Documents on Canadian External Relations, vol. 22, document 737. Available at: http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/department/history/dcer/menu-en.asp.

[36] Kevin Spooner, "Canada, the Congo Crisis, and United Nations Peacekeeping, 1960-1964," Ph. D. Diss, Carleton University, Ottawa, 2002, 79, 86.

[37] Maloney, Canada and UN Peacekeeping, xiii, 62, 127.

[38] Alan James, Peacekeeping in International Politics, (New York: St. Martin's, 1990) 316; and Hillmer, "Peacekeeping: Canadian Invention, Canadian Myth," 165.

The government was reluctant to involve Canada in Africa when these interests were absent. A key example involved Biafra, which experienced a mass famine during its attempt to secede from Nigeria in 1967-70. Initially, Ottawa had no desire to help. In fact, Liberal Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau (1968-79, 1980-84) flippantly queried "Where's Biafra?" in July 1968, when asked if Canada would ship food to the territory. On 27 September, he told Opposition parties and church groups to act on their own "if they want to be generous with their lives and their money."[39] Pressure groups, the media, public opinion, and Parliament convinced him to reconsider, but as soon as domestic interest faded his government decided that further action was not warranted.[40] In response to the pressure, two CF transport planes were deployed in mid-October to support the Canadian Red Cross. One delivered aid for less than a week, but then operations were suspended because of the unsafe conditions.[41]

Except for the occasional emergency or conflict, government interest in Africa remained limited through to the 1980s. Flora MacDonald, the Secretary of State for External Affairs in Joe Clark's Progressive Conservative government (1979-80), vividly demonstrated this. The text of an 4 October 1979 speech questioned the continent's relevance to Canada. According to what was given to the media (but not actually said), she asked:

> I look at the distribution of effort that our Department of External Affairs and our aid programmes have, and I wonder why we are so deeply committed in Africa. What are Canada's real interests in this involvement? It certainly doesn't have to

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[39] Cited in Editorial, "Public Pressure Wins Action on Biafra," Toronto Star, Thursday 10 October 1968: A6.
[40] Donald Barry, "Interest Groups and the Foreign Policy Process: The Case of Biafra," Pressure Group Behaviour in Canadian Politics, ed. A. Paul Pross, (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1975) 121, 144.
[41] Michael I. Draper, Shadows: Airlift and Airwar in Biafra and Nigeria, (Aldershot: Hikoki, 1999) 147.

> do with trade...We're not like the former colonial powers of Europe who have both ties and obligations.[42]

There were limited ties to Africa. However, this was related to human links that were not significant interests. Canadian missionaries, for example, had established 'human relations' with Africa beginning in the late nineteenth century. There were about 2, 500 Canadian missionaries in Africa in 1959 and almost 3, 300 in 1973. Collectively, they contributed immensely to the enhancement of health and education in Africa.[43] Canada shared linguistic and cultural ties with French and English Africa, as well as traditions and similar education, judicial and political institutions with African Commonwealth members. It had supported North-South dialogue, which had "justifiably led many African countries to rely on Canada as their advocate with the industrialised world and international financial institutions."[44] However, according to scholar Linda Freeman in 1980, MacDonald's speech suggested that Canada was "still a marginal actor in Africa and Africa's importance in Canada remain[ed] quite slight."[45]

Shortly after Mulroney became Prime Minister, he led the multilateral diplomatic effort that isolated South Africa's apartheid regime, but he backed off when the international spotlight shifted elsewhere and it appeared that further efforts would be costly to Canada. Mulroney disregarded Canada's traditional reluctance to apply economic sanctions after a massive black insurrection in South Africa in 1985-87. This

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[42] MacDonald referred to "certain parts of the world" instead of "Africa" in the actual speech. See Arthur Johnson, "MacDonald Suggests that Politics Should Play a Role in Foreign Aid," The Globe and Mail, Friday 5 October 1979: A1.

[43] Douglas Anglin, "Towards a Canadian Policy on Africa," International Journal, 15.4 (Autumn 1960): 293-4; and Steven Langdon, "Canada's Role in Africa," A Foremost Nation: Canadian Foreign Policy and a Changing World, eds. Norman Hillmer and Garth Stevenson, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1977) 181.

[44] EAITC, "Backgrounder – Canada and Africa: True Partners," 1. Attached to EAITC, "Monique Laundry Reaffirms Canada's Commitment to Africa," News Release No. 33, (10 February 1992).

[45] Linda Freeman, "Canada and Africa in the 1970s," International Journal, 35.4 (Autumn 1980): 794.

proved that the apartheid regime was vulnerable and prompted an exodus of western capital. Mulroney imposed the full package of sanctions on South Africa that the Commonwealth had agreed upon at Nassau, Bahamas in 1985, but he did not sustain the pressure after 1987 because international concern had ebbed, Pretoria had reasserted control, and domestic opposition to his campaign had revived.[46] In addition, Mulroney had reached the point where further sanctions would have real domestic economic costs that he was unwilling to pay. An intensified campaign against apartheid required multilateral action that Canada was unwilling to promote.[47]

The Mulroney government continued to stress, if not always act on, values in its approach to Africa. A 1986 Parliamentary report noted that "the international promotion of human rights is a fundamental and integral part of Canadian foreign policy. It is a vital and natural expression of Canadian values."[48] Mulroney built on this when he spoke to the Commonwealth in Harare and the La Francophonie in Paris in 1991. At Harare, the Prime Minister stated that "[f]or Canada, the future course is clear: we shall be increasingly channelling our development assistance to those countries that show respect for fundamental rights and individual freedoms of their people. Canada will not subsidize repression and the stifling of democracy."[49] However, despite this, human rights were

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[46] Linda Freeman, The Ambiguous Champion: Canada and South Africa in the Trudeau and Mulroney Years, (Toronto: U of Toronto P, 1997) 286-7.
[47] Chris Brown, "Canada and South Africa: Autonomy, Image and Capacity in Foreign Policy," Canada Among Nations 1989: The Challenge of Change, (Ottawa: Carleton UP, 1990) 208.
[48] Independence and Internationalism, 99. See also DFAIT, "Context – Human Rights in Canadian Foreign Policy," 1. Attachment to DFAIT, "UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to Visit Canada," News Release No. 54, (17 March 1995).
[49] Brian Mulroney, "Address entitled 'Global Report: World Political Review' to the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting, Harare, Zimbabwe," (16 October 1991): 2.

seldom a part of decisions regarding overseas development assistance (ODA), and only a tiny amount of Canada's ODA budget was devoted to human rights promotion.[50]

As Canada's peacekeeping deployments to Namibia (1989), Western Sahara (1991) and Somalia illustrate, the government did not alter its approach to Africa after the Cold War. Minister of National Defence Marcel Masse said that "Canadian Forces participation" in the Western Sahara mission "demonstrates the professionalism and the devotion of our soldiers to serve the cause of peace globally." Secretary of State for External Affairs Barbara McDougall added that Canada's "decision to contribute...to this UN operation highlights Canada's long-standing commitment toward international peacekeeping."[51] The government's decisions to contribute to UNOSOM and UNITAF were driven in part by the same multilateral interest. Canadian leaders believed that peace operations were becoming more relevant to international conflict resolution, and they wanted to encourage this trend.

The next chapter of the thesis examines the government's diplomatic moves prior to the establishment of UNOSOM. Consistent with the past Canadian role in Somalia, Ottawa sought to provide emergency humanitarian assistance to the country. Ottawa had followed the expansion of UN peacekeeping into areas such as elections monitoring and human rights with interest, and had developed a 'new internationalist' foreign policy that outlined how it hoped to encourage this process further, but a peacekeeping role in Somalia was not considered until mid-1992. Somalia was initially a low priority for Ottawa, and thus it called for a more effective humanitarian engagement. It did so

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[50] Gerald J. Schmitz, "CIDA as Peacemaker: Integration or Overload?" Aid as Peacemaker: Canadian Development Assistance and Third World Conflict, ed. Robert Miller, (Ottawa: Carleton UP, 1992) 94.
[51] EAITC, "Canada Contributes Largest Peacekeeping Force Since 1974 to UN Operation in the Western Sahara," News Release No. 163, (18 July 1991): 1.

because supporting multinational action was a key interest, and a credible UN role would enable Canada to play a larger part in the crisis.

The UN began preparations to create UNOSOM in mid-March to May. The DND / CF recommended that Canada not participate. This advice came from the National Defence Headquarters Joint Staff, which was an operational staff structure that had been created less than two years before to accelerate military decision-making. Although new, the Joint Staff muddled through, and the rest of the government heeded its concerns about safety and the viability of the peacekeeping operation.

International and national pressure led Ottawa to reverse its position. Having said 'no' to UNOSOM in May, the government decided to say 'yes' in August. The UN effort in Somalia was being compared unfavourably with the much more substantial multinational engagement in the former Yugoslavia, and this led to high profile suggestions that the world community was discriminatory. The domestic media contrasted the welcome provided to Yugoslav refugees with its apparent unwillingness to help Somalis immigrate.

In light of the building interest in Somalia, the UN and the DND / CF each began planning for significant deployments to Somalia in July and August. The UN, which was concerned about the worsening famine and the theft of relief deliveries, decided to expand its humanitarian airlift and UNOSOM. In line with Canada's multilateral and humanitarian interests, the CF advised the government that it could assist the airlift of food, and it began preparations for aid escort role in Somalia. The CF engaged eagerly without a great deal of knowledge about what to expect, and only found through trial and error that the airlift did not work.

The Mulroney government decided to deepen Canada's role in the multilateral assistance effort in August and December. In late August, Ottawa announced that a battle group would deploy to northeast Somalia. The government committed to UNOSOM, but it wanted a short-term humanitarian mission. When Ottawa found, to its dismay, that it had received a stability role, government representatives pressed vigorously for change. It did not cancel its contribution because that would have hampered the UN, and UNOSOM was the country's only means of engagement.

From August to November, CF planners were focussed on the role in UNOSOM. The ground deployment, initially expected in September, was rescheduled to December because Mohamed Sahnoun, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Somalia, was unable to get permission from the leading factions to send blue helmets. In October, the UN lost patience with the Somali factions and decided, with Ottawa's full support, to proceed without consent. The CF's task was vaguely defined until this period, which complicated planning. This did not affect the selection of the Airborne Regiment. While some military leaders knew that the Airborne had discipline problems, none guessed that the unit's internal difficulties could manifest themselves as seriously as they did during the UNITAF deployment.

The government believed that participation in the US-led UNITAF coalition would further Canadian multilateral and bilateral interests. Ottawa committed to UNITAF to support credible and successful multilateral action. In addition, the peace enforcement operation's famine-relief focus reflected Canadian humanitarian concerns. The suffering in Somalia was so serious that the Canadian government and public did not strongly object to working with the US. By contributing to UNITAF, Mulroney was able

to ease Canada's pursuit of its bilateral concerns, while advancing its goal of deepening the US involvement in multilateral actions.

The Joint Staff and the Canadian UNOSOM contingent had to adjust to the new mission in late-November and early December. The UN's attempt to behave in a more determined fashion resulted in UNOSOM's collapse. The US stepped forward and offered to lead the ad hoc UNITAF coalition, and the CF, responding to the intense political interest in a role, was able to quickly deploy a modified version of the force it had prepared for UNOSOM. However, the CF's preparations were complicated by the fact that there was limited time available to make the transition from UNOSOM to UNITAF. The CF was also unfamiliar with the writing of Rules of Engagement (ROE) for ad hoc coalitions and peace enforcement operations. The failure to adequately train all Airborne personnel on the CF ROE was the key preventable failure.

Chapter 2
The Government's Multilateral Humanitarianism and the Somalia Crisis to March 1992

The Canadian government did not pay much attention to Somalia during the Cold War. In the early 1990s, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney changed Canada's approach because Somalia's total collapse, mass famine and civil conflict had attracted the world's attention, and the end of the Cold War had removed the bipolar political constraint that would have made a rescue effort impossible. A new spirit of co-operation had seized the United Nations (UN) Security Council. Ottawa was inspired by internationalism, which was characterised by greater interdependence, co-operation between states and greater reliance on multinational institutions. The government wanted to strengthen and encourage the use of world bodies in times of emergency.

Yet Ottawa's response to the Somali crisis was less idealistic, and its engagement more cautious, than might be expected considering the extent of the suffering and disorder in the Horn of Africa. The government was troubled by the crisis, but its concern was UN multilateralism An effective multilateralist response was needed so that Canada would have opportunities to influence the diplomatic agenda and help alleviate suffering. Although it encouraged the UN to press forward, Ottawa was interested in supplying food aid to the international effort. It did not want to contribute troops to the planned UN Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM).

Ottawa's actions were underpinned by its belief that the UN was entering into a period of renewed relevance and vitality. The Cold War had resulted in the UN's "virtual paralysis," said Ambassador Yves Fortier, Canada's Permanent Representative to the UN in New York from 1988-92. The thaw that started in fall 1988 was "nothing less than a

earth-shattering revolution."[1] This change made it possible for the Security Council to serve as a forum for dispute resolution. With the Permanent Members co-operating rather than competing, the UN became more effective in dealing with conflict, although it remained essentially an instrument of persuasion.[2] The UN's legitimacy was on the rise because it was managing more complex missions and its rate of success was increasing.[3] The coalition victory in the Persian Gulf War (1990-91) suggested to Canada that the UN could mobalise political will and act decisively. Ottawa hoped that a new UN-led multinational peace and security architecture was on the horizon. Decision makers "felt that things could be done through the UN that were not possible before." There was "atmosphere, optimism, a belief that you [could] make a difference through peace operations and the use of military force."[4]

The government's response, 'new internationalism,' was not an entirely fresh foreign policy. Canada had long been an advocate of the UN's pacific methods and proud of its own unmatched peacekeeping experience.[5] International involvement was still crucial if Canada was to have a voice in world affairs, and multilateral institutions enabled the country's mediatory and bridge- and coalition-building skills to be put to best effect. The government continued to make UN peacekeeping commitments as if the

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[1] Yves Fortier, "Canada and the United Nations: A Half-Century Partnership," O. D. Skelton Memorial Lecture, (Montréal, 6 March 1996): 3, 7. Cited from: www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/skelton/lectures-en.asp.
[2] The five Permanent Members were China, France, Russia, United Kingdom and the United States. Anthony Parsons, "The UN and the National Interests of States," United Nations, Divided World: The UN's Roles in International Relations, 2nd. ed., eds. Adam Roberts and Benedict Kingsbury, (Oxford: Clarendon, 1996) 117-9.
[3] Ernst B. Haas, "Collective Conflict Management: Evidence for a New World Order?" Collective Security in a Changing World, ed. Thomas G. Weiss, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1993) 65.
[4] Ken Calder, "Interview with Assistant Deputy Minister (Policy and Communications) Dr. Ken Calder," at NDHQ in Ottawa, Friday 10 March 2000.
[5] Allen Sens, Somalia and the Changing Nature of Peacekeeping: The Implications for Canada, Study Prepared for the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services Canada, 1997) 102-3.

world had not altered. Ottawa applied the guidelines from the UN Emergency Force II in the Middle East (1973-78) to the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the former Yugoslavia (1992-95).[6]

However, new internationalism was more than old internationalism. It also sought to take advantage of the increased freedom and potential for activism on the world stage. "Multilateralism has been a long-standing Canadian mantra," said Secretary of State for External Affairs Barbara McDougall in 1992. "What is new is the growing willingness of other countries to use multilateral institutions."[7] The government wanted to capitalise on this spirit of collaboration and apply it to problems like civil conflict. These crises concerned Ottawa because they could increase refugee flows. In addition, the improvement in telecommunications and the emergence of worldwide media networks ensured that the viciousness of internal war would be widely, vividly and immediately known. Ottawa believed that western democracies could no longer ignore civil strife. As Mulroney noted in a September 1991 speech, Canada "favour[s] re-thinking the limits of national sovereignty in a world where problems respect no borders."[8]

New internationalism saw intervention as a moral imperative in cases of intra-state disorder, and it dismissed the idea that sovereignty could shield undemocratic practices and mass human rights abuses. "Canada," Mulroney said, "would like to see the UN become still more effective, more of an actor in international affairs," because "there are certain fundamental rights that all people possess...[and] sometimes, the international

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[6] Norman Hillmer, "Canadian Peacekeeping and the Road Back to 1945," Canada and Italy in the World: Current Opportunities, Future Possibilities, ed. Fabrizio Ghilardi, (Pisa: University of Pisa P, 1994) 149.
[7] Louise Crosby, "Stronger Ties to the US Hallmark of PM's New World Order," Ottawa Citizen, Saturday 21 November 1992: B5.
[8] Brian Mulroney, "Address on the Occasion of the Centennial Anniversary Convocation of Stanford University," California, (29 September 1991): 6.

community must act to defend them."[9] The government recognised that these were strong words. Part of what made its policy 'new,' McDougall stated, was the assumption that human rights in one country had become a legitimate concern for all, and a topic for discussion in multilateral forums. This was "a quantum leap in the evolution of international relations and law." Peacekeeping was highlighted as a tool that could help further this ambitious end. McDougall signalled Canada's intention to play a major role in the establishment of a new multinational order, noting that Canada had "special competence" in that activity.[10]

Ottawa had been one of the strongest supporters of Cold War peacekeeping, and had an almost perfect record of UN peacekeeping commitments up to 1990. Peacekeeping was important to Canadian security interests and was highly regarded domestically. Canadians greatly admired their blue helmets, so much so that Ottawa featured peacekeeping in its unsuccessful public relations campaign in support of the October 1992 constitutional referendum on the Charlottetown Accord.[11]

Most of these commitments were 'traditional' missions that were based on principles that had been set down by 1958. Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld had argued that peacekeeping troops could be deployed only "in the interest and with the consent and co-operation of the host government." Impartiality was also essential: "the Force should not be used to enforce any specific political solution of pending problems or to influence the political balance decisive to such a solution." The third rule was that "the operation may never take the initiative in the use of armed force, but is entitled to

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[9] Mulroney, "Address [to]...Stanford University," (29 September 1991): 6.
[10] Barbara McDougall, "Canada and the New Internationalism," Canadian Foreign Policy 1.1 (Winter 1992-93): 2, 4.

respond with force to an attack with arms."[12] Alan James, a noted peacekeeping scholar, argues that consent, impartiality and non-threatening behaviour "constitute the very core and essence of the activity."[13] Peacekeeping missions usually involved military officers or formed units monitoring ceasefires or force separations. Post-Cold War peacekeeping, in contrast, was more intrusive, comprehensive and multifunctional.

Government officials tended to focus on peacekeeping's advances and downplay the links between the old and new versions of the activity. The political functions the new missions performed or attempted to perform – the diffusion of tension, stabilisation of a situation and the resolution of disputes – were the same as before. In addition, internal tasks were not a unique phenomenon, although there was certainly a heavy concentration on this type of activity in the early post-Cold War era.[14] Canada, however, was concerned with international peacekeeping's renewal and potential. The government, McDougall said, hoped that the multidimensional mission in Namibia (which had military, humanitarian and political aspects) was "a harbinger of events to come."[15] Department of National Defence leaders were attuned to the "revival" of peacekeeping and the emergence of "new challenges and opportunities." The April 1992 defence policy update

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[11] Norman Hillmer and J. L. Granatstein, Empire to Umpire: Canada and the World to the 1990s, (Toronto: Copp Clark Longman, 1994) 322.
[12] Dag Hammarskjöld, "The UNEF [UN Emergency Force I] Experience Report, October-November 1958," The Public Papers of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations, vol. 4, Dag Hammarskjöld, 1958-1960, eds. and comp. Andrew W. Cordier and Wilder Foote, (New York: Columbia UP, 1974) 284, 288, 291.
[13] Alan James, Peacekeeping in International Politics, (New York: St. Martin's, 1990) 5.
[14] James, Peacekeeping in International Politics, 4-5; and Alan James, "The History of Peacekeeping: An Analytical Perspective," Canadian Defence Quarterly, (September 1993): 13, 16.
[15] Barbara McDougall, "Meeting the Challenge of the New World Order," International Journal, 47.3 (Summer 1992): 477.

stated that the country should "preserve and advance this new approach to international problem-solving."[16]

Peacekeeping moved into many new areas in the early 1990s. The UN Transition Assistance Group (1989-90), for example, demilitarised and administered Namibia and oversaw the election that created its first independent government. The mission's most important legacy was that it formed a link between traditional mandates and those of the multifunctional 'second generation.'[17] The UN Observer Group in Central America (1989-92) was the first blue helmet operation deployed to the western hemisphere, and the first to disarm and demobilise a guerrilla army (the Contras).[18] The UN Observer Mission in El Salvador (1991-95) was the first assigned human rights monitoring as a primary mandated task.[19] The UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (1992-93) dispersed throughout that country, exercised "direct control" over its federal and provincial departments of foreign affairs, national defence, finance, and public information, and organised its inaugural democratic election in spring 1993.[20]

Ottawa's interest in multinational peacekeeping led it to commit to the Somalia and former Yugoslavia missions. Both were troubled from the start because the disputants did not respect peacekeeping's principles. UNPROFOR deployed into the

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[16] Louis A. Delvoie, "Canada and Peacekeeping: A New Era?" Canadian Defence Quarterly, (October 1990): 9, 11; and Department of National Defence, Canadian Defence Policy 1992, (Ottawa: April 1992) 4.
[17] Steven R. Ratner, The New UN Peacekeeping: Building Peace in Lands of Conflict After the Cold War, (New York: St. Martin's, 1996) 123.
[18] Brian D. Smith and William J. Durch, "UN Observer Group in Central America," The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis, ed. William J. Durch, (New York: St. Martin's, 1993) 436, 453.
[19] Fen Osler Hampson, "The Pursuit of Human Rights: The United Nations in El Salvador," UN Peacekeeping, American Policy and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s, ed. William J, Durch, (New York: St. Martin's, 1996) 69, 80.
[20] Jocelyn Coulon, Soldiers of Diplomacy: The United Nations, Peacekeeping, and the New World Order, trans. Phyllis Aronoff and Howard Scott, (Toronto: U of Toronto P, 1994) 42; and James A. Schear,

middle of an on-going civil conflict without a stable ceasefire. In the former Yugoslavia, humanitarian assistance to one ethnic population was seen as having partial effects and UNPROFOR could not manage the fighting because local consent was unreliable. The mission hurt the cause of political settlement and served as a prelude to further violence by enabling Croatia and the Bosniacs time to regroup and concentrate on certain fronts.[21] But at the same time, it is questionable whether the UN could have avoided deploying. The UN decided that the consequences of failure were less than the harm that would be done to peace and stability if it did nothing.[22]

Ottawa engaged swiftly to support human rights, peace, and UN-led multilateralism. Canada deployed troops to the former Yugoslavia in April 1992, and was the first country to do so. According to McDougall, "we are participating because the reality of human suffering is so compelling" and "because peace and security in Europe are essential to peace and security in Canada."[23] An UNPROFOR role also gave the government reason to expect it would be consulted regarding the crisis. "Burden-sharing," noted the Prime Minister, "requires decision-sharing."[24] However, Ottawa did

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"Riding the Tiger: The United Nations and Cambodia's Struggle for Peace," UN Peacekeeping, American Policy and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s, ed. William J, Durch, (New York: St. Martin's, 1996) 146.

[21] William J. Durch and James A. Schear, "Faultlines: UN Operations in the former Yugoslavia," UN Peacekeeping, American Policy and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s, ed. William J, Durch, (New York: St. Martin's, 1996) 253.

[22] Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "Further Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 721 (1991)," United Nations document S/23592, (15 February 1992): para. 28. Cited in Kofi Annan, "Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 53/35: The Fall of Srebrenica," United Nations document A/54/549, (15 November 1999): para 13.

[23] Barbara McDougall, "Address entitled 'Peacekeeping, Peacemaking and Peacebuilding' to the Standing House of Commons Committee on External Affairs and International Trade," External Affairs and International Trade Canada Statement 93 / 11 (17 February 1993): 5; and Barbara McDougall, "Address entitled 'Peacekeeping and the Limits of Sovereignty' to a Seminar of the Centre Québécois des Relations Internationales," External Affairs and International Trade Canada Statement 92 / 58 (2 December 1992): 4.

[24] Mulroney, "Address [to]...Stanford University," (29 September 1991): 6.

not fully appreciate the difficulties associated with deploying peacekeepers into the civil war because its attention was fixed on using this tool to strengthen multilateralism.[25]

The government also wanted to assist UN-led humanitarian efforts in Somalia. Ottawa had an interest in alleviating suffering and fostering order since the country cannot "live in isolation even if we wanted to" and events in "Mogadishu have a direct effect on the lives of Canadians." Contributing to UN-sponsored activities was crucial, McDougall said, because they enabled Canada to be "a positive force in the world."[26] But in 1990, the UN's role in Somalia was limited and the government's involvement was confined to a few small bilateral humanitarian projects. Among these was an orphanage in Mogadishu, which was funded through the Canadian International Development Agency's Canada Fund.[27]

Even this limited support was interrupted by the disorder that followed Somali President Mohamed Said Barre's overthrow on 27 January 1991. Three rebel militias that were organised around one of country's six main clan families defeated Barre: the Somali National Movement (the Issaq of northern Somalia), the Somali Patriotic Movement (the Ogadeni clan in Ethiopia, a part of the Darood clan family) and the United Somali Congress (USC, the Hawiye of central Somalia). The USC delivered the final blow by seizing Mogadishu. This did not lead to a cessation of hostilities or the formation of a new regime because the militias or 'factions' loathed each other as much as they did

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[25] Norman Hillmer and Grant Dawson, "Canada and Peacekeeping in the 1990s: A Search for Strategy," unpublished mss., (2002) 10.
[26] Barbara McDougall, "Address to the Primrose Club of Toronto," External Affairs and International Trade Canada Statement 92 / 43 (17 September 1992): 1, 3.
[27] Chris Liebich, "Interview with Canadian International Development Agency Official Chris Liebich," at CIDA in Hull, Friday 22 September 2000.

Barre.[28] According to one journalist, it was accepted they would determine the new order not through dialogue, but by meeting on the battlefield.[29]

The faction leaders' quest for power intensified the tension that existed between Somalia's patrilineal clan families. Traditionally, clan disputes had been controlled by two social practices: xeer (or social contract), which prevented clashes by inhibiting the excessive economic stratification of society; and dia, which constrained violence by requiring payment of 'blood money' to a victim's clan.[30] The cauterizing role of the segmentary linage system was undermined because attention was placed on the war of attrition for control of the state's diminishing resources.[31] This prize split the USC into two factions. Ali Mahdi Mohamed (Abgal sub-clan), an hotelier based in north Mogadishu who was sworn-in as interim president on 28 January 1991, led one of the groups. The other was under the control of Brigadier-General Mohamed Farah Aidid (Habr Gedir sub-clan), who had commanded the forces that captured the capital and was now headquartered in south Mogadishu. Aidid had not been consulted on Ali Mahdi's appointment as president, and he therefore refused to acknowledge or accept it. Aidid and Ali Mahdi began fighting in November 1991, but each underestimated the other's resolve.[32] The battles that took place between them destroyed Mogadishu, disrupted the

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[28] Samuel M. Makinda, Seeking Peace From Chaos: Humanitarian Intervention in Somalia, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1993) 12-13.
[29] Jonathan Manthorpe, "Beyond Hope," Montréal Gazette Thursday 21 March 1991: A11.
[30] Thomas G. Weiss, Military-Civilian Interactions: Intervening in Humanitarian Crisis, (Boulder: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999) 71-2.
[31] David D. Laitin, "Somalia: Civil War and International Intervention," Civil Wars, Insecurity and Intervention, eds. Barbara F. Walter and Jack Snyder, (New York: Columbia UP, 1999) 150, 153.
[32] Laitin, "Somalia: Civil War and International Intervention," 155.

meagre humanitarian assistance effort, and produced over 4, 000 deaths and roughly 10, 000 wounded by January 1992.[33]

Compounding this problem was Barre's attempt to recapture Mogadishu during September 1991-April 1992. During this campaign, Barre plundered the Somali breadbasket between the Jubba and Shabeelle rivers (see map, p. vi). This interrupted farming and destroyed countless livelihoods, and was the principal cause of the catastrophic famine that overtook Somalia.[34] Considerable suffering was inflicted on the resident Digil and Rahanweyn clan families, the Gosha and other minorities of slave heritage also known as 'Bantu', and the Banadir costal town dwellers. These peoples were politically isolated and looked down upon because they were sedentary cultivators or urbanites in an overwhelmingly pastoral and nomadic society.[35] Their hardships were a reflection not only of clan rivalry, but were also about power and land, and race and class status.[36] These groups were poorly armed and could not resist Barre. They were also powerless before Aidid and the other factions who later sought to dominate the area.

Despite the seriousness of the situation, the UN and Canadian response was limited throughout 1991. A UN narrative suggests that the World Food Programme (WFP) and UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) were "fully engaged" in the relief effort by March, but each pulled out on several occasions for extended periods because of safety

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[33] Jane Perlez, "Slaughter Continues and the World Turns its Back," Vancouver Sun, Saturday 4 January 1992: B6. From the New York Times News Service.
[34] John Drysdale, Whatever Happened to Somalia? (London: HAAN Associates, 1994) 43, 57.
[35] Terrance Lyons and Ahmed I. Samatar, Somalia: State Collapse, Multilateral Intervention, and Strategies for Political Reconstruction, (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1995) 22; and Said S. Samatar, Somalia: A Nation in Turmoil, (1991; London: Minority Rights Group International, 1995): 10. See also the attached update, "Somalia and Somaliland," unnumbered pages, 4.
[36] Catherine Besteman, Unraveling Somalia: Race, Violence, and the Legacy of Slavery, (Philadelphia: U of Pennsylvania P, 1999) 22, 229-30.

concerns.[37] Nor was the UN proactive diplomatically. It did not try to support the June and July reconciliation conferences sponsored by Djibouti. Mohamed Sahnoun, the first Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Somalia (the head of UNOSOM), believed these were missed opportunities that could have given the peace process a promising beginning.[38] A key reason for the organization's reluctance to help was that Djibouti's initiatives lasted for only a limited time and were not supported by Aidid. Conflicts usually appeared on the Council's agenda when there was an internationally driven peace process and a set of disputants who wanted help.[39] Meaningful UN involvement was delayed until the crisis attracted a higher profile in the west.

Like the UN, Canada's initial role in Somalia was not extensive. Its engagement reflected the prominence of humanitarian values in its foreign policy. Mulroney told Commonwealth leaders at the 1991 Summit in Harare that human rights were a "concrete factor" in determining the allocation of Canadian development assistance.[40] The Department of External Affairs and International Trade Canada (EAITC) had been making a "major effort" to encourage human rights and democracy through stepped up political dialogue and concerted action with other donors.[41] To Ottawa, Barre's potential successors were suspect because they lacked good democratic and human rights records. It urged Ali Mahdi and the leaders of Somaliland, the new name for the north-west part

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[37] United Nations, "United Nations Operation in Somalia I and II (UNOSOM I and II)," The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping, 3rd ed., (New York: United Nations, 1996) 288.
[38] Mohamed Sahnoun, Somalia: The Missed Opportunities, (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace P, 1994) 10. See also Lyons and Samatar, Somalia: State Collapse, 29.
[39] Peter Wallensteen, Understanding Conflict Resolution: War, Peace and the Global System, (London: Sage, 2002) 244, 246.
[40] Brian Mulroney, "Address entitled 'Global Report: World Political Review' to the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting, Harare, Zimbabwe," (16 October 1991): 2.
[41] Wilfrid-Guy Licari, "Foreign Policy Update – Africa and Middle East," Africa and Middle East Bureau memorandum GGD-0029 to Policy Planning Staff, (12 February 1992): 2.

of Somalia, which had seceded from the south in May 1991, to behave more humanely. Otherwise, Ottawa would not recognise either party. Ali Mahdi's interim government was denied an official visit to Canada, and was told that even an informal tour was unwelcome. Somaliland was informed that new bilateral ties depended on budgets and "in Somalia's case [on] the policy approaches it adopts."[42]

Ottawa was active on the multinational humanitarian front. Ambassador Louise Fréchette, Canada's Permanent Representative to the UN in 1992, noted that Ottawa had "been much involved in the development of instruments related to the UN coordination of emergency humanitarian assistance."[43] The government concentrated on multilateral avenues of providing assistance because the provision of bilateral relief was exceedingly difficult. In addition, "Canada regard[ed] humanitarian assistance as an obligation, and will therefore help Somalia."[44] Ottawa focussed on the UN Special Emergency Programme for the Horn of Africa (SEPHA), which was a regional emergency response co-ordinating body formed in September 1991. Canada paid some of SEPHA's start-up costs, contributed to its first field mission and December interim appeal, and promised to help fund its February 1992 appeal.[45] The government also gave UNICEF, the WFP, and non-governmental organisations (NGO) $ 5.3 million in 1991 and $ 22.8 million in 1992 to further Somalia relief efforts.[46]

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[42] External Affairs, "Visit of Somali Prime Minister to Canada," telex GAA-0351 Permanent Mission to the UN in New York, (12 April 1991): 1; and External Affairs, "Call by Somaliland Foreign Minister on Embassy Representative," telex GAA-0895 to Embassy in The Hague, (21 August 1991): 1. Cited from: Files of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), 20-1-2-Somali, vol. 4.
[43] Louise Fréchette, "Statement to the Donor's Meeting for the Special Emergency Programme for the Horn of Africa," in New York, (28 January 1992): 3.
[44] External Affairs, "Call by Somaliland Foreign Minister on Embassy Representative," telex GAA-0895 to Embassy in The Hague, (21 August 1991): 1. Cited from: Files of DFAIT, 20-1-2-Somali, vol. 4.
[45] Fréchette, "Statement to the Donor's Meeting," 2, 4.
[46] Tim Martin, "Costs of Somalia Crisis," memorandum GAA-0129, (5 February 1993): 1. Cited from: Files of DFAIT, 20-1-2-Somali, vol. 6.

However, while Somalia's suffering was a preoccupation, the credibility of UN-led multilateral action became the government's priority. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), for example, started to publicly attack the world body in January 1992. During a New York University seminar on 6 January, ICRC President Cornelio Sommaruga characterised the UN role as "reserved" and as a "retreat from action." He stressed that UN leadership was required.[47] These comments had special weight because the ICRC was one of the few organisations that had managed to maintain a presence in Somalia throughout the emergency. It had developed a famine relief system that took advantage of the country's long coastline to filter in foodstuffs, and had deployed thousands of mobile kitchens to dispense these supplies. The ICRC's achievement put moral force behind its criticism, and illustrated that world opinion was not impressed with the UN's attempts to excuse itself by pointing to the security risks.

US Congressional representatives highlighted UN inadequacies and provided specific suggestions for improving its conflict resolution activity in Somalia. Two members of the Senate Subcommittee on African Affairs, Senators Paul Simon (Democrat-Illinois) and Nancy Kassebaum (Republican-Kansas), pointed out in the New York Times that, although the crisis was complex, the "lack of clear answers does not excuse inaction, neglect and apathy."[48] Simon and Kassebaum called for the appointment of a UN diplomat to negotiate a cease-fire and for the imposition by the Council of an arms embargo. Canadian government officials feared that the impression of UN passivity and ineffectiveness would deepen. "Indeed," the Permanent Mission in New York noted,

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[47] Canadian Permanent Mission to the UN in New York, "Somalia," telex WKGR-1806 to External Affairs, (7 January 1992): 1. Cited from: Files of DFAIT, 38-11-1-Somali, vol. 2.

the "harsh criticism of UN performance on Somalia by United States administration officials can be expected to spread to other capitals in [the] weeks ahead."[49]

The criticism threatened to undermine confidence in the UN. The Canadian and US media saw Somalia as a test of the UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali (who had just assumed his post), the 'new' peacekeeping, and the revived Council. A New York Times article, reprinted in the Winnipeg Free Press on 12 January 1992, noted that the UN's "[f]ailure to act would inevitably arouse comparisons with the Council's failure to address the long war between Iraq and Iran until it was almost a decade old."[50] The New York Times editorial board picked up this argument a month later, observing that Boutros-Ghali would fail to meet his crucial first test unless he received more support, particularly from the US.[51] Mulroney was likely exposed to these views since he read the New York Times daily,[52] and it is probable that he would have agreed since he had made similar points before Somalia became a concern of the international community. "If the UN is to succeed," the Prime Minister said in Harare in October 1991, "the Security Council will need the authority and the means to intervene...And the Secretary-General will need support to play the activist role the times we live in require."[53]

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[48] Nancy Kassebaum and Paul Simon, "Save Somalia From Itself," The New York Times, Thursday 2 January 1992: A21.
[49] Permanent Mission in New York, "Somalia," (7 January 1992): 1.
[50] The Iran-Iraq War lasted from 1980-88. The UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group deployed in August 1988. See Paul Lewis, "Somalia First Test for Ghali," Winnipeg Free Press, Sunday 12 January 1992: A11. From the New York Times News Service.
[51] Editorial, "Help Needed for Forsaken Somalia," New York Times, Sunday 9 February 1992: A16.
[52] Paul Heinbecker, "Interview with Ambassador Paul Heinbecker, Permanent Representative of Canada to the UN," Friday 16 August 2000.
[53] Mulroney, "Address...to the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting, Harare, Zimbabwe," (16 October 1991): 3.

The government therefore pressured the UN to engage with more determination. However, Ottawa did so privately to not embarrass the UN. McDougall referred to Somalia when she met Boutros-Ghali on 15 January to discuss the strengthening of the organisation's world role.[54] She said that Canada was dissatisfied with the low UN profile in Somalia and was eager to send aid, but could not because the UN was not positioned to receive it.[55] During a meeting on the 20th, Permanent Mission staff repeated that Canada expected the UN to take the lead, and that Ottawa saw the "Council resolution expected later this week as only first step in what must be effective (repeat effective) UN efforts to encourage [a] cease-fire in Somalia." In a March letter to Boutros-Ghali, Fréchette said Canada would send food aid to Somalia as soon as the UN could assure delivery.[56]

Ottawa agreed with Simon and Kassebaum's UN-centred conflict resolution suggestions. It was pleased when the Council decided on resolution 733 (23 January 1992), which imposed an arms embargo and asked the Secretary-General to press for a ceasefire.[57] The government believed the embargo was "due in part to our initiative" and was a breakthrough since it "represented the first time such action was taken in relation to an internal conflict." In addition, Canada had "achieved action" by pressing for the appointment of a Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Horn of Africa.[58] In fact, this exuberance was premature and perhaps naïve. Somalia was already

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[54] EAITC, "McDougall to Meet UN Secretary-General, Dr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali in New York," News Release No. 9, (10 January 1992): 1; and CBC Newsworld Special Broadcast, "Mission to Somalia," transcript of press conference by Barbara McDougall and Marcel Masse, (4 December 1992): 1. Cited from: Files of DFAIT, 21-14-6-UNOSOM, vol. 7.

[55] Permanent Mission in New York, "Meeting with James Jonah," telex WKGR-4338 to External Affairs, (20 January 1992): 4. Cited from: Files of DFAIT, 38-11-UN, vol. 65.

[56] Permanent Mission in New York, "Meeting with James Jonah," (20 January 1992): 4; and Louise Fréchette, "Letter to UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali," (13 March 1992): 1. Cited from: Files of DFAIT, 38-11-1-Somali, vol. 2.

[57] UN, S/RES/733 (23 January 1992): operative paras. 4-5.

[58] Licari, "Foreign Policy Update – Africa and Middle East," (12 February 1992): 1.

awash with weapons from its former armed forces and its borders were open to smugglers. Arms were essential to survival and possessed by all that could afford them. As a result, the UN could do little to enforce the embargo beyond seeking assurances from member states that they were not selling weapons to Somalia. At best, the arms embargo may have temporarily sparked the faction leaders' interest in a ceasefire. In approving the resolution, the Council's true purpose may have been to deflect criticism surrounding its inaction while still doing nothing.[59]

The government wanted the UN reconciliation and relief efforts to improve. However, the disorder was so pervasive that bandits and faction members were looting the food coming into the country without fear of arrest. So much was being stolen or impeded that UN humanitarian agencies considered breaking with procedure and feeding the gunmen so that their needs could be met without their disrupting the entire aid programme.[60] The Canadian perspective was different. The government wanted to act under a UN umbrella and believed the UN's inaction was "crippling...[its] credibility in the humanitarian assistance field."[61] A more determined engagement UN was urgently needed because Somalia was "the most prominent current element of the international humanitarian agenda with which Canada is strongly identified."[62]

Despite the criticisms, the UN believed caution was justified. Its personnel were unused to working without protection, and Somalia was unprecedentedly bad in this respect. UNICEF's Caroline Tanner, for example, recalled that "[y]ou didn't have any respect for working for the United Nations. Everything went out of the window...Nobody

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[59] David Cortright and George A. Lopez, The Sanctions Decade: Assessing UN Strategies in the 1990s, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2000) 184-6.
[60] Jane Perlez, "UN Sees Danger of Somali Famine," New York Times, Thursday 27 February 1992: A3.

really knew how to handle that."[63] The UN organisational culture was different from the NGOs and ICRC. While equally conscientious, UN personnel were not driven by the same adrenal temperament and sense of adventure and camaraderie.[64] SEPHA and the UN union were sensitive to the irrationality associated with exposing people to excessive risk in order to save others. One of the co-ordinating unit's draft reports pointed out that "it has to be recognised that the lives of our colleagues are not less important that those we are supposed to help and assist."[65] Staff Union President Ronald Hewson echoed this in an interview with the UN circular Secretariat News. The "purpose of UNICEF is to look after children," he said, "but that should not involve making orphans out of UN staff members' children."[66] This view had spread to the top of the UN hierarchy. Under-Secretary-General James Jonah, the lead UN diplomat for Somalia until UNOSOM's establishment in April, told Canada's Permanent Mission in New York that he wanted to be replaced because his wife was concerned for his safety.[67]

The UN's hesitancy and ineffectiveness was related to the considerable operational challenges in Somalia. The collapse of Somalia's government meant that the UN had to deal with the faction leaders since they were the most powerful figures on the ground. However, since no one group or person had the power to sign a peace deal and ensure it was honoured, it was difficult to secure a reliable agreement that could serve as

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[61] Permanent Mission in New York, "Meeting with James Jonah," (20 January 1992): 2.
[62] Permanent Mission in New York, "Somalia," (7 January 1992): 2.
[63] Cited in "Security in Somalia," Secretariat News, (July-August 1993): 12.
[64] Jonathan Stevenson, Losing Mogadishu: Testing US Policy in Somalia, (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1995) 38.
[65] Oto Denes, Draft Report of the SEPHA Preparatory Mission for the 1992 Assistance Programme, SEPHA/Fax/91-381, (30 December 1991): 5. Cited from: Files of DFAIT, 38-11-UN, vol. 65.
[66] Cited in "Somalia Too Deadly, Immediate Evacuation Urged by Staff Union," Secretariat News, (January 1992) 5.

the basis for further diplomatic peacemaking, peacekeeping and humanitarian relief efforts.[68] Since there was no peace to keep in Somalia, there was little chance that the principles of peacekeeping – especially the need for local consent – would be respected. Aidid, one of the principal faction leaders, did not want blue helmets because he believed they would bolster Ali Mahdi, his militarily weaker rival. Jonah said in January that "nothing short of a peacekeeping force would be acceptable as a solution." However, he was "not optimistic" about the deployment of a mission since Aidid maintained the conflict was an internal affair.[69] This posed a major dilemma for the UN. Without local consent, peacekeepers could be perceived as lacking impartiality, and this would greatly reduce the calming or stabilising effect that they can have. More than any other factor, the political context into which a UN force was sent determined whether it would be a success or failure.[70]

The UN felt caught between the expectations for action and its concern about deploying into a highly insecure country. Jonah noted that "I don't think we should put all our staff at risk, but if we have no presence there, our image in the world is at risk."[71] A SEPHA Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal (February 1992) admitted that "the UN must look for ways to ensure its own staffing and procurement processes are better able to adapt to swiftly changing situations which are both complex and hazardous."[72] The UN

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[67] Jonah was UN Under-Secretary-General (USG) for Africa. In February 1992, he became USG of the Department of Political Affairs. See Permanent Mission in New York, "Meeting with James Jonah," (20 January 1992): 3.
[68] Aidan Hartley, "Doomed to Chaos," Montréal Gazette, Wednesday 19 February 1992: A10.
[69] "Call for Security Force in Somalia," The Times, Tuesday 7 January 1992: A8; and Jane Perlez, "As Fighting Rages On, African Neighbour Seeks a Truce" New York Times, Monday 6 January 1992: A2.
[70] Paul F. Diehl, International Peacekeeping, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1994) 168.
[71] "Somalia Peace Elusive," Secretariat News, (February 1992): 11.
[72] Special Emergency Programme for the Horn of Africa, Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal, (New York: United Nations, 1 February 1992) 6.

decided to send volunteers to get around its rules barring staff deployments to perilous areas. However, this may not have been what it seemed. In a letter to UNICEF Executive Director James Grant, Hewson complained that its "staff members have been nudged to 'volunteer' for this dangerous assignment."[73]

The establishment of a peacekeeping operation in Somalia was further complicated by the UN's inexperience when it came to dealing with sub-national authorities in a constantly changing and chaotic setting. The UN had deployed without a ceasefire once before (to El Salvador in 1991),[74] but at the request of the disputants. In Somalia, conditions were much less favourable. On 14 February, representatives of Aidid and Ali Mahdi reached an agreement after UN-brokered talks. However, the UN revealed its greenness by conferring legitimacy on the factions leaders, who were unelected gunmen in possession of territory seized by force of arms. The UN peace process made them the central power brokers, and at the same time it excluded the voices of women, civil society and clan leaders.[75] In addition, the UN did not try to pin down specifics in order to conclude a deal. A short (102 words) and vague agreement was produced as a result. The ceasefire did not signify a true commitment to peace, and it led Aidid and Ali Mahdi to different interpretations of key issues, such as whether the UN or Somali clan elders would serve as the monitors.[76] Despite this, the UN hoped for a calming effect

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[73] Cited in "Somalia Too Deadly," 5.
[74] Hampson, "The Pursuit of Human Rights: The United Nations in El Salvador," 75.
[75] Mohamed Sahnoun, "Flashlights Over Mogadishu," New Internationalist, (December 1994): 9.
[76] Rakiya Omaar and Alex de Waal, "Who Prolongs Somalia's Agony?" New York Times, Wednesday 26 February 1992: A21.

from the ceasefire, which was signed by Aidid and Ali Mahdi in Mogadishu on 3 March and included a provision for a fifty-person UN observation mechanism.[77]

Shortly thereafter, Boutros-Ghali laid the foundation for UNOSOM when he connected this political and military task with the relief effort. In his 11 March report to the Council, he called for troops to escort aid deliveries out of Mogadishu. Peacekeepers had not been employed that way before, and, the Secretary-General admitted, "this exercise represents an innovation that may require careful consideration by the Security Council."[78] Boutros-Ghali's recommendation was acknowledged (but not approved) by Council resolution 746 (17 March 1992), which authorised the deployment of a seventeen-person Technical Mission to conduct negotiations on ceasefire monitoring procedures and to "develop a high priority plan to establish mechanisms to ensure the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance."[79]

However, the UN, in deploying the Technical Mission, was not showing Aidid the respect he demanded. These teams were created routinely so that the UN could determine the modalities for a new peacekeeping operation. The assignment was delicate because Jonah and Aidid had not discussed the use of blue helmets to protect humanitarian aid and workers during their ceasefire talks, and now an armed peacekeeping unit would have to be 'sprung' on Aidid. Jonah told the Permanent Mission that, while he questioned whether Aidid would accept the need to protect relief workers, he thought that with determined Council support and a strongly worded resolution, Aidid could be pushed into

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[77] Paul Lewis, "Warring Somali Factions Reach a Truce," New York Times, Saturday 15 February 1992: A5.
[78] Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "Report to the Security Council on the Situation in Somalia," S/23693, (11 March 1992): para. 74. Cited from United Nations, The United Nations and Somalia, 1992-1996 (New York: United Nations, 1996). (Hereafter cited as UN and Somalia.)
[79] UN, S/RES/746 (17 March 1992): operative para. 7. Cited in UN and Somalia.

accepting the idea.[80] This showed that the international community was prepared to assume compliance from and to underestimate the faction leaders. It also reflected a willingness push forward with multilateral peacekeeping, even if some local disputants were opposed to this, because of the serious humanitarian need.

Canada had followed these developments, but it was primarily concerned with finding a multilateral famine-relief role. Fréchette had highlighted the government's priorities in her March letter to Boutros-Ghali. She welcomed the fact that the 3 March ceasefire required a small monitoring mechanism, but did not offer unarmed military observers on behalf of Canada. Instead, Fréchette concentrated on the situation inside Somalia, "the humanitarian aspects of which are a matter of great concern to the Government of Canada." Fréchette was writing to stress "the gravity of the situation in Somalia and the need for the UN to provide as rapidly as possible an adequate level of humanitarian assistance, particularly food supplies."[81]

However, by calling for more effective humanitarian peacekeeping action, Canada passed too easily over the risks associated with operating without firm support on the ground. A possible reason for this, Norman Hillmer suggests, is that the success of the international coalition during the Persian Gulf War had ratcheted up expectations for UN-led operations to unrealistic levels, and in fact "did the UN a disservice by creating the impression that it could become a powerful and visionary organisation."[82] The groundbreaking deployments to Namibia, Central America and El Salvador reinforced

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[80] Permanent Mission in New York, "Somalia: Canadian Permanent Representative Meeting with Under-Secretary-General James Jonah," telex WKGR-3337 to External Affairs, (13 March 1992): 2. Cited from Files of DFAIT, 38-11-1-Somali, vol. 2.

[81] Fréchette "Letter to UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali," (13 March 1992): 1-2.

this optimism. This was significant because government officials tend to be strongly influenced by their experiences in previous operations.[83] Ottawa was not troubled by the uncertainties relating to how to help stateless Somalia, the UN's inexperience, or the risks associated with acting without the consent of all disputants. The key issue for Canada was getting the UN to act because the situation was intolerable.

Canada's encouragement of UN humanitarianism did not reflect the positions adopted by France, the United Kingdom (UK) and the US. These countries agreed that more needed to be done for the starving, but they were reluctant to send peacekeepers into a still simmering civil war where they might not accomplish much. All three believed it was too soon to deploy a force to protect relief deliveries.[84] The UK and US clearly expressed this when the Council gathered to consider the draft of resolution 746 on 16 March. The UK Permanent Representative, Sir David Hannay, was openly sceptical about the provision calling for the deployment of a Technical Mission. "It is all summed up in the little phrase," he said, "'You can't have peacekeeping if you haven't got a peace to keep.'"[85] US Deputy Permanent Representative Ambassador Alexander F. Watson concurred:

> the United Nations cannot perform effectively in a situation where the parties to the conflict are unwilling to create the conditions necessary to enable it to do so. No United Nations monitoring mechanism to supervise a cease-fire can be put

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[82] Norman Hillmer, "Canadian Peacekeeping: New and Old," Peacekeeping 1815 to Today, proc. of the 21st annual Colloquium of the International Commission of Military History, (Ottawa: Canadian Commission of Military History, 1995) 545.
[83] Paul Diehl, "With the Best of Intentions: Lessons from UNOSOM I and II," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 19.2 (April-June 1996): 154.
[84] Permanent Mission in New York, "Somalia: Canadian Permanent Representative Meeting with Under-Secretary-General James Jonah," 3-4.
[85] David Hannay, "Statement on Somalia on behalf of the United Kingdom to the Security Council," provisional verbatim record of Security Council meeting, United Nations document S/PV.3060, (17 March 1992): 57.

> into a situation where there is no effective cease-fire. The United Nations cannot deliver humanitarian assistance where an active conflict is under way.[86]

Ottawa disagreed because it wanted the UN to respond effectively to humanitarian crises, and it believed that a monitored ceasefire that had the respect of the parties would enable the UN to make progress in this area. During an informal discussion with Council members on 17 March, government representatives stressed that the Technical Mission "needs to be given a strong hand to negotiate monitoring of the ceasefire as a first step to ensuring effective humanitarian relief."[87]

Despite the objections of key Council members, it was apparent by mid-March that the UN would have to become more deeply involved. According to Ambassador Peter Hohenfellner, Austria's Permanent Representative to the UN, the Technical Mission needed to go to Somalia "to discuss arrangements to stabilize the cease-fire." The agreement, he said, "has not yet been fully respected...[and this] clearly indicates that further efforts are necessary."[88] The Technical Mission's recommendations would serve as the basis for Boutros-Ghali's report to the Council on how the UN should proceed.[89] The Secretary-General noted on 19 March that the Mission would "prepare for monitoring the cease-fire and providing humanitarian assistance in conformity with Security Council resolution 746."[90] This led to UNOSOM's establishment.

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[86] Alexander F. Watson, "Statement on Somalia on behalf of the United States to the Security Council," provisional verbatim record of Security Council meeting, United Nations document S/PV.3060, (17 March 1992): 48, 49-50.
[87] Peter A. Van Brakel, "Somalia: Security Council Informals," secure fax from Permanent Mission to External Affairs, (17 March 1992): 2. Cited from: Files of DFAIT, 38-11-1-Somali, vol. 2.
[88] Peter Hohenfellner, "Statement on Somalia on behalf of Austria to the Security Council," provisional verbatim record of Security Council meeting, S/PV.3060, (17 March 1992): 42.
[89] Boutros-Ghali, "Report," S/23693, (11 March 1992): para. 73.
[90] United Nations, "Transcript of Press Conference by Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, held at Headquarters Today," press release, SG/SM/4718, (19 March 1992): 1.

Conclusion:

The Canadian government welcomed the revival of UN peacekeeping in the late 1980s and early 1990s. With the relaxation of Cold War tensions, Ottawa believed that the UN would be able to take a leadership role in the maintenance of international peace and security. The Mulroney government adopted a new internationalist foreign policy that stressed multinational co-operation and intervention. Ottawa sought to make multilateral institutions as strong and relevant to world conflict as possible because they provided Canada with opportunities for influence and engagement. The government's chief goal was to support UN-led activities like peacekeeping because it believed that this would generate confidence in the organisation.

The government's priority during the first months of 1992 was to encourage and support UN-led humanitarian action in Somalia. Ottawa felt that safety concerns should not dissuade the UN from establishing a ground presence. While compassionate, this position was self-interested since the government had linked its foreign policy with a multinational humanitarian agenda, and it needed the UN to get involved so that Canada could be seen supporting it. Ottawa's optimism regarding the effectiveness of co-operative military action, which stemmed from the Gulf War and recent peacekeeping achievements, led it to pay less attention to the obstacles in the way of success in Somalia.

The UN, of course, could not ignore the operational difficulties. The unconventional situation – particularly the lack of a central government to guarantee order and abide by a peace deal – forced the UN into unfamiliar territory. It had to learn

how to deal with faction leaders like Aidid and marry ceasefire monitoring with humanitarian aid protection. However, the international organisation showed its inexperience by deciding to surprise Aidid with its intention to deploy peacekeepers. This was not the best way to approach the situation, for Aidid was a key figure and this sort of move could breed confrontation.

Canada differed from the US, UK and France on peacekeeping in Somalia. The three Permanent Council Members expressed doubts about the viability of peacekeeping in Somalia. They called for delay in mid-March since there was not a stable ceasefire. This was a reasonable argument, but it did not change the fact, recognised by Canada and the Secretary-General, that a UN engagement was becoming unavoidable.

Chapter 3
The NDHQ J Staff and the Recommendation to Stay Out of UNOSOM I in March-May 1992

Prior to 1990, the National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) concentrated mostly on the management of scarce defence resources and it tended to staff operations in an ad hoc way. The national headquarters did not acquire command experience and a system to staff operational needs rapidly until the Oka crisis (1990) and Persian Gulf War (1990-91). The Joint Staff (J Staff), established in July 1990, enabled NDHQ become an operational headquarters. The J Staff was focussed on the principle of operations primacy, which meant that the mission's requirements always had precedence over routine headquarters issues. Relying mostly on key officers at the colonel / captain (navy) level, the J Staff sought to co-ordinate and accelerate priority staffing issues through special joint cells and with meetings of the Joint Staff Action Team (JSAT). The J Staff served as the contact point within NDHQ for operations. This helped speed response times by leaving no doubt where mission-related correspondence or a commander's telephone call should be directed.

However, the Somalia crisis was not a high priority for Ottawa in March-May 1992, and the J Staff reflected that detached approach. The lack of government interest in a role meant that Somalia was left to middle-ranking officers, who concluded that the United Nations Operations in Somalia I (UNOSOM) was not viable. Their chief concern, that Somalia was too insecure, was shared by the United Nations (UN), but the latter did not have the luxury of saying 'no.'

The 'J' in J Staff stood for 'joint', which in military terms was the close operational co-operation of two or more national services. In the case of the single-

service Canadian Forces (CF), joint operations referred to the combination of at least two military doctrines.[1] To enable these doctrines and the related forces to work together, joint operating procedures and a J Staff were needed. Unfortunately, the CF had failed to "integrate the three service doctrines and practices into a tri-service base of fundamental beliefs, values, and collective sense of purpose."[2] The development of a joint culture and methodology had been further impeded by defence commitments that could be addressed by one environment. The land, maritime and air force roles in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and North American Aerospace Defence Command[3] (NORAD) nourished single-service cultures and outlooks.[4]

As a result, the CF had not established a joint staff in the national headquarters. The three environments were present in NDHQ, but there was no joint activity or focus, in the sense of soldiers, sailors and aircrew working in unison on a single mission or goal.[5] Instead, joint staffing existed in NDHQ only as an idea in a draft mobalisation plan called National Defence Headquarters Operations Plan (HQDP 900 for short). HQDP 900, however, only authorised key military specialists to gather temporarily to manage a specific crisis. It created ad hoc unified staff networks, only to have them dissolve after deployments or missions.[6] The 'matrix' was the permanent and dominant structure in

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[1] The Royal Canadian Air Force, Royal Canadian Navy and Canadian Army were formally unified into the single-service CF in February 1968.
[2] Major S. L. James, "Joint / Combined Doctrine Review Presentation," (22 January 1991), Annex F to Joint Doctrine Board Minutes of 22 January 1991 Meeting, 1150-110 / J244 (DGFD), (6 February 1991): 1.
[3] Named the North American Air Defence Agreement until 1981.
[4] Bruce Johnston, "Interview with Rear-Admiral (ret'd) Bruce Johnston," in Ottawa, Thursday 18 January 2001.
[5] Mike O'Brien, "Interview with Colonel (ret'd) Mike O'Brien," in Mountain, Ontario, Saturday 2 December 2000.
[6] Brigadier-General Ian Douglas, Special Peacekeeping Assistant to the DCDS, "Service Paper – Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) Review – Interim Report," (14 February 1991): 7. Attached to Colonel J. M. D. Henrie, "DM / CDS Briefing – 20 February 1991 – Peacekeeping Operations," 1450-1 (NDHQ Sec Coord), (14 February 1991): 1-2.

NDHQ.[7] The matrix functioned like a pyramid, staffing problems from the wide bottom up. Building consensus, typically through committee, was crucial if an issue was to move up the hierarchy to reach the decision-makers. NDHQ worked more like a regular government department than a military operations centre. While it reacted to operational pressures when it had to, the matrix was almost exclusively concerned with resource management and ensuring that the departmental budget was used to buy the right equipment in the right order.[8]

With the end of the Cold War, the CF was thrust into a more uncertain and threatening international environment. The new era was one of "civil wars, ethnic or even tribal conflict, and frontier disputes"[9] that could suddenly emerge as international priorities, often after they had resulted in terrible humanitarian tragedy. Commodore David Cogdon, the Chief of Staff to the J3 (the COS J3)[10] from 1991-93, noted that

> there was a recognition that we will be more and more into contingency ops...[in which] things would come upon us pretty quickly, [and] we would have to be able to react more quickly than the system was capable of doing at that time...[This] was really the genesis for the joint staff system.[11]

Three important and unforeseen operational taskings, in Haiti, in 1988, and Québec and the Persian Gulf in 1990, vividly demonstrated this.

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[7] A civil-military staff system, the matrix emerged when the previously separate military and departmental headquarters were merged in October 1972, creating NDHQ.

[8] Colonel Michael O'Brien, "'NDHQ Crisis Management System,' – Director-General Military Plans and Operations Presentation to Canadian Forces Command and Staff College," unpublished mss., (27 March 1991): 15.

[9] United Nations, "Secretary-General Addresses First International Youth Leadership Conference, in Montréal, on 'Nationalism and Globalization,'" press release, SG/SM/4756 (22 May 1992): 3.

[10] J3 was the Joint Staff name for the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (DCDS). The term 'DCDS', however, continued to be used.

[11] David Cogdon, "Testimony of Commodore David Cogdon to the Somalia Inquiry," Wednesday 25 October 1995. Cited from Information Legacy: A Compendium of Source Material from the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services Canada, 1997): vol. 9, 1657. (Hereafter cited as Information Legacy.)

Operation Bandit, a proposed deployment to Haiti in spring 1988, highlighted the fact that NDHQ was incapable of a rapid response. The CF had been asked to plan the evacuation of Canadians from Haiti, which was experiencing internal turmoil. NDHQ had no process to enable it to act quickly, and at the end of the day it had nothing – nothing workable or doable.[12] Lieutenant-General John de Chastelain, then the Assistant Deputy Minister (Personnel) and the senior army officer at NDHQ, advised the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) General Paul Manson that the operation should be cancelled and the plan redrafted.[13]

The Gulf War and the armed standoff near Oka, Québec (July-September 1990), a small-scale but politically sensitive confrontation between Mohawk natives and the Canadian Land Force, were critical contingencies in terms of the development of the J Staff. The importance that the government attached to both made it imperative that responsibility for planning and force employment stay with NDHQ because it was close to the political centre of authority and the source of strategic military advice. Oka "was such a politically charged activity, that it had in certain respects to be run from Ottawa," recalled David Huddleston, then a Lieutenant-General and Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (DCDS). "It did not really cause the J Staff to blossom as the Gulf War did, but it started the process, and the one ran into the other."[14] It was obvious that NDHQ could not cope with the speed at which Oka and the Gulf were happening, and that reform was necessary to prevent the occurrence of another Operation Bandit. The J Staff – the Canadian name for the continental European staff system that most western nations,

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[12] Bruce Johnston, "Interview with Rear-Admiral (ret'd) Bruce Johnston," in Ottawa, Friday 2 June 2000.
[13] Douglas Bland, Chiefs of Defence: Government and the Unified Command of the Canadian Armed Forces, (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1995) 191.

including the US, were using or adopting – was seen as the solution.[15] It was created in NDHQ in July 1990 and improved upon before Somalia in 1992.

The J Staff worked as a system within the matrix. The officers who implemented the J Staff took the European structure, in which the main military functions were separated and numbered alpha-numerically, and overlaid it on top of the existing matrix structure. The matrix had been divided into six Groups in 1992-93: Personnel, the DCDS (Operations) Group, Material, Finance, Policy and Communications and Defence Information Services. With a 'J' designating joint in front, these were retitled as follows: Personnel was J1 Personnel, the DCDS Group was J2 Intelligence and J3 Operations, Material became J4 Logistics and J4 Material, Finance was called J4 Financial, Policy and Communications was J5 Policy, J5 Public Affairs and J5 Legal, and J6 was Communications. J3 Operations, also known as the centre or central staff, was the heart of the new system. Its members were considered by NDHQ to be 'purple,' meaning that their loyalties were no longer to their environment and its uniform colour – navy blue, sky blue or green – but to the mission.

The J Staff's new focus on 'operations primacy' was driven by the need to be able to respond quickly to unforeseen crises. This meant that "the focus all staff effort [was on] the aim of the operation," and it permitted the DCDS to "task the J Staff to play a part or be responsive to the needs of an operation."[16] The DCDS could shortcut the normal procurement process "to identify priorities for the provision of material and services in

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[14] David Huddleston, "Interview with Lieutenant-General (ret'd) David Huddleston," Monday 18 December 2001.

[15] Mike O'Brien, "Testimony of Colonel (ret'd) Mike O'Brien to the Somalia Inquiry," Thursday 26 October 1995. Cited from Information Legacy, vol. 10, (1997): 1872. The principal J Staff implementers were DCDS Lieutenant-General David Huddleston, COS J3 Commodore Bruce Johnston and J3 Operations Colonel Mike O'Brien.

support of operations."[17] The new system gave the operation precedence over normal matrix duties. According to the COS J3 Commodore Bruce Johnston (Cogdon's predecessor) in February 1991, it was an "automatic assumption" under operations primacy that "to support a Commander in the field, the J Staff will assume that every staffing requirement is urgent unless subsequently proved otherwise."[18] Another way that it accelerated the responsiveness of NDHQ was by focussing responsibility for operations on the J Staff alone – it handled them all and did nothing else – so that deployed commanders and officers and officials from the functional Groups inside NDHQ knew where to turn with questions or comments.

Under operations primacy, there was a change in the way influence was exercised by the three informal networks of officers in NDHQ. These associations existed at the colonel / naval captain level, and the two- and three-star general / admiral ranks. The first network, the JSAT,[19] became most important. It was made up of roughly twenty-five colonels who filled key positions in each Group and who also headed 'J' cells. The team members in 1992-93 were:

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[16] Colonel Mike O'Brien, "Briefing Note for the DM / CDS: The Role of the J Staff," draft memorandum, 3350 / 165-F18 (ACOS J3), (15 May 1991): 2.
[17] Lieutenant-General David Huddleston, "Briefing Note for the DM / CDS: The Role of the J Staff," memorandum 3350 / 165-F18 (DCDS), (21 May 1991): 1.
[18] Commodore Bruce Johnston, "Staffing the J Staff," informal memorandum, (25 February 1991): 1
[19] Prior to mid-summer 1992, the JSAT had been called the Crisis Action Team.

The Joint Staff Action Team: June 1992 – June 1993:

J1 Personnel [Matrix location: Personnel Group]:

- J1 Coord – Lieutenant-Colonel L. R. Larsen
- J1 Medical – Lieutenant-Colonel Peter Green
- J1 Dental – Colonel Peter McQueen

J2 Intelligence [Matrix location: DCDS (Operations) Group]:

- J2 Ops Coord – Colonel Vic Ashdown
- J2 Security Ops – Colonel Al Wells

J3 Operations [Matrix location: DCDS (Operations) Group]:

- Chief of Staff J3 – Commodore David Cogden
- J3 Peacekeeping – Colonel Mike Houghton
- J3 Plans – Captain (N) Ken McMillan
- J3 Operations – Colonel Mike O'Brien
- J3 Coord – Major Terry Melnyk
- J3 Arms Control Verification – Colonel Gary George
- J3 Training and Nuclear / Biological / Chemical Warfare – Colonel Art Nielsen
- J3 Doctrine – Colonel William (Bill) Morton
- J3 Security – Lieutenant-Colonel Peter MacLaren
- J3 Engineering – Colonel Merv Lougher-Goodey
- J3 Reserves Coord – Lieutenant-Colonel P. D. (Dave) Montgomery
- J3 Organisation – Lieutenant-Colonel Lavigne
- J3 Air Coord – Colonel David Jurkowski
- J3 Maritime Coord – (no fixed representative during this period)
- J3 Land Coord – unknown
- National Defence Operations Centre – Commander John Keenliside

J4 Logistics / Material / Financial [Matrix location: Material and Financial Groups]:

- J4 Logistics – Colonel Les White
- J4 Movements – Colonel William (Bill) Fletcher
- J4 Financial Coord – Colonel Don Ferguson

J5 Policy / Public Affairs / Legal [Matrix location: Policy and Communications Group]:

- J5 Policy Operations – Colonel John Bremner
- J5 Public Affairs Coord – Colonel Geoff Haswell
- J5 Legal Coord – Commander William (Bill) Fenrick / Lieutenant-Colonel Kim Carter

J6 Communications and Information Systems [Matrix location: Defence Information Services]:

- J6 Coord – Colonel E. M. (Mel) MacLeod

The JSAT's centrality was a reflection of the general importance of colonels in the national headquarters: they possessed detailed, current knowledge of their professions,

and they had access, because they were senior enough to have the right contacts to their two-star superior.[20]

Either J3 Peacekeeping or J3 Operations would be named the office of primary interest (OPI) and given responsibility for a new mission. For UNOSOM, J3 Peacekeeping Colonel Mike Houghton was given the task. The selected body also served as the J Staff contact point for deployed commanders. JSAT meetings took place to "deal with staffing problems at an appropriate rank level to ensure their rapid and co-ordinated conclusion."[21] It also ensured that the matrix staff met the priorities and timelines it had set. Typically, about thirty-six hours were allowed between the time of identifying a task and the time when it was supposed to be completed and the centre was to be informed of the result. At the same time, team members kept their superiors informed of what the J Staff was doing or proposing. If a two-star had a problem, the colonel responsible had to resolve it within the time limit allowed unless that officer took the matter up directly with the DCDS.

The one- to three-star officers, in contrast, tended to be marginalised by the speed of the new system. Unless they held key J Staff positions like the COS J3, brigadier-generals / commodores (one-star) were generally cut out of the planning process because there was not enough time to consult them. The Battle Staff, the two-star network, was by-passed. Although supposedly a senior advisory body to the CDS, there was never time to convene the Battle Staff to discuss Somalia.[22] The three-star / assistant deputy minister (ADM) network also decreased in significance. It was composed of the 'Group

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[20] Johnston, "Interview," 2 June 2000.
[21] DND, NDHQ Joint Staff Standard Operating Procedures, 3121-900 (COS J3 / DGMPO), (Ottawa: DND, August 1993) 6.
[22] Cogdon, "Testimony of David Cogdon," cited from: Information Legacy (1997): 1664.

Principals': the military ADM (Personnel), the three civilian ADMs (Finance, Material, and Policy and Communications), and the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff.[23] Under operations primacy, the JSAT made most of the urgent decisions and the three-stars were not central to the day's activities.[24]

Under the J Staff, capability-based planning replaced the old practice of preparing for NATO or NORAD commitments that had been fixed beforehand at the political level.[25] Capability planning involved consideration of the 'what ifs' of an envisioned scenario or existing crisis. It enabled senior officers and officials to know what an option required before it was recommended, permitting the decision-making on each new contingency to be based on the actual capacity of the Canadian Forces.[26] J3 Plans included the results of this work in a catalogue of possible 'force packages.' The government could then draw on them either singly, or as part of a custom-built contingent when a joint or combined mission was desired.[27]

The process was officially adopted in mid- to late-1991, but was still new when the Somalia problem arose in mid-1992. The J Staff officers who used it for Somalia were developing joint operations planning procedures, the costing matrix and the options catalogue on an ad hoc basis as they went along.[28] This did not complicate planning for UNOSOM in March-May because this was largely handled by Houghton's J3

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[23] NDHQ attempted to get by with fewer senior officers during the early 1990s. From summer 1992 to February 1993, the DCDS was down-ranked to a pair of two-star positions. The one relevant here was named DCDS (Intelligence, Security, Operations). The DCDS (ISO) reported to the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff and was not a group principal. Cited from: Paul Addy, "Interview with Lieutenant-General (ret'd) Paul Addy," in Ottawa, Monday 21 March 2000.
[24] Johnston, "Interview," 2 June 2000.
[25] Colonel Alain Forand, "Presentation to the Canadian Forces Command and Staff School," unpublished mss., (May 1991) 11.
[26] Forand, "Presentation to the Canadian Forces Command and Staff School," 7-8, 10.
[27] Forand, "Presentation to the Canadian Forces Command and Staff School," 15-6.
[28] Ken McMillan, "Interview with Commodore Ken McMillan," in Ottawa, Friday 17 November 2000.

Peacekeeping cell, which recommended against a CF role. In addition, although the planning system was new, this problem did not have consequences for subsequent preparations because there were advance indications from the UN that the mission was expanding, and this gave the J Staff time to get ready.

Capability planning was driven by operations primacy and used estimates and staff checks to accelerate preparations. Staff officers doing an estimate were given an aim (a political objective) and any limitations to the achievement of that aim, and then were supposed to determine what was possible and the strengths and weaknesses of each option. Staff checks (also called capability assessments) were conducted to verify that the Canadian Forces had the forces available to do the task. This improved military responses because it allowed NDHQ to produce timely national-level documents that were based on actual capabilities, unlike the NATO 400 series operation plans developed during the Cold War. Capability planning was primarily a J3 Plans responsibility. However, the handling of the small UN missions such as UNOSOM was left to J3 Peacekeeping. J3 Plans continuously checked with the environmental commands to keep up-to-date, and co-ordinated with other J Staff members. Input from J4 Financial and J4 Move was needed to ensure that a plan was affordable and that unit response times were correct, and J1 Personnel would determine whether augmentees (and how many, and from where) were required.

Since the J Staff's function was co-ordination, it did not do much paper work besides this crucial national-level planning role. The J Staff was "a single high volume artery and vein connecting the organs (Groups) to the brain (senior management). The organs do the staff work. The J Staff co-ordination cell (s) are the interface between the J

Staff and the Matrix."[29] Breaking out from JSAT meetings where the timings and priorities were established, the J Staff worked by passing information and instructions to and from the appropriate matrix staff through the relevant joint cell.[30] The J3 Coord cell was especially important, for it received and distributed all operational correspondence entering and leaving NDHQ, and identified the actions to be taken and decisions to be made, based on the direction, messages or discussion emanating from the JSAT.[31] Detailed operations plans remained the responsibility of the matrix, which worked with the Environment in question when it came to determining the specifics of the Canadian military response. Once an item was fully staffed, it returned to the DCDS (Operations) Group where J Staff members would pass it up the reporting chain for decision makers' information or final approval.

Some of the Groups complied with the new system by developing special mechanisms to accelerate their share of the staff work for an operation. Initially, it was assumed that the joint cells would alone handle the co-ordination between the Groups and central J Staff. They were supposed to serve as a "fabric or spider's web within NDHQ," acting "as a horizontal staff action agency in times of crisis."[32] What in fact happened was that three of the groups developed or strengthened their own 'crisis action teams.' Each body – the National Defence Operations Centre (NDOC) and Intelligence Centre (NDIC) in the DCDS Group, the Personnel Control Centre (NDPCC) in Personnel, and Logistics Control Centre (NDLCC) and Movement Control Centre (NDMCC) in Material – was the J Staff 'engine' in that particular group.

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[29] Huddleston, "Briefing Note for the DM / CDS: The Role of the J Staff," (21 May 1991): 2.
[30] DND, Joint Staff Standard Operating Procedures, 1-2.
[31] DND, Joint Staff Standard Operating Procedures, 5, 6.

A weakness with the J Staff during the Somalia mission was that the three environmental Commanders of Commands were not based in Ottawa. Joint tasks have three basic characteristics: a joint mission, a joint staff, and joint component advice. This last aspect was missing in the NDHQ Joint Staff System before the mid-1990s, a gap that demonstrated its simplicity.[33] The absence of the environmental commanders from NDHQ meant that they were often left out of the loop when key operational decisions were being made. The opportunity for them to provide advice was not always taken or accepted.[34] For Somalia, CDS General John de Chastelain personally consulted with environmental commanders when necessary, but this was on an ad hoc basis. Commanders relied on 'environmental staff chiefs' to represent them in NDHQ. To the matrix, these two-star officers were called the Chief of Land / Air / Maritime Doctrine and Operations, while their J Staff designations were J3 Maritime / Air / Land. These two-stars, however, were marginalised by the J Staff's acceleration of the operational staff work because there was seldom enough time for their advice to be sought.

The other point of environmental input into the new system was at the colonel / captain (n) level. Three officers headed, in addition to their matrix roles, special cells that plugged into the Joint Staff Action Team. The J3 Air Coord, J3 Land Coord and J3 Maritime Coord provided service-specific input to the J Staff. However, these officers concentrated on operational-level details and were too low in the military hierarchy to provide the CDS with strategic component advice on behalf of their service. Before and

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[32] Colonel Mike O'Brien, "The Canadian Joint Staff System After Op Friction," unpublished mss., (6 January 1991): 1.
[33] Johnston, "Interview," 2 June 2000.
[34] Johnston, "Interview," 2 June 2000.

after Somalia, the CDS essentially commanded operations that had been planned using one leg (the J Staff) instead of two (the environments and the J Staff).[35]

This arrangement made the NDHQ staff work less sound and complete. It also made vertical and horizontal synchronization much more difficult, and it resulted in a time lag being built into all CF deployments because it was absolutely critical that tight co-ordination be maintained with the environments.[36] But it was not the case, as Charles Oliviero notes in an off-hand and unsupported passage, "that the 'Joint Staff' at NDHQ was neither joint nor a true staff."[37] In fact, the J Staff was a tri-environment reality that had, in a few short years, enabled NDHQ to become an operational organisation.[38]

The J Staff was not tested by the Somalia crisis in March-May 1992 because of the small size of the UN mission being considered. Security Council resolution 746 (17 March) called for a Technical Mission to travel to the Horn of Africa to consider the implementation of the UN-negotiated 3 March ceasefire (see chapter two) and the feasibility of protecting relief deliveries in and around Mogadishu.[39] Although Somalia was not a promising environment for peacekeeping because of the collapse of its government, famine, and continuing civil war, the world body hoped that it could calm the situation and help alleviate suffering. A small mission was being considered because the UN knew it would have to rely on local co-operation to help. In Canada, military

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[35] Bruce Johnston, "Interview with Rear-Admiral (ret'd) Bruce Johnston," Tuesday 20 February 2001.
[36] Raymond Henault, "Interview with then Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff Lieutenant-General Raymond Henault," at NDHQ in Ottawa, Thursday 15 February 2001.
[37] Charles Oliviero, "Operation 'Deliverance': International Success or Domestic Failure," Canadian Military Journal, 2.2 (Summer 2001): 58n26.
[38] Jean Morin and Richard H. Gimblett, The Canadian Forces in the Persian Gulf: Operation Friction 1990-1991, (Toronto: Dundurn P, 1997) 37.
[39] United Nations, S/RES/746 (17 March 1992): operative paras. 6-7. Document cited from United Nations, The United Nations and Somalia, 1992-1996 (New York: United Nations, 1996). (Hereafter cited as UN and Somalia.)

planning and preparation hardly took place in March-May because of the CF's serious force protection concerns and the lack of significant political interest in a role.

Canadian military leaders and the J Staff had not been following the Somalia crisis in early 1992. Indeed, Houghton was surprised when he was ordered to join the seventeen-person Technical Mission, even though he was a logical choice as the head of J3 Peacekeeping. The Horn of Africa had been such a non-issue that he assumed the shocking television footage coming from Somalia prompted his assignment.[40] J Staff involvement usually began when J5 Policy Operations, Colonel John Bremner, or Dr. Ken Calder, the Assistant Deputy Minister (Policy and Communications), learned of a situation that could lead to a CF role. But in this case, there had been no discussion of assisting UN ceasefire monitoring in Somalia. Houghton thought the decision to send him on the Technical Mission had been prompted by a 5 March episode of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation's (CBC) The Journal. The nationally televised world news program had aired a special report from British Broadcasting Corporation correspondent Michael Burke, in which Somalia was described as a place where there was "no government, no law, no order – just madness, anarchy and death." In the interview that followed with the CBC's Brian Stewart, Burke said he had

> never seen such heavily armed anarchy ever. You know, Mogadishu...is desperate and it's destitute and it's destroyed and people...people are just living like rats there...[It is] a test case for international intervention in this new brave post-Cold War world. There is no more desperate case for intervention by the outside world, there's no more treacherous place where the outside world should intervene.[41]

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[40] Mike Houghton, "Interview with Colonel (ret'd) Mike Houghton," in Ottawa, Wednesday 27 April 2000.
[41] Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, The Journal with Brian Stewart, transcript for Thursday 5 March 1992: 1, 3, 5.

Just thirteen days after this telecast, Houghton was given two days notice to move – he was ordered to depart, in other words, "on extremely short notice" – to Nairobi, the mission staging area.[42] Canadian Major Ken Klein, who was serving with the UN Disengagement Observer Force in the Golan Heights, was transferred (with Ottawa's concurrence) to serve as Logistics Officer.[43]

However, Houghton's view that military leaders and the J Staff were unconcerned with Somalia, and that therefore the media must have had a role in prompting his tasking, is only partly correct. Within the J Staff, for example, there was almost no information available to help Houghton prepare. This was a reflection of the CF's lack of interest in the region. Among his own seven-member staff, one officer was constantly monitoring world problems with a view to the possibility that they could involve Canada. But, since the CF had almost no expertise on the region or indication that it would be involved, Somalia had not been identified as a possibility.[44] Houghton asked for a briefing from the J2 Operations Coord cell, but it had only the Burke report, and Houghton was invited to watch the videotape, which he did. Bremner had also not been tracking events in Somalia. Among the six or seven officers who concentrated on international policy in that cell, none were knowledgeable about the Horn of Africa, and had Houghton asked for information, all it would have had available were basic sources like a few pages from the US Central Intelligence Agency World Factbook and telegrams from the Canadian High Commission in Nairobi.[45]

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[42] Mike Houghton, "Testimony of Colonel Mike Houghton to the Somalia Inquiry," 12 February 1996. Cited from Information Legacy, vol. 44, (1997): 8661.
[43] United Nations, Report of the United Nations Technical Team to Somalia, 21 March to 3 April 1992, (5 April 1992): para. 8b. Cited from Information Legacy (1997): document #: DND122543.
[44] Houghton, "Testimony to the Somalia Inquiry," cited from Information Legacy, vol. 44, (1997): 8655.
[45] John Bremner, "Interview with Colonel (ret'd) John Bremner," in Ottawa, Monday 31 July 2000.

Houghton knew he would be the mission's Chief Operations Officer, but specific duties remained unclear until he met the Mission Leader, Robert Gallagher, a retired Canadian lieutenant-colonel and former military representative at Canada's Permanent Mission to the UN, on 20 March in London. Only then, to his great surprise, did he learn that he would be expected to write the security plan for the protection of humanitarian aid delivery in Mogadishu and its environs.[46] Houghton's failure to anticipate his role indicates that, although his cell was principally responsible for peacekeeping operations, it had not examined the Secretary-General's 11 March report to the Council or resolution 746, both of which outlined the technical team's tasks and responsibilities.[47]

Contrary to Houghton's recollection, Canada's role in the UNOSOM preparatory mission took place as a result of a normal request from the Department of External Affairs and International Trade Canada (EAITC). Ottawa sought to support the UN so that it could provide humanitarian aid. The tasking came about through the normal process: EAITC received a UN request via the Permanent Mission in New York, which it then discussed with the Department of National Defence (DND). In this case, Michael Brock, the acting Director-General of the International Security Bureau, wrote to Rear-Admiral Larry Murray, the Associate Assistant Deputy Minister (Policy and Communications), on 18 March, the day after passage of resolution 746. The former hoped that DND would respond favourably to the UN request for an officer because this would be consistent with the government's recent encouragement of UN efforts. Brock hoped National Defence would accede to the request because Canada "has been among

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[46] Houghton, "Interview," 27 April 2000.
[47] Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "Report to the Security Council on the Situation in Somalia," S/23693, (11 March 1992): paras. 73-4; and United Nations, S/RES/746 (17 March 1992): operative paras. 6-7. Both documents cited from UN and Somalia.

the leaders in encouraging the Secretary General and indeed the Security Council to play an active role in Somalia." A contribution would support these previous statements at minimal cost. He shed light on the government's attitude, in particular its desire to avoid an unwanted peacekeeping commitment, when he added that "our involvement would be without prejudice to any future Canadian commitment."[48]

The J Staff interpreted the UN Technical Mission as a sign that Somalia could potentially involve the Canadian military in the future, but it did not prepare for such a role in March-May 1992. The creation of the Technical Mission indicated that the international community was growing increasingly concerned about Somalia. The mission was a notable development for the JSAT because it heightened the chances that Canada would eventually be drawn into the Somalia crisis. According to the COS J3 Commodore David Cogdon, Houghton's secondment to the UN mission "certainly gave us an indication that something may come down the road." There was now "a consciousness of Somalia as [having] potential for the future," but the J Staff "had no indication at all what it would be or if, in fact, it would involve Canada."[49] A contribution of peacekeepers to Somalia was neither anticipated by Canada nor even discussed at this point. Houghton noted that peacekeeping was not mentioned, and he was not given any instructions related to this activity before he left for Africa.[50]

In April the UN asked Canada for ceasefire observers for its new Somalia mission. UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, in his 21 April report to the Council, recommended that a peacekeeping operation be established in Mogadishu with

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[48] Michael Brock, "Letter" number IDD-0050 to Rear-Admiral Larry Murray, (March 18, 1992): 1. Cited from Information Legacy (1997): control #: 400013.
[49] Cogdon, "Testimony to the Somalia Inquiry," cited from Information Legacy, vol. 9, (1997): 1681.
[50] Mike Houghton, electronic mail message to author, Friday 4 May 2001.

security and peace observation components.[51] Fifty unarmed military officers were needed to monitor the ceasefire in accordance with the arrangements negotiated by the Technical Mission. Boutros-Ghali also called for five hundred armed security personnel to conduct light vehicle patrols and provide UN relief convoys with a muscular escort to deter looters. The UN approached Indonesia and Pakistan for the troops, and it informally asked Canada, Finland and Austria from the 'Western Europe and Others Group' of states to supply the monitors. Each was asked to contribute five observers (the organisation needed only one country to agree, but turning to several at once increased the chances of a positive response), and the UN hoped Canada would provide the Chief Military Observer (CMO).[52]

Houghton, the OPI for peacekeeping, did most of the staff work. If the UN had requested a battalion (as it did in August), the J Staff would have been more broadly and deeply involved. In that case, he would have consulted with Bremner, who would have been getting information about the task from his informal network, and with J3 Plans Captain (navy) Ken McMillan, to get a sense of the CF's capabilities.[53] Houghton would have developed an estimate with J3 Plans, and prepared a memorandum with other the J Staff cells for the DCDS on possible military responses to the UN request. He would have asked McMillan to inquire with the Canadian Forces' land, maritime and air elements to see whether they had the capability, keeping in mind the need to sustain existing operational commitments, to meet the UN's request. The questioning would

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[51] Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "Report to the Security Council on the Situation in Somalia," S/23829, (21 April 1992): paras. 24-9. Cited from UN and Somalia.
[52] John de Chastelain, "Projected UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM)," Briefing Note to Minister of National Defence Marcel Masse, (1 May 1992): para. 1, 4. Cited from Information Legacy (1997): document # DND000874.
[53] Houghton, "Testimony to the Somalia Inquiry," cited from Information Legacy, vol. 44, (1997): 8682.

revolve around generalities, like 'are we capable of providing a logistics unit,' or 'do we have a signals regiment available.'[54] As Houghton testified before the Somalia Inquiry, "What I would be doing is going to McMillan and saying: 'What is our capability to provide this particular kind of a unit, because it would appear that the UN is interested in Canada providing it.'"[55]

But in April, the staff work did not progress far or involve many people because the request – the CMO and five observers – was small, and UNOSOM's viability was doubted. Houghton's cell received advance notice of the UN requirement through an informal network that originated at Colonel Douglas Fraser, the military representative with the Permanent Mission to the UN in New York.[56] The key question of whether Canada should agree required close co-ordination between Houghton and Bremner. Houghton also consulted with his immediate superior, Cogdon, the COS J3, before his recommendation could be passed to the DND / CF decision-makers. Colonel Mike O'Brien, the J3 Operations (he had responsibility for all non-peacekeeping missions), generally stayed aware of UNOSOM-related developments, but had no direct input.[57] Otherwise, the staff work was largely limited to Houghton. His opinion on the advisability of contributing observers was asked for, but he did not brief the JSAT or prepare an estimate on the issue.[58]

Houghton recommended that the CF should not participate because the UN had chosen to deviate from the operational plan he had written. The way the UN had chosen

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[54] Houghton, "Testimony to the Somalia Inquiry," cited from Information Legacy, vol. 44, (1997): 8682, 8684.
[55] Houghton, "Testimony to the Somalia Inquiry," cited from Information Legacy, vol. 44, (1997): 8657.
[56] Houghton, "Testimony to the Somalia Inquiry," cited from Information Legacy, vol. 44, (1997): 8682.
[57] Mike O'Brien, "Interview with Colonel (ret'd) Mike O'Brien," near Mountain, Ontario, Saturday 13 May 2000.
[58] Houghton, electronic mail message to author, 4 May 2001.

to proceed seemed too risky considering the lawlessness on the ground. Houghton had called for the deployment of the observers, followed quickly by the security force, and only then the aid. However, he was not confident that the UN would follow these steps. He worried that aid would be delivered first, ahead of the security battalion and observers, meaning that "the warlords would have control of the humanitarian assistance and the international community would have lost control of the situation before it started."[59] He was proven correct. Even though the troops' arrival was potentially a long way off, Boutros-Ghali deployed the ceasefire monitors and redoubled the relief effort because the non-governmental organisations wanted to act immediately.[60] Houghton informed Cogdon that UNOSOM was unsafe, and likely would not succeed, because the change in plans called for the unarmed observers to work without protection in a city awash with gunmen.[61]

The UN plan also contained significant and questionable assumptions that may not have been clear to DND. The Secretary-General decided to deploy the observers with the expectation that it "would be the responsibility of the forces of the two sides to ensure their security at all times."[62] Mohamed Farah Aidid and Ali Mahdi Mohamed (the main faction leaders in the capital) promised to do so.[63] But, in reality, there were so many factions and bandits, and Mogadishu was so chaotic, that no group could reliably make such guarantees. The leading disputants were being endowed with power that they

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[59] Houghton, "Testimony to the Somalia Inquiry," cited from Information Legacy, vol. 44, (1997): 8680; and Houghton, "Interview," 27 April 2000.
[60] "Confidential Interview with UN Officer Involved in UNOSOM I and II," Friday 8 June 2001.
[61] Houghton, "Testimony to the Somalia Inquiry," cited from Information Legacy, vol. 44, (1997): 8680.
[62] Boutros-Ghali, "Report," S/23829, (21 April 1992): para. 26.
[63] Ali Mahdi Mohamed, "Letter dated 29 February 1992" and Abdi Osman Farah, "Letter dated 1 March 1992," annex IV:A-B to Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "Report to the Security Council on the Situation in Somalia," S/23693, (11 March 1992). Cited from UN and Somalia, 133.

wanted but did not actually have.[64] This would be demonstrated by their failure to deliver on their promises. Boutros-Ghali admitted that main threat to the UN force "comes from a variety of armed elements – many of which are not under the control of any political authority,"[65] but did not clarify how it would cope.

The difficulties experienced by the UN when it tried to establish UNOSOM confirmed Houghton's fears. Council resolution 751 (24 April) created UNOSOM and authorised the deployment of the monitors. It approved the security force only "in principle," to allow time for additional discussion among the Permanent Members and for negotiations with Aidid, who would not consent to their deployment.[66] Negotiations with the leading factions in Mogadishu were required to determine whether the observers would be armed and uniformed and to secure consent for the larger security force. Gallagher's biggest challenge was convincing Aidid that UN forces would only protect relief workers and not prop up his main rival, Ali Mahdi.[67] The latter, who was weaker militarily, welcomed everything the UN proposed, but Aidid did not want troops or uniformed monitors.[68] Aidid did not consent to the deployment of the observers until 21 June, and they did not deploy until late July. As Houghton anticipated, the aid groups became enmeshed in a 'protection racket' with the Somali gangs and factions in order to deliver a small amount of food.

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[64] Ioan Lewis and James Mayall, "Somalia," The New Interventionism, 1991-1994: The United Nations Experience in Cambodia, former Yugoslavia, and Somalia, ed. James Mayall, (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1996) 123.
[65] Boutros-Ghali, "Report," S/23829, (21 April 1992): para. 28.
[66] United Nations, S/RES/751 (24 April 1992): operative para. 3. Cited from UN and Somalia.
[67] Permanent Mission in New York, "UN Technical Assistance To Somalia," telex WKGR-3467 to External Affairs, (7 April 1992): 3. Cited from: Files of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), 38-11-1-Somali, vol. 2.
[68] Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "Report to the Security Council on the Situation in Somalia," S/24343, (22 July 1992): paras. 13-14.

The J Staff policy branch shared Houghton's concerns about the feasibility of UNOSOM. The policy staff articulated its views in light of the DND 'criteria' for accepting or rejecting new tasks. Policy officers were responsible for producing the aide-mémoire for the Minister of National Defence Marcel Masse on whether the CF should engage, and to do so it consulted with the rest of the J Staff and reviewed the seven 'criteria' in the 1987 Defence White Paper. However, according to Deputy Minister Robert Fowler, these points made more sense in the predictable context of the Cold War. By 1992, they were little more than general guidelines that DND took into account "somewhat" but "not in any particular detail."[69] Colonel Bremner said they "were never intended to be a checklist, a set that if we can't complete these we won't do it, or if we do meet these we will do it; that was not the point. It was to give us something to guide our policy process."[70]

Nevertheless, UNOSOM did not qualify under several criteria. The need for a mission to have "a clear and enforceable mandate" was not met since it was not clear that the faction leaders in Mogadishu could control their fighters. The requirement to have a "size and international composition [that was] appropriate to the mandate" was in doubt because Aidid had not consented to the 500 member security force, and in any case the Council had not yet approved it. An equitable financial arrangement, which was another criterion, also did not exist. This was because the US and United Kingdom believed that UNOSOM should be funded voluntarily like a humanitarian appeal, and not, as Ottawa preferred, via the assessment method normally used for peacekeeping.[71] The stipulation

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[69] Robert Fowler, "Testimony of Deputy Minister Robert Fowler," Wednesday 21 February 1996. Cited from Information Legacy, vol. 50, (1997): 10175.
[70] Bremner, "Testimony to the Somalia Inquiry," vol. 8, (1997): 1481.
[71] de Chastelain and Fowler, "Projected UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM)," (1 May 1992): paras. 7-9.

that a prospective mission be "likely to serve the cause of peace and lead to a political settlement in the long term" was questionable in this case since Somalia's problems were so pervasive.[72] These shortcomings did not guarantee that Canada would refuse to join UNOSOM, but they flagged it as an unpromising operation. "I recall the policy analysis of this," said Bremner, "we had significant concerns about the viability of sending fifty unarmed observers into a place like Mogadishu."[73]

More important in terms of how the criteria were interpreted was the cautious attitude that prevailed in Ottawa regarding UNOSOM. Government and military decision-making took place within an enveloping dynamic or atmosphere that helped to prioritise issues.[74] Prime Minister Brian Mulroney set the tone. His instinct was to help, but for reasons that are still unclear, he did not press the issue. On 4 May, Mulroney instructed Paul Heinbecker, the chief foreign policy advisor in the Prime Minister's Office and the Assistant Secretary to Cabinet for Foreign and Defence Policy in the Privy Council Office, to tell EAITC to agree to the UN request for observers.[75] EAITC was surprised because it believed it had settled the question of whether to join UNOSOM. "Although we had previously explained our position," said Brock, "we explained again [to Heinbecker] that we were not saying 'no' to participating, but rather 'no' to doing so under current arrangements."[76]

The Prime Minister allowed the EAITC / DND recommendation to stand. One possible reason for this was that Mogadishu was so insecure. Hugh Segal, his Chief of

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[72] All criteria cited from DND, Challenge and Commitment: A Defence Policy for Canada, (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1987) 24.
[73] Bremner, "Testimony to the Somalia Inquiry," vol. 8, (1997): 1489.
[74] John Bremner, "Interview with Colonel (ret'd) John S. Bremner," in Ottawa, Wednesday 19 April 2000.
[75] Paul Heinbecker, "Interview with Canadian Permanent Representative to the UN Ambassador Paul Heinbecker," Friday 16 August 2002.

Staff, has argued that Mulroney would never ignore a concern such as excessive risk to the CF,[77] and this was the reason for the J Staff's recommendation. However, this is not entirely convincing. Mulroney offered Canadian troops to an expanded UNOSOM in August, when the security situation had not improved. His unwillingness to push for a role suggests that he was not fully engaged in the crisis. This was because there was almost no media pressure to act, and the credibility of multilateralism was not being threatened since UNOSOM had just been created.

As a result, the government accepted the EAITC / DND advice to say 'no' to the UN because of the excessive risk. DND would only reject a new peacekeeping role if it would expose CF members to an unacceptable level of danger. Cost was a concern, but if the political will existed to make the deployment happen, then the money would always be found.[78] Safety was a much more serious consideration, and UNOSOM failed to meet the required standard during March-May 1992.[79] The government did not change its position once it became clear that it was the only country to refuse to assist out of the approximately sixteen informally approached by the UN. Pakistan filled the Chief Military Observer position, and monitors were accepted from Finland and Austria, the other two countries in Canada's geographic grouping.[80]

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[76] Michael Brock, "Somalia," memorandum to ADM Jeremy Kinsman, (4 May 1992): 1. Cited from: Files of DFAIT, 21-14-6-UNOSOM, vol. 2.
[77] Hugh Segal, "Interview with Hugh Segal," in Montreal, Wednesday 28 June 2000.
[78] Rick Burton, "Interview with Mr. Rick Burton," at NDHQ in Ottawa, Tuesday 23 November 1999. Burton was the Executive Assistant (1989-91) and Special Advisor (1991-93) to Deputy Minister Robert Fowler.
[79] Anthony (Tony) Anderson, "Interview with Lieutenant-Colonel (ret'd) Anthony (Tony) Anderson," in Ottawa, Friday 22 October 1999. Anderson headed the one to two-person Peacekeeping Section at EAITC in the early 1990s.
[80] Permanent Mission in New York, "Somalia: UNOSOM Peacekeeping," telex WKGR-5881 to External Affairs, (6 May 1992): 2. Cited from: Files of DFAIT, 21-14-6-UNOSOM, vol. 2.

The 'no' recommendation was passed up the DCDS Group reporting chain, but otherwise the J Staff settled back into a low level of activity with respect to UNOSOM. The fully staffed recommendation was given to Defence Minister Masse, having passed through COS J3 Commodore Cogdon, DCDS Vice-Admiral Bob George, and General de Chastelain and Robert Fowler. A similar recommendation was sent by EAITC officials to Barbara McDougall, the Secretary of State for External Affairs. Staff members in both departments would have considered it a failure if the ministerial briefs did not agree.[81] This process was complete in May, which was when Ken Calder remembers the first flurry of Somalia-related work having occurred.[82] As noted in Dishonoured Legacy, the Somalia Inquiry report, afterwards NDHQ "continued only to monitor the situation."[83]

Conclusion:

The J Staff was still under development in 1992. Joint planning procedures did not exist, work had only just begun on an options catalogue, and the need for rapid staffing had forced the J Staff's designers to create a system that marginalised the environmental commanders. Despite these shortcomings, the J Staff was able to successfully muddle through and produce accurate and timely advice that took into account both the operational context and the general view of the government. The effectiveness of the J Staff's response is evident from the fact that its advice was accepted as the government's

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[81] Anderson, "Interview," 22 October 1999.
[82] Ken Calder, "Interview with Dr. Ken Calder, ADM (Policy)," at NDHQ, in Ottawa, Friday 10 March 2000.
[83] Dishonoured Legacy: The Lessons of the Somalia Affair, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, vol. 1, (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services Canada, 1997) 239.

position. Its recent creation did not limit NDHQ's effectiveness in March-May, or in August and December, when a battle group, aircraft and a ship were committed.

During March-May 1992, the J Staff was not attentive to Somalia. This was because Somalia was not a high-profile issue for the UN, which decided to deploy a very small mission (fifty observers, with the security personnel agreed upon by the Council only "in principle"). UNOSOM was consequently not a major concern for Ottawa. Mulroney's first instinct was to help, but he did not become fully engaged because the multilateral peacekeeping mission was just starting and the activity's credibility was not being questioned. During this period, the Prime Minister was not being pressured by the media to commit Canada to a role.

The government was concerned with the UN Technical Mission and whether Canada should provide five ceasefire monitors and the CMO to UNOSOM in Mogadishu. Houghton remembers no discussion or serious consideration of a peacekeeping role prior to April, when Canada was informally asked to contribute. Bremner and Houghton handled the staff work related to the UN request. After a policy analysis that dealt with force protection issues and whether UNOSOM was a good mission for Canada to join, the J Staff recommended that Canada not get involved. EAITC was interacting and collaborating with DND, and it provided similar advice to McDougall.

The J Staff's work demonstrates that the government had not been closely following the Somalia crisis, and that the possibility of peace observation was not seriously considered in March-May. The J Staff's role was to provide decision-makers with a recommendation on whether to engage. UNOSOM did not appear viable to the military, which was, in part, a reflection of the fact that the international community had

not made Somalia a high priority. As long as this attitude prevailed, the Prime Minister was likely to think that the crisis was not Canada's crisis.

Chapter 4
Inconsistency, Famine and Families: Ottawa's Re-consideration of a UNOSOM Role, June-August 1992

In August 1992, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney committed Canadian Forces (CF) personnel to the United Nations Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM). He made this decision because UNOSOM was being expanded and it now appeared to be a promising mission. He was being pressured to do so because he had engaged aggressively in the former Yugoslavia in 1992 and had reached out to Balkan refugees later that year, but had not moved to assist Somalia. UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the New York Times, and Canadian newspapers argued that Somalia was being neglected while Yugoslavia received considerable attention from peacekeepers and diplomatic peacemakers. The difference, it was true, was stark: in July 1992 there were 13, 600 combat-capable blue helmets deployed with the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, while UNOSOM had only 50 unarmed observers.[1] The increased media coverage and the UN's plan to expand UNOSOM demonstrated that the Somalia crisis was becoming an international priority, and in this light it became critical to Ottawa that it contribute to the UN-led airlift and to UNOSOM to deflect suggestions of Euro-centric bias away from itself and the practice of peacekeeping.

The Prime Minister was the principal driver behind Canada's decision to commit to UNOSOM. It has been argued that peacekeeping's popularity in Canada made it

[1] Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina," S/24333, (21 July 1992): para. 13; and United Nations, S/RES/767 (27 July 1992): preambular para. 4, cited from United Nations, United Nations and Somalia, 1992-1996 (New York, United Nations, 1996). (Hereafter cited as UN and Somalia.)

impossible for Mulroney to resist a policy of energetic participation,[2] but what this overlooks is that he decided how active this engagement would be. Mulroney had spent over seven years in power by 1992, and according to Hugh Segal, his chief of staff, the Prime Minister was "prepared to push the envelope, to make sure we did what we should."[3] Mulroney's actions support this characterisation. Despite fiscal constraints, Mulroney made 1, 200 person commitments to Croatia, Bosnia and Somalia in 1992. His pragmatic side was revealed by the 25 February federal budget, which called for the withdrawal of all CF members stationed in Europe with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), and the 11 December announcement to end what would be a twenty-nine year commitment to the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) in mid-1993.[4] Both decisions freed up forces for use elsewhere. Mulroney's view was that Canada still had a responsibility and an interest in constructively engaging with world problems, despite the government's deficit reduction concerns.

Mulroney's conduct of Canadian foreign policy was facilitated by the decision-making structure he established. Instead of a collegial or highly bureaucraticised system, he preferred a centralised "process-empty bilateralism," which diminished the relevance to decision-making of the civil service and unwieldy full cabinet (it grew to forty ministers, the largest among western democracies).[5] Mulroney relied heavily on the telephone and a worldwide network of contacts that included national leaders (many of

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[2] Manon Tessier and Michel Fortmann, "The Conservative Approach to International Peacekeeping," Diplomatic Departures: The Conservative Era in Canadian Foreign Policy, 1984-93, ed. Kim Richard Nossal and Nelson Michaud, (Vancouver: UBC P, 2001) 114, 125.
[3] Hugh Segal, "Interview with former Chief of Staff of the Prime Minister's Office Hugh Segal," in Montréal, Wednesday 28 June 2000.
[4] Jim Gervais, "Land Force in Transition: Challenges and Opportunities, II" Canadian Defence Quarterly, (October 1992): 6-7; and Government of Canada, "Canada to Withdraw Troops from Cyprus," News Release No. 231, (11 December 1992): 1.

whom he knew on a first-name basis), generals, ambassadors, and regular Canadians to gather the information he required to make decisions.[6] Glen Shortliffe, the Clerk of the Privy Council, clearly described the top-down nature of the decision-making: "the leadership on this at the end of the day was very much in the hands of the Prime Minister. It was the Prime Minister's views that prevailed in terms of what we did."[7]

Shortliffe supported Mulroney by convening ad hoc meetings of senior officials to discuss options and share information. The improvements in telecommunications and reliance on high-level gatherings resulted in the concentration of decision-making in the hands of the Prime Minister and a few senior officials.[8] In the case of Somalia, the usual participants at these meetings were (the "/" indicates a change in office holder in summer 1992) Reid Morden, Jeremy Kinsman / Gäetan Lavertu and Mark Moher from the Department of External Affairs and International Trade Canada (EAITC); General John de Chastelain, Robert Fowler, Dr. Ken Calder and Rear-Admiral Larry Murray from the Department of National Defence (DND); and Paul Tellier / Glen Shortliffe and Paul Heinbecker / Jim Judd from the Privy Council Office (PCO).[9] Depending on the issue, representatives from the Department of Employment and Immigration and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) might be invited. After a meeting, the Clerk

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[5] Mark Schacter with Phillip Haid, "Cabinet Decision-Making in Canada: Lessons and Practice," Institute on Governance research paper, (Ottawa: April 1999): 9. Cited from: www.igvn.ca.
[6] Segal, "Interview," 28 June 2000.
[7] Glen Shortliffe, "Interview with former Clerk of the Privy Council Glen Shortliffe," in Ottawa, Friday 21 July 2000.
[8] Evan Potter, "A Question of Relevance: Canada's Foreign Policy and Foreign Service in the 1990s," Canada Among Nations, 1993-94: Global Jeopardy, eds. Christopher J. Maule and Fen Osler Hampson, (Ottawa: Carleton UP, 1993) 37-8.
[9] Morden was Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs (the Deputy Minister), Kinsman / Lavertu were Assistant Deputy Ministers (ADM) (Political and International Security) and Moher was Director General of the International Security Bureau. De Chastelain was Chief of the Defence Staff, Fowler was Deputy Minister, Calder was ADM (Policy & Communications) and Murray was Associate ADM (Policy & Communications). Tellier / Shortliffe were Clerks of the Privy Council and Heinbecker / Judd were Assistant Secretaries to Cabinet for Foreign and Defence Policy.

would be in a position to brief Mulroney on where the government stood on Somalia. The PCO's purpose was to guarantee that his decisions were based on access to the highest quality information.[10]

For the first half of 1992, however, there was little regarding Somalia for the Prime Minister to decide upon or support because the UN Security Council declined to get seriously engaged. The strongest resistance on the Council to a peacekeeping role in Somalia came from the United States (US), which as a Permanent Member could block any decision using its veto power. According to Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Herman Cohen, Somalia was "out of luck" because the explosion in peacekeeping operations had drained the US government administratively and financially.[11] The State Department's International Organisation Affairs Bureau had been overwhelmed by the number of Cold War missions to the Middle East, India-Pakistan, Cyprus, the Golan Heights and Lebanon; and 1990s missions to Iraq-Kuwait, Western Sahara, Angola, El Salvador, Cambodia and Croatia.

The US, along with other Permanent Council Members, did not want UNOSOM to be funded collectively through the assessment process. When a peacekeeping mission was funded by assessment, the cost was spread across the UN membership, but the US was responsible for the largest share, or 30% of the total.[12] The US Congress was not interested in financing another operation, given its concern over the dramatic rise in costs

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[10] Institute on Governance, "Government Decision-Making in Canada – Players, Processes, Institutions: Central Agencies in Decision-Making," report of study tour by the Secretariat of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, (Ottawa: January 2001) 13. Cited from: www.igvn.ca.

[11] Herman J. Cohen, Intervening in Africa: Superpower Peacemaking in a Troubled Contingent, (New York: St. Martin's, 2000) 207.

[12] United Nations, "Assessment of Member States' Contributions for the Financing of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) from 1 May 1992 to 30 April 1993," ST/ADM/SER.B/393, (22 December 1992): 5.

associated with peacekeeping,[13] including USD $ 1.7 billion for the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC).[14] The US and Russia objected to a Somalia mission for financial reasons because both were massively in arrears in their peacekeeping dues,[15] and the United Kingdom (UK) and US did not want Somalia recognised as a threat to international peace and security because that would mean it would fall under the Council's mandate. These countries preferred that UNOSOM be paid for voluntarily through appeals as aid initiatives traditionally had been.[16]

Africans believed that the Council's reluctance to do more for Somalia was discriminatory. Resolution 733 (23 January 1992), the Council's first on Somalia, imposed an arms embargo under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.[17] However, this did not protect the Council from charges of racial bias. Fatun Mohammed Hassan, Chargé d'affairs of the Somali UN Permanent Mission, wrote in early February that her country was being "neglected by the powerful members of the international community [either] because it had lost its strategic value" now that the Cold War was over, "or because of its being African."[18] Following the creation of UNPROFOR and the 22, 000-person UNTAC in late February, African intergovernmental organisations began demanding equal treatment for Somalia. Otherwise, an Organisation of African Unity representative informed the Council in March, "Africa will be left with no other impression than that its

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[13] Peter J. Schraeder, "The Horn of Africa: US Foreign Policy in an Altered Cold War Environment," Middle East Journal 46.4 (Autumn 1992): 586.
[14] Mats Berdal and Michael Leifer, "Cambodia," The New Interventionism, 1991-1994: The United Nations Experience in Cambodia, former Yugoslavia, and Somalia, ed. James Mayall, (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1996) 25.
[15] Herman Cohen, "Intervention in Somalia," The Diplomatic Record, 1992-93, ed. Allan E. Goodman, (Boulder: Westview P, 1995) 54.
[16] Paul Tellier, "Somalia: Observer Mission and Peacekeeping Force – Will Canada Be Asked?" memorandum for the Prime Minister, (7 May 1992): 1.
[17] United Nations, S/RES/733 (23 January 1992): operative para. 5. Cited from UN and Somalia.

problems are of limited concern to the international community...Africa deserves the same qualitative and quantitative attention which has been paid to other regions."[19]

Despite these statements, the Council was not prepared to mount a large operation to Somalia in the first half of 1992. The Council established UNOSOM with resolution 751 (24 April), which authorised fifty unarmed and uniformed UN observers, and agreed "in principle" on the need for a five-hundred-person security battalion.[20] The fifty observers would be sent to Mogadishu to stabilise the UN-brokered ceasefire signed on 3 March by Mohamed Farah Aidid and Ali Mahdi Mohamed, the faction leaders who controlled the southern and northern halves of the city. The security personnel were held back because of the Council's position on financing,[21] and the doubts Council members expressed about sending them without Aidid's consent. The observers deployed without the security forces because the Africans at the top of the UN hierarchy – Kofi Annan (Ghana), the Assistant-Secretary-General of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, James Jonah (Sierra Leone), the Under-Secretary-General of the Department of Political Affairs, and Boutros-Ghali (Egypt) – were determined to see UNOSOM go ahead in some form.[22]

Ottawa was concerned about the lack of attention being paid to Somalia, but like the Council, its energy was focussed on the former Yugoslav civil war. Boutros-Ghali commented in July that if the "Council continues to concentrate its attention and resources to such an extent on Yugoslav problems, this will be at the expense of the

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[18] Fatun Mohammed Hassan, "Approaches to the Problems of Somalia," annex to "Letter from the Chargé d'affairs A.I. of the Permanent Mission of Somalia to the UN to the President of the Security Council," United Nations document S/23507, (3 February 1992): 4.
[19] Ike O. S. Nwachukwu, "Statement of the Organisation of African Unity to the Security Council," provisional verbatim record, S/PV.3060, (17 March 1992): 12.
[20] United Nations, S/RES/751 (24 April 1992): operative para. 4. Cited from UN and Somalia.
[21] Tellier, "Somalia: Observer Mission and Peacekeeping Force," (7 May 1992): 1.

Organization's ability to help resolve equally cruel and dangerous conflicts elsewhere, e.g. in Somalia."[23] This criticism was also applicable to Ottawa, which shared the Council's preoccupation with the former Yugoslavia's civil war. According to Louise Fréchette, who was then Canada's Permanent Representative to the UN, this was partially because the Balkans seemed to be in constant crisis whereas Somalia was much quieter.[24] But it was also because the government was not as interested in and assigned less significance to UNOSOM, which it saw as nothing more than a humanitarian relief operation. The Somalia effort was "totally secondary, totally minor" compared with Yugoslavia, said then Assistant Deputy Minister (Political and International Security) Jeremy Kinsman. It was "a totally different and less comprehensive operation, and at a much lower level of priority in terms of interests and profile and everything else."[25]

EAITC was also highly critical of UNOSOM's weak financial foundation and the lack of protection for the observers, and it agreed with DND that Canada should not participate. The CF had deployed before despite considerable risk (most recently on 6 April, when it deployed to UN Sector West in Croatia), but the planned deployment of the observers without security caused EAITC to have "great difficulty with the totality of the Somalia package."[26] The government believed that the US and UK stance on financing for UNOSOM further diminished the mission's chances for success. Clerk of the Privy Council Paul Tellier noted that it was extremely unfortunate that financing issues had contributed to the security battalion's delay. In a memorandum to the Prime

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[22] Marrack Goulding, Peacemonger, (London: John Murray, 2002) 276.
[23] Boutros-Ghali, "Report...on the Situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina," S/24333, (21 July 1992): para. 13.
[24] Louise Fréchette, "Interview with Deputy Secretary-General of the UN Louise Fréchette," in New York City, Friday 16 June 2000.
[25] Jeremy Kinsman, "Interview with former Assistant Deputy Minister (Political and International Security) Jeremy Kinsman," Monday 21 August 2000.

Minister, he said that the force would have made the mission safer and alleviated its logical and medical shortfalls.[27]

Although Ottawa decided not to engage, the Prime Minister still attempted to bolster the UN-led multilateral humanitarian effort by encouraging states to throw their support behind UNOSOM. Mulroney publicly highlighted Somalia's plight and indirectly criticised the powers that he thought were holding UNOSOM up. At the International Conference of Young Leaders in Montréal on 24 May, the Prime Minister expressed disgust at how "[i]n Somalia, marauding gangs are shooting their country back into the stone age," and he called attention to the UN's "struggles to enlist the political will of member counties and their resources to end the suffering there."[28]

The civil service shared his commitment to multilateralism. For Morden, the Under-Secretary of State (Deputy Minister) for External Affairs, the conditions in Mogadishu may have been unlike a traditional peacekeeping situation in which the disputants generally agreed to stop fighting, but the bottom line was that the UN wanted to play a role in Somalia and Canada wanted to support it.[29] Another senior EAITC official said that he saw the Pearsonian tradition of being helpful as an axis of Canadian foreign policy, and he felt that Canada's interests were being served when it made responsible contributions to the maintenance of international peace and security and the

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[26] Anthony Anderson, "Canadian Response to an Informal Request by the UN to Contribute Five Observers," memorandum IDR-1737 for the Secretary of State for External Affairs, (30 April 1992): 3.
[27] Tellier, "Somalia: Observer Mission and Peacekeeping Force," (7 May 1992): 1-2.
[28] Brian Mulroney, "World Peace Demands a Stronger UN Role," Canadian Speeches: Issues of the Day, 6.4 (June / July 1992): 32.
[29] Reid Morden, "Interview with former Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs Reid Morden," in Ottawa, Thursday 7 September 2000.

alleviation of humanitarian suffering.[30] A key defence official recalled that almost no one in the civil service resisted assisting Somalia.[31]

The government's latent peacekeeping desires grew stronger because it seemed possible that peacekeeping could make a difference in Somalia, and UNOSOM would balance Ottawa's role in the Balkans and enable it to respond to the media claims that the international community was neglecting Somalia. The credibility of peacekeeping had been enhanced by the establishment of a risky new mission in Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia. A CF battle group, operating under UN Sector Sarajevo commander CF Brigadier-General Lewis MacKenzie, had secured the city's airport and opened it to humanitarian aid traffic in early July. For Ottawa, this was "a little moment...where it seemed that UN peacekeeping was having some effect and might be pertinent," said Kinsman. Somalia "had as its backdrop the challenge to the UN in the Balkans. Those two things were somehow psychologically connected for some people."[32]

At the same time, senior leaders in Ottawa were aware that Canada's large role in the former Yugoslavia could be embarrassing if not balanced by other commitments. Although Mulroney was the decision-maker, Secretary of State for External Affairs Barbara McDougall was actively involved in policy discussions. Gerry Wright, a former Special Advisor, recalls that McDougall worked hard to ensure that her views reflected those of the Prime Minister.[33] It is significant to note that on 6 May (the same day as Heinbecker's intervention, see chapter three), she wrote to Michael Brock, the acting Director-General of the International Security Bureau in EAITC, to say that "it is difficult

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[30] "Confidential interview," Friday 25 January 2002.
[31] "Confidential interview," Monday 26 June 2000.
[32] Kinsman, "Interview," 21 August 2000.

to avoid politically the issue of our being in Yugoslavia and hanging back in Somalia." McDougall urged EAITC to stress to the Secretary-General and the Canadian public that the government had not engaged only because the risks were believed to be too great. She said that "we are committed to go but cannot without security."[34] These were prescient words. The aggressive contribution of CF personnel to Sarajevo in July only worsened the problem McDougall highlighted. Ottawa became worried that its hesitancy with respect to Somalia might be perceived as a sign of disinterest, and the media intensified this concern in the months that followed.

Media influence was pivotal in the summer of 1992 because it helped make Somalia a priority political issue and partially accounted for the switch from the 'no' in May to the 'yes' in July-August. Several studies have observed that the impact of print and television journalism, while difficult to measure precisely, is strongest when government policy is uncertain, and that, when the opposite is true, this influence decreases.[35] The press had a 'push' effect on the decision to join UNOSOM because Canada's interest in multilateralism was not geographically specific. When it engaged in Somalia in August, the government was reacting in part to the evening news.[36] Media coverage focused Mulroney and the Canadian public on Somalia and the challenge there to the UN. As Kenneth Bush has noted, when "a growing domestic constituency began to

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[33] Gerry Wright, "Interview with Dr. Gerry Wright, former Special Advisor to Barbara McDougall," in Ottawa, Wednesday 23 August 2000.
[34] Underline in original. Barbara McDougall, hand-written note to Michael Burke, "RE: your memorandum IDR-1737 of 30 April," (6 May 1992): 1.
[35] Greg McLaughlin, The War Correspondent, (London: Pluto P, 2000) 194, 196; Piers Robinson, "The Policy-Media Interaction Model: Measuring Media Power During Humanitarian Crisis," Journal of Peace Research, 37.5 (September 2000): 614; and Brian Patrick Hoey, *Humanitarian Intervention in Somalia, 1992-1994: Elite Newspaper Coverage, Public Opinion, and US Foreign Policy*, D. Phil. diss., University of Maryland, College Park, 1995, 133-4, 151.
[36] Moher, "Interview," 21 December 2000.

demand Canadian involvement, the government recognised the need to be seen to be responding to the now-public crisis."[37]

Journalists had been drawn to the Somali crisis because of its timing and proximity to the 1984-85 Ethiopian famine. The simultaneous occurrence of many disasters can result in an another emergency being crowded out of the news, but when the mass famine in Somalia began to attract international attention it had been several years since the public had heard of that kind of human drama in that part of the world, and this helped make Somalia a shocking and emotive story.[38] Participants vividly testified to the horror. Geoff Loane, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) country coordinator for Somalia, said "Here is Hell...I thought I would never see Ethiopia again, and I didn't think we would allow it to happen again."[39] The UN's hesitancy permitted the crisis to fester. Only a small amount of food reached Somalia in the first half of the year, and as a result, a cycle of fighting and looting had began for what little was available, a cycle which completely undermined the relief effort.[40] ICRC delegate Andreas Schiess said that "We cannot operate under this tension...It's the Bermuda Triangle. Everything disappears."[41] By July, when the west finally started to pay attention, the news was extremely alarming. The situation had deteriorated so badly that

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[37] Kenneth D. Bush, "Somalia: When Two Anarchies Meet," Canada and Missions for Peace: Lessons from Nicaragua, Cambodia, and Somalia, eds. Gregory Wirick and Robert Miller, (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 1998) 91.

[38] Brenda Barton, "Interview with Brenda Barton, senior press officer for the World Food Programme in Nairobi," Wednesday 31 May 2000. A Canadian, Barton was the Regional Information Officer in Nairobi as of August 1992. She supervised all press activities in sub-Saharan Africa for the World Food Programme.

[39] Jane Perlez, "Deaths in Somalia Outpace Delivery of Food," New York Times, Sunday 19 July 1992: A1. Reprinted on the front page of The Globe and Mail the next day.

[40] Mohamed Sahnoun, "Prevention in Conflict Resolution: The Case of Somalia," Irish Studies in International Affairs, 5 (1994): 9.

[41] John Stackhouse, "Aid Reaching Somalia Stolen By Gangs of Thugs," The Globe and Mail, Monday 17 August 1992: A1, A2.

James Kunder, Director of the US Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, called Somalia the "worst humanitarian crisis in the world."[42]

Media interest built up because, while an effective assistance effort was not in place for Somalia, the suffering appeared to be equal to or worse than that in Ethiopia in 1984-85. While one million Ethiopians likely perished in that famine (out of a population of forty million), Somalia was believed to be suffering more in absolute and proportional terms, with roughly one-third of its people (estimated at four-and-a-half to six million) at risk of death.[43] Médecins sans Frontières nurse Brigitte Doppler said Somalia "was worse than Ethiopia. There it was mostly confined to one region. Here it is the whole country...We are losing an entire generation of children here."[44] The media exposed the international community's limited involvement and pressured Washington, Ottawa and other governments to do more. The New York Times editorialised that "unlike the Ethiopian famine...which also occurred during a civil war, there have been no Live Aid concerts, no chorus of pop stars singing 'We Are the World.'"[45] Canada, which had remained a leading food aid donor to Ethiopia,[46] was susceptible to this criticism. It had contributed $ 500 million to Ethiopia up to August 1992, but that year sent only $ 22.8 million to Somalia.[47] The government wanted to avoid the suggestion that it or the west was callously ignoring the next Ethiopia so soon after the multinational coalition's

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[42] Jane Perlez, "US Says Airlifts Fail Somali Needy," New York Times, Friday 31 July 1992: A9.
[43] Perlez, "Deaths in Somalia Outpace Delivery of Food," A1, A8.
[44] Reid Miller, "Smell of Death Haunts Desolate Somalian City," The Ottawa Citizen, Friday 7 August 1992: A6.
[45] Editorial, "The Hell Called Somalia," The New York Times, Thursday 23 July 1992: A22.
[46] Francis Filleul, "Interview with former Ambassador to Ethiopia Francis Filleul," in Ottawa, Saturday 16 September 2000.
[47] Tim Martin, "Situation in Somalia," memorandum GAA-1433 for the Secretary of State for External Affairs, (21 August 1992): 4; and Tim Martin, "Costs of Somalia Crisis," memorandum GAA-0129, (5 February 1993): 1. Cited from: Files of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), 20-1-2-Somali, vol. 6.

triumph in the Persian Gulf War (1990-91) in pursuit of a strategic end (Kuwaiti oil). A private citizen / non-governmental organisation movement had created Live Aid, and the sense existed, said Judd, the Assistant Secretary to Cabinet for Foreign and Defence Policy, that "there was a non-strategic humanitarian kind of imperative that had to be played out to address this kind of tragedy."[48]

Responding to media criticism about what the UN and Canada were doing in the Balkans and not doing in the Horn of Africa was one of the major reasons why the Mulroney government decided to join UNOSOM. By July, Canadian newspapers had begun to weigh-in and seek to influence public opinion with editorials criticising the government. The Montréal Gazette argued on 22 July that the UN needed to stop ignoring Somalia. Referring to the Canadian-led opening of the Sarajevo airport and the thousands of blue helmets in Croatia and Bosnia, the newspaper said "Lord knows, Yugoslavia needs the world's help. But so, urgently, does Somalia."[49] The Globe and Mail contrasted the decisive Canadian action in Sarajevo and the Council's support of UNPROFOR with the cold neglect of Somalia. "A Sarajevo-style relief operation," it urged, "would seem the obvious way to help. Indeed it is just the sort of operation that the new, more assertive UN should be undertaking."[50] Passivity regarding Somalia was casting multilateralism and the Mulroney government in a bad light. McDougall alluded to the press's impact when she commented that the "world to some extent was driven into

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[48] Jim Judd, "Interview with Jim Judd, Deputy Minister of National Defence," in Ottawa, Thursday 31 August 2000.
[49] Editorial, "Don't Forget Somalia," Montréal Gazette, Wednesday 22 July 1992: B2.
[50] Editorial, "If Sarajevo, Why Not Somalia?" The Globe and Mail, Wednesday 22 July 1992: A12.

Somalia because of the media coverage. At the same time, starvation in the Sudan has been virtually ignored."[51]

Domestically, the issue of the military response to the crisis was connected with the criticism of the government's handling of the Somali refugee situation. In July 1992, Ottawa announced special immigration measures to admit 25, 000 refugees from the Yugoslav civil war. Discrimination immediately became an issue as Somali refugees began demanding streamlined family unification and immigration procedures. Somalis were concentrated in four suburban cities of Metro Toronto (Etobicoke, North York, Scarborough and York), where 30, 000 resided. From 1989 to September 1993, 14, 903 Somalis had claimed asylum in Canada, and an additional 6, 157 claimants were waiting overseas.[52] Immigration and family reunification was a laboured process because the collapse of the Somali state and mass population displacement had made it difficult to locate people and, since documents were outdated or non-existent, to determine country of origin and familial ties. Immigration policy was also tempered by the government's belief that third-country resettlement could only be a solution for a small number of Somalis.[53] Despite this, the Toronto Star stressed on 27 July that Ottawa's Yugoslav initiative was "an example worth remembering when victims of a similarly brutal conflict in Somalia plead their cases for refugee status."[54]

Family reunification was perceived as another aspect of Canada's unsatisfactory detached approach. The government's position was not helped when, in early August,

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[51] Barbara McDougall, "A Few Parting Shots," interview by Anthony Wilson-Smith and E. Kaye Fulton, Maclean's, 106.27 (5 July 1993): 10.
[52] Hassan A. Mohamed, *The Socio-Cultural Adaptation of Somali Refugees in Toronto: An Explanation of Their Integration Experiences*, D. Ed. Diss., University of Massachusetts, Amherst, 2001, 49, 126-7; and Martin, "Costs of Somalia Crisis," 5 February 1993: 2.
[53] Gerald E. Shannon, "Canadian Statement to the Coordination Meeting on Assistance for Somalia, Geneva," 12 October 1992: 1. Cited from: Files of DFAIT, 38-11-1-Somali-2, vol. 1.

Minister of Employment and Immigration Bernard Valcourt said that "[y]ou have to first get the people to want to come. I mean these are nomadic people…they just don't want to go, they just don't want to leave."[55] Valcourt's statement made the government seem unsympathetic and stereotypical, and a leading newspaper and a Somali-Canadian group promptly denounced him. The editors of the Toronto Star called on the minister to apologise, and Mohamed Farah of the Somali Islamic Society of Canada argued in a letter to the editor that Valcourt was far from the mark.[56] On 3 August, just days after the Yugoslav refugee announcement, 250 Somalis marched on Parliament Hill to publicise their demand for equal treatment. They made emotional appeals, as evidenced by the Ottawa Citizen photograph of four-year-old Abdiziz Moalim, who carried a sign during the protest that read "Please / Let My Mom Join Me…Please."[57] Canadian editorial boards believed Canada had not been sufficiently attentive to Somalia. The Toronto Star, for example, argued that Ottawa should do its part in addressing this neglect by creating a special reunification programme and immigration permits.[58] Ottawa responded to the national (Somali immigration) and international (peacekeeping / airlift) aspects of this political concern at the end of August. The government announced on the 21st that Employment and Immigration officials would present a plan to Somali-Canadian community leaders in Toronto to speed up visa processing, and that the CF would participate in an UN-led humanitarian airlift.[59]

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[54] Editorial, "A Safe Haven," Toronto Star, Friday 31 July 1992: A22.
[55] Editorial, "Helping Somalis," Toronto Star, Saturday 8 August 1992: C2.
[56] "Helping Somalis," Toronto Star, 8 August 1992: C2; and Mohamed Farah, "Valcourt's Sarcasm Denies Reality," letter to editor, Toronto Star, Wednesday 19 August 1992: A18.
[57] Underline and ellipsis in original. "Somali Son's Plea," photograph, Ottawa Citizen, Saturday 8 August 1992: A3.
[58] Editorial, "Africa's Forgotten War," Toronto Star, Saturday 1 August 1992: B2.
[59] Martin, "Situation in Somalia," 21 August 1992: 4.

When, on 23 July, Boutros-Ghali rejected a plan to have UNPROFOR consolidate artillery in Bosnia under international control because he felt it was beyond UN resources, the tension within the organisation regarding the reluctance to engage in Somalia erupted. The Secretary-General accused the Council of a willingness to spend on "the rich man's war" in Yugoslavia but not on African crises, and he made the pithy comment that the victims from the former looked well fed.[60] On 31 December, he again implied that the former Yugoslavia was receiving extra attention. Boutros-Ghali told journalists enduring the Sarajevo siege that "[y]ou have a situation which is better than ten other places all over the world. I can give you a list of ten places where you have more problems than in Sarajevo."[61]

The first statement may have influenced Mulroney's decision-making. The Prime Minister felt he had done more for the UN than most leaders, and he resented the Secretary-General's July statement. Although it was never mentioned publicly as a reason to engage in UNOSOM, after the outburst Mulroney became very positive about and determined to see Canadian involvement.[62]

A more important factor in the government's decision-making was Ottawa's interest in the extension and expansion of UNOSOM, which had been called for by the Secretary-General in his 22 July report to the Council. At the time, the UN had only fifty military observers (the last of whom arrived on the 23rd) and a small number of civilian personnel in Mogadishu. The Special Representative of the Secretary General Mohamed Sahnoun, the overall head of the mission, was still trying to get Aidid to consent to the

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[60] "UN Head Charges Yugoslavia Bias," Facts on File, 52.2700 (20 August 1992): 623.
[61] Phillip Corwin, Dubious Mandate: A Memoire of the UN in Bosnia, Summer 1995, (Durham: Duke UP, 1999) xv.
[62] Morden, "Interview," 7 September 2000.

deployment of the five hundred security personnel, and the financing question had not been settled.[63] The UN plan, which was approved by resolution 767 (27 July),[64] was to decentralise UNOSOM into four zones in the northeast, northwest, south and central regions of Somalia to make it less susceptible to the lawlessness in Mogadishu and to open more points of access to rural areas. Each sub-mission was to be responsible for all aspects of the crisis in its zone.[65]

The UN's planned expansion of the mission and a multinational airlift into southern Somalia provided opportunities for Canada to participate in UNOSOM. Mulroney had decided that Canada would participate by late July, well before the UN informally requested Canadian assistance, but the plans for the airlift and UNOSOM were an important part of the context because he would not make an unsolicited offer.[66] On the 28th, the PCO asked the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) General John de Chastelain to determine if "something significant" could be done relatively quickly to help the UN in Somalia.[67] The Prime Minister did not know what was militarily possible, and he had to rely on de Chastelain's advice. The CDS instructed the National Defence Headquarters Joint Staff to do a capability check to determine what Canada could do, at what cost, and for how long (see chapter five).

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[63] Marc Perron, "Somalia Update," memorandum, (29 July 1992): 1. Cited from: Files of DFAIT, 21-14-6-UNOSOM, vol. 2.
[64] United Nations, S/RES/767 (27 July): operative para. 12. Cited from UN and Somalia.
[65] Boutros-Ghali later recommended the creation of a fifth zone to be based in town of Mandera, Kenya (see chapter seven). Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "Report to the Security Council on the Situation in Somalia," S/24343 (22 July 1992): paras. 57-61. Cited from UN and Somalia.
[66] Segal, "Interview," 28 June 2000.
[67] Captain (Navy) Ken McMillan, "Humanitarian Assistance Somalia – Record of Decisions," memorandum 3351-1, (28 July 1992): para. 1. Cited from Information Legacy: A Compendium of Source Material from the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services Canada, 1997) document #: DND002116.

Mulroney initiated this process in order to support Canada's interest in multilateralism. The government was feeling pressure from the UN to engage, and it wanted to respond to defuse this pressure while also maintaining Canada's traditional commitment to multilateralism.[68] Ottawa believed that multilateralism allowed the country to differentiate itself from the US and to play a larger role in world affairs than it could otherwise. Segal has suggested that Mulroney "had a very strong view that Canada is a minor player, of no great compelling consequence, unless its leadership decides to increase its importance by having it involved in the shaping of coalitions and linkages."[69] The government was concerned that continued inactivity would have a negative impact on the perception of the UN as a viable world institution. In a joint memorandum to the Prime Minister, McDougall and Minister of National Defence Marcel Masse noted that the Somalia crisis could be pivotal for the organisation. Canada had sought to prepare the organisation for such situations, they argued, and success in the Horn of Africa could cement support for UN-led peace and security efforts. On the other hand, an inadequate reaction, especially if compared to the UN's heavy involvement in the former Yugoslavia, might paralyse the UN and cripple consensus.[70]

Added to this was the building public concern regarding the famine. The mass starvation in southern Somalia was the most visible and troubling aspect of the crisis for Canadians. News stories tended to be from wire services like Reuters since the dangers and difficulty of access led most Canadian and other far-flung journalists to decide to

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[68] Bush, 91-2.
[69] Segal, "Interview," 28 June 2000.
[70] Barbara McDougall and Marcel Masse, "Memorandum to the Prime Minister," (July 1992): 2. Cited from: Files of DFAIT, 38-11-1-Somali, vol. 4. This memorandum is undated, but refers to the 22 July report. It also mentions in the future tense a démarche with France that Masse conducted on 30 July. This suggests that the document was prepared in late July. See also: Marcel Masse, "Talking Points: Possible

avoid Somalia (John Stackhouse of The Globe and Mail was one exception).[71] Indeed, during August and September there were no resident reporters in Mogadishu, and Canadian Rick Grant received no inquiries at all from Canadian media while serving as the media representative for CARE USA (the organisation's lead country for Somalia), which was one of the few non-governmental organisations then in Somalia.[72] Despite this, what coverage there was enormously increased public awareness and concern by August. In July and August, CARE Canada had raised almost $ 1 million for Somalia.[73] The government was aware of these developments. On the 18th, shortly before the UN informally asked Canada for a UNOSOM contribution, a memorandum to the Prime Minister noted that the humanitarian situation was deteriorating dramatically and that press attention and public interest in it was growing daily.[74]

Roles involving the protection and delivery of aid were most attractive to the government because Canada had no specific interest in Somalia other than to strengthen multilateral humanitarian action. As Kinsman noted, "Somalia was not connected to our interests, we were not intervening to make peace per se, or to work out any particular political solution for the country...the impulse was humanitarian and the credibility of the UN, [and] getting the assistance through."[75] Mulroney informed Boutros-Ghali that Canada's desired role was humanitarian in a 13 August letter. Canada, he wrote, would "provide the use of a military transport aircraft urgently for delivery of humanitarian

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Humanitarian Assistance to Somalia," (30 July 1992): 1. Cited from: Files of DFAIT, 21-14-6-UNOSOM, vol. 2.

[71] Barton, "Interview," 31 May 2000.

[72] Rick Grant, "Interview with former Principal Spokesperson for CARE USA in Somalia Rick Grant," via electronic mail, Tuesday 2 April 2002. Grant worked for CARE from August 1992-January 1993.

[73] Joseph Hall, "Canada Can Still Help, Aid Teams Say," Toronto Star, Sunday 30 August 1992: A1.

[74] Glen Shortliffe, "Canadian Involvement in Somalia," memorandum for the Prime Minister, (18 August 1992): 1-2.

[75] Kinsman, "Interview," 21 August 2000.

relief in Somalia." He supported the "proposals for deployment of a larger security force to ensure delivery of humanitarian aid," and said that Canada was "prepared to participate in an operation approved by the Council, in a security or other role."[76]

The first proposal initiated was the contribution of three CF Hercules transport aircraft to an ICRC / World Food Programme humanitarian airlift, to be based out of Nairobi, Kenya. Shortliffe informed the Prime Minister on 18 August that a DND advance team would visit Geneva (the location of ICRC headquarters) and Nairobi (the operating base) later that week to finalise planning for the relief flights.[77] The airlift enabled the government to answer the UN's call quickly and in a way that, the High Commission in Kenya noted, was in "the full glare of the global spotlight," since Nairobi was the hub for Eastern Africa media.[78] On 21 August, Mulroney made the airlift contribution public, and in doing so he "underlined Canada's support of UN efforts to initiate comprehensive security and humanitarian operations throughout Somalia."[79]

When the informal request for peacekeeping forces for UNOSOM came, Ottawa's answer was a foregone conclusion. On 17th, Shortliffe met with senior officials from DND, CIDA and EAITC to discuss Somalia. The next day, he informed the Prime Minister that DND could respond to any of the anticipated UN requirements – whether it be for infantry or engineering, logistics or medical personnel – and that the "[c]hances are high that Canada will be called upon to participate in this effort."[80] This comment related to the bargaining process that went on between the UN and potential troop contributing

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[76] Brian Mulroney, "Letter to Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali," (13 August 1992): 1. Cited from: Files of DFAIT, 38-11-1-Somali, vol. 2.
[77] Shortliffe, "Canadian Involvement in Somalia," (18 August 1992): 2.
[78] High Commission in Nairobi, "Airlift to Somalia," telex WADA-0766 to External Affairs, (6 August 1992): 3. Cited from: Files of DFAIT, 38-11-1-Somali, vol. 2.
[79] Office of the Prime Minister, "Canada to Provide Additional Help to Somalia," News Release, (21 August 1992): 1.

countries like Canada. The UN would never ask a government for a contribution until it had determined that the latter was willing to provide what was needed. Shortliffe was referring to the fact that this dialogue was nearly finished. There had already been a discussion 'in principle' with the Prime Minister regarding whether Canada would join UNOSOM if asked, and the answer had been 'yes.'[81] Ottawa received a UN request for a 750-person battalion for the mission, which had been increased to 4, 219 blue helmets as per Boutros-Ghali's recommendation, on the 25th.[82] It learned that the northeast zone, centred on the port town of Boosaaso, would be its area of operations (see map, p. vi), and that this was supposed to be "the most difficult" task.[83]

Canada committed to UNOSOM in August even though financing continued to be a problem. In late July, the US continued to resist applying assessment-based funding procedures to UNOSOM, and resolution 767 was almost profoundly altered as a result. In April, the qualifying phrase 'in principle' had been inserted to weaken UNOSOM's founding resolution, and Washington insisted that this phrase be used in the draft of resolution 767. It was removed from the final version, but for Ottawa, which was on the verge of engagement, this was a troubling indication of the US state of mind regarding UNOSOM.[84]

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[80] Shortliffe, "Canadian Involvement in Somalia," (18 August 1992): 2.
[81] Shortliffe, "Interview," 21 July 2000.
[82] Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "Report to the Security Council on the Situation in Somalia," S/24480 (24 August 1992): para. 37 and "Addendum," S/24480/Add.1 (28 August 1992): para. 1. For the Security Council's approvals, see United Nations, S/RES/775 (28 August 1992): operative para. 3; and United Nations, "Letter from the President of the Security Council to the Secretary-General," S/24532, (8 September 1992): 1. All documents cited from UN and Somalia.
[83] Douglas Fraser, "Somalia / UNOSOM: Request for Troops," COSICS formal message C-PRMNY-WKGR-0599 to External Affairs, (25 August 1992): 1. Cited from: Files of DFAIT, 21-14-6-UNOSOM, vol. 3.
[84] Permanent Mission in New York, "Somalia: Resolution 767 Adopted," secure fax WKGR-3865 to External Affairs Eastern and Southern Africa Division, (27 July 1992): 2. Cited from: Files of DFAIT, 21-14-6-UNOSOM, vol. 2.

Ottawa worried that the US attitude, particularly as it related to the financing of UNOSOM, could weaken the collective foundation of multilateral peacekeeping. The government did not want UNOSOM to repeat and entrench the UNFICYP precedent, in which contributing nations had paid for the costs of their contingents.[85] It considered promising troops, even if an assessment-based funding arrangement was lacking, to "shake the Security Council to its senses in this regard."[86] Mulroney used his relationship with President George Bush and Prime Minister John Major in an attempt to change their minds regarding UNOSOM funding. He wrote to Bush and Major, saying "that such a major humanitarian disaster calls for a response by the entire world community and warrants being managed and financed accordingly." In addition, he argued that although the "cost of a military effort in Somalia will be high, I would hope that possible differences of views concerning the means and sources of funding the UN operation can be rapidly reconciled and that the effort to save lives can be accelerated."[87]

Along with domestic US factors, Mulroney's personal diplomacy may have led the Bush administration to relent on the funding issue. At the same time as the letters, Senator Nancy Kassebaum (Republican-Kansas) was discrediting the State Department argument that Congress did not want to pay for another UN mission.[88] After a mid-July visit to Somalia, she said on the MacNeil-Lehrer NewsHour that UN security forces were

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[85] Ross G. Hynes, "Somalia," COSICS message [no number] to External Affairs at 18:28, (27 July 1992): 1. Cited from: Files of DFAIT, 38-11-1-Somali, vol. 2. Tim Martin, "Situation in Somalia," memorandum GAA-1433 to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, (21 August 1992): 4. Cited from: Files of DFAIT, 20-1-2-Somali, vol. 6.

[86] Ross G. Hynes, "Somalia," COSICS message [no number] to External Affairs at 17:34, (27 July 1992): 2. Cited from: Files of DFAIT, 38-11-1-Somali, vol. 2.

[87] Brian Mulroney, "Letter to US President George Bush," (14 August 1992) 2; and "Letter to UK Prime Minister John Major," (14 August 1992) 2. Cited from: Files of DFAIT, 38-11-1-Somali, vol. 2.

[88] William J. Durch, "Introduction to Anarchy: Humanitarian Intervention and 'State-Building' in Somalia," UN Peacekeeping, American Policy and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s, ed. William Durch (New York: St. Martin's, 1996) 317.

urgently needed and that the US, as a former ally of Somalia, was morally obligated to help. The US "need[s] to make a larger commitment and to provide a push...towards... stepping forward and saying more has to be done and should be done soon."[89]

Bush was considering stronger action, but parts of the US government remained opposed. A statement supporting the deployment of UN security forces to Somalia was issued by the administration on 27 July, and Bush announced on 14 August that the US would airlift food into Somalia.[90] However, the White House and the political divisions of the State Department and Pentagon were opposed to involvement because the 1992 election was being fought on domestic issues, and they wanted to protect the president from a risky overseas commitment.[91] Ottawa may have helped weaken Bush's opposition to UNOSOM. Mulroney had influence with Bush because of their close relationship, and this made it more likely that the president would pay attention to a Canadian issue like multilateral peacekeeping financing.[92] Perhaps as a result, when the Council agreed to expand the mission to 4, 219 troops with resolution 775 (28 August) and letter S/24532 (8 September), it also supported Boutros-Ghali's call for UNOSOM to be "considered an expense of the Organization" and that "the assessments to be levied on Member States be credited to the UNOSOM Special Account."[93]

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[89] MacNeil-Lehrer NewsHour with Robert MacNeil and James Lehrer, "Perot's Partisans; Lowering Your Guard; Misery's Cradle," transcript # 4383, Public Broadcasting Service, (Wednesday 22 July 1992).
[90] John L Hirsch and Robert B. Oakley, Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping, (Washington: US Institute of Peace P, 1995) 38-9.
[91] Ioan Lewis and James Mayall, "Somalia," The New Interventionism, 1991-1994: The United Nations Experience in Cambodia, former Yugoslavia, and Somalia, ed. James Mayall (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1996) 110.
[92] Paul Heinbecker, "Interview with Canadian Permanent Representative to the UN Ambassador Paul Heinbecker," Friday 16 August 2002.
[93] Boutros-Ghali, "Report," S/24480 (24 August): para. 37 and "Addendum," S/24480/Add.1 (28 August): para. 4; United Nations, S/RES/775 (28 August): operative para. 3; and United Nations, "Letter," S/24532 (8 September): para. 1. Cited from UN and Somalia.

Conclusion:

The Somalia crisis was neglected until July because western governments did not see it as a priority. Three Permanent Members of the Security Council – the US, UK and Russia – opposed the deployment of a large peacekeeping mission to Somalia in April because of cost. Somalia's representative at the UN and the Organisation of African Unity pointed out that the Council had authorised large missions to Cambodia and the former Yugoslavia, but was unwilling to do the same for an African country. However, the Council did not feel pushed to respond to this charge of discrimination until July. Boutros-Ghali's outburst regarding the attention being paid by the Council to Yugoslavia was important because it put the international spotlight on the west's unbalanced approach. The media did the same when it picked up the Somalia story in mid-1992, and contrasted UNOSOM with the large UNPROFOR.

Canada considered supporting UNOSOM in April, but it lacked sufficient motivation to do so. The deployment of an inadequate mission (only fifty unarmed observers) showed that the international community was not seized by the Somalia crisis. Not only did the size of UNOSOM mean that there were no opportunities for Canada to play a distinctive role, but it agreed with the powers on the Council that the former Yugoslavia's civil war was more important. Although the government believed that Canada had a responsibility to support multilateral actions designed to foster peace, it appeared that UNOSOM would expose the observers to excessive risk and, as a result, Ottawa decided not to peacekeep.

The Mulroney government worried that the Council's actions would undermine the credibility of UN-led multilateralism, and it therefore quickly offered aircraft and

troops to support the UN's efforts in Somalia in August. The UN had demonstrated that the international community had assigned a higher priority to the Somalia crisis. In addition, the government was interested in the expanded UNOSOM because it appeared to be a more credible mission and it offered Canada opportunities to play a noteworthy role.

Somalia became a significant issue for Ottawa in late July because the media began to highlight the severity of the crisis and inadequacy of the UN's activities. Canadian and foreign newspaper editorials contrasted the UN's diplomatic peacemaking in the former Yugoslavia with the much smaller effort in Somalia. This troubled Ottawa not only because it was interested in maintaining confidence in multilateralism, but also because it was a prominent participant in UNPROFOR, and had announced special immigration arrangements in July for roughly 25, 000 Balkan refugees. In August, the government accelerated the Somali family reunification and immigration process, and it contributed to the UN airlift and expanded peacekeeping effort in Somalia.

The Prime Minister's main role was to make the decision to engage, and to strengthen the multilateral effort by calling for UNOSOM to be funded collectively by assessment. Mulroney believed in multilateralism because he thought it was a way for Canada to help foster peace and security. He supported the expanded UN operation by offering forces to UNOSOM even before Boutros-Ghali requested them. The Prime Minister also wanted assessment-based financing to apply to humanitarian peacekeeping missions like UNOSOM, because this would be an unmistakable sign that this type of operation reflected the will of the international community. He called on states to

financially support the UN's efforts in Somalia, and he urged George Bush and John Major to allow UNOSOM to be funded collectively.

Chapter 5
Canadian Concern as the UN Struggles: The CF and UNOSOM up to August 1992 and Operation Relief's Failure in fall 1992

In late July 1992, the United Nations (UN) was becoming more deeply involved in Somalia, which was crippled by governmental collapse, famine, and civil war. The world body expanded the UN Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM) and its multinational humanitarian airlift. Prime Minister Brian Mulroney wanted to help the UN adapt its multilateral tools and procedures to the complex and unfamiliar Somali situation. His government contributed to UNOSOM and the airlift because it was concerned for the UN, which was being criticised by the media over its ineffectiveness in Somalia. The government shared the UN's determination to press forward with humanitarian efforts because it wanted to support UN multilateralism and the Canadian media had noticed and increased its coverage of the crisis. However, Ottawa and the UN did not fully appreciate the difficulty that traditional peacekeeping and an airlift would encounter in Somalia. Since the airlift was mounted relatively quickly, this was first revealed during the aerial relief efforts in fall 1992.

Like the airlift, UNOSOM, except for its humanitarian mandate, was a traditional operation. UNOSOM was created with well-worn peacekeeping principles in mind: the mission had to behave non-violently, be impartial, and not act without the consent of the disputants, regional states, and the major powers on the UN Security Council. In terms of its political functions, UNOSOM was expected to foster reconciliation, use its presence to stabilise the ceasefire in Mogadishu and protect aid deliveries. Like all Cold War UN operations, UNOSOM was overwhelmingly military in composition: Council resolution 751 (24 April 1992) authorised fifty unarmed ceasefire observers, five hundred security

troops (delayed, but anticipated) and seventy-nine civilians.[1] The number and roles of non-military peacekeepers multiplied in the 1990s,[2] but UNOSOM was not an example of this. Its civilian component was focussed on political reconciliation and headquarters administration. In the UN Transition Assistance Group in Namibia (UNTAG, 1989-90) and UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC, 1992-93), civilians operated all or parts of a national government and conducted an election.

But like these missions, UNOSOM had to behave in a non-violent and non-threatening manner. Avoiding the use of force except in self-defence had been a basic principle of peacekeeping since the UN Emergency Force I (UNEF I, 1956-67), the UN's first interpositional mission. This tenet was modified for UNEF II (1973-79) to allow the operation to respond aggressively against those blocking the implementation of its mandate. The revised guidelines shaped all subsequent missions, including Cold War internal operations like the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL, 1978-present), which had been advised that the "use of armed force is authorised only (a) in self-defence; or (b) in resisting attempts by forceful means to prevent UNIFIL from discharging its duties."[3] However, while passivity could have undermined the mission's credibility, the

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[1] United Nations, S/RES/751 (24 April 1992): operative para. 3-4; and Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "Addendum 2 to Report to the Security Council on the Situation in Somalia," S/23829/Add.2, (24 April 1992): para. 2. Both documents cited from United Nations, United Nations and Somalia, 1992-1996 (New York: United Nations, 1996). (Hereafter cited as UN and Somalia.)

[2] Department of National Defence (DND), Canadian Defence Policy 1992, (Ottawa: DND, 1992) 34.

[3] Marrack Goulding,, "Guide to the Use of Force by UNIFIL Military Personnel," coded cable MSC-842, to Force Commander Brigadier-General Imtiaz Shaheen, (2 September 1992): 1. Cited from Information Legacy: A Compendium of Source Material from the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services Canada, 1997): document #: DND009842. (Hereafter cited as Information Legacy.)

advisability of adopting a firm position was always far from clear because it could lead to a violent encounter.[4]

UNOSOM was faced with the same sort of dilemma. The mission's numerical inferiority and the pervasive disorder in Mogadishu made it impractical to threaten or use force to safeguard non-governmental organisation (NGO) aid deliveries, even though it was mandated to provide such protection.[5] UNOSOM was in the middle of an internal conflict where no government existed to impose order, and where factional fighters and unorganized and unaffiliated gangs vastly outnumbered and outgunned the mission. Many gunmen chewed khat leaves, a narcotic widely favoured as a hunger suppressant, but which also heightened paranoia and aggressiveness. Those who rode in jeeps or pick-up trucks mounted with heavy weapons acquired the nickname 'technicals' because the UN was forced to hire some of them as guards, and the item of expenditure used to account for their salaries was called 'technical services.'[6] In this lawless environment, an attempt by UNOSOM to escort aid forcibly as mandated by resolution 751 would have resulted in disaster. Canadian Forces (CF) Colonel Jim Cox, the UNOSOM Deputy Force Commander as of early October, said that if

> UN soldiers have to fight anyone to protect relief supplies, all UN personnel are put at risk that same moment. The sub-clan of looters who may have been thwarted by the force from looting food will strike against the UN at another time and place. It will be guerrilla warfare. The UN agencies and NGOs will have to withdraw and the entire relief program will collapse.[7]

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[4] F. T. Liu, United Nations Peacekeeping and the Non-Use of Force, International Peace Academy Occasional Paper, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1992) 29.
[5] United Nations, S/RES/775 (28 August 1992): operative para. 5. Cited from UN and Somalia.
[6] John Drysdale, Whatever Happened to Somalia? (London: HAAN Associates, 1994) 45-6.
[7] Colonel Jim Cox, "Fax" to J3 Peacekeeping Colonel Mike Houghton, undated mss., (December 1992): 4.

Avoiding the use of force also suited the UN's approach to peacekeeping in Somalia. When UNOSOM Force Commander Brigadier-General Imtiaz Shaheen received the UNIFIL rules regarding force, his attention was drawn to the "overriding principle:" "force can only be used by an United Nations operation as a last resort and when all peaceful means have failed."[8] The phrase "weapons to be used in self-defence only" was put in a special box on the UN's written informal request for a 750-person infantry battalion, which Canada received on 25 August 1992.[9]

UNOSOM departed from the precepts of traditional peacekeeping in the significance of its mandate of humanitarian assistance. During the Cold War, compassionate acts took place even when this was not the reason for the establishment of a mission. The UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (1964-present), for example, had shown that aid initiatives could be performed even when not a primary mandated activity if they did not complicate the mission's political function or seem to favour one side.[10] This had also been true for internal operations like UNIFIL, which could not carry out its primary mandate[11] and instead "used its best efforts to limit the conflict and to shield the inhabitants of the area from the worst effects of the violence."[12] UNOSOM was more innovative than these missions because it linked "the modalities of a cease-fire to the

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[8] Marrack Goulding, cover letter for "Guide to the Use of Force by UNIFIL," (2 September 1992): 1. Cited from Information Legacy (1997): document #: DND009842.
[9] Brigadier-General Maurice Baril, "United Nations Operation in Somalia," UN fax MSF-9617-08 to Canada's Permanent Mission to the UN in New York, (25 August 1992): 1. Cited from: Files of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), 21-14-6-UNOSOM, vol. 3.
[10] Alan James, "Humanitarian Aid Operations and Peacekeeping," The Politics of International Humanitarian Aid Operations, eds., Eric A. Belgrad and Nitza Nachmias, (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997) 55-56.
[11] Under UN Security Council resolution 425 (19 March 1978), UNIFIL was to verify the withdrawal of Israel's armed forces from southern Lebanon and help restore peace. Israel did not co-operate.
[12] United Nations, "United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)," The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping, 3rd ed., (New York: United Nations, 1996) 112.

implementation of humanitarian relief operations."[13] With UNOSOM, for the first time in peacekeeping history, the protection of aid deliveries had been the primary reason for the mounting of a mission.[14]

The prominence of UNOSOM's mandated responsibility to escort aid prevented the mission from remaining impartial, prompting hostility in Somalia because the control of food was vital to the disputants' survival and power. The UN should have anticipated this, because some of its leaders at the time were aware that, while aid protection was benign, it was also assertive. UN Under-Secretary-General Marrack Goulding, the head of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), noted in 1993 that guarding humanitarian convoys – a task UNOSOM was assigned but never able to carry out – was more akin to peace enforcement (by definition directed against at least one disputant) than peacekeeping.[15] According to Stanley Hoffmann, human rights breed confrontation because they touch on the very foundations of a regime's power, on the interface between the state and its people, and thus on the source and object of its power.[16] Humanitarian assistance deliveries can be antagonistic.

Somalia's faction leaders believed that humanitarian aid had a political impact. This was despite the statement made by Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, the outgoing UN Secretary-General, who reminded the factions of the "key principle" surrounding aid deliveries: "namely that such assistance is purely humanitarian in nature and has no

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[13] Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Somalia," S/23829, (21 April 1992): para. 58. Cited from UN and Somalia.
[14] Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "Introduction," The United Nations and Somalia: 1992-1996, (New York: United Nations, 1996) 24.
[15] Cited in Meeting New Challenges: Canada's Response to a New Generation of Peacekeeping, Report of Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Security and National Defence, 3rd Sess., 34th Parl., (Ottawa: Canada Communications Group, 1993) 37.
[16] Stanley Hoffmann, "The Hell of Good Intentions," Foreign Policy 29 (1977-78): 8.

political implications."[17] However, the factions fighting for power and plunder in Mogadishu and southern Somalia generally did not see aid in this light. The high stakes struggle between Ali Mahdi Mohamed and Mohamed Farah Aidid, the most powerful faction leaders in Mogadishu, which was the focal point of the civil war, virtually guaranteed that they would not respect the impartiality of peacekeepers assigned aid protection duties. They were fighting for the presidency and the related power, privilege and prestige, and in situations like this humanitarian assistance can easily be viewed politically and not as a neutral life-saving activity.[18]

The UN recognised that the use of peacekeepers to escort aid was controversial, but the famine was so serious that it had to proceed. The insecurity in Somalia had prevented the UN from delivering food to the starving from November 1991 to June 1992.[19] To improve its response, the UN decided to mix peacekeeping with humanitarian action and to expand UNOSOM, despite being uncertain about the practicality of these innovations. According to Elisabeth Lindenmayer, the DPKO political desk officer for UNOSOM, a strong desire to help drove the UN to experiment in Somalia:

> Let me emphasize that none of us is blessed with a gift of prophecy, nor do we have all the answers. But what else can we do but try and do our best to restore and keep the peace and alleviate human suffering...we have to act before all the evidence is in, since, by the time the evidence is all in, it would be too late.[20]

At the same time, the UN was confident, now that the political constraints imposed by the Cold War were gone, that it could handle situations like Somalia. The

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[17] United Nations, "Secretary-General 'Shocked and Concerned' Over Situation in Somalia," press release SG/SM/4682, (27 December 1991): 2.
[18] James, "Humanitarian Aid Operations and Peacekeeping," 59.
[19] United Nations, "More World Food Programme Aid Arrives in Somalia," WFP/801, (12 June 1992): 1.

early 1990s were "really very exciting from that point-of-view," recalled UN Deputy-Secretary-General Louise Fréchette, then Canada's Permanent Representative to the UN in New York. "The atmosphere in the halls of the UN was enormously positive and full of energy." A peacekeeping deployment to Somalia would have been out of the question during the Cold War because the Council would not have reached consensus on a mission to the strategically located country. But in 1992, Fréchette noted, the UN "could say, 'no, we will not let millions of people starve because warlords want to fight.'" This attitude was "in the air, and that explains why we got involved in Bosnia as well, it was this notion that everything was now possible."[21] Those at the top of the UN hierarchy seem to have been equally optimistic. CF Brigadier-General Maurice Baril, Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's Military Advisor, recalled being inspired by the enthusiasm of senior DPKO officials Goulding and Kofi Annan, and co-leader of the Department of Political Affairs Vladimir Petrovsky.[22]

However, progress in Somalia was slow for the UN because of the disorder and lack of a central government. UNOSOM had deal with a multiplicity of sub-national 'authorities.' Boutros-Ghali argued that the absence of any administration whatsoever in Somalia was a "completely new" problem for the UN, which is essentially an inter-governmental organisation, and this made the difficult task of diplomatic peacemaking

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[20] The DPKO military desk officer for UNOSOM was Major Nauludole Mataitini. See Elisabeth Lindenmayer, "Somalia: A New Role for United Nations Peacekeepers," unpublished mss., (New York: September 1992). Cited from: Information Legacy (1997): document #: DND006580.

[21] Louise Fréchette, "Interview with UN Deputy Secretary-General Louise Fréchette," at UN Headquarters in New York, Friday 16 June 2000.

[22] Maurice Baril, "Le Canada, les Casques bleus et le maintien de la paix," Francois Taschereau interview with Lieutenant-General Maurice Baril, bout de papier, 12.4 (Winter 1995): 17. Translated for the author by Alex Lazarow.

more complicated than ever before.[23] Aidid and Ali Mahdi had ambiguous chains of command and uncertain control over smaller sub-clans and other armed groups. They had no international reputations that could be besmirched if they broke an agreement, impeded UNOSOM or looted relief supplies from an NGO, and the world community had almost no way of applying leverage or pressure on them. The problem of how to foster order through such groups was further complicated by the fact that of the roughly 20, 000 gunmen in Mogadishu alone, four out of five were independent and totally uncontrolled bandits.[24] Only the harrowing UN Operation in the Congo (1960-64) and UNIFIL encountered environments that were as inhospitable to traditional peacekeeping. Both of these endeavours were extremely difficult (they suffered 250 and 211 fatalities respectively, the highest and second-highest peacekeeping mission totals ever[25]) and they illustrated the unyielding nature of such situations.

Although UNOSOM had been established after the signing of the 3 March cease-fire, the low level of support that it received from some factions impaired its diplomatic peacemaking and humanitarian efforts. UNOSOM had a most difficult peacekeeping task because it lacked a firm political basis and the local disputants were intermeshed and impossible to separate.[26] UNTAC, in contrast, had rested on the Paris Agreements (23 October 1991), and it likely owed its success in running Cambodia's first democratic

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[23] Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "Setting a New Agenda for the United Nations," interview by Carolyn Reynolds, et al., Journal of International Affairs 46.2 (Winter 1993): 292; and Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "Empowering the United Nations," Foreign Affairs, 72.5 (Winter 1992): 91.

[24] William J. Durch, ed., "Epilogue: Peacekeeping in Uncharted Territory," The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis, (New York: St. Martin's, 1993) 472.

[25] UNIFIL statistic as of June 1996. The UN Protection Force was third at 207, the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus was forth at 167, and UNOSOM II was fifth at 147. See United Nations, The Blue Helmets (1996): 698, 709, 750, 707, 722.

[26] Alan James, "Problems of Internal Peacekeeping," Diplomacy & Statecraft, 5.1 (March 1994): 33.

election to that foundation.[27] UNOSOM was built on a shaky ceasefire that the UN stopped monitoring after only six weeks.[28] Peacekeepers cannot create the conditions for their own success.

Special Representative of the Secretary-General Mohamed Sahnoun, the overall head of UNOSOM, was nevertheless able to establish influence over Aidid, Ali Mahdi, and the other faction leaders. His efforts lessened the hostility directed toward UNOSOM personnel and advanced preparations for reconciliation. Sahnoun relied "to a large degree, on moral suasion to get things done."[29] The Special Representative arrived on 4 May, and he concentrated on negotiating an end to the conflict and on winning consent from the factions for the deployment of UNOSOM's five-hundred-person security battalion. His strategy was to put the clan system to work for Somalia, in particular by bringing the influence of the clan Elders' to bear.[30] Sahnoun believed that the clans – especially the Elders, who were highly respected spiritual leaders within each community – were "politically interesting because they dilute power."[31] The Elders were mediators and arbitrators of intra-community disputes, and while continuing in this role depended on their staying clear of politics, the faction leaders took note of them because of the psychological authority they wielded over clan opinion. They were regarded as the only

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[27]Paul F. Diehl, International Peacekeeping, 2nd ed., (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1994) 200.
[28] Fifty observers were deployed by 23 July. Patrolling took place along the 'Green Line' dividing north (Ali Mahdi) and south (Aidid) Mogadishu. It started in the south on 15 August, in the seaport area on the 16th, and in the north on the 19th. Monitoring stopped on 30 September because of increased violations and hostility. Cited from Imtiaz Shaheen, et al., "Political and Military Events in Somalia, From Cease-fire Agreement to Resolution Multinational Force Deployment, 3 March – 3 December 1992," unpublished mss., (15 December 1992): 18.
[29] Mohamed Sahnoun, "Prevention in Conflict Resolution: The Case of Somalia," Irish Studies in International Affairs, 5 (1994): 9.
[30] Mohamed Sahnoun, Somalia: The Missed Opportunities, (Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 1994) 25.
[31] Cited in Jonathan Stevenson, "Hope Restored in Somalia?" Foreign Policy, 91 (Summer 1993): 146.

social group who could promote the search for peaceful dialogue within Somalia.[32] The civil war had marginalised the Elders, but as "an indirect way of influencing the warlords" they remained critical to Sahnoun's overall plan for Somali reconciliation. All that the Elders required, he argued, "was some leverage, some people to...convey their views, and so on. And we were happy, because they were beginning to have some effect on the warlords."[33]

Sahnoun made diplomatic inroads, but alleviating the humanitarian crisis in the near or medium-term was impossible. Jonathan Stevenson convincingly argues that "the UN's strongest suit is its ability to slog relentlessly...with gritty diplomacy, without taking sides or parceling out favours."[34] Sahnoun was an example. His patient, personal, consensus-building technique won praise.[35] However, Sahnoun's work was not seen as that of an impartial third-party mediator, because by deploying to Somalia the UN had become a party to the factions' pursuit of power. It was a misconception to believe that UNOSOM's profession of neutrality would be respected when the parties still wished to fight, and this political difficulty was compounded by the factions's disunity, lack of cohesion, and the ambiguity of their political programmes.[36] UNOSOM's security situation had improved by August thanks to Sahnoun, but the hijackings and theft of the aid did not decline.[37]

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[32] Rakiya Omaar, "Somalia: At War with Itself," Current History (May 1992): 234.
[33] Mohamed Sahnoun, "Interview with the former first Special Representative of the Secretary-General to Somalia Ambassador Mohamed Sahnoun," in Ottawa, Tuesday 7 August 2001.
[34] Stevenson, "Hope Restored in Somalia?" 154.
[35] John Hirsch and Robert Oakley argue Sahnoun generated grassroots support for the UN. See Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping, (Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 1995) 22.
[36] David B. Carment, "Rethinking Peacekeeping: The Bosnia and Somalia Experience," Canada Among Nations 1996: Big Enough to be Heard, eds. Fen Osler Hampson and Maureen Appel Molot, (Ottawa: Carleton UP, 1996) 225, 231.
[37] "Confidential Interview with senior UNOSOM official," Saturday 10 March 2001.

Sahnoun's peacemaking was well conceived, but it was too slow. By mid-1992, Sahnoun began to fall out of step with the international community's desire to be more assertive in Somalia. It took time for the influence of the Elders and other grassroots groups (such as local NGOs and women's groups) to be felt. Sahnoun believed his approach was reflected in the Somali saying: "If you want to prevent an eagle from flying, take off its feathers one by one." This meant, "take time, and eventually he will not be able to fly."[38] Sahnoun saw the Elders as the hope for reconciliation and famine relief, but he believed that they could not significantly influence the factions in the short term. Baril heard the same saying from an Elder in spring 1995. The world needed to be patient with Somalia. "The fixing of a country is done at the speed that the country wants to be fixed," said Baril, "I think that was a great lesson."[39]

But as the humanitarian crisis continued to worsen, the UN started to doubt whether Sahnoun was reading the Somali situation correctly, and it believed that results needed to be obtained more quickly. At the same time, there did not seem to be any alternative to the tedious soliciting of consent from Aidid, Ali Mahdi, and the other faction heads. "It was very, very difficult because nobody knew exactly how to handle the situation," Baril recalled, "we didn't really know how to approach it." All that was clear was that it "was a classic Chapter VI approach and we had to convince them."[40] By August, a desire for faster results, coupled with international concern over the rising death toll due to starvation, led to a new UN strategy and different techniques. As Sahnoun noted, "I think there was, on the part of [UN headquarters in] New York,

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[38] Sahnoun, "Interview," 7 August 2001.
[39] Maurice Baril, "Interview with General Maurice Baril, Chief of the Defence Staff," at NDHQ in Ottawa, Friday 18 August 2000.
[40] Baril, "Interview," 18 August 2000.

conviction that there was a better fix which will be quicker, and therefore which will be much more visible. And that, in a sense, I was taking a little bit too much time, that I should push things a little bit faster."[41]

The Secretary-General planned to expand UNOSOM and the UN's humanitarian airlift. These initiatives were first mentioned in Boutros-Ghali's 22 July report to the Council. In it, the Secretary-General said "a framework for the security of humanitarian relief operations is the *sine qua non* for effective faction." Faced with UNOSOM's difficulties, he concluded "that the United Nations must adapt its involvement in Somalia,"[42] and that UNOSOM had to be broadened so that it covered all of Somalia and not just Mogadishu. Through an "innovative and comprehensive approach," the mission would deal with "the cessation of hostilities and security, the peace process and national reconciliation"[43] throughout Somalia.

The second adjustment was the expansion of the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) and World Food Programme (WFP) airlift, and the parallel International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) effort, which were being operated from Mombassa and Nairobi, Kenya. UNOSOM's inability to protect or defend the food deliveries meant that the aid was leaving the port unprotected and was being stolen before reaching the rural areas where the need was greatest. "Many of the most destitute are located in the interior of the country," the Secretary-General noted, and "the mounting of an urgent airlift operation may be the only way to reach those areas and should be undertaken as soon as

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[41] Sahnoun, "Interview," 7 August 2001.
[42] Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "Report to the Security Council on the Situation in Somalia," S/24343 (22 July 1992): paras. 59, 56. Cited from UN and Somalia.
[43] Boutros-Ghali, "Report," (22 July 1992): para. 56.

possible."[44] Owing to the delay imposed by the need to determine the specifics of the revised peacekeeping operation, which was still called 'UNOSOM I', the airlift proposal was initiated first and was the first activity in which Canada participated.

By late July, Ottawa was eager to help because the humanitarian emergency had worsened and assumed a higher profile in national media sources. The government's interest in multilateralism had become strongly connected with the humanitarian crisis on the ground. Jim Judd, the Assistant Secretary to Cabinet for Foreign and Defence Policy in the Privy Council Office (PCO), said that the television images depicting the famine were compelling and impossible for the government to ignore.[45] The United States Cable News Network brought Somalia's suffering sharply into focus for the Department of National Defence (DND).[46] Deputy Minister Robert Fowler commented that "I don't think anyone was unaffected by what they saw...The overarching issue in Somalia was that 1- to 3,000 people were dying a day and it was going to get worse." It was clear, Fowler said, that "the UN was going to become engaged and wanted Canada to play."[47] Canada, therefore, decided to participate in the UN's more determined peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance efforts in Somalia to help ensure their success.

The government and CF initially focussed on UNOSOM, but its contribution to the UN-led multinational airlift, named Operation Relief, started first because of delays in finding a peacekeeping role. The CF discussed UNOSOM on 28 July at the morning Daily Executive Meeting (DEM), which involved the top leaders in the National Defence

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[44] Boutros-Ghali, "Report," (22 July 1992): para. 61.
[45] Jim Judd, "Interview with Deputy Minister of National Defence Jim Judd," at NDHQ in Ottawa, Thursday 31 August 2000.
[46] Ken Calder, "Interview with Assistant Deputy Minister (Policy & Communications) Dr. Ken Calder," at NDHQ in Ottawa, Friday 10 March 2000.
[47] Robert Fowler, "Testimony of Robert Fowler to the Somalia Inquiry," Thursday 21 February 1996. Cited from Information Legacy, vol. 50, (1997): 10166, 10176.

Headquarters (NDHQ). Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) General John de Chastelain asked the Joint Staff to conduct an estimate on the deployment of a security battalion to Somalia for six months, noting that his request could become a contingency plan once the costs were known and the operational concept approved by Fowler and himself. De Chastelain also agreed with acting Vice Chief of the Defence Staff Lieutenant-General Kent Foster's suggestion that the Canadian Airborne Regiment (Cdn AB Regt.), Canada's UN stand-by battalion, would be well suited for the assignment.[48]

The very influential Fowler, who had a better sense of the political pulse of the government than CF leaders, supported the CDS. He was involved in the discussions surrounding a UNOSOM role because the consideration of new operations was one area where the responsibilities of the CDS and Deputy Minister overlapped. During this period, Fowler offered opinions on humanitarian foreign policy since this was not in DND's mandate.[49] Fowler had a sense of the domestic and international political climate, and he noted at the DEM meeting on the 28th that a CF deployment would be welcome.[50]

Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (Intelligence, Security, Operations) Major-General Paul Addy responded to the CDS's request for an estimate, but it fell to his Chief of Staff, Commodore David Cogdon, to focus the J Staff and actually produce the document. This staff work was done, even though the UN had not informally asked for personnel yet, because it was considered possible that Pakistan might not be able to supply the five-hundred-person security battalion it had promised, or that additional

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[48] J. M. D. Henrie, "Record of Daily Executive Meeting Regarding Somalia," (28 July 1992): paras. 3-4. Cited from Information Legacy (1997): document #: DND299450.
[49] Fowler, "Testimony to the Somalia Inquiry," Information Legacy, vol. 50, (1997): 10157, 10200.
[50] Henrie, "Record of Daily Executive Meeting," (28 July 1992): para. 2.

forces would be required in Mogadishu.[51] As a result, Cogdon called a meeting of the Land members of Captain (N) McMillan's J3 Plans cell to examine whether the CF could provide the security force mentioned in resolution 751 (24 April).

The staffing process for the CF Mogadishu deployment demonstrated the centrality of concurrent activity to operational planning. Among the senior officers, discussions on UNOSOM continued both informally and formally in DEMs. Below them, the Joint Staff Action Team was engaged on the related staff work. Under the COS J3, inputs required from all over the J Staff were simultaneously tapped and forwarded to the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (DCDS) Group to be built into the estimate. In this case, the assignments were: J1 Coord (the medical support requirement), J2 Intelligence (risk assessment), J3 Plans and J3 Operations (the available CF forces and impact on air resources), J3 Plans (land forces available and impact on pre-existing alliance and other commitments), J3 Peacekeeping and J5 Policy Operations (an estimate of the likely tasks), J4 Movement (the air and sealift possibilities and deployment timelines), J4 Logistics (sustainability), J4 Financial Coord (financial issues), and J6 Coord (state of satellite, secure and back-up communications).[52] This division of labour gives a picture of the variety of expertise used by the J Staff for operational planning.

Two estimates were prepared, one as requested by the CDS, and another that was also done by the J Staff and reached the chief. The estimates reinforced what de Chastelain and Lieutenant-General Jim Gervais, the Commander of Force Mobile Command, were thinking: that the CF could respond positively to the Prime Minister's

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[51] Lieutenant-Colonel Robert H. Clark, "Aide-Mémoire on Somalia," memorandum 3451-1 (DI Pol 5), (29 July 1992): para. 8c. Cited from Information Legacy (1997): document #: DND001198.
[52] Ken McMillan, "Humanitarian Assistance Somalia – Record of Decisions," (28 July 1992): para. 2b. Cited from Information Legacy (1997): document #: DND002116.

request for a significant contribution to the UN efforts in Somalia, and that the Cdn. AB Regt. was one of the units that could be sent to Mogadishu to fulfill the security requirement in resolution 751 (24 April), which was the only clearly defined task in late July. J3 Plans believed that a six-month role was possible despite the CF's other tasks (another rotation, a year-long deployment, was also considered feasible).[53] It was also asked to anticipate that the support provided would be along the same lines as for the UN Mission for the Referendum in the Western Sahara (MINURSO). Canada would have monitored the Western Saharan ceasefire, protected the smaller contingents, and verified troop withdrawals. MINURSO had been derailed because Morocco refused to allow it to deploy fully. While keeping this CF mission in mind, J3 Plans was asked to assume that Canadian commitment to it would be withdrawn if the CF committed to UNOSOM.[54]

Although J3 Plans and J3 Peacekeeping believed that planning should wait until a second UN Technical Mission (scheduled to visit Somalia on 5-15 August) released its findings, the J Staff nevertheless had the impression that time was short and the CF might have to deploy to Mogadishu quickly. "If a humanitarian mission is to be mounted at short notice," an aide-mémoire for the CDS and deputy minister noted, then "authority should be obtained for a small DND reconnaissance team to proceed to Somalia as soon as possible."[55] The head of J3 Peacekeeping, Colonel Mike Houghton, sounded a note of caution in light of the urgency that he sensed had been attached to the planning and decision-making. He commented at the end of July that it "would be a very serious

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[53] Lieutenant Colonel Rick H. Froh, "Option Analysis for a Security Battalion in Support of UN Humanitarian Assistance Operations in Somalia as Requested by CDS," (31 July 1992): paras. 8a, 18. Cited from Information Legacy (1997): document #: DND002070. See also Major G. M. Whiting, "Option Analysis Somalia – Probable Tasks and Forces Available," memorandum 3351-1 (J3 Plans (L) 4), (29 July 1992): para. 7a. Cited from Information Legacy (1997): document #: DND002106.

[54] Froh, "Option Analysis for a Security Battalion," (31 July 1992): paras. 4, 5a-c, 8f.

mistake to attempt to pre-empt the UN in this matter. They should be allowed to do their job."[56] On 12 August, however, Aidid finally consented to the deployment of the UN security force after talks with Sahnoun, and the next day the United States offered to fly the Pakistani troops (drawn from its 7th Frontier Force) and their equipment to Mogadishu. This meant the UN's most pressing requirement, one Canada had hoped to fill, had disappeared.

The new interest in Somalia also influenced airlift planning. By August, it was obvious to the J Staff that the CF was going to be heavily involved in relief efforts. In the decision making 'dynamic' in government, atmosphere is crucial. With DND, External Affairs and International Trade Canada (EAITC), the PCO and the Prime Minister's Office all involved, and with television networks beaming back images of starvation, it was clear by July that Somalia promised to become a high profile issue, and this told the J Staff that the CF would be involved.[57] According to J5 Policy Operations Colonel Bremner, planning and policy "under such circumstances does not focus very much on whether or not we should participate. You try instead to present the cost of involvement, consequences of involvement, the risks...You try to present these things rationally."[58] There was no defining moment, but the airlift and UNOSOM ground role (with attention now focussed on the four-zone plan) escalated in significance as DND, in close

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[55] Lieutenant-Colonel R.H. Clark, "DM / CDS – Aide-Mémoire on Somalia," memorandum 3451-1 (DI Pol 5), (29 July 1992): paras. 8c, 11. Cited from Information Legacy (1997): document #: DND001197.
[56] Cited in Lieutenant-Colonel Rick H. Froh, "Option Analysis for a Security Battalion in Support of UN Humanitarian Assistance Operations in Somalia as Requested by CDS," (30 July 1992): para. 11. De Faye Board of Inquiry Exhibit 110. Cited from Information Legacy (1997).
[57] John Bremner, "Interview with Colonel (ret'd) John Bremner," at DFAIT in Ottawa, Wednesday 19 April 2000.
[58] Bremner, "Interview," 19 April 2000.

collaboration with other branches of government, decided on the best policy and then passed a memorandum to cabinet to secure approval to implement it.[59]

The J Staff aide-mémoire also invited the government to consider other possible roles in Somalia, in addition to participating in the airlift. Two options that were not selected were sending ceasefire observers and supporting national reconciliation with construction engineering or communications units. Humanitarian assistance efforts could have been bolstered with the provision of medical teams or a field hospital, ground transport to move aid within Somalia, or aircraft to fly in relief supplies.[60] Only the airlift was selected, and this highlighted a key difference between Canada's and the UN's approach to the Somalia crisis. The government strongly desired to make the UN's multilateral efforts in Somalia a success, but it was interested only in a humanitarian contribution. The UN wanted to foster political reconciliation in addition to facilitating food and medicine delivery.

The J Staff did not start planning for the UN airlift until Canada was informally asked for a contribution. Sahnoun did so personally on 31 July, when he met staff from the Canadian International Development Agency, PCO, DND and EAITC in the Lester B. Pearson building. He admitted that the UN desire to deploy security personnel would likely not receive full factional consent since there were so many of them. Airlift support, he argued, was required to evade those who were looting relief supplies before they could be transported out of Mogadishu, with the result that only 25% of requirements were

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[59] John Bremner, "Interview with Colonel (ret'd) John Bremner," in Ottawa, Monday 31 July 2000.
[60] Clark, "Aide-Mémoire on Somalia," (29 July 1992): para. 8a-d. Cited from Information Legacy (1997): document #: DND001198.

reaching the countryside.[61] He pointed to the urgent need to get food to the interior, the reduced security risks in remote rural areas, and the availability of six usable airstrips.[62] This was the third time that an airlift contribution was mentioned as a UN requirement that Canada could potentially fill. The other occasions had been the Secretary-General's 22 July report, and Council resolution 767 (27 July), which asked to the UN to "make full use of all available means...including the mounting of an urgent airlift operations" to deliver aid to the needy.[63]

Jeremy Kinsman, then EAITC's Assistant Deputy Minister (Political and International Security), recalls that Sahnoun had a powerful impact on the government with his look of near-desperation and passionate retelling of the UN's struggling humanitarian effort. "I don't want to say that it was the turning point, but [the meeting] was an important thing," Kinsman said. "At first, the visit was seen as being not a high priority. And then he came, and he kind of got to people somehow."[64] Kinsman points to the toll in terms of exhaustion and frustration that UNOSOM had had on Sahnoun, who after three months of effort had the fifty observers on the ground as his only tangible accomplishment. However, the Prime Minister had already indicated interest in a role, and the J Staff had highlighted the airlift option on 29 July. Reid Morden, the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, noted that the relevance to decision-making of high-level meetings "depends on how strongly held are the views on the agreements

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[61] Lieutenant-Colonel W. D. Turnbull, "Briefing Note: Somalia," memorandum 3451-1 (DI Pol 4), (16 August 1992): para. 3. Cited from Information Legacy (1997): document # DND002543.
[62] Verona Edelstein, "Somalia – Meeting with UN Special Representative for Somalia," telex GAA-1314 to High Commission in Nairobi, (5 August 1992): para. 8. Cited from Information Legacy (1997): document #: DND002582.
[63] United Nations, S/RES/767 (27 July 1992): operative para. 2. Cited from UN and Somalia.
[64] Jeremy Kinsman, "Interview with former Assistant Deputy Minister (Political and International Security) Jeremy Kinsman," Monday 21 August 2000.

which were reached by the political leadership. And when it circled back to the Prime Minister…he was very anxious that we be seen to be participating in this mission."[65]

Sahnoun's informal request helped military decision makers further isolate the UN's needs and determine what the CF could do to fill its requirements. Negotiations between the CF and international organisations usually began vaguely, but gradually the sides move closer together as the players' needs clarified. "As things get closer to reality," said then Associate Assistant Deputy Minister (Policy and Communications) Rear-Admiral Larry Murray, dialogue "becomes more defined, more specific, as things change. It is a dynamic process. Sometimes this happens over a long time, sometimes over a short period."[66] By the time of the Sahnoun meeting, the airlift had become a priority option for the government because multinational interest in it had become strong and did not diminish. On 12 August, for example, Sahnoun had made a public appeal for aerial assistance: "Let us organise a couple of airlift operations as we did for Ethiopia in the 1984-85 famine."[67] A second UN Technical Mission, which was sent to determine the working arrangements of the expanded UNOSOM, also called for an expansion of the small number of WFP and ICRC flights, and for airdropping to be examined because this would "bring food right into the villages to keep people from leaving their homes."[68] Boutros-Ghali agreed with this suggestion, stating in his 24 August report that he had "come to the conclusion that the present airlift operation…need to be substantially

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[65] J. Reid Morden, "Interview with former Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs J. Reid Morden," in Ottawa, Thursday 7 September 2000.
[66] Larry Murray, "Interview with Vice-Admiral (ret'd) Larry Murray," in Ottawa, Wednesday 16 February 2000.
[67] Julian Ozanne, "UN Will Send Troops to Guard Food Convoys in Somalia," Financial Times (London), Thursday 13 August 1992: A14.
[68] United Nations, Report of the Technical Mission to Somalia, (17 August 1992): 17. Cited from: Files of DFAIT, 21-14-6-UNOSOM, vol. 3.

enhanced."[69] The airlift proposal was further supported by Council resolution 775 (28 August), which welcomed the decision to "increase...the airlift operation to areas of priority attention."[70]

Diplomatic activity took place concurrently with military planning to determine whether Canada's participation in the multinational airlift would be welcome, and the form its role would take. The High Commission in Nairobi was asked to recommend potential partners for the CF and provide information on the implications of an airlift for UNOSOM.[71] Commission personnel consulted with the ICRC, which suggested that, if the CF provided a C-130 Hercules transport free of change, it would be able cancel its existing lease for such an aircraft, thereby saving $ 1 million CDN a month.[72] The Canadian Embassy in Geneva also contacted the ICRC headquarters, which expressed interest in CF support, but wanted "to know who will cover costs of fuel, landing fees, maintenance, and costs related to feeding and shelter of crew."[73]

An air force reconnaissance team visited Geneva to engage in the delicate negotiations regarding these issues. The ICRC wanted Canada's help, but would refuse it if less expensive assistance could be obtained elsewhere. The CF's air transport capabilities were limited and expenses had to be kept as low as possible, but the air force wanted the 'business' in order to justify itself to the Canadian government and public. The Hercules fleet was usually heavily utilized, and thus the airlift was not the freshest

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[69] Boutros-Ghali, "Report to the Security Council on the Situation in Somalia," S/24480, (24 August 1992): para. 15. Cited from UN and Somalia.
[70] United Nations, S/RES/775 (28 August 1992): operative para. 4. Cited from UN and Somalia.
[71] External Affairs, "Somalia: Meeting with UN Special Representative for Somalia," telex GAA-1314 to High Commission in Nairobi, (5 August 1992): 4. Cited from: Files of DFAIT, 38-11-1-Somali, vol. 2.
[72] High Commission in Nairobi, "Airlift to Somalia," telex WADA-0753 to External Affairs, (3 August 1992): 1. Cited from: Files of DFAIT, 21-14-6-UNOSOM, vol. 2.
[73] Embassy in Geneva, "Airlift to Somalia," telex YTGR-4230 to External Affairs and High Commission in Nairobi, (7 August 1992): 1. Cited from: Files of DFAIT, 21-14-6-UNOSOM, vol. 2.

demonstration of the air force's usefulness. Despite this, the task was valued because the air force always wanted "to show that we were in demand and doing things out there in the world in support of the country's interests," noted Roy Mould, who in 1992 was a colonel and Air Command Headquarters' (AIRCOM) G3 International (the former Deputy Chief of Staff – Operations). "A steady pace of well-managed operations," he added, "justified our share of resources."[74]

Mulroney now decided to write to Boutros-Ghali. The Prime Minister offered CF support to the expanded UN airlift in a 13 August letter. Having been informed by DND (via the PCO) that an aerial role was possible, he wrote that "in response to your recent report and a specific appeal by your Special Representative, Ambassador Sahnoun, Canada will provide the use of a military transport aircraft urgently for delivery of humanitarian relief in Somalia."[75] The political decision had been made. This was confirmed on 21 August, when the Prime Minister announced a three aircraft role and "underlined Canada's support of UN efforts to initiate comprehensive security and humanitarian operations throughout Somalia."[76]

In the CF, responsibility for the national preparations for Operation Relief fell to the J Staff, while the air force worked out the operational details, generated the forces, and provided follow-up support to its deployed personnel. The CF decided to send a 65 person Airlift Control Element and three Hercules (one each for the ICRC and WFP, plus a spare) to Nairobi. J3 Plans conducted a capability check to discover whether the air

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[74] Roy Mould, "Interview with Brigadier-General (ret'd) Roy Mould," in Toronto, Thursday 28 December 2000.
[75] Brian Mulroney, "Letter to UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali," (13 August 1992): 1. Cited from: Files of DFAIT, 38-11-1-Somali, vol. 2.
[76] Office of the Prime Minister, "Canada to Provide Additional Help to Somalia," News Release, (21 August 1992): 1.

force could do the job and for how long, and working with J4 Financial it determined the budgetary impact.[77] An estimate prepared on 14 August noted that the expected cost of the three month deployment was $ 17.8 million, $ 6.25 million of which was non-budgeted 'extra' expense.[78] Operation Relief would reduce by 15% the resources available for the Quarterly Airlift Plan (which took into account all regular airlift user needs, such as Search and Rescue, resupply of CF Station Alert in the Artic, and training). This meant exercises might have to be reduced, and contractors relied upon for some of the non-operational transport work.[79]

Relief would be the first mission run out of the AIRCOM operations centre in Winnipeg. Traditionally, AIRCOM had delegated its operations to its functional Groups (such as Air Transport Group (ATG), Fighter Group, 10 Tactical Air Group and Maritime Air Group) and had not assumed the responsibilities of managing its own operations. A Group headquarters was designated as the lead agency in conducting an operation or in co-ordinating the efforts of other Groups, where more than one was engaged. The lead Group would then be dealing directly with NDHQ while keeping Air Command informed. This was part of the legacy of AIRCOM's establishment on 2 October 1975. In order to create a locus for national air power expertise, senior air force leaders at the time had been forced to accept a less than ideal command and control arrangement in which Air Command owned all air assets but operationally controlled very little.[80] Winnipeg, in pursuit of the principle that air power was indivisible in nature, was able incrementally to

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[77] Commodore Ken McMillan, "Interview with Commodore Ken McMillan," in Ottawa, Friday 17 November 2000.
[78] Captain B. Tremblay, "Fact Sheet - Canadian Forces Support, UN Humanitarian Assistance in Somalia," (14 August 1992): table 1, para 2-3. Cited from Information Legacy (1997): document #: DND002551.
[79] Major K. D. Hunt, "Assessment of Air Capabilities for Humanitarian Assistance for Somalia," (17 August 1992): para. 2. Cited from Information Legacy (1997): document # DND002546.

strengthen its hold over air resources through the years.[81] However, in the early 1990s, it was clear to the Commander, Lieutenant-General David Huddleston, that AIRCOM needed to be in more direct control of all air operations.

The air force undertook a series of restructurings in 1992 in order to prepare for the short-notice, contingency-type taskings like Relief that were expected to predominate in the post-Cold War era. According to Brigadier-General Gordon Diamond, Huddleston recognised that the air force had to concentrate on the rapid deployment of forces and the improvement of the planning and management of operations while also reducing costs. This resulted in the creation of the Wing structure, which were formations that could be deployed in whole or in part, in contrast with bases, and the AIRCOM-driven change to take over Group functions, beginning with airlift in 1992.[82] Winnipeg's role had been weakened by the practice of designating a lead Group. For instance, although NDHQ was not on direct liaison status with ATG, it could contact the latter directly without going through Winnipeg as long as this was only for information.[83] Huddleston sought to strengthen AIRCOM's control over air assets and operations. "The Groups," he said, "had their specialised functions to perform, but the air force had to operate as an air force and it had to interface directly with NDHQ."[84]

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[80] Stephen L. James, *Formation of Air Command: A Struggle for Survival*, M. A. diss., Royal Military College, Kingston, 1989, 14.
[81] Stephen L. James, "The Air Force's Cold War Struggle with its National Purpose," Proc. of the 3rd Annual Air Force Historical Conference, eds. William March and Don Pearsons, (Winnipeg: DND, 1998) 91.
[82] Gordon Diamond, "Interview with former Commander ATG Brigadier-General (ret'd) Gordon Diamond," in Ottawa, Wednesday 24 October 2001.
[83] Jean Morin, "The Command and Control of the Air Transport Group During the Gulf War," Proc. of the 3rd Annual Air Force Historical Conference, eds. William March and Don Pearsons, (Winnipeg: DND, 1998) 117.
[84] David Huddleston, "Interview with former Commander of Air Command Lieutenant-General (ret'd) David Huddleston," Monday 18 December 2000.

Another one of Huddleston's objectives was the creation in AIRCOM of the same accelerated staffing system for operations that had been established in NDHQ with the J Staff. In August, Deputy Commander Major-General Lou Cuppens had asked Mould to create a rapid planning system in AIRCOM, initially called the General Staff (G Staff, now the Air Staff). In the old system, personnel were 'cap-badged,' meaning that they were grouped according to their trade – pilots, finance, maintenance, legal and so forth – and not in relation to what the mission was or the part they played in mission accomplishment.[85] This structure was turned on its side, so that with the G Staff everyone was slotted according to what they did: tactical helicopter, maritime air, fighters and transport. Huddleston knew about joint staffing because as DCDS during 1989-91 he had overseen the establishment of the J Staff, and in Winnipeg he had discussions with Cuppens about bringing it into AIRCOM.[86] This change was driven by a new focus on the primacy of operations and the need to respond rapidly to diverse and unpredictable operational requirements. With the G Staff, said Mould, "You brought the actual maintainer, the actual intelligence or personnel officer, right into the operations centre. That's what made it new. Operations became multi-skilled."[87]

While airlifts are never easy, the CF had recent experience in the region that helped it prepare for Relief. Operation Nile (June-September 1988), based in Addis Ababa, had involved two C-130 Hercules transports (one was a spare). Nile delivered food, 70-75% of which was destined for Mek'ele in north Ethiopia, and it often had to cope with sharp stones when landing and with airstrips that were indistinguishable from

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[85] Mould, "Interview," 28 December 2000.
[86] Lou Cuppens, "Interview with Lieutenant-General (ret'd) Lou Cuppens," Saturday 16 December 2000.
[87] Mould, "Interview," 28 December 2000.

the surrounding countryside.[88] Nile worked for the UN Disaster Relief Coordinator and was praised for helping to prevent widespread famine.[89]

Under Operation Preserve (August-December 1991), the CF transported grain from Djibouti to Gode, K'ebri Dehar and other communities in Ethiopia's Ogaden region.[90] Preserve's operational concept – three Hercules flying from one main base for three months – was also used in Somalia. Relief experienced many of the same challenges that Nile and Preserve encountered, such as short, unlit or potholed runways, burst tires, inaccurate or outdated maps, and animals on the runway that had to be chased off by a low pass before landing. By 1992, these challenges "had become a pattern," said Huddleston. ATG, which was responsible for Relief's technical requirements, "had people who had been experienced in the whole routine, and all of the operational aspects of working off these different airstrips."[91]

ATG's preparations were furthered by the vast body of experience it had with airlift, which enabled it to adjust to the particularities of Relief without too much trouble. According to Commander Brigadier-General Jeff Brace on 4 September, eight days before the start of Operation Relief, "[t]askings of this nature are never routine; however, such operations are not new to the men and women of ATG…In many ways this airlift mirrors numerous previous humanitarian undertakings."[92] The steps that planners took when mounting an airlift were spelled out in the manual CF-ACM-2603-Airlift Operations and Planning, and their preparations were further accelerated by the April

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[88] Charles R. Simonds, "External Military Involvement in the Provision of Humanitarian Relief in Ethiopia," Humanitarian Emergencies and Military Help in Africa, ed. Thomas G. Weiss, (New York: St. Martin's, 1990) 65, 68.
[89] Jamie Robertson, "Canada – Please Help Us!" Sentinel 27.6 (1991): 4.
[90] D. Hinton, "Where There's a Need ATG Crews Will Travel," Air Transport Group Newsletter, 4.1 (Spring 1992): 11.
[91] Huddleston, "Interview," 18 December 2000.

1992 decision to create a stand-by Airlift Control Element (ALCE) to speed response times. As Lieutenant-Colonel John Jensen noted, 426 (Training) Squadron Trenton had been pre-tasked with providing an ALCE for six months, and had already determined the general requirements for a deployment, including the operations and maintenance personnel required, the mobile air movements teams, and the communicators and administrators, with the specific aircrew being dependant on the tasking.[93] An ALCE involved creating a temporary base that was capable of doing most of the repairs that could have been done at the aircraft's home base. In this case, the ALCE also included a command and control vehicle (a truck with a high-frequency radio) so that a mobile repair party could be called if necessary.[94]

In mid-August, an ATG team travelled to Nairobi, the site of the pre-existing WFP airlift, to determine the specific parameters of its assignment. These trips enabled ATG to establish whom it would be assisting, where its planes would fly from, and under what arrangements. Owing to prior discussions, the CF teams left knowing that the air force would likely be delivering food aid and medicines from Nairobi for the WFP and ICRC, and the visits confirmed this. The CF also concluded that it should operate from Nairobi and not Mombassa because the latter's airport was full, and that Hercules 'H's and not 'E's were needed since the higher altitude at the former would require more powerful engines.[95] Securing good accommodations was another priority for the

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[92] DND, "Air Transport Group Aircraft Leave for Somalia," News Release, (4 September 1992): 1.
[93] John P. Jensen, "Airlift Control Element (ALCE) I," Canadian Joint Forces Somalia: In The Line of Duty, 1992-93, ed. Ron Pupetz, (Ottawa: DND, 1994) 36.
[94] Jeff Brace, "Interview with former Commander ATG Brigadier-General (ret'd) Jeff Brace," Friday 26 April 2002.
[95] Jensen, "Airlift Control Element (ALCE) I," 37-8.

reconnaissance team. It wanted to avoid the situation encountered on Preserve, when air force members had been forced to double bunk.[96]

Delivery flights in Somalia commenced on 11 September, but complications arose regarding the need to pay attention to the special ICRC rules. Neutrality was a fundamental principle of the organisation because this normally enabled it to secure the confidence of disputants and have the freedom of action necessary to carry out its activities.[97] To ensure that it was never accused of taking sides, the ICRC strictly barred the transport of anything but its supplies on aircraft bearing its distinctive emblem. This meant that any UN insignia had to be stored behind the bulkhead when the CF was on an ICRC flight.[98] Relief had to configure aircraft for two missions types, which was a unique problem that ATG had not encountered before.[99]

Poor facilities and the insecure ground situation in Somalia bred uncertainty that added to the complexity of Operation Relief. The CF flew into Somali airfields near Baidoa (the grimly named 'city of death'), Mogadishu, Kismaayo, Bardera, Beledweyne and elsewhere. The dirt and stone airstrips and lack of security made all of them extremely dangerous.[100] Operations were complicated by the fact that the UN was unable to provide destinations until the night before or even the day of the flight, and pilots had to learn to avoid afternoon landings because that was when many Somali men were under the influence of khat.[101] The rapid deterioration of security conditions was always a risk.

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[96] Jane MacDonald, "The First ALCE Commander," Canadian Joint Forces Somalia: In The Line of Duty, 1992-93, ed. Ron Pupetz, (Ottawa: DND, 1994) 34.
[97] International Committee of the Red Cross, The Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, (1 July 1996). Cited from: www.icrc.org.
[98] Jane MacDonald, "Operation Relief," Canadian Joint Forces Somalia: In The Line of Duty, 1992-93, ed. Ron Pupetz, (Ottawa: DND, 1994) 26.
[99] Brace, "Interview," 26 April 2002.
[100] Brace, "Interview," 26 April 2002.
[101] Jensen, "Airlift Control Element (ALCE) I," 38.

The need for the hourly monitoring of the situation on the ground was underscored on 19 September, when an offloading at Xuddur had to be abruptly terminated after a skirmish broke out between locals close to the airfield.[102] On 5 October, a Relief crew at Mogadishu International Airport was caught in a firefight between Somalis, but left without casualties or aircraft damage.[103] An engine was often kept running just in case a rapid departure was required, and no one, as High Commissioner Larry Smith discovered when he accompanied a flight to Baidoa, ever ventured far from the plane.[104]

However, airlifting food was only supposed to be a stopgap designed to lessen reliance on the insecure ground routes. By the time of the second ALCE rotation in late October 1992, it was clear that the international assistant effort was failing. Relief was hampered by ground fire and the continued thievery. For example, in October 1992, an assistance flight (not done by Canada) to Bardera had to be aborted when a few gunmen, disgruntled about having not received airstrip security jobs, drove up and fired a rocket-propelled grenade that just missed the aircraft.[105] This highlighted the great difficulty associated with delivering aid without the support of all parties.

The looters soon adjusted to the airlift. Canada and other nations airdropped food to areas made inaccessible because of rain, but these aircraft started to come under fire.[106] Much of what was transferred from the aircraft to the trucks never made it the few

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[102] Air Transport Command, "Operation Relief Situation Report # 8," telex to Air Command, National Defence Headquarters and External Affairs, (19 September 1992): 3. Cited from: Files of DFAIT, 21-14-6-UNOSOM, vol. 4.
[103] MacDonald, "Operation Relief," 27.
[104] MacDonald, "Operation Relief," 27; and Larry Smith, "Interview with former High Commissioner to Kenya Ambassador (ret'd) Larry Smith," at DFAIT in Ottawa, Tuesday 11 July 2000.
[105] "Confidential interview with UNOSOM I official," at UN Headquarters in New York, Monday 19 June 2000.
[106] Associate Minister of National Defence Mary Collins, "Speech to Parliament," Hansard, 3rd Sess., 34th Parl., (7 December 1992): 14783.

kilometres to the warehouses.[107] This did not directly impact on the work accomplished by the Operation Relief aircrews. ATG received reports about the thefts, but its flights continued because no one was actually robbing the aircraft.[108]

Despite these serious problems, Canada and its US, French, Belgian and German partners obtained important information from their airlifts. It became clear that these operations could not alleviate the suffering because they could not assist the areas of greatest need.[109] This was what happened during Operation Nile, which "in no way ameliorated the intensity of the civil wars." As in Somalia, Nile may "have enhanced the ability of all parties to continue the conflict."[110]

Conclusion:

The civil war undermined UNOSOM because it made the maintenance of consent and impartiality impossible. Although this was not its intention, some of the leading disputants perceived its attempt to protect humanitarian assistance as a political and potentially threatening act. The economic profit and political power associated with the control of food deliveries made it even more likely that the factions would perceive the mission in partial terms, attempt to undermine it, and refuse to give their consent to anything more than a token, ineffective presence. UN troops were not considered to be impartial and were not welcomed by Aidid and the unaffiliated bandits. UNOSOM was unable to perform its peacekeeping functions: stabilisation, diffusion of tension, and the fostering of reconciliation.

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[107] Colonel Serge Labbé, Somalia: Setting the Record Straight, unpublished mss., (March 1994): chpt. 1.
[108] Brace, "Interview," 26 April 2002.
[109] Larry Murray, "Interview with Vice-Admiral (ret'd) Larry Murray," in Ottawa, Wednesday 16 February 2000.

However, it would be an oversimplification to argue that UNOSOM failed or that peacekeepers cannot operate in civil wars. Humanitarian relief success must await events on the political front, and peacemaking progress in such situations will be slow. UNOSOM was not allowed enough time. Sahnoun's reconciliation strategy may have been the right one, but it progressed too gradually to satisfy the international community, which was preoccupied with the mass famine in the south. With the first of the five hundred peacekeepers delayed until 14 September, and with the starvation conditions worsening daily, the UN became impatient for results.

Boutros-Ghali's two new assertive initiatives – an airlift to Somalia and an expansion of UNOSOM – were strongly supported by Canada. The former was easier to implement and was Canada's first military role. The government had decided in late July to search for a significant role because it wished to support the UN's faltering multilateral effort. The Prime Minister's interest in having Canada be a visible actor profoundly influenced the decision-making dynamic and resulted in the commitments being made. The government wanted to be seen alleviating the humanitarian crisis, but it was not concerned with the UN's efforts to encourage reconciliation. Ottawa's consideration of an aid-escort role in Mogadishu and its airlift contribution reflected its desire to limit its engagement to famine relief. Canada's interest in the crisis did not lead the government to seek a deeper role. It was not clear in mid-1992 that meaningful humanitarian support for Somalia would require much more than an airlift.

The J Staff handled the strategic level planning and preparations for Operation Relief. NDHQ worked with AIRCOM and ATG in order to determine that an airlift was a realistic option. The J Staff also determined the size, cost and sustainability of the

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[110] Simonds, "External Military Involvement in the Provision of Humanitarian Relief in Ethiopia," 72.

mission. It then tasked Winnipeg to carry the mission out. NDHQ did not concern itself with the daily functioning of the airlift.[111]

Air Command exercised operational command and control of Relief, while ATG implemented the task and handled the specific requirements. Huddleston believed that for the air force to function properly, it needed to run its own operations, and AIRCOM must be the body that interacted with NDHQ on behalf of the air force. In order to prepare the air force to do so, and to enable it to respond to the short-notice missions that were expected to predominate in the 1990s, he implemented a number of changes. Two of them, both crucial, were the establishment of an operations centre and a G Staff in Air Command. General Diamond became chief of staff for operations because his mission orientation and transport experience complemented Huddleston's fighter and Cuppens' helicopter backgrounds, and as a former ATG commander he was able to ease the transfer, beginning with Relief, of direct management of airlift to AIRCOM.[112]

ATG was essential for the formation of the ALCE and other technical issues. The operations centre at Trenton handled specifics, such as who would lead and comprise the ALCE, the rotations, establishment of the airflow, and what spare parts should be brought. Airlift was a well-known mission type that could be quickly mounted by ATG – it conducted its reconnaissance in mid-August and was operational on 12 September – but Relief involved special complications. One related to the rules imposed by the ICRC on aircraft delivering its supplies. Another was the lawless and disordered operational environment. The constantly shifting ground situation increased the degree of risk and

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[111] David M. Jurkowski, "Interview with Brigadier-General (ret'd) David M. Jurkowski," in Ottawa, Sunday 25 February 2001.
[112] Diamond, "Interview," 24 October 2001.

complicated the mission in other ways, such as by preventing the ALCE from knowing where it would be flying until the night before or day of the tasking.

The greatest problem was that Relief could not sufficiently alleviate the suffering caused by the Somali mass famine. The merits of the airlift were that it could be mounted quickly, relieving some of the pressure on Ottawa to act, and it did increase the amount of aid reaching the starving, albeit in a manner that was much more expensive than truck convoys. In the end, however, Relief showed that the humanitarian assistance effort remained at the mercy of the factions and bandits who chose to steal the aid. The CF and UN did not recognise that the local parties would be able to undermine this effort just as easily as they had the land-based assistance efforts. By late November, UNOSOM began to crumble in the face of mounting Somali opposition to its presence. With the planned expansion of the mission, which was to begin with a CF deployment, still more than a month away from implementation, it became clear that much more assertive means would be necessary to help Somalia.

Chapter 6
Not in Somalia's Interest: Ottawa's Support of UNOSOM

Prime Minister Brian Mulroney's government committed to the United Nations Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM) in August 1992 to help deliver food to those dying from Somalia's mass famine. Ottawa accepted a stability role with reluctance, notwithstanding the importance of this task to the United Nations's (UN) conflict resolution strategy. It did not want to become enmeshed in the slow-moving peace process because Parliament and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) were not pushing it to do so, and the domestic media was focused on the famine victims. The Canadian Forces (CF) could not sustain a long-term role. In essence, Canada's UNOSOM commitment was shaped not by 'hard' economic interests, but by media pressure and the Prime Minister's desire to strengthen and influence the UN's multilateralist diplomacy, actions and processes.

Ottawa's contribution to UNOSOM coincided with the UN's adoption of a more determined approach regarding Somalia. The turning point came on 14 August, when the Security Council authorised the deployment of a Pakistani battalion to Mogadishu to carry out security and aid escort tasks.[1] UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali later called this "secure humanitarian assistance," which was "something new for UN peacekeepers, a form of 'peace enforcement,' as mentioned in An Agenda for Peace" (June 1992).[2] Shortly after the Council's decision came the report of the UN Technical Mission, which had visited Somalia from 6-15 August to determine how UNOSOM

[1] Li Daoyu, "Letter from the President of the Security Council to the Secretary-General," S/24452, (14 August 1992): 1. Cited from: United Nations, United Nations and Somalia, 1992-1996, (New York: United Nations, 1996). (Hereafter cited as UN and Somalia.)
[2] Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Unvanquished: A US-UN Saga, (New York: Random House, 1999) 55.

could be expanded to four zones. The Technical Mission argued that, if the factions did not allow the peacekeepers to deploy, then "the UN should be prepared to do so without the consent of the parties concerned."[3] Boutros-Ghali expressed a similar view in his 24 August report to the Council, in which he noted that the Somalis needed to co-operate "rather than obliging the international community to take initiatives of its own without them."[4] The Council reinforced its earlier decision by approving resolution 775 (28 August), which increased UNOSOM to 4, 219. The resolution gave the new troop contributors, including Canada, which was assigned the northeast zone centred on the port of Boosaaso, the same tasks as Pakistan.[5]

Canada supported this multilateral effort, but it was chiefly concerned with alleviating the famine. Mulroney outlined the government's priorities in a 13 August letter to Boutros-Ghali concerning the Somali and Yugoslav crises. His remarks on the former focussed on the "tragic humanitarian situation." Mulroney promised CF transport aircraft for the UN-organised airlift of food, and troops for aid escort duty with UNOSOM. This, he said, was an "appropriately active, cooperative role" that would help the UN in the Horn of Africa. The effort to "end the fighting" was not emphasised as it was for the Balkan crisis. In contrast with Somalia, the Prime Minister stressed the need for a "political agreement" and "negotiated solution" in Bosnia-Herzegovina in addition to deploring the civil violence.[6]

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[3] Peter Hansen, Report of the Technical Mission to Somalia, (21 August 1992): 19. Cited from: Files of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), 21-14-6-UNOSOM, vol. 3.
[4] Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "Report to the Security Council on the Situation in Somalia," S/24480, (24 August 1992): para. 36. Cited from UN and Somalia.
[5] United Nations, S/RES/775 (28 August 1992): operative para. 3. Cited from UN and Somalia.
[6] Brian Mulroney, "Letter to UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali," (13 August 1992) 1-2. Cited from: Files of DFAIT, 38-11-1-Somali, vol. 2.

The differing approach to diplomatic peacemaking reflected the fact that the Somalia peace process was miniscule compared to that for Yugoslavia. Ottawa's rhetoric regarding peace in Bosnia was louder in large part because there was more dialogue to support. European inter-governmental bodies, beginning with the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), got involved in the Balkans civil war as soon as it started in mid-1991. When the CSCE's consensus-seeking mechanism failed, it delegated responsibility to the European Community.[7] The latter's negotiators were assisted by the UN as of fall 1991. The conflict resolution effort led to the high profile London Peace Conference (26-8 August 1992), which drew up plans for complete sanctions against Serbia / Montenegro, but shied away from using force to forge peace.[8] Canada vigorously supported these multilateral efforts. During the London talks, for example, Secretary of State for External Affairs Barbara McDougall called for a war crimes tribunal to try military commanders guilty of gross human rights abuses in the conflict. She also offered 1, 200 troops for duty in Bosnia on top of the 1, 200 in Croatia to help the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) become "more active, more dynamic."[9]

UNOSOM, in contrast, received little international assistance to help it foster reconciliation. Regional bodies – the Organisation of African Unity, League of Arab States and Organisation of the Islamic Conference – had helped the UN negotiate the shaky 3 March ceasefire in Mogadishu,[10] but they kept to one side from then on. Special

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[7] Spyros Economides and Paul Taylor, "Former Yugoslavia," The New Interventionism, 1991-1994: The United Nations Experience in Cambodia, former Yugoslavia and Somalia, ed. James Mayall, (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1996) 69.
[8] Economides and Taylor, 72-3.
[9] Barbara McDougall, "Address to the London Peace Conference on the Former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia," External Affairs and International Trade Canada Statement 92 / 36, (26 August 1992): 2, 3.
[10] United Nations, Organisation of African Unity, League of Arab States and Organisation of the Islamic Conference, "Joint Communiqué on the Implementation of Security Council resolution 733 (1992)," UN

Representatives of the Secretary-General Mohamed Sahnoun (until 26 October) and Ismat Kittani received almost no logistic, administrative or communications support from the UN Secretariat, which was overwhelmed by the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) and UNPROFOR. Indeed, the Mogadishu headquarters was still sending in handwritten faxes in mid-August (there were no computers or typewriters).[11] The Somali peace process was a one-man show. Aside from the negotiations conducted by Sahnoun personally, nothing was happening.[12]

The passions at play inside Somalia sharply limited what the world community could do to encourage peace. Canada's High Commission in Nairobi noted in September that the disputants' mistrust and hatred was so strong that it would derail any political summit.[13] There was no peace process for Ottawa to push forward, and it had no reason to step out on a limb by itself. Marc Perron, the Assistant Deputy Minister (Africa and Middle East) in the Department of External Affairs and International Trade Canada (EAITC), wrote that the faction leaders were "not committed to a negotiated settlement to the civil conflict, and an international conference could find itself undermined by lack of local commitment or support."[14] The UN was also hesitant, but unlike Canada it could not remain aloof. The UN expected that organising a Somali peace conference would be

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press release IHA/431 (12 February 1992): 1. See also S/RES/746 (17 March 1992): preambular para. 10, and S/RES/751 (24 April 1992): preambular para. 9. All documents cited from UN and Somalia.

[11] Maurice Baril, "Interview with Chief of the Defence Staff General Maurice Baril," at NDHQ in Ottawa, Friday 18 August 2000.

[12] Baril, "Interview," 18 August 2000.

[13] High Commission in Nairobi, "Proposed International Conference on Somalia," telex WADA-0892 to External Affairs, (10 September 1992): 2. Cited from: Files of DFAIT, 38-11-1-Somali-2, vol. 1.

[14] Marc Perron, "Somalia," memorandum GGB-0182 to the Under-Secretary of State, (22 September 1992): 2-3. Cited from: Files of DFAIT, 21-14-6-UNOSOM, vol. 4.

time-consuming and dangerous. Despite this, it believed it had to proceed because of the threat of intensified fighting and starvation.[15]

Ottawa's decision to not engage on this level was partly due to its pessimistic assessment of the prospects for peace and the fact that it was not being pressured domestically to help. In October, the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs Reid Morden commented that protecting aid was one thing, but the country should not get involved in diplomatic peacemaking because it had nothing at stake in Somalia.[16] At the same time, the Permanent Mission to the UN in New York saw no reason for Canada to form a contact group.[17] Ottawa also lacked the domestic political motivation to press for peace that it had for the former Yugoslavia, where the impetus for a more prompt and forceful intervention came from the New Democrats and Liberals as well as government leaders.[18] For Somalia, there was no need to pre-empt demands from the official opposition for action because none were made. Prior to the deployment of the United States-led (US) United Task Force in December, very few questions were asked about Somalia in the House of Commons or parliamentary committees.[19]

NGOs were not focussed on the Somali peace process. Only a few large NGOs, such as CARE Canada and World Vision Canada, were involved or had experience in Somalia, and they were preoccupied with the famine. The UNOSOM role, which was

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[15] Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "Report to the Security Council on the Situation in Somalia," S/24343, (22 July 1992): paras. 42-3, 55. Cited from UN and Somalia.
[16] John Noble, "Proposals for Assisting UN Coordination on Somalia and Humanitarian Issues," memorandum IMD-0263 to External Affairs Eastern / Southern Africa Division, (21 October 1992): 1. Cited from: Files of DFAIT, 21-14-6-UNOSOM, vol. 4.
[17] Noble, "Proposals for Assisting UN Coordination," 1.
[18] Nicholas Gammer, From Peacekeeping to Peacemaking: Canada's Response to the Yugoslav Crisis, (Montréal-Kingston: McGill-Queen's UP, 2001) 91.
[19] David MacDonald, "Speech to Parliament," House of Commons Hansard, vol. 11, 3rd Sess., 34th Parl., (7 December 1992): 14790.

made public in September and cancelled in December, did not exist long enough for serious discontent to emerge among NGOs. However, in 30 October and 16 November letters to Mulroney, the Chairman of CARE International, Malcolm Fraser, and the President of CARE Canada, H. John McDonald, appealed for renewed relief efforts. McDonald also called for changes to the Canadian deployment. In the northeast, the "conditions are relatively stable and the need for assistance much less." If the UN decided to move the CF battalion, he said, "I hope you would accede to such a request."[20] Although CARE Canada was one of the only national NGOs with first-hand knowledge of Somalia's current troubles, the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) disregarded its advice and sent a standard 'thank you for your concern' reply.[21]

For these domestic and international reasons, the famine loomed largest in the minds of EAITC bureaucrats. UNOSOM, in fact, was seen as a relief task. Assistant Deputy Minister (Political and International Security) Jeremy Kinsman said it "was not a peacekeeping operation. This was an operation to protect the aid corridors to ensure that the humanitarian relief got through. That's all as far as I know that Canada ever signed on for."[22] By September, starvation and disease were consuming 1, 000 to 2, 000 lives daily[23] and troops were needed urgently to stop the factions and bandits from looting supplies brought in by the NGOs and UN aid agencies. Minister of National Defence Marcel Masse reflected Ottawa's approach on the 2nd, when he said that the "deployment

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[20] H. John McDonald, "Letter to Prime Minister Brian Mulroney," (16 November 1992): 1. Deputy Executive Director of CARE Canada Nancy Gordon provided the author with this document from CARE Canada's archives.

[21] Nancy Gordon, "Interview with Deputy Executive Director of CARE Canada Nancy Gordon," at CARE Canada headquarters in Ottawa, Friday 28 April 2000.

[22] Jeremy Kinsman, "Interview with former EAITC Assistant Deputy Minister (Political and International Security) Jeremy Kinsman," Monday 21 August 2000.

of the Canadian Airborne Regiment is another example of Canada's ongoing commitment to humanitarian aid by ensuring that supplies will reach those in need." He added it was "important that we do whatever we can to help the starving people of Somalia."[24]

Canada's desire for a humanitarian role was related to the media's focus on the famine. Although Somalia was a 'black hole' with which Canada had no ties,[25] western media coverage drew attention to its problems. According to Philip Johnston, the President of CARE USA and director of the UN 100-Day humanitarian relief plan in Somalia, journalists were "one of Somalia's most powerful allies" and "an invaluable facet of the humanitarian relief effort."[26] However, television, which transmitted the most vivid and shocking images, was concerned chiefly with the effects of the starvation. Western publics were largely ignorant of Somalia. Moralistic narratives that personified and sentimentalised suffering were the only way for the media to connect with viewers.[27] The mass famine bothered Canadians and caused them to want to help, but theirs was a shallow, cathartic interest. Television reflected this and distracted attention away from the long and expensive UN reconciliation process that was vital for sustainable peace.

The media tended to depoliticise the Somali crisis and de-emphasise its causes and context. Issues such as the local political context, goals of the fighters, and the pre-

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[23] Andrew S. Natsios, "US Relief Effort in Somalia," Statement to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Africa, US Department of State Dispatch, 3.39 (28 September 1992): 738.
[24] Department of National Defence (DND), "Canadian Airborne Regiment Going to Somalia," News Release 92 / 52, (2 September 1992): 1.
[25] Edward Willer, "Interview with former Eastern / Southern Africa Division Deputy Director Edward Willer," in Ottawa, Monday 6 December 1999.
[26] Philip Johnston, Somalia Dairy: The President of CARE Tells One Country's Story of Hope, (Atlanta: Longstreet P, 1994) 54.
[27] Michael Ignatieff, "The Stories We Tell: Television and Humanitarian Aid," Hard Choices: Moral Dilemmas in Humanitarian Intervention, ed. Jonathan Moore, (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998) 290, 293.

conditions for a sustainable peace became less significant because the coverage revolved around individual victims and the victimising factions.[28] Canadians saw the quiet and resigned faces of suffering, like those described by the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation's Gillian Findlay: "Children grow weaker. Old people seem to wither away."[29] They heard of people "dropping like flies" and of a "living hell" where Somalis were "praying for food."[30] Crises could become interchangeable when viewed through this fuzzy humanitarian lens. For example, in January 1993, a Canadian network showed pictures of what it thought was Somalia, only to admit the next day that they were from Mozambique.[31] This moral and pitying gaze was not the foundation on which a domestic political constituency could be built to call for a long-term nation-building role. The government's humanitarian engagement made it seem like Canada was doing something, but its declining overseas aid budget revealed how detached it was from peripheral nations such as Somalia.[32]

At the same time, the media was instrumental, especially in the US, in stiffening international determination regarding Somalia. The start of the US airlift into Somalia in August 1992 was a turning point. US media interest was weak until Washington committed the military.[33] The coverage then began to note that the factions were impeding US generosity, and to identify the factions and gunmen as the villains

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[28] Rony Brauman, "When Suffering Makes a Good Story," Somalia, Rwanda, and Beyond: The Role of the International Media in Wars and Humanitarian Crises, ed. Edward R. Girardet, (Dublin: Crosslines Communications, 1995) 141, 143.
[29] Cited in News in Review with Knowlton Nash, "Somalia: War and Starvation," (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation: October 1992). Findley originally filed her report in May 1992.
[30] Reuter, "Famine, War Create Living Hell," Ottawa Citizen, Thursday 6 August 1992: A12; and Michael Young, "Some Children May Never Recover," Calgary Herald, Thursday 10 December 1992: A5.
[31] Lewis MacKenzie, "Peacekeeping: Into the Grey Zone," Canadian Forces and the Modern World, ed. David E. Code and Ian Cameron, (Ottawa: Conference of Defence Associations Institute, 1993) 35.
[32] Ignatieff, "The Stories We Tell: Television and Humanitarian Aid," 301.

responsible for countless deaths.[34] The crisis started to be seen as a challenge to US kindness and international will. The US Congress grew frustrated by the inability to help, and President George Bush's administration came under pressure to do more.[35] The political recognition of the crisis as an affront coincided in November with the build-up of the media 'pack' in Somalia. The massive increase in coverage enabled the media to make Somalia 'the' story and influence public opinion.[36] Reporters concentrated on the need for forceful action, citing the horrendous humanitarian situation, the UN's helplessness in the face of widespread violence, and US moral responsibility to act as a former ally of Somalia. The New York Times criticised Bush's politically driven neglect of the country. The US focus on domestic politics during the election year, in the opinion of the Times, "clearly played a role in Washington's reluctant, half-hearted response." It noted that presidential leadership was needed because it would be "morally intolerable to acquiesce in this preventable tragedy," and that if a "UN intervention means looters risk being shot, that is a risk they bring on themselves."[37]

Ottawa considered engaging even though the CF was heavily tasked. Chief of the Defence Staff General John de Chastelain had been informed by the National Defence Headquarters Joint Staff that the Somalia mission, named Operation Cordon, could be accepted only if the CF did not have to contribute a battalion to the UN Mission for the

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[33] Susan D. Moeller, Compassion Fatigue: How the Media Sell Disease, Famine, War and Death, (New York: Routledge, 1999) 135-6.
[34] Walter Goodman, "Why It Took TV So Long To Focus on the Somalis," New York Times 2 September 1992: C18; and Moeller, Compassion Fatigue, 138-9.
[35] Embassy in Washington, "Somalia: [Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Herman] Cohen Appearance Before the Congressional Committee," telex UNGR-2352 to External Affairs, (18 September 1992): 4-5. Cited from: Files of DFAIT, 38-11-Somali, vol. 2
[36] Furio Colombo, "The Media and Operation Restore Hope in Somalia," Somalia, Rwanda, and Beyond: The Role of the International Media in Wars and Humanitarian Crises, ed. Edward R. Girardet, (Dublin: Crosslines Communications, 1995) 89.
[37] Editorial, "Don't Forsake Somalia," New York Times, Wednesday 4 November 1992: A30.

Referendum in Western Sahara, which Moroccan non-cooperation had postponed.[38] The Joint Staff told him that the CF "could support four simultaneous battalion-sized operations...only up until September 1993, including the necessary rotations. After that date, and in the absence of being given more personnel resources, we would have to cancel at least one of them. I gave that advice to the Government."[39] Not counting Somalia, the CF had battalions in Croatia and Cyprus and was preparing to deploy to Bosnia in the fall. It had 215 people with UNTAC, 180 with the UN Disengagement Force, and others in smaller roles. At the same time, Ottawa was cutting the military's strength in order to trim the federal budget deficit. The number of combat arms units in the Land Force, the source of most CF peacekeepers, would be reduced from sixteen to thirteen in mid-1993, and after that there would not be enough units to support its four major and three minor commitments without a large 2, 608 person-year augmentation.[40]

Masse reinforced this message and urged restraint. The CF "cannot accept any other mission[s]," he informed the Senate Subcommittee on Security and National Defence on 25 November 1992, two weeks before the Airborne was to deploy, "without having some new resources. It is not a question of will. It is a question of dollars...we cannot be more extended than we are now."[41] Masse's testimony reflected his belief that the government was so determined to play a role on the world stage and to maintain

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[38] Lieutenant-Colonel Rick Froh, "Option Analysis for a Security Battalion in Support of UN Humanitarian Assistance Operations in Somalia as Requested by CDS," (31 July 1992): para. 4f. Cited from Information Legacy: A Compendium of Source Material from the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, CD-ROM, (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services Canada, 1997): document # DND002070.

[39] John de Chastelain, "Letter to Author," (3 April 2000): 3-4.

[40] Lieutenant-Colonel Vince Kennedy, "Staff Estimate Land Force Personnel Augmentation Requirements for Sustainment of Peacekeeping Operations," 3450-1 (G3 Plans), (16 October 1992): 9-10.

[41] Marcel Masse, "Testimony in Support of The Study of Peacekeeping," issue no. 9, eighth proc. of the Senate Committee on Security and National Defence, subcommittee of the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, 3rd Sess., 34th Parl., (Wednesday 25 November 1992): 40.

Canada's nearly unblemished record of participation in UN peacekeeping that it was putting inordinate pressure on the CF. He felt it was irresponsible for the government to push so hard when there was a limited and declining number of soldiers to support its foreign policy objectives. Masse recalled that in "my speeches, when I talk[ed] about it, I stated that we don't have to be everywhere. But I was the only one who was saying that...The philosophy was still push, the Guinness Book of World Records approach, but at the same time there were budget cuts everywhere."[42]

The defence policy that outlined the defence reductions fixed the CF's expeditionary limit, and with Operation Cordon the CF was at, but not above, this maximum. In Challenge and Commitment, the 1987 white paper on defence, the government had reconfirmed the understanding that the CF could deploy up to 2, 000 peacekeepers at one time.[43] This maximum was raised in Defence Policy 1991 and continued in Canadian Defence Policy (1992) to permit the CF to "maintain a capability for contingency operations anywhere in the world up to and including brigade group level" – or roughly 5, 000 soldiers.[44] Sustainability was a key issue. De Chastelain informed the Senate subcommittee that about 4, 400 would be deployed worldwide when the Airborne went to Somalia. That was the true limit because 4, 500 was all that could be supported overseas for a year, with a six-month rotation.[45] This meant that the CF could not handle a Somalia assignment for long. A role stabilising Somalia was not

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[42] Marcel Masse, "Interview with former Minister of National Defence Marcel Masse," in Québec City, Monday 14 August 2000.
[43] DND, Challenge and Commitment: A Defence Policy for Canada, (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1987) 25.
[44] DND, Defence Policy 1991, (Ottawa: DND, September 1991) 12; and DND, Canada Defence Policy 1992, (Ottawa: DND, April 1992) 24.

desired because this would almost certainly be a complicated and drawn-out process. Helping restore order in Somalia did not have the same 'gift of Canada' media appeal as pictures of CF troops delivering bags of grain.

The government, however, soon discovered that its troops would not have any aid escort work to do. It had assumed as late as 25 September that the Airborne was needed to protect aid in northeast Somalia,[46] but on the 30th, a High Commission in Nairobi team found the area to be free of starvation. It learned that the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), the dominant faction in the region, had consented to the arrival of the blue helmets to entrench its political legitimacy and for humanitarian reasons.[47] Conversations with the SSDF revealed that troops were not required to protect NGO convoys because aid distribution in the region was unthreatened.[48] Ottawa nevertheless continued to state that it was interested only in famine relief. Ambassador Gerald Shannon, the head of the Canadian delegation to the Coordination Meeting on Humanitarian Assistance for Somalia held in Geneva on 12-13 October, said that, although reconciliation was vital, "the Canadian military presence will be strictly in support of humanitarian assistance."[49]

The government was concerned that it would suffer domestic political embarrassment if it did not have a famine-related role. A "strong negative media

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[45] John de Chastelain, "Testimony in Support of The Study of Peacekeeping," issue no. 9, eighth proc. of the Senate Committee on Security and National Defence, subcommittee of the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, 3rd Sess., 34th Parl., (Wednesday 25 November 1992): 39.
[46] External Affairs, "Somalia: Views of SSDF Faction on Canadian Participation in UNOSOM," telex GAA-1467 to High Commission in Nairobi, (25 September 1992): 2-3. Cited from: Files of DFAIT, 20-1-2-Somali, vol. 5.
[47] High Commission in Nairobi, "Somalia: Horn of Africa Roundtable, 2 October - Political Developments," telex WAGR-0895 to External Affairs, (30 September 1992): 4. Cited from: Files of DFAIT, 20-1-2-Somali, vol. 5.
[48] High Commission in Nairobi, "Somalia: Meeting with the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF)," telex WAGR-0952 to External Affairs, (14 October 1992): 5. Cited from: Files of DFAIT, 21-14-6-UNOSOM, vol. 4.

reaction" was foreseen, EAITC told Under-Secretaries-General (USG) Marrack Goulding of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and James Jonah of the UN Department of Political Affairs, "if Canadian troops arrived in Boosaaso and then were not involved in activities to secure the delivery of food aid, while at the same time television coverage would continue to show the miserable plight of starving Somalis in other parts of the country."[50] This was because the media was the key driver of Canada's policy toward the Somalia crisis. Canadian television and newspapers had concentrated on the shocking human impact of the famine, and once the government decided to engage it believed it had to be seen to be alleviating the suffering. Canada withdrew from Somalia in mid-1993 because the crisis had "lost its salience in Canadian domestic politics after it faded from the headlines." [51]

Another factor driving government policy was that it was strongly interested in participating in something that succeeded. Ottawa believed in the UN's multi-zone plan and countrywide approach to the famine. However, Canada equated success in Somalia with alleviating suffering, and it grew concerned that the UN had lost sight of this in the rush to get troops deployed. Ottawa therefore informed the UN on 9 October that the mission needed to be successful and be perceived to be successful by the media. For western publics such as Canada's, this meant helping to deliver food aid. Ottawa said that

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[49] Gerald E. Shannon, "Statement to the Coordination Meeting on Assistance for Somalia (12-13 October), Palais des Nations, Geneva," (12 October 1992): 1. Cited from: Files of DFAIT, 38-11-1-Somali-2, vol. 1.
[50] John Noble, "Somalia: Meetings with Jonah and Goulding," COSICS message C-EXOTT-IMD-0042 to Permanent Mission in New York, (9 October 1992): 2. Cited from: Files of DFAIT, 38-11-1-Somali, vol. 2.
[51] Kenneth D. Bush, "Somalia: When Two Anarchies Meet," Canada and Missions for Peace: Lessons from Nicaragua, Cambodia, and Somalia, eds. Gregory Wirick and Robert Miller, (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 1998) 92.

if there was anything Canada could do to help the mission get on the right track, the UN should just ask it for assistance.[52]

Although Ottawa was unhappy with its UNOSOM role in fall 1992, it did not withdraw because this would have further undermined the mission. The government maintained appearances in order to save both itself and the UN embarrassment. Leaving the mission was problematic in light of peacekeeping's domestic popularity. This would have gone against the assertive and interventionist principles that the Mulroney government announced in its new internationalist foreign policy. Withdrawal would have made a UN peacekeeping success less likely. Shortliffe noted that Ottawa did not want to complicate matters for the UN by publicising its grievances. As a result, Canada continued to support the mission right until it decided to do something else.[53]

The Prime Minister was also concerned about his public image. He did not want Canadians to think that he lacked determination or direction. "Mulroney would not have wanted to be seen as someone who bailed out on something because it was difficult," said Segal. That "would have been counter-intuitive for him."[54] He was also doubtless aware that peacekeeping's popularity in Canada could be used to offset the unpopularity of his own government.[55]

UNOSOM was Canada's only means of engagement in the Somalia crisis in fall 1992. Multilateralism and multilateral instruments of security were priorities because they enabled Canada to enhance its profile and acquire influence in the world. Hugh

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[52] Noble, "Somalia: Meetings with Jonah and Goulding," 1.
[53] Glen Shortliffe, "Interview with former Clerk of the Privy Council Glen Shortliffe," in Ottawa, Friday 21 July 2000.
[54] Hugh Segal, "Interview with former Chief of Staff of the Prime Minister's Office Hugh Segal," in Montréal, Wednesday 28 June 2000.

Segal, Mulroney's Chief of Staff, noted that "in the sense that we punch above our weight and we have more influence in the world because of our involvement in these things...they [EAITC] would be very reticent to have us be the first to bail out on any of those things and their preference would be that we be the last."[56]

The government therefore sought only to change its UNOSOM assignment. Ottawa instructed the Permanent Mission to the UN in New York to "ensure that Canadian concerns about the need to have humanitarian relief plans ready for the Boosaaso operation are conveyed to all relevant players."[57] Ambassador Louise Fréchette, Canada's Permanent Representative to the UN, met with Sahnoun and USGs Goulding and Jan Eliasson of the Department of Humanitarian Affairs at UN headquarters in mid-October. She told Sahnoun that there could be "negative implications for both Canada and the UN if troops arrived and found little to do in Boosaaso while to the south the famine continued unabated." Eliasson and Goulding were asked for "assurance that our soldiers would have food to escort once they landed at Boosaaso."[58]

As a result, Sahnoun, despite his interest in fostering reconciliation, found himself under pressure from Canada and the UN to get troops deployed to escort aid. Sahnoun wanted to stop the over-reliance on Mogadishu's port, which was the civil war's epicentre. His intention was to use UN troops to open other harbours to aid traffic, while providing the stability and security that would serve as the foundation for Somalia's

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[55] Andrew Cooper, Canadian Foreign Policy: Old Habits and New Directions, (Toronto: Prentice Hall, 1997) 185.
[56] Segal, "Interview," 28 June 2000.
[57] Noble, "Somalia: Meetings with Jonah and Goulding," 2.
[58] Kent Vachon, "Somalia: Meeting with Sahnoun," COSICS message C-PRMNY-WKGR-0950 to External Affairs, (16 October 1992): 2. Cited from: Files of DFAIT, 21-14-6-UNOSOM, vol. 4; and Nicole Rousseau, "Somalia," COSICS message C-PRMNY-WKGR-0913 to External Affairs, (13 October 1992): 1. Cited from: Files of DFAIT, 21-14-6-UNOSOM, vol. 4.

reconstruction. Sahnoun therefore curtly rejected, on 16 October, Ottawa's request to include Mogadishu in its reconnaissance.[59] He quieted Canada by authorising the UNOSOM troop reconnaissance and noting that a presence in the northeast was vital because it could then be held up as a model zone, serving as an example of the benefits of co-operation with the UN. There was a kernel of "modern civilisation and stability" in the region that needed to be preserved.[60] Canadian officials were impressed with Sahnoun and willing to continue working with him. The Canadian Embassy in Geneva said that he possessed "the intelligence, experience and subtleties that are necessary...to deal with the Somali factions," and that no one believed "the Secretary-General had chosen the wrong man for this very difficult assignment."[61]

However, Sahnoun came into conflict with the UN, which was under intense pressure to deal with the famine quickly, because of his desire to proceed gradually on reconciliation and not to push the humanitarian process faster than the factions wanted. Sahnoun had been negotiating with the socially influential clan Elders and the faction leaders to foster peace and secure consent for the deployments. The mission gradually became more acceptable to Somalis in Mogadishu as he made progress, but the UN and the media wanted more troops deployed to cope with the suffering, and what he was achieving did not satisfy international opinion. Boutros-Ghali strongly desired to act, but the need to secure the consent of the factions was frustrating its "over-riding concern to

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[59] Vachon, "Somalia: Meeting with Sahnoun," 2.
[60] Embassy in Geneva, "Somalia: UN Coordination Meeting on Humanitarian Assistance," telex YTGR-7112 to External Affairs, (21 October 1992): 6-7. Cited from: Files of DFAIT, 38-11-1-Somali-2, vol. 2; and External Affairs, "Meeting with Former SRSG Sahnoun," telex GAA-1859 to High Commission in Nairobi, (14 December 1992): 3. Cited from: Files of DFAIT, 20-1-2-Somali, vol. 5.
[61] Embassy in Geneva, "Somalia: UN Coordination Meeting," 11.

get military [forces] deployed as soon as possible."[62] Although agreements were reached with local disputants that normally would have implied a degree of co-operation with the UN, in Somalia these deals were often violated.[63]

Frustrated by the lack of progress, the UN started to doubt Sahnoun. By mid-October, the Secretary-General had become seriously concerned about Sahnoun's efforts to "understand" and establish "warm relations" with the capital's strongest faction leaders, Mohamed Farah Aidid and Ali Mahdi Mohamed. Boutros-Ghali believed that Sahnoun had allowed UNOSOM to succumb to a "protection racket," in which the UN paid the Somali gunmen to guard the aid convoys and the mission.[64] Violence was so common that NGO and UN workers would not go anywhere without hired gunmen, but this did not stop local merchants and faction leaders from arranging to steal donated food to keep market prices high.[65] As we will see in the next chapter, Sahnoun resigned on 26 October after receiving a telex from New York that harshly criticised his decision to hold a cross-clan reconciliation conference in the Seychelles Islands. But the underlying reason for his departure was the incompatibility between his consensus-building approach to peace, and Boutros-Ghali's preference for more decisiveness. Sahnoun reportedly told Phillip Johnston that, "For me to do my job, it is essential I have the complete confidence of the Secretary-General."[66] By October he did not have it.

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[62] Noble, "Somalia: Meetings with Jonah and Goulding," 2.
[63] Samuel M. Makinda, Seeking Peace From Chaos: Humanitarian Intervention in Somalia, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1993) 64.
[64] Boutros-Ghali, Unvanquished, 56-7.
[65] Paul Watson, "Famine Diary," Toronto Star, Sunday 13 September 1992: F1; and John Prendergast, "Staving Off Hunger and Food Bandits in Somalia," Wall Street Journal, Thursday 17 September 1992: A16.
[66] Cited in Johnston, Somalia Diary, 39.

As the UN attempted to press forward, the political and security situation deteriorated. Like the Somali saying, the UN found it was 'easy to come, but hard to stay,' which was a reference to Somalia's history of gradually undermining its occupiers.[67] Local resentment grew when the UN decided to deploy battalions without the consent of some factions. This was because not all Somalis wanted the civil war to end. Most of the young men who became bandits and faction members used to be nomadic herders, and for them times had never been better.[68] They did not want peacekeepers to arrive and reduce security guard revenues or prevent aid thefts. For Aidid, the assistance effort represented at best a brief windfall, and it is unclear how much he benefited from the international presence.[69] However, Aidid did not want the UN to deploy because he suspected the peacekeepers would prop up his rivals. The disputants intended to seize power by winning on the battlefield, not by submitting to the UN's procedural approach to peace in which the negotiation of a deal was followed with its implementation.[70] As the UN moved forward with deployment arrangements on the 23rd, more violence was directed against it. UN plans were stymied by fighting that

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[67] Lucie Edwards, "Interview with former High Commissioner to Kenya (with accreditation to Somalia) Ambassador Lucie Edwards," Tuesday 25 July 2000.
[68] David Kern, "Incentives and Disincentives for Violence," Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars, eds. Mats Berdal and David M. Malone, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2000) 21; and Andrew S. Natios, "Humanitarian Relief Intervention in Somalia: The Economics of Chaos," Learning From Somalia: The Lessons of Humanitarian Intervention, eds. Walter Clarke and Jeffery Herbst, (Boulder: Westview P, 1997) 85.
[69] David Shearer, "Aiding or Abetting? Humanitarian Aid and Its Economic Role in Civil War," Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars, eds. Mats Berdal and David M. Malone, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2000) 195.
[70] Christopher Clapham, "Being Peacekept," Peacekeeping in Africa, eds. Oliver Murray and Roy May, (Sydney: Ashgate, 1998) 305-6.

closed most airlift landing strips – including those near Kismayoo, Baidoa and Bardera – for days at a time, and interrupted or shut relief efforts down.[71]

By late November, UNOSOM's situation had become hopeless. The mission's position in Mogadishu was so precarious that Deputy Force Commander CF Colonel Jim Cox destroyed his confidential papers in the belief that an all-out attack was imminent.[72] The northeast sub-mission was also in total disarray. The High Commission in Nairobi again visited the area, this time with consultant Matthew Bryden, a Somali-speaking Canadian. The team learned that the UN Office in Boosaaso did not have a budget or functional communications with its headquarters, had no knowledge of the mission beyond what was outlined in resolution 775 (28 August), and did not know the CF advance party's approximate arrival date, even though this was barely a week away.[73] On 24 November, Boutros-Ghali told the Council that the "situation is not improving," and that it had become "exceedingly difficult for the United Nations operation to achieve the objectives approved by the Security Council."[74] This led US acting Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger to inform him the next day that the US was willing to lead a peace enforcement coalition into Somalia to create a secure environment for aid deliveries.

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[71] Jane Perlez, "UN Official in Somalia Quits in Dispute With Headquarters," New York Times, Wednesday 28 October 1992: A6.
[72] Jim Cox, "Interview with former UNOSOM Deputy Commander CF Brigadier-General Jim Cox," in Ottawa, Wednesday 16 August 2000.
[73] Matthew Bryden, "Interview with former High Commission in Nairobi consultant Matthew Bryden," Monday 18 September 2000.
[74] Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "Letter to the President of the Security Council on the Situation in Somalia,," S/24859, (27 November 1992). Cited in UN and Somalia, 209.

Conclusion:

Canada's desire for a short-term famine-alleviation role was illustrative of the limited degree to which the country wanted to help Somalia resolve its problems. Since Ottawa's desire to support multilateralism was fulfilled with the UNOSOM contribution, it did not want to provide the kind of deep or long-term assistance that restoring peace and security in Somalia would require.

As a result, the government was not interested in diplomatic peacemaking. It stayed aloof from the UN's peace process in Somalia because it received little international or domestic attention. The UN reconciliation effort was weak, poorly supported by the world community, and burdened by the complexity of having to negotiate with numerous sub-national parties from all over the country. EAITC doubted that success could be achieved in the near-term because of the mistrust and hatred between the disputants. These difficulties, and the fact that the government was not being pressured by opposition parties or NGOs to do more for peace, ensured that Canada's engagement with the crisis remained centred on humanitarian concerns.

The government concentrated on the famine because this was the main concern in Canada and it suited the country's military limitations. The western media was indispensable in attracting world attention to the civil war and disorder in Somalia, but journalists also tended to depoliticise the crisis and sentimentalise its victims in order to make emotional connections with their audiences. This helped ensure that the interest in Somalia did not expand beyond a visceral desire to relieve suffering. Ottawa was not faced with a domestic political constituency that wanted anything more than a

humanitarian role. The government found this convenient because the CF could not sustain a longer-term role aimed at stabilisation.

Ottawa contributed to UNOSOM because it appeared to be a promising multilateral operation. Canadian decision-makers began to doubt UNOSOM once the true nature of the CF's task was revealed. Despite this, the government remained engaged in order to avoid bringing discredit on itself for choosing the wrong mission or assignment, and to save the UN embarrassment that would have further undermined its efforts.

The UNOSOM commitment was maintained until late November because it was Canada's only means of engagement with the Somalia crisis, and the Prime Minister was concerned about improving his public image. The government believed that multilateral activities enabled Canada to play a larger role in the world, and UNOSOM remained the only way to have a role and to satisfy Canadians' mounting interest in the Somali famine. In addition, the Prime Minister did not wish to cancel his offer of troops. He did not want to appear weak, and he was aware that peacekeeping roles were domestically popular and that an activist commitment to this activity could help to restore his government's political fortunes.

However, Ottawa's interest in multilateralism conflicted with its desire to be seen delivering life-saving food. By contributing troops, Ottawa hoped to strengthen UN-led co-operative action and to show Canadians that their humanitarian values were being acted upon. The role in the northeast presented a problem because no one was starving in that area. The government believed that it would be criticised in the domestic media if the peacekeepers it deployed to Somalia did not have aid to deliver.

Ottawa was only satisfied when it learned that there would be some aid to distribute, and that its zone was critical to Sahnoun's overall peacekeeping and peacebuilding strategy. The pressure on Sahnoun and the UN to respond decisively to the food crisis, which was the main concern in the west, undermined UNOSOM. Canada added to the pressure on the UN that caused it to press forward and lose the consent of Aidid.

Chapter 7
More Determined UN Peacekeeping and the CF's Preparations to Deploy in Support of UNOSOM

Prime Minister Brian Mulroney's government wanted a role in the expanded and extended the UN Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM). The mission was being increased to 4, 219 troops and separated into five zones, four in Somalia and one in Kenya. The new UN strategy addressed some of the problems with the original operation, such as its over-centralisation in Mogadishu, but it did not alter the fact that securing the consent of all key disputants, which was essential to successful peacekeeping, was extremely difficult in the middle of a civil war. In August, the government contributed a Canadian Forces (CF) battle group to UNOSOM under the name Operation Cordon. This demonstrated that Ottawa strongly supported the UN-led efforts and shared the organisation's determination to press ahead with UNOSOM's expansion despite local opposition. But Ottawa lacked a clear understanding of the tasks it would perform in Somalia, and it engaged without knowing that the UN plan had been fatally undermined by the overbearing way it was implemented. The government committed to UNOSOM to strengthen international confidence in UN-led multilateralism, but the mission it supported would have the opposite effect.

Mohamed Sahnoun, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) in Somalia and overall head of UNOSOM, was the inspiration for the expansion of the mission. He believed that the humanitarian and reconciliation activities authorised by Security Council resolution 751 (24 April) could be implemented more easily if it was decentralised. As a result, he called for the establishment of UN Offices at a major port in four Somali regions: northwest (Berbera), the northeast (Boosaaso), central (Mogadishu),

and south (Kismaayo).[1] Headed by a Zone Director reporting directly to the SRSG, each Office would manage UNOSOM, non-governmental organisation (NGO) and UN aid agency operations in their area and co-ordinate them with Mogadishu.

UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali proposed a fifth zone to be located in the town of Mandera, Kenya in his 24 August report to the Council. He hoped that NGOs and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees would manage the zone, and that it would be able to feed starving Somalis in the adjoining Gedo district before the need for food forced them to leave their homes. The plan called for UNOSOM peacekeepers (at first Nigerians, and later Egyptians) to escort food convoys from Mandera into Gedo. This was supposed to forestall mass migrations into Kenya and decrease tensions along the border.[2] Boutros-Ghali was optimistic about this proposal because a UN Technical Team had visited Gedo in mid-August, and had found that the local people would welcome a UN presence.[3] However, Kenyan President Daniel Arap Moi believed that Somali problems should be solved inside Somalia[4] and his officials expressed irritation over not being adequately consulted before the plan's release.[5] Moi was also "unusually sensitive to the domestic involvement of foreign countries" since Kenya was in the midst

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[1] Imtiaz Shaheen, et al., "Political and Military Events in Somalia, From Cease-fire Agreement to Resolution Multinational Force Deployment, 3 March-3 December 1992," unpublished mss., (15 December 1992): 14.

[2] Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "Report to the Security Council on the situation in Somalia," S/24480, (24 August): paras. 22, 25. Cited from United Nations, United Nations and Somalia, 1992-1996 (New York: United Nations, 1996). (Hereafter cited as UN and Somalia.)

[3] Boutros-Ghali, "Report on the situation in Somalia," (24 August): paras. 25, 31. Cited from: UN and Somalia.

[4] "Confidential Interview with UN officer Involved in UNOSOM I and II," Tuesday 27 February 2001.

[5] John Noble, "Somalia: Meetings with Jonah and Goulding," to Canadian Permanent Mission to the UN, COSICS formal message C-EXOTT-IMD-0042 (9 October 1992): para. 3. Cited from: Files of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), 38-11-1-Somali, vol. 2.

of its first multi-party elections.[6] In early October, Moi informed the UN that it would not be allowed to establish a UNOSOM zone in Kenya.

The zones in Kenya and Somalia were supposed to assist UNOSOM's relief and reconciliation efforts by lessening its exposure to the disorder in and around Mogadishu. NGOs had aid in their 'pipeline,' but it was almost impossible to deliver food to the starving in the capital or the surrounding countryside because there was no one to protect their convoys from looters. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) had been forced to break with tradition and hire roughly 2, 600 gunmen to protect its personnel, convoys and warehouses in Somalia.[7] ICRC President Cornelio Sommaruga, in his preface to the organisation's annual review of 1992, wrote that "[n]ever before had our activities in certain conflicts seemed so fundamentally questioned."[8] Sahnoun hoped that the presence of armed peacekeepers in the zone port cities would provide new delivery options and the security requested by some NGOs. They might also have "collateral good" for the reconciliation effort, he said, since "because of them we were already working on the idea of having a police. So in a sense all of these things were following each other."[9]

Boutros-Ghali strongly supported this comprehensive approach, but some of its objectives were likely too ambitious. He wanted the world body to become more effective in Somalia, and he hoped that the redesigned and strengthened UNOSOM

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[6] High Commission in Nairobi, "Somalia / UNOSOM: Request for Troops," to External Affairs / IDS / GAA, NDHQ, PCO, telex WAGR-0802, (2 September 1992): 1-2. Cited from: Files of DFAIT, 21-14-6-UNOSOM, vol. 4.
[7] Caroline Moorhead, Dunant's Dream: War, Switzerland and the History of the Red Cross, (New York: Carroll and Graf, 1999) 686.
[8] Cited in Moorhead, 685.
[9] Mohamed Sahnoun, "Interview with Ambassador Mohamed Sahnoun, former Special Representative of the Secretary-General to Somalia," in Ottawa, Tuesday 7 August 2001.

would be able to accomplish a broad range of tasks. The Secretary-General commented that the mission would be responsible for protecting aid deliveries and monitoring ceasefires (peacekeeping), fostering a settlement through "conciliation, mediation and good offices" (diplomatic peacemaking), and demobilising and disarming the Somali fighters (peacebuilding).[10] The latter related to the construction of self-sustaining peace. UNOSOM's peacebuilding tasks may seem overly ambitious, but they were consistent with the international community's view at the time that, once the UN provided stability, the disputants would come to their senses and with help sort things out themselves.[11]

Another difficulty was that decentralisation of UNOSOM created problems that should have made the UN and Canada reconsider this approach. The zone plan was in response to two problems: security was needed in the countryside and the capital; and UNOSOM's five-hundred-person security force (in place in Mogadishu as of mid-September) was "far too small and ill-equipped, given the lawlessness and violence in Mogadishu."[12] The new strategy did nothing to alleviate the second concern. It sought to avoid the extremely insecure capital, even though that city was the heart of the relief effort because it had the country's largest functioning port and was close to the main land routes into the famine-stricken inter-riverine area.[13] This should have made Canada pause as well, because its priority was a humanitarian role, and the expanded UNOSOM was

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[10] Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "Report to the Security Council on the Situation in Somalia," S/24343, (22 July 1992): para. 57a-d. Cited from UN and Somalia.

[11] Paul Heinbecker, "Interview with Canada's Permanent Representative to the UN Ambassador Paul Heinbecker," Friday 16 August 2002.

[12] Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "Introduction," The United Nations and Somalia: 1992-1996, (New York: United Nations, 1996) 26; and United Nations, "Secretary-General Opens Photo Exhibit on 'Somalia's Cry,'" press release SG/SM/4855, (17 November 1992): 1.

[13] John Hirsch and Robert Oakley, Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping, (Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 1995) 26.

calling for tasks and deployments that were far removed in some cases from the mass famine in the south.

More seriously, UNOSOM's strength was increased too assertively, and this undercut the UN's entire zonal strategy. Sahnoun's negotiations with the factions had revolved around the deployment of 500-person battalions, and he was evidently making progress because the Council established the zones with resolution 767 (27 July).[14] However, an important change is evident in Boutros-Ghali's 24 August report to the Council, which called for 750-person battalions for Mandera and the southern, northwest and northeast zones in Somalia, on top of the 500 approved "in principle" for the central zone under resolution 751 (24 April). In an addendum to his report, the Secretary-General requested another 719 logistics troops, which would increase UNOSOM to 4, 219.[15] Boutros-Ghali doubled what Sahnoun had been discussing with the Somalis, and he got Council approval for the plan under resolution 775 (28 August) without having bothered to consult the factions about it. The Somalis saw this as an insult and a breach of faith. According to Sahnoun, they grumbled,

> 'these people at the UN are double-crossing us. They tell us something, and they are doing something else.' That was the sort of thing people resented...We were suddenly seen as enemies. They were before more sitting as friends, but suddenly, they became suspicious...And that is when the problems started.[16]

Council resolution 775 re-approved the zones, and by mistake increased UNOSOM to only 3, 500. It had overlooked the request for the logistics personnel, but the President of

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[14] Sahnoun, "Interview," 7 August 2001.
[15] Boutros-Ghali, "Report on the Situation in Somalia," S/24480, (24 August): paras. 36-7; and Add. 1: para. 1. Cited from UN and Somalia.
[16] Sahnoun, "Interview," 7 August 2001.

the Council rectified this in an 8 September letter (S/24532) to Boutros-Ghali.[17] But as Sahnoun indicates, the Somalis greeted the sudden news of the expansion with hostility, and this foreshadowed an important change in how they perceived and responded to the mission.

Boutros-Ghali's fait accompli was not a misreading of the Somali political scene, but part of a new method of dealing with the factions who were interfering with UN relief and reconciliation efforts. The UN did not know how to ensure that the international community's will would be respected in places where no government existed. There was no one who could negotiate a Status of Forces Agreement to confirm the mission's status in the country (which defined what peacekeepers could and could not be do and served to provide a measure of protection for the mission). Under-Secretary-General Marrack Goulding, who headed the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, said UNOSOM's difficulties related directly to the absence of recognised political leaders who could reliably conclude agreements pertaining to mission deployments and activities.[18] The UN thus decided, with Canadian and broad international support, to adopt a more determined peacekeeping approach that adhered less rigorously to the principle of consent.

This attitude was reflected in Boutros-Ghali's conflict resolution blueprint, An Agenda For Peace (June 1992). It described peacekeeping as "the deployment of a United

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[17] United Nations, S/RES/775 (28 August 1992): operative paras. 2-3; and José Ayala Lasso, "Letter from the President of the Security Council to the Secretary-General," S/24532, (8 September 1992): para 1. Both documents cited from UN and Somalia.

[18] Marrack Goulding, "The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping," International Affairs, 69.3 (1993): 458.

Nations presence in the field, *hitherto* with the consent of all the parties concerned."[19] This statement did not mean that the UN was prepared to apply force in certain situations, since that would have run against the impartial and non-violent UN organisational culture.[20] Rather, it was intended to give the UN flexibility when it came to coping with less permissive environments like Somalia. In doing so, An Agenda For Peace showed that the UN was profoundly naïve when it came to trying to control civil violence, in that a decreased reliance on consent could easily, as in Somalia, heighten the resentment local populations felt toward peacekeepers, making the avoidance of the use of arms more difficult. This would have negative implications for the UN. While peacekeeping was seen as something the Secretary-General managed, the use of force was the purview of powerful states.[21]

UN assertiveness also dismayed the UNOSOM officials who had worked hard on its consensual approach. Force Commander Brigadier-General Imtiaz Shaheen, for example, rejected the UN's "boorish attitude," arguing that "[w]e were not there to wage war on the people that we were to save, but arrogance got the better of the powers that be."[22] Sahnoun was not able to secure agreements for the extra troops announced by Boutros-Ghali, and although he continued as SRSG until 26 October, he believed in late August that he might have to resign.[23] Sahnoun had been publicly critical of the UN aid agencies for their slow response (especially compared to the ICRC), and this created

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[19] Italics added. See Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "An Agenda For Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping," A/47/277 - S/24111, (17 June 1992): para. 20.
[20] Adam Roberts, "From San Francisco to Sarajevo: The UN and the Use of Force," Survival, 37.4 (Winter 1995-96): 15; and Kofi Annan, "Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 53/35: The Fall of Srebrenica," United Nations document A/54/549, (15 November 1999): para 505.
[21] Innis Claude, "Peace and Security: Prospective Roles for the Two United Nations," Global Governance 2 (1996): 295.
[22] Imtiaz Shaheen, "Letter to Author," (3 March 2000): 1.

tension with Boutros-Ghali, but their disagreement was larger than this. At root it related to the Secretary-General's desire to be more assertive and to deploy a larger force even without the consent of all factions.[24] Sahnoun "got into a collision course with the Secretary-General," said Maurice Baril, Boutros-Ghali's Military Advisor, "because he would not agree with the approach we were taking."[25] The UN hoped that this would produce more rapid results, but it actually it weakened Sahnoun's ability to deal with the factions. Assertiveness was incompatible with his gradual, consensual, bottom-up peacemaking strategy that involved tapping the existing sources of local leadership, especially clan Elders and civil society representatives (intellectuals, NGOs and others), to rebuild stability.

As the UN attempted to move forward, the security situation worsened because Mohamed Farah Aidid, a key faction leader, had not consented to the UN plan to expand UNOSOM. Aidid did not want more blue helmets to deploy. He noted in September that "[t]here's no need for any more troops. We consider this a Somali problem."[26] The UN, in contrast, was becoming impatient with its lack of progress. The UN argued that the new UNOSOM was impartial, and that its "object [was] to save lives, defeat the sceptres of famine and civil strife and pave the way to political reconciliation,"[27] but the Secretary-General's show of determination in August made Aidid less likely to co-

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[23] Sahnoun, "Interview," 7 August 2001.
[24] Samuel M. Makinda, Seeking Peace From Chaos: Humanitarian Intervention in Somalia, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1993) 68-9.
[25] Maurice Baril, "Interview with Chief of the Defence Staff General Maurice Baril," at NDHQ in Ottawa, Friday 18 August 2000.
[26] Andrew Bilski, "Wings of Hope," Maclean's, 105.39 (28 September 1992): 35.
[27] United Nations, "UN Calls on Somali People to Co-operate with Special Representative to Save Lives, Defeat Famine and Strife, Pave Way for Reconciliation," press release SG/SM/4848, (2 November 1992): 1. See also "Secretary-General Sends Message of Hope and Reassurance to Somali People, Saying UN Mandate is One of Peace and Co-operation," press release SG/SM/4854, (13 November 1992).

operate with the mission. Although Sahnoun continued to make progress in September and October, his last initiative, a cross-clan peace seminar involving Somali intellectuals, took place in the Seychelles Islands on 23-6 October without Aidid's support. Aidid was less willing to co-operate with Sahnoun or respect UNOSOM's claim to impartiality.

Sahnoun resigned on 26 October as Aidid's mistrust of the UN was on the rise. Osman Hassan Ali 'Ato', a chief Aidid financier, told Nairobi High Commission interlocutors in late October that Aidid believed Sahnoun and the UN were playing games with him, and were wasting time through bureaucratic procedures.[28] On the 28th, Aidid withdrew his consent for and threatened to oppose the implementation of the multi-zone plan. He indicated that the Pakistani battalion in the capital "would no longer be tolerated in the streets of Mogadishu," and that any other "forcible UNOSOM deployment would be met by violence, and that the deployment of United Nations troops in Kismaayo [the southern zone] and Berbera [the northwest zone] was no longer acceptable."[29] The operation's position became impossible once Aidid's consent and co-operation had disappeared.[30]

Under the circumstances, Sahnoun likely did as well as anyone could have. However, his gradual reconciliation process meant that millions were being spent to deliver only a trickle of food, and this clashed with the desire in New York, Ottawa and elsewhere to immediately implement more effective international action. The pressure to

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[28] High Commission in Nairobi, "Somalia: Somali National Alliance (SNA) Views," telex WAGR-0975 to External Affairs, (21 October 1992): 2. Cited from: Files of DFAIT, 20-1-2-Somali, vol. 5.
[29] Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "Letter to from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council," S/24859, (27 November 1992). Cited in: UN and Somalia, 207.
[30] Jane Boulden, The United Nations and Mandate Enforcement: Congo, Somalia, and Bosnia, Martello Paper # 20, (Kingston-Québec City: Queen's University-Université Laval, 1999) 53.

act was severe when resolution 775 was approved on 28 August,[31] and as the months passed it became more intense. Few democratic governments did not feel pressed by the clamour to 'do something' when faced with the depictions of horrible suffering, and UN peacekeeping was 'something' that they could 'do' in Somalia.[32]

The government felt this pressure and shared the humanitarian motives that animated the UN and other countries. Ottawa agreed to a CF airlift contribution (see chapter five) and a relief delivery role for the Canadian Airborne Regiment (Cdn AB Regt.) near the town of Boosaaso, the main port in UNOSOM's northeast zone. The Joint Staff (J Staff) and Force Mobile Command (FMC, the Land Force) set about preparing for Operation Cordon in August, even though the CF had difficulty with aspects of the UN multi-zone approach. The CF was worried about the lack of a UN evacuation plan, and it thought that the idea of separating the UNOSOM battalions in Somalia by vast distances was militarily unsound.[33] More importantly, it did not know what its contingent would do upon arrival in Somalia. However, while the CF had concerns, it did not see the operation as a major challenge.

The CF's top leaders started to determine the basic shape of a Somalia contingent shortly after they learned in late July that the government wanted Canada involved in UNOSOM. National Defence Headquarters' (NDHQ) senior operations officers – General John de Chastelain, Vice-Admiral John Anderson and Major-General Paul Addy

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[31] Douglas Fraser, "Somalia / UNOSOM: Official Request," COSICS formal message C-PRMNY-WKGR-0617 to External Affairs, (31 August 1992): 1. Cited from: Files of DFAIT: 21-14-6-UNOSOM, vol. 3.
[32] Shashi Tharoor, "Should UN Peacekeeping Go 'Back to Basics'?" Survival, 37.4 (Winter 1995-96): 55.
[33] Paul Addy, "Interview with Lieutenant-General (ret'd) Paul Addy," in Ottawa, Monday 7 February 2000.

– started the planning process with an informal meeting on the mission.[34] These officers or their substitutes (Lieutenant-General Kent Foster was acting VCDS in late July) addressed the CDS' main challenge regarding Somalia: "assessing our capability for involvement in another battalion-level UN operation – in addition to the ones ongoing at the time – and determining if or how they could all be sustained."[35] At a follow-up meeting, Lieutenant-General Jim Gervais, the Commander of FMC, was present to discuss the land force's capabilities. These and the subsequent high-level meetings shaped the J Staff and FMC preparations.

Concurrent with these talks were the J Staff preparations. The day after authorisation of Council resolution 767 (27 July), the CDS, acting on a prime ministerial request (see chapter five), asked Addy to have the J Staff determine if the CF could provide significant assistance. J3 Plans was tasked to determine whether the CF could deploy a battalion. It consulted with J3 Peacekeeping, J5 Policy Operations, the environmental Commands, and regarding resources with Anderson, J1 Personnel and J4 Finance. Once this was done, J3 Plans confirmed on 31 July that the CF could deploy a battalion (four possible units were identified[36]) that could be self-sufficient for sixty days as the UN had requested, and that this would cost $ 58.1 million, of which $ 23.1 million was non-budgeted expense incurred because of the mission.[37] J3 Plans had been thinking

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[34] De Chastelain was Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS), Anderson was Vice Chief of the Defence Staff (VCDS), and Addy was Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (Intelligence, Security, Operations) or the DCDS (ISO). Paul Addy, "Interview with Lieutenant-General (ret'd) Paul Addy," in Ottawa, Monday 21 March 2000.

[35] John de Chastelain, "Letter to Author," (Belfast, Ireland: 20 September 2000): 1.

[36] The units were: 5^{e} Regiment d'artillerie légère du Canada (5th Regiment Royal Canadian Artillery), 12^{e} Régiment Blindé du Canada (12th Armoured Regiment of Canada), Royal Canadian Dragoons, and the Canadian Airborne Regiment.

[37] Rick Froh, "Option Analysis for a Security Battalion in Support of UN Humanitarian Assistance Operations in Somalia as Requested by CDS," (31 July 1992): paras. 5-6, 8, 11-12. Cited from: Information

about a deployment to Mogadishu, but the estimate remained valid when the mission shifted to northeast Somalia.

The J Staff policy branch was positive about a role in Somalia, in part because it fit the multilateral humanitarian strain in the government's foreign policy. "Somalia caught people's attention," said Larry Murray, the Associate Assistant Deputy Minister (Policy & Communications), and there was "openness to be as helpful as we could...that was the mindset."[38] An aide mémoire reminded Minister of National Defence Marcel Masse that resolution 767 (27 July) called upon "the international community as a whole to provide urgent humanitarian assistance to Somalia." Alleviating mass suffering and the resulting disorder was a national priority, and by late July the UN had identified new requirements that Canada could fill. The policy officers noted "Canada has already expressed considerable concern over the situation in Somalia, " and that participation in UNOSOM would be consistent these statements.[39] Military decision makers believed that multilateral operations like UNOSOM could be effective vehicles for protecting human rights in war-torn regions. Murray has noted that while the CF was not euphoric about peacekeeping, "there was a real awareness that the Cold War world was gone, and that the Persian Gulf War had been a successful military intervention." As a result, the policy staff in NDHQ determined the UN's needs and what Canada could do to help.

The expanded UNOSOM was more in line with CF defence policy regarding peacekeeping, notably regarding the potential for success. According to the J5 Policy

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Legacy: A Compendium of Source Material from the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services Canada, 1997): document: DND002070. (Hereafter cited as Information Legacy.)

[38] Larry Murray, "Interview with Vice-Admiral (ret'd) Larry Murray," in Ottawa, Friday 28 April 2000.

Operations Colonel John Bremner, the resolution 751 (24 April) mandate, which was declined, and the resolution 775 (28 August) mandate, which Canada accepted, called for "two different missions...[with] different force levels, different objectives, different areas, different everything." A second policy analysis was undertaken in late July and early August, and UNOSOM was now "assessed as being viable and Canada said yes."[40]

UNOSOM could easily have remained unattractive in August. The security situation in Somalia was just as bad in August as in May, and the multi-zone plan was militarily questionable and contained few new opportunities for humanitarian relief in the famine area. Mulroney's desire for an engagement, which was demonstrated by his 13 August letter to Boutros-Ghali offering Canadian peacekeepers, likely diminished the weight attached to these factors. As a result, Ottawa welcomed the informal UN request for a 750-person battalion on 25 August. The urgent and desperate nature of the Somali crisis led the UN to formalise its request on the 31st, even before Ottawa could agree.[41]

J3 Peacekeeping's Colonel Mike Houghton got to an early start on the multi-zone mission because of the information he received informally from Colonel Douglas Fraser, the Military Representative with Canada's Permanent Mission to the UN in New York. For Houghton, the Secretary-General's 22 July report was a "major development" that signified the "dropping of the first plan that we had recommended as a result of the technical mission I was on, and a new mission going in, and [the] coming up with an

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[39] John de Chastelain and Robert Fowler, "Somalia: UN Request for a Security Battalion," (2 September 1992): paras. 2-3. Cited from Information Legacy (1997): document: DND000885.
[40] John Bremner, "Testimony of Colonel John Bremner to the Somalia Inquiry," Tuesday 24 October 1995. Cited from Information Legacy, vol. 8, (1997): 1572-3.
[41] Fraser, "Somalia / UNOSOM: Official Request," (31 August 1992): 1. Cited from: Files of DFAIT: 21-14-6-UNOSOM, vol. 3.

entirely new plan."[42] Canada was unable to place a CF member on the second UN Technical Mission that developed the new operational plan outlined by the Secretary-General in his 24 August report and authorised by resolution 775 (28 August). This would have provided the CF with current and specific information on UNOSOM's requirements. These technical reconnaissances could be quite useful. When Canada prepared for its northeast Somalia assignment, it drew on one of the ideas – using a ship (the HMCS Preserver) to serve as a logistics base and headquarters – that Houghton had developed for the UN while on its March-April reconnaissance.[43]

J3 Peacekeeping did not plan large deployments or select units for duty, but it did monitor the readiness of the CF and track developments at UN Headquarters. Colonel Fraser contacted Houghton informally a second time in mid-August, providing one of the first indications that Canada would be asked for a battalion for Boosaaso, and passing on the details of the second Technical Mission's plan.[44] Houghton's cell helped J3 Plans determine which battalions could deploy. This was General Gervais' decision, but J3 Peacekeeping, after consulting with the latter, contributed to the J Staff estimate. Houghton told the Somalia Inquiry that he pointed to the Airborne because he had followed its desert training for the UN Mission for the Referendum in the Western Sahara (MINURSO), which had been indefinitely postponed in February 1992, and he believed it had an edge in the individualist, self-reliant training that was required in Somalia, which

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[42] See chapter 3 for more information on the first UN Technical Mission. Mike Houghton, "Testimony of Colonel (ret'd) Mike Houghton to the Somalia Inquiry," Monday 12 February 1996. Cited from Information Legacy, vol. 44, (1997): 8685.
[43] Mike Houghton, "Interview with Colonel (ret'd) Mike Houghton," in Ottawa, Wednesday 27 April 2000.
[44] Houghton, "Testimony to the Somalia Inquiry," Information Legacy, vol. 44, (1997): 8686.

was totally lacking in infrastructure.[45] And yet, Houghton may also have been trying to justify his actions to the Inquiry. He had been a supporter of the Airborne, and was one of its former commanders. Houghton wanted to see it receive the Somalia tasking, and this led him to urge senior CF leaders to chose the Airborne for the mission.[46]

Bernd Horn argues that former Airborne members like Houghton and General Foster influenced the section process for UNOSOM so that the regiment was chosen. Horn is right that these and other officers pressed for its selection at every opportunity.[47] However, Addy and Gervais, who were the key decision makers on this issue, have argued that this pressure did not influence them because they had their own reasons for selecting the unit. Addy has argued that the 'airborne family' factor was irrelevant and was ignored, and that the Airborne was selected for four reasons: it was a well-trained unit whose members had at least one regimental tour with another unit; it had undergone mission-specific training for MINURSO; they were inoculated; and they were the CF's designated UN stand-by unit.[48] These factors made choosing the Airborne a practical decision. Murray, who succeeded Addy as DCDS in February 1993, has noted that it was incredibly obvious that the Airborne was the right unit for the job, and he could not recall anyone suggesting an alternative.[49]

Of the factors mentioned by Addy, the most decisive one was the Airborne's UN stand-by status. Considering the operational strain that the CF was under – it had a battle

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[45] Houghton, "Testimony to the Somalia Inquiry," Information Legacy, (1997): vol. 12, 2261; and vol. 44, 8707.
[46] Bernd Horn, "Interview with Lieutenant-Colonel Bernd Horn and Dr. William Bentley," in Ottawa, Tuesday 2 May 2000.
[47] Bernd Horn, Bastard Sons: An Examination of Canada's Airborne Experience, 1942-1995, (St. Catherine's: Vanwell, 2001) 192.
[48] Addy, "Interview," 7 February 2000
[49] Larry Murray, "Interview with Vice-Admiral (ret'd) Larry Murray," in Ottawa, Friday 17 March 2000.

group in Croatia, another on the way to Bosnia-Herzegovina, a battalion in Cyprus (until June 1993), and other small roles – it made sense that the otherwise unoccupied stand-by unit take the Somalia tasking. This was what convinced de Chastelain to send the Airborne. "I believe," he has argued, "that any suggestion that the Airborne Regiment was recommended for the Somalia operation for a reason other than because it was the standby battalion, is incorrect."[50]

However, readers should also note that de Chastelain and the CF's other senior decision makers made these statements after the Inquiry's investigation into the Airborne's deployment to Somalia. The illegal killing of a Somali civilian by Airborne personnel resulted in these officers becoming reluctant to admit that there was anything improper in the way the regiment was selected. According to Bern Horn, "a lot of the senior leadership [have been] trying to back away because people were asking them why they picked the Airborne, why didn't they know of the problems in the unit, and were trying to blame them for the problems. They [senior CF leaders] are saying that the unit was chosen through the normal process and that yes, something happened, but it is not my fault because they were chosen as per normal. But it wasn't as per normal."[51]

Land Force Commander General Gervais has stressed that there were good reasons for choosing the Airborne. When it comes to the shape of a contingent involving their personnel, environmental Commanders' input is extremely significant.[52] Although the J Staff had recommended four possible units, and had noted that the Airborne's size

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[50] John de Chastelain, "Letter to Author," (3 April 2000): 2.
[51] Horn, "Interview," 2 May 2000.
[52] David Huddleston, "Interview with Lieutenant-General (ret'd) David Huddleston," Monday 18 December 2000.

had been recently cut and that it lacked enough qualified armoured vehicle drivers,[53] this was not significant to Gervais, who was solely responsible for choosing which of his units should deploy overseas. Gervais picked the Airborne because this suited the Land Force's ongoing restructuring programme and took into account its already heavy operational burden. As a result, he had made up his mind that the regiment would be the one to go by late July.[54] Brigadier-General Ernest Beno recalled that when he arrived at Canadian Forces Base Petawawa on 7 August to take command of the Special Service Force Brigade (SSF), of which the Airborne was one of ten units, the latter's selection for Somalia was fait accompli.[55]

The Land Force reorganisation was the key structural reason behind the assignment of the Somalia tasking to the paratroopers. In 1991-92, FMC (renamed Land Forces Command or LFC in mid-October 1992) had started to regroup its forces into four geographic areas – Land Forces Atlantic Area, Secteur Québec des Forces Terrestres (SQFT), Land Forces Central Area (Ontario), and Land Forces Western Area – which reported back to FMC. Gervais was acting on the principle that the physical occupation of the nation's territory is a unique army responsibility. The new structure was also a convenient way to subdivide the growing number of CF peacekeeping operations among

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[53] Froh, "Option Analysis for a Security Battalion in Support of UN Humanitarian Assistance Operations in Somalia as Requested by CDS," (31 July 1992): para. 19. Froh raised the same objections in a different estimate prepared a day earlier for the CDS. See Rick Froh, "Option Analysis for a Security Battalion in Support of UN Humanitarian Assistance Operations in Somalia as Requested by CDS," (30 July 1992): para. 18. Cited from: Information Legacy (1997): De Faye Board of Inquiry – Exhibit # 110.

[54] Jim Gervais, "Interview with Lieutenant-General (ret'd) Jim Gervais," in Ottawa, Wednesday 12 July 2000.

[55] Ernest Beno, "Interview with Brigadier-General (ret'd) Ernest Beno," in Kingston, Wednesday 24 May 2000.

the Land Force. The idea was to get "at least one major commitment, because there were also others associated with UN missions, for each of the three of the areas."[56]

Under the Area structure, the Airborne was the best of the available choices, and this was one reason why it was selected over the three other units in the J3 Plans estimate for Somalia. FMC gave SQFT the battle group-sized task that the government had accepted in September 1992 in Bosnia called Operation Cavalier (originally Operation Dagger).[57] This meant the armoured units from that Area – 12^{e} Régiment Blindé du Canada and 5^{e} Régiment d'artillerie légère du Canada – were unavailable even through the estimate had counted them as possibilities. Western Area was also "entirely committed." Its responsibilities included Operations Harmony (Croatia) and Snowgoose (Cyprus), a North Atlantic Treaty Organisation role (the Western Area had to be ready to contribute a unit to the Composite Force / Allied Mobile Force (Land) in an emergency), and the maintenance an immediate reaction unit in case of an internal crisis.[58]

Land Forces Central Area and the SSF at Petawawa were consequently named the mounting area and assembly base for Operation Cordon. The Royal Canadian Dragoons (RCD), the SSF armoured regiment cited in the J3 Plans estimate, was excluded by FMC for three reasons. The RCD was busy because it had to provide up to a squadron (roughly

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[56] Only three areas are mentioned because only three (Québec, Central and Western) had brigade groups. The Atlantic Area (which was stood up last, in fall 1992) had just one infantry unit, namely 2nd Battalion, Royal Canadian Regiment at CFB Gagetown. Gervais, "Testimony of Lieutenant-General (ret'd) James Gervais to the Somalia Inquiry." Cited from: Information Legacy, vol. 47 (1997): 9397.

[57] John de Chastelain, "Testimony of General (ret'd) John de Chastelain to the Somalia Inquiry," Information Legacy, vol. 49 (1997): 9947.

[58] W. I. Kennedy, "Briefing Notes: FMC to CDS, Ops Cordon and Dagger Planning," (4 September): 3, para. 18. Cited from Information Legacy (1997): document: DND131215. The date given on this document, "92/04/02," is not correct. Based on its contents, this is likely the briefing that took place on the 4th as mentioned in Dishonoured Legacy: The Lessons of the Somalia Affair, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, vol. 3, (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services Canada, 1997) 719-20. (Hereafter cited as Dishonoured Legacy.)

one-third of its strength) to SQFT's Bosnian mission. Somalia was seen as an infantry mission that could be more easily accomplished by mounted soldiers (the Airborne) than dismounted tank drivers (the RCD), and the RCD's main piece of equipment, the Cougar fire support / tank trainer vehicle, was considered to be overkill for a UN peacekeeping mission.[59] If the RCD was sent to Somalia, Gervais believed, the unit would require cross- training on the Grizzly, which was the less combat-capable general-purpose armoured vehicle used by 1 battalion, Royal Canadian Regiment (RCR). According to Gervais, mounting the Airborne on 1 RCR vehicles was better than tying up two armoured battalions (the RCD and 1 RCR) for Operation Cordon.[60]

But instead of focussing on this reorganisation plan, the Inquiry focused on the Airborne. The Commissioners concluded that concern for morale within the unit, and not its ability to deploy rapidly, was behind its selection. The Inquiry argued that "there was nothing in the designation of the [regiment] as Canada's UN standby unit that uniquely suited it for the Somalia mission," and that, in fact, the Airborne "could not possibly [have] deploy[ed] within seven days for the Somalia operation."[61] However, the CF's decision was not made based on morale. As is discussed below, de Chastelain was so confident of the Airborne's ability to establish a presence in theatre quickly that he reminded the UN that the CF had this capability.

For the CF, morale was only significant in relation to the Airborne's on-call posture. Military decision-makers recognised that the Airborne could not always be held back because it was the CF's rapid-reaction unit, and thus it was selected for MINURSO

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[59] Gervais, "Testimony to the Somalia Inquiry," Information Legacy, vol. 47 (1997): 9398.
[60] Gervais, "Testimony to the Somalia Inquiry," Information Legacy, vol. 47 (1997): 9398.
[61] Dishonoured Legacy, vol. 2, (1997): 494.

and, when that was cancelled, for UNOSOM.[62] But morale, de Chastelain noted, was secondary in the case of Operation Cordon, although morale was not a secondary issue.[63] While boosting morale was a concern, the CF picked the Airborne because the situation was urgent, there were no other appropriate choices, and it was the stand-by unit. "It would have been unusual," de Chastelain wrote later, "not to select the standby battalion for the task, especially given the number of other combat units involved in other overseas operations, either deployed, just returned or preparing for deployment."[64]

In addition to the operational pressure being placed on the CF in mid-1992, the CF believed that the Airborne was best suited for Somalia because of the indications that the UN wanted battalions in theatre quickly. A deployment appeared imminent by August. Mulroney had indicated that Canada was prepared to contribute to the now high-profile UNOSOM, the United States was airing the possibility of the CF replacing the slow-moving Pakistanis as the lead battalion in Mogadishu, and on the 31st, Assistant-Secretary-General Kofi Annan of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations expressed the hope that the CF could be on the ground in the northeast in two to three weeks.[65] The Airborne had been designated the standby unit to handle contingencies such as this. It could deploy in about a week, assuming that most of its equipment and logistical support followed, and the CDS therefore ensured that the UN knew that Canada could move promptly if necessary. At the morning Daily Executive Meeting (DEM) on 3

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[62] "Confidential interview with senior government official," Monday 26 June 2000.
[63] de Chastelain, "Testimony to the Somalia Inquiry," Tuesday 20 February 1996. Cited from Information Legacy, vol. 49, (1997): 9931.
[64] de Chastelain, "Letter to Author," (3 April 2000): 2.
[65] Douglas Fraser, "UNOSOM Developments," COSICS formal message C-PRMNY-WKGR-0596 to External Affairs, (25 August 1992): 1; and Fraser, "Somalia / UNOSOM: Official Request," (31 August 1992): 1. Cited from: Files of DFAIT: 21-14-6-UNOSOM, vol. 3.

September, he asked Assistant Deputy Minister (Policy & Communications) Dr. Ken Calder to remind the UN that the CF could be deployed in less than two weeks.[66]

In late August / early September, NDHQ thought the UN would soon be ready for Canada's contingent. A Department of National Defence (DND) press release suggested that the only thing delaying Operation Cordon was need to finalise agreements with the other troop contributing counties. "As soon as member states have agreed to the arrangements," DND noted, "the UN will enlarge its present mission in Somalia."[67] To support the government's desire to bolster UNOSOM, the CF geared-up for a rapid deployment. The Operation Cordon Warning Order issued on 4 September stated that the Airborne reconnaissance and advance party would depart on the 11th and 25th. At Maritime Headquarters in Halifax, preparations began on the HMCS Preserver for its scheduled departure on the 12th. Various types of equipment were being quickly installed onto the Preserver (such as a worldwide satellite telephone communications system called INMARSAT, a reverse osmosis desalination unit to enhance the ship's capability to make fresh water, and eight .50 calibre heavy machine guns), and it needed to be stocked with supplies.[68]

However, the contingent's departure was delayed because of disputes with the UN over resources, complications regarding the provision of cargo ships, and the UN's inability to get consent so that the expanded UNOSOM could be established on the ground in Somalia. The UN was always under pressure from member states to cut costs,

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[66] Michel Drapeau, "Record of Daily Executive Meeting Regarding Somalia," (3 September 1992): para. 3. Cited from Information Legacy (1997): document #: DND299457.
[67] Department of National Defence, "Canada Ready to Send Troops to Somalia," New Release 51 / 92, (28 August 1992): 1.

and this could come at the expense of operational effectiveness. The UN, for example, wanted the CF contingent to deploy with only 70 vehicles total, but in a 4 September briefing in which FMC outlined its contingency plan for the operation, the CDS was urged to ensure that 150 were approved. These would be spread out among the Airborne's three company-sized 'commandos,' each of which would receive 14 armoured Grizzlies owing to the large area of operations (400 x 250 kilometres, see map, p. vi), the reconnaissance platoon, engineer squadron, combat services support company, and the small reserve.[69] Another issue was the larger than normal reconnaissance team Canada wanted to send to their zone because of the uncertainties surrounding the mission. The CF did not know what its contingent was supposed to do in northeast Somalia, and it was unsure as to the reception they would receive. To get answers, the CF wanted to send a sizable group costing $ 100, 000, but the UN refused to pay.[70] Sahnoun's inability to get factional consent for the UN's assertive plans also delayed the reconnaissance. As a result, the CF was unable to confirm the assumptions built into its plans.

In particular, CF movements and logistics planning were complicated by the delays. J4 Logistics had determined that the CF contingent could deploy self-contained (with first, second and limited third-line support) by bringing a lot of the material it would need, and by being re-supplied from Canada and procurement in theatre.[71] J4 Move calculated that Preserver would take twenty days to sail from Montréal to

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[68] Robin W. Allen, "Combined and Joint Operations in Somalia," Multinational Naval Forces, eds. Peter T. Haydon and Ann L. Griffiths, (Halifax: Dalhousie University Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, 1996) 205.
[69] Colonel W. I. Kennedy, "Briefing Notes: FMC to CDS, Ops Cordon and Dagger Planning," (September 1992): paras. 7c, 9, 16. Cited from Information Legacy (1997): document #: DND131215.
[70] Michel Drapeau, "Record of Daily Executive Meeting Regarding Somalia," (11 September 1992): para. 7. Cited from Information Legacy (1997): document #: DND299550.
[71] Lieutenant-Colonel Gary Furrie, "Draft Warning Order - Op Cordon," memorandum 3451-9-034 / 293, (2 September 1992): para. A-1. Cited from Information Legacy (1997): document #: DND221319.

Boosaaso, and that a month would be needed for the UN-chartered cargo ships, the MV Bassro Star and MV Sysette, to haul the force's equipment.[72] The Preserver was to serve as a floating headquarters and supply base, and it therefore had to reach Boosaaso first to support the contingent advance party, which would set up camp and prepare to receive the main body. But before the Preserver could leave, Addy noted during a DEM on 11 September, a detailed reconnaissance had to take place to guarantee that the Preserver left appropriately loaded and to enable J4 Financial and J1 Personnel to complete their procurement and staffing processes.[73]

Another delay and complication encountered by the CF was the UN's inability to establish the enlarged mission in Somalia or specify what its disparate parts should be doing. When the UN introduced more troops (CF Colonel Jim Cox, UNOSOM's new Deputy Force Commander, and a group of Australian movement control personnel, which increased the mission's military strength from 550 to 564 in October), the factions opposed this, and the UN move only contributed to the dramatic deterioration of the security situation. In the Boosaaso sector, co-operation was more forthcoming, in part because many Somalis from the region had immigrated to Canada and this had piqued local interest in hosting the CF.[74] But according to Cox, the peacekeepers were seen by Somalis as a conduit to humanitarian aid, and in reality they were "after the influx of aid and money, and if it had to be a Canadian battalion to turn on the tap, well, OK."[75] A more serious concern for the CF was that it became apparent that Canada's zone was not

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[72] John Bremner, "Op Cordon - UN Request to Deploy Canadian Security Battalion to Somalia," memorandum, (26 October 1992): paras. 3-4. Cited Information Legacy (1997): document #: DND002210.
[73] Drapeau, "Record of Daily Executive Meeting," (11 September 1992): para. 7. Cited from Information Legacy (1997): document #: DND299550.
[74] Sahnoun, "Interview," 7 August 2001.

starving, and it had been reported that the region was even exporting cattle across the Red Sea to Yemen.[76] This was confirmed by the CF's reconnaissance, which Sahnoun authorised on 6 October and took place from 14-18 October.[77] In other words, it now appeared that the humanitarian role so enthusiastically accepted less than two months ago was not what it seemed and that this might embarrass the government.

The UN defended the zones because it believed they were critical to the national reconciliation process. Shaheen, for example, said Boosaaso was only "seemingly peaceful," and that it "had all of the ingredients of violence on its turf. It just so happened that since warring factions converged onto Mogadishu for control, the far-flung places appeared quiet."[78] The UN hoped to use the Cdn AB Regt. BG to demonstrate to Somalis the benefits of co-operation. Sahnoun explained to Ambassador Louise Fréchette, Canada's Permanent Representative to the UN, that the northeast would be used as a 'showpiece' region, in which the Canadians would provide a stabilizing presence, escort food when necessary, and rebuild sanitation, water and health services.[79]

Ottawa proceeded with its mission despite Aidid's objections to Canada's role. Sahnoun had authorised Canada's reconnaissance without Aidid's consent, and Aidid had responded by asking Mulroney to halt the deployment. In a 12 October letter to the Prime Minister, he said "the deployment of such forces in this manner would promote open

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[75] Jim Cox, "Interview with former UNOSOM Deputy Commander Brigadier-General Jim Cox," in Ottawa, Wednesday 16 August 2000.
[76] Paul Addy, "Interview with Lieutenant-General (ret'd) Paul Addy," in Ottawa, 26 November 1999.
[77] Michel Drapeau, "Record of Discussion on Reconnaissance Team Report – Somalia With the DM / CDS," (21 October 1992): para. 6. Cited from Information Legacy (1997): document #: DND444016.
[78] Shaheen, "Letter to Author," (3 March 2000): 1.
[79] Dishonoured Legacy, vol. 3, 749.

conflict in Somalia and thus undermine the peace process we are now engaged in."[80] The government consulted with Sahnoun. On the 16th, Sahnoun informed Fréchette that Aidid's letter could be disregarded since he had no influence in the northeast.[81] However, the authorisation of the Canadian deployment heightened the animosity between the UN and Aidid. The latter may have been a faction leader with a limited area of control, but he had the power to influence outcomes in Mogadishu and the famine-stricken area in the south, and Sahnoun's decision to allow the CF reconnaissance team to deploy was another UN action that was against his wishes and interests.

In mid-October, the UN finally asked Canada to send its contingent as soon as possible. On the 23rd, Boutros-Ghali "suddenly" asked Canada to immediately deploy its advance party, but this posed a problem for the J Staff logistics and movement planners, who had been waiting for the arrival dates of the UN-chartered roll-on / roll-off and load-on / load-off cargo ships to be confirmed before making final arrangements.[82] In addition, with the Airborne's reconnaissance only just completed, there was not enough time to purchase items like water and fuel storage and distribution systems and get them loaded on the cargo vessels when they docked at the port of Montréal on 16 November.[83] The J4 Logistics cell had to advise J3 Peacekeeping that the CF could not be ready for the ships. Not surprisingly, Boutros-Ghali was unimpressed when he heard that the CF would miss the 16 November deadline, and that the Airborne main body would not be fully deployed

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[80] Mohamed Farah Aidid, "Letter to Prime Minister Brian Mulroney," (12 October 1992): 1. Cited from: Files of DFAIT: 21-14-6-UNOSOM, vol. 4.
[81] Kent Vachon, "Somalia: Meeting with Sahnoun," COSICS formal message C-PRMNY-WKGR-0950 to External Affairs, (16 October 1992): 1. Cited from: Files of DFAIT: 21-14-6-UNOSOM, vol. 4.
[82] Bremner, "Op Cordon - UN Request to Deploy Canadian Security Battalion to Somalia," (26 October 1992): paras. 4-5. Cited from Information Legacy (1997): document #: DND002210.

until early January 1993. Reportedly, he said that this "would be embarrassing for Canada," since the CF had said it could deploy in less then two weeks.[84]

The J Staff was able to finish the staff work for the pre-deployment part of Operation Cordon by mid-November, and did not miss the rescheduled arrival times for the cargo ships (26 and 29 November). With the reconnaissance analysed, the UN tasking order received, and the Airborne declared operationally ready, J3 Operations Colonel Mike O'Brien issued the Operations Order on 13 November. The national-level military decision-making for UNOSOM was complete, although the J3 Peacekeeping cell was expected to monitor developments and resolve any problems involving the CF contingent that arose in Somalia. The reception of new dates for the cargo ships permitted the Preserver to set sail on 16 November, and it was expected to be in the vicinity of Boosaaso on 6 December. The Airborne advance party was supposed to arrive in several flights, staging through Djibouti, during the 6th-16th. The main body was to follow.[85] However, shortly before the advance party's departure, UNOSOM collapsed and was replaced by a United States mission, the Unified Task Force (also called Operation Restore Hope), which is the subject of the next two chapters.

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[83] Gary Furrie, "Deployment to Somalia – Delay," electronic mail message to ADM (Mat) R. Sturgeon, Associate ADM (Mat) Major-General J. Adams, et al., (5 November 1992): paras. 1, 4. Cited from Information Legacy (1997): control #: 823200.

[84] Cited in Michel Drapeau, "Record of Daily Executive Meeting Regarding Somalia," (13 November 1992): para. 2. Cited from Information Legacy (1997): document #: DND299507.

[85] William Fuller, "Operation Cordon Deployment Movement Order," 3451-9-293 (J4 Move), (23 November 1992): para. 2. Cited from Information Legacy (1997): document #: DND001650. All dates in this paragraph are from this document.

Conclusion:

The CF and UN planning for the expanded UNOSOM had several characteristics in common. Both were optimistic that peacekeepers could have a positive impact in Somalia despite the difficulties. Each was determined to proceed with significant operations despite a limited understanding of the complexities of the internal war. The CF and UN preparations for the multi-zone mission demonstrated a willingness to proceed with deployments and increases in troop strength even through this would have to be done without the consent of Aidid, a key faction leader. The UN attempted to go beyond traditional peacekeeping and adopt a more assertive posture. Ottawa was a leading supporter of UNOSOM, although it was subsequently revealed that it contributed to the mission without sufficient knowledge of the tasks the CF would be asked perform. The government and CF should have asked more questions about the viability of the UN's strategy and more determined approach.

The UN embarked on the multi-zone plan because UNOSOM as configured by Security Council resolution 751 (24 April) was not succeeding. Sahnoun's objective was to decentralise the operation and deploy battalions to stabilise the four zones (later briefly five), improve the humanitarian situation, and encourage reconciliation. The idea was to avoid the violence and looting in Mogadishu and to encourage uniform, countrywide stability. There was a certain logic to this, but the new plan never solved the problem of how peacekeepers were to function in an environment with no peace and no responsible political authorities to deal with.

The UN decided to adopt a more decisive peacekeeping approach in late August, but this strategy was not effective. Boutros-Ghali demonstrated his tougher stance by

increasing UNOSOM's strength to 4, 219, which was more than double what Sahnoun had been proposing, without consulting with the factions. This was ill-conceived, since even with the higher numbers UNOSOM would not be able to dominate the country or Mogadishu, and it could not therefore afford to distance itself from the crucial peacekeeping principle of consent. The way that Boutros-Ghali expanded the mission insulted the Somalis. UN-Aidid tensions increased when the UN added personnel to UNOSOM headquarters and authorised the CF reconnaissance and full deployment without his permission. By late October, relations between Aidid and UNOSOM had been poisoned.

Canada fully supported the UN's new approach, as defined by Council resolutions 767 (27 July) and 775 (28 August). This approval was driven by the government's desire, which was shared by the CF, to support UN-led multilateralism and act in a significant way to alleviate the severe humanitarian suffering. The J Staff had advised in May that the CF should not participate in UNOSOM, but the revised mission had won the support of the Prime Minister, it provided the CF with an opportunity to have a visible role, and it appeared to have a reasonable chance at success. Thus, from a defence policy perspective, UNOSOM was now a mission to which Canada should contribute.

According to the evidence received from interviews with senior military leaders, the 'Airborne family' was not a factor in the regiment's selection for the Somalia task. Houghton and Addy have argued that the Airborne was the best unit in terms of its training for the mission. Gervais has said that the Airborne was chosen in accordance with FMC's policy of assigning missions to specific Areas and brigade groups. The Central Area / SSF had been given Cordon. However, it should be noted that all of these

points were made during or after the Somalia Inquiry. As such, they may be an attempt by these officers to justify past decisions.

The fact that the Airborne was the UN stand-by battalion was another key factor behind its selection. The Airborne was ready to move quickly, but the advance party could not deploy until the Preserver, the logistics base and headquarters, was on station. Before that could take place, UN approval for a reconnaissance was needed. However, the UN was unwilling to pay for the large group the CF intended to send, and it needed to finish negotiating with the factions in order to authorise all troop-contributing countries' reconnaissances (and then their deployments) at roughly the same time.

The UN also complicated the CF's move to northeast Somalia. The Secretary-General decided to go ahead with Canada's deployment, even though Aidid had not yet agreed to the presence of additional UN troops. This illustrated the UN's impatience with some Somali factions, and especially Aidid's. The CF had to scramble to keep up with the UN's determination to press forward and could not be ready for the first cargo ship sent by the UN. New shipping times had to be arranged, and when they were the CF deployed the Preserver, setting its UNOSOM commitment in motion.

The UN and Canada encountered difficulty in Somalia because the situation was extremely complex and would not be resolved quickly. However, the government's and CF's problems were worsened because Ottawa had energetically committed Canada to UNOSOM without a full understanding of the risks associated with peacekeeping in an on-going civil war, of the CF's roles, and of the possible complications arising from the assertive implementation of the UN multi-zone plan. While the CF's doubts about the appropriateness of its task grew during October because the northeast was free of famine,

the military, like the government, nevertheless remained committed to supporting UN-led multilateralism.

Chapter 8
Robust Multilateralism:
Canada's Support for the US-led Ad Hoc Coalition

Prime Minister Brian Mulroney's government joined the United States-led (US) Unified Task Force (UNITAF) without hesitation when it replaced the United Nations Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM) in early December 1992. Participation in the peace enforcement coalition allowed Canada to support its interest in robust multilateralism and maintaining close ties with the US, and UNITAF's focus on aid protection was what Ottawa wanted to do all along. The government decided to engage in UNITAF to serve these national interests and the government's interest in participating in a success and in being seen to be alleviating the famine. Domestic opposition to this decision was muted because of the urgent need to act.

For Ottawa, the severity of the crisis and the memory of the successful Persian Gulf War (1990-91) effort made the US initiative hard to resist. Jim Judd, the Assistant Cabinet Secretary (Foreign and Defence Policy) in the Privy Council Office (PCO), said the need for the West to respond effectively "became more pressing when it became more obvious, and it became more and more obvious, that the international humanitarian relief effort was being thwarted."[1] The continuous television images and reports of the famine had shocked Canadians and Americans and moved their leaders. An intervention would support US President George Bush's vision of a co-operative and peaceful 'new world order' that he had mentioned in his 1991 State of the Union address, and his sense of

[1] Jim Judd, "Interview with Deputy Minister of National Defence Jim Judd," in Ottawa at NDHQ, Thursday 31 August 2000.

noblesse oblige.[2] Ambassador Robert Oakley, the President's Special Envoy to Somalia from December 1992 to March 1993, said the US intervened for fundamentally humanitarian reasons,[3] but Ottawa was also aware of the precedent set by the Gulf War coalition. The government feared that the credibility of this multilateral tool would be tarnished unless the west demonstrated that coalitions would be used for humanitarian reasons and not only to secure strategic interests like Kuwaiti oil. Judd said there "was a sense that if it could be done for that kind of a reason, why couldn't something smaller be done for an issue that was even more desperate in terms of its impact on the human beings involved."[4]

Mulroney decided that Canada would contribute to UNITAF during a telephone conversation with Bush on 28 November. During the call, Bush discussed his intention to intervene and asked Mulroney for help. The Prime Minister said that Canada would endeavour to do so, implying that *something* would be done.[5] The specifics were left to the Department of National Defence (DND) to determine (see chapter 9). To a certain degree, Canada succumbed to US pressure. The Gulf War had illustrated that the US usually got its way with Canada when it focussed on any single issue,[6] and the call to arms was as hard to resist in 1992. However, both leaders believed that something had to be done to ease the suffering in Somalia. They were also aware that the Gulf War had demonstrated the effectiveness of US-led ad hoc coalitions, and that this tool could be

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[2] Jonathan Stevenson, Losing Mogadishu: Testing US Policy in Somalia, (Annapolis: Naval Institute P, 1995) xii, 98-9.
[3] Robert Oakley, "Interview with former Special Envoy of the President to Somalia Ambassador Robert Oakley," Thursday 3 August 2000.
[4] Judd, "Interview," 31 August 2000.
[5] Hugh Segal, "Interview with Hugh Segal, former Chief of Staff in the Prime Minister's Office," in Montréal, Wednesday 28 June 2000.
[6] J. L. Granatstein and Norman Hillmer, For Better or For Worse: Canada and the United States to the 1990s, (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman, 1991) 316-7.

employed again. The view "was certainly shared between them that this was a situation that should not be allowed to continue without intervention," said Judd. The "magnitude of the humanitarian tragedy plus the sense post-Gulf War that the international community could act collectively and successfully to resolve these situations" ensured that UNITAF would happen.[7]

Mulroney wanted to help Bush because his most important priority was the management of the Canada-US tie through personal diplomacy. The Prime Minister developed warm relationships with Presidents Ronald Reagan and Bush because he believed this influenced the entire Canada-US bilateral tie, which was vital to Canada. Mulroney noted after retirement that "[t]he president energizes the process so when word goes out that the president had a meeting with the Prime Minister of Canada and likes and admires him and wants a file to be given the highest priority, that goes right through the system...and things happen."[8] The vastness of the Canada-US link meant that it was not dependant on the leaders getting along, but Mulroney's 'special relationship' eased Canada's pursuit of its bilateral and multilateral concerns.[9]

This personal link was central to Ottawa's decision-making regarding Somalia because it enhanced Canada's access to Washington's decision-making. The "relationships between the major leaders make a big difference about what happens in the world and what doesn't," said Paul Heinbecker, the senior foreign policy advisor in the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) and PCO up to August 1992. By sharing with Washington the risks and burdens of international problem solving, Canada could

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[7] Judd, "Interview," 31 August 2000.
[8] Robert Fife, "Former PM Deflects Pressure to Lead Tories," National Post, Tuesday 19 November 2002: A9.
[9] Mike Trickey, "When Leaders Need not be Friends," Ottawa Citizen, Saturday 14 September 2002: A11.

become a larger factor in US thinking, and this would enhance Ottawa's ability to advance the national interest.[10] For example, Canada was one of a few countries that received advance notice of the start of the coalition aerial attacks on Iraq on 16 January 1991, with only the United Kingdom, a major contributor of air forces, being notified significantly earlier.[11] For UNITAF, Bush called Mulroney the day before Boutros-Ghali brought the new initiative to the Council's attention.[12]

In addition, by contributing forces to US-led initiatives, bilateral relations could become easier for Canada to manage. Heinbecker noted that, by being helpful, "you also got – and this should not be underplayed – you also got credit from the people who were interested in seeing you participate."[13] For example, Washington appreciated Canada's timely contribution to the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus in 1964, and this may have earned the country the Canada-US Automotive Parts Agreement (1965).[14] By agreeing to support UNITAF, Mulroney may have gained favour, besides enhanced access to US decision-making, which was transferable to other issues.

By reacting positively to UNITAF, Mulroney was able to support Canada's interests in robust multilateralism. He was comfortable with the prospect of using force and did not regret the allies' use of its might during the Gulf War.[15] The government believed that the time had come to move beyond peacekeeping in Somalia, and was

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[10] Segal, "Interview," 28 June 2000.
[11] George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed, (New York: Knopf, 1998) 448-9.
[12] See Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "Letter dated 29 November to the President of the Security Council," S/24868 (30 November 1992). Cited from: United Nations, United Nations and Somalia, 1992-1992, (New York: United Nations, 1996) 211. (Hereafter cited as UN and Somalia.)
[13] Paul Heinbecker, "Interview with Permanent Representative of Canada to the UN Ambassador Paul Heinbecker," Friday 16 August 2002.
[14] Denis Stairs, "Canada in the 1990s: Speak Loudly and Carry a Bent Twig," Policy Options (January-February 2001): 45.
[15] Brian Mulroney, "World Peace Demands Stronger UN Role," Canadian Speeches: Issues of the Day, 6.4 (June / July 1992): 31.

pleased that United Nations (UN) members were willing to sanction force. In a speech to the House, Secretary of State for External Affairs Barbara McDougall said that the "process of achieving an international consensus to act strongly has taken a frustratingly long time, despite the urging of countries like ours. We were indeed among the first."[16]

The government was also interested in using international institutions to balance or countervail US influence on Canada, and it thought that UNITAF could perform a similar function by preventing the UN from being crowded out by US unilateralism. Since Lester B. Pearson's time as External Affairs Minister, Ottawa had believed that international organisations and activities could diffuse and constrain power and prevent its abuse.[17] A role in UNITAF responded to this by fostering international confidence in the ad hoc coalition model. Canada would not have to work alone with the US and, within the limits of the possible, would be able to subject its power to a collective discipline. The US-led UNITAF was a major step toward the more robust multilateral peace and security architecture that Ottawa had been encouraging. The US, Morden noted, had been unable or unwilling to peacekeep during the Cold War. Now, "we had the Americans and they were prepared to play…So you had to think very carefully before you say 'no.'"[18]

While at the prime ministerial and ministerial level UNITAF was seen as an opportunity for co-operation, the Department of External Affairs and International Trade Canada (EAITC) was slightly uncomfortable with the coalition because it was aggressive

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[16] Barbara McDougall, "Speech to Parliament," House of Commons Hansard, vol. 11, 3rd Sess., 34th Parl., (7 December 1992): 14772.
[17] Denis Stairs, "Lester B. Pearson and the Meaning of Politics," Pearson: The Unlikely Gladiator, ed. Norman Hillmer, (Montréal-Kingston: McGill-Queen's UP, 1999) 34, 38-9.
[18] Reid Morden, "Interview with Reid Morden, former Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs," in Ottawa, Thursday 7 September 2000.

and not UN-commanded. The higher level of danger made it more controversial.[19] EAITC had to talk itself into doing the mission. Ultimately, Morden noted, the feeling in EAITC was that "you would rather do things another way, but if this was the way to get the people with real muscle on the ground which the folks will listen to, and to stop the chaos, then you do it even though it might not be quite what you want."[20]

But while UNITAF was being discussed and defined, Canada maintained its original UN commitment. Canada was UNOSOM's only supporter by 1 December. Egypt, Belgium and Pakistan (which had a battalion in Mogadishu serving with UNOSOM) had indicated that they would join the enforcement action.[21] The Permanent Mission reminded the UN that "Canada is UNOSOM [and] needs to be consulted."[22] While the UN and US debated whether UNOSOM should be continued, suspended or merged with UNITAF, Ottawa urged UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali to consider a "Canadian Option." This involved the US-led force deploying to southern Somalia while the CF operated separately – a "UNOSOM pied-à-terre in the northeast."[23] This seemed possible because Canada had not received a formal written request for a UNITAF contribution, the Secretary-General was not opposed, and the US thought peacekeepers could succeed in the northeast.[24] This would have allowed Canada to

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[19] Glen Shortliffe, "Interview with Glen Shortliffe, former Clerk of the Privy Council," in Ottawa, Friday 21 July 2000.
[20] Morden, "Interview," 7 September 2000.
[21] Kent Vachon, "Somalia: Security Council Deliberations and Options for UNOSOM," COSICS message C-PRMNY-WKGR-1394 to External Affairs (1 December 1992): 2. Cited from: Files of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), 21-14-6-UNOSOM, vol. 7; and Colonel Douglas Fraser, "Somalia / UNOSOM Troop Contributors Meeting," COSICS message C-PRMNY-WKGR-1440 to External Affairs, (7 December 1992): 3. Cited from: Files of DFAIT, 21-14-6-UNOSOM, vol. 8.
[22] Vachon, "Somalia: Security Council Deliberations and Options for UNOSOM," 2.
[23] Vachon, "Somalia: Security Council Deliberations and Options for UNOSOM," 3.
[24] External Affairs, "Somalia: Secretary-General's Options," telex IDS-3026 to Permanent Mission in New York, (1 December 1992): 3. Cited from: Files of DFAIT, 21-14-6-UNOSOM, vol. 7; and Embassy in Washington, "Somalia: Evolving United States Views," telex UNGR-2394 to External Affairs, (2 December 1992): 3. Cited from: Files of DFAIT, 21-14-6-UNOSOM, vol. 7.

support UN-led multilateralism, play a visible part in a promising UNOSOM / UNITAF assistance effort, and avoid being too closely associated with the US. However, on the 2nd, Boutros-Ghali decided that peacekeeping and peace enforcement should not be allowed to co-exist, and he suspended UNOSOM until UNITAF stabilised the south.[25] This resulted in the cancellation of the Canadian option.

With UNITAF about to become a reality and UNOSOM receding into the background, Ottawa did not try to stand behind the UN any longer. The US-led ad hoc coalition in the Gulf War had harnessed the will and military might of like-minded states, while the Somalia crisis had revealed serious limitations in the UN's consensual approach. Judd recalled that "the blue helmet concept...had been called into question big time during the Iraq-Kuwait conflict of 1990-91." As a result, some countries had come to believe that "the UN as an institution had not successfully adjusted to the post-Cold War era."[26] In light of this, although the government preferred a broader-based multilateralism centred on the UN, few senior officials in EAITC and the PCO were prepared to argue in this case that Canada should stay 'true blue' and remain under UN command. DND believed the UN could not help Somalia. Its view was that people were starving now, help was needed now, and that the CF should deploy immediately under a UN or non-UN mandate.[27]

Ottawa hardly considered participation in UNOSOM II. This was despite the fact that the UN had thought of asking Canada to lead this mission.[28] The majority of the

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[25] Kent Vachon, "Somalia: Situation Report 2 December, 8:00 p.m.," COSICS message C-PRMNY-WKGR-1403 to External Affairs, (2 December 1992): 2. Cited from: Files of DFAIT, 21-14-6-UNOSOM, vol. 7.
[26] Judd, "Interview," 31 August 2000.
[27] "Confidential interview with senior government official," 26 June 2000.
[28] "Confidential interview with senior government official," 26 June 2000.

government believed that Canada should not delay. The choice, said Judd, was "between the coalition exercise or waiting around God knows how long for the UN to finally get its act together."[29] High-ranking members of EAITC, DND and PCO discussed whether Canada should join UNITAF or UNOSOM II at an ad hoc meeting convened by Shortliffe in late November or early December. Mark Moher, Director-General of the International Security Bureau in EAITC, was the only strong supporter of the UN option. "Instead of being there with all the primaries," Moher had suggested, "we would be the heart of the follow-up." He had argued that delaying would be consistent with past Canadian policy and would enable the country to make a more significant contribution later.[30]

Moher did not win support for UNOSOM II, but the UN was still an important factor in Canadian decision-making. UN approval remained vital so that UNITAF had international legitimacy. Canada "will be there in one form or another," noted McDougall on 3 December, but it was "very difficult to say what form that will be until we know what the position of the UN is going to be."[31] Boutros-Ghali played a role in freeing the government to act by removing the lingering concern that the UN wanted to save Canada for its follow-up mission. McDougall and senior officials from EAITC and DND met the morning after approval of Council resolution 794 (3 December), which officially authorised the humanitarian intervention soon to be named UNITAF, to discuss what the government should do. Shortly before start of the meeting, she was called out to take a

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[29] Judd, "Interview," 31 August 2000.
[30] Mark Moher, "Interview with former Director-General of the International Security Bureau Mark J. Moher," at DFAIT in Ottawa, Thursday 21 December 2000; and Mark Moher, "Interview," at DFAIT in Ottawa, Monday 21 February 2000.
[31] Geoffrey York, "Ottawa Delays Sending Soldiers to Somalia," The Globe and Mail, Thursday 3 December 1992: A2.

telephone call from Boutros-Ghali, who said that Canada's credibility as a peacekeeper was needed immediately, even if this meant it could not contribute to UNOSOM II.[32] At that point, everyone assembled knew Canada would join the enforcement mission.[33]

However, Mulroney, not McDougall, made the decision to engage after receiving a written request from Bush on the 3rd. McDougall was a strong communicator who regularly discussed policy options with the Prime Minister. But she was also cautiously pragmatic, and in public she generally stayed close to his positions.[34] Mulroney had seized the reins and was devoting a considerable amount of time to foreign policy. McDougall's Special Policy Advisor, Gerry Wright, was surprised at the many minor issues – such as the appointment of Canadians to international bodies – that went straight to the PMO.[35] The Prime Minister had already agreed in principle to a contribution, and as a result, Bush's official written call for troops was anti-climatic and not pivotal. Hours before the Council voted on resolution 794, Bush expressed to Mulroney his hope that "the Canadian troops designated for UNOSOM [will] quickly join the coalition forces in the area of operation in the south where the need is greatest." He added, "I ask you to join me in the necessary commitment at the UN and militarily that will allow humanitarian relief efforts in Somalia to go forward."[36] Following the receipt of the letter, the Prime Minister decided, likely on the 4th after learning of the McDougall-Boutros-Ghali

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[32] Barbara McDougall, "Letter to UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali," (11 December 1992): 1. Cited from: Files of DFAIT, 21-14-6-UNOSOM; and Moher, "Interview," 21 February 2000.
[33] Moher, "Interview," 21 December 2000.
[34] Charlotte Gray, "New Faces in Old Places: The Making of Canadian Foreign Policy," Canada Among Nations 1992-93: A New World Order? eds. Fen Osler Hampson and Christopher J. Maule, (Ottawa: Carleton UP, 1992) 20.
[35] Gerry Wright, "Interview with Dr. Gerry Wright, former Special Policy Advisor to SSEA Barbara McDougall," in Ottawa, Wednesday 23 August 2000.
[36] George Bush, "Letter to Prime Minister Brian Mulroney," (3 December 1992): 1. Cited from: Files of DFAIT, 21-14-6-UNOSOM, vol. 7.

telephone call, to contribute a 1, 300 person joint force comprising the Operation Relief airlift, HMCS Preserver, and the Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group to UNITAF.

The government had to convince Canadians that contributing to the US peace enforcement coalition was not a break from Canadian tradition and was the right thing to do under the circumstances. The perception among some members of the media was that UNITAF was another example of Canada following the US lead. The Calgary Herald editorialised that "Canada is once again obediently tagging behind," its foreign policy "in lock-step with the US."[37] During the Mulroney era, there had been serious disagreements between the two nations on major issues like South Africa, UN financing, and arctic sovereignty,[38] but the impression of subservience to the US was prevalent. Historian J. L. Granatstein said in 1992 that the government had "followed American policy on most world issues and it disturbed a lot of Canadians." He later added that Canadians were deeply suspicious of the US and frightened by its global dominance.[39]

Ottawa did not believe it was breaking with past policy by participating with the US in a peace operation in Somalia. Reid Morden recalls that most people in the government were not resistant to or concerned about joining with the US because Canada had acted similarly in the past when international circumstances had required it.[40] For example, Canada had participated in the International Commission of Control and Supervision (1973), which had provided the US with a face-saving means of extricating itself from Vietnam, and Canada had contributed to the US coalition in the Gulf War.

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[37] Editorial, "Canada Tags Along," Calgary Herald, Thursday 10 December 1992: A4.
[38] Denis Stairs, "Architects or Engineers? The Conservatives and Foreign Policy," Diplomatic Departures: The Conservative Era in Canadian Foreign Policy, 1984-93, (Vancouver: UBC P, 2001) 32.
[39] Cited in Louise Crosby, "Stronger Ties to the US Hallmark of PM's New World Order," Ottawa Citizen, Saturday 21 November 1992: B5; and J. L. Granatstein, "The World Canada Faces in the 1990s," Canadian Forces and the Modern World, eds. David E. Code and Ian Cameron, (Ottawa: Conference of Defence Associations Institute, 1993) 22.

Ottawa argued that a commitment to UNITAF was in step with Canada's multilateral tradition. This was important because peacekeeping had become one of the main vehicles for the expression of Canadian nationalism, and participation in US-commanded peace operations therefore posed a major problem for Canadians.[41] As a result, the government underlined that the US was acting in support of the UN in this case. Associate National Defence Minister Mary Collins told the House of Commons on 7 December that "the willingness of the United States to exercise its power through the United Nations... should be welcomed. For years middle powers like Canada have sought to engage the United States in multilateral endeavours of just this sort."[42]

The government also stressed that UNITAF was part of peacekeeping's adjustment to the more complex and dangerous challenges of the 1990s. Ottawa argued that the application of force was as a necessary extension of the activity. McDougall said that Canada was "helping to develop as we said we would the capacity of the UN to meet threats to international peace and security in new ways."[43] The successful adaptation of peacekeeping to the conditions in Somalia, Ottawa believed, could increase confidence in an UN-centred approach to peace and security problems.

Domestic opposition to UNITAF was muted primarily because of the belief that Canada had a moral duty to act to help Somalia. The Ottawa Citizen, for example, editorialised that a CF role was "necessary because we cannot demand that 'something'

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[40] Morden, "Interview," 7 September 2000.
[41] J. L. Granatstein, "Peacekeeping: Did Canada Make a Difference? And What Difference Did Peacekeeping Make to Canada?" Making a Difference: Canada's Foreign Policy in a Changing World Order, eds. John English and Norman Hillmer, (Toronto: Lester, 1992) 233; and Granatstein, "The World Canada Faces in the 1990s," 22-3.
[42] Mary Collins, "Speech to Parliament," House of Commons Hansard, vol. 11, 3rd Sess., 34th Parl., (7 December 1992): 14784.
[43] McDougall, "Speech to Parliament," 14773.

be done about the tragedy in Somalia and then expect others to take the risks."[44] Shortliffe informed Mulroney that media reports about Canada's role in UNITAF were "with very few exceptions, positive," and that editorials, which more directly targeted public opinion, were "overwhelmingly positive." His memorandum added, "those with serious objections concede that there is little choice but to mount such a mission."[45]

Some journalists commented that Canadian participation was needed so that UNITAF did not appear US-dominated. The Citizen said the mission "must be seen to be multinational" because the world community has "legitimate fears about the UN continually being high-jacked by trigger-happy Americans."[46] Even though it was critical of Mulroney's decision to engage, the Herald appreciated the importance of involvement. "There must be some counter-balance to US interests in UN operations," it argued. "The more nations that participate, the more difficult it will be for the US to unilaterally set the agenda."[47]

Canada's engagement could draw international support to UNITAF. Boutros-Ghali and Bush encouraged Ottawa to perform this bridge-building function for the coalition. The Secretary-General believed Canada could enhance UNITAF's credibility, and when he spoke with McDougall, he said Canada was needed so that UNITAF would not be seen as a unilateral US action.[48] This was consistent with what John Holmes, a noted Canadian diplomat and scholar, said could be a Canadian post-Cold War role. He suggested Canada should not behave like a US agent, but rather should aim to preserve

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[44] Editorial, "Somalia Poses New Moral Issues for UN," Ottawa Citizen, Saturday 5 December 1992: A10.
[45] Glen Shortliffe, "Situation Report on Somalia, December 8, 1992," Memorandum for the Prime Minister, (8 December 1992): 3.
[46] "Somalia Poses New Moral Issues for UN," Ottawa Citizen, 5 December 1992: A10.
[47] "Canada Tags Along," Calgary Herald, A4.
[48] "Confidential interview with senior government official," 26 June 2000.

the multilateral structures that would make it easier for the US to reassume its traditional position of leadership.[49] The President seems to have been thinking along the same lines. "It is vital," he wrote on 3 December, "that there be international contributions to make this a sound effort under UN auspices."[50]

While Ottawa rhetorically supported the UN's efforts, the enforcement mission provided the brief humanitarian role it had wanted all along. The government believed that a firm political settlement and economic reconstruction was needed to prevent the return of chaos in Somalia. But it did not want to assist UNOSOM II with its arduous nation-building process. A day after the UN force re-assumed command, the Canadian International Development Agency noted that the country should keep its distance because the "[r]econstruction of Somalia will be a complex, long-term and costly task, while the situation remains volatile and sustainable results are uncertain."[51] Canada had no desire to participate in this endeavour. Shortliffe commented in a memoranda to Mulroney that, while "we would not foresee a significant role for Canada in the longer term in Somalia (given the absence of any significant bilateral interests), it is incumbent on us, to some extent, to ensure that the UN and its members are seized of these issues."[52] UNITAF was convenient for the government because its mandate did not call on the coalition to forge a settlement (no diplomatic peacemaking). It would not deploy throughout the country so that famine-free areas could also be stabilised, seek to politically and economically reconstruct Somalia, or disarm the factions and unaffiliated

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[49] John Holmes, "The New Agenda for Canadian Internationalism," Canada and the New Internationalism, eds. John Holmes and John Kirton, (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1988) 20.
[50] Bush, "Letter to Prime Minister Brian Mulroney," 1.
[51] Canadian International Development Agency, "Position on Development Assistance in Somalia in View of Upcoming MINA Visit," telex BFH-0085 to the High Commission in Nairobi, (5 May 1993): 2. Cited from: Files of DFAIT, 20-1-2-Somali, vol. 6.

bandits (no peacebuilding). When publicly announcing Canada's contribution on 4 December, McDougall said it "will participate in the enforcement action only. We do not plan to participate in any subsequent peacekeeping operation."[53] The government re-emphasised this in Parliament on the 7th, when it defeated a Liberal motion (140-91) to have the CF stay behind.[54]

Out of concern for the follow-up UN effort, Ottawa wanted UNITAF to disarm the factions. In effect, it took the UN side in a public UN-US debate on the coalition's mandate. Boutros-Ghali argued that without the occupation of the whole country and full disarmament, "I do not believe that it will be possible to establish the secure environment called for by the Security Council resolution" (794 of 3 December).[55] The New York Times questioned his call for forceful arms seizures, but it agreed that UNITAF's goals needed more definition. It said that aid protection "leads inescapably to a wider goal of disarming the warring factions, so that, even after foreign forces depart, food can be distributed."[56] Yet the Bush administration refused to broaden the intervention beyond its humanitarian parameters. Washington did not want to deploy to the north since the famine was confined to the south, and it dismissed the idea of systematically confiscating weapons because this would be extremely time-consuming and dangerous. Somalia was saturated with arms, and was such a harsh environment that a gun was often the difference between life and death. Oakley, the senior US diplomat in Somalia during

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[52] Glen Shortliffe, "Somalia – The Longer Term," Memorandum for the Prime Minister, (8 December 1992): 2.
[53] Barbara McDougall and Marcel Masse, "Mission to Somalia," transcript of joint press conference, Canadian Broadcasting Corporation Newsworld Special Broadcast, (4 December 1992): 2. Cited from: Files of DFAIT, 21-14-6-UNOSOM, vol. 7.
[54] Tim Harper, "MPs Question Peacekeepers' Changing Role," Toronto Star, Wednesday 9 December 1992: A2.
[55] Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "Letter to President George Bush," (8 December 1992). Cited from: UN and Somalia, 216.

most of UNITAF's existence, said that disarmament was "absolutely impossible," and if attempted, "we could have a very messy situation."[57]

UN and US military leaders also made diverging arguments regarding the risks and likelihood of successful arms removal. UNOSOM Deputy Commander Cox believed factional disarmament was possible, and that UNITAF could contribute immensely to its achievement. It would be possible to have "the degree of security that all of us expect at home," he reasoned. UNITAF was expected to number about 35, 000, of which 10, 000 would be non-US, and this was enough to make progress. "We could have a pretty healthy crack at it with that amount [of troops]," he said.[58] The US continued to be highly sceptical about the feasibility of disarming. The mission had been created to provide a safe environment for humanitarian aid deliveries, and Bush's military commanders were wary about moving beyond that. The coalition wanted to exercise control over heavy weapons, including the armed jeeps and trucks nicknamed 'technicals,' but not to strip weapons away from Somalis. A total seizure of arms, said UNITAF's Commander, Marine Corps Lieutenant General Robert Johnston, "would have been mission impossible, and we would have been there for a year trying even to get a handle on it."[59]

The Canadian government and media sided with the UN because it feared that Somalia might re-descend into chaos without full disarmament. The Toronto Star said that while the US was "understandably reluctant," the weapons had to be taken to give UNOSOM II the best possible start. "The job won't be easy," it editorialised, but "disarming at least the clan-based militias is crucial to creating the security needed to

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[56] Editorial, "Do it Right in Somalia," The New York Times, Tuesday 1 December 1992: A24.
[57] Geoffrey York, "Somali Gun Raids Studied," The Globe and Mail, Wednesday 23 December 1992: A2.
[58] York, "Somali Gun Raids Studied," A1.
[59] Robert Johnston, "Interview with Lt. Gen. (ret'd) Robert Johnston, USMC," Tuesday 29 August 2000.

mount a peacekeeping operation."[60] This reflected the widely held view, evident also in Boutros-Ghali's comment, that UNOSOM II would not be as militarily robust as UNITAF. It was essential to do as much as possible while southern Somalia was still under UNITAF's control. However, when Washington Embassy officials spoke with the US State Department on 23 December, they found that the "[a]ssumption appears to be that UNOSOM II will be able to solve many problems after most United States forces leave."[61] Ottawa wanted UNITAF to undertake full factional disarmament because it thought the UN needed long-term help as well. McDougall said on the 24th that seizing arms was vital because it "will not be good enough to feed the starving populations if armed groups are in a position to move back in, immediately after the task force has departed."[62] Washington, however, refused to reconsider, and the UN-US debate was not resolved during UNITAF's existence.

Conclusion:

For Canada, UNOSOM's collapse in the face of mounting resistance on the ground was not a major setback because its main interest was not a strong UN, but rather effective and credible multinational action. UNITAF was focussed on the aid delivery effort in Somalia, which was what Canada had wanted to do all along. Canadians did not strongly object to working with the US in the peace operation because it was felt that Canada had

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[60] Editorial, "Disarming Somalia," Toronto Star, Wednesday 16 December 1992: A20.
[61] Embassy in Washington, "Somalia: State Department Update: Disarming the Factions," telex UNGR-2496 to External Affairs, (23 December 1992): 1, 4. Cited from: Files of DFAIT, 21-14-6-UNOSOM, vol. 10.
[62] External Affairs and International Trade Canada, "McDougall Comments on UN Secretary-General's Report on Somalia," News Release No. 246, (24 December 1992): 1.

a moral duty to act due to the suffering in Somalia, and because the government stressed that the commitment was not a break from Canada's peacekeeping tradition.

The US coalition was relevant to Canadian bilateral interests. Mulroney decided that Canada should contribute to UNITAF after receiving a request from Bush. The personal link between these two leaders was important because it made it more likely that Mulroney would be approached for a contribution, and that the Prime Minister, with an eye towards opportunities for smoothing Canada's pursuit of its bilateral concerns, would agree to a role. Mulroney was likely attuned to the possible benefits that Canada could derive from being there to help its ally. As a result, and in light of the successful Gulf War precedent and the failure of UNOSOM to cope in Somalia, the government was not seriously concerned by the fact that UNITAF was an aggressive non-UN peace enforcement coalition.

UNITAF directly related to the government's long held goal of deepening US involvement in world institutions. This was because US power could immensely improve the effectiveness of such bodies, and Ottawa preferred to work with the US in conjunction with other like-minded states. The debate over disarmament, however, demonstrated that even in a co-operative setting the government's ability to influence decision-making in Washington remained limited. Despite this, Ottawa believed it should engage to demonstrate that non-UN coalitions would be used for humanitarian causes like mass famine as well as to secure strategic interests like oil. In doing so, Canada could play a traditional bridge-building role. Its contribution would draw support to the mission by making it less likely that it would be perceived as a unilateral US initiative.

Chapter 9
Peace Enforcement: The Collapse of UNOSOM and the CF's Switch to the UNITAF Coalition

In November 1992, the United Nations (UN) decided to be more assertive in its dealings with the factions. The United Nations Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM) attempted to take decisive steps to assist the famine-relief effort by occupying the Mogadishu airport. UNOSOM collapsed because a principal faction leader, Mohamed Farah Aidid, did not want UN forces to deploy and he withdrew his consent completely once the UN changed tactics. Despite these difficulties, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney's government continued to support UNOSOM. For the Canadian Forces (CF), Somalia became a high priority for the first time when the UN admitted in late November that UNOSOM had failed, and the government quickly joined the United States-led (US) Unified Task Force (UNITAF) that was formed in December to establish a safe and secure environment for relief deliveries. UNITAF was a challenging mission for the CF because it did not have much time to adjust to the more aggressive task, and it had questions about its role and the coalition's Rules of Engagement (ROE). And yet, the CF had no reason to expect that its deployment would not go well.

Following the resignation of Mohamed Sahnoun, Ismat Kittani was named the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) and given responsibility for implementing the firmer UN approach. Sahnoun had worked hard building consensus through personal negotiation, but he could not significantly improve security conditions for the relief deliverers and recipients. Likely because Sahnoun felt there was no other

option, he had acquiesced in the theft of roughly 60% of aid shipments.[1] Kittani had a more formal and terse diplomatic style and a different mandate. "Kittani's mission," said UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "was to stop the factions from getting the humanitarian assistance. The difference was in methodology. Naturally, if you decide to not allow this, you will be less popular."[2]

The UN believed that it needed to move past peacekeeping's traditional limits in order to make progress in crises like Somalia. Boutros-Ghali, for example, argued in the fall of 1992 that in cases where humanitarian supplies were being robbed, missions might have to use force more often than in the past to complete their mandates.[3] One of Kittani's main conclusions from his experience as SRSG was that the UN needed to develop much more forceful techniques to deal with Somalia-like situations. He called attention to the "category of conflict where something less than full-scale enforcement is called for, but which nevertheless requires something more than traditional peacekeeping treatment...to protect humanitarian relief, for example."[4]

Kittani initiated the UN's firm approach when he arrived in Mogadishu on 8 November. One of his first actions was to meet with Aidid and Ali Mahdi Mohamed and to express the UN's dissatisfaction with the progress up to that point.[5] UNOSOM's

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[1] High Commission in Nairobi, "Mission to Somalia by High Commission Representatives, August 12-14," telex WADA-0786 to Canadian International Development Agency and NDHQ, (18 August 1992): paras. 5, 7. Cited from: Information Legacy: A Compendium of Source Material from the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services Canada, 1997): document #: DND002606. (Hereafter cited as Information Legacy)

[2] Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "Interview with Secretary-General of La Francophonie Boutros Boutros-Ghali," Friday 11 August 2000.

[3] Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "Empowering the United Nations," Foreign Affairs, 72.5 (Winter 1992): 91.

[4] Ismat Kittani with Ian Johnstone, "First Person: The Lessons from Somalia," UN Chronicle, 33.3 (September 1996): 81.

[5] Boutros-Ghali, "Letter from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council," S/24859 (27 November 1992). Cited in United Nations, The United Nations and Somalia, 1992-1996, (New York: United Nations, 1996) 207. (Hereafter cited as UN and Somalia.)

occupation of the Mogadishu airport on the 10th, which was in the Aidid-controlled southern part of the city, was another of the steps it planned to facilitate the relief effort. Kittani made a deal with the Hawadle, the sub-faction that controlled the airport and the lucrative extraction of landing fees, in which UNOSOM occupied the airfield while the former provided perimeter security. "Keeping the airport closed is what some factions wanted," Kittani said. "I think what you needed was to be more decisive with some of the factions."[6] The initiative soon stalled, however, because it provoked hostility. Aidid claimed the UN's agreement with the Hawadle was invalid since he had not been involved in the negotiations,[7] and he therefore demanded that the UN withdraw from the airport. The UN decided to remain, and as a result its Pakistani 500-person battalion was shot at and shelled by Aidid's forces on the 13th, revealing starkly the risks associated with such determined actions.

The occupation of the airport was the only act carried out, but other measures were planned. Force Commander Brigadier-General Imtiaz Shaheen announced in mid-November that UNOSOM would soon move from its beach and airport base into the capital, and would do so without factional concurrence if necessary. The escorting of food convoys into the northern (Ali Mahdi) and southern (Aidid) parts of the city was to be started and the seaport reopened.[8] Kittani delivered a tough message on 17 November to the factions in the northwest, which had declared independence for their area, naming it Somaliland. These leaders did not want to host Egypt, which had been assigned to the

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[6] Ismat Kittani, "Interview with Under-Secretary-General Ismat Kittani, former second Special Representative of the Secretary-General to Somalia," Friday 28 July 2000.
[7] High Commission in Nairobi, "Somalia: Visit to UNOSOM HQ," telex WAGR-1076 to External Affairs, (16 November 1992): 6. Cited from: Files of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), 21-14-6-UNOSOM, vol. 6.
[8] High Commission in Nairobi, "Somalia: Visit to UNOSOM HQ," 3.

area following Austria's withdrawal from UNOSOM, because when Boutros-Ghali was Foreign Minister of Egypt it had been a supporter of Mohamed Said Barre, Somalia's former dictator. 'President' Abdirahman Tuur was inclined to accept Egypt, but among those who disapproved was Colonel Ibrahim Abdullahi 'Degaweyne', who controlled the port city of Berdera, the planned Egyptian area of operations. Kittani indicated to all of these leaders that the UN would decide which units were placed where, and that further delays might result in no UN presence at all.[9]

However, UNOSOM found that it could not cope with the number and inconsistent behaviour of the factions. It could not build on the airport initiative because the Hawadle reneged on the original deal. According to Shaheen, a day after the airport deal went into effect, the Hawadle returned, denied that they had made a deal, and presented exorbitant new demands.[10] Another dispute arose during a meeting with the northwest faction. Kittani reported that Tuur had refused to sign a pre-negotiated agreement to permit Egypt's deployment. Tuur, in contrast, said that Kittani had rudely demanded a signature and left immediately when asked for time to read the document.[11] These difficulties arose because of the large number of factions, whose positions were constantly evolving in response to local conditions. By 20 November, Kittani seemed overburdened by the complexity of the Somali crisis.[12] Having sought to move beyond

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[9] High Commission in Nairobi, "Somalia: Meetings with Secretary-General's Special Representative (SRSG) Kittani," telex WAGR-1098 to External Affairs, (20 November 1992): 1-2. Cited from: Files of DFAIT, 21-14-6-UNOSOM, vol. 6.

[10] Imtiaz Shaheen, et al., "Political and Military Events in Somalia From Cease-Fire Agreement to Resolution Multinational Force," unpublished mss., (15 December 1992): 30.

[11] High Commission in Nairobi, "Somalia: Meetings with Secretary-General's Special Representative (SRSG) Kittani," 2; and John Drysdale, What Happened to Somalia?, (London: HAAN Associates, 1994) 80-1.

[12] High Commission in Nairobi, "Somalia: Meetings with Secretary-General's Special Representative (SRSG) Kittani," 1.

peacekeeping in order to satisfy the international demands for progress, UNOSOM was knocked back by the violence and disorder. "When things go wrong on the ground, there's always a tendency to go in for a lot of finger-pointing," said Sir David Hannay, the United Kingdom's Permanent Representative to the UN, but "I think you have to attribute a good deal of the responsibility simply to the inherent difficulty of the conditions on the ground."[13]

The international community decided to press forward and, with Canada's support, create a peace enforcement mission. Writing on 24 November, Boutros-Ghali informed the Council that it had "become necessary to review the basic premises and principles of the United Nations effort."[14] The international community was no longer willing to tolerate the frustration of its humanitarian relief efforts. Peacekeeping had proven inadequate, but leading western countries were willing to raise the stakes and deploy a show of force in order to ensure that the aid reached the needy. US Acting Secretary of State Laurence Eagleburger informed Boutros-Ghali on the 25th that the US was prepared to lead an enforcement mission. Boutros-Ghali welcomed this offer. On the 29th, he informed the Council that it "now has no alternative but to decide to adopt more forceful measures...Experience has shown that this cannot be achieved by a United Nations operation based on the accepted principles of peacekeeping."[15] Five new possibilities were outlined. The fourth one, "a country-wide enforcement operation

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[13] Canadian Broadcasting Corporation Prime Time News with Brian Stewart, "UN Bungling to Blame," (15 December 1992). Cited from: Files of DFAIT, 21-14-6-UNOSOM, vol. 9.
[14] Boutros-Ghali, "Letter," S/24859, (27 November 1992), 209.
[15] Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "Letter from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council," S/24868, (30 November 1992). Cited in UN and Somalia, 210, 212.

undertaken by a group of Member States,"[16] was selected, although the United States would focus the resulting coalition on famine-ravaged southern Somalia.

UNITAF was a humanitarian mission. The US engaged because the severity of the mass starvation was so troubling, and international assistance continued to be frustrated. On 4 December, when President George Bush announced that he would deploy a coalition to Somalia, he noted that it was "now clear that military support is necessary to ensure the safe delivery of the food Somalis need to survive...We're able to ease their suffering. We must help them live. We must give them hope."[17] UNITAF was narrowly focussed so that it could accomplish its mission and leave quickly. It was intended as a short-term intervention that would lead to "a prompt transition [back] to continued peacekeeping operations.[18] Council resolution 794 (3 December) sanctioned UNITAF and authorised it under Chapter VII of the UN Charter "to use all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia."[19]

The government believed that US participation could bolster multilateralism. The Prime Minister had indicated in May that he wanted to make the UN a strong and effective instrument. This included support for a more interventionist UN, and for greater US participation in multilateral actions.[20] Jim Judd, the Assistant Secretary to Cabinet for Foreign and Defence Policy in the Privy Council Office, said that there was the sense "that we were in the 'new world order' where disciplined intervention by like-minded

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[16] Boutros-Ghali, "Letter," (30 November 1992). Cited in UN and Somalia, 211.
[17] George Bush, "Humanitarian Mission to Somalia," US Department of State Dispatch, 3.49 (7 December 1992): 865.
[18] United Nations, S/RES/794 (3 December 1992): operative para. 18. Cited in UN and Somalia.
[19] United Nations, S/RES/794, (3 December 1992): operative para. 10. Cited in UN and Somalia.

countries could be used to put an end to tragedy and make things right."[21] The government therefore welcomed the coalition as part of the evolution of multinational peacekeeping. UNITAF was also desirable because it was clear that something needed to be done about Somalia. As Bush noted, when "we see Somalia's children starving, all of America hurts...now we and our allies will ensure that aid gets through."[22]

For Canada, UNITAF was an indication that the world community was catching up to the need for stronger multilateral responses to post-Cold War crises. The government saw its participation as an extension of its peacekeeping tradition. Ottawa believed that the distinction being made by the media between peacekeeping and peace enforcement was artificial, and that the choice between the two was more a function of the crisis. The "evolution of the Somali situation," said Secretary of State for External Affairs Barbara McDougall, "may change a word to another word, but the danger is the same with one word or another."[23] The ratcheting up of multinational determination to cope with the Somalia humanitarian problem was considered appropriate. "We support strong action," she said on 4 December. "We are not in a position as an international community to deal with this in traditional ways."[24] Her media representative, Scott

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[20] Brian Mulroney, "World Peace Demands Stronger UN Role," Canadian Speeches: Issues of the Day, 6.4 (June / July 1992): 31, 33.
[21] Jim Judd, "Interview with Deputy Minister of National Defence Jim Judd," at NDHQ in Ottawa, Thursday 31 August 2000.
[22] Bush, "Humanitarian Mission to Somalia," 865.
[23] Canadian Broadcasting Corporation Newsworld Special Broadcast, "Mission to Somalia," joint press conference by Barbara McDougall and Marcel Masse, (4 December 1992) 8. Cited from: Files of DFAIT, 21-14-6-UNOSOM, vol. 7.
[24] Reuter, Canadian Press and Associated Press, "UN Votes to Use Force in Somalia," The Globe and Mail, Friday 4 December 1992: A1; and Tim Harper, "Canada Waiting for Call to Make 'Contribution,'" Toronto Star, Friday 4 December 1992: A36.

Mullin, noted that UNITAF was "designed to go in, if necessary to kick ass – if *necessary* – to make sure that the food distribution situation is resolved."[25]

The Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) General John de Chastelain saw UNITAF as another indication that Canada was in the midst of a second generation of multinational peace operations. A key feature of these conflict environments and missions was the need for increased military robustness. On 27 November, he noted that Canada was "going into these operations...with forces that are much more heavily armed than they have been in the past...with the idea that should somebody at a low level try to impede us, we can do something about it."[26] UNITAF was dangerous since it was not clear if the Somali factions and bandits would oppose it. But it was not unprecedented. "I would say it is a risky operation," the CDS noted at a press conference on 4 December, the day Ottawa's decision to commit 1, 300 land, sea and air forces was taken and made public, but "I would say it is not any more risky then the Lebanon is for UNIFIL today, I would say it is not any more risky than Bosnia is today."[27]

This comparison is useful because it highlights how the CF perceived UNITAF. Analyst Charles Oliviero was correct when he noted that UNITAF was different from traditional peacekeeping because it was intended to *impose* peace temporarily.[28] However, peace enforcement was far from fighting war. Despite the name, the 'force' in

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[25] Italics in original. Trevor Lautens, "Somalia not our Problem," Vancouver Sun, Saturday 12 December 1992: A19.
[26] Canadian Television Network Question Period, "Craig Oliver Interview with General John de Chastelain, Colonel (ret'd) Brian MacDonald, and Executive Director of the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies Alex Morrison," (Friday 27 November 1992): 2. Cited from: Files of DFAIT, 21-14-6-UNOSOM, vol. 6.
[27] UNIFIL (March 1978-present) refers to the UN Interim Force in Lebanon. Cited from "News Conference – Chief of the Defence Staff and Gaëtan Lavertu of External Affairs," (Friday 4 December 1992). Cited from: Information Legacy (1997): document #: NS079033.
[28] Italics in original. Charles Oliviero, "Operation Deliverance: International Success or Domestic Failure," Canadian Military Journal, 2.2 (Summer 2001): 52.

enforcement related only to the potential use of arms. UNITAF was in-between peacekeeping and war fighting because it was constrained in how it could apply its power since it had not been created to subdue an enemy under the laws of war. UNITAF could apply force only in response to a violent action and its response had to be proportionate to that action.[29] In fact, the coalition's prudent use of its might disappointed Somalis, many of whom had hoped that it would disarm the factions and impose sustainable order.[30] Heavy weapons were intended to intimidate and impress the Somalis, but securing the disputants' co-operation remained vital since otherwise conflict – and casualties – could result.

Canada and US military leaders shared this view. General Colin Powell, head of the US military as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, explained during a 2 December telephone call with the CDS that UNITAF would be able to return fire against anyone attempting to impede aid deliveries, and to pursue those parties. However, a heavy force would not be required since the factions "seem to have been bending over backwards to be accommodating over the past few days, once they heard we might be coming."[31] On the 4th, Powell added that he had stopped using the term 'enforcement' because he doubted its appropriateness.[32] Colonel Serge Labbé, Commander of the Canadian Joint Forces Somalia, was also aware that UNITAF was chiefly a show of military power, and that it would react to the use of arms rather than seek to use force. "We were not going off to war, we recognize[d] that," he said, "but we also recognize[d] that in the snap of a

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[29] Jarat Chopra, Åge Eknes and Toralv Nordbø, Fighting For Hope in Somalia, (Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 1995) 11.
[30] Walter S. Clarke, "Testing the World's Resolve in Somalia," Parameters 23.4 (Winter 1993): 42.
[31] Cited in John de Chastelain, "Somalia – CDS Discussion with General Powell, 1250 hrs 2 December 1992," note to file on telephone conversation. Cited from: Information Legacy (1997): control #: 810800.

finger we could be in a situation where we were amongst warring belligerents in a very hostile scenario."[33]

The fact that UNITAF was more robust than peacekeeping but still a restrained activity is clear from the Council's hopeful deliberations. For example, US Permanent Representative Ambassador Edward Perkins commented that "one point should be clear: our mission is essentially a peaceful one, and we will endorse the use of force only if and when we decide it is necessary to accomplish our objective."[34] The Permanent Representative of France Ambassador Jean-Bernard Mérimée underlined the UN's wish to rely on consent rather than arms. "We hope that the Somali parties," he said, "will take due note of the international community's determination and that they will chose to co-operate in ensuring that the humanitarian goal of our action may be achieved without resort to force."[35]

Although UNITAF had similarities with previous missions in terms of the operational environment and the constraint on the use of force, the CF still found it challenging to develop the coalition ROE. This was a challenge not only because the government's desire to support assertive multilateral humanitarian action in Somalia presented some unfamiliar challenges to the military, but also because the need to secure a role that would be significant enough to fulfill the nation's interests created significant time pressures. Other than in the Gulf War, ROE for coalitions were something that the

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[32] John de Chastelain, "CDS Call to General Powell, 4 December 1992," note to file of telephone conversation. Cited from: Information Legacy (1997): document #: DND000956.
[33] Colonel Serge Labbé, "Testimony of Colonel Serge Labbé to the Somalia Inquiry," Friday 7 February 1997. Cited from: Information Legacy, vol. 161, (1997): 32877.
[34] Edward J. Perkins, "Statement on Somalia on behalf of the United States to the Security Council," provisional verbatim record of Security Council meeting, S/PV.3145, (3 December 1992): 36.
[35] Jean-Bernard Mérimée, "Statement on Somalia on behalf of France to the Security Council," provisional verbatim record of Security Council meeting, S/PV.3145, (3 December 1992): 30.

CF had not recently experienced. Larry Murray, at the time the Associate Assistant Deputy Minister (Policy and Communications), has noted that "this was not something we had done 23 times...formulating the ROE for an operation like that in a coalition sense was quite unique and precedent setting."[36]

For UNITAF, the Canadian ROE were only issued to soldiers as they were deploying, and this likely prevented all members of the Canadian Airborne Regiment from being trained on them. Once it became clear on 5 December that Canadian rules would be needed, the J3 Plans joint cell asked the coalition leader, the US Central Command in Tampa Bay, Florida, for a copy of its ROE so that it could ensure that the CF's version was compatible. While the National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) was responsible for the development of the Canadian ROE, operational commanders normally were responsible for interpreting them for their troops and for preparing the 'soldiers cards' that were issued to each contingent member. The lack of familiarity with peace enforcement and time pressures involved made this difficult for Airborne Commander Lieutenant-Colonel Carol Mathieu. The J3 Plans, Captain (navy) Ken McMillan, decided to develop the ROE for the Airborne because he knew it was struggling with this task.[37] The ROE were sent up the chain of command at NDHQ and approved on the 11th by the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (Intelligence, Security, Operations) (DCDS) Lieutenant-General Paul Addy. McMillan's staff then faxed the ROE to Labbé. In addition, on the 16th, as a gesture of "professional assistance," he provided Labbé with a proposed field aide-mémoire (the distillation of the ROE, which was put on cards for

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[36] Larry Murray, "Testimony of acting Chief of the Defence Staff Vice-Admiral Larry Murray to the Somalia Inquiry," Tuesday 4 February 1997. Cited from: Information Legacy, vol. 158, (1997): 32121.
[37] Ken McMillan, "Interview with Commodore Ken McMillan," in Ottawa, Friday 17 November 2000.

each soldier) because the Airborne's effort was more along the lines of guidance for subordinate commanders than direction for individual troops on force.[38] NDHQ reformatted its ROE for the soldier's cards and reissued them to Canadian Joint Forces Somalia (CJFS) personnel on 22 or 23 December.

However, the Airborne trained on and deployed with soldier's cards that were more aggressive than what was developed by NDHQ. J3 Plans worked on the ROE from the 5th until the day the CJFS advance party was scheduled to emplane (the 11th), but in the interim the regiment had been exercising using its own ROE. In preparing these rules, Mathieu's staff had tried to imagine what peace enforcement would be like. According to McMillan, their ROE was a combination of traditional peacekeeping and something they thought would be more aggressive and which would suit the peace enforcement aspect.[39] McMillan volunteered J3 Plans's expertise because he felt Mathieu's ROE were too aggressive. Nevertheless, Labbé decided to deploy with the Airborne's rules.[40] This is significant because Labbé's and Mathieu's comfort with the stronger ROE may have led or enabled members of the Airborne to interpret the rules governing the use of force too liberally. It is because of the Somalia mission that ROE are no longer the responsibility of field commanders and now fall under the mandate of the CDS.[41]

Another problem was the lack of time available for training the Airborne on the peace enforcement rules. The deployment schedule was tight, with Labbé and his twelve-person headquarters advance team departing for Somalia on 13 December (after a two-

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[38] Ken McMillan, "Canadian Rules of Engagement – Operation Deliverance," cover letter to Colonel Serge Labbé, 3120-62 (COS J3), De Faye Board of Inquiry on the Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group, (16 December 192): Exhibit 65, para. 1, 4. Cited from Information Legacy (1997).
[39] McMillan, "Interview with Commodore Ken McMillan," 17 November 2000.
[40] Ken McMillan, "Testimony of Captain (N) Ken McMillan to the Somalia Inquiry," Monday 30 October 1995. Cited from: Information Legacy, vol. 11, (1997): 2144.

day delay caused by a snowstorm and then an aircraft equipment failure), and the Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group (Cdn AB Regt BG) advance party leaving three days later. The ROE were discussed in Somalia, however, and Mathieu repeatedly assured Labbé that his unit knew them.[42] In fact, uncertainty persisted about the use of arms in a peace enforcement context. When Airborne personnel used excessive force on 4 March 1993, killing a Somali civilian, Labbé had to admit that in "hindsight, it is conceivable some confusion existed in the minds of a few as a result of transition" from peacekeeping.[43] Another reason for the inconsistencies in the Airborne's interpretation and application of the enforcement ROE was the lack of sufficient training time.[44] According to Labbé, the 4 March incident suggests "that inexperience with Chapter VII ROE and last minute mission changes resulted in a requirement for a level of training which was perhaps not fully achieved uniformly in all sub-units of the Cdn AB Regt BG prior [to] deployment."[45]

Vice-Admiral Murray, who had moved to the position of DCDS, has made a similar point. Murray was the senior NDHQ officer responsible for the Somalia operation when the 4 March shooting took place. He has argued that while there was no criminal intent, the incident demonstrates that there was a systemic problem within the Airborne

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[41] McMillan, "Interview with Commodore Ken McMillan," 17 November 2000.
[42] Labbé, "Testimony to the Somalia Inquiry." Cited from: Information Legacy (1997): vol. 162, Monday 10 February 1997, 32917; vol. 163, Tuesday 11 February 1997, 33259; and vol. 164, Wednesday 12 February 1997, 33388.
[43] Colonel Serge Labbé, "Letter to Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff Vice-Admiral Larry Murray," (26 April 1993): para. 3. Cited from: Information Legacy (1997): document #: DND017705.
[44] Dishonoured Legacy: The Lessons of the Somalia Affair, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, vol. 5, (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services Canada, 1997), 1465. (Hereafter cited as Dishonoured Legacy.)
[45] Labbé, "Letter," (26 April 1993): para. 7.

regarding the understanding of ROE.[46] The problem, he told the Somalia Inquiry, revolved around "a misinterpretation of hostile intent and a misinterpretation potentially of the use of deadly force after hostile intent had ceased and to people [who] are fleeing [and]...no longer constitute a threat."[47] However, as with the points raised by Labbé, there was simply no way of knowing at the time that this problem existed. Military decision makers did not believe that the CF should not have deployed or that the 4 March incident should have been anticipated. Despite the time pressures, the Joint Staff (J Staff) did not believe that the CF contingent had been inadequately prepared.

The struggle to accommodate the land contingent personnel cap of 900 was a further complication. The Somalia Inquiry took the addition of 185 personnel six weeks after deployment as proof that the CF rushed to engage while remaining under the assigned limit.[48] In Dishonoured Legacy, the Commissioners note that had military police been deployed, the 4 March incident could have been quickly investigated and this, they speculate, might have disrupted the atmosphere in the Airborne that allowed the more serious 16 March incident to happen.[49] But as Murray noted before the Somalia Inquiry, this view is questionable because it implies that only military police know that illegally killing civilians is wrong, and that they hold the balance between lawful and unlawful behaviour.[50] In any case, at the time, while the cap complicated preparations to augment the battlegroup and Labbé's headquarters for enforcement, it was not seen as a serious

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[46] Murray, "Testimony to the Somalia Inquiry," Thursday 30 January 1997. Cited from Information Legacy, vol. 155, (1997): 31664.
[47] Murray, "Testimony to the Somalia Inquiry," Thursday 30 January 1997. Cited from Information Legacy, vol. 155, (1997): 31656.
[48] Dishonoured Legacy, vol. 3, (1997) 855-6.
[49] Dishonoured Legacy, vol. 5, (1997) 1145.
[50] Murray, "Testimony to the Somalia Inquiry," Tuesday 28 January 1997. Cited from Information Legacy, vol. 153, (1997): 31261.

problem. Labbé has said commanders always want as many people as they can get – double and triple redundancies if possible – and that, despite his and Mathieu's requests for more, the total received in December 1992 was sufficient.[51] The Land Force Commander, Lieutenant-General Jim Gervais, who was responsible for generating the ground portion of the CFJS and who approved all the augmentations, felt 900 was "about right," although he had not ruled-out the need for adjustments.[52]

Despite the complications regarding the ROE and the cap, the Airborne was considered operationally ready in early December. When the Secretary-General suspended UNOSOM on the 2nd, the unit's deployment had been only four days away. The Inquiry, however, has pointed to the high rate of personnel turnover in the Airborne in the summer of 1992, to the missed training opportunities in late October and November.[53] Based on this, it has questioned whether the unit was ready for the UNOSOM or UNITAF operations.

Brigadier-General Ernest Beno, on the other hand, has stressed that the Airborne was adequately trained and prepared for its Somalia missions. The regiment, he notes, had been trained for the UN Mission for the Referendum in the Western Sahara (a desert mission cancelled in February 1992). The Airborne had worked with the US Marine Corps at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, in the spring, and participated in a brigade

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[51] Colonel Serge Labbé, "Interview with Colonel Serge Labbé," Friday 24 March 2000; and Mathieu, "Interview," 9 May 2000.
[52] Jim Gervais, "Interview with Lieutenant-General (ret'd) Jim Gervais," in Ottawa, Tuesday 7 March 2000.
[53] Labbé, "Testimony to the Somalia Inquiry," Friday 7 February 1997. Cited from: Information Legacy, vol. 162, (1997): 32923-32924.

concentration in the spring, and regimental exercises in the spring and fall.[54] Combat arms units, Beno says, do not need any more training than this.[55] He has argued that training opportunities were not missed, and that the training in the lead-up to the deployment was appropriate to peacekeeping. The initial burst of mission-specific training in September was curtailed because it was thought that the Airborne might have to deploy immediately, but then it was continued until the vehicles had to be quarantined and the arrival of cold weather and snow made field preparations for the African desert impractical and counter-productive.[56]

That said, the reader should be aware that the 4 and 16 March incidents and the Inquiry's investigation of them could have influenced these memories. The officers involved in the deployment preparations had to justify their decisions, and they had an interest in how their decision-making was represented. David Scott, Beno's lawyer at the Inquiry, stated this clearly: "What are the stakes for General Beno? Quite simply his career, his future in the military and his hard-earned reputation for decency and integrity."[57] This may have influenced how Beno and the others recalled their decision-making leading up to the Somalia deployment.

It seems, however, that these senior officers did not know about the Airborne cultural problems that contributed to the much more disturbing 16 March incident. The Somalia Inquiry argues that the Airborne's suitability "ought to have been an issue," but

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[54] Ernest Beno, "Testimony of Bridigier-General Ernest Beno to the De Faye Board of Inquiry," Report of the De Faye Board of Inquiry on the Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group, vol. 2, (Ottawa: 19 July 1993): 240. Cited from: Information Legacy (1997).

[55] Ernest Beno, "Interview with Brigadier-General (ret'd) Ernest B. Beno," in Kingston, Wednesday 24 May 2000.

[56] Ernest Beno, "Interview with Brigadier-General (ret'd) Ernest B. Beno," in Kingston, Thursday 25 May 2000.

that "commanders and staff officers at all levels never questioned their assumption that the Airborne was trained, disciplined, and fit for deployment...[but it was] not what it was assumed to be."[58] There is evidence that supports this. While the Land Force was focussed on fulfilling the government's desire to support multilateral peacekeeping, it does not seem to have been aware that there was an unprofessional culture in the unit. This culture was in part a reflection of the fact that regiments sometimes used the Airborne as a place to send troublemakers. Gervais has noted that a "hidden cancer" existed in the unit that was not evident to him.[59] Although he and Beno, who commanded the Special Service Force brigade, of which the Airborne was a part, had three conversations about the unit, they believed that the main problem was its senior leadership.[60] General Addy has noted that the leadership problems were deeper than this and should have been better known, but were not.[61] Gervais, with a whole army to command, trusted his subordinates to inform him of serious problems. This did not occur because his subordinates, in their professional judgement, believed that the discipline issues were not that serious.

Major-General Lewis MacKenzie, the Commander of Land Forces Central Area (the level in-between Gervais and Beno), is an example. He recalls that one of the disciplinary incidents the Inquiry examined – the discharging of pyrotechnics at a junior ranks mess party, and of pyrotechnics and ammunition in Algonquin Park near Canadian

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[57] David Scott, "Motion by Mr. Scott," Friday 19 April 1996. Cited from: Information Legacy, vol. 57, (1997): 11245.
[58] Dishonoured Legacy, vol. 1, (1997) 250.
[59] Gervais, "Interview," 8 March 2000; and Jim Gervais, "Interview with Lieutenant-General (ret'd) Jim Gervais," in Ottawa, Wednesday 12 July 2000.
[60] Jim Gervais, "Testimony of Lieutenant-General (ret'd) Jim Gervais to the Somalia Inquiry," Thursday 15 February 1996. Cited from: Information Legacy, vol. 47, (1997): 9426-9455.

Forces Base Petawawa, during the night of 2 / 3 October 1992 – he had done as a young officer.[62] The Airborne did not stand out within the Land Force with respect to such infractions. The number of disciplinary cases in the unit was not out of proportion with similar-sized units.[63] While the Airborne had some internal problems, no one imagined that some of its members would illegally kill a civilian. In December 1992, the concerns did not seem bad enough "for anyone including me to stand up and say to the government of Canada, 'sorry, we can't fulfill this mission,'" said MacKenzie. "They were absolutely the best prepared that we had. And good enough, I hasten to add, and good enough."[64]

This explanation of the decision to deploy the Airborne should be received with a measure of scepticism. While MacKenzie's explanation is likely accurate, it is also a justification for the failure to evaluate warning signs properly. Reid Morden, who was the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs in 1992, has pointed out that the October incident in which Airborne members burned a sergeant's car was a clear sign that serious internal problems existed that should have been more thoroughly examined. "I don't think it's just hindsight is 20:20," he claimed. "There were questions then... Even though [de Chastelain and Gervais] were relying on advice, I think they should have asked more questions than they did. Simply because there were things of sufficient note."[65]

In contrast with its inadequate understanding of the Airborne, the CF was very much focussed in December 1992 on whether it had sufficient time to deploy to Somalia.

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[61] Paul Addy, "Interview with Lieutenant-General (ret'd) Paul Addy," in Ottawa, Friday 26 November 1999.
[62] Lewis MacKenzie, "Interview with Major-General (ret'd) Lewis MacKenzie," Tuesday 5 September 2000.
[63] Bernd Horn, "Interview with Lieutenant-Colonel Bernd Horn and Lieutenant-Colonel (ret'd) Dr. William (Bill) Bentley," in Ottawa, Tuesday 2 May 2000.
[64] MacKenzie, "Interview," 5 September 2000.

Canada's commitment was made public on the 4th, and the US plan was to intervene on the 9th. This was a major concern, because if the CF was to serve the nation's interests by co-operating in a visible way with the US, it needed to deploy before all the desirable roles were assigned. The Somalia Inquiry has argued that the CF should have resisted the political pressure to get involved, and, considering the discipline issues and time pressures, should have set aside its 'can-do' attitude and questioned the Airborne's suitability.[66] In any event, the Cdn AB Regt BG advance party arrived at its staging area, Baledogle airfield, during 15-23 December. They were the first army elements of the CJFS, which included the core land component (845), the HMCS Preserver (319), the formally separate Operation Relief airlift (65), and joint headquarters (55). The combined Canada-US seizure of Beledweyne, the main town in the CF's Beledweyne Humanitarian Relief Sector, took place on the 28th using Canadian C-130 transports and US helicopters. The battlegroup main body reached the town during 29 December-1 January 1993.

J Staff members have rejected the view that the CF pressed forward even though it might have been unprofessional to do so. Commodore David Cogdon, the Chief of Staff to the DCDS, has stressed that, while the Airborne was the only unit that was available for deployment, it was still considered a good unit by the Land Force, and the mission was viewed as being within the CF's capability or else it would not have been accepted in the first place.[67] The 'can-do' approach, he argues, never got in the way of professionalism; it reflected the CF's willingness to cope with manageable challenges. "All that was required was building-in the additional sub-units," to make the battlegroup,

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[65] Reid Morden, "Interview with the former Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs J. Reid Morden," in Ottawa, Thursday 7 September 2000.
[66] Dishonoured Legacy, vol. 2, (1997) 698.

said Cogdon. "If you mean 'rushed' in terms of 'happening quickly,' then yes, the Somalia deployment was certainly rushed. But I cringe at the negative connotation of 'rushed.'"[68] Most of the land contingent had been ready for UNOSOM, and it was not difficult to augment it for UNITAF. For Land Force Command (Gervais), Land Force Central Area (MacKenzie), and the Special Service Force brigade (Beno), adding robustness – a Royal Canadian Dragoon squadron for direct fire support and a Royal Canadian Regiment mortar platoon for indirect fire support – was straightforward and routine.[69]

Joint / national-level planning and preparations were not undermined by the rapid switch to peace enforcement. Indeed, the J Staff had been created precisely to make this sort of quick response possible (see chapter three). J3 Plans, for example, had a capability-based plan already prepared (with input from the environmental commands) that outlined the land, air, maritime, and joint possibilities for a coalition contingency. It also had the deployment-related timelines.[70] This enabled military decision makers at the national level to determine in advance of the cabinet meeting on the 4th what the CF could do in terms of providing a joint force. Shortly after the commitment to UNITAF had been approved, this option rose to the fore as the most likely Canadian response. It was essential when proposing options that involved the use of force, as was the case here,

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[67] David Cogdon, "Testimony of Commodore David Cogdon to the Somalia Inquiry," Wednesday 25 October 1995. Cited from Information Legacy, vol. 9, (1997): 1704.
[68] David Cogdon, "Interview with Commodore (ret'd) David Cogdon," Sunday 4 March 2001.
[69] Gervais, "Interview," 7 March 2000; MacKenzie, "Interview," 5 September 2000; and Ernest Beno, "Testimony of Commander Special Service Force Brigade Brigadier-General Ernest Beno to the Somalia Inquiry," 29 January 1996. Cited from: Information Legacy, vol. 40, (1997): 7855.
[70] McMillan, "Interview," 17 November 2000.

that the government be provided with sufficient detail to permit an informed decision on whether it wished to proceed.[71]

The decision to deploy was made by the Prime Minister, but by the start of December it was obvious to the CF that it would be a part of UNITAF. Although commitments were based on national defence and external affairs policy analyses, the Prime Minister and ministers often informed their staffs of the answer they wanted before the process went too far.[72] Shortly before the decision to engage was made, the CF had already anticipated that UNOSOM was not going to happen. For the J Staff, the concern was whether the CF could adapt its UN commitment in time to secure a good mission in the US-led force.[73] Yet the J Staff could not commence formal preparations until cabinet gave its approval. This had to wait, as was noted at a special meeting chaired by the CDS and Deputy Minister Robert Fowler on 3 December, because UN sanction was essential and cabinet would not meet to discuss the issue until the Council had authorised UNITAF (it did so that evening with resolution 794).[74] The CDS, J3 Peacekeeping Colonel Mike Houghton, and another officer briefed an ad hoc cabinet committee the next day. They offered a concept of operations and outlined the two options, but did not recommend

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[71] Ken McMillan, "Military Planning Considerations," Multinational Naval Forces, eds. Peter T. Haydon and Ann L. Griffiths, (Halifax: Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, 1995) 88-89.
[72] Ralph Lysyshyn, "Domestic Political Considerations of International Security Operations," Multinational Naval Forces, eds. Peter T. Haydon and Ann L. Griffiths, (Halifax: Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, 1995) 78.
[73] John Bremner, "Interview with Colonel (ret'd) John Bremner," in Ottawa, Monday 31 July 2000.
[74] Tim Addison, "CDS / DM Meeting to Discuss Somalia," Notebook 1992-1994, unpublished mss., (3 December 1992). Captain (navy) Ken McMillan could not attend this meeting, and so Lieutenant-Commander Addison represented J3 Plans.

either since this had not been requested.[75] The "military's advice was that the risks were reasonable."[76]

The J Staff had to proceed rapidly once cabinet approval had been obtained on the 4th because of the concern that the CF might not receive a visible role as desired by the government. On the 4th, de Chastelain learned from Powell that the US had not even thought about the CF since it assumed Canada would remain with UNOSOM, and that at best the CF might receive a secondary role along with various other militaries "in due course."[77] A seven-member coalition had initially been planned, but Canada would have been not the first but the fourth or fifth country that the field commander, Marine Corps Lieutenant General Robert Johnston, would have looked to for a contingent.[78] This became a major issue shortly after the Canadian commitment was decided upon. Part of the point had been to receive a meaningful role that enabled the CF to contribute according to the capabilities it could bring to the table. The government wanted a high profile assignment in order to sustain public support for the initiative and to justify its military spending, while the military needed to show that Canadians were getting value for their tax dollars.[79] The CDS reflected this when he said "further delay, or a role that was seen to be secondary, would not sit well with the troops, with me, with the Government or with Canadians."[80]

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[75] Colonel Michel Drapeau, "Record of Discussion of a Special Meeting on Somalia with the DM / CDS," (4 December 1992). Cited from Information Legacy (1997): document #: DND127177.
[76] Jeff Sallot, "Troops Approved Without Policy on Use of Deadly Force," The Globe and Mail Tuesday 8 December 1992: A11.
[77] The quotation marks are de Chastelain's. See John de Chastelain, "Note to File – 7 December 1992," para. 1. Cited from: Information Legacy (1997): document #: DND018951.
[78] Robert Johnston, "Interview with Lieutenant General (ret'd) Robert Johnston, United States Marine Corps," Tuesday 29 August 2000.
[79] Paul Addy, "Interview with Lieutenant-General (ret'd) Paul Addy," in Ottawa, Monday 7 February 2000
[80] de Chastelain, "Note to File – 7 December 1992," para. 1.

The most pressing problem was finding a way to fit the CF into the US plans. If the CF was to be a player, liaison needed to take place immediately with Central Command and Johnston, who was based at Camp Pendleton, California. On 5 December, Murray visited Central Command for strategic-level discussions to see whether an adequate CF role was possible. This meeting went well, and it opened the way for negotiations for a task with Johnston. Canada was the only country granted direct access to the Commanding General.[81] Labbé had few details about the mission, but he knew that he had a highly motivated force with considerable organic capabilities (troops, a ship, helicopters and transport aircraft). Labbé impressed Johnston. He said that Labbé's message was, "I'll go anywhere, you give me a mission and frankly give me one that's not very easy. I'm not going to sit on an airstrip, I have paratroopers here, they are very capable."[82] Labbé left Camp Pendleton with an agreement in principle that the CF would have a visible mission and strategic airlift support (the entire US Army 10th Mountain Division was delayed to move the Royal Canadian Dragoons' Cougar armoured vehicles[83]) to get to Somalia more rapidly.

Despite this success, the complications presented by the lack of a precedent for peace enforcement remained. Labbé returned to Canada on the 8th, only three days before his planned deployment, and he was still struggling with the nature of his task. Being authorised to use force to protect aid in the context of a CF joint operation was a challenge. A humanitarian peace enforcement mission, Labbé noted, was difficult to

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[81] Johnston, "Interview," 29 August 2000.
[82] Johnston, "Interview," 29 August 2000.
[83] Labbé, "Interview," 24 March 2000

conceptualise because there "hadn't been too many of those in the history of the UN."[84] The specific tasks still remained unclear, although the interior towns of Beledweyne, Baardheere and Baydhabo to be secured in the operation's second phase were mentioned as possibilities. The Marines Corps had been assigned responsibility for the initial lodgement, the seizing of Mogadishu port and its airstrip on 9 December. It was not until the 19th that the CJFS was assigned Beledweyne. By that time, UNITAF had deployed and the operational picture had become clear.

The international community did not want the intervention to become enmeshed in Somalia politics. Robert Oakley, the Special Envoy of President Bush and UNITAF's political contact point with the factions, commented that, "We hope it will remain a humanitarian operation all the way through, because the purpose is to protect deliveries of relief supplies, relief workers and relief recipients."[85] The mission's aggressiveness was focussed on assisting the non-governmental organisation's efforts to end the famine, the worst of which was already over.[86] The US was worried about becoming bogged down pursuing goals like disarmament that would require an indefinite commitment. UNITAF was able to create a secure environment because it did not undertake contentious assignments like pacifying Somalia, disarming the factions, and restoring civil government.[87]

UNITAF's approach of enforcing stability while ignoring conflict resolution may have been prudent, in that many of the long-term activities related to reconciliation were

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[84] Labbé, Somalia: Setting the Record Straight, unpublished mss., (March 1994) chapter 1.
[85] Associated Press and Reuter, "Somalis Braced for US Landing," The Globe and Mail, Tuesday 8 December 1992: A1.
[86] Andrew S. Natios, "Humanitarian Relief Intervention in Somalia: The Economics of Chaos," Learning From Somalia: The Lessons of Humanitarian Intervention, eds. Walter Clarke and Jeffery Herbst, (Boulder: Westview P, 1997) 82.

likely not achievable at the time. Oakley felt that the Somalis would not be overawed for long by UNITAF's military power, and that the factions would instead seek to manipulate the force to their advantage.[88] He also indicated on 16 December that reconciliation had to come from the Somalis, and that this would be a difficult process. "There's an awful lot of negotiating going on amongst every possible faction and all of clans," he said. "It's something I don't understand. It's something that I think is almost impossible for a foreigner to understand...I don't envy [head of UNOSOM] Ambassador Kittani his job."[89] However, the presence of UNITAF still proved to be provocative. Shortly after the arrival of the force, French Foreign Legion personnel who were disarming Somalis at a roadblock killed two and injured seven after being fired at from a truck.[90]

Following a brief period of fascination with the coalition's technology, the Somalis grew increasingly resentful of the foreigners. On 15 December, a Somali woman was beaten and stripped of her clothing by a mob that suspected her of consorting with Legionnaires.[91] UNITAF generated resentment when it sought to adopt a 'zero tolerance' policy towards khat, not realising how widespread and routine use of the drug was amongst Somali males.[92] Shortly after deploying, Labbé noted that Somalis were beginning to resent the coalition. He observed on the 15th, his second day, that "many [were] neutral, many visibly happy with our presence but some, particularly the young

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[87] T. Frank Crigier, "The Peace Enforcement Dilemma," Joint Force Quarterly, (Autumn 1993): 66.
[88] Ioan Lewis and James Mayall, "Somalia," The New Interventionism, 1991-1994, ed. James Mayall, (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1996) 112.
[89] Robert Oakley, "Press Briefing in Mogadishu," Wednesday 16 December 1992. Cited from: Files of DFAIT, 21-14-6-UNOSOM, vol. 10.
[90] Jamie Dettmer, "French Kill Two Somalis at Mogadishu Roadblock," The Times, 11 December 1992: ?
[91] Geoffrey York, "Allied Convoy Reaches Hub of Somali Famine," The Globe and Mail, Wednesday 16 December 1992: A14.
[92] Geoffrey York, "Rival Somali Leaders Agree to Meet," The Globe and Mail, Friday 11 December 1992"

men, [were] scowling with disdain."[93] The Cdn AB Regt BG had the same experience in Beledweyne. In his situation report for 9 January 1993, Labbé commented that:

> The mood in Belet Uen [Beledweyne] has changed. In essence, the honeymoon is over. Although there have been no overt demonstrations of hostility, there are more and more young men glaring despairingly at Canadian troops in much the same way as those of Mogadishu do.[94]

This was evidence of the resentment that had emerged because of the intervention, despite its humanitarian nature and the care that was taken to avoid controversial issues such as disarmament.

Conclusion:

Sahnoun's replacement with Kittani marked the beginning of the UN's attempt to move beyond peacekeeping to a state where the consent of all disputants would not be a precondition for action. Kittani's mandate was to prevent the factions from stealing the food aid and to be more decisive when dealing with them. However, the only assertive initiative carried out under Kittani, the arrangement with a sub-faction that opened the way for the UN occupation of the airport, produced a violent backlash from Aidid and was undermined by the sub-faction's subsequent disavowal of the agreement.

UNOSOM's collapse in fall 1992 illustrated that going beyond peacekeeping's traditional principles was not possible. Although the first edition of An Agenda for Peace (June 1992) and some of Boutros-Ghali's and Kittani's statements indicated they

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[93] Labbé, Somalia: Setting the Record Straight, chpt. 2.
[94] Serge Labbé, "Operation Deliverance Situation Report # 26," (9 January 1993): para. 5e. Cited from: Information Legacy (1997): document #: DND024278.

believed that the factions could be pushed to go along with the UN if it was insistent, this was erroneous. The UN clearly did not comprehend the diversity of positions and the rapidity with which the Somali leaders changed them in response to local pressures. It underestimated their ability to frustrate the UN's intentions when it wished to press forward. When it went beyond peacekeeping – by remaining impartial to the conflict while it sought to alleviate the humanitarian crisis even without full consent – it soon found itself caught. It had learned that consent was so essential that UNOSOM could not function without it.

Although Canadian leaders supported the Council's authorisation of the UNITAF peace enforcement operation on 3 December, some only partially understood this tool. Enthusiasm was expressed in Canada regarding the use of force, but UNITAF involved the show of force and only potentially its application. If UNITAF did use force, it had to ensure that this was proportionate to the threat to which it was responding. While UNITAF reserved the right to do what it felt was necessary to fulfill its mission, it sought to remain impartial to the conflict and to rely whenever possible on consent.

The government responded enthusiastically when UNITAF was created in part because it did not see peace enforcement as a dramatic shift in peace operations practice. UNITAF supported the government's desire to bolster assertive multilateral actions, and its desire to alleviate the humanitarian suffering in Somalia. Once the government committed, a major concern became finding a visible role. Ottawa wanted to show that it would contribute sizable resources to co-operative initiatives that reflected the sort of interventionist multilateralism it hoped to develop.

Writing national ROE for a peace enforcement coalition situation was a huge challenge, and as a result the J Staff stepped in and provided some assistance. As with preparations for the mission in general, the writing of the ROE was complicated by the brief time between when the CF role was announced and when the CJFS deployed. ROE deal with the essential questions of when force can be used and how, but the rapid transition from UNOSOM to UNITAF, coupled with the time pressures that prevented a thorough training of all battle group personnel, led to confusion about the use of arms.

Uncertainty regarding the Canadian role had an impact on the way the CF dealt with the personnel cap assigned by the CDS. NDHQ understood that UNITAF was a humanitarian mission and not a combat operation, but it was not clear whether the intervention would be opposed during the initial landings. This related to the Land Force's struggle to fit its augmentations to its original UNOSOM contingent under the 900-person cap. The perceived need for armed strength resulted in certain specialists being cut and additional personnel being added later in order to deploy as many fighting soldiers as possible. At the time, the Airborne's disciplinary problems were not seen as major concerns, and no one imagined that unit members would be capable of beating a civilian to death on 16 March.

Once the ad hoc Cabinet committee decided on a UNITAF role, the CF's most pressing concern was to find a visible task. An identifiably Canadian role was one that fully tested CF capabilities and attracted media attention so that Ottawa received benefit from the expense it was incurring. Securing a 'good' role was part of the point when such tasks are assumed. In this case, by sending high-ranking teams down to CENTCOM and

Camp Pendleton, the CF was able to involve itself in the high-profile mission. Otherwise, it might have received only a secondary role.

It was expected that UNITAF would operate in a restrained manner consistent with its humanitarian objective, but it still proved to be provocative to the Somalis. The international community had intervened to respond to the mass famine being portrayed on television. Yet uncertainty at the operational level, stemming from the innovativeness of peace enforcement missions and the rapidity with which UNITAF developed, show that the implications of this action were not fully understood at the time.

Conclusion

Ottawa committed to the United Nations Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM) in August 1992 when three factors converged for the first time. The media had made the Somalia famine and civil war a major domestic issue, and Prime Minister Brian Mulroney was being pressured to act. The Prime Minister also wanted to support Canada's interest in multilateralism. He was a Pearsonian internationalist who believed in multilateralism, and he used peacekeeping as a political tactic to support his unpopular government. In December 1992, Mulroney contributed to the United States-led (US) Unified Task Force (UNITAF) for the same reasons, and to maintain close ties with the US. The decision-making context was shaped by the government's optimism for the post-Cold War United Nations (UN), Canada's multilateral and peacekeeping traditions, and Africa's place at the margins of Canadian foreign policy.

The main drivers behind the decisions – Mulroney, the media and multilateralism – were interlinked, but the Prime Minister was pre-eminent among them. In April-May 1992, the Prime Minister expressed interest in a UNOSOM role, but did not insist that Canada participate. The reasons for this are unclear, but Mulroney was likely influenced by the fact that the crisis was not well known to Canadians, and the UN's peacekeeping and diplomatic peacemaking efforts in Somalia were just getting underway and had yet to be discredited. The lack of prime ministerial interest was mirrored in the bureaucracy, which saw no reason for Canada to engage in a particularly distant part of Africa with which it had no ties. The government declined a role in Somalia in April-May 1992, officially because UNOSOM was too unsafe.

But by July, Mulroney was feeling pressure to do something about the Somalia crisis because the media had brought the famine to the public's attention. The media contrasted Mulroney's vigorous contribution to the UN effort in the former Yugoslavia with his passivity with respect to Somalia, suggesting that the UN and his government were ignoring Africa. Mulroney was susceptible to these criticisms, and he was doubtless aware that he could enhance the credibility of his unpopular government by participating in an activity with a wide appeal. He believed in peacekeeping, was optimistic about its potential, and thought that the expanded UN mission in Somalia could succeed. Although the situation in Somalia in late July / early August was as dangerous as before, Mulroney decided that Canada should contribute to UNOSOM. Military planners and diplomats stopped monitoring the crisis and wondering whether Canada should get involved, and implemented this decision.

In late November / early December, Mulroney decided that Canada would join UNITAF. The Prime Minister attached great importance to the maintenance of smooth relations with the US through personal diplomacy. As a result, he agreed to assist when President George Bush requested that Canada support his coalition and help make it appear less US-dominated. Although the Mulroney government had been criticised for being too pro-American, the government's decision met with little public opposition. The government, along with most Canadians, seem to have agreed that something drastic had to be done about Somalia.

The government saw UNITAF as a continuation of Canada's multilateralist and peacekeeping traditions. Ottawa argued that a more assertive multilateralism, as evidenced by UNITAF, was required because the post-Cold War era was awash with

vicious internal wars that traditional peacekeepers could not tame. The government noted that it had been urging the US to get more heavily involved in peace operations because this would strengthen multilateralism. The Canadian media, which in the main supported the government's decision, agreed that Canada's participation was necessary so that there was a counter-balance to US interests in the multilateral agenda.

The Mulroney government sought to support Canada's interest in multilateralism when rising media and public interest made it politically advisable to do so. This conclusion is unlike Nicholas Gammer's in his study of Canada's former Yugoslavia engagement. Gammer argues that Ottawa mobilized a more interventionist foreign policy toward that crisis, and that "[i]ntegral to the substantive shift...were Canadian initiatives aimed at the institutional renewal and reconstruction of multilateralism."[1] This thesis argues that the media pressured the government to act. It also argues that the government was being opportunistic because it engaged in support of multilateralism when the crisis became a major international issue, when the UN and US efforts in Somalia seemed likely to succeed, and, for UNITAF, because the US wanted Canada to act.

In the first months of 1992, by contrast, the government was preoccupied with the humanitarian crisis in Somalia. This was because peacekeeping talks were in their infancy and Ottawa wanted to show Canadians that it was acting on its human rights agenda. When observation of the 3 March ceasefire was being discussed, Ottawa decided not to contribute. Instead, it urged the UN to get established on the ground so that Canada could begin to provide humanitarian relief as it had during the mid-1980s.

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[1] Nicholas Gammer, From Peacekeeping to Peacemaking: Canada's Response to the Yugoslav Crisis, (Montréal-Kingston: McGill-Queen's UP, 2001) 195.

Canada did not want to supply a battalion to UNOSOM for stabilisation duty or to help with reconciliation efforts. The government feared domestic media criticism if did something other than deliver aid. Ottawa did not assist diplomatic peacemaking because the Somalia peace process was so weak, and Canada did not have an interest at stake in Somalia that justified such a deep role. Humanitarian action provided the government with the limited, short-term engagement it desired. Ottawa therefore decided to help UNOSOM escort aid to Somalis.

In August and December, Canada deployed military personnel to bolster the credibility of peacekeeping and peace enforcement. The government was reacting to the criticism of Canadian and UN inactivity. Canada preferred UNOSOM because it was more broadly multilateral, but UNITAF was also useful in this respect. Ottawa's ad hoc coalition contribution related to a wide range of bilateral concerns. UNITAF enabled Canada to help Somalia and co-operate with the US, and to use multilateralism to counterbalance the weight of the US. By deciding to participate, Ottawa may have earned credits in Washington that could be used elsewhere in the bilateral agenda.

However, the government's preference for a humanitarian task had significant implications for UNOSOM. The UN operation relied upon traditional peacekeeping principles, namely consent, impartial behaviour, and the non-use of force. The local disputants were engaged in a vicious war of attrition, and in famine-ravaged Somalia control of the food sources meant power. In particular, Mohamed Farah Aidid, a key faction leader in Mogadishu, did not want the blue helmets because he suspected that they would benefit his rivals. He welcomed humanitarian aid shipments, but believed that Somalis should distribute the supplies and be left to settle their own dispute.

Canada's desire for an effective multilateral emergency assistance effort, which UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the media, and much of the international community shared, thus put the UN on a collision course with the Somali factions. The pressure on the UN to get more food to the starving resulted in the adoption of an increasingly assertive posture in Somalia. With Security Council resolution 767 (27 July), the UN indicated that it was preparing to expand UNOSOM. In late August, Boutros-Ghali announced, without consulting the factions, that the mission's strength would be increased to 4, 219. This was double the number that the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Somalia, Mohamed Sahnoun, had been discussing with the factions. The UN imposed its Pakistani battalion on the Mogadishu international airport in November, despite Aidid's objections. The escalation of tensions resulted in the loss of Aidid's consent, making it impossible for UNOSOM to function and fully deploy.

Paradoxically, the UN's determination, and Ottawa's support of this approach, helped to undermine UNOSOM. Initially, the government simply wanted the UN to be more effectively involved. It was not until late July and August that Canada's concern grew as UNOSOM continued to struggle to deploy its five-hundred-person security battalion. The government encouraged the UN to deal with Somalia's problems more firmly. Anticipating Boutros-Ghali's need for troops, the Prime Minister offered peacekeepers before the Secretary-General stated what UNOSOM's new strength would be. The Canadian Forces (CF) shared the Prime Minister's strong desire to be helpful. It planned for a role in Mogadishu based on the possibility that the Pakistanis might not be able to deploy promptly enough, and it believed in late August / early September that its contingent would be deploying immediately.

Canada continued to support the UN even as UNOSOM began to fall apart. The UN's decision to authorise the troop reconnaissances in October without securing Aidid's agreement demonstrated that it was moving farther away from reliance on the principle of consent. Ottawa accepted this, but questions can be raised about whether the government moved too quickly, without giving sufficient thought to its multilateral aims. Canada's commitments and sustained support of the UN's assertiveness were not based on an adequate understanding of the conflict or the difficulties the world body was having in Somalia. The government contributed to UNOSOM with the expectation that the CF would be able to deploy within a month. It was only in mid-October, or two months after the Prime Minister offered troops, that Ottawa determined that the CF would provide stability and not escort aid in the northeast. The government's response to Somalia parallels its strong-willed but also partially uninformed Balkan engagement. As scholars of that conflict have noted, Canada immersed itself in the fighting in the naïve expectation that the disputants would respect a UN-negotiated ceasefire, and without reflecting realistically on whether peacekeeping could make a difference on the ground.[2]

The government did not probe the implications that a determined approach could have for a traditional peacekeeping mission like UNOSOM. The UN's firmer stance did not convince the factions to co-operate. Instead, it brought about the demise of the operation. Ottawa and the UN might have expected this: peacekeeping cannot function without local consent. However, the UN and Canada were focussed on strong-minded solutions, and, as a result, a peace enforcement coalition was mounted. Ottawa saw

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[2] Gammer, From Peacekeeping to Peacemaking, 85; and Gerald Wright, "Canada and Bosnia: A Ten-Year Retrospective," presentation to the Queen's University-Royal Military College conference, "Give Peace a

UNITAF as an extension of peacekeeping, and not as a break from the country's blue beret tradition. The government welcomed the fact that UNITAF was authorised to use force under Council resolution 794 (3 December).

Canada concentrated on participation in UNITAF, but it also hoped that the US would make it possible for the UN to succeed once the coalition departed. The government was attracted to UNITAF because it had a humanitarian mandate – to ensure that relief deliveries were not impeded – and was not supposed to operate in Somalia for long. But while UNITAF had the capacity to force help on the Somalis, it also heightened tensions between the factions and the international community. It was clear to Ottawa and Boutros-Ghali that the UN would need extra help from UNITAF, especially in the area of disarmament, to enable the international body to maintain control once the coalition left and to proceed with Somali reconciliation and reconstruction. However, the systematic seizure of arms was inconsistent with UNITAF's mandate. The international community's determination to help, in other words, undermined UNOSOM and made the mission of UNOSOM II, the eventual successor to UNITAF, extremely difficult.

In order to gain a full understanding of the reasons why and how Canada committed to UNOSOM and UNITAF, this thesis considers both the political and military aspects of government decision-making with respect to peacekeeping. The Prime Minister's Office (PMO), Privy Council Office (PCO) and Department of External Affairs and International Trade Canada (EAITC) were crucial to the analysis. The Department of National Defence (DND) / CF provided the force contribution options to the Prime Minister, and advised on military's capability, the risks and costs, and

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sustainability of any engagement. Previous peacekeeping studies have concentrated on 'why' Canada peacekeeps and on the nearly unbroken string of Canadian peacekeeping missions.[3] This thesis discusses a situation when Canada was the only nation to refuse a UNOSOM role in April-May. It did so because the crisis and mission were not believed to be important, the prime minister was not engaged, and the CF believed that the security risks were unacceptably high. The CF's part in determining which roles and units are chosen adds to our understanding of the country's UN and non-UN coalition commitments.

The PMO / PCO/ EAITC and DND / CF sides co-operate rather than compete. Mulroney, supported by EAITC and the PCO, had the lead when it came to deciding the whether UNOSOM was an appropriate mission for Canada. EAITC learned in July that the UN needed battalions, and it determined, in consultation with DND, that the CF had troops available. DND identified possible roles and the period for which they could be sustained. Commitments were not inflicted on the CF. DND did not resist or object to Ottawa's desire to engage, and the CF was not pushed beyond its limits by Mulroney. It was up to the military to decide what could be done, and up to the rest of the government (with the Prime Minister having the final say) to decide if Canada should do it.

Ottawa's decision-making was dynamic. With one eye on the international scene, the DND / CF and PMO / PCO / EAITC sides of the government interacted and

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2002): unpublished mss., 1.

[3] See Sean M. Maloney, Canada and UN Peacekeeping: Cold War by Other Means, 1945-1970, (St. Catherine's: Vanwell, 2002) xiii; J. L. Granatstein, "Peacekeeping: Did Canada Make a Difference? And What Different Did Peacekeeping Make to Canada?" Making a Difference? Canada's Foreign Policy in a Changing World Order, eds. John English and Norman Hillmer, (Toronto: Lester, 1992) 233; and Norman Hillmer, "Peacekeeping: Canadian Invention, Canadian Myth," Welfare States in Trouble: Historical Perspectives on Canada and Sweden, eds. Sune Åkerman and Jack L. Granatstein, (Uppsala: Swedish Science P, 1995) 159, 170.

influenced each other. For example, in April, international interest in Somalia was building but still limited, and this was reflected in the UN's authorisation of an inadequate peacekeeping mission. Somalia was consequently a low priority for the Prime Minister, for the Canadian public, which did not apply pressure on the government to get involved, and for the CF, which recommended that Canada not participate in UNOSOM because it doubted the peacekeeping mission's viability.

The UN and CF perspective changed in August. The Council's decision to expand and extend UNOSOM provided Canada with an opportunity to play a significant role. Mulroney wanted Canada to be involved, and EAITC's and DND's concerns were dropped. This did not mean that DND abandoned its responsibility to ensure that it could accomplish the task with an acceptable level of risk, or that the CF was being pushed beyond its limits. The government moved as one, with DND and EAITC responding to the Prime Minister's lead. This contrasts with John B. Hay's analysis of Canada's near-intervention into eastern Zaire in 1996. From the start, he argues, there was "disagreement" between DND and EAITC that "spoke to a dissonance in Canadian policy-making that would later become more apparent."[4]

The August commitment emphasised the importance of prime ministerial leadership. While Nicholas Gammer has argued that Mulroney and Secretary of State for External Affairs Barbara McDougall both showed leadership in attempting to resolve the Balkans conflict,[5] this thesis finds that the Prime Minister was far more prominent on the Somalia file. In August, Mulroney decided that Canada needed to support UNOSOM

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[4] John B. Hay, Conditions of Influence: A Canadian Case Study in the Diplomacy of Intervention, Norman Paterson School of International Affairs Occasional Paper # 19, (Ottawa: 1999) 6.
[5] Gammer, From Peacekeeping to Peacemaking, 211.

because of the calls from the domestic media to do more, and Boutros-Ghali's criticism of the world community's neglect of Somalia.

In December, the prime minister's role was again crucial. Mulroney decided that Canada should respond favourably to US President George Bush's request for troops because this could strengthen the Canada-US bilateral tie, and enable Canada to be more closely associated with the decision-making in Washington that affected its interests. Mulroney also wanted to support multilateral coalitions, and was not uncomfortable with the use of force in the context of a humanitarian intervention.

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UN Under-Secretary-General Ismat Kittani	by telephone	28 July 2000
Colonel Serge Labbé	by telephone	24 March 2000
DFAIT Deputy Minister Gaëtan Lavertu	Ottawa	25 January 2002
Lieutenant-General (retired) William Leach	Ottawa	6 April 2001
Chris Liebich	Hull	22 September 2000
Major-General (retired) Terry Liston	Montréal	7 February 2001
Major-General (retired) Lewis MacKenzie	by telephone	5 September 2000
International Peace Academy President David Malone	New York City	26 June 2000
Minster of National Defence (retired) Marcel Masse	Québec City	14 August 2000
Fijian Army Major Nauludole Mataitini	by telephone	27 February 2001
Lieutenant-Colonel (retired) Carol Mathieu	Montréal	9 May 2000
Susan Matthew	by telephone	10 March 2001
Major Steve McCluskey	Velika Kladusa, Bosnia-Herzegovina	3 April 2000
Secretary of State for External Affairs (retired) Barbara McDougall	by telephone	6 October 2000
Commodore Ken McMillan	Ottawa	17 November 2000
Lieutenant-Colonel Stephen Moffat	by telephone	2 February 2000
Mark Moher	Ottawa	21 February 2000 and 21 December 2000
US Army Lieutenant-General (retired) Thomas Montgomery	by telephone	30 June 2001
EAITC Deputy Minister (retired) J. Reid Morden	Ottawa	7 September 2000
Brigadier-General (retired) Roy Mould	Toronto	28 December 2000
Veterans Affairs Deputy Minister / Vice-Admiral (retired) Larry Murray	Ottawa	16 February 2000, 29 February 2000, 17 March 2000, 28 April 2000 and 30 May 2000

Guy Naud	Brigham, Québec	25 September 2000
US Ambassador (retired) Robert Oakley	by telephone	3 August 2000
Colonel (retired) Mike O'Brien	Mountain, Ontario	13 May 2000 and 2 December 2000
Ambassador (retired) Mark Perron	Ottawa	12 May 2000
Algerian Ambassador Mohamed Sahnoun	Ottawa	7 August 2001
Ambassador John Schram	by telephone	17 and 20 July 2000
Chief of Staff of the PMO (retired) Hugh Segal	Montréal	28 June 2000
Clerk of the Privy Council (retired) Glen Shortliffe	Ottawa	21 July 2000
Ambassador (retired) Lawrence Smith	Ottawa	11 July 2000
Brian Stewart	by telephone	19 January 2001
Rear-Admiral (retired) Ken Summers	by telephone	10 March 2001
Major (retired) Roy Thomas	Ottawa	20 July 1999
President of CARE International / Major-General (retired) Guy Tousignant	by telephone	13 December 2000
Major-General (retired) Howard Wheatley	Ottawa	6 January 2001
Edward Willer	Ottawa	6 December 1999, 3 May 2000 and 11 May 2000
Dr. Gerald Wright	Ottawa	23 August 2000

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