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Canada-United States Relations 1963-1980: An Analysis of
Canadian Perception and Action.

by

J. Gary King

A Thesis submitted to the Faculty of
Graduate Studies and Research in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree of Master of Arts in Political Science.

The Department of Political Science

Carleton University

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"CANADA-UNITED STATES RELATIONS 1963-1980:
AN ANALYSIS OF CANADIAN PERCEPTION AND ACTION"

submitted by Joseph Gary King, Hons.B.A.
in partial fulfilment of the requirements for
the degree of Master of Arts.

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Abstract

The thesis represents an attempt to show that elite perceptions of threat may be tied to Canadian behaviour in relations with the United States during the period 1963-1980. Perceptions of a number of Canadian foreign policy elites are tapped from various official documents and speeches, utilizing the research technique of content analysis. These perceptions are then compared with behaviour drawn from event data. Comparisons are also made across and between four separate time periods. Five separate research questions are addressed. The results indicate that Canadian elites will use various approaches to the relationship, such as, reciprocation or withdrawal, when the occasion warrants. However, a lack of consensus among the Canadian Foreign Policy Elite was also noted which may explain the lack of a more specific and common approach to the relationship. Further questions are raised regarding the concept of threat in a relatively friendly relationship and in particular its relationship to behaviour.

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Chapter I

Introduction

While the Canada-United States relationship is not always of concern or notice to many Canadians, there are a few Canadians intimately involved in this ongoing and pervasive connection. This paper explores the perceptions of this very small, but influential group.

Numerous studies of the United States and its effect on Canada may be found in literature covering many academic disciplines, such as history, sociology, economics, political science and philosophy. Because of the difficulty involved in determining perceptual validity, not to mention the laboriousness of research, few, if any, have taken a perceptual approach. However, the International Relations field as a whole has been moving toward analysis on an increasingly macro-level. As a result, less emphasis is being placed on individuals and their specific contributions in both qualitative and quantitative studies. Indeed, some would state that it is not necessary in International Relations to know who makes a decision or why it is made--only the end result, in the form of foreign policy behaviour, is important.

This author would argue, however, that the individual may make a difference. Often one decision may be the result of a

previous decision and/or the result of a particular actor in a particular circumstance. In addition, it will be further argued that perceptions of individuals are important; that a case can be made for validity, and that perceptual research is therefore, a necessary element in the field of International Relations.

Initially the intent was to study the link between perceptions and behaviour. This endeavour became only one small part of the analysis because that link has not been forged. Indeed, only suggestions may be made regarding this aspect of perceptual studies. The Canadian Foreign Policy Elite (CFPE) as a study group has been examined by many within the academic community (see for example, Holmes, 1970 & 1976 and Lyon & Tomlin 1979). If the CFPE do not make all the decisions, they are, at the very least, the spokesmen for the Canadian foreign policy community and thus, must be considered most important.

Many perceptual studies to date have utilized two sources of information: documents and interviews. Some preliminary work was carried out with the interview technique but, for a number of reasons, this proved unsatisfactory. Therefore, the use of documents was decided upon as a satisfactory, if not a first choice. In addition, many speeches are on public record making this the most convenient approach.

The next major decision was the time span. Initially a review of the literature pinpointed periods of high import. However, as the Dyad's Project was nearing completion and updated

CREON data were to be available, it was eventually utilized as the starting point for recognition of the time periods. In other words, availability of updated material was key.

An historical chapter was considered a necessity placing particular emphasis on the last twenty years, the years covered by the asymmetrical dyad's project. An explanation of the concepts and approach used, as well as the method of content analysis follows in Chapters three and four, while a descriptive analysis of the data is pursued in Chapter five and discussed further in the conclusions.

Finally, this thesis attempts to answer a number of questions about the CFPE and its connection to the possible threat Americans daily pose to the "winter half" (Clark, 1983) of North America. Is there a perceived threat among our decision makers and how is that threat handled?

Chapter II

The knowledge of the past is desired only for the service of the future and the present, not to weaken the present or undermine a living future (Nietzsche, 1957:22).

An Historical Overview of Canada-United States Relations*

The emergence of Britain as the only colonial power in North America led to a conflictual relationship between Canada and the United States. The American War of Independence which began in 1775, resulted a year later in the Declaration of Independence. The conflict spilled over into Canada with attacks on both Québec and Montreal. During and after the American Revolutionary War a large number of Americans maintaining allegiance to the British responded to the revolution by moving to Upper Canada. Following the War of 1812, many of these United Empire Loyalists (UEL) were particularly concerned about the American 'menace'. (1) This did not, however, disturb the British and thus, the Canadian-American relationship improved over subsequent years.

*Data availability has made it necessary to focus this thesis on the years 1963-1980. In this chapter, however, a brief excursion for purposes of perspective into the background of the relationship is presented.

British and American diplomats concluded a number of agreements including one limiting naval forces on the Great Lakes, a number of boundary settlements, and the Reciprocity Treaty of 1854 (Munton and Swanson, 1978:178).

By 1867, Canadian fears of American domination, as well as the perceived need and will to be different from the United States, provided Canadians with a major stimulus in the drive for federation. A number of reasons for the Canadian position may be advanced. First, ties to Britain were especially strong for the descendants of the UEL. These Upper Canadians desired the maintenance of ties to Great Britain and, thus complete independence from her was not considered practical (Shippee, 1939:180). (2) In addition, the War of 1812, had convinced some Canadians of the possibility of annexation by the Americans. This was particularly true during the 1840's and 1850's, and in the period following the American Civil War. Although the relationship had improved, fear of forcible seizure still existed. Canadian nationalists, in support of Imperial unity, saw the "strengthening of Canada not [solely] to aid Britain, but the better to defend the Dominion against the United States" (Penlington, 1965:11). Federation would provide not only ties to Britain, but greater opportunities to maintain a separate North American entity.

Confederation itself represented not only an attempt to achieve economic and political integration despite deep ethno-linguistic cleavages, but also a response to the threat posed by the American presence to the loyalist conception of British North America (Dolan, *et al.*, 1981a:5). (3)

Following Confederation there were a number of issues, including fishing rights and the Fenian raids which hampered not only the Canada-United States relationship but also the triangular affiliation between Britain, the United States and Canada. The most important issue according to Brebner (1945:188) was the Alabama Claims. (4) "Here national honour was at stake as well as the financial consideration, for the United States naturally insisted that Great Britain acknowledge publicly that she had been in the wrong". The Treaty of Washington in 1871, settled the differences for a time. Britain, in effect, recognized the United States as a major power. The Treaty and "its immediate aftermath marked the end of one period in Canadian-American relations and inaugurated a new day" (Shippee, 1939:478). (5) The years following were mainly years of nation-building for both countries. Amicable settlements were sought. An integral part of Macdonald's National Policy was the implementation, in 1878, of a high tariff on American goods. This tariff was intended to protect Canadian manufactures and Canadian capital (Levitt, 1970:51). It did not, however, seem to affect the growth of relations.

Nevertheless, the majority of Americans could not understand the Canadian desire for an evolutionary, rather than

revolutionary approach to independent status. (6) Thus, even the Treaty of Washington did not allow a cordial acceptance or understanding of a separate nation within North America (Morton, 1965:59-61). In retrospect, the Treaty did lessen the dangers of war and "assured a period of tranquility [in which] the United States might come to regard its neighbour to the north . . . as a legitimate and permanent part of the North American landscape" (Stacey, 1977:30).

Nineteenth century Canadian-American relations were noteworthy for the "tripartite nature of the negotiations" which were a necessary part of Canadian life (Tansill, 1943:vii). Canadian foreign policy came exclusively under British direction. While Britain did most of the negotiation with the United States on Canada's behalf, the Americans, by virtue of their local strength, held the upper hand in most confrontations. As a result, and to the dismay of most Canadians, settlements were generally concluded to the benefit of the United States. This situation was even more pronounced by the turn of the century. Around that time, Stacey notes, Britain had shifted her foreign policy stance in that she would not or could not afford the risk of war against the Americans. "The empire's interests in America, including those of Canada, were to be sacrificed for the sake of security and influence nearer home" (Stacey, 1977:101).

In the latter part of the century, the Canada-United States relationship, although arbitrated by Britain, expanded

both in terms of trade and friendship. While Britain maintained the power to conclude foreign treaties for Canada, Canadian statesmen found themselves increasingly involved. The early years of the twentieth century were to bring about new and greater changes for Canada and her relations with the United States.

Between 1906 and 1911, most of the outstanding issues of conflict were settled. Britain's 'aid' was instrumental in most cases. The Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909, however, stands out as a landmark in Canada-United States relations. Although it was signed as usual by the British Ambassador, virtually all the negotiations were carried out by Canadians. "The Boundary Waters Treaty was mainly shaped by Canadian ideas which were carried into effect in the face of considerable American opposition" (Stacey, 1977:113). The International Joint Commission (IJC) which was created by the Treaty still exists and carries out valuable service de-politicizing many Canadian-American issues. (7)

Canadian participation in the first great European war fostered a number of domestic problems which led to the perception that strong Imperial ties to Britain were not in Canada's best interests. This argument was contrary to the one offered at Confederation. The Liberal government's attempt to win re-election on a platform of reciprocity with the United States in 1911, however, was also treated with disdain. (8) Thus, Canadians found themselves striving for independence from

Britain, while uncertain about being, and unwilling to become more dependent on the United States. However, the war did make the British and Americans allies, after a fashion. The hostilities between the two "that had always clouded the relations of Canada and the United States were alleviated; and they (i.e., the British) would never be as powerful again as they had been before 1917" (Stacey, 1977:234).

The years immediately following World War I saw both the international decision to set up the League of Nations and the American decision not to take part. Both decisions were important for Canada: 1) the League lent credence to Canada's position as a separate state, albeit within the context of British Union, and 2) without American support the League of Nations could not hope to solve the political problems that had precipitated the previous major war. For Canada, the American position against joining the League was seen both as an "unwillingness to recognize Canada's world position", as well as a blow to the Anglo-American relationship (Stacey, 1977:310). Neither Canadian position was particularly well-founded. The Anglo-American relationship had never really blossomed and, in fact, Canadians were not convinced of the viability of the League itself. The Canadian delegation's position at the Paris meetings was similar to the American Senates' reasons for rejecting the League. (9) "But it did not occur to Borden and his colleagues to

oppose the League of Nations generally or to suggest that Canada should not join it" (Stacey, 1977:310-311). Finally, in terms of Canada's world status, McGinnis notes that the Americans had little appreciation of it as they preferred to deal with London on all diplomatic matters affecting the Empire (1969:493). This American position (i.e., not recognizing Canada's world status) could not, however, be considered a major reason for American rejection of the League of Nations.

Events in the following years affected both Canada's recognition and stance as a relatively independent nation. Canada sought the initiative to formalize her own treaties in 1923. It was a political initiative, and "the equality of status of the self-governing countries of the Commonwealth in foreign as well domestic affairs" was eventually legalized by the Statute of Westminster in 1931 (Glazebrook, 1950:497). This Canadian position may well have been due to American refusal to join the League of Nations. If Canada were not recognized by the Americans as an independent nation at the League, the negotiation and conclusion of a treaty with the Americans would make recognition a fact. It seems appropriate that the question at hand was a fishing treaty. In light of present day events this is somewhat ironic. Certainly fishing rights have plagued the relationship from the beginning; von Riekhoff, et al., (1979:95) note for example, that fisheries "formed an important element in

the peace treaties of 1783 and 1814 between Britain [who looked after Canadian affairs] and the United States". (10)

While concern for American manifest destiny was paramount in 1867, increased United States investment in Canada throughout the 1920's, provided a new danger for Canadians. Although this investment was generally welcomed, it added a new concern regarding economic domination by the Americans over Canada. This concern did not receive real attention, however, until some years later.

A "good neighbour" policy marked the nature of the relationship from the mid 1920's to the end of World War II. King and Roosevelt, who were to both hold longevity records in office, were partners in a North American isolationist dream. Both countries suffered significantly in the economic depression of the 1930's. The Americans were able to recover more quickly, however, due to Roosevelt's adroit handling of affairs. King, who had resumed office in 1935, was not inclined to strive in the American way; any move akin to the American's "new deal", which was considered politically unwise, was rejected.

The war brought the much needed economic recovery. By 1941, it had made Canada and the United States formal allies for the first time and, by 1945, two of the wealthiest nations in the world. The isolationism of the inter-war period, previously considered in the national interest of both, was abandoned. Neither country wanted, nor was necessarily able, to return to

isolationist policies. (11) Both realized their vulnerability to attack and their need for new collective security arrangements. The League of Nations had failed and any new arrangement required the help of the Americans.

While the war ended isolationism, it also began the "modern era" in the nature of the Canada-United States relationship. Both countries were financially and militarily strong, relative to most other nations of the world. Perhaps more important than Canadian and American strength was the global perception of that strength. (12) North America had to be asked to help build a better world and North Americans, for their own reasons, appeared most willing to oblige. It was felt that prosperity for Canada and the United States depended, to some extent, on a prosperous and peaceful Europe. In addition, it was deemed necessary by some smaller countries, as well as by Britain, that the great powers must be allayed in their attempts to rule the world (Eayrs, 1972:168). As a result, the apparent strength of the two countries in North America was to have profound effects on their respective approaches to foreign policy and, in turn, on Canada-United States relations.

Canada assisted her former mentor, Great Britain, as well as Western Europe, to recover from the war. The United States supported the rebuilding of war-torn Western Europe and Japan. The fact that there was now a "Western" Europe was to condition American responses to the international arena. The United States was considered the Western leader and Canadian

behaviour was based, to a great extent, on this relatively new American role. First, the communist menace, whether real, imagined or somewhere in between, was perceived by many as real. Escott Reid wrote: "We saw the tide of Russian power moving across Europe" (cited in Cuff and Granatstein, 1977:145). Second, economic advancement in Canada was now closely tied to the US economy. In addition, "Canadian economic needs contributed substantially to a foreign policy that converged at very much the same point reached by Washington decision-makers" (Cuff and Granatstein, 1977:143).

The confessions of Igor Gouzenko, the Soviet spy in Ottawa, as well as Soviet action in Eastern Europe and the revolution in China, led to fears of Communist subversion. These fears tempered North American responses to international affairs. In Canada, national unity was assured as the enemy was clearly recognized. Canada actively pursued and advocated the middle power role of 'helpful fixer'. "An innate suspicion of great powers and a quality of self-righteousness lingered" (Holmes, 1970:5).

A shift in peacetime foreign policy from isolationism to internationalism was, as much as anything, responsible for setting the tone of future Canada-United States relations. Increased impingement between the two, both bilaterally and internationally, threatened the harmonious relations of the war years. Both countries were involved in the formation of the

United Nations, although Canada may have been more committed to its ideals. In fact, the Canadian position at San Francisco was a complete reversal of its earlier lethargy at the League of Nations. The lack of real American and Soviet support, however, led to premature loss of effective UN control in the international arena.

At every point, as the United Nations took on substance it took on also the reality of power politics. It was clear that neither Moscow nor Washington was prepared to surrender sovereignty in significant measure. . . . The American success at San Francisco may have disguised for a time the hard fact that the great issues of the post-war [sic] were being actually settled elsewhere (Rostow, 1960:132-3).

Within the United Nations itself, however, the Americans exercised great control throughout the formative years.

From the Canadian perspective, Pearson's (1973:30) comment was most forceful: "It was not long . . . before it became clear that the UN . . . could not guarantee . . . peace and security". Canadian leadership had thus become more aware of the need for a new arrangement for collective defence. Public acceptance of Canada's international obligation was not as responsive, however, as was desired by the Canadian leadership. St. Laurent and Pearson saw a need, based on fear of Communism and the perceived ability of Canada to temper US policy, to attempt to work toward world peace and security. "It is always foolish", Pearson (1973:31) noted, "to assume that we can safely leave global matters of war and peace to the great powers". McInnis (1960:149) agreed with this assessment. Canadian leaders

"were not satisfied with the prospect of a system that would leave the right of decision, as well as the obligation of action solely in the hands of the larger states".

There were other reasons for Canada's position. It was necessary, Pearson felt, to be internationally responsible simply to "escape the dangers of a too exclusively-continental relationship" (1973:32). The point was made clear in 1947, in a speech by Prime Minister St. Laurent which provided the guidance for Canada's new foreign policy stance in the immediate post-war years.

It has never been the opinion of any considerable number of people in Canada that this continent could live unto itself. We have seen our own interests in the wider context of the Western World. We have realized also that regionalism of any kind would not provide the answer to the problem of world security (cited in Pearson, 1973:27).

7 The Canadian position was four-fold: 1) fear of Communist aggression; 2) avoidance of a too-close connection with the United States; 3) widespread international responsibility, not retained solely by the major powers; and, 4) US policy could and should be tempered. Thus, Canadians, mindful of foreign policy domination by the Americans, found it easy to lend full support to the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Canadian participation would tie Canada to the United States, as well as to Britain and France, the two "mother" countries. As a result, national unity, which was in Canada's interest to maintain, would not suffer. Indeed, for the first

time in its history, cultural duality was not at odds with Canadian foreign policy. (13)

The Americans, on the other hand, were initially "reluctant and uncertain advocates" of its (i.e., NATO's) usefulness (Dobell, 1972:9). Rostow (1960:224) notes that this reluctance may have been due to administration complacency in the late 1940's, a complacency borne of the revival of the Western European economy and the apparent containment of Communism. The development of nuclear weapons by combined American, British and Canadian efforts and the perceived need to control those weapons led to the Canadian position of demanding supranational control (Eayrs, 1972:278). Canadian participation in the nuclear club was to give Canada a far stronger voice in world affairs than was otherwise possible.

Multilaterally, the first major clash of Canadian and American interests at this time occurred over the Korean situation. The best Canadian diplomatic moves at the UN and on the United Nations Treaty Commission on Korea (UNTCOK) failed to influence the Americans to move softly in Korea. "In a situation in which Canada and the United States were competing for support of the same foreign powers (i.e., in the UN) the Canadians were bound to lose. Nevertheless, the Canadians put up a good fight and Washington must have been irritated as well as surprised" (Stairs, 1968:66-67). Since the Americans were ultimately successful in both the UN and UNTCOK in pressing their

demands--particularly to hold elections in South Korea--there was little need or motivation for retaliation. Finally, Stairs (1969:66-68) concludes that the Canadian position on most issues was not vital to the American national interest. Thus, there was little need for US retaliatory measures.

In both the Korean situation and the 1954 Indochina Truce Commission, Canada, by all accounts, acted out of a sense of obligation to the United Nations and the international community at large. Considered a good neighbour to the United States, it was not apparent in these two multilateral issues that Canada acted in response to undue American pressure. Korea may have provided the sounding board for the type of relationship which Pearson, both as Secretary of State for External Affairs and later as Prime Minister, pursued and wished to pursue in Canada-United States relations. This included maintenance of the Western alliance but with a proclivity to disagree quietly, or not so quietly, when the occasion warranted. He disagreed a number of times with the United States' position on Korea but was always to vote within the Western alliance at the UN. (14) No doubt he hoped that the Americans would change their minds in various circumstances and when that was not forthcoming, alliance maintenance gave him an alternative. Politically it may have seemed impossible or unwise to do anything else.

Canadian responses to the Cold War were, however, far less intransigent than those of the Americans. John Holmes

(1970:162) explains that it may simply be a matter of not being verbally attacked as often by the Communists. In addition, Canadian interests have generally been well-served by maintaining, for example, trade relations with countries which the Americans have treated as enemies. In turn, this allowed the perception that Canadians were somehow different than Americans. "It has always been essential for Canada to renew faith in its integrity by differing with the US from time to time" (Holmes, 1970:172). Holmes tends to understate the case. This may be considered more than a matter of integrity. There are, at times, real differences of opinion on policy matters. One particular philosophy on which the Canadians tend to differ from the Americans is simply that common ends are not always justified by common means. In multilateral affairs, such as UNCTOC, Canadians have disagreed with a number of American methods. At the same time, Holmes (1970:172) had noted that Canadian preoccupation with means has precipitated a healthy Canadian reaction against the doctrine of helpful fixer. Others would argue, however, that Canadian and American interests are often quite similar. Indeed, McInnis (1960:157) points out that US policies are most often of daily concern to Canadians.

This is both a consequence of the closer integration of the two countries during recent years and an illustration of the dominant place that the United States now occupies in the realm of external factors affecting Canadian policies and interests.

The Egyptian seizure of the Suez Canal in 1956 provided Canada the opportunity to fill its "famous" role as the linch pin between Britain and the United States. Canadian membership at both the UN and NATO provided the key to participation. Vital Canadian interests, such as maintenance of Commonwealth ties, aided in resolving a most difficult situation. The Americans disagreed sharply with British and French decisions to send troops to Suez. On the other hand, Canadians, upset over the British action, were probably just as concerned with American responses to the Anglo-French action. As a result, Canada for possibly the only time in its brief history, was able to bridge discussion between the British and Americans. "In the aftermath of the Suez invasion it often seemed as if Britain and France could communicate with the US only by way of Ottawa" (Granatstein, 1970:93).

It is necessary at this point to return to a discussion of Canada-United States economic relations. It was during the 1950's that some Canadians began to concern themselves seriously with the high level of American investment in Canada. This concern about economic affairs naturally led to an uneasiness over possible political integration. If investments in Canada were important to the US, would there be a concomitant American interest regarding Canadian internal and external activities? For many Canadians the answer was affirmative. In addition, access to American markets for Canadian manufacturing products

led to Canadian "apprehension and irritation over American trade policies" (McInnis, 1960:157). Thus, there was the dual problem of the small effect Canada had over US tariff policy and the greater apparent weight which the Americans could bring to bear on Canadian policies due to higher levels of US investment in Canada. While both economies accelerated in the post-war years, Canadians became increasingly aware of the dangers which lay ahead in a too-exclusive continental arrangement. Even though both countries postulated the advantages of multilateral exchange, Canada, because of its economic position vis-à-vis the United States and American practice in the economic field, was hampered considerably. (15)

As the argument was developed in the ensuing decade, these [Canada-US economic] ties were seen to render the Canadian economy extremely sensitive to fluctuations in the American economy and to restrict Canada's options in monetary trade and investment policies (Dolan, *et al.*, 1981a:5).

It is within the political realm, however, that the greatest problems for Canadians arose. To what extent did the key sectors of the Canadian economy fall under American control, further distorting Canadian economic and political development? "This led every now and then to dark mutterings about the danger that economic infiltration might end by undermining Canadian sovereignty" (McInnis, 1960:159). (16) The high costs to both sovereignty and economic control are implicit in the problem of extraterritoriality, whereby the US government attempts to control American companies operating within Canada. (17)

Nevertheless, little was done to limit the practice of large American investment. The Canadian public may not have been able to look a proverbial gift-horse in the mouth. George Grant (cited in Levitt, 1970:111) would charge that "materialism, modernization and internationalism is the new liberal creed of corporate capitalism. . . . The implication is clear: the nation state as a political unit of democratic decision-making must, in the interest of 'progress', yield control to the new mercantile mini-powers". It would take a number of loud cries from the wilderness (and a more convinced and concerned general public some years later) to even attempt to control Canadian development by means of limiting and controlling foreign investment.

As the Canadian economy developed in the 1950's and 1960's, Canada-United States ties increased. The perceived threat to North America from a Soviet-manned bomber attack across Canada's northern frontier inspired a new bilateral alliance with the Americans. In time it would also produce a major cooling of relations between the two countries. While most of the blame for the poor handling of the relationship has generally been placed on the shoulders of John Diefenbaker, some amount of responsibility may also be put in the hands of some rather unusual American interference in Canada. Diefenbaker and his new Conservative government heralded a period of deteriorating relations in North America. Diefenbaker's election in 1957, coincided with fresh Canadian demands to influence the conduct of

other countries. Publicity over Canada's role in the Suez crisis led to Canadian desires for new initiatives which would keep Canada visible on the world scene.

The combination of diminishing assets and rising expectations would have spelled trouble for the most experienced and talented of cabinets; with Mr. Diefenbaker's team, and the nearly perpetual electioneering of the period, it led to a number of ill-conceived initiatives that seemed to be designed principally to impress the Canadian public (Lyon, 1968:3).

Deterioration of the Canada-United States relationship did not begin immediately upon Diefenbaker's assuming office. In fact, he is given "passably good" marks (Lyon, 1968:7) for his handling of foreign affairs until the end of 1960. Diefenbaker's first major task in foreign policy was the finalization of plans for the North American Air Defence (NORAD) Agreement, initiated by the previous Liberal administration. NORAD, like the system of early distant warning radar lines that had been installed in Northern Canada, (16) was implemented to defend North America against Soviet bombers. Certainly, the Canadian contribution was to be relatively small. John Holmes (1970:154) explains that the United States acted with good intentions. If the Americans became involved in a war, Canada by geographical and economic association would also be involved. Thus, Canada should share in discussions which were important to a common defence. Canadians perceived that, geographically, they had little choice but to comply and that they must conclude a security arrangement with the Americans. Had there been no agreement on NORAD it may have

meant the admission of "American supplementary activities within her own borders and the consequent authority over such activities" (McInnis, 1960:159).

As Canada was now engaged in a new bilateral arrangement with the Americans, it was necessary to seek joint rather than independent action, and to collaborate more often than had been the case in the past. Opportunities for increased collaboration augmented Canada's ability to influence the Americans. Maintaining direct ties to NATO and NORAD provided a means to strengthen the West and search for new ways to decrease tension and increase the potential of finding world peace and security. These were noble causes. The Diefenbaker government, in its early years, was not wholly unable to understand or handle these situations. But as Lyon (1968:3) points out, Canadians in the main (and, in particular the government and opposition) tended to substitute posture for policy.

Diefenbaker's final year in office was notable for his apparent inability to define or understand either American or Canadian interests and needs. These problems stemmed from Diefenbaker's apparent mistrust of virtually everything and everyone. It was more his inability to take action rather than his actions, however, which were the cause of despair (Lyon, 1968:8). As a result Canada's popularity throughout the world declined. There were, of course, mitigating factors over which no one in Canada had control; the dramatic recovery of Western

Europe and Japan, as well as the technological revolution, allowed little scope for Canadian diplomatic initiatives. Nevertheless, in international relations, the Canadian cause was not aided by an apparently insecure Prime Minister and government.

Unfortunately for the waffling and indecisive Diefenbaker, a number of important Canada-United States issues came to a head in 1962-1963. Of direct and immediate concern was the question of nuclear weapons on Canadian soil. Some would argue, in hindsight, that Diefenbaker scored a moral victory by refusing to be pushed on this question. While many would say that it was a triumph against nuclear proliferation (it was not), (19) Diefenbaker's poor handling of the situation resulted in his party's election defeat and, subsequently for some, in a defeat of Canadian nationalism vis-à-vis the United States.

The extreme importance of the [nuclear weapons'] issue, not only within the bilateral context but also from the perspective of Western security needs, . . . and the unprecedented outcome in the form of the disintegration and fall of the Diefenbaker government . . . tend to underscore the extraordinary circumstances of that period (Dolan, et al., 1981b:14).

Although attempting through rhetoric, and in turn indecision, to protect Canadian sovereignty over such issues as nuclear weapons, Cuba, the Columbia River Project and NORAD, Diefenbaker succeeded only in assuring his own political defeat. In 1963, he lost not only the election but, more importantly from the Canadian perspective, he had placed a great strain on Canada-United States relations. Following his election loss, the

extreme rancour between the two countries all but disappeared. It would not be unfair to say that the Americans were relieved by the election of Lester B. Pearson.

With the possible exception of George Grant, it is difficult to find dispassionate observers of the final days of the Diefenbaker era. Diefenbaker, the populist (as Grant [1979:123] notes: the sincere but misguided nationalist), was considered the man many loved to hate. Suffice it to say that Diefenbaker was mainly responsible for a major crisis in Canada-United States relations. In the final analysis, however, his tenure as Prime Minister was important for three distinct reasons. First, it helped define the problems inherent in maintaining a sense of Canadian sovereignty. Second, it may have shown just how far the Americans would be pushed by Canadians. Finally, it reiterated the importance of presidential-prime ministerial relations to the overall tenor of Canada-United States relations.

The defeat of the Diefenbaker government in 1963 by Pearson's Liberals resulted in a return to a normal (rather than improved) relationship. Rapport at the most visible level, i.e., between Kennedy and Pearson, was quickly established. The nuclear weapons question was soon settled, as was the Columbia River problem and various other disputes.

In mid-1963, an issue of immediate economic concern for Canada surfaced. The U.S. President had proposed an

interest-equalization tax (IET) to stem the outflow of US dollars. The result, according to the Canadian government, would have been disastrous for the Canadian economy. Thus, an exemption was sought and partially won, based on two major factors: 1) the Americans were apparently unaware of the possible effect on Canada and, 2) without the tax, the Canadian government argued, the Canadian economy could assist the US balance of payments (Gordon, 1977:157-9). Gordon (Ibid., 159) notes, however, that Canada had been given "another sharp reminder of [its] . . . dependence upon the US". There is evidence that the proposed tax may have been applied to Canada in retaliation for the earlier Gordon Budget. (20) The eventual watering down of this budget was, in part, due to American pressure. On the other hand, there is no question that the Americans had a difficult economic problem which they had been trying for some years to solve. The tax was one solution which would provide immediate results. Exemption for Canada had been discussed in the initial phase, but Gordon's budget apparently removed that possibility (Wright, 1974:141).

The IET provides a good example of both the problems faced in the relationship and the nature of a modern relationship. Indeed, two points of economic importance may be gleaned from it. Of primacy is the dependence of the Canadian economy on the United States. The interdependence of the monetary market is also relevant because Canadian capital

requirements were most often met by American bankers. These factors became more evident after Canadian persuasion led to only a partial exemption from the IET. In one instance President Kennedy had become visibly upset over a large borrowing transaction by Hydro Quebec (Wright, 1974:138). It had been argued by the Canadians, however, that every dollar that flowed into Canada went back to the Americans in the form of payment for American exports in goods and services to Canada. It was apparent that Canada . . .

had run headlong into a dilemma that is central to [its] position in continental relations. The intensity and preponderance within the Canadian economic system of linkages with the United States make catastrophic the impact of globally oriented restrictive policies applied by that country (Wright, 1974:159).

A factor which directly intervenes in the Canada-US relationship in many situations is the reaction of other American allies. In the IET case, the Americans were concerned that Japan and Western Europe, who would also be hit hard by the tax, would react unfavourably to a Canadian exemption. The Americans were caught in cross-pressures. In the first instance, Japanese and European complaints ensured that exemption for Canada was unfair and sure to be resented and thus, the IET should be applied equally. On the other hand, some Americans felt that Canada should receive special status "in terms of the reliability and direction of Canadian national policy" (Wright, 1974:158). The "compartmentalization of policy development within the cumbersome disjointed structure of the US government", however, may help

explain the initial response the Americans gave for a Canadian exemption (Wright, 1974:141). As Wright (1974:141) further explains, the right hand of the American government may neither have known what the left hand was doing, nor for that matter, where the left hand was. Finally, if retaliation to the Gordon Budget were the key to the American response, this reaction echoes the comment of Willis Armstrong, a former US Ambassador to Canada. The Americans, he says, will seldom react sharply but if they do it is usually with good reason (1976:11). Interestingly, Canadian foreign policy-makers have been accused in the past of only reacting to the US. If Armstrong and Wright (the latter with reservation) are correct, the US too is reactive and interest-equalization may be a case in point.

Before the dust from the President's equalization program had settled, another economic issue became prominent. The Canadian automotive industry had been operating at a disadvantage vis-à-vis the United States for some time causing numerous problems for the Canadian current account balance with the US. In 1963, a new automotive export incentive scheme was announced by the Canadian government "which linked tariff rebates to export performance". This plan was considered by Canada as "expansionist but not protective" (Gordon, 1977:167). The Americans reacted strongly, however, to what they saw as a distinctly protectionist policy. In light of the controversy, discussions between Canadian and American government officials

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were begun that year culminating in 1964, with formulation of the Canada-United States Automotive Agreement. This agreement, signed in 1965, helped solve for the short-run, the Canadian current account balance. As settlement was based on a tough Canadian stance, the Americans were again, as with the Gordon Budget, watching with apprehension the growth of Canadian economic nationalism. The Americans, however, perceived the advantage of a closer integration of the two economies. In the long-run they appear to have been correct.

In the first two years of the Pearson Liberal government there were a number of other outstanding issues on which agreement was reached. The Columbia River Project was settled and Canada's twelve-mile fishing zone was set up with a compromise for American industry. In addition, the Great Lakes' union squabble was ended. Even as settlements were being reached on numerous items, President Johnson and Prime Minister Pearson had agreed to set up a working group composed of Livingston T. Merchant and Arnold D. P. Heeney, both former Ambassadors to Canada and the United States respectively. Their task was to attempt to define the problems of the future between the two countries and to offer solutions to them. Their report, criticized by many, (21) recommended the advantages of quiet diplomacy. While the Merchant-Heeney Report was intended to bolster the foundations of Canada-United States relations, Munton and Swanson (1978:179-182) note that "ironically [it] marked the

beginning of the end of this cooperative period". There were a number of changes occurring both externally and internally to Canada which led to re-evaluation of its national interest. The most important point was that Canadian economic dependence on the United States overflowed to all aspects of Canadian life. Nevertheless, of interest is that the Merchant-Heeney Report: Canada and the United States: Principles for Partnership, was dated some two months after Pearson's Temple University speech, in which Pearson called for a halt to the bombing of North Vietnam. How influential was this speech on the report's conclusion (i.e., the use of quiet diplomacy)? Pearson's memoirs Mike, Volume III, makes mention of neither Merchant nor Heeney nor their report. As noted earlier, Pearson utilized quiet diplomacy when he felt it was in Canada's interest to do so. (22)

The Temple University speech caused a rift in the otherwise friendly relations established between Pearson and Johnson. In 1965, however, Canadians as a whole were generally in favour of US policy in Vietnam. This support declined in the ensuing years, paralleling, but following, a similar decline in the United States. Canada is always under pressure, either real or imaginary, to support the general thrust of American foreign policy. Thus, a certain level of moralizing for domestic consumption is considered acceptable by the American government. Johnson's anger over Pearson's Temple speech, however, was probably due to Pearson's making the speech on US soil.

Americans, like Canadians, cannot easily tolerate that kind of interference." (23)

Canadian government assistance for the American war effort in Vietnam through the Defence Production Sharing Agreement was considered by many Canadians, in the latter stages of the war especially, as Canadian complicity. Others saw the Canadian position differently. "The [Canadian people] ignore the remarkable degree of detachment from the war in Indochina which the Canadian government has maintained and the part it has tried to play in keeping peace in that area" (Holmes, 1976:274).⁴ Pearson's rhetorical moralizing aside, the Arms Agreement was considered both politically and economically in Canada's best interest. Economically it was seen to help the balance of trade, while politically (discounting domestic politics) it lent tacit government approval to American foreign policy vis-à-vis Vietnam and the North American alliance.

The imposition of an embargo on the export of military equipment to the USA and concomitant termination of the Production Sharing Agreement would have far reaching consequences which no Canadian government could contemplate with equanimity. It would be interpreted as a notice of withdrawal on our part from continental defence and even from the collective defence arrangements of the Atlantic alliance (Pearson, cited in Thordarson, 1972:23).

During the final years of Pearson's term, Canada-United States relations took second place to domestic politics although "segments developed within all the major political parties advocating greater government intervention to stop the

Americanization of Canada's economy and culture" (Thordarson, 1972:15). National Unity, the Flag Debate and Centennial Year became the major topics of both conversation and politics. In addition, as Canada began to warm-up to celebrate its 100 years of nationhood, its 'world role' was considered of less importance. It is not necessary to review the reasons for this latter situation. Suffice it to say it was probably the beginning of the wide-open domestic debates which continue unabated. These domestic debates may have proved a blessing for the relationship in the mid to late 1960's. They saved the expense of Canadians waxing eloquent about the problems of both US domestic and foreign policy (although a number of Canadians could not help but discuss America's racial tension and Vietnam policy).

In 1968, both Pearson and Johnson stepped down from office. Their successors, Pierre Trudeau and Richard Nixon, took new initiatives in the realm of foreign and domestic policy. Each would be troubled in his attempt.

When Pierre Trudeau became Prime Minister in April 1968, he immediately took steps to change the direction and style of Canadian foreign policy. He announced in May of that year that his government, if elected, (24) would carry out a major foreign policy review. Implicit in this announcement was the concern that changes were already considered, and needed only de facto implementation. This included recognition of both the

People's Republic of China and the Vatican. While Canada's China policy might once have been a source of irritation for the Americans, this was not the case in 1968, as the US was developing "a roughly parallel policy departure" (Canadian-American Committee, 1972:33).

The results of the foreign policy review were published in 1970, under the title Foreign Policy for Canadians. The policy review was justified by the statement that "at times in the past, public disenchantment with Canada's foreign policy was produced in part by an over-emphasis on role and influence obscuring policy objectives and actual interests" (1970:8). Dobell (1972:7) has noted that "symptomatic of this condition" of public disenchantment were the number of books released at that time decrying Canadian participation in NATO and cooperation, particularly militarily, with the United States. While this may have some value in explaining the need for a review, it does little to answer the reason for the lack of a section on Canada's relations with the United States, particularly as many of these books dealt specifically with the relationship. It was two years before such a Canada-United States study was carried out. A number of plausible reasons have been posited for the lack of a US section; for example, the comprehensiveness of the relationship and, thus the extra time which it must be given. (25) There may also have been the concern that the relationship was too exclusive to make comment on at that time or in that

forum. The government, and in particular the Prime Minister, wanted to make changes in many areas. Therefore, it is possible that the government desired keeping change, for example, in NATO, separate from their relations with the Americans and the kind of modifications they sought in that "special" relationship.

The Trudeau government's attempt to utilize a rational approach to governing led to the foreign policy process being opened to numerous departments, the provinces, interest groups and the public, who had not normally been involved in foreign affairs. According to Michael Tucker, (1980:X) Trudeau "would abandon the ad hoc, reactive middle-power internationalism which Lester B. Pearson had practised, and replace it with a well-thought-out, logical policy founded on Canada's national interest". While the review expressed a desire to have foreign policy flow from domestic policy, one analyst has noted that only the rhetoric and not the substance of Canadian foreign policy changed (Thordarson, 1972:214).

In 1970, the Americans may have been listening to the rhetoric, while noting substantive changes such as the Canadian NATO cutbacks in 1969, and government alterations in decision-making. Indeed, these changes may have harboured the beginning of deteriorating relations between the two nations over the next few years. Not since Diefenbaker had the relationship been so strained. New developments such as the Canadian Arctic Pollution legislation and the consequent American reaction,

ultimately resulted in oil import cutbacks from Canada, US policy, and in particular the 1971 US import surcharge and the Nixon Doctrine put the emphasis on "a clear-eyed approach to the national interest. Each government will have to make hard decisions in line with its own perception of the national interest - decisions in which the other may find it difficult to concur" (MacEachen, cited in Tucker, 1980:84). In addition, "the emergence of an East-West détente and the accompanying decline in the perception of a military threat weakened one principal incentive for bilateral cooperation" (von Riekhoff, *et al.*, 1979:1). Thus, impinging national interests tended to take precedence over international interests. Increasing Canadian nationalism was probably a response to a concurrent increase in US nationalism. The American and Canadian governments were looking to satisfy their respective domestic publics.

The American surcharge on imports (instituted in August 1971), provided Canadians with the impetus (once again) to look more closely at the relationship and Canadian dependence on the United States. The shock effect of the August decrees provided a sense of urgency and produced a degree of consensus among federal government departments that had been notably absent during the earlier phase of the review process (von Riekhoff, 1978:87).

In addition, the Nixon Doctrine dealt a blow to the so-called special relationship and allowed for a full-blown conflict of interests. If Canadians were to be self-reliant, the opportunity had been presented. They had complained in the past of too little American concern for Canada. Indeed, the surcharge, while

crisis-like in nature, allowed Canadians the perception that they were finally being treated as a nation rather than an American sphere of influence. This perception, however, could only be accepted with reticence, for if the Americans wished, they could hurt Canada severely. Indeed, "the immediate impact of the legislation was to heighten dramatically a sense of vulnerability to US trade policies" (Tucker, 1980:81).

Canadian reaction to the US surcharge found release in the Options Paper of 1972, electing for a reduction of Canadian dependence upon the United States. If Canada were too reliant on the US, particularly in terms of trade, then other partners had to be found to help re-shape Canadian dependence. As a subject of sentiment, the Third Option (the one chosen to guide Canadian policy vis-à-vis the US) was well conceived. Objectively, it was prone to many obstacles. Following on the heels of the Nixon Doctrine and the surcharge, however, it was unlikely to be a subject of great American concern. In addition, it was the long awaited policy paper on Canada-United States relations, neglected in the 1970 policy review. Although the Third Option may be considered a landmark from a Canadian perspective in Canada-United States relations, it was fraught with difficulties over which the central Canadian government had little control. Von Riekhoff (1978:87-109) notes a number of these problems. Canadian control over international events, domestic concerns

outside of government control and, the state, of the economy are examples.

The Third Option must not (nor was it intended to) be considered government policy. Rather it was, and is, a framework through which government policies could be oriented. In addition, it did not "sanction a vigorous assertion of Canadian sovereignty claims, vis-à-vis the United States, but rather [it advocated] the 'judicious use of Canadian sovereignty'" (Tucker, 1980:86). As a direct result, a number of Canadian initiatives in the cultural and economic spheres were put forward in the 1970's with an eye to possible American reaction. The Foreign Investment Review Agency (FIRA), the Canadian Development Corporation (CDC), (26) as well as Bill C-58 to remove the tax-exemption on Time and Reader's Digest are examples of Canadian initiatives. More important than the actual policies, however, were the changes which occurred "in the process of formulating and conducting policy vis-à-vis the United States" (von Riekhoff, 1978:97). One development in particular has been the attempt to have the Americans understand that there is a border between Canada and the US, and, in addition, to attempt to coordinate that particular relationship "to a greater degree than its other foreign relations" (Kirtton, 1977-78:305). These developments resulted in a decrease of inter-governmental transactions and an increase in both the department of External Affairs' responsibility and the resources within its US division

(to the partial exclusion of other government departments) for maintaining ties with the US.

With these new resources [and responsibilities] External Affairs set out to alter policy towards the United States through both its daily dealings with officials throughout the government and its distinct issue review procedure (Kirton, 1977-78:306).

In turn, this led to an increased intercourse between Canadian government departments. Finally, Cabinet became more involved in the relationship which "provided a central locus of authority and guidance" necessary to achieve the elusive goals of the Third Option (von Riekhoff, 1978:97).

A further offshoot falling within the spirit of the Third Option was the Contractual Link concluded between Canada and the European Community in 1976. Although it has been associated with the Third Option, and properly so, the Contractual Link was initially seen as a counterweight to an overwhelming US presence in Canada. The concept of a counterweight for Canada, however, is far older than the option chosen to guide Canadian foreign policy vis-à-vis the US, and is also an integral part of the political philosophy of Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau. Various Canadian governments in the past have assessed its value as a measure to balance both British and American pressures on Canada. More recently, however, "because of the preponderate presence of the US, and the inability to match this presence, the rough equivalence of the counterweight has been relaxed to include any relationship which

will reduce Canadian dependence on the US" (Dolan, 1978:28). The emphasis of the Contractual Link was to be on economic ties. Dolan (1978:29) notes that Canadian foreign policy directed toward Europe might be affected by both changes in the Canada-United States relationship and the behaviour of the European Community. In addition, hostile American behaviour toward Canada would likely increase friendly Canadian relations toward Europe. While Dolan's analysis is behavioural rather than policy-oriented, he concludes that the Canada-United States relationship had limited influence on Canadian behaviour toward Europe between 1946 and 1973.

Finally, the Third Option must be seen as neither a panacea for Canadian dependence, nor as a failure. It is difficult to make predictions about, for example, the long-term results of the buy-back policy. It is possible, however, to predict, as Munton and Swanson (1978:175-211) have done in a Delphi project, what might happen to Canada-United States relations in the short-term. "Canada will probably be more not less, integrated with the United States and the two governments will probably have more, not fewer, conflicts" (Ibid., 193). They conclude that this would be in line with the Second Option, i.e., closer integration with the US. It would not necessarily be a sought after conclusion from Canada's position, but rather the result of closer integration in particular areas such as pipeline development.

Intent on setting a new style and direction for foreign policy, Prime Minister Trudeau encouraged Canadians to be less concerned about the vicissitudes of the external environment and to establish a strong domestic environment. In this way, foreign policy would become a product of and a response to domestic concerns. Because there was reason for optimism in the early 1970's, Canadians largely welcomed these ideas. As a result, the energy problem of 1973, for example, was not considered major; Canadians believed in the strength of Canada's natural resources. "This perception gave rise to an assertiveness - even a national arrogance - of which the United States became the principal target" (von Riekhoff, et al., 1979:2). On the other hand, Canadians were not willing to sell all they had in terms of energy (no one really seemed to know in 1973 just how much that was) to the Americans to satisfy their "gluttony". Thus,

Americans . . . did not take kindly to Canadian recalcitrance about oil supply commitments to the United States; they took even less kindly to the prospect of having to pay the going world price for Canadian oil (Tucker, 1980:88).

At the same time, there were problems in the United States which could not but add to some amount of Canadian arrogance. Canadians had not had the experience of Vietnam or Watergate. The Americans were looking inwards trying to decipher why they had been burdened with such calamities. Naturally, the threshold of tolerance to criticism from abroad decreased. Canadians were

not unwilling critics, and thus, the relationship suffered (von Riekhoff, et al., 1979:2).

By the mid 1970's Canada-United States relations were showing signs of rapid improvement. New American presidents in 1974, and again in 1976, were important to an improved situation, as were friends in the US State department who (although for different reasons), like Canadians, were opposed to the Garrison project. In addition, a number of agreements between the two countries, such as fishing and pipelines have been instrumental in improving relations. In turn, the election of the Parti Quebecois in 1976, not only increased Canadian concerns for domestic stability but also led to the desire for a friendly neighbour to the south. The Americans were willing to play the part of friendly, non-interfering neighbours and in this manner lent tacit approval to the federal cause.

Although the relationship had been growing friendlier in the latter half of the 1970's, part of the bilateral success story must also be attributed to global factors. Sagging economies, oil shortages and Soviet actions, particularly in Afghanistan, brought the two closer together. President Carter and Prime Minister Trudeau established a good working rapport which also assisted the stabilization of relations between Canada and the US. The apparent inability, however, of Carter to control Congress led his successor Ronald Reagan, to restate or reject many of the previous Administration's policies and begin

anew. A number of important agreements between Canada and the US were never ratified in Congress. As a result, Reagan has decided that while Canada-United States relations are important, some of the nasty issues which apparently had been settled previously at the highest levels will be re-negotiated. These problems, coupled with an emerging intention on the part of the Canadians to buy back some of their resources and industries, has set the relationship on a precarious course. It appears that there will be problems and conflicts in settling numerous issues. In addition, Canadian reticence over American conduct on a number of global issues may well add to the burden of conducting North American affairs.

How often has it been said that the United States and Canada share the world's "longest undefended border"? This cliché concerning Canadian-American relations resists burial; doubtless, if the US were not a global superpower, the sod over this grave would be well-turned. President Richard M. Nixon in a speech to both Houses of the Canadian Parliament (April 14, 1972) attempted to lay the image of untroubled partnership to rest.

Through the years our speeches on such occasions have often centered on the decades of unbroken friendship we have enjoyed and our four thousand miles of unfortified frontier. In focusing on our peaceful borders and our peaceful history, they have tended to gloss over the fact that there are real problems between us. . . . It is time for Canadians and Americans to move beyond the sentimental rhetoric of the past (cited in Swanson, 1975:298).

One point which stands out as worthy of note in 1983, is that it appears many Americans finally seem to realize that there is a border.

Notes

(1) The Americans had failed to capture the Canada's mainly because individual states did not work together during the War of 1812. Thus, the US turned their eyes southward. The British were aware, however, of the strength of the United States and Canada's vulnerability. "Probably the underlying reason for Canada's salvation lay in the improved relations between Great Britain and the United States. If British North America was vulnerable to land attacks, the American seaboard was vulnerable to the British navy. Gradually purely economic considerations triumphed over the ancient politico-economic orthodoxies". (Brebner, 1945:108-109).

(2) Federation of the provinces was, however, considered both important and practical, especially in Upper Canada. The British position showed a general lack of concern on the part of the government. Indeed, some British leaders thought Canada might become part of the US. On the other hand, there were strong financial interests in Britain which were not anxious to let Canada go completely. For a good account see Brebner, 1945.

(3) A number of different approaches to the study of Canadian history are presented by J.M.S. Careless, "Frontierism and Metropolitanism" in Approaches to Canadian History, 1979: pp.63-83. Regarding the "Laurentian School" of Canadian history, for example, Careless (1979:77) notes that both Creighton and Innis felt that "the existence of a separate Canada was not just a fortuitous result of the American Revolution, of French determination to survive, nor of Loyalist emotional resolves to 'stay British'--despite the hard facts of the environment--nor again of the mere continuance of the Imperial tie. It was also rooted in powerful factors of geography and commerce that underlay the whole Canadian development".

(4) During the American Civil War a number of ships including the "Alabama", which had been built in Britain, were utilized as commerce raiders by the Confederate South. By war's end the victorious North sought punitive remuneration from Britain. The issue dragged on for some years and was finally settled by the Treaty of Washington in 1871. Britain paid \$15.5 million in damages to the US. In 1866, the Reciprocity Treaty between Canada and the US had been cancelled by the Americans. However, the Americans had wanted to retain their fishing privileges in the Atlantic. Linking the fisheries question with the Alabama Claims and the possibility of trade negotiations, opened the way for the eventual signing of the Treaty of Washington.

(5) While the Treaty of Washington did settle a number of major differences between the three countries there were conflicts over the carrying out of its provisions. For example, the first payment of the Halifax Commissions award was not made till some seven years later.

(6) In the 1980's, Canadians must be seen as morally superior to the Americans, Robin Winks, an American historian says. "They tend to cling to some half-truths, myths and 'vital lies': that political revolution is better than revolution; that Canadians know the United States while Americans know nothing about Canada; that the country never practices official racism; that Canada serves the world as an exemplar, even a linchpin, of peaceful coexistence among nations" (Globe and Mail, 25/5/82).

(7) Early in 1981, the new American President, Ronald Reagan, asked and received the resignations of the American half of the Commission. This will no doubt have an effect on its continuity and may also mark a shift to increased politicization in the relationship. While not independent of government, the tendency for the IJC had been, in the past, "to relegate national allegiances to the background when they consider the technical aspects of particular problems". Until 1977 only four of eighty cases had been divided along national lines (Tucker, 1980:98).

(8) Some historians have argued that while reciprocity may have been the visual issue in the election of 1911, the Naval Service Act was as important in the Liberal defeat. See, for example, the Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs for May 15, 1980. Stacey (1977:102) offers another argument noting that the Alaska Boundary settlement which ended in favour of the US may have been partially instrumental in the defeat of reciprocity. He says that Canadians felt that they had been poorly treated by the Americans in that dispute and did not want to forget it.

(9) The Canadian delegation at the Paris meetings, headed by Prime Minister Borden, was most concerned about Article X of the League Covenant, which committed members of the League "to respect and preserve as against all external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League" (cited in Creighton, 1969:455-456). Article X was an anathema to Canadians who had gained some amount of freedom from England. Likewise Parliament was negative in its response to a new "collective" system. Nevertheless, the Treaties were signed.

(10) In the 1970's, fisheries again became the subject of both cooperation and conflict in Canada-United States relations. Spillover from the Law of the Sea Conference, as well as a number of unilateral acts led to a decline in cooperation on the

fisheries question and the subsequent "fisheries war". This was short-lived, however, and cooperative relations resumed in 1979 although there have been sporadic outbursts of conflict since then.

(11) The consensus of most observers regarding King is that he would have preferred a return to isolationism, but events would soon pass him by. (see for example, J. Eayrs, 1972).

(12) Both Canada and the United States cut their military strength back significantly at war's end.

(13) It can be argued, however, that French Canadians had never wanted a European connection. In fact, to many, NATO had been contrary to French Canada's desire or concern.

(14) Denis Stairs (1974:173) argues that contrary to the initial design of the UN it was de facto "the foreign policy instrument of the Western alliance".

(15) For example, the American practice of disposing of commodity surplus abroad on special terms, restricted Canada's ability to sell goods to the US. In addition, Canada was "being undercut by unfair practices in the alternative markets for her exports" (McInnis, 1960:158).

(16) These mutterings were not so dark in 1970, when Kari Levitt stated that Canadian sovereignty had indeed been lost and there seemed little chance of it being regained (1970:116). In addition, she noted: "the abrogation of sovereignty implicit in the branch plant economy may yet prove to carry substantial economic cost" (1970:33).

(17) This problem was also broached in the Watkins Report (1968), a government White Paper inquiring into problems faced by the Canadian economy due to foreign investment.

(18) The early warning radar systems were built between 1954-1957 and expanded to include the Aleutians and Greenland between 1959-1961.

(19) When the Liberals came to power in 1963 and accepted a nuclear role it was clear in the House that "this decision in no way makes Canada a member of the nuclear club in the sense of owning or manufacturing nuclear warheads" (Martin, 1963:307). Others, however, thought this was hair-splitting. See, for example, T.C. Douglas p. 482, Vol. 1, 1963, Debates.

(20) The Gordon Budget had been introduced in June of 1963, in an attempt to alleviate some of the problems of foreign ownership. According to Charlotte Girard (n.d.:113) it was a bombshell in

Canada-US relations and may have been the catalyst which provoked JS retaliation in the form of the interest equalization tax. See also G. Wright (1974:137-163).

(21) See Dobell, (1972).

(22) Two years earlier, however, Pearson stated in a series of questions and answers he had drawn up ostensibly for his speeches: "Q. what should Canada's position be vis-à-vis the US? In foreign policy? A. A candid friend, recognizing that she [i.e., Canada] must be involved in practically every aspect of US foreign policy and must, therefore, support her whenever she can, criticize her when necessary, and persuade her to alter her policies. The latter role should normally be discharged through confidential diplomacy rather than by public criticism. We must not forget that only the USA has the material power to be the leader of the coalition of which Canada is a part. Canada's influence with the USA will be nil if she becomes merely an automatic follower; a satellite". (Pearson, Archives:1963). It is most unlikely that Pearson thought he was flying in the face of his own judgement regarding confidential diplomacy. He may have felt that he was doing the Americans a favour by pointing out the obvious fallacy of their policy. Apparently there was great concern within the department of External Affairs over this issue and an unsuccessful attempt to thwart the speech.

(23) President Kennedy's 1961 reference in Ottawa to Canada's joining the Organization of American States (OAS) was greeted with great disuain and no doubt aided the ultimate decision by Canada to stay out of the OAS.

(24) Riding high on a wave of confidence, Trudeau decided to hold a federal election immediately after his successful bid to party leadership.

(25) See Thordarson, (1972:188).

(26) The CDC had been mentioned as early as the 1963 Speech from the Throne in Ottawa.

Chapter III

Conceptual Framework

Controversy about the nature of bilateral relations between Canada and the United States abounds. Although Munton and Swanson (1978:199) provide no empirical evidence, they believe that there is a link between Canadian elite perceptions and Canadian foreign policy behaviour directed toward the United States.

The most effective political constraint on Canadian policy measures . . . is not the big stick of American retaliation. It is rather the perceptions and expectations of Canadian policy makers themselves. Anticipating a negative American reaction, they will in the future, as they have in the past, avoid measures concerted enough as to be likely to incur a formidable response.

In effect, they state that Canadian action is moderated by perceptions of possible American reactions. Many others like Walter Gordon (1977), James Laxer (1970), and Karl Levitt (1970), argue that Canada is vulnerable to multiple forms of American penetration and thus, will be the loser in (any) foreign policy behavioural exchange(s). The record, in fact, does not always correspond to this impression. (1) Nevertheless, Canadian dependence upon the United States aids in maintaining both a perception of vulnerability, as well as an explicit structural

vulnerability. In this situation of asymmetrical interdependence, the unease felt by Canadians is, at the very least, understandable.

American presence in Canada manifests itself in various ways, for example, economically, culturally, philosophically. This presence is also of utmost importance in a bilateral sense. The very pervasiveness of the relationship, from the Canadian perspective, places tremendous strains on Canada's ability to manoeuvre both within the relationship and in international politics. "These . . . concerns bearing on the conduct of Canadian foreign policy have been issues because of the American capability, if not the intention, to exact 'penalties' for deviant behaviour" (Tucker, 1980:79). It is not just the possible American capabilities and intentions but their combination with Canadian perceptions which, according to Munton and Swanson, may hinder Canadian action.

Perception has been considered fundamental by many analysts in the process of decision-making and thus, ultimately important to a state's behaviour. Certainly, some of the differences in Canada-United States relations, and in the foreign policies of each, will not be found only within the realm of objective reality or the environmental milieu. Psychological factors too are of importance. Nevertheless, the link between perception and state behaviour is elusive. While numerous studies utilizing a perceptual approach have been carried out and

doubtless added to the sum of knowledge, few, if any, have been able to bridge the gap between subjective reality and behaviour. Richard Brody (1969:127) notes, for example, that North and his associates (including Brody) in their "work on the 1962 Cuban missile crisis . . . revealed important differences in the relationship of perception to behaviour in the events of 1914, and 1962". In the 1914 case, the perceptions of the central actors were found not to be responsive to the other states' behavioural changes; this resulted in misperception of the other's intent. In 1962, on the other hand, they found more congruence between perception and behaviour. Both cases--misperception (1914), perception (1962)--were considered important by the analysts to the states' ultimate behaviour. However, the work of Brody and the Stanford Group has been criticized on numerous accounts. Michael Hass (1969:161-163), for example, takes them to task for their misuse of the scientific method but concludes only by asking "for more rigor in pursuing behavioural methods of research". Would this help solve the empirical link between perception and behaviour? Caporasso (1976:354-367) too has been critical of the Stanford Group. He is more interested, however, in the relationship between components of the mediated-stimulus-response model and in the group's approach to theory-building. Caporasso's critique of the perceptual data is of interest:

From [initial testing] the authors go on to test the same hypothesis (perception of hostility is related to intentions of hostility), using data on the frequency of perceptions rather than on the intensity of perceptions. That is, they looked at how many (frequency) hostile perceptions there were as opposed to how hostile (intensity) the perceptions were (1976:361).

Caporaso's response to the Stanford Group's theory which underlay their model is more damning. His interpretation of the stimulus-response framework "is that it is not a theory at all in any strict sense but a meta-language" which can be used to test propositions. But these propositions are not "logical deductions of the framework." In addition he wonders whether the terms stimulus and response are empirically independent. "Such independence" Caporaso notes "would be a minimum requirement for an empirical test of the stimulus and response terms" (1976:366).

Various studies utilizing both perceptions of threat and perceptions of hostility have had limited success in attempting to explain state behaviour. (2) It is beyond the scope of this thesis, and perhaps as yet beyond the expertise of the field, to illustrate empirically how the link between perception and behaviour is manifested. Instead, "many authors try to create decision-making models" (Falkowski, 1978:12). Nevertheless, one can seek to show that behaviour does change, and that one's perceptions of another's behaviour may somehow be linked to that change. Most would tend to agree with Munton and Swanson (1978) that there is a correlation between perception and behaviour. However, one must not confuse correlation with

causation. Correlation may be the first step in attempting to understand, in this case, foreign policy behaviour, but "causal inferences can often be drawn from such correlations" (Sullivan, 1976:5). While psychologists point out that perception is a necessary but not sufficient condition for explaining behaviour and that both ability and knowledge must also be present, most perceptual models of foreign policy decision-making assume that these two conditions are met. In studies carried out to date the object of analysis is an elite who is expected to have, or has attained, while in office, a knowledge of the system and the ability to influence behaviour. Neither knowledge nor ability could be explained without more extensive investigation into the individual's background and decisions both he and the state have been involved in.

Tucker clearly indicates that American capability is important to an understanding of Canadian foreign policy behaviour. To present a fuller discussion of the relationship, however, one must look beyond capabilities. (3) To this end, therefore, the intent here is to focus on possible changing levels of Canadian elite perceptions of threat based on US behaviour directed toward Canada and, in addition, to show that there may be a connection between these perceptions of threat and the Canadian foreign policy response directed toward the United States. The important point to note is whether perceptions of threat change and whether behaviour patterns change. To arrive

at a departure point for such an analysis, however, requires a discussion of the major concepts to be utilized.

The state of relations concerning interaction and its effect on the autonomy and vulnerability of the subordinate state in a dyad is part of the problem upon which Tomlin *et al.* are concentrating. (4) At what point does the state decide that (a) levels of autonomy are too low or (b) the cost of economic gain is too high *vis-à-vis* levels of autonomy? In other words, in an asymmetrical dyad, economic well-being and autonomy are considered as competing goals by the subordinate state. (5) Increased relations to enhance the subordinate's economy, for example, would likely reduce her autonomy. Moreover, the ability of the subordinate to withdraw from the relationship when the level of vulnerability is perceived as escalating is emphasized. Increased hostile behaviour by the superordinate "draws attention to the vulnerability of the subordinate country and thereby encourages the latter to seek greater autonomy" (Tomlin *et al.*, 1980a:24). While their direct concern is not with perception, an allowance is made within the theory for perceptions of the subordinate's behaviour which the researchers feel will ultimately affect the behaviour of the subordinate. The Asymmetrical Dyads Project has utilized two streams of literature: dependence and interdependence. Both are conceptually important for the task undertaken here.

In their works on dependence and interdependence Caporaso (1978) along with Keohane and Nye (1977) agree that the concept "dependence" means state reliance on external factors. In addition, Caporaso (1978b:22) sees dependence (6) as asymmetrical interdependence. Keohane and Nye (1977:9-10) note that "nothing guarantees that relationships that we designate as 'interdependent' will be characterized by mutual benefits." To the contrary, they argue that an interdependent relationship will connote costs and restrict autonomy, although it is unlikely to be a total zero-sum game. In other words, one state's gain will not always result in another's loss. They also appear to agree with Caporaso when that say "it is asymmetries in dependence that are most likely to provide sources of influence for actors in their dealings with one another" (1977:10-11). Caporaso's (1978a:1-2) delineation of dependence theory is important here: dependence focuses on "relational inequalities among actors . . . [and] the vulnerabilities of members of the global system resulting from these unequal relations." (7) The interdependence literature stresses the "vulnerability created by patterns of transactions among national societies and emphasizes the sensitivities of societies and policies to one another" (Tomlin et al., 1980a:5).

Methodologically, the dependence approach is concerned with symmetry or asymmetry among nation-states and thus, states as actors are the unit of analysis. (8) A paramount example of

asymmetric interdependence is a situation in which country "A" receives nothing from country "B" while "B" acquires all its goods and services from "A" (Caporaso, 1978b:18). Although the Canada-United States case is not so extreme, Canada depends on the United States for approximately 70% of both its imports and exports. The US receives about 19% of its imports from Canada and exports approximately 16% of its total exports in return (IMF, 1983). Thus, while not an absolutely asymmetrical relationship, Canadian dependence on the American market is overwhelming. Trade dependence, however, is not the only indicator of this asymmetrical relationship. For example, monetary dependence, such as Direct Foreign Investment (DFI), cultural dependence through the media and arts and, ecological interdependence are also important.

Finally, Caporaso (1978) and Keohane and Nye (1977) have noted the structural conditions necessary for dependence. According to Caporaso (1978b:22) "dependence is a structural phenomenon" identified by enduring patterns of interaction having asymmetric properties and by the "shape and form of the distribution of their interactions." Combining dependence with the notion of power, he states: (1978b:28) "the first linkage [between them] is that dependence rests on structural asymmetries which can with certain probabilities be converted into decisional power." In other words, structural power provides the means by which one actor has more capability to

affect another and thus influence the relationship. Another form of structural imbalance "concerns the gross disparity in the intensity of involvement of the two actors in the relationship [which] generates sensitivity to a change in relations" (Dolan et al., 1981c:3-4). In this instance, the subordinate state will be the more sensitive to changes in the relationship. Both structural power (9) and intensity of involvement, considered together as structural asymmetry, will orient the subordinate actor to the relationship.

Similarly Keohane and Nye (1977:11) see power as a nation-state's control over resources, and its "potential to affect outcomes." Thus, the subordinate state is not only less able to affect outcomes but is rendered extremely sensitive to any changes in the relationship which may further reduce its ability to be effective. Nevertheless, Keohane and Nye also recognize that the superordinate state will not always be in the most favourable position within the dyad. In other words, there is not always a one-to-one relationship between power as a resource and power over outcomes. To shed light on the role of power in situations of interdependence, they introduce a distinction between sensitivity and vulnerability interdependence. Sensitivity refers to "how quickly . . . changes in one country bring about costly changes in another" (1977:12). Vulnerability refers to the costs of adjustment to that outside change (10) (1977:13).

Vulnerability is particularly important for understanding the political structure of interdependence relationships. In a sense, it focuses on which actors are the "definers of the *ceteris paribus* clause" or can set the rules of the game (Keohane and Nye, 1977:15).

Vulnerability interdependence as recognized by Keohane and Nye, does not allow total political leverage to the superordinate state. "Instead, a dominant country must establish and maintain 'linkages' between the domain of its dominance (i.e., military, economic, etc.), and the area of policy it wishes to influence" in the dependent country (Richardson and Kegley, 1980:3). In the case of Canada and the United States, because the latter is the former's most important world partner, Canada may more easily concentrate on one bilateral issue of importance. On the other hand, as Canada is of much less concern to the United States and her foreign policy, the countervailing American position may be weak in comparison. (11) In complex relations, asymmetrical interdependence may be distributed in such a way as to shift decisional power from one party to the other, depending on the issue area" (Tomlin et al., 1980a:5). Canada, although apparently far more vulnerable to harm as a result of US action, has not always been the loser in bilateral exchange with the United States. (12) In this asymmetrical dyad, Canada is far more vulnerable in some issue-areas than in others. Indeed, Canadian "vulnerability was first perceived as the consequence of the amount and concentration of foreign ownership in key sectors of Canadian industry, although a second concern

arose out of the related concentration of trade with the US" (Dolan, 1981a:5).

The Third Option as an attempt to increase Canadian autonomy by reducing dependence on and vulnerability to the United States has been anything but successful. While a detailed analysis of its apparent lack of progress has yet to be undertaken, it may be hypothesized that one reason was the inability of Canada to find readily open markets outside of the US at a reasonable cost. (13) At the same time the Canadian government's sensitivity to its own vulnerable position based on changes in American import practices was profound. Policy measures intended to aid in Canada's search for economic independence from the US have been noteworthy for their failure. In fact, Dolan *et al.*, (1981a:7-8) point out that, although there were some early disintegrative trends in Canadian behaviour directed toward the United States in order to reduce Canada's economic dependence on the Americans, the overall result was, at best, limited. In the final analysis, "it is concern about vulnerability which sets subordinate states apart from others" (Dolan *et al.*, 1981c:6), where vulnerability is defined as a restriction in choice faced by the subordinate. (14)

In brief: Canada is highly dependent on the United States. It is assumed that this asymmetry or inequality in the relationship heightens Canadian sensitivity to change and decreases the ability of Canada to affect outcomes. Changes

emanating from the US which carry costs to Canada may increase the sense of vulnerability. It is not only US action but also the Canadian perception that the action generates higher costs, and Canadian inability to avoid those costs, which increases a sense of Canadian vulnerability. In other words, the issue is the degree to which Canada is perceived as vulnerable to harm because of the superordinate's actions.

The asymmetrically-interdependent nature of the Canada-United States dyad is taken as a given. This interdependence conditions perceptions of both the US and its behaviour. American action directed toward Canada may signify a relative increase in the intensity of relations and may well generate an increased sense of vulnerability to harm. For purposes of this thesis, the term 'perceived threat' will be utilized to define the degree to which the state, or its elite, perceives itself as vulnerable to harm as a result of the actions of the superordinate state.

The concept of threat perception in international behaviour research has been, for the most part, characteristic of crisis studies. While crisis is not the topic of this research, it is necessary to extract some of the relevant concepts from that literature.

Both decision-making and interaction analysis, the two predominant approaches to the study of crisis, have moved progressively to a definition which centres on threat as a principle ingredient in a crisis situation (Dolan et al., 1981b:2).

Charles Hermann (1972:13) in his decision-making analysis, for example, recognizes three major characteristics of crisis: 1) "threat to high-priority goals of the decision making unit", 2) restrictions of time and, 3) surprise. (15) A more recent conceptual definition has been provided by Brecher (1977:43).

A foreign policy crisis is a situational change in the external or internal environment which creates in the minds of the incumbent decision-makers of an international actor a perceived threat from the external environment to basic values to which a responsive decision is deemed necessary.

In operational terms Brecher's definition departs from Hermann's in four ways: 1) surprise is not considered a necessary condition; 2) response time is finite rather than short; 3) crisis may originate internally; and, 4) there is a "perceived high probability of involvement in military hostilities" (1977:44). (16) Both Hermann and Brecher recognize threat (to high priority goals, Hermann; to basic values, Brecher) as important.

Interaction analysis states that crisis is a product of "dramatic changes in the number and types of interactions between states" (17) inducing turbulence in the relationship (Dolan et al., 1981b:2). Similarly, in this approach, threat is considered relevant because of an inability on the part of the interacting states to control developments (Ibid., 2). (18) In dyadic terms Dolan et al., (1981b:5-6) conceptualize crisis as:

A sudden and substantial change in the normal pattern of relations between two states which either reflects or produces a perceived threat to the objectives which

decision-makers desire with respect to their internal or external environments. (19)

American behaviour, which may carry increased costs for Canada and which, in turn, become more difficult to avoid, will amplify the Canadian perception of vulnerability to harm. Thus the concept of threat perception in Canada-United States relations may be of prime importance both in attempts to recognize crisis (20) and to explain foreign policy behaviour. Moreover, the high levels of flux in the nature of the relationship since the early sixties suggests that perceived threat may be a fruitful area of analysis.

Cohen (1979:3) notes that "threat perception is, if anything, the decisive intervening variable between event and reaction in international crisis". Cohen's statement, however, limits most foreign policy behaviour during crisis to reaction. This may or may not be the case. In the Canada-United States relationship it is often assumed that Canadian foreign policy is a reaction to American stimuli. It is not always easy, however, to discern who is reacting and who is stimulating.

It is taken as a given that some level of perceived threat is always present, based on the asymmetrical nature of the relationship. As noted previously, the major component of crisis is seen as sensitivity to situational change creating or reflecting a perceived threat in the mind of the decision-maker. In the Canada-United States case, and from the Canadian perspective, the most obvious situational changes are caused by

major behavioural change emanating from the United States. The problem is to discover if changes in threat perception among the Canadian foreign policy elite occur following an increase in intensity of negative American behaviour (i.e., a perceptual reaction). Finally, can this potential threat be considered a conditioning factor in the Canadian response. Behavioural change, even in a negative direction may not be perceived as threatening to the target of that change for two reasons. First, it is not self-evident that conflictual behaviour directed by one party toward another will increase perceived threat. There may well be a lack of information or imperfect information on the part of the target. In addition, the behaviour may be misperceived. Second, behaviour which is negative in nature may be viewed from very threatening to not at all threatening. For example, a decrease in a non-tariff barrier (i.e., a quota), on a specific item, such as leather shoes, might well threaten a number of manufacturers with closure. In addition, the leather shoe manufacturer might have to reduce his prices, for the short-term, to clear stock. Thus, some government departments and their ministers might come under great pressure to take retaliatory action or, at least, some policy action to assist those affected. On the other hand, companies that produce a different leather product might consider it a windfall in available material. Thus, what appears to be a threatening action to some could produce varied results. (21)

The nature of the Canada-United States dyad as asymmetrically interdependent, implies that US action can harm Canadian objectives and goals and increase the costs to reach those goals. Charles Lockhart's (1973:7) conceptions of threat and threat perception are useful in this regard. "Those who scrutinize undertakings and perceptions of harm respectively are simply dealing with different phenomena". Undertakings or acts are considered as influence attempts while perceptions of harm should be understood as actor anticipation and fear of harm to the national interest.

According to Lockhart (1973:7), "threat implies a relationship between parties: one party attempts to influence another's action through the contingent application of punishment, and the target party recognizes this attempt." The initiator of threat may not be concerned with the target's perception. It is, however, precisely the target's perception which is the concern of this study. While an active threat relationship need not be present, fear of vulnerability to harm is necessary. This implies that to the perceiving target, there is both an initiator and a relationship.

Fear of anticipated harm "assumes that expecting and preparing for the severest possible contingencies provides the best defense of national interests" (Lockhart, 1973:78). Although misperception may occur, it is considered better to imagine the worst than to be caught unaware. Two points

regarding perceptions have thus been made. First, it is assumed that an implied fear of harm to the state is present. Second, American behaviour of a conflictual nature will generally elicit a response (i.e., threat perception may change) which may be followed by some behavioural response.

Klaus Knorr (1976:112) points out a number of cognitive factors which should be considered in an analysis of threat perception. "The act of threat perception creates an image [in that] all human awareness is a personal construct, something that we organize". Thus, some components of the world are dealt with while others are ignored. In addition, Knorr posits that "pre-existing assumptions [or beliefs] about the outside world help us to select our 'bet'". In this thesis, threat perception as a cognitive construct and not as a given, is central. To this end, the three most important factors of human judgment as demonstrated by Osgood (1959:72-3)--evaluation, potency, activity--will be investigated. Each factor as noted can be measured on a continuum as follows:

evaluation: positive - negative

potency: strong - weak

activity: active - passive

Osgood contends that the "evaluative factors in human judgement regularly appear first and account for approximately half to

three-quarters of the extractable variance." This is best defined by the opposites, good - bad or positive - negative. The second and third dimensions, potency and activity, both with some amount of evaluative meaning, each account for about half the variance of the first dimension. (22) A nation which perceives another nation as positive, weak and passive is unlikely to feel threatened by that target of perception. On the other hand, if nation 'A' perceives nation 'B' as negative, strong or capable and active, the former might consider B's actions as threatening. Generally, a negative, strong and active action would be seen as a threat to the perceiving agent. Ole Holsti and his associates (1973) have used these dimensions for the attitudinal component in their study of unity and disintegration in international alliances.

Actors in positions of influence regarding foreign policy must act, or not act, on the information available and their definition of the situation. Both of these factors will be conditioned, in the Canadian case, by the asymmetrically, interdependent nature of the Canada-United States dyad. While "definition of the situation" (23) has been considered synonymous with perceptions in some studies, this will not be the case here. Emphasis will be placed on threat perception based on the perceived evaluation (affect), potency and, activity of the other actor's actions. An individual actor in the subordinate country of an asymmetrical dyad must concern himself with his country's

vulnerability to harm. Thus, it is important to attempt to indicate how the actor's perceptions of threat may ultimately affect his response. As Lyon and Tomlin (1979:134) point out:

We must ultimately discover the conditions governing Canadian perceptions of vulnerability and those which determine the nature of Canada's response to this threat.

An analysis of threat perception and how it varies across a number of particular time periods may be one step toward discovering how threat perception, and ultimately behaviour, is affected by another country's actions. External behaviour must be considered at least one of the conditions governing an actor's choice.

Noting the importance of perceptions, however, does little to explain their role vis-à-vis foreign policy behaviour. Boulding (1969:391) posits that it is not what the world is really like but rather what we think it is like that is important to our behaviour. Thus, a definition of perception may be simply a subjective notion of reality, or a "choice" or "guess" about the real nature of a stimulus (De Rivera, 1968:20). As De Rivera (1968:35) points out while perception is the process determining which of several alternative views of the stimulus is actually perceived, perception is dependent on one's beliefs. The perceptual interpretation of a stimulus is one which preserves a person's beliefs. Ole Holsti (1962:244) makes a similar comment: "Images are . . . dependent upon the decision-maker's belief system [which] . . . may or may not be accurate representations

of reality".

The "perceptual approach" in foreign policy sees the individual as actor operating from a bureaucratic and/or political base. Although the national perspective (eg., the "rational actor model") in international politics is also valid, individuals in specific roles form images and perceptions of most (apparently relevant) information and make or do not make the decisions. "These individuals may attempt to act rationally (in the formal sense), but the national interest and the goals of foreign policy may not be uniformly perceived by all those concerned" (Knorr, 1976:20). Indeed, Allison (1971) has shown quite clearly that homogeneity may not be evident among the foreign policy elite as to solutions in time of crisis. In his case study of Cuba, however, the nature of the crisis was probably well understood and the perceptions of it shared. (24)

In his 1979 article, Kim Nossal has attempted to illustrate that Allison's bureaucratic-politics model may be able to account for foreign policy outcomes in the Canadian parliamentary system because of policy-making changes introduced by the Trudeau government. These changes resulted in more participant involvement in decision-making, and thus, outcomes which were likely to be the end-product of bargaining and compromise. Nossal argues that the dominant Canadian foreign policy outcomes will tend to be the result of compromise "between

differing and contending preferences of the players in the system, both at the ministerial and bureaucratic levels" (1979:626).

In his work on misperception, Jervis (1976:14) makes a cogent point: if people did not see the world differently there would be no need to explore decision-making in attempting to explain foreign policy. "It is often impossible to explain crucial decisions and policies without reference to the decision-maker's beliefs about the world and their images of others". In addition, he says that although there may be, at times, homogeneity of perceptions, responses may not always be identical. When the perceptions are similar, however, "responses will often be the same and, when they are not, it is usually relatively easy to find the causes of the differences" (1976:31). Finally, Jervis notes that the roots of many important disputes about policies lie in differing perceptions (1976:31). Nevertheless, it might be argued that foreign policy elites within one political system holding shared beliefs, attitudes and values regarding the nature of foreign policy, would hold similar perceptions/misperceptions particularly in those situations of most concern to them.

It is accepted that the perceptions of foreign policy elites are important to decision-making and are likely of importance to the resulting state behaviour. To reiterate, however, it is not the elites' perceptions in general which are

important. Rather structural asymmetry is assumed to mediate the degree to which the elites perceive themselves and the national interests of the state vulnerable to harm due to the actions of the superordinate. This will be investigated by considering changes in elite perceived threat based on US actions directed toward the subordinate state.

The discussion, thus far, indicates that a relationship may exist between "American behaviour directed toward Canada, perceived threat based on that behaviour, and the Canadian behavioural response. Perceived threat may vary in strength according to the kind of signal received and perceived from the Americans, be it cooperative or conflictual in nature. American behavioural change indicating a possible shift in the relationship may amplify perceptions of threat. This is based on a fear that American action could restrict Canadian action and thus increase Canadian vulnerability to harm. Increased fear of vulnerability to harm is the initial response to higher-than-normal levels of US conflict behaviour. This may indicate a change in the relationship to the detriment of Canada.

A major feature of interaction analysis is that it allows the recognition of "sudden and substantial behavioural change in [a] relationship" (Dolan et al., 1981b:6). It may also provide the foreign policy elite with a signal of change in either or both the nature and state of relations. In light of recent Canada-United States relations, any strong behavioural

signal may not be so extraordinary. The concepts of dependence, interdependence and vulnerability have been combined with concepts from the perceptual and decision-making literature as well as interaction analysis to provide one framework. A Canadian foreign policy elite must decide--using judgement and best guess--on the intent of US behaviour and its effect on Canada. Changing conditions which signal a possibility of an increased sense of vulnerability to harm based on relatively stable Canadian dependence (25) on the US, may imply that a threat to Canada is now more imminent than in the past. One coping mechanism of the decision-maker may be to perceive a new level of threat and to respond accordingly. When the superordinate's behavioural signals are reduced, the fear implied in the initial change may not allow a total relaxation to a previous level of perceived threat. The 1971 surcharge, for example, which has been considered as conflictual American behaviour by most analysts, indicates in preliminary analysis, that it may have "had a lasting effect on Canadian perceptions" (Dolan et al., 1981:10). It is conceivable that a comparative analysis of this issue over time would indicate a shift upward in the level of threat perception. It should also be noted, however, that the surcharge incident may be a landmark issue in Canada-United States relations. Don Munton's (1978) analysis, on the other hand, indicates that the "special relationship" was ended long before Nixon's economic doctrine. "The demise of the

'special relationship' would instead be the result of causes of a much less ephemeral nature and of much earlier origin" (1978:19). Munton fails to be convincing. First, his analysis ends in 1970 thus leaving out the date that he considers unimportant. Second, if 1971 is not the beginning of the end of the "special relationship" it has been argued that perceptually this is the case. Further, the Asymmetrical Dyad's Project found that "all five dimensions of foreign policy responded in a similar i.e., strongly disintegrative manner to the 1971 crisis in Canada-US relations that was triggered by the international economic policies of the Nixon Administration" (Dolan et al., 1981a:31). While it may appear that other-than-normal American behaviour may be a signal of impending crisis, there is no intent to imply that this is the case. In other words, the main concern is perceptual change following US behaviour outside of the normal relations range and not whether a crisis is imminent or present.

It has been suggested above and, indeed, is the main referent in the decision-making literature, that the individual is most important for a fuller understanding of a state's behaviour. Critics of decision-making analysis contend, for example, that position is probably more important than the individual. Indeed, they suggest that it would matter little who was filling the position; decisions would be similar. The criticism implies, however, that every decision-maker is a rational, calculating machine capable of choice. The

psychological literature on decision-making makes the point: "Beset with uncertainties, the decision maker is reluctant to make an irrevocable choice" (Janis and Mann, 1977:46). In his search for a reasonable choice, the decision-maker will generally seek answers consistent with his perceptions and beliefs.

Elite decision-makers may be found in numerous positions within Canada, for example, in the realm of politics, bureaucracy or the military. The Canadian foreign policy elite may be made up of individuals from all of these groups. The common ground rests with their expertise and decision-making leverage within the field of foreign affairs and in their position as the voices of the foreign policy community. The focus of this thesis is directed toward the core of this elite.

In the final analysis, the concern here is toward a clearer understanding of how perceived threat, defined in terms of the degree to which Canadian foreign policy elites (and the state) perceive themselves as vulnerable to harm generated by the actions of the US, may affect Canadian foreign policy. Does this perceived threat vary across a particular time period and is there a connection between perceived threat and Canadian actions directed toward the United States? In addition, is it possible to determine whether the Canadian Foreign Policy Elite (CFPE) respond in either a conciliatory or retaliatory manner to their perceptions of threat, and whether responses vary? For example, in periods of high threat perception is Canadian action

submissive, reciprocal or escalatory, or is there a tendency to withdraw and seek broader relationships elsewhere to reduce the apparent severe effects of dependence and the increasing sense of vulnerability? Following negative US behaviour is there an increase in perceived threat and do Canadian elites maintain a high perception of threat or does that perception revert to some "normal" level? Finally, is there a locus of threat perception within the CFPE (i.e., a select few) or does it vary across elites depending on the issue-area? These five research questions which constitute the basis and rationale for this study will be addressed in more explicit form below.

Although the questions are interrelated, they will be discussed separately.

1) Does perceived threat vary across a particular time period?

It is expected that prior to each selected time period, some level of threat perception may well exist. In other words, the US would be perceived as somewhat negative, strong and active in terms of its ability to inflict harm on Canada. Following conflictual US behaviour, however, the perceptions of the CFPE would doubtless increase in terms of an evaluation of the superordinate's ability (and possible intent) to harm the national interests of Canada. Values across the three dimensions should increase. In other words, affect should become more

negative, while potency and activity become more positive; (i.e., higher values). In addition, the actions of the US, as perceived by the CFPE would be seen as harmful and would increase Canadian awareness of the potential for real harm. Thus, two types of perception are indicated as measureable. 1) An evaluative perception of the US as increasingly negative, strong and active, and 2), an action perception (more will be said of it later) which considers US behaviour as harmful to Canadian interests. In most cases, increases in threat perception are expected to be issue-linked. Thus, the level and degree of threat perception may well vary with the importance of the issue(s).

2) What is the connection between perceived threat and the Canadian response?

While it is impossible at this stage to support empirically that this connection exists, some trends in Canadian behaviour directed toward the US can be measured and explanations attempted. If, for example, US conflictual behaviour apparently led to an increase in Canadian efforts to coordinate policies between the two countries, a relationship between American behaviour and a Canadian response might be posited. It will be impossible to state whether the Canadian response is due to the superordinate's behaviour or elite perceptions of threat. In other words, is the stimulus more important than the perception of that stimulus?

3) Do Canadian elites respond in either a conciliatory or retaliatory manner to their perceptions of threat, or do responses vary?

Canadian responses will be investigated utilizing the Canadian event data set from the Asymmetrical Dyads Project (1980). A number of scenario's are possible and have been suggested (eg., retaliation--moderation--withdrawal). Don Munton (1978:19) has suggested, at least for the period 1957-1970, that Canadians generally reacted to external stimuli. "Indeed, [Canada's] behaviour may well be proportionally more 'reactive' than that of many countries" in particular with respect to the United States. His results tend to indicate that Canadian interactions were, more or less, symmetrical (i.e., close to the stimuli) along two dimensions: activity-passivity and cooperation-conflict. Thus, Munton's analysis suggests retaliation is more likely than either moderation or withdrawal. Reciprocity is also highly possible he notes. The actual action responses can be measured (as in the previous question), analyzed and tentative explanations provided. Because each time period will be investigated, both before and after US behaviour moves out of the normal-relations range, it will be possible to initiate a comparative analysis of Canadian responses.

4) Do Canadian elites maintain a high perception of threat or does threat perception revert to some other level?

Earlier it was maintained that some level of threat perception will always exist. The question remains, however, if threat

perception increases because of US conflict behaviour can we expect an equal decrease some time after the behaviour? Or, conversely, will threat perception find a new level that may be considered normal?

5) Is there a locus of threat perception or does it vary across elites depending on the issue area?

The greatest responses in terms of increased threat perception are expected from those elites who are involved in the issue-area of concern. For example, if trade was the main issue, then the responsible minister would likely hold the strongest views with respect to that action. There are, however, certain elites who, by nature of their position, are most often held accountable for foreign relations. The Secretary of State for External Affairs is uppermost in this regard. Is he likely to feel the most threatened by American behaviour which is outside of the normal relations range? These within differences across elites can be measured for each time period.

One state's behaviour toward another has numerous dimensions. It may be friendly or hostile, or it may, for example, include increased or decreased coordination or interaction (i.e., affective and participatory behaviour—Kegley et al., 1974). At any time, various combinations and levels of these dimensions may be active. For example, the institution of a monitoring device to audit trends in the Auto Pact could lead to increased interaction between Industry, Trade and Commerce

(ITC) and its American counterpart. At the same time the Department of the Environment might be attempting to influence industry in New York State regarding Great Lakes pollution. While these may be issue-specific cases, they are part of the general tenor of Canada-United States relations.

In the last two decades this bilateral relationship has been marked by great fluctuations in both stability and cooperation (von Kieckhoff et al., 1979:1). Numerous issue-specific cases of agreement/disagreement may be put forward as indicators of, and possible reasons for, the flux in Canada-United States relations. Few, if any of them, have been investigated through a perceptual approach. Canada's Arctic policy, the 1971 US surcharge, problems with fishing rights and the Garrison Diversion project are all examples of disagreement. On the positive side, Presidential--Prime Ministerial agreements about pipelines and the Canadian emergency electrical supply to the United States are noteworthy. These have all been considered as more recent major issues which affect, or have affected the relationship. (26)

Notes

(1) For example, Keohane and Nye (1977:165-218) note that in a number of situations of high-conflict between 1920-1959, Canada and the United States were almost equal in terms of outcomes closer to objectives (See Keohane and Nye, Table 7-10:192). In addition, they add that as long as bilateral issues remain unlinked, Canada is in a less disadvantageous position than appearances suggest. According to some Canadian officials (Globe and Mail, July 27, 1981) "The worst move would be for the United States to link changes in Canadian energy policy with policies on which Canada is seeking cooperation with the United States". This was in response to a question regarding Canadian energy policy and American reaction.

(2) "It is obvious from several analyses in several domains that some international behaviour is not dependent on the individual's perceptions" (Sullivan, 1976:65). Nazli Choucri has noted, for example, that while the perceptions of a number of Afro-Asian leaders were similar, their states' behaviour differed (cited in Sullivan, 1976:43). Nevertheless, in all the studies carried out on the 1914 crisis by the Stanford Group (North et al., 1967) the most potent variable in attempting to relate perceptions to foreign policy behaviour was the variable "hostility" (Ibid., 61). In addition, concerns about hostility and friendship in documentary evidence of the 1914 study were far more numerous than concerns about capabilities. "Preoccupation with capabilities that one might expect on the basis of power theory was conspicuously absent" (Hass, 1974:26).

(3) The rhetoric about Canadian capabilities has been downplayed in recent years, most notably by Prime Minister Trudeau. However, Lyon and Tomlin (1979:56-76) indicate that Canada's potential places it among the secondary-powers group consisting of Japan, West Germany, France and Britain.

(4) The asymmetrical dyad is a given: taken as a scope condition.

(5) The theory initially indicated that during periods of economic strength the government would attempt to enhance political autonomy by reducing transactions with the superordinate. However, in preliminary testing of the theory, the empirical results indicated that the reverse was true: "during 'good times', policy makers are willing to extend the relationship, while in periods of economic decline, they act to limit transactions, reduce coordination and alignment, and behave in a hostile manner" (Dolan et al., 1981d:9). As a result the

theory was reformulated such that in periods of poor economic performance by the US the Canadian government attempts to withdraw "because policy makers are aware that their economic problems stem from a decline in American economic performance. Thus our assumption that economic benefits are expected to result from increased relations may be correct only during periods of US economic growth" (Ibid., 11).

(6) The term dependence here is not used in its generic sense (i.e., as a body of literature) but as a concept.

(7) In this case Caporaso is noting the similarities between dependence and dependency--both as approaches to the analysis of state behaviour.

(8) A caveat is required: dependence theory is outside of my main concern. It does, however, provide some of the definitional framework used in this research.

(9) An attempt by Tomlin *et al.*, (1980:1-2) to explain Canadian foreign policy over time, utilizing status-field theory, yielded limited success. They note that a disparity in power can only be a scope condition and cannot account for foreign policy changes over time. Although status distance was considered important to Canadian behaviour it was "only in the sense that the relatively greater asymmetry between Canada and the US distinguishes Canadian behaviour toward its North American neighbour from that which it directed toward the other industrialized countries". Their findings did suggest, however, that asymmetry had a significant effect on the dynamics of foreign policy.

(10) An example in Canada-US relations may help explain the concepts. The Nixon surcharge of 1971, indicated (at least to the Canadian government) just how sensitive Canada was to American monetary and trade policies. The cost (not just economic but political as well) over time, of policy change would be a measure of vulnerability interdependence.

(11) See, for example, Keohane and Nye (1977:206) and their discussion of intensity and coherence in bargaining.

(12) See n. 2 above.

(13) Reasonable cost here refers not only to the dollar cost but also to political and attitudinal costs. In terms of attitude it was a matter of convincing Canadians to seek markets elsewhere and politically of probably having to lift trade barriers and of providing a so-called national industrial policy. Mitchell Sharp (47-560, 1980) has said that one reason for the failure of the Third Option was the inability of the government to convince the heads of industry that it was in their own best interests to seek

new markets. It is obvious, however, that the US surcharge did not have the impact on the Canadian export market to the US that the Canadian government thought it would. Otherwise the attitudinal change may have come about more easily. The problem was further exacerbated by the fact that many of the major industries in Canada are American owned. One apparent result of the surcharge was the reorientation of the relationship which apparently took place in 1971 and after. It was in effect a "turning point in relations which provided a heightened sense of Canadian vulnerability to the effects of unilateral American action" (Dolan et al., 1981b:1-2). For an account of the Third Option see H. von Riekhoff, 1978.

(14) Once again, it should be noted that in their theory reformulation Dolan et al., (1981d:12) expanded "the focus of [their] political autonomy axiom from a capacity for autonomous decision-making, i.e., restricted choice, to include the avoidance of the costs to economic growth imposed by external economic forces".

(15) Hermann later omitted the element of surprise from his crisis definition (cited in Dolan, 1981b:n1).

(16) Point four identifies the military-security issue-area as important. Brecher notes, however, that any of the four issue-areas (i.e., international-political, economic, military-security, and status) would yield valuable results. In the Canada-US case the economic issue-area would certainly be of more interest.

(17) This is similar to Brecher's "situational change".

(18) While Dolan et al., note that situational change which is prevalent in both types of analysis is relevant for their direct purposes, in my case the concept of threat which is also indicated in both types of analysis is of more direct value. Nevertheless, the concept of situational change will enter into the research early on.

(19) Dolan et al., (1981b:n1) and their concept of crisis differs from Brecher in that situational change in relations may be only a reaction to a threat.

(20) See Dolan et al., (1981b).

(21) For an account of trade decisions and the impact of policy-makers in both crisis and non-crisis see David Protheroe (1979), Making Trade Decisions in Canada 1968-1978.

(22) J.B. Carroll (1969:111-112) suggests the following definitions for these three factors of human judgement:

"Evaluation corresponds to the individual's tendency to make an approach to the stimulus or to avoid it; it measures the extent to which the stimulus has positively or negatively reinforced the individual's responses". "Activity refers to the necessity or non-necessity of making movements in adjusting to stimuli". "Potency suggests a measurement of the amount of adjustment that is made or must be made to a stimulus, or perhaps the amount of effort which is put into the response to a stimulus". The term affect will be used here in place of the term evaluation to avoid confusion between the words evaluation and evaluative and also because both potency and activity are evaluative. In addition, the combination of the three dimensions will be considered as an evaluative perception.

(23) As Sullivan (1976:49) explains "definition of the situation . . . can be considered [a] very general image or perception and as such, carries [little] explanatory power".

(24) The point is made only to show that there will not likely be homogeneity of threat perception at all times and in all situations.

(25) Dependence is not stable rather it is dynamic. For my purposes, however, it is enough to be aware of the high levels of dependence which Canada has on the United States. Increasing vulnerability may induce the fear that interdependence is becoming more costly. There will be no measure of interdependence in monetary or trade terms taken.

(26) See, for example, H. von Riekhoff et al., Canada-United States Relations, 1979.

Chapter IV

Operationalization

The preceeding chapters discussed the development of the relationship between Canada and the United States from a state of almost total independence to extreme levels of Canadian dependence. Some would consider that trends in this dyad reflect those in the international system in general, as the concept of interdependence is considered synonymous by the modernists, with the state of global affairs. (1) Nonetheless, few other relationships are tied in the same manner as that between Canada and the United States, with high levels of American investment and ownership in Canada, and a close historical relationship in both language and culture. Many Canadians feel constrained by the degree of integration between the two societies and the apparent loss of control over both the Canadian economy and decisions affecting the Canadian way of life. For a number of years Canadians have tried various means to either allay their fears of American ownership and influence or to regain control of their own market. More recently discussion and rhetoric regarding Canadian autonomy have become increasingly strident. Successive Canadian governments have become hampered, however, by a pragmatic as well as an astutely, political approach to the

problem. Certainly, in the past, Canadians have been willing to accept the "good life" of the American polity. This allowed, at the same time, decisions which were not detrimental to the relationship. Many may have felt that behaviour which annoyed the Americans would be met with retaliation that could only hinder Canadian freedom of choice. The irony may be that because of this reticence, freedom of choice was lost. Do Canadian politicians and senior bureaucrats, however, fear reprisal from "Uncle Sam"?

The research questions advanced in the previous chapter will be employed to investigate this problem. To this end, three variables must be measured: US behaviour directed toward Canada; Canadian behavioural response directed toward the United States; and, threat perception. While Canadian behaviour may be considered the dependent variable, it must be reiterated that the intent is not to explain Canadian behaviour but rather to see if a connection can be found between perceived threat and behavioural responses to that threat. It is impossible at this point to provide an exact empirical link between the two that would not have other explanations. For example, Ole Holsti et al., (1968) have found that the stimulus of another's action appeared more important than the perceptions of that stimulus in explaining state behaviour. Nonetheless, some empirical generalizations may be possible. One point which must be underscored is that perceptual data are more indicative of the

decision-making paradigm. Slippage between decision and action is well-documented, particularly in the bureaucratic politics' literature, although each action has its origin in the decision-making process. Prior to proceeding with a discussion of the variables and their measurements a number of definitions not included in the previous chapter must be considered.

It is taken as a given that Canada, in structural concerns alone, is very dependent on the United States. The concept of dependence is defined simply as extremes of Canadian reliance on the United States. Although the dyad is interdependent, many Canadians interpret the level and asymmetry of interdependence as a weakness in Canada's ability to affect the relationship. In effect, interdependence may be considered a euphemism for dependence. Canada profits tremendously by association with the Americans but the levels of dependence constrains Canadian action and augments vulnerability. Vulnerability of the nation is characterized by restriction in choice. As a dependent nation Canada's freedom of choice can be greatly affected by American action. The 1971 surcharge, for example, while not costly in the long run, pointed out Canada's rather weak position in terms of trade flow.

Although Canadian dependence upon the US is paramount there are concerns which are of tremendous importance to the United States in pursuit of America's own national interest and foreign policy goals, not the least of which is maintaining a

friendly North American neighbour. United States' actions intended specifically to hurt Canada have been, at best, sporadic. Nevertheless, American behaviour which increases the Canadian sense of vulnerability may cause a rethinking of Canadian dependence that could lead to offset policy initiatives. A number of meaningful factors intrude: proximity of the superordinate state; unwillingness and possible inability of Canadians to accept the cost of change; the nature of Canadian trading commodities; the availability of other markets; and, the level of present involvement within the dyad.

When a nation implements a foreign policy it does so with the express intent of influencing its external environment. While the actions themselves may be multifaceted, they are gradually explained in reasonable and rational terms. A different scenario is also possible: a decision may be made, rationalized, followed by some action. "Regardless of their decision-making model, rational or irrational human beings make decisions through combining (perceived) facts relevant to the situation and their sets of pre-determined beliefs and values about correct strategy and tactics" (Selim, 1979:28-29). In the main, a country's foreign policy consists of a number of objectives that are pursued in attempts to influence the external environment. Foreign policy, by definition, will include attempts and choices to protect the national interest. Objectives such as political autonomy and maintenance of both a

political philosophy and political system would be considered in the national interest. (2) Although there may be insidious intent in foreign policy, this is generally not the case in the Canada-United States dyad. In this study, the definition of foreign policy is confined to a number of quantifiable dimensions based on the discrete actions of Canada and the United States as actors in the dyad. Thus, the objectives of these two nation-states are subsumed in the actions they take.

The level of analysis discussed to this point sees the state as actor; the so-called "rational-actor model" of decision-making. In this model the state carries out its foreign policy, choosing the method/behaviour which will best fit its objectives. This level of analysis will be utilized to indicate both US and Canadian behaviour. In order to measure this behaviour, events from the Dyads Project will be investigated. The Dyads Project abstracted events from issues of The Globe and Mail and International Canada (a monthly report of Canadian foreign policy activity published by the Canadian Institute of International Affairs - CIIA). 20,394 events involving the US and Canada were coded on forty-one variables, covering the years 1963-1980. (3)

Foreign policy behaviour is conceived, in the first instance, in terms of five dimensions which "assign meaning to discrete official actions (4) in which governments engage as they attempt to influence the external environment" (Dolan et al.,

2

1.0

1.1

1.25

1.4

1.6

1.8

2.0

2.2

2.5

2.8

3.2

3.6

4.0

4.5

5.0

5.6

6.3

7.1

8.0

9.0

10

11

12.5

14

16

18

20

22.5

25

28

32

36

40

45

50

56

63

71

80

1981a:12). These include a) nature/level of dyadic transactions; b) policy coordination; c) relative position; d) distribution/level of dyadic costs and benefits; and, e) affect (Tomlin et al., 1980b:51). These dimensions are "not exclusive of one another, for the same instance of behaviour may involve more than one dimension" (Tomlin et al., 1980a:18). Definitions of these dimensions are given below.

a) Nature/Level of Dyadic Transactions:

Measures expressions of actor (i.e., central government) preferences concerning the nature/level of transactions between Canada and the United States, and "the extent to which the actor desires to change [these transactions] and the amount of effort which the actor will expend in order to change them" (Tomlin et al., 1980b:53). Numerous transactions between the two countries are indicative of the relationship. Federal actors may seek to increase or maintain certain transactions while decreasing others. These preferences may be expressed in either words or deeds.

b) Policy Coordination:

Measures the degree to which the federal governments knowingly attempt to coordinate their various policy fields or policy-making structures. Policy coordination implies behaviour utilizing established bilateral institutions or achievement of similar results outside of formal institutions. The other side of this dimension implies a lack of desire to work together.

Generally, the propensity has been to promote policy coordination between Canada and the United States. This was particularly true between the years 1963 and 1972, possibly indicating, from the Canadian perspective, a desire to influence US policy initiatives (Dolan et al., 1981a:21).

c) Policy Alignment:

"Measures the degree to which the policies/positions of the central governments of the two parties in the dyad agree with and support each other" (Ibid., 66). Between 1963 and 1972, Canadians tended to disagree more often with the US and its policy position. The Americans, on the other hand, were prone to agree with Canadian policy (Dolan et al., 1981a:22).

d) Distribution/Level of Dyadic Costs and Benefits:

Refers to behaviour which indicates satisfaction (or dissatisfaction) with the distribution of costs and benefits "or which compares those mutual benefits" or costs (Tomlin et al., 1980a:19). Both governments, generally, showed limited satisfaction between 1963 and 1972 (Dolan et al., 1981a:22-23). The IET, the Auto Pact and the surcharge would all be important elements to a fuller understanding of this dimension.

e) Affect:

Is a behavioural dimension concerned with "the feeling/emotion/style/orientation which accompanies/characterizes the action" (Tomlin, 1980b:80). Basically Canadians and Americans appear to like each other at least from their perspective as

international actors (Dolan et al., 1981a:23). This affective orientation is also apparent, if not prominent, in Canadian-American relations generally.

This set of event data dimensions will be used in the measurement of Canadian actions directed toward the United States.

An additional set of behavioural data was also coded which captures levels of cooperation and conflict in the dyad. This typology, drawn from the CREON (Comparative Research on the Events of Nations) Project (5) allows actions which are represented in each event to be differentiated as either cooperative or conflictual (Dolan et al., 1981b:6). An average level of both cooperation and conflict in the eighteen year period provides an indicator of the 'normal relations range' and, "substantial change is defined as . . . behaviour which is equal to or greater than two standard deviations for any interval within this period" (Ibid., 7). The information provided by the CREON typology will be used to measure the extent and level of US behavioural change directed toward Canada. This will be done by pinpointing particular time periods of American behavioural change which meet the criterion of substantial change.

Both sets of events data have been aggregated into monthly time periods. The date 6310 would indicate the 10th month of 1963, and so on. Eight separate months of US conflict behaviour outside of the normal relations range directed toward Canada have been identified. See Figures IV-1:91 for the four

time periods between 1963 and 1972, and IV-2:92 for the four time periods between 1973 and June 1980. The 'X' axis represents time in months while the 'Y' axis indicates conflict behaviour. (6) Eight periods of behaviour outside of the normal relations range are as follows:

6310 - October 1963.

7111 - November 1971.

7202 - February 1972.

7203 - March 1972.

7406 - June 1974.

7409 - September 1974.

7502 - February 1975.

7603 - March 1976.

Although eight months of conflict related behaviour have been identified they will be treated as four discrete periods for purposes of graphing and analysis. This is made necessary by the overlap in monthly periods investigated. Each conflict month will be analyzed for perceptual data four months on either side, so that changes in threat perception across time may be examined.

CF-6 SPSS

FILE CONFLICT (CREATION DATE = 04/29/82)
SCATTERGRAM OF (DOWN) V5

Figure IV-1

04/29/82

(ACROSS) SEQNUM
63.45 78.35 90.25 102.15 114.05

CP-6 SPSS

FILE CON7380B (CREATION DATE = 06/14/82)
SCATTERGRAM OF I(DOWN) X3

06/14/82

Figure IV-2

(ACROSS) SEGNUM

Figure IV-2

Thus, 7111 (Nov. 71) would include July 1971 to March 1972 which also covers the conflict month 7202 (Feb. 1972) and so on. The five dimensions of Canadian foreign behaviour, also aggregated monthly, will be investigated across the conflictual time periods for four months on either side to compare with the perceptual data collected. Thus, after collapsing, the periods are as follows:

Period I 6310: (June 1963 to Feb. 1964).

Period II 7111, 7202, 7203: (July 1971 to July 1972).

Period III 7406, 7409, 7502: (Feb. 1974 to June 1975).

Period IV 7603: (Nov. 1975 to July 1976).

A second level of analysis will be used to investigate threat perception. This level sees the individual as actor making choices and decisions based on numerous factors which may or may not be outside of the general concerns of national objectives. These factors include, for example, an actor's own beliefs, perceptions, personal interests, ambitions, organizational interests and pressures, as well as standard procedures. This group of individuals would normally be involved in making numerous decisions and policies affecting the external environment. Included within this foreign policy group is a smaller elite that by position alone is more visible and more responsible for both the decisions made and policies carried out.

In addition, the communications of this smaller elite group are generally more accessible.

This latter group consists of those individuals normally recognized as being in positions to coordinate and affect the foreign policy of the country. As a general rule, an elite group would comprise strong leadership and decisive support from either or both other powerful individuals and coalitions. In addition, it is assumed that this elite group have similar outlooks and beliefs regarding the realm of external behaviour. And if this is not the case (i.e., a dissimilarity of beliefs exist) it is precisely the reason for focusing on the individual decision-maker and his cognitive processes (Holsti 1976:34). They include, in Canada, the Prime Minister, the Secretary of State for External Affairs (SSEA), and his undersecretary, as well as departmental ministers and parliamentary secretaries from various government departments such as Industry, Trade and Commerce (ITC), the Department of National Defence (DND), Energy, Mines and Resources (EMR), the Departments of the Environment, Agriculture, Manpower and Immigration and, Fisheries. Each of these individuals perceives his country's vulnerability to harm, based on the superordinate's action, using his own judgement and best guess. Thus, there is first the knowledge in the minds of the CFPE that American action can be of tremendous importance. Second, there is the fear that American action can do harm (a constant and present threat). Finally, action which may

knowingly cause possible harm may be interpreted by the elites as increased threat. Canada's subordinate status in the dyad indicates that the CFPE heavily weight American behaviour which can, in particular, affect Canadian goals and objectives.

Two distinct levels of threat perception must be found: a 'normal' level and a 'change' level. The normal level should be distinguishable from the latter since measures of the two will be contiguous. The time periods which have been selected, indicating increased conflictual behaviour from the US, are indicative of change in the relationship. Perceptual data will be garnered from four months before and after these time periods which fall outside of the normal relations range utilizing the research technique of content analysis allowing for a comparative analysis of threat perception. It is expected that threat perception will remain at some normal level until a shift outside of normal US behaviour is signaled. At this point, perceived threat is expected to change to some new level. Increased perceptions of threat will be measured as a composite of perceptions of the United States as negative, strong and active as noted in the content analysis. In other words, the differences in perceptions of the elite across a particular time period will serve as an indicator of either increased or decreased threat perception.

Thus, three indicators will serve as the measures required to answer the research questions: Two behavioural

indicators utilizing event interaction analysis as the research technique, and an indicator of threat perception using the technique of content analysis. It is expected that high levels of threat perception should be matched by increased or decreased activity on one or more of the Canadian dimensions of event interaction (i.e., Canadian foreign policy behaviour) indicating more than normal levels of response to the other's actions.

Because the research technique of event interaction analysis is part of a much larger project and is explained elsewhere (Dolan et al., 1981a) only the technique of content analysis will be more fully discussed. The eighteen years (1963-1980) covered in this analysis present a number of examples of major decisions in the ongoing Canada-United States relationship. The intent is not to capture any particular landmark decision that may have grossly affected one country or the other; instead it is to determine what effect CFPE perceptions of threat have on Canadian behaviour in response to other than normal US behaviour. Are the perceptions as important as implied by Munton and Swanson? Content analysis of documents will aid in answering these questions. Indeed, some form of content analysis may be the only realistic method of determining the importance of perceptions and their connection with behaviour. Content analysis as now carried out implies more than simply a frequency count of attributes or words.

Content analysis is useful as a research tool in multiple and varied situations. It was "developed specifically for investigating any problem in which the content of communications serves as the basis of inference" (Holsti, O., 1969:2). One area of investigation centres on the individual who delivers the communication. The researcher attempts to make inferences, for example, about the attitudes or beliefs of the individual or actor concerned. The content of a communication may be broken down in various ways, for example, by counting key words or phrases and classifying them. To make replicative inferences, however, a large sample of material is usually required. This in turn demands a rigorous methodology. Without proper attention to methods, results are unreliable and replication becomes impossible.

A number of definitions of content analysis are available. (7) Holsti's (1969:14) rather broad definition, however, may be best suited for present purposes. "Content analysis is any technique for making inferences by objectively and systematically identifying specified characteristics of messages."

The use of content analysis as a tool in quantitative research has generated concern among traditional scholars about its value. Robert Jervis (1969:190) notes that "neither other states nor scholars can take at face value a nation's statements of its perceptions". A state may well practice deception and/or

misrepresentation. (8) While he is critical of the counting of words, Jervis (1969:216) does admit that "quantitative studies are able to cast doubt on previously accepted views" and may even suggest new relationships as yet unexplored. Certainly Jervis' criticism is well-taken, but the problem is not limited to quantitative analysis. Anyone utilizing textual analysis will be subject to the same difficulty (Holsti, O., 1973:243). Moreover, the explicit distortion of a leader's "real" thinking may be useful to the analyst if the reasons for such distortion or reticence (i.e., how much does the author reveal of himself) can both be known and interpreted. Indeed, verbal behaviour which seems at odds with the same person's private attitudes and actions must be considered important and relevant to the investigation. Generally, one must assume that the author of the communication is saying what he means. Mahl (1959:89-90) notes that the representational model of content analysis "assumes that behavioural states in a speaker are necessarily directly represented in the symbolic content of messages he emits . . . when a person says he is frightened or talks of frightening things that is taken to show that he is frightened". (9) Finally, "it should not be assumed that qualitative techniques are insightful, and quantitative ones merely mechanical methods for checking hypotheses. The relationship is a circular one; each provides new insights on which the other can feed" (Pool, 1959:192). In fact, if utilized properly, content analysis has a

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distinct advantage over impressionistic modes of analysis; it is systematic. (Mueller, 1969:217).

Content analysis as a method assumes that verbal or written communication is important, and may be studied utilizing various sources of information such as public or private documents and interview transcripts. (10) In this study, public documents will be used. While the content analysis of public documents may be considered problematic by some (inferences regarding their use have already been made) they provide the analyst with the most unobtrusive method available. Specifically, the author of the documents is normally not aware that his communications are being analyzed. "In a way public documents are 'harder' data and they generally stand still for the researcher" (Budd et al., 1967:vii). In addition, availability is without a doubt a major consideration for their use. By the same token the analyst is limited to those documents both available for public scrutiny and those which have been produced by the source. Nevertheless, as Mueller (1969:222) points out, written transmissions are usually more important than verbal ones in diplomatic analysis because they are generally more formal, serious and less remediable than verbal transmission and "its author expects to be held more fully accountable for what he has said". An additional problem lies in choosing the documents to analyse. Jervis (1969:188) notes that the scholar's judgement may be the only criterion available for document

selection. In this study, however, document selection will be made easier by the pre-selection of time periods; available documents falling within four months on either side of the selected periods will be utilized.

Content analysis has enjoyed mixed success. While some problems were due to a simple bias (i.e., the method failed to be systematic) or lack of proper application of the rules, (i.e., failing in objectivity) a number of other criticisms have been put forward regarding its use with public documents. Studies which have been carried out on a cross-national basis have had to rely on language translations. In the study undertaken here, only documents from one country (i.e., Canada) will be searched and translations which appear in the documents will be official (i.e., governmental) translations. Another point is that often the author of the communication is not the same person who delivers it. In other words, ghost writers are sometimes used. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that the individual making a statement would proffer a communication with which he is not in agreement. People tend to say what they believe or what they want others to feel they believe. Selim (1979:97) notes that verbal behaviour sets the limits for action, creates commitments and indicates how the elite would like to be perceived.

The use of public documents in quantitative analysis may take the 'flavour' or 'flesh' out of the inferences being measured. For example, voice inflection, posture and intensity

of speech may all be lost. But these drawbacks may be overlooked because of the "manipulation that can then be done on the quantitative data" (Sullivan, 1976:42).

It is not possible to solve all the problems inherent in the use of public documents. (Indeed, no data source will be completely without disadvantages), however, in terms of reliability, comparability, and validity, public documents seem to have more advantages than disadvantages (Falkowski, 1978:41).

In quantitative content analysis the investigator attempts to make inferences about, for example, the attitudes or perceptions of the source. As yet there is no reason to believe these inferences should be made. In fact, the relationship between inferences and the person's actual statement or motives and personality "is at best only vaguely understood" (Holsti, D., 1969:32). This problem relates somewhat to the above discussion regarding the representational model of communication. In this model the position is taken that the importance of a communication is "what is revealed by the lexical items present in it" (Pool, 1959:3). A second model, the "instrumental", places far less importance on the face value of the message and more importance on the context and circumstances in which it was presented. Some would argue that in an analysis of public documents, the instrumental model would be more appropriate as the intent may be to persuade, threaten or influence another's behaviour (Zinnes et al., 1976:443). Although the problem has validity, it will not be approached in this study. The intent here is to attempt a deliniation of perceptions of certain elite

actors and the method chosen may be more indicative of the representational model. This should not, however, diminish its value as it appears to be the first attempt of its kind in Canada-US relations. Note will be made, however, of the audience. Moreover, the argument regarding lexical content versus circumstance will not easily be solved. (11) In 1954, Berelson stated that content analysis had only been used to tap the lexical content of a message. He indicated, however, that information of this kind can "frequently serve as the basis for . . . interpretations of the latent content" ((1954:489). Nevertheless, two points of discussion are valid here. Does the method of content analysis chosen have validity and can perceptions really be tapped? The two questions are closely related.

Jervis (1969:192) points out that equating "most statements of perception with perception itself is dangerous". But this can be considered a problem with all information derived from decision-makers and in all perceptual studies carried out. It is, therefore, important to be aware (if possible) of the source's communication strategy (Jervis, 1969:193). As North (1969:234) points out in response "if there is a persistently high correlation between a certain type of perception [i.e., statements of perception] and a certain type of action, one seems justified in concluding that there may be a relationship." The question of validity in the use of content analysis is cogent and

ties directly to the question of the measurement of perception. Validity means simply the extent to which one is actually measuring what one is intending to measure.

Content validity [face validity] is usually established through the informed judgement of the investigator. Are the results plausible? Are they consistent with other information about the phenomena being studied? (Holsti, O., 1969:143).

The method of content analysis chosen to extract measures of threat perception in this study is "evaluative assertion analysis" in combination with the "Stanford Political Dictionary". Each will be thoroughly explained.

"The objective of evaluative assertion analysis is to arrive at a measurement of the attitude of the source toward certain attitude objects. It is an attempt to obtain a measure of evaluation, not frequency" (Pool, 1959:194). It begins with a "raw" message and "ends up with an evaluative scaling of the attitude objects referred to by the source" (Osgood, 1959:42). This type of content analysis meets the basic requirements called for in an analysis of communication. It is reliable--the work can be replicated; it is objective--there is a specific set of rules and procedures to follow which allow categorical decisions to be made which will minimize the coder's bias; it is systematic--"the inclusion and exclusion of content or categories is done according to consistently applied rules" (Holsti, 1969:4). Finally, evaluative assertion analysis meets the requirements of generality because it has theoretical relevance.

The general purpose of this form of content analysis is to "extract from a message the evaluations being made of significant concepts" (Osgood, et al., 1956:47). It is initially a type of quantitative content analysis. The message being analyzed is translated into a simple, three part assertive format: attitude object - connector - common meaning term or other attitude object. The connector and common meaning term (or other attitude object) are numerically valued. Thus, the latter can be either associated or dissociated, from the first attitude object. The product provides a value for each attitude object. Each assertion can be considered a single unit of thought or unit of idea "that conveys a single item of information extracted from a segment of content" (Budd et al., 1967:34). This method assumes that language users can distinguish between two different types of symbols called attitude objects (AO) and common meaning terms (cm) respectively. "Attitude objects are signs whose evaluative meanings vary extremely with the person producing or receiving them", (Osgood et al., 1956:49), for example, Communism and Liberalism convey different meanings to different people. Common meaning terms on the other hand, are words in which the users of language can generally agree, for example, that "hate" is bad, that "loving" is good. However, Osgood (1959:42) notes "this distinction is one of degree".

A number of steps are necessary to reach the point of quantitative manipulation from raw data. In step 1, all the

attitude objects (AO's) relating to the variables under study must be identified and isolated from surrounding evaluative material. In most cases the AO will be a capitalized proper noun or a pronoun. For example, the terms US government, US Congress and American president, would all be considered attitude objects. One can generally distinguish between a) the US government's denunciation of Canada's oil policy; and, b) the consistency of Canada's oil policy with US government expectations. The first case would be considered a strong, negative association while the second would be positive but of weak intensity. This will be explained further below under intensity and direction evaluation. Osgood and his associates (1956:60) note that a coder may "(a) extract exhaustively all evaluations relating to all AO's in the message or (b) may extract only those evaluations which relate to a limited set of AO's as selected for some specific purpose." In this study only those AO's dealing with the United States government or its policies or which are implied directly will be extracted. (See Appendix A). While implied assertions may provide some difficulty regarding reliability it is hoped that the results will be more valid. "What does it matter if we gain reliability" Berelson (1954:514) notes. "if in the process we lose all our insights."

The second step is the masking of each attitude object into meaningless symbols. However, as there is only one AO of concern (the US government/policy and synonyms), and only one

coder, this step is not considered necessary. In practice the identifying, isolating and symbolizing each AO can be carried out in one step.

Example Text:

The enunciation of the "Nixon Doctrine", and more particularly its specific manifestation in the economic measures taken by the United States last month, has effectively, and perhaps brutally, challenged some of our assumptions and led us to re-examine our position as an industrial and trading nation. . . . A United States measure that damages the Canadian economy also damages the American economy (Sharp, 1971).

Three AO's can be recognized in this example: 1) Nixon Doctrine (i.e., a policy); US government, (implied by economic measures); 3) US economic measures (i.e., a policy).

The next step is the translation of each message into one of two assertion forms while maintaining the equivalent meaning of the actual message. The first task at this stage is to identify the common meaning terms contained in the message. "A number of factor analyses of meaningful judgements have provided evidence for a persuasive evaluative or attitudinal factor in human thinking" (Osgood, 1957:45). Thus, in most cases the good-bad continuum appears first and has the highest loading and is normally followed (i.e., in terms of loading) by the evaluative continua, strong-weak (potency) and active-passive (activity). For example, the assertion "the US State department has been most helpful" would clearly lean towards the "good" direction and would indicate an "active" relationship. Generally

speaking, recognition of the common meaning material is quite simple.

To this point the Attitude Objects and common meaning material have been identified. The next step is the translation into simple three part assertions so that the text can be readily understood. Two generic forms of assertions are possible.

1) A0/c/cm.

2) A01/c/A02.

In most cases the A0 is a noun, the connector (c) is a verb or verb phrase, and cm is the complement to the A01. This form follows the most common type of English assertion: actor-action-complement. An example of the first generic form called "type A" might be:

A0	c	cm
Nixon economic measure	is	effective

Another example of type A might be, Text: "the tough American stance" would translate into assertion form: Americans are tough (i.e., A0-c-cm).

Form two, called "type B", might appear as follows:

A01	c	A02
US actions	can damage	Canadian economy

A second example of type B might be, Text: "US tariff policy threatens Canadian industry." (i.e., A01-c-A02). Comprehensive rules for translating the text of a message into assertion form are found in Usgood et al., (1956:61-74). (12) To maintain coherency while translating texts into assertion form an eleven column data chart will be used. See Figure IV-3 (p. 109). Column 1 identifies the source of the message, for example, a speech by the Prime Minister and his audience. In addition, as perceptions over time are considered important the date of the message will also be recorded in column 1. Column 2 contains the Attitude Object about whom the assertions are made. For example, US government or US policy. The third column contains the verbal connector (c) in plain language and as close as possible to the original text. Column 5 indicates either the evaluative common meaning term (type A) or another A0 (type B). Columns 4 and 6, 7, 8 are value columns of c and cm respectively, and columns 9, 10, 11 are the product of columns 4 X 6, 7, 8 respectively. Columns 4, and 6 through 11 are discussed below.

Evaluative Assertion Analysis

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The next major step in developing measures is the assigning of direction and intensity to verbal connectors (c) and evaluative common meaning terms (cm). In this task work can be carried out directly on the assertion chart.

Connectors are verbs or verb phrases often accompanied by other common-meaning material, which serve either to associate (+) or dissociate (-) the A0 in column 2 and the common-meaning evaluation or other A0 in column 5. Connectors thus have direction [and] vary in intensity (Osgood *et al.*, 1956:80).

A semantic differential scale is used to value both the verbal connectors and common meaning evaluative terms.

Semantic Differential Scale

 (+) 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 (-)

The semantic differential scale is somewhat problematic in that the distance between intensity levels, for example, between +2 and +1, or between -1 and -2 are considered equal. The use of the Stanford Political Dictionary (see below) and its relatively high rate of intercoder reliability on dictionary coding, however, will aid in overcoming this problem. The direction of the verbal connector is associative when columns 2 and 5 are tied to one another at some level of intensity. For example, A0 is cm, would be highly associative. The direction is dissociative if columns 2 and 5 are separated or are shown to be

less related and so on. For example, A0 condemns cm, is highly dissociative. "It should be emphasized that association and dissociation have nothing necessarily to do with evaluation" (Osgood, et al., 1956:80). While assertions vary in an associative or dissociative manner they also vary in the degree to which the A0 and cm are either tied or not tied to one another. Osgood (1956:84) notes that hard and fast rules regarding intensity are difficult to set-up, but because the method only requires three degrees in each direction the task is somewhat simplified. Generally a strong verbal connector (+/-3) is one which implies complete identification between the data in columns 2 and 5 or complete separation between the two. For example, the verb "to be" and most other simple, unqualified verbs would be considered as complete identifiers and are usually scored (+/-3). On the other hand, connectors which imply only partial, probable or increasing association or dissociation, for example, "like" or "quite", or which utilize auxiliary verbs, such as, "has evaded" or, "has been seen", would be valued (+/-2). Finally, connectors which are of weaker intensity and which indicate a possibility, obligation, or hypothetical relationship between the A0 and cm, for example, "may" or "slightly" would be valued (+/-1). A value of "0" on either a connector or, cm would indicate a lack of an assertion and would not be utilized. (13)

The next task in step three is assigning intensity and direction to the common meaning material (column 5). While Osgood et al. (1956:85-89) have developed a method to do this, an easier method has been made available by the use of the Stanford Political Dictionary. The dictionary contains 4062 words "coded on three dimensions of the 'semantic differential' found by Osgood and his colleagues to be basic to human attitudes in many cultures. . . . This procedure assumes that many relevant discriminations in an individual's perceptions of objects are made in terms of . . . three attitudinal dimensions. Furthermore, when all dictionary words are scaled on these three dimensions, comparisons among document authors' perceptions of events can be made against a common yardstick" (Holsti, 1973:108). (14)

Affect (Positive) +3, +2, +1, 0, -1, -2, -3, (Negative)

Potency (Strong) +3, +2, +1, 0, -1, -2, -3, (Weak)

Activity (Active) +3, +2, +1, 0, -1, -2, -3, (Passive) (15)

While most studies to date which have utilized the Stanford Dictionary have been studies of conflict between world systems or between alliances, the study at hand is utilizing it to study perceptions of threat between two friendly nations. However, this should not vitiate its usefulness. Moreover, it may provide a good test of the dictionary. As noted above, the

dictionary is made up of 4062 modifying words and actions precoded on three dimensions, "according to which one actor's perceptions of another actor can be evaluated" (Holsti et al., 1973, App. B:240). An example of dictionary terms follows: numbers indicate affect, potency, activity respectively. (16)

Actively 0, 0, 3.

Accost -3, 2, 2.

Fever -1, -2, 0.

The Stanford Political Dictionary in the context used here presents some difficulties. In the first place it was developed to study documents in the 1914 and later (the 1962 studies of conflict. The dictionary was expanded for a 1973 study of inter-alliance conflict, which included both Canada and the United States as part of the NATO alliance. Thus, most words appearing in the diplomatic language of the day should be available in the dictionary. This suggests that some words will not appear. For example, the word 'protectionist' does not appear. The closest word in the dictionary is 'protect'. However, as these two words convey different meanings, Roget's Thesaurus (1977) will be utilized to locate a synonym. In the above case the term 'exclusion' would be substituted for the word 'protectionist'. This will be carried out in every case where a requirement for word substitution is needed. It is expected that

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this will be a low percentage of the total common meaning terms. This percentage will be included in the data analysis.

Another problem, albeit minimal in nature, is worthy of note. The values of certain words in the dictionary may not agree with the context in which that word may have been used or this author is simply not in agreement with it. For example, the word 'concern' is valued at -1 on the affect scale. If the assertion reads, "US government shows concern", depending on the context, a negative evaluation may not be intended. Once again the thesaurus would be used. In this case the word 'interest' would be substituted which has a value of +1 on the affect scale. Finally, one other problem is the lack of some antonyms. For example, the word 'helpful' has a rating 2 (affect), 0 (potency), 2 (activity). On the other hand, the word 'unhelpful' is not listed. In this case the signs for the word 'helpful' would be reversed giving values of -2, 0, -2 on the three dimensions. All signs are reversed because it is assumed that antonyms would totally change all values.

It is now necessary to refer back to the assertion chart. Columns 6, 7, and 8 provide space to include values for the affect, potency and activity dimensions. When an assertion has been identified, a scan of the Stanford Dictionary will provide the valence and intensity for each of the three dimensions. Thus, we have an assertion chart containing assertions, as well as the direction and intensity of each

connector (c) and common meaning term (cm) of each type A assertion.

The penultimate step is the determination of values for each assertion. This is done by multiplying the value of the verbal connector (column 4) by each dimension in columns 6, 7 and 8 (i.e., the common meaning material) and recording it in columns 9, 10 and 11 respectively. An example of an assertion chart completed and valued will suffice for explanation. See Figure IV-4 (p. 116)

The next step is the computation of values for each AO. Although only US government actors are considered as attitude objects, they will be treated in terms of three separate AO's--US policy, US government, and US actor. The distinction between policy and government is based on the assumption that the United States government may not be perceived in the same manner as American policy. The separation of powers in the United States between Congress and the Administration, and the method of checks and balances provides different areas of focus. The division of AO's as US policy or US government is indicated on the assertion chart in column 2. Thus, when dealing with each AO separately only those values given for each need be totalled. The third AO--US actor--is an aggregate of all type A assertions. In other words, this AO is a combination of the first two.

Figure IV-4

Evaluative Assertion Analysis Assertion Chart

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
Source and Date	A01	Connector (c)	Value of col. 3	Common meaning (cm) or A02	Aff.	Pot.	Act.	Products of cols. 4 X 6, 7, 8 Resp.		
Sharp 21/9/71 US audience	US econ. measures " "	are are led to	+3 3 2	effective brutal re-examination	2 -3 0	3 3 0	2 3 1	6 -9 0	9 9 0	6 9 2
Notes for Fig. IV-4	1)	Column 3:	The verbal connector (c) "are" is considered +3. "led to" is considered +2.							
	2)	Columns 6,7,8:	Stanford Political Dictionary values for the terms effective, brutal and re-examination, are noted under each dimension.							
	3)	Columns 9,10,11:	Values are the products of column 4 by each dimension (cols. 6,7,8). Each product is placed under its appropriate dimension.							

The values for each AO as indicated in columns 9, 10, and 11 are summed algebraically, on each dimension, and divided by the sum of the themes, yielding a score of +9 to -9. If the semantic differential scale is desired the sum of the products is divided by 3 times the sum of the themes, or assertions, yielding a score of +3 to -3. The formula to be used here will utilize the semantic differential. Thus, the formula:

$$\frac{\sum P}{3 \sum T}$$

The scores resulting from this computation correspond to the AO's evaluation as based on the available common meaning information. See Figure IV-5 (1) (2) (3), (pp. 118-120). These figures are examples of October 1971 only. The final values shown are composites of more than one elite. In other words, the document author's evaluative perceptions of an actor as agent, are based on numerous modifying words (Holsti, 1973:242). Thus, there will be AO scores for each of the three AO's on each of the three dimensions, affect, potency and activity. These scores will be computed for each elite both before and after each time period to provide a measure of locus of threat perception. In addition, a total of all elites' evaluative perceptions both before and after each time period will also be measured to indicate changes in threat perception and thus provide a comparison across the conflictual time periods.

Figure IV-5 (1)

US Government

Evaluative Assertion Analysis

Assertion Chart Type A

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
Source and Date	AO1	Connector (c)	value of col. 3	Common meaning (cm) or AO2	Aff.	Pot.	Act.	Products of col. 8		
Faulkner H. of C. 7-10-71 pp. 8518-8521	US govt. " " " " " " " "	is forcing is not building " " " is " " " is	3 -3 -3 3 3	adjustment confidence stability tough single-minded	1 2 2 0 2	0 2 3 3 3	-2 0 0 0 0	3 -6 -6 0 6	0 -6 -6 9 9	-6 0 0 0 0
118 Pepin 29-10-71	US admin " " " "	has been less than is not alone is	-2 -2 3	successful responsible passive	3 2 0	2 0 0	0 0 -3	-6 -4 0	-4 0 0	0 0 -9
	US leaders	have	3	misconceptions	-2	-1	-1	-6	-3	-3
	" "	must be	2	patient	2	2	-2	4	4	-4
	" "	" "	2	sensitive	1	0	0	2	0	0
	US govt.	is	3	wrong (Amchitka)	-2	0	0	-6	0	0
	" "	may be	1	indifferent	-1	-2	-2	-1	-2	-2
					+15 -35 -20 3X11 -20 33 = -0.6 = -0.08					-24 22 -2 3X8 -2 24 = -1.6

Figure IV-5 (2)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
Source and Date	AO1	Connector (c)	value of col. 3	Common meaning (cm) or A02	Aff.	Pot.	Act.	Products of cols. 4 X 6, 7, 8 Resp.		
					Value of col. 5					
Agartha H.ofC. 15-10-71 PP.8741-8742	Amchitka	is drastic set-back for contrary to	-3	peace	3	0	0	-9	0	0
	"		-3	common-sense	1	0	0	-3	0	0
	DISC	is	3	subsidization	1	2	1	3	6	3
Pepin 29-10-71	Surcharge	is	3	far-reaching (widespread) pain	0	1	1	0	3	3
	"	is	3	adverse	-3	0	0	-9	0	0
	"	is	3		-3	-2	0	-9	-6	0
US trade policy		is	3	liberal	1	0	0	3	0	0
US econ. meas.		make negotiation	2	important	2	1	0	4	2	0
"	"	"	2	urgent	-1	0	0	-2	0	0
Surcharge		is	3	impact (influence)	0	3	2	0	9	6
Job Dev. Tax		is	3	discriminatory (injustice)	-3	0	0	-9	0	0
Amchitka		will likely cause	1	pollution	-2	0	0	-2	0	0
H.ofC. 15-10-71 p.8738	"	"	1	ecological problems	-2	0	0	-2	0	0
"	"	"	1	contamination	-3	1	0	-3	1	0
"	"	is	2	uncertainty				0	0	6

Figure IV-5 (3)

Evaluative Assertion Analysis Assertion Chart Type A

"S Policy" (cont)

	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
	A01	Connector (c)	value of col. 3	Common meaning (cm) or A02	Aff.	Pot.	Act.	Products of 4 X 6, 7, 8 Resp.		
Source	US meas:	are not	-3	equitable	3	0	0	-9	0	0
	" "	" "	-3	appropriate	1	0	0	-3	0	0
	" "	are	3	inequity	-3	0	0	-9	0	0
	DISC	is	3	ominous	-3	0	0	-9	0	0
	" "	is	3	threatening	-3	2	0	-9	6	0
	" "	is	3	unacceptable	-2	0	0	-6	0	0
	" "	is not	-3	rational	2	1	0	-6	-3	0
								-89	18	18
								3X19	24	12
								-89	18	18
								57	24	12
								-1.56	=0.75	=1.5
"S Actor	Affect Potency, Activity									
	-109	16								
	90	48								
	=-1.2	= 0.3	=-0.2							
	Therefore composite score:									
	12+0.3+0.2 = 1.3									
	3 = 0.43									

The above computations only take into account type A assertions (i.e., A0/c/cm). When a type B assertion (i.e., A01/c/A02) appears on the assertion chart it is recorded as A01/c/A02 and also as A02/c/A01. For example, if the assertion "US condemns Canada" was indicated it would also be recorded as "Canada is condemned by US". In this manner each A01 becomes a complement or target. After the evaluation for each A0 is computed for type A assertions, it (i.e., A01) is assigned this value as the complement in type B assertions. All type B assertions are then totalled from the assertion chart and averaged as before. Thus two types of perceptions may be captured from the assertions as abstracted from original sources. An evaluative perception (type A assertions) indicating a measure of perceived threat and an action perception (type B assertions) indicating a measure of the action which Canada perceives the US is taking toward Canada. The final evaluative score for each A0 is the grand average for all assertions of both types (Osgood, 1959:50). Each time period will be illustrated graphically. Each graph will indicate the time period in months, as well as the level of evaluation on the semantic differential scale. Except for purposes of illustration, not all the graphs will appear in the body but will be included in an Appendix (see App. C:231-242). As the main interest here is threat perception, which is a composite of the three evaluative scores, only those graphs indicating this will be included. For example, US Actor as

threat would be a composite of US Actor Affect + US Actor Potency + US Actor Activity. The composite score is the mean of these three scores. To allow the scores to be graphed reversal of the sign of affect is required. Thus, a positive composite score would indicate threat while a negative number would indicate no threat.

Notes

(1) See, for example, L.R. Brown, World Without Borders: The Interdependence of Nations, New York, Foreign Policy Association, Headline Series, 1972.

(2) Similar to definition of the situation, the national interest is a widely used concept without much explanatory power. An elite will act for the sake of the national interest almost by definition. "If a state acts in a given situation, then logically some interest is at stake" (Sullivan, 1976:49).

(3) The collection of events, their abstraction and the coding procedures are described in Dolan *et al.*, 1981a. Complete details of this technique are available in Tomlin *et al.*, 1980b.

(4) Action and event are not considered synonymous in the Dyad's Project. "Event refers to the whole set of information: the actor, target, issue, setting, etc., as well as, the action. The action is the description of the specific behaviour which the actor is undertaking" (Tomlin *et al.*, 1980b:4).

(5) CREON attempts to investigate the behaviour of nations across time by concentrating on the level and change of national behaviour (actions). The data produced are intended to aid in hypotheses testing and theory construction. See Hermann *et al.*, 1973. The categories used in the Dyad's Project constitute a revised version of action categories of the CREON Project.

(6) The scattergram shown in Figure IV-1 has a mean -10.183 and standard deviation of 6.832. Thus, two standard deviations from the mean is indicated at -23.847. Figure IV-2 has a mean of 12.349 and standard deviation of 13.197, two std. dev. from the mean = 38.743.

(7) See O. Holsti, 1969:1-14.

(8) Jervis' criticism, while directed at quantitative analysis in general, was more specifically pointed to the work of the Stanford group. North replied that, as content analysis is a "tool" of analysis, Jervis was criticising the craftsmanship or its lack "but in places he (i.e., Jervis) seems to condemn the tools along with the journeyman: this is misleading and unfortunate" (North, 1969:228).

(9) Emphasis in original.

(10) While interviews provide a first-hand method of gaining information they are problematic, particularly in studies of cognition, in that a bias (viz., the interviewer) is introduced early into the procedure.

(11) A . . . major source of disagreement among those defining content analysis is whether it must be limited to manifest content (the surface meaning of the text) or whether it may be used to analyze the deeper layers of meaning embedded in the document" (Holsti, 1969:12). The definition of content analysis used here leaves open the issue of what may be inferred from a document. As Holsti (1969:14) points out the requirement of objectivity in content analysis precludes the problem of inference in that only the manifest content can be coded. However, "inferences about the latent meanings of messages are . . . permitted" but . . . they require corroboration by independent variables".

(12) In both of the first two stages, 1) the identification of AQ's and, 2) the translation into assertion form; inter-coder reliability checks carried out by Osgood and his associates proved, on average, to be .80 or better. For step 1, see Osgood et al., 1956:57-59. For step 2, see Ibid., 75-80.

(13) For further explanation see, Osgood et al., 1956:80-85.

(14) See, for example, Holsti, O., P.T. Hopmann, and J.D. Sullivan, Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances, John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1973, New York. See also, P.T. Hopmann, "International Conflict and Cohesion in the Communist System" in ISQ, 11, 1967.

(15) The dictionary has been used in a number of studies in conjunction with the General Inquirer Program of Philip Stone. See, Stone P.J., D.C. Murphy, M.S. Smith and D.M. Ogilvie, eds., The General Inquirer: A Computer Approach to Content Analysis, the MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1966.

(16) Inter-coder reliability for the coding of 434 words in the updated Stanford Political Dictionary was considered high. Evaluative (composite) .91, Potency (composite) .80, Activity (composite) .76. Holsti does not give any other information regarding these figures. (See, Holsti et al., 1973:App.B:240).

Analysis and Results

This chapter examines two of the three major variables: Canadian behaviour directed toward the United States; and content analysis of Canadian foreign policy documents. Assertions were coded using evaluative assertion analysis (1) from ninety-four speeches and press conferences of fifteen federal ministers. In addition, twenty volumes of Hansard were utilized and perceptions of three other ministers and five parliamentary secretaries were found (see Appendix B:228). Speeches were chosen if they fell within the proper time frame and dealt with Canada-US relations.

Roget's Inesaurus of English Words and Phrases was used a total of 68 (12%) times to substitute for words not found in the Stanford Political Dictionary. This figure does not truly reflect its use, however, as a number of words, such as "concern" and "extraterritoriality" appeared three or four times each. In contrast, the sign of type A assertions was changed only six times or 1%. (2) Inter-coder reliability for coding assertions was 70% while intra-coder reliability was slightly higher at 74%. (3) Twelve hundred and two perceptions were coded covering forty-eight months in the four main time periods (see Table V-1:170)). These include 461 (38%) perceptions of affect; 327

(27%) perceptions of potency, and 269 (22%) perceptions of activity. These three dimensions are considered within type A assertions. In addition, 145 (12%) action or type B perceptions were also coded (4%).

If the three dimensions of type A or evaluative assertions are considered unidimensional, for comparative purposes, the figures are altered. Table V-2:170 illustrates totals of 551 (79%) type A assertions and 145 (i.e., the same number as above) type B or action assertions. The differences indicated in type A assertions between Tables V-1 and V-2 is simply that Table V-1 shows the evaluative assertions as broken down into three dimensions. In Table V-2 this is not the case. This discrepancy in figures of type A assertions results from the fact that every evaluative assertion does not score every time on each of the three dimensions. For example, of the 551 complete evaluative assertions, "affect" scored 461 times. Type B assertions, on the other hand, do not break down.

Table V-1 illustrates that the frequencies of the three dimensions of the evaluative assertions fall into the approximate range as suggested by Osmond (see Chapter III:64-65). He notes that affect should occur one-half to three-quarters of the time while potency and activity should appear half that often. Indeed, the activity dimension occurs approximately one-quarter of the time as expected, potency is somewhat higher and affect

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somewhat lower, however, than suggested. It must be noted that the Osgood figures are only approximations.

Table V-3:170 contains the four discrete time periods summarizing the perceptions totals for each. A total of 238 (24%) type A perceptions were coded for Period I, while there were 459 (38%) for Period II; and 226 (19%) for the third period were coded. For the final period there were only 24 (2%) perceptions of the total number of coded perceptions. The totals of type B perceptions for each time period, also shown in Table V-3, are as follows: Period I, 22 (2%); Period II, 64 (5%); Period III, 31 (3%); and Period IV, 28 (2%). (5) Because of their relatively small number, and the confusion which would ensue, type B assertions will not be used for a grand average of perceptions of threat, nor will they be graphed. They will be utilized, however, for comparison with the averages of type A perceptions. The results should be similar for both types of perceptions.

Although Periods I and IV cover the same amount of time in months, Table V-3 shows the perception totals for each are vastly different, with Period I having more than three times as many coded perceptions as Period IV. The same situation exists between Periods II and III. Period II covers 13 months but has twice as many perceptions as Period III's 17 month duration.

Dividing the evaluative perceptions such that they reflect the two main categories - US government and US policy

(see Appendix A:20), the figures for 1963 (see Table 1-4:171), show 139 (of 206) (68%) were directed at US policy and 149 (51%) were directed at the US government. In contrast, the 1971-1972 attributes were overwhelmingly directed at American policy, (i.e., 364 of 459 perceptions) while only 95 (20%) were directed at the US government. In 1974-1975, this trend was reversed with only 70 perceptions (31%) directed at US policy, while 156 (62%) were directed at the US government. In Period IV, 82% of the perceptions were directed at the US government.

Figures for each time period and for each dimension of the evaluative perceptions (i.e., type 1A) along the semantic differential continuum as positive/negative (affect); strong/weak (potency); and, active/passive (activity), are shown in Table V-5:171. For example the word "threat" scores -3 on affect. This would appear as one score under the negative column of affect. Thus, in Period I there were 43 negative scores on the affect dimension.

Table V-5 indicates that the CFPE were almost equally divided in their perceptions of affect of the US as positive or negative across the four time periods. However, in no single period was this the case. Indeed, the ratios are better than 2:1 positive in Periods I, III and IV and almost 3:1 negative in Period II. On the other hand, the Americans were considered stronger 3 out of 4 times overall and stronger rather than weak in every period. On the activity dimension the US was perceived

as active on a ratio of almost 2:1 overall, as well as active rather than passive in every period.

Table V-6:172 summarizes the sources from which all perceptions were drawn. Thirty-six percent of the total were taken from the House of Commons Debates while 64% were from sources outside of the House. The percentages were consistent throughout the four time periods varying only 4% in both categories, from the lowest (34% and 62%) to the highest (38% and 66%).

Of a total of 695 assertions of both types, Table V-7:172 shows that three federal ministers, the SFA, the Prime Minister and the minister of ITC (which includes the minister of Trade and Commerce for the 1963 period) were responsible for 71% of the final total. The remaining 29% was accounted for by numerous ministers. The only notable "other" was the minister of Finance in 1963, Walter Gordon, with 22 assertions. These results are not surprising but rather confirm the notions we have of the CFPE and of those who are most involved in decision-making in this sphere or who serve as the spokesmen on foreign policy related issues.

Findings by Period

Note: To dispel confusion regarding figures in this chapter the following legend is added to the text. Figures are by Chapter, Period and in alphabetical order. (pp. 173-227)

Figure V-IA Period I US Actor Threat.

Figure V-IB Period I US Actor Affect.

Figure V-IC Period I US Actor Potency.

Figure V-ID Period I US Actor Activity.

Figure V-IE Period I Transactions.

Figure V-IF Period I Policy Coordination.

Figure V-IG Period I Relative Position.

Figure V-IH Period I Cost and Benefits.

Figure V-IJ Period I Affect.

Period II, III and IV utilize the same sequencing, for example,

Figure V-IIIC would be Period II US Actor Potency.

Period I-6310: (June 1963 to February 1964)

In the target month - October - the most perceptions (78) were evident while only five were found in August (see fig. V-IA:173).

The most threatening month was August with a score of 1.23. The least threatening and, in fact friendly month, was January with a mean of -0.14. The average over the whole period was 0.382. (6)

In other words, based on 288 perceptions of the US, the CPPE considered the Americans as slightly threatening overall.

Figure V-1A illustrates Period I graphically showing levels of threat perception throughout. Figures V-1B, V-1C and VI-0:174-176, graphically illustrate the various scores from which the composite threat graph (i.e., fig. V-1A) was made. As shown in Figure V-1B, the US was perceived as friendly throughout the period with scores ranging from a high of +2.3 to a low of -0.05, with an average of -0.09. With the exception of January, perceptions of potency as shown in Figure V-1C, were strong through the whole period. Scores ranged from 3.0 (i.e., very strong), to -0.0 (i.e., weak) with an average of 1.25, or relatively strong. Figure V-1D, the activity dimension of the evaluative or type A assertions, indicates an average score of 0.841 (i.e., active) and scores ranging from 3.0 to 0.145. As can be seen in this graph the US was considered active throughout Period I.

Figure V-1A shows that, except during July and January, the US was perceived as threatening throughout Period I. This is based on the CFPE's evaluation of the Americans as friendly, but strong and active. In other words, US strength and activity overcame the sense of friendliness or positive perceptions that apparently existed. This is problematic. Does one view a strong/active friend as threatening? In operational terms it appears that (here at least) one may view another as positive but threatening. Two points, however, may be made. In the first place, if discussion were only of US policy during the four

period, the US would not have been considered so friendly. Indeed, in three of the four periods US government affect is far more positive (i.e., friendly) than is US policy affect (see App. C:231-242. Period IV not included). In terms of US government threat versus US policy threat, in the first two periods this point also stands. For Period III, however, the reverse is true. In other words, in Period III, US government threat is minimally greater than US policy threat. Period IV is not considered here because of the few policy assertions. In Holsti's study of J. F. Dulles, both Soviet policies and government were considered in varying negative degrees. It would appear that Canadian elites generally distinguish between US policy and government more clearly. Canadians may be able through discussion to change the direction of American policy, or at least discuss the points on the agenda more readily than can the Soviets. Thus it would not be importune to spite US leaders and close the door to negotiation. Second, it would not be considered too unusual for a nation to behave in a manner which could threaten a friendly neighbour, particularly when the presence and strength of the former is so pervasive. Finally, although the discussion above is a ratio for a threatening friend, threat was earlier defined as an actor perceived as negative, strong and active. The findings in this study, however, indicate that the US as actor was generally perceived as friendly, albeit, at times, threatening. This will be discussed

further in the conclusions.

There were several significant issues considered harmful to Canada in the 1967 period which were found in the evaluative assertion analysis. Certainly, the American Interest Equalization Tax (IET), was not an unexpected issue when the crisis period had been identified. In addition, US tariff policy and trade relations in general were of importance. The content analysis findings generally agree with those of the asymmetrical Dyads Project, which indicate that 50% of the issues coded in October were trade-linked. These include, for example, Canada-US trade relations, and trade competition for third markets. Contrary to these problems the CFPE viewed American leadership as "friendly", "responsible", "wise", "imaginative" - that is, in favourable terms. In some trade areas, for example, oil policy, the content analysis indicates that Canada had little or no quarrel with the Americans.

Through the nine months of Period I, 139 policy-related perceptions were found (see Table V-4) and of those, trade issues arose 62 (45%) times. From this total the minister responsible for trade, Mitchell Sharp, mentioned US trade policy in some form on 41 occasions accounting for nearly one-third of the total policy perceptions.

Type B assertions indicate, on average, a friendly perception (i.e., no threat) of the US in this period with a mean score of -0.13, compared to the threat situation of type A

perceptions with a mean score of 0.382. Type B scores ranged from 0.93 to -1.7. The most important type B figures in this period are between September and November, which reflect a period of perceived threat and which paralleled the type A assertions. (7) As the total number of type A assertions for the whole period is quite low (i.e., 22), these results must be considered tenuous at best. This remains true for type B assertions throughout the four periods.

Period II-11112-12024-12031: (July 1971 to July 1972)

Figure V-IIA:182 illustrates fluctuating perceptions throughout the period with five direction changes. While no perceived threat was present at the start of this period, perceptions of threat were evident in September and remained this way until December. This was followed by a return to friendliness for the first four months of 1972, (although it decreased in April) and a return to threat again in May. The average for the whole period is -0.008 (i.e., no threat). The first target month, November, was considered threatening while in the last two target months (February and March of 1972), perceptions of threat were not evident. The highest levels of threat were perceived in September of 1971, and May 1972 (0.38) for each. The least hostile month for Canadians was March 1972, a target month which had a score of -1.5. The three dimensions which make up the composite scores of threat also fluctuated as shown in Figures V-IIb, V-IIc, V-IId:183-185.

The interesting point of these three dimensions is that each averaged very close to neutral over the whole period. Unfortunately a number of months in the various dimensions had very few assertions which seems to foul the results. For example, the affect scale for July 1971 and June 1972, had only one assertion each. Nonetheless, the perceptual trends can be discussed. No assertions may simply mean that there were no speeches available or, on the other hand, it may be due to a lack of issues.

Perceptions of the US as negative (see fig. V-II-3) were most apparent in late 1971. Although she was also perceived negatively in February and May of 1972, the general trend was moving in a positive direction. Perceived US strength (see fig. V-II-4) followed a similar pattern, although surprisingly the US was considered strong in neither November nor March, two target months. On the other hand, the most active months (see fig. V-II-5) were December (1.3) and January (2.0), and the least active month was March (-2.0).

The Nixon economic measures were the issues coded most frequently in the evaluative assertion analysis and found as harmful to Canada in Period II. These included the surcharge on imports, the Disc legislation, the Nixon Doctrine (the first two deal mainly with trade) and finally the Amchitka Atomic test. These issues make up close to 40% of the assertions.

Once again, as in Period I, these findings are in general agreement with the Dyads Project which indicate for November 1971, that the events coded most often were trade and the surcharge, totalling 30% of all issues, while the nuclear test alone was coded over 12% of the time. In February 1972, trade accounted for almost 50% of the dyad codings and foreign ownership over 10%. In March trade is again the most coded event followed by the proposed pipeline route. Throughout Period II, the content analysis indicated that while the attitude object "US Policy" was negative on the affect scale, activity was generally strong, while potency fluctuated throughout. On the other hand, except for two months the "US government" was perceived in a positive light, generally inactive but relatively strong.

In contrast to type A assertions, type B indicate on average, a perception of threat with a mean score of 0.22 (2). The most threatening month is January with a score of 1.0 and the most friendly is March at -1.1. From September through February the scores indicate a period of perceived threat and, as expected, except for October, parallel the type A assertions. The total number of assertions of type B is 64 which is the most for any of the four periods under discussion. The most type B assertions appear in September while no less than five months in this period have no assertions. Once again type A assertions far outnumber type B on a ratio of more than 8:1.

Period III 7406-7407-7502: (February 1974 to June 1975)

Figure V-III A:191 indicates that perceptions of threat were far more prevalent in the latter half of Period III. In all, nine direction changes can be noted in these seventeen months. Nine months show perceptions of threat, while five indicate a friendly relationship. One month has an average score of zero while two others have zero assertions. Of the three target months only one, February 1975, indicates a perception of threat. The other two are friendly although June is almost neutral. On the other hand, September while quite friendly is less so than the previous month. The average for the whole period indicates a slight perception of threat (0.195).

The average strengths of the three dimensions in this period were greater than in Period II but not so strong as Period I. Perceptions of the US were positive overall, and in only two of the seventeen months were they seen as negative, although quite strong and active on average. However, they were seen as strong in all but four months and active in all but three (see fig. V-III B, III C, III D:192-194). These figures have to be tempered because a number of months across all three dimensions had no assertions. Nevertheless, while considered positive in most months, American strength and activity, particularly in the latter part of the period, indicated a threat to Canada.

The issues of most concern found in the evaluative assertion analysis were the Garrison Project and US agricultural policy, each mentioned on fifteen occasions. Trade was coded nineteen times but this includes the references to agricultural policy. In contrast to Period II US leadership appeared to be of far greater concern than was US policy (see Table V-4). In fact this was the case by a ratio of more than 2:1 on the total number of assertions. The Nixon era had ended in August 1974, and a new President, Gerald Ford, came to power. It appeared that the CPER were interested in making him welcome, hoping for a turnaround in the poor relations of the recent past. This may well help explain Figure V-III A in that there was no desire on the part of Canadians to see the American constitutional system crumble in mid 1974, and thus support was shown for both Nixon and Ford. By late 1974, the new President had been in office for a few months and the US administrative structure had survived. As a result Canadians could get on with living next to a powerful neighbour once again--a neighbour that had direction and leadership following a period of uncertainty. Thus, the rhetoric apparently returned to normal.

Contrary to the first two periods, Period III's perceptual data are not similar to the events data from the Oyads Project. The major behavioural issue for all three target months is overwhelmingly trade, scoring over 43%, 30% and 47%

respectively. In addition, energy exports in September alone accounted for 50% of the codings.

There were few assertions on the potency or activity scale for the attitude object "US policy" after November. The attitude object, "US government", was seen as positive, (except for three months), but strong, (except for two months) and active at the beginning and end of this time period.

Type B assertions (9) on average scored 0.12. Perceptions of threat almost exactly the same as type A which had a mean of 0.105. However, there were only 31 type B assertions, and these spread over the seventeen months--thus, a ratio of more than 7:1, type A to type B. There is a crowding of type B assertions at both ends of this period with the most in March 1974. Eight months had no type B assertions. The high score, or most threatening, is 2.3 in April 1975, and the low or least hostile is January 1975, at -1.6. The scores for type B as expected are similar to type A through Period III, except for January 1975, with type A scoring 0.76 and type B -1.6.

Period IV--7603: (November 1975 to July 1976)

Figure V-IVA:200 indicates that threat perception was relevant in six of the nine months of Period IV. Five direction changes were noted over this period. The target month, March 1975, was threatening, but barely above neutral. The average for

the whole period indicates a perception of threat with a score of 0.281.

Measures of threat in this period are the result of a strong and active but positive neighbour. In fact, in every month but one (i.e., December) the US was seen as positive (see fig. V-IVb:201). They were, however, also considered strong throughout as well as active in all but one month (i.e., May) (see fig. V-IVc, V-IVd:202-203).

The issue mentioned most often perceptually in this period is the Law of the Sea Negotiations. As in the previous period this is inconsistent with the behavioural dimensions where trade, foreign ownership and environmental problems makeup over 50% of the coded events. From the evaluative assertion analysis, however, there were few policy issues coded. Indeed, fully 90% of the type A assertions in this period include references to the US government. The US government was considered positive throughout although also strong throughout and active in every month except May.

Type B assertions (10) score 0.29 perceptions of threat on average compared to 0.281 for type A assertions. Over the nine month period there were 28 type B assertions in total. However, most of them were in the next to last two months, May and June. The most threatening month was December at 1.5 with only two assertions and the least threatening was May at -0.07 on

almost neutral and 12 assertions. Both months compare favourably with type A assertions.

Research Questions:

- 1) Does perceived threat vary across a particular time period?

Period I

With the exceptions of July and January there was a perception of threat throughout Period I. In other words, as indicated on Figure V-1A, using a mean of zero, seven of the nine scores were positive. Perceptions of threat are strongest in the two months preceeding October, the target month, and again in December. The indications regarding August and September are that Canadians were well aware of impending US actions, (for example, the IET) which had the potential of doing great harm. While the affect dimension (See fig. V-1B) was shown as friendly or positive throughout, it declined dramatically from a high of -2.3 (sign reversed) in August, to -3.26 in October, and never again reached the positive levels it had attained earlier. Before the target month, threat perception was actually higher averaging 0.57 as compared with 0.23 following October.

A number of interesting points may be made at this stage. First, affect was more strongly positive prior to October than after. This is not unexpected. US behaviour did not move out of the normal relations range until that month. While the

IET was known about, the CPRE would maintain a friendly negotiating stance until they were successful or failed. Indeed, the public rhetoric on July 18, (the date the IET was announced) was friendly. However, both potency and activity declined after October. The net or composite result is less threat rather than more. Thus, it may be seen that only one dimension affected in the expected direction: it declined or became less positive.

Two points, one substantive the other methodological are of interest here. First, although October was the target month the major issues were known far in advance. Second, the number of perceptions appear to foul the results. The month of August is a case in point. It is the friendliest month but also the strongest and most active, resulting in the highest threat score. It is likely to be a very inaccurate score as activity and potency each have only one perception. A look at the scores preceeding and following August may give a more realistic picture and result in a more accurate threat chart.

Period II (Question 1)

The data indicate that in only six of the thirteen months of Period II are there perceptions of threat (see fig. V-IIA). That is September until December with little variation in the scores (0.88 to 0.43) and again in May (0.88) and June. The month of June, however, is almost neutral. While no threat

was perceived in April, it was a far less friendly month than has been the case previously.

One of the more interesting points is that no perception of threat was apparent in two of the target months: February and March. In fact March was a considerably more friendly month than any other. This is a particularly surprising finding but may well be the result of the relaxation of the surcharge on imports to the United States from Canada. Scores over the whole period ranged from -1.5 to 0.88. Perceived threat is similar in nature to Period I, indicating threat through most of the first few months and then dropping rapidly to a friendly situation in mid-term.

Period III (Question 1)

It has been noted previously that perceived threat was present in nine of the seventeen months of Period III (see fig. V-III A). Scores in these nine months ranged from 0.08 in December to 1.5 in April 1975. From November through May 1975, threat scores varied a great deal. Only in August and September could relations be considered as friendly. However, by September there was an abrupt turn around with the CFPE perceiving the Americans as less friendly and heading toward a condition of threat. The major issue at stake, as indicated in the perceptual data, was American beef policy and in particular the beef quota. Generally, threat perception was present over the last half of

Period III, with the variation being one of level. It is difficult here to discover why threat perception shifted so abruptly from no threat to threat. In methodological terms, affect became more negative, potency very strong and activity fairly active, at about the same time.

Period IV (Question 1)

Threat was present in six of the nine months of Period IV (see fig. V-IVa). Scores ranged from 1.3 to -0.18. Perceptions of threat were higher and more pronounced in the four months before the target month (0.5) than after (0.1). As noted above, there were few US policies discussed in this period with more emphasis placed on perceptions of the US government. Nonetheless, the composite picture of perceptions of the US actor as threat, indicate a slightly varied month by month response and generally little concern with threat or no threat.

2) What is the connection between threat perception and the Canadian response? (11)

Period I

The transaction dimension (see fig. V-IE:177) which measures Canadian preferences concerning the nature/level of transactions in the dyad, and which includes the desire for change as well as the effort one may put into bringing about

change, indicates a Canadian desire to decrease or to further regulate cross-boundary transaction. The spread between scores is only 0.3 from July (high) to November (low). While there is little variation on the transactions dimension, the perceptual data tends to be antithetical to these results through the middle of the period. From July to November there was a Canadian desire to decrease transactions, while perceptually (after August) the US was considered less threatening.

The Policy Coordination dimension shown in Figure V-IF:178, indicates a desire/willingness to work together throughout the Period. It ranged from 2.0 to 0.8. Nonetheless, there is a decline in scores and a subsequent levelling off after the crisis month. Thus, while threat perception was declining, the Canadian desire to work more closely with the US was also declining.

The alignment dimension, which measures policy agreement between the two governments is most interesting during Period I (see fig. V-IG:179). The graph is far more complicated than the previous two, with five direction changes and scores ranging from 3.0 to -1.7. However, most scores tended to hover around + or - 0.5. After August, Canadian scores dropped drastically to a position of disagreement, but returned to agreement in the target month. There was a further decline after October followed by a return to agreement by period end. In comparison with threat perception, Canadian agreement declined

generally as threat perception was decreasing. As has been noted earlier, the swings in threat perception are relatively small, while changes in agreement with the US position are more pronounced.

As shown in Figure V-IV:140, there is little or no Canadian satisfaction with the distribution of costs and benefits until the end of the period. Scores ranged from -2.0 to 0.3 with five direction changes. Although Canadian dissatisfaction is indicated, this dimension matches favourably with the perceptual data. Indeed, until the month of December the graph follows in the expected direction. For example, between September and October, when Canadian satisfaction with the distribution of costs and benefits increased, perceived threat decreased.

The affect dimension of the Dyad's Project illustrates Canadian friendship toward the US (see fig. V-IV:181) throughout the period. It is the least complicated of all the curves with only one direction change. The only drastic change is the dip to a near negative value in October. These results are not unlike the affect dimension of the perceptual data (see fig. V-IB) which also showed a drop in friendship in October.

Certainly there appears to have been a Canadian response to American conflictual behaviour at this time. During the middle period, transactions were on the decline as were efforts to coordinate policies, and Canadian friendship dropped almost to the level of hostility. On the other hand, the costs

and benefits of being involved in the dyad were not as negative in October as had been the case earlier. In addition, Canadians moved toward agreement with US policies in that same month.

Period II (Question 2)

The transaction dimension (see fig. V-II E:186) mean scores are spread from a high of 0.54 in September to a low of -0.23 in June 1972. Most of the transactions hovered around the neutral or zero point. However, through the whole period there was a declining preference to maintain transactions. Indeed, this dimension decreased below zero to a level of withdrawal in February, and then again at the end of this time series. Nonetheless, the scores from October onward are so close to neutral that the status quo was the apparent order of the day. The most interesting points in this dimension are its mirror image to levels of threat initially and then its similarities with threat following February (see fig V-II A). When perceptions of threat were at their highest (i.e., most hostile) satisfaction with transactions was also most apparent but threat perception remained in force until December and transactions decreased. This would be expected. After December, however, threat was not present but transactions still decreased. The overall trend appeared to be toward a decreasing level of transactions in the dyad tempered by low scores. It would appear that transactions fell initially in response to threat. A turnaround in

transactions was delayed, indicating that perceptions in this case led policy shifts. Transactions may be harder to turnaround. In other words, a time lag is indicated between shifts in perceptions and shifts in foreign policy actions. In this period Canadian transactions changed direction six times, although the magnitude of change is relatively low.

On the policy-coordination dimension (see fig. V-11F:187) this period was positive with the exception of July and October 1971, although the score for these two months was only -0.33. Thus, this is similar to Period I. General satisfaction was expressed with scores on the positive side ranging as high as 1.50 in January.

As was the case with the transactions dimension, policy coordination changed direction six times although the magnitude of change was generally much larger. This holds particularly true for the first four direction changes. Overall, the tendency was toward increasing the coordination of Canadian and US policy. Considered in this light, the policy dimension more accurately reflects the levels of perceptions of threat as shown in Figure V-11A. When perceived threat was apparent in the latter stages of 1971, a more independent approach to policy was taken by Canada. Perceived threat became apparent once again only very late in the period. However, at that point policy independence was not indicated.

On the alignment dimension (see fig. V-IIIG:188) there was strong Canadian disagreement with the positions taken by the US government, with a range of scores from 0.9 to -2.09. The Canadian position on this dimension changed direction five times with the largest average changes at the beginning of the period. In addition, the very high levels of disagreement appear between August and November, paralleling the highest levels of threat perception. Alignment was less of an issue in December and January. Canadians were not in agreement with US policies throughout.

In cost-benefit terms (see fig. V-IIH:189) scores ranged from a high of 2.0 to a low of -2.0. Direction changes were evident seven times in this period. As expected, the lowest levels of satisfaction over time appear at the beginning of this period and the greatest satisfaction levels are found in early 1972. Average scores dropped dramatically between January and March, reflecting the two target months. In addition, while perceived threat was irrelevant in February and March, satisfaction with costs and benefits decreased. One other anomaly is October which indicates satisfaction in costs and benefits but which also indicates a perceived threat.

An interesting, if expected result, concerns the affect dimension (see fig. V-IIJ:190). A comparison with the perceptual data of Figure V-IIB shows an almost identical situation in terms of direction. (Note: the perceptual data is reversed). Both

graphs are relatively complex with five direction changes. The average scores for the perceptual data, however, are much larger. Scores on the affect behavioural dimension range from 1.0 to -0.8. Except for the month of December the highest levels of hostility on this dimension parallels the highest levels of perceived threat (see fig. V-IIA).

In contrast to Period I the five dimension responses here are more complex. This is partly the result of a longer time span. While position (in the first half), costs and benefits, affect and policy coordination were generally in agreement with the perceptual data, the transactions dimension sloped in an opposite direction and thus was similar to transactions in Period I. Only in the first target month did the perceptual data indicate partial support. In other words, perceived threat was present in November and not in February and March. On the behavioural dimensions, transactions were positive for the target months November and March, but were negative in the other target month February. In terms of policy coordination there was little support regarding the target months except for February which indicated declining agreement. The policy alignment dimension is a different story, however, indicating support on all three target months. Distribution of costs and benefits is positive on two of the months although a measure of support is noted in February and March (i.e., a decline in satisfaction was noted from the previous month). Support is

indicated at all three points on the affect dimension although this is decreasing in November and March.

The varied results in Period II seem to indicate general dissatisfaction with the US and the realization that the Americans are capable of doing harm. The inclination on the part of the CFPE to take any drastic measures at this time (i.e., to drastically change transactions or to not work with the Americans) was not, however, evident. In the case of policy coordination, there have usually been attempts made by both parties to cooperate. The Canadian responses, on a seven point continuous scale, to other than normal US behaviour were similar to Period I on the transactions dimension; varied far more on the policy coordination dimension; were more negative on relative position; and more positive on costs and benefits. Perceptions of threat on average, however, were much higher in Period II and, in fact, they were neutral in this second period.

Period III (Question 2)

The scores on the transaction dimension (see fig. V-III E:195) range from a high of 1.7 to a low of -1.6 with seven direction changes. Contrary to the previous two periods, only in three months was there a Canadian preference to increase or maintain the level of transactions. The most dissatisfaction is indicated in the first few months between February and June of 1974. The most satisfaction is in July 1974, which precedes by

one month the least threatening month of the perceptual data. While transactions are not generally as low between September and January as they had been, there was a concurrent increase in threat perception from no threat in September to threat in November through to May. In other words, dissatisfaction with transactions tended to match perceived threat. However, while perceived threat was still apparent in February and March, satisfaction with transactions is also indicated. Generally, the transactions data parallel the perceptual data.

On the policy coordination dimension (see fig. V-IIIF:196) the average values for each month indicate a Canadian willingness to work with the US throughout the whole period, with eight direction changes and scores ranging from a high of 2.5 to a low of 0.6. Because of the positive scores on this dimension, comparison with the threat chart is difficult although there were nine direction changes in terms of threat making both somewhat complicated. The magnitude of the average values of policy coordination indicates an increasing desire to coordinate policies with the US. Thus, increased threat perception was matched by increased policy coordination. This might be considered a conciliatory move on the part of Canada.

On ten of the seventeen months on the position or policy alignment dimension (see fig. V-IIIG:197) there was Canadian disagreement with the US although the trend was toward increasing Canadian satisfaction. The average values on this

dimension were broad ranging from a high of 3.6 to a low of -2.2. There were eight direction changes throughout Period III with the greatest occurring between April and June of 1975, when the average value fell almost five points on the continuous scale. Once again the perceptual threat data does not match the general results of this dimension, except between September and January, as there was more agreement at the end of this period. If anything the results tend to be opposite and progressively conciliatory.

In terms of the distribution of costs and benefits (see fig. V-IIIH:198) in four of the seventeen months there were no scores. On the other thirteen months, however, nine showed Canadian satisfaction and only four dissatisfaction. Scores ranged from a high of 2.0 to a low -2.0. Changes in the curve were evident eleven times indicating a very complicated situation regarding the distribution of costs and benefits. In addition, changes in the first half of this dimension and from March to May 1975, tend to be opposite to changes in threat perception. For example, while Canadians were satisfied with costs and benefits in September and November, the CFPE were feeling less friendly in September and quite threatened in November.

On the affect dimension (see fig. V-IIII:199) scores ranged from 1.2 to -0.5 with the majority above zero. Compared to the perceptual data on affect (see fig. V-IIIB) this is a far less complicated graph. However, both were more positive than

negative. Generally, the affect dimension of the Dyads Project matches the affect data for the first half and latter part of this period as found in the evaluative assertion analysis.

The responses in Period III on the five dimensions varied throughout. While transactions could be compared positively to perceptions of threat, the policy coordination dimension was similar only in the first half of the period. On the other hand, the alignment and distribution dimensions tended to be opposites of the perceptual data. In addition, the perceptual data showed support for the three target months only in the last case (i.e., February 1975). Once again, as in Period I, the policy coordination dimension indicates a Canadian desire to coordinate policies with the US but little satisfaction is indicated on the transaction dimension. At the same time there appeared to be increasing agreement on the position dimension and increasing satisfaction with costs and benefits.

Period IV (Question 2)

On the transactions dimension (see fig. V-IVE:204) scores ranged from a high of 1.4 to a low of -0.6 with five direction changes. Canadian satisfaction was present in three months and dissatisfaction in six months. The most dissatisfaction is present in April and the most satisfaction in December. March, the target month is one of satisfaction. The transaction curve tends to match the perceptual data of the

evaluative assertion analysis, although the mean scores are higher.

Once again the policy coordination dimension (see fig. V-IVF:205) was generally uncomplicated with only four bends and the scores all positive. In other words, a Canadian desire to coordinate activity throughout Period IV is indicated. Mean scores ranged, on average, from a high of 3.0 to a low of 0.8. The most satisfaction on this dimension was evident in the first few months and at the end, with a decrease beginning in January. Although this period is one of satisfaction, the curve bends tend to occur in places similar to the perceptual data, although, often in opposite directions.

In seven of the nine months the Canadian position was in agreement with the Americans (see fig. V-IVG:206). Only in February and in July was there Canadian disagreement. For the period as a whole (with the exception of July) the trend was toward increasing agreement. Average scores ranged from a high of 1.4 in June to a low -2.5 in July. There were five direction changes in the graph comparing favourably to the threat curve. However, there is little match-up in the direction of these bends, except when threat was at its peak there was a decreasing Canadian agreement with the US position, leading one to suspect that perceived threat may have led to this decrease.

On the affect dimension (see fig. V-IVJ:207) (12) scores ranged from a high of 1.5 in January to a low -0.2 in

July. In seven of the nine months Canadians considered the US as friendly, and thus compare positively to the perceptual affect data (see, fig. V-IVB). In only February and July was the reverse true. When affect increased from February to March perceived threat was also increasing although the latter negligibly.

As in the previous period, Period IV responses on the behavioural dimensions varied throughout. On the transactions dimension there is a match with the perceptual data. On policy coordination, alignment and affect, however, little match is apparent.

3) Do Canadian elites respond in either a conciliatory or a retaliatory manner to their perceptions of threat or do responses vary?

Period I

Based on the responses to the previous question, the following argument is put forward regarding the Canadian position. Perceptions of threat were indicated from August through December. Until November there appeared to be a general Canadian withdrawal on most of the foreign policy dimensions. This disintegrative trend had, however, reversed itself (in every dimension) by the end of the period under study. This is true

also of perceived threat which had reverted from threat to neutral.

Certainly the disintegration cannot be termed conciliatory action by the Canadians. Were Canadians reacting to other than normal US behaviour? Although this extra American behaviour took place in October, the Canadian withdrawal generally began much earlier, as did above zero levels of threat perception. Increased threat perception was no doubt a response to some earlier US actions, for example, the IET. In turn, threat perception rather than actual US behaviour, appears to have precipitated some of the Canadian reaction in this period. While the worst of US behaviour occurred in October much of the concern over certain difficult and threatening US action had already been discussed. Thus, the threat had been recognized before October. The major problem, (i.e., the IET), subsequently proved less a threat than first expected by the CFPE. Canadian action must be considered retaliatory in the target month.

Period II (Question 3)

This period appears similar to Period I for the first target month. While perceptions of threat were coded between September and December, transactions increased initially as Canadians demanded that the surcharge be dropped, but declined in October and November when it became apparent that some concessions would be made. There was also strong support towards

withdrawal on the policy alignment dimension as well as some dissatisfaction with costs and benefits. Thus, it would appear that the strategy/strategies were toward some level of withdrawal throughout Period II. An increasing desire to work together to seek common solutions, however, was evident.

On the other hand, Canadians did not support the US policy position and certainly between August and December were generally not satisfied with the cost and benefits of the relationship. It may be that this was a period of solution seeking, with withdrawal as a general trend. There appeared to be a strong desire to work together but not at any cost. Nonetheless, Canadians were trying increasingly to work with the US while at the same time indicating disagreement with US government policy. This is not unlike the results of the evaluative assertion analysis. While policy coordination was conciliatory, the other three action dimensions (transactions, alignment and costs and benefits) were retaliatory.

Period III (Question 3)

In Period III on the transactions dimension (see fig. V-III E) retaliation seemed to be the order of the day. This is particularly noticeable in the first two months, and in August through to January. As in the previous two periods the policy coordination dimension was positive and increasing throughout, indicating a conciliatory Canadian approach. On the policy

alignment dimension, retaliation to perceived threat was evident from November to January followed by conciliation. In terms of the distribution of costs and benefits, when threatened, the CFPE appeared generally satisfied, when not threatened they were often satisfied or on the way to becoming so. This is true except for the months of December and February of 1975, when threat decreased but dissatisfaction was evident. There is little evidence on this dimension to suggest any specific strategy. Just before the end of Period III most of the dimensions point to increasing satisfaction or agreement followed in four of the five dimensions with a decrease. This is also the time of most threat according to the perceptual data. It is difficult to find the reason for this anomaly. It may well be the result of the resumption of more normal relations after the resignation of President Nixon in August of 1974. While perceiving threat in the latter part of this period there may have been the earlier desire to allow the new president time to adjust. Americans had been through a most harrowing experience and Canadians may have been trying to allow the US some breathing space. Nonetheless, when threat decreased in the last couple of months of this period only transactions indicated support (i.e., transactions increased).

Period IV (Question 3)

In Period IV the transactions dimension tends to follow the perceived threat curve. Thus, a retaliatory stance by the Canadians is indicated in this area only. On the other hand, the policy coordination and alignment dimensions were not similar and Canadian action might be considered conciliatory. Thus, similar to Period II, there was no solid strategy but rather a mixture of various strategies based on apparent need.

4) Do Canadian elites maintain a high perception of threat or does threat perception revert to some other level?

Period I

In seven of the nine months of Period I the US was considered threatening to Canada. Threat perception increased from the first two months and remained above zero until January. Perceptions of threat were, however, lower in October, the target month, than they were in the previous two months. During this period, threat perception remained above zero until the last two months when it dropped to neutral. Thus, the level of threat perceptions of the US after October on a threat/no threat continuum would appear to be neither threatening, nor friendly but rather neutral. The only point that may be made is that threat perception did not increase in the target month, nor did it stay at any high level.

Period II Question 4)

In only six of the thirteen months was the US considered perceptually a threat to Canada. Of those thirteen months, however, two months had no assertions. Threat perception was coded from September through to December and was at the second highest level (0.66) in November, one of the three target months. However, no perceptions of threat were apparent in either February or March the other two target months. In fact, in both these months perceptions of the US were increasingly friendly. While it is difficult to explain the latter situation, two points may be made. First, as mentioned above, the US surcharge problem had been settled. The Canadians knew where they stood vis-à-vis the US and the Nixon Doctrine, although Canadian responses were not homogeneous. There were so many issues involved from the event data which led to recognition of the conflict period, that there was no major issue which seemed to dominate affairs as the surcharge had in mid to late 1971. As in Period I, threat perception had no normal or specific level. Rather threat perception was present in late 1971, and not present in early 1972.

Period III (Question 4)

Threat was apparent in nine of the seventeen months of Period III. Two months had no assertions. Threat perception was coded for February and March 1974, and then not again until

November. However, threat was perceived until the following day. As noted above, threat was coded in only one of the target months, (i.e., February) with an average score of 0.3 which is almost double the mean for the whole period. Once again threat perception did not stay at any one level for any length of time. Indeed, there were a number of large bends in the curve throughout with threat perception only being coded consistently at the end of this period. Thus, the major point here regarding threat perception is not the level it seeks but that it was apparent from November on.

Period IV (Question 4)

In six of the nine months the US was considered a threat to Canada. The target month, (i.e., March) is almost neutral. Perceptions of threat before March are higher than those following. Except for the first two months of this period, however, the scores hovered around the neutral or zero level on the semantic differential. Numerous events may have caused US behaviour to move out of the normal relations range but there was no substantive issue which precipitated this.

5) Is there a locus of threat perception or does it vary depending on the issue area?

Period I

The majority of speeches in this time period were given by Mitchell Sharp, the minister responsible for Trade and Commerce. Thirteen of his speeches were used in the content analysis for Period I. This was followed by Prime Minister Pearson with eight speeches, Walter Gordon of Finance with four and two from the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Paul Martin. In addition, content analysis of House of Commons Debates also includes the above ministers. Their composite scores (i.e., threat/no threat) for the whole period are as follows:

Sharp (T and C) 0.7

Pearson (PM) 0.2

Martin (SSEA) -0.04

Gordon (Fin) -0.25

The figures above illustrate that the minister of Trade and Commerce considered the United States more threatening than did his colleagues. Surely the important issues of the day make this understandable as most were trade related. The fact that Walter Gordon did not consider the US as threatening is a rather surprising result. Considering the propensity for quiet diplomacy, however, this may not be so unusual. Did Gordon

follow the rules of quiet quiet diplomacy more closely than some of the other elites because of his attempts at Canadianization? He states in his memoirs (1977:174) regarding the Merchant/Heaney Report that he did not like the quiet diplomacy approach because it would lead to closer ties with the United States but "I did not make any public comment or criticism". Finally, "we are more likely to get attention in Washington . . . if we state our position on important policy issues clearly and publicly". In this study, however, Gordon was found to have said little. His private thoughts appeared to take second place to his public utterances. Nonetheless, the June 1963 Budget had caused a great deal of concern for both Canadians and Americans.

Paul Martin, the Secretary of State, on the other hand, rarely discussed the Americans in anything but neutral or friendly terms when he mentioned them at all. There are, Martin stated (1963:5172) "a number of important and delicate questions affecting Canada-US relations. It is not my intention today to go into detail with regard to these relations, except to assure the committee that all of them are under intensified discussion with the United States government." Possibly D.S. MacDonald (1963:5466) the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Justice said it more eloquently if more patronizingly. "The field of discussion between diplomats may prove to be too strong meat if it is to be unreservedly placed before the public." In 1963, quiet diplomacy was part and parcel of the Secretary's

concern - would he or could he play it differently? Even the Prime Minister some two years later was counselled against making his Temple University speech by the department and ministers with the most interest in the maintenance of quiet diplomacy.

The difficulty with the content analysis during this period centres on the great desire on the part of the CFPP to remain relatively silent regarding the relationship. Indeed, even a cursory reading of the House of Commons Debates of the day, indicates this desire to utilize quiet diplomacy.

Period II (Question 5)

The Prime Minister, the SSEA, and the Minister of Industry, Trade and Commerce, each gave six speeches during this period. In addition, four speeches by Jack Davis, the Minister of the Environment were coded. Of the total of type A assertions these four elites accounted for 312 of 459 (68%) assertions. In addition, of 64 type B assertions only 14 were coded from other sources.

Composite threat scores for these four ministers are as follows:

Pepin - 0.9

Davis - 0.7

Sharp - 0.6

Trudeau - 0.6

Pedín, Davis, and Sharp all considered the US as threatening over this period. In contrast, the Prime Minister's speeches indicated no threat emanating from the US.

There appeared to be far less concern in this period regarding quiet diplomacy. Indeed, the three ministers noted above were quite outspoken at times and on various issues. Environmental spokesmen echoing Canadian interests were most concerned about the Amchitka nuclear test, calling it a travesty. Both Sharp and Pedín were worried about Nixon's economic policies and, in particular, the US surcharge as being shocking and a threat to Canada. To many in the Canadian government this was a turning point in the relationship. By February of 1972, Sharp had noted the diminishing effect of the Nixon measures on Canada. On the other hand, the toughest words Trudeau managed to speak were that the surcharge can cause losses and put pressure on Canada, but in retrospect it had not hurt very much. Once again, trade and economic issues were most important although environmental concerns were also of great interest. Naturally, as expected, the most involved ministers were those whose job description fell within these areas.

The major difference between Period I and II appears to be the changing role which a different SSEA took along with the decline of quiet diplomacy. In 1963, the Secretary of State said little. By 1971, he was far more outspoken and showing far more support for his cabinet colleagues in relations with the US.

Indeed, many of the secretary's negative comments were to American audiences which no doubt added fuel to flame the already deteriorated relationship.

At the same time these comments appear to be the precursor of the Options Paper which was released under Sharp's name. Although not fully endorsed by the Canadian government, perceptions of the Third Option must have led to the conclusion, by some Americans, that the Third Option would be the flagship of Canadian policy. Sharp's speeches in the US could only be considered the start of Canadian rethinking, albeit aloud, of the direction Canadian foreign and trade policy must take vis à vis the United States.

Period III (Question 5)

The Prime Minister gave fourteen speeches in this period. The Minister of Agriculture, Eugene Whelan, made seven, followed by two Secretaries of State, Mitchell Sharp and Allen MacEachen, with six. Of the total of type A assertions these four accounted for 157 of 226 (74%) and 25 of 31 (81%) of type B. Composite scores for these four are as follows:

Whelan 1.1

Sharp 0.2

Trudeau -0.3

MacEachen -0.9

Throughout Period III Whelan and Sharp both perceived the US as threatening while Trudeau and MacEachen did not.

The minister responsible for Agriculture in Canada, Eugene Whelan, was most outspoken regarding the US policy on beef. He considered American beef quotas as being not only unfair but also not making much sense. They were considered discriminatory and there were fears that they could create havoc. On the other hand, Trudeau noted that US beef policy was not a hardline policy. Both Sharp and MacEachen were concerned, as many had been in the past, about the US Trade with the Enemy Act. None of these ministers, however, had anything but praise for US government officials.

Perceptions regarding the US government far outnumbered perceptions of US policy in this period by a ratio of 2:1. Once again the sudden changeover in the US administration must be mentioned as a catalyst in this regard. Much was made of the new president, Gerald Ford and support was also forthcoming for Henry Kissinger, his Secretary of State.

Period IV (Question 5)

The most speeches given in Period IV were by Allen MacEachan the SSEA, and Prime Minister Trudeau with two each. However, the Secretary's speech of June 8, 1976, was quite lengthy and accounted for no less than 62% of type A assertions

and 50% of type B. The Prime Minister, on the other hand, with two speeches had very few assertions. Don Jamieson, the minister responsible for trade had almost all type B assertions in only one major speech. Thus, the composite score for only the Secretary of State is included here.

MacEachen 0.26

Contrary to the previous time period this Secretary of State (i.e., MacEachen) considered the US as slightly threatening throughout Period IV. His main concern was the Law of the Sea negotiations and the American position which he considered incompatible with and in opposition to Canada's needs.

Finally, due to the descriptive nature of the material and indeed the amount of information in this chapter further discussion of the four time periods has been left to the final section.

Table V-1
Total Perceptions

<u>Dimension</u>	<u>#</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Scale (+3 to -3)</u>	<u>% type A</u>
(Type A)				
Affect	461	38	Positive-Negative	43.9
Potency	327	27	Strong-Weak	30.6
Activity	269	22	Active-Passive	25.4
sub-total	1057	87		99.9
(Type B)				
	145	12		
	1202	100		

Table V-2
Total Assertions

Type A	551	79
Type B	145	21
	696	100

Table V-3
Perceptions by Period

<u>Time Period</u>	<u># type A</u>	<u>%</u>	<u># type B</u>	<u>%</u>
I. June 63-Feb. 64	288	24	22	2
II July 71-July 72	459	38	64	5
III Feb. 74-June 75	226	19	31	3
IV Nov. 75-July 76	84	7	28	2
	1057	88	145	12

Table V-4

Categories by Time Period (type A)

<u>Time Period</u>	<u>Category</u>	<u>#</u>	<u>%</u>
I (6310)	US policy	139	48
	US govt.	149	51
		<u>288</u>	
II (7111, 7202, 7203)	US policy	364	79
	US govt.	95	20
		<u>459</u>	
III (7406, 7409, 7502)	US policy	70	31
	US govt.	156	69
		<u>226</u>	
IV (7603)	US policy	9	11
	US govt.	75	89
		<u>84</u>	

Table V-5

Perceptions by Dimension

<u>Time Period</u>	<u>Affect</u>		<u>Potency</u>		<u>Activity</u>		<u>Totals (across)</u>
	<u>Pos.</u>	<u>Neg.</u>	<u>Str.</u>	<u>Weak</u>	<u>Act.</u>	<u>Pas.</u>	
I	89	43	62	16	49	29	288
II	58	137	107	50	69	38	459
III	70	34	43	18	35	27	226
IV	27	6	25	2	18	6	84
(Totals down)	244	220	237	86	170	100	1057

Table V-6

Assertions by Audience (A and B)

<u>Time Period</u>	<u>H. of C.</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Speeches</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Totals</u>
I	58	35	107	65	165
II	117	38	193	62	310
III	51	34	99	66	150
IV	25	35	46	65	71
	<u>251</u>	<u>36</u>	<u>445</u>	<u>64</u>	<u>696</u>

Table V-7

Major Contributors and Assertion totals (A and B)

<u>Time Period</u>	<u>SSEA</u>	<u>PM</u>	<u>PTC</u>	<u>Other</u>	<u>Totals</u>
I	18(Mar.)	41(P)	62(Sh.)	43	164
II	76(Sh.)	29(T)	103(Pep.)	104	312
III	25(MacE) 28(Sh.)	40(T)	4(Gil.)	51	148
IV	44(MacE)	7(T)	11(Jam.)	10	72
	<u>191</u>	<u>117</u>	<u>180</u>	<u>208</u>	<u>696</u>

Figure V-1A
 Period I US Actor Threat
 June 1963 - February 1964

	June	July	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Jan.	Feb.	Total
Asser. #	51	37	5	8	78	34	20	29	26	288
Score	0.443	-0.06	1.23	0.66	0.245	0.223	0.83	-0.14	0.007	0.382

Figure V-1B

Period I, US Actor Affect (sign reversed)

June 1963 - February 1964

# of Asser.	June	July	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Jan.	Feb.	Total
	26	17	3	2	35	15	70	15	10	130
Score	-0.24	-2.1	-2.3	-1.5	-0.26	-1.3	-0.05	-0.06	-1.1	Avg. -0.99

Months

Figure V-1C
 Period I - US Actor Potency
 June 1963 - February 1964

	June	July	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Jan.	Feb.	Total
# of Asser.	13	10	1	4	19	12	7	5	7	78
Score	1.3	1.3	3.0	2.0	0.87	1.4	1.66	-0.8	0.57	1.255
										Avg.

Months

Figure V-1D

Period I US Actor Activity
June 1963 - February 1964

# of Asser.	June	July	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Jan.	Feb.	Total
	12	10	1	2	24	7	6	9	9	80
Score	0.27	0.6	3.0	1.5	0.125	0.57	0.88	0.44	0.55	Avg. 0.881

Months

Figure V-12

Period I Transactions

June 1963 - February 1964

Figure V-1F
Period I Policy Coordination
 June 1963 - February 1964

Figure V-1g
Period I Relative Position
June 1963 - February 1964

Figure V-1H

Period I Distribution, of Costs and Benefits

June 1963 - February 1964

Figure V-1J

Period I Affect.

June 1963 - February 1964

Figure V- IIA
 Period II US Actor Threat
 July 1971 - July 1972

Semantic Differential
 Scale 3 - Very Threatening

Not at all Threatening

	Jul.	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	June	Jul.	Total
Asses. #	2	0	250	57	37	25	7	48	8	3	19	3	0	459
Score	-0.45	0	0.88	0.43	0.64	0.46	-0.42	-0.7	-1.5	-0.33	0.88	0.003	0	-0.008

Months

Figure V-11B

Period II US Actor Affect (sign reversed)

July 1971 - July 1972

Semantic Differential Scale

Asses- #	Jul.	Aug.	Sent.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	June	Jul.	Total
	1	0	95	30	15	14	4	21	4	2	8	1	0	195
Score	-2.0	0	0.95	1.2	2.1	-0.24	-1.25	0.158	-0.5	-2.0	1.37	-0.68	0	Avg. -0.06

3 3
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Figure V-IIC
Period of US Actor Potency
 July 1971 - July 1972

Semantic Differential
 Scale

Asser.	Jul.	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	June	Jul.	Total
#	1	0	88	17	16	10	2	15	2	0	6	1	0	158
Score	0.66	0	1.06	0.6	-0.33	0.33	-2.0	1.4	-2.0	0	1.27	1.33	0	AVE. 0.128

Figure V-11D

Period II US Actor Activity

July 1971 - July 1972

Semantic Differential
Scale

Active

Passive

Asser. #	Jul.	Aug.	Sent.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	June	Jul.	Total
	0	0	67	10	6	1	1	12	2	1	5	1	0	106
Score	0	0	0.64	-0.2	-0.17	1.3	2.0	-0.52	-2.0	1.0	0	-0.66	0	0.106

Months

Figure V-11E
 Period II Transactions
 July 1971 - July 1972

Continuous
 Scale

Months

Figure V-IIIF
Period II Policy Coordination
 July 1971 - July 1972

Figure V-IIg

Period II Relative Position

July 1971 - July 1972

Figure V-IIH
Period II Distribution of Costs and Benefits
 July 1971 - July 1972

Figure V-IIJ

Period II Affect

July 1971 - July 1972

(2)

Figure V-III A

Period III US Actor Threat
February 1974 - June 1975

		Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	June	Jul.	Aug.	Sep.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	June	Total
User #		6	30	4	0	9	0	11	6	25	20	37	25	8	2	4	10	29	226
Score		0.5	0.52	0.0	0	-0.03	0	-1.56	-0.66	-0.13	1.26	0.08	0.76	0.30	0.33	1.5	0.35	-0.11	0.195

Months

Figure V-III B
Period III US Actor Affect (sign reversed)

February 1974 - June 1975

	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	June	Jul.	Aug.	Sep.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	June	Total
Ass. #	2	15	2	0	4	0	7	2	9	9	15	14	4	1	2	5	11	102
Scr.	1.0	-0.4	0.0	0	-1.7	0	-1.5	2.0	-1.1	1.22	-0.5	-0.68	-0.7	-1.0	-0.5	-1.5	-1.4	Avg. -0.396

Figure V-IIIC

Period III US Actor Potency
February 1974 - June 1975

Asst #	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	June	Jul.	Aug.	Sep.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	June	Total
	2	7	1	0	3	0	3	2	7	5	13	5	3	1	1	2	8	63
Score	-1.0	1.0	-1.0	0	1.66	0	-0.5	-2.0	1.04	1.86	0.33	2.0	0.66	2.0	3.0	2.0	0.87	0.724

Months

Figure V-IIID
 Period III US Actor Activity
 February 1974 - June 1975

	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	June	Jul.	Aug.	Sep.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	June	Total
Asser. #	2	8	1	0	0	0	1	2	9	6	9	6	1	0	1	3	10	61
Score	1.5	1.0	1.0	0	0.0	0	-3.0	-2.0	-0.33	0.7	0.41	0.94	1.0	0	2.0	0.55	0.2	0.233

Figure V-III E

Period III Transactions

February 1974 - June 1975

Continuous
Scale

Figure V-III F

Period III Policy Coordination

February 1974 - June 1975

Continuous
Scale

Figure V-IIIIG

Period III Relative Position

February 1974 - June 1975

Continuous
Scale

Months

Figure V-IIIH
Period III Distribution of Costs and Benefits

February 1974 - June 1975

Figure V-IIIJ

Period III Affect

February 1974 - June 1975

Figure V-IVA

Period IV US Actor Threat

November 1975 - July 1976

Asser. #	Nov.	Dec.	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	June	July	Total
Score	6	13	3	2	8	5	9	38	0	84
	0.94	1.3	0.006	-0.18	0.01	0.33	0.07	0.38	0	AVG.

Figure V-IVB

Period IV US Actor Affect (sign reversed)

November 1975 - July 1976

Nov.	Dec.	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	June	July	Total
3	8	1	1	3	2	2	14	0	34
Score	-1.66	0.45	-1.3	-1.3	-2.3	-1.5	-1.33	-1.47	Avg.
								0	-1.156

Months

Figure V-IVC

Period IV US Actor Potency

November 1975 - July 1976

Asser. #	Nov.	Dec.	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	June	July	Total
	2	3	1	1	3	1	3	14	0	28
Score	2.5	1.0	0.66	0.75	1.33	1.0	1.2	1.52	0	1.106

Figure V-IVD

Period IV US Actor Activity
November 1975 - July 1976

Asser. #	Nov.	Dec.	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	June	July
1	2	2	1	0	2	2	4	10	0
Score	2.0	2.5	0.66	0	1.0	1.5	-0.08	0.56	0
									0.904

Months

Figure V-IVE
Period IV Transactions
 November 1975 - July 1976

Figure V-IVF

Period IV Policy Coordination

November /975 - July 1976

Continuous
Scale

Figure V-IVG
Period IV Relative Position
 November 1975 - July 1976

Continuous
 Scale

Months

Figure V-IVJ

Period IV Affect

November 1975 - July 1976

Notes

(1) One minor problem with evaluative assertion analysis and the evaluation of connectors should be mentioned. While the direction of a connector (i.e., positive or negative) is relatively straightforward, its strength (+3 to -3), can be difficult to assess. On this point the Osgood rules are intricate. As consistency was maintained throughout and only one coder used, this should not be considered a major stumbling block. (Holsti, 1973:242 App.B).

(2) The percentage used here is of 551 type A assertions.

(3) While only one coder was used for the entire content analysis an inter-coder reliability check was carried out to satisfy methodological requirements. Approximately 10% of the assertions were checked using the following formula: (Osgood et al., 1956:57).

$$\frac{2 \times \# \text{ of agreements}}{\text{coder 1 total} + \text{coder 2 total}}$$

$$\text{Example: } \frac{2 \times 44}{56 + 66} = 72\%$$

The same method was used for intra-coder reliability which was carried out near the end of the initial coding. In this check, however, coder 1 and coder 2 were the same person. My thanks to Kathy Froome, a law student, for her assistance with reliability checks.

(4) More explicit information regarding the differences between type A and B can be found in Chapter IV:107 and 121.

(5) The percentages discussed here are based on a total of 1212 perceptions.

(6) Composite scores for each month are based on the following formula:

$$\frac{\text{Affect (sign reversed)} + \text{Potency} + \text{Activity}}{3} = \text{Threat Perception}$$

Example: June, 1963. $\frac{-0.24 + 1.3 + 0.27}{3} = \frac{1.33}{3} = 0.443$ (ie., threat)

(7) Formula for type B assertions - mean scores and scores for this period: June, (0.93); July, (-1.7); August, (0.3); September, (0.5); October, (0.43); November, (0.09); December, (-0.07); January, (-0.084); February, (-0.5).

Formula:

connector (c) X US Policy or US Govt. (i.e., A0) as threat each month

Then: $\frac{\text{US Policy Score (algebraic)} + \text{US Govt. Score (algebraic)}}{\text{absolute sum of (c)}}$

Example: Nov. 1963.
$$\begin{array}{r} 3 \times 0.27 = 0.81 \\ 3 \times 0.27 = 0.81 \\ -3 \times 0.27 = -0.81 \\ \hline 9 \qquad \qquad 0.81 \\ = \frac{0.81}{9} = 0.09 \end{array}$$

(8) Type B scores are as follows: July, (0); August, (0); September, (0.05); October, (0.94); November, (0.19); December, (0.4); January, (1.0); February, (0.47); March, (-1.1); April, (0); May, (0.80); June (0); July (0).

(9) Type B scores are as follows: February, (0.5); March, (0.31); April, (0); May, (0); June, (0); July, (0); August, (0); September, (0); November, (1.3); December, (0.14); January, (-1.6); February, (0); March, (0.16); April, (2.3); May, (0); June, (0.11).

(10) Type B scores are as follows: November, (0.94); December, (1.5); January, (0.006); February, (0); March, (0); April, (0); May, (-0.07); June (0.26); July (0).

(11) The answers to Questions 2 and 3 are drawn from the five dimensions of Canadian behaviour as well as threat perception graphs.

(12) There were not enough scores on the Costs and Benefits dimension to discuss.

Discussion and Conclusions

By 1953, Canada had a new Prime Minister which was an apparent plus for Canada-US relations. In addition, the Cuban missile crisis had been resolved and the Americans had signed the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty with Britain and the Soviet Union. Indeed, Canadian attitudes toward the Soviet Union had softened dramatically (1). Thus, internationally at least, there was little need for Canadians to feel insecure or threatened by the Soviets. Bilateral issues could become the focus of Canadian attention. Trade relations in general formed a large part of the agenda. Specific items included Auto trade and the Canadian wheat deal with Japan, which upset the Americans and thus became part of the bilateral agenda.

While perceived threat was higher in Period I before October, averaging 0.568 compared to after October, with an average score of 0.23, the most significant results are in the Canadian behavioural dimensions. Four of the five dimensions indicate dissatisfaction or disagreement with the relationship by the middle of the period. In this period decreasing threat might be the end-product of some successful pulling back in terms of Canadian behaviour. Although Canadian attitudes dropped

parastically (1.34) between July and October (see fig. 1-18). Canadians perceived US strength and activity as being far less effective. Thus, it may be the result of Canadians perceived success in terms of behaviour. Nonetheless, there was little consensus in Ottawa regarding the threat stemming from the US. In fact, the trade minister's perceptions of the US were far more negative (0.7) than his cohorts. In addition, there is a range between perceptual extremes of almost 1.0 on the semantic differential scale (see Chapter V:163).

In the intervening years between 1963 and 1969 relations between Canada and the United States were relatively friendly. Between 1968 and 1971, however, the relationship deteriorated. The new Prime Minister, Pierre Trudeau, had come to power in 1968 as had the American President Richard Nixon. The relationship hit its low point in 1971. Although there were no major multilateral problems as had been the case in 1963, (e.g., Japan and wheat) trade was as usual the focal point of the relationship. Indeed 1971 is credited by some as the year from which the dyad would never recover the vestiges of the old 'special relationship'.

Similar to Period I, CFPE perceptions of threat were greater in the first half (0.326) of Period II than in the latter half (0.29). In fact from January until April there was no threat perceived. Unlike Period I, however, this is far more the result of the perceived affect. As Table V-5 indicates negative

perceptions outnumbered positive by almost 3:1. In addition, a far greater number of assertions of affect were coded in the first six months than in the latter seven (155 to 42).

It is not unexpected that Canadian positive evaluations of transactions with the US decreased after September, the highest threat month. Indeed, there was a steady downward trend until March 1972, another target month but one of low perceived threat. Following March the downward trend in transactions continued. The first decrease in transactions could have been due to high perceptions of threat. This is not the case, however, for the second decrease, at least not as found in the documents studied, because no perceptions of threat were apparent at that time.

The other behavioural dimensions match the threat data quite closely, although in every case, including threat, they are opposite to the expected results. In other words, perceived threat decreased rather than rose and the behavioural dimensions indicated increasing satisfaction and agreement. This might be explained by the tremendous perceptual affect which the Nixon Doctrine appeared to have on the CFPE. It may be that the implications of Nixon's new concepts led to an initial conciliatory stance by the Canadians, at least until such time as Canadian foreign policy could be studied and adjusted, if this were possible. In the meantime, the Canadian position would be one mainly of conciliation.

The Canadian position, however, may also be the result of the retraction of the surcharge in November of 1971. While all the reasons for the lack of a Canada-US section in the foreign policy review of 1968-1970 have been made explicit elsewhere, one can only surmise that without the Nixon Doctrine there might not have been a Canadian desire to look closely at the relationship. Rather, a typically Canadian pragmatic approach sufficed. In effect the Third Option was a reaction to the Nixon Doctrine and specifically the surcharge. The final demise of the special relationship, however, made it imperative that the government be seen to be doing something. The Third Option may have filled the void. Never officially endorsed and not really pursued at this point, it was a strategy nonetheless that a 'pragmatic' government could fall back on when seeking solace for the 'masses' in the future. Witness, for example, FIRA and Time and Reader's Digest. Canadians in general, would not be unwilling participants although much of the business community may have felt otherwise.

The suggestion from the perceptual data is that the Prime Minister had a strong grip on the state. While three of his ministers, two in most important portfolios, regarded the US as quite threatening, Trudeau himself did not. And while there was a rethinking of the Canadian position to come in the near future little of a substantial nature was changed in the immediate to upset the relationship. Perhaps Trudeau's newly

learned experience resulting from the Arctic control legislation and the ultimate American reaction led to his response and maintenance of control of his cabinet. He may have feared an over-reaction by Canadians and in particular by his cabinet.

Between 1972 and 1975, however, the Canada-US relationship merely deteriorated farther, due mainly to events which had already taken place both internationally and domestically (for example, the east-west détente and the Canadian Arctic pollution legislation). US behaviour in the middle of 1974, and early 1975, which was outside of the normal relations range, could only add to a most difficult situation.

The most interesting aspect of this third period is that, perceptually at least, it follows the expected results more closely. In other words, perceived threat is low or non-existent over the first nine months of this period (-0.15) and quite high (0.558) over the last eight months. On the other hand, while the behavioural dimensions are quite complicated there is a very general trend upward indicating some satisfaction and agreement with the relationship. As noted in the previous chapter, perceived threat may be the result of the resumption of more normal relations after the previous harrowing experiences of the Americans.

While there appeared to be greater consensus among the individuals within the foreign policy elite that the US was not a great threat, with the exception of the minister of agriculture,

It must be remembered that Canada was in the midst of some very difficult domestic problems. In the first place, the federal government was considering price and wage controls to help control a sagging economy. In addition, a policy refuting the use of capital punishment was on the agenda. In short, domestic concerns were rapidly outpacing Canada-US bilateral problems. This may be seen also in the two main attitude objects. The US government was mentioned far more often than was US policy, indicating a relative lack of concern or possible agreement with the direction of US policy in general. This is only a partial explanation, however, as the second half of the threat graph indicates (see fig. V-III A). As noted above, after the US experience of the previous two years (1973-1975) it would seem only a return to more normal rhetoric on the part of the CFPE. Indeed, there were more assertions coded in the last eight months (135) compared to the first nine months (91) of this period. In addition, the settling of American administrative problems shows up quite clearly on Figures V-III C and V-III D (i.e., US Actor Potency and Activity). In both cases perceptions of American strength and activity increased to positive levels near the end of 1974. There was little Canadian concern in these areas previous to this because the Americans were looking almost totally inward to their own major domestic problems. Once these problems were settled, however, the resumption of more normal international relations could take place. Doubtless the US wanted to show the

world that they were no longer hampered by a 'corrupt' administration.

Period IV follows closely Period III. In fact the target point is only thirteen months later. This period, however, surrounding March 1976, is the most enigmatic in all terms. Certainly, the relationship had been increasing in friendliness. Perceived threat (see fig. V-IV4) was more apparent in the four months before March (U.516) than in the four months following (U.115). Similar to Period III far more discussion (89%) centered on the attitude object "US Government" than on "US Policy".

Interestingly, every behavioural dimension except transactions rose generally during this period. In the final analysis of Period IV it is difficult to find a reason for the negative American behaviour. There are fewer assertions than one would expect if a crisis or conflict was at hand and there is little support in the literature for a major Canada/US problem. It may be possible that the CEPE who were so engrossed in domestic problems at the time that they misperceived American behaviour and saw little to concern them. Indeed, there was very little spoken of US policy at this time.

Several questions remain relating to the methods used in this study. Therefore, the following areas will be discussed. Is the perceptual approach adequate to explain Canada-US relations from the Canadian perspective? Is the measure of

threat, as utilized, an accurate measurement? What, if any, methodological problems presented themselves? Were the five research questions answered?

The perceptual approach alone as used in this thesis explains little about dynamic relationships. On the contrary it merely provides part of the answer regarding a nation's behaviour. However, if perceptions can be tapped, and this study maintains that they can, then they may be placed in time series to provide a measure for comparison across a time period. While perceptions of threat were not always present, as had been expected, the evidence gathered indicates that as a measuring device perceptions, either hostile or friendly, may be a useful tool in any dyadic analysis.

A number of other points are relevant regarding perceptions and behaviour as used in this study. First, as noted earlier, this represents a first attempt to use this kind of information to study the broad range of behaviour in the North American dyad. The second point is closely related. Most perceptual studies have focused on conflict or on actors and their perceptions of some known enemy (2). As a result a study of perceptions between "friendly" nations is hampered by a lack of previous research. Ole Holsti (1973), for example, utilizing the same method of content analysis for a study of conflicting alliances was able to make comparisons mainly using the dimension 'affect' of the evaluative assertion. However, his measure of

threat or 'hostility' was also utilized in his discussion as the "independent variable for the attitudinal component of our hypothesis" (1973:114). In the context of Canada-US relations, the affect dimension would provide little in the way of explanation or description as almost every US Actor Affect chart is positive throughout. Thus, the composite measure of threat was required as it captures a fuller picture of any ongoing relationship. Finally, this study has set out to determine if perceptions of threat change--they do--and if behaviour can be linked to those changes. The perceptual approach is certainly adequate for a study of this nature but it does not, nor was it intended to, provide a complete picture of the Canada-US dyad or be, in any manner, deterministic as the links between perceptions and behaviour are tenuous at best.

The measure of perceptions of threat as used here is problematic. Based on the groundwork of Osgood and supplementary use by Holsti et al. (1973) the method has had success in pinpointing relative changes in threat. This has been the case in this study, with the exception that the monthly average values did not always add up to threat. Rather, there were numerous months in which the average scores were well below the threat range on the semantic differential scale. While this is a problem with respect to the research questions, it is not a methodological problem. Interestingly, the average overall mean scores for the four periods indicated a perception of threat in

three of the four crisis periods. On the other hand, in the context of Canada-US relations, at times the US is perceived as friendly but threatening overall. Thus, either the method is not valid and does not measure what it is supposed to, or threat in the context of a friendly dyad may need to be redefined. Based on the evidence supplied by Osgood and his colleagues the measure of perceptions is probably accurate, allowing for the proper use of techniques. Therefore, the concept of threat in a friendly dyad may not be totally practical. Indeed, it may be more important to look at fluctuations from threat to no threat across time and discover why those changes take place. In other words, drawing on both sides of the semantic differential scale and utilizing concepts that might shed more light on fluctuating perceptions may be a more fruitful approach.

While perceptions of threat were expected at all times this did not prove to be the case. This may indicate that the problems of asymmetry have been well-learned by Canadians. Canada does not always lose its case within the dyad; thus, a negative reaction (i.e., perceived threat) to negative US behaviour may not always be warranted.

With respect to methods, the number of assertions per period varied greatly (see Table V-3). While there is fairly strong support in the literature for conflict during the first three periods of this study, little support has been found for Period IV. The assertions totals tend to bear this out and, thus

providing some measure of face validity. Two points are worth noting. First, in general terms it would appear that the greater the number of assertions the more important the issues at stake in the Canada-US dyad. Witness, for example, the large number of assertions in September 1971 (250) following the American surcharge announcement.

Second, assuming that the first point is correct, it would seem that there would be little to gain from a longitudinal study of the relationship utilizing public documents unless it covered a particular period of crisis or high import. In other words, levels of public rhetoric are low unless an issue of some importance is on the agenda. Documentary evidence, therefore, would be sparse in times of no conflict. However, if a study were carried out during non-conflict eras it may well indicate whether the relationship in these times is ever threatening.

Period IV was problematic as there were so few assertions. Perhaps there was no real crisis present. As Sullivan (1976:278) notes, event data should only be considered as indicators of the real world; not everything is recorded due to factors such as censorship and newsworthiness. However, the opposite may be true. In March, 1976, for example, the events which were recorded undoubtedly were of a minor and irritating nature in the dyad. As event data are based on totals of events a number of minor irritations occurring in one month could appear as a major problem. In this period the major question appears to

have been the dealings with the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation regarding a new aircraft. It has been noted above that the first three periods had many more assertions and that face validity is provided from numerous sources in the literature. This is not the case in early 1976, however, as the Canada-US relationship was going through a perceived level of improvement. Nonetheless, Period IV received similar treatment in methodological terms.

In terms of the length of the periods, the longer the time-series the better the perceptual trends can be noted. Although fluctuations within the trends would not be affected, that is not unimportant. Thus, Periods II and III should be better indicators of the trends in the relationship. While each of those periods has at least one month with no assertions this should not alter the picture. In fact, this may only point to the lack of a major issue in that month or to a desire to say nothing which might confuse an issue.

On a different note one interesting aspect which came to light is the role of the Parliamentary Secretary in the House of Commons. While acting in a position of some responsibility as a knowledgeable consort to a minister, the secretary tends to pre-empt much of what the minister might say or might not want to say for diplomatic reasons. As the minister is the speaker of record, however, this is not very surprising. While there appears to be less regard for confidential diplomacy as had been the case in the past it is, and probably will remain, a

cornerstone of Canadian foreign policy. It would be difficult to find any country in the world that does not utilize this internationally accepted behaviour in foreign policy. Quiet diplomacy in Canadian terms, however, has usually meant the manner in which Canada deals with the United States (Holmes, 1976:50). As a rule a cabinet minister is not a diplomat but usually an elected representative who has been assigned an administrative area of some responsibility. Nonetheless, he is responsible for his public utterances and, thus when he makes a speech it may be assumed to be in line with the way he wants to be perceived.

In the coding categories one problem was quite apparent from the beginning. Numerous evaluative statements were left out because they did not meet the criteria outlined in the two major categories - US government and US policy. In every case very general comments, for example, "Canada is dependent on the US", had to be excluded. Because there was no coding carried out on these type of statements it is difficult to say whether there would have been an appreciable affect on the final results. One can only surmise that there would be little real change since these statements tended to follow the general line of discussion in each speech.

One further difficulty mentioned earlier is the time-consuming nature of content analysis. This must be stressed again. It was not just the laboriousness of the task but, more

importantly, the lack of literature on the subject. While Dolstra has used the evaluative assertion method and Osquith lays the basis of it out fairly well, numerous problems had to be overcome. The Composite threat score, for example, while utilized by Dolstra (1973) as his hostility index, is not adequately explained in the text or in notes. Thus, a lot of valuable time was spent working out a satisfactory method of scoring threat perception with the few clues at hand.

A critical problem must now be broached. Were the five research questions answered or could they be answered? This refers specifically to Question 4. "Do Canadian elites maintain a high perception of threat or does threat perception revert to some other level?" Earlier it was said that threat perception would always be present based on the concept of asymmetrical interdependence and the assumed presence of Canadian vulnerability to harm. This study has shown, however, that constant fear of harm and/or vulnerability to harm are not always present in the perceptions of the CFPE. This may be due simply to a lack of issues; the CFPE do not perceive any harm; or, the elites said nothing. There were, however, major issues present in three out of the four periods. Thus, it may point to a lack of consensus among the CFPE. Indeed, question 5 indicates this is the case. While the average range between ministers is not always that wide, across a large number of statements and throughout the periods there was at times a significant spread.

2

This is particularly true considering that the major foreign policy spokesmen accounted for over 70% of the assertions. In other words, for various reasons particular spokesmen were far more adamant in their concern over the US than were others. If their statements alone (or only those who were friendly) had been coded the results would have been far different. Nonetheless, it does point to a lack of consensus among the CFPE and also to the problem of issue specific circumstances. In only one case was it noted that the SGA, while perceiving a threat, appeared to be supporting the issue specific minister regarding some US policy. Finally question 4 in its present form did not stand up to testing and might better have been considered as a facet of question 1, relating it only to the presence or absence of threat. On the other hand, questions 2, 3 and 5 did provide a basis from which discussion of the data could be made.

Finally, from a normative standpoint, much of the International Relations field is concerned with solutions to conflict. This is usually accomplished by looking at conflict and its related variables. Perhaps the solution to conflict lies in further studies of cooperation. In other words, by defining what makes nations cooperate rather than what puts nations into conflict, the variables defining cooperation could be put into practice between conflictual nations.

Notes

(1) See Holsti, 1973:116, Table 3.

(2) For example, see Holsti and his Dulles study.

Rules for abstracting Attitude Objects: Categories

1) US government: include references to:

- a) government
- b) administration
- c) congress
- d) senate
- e) individuals--president, secretaries of state, unnamed high government officials
- f) leadership
- g) cabinet

Note: Does not include IJC.

2) US government policy

- a) any federal policy/measure
- b) US law/legislation
- c) acts/action/behaviour

d) treaties

Examples of above:

1) US Trade with Enemy Act

2) Disc. Legislation.

3) implied references

a) to any of 1 or 2 above.

4) non-evaluative material not coded.

Example: The President is healthy.

5) Must refer to present or future:

Example:

1) US good in WWII (not coded)

2) US good now (coded)

However, a policy implemented in the past would still be coded if it was affecting the present. For example, the "US surcharge is still of great concern to Canada."

Speeches of Ministers, et al., and Dates.

Cadieux.	25/5/71
Davis	1/9/71
	30/9/71
	13/5/72
	23/3/72
Gillespie	11/2/74
Gordon	27/6/63
	5/12/64
	6/1/64
	30/1/64
Hay	27/7/63
	2/12/63
Hellyer	27/6/63
Jamieson	19/5/76
Martin	28/5/63
	24/8/63
MacDonald	29/5/72
	4/2/74
	5/12/75
MacEachen	23/1/75
	11/3/75
	19/3/75
	30/4/75
	8/6/76
	10/6/76
Olson	25/11/71
	1/12/71
Pearson	22/9/63
	20/10/63
	22/10/63
	29/10/63
	6/11/63 (X2)

17/1/64

21/4/64

Pepin

4/12/63

7/1/64

20/9/71

29/9/71

19/10/71

29/10/71

31/12/71

1/3/72

Sharp

13/6/63

19/6/63

9/9/63

11/9/63

1/10/63

3/10/63

18/11/63

24/12/63

16/1/64

29/1/64

3/2/64

10/2/64

18/2/64

21/9/71

27/9/71

6/11/71

14/1/72

17/1/72

5/2/72

Trudeau

27/1/71

17/11/71

1/12/71

1/3/72

14/4/72

15/4/72

16/6/74

20/6/74

8/8/74

12/8/74

26/9/74

28/11/74

1/12/74

5/12/74

8/12/74

29/12/74

16/1/75

11/3/75

30/4/75

7/12/75
2/2/76

Turner 18/11/71

Whelan 21/2/74
29/3/74
21/11/74
29/1/74
7/12/74
12/2/75
26/4/75

Other Ministers in House of Commons

Sauve, Benson, Leblanc.

Parliamentary Secretaries

Faulkner, Breau, Hogarth, Mahoney, Danson.

Figure App: I-A

US Polity Affect (sign reversed)
(June 1963 - February 1964)

Semantic Differential
Scale

	June	July	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Jan	Feb.	Total
Asser.	17	2	1	2	10	6	3	12	5	58
Score	-0.57	-0.5	-2.0	-1.5	1.3	0.0	0.66	-0.09	-0.2	-0.32
										Avg.

Months

Figure App:I-B

June July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb.

Figure App:I-C
US Policy Threat
(June 1963 - February 1964)

Figure App:I-D
US Government Threat
(June 1963 - February 1964)

Semantic Differential
Scale

Very Threatening

3

2

1

0

-1

-2

-3

Not at all Threatening

Asser. #	June	July	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Jan.	Feb.	Total
	16	31	2	3	54	16	7	7	11	147
Score	-0.5	0.45	-0.8	1.3	0.02	0.7	0.9	0.08	-0.3	AVG: 0.21

Figure App:II-A

US Policy Affect (sign reversed)

(July 1971 - July 1972)

Semantic Differential
Scale

July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May June July

Asser. #	July	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	June	July	Total
Score	0	0	82	18	15	8	2	13	1	0	8	0	0	0
			1.2	1.56	2.1	0.71	3.0	0.97	3.0	0	1.37	0	0	1.07

Months

Figure App: IIB
 US Government Affect (sign reversed)
 (July 1971 - July 1972)

Asser #	July	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	June	July	Total
1	0	13	12	0	6	2	3	3	2	0	0	1	0	48
Score	-2.0	0	-0.72	0.6	0	-1.5	-0.5	-1.16	1.66	-2.0	0	-0.66	0	AVG 48

Figure App:II-C
US Policy Threat
(July 1971 - July 1972)

Figure App:II-D
US Government Threat
(July 1971 - July 1972)

Asser. #	July	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	June	July	Total
	2	0	25	27	0	9	2	.18	6	3	0	3	0	95
Score	-0.45	0	-0.34	-0.36	0	-0.2	-0.16	-0.23	-1.1	-0.33	0	0.003	0	AY823

Figure App:III-A

US Policy Affect (sign reversed)

(February 1974 - June 1975)

Asse. #	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	June	July	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	June	Total
1	10	1		0	3	0	2	0	3	0	6	9	0	0	1	0	0	36
Score	3.0	0.23	2.0	0.0	-2.0	0.0	-3.0	0.0	-1.3	0.0	-1.0	0.07	0.0	0.0	-3.0	0.0	-0.3	Avg.

Months

Figure App:IIIB

US Government Affect (sign reversed)
(February 1974 - June 1975)

Asses. #	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	June	July	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	June	Total
1	5	1	0	1	0	0	5	2	6	9	9	5	4	1	1	5	11	66
Score	-1.0	-1.8	-2.0	0	-1.0	0	-2.2	2.0	0.74	1.22	-0.2	-2.0	-0.75	-1.0	2.0	-1.5	-1.4	Avg: -0.61

Months

Figure App:III-C

US Policy Threat

(February 1974 - June 1975)

Semantic Differential
Scale 3
Very Threatening

Asset #	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	June	July	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	June	Total
3	18	2	0	0	7	0	3	0	9	2	11	14	0	0	1	0	0	70
Score	0.66	0.5	0.3	0	-0.16	0	-0.66	0	0.09	0.88	0	-0.4	0	0	-1.0	0	0	-0.0

Months

Figure App:III-D

US Government Threat

(February 1974 - June 1975)

Semantic Differential
Scale

3 + Very Threatening

Not at all Threatening

Feb. Mar. Apr. May June July Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May June

Asses- #	3	12	24	0	2	0	8	6	16	18	26	11	8	2	3	10	29	156
Score	0.3	0.46	-0.33	0	0.33	0	-1.9	-0.66	-1.16	1.27	0.3	-2.4	0.3	0.33	2.3	0.35	-1.1	0.02

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