Maintaining Party Unity: Analyzing the Conservative Party of Canada’s Integration of the Progressive Conservative and Canadian Alliance parties

by

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Federal conservative parties in Canada have long been plagued by several persistent cleavages and internal conflict. This conflict has hindered the party electorally and contributed to a splintering of right-wing votes between competing right-wing parties in the 1990s. The Conservative Party of Canada (CPC) formed from a merger of the Progressive Conservative (PC) party and the Canadian Alliance in 2003. This analysis explores how the new party was able to maintain unity and prevent the long-standing cleavages from disrupting the party. The comparative literature on party factions is utilized to guide the analysis as the new party contained faction like elements. Policy issues and personnel/patronage distribution are stressed as significant considerations by the comparative literature as well literature on the PCs internal fighting. The analysis thus focuses on how the CPC approached these areas to understand how the party maintained unity. For policy, the campaign platforms, Question Period performance and government sponsored bills of the CPC are examined followed by an analysis of their first four policy conventions. With regards to personnel and patronage, Governor in Council and Senate appointments are analyzed, followed by the new party’s candidate nomination process and Stephen Harper’s appointments to cabinet. The findings reveal a careful and concentrated effort by party leadership, particularly Harper, at managing both areas to ensure that members from each of the predecessor parties were motivated to remain in the new party. Harper’s role in maintaining party unity is substantial, and the findings indicate that the centralization of power under the Prime Minister can have a positive impact. The findings also situate the CPC relative to its predecessor parties, uncovering in detail where the new party bears resemblance and differs from its predecessors.
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**List of Abbreviations**

ALP – Australian Labor Party
CD - Christian Democratic Party (Italy)
CDU - Christian Democratic Union (Germany)
CPC – Conservative Party of Canada
DPJ - Democratic Party of Japan
DRC - Democratic Representative Caucus
FDP - Free Democrats Party
FEA - Federation of Ecologists Alternatives
GIC - Governor in Council
JSP - Japan Socialist Party
LDP - Liberal Democratic Party
MP – Member of Parliament
PC – Progressive Conservative
PCI - Italian Communist Party
PRI - Institutional Revolutionary Party
PSDI - Italian Socialist Democratic Party
SDP - Social Democratic Party
UA - United Alternative
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CHAPTER ONE – PARTIES AND FACTIONS

The presence of internal groups competing for power and influence within political parties is not a new development in the political party literature. Known as factions, the literature contains extensive discussion on the presence of factions in parties (see Boucek, 2012; Karamichas and Botetzagias, 2003; Kollner, 2004). Most of this literature focuses on parties where factions are deeply institutionalized such as Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) (Kollner, 2004; Tomita et al., 1981) and the Australian Labor Party (ALP) (Leigh, 2000). While the literature addresses many relevant topics regarding factions, there are significant questions that have not been adequately addressed regarding the management of factions. There is agreement that the presence of factions can put a party’s future in jeopardy (Boucek, 2012: 2; Karamichas and Botetzagias, 2003: 65). Yet there is not substantial analysis of how a party can successfully manage its factions (Lees et al., 2010: 1300; Boucek, 2012: 35). How can party leadership manage factional tensions in the party? What steps can be taken and what benefits can be distributed by party leadership to mitigate factional conflict in a party? This project will explore this by using the literature on factionalized parties to analyze the Conservative Party of Canada (CPC) to determine how it effectively managed its competing internal cleavages following its creation in 2003.

The CPC serves as a compelling case study when accounting for the long history of conflict in Canadian federal conservative politics. For much of the twentieth century, conservatives in Canada were represented federally by the Progressive Conservative (PC) party. There is a wealth of literature that explores the problems experienced by the PC party with internal fighting and intraparty disunity (see Courtney, 1981; Perlin, 1980). In the 1993 election the PC party suffered massive losses in their seat count as two new political parties enjoyed
significant electoral breakthroughs. The Bloc Quebecois formed because of disillusionment with the PCs attempts to attain Quebec's endorsement of the constitution. Several prominent PCs left the party as it became clear that the Meech Lake Accord, which would have brought Quebec's support of the constitution, would not pass. These Members of Parliament (MP) formed the Bloc Quebecois which openly endorsed Quebec separatism. Following the 1993 election, the Bloc formed the Official Opposition in Parliament (Carty et al., 2000:12, 39-42). In Western Canada, feelings that the PCs were too sympathetic to Quebec combined with feelings of alienation from government fueled the formation of the Reform party. The Reform party came out of the 1993 election with only two fewer seats than the Bloc. Numerous works have examined the emergence of the Reform party, battles between them and the PC party, the similarities and differences between the two parties and the attempts made to reunite them (see Ellis, 2005; Laycock, 2002; Nevitte et al., 2000; Patten, 1999; Harrison, 1995; Lusztig and Wilson, 2005).

Following multiple failed attempts at uniting the right-wing parties, in 2003 reconciliation was achieved and the PC party and the Canadian Alliance party (which replaced the Reform party) merged into the CPC. After reducing the Liberals to a minority government in 2004, the new party would win minority governments in the next two elections followed by a majority government in 2011. The Canadian party literature has placed its attention on the decision to merge and the merger process (see Belanger and Godbout, 2010; Segal, 2006; Flanagan, 2007, Marland and Flanagan, 2015). More recent literature on the party has focused on specific aspects of the party, such as its policy agenda (see Farney and Malloy, 2011; Farney and Rayside, 2013; Marwah et al., 2013). Similar to the lack of attention on managing factional tension in the parties’ literature, the Canadian literature has failed to explore how the CPC was able to manage the long-standing cleavages in Canadian federal conservative politics and
maintain harmony between the two predecessor parties in the new party. This analysis will address this gap in the existing literature.

The major thrust of this analysis is exploring an often-neglected consideration in the literature on factionalized parties: how does a political party successfully manage its factional elements? Through a thorough case study of the CPC, the findings will illustrate how a party with faction like elements manages those elements. In doing so, this analysis will also address a significant gap in the literature on Canadian parties, specifically why the CPC was able to maintain unity where many other federal conservative parties have failed. It must be noted that the CPC did not contain the deeply institutionalized factions that are frequently referred to by the literature. At times, the literature on the PC party has referred to its internal divisions as factions. Perlin, in his seminal work on the internal turmoil that plagued the PC party, used the term "faction" to describe two opposing groups in the party (Perlin, 1980: 63). In countries such as Japan and Australia, however, factions have official names, offices, and in some instances staffers and budgets at their disposal. In the CPC, there was no such formal organization for factions. What was present were two distinct organized groups that have a long history of conflict, both internally in the PC party and externally between the PC and Reform/Alliance party. The merger which created the CPC brought these two parties together, resulting in the new party containing these two distinct groups. There is also an ideological consistency within the two sides. The Reform/Alliance side contrasts from the PC side on issues of social tolerance, Quebec/Federalism and populism (Cross and Young, 2002: 869; Nevitte et al., 2000: 98; Laycock, 2002: 55; Ellis, 2005: 132). Thus, while there were not institutionalized factions in the new party, the CPC contained two groups each with its own distinct ideological positioning, that are comparable to factions. The resemblance to faction like elements in the CPC allows for the
literature on factions to be utilized for understanding how the party was able to maintain party unity. The literature on party factions will inform this analysis on how the CPC managed its internal divides. The findings will also contribute to our understanding of the party by thoroughly situating the CPC relative to each of its predecessor parties.

**WHAT ARE FACTIONS?**

Starting a discussion of how a party can successfully manage its factions with a precise definition of what constitutes a faction from the existing literature would intuitively be the most appropriate path. To conceptualize what a faction is, it is necessary to acknowledge that a party is not a unitary actor. Political parties “are not monolithic structures but collective entities in which competition, divided opinions and dissent create internal pressures” (Boucek, 2009: 455). Turning to the treatment of the term “party faction” in the existing literature unveils a wide array of definitions. DiSalvo stresses the need for clarity in classifying factions noting that different findings in analysis are resulting from differing definitions of factions (DiSalvo, 2010: 271). Similarly, Bettcher also stresses that the differences in findings from case studies on factionalized parties are the result of differences in the cases or in how factions are classified (Bettcher, 2005: 339-40). The lack of conformity and the wide range of conceptualizations on party factions is best summarized by Kollner stating “in the vast literature on factionalism in political parties worldwide, one comes across nearly as many definitions as studies” (Kollner, 2004: 88).

Much of the literature on factions begin their attempts to define factions by referencing several key works going back to the early 1960s. Both Bettcher and Boucek reference the work of Richard Rose (Bettcher, 2005: 341; Boucek, 2009: 463). Rose studied the two major parties in Britain at the time, the Conservative and Labour parties, and distinguished two groupings
within the parties: factions and tendencies. Tendencies according to Rose lack organization and permanency and are seen as an agreement of policy beliefs and attitudes. Factions meanwhile are more permanent organizations of Parliamentarians who seek to advance policy goals (Rose, 1964: 35-8). Boucek summarizes Rose’s classifications by noting that factions differ from tendencies according to their level of institutionalization with factions being much more institutionalized than tendencies. Boucek finds shortcomings in Rose’s conceptualization as it does not operationalize stability or offer ways to measure durability and degrees of organization (Boucek, 2009: 463).

A more nuanced notion of factions comes from Zuckerman, who looked at factions in Italian political parties. Zuckerman defines factions as “structured group within a political party which seeks, at a minimum, to control authoritative decision-making positions of the party. It is a ‘structured group’ in that there are established patterns of behavior and interaction for the faction members over time” (Zuckerman, 1975: 20). This definition speaks to both the ambitions and the organizational characteristics of factions. Persico et al. draw out the significance of Zuckerman’s definition, which is the distinction between factions of interest and factions of principle. Factions of interest are motivated by aims of attaining power whereas factions of principle are fueled by policy beliefs (Persico et al., 2011: 248).

The classification of factions between factions of interest and factions of principle is addressed in greater detail by Sartori. Similar to Rose, Sartori is referred to frequently by contemporary scholars exploring party factions. Sartori highlights that factions of interest and factions of principle are not completely separate from each other. Factions of interest are most likely to be built on patronage whereas factions of principle are associated with ideology (Sartori, 1976: 6-7). Bettcher expands on Sartori’s work noting that these two definitions do not
exist completely independent of each other and that any faction can be classified at various points along either or both of these categories (Bettcher, 2005: 343). The key point is that factions are more institutionalized than other party associations like clienteles (344). Boucek explores one of the key limitations with classifying factions by their behaviours and organization; the variables used to characterize the factions are rarely independent of each other and often influence each other (Boucek, 2009: 465). Sartori acknowledged these limitations, especially with regards to the interaction between motivational and organizational variables (Sartori, 1976: 79).

Beller and Belloni provide further advancements in the conceptualization of factions, seeing factions as “any relatively organized group that exists within the context of some other group and which . . . competes with rivals for power advantages within the larger group of which it is a part” (1978: 419). This definition works on a wider scale than just political parties, yet it is easily applied to parties. In another piece, Belloni and Beller differentiate between factions that are formed around a charismatic leader and those that are formed along policy lines. They stress that a faction can contain a diverse mix of both organizational motives. Similarly, factions can partake in activities that are centered on conflict with other factions for control of the party or engage in acts of cooperation with other factions in the party, and once again these two classifications are not dichotomous (Belloni and Beller, 1976: 544-45).

The literature to this point has focused on the most appropriate way to classify and categorize party factions. Looking at how more contemporary literature has defined factions provides more detailed conceptualizations. Bettcher conceptualizes factions as “groups that compete with others for power advantages within parties” and differentiates these groups according to their motivation and level of organization (Bettcher, 2005: 340). DiSalvo builds off
this stating that “factions exist inside established parties... factions exist when some party members share a common identity... and articulate different policy positions from the mainstream of their party” (DiSalvo, 2009: 31). Ceron works with a definition of factions as an intraparty group motivated by policy goals (Ceron, 2014: 187). Factions are seen by Ceron as “rational actors” that direct their adherents to attain goals in the form of policy and personnel rewards (Ceron, 2013: 122, 126). A more nuanced conceptualization is provided by DiSalvo listing four characteristics that a faction must contain: “(1) ideological consistency, (2) organizational capacity, (3) temporal durability and (4) undertake significant actions to shift a party’s agenda and reputation” (DiSalvo, 2010: 271). In another piece of work, DiSalvo defines factions by their actions as “agents of preference formation, agenda setting, and coalition building” (DiSalvo, 2009: 31).

The most useful approach to conceptualizing a faction comes from Boucek who utilizes the definition first employed by Zariski. Zariski states: “We might define a faction as any intraparty combination, clique, or grouping whose members share a sense of common identity and common purpose and are organized to act collectively – as a distinct bloc within the party – to achieve their goals” (Zariski, 1960: 33). This approach is advocated by Boucek as it does not attempt to create dichotomous groupings for factions to fall into, and “it avoids conceptual overlaps and it makes no normative judgments about the different goals pursued by factions” (Boucek, 2009: 468). This broad conceptualization allows all types of factions to be incorporated into an analysis, which provides a greater scope of cases to learn from.

Much of the existing literature on factionalized parties focuses on a handful of parties where factional elements have become deeply institutionalized. One of the most documented cases comes from Japan. The role that factions play in Japanese politics cannot be overstated. In
what is referred to as the “political system of 1955”, Japanese politics have come to be characterized by the frequency of factional issues involved with the LDP and the Japanese Socialist Party (JSP) (Tomita et al., 1981: 245). Factions in the JSP were formed around ideological lines, and they initially emerged around individual leaders and transitioned to durable and highly institutionalized factions (Kollner, 2004: 91-92). Formed in 1996, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) is also well versed in dealing with factionalism (Kollner, 2004: 96). Factionalism in the parties, particularly in the LDP has been so severe, that Tomita et al. argue it is impossible to understand Japanese politics without taking factions into account (Tomita et al., 1981: 250). A substantial amount of literature is cited by Bouissou to show that there are two primary roles fulfilled by factions in Japanese politics: recruiting candidates and distributing patronage rewards (see Ramseyer and McCall-Rosenbluth, 1993; Cox et al., 1999; Woodall, 1996). A slightly more expansive position is taken by Kollner who lists three roles for the factions: patronage appointments within the party and government, distribution of funds to faction members and providing endorsements from the party for candidates in national elections (Kollner, 2004: 93).

Factionalized parties in several other countries have also received considerable attention. Italian parties have long been acknowledged as being deeply factionalized; Ceron states that Italian parties offer the premier example of party factions. Several examples are listed by Ceron going as far back as 1946; parties such as the Italian Communist Party (PCI), and the Italian Socialist Democratic Party (PSDI) have had to deal with factions (Ceron, 2013: 122). The Christian Democratic Party (DC) party has been one of Italy’s more successful parties, yet its factions are well-developed and institutionalized. The DC factions have their own names, membership lists, and in some instances their own headquarters (Belloni and Beller, 1976: 533).
Similarly, in Mexico, the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), which was the governing party for the last 70 years of the twentieth century, has also had to deal with factions. Known as “camarillas” these factions are identified in the literature as being developed based on personal relationships and are noted as being less institutionalized than factions in Japan and Italy yet they still exert significant influence in the party (Persico et al., 2011: 251).

Another example of a party with deeply institutionalized factions is the ALP. Comparable to the presence of factions in Japanese parties, Leigh states that is necessary to study factions to fully understand the functioning of the ALP. Three major factions (the Right, Left and Center-Left factions) emerged through the 1960s and 1970s and became entrenched while the ALP formed government from 1983 through 1996. These three factions quickly became institutionalized in the ALP, performing tasks such as nominating candidates, appointing members to party positions and occasionally developing their own policy. The role played by factions became so prominent that power was exerted not in the party at large but in the factions. As a result, various conflicts erupted between the factions as they each attempted to exert their influence on the party (Leigh, 2000: 427-38).

Despite the cases of factionalized parties just discussed, Belloni and Beller argue that factions have “been only poorly developed as a category of inquiry and analysis in political science” (Belloni and Beller, 1976: 531). Belloni and Beller further stress that due to the critical roles performed by factions in multiple nations it is necessary for the analysis of factions to be further developed (Belloni and Beller, 1976: 531). Boucek is also critical of the existing literature on factions and its failure to provide compelling and conclusive findings on relevant topics regarding factions (Boucek, 2009: 456). In their review on the treatment of factions in the literature, Belloni and Beller highlight the causes of factions, the activities performed by factions
and the organization of factions as the main concerns addressed (Belloni and Beller, 1976: 547). In addition to asking why factions exist in certain parties and not others, and how factions transform over time, another area frequently explored in the literature on party factions are the roles performed by factions such advocating policy positions and distributing patronage rewards (Cox et al., 1999; Leigh, 2000; Tomita et al., 1981; Woodall, 1996).

The risks that factions pose to party stability and even the existence of a party are also addressed in the literature. DiSalvo notes that factions are seen as a significant threat in political systems where parties are emerging and as a potentially damaging force in advanced party systems (DiSavlo, 2009: 31). Ceron also points out that parties can be broken up by factional conflict (Ceron, 2013: 122). There is agreement in the literature that the presence of factions in a party can put the party’s future in jeopardy (Boucek, 2012: 2; Karamichas and Botetzagias, 2003: 65). Indeed, a brief glance at the electoral fortunes of factionalized parties provides multiple examples of factions hindering their host party. In Japan, the JSP has suffered repeated electoral failures partially attributable to its managing of factional conflict (Tomita et al., 1981; Kollner, 2004). Similarly, electoral fortune eluded the Social Democratic Party (SDP) in Britain as it battled and attempted to manage several internal factions during its turbulent and short-lived existence in the 1980s (Denver and Bochel, 1994: 403). Another example can be found in Greece, where its Green Party ran into numerous obstacles as it struggled to keep control of its factional elements (Karamichas and Botetzagias, 2003: 65-66).

Based off of these examples, the conclusion could be jumped to that the presence of factions equates with disaster for a party. At the same time, there are other examples where factionalized parties have been able to manage their internal conflict and achieve electoral success. The deeply factionalized LDP in Japan has experienced a prolonged period of electoral
fortune and has formed government (Tomita et al., 1981; Kollner, 2004). Success has also found the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) in Germany. Following the unification of Germany its two main political parties in the West, the CDU and the Free Democrats Party (FDP) absorbed the parties from East Germany. These two mergers resulted in the presence of factions in both parties, and the CDU has been able to successfully manage those factions and attain electoral success (Hopper, 2001: 622-23). Similarly, the previously mentioned PRI in Mexico was quite successful while dealing with factions (Persico et al., 2011: 251).

What accounts for why factions in some instances destroy parties and in other cases are successfully managed and allow the party to attain electoral success? This is a question that has not been thoroughly addressed by the existing literature. Several scholars are critical of the existing literature for failing to analyze how a party can successfully manage its factions (Lees et al., 2010: 1300; Boucek, 2012: 35). Boucek explores this subject by looking at four examples of parties that have dealt with factional flare ups to varying results. Boucek argues for the need to incorporate institutional differences into the analysis of how a party manages it factions, noting that a party’s response to factional elements is strongly influenced by its institutional environment (Boucek, 2012: 2). Boucek analyzed how the Liberal party in Canada in addition to parties in Japan, Britain, and Italy have dealt with varying levels of factional conflict. To assess each party, Boucek goes into significant detail on the electoral system each party functions in, and how the differing systems for each country distinctly influence the party’s behaviours. Aside from Boucek however, this is a problem that has been neglected in the existing literature.

An additional concern with much of the existing literature is that it focuses on factions and how they influence or impact the party. There is only a limited discussion of how parties can affect factions, particularly beyond the role a party can play in the emergence of factions.
Factions are a part of the party at large, and this raises the question of how the actions taken by a party and party leadership can influence the behaviour and actions of factions and the significance of factional conflict. This analysis will address these two major gaps in the literature by utilizing the literature on factions to explore how the CPC managed its faction like cleavages? By engaging in a detailed case analysis of the CPC this project will be able to satisfy the ideas raised by Boucek in fully incorporating the specifics of the electoral and party system in Canada and how they shaped the actions of both the party and its cleavages. Furthermore, by shaping the analysis to address the motivations, behaviours, and organization of the two sides in the CPC based on the comparative literature on factions this project avoids potential limitations faced when doing a single case study. The findings will demonstrate how a party was able to shape and influence the behaviour of its internal cleavages to enable it to attain electoral success.

**BROKERAGE POLITICS**

Canadian political parties are frequently referred to in the literature as brokerage or big-tent parties (Sniderman et al., 1974). Historically, the Liberal and PC parties are both classified under such labels (Cross and Young, 2002: 861). Wesley points out that “a general perception persists that all major Canadian parties, at both the federal and provincial level, are essentially brokerage organizations” (Wesley, 2009: 215). The term brokerage party comes from the role that parties play in this system of brokering the interest and demands of civil society with the state while also advancing and advocating the policies of the government to civil society. Katz and Mair point out that brokerage parties see their support come from evolving allegiances of groups and interests and that a brokerage party must act to bring compromise amongst the different interests it represents while ensuring that the party is open to as many interests as possible (Katz and Mair, 1995: 13-14). Carty defines a brokerage party as one that "actively
aims to obscure differences," continuing that "a brokerage party instinctively eschews ideological agendas and programmatic politics in pursuit of large, volatile and heterogeneous support bases" (Carty, 2015: 53). Similarly, Wesley finds that the ability of a brokerage party to build consensus and inspire co-operation amongst the interests and cleavages it represents is the party’s “instrumental function” (Wesley, 2009: 212). The ability of a brokerage party to appeal to and attract supporters across multiple cleavages enables a party to bring “together a diverse coalition of interest under a common partisan umbrella” (Brodie and Jenson, 2007: 42).

Federal Canadian parties have been referred to as big tent or brokerage parties as they have incorporated supporters from differing social and demographic cleavages. By doing so, Canadian federal parties integrate competing political positions within parties as opposed to having parties that specifically represent particular interests. Representatives of the competing cleavages are often given prominent roles within the parties (Carty and Cross, 2006: 101). The Liberal party has demonstrated its brokerage tendencies by rejecting "the notion that is was constrained by genetic obligations to any particular group of supporters. Indeed, it conceived its raison d’être as that of the social and political broker charged with accommodating the competing interest and distinctive elements of the entire electorate (Carty, 2015: 54). A consequence of brokerage parties is that election campaigns are often void of detailed policy debate between the parties (Cross and Young, 2002: 862). In the absence of policy debates, elites in a brokerage system act as representatives of the competing social interests to mitigate potential conflict (Thorburn, 1991: 120). Stevenson attributes “the weakness of class and ideological cleavages in a regionally divided society” to the presence of brokerage parties (Stevenson, 1987: 813).

Contrasting with brokerage parties are modern catch-all parties. Catch all parties seek to win office by expanding their policy stances to appeal to as wide a segment of society as
possible. The policy agenda of catch all parties are toned down with the aim of attracting and expanding their support from the electorate (Carty, 2015: 54-55). While the Liberal party is frequently characterized as a brokerage party, the CPC and the PCs before them have at times been referred to as a catch-all party. Carty argues that the PCs were able to build catch-all coalitions and subsequently win elections before those coalitions would disintegrate (125). Historically, the PC party has contrasted with the Liberal party as the result of the PCs repeatedly confronting several polarizing cleavages. While the Liberal party has been able to act as a brokerage party responding to differing issues, the PC party has faced several enduring cleavages that have outlasted individual issues. The persistence of these cleavages has limited the ability of the PCs to act as a brokerage party, and when the party has formed catch-all coalitions, these cleavages have contributed to the breakdown of the catch-all coalition. This analysis will explore how Harper and the CPC were able to manage these long-standing cleavages.

**CLEAVAGES IN FEDERAL CANADIAN CONSERVATIVE POLITICS**

This analysis will focus on three specific cleavages. These cleavages were selected due to their long history within the PC party, the significance of their impact on the PC party, and their correspondence with three areas of ideological difference between the PC and Reform/Alliance party identified by Cross and Young (Cross and Young, 2002: 869). The first cleavage is populist ideology, and its origins can be traced back to a long history of feelings of alienation in segments of the PC party. An internal divide has long been evident in the PC party between the party establishment and the party's grassroots. Perlin found that a significant and on-going source of intraparty tension was the feeling of alienation by party members he classified as social outsiders (Perlin, 1980: 182, 191). The origins of this divide are tracked back to John Diefenbaker's initial leadership campaign; Diefenbaker's leadership campaign positioned
himself as a representative of the everyday citizen against the interests of party elites (70, 80-82). Significantly, the populist cleavage persisted and continued to play a role several decades later. Carty notes that while seeking the party leadership, Mulroney initially benefited from the perception of being an outsider. While Mulroney certainly did not meet the criteria of social outsider listed by Perlin, his lack of connection with party elites and the party hierarchy meant that many members who saw themselves as being alienated from decision-making and influence within their own party felt an attraction to Mulroney. This support was significant as the number of PC members who saw themselves as outsiders was quite large (Carty, 1988: 68).

The populist cleavage surfaced again with the emergence of the Reform party. The Reform party benefited greatly from the increasing alienation of citizens in Canada. Reform capitalized on the space created for a new political actor as a result of increasing discontent with the representation offered by traditional political parties (Laycock, 2002: 55). Delegates to Reform party conventions reported feeling significantly alienated from Canadian politics and saw themselves as social outsiders and as individuals who had no influence on government policy (Ellis, 2005: 100, 117). Laycock found that the Reform party benefited greatly by engaging citizens who felt that the traditional structures of power and elites in Canadian politics were out of touch with their concerns (Laycock, 1994: 215). Similarly, Nevitte et al. found Reform voters to be at the high end of cynical attitudes (Nevitte et al., 2000: 48-49). Nevitte et al. also observed that one of the two most significant policy positions for individuals who voted Reform was having a high level of cynicism towards parties and government (92).

Continuing on the populist front, a strain referred to in the literature as “negative populism” portrays a battle between regular citizens and a class of elites (either real or imagined) that are claimed to be responsible for the hardships experienced by everyday citizens (Mayer et
Rather than proposing policy measures that enable more say for citizens, negative populism goes after the elites. There were two types of elites that were singled out and attacked by Reform: special interests, and bureaucrats that supported those special interests. While the term special interest is rather vague, one of the ways a group was classified as a special interest by Reform was if that group received any government funding (Laycock, 2002: 56). From Reform party policy statements and documents, Laycock listed the following groups as those seen as a special interest by Reform: “feminist lobby groups, native organizations, organized labour, linguistic and ethnic groups” (Laycock, 1994: 217). Many Canadian conservatives had grown tired of the PCs being, in their opinion, too accommodating to the wishes of special interests (Harrison, 1995: 23).

The second major cleavage has caused significant problems for federal conservative parties in Canada for a prolonged time. One of the most divisive issues in the history of Canadian conservative politics has been Quebec and the role of federalism. The Quebec cleavage has hurt party unity for much of the PC’s history (Perlin, 1980: 191). The pro-Diefenbaker faction had some of its most visible opposition within the party to policy that was supportive of linguistic and cultural accommodation for French Canadians and Quebec (Perlin, 1988: 82). Diefenbaker's "One Nation" campaign appealed widely to voters in English Canada but it harmed the party in Quebec (LeDuc et al., 2010: 190). For both the 1957 and 1958 campaigns, Diefenbaker's approach to Quebec was informed by Gordon Churchill. Churchill advised Diefenbaker to focus the campaign on English Canada and to not waste resources on Quebec in what came to be known as the Churchill Memorandum. Diefenbaker followed this advice, and in addition to only limited campaigning in the province, Diefenbaker appointed very few Quebec MPs to cabinet and only in minor roles. This approach to Quebec would be harmful
to the PCs electoral fortunes in Quebec for many subsequent elections (207). Blake's analysis of party activists found the greatest variance amongst the activists was on the issue of bilingualism and Quebec (Blake, 1988: 40). It is important to note that the PC party itself was divided over the place of Quebec in confederation and what the government’s stance towards Quebec should be. The Reform party entered the Quebec debate by positioning itself against the idea of two nations (Patten, 1999: 31). Harrison found that this benefited the Reform party as many PC supporters were aggravated by their perception of the PCs frequently giving into the demands of Quebec interests (Harrison, 1995: 23). Lusztig and Wilson observed that one of the most significant factors bringing support from voters for the Reform party was its stance on Quebec accommodation (Lusztig and Wilson, 2005: 125). The literature found Reform voters to be on the low end of support for Quebec (Nevitte et al., 2000: 48/49; Lusztig and Wilson, 2005: 121) in addition to Reform delegates being strongly opposed to any Quebec accommodation (Ellis, 2005: 87).

The final cleavage that has caused significant turmoil in federal conservative politics is social tolerance. Under this heading, the literature brings together policies on controversial issues such as abortion and gay marriage. Nevitte et al. argue that penal legislation and moral traditionalism are two of the most distinguishing factors between Reform and other voters (Nevitte et al., 2000: 98). Reform was also seen to be most assertive in opposing rights and accommodating for gays and lesbians (Farney and Rayside, 2013: 12). Media observations from the 2000 campaign point out that particular attention was given to the moral traditionalist beliefs of Alliance leader Stockwell Day (Belanger and Godbout, 2010: 45).

Support for social tolerance policies was an important factor in determining Reform/Alliance supporters from other party supporters. Cross and Young’s analysis of the
policy beliefs of party members found a stark difference between the stances of Alliance members on social tolerance issues compared to the other major parties (Cross and Young, 2002: 869). Cross and Young find that “the factor scores of Alliance members differ dramatically from those of the other parties. The Alliance is the only party that falls on the less tolerant side of the overall mean” (Cross and Young, 2002: 872). Similar findings come from Nevitte et al. who found that the Reform party was a particularly attractive option for individuals who held moral traditional beliefs (Nevitte et al., 2000: 92). Issues such as reduced gun control, tougher criminal penalties, and the return of capital punishment all found high levels of support amongst Reform voters (99). In both 1993 and 1997, voters for the Reform party had significantly stronger views on moral traditionalism and crime, and these views served to distinguish between Reform and PC voters (Lusztig and Wilson, 2005: 121).

What happened to these long-standing disputes in Canadian conservative politics when the PC and Alliance parties merged to create the CPC? How was the new party able to attract support from both of its predecessor parties and successfully integrate their contrasting views in the new party? To answer these questions, it necessary to explore the central question of this project: how was the CPC able to successfully manage long-standing conflicts in Canadian conservative politics? In shedding light on how the new party dealt with the long-standing conflicts in the old parties, the findings will also help to situate the new party relative to its predecessor parties. One of the more intuitive questions about the new CPC is whether it is closer to its PC lineage or its Reform/Alliance lineage, and while this issue has been explored by looking at specific components of the new party (see Farney and Malloy, 2011; Farney, 2013; Marwah et al., 2013) it has not been addressed on a party-wide level.
METHODOLOGY

The starting point for this analysis was to conduct a series of interviews with former party elites. Elites were sought out that were involved with either of the predecessor parties, the new party during the merger process, with the new party following the merger, or who had extensive involvement in federal conservative politics in Canada. Respondents included individuals that were directors in the CPC in its first years of existence. This ensured that individuals who were interviewed were well versed on the merger itself as well as the long-standing cleavages in Canadian conservative politics. Semi structured interviews were conducted with five party elites. Questions focused on the specifics of party processes such as candidate nomination and policy conventions in combination with perspectives on the merger and the management of tensions by the new party. These interviews are utilized in two ways. First, they provided insight and details on the actions, decisions and the decision making process of the new party and on prominent individuals in the new party. Secondly, the interviews illuminate areas of concern for conflict in the new party and help to guide where the analysis should focus. This invaluable resource helped to indicate areas of inquiry that were not alluded to by the existing literature.

Recall from the earlier discussion on how to classify factions that much of the literature focuses on the functions performed by factions. In many instances, the literature stresses two key roles performed by factions: policy advocating and the distribution of party positions (Cox et al., 1999; Leigh, 2000; Tomita et al., 1981; Woodall, 1996). It is particularly significant that ideological positioning and patronage appointments both play important roles in factions in a variety of countries with differing electoral and party systems. This does not mean that in each instance the influence and treatment of these two roles were dealt with the same. For example,
there are important differences of the impact of candidate nomination between countries with different electoral systems. The presence of ideology and patronage in so many analyses of factionalized parties does, however, narrow the focus for subsequent analysis on these two areas.

Intriguingly, turning to the seminal work on the early presence of factionalism in the PC party in Canada also produces similar results. Perlin lists three types of motivations that can fuel factional conflict. The first, and most significant for Perlin is affective motives. These motives are based on feelings of like or dislike towards individuals such as the party leader. Perlin finds that negative affective feelings are the most powerful explanatory tool for the factional divide in the 1960s and 1970s. The second form of motivation is the evaluation of policy, which Perlin found to not be a significant source of tension during his period of inquiry. Finally, Perlin discusses patronage motives, which are when individuals are supportive of a person with the intention of gaining financial reward, employment, power or other individual benefits in return. Perlin feels these motives are the easiest to resolve but require the party to be in power to do so (Perlin, 1980: 2-5).

While Perlin found affective motives to explain the factional conflict during the timeframe he studied, the primacy of affective motives would diminish during the second period of internal conflict. With the emergence of the Reform party, policy differences would come to play a significant role. As previously mentioned, there were three distinct areas of ideological difference (social tolerance, federalism and provincial powers, and populism) and one area of ideological agreement (government intervention in the economy) between the PC and Reform/Alliance parties (Cross and Young, 2002: 869; Nevitte et al., 2000: 98; Laycock, 2002: 55; Ellis, 2005: 132). The earlier discussion on the cleavages dividing conservative politics in
Canada demonstrated the depth of these divides and raised the question of how the CPC dealt with these differences.

**Table 1.1 Chapter Outline**

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<th>Chapter</th>
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<td>Chapter Three</td>
<td>How did the CPC construct its policy agenda to maintain party unity?</td>
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<td>Chapter Four</td>
<td>How were policy conventions managed to prevent conflict between the predecessor parties?</td>
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<td>Chapter Five</td>
<td>How were patronage appointments distributed to members of the predecessor parties?</td>
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<td>Chapter Six</td>
<td>How was the candidate nomination process handled by the CPC? What was the predecessor party background of CPC candidates?</td>
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<td>Chapter Seven</td>
<td>How were cabinet appointments utilized to promote party unity?</td>
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Based on the significance attached to policy by both the comparative literature and the literature on Canadian conservative politics, the analysis begins by exploring how the new party dealt with policy. There are two policy chapters, which will focus on three areas of ideological disagreement and one area of agreement between the predecessor parties. This first section of the analysis specifically asks how the new party used policy to manage tensions. How did the new party formulate policy to attract support from both predecessor parties? Further, accounting for the long-standing ideological differences in Canadian conservative politics and the propensity of policy to cause conflict in factionalized parties, how did the CPC develop policy in a way that integrated both predecessor parties and mitigated conflict? Finally, how were conflicts over
policy dealt with by the party? Answering these questions will require looking at both policy positions advocated by the CPC and the policy implemented by the party while in government.

Table 1.1 provides a chapter outline, indicating the primary question of each chapter along with the data source analyzed. Chapter three will begin the policy section of the analysis. Campaign platforms offer a valuable public statement of the ideological positioning of a party and have been a widely utilized resource by the existing literature (see Clare, 2010; Abney et al., 2007; Marion and Oliver, 2010). The data source for this analysis will be the CMP data set on the PC and Reform/Alliance platforms for the 1993, 1997 and 2000 Canadian federal elections, and on the CPC platforms for the 2004, 2006, 2008 and 2011 federal elections (Volkens et al., 2014). Numerous works on platform analysis utilize the CMP (Quinn, 2008; Camia and Caramani, 2012; Adams and Somer-Topcu, 2009). Gemenis emphasizes the significant usage of the CMP in research on political parties (Gemenis, 2013: 24). The CMP provides researchers with coding on party platforms for over fifty nations, dating back to 1945 (Adams and Somer-Topcu, 2009: 829). The CMP scores platforms on a left-right index with +100 representing a fully right-wing platform and -100 indicating a fully left-wing platform (Quinn, 2008: 183). Camia and Caramani utilize the left-right index to analyze policy convergence (Camia and Caramani, 2012: 52-54). Utilizing a left-right measurement to analyze party platform convergence is also performed by Debus albeit using an alternative coding system, Wordscore (Debus, 2011: 298). This analysis will use the CMP’s left-right index value to compare the platforms of the PC, Reform/Alliance and CPC.

The second value offered by the CMP are the 56 policy categories that are used to classify sentences. Sentences are counted to determine how much importance is attached to each policy area in the platform based on the percentage of sentences dedicated to it. Pogorelis et al.
use this to compare how much importance is attached to a policy issue by different parties. They add up the differences between the values for each policy area, and the total difference is divided by the number of policy issues. A higher value indicates a greater difference between the two party’s policy positions (Pogorelis et al., 2005: 1003). This analysis will calculate the aggregate difference in the same manner as Pogorelis et al. to determine which of the predecessor party platforms has a closer resemblance to the CPC platforms.

While widely used, there are critiques of the CMP. One of the more specific concerns addresses the weight attached to the values given for a party’s attention to a specific policy area. Budge notes that this measure has been critiqued due to it being a rough measure of general attention paid to an issue (Budge, 2001: 212). This project will follow the solution offered by Gemenis, which is to not refer to the values as an indication of policy salience, but rather as policy “emphasis” (Gemenis, 2013: 38). A final consideration is why use the CMP data set when there are alternatives for platform analysis, such as a Wordscore approach? Klemmensen et al., compared the CMP and Wordscore approach analyzing Danish campaign platforms and found that both measures performed comparatively well, with the CMP performing marginally better than the Wordscore’s approach (Klemmensen, 2007: 754). The CMP also has the benefit of being the largest available longitudinal and cross-national source of such data (Adams and Somer-Topcu, 2009: 829). Budge cites the comprehensiveness of the CMP project as one of its strengths in comparison to other sources (Budge, 2001: 222). Gemenis notes that despite the variety of platform content analysis options available, the CMP continues to be the most utilized (Gemenis, 2013: 23). The findings of the CMP will be supplemented by exploring each platform individually. The small number of platforms under study allows for the reading of each one
individually. This analysis will look at which issues are given prominence in their placement in the platform, and the proportion of the platform the issues are given.

For the second and third policy indicators, this analysis will utilize the coding framework developed by Soroka (Soroka, 2005). Beginning with Question Period, the analysis will start with the 38th Parliament. This session of Parliament is of particular importance as it follows the first election contested by the CPC and as a result is the first full Parliamentary session for the party. Intuitively, it is during this time when the bonds between members from the predecessor parties are most raw and vulnerable. As the CPC was in opposition during this session, there is not an opportunity to look at policy enacted by the party. Instead Question Period provides a valuable resource to explore the policy issues emphasized by the CPC.

Following Soroka’s lead, a database is constructed containing all the questions asked by members of the CPC and the policy topic they represent. Transcripts for each session of Question Period are available on the Hansard website (Hansard, 2016). Soroka cautions that it can occasionally be a challenge to distinguish between an MP asking a follow-up question versus the end of questions on a particular topic; following his lead a question is recorded as a new question when: the question had a new heading in bold, or when the topic of the questions was noticeably different (Soroka, 2005: 33-34). This resulted in a total of 1555 questions asked by the CPC during this sitting of Parliament. A Major Topic code and a Subtopic codes were assigned to each question asked.iii Soroka revised the coding schemes developed for the Policy Agendas Project by Frank Baumgartner and Bryan Jones for the Canadian context. The result is 27 Major topic codes with corresponding subtopic codes to classify the policy content of each question asked in Question Period. Each question asked by a CPC MP was scrutinized and assigned the most appropriate Major Topic and Subtopic codes. To illuminate how the CPC
addressed the issues of ideological difference and agreement between the predecessor parties, it was necessary to sort the Subtopic codes to determine if they aligned with the areas of ideological interest. Accordingly, it is recorded if the question addressed the area of ideological agreement or any of the three areas of ideological disagreement.

A similar process was involved in building the dataset of the policy put forward by the CPC while they formed government for the 39th, 40th and 41st sessions of Parliament. The Hansard website was utilized to obtain information about each bill put to the House of Commons by the CPC (Hansard, 2016). This project focused specifically on government-sponsored bills as the principal concern was how policy was utilized by the party leadership to manage conflict along the ideological cleavages. In total, there were 394 government-sponsored bills put to the House by the CPC government. Government bills are more complex than questions asked during Question Period and can cover multiple policy issues thus requiring the recording of up to four Subtopic codes. The additional subtopics makes the sorting of bills into categories representing the three areas of ideological difference and one area of ideological agreement slightly more complicated. This step in the database construction must now include coding for when a bill represents two separate areas (for example social tolerance and populism).

The next chapter focuses on party policy conventions. Conventions and the debates between delegates at conventions have been utilized as an important source to establish party ideology in the literature. Herrera makes use of the debates and speeches at conventions to identify ideological positions within parties (Herrera, 1993: 76). Media reports on conventions are an emerging source being utilized by the literature. Analyzing media reports on party conventions enables the researcher to explore and compare multiple conventions across time. Media reports also point to the issues and debates that were regarded as being prominent at the
time of the convention. Farnsworth et al. look at the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation’s newscast, The National, to analyze its coverage of the Liberal party's 2006 leadership convention in the month leading up to the convention. Farnsworth et al. aim to “fill an important gap in the literature: the study of nomination news coverage in Canada” (Farnsworth et al., 2009: 290, 292). Mershon meanwhile utilizes newspaper coverage of party conventions to help uncover the factional allegiances of ministers in the Italian CD Party (Mershon, 2001: 559-60).

This project will follow the existing literature's lead by conducting a media database search for each of the four CPC policy conventions. For each convention, a LexisNexis database search on party conventions is performed for newspaper articles from ten days prior to the first day of the convention through to ten days after the last day of the convention. The articles are analyzed to uncover the major issues and topics being addressed at the convention, any discussion of party organizational matters, any policy discussion related to the areas of ideological interest and any mention of conflict between members from the predecessor parties. These findings are then combined with the brief mentions these conventions have received in existing literature to explore how the CPC managed conflict at the party conventions.

The second section of the analysis will explore personnel decisions and patronage distribution in the CPC. This section will be guided by the question of how did the CPC utilize personnel and patronage posts to maintain unity in the new party? The analysis will determine whether one of the predecessor parties benefited itself with undue appointments, if personnel positions were used as a tool for integrating the weaker predecessor party, or if posts were equally distributed amongst the two sides according to their strength in the new party? The findings from this analysis will provide key insight into how the new party attempted to maintain
party unity through personnel appointments and will further provide insight into the distribution of power in the new party between the two predecessor parties.

The first type of patronage appointments explored in chapter five are Governor in Council (GIC) appointments. A database is constructed of all GIC appointments made by Harper from 2006 through 2008. The database is limited to the first three years as the expectation is that as time progresses there is likely to be fewer appointees coming from either of the predecessor parties. Indeed, if the CPC did engage in patronage based GIC appointments in the latter years of their government, it is much more plausible that they were rewarding individuals who were supporters of the new party. Whether the CPC engaged in such patronage is an engaging question, yet it is beyond the scope of this analysis. This timeframe was the first opportunity for the CPC to distribute patronage rewards and the timeframe with the most available members from either predecessor party to receive appointments. This timeframe also covers the party when it was still in its infancy and in the greatest need of mitigating potential conflict between the predecessor parties.

To attain all of the appointments made required exploring the online archive of the Canada Gazette. This resulted in a database containing 2,092 appointments. The background and any possible connection to a predecessor party of each appointee was researched following the lead of Koop and Bittner. Koop and Bittner used media database searches to establish the past political history of election candidates (Koop and Bittner, 2011). Each appointee was searched in the Canadian Newsstream database to see if any trace of past association with either predecessor party exists, this includes running as a candidate for the predecessor party, working in the local riding association for a predecessor party or working for the national party office of one of the predecessor parties.
A similar database was built with all Senate appointments made by Harper during the CPC’s time in government. A longer timeframe is utilized here as the number of appointees is significantly smaller than for GIC appointments. Senators who stepped down from the Senate to be reappointed later by Harper are counted as a single observation. This dataset contains a total of 57 observations. As with GIC appointments, a Canadian Newsstream database search is performed on each Senate appointee to determine if they have any past linkage to either predecessor party. Additionally, any previous federal electoral experience for an appointee is determined through the Library of Parliament website. Finally, the small number of Senate appointments allows for the searching of financial contributions to political parties and candidates. Elections Canada’s lists of contributions to candidates and political parties from 1993 to 2004 were searched for each Senate appointee to determine if the appointee had made a financial donation to either the PC or Reform/Alliance party (Elections Canada, 2017).

The next area of inquiry is candidate nomination, which is explored in chapter six. A database of all candidates for the CPC in the party's first two general federal elections is constructed for this section. The 2004 election, being the first after the merger (which occurred only a short time before the election) offers a vital window into how the candidate nomination process took place in the new party. Similarly, the 2006 election occurs when the new party is still relatively young and at risk for conflict between the PC and Reform/Alliance sides. Elections beyond 2006 are not included as the returns from inquiry can be expected to drop off significantly. With the passage of time, more new candidates come to the party, many of who were not involved with either of the predecessor parties. Furthermore, most of the candidates who had an involvement with one of the predecessor parties are likely to be already accounted for in the 2004 and 2006 campaign. The database of CPC candidates is complied by using a list
of all CPC candidates obtained from Elections Canada.\textsuperscript{vi} To determine whether the candidate has a history with either the PC or Reform/Alliance party, each candidate’s name was searched on the Library of Parliament website.

After every candidate who had run previously is accounted for, tracing connections to predecessor parties for the remaining candidates is a more challenging endeavour. Beyond running as a candidate, there are numerous other roles that individuals could fill in a party, such as being on the riding association executive, being an advisor to the party, or working for an MP. Furthermore, a candidate could also have previously identified with or been a member of one of the predecessor parties. The most reliable way to extract any of these or other potential linkages is through an analysis of media coverage of the candidates. Wuhs as well as Koop and Bittner make use of media sources in their work on candidate nomination in parties (Wuhs, 2006; Koop and Bittner, 2011). Koop and Bittner seek to uncover whether there are different legislative roles for candidates who are parachuted in compared to regular candidates. Koop and Bittner undertake a LexisNexis database search of 22 major Canadian newspapers for the six months up to a general election. Candidates are coded as being “star” candidates if any of the coverage surrounding them refers to them as so (Koop and Bittner, 2011: 484).

Following this lead, each candidate's name was searched in the Canadian Newsstream database for the 12 months leading up to the election date.\textsuperscript{vii} If there is any mention of a candidate having an affiliation with either of the predecessor parties this was recorded, in addition to any role with any other federal party. Furthermore, if the candidate had any role with a provincial PC party, this was also recorded (with the exception of Quebec, Saskatchewan and British Columbia due to the lack of a provincial PC party). Finally, for the 2004 nominations, it
is recorded whether the nomination was contested or if the candidate was acclaimed if that information is available.

The analysis will also focus on the type of ridings that CPC candidates are being nominated in. Classifying desirable versus undesirable ridings poses a challenge. The literature on candidate gender is full of debates over the appropriate measure for electoral competitiveness (see Blais and Lago 2009; Thomas and Bodet, 2013; Bodet, 2013). Unfortunately, all the proposed measurements by these authors require including the party’s performance in each riding from the previous election, and in most instances, two previous elections into the equation. As such, this requires elections where redistribution does not occur. Bodet specifically cautions against including elections where redistribution has occurred (Bodet, 2013: 585). Thomas and Bodet analyze the 2008 and 2011 Canadian federal elections by using the 2004 and 2006 elections to classify ridings as being desirable or undesirable. The authors stress that an important component of this time frame was the lack of redistribution (Thomas and Bodet, 2013: 158). This presents a problem for this analysis as a redistribution occurred before the 2004 election. As a result, these measures of electoral riding competitiveness cannot be applied for this analysis.

Therefore, it was necessary to consult Elections Canada Transposition of Votes. The aim is to explore nominations in ridings where the combined vote of the PC and Alliance candidate in the 2000 election was greater than the winning candidate. The Transposition of Votes "determines the number of votes that each registered political party at the last general election would have obtained according to the electoral districts proclaimed in the" redistribution (Elections Canada, 2016). This allowed for each riding to be categorized by whether the
combined vote of the two predecessor parties was higher than the candidate that won, and which of the predecessor parties was stronger in the riding.

Finally, for chapter seven on cabinet appointments, the dataset from the previous section is utilized. This set is expanded to include all elected CPC candidates in the next three elections, revealing the number of MPs with association to either predecessor party in the CPC caucus from 2004 to 2015. To determine the strength of each of the predecessor parties in the CPC caucus, it is necessary to determine the past affiliation of all CPC MPs. There is a clear consensus in the existing literature that the most appropriate measure of factional strength is the number of sitting government members belonging to that faction (Back et al., 2011: 441; Ennser-Jedenastik, 2013: 316). The strength of each side in the CPC caucus in each parliamentary session is then compared with the number of shadow cabinet/cabinet ministers in each of those sessions. Recording CPC cabinet appointments is informed by the literature on cabinet appointment in factionalized parties and the gender inclusiveness of cabinet appointments, the latter providing more nuanced approaches for examining Canadian governments. There is considerable variance in how the literature records cabinet ministers. In some instances Prime Ministers/Premiers are included while not in others, some of the literature documents each ministry held by an individual and in some cases a minister who leaves and returns to cabinet is treated as one observation and in other instance as two observations (Kerby, 2011: 600; Studlar and Moncrief, 1999: 372). For this analysis, the Prime Minister is excluded from the count. Prime Ministers have the sole authority to appoint and dismiss ministers, and the intent of this analysis is to see how Harper used this power to manage tensions in the new party. Individuals who are appointed to cabinet are counted as one observation for each session of parliament under observation. If the individual leaves and returns to cabinet at a later point or holds several
ministries, this is still treated as a single observation. The rationale is that recording the cabinet positions in this manner provides the most direct overview of the number individuals appointed to cabinet and the past associations of those individuals. In this section, all cabinet ministers are treated equally, including junior ministers or ministers of state. For the 2004 session, the shadow cabinet of the CPC is recorded. This project follows the lead of Studlar and Moncrief by analyzing the percentages of cabinet ministers as our measurement, focusing on the percentage belonging with an association to one of the predecessor parties (Studlar and Moncrief, 1999: 385). This is done as it provides both the most direct level of comparison between the strength in caucus and cabinet seats and the most direct insight into how power was distributed amongst members associated with one of the predecessor parties in the CPC.

Following the lead of Kam, the recording of the ministerial positions attained by MPs also tracked any other parliamentary portfolios assigned to an MP. In addition to documenting whether an MP was appointed to the cabinet, this coding process also records if the MP was made a Parliamentary Secretary or a Chair/Vice Chair of a House of Commons Committee. The latter options are clearly noted as less powerful positions than a cabinet seat (Kam, 2006: 568). Koop and Bittner utilize a similar coding scheme differentiating between “high-profile legislative roles” such as cabinet ministers and “low-profile legislative activities” which include committee chairs (Koop and Bittner, 2011: 438). It is significant that in both instances there is a clear distinction made between the importance of the parliamentary positions. Including this information in the analysis will thus provide greater insight into how the party leadership allocated power via parliamentary roles to MPs from both predecessor parties.

The measurement of portfolio prestige is a more challenging task. A major challenge is to accurately classify portfolios according to their level of significance. Variations in the
importance of particularly ministries across time and between countries have created substantial
difficulty for scholars attempting to rank portfolios by importance (Warwick and Druckman,
2006: 636; Krook and O’Brien, 2012: 845; Studlar and Moncrief, 1999: 385). Therefore, there is
no clearly defined list of ministries by importance, nor is there a set formula to determine what
constitutes the most important portfolios. Krook and O’Brien working on a cross-national study
argue that the most important cabinet posts are signified by their “visibility and significant
control over policy,” while lesser portfolios had substantial financial resources at their disposal
but with less presence (Krook and O’Brien, 2012: 845). White takes a similar approach noting
that “high spending or strategically important portfolios” tend to be the most significant posts
(White, 2005: 44). In the Canadian context, White developed a detailed list of “important”
“middle range” and “junior” provincial portfolios that is subsequently used by Studlar and
Moncrief in their analysis of women in Canadian cabinets (White, 1998: 394; Studlar and
Moncrief, 1999: 385). Obviously, a list of provincial portfolios cannot simply be transferred to
the federal government. Different areas of jurisdiction and different types of ministries require
the rankings be modified to be applied to the federal government. However, White’s list in
addition to the criteria put forward by Krook and O’Brien provide essential guidance to the
classification of federal cabinet portfolios in Canada. For each session of Parliament when the
CPC was in power the highest-ranking cabinet portfolio attained by each minister is recorded.

This analysis will focus on how party leadership, particularly Harper, managed conflict in
the new party. It is necessary to focus on party leadership as the literature on Canadian politics
points to the growing power of party leaders, and the Prime Minister in particular. Savoie tells
us that power has become increasingly located within the hands of a select few individuals; party
leaders and their selected advisors (Savoie, 1999: 230-31). Key decisions regarding policy and
the functioning of government are no long made by cabinet or Parliament as a whole. Instead, decision making is controlled by the Prime Minister and a selected few cabinet ministers and senior advisors in the PMO (291). Savoie goes on to say, "anyone seeking to locate political power should start by looking at the Prime Minister... within the federal government, the Prime Minister is king" (Savoie, 2010: 133). The concentration of power in party leadership was further entrenched by Harper. Carty argues "Harper's leadership style is to be dominant and controlling in all matters in which he is personally involved and his instinct is to be involved in all aspects of party activity" (Carty, 2015: 128). Accordingly, it would be Harper that would have the greatest ability to act and manage the party in attempts to mitigate conflict and maintain unity.

Together, the analysis of the CPC’s approach to policy, personnel and patronage, will show how the party approached managing conflict and the long-standing cleavages in Canadian conservative politics. By looking at each section through multiple lenses, the findings will both comprehensively cover the party’s strategy and provide an in-depth look at the new party. The latter will contribute to the existing literature on Canadian parties by analyzing the CPC to a greater extent than has currently been done and the findings will situate the new party to determine if it does bear a closer resemblance to one of its predecessor parties. The analysis of the CPC’s management of tensions will contribute to both the literature on factionalized parties by providing an exhaustive case study of how a party was successfully able to manage conflict and to the literature on Canadian parties by demonstrating how the CPC was able to overcome the long-standing cleavages in Canadian conservative politics.
CHAPTER TWO – THE CANADIAN CASE

Before the analysis can begin, it is necessary to explore the long-standing history of conflict in Canadian conservative politics, particularly within the PC party. While the previous chapter referenced the long-standing cleavages in Canadian conservative politics, it is necessary to explore the party’s history of internal conflict to understand the origins of the conflict and to appreciate its depth and persistence. This is essential to be cognizant of how much a challenge it was for the CPC to maintain harmony.

THE FIRST PHASE OF PC FACTIONAL CONFLICT

The PC party is infamous according to numerous scholars for being plagued and consistently distracted by internal fighting (Courtney, 1981: 121; Perlin, 1980: 1; Harrison, 1995: 90). Two time frames are regularly referred to in the literature as periods of significant internal conflict in the party. The first period of conflict was most intense from the 1960s through the 1970s and had its origins several decades prior with the arrival of John Diefenbaker in the party’s leadership contest. In 1948, during his first attempt at the party leadership, Diefenbaker took on a populist role and Perlin found Diefenbaker to have strong appeal to party members and voters who were not part of the economic centres of the country (Perlin, 1980: 81). Diefenbaker was seen as the only serious challenger to George Drew, a candidate who had the strong support of party elites and the commercial sectors of Toronto and Montreal. Running a populist campaign and backed by the rank and file members of the party, Diefenbaker’s campaign touched upon a divide in the party. Diefenbaker lost the leadership race, and Perlin attributes the beginning of the factional tensions to this failed party leadership campaign. Following his loss, Diefenbaker developed a severely strained relationship with the party elites that supported Drew (52-53).
Eventually, Diefenbaker would win the party leadership and the PCs under his leadership would form government. The attainment of power would not minimize dissent in the party. Within caucus, Perlin found evidence of a clear division along the lines of MP's association with the economic centre of the country. For both MPs and subsequently cabinet ministers, those who had less characteristics associated with the establishment (such as representing a rural riding, not hailing from Ontario or Quebec, not holding a University education or high-level professional job) were more likely to be supportive of Diefenbaker while MPs holding those characteristics were more likely to oppose Diefenbaker (Perlin, 1980: 70, 80-82). The depths of the conflict are illustrated by Robert Coates, an MP during this era who considered himself as a Diefenbaker loyalist. Coates referred to the faction within the party opposed to Diefenbaker as the “power brokers” (Coates, 1969: 14). This group of “power brokers” according to Coates was comprised of party members from every major city in the country and was united in the cause of removing Diefenbaker from the party leadership. Coates felt that the party was nearly destroyed because of this faction and its unrelenting push to replace Diefenbaker (14-16).

Internal conflict in the party intensified following a general election loss and a subsequent challenge to Diefenbaker’s leadership. According to Coates’ account of the leadership challenge, the faction opposed to Diefenbaker actively engaged in a search for a challenger and settled on Dalton Camp. Camp played a crucial role in the internal campaign against Diefenbaker and was described by Coates as an “assassin” (Coates, 1969: 20). According to Perlin the refusal of Diefenbaker to vacate the party leadership in the face of mounting pressure from party elites helped to solidify two competing factions within the party (Perlin, 1980: 89). The divisions between the two factions were based on affective feelings towards Diefenbaker and the party elite (83). One of the most intriguing findings from Perlin’s
analysis is that the pro-Diefenbaker faction was motivated primarily by their negative affective feelings towards the party establishment. Thus, even after Diefenbaker had lost the leadership, and his primary opponent in the party executive, Dalton Camp was gone, Camp’s name would still be invoked by members of the Diefenbaker faction to signal opposition towards the party elites (89, 106).

The factional tensions in the PC party created during the Diefenbaker leadership continued to persist under the next party leader, Robert Stanfield. Upon taking over the leadership of the party, Stanfield’s biggest challenge was to try and manage the ongoing tensions in the party that had originated from the Diefenbaker leadership battles (Perlin, 1980: 108). Stanfield was viewed with apprehension by many caucus members as a result of him being a member of the party’s elite and because he replaced their preferred leader, Diefenbaker (Carty, 1988: 61). In an attempt to manage these tensions, Stanfield brought Diefenbaker loyalists into his leadership campaign committee and ensured that appointments from caucus comprised a substantial number of Diefenbaker supporters. Perlin found that this use of patronage was unsuccessful at managing the factional conflict due to the powerful affective attachment felt by Diefenbaker loyalists to Diefenbaker (Perlin, 1980: 92, 111-112, 125).

One example of the challenges faced by the party owing to the factional conflict came in the form of a lack of unity in parliament. Stanfield wanted his party to vote in favour of the Official Languages Act. Despite the wishes of the party leader, 17 out of 65 MPs, mostly from Western Canada, voted against the act (Perlin, 1980: 114). Following a general election loss in 1968, a battle erupted over the election of a new party president at the national party convention (113). This conflict over the party presidency along with other dissent directed towards Stanfield was largely conducted by “social outsiders.” Social outsiders were members of the party who
lacked characteristics associated with the party establishment, who opposed any individual or policy that appeared to have a connection with the party’s establishment and who had traditionally been supportive of Diefenbaker (184).

Stanfield was replaced by Joe Clark in 1976. This leadership contest also demonstrated instances of faction like conflict. Clark was identified as being associated with the party's left wing, known as "red Tories" while Claude Wagner who Clark defeated on the final ballot of the leadership contest was a representative of the party's right wing. Perlin noted media reports on the convention described it as being fought between the party's right wing and the red Tories. Seven of the eleven leadership candidates are identified as representing the red Tory side of the party, while the other four were from the party's right wing (Perlin, 1980: 173-74). Clark also faced opposition from Diefenbaker loyalists. The pro-Diefenbaker element of the party remained quite vocal during the 1976 convention. This was problematic for Clark as he was clearly linked to the anti-Diefenbaker side of the party (Martin et al., 1983: xiv). Diefenbaker loyalists would cause problems for Clark following his selection as party leader. An electoral boundary redistribution resulted in Clark and MP Stan Schumacher, a Diefenbaker loyalist, both potentially vying for the same seat. Schumacher refused to step aside for the party leader, and Clark eventually relented, and contested a different riding (xv).

One of the key findings from the analysis of the PC party during this timeframe is the persistence of factional conflict even after the primary sources of the conflict had been resolved. Perlin found that conflict between the pro-Diefenbaker and pro-Camp groups persisted long after the initial incidents had passed (Perlin, 1980: 89, 106). This is indicative of the strength of the factional divide in the PC party and the potentially harmful implications for the party’s electoral fortunes. The threat posed by the factional fighting in the PC party was stressed by Perlin
concluding with doubt about the future success of the party and cautioning that any future PC government can be expected to experience substantial internal turmoil and internal attacks (201). Similarly, Carty’s analysis of the PC party found that the internal conflict experienced during this era was the most severe the party had ever experienced (Carty, 1988: 61). In their analysis of the PC party in comparison to the Liberal party, Goldfarb and Axworthy stress the significance of the ongoing presence of factional conflict through multiple party leaders and party executives within the PC party and characterize the conflict in the PC party as a “civil war” (Goldfarb and Axworthy, 1988: 22-25, 27). Despite the severity of the divide during this period, the PC party did endure and on occasion formed government. It would be during a majority PC government that the second period of conflict would engulf the party.

**THE SECOND PHASE OF PC FACTIONAL CONFLICT**

Up until this point, the conflict in the PC party had been largely fought over affective lines, between those loyal to Diefenbaker and those not. Elements of that divide would persist into the next era of conflict. However, the cleavages plaguing the party would transform the conflict into a policy based one. In 1984 and 1988 the PCs won strong majority governments under the leadership of Brian Mulroney. Similar to the challenges faced by Stanfield in dealing with the Official Languages Act, Mulroney faced internal discord when the Liberal government introduced a motion to support the Manitoba government’s move to recognize French as an official language in the province. Many Western MPs were not in favour of this bill. Mulroney however, unlike Stanfield was able to bring these MPs in line to vote with the party and support this motion (Perl in, 1988: 83). While Mulroney was successfully able to manage the potential for conflict in this instance, the challenges faced when the PC’s formed government would be much more significant.
In the 1984 campaign, an alliance between Quebec nationalist, central Canadian business interests, and Western conservatives brought the PCs into power. A similar alliance brought back together in support of the Free Trade Agreement in the 1988 election also led to a PC victory (Harrison, 1995: 83, 129). Under Mulroney, PC members, particularly from Western Canada felt that the party was primarily concerned with the interests of Quebec, and secondly with Ontario (27, 99). Key decisions that fueled this discontent were the awarding of a military jet contract to a Montreal company despite a superior bid from a Manitoba company, as well as the later awarding of a contract for building icebreakers to a Montreal company once again despite a superior Western bid (103). With roots in Western Canada, where a strong feeling of alienation from influence, decision making, and power was felt, the Reform party built itself as a party that would stand up for the interests of everyday citizens. The Reform party formed in 1987 under the leadership of Preston Manning, who remained as party leader until 2000, when the party was replaced by the Alliance. The literature contains extensive discussions on how the party acted upon the disenfranchisement particularly of Western Canadians, attracting individuals who would be classified as outsiders to become party supporters (Laycock, 1994; Laycock, 2002; Ellis 2005).

As a result, these individuals began to search for a different form of political representation, which would bring an end to the alliance that had brought the PCs to power. The Reform party emerged as a federal party in Canada during the 1980s and the Bloc Quebec emerged in the early 1990s. It is important to note that the Reform party did not only attract supporters and voters from the PC party. Indeed people came to the Reform from all sides. However, there were many PC supporters, once again especially those in Western Canada, who left the party and went to the Reform party. After two consecutive majority governments, the
PC party was decimated and reduced to only two seats in the 1993 election. Meanwhile, the Reform party made a significant electoral breakthrough receiving 52 seats and over 18 percent of the popular vote, compared to 16 percent for the PC party. In the 1993 election, half of the voters for the Reform party were previously PC voters (Nevitte et al., 2000: 80). Along a similar line, Harrison finds that the early years of the Reform party saw it attracting many members who had become alienated from the central establishment in government and their own previous party (Harrison, 1995: 27). Many supporters of the Reform party were Western Canadians who felt their own MP would not stand up for their interest, and thus a different means of representation was required (99). Meanwhile the Bloc Quebecois was a regionally based protest party that emerged following the failure of the Meech Lake Accord. Mulroney had promised to attain Quebec support for the constitution. The Meech Lake Accord aimed to do so, however it contained a clause recognizing Quebec as a distinct society that was controversial for much of English Canada. As the deadline for approving the accord approached and its demise seemed imminent, a Parliamentary committee was established to determine if modifications could be made to save the accord. Changing the accord was received negatively in Quebec and PC cabinet minister Lucien Bouchard along with several other MPs resigned from caucus in protest. By June 1990, six PC MPs had left the PC caucus and would go on with two former Liberal MPs to form the Bloc Quebecois with Bouchard as their leader. The party only nominated candidates in Quebec and advocated strongly for Quebec interests, for special status and for Quebec separatism. Mulroney's second attempt at securing Quebec support for the constitution also benefited the Bloc Quebecois. The referendum on the Charlottetown Accord gave the party a purpose and energized the party heading in the 1993 election where the Bloc would win two
more seats than Reform, and form the Official Opposition. A substantial segment of Bloc voters were formerly PC voters (Carty et al., 2000: 37, 41-44, 46).

**THE DIVIDED RIGHT**

The splitting of the vote between the PC and Reform parties was a concern for many Canadian conservatives. The inability to unite the two parties led to additional vote splitting in the next two elections with the PCs receiving just under 19 percent of the popular vote in 1997 and slightly over 12 percent in 2000. This compared to marginally over 19 percent of the vote in 1997 for the Reform party and 25 percent for the Alliance in 2000. The distribution of seats was much more favourable for the Reform/Alliance side which formed the official opposition after both elections, while the PCs had the fewest seats of any of the major parties on both occasions. The Liberal party won three consecutive majority governments with 41, 38 and 40 percent of the votes while the Reform/Alliance and PC combined for 34, 38 and 37 percent of the vote in. Additionally, in over 30 ridings the combined vote of the PC and Reform/Alliance candidates would have won the riding. It could not be assumed that a merger of the two parties would result in the new party receiving all the votes of the two predecessor parties, yet the prospect of a united conservative party certainly posed a more challenging threat for the Liberal party.

Multiple attempts were undertaken to bring the two parties together and present a united right-wing party to take on the Liberals. One of the first attempts was the 1996 “Winds of Change” conference in Calgary. This conference would see an eloquent speech from Harper that advocated bringing the two sides together. The conference, however, would not be successful in bringing about reconciliation amongst conservatives. One of the main obstacles to the success of this conference was that members of the federal PCs refused to attend, resulting in attendees that
were either members of the Reform party or provincial PC parties (Flanagan, 2007: 16). Even though the electoral incentives to a merger were evident after just one campaign, there was still not sufficient motivation for the two parties to put aside their differences.

The results of the 1997 election would once again signal that a merger of the two right-wing parties would be beneficial. Following the election, the Reform party would improve its standing in the House becoming the Official Opposition. However, the Reform party failed to capture any seats in Ontario which further reaffirmed the party as a Western based protest party. Flanagan points out that the results of this election were not a "breakthrough" for the party (Flanagan, 2009: 202). Particularly concerning for Reform party supporters was their lack of success in Ontario, where votes were being split between their party and the PCs, resulting in the Liberals winning all but two seats in the province. Flanagan notes that it had become evident to Manning that the Reform party was not going to be able to win a general election and continuing on would lead to repeated Liberal majorities. The United Alternative (UA) was launched with the aim of bringing together like-minded conservatives to transform the Reform party into a new party (202-03). Concerns were voiced within the Reform party about a potential merger with the PCs. An initial UA assembly was held in February 1999, where delegates committed to forming a new party and holding a leadership race. A subsequent assembly would alter the Reform party's policy stance, removing some of the policies that had only drawn support in Western Canada. It was necessary for Reform party members to approve the rebranding, and thus it conducted a membership referendum where party membership overwhelmingly supported the UA initiative (Flanagan, 2009: 203-04). The UA initiative would ultimately result in the creation of the Canadian Alliance party to replace the Reform party but not in any progress at reconciliation with the PC party. Once again only delegates from the Reform party and
provincial PC parties were involved with no presence from the federal PCs, who refused to participate (164-172).

The new Alliance party required a leadership contest, which was won by Stockwell Day. Day had the backing of the party's social conservatives, who Manning had always tried to keep a close watch on. Under Day, the Alliance would see some improvements in the 2000 election, yet they were modest improvements at best. Both the percentage of the vote share and total votes would increase in the 2000 election for the Alliance; neither increase was major, however, with only a seven percent increase in the popular vote and six additional seats. The PCs captured enough seats to maintain official party status, and their leader Joe Clark won his riding in Calgary. Crucially, the Alliance party continued the Reform party tradition of performing poorly in Ontario; only two seats were won by the rebranded party. As a result, the Alliance performance in this election was deemed a "disappointment" (Flanagan, 2009: 206). The results of the 2000 election provided further reinforcement of the electoral incentives for uniting the right-wing parties.

Forming the official opposition did not prevent internal discord from surfacing inside the Alliance. Day was subject to harsh criticism from caucus members regarding his leadership style. Several members of the shadow cabinet resigned their posts to signal their objection to Day’s leadership and his handling of internal issues in the party. Amid calls for Day to step down, attempts were made by party members and MPs to force Day out of the leadership. After several weeks, Day presented a detailed three year plan for the party at a weekly caucus meeting that would garner the support of most caucus members. Not all members were supportive and 13 members of the caucus, beginning with Art Hanger would be suspended or voluntarily remove themselves from caucus due to their opposition to Day. In addition to their opposition to Day, a
common thread amongst these MPs was their support for Manning (Ellis and Woolstencroft, 2004: 69-72). This internal fighting in the Alliance party was evidence of the persistent general turmoil in right-wing parties in Canada. A consequence of this turmoil was a negative impact on party fundraising which had a notable decline (Flanagan, 2009: 207).

As the Alliance was attempting to deal with its internal discord, meetings were being held by the PCs Deputy Leader Peter MacKay with the dissenting Alliance members in an attempt to unite the sides. PC leader Joe Clark urged that caution was needed, yet several Alliance MPs still appeared at a PC fundraiser and in May 2001 eight Alliance MPs very publicly called for Day to resign. Dealing with those eight MPs caused even great internal strife in the Alliance, especially between supporters of Day and supporters of Manning. At the same time, Clark refused to formally meet with the Alliance to discuss policy cooperation and the possibility of unification. As a result, the disaffected Alliance members began conducting meetings with MacKay and PC caucus members. The internal dissent would be too much for Day to overcome, and he ultimately called a leadership contest and promised to resign before the contest. This decision did not please all the dissenters, and a group of 12 eventually created their own parliamentary caucus under the banner of the Democratic Representative Caucus (DRC). Negotiations between the DRC and PC caucuses followed. Under threat of expulsion from the Alliance caucus, four members of the DRC would abandon it. The remaining eight entered into a pact with the PC caucus, the PC-DRC coalition; however, they refused to call this arrangement a party (Ellis and Woolstencroft, 2004: 72-75).

Neither Day nor Clark would remain as leader of their respective party for much longer, and in leadership contests that focused largely on intraparty unity, each party elected new leaders that were much more open to cooperation between the two parties. In 2003, the two parties
would enter formal merger negotiations (Ellis and Woolstencroft, 2004: 77-82). For the Alliance side, party leader Stephen Harper was faced with the party’s inability to win seats east of Manitoba. A by-election in the Ontario riding of Perth-Middlesex was the decisive motivational push for the Alliance to pursue a united right. The by-election contested in May 2003 was in a riding that had consistently elected PCs for 40 years until the Reform party emerged in the 1993 election. In the 1993 campaign, right-wing votes were split between the Reform candidate and the PC candidate enabling the Liberal candidate to win the riding. For this by-election, the Alliance saw it as a crucial opportunity to demonstrate that they could be successful in Ontario. The importance the Alliance attached to this by-election was evident by multiple visits from Alliance caucus members and five visits from Harper during the campaign. The results were a worst-case scenario for the Alliance; the PC candidate won the riding while the Alliance candidate placed last, receiving a lower amount of popular vote than the Alliance candidate had in the last election (Flanagan, 2007: 92,95). The loss made it very clearly that the only plausible scenario for the Alliance to form government was through a merger with the PC party (Ellis, 2005: 164). The PCs meanwhile, despite winning that by-election still faced dismal electoral prospects. Under new leader Peter MacKay, the party faced a dwindling seat count in the House of Commons (receiving the lowest number of seats in each of the last three elections under previous party leaders, despite attaining a much higher percentage of the total votes). The electoral fortunes of the Liberal party continued to prosper as a result of the two battling right-wing parties. Electoral motivations thus offered a compelling motivational factor for both the Alliance and PCs to explore the possibility of a merger.

The merger talks faced two issues that threatened to halt the talks and end any possibility of a new party. The first issue was over how to handle candidates from either party that had
already been nominated for the next election. The Alliance wanted all candidates already nominated by either party to remain as candidates for the new party, which caused the PC side to feel threatened as they had not nominated nearly as many candidates. The second and most significant point of contention was the method of leadership selection. Harper and the Alliance wanted to use a one member, one vote method, the same as employed in the previous Alliance leadership contest. The PCs, fearful that their smaller membership would be swamped by the larger Alliance membership, were willing to hold a membership vote at the constituency level with each constituency given equal weight. Fears on the PC side were motivated as by many measures they were the weaker of the two parties going into the merger. Caucus strength greatly favoured the Alliance side, with the Alliance having 66 MPs elected in the last election and the PCs only 12. The Alliance had much greater financial stability, with a much larger base of individual financial contributors. Finally, membership numbers favoured the Alliance, who had 110,000 members prior to the merger compared to only 40,000 for the PCs, including a significant minority that had indicated they would not join a merged party. Ultimately the fears would not be realized as the desire to unite the warring sides would win over Harper, and he would agree to all the PCs demands (Flanagan, 2007: 99-101).

UNIFICATION

The CPC would be born from these talks, and following the official announcement of the merger on October 16, 2003, a leadership selection convention was scheduled for March where Harper would be selected as the new party’s first leader. In the first election the new party contested, the CPC reduced the Liberals to a minority government. The following elections in 2006 and 2008 saw the CPC win minority governments and then in 2011, the CPC would win a majority government. How was the CPC able to mitigate all the internal discord and
successfully manage the long-standing tensions to enable the party to govern for nine years? Even when the CPC was defeated in the 2015 election, the party did not implode like the PCs had in previous campaigns.

With the long history of enduring cleavages in the PC party and the numerous past failures at bringing together the two parties, what explains why the new CPC was successfully able to maintain party unity? This is an important question that is not addressed by the literature. This project will thoroughly analyze the CPC to explore its management of the long-standing cleavages in the Canadian conservative politics to answer this question. The literature shows that a strong divide emerged in the PC party beginning in the 1960s. Even after the initial source of this tension had moved on, the battles continued to plague the party through the 1980s. After a period of governance in the 1980s, the competing tensions in the party led to the destruction of the party, and the emergence of the Reform party. The literature documents how the 1990s saw the battles continued to be played out between now competing parties. While the literature makes the long-standing divides clear, it does not offer an explanation as to what happened to those tensions and how they were dealt with in the CPC.
CHAPTER THREE – POLICY AGENDA

Perlin found that the initial factional conflict in the PC party during the 1960s and 1970s was not a product of ideological differences (Perlin, 1980: 98). The most recent period of conflict, which resulted in the breakaway of the Reform party saw differing policy beliefs play a much more significant role. Throughout the Reform/Alliance party’s existence, policy differences between them and the PC party would become quite evident. The existing literature extensively documents the policy differences between the PC and Reform parties (Cross and Young, 2002: 869; Nevitte et al., 2000: 98; Laycock, 2002: 55; Ellis, 2005: 132). What happened to these differing policy beliefs once the parties merged into the CPC? How could party leadership successfully integrate these contrasting ideological positions?

Recall that the literature identifies three areas of ideological difference between the Reform/Alliance party and the PC party: social tolerance, federalism and provincial politics, and populism. Social tolerance, also referred to as moral traditionalism, includes calls for banning abortions and support for a ‘traditional’ family lifestyle (Lusztig and Wilson, 2005; Nevitte et al., 2000; Farney and Rayside, 2013). Not only the PC party but all the other major parties were at the opposite end of support for social tolerance compared with the Reform/Alliance party (Cross and Young, 2002: 869). The second area of ideological difference between the two predecessor parties, provincial powers, saw the Reform/Alliance side advocating for greater provincial powers and respecting areas of provincial jurisdiction (872). Finally, the literature also found a notable difference between the PC and Reform/Alliance parties on populist ideology. Amongst the major parties, Cross and Young observed the least amount of variance on this issue. However, the Reform/Alliance party was at the opposite end of the spectrum with the highest levels of support for populism while the PC party was near the lowest (872). In addition to these
three areas of ideological disagreement, the Reform/Alliance and PC parties shared one ideological bond: attitudes towards government intervention in the economy. While there was initially some contrast in the two parties' positions on the economy, by the latter half of the 1990s both parties were strongly opposed to government intervention in the economy (Cross and Young, 2002: 872; Harrison, 1995: 23; Nevitte et al., 2000: 98).

The question that arises is what happened to these ideological differences when the two parties merged? If notable differences persisted in the new party, what impact did that have on the ideological positioning of the CPC? This is a pressing question as it speaks to a significant area of potential conflict in the new party. An analysis is needed to look at the policy stance of the new party, which will also be indicative of how the party utilized ideology to manage conflict. Further, the results of this analysis will also provide insight into how the new party positioned itself not just for traditional Reform/Alliance or PC voters, but to the entire electorate. Finally, the findings will also address the question of whether the new party more closely resembles either of its predecessor parties by situating the policy stance of the new party relative to the Reform/Alliance and PC parties.

**POLICY CONFLICT IN FACTIONAL PARTIES**

The significance of ideological positioning and policy development for political parties cannot be understated. Flynn notes that the party leadership in a governing party can enact their desired policies (Flynn, 2011: 237). Furthermore, even when not forming government, there are opportunities for the party leadership and party members to express policy opinions such as during debates in government. Tonge and Evans caution that party members need to believe that the policies being put forward by their party are in their best interest, which can necessitate the selling of policy positions by leadership to party members (Tonge and Evans, 2002: 63).
the possibility of conflict over policy in factionalized parties may seem self-evident, a review of
the literature draws out how serious this risk is.

From the definitions of party factions in the first chapter, recall that policy is an important
consideration for factions. One of the earliest definitions of factions, provided by Rose saw
factions as groups of parliamentarians seeking to advance their policy objectives (Rose, 1964:
35-8). Similarly, Zuckerman’s analysis of Italian party factions’ points to the goal of factions as
being to control the party’s policy decision-making apparatus (Zuckerman, 1975: 20). Sartori’s
seminal work on party factions draws out the distinction between factions of interest and factions
of principles, the latter being primarily concerned with ideological objectives (Sartori, 1976: 6-
7). Belloni and Beller make a similar distinction, differentiating between factions formed around
a charismatic leader and factions formed in pursuit of policy objectives (Belloni and Beller,
1976: 544-45). The commonality of ideological goals in the conceptualization of factions both
stresses the significance of policy development to factions and implicates the possibly of conflict
between factions over policy formulation in a party.

The potential for conflict over policy was realized in the deeply factionalized ALP.
During the 1980s, the ALP saw its factions advocating for contrasting policy stances and
producing their own policy documents (Leigh, 2000: 428). The ALP factions within the
legislature have been known to hold regular and frequent meetings to formulate their own policy
stances and determine how best to pursue their policy aims (McMullin, 1991: 413). In Japan, the
DPJ has faced significant challenges due to the contrasting policy beliefs of their factions.
Kollner observes that the primary function of the DPJ factions is to advocate their policy agenda.
As a result, on prominent issues such as the role of Japan's military, economic policy, and
constitutional revision, Kollner found significant amounts of heated internal fighting between the
factions. The consequence of this internal conflict was that the party did not have a clear and explicit policy stance or profile (Kollner, 2004: 101). Moving forward the consequences for the DPJ were more severe; Mutlu-Eren cites the breakaway of Yukio Hatoyama and his faction from Japan’s New Harbinger Party as a result of policy disagreements (Mutlu-Eren, 2015: 120).

How can factionalized parties deal with potential and actual conflict over party ideology? Wood and Jacoby offer that factionalized parties moderate conflict over policy by putting forward policies that will have broad support in the party, though not necessarily its more radical or extremist wings (Wood and Jacoby, 1984: 205). According to Mutlu-Eren, faction leaders organize their supporters in order to influence the formation of policy in the party, while party leaders must simultaneously try to implement their own policy goals while trying to maintain party unity (Mutlu-Eren, 2015: 120). Looking at coalition governments where comparable obstacles in policy development exist, Clare points out that coalition’s which have less ideological diversity have an easier time formulating policy and might be more willing to take policy risks (Clare, 2010: 970). Along the same lines, Hopper writing on the merger of German parties following reunification argues that a party which has a weak ideological base and its policy options not limited by ideology will be better able to integrate competing factions (Hopper, 2001: 625). Karamichas and Botetzagias concur arguing that parties with more radical ideological stances are more likely to experience internal, factionalized conflict (Karamichas and Botetzagias, 2003: 67). Bernauer and Brauninger note that while factional conflict over policy can threaten party unity, the presence of factions during the policy development process can result in the integration of multiple competing views including more extreme views into one party (Bernauer and Brauninger, 2009: 386).
How policy development can be managed to integrate competing views and maintain party unity is the responsibility of the party leadership. The role of newly selected party leadership in policy-making is addressed by Harmel and Tan. In their analysis of five factionalized parties in Europe they find that when new party leadership represents the strongest faction in the party, there is a greater likelihood of the party’s policy being reshaped to reflect the preferences of the stronger faction (Harmel and Tan, 2003: 411). Mutlu-Eren found that party leaders are willing to accommodate competing policy orientations within their own party when the risk of party disunity can lead to opposition parties gaining power (Mutlu-Eren, 2015: 118). It is a result of such considerations that Dewan and Squintan argue for the potential of factions to act as an inclusive force by bringing more extreme positions into a relationship with more moderate stances (Dewan and Squintan, 2016: 875). Levy takes a slightly different view, claiming that factional influence over policy formation in the party is relative to the faction’s strength in the party (Levy, 2004: 252). Ceron found strong evidence that factions exert influence over policy development. The influence of factions can be constrained depending on the method of leadership selection according to Ceron, with party leaders elected by mass ballots having more freedom from factional demands. However, particularly when elections are near and when party unity concerns are present, the formation of policy must heed the policy goals of factions. Similar to Levy, in an analysis of factions in Italian parties over 60 years Ceron finds that the influence of factions over policy development is dependent on their strength in the party (Ceron, 2012: 698-700).

The findings from the comparative literature further demonstrate that the CPC faced a challenging task in developing its policy. The significance of policy goals to factions is well documented, as are the policy distinctions between the PC and Reform/Alliance parties. The
comparative literature indicates that members from the predecessor parties would advocate for their desired policy goals and potentially clash over differences. The findings of Levy and Ceron suggest that the strength of the two sides in the CPC will dictate their influence over policy. Recalling that by most indicators the Reform/Alliance side was the stronger one in the new party, this would appear to favour them. None of the existing literature, however, suggests that the desires of the weaker side will be completely disregarded. Instead, when party unity is a serious concern, the strength of the dominant faction over policy development may be weakened. For the CPC, unity was a concern as the PC side could become alienated if the policy of the party too closely reflected the ideology of the Reform/Alliance side. At the same time, if the policy ambitions of the Reform/Alliance side were ignored, the CPC risked repeating the errors of past PC governments. This analysis will explore how policy formulation in the new party was managed to maintain party unity; keeping the PC side on board while ensuring that the Reform/Alliance side was motivated to remain in the unified party.

**POLICY INDICATORS**

This analysis will utilize three different policy sources. Each source offers a different view into the ideological positioning of the CPC and how the new party handled the policy differences. Campaign manifestos are the first policy source analyzed. For deriving and determining a party’s policy, the existing literature places particular emphasis on campaign platforms. Note that in Canada campaign manifestos are commonly referred to as platforms. Campaign platforms provide a look at what the party considers to be the key issues and their stance and approach for tackling these matters (Marion and Oliver, 2010: 481). Flynn points out that campaign platforms play a prominent role in election campaigns as an important source of a party’s policy stance (Flynn, 2011: 238). There has been an increase in research utilizing party
Platforms over the last few years that has been driven by technological advances, which make content analysis easier (Coffey, 2011: 131). For example, Abney et al. make use of content analysis of party manifestos to explore the influence of electoral systems on party system dispersion in 25 countries (Abney et al., 2007: 155). Conti meanwhile uses the policy platforms of Italian parties to assess whether there has been a convergence between the party’s policy positions (Conti, 2008). Campus also uses campaign manifestos to study Italian parties, trying to establish and trace breaks and continuities between new parties and previous parties (Campus, 2001). A similar study of British political parties utilizes campaign platforms to determine whether parties have shifted to the center of the political spectrum (Quinn, 2008: 180). Hopper also makes use of platforms to track policy change in the CDU in Germany following the party’s merger after the reunification of Germany (Hopper, 2001: 636).

The analysis of campaign platforms offers several incentives for researchers. For starters, platforms are an elite level document that provides a direct opportunity to study the policy position of a party (Camia and Caramani, 2012: 52; Budge, 2001: 210). Platforms are also a public document that represents the stances of the party as a whole and not just particular factions or members within it (Budge, 2001: 211-12). Additionally, platforms are available with a degree of regularity and they represent a primary data source (Libbrecht et al., 2009: 60). Pogorelis et al. point out that while there are other sources from election campaigns, such as media reports, they are secondary sources and often reference their coverage back to what is contained or omitted in the platforms (Pogorelis et al., 2005: 993).

For this analysis, it is significant to note that the development of platforms in Canadian federal parties is largely controlled by party leaders and their allies. Savoie recounts complaints from Liberal MPs that they had no chance to offer input or even view the platform before it was
finished (Savoie, 2008: 306). Similarly, Savoie also points out how party convention delegates were cognizant of their lack of input on the party platform. The delegates stressed that regardless of any motions passed at the convention, "in the end the platform would be crafted by the ... party leader and his close advisors" (Savoie, 2010: 91). The 2006 CPC platform, for example, was constructed by just Harper and one of his confidants (Flynn, 2011: 244). CPC Campaign platforms, therefore, offer a document produced by the party leadership that also serves as an indicator of the party's policy stance. Analyzing CPC platforms thus provides valuable insight into how the new party used policy to manage conflict in the party.

One of the limits of party platforms is that they are limited to what a party promises to do. The next two indicators address this shortcoming by focusing on what a party does while government is in session. A challenge exists when the party does not form government, serving in the role as opposition. The comparative literature does not offer guidance in the tracking of the policy position of opposition parties. Turning to the literature on Canadian and other Westminster parliamentary systems does offer an area of inquiry: Question Period. Franks notes that Question Period takes up a significant portion of the daily activity in Parliament (Franks, 1985: 1). Soroka et al. concur stating “Question Period is the most visible part of the Canadian Parliamentary process. Indeed, for most Canadians, Question Period is Parliament” (Soroka et al., 2009: 567). Similarly, Blidook points out that the bulk of media coverage of Parliament focuses on what occurs during Question Period (Blidook, 2014: 217). The significance of Question Period is underscored by noting that the House is sparsely attended by both MPs and the public before and after Question Period, yet full during it (Franks, 1987: 145). Ladley, writing on the significance of Question Period in Westminster governments, describes it as an opportunity for opposition parties to hold the governing party to account by providing the forum
for question and answer sessions on policy issues (Ladley, 2006: 56-57). Question Period further
gives opposition parties the chance to critique government policies and offer their suggestions to
replace it (Penner et al., 2006: 1008-1009).

In Canada, Question Period occurs for 45 minutes every day with questions being asked
orally by opposition MPs and answered by a member of the governing party (Piroth, 2012: 163).
The frequency and method of asking questions vary from country to country, in Britain “Prime
Minister’s Question Time” occurs for 30 minutes every week and questions are submitted via
formal Order Papers and can then be followed up with a few supplementary questions (Ladley,
2006: 57). For the Canadian Parliament, the Speaker of the House of Commons oversees
Question Period, presiding over the order of MPs asking questions. It is not the Speaker who
determines the order, however; it has become standard practice for the opposition parties to
provide the speaker with a list of their MPs who will be asking questions that day. The Speaker
is not legally bound to follow this, yet general practice has seen it followed (Bedard, 2011: 2).
Crucially, MPs do not have free reign to ask any question they choose. Franks points to the
increasing organization parties put into their approach to Question Period (Franks, 1987: 145).
Soroka et al. discuss how parties decided both what questions will be asked and who will be
asking those questions. Morning meetings are held every day where those decisions are
rendered, the inclusiveness of the process varies between parties. In some instances, all that is
required is for an MP to have their question vetted and approved by several other MPs whereas
in other instances all questions and speakers are determined by the party leader and a select few
other party elites (Soroka et al., 2009: 569). While in opposition, the CPC had a Question Period
preparation meeting every morning involving several party elites and MP Jason Kenney who
selected which MPs would be participating in Question Period that day. Later in the day, the
involved MPs would have a preparatory session to practice asking their questions under the supervision of Kenney and Harper (Ibbiston, 2015: 239; Carson, 2014: 104, 156).

Soroka et al. argue that Question Period is important to study as MPs perceive it as a chance to advocate policy goals, and it does offer them that opportunity. While Question Period may have little to no impact on government policy formation, what is significant for Soroka et al. is the representative opportunity it affords parties in opposition (Soroka et al., 568-569). Tremblay takes a similar stance utilizing Question Period amongst other data sources to determine if female MPs represent female issues in government (Tremblay, 1998). Penner et al. use the issues raised during Question Period to analyze if parties represent and raise issues that are public priorities (Penner et al., 2006: 1017). This project will follow the lead of these works by exploring the issues raised during Question Period by the CPC, and using those issues as an indicator of the policy stance of the CPC while in opposition in relation to the areas of ideological differences and similarity between the predecessor parties.

The last indicator of ideological positioning to be utilized by this study is the legislation put forward by the CPC while in government. Existing literature has already scratched the surface by looking at the policy of the CPC and making comparisons to its predecessor parties. For example, Ellis and Woolstencroft touch on the bills enacted by the party leading up to the 2011 campaign, noting the party’s emphasis on law and order (Ellis and Woolstencroft, 2011: 27-28). Malloy uses the policy record of the CPC to evaluate its treatment of social conservatism finding that “the larger Conservative strategy appears to emphasize broader brokerage issues, especially “family-friendly” policies that appeal strongly to social conservatives without polarizing others” (Malloy, 2013: 195). Similarly, Farney and Malloy explore the policy record of the new party to analyze the CPC’s ideological positioning (Farney
and Malloy, 2011). The use of the party’s enacted legislation to situate the party ideologically demonstrates the utility of this avenue of inquiry. This literature, however, does not consider the question of how the new party used policy as a tool for managing internal conflict. Additionally, discussion over the potential for aggravating the long-standing cleavages in the policy development process is not fully developed. Furthermore, while the existing literature highlights key pieces of legislation put forward by the CPC, it does not provide a systematic overview of all the bills introduced under their reign. This analysis will build off the existing literature by expanding the scope to include all government bills introduced by the CPC and exploring how the policy was formulated with the long-standing cleavages in mind.

HYPOTHESES

**H1:** The policy stance of the CPC will contain some policy stances similar to the policy positions of both the PC party and the Reform/Alliance party.

The existing literature on policy formation in factionalized parties found that when unity was a concern policy formation was more likely to be informed by the policy goals of factions and for the dominant faction to be willing to accept the views of the weaker factions. The comparative literature also indicates that the party will seek out a policy route that will have the widest support in the party. As a result, this hypothesis expects that the new party will try to incorporate elements of both predecessor parties into its ideological positioning. Doing so would allow both sides to see their interests represented in the new party thus providing motivation for party unity and not providing a reason to exit the party.

**H2:** The CPC will place diminished emphasis in their policy on the areas of ideological disagreement between the predecessor parties.

The existing literature on factionalized parties found that the policy agenda of factionalized parties would represent the interests of factions according to their strength in the party.
Completely omitting the policy issues which defined one of the predecessor parties and led to its initial split from the PC party would not be beneficial to party unity. It would also not be beneficial for party unity to emphasize the ideological differences as that would likely cause the party to lose support from former PC supporters. The literature also found out that when unity was a concern, the stronger faction will omit some of its policy goals. Therefore, it is expected that some of the policy ideas that separated the Reform/Alliance party from the PC party will be given attention in the new party, however not all of the areas of ideological difference will be emphasized.

H3: The CPC policy stance will put emphasis on the one area of ideological agreement between the predecessor parties, the economy.

This hypothesis also expects that the one area of ideological agreement will be given particular emphasis in the interest of preserving party unity. This is based on the expectation that for the new party to successfully manage its divides, the CPC must include the policy stance which has the broadest support. The expectation is that economic concerns will form the main thrust of the CPC’s policy stances. Economic issues have the broadest levels of support among both predecessor parties, and as such, the CPC would be able to retain and build its support amongst the predecessor parties by focusing on economic concerns.

**FINDINGS**

**CAMPAIGN PLATFORMS**

Table 3.1 shows the right-left index score for all the major parties in the elections under study. Comparing the predecessor parties first, the initial observation is the considerable variation for both the PC and Reform/Alliance platforms. The PC platforms range from a moderate right-wing score in the 1993 election to a very marginally left-wing score in the 2000 election. The Reform party meanwhile had a substantially more right-wing platform in 1993 and
1997, followed by a much more centric score under the Alliance banner in 2000. Overall, the 2000 campaign stands out amongst the first three elections. The shift towards the centre can be accounted for by recalling that the 2000 election saw the Alliance desperately trying to break through in Ontario. As well, even the PC and Liberal platforms took a substantial left shift during this campaign. Significantly, while the 2000 results indicate that this campaign was more of an anomaly, the Alliance platform is still considerably further to the right than the PC platform. Switching to the CPC, the variation between campaigns is substantially lower, with a very limited difference between the first three campaigns. There is only substantial variation with the 2011 campaign, and while that is a sharp slide towards the right end of the scale, it is still much less variation from any of the other CPC platforms than exhibited by the predecessor parties.

Table 3.1 Party Platform Left-Right Index Score by Election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PC</td>
<td>24.62</td>
<td>10.58</td>
<td>-3.95</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reform/Alliance</td>
<td>40.45</td>
<td>40.45</td>
<td>10.79</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>30.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>4.04</td>
<td>6.34</td>
<td>-12.24</td>
<td>-12.20</td>
<td>-12.10</td>
<td>5.17</td>
<td>-7.78</td>
<td>-4.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDP</td>
<td>-23.05</td>
<td>-31.76</td>
<td>-35.02</td>
<td>-17.56</td>
<td>-21.70</td>
<td>-20.66</td>
<td>-27.91</td>
<td>-25.38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Left-Right values obtained from the CMP. A perfect left-wing score would be -100, while a perfect right wing score would be +100

Most intriguing is that the CPC regularly situates itself further right on the index than the space occupied by the PCs. Looking at the averages for the parties, we find the PC’s closest to the center with a value of 10.41, the Reform/Alliance the furthest right with 30.56, and the CPC between the two with 16.48. The findings on average locate the new party closer to the PCs than the Reform/Alliance. For the first three CPC campaigns, their platforms are close to the 2000 Alliance platform, although they are a notable distance from the previous Reform platforms. These findings offer support for the first hypothesis as the new party is clearly situated between the two predecessor parties, with the platforms of the new party shown to be closer to the PC
side than the Alliance/Reform. One interview respondent, who had a long history with the PC party, observed that the 2006 platform contained many parts that strongly resembled a PC platform (R2).

Looking at the CPC and its predecessor parties compared to the other parties paints a slightly different picture. The smallest distance between the Reform/Alliance and Liberal party was approximately 22 points in the 2000 campaign, with a much more drastic difference in the previous two campaigns. The Liberal and PCs were often much closer, with a gap of just over eight points in 2000 and only slightly more than four points in 1997. While 22 points were as close as the Liberals would get to the Reform/Alliance, the same distance was the furthest they would get from the PCs, which happened in the 1993 campaign. Compared to the CPC, there is a much starker difference with the Liberal party than there was with the PCs. Aside from 2008, where the difference was under four points, in every other campaign, there was at least a 20 point difference between the CPC and the Liberal platforms. The difference was 26 points in 2004, 28 points in 2006 and a staggering 34 points in the 2011 campaign, a margin of difference only two points less than between the Reform and Liberal platforms in the 1993 campaign. Relative to the Liberal party, who for the most part were the main competitors for forming government, the CPC is quite comparable to its Reform/Alliance predecessor.

The next evaluation is to follow the lead of Pogorelis et al. and look at the “aggregate difference” between the parties (Pogorelis et al., 2005: 1003). The aggregate difference is a measure constructed by Pogorelis to determine how similar or dissimilar two platforms are. The aggregate difference between the CPC and PC platforms scores a 1.31, while it is a 1.53 between the CPC and Reform/Alliance platforms. Comparatively this score indicates a notable amount of similarity between the two platforms. Crucially, the results are comparable for both
parties. This indicates that the platforms of the new party bear a similar resemblance to the platforms of both predecessor parties. The aggregate difference was calculated for a second time focusing only on policy categories where one of the parties was active.\textsuperscript{xi} The results indicate more difference between the new party and the predecessor parties, with a value of 2.30 between the CPC and PC platforms and 2.80 between the CPC and Reform/Alliance platforms. Most notably, the difference between the two predecessor parties increases with the CPC platforms having a slightly greater difference compared to Reform/Alliance platforms. This difference, however, is marginal. The CPC platforms are shown here to have a fairly equal amount in common with each of the predecessor parties. The findings are a further indication of the new party’s policy balancing elements from both predecessor parties.

\textit{FEDERALISM AND PROVINCIAL POWERS}

\textbf{Table 3.2 Mean Emphasis in Campaign Platforms on Decentralization}

\begin{tabular}{|l|c|}
\hline
PC & 3.00 \\
\hline
Reform/Alliance & 5.49 \\
CPC & 3.12 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

\textit{Average emphasis attached to this policy area by each party for all elections the party contested between 1993 and 2011. Values from CMP.}

How do the platforms deal with the issues of ideological agreement and difference? To answer this question requires focusing on the sub-policy categories provided by the CMP. On the issue of federalism and provincial powers, the sub-policy categories provided by the CMP are of limited value. In only one of the sub-policy categories where any of the parties placed a discernible emphasis speaks to this issue: decentralisation. The CMP Codebook describes decentralisation as statements that offer: “Support for federalism or decentralisation of political and/or economic power” (Volkens et al., 2014a: 10). Unsurprisingly given the Reform/Alliance's stance on strengthening provincial powers and respecting provincial jurisdiction they are shown to have placed considerable emphasis on this topic. Table 3.2 shows the mean emphasis devoted
to decentralisation by each of the three parties. The findings do indicate that the CPC platforms put a similar level of emphasis on this issue as the PC platforms did, which is considerably less emphasis than the Reform/Alliance platforms did. This suggests that the new party did not attach the prominence to provincial powers that their Reform/Alliance predecessors did. This is supportive of the second hypothesis, as it indicates that the CPC downplayed one of the areas of ideological difference.

Reading the CPC platforms shows that the party adopted a similar theme on federalism and provincial powers to its Reform/Alliance predecessors. The 2004 CPC platform promises to not undertake any future cost shared programs without first gaining provincial support (Conservative Party of Canada, 2004: 15). While the 2006 platform sees the CPC calling “to establish a new relationship of open federalism with the provinces” (Conservative Party of Canada, 2006: 42). A similar promise is made by the CPC in their 2008 platform, with a pledge to get approval from the majority of provinces before enacting a shared cost program in an area of provincial jurisdiction (Conservative Party of Canada, 2008, 26). The CPC platforms do not advocate any form of special treatment or powers for Quebec, instead pushing for greater power and recognition for all provinces. This bears a strong resemblance to the stance of the Reform/Alliance party. Noteworthy though is that the CPC pays only minor attention to this issue. The examples from 2006 and 2008 cited above saw this issue granted only a few sentences in each platform. Additionally, this issue was addressed under the last priority heading in the 2006 platform. Only in the 2004 platform is the treatment of provinces and federalism addressed in the first half of the platform; when it is discussed as the last point under the first priority in the platform, Accountability. Thus, while the CPC takes a similar stance to its Reform/Alliance predecessor on this area of ideological disagreement, the emphasis is greatly
diminished as a result of how little attention is paid to the subject. This finding is supportive of the second hypothesis as the adopts a similar tone on a policy position of its stronger side but does so with much less emphasis.

Table 3.3 shows the number of questions per issue asked by the CPC during Question Period in the 38th Parliament. Looking at the overall number of questions asked shows that questions regarding federalism and provincial powers were raised infrequently. Only questions regarding social tolerance were asked less frequently. When the questions are narrowed to focus only on ones relating to the areas of ideological disagreement, federalism is shown to have received significantly less attention than economic and populist issues. An overwhelming majority of the questions asked focused on fiscal arrangements with the provinces, and provincial rights in shared costs programs. The content of the questions asked on federalism in Question Period was thus consistent with the themes addressed in the party platforms. The limited attention paid to federalism issues is further supportive of the second hypothesis; indicating that an area of ideological disagreement was considerably downplayed by the new party.

Table 3.3 Questions Asked by CPC MPs in 38th Parliament sorted by Policy Area.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Questions only on areas of Policy Interest</th>
<th>All Questions Asked</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economy</td>
<td>175 (37.2)</td>
<td>175 (11.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Tolerance</td>
<td>34 (7.2)</td>
<td>34 (2.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federalism/Provincial Powers</td>
<td>75 (15.9)</td>
<td>75 (4.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Populism</td>
<td>187 (39.7)</td>
<td>187 (12.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption</td>
<td>337 (21.7)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law and Order</td>
<td>165 (10.6)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>582 (37.4)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td><strong>471</strong></td>
<td><strong>1555</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Questions obtained from Hansard and coded following Soroka’s (2005) codebook. Column percentages in parentheses.
For the final indicator Table 3.4 classifies all government bills that were put to the House of Commons by the CPC government for the 39th, 40th and 41st sessions of Parliament by their connection to the areas of ideological difference. The results in Table 3.4 also document the continuing trend of a lack of emphasis on issues of federalism and provincial powers. This area of ideological disagreement peaks with just under five percent of government bills addressing this area in the first CPC parliament and totals less than three percent of overall bills by the CPC government. These findings demonstrate that the CPC government paid limited attention to this issue. The CPC government did not ignore federalism entirely; crucially when it was addressed the tone of the content was similar to the ideological positioning taken by the Reform/Alliance party. The minimal amount of overall attention paid to this issue, however, demonstrates that it was not a priority for the new party and provides direct support for the second hypothesis.

Table 3.4 CPC Government Bills sorted by Policy Area

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy Area</th>
<th>39th Parliament</th>
<th>40th Parliament</th>
<th>41st Parliament</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economy</td>
<td>28 (22)</td>
<td>28 (21.6)</td>
<td>42 (29.8)</td>
<td>98 (24.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Tolerance</td>
<td>5 (3.9)</td>
<td>7 (5.4)</td>
<td>8 (5.7)</td>
<td>20 (5.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quebec/Provincial</td>
<td>4 (3.2)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>6 (4.3)</td>
<td>10 (2.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Powers</td>
<td>16 (12.6)</td>
<td>7 (5.4)</td>
<td>8 (5.7)</td>
<td>31 (7.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law and Order</td>
<td>23 (18.1)</td>
<td>44 (33.8)</td>
<td>31 (21.9)</td>
<td>98 (24.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>51 (40.2)</td>
<td>44 (33.8)</td>
<td>46 (32.6)</td>
<td>141 (35.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>127</strong></td>
<td><strong>130</strong></td>
<td><strong>139</strong></td>
<td><strong>398</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Government bills obtained from Hansard and coded following Soroka’s (2005) codebook. Column percentages in parentheses.*

**POPULISM**

The issue of populism can be related to two policy areas identified by the CMP, both shown in Table 3.5: the need to reduce political corruption, and the need to make government administration leaner and more efficient. Beginning with the latter, the CPC attaches far less significance to this issue in their platforms than either of the predecessor parties and substantially less than the Reform/Alliance platforms. This is an issue that was emphasized by both
predecessor parties; with a strong emphasis placed on it in the Reform/Alliance platforms. The findings show that while the new party has not eliminated this issue from their platforms, they have given it far less attention. This finding is consistent with the expectations from the literature. Alternatively, on the issue of political corruption, the CPC once again sets itself far apart from its predecessor parties but this time in the opposite direction. The new party placed substantially more emphasis on this area than either predecessor party, even the Reform/Alliance. Part of this can be attributed to the CPC campaigning against the Liberal party who were plagued by the sponsorship scandal, yet the significant amount of attention placed on this issue contradicts the expectations from the literature. In this policy sphere, while the overall approach of the CPC can be seen as a balance between the two predecessor parties, the CPC has not followed the expectation of the literature by not placing reduced emphasis on an area of policy division between the predecessor parties.

Table 3.5 Mean Emphasis in Campaign Platforms on Populist Policy Areas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Political Corruption</th>
<th>Government Administration Efficiency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PC</td>
<td>1.18</td>
<td>5.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reform/Alliance</td>
<td>2.93</td>
<td>8.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPC</td>
<td>5.62</td>
<td>2.40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Average emphasis attached to populist policy areas by each party for all elections the party contested between 1993 and 2011. Values from CMP.*

Fuelled by the Liberal government’s sponsorship scandal, the first priority listed by the CPC in the 2004 and 2006 platforms was Accountability. Under this heading, populist measures are advocated by the new party such as fixed election dates, ending the financial subsidy for political parties, free votes for MPs and elections to fill Senate vacancies. The first two platforms by the CPC not only place these populist ideas in prominent positions in the platform, but they also grant considerable space to them. The placement of populist ideas is diminished in the 2008 platform, as is the amount of space dedicated to it with less than two pages out of 41
covering such measures (see Appendix A for a page count for each platform). By the 2011 platform, populist mentions continue to decline receiving less than four pages of coverage in a platform more than 60 pages long, and they comprise the last principle listed by the party. Hallmarks of their previous populist appeals remain such as Senate reform, yet the CPC greatly diminishes the amount of space and prominence devoted to these topics. The treatment of populist ideology by the CPC is intriguing as it is an example of one of the areas of ideological disagreement being given significant treatment in the early life of the new party and seeing that treatment greatly diminish as the party matured. Populism did offer a safe option for the CPC to appeal to its Reform/Alliance base. While the predecessor parties had differing opinions on populism, it was not a particularly salient issue for the PC side (Cross and Young, 2002: 872-73). Accordingly, raising policy on populist measures allowed the CPC to satisfy the policy goals of Reform/Alliance supporters without risking alienating the PC side.

Turning back to Table 3.3, we find that populist ideals were raised with considerable frequency by the new party in Question Period. Of all the areas of ideological disagreement, populist issues were raised the most by a substantial margin. Part of this can likely be attributed to the climate in Parliament during this session, which was dominated by the sponsorship scandal. While questions relating directly to the sponsorship scandal were coded separately, the atmosphere heightened the opposition parties’ sensitivities to potential government waste. Questions asked did touch upon Reform/Alliance hallmarks such as Senate reform, especially the appointment process. Most CPC questions on populist issues, however, focused on issues such as patronage appointments and government interference on contracts. These populist-themed questions were not a divisive issue for the new party, as while populism was an area of ideological disagreement, these questions predominantly focused on populist concerns regarding
Liberal government corruption. Abuses by the Liberal government were an issue that appealed not only to Reform/Alliance beliefs on patronage but also to PC members based on their opposition to the Liberal party. These findings do not entirely support or contradict the second hypothesis; the new party did emphasize an area of ideological disagreement to a greater extent than either predecessor party did. However, the added emphasis was on specific themes that appealed to both sides in the new party and acted as a cause that all members could support.

Focusing on government bills, of all the areas of ideological interest shown in Table 3.4, the populist area has the most intriguing results. In the first CPC parliament, bills representing populist measures make up a considerable amount at over 12 percent. In the next two sittings, these numbers fall notably to under six percent in each. Part of this can be explained as certain measures, such as fixed election dates were addressed in the first session of CPC government. Other measures such as Senate reform became less practical in the later stages of CPC government as a result of previous failures and court rulings. Recall though that populist appeals also saw a decrease in their prominence in campaign platforms after the first two elections contested by the new party. The findings demonstrate a clear trend of declining emphasis on populist measures over time by the CPC. What is most compelling is that this area of ideological difference was emphasized in a manner comparable with the party’s Reform/Alliance heritage while the new party was still in its formative and most vulnerable period and treated with less prominence as the party aged.

**SOCIAL TOLERANCE**

Social tolerance issues represented the most controversial and significant area of ideological difference facing the new party. Of the three areas of ideological difference, there is the greatest variance between the predecessor parties on social tolerance issues (Cross and
Young, 2002: 872-73). The CPC had to be particularly careful on the social tolerance front as too much emphasis on these issues could easily offend and push away PC members from the new party. Looking at the average emphasis on positive mentions of Traditional Morality in the CMP in Table 3.6 demonstrates how significant this divide was. The CMP codebook describes Traditional Morality as "favourable mentions of traditional and/or religious moral values. May include: ... maintenance and stability of the traditional family as a value" (Volkens et al., 2014a: 18). The Reform/Alliance platforms placed more than double the emphasis on this issue than the PC did. Quite intriguing is how little attention is paid to this issue by the CPC. These findings show that Traditional Morality issues are barely touched on in the new party. This is an important observation, as recalling how divisive this ideological area was it is quite notable that the CPC not only placed less emphasis on it than the Reform/Alliance platforms did but also significantly less emphasis than the PC platforms did. The findings clearly demonstrate that the party attempted to downplay the most controversial of the areas of ideological difference.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Traditional Morality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PC</td>
<td>4.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reform/Alliance</td>
<td>9.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPC</td>
<td>.72</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.6 Mean Emphasis in Campaign Platforms on Social Tolerance Policy Areas

Average emphasis attached to social tolerance policy areas by each party for all elections the party contested between 1993 and 2011. Values from CMP.

Opening the platforms produces similar results with regards to social tolerance issues. Once again, the party devotes only very minimal space to these issues in its platforms. The 2004 platform contains no mention of social tolerance issues. Turning to 2006, the topic of same sex marriage is broached but in a slightly different way than the Reform/Alliance had. The CPC platform devotes several sentences noting a plan to allow a free vote on the definition of marriage in Parliament. This plan is significantly different from the Alliance's 2000 platform that promises to "protect the institution of marriage as the exclusive union of one man and one
woman" (Canadian Alliance, 2000: 20-21). The new party deviates sharply from its Reform/Alliance predecessors on social tolerance issues by paying only modest attention to these issues, and when dealing with social tolerance issues, the new party does so in a more moderate manner. This is supportive of the second hypothesis.

Social tolerance issues did not receive more favourable treatment during Question Period. Looking at Table 3.3, it is shown that social tolerance issues comprised a barely noticeable amount of questions asked by the new party. Among the three areas of ideological disagreement, social tolerance issues received significantly less attention than either of the other issues. Federalism issues which had the next fewest questions still were raised twice as often as social tolerance issues. Same sex marriage was the most asked about topic by CPC MPs during Question Period. However, the questions were not on the definition of marriage itself. Similar to how the issue was approached in their 2006 platform, CPC MPs asked for there to be a free vote on the definition of marriage. Also on the same sex marriage front, another topic that came up with some frequency was calls for officials to have protection against being forced to perform same sex marriages. Thus, the content of the social tolerance questions being asked was a more moderate take on social tolerance issues. Crucially, the number of questions dealing with social tolerance issues was so minor that it offers strong support for the second hypothesis, indicating that the new party substantially downplayed one of the areas of ideological disagreement.

Finally, an examination of CPC government bills in Table 3.4 reaffirms the limited attention paid to social tolerance issues by the new party. Compared to the other areas of ideological disagreement, social tolerance issues do not fare as poorly as they did in Question Period. Overall, however, the number of bills on social tolerance issues are minimal, never accounting for much more than five percent of the party's legislative record. When considering
how divisive social tolerance issues were, and the controversial nature of the issues, the limited attention paid to these issues by the new party is a significant finding. The expectation of the second hypothesis was that the new party would place diminished attention on areas of ideological disagreement; the extent to which the CPC downplayed social tolerance issues is significant. These findings help explain how the policy agenda of the new party helped to mitigate tension from the PC side. The most controversial social tolerance issues that would likely alienate parts of the PC base were omitted from the CPC policy stance.

*LAW AND ORDER*

While downplaying social tolerance issues goes a long way to explaining how the policy agenda of the CPC maintained support from the PC side, what about the Reform/Alliance side? This analysis uncovered a key component of the new party's policy stance that was not one of the areas of ideological disagreement, yet that played an important role in gaining the support of the Reform/Alliance side. Table 3.7 shows the amount of emphasis attached to positive mentions of Law and Order issues in the platforms. While both the PC and Reform/Alliance platforms attached substantial emphasis to law and order issues, the CPC leads the way with the most attention paid to this topic. The CPC platform devotes substantial space to focus on law and order issues. The platform calls for harsher jail sentences, tougher eligibility for parole, more resources for law enforcement, enhanced restrictions and punishment for illicit drug use, and raising the age for sexual consent. In the 2004 and 2006 campaigns, crime and security issues featured prominently in the platforms. This shows that the CPC platforms have more resemblance to their Reform/Alliance heritage compared to their PC lineage; for example, the 1997 PC platform devoted less than two pages out of 45 to crime issues while the Reform platform from the same year devoted three out of 23 pages to the same topic. These findings are
particularly intriguing as they show the CPC emphasising an issue in the same direction as their Reform/Alliance predecessor, yet exceeding the emphasis of the predecessor.

**Table 3.7 Mean Emphasis in Campaign Platforms on Positive Mentions of Law and Order**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Positive Law/Order</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PC</td>
<td>7.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reform/Alliance</td>
<td>12.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPC</td>
<td>14.25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Average emphasis attached to law and order policy areas by each party for all elections the party contested between 1993 and 2011. Values from CMP.*

Similarly, the findings in Table 3.3 on Question Period also document the prominence attached to law and order issues by the CPC. Over ten percent of the questions raised by CPC MPs dealt with law and order issues; an amount exceeding two of the areas of ideological disagreement and almost as high as the one area of ideological agreement. The questions asked by the CPC called for crackdowns on drug crime, more support for police officers and harsher sentences for dangerous offenders. These issues and others were addressed when the CPC formed government. The findings in Table 3.4 show that law and order issues were consistently one of the most addressed topics by the CPC in government. The legislation introduced by the CPC proposed minimum sentences, made it more difficult to qualify for parole and offered more resources for combating crime. Law and order issues are shown here to play a prominent role in all aspects of the CPC's policy agenda.

This finding is significant as law and order issues offer a policy option that garnered the party support from its Reform/Alliance side. Recall that a tough on crime, law and order agenda had strong support in the Reform party (Ellis, 2005: 148; Lusztig and Wilson, 2005: 121). By adopting a strong law and order platform, the new party could solidify support amongst the Reform/Alliance base despite downplaying most of the areas of ideological disagreement in the favour of the PC side. The law and order agenda takes on further significance as it represents a much less controversial stance, and thus is less likely to bring objections from the PC side.
Unlike social tolerance issues, which were deeply divisive and opposed by many on the PC side, law and order measures could be advocated by the new party without risking conflict. The emphasis on law and order legislation, therefore, comprises a significant component of the CPC’s policy agenda and understanding how the party was able to utilize policy to avoid internal conflict and promote party unity.

**ECONOMIC ISSUES**

**Table 3.8 Mean Emphasis in Campaign Platforms on Economic Policy Areas**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Economic Growth</th>
<th>Economic Orthodoxy</th>
<th>Economic Incentives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PC</td>
<td>1.60</td>
<td>5.78</td>
<td>7.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reform/Alliance</td>
<td>2.54</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>3.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPC</td>
<td>2.56</td>
<td>2.78</td>
<td>2.54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Market Regulation</th>
<th>Technology &amp; Infrastructure</th>
<th>Free Market Economy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PC</td>
<td>1.27</td>
<td>5.76</td>
<td>1.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reform/Alliance</td>
<td>2.04</td>
<td>1.17</td>
<td>5.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPC</td>
<td>2.59</td>
<td>5.55</td>
<td>.35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Average emphasis attached to economic policy areas by each party for all elections the party contested between 1993 and 2011. Values from CMP.

The last ideological area to be considered is the one area that predecessor parties agreed on, the economy. Table 3.8 shows the emphasis attached to economic issues in the platforms of the new party and both predecessor parties. The focus here is not on whether the new party takes a stance closer to either of its predecessors. Instead, the principal concern is that the new party is placing a significant amount of emphasis on economic matters. The findings here demonstrate that economic issues comprised a significant proportion of the new party's platforms. In each of the four platforms, economic matters are one of the first two priorities listed in the platforms. Only in 2004 and 2006, when the Liberal sponsorship scandal was still front and centre is any issue prioritized above economic issue in CPC platforms; accountability was the first priority listed in both those platforms. With the exception of the 2006 platform, economic issues receive
more pages than any other one issue in each of the CPC platforms. The types of economic issues addressed by the CPC are similar from platform to platform; focusing on tax cuts, tax credits, reducing red tape, job growth, reducing government spending and government grants. The findings from the CMP data and the CPC platforms support the third hypothesis, showing that the new party prominently featured the one area of ideological agreement.

Looking at Question Period, Table 3.3 shows that economic concerns were one of the main priorities addressed by the new party. Interestingly, one of the areas of ideological disagreement, populism, was asked about more than economic matters. It is important to remember the context as this session of Parliament was dominated by the sponsorship scandal, which contributed to questions about Liberal corruption that touched on populist ideals. Economic issues were still raised a significant amount by the new party, further indicating that the party was emphasizing the one area of ideological agreement. This finding is reinforced looking at Table 3.4, as economic matters were the subject of the most bills on a specific topic in two out of the three sessions under study. Even during the second CPC minority government, where law and order issues were the most prominent issue in the legislative agenda, economic issues were still addressed a significant amount. The content of these bills featured measures to reduce government intervention in the economy and tax cuts in particular, such as a reduction in the GST and tax credits for things such as child care, child sports enrollment and transit passes. These findings support the third hypothesis as they demonstrate that the new party emphasized the area of ideological agreement between the two predecessor parties. Harper clearly made economic measures a policy priority for the new party; the 2006 election campaign, for example, advocated five key priorities, one of the most significant which called for tax cuts and a reduction in the GST (Ellis and Woolstencroft, 2006: 77). In an interview for this research, a
former high-ranking CPC official noted that the economy was the principal concern of Harper. This official stressed that Harper was an economist and what he was primarily interested in doing was running the economy (R3). The findings here offer support for that statement and for the third hypothesis. The new party was able to maintain support by placing significant focus on the one area of policy agreement.

CONCLUSION

The expectation of the first hypothesis was that the policy stance of the new party would combine components of the policy stances of both two predecessor parties. It should not be surprising that the findings in this section are diverse. The values on the left-right index offered by the CMP show that the new party’s platforms are between its two predecessor parties yet stationed closer to its PC lineage. However, when these values are looked at in comparison with the competing Liberal party, the distance between the Liberals and the new party bears much closer resemblance to its Reform/Alliance predecessor. Looking at the aggregate difference tilts the balance back in the other direction, finding the new party’s platforms to be more comparable with PC platforms. These mixed results support the first hypothesis as they demonstrate that the CPC represented elements of both predecessor parties. If the findings showed that the platforms were consistently more closely aligned with either of its predecessor parties that would indicate that the party was not taking a balanced approached. Instead, the varied findings support the expectation of the first hypothesis that the new party would position itself between its predecessors. This is crucial for understanding how the new party was able to mitigate potential conflict over policy. By containing elements of the policy positions of both predecessor parties, the CPC appealed to the policy goals of both its Reform/Alliance and PC members and allowed members of each side to see their interest represented in the new party.
Greater insight comes from the exploration of how the new party dealt with the areas of ideological agreement and disagreement. All the policy indicators utilized show the lack of prominence given in the new party to the most divisive area of ideological disagreement, social tolerance issues. As the second hypothesis expected, the CPC maintained party unity by not placing significant emphasis on social tolerance issues. The treatment of social tolerance issues is intriguing as consistently it was found that the CPC omitted many of the more controversial positions taken by their Reform/Alliance predecessors (such as gay marriage and capital punishment). By leaving such topics out, the party presented itself as a more appealing and less alarming option to members from the PC side. Indeed, a PC based interview respondent observed that former PC supporters could identify with portions of the CPC policy stance and would find only very limited items to object to (R2). At the same time, there were still enough issues included to satisfy Reform/Alliance members.

Similarly, the treatment of populist issues by the new party demonstrates an initial push by the CPC to maintain the support of the Reform/Alliance side. Populist concerns were featured prominently in the first two platforms of the new party. Likewise, in the new party’s first full session of parliament, the CPC raised questions involving populist issues almost as much as any of the other areas of ideological interest during Question Period. While not as prominent, populist concerns still featured notably in the government bills put forward by the CPC during its first session as government. By the CPC’s third campaign and the subsequent session of Parliament, the prominence of populist issues took a noted decline. As previously discussed, the combination of legislation enacted in the first sitting of CPC government and the realization of roadblocks and limits to other populist ambitions by the maturing CPC government can explain some of this decline. At the same time, the decline is also indicative that party
placed less emphasis on this area of ideological difference as time progressed. When the new party was still in its infancy, and the need to firm up support was greatest, the party included populist appeals that would resonate with its Reform/Alliance base. Populist appeals could also be included in the early phases of the CPC policy strategy as it was not a particularly controversial issue. While the Reform/Alliance side had shown pronounced support for populist measures than the PC side, such measures were not offensive to PC supporters in the way that social tolerance issues were.

Finally, with regards to federalism and provincial powers, the findings showed that only minimal attention was given to this issue. For every indicator used, there is a consistent lack of emphasis on issues relating to federalism and provincial powers. The overall lack of action by the new party on this issue enabled it to avoid raising conflict. The findings support the second hypothesis yet they do raise the question of how did the CPC maintain the support of its Reform/Alliance side? A substantial amount of attention was paid to law and order issues by the new party. From the CPC platforms, right through to the legislation they introduced in Parliament, there was a consistent theme of law and order issues being a primary focus. This is an important finding as the literature acknowledged that law and order issues had been associated with the Reform/Alliance party. Thus, by focusing their policy agenda on these issues, the new party was able to secure support from that side. Crucially, law and order issues were not as controversial to the PC side as social tolerance issues were, and were generally issues the PC side could support. As a result, the CPC could shore up support amongst its Reform/Alliance base without risking alienating the PC side.

The expectation of the third hypothesis was that economic issues, as the sole area of ideological agreement, would be emphasized by the CPC. The CPC behaved as expected, with
economic issues being giving prevalence in the party's platforms, their questions asked during Question Period, and the legislation introduced when the party formed government. As economic issues were agreed on by both predecessor parties, focusing on the economy made sense for the new party as a way to focus on what united the majority of its members. Tax cuts were a common theme in the new party's policy agenda through its first decade plus in existence. The findings also documented that economic issues were the primary concern for Harper and party leadership in the new party.

The literature tells us that policy formation in Canadian federal parties is largely controlled by the Prime Minister and at most a handful of close advisors (Carty, 2002; Savoie, 1999; Savoie, 2010). For example, before a CPC MP could ask a question in Question Period, they had to be selected by Jason Kenney and rehearse the question with Kenney and Harper keeping a close eye. This implies that much of the credit for the policy agenda of the CPC falls on Harper. Harper's prioritization of economic issues helped the party electorally and more significantly helped maintain unity by focusing the party on an issue that both predecessor parties agreed down. By downplaying the areas of ideological disagreement, particularly social tolerance issues, Harper ensured that the cleavages that previously divided federal conservative parties were controlled in the CPC.

This chapter builds on the existing literature by utilizing multiple policy indicators to measure and analyze the policy agenda of the CPC. These findings also help to situate the new party in Canadian federal politics. The findings have demonstrated that the new party is very much a combination of the policy stances of its predecessor parties. Crucial to the task of preventing internal conflict and building a broader base of support was the decisions on which
elements from its predecessor parties to include and which to exclude in the new party’s policy agenda.
CHAPTER FOUR – POLICY CONVENTIONS

The previous chapter explored policy development, which in Canadian federal parties falls largely in the realm of party leadership. Party members and activists, however, do have an opportunity to voice their opinions on the direction of party policy at national party conventions. During these conventions delegates put forward policy resolutions, which if they have enough support according to rules designed by the party leadership, are then debated at the convention and voted on by all delegates. These conferences are routinely billed as establishing the policy agenda of the party going forward. In reality, the party leadership is not obligated to adhere to any policies supported by delegates and often formulate party policy with little regard for resolutions passed at conventions (Carty and Cross, 2006: 100). The presence of policy debates at conventions is significant though; Farnsworth et al. note the prevalence of substantial policy disputes during Canadian party conventions (Farnsworth et al., 2009: 291). Martin concurs arguing that "convention delegates spend considerable time and effort debating and ultimately adopting policy resolutions that the party is pledged to follow... in practice there is no guarantee that these resolutions will be implemented" (Martin, 2016: 260). Conventions fulfill an important role, acting as a forum for members to represent their constituency and their concerns in the larger party (262). Given the significance of policy goals to party factions, as discussed in the introductory chapter, there is an evident risk that policy debates could elevate into factional squabbles that pose a risk to party unity. Since parties experience such policy debates at conventions, how does a party manage these debates during conventions in a way that does not provoke serious factional conflict and maintains party unity? This chapter asks that question by analyzing the four policy conventions held by the CPC. Recalling that there were three areas of ideological difference between the predecessor parties, it is important to explore how the party
managed these conventions to keep tensions between members from the predecessor parties at a minimum.

**CONFLICT AT PROGRESSIVE CONSERVATIVE CONVENTIONS**

Stewart observed that conventions held by both the PC and Liberal parties have experienced a history of conflict. Going back into the history of conventions held by the PC party unveils a long list of fights. At PC conventions, the conflict was usually between party outsiders and the party hierarchy (Stewart, 1988: 151). What is particularly significant about the conflict at PC conventions is that it was regularly fought out along the main cleavages dividing the party. Indeed, much of the conflict that Perlin observed in his writing on factional divides in the PC party occurred at party conventions (Perlin, 1980: 71, 83). One of the more extreme examples of conflict at a PC convention occurred in 1966. The 1966 convention saw a challenge to and a heated battle over Diefenbaker’s leadership of the party (111). Perlin talks to an MP who was at the conference and recalled tensions running so high that physical altercations occurred (82). The clashes at PC conventions initially focused on the selection of leaders and party rules. An example includes a battle over a leadership review clause for a proposed party constitution; the intent of the clause was to avoid future battles over party leadership similar to what Diefenbaker had faced. The conflict over this clause was carried out between the Diefenbaker loyalists and the party establishment, which comprised the Diefenbaker opposition. Similarly, the election of a party president at the 1968 was also contested along similar divides. Party leader Robert Stanfield, who had the support of the party establishment, saw his preferred candidate for the party presidency in a significant battle against the preferred candidate of the Diefenbaker loyalists (113-114).
Notable conflicts would continue to be fought at PC conventions well into the next decade. Joe Clark would face contempt and scrutiny at multiple conventions as a result of his association with the party elites. At the 1976 conference, where Clark was elected party leader, attempts were made by Clark’s team to recruit support from high profile party members in a bid to appeal to the Diefenbaker loyalists (Stewart, 1988: 151). The challenge facing Clark was that he was perceived as being connected with the party establishment; which was still blamed for the removal of Diefenbaker. These challenges would continue at the 1983 convention where the lack of support for Clark in a leadership review would lead to the calling of a leadership convention. Goldfarb and Axworthy stress that the conflict between the supporters of Diefenbaker and his opponents in the party leadership was still being played out at the 1983 convention (Goldfarb and Axworthy, 1988: 22-25). Significantly for this chapter is that once again party conventions acted as a forum for conflict.

Under Harper, the CPC held four national party conventions beginning in 2005, again in 2008, and then in 2011 and 2013. With the history of fighting at PC conventions, the possibility of conflict between the predecessor parties occurring at these conventions is considerable. The limited literature on policy conventions in Canada stresses their importance. Savoie argues that "it is no exaggeration to write that party policy conventions are there to be managed by party leaders and their key advisers, not to generate new policies" (Savoie, 2010: 92). Accounts from the CPC's preparation in the lead up to the 2005 convention support the notion that party leadership attempts to manage the conventions. According to a former party insider, the party's leadership was driven to ensure that the convention resulted in the party being perceived as a moderate and mainstream party. Gary Lunn, an MP from the Reform/Alliance side was tasked with ensuring that the convention achieved the desired results of the party leadership; which was
to adopt moderate policies that portrayed the party as being moderate (Carson, 2014: 99-101). Thus, even though these conventions have minimal impact on the policy direction of the party, they are an important area of inquiry for understanding how the new party attempted to manage conflict. Analyzing the conventions also provides insight into how the decisions of party leadership had an impact on party members and activists.

An additional level of intrigue comes from exploring the CPC conventions when taking account of one of the major hurdles faced during the merger negotiations. Recall that there was substantial conflict between the predecessor parties over the method of leadership selection for the new party. The Alliance side wanted to utilize their system of one member one vote, where each party member was able to cast a ballot in support of their preferred leader while the PC side favoured a weighted system where each constituency association was given equal weight (Flanagan, 2007: 99-101). This is significant for analyzing the new party’s conventions as this is another potential area for conflict. As noted above, conflict had previously occurred at past PC conventions over party rules. Therefore, there is a distinct possibly of the CPC experiencing conflict over the rules for leadership selection at its conventions. The prospect for conflict is especially high when taking into account that the new party only had an interim constitution heading in the 2005 convention, with the aim of ratifying a final version there (85).

Brief mentions of CPC policy conventions are made in the existing literature. For example, Ellis and Woolstencroft discuss the 2005 convention including some of the challenges going into it, some of the issues arising during the convention and resolutions that were passed and defeated (Ellis and Woolstencroft, 2006). While the CPC conventions are referred to by the existing literature, the literature has not examined the potential for conflict at these events nor has it explored how the party leadership attempted to mitigate this potential conflict. The
existing literature has also not focused specifically on the conventions as a point of inquiry for adding to the understanding of the new party. Doing so offers greater insight and understanding of the policy stance of the CPC.

**PARTY CONVENTIONS IN THE COMPARATIVE LITERATURE**

The comparative literature references the significance and utility of studying party conventions. Carsey et al. point out that conventions feature party activists who fulfill the role of bringing new policy positions into the party (Carsey et al., 2006: 247-48). On a similar note, Herrera finds great utility from studying these party activists and party conventions as it enables the researcher to observe the differing policy positions within a party. This, in turn, is indicative of how united the party is ideologically; providing a more comprehensive look at divisions and factional divides in a party (Herrera, 1993: 76). Party conventions have been utilized by Webb and Childs to study the Conservative party in the United Kingdom, specifically due to their ability to indicate the policy positioning of party members from conventions (Webb and Childs, 2011: 384). Archer and Ellis also make use of party conventions as a valuable source to reveal the ideological composition of a party (Archer and Ellis, 1994).

Focusing on factionalized parties, the existing literature notes the risk of divisive factional conflict at party conventions. Karamichas and Botetzagias point out that factionalized parties have witnessed intense factional battles during conventions; in extreme instances, these battles have led to the party’s demise (Karamichas and Botetzagias, 2003: 81). There are multiple instances of factional conflict being experienced during conventions in the deeply factionalized ALP. Factions play a prominent role in policy conventions in Australia, where their defined input in the policy process is to advocate their preferred policy stances at the national conferences (Cross and Gauja, 2014: 616-17). For example, during the 1975 ALP
conference, Lavelle acknowledges significant factional battles over the economic ideological positioning of the party (Lavelle, 2005: 761). The 1991 national conference witnessed a particularly intense factional conflict that had carried over from previous debates on the privatization of telecommunications and air travel industries (Lloyd, 2000: 65). Similarly, there was a heated conflict between the right and left factions over workers rights and their inclusion in international trade agreements at the 1994 ALP national conference (Griffin et al., 2004: 94). Hearn analyzes the speech of ALP leader Mark Latham at the 2004 party convention noting that the address made appeals to both factions in an attempt to keep each faction content (Hearn, 2004: 198). Bramble and Kuhn point to the presence of factional conflict, at the 2008 ALP conference. Once again, the issue of dispute was the government’s management of the economy, in this instance, the proposed New South Wales government sell off of the publicly owned electricity system (Bramble and Kuhn, 2009: 287). Outside of Australia, in their analysis of the short-lived Federation of Ecologists Alternatives (FEA) in Greece, Karamichas and Botetzagias observed substantial amounts of factional conflict at their conventions which negatively impacted the party's organizational capacity (Karamichas and Botetzagias, 2003: 82). In Mexico, the PRI experienced battles over convention rules, such as delegate nomination, based on the perceived benefits the proposed rules granted particular factions (Langston, 2001: 488).

While the existing literature is well versed in the presence of factional conflict at conventions, discussion of how parties can deal with and mitigate this conflict is largely absent. Part of this can likely be attributed to differences in the frequency, governing rules and operation of conventions between countries and parties. However, this gap poses a significant problem for understanding how the CPC managed conflict at its conventions. Guidance can be found by turning to the literature on intraparty conflict resolution. Jacobson argues that it is essential to
include factions with more extreme positions in the negotiation process to maintain unity. He contends that by including radical positions alongside moderate positions, the advocates of the moderate positions are freed from having to take a position as a hard advocate for their side and can engage in more reasonable debate with their moderate counterparts (Jacobson, 1981: 471-73). Similarly, Lynch contends that spoiler factions must not be given opportunities to disrupt potential agreements. She stresses the importance of convention rules for limiting factions the chance to act as spoilers, and the key is not limiting or prohibiting issues from being discussed (Lynch, 2005: 210-12). While not speaking specifically to party conventions, this literature on conflict management in factional parties shares a theme of including the radical ideological factions and their policy positions as a way to help maintain party unity. This analysis will determine if these findings are applicable for the CPC case of managing long standing cleavages at policy conventions.

**HYPOTHESIS**

_The CPC will allow debate on the issues of ideological disagreement and party organizational matters to help maintain party unity._

The literature reviewed on conflict management stresses the importance of inclusion of all factions and their ideological beliefs in debates. This hypothesis tests these assumptions to see if the CPC was able to maintain party unity by allowing debate involving the cleavages at the party conventions. Since Canadian parties are not bound by the resolutions passed at conventions, this provides the CPC freedom to maintain the party leadership's preferred policy position regardless of any declarations made during conventions. Furthermore, the literature on intraparty conflict resolution suggests that by including the extremist policy positions there is a greater likelihood of the moderate positions attaining support. Accordingly, it is expected that by including debate
over the issues of ideological disagreement, the CPC will be able to focus on areas of agreement between the predecessor parties

**FINDINGS**

**SOCIAL TOLERANCE**

The analysis will begin with the most substantial area of ideological disagreement between the predecessor parties: social tolerance. Heading into the party’s first convention in 2005, there was notable concern over potential conflict surrounding social tolerance issues at the convention. The academic literature stresses the concern over this conflict as does media coverage surrounding the convention. In one article, Greenaway contends that the convention was “designed to bury the notion the new party harbours a hidden agenda” relating specifically to social tolerance issues (Greenaway, 2005). The majority of media coverage of the convention focused on motions that covered issues such as abortion and same-sex marriage. One delegate interviewed by Bailey emphasized the importance of addressing these social tolerance issues and then moving on to other priorities such as the economy and the environment. Another delegate, however, spoke with the media about his plans to fiercely advocate for a ban on same-sex marriage at the convention (Bailey, 2005). Peter MacKay indicated his plans to the media to push for a resolution calling for free votes on issues like same-sex marriage. MacKay suggested such a measure was necessary to avoid accusations of a hidden agenda from opposition parties. Media coverage of the convention regularly stressed the controversial nature of these motions and the risk debate over the motions posed to party harmony.

Ultimately the results at the convention would downplay many of the social tolerance issues. A motion to push forward with abortion legislation in Parliament was defeated at the convention. The results of the vote saw 55 percent of delegates vote against the motion. Harper
took a strong stance on the issue, telling delegates there will be no abortion law if he becomes Prime Minister (Panneta, 2005). The party leader’s statement along with the results of the vote was seen by the media as pushing the party more towards the centre. On the issue of same-sex marriage, a motion opposed to it received the support of 74 percent of delegates and Harper. MP Belinda Stronach is quoted as being alarmed by the support this motion received and how it could lead to negative portrayals of the party in the next election (Thompson, 2005a). The general perception of the media on the convention was that party had adopted stances that moved it closer to the centre and away from more radical social tolerance positions.

Shifting to the 2008 convention social tolerance issues continued to occupy a prominent place in the media coverage of the convention, albeit a diminished one compared with the 2005 convention. Once again, the media coverage stresses the potentially divisive nature of debates on social tolerance issues. Yaffe comments that while some of the motions are particularly right leaning, the party leadership has done a good job focusing the party on “policies that are mostly mainstream” (Yaffe, 2008). The media also acknowledges that if the motions were successful, they could negatively impact Harper’s ongoing attempt to move the party to a more centrist position. Concerns over the party’s image and appearing to be too accommodating of radical positions on social tolerance thus led to a limit on anything that would potentially portray the party as too far right. The social tolerance issues raised at the convention bore some similarity to the 2005 convention, yet with some important differences. Abortion legislation was not directly discussed during this convention. Instead, there was a motion calling for additional legal penalties against individuals who harm an unborn child while attacking the mother; a motion that critics felt would reignite the abortion debate. With regards to same sex marriage, there were no longer calls to ban same-sex marriage; now the motion sought to protect religious organization’s
ability to refuse to perform same-sex marriages. The distinction between both issues is significant as it indicates that while social tolerance issues remain on the agenda for the CPC convention, they are less controversial than the issues that were previously addressed.

By the 2011 convention, the attention on social tolerance issues had greatly diminished. There were very limited mentions of social tolerance motions in the convention’s media coverage. The little space that was dedicated to social tolerance issues emphasized that once again the party placed a high value on avoiding policy resolutions that could portray the party as being far right. An interview with a riding association president at the convention stressed that the party had to ensure its policy stance did not project the image of an extreme right-wing party (Cohen, 2011). One social tolerance motion that was passed at the convention reaffirmed the rights of religious organizations to refuse to perform same-sex marriages. While this demonstrates that social tolerance issues remained at the 2011 convention, there was only limited discussion or attention paid to them. Crucially, unlike the first two CPC conventions, the 2011 convention was not dominated by social tolerance issues. The media analysis yields little discussion of any social tolerance issues being raised during the convention. This finding is significant as it indicates a notable decrease of media concern to the possibility of convention conflict over social tolerance issues and an actual decline of social tolerance issues being raised at the convention.

Social tolerance issues would play a slightly more prominent role at the 2013 convention. One of the motions presented to delegates stipulated that the party would oppose any legislation that legalized euthanasia. Media reports note that the debate was healthy, with the motion carrying. More substantially, the abortion issue once again surfaced at this convention. The riding association of MP Mark Warawa, described as an anti-abortion politician, put forward a
motion calling to prohibit gender-selective abortion (Wingrove, 2013). Warawa had tried to raise this issue in the House of Commons earlier in the year. However, he was blocked from doing so by party leadership (Kennedy, 2013a). This motion was passed, which garnered praise for convention delegates from MP Jason Kenney. When asked if the passing of this motion reopened the abortion debate, Warawa was quick to deny that, yet Rob Anders another anti-abortion MP felt the passing of this motion sent a significant signal of support to socially conservative members of the party (Wingrove, 2013; Wood, 2013a). The passing of these social tolerance motions did lead some members of the media to conclude that the CPC membership “was not frightened to embrace social conservatism and a hard-core shift to the right” (Kennedy, 2013a). However, compared with the social tolerance issues debated at the first party convention, social tolerance issues played a much less controversial role in 2013. While the debate may have been heated over euthanasia legislation, that particular issue does not conjure up the controversial conflict like same-sex marriage had. Furthermore, while the motion on gender selective abortion did lead to discussion on abortion legislation, it is not the same as a motion calling for general abortion restrictions. The social tolerance issues being debated at the party conventions have thus progressed to less controversial and more significantly less divisive motions. This is best reflected by the significantly diminished attention on social tolerance motions and debates in the 2013 convention compared with the 2008 and especially the 2005 conventions. While the 2013 convention did have more time devoted to social tolerance issues than in 2011, the limited amount of discussion for each of the latter two conventions demonstrates that prominence and threat of social tolerance issues diminished considerably from earlier conventions.
POPULISM

Unlike social tolerance issues, there were not near as many contentious motions or as a high a level of fear surrounding populist ideas. During the 2005 convention, only limited attention was placed on populist motions. Motions were put forth that sought to allow the recall of sitting MPs based on signed petitions and to have referendums on major national issues (Dawson and Bailey, 2005). These motions along with ones calling for fixed election dates and calls to consider alternative electoral systems were all defeated at the convention. The presence of these motions and their defeat is noteworthy as it was done with little fanfare. Unlike social tolerance issues that were quite contentious at times, populist motions were dealt with relatively smoothly. The lack of attention and conflict on this area of ideological disagreement indicates that populist ideals were not a serious source of conflict at the 2005 convention.

Populist motions remained limited in their presence and impact at both the 2008 and 2011 conventions. The 2008 convention saw motions that tried to enforce salary limits on the bureaucracy, ten-year term limits on Supreme Court appointments and increased amounts of free votes in the House of Commons. In his address to the convention Harper pledged to move forward with an attempt to fill Senate vacancies through elections. These motions along with Harper’s speech all touch upon the populist ideals that were a source of ideological difference between the two predecessor parties. At the 2008 convention, these motions did not result in fierce debate or conflict. Instead, they comprised a relatively minor portion of the convention. Similarly, at the 2011 convention, there was very limited mention of any populist issues. In his address to that convention, Harper did try to portray his party as being a party of the people alluding to a populist theme. Once again though, the presence of populist issues at the 2011 convention was minor at best. For the first three CPC conventions, populist ideas only had a
limited presence that declined in each subsequent convention. Furthermore, the populist motions presented did not have a prominent role in the convention or pose the threat of divisive conflict.

There was a notable change at the 2013 convention where populist measures had a much more prominent role, yet without any sign of conflict. Much like in 2008, the public service was once again under attack at the 2013 convention, only with more enthusiasm this time. The bureaucracy was attacked on two fronts. First, public service pensions were severely criticized at the convention. Treasury Board President Tony Clement supported a motion that called for public sector pensions to be reduced through a defined contributions plan. Clement also spoke out against wages for the public sector, calling for them to be more comparable to wages in the private sector. The anti-public sector attitudes were in sync with the message delivered by Harper during his speech to delegates. Harper cast blame towards Ottawa elites and the bureaucracy and tried to position the CPC as the party of the people. This is particularly notable as the populist messaging at the convention was not only amongst the grassroots delegates; the party leadership and senior MPs were also supporting it.

The support of populist measures from the party leadership was most evident in dealing with the Senate at the 2013 convention. Leading up to the convention, several CPC appointed Senators were embroiled in scandals and facing calls to resign. Harper had sought the ability to reform the Senate selection process; shortly prior to the convention the Quebec Court of Appeal ruled that the federal government could not reform the Senate without provincial approval. Harper reflected on his government's past attempts at changing the Senate, claiming that only the CPC had attempted such reform and blamed the other parties and especially the courts for the lack of progress. Cabinet ministers Maxime Bernier and Pierre Poilievre were also quite active at the convention on the cause of Senate reform. Bernier advocated for holding a national
referendum on the future of the Senate, an idea that had strong support amongst delegates. Poilievre meanwhile continued to push for reform, and similar to the sentiments expressed by Harper, he argued that the CPC would be the only party to reform the Senate and enable the public to have a say in the process.

At none of the four conventions held by the CPC were populist motions the primary concern or a particularly divisive issue. Intriguingly, populist motions were initiated by the grassroots at the party’s first convention; at which the motions were defeated quietly. By the 2013 convention, it was the party leadership, including cabinet ministers, making use of populist appeals to rally support. The findings show that after their initial inclusion, populist motions remained on the margins for the 2008 and 2011 conventions and only returned to prominence at the behest of the leadership. This area of ideological disagreement was not a source of conflict for the CPC.

FEDERALISM

Similar to the findings of limited attention paid to federalism and provincial powers by the party in the policy chapter, the findings here indicate that federalism was not a major issue at the CPC conventions. Only at the 2005 convention was there any notable talk about reworking federalism and respecting provincial powers. Motions debated and passed at the convention emphasized the need to address and fix the fiscal imbalance with the provinces. Harper also placed emphasis on resolving the fiscal imbalance at the convention. Another issue Harper spoke to was the need to “practise an open federalism” which meant respecting areas of provincial jurisdiction, thus increasing provincial autonomy and power (Thompson, 2005). These topics correlate directly with one of the areas of ideological disagreement between the predecessor parties. Similarly, a motion at the 2008 convention once again called for improving
financial transfers with the provinces. Intriguingly, while this speaks to an area of ideological disagreement, very little attention was devoted to these issues at the conference. Furthermore, there is no indication of significant conflict over these issues. It is more telling that issues relating to federalism and provincial powers did not play a notable role in the 2011 or 2013 conventions. Overall, this area of ideological disagreement did not constitute a significant presence at the party conventions. The findings demonstrate that federalism was a concern addressed with only a minor amount of attention at the CPC’s first convention, followed by brief mention at the 2008 convention and absence at the party’s latter conventions.

**ECONOMY**

As expected, the new party looked to the one area of ideological agreement, the economy, as a source of unity at the conventions. While much of the media coverage leading up to the 2005 convention focused on social tolerance issues, economic matters were quite well represented among the motions debated at the conference. Motions were presented at the 2005 convention calling for personal and business tax relief, reducing the capital gains tax, less government intervention in the economy, reducing Employment Insurance premiums and government debt reduction. In total, motions relating to the economy made up nearly 25 percent of all the motions voted on at the convention (Vieira, 2005). A common theme amongst many attendees at the convention was that the economy should be the focus of the new party. The rationale for focusing on the economy was that through focusing on economic issues and moving past the controversial social tolerance issues; the party would have its best chance at electoral victory. Intriguingly this proposed route for electoral success is also the route for maintaining party unity, by emphasizing the issue of ideological agreement between the predecessor parties over areas of ideological difference.
Going into the 2008 convention, the economy continued to play an important role in policy discussions. Motions were put forward by delegates advancing economic issues, including a more radical motion calling for legislation requiring the federal government to pass a balanced budget every year. This motion originated from the party's grassroots, and there was little optimism that such a policy would be enacted by the party leadership. Party leadership also put emphasis on economic issues in speeches during the convention. Some of the messages put forward by party leadership did contrast from the standard economic positioning of the party. A global recession was impacting the economies of many countries, including Canada at the time of the convention. As a result, the CPC government had taken actions it normally denounced, including government intervention in the economy and deficit financing. Harper as well as Finance Minister Jim Flaherty strongly pushed the necessity of such measures to help get the Canadian economy through the recession. Even though the party leadership was taking a stance that opposed much of the economic beliefs of its supporters, this did not result in conflict at the convention. What the findings do show is that the economy was an issue of substantial concern by both party leadership and delegates at the 2008 convention.

By the 2011 convention, the emphasis placed on economic matters did not decline. Once again, grassroots delegates pushed forward motions covering economic matters. One example of the economic motions presented called to make the Income Tax Act less complex and simplify the corresponding tax forms. This motion was widely supported and endorsed by convention delegates. Similar to the 2008 convention, prominent party members also played up economic matters during the convention. Stockwell Day, a former cabinet minister who announced his retirement shortly before this convention, strongly advocated the CPC stance of lower taxes and limited government intervention and regulation in the economy at the convention. During his
speech to delegates, Harper put emphasis on his government's tax cuts, the creation of a business-friendly environment and the overall management of the economy. The 2011 convention saw the CPC continue the trend of all elements of the party emphasizing the one area of ideological agreement between the predecessor parties.

Finally, the 2013 convention would see the continuation of stressing economic policy by convention participants. A delegate from Eastern Ontario told the media that the focus of the convention needed to be on the party’s track record of successfully managing the economy (Kennedy, 2013). Similarly, other media reports observed that there was strong agreement amongst delegates that the primary focus of the party should be on economic policy. The repetitive finding of the party’s grassroots focusing on this area of ideological agreement was also matched by Harper continuing to focus on his economic management. Harper’s speech to convention delegates stressed the economic measures taken by the party; economic issues made up most of his speech. Measures that Harper pointed to during his speech included lowering the GST, tax reductions that saved families thousands of dollars including the child tax benefit and a free trade agreement with Europe. Harper also took the opportunity during his speech to take shots at the other parties’ economic policies. “Would the NDP have ever made a trade deal with Europe” Harper asked delegates along with claiming “the only trade policy Justin Trudeau's been working on is the marijuana trade” (Kennedy, 2013b).

Unlike some of the areas of ideological disagreement, economic measures were regularly emphasized at each of the CPC conventions. Most notable is that economic issues were routinely raised and stressed by both grassroots party members and the party leadership. This contrasts the treatment of economic issues to social tolerance issues. Social tolerance issues played a prominent role in the first CPC convention and a notable yet diminished role at the 2008
convention. By the last two conventions, however, social tolerance issues received much less attention. The social tolerance issues on the agenda at the first two conventions and even the ones that lingered for the 2013 convention did not have near the same broad level of support that economic issues did. Unlike economic issues, many social tolerance motions were not passed at the conventions and they often originated amongst the grassroots or lone members of the government, not the party leadership. As the hypothesis expected, the one idea of ideological agreement was a point of unity that was given significant attention at each convention. The media analysis found a recurring theme that economic matters were seen as the best way forward for the party to win and maintain government. In addition to electoral success, emphasizing the one area of ideological agreement also contributed to the unity of the party.

LAW AND ORDER

The analysis found a similar issue emphasized at the conventions as was found in the policy chapter: law and order. Although law and order issues were not noticeable during the party’s first convention, at each subsequent convention law and order issues played a significant role. At the 2008 convention, motions were passed that called for: a three-strike condition on violent offenders at which point they would be classified as a dangerous offender who could be incarcerated indefinitely, more efforts to reduce gang activity, and the removal of faint hope parole clause for offenders sentenced to 25 years in jail. In addition to these issues making up a considerable amount of the motions on the floor, Justice Minister Rob Nicholson also addressed the place that law and order issues held in the CPC government. Nicholson said he would ensure that law and order issues were a priority for the CPC government and would feature prominently in the upcoming legislative session. A similar occurrence happened at the 2011 convention, where Harper pledged to delegates that the party would “move forward with an omnibus justice
bill which... the opposition has blocked for years” (Postmedia News, 2011a). Motions at the 2013 convention followed suit with calls for offenders convicted of multiple serious crimes to be required to serve their sentences consecutively instead of concurrently, a plan to reduce prison costs by forcing inmates to work and appeals to crack down on the sex trade. Aside from the 2005 convention, law and order issues were present and notable at every CPC convention.

The inclusion of these issues is important for understanding how the new party appealed to both predecessor parties at the conventions. Their prevalence led some media commentators to argue that “the right-leaning impulses of the membership were on display” (Yaffe, 2008). However, just as the inclusion of law and order actions in CPC policy measures discussed in the previous chapter offered an incentive to members from the Reform/Alliance side without the risk of alienating PC supporters, so does their inclusion at the CPC conventions. Indeed, there was no report of any conflict or even the potential of conflict over law and order motions. Instead, these motions were largely supported; meaning that the majority of the party was supportive. As in the policy chapter, the law and order motions offer a stance that appealed strongly to the Reform/Alliance base while not being objectionable or controversial to PC members. As a result, the inclusion and prominence of law and order issues at the CPC conventions provided an opportunity to keep both sides happy and maintain party unity.

**INTERNAL ORGANIZATION**

One area where the party was not as successful at managing conflict were debates surrounding the internal organization of the party. One particularly contentious issue was the existence of a youth wing for the party. The PC party had a youth wing, where young members of the party held events and activities that were particularly aimed at their interests and allowed them to find a voice for themselves in the party. The Reform/Alliance party never had such an
organization as that would contradict their opposition to special status for any group. The CPC followed the Reform/Alliance precedent by not establishing a youth wing. In an interview with a former high-ranking CPC official who came from the PC side, they reflected fondly upon the PC youth wing recalling it as a training ground for future party members and politicians. The respondent's argument was countered by Harper, whom they remembered telling them "my youth wing is sitting in Parliament in my caucus" (R3). This sentiment was supported by Jeremy Harrison, a 27 year old CPC MP from Saskatchewan heading into the 2005 convention. At this convention, there were concerns of a particularly divisive motion calling for the creation of a youth wing. Harrison proclaimed that MPs like him were proof that there was no need to create such a wing. Harrison was also opposed to the youth wing as it represented a special interest, while delegates from the PC side claimed that the youth wing acted as a valuable training ground (MacCharles, 2005). The motion would be defeated at the convention and the defeat provoked a harsh response from some delegates. A 22 year old delegate from the PC side called the defeat “a huge slap in the face” and openly question his future in the partly. Similarly, a group of young delegates were vocally frustrated at the defeat and observed angrily shouting about the defeat in a hallway at the convention. Significantly, the reports on this incident noted that it was a barely noticeable one (Mills, 2005).

This issue would once again make it to the convention floor at the 2011 convention. During this convention, a motion called for the establishment of a youth wing for the CPC. A past president of the PC Youth Wing was instrumental in getting this motion to the convention arguing that youth was not a special interest as all individuals belong to that category at one point in their life. The motion did not last long and was defeated quite easily. An important difference from the 2005 convention, there were no signs of conflict or anger following the
defeat of this motion. This is important as while the issue did re-emerge, and in doing so brought up discussions of past divisions between the predecessor parties; at the 2011 convention this issue was not a source of conflict. Thus, while the CPC did face some conflict at their first convention through the debate over this organizational matter, that initial debate largely resolved the issue and future motions that tried to reopen the issue were both unsuccessful and not a source of conflict.

Where the CPC did not fare as well with organizational matters was with the leadership selection method. Recall that the method for leadership selection was one of the major sources of conflict during the merger process. At each CPC convention, this issue has been revisited as the result of motions attempting to alter the leadership selection formula to more closely resemble the Reform/Alliance method. The leadership selection formula was a particularly problematic issue at the 2005 convention. MP Scott Reid put forward a motion that would have altered the selection formula to be more representative of the number of party members in each riding. This motion infuriated Deputy Prime Minister and former PC leader Peter MacKay, who expressed feelings of betrayal and accused the former Alliance MP of trying to destroy the still fragile party. Media coverage of this conflict emphasized not only the contrasting preferences of the predecessor parties but also the past association of both the key players in this debate. This motion was defeated on the convention floor. The most noteworthy point of this conflict was that following MacKay’s public challenge of Reid’s motion, Harper was observed backstage upset and kicking over chairs (Flemming, 2005). Harper's backstage reaction subsequently drew considerable media attention. This moment escalated the controversy and the significance of this conflict in the party. The leadership selection debate was the most significant example of conflict between the predecessor parties at the first CPC convention.
This trend would continue at the 2008 convention, where another motion attempted to change the leadership selection formula. As in 2005, the motion called for the leadership selection formula to more closely resemble the Reform/Alliance model by allocating weight to each riding by their number of party members. The media coverage on this motion stressed the potential conflict that this motion could cause and once again pointed to the predecessor party origins of the debate. Continuing the trend from the 2005 convention, at the 2008 convention proponents of keeping the status quo tended to come from the PC side, while advocates for the motion had Reform/Alliance roots. This motion would be defeated, and most notably, it was defeated without the drama involved in the 2005 convention. There was no chair-kicking incident and no allegations of betrayal and claims that the unified party was at risk.

At the 2011 convention, the leadership selection issue would be raised again, with much more fanfare than in 2008. Scott Reid was once again the driving force behind a motion to transform the leadership selection formula, though it was largely speculated that he was acting on behalf of potential future leadership candidate Jason Kenney. Reid’s motion proposed a compromise between the systems employed by the predecessor parties, with a cap on how many votes could be allotted the stronger ridings, therefore, ensuring the ridings with smaller memberships would not get drowned out. MacKay was once again the vocal proponent of keeping the status quo, expressing frustration that Reid kept trying to bring this issue up despite being defeated at every other convention. Harper was reportedly concerned about the potential for conflict over this motion at the convention and pressed his caucus to engage in a civilized debate over the matter (Ditchburn, 2011). Crucially, while Harper appealed for reasoned debate he did not try to stop the debate from occurring. This fits with the expectations from Lynch, as by not prohibiting a divisive issue from being raised, Harper is not giving either side the
opportunity to act as a spoiler (Lynch, 2005: 210-12). Each side went all out to persuade delegates to their side during the convention; flyers were distributed, and each party offered luxurious hospitality suites with food and alcohol. As at the previous two conventions, this conflict was clearly fought along the lines of the predecessor parties with proponents of the status quo coming from the PC side and opponents having Reform/Alliance lineage.

Even though Reid’s motion had the support of 30 MPs and Senators (Cohen, 2011a), it was defeated at the convention. Significantly, the debate over this motion was regarded as being the fiercest debate during the convention (Postmedia News, 2011). Delegates who voted against the motion positively reflected on how tough it was to ensure the existing leadership selection method remained in place. It was not a complete victory for the PC side. Another motion was debated that called for this issue to not to be revisited at future conventions. Despite being defeated at three consecutive conventions, delegates did not support the idea of banning it from being considered at the next convention. This offered hope to Reid, who felt that the issue would not go away and would be revisited at the next convention. The continuing presence of this issue at CPC conventions indicates that the party to this point was not successful at managing conflict over this issue. While the level of drama was lower at the 2011 convention than in 2005, it was an increase from the 2008 convention. By the third convention, all the areas of ideological disagreement were either only minimally present on the convention floor or present in much a less controversial manner. The method of leadership selection remained, thus showing that this area of conflict between the predecessor parties was not only not disappearing, but it was also remaining a notable concern for party unity.

Changes to the leadership selection process were once again on the agenda heading into the 2013 convention and were once again seen as a source of potential conflict. At this
convention, there were two motions that sought to change the leadership selection formula, one sought to alter the weighting system and one called for a one member one vote system. As in the past, MacKay was the leading proponent of maintaining the status quo. Interestingly, the rhetoric from MacKay was toned down heading into this convention. Unlike previous conventions where MacKay had warned the party was at risk if the leadership selection process was altered, heading into the 2013 convention MacKay cautioned that altering the system would hurt party members in specific regions of the country. Media coverage referred to prominent MPs from the Reform/Alliance side that had supported changing the system in the past; intriguingly they were all relatively quiet this time. Aside from the regions of the country that stood to lose under the new system being predominantly PC prior to the merger, the media reports offered little evidence of the predecessor parties influence on this debate. Ultimately both motions would be defeated, and once again the existing leadership selection system prevailed. Following the defeat, MacKay expressed joy at the outcome and referred to the debates as just “inside baseball” (Wood, 2013). This is significant as it is a much more tempered response to this debate than had been shown previously by MacKay. As a result, it suggests that while the leadership selection debate has remained an issue for the CPC, the threat posed by the regular calls to alter the system has diminished.

That attempts have been made to alter the leadership selection process at every CPC convention is problematic for the hypothesis. It is an example of an area of conflict between the predecessor parties that has refused to go away. What stands out about this issue is that it is the only area of conflict between the predecessor parties that persists at CPC conventions. The areas of ideological disagreement were present to varying levels concerns at the early CPC conventions, yet by the 2013 convention, they were not a source of conflict. Only leadership
selection remains as a potential fault line. This is not saying that the party has not made progress though at remedying this issue. In an interview with a party member, the member reflected that the motions to change the leadership selection method were defeated by an increasing margin at each subsequent convention (R5). Indeed, even the level of conflict did diminish by the 2013 convention. These findings do indicate that while leadership selection remains a concern for maintaining harmony in the CPC, its threat to party unity has decreased. Thus, while this is not an area of completely successful management by the party leadership, it is far from a defeat.

CONVENTION CONTROL

Recall that the literature suggested the most successful path to preventing conflict at the conventions was to limit the options for factions to act as spoilers, such as by limiting or restricting issues from being discussed. The analysis of media coverage of the conventions sheds important light onto how the party attempted to manage the issues and the potential conflict at the conventions. Leading up to the 2005 convention, CPC leadership tried to do the opposite of what the hypothesis expected. Party leadership put forward a motion that would have eliminated any debate on social tolerance issues; the motion called for MPs to have free votes in Parliament on any of these moral issues. If such a motion carried, there would have been no need for the convention to debate any issues like same-sex marriage or abortion as there would be no party policy on the issues, MPs would simply vote their conscience or the will of their constituents. This proposal received a fierce backlash, as it was perceived as being excessive top-down control of the party. The negative reaction was enough for the party leadership to back down on this proposal and allow the social tolerance issues to be debated at the convention (Dawson and Bailey, 2005; Yaffe, 2005; Galloway, 2005). The CPC leadership would not repeat this misstep at future conventions. The CPC thus did act as the literature expected by not providing either
side the opportunity to act as a spoiler; though it did come quite close to doing so leading up to
the first convention.

Party leadership did take several different approaches to exerting influence and a level of
control over subsequent conventions. Much more subtly, the party tweaked the rules regarding
convention participation and debating motions. For the 2008 convention, debate time was
reduced approximately 30 percent, and policy workshops were regularly scheduled at the same
time as celebratory events. Academic Faron Ellis was quoted by one newspaper arguing that
“policy, and even governance of the party, is not what (this convention) is about” (Mayeda,
2008a). The cost of attending the 2008 convention was also substantial, leading to allegations
that the convention was priced out of the reach of many potential delegates and subsequently
more about “partying than policy-making” (Mayeda, 2008a). Likewise, the requirements for
policy motions to get to the floor and be passed were also seen as particularly restrictive at the
2011 convention. The requirements included a motion garnering a double majority to pass; that
is a majority of delegates in addition to a majority of provinces. As a consequence, less than two
dozen motions made it through out of hundreds proposed. These regulatory actions by the party
demonstrate that the CPC leadership did take some steps to manage the debate at the
conventions. However, these steps were all minor and did not likely play a major role in
preventing discord from surfacing.

A more significant step taken by party leadership was the treatment of media at the
conventions. Beginning with the 2008 convention and continuing through the 2013 convention,
the media was increasingly limited in their access and ability to cover debates and the
conventions overall. The media was allowed to witness Harper addressing the 2008 convention
before being ushered out. The policy workshops, where potential conflict could materialize,
were off limits to the media. The media was not allowed to socialize with delegates and were
dependent on intermittent updates from cabinet ministers in a controlled area to be informed on
the transpiring of policy debates. A spokesperson for the Prime Minister claimed that “the
convention organizers decided to hold the workshops behind closed doors so delegates could
engage in a fulsome debate” (Mayeda, 2008). A direct consequence is that the ability of the
media to observe and report on any conflict including debates touching on long standing
cleavages was severely curtailed. While the media was still able to garner insight and report on
the conventions, their limited access opens the possibility that conflict did exist but was confined
to closed-door sessions. By the 2013 convention, the media was increasingly critical of the
limited access they were given to the conventions. Andrew Coyne wrote “if there is one image
that defines this past Conservative convention, it is surely that of a closed door” (Coyne, 2013).
Once again reporters were barred from the policy sessions, and they were prevented from
accessing delegates as they attended the convention. The limited media access granted by the
CPC is an important step for understanding how the party managed conflict. In addition to
allowing controversial issues to be debated, the party severely impaired the ability of the media
to observe and subsequently report on these debates and any conflict that may have occurred.
The media restrictions from 2008 onwards would not directly stop conflict from occurring;
instead, they would limit the appearance and discussion of any conflict. This does not mean that
reports of conflict and controversial motions could be completely concealed. The findings
explored above demonstrate that is not the case. By limiting what the media could observe and
report, however, the party was able to ensure it was presented in a more unified light.
CONCLUSION

Policy conventions have been long documented as venues for factional conflict both in the PC party and in the comparative literature on factionalized parties. The CPC faced a particular challenge as there were three areas of ideological disagreement between the predecessor parties that posed potential fault lines for conflict to erupt at policy conventions. Division over organizational matters also posed as potential sources of conflict at CPC conventions. Possible ways for the new party to avoid conflict at the conventions suggested by existing literature included limiting the opportunity for a faction to play a spoiler roll by allowing controversial positions to be included at the conventions. The literature also offered that including the more radical positions would free up moderates from trying to appeal to the more radical wings of the party, therefore allowing the moderates to focus on mainstream positions with other moderates.

The findings demonstrate that the new party, for the most part, followed the expectations of the literature, which enabled the CPC to avoid most occurrences of conflict at their conventions. Heading into the 2005 convention, the party attempted to limit debate on social tolerance issues with a motion that would have allowed for free votes on moral issues. Had that motion carried, any debate on controversial issues such as abortion and same sex marriage would not have been necessary since the party would not have had a defined policy on them. This motion provoked considerable controversy and was subsequently dropped. Social tolerance issues were thus present, to a notable extent for the party's first two conventions. Motions on social tolerance issues were controversial and an indication of conflict over an area of ideological disagreement between the predecessor parties. These motions were generally defeated and by the party's last two conventions their prominence had decreased substantially. Furthermore, the
motions raised regarding social tolerance issues covered different issues by 2013 than they had at previous conventions and were much more moderate.

By allowing debates on the controversial issues to occur, the party was able to achieve its desired outcome: a moderate policy stance focusing on the area of ideological agreement, the economy. The findings show that economic issues were a priority for party leadership and the grassroots at each convention. Media interviews with delegates along with a number of motions and Harper's convention speeches all emphasized the economy. A focus on the economy was seen as the most electorally viable path for the party. This path was also beneficial for party unity as it put the focus on the one ideological area that both predecessors agreed on.

Additional support for the hypothesis comes from exploring the lack of populist ideas and issues relating to federalism and provincial powers at the conventions. For the latter, there is only a minimal discussion of related issues at the conventions. As for populist measures, a handful of initiatives were put forth at the party's first convention and were all quietly defeated. There is a slight deviation as in the final convention under study; populist measures did take on a more prominent role and were emphasized by Harper. Aside from that one convention, however, both of these areas of ideological disagreement are greatly downplayed in the new party. This is further evidence of the party aiming to focus on what the predecessor parties had in common.

As in the previous chapter on the CPC's policy agenda, a policy stance that drew support from both predecessor parties was law and order issues. Except for the 2005 convention, law and order issues were frequently given prominence at the CPC conventions. This is significant as law and order issues strongly appeal to the party's Reform/Alliance base while also offering a policy stance that the PC side could support. By having a considerable portion of the
conventions focus on law and order issues, the new party ensured that prominence was given to an area that was agreeable to a larger portion of the party.

The CPC was not entirely successful at avoiding conflict. Organizational issues, particularly the leadership selection method had been contested at every CPC convention. In each instance, a motion was put forward by former Reform/Alliance member calling to transform the leadership selection process to more closely resemble the Reform/Alliance's one member one vote system. These motions were consistently opposed by former PC MPs, especially by MacKay, who insisted on retaining the system agreed upon in the merger that gave each riding an equal say in selecting the party leader. The endurance of this conflict is troubling for the management of unity in the party. This concern is partially tempered as the findings note that support for these motions has diminished at each convention. However, the persistence of this divide over the leadership selection method serves as a notable example of the remaining divides in the new party.

While the CPC quickly abandoned attempts to directly limit divisive debate at the conventions, it did exercise substantial control in another manner. Media coverage of the conventions was increasingly restricted as the party matured. The findings noted that the media were eventually prohibited from discussion with delegates and were not able to view the policy debates. A direct consequence is that if heated debate did occur inside the convention, the media and public might not be aware of it. This is beneficial for party unity as it results in a unified image of the party being presented. Especially when considering that most of the motions passed were moderate motions, the image that the public attains of the conventions are not ones of conflict or even of divisive issues comprising a part of the new party. Thus, by restricting media
access to the policy conventions, the new party was able to mitigate conflict by influencing the portrayal of the party.

Harper fulfilled a particularly prominent role in the management of the conventions. Through his speeches, Harper drew attention to and stressed economic issues, which in the process focused party members from both predecessor parties on their shared values.

Additionally, aside from the initial misstep leading to the 2005 convention, Harper and party leadership did not prevent contentious issues from being discussed. Harper's approach to these controversial debates was best exemplified in the leadership selection debates where the media reports noted his appeal for a civil debate. This approach did not provide the Reform/Alliance side any opportunity to take on a spoiler role. Finally, while the media were critical of their restricted access to the conventions, this decision from party leadership allowed the conventions to have potentially heated debate without subsequent media reports on old cleavages emerging in the new party.
CHAPTER FIVE – PATRONAGE APPOINTMENTS

The next three chapters focus on personnel and patronage decisions in the CPC. This chapter asks if the CPC utilized two specific types of patronage appointments, both which have a long history in Canadian federal politics, as a resource to mitigate conflict? To answer this question, it is first necessary to explore the nature of patronage appointments. Patronage in politics can take on many forms, and patronage posts are distributed across a wider group of individuals than the party in public office. Flinders et al. provide a useful starting point with their definition of patronage “as an incentive system denoting an exchange relationship in which a patron... exerts control over another agent through the provision of certain goods or services” (Flinders et al., 2012: 512). In a political context, patronage occurs when a political party bestows goods and services, such as government jobs, on patrons who have provided support to the party, such as financial contributions or votes. Individuals rewarded with political patronage can include friends of politicians in power (Greene and Shugarmma, 1997: 39). For a party to distribute patronage rewards, the party must be in power. Perlin noted that patronage ambitions can serve as a motivation leading to factional conflict and that they can be the easiest to be resolved, but they require the party to be in power (Perlin, 1980: 4-5). The range of patronage benefits varies from small one-time incentives to tenured senior government positions with a substantial salary. Historically, political parties have utilized the distribution of patronage rewards to help establish themselves. Flinders et al. note that political parties have viewed patronage as a major tool at their disposal (Flinders et al., 2012: 512). Parties in countries such as Iceland, Ireland, Italy, and the United States have all relied to varying degrees on patronage rewards to benefit the party’s development (Kristinsson, 1996: 433). Canadian parties in
particular, have a historically robust and well-documented relationship between the growth of the parties and the distribution of patronage rewards (446).

Since patronage has played such a significant role in the development of parties when factional conflict is absent, this raises the question of how patronage has been utilized in factionalized parties? There is an extensive body of comparative party literature on candidate nomination in factionalized parties, which illustrates how the nomination process is used to manage factional tensions in parties (Tomita et al., 1981; Bouissou, 2001; Wuhs, 2006). Similarly, the literature on cabinet appointments has uncovered numerous examples where party leadership distributes cabinet post to factional members based on the strength of factions in the party, with the intention of minimizing factional discord (Ennser-Jedenastik, 2013; Gamson, 1961; Warwick and Druckman, 2006). Both candidate nomination and cabinet appointments are covered in subsequent chapters. This chapter asks, aside from these two major types of patronage posts, are there are other types of patronage positions that can be utilized to maintain party harmony?

The existing literature on patronage distribution in factionalized parties is predominantly focused on candidate nomination and cabinet appointment. Unfortunately, the literature on other forms of patronage posts is not as well developed. The literature on the LDP in Japan stresses the important role that factions play in having their members appointed to various party posts. Factional leaders ensure that their members are not only appointed as candidates or to the cabinet, but also to jobs within the government and the party bureaucracy. The distribution of these posts is seen as being an important recruitment tool for the factions and for maintaining unity between the factions (Tomita et al., 1981). For example, factions in the LDP remained relevant to members during the 1990s due to their influence over the patronage appointment
process. Similarly, in the DPJ, factions have actively participated in the distribution of patronage posts. Younger members of the party have been known to join smaller factions to enhance their own standing and increase their odds of attaining patronage posts. Notably, one of the contributing factors to maintaining party unity has been the balanced dispersion of patronage posts amongst the factions (Kollner, 2004: 94, 100-02). Bettcher notes that such appointments are “coveted posts (for politicians)... to increase their own power and electoral competitiveness” (Bettcher, 2005: 346-47). Similar findings come from the literature on the CD party in Italy. In addition to the distribution of cabinet seats in the CD, factional affiliation is found to play a strong role in determining appointments to jobs in the public service at a multitude of levels. Bettcher stresses that much of the state apparatus is utilized by the CD party and its factions to distribute patronage rewards in the form of jobs for faction members. This includes appointments to jobs from the national level of government down to municipal government posts and has even required an increase in the number of government posts to satisfy the needs of the CD party’s factions (351-52). This literature suggests that factions do make use of patronage posts to manage party factions. This chapter seeks to determine if the CPC utilized patronage appointments in a similar manner with two key forms of patronage in Canadian politics.

**PATRONAGE IN CANADA**

As already noted, patronage has played a significant role in the growth of Canadian parties (Kristinsson, 1996: 446). There is a limit on the types of patronage available for Canadian federal parties, as they typically lack the party in central office (Carty and Cross, 2006: 96). The public service in Canada, as in other Westminster systems, is a professional service not subject to removal due to partisan interests or when a new party takes office (Savoie, 1999: 72). This removes the option of appointments to party bureaucracy as being a major source of
patronage for Canadian parties. Key options still exist, especially since “federal and provincial cabinets maintained partial control over the distribution of benefits from economic development programs” benefits which include “discretionary appointments such as judgeships and positions on agency boards” (Greene and Shugarmna, 1997: 41). Known as Governor in Council (GIC) appointments, these appointments fill vacancies “including officers of Parliament, officials reporting to Parliament, judges, ambassadors and high commissioners, senior public servants, senior executives and directors of Crown corporations, and members of regulatory boards, tribunals and agencies” (McGrath, 1985: 29).

Formally, GIC appointments come from the Governor General. However, it is the Prime Minister who was the ultimate say on who is appointed. For example, Bakvis found that Liberal Prime Minister Jean Chretien made 2,758 GIC appointments between 1993 and 1998. Crucially, these appointments were at the discretion of Chretien without any formal requirement for scrutiny or outside consultation (Bakvis, 2001: 74). Savoie observes that Prime Ministers may choose to consult outsiders on appointments, but this is not a necessity nor is it a requirement that any advice offered be followed (Savoie, 1999: 264). Historically, the Prime Minister has handed out GIC appointments to provide “paid employment to supporters of the government or members of political networks because of their affiliations” (Scratch, 2006: 1). It is not surprising that McGrath notes that Prime Ministers routinely face scrutiny and criticism over their choice of appointments (McGrath, 1985: 29). Savoie points out that "the media are constantly on the lookout for appointments to boards or commissions to see if there is any link to the party in power" (Savoie, 2008: 304).

The distribution of GIC appointments and patronage appointments led to significant internal turmoil in the PC party from the end of the 1970s through the 1980s. In 1979, the PCs
won a minority government led by Joe Clark. Only a few months later the government’s minority status enabled opposition parties to bring down the government and the PCs would lose the subsequent election. Among the many critiques applied to Clark and his government, one of the popular ones regarded Clark’s refusal to reward party loyalists with patronage benefits, including GIC appointments. The short life span of Clark’s time as Prime Minister cannot be solely attributed to his lack of patronage appointments; there were many other factors at play. The next party leader, Brian Mulroney was aware of the criticisms of Clark’s lack of patronage appointments and would be informed by those critiques upon taking office in 1984 (Harrison, 1995: 86-87).

In the lead up to the 1984 campaign, Liberal Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau retired and was replaced by John Turner. In his final month as Prime Minister, Trudeau appointed 225 of his associates and friends to GIC posts. A further 18 Liberal loyalists were appointed after Turner took over according to the terms of a secret agreement between Trudeau and Turner (Harrison, 1995: 86). The issue of patronage appointments was capitalized on by the PCs in the 1984 campaign, making these appointments one of the key issues of the campaign. Mulroney routinely and loudly pounced on the Liberal party for their blatant patronage (Greene and Shugarmna, 1997: 41). One of the most memorable moments in Canadian campaign history followed when Mulroney challenged Turner during a nationally televised debate, accusingly pointing his finger towards Turner and telling Turner that he had a choice and he chose to make those appointments (Harrison, 1995: 86).

After winning the 1984 election, the PC government under Mulroney would behave in a very similar fashion as Trudeau had with the distribution of patronage appointments. Greene and Shugarmna describe the patronage appointments doled out by Mulroney as “the most efficient
system yet devised for filling the order in council positions with his own loyal party supporters” (Greene and Shugarmna, 1997: 41). In March of 1985, for example, the entire board of Air Canada was replaced with supporters of the PC party. The boards of other crown corporations such as Via Rail, CN, and Ports Canada would meet a similar fate (Harrison, 1995: 87). Greene and Shugarmna cite the Immigration and Refugee Board as a preeminent destination for faithful PC members. The appointment secretary for the PCs was quoted as saying that “in some cases, it was reward over competence” (Greene and Shugarmna, 1997: 42). Wardhaugh pointed out that many Western Canadians, in particular, became angered by Mulroney’s use of patronage, likening it to the same practiced by past Liberal governments (Wardhaugh, 2007: 241). Recall, that much of the initial support for the Reform party originated in Western Canada as the result of feelings of alienation from government and concerns that MPs were not representing the interest of their constituents (Laycock, 2002; Ellis, 2005).

The opposition of the Reform party to patronage appointments may appear obvious considering their pro-populist stance discussed in the introductory chapter. Looking at the campaign platforms from the Reform/Alliance party provides direct statements against patronage appointments. For the 1993 campaign, the Reform Party campaigned for “restrictions and limitations on the number and types of Orders-in-Council permitted by a government” (Reform Party of Canada, 1993: 3). Orders-in-Council included the granting of GIC appointments. In a similar vein, the 2000 Alliance platform advocated to “allow for Parliamentary review of important government appointments” under the heading of “Making government more responsive to citizens” (Canadian Alliance Party, 2000: 20). This is further evidence of the opposition to patronage appointments by Reform/Alliance under the theme of government representing citizen’s interest against entrenched parties and their cronyism. The
Reform/Alliance party was not alone in its opposition to patronage appointments. PC platforms from this period also indicate an intention to reform the appointment process (Progressive Conservative Party of Canada, 1997). The PCs, however, had called for change before only to engage in the same practice once elected while the Reform/Alliance side had never had that opportunity.

Throughout the 1990s and into the 2000s, concerns continued to be raised regarding the patronage-based nature of GIC appointments. Reports issued noted that public perception felt these appointments had little to do with merit. Minor changes made to the appointment processes granted more input for MPs. These changes, however, only granted advisory powers to the House and still left the final say in the hands of the Prime Minister. The final recommendations made before the CPC would take office came in the form of a report from the President of Treasury Board in 2005. The report advocated giving the boards of Crown Corporations more input on establishing criteria and guidelines for future appointments. Once again, these recommendations did not suggest altering the Prime Minister's power in distributing appointments (Scratch, 2006: 1-7).

Upon forming government, Harper and the CPC enacted the Federal Accountability Act, a key part of their campaign against the Liberal government and the sponsorship scandal. The sponsorship scandal resulted from the Liberal government's sponsorship program which aimed to promote the federal government's contributions to the province of Quebec. Massive corruption was unearthed in this program, including the awarding of government money to Liberal associated ad firms that performed little or no work for the money, and in some instances donated part of the money back to the party. One component of the Federal Accountability Act
addresses GIC appointments by calling for the creation of a Public Appointments Commission. The Commission was:

\textit{to oversee, monitor, review and report on the selection process for appointments and reappointments by the Governor in Council to agencies, boards, commissions and Crown corporations, and to ensure that every such process is widely made public and conducted in a fair, open and transparent manner and that the appointments are based on merit} (Canada. Parliament, 2006: 176)

This position was never filled. After a vote in the House of Commons (where the CPC was in a minority position) rejected Harper’s initial choice for Commissioner, Harper responded by scrapping the commission (Weston, 2012). There has not been substantial scholarly attention paid to the appointments made by Harper and any possible patronage motivations behind them. Did Harper use GIC appointments to reward supporters of the predecessor parties or of the CPC. Some media and online reports have explored whether GIC appointments under Harper were patronage based, but the academic literature has not adequately addressed this topic.

Most intriguing for this analysis is not whether the CPC rewarded its supporters with patronage posts. Instead, the question is whether GIC appointments were distributed to supporters of either of the predecessor parties as a way to build party unity? The comparative literature on factionalized parties demonstrates that factions exert significant influence over patronage appointments, securing appointments for their own members (Bettcher, 2005: 346-47; Kollner, 2004: 100-02). Patronage appointments have been found to offer an incentive for members to become involved in with the party. For the party leadership, the distribution of patronage posts has provided a useful tool for managing factional conflict. Combined with the history of GIC appointments being distributed as patronage rewards in Canadian politics, the possibility of the CPC utilizing GIC appointments as a way to build party unity is plausible. The question becomes more intriguing when the opposition to patronage appointments by the
Reform/Alliance side is taken into account. The Reform/Alliance opposition, especially when considering that by many measures they were considered the stronger party in the merger, adds a further dimension which warrants a scholarly inquiry into the CPC’s distribution of patronage appointments. In the interviews conducted for this project, a high-ranking staffer under Harper suggested that the study of patronage appointments in the new party would be a worthwhile endeavour. This respondent’s perception was that they “did not think either side was excluded” from appointments, but they admitted they had no numbers to support that claim (R1).

The second form of patronage appointments available to Canadian Prime Ministers are appointments to the Senate. The Canadian Senate acts (and was intended to do so) as “a chamber of sober second thought from the perceived more radical lower house” (Docherty, 2002: 28). Before a bill passed by the House of Commons can become law, it must first be reviewed and adopted by the Senate (28). Smith is quick to point out that despite having the ability to strike down proposed bills, the Senate rarely exercises that power (Smith, 2003: 10). Individuals are appointed to the Senate as a representative of a province or territory, keeping in line with the aim of the Senate acting as a body to represent regional interests. There has been little change or transformation in the workings of the Senate since its inception, Hicks and Blais contend that it “has remained virtually unchanged from the configuration agreed to by the Fathers of Confederation” (Hicks and Blais, 2008: 11).

Officially it is the Governor General who appoints individuals to the Senate, and upon appointment, that individual is entitled to remain a Senator until the age of 75. The ultimate power over Senate appointments, however, rests with the Prime Minister. It is at the sole discretion of the Prime Minister which individuals will be appointed (Hicks and Blais, 2008: 11). Docherty points out that this power can be utilized to achieve other representational imperatives.
for the PM, such as gender, ethnicity, and religion. Using Senate appointments to increase representation of groups not adequately represented in the House of Commons has become a tradition. One form of representation through Senate appointment that has never been in doubt is political. According to Docherty, over 95 percent of appointees are from the same political affiliation as the sitting Prime Minister (Docherty, 2002: 30-31). The implication of this form of patronage is that “appointments are used first and foremost as a political reward for party faithful, both elected and those who toil behind the scenes” (Docherty, 2002: 31).

Unsurprisingly the patronage basis of appointment to the Senate has been a source of controversy throughout its existence. Multiple sources have made calls to reform the Senate including politicians, academics and members of the public. There have also been multiple attempts at reform. The failed Charlottetown Accord of 1992 included an attempt at Senate reform (Docherty, 2002: 28). Parliamentary hearings and Royal Commissions have also undertaken examinations of the Senate. Hicks and Blais observe that most of the recommendations since the 1990s have advocated Senators be selected by direct election (Hicks and Blais, 2008: 10). One of the common themes in most calls to reform the Senate is to modify the appointment process. The centering of power over Senator selection in the hands of the Prime Minister is a common grievance of Senate commentators (Smith, 2003: 3). Pellerin argues that most calls for Senate reform originate initially as populist beliefs from the social left and more recently the populist right (Pellerin, 2006: 4). With their emphasis on populist ideology, it should not be surprising that the Reform/Alliance party were strong proponents of altering the Senate, especially the selection mechanism and length of term. Recall that there was a strong linkage between the Reform/Alliance party and calls for more involvement of citizens in politics, including the election of Senators (Ellis, 2005, Laycock 2002). The first principle in the
Reform party’s 1993 campaign platform calls for the establishment of a “Triple-E” Senate. A Triple-E Senate would see all senators elected, with each province getting equal representation, ensuring that the Senate would be effective in advocating regional concerns (Reform Party of Canada, 1993: 2). Similarly, the Alliance platform in 2000 made a slightly less radical call to appoint only Senators who had been elected in the province they would be representing (Canadian Alliance Party, 2000: 20). There is no mention of Senate reform in the 1993 or 2000 PC platforms, and the issue only receives several sentences in the 1997 platform indicating a willingness to let provinces recommend potential senators and limiting term length to ten years (Progressive Conservative Party of Canada, 1997: 43).

The CPC government under Harper did attempt to alter the Senate selection process. In their first parliamentary session as government, the CPC introduced the Senate Tenure Bill and the Senate Appointment Consultations Act. The latter aimed to allow the federal government to hold consultative provincial elections on who should be appointed to the Senate, while the former sought to limit Senators to an eight-year term. Both bills died with the 2008 election call (Hicks and Blais, 2008: 12). In 2014, the Canadian Supreme Court issued its decision in a reference case regarding the legality of the federal government reforming the Senate without approval from the provinces. The Supreme Court ruled that provincial consent was required to make any significant changes to the Senate and its appointment process (Supreme Court of Canada, 2014). As a result, for the nine years of CPC government, Senate appointments were governed by the same process as they had been for previous governments, at the discretion of the Prime Minister.

Current Liberal Prime Minister Justin Trudeau has attempted to alter the Senate appointment process by appointing non-affiliated Senators. These Senators do not represent any
political party in the Senate. The appointments follow the recommendation of an arm's length advisory board. The board received 2700 applications to fill 21 vacancies and recommended 105 of those individuals to Trudeau. Trudeau chose nine of those individuals to appoint to the Senate in October 2016 (Bryden, 2016). This transformation is significant, particularly for the partisan makeup of the Senate. If this appointment process continues, independent Senators will gain a majority in the Senate. However, while the board screening potential applications does bring a degree of merit to the appointment process, the final decision remains with the Prime Minister.

This chapter seeks to determine if appointments were utilized to by Harper as a tool for building party unity? How did Harper manage potential conflict over appointments to the Senate? These questions are particularly intriguing as we know from the comparative literature that factional parties frequently use patronage appointments to maintain unity amongst the factions. The long history of Senate appointments being distributed as patronage rewards in Canadian federal politics certainly raises the possibility that the CPC could use this form of patronage to manage conflict. The question becomes more engaging when the continued opposition to Senate appointments as a patronage tool by the Reform/Alliance side is taken into account. Furthermore, with the long history of Senate appointments as a patronage reward, it is foreseeable that members of the CPC with PC lineage could have been expecting Senate appointments for themselves. If Harper were not to engage in this patronage distribution, he faced the risk of angering the PC side. Alternatively, the distribution of patronage rewards to former PC members risked angering the Reform/Alliance side due to their opposition to patronage. An analysis of the distribution of Senate appointments in the new party is, therefore, crucial for understanding how Harper was able to balance the competing interests in this patronage process and maintain party unity.
HYPOTHESES

H1: It is expected that the CPC will use GIC appointments as a patronage tool to manage conflict and that more of these appointments will be given to CPC members from the PC side to further expand support for the new party amongst former PC members.

This hypothesis takes the findings from the comparative literature on patronage distribution in factionalized parties and tests those findings on a specific form of patronage distribution in the Canadian case. While the comparative literature is not comprehensive on patronage beyond candidate nominations and cabinet appointments, it does emphasize the significance of patronage in managing party unity. GIC appointments were shown to be a major form of patronage distribution in Canadian politics. This hypothesis will demonstrate how the new party managed patronage. Further, acknowledging the Reform/Alliance opposition to patronage appointments, exploring how party leadership could manage conflict through patronage distribution will shed valuable insight on Harper's approach to maintaining party unity. The expectation is that even though the Reform/Alliance side was perceived as the stronger side in the merger, they will receive fewer nominations than the PC side due to their predisposition against patronage appointments. The PCs however, had much a long history with the distribution of patronage posts, and this hypothesis expects that by giving these appointments to PC members, the new party will expand its support on the PC side.

H2: The distribution of Senate appointments will be more favourable to the PC side, despite the Reform/Alliance side being stronger.

Similar to the first hypothesis, this hypothesis examines another form of patronage appointments and how they were distributed in the CPC. The literature review noted the long history of Senate appointments as a kind of patronage, thus providing an intriguing avenue to test the applicability of the findings of the comparative literature to the CPC. The comparative literature found that distribution of posts goes according to the strength of the faction. Exploring this hypothesis is
particularly intriguing given the well-documented stance of the Reform/Alliance side towards Senate appointments. Based on this opposition to Senate appointments, the expectation is that the stronger Reform/Alliance faction will not receive the majority of Senate appointments. How Harper was able to balance this long-standing tradition of patronage appointments given the strong sentiment of the Reform/Alliance side against these appointments is a fundamental component of understanding how the new party functioned and how it was able to manage conflict.

**FINDINGS**

Table 5.1 shows the number of GIC appointments by association with a predecessor party for each of the first three years of CPC government. The first point that stands out is the limited number of appointments going to individuals with past association to either of the predecessor parties. Only in 2007 do appointments to individuals associated with a predecessor party comprise more than five percent of the overall appointments, and even then, barely so. This is most pronounced in 2008 when less than two percent of the overall GIC appointments went to individuals from either of the predecessor parties. It is certainly possible that some patronage appointments went undetected. No approach to discerning past association can be guaranteed to detect all individuals with association to a predecessor party without something along the lines of official membership lists. Media reports however, were considerably thorough when a history with either predecessor party was reported. This gives confidence that many of the individuals with significant association to a predecessor party were detected. As for appointees whose association went undetected, this risk is acceptable as there is no reason to believe that media reports would neglect to mention past association with any bias to either of the predecessor parties. Accordingly, the findings might not capture the full extent of patronage appointments in
the new party; the findings, however, will not be skewed towards either of the predecessor parties.

The findings demonstrate that Harper did not utilize GIC appointments to appease the predecessor parties. The historical approach of Canadian parties has been to utilize GIC appointments to reward party loyalists. During the research for this section, several media articles were uncovered that pointed to the CPC continuing this process and distributing GIC appointments to CPC supporters (Riley, 2006; Naumetz, 2007; Naumetz, 2009; The Canadian Press, 2013). For example, one article noted that “as many as one of every five appointees to the Employment Insurance Boards of Referees” had donated money to the CPC (The Canadian Press, 2013). This indicates that the CPC behaved along the same lines as past federal governments. Looking at this use of patronage by the CPC is beyond the scope of this analysis, as it does not directly speak to the maintenance of party unity. It does, however, raise an important question for future research into the behaviour of the CPC in government. The first hypothesis purposed that GIC appointments would be used as a patronage tool to manage conflict and these findings show that for the most part, this was not the case.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>PC (2.5%)</th>
<th>Reform/Alliance (1.1%)</th>
<th>None (96.4%)</th>
<th>Total (100%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>10 (2.1%)</td>
<td>8 (1.7%)</td>
<td>465 (96.3%)</td>
<td>483 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>32 (4%)</td>
<td>11 (1.4%)</td>
<td>749 (94.6%)</td>
<td>792 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>10 (1.2%)</td>
<td>5 (0.6%)</td>
<td>802 (98.2%)</td>
<td>817 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>52 (2.5%)</td>
<td>24 (1.1%)</td>
<td>2016 (96.4%)</td>
<td>2092 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Appointees past affiliation determined by Canada Newsstream database search. Column percentages in parentheses.*

Focusing on the number of GIC appointments between the predecessor parties, the findings show a much higher number of PC appointees. On the Reform/Alliance side, examples of appointees include Ann-Marie Applin who was a fundraiser and organizer for the Alliance and was appointed to the National Film Board in 2007. Mina Fung, a past financial contributor to the
Alliance was appointed as a Citizenship Judge in 2006. Similarly, Kelley Sherwood a former activist for the Reform Party was appointed to the Canadian Pension Plan Review Tribunal in 2006. Turning to the PC side, former PC MP Kenneth Atkinson was appointed to the Immigration and Refugee Board in 2007. Another former PC MP, Jean Dube was appointed to the Canadian Pension Plan Review Tribunal in 2007. It is striking that in each year shown; more GIC appointments went to individuals from the PC side than from the Reform/Alliance side. The difference was barely noticeable in 2006, with only two more appointments going to the PC side. Similarly, in 2008 while the PC side did receive twice as many appointments as the Reform/Alliance side the small number of appointments to both weakens that distinction. While the difference is marginal in each of those years, the PC side ultimately still received more GIC appointments. The difference is much more noticeable in 2007, with a substantially larger number of individuals from the PC side receiving appointments than from the Reform/Alliance side. As a result, the total number of appointments sees the PC side receiving slightly more than double the nominations of the Reform side. These findings support the first hypothesis.

Despite the Reform/Alliance side being the stronger side in the merger, a greater number of appointments were not granted to them. The explanation for this likely comes from the fact that the Reform/Alliance side had been strongly opposed to the distribution of patronage rewards. This opposition combined with the Reform/Alliance party having never been in power meant that GIC appointments were not the expected reward for loyalty to Reform/Alliance members that they were to individuals from the PC side. This was noted by a party staffer coming from the Reform/Alliance side, who stated “I do think the PCs may have played the patronage game more enthusiastically than the Alliance people did. That was of course a grand tradition in the PC party was patronage. The Alliance people weren’t really use to it having never
been in power in the past” (R1). This enabled Harper to entice loyalty and support from the PC side by distributing more of these appointments to former PC supporters. Any potential risk of alienating the Reform/Alliance side as a result of these patronage appointments is minimized by the small number of GIC appointments given to either side. These findings are demonstrative of how Harper and CPC leadership was able to keep both predecessor parties happy by providing expected patronage rewards to the one side while doing so in a small enough number as to not alienate the other.

Table 5.2 CPC Senate Appointments per Parliamentary Session by Predecessor Party Association

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PC</th>
<th>Reform/Alliance</th>
<th>None</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Session</td>
<td>1 (50%)</td>
<td>1 (50%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Session</td>
<td>9 (25%)</td>
<td>11 (30.6%)</td>
<td>16 (44.4%)</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Session</td>
<td>6 (31.6%)</td>
<td>2 (10.5%)</td>
<td>11 (57.9%)</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>16 (28.1%)</td>
<td>14 (24.6%)</td>
<td>27 (47.4%)</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Appointees past affiliation determined by Library of Parliament website and Canada Newsstream database search. Column percentages in parentheses

For the second hypothesis, Table 5.2 shows the Senate appointments for each parliamentary session by past association. As in the previous section, the PC side once again came out ahead of the Reform/Alliance side. The difference, however, is marginal at best. For the first parliamentary session, the two appointments to the Senate were equally divided between the two sides. Looking at the second session, the findings show a slight edge to the Reform/Alliance side who received two more appointments than the PC side. Once again though, this difference is not substantial. Finally, in the third session, there were four more appointees from the PC side than the Reform/Alliance side. The difference is most notable in the third session, as the PC received three times as many appointments as the Reform/Alliance side.

Examples of appointees from the PC side include Thomas McInnis who ran unsuccessfully for the PCs in the 2000 campaign. Long-time PC fundraiser, Irving Gerstein also garnered a Senate appointment, as a representative of Ontario. One of the more intriguing appointees was Norman
Doyle. Doyle had successfully run twice as a federal PC candidate followed by two successful runs as a candidate for the CPC. After not contesting the 2008 and 2011 campaigns, Doyle was appointed to the Senate in 2012. Looking at the Reform/Alliance side, former Alliance candidate Betty Unger was appointed to the Senate in 2012. Similarly, Stephen Greene who was unsuccessful in his two attempts as a Reform candidate in the 1990s was also appointed to the upper house. Don Plett, who successfully managed the campaign of Alliance candidate Vic Toews in the 2000 campaign, and later served as interim president of the CPC was another Senate appointee. These findings do offer a tentative support for the second hypothesis, as the PC side did receive more appointments, even if only marginally so.

Unlike the GIC appointments, a slight majority of Senate appointments went to individuals with association to one of the predecessor parties. Particularly intriguing is that individuals from the Reform/Alliance side, who had been starkly opposed to Senate appointments and strong advocates of a Triple-E Senate, were appointed in considerable numbers to the Senate. While the CPC had attempted to reform the Senate and the nomination process; the majority of appointments from the Reform/Alliance side came before the third session when the Supreme Court decision deflated hopes for an easy alteration of the nomination process. This indicates that the strength of patronage rewards as a tool for mitigating conflict is notable. Even with past opposition to Senate appointments, the Reform/Alliance side was still receptive to being granted appointments in the new party. Furthermore, that the PC side had a larger share of Senate appointments than the Reform side is also demonstrative of the use of patronage posts to manage conflict, showing that Harper provided the PC side with the patronage rewards the PC party had traditionally given themselves. Patronage appointments had been a
part of previous PC governments, and by rewarding PC supporters with such posts, the new party was able to solidify support amongst the PC side. These findings support the second hypothesis.

It is particularly intriguing that a total of nine Senate appointments went to former candidates for the CPC. Seven of these appointments came in the second Parliamentary session, and two came in the third session. Two of these appointments from the second session went to individuals with a previous PC, while the rest had no link to a predecessor party. This shows that former election candidates were a source to draw Senate appointments from for the new party, suggesting that the CPC behaved comparably to previous governments. Salma Ataullahjan and Jean-Guy Dagenais both ran unsuccessfully for the CPC and were later appointed to the Senate. Larry Smith was appointed a Senator and later resigned to run for the CPC in the 2011 campaign only to be defeated. Shortly after his electoral defeat, Smith was reappointed to the Senate. While these candidates did not have any notable connection with either of the predecessor parties, this is suggestive of the new party acting comparable to previous Canadian federal governments. The literature discussed earlier in this chapter stressed that Senate appointments were routinely utilized to reward party loyalists. The appointment of past candidates to the Senate certainly fits with the expectations from that literature. While this does not speak to how the new party managed internal conflict, combined with the media reports of GIC appointments going to CPC supporters, these observations point to the CPC acting much like its predecessors in government.

CONCLUSION

This chapter took the findings from the comparative literature on patronage appointments in factionalized parties and applied it to two forms of patronage well established in Canadian federal politics. The aim was to see whether GIC and Senate appointments would be utilized in
by Harper to manage conflict similar to how patronage has been used in factionalized parties. An extra wrinkle was the long-standing opposition of the Reform/Alliance party to patronage appointments in general, and especially Senate appointments. The literature notes extensive opposition to the patronage nature of GIC appointments made by Mulroney which fueled support for the emerging Reform party in the 1980s. Similarly, the idea of a Triple-E Senate, where Senators would be elected and not appointed, has long been advocated by the Reform/Alliance side.

The findings did not find many examples of GIC appointees who were associated with a predecessor party, while Senate appointments did have stronger patronage ties. With GIC appointments, the PC side received notably more appointments than their Reform/Alliance colleagues. A higher number of Senate appointments made by the CPC went to members connected to either of the predecessor parties, with a very slightly higher number of appointments going to the PC side. For both types of appointments, a considerable amount were distributed to individuals who lacked an association with a predecessor party. Part of this can be attributed to the possibility that the media analysis did not unearth all the past ties of appointees. Another option is that the new party did not make as excessive use of patronage posts as previous parties did. This possibility seems less likely, however when recalling the media articles already mentioned that point to a large number of appointments going to CPC supporters (Riley, 2006; Naumetz, 2007; Naumetz, 2009; The Canadian Press, 2013). It is also plausible that the lack of appointments to individuals from predecessor parties was an attempt by Harper to move the party beyond its divided past. By rewarding supporters of the new party over supporters of the predecessor parties, Harper could build a support base for the CPC while distancing the party from its conflicted past.
Harper managed patronage appointments in a way that satisfied supporters of both predecessor parties. Looking at the limited number of appointments going to members associated with either predecessor party shows that the PC side is well represented in these appointments, despite being the weaker of the two sides in the CPC. A strong contributing factor here is likely how patronage appointments were perceived by the predecessor parties. Patronage appointments have long been utilized in the PC side party and have helped inspire strong opposition on the Reform/Alliance side to such appointments. By limiting the number of patronage appointments going to either side, Harper decreased the risk of angering the Reform/Alliance side with these appointments. However, it would be a challenge to avoid any form of patronage distribution to individuals connected with a predecessor party, particularly since members on the PC side would have historically expected such appointments to be granted to them. By granting GIC and Senate appointments to individuals from the PC side, even in limited numbers, Harper provided an incentive for the PC side to remain in the new party and be supportive of the new party. Harper thus performed a delicate balance with the distribution of patronage rewards.

The findings presented here also call for further research on the behavior of the CPC with regards to appointments. The research for GIC appointments uncovered media reports of those appointments being granted to supporters of the new party. In a similar action, a considerable number of Senate appointments were distributed to former CPC election candidates. This suggests that while being a new party on the scene, the CPC is behaving comparably to other federal parties. Future research could benefit from analyzing the overall distribution of patronage in the new party to party supporters, regardless of past association.
CHAPTER SIX – CANDIDATE NOMINATION

On the personnel front, nomination as a party candidate can bring numerous benefits to an individual, including helping them be elected to office. The CPC faced a daunting task heading into their first election in 2004; a slate of candidates was needed to contest the election and this roster had to be comprised when both predecessor parties already had their own candidates ready to go. This chapter explores candidate nomination in the CPC for the first two elections it contested. The chapter begins by examining how candidate nomination works in Canada, with specific attention to how and who make the choice on potential candidates. From there the focus shifts to the comparative literature on candidate nomination in factionalized parties. While many of these parties exist in different electoral systems with different rules governing candidate nomination, the findings from this literature emphasize the challenges facing the CPC in nominating candidates and maintaining party unity.

CANDIDATE NOMINATION

De Luca et al. stress that candidate nomination is one of the key functions performed by a political party. They contend that candidate nomination comprises an integral part of the “definition of a political party” (De Luca et al., 2002: 413-14). Candidate selection is crucial for a party as it influences the composition of a party in office, has a formative impact on the identity of the party and impacts the balance of power within a party (Hazan and Rahat, 2010: 4,6). The significance of candidate nomination to the concept of a political party is particularly prevalent in Canada. As Carty and Erickson point out, under the Canadian electoral legal framework candidate "nomination is the critical activity that defines parties" (Carty and Erickson, 1991: 97). For an organization to officially register as a federal political party in Canada the requirement is that they have at least one candidate to contest a general election or a
by-election. The candidate nomination process in Canadian political parties is especially noteworthy as it is almost always a candidate of a major party that wins an election. The candidate nomination process, therefore, plays a pivotal role in shaping the makeup of political parties and the House of Commons. For individual citizens, candidate nomination offers the first opportunity to become involved in the electoral process. Furthermore, the electoral system used in Canadian federal elections only gives the voter the choice of one candidate representing their preferred political party to support (Patten, 2010: 135-36; Pruysers and Cross, 2016: 781-82). Koop and Bittner take a similar stance, pointing out that the candidate nomination process plays a major role in shaping the look and behaviour of the party (Koop and Bittner, 2011: 432). Candidate nomination in Canadian parties is consistent with Langston's argument that the nomination of candidates by political parties is a major component of the electoral process (Langston, 2001: 490).

Given the importance of candidate nomination, it is a surprise that there is very limited legislative oversight of the process. Carty and Erickson contend that "One might expect that a process so central to parties and elections would be carefully regulated by the Canada Elections Act. After all, its provisions typically provide for exhaustive control of most aspects of electoral activity. But such is not the case" (Carty and Erickson, 1991: 97). Pruysers and Cross concur, noting the contrast between the substantial legislative oversight on general elections and the lack of oversight on the candidate nomination process. Recent legislative changes have brought in regulation of the financing of the nomination process, however aside from that, rules governing who can participate, the age and citizenship requirement of voters, method of voting and location of voting along with any charge to be involved are all left up to the discretion of each party (Pruysers and Cross, 2016: 783).
There is one key part of the Canada Elections Act that applies to candidate nominations. Amongst a myriad of changes preceding the 1972 campaign, the Canada Elections Act requires that a candidate's party association be labeled on the ballot. Before this point, party affiliation was not included on the ballot. A consequence of this change was the necessity to ensure that a candidate claiming to be representative of a certain party was truly endorsed by the party. As such, the Canada Elections Act requires that the party leader sign off on each of their party's candidate's nomination papers. As a result, national party leaders do have the ability to not sign and thus prohibit an individual from being their party's candidate (Carty and Erickson, 1991: 103-04; Cross, 2004: 53-54). Cross acknowledges that an unwanted or undesirable candidate in the eyes of the party leader could see their nomination papers go unsigned (Cross, 2004: 55).

Discussion of the leader's potential veto over candidate nomination brings up the important consideration of where the authority over selecting candidates sits in Canadian federal parties. In Canadian federal parties, it is the local constituency association that exerts control over the nomination process. Siavelis tells us that on a comparative level there are two extremes where power is located in a party regarding candidate nomination. At one end of the spectrum, party leaders exercise sole discretion over who will run as candidates in their party while the other extreme sees the grassroots select their candidates without any influence or input from the party brass. It is frequently the case Saivelis finds, that parties lie somewhere in the middle of these two extremes (Siavelis, 2002: 425). In Canada, the tilt is heavily towards the grassroots end despite the legal requirement for leader endorsement on candidate papers. In his seminal work on this subject, Carty finds that in exchange for policy formulation powers, Canadian party leaders leave the candidate selection decisions up to the local riding associations (Carty, 2002). Cross concurs observing that local associations regularly enjoy freedom in the nomination
process in exchange for disciplined support of the legislative agenda (Cross, 2004: 53). Similarly, Carty and Eagles find that "local activists jealously guard this (candidate nomination) prerogative" (Carty and Eagles, 2005: 53). This does not mean that constituency associations have absolute power over the nomination process. There are instances where party leadership exercises the veto it holds and denies signing off on candidates. Another power at the disposal of party leaders is the authority to parachute candidates into a riding. This process occurs when a candidate is installed in a riding by a party leader without that candidate being required to win the support of the local constituency association (Koop and Bittner, 2011: 432). The lack of legislation covering the nomination process means that parachuting candidates is entirely permissible. It is not, however, a common occurrence. Patten found that in most instances it is the local constituency association making the decision on candidate selection and not the party leadership (Patten, 2010: 137).

**CANDIDATE NOMINATION IN THE CPC**

Recall that during the merger negotiations between the two predecessor parties, there was two conflicts that threatened the negotiations, one of them being candidate nomination. Harper had put forward a proposal that would have seen all candidates already selected by either of the predecessor parties to be brought in as candidates of the new party and all future nomination meetings halted until the merger was complete. This was strongly objected to by the PC side as the Alliance party had already nominated substantially more candidates than the PC side. As a result, there was a fear amongst the PC side that majority of candidates for the new party would be from the Alliance side and that they would be in the ridings where the party had the great shot of winning. Harper would eventually back off this proposal to secure the merger; as a result, the new party was faced with the challenge of nominating candidates in every riding for the next
election (Flanagan, 2007: 99-101). This posed an intriguing challenge for the party. Candidate nomination in the new party would not only require the merging of local constituency associations across the country, but it also required that the membership elected candidates together. Accordingly, the new party would in some instances face a candidate nomination battle between a candidate from the PC side and a candidate from the Alliance side. While this competition could be healthy for the party, it could also lead to conflict between the two sides, at a time when the CPC was still in its infancy and particularly vulnerable.

Marland and Flanagan raised this issue, noting that the merger "extends to the grassroots where the merger of local party unity invites conflict over private goods" (285). Their interviews with party members found that there was trepidation about potential conflict between grassroots members from each side during the nomination process (Marland and Flanagan, 2013: 286). Similarly, media reports at the time draw attention for the potential of substantial battles between the predecessor parties over the nomination of candidates in the new party. Members from the Alliance side were interviewed about their concerns; MP Jason Kenney's main concern was that the battles would be a repeat of the old battles between the two parties (Ferguson, 2003). This is notable as the fear expressed by Kenney is not for his own personal spot, instead it is on the overall well being of the new party. What allowed for the CPC to get through the candidate nomination process without succumbing to significant levels of conflict? This is a question that has not been addressed by the existing literature. The issue is briefly touched on for the 2004 and the 2006 campaigns, yet there are several significant shortcomings in this literature (Ellis and Pammett, 2004; Ellis and Pammett, 2006). To begin with, this literature only counts candidates who have previously run for one of the predecessor parties in their analysis. Candidates who were otherwise involved with either of the predecessor parties are omitted.
Furthermore, these works only briefly touch on the background of the CPC candidates and do not explore how this relates to tensions and party unity in the CPC. Finally, by not exploring the nomination process in the new party in-depth, the existing literature lacks a comprehensive understanding of the functioning of the new party. Koop and Bittner point out that important perspective on internal power arrangements in a party can be gathered by looking at how candidate nominations are distributed (Koop and Bittner, 2011: 431). Thus far the literature has not provided this perspective on the CPC.

**CANDIDATE NOMINATION IN THE COMPARATIVE LITERATURE**

Turning to the comparative literature on candidate nomination in factionalized parties and other similar arrangements where multiple groups must be accommodated offers insight into how the CPC could approach candidate nomination. It must be noted that in each of the examples discussed below there are critical differences in the electoral system between the country studied and Canada. In many instances, the electoral system understudy is one where candidate nomination is controlled by the party leadership. These differences restrict the applicability of the findings to the Canadian case. The grassroots control of candidate nomination in Canada means that what has worked elsewhere may not be feasible here. However, the findings from this literature offer guidance and are instructive for what can be expected when analyzing candidate nomination in the CPC. Hazan and Rahat note the variety of regulations and methods used for candidate nomination in a comparative perspective. As a result, they stress that when analyzing candidate nomination "the unity of analysis is the single party, in a particular country, at a specific time" (Hazan and Rahat, 2010). Wuhs sought to understand the type of candidate nomination process chosen by party leaders in Mexico as the country continued to democratize. Parties, Wuhs cautions, face the challenges of not only remaining electorally viable but also...
maintaining party unity. Wuhs finds that candidate nomination, and in particular the rules 
surrounding the process, is a key tool for managing both those challenges (Wuhs, 2006: 34). 
Thus, while the candidate nomination process poses a risk for factional conflict, it can also serve 
as a tool for mitigating factional conflict.

The process of candidate nomination in Chile provides insight into how a party can 
manage tensions through its nomination process. Political parties in Chile have entered into sub-
pacts. Parties normally come together that share an ideological perspective but differ in other 
ways. According to Siavelis, candidate nomination becomes a more challenging process when 
multiple parties are involved, such as in Chile. When selecting candidates in Chile, there is an 
emphasis on ensuring that each party within a sub-pact receives an appropriate number of 
nominations. Siavelis stresses that it is not only the major parties within a sub-pact that must be 
accounted for, but also the small parties have to be considered. It is found by Siavelis that the 
size of a party influences its behaviour in negotiation over candidate nominations. An example 
of an ideological left-wing sub-pact is used, where the two major parties had an equal level of 
national support and therefore felt that each should receive an equal level (one half) of the sub-
pact’s nominations (Siavelis, 2002: 422-27). This provides us with several important findings. 
It demonstrates that all parties within a sub-pact expect to be included in the candidate 
nomination process, which can be applied to factionalized parties, where each faction can have 
the expectation to be included in the nomination process. Further, it shows that there is an 
expectation that the strength of a party in a sub-pact should determine the number of nominations 
it receives. Once again this can be applied to a factionalized party, implying that the strength of 
a faction should dictate how many candidate nominations that faction is given.
The literature on factions in Japanese parties’ stresses that one of the primary tasks performed by the factions is the recruitment of candidates and getting their candidates nominated to contest elections (Bouissou, 2001; Ramseyer and McCall-Rosenbluth, 1993; Cox et al., 1999; Woodall, 1996; Kollner, 2004). Tomita et al. find that factions play a key role in helping their members compete against members of other factions in the same party for seats in multi-member districts (Tomita et al., 1981). Furthermore, factions also take on the important tasks of drawing in new candidates and then providing the financing and advice/leadership to run the candidates campaign (Bouissou, 2001: 581). Recently, there have been an increasing number of candidates in the LDP party who did not disclose an official factional association while contesting an election. This suggests that the role of factions in candidate nomination is decreasing. It is stressed though, that factions still have a significant role in the nomination process, particularly when seats come up for election. Furthermore, there is noted importance and pressure for factional leaders to ensure their own members fill any vacant seats (Kollner, 2004: 94).

Meanwhile, in the DPJ, Kollner observes that factional influence continues to be felt in the candidate nomination process. Early in the party’s existence, the formation of factions was facilitated by an upcoming election and subsequent battles over the nomination of candidates (96). Kollner finds that factional affiliation has come to play a more prominent role in the party regarding candidate nomination as the party matured (100).

Finally, the case of the ALP is significant as it is one of the most factionalized parties. There is a great deal of variance in how ALP candidates are nominated as each state and territory can set its own rules for the candidate nomination process. The factions exert notable influence over the nomination process; it is frequently a requirement to have factional membership to attain a nomination. As a result, there has been some desire to reshape the candidate nomination
process in manner that would constrict the ability of factions to influence the process. An example of how the factions can influence candidate nomination in the ALP occurs when the nomination process is centralized and the factions are given a representative role in the selection (Cross and Gauja, 2014a: 24, 32, 35, 37). McAllister argues that factional associational is essential for receiving a nomination in the ALP. He finds that factional association is a "major consideration in candidate selection" and that the majority of candidates are members of a faction (McAllister, 2002: 392).

**RIDING DESIRABILITY**

An area of study that is lacking in the comparative literature on candidate nomination in factionalized parties is looking at the desirability of ridings that candidates are nominated in. The existing literature focuses primarily on the larger picture, the number of nominations received by each faction/party. When the focus shifts away from the broader scene, it is placed on individual riding battles and the particulars of that contest. Where focus is not placed is on what ridings are being distributed to each faction? Are more desirable ridings (such as party strong holds or against weaker opponents from the opposing parties) being distributed to one faction rather than the other? McAllister does briefly address the topic, arguing that ALP factions focus their energy on attaining nominations for their members in the most winnable ridings (McAllister, 1991: 222). The key is that the faction is not just getting their members a nomination, it is getting their members a nomination in a riding they are likely to win in.

Literature on cabinet allocation in factionalized parties has explored the qualitative side of appointments. Tomita et al. point out that the existing literature fails to account for that significance of ministerial positions being distributed (Tomita et al., 1981: 255).
Warwick and Druckman examined cabinet appointment by portfolio prestige and found that the more powerful faction/party in a party/coalition does not on average take a larger or unwarranted share of the more powerful party posts (Warwick and Druckman, 2006: 650). Similarly, Back et al. found that the larger faction is not likely to receive a disproportionate share of prestigious cabinet portfolios (Back et al., 2011: 459). While these findings do not support the idea of the stronger faction monopolizing important cabinet posts, it does raise the question of whether the stronger faction in a factionalized party sees its candidates be nominated in more desirable ridings?

What does this mean for studying candidate nomination in the CPC? Given that party nominations are not centrally controlled in Canada, it is not a feasible notion that the stronger side would be able to place its members in the most winnable ridings through party leadership. It does raise the notion however, that it is worthwhile to look at the competitiveness of the ridings candidates are being nominated to. Recall that one of the motivating factors behind the merger was vote splitting between the two predecessor parties. In many instances, the combined votes for the PC and Reform/Alliance candidate was greater than the votes received by the winning candidate. Even though the merger did not mean that all voters for the predecessor parties would subsequently vote for the new party, it does raise the prospect that ridings like this would be the most desirable for non-incumbent candidates in the new party. Whether candidates from one of the predecessor parties attained more nominations in the more winnable ridings is also significant as that likely influences the strength of each side in caucus. Exploring the nomination contests for these ridings, particularly whether they were contested, will also shed light on the functioning of the new party. Thus, despite this not being an option for party leadership to
manage conflict; the competitiveness of the ridings is an important component for understanding the balance of power in the CPC.

**HYPOTHESES**

*H1: It is expected that the candidates with a past association with the Reform/Alliance party will receive a substantially larger share of candidate nominations than candidates from the PC side.*

The comparative literature regularly found that candidate nominations were correlated to the strength of the faction. Stronger factions received a larger share of nominations than weaker ones. This hypothesis applies these findings from other countries with differing electoral systems to the Canadian case. The expectation is that the stronger Reform/Alliance side will have more members and thus be able to vote in more of their candidates. Further, based off the Reform/Alliance's larger number of incumbents and base of strength in Western Canada, where the CPC is strongest, it is expected that they will have more candidates. The findings will provide insight into how the balance of power is spread between the two predecessor parties in the new party by showing the number of candidates from each predecessor party in the campaign and subsequently in the caucus.

*H2: The Reform/Alliance side will have their candidates nominated in more desirable ridings than candidates from the PC side.*

The literature has largely disregarded the qualitative side of candidate nomination. However, the literature on cabinet appointments in factionalized parties has shown that the powerful faction in a party will distribute the more important cabinet posts to its members. This raises the possibility that the same could be true for candidate nomination; the stronger faction is expected to have its members nominated in the most winnable riding. This hypothesis explores whether the Reform/Alliance side can translate their strength into winning nominations in the most desirable ridings, which in this context equates with the ridings where the combined vote share
of the predecessor parties was greater than any other party in the previous election. The findings here will shed important light on the nomination process in the new party, and subsequently the strength of the predecessor parties in caucus.

**FINDINGS**

For the 2004 election, the CPC put forth a total of 308 candidates, one for every riding. This is noteworthy as neither the Reform or Alliance party had ever reached this milestone (Flanagan, 2007: 151). Of those 308 candidates, 53 were incumbent candidates from the Reform/Alliance side while 8 were PC incumbents. Almost all the Reform/Alliance incumbents represented Western ridings while the PC incumbents came predominantly from Atlantic Canada. This is noteworthy as the Reform/Alliance side was traditionally stronger in the West, while the PC party was stronger in Ontario and Atlantic Canada. From the PC side, approximately half of the PC incumbents contested the 2004 election under the CPC label. Of those who did not, several defected to the Liberal party, others were not supportive of the merger and some retired. None of the PC candidates who sought re-election were defeated in the nomination process. On the Reform/Alliance side, only a handful of incumbents decided not to contest the 2004 election. Most of those individuals retired. Only two of the sitting MPs faced contested nominations and lost. Chuck Cadman, the MP for Surrey North was defeated by a political rookie for the CPC nomination. Cadman alleged the loss was the result of his opponent signing up members before the vote (Canadian Press, 2004; O'Neil, 2004). Importantly, there was no evidence of conflict between the predecessor parties being involved in the nomination battle. The candidate who defeated Cadman had no previous involvement with either predecessor party.
One other Alliance incumbent lost their nomination, Val Meredith, and in this instance past associations did play a role. Meredith came from the Reform/Alliance side and had played a prominent role in both of those parties. Russ Hiebert defeated Meredith for the South Surrey-White Rock-Cloverdale nomination, and while Hiebert was not associated either of the predecessor parties, his campaign was. Hiebert's campaign involved Benno Friesen who had been the PC MP for the riding until being defeated by Meredith representing the Reform party in 1993. Meredith alleged that Friesen had worked with Heibert as part of a ten-year grudge against her. Meredith also alleged that she was pushed out due to her support of Belinda Stronach's leadership campaign (Zytaruk, 2004; Zytaruk, 2004a,). The tension between Meredith and Friesen is a clear example of conflict between the predecessor parties being played out in the nomination contest. Significantly, this is the only instance of heated conflict amongst incumbent candidates.

The media analysis was also used to try to determine how many of the nomination contests were contested. Information was not available for each riding, however, 85 ridings of the 308 (27 percent) were found to have contested nominations for the CPC. It is possible that there were additional ridings which had contested nominations that were not reported on by the media. Of those 85, nine of them pitted a potential candidate from the Reform/Alliance side against one from the PC side. Of the 85 contested nominations, and in particular the nine between individuals connected with the predecessor parties, it is remarkable how little incidents of conflict there were. There were some instances of conflict, such as in the riding of Souris-Moose Mountain, where former Saskatchewan Premier Grant Devine intended to run for the CPC candidate nomination. Devine had the backing of Peter MacKay, however he was deemed undesirable by party leadership and his candidacy was blocked by Harper (O’Connor, 2004).
This conflict hints at faction like conflict as the potential nominee with support from the PC side was blocked by the Alliance based party leadership. It is only a limited example however, and does not represent a pattern of conflict between the predecessor parties. Calgary East incumbent MP Deepak Obhari's nomination was also the source of some controversy. Several members complained that there had been multiple irregularities with the nomination, including voting being cut off too early. It is particularly notable that these complaints all came from members from the PC side, while the constituency association executive was comprised entirely of former Alliance supporters. All 30 of the executive spots went to former Alliance supporters despite the attempts of 16 former PC supporters to be involved (Heyman, 2004). These conflicts are notable, but it is equally significant that there are only these few instances of conflict out of all 308 ridings. In the nomination process conflict between the predecessor parties and conflict in general was quite rare.

Indeed, the media analysis found many examples of nominations that had healthy but respectful debates. In the Oakville riding, a former PC candidate Rick Byers beat out Glen Herring, a former Alliance candidate for the nomination (MacBride, 2004). The nomination process was conducted quite respectfully. Similarly, former Alliance MP and incumbent Maurice Vellacott's nomination was contested by Nick Bakker, who came from the PC side (Leader Post, 2004). Once again there was no evidence of acrimonious conflict during this nomination process. The situation was quite similar in the riding of Guelph, where a former PC candidate was defeated for the nomination by Jon Dearden, who use to be president of the Alliance Guelph-Wellington constituency association. Media reports describe the nomination meeting as being well attended, with an enthusiastic crowd and a close vote (Shuttleworth, 2004). Critically, there was no evidence of conflict here either. In an interview for this project, a
respondent from the PC side acknowledged that there was concern over the potential for conflict leading up to the nominations. However, this respondent could not recall any examples of such conflict occurring (R2). The findings from the media analysis are supportive of this statement. While the examples of conflict discussed in the previous paragraph must be acknowledged, they were the exception. Far more frequently, the nominations were conducted respectfully.

From the media reports, one key distinction was evident between a riding with electoral conflict and others where conflict was absent. As previously mentioned, in the Calgary East riding where there was controversy surrounding electoral irregularities, the riding association executive was comprised entirely of former Alliance members. In Saanich-Gulf Islands, where the nomination process went without controversy the riding association executive was evenly split between members from the two sides (Harnett, 2004). Similarly, in the riding of Bruce-Grey-Owen Sound, the constituency association's executive was split with 17 members from the Alliance side and 13 from the PC side. This association also had a nomination process that was free of conflict (Dunn, 2004). While it was not pervasive, there was a trend of ridings that had a balanced executive avoiding conflict in their nomination process. Marland and Flanagan touch on potential problems arising in the new constituency associations when the executive is dominated by either one of the predecessor parties (Marland and Flanagan, 2015: 286). The findings here support those concerns. The significance of a balanced constituency executive was also stressed by one of the party officials interviewed for this project. They noted that following the merger, their riding association always had members from both sides on its executive. The respondent attributed that this was crucial for minimizing disruption in the association. The balancing of executive posts was not the result of a top down mandate; instead the respondent
saw it as a result of a general spirit of co-operation driven by an interest in forming government (R1).

Turning to the distribution of candidates according to past federal party association, Table 6.1 shows the distributions of nominees according to their association with either predecessor parties by province in the 2004 election. One of the first striking features from these results is the regional patterns of strength exhibited by the predecessor parties. Atlantic Canada is far more favourable to candidates with a PC lineage than those from the Reform/Alliance side. A total of 20 candidates have a past association with the federal PC party in Atlantic Canada while only one candidate came from the Reform/Alliance side. West of Ontario the situation is reversed, with candidates connected to the Reform/Alliance being much more numerous, receiving 67 nominations and PC associated candidates gaining only 7 nominations. Based on the regionally based historical support for the Reform/Alliance parties in Western Canada, and the lack of support in the Maritimes, these findings should not be surprising. Recall that most of Reform/Alliance incumbents came from Western Canada while most PC incumbents hailed from Atlantic Canada. These findings are indicative of the regional strengths and weaknesses of the previous parties continuing in the new party.

The findings in Ontario and Quebec are particularly intriguing. In each of these provinces, candidates with a PC history fared better than candidates from the Reform/Alliance side. Yet it is only the slimmest of differences between the two sides. The two sides attained relatively the same number of nominations in each of these key provinces. This is particularly intriguing as both Ontario and Quebec were critical provinces in the success and failures of the predecessor parties. Recall that the Reform/Alliance party’s inability to breakthrough into Ontario was a contributing factor to their decision to enter merger negotiations. Quebec
meanwhile had been an electoral wasteland for conservative politicians of any stripe for some time. The findings show that in the first election for the CPC, in two provinces containing well above fifty percent of the seats in the entire country, the predecessor parties had a relatively equal number of nominations.

Table 6.1 2004 CPC Candidate’s Past Federal Party Affiliation by Province

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>PC</th>
<th>Reform/Alliance</th>
<th>Other Party</th>
<th>No Party</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Newfoundland</td>
<td>4 (57.1%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3 (42.9%)</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEI</td>
<td>3 (75%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 (25%)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nova Scotia</td>
<td>5 (45.5%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 (9.1%)</td>
<td>5 (45.5%)</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Brunswick</td>
<td>4 (40%)</td>
<td>1 (10%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5 (50%)</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quebec</td>
<td>13 (17.3%)</td>
<td>9 (12%)</td>
<td>2 (2.7%)</td>
<td>51 (68%)</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ontario</td>
<td>27 (25.5%)</td>
<td>26 (24.5%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>53 (50%)</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manitoba</td>
<td>1 (7.1%)</td>
<td>4 (28.6%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9 (64.3%)</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saskatchewan</td>
<td>1 (7.1%)</td>
<td>10 (71.4%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3 (21.4%)</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alberta</td>
<td>3 (10.7%)</td>
<td>25 (89.3%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BC</td>
<td>2 (5.6%)</td>
<td>28 (77.8%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6 (16.7%)</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territories</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3 (100%)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>63 (20.5%)</strong></td>
<td><strong>103 (33.4%)</strong></td>
<td><strong>3 (1%)</strong></td>
<td><strong>139 (45.1%)</strong></td>
<td><strong>308</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Candidates past affiliation obtained from Library of Parliament and Canadian Newsstream database search. Column percentages in parentheses.

Initially, looking at the overall results of the 2004 nominations, the expectations from the first hypothesis receive tentative support as candidates with a Reform/Alliance background garnered 103 nominations compared to only 63 for candidates from the PC side. This margin of difference between the two sides is certainly substantial and indicative that the Reform/Alliance side was in a stronger position in the CPC. On closer examination, however, the gap between the
two sides is much narrower than could be expected. After the 2000 election, the Alliance party had over five times as many seats as the PC party. While it certainly cannot be expected for the same ratio to be maintained in nominations in the new party, that candidates from the PC side were nominated in well over half as many as ridings Reform/Alliance candidates indicates that the PC side was much stronger in the CPC than previously thought. Furthermore, much of the Reform/Alliance's strength here is attributable to its base being in Western Canada, where the new party was strongest.

Table 6.2 2004 CPC Non-Incumbent Candidate’s Past Federal Party Affiliation by Province

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>PC</th>
<th>Reform/Alliance</th>
<th>Other Party</th>
<th>No Party</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Newfoundland</td>
<td>1 (25%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3 (75%)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEI</td>
<td>3 (75%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 (25%)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nova Scotia</td>
<td>2 (25%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 (12.5%)</td>
<td>5 (62.5%)</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Brunswick</td>
<td>3 (33.3%)</td>
<td>1 (11.1%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5 (55.6%)</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quebec</td>
<td>13 (17.3%)</td>
<td>9 (12.0%)</td>
<td>2 (2.7%)</td>
<td>51 (68%)</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ontario</td>
<td>26 (25.2%)</td>
<td>24 (23.3%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>53 (51.5%)</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manitoba</td>
<td>1 (9.1%)</td>
<td>1 (9.1%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9 (81.8%)</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saskatchewan</td>
<td>1 (14.3%)</td>
<td>3 (42.9%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3 (42.9%)</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alberta</td>
<td>3 (42.9%)</td>
<td>4 (57.1%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BC</td>
<td>2 (12.5%)</td>
<td>8 (50%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6 (37.5%)</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territories</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3 (100%)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>55 (22.3%)</td>
<td>50 (20.2%)</td>
<td>3 (1.2%)</td>
<td>139 (56.3%)</td>
<td>247</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Candidates past affiliation obtained from Library of Parliament and Canadian Newsstream database search. Column percentages in parentheses.

Table 6.2 shows the number of candidates nominated by the CPC in 2004 according to their past association with incumbents removed. By eliminating sitting MPs, this indicates how
new candidates fared in the party. The most significant finding here is that there were more new candidates from the PC than the Reform/Alliance side. The difference between the two sides is not substantial, considering however that the PC side was seen as the weaker one, it is quite noteworthy that more non-incumbent candidates from their lineage were able to win more nominations than their Reform/Alliance counterparts. These findings cannot be interpreted to say that the PC side was stronger in the CPC; the higher number of new candidates from the PC side falls far short of offsetting the Reform/Alliance's advantage in incumbents. The findings do show however that the PC side has a greater level of strength in the new party than would be expected.

Looking at Table 6.2 through a regional perspective, the findings follow the expectations set out from Table 6.1. The lack of incumbents in Quebec and Ontario required that the CPC put forth predominantly new nominees in these two provinces. Atlantic Canada remains a stronghold on the PC side; intriguingly the Reform/Alliance side showed little strength in this region only nominating one new candidate. In Western Canada, the Reform/Alliance side maintained a stronger position relative to PC candidates, yet the PC side did make a minor breakthrough in this area. While the numbers are minor, it is important that new candidates from the PC side had a presence in a region of the country dominated by the Reform/Alliance prior to the merger. This is further evidence of the PC side having more strength and a greater presence in the new party than their status going into the merger would have suggested.

The findings in Table 6.3 show a continuation of these trends. Table 6.3 shows the past affiliation of CPC candidates in the 2006 election. Once again, the regional trends are present, in Atlantic Canada, there is only one candidate with a past connection to the Reform/Alliance side while ten candidates hail from the PC side. At the same time, Western Canada remains a
stronghold of the Reform/Alliance side with 56 candidates coming from that side and only eight with PC lineage. The seat-rich provinces of Ontario and Quebec also saw the CPC follow the same path, with candidates from the PC side getting only marginally more nominations than those from the Reform/Alliance side. The margin between the two sides did increase in Ontario. This shows that the historical basis of support for the predecessor parties continued in the new party. Ontario and Quebec are the exceptions, as, in these two seat-rich provinces, candidates connected each of the two predecessor parties won a similar number of nominations.

Table 6.3 2006 All CPC Candidate’s Past Federal Party Affiliation by Province

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>PC</th>
<th>Reform/Alliance</th>
<th>Other Party</th>
<th>No Party</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Newfoundland</td>
<td>3 (42.9%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4 (57.1%)</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEI</td>
<td>1 (25%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3 (75%)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nova Scotia</td>
<td>3 (27.3%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 (9.1%)</td>
<td>7 (63.6%)</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Brunswick</td>
<td>3 (30%)</td>
<td>1 (10%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6 (60%)</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quebec</td>
<td>6 (8%)</td>
<td>5 (6.7%)</td>
<td>2 (2.7%)</td>
<td>62 (82.7%)</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ontario</td>
<td>26 (24.5%)</td>
<td>19 (17.9%)</td>
<td>2 (1.9%)</td>
<td>59 (55.7%)</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manitoba</td>
<td>3 (21.4%)</td>
<td>5 (35.7%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6 (42.9%)</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saskatchewan</td>
<td>1 (7.1%)</td>
<td>9 (64.3%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5 (28.6%)</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alberta</td>
<td>3 (10.7%)</td>
<td>22 (78.6%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3 (10.7%)</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BC</td>
<td>1 (2.8%)</td>
<td>20 (55.6%)</td>
<td>1 (2.8%)</td>
<td>14 (38.9%)</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territories</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3 (100%)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>50 (16.2%)</td>
<td>81 (26.3%)</td>
<td>6 (1.9%)</td>
<td>171 (55.5%)</td>
<td>308</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Candidates past affiliation obtained from Library of Parliament and Canadian Newsstream database search. Column percentages in parentheses. All 2006 candidates are included, even those who ran in the 2004 election.
Looking at the total number of nominations in 2006, it stands out that much like in 2004, the 2006 nominations see a greater number of candidates with a Reform/Alliance past than those with a PC history. The gap between the two remains relatively constant between 2004 and 2006. These findings reinforce the findings from the 2004 results where candidates with a PC lineage were able to win nominations in greater number than their strength suggests they should. This is significant as it demonstrates that both predecessor parties not only had a presence in the new party but that both parties had a significant presence in the new party. Any expectation that the stronger Reform/Alliance side would dominate the nomination process are dispelled. Instead, the findings show that a considerable number of individuals from the PC side ran as candidates for the new party.

Table 6.4 2004 CPC Non-Incumbent Candidate’s Past Federal Party Affiliation by Province

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>PC</th>
<th>Reform/Alliance</th>
<th>Other Party</th>
<th>No Party</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Newfoundland</td>
<td>1 (20%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4 (80%)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEI</td>
<td>1 (25%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3 (75%)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nova Scotia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 (12.5%)</td>
<td>7 (87.5%)</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Brunswick</td>
<td>2 (25%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6 (75%)</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quebec</td>
<td>6 (8%)</td>
<td>5 (6.7%)</td>
<td>2 (2.7%)</td>
<td>62 (82.7%)</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ontario</td>
<td>19 (22.6%)</td>
<td>9 (10.7%)</td>
<td>2 (2.4%)</td>
<td>54 (64.3%)</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manitoba</td>
<td>2 (28.6%)</td>
<td>1 (14.3%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4 (57.1%)</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saskatchewan</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 (100%)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alberta</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2 (40%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3 (60%)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BC</td>
<td>1 (5%)</td>
<td>5 (25%)</td>
<td>1 (5%)</td>
<td>13 (65%)</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territories</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3 (100%)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>32 (14.5%)</td>
<td>22 (10%)</td>
<td>6 (2.7%)</td>
<td>160 (72.7%)</td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Further evidence of the strength of PC candidates in the new party can be seen from looking at Table 6.4. The table shows candidate nominations by affiliation for the 2006 campaign election with incumbents removed. Once again, the PC candidates outperform Reform/Alliance candidates, this time by an increasing margin. Most PC gains came from east of Manitoba, with only a few gains in Western Canada. The opposite applies to the Reform/Alliance party, who maintained had no new candidates in Atlantic Canada. The regional bases of support for the predecessor parties have clearly carried over to the new party. An important observation is the growing number of candidates with no past linkage to either of the predecessor parties. This demonstrates that as the party matures, the presence of its predecessor parties does start to decline. Crucially, the findings demonstrate that both predecessor parties have a strong presence in the CPC.

The most significant finding so far is that each predecessor party had a significant number of candidates contesting the elections. As the existing literature suggested, the Reform/Alliance side, as the more powerful one in the CPC, garners a majority of the nominations. Strikingly though, the PC party won a much larger number of nominations than one would expect. When counting all candidates in each election, candidates with a PC lineage won approximately 61 percent of the nominations that candidates with a connection to the Reform/Alliance did. If candidates who ran in both elections are only counted as single observations the difference between the two predecessor parties is even less, as candidates from the PC side attained 76 percent of the nominations that Reform/Alliance candidates received. While that still is a notable difference between the two parties, it is nowhere near as drastic as the power relations going into the merger combined with the expectations from the existing literature would suggest. Instead, it shows that the PC side has a
presence in the CPC. This shows a situation that much more closely resembles a merger among equals than a merger where one party was unanimously seen as the stronger partner. However, since the findings show more candidates with Reform/Alliance heritage than from the PC side, the first hypothesis is supported.

An interesting observation comes from looking at the number of candidates that do not have a past affiliation with either predecessor party or any other federal party. It should be noted that this does not mean all these individuals had no association with either of the predecessor parties. It is possible that in some cases an individual’s past linkages were not uncovered, perhaps due to only having a minor connection to a predecessor party or a lack of media attention to a particular candidate. It can be safely said that such exceptions would be rare. For an overwhelming majority of candidates, newspaper articles were found that provided at least a brief biography of the candidate. For the 2004 election especially, media attention was heightened on the newly merged party and highlighted any connection a candidate had with either predecessor party. Therefore, for the candidates who had no past affiliation revealed, it can be concluded that they are not coming from either of the predecessor parties.

Where did these remaining candidates come from? Table 6.1 shows that 46 percent of all CPC candidates in 2004 had no affiliation with either of the predecessor parties. That number jumps to over 58 percent in 2006, shown in Table 6.3. The result is a considerable number of candidates in the new party that have no connection with the predecessor parties, an amount that grows as the party ages. Due to the CPC not having traditional factions and the two predecessor parties ceasing to exist upon the merger, it is unavoidable that an increasing number of new candidates to the party will lack an association to either predecessor party. Some of these candidates are individuals who are newly attracted to politics and political life. The media
analysis found many instances of candidates who stated they were getting involved due to a new desire to get involved and change the system. This aids the cause of party unity by increasing the number of individuals who lack the baggage of the predecessor parties and their conflicts. There is nothing to suggest that attracting these new candidates was a centrally driven party strategy. However, it does suggest that if the party is able to survive its formative years when the predecessor parties remain in large numbers the opportunity for unity increase as the predecessor party presence declines. The analysis also found an interesting source of candidates for the new party: provincial politicians.

Table 6.5 2004 and 2006 All CPC Candidate’s Past Provincial Experience

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PC Provincial Involvement</td>
<td>PC Provincial Legislative Experience</td>
<td>No Experience</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>42 (23%)</td>
<td>20 (10.9%)</td>
<td>121 (66.1%)</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>35 (19.1%)</td>
<td>19 (10.4%)</td>
<td>129 (70.5%)</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>77 (21%)</td>
<td>39 (10.7%)</td>
<td>250 (68.3%)</td>
<td>366</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Candidates, provincial experience obtained from Library of Parliament and Canadian Newsstream database search. Column percentages in parentheses. Candidates who ran in both elections are counted as two observations. Candidates from Quebec, Saskatchewan and British Columbia are omitted due to lack of provincial PC party.

Table 6.5 shows any past provincial involvement with provincial PC parties by CPC candidates in 2004 and 2006. Candidates were classified as having a Provincial PC Past when they had roles with their provincial PC parties such as being a local constituency association executive, contesting a provincial PC nomination, working for the provincial party or running unsuccessfully as a PC provincial candidate. Candidates classified as PC provincial politicians are those who have were elected to their provincial legislator as a PC candidate. CPC candidates were included here regardless of whether they had an association with either of the predecessor parties at a federal level. As indicated in Table 6.5, 62 candidates for the CPC in
2004 had a background in provincial PC politics while 54 candidates came from a similar background in the 2006 election. These findings are intriguing as they indicate a source of widespread recruitment of candidates by the CPC. Candidates with provincial experience bring many assets to the new party, in particular, legislative experience.

**Table 6.6** 2004 CPC Candidate’s Provincial Experience by Association to one of the Predecessor Parties Federally

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PC Federal Party</th>
<th>Reform/Alliance</th>
<th>Other Party/None</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>PC Provincial Involvement</strong></td>
<td>16 (38.1%)</td>
<td>13 (31%)</td>
<td>13 (31%)</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PC Provincial Legislative Experience</strong></td>
<td>5 (25%)</td>
<td>4 (20%)</td>
<td>11 (55%)</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>21 (33.9%)</td>
<td>17 (27.4%)</td>
<td>24 (38.7%)</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Candidate’s provincial experience obtained from Library of Parliament and Canadian Newsstream database search. Column percentages in parentheses. Candidates from Quebec, Saskatchewan and British Columbia are omitted due to lack of provincial PC party.

An additional asset that candidates with provincial experience bring is that they potentially lack the baggage of the long-standing cleavages. In Tables 6.6 and 6.7 the past provincial experience of the CPC candidates by their association with a predecessor party for both the 2004 and 2006 elections respectively is shown. These findings further indicate the incorporative nature of the CPC candidate nomination process. Candidates in the 2004 election with provincial political experience are spread out evenly between candidates from the Reform/Alliance side, and slightly more candidates not associated with either of the predecessor parties. The findings in the 2006 election continue on a similar trajectory, except that candidates from the Reform/Alliance decrease. The totals for both elections indicate that Reform/Alliance candidates are the least likely to have provincial experience, while PC candidates are slightly more likely in 2004 and much more likely in 2006 to have previous provincial involvement. In both elections, the largest number of CPC candidates with provincial experience had no linkages.
with either of the predecessor parties. This is significant as this shows that the CPC benefited not only from having some candidates with provincial experience, a considerable number of those candidates brought their provincial experience without linkages to the predecessor parties. This impacts the balance of power in the new party as in addition to the candidates from each of the predecessor parties; there are also experienced candidates not connected with either.

Table 6.7 2006 CPC Candidate’s Past Provincial Experience by Association to one of the Predecessor Parties Federally

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PC Federal Party</th>
<th>Reform/Alliance</th>
<th>Other Party/None</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PC Provincial Involvement</td>
<td>13 (37.1%)</td>
<td>7 (20%)</td>
<td>15 (42.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC Provincial Legislative Experience</td>
<td>6 (31.6%)</td>
<td>4 (21.1%)</td>
<td>9 (47.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>19 (35.2%)</td>
<td>11 (20.4%)</td>
<td>24 (44.4%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Candidate’s provincial experience obtained from Library of Parliament and Canadian Newsstream database search. Column percentages in parentheses. Candidates from Quebec, Saskatchewan and British Columbia are omitted due to lack of provincial PC party. Candidates who ran in both elections are counted as two observations.

Turning to the second hypothesis, Table 6.8 show the past association of candidates by the riding they contested using Elections Canada Transposition of Votes. By using this data, it can be ascertained in which ridings the combined vote total of the two predecessor parties would have been sufficient to win the election in 2000 with the constituencies adjusted for the new boundaries. There were 32 ridings not won by either of the predecessor parties where the combined votes for the Alliance and PC candidates would have won the riding. Of these 32 ridings, there is an even split with nine candidates from each of the predecessor parties being nominated in these ridings. Even though this is not the result of a centrally controlled action by the central party and there was no belief that the CPC would attain all the votes given to its predecessor parties, this finding is still significant. It demonstrates that both predecessor parties are well represented in the new party in winnable ridings. These ridings represent some of the
most winnable ridings for the new party. These are significant ridings, especially when remembering that vote splitting was a motivating factor leading to the merger. The findings, therefore, show that despite being considered the weaker side going into the merger, the PC side maintained a strong and significant presence in the new party.

Table 6.8 2004 CPC Candidate Predecessor Party Association by Riding with Transposition of Votes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PC</th>
<th>Reform/Alliance</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Combined votes would have won</td>
<td>9 (28.1%)</td>
<td>9 (28.1%)</td>
<td>14 (43.8%)</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Would not have won</td>
<td>40 (21.2%)</td>
<td>31 (16.4%)</td>
<td>118 (62.4%)</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC candidate won. Incumbent not</td>
<td>1 (14.3%)</td>
<td>1 (14.3%)</td>
<td>5 (71.4%)</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>contesting</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance candidate won. Incumbent</td>
<td>5 (26.3%)</td>
<td>9 (47.4%)</td>
<td>5 (26.3%)</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>not contesting</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>55 (22.3%)</td>
<td>50 (20.2%)</td>
<td>142 (57.5%)</td>
<td>247</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Candidates past affiliation obtained from Library of Parliament and Canadian Newsstream database search. Transposition of votes recalculates the votes from the 2000 election to determine how many votes each party would receive in the new electoral boundaries. Ridings won by either of the predecessor parties and contested by the incumbent are not included. Column percentages in parentheses.

The lower two rows show the results for ridings where a PC or Alliance candidate won or would have won and the riding is being contested by a non-incumbent. There are seven ridings that PCs would have won being contested by new candidates for the CPC, and 19 ridings that the Alliance would have won. Ridings where the PC side would have won offer little insight; being split with one riding going to each of the two sides. However, ridings that the Alliance would have won are much more telling with Alliance associated candidates winning nine of those ridings and candidates from the PC winning five. While the total numbers indicate a better outcome for the Alliance side, it is intriguing that candidates from the PC side were nominated in five of these ridings. This indicates a breakthrough for the PC side in the nomination process by
winning nominations in ridings that had previously been favourable to the Reform/Alliance side. It also further indicates that PC side was quite well represented in candidate nominations in the CPC. These findings fail to support the second hypothesis.

Table 6.9 CPC Caucus by Predecessor Party Association

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PC</th>
<th>Reform/Alliance</th>
<th>Neither</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>18 (18.4%)</td>
<td>67 (68.4%)</td>
<td>13 (13.3%)</td>
<td>98 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>27 (21.6%)</td>
<td>59 (47.2%)</td>
<td>39 (31.2%)</td>
<td>125 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Candidates past affiliation obtained from Library of Parliament and Canadian Newsstream database search. Column percentages in parentheses.

The final consideration is how did the CPC candidates fare in the first the two elections? Table 6.9 shows the composition of the CPC's caucus by past association. In 2004, there were more candidates elected with past association to the PC side than the PC party did in the 2000 election. The difference compared to Reform/Alliance side is still substantial, however. The 2004 caucus is dominated by members from the Reform/Alliance side; largely a result of the larger number of Alliance incumbents contesting the election. While the PC side attained a respectable number of nominations and did see its presence increase in Parliament, the Reform/Alliance side remained the strongest force in the new party. By 2006 the situation would improve for the PC side, the number of caucus members from their side increased notably while the Reform/Alliance presence diminished. The 2006 caucus finds the PC party continuing to have a stronger presence in the party than had been expected. Particularly notable is the increase in the number of candidates with no past association in the 2006 caucus. This suggests that as the party matured, the presence of the predecessor parties and subsequently the need to manage potential conflict diminished.
CONCLUSION

This chapter does not further our understanding of how party leadership managed factional conflict in the new party. The analysis does however, offer crucial insight into the important process of candidate nomination in the CPC. The literature on candidate nomination stresses the significance of candidate nomination in Canadian parties; it is through nominating candidates the parties are officially recognized in Canada. Examining how this process was executed in the new party is thus a vital component of understanding the new party and the management of competing tensions within it. The importance of candidate nomination is further underscored by the extensive literature on candidate nomination in factionalized parties. The comparative literature regularly finds that one of the main roles performed by factions is getting their candidates nominated.

One theme in the comparative literature is the potential for factional conflict over the nomination process. Despite important differences between those countries studied and Canada with regards to the electoral system there was a fear of potential conflict between the predecessor parties similar to the conflict experienced in factionalized parties over candidate nominations. In the literature, media, and interviews with party insiders, a common theme was the apprehension that nomination process in the CPC would see a re-ignition of the old PC and Reform/Alliance feuds. Remarkably, this fear did not materialize. Aside from relatively few incidents, the media analysis found that most of the nomination meetings were conducted without conflict. This includes nominations contested by candidates with a PC past against candidates with a Reform/Alliance past. Part of this can be attributed to constituency associations comprising their executives from members of both predecessor parties.
The lack of conflict during the initial candidate nominations is crucial for the long-term health of the party. The newly merged party was particularly vulnerable at this phase, and had serious clashes broken it out it is not unreasonable to suggest the future of the party would have been in jeopardy. By conducting peaceful nominations, the party membership contributed to the maturation of the party. While the increase in nominations did not bring the PC side up to par with the Reform/Alliance side in either nominations or presence in caucus, it did increase the presence of the PC side in the new party. This is particularly the case as candidates with a PC past were nominated in ridings where the past vote share of the two parties would have won them the election. PC supporters could thus see that they did have a place in the new party. The nomination process did not see the larger Reform/Alliance side excessively throw its weight around, and their former members were represented both as candidates and MPs. Reform/Alliance supporters could also be motivated as they maintained the dominant position in nominations and in caucus, and the party they supported now enjoyed substantially more electoral success than the Reform or Alliance side ever had.

This chapter also provided valuable insight into the distribution of power in the new party. In addition to showing the PC party performing stronger than expected, and the prominence of the Reform/Alliance side in the new party, another important component of the party makeup was uncovered: candidates with no association to a predecessor party. While only maintaining a minimal presence in 2004, this portion of the party increased significantly. A key component of this segment were candidates who had previous experience with the provincial PC party. In addition to candidates from a predecessor party who also had provincial experience, this group brought valuable experience to the new party. Furthermore, the provincially experienced candidates with no association to a predecessor party had the added benefit of not
bringing baggage with them. This part of the party will play an important role in the formation of the cabinet, discussed in the next chapter.
CHAPTER SEVEN – CABINET

Few personnel decisions made by a party leader are as significant as whom to appoint to the cabinet. As Savoie tells us, policy development in Canada is largely carried out by court government; court government sees "authority highly concentrated in the hands of prime ministers and their courtiers" and included in the courtiers are senior cabinet ministers (Savoie, 2008: 17, 291). For MPs to have any hope of influencing policy and achieving their policy goals, attaining a cabinet post is a must. Cabinet posts are both a desired achievement for party members and a significant patronage tool for party leaders to utilize in managing party unity. How can party leadership distribute cabinet posts in a way that mitigates conflict and maintains party unity? This chapter explores this question through an analysis of the appointments by Harper to the CPC's shadow cabinet and cabinet from 2004 through to the end of the 2011 parliamentary session.

This chapter begins with a review of the extensive literature on cabinet government in Canada and on cabinet appointments in coalition governments and factionalized parties. This review will highlight a common trend in how the distribution of cabinet posts is done according to the strength of parties or factions in the caucus. These findings will establish expectations for how cabinet seats will be distributed in the CPC. Beyond the literature on the overall number of appointments, the review will highlight an area not well covered by the existing literature; cabinet appointments by portfolio prestige. Insufficient attention has been devoted to looking at how appointments to the more significant portfolios vary along factional lines. This literature review will provide the basis for exploring cabinet appointments in the CPC according to the prestige of the portfolios.
CABINET GOVERNMENT

In countries with a Westminster system of government, influence and power over policy formation are centred in the cabinet (Kam, 2006: 563-64). The best demonstration of the power of being in cabinet is the exclusive ability of cabinet members to introduce bills in Parliament that involve government spending or taxation. While backbench MPs retain some influence in caucus, the primary positions of influence on policy development are in cabinet. The cabinet has further powers in its ability to direct and influence the bureaucracy and to initiate multiple types of government action and programs without being subject to parliamentary debate or approval (White, 2005: 13-14).

The power exercised in cabinet can explain why becoming a member of cabinet is a career goal for MPs. For an MP to have a realistic hope of achieving their policy goals or exercising power and influence in their party and government, that MP must be a member of cabinet (Moscardelli and McGhee, 2015: 228). The necessity of being a member of cabinet for achieving political goals is stressed by Kerby who refers to cabinet seats as “prized objects for MPs” (Kerby, 2011: 599). Kerby points out that in Canada, where parties do not have substantial extra-parliamentary organizations cabinet ministers are the principal representatives of the governing party. Accordingly, it is not a surprise that most MPs desire to be members of cabinet (Kerby, 2009: 593). Similarly, Bakvis points out that ministers can "carve out their own sphere of influence" and subsequently act on and represent those interests in government (Bakvis, 2001: 65). The representative role is important to note for cabinet formation in the CPC; if appointments favour MPs from either of the predecessor parties, then the representatives of the governing party would bear a strong resemblance to the corresponding predecessor party. Docherty provides the most in-depth analysis on the significance of cabinet positions to MPs.
Through a survey of MPs from the 34th Parliament and MPs and election candidates for the 35th Parliament, Docherty finds that an overwhelming majority of MPs see a cabinet position as “the most prized possession” (Docherty, 1997: 100). For MPs on the opposition side of the House, they attach great importance to attaining a spot in the shadow cabinet (98). Heppell notes that shadow cabinet experience is perceived as a qualifying factor for cabinet appointment when a new party forms government (Heppell, 2014: 66-67).

It is important to acknowledge the role played by the party leader in forming cabinet. White underscores that in Canadian federal governments the Prime Minister has “unquestioned authority to choose the ministers, the portfolios they hold, and whether they remain in cabinet” (White, 2005: 31). White attributes this power to long standing convention and the large role party leaders play in securing electoral victory (31). This power is not without limits. A Prime Minister's cabinet selection is constrained by the members of his party elected to government, the experience or lack thereof along with the qualifications and skills of these MPs does influence the decisions made by the Prime Minister when forming cabinet. In the Canadian context, representation concerns regarding region, gender, linguistic and ethnicity also need to be addressed (Kerby, 2009: 594). None of these representation concerns in Canada carry a similar weight to regional representation. The representation of region by selecting MPs to cabinet from each region of the country is noted as a critical and unique feature of cabinet formation in the Canadian federal system (White, 2005: 40-42). When forming cabinet, Prime Ministers also have to consider including prominent MPs from their party (Allen and Ward, 2009: 239). While these limitations do influence the selection of MPs to cabinet this influence does not diminish the significant power exercised by the party leader in the formation of cabinet.
The study of cabinet formation, therefore, takes on several critical dimensions for exploring how factional tensions can be managed. The power vested in the Prime Minister to appoint and dismiss ministers is a primary source of power exercised by party leadership. This power is underscored both by the role cabinet plays in formulating policy and the significance in attaining cabinet membership to MPs. Exploring how party leaders make use of this power has the potential to show how power is distributed within a party. Warwick and Druckman assert that it is necessary to understand the distribution of cabinet seats to fully explain the functioning of parliamentary government (Warwick and Druckman, 2006: 638). Keeping in mind that Perlin found that factional tensions can be created and escalated by personal motivations for attaining career advancements, it is easy to see how the allocation of cabinet portfolios could become a serious problem in the CPC (Perlin, 1980: 2-5).

Going back to the first period of conflict in the PC party provides an example of shadow cabinet distribution being influenced by factional considerations. Robert Stanfield had become the leader of the PCs with the help of Dalton Camp and others who were opposed to the leadership of Diefenbaker. Once he became the party leader, Stanfield had the daunting task of selecting MPs for shadow cabinet from a deeply divided caucus. The PC caucus totaled 96 members, 26 of which had been supportive of Camp’s attempt to remove Diefenbaker as party leader at the 1966 annual party convention. The remaining members of the caucus were almost all loyal to Diefenbaker and suspicious of Stanfield (Perlin, 1980: 109). In appointing MPs to shadow cabinet, Stanfield had to decide between promoting his supporters and the factional element that had helped him win the leadership or taking a more balanced approach by granting each side an appropriate level of appointments (109-110). Accounts of Stanfield describe him as someone worried “more about reconciling his enemies than rewarding his friends” and he
accordingly took an inclusive approach to distributing shadow cabinet spots (Stevens, 1973: 206-07). A strong majority of Stanfield’s shadow cabinet was made up of MPs who had supported Diefenbaker at the 1966 convention (Perlin, 1980: 111). Even with this inclusive approach, Stanfield could still not overcome the conflict within the party. This analysis will explore what allowed the CPC to be more successful in managing party unity through cabinet appointments.

CABINET ALLOCATION IN THE COMPARATIVE LITERATURE

Looking at the comparative literature offers some examples of how cabinet distribution can be utilized to manage party unity. As opposed to utilizing more heavy-handed measures, the Prime Minister’s ability to disperse patronage rewards, particularly cabinet posts, is noted as an effective way to manage party unity (Kam, 2006: 531). The literature is not restricted to Westminster parliamentary systems of government. Baik et al. analyzed the appointments of Latino Americans to cabinet, as well as other patronage positions, during the presidency of George W. Bush. Finding that several key cabinet positions were allocated to Latinos, Baik et al., argue that cabinet appointments are used as a tool for building unity (Baik et al., 2009: 602).

Political leaders in Africa have also made great use of cabinet appointments. Arriola looks at political instability in Africa, using cabinet appointments to explain why some leaders can stave off political coups and prolong political stability. Cabinet appointments are singled out as a key form of patronage reward, and through an analysis of all cabinet appointments in 40 African governments from 1970 to 2000 Arriola found that African leaders can prolong their tenure and prevent political instability through an ongoing distribution of cabinet posts (Arriola, 2009: 1340-41, 1345-47).

When more than one party is involved in governing, the allocation of cabinet portfolios remains significant. Coalition governments are not the same as factionalized parties that form
government. However, the literature on cabinet appointments in coalition government is still useful as it provides important insight into the significance of cabinet posts for politicians and how their appointments are managed by party leadership. Warwick and Druckman point out that the distribution of cabinet posts in a coalition government is one of the most important decisions facing party leaders (Warwick and Druckman, 2006: 635). When two major parties come together to form a government, such as the Christian Democrats and Social Democrats in countries such as Austria and Germany, Miller and Muller refer to this as a “Grand Coalition” (Miller and Muller, 2010: 332). The challenge of functioning and maintaining harmony is a particularly daunting task in such a context, as the two parties forming government are at once partners and opponents. Grand Coalitions are especially unique as the two parties forming the coalition are two major parties, unlike many other coalitions which see a large party working with one or more smaller parties. Miller and Muller find that to successfully manage party unity both parties will see some of their members appointed to cabinet and others not. This requires both parties to accept having some of their higher-ranking members not being given cabinet seats (334). Further, Miller and Muller find that the distribution of cabinet posts in this arrangement is relatively equal to the strength of each party in the coalition (340).

The wealth of research into the allocation of cabinet portfolios in coalition governments has produced ‘Gamson’s Law.” Gamson’s Law dictates that the number of cabinet positions a partner in a coalition government will receive is directly relatable to the strength of that partner in the coalition, which is measured by the number of seats that partner has in government (Gamson, 1961: 374-76). Scholars have revisited Gamson’s Law on numerous occasions and have arrived at similar conclusions, leading Miller and Muller to refer to Gamson’s Law as “one of the most well established ‘laws’ in comparative politics” (Miller and Muller, 2010: 334).
Back et al. note the strength of this law, once again observing that the number of cabinet seats attained by a coalition partner is comparable to the party’s strength in the coalition (Back et al., 2011: 441). Determining the strength of a party in a coalition is best determined by looking at the number of elected representatives they have (Ennser-Jedenastik, 2013: 317). Warwick and Druckman tested Gamson’s Law on a large data set covering 268 coalition governments involving over 800 parties in 14 Western European countries. Their findings reaffirm the proportionality of cabinet seats to party strength, although they find a tendency for smaller parties to receive a slightly larger number of seats than their strength would warrant and larger parties to receive slightly less (Warwick and Druckman, 2006: 646-47).

New Zealand offers additional insight into the distribution of cabinet posts in coalition governments. New Zealand switched to an Mixed Member Proportional electoral system before the 1996 election, as a result of this new electoral system, there was a notable increase in the number of political parties that had representatives elected and an end to single parties winning majority governments (Boston and Bullock, 2010: 352-53). In the first election under the MMP system, the National party won a plurality of seats with the Labour party coming in second. The New Zealand First party came in third and found itself in a desirable position as a potential coalition partner for either of the top two parties. A coalition government between the National Party and the New Zealand First party was formed and lasted until 1998; it was followed by coalitions between the Labour and Alliance parties, and subsequently the Labour and Progressive Party (Jou, 2010: 174). Cabinet posts have frequently gone to individuals from multiple parties since the electoral system change and the formation of coalition governments. The coalition arrangements, including the distribution of cabinet post have varied from one coalition
government to the next; each coalition, however, has produced written agreements governing the relationship (Boston and Bullock, 2010: 354-56).

The Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government in the United Kingdom following the 2010 election offers a particularly insightful example of cabinet formation in a coalition government in a Westminster system of government. The 2010 election results saw the Conservatives defeat the governing Labour party but only win a plurality of seats. The Conservatives won 306 seats to the 258 captured by the Labour party and 57 seats for third place Liberal Democrats. Coalition negotiations began with both the Conservative and Labour parties trying to attract the Liberal Democrats; the negotiations resulted in the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats forming a coalition government. Crucially the negotiations did not cover cabinet appointments or stipulate that the Liberal Democrats party leader would be consulted on the appointments (Heppell, 2014: 68). As a result, Conservative party leader David Cameron had full discretion over cabinet choices. Debus found that the distribution of cabinet posts relatively resembled the strength of the parties in Parliament, with the weaker Liberal Democrats receiving just under 23 percent of the cabinet posts despite having just under 16 percent of the seats (2011: 300). The distribution of cabinet posts in the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition reaffirms the findings from other coalition governments that the distribution of cabinet posts is comparable to a party's strength in caucus, with the weaker party receiving a slight increase in their share of cabinet posts. This finding is particularly significant for the CPC case as the United Kingdom's electoral system is comparable to Canada's.

While coalition governments and factionalized parties are quite similar it does not automatically follow that both will deal with cabinet posts in the same manner. Focusing on factionalized parties, Ennser-Jedenastik argues that it would be a rational aim for all factions to
attain as many portfolios as they can (Ennser-Jedenastik, 2013: 311). Factionalized parties face the risk that cabinet posts could be distributed based on factional association rather than the qualifications of the party members (Kollner, 2004: 89). Allen and Ward note the importance of managing the distribution of cabinet posts to ensure party unity. It is further noted that Prime Ministers are likely to ensure members of their own faction are well treated in the distribution process (Allen and Ward, 2009: 239).

In one of the most factionalized parties, the ALP, factions also play a significant role in the distribution of cabinet posts. The input factions have on the cabinet nomination is well developed. Factions regularly put forward a list of their own candidates to fill cabinet posts. After the factions select their desired nominees from that list, those names are brought to the party leader by the faction leaders. This process occurs whenever a cabinet post becomes available; the factions consult with each other to determine which faction is next in line for an appointment (Weller, 2007: 161). The Prime Minister can exert influence in these negotiations, for example Prime Minister Bob Hawke was able to push back in 1987 to ensure that more women were appointed to the cabinet (Parkin and Warhurst, 2000: 38). In a similar fashion to coalition governments, cabinet seats are distributed in the ALP based on the strength of each faction in the caucus. The same holds true for the shadow ministry in the ALP, which is how shadow cabinets are referred to there. Media observations on ALP shadow ministry appointments following the 2013 general election found that only one individual who did not have a factional association was appointed (Grattan, 2013). Crucially, only in select instances are individuals appointed to cabinet or the shadow ministry without having factional association and support from that faction (Weller, 2007: 198).
The most well-documented example of cabinet seat distribution in factionalized parties comes from Japan. In addition to the nomination of candidates, one of the three main roles identified in the literature for factions in the LDP is the distribution of cabinet posts (Kollner, 2004: 93). Factions have taken on a significant role ensuring that their members can attain important cabinet roles. In the DPJ there has been a particular emphasis on balancing the distribution of the most important posts between the factions. One of the factors that has helped keep the party together is a balanced distribution of cabinet positions (100-02).

The analysis of the role played by factions in cabinet distribution is further explored by Tomita et al. Since the 1950s, for a member of the Japanese government to be appointed as a cabinet minister, Tomita et al. show that there are two determining factors: the number of times an individual has been elected, and the faction that the individual belongs to (Tomita et al., 1981: 236, 245). The strength of a faction in the LDP plays a critical role in determining the allocation of cabinet posts. The party leadership plays an important role in ensuring that representatives from all coalition partners are included in the cabinet. It is stressed that the weaker partners cannot be marginalized at the cabinet table in order to not risk party unity (251). Tomita et al. analyze multiple Japanese governments and find that cabinet seats are distributed in proportion to the strength of the party’s factions (253-55). Even leaders such as Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda, who are noted as publicly declaring their dislike of factions and the factional system, were still found to distribute cabinet posts according to the strength of each faction in the party (255).

Bouissou observes a similar balance between faction strength and cabinet distribution (Bouissou, 2001: 582). Initially, Bouissou found that cabinet allotments were disproportionately awarded to the strongest faction in the party, while the weaker factions were fortunate to receive
any seats. This distribution would evolve to be more balanced as has been found in the literature on coalition governments, where the stronger party’s faction received slightly less than its proportionate share of cabinet, and the weaker factions received more than their fair share (583). The reason for this gradual transformation was to achieve political stability. Bouissou’s analysis of multiple governments and cabinet formations found that government unity and stability increased as the governing party awarded itself a diminishing proportion of cabinet seats (586–90). To achieve political stability, Bouissou concluded that it was necessary to have a distribution of cabinet seats proportionate to the faction’s strength, with the stronger factions getting slightly fewer seats than they deserve and the weaker factions receiving slightly more (591). In more contemporary times, Bouissou observes that the disadvantage experienced by the stronger party has diminished and that the distribution has become more proportionate to factional strength (594).

There is a clear pattern shown in the literature that cabinet positions are an important achievement for party members and for factions, and that their distribution is an important tool for party leadership. The distribution of cabinet posts is a clear example of how patronage rewards can be used to manage party unity. Regardless of the type of government, electoral or party system it has been shown in the literature that cabinet seats are allocated in a proportionate relationship to the strength of parties or factions. When deviations from proportionality occur, they are in the direction of favouring the weaker factions at the expense of the stronger factions to promote party unity, these deviations, however, are marginal at best. Based on the comparative literature, the expectation is that the analysis will show that Harper managed tensions by distributing cabinet posts to MPs from both predecessor parties according to their strength in the party, with a possible increase in posts to the weaker PC side.
QUALITATIVE STUDIES OF CABINET DISTRIBUTION

While the relationship between factional strength and the number of cabinet posts is well documented in the literature, the relationship between the factional association and the type of ministerial posts given to each faction is much less developed. As Warwick and Druckman point out, it would be a serious misrepresentation to treat the Minister of Sports portfolio the same as the Prime Ministers portfolio (Warwick and Druckman, 2006: 636). Similarly, in the Canadian context White stresses that there is a disparity between cabinet portfolios with some portfolios taking on much greater significance than others (White, 2005: 44). This raises the question of whether the strength of a faction in a governing party has any influence on the type or significance of cabinet portfolios it is allocated? This is a question that has not been sufficiently explored in the existing literature. Back et al. note the lack of research into how cabinet positions are distributed amongst coalition partners according to their level of prestige and call for further research and theoretical development (Back et al., 2011: 442). A lack of inquiry into the differing importance of cabinet posts in the work on factional influence on cabinet allocation in Japan is noted by Tomita et al. (Tomita et al., 1981: 255). The existing literature is also criticized for failing to incorporate portfolio prestige by Warwick and Druckman. They argue that counting the number of portfolios alone is insufficient and that the importance of each portfolio must also be included in the analysis (Warwick and Druckman, 2006: 636). The hypothesis is put forward by Warwick and Druckman that the stronger party in a coalition will not take on a disproportionate share of the overall number of cabinet posts, instead it will monopolize the more prestigious cabinet positions (637-40). A very similar hypothesis is also explored by Back et al. (Back et al., 2011: 456).
The lack of consideration given to portfolio weight is a concern with the existing literature, and the proponents of including portfolio significance make a compelling case. The results of their analysis, however, are intriguing. In the few instances where the literature has looked at the prestige of cabinet portfolios, they have not found evidence of the stronger parties taking on more of the important positions. Warwick and Druckman found the opposite. Their findings demonstrated that prestigious portfolios are not given disproportionately to the stronger partner in a coalition. Instead, they find that the distribution of cabinet posts, both the overall number and by prestige, is relative to the strength of the party in the coalition (Warwick and Druckman, 2006: 650). Similar conclusions are reached by Back et al. who find that while the stronger party is more probable to hold any of the cabinet seats (because they hold more seats overall), there is no monopolization of prestigious portfolios by the stronger party in a coalition (Back et al., 2011: 459). The failure to find a statistically significant relationship between party strength and the prestige of portfolios received is noted in the more recent literature, which subsequently treats all ministerial posts as equal in their analysis (Ennser-Jedenastik, 2013: 317).

The Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government offers a particularly telling example on the significance of cabinet positions in a coalition government according to portfolio salience. Recall that there had been no formal discussion of the cabinet appointment process, including the significance of the portfolios, between the two parties. Additionally, remember that the smaller party in the coalition, the Liberal Democrats, received a greater proportion of cabinet appointments than their strength in caucus suggested they should. Crucially however, the Liberal Democrats did not perform as well in the significance of portfolios they received. Conservative MPs were appointed to almost every one of the key portfolios while the Liberal Democrats only received one (Debus, 2011: 302). Heppell concludes that "the significant offices
of state were saved for Conservatives" (Heppell 2014: 69). The salience of portfolios thus greatly benefited the stronger party in this coalition.

For this analysis, these findings raise several interesting discussions. Theoretically, it does seem plausible that the stronger faction could reward itself by granting its members the more prestigious cabinet posts, and the failure of most of the literature to address this possibility is a concern. Most of the articles that have broached the topic have found that there is not a significant relationship between coalition partner strength and the importance of the portfolios they receive. The case from the United Kingdom being a key exception. There are two significant shortcomings with these findings that need to be considered. First, compared with the voluminous amounts of literature that analyze the relationship between the number of cabinet posts received in relation to party strength, the amount of literature testing the salience of portfolios in relationship to party strength is minimal. Secondly, the few pieces of literature that do address this relationship have only focused on coalition governments; there has not been an exploration of portfolio significance in factionalized parties. Coalition governments and factionalized parties in government have been found to behave similarly in the overall distribution of cabinet posts. Accordingly, it is reasonable to theorize that the qualitative significance of cabinet appointments in coalition governments could also be applicable to factionalized parties. The CPC case provides an especially intriguing case to test this theory; the CPC offers the chance to examine how a new party with non-institutionalized factions and a non-factionalized portion of the party managed the distribution of cabinet portfolios, and their respective levels of importance.

**HYPOTHESES**

*H1: It is expected that the number of cabinet posts allocated to MPs from each of the predecessor parties will be relative to their strength in the CPC caucus.*
The literature has shown that cabinet plays an important role in the functioning of parliamentary government. Attaining a cabinet portfolio has been shown to be a significant goal for most MPs and the factions that they represent, while the power to appoint and dismiss MPs from cabinet is noted as one of the most significant powers of a party leader. Accordingly, there has been substantial attention paid by scholars to how party leaders distribute cabinet posts; the roles factions play in distributing those posts and the consequences the distribution has for the management of party factions. A consistent finding in the literature is that the number of cabinet posts a faction receives is dependent on the strength of the faction in the caucus. This hypothesis will test these findings to see if they apply to the CPC. The findings of this analysis will offer important insight into how Harper utilized cabinet appointments to maintain party unity.

H2: The distribution of prestigious and important cabinet portfolios will be relative to the strength in caucus and will see the Reform/Alliance side monopolize the more important cabinet positions.

The notion that the stronger faction in the party will cede a proportionate number of cabinet posts being granted to the weaker factions in exchange for a greater proportion of the high-ranking cabinet posts has been suggested by the literature. The limited analysis this theory has received has found one significant example of the stronger party receiving the more prestigious posts for its own members. Unfortunately, this concept has not been fully explored in the existing literature and has only been tested in two studies on coalition governments. By testing this hypothesis on the CPC, this study will contribute to the existing literature on portfolio distribution by significance.

**FINDINGS**

Table 7.1 shows the past association of all CPC MPs in the 2004 parliamentary session and the distribution of shadow cabinet appointments. In the bottom row, the distribution of CPC
MPs by predecessor party association shows that just over 18 percent of their MPs come from
the PC side while just over 69 percent have Reform/Alliance lineage. Amazingly, the percentage
of shadow cabinet ministers from the PC side is nearly identical at just under 19 percent. The
same is true for shadow cabinet ministers hailing from the Reform/Alliance side. While the first
hypothesis expected that caucus strength would translate to the proportion of cabinet seats,
finding the percentages nearly identical is a stronger relationship than most would anticipate. In
an interview for this project with a former high-ranking CPC official, they indicated that Harper

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PC</th>
<th>Reform/Alliance</th>
<th>Neither</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shadow Cabinet</td>
<td>9 (18.8%)</td>
<td>34 (70.8%)</td>
<td>5 (10.4%)</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Position</td>
<td>9 (18%)</td>
<td>34 (68%)</td>
<td>7 (14%)</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Caucus</td>
<td>18 (18.4%)</td>
<td>68 (69.4%)</td>
<td>12 (12.2%)</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 7.1 2004 Shadow Cabinet Appointments by Predecessor Party Association*

*MPs past association determined by Library of Parliament and Canada Newsstream database search. Prime Minister is not included. Column percentages in parentheses.*

was very conscious of the need to distribute shadow cabinet posts to MPs from both predecessor
parties. On the subject of the distribution of shadow cabinet posts, they recalled Harper telling
them “I had to sit some of my people down.” and remembered Harper as being attuned to the
need for some members of his former party to relinquish their shadow cabinet spots to
incorporate the PC side. “He never made any apologies for that” the official would go on to say,
emphasizing that Harper realized if the merger was to be a merger of equals, that meant some
former Alliance members must step aside for MPs coming from the PC side (R5). Also telling
that is that over 85 percent of all CPC MPs have a past association with one of the predecessor
parties. This demonstrates that the predecessor parties formed a significant component of the
new party, particularly its caucus, following its first election. The continuing strong presence of
MPs with past associations to either of the predecessor parties also leads to another important
observation; an overwhelming majority of the shadow cabinet members come from one of the
predecessor parties. Thus, not only did MPs with an association to a predecessor party continue
to exist in significant numbers in the new party, the findings show that these MPs also filled important roles.

Table 7.2 shows the composition of the CPC caucus and its shadow cabinet by province. The findings here speak to the traditional regional bases of support for the predecessor parties. Atlantic Canada is only represented by MPs from the PC side, two of which were appointed to the shadow cabinet. Similarly, Western Canada is well represented by MPs from the Reform/Alliance side. While MPs from the Reform/Alliance side have a dominant presence in

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>PC</th>
<th>Reform/Alliance</th>
<th>None</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Newfoundland</td>
<td>1 (100%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Appointed</td>
<td>1 (100%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prince Edward Island</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Appointed</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nova Scotia</td>
<td>1 (100%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Appointed</td>
<td>2(100%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Brunswick</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Appointed</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quebec</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Appointed</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ontario</td>
<td>3 (25%)</td>
<td>6 (50%)</td>
<td>3 (25%)</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Appointed</td>
<td>4 (33.3%)</td>
<td>5 (41.7%)</td>
<td>3 (25%)</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manitoba</td>
<td>1 (20%)</td>
<td>3 (60%)</td>
<td>1 (20%)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Appointed</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 (50%)</td>
<td>1 (50%)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saskatchewan</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5 (83.3%)</td>
<td>1 (20%)</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Appointed</td>
<td>1 (14.3%)</td>
<td>4 (57.1%)</td>
<td>2 (28.6%)</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alberta</td>
<td>2 (18.2%)</td>
<td>9 (81.8%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Appointed</td>
<td>1 (7.1%)</td>
<td>13 (92.9%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Colombia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10 (100%)</td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Appointed</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11 (91.7%)</td>
<td>1 (8.3%)</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territories</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Appointed</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Caucus</td>
<td>18 (18.4%)</td>
<td>68 (69.4%)</td>
<td>12 (12.2%)</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*MPs past association determined by Library of Parliament and Canada Newsstream database search. Prime Minister is not included. Column percentages in parentheses.*
Western Canada, it is intriguing that three shadow cabinet appointments went to MPs from the PC side in this region. Three MPs may seem insignificant compared to the 27 Reform/Alliance MPs in the shadow cabinet; however, those three still provide a face for the PC side in the shadow cabinet and especially in Western Canada. By appointing these three MPs, party members from the PC side are able to see their interests and their former party members fulfilling an important role in the new party. Ontario is intriguing with former Reform/Alliance members gaining six shadow cabinet appointments while the PC side attained three.

Remembering that failures to achieve electoral success in Ontario was a strong motivating factor behind the merger for the Reform/Alliance side, it is noteworthy that Reform/Alliance MPs gained twice as many shadow cabinet appointments as MPs from the PC side. These appointments offered a strong reward to the Reform/Alliance side without the risk of alienating the PC side, which was represented over much of the country.

Turning to the 2006 session, Table 7.3 shows that the strength of the predecessor parties continued to have an impact on the composition of the cabinet. MPs connected with the Reform/Alliance side comprised 48 percent of the total caucus and just over 48 percent of all cabinet ministers. The near perfect relationship between caucus strength and cabinet seat distribution found in the 2004 shadow cabinet remains in the 2006 session. Looking at MPs from the PC side, the difference is much more noticeable. Just over 32 percent of the cabinet came from PC side, compared to less than 22 percent of the CPC caucus coming from the same lineage. This significant disparity shows the PC side to be given a much stronger role in the cabinet than their strength in caucus indicates they should have. While the literature noted that the smaller side sometimes received a slight boost in the percentage of cabinet seats relative to its strength in caucus, the difference here is substantial. The PC presence in cabinet can partially be
accounted for by the past provincial cabinet experience of CPC MPs from the PC side. Jim Flaherty, appointed as Minister of Finance by Harper, held multiple cabinet portfolios during his tenure in the Ontario legislature. Flaherty had previously served as Minister of Finance, Attorney General and Ministry of Labour amongst other posts. Similarly, John Baird who began his federal ministerial career as President of the Treasury Board, held posts such as Minister of Energy and Minister of Community and Social Services at the provincial level. This past ministerial experience enhances the qualifications of these individuals for cabinet appointments in the CPC.

Table 7.3 2006 Cabinet Appointments by Predecessor Party Association

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role</th>
<th>PC</th>
<th>Reform/Alliance</th>
<th>Neither</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cabinet</td>
<td>10 (32.3%)</td>
<td>15 (48.4%)</td>
<td>6 (19.4%)</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parl. Secretary</td>
<td>5 (18.5%)</td>
<td>15 (55.6%)</td>
<td>7 (25.9%)</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee Chair/Vice Chair</td>
<td>4 (16%)</td>
<td>14 (56%)</td>
<td>7 (28%)</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Role</td>
<td>8 (19%)</td>
<td>16 (38.1%)</td>
<td>18 (42.9%)</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Caucus</td>
<td>27 (21.6%)</td>
<td>60 (48%)</td>
<td>38 (30.4%)</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*MPs past association determined by Library of Parliament and Canada Newsstream database search. Prime Minister is not included. Column percentages in parentheses.*

Another difference from the expectations of the literature is that the gains in cabinet seats for the PC side do not, for the most part, come at the expense of the Reform/Alliance side, instead coming from candidates who did not have any predecessor party association. In this respect, the CPC differs from the coalition parties and factionalized parties discussed in the literature as a considerable, and growing amount of the caucus does not have any association with one of the predecessor parties. Even when looking at the lower level roles of Parliamentary Secretaries, Committee Chairs and Vice Chairs, CPC members who have no past association consistently receive few roles than their strength in caucus suggests they should. Intriguingly, looking at the lower level parliamentary roles shows that the situation is reversed between the Reform/Alliance and PC sides with the Reform/Alliance attaining more roles than their strength
indicates they should have and the PC side less. While these roles are not the valued objects that cabinet seats are, it is intriguing that the Reform/Alliance side performs better here and once again, the disparity comes at the expense of caucus members with no association to a predecessor party.

The provincial breakdown of cabinet appointments by past association for the CPC's first session of government is shown in Table 7.4. Once again, Western Canada acts as a bastion of support for appointments from the Reform/Alliance side. All but one of the cabinet

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Appointed</th>
<th>Reform/Alliance</th>
<th>None</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Newfoundland</td>
<td>Appointed</td>
<td>1 (100%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not Appointed</td>
<td>1 (50%)</td>
<td>1 (50%)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prince Edward Island</td>
<td>Appointed</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not Appointed</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nova Scotia</td>
<td>Appointed</td>
<td>1 (100%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not Appointed</td>
<td>2 (100%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Brunswick</td>
<td>Appointed</td>
<td>1 (100%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not Appointed</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 (50%)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quebec</td>
<td>Appointed</td>
<td>1 (20%)</td>
<td>4 (80%)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not Appointed</td>
<td>2 (33.3%)</td>
<td>4 (66.7%)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ontario</td>
<td>Appointed</td>
<td>5 (50%)</td>
<td>3 (30%)</td>
<td>2 (20%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not Appointed</td>
<td>7 (23.3%)</td>
<td>10 (33.3%)</td>
<td>13 (43.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manitoba</td>
<td>Appointed</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 (100%)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not Appointed</td>
<td>2 (28.6%)</td>
<td>3 (42.8%)</td>
<td>2 (28.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saskatchewan</td>
<td>Appointed</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3 (100%)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not Appointed</td>
<td>1 (10%)</td>
<td>5 (50%)</td>
<td>4 (40%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alberta</td>
<td>Appointed</td>
<td>1 (20%)</td>
<td>4 (80%)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not Appointed</td>
<td>2 (9.1%)</td>
<td>17 (77.3%)</td>
<td>3 (13.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Colombia</td>
<td>Appointed</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4 (100%)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not Appointed</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9 (69.2%)</td>
<td>4 (30.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territories</td>
<td>Appointed</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not Appointed</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Caucus</strong></td>
<td>27 (21.6%)</td>
<td>60 (48%)</td>
<td>38 (30.4%)</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*MPs past association determined by Library of Parliament and Canada Newsstream database search. Prime Minister is not included. Column percentages in parentheses.*
appointments from Western Canada went to caucus members from the Reform/Alliance side. MPs from the PC side saw their Western presence decrease in this first cabinet from their presence in shadow cabinet, while their number of ministers from Ontario increased both compared to the Reform/Alliance side and in absolute numbers. Atlantic Canada remained a strong hold for the PCs, although one candidate with a Reform/Alliance heritage was elected yet not appointed to cabinet. Quebec comprised a notable portion of the CPC's cabinet, with four appointments going to MPs with no past association and one to an MP with a PC past. The results demonstrate that the traditional regional bases of support for the predecessor parties remain relevant in the new party. This helps to explain the strong PC presence in the new party's cabinet; in addition to maintaining party unity, regional considerations also played a notable role in the appointment of former PC members to the CPC's first cabinet.

For the 2008 parliamentary session, Table 7.5 shows that the correlation between the strength in caucus and the number of cabinet seats attained is diminishing. While the difference is not overwhelming, both sides receive a higher proportion of cabinet seats than their strength in caucus indicates they should. The difference is marginally more pronounced for the Reform/Alliance side, and much like in 2006, these gains come at the expense of candidates who have no past association. As the percentage of caucus members with association to a predecessor party continues to diminish, so does their share of cabinet seats. However, MPs with an association to a predecessor party still fill just over 70 percent of the cabinet seats and MPs without an affiliation still hold a smaller percentage of cabinet seats than the percentage of the caucus they make up. Part of this is attributable to the level of experience MPs with an association predecessor have compared to MPs without. Recall that shadow cabinet experience is treated as a qualifying factor for cabinet appointment. MPs that were previously MPs for
either of the predecessor parties are likely to have such experience. For lower level roles in parliament, the distribution of posts corresponds more closely to the strength in the caucus. MPs from the Reform/Alliance side are allocated slightly fewer lower roles than their caucus strength would suggest they should have, but the difference is minimal. Overall the findings from 2008 continue the trends noticed in 2006. The PC side continues to receive more cabinet appointments than is expected based on their caucus strength. What is noteworthy about the CPC case is that this added strength does not come at the expense of the other side, which also attains more cabinet posts than expected. Instead, the costs are absorbed by MPs who have no association to a predecessor party. This is partially supportive of the first hypothesis as the percentage of cabinet seats received by the two sides is comparable to their strength in caucus.

Table 7.5 2008 Cabinet Appointments by Predecessor Party Association

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PC</th>
<th>Reform/Alliance</th>
<th>Neither</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cabinet</td>
<td>8 (21.6%)</td>
<td>18 (48.6%)</td>
<td>11 (29.7%)</td>
<td>37 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parl. Secretary</td>
<td>6 (21.4%)</td>
<td>10 (35.7%)</td>
<td>12 (42.9%)</td>
<td>28 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee Chair/Vice Chair</td>
<td>5 (17.2%)</td>
<td>10 (34.5%)</td>
<td>14 (48.3%)</td>
<td>29 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Role</td>
<td>7 (13.2%)</td>
<td>19 (35.9%)</td>
<td>27 (50.9%)</td>
<td>53 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Caucus</td>
<td>26 (17.7%)</td>
<td>57 (38.8%)</td>
<td>64 (43.5%)</td>
<td>147 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 7.5 2008 Cabinet Appointments by Predecessor Party Association*

MPs past association determined by Library of Parliament and Canada Newsstream database search. Prime Minister is not included. Column percentages in parentheses.

The provincial breakdown of the cabinet posts according to association with a predecessor party once again demonstrates the strength of the traditional regional bases of support, however, it indicates that these bases are weakening. As shown in Table 7.6, MPs from the PC side remains strong, albeit less so than in previous caucuses in Atlantic Canada. Notably, the lone MP from the Reform/Alliance side was appointed to cabinet during this sitting of Parliament. As well, two cabinet appointments went to candidates with no association to a predecessor party from Atlantic Canada. Quebec is predominantly represented by MPs with no past association, the sole cabinet minister with a link to either predecessor party comes from the
PC side. For Ontario, there was an even divide with four MPs each from the Reform/Alliance side, the PC side and those with no association to a predecessor party who were appointed to cabinet. Western Canada remains consistent from the previous Parliaments, with all cabinet appointments except for one going to MPs from the Reform/Alliance side. The traditional regional bases of support do help to explain the continuing strong presence of MPs from the PC side in the CPC cabinet. Yet, it alone cannot fully explain the PCs strength. It cannot account for the exceptions, such as the MP from New Brunswick with a Reform/Alliance lineage that was appointed to cabinet. More significantly, it also cannot explain why the growing members

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>PC</th>
<th>Reform/Alliance</th>
<th>None</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Newfoundland</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appointed</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Appointed</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prince Edward Island</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appointed</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 (100%)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Appointed</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nova Scotia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appointed</td>
<td>1 (100%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Appointed</td>
<td>1 (33.3%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2 (66.7%)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Brunswick</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appointed</td>
<td>1 (33.3%)</td>
<td>1 (33.3%)</td>
<td>1 (33.3%)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Appointed</td>
<td>1 (33.3%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2 (66.7%)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quebec</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appointed</td>
<td>1 (20%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4 (80%)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Appointed</td>
<td>2 (28.6%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5 (71.4%)</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ontario</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appointed</td>
<td>4 (33.3%)</td>
<td>4 (33.3%)</td>
<td>4 (33.3%)</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Appointed</td>
<td>10 (25%)</td>
<td>11 (27.5%)</td>
<td>19 (47.5%)</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manitoba</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appointed</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2 (100%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Appointed</td>
<td>2 (25%)</td>
<td>1 (12.5%)</td>
<td>5 (62.5%)</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saskatchewan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appointed</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2 (100%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Appointed</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4 (36.4%)</td>
<td>7 (63.6%)</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alberta</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appointed</td>
<td>1 (25%)</td>
<td>3 (75%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Appointed</td>
<td>2 (9.1%)</td>
<td>14 (63.6%)</td>
<td>6 (27.3%)</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Columbia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appointed</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6 (100%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Appointed</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9 (56.2%)</td>
<td>7 (43.8%)</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territories</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appointed</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 (100%)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Appointed</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Caucus</td>
<td>26 (17.7%)</td>
<td>57 (38.8%)</td>
<td>64 (43.5%)</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

MPs past association determined by Library of Parliament and Canada Newsstream database search. Prime Minister is not included. Column percentages in parentheses.
of caucus with no association to a predecessor party were significantly underrepresented in cabinet. Experience in government likely accounts for a portion of the underrepresentation; however, another crucial explanation is the desire to ensure that each predecessor party had representation in cabinet to mitigate potential conflict.

Table 7.7 2011 Cabinet Appointments by Predecessor Party Association

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PC</th>
<th>Reform/Alliance</th>
<th>Neither</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cabinet</td>
<td>10 (20.8%)</td>
<td>18 (37.5%)</td>
<td>20 (41.7%)</td>
<td>48 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parl. Secretary</td>
<td>8 (24.2%)</td>
<td>8 (24.2%)</td>
<td>17 (51.5%)</td>
<td>33 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee Chair/</td>
<td>2 (7.7%)</td>
<td>9 (34.6%)</td>
<td>15 (57.7%)</td>
<td>26 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vice Chair</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Role</td>
<td>10 (14.3%)</td>
<td>19 (27.1%)</td>
<td>41 (58.6%)</td>
<td>70 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Caucus</td>
<td>30 (16.9%)</td>
<td>54 (30.5%)</td>
<td>93 (52.5%)</td>
<td>177 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*MPs past association determined by Library of Parliament and Canada Newsstream database search. Prime Minister is not included. Column percentages in parentheses.*

Finally, Table 7.7 shows the results for the 2011 parliamentary session. Once again both sides receive more cabinet appointments than their strength in caucus leads us to expect they should. The difference is slightly less pronounced than in 2008, but it is still present. Much like in 2008, MPs with an association to a predecessor party acquired more cabinet posts at the expense of MPs not associated with a predecessor party. For the first time in 2011, MPs without association to a predecessor party make up more than 50 percent of the CPC caucus. Their presence in cabinet though is under 45 percent. It is noteworthy that in each parliamentary session, the percentage of CPC MPs with past associations has diminished. The percentage of CPC cabinet posts distributed has followed a similar decline from session to session, yet MPs from the predecessor party have continued to hold more cabinet posts however than colleagues who lack a linkage to a predecessor party. Looking at the lower level parliamentary appointments shows a mixture of results. Parliamentary Secretary spots were filled by more MPs from the PC side and less from the Reform/Alliance side than their caucus strength indicates they should receive, with the situation being reversed for Committee Chairs and Vice-
Chairs. MPs without an association to a predecessor party received slightly fewer Parliamentary Secretary spots and slightly more Committee Chairs and Vice Chairs than their caucus strength suggests they should.

Table 7.8 shows how Harper distributed cabinet appointments by province for the final sitting of Parliament under study. Western Canada remains as an area dominated by MPs from the Reform/Alliance side. Intriguingly, there is only one MP from the PC side appointed to cabinet from Western Canada, the number of Western MPs with no linkage to a predecessor

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>PC</th>
<th>Reform/Alliance</th>
<th>None (%)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Newfoundland</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 (100%)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nova Scotia</td>
<td>1 (100%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Brunswick</td>
<td>1 (33.3%)</td>
<td>1 (33.3%)</td>
<td>1 (33.3%)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quebec</td>
<td>2 (40%)</td>
<td>5 (26.3%)</td>
<td>9 (47.4%)</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ontario</td>
<td>12 (21.1%)</td>
<td>11 (19.3%)</td>
<td>34 (59.6%)</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manitoba</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 (33.3%)</td>
<td>2 (66.7%)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saskatchewan</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2 (36.4%)</td>
<td>7 (63.6%)</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alberta</td>
<td>1 (14.3%)</td>
<td>5 (71.4%)</td>
<td>1 (14.3%)</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Columbia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4 (80%)</td>
<td>1 (20%)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territories</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 (100%)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Total             | 29 (16.5%) | 54 (30.7%) | 93 (52.8%) | 176   |

MPs past association determined by Library of Parliament and Canada Newsstream database search. Prime Minister is not included. Column percentages in parentheses.
party increased considerably. In Ontario, appointments are once again evenly split between the two sides while MPs with no past association received a larger number of appointments. Quebec only contributed two MPs from the PC side to the cabinet, compared with three who had no association to a predecessor party. The PC side also remained the stronger of the two sides in caucus and cabinet for Atlantic Canada. The predecessor parties’ strength in their traditional areas of support overall was being challenged here; the increasing number of MPs without association to a predecessor party is responsible for this.

The findings presented here provide an intriguing observation on the distribution of power in the CPC. The percentage of MPs with an association to a predecessor party has declined from 85 percent in 2004 to just over 45 percent in 2011. This decline in the presence of the predecessor parties in the CPC has largely been felt by the Reform/Alliance side, which in 2004 saw MPs from their lineage comprise nearly 70 percent of the CPC caucus and have since decreased to just fewer than 30 percent in 2011. The percentage of MPs from the PC side has only ranged between 16 and 22 percent. This decline of MPs from either predecessor party is to be expected. As time passes the number of individuals involved with either predecessor party, which ceased to exist upon the merger in 2003, should be expected to decline. The CPC contrasts here from parties with institutionalized factions, where the factions are active entities within the party. Individuals and candidates joining the CPC as the party ages, are decreasingly likely to have been involved with either predecessor party in years prior. While this is indicative of a decline in the strength of the Reform/Alliance side in the CPC, the presence of MPs with a Reform/Alliance heritage in cabinet tells otherwise. Until the 2011 session, more cabinet ministers came from the Reform/Alliance side than either the PC side or the MPs with no past association. The 2011 session did see more cabinet ministers without linkage to a predecessor
party than from the Reform/Alliance side, yet Reform/Alliance MPs still made up a substantial proportion of the cabinet. Thus, while the overall numbers of MPs from the Reform/Alliance side did decline, the ones who remained in the party held prominent roles in the party.

Ultimately the results from Table 7.4 along with the previous three tables offer a soft support for the first hypothesis. In all four of the parliamentary sessions, the distribution of shadow cabinet/cabinet portfolios is comparable to the strength of the two sides in the CPC caucus. The relationship ranges from the near perfect correspondence in the 2004 session to a more pronounced difference for the PC side in 2006 and the Reform/Alliance faction in 2008. The literature has observed instances where the weaker faction in a party received slightly more cabinet appointments than its strength in caucus entitled it to. The CPC contrasts from these examples as it was also shown that the stronger Reform/Alliance side received more cabinet appointments than it was entitled to as well. Unlike many of the parties previously studied where the vast majority of caucus members belong to a faction, in the CPC a growing percentage of MPs had no connection to either predecessor party. Accordingly, both sides could be rewarded with additional cabinet posts without either side bearing the cost. Factionalized parties using non-factionalized members to bear the brunt of managing factional conflict is not unheard of. While sitting as the Opposition in 2016, ALP leader Bill Shorten had to manage an escalating factional rift by dispersing additional shadow ministry posts to a rival faction. In doing so, Shorten exceeded the maximum number of MPs receiving a higher salary for being a member of the shadow ministry. As a result, Andrew Leigh, the lone MP on the shadow ministry not associated with a faction had his pay reduced to that of a backbench MP while remaining on as a shadow minister (Martin, 2016; Grattan, 2016). This example from the ALP demonstrates that there is precedence for MPs without factional ties to be denied the benefits of
ministerial posts in order for those benefits to be directed to members form the factions. Unlike the ALP case where there was only one MP without factional association suffering, the findings from this analysis of the CPC find members without a connection to a predecessor party constituted a plurality in 2008 and a majority of the caucus in 2011 yet were limited in their cabinet appointments. By giving additional appointments to MPs from the predecessor parties at the expense of MPs who lacked that linkage, Harper was able to further solidify party unity. The MPs without association to a predecessor party did not pose the threat to party harmony that the factionalized MPs did.

Table 7.9 2006 Cabinet Appointments by Level of Prestige and Predecessor Party Association

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PC</th>
<th>Reform/Alliance</th>
<th>None</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Important Portfolio</td>
<td>3 (37.5%)</td>
<td>4 (50%)</td>
<td>1 (12.5%)</td>
<td>8 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Range Portfolio</td>
<td>6 (42.9%)</td>
<td>7 (50%)</td>
<td>1 (7.1%)</td>
<td>14 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junior Portfolio</td>
<td>1 (11.1%)</td>
<td>4 (44.4%)</td>
<td>4 (44.4%)</td>
<td>9 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not in Cabinet</td>
<td>17 (18.1%)</td>
<td>45 (47.9%)</td>
<td>32 (34%)</td>
<td>94 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Caucus</td>
<td>27 (21.6%)</td>
<td>60 (48%)</td>
<td>38 (30.4%)</td>
<td>125 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*MPs past association determined by Library of Parliament and Canada Newsstream database search. Prime Minister is not included. Column percentages in parentheses.*

The expectation of the second hypothesis was the distribution of cabinet portfolios according to their prestige would mirror the strength in the caucus. Table 7.9 shows the distribution of cabinet portfolios according to their prestige by the predecessor party association of the MPs. Surprisingly the Important Portfolio’s see similar results for the two sides, with MPs from the Reform/Alliance side receiving four Important Portfolios and three MPs from the PC side receiving comparable appointments. This represents a gain for the PC side as they receive more Important Portfolios than their caucus strength suggests they should, receive as does the Reform/Alliance side albeit with the only slightest of differences. On the PC side, former PC leader Peter MacKay held the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs while former PC cabinet minister Rob Nicholson was named Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada.
approximately a year into this parliamentary session. Former Reform and Alliance party member Monte Solberg was given the post of Citizenship and Immigration during this parliamentary session while Gordon O’Connor, a past supporter of Reform/Alliance without federal government experience was appointed Minister of Defence. Also from the Reform/Alliance side, former CPC leadership contender and former Ontario PC MPP Tony Clement was appointed the Minister of Health. Turning to Middle Range Portfolios, the PC side receives double the percentage of appointments their strength dictates they should receive. The Reform/Alliance side also receives a greater share of Middle Range Portfolios than their strength in caucus would indicate, although the difference is marginal. Similar results hold for the Reform/Alliance sides share of Junior Portfolios, except that this time, they receive slightly less. For the PC side, they receive far fewer Junior Portfolios than their strength in caucus indicates they should. These findings are not supportive of the second hypothesis. The PC side fares far better in both Important and Middle Range portfolios than their strength in caucus suggest they should. Furthermore, while the PC side benefits from Reform/Alliance side receiving fewer Important Portfolios than its caucus strength indicates it should, for the Middle Range Portfolios both sides perform above expectations.

**Table 7.10 2008 Cabinet Appointments by Level of Prestige and Predecessor Party Association**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Prestige</th>
<th>PC</th>
<th>Reform/Alliance</th>
<th>None</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Important Portfolio</td>
<td>4 (50%)</td>
<td>2 (25%)</td>
<td>2 (25%)</td>
<td>8 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Range Portfolio</td>
<td>2 (15.4%)</td>
<td>7 (53.8%)</td>
<td>4 (30.8%)</td>
<td>13 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junior Portfolio</td>
<td>2 (12.5%)</td>
<td>9 (56.2%)</td>
<td>5 (31.2%)</td>
<td>16 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not in Cabinet</td>
<td>18 (16.3%)</td>
<td>39 (35.4%)</td>
<td>53 (48.2%)</td>
<td>110 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Caucus</td>
<td>26 (17.7%)</td>
<td>57 (38.8%)</td>
<td>64 (43.5%)</td>
<td>147 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*MPs past association determined by Library of Parliament and Canada Newsstream database search. Prime Minister is not included. Column percentages in parentheses.*

The results for the 2008 session shown in Table 7.10 go in an unexpected direction as the PC side receives more Important Portfolios than the Reform/Alliance side. This is particularly
intriguing as there are more than double the number of MPs from the Reform/Alliance side than the PC side, yet the PC side received more Important Portfolios. This difference indicates a strong role played by former PC members in the CPC cabinet. Intriguingly, it is the same members from the PC side continuing to be appointed to Important Portfolios. MacKay oversaw National Defence during this session while Nicholson remained as Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada. On the Reform/Alliance side, Jason Kenney, a long-serving MP who had served as a parliamentary secretary during the 2006 session took on the post of Minister of Citizenship, Immigration, and Multiculturalism following the 2008 election. Clement remained in a notable portfolio, being appointed as the Minister of Industry. Looking at Middle Range and Junior Portfolios sees MPs with PC lineage attain these portfolios in shares more comparable to their caucus strength. John Baird, a former provincial politician who had strong ties to the federal PC party was appointed as Minister of the Environment. The Reform/Alliance side receives more Middle Range posts and more Junior Portfolios than their caucus strength indicates they should. The Reform/Alliance side still plays a role in the 2008 CPC cabinet; it is most prominent though in the lower portfolios. These findings further undermine the second hypothesis.

Table 7.11 2011 Cabinet Appointments by Level of Prestige and Predecessor Party Association

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Portfolio Type</th>
<th>PC</th>
<th>Reform/Alliance</th>
<th>Neither</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Important Portfolio</td>
<td>4 (40%)</td>
<td>3 (30%)</td>
<td>3 (30%)</td>
<td>10 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Range Portfolio</td>
<td>3 (17.6%)</td>
<td>5 (29.4%)</td>
<td>9 (52.9%)</td>
<td>17 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junior Portfolio</td>
<td>3 (14.3%)</td>
<td>10 (47.6%)</td>
<td>8 (38.1%)</td>
<td>21 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not in Cabinet</td>
<td>20 (15.6%)</td>
<td>36 (27.9%)</td>
<td>73 (56.5%)</td>
<td>129 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Caucus</td>
<td>30 (16.9%)</td>
<td>54 (30.5%)</td>
<td>93 (52.5%)</td>
<td>177 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

MPs past association determined by Library of Parliament and Canada Newsstream database search. Prime Minister is not included. Column percentages in parentheses.

Table 7.11 shows the results for the 2011 cabinet and once again there are a greater number of MPs from the PC side than the Reform/Alliance side filling the Important Portfolios.
Unlike in 2008 though, the Reform/Alliance side receives a number of Important Portfolios that its caucus strength indicates it should. The PC side thus gains its additional Important Portfolio posts at the expense of the MPs with no association to either predecessor party. As in the first two sessions of CPC government, the members of the cabinet from the PC side with Important Portfolios are the same individuals, such as MacKay and Nicholson. Baird also takes on an Important Portfolio, being appointed as Minister of Foreign Affairs. The situation is much more fluid looking at cabinet ministers from the Reform/Alliance side as MPs such as James Moore who began his parliamentary career with the Alliance party in 2000 was promoted during the 2011 session from lower prestige portfolios to the prestigious Minister of Industry. Similarly, Rona Ambrose who came from the Reform/Alliance side and who had filled lower level cabinet roles in each of the two previous sessions took on the Minister of Health portfolio during the 2011 session. With MPs from the PC side being appointed to Important Portfolios remained fairly static, the Reform/Alliance side saw a wide variety of their MPs take on Important Portfolios in the near decade of CPC government. It should also be noted that the number of MPs with no association to a predecessor party who were appointed to cabinet steadily increased, including the number of MPs appointed to Important Portfolios. Looking at the Middle Range Portfolios, the PC side attained nearly a proportionate share of posts compared with its strength in caucus while the Reform/Alliance side received a relatively equal number of posts. Focusing on Junior Portfolios, the PC sides received marginally fewer posts than its strength in caucus indicated it should while the Reform/Alliance side attained substantially more posts than expected. The second hypothesis is not supported by these findings.

The second hypothesis expected the distribution of cabinet portfolios according to portfolio prestige to be relative to the strength of the predecessor parties in the caucus. The
literature on the coalition between the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats in the United Kingdom demonstrated this relationship explicitly. This expectation is clearly not played out in the findings, especially with regards to the Important Portfolios. The findings here do not uncover evidence of this and show the opposite. An important difference between the United Kingdom example and the CPC case is that the coalition partners in the United Kingdom were driven by a goal of maintaining unity and power until the next election, at which point they would be competing against each other. For the CPC, the aim was to maintain the unity of the party going forward and to win future elections. Had the distribution of cabinet portfolios been carried out in a comparable fashion to the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition, the PC side would have received fewer Important Portfolios and accordingly had a weaker case for maintaining unity in the party. The aim to mitigate internal conflict and maintain a united party, a necessity for winning elections and forming government, required Harper to appoint PCs to Important Portfolios at a much higher rate than would be expected. As a result, past PC supporters not only saw their members being appointed to cabinet, they also saw former PC members holding prominent roles in it. While the second hypothesis must be rejected, this analysis has offered critical insight into the distribution of cabinet posts and the management of tensions in the new party.

**CONCLUSION**

This analysis provides considerable insight into the CPC’s and specifically Harper's strategy towards personnel decisions and the approach to integrating the two predecessor parties. Beginning with the PC side of the merger, the party in a weaker position heading into the new party, the findings have shown that the new party was especially kind to MPs from the PC side. PC MPs consistently had more of their members appointed to cabinet than their strength in
caucus indicates they were entitled to. In most instances, the portfolio increase awarded the PC side is more than a marginal bump that the literature suggests the weaker party could receive. The only occurrence where the PC’s strength in caucus mirrored its appointments was for the Shadow Cabinet of the 2004 session. This demonstrates that the Harper took an inclusive approach towards the weaker party and made a clear effort to include members from that side in the governing process. Looking at the prestige level of the portfolios attained by MPs from the PC side, it is evident that PC appointments were more than token appointments. For all three CPC governments, MPs from the PC side were appointed to high-level cabinet portfolios. In some instances, there were more important portfolios distributed to MPs from the PC side than the Reform/Alliance side. This further demonstrates the important role played by the PC side in the new party. Harper did not attempt to marginalize or punish the PC side in the merger. Instead, Harper ensured members associated with the PC side were well represented in the CPC. This is a significant component of how the new party mitigated the risk of internal conflict.

The CPC’s approach to integrating and including the PC side served the new party well in two ways. First, as Perlin noted, the personal ambition of MPs to be advance their own careers can instigate and fuel factional tensions in a party (Perlin, 1980). By including a considerable number of MPs from the PC side both in the cabinet and in high-ranking cabinet portfolios, Harper diminished the possibility of this tension from emerging. Even for MPs from the PC side that were left out of cabinet, while they might feel personal frustration they could not equate this with a bias against their party. The sheer number of their fellow colleagues who attained cabinet posts clearly shows that their side is being accommodated in the new party. Secondly, for both MPs from the PC side and supporters from the PC side, the high level of PC representation in cabinet allows them to see themselves in the party. This is especially important
remembering that there were fears by some on the PC side that the CPC was a takeover of the PC party by the Reform/Alliance party. The appointments of numerous cabinet ministers and high-level cabinet minister from the PC side by Harper goes a long way to dismissing those fears. These findings show that it was clear to see for all from the PC side that they played an important and contributing role in the new party. This helps build and maintain unity the new party and acts a motivation for individuals from the PC side to stay involved and supportive of the CPC. The cabinet appointments made by Harper played a serious role in creating and managing unity in CPC and mitigating tensions from the PC side.

Where does that leave the Reform/Alliance side in the CPC? The existing literature leads us to expect that the Reform/Alliance side will bear the costs of the over-representation of the PC side. The motivation for the Reform/Alliance side to accept these costs is that they are essential for maintaining party unity. It is quite fascinating that the Reform/Alliance side, for the most part, does not bear these costs. In almost all cases, the number of cabinet ministers appointed from the Reform/Alliance side is greater than its strength in caucus indicates it should be. In the only instance where the Reform/Alliance side received less than its proportionate share of cabinet appointments, the difference was marginal at best. Looking at the portfolios by their level of prestige the Reform/Alliance party did suffer a bit. Their number of high-level portfolios was not as high as their strength in caucus led us to expect. As compensation, though, the Reform/Alliance side on average exceed its expected allotment of middle range portfolios. Overall, MPs from the Reform/Alliance side frequently enjoyed more of than their share of cabinet appointments and a respectable level of prestige cabinet appointments. Most of the suffering for the PC side’s gains in the cabinet process was not felt by members from the Reform/Alliance sides. As a result, MPs and supporters from the Reform/Alliance side were kept
content in the new party. Much like their colleagues from the PC side, MPs from the
Reform/Alliance side could see their side represented not only in the cabinet but in significant
positions in the cabinet. Even high-ranking MPs from this side who were left out of the cabinet
picture could not make a strong argument that the new party was catering to the wishes of the PC
side. The numbers make it very clear that both sides were being given considerable
representation in the new party’s cabinet. This would also assure that supporters from the
Reform/Alliance side would be able to see themselves in the new party. Thus, very similar to
how the Harper used cabinet distribution to manage the PC side, the ambitions and motivations
of the Reform/Alliance side were addressed by the distribution of cabinet seats in the CPC.

MPs who did not have any association to a predecessor party, and who continued to make
up a larger share of the caucus, were the ones who were consistently short-changed both in their
allotment of cabinet seats and in the attainment of high-level cabinet posts. As a result of this
group being short changed in the cabinet distribution process, members from both predecessor
parties could be rewarded. The significance of this finding and its importance for understanding
how Harper managed tensions and built party unity cannot be understated. This strategy is not
without risks. The new party faces the risk of alienating some of the MPs who are not associated
with a predecessor party and do not receive a cabinet appointment. However, this risk cannot be
avoided in the cabinet appointment process. There is bound to be disappointment amongst the
MPs who do not attain a cabinet post. It is a far greater risk to party unity to alienate one or both
predecessor parties than to disappoint MPs without attachment. In this regard, the CPC differs
from the factionalized parties studied in the comparative literature. The presence of this growing
segment of the party caucus not associated with either of the predecessor parties allowed Harper
to manage the distribution of cabinet posts in a manner that kept both predecessor parties satisfied.

Some may mistakenly take these findings as a challenge to the existing literature that calls into question the findings of previous research. Instead, these findings illustrate an area not fully covered by the existing research. The CPC is different from many of the parties previously studied as a result of having a considerable portion of its membership and caucus that do not have an association to a predecessor party. In the previous research on either coalition governments or factionalized parties, a similar component does not exist. In those instances, the smaller segments of the coalition/party are comprised of smaller parties or smaller factions, or in some cases a very small portion of the party that has no factional linkage. This composition of the CPC caucus afforded Harper a way to reward the predecessor parties in the cabinet distribution process without having to risk angering either and as a result; the CPC case drifts away from the expectations of the existing literature. In 2004, the only session where MPs connected to a predecessor party constituted a strong majority of the caucus, the distribution of shadow cabinet seats by the CPC fell in line with the expectations of the literature. It is only in the subsequent sessions, where MPs without a linkage to a predecessor party make significant gains in their presence in caucus that the findings of the CPC drift away from the literature’s expectations. The findings from the CPC, therefore, make an important contribution to the literature by expanding the findings from the previous literature to a type of party not previously encountered. The findings also provide valuable insight into how Harper utilized cabinet posts to enhance party unity.
CHAPTER EIGHT - CONCLUSION

Perlin was pessimistic about the prospects for the PC party at the end of his analysis; doubting that the party would be able to overcome the factional conflict that plagued it. Even if the party could overcome these hurdles and win an election, Perlin remained pessimistic, stressing that the factional squabbles would lead to internal turmoil and internal attacks that would bring the party down in dramatic fashion (1980: 201). This gloomy outlook was based on a well-documented history of factional conflict in federal PC politics that had began during Diefenbaker's leadership. Diefenbaker had strong support amongst social outsiders in the party who regularly clashed with party elites, representing the establishment wing of the party. The factional conflict between the pro-Diefenbaker group and the party elites would not only be damaging during Diefenbaker's leadership tenure but remarkably would continue to hinder the party under the next several leaders. Leaders who had been or were perceived as having been associated with the party elites that ousted Diefenbaker from the party leadership were routinely challenged by the pro-Diefenbaker faction. The consequences of these factional battles included a lack of a clear policy stance for the party, a lack of unity in caucus and cabinet, as well as heated battles at party policy conventions.

Perlin's observation on the pessimistic outlook for the party was written in 1980. It is difficult to imagine how dire the outlook would have been had Perlin discussed the party's future in the 1990s. Under the leadership of Mulroney, the PCs had been able to win two elections both with strong majorities. The winning coalition built by Mulroney crumbled following the second election with two regional protest parties emerging and capturing a large share of former PC votes. In Quebec, the Bloc Quebecois was led by a former PC cabinet minister who defected before forming a new party that only contested Quebec ridings and advocated for Quebec
sovereignty. Meanwhile, in western Canada, feelings of alienation from political influence and decision making, anger over perceived special treatment of Quebec and special interest groups, combined with strong desires for populist reforms lead to the creation of the Reform party.

The electoral consequences would be devastating for the PCs; they went from having a majority government to not having enough seats to qualify for official party status, winning only two ridings. For the Liberal party, the splintering of right-wing votes was particularly beneficial. They would go on to win three successive majority governments while never attaining 42 percent of the popular vote. Vote splitting was a significant concern for both PC and Reform/Alliance parties as in multiple ridings the combined votes for candidates from both parties would have been enough to win the riding. Despite the electoral motivations to bring the two right-wing parties together, several attempts at doing so during the 1990s would fail. The failed attempts were hindered by in many instances by the refusal of the PC party to participate. Even when the Reform party transformed into the Canadian Alliance, the absence of the federal PCs from the process meant that the two right-wing parties would continue to be fighting each other in election campaigns rather than the Liberal party.

By the early 2000s, the outlook for either of Canada's federal right-wing parties was not promising. While the Reform/Alliance had twice formed the official opposition in the House of Commons, their origins as a western protest party had translated into the party having virtually no electoral success east of Manitoba. As a result, the prospects for the Reform/Alliance to win an election and form government were not strong. On the PC side, while the party was able to capture a respectable amount of the popular vote this was not resulting in a substantial number of PC MPs. The party routinely was the fifth placed party in the House. The Liberals meanwhile were enjoying the divided opposition, winning majority government after majority government.
A 2003 by-election in Ontario would be the final signal to the Alliance side that a merger needed to happen. After a concerted effort, including multiple visits by Harper, to use this by-election to demonstrate the potential for the party in Ontario, the Alliance finished in last amongst the major parties. It was evident that only through a merger with the PCs would a right-wing party win a national election. The electoral incentives were sufficient for both parties to engage in merger negotiations that were only held up by two issues: the PCs insisting on holding new nomination contests for every riding prior to the next election and the leadership selection formula with the PC side calling for a system where each riding was treated equally and the Alliance side pushing for a one member one vote system. Harper's desire to unify the parties would eventually overcome his objection to the PC requests; Harper would subsequently agree to all the PC demands.

The new CPC would find a limited amount of success in their first election, where the governing Liberals were reduced to a minority. The next two elections would see the CPC win minority governments, leading up to a CPC majority government following the 2011 election. Significantly, the new party did not succumb to the factional fighting that had brought down its predecessor. Even when the party was defeated in the 2015 election by the Liberal party, it was not a complete breakdown like the PC party had previously experienced. Given the pessimistic outlook for the PCs in the 1980s followed by the divided parties in the 1990s, this is a remarkable accomplishment for the new party. This analysis set out to determine what explains the successful management of conflict in the new party. More specially, how did the new party avoid the divisive battles that had plagued its predecessors?

Answering this question situated this analysis within the larger analytical framework of party factions. In the extensive literature on party factions, a wealth of, at times contrasting,
definitions of factions are offered. Common themes in the literature on factions’ stress that they are intra-party subgroups that are often driven by ideological aims and supported by patronage distribution. Intriguingly while the literature on party factions offers multiple definitions and examples of the negative consequences of factions, there is little said on how a party can successfully manage its factions. The existing literature offers little analysis on how factionalized parties can integrate their competing factions and avoid conflict. This analysis utilized the party factions’ literature to examine the CPC.

To explore how the CPC maintained unity, it was necessary to focus on party leadership and specifically Stephen Harper. The existing literature on Canadian parties and government has repeatedly stressed that power is increasingly centered in the hands of the party leader and a select team of advisors. This was especially the case with the CPC, as Harper was known to be particularly controlling and overseeing of all aspects of the party. Accordingly, to understand the functioning and behaviour of the CPC, the primary point of inquiry is the party leadership.

Recall that many of the definitions on factions stressed two components of factions: that they existed to advance policy goals and they played a crucial role in securing patronage posts for their members. Intriguingly these two considerations matched with two of the motivating factors for factional conflict listed by Perlin in his seminal work on the emergence of factions in the PC party. Perlin pointed out that differing policy objectives could fuel factional conflict within a party, and he also noted that patronage distribution was a tool party management could use to manage conflict, by ensuring that each faction received a share of the patronage posts. The analysis was thus focused on policy and patronage to understand how party leadership was able to mitigate conflict in the CPC.
The analysis began by looking at the policy agenda of the new party. Unlike the original emergence of factional conflict, policy disputes had played a notable role in the divide between the PC and Reform/Alliance parties. The existing literature noted that there were three areas of ideological disagreement between the predecessor parties: social tolerance, federalism and provincial powers, and populism. The economy had been the fourth area of ideological difference; however, the PC party had adapted its policy stance to resemble the economic beliefs of the Reform/Alliance party. As a result, the economy represented the one area of ideological agreement between the predecessor parties.

Looking at three indicators of the CPC's policy agenda (campaign platforms, the subject of their questions during Question Period, and the bills introduced by the party when in government) the results showed that the party downplayed many of the areas of ideological disagreement. Social tolerance issues in particular, which represented the most controversial divide between the predecessor parties, received only minimal attention from the party. By avoiding most of these issues, the new party could build its support amongst former PC members. Federalism and provincial power issues fared similarly in the new party. In all three indicators, the new party devoted limited attention to issues regarding federalism. These findings did fit with the expectations of the existing literature. The PC side did not see policy positions in the new party that represented the first two areas of ideological disagreement and thus were not faced with policy stances that their membership had traditionally opposed.

The third area of ideological disagreement helps to account for how the new party was able to shore up support from its Reform/Alliance base. Populist ideals did receive a notable level of attention from the party, particularly in Question Period and its first two campaign platforms. This is partially a result of the sponsorship scandal that plagued the sitting Liberal
government and raised the issue of government corruption. This scandal afforded the new party multiple benefits, including the opportunity to emphasize populist ideals in opposition to Liberal corruption. The presence of populist ideas in the CPC's policy agenda offered a policy position that the Reform/Alliance portion of the party could strongly support. Furthermore, by framing their policy agenda against Liberal corruption, the new party appealed directly to its PC supporters. Liberal corruption acts a rallying cry that all party members can easily get behind. The careful placement of populist measures in the CPC's policy agenda enabled the new party to satisfy its Reform/Alliance base while garnering support from the PC side as well.

Law and order issues also played a prominent role in the policy agenda of the new party. While law and order did not constitute one of the areas of ideological disagreement between the predecessor parties, the frequency with which law and order issues were raised by the new party warranted analysis. The Reform/Alliance base was enthusiastic for law and order issues, some of the existing literature noted that crime issues were of significance for the Reform/Alliance party. At the same time, law and order issues were not controversial or offensive to the PC side like social tolerance issues were. Accordingly, by emphasizing law and order issues in their policy agenda, the new party was able to appeal to its Reform/Alliance base with a policy stance that would not alienate its PC base.

Turning to the one area of the ideological agreement, the findings clearly demonstrated that the new party emphasized the economy in their policy agenda. Economic matters featured prominently in the party's platforms, in the questions they asked during Question Period and in the legislation introduced by the CPC in Parliament. The findings further observed that the economy was the main priority that Harper wanted the party to focus on. Economic issues were perceived as being the most electorally beneficial route for the new party to take. By
prominently featuring economic issues the new party was also able to build and expanded its support base. The emphasis on economic matters was expected as the literature stressed that new parties would play up the policy beliefs that were shared by both predecessor parties. In doing so, the new party focused on the commonalities between the two predecessor parties, which in turn downplayed the potential for conflict.

Similar points of emphasis on ideological issues were found by studying the policy conventions of the CPC. It was important to explore policy conventions as conventions offer the opportunity for party members to engage in policy discussion. Policy conventions were also an important area of inquiry as the literature noted past instances of factional conflict erupting at PC conventions along with multiple instances of conflict at policy conventions in factionalized parties in the comparative literature. The new party nearly made a drastic mistake heading into its first convention in 2005. In the lead up to this convention, the potential that social tolerance issues would erupt and cause an embarrassing rift at the convention was a source of fear in the new party. An attempt by the party to sidestep this potential controversy, saw a motion introduced that would allow free votes on matters of moral conscience in the House of Commons. This attempt was not well received, and the party would back off, allowing social tolerance issues to be debated at the convention.

Allowing social tolerance, along with issues related to the other areas of ideological disagreement to be debated at the conventions had beneficial results for the party. For example, issues relating to populism were put forth at the first convention before being quietly defeated. Their presence on the convention floor catered to the Reform/Alliance side, while their quick and uneventful defeat appeased the party leadership. Social tolerance issues played a prominent role in the first convention, yet that prominence would notably decline as time progressed. Even
when social tolerance issues made a slight increase in the 2013 convention, the content of the motions was notably more moderate than the social tolerance motions put forward at the 2005 convention. Thus, as the party matured the frequency and severity of social tolerance issues at policy conventions declined.

Alternatively, issues that had broad support amongst the predecessor parties were featured prominently at the party conventions. Economic issues, the one area of ideological agreement, was a regular theme of emphasis amongst the party's members and the party leadership at the conventions. The findings revealed party delegates advocating that the party should focus on the economy in addition to Harper's convention speeches regularly emphasizing the party's economic track record. Law and order issues meanwhile, which featured prominently in the party's legislative agenda, also took on an important role at all but the first party convention. At each of the latter three conventions, there were multiple motions that dealt with crime issues. Both of these issues helped to solidify party unity by appealing to the interests of both predecessor parties.

The findings indicated that it was not entirely smooth sailing for the new party at its conventions. The method of leadership selection, an issue that had nearly stalled the original merger, reared its head at each convention. Not only was the method of selecting a party leader contested at every convention, but it was consistently fought between members from the predecessor parties. Members from the Reform/Alliance side repeatedly introduced motions trying to switch the leadership selection to a one member one vote system, and they were regularly opposed by PC members looking to maintain the status quo of each constituency being given equal weight. It is noteworthy though that by the 2013 convention, the debate over the leadership selection process was substantially less heated than at previous conventions. The
continued presence of this debate at the CPC conventions is, however, evidence that some divides do remain in the party.

Turning to the personnel and patronage side, the analysis began by looking at two commonly used patronage appointments by Canadian governments: GIC and Senate appointments. There was a well-documented trend in the comparative literature of factions playing a notable role in securing patronage posts for their members. Additionally, the existing literature noted that by providing a balanced distribution of patronage posts, party leadership could ensure that unity was maintained. Taking these findings into account with the long history of Canadian parties distributing these posts to party loyalists, there was an expectation that CPC would use patronage distribution as a tool to mitigate conflict. The analysis was more intriguing as the stronger Reform/Alliance side had a long-standing opposition to patronage distribution. While the Reform/Alliance side was against patronage distribution, the PC side had expectations of patronage rewards based on their experience in government.

Looking first at GIC appointments, the findings demonstrated that only a small portion of these appointments went to individuals associated with a predecessor party. The PC side fared far better receiving over twice as many appointments as the Reform/Alliance side. This approach contributed to party unity by giving the PC side the patronage that would be expected from them, while doing so to a limited extent and thus not angering the Reform/Alliance side. The opposition to patronage appointments from the Reform/Alliance side meant that they would not be in favour of overt patronage posts being provided to them. This freed up party leadership to give more appointments to the PC side, thus helping secure their support for the new party. Senate appointments once again favoured the PC side, although in this time the margin of difference was minimal. Intriguingly, Senate appointments saw a much greater percentage of the
appointments go to individuals associated with a predecessor party than GIC appointments. However, even with this increase, individuals with no association to a predecessor party still constituted a sizeable portion of the appointments. As with GIC appointments, the new party mitigated tensions by providing the PC side with the patronage rewards their past government experience would lead them to expect. The difference between the two sides in appointments was minimal though. The Reform/Alliance's opposition to patronage posts allowed the new party to distribute patronage more generously to the PC party, which reinforced unity for the PC side in the new party.

The analysis for this section uncovered several references to excessive usage of these patronage posts to reward CPC supporters. This raises the question of how patronage appointments were handled by the party overall? The existing literature has yet to address this question. Historically, parties have campaigned against patronage appointments and once in government distributed them like their predecessors. Mulroney's use of a patronage is a direct example of this. Given the Reform/Alliance opposition to patronage appointments, and the sponsorship scandal that contributed to the CPC defeat of the Paul Martin government, exploring the distribution of patronage appointments by the CPC to CPC supporters is an intriguing question for future research.

Candidate nomination constitutes an important component of a party’s existence, particularly in Canada. Legislation in Canada requires a party to nominate candidates to formally qualify as a party. Unlike many factionalized parties, the candidate nomination process is relatively localized for Canadian federal parties. Much of the decision making regarding candidates is left to the local constituency association. As a result, party leadership cannot enact a management strategy or use the candidate nomination process to directly manage party unity.
The candidate nomination process in the CPC was important to explore, however, as it comprised an important component of the party's activities and posed a daunting tasking for the new party to field a full slate of candidates under the merged party's banner.

The findings for candidate nomination were particularly intriguing, demonstrating that the PC side was stronger than many indicators had led to believe. The number of Reform/Alliance incumbent MPs was substantially higher than the number of PC incumbents. The number of candidate nominations won by the PC side was much higher than expected. The Reform/Alliance side still captured a majority of the nominations, but the PC side was much closer than would have been expected. This gap was narrowed further going into the 2006 campaign. Accordingly, the PC side was shown through this analysis to have a more powerful presence in the new party than was previously anticipated. These findings were further supported by looking at ridings where the combined vote totals of the two predecessor parties would have won the riding. Candidates from the PC received as many nominations as did candidates from the Reform/Alliance side. This demonstrates that the PC side constituted an important presence in the new party.

An important observation from the analysis on candidate nomination was the limited number of instances of heated nomination contests. There were several instances of nomination contests that turned ugly, including a couple of instances involving members from each predecessor party. Overall these incidents were the exception, with the vast majority of contests being conducted smoothly, even those between potential candidates from each side. Given the propensity for conflict over nominations identified in the existing literature, the peaceful nomination process in the CPC is a noteworthy achievement. The findings suggest that part of the harmonious nomination process can be accounted for by ridings sharing constituency
executive posts amongst the predecessor parties. Many of the ridings where peaceful contests occurred had constituency association executives split between the predecessor parties, whereas one of the ridings that had a controversial nomination had an executive dominated by former Alliance members. A former party executive interviewed for this project also stressed the importance of having a balanced constituency executive. The results of the nomination process and having a balanced constituency executive, made a positive impact on tensions in the new party, resulting in both sides having a considerable presence in the new party's election candidates.

There is an avenue for future research to explore the role of constituency association executives and their composition. The findings indicate that when the executive had a balance of individuals from both predecessor parties, conflict was avoided. This was not an observation that literature anticipated. The specifics of candidate nomination in Canada compared with other jurisdictions accounts for the lack of discussion on this issue. Yet is an intriguing example of the distribution of party positions at the grassroots level and the influence it has. With the recent merger of the Wildrose and PC parties at the provincial level in Alberta, the findings here warrant an inquiry into the composition of riding association executives when this merged party conducts its candidate nominations.

The stronger showing of the PC side in candidate nomination carried over to the House of Commons, where the PCs comprised a higher percentage of the CPC's caucus than would have been expected. However, the Reform/Alliance side remained the stronger of the two in caucus by a notable amount. This advantage was largely attributable to the higher number of Reform/Alliance incumbents. Most of the literature on cabinet formation in coalition governments and factional parties would expect the stronger Reform/Alliance caucus to result in
a stronger presence in the CPC cabinet. Intriguingly, the results from the cabinet analysis find that the PC side continued to perform better than expected. MPs from the PC side regularly received a higher share of cabinet posts than their strength in caucus suggested they should have. Part of this is due to the requirement of cabinets to be regionally representative. The predecessor parties maintained their regional bases of support, and thus MPs from the PC side were in some instances appointed to ensure regional representation in the cabinet. Overall, however, the PC side still received more cabinet posts than region alone can account for.

There were instances in the existing literature where the weaker faction received a bump in their cabinet appointments as a way to enhance their presence in the party and maintain party unity. What sets the CPC case apart from many of those examples is that the CPC was able to reward its weaker side without harming the stronger side. Reform/Alliance MPs were also consistently appointed to the cabinet in greater numbers than their caucus strength indicated they should be. The CPC was able to benefit both sides by giving fewer cabinet posts to MPs who had no association to a predecessor party. Despite comprising an increasing percentage of the caucus, MPs without association to a predecessor party were never appointed to the cabinet with the frequency of MPs from either predecessor party. Similar observations came from looking at cabinet posts by ministerial importance, where MPs from both sides performed well. Once again, MPs who lacked a linkage to a predecessor party received fewer prestigious portfolios than their caucus strength suggested they should. MPs without an association provided a useful resource to the new party, as the party could provide both predecessor parties with cabinet posts which in turn mitigated conflict by providing an incentive for them to remain in the new party.

Taken as a whole, the findings show that the new party truly is a combination of both predecessor parties. Personnel wise, individuals from both factions are featured prominently
throughout the party. While the Reform/Alliance side was perceived as being stronger going into the merger, from GIC appoints to being election candidates to sitting in caucus and being appointed to the cabinet and the Senate, PC members are well represented throughout. This is significant on several fronts; for potential supporters from the PC side, it is important to see their colleagues represented throughout the party. Furthermore, the PC presence on cabinet meant that the PC side had an impact on policy development in the new party.

The impact on policy development was significant, as similar to personnel, the policy agenda of the new party represented both predecessor parties. Certainly, policy that was supported by Reform/Alliance side was present in the new party. In addition to a focus on populist measures early in the new party's existence, the law and order agenda of the CPC did appeal strongly to its Reform/Alliance base. The policy agenda of the new party though was driven by its economic agenda. This is significant as economic issues played to both the Reform/Alliance base and the PC base. Thus, the policy stance of the new party was representative of the policy interests of both sides. This, in turn, is further evidence of the new party representing a mixture of both its predecessor parties.

One of the critiques of the existing literature on party factions was that its fails to address how a party can successfully manage its factions. Even though the CPC does not contain formalized factions, the findings here address this gap in the literature. The framework for this analysis was guided by two recurring themes in the literature on party factions: policy and personnel. The findings on the policy analysis indicate that for a party to successfully manage its factions, it is necessary to emphasize areas of agreement over areas of disagreement. This seems intuitive, it is crucial though that even the stronger group in a party has to be willing to sacrifice some of its policy ambitions in the name of unity. The findings in the policy section indicate that
not all of the areas of ideological difference between the predecessor parties were ignored, however they were not priorities or points of emphasis for the CPC.

The conventions chapter demonstrates that the areas of disagreement can still have a place in the party. While party leadership focused on economic concerns, delegates were able to raise motions, especially in the first party convention on areas of disagreement. This means that factions must be willing to accept divergent views in a unified party. Thus, for understanding how party factions can be successfully managed, it is necessary for the factions to be open to compromise and focused on party unity. Party leadership plays a key role focusing the party on what is has in common, while ensuring there is an opportunity for divisive policies to be discussed by the party grassroots.

Switching to personnel and patronage decisions, the existing literature already hints at how factions can be managed. Once again, the theme is that party leadership and members must be open to arrangements that serve all sides. Whether decisions are centralized in the party executive or made by grassroots riding associations, there must be a willingness to accommodate competing factions in patronage appointments, constituency executives, candidate nomination and cabinet appointments. As in the policy section, the stronger faction cannot expect to use its strength to gain additional rewards at the expense of the weaker factions. The opposite is more accurate; the stronger faction must be open to receiving fewer patronage appointments so that weaker faction has an incentive to remain in the party. The literature on cabinet appointments in factionalized parties find instances where the weaker faction does receive a slightly larger share of cabinet posts than their strength indicates they should. The findings here show that this distribution is an essential component of the management of party factions.
The findings here are limited in their applicability to other cases of factionalized parties. Without considering that the CPC did not contain institutionalized factions, the electoral and party system particularities of the CPC case set institutional boundaries on how Harper could act. However, the centrality of policy and patronage considerations to the management of factions is applicable regardless of the electoral system. Future work on factions should prioritize analyzing policy development within the party and the distribution of personnel and patronage posts. Future research must adapt to the electoral system under study and explore how candidate nomination for example, functions in that particular electoral system and how the party under study interacts with its faction in the nomination process. Focusing on these two areas is how to gain insight into the management of factions while allowing for the context the party is operating in to be accounted for.

Analysis of faction management must also locate where power is concentrated in the political party/system under study. Key to the findings in this analysis was the choices and actions of Harper and a few advisors. Apart from the candidate nomination chapter, the findings in every chapter indicate the steps taken by Harper that enhanced party unity and prevented conflict between the predecessor parties. Party members and supporters deserve acknowledgement for their willingness to work with other side, "the spirit of co-operation" described by one of the interview respondents (R1). However, the primary actor behind the management of tensions in the CPC was Harper. Accordingly, researchers need to determine where power is located in the party they are studying and focus their analysis there.

The role played by Harper in the maintenance of party unity raises another point. Recall that there has been criticism of the increasing centralization of power in the hands of the Prime Minister in Canada. Savoie in particular, has argued that power and control over policy has
become increasingly located with the Prime Minister and their closest advisors (Savoie, 1999: 230-31, Savoie, 2010: 133). The centralization of power began long before Harper took office, however Harper has been noted for increasing the power of the Prime Minister. Carty points out that Harper exercised significant control and oversight on most activities of the CPC (Carty, 2015: 128). Media reports on Harper are critical of the level of power and control he exercised, and note that the controlling style has alienated some party members (Toronto Star, 2010; Akin, 2016). The centralization of power with Harper is what enabled Harper to mitigate conflict between the predecessor parties. If authority was more dispersed in the party, more individuals would have been able to influence the development of policy and cabinet appointments for example. As a result, these individuals could have easily acted as spoilers and hindered the management of party cleavages. The centralization of power not only aided Harper, it benefited the party and supporters as it allowed Harper to unify the predecessor parties and successfully navigate the party through multiple election victories. Thus, while the control exercised by Harper and Prime Ministers in general has been negatively viewed, the findings here show a beneficial side to it.

The most pressing question remaining is where does this leave the CPC now? Answering this question is complicated as the lack of formal factions means their presence in the party cannot be easily tracked or measured. From the findings, it can be concluded that Harper successfully integrated the predecessor parties and mitigated any risk they posed going further. The declining number of MPs associated with either predecessor party is indicative of the diminishing presence of the predecessor parties. As a result of Harper ensuring the new party remained united for a prolonged period, the threat of either predecessor party defecting from the CPC or emerging as a new party elapsed. The leadership selection method has been debated at
every party convention, and this is indicative of a remaining divide between the predecessor parties. Recall that it was noted in the findings that debate over the leadership selection method had become less threatening and was no long seen as a risk to party unity by 2013. The risk to party unity is even less now, as individuals such as Peter MacKay who were frequently involved in these debates with their linkage to a predecessor party are no longer MPs in the party. Accordingly, the predecessor parties do not pose an on-going threat or concern for the CPC.

The more daunting issue facing the CPC are the long-standing cleavages that have repeatedly plagued federal conservative parties in Canada. Here, the outlook is not as optimistic. Harper was able to successfully manage the cleavages and prevent them from dividing the CPC, the cleavages do remain in the new party though. On the populist front, Harper and several prominent MPs invoked populist themes and messaging at the 2013 convention. The social tolerance cleavage meanwhile remains a notable concern for the party. Harper stepped down as party leader and as an MP following the Liberal party victory in the 2015 election. Andrew Scheer succeeded Harper as leader of the CPC, winning the leadership contest in May 2017. Scheer has already been subject to significant scrutiny over his association with the party's social conservative base (Boutilier, 2017). The cleavages remain present and as a threat to the CPC going forward.

Harper was able to successfully minimize the impact and influence of the cleavages rather than defeating them. Accordingly, the fate of the CPC going forward is dependent on Scheer's ability to do the same. The findings from this analysis tell us that the path to managing the cleavages is not to try and eliminate them. Instead, the findings tell us that the party must focus on what it has in common, the economy, and find policy areas that appeal to its base without risking alienating parts of it, law and order issues for example. As for the divisive
issues, allowing them to be raised at policy conventions, albeit in carefully controlled forums with limited media access, is also important for maintaining unity. It is crucial that CPC policy emphasize policy that has wide appeal in its base, while downplaying divisive issues revolving around the cleavages that divide the party. The findings from this analysis tell us that this responsibility falls to party leadership, and specifically the party leader. Harper was successful at this task; the future success of the party will depend on Scheer having similar results.
### APPENDIX A: Platform Page Count

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ENDNOTES

i Carleton Research Ethics Board Clearance Project #103177. Interviews were conducted between December 2015 and February 2016. The interviews were conducted via telephone, and in each instance the interviewee agreed to have the phone call recorded. From the audio recording, a transcript was typed up and then sent to the interviewee for them to review.

ii Following an election, sentences in a platform are coded as belonging to one of 56 policy categories. Researchers attribute certain policy positions as belonging to a policy category, which is then classified as either left or right wing (Budge, 2001: 218). Based on the percentage of left or right categories, a score is calculated by the CMP researchers with +100 indicating a fully right-wing platform and -100 indicating a fully left-wing platform (Quinn, 2008: 183).

iii The first step in constructing the database was to record the name of the MP asking the question, along with the date, the MP responding to the question, and any MPs who asked follow up questions.

iv Descriptive information for each bill was also recorded including: the bill number, parliamentary session, and the date of the first, second and third readings and granting of royal assent if applicable.

v The Canada Gazette is the official government publication of the Canadian federal government and lists each GIC appointment made (Government of Canada, 2016). Each appointee was recorded; any individual who received more than one appointment was only counted as one case.

vi From their website a full list of all CPC candidates, the riding they contest, their status as the incumbent and how they fared in the election is recorded

vii This database was selected due to its access to multiple local newspapers that provide more in-depth and in some instances the only, coverage of local constituency nomination meetings. The time frame searched ranges for 12 consecutive months ending the day after each of the national elections. Such a wide time span is necessary with the 2004 election as a result of a prolonged period of nominations following the creation of the new party. An equal time span is needed leading up to the 2006 election as a result of considerable uncertainty over when this election would be called due to the instability of a minority government.

viii For this analysis, the following portfolios are classified as important: Finance, Foreign Affairs, Health, Industry, Justice, National Defence and Citizenship and Immigration. Middle range portfolios are Agriculture and Agri-Food, Employment and Social Development, Environment, Fisheries and Oceans, Human Resources and Skills Development, Indian/Aboriginal Affairs, Infrastructure and Communities, Intergovernmental Affairs, International Trade, Labour, Multiculturalism, Natural Resources, Public Safety, Public Works, Transport, and Treasury Board. All other portfolios are classified as junior.

ix The CMP consists of 56 policy categories, for which the attention given to that issue by a party in their platform is recorded. The aggregate difference is calculated by adding the absolute difference between the CPC and PC for each of the CMP policy categories and then dividing that total by the number of policy areas, repeating this process with the CPC and Reform/Alliance platforms.
The higher the value of the aggregate difference the greater the variance between the two parties. Compared to the findings in Pogorelïes et al., (2005) the values found here are comparatively in the lower end.

For this test, 21 of the 56 CMP policy categories were eliminated. The 21 categories eliminated were policy areas that none of the three parties were active in.

Mean emphasis refers to the percentage of sentences in a platform dedicated to a specific policy area. The CMP counts each sentence and codes it to a corresponding policy area.

Candidates from Quebec, Saskatchewan and British Columbia were omitted due to each of those provinces not having a provincial PC party.