Campesino Organizations and Public Policies in Ecuador: From Neoliberal to Post-Neoliberal Rural Development, 2006-2016

by

Patrick Clark

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate and Postdoctoral Affairs in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

In

Political Science with a Specialization in Political Economy

Carleton University Ottawa, Ontario

© 2019 Patrick Clark
Abstract

Food sovereignty is a concept that has been popularized by the international coalition family-farmer and peasant organizations, *La Via Campesina*, or peasant way in English, since the organization was founded in the 1990s. The concept proposes agricultural production and agri-food economies controlled by small producers, understood as family farmers or “peasants”, as an alternative to the consolidation of agricultural production, the globalization of agri-food systems and creeping control of transnational agribusiness firms. This study analyzes the impacts of the institutionalization of food sovereignty in Ecuador on public policies for agriculture and rural development during the “post-neoliberal” government of Rafael Correa between 2006-2016. Ecuador is one of a handful of countries in the world that has attempted to institutionalize food sovereignty as a state policy objective with the incorporation of the concept into the 2008 constitution and several subsequent pieces of government legislation. Drawing on the work of Peter Evans and others on the developmental state, I proposed that in order for this program to be implemented successfully policies for food sovereignty would necessitate the construction of what Evans calls “embedded autonomy” between organizations of smallholder agricultural producers and public institutions. In order to evaluate whether this dynamic emerged under the Correa government I analyze national-level policies and political dynamics and compare three cases of producer organizations at the sub-national level and the impacts of the post-neoliberal government’s policies. In each case I analyze the relationship between the organization, national government programs, local governments and the politics of policy implementation considering whether the post-neoliberal turn strengthened or hindered these organizations and their respective *via campesina* strategies. I argue that the Correa government transformed the neoliberal model of rural development interventions dominated by non-governmental organizations through increased public investment and new national programs for agricultural production. However, for the most part, these new post-neoliberal programs undermined the space in which embeddedness between state interventions and rural social organizations could have emerged. The government’s rural development policies largely favored conventional agriculture and domestic agri-business firms which incorporated smallholders to produce agricultural commodities for their value chains. I conclude that the gap between the policy framework for food sovereignty in Ecuador and the actual policies implemented by the Correa government reflect unresolved contradictions within food sovereignty.
Acknowledgements

This dissertation is the product of nearly a third of my life. It would not have been possible without the love and support of so many friends and family, who have been with me through the long and winding road of the PhD process. On the personal side, the greatest thanks goes to my parents, Dave and Mary Liz Clark and my four late grandparents, who have always given their unconditional love, support and have helped in innumerable ways. Thanks to my sister Emlyn, my aunt Cathy Clark and my two uncles Peter Knight and Dale Churchward who have been through the grueling PhD process themselves. My gang of high school friends Annelise Petlock, Ben Logan, Justin Hilborn, Andrea Hilborn, Paul Adams and Michelle Adams who have all been touchstones throughout my PhD. In Ecuador, my Ecuadorian family Maru Vasconez, Marco Bustos and my sobrinos Ezequiel, Jacobo and Sara and their extended families deserve a special thanks. Moni Hernandez and Arnaud Lefevre deserve special thanks for their hospitality at the Mono Verde farm in Tabuga, Manabí on numerous occasions. Other Quito friends like Jacobo Garcia and Priscilla Vargas, Eric Weyer, Dee Rutgers and Patricio Salazar and the entire Zuñiga family of Sangolquí also deserve special mentions. My dear friend Rich Allen also deserves mention for his steadfast friendship and for encouraging me to get out on some great walks during the final push of finishing the last chapters of this dissertation in the fall of 2018.

On the academic and fieldwork side of things, my supervisor Laura Macdonald deserves special thanks for her understanding, kindness and patience, and in kind the other members of my committee including Cristina Rojas and Peter Andrée. Others helped in significant ways or were important mentors over the process including Liisa North (who I like to joke is an academic godmother to myself and so many others), Cristobal Kay, Leandro Vergara-Camus and Darryl Reed. At FLACSO, I want to give thanks to Myriam Paredes, Luciano Martínez, Anita Krainer, Marta Guerra, Maria Belen Troya, Luis Llambi, Santiago Ortiz, Jenny Ponton, Franklin Ramirez and Valeria Coronel and to all the students and staff who made me feel at home there. Other graduate students at FLACSO and collaborators on research projects including Laura Boada, Nataly Torres, Maria Rosa Yumbla, Ronald Herrera, Silvia Paspuel and Jasper Feiner, Eva Bartanova and Iñigo Arrazolo all deserve mention. Luis Alberto Múnaza and Viviana Vega deserve special thanks for their excellent work in helping transcribe some of the key interviews I cite in this dissertation. Fellow PhD travellers including Diego Martínez, Geovanna Lasso, Melany Barragan, Paola Ortiz, Karla Peña, Natalia Landivar, Antulio Rosales, Patric Hollenstein, Esteban Nicholls and Daniella Celleri deserve special thanks for their loyal comradery, intellectual fellowship and friendship.

The biggest thanks and greatest debt I owe is to the over one hundred people who participated in interviews for this study and made it possible. It is my greatest hope that this process some small ways will reflect their aspirations and hopes. I also hope that it might represent a small contribution to building a fairer Ecuador and a fairer world where all farmers and rural workers can have lives with greater dignity and happiness.
Table of Contents

Acronyms .................................................................................................................. 6
Preface ......................................................................................................................... 11

Chapter 1- Introduction .......................................................................................... 19
  Introduction: Agriculture, the “Double Movement” and a *Via Campesina* ....... 21
  Research Questions ................................................................................................. 30

Main Arguments ....................................................................................................... 31
  “Broadened” Embedded Autonomy for a *Via Campesina* ................................. 34
  Ontology, Epistemology and Methodology ............................................................ 41
  Data Collection ........................................................................................................ 44
  Structure and Outline of this Dissertation ............................................................ 48

Chapter 2- Theory and Literature Review: “Moving the State” Towards Food
  Sovereignty in Ecuador? ....................................................................................... 50
  Introduction .............................................................................................................. 50
  Part 1- Colonialism, the “Double Movement,” Agrarian Change and Food
    Sovereignty in Ecuador ......................................................................................... 52
  Part 2- State, Society, Politics and Development in Ecuadorian Context .......... 69
  Rural Social Organizations in Ecuador as State-Led Civil Society ................. 79
  Development and Developmental States as “Embedded Autonomy” ............... 81
  Part 3- Neoliberalism, Governance, NGOization and the “Countermovement” in
    Latin America ...................................................................................................... 90
  Part 4- Post-Neoliberalism, Polanyian “Re-embedding” and the Pink Tide as an
    Opening for “Symbiotic Transformation” ........................................................... 106
  The Pink Tide: An Opening for “Symbiotic Transformation” ......................... 117
  “Moving the State” Towards State-Society Synergy as “Re-Embedding” in Post-
    Neoliberal Ecuador ............................................................................................ 123
  Conclusions ............................................................................................................ 126

Chapter 3- From “Informal Apartheid” to “Corporatism from Below”: A Brief
  History of Rural State-Society Relations in Ecuador ......................................... 130
  Introduction ............................................................................................................ 130
  Colonial Subjugation, Political Independence, Internal Colonialism and
    *Gamonalismo* .................................................................................................... 133
  The “Agrarian Question” and the 1895 Liberal Revolution ............................. 140
  “Corporatism from Below” and the Roots of Social Citizenship ...................... 145
  Structuralism and Agrarian Reform ..................................................................... 152
  Neoliberalism, the Rise of the CONAIE, and Neo-Corporatism ...................... 158
  International Development Cooperation and the Emergence of Food Sovereignty
    Discourse ............................................................................................................... 170
  The ‘Cycle of Insurrection,’ the Emergence of *Patchakutik* and Crisis in the
    CONAIE ............................................................................................................ 175
  Conclusions ............................................................................................................ 180

Chapter 4- The Citizen’s Revolution, Political Recentralization and Post-Neoliberal
  Rural Development ................................................................................................. 184
  Introduction ............................................................................................................ 184
State Building, Neo-Developmentalism and the Political System .................. 186
Post-Neoliberal Agricultural and Rural Development Programs .................. 193
Agribusiness Power and the Post-Neoliberal State .................................. 202
International Relations and Development Cooperation ............................ 206
Rural Social Movements, the Decline of Neo-Corporatism and Post-Neoliberal Citizenship ......................................................................................... 210
Conclusions ................................................................................................. 220

Chapter 5- The Unión Provincial de Organizaciones Campesinas de Manabí (UPOCAM) and the Challenge of “Moving” the Post-Neoliberal State .......... 224
Introduction .................................................................................................. 224
History of the Region and the Organization ................................................. 226
Neoliberalism and Campesinista Rural Development ................................... 230
The UPOCAM in the Post-Neoliberal Period ................................................ 235
Conclusions ................................................................................................. 243

Chapter 6- The Red de Ferias of Imbabura: “New Markets” and New Alliances in the Post-Neoliberal Turn ................................................................. 246
Introduction .................................................................................................. 246
Imbabura and the Northern Highlands: From Haciendas to Minifundios y Comunidades .......................................................... 248
Neoliberal Proyectismo and Agroecology in Ecuador and Imbabura ............. 254
The Red de Ferias: Between Proyectismo and Neo-Developmental State Building ......................................................................................... 261
Conclusions ................................................................................................. 271

Chapter 7- FAPECAFES and the Post-Neoliberal “Plan Café” ..................... 274
Introduction .................................................................................................. 275
Coffee Production and Peasant Social Organization in Southern Ecuador ...... 278
Fair Trade, FAPECAFES, and Neoliberal Proyectismo ................................. 282
Coffee Production and Post-Neoliberalism in Southern Ecuador: Transcending Neoliberal Proyectismo ............................................................... 290
Fair Trade in Ecuador: From Private Certification Towards Public Policies... 297
Conclusions ................................................................................................. 303

Chapter 8- Conclusions: Post-Neoliberal State Building and the Decline of Neoliberal Governance ................................................................. 305
Introduction .................................................................................................. 305
Key Explanatory Factors ............................................................................. 310
Divergent Sub-National Impacts of the Post-Neoliberal Turn ....................... 323
Ideas for Future Research ........................................................................... 334
Bibliography ................................................................................................. 336

Appendix 1- Interviews .................................................................................. 384
Appendix 2- Interview Guide ......................................................................... 391
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym or Name</th>
<th>Full Name</th>
<th>Translation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ALBA</td>
<td>Alianza Bolivariana para Nuestra América</td>
<td>Bolivarian Alliance for Our America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AP</td>
<td>Alianza PAIS Patria Altiva y Soberana (PAIS)</td>
<td>Proud and Sovereign Fatherland Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APECAP</td>
<td>Asociación de Cafetaleros Ecológicos de Palanda</td>
<td>Association of Ecological Coffee Growers of Palanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVSF</td>
<td>Agrónomos y Veterinarios sin Fronteras</td>
<td>Agronomists and Veterinarians without Borders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BNF</td>
<td>Banco Nacional de Fomento</td>
<td>Ecuadorian National Development Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCCIM</td>
<td>Consejo de Comunas Campesinas e Indígenas de Montufar</td>
<td>Council of Peasant and Indigenous Communes of Montufar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CECJ</td>
<td>Coordinadora Ecuatoriana de Comercio Justo</td>
<td>Ecuadorian Fair Trade Coordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIALCOs</td>
<td>Circuitos Alternativos de Comercialización</td>
<td>Alternative Commercialization and Marketing Circuits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNC-EA</td>
<td>Coordinadora Nacional Campesino Eloy Alfaro</td>
<td>Coordination of National Peasant Organizations- Eloy Alfaro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CODENPE</td>
<td>Consejo de Desarrollo de las Nacionalidades y Pueblos del Ecuador</td>
<td>Development Council of Ecuador’s Nationalities and Peoples</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CODEPMOC</td>
<td>Consejo Nacional del Pueblo Montubio del Ecuador</td>
<td>National Council of the Montubio People of Ecuador</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONFEUNASSC</td>
<td>Confederación Nacional del Seguro Social Campesino</td>
<td>National Confederation of Peasant Social Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COFENAC</td>
<td>Consejo Cafetalero Nacional</td>
<td>National Coffee Producer’s Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONAGOPARE</td>
<td>Consejo Nacional de Gobiernos Parroquiales Rurales del Ecuador</td>
<td>National Council of Rural Parish Governments of Ecuador</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONAIE</td>
<td>Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador</td>
<td>Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COOTAD</td>
<td>Código Orgánico de Ordenamiento Territorial, Autonomía y Decentralización</td>
<td>Organic Code of Territorial Planning, Autonomy and Decentralization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COPISA</td>
<td>Conferencia Plurinacional e Intercultural de Soberanía Alimentaria</td>
<td>Plurinational and Intercultural Conference on Food Sovereignty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CORMOLIT</td>
<td>Corporación de Montubios del Litoral</td>
<td>Corporation of Montubios del Litoral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSCC</td>
<td>Consejo Sectorial Campesino Ciudadano</td>
<td>Peasant Citizen Sectoral Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTE</td>
<td>Confederación de Trabajadores Ecuatorianas</td>
<td>Confederation of Ecuadorian Workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DNEIB</td>
<td>Dirección de Educación Bilingüe</td>
<td>Directorate of Bilingual Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECUARUNARI</td>
<td>Ecuador Runacunapac Riccharimui</td>
<td>Highland Federation of Indigenous Communities, Federated to the CONAIE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EECJ</td>
<td>Estrategia Ecuatoriana de Comercio Justo</td>
<td>Ecuadorian Fair Trade Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAPECAFES</td>
<td>Federación Regional de Asociaciones de Pequeños Cafetaleros Ecológicos del Sur</td>
<td>Regional Federation of Associations of Small Ecological Coffee Growers of the South</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FECAFEM</td>
<td>Federación de Asociaciones Artesanales de Producción Cafetalera Ecológica de Manabí</td>
<td>Federation of Associations of Artisanal-Ecological Coffee Production of Manabi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEI</td>
<td>Federación Ecuatoriana de Indios</td>
<td>Ecuadorian Federation of Indians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FENACLE</td>
<td>Federación de Campesinos e Indígenas Libres del Ecuador</td>
<td>Federation of Free Peasants and Indigenous Peoples of Ecuador</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Spanish Name</td>
<td>English Translation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FENOC</td>
<td>Federación Nacional de Organizaciones Campesinas</td>
<td>National Federation of Peasant Organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FICI</td>
<td>Federaciòn Indígena Campesina de Imbabura</td>
<td>Indigenous and Peasant Federation of Imbabura</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FODERUMA</td>
<td>Fondo para el Desarrollo del Rural Marginal</td>
<td>Marginal Areas Rural Development Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FUPOCPS</td>
<td>Federación Unitaria Provincial de Organizaciones Campesinas y Populares del Sur</td>
<td>Federation of Peasant and Popular Organizations of the South</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FURA</td>
<td>Frente Unido de Reforma Agraria</td>
<td>Agrarian Reform Unity Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GATT</td>
<td>General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ID</td>
<td>Izquierda Democrática</td>
<td>Democratic Left</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IEPS</td>
<td>Instituto Nacional de Economía Popular y Solidaria</td>
<td>National Institute of Popular Economy and Solidarity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IERAC</td>
<td>Instituto Ecuatoriano de Reforma Agraria y Colonización</td>
<td>Ecuadorian Institute of Agrarian Reform and Colonization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IESS</td>
<td>Seguro Social Campesino- Instituto de Seguridad Social del Ecuador</td>
<td>Peasant Social Security Institute of Social Security of Ecuador</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INIAP</td>
<td>Instituto Nacional de Investigación Agropecuaria</td>
<td>National Institute of Agricultural Research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOEPS</td>
<td>Ley de la Economía Popular y Solidaria</td>
<td>Law of Popular Economy and Solidarity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LORSA</td>
<td>Ley Orgánica del Régimen de Soberanía Alimentaria</td>
<td>Law of Food Sovereignty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAGAP</td>
<td>Ministerio de Agricultura, Ganadería, Acuacultura y Pesca</td>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, Aquaculture and Fisheries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCE</td>
<td>Ministerio de Comercio Exterior</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPD</td>
<td>Movimiento Popular Democrático</td>
<td>Democratic Popular Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Spanish Name</td>
<td>English Name</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPST</td>
<td>Ministerio de Previsión Social y Trabajo</td>
<td>Ministry of Social Welfare and Labor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSGs</td>
<td>Organizaciones de Segundo Grado</td>
<td>Second-Level Organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBV</td>
<td>Plan Buen Vivir</td>
<td>Good Living Plan - National Development Plan of Ecuador</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCE</td>
<td>Partido Comunista Ecuatoriana</td>
<td>Ecuadorian Communist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PGS</td>
<td>Participatory Guarantee System</td>
<td>Sistema Participativa de Garantía</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PK</td>
<td>Movimiento de Unidad Plurinacional Pachakutik</td>
<td>Pachakutik (New Dawn) - Movement of Plurinational Unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRCE</td>
<td>Proyecto de Reactivación de la Caficultura Ecuatoriana</td>
<td>Ecuadorian Coffee Reactivation Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROBIO</td>
<td>Corporación Ecuatoriana de Agricultores Biológicos</td>
<td>Ecuadorian Organic Agriculture Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROCAP</td>
<td>Asociación Agroartesanal de Productores de Café de Altura Puyango</td>
<td>Agroartesanal Association of Highland Coffee Producers of Puyango</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROLOCAL</td>
<td>Proyecto de Reducción de la Pobreza y Desarrollo Rural Local</td>
<td>Poverty Reduction and Local Rural Development Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSE</td>
<td>Partido Socialista Ecuatoriano</td>
<td>Ecuadorian Socialist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SENPLADES</td>
<td>Secretaría Nacional de Planificación y Desarrollo</td>
<td>National Secretariat of Planning and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SETECI</td>
<td>Secretaría Técnica de Cooperación Internacional</td>
<td>Technical Secretary of International Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPG</td>
<td>Sistemas Participativos de Garantía</td>
<td>Participatory Guarantee Systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPL</td>
<td>Territorio de Producción Limpia</td>
<td>Territory of Clean Production</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UICMA</td>
<td>Unión de Comunidades Campesinas de Mariano Acosta</td>
<td>Union of Peasant Communities of Mariano Acosta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UOCC</td>
<td>Unión de Organizaciones Campesinas Cochapamba</td>
<td>Union of Peasant Organizations Cochapamba</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Spanish Name</td>
<td>English Translation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNA</td>
<td><em>Unidad Nacional de Almacenamiento</em></td>
<td>National Aggregation Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNORCAC</td>
<td><em>Unión de Organizaciones Campesinas Indígenas de Cotacachi</em></td>
<td>Union of Indigenous and Peasant Organizations of Cotacachi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPOCAM</td>
<td><em>Unión Provincial de Organizaciones Campesinas de Manabí</em></td>
<td>Provincial Union of Peasant Organizations of Manabí</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Preface

Dissertation topics in the social sciences are determined just as much by one’s autobiography as they are by “objective” scholarly research questions despite what any methodology textbook will tell you. One’s life experience, the period in which one has grown up, and one’s normative/value commitments are as important as the empirical or philosophical questions that one spends several years researching, thinking and writing about. The scholars’ subjectivity or their “scholastic point of view” (Bourdieu 1990) inevitably end up making any work of social science part auto-biography. Therefore, I shall begin this dissertation by giving the reader a brief sense of who I am and how I came to formulate the core research question and hypothesis analyzed in this study. This dissertation ultimately has been shaped by my attempt to understand how the world is and how it might change.

My interest in politics and the world beyond Canada started during childhood when I began collecting postage stamps as a seven-year-old. My parents, who were both public school teachers, taught my sister and me about the importance of social justice and fairness and to be engaged in our town and the wider world. I first understood power and the contentious nature of politics during the late 1990s through the cutbacks of the Mike Harris Conservative government in Ontario. I remember the anger of my parents in discussions around the dinner table and later playing with the children of other teachers when my mother took us with her to the picket line during the 1997 teacher’s strike. This strike and the Harris years were a first lesson in the combative nature of politics and taught me that government decisions had real impacts on people’s lives. My upbringing shaped me to believe that a truly democratic society is characterized by “substantive
equality” (Huber et al. 1992) and much more than just elections or “procedural democracy” and this remains at the core of my beliefs.

My interest in Latin America also began relatively early in my life when I was in high school and travelled to Nicaragua as part of a youth exchange. I learned about the history of that country and the shameful U.S. war against the Sandinista government in the 1980s. This experience opened my eyes to many things, and after it, I became influenced as a teenager by the anti-globalization movement of the early 2000s. This initial trip to Nicaragua led eventually to my choice to study International Development Studies program at Trent University. It is now clear to me that the questions I explore in this dissertation had been developing in my mind long before I enrolled at Carleton to pursue this PhD. Of notable significance in sparking my intellectual interests was my first trip to Ecuador in 2006-2007 as part of a study abroad program during my undergraduate degree. I spent eight months in the country and completed a research placement for credit with one of the organizations that I subsequently studied in this dissertation, FAPECAFES, analyzed in chapter 7.

One vignette that stands out in my mind from this period is something that one of the coffee producers said during one of the many meetings I observed during my time in the cooperative. I often stopped listening in my second language, Spanish, while I was still learning to speak it fluently, but on this occasion, I perked up when one of the producers in the meeting said “si mejoramos los mercados, mejoramos el mundo”, or “if we make markets better, we make the world better.” The simplicity of his statement summed up for me what Fair Trade certification was trying to achieve, to try to make markets better. However, it also struck me as naïve, for it seemed to me that the market
was the fundamental challenge these producers faced as well. The phrase stayed with me however, compelling me to ponder various questions. How could markets be \textit{made} better? How could markets be organized so as to moderate the so-called race to the bottom?

During my time working with FAPECAFES, I was impressed by the work the cooperative and its leaders were doing and believed that the core idea of “Trade not Aid” was, in theory, a much better approach than many other rural development interventions. However, it also seemed obvious to me that Fair Trade or certification alone was not going to solve the problems these coffee producers faced. While FAPECAFES was able to sell nearly 80% of its coffee through Fair Trade certification (a higher amount than many other cooperatives in the system), producers would say that this was still not enough to make ends meet. Many of the producers I met received more income from the remittances their children working in Spain sent home to them than from coffee sales. While I saw that much of the work done by NGOs supporting FAPECAFES was well-intentioned, it was also fundamentally unable to change any of the broader factors that worked against these producers, something that further resonated while reading James Ferguson’s \textit{The Anti-Politics Machine} (1994), which suggested how futile many development interventions can prove to be because they don’t address the root causes of political, social and economic structures.

The next year when I returned to Trent to complete my degree, I took a class with a new professor in the Politics Department, Gavin Fridell, who had just completed his doctoral dissertation on Fair Trade certification in coffee. Gavin’s study had analyzed Fair Trade certification as a neoliberal project, which resonated with what I had learned
about in Ecuador. Developed as a historical political economy approach to Fair Trade, Gavin argued that Fair Trade certification was much less effective than the previous system of international quota systems associated with the International Coffee Agreement (ICA) (2007). Engaging with Gavin’s work also confirmed my belief that much being done under the guise of international development by NGOs and grassroots organizations was simply perpetuating neoliberalism rather than challenging it and were secondary to other factors such as economic history and politics in determining the trajectories of change or development in particular countries. Many of the thinkers I read in my undergraduate courses had focused on the problems associated with neoliberalism and “development” but seemed to offer no solution or counter-hegemonic project other than local grassroots empowerment and critiques (Mohan and Stokke 2000). To me, it seemed that poverty and injustice were the result of politics and solving many of the problems faced by smallholder producers would require a change in policies. Stimulating conversations with Gavin and his kindness and friendship helped me develop my ideas as well as confirm that I wanted to pursue graduate studies.

The fall of 2006 coincided with a presidential election in Ecuador which brought the first-time candidate and left-wing populist Rafael Correa to power as President. I remember observing the excitement of people in the streets on the evening in mid-November when Correa won the runoff election. Like many people, I was impressed by Correa’s vision and felt hopeful about what he might accomplish in government. His criticisms of neoliberalism and the inequalities of the international system resonated with me and attempted to get to the root of the big questions in development. Many of the producers in the FAPECAFES cooperative supported Correa as the government promised
to invest more resources into rural areas. While I was completing my placement and the new government was taking shape, I began to think about what the government could do to support FAPECAFES’ efforts since the producers in the cooperative were a very small minority of coffee producers in the region. How could the programs for a promised “agrarian revolution” strengthen the cooperative’s work allowing more producers to join the cooperative and receive higher prices and “make markets better”? I continued to follow developments in Ecuador under the new government and watched the 2008 constituent assembly’s institutionalization of food sovereignty with interest.

In hindsight it occurs to me that the whole journey of my undergraduate to graduate degrees has been a type of “re-enchantment with the world” after feeling disillusioned by the Marxist, liberal/ neoliberal and post-development/ post-structuralist approaches to development that I was exposed to in my undergraduate degree, which has been described as the “impasse” in development studies (Schuurman 1993). The program I studied in at Trent had a slant towards “deconstructing” development or “post-development” (Escobar 2011), and while I valued these critiques to some degree, they offered no workable alternative. Post-development has been described as a product of post-modern or post-materialist societies and as Max Weber observed: “The disenchantment with the enlightenment due to its inability to offer a cozy, meaningful world was followed by disenchantment with European born attempts of re-enchantment (Marxism and Neo-Marxism).” (Gonçalves 2006: 1159). In light of my dissatisfaction with elements of both the critical (Marxism, post-structuralism) and mainstream or orthodox approaches to development I set off in search of my own “re-enchantment” through my interest in the post-neoliberal or Pink Tide governments in Latin America.
which seemed to me to suggest at least some kind of hopeful path out of the development impasse.

In my master’s program and after it, in my PhD, I proposed studying the rural development policies of the post-neoliberal governments in Latin America. I decided to write my Major Research Paper in my master’s about the “endogenous development” policies for the agricultural sector in Venezuela under the Chávez government, which as a young leftist was an incredibly “enchanting” place. Beyond the enchantment though I was also just curious to understand what was happening in country and whether the model of “socialism” in Venezuela was distinctive from that of “actually existing socialism” of the twentieth century. In theory (Dietrich 2012; Lebowitz 2006), the program being attempted in Venezuela seemed to avoid state-centrism with a more bottom-up approach, developing the agricultural economy by encouraging start-ups of cooperatives. I read Paul Hirst’s work on “associative democracy” (1994) and became convinced that an alternative to both the shortcomings of social democracy, central planning and neoliberalism might look something like the ideas he put forward as an alternative for left-wing politics.

The chance to experience the processes of political change in Venezuela was a fascinating experience but left me feeling more disenchanted than reenchanted and with a whole host of new questions. While there was no question that a process of social and political transformation was underway which had made a clear difference in the lives of the poor, it seemed to me that the specific topic I researched, the government’s agricultural policies or what it called “sowing the oil” (Clark 2010) through programs to encourage agricultural production and cooperatives were doomed to fail. The people
working in the state I interviewed seemed to understand the objectives of the policy, the clear political will to “sow the oil” existed, but the rural population was so small that the government was left with no other option but to “create campesinos” by encouraging urban populations to settle land and start farming (Linton Page 2010). The resources at the disposal of the government and the political will were not enough to move in a different direction. As I remember one Cuban agronomist working in the Ministry of Agriculture telling me, the government’s efforts were well-intentioned, but the conditions simply did not exist to spur agricultural production through cooperatives, through socialist enterprises or even through capitalist farming due to the depopulation of the countryside.

What I learned from experiencing the Venezuelan case firsthand and thinking about the process of political change there, was that the political will to implement a political program or model of development is not enough for political change to take root. This reflects Peter Evans’ observation that state-led development will not be successful in capitalist societies without a joint project with actors “in society” development cannot occur due to the fact that in capitalist societies neither “…investment nor production can be implemented without the cooperation of private actors “…it seems likely that states must be “embedded” in order to be effective.” (Evans 1995: 41). The boom and bust cycle of co-ops and later socialist enterprises that I observed and intensified after I was in Venezuela seemed to confirm that the policy of “sowing the oil” was doomed to fail. In his work, Tom Purcell (2011) has observed that these programs were mainly functioning as a way to transfer money to the poor, more like social welfare payments rather than as a viable economic strategy, either socialist or capitalist. With an agricultural sector that had
declined over the twentieth century, the state had no choice but to “create campesinos” through a whole variety of development initiatives aimed at “sowing the oil” or what Peter Evans calls “husbandry” by the state in developing a new economic sector (1995). As Evans argues, without “presence of organized social groups with something to gain from transformation” it is unlikely that “developmental” processes will take root through a “transformative bureaucratic state” (1995: 41).

The failure of Venezuela’s rural development strategy based on “sowing the oil” was also hampered precisely because of oil, something which was considered in Terry Karl’s seminal work *The Paradox of Plenty* considered the impacts of this “resource curse” (Karl 1997) on politics and economic development as well as Fernando Coronil’s concept of the “magical state” (1997). The role of government revenue from oil rather than taxation was in the end what allowed for the unique conditions in Venezuela to foster “socialism” through popular organization or popular organization before to develop domestic industries in the twentieth century through import substitution policies. The problem of how to make political change and move an economic sector or development strategy towards a given goal is something that stayed with me as a puzzle I wanted to understand through further enquiry. While earlier on Venezuela was attempting to construct a different model of development, it has since devolved into what has been called “socialist rentierism” (Rosales 2018). In spite of what I still believe were the noble, though improvised and naïve, intentions of Hugo Chávez to build a different society, contemporary Venezuela looks increasingly like a predatory state. This is a tragic and catastrophic outcome for Venezuelans, for the region more broadly and for the
international left another “disenchantment” after it had looked to Venezuela as a cause for hope and an alternative to neoliberal capitalism.

When I applied to do a PhD I had originally wanted to do a comparative study of post-neoliberal rural development policies in Venezuela and Ecuador. However, I eventually concluded that the Venezuelan case seemed like too much of an outlier in terms of its agrarian sector and history. I decided to focus on Ecuador and compare different case studies within Ecuador. My thinking about the question of smallholder producers and rural development evolved during my PhD as I continued to read the work of Peter Evans, Karl Polanyi, Robert Bates, Paul Hirst and Adrian Leftwich amongst others. I began to think more about developmental states and the importance of politics in shaping different economic histories across country’s outcomes. In contrast to Venezuela, Ecuador had a larger rural sector and a larger rural population and already had a significant number of NGOs working to promote sustainable agriculture and to organize producer cooperatives and associations. In this regard, Ecuador seemed like a more promising case. I decided that sub-national comparative research would consider how and why or why not what appeared to be a similar approach as in Venezuela seemed more likely to work in Ecuador where there was a vibrant agriculture sector, organized rural social movements and non-governmental organizations working on rural development strategies with smallholder producers.

At the start of the government, rural social movements achieved representation within the governing party of AP and channels like the COPISA were created to represent rural smallholders in the policy process as well. However, the channels that were created involved incorporation from above instead of a dynamic of
“corporatism from below” as rural social movements had been weakened considerably by their participation in politics which reduced their ability to mobilize their constituents. The government’s efforts to “decorporatize” the state largely served to disarticulate rural social organizations and channels for interaction and deliberation between rural social organizations and the government that were significantly representative did not emerge. However, this outcome also reflects the fact that rural social movement were largely disarticulated before the Correa government was elected and were later usurped by the government in many areas, leading to the fulfilment of many of the material demands of their grassroots members.
Chapter 1 - Introduction

“The idea that states operate most effectively when their connections to society are minimized is no more plausible than the idea that markets operate in isolation from other social ties. Just as in reality markets work only if they are “embedded” in other forms of social relations, it seems likely that states must be “embedded” in order to be effective.” (Evans 1995: 41)

Introduction: Agriculture, the “Double Movement” and a Via Campesina

Food and agriculture are vital to human existence and the most visceral link between humanity and the natural environment on which we are dependent. The vast changes that have taken place in food and agriculture over the past two centuries have deepened the “metabolic rift” between human survival, or social metabolism, and the natural environment (Wittman 2009). The evolution of agriculture towards ever more industrial scales has exacerbated “food distance” (Kneen 1993) in geographic, social and psychological terms between people and what we consume due to deepening processes of “agrarian change” (Bernstein and Byres 2001). The accelerating pace of change has raised a whole range of new issues with regards to the future of food and agriculture including the impacts of large-scale and synthetic input-intensive agriculture on climate change and biodiversity, the feminization of agricultural labour and global changes in diets and nutrition to name only a few (see Clapp 2012; Weis 2007). Implicit and explicit in many of these discussions is the broader question of what a sustainable model of agricultural production will require in the future including: whether smaller farms are more environmentally sustainable than larger ones; whether locally grown food is more sustainable than imported food, and questions around organic versus conventional versus agroecological production techniques. At their core, these are ecological, scientific and socio-cultural questions but they are also political ones. Government policies have shaped
food and agriculture in significant ways determining who produces what kind of food and whose interests are favored by one set of policies over another.

The idea of a distinctive “via campesina”, or “peasant path” of agricultural development - the redistribution of land to landless workers and government support for small farmers - has emerged in recent years as a distinctive framework and set of ideas with particular resonance in Latin America (see Edelman 2014; Redclift 1980; Sanderson 1983) as well as other regions. In this study I propose that economic historian Karl Polanyi’s “double movement” (1957), helps to explain the uneven ways capitalism has transformed agricultural production and agriculture has developed across national borders. Polanyi’s work, like the work of Karl Marx, considered the impacts of capitalism in the nineteenth century which, he argues, brought with it the emergence of the “self-regulating market,” which was a new development in world history. Polanyi asserts that prior to the nineteenth century economies were characterized by forms of economic integration or embeddedness including reciprocity, redistribution and market exchange (Polanyi 1968; Schaniel and Neale 2000). With the development of capitalism and the extension of self-regulating markets these other forms of integration were broken down, or transformed, as more and more of social life became subordinated to the capitalist market imperative.

Polanyi’s argument was that unregulated markets were not without political consequences and as the expansion and impacts of self-regulating markets brought with it what he called “countermovements” for social protection which sought to regulate and limit the power of markets activated through government policies. Polanyi described this “double movement” as on the one hand the expansion of the “self-regulating market” and
a “countermovement checking the expansion in definite directions” (Polanyi 1957: 130). Examples of measures associated with the countermovement highlighted by Polanyi include “factory legislation”, “social laws” (social welfare programs), “land laws and agrarian tariffs” (1957: 132). I believe Polanyi’s theory is particularly illuminating for understanding the ways in which food and agriculture develop due to the role of government policies, politics and the balance between different social forces in shaping different trajectories of agricultural development across time, national borders and regions.

The establishment of the international federation of peasant and small farm organizations taking the name, *La Via Campesina* (LVC) or “The Peasant Way” in English, in 1993, was a reaction against the liberalization of agricultural sectors with economic globalization (Desmarais 2002) and an example of the double movement described by Polanyi. Agriculture was one of the first sectors where economic liberalization was attempted and the establishment of LVC was a rejection of the policy space governments lost with the liberalization of food and agriculture. At the 1996 Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) summit, LVC made a proposal for
foodsovereignty\textsuperscript{1} as an alternative to food security\textsuperscript{2}, the concept that the FAO was promoting. The LVC proposal was an alternative proposal to the continuing liberalization and globalization of agricultural production and trade and subsequently became associated with the broader anti-globalization movement (Ayres and Bosia 2011). Since the concept emerged, food sovereignty has been the expression of a countermovement against economic liberalization in agriculture and trade policies (Holt Giménez and Shattuck 2011; McMichael 2009). However politically, the vision proposed by food sovereignty would be very challenging for most national governments to implement and perhaps near impossible for governments who have locked-in to the neoliberal path of economic globalization through multi-lateral and bilateral trade and investment agreements.

Not every region of the world has continued to move towards the neoliberal economic model of deeper international integration, however. Since the beginning of the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1} The Nyeleni Declaration that was developed through plenaries of the international LVC meeting came up with the following definition the concept: “Food sovereignty is the right of peoples to healthy and culturally appropriate food produced through ecologically sound and sustainable methods, and their right to define their own food and agriculture systems. It puts those who produce, distribute and consume food at the heart of food systems and policies rather than the demands of markets and corporations. It defends the interests and inclusion of the next generation. It offers a strategy to resist and dismantle the current corporate trade and food regime, and directions for food, farming, pastoral and fisheries systems determined by local producers. Food sovereignty prioritizes local and national economies and markets and empowers peasant and family farmer-driven agriculture, artisanal fishing, pastoralised grazing, and food production, distribution and consumption based on environmental, social and economic sustainability. Food sovereignty promotes transparent trade that guarantees just income to all peoples and the rights of consumers to control their food and nutrition. It ensures that the rights to use and manage our lands, territories, waters, seeds, livestock and biodiversity are in the hands of those of us who produce food. Food sovereignty implies new social relations free of oppression and inequality between men and women, peoples, racial groups, social classes and generations.” (La Via Campesina 2007, cited in Patel 2009, 666).
\item \textsuperscript{2} At the 1996 Food Security Summit, the FAO established the following definition of food security, “Food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food which meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life. Household food security is the application of this concept to the family level, with individuals within households as the focus of concern.” (FAO 1996). For a detailed discussion and analysis of the overlap and differences between food security and food sovereignty see Clapp (2014).
\end{itemize}
twenty-first century, another countermovement has filtered through Latin America (Munck 2015; Silva 2009), mediated by the election of the so-called “Pink Tide” leftist governments (Cameron and Hershberg 2010; Levitsky and Roberts 2011; Lievesley and Ludlam 2009) a turn described as ushering in a “post-neoliberal” era (Macdonald and Ruckert 2009). In theory, these governments should enjoy more policy space to implement agriculture and rural development policies associated with the vision of food sovereignty. This dissertation considers the idea and potential of increased policy space and the nascent state support for food sovereignty in Ecuador whose government turned to the political left with the election of Rafael Correa as President in 2006 and whether the rural development policies implemented by the Correa government resembled the proposal for food sovereignty of LVC that was adopted in the 2008 Ecuadorian constitution.

The election of Correa brought an end to more than a decade of social and political unrest due to widespread opposition to neoliberal policies (Collins 2014; Silva 2009) including the liberalization of foreign investment in the oil and natural resource sectors (Valdivia 2008). In general, it seemed that the 2006 Presidential campaign of Rafael Correa was backed by rural social movements that hoped he would reverse neoliberalism and hold a constituent assembly (Becker 2011). The Mesa Agraria (MA) a coalition of all the major national Federations of campesino and Indigenous communities and associations, backed Correa’s Presidential campaign in 2006 and was instrumental in food sovereignty enshrinement in the 2008 constitution (see Giunta 2014). The three largest organizations in the MA including the Confederación Nacional de Organizaciones Campesinas, Indígenas y Negras (FENOCIN), Federación de
Campesinos e Indígenas Libres del Ecuador (FENACLE) Coordinadora Nacional

Campesina- Eloy Alfaro (CNC-EA) all actively supported Correa’s election while the largest and most powerful Federation of Indigenous communities, the Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador (CONAIE), initially maintained distance but critically supported to the government between 2007-2008 and backed the 2008 constituent assembly. All of these movements, the political left and progressive social movements all had a major influence over the contents of the 2008 constitution (Andrade 2012; Becker 2011). At the center of the constitution was the concept of buen vivir, or sumak kawsay in Quichua, often translated as “living well” in English, and defined in the preamble of the constitution as “A new form of public coexistence, in diversity and in harmony with nature, to achieve the good way of living, the sumak kawsay; A society that respects, in all its dimensions, the dignity of individuals and community groups” (2008). With the incorporation of buen vivir and the rights of nature, food sovereignty was seen to demonstrate the influence of “post-development” (Escobar 2011) ideas on the 2008 constitution and suggested a move not just beyond neoliberalism but also beyond traditional Eurocentric ideas of development.

By lobbying for the inclusion of food sovereignty in state legislation, social movements, as well as the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that supported them, it was hoped that something like a state-supported food sovereignty or a developmental state for peasant agriculture would begin to emerge. On paper, the provisions for food sovereignty in the Ecuadorian constitution appear to be an ideal blueprint for a model of rural development based on the principles of food sovereignty as conceptualized by LVC. For example, article 281 commits the Ecuadorian state to guaranteeing the human right to
food sovereignty for all Ecuadorian citizens. Numerous other articles in the constitution likewise refer to the strategic responsibility of the state to promote peasant farming, small-scale enterprises and domestic production. Article 336 states that government policies and programs will promote and support fair trade and models encouraging the equitable exchange of goods and services. The entire fourth chapter of the constitution is dedicated to Indigenous rights and protecting collective and ancestral land tenure arrangements. Article 282 declares that land has a social and environmental function and subsequently prohibits its concentration. The responsibility to guarantee food sovereignty is placed squarely on the state but community and territorial sovereignty are also recognized and protected. The government went on to draft and approve the Law of Food Sovereignty in 2009, which lays out an even more detailed framework for the promotion of food sovereignty emphasizing the importance of participation in the policy implementation process.

As a case study, Ecuador is an outlier globally. Only a handful of other countries have included food sovereignty in government legislation. Though much of the earlier academic literature on food sovereignty is boosterish and value-committed, more recent empirical studies and theoretical debates have been more nuanced and even critical of the concept. In particular, the tension between Westphalian or state sovereignty and the sovereignty of peasant or Indigenous communities/territories has been identified as the central unresolved tension in definitions of food sovereignty (Bernstein 2014; Claeys 2012; Edelman et. Al 2014; Patel 2009; Schiavoni 2016). Otto Hospes sums this problem up as “…whether the concept of food sovereignty can be understood as an example of a state-centric or a pluralistic approach of sovereignty” (2014: 122). Definitions of food
sovereignty thus far have invoked the state to protect domestic agricultural production but
to also enhance the sovereignty of peasant communities and territories and encourage
forms of moral economy and reciprocity. While certainly food sovereignty encompasses
struggles to maintain self-subsistence, one of the criticisms levelled against
Chayonovians or campesinistas is that they have a static view of peasants or a “peasant
essentialist” approach\(^3\) (Bernstein and Byres 2001). As Otto Hospes has argued, the
tension between a kind of “revolutionary” approach based on a fetishized autarkic view
of peasant autonomy and the definitions of food sovereignty that invoke government
support for smallholders and the state’s responsibility to guarantee citizen rights to food
sovereignty has produced a “deadlock” in the theoretical debate about the concept
(Hospes 2014: 124).

The practical and theoretical question in light of this “deadlock” over what
sovereignty means in food becomes then, how “autonomous” peasant or rural
communities relate to the state and state sovereignty. This question is exemplary of a
thorny issue in social and political theory for political leaders described by Joel Migdal as
the “paradox” of states state building of “…how to remain apart from society – the state
as the ultimate authority – while somehow still benefiting from people’s “collective self-

\(^3\) Henry Bernstein and Terry Byers define “peasant essentialism” as the following ideal type which they argue is no longer helpful in the empirical study of most “peasants” or petty commodity producers:
“…household farming organized for simple reproduction (‘subsistence’), the solidarities, reciprocities and
egalitarianism of (village) community, and commitment to the values of a way of life based on household
and community, kin and locale (and harmony with nature, a motif revived and privileged by current ‘green’
discourses)...Such essentialist constructions acknowledge the relations of peasants with other social groups
and entities – landlords, merchants, the state, the urban in general – and typically view them as relations of
subordination and exploitation that also define the peasant condition and generate the politics of peasant
resistance.” (2001: 6). Their call was to abandon the study of peasants based on this ideal type in favour the
study of “agrarian change”. While I agree with their argument about peasant essentialism in this study I
don’t share their pessimism about the viability of a via campesina for the future of agricultural production.
consciousness,” their sense of belonging to something bigger than themselves of which they are an integral part.” (2001: 257). As McKay et. al have put it, “The state cannot ‘stand-alone’ on food sovereignty, but neither can ‘local’ communities, groups or people. If food sovereignty is to be about the ability of ‘local’ peoples to have a say in defining, managing and controlling their own food and agricultural systems, then state efforts to support food sovereignty must involve some degree of structural reform to distribute power in ways that facilitate such local autonomy.” (McKay et. al 2014: 1177). Hospes suggests what I believe to be the most viable, though challenging, way out of the deadlock in the debate over food sovereignty. He suggests that the objectives of food sovereignty can be best advanced through “interactive governance” (Kooiman 2009) or “…the development of new modes of governance…between state and non-state actors” (Hospes 2014: 126). This direction is supported by the literature on rural politics and development and has pointed to the fact that change often occurs when synergy exists between actors or institutions within the state and organized social forces working and applying pressure on the outside (Borras 2001; Fox 1993; McKay et. al 2014)In this study I propose that state-society relations characterized by “state-society synergy” (Evans 1996) - the vision for rural development and agriculture set out in the 2008 – were a necessary precondition for the emergence of supported food sovereignty. This study develops this theoretical framework in analyzing whether anything amounting to state-society synergy through “symbiotic transformation” (Olin Wright 2010) between rural social organizations and the Ecuadorian and the post-neoliberal state.
Research Questions

With the return of the state, rural social movements were demanding higher and greater public spending for agriculture from the state in Ecuador. The post-neoliberal turn with the election of Correa and the 2008 constitution raises the question: did a “state for food sovereignty” (Clark 2015) emerge in Ecuador during the Correa government or did such a state not emerge? This dissertation considers whether the policies and programs implemented by the Correa government did or did not reflect the concept of food sovereignty as defined by LVC. The primary research question of this study is whether the agricultural and rural development policies implemented by the government of Rafael Correa reflect the principles of food sovereignty promoted by LVC. Did the preconditions exist for “state-society synergy” (Evans 1996) to emerge between rural social organizations and the post-neoliberal reforms implemented by the Correa government? What factors either facilitated or hindered the emergence of this dynamic at both the national level as well as the subnational level case studies? Secondary research questions include: was there was enough political will on the part of the Correa government to implement policies reflecting food sovereignty principles? Is food sovereignty, as articulated by LVC and conceptualized in the academic literature, an empirically relevant concept, both in political and conceptual/analytical terms, to understand the aspirations of rural social movements and organizations in Ecuador? How did the post-neoliberal turn impact the relationship between the government and rural social movements and their regional and local organizations? In what ways does the post-neoliberal period and policy framework differ from the previous neoliberal period, and how has this shift affected state-society relations?
Main Arguments

This study proposes that the post-neoliberal turn in Ecuador (the election of Rafael Correa in 2006) and inclusion of food sovereignty in the 2008 Ecuadorian constitution represented the possibility of a transformation in state-society relations: a “joint project” (Evans 1995: 41) along the lines of what Erik Olin Wright has described as “symbiotic transformation” (2010). However, this scenario was dependent on the establishment of embedded autonomy or synergy between rural social organizations and the post-neoliberal state. Though government legislation was favorable, rural social movements had influence within the governing party of AP leading to increased investment in rural development programs targeted at smallholder producers this study found that the organizations analyzed in the case studies were largely unable to achieve the political influence necessary to “move the state” (Heller 2001) and bring about an episode of synergy or embedded autonomy for food sovereignty as a via campesina in agriculture and rural development. I argue that the main reasons why embedded autonomy did not emerge in the period studied include the top-down political style and modus operandi of the Correa government, the tension between post-neoliberal state building and a more deliberative mode of governance and the weakness of rural social movements and their failure to mobilize widespread pressure on their membership to implement food sovereignty legislation.

The post-neoliberal state-building process the government undertook, including the recentralization of many state functions and increases in public investment and service provision, directly undermined rural social organizations. As I analyze in chapter
three, rural social organizations became integral to processes of neoliberal governance and “NGOization” (Alvarez 1999) in the neoliberal period which is when the strategies for a via camepsina and the discourse of food sovereignty also originated. What I refer to in this study as neoliberal “projectism” (proyectismo in Spanish) or the ways in which rural communities and organizations implemented rural development activities directly through projects funded by NGOs, benefitted these organizations in material terms. It also coincided with the greater involvement of these organizations in electoral politics and lobbying and, for example, the efforts of these organizations to include food sovereignty in the 2008 constitution. As the Correa government attempted to build a more centralized, neo-developmental type of state along the lines of a “command” logic of governance (Jessop 2003), rural social organizations lost the influence they had gained through the neoliberal polycentric state. This shift was riddled by a tension between the logic of “state building” and “governance” (Yu and He 2011) which was detrimental to the emergence of embeddedness. The political role and logic of rural social organizations also proved to be a barrier to the emergence of embedded autonomy. As I analyze in chapter three, it is difficult to categorize rural social movements as always operating as a form of liberal civil society due to their state-sanctioned, corporatist origins and in particular due to the way in which they have been shaped by the “absent-present” (Coloredo-Mansfeld 2007) nature of the Ecuadorian state in social and economic life. As Peter Evans has argued, historically weak states undermine the emergence of what would be called peak interest groups in corporatist theory or a robust civil society in liberal theory (1995: 41). As a result, the particularistic interests and divisions between
organizations undermined any real possibility of exerting enough pressure on the
government to change policies at the national level.

Instead of leading to embedded autonomy the political recentralization associated
with the Correa government neo-developmental state sought to increase what Joel Migdal
has termed “state social control” (2001) as part of the Polanyian countermovement
against the “polycentric” (Scholte 2004) neoliberal state and neoliberal governance. I
argue that this is indicative of a political style of the Correa government that did not
allow much room for a modality of governance associated with working directly with
rural social organizations and the “…sources of intelligence and channels of
implementation…” they provide as a form of embeddedness (1995: 248). Instead the
government focused on building a more “autonomous” type of Weberian state apparatus.
It does seem that in some regards state autonomy improved during the Correa period
though this study was not able to assess the capacity or quality of the state programs
analyzed in this study. At the same time the increases in public investments in agriculture
and rural development did benefit many rural social organizations, as did access of small
producers to state programs including subsidized synthetic inputs and credit. These
advances gave political legitimacy to the Correa government which remained popular in
rural areas. For these reasons, I argue that the Ecuadorian state in the period analyzed was
an “intermediate case” between a developmental and predatory state (Evans 1995). As
the comparative analysis of the three subnational cases demonstrate, some “pockets”
(Evans 1989: 577) of embeddedness between some organizations and government
programs and institutions did emerge as well that reflected some aspects of the via
campesina model. As I analyze in chapter seven, the relative success of FAPECAFES at
“moving” (Heller 2001) the state reflected the importance of economic clout in achieving political influence and a degree of embeddedness with state programs and initiatives.

**“Broadened” Embedded Autonomy for a *Via Campesina***

Current debates regarding the future of the peasantry and rural production mirror historical debates taking place at the beginning of the twentieth century about the “agrarian question”⁴ (Kautsky 1899; Lenin 1943). These earlier deliberations between Marxist leaders and thinkers of the time posed the empirical and theoretical question of how capitalism was “…taking hold of agriculture, revolutionizing it, smashing the old forms of production…and establishing the new forms which must succeed?” (Kautsky 1899, quoted in Akram-Lodhi and Kay 2012: 5). The argument of Karl Kautsky, Vladimir Lenin and other Marxists was that small-scale producers or “peasants”⁵ would disappear over time as capitalism would tend towards the consolidation of land and production into larger and more efficient capitalist farms (Coulson 2014). As a result of this prediction, Kautsky and Lenin argued that a socialist transformation should do the same. They encouraged the collectivization of production into large, collectivized state farms (McLaughlin 1998). The most important critic of this theory and advocate for an alternative path was Russian agricultural economist Alexander Chayanov who argued that, with supportive state policies for the aggregation, processing and commercialization

---

⁴ As Paul McLaughlin has argued, the agrarian question was actually not one but two questions; the first “theoretical” and the second “political”: “(1) what are the dynamics of capitalist agriculture and (2) given those dynamics, what stance should the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) take towards the peasantry?” (1998: 25).

⁵ Cristóbal Kay and Haroon Akram-Lodhi regard a peasant as “…an agricultural worker whose livelihood is based primarily on having access to land that is either owned or rented, and who uses principally their own labour and the labour of other family members to work that land.” (2012: 5).
of smallholder production (what he called “vertical integration”⁶), peasant or smallholder agriculture could be modernized to spur the development of other economic sectors in either a capitalist or centrally planned economy (1966). Marxists labelled this position derisively as “agrarian populism” because it defended the right of peasants to maintain private property (Brass 2007). While Karl Kautsky had concluded that the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) and other Socialist parties around the world should do nothing to “… ‘artificially’ hasten or retard the proletarianization of the peasantry” (McLaughlin 1998: 25) due to these factors this was precisely what governments of both the political left and the right did as the twentieth century progressed by implementing all kinds of subsidies and market protections in agriculture.

The theoretical model I proposed as a potential pathway towards state supported food sovereignty in Ecuador is premised on the assertion that if the vision of food sovereignty codified in the 2008 Ecuadorian constitution was to become a reality, then the various networks and ties characterized by “embedded autonomy”⁷ (as described by Evans in his 1995 book Embedded Autonomy: States in Industrial Transformation) needed to be instituted during the post-neoliberal turn in Ecuador. The original work of

---

⁶ Chayanov argued that vertical integration or cooperative collectivization would achieve “…a link between each peasant farm and the central bodies of state capitalism” (1966: 268) and through unions of regional and national cooperatives forming “…gigantic unions that embrace hundreds of thousands of small producers.” (1966: 268). As Chayanov argued cooperative collectivization “…is the sole course possible in our conditions to introduce into peasant farming the elements of the large-scale industrialization and state plan.” (1966: 267).

⁷ Evans defines embedded autonomy in the following terms: “The power of embedded autonomy arises from the fusion of what seem at first to be contradictory characteristics. Embeddedness provides sources of intelligence and channels of implementation that enhance the competence of the state. Autonomy complements embeddedness, protecting the state from piecemeal capture, which would destroy the cohesiveness of the state itself and eventually undermine the coherence of its social interlocutors. The state’s corporate coherence enhances the cohesiveness of external networks and helps groups that share its vision overcome their own collective action problems. Just as predatory states deliberately disorganize society, developmental states help organize it.” (1995: 248)
Evans considered the developmental state in the sense of state support for industrial development. This is not what I analyze empirically in this study. However, I do take up his suggestion that the theory could be “broadened” beyond his chosen, narrow empirical focus on state-led industrialization. For Evans “…broadening the focus of embeddedness means that bureaucratic agencies and the personal networks that grow out of them are no longer sufficient to connect state and society” (1995: 246). Evans suggested that future research would have to consider the role of intermediary institutions such as political parties, unions and other civil society organizations representing the interests of the lower and popular classes in society as opposed to private firms and particular government departments.

Evans has continued to expand on and develop his work on developmental states and state theory and in more recent work defined embeddedness in much more general terms as “…the dense sets of interactive ties that connect the apparatus of the state administratively and politically to civil society…” (Evans and Heller 2015: 693) At the heart of Evans’ vision for a “twenty-first century developmental state” is what he has called “deliberative development” (2004: 31) or processes led by states to discover “…shared coherent goals whose concrete implementation can then be “co-produced” by public agencies and the communities themselves” (Evans and Heller 2015 :693). Unlike the twentieth century developmental states which included both democratic and authoritarian cases (Evans 1995; Leftwich 1993), neo-developmental states are necessarily “democratic developmental states” (White 1998). The work of Evans has had an impact across the social sciences and is related more broadly to research on the importance of democratic governance in policy implementation (Lam 1996; Tendler
The refined approach to embeddedness resonates with many researchers and overlaps with other concepts including “state-society synergy” (Ostrom 1996), “co-governance” (Ackerman 2003), “symbiotic transformation” (Olin Wright 2010) and the “co-production” of public policies and programs (Mitlin 2008; Vaillancourt 2009).

In order to assess whether or not anything akin to a form of embedded autonomy of rural social movements and organizations emerged during the Correa government, in this dissertation I study the “interface” (Long 2001) between government agencies and programs and sub-national rural social organizations of campesinos. Peasants, both individually and as a collectively organized social force, are the central protagonists in food sovereignty and this study analyzes whether they were able to “move” (Heller 2001) or “mobilize” (Abers and Keck 2009) the post-neoliberal state building project in their favor. If food sovereignty is fundamentally about empowering peasants or rural communities from below utilizing state policies, one must focus on relations between these social actors and the state agencies tasked with implementing agricultural and rural development policies for food sovereignty. According to Evans, the essence of “embeddedness” is in the emergence of “…sources of intelligence and channels of implementation that enhance the competence of the state” (Evans 1995: 248). As Abers and Keck put it, participatory and deliberative processes, like the 2008 Ecuadorian constituent assembly, may generate new laws or state programs but, “Institutional designs are not self-activating…if [social movements] want their decisions to have consequences, they must go beyond deliberation. They find they must break open the “black box” of the state to identify deficiencies and help government agencies do their jobs…” (Abers and
Keck 2009: 290-291). This notion of the relational nature of transformation means that methodologically it is necessary to study the “throughput” (Abers and Keck 2009: 292) of how social organizations and state agencies interact in the process of policy implementation as I will explain in the section on methodology below.

My proposition and argument about the importance of synergy between state and rural social organizations is speculative, and critics may characterize it as little more than wishful thinking. However, precedents exist in the academic literature where this dynamic has been identified and analyzed. Many of these studies have focused on Brazil between 2002-2016 under the Worker’s Party (PT) of Lula da Silva and, later, Dilma Rouseff, elected with the critical support of the MST or Landless Worker’s Movement (Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra in Portuguese). Case studies of Brazil in this period have been described as containing elements of “embedded autonomy” (Kroeger 2011) or “co-production” (Tarlau 2013) and show that such synergies can and do exist, even if they are not tension-free and can be difficult to sustain. Empirically then, the phenomena of embedded autonomy, state-society synergy and co-production are concrete phenomena but there is little question that they are “elusive” (Schneider 1998).

As Evans states, “Embeddedness was never a tension-free symbiosis”, as in practice there is often a fine line between “capture” or “rent seeking” behavior, and the public-minded or developmental nature of embedded autonomy (2010: 47). Evans has also conceded that the task of broadening embedded autonomy beyond cases of state-led industrial development associated with the twenty-first century developmental state is a much more “politically demanding task” due to the fact that “…civil society is a complicated beast, full of conflicting particular interests and rife with individuals and organizations claiming
to represent the general interest.” (Evans 2010: 49). Taking this into account I compliment theories of synergy and embeddedness with the “state-in-society approach” of Joel Migdal (2001) which considers “state social control” as potentially a “zero-sum” conflict between a government’s policy objectives and social actors, in contrast to the “mutual empowerment” (Wang 1999) underlying state-society synergy.

How much potential was there for the scenario of an embedded autonomy between rural social organizations and the Correa government to “move the state”? As I highlighted above, the constitution and 2009 Food Sovereignty Law or LORSA provide a legal framework to support a model of agricultural and rural development based on LVC’s vision of food sovereignty. The 2008 constitution is, in theory, a blueprint for the political economy of a developmental state as well. The term *fomento*, which can be translated as to “foment”, “support” or “encourage”, appears in the text of the 2008 constitution thirty times in relation to the state’s role in economic development and state-society relations. This vision speaks to what Evans has referred to as the “handmaiden” and “husbandry” roles of government in economic development, in supporting existing industrial or economic sectors in the case of the latter and taking a lead to create new industries or activities (1995: 249). This same approach is also reflected in the Ecuadorian legislation pertaining to food sovereignty, with its many references to the importance of *campesino* organizations in the construction of food sovereignty (LORSA 2009). The close relationship and support of government rural social movements also suggested that the government would be subject to pressure from below to implement the legislation it adopted. Some of the early political decisions of the Correa government, such as defaulting on and renegotiating Ecuador’s foreign debts, raising royalties on oil
extraction and raising taxes on the financial sector, suggested that the government did possess the political will to chart the post-neoliberal course necessary for instituting the kind of post-neoliberal policies associated with food sovereignty.

Though it is difficult to get an accurate picture of rural Ecuador prior to the election of the Correa government, advocates of food sovereignty argue that a shift in state policies towards the redistribution of land to small producers would be a viable rural development strategy as well. According to official data based on the 2000 census (the last agricultural census conducted in the country), and based on the definition of

*agricultura familiar campesina*\(^8\) or peasant family farming adopted by the Ecuadorian government in 2014, it was estimated that there were 3,034,440 *campesinos* in Ecuador in the year 2000 (this figure includes *all* household members), and 84.4% of farms or *unidades de producción Agricola* (UPAs), agricultural production units in English, belong to *campesinos*, while only occupying 20% of the total arable land in the country. This means that the other 16.6% of farms are agroindustry operations which use 80% of the agricultural land (SENPLADES 2014: 159). As a result of these conditions, *campesinista* NGOs have made the case that the further redistribution of land and access to other productive resources like irrigation, stable prices and credit and technical assistance would be a viable rural development strategy for Ecuador to pursue.

\(^8\) This definition proposed by the Ecuadorian state defines any farm or *unidad productiva agricola* (UPA) of less than 5 hectares in the highlands, less than 20 hectares in the coastal region and less than 50 hectares in the Amazon as peasant or *campesino* farms defined as “peasant family farming” or *agricultura familiar campesina* (SENPLADES 2014: 158).
Ontology, Epistemology and Methodology

The ontological and epistemological approach I adopt in this study is critical realism, a broad and sometimes disparate approach associated with the work of philosopher Roy Bhaskar (see Bhaskar 1978) that is less influential than interpretivism and positivism in the social sciences (Bhaskar 1978; Collier 1994). The foundational claim put forward by Bhaskar’s theory of critical realism is that there is an objective reality out there which can be understood through scientific enquiry but that it is constituted of overlapping layers which he describes as “the real, the actual and the empirical”9 (1978). In empirical social science research, while a critical realist ontology and epistemology ultimately upholds the axiomatic claim of positivism that there is indeed such a thing as objective reality, it is nevertheless skeptical, or critical, about the social scientific method and regards knowledge as mediated through the subjectivity of researchers, therefore seeing this knowledge as contingent (Easton 2010: 119). As Belfrage and Hauf put it in critical realism: “Social reality is open-ended with multiple mechanisms co-determining events, overlapping, reinforcing or counteracting one another; it is impossible to close the system experimentally in order to isolate a single mechanism as in the natural sciences. While it stipulates the existence of a material reality ‘out there’, it maintains that all knowledge about that reality, all meaning it acquires for us, is socially constructed and thus historically contingent.” (2017: 253). While critical realism does not abandon the idea of

---

9 The “real”, for Bhanskar, is the realm of objects, materiality and the causal powers of these forces on the social world, which he argues is unknowable to human beings. The ‘actual’ is what happens as these objective forces cause changes at the social and individual levels, and, finally, the empirical is what individual and collective actors experience; the subjective and inter-subjective realm in which human ontology operates and scientific theorizing takes place (1978). Bhaskar posts that these domains are nested within one another; the empirical domain nested within the actual domain, which in turn is a subset of the real domain (Bhaskar, 1978).
truth, it understands truth as contingent and subjective but also as achieved through intersubjective dialogue based on evidence drawn from empirical enquiry.

Methodologically this dissertation is a case study\(^\text{10}\) of the institutionalization of food sovereignty in Ecuador that considers these developments as a “class of events” (Gerring 2004) in the period between 2006-2016. Case studies analyze a given phenomenon in depth at a point in time and add to knowledge through description but can also serve to test or refine theories. Easton describes case study research as “…a method that involves investigating one or a small number of social entities or situations about which data are collected using multiple sources of data and developing a holistic description through an iterative research process.” (Easton 2010: 119). Drawing on the inference method of retrodution from critical realism, I use the theoretical framework I develop in chapter two to consider whether these theories “…describe the structures and mechanisms responsible for giving rise to the observable events…Unlike the positivist stress on discovering law-like relationships with predictive power, critical realists are content with adequate explanations of past events” (Tsang 2014: 176). As such, this study assesses the theoretical argument I presented above about the importance of state-society synergy considering whether “…the generative mechanism that the theory describes produces the actual events that constitute the research domain to which the theory applies” (Johnston and Smith, 2010, p. 32). (Tsang 2014: 182). The aim then is not to

---

\(^{10}\) George and Bennett define a case study not in terms of a specific historical event or an ethnography of a specific place but as “…a phenomenon of scientific interest…a well-defined aspect of a historical episode that the investigator selects for analysis, rather than a historical event itself.” (George and Bennett 2004: 17-18). In this dissertation, this “aspect” is the relationship between the post-neoliberal state and rural social organizations, how this changed during the period that I analyze, and whether anything approximating “embedded autonomy” between public programs and these organizations emerged or not, and why or why not.
rigorously test the theory of embedded autonomy or others that I draw on but instead to
use them to understand what happened in the period analyzed and identify possible causal
mechanisms rather than establish firm causal relationships with predictive power as one
would attempt to do in a strictly “theory-testing dissertation” (Van Evera 2015). My hope
is that this study adds to knowledge through description but will also be “hypothesis
generating” (Lijphart 1971: 692) and a step towards refining the theories I draw on
through future empirical and theoretical work.

This dissertation primarily employs process tracing and case study methodology
in going about the retroductive process of analysis described above. Process tracing is a
research method defined through which “…the researcher examines histories, archival
documents, interview transcripts and other sources to see whether the causal process a
theory hypothesizes or implies in a case is in fact evident in the sequence and values of
the intervening variables in that case” (George and Bennett 2004: 6). The study employs
process tracing to assess whether relationships approximating embedded autonomy or
state-society synergy emerged both at the national level and also in the three subnational
case studies. As Peter Evans argues, the study of the “…success or failure of
transformative projects depends on how they jibe with the strategies of particular firms.
An investigation of the consequences of state policy, especially one that focuses on a
particular sector, must look at individual firms and how their strategies resonate with
state actions.” (Evans 1995: 20). The case studies also allow for a “contrast of contexts”
(Collier 1993: 108) through the incorporation of the “subnational comparative approach”
(Snyder 2001) by considering the same hypothesis “…under different historical
condition” (Przeworski 2007: 478). Through the three case studies I draw upon “cross-
case analysis” to complement the “within-case analysis” of the broader Ecuadorian case as a whole (Gerring 2004: 341). Richard Snyder argues that sub-national comparative work within countries can help understand the uneven nature of national-level political developments or processes of policy implementation and are particularly suited for heterogeneous countries like Ecuador in order to assesses how national political changes have, or do not have, differential local impacts (2001: 94). The “small-n comparative approach” of combing sub-national cases within the broader case of Ecuador allowed me to extrapolate more representative conclusions about the nature of state-society relations under the Correa government.

**Data Collection**

While this dissertation is very much in conversation with ethnographic or anthropological studies of the state and government, in particular the work of James Scott, the three case studies I conducted are not ethnographic. Though I did spend a total of one or two months “in the field” researching each of the three case studies, this is not equivalent to the time required for ethnographic research. I was a participant-observer at different times during the research process and I don’t draw on observations from these experiences as a primary source of data to develop my analysis and argument as one would do in an ethnography. The main source of primary data I collected for this project is interviews with key actors, reflecting the focus of this study on embedded autonomy. The original research conducted for this study is based on interviews with key informants in public institutions at the national and local level: politicians, leaders of rural social movements and of local campesino organizations. Through preliminary discussions with researchers at the *Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales* (FLACSO-Ecuador),
through review of secondary literature and primary documents from NGOs and through news articles, I identified the “key political actors” at the national level as well as in each case study. Rather than adopting any kind of representative sampling I relied on these interviews with key political actors for the bulk of the primary information I drew upon in writing up this study. However, in particular in the three case studies, I employed further “snowball sampling” based on suggestions made by these key informants during interviews (Tansey 2007: 765). In order to triangulate the information collected, make the process of data collection more rigorous and reduce bias as much as possible, in each case study I interviewed an equal number of individuals working within public institutions, in NGOs and those working within the organizations.

The interviews conducted for this dissertation were conducted drawing on a guide of research questions of general themes and issues which is included in appendix two. All of the interviews were open-ended, at the national level as well as at the sub-national level. The interviews with the key figures (leaders of each organizations, directors of government programs, politicians) were based on the guide, based on the interview guide that is included as an appendix. These interviews led to further interviews through snowball sampling however and these interviews typically drew on the themes of the questions in the original guide but were less structured and often included questions that were tailored towards the specific context of the organizations and government programs analyzed in each case study. I conducted 101 interviews in total with the vast majority conducted in 2013 and 2014. Those who were interviewed during the research included public servants, politicians, campesino and Indigenous leaders, and officials from NGOs and bilateral cooperation agencies. In addition to these interviews, I also draw upon
participant observation in certain public events and meetings, and on a variety of primary and secondary sources, both quantitative and qualitative. I treat laws, government plans and policy documents as the official worldview of the government and triangulate these with the interviews I conducted as well as other qualitative and quantitative sources of information.

The three case studies analyzed in this study are the FAPECAFES (in Loja and Zamora-Chinchipe), the UPOCAM (in Manabí), and the Red de Ferias de Imbabura (in Imbabura and Carchí). The three organizations were selected with the intent to contrast different regions of the country and reflect the heterogeneity of Ecuador. The three cases were also selected because they all developed an explicitly via campesina project for rural development and were supported by NGOs and international cooperation prior to the election of the Correa government. At the same time, the three organizations differ with respect to their political linkages with the governing party, the kinds of crops their members produce, culture, identity and ethnicity, and the ways in which they have been linked to and used funds from international cooperation. Though they all differ in important ways, an essential commonality is that they were all involved historically in the social and political struggles for land reform and are broadly representative of the nature of rural social organizations in Ecuador as “state-led civil society” (Frolic 1997). The other criteria I decided upon for selecting the three cases was that they were all considered historically to be successful, or organizations with a degree of profile of capacity relative to other regional rural social organizations. The reason I selected what were considered historically significant or successful organizations was to be able to assess the argument about the importance of embedded autonomy or state-society
synergy. Intuitively it makes sense that this dynamic is more likely to emerge when organizations have a certain degree of capacity to influence the state and find ways to “move the state” (Heller 2001) and in theory partner with the state in transformative projects of change. At the same time, as the three case study chapters demonstrate, each organization shared a host of different challenges representative of those facing smallholder producers in different parts of Ecuador. The specific dynamics analyzed in each case also serve to illuminate the broader questions and issues driving the government’s approach to rural development and agriculture.

While I was an observer of processes in the different case studies, in some modest ways I was also an actor within the broader field of rural development that I was studying during and after the research for this study. During the research and after I worked with two of the three organizations inviting them to participate in workshops and forums I organized while I was working as a researcher at FLACSO on the role of local governments in sustainable agricultural certification. This dissertation is the final product of my experience after having lived and worked for more than a half a decade in Ecuador, first as a visiting researcher in the Rural Development Studies department at FLACSO, then a visiting lecturer at the Universidad Andina Simon Bolivar. My interactions with the professors, researchers and students coupled with my participation in numerous academic events and conferences at both institutions, were together an incredibly enriching and an important component of my intellectual process during the dissertation research process. My values are likely apparent in my choice of dissertation topic, but I include critical analysis of food sovereignty and the organizations that were part of this study, as I believe it is ultimately my job to be as critical and objective as possible in light
of my own subjectivity and inherent biases.

**Structure and Outline of this Dissertation**

In the second chapter, I present the theoretical framework of this dissertation that will provide the theoretical concepts and tools used for analysis in the four empirical chapters. I expand on the themes and issues introduced in this chapter and introduce other more peripheral concepts by reviewing the literature on the post-neoliberal turn in Latin America, food sovereignty and agrarian change. The third chapter provides a historical background that serves to place the appeals for food sovereignty within the longer history of rural social movements as an example of state-led civil society in Ecuador. The fourth chapter provides an overview of the political and policy changes with regards to rural development and relations with *campesino* and Indigenous organizations under the Correa government. This chapter will provide an overview of the emergence of Alianza *PAIS* (AP) the political movement launched by Rafael Correa as his vehicle for the Presidential election in 2006, and the relationship between the party and rural social movements.

The fifth, sixth and seventh chapters present the case studies of *campesino* organizations and explore how they have navigated the new political and policy context in Ecuador. The fifth chapter examines how the UPOCAM in the Coastal province of Manabí has been affected by the return of the state and how it has navigated its political alliance with AP. The sixth chapter examines the agroecology movement in Ecuador and the growth of producer-consumer *ferias*, focusing specifically on the case of the *Red de Ferias de Imbabura* in the province of Imbabura. The seventh chapter analyzes FAPECAFES, the largest Fair Trade and organic coffee cooperative in Ecuador. While
these chapters focus mainly on the stories of specific organizations, each chapter will also include some broader discussion of the national policies and issues relevant to each case. Each case study chapter analyzes a different campesino/Indigenous organization, its economic and political strategies, as well as the specific models of agri-food governance developed by each, and how these interact with state policies. In the eighth chapter I conclude the dissertation with a cross-case comparative analysis of the main dynamics and themes analyzed, paying attention to how they relate to embedded autonomy and the other central concepts outlined in the theoretical framework. My hope is that this study contributes to a broader plural dialogue on the topic of food sovereignty in the context of a democratic developmental state which may also generate new research questions and topics.
Chapter 2- Theory and Literature Review: “Moving the State” Towards Food Sovereignty in Ecuador?

“…a robust human freedom depends on a coalition of state and civil society that has the power to protect society against the destructive forces of marketization.”

(Block and Somers 2014: 6)

Introduction

This chapter lays out the theoretical framework that I draw upon in this study and presents the nuances of the central argument about embedded autonomy in building a *via campesina* for agriculture and rural development. It compliments and expands upon the argument I presented in the previous chapter about the importance of synergies (Evans 1996) in the process of change across state and society in constructing food sovereignty as a *via campesina* as conceptualized in the 2008 Ecuadorian constitution. The chapter is organized into four sections and each explore key concepts, grouped chronologically, and which are interrelated. I draw connections between the various theories and concepts I utilize in this study, with a close eye to the relevant debates in the social science literature of Ecuador. In the first section, I lay out how I understand colonialism, agrarian change and food sovereignty, arguing for an anti-essentialist neo-Chayanovian approach to food sovereignty, an approach which I argue is now conceptualized in much of the academic literature as a *via campesina*. In the second section, I define and discuss key concepts used in this study, including discussions of the state, state-society relations, civil society, corporatism and developmental states in the Ecuadorian context. In the third and fourth sections, I discuss the literature on neoliberalism in Latin America, its impacts across state and society, the emergence of neoliberal governance and the NGOization of rural
social organization. I also summarize Karl Polanyi’s work on the “double movement” and “re-embedding the economy” in relation to the Pink Tide or “post-neoliberal” political turn and new models of development. I conclude the fourth section by discussing the potential of neo-developmental states and various potential pathways of re-embedding the economy and markets in social and democratic oversight.

The central issue analyzed in this chapter is the question of how state-society relations approximating embedded autonomy favoring marginalized rural populations could emerge in Ecuador given the unfavorable historical preconditions for such a dynamic. Legacies of colonialism, including racism and inequality, have truncated the uneven efforts to build state institutions associated with an “autonomous” or Weberian type of state apparatus. Reflecting Joel Migdal’s “state in society” (1988; 2001) approach, I view the Ecuadorian state as marked by unequal power relations and an “absent-present” state type that made the emergence of an “encompassing” (Dekker 2016: 1) sort of democratic corporatism elusive. In discussing neoliberalism and its impacts in Ecuador, I highlight its ambiguous effects in worsening the economic situation faced by many smallholder producers while simultaneously empowering rural social organizations through neoliberal proyectismo as a form of neoliberal governance. I discuss Karl Polanyi’s work, arguing that the Polanyian problematic provides an illuminating framework for the issues analyzed in this study about whether the post-neoliberal Correa government opened space for the construction of food sovereignty as a form of Polanyian re-embedding. I conclude with the more recent literature on the relational nature of the state and state-society synergy and how it can supplement the major blind spot in Polanyi’s work which lacks a convincing theory of the state and state
power. Finally, I briefly discuss how I operationalize the various concepts I present in the theoretical framework across the three case studies by analyzing whether they were able to “move the state” (Heller 2001) in the Citizen’s Revolution period.

Part 1- Colonialism, the “Double Movement,” Agrarian Change and Food Sovereignty in Ecuador

It is fundamental to understanding this topic of enquiry by highlighting the centrality of colonialism in the contemporary Ecuadorian state society. As I describe in chapter three, since political independence in the 1820s, Ecuadorian state and society have been characterized by neo-colonial power relations. The origins of the contemporary economy of smallholder agricultural production and the “agrarian question” in Ecuador about how capitalism has transformed agriculture is also impossible to understand without taking into account the colonial origins of the agrarian structure. As Aníbal Quijano has argued, the “backwards” social relations associated with peasant agriculture including “…slavery, serfdom, petty commodity production and reciprocity” often considered “pre-capitalist,” were central in producing wealth that served to reproduce “…the axis of capital and the world market” (2000: 216). The varied forms of oppression and subjugation that have characterized Ecuadorian agricultural development since colonial times persisted and have arguably been syncretized with “modern” wage labour. The insight offered by the decolonial lens is that “traditional” or pre-capitalist social relations were integral to the economic growth of Europe associated with capitalist modernity. While colonial domination was economic, it was upheld both socially and culturally. As Quijano puts it, “The idea of race, a mental construction that expresses the basic experience of colonial
domination and…its specific rationality: Eurocentrism.” (Quijano 2000: 216). The different forms colonial subjugation took, were often attempts to destroy Indigenous cultural practices and served to reproduce capitalist domination. These legacies of colonial power relations lie at the center of neo-colonial power relations reproduced in contemporary Ecuador.

As I describe in chapter three, although Ecuador achieved formal political independence in the 1820s, these neo-colonial social relations, often described as internal colonialism, continued into formally republican times through the hacienda system and the various forms of non-waged or “pre-capitalist” systems of labour and social relations (Bretón 2015; Krupa 2010). Political independence from Spain reorganized these social relations rooted in the colonial past and continued them while non-capitalist labour relations fostered the emergence of “modern” capitalist economic sectors principally through the cacao boom on the Ecuadorian coast (Clark 1998). Following Barrington Moore Jr’s (1966) argument that economic change precedes political change, the emergence of capitalist agriculture on the Ecuadorian coast eventually led to political change with the 1895 Liberal Revolution which signaled a change in power from the predominance of highland landowning elites to the emergent coastal bourgeoisie. As I analyze in chapter three, the Liberal Revolution was the beginning of a gradual process of transition to a national-popular state, the political recognition of campesinos and Indigenous peoples and an eventual break with the gamonal power of the landowning classes in the highlands. It was at this moment wherein the “agrarian question” really emerged as a concern at the national political level and as an issue considered by political leaders. To put it in the plainest of terms, the “Agrarian Question”, as proposed by
German Marxist Karl Kautsky, considers the various ways capitalism transforms agriculture and in particular how the surplus, or profits, generated from agricultural production interact with the growth and development of other sectors (see Akram-Lodhi and Kay 2012; Banaji 1976; Byers 1977). In debates in the Second International of communist and socialist parties, some leaders favored strategic alliances with peasants and small farmers; Kautsky and others argued against this and instead for the collectivization of landholdings into large state farms in the socialist transition (see Coulson 2014). Peasants and farmers were considered conservative because of their ambiguous position of “dependent autonomy” within capitalism, being both capitalists and exploiters at once (Narotzky 2016: 302). It was for this reason that in the Russian case, richer peasants or Kulaks were targeted because of their perceived potential as a counterrevolutionary force. This argument became the orthodox Marxist position of the Soviet-aligned Third International (Mitrany 1951). The original agrarian question as proposed by Kautsky largely focused on agricultural development in Europe which meant that, like Marxist theory more generally, this original formulation was largely Eurocentric.

As mentioned briefly in chapter one, the most important alternative perspective was that of Alexander Chayanov who emerged as the most important theorist of an alternative path which Marxists derisively called “agrarian populism,” since it defended peasant production and individual land ownership. Working as a researcher and advisor in the early years of the Soviet Union, Chayanov’s work questioned the viability

---

11 Tom Brass has defined agrarian populism as “…a plebeian pro-rural politics and philosophy which argued that farmers and peasants were the economic and cultural backbone of the nation” (2007: 595).
of state collectivization in the transition to socialism. He was executed in 1937, his ideas considered counterrevolutionary. Chayanov developed a characterization of a “peasant mode of production” that he argued was distinctive from the capitalist and feudal modes of production centered on his theory of the peasant household\textsuperscript{12}. The Chayanovian path of vertical integration held that “cooperation was an ideal compromise, combining the advantages of small peasant property with the technical advantages of large-scale farming” (1966: 1x). The Chayanovian model of political economy or agricultural development in essence becomes some configuration of “peasants/small farmers + cooperatives + a supportive state” (2009: 63) and could, in theory, be compatible with a centrally planned or market economy. This was similar to Karl Polanyi’s work on the “substantive economy,” which emphasized how economic activity is co-produced through the logics of householding and reciprocity rather than just market or exchange rationality (Polanyi 1968) and his later work on “moral economy” (Scott 1976; Thompson 1991). Chayanov’s extensive empirical studies provided evidence to support his eventual argument against collectivization, and his contrary advocacy for the superior productivity of smallholders, a stance further developed by scholars following his approach (Shanin 1973; Van der Ploeg 2013).

One of the greatest ironies of twentieth-century history is that in spite of the anti-peasant doctrine of the Second and Third International and the Soviet-aligned Communist parties that adopted this position, most Marxist-inspired revolutions were not led by the industrial proletariat but were, in fact, “peasant revolutions” (Wolf 1969). In

\textsuperscript{12} As Jan Van der Ploeg puts it, one of the most important neo-Chayanovians, “Chayanov’s theory of a mode of peasant productio focused on two balances (one of labour and consumption, the other of drudgery and utility) that are to be equilibrated within each peasant farm…” (2013: 6).
the case of Ecuador, an explicit proposal for a *via campesina* eventually emerged, not inspired by Chayanov but by Marx, despite the fact that Chayanov’s writings weren’t translated into languages other than Russian until the 1960s. Speaking about the agrarian question in this period Kim Clark states, “…campesino petitions and complaints to political authorities…faithfully reproduced the labour theory of value, as formulated by the Ecuadorean left…this smallholder path argued for the central role of campesinos in the creation of wealth.” (1998: 379). The demands of Indigenous *campesinos* speaks to the long shadow cast by the work of Peruvian Marxist Jose Carlos Mariátegui (1971), whose work emphasized the pre-colonial Incan community or *ayllu* as an example of moral economy and reciprocity and formed a basis on which to build socialism (Becker 2006; Gordy 2013; Löwy 2008). In spite of Kautsky’s contention about the disappearance of smallholder agriculture, agrarian populism proved to be a much more potent political force than originally assumed and was championed by the left in various countries in some parts of the world (Argersinger 1995; Lipset 1971) and by conservatives in other parts (Brass 2007; Karaömerlioğlu 2007). What I take from this, following Paul McLaughin (1998), is that the Kautsky and Lenin Marxist conception of capitalist transformation in agriculture are both incapable of accounting for the multivariate and multi-causal nature of capitalist transformation.

In retrospect it is now clear that the original prediction of Kautsky about the impacts of capitalism on agriculture did not unfold as predicted. As Paul McLaughlin puts it:

“One of Marx’s ([1867]1976) most important hypothesis concerning the “natural” tendencies of capitalism was that accumulation within and competition between
capitalists would lead to the increasing concentration and centralization of industry. Furthermore, Marx assumed that non-capitalist forms of production, such as petty commodity production, although essential to the development of capitalism, were ultimately transitory…” (1998: 30).

However, as McLaughlin argues, Marx’s economic theories and models were based mainly on industry and no general theory of agriculture was developed (1998: 30). As a result, what Kautsky was doing was essentially trying to develop a Marxist theory of agriculture by considering “…whether or not the “tendencies” which Marx postulated for industry applied with equal force and validity to agriculture…Kautsky ([1899]1988) wrote The Agrarian Question in an attempt both to extend Marx’s analysis of capitalism to agriculture and to explain the anomalous persistence of the small holding in Germany” (1998: 30). The problem with this original attempt to apply a Marxist analysis to capitalist change in agriculture was that “Kautsky ([1899]1988) conceptualizes the question of tendencies in frame-invariant terms. That is, Kautsky does not begin by asking which circumstances—e.g., state policies, commodities, markets, technologies, regions, climates, soils, etc.— favor large farms and which favor small farms…his attempt to adjudicate this question is totally abstracted from the characteristics of particular farms and from the contexts in which they operate… in the absence of interfering forces, the larger establishment will, as in industry, tend to replace the smaller. (1998: 30-31). In sum, Kautsky’s theorization of the Agrarian Question seriously underestimated the “interfering forces” (McLaughlin 1998) in agrarian transitions as well as the political power of agrarian populism in the twentieth century.
In light of the serious flaws in the orthodox Marxist approach to the Agrarian Question, I believe that Karl Polanyi’s theory of the “double movement” provides a more comprehensive framework for understanding (1957). Even though, like any social or political theory, Karl Polanyi’s concept of the “double movement” articulated in his 1944 book *The Great Transformation* is incomplete, I believe it offers the most compelling analytical framework to understanding the uneven nature of agrarian change across national borders. Polanyi’s theory of the “double movement”, as an integral dialectic throughout nineteenth century capitalism between the liberalization of markets and political intervention to restrict markets, helps to explain the indisputable role of national governments in “…altering the rate of change” associated with capitalist transformation (1957: 37). Polanyi’s concept of a double movement, and the protectionist measures put in place across the different countries associated with it, help explain why capitalism had very uneven impacts on agricultural development across national borders during the relative “sovereignty” that national governments had over food and agricultural policies during the period of “national food and agricultural regimes” (Friedmann and McMichael 1989) which limited the power of self-regulating markets.

Karl Polanyi originally published *The Great Transformation* in 1944 with the likely intent to influence the creation of the set of institutions that shaped the international order of the succeeding period (Dale 2010). The world order shaped by the Bretton Woods institutions were modelled on the work of economist John Maynard Keynes or Keynesian economic theory (Helleiner 1996). The models and theories of Keynes contradicted the neo-classical view of self-regulating markets, calling instead for state intervention in the economy and the regulation of markets and in the post-WWII period.
This resulted in an international system granting governments autonomy to implement a whole range of economic and social policies (Blyth 2002). This international order has been called “embedded liberalism” by John Ruggie, building on Polanyi’s work, and emphasizing the political influence enjoyed by domestic governments over a range of social and economic policies. During this period governments intervened in agricultural markets to such a degree that anything approximating “self-regulating markets” became elusive in most countries, even though these policies often favored large-scale capitalist production over small-scale producers or peasants. Latin American governments implemented land and agrarian reform policies garnering mixed impacts, yet which benefitted smallholders in some cases (Kay 1989; Kay 2002). Developing country governments pushed for an extension of international quota systems in agriculture through the New International Economic Order which itself has been conceptualized as an example of “agrarian populism” (Johnson 1982). All these developments involved considerable intervention into national economies by governments made possible by the “national food and agriculture regime” that preceded the latter “global corporate” food regime (Friedmann and McMichael 1989). The national food and agriculture regimes gave governments considerable leeway in setting national policies and market protections which have been characterized as “agricultural welfare states” (Sheingate 2003) in the global north countries.

The mid-twentieth century has been described as the “golden age of land reform” (Bernstein 2007: 32) across the global south as national developmental states demonstrated how agriculture would contribute to different models of national economic development (Lehmann 1974). The intent of these processes of land reform, whether
carried out under centrally planned and capitalist economies or not, was to increase the state-led developmentalist agrarian reform process. It went hand in hand in most countries with technological modernization and the so-called “Green Revolution”\textsuperscript{13}, a progression that corresponded with the model of agricultural modernization. National governments played a central role in this process as they provided subsidized inputs, credits, extension services and other programs. The developmental paradigm of the time called for governments to foster economic modernization by providing peasant or smallholders with the “high payoff input model” whereby governments subsidized and facilitated access by peasant smallholders to new technologies and inputs to promote greater productivity, market integration and capitalization of traditional agriculture (Schultz 1964; Vernon 1998: 159). While earlier models of orthodox agricultural economics had been based more on a neo-classical model that predicted the emergence of economies of scale along the same lines predicted by Kautsky, the “high payoff input model” saw smallholder agricultural pursuits as economically viable with the right policies in place through the capitalization of smallholder farming (Thorsby 1986: 13). Research has since demonstrated that smallholder farms are more efficient than larger consolidated operations (Berry and Cline 1979; Hayami 1996). What I believe this period teaches us is that there were “multiple paths of transition” available in pursuit of agricultural modernization (Kay 1994: 22) and much depends on history and the politics of countries as well as a host of other factors.

\textsuperscript{13} In most countries, Green Revolution policies involved the widespread adaption of synthetic inputs and new hybrid seed varieties (Pearse 1980; Shiva 2016). Quantitative studies of the impacts. These changes have been quite uneven across countries (see Evenson and Gollin 2003) and while the Green Revolution did lead to significant rises in productivity in almost every region of the world while marginalizing smaller producers.
Many government policies for agricultural modernization followed Chayanov’s recommendation for vertical integration in the establishment of agricultural cooperatives to aggregate production for processing and commercialization (Worsley 1971). State-controlled marketing boards were set up to provide price stability to producers and quota schemes were developed in international trade such as the International Coffee Agreement that I touch upon in chapter 7. Examples closer to Chayanov’s vision or a “Chayonovian” path, distinctive from either capitalist modernization or state collectivization, might include Tanzania under “African socialism” (Bernstein 1981), Peru under the nationalist military regime of the 1970s (Korovkin 1990) or state-led peasant cooperatives in Nicaragua under Sandinista rule in the 1980s (Zalkin 1987). The work of Robert Bates on state intervention in agriculture and state marketing boards in Africa demonstrates how the state was used to extract the profits of producers through taxes to fund programs for state-led development and industrialization, even though these institutions were established with the intent of stabilizing commodity prices (Bates 2005; 2014). It is also understood as an example of the hypothesis of the “urban bias” these policies were seen to represent (Lipton 1977).

In Latin America however, only a few countries undertook significant land reform efforts as part of agricultural modernization and development programs, with the Mexican post-revolutionary case representing the most radical process of land reform (Vergara-Camus 2014: 58). Though there were some regions at the sub-national level throughout Latin America where important processes of land and agrarian reform were carried out in the twentieth century, for the most part the efforts of Latin American governments to spur agricultural modernization largely led to a “landlord path” (Kay...
through which large-scale capitalist and commercial farming developed out of earlier models of agricultural production. The region that has often been posed as a counterfactual to Latin America is that of the East Asian countries, including in particular Taiwan and South Korea which implemented ambitious agrarian reform policies that radically redistributed land to create a class of small-scale agricultural producers (Boetsel et al. 2013; Cameron and North 1998: Kay 2002). The East Asian trajectories of agrarian reform are considered to have been more successful\(^\text{14}\) than the processes of agrarian reform in Latin America because agrarian reform took place before the implementation of ISI policies and “…provided the basis for food self-sufficiency, raising agricultural productivity and incomes, and a growing rural mass market for the manufacturers of import-substitution industries.” (Cameron and North 1998: 52). Another key factor emphasized by Cristobal Kay was “state capacity”, which he argues was high in East Asia and low in Latin America due to the entrenched position of elites in Latin America that prevented land reform from occurring (2002; 2006). When agrarian reform was implemented in the 1960s and 1970s in Latin America, these policies were neither as radical nor as effective as they were in East Asia (Kay 2002). At the same time, the agrarian reform programs that were implemented in Latin America did provide some smallholders with material benefits with some programs like subsidized inputs, price controls, credit and agricultural extension services. Most of these programs were subsequently eliminated under neoliberalism when state supports for agriculture were reduced or eliminated in many countries in the region (Green 2003; Gwynne and Kay

\(^{14}\) Cameron and North note that agrarian reform was successful in Taiwan and South Korea because they involved more than just the redistribution of land but were implemented in tandem with “…the organization of credit, services, and marketing cooperatives as well as heavy public investment in rural infrastructure, health care and education.” (1998: 52).
2000). As I analyze in chapter three, in Ecuador, agrarian reform was perhaps more important in social and political terms than it was in economic terms where the changes were rather modest due to how it restructured state-society relations.

I would argue that one cannot fully grasp the emergence of food sovereignty without understanding it as part of a shift towards neoliberal globalization and a shift away from national development policies. By the beginning of the 1980s the global order based on Keynesianism had begun to unravel and structuralist policies associated with state-led development had fallen out of favor in Latin America with neo-classical theories becoming the emergent “neoliberal” framework in economic policymaking (Harvey 2005). The launch of the Uruguay Round of negotiations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was a watershed moment as the negotiations sought to move towards the economic liberalization of food and agriculture - a Polanyian extension of market logic (Wolfe 1998). In fact, liberalization advocates argue that the intention was to remove the “distortions” associated with tariffs and subsidies in agriculture (Anderson 2005). Agrarian reform programs associated with state-led development were halted and gave way to policies based on freeing up markets and reducing government subsidies and tariffs to favor national producers. In this period agrarian and rural social movements have proven some of the most active and outspoken challengers of economic liberalization and globalization (Deere and Royce 2009; Edelman 1999; Moyos and Yeros 2005). Agriculture in the global south was one of the first sectors where economic liberalization was applied on a wide scale even though the literature on neoliberalism focused more on the global north than on the global south (Connell and Dados 2014). When food sovereignty emerged in the 1990s with the establishment of LVC, there began
the need for a new global organization to push back against the negative effects of economic globalization on smallholder agriculture (Desmarais 2002) and in opposition to the WTO and policies of trade liberalization (Anderson 2005; Clapp 2006).

The concept of food sovereignty has continued to develop over the past two decades as an alternative proposal to the neoliberal globalization of the food system, proposing an alternative via campesina or neo-Chayanovian model of agricultural production. For example, one of the principal demands of LVC is to exclude agriculture from the World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations, an effort captured by the slogan “food is different” (see Rosset 2006). The demands and movements associated with food sovereignty are heterogeneous (see Andrée et. al 2014; Edelman et. al 2014) and there are certainly many unresolved contradictions, but overall the concept is almost synonymous with agricultural production by smallholders, family farmers or “peasants,” and it is in this regard a “neo-Chayanovian” concept (van der Ploeg 2008). While food sovereignty is centered on the “autonomy” (van der Ploeg 2008) of small-scale farmers or peasants it also invokes a very interventionist role for government in agriculture, harkening back to the “national food and agriculture regimes” from the current “global corporate” food and agricultural regime (McMichael and Friedmann 1989). For example, the framework for “integral agrarian reform” proposed by LVC demands that governments implement, … policies of redistribution, just, equitable access and control of natural, social and productive resources (credit, appropriate technologies, health, education, social security etc.)…development policies…based on agroecological strategies centered on family and peasant agriculture and artisanal fishing; trade policies that oppose dumping of products in the market and favor peasant and family farm
production oriented towards local, national and international markets; and public policies in the areas of education, health and infrastructure for the countryside that complement trade and other policies (Torrez 2011: 49).

Clearly, the vision set out here would be a tall political order for many states in the global south to implement which means that food sovereignty is a politically challenging concept.

In conceptualizing the significance of the emergence of food sovereignty Phillip McMichael has proposed that food sovereignty is the “new” agrarian question (2006: 468), centering on the political subjectivity of “peasantry” in resisting the impacts of neoliberalism and on the distinctive moral economies of peasant agriculture. Underlying much of the literature on food sovereignty is a focus on local and community autonomy and forms of moral economy and reciprocity as a peasant alternative to neoliberal globalization (Martínez-Torres and Rosset 2010; Patel 2009). On the other hand, Henry Bernstein (2014) has criticized McMichael, arguing that this creates a false peasant against capital dichotomy which is grounded in a fetishized or “essentialist” (Bernstein and Byres 2001) conception of the “peasant”. For Bernstein (2014), this framing of the agrarian question denies the fact that they are what Marxists call “petty commodity producers” existing within and often benefitting as well as being exploited within capitalist markets, rather than “resisting” capitalism by practicing peasant agriculture based on moral economies of community reciprocity and self-provisioning of food.

While I believe a via campesina can be a viable and normatively desirable path of agricultural development, I also believe one of the main shortcomings of the literature and debates on food sovereignty is that it tends to downplay the way in which
state policies remain central to demands for food sovereignty by actual rural social movements. Here I agree with the critiques of McMichael’s “peasant essentialist” or “post-modern populist” (Brass 2007) portrayal of food sovereignty as peasant autonomy. I argue that this conception is a barrier to assessing contemporary smallholders socio-economic and political strategies and considering how something approximating the principles of food sovereignty might be achieved. As an alternative to the “post-modern populist” (Brass 2007) version of food sovereignty and to the Marxist critiques of Brass and Bernstein, I suggest an approach which builds on Polanyi’s framework as an “anti-essentialist” but “neo-Chayanovian” (Van der Ploeg 2009; 2013) approach to food sovereignty. This approach understands food sovereignty as a movement to make smallholder production viable and the market as a means to the end goal of farmer or peasant “autonomy” as a sustainable livelihood (Stock and Forney 2014). Regarded in this way, food sovereignty could be either a struggle for “decolonization” and a different, post-capitalist future (Grey and Patel 2015) or may also be a petty capitalist strategy - a struggle to develop viable petty commodity producers - “capitalism from below” (Jansen 2015) or range of strategies in between these two. In short, what food sovereignty means is something that exists in context and is an empirical question that needs to be understood through empirical consideration. In defining the term “peasant” agriculture, I adopt the definition proposed by Colombian sociologist Jaime Forero-Alvarez who proposed that contemporary peasant agriculture/family farming, exists on a continuum between “…two types of family farming: peasants and capitalized non-peasants. (2013: 29). This approach proposes a definition of campesinos or peasants as a broad continuum between, on one end, subsistence producers (though today Forero-Alvarez
argues such producers are extremely rare) and on the other end, capital intensive “farmers” (2013: 35). The common feature between these two ends of the continuum is the role of family labour in the reproduction of the agricultural unit, though in more capital-intensive operations hired wage labour may play a greater role very much in keeping with Chayanov’s pioneering work on the peasant economy.

Despite the potential of alternative interpretations of food sovereignty, I would suggest that Phillip McMichael’s version of food sovereignty as peasant autonomy and a “peasant” political subjectivity has been the predominant way in which food sovereignty has been taken up and understood in the academic literature. At the extreme, this version of food sovereignty, means that it retreats into “local” resistance or what John Holloway famously proposed as “changing the world without taking power” (2002). In addition, the anti-globalization movement has been criticized for distracting attention from the need for political change at the national and global levels (Mohan and Stoke 2000). Even while much of the scholarly literature seems to either implicitly or explicitly endorse this “local” position, the actual definitions of food sovereignty reinforce Westphalian state sovereignty by emphasizing the importance of trade policy, which is governed by states (Via Campesina 1996; Via Campesina 2007). The fact that food sovereignty is a *via campesina* means that it is premised on individual land ownership (and in some cases cooperative or common ownership of land) individual plots and petty commodity production as a means towards greater producer autonomy (unlike state collectivization), which raises the difficult political question of how - as food sovereignty as a *via campesina* implies - “…individual ownership [would] be converted into collective rights?” (Agarwal 2014: 1259). As Marc Edelman has argued, if food
sovereignty is to have any future as a significant political proposal for change then it must “…go beyond scattered and mostly localized market arrangements between producers and consumers (internationalized mainly through fair trade), and work towards large-scale food system-wide reform…public policy carried out by the central state is essential” (2015: 918). Within the debates on food sovereignty, this study’s foundational concern lies with understanding how (i.e. under what circumstances) government policies can support rather than hinder these sorts of arrangements for sustainable smallholder agricultural development.

As Henry Bernstein has argued, the ambiguous role assigned to national governments in food sovereignty has made the question of the state into the “elephant in the room” in recent debates about food sovereignty (2014: 1040). I propose that the question of the role of national, as well as international governance (Burnett and Murphy 2014), represents the central political question facing advocates of food sovereignty as a *via campesina*. What I hope this dissertation will contribute to theoretically are some of the questions around state policies that support food sovereignty as a *via campesina*. The question of what government policies or governance for a *via campesina* might look like builds on recent contributions which have attempted to understand food sovereignty, not as protest and resistance, but as a new kind of “governance” (Pahnke 2014: 7) or “governmentality” in Foucauldian terms (Martin and Andrée 2017). Understood in this way, food sovereignty has many parallels with earlier agrarian populist movements in demanding protections and favorable government policies. However, it also speaks to the Polanyian problematic of how to “re-embed”: food and agricultural markets in regulation and control by small producers and the organizations representing their interests, rather
than through forms of state regulation and management of the sectors via some mix of embedded markets and supportive state policies and regulations (Barham 1997; Barthélemy and Nieddu 2007; Hinrichs 2000; Raynolds 2000). It is this approach that I attempt to develop and contribute by studying food sovereignty in the Ecuadorian case.

**Part 2- State, Society, Politics and Development in Ecuadorian Context**

In this study I adopt a “neo-Weberian” or “left Weberian”\(^1\) (Vandergeest and Buttel 1988) approach to studying politics and the state. Conceptually, I draw mainly upon Joel Migdal’s “state-in-society” approach (1988; 2001) and the “comparative institutional approach”\(^2\) of Peter Evans (1995: 19). Migdal and Evans can both be categorized as part of the “new institutionalism” in political and social science occupying a “centre ground” (Braathen 1996: 215) between structuralist or economic approaches such as rational choice and orthodox Marxism and post-structuralist/post-modern approaches. Broadly in line with Anthony Giddens’ theory of “structuration” (1979; 1984), both of their approaches consider the co-constitutive nature of state and society. I see this approach as

---

\(^1\) Vandergeest and Buttel suggest the neo-Weberian or “left Weberian” approach as an alternative to Marxist, rational choice and post-structuralist approaches while they argue all share a somewhat “instrumentalist” conception of the state and state power and all “…share a lack of attention to the political sphere more generally, a lack of attention to the complexities of power and class relations, and a lack of attention to cultural influences and change.” (1988: 685). They suggest that in such an approach Weberian theories about the state as well as theory and “theoretical models” more generally should be reconceptualized as “ideal type” since as they argue, “Theoretical models are clearly recognized to be subjective or interpretative, and may be used to “understand” but not “explain” an empirical case…The key to the neo-Weberian approach is that theory is built not simply from pre-given models, but also from empirical work. For a given case, theory is not used to “predict” but is employed in dialogue with evidence and observation to construct an analytic account and analysis of what is and what might be possible” (1988: 687-688).

\(^2\) As Peter Evans states, “…the central methodological precept of a comparative institutional approach is to ground assertions of institutional effects in the analysis of the actions of specific groups and organizations. Above all, a comparative institutional approach must avoid treating the state as a reified monolith.’ (1995: 19).
neo-Weberian rather than simply Weberian due to the fact that it is fundamentally concerned with the social constitution of states rather than treating the state as a “reified monolith,” as Evans puts it (1995: 19). As Vandergeest and Buttel put it, the original Weberian conception of the state “…conceptualized in terms of structural models needs to be broadened to include subjectivity and agency” (1988: 689) as an alternative to the Marxist debates about the relative autonomy of states from capitalist interest or orthodox Weberian approaches which have tended to treat the state as a thing rather a whole set of institutions and social relations.

The Weberian ideal type of the modern state is based on Max Weber’s theorizing about the European state in the late nineteenth century of Westphalian state and political sovereignty. Weber’s famous ideal type of the modern state is defined as a “…human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.” (1990: 38). The second element of Weber’s conception of modern state formation is the expansion of a “rational bureaucracy” vis-a-vis traditional or “particularistic” forms of authority (1968). Although this definition remains useful as an ideal type, especially due to the fact that it is near hegemonic across the social sciences, it is also problematic because of the way in which it posits the state as a “black box” or actor with a coherent logic. The Weberian understanding of the state is Eurocentric in its origins and rooted in the nature of post-colonial attempts to build new states onto which is imposed an essentially Eurocentric model of the state against

---

17 The Westphalian state is the form of political sovereignty associated with the modern state, which evolved out of the treaty of the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 that ended the ‘Thirty Years War’ between European powers and enshrined the principles of non-interference of sovereign countries in the internal affairs of other countries and thus the emergence of the modern form of national political sovereignty.
formally independent societies (Migdal and Schlichte 2005). Talal Assad’s description of colonized peoples as “conscripts of western civilization” (1992) describes the compulsory and oppressive nature of this process while others have emphasized the multiplicity of ways in which modernity, the state and political sovereignty were interpreted (Chakrabarty 2009). Instead of states conforming to the Weberian ideal type of the state characterized by high levels of “state social control” (Migdal 1998), decolonization in much of the former so-called “Third World” did not lead to the formation of such kinds of states. Instead these so-called “Third World” states were often described through concepts such as the ‘soft state’ (Myrdal 1968) or the “patrimonial”

18, “neo-patrimonial” states (see Bach and Gazibo 2013; Eisenstadt 1973). These states have been described as “extreme” cases, the opposite of the Weberian state. Evans has characterized such states as “predatory” states (1995), wherein the state apparatus is used for personal gain rather than to serve the broader public interest or promote “development”.

In this study I understand the state as: “...a field of power marked by the use and threat of violence and shaped by (1) the image of a coherent, controlling organization in a territory, which is a representation of the people bounded by that territory, and (2) the actual practices of its multiple parts (Migdal 2001: 15-16). Migdal’s definition understands the state as simultaneously disparate and variegated but also unitary in the ‘image’ or idea of the state (Migdal 2001: 15). This state “image” explains many functions of modern states (for example, “Ecuador,” as a unitary subject in

18 Patrimonialism is, broadly speaking, a form of power and political rule which there is no distinction between the public and private interests of the political leaders, the state apparatus and political life is dominated by these leaders and as a result there is no effective rule of law. This concept draws on Weber’s conception of ‘traditional authority’ based in “patriarchal” or “patrimonial” social relations and authority rather than modern forms of rule and authority (1968).
international relations, etc.) but this ‘image’, or the state as subject, is ultimately an
illusion constituted by the “actual practices” of numerous institutions, practices and
power relations which are, at the end, social relations. I agree with Bob Jessop who has
argued for a methodological approach that treats the state as, before all else, a “bundle of
social relations” (Jessop 2011) and as such, states are ultimately nested in society. Since
it is not a subject, the state does not and, indeed, cannot, exercise power. “Instead its
powers (plural) are activated in specific conjunctures by changing sets of politicians and
state officials located in specific parts of the state.” (Jessop 2011: 241-242). While
orthodox Weberian approaches see the “soft state” resulting from cultural
“backwardness” I would argue that the challenges of state consolidation have more to do
with the inequalities in the international system which have prevented the consolidation
of state capacity (Moore 2001).

It is in their empirical focus where the two versions of modernity diverge,
with Migdal focusing on the question of rule in the consolidation of state power and
Evans on the question of bureaucracy and the role of the state in development. The work
of Evans emphasizes the importance of an effective Weberian bureaucracy (what he calls
autonomy) in tandem with embeddedness, or a state with “…close ties to key social
groups…” (1995: 41), as fundamental for the basis of processes of economic
transformation in capitalist societies. This constitutes what Evans refers to as the
“developmental state” (1989; 1995). In contrast, Migdal’s work on state formation
examines the conflict between centres of power “in society” and an emergent Weberian
state authority (1988). Migdal argues that the growth of the modern state is dependent
upon the ability of governments to construct “state social control” (1988: 22). As Migdal
says, “State social control involves the successful subordination of people’s own inclinations of social behaviour sought by other social organizations in favour of the behaviour prescribed by state rules…Increased capabilities of states include and rest upon increased state social control.” (1988: 22). While Evans is interested in “mutual empowerment” and the expandable nature of political power, Migdal’s work has focused more on the zero-sum possibility of social groups losing out from processes of state building.

In contrast to the state, society is the broadest sphere of human social relations and societies are constituted by groups of people who share norms, territory, culture and linguistic ties. While states are political constructs nested in society, multiple societies can exist within the territorial bounds of a Westphalian state. This is the central problematic in the work of Eric Hobsbawm (2011) on state formation in Europe who argued that state formation typically involved the creation of a common national identity, or as anthropologist Benedict Anderson (2006) put it, an “imagined community”. In Ecuador, the demand for plurinationalism is being contested, yet its origins (see Becker 2006; Lucero 2003; Viatori 2010) emphasize the existence of different Indigenous groups or societies existing within the boundaries of the Ecuadorian state. Various societies overlap within the territorial borders of states and therefore state formation is the continuing attempt to create a body politic, the central problematic of state-society relations. As the work of Migdal demonstrates, the chronic weakness of states also meant that in order to build states, governments had to contend with an array of power centres or forms of sovereignty “within society”. It is this problem that is really at the heart of the debate over how to understand sovereignty in food sovereignty, and whether as a political
project, food sovereignty can ultimately correspond to a notion of sovereignty nested “in society,” or rather if the Westphalian state is the ultimate “power container” (Giddens 1981) of sovereignty over food and agriculture.

Society is sometimes used interchangeably with civil society, although civil society has very distinctive origins due to the Eurocentric origins of the concept (Meiksins Wood 1990). Even within the Western cannon “civil society” is a contested concept and, like other contested concepts, this contestation is nested within divergent philosophical and normative groundings of the concept. The explanatory power or analytical utility of civil society in non-western contexts has been questioned (Ekeh 1975; Hann and Dunn 1996). Countries without a liberal democratic tradition may have forms of social organization which liberals would interpret as civil society but these organizations understand themselves differently often due to their origins in “communal” rather than “associative” or “social”’ ties, as conceptualized by Ferdinand Tönnies as the distinction between *gemeinschaft* and *gesellschaft*” in German. A descriptive, non-normative definition of civil society, which is how I understand civil society in this study, lies in an intermediate realm between individuals (or the family) and the state constituted by independent social organizations.

The idea of civil society as put forward by Alexis De Tocqueville’s (2003) vision of civil society as the sphere that holds state power to account has been foundational in Anglo-American political science. The resurgence of the concept of civil society with the “Third Wave” of democratization (Huntington 1991) in particular in its early stages, adopted this conception as a normative basis to support the processes of democratization that were occurring, especially in light of the collapse of the Soviet
Union. Civil society, and the importance of strengthening civil society, became a kind of new orthodoxy in the 1980s and 1990s. Larry Diamond’s definition of civil society encapsulates this view, defining civil society as “…a realm of organized social life that is voluntary, self-generating, (largely) self-supporting, autonomous from the state, and bound by a legal order or a set of shared rules. It is distinct from ‘society’ in general in that it involves citizens acting collectively in a public sphere to express their interests, passions, and ideas, exchange information, achieve mutual goals, make demands on the state, and hold state officials accountable” (1994: 5). This understanding of civil society is of course highly compatible with the negative freedoms associated with neoliberalism. While this idea of civil society has purchase on the political right, it was also embraced by some on the political left with the idea of global civil society as a kind of Gramscian counter-hegemonic project to neoliberal globalization. As Agnes Ku has observed, this liberal view of civil society, which was embraced across the political right and left, has made “…a realm of social life outside the state” in terms of negative freedom and has given rise to what she refers to as “civil society without citizenship” (Ku 2002: 530). In the context of a region like Latin America this conception has been criticized since the origins of many forms of autonomous social organization were organized by the state, reflecting the legacies of “corporatism” in the region (Collier and Collier 1991).

Corporatism is the antithesis of the orthodox view of civil society or forms of social organization as necessarily interconnected with the state and in this regard is the inverse of how liberals describe civil society as an oppositional space in which citizens hold state power to account. Instead of emphasizing the necessary autonomous condition of civil society, the essence of corporatism is that the demands of social actors need to be
channeled into decision-making bodies within the state in the attempt to achieve consensus between different social actors (Schmitter 1974). As Phillipe Schmitter’s seminal work on corporatism argued, institutions resembling corporatist arrangements attempt to embed the state in society and solve coordination problems. Latin America is considered to be a region where corporatism has been the pre-dominant form of political organization, in the politics of most countries (Collier and Collier 1991; Malloy 1976). Studies have examined the role of the representation of labour unions, peasant and agricultural interests and business interests (Schneider 2004) in different kinds of government bodies.

The association of corporatism with fascist regimes in the twentieth century often means that the term has a negative connotation. In Latin America many accounts of corporatism simply meant state capture or mediation by particular groups rather than channels of interest representing encompassing interests or representing an effort by the state to exercise social control. There are of course a whole range of forms corporatism can take from “privatizing” to “statizing” forms of corporatist interest mediation (Collier 2005: 145). As Dekker argues, while corporatism can result in capture more democratic forms of corporatism can also function to curb “…special interests…not by insulating the state from special interest groups… [but by] channeling the interest of powerful (encompassing) interest groups toward the common good, or rather away from harm and domination.” (Dekker 2016: 1). When corporatism is not based on “encompassing” interest representation it can often devolve into state capture by interest groups, as in the concept of the predatory state put forward by Evans (1995). In many countries, including Ecuador, corporatist channels of negotiation developed but devolved into capture, or
what is sometimes called “poderes fácticos” (Roberts 2006: 137) or “factional” or “private” power dominating public or state institutions, which in the most extreme become what Peter Evans refers to as a predatory state (1989; 1995). Here, dysfunctional cases of corporatism typically converge with clientelist practices. Tina Hilgers defines clientelism in minimalist terms, as characterized by “…longevity, diffuseness, face-to-face contact, and inequality…it is a lasting personal relationship between individuals of unequal sociopolitical status.” (2011: 568). As Jonathan Fox has argued, the transition from “clientelism to citizenship” is difficult (Fox 1994) and there is certainly plenty of liminal space in between including many varieties of “semi-clientelism” (Fox 1994; Luccisano and Macdonald 2012). In the Ecuadorian case, although corporatist interest mediation have rights on paper, these have always lagged behind the enforcement of rights or people’s lived experience, resembling what Lucy Taylor has dubbed “client-ship” (2004).

The Ecuadorian state throughout most of its two-century history has been very weak with limited “state social control” over its territorial borders and limited “state social control” to draw on (Migdal 1988; 2001). It had little to no presence or authority in the Amazon region and, while in some periods it could exercise moderate “despotic” power, it had very limited “infrastructural’ power throughout much of its history (Mann 1984). Furthermore, the state has been described as elitist and dominated by particularism’, and in certain periods it reflected the predatory state rather than the autonomous state described by Evans (Andrade 2009; Clark 1998; Nicholls 2014). Add to this the neo-colonial nature of the Ecuadorian state and society, which elements of the Indigenous movement recognized through its “post-liberal” (Yashar 1999) challenge, it
remains impossible to talk about any kind of meaningful citizenship or republican or liberal political equality let alone “substantive democracy” (Rueschemeyer et al. 1992).

Ecuadorian politics and the political system have been described as a weak state with “clientelist” with personal ties of patron-client relations pervading politics across the political spectrum (de la Torre 1997; Freidenberg and Alcántara 2001; North and Larrea 1997). Historian Juan Paz y Miño (2010) has argued that populism has been used by every political party since the return to democracy in 1979 that was nearly all-pervasive across the political spectrum. The fragmented nature of social organization and politics in Ecuador meant that instead of class or sectoral forms of political organization, oppositional politics typically occurred through populism and personalistic or clientelistic ties. Populism often goes hand in hand with clientelism and though both of these terms are arguably overused and imprecise they need to be understood as a reflection of all of the various inequalities and injustices in the societies which they are ultimately both reflections of. In this study, I follow an “ambivalent” approach to populism and Cristobal Kaltwasser’s call for a “minimalist definition of populism as a “…discourse or ideology…based on a Manichean distinction between the pure people and the corrupt elite, whereby the former is seen as a virtuous entity and the latter as the source of all

19 In the work of Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Huber-Stephens on democracy, democracy is defined as more than political democracy that is more than just electoral or “procedural” is characterized by “formal”, “participatory” and “social” democracy which are interlocking and mutually facets of a democracy characterized by “substantive equality” (1992).

20 Populism is a concept of much debate in political and social science and the interpretations of the concept are typically grounded in “normative” conceptions. Though many scholars argue that populism is inherently anti-democratic I believe that populism can be a democratizing force in that it forces issues into the public arena and in the case of Latin America has served as a democratizing force since the “national popular” governments of the 1930s-1970s (Di Tella 1965). This potential of populism as a vehicle for fundamental transformation or as a counter-hegemonic strategy for radical democracy has been theorized by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (2001).
badness.” (2014: 496). In this light, populism is not seen as tied to any ideology or political position but as a form of doing politics and disposition. As James Bowen (2015) has argued, populism is a symptom of the chronically fragile state institutions in Ecuador and the challenge of overcoming populism is then the challenge of state building.

**Rural Social Organizations in Ecuador as State-Led Civil Society**

While the state in Ecuador has historically been fragile, at the same time, certain political projects did focus on state building beginning with the 1895 Liberal Revolution which, as I argue in chapter three, unevenly engaged subaltern groups in processes of state formation. Although governments were typically weak in terms of delivering on political promises the Ecuadorian state also did engage in state building in certain periods such as the Liberal Revolution and the oil boom of the 1970s that brought about deliveries on government promises. Therefore the Ecuadorian state in the twentieth century has been described as an “absent-present” state (Colloredo-Mansfeld 2007: 89) and in light of this, *campesino* and Indigenous communities in this context as a form of “vernacular statecraft” (2007) or “…a civil society built of state-designed institutions without the hegemonic control of the state” (2007: 88). As Colloredo-Mansfeld has argued, it is difficult to characterize these organizations as “civil society since the “…historic link to the state means that the resultant Andean communities in fact, fail to fit the common definitions of civil society - voluntary civic and social associations that exist outside of official state administration.” (2007: 90). My choice of the term “rural social organizations” to describe the organizations I analyze in the three case studies in this

---

21 Rural social organizations is an inclusive term I use to include the various forms of social organization that emerged in Ecuador since the 1937 Law of Comunes including Indigenous and *campesino*.
dissertation can, I think, accurately describe the organizations of small-scale agricultural producers more broadly in Ecuador. I settled on this term because of the polymorphous role these organizations have played throughout Ecuadorian history, at times playing a role closer to that conceptualized in liberal or Gramscian theories of civil society as counter-hegemonic by pushing counter-narratives and projects from outside of the state.

In Ecuador, corporatist interest mediation did function at some points (such as in the 1990s between the state and CONAIE) and corporatism was in practice blurred with “clientship” (Taylor 2004) or what Partha Chatterjee calls “political society,” a form of state-society relations in which “…people are not regarded by the state as proper citizens possessing rights and belonging to the properly constituted civil society. Rather…[they are] seen to belong to particular population groups…which are targets of particular governmental policies…Their entitlements, even when recognised, never quite become rights” (2008: 123). The predominance of clientelism, clientship and political society makes the emergence of liberal or social citizenship, democratic corporatism and more recently “post-liberal” (Yashar 1999) plurinational political order all elusive and politically challenging to construct. In sum, the Ecuadorian case includes elements of both corporatism and civil society, but is closest to a case of “state-led civil society” (Frolic 1997) which also shows characteristics of “disjointed corporatism” ” defined as “…a combination of a set of corporatist organisational features and a prevailing political modality that lacks diffuse reciprocity and remains incapable of brokering social pacts.” This reflects the result of “mutations” in the consolidation of corporatist interest
mediation (Lavdas 1997: 17). The corporatism that has existed throughout much of Ecuadorian history has often been closer to Chatterjee’s conception of “political society” and the political instability in Ecuador prevented the establishment of enduring and “encompassing” corporatist interest mediation, making them largely elusive (Dekker 2016: 1; Evans 1995: 41). As I examine in chapter three, interest representation was pluralist and competitive in Ecuador and in the 1990s became more of a “market in civil society” (Green 2012) as the different rural Federations vied with one another for influence. As a result of this mutated legacy of corporatism these organizations resorted to more militant strategies to demand attention from the state, especially in the 1990s, a situation much more in the vein of a liberal theory of civil society. However, groups in society also used institutions and the law to advance their own interests as well, even if this did not occur through the consolidation of stable channels of corporatist intermediation as happened to a greater degree in other countries in the region.

**Development and Developmental States as “Embedded Autonomy”**

Another important set of theoretical reference points necessary to understand the problematic of supportive state policies and state-society relations for a *via campesina* comes from the literature on development and developmental states. Here I adopt Gillian Hart’s proposal to understand development in two ways, at once as “big D development” or the “…geographically uneven, profoundly contradictory set of processes underlying capitalist developments’ (Hart 2001: 650), processes analyzed and theorized by the classical thinkers in political economy. The second way in which Hart argues for understanding development is as “little d development”, which she defines as the ‘…project of intervention in the ‘third world’ that emerged in a context of decolonization
and the Cold War’ (Hart 2001: 650) - a project associated with the aid programs of northern governments and international institutions aimed at supporting processes of development as modernization. This “little d development” is tied together with notions of economic growth and a teleology of forward motion towards economic growth. It is a post-WWII project of European and Western nations to promote political stability, economic growth and state building in the post-colonial nations of Africa, the Caribbean and Southeast Asia (Leys 1996; Rist 1997). It is also inextricably linked with the politics of the Cold War and the American social scientists (Latham 2011) who developed “modernization theory” (see Rostow 1959).

The Keynesian paradigm was predominant in economics in this period and developing coherent bureaucracies in the image of the Weberian ideal type was seen as key to generating economic movement from traditional to modern society and the laying of groundwork for the modernity associated with economic “take off.” This was true of both capitalist and socialist versions of political and economic modernization associated with development. In Latin America, big D development has been marked by the legacies of colonialism and the region’s subordinated position within the global order. It was connected to colonialism and associated with resource extraction and an export-oriented economic model that did not change significantly in most countries attaining political independence (see Bulmer-Thomas 2003) and was further problematized by dependency theory (Cardoso and Faletto 1979) in concert with structuralism. In Ecuador, this led to a national economy characterized by the export-oriented production of agricultural and natural resources with boom and bust cycles due to the fluctuation of global commodity prices associated first with cacao, next with banana production, and from the 1970s to the
present, in oil (Larrea 1992). The central question in Latin American development has been how to overcome their economic position within the global economy as resource-based economies through the development of other economic sectors and activities.

Beginning in the 1930s, governments of different political orientations in Latin America followed a set of policies known as structuralism (Kingstone 2010). Though structuralism reflected many of the predominant Keynesian paradigms of the day it was a paradigm that was developed in Latin America, in particular in the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLAC) or CEPAL in Spanish, headquartered in Santiago, Chile. Argentinian economist Raul Prebisch is considered the founder of this school of thought with his “declining terms of trade”\(^{22}\) thesis (1950) being a key theoretical contribution. Prebisch and CEPAL recommended that resource exporting countries reverse the decline in commodity prices that was occurring over time by implementing tariffs on imports in order to protect and stimulate domestic industry and that national governments take a lead role in development policies known as Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI). The structuralist paradigm also involved extending social welfare policies and brought with it the emergence of a larger working class and labour union movement linked to corporatist forms of interest mediation with the governments of this period, though this was uneven across countries. In terms of politics, this period has been referred to as the period of “national popular” political movements, since seen as “Latin America’s version of the social democratic compromise that evolved in Europe during the long twentieth century” involving class compromises between

---

\(^{22}\) Based on an analysis of international trade flows, the model found that international commodity prices for raw materials from former colonies tended to decline over time in relation to the rising costs of imported industrial and processed goods from Europe and North America (Prebisch 1950).
domestic capitalists and workers (Silva 2012: 7). As Ronaldo Munck puts it, the developmental states of Latin America were in modest ways “…a conscious bid to temper the free market and to create national development based on state-led industrialization behind protectionist barriers.” (2015: 434). Another aspect of this paradigm was the necessity of land reform and agricultural modernization that I analyzed in the first section of this chapter. The advent of ISI and structuralist economic policy in Latin America was a homegrown framework for “little d development” even though these policies had a mixed record in promoting industrialization (Baer 1972). As I analyze in chapter three, Ecuador’s version did not lead to significant processes of industrialization, but instead devolved into predation and cronyism rather than the development or growth of infant industries (Conaghan 1988).

The decline of state-led development converged with the post-development critique and the rise of neoliberalism. Coinciding with this, we see the rise of the post-structuralist/post-modern paradigm in the social sciences (Escobar 2011; Rist 1997). The post-development critique is suspicious of this teleological narrative of forward progress. It sees the critique and rejection of “development” was borne of both capitalist and socialist paths and grounded in a modernist Eurocentric epistemology and view of linear progress. While the post-development critique made important contributions in exposing the Eurocentric assumptions underlying the linear and teleological nature of the old development, it is my view that it has left development studies at an “impasse” (Schuurman 1993). Post-development is helpful in considering the plurality of possible versions of the “good life” and in unsettling the idea of one version of modernity, democracy or development or other worldviews and different forms of the “political” (de
la Cadena 2010). The problem is not the critique put forward but the tendency to romanticize and essentialize “the other”, which is both analytically and theoretically a problem when it comes to food sovereignty.

Theories of post-development have been influential on how food sovereignty has been interpreted and framed. The danger of this version of food sovereignty is that it makes food sovereignty as a via campesina into a “post-modern re-enchantment effort…through the romantisation of ‘the Other’…” (Gonçalves 2006: 1159). Although it is difficult to draw broad conclusions about the worldviews of the various organizations federated to LVC, I believe that most rural social movements that have adopted the food sovereignty discourse have often done so out of “…unmet needs and aspirations of those who have been left out of the gains of development” (Nanda 1999: 7). Put another way, they are the result of an “aborted modernity” (Schuurman 1993) rather than a rejection of modernity even if they are critical of some aspects of modernity. While post-development has been criticized for emphasizing “…resistance rather than transformation or emancipation” (Nederveen Pieterse 2000: 187), food sovereignty offers concrete solutions such as agroecology and a via campesina path of agricultural development. I suggest that a more constructive and fruitful route to social and economic transformation lies in a kind of “critical modernism” (Mohan and Stokke 2004), which takes seriously the various post-development injustices, including ontological ones, that have taken place, but allows space for the possibility that the “horizon of expectations” (Domingues 2009: 179) of campesino movements may be firmly within modernity while also not foreclosing the possibility that in some cases these movements may be anti-“development”, however that is understood.
As I suggested in chapter one, I believe the most fruitful way forward for food sovereignty advocates is to rethink what a developmental state for food sovereignty would look like. This rejects the strong “populist” and “anti-managerial” (Nederveen Pieterse 2000: 176) overtones of the post-development literature and instead considers an alternative to the impasse in development studies and proposes new forms of “interactive governance” between state and non-state actors in the construction of food sovereignty principles (Hospes 2014: 126). With regards to food sovereignty, the challenge smallholder producers face is often one of governing markets so that they produce more favorable outcomes for smallholders. In contrast to the anti-authoritarian and anti-managerial streak in post-development, “…the problem is not that the state sees too much, which is [James] Scott’s concern, but that it sees too little” (Corbridge 2005: 18).

As I suggested previously, I believe the most fruitful option for advocates of food sovereignty is to consider the literature on the developmental state (Evans 1995; Leftwich 1993; Kohli 2004) and how a “state for food sovereignty” (Clark 2015) could be constructed. Authors who have analyzed developmental states focus on how to develop rational and capable bureaucracies that can carry out the policies of their respective governments. Building on this approach, Gordon White has argued that developmental states must be able to carry out “three basic socio-economic functions: regulative, infrastructural and redistributive. White’s three functions comprise the integral parts of the construction of how recent work has defined “state capacity” or “capability” (Andrews et. al 2017). Peter Evans defines this state capability or bureaucratic autonomy as “…organizations characterized by meritocratic recruitment, reward for long-term service, sustained and predictable funding of operations, and the fostering of
organizational cultures that transcend narrow, parochial interests” (Evans, 1995: 59).

Leftwich argues that while the handful of “developmental states” in existence in the twentieth century varied greatly in terms of regime types and constitutional forms, they did show similarities across their “character and capacity of the regime,” emphasizing “…the legitimate authority and consolidated power of the state, its political will, developmental determination and bureaucratic capacity” (2005: 579). The construction of this capability took various political forms in the twentieth century including both democratic and authoritarian developmental states.

Most of the notions outlined here of state capacity are broadly in line with the Weberian definition of modern states. Evans argues, however, that while developmental states may be autonomous from powerful groups and interests in society, they are not “insulated” (1995: 12) but “embedded” in society through ties with different social actors. As Evans puts it, “Embeddedness provides sources of intelligence and channels of implementation that enhance the competence of the state. Autonomy complements embeddedness, protecting the state from piecemeal capture...” (1995: 248). Along similar lines Gordon White suggests that in a democratic developmental state, forms of corporatist intermediation need to occur through “…institutionalized access (through parties and other organized channels)” rather than through clientelist mechanisms (White 1998: 23) or personalistic ties.

Within the literature on the developmental state there are cases where states have been successful in promoting social and economic transformation, cases where states have been unsuccessful and cases where state power has been used in highly destructive or detrimental ways. Peter Evans’1995 book *Embedded Autonomy* is an important
contribution to theorizing the role of states in economic development. Evans argues that the combination of a robust civil society or private sector together with a coherent and non-corrupt state apparatus explain successful cases of state-led development. James C. Scott is more critical of the developmental state in his book *Seeing like a State* (1998), highlighting cases where developmental state policies were unsuccessful and even disastrous. Scott argues that many well-intentioned state interventions which impose one-size-fits-all models as examples of “high modernism” fail because they don’t take into account the importance of local realities and the practical knowledge of local people or what he calls “metis” (1998). Scott argues that these failures are more extreme in authoritarian states where civil society is weak and cannot resist or alter the imposition of state policies “from above” (1998). Scott however does not rule out the possibility that states can play a developmental role but argues that in order for the state to do so it must take into account the reality of “metis” (1998). Ultimately while diverging in important respects, Evans and Scott draw one similar conclusion: that without strong counterparts in society, developmental state actions and policies are unlikely to succeed.

Evans has argued in recent writings on the developmental state that the “old” industrial development policies applied in East Asia and elsewhere are less viable due to the changes at the international level associated with neoliberal globalization that have reduced the policy space available to governments to implement industrial policies. He suggests that the twenty-first-century developmental state must be a “capability-enhancing state” (2010) rather than a state focused on fostering the development of domestic industry or particular economic sectors. He describes a state possessing a much broader mandate and what the difficult and all-encompassing task of, “…constructing
shared coherent goals whose concrete implementation can then be “co-produced” by public agencies and the communities themselves.” (Evans and Heller 2015: 693). Following this expanded perspective on the development state, embeddedness is understood as “…the dense sets of interactive ties that connect the apparatus of the state administratively and politically to civil society…” (Evans and Heller 2015: 693) and that produce what Evans calls “deliberative development” (2004: 31). Migdal’s focus on conflict and the challenge involved in establishing “state social control” also can offer constructive insight into why “mutual empowerment” (Wang 1999: 234) or positive-sum power relations emerge in some cases, and why zero-sum relations exist in other cases.

As I will analyze in the last part of this chapter, theoretical accounts on alternatives to neoliberalism in Latin America have recognized that the old model of state-led development was too top-down and ineffective due to its “high modernism” and a democratic neo-developmental state could be an improvement on this earlier top-down approach. The question is: how can neo-developmental states partner with the actors advocating for and implementing the agricultural and rural development initiatives associated with food sovereignty play a developmental or “entrepreneurial” (Mazzucato 2015) role in strengthening a via campesina approach to rural development? In a 1999 article, Anthony Bebbington pointed to this possibility stating that “Evans argued that forms of state-business interaction can create industrial viability in East Asia, so too certain forms of state-civil society-market-campesino interaction can create rural viability” (2030). Here Evans suggests that future research would have to consider the role of intermediary institutions such as political parties, unions and other organizations that represent the interests of the lower and popular classes in society which is what I take
Part 3- Neoliberalism, Governance, NGOization and the “Countermovement” in Latin America

Latin America is well-known for being the region in which neoliberal reforms were pioneered (see Green 2003; Gwynne and Kay 2000; Saad Filho 2005). The ascendency of neoliberal policy prescriptions became known as the “Washington Consensus” (Williamson 1994; 2003), due to the origination of many of the ideas in international institutions like the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) headquartered in Washington (see also Babb 2013). Neoliberalism is one of the most used concepts in the social sciences in recent decades and scholars have argued that it has been overused and can lose analytical purchase if one does not clearly define it (Fine and Saad-Filho 2017; Thorsen 2010). In this study, I build on Eduardo Silva’s understanding of neoliberalism in the Latin American context which sees the adoption of neoliberalism in Latin America as part of the “double movement” proposed by Karl Polanyi. Silva understands neoliberalism primarily as attempts by governments to create a “market society” by subordinating “…politics and social welfare to the needs of the self-regulating market economy” (2012: 11). Polanyi’s original definition of self-regulating markets is very much in line with the definition of neoliberalism offered by David Harvey, which emphasizes the role of the state in restricting the regulation and social or democratic control of markets (2005). Rather than simply critiquing neoliberalism, I also strive to explain how neoliberalism transformed state-society relations and politics in ways that had surprising effects. Here I concur with James Ferguson who argues that critical social science analysis needs to move beyond treating “neoliberal” as a synonym.
for “evil” and, as he puts it, understand how “…fundamentally polyvalent the neoliberal arts of government can be” (2009: 174). As Ferguson argues, it is important to understand neoliberalism as a process of “creative destruction” (Harvey 2007) that can have unexpected and unintended consequences, which I argue produced a range of contradictory results.

An issue that has been explored in the literature on the neoliberal period is the shift from the more corporatist forms of interest mediation to what has been called “neo-pluralism” (Oxhorn 2004). This shift was associated with the return to democracy in many countries throughout Latin America (Diamond 1999; Prezworski 1991; Linz and Stepan 1996). Even though this process was uneven, the transition to democracy transformed state-society relations across the region. The shift towards neo-pluralism also led to atomization and fragmentation in many societies with the destruction of forms of corporatist organization associated with ISI that were undermined by deindustrialization in many countries (Murillo 2000). It also involved the implementation of “decentralization” policies where local or sub-national levels of government were given new jurisdictional authority and powers (Cameron and North 2000; Oxhorn et. al 2004). In Latin America state reform processes typically involved “…privatization, decentralization and delegation of provision of public services to private sector and civil society actors…” (Zurbriggen 2014: 345). As an alternative to the corporatist model of politics and state-society relations, international development cooperation efforts were aimed at strengthening civil society. In the place of earlier development policies based on state-led development, the new paradigm that emerged could be described as “neoliberal governance”.

91
Neoliberal governance can be defined as primarily concerned with how government or the state can mobilize “…agents, movements, energies, and cultures outside of the state…whether civil society figures as the “partner,” “zone,” or “source” of government, these programs rest on a hope in civil society – a hope that it holds the solutions, innovative forces, or instructive ethics essential for efficient and effective delivery of services that were once the sole province of the welfare state” (Villadsin and Dean 2012: 401). These ideas took the form of new paradigms in decentralization of the state, the privatization of social welfare delivery and the decentralization policies implemented across the region as part of a package of ideas associated with the New Public Management (NPM) paradigm (Paladino 1999). These changes led to “polycentric governance” through the networking, partnering and self-organizing governance practiced by liberalized market forces and civil society organizations” (Yu and He 2011: 3). This shift has been captured by the idea and phrase “government to governance” (Jessop 1997: 574). Bob Jessop conceptualizes the shift from government to governance in the context of neoliberalism and argues that with the shift towards steering, and away from command and control strategies associated with Keynesian political economy and the welfare state, things have moved toward what he calls the “destatization of the political system” (Jessop 1997: 574). Jessop describes governance as “…a movement from the central role of official state apparatus in securing state-sponsored economic and social projects and political hegemony towards an emphasis on partnerships between governmental, para-governmental and non-governmental organizations…” (1997: 574).

Governance is a notoriously “fuzzy” concept but has now become the most widely used term in the social sciences (Torfing et. al 2012: 2). In this study, the idea of
governance is indispensable given the fundamentally “relational” way in which I have conceptualized the state and the focus of this study on the developmental state and the potential of “mutual empowerment” (Wang 1999) between state and society. At the most fundamental level the subject and focus of this study is on governance and more specifically “interactive governance” (Kooiman 2009) as I described above. In this study I understand governance as “…steering and control of society and the economy through collective action that aims to achieve common goals” (Torfing et. al 2012: 2). As Torfing et. al emphasize, the “…interactive format for governing is an important case of governance, but it is not all of governance.” (2012: 4). Governance, and especially the agenda of “good governance” associated with the promotion of social capital by the World Bank and international development cooperation, has been rightfully criticized along the lines of James Ferguson’s critique of the “development industry” as an “anti-politics machine” (1994), as deeply depoliticizing or anti-political.

As William Walters has argued, the problem with much of the theoretical work on governance is that it “…seeks to redefine the political field in terms of a game of assimilation and integration. It displaces talk of politics as struggle or conflict. It resonates with “end of class” and “end of history” narratives in that it imagines a politics of multilevel collective self-management, a politics without enemies” (Walters 2004: 36). With this in mind however, Walters also argues that the new focus on governance is also positive in that it also encompasses a dynamic of “…reorientation of political studies towards the “mechanics” of governing, a question that had for some time been the specialized preserve of public administration…” (Walters 2002: 32). Walters stresses the need to be critical of the concept of governance, even if it offers a significant lens on the
study of politics, and that it is important to maintain a critical eye on the forms of antagonisms inherent in concrete cases of governance. At the same time, I also agree with Stuart Corbridge and his co-authors who have been more critical of the literature criticizing the “good governance” literature saying “…that a degree of romanticism about politics is present in the claims of those who shout loudest about the dangers of depoliticization. These claims speak to an account of politics that makes reference to what we shall call an ‘ideal outside’, or a world where politics can be properly constituted and made to secure its desired effects.” (2005: 153). Instead they argue for a “less enchanted” approach that “…is geared to thinking of politics as a continuum of practical and not always additive actions around the construction of social and economic relationships and forms of rule.” (2005: 153). Ultimately the study of governance needs to be empirical, but it is in interpreting particular cases where it becomes important to return to these theoretical debates to assess the utility of different approaches.

There are of course many different types of governance. Bob Jessop describes three distinct modalities of governance, including exchange (typically associated with the market), command (associated with the State) and dialogue (associated with networks) (2003: 102). In short, there are many forms of governance which makes it even more important to be critical of the concept as well as to specify what kinds of political and social relationships define a given case study of governance in practice. As Jessop argues, the literature on neoliberalism and governance has sometimes overemphasized the power or reach of the “old” Keynesian and developmental states and he has argued that these types of states also had to rely on forms of “steering” and were not only characterized by the kind of “command” model of government typically associated with them (1997).
However, Jessop also states that the elimination of many of the earlier institutional channels associated with state corporatism has made governance into the new “corporatist concertation” (2003: 103). Here, the question of “meta-governance” or the “governance of governance” emerges as a key question for governments and in public administration. Jessop defines meta-governance as the question of how “Political authorities (at national and other levels) are more involved in organizing the self-organization of partnerships, networks and governance regimes” (Jessop 1997: 575).

Whereas the state was central to the old corporatist model, the decentering of the Westphalian model, that has been integral to neoliberalism, make meta-governance a challenge for states that have been shaped by neoliberal reforms. In many parts of the global south, neoliberal reforms restricted the role of the state and civil society, while non-governmental organizations (NGOs) replaced or became a “surrogate state” (Brass 2010), as opposed to the global north where states have more capacity and could play a more effective role in “steering” and “meta-governance” (Jessop 1997).

The shift from state-led development strategies to more bottom-up, localized and decentralized development interventions and the new importance of NGOs in delivering services, has resulted in a large literature in the social sciences about the role of NGOs in development. The literature on the impacts of NGOs has been quite contradictory regarding the conclusions drawn. Gerard Clarke concludes that evidence exists for a whole range of outcomes including depoliticization as well as the strengthening of civil society (Clarke 1998). This literature is too extensive to provide an exhaustive review of here and I will only highlight a few key issues that are most relevant to this study. First off, it is important to distinguish between NGOs and what is referred to as “grassroots
organizations” (GOs) or sometimes as people’s or popular organizations. Laura Macdonald makes the further distinction between “international NGOs” who work around the world implementing development projects or in running advocacy campaigns, “national NGOs”, which are organizations located in global south countries that are involved in advocacy or implement development projects, and “popular organizations” which, often in contrast to the first two, are accountable to a particular membership or constituency (1994: 277-278). Bebbington and Farrington (1993: 200) also emphasize the importance of this distinction between NGOs and “grassroots organizations,” what I refer to inclusively as rural social organizations in this study. Of course, real world cases are often messier than these ideal types and in practice there is often overlap in practice between NGOs and GOs. The concept of “NGOization” (Alvarez 1999), which has a somewhat negative connotation, describes cases of groups that began as GOs or representative member organizations, and became NGOs when they started to receive funding from international development cooperation agencies or governments.

Beginning in the 1980s, and as an integral part of neoliberal reforms and the post-Cold War processes of democratization, civil society experienced a resurgence which coincided, and was often conflated with, the rise of NGOs, which, as I analyze in chapter three, mushroomed in Ecuador in the 1980s with cutbacks or elimination of government programs. As Jean Grugel has put it, the boom in NGOs represented a “romancing” of civil society (2000). The question of how donors and governments could develop civil society became the subject of debate in the academic literature and in policy circles (see Hadenius and Uggla 1996). NGOs and development cooperation have played a significant role in building civil society during the so-called “associational revolution” of
the period (Biekart 1999; Edwards and Hulme 1995). The hope of international development donors was that the thickening of civil society that was encouraged by international institutions contributed to local democratization through new forms of collaboration between NGOs and local governments (Reilly 1995). The idea behind the promotion of civil society has various aims but the idea of “supporting civil society” (Macdonald 1997) was in theory to promote “political development” (Fisher 1998) by strengthening civil society with the end goal of improving the quality of citizen participation within politics.

One of the main features of the rise of civil society was the broad agreement across the political spectrum about the role of civil society in development and in the implementation of a whole range of social and public policies. As Gillian Hart (2001) has noted, the post-development and orthodox agenda associated with neoliberal globalization converged in their rejection of the old state-led development model. The promotion of civil society and the idea of bottom-up or grassroots implementation of policies and programs gained a kind of hegemony across the new right and left (Green 1990; McIlwaine 1998; Mohan and Stokke 2000; Seethi 2001). The reality is that the impacts of this shift were very mixed and led in contradictory directions. While NGOs, as part of civil society, were typically defined in opposition to the state, “…the notion of global civil society disregards the role of the state in funding and influencing NGOs. On the other hand, according to the underlying ideology, the civil society actors and the donor bureaucrats belong to opposing parts in a binary opposition—the state versus civil society. In this conventional perspective the state is represented as “opponent,” thus producing an image of the NGO world that places NGOs outside the influence and power
The reality is that NGOs are not neutral and as Macdonald has argued, they are conditioned to varying degrees by the political interests of the governments or other actors they are funded by and the kinds of relationships with states in the global north and south and also represent various political ideologies and projects (1994: 281). In this regard it is difficult to come up with one theory through which to understand the impacts that the emergence of NGOs as a rebirth of civil society had across various cases even though there are several key perspectives that emerged in the academic literature.

One strand of argument that can be identified in the literature has been critical of the rise of NGOs and the “NGOization” of development cooperation as well as civil society organizations. Others have argued that NGOization created a new layer of elites (Hearn 2001; Kamruzzaman 2013) or reproduced certain kinds of inequalities (Baillie-Smith and Jenkins 2011). Evelina Dagnino has argued that there was a “perverse confluence” of the neoliberal discourse about civil society and the growth of progressive social movements demanding the extension of citizenship (2003: 218). The recognition of certain social and cultural rights, in particular Indigenous rights, has been referred to as “neoliberal multiculturalism” (Hale 2002) or in the Ecuadorian context “multicultural market democracy” (Bowen 2011). A number of scholars also described the resurgence of civil society and the boom of NGOs as a form of depoliticization, or a new form of “governmentality” in Foucaudian terms, or the promotion of new forms of social control and self-regulation (Rose 2000; Sending and Neumann 2006), or in Marxist terms, as agents of “imperialism” (Petras 1997).
On the one hand, other studies have pointed to the Gramscian counter-hegemonic or potential of civil society as an oppositional realm within a liberal state as advancing progressive politics. While the above authors have talked about NGOs and NGOization in terms of depoliticization, some authors have argued it had the opposite impact. Empowerment was not completely empty so that disempowerment, its opposite, was a common outcome of development cooperation assistance. NGOization of civil society sometimes lead to the development of new political forces or even directly funding political protest (Boulding 2014), or at least more effective political advocacy and lobbying by new coordinating NGOs representing particular interest groups or sectors (Gurza Lavalle and Bueno 2011). In research on Brazil, David Brown has done large-n analyses of voting behavior and projects working in environmental conservation. He did find a correlation between NGO projects and voting for the left (2003; 2008). However, there is still no consensus in the literature because NGOs are such a catch-all category that evidence is very contradictory (Clarke 1998). However, NGOs working across various areas, especially those with a focus on a rights-based discourse, have managed to shape and reshape policy agendas, because as Sujay Ghosh states, “…whenever people acquire more rights under particular circumstances due to the shift in existing power relations, the matter becomes political. It happens when NGOs seek to alter various aspects of state power: both by confrontation, or indirectly, through bargaining and compromise.” (2009: 482-483). So, while NGOization as a form of depoliticizing governmentality is certainly a phenomenon that seems to have been empirically verified, development cooperation assistance through NGOs can also have the opposite impact.
Considering agricultural and rural development specifically, Bebbington and Farrington argue that, “NGOs operate with a concept of participatory agricultural development that goes beyond concepts generally expressed in farming systems and participatory research literature…Instead participation has a political resonance, implying an effort to strengthen peasant organizations, and to enhance the rural poor’s capacities for self-management and negotiation…In many cases such a combination of productive and organizational initiatives can increase the impact of the project and strengthen the organization simultaneously. The aim is to establish financially and administratively self-sustaining rural organizations.” (1993: 206). In the context of Ecuador in the 1980s to 2000s, as I analyze in chapter three, it seems that NGOs actually sowed the seeds of the post-neoliberal turn in a range of ways. Though further historical research would be necessary to establish firm causal relationships, organization from below actually did empower some groups to challenge neoliberalism in Ecuador, where much of the impetus for the alternative, anti-neoliberal vision of rural development that would emerge in the 1990s came from NGOs, often directly supported by funds from international development cooperation (Chiriboga 2014). For example, as I analyze in chapter three the Mesa Agraria, which eventually lobbied for the inclusion of food sovereignty in the 2008 constitution, operated with important funding from international development cooperation donors (Giunta 2014). In short, neoliberal reforms paradoxically sowed the seeds of social forces that would later challenge neoliberalism but also depoliticized and demobilized these forces in other cases, which builds on Ferguson’s (2009) call to understand the complex impacts of neoliberalism rather than taking an overly determinist approach.
I now address an issue and concept that I make reference to throughout this study which is that of the rural development model of the neoliberal period in Ecuador which I refer to as “projectism” or “proyectismo” in Spanish. The term project comes from the marketized model of the grant-based funding model which gives money to NGOs on a project basis which has conditioned their operations around “project implementation” (Charlton and May 1995: 239). This idea emerged during the research for this dissertation as a central feature of the rural development model in Ecuador prior to the Correa government. What happened in the neoliberal period in Ecuador was the creation of markets in rural development where various actors competed against one another to receive funds from multilateral and bilateral donors, i.e. “projectism”. As Maia Green has argued in the context of neoliberal reforms in Tanzania, public funding for development projects involved “…the creation of markets in services” “a contractor to government. Market relations and enterprise models, through competitive tendering and the sale of services, structure the organization of local and national civil society where organizations compete to become development contractors” (Green 2012: 310). As Green argues, this led to the establishment of a “market in civil society” (2012: 322) with the boom in NGOs that occurred with economic liberalization. This created “…a niche in which organizations achieving categorisation as civil society can potentially flourish….local NGOs assume a facilitation role in relation to communities as agents and subjects of development interventions, a role previously assumed by district officials and by representatives of village governments.” (Green 2012: 311). As Bretón (2008) argues in the case of Ecuador, a “non-paradigm” emerged in rural development with “…as many rural intervention models as there are development agencies…with an astonishing
number of these agencies operating simultaneously [in peasant communities].” (2008: 599). Bretón argues that this model only led to fragmentation and inefficiency instead of change in a particular direction or “development”, something which came up throughout the research for this dissertation.

The increasing fragmentation and polycentrism which came to characterize the neoliberal era, particularly in the context of Ecuador’s weak state, raises a whole host of new issues. While the original intent of these programs was to strengthen or build the capacity of civil society which would then be able to deepen democracy and participate in political parties, its effects were quite uneven and arguably went in quite disparate directions often at the same time. To a great degree this was an unintended effect of neoliberalism and the “feckless pluralism” or “radical polycentrism” (Houtzager 2003:6) that the third wave of democratization ended up generating (Carrothers 2002). Many democracies in Latin America, and in particular in the Andes: Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia and Peru, experienced the breakdown of institutionalized party systems that would subsequently lead to the emergence of new political forces (Mainwaring 2006) leading to what has been referred to as “non-party systems” (Sánchez 2009), as traditional party systems collapsed with very different outcomes in different contexts. The breakdown of party systems allowed social movements to usurp political parties as the legitimate representatives of society (Hochstetler and Friedman 2008), as was the case with social movements in Ecuador in the 1990s. In short, the impacts of the so-called Third Wave of democracy in the region were mixed with some countries moving towards relatively new party systems like in Chile, Brazil and Uruguay, and a complete
breakdown of party systems and a crisis of the democratic system in the Andean countries (Levitsky and Roberts 2011).

As I described earlier in this chapter, the concept of Karl Polanyi’s “double movement” is considered to be a market-driven or economic phenomenon, but as Polanyi’s work emphasized it is impossible to separate the political and economic realms so the double movement always has impacts in the socio-political realm. What I am suggesting here is that the countermovement in Ecuador was not just a reaction to the economic impacts of neoliberalism but also the model of neoliberal governance associated with proyectismo which proved ineffective and unable to resolve the problems of smallholder agricultural producers or for that matter the social, economic or political problems of the country more broadly. All of the organizations I profile in the case studies in this dissertation were critical of neoliberalism not just because of its negative economic consequences but because of the inadequacies of proyectismo at providing long-term solutions beyond the short-term project cycles. Due to the “market in civil society” described by Green (2012), NGOs were generally “structurally positioned…[as]…project implementers within the interlocking policy cycles of governments” (Charlton and May 1995: 239). The problem with this model was that it led to some advances in more innovative or successful projects due to greater embeddedness in local communities, as Liisa North and John Cameron have put it in the context of Ecuador, and this model led to a paradox of “rural progress, rural decay” (2003). In short, the proyectista model of rural development was not able to solve the problems facing smallholder producers after the abandonment of state-led agricultural development programs of the agrarian reform period and, consequently, demands for a
“return of the state” in agricultural extension, rural development and in regulating became the natural response and political position of organizations representing smallholder producers.

As I have emphasized previously, Ecuador has historically been characterized by the “strong society weak state” (2001) dilemma raised by Migdal but the reforms associated with neoliberal reforms only exacerbated and led to increasingly intense political dysfunction across the region wherein Ecuador represents one of the most politically unstable countries in the 1990s and 2000s. This speaks to a broader problem that has been characteristic of neoliberal globalization, namely the coordination problems that have resulted from the movement from a statist to a polycentric model. The fact that demands for food sovereignty policies coming from rural civil society are so state-centric reflects the fact that despite all of the shortcomings of the “old” developmental state or structuralism, mechanisms for international cooperation or global governance are simply not in place to effectively manage many of the problems these organizations face. As Scholte puts it, “...a dispersion of activities does not necessarily entail a diffusion of power...Decentralization...has also been a context for considerable concentration of power in certain states and social circles. As a result, today’s globalizing world confronts critical democratic deficits” (Scholte 2004: 42). Along similar lines, Jesse Ribot has criticized the impacts of “democratic decentralization” associated with the good governance agenda that can even be a form of “enclosure” as the “…privatization of public powers” are delegated to “NGOs, customary authorities and other private bodies” forced to compete with local governments (Ribot 2007: 47). To play an effective role in “steering” or “meta-governance” (Jessop 2003) and to achieve collective or public goals
democratic government still matters, but neoliberal reforms had the effect of reducing rather than improving the capacity of many states to even carry out these functions exacerbating political instability in the process as well.

To sum up, demands for the “return of the state” (Silva 2009) that animated the social mobilization opposing neoliberalism in Ecuador and elsewhere in Latin America need to be understood not only in the context of the economic shortcomings of neoliberalism but also in light of the shortcomings of neoliberal governance. As Keck and Von Bulow have put it, the demands of these movements was not for autonomy from the state but “…have pressured national governments to change public policies or to implement existing ones have never been ‘anti-government’” (Keck and Von Bulow 2011: 285). In light of the failures of NGOs and neoliberal governments at generating effective kinds of meta-governance, many have suggested the need to rethink the role of the state in development. As Akbar Zaidi has argued, “Although prone to many pitfalls, institutions of the state are at least accountable to citizens, unlike NGOs, who have very little accountability and responsibility to anyone but their donors…Because of their limited scope and reach, NGOs are no alternative to state failure. The only alternative to state failure, which is indeed endemic, is not privatization, the market, or any new or alternate paradigm, but the state itself” (1999: 270). “Neoliberalism” became what Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe call an “empty signifier” which is key to developing political antagonisms that can be used to win elections and unite disparate and diverse coalitions of voters (2001). The dissatisfaction with neoliberalism was social, economic and which explains the attempt of the Pink Tide to resurrect the developmental state.
As I discussed in the previous section, the neoliberal period transformed the state politics but it also transformed Latin American societies and civil societies. As I argued above, the role of NGOs or support from development cooperation did not automatically depoliticize social movements in all cases and actually had the opposite effect in many cases. The shift towards a more “polycentric” kind of state and political order associated with neoliberalism empowered certain actors as well, such as the Indigenous movement in Ecuador and the new political space opened up by neoliberalism, as I analyze at the end of chapter three when I discuss the rise of anti-neoliberal social movements. For example, the 1980s in Ecuador has been described as the “decada ganada” or “decade won” due to the thickening of social organization that occurred throughout the decade (Ramon 1992). There came an upsurge in social organization and organizations rallying around civil society, especially in pro-democracy movements in the countries around the region which were coming out of dictatorships (Foweraker 1995; Escobar and Alvarez 1992). While the demands of many of these social movements were not rooted in new issues, some issues did emerge that had historically been marginalized or downplayed, including environmental degradation, women’s and gay rights movements. These newer movements that emerged alongside the rejection of neoliberalism would be seen in the popular protests in many countries that overturned governments in Ecuador and would foreshadow the election of the Pink Tide governments as part of Polanyi’s double movement (see Silva 2009).

For Polanyi, the “double movement” is an intrinsic feature of capitalism and even though the rise of the “self-regulating market” was facilitated by legal and institutional
change underpinned by neo-classical theories of political economy, Polanyi described “countermovements” in precisely the opposite terms arguing that policies for economic protection and social welfare typically emerged as a reaction that was “…spontaneous…and actuated by a purely pragmatic spirit…[and]…not due to any preference for socialism or nationalism on the part of concerted interests…” (1957: 141).

On the other hand, re-embedding as a political question, was ultimately about how to establish greater democratic or social control over economies and markets, a “political project” of re-subordinating the economy to social control (Dale 2010: 198; Vančura 2011: 3). If the double movement is an inherent feature of capitalism, it is the task of political leaders and social movement leaders to lead projects to re-embed economies by establishing socialism or some other alternative to self-regulating markets. The election of anti-neoliberal, left-wing governments across the region has been described as an undergoing “post-neoliberal” shift in politics, affording new models of development (Burdick et. al 2008; Grugel and Riggirozzi 2012; Macdonald and Ruckert 2009). In terms of political economy, these governments have proposed new models of economic development and social welfare characterized by a more prominent role for the state implied in the theories of “neo-structuralism” (Sunkel 1993) or “neo-developmentalism” (Leiva 2008; Wylde 2007). In the context of Argentina, Jean Grugel and Pia Riggirozzi argue that the election of Nestor Kirchner in 2003 represented a shift toward neo-developmentalism which they define as “…an ambitious, if sometimes vague and ad hoc, strategy for growth, and managing growth, based on macroeconomic prudence, moderate state intervention and reindustrialization…it also represents a new strategy of social inclusion based economically on a state-led revival of domestic markets and politically
on a renewal of populist strategies of social conflict management…” (2007: 106). From
the outset, the Pink Tide was characterized mainly by political strategies of “class
compromise” and reforming the existing order rather than a total break with it
(Sandbrook 2007; Przeworski 1985)

The post-neoliberal turn in the region needs to be situated within the broader shift
away from the Washington Consensus and the push by mainstream development
institutions to foreground social and institutional questions which the good governance
and social capital agendas represented (Bebbington et. Al 2006; Fox and Gersham 2000).
As Adrian Leftwich puts it, the new focus on good governance emerged with the
recognition that if “…clumsy state intervention in the economy…[was] central to the
developmental malaise, then democratisation would surely ensure that they would no
longer be able to get away with it.” (Leftwich 2005: 581). As Fernando Leiva has argued,
the neo-structuralist vision put forward by the CEPAL and advanced as an alternative to
neoliberalism was “…acutely aware that those traditional forms of political
representation that prevailed under the ISI developmentalist state from the 1940s to the
1970s…exhausted themselves” and that “…neoliberalism’s sole reliance on market-based
coordination” had proven untenable and as well as new economic policies, politics and
the role of the state also had to be redefined (2008: 166). Along similar lines, Grugel and
Riggirozzi have asserted post-neoliberalism is both a set of “…political aspirations
centered on ‘reclaiming’ the authority of the state to oversee the construction of a new
social consensus and approach to welfare” and “…economic policies that seek(s) to
enhance or ‘rebuild’ the capacity of the state to manage the market and the export
economy in ways that not only ensure growth but are also responsive to social needs and
citizenship demands” (Grugel and Riggirozzi 2012: 2-3). While the political changes associated with the election of Pink Tide or new left governments are certainly significant, the process has never represented anything amounting to revolutionary change. As Laura Macdonald and Arne Ruckert have argued, “post-neoliberalism” should be understood not as a total break with all aspects of neoliberal orthodoxy but can best be defined as “discontinuity within continuity” with neoliberal capitalism (2009: 7).

Building on this conception, I argue in this chapter, the post-neoliberal turn opened up new political space for policy experimentation, new forms of doing politics and new models of development in the region and is better understood as an opening for “symbiotic transformation” (Olin Wright 2010).

**The Contemporary Polanyian Question of “Re-embedding”**

The central research question of this study about the ability of the “post-neoliberal” government of Rafael Correa to implement agricultural and rural development policies modeled on food sovereignty reflects the contemporary “Polanyian question” (Sandbrook 2011: 416). In developing this dissertation and its central research questions, I have often come back to Richard Sandbrook’s proposal for different strategies and pathways to re-embed the economy in the global south in the context of post-neoliberalism (2011). For Sandbrook the contemporary political question from a Polanyian perspective is “…how can we re-subordinate the economy (market forces) to society (protective regulation and social norms, especially solidarity norms) in order to advance the prospect of freedom and ecological sustainability?” (2011: 416). An important insight of Polanyi’s work is that all markets are “always embedded” since human psychology and social relations are ultimately “social” in nature, though in a “self-regulating market” these social relations
are ultimately “always embedded markets” (Block 2003). This is where the political question of “re-embedding” as proposed by Polanyi, comes in. How to go beyond the “double movement” becomes the central political question raised by Karl Polanyi’s work.

Sandbrook proposes that there are three strategies which, while employing different means, all attempt to re-embed the economy to social control: socialism, social democracy and communitarian pathways which he argues all come with their own “dilemmas” in practical political terms (2011). Sandbrook starts off discussing socialism, which he associates with the “actually existing socialism” or the “bureaucratic collectivism” or “bureaucratic authoritarianism” (Harrington 2011) of the twentieth century. Sandbrook argues that “actually existing” socialism was not democratic and in Polanyian terms was “disembedded” from social control even if it was governed by a logic of redistribution. Discussing the case of the Bolivarian Revolution in Venezuela as an example, Sandbrook argues that the dilemma of this model of re-embedding is “…the challenge of reconciling genuine participatory democracy with a pre-ordained plan of human liberation.” (Sandbrook 2011: 430). The second way in which Sandbrook argues economies can be re-embedded is the social democratic path which he argues involves attempting to manage the divergent tendencies in the double movement “…the egoism and material motivations of market behavior, on the one hand, with the altruism and solidarity of community” (2011: 439). This version of re-embedding markets or the economy does not totally transcend the double movement by eliminating capitalism but manages the antagonisms inherent in capitalism through Keynesian economic management and redistributive taxation and social welfare programs. The dilemma associated with the social democratic path is that the gains associated with redistribution
will always be threatened by the political influence of capitalist interests which will try to undermine the gains for working and lower classes. The third path proposed by Sandbrook, and perhaps the understanding of embeddedness that is most commonly associated with Polanyi, is that of communitarian or the “moral economy” version of re-embedding. This path is associated with the forms of integration proposed by Polanyi including reciprocity and house holding (see Polanyi 1968) and related to the concept of “moral economy” (Scott 1976; Thompson 1991) and this interpretation had an influence on the field of peasant and critical agrarian studies. Sandbrook argues that while this may be an option in areas where the state is absent, and people are forced to cooperate, it leaves the broader self-regulating capitalist economy intact (2011).

In contrast to Sandbrook’s interpretation that characterizes all of these political strategies as potential pathways for re-embedding, Hannes Lacher (2007) has argued that Polanyi’s work is characterized by an ambiguous conception of capitalism, sometimes implying that state regulation can equal re-embedding and at other times implying that re-embedding is necessarily anti-capitalist; what Lacher calls the “hard” and “soft” versions of Polanyian re-embedding (2007). Lacher’s characterization appears to conceptualize hard as the “purer” form of re-embedding or that re-embedding necessarily means overcoming the capitalist double movement. As Gareth Dale (2010) has argued, Polanyi’s work was ambiguous about this question because Polanyi’s views changed throughout his life which makes it difficult to define a clear definition of re-embedding or embeddedness. What is clear is that Polanyi was in the end a democratic socialist even if he appreciated the contradictory ways in which the affects of capitalism could be ameliorated through the double movement. Fred Block and Margaret Somers have
defined Karl Polanyi’s vision of democratic socialism as “...a moral social democracy supported by vigorous democratic participation from civil society” (2014: 6). Polanyi’s own vision was never fully fleshed out as a distinct model and the best blueprint we have is his contribution to the “socialist accounting” debate of the early twentieth century (see Bockman et. al 2016; Polanyi 1922). Polanyi’s blueprint was that of a socialist economy where worker cooperatives and federations of cooperatives realized production and distribution (Polanyi 1922). Interestingly, this model overlaps with Chayanov’s proposal for “vertical integration” of individual peasant farms united through “unions of regional and national cooperatives” forming “…gigantic unions that embrace hundreds of thousands of small producers.” (1966: 268) as a model of federalist democratic socialism.

Central to Polanyi’s vision of re-embedding or of an embedded economy are processes of “internal oversight” performed by self-organized, member-based organizations, such as federations of producer cooperatives and processes of “double accounting” where these different actors would negotiate economic transactions with one another (Dale 2010: 22). While the Polanyian democratic socialist model of re-embedding has never characterized a national economy in its totality, it is reflected in many examples such as cooperatives and other initiatives related to the social economy and his influence has been very important in academic work on the social economy (Corragio Laville 2003; Mendell 2010) particularly for Latin American theorists (Cattani 2004; Corragio 2014; Corragio et. al 2014). Most relevant to this study is the literature that has considered different kinds of markets or “embedded markets” (Hebinck et. al 2015; Van der Ploeg et. al 2012). “(E)mbded markets” as alternative agri-food chains which are “embedded or (‘nested’) in normative frameworks (and associated forms of
governance) which are rooted in the social movements, institutional frameworks and/or policy programmes out of which they emerge…they are markets with a particular focus (sometimes underpinned by a specific brand, or a specific quality definition, or by relations of solidarity, or specific policy objectives, etc).” (2012: 139). The role of a neo-developmental state in fostering or enabling these “embedded markets” is essentially what I would argue state-supported food sovereignty consists of in practical terms.

My interpretation of Sandbrook’s characterization is that all of the proposed pathways could be viable processes of re-embedding economies and markets to greater social control despite their various dilemmas. I also believe, however, that rather than existing as three distinctive strategies the three could overlap in actually existing cases. Take for example the way in which the Correa government defined its political project as “twenty-first-century-socialism” and “socialismo del buen vivir”. In the 2013-2017 Plan Buen Vivir, the country’s development plan, the ultimate objective of socialismo del buen vivir is

“…to defend and strengthen society, work and life in all its forms. The first step is to guarantee equitable access to goods, opportunities and conditions of life, in order to ensure that individuals, communities and future generations enjoy lives of dignity without causing irreparable harm to nature. Good Living is a day-to-day effort. It demands the construction of a plurinational people's state that protects the interests of the majority, and which has the capacity to govern itself and change the current model of capitalist domination.” (2013: 22).

It is interesting to note that Polanyi’s thinking had a direct influence on figures who were ministers or involved in other ways in the Correa government and there are clear
Polanyian overtones in this definition (León 2016; Orbe et. Al 2016). While this definition is certainly vague and open to interpretation, it arguably contains strains of the three different pathways of re-embedding proposed by Polanyi. It invokes the role of the state “defending” and “strengthening” society as in the social democratic and communitarian pathways, elements of Polanyian democratic socialism with references to the “protection” of society and also the eventual goal of “changing” the “model of capitalist domination” as in the socialist path of re-embedding (2013: 22).

In theory, the model of socialism of *buen vivir* posits that attempts to re-embed the economy through state regulation (the social democratic route) could also open up space for communitarian re-embedding and some elements, if more in theory rather than in execution, of the democratic socialist path proposed by Polanyi. As I argued in the first chapter, food sovereignty is often understood as “peasant territory” or “autonomy”, essentially as communitarian re-embedding through substantivist or moral economies (Sandbrook 2011). However, these phenomena are threatened by the self-regulating market so in order to protect them from the “redistributive” and “protective” mechanisms of the state (the social democratic pathway of re-embedding) is also a precondition for food sovereignty due to the need to regulate markets on a widescale. Food sovereignty would necessitate a combination of the social democratic path (neo-structuralist political economy in the Latin American context) as described by Sandbrook with government measures aimed at strengthening embeddedness based “communitarian” social relations (2011). The practical challenge of combining elements of the social democratic, the federalist socialist model and communitarian forms of re-embedding with a social democratic path was the challenge the Correa government faced in implementing state-
fostered food sovereignty. Here, in contrast to neoliberal governance, the neo-
developmental state must take a role in a “steering” role in planning the scaling-up of the
\textit{via campesina}. This necessarily transcends the “command” (Jessop 2003: 231) form of
governance most traditionally associated with state power and the “old”
developmentalism, central planning or social democracy. As I put forward following Otto
Hospes in chapter one (2014: 125) “a state \textit{for} food sovereignty” (Clark 2015), or public
policies for food sovereignty would need a focus on state-society relations or “interactive
governance” (Torfing et. al 2012) as well as meta-governance. The role of such a neo-
developmental state is distinctive from the traditional developmental state because as Yu
and He put it, “…if …[the] state wants to play such roles in governance and meta-
governance, it has to dethrone its own supremacy, reflexively decentralize its power to
civil society and the market, and build partnerships with them.” (Yu and He 2011: 5). In
order for the policy framework adopted by the Correa government with the 2008
constitution to be activated and actually achieve its objectives, civil society must be
activated in constructing the objectives of the development Plan Buen Vivir which were
centered on “state building” rather than “governance” (Yu and He 2011) which as I
analyze in this study proved a major challenge and tension in the chapters ahead.

The reason I believe Polanyi’s work is so useful as an analytical framework is
because it overcomes what Nancy Fraser calls the “critical separatism” of contemporary
social science, addressing what she characterizes as the “tripartite” global crisis which
she argues includes ecological destruction, financialization and the squeeze on social
reproduction (2014: 542). Another strength of Polanyi is the non-teleological nature of
his approach which responds to the decolonial challenge better than other Eurocentric
social science frameworks (Munck 2015: 437; Özveren 2007). Polanyi’s body of work has problems though, two of which I will briefly highlight here. The first problem is what Nancy Fraser describes as the “grammar of social conflict” (Fraser 2014: 550) implied by the “double movement”. While Fraser endorses Polanyi’s theory, she argues that “…struggles around labour’s commodification were actually three-sided: they included not just free marketeers and proponents of protection, but also partisans of ‘emancipation’, whose primary aim was neither to promote marketization nor to protect society from it, but rather to free themselves from domination…Such actors vigorously opposed the oppressive protections that prevented them from selling their labour power.” (2014: 550). I agree with Fraser’s call for a “triple movement” that considers struggles for emancipation, sometimes against oppressive forms of protection (2014: 551). Fraser’s assessment on the importance of including this third dimension of social power should be included in any Polanyian analysis.

The second issue, which is a challenge for anyone drawing on Polanyi to understand processes of political and institutional change, is that Polanyi’s work does not offer a robust theory of political power or of states. Polanyi largely treats the state as a “black box” in his discussion of the double movement and does not discuss how the countermovement moves through the state (Dale 2010: 76; Goodwin 2018: 1272). Here I agree with Goodwin’s (2018) suggestion that future scholarship drawing on the concept of the double movement needs to move beyond a “unidirectional” state-market divide and adopt a “multidirectional” conception of the double movement. As Goodwin states, the state-market dichotomy needs to be transcended and replaced by a conception of the double movement as:
“…a complex, multidirectional process which involves continuous and contested interactions between state and society. From this perspective, democratic states have the capacity to accommodate, dilute or repress demands for protection, while countermovements have multiple political paths to follow, including routine and contentious forms of political action. Within this formulation, countermovements are not limited to shaping the design of laws and policies, but also to influencing their enforcement and implementation.” (Goodwin 2018: 1273).

As I argue in the next two sections, I believe Polanyi’s blind spots on these two fronts can be supplemented by drawing on work that has considered the state-society interface including (Fox 1993; Borras 2001). In line with the neo-Weberian approach I described above, these approaches don’t treat the state as a black box considering how countermovements move through the state which is essentially what I analyze in the three case studies in this dissertation.

**The Pink Tide: An Opening for “Symbiotic Transformation”**

The Pink Tide was receding by the mid-2010s and at the time of writing the region has shifted politically with center-right parties being elected in many countries and in Ecuador Correa’s successor Lenin Moreno moving to the right after being elected on a platform of continuity. While it is very difficult for Latin America to change its structural position in the global economy as a region that exports primary commodities, there is arguably a lot that national states could still do to make societies more just and democratic. Steve Levitsky and Ken Roberts define the parties of the left as “…political actors who seek, as a central programmatic objective, to reduce social and economic inequalities. Left parties seek to use public authority to redistribute wealth and/or income
to lower-income groups, erode social hierarchies, and strengthen the voice of
disadvantaged groups in the political process” (2011: 5). The literature on the Pink Tide
is often polemic as interpretation of the period is shaped by different political and
normative commitments. Those taking a more centre-right liberal, or what I refer to here
as an anti-populist position, have advanced the unhelpful “good versus bad left”
argument pitting radical populists against social democrats (Petkoff 2005; Castañeda
2006). To a degree these anti-populist authors make similar arguments in terms of
political economy and the concept that the populist governments are “rentier” states
(Remmer 2012; Weyland 2009). In the literature on Ecuador in particular, many political
scientists who have analysed the Correa period have been critical of the Correa
government, arguing that its populist politics led to a “plebiscitary” style of politics has
led to an erosion of democracy (Conaghan 2011; de la Torre 2013). To the left of these
critics, there are those who have argued that these governments have not really
challenged the existing order at all. This position could be referred to as an anti-capitalist
or anti-developmentalist position encompassing both Marxist critiques of the Pink Tide
governments (Webber 2011; 2017; Petras and Veltmeyer 2009) and analyses drawing on
political ecology to criticize the “neo-extractive” policies of these governments
(Gudynas 2013; Misoczky 2011; Svampa 2015). While these authors overlap with the
Marxist critique their position is often politically closer to Gustavo Esteva’s “autonomist”
approach (2001; 2015). Both positions see neo-developmentalist in negative terms
rather than as a political opening as I propose here.

What unites both the anti-populist liberals and the anti-developmentalist left
authors is their criticism of the Pink Tide governments as the agents of authoritarian neo-
developmental capitalism as the vehicle for extractive capitalism. Criticizing these
governments from the left, Webber argues, for example, that these governments failed to
transform society because left parties and social movements lost sight of the “class
struggle” and “a revolutionary horizon of transforming capitalist society in its totality”
(2017: 290). However, it seems to me there is no evidence to suggest that this kind of
political horizon was in the minds of most people who voted for the Pink Tide
governments, even for the more stridently “socialist” governments of Ecuador, Venezuela
and Bolivia. While Webber and others have been critical of the Pink Tide governments
other self-identified Marxist intellectual acolytes for the Pink Tide governments seem to
converge in some of their thinking with the path of “symbiotic transformation”. The
proposals of Michael Lebowitz (2006), Heinz Dietrich (2012), Alvaro García Linera
(2006; 2008) and Atilio Boron (1995) seem to posit that the old path of taking power
through the state, either democratically or through revolutionary change, and the
implementation of a centrally planned is no longer a viable Marxist political project. As
Heniz Dietrich, the thinker who coined “twenty-first century socialism” has put it,
“Planning by itself is not socialism…the new socialism of the twenty-first century is
ccharacte by participatory democracy and a democratically planned equivalence
economy.” (Dietrich and Franco 2012: 61). These authors seem to put forward the idea
that a contemporary Marxist path does not imply revolutionary political change or a
centrally planned economy but something both more piecemeal and as well as more
bottom-up and participatory than “old left” ideas of socialism. These ideas seem closer to
Eric Olin Wright’s work on “real utopias” and his argument that the greatest possibility
for change lies in “non-reformist reforms” (2010) which consider concrete strategies of
how to transform what *is* into what *could be*.

I am not doing justice to the nuances of either of these positions with this characterization but the purpose of this exercise is just to situate how I see my approach and argument and that it is analytically more helpful to think of the post-neoliberal turn as an opening for “symbiotic transformation” as put forward by Erik Olin Wright. I think of this approach as critically supportive of the objectives of the Pink Tide governments but most importantly as empirically grounded, in that I am most interested in describing and trying to understand the period, the organizations and processes I studied in Ecuador in order to understand why or why not they fail to fit into ideal types or theories or normative concepts like *buen vivir*, neo-developmentism and the like. Instead of seeing the post-neoliberal period or left turn as an opening for either post-liberalism, socialism for the twenty-first century, *buen vivir* or any of the other ideal types and normative concepts debate in the literature, I am more interested in simply analyzing whether the period opened up any possibilities for change and what the barriers to moving in a post-neoliberal direction were. In this sense, Macdonald and Ruckert’s characterization of “discontinuity in continuity” (2009: 7) with neoliberal capitalism is more in line with how I understand the period.

With this in mind, I suggest here that conceptually the period can be understood as a political opening for “collaborative problem-solving experimentalism” (Olin Wright 2010: 254) since I don’t believe the objective conditions existed for anything other than capitalist neo-developmental states and reformist class compromise. Olin Wright proposes this pathway as one possible strategy of several in the *Real Utopias* book and that, historically, symbiotic transformation was associated with social democratic and
reformist political strategies. As Olin Wright states:

The basic idea of symbiotic transformation is that advances in bottom-up social empowerment within a capitalist society will be most stable and defendable when such social empowerment also helps solve certain real problems faced by capitalists and other elites...Forms of social empowerment are likely to be much more durable and to become more deeply institutionalized, and thus harder to reverse, when, in one way or another, they also serve some important interests of dominant groups, solve real problems faced by the system as a whole. (2010: 240)

The important thing to note about the path of symbiotic transformation as well as reflecting a strategy of transformation which involves synergies between state and society is that it does not challenge the existing order, at least in the short run. The concept also implies “…that movements in the direction of a long-term metamorphosis of social structures and institutions in a democratic egalitarian direction is facilitated when increasing social empowerment can be linked to effective social problem-solving in ways that also serve the interests of elites and dominant classes.” (2010: 253) resonating with Michael Lebowitz’s observation “that socialism does not drop from the sky” (2006).

What I am proposing here is that instead of understanding the Pink Tide as a political moment where anti or post-capitalist alternatives were ever really on the table, the period is better understood as an opening for symbiotic transformation which was seized upon in some cases and truncated in others. In the Ecuadorian context, the Correa government was elected due to the political vacuum generated out of the political instability of the counter-movements against neoliberalism as I analyze in chapter three. At the beginning of the Correa government during the 2008 constituent assembly, elected
with the support of the social movement or “movimentista” left (Andrade 2012) and as I describe in chapters three and four, these movements attempted to influence the 2008 constitution. The framework put in place in the 2008 constitution is without a doubt a visionary blueprint for a pathway of transformation. However, as Pablo Andrade has argued, the whole exercise of the constituent assembly was the “reign of the imaginary” in that the constitution is contradicted by “actually existing” Ecuadorian society and politics. The consensus that has emerged with the adoption of buen vivir as an official state discourse in Ecuador became a new shorthand for state-led development and is largely emptied of the significance of its contents which is lamented (Lalander 2016; Caria and Domínguez Martín 2014; Walsh 2010). The hope is that the contribution of this study emerges through describing and analysing the actual processes of policy implementation and politics in the post-neoliberal era. By focusing on the processes of change and arguing that, at best, the post-neoliberal period represented an opening to “symbiotic transformation” or non-reformist reforms within an otherwise inhospitable context, this study hopes to illuminate whether the political space that appeared to have been opened up with the post-neoliberal turn brought about the nascent possibility of a state-supported via campesina as food sovereignty and what factors either helped to facilitate or hinder this process. In the next section I provide an outline of how I believe Patrick Heller’s approach of “moving the state” (2001) as well as the other literature which has focused on the relational nature transformation across state and society offers more practical methodological insights to understanding how the Polanyian countermovement moves through the state.
“Moving the State” Towards State-Society Synergy as “Re-Embedding” in Post-Neoliberal Ecuador

This study analyzes whether the Correa government could implement rural development policies that reflected anything akin to a via campesina for rural development as food sovereignty as laid out in the 2008 constitution. At a basic level level, the “broadening” of embedded autonomy beyond state-led industrialization to consider whether synergies or mutual empowerment between the Correa government and rural social organizations after the post-neoliberal turn. The proposed pathway for state-led food sovereignty as a via campesina in Ecuador called for the kind of development model laid out in the 2008 constitution, wherein a supportive state is coupled with a synergistic relationship that would have to be developed between campesino organizations and public policies and is based on existing theories on the role of the state in agrarian change (Borras 2001; Fox 1994). The problem is “How can state action block or encourage the broadening and strengthening of organizations…” for the “coproduction between state and societal actors” (Fox 1996: 1089) based on “mutual empowerment” across state and society (Schneider 1998; Wang 1999). The policy framework for food sovereignty that Ecuador adopted, modelled on a via campesina for rural development, would require these state-society relations to be successfully activated.

As I asserted above, the model of state supported food sovereignty as necessitating state-society synergy could represent a pathway of Polanyian “re-embedding” based on a combination of the “social democratic” path of market regulation and a neo-developmental state as well as elements of “communitarian” and “democratic socialist” paths (Sandbrook 2011). This study is concerned with understanding the processes of these pathways of re-embedding. In supplementing the lack of a theory of
political power and the state in Polanyi’s work, Patrick Heller’s work identifies the preconditions that allow for the successful “moving of the state” by organized social forces which he identifies as “institution building” and an effective Weberian state (2001:133), high levels of “organizational capacity and cohesiveness” (2001: 132) of organized working-class groups in civil society and ties linking these groups in civil society to “left-of-center political parties” (2001: 132). Along similar lines, Heller proposes that the more successful cases he studied of “moving the state” were characterized by “…party-social movements relations have generated functional synergies between institution building and mobilization” (2001: 134). With regards to the case of the Landless Worker’s Movement or MST in Brazil, Anthony Panhke argues that rather than only resistance or protest, the MST does not just disrupt the existing order but provides functions of “governance” (2014:7) through “order-providing” activities what he calls “self-governmental resistance” (2014: 19). In order for the neo-developmental model of state to be activated social organizations must assume a role.

Ecuador at the beginning of the Correa government seemed to have some of these pre-conditions in place even if unevenly so. As I analyze in chapters three and four, important political linkages did develop between rural social movements and the AP governing party at the national level and the social movement Federations representing smallholders both during and after the 2008 constituent assembly. In this sense, the political conjuncture at the beginning of the Correa government seemed to have the three pre-conditions of a successful case of “moving the state” (Heller 2001). In each of the case studies I analyze the schema includes a comparative analysis of the following factors: Participation by each organization in state institutions and bodies; Informal
(extra-congressional) activities and strategies of each organization; participation in formal/electoral politics; the capacity and autonomy of the organization and the impacts and capacity of the state programs interfacing with each organization.

The methodology of selecting three different cases of smallholder organizations in different parts of the country allows for a comparative institutional analysis of the empirical specificities of particular cases, at the “interface” as proposed by Norman Long between the government’s policies and particular smallholder organizations. As Long argues, interface analysis must counterpoise “…the voices, experiences and practices of all the relevant social actors involved, including the experiential ‘learning curves’ of policy practitioners and researchers.” (Long 2001: 66). The case studies entail studying the “interactions” across state and society (Long 2001) which is complimentary to embedded autonomy and the state-in-society approach. Methodologically, the case studies involved analyzing and contrasting their perspectives on different issues in order to triangulate the data collected and identify divergent perspectives on different issues. As Norman Long puts it, interfaces imply spaces of interaction between different actors and in order to be studied require “…a methodology that counterpoises the voices, experiences and practices of all the relevant social actors involved, including the experiential ‘learning curves’ of policy practitioners and researchers” (Long 2001: 66).

Along similar lines, Joel Migdal states that “…the state-in-society approach points researchers to the process of interaction of groupings with one another and with those

---

23 A definition of Long’s concept is ‘…a critical point of intersection between lifeworlds, social fields or levels of social organization where social discontinuities, based upon discrepancies in values, interests, knowledge and power, are most likely to be located.’ (2001: 69)
whose actual behavior they are vying to control or influence...” (Migdal 2001: 23). From a practical standpoint, in doing the research for this study, it was in these interface spaces that I moved in as a researcher and in which the research questions I analyzed and the processes of change I studied were nested.

Conclusions

This dissertation considers whether the policies and programs implemented by the Correa government in Ecuador did or did not reflect the concept of food sovereignty as defined by LVC. This study analyses whether state supported food sovereignty emerged under the Correa government and what were the factors that either hindered or fomented such state-society relations. This chapter presented the ways in which I understand key issues and concepts employed in this study in relation to this central question. I began this chapter by arguing that the emergence of food sovereignty is best understood as a product of Karl Polanyi’s “double movement” that characterizes capitalist societies and economies. This theory holds that as agricultural production has become subordinated to “self-regulating markets” (1957) “countermovements” against the market emerged as government policy measures put in place to “protect” producers from the impacts or course of free markets. These measures have altered the rate of agricultural development and this evident by the divergent paths of agricultural development across countries and between regions (for example, Latin America compared with East Asia). The persistence of “peasant” production and the emergence of food sovereignty is not easily explained by the original “Agrarian Question” posed by Karl Kautsky (1899) which took a reductive view of the impacts of capitalist development in agriculture. I argued instead that the differential rate of agrarian change across national borders is better accommodated by
Polanyi’s theory of the double movement in capitalist societies. The national capitalist states that were associated with the “national food and agricultural regimes” (Friedmann and McMichael 1989) have been chipped away at unevenly since neoliberal globalization came into the ascendant in the 1980s. Calls for “sovereignty” over food and agriculture by peasants and smallholder agricultural producers need to be understood in this context.

The recent empirical and theoretical literature on food sovereignty has begun to shed greater light on the contradictions in food sovereignty discourse namely the tension between Westphalian state sovereignty and plural or communitarian sovereignties. This has led to an impasse in debates about food sovereignty which Hospes (2014) has suggested could be overcome by considering new forms of agri-food governance which cross state and society and I explained why I adopted this approached to food sovereignty in studying the Ecuadorian case. I defined the approach I adopted a neo-Chayanovian one and argued for an anti-essentialist approach that goes beyond the “peasant essentialism” (Bernstein and Byres 2001) of earlier waves of peasant studies scholarship and considers the empirical specificities of cases. I proposed that the political question facing this neo-Chayanovian path was to construct a developmental state based on Peter Evans’ concept of “embedded autonomy” for rural development strategies characterized by food sovereignty as a via campesina as Evans’ proposal for “broadening” embedded autonomy beyond cases of industrial transformation (1995) to consider the dynamic of “state-society synergy” (Evans 1996) more broadly.

I presented the neo-Weberian approach to studying the state and politics I employ in this study which does analyzes the constituent parts of states rather than as a unified
subject or actor and that is methodologically focused on the interactions across state and society. I argued that one of the main challenges to the emergence of state-society were the origins of rural social organizations (campesino and Indigenous communities and their regional and national Federations) as a case example of state-led civil society and “disjointed corporatism” (Lavdas 1997). This disjointed corporatism prevented the emergence of a hegemonic national organization elusive, with the exception of the “neo-corporatism” achieved by the CONAIE in the 1990s and the decline of the CONAIE and rift with the Correa government prevented the emergence of embeddedness during the post-neoliberal turn. Though at some points in history these organizations have conformed to liberal theories of civil society in pressuring government from below or Gramscian theories of disputing the hegemonic order but at other times have been closer to Partha Chatterjee’s concept of “political society” (2008). The decline of developmental states and corporatism with the shift towards neoliberal governance in Latin America exacerbated this situation as the different Federations of rural communities in Ecuador competed against one another as part of the “market in civil society” (Green 2012) that characterized what I defined as neoliberal “projectism” or the NGOization of rural social organizations in Ecuador that characterized the neoliberal period. I argued that NGOization in Ecuador had uneven effects as it did not depoliticize rural social organizations as some in the literature have argued occurred and actually had the opposite affect and helped to sow the seeds of the eventual demise of neoliberalism with the rise of the proposals put forward by the Pink Tide governments. The central argument of this study is based on the assertion that there appeared to be latent potential for “state-society synergy” (Evans 1996) between the post-neoliberal Correa government and rural social
organizations that would have favoured the construction of a *via campesina* for agricultural development strategies, in line with the vision laid out in the 2008 constitution and 2009 food sovereignty law. In the last part of the chapter I proposed that the post-neoliberal political turn or Pink Tide in Latin America raised the Polanyian “political question” of how to “re-embed” markets and economies to social and democratic oversight and control. I presented and discussed Richard Sandbrook’s proposal for three potential pathways to re-embed economies including “socialist, social democratic and communitarian paths” (2011). I discussed the political vision of the Correa government and argued that it combines elements of all three of these strategies and argued that the vision of food sovereignty it adopted would require a combination of a “democratic developmental state” associated with the social democratic path of re-embedding described by Sandbrook and elements of the communitarian path. I concluded by arguing that the Pink Tide and the case of the Correa government in Ecuador can be most fruitfully understood as an opening for “symbiotic transformation” (Olin Wright 2010) between neo-developmental states characterized by class compromise and organized social actors as the existing path of change in light of the objective conditions in twenty-first century Latin America. I argued that Karl Polanyi’s blindspot with regards to theorizing political power and the state can be supplemented by approaches that focus on how processes of social and institutional transformation occur across state and society (Abers and Keck 2009; Heller 2001) as a way of considering how countermovements *move* through the state. I concluded by discussing how I applied this approach across the three case studies in this dissertation.
Chapter 3- From “Informal Apartheid” to “Corporatism from Below”: A Brief History of Rural State-Society Relations in Ecuador

“…the archaeology of political institutions has more than antiquarian value. As the product of previous conflicts and confrontations, institutions have embedded in them the sediments of earlier struggles. Uncovering these helps us understand not only the history of how they were formed but also their present character and future potential.” (Mallon 1994: 69).

“Through symbols and institutions states have been at the core of the reinvention of society.” (Migdal 2001:262)

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to provide a historical interpretive framework through which to understand the changes in rural state-society relations in Ecuador during the Citizen’s Revolution period. Building on approaches to Latin American historiography that focus on the participation of subaltern groups in state formation (Clark and Becker 2007; Gilbert and Nugent 1994; Mallon 1995; Thurner 1994), I argue that Indigenous peoples, campesinos and other subaltern groups advanced their civil, political and social rights through cycles of political struggle following historian Valeria Coronel’s argument about a “revolution in stages” in nineteenth and twentieth century Ecuador. This development was admittedly uneven - in the context of a chronically weak state and recurrent political instability - reflecting the absent/present nature of the Ecuadorian state. However, I argue that the fact that these rights were advanced through political and legal recognition, albeit quite unevenly, their advancement reinforces the central argument of this study, that struggle potentially transforms laws and state institutions following the “state in society” approach of Joel Migdal (2001). I highlight key themes recurring throughout Ecuadorian history including the political recognition of peasant and Indigenous communities, the shifting boundaries between rural communities and the
Ecuadorian state, political alliances between rural social organizations and other political actors and the question of corporatism. I argue that the adoption of food sovereignty as a political demand by rural social movements, and subsequently as official state policy, represents the most recent episode of this historical pattern through which peasant and Indigenous communities engaged in the process of state formation.

This chapter is organized as a chronological review of Ecuadorian history since colonial times and integrates analysis related to the main arguments of this thesis. I begin by touching briefly on the colonial period but focus mainly on the nineteenth, twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. I analyze the 1895 Liberal Revolution, the agrarian reform programs of the 1960s and 1970s and then consider the origins of the food sovereignty discourse in Ecuador as part of neoliberal proyectismo. I begin the chapter by highlighting some key issues in the colonial period that shaped the subsequent Republic period. During the early Republican period colonial racism persisted, even as towards Republican or liberal citizenship expanded. At the same time, the tepid and uneven moves towards liberalism in the 1850s and early 1900s allowed Indigenous and peasant communities to gain some rights and political recognition vis-à-vis the state and neo-colonial social relations. Through struggles from below and alliances with reformist political actors, subaltern populations slowly worked to overcome internal colonialism through political recognition. Key junctures that I highlight include the growing recognition of Indigenous and peasant communities from the 1930s onwards and the emergence of regional national supra-communal organizations after the agrarian reform process of the 1960s-1970s, the heightened social protest of the 1990s and the
NGOization of rural social movements as part of neoliberal governance and the polycentric state.

I argue that this history explains the state-centric discourse and political orientation of rural social movements demanding the “return of the state” in the neoliberal period. Though the original intent of “communalization”, and the recognition of the myriad forms of rural social organization, may have been to extend state social control recognition it had the unintended consequence of creating the organizational basis for the social mobilization of the 1980s-1990s. I end the chapter with an analysis of the period leading up to the election of the Correa government, giving consideration to the political relations between rural social movement organizations, such as the FENOCIN and the CONAIE, with the government and the role of these organizations in institutionalizing food sovereignty in the 2008 constituent assembly. In this chapter, I analyze empirically the paradoxical nature of rural social organizations. Rural social organizations gained more influence in this period as they were favored by NGOs and international development cooperation to implement projects and deliver agricultural extension and social services, as well as to execute rural development projects as part of neoliberal governance. I argue that the demands of rural social movements in the 2008 constituent assembly process reflected the political recognition and access to state resources that agrarian reform had gained and then abandoned with the shift towards neoliberalism. The concepts incorporated into the 2008 constitution such as plurinationalism and the laws related to food sovereignty represent an attempt to find a model of democratic corporatism and interest mediation, reflecting the historical question of how to reconcile state power with communal institutions and local communities.
Colonial Subjugation, Political Independence, Internal Colonialism and Gamonalismo

Before the arrival to the Andean region of the Spanish in the early 1500s, different Indigenous groups lived throughout what is now post-independence Ecuador. Just prior to the invasion of the Spanish, some of these groups comprised the Inca empire, with its seat of power in what is now Cuzco, Peru. During Spanish colonial rule, Ecuador formed part of the Royal Court of Quito, the Real Audiencia de Quito in Spanish, which included parts of present-day Colombia, Peru and northern Brazil, with the central administrative seat of power in Quito. Historian Enrique Ayala describes the colonial state as co-constituted by several different structures including the official administrative structures of the Spanish Crown, the Catholic Church and the colonially created structures of Indigenous governance, the cabildos, acting as interlocutors between Indigenous groups and the colonial government (2008: 46-47). Although colonialism was a violent process of subjugation it also established and allowed for spaces of political negotiation with recognized, and colonially sanctioned, Indigenous authorities or cabildos, and other processes which incorporated Indigenous communities into colonial rule, albeit on subjugated terms (2008: 39-40). The system of encomienda, had a Spanish colonial representative or encomendero24 in charge of extracting taxes from the local Indigenous population. This system was later replaced by the mita, or Indian tribute, the name of which was adapted from Inca colonialism. Mita required of each adult male a certain

---

24 The encomendero attempted to extract labour, goods or money from the local people that was exchanged for evangelization in Catholic doctrine (Ayala Mora 2008: 40).
amount of annual forced labour for different economic activities including public works and laboring in mines (Ayala Mora 2008: 42). Though tribute was extracted under completely asymmetrical terms it also established a political relationship between the colonial and Indigenous communal authorities (Sánchez 2007: 362).

Under colonial rule there were two systems of jurisdiction: what the Crown referred to as the *Republica de blancos* and the *Republica de indios*, the White and Indian Republics respectively (Ayala Mora 2008: 44). Though colonial laws did apply to Indigenous peoples they were not recognized by the Crown as human beings but as an inferior, “protected”, population that needed the guidance of the Church and protection of the colonial state. European descendants born in the Americas were known as *criollos* and people of mixed heritage became known as *mestizos*. African slaves were brought to some regions of present-day Ecuador for agricultural and other forms of labour throughout the colonial period. Some escaped or were freed and settled in a region of northwestern Ecuador, which is today the province of Esmeraldas. The labour of enslaved African populations became important in the expansion of agricultural production in the 1700s. Prior to the early 1700s, the vast majority of the population in what is now Ecuador lived in Quito and in the central highlands, and to a lesser extent the southern highlands around Cuenca and Loja, and the coastal regions of Ecuador were largely unpopulated by European colonists though different Indigenous settlements did exist. This changed in the 1700s when agriculture became more important to the colonial economy as textile manufacturers in Quito faced new competition from European imports (Ayala Mora 2008: 52). This forced European colonists to expand the agricultural frontier to new areas of the highlands and the coast where the first cacao plantations were
established and as a result the population living in the coastal regions increased. The expansion of the agricultural frontier brought with it the origins of the post-colonial hacienda system as mita was adapted and largely replaced by concertaje in light of the expansion of the haciendas. More and more of the rural population became conciertos, meaning that they were tied to one landlord who paid their mita contributions to the state and to whom they were subsequently indebted, forcing them to work on the hacienda (Ayala Mora 2008: 52-53).

Colonial rule began to wane when pro-independence elites in the Real Audiencia de Quito cooperated with the broader independence efforts led by the Venezuelan-born Simon Bolivar in a fight for independence from the Spanish Crown. In the period between 1820-1822 different cities in Ecuador declared independence and after the Battle of Pichincha for control over Quito in 1822, Ecuador became independent as part of the Republic of Gran Colombia led by Simon Bolivar. Ecuador became an independent republic after Gran Colombia disintegrated in 1830 with its first President being a Venezuelan-born independence leader, Juan Jose Flores. While independence from Spain did bring about a form of representative republican government, political participation was restricted to a tiny handful of white criollo elites. Historian Marc Becker describes the exclusive nature of citizenship rights under the first Ecuadorian constitution of 1830 which, in order to have voting rights “…required a person to be married or older than twenty-two years of age, own property worth at least 300 pesos or be engaged in an

---

25 Concierto is a term for a rural labourer who is officially tied to one landlord who paid their tribute to the colonial authority and later the Republican state as well as access communal land and plots for individual family production known as huasipungos within the estates. As Derek Williams states “…the term concertaje, apparently particular to the Ecuadorian region, translates simply as a “concordance” for labor services made between consenting parties.” (2003: 712)
independent "useful" profession or industry (domestic servants and day laborers are explicitly excluded), and be able to read and write” (1999). Becker also cites data that provides insight into just how exclusive the early Republican state was; out of a national population of 800,700 only 2,825 people or 0.4% of the population qualified as citizens and could vote (Quintero and Silva 1991 cited in Becker 1999). Citizenship under the new republic was not a reality for the vast majority of the population who were effectively subjugated to a tiny minority of elites. Indigenous people continued to pay tribute in the republican period and as most Indigenous people resided within the boundaries of haciendas, the concertaje system continued into the formally post-colonial republican period. In addition to conciertos there were also some Indigenous people, known in different parts of the highlands as either yanaperos or sitiajeros, who were technically free and only exchanged their labour for access to some common resources on the haciendas. In addition, some smallholders, called arrendatarios, rented land from the hacienda.

Like many other countries in Latin America, independence in the nineteenth century, followed by decades of civil conflict and instability, often challenged effective state building. In broad terms, the civil conflicts of the nineteenth century pitted elites favoring variances of liberal ideas and enlightenment values against conservative elites who were tied to large landholdings in the highlands and favored maintaining the strength and power of the Catholic Church (Ayala-Mora 2008; Williams 2003). Due to the persistence of so many colonial institutions and practices Ecuador, along with several other countries in Latin America, is characterized by a model of “internal colonialism” (Kay 1989) or the “Indian Question” (Clark 1998). A key issue in the nineteenth century
political debates between conservatives and liberals was “the question” of the rural and Indigenous populations in a formally post-colonial republic. While conservatives were in power for most of the nineteenth century, the 1850s saw a reversal of this when a liberal regime, led by military General Jose Maria Urvina, seized power in 1851. Urvina came to power with the support of a political coalition\textsuperscript{26} that historian Derek Williams refers to as “popular liberalism” \cite{Williams2003}, a movement antithetical to highland landlords and critical of the power of the Catholic Church. The Uriva regime’s 1851 constitution expanded voting rights to more of the African population and the government also abolished slavery in 1854. The most politically ambitious policies were the extension of new rights to Indigenous conciertos and free Indigenous, known as comuneros, and the abolishment of Indian tribute in 1857. While the abolition of the hacienda system and concertaje was politically unthinkable at the time, the Urvina government eliminated tribute. This gave Indigenous conciertos and comuneros more labour rights regulated through the central state and newfound, increased access to the justice system (Williams 2003). The liberals also recognized Indigenous communities\textsuperscript{27} as legal entities and did not propose doing away with the colonial protections offered to Indigenous communities or as Derek

\textsuperscript{26} Urvina’s regime came to power favouring a more Anglo-American Republicanism with an emphasis on social and economic equality \cite{Williams2003: 701}. The political coalition that supported the liberal regime included “…Coastal cacao land-lords, commercial bourgeoisie, mestizo soldiers, Indian peasants and peons, and middling and plebeian urban sectors” \cite{Williams2003: 701}.

\textsuperscript{27} The recognition of communal institutions in the 1850s is an important precursor to the vision of a plurinational state that was adopted in the 2008 constitution as well as the 1937 Ley de Comunas. As Derek Williams explains, “Urvina’s legislation pragmatically recognized Indian communal rights to hold lands collectively. The same provision that asserted Indian rights to a private usufruct property, for example, also guaranteed their access to lands held “in common.” The law protected all lands with “special titles” proving they belonged to an Indigenous community, and it validated community rights in several other places as well…In short, Urvinista land reform was conceived so as to perpetuate indefinitely the Indian community structure.” \cite{Williams2003: 707}. 137
Williams argues: “Indians were encouraged to advocate both their rights as individual citizens and their rights as a protected class” (2003: 721). These new laws challenged abusive landlords and also created the right to be able to leave haciendas if they paid their debts to the landlord.

The internal conflict between liberal and conservative elites was characterized by political instability through the early 1800s, but by the 1860s the conservative regime of Gabriel García Moreno undertook a process of state building around the idea of Ecuadorians united as a “Catholic nation” (Williams 2001). The conservatives proceeded to roll back Urvina’s liberal reforms and the liberals were unable to seize power again until the end of the nineteenth century. While the Conservatives reversed many of the reforms of the liberals, Derek Williams argues that Indigenous communities were able to use some of the laws passed under the liberals in the 1850s against landlords under the conservative regime (2003). A consequence of the elimination of Indian tribute was that the state eliminated some of the colonial provisions granting the state the paternal protector of Indigenous peoples and this in effect handed more power over Indigenous-state relations back to the Church and to landlords and local governments; this triad of power is what historians refer to as gamonal power and what anthropologist Victor Bretón calls the “hacienda regime” (Bretón 2015: 95), to refer to the “privatization” of the Indian problem (Sánchez 2007: 364). These conditions have led Enrique Ayala Mora to describe the conservative regime of Gabriel García Moreno as an *estado oligarquico*

---

28 Victor Bretón argues that the term *hacienda* can be understood in a number of ways; a *hacienda* “…has been variously used as a synonym of latifundio or ‘large estate’; as a way of referring to the building of a set of buildings of a large agrarian property; as an administrative structure and a rural business oriented to benefit the owner; or from a broad point of view, as the central element of a system of domination that had its hierarchal vertex in the landowning caste. This last meaning, which is the one I use here, equates hacienda to the more precise phrase of hacienda regime.” (2015: 95).
terrateniente or the “oligarchical landowner state” (2008: 74). This new scenario reinforced racist attitudes rooted in colonialism and furthered the separation between the Indigenous world and the white-mestizo world.

Although in theory the elimination of tribute was done to extend political equality, in practice it privatized the subjugation of Indigenous communities in a system historian Brooke Larson refers to as “informal apartheid” (Larson 2004). The period of conservative rule that would last from the 1860s to 1895 reinforced many residual colonial practices and power dynamics through the uniting state building project of a “Catholic nation” (Williams 2001). What is important to note about the García Moreno regime is how it used the formally private realm of gamonal power to rule, delegating state functions to the triad of gamonal power: landlord, Church and local government authorities (Williams 2001). As Derek Williams argues:

“The Ecuadorian state of the mid-19th century was constituted not only of a singular and centralized institution, but was also made up of other decentralized dimensions — corporative entities that functioned within that state, but with high levels of autonomy. As elsewhere in early republican Latin America, executing state tasks of tax-collection, juridical punishment, and even military defense, entirely under central rule was impossible…In the Ecuadorian context, the two most pertinent of these semi-autonomous bodies were the Church and the municipio. Other less formalized corporative “institutions” within civil society — such as Indian comunidades and their authority structures or large rural estates and their semi-institutionalized clientelisms — also performed “state functions.”” (2001: 151-152).
García Moreno’s project of Catholic state building was an attempt to revert back to a more colonial style of government based on the power of landlords and the Catholic Church in adopting many former state functions including administering parts of local government and the education system.

While the period of conservative rule under García Moreno and subsequent conservative leaders reverted Ecuador back to colonial patterns in many respects, the liberal reforms of the 1850s did have longer-term effects as well. Historian Valeria Coronel argues that these reforms brought with them political recognition of Indigenous communities and were the first stage in a longer historical process towards an emergent social citizenship that she argues culminated in the 1940s (2011). Coronel describes the period as “…a first stage of democratic political identity-formation…[and] a transition from a colonial pact to a republic capable of recognizing the existence of the Indigenous communities within the nation. Such a transition included negotiations in regard to issues such as land possession, tributary taxes, political representation, and access to the justice system” (2011: 11). One could also think about the tepid moves towards political recognition of the 1850s as first steps away from colonialism towards the “right to have rights” (Arendt 1951). While the conservatives were able to halt and reverse some of the changes that the liberals began to implement in the 1850s, they were not able to construct a complete hegemony through their Catholic state building project. As liberal elites grew more powerful by the end of the 1800s, due in large part to the economic growth on the coast associated with cacao production, the liberals overthrew the conservative regime in a military campaign led by general Eloy Alfaro in 1895.

The “Agrarian Question” and the 1895 Liberal Revolution
The 1895 liberal revolution was an ambitious political project but from the beginnings it was also a disputed one due to the cross-class nature of the political coalition that supported the liberal forces. The revolution was a rebellion financed and driven by the emergent bourgeois on the coast against the highland-based conservatives but it succeeded due to significant popular participation. The guerilla army leader that would defeat the conservative regime in 1895 was army General Eloy Alfaro, a military man and liberal from the coastal province of Manabí. Alfaro’s army was made up of coastal peasants and blacks known as the montoneros and their presence served to radicalize the program advanced by Alfaro (Coronel 2011: 983; Foote 2006: 263). Alfaro’s main financiers were the emergent cacao barons, many of whom had become incredibly wealthy with the expansion of cacao production since the 1880s, through which Ecuador would become the most important cacao producer in the world. These families who owned enormous plantations were mainly the descendants of European immigrants who came to Ecuador in the post-independence period and were an emergent elite compared to the hacendados of the sierra. They represented a kind of new elite with competing interests to those of the highlands (Henderson 1997: 174). Alfaro’s liberalism later came to be defined as “radical liberalism” due to its nationalist, anti-clerical and egalitarian bent; its spirit would eventually put him at odds with other liberals who had a more elitist and less popular vision of liberalism.

While there was genuine popular participation in the liberal revolution by groups like the montoneros as well as some highland Indigenous communities, the liberal revolution was a process principally led by a vanguard of liberal elite reformers and financed by the cacao barons. Liberal politicians and intellectuals of the time saw
themselves as a vanguard acting on behalf of subaltern groups like the *montoneros*, blacks and Indigenous peoples. In this vein, Andres Guerrero (1997) argues that the conditions of the Indigenous *conciertos* became a point onto which liberal politicians and intellectuals could pin many of the evils of conservative rule in their own bid for power. In his study of public debates during and prior to the liberal revolution, Guerrero argues that the *hacienda* system represented the perfect strawman target for liberal politicians and intellectuals who favored economic modernization and the development of wage labour relations. Guerrero argues that this allowed them to link the future well-being of Indians…with the role of the State in society’ as the State acted to curtail landlord and *gamonal* power (1997: 580). Guerrero refers to this as “political ventriloquicy” by which he argues that “…there seems to come a voice from the Indian subject” (1997: 588) while in reality liberals, politicians and others are speaking on behalf of Indigenous communities and framing their demands in terms of liberalism. Like Gayatri Spivak’s argument in her famous essay “Can the subaltern speak” (1988), Guerrero argues that Indigenous people did not speak for themselves but were represented through intermediaries using a liberal political discourse that did not necessarily reflect their own subjectivity. However, this ventriloquism did advance the rights of Indigenous communities and undoubtedly also shaped the political subjectivity of Indigenous peoples as well. This ventriloquism also began a process which legitimated the role of the state in rural communities as the defender of labour rights against landlords (Clark 2005: 57).

29 Guerrero argues that the liberal regime constructed an image of the Indian “…as one in need of protection [and this] initiated a new method of representation: it established a political ventriloquy. Through the ethnic mediators, both private and public…a set of white–mestizo social agents talk and write in the name of the indian in terms of his oppression, degradation and civilisation.” (1997: 588).
Historians have remarked on the fact that despite the significant changes the liberal revolution brought to the country it didn’t achieve many of its initial objectives. While the liberals controlled the state they never achieved total hegemony due to the concessions they had to make to the Catholic Church and highland conservative groups to stay in power (Ayala 1988; Foote 2006). The first government of Eloy Alfaro introduced a minimum wage and officially prohibited unpaid services of conciertos and huasipungueros, as well as reinforcing the regulation of labour contracts on haciendas, even though the implementation of such measures proved quite uneven on the ground (Guerrero 1997: 583). The government also passed the Ley de Beneficiencia in 1908 which allowed the state to expropriate haciendas owned by the Church to bolster state revenues (Sánchez 2007: 365). Further, the liberal project included changes such as improvements in infrastructure, public services, the separation of Church and State in the 1906 constitution and the extension of women’s rights, including access to education and the right to divorce. A 1918 law adopted by the government to eliminate debtors’ prison for conciertos allowed more conciertos and huasipungueros to leave the highlands to work on coastal cacao plantations (Sánchez 2007: 366). Labour was often scarce during the harvest season and wages began to rise as a result (Henderson 1997: 177). This brought with it social and economic changes as the highland landlords had to start competing with the cacao plantations on the coast for labour and as a result in this period many of the highland haciendas began to decline economically (Clark 1998).

The contradictions within the liberal regime were present throughout the period of the liberal coalition between the radical liberals of Eloy Alfaro and the so-called ‘oligarchical liberals led by Leonidas Plaza (Coronel 2011). The oligarchic liberals
eventually conspired against Eloy Alfaro and his closest supporters and murdered them in 1912 through a conspiracy with radical Catholics angered about the country’s rising secularization. The liberal revolution then moved into what has been referred to as its more ‘oligarchical’ phase in which the cacao barons expanded their influence over the government (Coronel 2011). The cacao barons had diversified into commerce and banking and these domestic banks become the most important creditor to the Ecuadorian government which led to a growing debt crisis by the 1920s (Henderson 1997: 179-180). With the urbanization of Guayaquil there was also a growing working class that began to organize into unions and mutual aid societies to demand higher wages and better working conditions. This led to a general strike in 1922 during which the army opened fire on the workers and it is estimated that several hundred people were killed (Coronel 2011: 643-645). By this time, the cacao boom had ended and production was declining leading to economic difficulties and high public debt. As a result of these contradictions, a coalition of military officers, highland conservatives as well as some popular sectors and the emergent political left united to overthrow the liberal regime in March 1925 and install a provisional government.

The liberal revolution brought with it many changes to Ecuador even though its impacts were highly uneven. Historian Nicola Foote sums up the period well in arguing that the fundamental challenge of this period was “…the gap between policy ideas and state resources. Government authorities made extravagant gestures in speeches and proclamations, but the ability of the state to implement its goals was notably weaker.” (Foote 2006: 272). While Ecuador does not fit cleanly into Barrington Moore Jr’s typology of a capitalist-democratic route to democratization, the role of the emergent
coastal bourgeoisie in the 1895 Liberal Revolution is in keeping with Moore’s “no bourgeoisie, no democracy” thesis (1966) as the rising costal bourgeoisie associated with international trade and cacao exports helped to attack the neo-colonial power structures dominant in the highlands. The liberal revolution also began a process which legitimated the role of the state in rural communities and slowly shifted the locus of power from haciendas to the state, with the state as the protector of rural populations against the abuses of landlords (Clark 2005: 57). The participation by the montoneros and some Indigenous communities in Alfaro’s army illustrates the importance of peasant and Indigenous groups in the liberal revolution and the horizon it opened towards greater equality and the curtailment of landlord power. This reflects the point emphasized by Florencia Mallon (1995) as well as Gilbert and Nugent (1994) that subaltern groups were involved in processes of state formation from the beginning of the Republican period through progressive resistance that shaped the development of the state. This dynamic would reach new milestones after the 1925 March Revolution that ended the liberal age and ushered in a period in which the Indigenous and peasant groups would transcend the political ventriloquism of the liberal age by gaining greater legal recognition and forming new alliances with the emergent political left. This all helps to explain the state-centric nature of the demands of more rural social movements in the neoliberal period.

“Corporatism from Below” and the Roots of Social Citizenship

The period after the liberal revolution deepened the process of social, political and economic change that had begun with the liberal revolution. Historian Valeria Coronel argues that the period from 1925-1945 was the third and final stage in a process she
argues represented a “revolution in stages” through which the country moved beyond the internal colonialism of the 1800s through to the political recognition of peasant and Indigenous communities and the extension of social citizenship and labour rights to the popular and working classes. Coronel argues that this process culminated in the emergence of a national popular political project in Ecuador as a form of political modernity. One of the first actions of the provisional government that came to power following the March 1925 revolution was the adoption of social security legislation establishing the Ministry for Social Welfare Provision and Labour or *Ministerio de Previsión Social y Trabajo* (MPST). The emergence of the MPST fostered the role that new left-wing political forces played in allying with and brokering between the dominant liberal and conservative forces. The MPST institutionalized new channels of interaction between state and society through which local conflicts related to land and labour rights could be resolved and Valeria Coronel argued that this served to empower social organization from below. A new generation of lawyers linked to the political left also

---

30 Valeria Coronel proposes a three-stage model of Ecuadorian history from independence to the 1940s to explain her theory of a “revolution in stages”. The first period the period ranged from “1845 and 1896…a first stage of democratic political identity-formation through a negotiation between communities and republican leaderships. Such formation took place during a transition from a colonial pact to a republic capable of recognizing the existence of the Indigenous communities within the nation. Such a transition included negotiations in regards to issues such as land possession, tributary taxes, political representation, and access to the justice system.” (2011: 11). She defines the second stage as lasting from “1906-1924…demonstrated processes of resistance, legal and other forms of confrontation, and collective mobilization that various peasant actors and fragments of the artisan working-class fomented in three regions of the country…characterized by the existence of multiple scenarios of popular conflict and resistance that developed in various radicalized regions that would later unite through Gramscian national-popular discourses after the fall of the liberal regime.” (18). The third stage, 1925-1945 brought with it the integration of subaltern groups within the State and was “…a period marked by alliances between mobilized peasant communities in different regions of the country, worker organizations, and a new and diverse group of state reformers, including military officers and the young Socialist and Communist Parties…This Left promoted a transformative dialogue between popular groups, communities, and unions through new state agencies that supported policies of redistribution and assistance for popular classes.” (2011: 18-19)
emerged in this period to represent land and labour struggles and this reinforced the increased social organization from below.

At the end of the 1920s, the emergent left-wing political forces formalized into parties including the Communist Party, *Partido Comunista Ecuatoriano* (PCE) and the *Partido Socialista Ecuatoriano* (PSE). These two parties would undergo many subsequent divisions and schisms but they were both actively involved in labour organizing (Alexander 2007; Becker 2008). These parties also became adept at political brokerage which allowed them to wield influence in different governments, both military and democratically-elected ones, between the 1930-40s. This development reflects Jonathan Fox’s “sandwich strategy” to describe the role of bureaucrats allied to peasant movements in the case of Mexico (1993). The importance of the MPST was that it, “…represented a new state practice characterized by an autonomy with respect to local *gamonal* power...The logic of this social-political exchange and of the practices of the MSPT led to an alternative path for state formation…” (2011: 995). Coronel argues that the move to create the MPST was not the result of ‘corporatism from above’ as in Mexico or the Southern Cone countries, but represented a “corporatism from below” (2011: 995) by which labour, Indigenous and peasant groups pushed from below for this recognition and were empowered by the extension of new legal protections and some redistributive and social welfare measures. Valeria Coronel argues these developments led to the emergence of a national popular political coalition and built upon an important political vision for these groups.

In the 1930s many highland *haciendas* experienced economic decline which brought about public debates around the ‘agrarian question’ in relation to the future of the
haciendas (Clark 1998). One of the causes of the decline of the haciendas was the abandonment of the hacienda by some huasipungueros who had migrated to the Coast to work on the cacao plantations or, alternately, in urban centers. The Communist and Socialist parties had developed linkages with Indigenous communities and were organizing unions on some haciendas and collaborating with Indigenous leaders (Becker 2008). Following an orthodox Marxist line, these urban Leftists believed that by forming unions, wage labour relations could develop on the haciendas and this would promote the development of capitalism. The introduction of wage labour relations would make many haciendas economically unviable and these developments might contribute to their decline. While some of these urban white-mestizo leftists had a paternalistic attitude that viewed the rural population as the masses and themselves as the vanguard (Korovkin 2010: 333), the predominant position became one which demanded land and agrarian reform and recognized Indigenous and peasant communal authorities. This is in line with the position developed by Peruvian Marxist Jose Carlos Mariátegui (1971). These ideas had a particularly important influence on the Communist Party which was involved in the establishment of the Federación Ecuatoriano de Indios (FEI) in 1944 under the leadership of Dolores Cacuango, a legendary female leader in the formation of rural unions on haciendas in Cayambe, just north of Quito. The FEI later joined the national labour federation federated to the Communist Party, the Confederación de Trabajadores Ecuatorianas (CTE) (Alexander 2007: 208). The FEI advocated for a via campesina version of land reform based on communal authorities, following the political line of Mariátegui, as opposed to the collectivization and state control of agriculture. As Kim Clark notes, demands for land reform were framed in terms of “…integration into the
market economy” (2005: 59) by Indigenous and peasant producers in line with the position of dominant groups which emphasized the development of capitalist production and the new technologies.

One of the most important developments of this period was the adoption in 1937 of the Ley de Comunas, or Law of Communes, during the military government of General Alberto Enríquez Gallo which the left, and the PSE in particular, supported and had influence in. The 1937 law recognized autonomous Indigenous communities that had begun to seek legal recognition as independent legal entities with the decline of the hacienda system. Mestizo peasants in the highlands and the coast also used this mechanism to form peasant communities even though the legislation was modelled on the traditional highland Indigenous authority structure of the cabildo. This process further demonstrates that in many cases peasant and Indigenous communities were not “…naturally existing units but rather the products of politics.” (Lucero 2003: 36). The law imposed a particular code of communal governance and structure onto all Indigenous and peasant communities that didn’t necessarily represent historical forms of communal governance and organization (Goodwin 2014: 107). In this same period the government of Enríquez Gallo created the first body to regulate cooperatives and also officially adopted the first law regulating cooperatives in 1938, creating a Department

---

31 Ley de Organización y Régimen de las Comunas, adopted in the state registry on August 6th 1937.

32 As Geoff Goodwin describes, “The law dictated that every community should have a cabildo (council) formed of five community members. The cabildo was responsible for taking decisions on behalf of the community and representing the community to government officials and state agencies. While the actual organisational structures of communities varied enormously (i.e. the legal framework was not universally followed), most included a central authority which provided a basis for collective decision making.”(2014: 107)

33 Reglamento General de la Ley de Cooperativas, adopted in the state registry in February 1938.
of Cooperatives within the *Ministerio de Previsión Social* (formerly the MPST) (Miño 2013: 43). This law reflected the growth of cooperatives in other sectors of the economy, including agriculture, expanding beyond its original concentration in the credit union and transport sectors.

The *Ley de Comunas* is not seen by all as part of the “bottom up corporatism” described by Valeria Coronel (2011) and the law can also be seen as a move of the state to “see” in James Scott’s (1998) terms, Indigenous or *campesino* communities in the context of the decline of the hacienda system and a move towards political incorporation. Though some communities had legal recognition stemming from the colonial period or from the recognition extended in the Urvina period, the *Ley de Comunas* was significant because it allowed communities to apply for recognition as a strategy for political autonomy and was the beginning of a process of ‘communalization’ of rural Ecuador that would culminate after the agrarian reform process of the 1970s. This process reflects what anthropologist Collored-Mansfeld terms “vernacular statecraft”t which “…combines replicable form, local action, and an absence of ‘overarching’ governmental structure…[that he argues produced]…a civil society built of state-designed institutions without the hegemonic control of the state.’ (2007: 88). The law “…bestowed legal recognition of freehold communities with elected councils (*cabildos*), newly created institutions rooted in colonial and precolonial practices but influenced by trade-union and cooperative principles. Such legally recognized communities or communes were entitled to government assistance.” (Korovkin 2001: 46). In this sense, the law was an attempt at incorporation from above and the establishment of corporatist relations in light of the slow decline of *haciendas*. The communal organizations recognized by the law floated in
an ambiguous position that had formally been rooted in society but was now performing many functions carried out by the state. While the law may have been intended to incorporate these communities ‘from above’ Steve Striffler argues, “…the intensified and formalized relationship between the state and rural peoples often benefited, even empowered the latter.” (Striffler 2002: 125). Whatever the original intentions of the law, it was a key historical event that had long-lasting implications in terms of the political recognition of Indigenous and peasant communities and it laid the foundation for the rural social movements to emerge in the following decades.

The events of the late 1920s to the 1940s laid the groundwork for the formal legal, civil and political representation of peasant and Indigenous communities and the congealing of rural social organization that would follow over the rest of the century. The quintessential example of Latin American corporatism is represented by the Mexican case of state-peasant relations (see Grammont 2009). In the Ecuadorian context, state recognition of communal authorities did not lead to the same kind of incorporation into official national representative bodies and channels as in the Mexican case prior to democratization. In contrast, Ecuador was stamped by the competitive pluralism or “disjointed corporatism” (Lavdas 1997) - the absence of stable institutional channels of corporatist mediation or of hegemonic organizations representing the entire rural sector. In this chaotic scenario, three main national federations of rural communities attempted to represent rural communities at the national level. These were: 1 - the FEI, affiliated to the CTE; 2 - the Confederación Ecuatoriana de Obreros Católicos (CEDOC)34, a

---

34 The CEDOC united several local and regional Catholic labour organizations and also create a separate section only for rural workers and communities the Federación Ecuatoriana de Trabajadores Agropecuarios (FETEP). The CEDOC was later renamed the Confederación Ecuatoriana Organizaciones Clásicas (CEDOC).
Catholic labour organization established (1946) to counter the influence of the FEI-CTE; 3 - the Confederación Ecuatoriana de Organizaciones Sindicales Libres (CEOSL), established in 1962 with US aid and anti-Communist in its orientation (Alexander 2007: 189). These organizations competed with each other and all had different political ties and interests and often tried to undermine one another. At the same time the growth of these unions led to increasing labour unrest in the 1950s and 1960s in all parts of the country and this helped to spur calls for agrarian reform from different quarters (Goodwin 2014: 108). None of these organizations achieved an official or hegemonic position of corporatist representation in state institutions and instead developed more short-term pacts with different political parties. Though there was an upsurge in social organization there wasn’t a united national campesino or Indigenous movement in the first half of the twentieth century with most communities remaining atomized (Iturralde 1985). However, the emergence of this informal political representation was an important pre-condition to the emergence of exclusively campesino and Indigenous federations in subsequent decades.

**Structuralism and Agrarian Reform**

Beginning in the 1950s, various governments in Ecuador, democratically elected and military alike, implemented measures like import tariffs, varying subsidies and explicit programs to encourage the development of domestic industries associated with the ascendant structuralist and ISI policies in the region (Conaghan 1988: 42). In Ecuador these policies were implemented to develop the state economy, as in larger countries such as Argentina and Brazil, and some domestic industries did result, with the most ambitious
period being the 1970s (Larrea and North 1997: 914). On the whole however ISI policies failed to generate significant industrialization or competitive industries that were independent of state protection and did not benefit the traditional elite classes. The elites tended to receive the majority of subsidies and market protections and often developed domestic subsidiaries of foreign companies, which did not foster innovation (Conaghan 1988; North and Cameron 2000: 1753). In the two decades between 1952 and 1972 public expenditures grew eightfold reflecting the growth of the central government and its role in implementing programs (Korovkin 2001: 47). Through this process “…municipalities lost part of their power to provincial branches of the centrally controlled development agencies, such as ministries and national institutes” which also served to break down traditional gamonal power relations at the local level (Korovkin 2001: 43). In contrast to a century earlier, when conservatives tried to strengthen local informal institutions, the central state was strengthened in the name of economic modernization.

The need for agrarian reform was an agreed upon goal between different actors at the time, ranging from peasant and Indigenous communities who were clamoring for reform, sectors of the business class who believed agrarian reform was necessary for economic modernization and even the political left. Internationally, a concomitant push via U.S. President John F. Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress and other international institutions, aimed to promote land reform in light of the aftermath of the 1959 Cuban Revolution (see Scheman 1988; Taffet 2012). Beginning in the 1950s there was an expansion of central government bureaucracies such as the Ministry of Agriculture to provide technical assistance and subsidized inputs to producers both for the
modernization of large-scale ex-haciendas and the smallholder beneficiaries of agrarian reform. In 1959, the government created the Instituto Nacional de Investigación Agropecuaria (INIAP) to promote agricultural research. To implement agrarian reform policies, new state institutions were created like the Instituto Ecuatoriano de Reforma Agraria y Colonización (IERAC) which was established to oversee and manage the agrarian reform process in 1964. The state was central to the process in which new technologies were adopted though this modernization was often adopted unevenly (Sherwood 2009). The discovery of oil in the 1970s gave governments a greater degree of relative autonomy from domestic elites than previous governments. In the period between 1970-1978, there was a 112.8% increase in the number of employees working in the public sector to implement the agrarian reform (Salgado 1987: 133). The 1970s marked the most ambitious period for the implementation of these policies and it was during the military government of Guillermo Rodríguez Lara, from 1972-1976, that such policies were pursued most aggressively. Like the military governments of this period in other Andean countries such as Bolivia and Peru, these were “military governments with a mission” (Conaghan and Malloy 1994) in that they viewed themselves as playing a historical role in implementing developmental state policies of which agrarian reform was a key component.

The agrarian reform processes of 1964 and 1973 were very uneven in terms of their implementation in different regions of the country. Some regions were much less

---

35 According to the data compiled by Geoff Goodwin: “The total amount of land redistributed in the highland region between 1964 and 1994 was roughly 580,962 hectares or 12.2% of the 2000 agricultural land surface. Most land was redistributed in the southern province of Loja (26.8%), the central province of
effected while others underwent substantial redistribution of land, making the way for new models of agricultural development based on smallholder production. In particular, the provinces of El Oro on the coast and Chimborazo, Cotopaxi, Carchi and Loja represent highland provinces that underwent significant redistribution processes (Barsky 1988). Colonization of state-owned land by landless workers and ex-huasipungueros, instead of redistribution, in areas like the Amazon and the Coast, was also extremely important and a less politically motivated towards land reform. In contrast, in many highland provinces ex-concierios and huasipungueros actually became worse off as they often received land located at higher elevation, which was of much poorer quality and in many cases inaccessible to formerly common tracts of land on the haciendas where grazing and resources like firewood had been abundant (Chiriboga 1982; Korovkin 1997: 29; Martínez 1984). Anthropologist Victor Bretón argues that the final dissolution of the hacienda system represented a significant moment of rupture for rural and Indigenous communities in the highlands (2015). As Bretón states, “…agrarian reforms broke an enormous dam in the Andean world, that of the long-standing domination of the hacienda…” (2015: 93). The dissolution of the haciendas, beginning during the liberal revolution and culminating in the 1960s-1970s, raised the question of social and economic incorporation of the former concierios and huasipungueros which now looked to the state and agrarian reform programs to ameliorate the effects of this transformation. The agrarian reform processes of 1964 and 1973 extended a process which began in the 1930s with the Ley de Comunas.

Chimborazo (20.9%) and the northern provinces of Pichincha (12.7%) and Cotopaxi (12.1%). Over 70% of the total amount of land redistributed was done so within these four provinces” (2014: 245).
A form of organization that took on more importance with the agrarian reform process was that of agrarian cooperatives, both land and farming versions, as well as commercialization and processing cooperatives (Carrillo 2014; Redclift 1978). While the 1938 law had created a regulatory and policy framework for cooperative enterprises, only a small space was created within the Ministry of Social Welfare for cooperatives; in 1961 this small department was expanded and renamed the Dirección Nacional de Cooperativas (Miño 2013: 63). After another law was passed in 1966 to update the legal and policy framework, the Consejo Cooperativo Nacional (COCONA) was established to support the development of cooperatives. As part of the Alliance for Progress, USAID and the international development arms of U.S. cooperatives established cooperation agreements with the new COCONA, and other international development organizations also focused their efforts on forming agricultural cooperatives (Miño 2013: 65). Between 1961 and 1966, 874 new cooperatives, more than four times the number that existed in 1960, came into being (Miño 2013: 65). The state policy was to encourage cooperatives and, in many cases, campesinos could only access state resources through cooperatives, reflecting the concept of ‘vernacular statecraft’ proposed by Coloredo-Mansfeld (2007). As the number of cooperatives grew in the country, so did the registration of new comunas and peasant and Indigenous communities. Data compiled by Leon Zamosc demonstrates the growth in the registration of new campesino and Indigenous communities increased significantly after the first agrarian reform law of 1964. 360 new communities applied for legal status between 1964 and 1973, 162 more cases than the previous decade between 1954-1963 (Zamosc 1995: 90-94 cited in Goodwin 2014: 134).
In short, agrarian reform amounted to a state facilitated process of solidifying rural social organization.

In his study of agrarian reform in the highlands, Geoff Goodwin argues that while agrarian reform was a process with significant impacts it was also limited and contradictory. Though expropriations of land did occur, the vast majority of redistributed land was bought from landowners and sold by the IERAC to small and medium landowners or peasant and Indigenous communities. Goodwin points to the relative weakness of peasant and Indigenous actors in influencing the policy process compared to other actors, in particular the Camaras de Agricultura, or Chambers of Commerce for Agriculture representing agri-business and hacienda owners in the 1964 reform (2014: 75). New organizations federating peasant and Indigenous communities created during the agrarian reform process also emerged in this period including the Federación Nacional de Organizaciones Campesinas (FENOC) which grew out of the CEDOC and Catholic labour movement but was radicalized by a new group of leaders linked to the Socialist Party (PSE) in 1972. In the same year, progressive members of the Catholic Church helped communities in the highlands to form the Ecuador Runacunapac Riccharimui (ECUARUNARI) (Goodwin 2014: 136). With the rise of liberation theology in the 1970s, some sectors of the Catholic Church in Ecuador became more involved in organizing Indigenous communities and also in founding rural development NGOs like the Fondo Ecuatoriano Populorum Progressio (FEPP) (see Martínez Novo 2008; Proaño 1980). Despite this important thickening of social organizations, efforts amongst these different platforms remained divided. It was only during the second agrarian reform process of 1973 that the different organizations representing rural communities and
workers assembled their own proposal for the reform legislation through the Frente Unido de Reforma Agraria (FURA), also organizing demonstrations and public actions to encourage the reform process (2014: 75). However, these efforts did not translate to any real influence or corporatist representation within the institutions charged with agrarian reform like the IERAC where peasant and Indigenous community representation existed but large landowners often had most influence (Goodwin 2014: 127). In conclusion, the developmentalist and agrarian reform period consolidated the breakdown of *gamonal* social relations and the movement from local power relations to a national focus with peasant communities now having to negotiate increasingly with national government bureaucracies and a focus shift of these movements from landlords to the state as the locus of power.

**Neoliberalism, the Rise of the CONAIE, and Neo-Corporatism**

Tanya Korovkin has called agrarian reform an “economic defeat” for highland Indigenous and peasant communities but a “political victory” (1997: 27). This reading incapsulates many of the developments in the 1980s-2000s as well as the period analyzed in this dissertation. Korovkin argues that the breakdown of the hacienda system brought with it an incorporation crisis for many rural people who were now more politicized and looked towards the state to claim their rights. The processes of agrarian and social change that had been generated by the agrarian reform process brought about the “communalization” (Bebbington 1993: 282; Ramon 1988; Yashar 1999: 80) of rural Ecuador and with it a new political empowerment and thicker social organization of Indigenous and *mestizo* peasants at the local and regional levels. Korovkin argues that the
increased ‘autonomous political action’ of the peasant and Indigenous communities in the neoliberal period was “…fueled by state intervention…” of the agrarian reform period (1997: 26). The return to democracy and the change in the 1979 constitution opened up a new scenario whereby illiterate people were now allowed to vote. This changed the makeup of the electorate and enfranchised a record number of new voters, in particular the rural population. The FEI, FENOC and ECUARUNARI also formed a coalition called the Frente Unico de la Lucha Campesina e Indigena (FULCI) to pressure politicians on rural issues and to deepen agrarian reform (Goodwin 2014: 153). This new political environment brought about the election of center-left candidate Jaime Roldos in 1979, who promised a program of social reform including deepening the agrarian reform process.

The expansion of the democratic franchise in 1979 surely helped to elect Roldos and during his period rural social organizations organized to pressure the government to resolve land conflicts and continue the agrarian reform process. In 1980, there was a demonstration of 10,000 people in Quito organized by the FENOC and ECUARUNARI to demand “agrarian reform with peasant control” (Becker 2008: 164 cited in Goodwin 2014: 214). While the Roldos government did increase social spending and charted an independent foreign policy critical of many of the military dictatorships in power across the region at the time, the government was not able to push through many of the reforms it had proposed. The Presidency of Jaime Roldos was cut short when he died in a plane crash in the south of Ecuador in 1981 that many believe was an assassination. By the early 1980s, like most other countries in Latin America, Ecuador began to experience an economic slowdown in the wake of the 1970s oil boom which had resulted in the
subsequent growth in public debt. Roldos’ vice-President and successor Osvaldo Hurtado implemented the first shift towards neoliberal policy after the 1982 Latin American debt crisis hit Ecuador. As a result, agrarian reform was stalled as state investment in agriculture declined. In 1980, state investments in agriculture represented 6.24% of the national budget. By 1987, this had declined to only 2.88% (IEE 2011: 24). Social spending per person declined significantly throughout the 1980s and 1990s and real wages also stagnated (see Larrea and Sánchez 2002). Neoliberal reforms were uneven in Ecuador but they reversed the process of constructing a more consolidated central state in the structuralist period (see Hey and Klak 1999). In this period poverty, rural poverty in particular, increased reaching the highest levels with the economic and financial crisis of 1998-2000. Real wages stagnated from the early 1980s until the early 2000s ushering in a period of “rural decay” (North and Cameron 2003).

While the 1980s has been proclaimed the ‘lost decade’ in terms of economic growth in Latin America, in the wake of the debt crisis and structural adjustment policies, it has been referred to as a “decade won” in terms of strengthening popular social movements (Ramon 1992). The expansion of rural social organization through agrarian reform resulted in the creation of supra-communal organizations at the regional level known as second-level organization or organizaciones de segundo grado (OSGs), which federate local Indigenous communities into local federations (Martínez 2006). These organizations are federated to provincial, regional and often to national level

---

36 Social spending per citizen declined from 146.00 USD in 1980 to 108.60 USD in 1995 (Larrea and Sánchez 2002: 23). The percentage of the total population living in poverty increased from 55.9% in 1995 to 62.6% in 1998 with the beginning of the economic and financial associated with dollarization (Larrea and Sánchez 2002: 25).
organizations like the FENOC or the FEI. In the 1980s there was also a boom in the establishment of NGOs when they emerged as central players in the country during the neoliberal era. These communal structures would gain a new importance. In the neoliberal period, these supra-communal federations became interlocuters with public institutions and international development cooperation, combining both “…political and developmental functions, negotiating with public agencies on the one hand and implementing development projects on the other” (Bebbington 1993: 286). I described this model as proyectismo in chapter two and another way to read it is as the “NGOization” of these movements (Alvarez 1999). The most significant event of the decade was the formation of a new national federation of Indigenous communities and groups when three regional federations came together and founded the Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador (CONAIE) in 1986. This was an important development since the national organization unified communities and groups from all regions of the country and was a step towards a larger more representative national organization. Though the CONAIE became the largest and most important national federation other national organizations like the FENOC and the FEI continued to exist and federate other Indigenous and peasant communities as well.

The establishment of the CONAIE was significant from an international perspective as well since it remains the only national-level Federation of Indigenous

---

37 Jorge Leon cites data on the registration of NGOs in Ecuador from 1990-1995 which shows that 72% of NGOs in Ecuador registered with the state between 1900 and 1995 were formed in the neoliberal period between 1981 and 1994 (1998: 663)

38 These regional federations included the highland-based Ecuador Runacumapac Richarimui (ECUARUNARI), the small federation of coastal communities, the Confederación de Organizaciones Indígenas de la Costa (COICE) and the Amazonian confederation, the Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas de la Amazonia Ecuatoriana (CONFENIAE)
communities and organizations in Latin America. This makes Ecuador unique (Chartock 2011). Yet this new unity engendered tensions, as cleavages erupted between those highland organizations and the interests of Amazonian organizations more focussed on a struggle for territory in light of increasing oil extraction instead of land reform which was the focus of highland organizations (Clark 2005: 62). The unifying principle of all of these different groups became the recognition of distinctive “nationalities” in the struggle for a plurinational state (Clark 2005: Lucero 2003). For highland Indigenous organizations this marked a shift from a peasant or campesino discourse that was focused on land reform and class, towards a discourse focused on ethnic identity (see Máiz 2004; Pallares 2002). The transformation of the discourse of these movements coincides with the transnational linkages from the 1980s onwards wherein Indigenous communities became more connected with international organizations and development cooperation (Yashar 2006). Thomas Perrault has referred to this as a strategy of “jumping scales” to describe the growing importance of transnational linkages for Indigenous organizations (2003: 97). As a reflection of this shift to revalorize identity, the FENOC changed their name to FENOC-I to include the Indigenous in 1988, and later to FENOCIN in 1997 recognizing Afro-Ecuadorian communities affiliated to the organization (FENOCIN 2018).

Even though the discourse of both the FENOCIN and the CONAIE took an ethnic turn with the explicit demand for a plurinational state, neither organization abandoned class discourse or demands either. As Marc Becker has argued, the Indigenous movement of the 1990s was not a “new social movement” but instead was one rooted in past struggles over land and class - issues inextricably linked to identity (Becker 2008).
CONAIE’s 1994 political project reflects this with its demands for a plurinational state but reflects also a shift back to a more nationalist and developmental model of development that protected smallholder producers and provided them with state assistance while simultaneously emphasizing measures for decolonization and plurinationalism (CONAIE 1994). In this regard, the demands for a plurinational state need to be understood in relation to the legacies of the Liberal Revolution, which as Kim Clark has argued involved a process through which “…laws were passed that undermined local powers in the highlands, with the rationale that those groups abused the rights of Indians. As a result, Indians parroted back to the state its image of them as requiring protection.” (Clark 1998: 378). While the state attempted to extend “state social control” (Migdal 2001) by recognizing communal rights, campesinos and Indigenous groups used the mechanisms put in place as “bottom-up corporatism” (Coronel 2011) in order to benefit from the extension of social citizenship, later agrarian reform and most recently a plurinational state.

In sum, while the struggles against the power of haciendas and gamonal were demands for decolonialization (or against “internal colonialism”) and were constructed originally in liberal/Marxist terms (i.e.: Eurocentric terms) and mediated through the state via legal/political recognition from the 1930s onwards as a kind of “ventriloquism” (Guerrero 1997) campesinos and Indigenous groups would re-appropriate the process to undermine the colonial power of gamonal social relations. As José Mauricio Domingues has argued, this is an example of the way in which Indigenous and other subaltern movements in Latin America have combined “…the telos contained in the horizon of expectations of modernity and lend new specificities to older traditions stemming from
liberal and socialist thought…the same is happening to Indigenous traditions, which have by now been radically modernized themselves.” (2009: 127). This is reflected in the emergence of the CONAIE’s more explicit decolonial discourse in the 1980s, centered on recognition of “difference”, of distinct peoples and nationalities within a broader “political equality” (Pacari 1984: 121). The emergence of these demands can be understood as a continuation of this earlier process of dismantling of gamonal power through state power, demanding more autonomy and “indigenship” through self-government (Rojas 2013) and an intercultural state (Walsh et. Al 2006). This “post-liberal challenge” (Yashar 1999) is thus a continuation of the earlier radical liberalism of the Liberal Revolution period as the transformation of earlier Marxist/influenced discourses (Aboul-Ela 2004; Gordy 2013).

Into the 1990s, the CONAIE would have a significant impact on political events and the public discourse in Ecuador. The most important of these was the Indigenous uprising or levantamiento of April 1990 which had a profound impact on Ecuadorian society. The uprising lasted for several weeks and was led by the CONAIE who developed a list of sixteen demands39 levelled at the Ecuadorian government of the day led by the center-left Rodrigo Borja. Geoff Goodwin argues that in addition to being an example of a Polanyian counter-movement against neoliberal reforms, the levantamiento

had an “offensive” character to it that aimed to extend the unfinished project of agrarian reform and not just reverse neoliberal reforms (2014). Along the same lines, Anthony Bebbington suggests that the state-centric demands of the 1990 levantamiento reflected the way in which agrarian reform had legitimated the presence of the state in rural communities. A common belief amongst many highland Indigenous leaders was that “…the reproduction of Indigenous agriculture and society will necessarily be mediated by state resources.” (Bebbington 1993: 283). This reflects what Tanya Korovkin argues about “political victory” (1997) and the residue effect of agrarian reform while leaving the economic and productive concerns. The uprising led to a series of political negotiations with the Borja government and subsequent government that would see the creation of new institutions that Sarah Chartock has described as “neo-corporatist” (2011; 2013). The Borja government had already instituted bilingual public education in Indigenous communities in 1988 and after the uprising created the Dirección Nacional de Educación Bilingüe (DNEIB), the bilingual education secretariat, which effectively became controlled by the CONAIE. This was seen as an important victory for the movement. The success of the CONAIE at “moving the state” (Heller 2001) in this period is more reflective of the liberal/Gramscian understanding of civil society as opposition or autonomy from the state and has some explanatory power in the context of neoliberalism. However, the ultimate objective of the CONAIE was not autonomy from the state per se but greater social and political sovereignty within a neo-corporatist state and for the implementation of economic alternatives to neoliberalism through state policies.
In the 1990s different governments continued to respond to the political pressure of the Indigenous movement by creating other institutions to mediate with the CONAIE, including the Secretaría Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas y Minorías Étnicas (SENAIME). SENAIME would subsequently undergo several transformations including later evolving into a development planning secretariat for Indigenous peoples, Consejo de Planificación de los Pueblos y Nacionalidades (CODENPE). An example of this approach is rural development programs managed through the CODENPE and financed by the World Bank and the Ecuadorian government in the 1990s and early 2000s, including the Proyecto de Desarrollo de los Pueblos Indígenas y Afroecuatorianos del Ecuador (PRODEPINE) and later the Programa de Desarrollo Local Sostenido (PROLOCAL). The PRODEPINE was a $50 million-dollar program established through negotiations between the World Bank, the Ecuadorian government and the Indigenous organizations. Reflecting the shift away from what I argued was the competitive pluralism between the rural federations in the previous decades, the CONAIE initially gained a “monopoly” in the negotiations and the implementation of the PRODEPINE within its member organizations (Coignet 2011: 118). This generated tensions and divisions between the CONAIE and other national Indigenous organizations as to who was considered the

---

40 The goal of the PRODEPINE was the reduction of poverty in the Indigenous population and the activities varied from agriculture and economic development to bilingual education. However, the methodology of the intervention was based on the idea of self-management and strengthening the “social capital” of Indigenous communities and organizations to manage the interventions themselves (Coignet 2011: 125).

41 The total project budget is $50 million ($25 million from the World Bank, $15 million from the International Fund for Agricultural Development, and $10 million from the Ecuadoran government and beneficiary communities and organizations. The project was prepared beginning in early 1995, approved in early 1998, and ran from 1998-2003 (Uquillas 2003: 2)

42 The FENOCIN and the Federación Ecuatoriana de Indígenas Evanélicos (FEINE) were the two most important of these organizations and smaller national organizations included the CNC-Eloy Alfaro and the Confederación Nacional del Seguro Social Campesino (CONFEUNASSC).
most “authentic” representative of Indigenous peoples at the national level (Lucero 2006). The other national organizations, in particular the FENOCIN, subsequently negotiated through the CODENPE to have their OSGs receive projects through the subsequent PROLOCAL program after protesting the CONAIE’s monopoly in the initial negotiations reflecting what Maia Green has called the “market in civil society” that emerged with neoliberal NGOization (2012). In this period, governments were pressured by groups outside of the CONAIE to extend state resources and representation through neo-corporatist channels to other pueblos y nacionalidades recognized in the 1998 constitution. Examples of this include the recognition of montubios, who are essentially mestizo campesinos from the Coast (see Bauer 2010; Macías Barres 2014) as well as Afro-Ecuadorians. In 2001, the Ecuadorian government created the Consejo Nacional del Pueblo Montubio del Ecuador (CODEPMOC) to provide rural development programs based on the cultural heritage of the montubio population. The Afro-Ecuadorian population also achieved recognition and access to development projects through the PRODEPINE with the creation of the Consejo Nacional de Desarrollo Afroecuatoriano (CONDAE) (Rahier 2011). In addition to neo-corporatist leanings, these new institutions have also been described as part of new paradigm of ‘ethno-development’ (Chartock 2011; Bretón 2008) and part of a broader shift towards ‘neoliberal multiculturalism’ which led to the recognition of Indigenous rights in the context of neoliberal reforms (see Bowen 2011; Hale 2002). Some have argued this shift is reflected in the Ecuadorian context with the growing power of the CONAIE within certain institutional spaces being opened up within the state (León 1997; Santana 2004).
The activities of the PRODEPINE and PROLOCAL were operationalized on the ground by local NGOs working with local Indigenous organizations, particularly the OSGs. Victor Bretón argues that the decline of state-led agrarian reforms and their replacement with rural development projects implemented by international development cooperation and local organizations amounted to the “privatization” of rural development (2010). On the other hand, delegating these programs to NGOs and OSGs opened up space for these organizations to experiment with approaches distinctive from the agricultural modernization paradigm of the agrarian reform period which could be referred to as a via campesina. Bebbington argues that the programs that emerged in this period “…revolved around an explicit notion of a “campesino path” (a “via campesina”) to agricultural development- a path based on building on the productive, social, and cultural capacities of the small-farm sector.” (1997: 120). This was certainly the focus of many of the projects implemented through the programs associated with the PRODEPINE and PROLOCAL. At the same time, these programs did not address the structural issues facing rural communities and subsequently, conditions for the constituents of organizations like the CONAIE and FENOCIN deteriorated in broad terms despite some successful local development experiences in this period (North and Cameron 2003). The agrarian reform law of 1994 reversed the movement towards redistributive land reform that was favored in the agrarian reform laws of the 1960s-70s, sped up privatization of water and reduced the state apparatus of rural development programs (credit, technical assistance, etc.) to a shell of what it was during the 1960s-1970s (Ospina and Guerrero 2003) as smallholders faced deteriorating conditions and the intensification of out-migration from rural areas (Bates 2007). The worsening conditions
faced by most local members of these organizations created a distancing between the rank and file and the national leaderships of the FENOCIN, CONAIE and others.

The NGOization of the Indigenous and peasant movements in this period had contradictory impacts as it seems to have simultaneously strengthened and undermined them. On the one hand, the federations became more ‘professionalized’ as a new generation of educated Indigenous and campesino professionals staffed these organizations and they became more enmeshed in implementing development projects (Andolina et. al 2002; Bretón 2008). This professionalization helped to develop the capacity of a generation of leaders who would go on to participate in politics and these organizations continued to mobilize their constituents to participate in protest activities against neoliberal governments and development cooperation. On the other hand, a lack of resolution to many of the problems facing their rank and file no doubt contributed to the distancing between the rank and file and the leadership. As an evaluation conducted by Bebbington and Biekart for several international NGOs\(^43\) that worked with national Indigenous organizations in Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru in this period emphasized, these agencies worked with these organizations and saw themselves as building the capacity of the ‘Indigenous movement’ as ‘…a socio-political process in which a set of claims and arguments around ethnic identity and social justice assume greater visibility and recognition in society’ (2007: 5). However, the report notes that this approach focused on advocacy which may have actually undermined the legitimacy of the leadership of national organizations by making them more “dependent” on NGO funds (2007: 31), something which has been analyzed in the case of environmental NGOs in Ecuador as

---

\(^43\) These organizations included Ibis, Hivos, Oxfam America and SNV.
well (see Lewis 2016). The evaluation stated that “…agencies feel that organizations are far too financially dependent on their funds, and that the presence of agency funding only serves as a further disincentive for organizations to raise resources from their bases. Indeed, some more than others, agency staff feel that organizations must raise more resources from their membership or their constituency if they are to be legitimate (and downwardly accountable) political actors.” (Bebbington and Biekart 2007: 35). In conclusion, while the intensified relationship between development cooperation and rural social organizations in this period doesn’t fit neatly into the depoliticization hypothesis of development cooperation as an ‘anti-politics machine’ (Ferguson 1994), it appears that development cooperation efforts explicitly aimed to strengthen these organizations politically may have contributed to their decline by making them more top heavy at the national level.

International Development Cooperation and the Emergence of Food Sovereignty Discourse

Food sovereignty emerged through the LVC in 1996 and it subsequently diffused throughout the world through LVC’s “global advocacy network” (Keck and Sikkink 1998) of constituent member organizations. Several of the national federations in Ecuador joined LVC and the discourse of food sovereignty was adopted by these organizations. The first space in which the discourse appears to have been adopted was within the Coordinadora Nacional Agraria (CNA), which was a platform of several of the national federations formed in 1994 in an attempt to block the adoption of the Ley de Desarrollo Agraria or Agrarian Development Law which replaced the agrarian reform legislation and eliminated the IERAC. The CNA later evolved into a coalition called the
Mesa Agraria (MA) which was an ad hoc coalition supported financially by international NGOs and which served as a key space to organize against the proposed free trade agreements, such as the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA), and later, the proposed free trade agreement between Ecuador and the United States. The MA also developed alternative policy proposals to the neoliberal rural development and agricultural policies (Giunta 2014; Muñoz 2010). The organizations that formed part of the MA included the FENOCIN, the Federación de Campesinos e Indígenas Libres del Ecuador (FENACLE), the Confederación Nacional del Seguro Social Campesino (CONFEUNASSC), the Coordinadora Nacional Campesina – Eloy Alfaro (CNC-EA) and the ECUARUNARI (Giunta 2014: 1209–1212).

As highlighted previously, in Ecuador the idea of a via campesina path based on smallholder production and agroecological agriculture originated in the rural development activities of national and international NGOs in the 1980s and 1990s (Bebbington 1993; Chiriboga 2014). The central role of international NGOs in supporting an advocacy platform like the MA raises the issue of how much the discourse of food sovereignty, much like that of buen vivir, was promoted by development cooperation networks and how much it represented the aspirations of grassroots members. What I am proposing is that the idea of a via campesina model of rural development created its own momentum in this period, by stimulating self-provisioning and a transition to agroecological production, understood as food sovereignty, as an end in itself. The

---

As Giunta documents, the Mesa Agraria received support “…of various Ecuadorian NGOs, such as Acción Ecológica, Fundación de Campesinos María Luisa Gómez de la Torre (FMLGT), Heifer Ecuador, Terranueva and international organizations such as Centro Regionale d’Intervento per la Cooperazione (CRIC), Terra Nuova, Intermón Oxfam or Solidaridad Suecia-América Latina (SAL).” (2014: 1211)
grassroots members of the federations who mobilized against neoliberal policies in the
1990s were not necessarily advocating for agroecology or a via campesina per se, as
much as policies that would help make them viable petty commodity producers. For
example, Anthony Bebbington’s research in the late 1980s found that while many NGOs
encouraged agroecological agriculture and a via campesina approach, he argues that these
ideas were not always embraced by Indigenous communities who were keen to adopt
Green Revolution technologies in a process he calls ‘modernization from below’ (1993).
Bebbington argues that instead of the content of the technologies adopted, the primary
concern was community control of the modernization process. He argues that maintaining
traditional crops or productive systems had already been transformed with the dissolution
of the hacienda system and the access to animal manure which that hold helped to
facilitate (1993: 281). While this vision does reflect the aspirations of some local
organizations, the problem with it is that it can become a kind of new ventriloquism like
that described by Andres Guerrero in the early twentieth century (1997). José Sánchez
Parga has rejected buen vivir for similar reasons, arguing that it is a “retro-projection” of
a future based on an ahistorical communitarian Andean world that has been destroyed by
colonialism and capitalism, and not a demand or project with much social basis in

The relationship between NGO organic intellectuals and peasant movements is an
ambiguous question for LVC beyond Ecuador as well. When LVC was founded and the
food sovereignty discourse emerged at the international level, the organization rejected
NGO support and development projects (Desmarais 2002). In fact, LVC only permitted
constituent-based organizations that agreed with its principles - to join the international
federation - and banned the participation of NGOs (Patel 2006: 80). However, NGOs have also been central to the diffusion of agroecological production techniques in Latin America (Altieri et. al 2012). This early rejection of NGOs ignores the reality that many smallholder organizations depend on NGOs and development cooperation as well as the fact that these organizations may actually be propagating via campesina influenced proposals. More recent studies have analyzed the interface between food sovereignty and NGO assistance because many initiatives for agroecology are implemented through NGOs (Desmarais and Rivere-Ferre 2014). At the international level, NGOs that support food sovereignty have also become key in the process to push forward food sovereignty through international bodies like the Food and Agriculture Organizations (FAO) and through participation mechanisms for civil society organizations (CSOs) (Claeys 2014).

In the Ecuadorian instance the notion of food sovereignty gained an inertia or momentum in itself based on the “epistemic community” (Haas 1992 cited in Clark 2017: 351) of NGOs that grew up to support the rural federations through proyectismo and in the promotion of a via campesina strategy in the 1980s onwards. I argue that the emergence of the Agroecology Collective, or Colectivo Agroecológico, is the culmination of this phenomenon. The Colectivo was formed in 2005 and is a much different kind of social movement than the FENOCIN or the CONAIE. The Colectivo is focused on disseminating agroecological agriculture and pushing the state to adopt policies favouring agroecology but it also uses the discourse of food sovereignty. The emergence of the

---

45 As Arce et. al describe the Colectivo as made up of “…organizations involved in advancing consumer interests, such as the national NGO Utopia and its “Community Food Baskets” purchasing groups, several outspoken chefs and a network of restaurateurs and over time members of the burgeoning Movimiento de Economía Social y Solidaria del Ecuador (MESSE)…it also include like-minded Indigenous peoples, mestizos, nationals and foreigners working as practitioners, scientists, and government civil servants.” (2015: 126).
Colectivo as an advocacy coalition represents the movement for food sovereignty as agroecology as an end in itself but it also sees it as a means towards the sustainable livelihoods of smallholders.

An important 2017 article, co-written by several leaders of the Agroecology Collective on the history of agroecology in Ecuador, illustrates the importance of agroecology in Ecuador. The authors trace the origins of agroecological agriculture and production techniques to “…European or North American professionals and volunteers who brought with them knowledge of biological and organic farming, respectively. The Ecuadorian Corporation of Biological Producers (PROBIO), created at the end of the 1980s by a variety of enthusiasts and promoters of biological/organic agriculture, followed this trend. It even incorporated an early articulation of organic norms and guarantees, giving reference to Europe and the International Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements (IFOAM)” (Intriago et. Al 2017: 315). In their own account, the origins of agroecology in Ecuador grow out of international development cooperation and foreign volunteers. However, they argue that “…gradually NGO-led initiatives linked to the original incarnation were overtaken. Instead agroecology became a central demand and daily practice of peasant and Indigenous organizations, one that originated from their own thinking and adopted as a form of peasant resistance.” (Intriago 2017: 317). While some Indigenous and campesino organizations have no doubt embraced agroecology and adapted it to their local contexts, it is not principally an endogenous phenomenon but has been propagated through the intervention of NGOs. In contrast to the federations, the Colectivo does not ally with political parties but promotes agroecology through practical actions and pressuring the state for more favourable policies to foster agroecology as via
*campesina* in general (Gortaire Interview June 4 2014). While the peasant Federations had broader political objectives such as opposing neoliberalism, the *Colectivo* is narrowly focused on agroecology, meaning it is very different in focus from the federations and is not representative of the same broad constituency of organizations with a territorial basis in rural areas throughout the country.

The “Cycle of Insurrection” the Emergence of *Patchakutik* and Crisis in the CONAIE

The contradictory impacts of neoliberalism are captured well by Nancy Postero (2007) who argues that the neoliberal decentralization process and role of international development cooperation in Bolivia fomented social organization from below and the rejection of neoliberalism. She argues that this set the stage for the *Movimiento al Socialismo* (MAS) party and the victory of Evo Morales as President in 2005 and similar conclusions have been reached by other analysts of this period (see Faguet 2012; Kohl 2003). Although a more rigorous historical study of this period could determine the exact causal mechanisms in the Ecuadorian case, I suggest there was a correlation between the strengthening of the CONAIE and the FENOCIN through development cooperation funding and their role in social protest and later in politics in the late 1990s and 2000s. Neoliberalism opened up space for Indigenous leaders to learn the language of development and build certain skills they had gained through their experience in NGO-funded projects and later challenge neoliberalism by entering into electoral politics. This reflects the observation that international NGOs working with grassroots organizations often have ‘room for maneuver’ to mould development cooperation to their own ends and interests (Bebbington and Farrington 1993: 200) than has sometimes been assumed by the
literature on NGOization. I propose that Postero’s argument about Bolivia extends to the Ecuadorian case and helps to explain the entrance of the Indigenous movement into electoral politics in the late 1990s. However, in contrast to Bolivia, due to a number of factors, principally the smaller size of the Indigenous population in Ecuador compared to Bolivia, the foray into electoral politics undermined the Indigenous movement by fragmenting it rather than strengthening it.

The CONAIE was the largest constituent organization of a broader coalition of social organizations and left-wing political groups that made up the Coordinadora de Movimientos Sociales (CMS) that was formed to oppose neoliberal policies and unite popular movements under a broad umbrella. This organization became very important between 1997 and 2005 as Ecuador entered into a very unstable period in which these popular movements galvanized popular opinion and were central to the overthrow of several governments. This period has been called a cycle of “insurrection”, from 1997 until the election of the Correa government in 2006 (Ramírez 2005; Silva 2009). During this period no elected President served out their term and in most cases, they were ousted by street protests in which the CONAIE and the CMS played key roles in organizing yet included broad popular participation. In the early 1990s, some Indigenous communities had begun to collaborate with political parties on the left and centre-left during elections but these experiences had been mixed (Van Cott 2005:104-105). In 1996, the CONAIE and these other popular organizations decided to found a new political party called Pachakutik (PK)46 or “new dawn” in English, for which the CONAIE had a chief role in

---

46 Pachakutik, which means “new dawn” in Quichua. The full name of the party is Movimiento de Unidad Plurinacional Pachakutik- Nuevo País.
setting party policy. Though the party was explicitly Indigenous, non-Indigenous leftists also joined and supported the party. The party garnered 20.5% of the Presidential vote with their mestizo candidate, journalist Freddy Ehlers, and gained eight seats in Congress. The party was subsequently elected at the municipal and provincial levels throughout Ecuador and in some cases was able to push forward alternative policies and development initiatives with important successes (Cameron 2005; Ospina et. Al 2008).

José Sánchez Parga has described the process which led to the creation of PK as the “larga ruta de la comunidad al Partido” or the “long march from the community to the party” (2010). The establishment of PK brought with it the culmination of a cycle in which Indigenous and peasant communities went from being excluded from citizenship and political recognition as a result of “internal colonialism” (Kay 1989), to inclusion and representation in electoral politics through the PK. However, the transition into electoral politics ultimately contributed to the decline of the Indigenous movement. The relationship between CONAIE and PK has been analyzed in depth elsewhere (see Becker 2011 and Beck and Mijeski 2011), but the consensus amongst analysts is that the creation of PK undermined the unity of the Indigenous movement in the early 1990s (Novo Martínez 2014; Zamosc 2007). The crisis of the movement began in 2000 when the leaders of CONAIE supported a coup in conjunction with some sectors of the military led by Colonel Lucio Gutiérrez that ousted President Jamil Mahuad who had resided over the 1999 banking crisis and the dollarization of the economy. In 2002, the CONAIE and PK supported Gutiérrez’s campaign for President and several PK leaders were named as Ministers in the government when he won the Presidency. Once in office Gutiérrez reversed his campaign promises and proceeded with the same neoliberal policy agenda he
had opposed. As a result, his support quickly declined but PK and the CONAIE were divided on whether to leave the coalition government. This episode weakened both PK and CONAIE, and the favourable popular opinion towards the Indigenous movement that had characterized much of the 1990s declined. For the first time in a decade, the CONAIE was not at the vanguard of the uprising in April 2005 that forced Gutiérrez out of office. Instead a new group that came to be known as the *forajidos*, popular and middle-class sectors in Quito, were the main protagonists in the ousting of Gutiérrez (Ramírez 2005).

The April 2005 ousting of President Lucio Gutiérrez after significant popular protests left the political system in chaos. Popular movements were also demoralized and demobilized by the betrayal of the Gutiérrez government that had been elected on anti-neoliberal platform with the support of popular sectors and movements. It was in this period when Correa first gained a public profile during the transitional government of Alfredo Palacio, that followed Gutiérrez, when Correa was named as a Minister and made responsible for renegotiating contracts with oil companies and increasing state royalties. Correa was a political outsider when he decided to run for President in 2006 but he was able to build a coalition with social movements and many prominent figures of the political left to support his 2006 campaign. AP was very much a platform for Correa to launch his bid for the presidency rather than a broad-based left-wing party like the MAS in Bolivia which had more structures in place to mediate between social movements and the party. However, in this early period the AP sought to make alliances with social movements that provided political and electoral mobilization for the new movement. The FENOCIN was going to back the candidacy of the centre-left
Presidential candidate Leon Roldos of the *Izquierda Democratica* (ID) in 2006, but switched its support to Correa when the PSE got behind Correa (Interview 1 2013). During the 2006 campaign, the FENOCIN and the other organizations that were part of the MA, signed an agreement with Correa’s campaign. In exchange for their support, Correa committed to implementing an “Agrarian Revolution” which would focus on the “reactivation” of campesino agriculture by expanding access to credit and creating both agricultural extension land and irrigation for smallholders (Giunta 2014: 1212). Despite attempts by Correa to forge an electoral coalition with PK, the party ran its own candidate, Luis Macas, who garnered only 2.19% of the popular vote in the first round of voting. In contrast, from the early days of Correa’s rise to power, the other rural federations backed the Correa government as did many former members of PK.

The organizations that constituted the MA would later formally campaign for the election of AP delegates in the September 2007 elections for the constituent assembly process (Giunta 2014: 1212). AP won the majority of delegates elected to the constituent assembly and these delegates were receptive to the proposals put forward by the rural social movements. With the exception of the CONAIE, all the other rural federations allied with the new Correa government and the leaders, Pedro de la Cruz, the president of the FENOCIN, and Guillermo Touma, the president of the FENACLE, were elected as members of the constituent assembly for AP. These two leaders played central roles in instituting the concept of food sovereignty in the new constitution working in concert with the *Colectivo Agroecológico*. Though CONAIE and the FENOCIN came to heads over some issues during the constituent assembly process, the CONAIE-linked PK delegates also supported the inclusion of food sovereignty into the constitution (Becker
The 2008 constitution adopted nearly all of the proposals that these groups advocated for during the deliberations. During the constituent assembly, tension emerged within AP, in particular between President Correa and the AP delegate who was elected as President of the constituent assembly Alberto Acosta. Acosta, an environmental economist and former member of PK, gave considerable space to the CONAIE and other social movements during the constituent assembly but tensions emerged between him and Correa over their opposing visions on a number of policy issues. Though Acosta left AP and the government after the constituent assembly, his mark on the new constitution, and that of the social movements actors he gave space to in the process, was indelible.

Conclusions

In this chapter, I have highlighted key historical events that shaped the evolution of state-society relations from the pre-Republican period to the early 2000s and the election of the Correa government in Ecuador. While the early Republican period was marked more by continuity with colonialism rather than change, tepid legal and institutional reforms gradually extended formal rights to Indigenous peoples, campesinos and other subaltern groups. These changes were the indirect result of the process of capitalist modernization on the Ecuadorian coast that culminated in the 1895 Liberal Revolution. Though the initial impacts of the Liberal Revolution were modest, they laid the ground for deeper changes in rural state-society relations in the 1930s and 1940s (Coronel 2011) as campesinos, Indigenous groups and others claimed rights in the context of the emergent “national popular state”. The political/legal recognition of Indigenous and peasant communities, beginning with the 1937 *Ley de Comunas*, allowed the Indigenous peoples and non-Indigenous campesinos to claim rights through the recognition of communal
structures. In the words of Monique Nuijten the state became a “hope generating machine” (2003) with the end of the hacienda system, political recognition and the implementation of agrarian reform in the 1960s-1970s.

While state formation in rural Ecuador began as a process “from above” what I have argued in this chapter is that this original project that began with the Liberal Revolution was unevenly appropriated “from below” reflecting the way in which “…the engagement of the state with society, which has created sites of struggle and difference in society subverting the state’s efforts at uniformity, has also transformed the state.” (Migdal 2001: 263). The state building process brought about by the Liberal Revolution slowly replaced the institutions of gamonal power in the highlands by empowering rural social organizations through “vernacular statecraft” (Colloredo-Mansfeld 2007).

However, as I analyzed in this chapter, the attempts to build stable corporatist organizations of rural social organizations to interface with the state at regional and national levels proved difficult due to the power imbalances in Ecuadorian society, the chronic weakness of state institutions and political instability. The national Federations of Indigenous communities and campesino organizations emerging from the middle of the twentieth century onwards did not converge into one national organization with corporatist political leverage reflecting a case of “disjointed corporatism” (Lavdas 1997) rather than effective corporatist organization through a “encompassing” corporatist body with a a monopoly over interest representation (Dekker 2016). The establishment of the CONAIE in 1986 and its leadership in the 1990s diverged from this historical tendency and as a result the CONAIE was arguably successful in shaping states policies through the “neo-corporatism” of the 1990s (Chartock 2013). At the same time however, neo-
corporatism also brought with it the NGOization of the CONAIE and the other Federations as they became implicated in neoliberal governance. However neoliberal governance and NGOization did not “depoliticize” (Ferguson 1994) these organizations and instead correlated with the forays of the CONAIE and the other Federations into electoral politics first through the formation of the _Pachakutik_ party in 1996 and later with support for Correa’s Presidential bid in 2006.

While the liberal conception of civil society as opposition or autonomy from the state offers explanatory power at different points in Ecuadorian history, the historical legacy of corporatism helps to explain the “state-centric” strategies of demand-making that have characterized the rural social movement Federations. As a result of this “disjointed” corporatist model (Lavdas 1997), with the exception of the CONAIE at the height of its power in the 1990s, participation in corporatist spaces has often been structured around individual leaders’ “personal interests” rather than “long term collective aims” which as Evans argues leads to deeper transformative change (Evans 1995: 247). This has meant that for political elites and governments, the rural Federations have been characterized more by “political society” (2008) or “clientship” (Taylor 2004) than as civil society, speaking to the challenge of “clientelism over citizenship” (Fox 1994). This can be seen in the way political struggles have revolved around the struggle over access to state resources of privileges (León 1997) which, as I analyzed in this chapter, intensified in the neoliberal period due to the “market in civil society” (Green 2012) as these movements became “proxies” (Krupa 2010) or “surrogates” (Brass 2010) for the state after neoliberal restructuring. State-centric, anti-neoliberal demands characterizing food sovereignty in the 2000s need to be understood in relation to the
history of “bottom-up corporatism” (Coronel 2011), the truncated programs of agrarian reform abandoned in the neoliberal period and the limits of neoliberal proyectismo and the “market in civil society” (Green 2012) it promoted that pitted these movements against one another. The lack of stable state funding for rural development projects and resources generated from members weakened the Federations, as did their forays into electoral politics. These internal contradictions and weakness would thus make it difficult for these national organizations to work effectively to pressure the national government to “move the state” (Heller 2001) on political and policy issues of a national scope during the Correa government as I will analyze in the next chapter.
Chapter 4- The Citizen’s Revolution, Political Recentralization and Post-Neoliberal Rural Development

“Because of their limited scope and reach, NGOs are no alternative to state failure. The only alternative to state failure, which is indeed endemic, is not privatization, the market, or any new or alternate paradigm, but the state itself.” (Zaidi 1999: 270)

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the main changes and issues at the national level regarding agricultural policies, campesino organizations and rural development during the Correa government. I argue that the policies and programs implemented by the Correa government, signified an attempt to build a neo-developmental state apparatus and these changes represented a break with neoliberalism in many respects yet fell short and even undermined the post-development goals associated with buen vivir. In arguing that there was a shift towards post-neoliberalism, I stress that the significant investments made by the government represented, what I refer to throughout this study as the “return of the state,” shorthand for the state building project of the Correa government associated with post-neoliberalism. I begin by highlighting some the main features of the changes in the design of the Ecuadorian state as a result of the adoption of the 2008 constitution including the return to national development planning and the “recentralization” of the jurisdictional authorities previously granted to local governments and the government’s neo-developmental policies for the “transformación de la matriz productiva”. I highlight the importance of the governing party of AP in bringing about the nationalization of voting patterns and breaking the historical gridlock in Ecuadorian politics based on the regional cleavage
between the highlands and the coast and argue that the state building process associated with post-neoliberalism reinforced the political consolidation of AP

I continue by analyzing how these shifts shaped the government’s agricultural policies providing an overview of some of the main national agricultural and rural development policies and programs implemented by the government. Though I argue these policies did mark a break with neoliberal proyectismo I argue also that they diverged considerably from the vision of food sovereignty as a via camepsina outlined in the 2008 constituent assembly or the 2009 LORSA. The “return of the state” as a strengthening of jurisdiction of the national government and national government Ministries was a clear change from the neoliberal era when the central government was much less active in agricultural and rural development initiatives. While certainly not reflecting a Polanyian “re-embedding” of the economy to social or democratic oversight, the Correa government’s increased investments and new programs need to be understood as a result of the Polanyian countermovement and how they helped provide political legitimacy to the government by demonstrating to the population that neoliberalism had been reversed. I touch briefly on some of the foreign policy shifts undertaken by the Correa government and in particular the government’s attempts to regulate international development cooperation with changes in state-rural social movement relations highlighting the decline of the “neo-corporatism” associated with the CONAIE in the neoliberal period. Finally I discuss the evolution of political and state-society relations between the government and organized rural social movements.
After the 2009 elections and the ratification of the 2008 constitution, the Correa government had a mandate to make many changes and passed a whole range of laws to enact the framework laid out in the constitution to lay the groundwork for the construction of new institutions to support the vision of a neo-development state as outlined in the constitution. As I highlighted in chapter three, the 2008 constituent assembly was a unique historical moment due to the presence of popular social movements and the historical forces of the political left in the constituent assembly (Becker 2011). The new constitution positioned the question of “alternatives to development” or “post-development” (Escobar 2011) though the irony is that one thing that ensued after the 2009 elections was a post-neoliberal state building process which was really the hallmark of the Correa government. This new model has been described variously as a nascent attempt to build a “developmental” state (Andrade 2015), the transition from the neoliberal “polycentric” model of governance (Boelens et. al 2015) to “bureaucratic centralism” (Fontaine and Fuentes 2011), “capitalist modernization and state building” (North 2013: 15) or a “modernizing neo-development state” (Nicholls 2014). While the government continued to mobilize the discourse of buen vivir it essentially did so under the guise of promoting a neo-development state which has been pointed at as a contradiction (Walsh 2010; Lalander 2016).

One of the first moves towards post-neoliberalism was the establishment of a national development-planning ministry in 2007, the Secretaría Nacional de Planificación y Desarrollo (SENPLADES), which has been in charge of coordinating the national development plans, the Plan Buen Vivir (PBV). The creation of SENPLADES
marks an important shift towards post-neoliberalism and a return to state-led
development in Ecuador. This orientation of “modernizing neo-developmentalist” can
clearly be seen in the government’s national development plan, the *Plan Buen Vivir*
2013-2017, which at its heart proposes that Ecuador move towards a “modern knowledge
economy”, transcending its history of patterning an economy based on the export of
primary commodities (SENPLADES 2009; SENPLADES 2013). The Plan identifies
strategic sectors of “non-renewable resources such as hydrocarbons and mining…” as the
basis for the transformation of the economy or what the government refers to as
*transformación de la matriz productiva*47 (2013: 23). The expansion of mining and
resource extraction activities is conceptualized as the economic basis on which the
country can develop a “modern knowledge economy” using the revenues from resource
extraction to fund measures such as “…import substitution…diversification…and the
development of a knowledge economy” (2013: 79). This process involves greater
investments in higher education and in science and technology infrastructure amongst
other things. Ecuador’s development plan with its emphasis on “*transformación de la
matriz productiva*” reflects the central concern of structuralists and dependency theorists;
overcoming economic dependence on primary commodities. However, the vision differs

---

47 This term is normally translated as “transformation of the productive matrix in English. Essentially, it
refers to a progression away from the predominance of the primary sector of the economy and towards the
development of the secondary and tertiary sectors in the economy. The measures identified in the 2009-
2013 *Plan Buen Vivir* published by SENPLADES to achieve this vision include the selective substitution of
imports (2009: 60); increasing productivity, diversifying exports and export markets (60: 2009);
transforming the higher education system and securing technology transfer to foster science, technology
and innovation (62: 2009); improve connectivity and telecommunications in order to foster a ‘knowledge
economy’ (63: 2009) and to transform the countries energy grid (64: 2009). The economic motor for this
transformation is named clearly in policy 11.2 of objective 11 in the of the 2013-2017 Plan that states the
basis of the economic transformation lies in the need to “…industrialize mining activity as the basis of the
from classical ISI policies, with the focus on building upon Ecuador’s strengths as a country to develop the tertiary sectors of the economy rather than just encourage industrialization and infant industries. The plan states that Ecuador should focus on developing its “competitive advantage” in “…biodiversity, through its conservation and by building national industries related to bio-and nanotechnology…the strategy must be oriented to building, in the medium- and long-term, a society of “bio-knowledge” and of community-based eco-touristic services” (SENPLADES 2009: 56). In this sense the goal of a neo-development state model is not to implement a classical ISI development model of industrialization which in theory is more in line with “neo-structuralism” (Leiva 2008).

A whole range of measures and indicators are indicative of the scope of the state building project the government implemented. Utilizing a crude measure such as the size of government spending as a percentage of GDP, it is quite clear that the Correa government expanded significantly - the number of government Ministries doubled from 14 or 15 to 32 compared to the average under previous governments (Basabe-Serrano et. Al 2017). The government also created a whole range of new ministries related to the economy and economic management reflecting the shift towards a developmental model of political economy including coordinating ministries. The central government improved the tax collection system48 and renegotiated the royalty schemes for oil and other natural resources to fund the strengthening of the national government institutions. The public sector as a percentage of GDP expanded from 24% in 2006 to 48% in 2011, allowing for

---

a significant expansion of public investments in social programs and other public investments (Ospina 2013: 159). Between 2003 and 2011, the number of public employees more than doubled increasing from 230,185 to 510,430 (Sánchez and Polga-Hecimovich 2019: 34). Social spending as a percentage of GDP has increased in Ecuador from 4.17% in 2005 to 9.73% in 2013 (SENPLADES 2014: 68) and this expansion of universal services has led observers to characterize these policies as a nascent move towards “universal social citizenship” (Minteguiaga and Ubasart-González, 2014). The expansion of the public sector as the “return of the state” is what post-neoliberalism meant in practical terms in the Ecuadorian case (Sánchez and Polga-Hecimovich 2019).

What is clear from these various indicators is that there was a clear attempt by the government to strengthen the public sector which I would argue it saw as a precondition to establishing a neo-developmental state.

Another way in which the post-neoliberal turn manifested was through the recentralization of jurisdictional functions in national government agencies, reversing the 1997 decentralization law that had transferred jurisdiction over state functions to local sub-national levels of government. In a move to reverse the institutional changes implemented in the neoliberal period, the Correa government recentralized many jurisdictional responsibilities into national government ministries that the decentralization policies of the neoliberal period had devolved to lower government levels from the 1980s-2000s (Faust 2008). In a 2008 document, the later Secretary of SENPLADES, Pabel Muñoz, laid out this vision that reversed the 1997 decentralization law and proposed the recuperation of a strong public sector and central government Ministries (2008: 339). The Correa government reversed the decentralization model that had been
described as a model of decentralization of jurisdictional responsibilities that allowed local governments to request jurisdictional responsibility from the national government “…one by one off the menu” instead of in an orderly fashion (Carrion 2008: 45). Kent Eaton (2014) also argues that the changes that took place under the Correa government represent “recentralization” relative to the processes of decentralization that took place during the neoliberal period49. Such measures were of course part of the government’s political goal of strengthening a strong central state and state capacity. With the 2010 Código Orgánico de Organización Territorial, Autonomía y Descentralización (COOTAD), which provided a new framework for inter-governmental relations and policy jurisdiction in Ecuador, more opportunities came into existence for local governments, known as Gobiernos Autónomos Decentralizados (GADs), including provinces, municipalities and juntas parroquiales to implement programs and initiatives related to agriculture and rural development.

The adoption of the COOTAD reversed the “off the menu” model of decentralization and inter-governmental relations and established a whole new model of planning and administration organized as different zones (Interview 6 2013; Interview 10 2013). The juntas parroquiales, parish councils, gained more power and jurisdictional responsibilities (including economic development, international cooperation aid and agricultural development) while the jurisdictional scope of municipalities and provinces was curtailed. The COOTAD changed the funding formula of transfers from the national

49 As Eaton’s study notes, the Correa government reversed the 1997 law which allowed Ecuadorians to transfer up to 25% of their income taxes to their home municipality (Eaton 2014: 1148). The government also reversed transfers of oil revenues to local governments while increasing royalties payments for central government coffers (Eaton 2014: 1149).
government to local levels of government and transfers to local governments increased substantially from when the government came into power in 2006. However, the capacity of these local governments, in particular the juntas parroquiales, is extremely patchy even though they have more authority on paper to implement policies and programs for rural development under the new regime (Interview 15 2013). The establishment of coordinating ministries was done with the intent of promoting better inter-institutional coordination. Entities were also established around issues such as the Sub-Secretariat of Rural Development within the MAGAP which included representation from other agencies like SENPLADES to foment coordination across ministries in rural development for example. Taken together these institutional changes represented the “return of the state” in rural development and agriculture and also represent the emergence of a more vital state capacity that could potentially been mobilized to implement a program of rural development based on via campesina principles.

It is difficult to understand these significant changes in the Ecuadorian state undertaken by the Correa government without understanding the political maneuverings of AP, a party formerly enjoying little political power. What is notable about AP is that like other populist machine parties of the past, while it orbited around Correa’s

---

50 Under the COOTAD, provincial governments now receive 27% of the transfer payments to local governments from the central government; municipalities receive 67% and juntas parroquiales, or parish level councils only 6% (Chiriboga and Wallace 2010: 17). The institutional capacity of these local governments is extremely varied in Ecuador and while under the COOTAD juntas parroquiales now have far greater jurisdiction to implement programs for agriculture and economic development they receive a far lower level of transfers from the central government to be able to do so.

51 In 2006, the central government transferred $1,417,000,000.00 to the provinces and by 2012 this had increased to $2,035,000,000.00. This has increased steadily since the height of the neoliberal period; in 1997, the central government only transferred $569,000,000.00 to local governments (SENPLADES 2013: 88).
leadership, Correa was successful in uniting a whole range of established left political forces and parties into the party fold. Many of the core figures who would later serve as Ministers came to AP from the established left parties of Ecuadorian politics. While after the 2008 constituent assembly the national leadership of the CONAIE and the PK members of the National Assembly joined the opposition to the government, at the sub-national level, leaders of PK formed alliances with AP and the government. While the AP core leaders were mainly drawn from the ranks of old left politics, the party was adept at incorporating traditional political bosses, particularly in the coastal region (Clark and García 2019). This pragmatism and the fact that AP constructed its political movement from power or from government helps to explain the way in which it has been able to incorporate sectors of the left and the right into a multi-class political coalition reflecting what Conaghan (1995) refers to as the phenomenon of Ecuador’s “floating politicians” much like the “floating voters.” The fact that Correa also arrived at a time when the political system was in flux, being in power allowed the governing party to attract a whole range of political actors into the party fold.

The consolidation of AP as a political force at both the national and sub-national levels brought with it the “nationalization” of the party system which occurred for understated in the context of Ecuadorian history. I believe this needs to be understood in relation to the “return of the state” and the clear political project and political stability the Correa government brought about. While Ecuador has been formally a democratic country since 1979 and prior to this had a history of national popular authoritarian

---

52 These parties included the Partido Socialista Ecuatoriana (PSE), the Movimiento Popular Democratico (MPD), Pachakutik (PK), the Ecuadorian Communist Party, or Partido Comunista Ecuatoriana (PCE) and the main center-left social democratic party Izquierda Democratica (ID).
governments, since the mid-1990s in particular, it has been very difficult for one party to gain a majority in the Congress (Alcántara y Freidenberg, 2001). Ecuadorian politics has also been marked historically by regionalism with center and left parties being dominant in the Highlands and right wing and populist parties dominating the Coast. The resultant historical regional cleavages in electoral politics, some suggest, were exacerbated by neoliberal decentralization (Faust 2008). With the party system in disarray in 2006, the 2009 and 2013 national elections saw AP gain national representation in the different regions of the country and for one of the first times in history, Ecuadorian party politics were no longer fractured along regional lines. Political scientists have pointed out the tendency towards regional splits in national voting patterns and AP is the first political party to gain equal levels of support throughout the country with the “nationalization”\textsuperscript{53} of its politics (Polga-Hecimovich 2013). As I have argued elsewhere (Clark and García 2019), the nationalization of party politics in Ecuador correlated with the state building efforts of the Correa government and future research could analyze causal linkages between post-neoliberal state building and the nationalization of voting and the party system.

**Post-Neoliberal Agricultural and Rural Development Programs**

The coming to power of the Correa government brought a strengthening of state capacity and power at the national level compared to the neoliberal period when the role of the state and state capacity to implement agricultural and rural development programs was reduced. These investments were mainly channeled through the Ministry of Agriculture,

\textsuperscript{53} The nationalization of party politics is defined by Imke Harbers as “the degree to which major political parties obtain similar vote shares throughout the national territory” (2010: 606).
Ministerio de Agricultura, Ganadería, Acuacultura y Pesca (MAGAP) and the Instituto for the Popular and Solidarity Economy, or Instituto Nacional de Economía Popular y Solidaria (IEPS). In the first years of the government, different programs were implemented including a subsidized nitrogen fertilizer program (urea). The MAGAP increased investments in extension services through a new program Escuelas de la Revolución Agraria (ERAs), aimed exclusively at smallholders. The ERAs later evolved into the program Hombro a Hombro, allowing agronomists to have an office in rural communities, often working directly with the junta parroquial in a local area. The government also invested heavily in the Programa de Semillas de Alta Rendimiento, which provides smallholders, that is producers with under 20 hectares of land, with subsidized “kits” of improved seed varieties, fertilizers and pesticides (MAGAP 2013). Producers farming less than twenty hectares became eligible for a subsidy on urea, a synthetic nitrogen fertilizer, through the MAGAP. The cost of this is reflected in the amount of money that the country spends on imported agricultural inputs\(^5\). Other non-agricultural programs have impacted rural areas such as the conditional cash transfer programs with environmental conditions, including the Socio-Bosque and Socio-Paramo programs which paid landowners to steward forested areas. The boom in rural infrastructure projects including roads, bridges, public buildings like schools and hospitals, as well as other infrastructure also needs to be understood as part of the broader picture of the return to a more state-led model of agricultural and rural development.

\(^{54}\) Imports of chemical pesticides increased from $159,700,00.00USD in 2000 to $504,800,000.00 USD in 2013. In terms of metric tons, imports of chemical fertilizers, insecticides and herbicides increased from 445,504 tones in 2000 to 641,391 tones in 2013 (SENPLADES 2014: 163).
In terms of programs to support agricultural production, the “return of the state” manifested itself through investments in programs for agriculture and rural development implemented via the MAGAP. This expansion can be observed through the growth in the annual operating budget of the MAGAP which increased from $159,749,000 USD in 2000 to 504,782,000 USD in 2013 (Carrion and Herrera 2012: 54-55). There was a significant expansion of public credit available to agricultural producers through the national development bank, the *Banco Nacional de Fomento* (BNF), reflected in the dramatic growth of loans, the return of public financing to rural areas and small producers, producer associations and small businesses. The BNF opened up new branches in historically underserved rural areas and the plan of the government was to eventually establish a branch in each *canton* (county) of the country (Interview 2013).

According to the BNF statistics, in 2005, prior to the election of the Correa government, the bank lent out $176,187,218 to 49,191 borrowers at the national level. In 2012, after five years of dramatic expansion under the Correa government, the bank lent out $525,454,061 to 220,192 borrowers\(^{55}\). An analysis of the recipients of BNF credit during 2010, determined that 60% of credit was destined to cattle production, 29% towards crops produced through monocultural techniques and only 11% was associated with products that could be considered traditionally “*campesino*” crops produced in more diversified farming systems (Carrion and Herrera 2012: 99). The destination of BNF credit towards cattle production\(^{56}\) may benefit *campesinos* or smallholder producers in some areas like the Amazon but the allocation of these credits was not focused on

\(^{55}\) These figures were provided directly to the author by the BNF financial department in 2013.

\(^{56}\) This growing tendency towards land use for ranching and grazing in Ecuador is reflected in the increases in dairy production increased between 19.2% between 2007 and 2012 (SENPLADES 2014: 155).
transforming the food system towards sustainable intensification or the promotion of more agroecological production techniques but essentially through the deepening of existing conventional production of which food sovereignty discourse is critical.

On the commercialization and processing side, one of the main rural development programs for smallholders, often tied into the programs analyzed previously, is that of “inclusive business” or negocios inclusivos. This model is essentially one of contract farming where smallholders are inserted into conventional agricultural commodity chains through contracts with agro-industrial processing companies through the Programa Nacional de Negocios Rurales Inclusivos (PRONERI). The PRONERI promotes a model of contract farming in which smallholders, producing milk, feed corn, rice and other commodities, make contracts with agri-business enterprises like Nestle. The MAGAP had budgeted $126 million USD on this program from 2010-2014 (Chiriboga y Wallace 2010: 14). The PRONERI attempts to govern or regulate commodity chains from the producer through to the intermediary to ensure fair and pre-negotiated prices for producers through contracts monitored by the MAGAP (Interview 24 2013). The harvests are sold directly to private aggregators and processors and in other cases through the Unidad Nacional de Almacenamiento (UNA) which had been established in the 1970s prior to neoliberalism and was eliminated in the 1990s. Through the UNA and the PRONERI, the MAGAP promoted the integration of smallholders into the production of hard feed corn in the Negocios Inclusivos model. An example of this policy targeted to small producers is that of the government’s Plan Maíz or plan for feed corn production that I analyze in chapter five (MAGAP 2013). The Plan Maíz sets the target of making the country self-sufficient, or in the words of the plan, “food sovereign”, in hard feed
corn production used for animal feed and inputs for agro-industrial products. This policy reflects the government’s emphasis on import substitution as well as increased investments in agriculture.

The PRONERI started as an initiative promoted through international cooperation and specifically the Dutch NGO, Dutch Development Cooperation Service or Servicio Holandés de Cooperación al Desarrollo (SNV). Christian Marlin, the Director of the PRONERI, worked previously with the SNV and before that in international development cooperation, stated in an interview that the hope as the government would scale-up the model of inclusive supply chains that development cooperation had pioneered (Interview 24 2014). Marlin said the PRONERI was created in 2010 when Ramon Espinel was the Minister of Agriculture when Marlin, who had worked on projects with a focus on inclusive supply chains, joined the MAGAP to help establish the PRONERI as an official program. As he described it, the aim was to scale-up the lessons learned through development cooperation projects that had worked with this focus and implement strategies that would “transform the development cooperation project into a public policy of the Ministry of Agriculture” (Interview 24 2013). As Marlin stated, the need to convert the PRONERI into a public policy and government program came from the lessons learned from the projects implemented in nine different countries by the SNV which included the lesson learned that “…these inclusive supply chains are not effective without a public policy behind them that helps the initiative cover marginal costs incurred through such relations between smallholders and businesses” and that while these supply chains may exist, they will not reach as many producers without state support (Interview 24 2013). The PRONERI worked with associations and individual producers, and Marlin
stated that while it made more sense to work with associations or cooperatives it was more of a challenge to find stable, high-capacity producer associations (Interview 24 2013). The PRONERI has been criticized as the antithesis of food sovereignty and even as a form of “indirect land grabbing” since it promotes monocropping and dependence on one crop (Yumbla 2011: 120). At the same time, aspects of the PRONERI also overlap with the Chayanovian vision of aggregating the production of smallholders through “vertical integration” (1966) which is arguably the central challenge for a via campesina strategy of rural development.

The various programs and policies I have described in this section clearly do not represent a “re-embedding” of the economy in great social control in Karl Polanyi’s terms, or even in social democratic terms. However I believe they represent the impacts of Polanyi’s “double movement” (1957) since they all involved a greater role for the Ecuadorian state in regulating and intervening in agricultural markets, putting certain indirect and direct subsidies in place for producers and investing in rural public infrastructure in ways that had not occurred in Ecuador since the agrarian reforms of the 1970s. Though these policies can be considered post-neoliberal, due to the central role of the state, they bear little resemblance in terms of their content with the vision of food sovereignty laid out in either the 2008 constitution or the 2009 LORSA. For example, the expansion of credit from the BNF is largely tied to mono-crop commodity production and this ties into the focus of the MAGAP’s main programs that encourage producers, small and large, into monocrop and conventional commodity production, which ironically is criticized by food sovereignty discourse. At the same time, the government’s neo-developmental policy for the “transformación de la matriz productiva” in agriculture
focused on the substitution of imported foods and crops, such as the example of yellow feed corn analyzed in chapter five with the example of the Plan Maíz. While in some cases programs that included agricultural extension and training promoted production practices and techniques more in line with agroecological production methods or sustainable intensification, most of the training offered through the ERAs and Hombro-a-Hombro was based on conventional techniques. Although, depending on the knowledge of the extension staff in charge of the local programming, in some cases alternative techniques may also have been incorporated (Interview 25 2013). The Correa government had originally campaigned on an “Agrarian Revolution” (Giunta 2014) traditionally associated with land reform in the Latin American context and in this vein the government also implemented a land reform program known as Plan Tierras. For the most part, Plan Tierras did not involve the expropriation and redistribution of land, but land transferred instead through the state facilitating the purchase of land by campesinos via long-term, low-interest loans. As of March 2013, an internal document stated that the government had redistributed 20,524 hectares to 4020 families through the program, significantly less than earlier objectives (MAGAP 2015).

What is apparent from this brief overview of some of the government’s main policies is that advocates of food sovereignty would almost certainly consider them as going in the opposite direction rather than towards food sovereignty as a via campesina since they focused on subsidizing smallholders to insert themselves into conventional agricultural commodity production, losing “autonomy” (Stock and Fourney 2015). At the same time, a few government-implemented or funded programs fell more in line with a via campesina approach. As I analyze in chapter six, the MAGAP and the IEPS
supported the establishment of direct producer to consumer markets or ferias in different parts of the country. The government established a department within the MAGAP called the Coordinación General de Redes Comerciales, which focused on the establishment of alternative markets for agricultural production including ferias and Fair Trade markets. While it was smaller and under-resourced compared to other programs or departments, Redes Comerciales proved to be active in building alliances to work with local governments, which also set about implementing alternative via campesina programs for agriculture as analyzed in chapter six. One of the initiatives that Redes Comerciales has been particularly involved in is the promotion of Participatory Guarantee Systems (PGS), peer to peer agricultural certification for agroecological and sustainable agricultural production, which I analyze in chapter six. One program, likely one of the largest missed opportunities for a via campesina strategy, was the legal provision of procurement by public institutions of produce from smallholder producers established in the Ley de la Economía Popular y Solidaria (LOEPS), passed in 2011. It regulates social economy enterprises including producer cooperatives and associations. According to the LOEPS, five percent of the budget for public procurement in government Ministries or departments could be reserved for purchases from this sector. Though the IEPS established an entire department dedicated to assisting producer associations to access these opportunities, there were a number of problems in finding vendors who had sufficient volumes to supply public procurement contracts. Though these programs have been successful in Brazil and in other Latin American countries (Schneider 2014) it proved too challenging for the government to change course and form development mechanisms to include small producers. In interviews with some of the different actors
involved in this scheme, several challenges were identified including conflicts between
the associations and the public institutions over price, product variety and continuous
supply (Interview 11 2013; Interview 31 2013). These problems exemplify the challenges
involved in public procurement from small-scale producers due to a lack of capacity to
organize and then aggregate production, residue from government underinvestment over
the last three decades. As I analyze in chapter seven, the elaboration of the Fair Trade
Strategy, the *Estrategia Ecuatoriana de Comercio Justo*, contrasted with these other
initiatives developed through deliberation with various actors in the Fair Trade sector -
mainly the producer cooperatives that represent campesinos producing cacao, bananas,
coffee and other products - did actually represent an example of an embedded autonomy
between the government and producer organizations.

I believe this brief overview demonstrates that all of these various measures led to
a significant “return of the state” in agriculture, understood as a return to “statism,” with
policies and programs driven by Ecuador characterizing a “territorial national
government” (Scholte 2004: 3). It further demonstrates a decline of the model of
*proyectismo* characterized by more polycentric local implementation and a greater role
for international cooperation. The recentralization of the jurisdictional authority of the
Ecuadorean state, through the 2010 COOTAD and the renewed role of the MAGAP in
implementing programs of a national scope, transformed the previous model from one
where it was more typical for rural social organizations to work directly with local
municipalities and national and international NGOs to implement rural development
projects (Bebbington 1993; Keese and Argudo 2006). These different agricultural
development programs were also linked in terms of an overarching logic or model of
development to the broader objectives of the PBV national development plan: such as increasing the production of conventional agricultural commodities like hard feed corn, soya and palm oil to substitute imports for domestic production and to use MAGAP’s own terms, promote food sovereignty (MAGAP 2013). A commonality of all of these various “statist” programs is the way in which they are characterized by a kind of “institutional monocropping” (Evans 2004) with programs largely designed at the national level in Ministry offices and implemented through regional branches of the MAGAP, IEPS or other ministries, or in partnership with GADs. As I will examine in the last section of this chapter, institutional spaces for “deliberative development” (Evans 2004) about the content of these programs or how they could be implemented most effectively was also reduced. In this sense, there was a general lack of “embeddedness” between these programs and rural social organizations that, as I argued in chapter one, could have led to synergies for a state supported via campesina.

**Agribusiness Power and the Post-Neoliberal State**

The Correa government did invest more resources into production, but it also brought in several new laws and programs that increased regulation in the agri-food sector. One of the boldest initiatives in this regard was an initiative for nutritional food labelling known popularly as the “stoplight” label which indicated the amounts of sugar and fats in all foods. It is considered to have had a positive impact in raising awareness amongst consumers about the nutritional content of processed foods (see Díaz et. Al 2017). With the prohibition of GMOs in the 2008 constitution, the government also implemented a mandatory GMO labelling practice for all food products and to disclose GMO information to consumers. All processed foods sold to consumers had to abide by this
new law. While different groups pushed to ban Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) in agriculture, in 2012 President Correa publicly stated that this ban was a mistake and that the country should consider amending the constitution to allow public universities to experiment and research GMOs. This generated uproar and the Colectivo Agroecológico and other groups campaigned against movements within the state to consider amending the constitution by passing a law permitting public research of GMOs (see Intriago and Bravo 2015). Ultimately, the Colectivo Agroecológico and other environmental groups were successful in opposing attempts by the government to find a loophole in the constitution and adopt a law that would permit the entry of GMOs into the country or research on GMOs for scientific purposes.

Though the PRONERI program described previously has been described as facilitating “indirect land grabbing” (Yumbla 2011) by making small producers subordinate to agroindustry conglomerates, the idea of linking smallholders to private agroindustrial aggregators or processors was also seen as a way of tackling economic inequality by assisting small producers get higher prices for their crops. One initiative with this focus was the Manual de Buenas Practicas para Supermercados conceived through the Superintendencia de Control de Poder de Mercado, created in 2012. It is essentially a guideline for supermarkets obligating them to buy more produce from smallholders. This guideline would force the largest supermarkets in Ecuador to increase the diversity in their providers and to buy from small producers, micro-businesses and start-ups and by doing so give preferential access to social economy enterprises. The government’s policies to replace imported crops and food with domestic production appeared to be compatible with domestically owned supermarkets, which expanded
The domestic agribusiness and processing sector was one sector favored by the policies of the “transformación de la matriz productiva” being named as a strategic sector in the 2013-2017 PBV (SENPLADES 2013). What is notable here is the way in which elements of neoliberal strategies (like the inclusive value chains of PRONERI) combined with the post-neoliberal focus on a stronger role for the national government in promoting these initiatives. In the case of Bolivia under the Morales government, Cordoba and Jansen have described this new model as “neocollectivism” (2014) and I believe this is also a relevant descriptor in the Ecuadorian case.

The government strengthened the pre-existing national labelling scheme for products made in Ecuador known as the Primero Ecuador campaign and labelling process. After the economic downturn caused by a decline in oil prices, the government put in place a series of measures to stimulate the domestic economy by restricting imports of products produced domestically known as the salvaguardias o sobretasas arancelarias. This coincided with the establishment of the Alianza para el Emprendimiento e Innovación (AEI), a government-created institution to support entrepreneurship and innovation. In line with the supermarkets Manual, domestically-owned supermarkets were forced by these measures to replace imports and purchase from domestic producers including from the social economy (Welle 2015). The government’s policies appear to have bolstered nationally-owned supermarkets, which are some of the largest private companies in Ecuador. For example, annual sales of the La Favorita, a corporation which owns the largest supermarkets in Ecuador, the SuperMaxi chain, increased substantially during the first years of the Correa government jumping from $483,973,320 million USD in 2006 and reaching $1,619,882,000 billion USD in 2012.
The food-processing sector has become one of the fastest growing sectors of the Ecuadorian economy, currently representing 45% of manufacturing output and increasing from 1,849,040,000 billion USD in 2006 to 3,315,750,000 billion USD in 2011 (ISIP 2015: 14). Clearly the interests of agribusiness relative to those of smallholders have not been challenged under the Correa government, although the collection of taxes has increased and new labour and environmental regulations have increased the costs of production for some products (Interview 18 2013; Interview 19 2013). While a specific analysis would be necessary to determine the impacts exactly, programs like the PRONERI, subsidized inputs and others, are a kind of indirect subsidy for domestic agribusiness firms since they help these firms secure the supply side of their operations. However, in this regard it is important to emphasize that the 2008 constitution, while being anti-neoliberal, is not anti-market or anti-private enterprise as it prohibits the expropriation of private property. Even so, the criticism commonly levelled against the agri-food sector is that it is dominated by a few large private firms. While an initiative like the *Manual* might not fundamentally alter this structure, it could lead to some important structural changes within the agri-food sector and create a more favorable environment for small producers and social economy enterprises reflecting the politics of “symbiotic transformation” (Olin Wright 2010).

Studies on agricultural policies in the Correa period have pointed to the enduring influence of agribusiness on the Correa government and suggested that the political influence of groups like Chambers of Commerce and other large firms like *La Favorita* prevented the government from moving towards the programs mandated by the LORSA (Daza 2015; 2018; Herrera 2015; Macaroff 2018). Though the question of government-
agribusiness was somewhat outside the scope of this study, this is surely a reason why the *via campesina* vision proved elusive. On the other hand, other studies have suggested that the capacity of the state did improve some under the Correa government even if the government did not really challenge business interests (Chiason-Lebel 2016; Wolff 2016). Following Tasha Fairfield’s (2015) distinction between the “structural” and “instrumental” power of business in politics, certain state institutions in the Correa period do seem to have limited the “instrumental” power of the agri-food sector even if the “structural” power of big agri-food businesses has not been challenged and appears to even have been strengthened. The pressure of agribusiness interests makes intuitive sense in terms of *realpolitik* due to large-scale agri-business also generates significant economic activity (and foreign exchange in a dollarized economy) and tax revenues which are needed more than ever to pay for the increased public investments of the Correa government. These studies, and others that have focused on the relationship between the government and agribusiness, should ultimately be considered in relation to this study in order to get a more fulsome picture of this period and the policies for agriculture and rural development.

**International Relations and Development Cooperation**

During the Correa period, China replaced multilateral institutions as Ecuador’s most important lender with Chinese credit exchanged for the future production of Ecuadorian oil. The Correa government negotiated with China to pre-finance the Ecuadorian state budget in exchange for long-term sales of Ecuadorian oil to China. Under these agreements, the government now sells the majority of its oil to PetroChina at a pre-negotiated price. PetroChina is then free to sell the oil on the open market when it
receives it, essentially acting as an intermediary. The increased role of China under the Correa government was a marked shift away from the historical ties between Ecuador and the United States especially with regards to the oil sector. Traditionally, Ecuador has had strong associations with the United States in terms of trade, aid and investment, with USAID operating in Ecuador since the 1940s (Interview 8 2013). A sign emblematic of this shift away from political relations with the U.S. came in December 2013, when the government and USAID could not come to agreement in their negotiations on international cooperation and aid and as a result USAID decided not to continuing to work in Ecuador after its current project cycle because they would not agree to the government’s terms for how aid was to be managed (Interview 8 2013). While European governments did continue to provide funds cooperation from Europe declined and cooperation from Asia increased, in particular from China, increased though this cooperation was centered on building infrastructure (Interview 5 2013). I believe it is important to highlight these changes, as the decline of development cooperation reduced a key source of expertise and seed financing for alternative agriculture projects which, as I analyzed in chapter three, had been tied up with European and North American development cooperation donors (Intriago et. al 2017: 350).

As I argue in chapter three, and also analyze in the three case study chapters, the origins of the via campesina approach to agriculture and rural development appears to be tied up with the influence of international development cooperation funds from European and North American donors in particular. The government’s policy of regulating development cooperation and attempting to align it with the Plan Buen Vivir along with other factors, including the 2008 financial crisis, the rise of China and the emergence of a
more multi-polar global order have also affected the shifts in development cooperation during the Citizen’s Revolution that would significantly reduce the role of these international cooperation organizations in rural development efforts. Under the Correa government, an effort was made to diversify trade and investment relations with other countries in the global south. Ecuador also lay at the forefront of strengthening Latin American integration as part of the Bolivarian project, the *Alianza Bolivariana para Nuestra America* (ALBA), spearheaded by the Chávez-Maduro government in Venezuela as part of the “new regionalism” emerging in South America (Benzi, Guayasamín y Zapata 2013). Ecuador proved to be a central player in this ‘new regionalism’ through its promotion of the *Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos y Caribeños* (CELAC) and *Union de Naciones Suramericanas* (UNASUR) blocs (Bonilla and Long 2010). Quito was selected as the headquarters of the UNASUR which was constructed on the outskirts of Quito and after the death of Hugo Chávez in 2013, Correa positioned himself as a key leader of the Latin American efforts at Latin American political and economic integration through these new regional bodies.

The post-neoliberal turn, at least on paper, significantly altered the governance of international cooperation as well. As a result of the 2011 Presidential Decree 812 (2011: 33), all NGOs working in Ecuador were mandated to register with the state through the *Secretaría Tecnica de Cooperación Internacional* (SETECI). The SETECI was established with the aim of having NGOs align the work that they do with the goals of the national PBV development plan. The SETECI was established to ensure a government goal referred to as the “sovereign” management of international cooperation and aid in Ecuador. The SETECI emphasizes that international cooperation and aid must align with
the *Plan Buen Vivir*. In its annual report, the SETECI emphasizes that the Correa government has recuperated the “planning and regulatory capacities of the state…And in contrast to the neoliberal agenda, recognizes the State as the principal actor in development…In this context, international cooperation should be received as a complement to the development plans of the country” (2011: 33). A representative of the negotiating team of SETECI explained in an interview, that bilateral and multilateral cooperation now needs to be negotiated through SENPLADES, SETECI and the Ministry of Finance in order to establish how cooperation projects will be deployed and must align with the PBV (Interview 5 2013). This shift also needs to be understood as a reaction against the dispersed and fragmented nature of international cooperation and aid in the neoliberal period when donors were able to impose their own program design and agendas and implement their projects with little to no oversight by the Ecuadorian state (Interview 3 2013). As part of the “sovereign management” of international cooperation, the SETECI now requires: “1. Processes of negotiation and the construction of strategies of international cooperation aligned and harmonized to national policies 2. The utilization of national public systems (planning, public finances and public procurement) in international cooperation 3. Reviews and Monitoring within the Framework of the Paris Declaration 4. Decentralized evaluation of aid effectiveness by local governments.” (SETECI 2011: 38-48). The idea of alignment with national public policies is a central aspect of the Paris Declaration (OECD 2014) and it is interesting that the SETECI draws on the Paris Declaration as part of the rationale behind its new framework for the “post-neoliberal” governance of international cooperation.
These shifts in international relations and their impacts on development cooperation appear to have put a squeeze on rural social organizations that have historically depended on funds from international cooperation donors. In other cases, certain more political NGOs have emerged to become the most vocal opponents of the Correa government. The economic strategy of the Correa government, with its focus on the extraction of natural resources is a contentious issue in Ecuador. The issue has generated considerable conflict with social movements and environmental NGOs. NGOs such as Acción Ecologica have been central to the criticisms of the government’s mining policies. In June 2013, the government issued Presidential decree 16 on the activities of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), leading to the closure of one environmental NGO, the Fundación Pachamama (CEGE 2014). However, as Tammy Lewis’ study of the environmental movement in Ecuador suggested, many of these organizations were “dependent” on foreign funding and had shallow roots in local society (2016). While the government invoking its “sovereignty” over international development cooperation funds might have ugly chauvinistic overtones, it also needs to be understood as part of a movement against the proyectismo of the neoliberal period and a return to state planning as an antidote to the polycentrism of the neoliberal period when the national government’s role in development planning was reduced.

**Rural Social Movements, the Decline of Neo-Corporatism and Post-Neoliberal Citizenship**

While rural social movements were demanding the return of the state in the neoliberal period, the return of the state during the Correa government arguably weakened these
organizations and the influence they had in policymaking and within the state (Silva 2009: 167-168). On the one hand, it is predictable that social mobilization declined as Ecuador became more prosperous and experienced higher rates of economic growth and reductions in poverty. However, the design of the new institutions of the post-neoliberal state deliberately reduced spaces of corporatist deliberation in the name of strengthening the “autonomy” of the state vis-à-vis particular interests in society, reflecting Joel Migdal’s focus on the centrality of the establishment of “state social control” in state building processes (1998; 2001). The Correa government was also deliberate in its mission to “decorporatize” state institutions and the political system which, it argued, was a vestige of neoliberalism. As discussed in the previous chapter, the state in the neoliberal period was more permeable in terms of organized rural social interests but in particular for the CONAIE. These Correa government moves to eliminate the institutions have been criticized as anti-democratic (de la Torre 2008). On the other hand, these moves have been viewed as part of the process of reclaiming state “autonomy” as an alternative to neoliberalism and the reduction of the influence of big finance and big business policy processes (Ramírez 2016). While the government was criticized for some of its actions as attacks on civil society, an underlying tension that has been undertheorized in the context of the post-neoliberal return of the state is between “accountability” and “autonomy” in democratic politics (Bowen 2015: 102). I also believe that since Correa was unable to secure an electoral alliance with PK in 2006, the dismantling of the Indigenous neo-

57 The “neo-corporatist” (Chartock 2011; 2013) spaces within the state that were established were These institutions included the institutions such as the Dirección de Educación Bilingüe (DNEIB) was created by the government of Rodrigo Borja in 1990. Later the CODENPE was created Consejo de Desarrollo de las Nacionalidades y Pueblos del Ecuador (CODENPE) that was established to give the CONAIE, as the organization representing Indigenous peoples in Ecuador, a voice in implementing rural development projects.
corporatist agencies, which the CONAIE effectively controlled, needs to be understood in terms of political brokerage and *realpolitik*.

For the national leadership of the CONAIE, relations with the Correa government became a zero-sum game and due to political disagreements early on, the possibility of any kind of “mutual empowerment” (Wang 1999) became totally elusive. The post-neoliberal state was clearly the opposite of what the CONAIE had hoped to achieve by pushing for the recognition of Ecuador as a plurinational state. And many have argued that the CONAIE was marginalized under the Correa government in particular over local struggles over resource extraction projects on Indigenous territories (Becker 2013; Martínez Novo 2014; Riofrancos 2015). As Eduardo Silva has put it, the Correa government “…appropriated the incorporation project that emerged from resistance to neoliberalism and delivered public spending…directly to local communities and individual citizens…although Correa’s government believed that interest groups, including popular sector ones, should be excluded from policymaking, his government’s policies, however, would address their interests” (2017: 105-106). While the privileged access to the state through channels of intermediation was eliminated under Correa, it is not as though rural social organizations never enjoyed representation within the government or within the state. In 2010, based on the mechanisms put in place in the 2010 constitution for citizen participation within the state, the government adopted the *Ley Orgánica de Participación Ciudadana*, or Citizen Participation Law. In fact, the 2008 constitution establishes a fifth power known as “Transparency and Social Control,” the *Consejo de Participación Ciudadana y Control Social* (CPCCS), which is responsible for designating officials that oversee other branches of government and public agencies.
The Citizen Participation Law adopted in 2010 provides a range of tools the public could theoretically use to hold government programs accountable including through audits and representation on citizen councils within different government Ministries and agencies. Though a study on this question would provide a more definitive answer, this law and the mechanism for participation did not appear to be effective for rural social organizations to influence the state.

Though the government eliminated or undermined what were considered neo-corporatist institutions, including the DNEIB and the CODENPE, in the case of the CONAIE, new spaces and institutions for social participation were also created. With regards to rural development and food sovereignty, the most important one was arguably the *Conferencia Plurinacional y Intercultural de Soberania Alimentaria* (COPISA), created in 2010 to provide a mechanism for elected citizen representatives to lead the process of drafting nine secondary laws to the LORSA\(^{58}\). Activists from the different federations and the *Colectivo* who were involved in the constituent assembly later became representatives in the COPISA (See Peña 2013; 2016). The COPISA promoted widespread participation by a wide variety of actors from rank and file *campesinos*, local politicians, representatives of NGOs and public servants all over Ecuador (Peña 2013: 14). The process through which the COPISA consulted the public to draft nine laws concluded in 2012 and only one of the nine laws drafted by the COPISA, the Law of Agro-biodiversity, was ever introduced in the National Assembly to be debated by

---

\(^{58}\) Article 32 of the LORSA stipulates that the COPISA is responsible for drafting nine supplementary including: 1) land and the productive resources to produce on that land; 2) artisanal fishing, aquaculture and the conservation of mangrove fisheries; 3) seeds, agrobiodiversity and agroecology; 4) ancestral territory and communal property; 5) food safety regulations; 6) agro-industrial development and the agricultural workforce; 7) credits, subsidies and insurance; 8) nutritional and consumer health; and 9) commercialization.’ (Peña 2013: 7)
lawmakers. This suggests that there was little political will on the part of the government to implement it. However, the COPISA gave air to the discourse of food sovereignty by providing a platform for advocates of a *via campesina* to advance proposed laws for food sovereignty as well as public resources to hold widespread consultations around the country on the legal proposals for the secondary laws.

Amongst other organizations, the *Colectivo Agroecológico* and other rural organizations and agricultural and rural development experts were important actors in participating in the first COPISA. The government also created a body called *Consejo Sectorial Campesino Ciudadano* in the Ministry of Agriculture through which representatives of rural social movement platforms (in particular the CNC-Eloy Alfaro, the FENOCIN and the *Colectivo Agroecológico*) participated. These councils also exist at the provincial level of MAGAP but are consultative bodies lacking decision-making power over public policies and government programs (Interview 12 2013). A small but not insignificant group of politicians were elected to the national assembly for AP from the ranks of rural social movements and publicly supported a *via campesina* vision of rural development giving these movements channels of representation within AP and the government. Overall though, the social and popular movements that had converged in opposing neoliberalism in the 1990s and 2000s became disarticulated and fractured. For

---

59 In this group I have included Pedro de la Cruz, Indigenous leader from Imababura and the former President of the FENOCIN; Ramiro Vela, former President of the Ecuadorian Organic Agriculture Association (PROBIO) and a member of the National Assembly for AP, Ervia Ponce, a small agroecological producer from the province of Azuay as an alternate member of the National Assembly for Azuay; Jorge Loor, the ex-President of the *Unión Provincial de Organizaciones Campesinas de Manabí* (UPOCAM), the case analyzed in chapter five, as an alternate national deputy for AP, Ángel Doguer, national member for AP and former President of the FENACLE.
example, national level popular social organizations that splintered largely along pro and anti-government lines came into being with separate contingents in the annual International Worker’s Day marches on May 1st (El Pais 2015). Despite this, different leaders from the Federations formed an alliance called the Red Agraria\footnote{The Red Agraria was made up of many of the former members of the Mesa Agraria, including the FENOCIN; CNC-Eloy Alfaro, the Corporación de Montubios del Litoral, CORMOLIT and representatives of the COPISA and collected signatures in favor of a proposed land law (Daza 2015).} which unsuccessfully attempted to introduce an alternative land law in the Assembly in 2013 (Daza 2015: 18). In 2014 the government introduced draft legislation, the Ley Orgánica de Tierras Rurales y Territorios Ancestrales, in the National Assembly through the Comision de Soberania Alimentaria, chaired by AP member of the Assembly Miguel Carvajal. In 2015, the Comision held pre-legislative consultations throughout the country and a final version of the law was eventually adopted by the government in 2016. While this version was criticized by the CONAIE, other groups such as the FEI, FENOCIN and CNC-Eloy Alfaro were more critically supportive of it. While the law does not specify particular limits on the size of land it does include mechanisms to monitor the productivity of land and a fund for the redistribution of land.

While the power and influence of the CONAIE, FENOCIN and the other national Federations declined, the Colectivo Agroecológico, a network made up of various actors that was central to the institutionalization of food sovereignty in the 2008 constitution, I believe, became the most important collective actor carrying the banner of food sovereignty and attempting to pressure the state to implement the vision of the constitution and the 2009 LORSA under the Correa government. As I described in chapter three however, the Colectivo is a very different kind of organization than others,
with a different social base and internal culture than the traditional organizations, including the CONAIE, the FENOCIN, the FENACLE or the CNC-Eloy or the other organizations involved in the *Mesa Agraria*. These organizations are all Federations of regional *campesino* and Indigenous organizations representing territorially rooted communities or federations of associations and are more hierarchal and formalized, while the *Colectivo* is a much more informal kind of platform or space in which various groups and individuals participated with the common aim of promoting agroecological agriculture. More than organizing around resistance or opposition (as the Federations did with regards to neoliberalism in the 1990s), as several agronomist academics who are part of the *Colectivo* put it in a chapter they published “…we view the *Colectivo* as not specifically organized around disobedience or “resistance” to the localizing or globalizing economic forces of modern food, but rather it is organized in favour of the on-going, intensifying forces of daily “existence”: finding and strengthening existing patterns of food practice as a means of policy intervention.” (Arce et. al 2015: 126). This vision is distinctive from the earlier experiences of “bottom-up corporatism” (Coronel 2011) described in chapter three where organizations made clear demands of the state and pressured for their implementation.

While the *Colectivo* also makes demands on the state, this approach is clearly quite different from that of the other rural social movement organizations which continue to have a more classically political position of lobbying and pressuring the government for demands such as land reform and access to water, credit etc. The *Colectivo* became a more important actor than the Federations in their interface with certain state institutions, with sympathetic officials in the MAGAP in particular. With support from the MAGAP
and other public institutions the Colectivo organized what they called the *Jornadas Agroecologicas*, which the Colectivo began organizing in 2013. They brought renowned scientist and expert on agroecological agriculture Dr. Miguel Altieri to Ecuador to give talks and presentations to the public and to officials working in the MAGAP and in GADs concerning agroecology as an alternative for agricultural development (*Colectivo Agroecológico* 2019). In these regards, the Colectivo arguably had some moderate successes at “moving the state” (Heller 2001) during the period studied by working with sympathetic officials within the MAGAP and in GADs. This dynamic appears to reflect Jonathan Fox’s theory of the “sandwich strategy” (1993) which describes the possibility of change based on synergies across state and society based on pressure from below and sympathetic actors within state institutions. The Colectivo assumed a different role from the Federations, one more focused on symbiotic transformation by trying to influence the state instead of making political alliances with political parties as these other Federations do. The Colectivo promoted agroecology through practical actions and pressuring the state for more favourable policies to foster agroecology and *campesino* agriculture in general (Interview 99 2014). However, the Colectivo cannot claim to represent large constituencies of rural peoples the way in which the CONAIE or FENOCIN could once claim to, and this is the main drawback of this more plural and less hierarchal type of social movement platform.

While for the Correa government, the implementation of a model of rural development based on a *via campesina* was clearly not a high priority, what I have analyzed and attempted to consider was why this was the case. As has been suggested in the academic literature, “scaling up” agroecology would require a supportive state and
not only what Evans (1995: 249) refers to as the “handmaiding” of the existing agroecological production initiatives and experiences in Ecuador but also the “husbandry” of the sector in helping it to expand and grow or “scale-up” as has been discussed in the literature on agroecology (Altieri and Nicholls 2008). In this regard, agroecology alone, which was the most concrete demand of these movements, did not prove to be a mobilizing force in the same way that anti-neoliberalism proved to be for the national Federations in the 1990s in Ecuador. An interview with AP member of the Assembly for the province of Cotopaxi, Ramiro Vela, who was the former president of the national association of organic agriculture (PROBIO) and a longtime advocate of agroecology, confirmed that a lack of organized pressure from below and the difficulties of promoting agroecology, as something that required innovation, made it difficult to move the state (Interview 17 2013). When I interviewed him, he shared an anecdote about a conversation with Correa about the potential for change in the direction of a *via campesina*. He said: “One day I spoke with President Correa, and we had a discussion about agroecology…and this is what he told me, “It is very interesting, but tell me Ramiro, competition in the agricultural sector is cut throat, it is terrible. And my first responsibility as President of this country is to guarantee that here in this country there is food security. Maybe it isn’t perfect [the status quo] but I have to be responsible.” (Interview 17 2013). What I take from this anecdote and the interview with Vela was that Correa was not against agroecology but saw the promotion of alternative agricultural production as an unknown and as a risk. Investing in conventional production seemed a more predictable venture than risking investments on programs, which one could argue, still lack evidence to suggest that they can guarantee food security. One can only
extrapolate from this that resistance to agroecology within government ministries like the MAGAP persists, since agroecology remains marginal within the university curriculum in the country. In addition, other training programs in agricultural production take precedence, which made it necessary for the Colectivo to first familiarize public officials with the agroecology concept, the prime focus of the Colectivo’s actions.

In conclusion, the political and institutional context changed significantly during the Correa government. Overall, and curiously, the “return of the state” both incorporated and undermined the neo-corporatist spaces in which the CONAIE, and to a lesser extent the FENOCIN, had exercised power. These spaces were eliminated and some new ones like the COPISA emerged. The political situation was starkly different from the neoliberal period as the “anti-neoliberalism” that served as a kind of empty signifier in the popular uprisings in the 1990s and 2000s could no longer be employed as a discourse or narrative to mobilize the bases of the national Federations. At the national leadership and organizational level, groups that had potential to “move the state” - save for the leadership of the CONAIE which opposed the government and still had some capacity to mobilize its members – groups like the FENOCIN and CNC-Eloy Alfaro, criticized the government on some issues and attempted to push on particular issues but did not engage confrontation with the government or actively support it during elections. Though a number of individual leaders who rose through rural social movements and were proponents of the food sovereignty discourse did participate in the government, this didn’t alter the government’s policies, which on the whole involved implementing additional supportive measures to encourage smallholders to produce conventional agricultural commodities. At the same time, I believe the modest successes of the
"Colectivo Agroecológico" demonstrates that the Correista state was not completely "insulated" or impermeable, and the modest successes which would appear to reflect Erik Olin Wright’s theory of “symbiotic transformation” (2010) could explain the openings that emerged for the Colectivo Agroecológico as the Federations declined.

Conclusions

This chapter has provided background to interpret the disjuncture between the concepts of buen vivir and food sovereignty institutionalized in the 2008 Ecuadorian constitution and the actual agricultural and rural development policies implemented by the Correa government. While as I analyzed in chapter three, the 2008 constituent assembly provided a great deal of political space for these movements to voice and subsequently institutionalize their demands, it proved much more difficult for these movements to “move the state” (Heller 2001). In spite of this, I argued in this chapter that the policies for agricultural and rural development implemented by the government marked a significant change from the neoliberal model of proyectismo. While they fell far short of the transformative vision of food sovereignty as a via campesina as outlined in the constitution or the LORSA, the measures implemented by the government can be understood as the result of the Polanyian countermovement against the impacts of neoliberalism, even if they do not represent any kind of long-term scenario of a more “embedded” agri-food economy. While many of the programs and policies implemented by the government benefitted smallholders, they were based on conventional production methods and in this sense didn’t reflect the principles of a via campesina model.
While this “return of the state” may not have represented a case of Polanyian “re-embedding,” it did represent significant change and a countermovement against the neoliberal economic and political order.

The tangible changes that the rural population could experience firsthand lent the government political legitimacy and arguably explains why it remained popular in rural areas. The ‘return of the state’ reduced the role of NGOs as “intermediaries” (Esman and Uphoff 1984) between rural social organizations, the state and/or businesses involved in the processes of rural development. While it was necessary to build state capacity, the way in which the government went about doing so followed a zero-sum logic, more reflective of Migdal’s conception of national states attempting to subordinate heterogeneous interest groups to “state social control” (1988; 2001) or to put it another way, the government prioritized “state building” over “governance” (Yu and He 2011). As the government attempted to implement more programs from the top-down, the resultant usurping of rural social organizations, I believe, made many of the programs implemented by the government less effective. Rural social organizations had to deal directly with government ministries to apply for projects or to participate in government programs to gain financing from these ministries. This will be observed in all of the case studies. The organizations in the case studies are still receiving some funds through international cooperation but state programs have largely come to replace the role of international cooperation and NGOs in rural development. As Victor Bretón observed, in the 1980s there was an exodus of professionals from the public sector to NGOs due to the shrinking of the state caused by adjustment policies (2008: 598). During the Correa
period, as opportunities in NGOs diminished, many from the NGO sector moved back to the public sector to work in state-led rural development programs.

In general, addressing agrarian and rural political priority for the government as compared to investments in infrastructure or higher education, which are both seen as more central to moving towards a “modern knowledge economy” as laid out in the Plan Buen Vivir 2013-2017. There was little pressure on the government from the outside due to the lack of political mobilization from below that would be required to push the government in a more pro via campesina direction. This is likely because the rural sector has also benefited from many of the Correa government’s policies, even if they don’t reflect a via campesina path based on cooperative or farmer-owned agribusiness based on Chayanovian “vertical integration” (1966). The fact that rural social movement leaders enjoyed a degree of political representation with AP and within the government meant that the fundamental direction of the government’s policies were not altered. As I argued in chapter one of this dissertation, a state for food sovereignty was most likely to come about if synergies were constructed between state agencies and rural social organizations. The methodology of this dissertation, which analyzes case studies of three campesino organizations and the interface with the post-neoliberal state, reflects this argument. What the analysis in this chapter has demonstrated is that the politics of the neo-development state, and in particular the “institutional monocropping” (Evans 2004) of a return to national programs made the emergence of these state-society relations a major challenge. The dynamics and issues discussed in this chapter are reflected to varying degrees in the three case studies even though each of the organizations analyzed navigated the post-
neoliberal turn differently with varying degrees of demonstrated greater capacity in their ability to negotiate these different challenges.
Chapter 5 - The Unión Provincial de Organizaciones Campesinas de Manabí (UPOCAM) and the Challenge of “Moving” the Post-Neoliberal State

**Introduction**

The Unión Provincial de Organizaciones Campesinas de Manabí, Provincial Union of Peasant Organizations of Manabí in English (UPOCAM), has historically been one of the most influential rural Federations in coastal Ecuador. Founded in 1978 at the end of the agrarian reforms introduced under the nationalist military governments of the 1970s in Ecuador, the organization’s political coming of age was spawned by the popular protests against the implementation of neoliberal policies in the 1980s and 1990s. It was in this period that the UPOCAM began to manage rural development projects funded by NGOs and international development cooperation as part of the shift to neoliberal *proyectismo*. It was the most explicitly political of the three case studies in this research, it supported Correa’s Presidential campaign in 2006, and it became a founding member of AP in Manabí.

In this case study, I argue that despite UPOCAM’s support for the Correa government, and participation in the governing party, the post-neoliberal shift undermined the organization in its efforts to further a campesinista model of rural development. The implementation of new state programs after the post-neoliberal shift such as the Plan Maíz served to replace rather than complement the organization's efforts, since the organization ceased to implement agricultural extension programs when international funding dried up. I begin this chapter by analyzing some of the unique historical features of Manabí and the UPOCAM as an organization, with particular emphasis on the political legacies of the liberal revolution and the agrarian reform and rural modernization policies of the 1960-1970s. I argue that the founding of the UPOCAM was a clear example of “corporatism from below” (Coronel 2011) due to the hand of state employees in helping to organize the Federation. The UPOCAM was
founded with support from agrarian reform programs but replaced the state and quickly replaced the functions of these programs by implementing and managing rural development projects itself in the 1990s and 2000s. However, the participation of the organization in development projects through neoliberal *proyectismo* did not “depoliticize” UPOCAM (Ferguson 1994). On the contrary, *proyectismo* appeared to have advanced its political work through mobilization of its members into protest activities in the 1990s and through the founding of *Pachakutik*.

I suggest that the adoption of a *campesinista* orientation in the UPOCAM’s projects, most clearly exemplified by the Fincar program, was due to the influence of the *campesinista* approach favoured by NGOs like Heifer that supported the UPOCAM. This influence shaped the discourse of the leadership of the organization. In interviews UPOCAM leaders revealed that the decision to support the Correa government carried with it the hope that the state would adopt the approach of the Fincar project and scale the program up. In the end, the post-neoliberal turn had the opposite effect on the organization. The fact that the Correa government did not find a way to work collaboratively with the UPOCAM speaks to the lack of effective intermediary channels between the government and the organization, or of any kind of deliberation with either state agencies or through the participation of the organization in the governing party, AP. Despite having some representation within the government and the governing party, this did not lead to movement in a direction towards a *via campesina* in agrarian policy. I argue that the UPOCAM was the most fragile of the three organizations studied in this project, hampered by low levels of capacity. The near moribund state of the organization during the period of study appeared to correlate with the increase in agricultural extension services, credit and other programs implemented through central government institutions like the MAGAP.
History of the Region and the Organization

Manabí is the largest province on the Ecuadorian coast and has historically had a reputation as a frontier or “Wild West” within Ecuador. A common popular reference to Manabí within the Ecuadorian lexicon includes the “law of the machete”, referring to a historical lack of state presence and violence as resolution for local disputes (Friedric 2015). Other studies of Manabí emphasize the unique characteristics of the region including the relatively more equal distribution of land than in other parts of the coast, particularly the southern part of the province. Large agricultural plantations were historically not as common in Manabí as in the neighbouring provinces of Guayas or Los Rios, which together comprised the epicentre of the cacao boom of the late 1800s (Guerrero 2011: 93). Manabí experienced European immigration and settlement in the 1800s and early 1900s and the phenotype of mestizos in some parts of the province is more white than Indigenous. Smallholders were often independent petty commodity producers who owned land. A part of this history is the importance of the montubio identity in some areas of the province. A montubio is a campesino from the Ecuadorian coast and the label has historically been associated with “ferocity” and “wildness”. The best English translation is a “hill person” (Bauer 2014); something akin to the term hillbilly or redneck in the southern United States. It is not a racial identity, but the term became recognized as an official identity by the Ecuadorian state in 2001 (Roitman 2008: 8). The hillbilly stereotype of the montubio is the opposite of the submissive, quiet and docile one that the Indigenous peoples from the highlands have often been given, owing to the distinctive histories of coastal and highland Ecuador.

---

61 The provinces of Guayas and Los Rios were the epicentres of the cacao boom that made Ecuador the largest exporter of cacao in the world in the late 1800s. Capitalist wage labour plantations emerged in this period with the investment of merchant and commercial capitalists based in Guayaquil.

62 The category of montubio is not racial. A montubio could be white, Afro-Ecuadorian or Indigenous in terms of phenotype and has more with their socio-economic status as land owning peasants.
Anthropologist Daniel Bauer argues that the *montubio* identity is a “peripheral identity” within Ecuadorian society and thus linked with the history of economic expansion and resource extraction on the Ecuadorian coast in the late 1800s (2014). The coast became a much more important power centre in the late 1800s due to the cacao boom which generated areas for plantations and frontier settlements. While cacao production was concentrated in large capitalist plantations, *montubios* were smallholders and subsistence63 farmers who were integrated into the growing coastal capitalist markets engaged in the production of tagua64, coffee, sugar and cattle, which they sold to commercial intermediaries. Depending on the region, *montubios* were often semi-proletarian and their plots may have been supplemented with other economic activities. Historically women participated both in some productive agricultural labour and have the burden of the double day performing most of the labour associated with household reproduction based on traditional gendered division of labour. While *montubios* live in the various coastal provinces of Los Rios, Guayas and Esmeraldes, as well as in Manabi, this identity has a special association with Manabi because of the larger number of independent landowning smallholders in the province. The history of Manabi is deeply intertwined with the 1895 liberal revolution as well. The revolution’s leader Eloy Alfaro was born in the town of Montecristi where the 2008 constituent assembly was held in his honour. As I analyze in the third chapter, the popular or radical liberalism of Eloy Alfaro, and its egalitarian and modernizing objectives, attracted the support of a popular lower class and peasant revolutionary army known as the *montoneros*. Bauer (2014) argues that

63 Daniel Bauer identifies the traditional subsistence production of *montubio* peasants as “plantains, manioc, citrus, bananas, papaya, and a variety of other vegetables” as well as animals such as pigs, chickens, ducks, horses and donkeys (2014).

64 Tagua, also known as vegetable ivory, is harvested from the tropical forests and sold to commercial middlemen.
the emergence of the *montubio* identity is interlinked with the *montoneros* and the sociohistorical causes behind the liberal revolution.

While in this study I argue that all of the organizations have corporatist origins as an example of “state-led civil society”, the UPOCAM is the organization that is most shaped by “bottom up corporatism” (Coronel 2011) as a political strategy. Fernando Guerrero noted the state-centric discourse of rural movements in Manabí was not focused on land reform or land concentration but on the abuses of commercial middlemen, local political *caciques* and the absence of state provision of infrastructure and public services (2011: 94). Manabí rural organizations acted as central actors in pushing for the creation of the *Seguro Social Campesino* in the 1970s, which extended coverage of the social security system to rural smallholders (Castro 2008:18; Guerrero 2011: 94) through the *Instituto de Seguridad Social del Ecuador* (IESS). In sum, in Manabí, rural social and political mobilization has historically been more centered on the state guaranteeing certain rights and services coupled with a discourse of “inviting the state in” to local spaces (Nugent 1994) rather than upon land reform as in other parts of the coast or highlands.

The UPOCAM was founded in 1978 as a second-level federation of five municipal/local-level federations of peasant communities, associations or *comunas* representing 150 local organizations. Many of these local organizations formed during the agrarian reform period in order to gain access to state programs and agricultural subsidies for modernization, which augmented the introduction of Green Revolution technologies. Other local structures were *comunas*, formed after the 1937 law, though many were only communal in the legal sense not in practice65 (Guerrero 2011: 97). Another form of rural social organization that overlapped with membership in the

---

65Fernando Guerrero notes that though some *comunas* in Manabí maintain common lands such as forests or pasture though the majority do not (2011: 97)
UPOCAM during its founding was the coffee cooperative. Because they were guaranteed under the International Coffee Agreement (ICA), co-ops were important in rural Manabí from the middle of the twentieth century up until 1989 when national production quotas expired. The decline of the international quota system led to a severe decline in coffee prices and Manabí coffee production. Most of these co-ops were cooperatives in name only however, often controlled by a local leader cacique or captured by commercial intermediaries in Jipijapa and Manta (Guerrero 2011: 99). In his study of social organization in rural Manabí, Fernando Guerrero noted that the legacy of these coffee cooperatives had led many campesinos to view cooperatives with skepticism (Guerrero 2011: 99).

Since its founding, the purpose of the UPOCAM was to give political voice to its members, the campesinos, but the organization was also founded to serve as an interlocutor with government programs and to implement agricultural extension programs in local communities. This was made clear to me in an interview with Jorge Loor, former President and a founder of the UPOCAM. Loor described the way in which the nationalist military government of the 1970s encouraged campesinos to organize themselves by forming production cooperatives and associations to facilitate the agrarian reform process and participate in agricultural modernization programs (Interview 79 2013). Loor explained that extension workers from the MAGAP and the Fondo para el Desarrollo del Rural Marginal (FODERUMA), a government program of the period, helped organize the original meetings leading to establishment of the UPOCAM. The role of the military government, which encouraged organization from below through its rural development programs in the history of the UPOCAM, reflects the state-society synergy models developed by Fox (1994) and Borras (2001) but is also an example of “state-led civil society” (Frolic 1997) or “bottom-up corporatism” (Coronel 2011).

While the UPOCAM’s origins are associated with state goals in the agrarian reform period, its role became much more explicitly about social mobilization and
politics in the 1980s-1990s. The participation of many communities federated to the UPOCAM in state-led agriculture programs, which were subsequently scaled back due to neoliberal adjustment, led the organization to become critical of agricultural modernization and Green Revolution technologies (Guerrero 2011: 103). As Jorge Loor stated in a speech in the year 2000: in the 1960s and 1970s various governments played a key role in introducing input-intensive agriculture in the countryside. Yet, without subsidies, input-intensive agriculture was not a viable economic option for smallholders because it made producers more dependent on synthetic inputs. The new technologies encouraged by the government in the 1960s-1970s were initially subsidized by the state and in many cases replaced the traditional production system that combined subsistence production and petty commodity production (traditional montubio production) with the increasing mono-cropping of rice, wheat and corn. The withdrawal of the national government from agrarian reform led the organization to take a critical stance against Green Revolution technologies and, with the support of the campesinista NGO Heifer, to develop the Fincar program to promote agroecological and organic production methods (Castro 2008). At the same time, the leadership of the organization continued to have a state-centric view of politics and political struggle, participating in popular mobilizations against neoliberalism and explicitly demanding more public investment in rural development and agriculture, more characteristic of the previous agrarian reform period.

Neoliberalism and Campesinista Rural Development

The UPOCAM was founded as an organization that was to be the political voice of the campesinos and so the neoliberal period brought with it a chance to mature politically through participation in the national popular mobilizations of the 1990s and early 2000s. The neoliberal period also ushered in new opportunities to manage rural development projects through proyectismo. The organization was able to attract ventures ranging from
large bilateral programs funded by the World Bank - in the case of the UPOCAM funding from the PROLOCAL program - to smaller undertakings funded by international and national NGOs. Through the PROLOCAL program, the organization established its own community radio station, an Internet café run by youth in Jipijapa, healthcare programs and a non-traditional education strategy for adult and rural youth dropouts to get their high school certificates, the Unidad Mi Tierra. The UPOCAM developed an explicitly campesinista focus with programs promoting agricultural production using agroecological and organic production methods through the influence of and collaboration with NGOs like Heifer and Fundación María Luisa Gómez de la Torre, both organizations with an explicitly campesinista orientation (Guerrero 2011: 114). The funding for these followed the proyectista model of piecemeal projects, though some longer-term funding was received through the PROLOCAL program to support production initiatives. UPOCAM's evolving “surrogate state” (Brass 2010) role at the local level is apparent through its penchant to work across a range of areas where the government provided inadequate services or was completely absent.

The UPOCAM took a bottom-up approach to rural development as an alternative to the Green Revolution model of agricultural techniques that undermined traditional practices of bio-diverse production systems combining subsistence and commercial agricultural. The longest running and most emblematic program implemented by the organization was the Fincar program. The Fincar began in 1992 as part of the aid for rebuilding after a hurricane devastated the Ecuadorian coast. The NGO Heifer initially established and funded the Fincar program and the UPOCAM operated it for fifteen years between 1992-2007. Fincar’s explicit campesinista focus promoted processes of re-peasantization by training producers and providing credit for more diversified

---

66 Proyecto de Reducción de la Pobreza y Desarrollo Rural Local (PROLOCAL).
agroecological and organic production systems (Castro 2008). It also integrated workshops on gender, political participation and food sovereignty. Castro (2008) suggests that the Fincar program was the largest of its kind on the Ecuadorian coast to promote agroecological productive techniques; most projects with an agroecological focus have been implemented in the highlands.

An impact evaluation of the Fincar program was conducted as a master’s thesis project in 2007-2008 and evidenced the mixed impacts of the Fincar project in the local communities of the UPOCAM. It cited the transition difficulties inherent in agroecological production for smallholders. This study conducted by Cristina Castro was based on a representative sample of participants in the Fincar program and analyzed the transition process towards more bio-diverse agricultural systems. The study identified significant trends towards depeasantization in the families surveyed; in particular widespread permanent and temporary migration of household members to urban areas to access wage labour. While the program had a campesinista orientation, most producers involved in it derived a limited amount of income and subsistence food production from agricultural production and in this sense their status as ‘peasants’ is debatable (2008: 13). Castro’s study concluded that certainly many farms had become more bio-diverse due to the program but that some producers were already falling back into mono-crop production. They had not wholly adapted the techniques learned through the training offered.

One revealing example from Castro’s study comes from comparative data she collected of producers in the program who had transitioned to organic corn vs. those still

---

67 The sample in Castro’s study was representative of the universe of 262 participants who were active in the Fincar project and included surveys and semi-structured interviews with 65 households who were beneficiaries of the program (Castro 2008: 28).
using conventional Green Revolution seed packages and inputs to grow corn. The conventional producers had less bio-diverse productive systems on their farms and lower levels of production of subsistence crops than the producers in the organic system (2008: 39). On the other hand, the producers who had made the full transition to organic production spent 14% less overall on production and input costs, but their productivity was 19% lower than that of the conventional producers (2008: 41). The organic producers also spent more on hired labour, at 89% of total production costs, versus 75% of production costs for conventional producers, but obtained lower yields and prices for their organic corn than the conventional producers (2008: 41). In summary, while the producers making the full transition to organic production spent less on inputs, this was not enough to make up the difference for the lower levels of productivity and ultimately, price in the commercialization process (Castro 2008: 41). Castro’s broader conclusions about the program were that its impacts had been mixed and that some of the advances towards more biodiversity and sustainable intensification were already being reversed when she conducted her evaluation of the study (2008). Another aspect that Castro noted in her evaluation of Fincar is that after 40 years of Green Revolution technologies producer attitudes about agricultural production have also changed. Castro quotes a producer referencing his participation in the Fincar: “Casi no ponemos en práctica lo que aprendemos en los talleres porque nosotros los campesinos tenemos nuestra ideología de raíz. La UPOCAM quiere que retrocedamos a los ancestros, pero nosotros somos más modernos.” 68 (Castro 2008: 54).

Another project with an explicitly campesinista focus, and also the largest of the projects the UPOCAM implemented during the neoliberal period, was the Café Manabí program. This was funded by development cooperation from the European Union and

---

68 My translation of the quote into English- “We almost don’t put into practice what we learn in the workshops but we, the peasants, have a deeply rooted ideology. The UPOCAM wants us to go back to how our ancestors were, but we are more modern.”
managed in collaboration with the MAGAP, creating the CORREMABA, the *Empresa de la Corporación Ecuatoriana de Cafetaleros y Cafetaleras* (CORECAFE S.A. Manabí) a Federation of 19 local producer groups throughout Manabí which processed and commercialized the coffee. Fernando Guerrero describes this program as a ‘last attempt’ to try and revive the coffee sector in a province in serial decline since the end of the quota system (Guerrero 2011). Through this project, the UPOCAM received funds to hire *promotores*, who were often members or the offspring of the UPOCAM. The program promoted organic coffee production methods based on agro-forestry techniques, which built up greater biodiversity and allowed for the integration of traditional subsistence crops like plantains and yucca. Some producers began working towards organic production methods and organic certification through this initiative as well.

While the organization dedicated itself to *proyectismo* it was also quite politically active in the mobilizations against neoliberalism, both in extra-parliamentary activism as well as in electoral politics. The UPOCAM was involved in the creation of *Pachakutik* in 1996 and fielded candidates in local elections in Manabí under the party banner, though none of them were elected (Interview 75 2013). In our interview, Jorge Loor emphasized the political learning experience of the leaders of the UPOCAM in building a national coalition of social movements against neoliberalism in the 1990s. Loor emphasized the close relationship the organization developed with the CONAIE through the *Coordinadora Nacional Campesino Eloy Alfaro* (CNC-EA) in building what he described as a “monster” national social force against neoliberalism (Interview 75 2013). Through the CNC-EA the UPOCAM was part of the *Mesa Agraria* the national coalition of rural social organizations that pushed for food sovereignty in the 2008 constituent assembly (Giunta 2014). The UPOCAM was one of the main social organizations in Manabí that had long called for the expulsion of the U.S. military base located outside the city of Manta. The organization helped to organize a march from Quito-Manta and an international conference in March 2007 calling for the expulsion of the American military
base (Fitz-Henry 2011), a measure the Correa government eventually did take. The
UPOCAM had a falling out with the CONAIE and Pachakutik when Lucio Gutierrez
turned to the right after his election in 2003 and Pachakutik stayed in coalition with
Gutierrez. In deciding to support Correa’s Presidential campaign in 2006, the UPOCAM
mobilized under the slogan “No mas proyectos estilo del Banco Mundial” or “No more
World Bank-style projects” which can be understood as a rejection of the inadequacies of
neoliberal proyectismo in resolving the problems of rural Manabí (Guerrero 2011: 115).
The organization supported the Correa government because it liked the government’s
vision with respect to post-neoliberal orientation economic policy and its “universal”
approach to social policy (Interview 75 2013). Through the alliance with AP the
organization hoped to collaborate directly with the new government in implementing
development projects reflecting its campesinista vision (Guerrero 2011: 115).

The UPOCAM in the Post-Neoliberal Period

In an interview with Fausto Alcivar, the President of the UPOCAM in 2013, it quickly
became clear to me that while the organization continued to identify with and support the
Correa government, its leadership was disappointed that the government had made so
little progress on agrarian policy and towards food sovereignty. At the same time, Alcivar
was willing to maintain “patience” with a government that had to spend its first few years
undoing a neoliberal order that had attempted to, as he put it, “privatize even the air”
(Interview 69 2013). He said the government’s policies were characterized by a bias
towards conventional Green Revolution agriculture techniques. He argued that social
organizations needed to keep pushing from below to achieve the 2008 constituent
assembly agenda for food sovereignty. He emphasized the process of popular citizen
participation through the Mesa Agraria/CNC-EA which had petitioned the government to
adopt a new law of land reform. He also said that the participation of many campesino
leaders in the government, like the UPOCAM’s own Jorge Loor, would help to move it
toward implementing the vision in the 2008 constitution. He pointed out that between
2009-2013 AP did not have a majority, yet after the 2013 elections they did, and this
might favor moving an agenda for food sovereignty forward (Interview 69 2013).

The UPOCAM became an official constituent member of AP when Jorge Loor
was elected in 2009 and again in 2013 as the alternate member of the National Assembly
for Marcela Aguiñaga, who was vice-President of the National Assembly during the term.
The UPOCAM also became involved in constructing the provincial branch of AP with
Jorge Loor serving on the governing body of AP Manabi. As Flor Pagliarone analysed in
her study of AP in Manabi, the growth of AP in Manabi involved a strategy of brokerage
with the historical local caciques in the province (2015). For example, the provincial
prefect Mariano Zambrano, was already the provincial leader when Correa was elected as
a member of the centre-right PSC party in 2005. Zambrano and the PSC later created the
political movement, Manabi Primero and struck an alliance in the province with AP
(2015: 107). This strategy reflects the way in which nationalization of AP has involved
co-opting previously elected caciques under the banner of AP in the classic phenomenon
of “floating voters, floating parties” (Conaghan 1995) that has long characterized
Ecuadorian politics.

Despite the marginalization of AP in Manabi in the 2006 elections, and political
parties of the left historically in the province, Manabí subsequently became the strongest
bastion of support for the Correa government as the fortunes of the party improved
dramatically during the government's tenure. After losing the second round of the
Presidential vote in 2006\(^69\) it became the province in which AP received the highest

---

\(^69\) Correa lost the runoff election to Alvaro Noboa in 2006 37.83% to 62.17%, the lowest percentage
obtained for Correa in any of the provinces during the 2006 runoff (Pagliarone 2015: 99).
percentage of the vote for the party in any province in the 2013 and 2017 Presidential elections. Flor Pagliarone argues that as the third most populous province after Guayas and Pichincha, Manabí became strategically important for the Correa government (2015: 10). This strength, she argues, was reflected in the significant government infrastructure investments in the province. The use of the symbolism of Eloy Alfaro has also been very important and Correismo sees itself as the inheritor of this tradition. For example, one of the largest and most emblematic infrastructure projects of the Citizen’s Revolution is located in the province, the Eloy Alfaro Oil Refinery (Fitz-Henry 2015). These investments have not gone unnoticed by a population which historically felt forgotten by the more powerful centers of both Guayaquil and Quito.

The leaders of the UPOCAM were critical of the strategy of brokerage politics pursued by AP in the province. However, the Director of AP Manabí, Vicente Velez70, a lifelong leftist who came to AP from the PSE, argued that these alliances were necessary since the left had historically had no space in electoral politics in Manabí (Interview 77 2013). He emphasized that in the past the only goal of the left was to “stay alive” and that many progressive and well-meaning politicians chose to run for the PSC or the PRE as the only viable political parties in the province (Interview 77 2013). Velez argued that the pre-dominance of AP in the province as a centre-left party is historically unprecedented in Manabí and that the pragmatic strategy of alliance-making and brokerage politics was necessary to achieve the broader goals of the Citizen’s Revolution (Interview 77 2013). Velez stated that centre-right politicians like the provincial leader Mariano Zambrano could get behind the state-building project of the Citizen’s Revolution and that as a leftist, results mattered, which he argued were on balance positive for the poor and the popular classes. With the widespread popularity of AP in Manabí, perhaps it is not that surprising

70 Velez served as the Ecuadorian ambassador in Iran for several years under the Correa government.
that the UPOCAM and other social organizations are not as important in winning
elections as they were during the 2006 elections.

While the Correa government has continued to provide state funds to promote the
*montubio* identity, for the UPOCAM, this identity was not one that all affiliated
communities necessarily identified with (Guerrero 2011: 178). One leader I interviewed
was perplexed by the term and said that in his community people did not identify as
*montubios* but simply as *campesinos*, feeling that the term was a ‘political invention’
(Interview 2013). Another leader was critical of the increasing political usage of the term
by other organizations linked to the *Consejo Nacional del Pueblo Montubio del Ecuador*
(CODEPMOC), arguing that they did not represent all *montubios* and the rural
development projects they had managed had been “frauds”. The recognition of the
*montubio* happened at the same time that the CONAIE had gained control of the
CODENPE and reflected the “neo-corporatism” of the neoliberal period (Chartock 2013).
Karem Roitman argued in her 2008 study that the growth of *montubio* identity politics in
Ecuador represented the “ethnicization” of the *montubio* identity from a class and
regional categorization to an ethnic one (2008: 8). Roitman links the government’s 2001
recognition of the *montubio* identity, to “neoliberal multiculturalism” (Hale 2002)
discussed in chapter two. The Correa government has further expanded the recognition of
*montubio* identity, perhaps as a counterweight to the opposition of the CONAIE to the
government. The alliance between the UPOCAM and the Correa government needs to be
understood in this context even though some leaders of the UPOCAM did not identify as
*montubios* themselves.

---

71 The *montubio* identity has been recognized as an ethnicity within Ecuador and in 2001 the CODEPMOC
was formed as a national umbrella organization for *montubios*. However, when the issue of *montubio*
identity came up in interviews, the leaders and members of the UPOCAM did not identify as *montubios*
and were critical of the CODEPMOC, saying that the leaders of the CODEPMOC were crooked and that
the money they had received for local development projects had not been put to good use (Loor 2013).
The most notable change for the UPOCAM in the post-neoliberal period has been the inability of the organization to access funds to implement rural development projects as it had done in the neoliberal period. Flor Pagliarone emphasized in her study of AP in Manabi that the UPOCAM did not see its role as simply being involved in the party but that it also wanted to implement public policies (Pagliarone 2015 93). In this sense, one of the programs that UPOCAM President Fausto Alcivar believed could have had an important impact was the Escuelas de la Revolución Agraria (ERAs) program the government had implemented. ERAs were implemented by the MAGAP and was based on a bottom-up model of rural extension: its objective was to at once strengthen local campesino organizations and provide technical assistance. Alcivar argued that the ERAs could have played an important role in organizing campesinos but that they weakened any of the gains made by the Fincar program. As he stated:

“…our hope was that the ERAs would supplant the Fincar program, because the objective of the organization has always been to implement programs that could be adopted as public policies. Unfortunately however the role of the ERAs was not at all in line with the vision of the Fincar. The ERAs did not play any kind of role in organizing local communities and only focused on handing out the agricultural kits. As a result, the ERAs have had very little impact and the local organizations working with the ERAs are falling apart (rematados) and are asking for subsidized Urea from the MAGAP.” (Interview 69 2013)

Alcivar’s description of these impacts suggests that the progress the organization had made toward a more campesinista direction, through diversified production with the Fincar project and Café Manabí programs, is being actively undermined by the Correa government’s policies. As Alcivar stated, the local organizations affiliated to the
UPOCAM working with the ERAs were receiving subsidized\textsuperscript{72} urea (a petroleum-based chemical fertilizer) from the government. The overall amount of money that Ecuador spent as a whole on synthetic agricultural inputs, and this increased significantly during the Correa government’s first years in power, was likely due to new programs such as these\textsuperscript{73}.

Despite UPOCAM leaders’ criticisms of conventional agriculture, in 2013 the organization was considering working with the government program PRONERI and the \textit{Plan Maíz} to manage an aggregation facility for yellow feed corn which could be used to aggregate other products as well. At the end of 2014, the UPOCAM entered into an agreement with the MAGAP to open and manage the facility\textsuperscript{74}. While the UPOCAM had not yet begun its collaboration with the \textit{Plan Maíz} when I conducted fieldwork in 2013, corn production had already visibly altered the landscape of much of southern Manabí. The government subsidies being dedicated to this model of production had likely played a key role in expanding production in the province through the creation of new associations to participate in the program.

In order to get a sense of the \textit{Plan Maíz} program in an area where it had already been implemented in the province, I visited an association in the municipality of Junín with extension workers from the PRONERI. The President of the association told me that they started working with the \textit{Plan Maíz} in 2010 and had since entered into an agreement to sell the corn to national food processing companies through the PRONERI. The

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{72} Producers with less than 10 hectares are eligible to receive a $10 USD sack of urea, imported from either China or Venezuela, which costs $30 per sack without the subsidy, through the MAGAP (MAGAP 2017).\

\textsuperscript{73} Imports of chemical pesticides increased from $159,700,000 USD in 2000 to 504,800,000 USD in 2013 (SENPLADES 2014: 163).\

\textsuperscript{74} Ministerio de Agricultura, Ganadería, Acuacultura y Pesca (MAGAP). 2017. ‘Centro de Secado de Maíz beneficiará a 450 familias de Manabí’ 30 de diciembre 2014.
\end{flushleft}
program subsidized each hectare of corn planted at $214 USD per hectare, which had a total cost $600 per hectare for the whole “kit”, including seeds and input, and this subsidy is paid directly from the MAGAP to the agri-business firm EcuaQuímica. The MAGAP had invested in a processing facility that the association would administer, which represented a $200,000 USD investment and also a tractor, used by all of the members, 90% of the cost of which was paid for by the MAGAP (Interview 75 2013).

In an interview with the President of the association in Junín, I was provided with what I interpreted to be a genuinely positive account of the Plan Maíz and the beneficial impacts of the program. Additionally, he was very supportive of the Correa government, arguing that it was the only government that had done anything for small producers in his lifetime (Interview 75 2013). He stated that, since adopting the conventional kit and inputs provided by the program, producers in the association on average had seen a tripling of productivity from 40-50 quintals per hectare to 150 quintals per hectare. He also emphasized that producers now receive higher prices due to the direct contracts with national agri-business processors (Interview 75 2013). One question is whether this protectionist, neo-developmental model promoted by the PRONERI can be sustained without government subsidies if government policies were to change in the future. Producers could find themselves in a similar situation as in the 1980s and 1990s when state subsidies for conventional production were reduced.

The canton of Jipijapa, historically known as the “Sultana de Café”, was where the UPOCAM had implemented organic coffee projects between 2004 and 2007 with the assistance of the Café Manabí program. The landscape around Jipijapa had changed in 2013 from former coffee plots to one of corn monocrop. In an interview with one of the officials in the MAGAP in charge of PRONERI Manabí, I learned that only two of the 19

---

75 Plan Maíz is part of the broader program to subsidize ‘improved’ seed varieties for small producers, the Programa de Semillas de Alta Rendimientó. Only smallholders, that is producers with under 20 hectares of land, are eligible for the program and receive subsidized “kits” which include seeds, fertilizers and pesticides, the majority of these inputs being imported (MAGAP 2015).
associations that had originally formed part of the CORREMANABA were still in existence (Interview 61 2013). The continuing decline of coffee production in the province was confirmed by FECAFEM Director, Lucrecia Alcivar, one of only two remaining producer cooperatives that participated in the Café Manabí project along with local organizations affiliated to the UPOCAM and others (Interview 74 2013). She argued that the Correa government’s coffee reactivation policies had had an adverse impact on the work of the organization in organic coffee production as the MAGAP techniques only taught conventional methods and used synthetic inputs (Interview 74 2013). As I analyzed in the previous chapter, this account contrasts with the case of ACRIM and APECAP in FAPECAFES, which had developed a much better relationship with the provincial branch of the MAGAP, affectively forcing them to adapt techniques that were compatible with organic certification requirements. The base groups of the UPOCAM that had been formed around Jipijapa for the Café Manabí project had all since disbanded and these producers had not made the transition to organic certification (Interview 74 2013). The other associations that had been integrated into CORREMANABA had also all since disbanded and the producers in these associations were selling to intermediaries again. The official pinned the failure of the CORREMANABA program on the culture of “caciquismo”, arguing that most of these associations were not controlled by the membership but were run like family businesses by one leader, or cacique (Interview 61 2013). It seems from this account that coffee coops had not escaped the historical problems they had always faced in the province.

Finally, in contrast to the Fincar and coffee programs that the UPOCAM implemented during the neoliberal period, one program the organization was still running was the Unidad Mi Tierra. During a field visit to the Rocafuerte office, I visited the school on a Saturday to give a guest lecture to the civics class about international politics. I was impressed by the bright and keen students in the class, many of whom travelled from remote areas to Rocafuerte on a Saturday to participate. In an interview with the
coordinator of the program, I learned that the Ministry of Education was threatening to close down the program because it did not meet the standards of the new national curriculum. The Ministry of Education wanted to revoke the program's accreditation to grant high school certificates (Interview 80 2013). This parallels the example of the Fincar and Café Manabí but also the situation of bilingual education in Indigenous communities discussed in chapter three under the Correa government. All of these examples are antithetical to the vision laid out in the 2008 constitution that describes a complimentary relationship between the state and society. In the case of the UPOCAM however, post-neoliberalism has almost exclusively meant the undermining of its capacity as an organization due to the re-centralization of the Correa government and the continuation of programs promoting conventional agriculture.

Conclusions

What became apparent to me during the course of my fieldwork in Manabí was that UPOCAM was practically in a moribund state with the exception of the Unidad Mi Tierra program, the Internet café, the radio station and formal leadership and governance structures. Of the three case studies, the UPOCAM has been the most negatively impacted by the shift from neoliberalism to post-neoliberalism with its work to promote campesinista and agroecological production being directly undermined by government programs like the Plan Maíz. This seems paradoxical since the UPOCAM is the organization analyzed in this study with the closest political relationship to the governing party. However, if we consider the post-neoliberal objectives of Correismo, in terms of de-corporatizing the state and reducing the role of NGOs, then this outcome is less surprising. The leaders of the UPOCAM were explicit about the limitations of neoliberal proyectismo and were calling for more state investment in rural development programs. Their hope was that the government would implement programs with the focus and
orientation of the Fincar. This did not happen. And while the leaders of the organization voiced their disappointment about this they were still supportive of the Correa government more broadly and its policies including investments in infrastructure and the expansion of social services such as healthcare, education and public daycares. They also praised the foreign policies of the government.

The significant negative impact on UPOCAM by post-neoliberalism has to be the loss of all of its projects funded by international development cooperation. The organization could not attract new projects due to the trend of northern NGOs and multilateral and bilateral development cooperation pulling out of Ecuador. The international development cooperation policies of the Correa government which centralized development cooperation through the SETECI contributed to this as well. The UPOCAM was in a difficult position in 2013 as they no longer had projects from NGOs and international cooperation and could only apply to the government to fund initiatives for rural development. While the Plan Maíz undermines the objectives of the previous Fincar and Café Manabí projects by promoting mono-cropping and conventional agriculture, as I argued in chapter three, Plan Maíz, is also part of the neo-developmental trasformación de matriz productiva policies of the government and is post-neoliberal in this sense. Ecuador became self-sufficient or ‘food sovereign’ in the production of yellow feed corn in 2014 - a huge shift from 2007 when half of the feed corn used in animal production and agro-industry was imported. While the campesinista vision of the UPOCAM and the Fincar was undermined by the programs of the Correa government, even with more supportive public policies, it remains unclear whether agroecology would be viable if producers do not buy-in to strategies of re-peasantization through agroecology. The UPOCAM was founded to be a political voice for campesinos in Manabí and to advocate for political change and policies favouring the province. The more existential question facing rural social movements like the UPOCAM and the NGOs that support them is what it means to be a campesino in Ecuador today with all of
its regional and cultural and socio-economic diversity? While southern Manabi remains one of the areas in the country with a significant number of smallholders, the real question is how the UPOCAM can best act to serve the interests of these campesinos if they produce less and less of their own and progressively more like petty commodity producers. While the Plan Maíz will likely deepen the vicious cycle associated with petty commodity production through mono-cropping, it appears to be the default option for smallholders in Manabi with the UPOCAM embracing the program as well. In conclusion, rather than the UPOCAM “moving the state” (Heller 2001) it appears that the state under the Correa government moved the UPOCAM by incorporating the organization into the Plan Maíz program.
Chapter 6 - The Red de Ferias of Imbabura: “New Markets” and New Alliances in the Post-Neoliberal Turn

Introduction

The Red de Ferias de Imbabura is a loose network of producer-consumer, open-air markets, or ferias, located throughout the province of Imbabura in the northern highlands of Ecuador through which smallholder producers, employing principles of agroecological production, directly sell their produce to consumers. This case study puts into practice the conception of food sovereignty favoured by most scholar activist discourse on food sovereignty and LVCs official discourse: food sovereignty and agroecological production as repeasantization or a means of sustaining precarious peasant livelihoods. The Red de Ferias was initiated and organized by the French-based NGO Agronomists and Veterinarians without Borders, Agrónomos y Veterinarios sin Fronteras (AVSF) who partnered with the supra-communal organization of Indigenous communities the Federación Indígena Campesina de Imbabura (FICI) to organize the ferias. However, after the post-neoliberal turn, the initiative began to receive support from government ministries and local governments as well. The legal and policy framework put in place by the Correa government, in particular articles in the 2009 Law of Food Sovereignty (the LORSA) and the 2012 COOTAD law of inter-governmental relations, all codified the obligation of provincial and municipal governments to create favourable conditions for such initiatives and provide them with infrastructure and public space. The case of the Red de Ferias is thus an interesting one to consider; from it we might gauge whether this actually occurred in practice since the initiative began after the new laws had been established.

In this chapter I argue that although AVSF’s interventions were moderately effective at building ties with some local governments and public institutions in “moving
the state” (Heller 2001) to support these alternative practices, overall there was a lack of coordination and meta-governance between the institutions and the ferias which ultimately undermined the Red de Ferias initiative. In some instances, the actions of government agencies and local governments actively undermined agroecological production and the ferias, despite official policies and legislation that stated it had to support such initiatives. Overall the actions of the central and local governments did more to hinder rather than support the Red de Ferias initiative. The divisions that occurred in nearly all of the ferias and the creation of separate provincial government ferias was an unintended consequence of the promotion of the ferias and speaks to the difficulty involved in transcending a clientelist logic at the local level. Despite this, the ferias do appear to be providing a source of income and an alternative pathway for a kind of re-peasantization in the face of broader trends that have eroded the economic and social viability of minfundio production. In particular, the ferias seem to facilitate more economic autonomy for women owing to the fact that ferias’ makeup is almost entirely female, reflecting the trend towards the feminization of agriculture in the region and the Ecuadorian highlands more generally.

I begin this chapter by providing background on the emergence of the proposals for agroecological agriculture in Imbabura and the relationship between the model of the Red de Ferias and earlier efforts associated with the “development with identity” paradigm for rural development associated with the second and third-level Indigenous and campesino organizations in the province. Like the other two case studies in this dissertation, the origins of this via campesina model of development originate in the partnership between foreign NGOs, local NGOs and rural social organizations characteristic of neoliberal proyectismo. Imbabura was a stand-out case during neoliberal times due to the success of Pachakutik-led municipal governments that collaborated with Indigenous and other rural grassroots organizations. By 2009, the political context had shifted quite dramatically after the emergence of AP and the implosion of Pachaktutik in
the province and the changes to the jurisdictional authority of municipalities with the 2012 COOTAD law which had taken away the jurisdiction of municipal governments to support rural development initiatives but obligated municipalities to provide space to direct producer-consumer ferias. In several of the cases municipalities had begun to support the ferias by providing them with public space in which to operate, yet this only occurred after pressure from AVSF and the ferias leaders to do so. Although the provincial government of Imbabura implemented a program to support the ferias, including with several extension workers, in the end this appeared to backfire since this policy resulted in the provincial government attempting to take over the network with the goal of establishing a more clientele-based kind of political relationship with producers in the feria. When the project funded by AVSF concluded at the end of 2013, there did not appear to be a kind of meta-governance in place to support the ferias into the future and ensure their sustainability, in particular on the side of agroecological production, since the FICI did not have the resources to continue supporting the producers with technical assistance.

Imbabura and the Northern Highlands: From Haciendas to Minifundios y Comunidades

Imbabura is unique amongst Ecuador’s highland provinces in several respects, and its particularities made the area an important centre for the Indigenous movement emerging on the national stage in the 1980 and 1990s. Prior to colonization by both the Incas and Spanish, one of the Indigenous groups in the area around Otavalo, the Caranquis, produced and traded textiles. This tradition endured through national independence. The production of textiles was enhanced in the area in the 1920s with the introduction of new technologies that increased textile production for the domestic market in Quito (Coloredo Mansfeld 1998: 189). While the huasipungo system was dominant in the region, just as in
other areas of the Ecuadorian highlands, some of the families involved in textile production used the production profits to buy land from white landowning families (Coloredo Mansfeld 1998: 190), reflecting the more relatively autonomous yanapa relationship with the haciendas as some had been able to buy their own plots of land as opposed to the huasipungo ties (Ortiz 2011: 132). As a result of these processes of accumulation by some Otavaleños, the Quichua-speaking Indigenous campesinos who live in and around Otavalo, due to their entrepreneurial activities (Coloredo Mansfeld 1998; Prieto 2011) have had a historical reputation of being ‘clean’ Indians in the racist white mestizo imagery. The modern Indigenous movement as an official political organization has its origins in the canton of Cayambe, in the neighboring province of Pichincha, where the Federación Ecuatoriana de Indios (FEI) was established in the 1940s through the leadership of Dolores Cacuango, a figure tied to the Communist Party and labour unions affiliated with the Communist Party (Becker 2003). The relative proximity of the region to Quito has also allowed rural dwellers to travel back and forth, commercializing agricultural goods in Quito while maintaining ties to their rural homes and agricultural plots (Waters 1997).

The dissolution of the hacienda system brought with it the formation of Indigenous communities and comunas in the province (Ortiz 2011). The processes of agrarian reform occurred unevenly and did not change the discrimination experienced by Indigenous people particularly as they were increasingly accessing services in urban centres like Ibarra (Coloredo Mansfeld 1998), even as a significant Indigenous middle and upper class continued to grow due to the economic dynamism of Otavalo (Kyle 1999). In the 1970s, supra-communal organizations of free and legally recognized Indigenous and campesino communities grew to represent the interests of Indigenous communities with local and national authorities and to fight racial discrimination (Ortiz 2011). These organizations included the Unión de Organizaciones Campesinas Indígenas de Cotacachi (UNORCAC), a second-level supra-communal organization of Indigenous
communities in the cantons of Cotacahi and Otavalo as well as the FICI, a third-level organization which was founded as a province-wide organization of Indigenous communities and comunas, and finally, the Federación de Comunidades Negras de Imbabura y Carchi (FECONIC), representing the Afro-descendent communities in the Chota valley in the north of the province. The two main supra-communal organizations in the province have always been the FICI and the UNORCAC. Researcher Santiago Ortiz notes that the second-level or canton-level unions in cantons other than Cotacachi have been weakened over time and in a de facto sense the FICI and the UNORCAC compete against each other as provincial organizations even though the UNORCAC is only a second-level canton-level organization and the FICI is third-level and province-wide (Ortiz 2011: 115). The relative prosperity of Imbabura compared to central highland provinces like Cotopaxi and Chimborazo, coupled with greater access to education, has produced an important group of Indigenous intellectuals. These unique factors contributed to making the region one of the most important power bases for the Indigenous movement emerging in the 1980s with the founding of the CONAIE at the national level.

Anthropologist Rudi Colloredo-Mansfeld, who has done fieldwork in the province for several decades, argues that the strength of the Indigenous movement is the emphasis on community and common issues despite stubborn class differences within many Indigenous communities (2007). The class differences in Indigenous communities, amongst other factors, including the influence of different political parties and movements (Korovkin 2001), have meant that even since its origins in the 1970s the Indigenous movement has always been politically heterogenous in Imbabura. The most significant division has historically been between the FICI and the UNORCAC, the former being affiliated to the CONAIE at the national level and the latter to the FENOCIN (see Kothari 1996; Lalander 2007: 2010). The UNORCAC always had a class-based discourse and since its beginnings was affiliated with a political alliance to
the Ecuadorian Socialist Party (PSE) and later with A.P. and the Correa government. In contrast, the FICI was one of the founders of the CONAIE and had political linkages to Pachakutik. These differences were in part due to differences within the province, in particular between the wealthier businesspeople and traders in Otavalo and the poorer ex-huasipungueros in the rural areas.

The strong fabric of social organizations in the province, manifest in the FICI and the UNORCAC, was recognized in the 1980s and 1990s by international development cooperation agencies that partnered with both organizations to implement rural development projects. Both the UNORCAC and the FICI implemented different projects associated with the emergent “ethno-development” paradigm funded through the World Bank’s various rural development programs (Baez et. al 1999; Chartock 2011; Coignet 2011; Rhoades 2006). The strength of these organizations translated into electoral success in the 1990s when the municipalities of Otavalo and Cotacachi made history by electing Indigenous mayors76 under the banner of Pachakutik (Cameron 2003: 2010; Llander 2007: 2009: 2010; Stolle-McAllister 2013). Both of these mayors led administrations considered quite successful, expanding the activities of the municipal governments into new areas including social and rural development by taking advantage of the ‘a la carte’ model of decentralization laid out in the 1997 law. In the particular case of Cotacachi they were able to coordinate with the UNORCAC to establish participatory mechanisms in budgeting and decision-making (Cameron 2003). This trajectory reflects the theory of the Ecuadorian Indigenous movement described by Jose Sánchez-Parga of the ‘long march from the community to the party’ whereby the movement of Indigenous politics evolves from communal organizations toward effective party politics Sánchez Parga 2010).

76 Auki Tituana was elected in Cotacachi in 1996 and Mario Conejo in Otavalo in 1996.
Although Conejo and Tituaña had each been well-respected and popular mayors, the political success of Pachakutik at the local level in the province had reached an ebb by the mid-2000s. The declining political fortunes of Pachakutik there were due to several factors including the divisions in the Indigenous movement at the national level (due to the alliance with Lucio Guittierez), the historical divisions existing between UNORCAC and FICI-affiliated communities, and the likely inevitable conclusion of a typical up-cycle in electoral politics after Pachakuik leaders like Conejo and Tituaña had spent a decade in power. The election of the Correa government and the 2008 constitution represented the end of this cycle. In Imbabura, Indigenous politicians and members of Pachakutik joined AP\textsuperscript{77} which swept the province in the 2009 local elections (Ortiz 2011; Ortiz 2013). Alianza PAIS incorporated Indigenous and campesino leaders into its ‘big tent’ and this was embraced by the general population who voted overwhelmingly for AP candidates at all levels of government in the 2009 elections (Ortiz 2013). The in-depth study by Ortiz (2011) of political attitudes and political change via the Indigenous municipal governments in Cotacachi and Otavalo suggested that there was a great affinity between the demands of many sectors of the Indigenous movements and the proposals of the Correa government and that this is why so many Pachakutik loyalists joined AP.

While politically the Indigenous movement was enjoying the height of its success in the 1990s and early 2000s, the agrarian and rural social relations were undergoing ongoing and complex processes of change throughout the whole of the northern highlands. The division of the haciendas in Imbabura and in the rest of the northern

\textsuperscript{77}Prominent politicians to jump over to Alianza PAIS from Pachakutik in the province included the mayor of Otavalo Mario Conejo. Former President of the UNORCAC, national President of the FENOCIN and former alternate member of the national assembly for the PSE became a delegate to the 2008 constituent assembly and later a member of the national assembly for A.P. In Cotacachi, another former President of the UNORCAC, Alberto Anrango, ran against Auki Tituaña of Pachakutik and became mayor. Auki Tituaña later surprised many by nearly joining right-wing opposition candidate Guillermo Lasso on his ticket as vice-President in the 2013 national elections but was ultimately disqualified from doing so because he was still a member of Pachakutik.
highlands brought with it a variety of trajectories of agrarian change. In the case of the areas around Cayambe, former hacendados modernized their operations to enter new export markets. This path is illustrated most clearly in the case of the industrial flower greenhouses in the area (Korovkin 2005; Sawers 2005). Some exhuasipungueros were incorporated into agro-industrial commodity chains, such as for dairy, through models of contract farming (Martínez 2013). Others have become more involved with monocultural commodity production in crops like potatoes for the national market (Sherwood 2009). This deepening integration into the market as commodity producers led to an overall loss of biodiversity and genetic diversity in the northern highlands (Abbot 2005; Skarbø 2016) and a loss of household self-sufficiency in food production (Boada 2014).

New social pressures emerged as well, including migration of youth from rural communities, both abroad and to urban areas (Célleri 2012), and an influx of foreigners buying land and real estate in areas like Cotacahi for “residential tourism” (Gascon 2016), causing extreme rises in land prices and in the rates of land subdivision amongst the children of exhuasipungueros. Perhaps the most significant trend, exacerbated by many of these other changes, has been the feminization of Indigenous communities and of agriculture in the region. This has occurred as men have tended to migrate more than women out of the province for work, leaving women even more involved in agriculture than historically, exacerbating the “double burden” of agricultural and reproductive labour (Célleri 2012; Fueres et. Al 2012; Rodríguez Avalos 2015). These significant changes have led to new stresses on peasant households that can be understood as dynamics of depesantization, spurring a search among Indigenous and mestizo smallholders alike for new strategies of social and economic reproduction.

Due to these various changes and stresses on smallholder households, some Indigenous leaders, campesinos and NGOs alike, have come to see a transition to agroecological production as a strategy to sustain smallholder production and livelihoods on small plots of increasingly subdivided and marginal land. The question raised by
Ortiz’s (2011) study on the evolution of Indigenous social and political organization in Imbabura revolves around the role communal values and community itself might continue to play in social and political life if these structures appear to be less important with the entrance of the Indigenous move into electoral politics. My case study, begins chronologically, right after Ortiz’s study, with this confluence of forces in the background: the decline of Patchaktuik and rise of A.P., the further fracturing of the Indigenous movement in the province, the ongoing processes of social and agrarian change, and finally, the emergence of a new legal and policy framework under the Correa government that incorporated the demands of the Indigenous movement and was attempting to convert proposals for repeasantisation through agroecology into government policies and programs. The key questions of this case study are then: What prospects do ferias campesinas in the Red de Ferias have in light of these broader processes of changes? Are they a viable alternative for smallholders? and how can we understand them?

Neoliberal Proyectismo and Agroecology in Ecuador and Imbabura

As discussed in chapter four, agroecology has been adopted more and more, in tandem with food sovereignty, as a central demand by the official discourse of LVC. Agroecology is a broad term that includes under its umbrella a variety of different farming practices. Agroecological approaches to agriculture have been promoted by NGOs unevenly throughout Ecuador since the 1980s (see Intriago et. Al 2017). In Ecuador, the NGOs and rural social movements and organizations involved in promoting agroecology have sometimes framed agroecology in terms of a ‘return’ to ancestral Indigenous agricultural practices and this discourse was present in the way in which A VSF promoted agroecology. In Ecuador, agroecology is generally understood as an alternative path out of the problems related to the introduction of mono-cultural production associated with
the introduction of Green Revolution technologies that have in some cases made conventional mono-cultural production less profitable for producers over time (Sherwood 2009). Agroecology is in this sense an alternative to monocultural production for the minifundio producers in places like the Andes where access to land is limited and soil quality is uneven or poor in higher areas. Though some practices promoted through contemporary agroecological approaches have a historic basis, overall the practices being taught are a mix between newer western scientific approaches and historical Andean techniques undermined with the promotion of monocultures as part of agrarian reform programs (Interview 90 2013; Interview 101 2014). Agroecology has become commonly linked to food sovereignty because, in theory, by diversifying production, producers improve their livelihoods by making their farms less dependent on one crop.

The ecological diversity that comprises a core feature of many agroecological systems of production, challenges the conventional chains of commercialization organized around the buying and distribution of commodities and economies of scale (Interview 4 2013). Agroecological models of production don’t fit easily into the traditional system of commercial inter-mediation. Further, traditional value chains of commercialization in highland Ecuador also don’t recognize the different quality of production. In this sense, the economic logic behind creating a direct system of commercialization is simple: cut out the traders and commercial intermediaries to reduce costs and allow producers to capture more production value by selling directly to consumers, emphasizing the high quality and organic production practices behind the produce.

The first producer-consumer ferias emerged in the 1990s and were supported by NGOs. They have expanded considerably in Ecuador since the mid-2000s. According to data consolidated in a 2015 report by the U.S.-based NGO Heifer, one of the leading NGOs promoting agroecology in Ecuador, in 2015, there were 210 ferias operating in Ecuador, in which an average of 56 producers participated (Heifer 2015: 112). The report
notes that 82% of these ferias were located in the highland provinces where minifundios are more present; they are less prevalent on the coast where commodity production and the agro-industry are more dominant (Heifer 2015: 99). Out of these 210 agroecological ferias, the study estimates that only 37% are producers who have fully made the transition to agroecology, which means that the others range somewhere along the process of transition (Heifer 2015: 104). Some of these ferias have developed their own alternative peer-peer models of certification known as Participatory Guarantee System (PGS) and the same Heifer report states that there are 1262 producers in eight different provinces employing PGS systems, which is a smaller number of the total of producers participating in ferias (2015: 65). While most ferias are not run through consolidated PGS systems, most do have governing bodies made of producers involved in the selection of new producers. These serve a variety of the same functions as a PGS system and are often in transition towards becoming full PGS systems.

In Imbabura, agroecological approaches to agriculture were promoted mainly through the efforts of neoliberal proyectismo beginning in the 1990s. In the case of Otavalo, a local Indigenous NGO, the Centro de Estudios Pluriculturales (CEPCU) - an NGO founded by local Indigenous university students wanting to give back to their communities by implementing rural development initiatives after studying in Quito - was the first organization to implement projects focused on agroecological agriculture soon after the organization was founded in the 1990s (Interview 90 2013). According to Luzmila Vasquez, one of the leaders, a participant in the original CEPCU projects, and a producer in the Imbabio feria in Otavalo, the approach of the CEPCU included both the recuperation of more “ancestral” crops like mashua and quinoa, more common in her

---

78 The study details that 53% of the producers in these ferias have less than one hectare of land, 31% of these producers 1.5 to 3 hectares and 27% of these producers have access to more than three hectares of land. (Heifer 2015: 109). It is estimated that these ferias generated $15,221,101 USD in 2015 in revenues (Heifer 2015: 112).
grandparents’ generation, but less common in the diet of her and her parent’s generation, as well as the production of totally new vegetables that were never in the traditional diet. All these changes lead to a push towards introducing more diverse production as part of agroecology (Interview 90 2013). Luzmila believed the idea of direct selling in the case of the CEPCU project was a result of the fact that the participant producers could not easily sell all of the produce that came from the new agroecological methods. This spawned the idea of a direct producer-consumer feria in Otavalo. According to Luzmilla, the Imbabio ferias was in part the legacy of the years of work that the CEPCU had done in the rural areas around Otavalo promoting agroecological production because many of the producers in the feria had participated in these original projects (Interview 90 2013).

The most advanced example of a feria and initiative based on agroecology in the province has been promoted by the UNORCAC in and around Cotacachi since the late 1990s. The feria of the UNORCAC was not part of the project of the Red de Ferias, likely because of the political antagonism between the UNORCAC and the FICI but perhaps also because it was already well-established. Both initiatives participated in the same national-level networks like the Colectivo Agroecológico and the MESSE. The origins of the feria of the UNORCAC, called La Pachamama Nos Alimenta, lie as far back as 1998 when the UNORCAC initiated the promotion of agroecology as an alternative to monocultural commodity production when they organized a group of producers to sell their produce directly to consumers in Cotacachi. The initiatives in the organization related to agroecology were always heavily promoted by the women’s committee and also by the “Women and Family” and “Nutrition” commissions of the UNORCAC. The women’s committee has since also promoted several projects to catalogue the agrobiodiversity of the canton including a seed bank - a seed exchange that has been organized several times over the years called Muyu Raymi. The women also developed initiatives to catalogue and promote traditional recipes which the UNORCAC later published as a cookbook (Arellano 2014: 43-45). In 2014, the feria had 150
participants, the vast majority being women, who sold produce in front of the UNORCAC offices in Cotacachi every Sunday morning (Arellano 2014: 43). The demographic makeup of the feria accords with other studies pointing to the growing feminization of agriculture over the past several decades in the region.

A study that surveyed a representative sample of the women who participated in the UNORCAC feria provides a snapshot of the conditions and demographics of smallholder producers in the province. This study, echoing other studies of smallholder production in the region, revealed the central role that women’s labour had come to play in agricultural production in these households. Those surveyed reported that their families had an average 1.42 hectares of land for production and 75% of them indicated that income from agriculture represented 50-75%, with 25% of these placing agricultural income at over 75%. This suggests that the importance of economic pluriactivity is still somewhat varied and that income from agriculture remains very important to many of these households (Rodríguez Avalos 2015: 145). At the same time 67% reported that their children had migrated either temporarily, including day migration, or permanently, for work or school, and found that their children's optimism had diminished about a future in agriculture (2015: 149). The women reported that 75% of them managed household finances while 25% indicated that their husbands took charge of household finances. The study credits this result to the fact that the women were more involved in domestic reproductive labour with most of the men working outside the home and that this had given them more control over household finances (2015:145). This study appears to add more evidence to the feminization of agriculture hypothesis that appears highly relevant in Imbabura and, in this context, to the importance of the ferias as an alternative source of household income.

The Red de Ferias was established by the AVSF as a network of new and existing ferias and one part of the larger Mercados Campesinos project of the AVSF, with the
objective of providing support to the disparate ferias in the province, helping them to
learn from one another through the network and also provide agricultural extension
services. The broader national Mercados Campesinos project was financed by the
European Union and the French International Development Cooperation Agency. The
project received funding through some other international development donors as well
as the main local partner organization, the FICI, which received funds to hire an
agricultural extension worker to liaise with the producers in the different ferias, although
the different ferias had links to or were formed by some different second-level rural
organizations. In general, the model of partnerships in the project reflects the model
typical of neoliberal proyectismo with the partnership of an international development
NGO working directly with rural social organizations. During my fieldwork there in 2013
and 2014, four different ferias existed in the network, three in Imbabura and one in the
neighboring province of Carchi.

A 2012 presentation prepared by the coordinator of the Red de Ferias project
provides insights into the size and scale of the network and the demographic makeup of
the producers involved. According to the presentation, in 2012, 640 producers in the

---

79 ‘Sistemas alternativos de comercialización asociativa para la seguridad de las familias campesinas y la
soberanía alimentaria en los territorios andinos’ 2009-2013 (Contrato DCI-FOOD/ 2010/ 230-269 del
Programa Global de Investigación Agraria para el Desarrollo).

80 Other international donors included the Belgian Development Cooperation Agency (through its
partnership with the provincial government), the French International Development Agency and
SWISSAID.

81 The second-level organizations behind the ferias included the Consejo de Comunas Campeinas e
Indígenas de Montufar in Carchi and the second-level organizations Unión de Comunidades Campesinas
de Mariano Acosta (UCICMA) and the Unión de Organizaciones Campesinas Cochapamba (UOCC). At
the time when I was conducting fieldwork none of the ferias themselves had acquired any legal status and
were a de facto part of these communal organizations in legal terms (Interview 88 2013).

82 The ferias that were part of the network included Imbabio in Otavalo, Esperanzas de Vida in Pimampiro,
Feria el Ejido in Ibarra and the feria of the Consejo de Comunas Campesinas de Montúfar (CCM) in the
town of San Gabriel in Carchi.
network sold 140 different products through the *ferias* with 95% of these being women, including Indigenous, *mestizos* and a handful of Afro-Ecuadorians (AVSF 2012). In terms of economic impact, the sales at all of the *ferias* grossed $639,389 USD in 2011 and $1,678,970 USD in 2012, which meant an average of $240 USD in household income per producer-family, per month (AVSF 2012). The producers who participated in *Red de Ferias* didn’t only sell through the *ferias* but also through public procurement to public daycare centres, through a food basket program to consumers in Quito and through direct sales to restaurants, although the *ferias* were the main point of sale for most of the producers participating in the project (AVSF 2012). In an interview with an intern from France studying the social impacts of the initiative, the most significant impact of the *ferias* was that it had empowered women in economic terms (Interview 100 2014). She argued that the whole element of direct selling had built new social connections and affective ties for the women and that the women’s participation in the *ferias* had also helped to stabilize producer incomes, allowing them to count on a certain amount of income from the *ferias* each week (Interview 100 2014). The model promoted by the *ferias* can be understood as a way of adapting peasant agriculture to the social changes driving the feminization of agriculture.

The delivery of front-line programming was not the only focus of the *Mercados Campesinos* project and I believe that this was important in the minor successes that the AVSF project had on influencing different levels of government during the project. The AVSF was one NGO that included a broader “epistemic community” (Haas 1992) of *campesinista* NGOs and rural social movement actors advocating for food sovereignty and agroecology during the 2008 constituent assembly process. Through the *Mercados Campesinos* project, the AVSF worked within the project to advise the government at the national level with its *campesinista* ideas for programs and policies and I believe this made it a successful “policy entrepreneur” (Dolowitz and Marsh 1996: 346) in addition to
implementing frontline programs. The AVSF advised the Correa government in setting up the *Redes Comerciales* department in the MAGAP (Interview 4 2013; Interview 91 2013). This relationship began as a study that the AVSF conducted to analyze existing *ferias* and forms of producer-consumer commercialization in Ecuador, inspired by the French school of thought around rural territorial development, called the *Circuitos Alternativos de Comercialización* (CIALCOs). The incorporation of these ideas through *Redes Comerciales* is a case of policy transfer from other contexts where agroecology and alternative models of commercialization have been relatively successful as in the cases of France or Brazil (Interview 4 2013). As part of the original CIALCOs project, different studies, manuals and materials were created and diffused through the MAGAP. In this way AVSF was able to work on the ground in project implementation throughout different regions of Ecuador as well as at the national level in advising the government on the creation of the *Redes Comerciales* department. This appears to have constituted a relatively successful case of policy transfer for *campesinsta* ideas and models despite the relatively small size of *Redes Comerciales* compared to other areas and programs of the MAGAP.

**The Red de Ferias: Between Proyectismo and Neo-Developmental State Building**

The constitution of the *Red de Ferias* is very similar in its overall structure to the coalition of actors involved in neoliberal *proyectismo*, in that it was funded by AVSF and other international development cooperation agencies and implemented in partnership with grassroots rural organizations. While the *ferias* were driven forward by the AVSF project and the FICI - due to the new program's newly constituted legal framework - they increased their interaction with government agencies and the provincial government, prompted by the new jurisdiction granted to provincial governments under the COOTAD. Based on the research I did, I argue that the AVSF played an important role in terms of
facilitating processes and helping the ferias to pressure local municipalities and
government agencies to provide certain kinds of support for the ferias, mainly forcing
municipalities to provide public spaces for them to operate without harassment from
authorities. At the same time, I argue that the A VSF was unable to establish effective
meta-governance within the province to lead local governments and government agencies
like the MAGAP toward implementation of the legal and policy framework existing to
support both the ferias and agroecological production expansion. I argue that while A VSF
did help the ferias secure public space to operate in the case of the provincial
government, the new powers granted through the COOTAD actually had a negative
impact on the initiative. The fact of the provincial government’s creation of parallel ferias
or the increased resources of the MAGAP going into initiatives to foster conventional
agricultural production are two such examples, and each, ultimately undermined the
objectives of the Red de Ferias.

The legal framework put in place by the 2008 constitution and the Correa
government created quite favourable conditions for the creation of the ferias through the
many provisions promoting food sovereignty and the social economy. The 2009 Law of
Food Sovereignty (LORSA) states in article 3 that the government should implement
programs that encourage the formation of producer’s associations, and provide these
associations with infrastructure and other support for commercialization as well as
support for agroecological production methods. Under the COOTAD, the code of inter-
governmental relations and jurisdiction adopted by the Correa government, provincial
governments were given more responsibilities around programs related to production and
economic development under article 41 of the 2012 law, which gives provincial
governments responsibility to implement programs for agriculture, rural and economic
development. Article 54 of the COOTAD and article 133 of the LOEPS both mandate
municipalities to provide producer associations and direct-consumer ferias with public
space for the *ferias* and also to promote/provide the construction of public infrastructure for commercialization. Article 64 of the COOTAD grants juntas parroquiales with jurisdiction over initiatives related to agricultural economic development. They are supposed to coordinate with other levels of government and central government programs to implement programs. While the legal responsibilities of the different levels of government are clear, the COOTAD only states that the different levels of government must coordinate with one another to ensure that these policies are implemented; it does not mandate the creation of inter-governmental bodies nor mechanisms for coordination.

I believe that this imprecision and lack of coordination - some caused by opposing interests and agendas, and some, the product of poor organization – challenged the effective establishment of coherent public action in favour of the *ferias* and agroecological production.

At the national level, the *Red de Ferias* was linked to national-level organizations, both informally and informally, that were engaging with the Correa government to push for public policies favouring agroecology through the *Colectivo Agroecológico* and the MESSE. Over several years, including in 2013 and 2014, the *Colectivo Agroecológico* and *Redes Comerciales* in the MAGAP co-organized a series of public conferences on agroecology at the national level where they invited international experts on agroecology such as Miguel Altieri to speak in different places around Ecuador (Interview 99 2014). This again shows the successful incursion made by the “epistemic community” (Haas 1992) – and AVSF and other NGOs were a part of these – in the forming of public policies during the Correa government. Leaders of the *Colectivo Agroecológico* participated in the COPISA and later became involved in negotiations with Agrocalidad after the agency had attempted to force agroecological producers to adopt the same organic standard to regulate their operations certified in 2014 and 2015. The members of the *Colectivo* and others successfully prevented Agrocalidad from forcing all of the agroecological producers in the country who sold through *ferias* from having to adopt the...
organic standard adopted by the Correa government (Agrocalidad 2015). The *Colectivo Agroecológico* considered this to be a victory since they didn’t believe it was appropriate for agroecological producers to adopt the same technical standards as certified organic producers. Some provinces in Ecuador had begun to establish arms-length public agencies to certify sustainable agriculture and the province of Pichincha had established a provincial ordinance recognizing SPG systems in the province (Clark and Martínez 2016) though Imababura hadn’t established such an ordinance. The *Colectivo Agroecológico* was in favour of recognition of existing SPG systems, even for mechanisms of monitoring to ensure the proper functioning of these systems, but as a mechanism for the “*fomento*” or development and strengthening of these systems, not simply for monitoring and control (Interview 99 2014).

One of the central issues for each of the *ferias* at the local level was in securing a public space to hold the weekly markets. This led to conflicts with municipal authorities in charge of regulating informal commerce and vendors, particularly in clearing those without permission from the streets. In Ecuador, there have been attempts by governments from the middle of the twentieth century to the present to get informal vendors off the streets and into formal spaces (Hollenstein 2011). The attempts by different municipal governments to regulate informal commerce have led to prolonged episodes of social conflict with informal vendors and to the political organization of such vendors (Middleton 2003). Most municipal markets are governed by vendor’s associations who are voters and potential political constituents and clients of municipal politicians. The vendor associations in the municipally owned markets are often wary of new competition and may have reason to oppose informal street vendors or new open-air markets. Pressure from vendor associations initially caused tensions between municipal authorities in Pimampiro and Ibarra which led municipal authorities to break up the *ferias* and force them off the streets. Several of my interviews pointed to this as a factor that led
municipalities to oppose the operations of the ferias, particularly in the cases of Ibarra and Pimampiro (Interview 88 2013; Tafur y Flores 2013: 151).

On the other hand, in several cases the contradictory responsibilities experienced by municipalities to, one, allow the ferias to operate in public spaces and, two, provide access for space for the ferias to operate was increased by the political pressure that AVSF was able to apply onto the authorities. In the case of Pimampiro, direct pressure through a meeting between the coordinator of the Red de Ferias project and the municipal authorities led the authorities to grant space to the Pimampiro feria (Interview 88 2013; Interview 89 2013). This was repeated in the case in San Gabriel, where initial pressure from vendor’s associations had led them to oppose the feria but pressure from the project coordinator onto the municipal authorities (referencing the new laws that obligated municipal authorities to provide space to the ferias) also helped the feria secure space in front of a building owned by the municipality (Interview 85 2013). In the case of Ibarra, because the original feria had split several times due to the divisions caused by the provincial government, the local branch of MAGAP ended up providing space in the local ministerial office for the feria due to pressure from the AVSF project coordinator (Interview 98 2013). In the case of Otavalo, the Imbabio feria had struggled to find permanent space and was operating in rented space outside of a public school. However, this space was secured in part due to the role of two municipal councillors supportive of the feria’s objectives. Both also helped advocate for the feria when it ran into other issues with the municipal authorities (Interview 90 2013). This demonstrates the important role that local politicians can play when they act to represent constituent's interests rather than simply see the ferias as potential political clients, even though the distinction is often quite blurry in reality.

When the AVSF first began to work in the area in 2009 and 2010, the only public institution the AVSF established ties with and received some funds from was the provincial directorate of the MAGAP. According to Rosa Murillo, the coordinator of the
Red de Ferias project, the MAGAP supported some activities of the different ferias mainly by providing infrastructure such as tables and tents for the ferias (Interview 88 2013). In 2010, she stated that the provincial government became aware of the initiative and approached her about establishing a collaboration agreement since the provincial government’s economic development department had already established a program to support the ferias ciudadanas - a Correa government national policy authorized through MAGAP, the MIES and implemented through some provincial governments (Interview 88 2013). The provincial government signed an agreement with the AVSF and they began to collaborate, with part of this agreement including a $30,000 investment by the provincial government to support the ferias with infrastructure and to support the activities of the network. Additionally, the provincial government offered to provide space in their office for the AVSF project coordinator and extension workers employed through the FICI (Interview 88 2013). According to Rosa Murillo, this relationship deteriorated quickly once it became apparent that the motives of the provincial government were to use the ferias as potential spaces to build political support and promote the brand and interests of the provincial government more generally.

The involvement of the provincial government ushered in a tumultuous period for the Red de Ferias in which three of the ferias including those in Ibarra, Otavalo and Pimampiro, divided. The resultant new ferias established more direct links to the provincial government (Interview 88 2013; Interview 89 2013; Interview 98 2013). In all of the cases, during this period, schisms developed in the original ferias when some of the producers - members of AP- split off to form ferias that were directly sponsored by the provincial government. My interpretation of this discord, based on the interviews I conducted with the different actors, characterized this ferias politicization as due mainly to the involvement of the provincial government with the ferias and their attempts to have participants in the ferias affiliate to the provincial branch of AP. This appears to be a fairly clear case of clientelist or “assistencialista” logic, by which the provincial
government intended to garner recognition and political support through the act of sponsoring the ferias. The initial partnership between the AVSF and the provincial government deteriorated quickly once it became clear that the provincial government seemed interested in supporting the ferias only as a means to increase its own branding and political legitimacy (Interview 88 2013). The dissolution of the agreement between the provincial government and the AVSF project caused the splits of the ferias into the consequent AVSF project rebranding of, on the one hand, ferias of agricultura familiar campesina. The provincial government-sponsored ferias, on the other hand, became known as (Interview 88 2013) ferias of economia solidaria, Rosa Murillo was very critical of the ferias that had split off, arguing that the ferias organized by the provincial government (ferias of economia solidaria) were letting in producers for reasons of political loyalty including those who were intermediaries, buying produce and reselling the produce as if they had grown it themselves (Interview 88 2013). In the case of Ibarra, which was the largest of the original ferias in the AVSF project, the provincial government took over the space occupied by the feria, a lot adjacent to and owned by the municipally owned bus terminal. After this, the autonomous producers who had rejected staying in the province’s Terminal feria eventually moved to a space outside of the provincial offices of the MAGAP in Ibarra.

In the end, provincial government involvement in the Red de Ferias initiative was damaging rather than supportive. This also appears to have been the case of other public institutions that worked directly and indirectly with producers participating in the ferias. Several producers that I interviewed talked about the way in which MAGAP, and the return of the state to agriculture, had brought with it more visits from extension workers of the provincial government as well as the MAGAP and some juntas parroquiales that had established local agricultural extension projects (Interview 85; Interview 90; Interview 98 2013). This increased state action in agricultural extension was pulling producers who could potentially join efforts related to agroecology in opposing directions
through the concurrent promotion of conventional technologies and inputs. Like the involvement of the provincial government, other state interventions were typically more of a hindrance than a help to the producers in the Red de Ferias. In an interview Pierril Lacroix, the coordinator of the Mercados Campesinos project of AVSF at the national level, argued that the renewed role of the state in rural development under the Correa government had come about in a very inefficient way, adding that a lot of duplication developed between the different government agencies and levels of government (Interview 91 2013). In his view, if an adequate coordination between different ministries and levels of government that understood the agroecological focus could not be established, it might simply be better for these programs to just leave the producers already involved in agroecology alone. He added that if they were not going to be helpful in supporting these processes, they could at least “stop doing damage” by promoting conventional inputs and practices (Interview 91 2013).

The producers affiliated with the AVSF (ferias of agricultura familiar campesina) in remaining autonomous from the provincial government (and the project coordinator alike) all appeared embittered from the experience of working with the provincial government. They all expressed that the provincial government had not respected the existing organizations and autonomous processes of the ferias as the legal framework had been designed for. I also interviewed extension workers and staff of the provincial government and I interpret these criticisms of the AVSF-affiliates as fair and well-founded. The provincial government was providing technical assistance to producers participating in the ferias they partnered with and had two full-time extension workers working on farm visits. The extension worker who I interviewed told me that extension workers were trying to promote “producción limpia” and the reduction of external inputs over time, not agroecology, which he argued would be very difficult for most of the producers who participated in the ferias (Interview 96 2013). From my visits to the
Terminal *feria* in Ibarra that had been taken over by the provincial government it was clear that the *feria* had a very different makeup and was less organized than the AVSF-affiliated *ferias*. The politicization of the *feria* in favour of the provincial government was apparent after five minutes in the *feria*. The entire time I was there, a provincial government representative would speak into the sound-system and announce that the *feria* was sponsored by the provincial government and specifically the provincial leader, Prefecto Diego García. This particular *feria* was much larger than any of the *ferias* supported by AVSF and in my interview the president explained to me that they were oversubscribed with producers including some coming from neighbouring provinces, resulting in their having to turn down producers who had requested to participate (Interview 94 2013). While the *feria* did have a governance structure and a committee made up of producers who decided whether new producers could join and sell within the *feria*, it appeared to have become a way for the provincial government to reward supporters and demonstrate that it was “doing something” for the province in order to strengthen its political legitimacy.

While the politicization of the *ferias* by the provincial government was frustrating for the producers who participated in them, viewed in another way it was also the result of the policy transfer by the AVSF and other NGOs which had pushed for this *campesinista* approach during the 2008 constituent assembly. While the provincial government *ferias* may well have been inferior and dysfunctional versions of the AVSF-supported *ferias*, they still served the same function and provided more smallholders with the opportunity to commercialize their produce directly. When I interviewed the president of the Ibarra ‘Terminal’ *feria*, his perspective reflected this. He argued that the provincial government was the first one that had ever implemented any kind of policy for *campesino* agriculture; as he stated no other provincial government had done this and President Correa was the only President who had ever taken *campesinos* into account (Interview 94 2013). When I asked him about his impression of the AVSF-sponsored *ferias*, he said that
they had the same objective but a different political orientation and that they opposed the
government because they were linked to the FICI and this is why there had been conflict
between the producers in these *ferias* and those in the provincial government-sponsored
*ferias* (Interview 94 2013). While the AVSF and the other NGOs pushing the government
to adopt supportive policies did not intend to create politicized *ferias*, it remains true that
the provincial government implemented a version of their intended vision, albeit, an
inferior one.

A theme that emerged in interviews with the producers and leaders of the different
*ferias* in the network was their outright hostility to the politicization of the *ferias* by
*Pachakutik*, AP or any other political party. The insistence by different producers I
interviewed that the *ferias* should be ‘autonomous’ from politics, I believe, was in part a
reflection of a fatigue of the participation of rural social organizations in electoral politics
in the province. Several of the leaders of the AVSF-affiliated *ferias* I interviewed argued
that they merely wanted support based upon the relevant laws and programs that favoured
the *ferias* and that politics should be irrelevant (Interview 85 2013; Interview 89 2013;
Interview 98 2013). The sentiment expressed by different participants in the *ferias* was
for the *ferias* to be less politicized, reflecting a fatigue not only with the provincial
government’s actions, but also with the ethno-development model that led to and even
encouraged Indigenous engagement in rural social organizations and participation in
electoral politics.

In the interview I did with the president of the FICI, she recognized an existing
fatigue with electoral politics and said that the decline in the influence of the FICI was in-
part due to the politicization of the organization, through its links to *Pachakutik*
(Interview 101 2014). Even though she believed that it was necessary for members of the
FICI to support *Pachakutik* during elections, she also believed that a clear separation
should exist between the organization and electoral politics because the organization had
to represent communities before any political party (Interview 101 2014). She said that
she believed the *Red de Ferias* project was an important initiative for the FICI because they hadn’t done much work in the past directly related to agricultural production and had focused more on lobbying for political change along with the issues championed by the CONAIE, like strengthening the recognition of Indigenous justice systems (Interview 101 2014). She stated that the project had come at a crucial juncture for the organization within a context of political division due to the implosion of *Pachakutik* and the erosion of participation in the organization as many former community leaders elected to positions in local government abandoned positions in the *cabildos* (Interview 101 2014).

Interestingly, this same sentiment was expressed by Pedro de la Cruz, former President of the UNORCAC and the FENOCIN and member of the assembly for the governing A.P. who, while on the other side politically from the FICI, argued that politics had become too "partisan’ and that this was often slowing progress on specific issues related to agriculture and food sovereignty (Interview 1 2013). In this regard, leaders on both sides, while still viewing politics as necessary, recognized that politics had had a corrosive effect on rural social organization and also on the implementation of programs targeted at these organizations like the *Red de Ferias* initiative.

**Conclusions**

In implementing policies to support agroecological agriculture and new models of direct commercialization such as *ferias*, it is not so much a “handmaiden” role for government action that is necessary, but rather, “husbandry” (Evans 1995: ), meaning re-engineering farming systems both in terms of production and commercialization. In contrast to the FAPECAFES and the UPOCAM cases in this dissertation, the *Red de Ferias* case, in which promoting agro-ecological production was the goal, proved quite different in that it required government policies to go in a new direction by “husbanding” new practices rather than “handmaiding” existing processes (Evans 1995). The successful expansion
of agroecology requires a shared vision. It is a challenge to achieve this through government action without a leading institution establishing a meta-governance between the different institutions involved. By organizing and coordinating the Red de Ferias the AVSF played a small role in “moving the state” (Heller 2001) towards more favourable public actions for the development of the ferias, specifically by advocating to municipal governments to secure space for their operations and in getting funding from the MAGAP. Ultimately though, the success of the Red de Ferias was limited by the challenge of articulating the different public sector actors who, according to the legal framework, were supposed to be supportive of the Red de Ferias, but in practice did more to undermine rather than support the initiative. While the AVSF and the FICI through the Red de Ferias played a developmental role for the growth and expansion of the ferias, most local government action and that of other public programs had the opposite effect on the ferias and the producers in transition to agroecological production.

The role of the AVSF as an NGO in this case reflects what Bebbington and Farrington argue NGOs working in agricultural extension and development have tended to be most effective at: ‘methodological innovation, grassroots organization and lobbying, rather than only implementing projects and services (1993: 205). It appears that the consulting work that AVSF was able to do for the creation of Redes Comerciales in 2010, and at the local level in Imbabura in organizing local producers for the Red de Ferias, reflects this effectiveness and speaks to the relative success of AVSF in supporting the ferias. At the same time, the AVSF was too weak an actor to lead a process of meta-governance amongst the different institutions that could have potentially supported the organizations in the Red de Ferias, including the provincial government, municipal authorities, the MAGAP and the juntas parroquiales. In the case of Zamora-Chinchipe and Loja, the provincial governments had established mechanisms like the Territorio de Producción Limpia (TPL) and the Mesa de café, which served as spaces of meta-governance and coordination between the actors involved in coffee production.
Despite many challenges, these organizations of coffee producers seemed to have had greater strength and political clout in relation to government ministries and local governments compared to the Red de Ferias and the FICI.

Provincial government involvement leading to the splits in the different ferias also prevented the possibility of any kind of effective meta-governance by either AVSF, the FICI or the provincial government. When I was conducting the research for this case study, the Red de Ferias initiatives were ending just as the Mercados Campesinos project ended, at the close of 2013. The FICI did not have funds to continue employing extension workers so the only practical option for most of the ferias for agricultural extension services would be to rely on workers from the MAGAP or with the provincial government. One option that the Red de Ferias and the FICI could have explored were the mechanisms in the LORSA, the LOEPS and the Law of Social Participation and Social Control to audit government programs and establish spaces for social control and oversight that could potentially have led to more oversight of these programs and coordination. To my knowledge, the AVSF and FICI didn’t take advantage of these mechanisms, yet these mechanisms could have led to a more coherent strategy to provide more developmental support for the ferias and agroecology.
Finally, although agroecology as having ancestral origins has become increasingly synonymous with food sovereignty in the discourse of LVC and scholar activists (see Rosset and Martínez-Torres 2014), I believe that the association between agroecology and ancestral agriculture in this case is somewhat misleading. Despite the fact that this discourse was promoted by the AVSF, the approach of the ferias is quite novel, and while it may be a form of repeasantization in some cases, in fact, in practice, agro-ecology appeared to facilitate a kind of smallholders readjustment to new circumstances associated with the feminization of agriculture. Not, as some might presume, an elemental return to any previous historical moment. While the ferias may be providing a pathway of repeasantization for the minifundistas deciding to remain in agriculture, the feminization of production ushers in social relations distinctive from the traditional peasant household, where men were more engaged in production – an angle that is lost by associating agroecological production with a ‘return’ to ancestral agricultural practices. This is not something that this study was focused on or could analyze in-depth, but it raises new research questions for proponents of agroecology and for the social sustainability of agroecological production in Ecuador and beyond.
Chapter 7 - FAPECAFES and the Post-Neoliberal “Plan Café”

Introduction

Coffee production over the last three decades in Ecuador encapsulates the paradox hypothesized by Liisa North and John Cameron of “rural progress, rural decay” (2003) to describe the impacts of neoliberalism on local initiatives for rural development in the country. While coffee production increased in Ecuador after the agrarian reform processes of the 1960s and 1970s, it began to decline dramatically from the 1990’s leading to its widespread decline or “decay”. In spite of these broader trends, beginning in the mid to late 1990s, a small minority of producers were able to move into the production of coffee for “new markets” (Hebinck et. al 2015) through Fair Trade and organic certification supported by the efforts of neoliberal proyectismo. This process involved the organization of new cooperatives and associations for aggregation and marketing, a process fostered by international cooperation and local NGOs, to gain access to these private certification systems.

The largest and most important of all the coffee producer’s organizations to emerge in this period was the Federación Regional de Asociaciones de Pequeños Cafetaleros Ecológicos del Sur (FAPECAFES), a second-tier cooperative of seven first-level producer associations located throughout southern Ecuador. Despite the

83 Coffee production has been in terminal decline for since the beginning of the 1990s and the end of the national quota system of the International Coffee Agreement (ICA). According to the MAGAP, in 1989 there were 500,681 hectares of coffee in production and 127,120 metric tons of coffee harvested and by 2012 this figure had declined to 194,896 hectares in production and only 23,125 tones harvested (MAGAP 2012: 12).

84 The four original associations founded in the late 1990s and early 2000s included, Asociación de Pequeños Exportadores de Café Especial de Marcabelí (APECAM) in El Oro, Asociación Agroartesanal de
persistence of agri-environmental problems, declining production and productivity and other challenges, access to these “new markets” has allowed coffee production to stabilize and maintain an agrarian livelihood. FAPECAFES has demonstrated an ability to establish relationships with state institutions that are a closer proximation to embedded autonomy than the other two cases in this study. I argue that the relative success of FAPECAFES in doing this speaks to the greater relative organizational capacity and autonomy developed through participation in Fair Trade and organic certification. The organizations\textsuperscript{85} that make up FAPECAFES were able to negotiate with different levels of government, ranging from the local level to national level programs, to establish specific instances of embedded autonomy in support of its model of a via campesina for rural development. The factor that I argue sets the organization apart from the other two cases is the greater capacity and economic clout of the organization compared to the other two. The long-term participation in organic and Fair Trade markets and the cooperative organizational form mandated by Fair Trade certification has contributed to the consolidation of organizations with greater economic autonomy which translated into

Productores de Café de Altura Puyango (PROCAP) in the northwestern part of Loja province, Asociación Agroartesanal de Productores de Café de Altura de Espíndola y Quilanga (PROCAFEQ) in the southeastern part of Loja and Asociación de Productores Ecológicos de Altura de Palanda (APECAP) in the province of Zamora-Chinchipe. Three other first-level associations would join at a later or be formed including the Asociación de pequeños exportadores agropecuarios orgánicos del sur de la amazonía ecuatoriana (APEOSAE) in 2005 and Asociación Agroartesanal de Productores Ecológicos de Café Especial de Cantón Loja (APECAEL) in 2008 and later the creation of Asociación de Productores Ecológicos de Café Orgánico ‘Cuencas del Río Mayo’ (ACRIM) in 2009. As of 2013, the total membership in these seven associations was approximately 1200 producers.

\textsuperscript{85} In the research for this case study, I draw upon interviews with leaders and staff of the Federation level of FAPECAFES but the analysis is mainly drawn from interviews with local leaders and staff from three of the seven base coops (PROCAFEQ, APECAP and ACRIM) conducted in 2013 and 2014. I selected the cases that I did because of prior knowledge and ties in the areas where these organizations were located. The other advantage characteristic of these three local organizations is that they have historically been the better organized and consolidated of the different base cooperatives. Some of the other cooperatives have had more challenges in getting established and with general administrative questions as others had a longer history.
greater political influence during the post-neoliberal turn. This is evident in the ability of the leaders of FAPECAFES to position their organization in relation to state programs at the local and national levels, to work with government agencies and to receive government funding for their own projects. In short, my argument is that the relative success of FAPECAFES in relation to the other two cases speaks to its economic autonomy which in turn led to greater political influence and the concomitant establishment of embedded ties with different levels of government relative to the other two cases.

I begin this chapter with a brief history of peasant social organization and coffee production in southern Ecuador. The origins of FAPECAFES are rooted in the 1960s-1970s period of land reform and the expansion of peasant social and political organization brought about by land reform. By the late 1990s, a deep state of crisis existed in southern Ecuador due to low international coffee prices. This began with the end of the international quota system for coffee production - the International Coffee Agreement (ICA) in 1989 - and culminated in the international “coffee crisis” of the late 1990s. As a result, over a million Ecuadorians emigrated abroad in order to send remittances back home and the rural areas of southern Ecuador experienced the most out-migration of any region of the country. In this unfavourable context, beginning in the mid-1990s, in order to become certified in organic production and to access Fair Trade and organic markets for coffee production, national and international NGOs in southern Ecuador worked with local peasant organizations to organize producers into new organizations. In 2005 these different local initiatives came together to form the second-tier cooperative FAPECAFES. Through this process FAPECAFES and the first-level
organizations received significant supports from international development cooperation and the quality of the coffee they exported also steadily improved. In the period after the post-neoliberal turn, government ministries and local governments looked to the organization as a key actor in helping implement the national coffee reactivation program. Through this process, the organization was able to shape government programs, both at the local and national levels, in ways that the other two organizations in this study were unable to achieve. While it would be premature to call these various instances a full-blown case of embedded autonomy, it is the closest approximation of this phenomenon analyzed in this study.

Coffee Production and Peasant Social Organization in Southern Ecuador

FAPECAFES is a second-tier federation of coffee producer organizations made up of seven first-level cooperatives and associations spread across the three provinces that make up the region known as the south of Ecuador (the provinces of Loja, Zamora-Chinchipe and El Oro). This region, known together as el sur, has some of the best conditions in Ecuador for coffee production due to the predominance of different microclimates in the zones between the Andean mountain range and the coastal and Amazonian lowlands. The region was historically isolated from the rest of Ecuador due to poor infrastructure. Historically the economy has been based on agricultural production and trade with Peru. Loja is considered a highland province even though levels of elevation are much lower in some areas of the province than in other regions of highland Ecuador. In the colonial period, the city of Loja was an important centre for trade between the colonial authorities of Grand Colombia and Lima and the Lojano identity is an important
unifying force in the southern region. The population of the region\textsuperscript{86} is almost entirely *mestizo* and the process of *mestizaje* dates back to the early settlement and colonization of the area. In Loja, the landlord class had influence over the highland areas in the neighbouring coastal province of El Oro, a province named for the mines that Spanish colonizers began to exploit in the 1500s. Though coffee has been produced in Ecuador prior to political independence from Spain, independent smallholders became more intensely involved in coffee production after the agrarian reform and land colonization programs of the 1960s and 1970s\textsuperscript{87}. Both prior to and proceeding agrarian reform, coffee production was one of the main agricultural activities in the region. While levels of coffee production in Ecuador never rivalled those of Colombia, at one time it achieved levels of production similar to those of Peru, whose production has since far surpassed Ecuador’s (MAGAP 2012: 13). Even so, Ecuadorian coffee, particularly coffee from the south of the country, is known for its high quality and is sought after internationally by buyers.

The three provinces making up the south of the country are home to a large number of smallholder\textsuperscript{88} coffee producers who emerged as independent smallholders as a result of processes of land reform in the 1960s and 1970s. In Ecuador, since the early 1800s when the area was still dominated by the *gamonal* model of production and social organization, coffee has been an important export commodity, though far less important than either cacao or bananas. Due to the early process of *mestizaje* in the region, the same kind of racial stratification does not exist in southern Ecuador as in the northern and

\textsuperscript{86} The Saragueros are an exception to this being the main Indigenous group in southern Ecuador. The Saragueros are concentrated in the canton of Saraguro in northern Loja though some Saragueros also migrated to Zamora-Chinchipe with the land colonization programs of the 1970s.

\textsuperscript{87} Based on data from the 2000 agricultural census, as of 2012 it is estimated that there were 105,000 UPAs in Ecuador that produce coffee out of the 842,882 UPAs (2012: 7). From this total number of farms, 80\% are of 5 hectares or less, 13\% are between 5 and 10 hectares and only 7\% are larger than 10 hectares which speaks to the nature of coffee as a campesino product (2012: 7).

\textsuperscript{88} The definition of a smallholder varies in each province, with the colono producers in El Oro typically having more land than producers in Loja. The data from a representative survey of two of the first-level cooperatives in FAPECAFES, APECAP and PROCAP, the average size of a landholding in APECAP was 1.73 hectares and 2.26 hectares for the producers in PROCAP (Hollenstein y Baez 2016: 87)
central highlands. However, Loja and the rest of the south was also characterized by a *gamonal* system of landowners and tenant labour known as the *arrimado* system or “agreement” between landlord and landless peasant. This “agreement” centered on the exchange of a certain amount of labour annually in exchange for access to land (Dutan y Poma 1994: 20). This system had a similar structure to the *huasipungo* system that characterized much of northern Ecuador and it has been said that the *arrimados* were the *mestizo* counterparts of the *huasipungos* in the central and northern highlands (Dutan y Poma 1994: 20). The level of land concentration in Loja by landlords was extreme even by Ecuadorian standards prior to agrarian reform. For example, before reform there were 86 *haciendas* with over 500 hectares each with the average size being 2888.48 hectares (Dutan y Poma 1994: 19). The process of agrarian reform in Loja was preceded by social conflict in some areas. *Arrimados* organized themselves to demand expropriation of *haciendas* followed by redistribution by the state. After these mobilizations, agrarian reform had a significant impact on landholding patterns with substantial redistribution throughout the whole southern region.

Agrarian reform in the southern region not only led to significant changes in land use patterns in Loja but also brought new forms of social and political organization. In the 1970s, a new fabric of social organization emerged in rural Loja with the breakdown of the *arrimado* system. The actors involved included the Catholic Church, new political forces of the Left, as well as populist parties emerging in the 1960s and attempting to organize *campesinos* for their own respective projects. All of these groups attempted to influence the emerging *campesino* organizations springing from agrarian reform (Dutan y Poma 1994). Between 1967-1970 there was also a severe drought in Loja that caused many former *arrimados* to emigrate out of the province and settle as *colonos* in other
parts of Ecuador including parts of the coast and the Amazon\textsuperscript{89}. The \textit{colonos} worked their farms based primarily on family and women participated both in productive agricultural labour and were also expected to perform most labour associated with household reproduction based on traditional notions of the gendered division of labour. Due to this initial wave of out-migration, Loja has the distinction of being the province with some of the highest levels of national and international emigration in Ecuador. \textit{Lojanos} and the descendants of \textit{Lojanos} live in every contemporary Ecuadorian urban centre as a result of this period’s out-migration. Nearly the entire population of Zamora-Chinchipe, the province directly east of Loja, are the descendants of \textit{Lojanos}. During my research I met many producers who recounted the harsh process of land colonization and area settlement that existed before road construction, necessitating long days of foot travel from Loja into the area.

Through agrarian reform, state agencies like the MAGAP encouraged the formation of production cooperatives for coffee and other agricultural commodities (Interview 35 2013). Some of these organizations had a more geographical/territorial basis, such as \textit{comunas}. Others took the form of agricultural cooperatives or associations. During this period, there was a high level of involvement from extension workers and other officials from the Ministry of Agriculture in the constitution of these new organizations (Interview 35 2013). In an interview with several MAGAP officials who had worked in the state bureaucracy since the 1970s, they confirmed that the vast majority of these cooperatives disbanded while the \textit{comunas}, indivisible tracts of land, have persisted (Interview 35 2013). The cooperatives and associations formed for processing and commercialization had many problems, the foremost being capture by local commercial intermediaries and traders. After the decline of the ICA in 1989 and the end of the national quota system for coffee, none of the coffee commercialization

\textsuperscript{89}The Amazonian city of Lago Agrio in the province of Sucumbios was first called ‘New Loja’ when it was founded in the late 1960s with the settlement of colonos from Loja
cooperatives in Loja survived (Interview 35 2013). The last vestiges of the programs for coffee production associated with agrarian reform were eliminated with the creation of the Consejo Cafatelero Nacional (COFENAC) in 1995, following the 1994 reforms that liberalized agriculture and rural development policies. The COFENAC was created after protests by coffee producers in the wake of the elimination of the national coffee program in 1994 (Interview 40 2013). The COFENAC was set up as a private foundation governed by a board of directors representing the coffee sector, mainly exporters and processors from the Asociación Nacional de Exportadores de Café (ANECAFE) but also with representation from coffee producer organizations as well. The COFENAC did not receive public funding and its only stable funding came from a 2% tax on each sack of coffee the country exported (Interview 40 2013). As coffee production and exports declined throughout the 1990s the core revenue of the COFENAC subsequently declined as well. As a result, the COFENAC could only ever afford to employ a small number of extension and field staff, sometimes as few as twelve extension workers for the whole country, at most reaching 5% of coffee producers in Ecuador (Interview 40 2013). It was in the context of the end of these state programs and the creation of the COFENAC that efforts to organize smallholders to participate in higher value niche markets through the efforts of neoliberal proyectismo began.

**Fair Trade, FAPECAFES, and Neoliberal Proyectismo**

The nature and prospects of Fair Trade, in particular whether it is compatible with neoliberalism or whether it has more radical transformative potential, has been the subject of an extensive debate in the academic literature. The case for the first perspective has been made thoroughly by Gavin Fridell in his 2007 book in which he argued that Fair

---

90 The COFENAC is an arms-length government agency funded by a tax levied directly on coffee exports. The CONFENAC was created in 1995 with the adoption of the Ley Especial del Sector Cafetalero, Registro Oficial Nº 657, March 20th, 1995.
Trade is compatible with neoliberalism as a market-driven mechanism of non-state certification and commerce which does not address the underlying problems faced by smallholder producers in the global south. Fridell points to historical farm gate prices prior to 1989, during the period when the ICA was dominant, to argue that state regulation and programs for production were more effective than Fair Trade in providing higher farm gate prices to producers than Fair Trade certification has been (2007: 139). However Fair Trade certification has also been criticized by orthodox neoliberal analysts as a form of “political” market intervention. These authors argue that certification restricts access to a small group of relatively well-off producers who can pay for certification and that this is unfair (Griffiths 2010; Weber 2009) and also that certification represents undesirable “political” interference in market mechanisms. Taking a heterodox perspective, Juliane Reneicke argues that it is precisely the fact that prices are not set through the market that makes Fair Trade ‘alternative’, because the determination of a “fair” price occurs outside of the market (2010). While Fair Trade may not challenge the rolling back of state subsidies for agriculture associated with neoliberalism, it is also not necessarily compatible with orthodox liberal conceptions of a free market either.

While observers such as Fridell are pessimistic about the transformative potential of Fair Trade, its origins in more radical political positions have a distinct affinity with a via campesina political orientation. The origins of the contemporary Fair Trade certification system go back to initiatives by North American churches, in particular the Mennonite Church with its model of importing handicraft known today as the social enterprise Ten Thousand Villages, and with others that are today affiliated to the World Fair Trade Organization (WFTO) and also to the Third World solidarity movements of the 1960s-1980s. These earlier initiatives sought to connect marginalized producers in the global south with buyers in the global north and were also known as “alternative trade”. These early conceptions of Fair Trade were first applied to the agricultural sector in the early 1980s through a pioneering project by the Dutch NGO Solidaridad and Mercado
Alternativo that worked together to organize a cooperative comprising smallholder farmers in Oaxaca in southern Mexico, now known as the Union de Comunidades Indígenas de la Región del Istmo (Union of Indigenous Communities of the Istmo Region). A Dutch priest, Francisco Vanderhoff, of the liberation theology generation was a central protagonist in this pioneering organization for exporting coffee directly from southern producer organizations to northern consumers. UCIRI was an important case because out of the initial exports to groups in the Netherlands and Germany, this initiative would evolve into the non-profit certification agency Max Havelaar, established in 1988 (Vanderhoff Boersma 2005: 148). Max Havelaar was the first national initiative that would later evolve into the international network of certification agencies Fair Trade Labelling Organizations International (FLO)\textsuperscript{91}, known today as Fairtrade International (FTI). In the 1980s, other similar initiatives emerged in North America comprising important precursors to the contemporary FTI system. Equal Exchange, an importer run as a worker cooperative in the United States and established in Canada by Oxfam-Canada, were both founded to import coffee from Nicaragua during the US-backed civil war and both became part of the FTI system. The early history of the Fair Trade movement and the influences of liberation theology and solidarity with Sandinista Nicaragua certainly contrasts with the size of the global system of certified commerce which FTI represents today, surpassing one billion dollars of sales in 2015. Laura Raynolds refers to this as the shift from “partnership to traceability” (2009) as the driving force of Fair Trade. This has led observers to suggest that certification has become driven

\textsuperscript{91} Between 1988 and 1997, fourteen national Labelling Initiatives (LIs) were established in countries across Europe, North America and Japan under different names including Max Havelaar, TransFair, Fairtrade Foundation but all under the broader umbrella and standards of FLO. In 2003, in order to become compliant with the International Organization for Standardization ISO 65 by creating an arms-length certification agency called FLO-Cert which is part of FLO but audits the certified commodity chains of certified products. FLO which is changed its name to Fair Trade International (FTI) in 2010 and many LIs have rebranded themselves according as Fairtrade Canada for example. At the end of 2011, after a drawn-out dispute over the standards set at the global level, Fair Trade USA (FTUSA) left the FTI system and became independent and has since charted its own course which has involved certifying independent farmers and wage labour on plantations.
more by a “bureaucratic logic” (Vifell and Thedvall 2012; Clark and Hussey 2015) reinforcing the argument that Fair Trade, like other private sustainability certification systems, is a form of “neoliberal governance” (Guthman 2007).

While more pessimistic takes on the transformative potential of Fair Trade tend to lump Fair Trade in with other systems of private sustainability certification, I believe it is important to differentiate Fair Trade from these other initiatives in at least two regards: the minimum floor prices for certified commodities and the role of producer-owned cooperatives in the governance certification system (Crowell and Reed 2009; Reed 2012). The multi-stakeholder nature of certification has meant that different actors within the system (producers, cooperatives, importers, labelling initiative staff) have different interests that are negotiated in the system (Clark and Hussey 2015). Although other similar private certification initiatives are also characterized by multi-stakeholder governance mechanisms, in the Fairtrade system producers are co-owners and have organized representation within the certification system through producer networks. For example, FAPECAFES and its first-level members are affiliated to the CLAC through a national association, the Coordinadora Ecuatoriana de Comercio Justo (CECJ). A controversial development has been the launch by the CLAC since 2006 of its own certification system called the Símbolo de Pequeños Productores (SPP), or Small Producer’s Symbol in English, as a tactic to pressure for changes within the FTI system that FAPECAFES has also promoted and exported coffee through. As I argue in this chapter, access to Fair Trade markets seems to have been crucial to the construction of the relatively high level of capacity and political influence of FAPECAFES, compared to the other two cases in this study, during the post-neoliberal turn. While Fair Trade certification, as a market-driven strategy, may be compatible with neoliberalism it may

92The three regional producer networks within the FTI system include the Coordinadora Latinoamericana y del Caribe de Pequeños Productores de Comercio Justo (CLAC), Latin America and Caribbean Coordinator of Small Fair Trade Producers, the Network of Asia and Pacific Producers (NAPP) and Fairtrade Africa.
also serve to develop the capacity of producer organizations that challenge neoliberalism by establishing nascent instances of embedded autonomy with the post-neoliberal state. The case of FAPECAFES demonstrates this point.

The FAPECAFES’ origin story is one of neoliberal proyectismo; the projects that preceded the constitution of the first-level organizations of FAPECAFES were funded by international cooperation and northern NGOs and implemented by local field staff. The origins of FAPECAFES can be traced back to 1995 when a group of producers mobilized in the canton of Puyango in the northwestern part of Loja into the association Asociación Agroartesanal de Productores de Café de Altura Puyango (PROCAP) to produce and export organic coffee. This initiative came about due to support from the Belgian NGO VECO Andino, which paid for agronomists and local leaders to serve as promotores to organize producers transitioning to organic and shade-grown production methods (Eberhart 2006). In order to access FTI certification, producers had to be organized into democratically run cooperatives or associations. In the case of PROCAP, Nicolas Eberhart, who worked in the early days of this pilot project organizing producers, notes in his report on the history of FAPECAFES, producers had a negative impression of cooperatives because of the previous cooperatives in the area that became beholden to commercial intermediaries and exporters in the period when the ICA quota system was still functioning (2006: 12). While the experience of earlier organizations had been negative in the case of PROCAP, in other cases the organizations founded during the agrarian reform period served as the basis for the organization of producers into the new associations that had to be formed to access certification.

In the case of the canton of Espíndola in southeastern Loja, the Unión Cantonal de Organizaciones Campesinas Populares de Espíndola (UCOCPE), a canton-level federation of campesino comunas and first-level organizations, served as the institutional vehicle to form the local association that was another founding member of FAPECAFES,
the PROCAFEQ. UCOCPE ran the technical assistance projects and hired *promotores* to lay the groundwork for the creation of the new association. However, in forming these new associations and cooperatives, efforts at eliminating the *proyectismo* were implemented through the associations created in the agrarian reform period to organize producers and help them transition to organic production methods. These efforts reflected the “vernacular statecraft” (Coloredo-Mansfeld 2007) of this period with an organization like the UCOPCE in Espindola being an important case in point (Interview 39 2013). Emilio Aguilar, a long-time staff member and activist in the UCOCPE stated that the debate over whether to maintain *proyectismo* or restrict its actions to social and political organization became a perennial discussion within the organization. This was particularly the case in the height of the neoliberal period when public services were so absent in rural communities that the organization felt that it had to respond to urgent needs by organizing projects with NGOs, even while they still believed in the importance of political change and activism (Interview 39 2013).

The origin stories of the other local organizations that make up the Federation follow more or less the same formula of social organization associated with neoliberal *proyectismo*. Funding for initial activities (organizing workshops and trainings, hiring *técnicos* and *promotores*, etc.) came from foreign NGOs\(^3\), like VECO Andino, through short to medium-term projects to promote capacity building and the transition to organic farming. These were carried out by local NGOs\(^4\) which expanded in Loja in the 1990s when multi-lateral development programs began to channel more funding through NGOs (Interview 45 2013). In some cases, municipal governments also gave funds for these processes as well (Aguilar and Robles- Pilco 2009). With the previous 1997 legislation

\(^3\) Other foreign NGOs that supported the first-level organizations and FAPECAFES included Oxfam.

\(^4\) Ecuadorian NGOs, many based in Loja, that supported the organizations conforming FAPECAFES included Fundación de Apoyo Comunitario Economico y Social (FACES), Colinas Verdes, Fundación Cultura y Naturaleza and FEPP Loja.
municipalities had jurisdiction over local development and agriculture. Multilateral and bilateral development cooperation also funded the various local initiatives to organize producers through the projects of the PROLOCAL funded by the World Bank, the Spanish Development Cooperation Agency (AECID), USAID and the German Development Cooperation Agency (GIZ). In their study of the case of PROCAFEQ, Ospina and Hollenstein argue that the founding of the association and the move towards organic coffee production involved the formation of what they refer to as ‘territorial coalition’ which brought these different actors together around neoliberal *proyectismo*. They describe the coalition of actors as largely external including “…a marketing company, several NGOs, international development agencies, and organic coffee roasters…” and the resultant inertia to seek out entry into international coffee markets after prices began to rise again in the early 2000s after the price crisis of 1998-1999 (Ospina and Hollenstein 2015: 91). The coordination of all of these different actors served to pool resources and develop piecemeal projects and strategies to hire *promotores* and agronomists and to fund projects and implement organizational capacity building activities.

All of the first-level organizations that would eventually federate and form FAPECAFES formed new associations or cooperatives in order to meet the requirements of FTI certification. The organization of these new producers’ associations had important impacts on changing power relations in some of the local communities in which producers are often isolated due to the great distances between neighbors and the power that commercial intermediaries traditionally enjoyed over producers in buying their coffee at the farm gate and offering them pre-harvest financing. This pre-harvest financing often led to a cycle of indebtedness forcing producers to sell to intermediaries, who often double as *chulqueros* loaning money informally at high interest rates. As the Director of APECAP emphasized, the organization of the association has helped
producers to feel less isolated and build their self-esteem. This has changed the traditional power relations between the commercial intermediaries and producers and these represent important gains accomplished by access to Fair Trade markets (Interview 32 2013). While these are important impacts, Fair Trade has not solved the longer-term chronic issues around low productivity of coffee production. As Valentin Chinchay, a coffee producer who was one of the founders of PROCAFEQ and the first President of FAPECAFES argued, while the new levels of social organization that access to Fair Trade brought with it are important, it has not been enough to address the deeper problems in coffee production exacerbated by declining production and a total absence of favorable government policies. For example, he estimated that out of all the smallholder coffee producers in the area represented by the PROCAFEQ, only 20% were ever part of the organization or benefitted from its projects, and 80% still participated in the traditional commodity chain of intermediaries (Interview 41 2013). Don Valentin argued that he didn’t want the State to “give” him, or any of the other producers, anything, but that what was needed was a long-term state policy to help producers replace (renovar) the old coffee bushes and help replace them with new bushes to raise productivity so that young people would have more incentive to stay in coffee production95 (Interview 41 2013). A central plank of the Alianza PAIS platform in the Presidential campaign of 2006 was the promise for an agrarian revolution to reactivate the agricultural sector. This seems to

---

95 This excerpt from the transcript of the interview with former President of FAPECAFES Valentin Chinchay is an excellent summary of the problems facing smallholder coffee producers: “…what we really need is for the State to design a policy that really works for coffee producers…because if they don’t, for the few of us who are still in the countryside we are getting older and older and we are going to die poorer than we’ve ever been. Of course, this is because of declining production because we don’t have the resources to invest in coffee production. There is also not enough day labour to work in the harvests and it is expensive, there just isn’t enough. As you see, as you see here, come and look, my wife and I are two veterans, what do we do if there is not enough labour or resources to invest in the plot? We don’t want anyone to give us anything, we just want there to be a state policy, for example long-term and low interest loans so that we can work…because after coffee plants have been replaced you can’t repay loans for production in two years, coffee plants only begin to produce after three years. All we want is that there is a real policy, not that they give me anything, just that there is a policy of two- or three-years grace period, just pay the principal but not the interest” (Interview 41 2013).
speak to the dynamics that Don Valentin describes, of “rural decay”. From the beginning Valentin and other leaders were supportive of Correa’s political project and hopeful his discourse of an ‘agrarian revolution’ would favour their interests.

**Coffee Production and Post-Neoliberalism in Southern Ecuador: Transcending Neoliberal Proyectismo**

According to official government figures, in 1989 there were 500,681 hectares of coffee in production and 127,120 metric tons of coffee harvested annually in Ecuador. By 2012, this number had declined to 194,896 hectares in production and a mere 23,125 tones harvested\(^6\), illustrative of the terminal decline that has occurred over the two decades (MAGAP 2012: 12). Though production increased slightly in the 1990s, after the ICA quota system ended, it never recovered from the price drop of the late 1990s. According to figures from 2012, Ecuador exports 81% of all the coffee it produces and imports up to 70% Robusta coffee, mainly from Vietnam\(^7\), but also from Brazil and other countries, to process instant coffee in Ecuadorian firms for the domestic market (MAGAP 2012: 8). It is also estimated that 93% of the UPAs producing coffee are campesinos in that they produce on less than ten hectares of land and in this sense, policies aimed at the coffee sector would benefit small producers (MAGAP 2012: 7). Investing in a national coffee reactivation program was a policy that was highly coherent with the revolución agraria promoted by the government in that it was targeted at smallholders and would also generate foreign exchange. In this context, in 2012 the Correa government officially

\(^6\) According to data from the 2000 agricultural census, the MAGAP estimates that there are 105,000 farms in Ecuador that produce coffee out of the 842,882 UPAs registered in the 2000 agricultural census. Out of this total number of coffee farms registered in the 2000 agricultural census, 80% are of 5 hectares or less, 13% are between 5 and 10 hectares and only 7% are larger than 10 hectares (MAGAP 2012: 7). In this sense, coffee production is overwhelmingly an activity involving small family farms in Ecuador and investment in a coffee reactivation project is something that will benefit small producers who have been abandoning coffee production.

\(^7\) Gavin Fridell (2014) has pointed out that Vietnam flooding international markets with cheap robusta coffee was achieved through state-led development policies for the coffee sector in a period in which governments in other parts of the world were withdrawing supports for agriculture.
launched the *Proyecto de Reactivación de la Caficultura Ecuatoriana* as a component of its broader project of *revolución agrarian*, to reactivate the national agricultural sector in an attempt to recuperate coffee production in Ecuador through technical assistance, subsidized inputs and new credit programs which represented a significant departure from the de facto abandonment by the state of coffee production in the 1990s.

Former President of FAPECAFES, Valentin Chinchay suggested that the impetus for the creation of this strategy might have come in part from an event in Loja in 2011 where leaders of FAPECAFES presented President Correa with a basket of their products (Interview 41 2013). He recounted that after this the President called for a meeting on the coffee sector in the coastal city of Machala with officials from the MAGAP and the organization on the coffee sector and this also led to the participation of the organization in a sectoral coordinating body in Loja for coffee, the Mesa de Café, that was coordinated by the provincial government (Interview 41 2013). This example speaks to the importance of “personal channels” (Evans 1989: 578) in moving towards embedded autonomy in intermediate instances of developmental states such as this case. When the plan was later launched in 2012, the budget was set at $60,519,647 USD investment that was to be spent over nine years (MAGAP 2012: 6). In order to achieve the goal of reactivating the coffee sector, this original plan assigned 59% of the 60 million USD budget to improving plant varieties and incentivizing producers to plant these new varieties to improve productivity. The remaining amount of funds would be divided between activities including low-interest loans for producers, capacity building for producer organizations, improvement of post-harvest processes and the hiring of specialists to implement the project (MAGAP 2012: 6). The objective of the project was to eventually reach all coffee producers, but it would first roll out initiatives through existing organizations like FAPECAFES and eventually all coffee producers in the country.
The analysis of the problems outlined in the government document about the coffee sector are the same ones identified by Don Valentin including declining productivity, the abandonment of production by many producers, ageing of coffee producers and the lack of investment in infrastructure in rural areas, amongst others. The plan also recognized the centrality of producer organizations in the reactivation strategy as assisting the MAGAP and the other government agencies involved in implementing the strategy (MAGAP 2012: 97) including FAPECAFES and other producer organizations in rolling out the program. In short, the strategy recognized the importance of embedding state programs with producer organizations and vice versa. The plan argues explicitly that terminal decline of coffee production from the neoliberal approach to the sector was to privatize all extension services and research through the COFENAC, which was not able to have the impact it was mandated to have (MAGAP 2012: 10). The government intended for the new suite of programs associated with the coffee reactivation project and the Unidad de Coordinación Café y Cacao in the MAGAP to replace the COFENAC and the plan describes the COFENAC in derisive terms, as a vestige of neoliberalism that had failed to meet its objectives (MAGAP 2012: 10). It further argues for the importance of widespread reinvestment in the sector to revive coffee production to historical levels.

As a result of the adoption of the national coffee program I learned that the COFENAC was to be eliminated while I was in the process of conducting fieldwork. The officials I interviewed at the COFENAC were naturally critical of the decision to disband their organization even though they were supportive of the increased investments being made by the government through the reactivation program. In light of the years of neglect of coffee producers by the state, the officials at the COFENAC argued that the policies represented a significant change, but these policies were being implemented without consulting the COFENAC staff and their ‘know how’ and research about the sector (Interview 41 2013). In particular, they expressed concern that the new program had not
incorporated research they had conducted on different varieties of coffee plants in different coffee producing regions to improve cup quality. In an interview with a top official overseeing the national coffee program it was clear that the program’s central focus was to plant the high-yield Brazilian variety Catuai and use conventional methods for production and pest management, reflecting a narrow focus on productivity over quality (Interview 46 2013). This official, an agronomist hired from Colombia, argued that it was not possible to manage all of the agro-environmental problems with organic methods and that the most important objective of the plan should be a focus on increasing productivity using conventional methods and by introducing high yielding seed varieties (Interview 46 2013). While all of the different actors I interviewed agreed on the need to replace the old bushes with low yields through re-planting, the central focus on the introduction of new high-yield seed varieties like Catuai was criticized by the COFENAC and producer organization representatives as an overly simplistic solution to the problems in the coffee sector. The staff I interviewed argued that since these varieties had not been widely tested in Ecuadorian microclimates there was no guarantee that the coffee would score high quality ratings and be a high value crop for producers (Interview 41 2013).

While the coffee plan was designed with ambitious goals in mind and represented a major shift from the neoliberal privatization of coffee extension services with the creation COFENAC and proyectismo, it also became clear to me that the design and implementation of the plan at the national level were plagued by the broader problems associated with the Correa government’s recentralization in policy implementation and “institutional monocropping” (Evans 2004). However, while these tendencies appeared to characterize the plan at the national level, more positive synergies were also emerging between FAPECAFES and the local offices of the MAGAP charged with implementing the program.

When I was conducting fieldwork for this case study in 2013, the post-neoliberal shift was evident in the sheer increase in financial resources invested in the coffee sector
and being channeled to the members of FAPECAFES along with other coffee producers. The producers and staff I interviewed in FAPECAFES were all very supportive of the coffee plan and of the Correa government in general despite the ongoing agri-environmental problems they were experiencing in production with diseases like broca. The Director of the APECAP was optimistic about the ‘return of the state’ in coffee production and said that the increase in resources to solve issues related to low productivity was a welcome shift as this was the main problem facing the organization (Interview 32 2013). He argued that the coffee plan was not conditioned by the objectives “in fashion” amongst NGOs and international cooperation, giving the organization more autonomy to allocate resources in ways that they thought most important, namely on technical assistance. He also stated that the new low-interest loans from the BNF had helped attract some new members to the association and make the transition to organic certification (Interview 32 2013). Despite the fact that at the national level the national reactivation program was promoting conventional production methods and subsidizing chemical inputs, in the case of Zamora-Chinchipe, the local extension offices of the MAGAP had worked with the local associations to adapt extension services for coffee based on organic production methods and inputs due to pressure from these associations (Interview 32 2013; Interview 57 2014). The extension workers in the local offices of the MAGAP that I interviewed likewise expressed the importance of developing a good “anclaje” [embeddedness] with the associations to coordinate their activities and make the reactivation project more effective (Interview 57 2014). The focus of the government on working with producer’s associations helped FAPECAFES to continue strengthening its model of organic production rather than undermine it. In short, the ties with extension workers at the local level appeared to be largely synergistic instead of operating at cross purposes.

In addition to the impacts of the coffee reactivation program, I encountered several examples of collaboration between the first-level organizations of FAPECAFES
and the *juntas parroquiales* or parish councils, the most local level of government in the implementation of activities related to coffee production. These new linkages exemplified the increased resources and authority given to these councils in the 2008 constitution and the 2010 COOTAD law\(^98\). I came across several cases where these councils exercised their newly granted powers in economic development and agriculture in conjunction with the efforts of FAPECAGES. For example, the parish council of San Francisco, in the Municipality of Palanda, had established an agreement with the local branch of the MAGAP to promote cacao and coffee production and was also coordinating these activities with the APECAP (Interview 57 2014). In the case of PROCAFEQ, the council in the parish of El Airo in Espindola, where former President of FAPECAFES Valentin Chinchay was elected as vice-chair, had implemented coffee reactivation activities through a similar agreement with the local extension office of the MAGAP (Interview 42 2013). Through this program, the council hired four extension workers to promote the reactivation of the coffee sector through on-farm technical assistance and the establishment and management of a nursery for coffee plants that were subsequently distributed to producers in the parish (Interview 42 2013). Being public programs, these activities didn’t just benefit the members of PROCAFEQ but the production methods used were nevertheless in line with organic certification since most producers in the *parroquia* were members of the organization.

The second case in PROCAFEQ in particular was an interesting example of the post-neoliberal shift and also spoke directly to the political influence of FAPECAFES at the local level. The *junta parroquial* was implementing activities associated with coffee reactivation as a direct result of political participation by the former President of FAPECAFES in politics, Don Valentin, who was elected as vice-President of the junta as

---

\(^98\) As I analyzed in chapter three, with the adoption of the COOTAD in 2010, juntas parroquiales were granted increased jurisdictional authority in areas like agriculture and economic development than under the previous 1997 decentralization legislation.
a candidate for AP in 2009; a case of “crossing over” from the NGO world into electoral politics (Reid 2008). In interviews with both Valentin and the extension workers hired by the council it was confirmed that the program had been proposed and driven forward by Valentin (Interview 41 2013). Don Valentin was not the only leader of FAPECAFES who would go on to participate in politics. The former vice-President of APECAP, Victoria Alverca, was elected deputy mayor of Palanda in 2014. These cases demonstrate the local base of power that the organizations have been able to construct. Don Valentin reflected on his experience of “crossing over” from the organization into politics in my interview with him, arguing that his previous experience negotiating with NGOs for international cooperation helped him to have an understanding of how to navigate the political realm as well as the public sector. He attributed his success in establishing agreements with the MAGAP and the provincial government and the extension and technical assistance activities the council was implementing to this experience (Interview 41 2013). What his comments also demonstrate is that while the COOTAD established a more even model of funding formula for local governments across poorer and richer regions of the country, the COOTAD is still somewhat of an “off the menu” model of decentralization in practice since it was still dependent on the political will and leadership of local politicians to establish local projects like the coffee project established in El Airo by Don Valentin. These instances of coordination between the juntas parroquiales and the first-level associations represent a shift away from the neoliberal model of proyectismo when juntas parroquiales had no jurisdictional authority to work on issues like agriculture or economic development.

Besides these cases of members and leaders of FAPECAFES who had “crossed over” into politics, I also encountered professionals working in the public sector who had worked in some capacity with the NGOs and projects that had helped found FAPECAFES. One interview was with an official who was now working in the Municipality of Espindola. It was insightful for understanding the shift of the post-
neoliberal period. This official was a veterinarian and had worked in international development projects that had benefitted the PROCAFEQ in the 1990s during what he referred to as the “decadencia” of NGOs (Interview 45 2013). In the case of PROCAFEQ, the idea to promote organic coffee production was generated out of initiatives aimed at conservation in the area. He emphasized how Loja had been a leading area in the country for experimentation with agro forestry in the neoliberal period when many local NGOs funded by international donors began to promote this model (Interview 45 2013). He argued that the Socio Bosque program, devised by the Correa government at the national level, had sprung from Loja and that some of the national level managers of the program had worked in Loja. In the interview he confirmed a substantial landscape change over the past several years with the return towards a more state-led model of development. He expressed some nostalgia for the “room to maneuver” one had working in the NGO sector versus the State (Interview 45 2013). He argued that the COOTAD had restricted what Municipalities could do in terms of local development initiatives because they no longer had the jurisdiction to work on local development enjoyed under the previous a la carte model of decentralization, all while giving more power to the juntas parroquiales, but that municipalities in particular now had no jurisdiction to implement programs to support economic development or agriculture.

Fair Trade in Ecuador: From Private Certification Towards Public Policies

The reinvestment of the state in the coffee sector was welcomed by FAPECAFES and in general terms helped the organization to continue its model of rural development through organic coffee production. In contrast to the other two cases in this study, government programs such as low-interest loans, technical assistance and subsidized inputs were in line with the guidelines for organic certification and seemed to be helping the organization to consolidate its existing model rather than pull it in a different direction.
(ie: encouraging conventional production practices). There was a general sense within the organization that the government was “on their side” and that the reinvestments in the coffee sector were an improvement over the near abandonment of coffee by the State during neoliberal *proyectismo*. While the previous examples point to synergies between the organizations and government programs around issues related to production, the organization, both at the provincial and national levels, has been involved in advocating anew for policies and initiatives related to certification and commercialization and other policies favouring small-producer organizations. The following two examples demonstrate the relatively high capacity of FAPECAFES developed through participation in Fair Trade certification that allowed the organization to exert relatively more political influence during the period of study than the other two organizations.

The first example is that of an initiative launched by the provincial government in Zamora-Chinchipe. The three first-level associations, APECAP, ACRIM and APEOSAE worked with the provincial government to develop a multi-stakeholder local model of certification called the *Región Bracamoros- Territorio de Producción Limpia* (TPL) or Territory of Sustainable Production in English, beginning in 2010 (Clark and Martínez 2016; GAD de Zamora-Chinchipe 2014). The concept of the TPL initiative was to create a public model of agricultural certification as well as a regional brand for agricultural products for the province. The idea first emerged from a 2010 meeting between the associations with the provincial government where the organizations had pitched the idea to the provincial government as an alternative to private certification (Interview 34 2013; Interview 32 2013). The TPL system gained legal status through an ordinance passed by the provincial government in 2013 for a system of standards and the creation of a multi-stakeholder committee building on pre-existing capacities of first-level associations in
certification and quality control to certify farms that wanted to participate\textsuperscript{99}. The inter-institutional committee officially recognized by the ordinance includes representatives from producer’s associations and more specifically their internal control committees, representatives from the provincial government, extension staff from the MAGAP and representatives from municipal governments (Clark and Martínez 2016: 297). In this sense, this initiative represented a form of co-construction as well as co-production of public policy between the local government and the producer organizations. The TPL designation was also open to producers outside of the two organizations if they could meet the six general criteria laid out in the ordinance. Part of the development had been the creation of the \textit{Bramaros} label, named for the confederation of Amazonian Indigenous groups who lived in the area prior to Spanish colonialism (Clark and Martínez 2016: 296), a brand name that the two associations have begun to use to export their coffee and also commercialize it at the national-level.

The technical staff and leaders of both APECAP and ACRIM I interviewed were enthusiastic about the TPL initiative because they believed it might allow them to move away from paying fees to private certification bodies (Interview 32 2013; Interview 34 2013; Interview 55 2014). While for larger cooperatives selling into Fair Trade and organic markets this might not be a realistic prospect, the small size of the organizations could have made it an option in the future since they were already selling so much of their coffee as speciality or origin coffee without certification (Interview 32; 2013). Each association had their certification license through FTI and since they were both such small organizations having FTI certification to sell their coffee through alternative channels such as the TPL, the SPP or as speciality origin coffee, could be a viable option.

for these two associations. Despite the enthusiasm of the associations about this initiative, its future prospects were also uncertain at the time I did fieldwork. Even though APECAP and ACRIM were key actors pushing for the TPL initiative, one of the key facilitators behind the initiative was the German Development Cooperation agency, the GIZ, that was working with the provincial government of Zamora-Chinchipe on a multi-year project\(^\text{100}\). The GIZ ended their project with the provincial government in 2014 and from what I gathered in interviews with representatives of APECAP and ACRIM, they felt that it would be difficult to keep moving the initiative forward without the support that the GIZ staff had provided up to that point as it wasn’t clear that the provincial government staff had enough understanding of the model to implement it. In an interview with an agronomist in the local MAGAP office in Palanda, I learned that that they had not attended the TPL initiative meeting since the GIZ left the province and that the GIZ was the driving force behind the initiative (Interview 57 2014). Despite the possible challenges going forward, the establishment of the TPL model and the vision for an alternative to private certification is significant as an alternative to the private market-driven nature of most forms of agricultural certification (Clark and Martínez 2016). The TPL initiative is unique and represents a model much closer to synergy between government, at the sub-national level in this case, and the objectives of the organization much closer to a state-supported example of a *via campesina*.

At the national level, FAPECAFES was involved in advocating for and later helping to draft a national Fair Trade Strategy, the *Estrategia Ecuatoriana de Comercio Justo* through the CECJ (Clark, Reed and Decker 2016; Republica del Ecuador 2014). The institutionalization of Fair Trade in Ecuador began with the inclusion of social economy and other articles related to Fair Trade in the 2008 Constitution. The inclusion

\(^{100}\text{This project was part of the Gestión Sostenible de Recursos Naturales (GESOREN) program of the German Development Cooperation Agency (GIZ) or Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), which ended in 2014.}\)
of these articles had mainly to do with the political influence that the WFTO-affiliated Fair Trade organizations had with President Correa, discussed in chapter three. Although Fair Trade certified organizations represent the majority of Fair Trade exports in Ecuador, the WFTO appeared to have more influence in the policy process, likely because the organizations it worked with like MCCH and Camari are so old and well-established. With the inclusion of Fair Trade in the 2008 constitution the government took steps to create institutional space within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to promote Fair Trade and social economy products and commerce. In 2010, the Direction of Inclusive Trade was established within the Foreign Affairs Ministry - at this time the Ministry of International Relations, Trade and Integration (MRCI) - which divided in 2014 to create the new Ministry of International Trade (COMEX), separated from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This was a small department with the Foreign Ministry charged with promoting Fair Trade and products from the social and solidarity economy abroad as well as helping these organizations find new markets and buyers and also to lead the process of crafting the strategy through officials there.

The development of the strategy took place between 2012-2014 and was a process of co-construction between the various government ministries and a wide array of actors from the Fair Trade sector\textsuperscript{101}. As the largest coffee producers’ organization in the country, FAPECAFES played an important role in advocating for coffee producers throughout the process. The consultations to develop the strategy took place between 2012-2014 and the document was presented to SENPLADES in July 2014. The strategy document identified challenges in the construction of Fair Trade across five main areas: legal and institutional

\textsuperscript{101} The working group that developed the strategy included the CECJ, Consorcio Ecuatoriano de Economía Solidaria y Comercio Justo (WFTO affiliated organizations), Fair Trade International certified rose plantations, exporters that work with Fair Trade producer organizations, universities affiliated to the Observatorio de Economía Solidaria y Comercio Justo, the NGO VECO Andino, Ministerio de Comercio Exterior, Instituto de Promoción de Exportaciones e Inversiones PROECUADOR, Ministerio de Inclusión Económica y Social (MIES), Instituto de Economía Popular y Solidaria (IEPS) and the MAGAP (MCE 2014: 2).
measures, commercialization and access to markets, production, capacity-building for Fair Trade cooperatives and organizations and campaigns for responsible consumption or the demand side for Fair Trade products (Republica del Ecuador 2014). The consultations to develop the strategy were completed in 2014 and the document was officially launched in a ceremony to which all participating organizations came at the Ministry for International Trade offices in Guayaquil in July 2014. From there, the strategy was submitted to SENPLADES, which would be in charge of determining how to implement it. By 2016, PRO-Ecuador and the Ministerio de Comercio Exterior began implementation through an inter-institutional working group which included permanent representation from both the CECJ and the WFTO-affiliated organizations. The strategy was officially adopted by the government and given legal basis in March 2017 when a ministerial agreement\textsuperscript{102} created the Comité Interinstitucional de Fomento del Comercio Justo. The inter-institutional committee is made up of 11 different Ministries\textsuperscript{103}. While both of these initiatives were in their infancy when I was conducting the research for this study, what they both demonstrate is the greater political clout of FAPECAFES and other Fair Trade organizations compared to others analyzed in this study. While the national-level organizations to which the other two in this study were linked also engaged in processes of political advocacy at the national level, they were not as successful as FAPECAFES or the CECJ in establishing initiatives for the co-construction of policies.

\textsuperscript{102} Acuerdo Ministerial 3, Registro Oficial Edición Especial 945, March 10th, 2017.

\textsuperscript{103} In addition to the permanent representation by the Fair Trade organizations on the committee, the inter-institutional committee includes representatives from the following government ministries: 1. Coordinating Ministry of Economic Policy (MCPE); 2. Coordinating Ministry of Production, Employment and Competitiveness (MCPEC); 3. Coordinating Ministry of Social Development (MCDS); 4. Ministry of Industry and Productivity (MTPRO); 5. Ministry of Agiricultura, Cattle and Fisheries (MAGAP); 6. Ministry of Social and Economic Inclusion (MIES); 7. Institute of Popular and Solidarity Economy (IEPS); 8. Superintendent of Popular and Solidarity Economy (SEPS); 9. National Financial Corporation (CFN); 10. National Corporation of Social and Popular Finance (CONAFIPS); 11. BAN ECUADOR; 12. Ministry of International Trade (COMEX). The Ministry of International Trade is designated as the permanent chair of the committee and the institution responsible for the operations of the committee.
such as the TPL or the national Fair Trade Strategy. The reasons behind this will be further analyzed in the concluding chapter.

Conclusions

FAPECAFES and the coffee sector were favoured by many of the measures taken by the Correa government to reinvest in the agricultural sector through its revolución agraria. The implementation of the national coffee reactivation program was a significant ‘return of the state’ in particular in light of the rolling back of national government programs that characterized neoliberal proyectismo. In this chapter I have highlighted instances of both nascent or more full-blown examples of embedded autonomy including: the collaboration of FAPECAFES with the MAGAP in the investments targeted at the reactivation of the coffee sector; the collaboration between FAPECAFES’ first-level organizations and the juntas parroquiales in activities related to agricultural extension; the participation of leaders of FAPECAFES in local politics; the participation of FAPECAFES in pushing for alternatives to third-party certification through both the TPL initiative and the national Fair Trade Strategy. The organization was able to build on its model of cooperative organization and organic production and negotiate with public institutions to adapt public policies to the focus of the organizations on Fair Trade and organic markets due to political clout vis-à-vis external actors from local governments, national government ministries and programs. While this might not add up to a sustained episode of embedded autonomy, it is closer than the relationship between the State and the other organizations analyzed in this study. These examples all speak to what adds up to a relatively greater level of political influence for FAPECAFES compared to the other two cases analyzed in this dissertation.

A key factor underlying the relative success of FAPECAFES in establishing an embedded autonomy with public institutions is that the goals of the organization were aligned with the government’s goals of increasing agro-exports. In this sense, it made
both practical and political sense for the government to increase supports to producer organizations like FAPECAFES and to work with the CECJ and other actors from the Fair Trade sector to develop the Fair Trade strategy. A question that this case raises is that participation in Fair Trade, which as I reviewed has been described as neoliberal governance by some analysts, appears to have been crucial to the relative success of FAPECAFES in pressuring the state in pursuit of embedded autonomy. While the examples of embedded autonomy I pointed to were only nascent in some cases, the success of FAPECAFES in lobbying different public institutions for more favourable policies would not have been possible without the participation in Fair Trade certification prior to the election of the Correa government. The opening of more favorable government policies with the coffee reactivation program and other measures associated with neo-developmentism appear to have compounded and reinforced the changes that nearly two decades in Fair Trade and organic markets as a neoliberal market-driven strategy had helped FAPECAFES to achieve.
Chapter 8- Conclusions: Post-Neoliberal State Building and the Decline of Neoliberal Governance

Introduction

The outcomes and impacts of processes of social, political and economic change, such as the case analyzed in this study, are unpredictable and multicausal, shaped and reshaped by the contingent path of change. Such processes can also result in unintended consequences. It was this understanding of change that was central to Karl Polanyi’s theory of the “double movement” laid out in *The Great Transformation* was a contradictory, multi-variate understanding of political and economic change. While Polanyi quipped that “laissez-faire was planned” (1957: 141), referring to the theories of neo-classical political economy that underpinned the institutional and legal changes that had facilitated the rise of “self-regulating markets”, he argued that “countermovements” were, by contrast, improvised reactions to the impacts of unfettered markets and an intrinsic feature of capitalism. In order to understand why and how this class of events analysed in this study occurred in the way they did, it is important to remember Polanyi’s assertion that countermovements are typically mediated through the state, because the state is the only institution that can implement protectionist economic policies or social welfare policies (1957: 37). With this ambiguous and state-centric understanding of the nature of countermovements in mind, it becomes easier to interpret and understand the effects of the countermovement in Ecuador during the Correa government which I will take stock of in this final chapter.
In this study I argued that the election of the Correa government in 2006 can be interpreted as the result of a Polanyian countermovement against neoliberalism following Eduardo Silva’s reading (2009; 2012; 2017) but that this process of change did evolve into a case of “re-embedding” as theorized by Polanyi (1957) and discussed in chapter two. I argued that while the post-neoliberal turn opened the possibility for forms of state-society synergy to emerge that could have allowed for “embedded markets” (van der Ploeg et. al 2012) to emerge reflecting the principles of food sovereignty as put forward by LVC through dynamics of “state-society synergy” (Evans 1996). Based on this study, I conclude that the countermovement against neoliberalism mediated through the policies of the Correa government, did not yield much movement towards “re-embedding” the economy through a strategy of embedded autonomy as theorized in chapter two. Although due to influence from rural social movements and other actors supportive of a via campesina at the beginning of the Correa government, food sovereignty was incorporated in the political discourse and policy proposals of the government over time they were lost within the broader post-neoliberal political project of the Correa government.

Here it is important to understand the way in which the countermovement was mediated politically through the Correa government through what Ernesto Laclau calls the “equivalential articulation” which united the “…separate and isolated demands that have gone unsatisfied by the state.” (Collins 2014: 67). It was this broader “equivalential articulation” (Collins 2014: 67) around “anti-neoliberalism” that ultimately built the political coalition to bring the Correa government to power. While rural social movements supported the Correa government in order to reverse neoliberalism the ideas
and proposals for *buen vivir* and food sovereignty as a *via campesina* for rural development, they were not just calling for a state-led countermovement but calling to deepen this proposal through Polanyian re-embedding. As I proposed in chapters one and two, the nascent political opportunity and arguably best-case scenario for these movements was for a dynamic of embedded autonomy to emerge in Ecuador based on “state-society synergy” (Evans1996). While the measures implemented by the Correa government with regards to rural development projects to re-embed the economy may have reflected to varying degrees “redistribution” through the state or what Richard Sandbrook defines as “re-embedding” in the cases of socialism and social democracy, they for the most part did not favour or encourage the forms of “communitarian” (Sandbrook 2011) forms of re-embedding based economic integration “in society” including forms of “moral economy” such as reciprocity and householding associated with campesino or Indigenous community associated with food sovereignty as a *via campesina*. Judged by this standard, most of the Correa government’s actions undermined this last form of embeddedness or re-embedding and more importantly many of the measures associated with a post-neoliberal countermovement undermined this latter path of re-embedding.

There is considerable evidence to support the assertion that a countermovement occurred in Ecuador as a result of the post-neoliberal political turn. As I analyzed in chapter four, the significant reductions in poverty and inequality in the Correa government help explain the popularity of the Correa government as it fulfilled the demands of anti-neoliberal popular movements. The post-neoliberal turn had important impacts in terms of human development in Ecuador and this may help to
explain why the Correa government remained popular. Under the Correa government, the Human Development Index in Ecuador increased from 0.693 in 2005 to 0.752 in 2017. In 2017, Ecuador ranked 86 out of the 189 in the global human development index measured by the UNDP which put it in the “high human development” category. In 2005, 87.7% of the rural population had access to electricity and in 2017 nearly one hundred percent of rural areas and households had access to electricity with 99.8% of rural households having access to electricity and these changes likely explain the government’s enduring popularity in many of the country’s rural regions during its time in office (UNDP 2019).

As I emphasized in chapter four, the return of the state in public provision in social welfare and public services was a marked change from the neoliberal period and impacted Ecuadorians in both urban and rural areas. While the government rolled out several new social welfare initiatives described in chapter four, spending on health and education as a percentage of GDP both increased significantly. For example, before the government came to power in 2005 5.6% of GDP was dedicated to health services and by 2015 this had risen to 8.5% of total GDP and spending on education rose even more dramatically rising from 1.2% of GDP in 2000 to 5% of GDP in 2017 (UNDP 2019). While the Correa government made significant investments in public services and the size and reach of the Ecuadorian state expanded significantly, concurrently the agricultural sector shrank as a percentage of total employment. According to data compiled by the UNDP, the agricultural sector as a percentage of total employment declined several percentage points during the tenure of the Correa government going from 29.1% in 2005 to 26.9% in 2017, reflecting a long-term decline in the importance of
agricultural employment in the economy, which represented 35.4% in 1991 (UNDP 2019). These statistics suggest why the rural and agricultural sector did not appear to be amongst the top priorities for the government. The fact that agriculture is declining as a source of employment and economic sector mirrors the decline of rural social movements which were so important in laying the groundwork for the election and the Polanyian countermovement and election of the Correa government.

The success of the Correa government in carrying out measures associated with the countermovement and in transcending orthodox neoliberalism had the effect of undermining rural social organizations rather than strengthening them. By rebuilding the state and “decorporatizing” the state the power and influence these organizations had gained through the neoliberal polycentric state and the “neo-corporatist” (Chartock 2013) institutions created in the neoliberal period in which national organizations like the CONAIE and the FENOCIN were represented through. The state building project of the government prevented the emergence of effective channels between the government and rural social organizations. This divergence reflected the competing projects within AP at its early stages as the tension between “development” and sumak kawsay or buen vivir (Lander 2016). The inability of most rural social organizations to “move” (Heller 2001) the state towards the latter vision due to the fact that the “return of the state”, in terms of increased public investment and gave the government political legitimacy. In sum, while a Polanyian countermovement occurred in Ecuador under the Correa government, processes of re-embedding through a process of “symbiotic transformation” (Olin Wright 2010) mediated through a process of “state-society synergy” (Evans 1996) proved to be a largely elusive path of change based on the research conducted for this study.
Research Questions and Key Explanatory Factors

In this final section I will revisit the research questions I presented in chapter one and subsequently highlight some of the key explanatory factors that I believe help explain the outcome I described above. The post-neoliberal shift brought about greater public investment in rural development and agriculture reflecting the countermovement against neoliberalism, but these investments and the programs implemented by the government did not reflect the vision of food sovereignty as put forward by LVC or the rural social movements and NGOs in Ecuador who pushed for food sovereignty during the 2008 constituent assembly. Instead, the agricultural and rural development policies implemented by the Correa government for the most part involved subsidizing conventional production and inputs for smallholder producers to produce agricultural commodities for domestic markets instead of policies incentivizing more diverse agricultural production such as agroecological and organic production. As I analyzed in chapters four through seven, while the rural development programs of the Correa government, including the Plan Maíz and Plan Café, were a departure from those of the neoliberal period but the rupture they represented with neoliberalism either undermined or had only a moderately favourable or varied impact on the via campesina strategies as in chapters six and seven. As I suggested in chapter four, this reflects the predominance of “institutional monocropping” (Evans 2004) in the post-neoliberal programs implemented by the government that prevented the emergence of spaces for deliberation and brought with it the weakening of rural social movements and in particular their national neo-corporatist Federations. However, as I analyzed in chapters six and seven, the fact that there was variation amongst the three cases as to how each organization
responded to the post-neoliberal turn suggests that different rural social organizations had
different degrees of capacity to move the state and that the effects of the post-neoliberal
varied considerably at the sub-national level.

Cases of state-society synergy based on “symbiotic transformation” (Olin
Wright 2010) and “state-society synergy” have preconditions that need to be in place at
least to some degree in order for these dynamics to emerge. Following the work of Peter
Evans (1995; 1996) and others, these preconditions include a relatively “autonomous”
state apparatus and institutions, cohesive and representative social actors and
embeddedness defined as channels linking these actors to one another for processes of
deliberation. When the Correa government came to power in 2006, the Ecuadorian state
and state institutions had been significantly weakened by neoliberal reforms and many
state functions had been replaced by NGOs and rural social organizations, so this
precondition was lacking. Rural social movements and their national Federations
appeared to be relatively strong when the government came to power and there were
important political linkages between these movements and AP which suggested that this
precondition was at least to some degree in place. It also must be said that the
government did make a significant effort to build and strengthen a more autonomous kind
of state and state institutions during its tenure but that by trying to strengthen this
precondition, rural social movements were concurrently undermined by the government’s
actions aimed at doing this. Finally, at the start of the government, rural social
movements achieved important representation within the governing party of AP and
channels like the COPISA were created to represent rural smallholders in the policy
process as well. However, the channels that were created by the new government were
largely characterized by incorporation from above instead of a dynamic of “corporatism from below” (Coronel 2011). The government’s efforts to “deincorporatize” the state largely served to disarticulate rural social organizations and channels for interaction and deliberation between rural social organizations and the government that were significantly representative did not emerge. However, this outcome also reflects the fact that rural social movement were probably more disarticulated than was widely believed before the Correa government. Finally, they were later usurped by the government in many areas, leading to the fulfilment of many of the material demands of their grassroots members. On the whole though the preconditions for state-society synergy were far from ideal in Ecuador, and even if it was was also not the least likely case for the dynamic of synergy between rural social movements and the post-neoliberal state to emerge, it is not that surprising that the pathway of change I proposed to study largely proved elusive.

While on the whole, embeddedness between the state and rural social organizations did not emerge during the Correa government, the variations between the three case studies, from no capacity to “move the state” in the case of the UPOCAM, some capacity in the case of FAPECAFES to “move the state” towards policies supportive of a via campesina or food sovereignty speaks to the fact that trajectories of change are shaped by a whole host of contingencies that were not stable across cases and were determined by local context, history and other factors. The factors that prevented the dynamic of synergy from emerging included the withdrawal of international development cooperation projects and the decline of neoliberal proyectismo, which appears to have weakened the internal structure of rural social organizations and their ability to mobilize their constituents prior to the post-neoliberal.
UPOCAM, the withdrawal of development cooperation meant that they could no longer implement projects like the Fincar initiative and the support that they were hoping to secure through engagement with the post-neoliberal state did not emerge either. In contrast, in the case of FAPECAFES and the Red de Ferias, the fact that these initiatives were both organized more around commercialization and marketing of production (an economic base) which seems to have helped make for to greater success in exercising power and influencing different levels of government or state programs. This correlation between economic organization and political influence makes intuitive sense and is one inference that could receive further attention in future research.

Despite the incorporation of the language of food sovereignty into the 2008 constitution and subsequent laws and policies of the government it seemed that implementing policies and programs that reflected the principles of food sovereignty was a relatively low political priority for the government. This was suggested in some key interviews with a variety of different actors and is also reflected in the decline of agriculture as a proportion of economic activity in Ecuador. Instead of a via campesina approach, most agricultural and rural development policies were geared towards increasing productivity either to tie into the government’s import substitution policies or to increase export crops. Even though many of these policies benefitted smallholders or campesinos in economic terms they did not advance food sovereignty as understood by LVC. In fact, many of the programs such as the Plan Maiz for example, encouraged producers to become more dependent on income from conventional monocultures and undermined more diverse models of agriculture associated with great self-provisioning and self-sufficiency or food sovereignty. Though actors in the three cases analyzed in this
study did seem to value or align with many aspects of the concept of food sovereignty as put forward by LVC and as it is understood in the Ecuadorian constitution food sovereignty also seemed to be associated more in terms of stable access to agricultural markets and state supports. While the policies and programs implemented by the Correa government did extend greater state intervention into agricultural markets on the whole to support the model of agricultural and rural development associated with food sovereignty as a via campesina. In sum, the post-neoliberal turn brought about a significant shift in state-society relations, with the attempt by the Correa government to significantly strengthen state institutions which undermined the model of neoliberal governance or proyectismo I described in this study and largely seems to have undermined the potential for state supported food sovereignty. Though a more autonomous and capable state was arguably necessary for the government to be able to implement the measures associated with the program for food sovereignty associated with the 2009 LORSA, the government’s political style that focused on state building over styles of governance more associated with “deliberation” (Evans 2004) tended to undermine the potential for the emergence of embedded autonomy.

With the original research questions in mind, I will highlight what I believe are the three most important explanatory factors that led to the outcome I described above. I identified these factors based on the analysis, case studies and framework I adopted in this study and they are all interconnected. These factors include the politics and political style of the Correa government, the tension between state building and deliberative governance in the post-neoliberal state and the weaknesses of rural social movements due to their historical origins and role in the Ecuadorian political system. As I
will emphasize at the end of this chapter, these factors are by no means conclusive as the scope of this study was limited and there are surely a host of other variables and causes that determined the trajectory of change during the Correa government. While the potential for “mutual empowerment” (Wang 1999) and “synergy” between the Correista state and these organizations proved largely elusive, I conclude that the Correa government is an “intermediate” case between a developmental and predatory state (Evans 1995) due to the fact that there were some “pockets” (Evans 1989: 577) within the state where synergies and embeddedness emerged as the result of more deliberative processes of political negotiation and policy implementation. For example, as I suggested in chapter seven, the relative success of FAPECAFES and Fairtrade certified organization at “moving” the state relative to others was due to the economic/ productive basis of these organizations based on Chayanovian “vertical integration” (1966) compared to the UPOCAM which had failed to consolidate economic organization and was primarily a representational/ political organization.

Arguably the most important factor as to why policies more supportive of the \textit{via campesina} program did not emerge under the Correa government was the government’s political style. As I analyzed in chapter 4, this style has been described as “technocratic populism” (de la Torre 2013), “plebiscitary” (Conaghan 2009) and “semi-authoritarian” (Basabe-Serrano 2015). I believe these characterizations are overly simplistic. The common assessment of most of the academic literature that the government’s political style was top-down is accurate and it is this style that prevented the emergence of a more “deliberative” (Evans 2004) model of development, at least with regards to Indigenous and \textit{campesino} organizations. For example, the political discourse of Correismo based on
a polarizing “Manichean populism” (Mudde 2004) tended to steam roll policies and programs through rather than advance policies through dialogue and consultation. Instead of the politics of “convergence” with organized and autonomous groups in society (such as rural social movements and organizations) or “persuasion” Correismo relied on a populist politics of “command” by the leader from above (French 2009: 368). As I analyzed in chapter three, in order to govern, the Correa government also did not have to rely on the support of rural social movements that had supported his election. The FENOCIN’s support of the government and the divisions within the CONAIE and PK meant that some leaders from these organizations participated in AP and may have had a modicum of influence within the government and the party. However their participation was as individual leaders, leaders who may have had structured “personal interests” and considerations as opposed to “long term collective aims”, which is what could have translated into a more “developmental” program for a via campesina (Evans 1995: 247) due to the fact that they weren’t necessarily accountable to local or national member-based organizations they also belonged to.

As I analysed in chapter four, while campesino and Indigenous leaders had representatives in the Correa government, this participation did not fundamentally alter the government’s policies in favour of a via campesina. As I mentioned above, Evans has suggested that political parties could play a key role in intermediate cases in “broadening” embedded autonomy beyond industrial development. I cited the successful cases of social democracy in Austria and of agrarian communism in Kerala, India as examples where “…state-society connections run primarily through parties” rather than exclusively through government (Evans 1995: 246). AP could have potentially played a
constructive role in this regard but was not sufficiently consolidated or internally
democratic to hold the government accountable or come up with policy ideas. Instead, as
I analysed in chapter four, the government kept together a broad coalition of leftist
tendencies in A.P. (as a kind of Leninist vanguard party) by incorporating “floating
politicians” (Conaghan 1995) and traditional regional political bosses or caciques (Clark
and García 2019). Due to this, the party was mainly an electoral machine rather than the
more desirable party organization “…capable of providing coherent support for long-
term collective aims.” (Evans 1995: 246) In conclusion, Correa’s style of leadership, and
the nature of the governing party AP, were not conducive to the emergence of a more
deliberative style of governance. However, the reason why this was the case is
interwoven with the other two factors I highlight here including the tension between state
building and deliberative governance and the weakness of rural social movements.

The central political objective the Correa government was elected on was a
commitment to rebuild the state as a result of the countermovement against
neoliberalism. Correa’s government dedicated itself to using this consolidation of power,
as an alternative project to neoliberalism. As I analyzed in chapters two and three, the
Ecuadorian state prior to the election of the Correa government was characterized by
what Migdal theorized as “strong society, weak state” (1988), a reality that was deepened
by the “polycentrism” (Scholte 2004) associated with the shift towards neoliberal
governance. I have argued that the fact that the Correa government strengthened the
central state and engaged in political recentralization as an alternative to the polycentrism
of the neoliberal period needs to be understood as an attempt to move towards a post-
neoliberal model of development. Here it is important to understand Correa’s own
ideological commitments (see Correa 2009), which were leftist but modernist and
developmentalist, and thus largely at odds with ideas like food sovereignty and **buen vivir**. Central to Correa’s vision was the idea that the central problem in Ecuador was the
lack of what Joel Migdal would refer to as “state social control” (2001) and the
domination of the state by powerful interest groups. However, by overcorrecting for what
Correa referred to as the “corporatism” of the neoliberal period and by trying to build a
more “autonomous” state apparatus (Ramírez, 2016: 146) the neo-developmental state
was plagued by elements of “high modernism” (Scott 1998) or what Peter Evans has
called “institutional mono-cropping” (2004) reflecting the tension between the logic of
“state building” and “governance” (Yu and He 2011: 3) as I analyzed in chapter two.

While in order to solve many of Ecuador’s problems the government had to focus
on building more capable state institutions, in order to achieve many of its neo-
developmentalist goals the Correa government would have needed to develop channels
linking state agencies or programs to their relevant counterparts in society. As Evans has
put it, developmental states are not only characterized by a “Weberian
bureaucracy…insulated from society as Weber suggested….To the contrary, they are
embedded in a concrete set of social ties that binds the state to society and provides
institutionalized channels for the continual negotiation and re-negotiation of goals and
policies….A state that was only autonomous would lack both sources of intelligence and
the ability to rely on decentralized private implementation.” (1995: 12). Instead of
building institutions and programs in a way that could have channeled and engaged social
actors in developmental initiatives, the Correa government rolled out programs and
constructed institutions to improve the “infrastructural power” (Mann 1984) of the state
rather than “…channels for the negotiation and re-negotiation of goals and policies” (Evans 1995: 12), a necessary precondition for embedded autonomy to emerge. In the case of the Fair Trade Strategy these channels were established and cooperatives and groups from the Fair Trade sector participated in the construction of the Fair Trade Strategy but, as I analyzed in chapter seven, this was the exception rather than the typical way the government operated.

While the possibility of “state-society synergy” proposed by Evans (1996) and others necessitates a coherent state apparatus and institutional channels across state and society, it also requires robust and coherent social organizations that can “embed” with a capable, “autonomous” state (Evans 1995). Just as Joel Migdal argues convincingly that state institutions reflect the societies in which they are embedded, the work of Peter Evans demonstrates that states also shape and reshape these societies as well. In this sense as Evans puts it, “…the absence of a coherent state apparatus makes it less likely that civil society will organize itself beyond a loose web of local loyalties.” (1995: 41). Drawing on this insight, what I extrapolate from the history of rural social organizations I presented in chapter three is that these organizations reflect the weak and unstable nature of the Ecuadorian state. As a result of the history of rural social organizations, as an example of “state-led civil society” (Frolic 1997), they have pressured the state from the outside as civil society, replaced state functions through neoliberal proyectismo and been immersed in electoral politics, in some cases all at the same time. While some of the earlier literature on the CONAIE and other rural social movements characterized them as part of civil society, in this study I questioned this interpretation while emphasizing that at times these organizations have functioned more
like the civil society as conceptualized in liberal political theory. However as I argued in chapter two, for the most part national and local rural social organizations are closer to what Partha Chatterjee has described as “political society” (2008) or “clientship” (Taylor 2004) with a logic of “clientelism” overruling a logic of rights or “citizenship” (Fox 1994). The divisions between the CONAIE, FENOCIN, CNC-Eloy Alfaro, FEI, FEINE and others speaks to this. As I argued in chapter two this is illustrative of the “disjointed corporatism” (Lavdas 1997: 17) of the Ecuadorian case. Except for the CONAIE at the height of its power in the 1990s none of these national Federations could legitimately claim a monopoly over the representation of rural smallholders, producers or Indigenous communities in Ecuador. As I argued in chapter three, the “NGOization” (Alvarez 1999) of these national movements. The lack of stable material resource bases and of self-production within rural social organizations and national organizations like the CONAIE and the FENOCIN and their increasing dependence on funds from international development cooperation distanced them from their members and weakened them internally as did their forays into electoral politics.

The counterfactual case that I proposed and that could have served as a potential trajectory of change for Ecuador during the post-neoliberal turn was the case of the relationship between the MST and PT government in Brazil. In retrospect I now believe that this outcome would never have been possible at a national level in Ecuador since there was no national-level organization in Ecuador comparable to the MST, despite the comparison some have made between the MST and the CONAIE (Pahnke 2014). Unlike the CONAIE, the MST is a national organization sustained through “self-production” (Edwards and McCarthy 2004: 123), namely agricultural production and
commercialization through marketing cooperatives and associations. This gives the organization relatively more “autonomy” from the state than other social movements in Latin America even though the MST has never primarily been fighting for autonomy from the state but also to transform state institutions and policies (Vergara-Camus 2014). The MST was reasonably successful at finding synergies with the state during the PT government and was able to push for “…policy reforms through both political negotiation and social mobilization” (Tarlau 2015: 1175). In contrast in Ecuador, while many local level campesino organizations and Indigenous groups do engage in “self-production” through associations and cooperatives, the national level Federations like the FENOCIN, the CONAIE and others became delinked from their grassroots members prior to the election of the Correa government due to NGOization. As I will touch upon in the conclusions of this chapter, the case of Bolivia and the MAS government may be an intermediate case between Brazil and Ecuador due to the Pacto de Unidad which provided a channel of negotiation between these movements and the MAS government even if it was not that effective (Farthing 2019; McKay 2018). By contrast, in Ecuador, rural social organizations were too weak and dependent on funds and resources from NGOs and simply did not have the capacity to move the state the way in which the MST was able to do under the PT government in Brazil.

To sum up, the emergence of “state-society synergy” (Evans 1996) based on a “deliberative developmental state” (Evans 2004) which could have supported a via campesina strategy for rural development proved elusive under the Correa government, at least on a large scale. Though the rural development policies of the Correa government were not a complete failure they did not reflect the vision for a via campesina as food
sovereignty put forward in the 2008 constitution. This is the result of the fact that the development politics of the Correa period ended up being closer to James Scott’s criticism of a top-down state characterized by “high modernism” (1998) rather than a developmental state characterized by “embedded autonomy” (Evans 1995) or “deliberative development” (2004), which surely represents a lost opportunity for Ecuador to move towards a more sustainable model of development. Beyond Ecuador’s borders, Evelina Dagnino has suggested that this outcome was also indicative of post-neoliberal governments in Latin America, who all missed the mark in terms of constructing a different kind of developmental state. As Dagnino puts it, the “…new developmental conception of the state…undermined the participation of society in sharing decisions concerning development directions.” (2016: 158). The central lesson that I draw from the Ecuadorian case was that in attempting to correct for the most perverse elements of the polycentrism of the neoliberal period, the Correa government repeated many of the mistakes of the “old developmentalism” (Dagnino 2016: 158) by imposing policies and programs from above and from central government as a kind of “institutional monocropping” rather than governing through a more “deliberative” style (Evans 2004: 33). At the same time, the potential advantages of a more deliberative model of development strategy may not have been possible in Ecuador due to the internal problems and weaknesses of rural social movements rendering them unable to “move the state” (Heller 2001) at the national level even though some local organizations enjoyed varying success, as the case studies found. In sum, while the Correa government’s style of governing and politics prevented embedded autonomy from emerging, at the same time, rural social organizations were also too atomized, motivated by narrow and
personal interests and devoid of a broader, shared agenda or vision to adopt a *via campesina* that could “move the state”.

**Divergent Sub-National Impacts of the Post-Neoliberal Turn**

Despite the disappointing attempts by rural social movements and their supporters to develop a *via campesina* path for rural development policy, the three case studies show that some exceptions or examples of what Evans referred to as developmental “pockets” did emerge within intermediary cases between predatory and development states (Evans 1989: 577). As I analyzed in the case study chapters and consider in the next section, the rural development policies of the government were not a complete failure, and in particular instances rural social organizations were able to influence particular state policies and “move” the state in important ways, so the fact that the case studies diverged from one another considerably suggests that organizational strength and coherence did matter in determining outcomes. As analyzed in the case studies, the failure of the UPOCAM to move the state towards strategies more aligned with a *via campesina*, contrasts with the other two cases where some modest gains were made towards a more deliberative model of state-society relations and actions by government institutions that benefitted these initiatives.

What I take to be the most important factor that allowed for these more deliberative kinds of relations helped for these organizations to have an economic base as in the case of FAPECAFES. What I believe this demonstrates is what Chayanov called “vertical integration” (1966), or social organization around aggregation and commercialization of production, and that this emerges as the most effective route for
campesino organizations to build greater capacity and political influence. This makes intuitive sense. The variations across the case studies with regards to the synergies that emerged, and mostly did not emerge, with the Correa government’s interventions, speaks to the importance of economic activity and a material resource base translating into political influence. While the post-neoliberal turn reduced the material resources of international development cooperation, which had been important to all of the organizations prior to the Correa government, this appeared to be most detrimental to the UPOCAM since it did not have self-generated income streams or activities that could replace this funding. While the increased public investment in agriculture and rural development did not reflect the via campesina objectives of the organizations, in the case of FAPECAFES the local organizations were able to “move the state” in modest ways and exert more influence over government programs associated with the post-neoliberal reinvestment in agriculture.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>FAPECAFES</th>
<th>Red de Ferias</th>
<th>UPOCAM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Participation or Interface with State Institutions</td>
<td>Participation through national-level Fair Trade association, the CECJ, in the formulation of a national Fair Trade strategy officially adopted by the government in 2016.</td>
<td>-Participated in the provincial program for producer markets but ultimately rejected this assistance after the provincial government attempted to use the markets for political clientelism.</td>
<td>-Participation through CNC- EA in consultations with the MAGAP through the national Consejo Campesino Ciudadano, Peasant Citizens Council, was described by leaders of the organization as marginal and ineffective.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Extra-Congressional Actions** | - Secured a meeting with MAGAP about the Coffee Program due to an executive order of President Correa after a meeting with the President. | - Indirect participation through the national-level advocacy organizations for agroecology like the Agroecology Collective and informal network of NGOs promoting agroecology. This support was more important than the support of state programs.  

- The *Red de Ferias* was the product of the NGO-funded project *Mercados Campesinos* rather than support from the government. This project appeared to influence local governments in other parts of Ecuador to adopt programs more favourable to agroecology. | - Campaign for land reform law in 2011-2012 through CNC-EA in coordination with the FENOCIN was perceived as unsuccessful as the government rejected the proposed draft of the land law.  

- Participation in campaign for the withdrawal of the U.S. military base in Manta was seen as successful as the Correa government did not renew the license of the base leading to its closure in 2009. |

<p>| <strong>Formal/ Electoral Politics</strong> | - Several former leaders of the organization elected as | - Members and leaders of the organization rejected clientelism | - Organization formed part of <em>Alianza PAIS</em> since 2006 and |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organizational Capacity and Economic Autonomy</th>
<th>politicians at the local level (municipal and parish-level) for Alianza PAIS or local political movements. and expressed disillusionment with electoral politics.</th>
<th>participated in the party structure in Manabí but were a marginal actor in the provincial party. -Former President, Jorge Loor, elected as an alternate member of congress for Alianza PAIS in 2013.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-Strong economic base of the organization (typically over one million annually in exports from APECAP alone for example). This provided the organization with greater capacity and autonomy from the State than the other cases analysed. -The organization maintained some international development cooperation funding and received more funds from the government by collaborating with public programs.</td>
<td>-The markets appeared to be functioning well and be largely self-sustaining. The question is whether the network will be self-sustaining or whether this apparent success was due to ‘dependence’ on NGO funds which finished in 2014.</td>
<td>-Organization appears to have become ‘dependent’ on funds from international development cooperation in the 1990s-2000s. -The withdrawal of development cooperation reduced the autonomy and capacity of the organization to execute projects/ The organization ceased operating agricultural extension projects. -Autonomy of Unidad mi Tierra program undermined by education reforms of the government, threatened with closure in 2013.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Interface with Post-Neoliberal State Programs

- Members of the organization have taken advantage of new state credit programs, extension services and social welfare policies which did not exist prior to the Correa government. The coffee program adapted its programs to the organic certification requirements of the organization.

- Coffee program extension workers collaborated with the member organizations of FAPECAFES. The relationship between the government and the organization appeared to be largely synergistic.

- State programs, in particular agricultural extension programs of MAGAP, undermined the efforts of the organization to promote agroecology.

- The attempt by the provincial government to use the *ferias* for political clientelism suggests that this program was not ‘autonomous’ from political considerations.

- Local communities benefitted from extended state credit programs, extension services and social welfare policies of the Correa government. These new programs usurped the role of the UPOCAM rather than strengthened it.

- Programs like Plan Maíz appeared to be relatively effective in their implementation but undermined the previous efforts of UPOCAM to promote agroecology and organic coffee production.

### Capacity to Move the State

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Intermediate</th>
<th>Intermediate-Low</th>
<th>Low</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Of the three, the UPOCAM was the most negatively affected by the post-neoliberal turn, in its work through earlier development cooperation funded initiatives to promote a *via campesina* for rural development through the Fincar project promoting agroecological production methods. This earlier initiative (it was defunct when I conducted fieldwork for this dissertation), and its impacts appear to have been mixed (see Castro 2008). The earlier agroecological approach of Fincar was directly at odds with
government programs like the *Plan Maíz* which was promoting monocropping and commodity production. The government’s reforms to education - it was investing significantly in public education - threatened to close the *Unidad mi Tierra* program due to the new regulations governing the completion of high school diplomas. The organization was struggling to attract new projects due to the trend of northern NGOs and multilateral and bilateral development cooperation pulling out of Ecuador and due also to the new regulations put in place on international development assistance by the Correa government. Overall, the post-neoliberal turn clearly had had a detrimental effect on the organization even if many of its members benefitted from the government’s policies.

What was paradoxical about the difficult situation the UPOCAM was in when I conducted fieldwork was that, of the three groups, UPOCAM had the closest political relationship with the governing party of AP. UPOCAM leaders also remained largely supportive of the government’s other policies even if they were disappointed in its rural development policies and the failure to work with them to scale-up the Fincar project. The marginalization of the UPOCAM within the party structure of AP goes some way toward explaining this outcome. While the party participated in the governance structure of AP in Manabí and the former President of the organization, Jorge Loor, was elected as an alternative member of Congress for AP, it didn’t give the organization any real influence over the policies of the government. The fact that the UPOCAM did not benefit in either political or material terms under the Correa government also suggests that the Correa government genuinely believed in the need to “decorporatize” and build a more Weberian type of state apparatus “insulated” from political loyalists (Evans 1995: 12). This example puts Ecuador completely at odds with the case of Venezuela, where the
Chávez-Maduro governments created and funded grassroots organizations aligned with the broader political project of the Bolivarian Revolution (Ellner 2011) as well as the case of the MST under the PT government in Brazil which favoured the MST with investments in rural development projects (Pahnke 2014) and devolved control over public schools to the organization in some of its settlements (Tarlau 2015).

While the campesinista vision of the Fincar was undermined by the programs of the Correa government, it is obvious even with more supportive or developmental policies for agroecological production, would be viable if producers do not buy-in to strategies of re-peasantization through agroecology. While the organization’s decision to operate an aggregation facility for Plan Maíz likely deepened mono-cropping, it appears to be the default option for smallholders in Manabí rather than more diversified farms.

The failure of Fincar and the sustainability over time of agroecological production calls into question the assumption that agroecology is equivalent to food sovereignty. Without considering broader questions like vertical integration and the local social, cultural and economic contexts in which these organizations exist, agroecology leading to great self-sufficiency in food provisioning may not be an option. Tanya Li Murray has studied smallholder producers in Indonesia over several decades. She has posited in her article “Can there be food sovereignty here?”, that the pull of smallholder producers away from self-provisioning towards monocropping and commodity production over time is compelling (2014). While the Plan Maíz may not be a sustainable solution it at least provided the UPOCAM with something to keep them relevant by offering a service to the communities they have represented historically. This brings us back to the importance of vertical integration and the organization of producers for commercialization.
If the UPOCAM was the organization that was most negatively impacted by the post-neoliberal turn, the impact of the post-neoliberal rural turn was more mixed for the Red de Ferias initiative in Imbabura. As opposed to the other two cases, the initiative was the product of proyectismo and emerged due to a cooperation project funded by the European development cooperation and implemented by the NGO AVSF as I analyzed in chapter six. Compared to the UPOCAM or FAPECAFES, the organization of producers through the Red de Ferias was both recent and based around the organization of producers from several different historical rural social organizations into a network solely for the purpose of commercialization through the ferias. However, the FICI, as the main grassroots organization supporting the initiative, was in a difficult situation because of its affiliation with the CONAIE and PK, groups which opposed the Correa government. The FICI was trying to find a new role for itself in the changed context of the Correa period. By partnering with AVSF and organizing the ferias, the organization could get more in touch with grassroots members and participation in the network breathed some new life into the organization. The role of the FICI was relatively marginal and the ferias operated mostly with assistance from AVSF and a host of other institutions that did not coordinate their efforts to work with the producers.

Imbabura was an important case study to understand the broader political situation during the Correa period because of the number of national Indigenous leaders affiliated with different national Federations and political parties who have risen to prominence on the national scene. During the period I conducted fieldwork, most of the municipal governments and the national congressional representatives were affiliated to AP, yet many Indigenous leaders had quit PK to join AP following Correa’s election. The
relative prosperity of the region and the pluri-activity of smallholder producers also made the ferias a viable option for some producers though these other specificities meant that agroecological production was a highly feminized activity.

The provincial government impacted the ferias negatively when it poached members from one of the ferias in Ibarra to establish a market at the Ibarra bus terminal – a larger facility that was also less stringent in terms of the rules around agroecological production than the ferias associated with the Red and the FICI. The competing interventions by different government programs sowed more disarray than it fostered toward the development or consolidation of the ferias. The interventions of the MAGAP, parish councils and the provincial government were also at cross purposes with the Red since they were promoting conventional production at odds with the agroecological approach of AVSF and the FICI. There was no inter-institutional coordination or “meta-governance” (Jessop 2003) between the different public institutions involved in supporting the various ferias. At the same time, the fact that the provincial government copied what the Red de Ferias was doing by working to establish more ferias suggests that the initiative did affect changes to state programs since the provincial government copies were essentially scaled-up, clientelist versions of Red de Ferias originals.

The role of AVSF and national organizations like the Colectivo Agroecológico and the MESSE was also important at points because these linkages allowed for the sharing of ideas that helped the ferias defend themselves against the municipality when it attempted to expel them from one public plaza. In this regard, the AVSF played an important role as a kind of intermediary to help the Red “move the state” in a handful of minor ways or at least continue operations. For example, the participation of the
*Colectivo Agroecológico* in the process established by *Agrocalidad* to regulate SPG systems prevented *Agrocalidad* from moving ahead on establishing a national norm for agroecological production that all the *ferias* would have had to follow. While most of the public programs and interventions targeted at the *Red de Ferias* proved more disruptive than developmental, the organization at least had enough capacity and autonomy to opt against clientele practices and, for example, push back against the municipality.

Finally, out of the three case studies in this study, FAPECAFES was by far the most successful at “moving the state” and finding points of synergy with the government’s programs and policies and its own rural development model of organic coffee production and marketing cooperatives. While it would not be accurate to describe this case as a full-blown case of embedded autonomy, there were a number of ways the organization found synergies with the state. These include: the collaboration of FAPECAFES with the MAGAP in the investments targeted at the reactivation of the coffee sector; the collaboration between first-level organizations like the APECAP and some parish councils to implement extension services; the participation of leaders of FAPECAFES in local politics; the participation of the first-level organization in channels stretching across state and society, like the TPL initiative in the province of Zamora-Chinchipe, and at the national level through the CECJ; and finally, the participation of FAPECAFES in formulating the national Fair Trade Strategy launched in 2014. I believe the most important factor that made the organization more successful than the other two cases was, and in spite of its internal problems, the organization had an autonomous base of material resources based on Chayanovian “vertical integration” (1966) which lent it weight in negotiating with public institutions at both the local and national levels.
The other key factor underlying the relative success of FAPECAFES in establishing the instances of embeddedness that it did with public institutions were that the goals of the organization were aligned with the government’s goals of increasing exports. In this sense, it made both practical and political sense for the government to increase supports to producer organizations like FAPECAFES and to work with the CECJ and other actors from the Fair Trade sector to develop the Fair Trade strategy. A question that this case raises surrounds its participation in Fair Trade, which, as I reviewed, has been described as neoliberal governance by some analysts. This participation appears to have been crucial to the relative success of FAPECAFES in “moving the state”. I am also sure that the success of FAPECAFES in moving different public institutions for more favourable interventions would not have been possible without the participation in Fair Trade certification prior to the election of the Correa government. In this sense, the opening provided by more favourable government policies, such as the coffee reactivation program and other measures associated with neo-developmentalism, appears to reinforce the changes that nearly two decades in Fair Trade and organic markets as a neoliberal market-driven strategy helped FAPECAFES to achieve.

In the cases of both FAPECAFES and the Red de Ferias, connections to national level networks were important in terms of their ability to “move the state”. National efforts at political advocacy through the CECJ and other allied organizations allowed for the formulation of the national Fair Trade Strategy. Despite the challenges within FAPECAFES, its linkages and participation in FTI certification appears to have facilitated the building of relationships to organizations with greater capacity and stability.
than either the FICI or the UPOCAM for example, both of which were much more dependent on external economic resources to function. As an export product, the economic value and contribution of coffee is easier to measure than the production of vegetables and other produce for local and national use as in the other two cases, so this also helps explain the success of FAPECAFES in “moving the state”. In terms of food sovereignty discourse however this is paradoxical, since it was the integration of these producers into commodity production, albeit through cooperative organizations with Fair Trade and organic certification, that gave their strategy greater viability. While Fair Trade certified products and initiatives in Ecuador are marginal, compared to the national level political work of the other two case studies, related to land reform and the promotion of agroecology respectively, the Correa government took greater steps to promote Fair Trade than it did other campesinista models, at least in terms of creating institutional spaces within the state to promote these models at the national level like through the Fair Trade Strategy.

**Ideas for Future Research**

In my view this study has raised many new research questions spanning across the various issues analysed in this study. With regards to the theoretical framework I drew upon, I believe future work drawing upon and combining Polanyi’s framework, and in particular some recent works that have developed Polanyi’s work in relation to the Pink Tide (Munck 2015: Silva 2009; 2012; 2017), would be fruitful. Future work could also deepen the work on state-society relations and the concepts of “mobilizing” and “moving” the state to consider how countermovements move through states (Abers and
Keck 2009: Heller 2001). As I discussed in chapter two, Polanyi’s theory of the double movement does not provide a robust theory of political power or power relations within the state or between state and society so I believe future theoretical and empirical work could develop these questions drawing on these authors and others. As I discussed in chapters four and six, agroecology has became conflated with food sovereignty due to the discourse of LVC in promoting agroecology as a pathway to peasant autonomy. Here I argued that there was a tension between the increased investments in agriculture and rural development, as a Polanyian countermovement or post-neoliberal “return of the state”, and the proposals of advocates of agroecology which would have required not just increased state investments but also a significant qualitative shift in terms of the content of programs for agriculture and rural development. This conflation and the challenges of policy and institutional innovation to “scale-up” agroecology is another area for future research.

Future work could analyse and consider how the post-neoliberal turn has transformed state-society relations in other sectors (for example in women’s organizations, arts organizations or environmental groups) within Ecuador or across country cases and consider how older concepts such as “neo-pluralism” (Oxhorn 1998) and different varieties of “corporatism” (Schmitter 1974) either explain or don’t explain state-society relations after the post-neoliberal turn. Future work could also consider the impacts of the COOTAD law and the jurisdictional powers that were granted to sub-national governments and the impacts that this had in terms of the implementation of extension services for agriculture as I analysed anecdotally in chapter seven and perhaps take stock of decentralization policies across the region through comparative work.
Though there are studies that have considered the relations between agribusiness and the Correa government, a more in depth study that considers the interface of the Correa government’s policies with national agribusiness firms would certainly provide a more well-rounded account of the Correa period and the barriers the power of the agribusiness sector posed to food sovereignty as a *via campesina*. It does appear that in some cases, such as the domestic firms that benefitted from the PRONERI program, that some of the government’s policies acted as a developmental state for domestic agri-business firms or as a I analysed briefly in chapter four, domestic supermarket chains, so analyses of the interface between the programs implemented by the Correa government and agribusiness is an important line of enquiry.


Agrocalidad. 2015. “Segundo taller de sistemas participativos de garantía” 1 de Julio 2015 http://www.agrocalidad.gob.ec/segundo-taller-de-sistemas-participativos-de-garantia/


Auld, Graeme, Stefan Renckens and Benjamin Cashore. 2015. Transnational private governance between the logics of empowerment and control. Regulation & Governance 9 (2): 108-124


Bebbington, Anthony and Kees Biekart. 2007. Northern NGOs and indigenous organizations in Peru, Ecuador and Bolivia: Reflecting on the past to look to the future. Synthesis study of a joint research project initiated and supported by Ibis, Hivos, Oxfam America and SNV


Boada, Laura. 2014. La agricultura familiar: su relación con el abstacimiento alimentario a nivel familiar. Eutopia: Revista de Desarrollo Económico Territorial 6: 55-71


Boestel, Joanna, Penelope Francks, and Choo Hyop Kim. 2013. Agriculture and economic development in East Asia: from growth to protectionism in Japan, Korea and Taiwan. London: Routledge


Boulding, Carew. 2014. NGOs, Political Protest, and Civil Society. Cambridge University Press


Brookfield, Harold. 2008. Family farms are still around: time to invert the old agrarian question. Geography Compass 2 (1): 108-126

Brown, David. 2002. Left Turn on Green? The Unintended Consequences of International Funding for Sustainable Development in Brazil. Comparative Political Studies 35 (7): 814-838


Cameron, Maxwell. 2009. Latin America’s Left Turns: Beyond Good and Bad.

Canovan, Margaret. 1999. Trust the people! Populism and the two faces of democracy. Political Studies 47 (1): 2-16


Carrión, Diego y Stalin Herrera. 2012. Ecuador rural del siglo XXI. Quito: La Tierra


Castro, Cristina Vicente-Almazán. 2008. Evaluación de impacto de la Propuesta Agroecológica Fincar de la Unión Provincial de Organizaciones Campesinas de Manabí (Ecuador), Universidad Politécnica de Valencia, Valencia, España


Chiriboga, Manuel. 2014. Las ONG Ecuatorianas en los Procesos de Cambio. Quito: Abya-Yala

Chiriboga, Manuel and Brian Wallis. 2010. Diagnostico de la pobreza rural en Ecuador y respuestas de política publica. Centro Latinoamericano de Desarrollo Rural (RIMISP), Grupo de Trabajo sobre Pobreza Rural. Santiago, Chile


Clark, Kim. 2005. Ecuadorian Indians, the Nation and Class in Historical Perspective: Rethinking a ‘New Social Movement’. Anthropologica 47: 31-43


Clark, Patrick, Darryl Reed and Lukas Decker. 2016. ‘El Comercio Justo, Regulación y el Desarrollo: El Caso de la Estrategia Ecuatoriana de Comercio Justo.’ En Stelzer, Joana y Rosemary Gomes (Eds.) Comércio justo e solidário no Brasil e na América Latina. Florianópolis


Colectivo Agroecológico del Ecuador. 2019. “Desde el 14 de octubre las IV jornadas agroecológicas recorrerán el país”


Coraggio, José Luis. 2011. Economía social y solidaria. El trabajo antes que el capital. Quito: Abya-Yala y FLACSO-Ecuador

Coraggio, José Luis et. al (Ed.). 2014. La economía social desde la periferia: contribuciones latinoamericanas. Buenos Aires: Editorial Universidad Nacional de General Sarmiento


Daza, Esteban. 2015. Estado, agroindustria y campesinos en el Ecuador. Quito: Instituto de Estudios Ecuatorianos (IEE)

Dekker, Erwin. 2016. Corporatism and Civil Society. SSRN Available at: https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2832328


Eaton, Kent. 2014. Recentralization and the left turn in Latin America: Diverging outcomes in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela. Comparative Political Studies 47 (8): 1130–1157

El PAIS. 2015. “El poder social se fragmenta en Ecuador el primero de mayo” Por Soraya Constante, April 30th 2015
https://elpais.com/internacional/2015/04/30/actualidad/1430414690_186769.html


Evans, Peter B., Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol (Eds). 1985. Bringing the state back in. Cambridge University Press


Fontaine, Guillaume, and José Luis Fuentes. 2011. Transición hacia el centralismo burocrático en pg. 247-262 en Estado Informe Cero 1950-2010 del país.


Fueres, Magdalena, Oarmelma Morán, Dana Hill, Mana Isabel Altamirano, Tanya de la Torre, Amparo Pillaje, Margarita Agumaga Nano y Damián Judith Flores. Soberanía alimentaria y mujeres. 2012. Quito: FLACSO Ecuador y IEE


http://www.zamora-chinchipe.gob.ec/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1030&Itemid=1


Grey, Sam, and Raj Patel. 2015. Food sovereignty as decolonization: some contributions from Indigenous movements to food system and development politics. Agriculture and Human Values 32 (3): 431-444


Hospes, Otto. 2014. Food sovereignty: the debate, the deadlock, and a suggested detour. Agriculture and Human Values 31:119–130


Iturralde, Diego A. 1985. “Notas para una Historia Politica del Campesinado Ecuatoriano” en Pablo González Casanova (Ed.) Historia política de los campesinos latinoamericanos: Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Perú, Bolivia, Paraguay. Siglo Veinteuno Editores


Löwy, Michael. 2008 Communism and Religion: José Carlos Mariátegui’s Revolutionary Mysticism. Latin American Perspectives 159 35 2: 71-79


Macías Barres, David. 2014. Patrimonio cultural y lingüístico: El montubio y el amorfino. HISTOIRE(S) de l'Amérique latine 10 (5): 1-15

MAGAP (Ministerio de Agricultura, Ganadería y Pesca. (2012). En Cotacachi se organiza encuentro provincial de ferias campesinas, 21 de diciembre 2012
http://www.agricultura.gob.ec/en-cotacachi-se-organizan-encuentro-provincial-de-ferias-campesinas/


Mahoney, James. 2007. Qualitative Methodology and Comparative Politics. Comparative Political Studies 40 (2): 122-144


Martínez Godoy, Diego. 2013. La asociación lechera, desarrollo local o subordinación productiva? Ecuador Debate No 89


Martínez, Luciano. 2014. La concentración de la tierra en el caso ecuatoriano: Impactos en el territorio. In A. Berry, L. Martínez, C. Kay, & L. North (Eds.), La concentración de la tierra: Un problema prioritario en el Ecuador contemporáneo (pp. 43–62). Quito: Abya-Yala


Mazzucato, Mariana. 2015. The entrepreneurial state: Debunking public vs. private sector myths. London: Anthem Press


McMichael, Philip. 2009. Peasants make their own history, but not just as they please.... Journal of Agrarian Change 8 (3): 205-228


Mitrany, David. 1951. Marx against the Peasant: A study is social dogmatism. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson


368


Neyeleni Declaration, La Via Campesina. 2007. ‘Food Sovereignty: A Right for All’ Rome, June 8th-13th, 2002. Available at: https://nyeleni.org/spip.php?article125


Ortiz, Santiago. 2013. Comuneros y revolución ciudadana: los casos de Otavalo y Cotacachi en Ecuador. Anthropologica 31: 81-100


Pahnke, Anthony. 2014. Social Movement Self-Governance: The Contentious Nature of the Alternative Service Provision by Brazil’s Landless Worker’s Movement. PhD Dissertation, Department of Political Science, University of Minnesota


Peña, Karla. 2016. Social Movements, the State, and the Making of Food Sovereignty in Ecuador. Latin American Perspectives 43 (1): 221-237


Raynolds, Laura T. 2000. Re-embedding global agriculture: the international organic and fair trade movements. Agriculture and Human Values 17 (3): 297-309


Rodríguez Avalos, Laura (Ed.). 2015. Mujeres: su rol en la soberanía y seguridad alimentarias Producción, organización, participación y nutrición en la zona 1 norte de Ecuador, desde los saberes y la identidad cultural. Quito: Instituto de Estudios Ecuatorianos (IEE)


Rosset, Peter. 2006. Food is different: Why the WTO should get out of agriculture. London: Zed Books


Schneider, Sergio. 2014. Elaboración y Evaluación Operativa y Rediseño del Programa de Alimentación Escolar (PAE) en Ecuador. Levantamiento del funcionamiento institucional de los programas, análisis nutricional (macro, micronutrientes y aditivos) y implicaciones en salud del consumo, análisis de precios, levantamiento del estado del arte de las evaluaciones internacionales y diferencias entre el programa ecuatoriano y experiencias exitosas. Quito: Secretaría Nacional de Planificación y Desarrollo (SENPLADES)


Sherwood, Stephen. 2009. Learning from Carchi: Agricultural Modernization and the Production of Decline


Tafur, Andrea y Juan José Flores. 2013. Comercialización Campesina, Instituciones y Soberanía Alimentaria en el Ecuador: El Caso de la Provincia de Imbabura pp. En Verónica Proaño y Pierril Lacroix (Eds.) Dinámicas de comercialización para la agricultura familiar campesina: desafíos y alternativas en el escenario ecuatoriano. Quito: Agrónomos y Veterinarios sin Fronteras (AVSF), Sistema de Investigación sobre la Problemática Agraria en el Ecuador (SIPAE).pp. 139-158


Teichman, Judith. 2012. Social Forces and States: Poverty and Distributional Outcomes in South Korea, Chile, and Mexico. Stanford University Press


Torrez, Faustino. 2011. La Via Campesina: Peasant-led agrarian reform and food sovereignty. Development. 54 (1), 49–54


Vergara-Camus, Leandro. 2014. Land and freedom: The MST, the Zapatistas and peasant alternatives to neoliberalism. London: Zed Books


Walsh, Catherine E., Walter Mignolo, and Álvaro García Linera. 2006. Interculturalidad, descolonización del estado y del conocimiento. Ediciones del Signo


Weyland, Kurt. 2009. The rise of Latin America’s two lefts: Insights from rentier state theory. Comparative Politics. 41:145-164


Appendix 1- Interviews

1. Pedro de la Cruz, Member of the *Parlamento Andino*, AP; ex-President of the FENOCIN, Quito, April 4th, 2013


3. Carlos Jara, Director of Buen Vivir Rural Program, SENPLADES, Quito, May 21st, 2013

4. Marcelo Silva, Director, Redes Comerciales Department, MAGAP, Quito, June 11th, 2013

5. Anonymous Interview, Official in the International Negotiations team, SETECI, Quito, June 14th, 2013


7. Anonymous Interview, Official in Legal Affairs Department of the IEPS, June 27th, 2013

8. Enrique Roman, USAID Ecuador, Quito, July 1st, 2013

9. Jose Tonello, Executive Director, FEPP, Quito, July 2nd, 2013

10. Anonymous Interview, CONGOPE, Quito, July 19th, 2013

11. Anonymous Interview, IEPS, Quito, September 25th, 2013

12. Romelio Guaman, President of CNC- Eloy Alfaro, Quito, October 1st, 2013

13. Anonymous Interview, Representative of the GIZ in MAGAP, Quito, November 4th, 2013

14. Anonymous Interview, Member of the National Directorate of the FENOCIN, Quito, November 18th, 2013

15. Anonymous Interview, CONOGOPARE, Quito, November 19th, 2013

16. Elvia Ponce, Alternate Member of the National Assembly for Azuay for AP, Quito, November 21st, 2013

17. Ramiro Vela, Member of the National Assembly for Cotopaxi for AP, Quito, November 18th, 2013
18. Gabriela Villagran, owner of a banana plantation and a packaging business for banana shipping, Guayaquil, October 30th, 2013

19. Anonymous Interview, Representative of the Guayaquil Chamber of Commerce, Guayaquil, October 17th, 2013

20. Paola Pabon, Member of the National Assembly for Pichincha for AP, Quito, December 13th, 2013


22. Anonymous Interview, Official, Plan Semilla project, MAGAP, Quito, December 16th, 2013

23. Maria Augusta Calle, National Member of the National Assembly for AP, Quito, December 18th, 2013

24. Christian Marlin, Director of PRONERI, MAGAP, Quito, December 18th, 2013

25. Anonymous Interview, Social Organization Department of the MAGAP, Quito, December 18th, 2013


27. Anonymous Interview, Official in Agrocalidad, MAGAP, Tumbaco, Quito, June 10th, 2014

28. Lorena Muñoz, Official in the Coordinador de Comercio Inclusivo, MCE, Quito, July 14, 2014

29. Interview with Cesar Marcillo, Professor in Social Economy and Economics at UTE; Member of the Observatorio de Comercio Justo, Quito, January 14th, 2015

30. Ricardo Carrillo, Social Movement Director, AP, Quito, January 29th, 2016


32. Cosmel Merino, Director of APECAP, Palanda, Zamora-Chinchipe, February 1st, 2013

33. Ivan Valladares, MIES Palanda Extension Office, Palanda, Zamora-Chinchipe, February 1st, 2013
34. Anonymous Interview, Interim Director of the ACRIM, Zumba, Zamora-Chinchipe, February 5th, 2013


38. Anonymous interview, Official in MAGAP-Loja, Loja, February 8th 2013

39. Emilio Aguilar, Representative of the FUPOCPS, Loja, February 8th 2013

40. Anonymous Interview, Official of the COFENAC, Portoviejo, Manabí, March 11th, 2013


42. Freddy Jimenez, Extension assistant, Junta Parroquial El Airo, Espindola, Loja, May 14th, 2013


44. Interview with producer, Member of PROCAFEQ and Comuna Cochecoral, Espindola, Loja, May 15th, 2013

45. Anonymous Interview, Official in projects department of the municipality of Espindola; worked previously in project with PROCAFEQ funded by development cooperation, Amaluza, Loja, May 16th, 2013

46. Anonymous Interview, Representative of Plan Café, MAGAP, Quito, May 27th, 2013

47. Wiliber Ibarra, Director of the CCEJ, Quito, July 26th, 2013

48. Anonymous Interview, representative of the Cooperación Alemana (GIZ), Zamora, Zamora-Chinchipe, October 8th, 2013

49. Anonymous Interview, representative of German Development Cooperation (GIZ), Zamora, Zamora-Chinchipe, October 9th, 2013

51. Anonymous Interview, representative of the Association of Juntas Parroquiales of Loja, Loja, October 14th, 2013

52. Anonymous Interview, Extension staff GAD of Zamora-Chinchipe and TPL initiative, Palanda, Zamora-Chinchipe, November 30th, 2013

53. Anonymous Interview, Coffee producer and participant in the TPL training, Palanda, Zamora-Chinchipe, November 30th, 2013

54. Victoria Alverca, ex-President of APECAP, Palanda, Zamora-Chinchipe, November 30th, 2013

55. Juan Calva, ex-President of APECAP, Palanda, Zamora-Chinchipe, May 21st, 2014

56. Anonymous Interview, Extension staff, GAD of Zamora-Chinchipe, Zamora, Zamora-Chinchipe, May 23rd, 2014

57. Anonymous Interview, Extension staff of MAGAP Office in Palanda, Palanda, Zamora-Chinchipe, May 23rd, 2014

58. Camilo Luzuriaga, Coffee and member of the Internal Control Committee of APECAP, Palanda, Zamora-Chinchipe, May 23rd, 2014

59. Santos Zumba, Coffee producer and President of APECAP, Palanda, Zamora-Chinchipe, May 22, 2014

60. Anonymous Interview, Representative of the Asociación de Juntas Parroquiales de Manabí, Portoviejo, Manabí, March 5th, 2013

61. Edison Sánchez, ex-President of the UPOCAM, Jipijapa, Manabí, March 12th, 2013

62. Anonymous Interview, Analyst in the Agricultural Program of the GAD of Manabí, Portoviejo, Manabí, March 5th, 2013

63. Anonymous Interview, Analyst in the IEPS Regional Office, Portoviejo, Manabí, March 6th, 2013

64. Anonymous Interview, Leader of Manabí Primero political movement in alliance with AP in Manabí, Portoviejo, Manabí, March 6th, 2013
65. Anonymous Interview, Agricultural Engineer in Coffee Reactivation Program, MAGAP Manabí, Portoviejo, Manabí, March 8th, 2013

66. Anonymous Interview, Agricultural Engineer in the Cacao Reactivation Program, MAGAP Manabí, Portoviejo, Manabí, March 8th, 2013

67. Anonymous Interview, Representative of Fomento Productivo, GAD of Manabí, Portoviejo, Manabí, March 13th, 2013

68. Anonymous Interview, Official from Coffee Program, GAD of Manabí, March 13th, 2013

69. Fausto Alcivar, President of the UPOCAM, Rocafuerte, Manabí, March 13th 2013

70. Anonymous Interview, Agronomist in the Coffee Project, MAGAP Manabí, Portoviejo, Manabí, September 2nd, 2013


73. Anonymous Interview, Extension Staff for PRONERI Manabí, Portoviejo, Manabi, September 3rd, 2013

74. Lucrecia Alcivar, Director of FECAFEM, Portoviejo, Manabí, September 3, 2013

75. Anonymous Interview, President of La Asociación de Productores Agrícolas La Montañita, Parroquia Colón, Canton Junín, Manabí, Portoviejo, Manabí, September 5th, 2013

76. Interview with Alexis Mier, Organizer of AP Manabí, Manta, Manabí, October 18th, 2013

77. Vicente Velez, Director of AP Manabí, Portoviejo, Manabí, October 19, 2013.


79. Jorge Loor, Founder and ex-President of the UPOCAM, Alternative Member of the National Assembly for Manabí Representing AP, Rocafuerte, Manabí, November 23rd, 2013.

80. Anonymous Interview, co-coordinator of the Unidad Mi Tierra in UPOCAM, Rocafuerte, Manabí, November 23rd 2013
81. Benjamin Macas, Leader of the *Coordinadora Ecuatoriana de Agroecología* (CEA), Loja, February 6th, 2013

82. Anonymous Interview, Municipal GAD of Ibarra, Ibarra, November 26, 2013

83. Anonymous Interview, Presidenta, Feria de Ibarra del MAGAP, Ibarra, November 25, 2013

84. Anonymous Interview, CTB, Ibarra, November 26th, 2013

85. Anonymous Interview, Producer, Feria de San Gabriel, Carchi, November 16th, 2013

86. Anonymous Interview, Project officer, Association de Juntas Parroquiales de Imbabura, November 20th, 2013


89. Anonymous Interview, Producer, Feria de Pimampiro, Ibarra, July 6th, 2013

90. Luzmila Vasquez, Producer and Coordinator of the Feria Imbabio, Otavalo, May 28th, 2013

91. Pierril Lacroix, AVSF, Quito, May 22nd, 2013

92. Anonymous Interview, Member of the Board of Directors, Centro de Acopio, Quiroga, Imbabura, April 12th, 2013


94. Anonymous Interview, Leader of the Feria Solidaria de Ibarra (Terminal), December 12, 2013

95. Anonymous Interview, Official of the GAD de Imbabura, Ibarra, December 12, 2013

96. Anonymous Interview Tecnico, GAD de Imbabura, December 12, 2013

97. Anonymous Interview, Agronomist, MAGAP Imbaura, December 11th, 2013

98. Anonymous Interview, Producer Feria de MAGAP, Ibarra, December 11th, 2013

100. Anonymous Interview, Intern, FICI/ Red de Ferias, June 5th, 2014

101. Rocio Cachimuel, President of the FICI, Otavalo, June 6th, 2014
Appendix 2- Interview Guide

1. Interview Questions for National Government Officials and National Leaders and Officials- Ministry of Economic and Social Inclusion, Ministry for the Coordination of Political Economy and the Ministry of Trade and International Relations, Ministry of Agriculture, National Peasant Federation Leaders, Non-Governmental Organizations

-When did the government begin to mandate support for cooperatives and the social economy and what have been the main policies, programs or actions that have been implemented through your department or ministry?

-Which agricultural commodities are most important in economic terms for Ecuador?

-Which agricultural commodities are most important for small-scale, peasant producers and which for large-scale plantation producers?

-Which commodity represents the most potential for growth for small-scale producer cooperatives in Ecuador?

-What is your opinion of the concept of “buen vivir” (living well) and how does it reflect in the policies brought forward by the government related to small-scale producers?

-How does the government define food sovereignty and how does this concept relate or differ from food security?

-Can plantations or large-scale farms help Ecuador achieve greater food sovereignty?

-Is there any tension between production for domestic markets/consumption and production for export?

-How does the government define small, medium and large-scale producers?
- How do cooperatives fit into the government’s vision of twenty-first century socialism?

2. Interview Questions- Municipal Government Officials, Municipal Politicians, Farmer and Producer Association Representatives

- Has the cooperative contributed to the development of the local region in any ways?

- Has the cooperative served as a forum for consulting the membership on local political issues?

- Has the cooperative served to enhance the work of the local government?

- What are the main economic and social challenges facing your local region?

3. Case Studies- The main component of my project will be to conduct comparative case studies of three cooperatives or associations to understand their perspective on the relationship between the government’s policies and their cooperatives in different regions of Ecuador.

Interview Questions- Cooperative Members (Farmers)

- What are the main challenges facing the cooperative in your view?

- Is the price that you receive through the cooperative enough to meet your expenses? Do you receive a living wage in your opinion?

- Do you produce food for your own consumption?

- What is your opinion of the current government and its policies towards cooperatives?
-What is your opinion of the concept of food sovereignty?

-Why did you join the cooperative?

-What is your opinion of the concept of “buen vivir” (living well) and do you think that the cooperative contributes to this notion?

-What do you believe is the most important function of the cooperative? Is it primarily a business or as an association for addressing common problems and taking political and social action?

Interview Questions- Cooperative Staff, Leadership (Boards of Directors), Extension Workers

-What are the main challenges facing the cooperative in both social and economic terms?

-In the meetings of the cooperative, is participation by the membership high or low in your opinion?

-What is your opinion of the current government and its policies towards the cooperative sector?

-What is your opinion of the concept of food sovereignty?

-What is your opinion of the concept of “buen vivir” (living well) and do you think that cooperative organization contributes to this notion?