INFORMATION TO USERS

This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of computer printer.

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.

Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand corner and continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps.

Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6" x 9" black and white photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order.

ProQuest Information and Learning
300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346 USA
800-521-0600

UMI
THE PSYCHOLOGIST THE PHILOSOPHER
AND THE ANCHORITE.

JUNG, NIETZSCHE AND THUS SPAKE ZARATHUSTRA

BY

JENNY McMCMASTER

BA (Honours) (Religion and Art History), Carleton University, Ottawa, 1999

A thesis submitted to

the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

College of the Humanities (Religion)

Carleton University

Ottawa, Ontario

May 11, 2001

© 2001, Jenny McMaster
The author has granted a non-exclusive licence allowing the National Library of Canada to reproduce, loan, distribute or sell copies of this thesis in microform, paper or electronic formats.

L’auteur a accordé une licence non exclusive permettant à la Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de reproduire, prêter, distribuer ou vendre des copies de cette thèse sous la forme de microfiche/film, de reproduction sur papier ou sur format électronique.

The author retains ownership of the copyright in this thesis. Neither the thesis nor substantial extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without the author’s permission.

L’auteur conserve la propriété du droit d’auteur qui protège cette thèse. Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés ou autrement reproduits sans son autorisation.

0-612-60997-9
The Undersigned recommend to the
Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
Acceptance of the thesis

The Psychologist, The Philosopher and the Anchorite:
Jung, Nietzsche and Zarathustra

Submitted by Jenny Raye McMaster
In partial fulfilment of the requirement for
the degree of Master of Arts

[Signature]
John P. Dourley, Thesis Supervisor

[Signature]
S. Wilson, Director, College of Humanities

Carleton University
Ottawa, Ontario, Canada
May, 2001
ABSTRACT

The purpose of this thesis is to elucidate the psychological and spiritual thought of Carl Jung and Friederich Nietzsche through their comparison. Part I will investigate the Seminars participated in by Jung and his followers on Nietzsche's Thus Spoke Zarathustra, as well as material found in the Collected Works on the subject. Part II will attempt to relay a likely response from Nietzsche. Part III will investigate the practical ramifications of Jung and Nietzsche's soteriologies with regards to the use of the intuitive and artistic in philosophy, psychology and spirituality. It will also examine the adequacy of Jung and Nietzsche methods of dealing with abnormal psychological experience and altered states of consciousness.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

General Introduction.................................................................1

Part I: Jung on Nietzsche...........................................................8
  Chapter 1: The Seminars.........................................................10
  Chapter 2: The Collected Works...............................................63
  Conclusions Part I...............................................................91

Part II: A Response From Nietzsche............................................93
  Chapter 1: Jungian Slips.......................................................93
  Chapter 2: Affinities..........................................................100
  Chapter 3: Disagreements, The Other Side of the Paradox.................136
  Conclusions Part II.............................................................172

Part III: Art, Alchemy and Mystical Experience.............................178
  Chapter 1: Jung on Art.........................................................185
  Chapter 2: Nietzsche and Art...............................................192
  Chapter 3: Similarities in Jung and Nietzsche’s Approaches..............206
  Chapter 4: The Remaining Divide...........................................214
  Chapter 5: Mystical Experience.............................................230
  Conclusions Part III...........................................................245

General Conclusions..............................................................251

Bibliography..............................................................................266
CITATIONS

PRIMARY SOURCES

AC  Nietzsche, The AntiChrist
BT  Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy
BGE Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil
GC  Geoffrey Clive (Editor), The Philosophy of Nietzsche
CW  Jung, The Collected Works
EH  Nietzsche, Ecce Homo
GM  Nietzsche, The Genealogy of Morals
GS  Nietzsche, The Gay Science
GW  Nietzsche, Gesammelte Werke (Collected Works, German)
GW  Jung, Gesammelte Werke (Collected Works, German)
HH  Nietzsche, Human all too Human
MDR  Jung, Memories, Dreams and Reflections
NB  Nietzsche, Nietzsche Briefwechsel (Nietzsche’s Personal Correspondences)
NCW Nietzsche, Nietzsche Contra Wagner
S1, S2  Jung, The Seminars
TI  Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols
TOS  Nietzsche, Thought out of Season
UW  Nietzsche, Die Unschuld des Werdens
Nietzsche, Untimely Meditations (Thoughts Out of Season)

Nietzsche, The Will to Power

Nietzsche, La Volonte de Puissance (Will to Power, French)

Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra

SECONDARY SOURCES

Peter Bishop, The Dionysian Self

J.J. Clarke, Jung and Eastern Thought

Gille Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy

Nicholas Daveys, Intro to Thus Spoke Zarathustra (Trans. Thomas Common)

Charles Taylor, Human Agency and Language

Hofstadter and Kuhns, Philosophies of Art and Beauty

Karl Jaspers, Nietzsche and Christianity

Joseph Campbell, The Power of Myth

John Dourley, “Jacob Boehme and Paul Tillich on God” RS

Maurice Merleau Ponty. The Primacy of Perception

Elain Pagels, The Gnostic Gospels

Paul Williams, Mahayana Buddhism

Kurt Rudolph, Gnosis

Walsh, Roger, “The Psychological Health of Shamans” JAAR
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ST</th>
<th>Shirley Toulson, <em>The Celtic Alternative</em></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>T</td>
<td>Paul Thiele, <em>The Politics of the Soul</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W</td>
<td>David Wullf, <em>The Psychology of Religion</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WC</td>
<td>Walter H Capps, <em>Religious Studies</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Dennis Young, <em>New Alchemy: Elements, Systems and Forces</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION

In the postmodern era the influence of institutional religion has ceased to be the predominant means of defining the spiritual. Psychology and philosophy are now the preferred methodologies which have been used to fill this gap.

At first glance, philosopher Friederich Nietzsche, the quintessential atheist, and psychologist Carl Gustav Jung, who considers humanity to be intrinsically religious, seem to have very little in common. The truth of the matter is, however, that Jung was profoundly influenced by Nietzsche and in many ways Jung is uniquely qualified to comment on Nietzsche.

Both Jung and Nietzsche were preacher's sons and subsequently reacted against the Christian church. Both underwent psychological breakdowns and yet both considered mental illness an opportunity for spiritual growth and the attainment of special knowledge. Both considered mystical experience to be something more than a product of pathology. Both used alchemy and symbols as a means of explaining their systems of thought. Both were greatly influenced by Eastern philosophy. Both considered the irrational and intuitive side of the human psyche to be unfairly maligned, unlike Freud who still considered it automatically associated with neurosis, primitiveness and infancy. Both saw the Christian opposites of good and evil as an artificial split, no longer appropriate to the modern era.

Having said this, Jung did define many aspects of his psychology in opposition to Nietzsche's philosophy. Jung did not agree with nor understand everything that Nietzsche wrote. Though Jung did most of his work at the beginning of the
Twentieth century, and Nietzsche at the end of the Nineteenth, Nietzsche is more radical and more modern (or postmodern) than Jung in many ways. However, I would also assert that Jung is correct in his statement, that though Nietzsche championed the unconscious, he still clung to the Western prejudice that conscious experience was the only experience which ought to be trusted.

In Thus Spoke Zarathustra Nietzsche writes of the Wise Persian Magus, the maker and breaker of the consecrated tables of natural order.\((\text{BT}, 61)\) He writes about the Dionysian artist who creates his own values and his own life as a work of art. The action of his life and the creative affirmation of his fate become a beautiful but tragic myth. Nietzsche also writes about the critical historian who tears apart his past and reapplies it in new and innovative ways. He revalues and reinterprets the religious and cultural imagery he was brought up with. Thus Spoke Zarathustra is Nietzsche's autobiography as a work of art, his life as a tragic myth, his religion and history gutted and reborn. The work is filled with religious imagery, including Christian. The apocalypse, the anchorite and the second coming are among the features we encounter. Zarathustra, better known as Zoroaster to historians of religion, was the prophet who arguably first cracked open the divide between good and evil.\((S1, 5)\) The story begins when he descends from his mountain to deliver a new testament to those who are worthy.

Jung writes about Nietzsche as a great prophet of the spirit and the unconscious, an alchemist of the psyche and a victim of pathology. Thus Spoke Zarathustra, explains Jung, represents Nietzsche's effort to return the immediacy of the spirit to culture and philosophy.\((S1, 61)\) In the post enlightenment world the spirit was seen as a
purely cerebral or intellectual phenomenon. Each chapter of Zarathustra, asserts Jung, is like a stage in the process of spiritual initiation. (S1, 459) The problem, in the psychologist’s eyes, was that Nietzsche had turned his back on time tested methods of dealing with undefined spiritual forces. Though Jung and Nietzsche both agreed that the force of the spirit was native to the psyche, Jung believed that Nietzsche did not have enough respect for the strength of spiritual forces.

Nietzsche, says Jung, was as much a victim of Thus Spoke Zarathustra as he was its author. (S1, 51) He was one of the first philosophers to acknowledge the emotional, the irrational and the unconscious. And because he dealt with unconscious subject matter, he had no choice but to resort to intuitive means. He used the poetic, hieratic style of the epic to express his ideas. (CW6, 540:320)iii The philosopher lamented that he spoke rather than sang. (Davey, ixii)

Formerly the dark and hidden forces of the unconscious had been dealt with through religious symbols. What Jung now called the central archetypal power, the Self, had been spoken of as God. Now that Nietzsche declared that God was dead, an entirely new means had to be devised for communicating about and with the unconscious. The alchemical spirit had been pulled from the stone. (CW12, 406:296) Ghosts and demons no longer inhabited trees and rivers but were now bumping about in the psyches of unsuspecting Europeans. (CW10, 432:212) The mediating device of the symbols was lost.

A symbol for Nietzsche is not a sign which allows an unconscious force to manifest on a conscious level but a metaphor. It is a means of creation, a means of evaluation and interpretation. The religious practitioner with his arsenal of symbols is replaced by Nietzsche with the artist. We find ourselves exiled from our archetypal
homelands, and forced to draw new spiritual landscapes to inhabit. The Nietzschean leaves the land of the grandfather and embarks on a journey to the children’s land. (Z, 112)⁴ The Nietzschean attempts to become who he is. Many a Self, says the philosopher, is not discovered unless it is first invented. (Z, 38) We must create ourselves beyond ourselves. The Superman or the Overman is super human. He goes against human nature’s nihilistic desire for security and desire to be told ‘thou shalt’, rather than say ‘I will,’ in an affirmation of moral independence. Nietzsche’s God Dionysus is an unknown, unfamiliar God beyond nihilism. He is a God who affirms life by living it. He does not stand over it with a set of commandments. By following Dionysus’ example, we can ourselves take on the role of affirmative Gods. We should act according to our own will, rather than reacting to the will of a transcendent divinity or abstract ideal.

Jung however argues that it is wrong to see ourselves as Gods. We do not create but rather the archetypes create through us. The conscious does not control the will. Divinity is experienced as an independent force because the ‘Self’ extends far beyond the conscious ego. The Self acts upon us as an unconscious God who needs his conscious subjects to become conscious.

Nietzsche agrees that the Self commands the ego. The Self tells the ego, “feel pain” and the ego feels pain. (Z, 30) The Self, according to Nietzsche, is the body, the totality of our biological drives and the seat of species activity. He who denies his own psychological freedom is spiritually ill, but he who denies his lack of freedom is stupid. (GW, 14:58)⁵ We must however avoid the apprehension that we are being led, that we are merely reacting to the voice of the unconscious. In order that we act our
reactions, in order that we perceive ourselves to be free, we must identify our conscious with the active drives of the unconscious.

For Jung this is a problem. This is in fact his central problem with Nietzsche. According to Jung, Nietzsche identifies his conscious ego with the unconscious powers of the Self. This, according to the psychologist, could only lead to inflation and the eventually loss of the distinction between conscious and unconscious forces. This is explained by Jung as the nature of psychosis.

Though Jung had great respect for Nietzsche, he also feared him. Jung admired his attention to the body and his criticism of the Christian church. He saw him as an important psychologist and a great artist, but he feared that he had drawn up a Faustian deal with the devil by taking on the role of a creator God. Jung often speaks about Nietzsche as he would a patient. One might ask if it is fair or not to blame Nietzsche’s eventual psychological breakdown on his philosophy since he did indeed have a physiological condition known to cause insanity. It is rare that Jung mentions that Nietzsche had syphilis (B, 78) However, even if we cannot blame his demise on certain aspects of his philosophy the question remains as to whether certain aspects of his philosophy were effected by his physiological condition. Nietzsche himself would not divorce sickness and madness from philosophy. I would assert in fact, he would credit his illness, psychological and physiological, with providing him with certain insights.

I believe Nietzsche would mostly be in agreement with the following quote from Jung, in which he tries to delineate a psychopathology of philosophers... “There is no thinking qua thinking...Neurosis addles the brains of every philosopher because he is at
odds with himself. His philosophy is then nothing but a systematized struggle with his own uncertainty". (Letters: 332)(B, 79)\textsuperscript{vi}

The first section of this thesis will cover Jung’s commentary on Thus Spoke Zarathustra in the Seminars held in Basle, Switzerland between 1933 and 1939. It will also compare this commentary to the general statements made about Nietzsche in the Collected Works. Part II will attempt to relay a likely response from Nietzsche as well as correct some of Jung’s misconceptions about the philosopher. Finally Part III will be devoted to my conclusions on the comparison of the two figures with emphasis given to the subjects of aesthetics, alchemy and mystical experience.

It is the intention of this thesis to elucidate various aspects of Jung and Nietzsche’s work through their comparison. Jung, for the most part, presents us with a dynamic and process oriented psychology which seeks to make the Divine Immanent. However, when compared with Nietzsche, the functional transcendence of Jung’s metaphysically immanent Divinity is revealed. A residue of structuralism is made evident in Jung’s system. When compared with Nietzsche’s world of conscious experience, in which everything is coming into being and passing away, the Jungian archetypes are shown to have a relative permanence.

Nietzsche reminded consciousness of its need for modesty and spoke with great enthusiasm of the active powers of the unconscious. Nevertheless, when he is compared with Jung, it is made evident that Nietzsche continued to consider conscious analytic thought the ruler with which to measure ecstatic or altered states of consciousness.

It is not the intention of this thesis to establish whether Jung or Nietzsche’s system is more likely to be metaphysically or ontologically accurate. It is the intention to
evaluate both men's attempts to relay a faithful picture of psycho-spiritual experience, both conscious and unconscious. It is the intention to evaluate both their methods of dealing with abnormal psychology and spiritual experience. It is the intention to determine whether they offer adequate replacements for traditional spiritual systems. Do their methods vivify psychology and philosophy with spiritual piety, without detracting from the freedom provided by the modern rejection of transcendent Divinity? This paper is concerned with function and experience rather than metaphysics. It is concerned with the key functional differences (and similarities) shown to exist when Jung and Nietzsche's work are held up in comparison and not how they would be described in a stand alone description.

PART I

JUNG ON NIETZSCHE

Carl Gustav Jung, depth psychologist and secular scholar, claimed that he did not presume to posit the existence of a God in his work. However, Jung did assert that human beings are intrinsically religious, and that this religious dimension of humanity is something which cannot be ignored. Jung describes the experience of the Divine as proceeding from a source entirely native to the psyche. The experience of the Divine proceeds from the unconscious, the archetypes, the Self. In contemporary society Jung's work has, to a great extent, become the language with which the spiritual is discussed. Speaking of Gods and Goddesses as Jungian archetypes gives the discussion of religious phenomena a certain credibility.

For Jung, the statement "God is Dead" not only has profound psychological ramifications, but social and metaphysical ones as well. God, for Jung, though not a transcendent entity, is a psychological fact which must be faced. And though Jung sees Nietzsche as a brilliant psychologist (S2, 1095) and prophet (CW6, 322:191) who contributed to the recognition of the unconscious mind, he predictably has some fundamental disagreements with the philosopher.

Jung argues that atheists are really very religious people because they concern themselves so much with God.(S1, 72) This would make Nietzsche the atheist's high priest. His most religious book is Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Thus Spoke Zarathustra is a modern epic, a new Bible which dethrones God and puts the Superman in his place. Human kind is set free to write their own rules, their own values; all previous conceptions of good and evil are left behind. Nietzsche, from Jung's point of view, attempts to ignore the reality
of the archetypes. Though Nietzsche may be free to consciously reject God, there are unconscious results to this rejection which he has no control over.

Jung's commentary on *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* goes far beyond the psychological analysis of the brilliant but neurotic Nietzsche. It asks the question, what happens to us when we lose the archetypal and mythological homelands we have in our religious beliefs? Although we may consciously have moved on we must enquire as to what is going on at an unconscious level. What subtle and not so subtle ramifications will occur in both the individual and society?

The first section of this paper is devoted to the Seminars which focus specifically on *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* and the *Collected Works* which refer to Nietzsche in a variety of different contexts and to a variety of his works. In order to convey a more faithful picture of Jung's view on Nietzsche, sections of the *Collected Works* that speak about other books, beyond *Zarathustra*, have been included in this paper's scope.
CHAPTER I

THE SEMINARS

THE UNIQUE CHARACTER OF THE SEMINARS

The Seminars, which entail the discussion of Thus Spoke Zarathustra by Jung and his followers, were held in Basle Switzerland between the two world wars, from 1933 to 1939. Europe had lost the idealism that characterized the nineteenth century and the significance of Nietzsche's work was being widely recognized. After the Great War the statement "God is Dead" hit home with great magnitude.

The Seminars involved a panel of over 80 members who included, among the more vocal, Mr. and Mrs. Baumann, Mrs. Crowley, Miss Hannah, Mrs. Fierz, Professor Reichenstein, Mrs. Siggs, Mr. Barnhard, Miss Wolff and Emma Jung. (S1, xxiv) Jung never discriminates against the female members of the Seminars, in fact one could write an entire paper on the comments made by Mrs. Siggs.

The Jung who responds to the questions and comments in the Seminars is less cautious about his metaphysical assertions than the Jung we read from in the Collected Works. His statements do not always fit neatly into his psychological schematics and certainly trespass onto what he often claims is not the domain of a scientist but that of a theologian. The Seminars may contain a Jungian theology.

Thus Spoke Zarathustra is not just a psychological case study in either the Seminars or the Collected Works. Jung admits that it is a revelation, a profound
manifestation of the reality of the Self, but he would certainly qualify this statement by adding that as revelations go, this one was profoundly dysfunctional. Jung would assert that Nietzsche has much to teach us both as a patient and as a prophet. (S2, 1095) both as a psychologist (CW6, 191) and as an artist. (S2, 1254) Nietzsche comes across as being more of a unique phenomenon in the Seminars (though he is never presented as a closed case of anything). He is presented neither as unilaterally negative or unilaterally positive. In contrast, in the Collected Works, Nietzsche is sometimes presented as entirely positive, if it suits the course of argument that Jung is attending to in a particular essay or chapter.

As in the Collected Works, in the Seminars Jung's criticism of certain aspects of Nietzsche's philosophy grows harsher as the Second World War approaches. Jung asserts that what was going on in Germany had a close connection with Nietzsche's philosophy. Though he acknowledges that the Germans to a large extent misinterpreted what Nietzsche says, the last few sessions of the Seminars clearly show that Jung believes that some of the philosopher's statements have done direct damage. The last meeting of the Seminars was held on February 15\(^{th}\), 1939, before the review of Thus Spoke Zarathustra was completed. To learn of Jung's post war sentiments on Zarathustra one must turn to the Collected Works.

According to Jung, Nietzsche was just as much a victim of Thus Spoke Zarathustra as he was its author. Jung states that the life of a creative individual contains any amount of destruction even self-destruction. "A man does not possess creative powers but is rather possessed by them." (S1, 57) Creative powers steal your time and sap your strength. Man's creativity can penetrate the depths or the heights of the
universe like a God or a great demon, but if we behave like Gods we will, as a matter of course, undergo Divine punishment. Jung says, Nietzsche was robbed; he lived only that Zarathustra might speak. When it came to his own life he was sick and neurotic. Greatness will the destroy the ordinary in man. (S1, 615, 620)

Jung calls it a mistake that Nietzsche ever published Zarathustra, it should have been reserved for people who have undergone careful training in the psychology of the unconscious. (S1, 475) Perhaps the Seminars were an attempt to right this oversight.

THE STORY OF ZARATHUSTRA AND THE HISTORICAL ZOROASTER

According to Jung, Nietzsche wrote Thus Spoke Zarathustra in the novella form, so that he might attend to the intuitive and emotional side of humanity, which he had come to focus on in his philosophy. He adopted a hieratic poetic style so he might give fuller voice to the Dionysian. He chose as his protagonist Zarathustra, better known to historians of religion as Zoroaster, the prophet of Zoroastrianism, the wide spread Persian faith which preceded Islam.

The novella begins when Zarathustra, after years of isolation, decides to come down from his mountain home. After living in contemplation as a hermit for so much time he decided he must bring his message to the people. It was his quest to rectify the opposition of good and evil. (This divide was arguably first cracked open by the historical Zoroaster’s doctrine of the cosmic struggle of darkness and light.) According to Jung, the awkwardness of the battle between good and evil, the Godly and the Satanic, is an old inheritance from Persian religion. Zarathustra, states Jung, is really the founder of this Christian dogma. (S1, 8) Zarathustra was manifesting in a new modern incarnation in
Nietzsche's book. As Jung asserts,

Now that is Nietzsche's idea. He thought that Zarathustra had been the inventor of the great conflict between good and evil, and that he influenced the whole mental evolution of the world by this most fundamental concept. And his idea was that he (Zarathustra) ought now to come back again in order to improve his former invention: Something should be done about the unsupportable conflict between good and evil, because the old Christian point of view, represented by the old man in the wood, was no longer valid. (S1, 34)

"It is true," Jung states, "that one would not be able to find any thinker earlier than Zarathustra who stressed the contrast between good and evil as the main principle. The whole Zoroastrian religion is based on this conflict." (S1, 5)

Historians of religion would agree that the dark and light divide found in Christianity is due, at least in part, to Persian influence. Due to the influences of the heretical Gnostic ideas put forth by Marcion and Mani, Christians saw God the Father as possessing both a dark and light side. Gnosticism combined the opposition of the flesh and the mind asserted by Greek philosophy and as well the opposition of the dark/evil and light/good found in the Zoroastrian religion. (R, 60)

The essential point of Marcion's theology is the absolute antithesis of the God of law and the God of salvation. The God of the Hebrew Bible rules the world with the rigour of law, justice without mercy and goodness. The God of the New Testament embodies perfect goodness and mercy. (R, 314) Marcion asked the question, "Why would a God who was almighty - all powerful - create a world that includes suffering pain and disease...?" he concluded that these must be two different Gods. (P, 33)

Mani, the founder of Manichiesm, acknowledged Zoroaster as one of the
“apostles of light” alongside figures such as Buddha and Jesus. (R, 132) Mani is considered to be both an independent minded representative of early Syrian Christianity and the last Gnostic. Mani’s teaching is based on the well known Gnostic dualism of spirit and body, light and darkness, good and evil but he advocates it most radically in dependence on his Iranian heritage. (R, 335) Though both these men were condemned by the Christian authorities as heretics, their ideas had a great influence on the fledgling religion.

Gnosticism brought Zarathustra's philosophy to the greater Mediterranean world and the Christian Church eventually spread it through the rest of Europe. What began as a solution for the expression of ancient peoples' early consciousness of morality has since become, what Nietzsche considered to be a tremendous problem. According to Jung, the reason for Nietzsche’s modern Zoroastrian testament, is that the prophet’s first teachings are no longer valid. (S1, 34) Thus Spoke Zarathustra summons the prophet from his grave to right the wrongs his teachings have brought upon the world. (S1, 5)

Nietzsche's prophesy aims to usher in a new transformation in human consciousness, a new freedom of thought. To the people, Zarathustra preaches the Superman, a man freed from Christian morality and freed from the Shadow of God. God is proclaimed dead and all his creative powers are transferred to the human will to power. Ultimate responsibility is put in the hands of the individual, from their every act to their every thought. Morality is now something that must come from within each individual, their will to become their true Self with a capital "S". From 6000 feet above good and evil, Zarathustra descends to the masses, whom he both despises and desires the affection of.
JUNG'S ANALYSIS OF ZARTHUSTRA'S QUEST

Jung states that Zarathustra appeared when something happened which made his presence necessary, namely the death of God. When God died man needed a new orientation so the father of all prophets appeared.(SI, 24) God was dead, I would assert, because the Christian symbols which translated the Divine powers to the people ceased to function. They were no longer appropriate for the times. As Jung states, the supreme guiding principle of Christian love had had its day.(SI, 40)

Jung adheres to the theory that religious and philosophical ideas naturally evolve in the course of history. Unconscious forces gradually build and eventually rear their heads in conscious manifestations. Philo, a Jewish philosopher, developed what Jung considers to be the central Christian archetype, the Logos. We find Logos, the intellectual side of the spiritual defined by word, in the writings of John the Evangelist.(41, S1) As Jung explains, just as the monasteries were in existence before anything "Christian" so the very thoughts of Christianity had been well prepared for centuries. The Christian spirit of Logos lifted man out of nature and put him in opposition to it. As Jung asserts, because of the writings of people like Augustine, the devil was located in every natural thing.(SI, 42)

As the psychologist tells us, in the Twelfth and Thirteenth centuries nature was rediscovered, and by the time of Nietzsche, this process of becoming acquainted with the spirit of nature reached its culmination. It was recognised that the Christian principle was dead. This was the confession of the naturalistic age which began with the French
enlightenment in about 1730. (S1, 43) As Zarathustra descends from his mountain he meets up with the character Jung describes as the Christian Good Spirit of the forest. This spirit has become very sceptical in his old age and prefers the solitude of the mountains and the woods to life in collectivity. (S1, 43, 44) "When Zarathustra was alone, however, he said unto his heart: Could it be possible! This old saint of the forest hath not yet heard of it, that God is Dead?" (Z, 5)

Zarathustra goes into the town to preach this message and bear the good news of the Superman, the ideal which returns the powers of God to man. The formula for creating a Superman is to create yourself beyond yourself. Active creative powers are bestowed upon man. According to Jung, these are the words of Zoroaster because it was he who said man is the perfection of creation. He was really the first one to make man conscious of himself. It was necessary to distinguish the opposites of good and evil because nobody becomes conscious of himself without becoming conscious of internal conflict. (S1, 209) As long as we are not living according to our own choice we cannot know ourselves. In Zoroastrianism man plays the most important role rather than the Gods. The moral conflict, which was formerly a Divine role, is now given to man. Now nobody can use the excuse, the devil made me do it. (S1, 210)

**NIETZSCHE’S MORALITY ACCORDING TO JUNG**

"The Superman," says Zarathustra, shall be the meaning of the earth. He goes to seek and preach the earth, physical matter, the body and the Self which Nietzsche believed were negated by the Christian religion. According to Jung, the body symbolises specificness, concreteness, communicability and the forces of the unconscious. (S1, 64)
Zarathustra says "I conjure you my brethren to remain true to the earth."(Z, 6) This means, Jung tells us, to maintain our conscious relationship to the body. This, Jung asserts, is the only good teaching for those who have lost the body, it is the only good teaching for those whose minds, but not their bodies have been fed.(S1, 66) The importance of the body indicates the importance of the specific concrete individual. Jung agrees that there is some truth to Nietzsche's teaching that the essence of the body constitutes the Self. While Jung does not restrict the Self to the body, he believes that animal physicality is fundamental in the process of individuation.(S1, 64) The body, explains Jung, is the Self distinct in time and space.(S1, 70) The body is the Self's unique moment in creation.(S1, 74) Jung states that this is truly Nietzsche's new religious ideal, the recognition of man as he really is over and against illusions and projections.(S1, 70)

"Lo I teach you the Superman," says Zarathustra, "He is lightening and he is frenzy. The greatest thing one can experience is an hour of great contempt."(Z, 7) Nietzsche affirms the Jungian Shadow. He compensates for all the dark forces behind all the beautiful virtues that have long been ignored. Jung states that the highest ideal creates in consequence a shadow which is as dark as hell.(S1, 76) The Shadow of the Christian church is called up from the depths. Both Nietzsche and Jung agree the dark things which are understood to be sin are only sin when you are coming entirely from the standpoint of good qualities.(S1, 77) Values are defined by opposition. Sin exists only when there is a moral code to be breached.

With a great flash of intuitive lightening and a stinging pain, Zarathustra awakens the masses from their slumber. The old order which was supposed to last for an eternity
The living religious truth now changes completely. When God dies, states Jung, he appears in him who killed him. The Divine creative faculty is reborn in the Superman, a man who can deal with the darkness of human nature, beyond the social constructs of good and evil.

"I love those that know not how to live except as down goers, for they are the over goers. I love the great despisers because they are the great adorers of the other shore." Jung states that Nietzsche hates those who are content to be ordinary and loves those that detest mediocrity. He loves those men who are not content to remain where they are, who live in order to change, who live beyond themselves in order to become. He loves the Superman and hates inferior man. "I love those who do not first seek a reason beyond the stars for going down and being sacrifices, but sacrifice themselves to the earth, that the earth of the Superman may hereafter arrive." Nietzsche, Jung explains, is a sort of materialistic prophet, but he saves some spiritual substance. The Superman goes beyond the actual body. It is a new creation, a new being in which the body is completely subject to the will. Nietzsche, says Jung, is the prophet of the will.

He denies, Jung explains, the Christian idea of self-sacrifice for a thing which is beyond the world, for an extramundane spirituality. He doesn't see any merit in killing the body for the sake of the spirit. His idea is that it takes greater courage, greater virtue and greater sacrifice, to live. In sacrificing oneself to concrete reality one is changed and one prepares the way for the Superman.

As Jung explains, Nietzsche advises that we must reaccept instinctual man. We don't want to be our true selves because we can't stand ourselves. Instead we cling to
idealistic delusions and never make any progress toward self discovery. Man must be ready to cast off or change his former external attitude in order to give birth to a new being. "I tell you one must still have chaos in order to give birth to an advancing star." (Z, 10) The star, Jung explains, is a symbol of individuation. (S1, 105)

According to the psychologist, the foundation of Nietzsche's new morality may be found in the words, "Let your life be your highest hope and let your highest hope be the highest thought of life." (Z, 44) Formerly, states Jung, morality was based on the idea that whatever was pleasant to the Gods was good or moral. Now with Nietzsche whatever is vital is of moral importance. (S1, 568) We call many things good which have lost their vitality all together while there are other things which are not only vital in themselves but provide a basis for living. As Jung explains, we often do something because we claim it is moral, when the truth is we do it out of sheer cowardice. (S1, 569) We hide behind societal laws. Nietzsche, therefore, advises we should throw off this false canon of good and evil and instead focus on what is vital. The laws of life itself are quite irrespective of our human codes of morality. Despite all attempts to restrict life, canalise it and organise it, finally life will break through all barriers. Life itself, Jung explains, should decide as it always does in reality. (S1, 570)

Man must be surpassed or surmounted in favour of the Superman. Man, the bereft societal puppet, must be left behind in favour of the Superman who lives only at the command of his own will.
THE SUPERMAN VERSUS THE STATE

In the chapter entitled "The New Idol" Nietzsche explains the morality of vitality and its opposition to the power of the state. The dead church is of course the old idol, the state is the new one. "The state," Nietzsche declares, "is called the coldest of all cold monsters."(Z, 45) Jung asserts that the state is built on the concretisation and personification of concepts. And concepts concretised and personified become poisonous.(S1, 577) Nietzsche explains to us quite clearly how the state is bound up with the opposites of good and evil. "Every people speaketh its language of good and evil: Thus its neighbour understands it not. Its language hath it devised for itself, its laws and customs."(Z, 45) What to one people is a good ideal to others is hell.(S1, 582)

"The state," Nietzsche says, "is verily the will to death."(Z, 45) This, Jung explains, is true in as much as the state becomes an absolute idol detached from the people. Nietzsche calls the state a confusion of the language of good and evil and Jung agrees; when a great many people heap themselves together in a sort of organisation, morality deteriorates. Nietzsche, however, cannot help seeing the state as necessary. The indecency of the ignorant masses must be controlled by the indecency of the state. Of course, Jung says, one must deal with the state. The state is only wrong when a man loses the idea of himself, when he sells out to the organisation. The danger of the state is that it becomes amoral. It cannot do anything but good: "My country right or wrong."

Jung and Nietzsche would agree that the knowledge of good and evil must come from individuals.(S1, 592)

"The state," Nietzsche says, "is where the slow suicide of all, is called life...Just see these superfluous ones! They steal the works of all the inventors and the treasures of
the wise. Culture, they call their theft." (Z, 46) The state is an illusion, an abstraction.

However, Zarathustra offers words of hope, "Open still remaineth a free life, for great souls. There where the state ceaseth – pray look thither my brethren! Do ye not see it, the rainbow and the bridges of the Superman." (Z, 47)

At the beginning of Chapter 15 "The Thousand and One Goals" Nietzsche writes...

Many lands saw Zarathustra and many people; thus he discovered the good and bad of many peoples. No greater power did Zarathustra find on earth than good and bad. (Z, 55)

This means, explains Jung, that there is no greater power than the societal table of values and the decisive or leading idea which characterises a state. (S1, 644) According to Nietzsche,

No people could live without first valuing, if a people will maintain itself however it must not value as its neighbour valueth...Never did the one neighbour understand the other; ever did his soul marvel at his neighbour's delusion and wickedness. A table of excellences hangeth over every people. Lo! It is the table of their triumphs: Lo it is the voice of their will to power. (Z, 55)

The will to power is the central premise of Nietzsche's morality. As Jung explains, he makes morality dependent upon the power instinct. This is chiefly what is lacking in states and individuals. (S1, 67) Rather than the will to power, to be moral is the will to be something useful, a way to success. What relieves distress becomes the central tenet of morality. As Zarathustra explains "Whatever make them ruleth and conquer and shine, they regard as the highest and the foremost thing, the test and meaning of all else." (Z, 47)
The chief value, Jung states, embodies a peoples' psychological quality and therefore it is the way to success. However, you can only really succeed in your own way. The real will to power, the Superman, is a motive to discover individualistic will to power rather than collective power, which relieves the individual of the stress of finding their own path. The Superman is the will to create something which is unlike anything else. (S1, 648) It is a great attempt to leap out of collective identity.

WHERE JUNG DISAGREES

There are many aspects of Nietzsche's philosophy that Jung agrees with or at least admires, however, Nietzsche adhered to the point of view that man could invent values. It was this same hypothesis which held that man invented his own Gods. This to Jung was a tremendous error.

"Verily," says Nietzsche, "men have given unto themselves all their good and bad...It came not unto them as a voice from heaven." (Z, 56) Jung asserts that Nietzsche does not see that man does not invent his values but that they are invented for him or rather through him. (S1, 651) The whole problem for Jung, starts with the fact that he believes that Nietzsche locates the entirety of individuality within the conscious will, within the ego. Jung bases this assumption on the fact that Nietzsche does not recognise the fact that our values, our symbols, our heroes arise from the contents of the collective unconscious and the archetypes. According to Jung, Nietzsche's big mistake is he equates the ego with the Self.

Here it must immediately be stated that, at least ontologically, Jung's statement is incorrect. Nietzsche does not equate the ego with the Self. The Self is most definitely located in the unconscious. The instinctual power of the body and species activity, both
considered positive and influential forces, are located in the unconscious. However, the capacity to create positive change is delegated by Nietzsche to the conscious mind. Though our unconscious may be dictating our actions it is better we are not aware of it, otherwise rather than acting, we would simply be reacting to the past. While the will to power may proceed from the unconscious it is vital that we do not see ourselves as being led by it. This would rob us of our freedom. It is better that we perceive our actions as being products of the conscious. Thus, I would argue, on a functional level, Nietzsche does wish us to identify world-creating powers with the ego.

Nietzsche was one of the first to acknowledge the irrational, the emotional, the dark and the chaotic as essential parts of the human being. These elements were previously left to artists and deemed unfit for philosophy. Jung asserts that this shift, combined with Nietzsche's attribution of all God-like creative powers and responsibilities to the ego, put a strain on the psyche that no individual is capable of withstanding. Jung usually locates what we experience as God in the Self, a part of the human psyche which lies largely beyond the control of our ego. Jung argues that Nietzsche made the mistake of identifying Zarathustra, his new God, the maker and breaker of the opposites of good and evil, with his ego consciousness, rather than seeing him as proceeding from the powers of the unconscious. While a closer examination of Nietzsche's writings reveals that Zarathustra is not a God but simply a prophet, the Superman's God-like powers are to be affirmed as the capacities of the conscious. Thus I would assert that Jung's argument still stands.

At first glance the philosopher's effort to bring, what Jung would consider the powers of the unconscious, under the power of our conscious will seems rather similar to
the Jungian goal of uniting opposites, and in some ways it is. Jung frequently calls 
Nietzsche a great psychologist (S1, 120, 745-46 S2, 1095) or a great alchemist of the 
psyche. (S2, 949) The trouble is, in making the statement "God is dead," Nietzsche does 
away with the essential link or bridge between the conscious and the unconscious. We 
are left with no symbol to mediate between these two worlds.

THE NECESSITY OF THE MEDIATION OF SYMBOLS

Without hesitation we may call Nietzsche the ultimate iconoclast. He smashes all 
tables of values calling them illusory prisons, but at the same time he embraces all the 
spiritual vitality which symbols and mythologies embody. Jung would assert that 
Nietzsche in effect seeks an unmediated encounter with the abyss, the unconscious. He 
called up into the philosophical arena the demonic forces of pain, passion and suffering 
and expected to be able to tame them with the force of the conscious will. Jung also 
asserts that Nietzsche is ultimately not able to acknowledge his shadow, his inferior 
aspects. He cannot really admit that there will always be things beyond the control of the 
individual and aspects of the psyche beyond ego control. And, as Jung explains, the 
contents of the collective unconscious had previously been the domain of religion rather 
than philosophy for a very good reason. The rational analytic method lacked the means 
to deal with them.

Jung would assert that Nietzsche eventually took up the mode of epic narrative 
because the discursive mode was an inadequate means of speaking about the archetypal 
forces he wished to tackle. (S1, 103) Nietzsche in effect tried to create a new mythology, 
a new God, a new symbol, the Superman. Unfortunately, as Jung explains, in as much as 
he was a figure Nietzsche invented, the Superman is not a symbol. A symbol or
archetype simply happens to one. "A God is never invented, it is always an occurrence, a psychological experience..."(S2, 916) This is why I maintain that the Jungian God (the Self), however metaphysically immanent, is functionally and experientially transcendent. In Jungian psychology the Self functions, or is experienced, as what has been described in the past as the divine. A human being cannot make the statement "I am God." Neither the individual nor humanity as a whole can entirely know the Self. The potency of the Self will always transcend individuation. A human being cannot take the entire power of the Self upon their conscious ego; they will get burned up.

**JUNGIAN METAPHYSICS**

In order to explain where Jung believed Nietzsche went wrong, we must first examine Jungian metaphysics. According to Jung, the Self is the victory of Divine life in the turmoil of space and time.(S2, 979) The Self is more man and more manifest than a transcendent Divinity would be.(S2, 978) It is the thinker of our thoughts and the doer of our deeds. Whenever you suffer or enjoy the victory of being yourself you succeed in giving wider space to the Self.(S2, 979) The Self is something that wants to live and unfold and exist, just as a snake wants to be snakey. This law of the Self runs parallel to Nietzsche's will to power; the need of the individual to follow the dictates of his heart. Nietzsche often even describes the Self, with a capital "S", as being that which must be acknowledged. So according to Jung, this truly becoming yourself, this following the will to power and becoming a Superman is really an expression of Divinity.
Following Jacob Boehme’s lead, Jung states that creation occurred because the blind creator needed a seeing consciousness. Creation ultimately culminates in man as God’s seeing consciousness. The collective unconscious existed prior to any conscious function in man. Man is not just man. Self is not just self, it is the carrier of the unconscious urge of a Divinity to become conscious. This is the activity of the immense substratum which lies below the level of the ego.

NIETZSCHE TAKES ON THE ROLE OF THE CREATOR GOD

Jung argues that Nietzsche takes upon his ego the role of the creator God. And as Jung explains, only people with inflation assume that they can create. “You don’t create, you are created. Something makes you do it; something is working through you. You are most tremendously instrumental.”

Value, says Nietzsche, is creating,

Through valuation (the leading principle of the will to power) only is there value and without valuation the nut of existence would be hollow. Hear it ye creating ones! Change of values – that is the change of ye creating ones. Always doth he destroy who hath been a creator.

Here, Jung asserts, Nietzsche’s process of thought turns into an enantiodromia. The enantiodromia is defined by Jung as the emergence of the unconscious opposite in chronological sequence. “It expresses renewal and self destruction, the death of a god and the birth of a god...The end is a beginning: what has come to an end is reborn in the moment when it ceases to be.” When we go a bit deeper we realise that bound up with the instinct of creation is the destruction of something. Creation in its own
essence is also destructive. The Hindu God Shiva, the one who dances the world into existence, is also the destroyer. Getting caught up in the creative impulse, identifying with it, will destroy you or at least the consciousness you had prior to the event of the destruction and creation.

The interesting thing is, Nietzsche knew this. It is the prerogative of the truly free individual to sentence themselves to death, in order that they may truly live. Nietzsche's philosophy allowed for any sort of life threatening danger and anarchy, providing it aided one along the path toward vitality.

NIETZSCHE'S SELF DESTRUCTIVE TENDENCIES

Jung explains this self-destructive aspect of Nietzsche's philosophy as being a result of the fact that Nietzsche identifies the Self with the ego and the body. If we restrict the life of the Self to the experience of the ego, naturally it will tire of its imprisonment and develop a suicide wish. Our ego will is not the same as our Self will; our Self will does not want what the ego wants. Why has the Self created a body? We must assume that the Self really meant us to live in the body, to live the experiment of our corporeal lives. But what sort of experiment does the Self want to make? Nobody, says Jung, can say what the individual experiment is; for one it is this and for another that.(S1, 403)

Now if this experiment is denied, the Self gets fed up and says, "Well if that experiment is not worthwhile, I prefer to disappear." Then one will find that he or she is a mere husk of his or herself because the real life has gone. As Jung sees it, Nietzsche
has mistaken the wish of the frustrated imprisoned soul with the soul's true wish. (S1, 405)

The other answer to the self-destructive impulse relates to the nature of life, the nature of experience which is carried out through death. The experiment is meant to come to an end, otherwise it is no experiment but rather a static condition. Life is defined by the fact that we will one day die. The experiment must come to a conclusion at some point. That you look for an end, and do not resist the end, that you live with the certainty of the end, is obviously how the experiment ought to be conducted. This is why it makes sense to say death is the goal. According to Nietzsche you must have enough commitment to life that you are willing to experience death. (S1, 404) "To succumb...so wisheth your Self: And therefore ye have become despisers of the body. And therefore are ye now angry with life and with the earth." (Z, 31)

In fact, states Jung, "it is not meant that the self should perish, but if the self cannot carry through the experiment then it kills the body." (S1, 405) Jung states that the mistake Nietzsche makes is that he identifies the Self with the body, and in doing this, he has no choice but to come to the conclusion that if the body dies, then the Self must desire to perish as well. The body, as Jung explains it, is just one of the experiments in the visibility of the Self and if it doesn't function it will be cast away, and a new experiment is made. (S1, 405)

NIETZSCHE AS A SACRIFICIAL GOD

This line of thought runs parallel with the reality of life as a process of death and rebirth. Things are cast aside when they outlive their usefulness, when they are no longer
able to serve the vitality of the true Self. When a new symbol or new God takes over, the universe is created anew out of the remains of the old God, be it Purusa the primal man of old Indian mythology, or Nietzsche, posing as the God-like Superman.

Jung argues that Nietzsche eventually realised that he was not entirely in control of his own will and that because of this he came to the conclusion that the Superman can only live through the destruction of man as he is. Jung believed that Nietzsche offered himself as a sacrificial lamb, dying that at some golden time in the future, a new era of Supermen might arise. Most likely this argument comes from, among other places, part six of "Old and New Tables" when Zarathustra speaks of himself and his followers as firstlings to be sacrificed. (Z, 194)

MAN BETWEEN OPPOSITES

The third reason for Nietzsche's assumption of the Self's self-destructive nature is illustrated by Zarathustra's encounter with the Rope Dancer. In the first town which Zarathustra visits, and during his first sermon, this archetypal figure steps out and begins his performance. The Rope Dancer represents the part of Nietzsche which steps out into the gulf between man and Superman. Bridging the gap is a most characteristic affair of the Superman. Jung states that it reflects the necessity of keeping the balance between opposites. However, with this image, we see a bridge with no goal. Man seems doomed to exist perennially at a point in tension between these two opposites. As Jung explains it, Nietzsche is referring to a balance between a psychological split which began at the time of the French Revolution. When the Christian God was dethroned values began rattling down and it was recognised that man was both civilised and barbarous. Or as
Nietzsche would say, he had both the Apollonian and the Dionysian within him.

Nietzsche continually seeks a means of overcoming this condition. (S1, 117)

THE WRATH OF THE SHADOW

In the middle of the Rope Dancer's feat of skill, out springs the Buffoon who proceeds to leap over the Rope Dancer and cause him to lose his balance and fall down dead. Jung believes that the Buffoon, the fool, the joker, represents Nietzsche's Shadow, inferior man, that part of himself which he refused to acknowledge, the humanity that the Superman leaves behind.

The fool is often described as a simpleton or a mad man who carries with him insights not available to those who live within prescribed societal structures or normal psychological structures. The king's jester is often allowed to say things that nobody else would dare, but he is also the secret counsellor of the king who gives the best advice. (S1, 163) It is just this advice that Nietzsche refuses to heed. According to Jungian psychology if ignored too long the Shadow will manifest itself, one way or another. The Shadow, Jung explains, is capable of possessing all the powers of a dark God. It says "if you do not accept me, I will kill you." (S1, 125) God, who embodies all the powers of the Self, is very dangerous. "You cannot cheat him; you must fulfil his laws." (S1, 127) Nietzsche, of course, attempts to deny that God exists entirely. And when God is denied, as Jung explains, he appears in the place where no one would expect him, the Shadow. (S1, 128) The Buffoon here embodies God's lightning. Jung's God, the Self, if
not acknowledged in its entirety, including its darker and less attractive elements, will kill
the body, or at least cause the ego to fall apart.

The extreme one-sided demands of the Superman philosophy are evident in the
central position of virtue or the leading principle. Nietzsche asserts that virtue is the
thing which one has in common with no one else; the highest virtue of man, his destiny,
his moira, is that he be himself. Nietzsche preaches an extreme individualism. He
preaches the pursuit of a uniqueness which fosters such an isolation, loneliness and
differentiation that there is not any sort of participation or connection with real life.(S1,
425) The Superman is the intellectual criminal, the voice of one crying in the wilderness,
the mad prophet, the sacrificial hero god, the marginalised shaman to whom compromise
is unknown.

ZARATHUSTRA AND THE IMMEDIACY OF THE SPIRIT

Each chapter in Zarathustra is a stage in a process of initiation. Nietzsche’s
Zarathustra, explains Jung, is one of the first attempts in modern times to come back to
immediate individual initiation. Like many shamans or other spiritual practitioners he
did not seek it, but rather it presented itself unannounced. He was overcome by the
process because the time was ripe, and he was just the kind of man who was open to such
a thing.(S1, 461)

It happened at the height of a period of blooming materialism. Nietzsche realised
that the old traditional forms had become more or less empty. He moved in academic
circles where spiritual life was utterly gone. The spirit gripped him at a moment when it
was completely denied. Jung states that when Nietzsche himself denied the existence of
the spirit in the world around him, it was removed from any of its incarnations. It was let loose within his psyche, his unconscious began to stir and his initiation process began. When one has a vivid experience, explains Jung, one always feels tempted to write it down, give it formal expression. Jung states that Zarathustra is a most passionate confession, from beginning to end. The experience of life itself flows into these chapters. Therefore each chapter is a new stage and image in the process of initiation. (S1, 459)

Jung compares Zarathustra to ancient initiation processes where one is confronted with a certain threat, put into a dark room, and exposed to all sorts of dangers and tests of courage. "Those are the symbolic stages imitating the processes one would presumably go through in an individual initiation." (S1, 461) Nietzsche finds himself confronted with all the devils and temptations of his own nature, all the lowest as well as the highest qualities of man, the depths as well as the heights. (S1, 462)

THE CONFUSION OF NIETZSCHE THE MAN

AND ZARATHUSTRA THE ARCHETYPE

The true prophet, Jung explains, is the man who in his personal life experiences the fate of his people and who also tries to find the remedy in his personal life for the disease of his people. (S1, 496) Nietzsche is on a mission to write Zarathustra in order to compensate for imbalances in society. However, the way in which he tries to compensate is utterly insufficient on account of the fact that he identifies with his prophet. When he says "Thus spake Zarathustra," he often means "Thus spake Nietzsche." (S1, 535) While it might be argued that Zarathustra is simply a protagonist on
a hero's journey, Jung would still state that Zarathustra is simply oozing with archetypal energies; he is a prophet, a hermit and, of course, the legendary Zoroaster.

Also in attempting to become the God-like Superman, Nietzsche was destined to take on heavy God-like responsibilities. While Gods embody the process of the enantiodromia (the conflict of opposites), a human being cannot withstand this sort of tension. Nietzsche becomes a victim of this conflict.

Christ was crucified by his virtues (S1, 447) and according to Jung, Nietzsche believes that we, as human beings, should do the same. As our consciousness develops we begin to name our virtues and eventually these virtues come into conflict. So long as our virtues remain unnamed they remain unconscious forces which lead us to positive spontaneous action. It is only when we begin putting labels on these virtues and making them into abstract ideals that opposition develops. We cannot escape this. We are meant to experience this conflict. We cannot remain in an unconscious primitive state without oppositions. Jung claims that since Nietzsche understood this conflict to be inevitable, he would advise that we should give as many and as accurate names as we know how.

Virtues which are named have a tendency to kill themselves. If you overdo justice it is no longer justice...You can kill each virtue by following up only its own tendency. Compassion that goes beyond common sense one could say is no longer compassion; it simply becomes a vice and it kills itself.(S1, 439)

According to Jungian psychology this violent pluralism works to your own psychological breakdown. In the end you are dissolved, dissociated, disintegrated, extended over the cross and torn asunder.(S1, 448)
Crucifixion, explains Jung, is also dismemberment. In the classical death of a God, like Osiris and Dionysus, through the dismemberment the God distributes himself to all parts of creation. Everywhere is a part of God. This dismemberment is figuratively shown in Christianity in the dividing of Christ's mantle under the Cross. Christ is distributed all over the world in the form of the Host. As a sort of Dionysus, he enters into everybody and defines everybody. This participation in God allows us to attain immortality. This dismemberment and crucifixion symbolises the state of supreme torture through conflicts. (S1, 448) What image could more poetically describe what Nietzsche takes upon himself? He volunteers himself to be spread out on the four corners of the horizon.

This condition of the crucifixion is a symbolic expression of the state of extreme conflict where one simply has to give up, where one no longer knows, where one almost loses his mind. (S1, 449) Out of this condition grows the thing that was really fought for. For Nietzsche it would be the birth of the Superman. Jung would say the birth of the Self. Only through extreme pain do we experience our true Self. (S1, 449) Man is supposed to name his virtues and live them to the utmost until he himself is killed by them. (S1, 451) We should love our virtues knowing that they will eventually mean our own undoing. We must all suffer the consequences of our own actions, die for our cause. Jung did not have a problem with the idea that one needs to be torn apart in order to be reborn or discover her true self. His problem lay in the concept that individual consciousness alone was the source and the means of the reconstruction.

Jung explains that Nietzsche took the entire enantiodromia upon himself, in part because he was a man of his time. In the Renaissance the individual was a microcosm:
They saw the macrocosm of God as the ruling spirit of the universe. Every individual mirrored the whole. Jung states that it was as if the whole cosmos had descended into the individual entity and made him a microcosm. (S1, 670) Renaissance cosmological theories of universal relation held that the world and everything in it were signs which expressed the ideas of God. (CT, 283) Humanity and all the objects in the universe were magically interconnected. Alchemists of the time truly believed that they were affecting themselves and the universe through the manipulation of natural elements. In Nietzsche's time however the microcosm of the individual was considered the origin of the macrocosm. Individual man was in effect the origin of the universe because it was he who gave the universe meaning. (S1, 670)

This belief was the bridge that led to the Superman. Man had made the eternal signs and or a God-man had made them. They never came down from the heavens. As Jung explains, it was with this viewpoint in mind that Nietzsche began to interject the whole of metaphysics into his own personal life, and this time God was not the locus of the creative power, the personal ego was. (S1, 671) This led to, among other things, inflation.

When God was declared dead, the individual was filled with all things in the universe. Nietzsche in effect took on the responsibility for the whole of cosmology, including the process of creation and destruction going on within it.

In Jungian psychological terms, the trouble was that Nietzsche tried to bring the entirety of the contents of the unconscious, collective and personal, up to the conscious level.
As Jung, explains, you cannot lift up something from the unconscious without being just a bit lowered in consciousness. (S1, 477) If you pull up something from the collective unconscious it is of much greater weight than something from the personal unconscious. What Nietzsche pulls up comes from the very bottom, the deepest darkest and most primitive strata. "So put this in your boat and you will be pulled down into the collective unconscious." (S1, 478)

There is a reason why we have a natural fear of becoming conscious of things. Nietzsche's work reveals to us the darkest and most unpleasant characteristics of our own psyches. He states that the concept of justice arises from our desire to inflict pain on the criminal because we are frustrated by the fact that we are not free to commit the same crimes. Such knowledge is not easy to take. Nietzsche forces us to come face to face with the tragedy and pain of reality. In The Birth of Tragedy when the wise Silenus, companion of Dionysus, is caught by King Minos and repeatedly goaded as to what was man's greatest good, he finally very reluctantly replies,

Ephemeral wretch, begotten by accident and toil, why do you force me to tell you what it would be your greatest boon not to hear? What would be best for you is quite beyond your reach: not to have been born, not to be, to be nothing. But second best is to die soon. (BT, 29)

In Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Nietzsche's unconscious is activated and he becomes identical with its contents. He becomes identical with the Self which takes on the quality of an ancient and rather primitive God. This is what is at the bottom of this famous Dionysian experience. (S1, 601) Jung states that Nietzsche, believing himself to be a God, is inflated with megalomania claiming to be 6000 feet above good and evil.
The truth is, however, that he has found his way 6000 feet into the depths of the unconscious. (S1, 482)

When Nietzsche identifies “The Thousand and One Goals” and delineates a thousand and one virtues, he gets washed up in the great turmoil of plurality that is always at the beginning of the peculiar pathology of schizophrenia. If the disassociation of the mind into little units continues eventually the mind will dissolve. The archetype inflates the schizophrenic's mind until it explodes into many bits. Each bit seems like a little "I" which devotes itself to a particular tendency or goal which is never arrived at because of fragmentation. (S1, 640)

**ZARATHUSTRA AS A RELIGIOUS BOOK**

As has been demonstrated, Jung sees many psychological problems with what Nietzsche attempts in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, but Jung also delineates many problems which spill out of psychology and pass into the jurisdiction of metaphysics and theology. Jung repeatedly states that *Zarathustra* is a very religious book. While it begins with the statement that "God is dead," one can see that throughout the work Nietzsche is never able to get rid of God. For God, Jung asserts, is the unknown partner of man. Denied as a metaphysical reality he disappears into the unconscious, unnamed and not visible but there still. This is the cause of the enormous poetic enthusiasm which bursts out of Nietzsche. In former times they would have said that God was speaking through him. (S2, 843)

Religion, Jung says, is the very apt medium with which one may express the unconscious. The moment its systems are suspected, the moment we loose our faith and
our connection with these structures, the unconscious seeks new expression.

Zarathustra is a religious figure and the book is filled with religious problems; even the style it is written in is religious. It is as if the backwash of Christianity were flowing out. Nietzsche seems inundated with material which no longer has a place in the church or in the Christian system of symbols. (S2, 1351)

NIETZSCHE AS A GOOD CHRISTIAN

Jung often states that Nietzsche is in fact a good Christian. (S1, 73) There are many reasons why he makes this seemingly preposterous statement. First of all, in reacting against Christianity and attempting, in effect, to create a new religion, Nietzsche uses many Christian symbols. I would assert that anyone who defines their system in opposition to another system is in debt to the structures and ideas of that system. Satanism for instance is indebted to Catholicism.

The atheist, Jung asserts, posits a God. For God to be dead there had to be a God to begin with. (S1, 73) You cannot deny a thing without giving it a certain existence. As Jung explains, in the East, they have a saying that a man who loves God needs seven rebirths in order to reach Nirvana, but a man who hates God will need only three. This is because a man who hates God will think of him much more. (S1, 72) This explains why Zarathustra is such a moral book.

Jung states that Nietzsche carries Christ's championing of humanity and the individual to its logical extreme. Becoming an individual was seen by many cultures as a sin, the original sin. Separation from collectivity is the original evil. However, at the time of Christ people began to see that the individual could be valued. In Jung's eyes
Nietzsche's extraordinary man isn't really that far from the idea of the son of man or Christ as very God and very man. (S2, 843)

Secondly, Jung claims that Nietzsche's viewpoint is the logical continuation of the Protestant religious proclamation that we no longer need the Pope or the ecclesiastical hierarchy to advise us on what God wants, but may know him and interpret his words on our own. The parson is technically not at a superior level compared with his congregation, he is simply meant to be a teacher, while in Catholicism the ecclesiastical hierarchy held absolute authority. With the Reformation the Vatican's authority was denied and God became open for interpretation. Jung claimed that in his own time there were so many Protestant denominations that God had lost his authority and identity entirely. When everybody preaches his own gospel and as we begin preaching only to ourselves then God becomes the Self. (S2, 908) In the Social Gospel movement when the kingdom of heaven descended to earth there was a belief that we must do good ourselves. We must force ourselves into an ideal rather than letting God's grace take care of things. At this point, everything became dependent on man's own morality, man's own will, and man's own powers.

Thirdly, as explained above, Nietzsche had no option but to find himself affected by the archetypal forces of Christianity. For when dogmatic ideas are discarded they tend to resurface in the psyche. Christianity was overleapt by Nietzsche rather than integrated. If you simply destroy an old value you release its ghost and you may become possessed by it.

In the chapter entitled "Old and New Tables", Zarathustra speaks of himself and his disciples as firstlings to be sacrificed. (Z, 194) Jung argues that when Nietzsche
realised he could not entirely control his own will, he volunteered to be a firstling, a sacrificial lamb that there might be a true Superman in the future. (S2, 1515) Jung would argue that although Nietzsche preaches that one should think of the Self first, putting a twist on the Christian ideal of loving your neighbour as yourself, he doesn’t follow his own advice. He sacrifices himself to the future.

Jung explains that Nietzsche did not entirely leave the spirit-centric philosophy of Christianity behind. The body is eventually transformed through the spirit. Nietzsche’s attempt to conjoin the opposition of matter and the spirit is represented by Zarathustra’s two animal companions; the eagle (spirit) and the snake (chthonic forces). When the eagle flies away with the snake, Nietzsche’s attempt to bring matter up to the spiritual domain is illustrated. He is still working in the world of spirit. He still lives like saint or hermit unable to come to terms with his normal earthly life.

The chapter entitled, "The Great Noontide," portrays the coming of the Superman as both the coming of the vengeful fiery Old Testament God and the inspirational Holy Spirit.

Soon shall they stand before me like dry grass and prairie, and verily, weary of themselves — and panting for fire more than water! Herald shall they one day with flaming tongues...It cometh it is nigh, the great noontide. (Z, 167)

The Old Testament God devours his people with fire whereas the New Testament Holy Ghost descends in the form of fiery tongues to turn the disciples into heralds through the Pentecostal glossolalia.

As Jung explains, in dreams fire represents an outbreak of the unconscious, a critical situation with intolerable effects. (S2, 1378) Nietzsche looks forward to a great
mystical hour, a time of rapture when the Superman will be revealed to the world in a second coming. This day of the great noontide or midday when the sun is at its highest, indicates a time when consciousness is at its fullest. For Nietzsche this meant the consciousness of moral paradox. The Great Noontide also means the destruction of all the chaff, all of those worthless people who are unable to come to the above realisation. (S2, 1381) Here we have “the good old Christian idea of ultimate redemption with all the paraphernalia of the apocalypse.” (S2, 1386)

Here, Jung says, Nietzsche falls down over the imperfection of man (S2, 1382) He, like Christianity, falls down over his refusal to accept the Shadow. The Shadow is indispensable for making a person whole. Nobody is whole without his or her negative qualities. This, of course, is an enormous ethical problem. People often choose the way of the church in order to escape this terrible responsibility. You only gain freedom with the assimilation of the Shadow. The demoniacal power of the Buffoon is due to the fact that the Shadow, if ignored, is activated by the superior power of the push to the integration of the self. The Shadow carries with it all the powers of the dark Gods. (S1, 123) I would assert that it was Christianity's fear of the Shadow which led to the creation of the great horrific power of Satan and the fantastic contents of the Malleus Maleficarum. The demons denied by the church crept about the capitals of Romanesque Cathedrals and depictions of hell grew more and more frightening.

While Nietzsche went to great lengths to encounter the Shadow which is clearly shown in works like The Genealogy of Morals and The Birth of Tragedy as well as Zarathustra, Jung argues that he ultimately could not deal with the lack of control and
the inferiority that the Shadow entails. Nietzsche does not want to integrate the Shadow, and Jung insists that this integration is the best plan of action.

Christianity began as a religion of "inferior humanity," of women, of slaves, of the oppressed. This may be the thing Nietzsche hated Christianity for the most. Nietzsche claims to have a bird's stomach. He claims that he can swallow anything. (S2, 1464) He states that an eagle likes lamb's flesh, indicating that he plans to devour the lamb of Christianity. The eagle represents a spirit hostile to Christianity, to all innocent things and to inferior man. (S2, 1465)

Jung states that though Nietzsche repeatedly criticises the Christian tendency to do unto others and to ignore the self, in the end, having devoured the dead Christian lamb, he finds himself possessed by its ghost. Jung argues that he volunteers himself as a sacrificial lamb for a future age of Supermen and calls on his brethren to do the same. Zarathustra states that though the goal of Superman may be impossible for people of the present, it may be possible for people a few generations along the line. "Not perhaps you yourselves my brethren! But into fathers and forefathers of the Superman could you transform yourself, and let that be your best creating!"(Z, 82) Nietzsche, Jung argues, puts others before himself. He is thrown back into the Christian state of mind. He is the first prophet of the Superman, but he is not the Superman, and Jung argues, he never can be because he realises he is not master of his own will. So he wishes to seek guilt and pain. He takes up the Christian morality which consists of doing unpleasant things and the over heroic attitude of Christ. (S2, 1515) In the final pages of the Seminars Jung criticises Nietzsche's emphasis on a 'children's land' as opposed to a 'fatherland' as well as his insistence that the time of the reliance on the 'grandfather' has passed. (S2, 1542-
44) Jung argues that we cannot cut ourselves off from our past for the sake of our future. Jung also states, if you torture yourself in order to produce something for your children, you give them a picture of a tortured life. When you neglect your own welfare, you leave your children a bad inheritance and a very bad impression of the past. (S2, 1543) Having both grown up preacher’s sons, Jung and Nietzsche might have witnessed this self deprivation in their own fathers. (S2, 1095)

NIETZSCHE AND GERMAN HISTORY

Jung claims that Nietzsche was a prophet of his people, that Nietzsche’s neurosis was not only his, but that of all of Germany and to a lesser extent all of Europe. Jung stated that it was as if the whole world had heard of Nietzsche and read his books and had consciously brought about what was written in them. The reason for this is simply that Nietzsche listened to the underground process of the collective unconscious a few decades before it broke through onto the conscious level. (S2, 1518) The formerly Christian nation of Germany “finds itself possessed by the ghost of Christianity,” which it tried to overleap rather than integrate. The idea that everybody must now be sacrificed is essentially Christian. However, Jung asserts,

We know of no time in history when a pope or bishop would educate his nation as Germany is now being educated. It is much worse than it has ever been. (S2, 1515)

Since the spiritual dimension has been discarded the German people are being told to sacrifice themselves without mercy, without redemption, without explanation. (S2, 1515)

Nietzsche says that we must create our own nobility that self-sacrifice leads to the
transformation into a God. "Many kinds of nobles are needed for a new nobility," says Zarathustra, "That is just divinity, that there are Gods but no God." (Z, 197) Jung argues, that Nietzsche believes that the nobility are transformed into Gods, through the sacrifice of the many. Nobility replaces the populace whose thoughts go back to the grandfather, or past traditions. Jung links this to the Christian idea that wholesale slaughter will result in transformation. (S2, 1524) Nietzsche's philosophy, says Jung, seems to lead to a corrupt socialist oligarchy. Christ's oligarchy was superior because it was spiritually, rather than socially, chosen. (S2, 1525) The power of the Self, versus the ego, made up the new nobility.

According to Jung, National Socialism, the corrupt socialist oligarchy, is an aspect of Christianity realised in the flesh. It has not been appointed by a spiritual power but rather has created itself. The young SS have made themselves into the order of the knights of a new state. There is no God now, but there are now National Socialist Gods. (S2, 1524) The Christian idea of being cooked through pain and fire and torture has infiltrated into man and become very real, but it has happened blindly, and this is exceedingly dangerous. (S2, 1525)

If you want to get rid of a certain Christian tradition, says Jung, one should understand what Christianity really is in order to get to the true value, and "perhaps you may return to the true value of Christianity and if you move farther, don't say that Christianity has been all wrong. It is only that we have had the wrong idea of it." (S2, 1542) To destroy all tradition is a most regrettable mistake. Primal cultures say you cannot leave your ancestral grounds because you lose contact with your spirits. You might get in contact with wrong ancestral souls, wrong influences, or you may simply
become detached and your civilisation becomes strained and unnatural. You suffer from a pronounced disassociation between conscious and unconscious. A symbol cannot be invented. A true hero must return to his ancestors. The ancestors or grandfather's land cannot be neglected in favour of the children's land. "Western man cannot get rid of his history as easily as his short – legged memory." (C, 154)

**WOTAN**

As Jung explains, another difficulty with discarding Christianity, rather than understanding and integrating it, stems from the fact that Christianity came into being to rival certain forces. Without Christianity these forces, the ferocious pagan Gods, are let loose.

In "Old and New Tables" Zarathustra says,

O my brethren, he who is a firstling is ever sacrificed. Now, however, are we firstlings! We all bleed on secret sacrificial alters, we all burn and broil in honour of ancient idols...Our flesh is tender, our skin is only lambs skin – how could we not excite old idol - priests! In ourselves dwelleth he still, the old idol priest who broileth our best for his banquet. Ah, my brethren, how could firstlings fail to be sacrifices. (Z, 194)

Jung argues that the burn and boil of pagan idols was coming to life in the state. (S², 1516) The Christian herd of sheep, now without a shepherd, have become a flock of firstlings to be killed by Wotan and the ancient Gods of war. This was the psychology that Jung felt threatened Europe in his time. When there is no recognised leading principle, the collective unconscious comes up and takes the lead, taking the form
of impersonal powers, a barbarous deity to rule the masses. Old instincts begin to rage again. (S2, 1516)

Jung explains that Christianity marked a new level of consciousness in society. When the Greeks threw away the nature Gods in favour of new Gods with more human characteristics, the Olympians may have appeared to have triumphed over the Titans and forest spirits such as Pan, but in fact they were possessed by the intrigues and conflicts those older gods were having. The saviour religions arose to save the people from the Gods in themselves. Christ came when a wave of superstitions was flooding the ancient world. First century Rome was swarming with sorcerers and amulets. (S2, 1519)

Jung's descriptions of the forces of Wotan make up much of the Seminars. In the course of the meetings form 1933 to 1939 Jung goes from applauding the ancient God's presence in Germany to being horrified by it. In February of 1936, Jung remarks that Germany has the great merit of having formulated a new spirit.

They say that it is old Wotan. They say that they have become pagans. I am grateful to the Germans for their pagan spirit. (S2, 813)

Even at this time Jung was wary of the force of Wotan. He references a Swiss scholar named Martin Ninck who had written a book entitled Wotan and the German Belief in Destiny. In this book evidence was collected to support the fact that Wotan was the personification of the spirit moving behind Hitler. Fascism in Italy was Wotan again. (S2, 814) By 1939 Wotan's dangerous nature ceased to be sublime and became horrific.

Jung explains that Wotan's spirit has a very violent side. It was given the name of the devil by Charlemagne. Thus it is no surprise that when the old pagan God came to
life in the ruling class in Germany, he was really against the church. Jung was alarmed by the paganisation of Christianity in Germany, which he considered nothing more than a nationalisation of God. (S2, 867) Wotan causes natural disasters and wars among human beings but he also, explains Jung, has another side. He is a psychopomp, the one that leads souls to the ghost land. He is the god of revelation. He is very similar to the Thracian Dionysus, the God of orgiastic enthusiasm. He is the romantic character of the sorcerer; he is the God of mysteries. Wotan is like Odin, who only has one eye because he sacrificed the other to the underworld. This is another reason why he is an exceedingly apt symbol for our modern world in which the unconscious has finally come to the foreground forcing us to turn our eyes inward. (S2, 869)

Wotan embodies the wild wisdom of the underworld, not the domesticated knowledge of an organised value system. It is not a wisdom of reflection but a sort of a priori wisdom. It is Dionysian rather than Apollonian. It is not a knowledge which can be possessed by man but rather a knowledge that one is possessed by. It can be found in all nature and all nature is an expression of it. (S2, 873)

**WOTAN AND THE SPIRIT**

Jung explains that the recognition of the archetypal Wotan was about a new understanding of spirit. In the Nineteenth century there was a strong tendency to see the spirit as purely cerebral and intellectual, cut off from the body and the heart. In Greek the term for spirit *pneuma* originally referred to breath or air, but the German term for spirit *geist* does not have the same history. (S2, 809) It referred to a welling up or a dynamic. It unfortunately lost this meaning but the whole of Zaratustra is about spirit
in its old German sense. In Christianity, states Jung, spirit has lost its Pentecostal verve and has become lame and abstract. But in Nietzsche’s book the spirit and body are reconnected in the immediacy of the here and now. (S2, 810)

...remain true to the earth with the powers of thy virtue. Let your spirit and virtue be devoted to the sense of the earth. Therefore ye shall be fighters, therefore ye shall be creators. (Z, 73)

With Nietzsche the earth and the body assume the dignity of spiritual importance. One is not in the here and now when one is living purely in the spirit. (S2, 815)

Nietzsche’s philosophy forces us to remain in the here and now, which is painful. This is one of the key ideas in Nietzsche’s philosophy. Here is Nietzsche’s life of orgiastic suffering, embracing the earth and getting caught up in it.

My impatient love overfloweth in streams down towards sunrise and sunset. Out of silent mountains and storms of affliction rusheth my soul to the sea. (Z, 80)

This, Jung explains, is an exact description of the movement of the spirit. These are fine sentiments for Zarathustra, who as an archetype is an embodiment of the spirit, but for Nietzsche the man, this amounts to inflation. This spirit is not human. (S2, 858)

Wotan’s wisdom is not manmade but a revelation. You do not intuit it you experience it. It is a will which is not identical with your own will. It is the prophetic will of God. Nietzsche had the experience of Zarathustra speaking through him. Nietzsche lived at a time when he could not objectify psychological events, and yet he could not see them as the voice of an independent spirit so he thought he was hearing his own voice.
The spirit, says Jung, is really a tremendous adventure. It is cruel. It is inhuman. It was the thing riding through the forests in Germany. It is by no means compassionate. Nietzsche identified with the spirit instead of realising what a very weak suffering human creature he was. When the spirit took possession of him, he was bound to break. (S2, 863)

Wotan personifies a destructive spirit. It is detached, it has no continuity, it is a wanderer with no obligations, its sole purpose is to arouse life, trouble, strife and misunderstanding. As stated earlier, Wotan is comparable to Dionysus. However, while there was difficulty when the Greeks were confronted with the task of integrating the Dionysian spirit he was eventually given equal rights with Apollo. Wotan is different here. He has no Zeus above him. He is an uncontrolled element which cannot be assimilated. (S2, 898)

Jung asserts that Nietzsche had a definite religious experience. He called this an experience of Dionysus. Jung compares his experience to that of the early Christians. Paul's experience on the road to Damascus was nothing mental. It was an autonomous divine manifestation. Back in the time of Justinius Martyrus, religion and philosophy weren't so different. Philosophy and Religion were a kind of a confession of the experience of the spirit, the geist. (S2, 1129)

It was this spirit which often forced religious reformers and prophets to leave the community. It was this vital spirit which had little to do with the orderly Apollonian societal spirit from which they were isolated. Poor Nietzsche was just trying to be an ordinary citizen when something seized him and drove him out of his previous existence. He became a hermit living in a small pension. "So he himself has an experience at first hand how the spirit can cut into one's life." (S2, 1129)
In *Zarathustra* the spirit leads to the death of an old epoch. As Jung explains, *Zarathustra* is a drama of the ending of an old age and the beginning of a new one. Nietzsche speaks about the spirit both as something which can be controlled and intellectualised, as it was in the Nineteenth century, and as something which is ferocious and Dionysian, blowing apart everything in its path. He both ignores the unconscious dimension of the spirit and embraces it.

**NIETZSCHE AND THE ENANTIODROMIA**

According to Jung whatever Nietzsche says he contradicts, thus, whatever we say about Nietzsche must be contradicted. (S2, 1132) This is because he stands at both an end and a beginning. It is the law of the enantiodromia that something must be destroyed before something else can be created.

Nietzsche unleashes for the new age the powers of the Dionysian, the powers of the unconscious, the immediate, the irrational, the vital. Nietzsche’s philosophy forces us to remain in the here and now. He embraces the life of orgiastic suffering. He embraces the earth and gets caught up in it.

Jung asks the question as to whether it is good or bad to be caught up in the current of life. He states that while those who are not in the current of life, like Buddhist monks, are less offensive it is still better to be in life. (S2, 819) Jung also states that if you think you can be completely good while active in life you are sorely mistaken. (S2, 820) This is an impossible illusion. Here Jung and Nietzsche meet eye to eye. Both advocate a profound joyous involvement in a life rife with the enantiodromia, the conflict of forces. This battle will never be either lost or won. Though Jung’s solution is the
reconciliation and the dissolution of opposites and Nietzsche's solution is to affirm differences, they both agree that their solutions will only be accomplished temporarily.

But how are we to withstand this state of incredible tension?

Nietzsche's short answer would likely be that those who can't stand the state of tension that is life are doomed to be considered inferior folk, where as those who can, may go on to become Supermen.

NIETZSCHE ON AESTHETICS

The more complex answer to this question, given by Nietzsche's, is one that Jung neither agreed with nor entirely understood. That answer is art.

Schopenhauer heavily influenced Nietzsche. Schopenhauer paints a very pessimistic picture of the world, which he in part derives from Buddhist philosophy. Life is suffering. The only thing which will lead to the cessation of suffering is the cessation of desire or of grasping. Schopenhauer understood this solution as the cessation of human will. Nietzsche ultimately both disagreed with what Jung would describe as the Eastern solution to suffering, "the stepping out of life," and disagreed with Schopenhauer's pessimism. While life is painful, it is also joyous. One ought to live it as hard as one can, "cook it in our pots until it is done." Where Nietzsche and Schopenhauer agree is that the suffering of the world may be abated through the transformative powers of art. As one may conclude from the contents of The Birth of Tragedy, art, for Nietzsche, serves a similar function to religion.

Jung believed that Nietzsche's recommendation of aesthetics simply involved a detachment or an abstraction from life. Jung asserts that Nietzsche states the truth
without taking it seriously. He goes about it with a playful aesthetic attitude. (S2, 1255)

Jung believed that for Nietzsche the world is an aesthetic problem, and he heartily disagreed with this. The psychologist states that on the contrary the problem "goes right down under the skin." (S2, 1254) Nietzsche, says Jung, was a great artist, but he was also a philosopher, and we expect a philosopher to think. (S2, 1254)

Jung explains his viewpoint on Nietzsche's aesthetic by comparing the Rope Dancer, in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, to the dancing Gods of Hindu religion like Shiva and Kali. Shiva dances on the dead. It is a dance of both creation and destruction. This dance is an expression of nature in its completeness and it is aesthetic. (S2, 1398) It is aesthetic, says Jung, because Shiva and Kali's dance is really reckless and inconsiderate. It is the expression of the cruelty and indifference of nature. It is the expression of that which destroys with no regret. (S2, 1391)

Jung states that while Nietzsche wrote *Zarathustra* he was in a dream of ecstasy and in this condition he metaphorically created and destroyed the world. He was possessed by a sort of playfulness which does not involve responsibility or an awareness of one's own doing. This is the attitude of unchecked playful intuition. Whenever Nietzsche is dealing with a particularly difficult or painful subject he invents dancing and skates right over the matter as if he is not concerned with it. (S2, 1391)

**NIETZSCHE'S AESTHETIC AND EASTERN PHILOSOPHY**

Jung compares this aesthetic attitude with that of Eastern philosophy. In the chapter entitled "The Dance Song" Nietzsche dances with a group of maidens. Jung asserts that this represents the superficial joyous aspect of life or the aesthetic aspect.
Again this is comparable to Shiva's divine dance of creation. This ring of maidens, says Jung, is a sort of shadowy maya, and in as much as Nietzsche is Divine (identified with Zarathustra), he can remain in such a world, but in as much as he is human, he will descend into the isolation and the singleness of man. He is quite unable to envisage the world as Gods do, as a sort of mirror reflection of themselves. Hindu Gods don't suffer from the reality of the world because they assume that it is their own mirage. The Yogi is naturally always striving to reach a condition in which he can envision the world as his own creation, his imagery or his self reflection, but he can only do that at the expense of the sacrifice of his own human existence. He must transcend humanity in order to attain the vision of God. (S2, 1173) Jung states with a bit of sarcasm that, "If you don't want to live, you can step out of all that nonsense...and the one who understands that it is illusion, maya, can step out of it - provided it is the right time." (S2, 1454)

There seems to be some confusion on Jung's part as to both Nietzsche's ideas and those of Eastern philosophy. I would assert that the state in which the Yogi recognises the world is his own creation, that he is one with the divine and the universe, is not the shadowy maya but rather a state of raised consciousness. Jung's confusion on the subject likely resulted from the fact that for the psychologist, the "ground of being", meant the unconscious and to encounter the unconscious one must be witness to a drop in consciousness rather than a heightening to superconsciousness.

Although Jung greatly admired Eastern philosophy and was greatly influenced by it, the fact that Eastern enlightenment involved the dissolution of the ego and the complete cessation of suffering was a major difficulty for the psychologist.

Jungian scholar J.J. Clarke states,
The ultimate goal of yoga was not merely the integration of the ego, into the higher self, but rather a state of complete absorption (samadhi) in which the ego to all intents and purposes ceases to exist. (C, 146)

Jung, says Clarke, could not imagine a conscious mental state which did not relate to a subject, that is, to an ego. For Jung if there was not an ego, there was nobody to be conscious of anything. (C, 147) Vedanta philosophy does not see the assimilation of the ego by the self as resulting in total mental breakdown, but as facilitating a state of illumination, a state of pure consciousness. In contrast, according to Jung, the unconscious can never become fully luminous, thus, complete self-realisation or the complete cessation of suffering can never be attained. (C, 148)

He taught that the fundamental structure of the psyche involved a polarity between complimentary opposites, and hence conflict was of its very essence... The life of the unconscious goes on and continually produces problematic situations. There is no change which is unconditionally valid over a long period of time... This view is fundamentally at odds with yoga, and also with Buddhism, for both hold out the hope of an ultimate transcendence of the ego and consequently the final conquest of suffering. (C, 148)

However, in the chain of influence from the East to Schopenhauer to Nietzsche there are considerable changes. There are also changes in Nietzsche's philosophy in the time that spans between The Birth of Tragedy and Thus Spoke Zarathustra.

According to Jung, in Zarathustra Nietzsche tries, it seems, to remain within life and yet to be above it like a Yogi. He wants to have his cake and eat it too. Nietzsche has failed to attain a state of mind that would allow him to step out of the world of opposites. He lacks the insights that Eastern philosophy could have taught him.
We spend most of our lives, Jung states, without knowing what we live. Indian philosophers are aware of this fact far more than we are in the West. We praise a life that is just living, but it is not really lived because it has no subject. There is no subject because we only use our intellect or will power to inhibit life. The East is fully aware of our peculiar incapacity for knowing what we are living, and therefore they insist on the realisation of it. Eastern philosophy begins with the questions, who am I? who are you? (S1, 1425) In the East they are well aware of the fact that man's consciousness is always behind the facts. It never keeps up with the flux of life. One only lives completely when one's mind really accompanies one's life and one thinks no further than one is able to live. What is a life or world of which we are not aware? (S1, 1426)

According to Jung, Schopenhauer, who as previously stated was influenced by Buddhist thought, was practically the only one in the West to realise that the world would not exist if we did not believe it existed. (S1, 1426) This is true of the Yogacara tradition in Mahayana Buddhism. However, like Nietzsche, Schopenhauer suggests art, rather than meditation, as a means of getting beyond our illusory man made world. Schopenhauer claims that art has the ability to lift us out of our human will and suffering. It allows us to comprehend things free from their relation to the will and thus to observe them without personal interest, without subjectivity, purely objectively. It lets us give ourselves entirely to things as they are ideas, but not so far as they are motives. Schopenhauer describes this as a state of peace, the painless state, the state of the Gods. For a moment we are free of the will. The wheel of Ixion (the wheel of samsara) stands still. Art can allow us pure contemplation, sinking oneself into perception, losing oneself
in the object, forgetting all individuality, willess knowledge, out of the stream of time and relations.(H & K, 457)

Schopenhauer's will to cease willing is a somewhat skewed interpretation of the Buddhist concept of mindfulness or the Hindu concept of Karma Yoga (action with detachment). Through the practice of mindfulness or heightened awareness, the Buddhist eventually realises that there is no reality but interrelatedness, that the world and the self are empty of inherent existence and any indications to the contrary amount to illusory thought constructs.

In the Hindu epic the Bhagavad Gita the God Krishna advises Arjuna to fulfil his duty as a warrior and to fight his cousins. However, Arjuna must do this without his own desires in mind, giving his actions to Krishna with the love of a devotee. In this way Arjuna could avoid accumulating any bad karma. Buddhism explains that in becoming aware of our own thought processes we can eventually learn to observe a phenomenon without attaching feelings of pleasure or pain to it. We may observe the world without desire. This is perhaps what Jung would describe as the attitude of a God looking at his illusory world and giving up his individuality to rid himself of suffering.

In Thus Spoke Zarathustra Nietzsche, of course, does not recommend that we cease willing as Schopenhauer does, but rather advises that we find the true nature of our will to power and to follow it honestly and fervently. He also does not advise that we sacrifice our individuality. We are to attempt to be Gods within our natural individual human frames. Nietzsche's philosophy in Zarathustra falls into diametrical opposition to the Eastern ideal of getting off the wheel of life. Nietzsche would agree with his one
time friend Wagner's statement "In this world let me have my world, to be damned with it or to be saved." (JC, 192)

Joseph Campbell in his description of the age of chivalry speaks about 'this uniquely Western approach to life.' The troubadours in their songs of courtly love effectively said, "This is my life and I'm willing to take any kind of pain for it." (JC, 192) When Isolde's nurse realises that Isolde and Tristan have drunken the love potion she says, "You have drunk your death," and Tristan says, "If by my death you mean this pain of love, that is my life. If by my death you mean the punishment that we are to suffer if discovered, I accept that." (JC, 190) This is the affirmation of the pain of life in a big way. We should follow our individual bliss regardless of what happens. (JC, 190) This affirmation of the pain of life lies at a central point of what Campbell calls the beginning of Europe.

The troubadour's quest - their focus specifically on romantic love not withstanding - is what I would consider to be Nietzsche's "life of the artist" - to follow one's individual bliss at the expense of anarchy, the church's threats of hell fire, pain and even death, to act according to one's Self will versus reacting to societal laws and moral codes. The artist acts according to his own will and joy rather than playing it safe and reacting to a preordained set of societal values. The artist lives his or her life as an act of creation, not as a reaction to a prescribed template.

As becomes evident in both the Seminars and the Collected Works, Jung does not approve of the Eastern goal of stepping out of life. He would agree with Nietzsche that life is worth the pain and he does not seem to have enough experience with altered states of consciousness to appreciate the mystical goal of leaving the ego behind. It runs
contrary to his own goal of individuation. Jung’s final conclusion does not lift us out of
the tension of opposites. In Memories, Dreams and Reflections Jung states,

> The Indian’s goal is not moral perfection, but the condition of nirdvanda
(beyond pairs). He wishes to free himself from nature; in keeping with this
aim he seeks in meditation the condition of imagelessness and emptiness.
I, on the other hand, wish to persist in a lively contemplation of nature and
of the psychic images. I want to be neither freed from human beings, nor
from myself, nor from nature; for all these appear to me the greatest
miracles. Nature, the psyche, and life appear to be like divinity unfolded –
what more could I wish for? To me the supreme meaning of Being can
consist only in the fact that it is, not that it is not or is no longer. (MDR,
306)(C, 148)

Many branches of Eastern philosophy would deny the charge that they advocate stepping
out of life. The philosopher Nagarjuna states that samsara (the wheel of life) and nirvana
are two sides of the same coin. What changes is a shift in perception, which allows us to
cease clinging to things, which allows us to no longer be ruled by conflict. On the road
to enlightenment those named virtues which cause the conflict of opposites are
effectively unnamed. However, when we read about how the enlightened Buddha’s
followers did not cry when their leader died, we can only conclude that something of the
world has been left behind, something that the passion loving Nietzsche, and I believe
Jung too, would refuse to forfeit.

**CONCLUSIONS**

I would surmise that Nietzsche’s teaching ultimately advises us to become Gods,
in that we ought to become the inventors of our own values, leaving behind all state and
religious constructs of good and evil. We must realise our own will to power, our own
driving virtue and give ourselves to it completely and without compromise. Nietzsche
wants us to live in the world, to live in the body, experiencing the true nature of the world in all its orgiastic chaos and pain. We must ourselves bring existential meaning to our lives. Jung argues that Nietzsche wants us to become masters of our own will. However, he also argues that Nietzsche eventually realised that he was not a master of his own will himself. (S2, 1243) Jung states that Nietzsche thus commits himself to die so that the Superman, who is entirely in control of his own will, may live in future generations. (S2, 1508) This is why Jung asserts that Nietzsche is not really an individualist as he ultimately gives up his own fulfilment for the people of the future. (S2, 1543-44)

Jung argues that there are several reasons why Nietzsche did not succeed in his philosophy. He does not accept his Shadow: inferior man. He ultimately refuses to confront his own unconscious. In the process of his misadventures when he does journey into the underworld, instead of revealing what he truly sees, he simply "dances" over the situation with what Jung considers to be shallow intellectual posturing.

Nietzsche stands astride two worlds. He both proclaims the advent of a new realisation of the *geist* or spirit as a gushing uncontrollable force of nature and yet treats the spirit as if it were merely a rational intellectual process which was restricted to the ego. Nietzsche advises a return to the body but he then, in a manner similar to the apostle Paul, attempts to spiritualise this body. The eagle (the spirit) flies high with the snake (the natural). The body is uprooted from the earth, snake and all.

Last, but certainly not least, Jung argues that Nietzsche in saying "God is dead" does away with the guiding symbols and the contents of the collective and personal unconscious. He believes he can overtake the inferior man rather than integrating him.
He believes he can leave behind the grandfather, the heritage of archetypes that he as a German carries with him. When these spiritual forces are pushed into the unconscious they will manifest themselves psychologically, possessing whoever attempts to ignore them.

Nietzsche wishes to possess the forces of the unconscious or, the Self, by bringing them up and restricting them to the ego. According to Jungian psychology this could only cause inflation. There is nothing healthy about identifying with the forces of the Divine. Nietzsche falls victim to the enantiodromia; the death and rebirth of the old and new Gods. He falls victim to the conflict of opposites or identifies with one of them (the spirit) at the expense of the other (the body). Jung advises us to acknowledge the conflict of opposites within ourselves. Partaking in the energy of the unconscious and the Self is something which is absolutely essential to our lives. However, this is not something which can be done in an unmediated manner. We need symbols. We need a ruling archetype or "God." We need a system of symbols or a religion. That humanity is intrinsically religious, for Jung, is a fact which cannot be denied. God is a psychological fact.

Jung does not see any possibility of the total resolution of opposites, so long as we inhabit the world, but we are driven to this goal nonetheless. Good and evil, as in William Blake's Marriage of Heaven and Hell, exist side by side. Jung agrees with Nietzsche that God loves with both great love and great contempt. (S2, 1368) Though they are ultimately the same, we cannot witness their dissolution and synthesis into one thing unless by some mystical feat we step out of ordinary consciousness if even for a moment.
When Nietzsche dissolves into the mind of God, says Jung, he is no longer human, but that this is the goal of certain religious practices.

Jung states that Nietzsche's advice, "love with great love...love with great contempt," is a formula for the assimilation of the Shadow. You have to both love and feel contempt for inferior man. We as human beings must do both separately. Only God can love with great contempt or hate. When you try to create the idea of universal being, you must bring the two things into one and you cannot do this, unless you do it in yourself. (S2, 1368) Only by passing through a time when you no longer project good and evil, when you no longer believe that good is something in the sky and evil in the earth, can you conjoin love and hate. You must interject these. This means you become temporarily inflated in order that you may become a laboratory of alchemy. (S2, 1369)

However, states Jung, you are not the centre of the world. You are not the Messiah. You must come back down to your own reality, where you are the suffering man, the man with the wound as incurable as ever. (S2, 1369) This is the wound which Zoroaster inflicted when he distinguished good and evil, this is the wound which was inflicted at the Fall when Adam and Eve ate of the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil. This is the wound that was cut at the beginning of creation as there can be no creation without opposites.

Jung asserts that Christ, in a certain way, is a mediator of opposites. He mediates between the Iranian figures Ormazd (Primal Man) and Ahriman (the Devil). Christ is God descended into the imperfect body of man. He is very God and very man. We can see Christ as a Superman, the man that is a paradox, God as both father and man. Christ
is not a human thought invented by a philosopher or a simple personal experience. He is a Divine experience. (S2, 1370)

The reality of Jesus is not something that has happened in the remote past but an eternal truth in a metaphysical sense. The alchemical transformation of all elements in the substance of the Holy Communion which we ingest is the sacrifice of Christ. (S2, 1371)

In this interpretation, Christ is neither a transcendent Divinity nor only good. This ideal Christ both embodies the Devil and the Primal Man and makes a bridge between man and God. (S2, 1370) By no stretch of the imagination can Christ be seen as a being who is above human suffering. He is not the Buddha who has left all attachments and conflicts behind. I believe that Jung admires the ideal Christ more than that of the enlightened Yogi. He cannot entirely swallow the Eastern ideal of stepping off the wheel of life. In this respect, Jung like Nietzsche, might perhaps be considered a good Christian. Jung wrote that,

Complete redemption from the sufferings of this world must remain an illusion. In the end we can only deal with suffering by facing it and living through it. Thus in spite of his claim that Buddha was a more complete human being than Christ, on the question of suffering he clung to his Christian heritage. (C, 148)

CHAPTER II
THE COLLECTED WORKS

THE UNIQUE CHARACTER OF THE COLLECTED WORKS

The differences that distinguish the Seminars and the Collected Works, on the subject of Frederick Nietzsche, occur for the most part because of variations in the context in which Nietzsche is discussed versus any explicit differences in Jung's outlook. There are some issues which are developed more extensively in the Collected Works than in the Seminars and vice-versa. The few essential changes in Jung's views are due to the passing of time. Jung's opinions on the Dionysian forces at work in Germany understandably change considerably before and after World War II.

The Collected Works assert a similar ambivalent attitude towards Nietzsche and his encounter with the unconscious mind to that found in the Seminars. Nietzsche is still described as a prophet-genius, a great artist (CW6, 322: 190) and also a victim of pathology. (CW1, 184: 105) However, while in the Seminars the main focus is on the significance of what Nietzsche wrote and why he wrote it, in the Collected Works Jung seems more interested in Nietzsche, the man, and a less interested in what he wrote. He describes Nietzsche as both a creative and pathological type. Jung's case in the Collected Works is couched in a more rigorous and systematic brand of psychology than we find in the Seminars. In the Collected Works we tend to see Nietzsche as a piece of evidence in a system of thought. For example, he is introduced as a prime case of the intuitive among Jung's four personality types. (CW6, 240: 145)
We see Nietzsche as one figure in the line of historical thought, which evolved the recognition of the intuitive and the unconscious as influential factors in the human makeup.

We see Nietzsche as the author of many works aside from Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Because of the attention given to The Birth of Tragedy in the Collected Works, the dichotomy of the Apollonian and the Dionysian (which became so important in modern thought on aesthetics, psychology and religion), is discussed at greater length in than in the Seminars. Thus Nietzsche’s statements on the salutary powers of aesthetics, and Jung's disagreements with this, are predictably more explicitly discussed. This is problematic in that the Nietzsche who wrote The Birth of Tragedy had different ideas than the Nietzsche who wrote Zarathustra. Jung unfortunately, in both the Seminars and the Collected Works, seems to be conflate the two distinct outlooks into one.

NIETZSCHE AS A CASE STUDY IN POETIC GENIUS

In Collected Works Volume 1 in the section devoted to "So Called Occult Phenomenon and Heightened Unconscious Performance," Jung speaks about Nietzsche and cryptonesia. Cryptonesia takes place when a memory enters consciousness without the mediation of the senses. It is the unconscious reproduction of a forgotten text almost word for word via a minimum of associations. (CW1, 139:81) With the evidence collected during conversations with Elizabeth Forester Nietzsche (one of the philosopher’s sisters) Jung determined that the chapter in Thus Spake Zarathustra,
which describes the prophet's descent into hell through the mouth of a volcano, was a transcription of a fictional ship's log written by Kerner. Nietzsche had taken a lively interest in Kerner between the ages of twelve and fifteen. Obviously, states Jung, it would not have been his intention to plagiarise the ship's log, especially pointless details like rabbit hunting. While painting a picture of Zarathustra's decent into hell, forgotten impressions from Nietzsche's youth must have stepped wholly unconsciously into his mind. (CW1, 141:83)

Jung uses this incidence of cryptonesia to prove that while writing *Zarathustra* Nietzsche was in an abnormal state. Jung provides us with a quote, also used in the *Seminars*, that we may read about Nietzsche's psychological state in the philosopher's own words,

There is an ecstasy so great that a tremendous strain is eased by a storm of tears. Where your steps involuntarily rush ahead...a feeling of being completely beside yourself with the most distinct consciousness of innumerable delicate thrills. A depth of happiness in which pain and gloom do not act as its antithesis but as its condition. (EH, 3)

These shattering extremes of feeling, states Jung, transcend Nietzsche's personal consciousness. Here the conscious only plays the role of slave to the daemon of the unconscious which tyrannizes it and inundates it with alien ideas. (CW1, 184:105)

Jung states that no one has described the state of being under an automatic complex better than Nietzsche himself in *Ecce Homo*. Here Nietzsche describes what the poets "of a stronger age," meant by the word inspiration; namely that it was a revelation.
It was something which profoundly convulses and shatters one. One hears when one does not seek. "I never had any choice in the matter," Nietzsche said. (EH, 102) (CW1, 184:105)

At first it seems that Jung will describe Nietzsche's case as solely pathological. While explaining cryptonesia, Jung states that when the brain begins to die and consciousness disintegrates, and as well in the case of insanity, automatically and without co-ordination, fragmentary memories may be reproduced together in a "mass of morbid rubbish". Jung, however, goes on to state that a work of genius is something different. It fetches up fragments and builds them into a meaningful structure. (CW1, 184:105)

As we can see from his descriptions of Nietzsche the line Jung draws between genius and psychotic is not hard and fast. It is always Jung's goal to discover the meaning in the madness. Jung states, that from an objective standpoint something may be seen as an infantile fantasy, so far as the objective is equated with the scientific and the causal. But from outside this, subjective creation spells redemption. Jung reinforces this point with a quote from Zarathustra, "Creation, that is the great redemption from suffering; that is the ease of living." (Z, 83)

**NIETZSCHE AS THE PROPHET OF THE AGE**

Nietzsche's creation, in Jung's eyes, is not simply meaningful in that it can tell us about his own psyche; it is more than that. It goes well beyond being merely subjective. While the poet of modest means at the pinnacle of his work does not transcend his personal joys, sorrows and aspirations, Nietzsche's work far transcends his personal
destiny. (CW6, 322:190) In Zarathustra the contents of the collective unconscious are brought to light.

What the creative mind brings up out of the collective unconscious actually exists and sooner or later will make its appearance in collective consciousness. As Jung describes the situation, the features we see in Nietzsche such as anarchism and absolute hostility to culture are the phenomena of mass psychology which were long ago described by poets and creative thinkers. The poets may have proclaimed it aloud or fashioned it in a symbol in which they took aesthetic pleasure without any consciousness of its true meaning. (CW6, 322:191) Jung goes on to state that,

The more deeply the vision of the creative mind penetrates, the stronger it becomes to mankind in the mass, and the greater is the resistance to the man who in a way stands out from the mass. The imperfectly understood, yet deeply significant content of the work of a master poet, usually has something morbid about it. The fame of these creators is posthumous. (CW6, 323:192)

THE ALCHEMIST AS CREATOR

In Collected Works 13, which deals with alchemical studies, Jung states that the greater the tension within an individual, the greater the potential. In regards to his description of the alchemist Paracelsus, Jung states that it was the constellation of the most powerful opposites within him to which he owed his almost ‘deemonic’ energy. This energy was not an unalloyed gift from God but went hand in hand with his impetuous and quarrelsome temperament, his hastiness and his arrogance. It is not for nothing that Paracelsus is considered the prototype of Faust, whom Jacob Burckhardt once called a great primordial image in the soul of every German. From Faust the time
line leads directly to Nietzsche "who was a Faustian man if there every was one." (CW13, 154:118)

Though Jung appreciated alchemy as a means of individuation, he also saw problems with it. With alchemy, Jung states, we see the beginning of a progression of Promethean human arrogance which is completed by Nietzsche. For the alchemist, the salvation or transfiguration of the universe is brought about by the mind of man. Man takes the place of the creator. This, as Jung eventually explains, is not without great dangers. (CW13, 154:118) When a human being takes the place of the creator he or she risks becoming inflated. Once again it is essential that the subject recognise that creation does not proceed from the ego but from the Self.

In Thus Spoke Zarathustra Nietzsche describes the Superman as an image that slumbers for me in stone. (Z, 84) With this statement he reverses the alchemical search for the spirit in matter. In antiquity the material world was filled with the projection of a psychic secret, which from then on appeared as the secret of matter and remained so until the decay of alchemy in the Eighteenth Century. (CW12, 406:296) Nietzsche wanted to pull the spirit from the stone while alchemist wanted the stone itself. The old alchemists wanted to transform matter and in transforming matter, transform themselves.

Since the Enlightenment the psyche has become synonymous with consciousness or the ego. The psyche has become synonymous with "what I know." Gone are the days when the psyche was still for the most part outside of the body and imagined in the greater things that the body could not grasp such as the gods and spirits. These have all now become ego possessions. All this amounts to what Jung would call inflation or
possession by the archetypes. The inflated consciousness is egocentric and is conscious of nothing but its own existence. And with the inflation of Nietzsche by Zarathustra the most horrific catastrophe occurs. Another deluge is let loose by the gods on a humanity wrought with Promethian hubris. (CW12, 562:480)

Paradoxically inflation also amounts to the regression of consciousness into unconsciousness. This happens because the ego conscious tries to take on the responsibility for all the forces of the unconscious, proceeding to lose its faculty of discrimination between the conscious and unconscious. (CW12, 563:481)

In *Collected Works* 7, in the chapter devoted to "The Psychology of the Unconscious", Jung states that a patient must learn to differentiate between ego and non-ego, i.e. the ego and the collective psyche. Taking Freud's lead, Jung states that man should be firmly rooted in the ego function in order that he may fulfil his duty in life, so as to be in every respect an available member of the community. All that he neglects, however, will fall into the unconscious and reinforce its position. The stronger its position becomes the more he is in danger of being swallowed up by it. (CW6, 113:72)

Jung explains that in World War II nobody realised that European Man was possessed by something that robbed him of all his free will. This state of unconscious possession was to continue until Europeans once again had a healthy fear of "God" i.e. the Self. They needed to realise that there are powers that do not belong to the conscious psyche. What we may learn from the models of the past is above all this - that the psyche harbours contents or is exposed to influences, the assimilation of which, is attended by the greatest danger. The old alchemist saw the power of the Self as embodied by nature.
Jung states that neither Faust nor Nietzsche present a very encouraging example of what happens when we attempt to embody this secret within ourselves. (CW12, 564:481) In other words neither Faust nor Nietzsche present a very encouraging example of what happens when we attempt to pull the powers of the Self from the stone, and attribute them to ego consciousness. If nature is no longer acting as a mediator for the powers of the psyche, some replacement must be found.

A man must certainly be mad, states Jung, to suppose that he is the master of his own world and the psyche. (CW7, 395:236) Goethe (who first coined the term Superman) and Nietzsche tried to solve their problems through the idea of human mastery. Nietzsche’s master man (Superman) and supreme sage (Zarathustra) know neither God nor the devil. In Nietzsche’s philosophy man stands alone as the philosopher himself did, financially dependent, Godless and wordless. As Jung explains, nothing can argue the world out of existence, just as nothing can argue the effects of the unconscious out of existence. (CW7, 397:237)

NIETZSCHE AS A SACRIFICIAL GOD

In the Collected Works, as in the Seminars, Jung claims that in identifying his ego with the forces of the unconscious and in claiming the powers of God, Nietzsche becomes the victim of the enantiodromia. Old Gods are dismembered in order that a new creation may come into being. Old Gods are ripped apart by the conflict of opposites. Old Gods sacrifice themselves that new worlds and new Gods can be born.

The creation of individual consciousness and the creation of the world, are not
linked only by Nietzsche. Jung quotes the Rg Veda as an example of a philosophy which sees the creation of the world as the product of the development of individual consciousness.

From there arose in the beginning of love,
Which is the germ and the seed of knowledge.
The wise found the root of being in not being
By investigating the impulses of the human heart. (CW5 590:381)

Schopenhauer, says Jung, tried in exactly the same manner to abolish through negation the cardinal error of the Primal Will, the creation of the world. Goethe states, "Is not the core of nature in the heart of man?" (CW5, 591:382) However, if there is too much of this libininal force it is also destructive. The hero who sets himself the task of renewing the world and conquering death personifies world creating power, but this world creating power is like a snake broadening in on itself in introversion, coiled round its own egg, threatening life with its poisonous bite, so that the living may die and be reborn again from the darkness. (CW5, 592:382) What Jung means is by necessity creation carries with it the seeds of destruction. As circumstances change a new creation and revelation become necessary. Neither the individual nor the universe can exist as a static construct or they will become poison prisons. For this reason God must die and be reborn at regular intervals.

In Nietzsche's poem "the Glory and the Eternity" we find that the hero himself is
a snake, the sacrificer and the sacrificed. *(CWS, 592:382)* From Nietzsche's *Human all too Human* we learn that the mind, in which the ideal of the free spirit can grow to perfection, has had its decisive crisis in some great act of emancipation and that before this it was a spirit bound. *(CWS, 471: 311)* Of such evil and painful things, says Jung, is the history of the great emancipation composed. It is like a disease that can easily destroy man, this first eruption of strength and will to self-determination. Jung believes that Nietzsche recognises the danger of coiling off into oneself like a snake in a similar manner that Jung recognises being cut off from the Great Mother, the unconscious.

The libido that is withdrawn so unwillingly from the "mother" turns into a threatening serpent symbolising the fear of death for the relation to the mother must cease, must die and this is almost the same as dying oneself. *(CWS, 473:312)*

I believe a connection can be made here with the serpent in the story of the Garden of Eden. Until Adam and Eve meet the serpent they live in a state of natural innocence. They have yet to have made their first decision based on the conjecture of their individual egos and will. They still live by the natural order present in nature. They live in an unconscious state, they have yet to have separated from the Great Mother. They break away from the Mother when the serpent advises them to eat of the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil. They make their first moral decision as individuals and as a result sentence themselves to eventual death.

According to Nietzsche the will to individual power is worth the risk of death, worth being cut off from the protection of societal constraints. Jung would state that
individuation would indeed warrant the risk of a psychological death and rebirth, but he would also state that we can never cut ourselves off from the Great Mother of the collective unconscious. To successfully undergo the process of death and rebirth, we must remain in dialogue with collective traditions. Jung was concerned with what he saw as Nietzsche's effort to employ the powers of the unconscious for the purposes of the individual, without the help of cultural and religious landmarks.

The self-sacrifice caused by the force of the libido may not be purely selfish. As in Christ's case it may be a more explicit world creating act, a sacrifice for the sake of humanity. Zarathustra, like Odin, sacrifices himself to himself but also to a new age. (CW5, 445-446:290) So long as the symbolism thrown up by Nietzsche's suffering is archetypal and collective, it can be taken as a sign that he is no longer suffering for and from himself but for and from the spirit of the age. (CW5, 447:292)

NIETZSCHE AND GERMANY

The Collected Works, like the Seminars, speak much of Nietzsche's involvement in the spirit of the age. However, they also contain several essays devoted specifically to the changing spirit in history and as such there are more concrete references to historical events and figures who felt the effects of these events. Dionysus, the pagan God Wotan, and the German neurosis which caused World War II, are all found to be bound up together. The extensive commentary found in the Seminars on the effects of the suppressed contents of Christianity is, however, not present in the Collected Works. The reason for this could be that Thus
Spoke Zarathustra is not examined in as much detail in the Collected Works. Or, as the essay "After the Catastrophe" was written long after the Seminars ceased to meet, the case might be that Jung had now drawn different conclusions. Instead of statements referring to the ghost of Christianity, the Collected Works contain references to what happens when we forfeit the protection of Christianity.

Jung attributes Nietzsche's breakdown in part to the dangers that lurk beyond Christianity. Nietzsche felt the denial of animal nature very deeply and therefore sought a higher human wholeness beyond good and evil. However, in doing this he forfeited Christianity's protection and delivered himself unresisting to the animal psyche. (CW7, 40: 32)

In Collected Works 10 in "An Essay on Contemporary Events" (1936) Jung wrote that after the war (WWI) came a "variable witches Sabbath." As Jung explains it, everywhere there were fantastic revolutions, violent alterations on the map and reversions in politics to medieval or even antique prototypes. Everywhere totalitarian states engulfed their neighbours and outdid all previous theocracies in their absolutist claims, Christians and Jews were persecuted and wholesale political murder was being committed. (CW10, 371:179)

The ancient God of storm and frenzy (Wotan) awoke in a civilised country that was long supposed to have grown out of the middle ages. He came to life in the German Youth movement and the blood of sheep was shed in honour of his resurrection. The God Wotan was a restless wanderer who created unrest, stirred up strife and worked magic. He was once the God of wandering youth but by 1933, under Hitler, the youth
wandered no more but marched in the hundreds of thousands. (CW10, 373:180) In 1936 Jung found the events in Germany, such as the terror of National Socialism and the German Youth Movement’s sacrifice of sheep at solstice, to be caused by a manifestation of Wotan in the nation’s psyche.

The German youths who sacrificed sheep were not the first to hear Wotan, however. As Jung explains, they were anticipated by Nietzsche, Schiller, Stephan George and Ludwig Klages. Jung states that literary tradition in the Rhineland had long been marked with a classical stamp. In Nineteenth Century German literature we meet up with puer aeternus, cosmogonic eros and Dionysus. (CW10, 375:181)

Ever since Nietzsche, there has been a consistent emphasis on the Dionysian aspect of life in contrast to its Apollonian opposite. Since The Birth of Tragedy the dark earthly feminine side has possessed the imagination of philosophers and poets. Irrationality gradually came to be regarded as ideal. (CW10, 375nt:181)

Stephan George combined elements of classical civilization, medieval Christianity and Oriental mysticism to make an attack on Twentieth Century Rationalism. Klages saw logos and consciousness as destroyers of preconsciously. (CW10, 375nt:181)

Though, as Jung claims, Nietzsche had no knowledge of Germanic literature, his announcement that "God is Dead," lead to Zarathustra's meeting with the same unknown God who manifested in the works of other Nineteenth Century German minds. (CW10, 376:182) What Nietzsche encountered in the collective unconscious realm in the Nineteenth Century, was manifested in the collective conscious of the Twentieth. Wotan
disappeared when his oaks fell. He was designated as the devil by Christianity and lived on in local tradition as a ghostly hunter. (CW10, 374:181) However, when the Christian God proved to be ineffective in consoling the Germans during the humiliating period after WWI, Wotan stepped into the forefront again. (CW10, 384:184)

Jung states again in the Collected Works, as he stated so emphatically in the Seminars, that as Gods are psychic forces they can never be invented. Man's early intuitions personified the psyche's autonomous powers as Gods. This could be done readily on account of the firmly established primordial types or images, which are innate in the unconscious of many races. Because the behaviour of a race takes on a specific character from these underlying images, we can speak of archetypes such as "Wotan" of the Germans. (CW10, 391:187) Archetypes are like river beds which dry up when the water deserts them, but which the water can find again at any time. The archetypes begin to function in the lives of individuals when they are confronted with situations that cannot be dealt with in familiar ways. (CW10, 395:189)

"One man (Hitler)," says Jung, "who is obviously possessed by the spirit of Wotan, has infected the whole nation." (CW10, 388:185) Jung goes on to explain however that Wotan cannot be blamed entirely on Hitler as the storm God is fundamental to the German psyche. (CW10, 389:186)

Jung calls Germany a land of spiritual catastrophes where nature never makes more than a pretence of world ruling reason, where the elemental Dionysus breaks into the Apollonian order. But Germans also have the opportunity, perhaps unique in history, to look into their own hearts and to learn of the perils of the soul from which Christianity
tried to rescue mankind. (CW10, 391:187)

Intelligent people should have seen that even the God of the German Faith
movement, which claimed to be Christian, was Wotan and not a Christian God. (CW10,
398:191) The German God Wotan, Jung explains, represents a very primitive kind of
psychology in which man's will is almost identical with the God's and entirely at the
God's mercy. (CW10, 394:189) According to the psychologist, Germany, like Nietzsche,
was less a responsible agent and more a victim of psychic forces. (CW10, 389:192)

Jung wraps up the 1936 essay on contemporary events with a note of hope. He
states that Wotan must in time reveal not only his stormy side but his ecstatic and mantic
qualities, for he is also a God of the poets, romance and secret knowledge. National
Socialism, states Jung, will not be the last word. (CW10, 399:192) With the balancing of
these two sides Germany could at last responsibly resurface its true archetypal character.

In the essay "After the Catastrophe" (1945) there is no such optimism. This latter
paper not surprisingly has a more urgent tone. It speaks less of Christianity and Wotan
and focuses on what Jung considered to be the most dangerous feature of Nietzsche's
philosophy, his refusal to accept the inferior man. Jung uses, what is perhaps the most
socially relevant of all of his psychological theories to explain this phenomenon, the
projection of the Shadow. The projection of the Shadow involves the projection of all the
unattractive traits that we wish we didn't possess. According to Jung, Nietzsche, and the
German people in general, refused to accept their own Shadow, thus projecting it outside
themselves. The Germans projected their Shadow side onto, more than any one else, the
Jews.
Jung tells us that decades before WWII Nietzsche provided a warning about the dangers of blind idealism and dependence on the state which the Germans failed to heed. Nietzsche is described as both a prophet who might have foreseen the evils of WWII and as a victim afflicted by the same pathological illness which caused it. In becoming a victim of the one sided approach of the Superman, Nietzsche set forth for the Germans an example of the terror they ought to avoid. Here is the danger of Nietzsche's state as the coldest of all cold monsters. The whole nation was a fair way to becoming a herd of sheep constantly relying on a shepherd to drive them into good pastures. Eventually the staff became a rod of iron and the shepherd becomes a wolf. "Germany heaves a sigh of relief when a megalomaniac psychopath proclaims, I take over the responsibility."(CW10, 413:201)

The state of affairs in Germany recalled the figure, which Nietzsche called the pale criminal who in reality shows all signs of hysteria. He simply will not and cannot admit that he is what he is. He cannot endure his own guilt.(CW10, 416:202) After WWI and the treaty of Versailles Germany fell victim to an inferiority complex. This inferiority complex led to hysterical disassociation of the personality which consisted essentially of one hand not knowing what the other hand was doing, in the want to jump over one's own Shadow, in looking for everything dark and inferior in others. A good portion of the population was seen as a crowd of submen who should be exterminated so that the Superman could live on a high level of protection.(CW10, 417:203)

Jung calls the German nation a victim of "psychopathic inferiority," a victim of an hysterical disposition in which the opposites inherent in every psyche, especially those
affecting character, are drawn further apart than in normal people. Just as Nietzsche suggested in his philosophy, Jung states that this greater distance produces a higher energetic tension. This, the psychologist explains, accounts for the undeniable energy and drive of the Germans. However, this same tension which made Nietzsche and Parcelsus great, also produces inner contradictions, conflicts of conscience and disharmonies of character. There is a loosening of opposites that are normally held firmly together. There is an amazing ignorance of the Shadow. And when bad acts can no longer be denied, the victim becomes, as Jung puts it, the unscrupulous Superman. (CW10, 424: 207)

As Jung explains, when Nietzsche announces that God is dead, God is succeeded by the Superman. When a projection comes to an end it always returns to its origin. When God dies, the human being finds himself struck by inflation, which may take the form of “God-almightiness” which is the quality peculiar to fools and madmen and leads to catastrophe. “God-almightiness,” states Jung does not make a man Divine, it merely fills him with arrogance and arouses everything evil in him. (CW10, 437:214)

When archetypal powers, given names like God and Wotan, are proclaimed to be nonexistent in an exterior ontological sense this does not erase the fact that they possess definite psychological existence. As Jung explains, from time immemorial nature was always filled with spirit. Now for the first time we are living in a lifeless nature bereft of Gods. The Enlightenment may have destroyed the spirits of nature, but not the psychic factors that correspond to them, such as suggestibility, lack of criticism, fear, propensity to superstition and prejudice. The demons who make possession possible remain in existence as unconscious psychic forces. (CW10, 431:211) Instead of flitting about in
attics these spirits are now in the minds of apparently normal Europeans. (CW10, 431:212) This was the cause of the epidemic of insanity in Europe, particularly Germany. It was a case of collective possession.

The Germans, Jung states, seem to have put up the least resistance. Jung blames this on an inherent weakness in German character, namely their susceptibility to the spirit of Wotan. However, their peculiar gifts might have also enabled them to draw helpful conclusions from both the example of Nietzsche's life and his prophetic teachings.

"Nietzsche," says Jung, "was German to the very marrow of his bones even to the abstruse symbolism of his madness." (CW10, 432:212) However, as Jung explains, Nietzsche himself criticised the German philistine very freely. In fact, Nietzsche criticised the anti-Semites very specifically at the end of the Genealogy of Morals. He saw them as possessing the same ascetic blindness as Christians. (CW10, 432:212)

The problem was the Germans were led to imitate their prophets; they took their words literally rather than really understanding them. They killed thousands of submen in the interest of Nietzsche's Superman. Rather than heeding the words of Goethe they, like Faust, signed a pact with the devil for power.

EGO AND EROS

As stated earlier there are some themes which are developed more fully in the

**Collected Works** than in the **Seminars**. In Volume 6 Jung expands on the emphasis on individual power in the progression of history in a manner which is unique to the

**Collected Works**. Jung contrasts the ego instinct (the instinct of self-preservation) with
the Eros instinct, the want to return to a more primitive state of oneness with the world about us. Freud’s psychology and Schopenhauer’s Eastern flavoured philosophy become important in this discussion.

According to Freud, Jung states, the immoral man who lives a life of unrestrained instinct should be immune to neurosis. Experience, however, shows this not to be the case. Such a man can be as neurotic as any other. His morality is simply repressed; he is Nietzsche’s pale criminal. (CW7, 29:26)

Nietzsche and Freud both insist on a psychology which insists on the acknowledgment of our seamy side, theoretically forcing us to acknowledge our shadow. Freud’s contribution to our knowledge of the psyche is without a doubt of greatest importance. It yields insight into the human mind and character which can only be compared to Nietzsche’s *Genealogy of Morals*. (CW18, 1069:438)

However, according to Jung, while Freud acknowledges the need for a certain amount of suppression and sublimation, Nietzsche wished to free us entirely from Christianity’s ascetic morality at the risk of disorganising man’s animal nature at the deepest level. He gave us the Superman, a man who through obedience to instinct, transcended himself. (CW7, 35-36:31)

Jung states that if we look critically at the situation, however, we see that Nietzsche did not live by instinct at all. In reality he loathed the human animal that lived by instinct. He talked of yea saying and lived nay. (CW7, 37:31) The reason for this is that following his instinct led him away from humanity rather than towards it. According to Jung, there is not one possible instinct to follow, but two. There is both the instinct
which acts to preserve the species, which Freud would call Eros, and the instinct of self-preservation. From Freud's point of view, states Jung, Nietzsche made a glaring one-sided error.

The animal fulfills the law of its own life. This is one of the ways Nietzsche describes the will to power, the fulfilling of ones nature, a tiger being a tiger. In the animal's case, this means fulfilling the will to preserve his species, and we call it obedient and good. In contrast there is the human heroic figure, the ecstatic that breaks societal laws, passes all the laws of his own life and behaves, from the point of view of nature, with impropriety. That's the Superman, says Jung and that's the will to power too. This impropriety is the exclusive prerogative of man. It is the foundation of all culture, but it is also a spiritual sickness if it is exaggerated. (CW7, 41:33) Man, says Jung, can only suffer a certain amount of culture without injury. Human nature bears the burden of a terrible unending conflict between the principle of the Ego and the principle of Eros. (CW7, 41,43:34)

Jung describes Nietzsche as a prophet of the triumphant will for individuality. Nietzsche seized on the idea of a master caste and a master morality, an idea embodied in many a fair haired knight and hero in the middle ages. While Wagner broke the bonds of fettered love, Nietzsche shattered the "table of values" that cramp individuality. (CW6, 408: 241)
THE APOLLONIAN AND THE DIONYSIAN

In another dichotomy, frequently brought up in the Collected Works, Nietzsche comes out on the nonindividualistic side. This second dichotomy is the Apollonian and the Dionysian. The Apollonian, Jung explains, signifies measure, number, limitation and subjugation of everything wild and untamed. It is the principium individuationis. The Dionysian, on the other hand, means the liberation of unbounded instinct, the breaking loose of the unbridled dynamism of Divine nature. The Dionysian is the horror of the annihilation of the principium individuationis and at the same time the rapturous light of its destruction. It is the dissolution of the ego into the collective. (CW6, 226:138)

Nietzsche is famous for his interest in the Dionysian.

Jung admired Nietzsche’s recognition of the Dionysian. He saw it as an important historical shift. He links Nietzsche’s Hellenistic aesthetics to Schiller’s but he claims that Nietzsche went beyond him. Jung states that Schiller glimpsed into the abyss of human nature, the archaic power of instinct beneath civilized living. Schiller wrote,

In that nether world is terror
And man shall not tempt the gods
Let him never yearn to see
what they veil with night and horror (CW6, 150:96)

Jung explains that when Schiller lived, the time for dealing with that nether world had not yet come, but Nietzsche came much nearer to it. Nietzsche was the only true pupil of
Schopenhauer, who tore through the veil of naivete and in Zarathustra conjured up from
the nether region ideas which were destined to be the most vital content of the coming
age.(CW6, 151:96)

In the Birth of Tragedy Nietzsche borrows the words of Schopenhauer to describe Apollo,

As upon a tumultuous sea, unbounded in every direction, the mariner sits
full of confidence in his frail craft, rising and falling amid the raging
mountains of waves.(BT, 22)

Nietzsche states that Apollo can be seen as a glorious Divine image of the
principle of individuation. Apollo then, explains Jung, is a withdrawal into one’s self or
introversion. Conversely the Dionysian state unleashes a torrent of libido into things.

According to Nietzsche,

Not only does the bond between man and man come to be forged once
more by the magic of the Dionysiac rite, but nature itself, long alienated or
subjugated, rises again to celebrate the reconciliation of her prodigal son
man... Now the slave emerges a free man; all rigid, hostile walls which
either necessity or despotism have rected between men are shattered... as
though a the veil of Maya had been torn apart and there remained only
shreds floating before the vision of mystical oneness.(BT, 23)

AESTHETICS AND THE BIRTH OF TRAGEDY

With the Dionysian, says Nietzsche, man is no longer an artist but a work of
art.(CW6, 227:139) All the artistry of nature is revealed in the ecstasies of intoxication.

This means, Jung explains, the creative dynamism, the libido in the instinctual form,
takes possession of the individual as though he were an object and uses him as though he were a tool or an expression of itself. The trouble with this theory, Jung explains, is a natural creature is not a work of art, as a work of art is a creation of man.\(^{(CW6, 227:139)}\)

Nietzsche sees the antagonism between Apollo and Dionysus as bridgeable by art. He has a pronounced tendency to credit art with a mediating or redeeming role. The problem thus, says Jung, remains stuck in aesthetics.\(^{(CW6, 231:140)}\) Jung argues that the struggle between Apollo and Dionysus, and their ultimate reconciliation, was never an aesthetic problem for the Greeks but rather essentially a religious one. He believes that seeing things in aesthetic terms trivializes them and can never do justice to their true content.\(^{(CW6, 231:141)}\) The aesthetic approach immediately converts the problem into a picture which the spectator can contemplate at his ease, admiring both its beauty and ugliness, merely re-experiencing its passions at a safe distance with no danger of becoming involved. There is no real participation or personal implication, which is what religious understanding of the problem would mean.\(^{(CW6, 232:142)}\)

Here it is very important to make a distinction between the Apollonian and the Dionysian aesthetic. While the Apollonian, it is true, involves stepping back and regarding the world with a distanced detachment, it was not seen by Nietzsche as the whole of the solution. The Dionysian aesthetic, which involved becoming a work of art created by the hands of nature, by the force of the ground of being,\(^{(BT, 39)}\) was held in higher regard. Apollonian contemplative detachment by itself was insufficient.

Jung states that Nietzsche had an inkling of the real solution when he said that the antagonism was not bridged by art but by a metaphysical miracle of the Hellenic will.
Here Jung states that Nietzsche may be speaking of Schopenhauer's metaphysical unconscious will. It is an unconscious miracle without the assistance of reason and conscious purpose. It just grows like a phenomenon of creative nature, not from any clever trick of human wit. (CW6, 233:143) Though in both his later and earlier works, Nietzsche advises us to tap into the natural powers of instinctual vitality, in the Birth of Tragedy Nietzsche talks about leaving subjectivity behind and becoming one with "the ground of being", (BT, 39) while in Thus Spoke Zarathustra he clearly locates creative powers in the hands of the individual.

The discussion of the metaphysical miracle of the Hellenic will versus the clever trick of human wit or the religious versus the aesthetic solution, lead us back again to the core problems that Jung sees in Nietzsche's philosophy. I do not believe that Jung should have had a fundamental disagreement with tapping into The Birth of Tragedy's "ground of being", but one must certainly admit that Zarathustra's bid to put the ownership of all creative powers in the hands of what is perceived to be the individual conscious will, runs contrary to Jungian psychology. According to Jung, the solution cannot be human, or at least it cannot be ego based. It must be some thing which comes from the unconscious or from the Self. Jung calls the Superman a "fake figure" invented as compensation for Nietzsche's own weakness. (CW18, 375:600) The Superman is a man made invention; it is not Divine. Therefore it cannot be set in the place of religion and God. According to Jung, the Superman does not acknowledge weakness or the Shadow.
THE DIONYSIAN AND THE INTUITIVE

Jung classifies the Dionysian as being akin to two of his four psychological types, the intuitive and the sensate. These are the aesthetic types as opposed to the rational types. They do not differentiate between perception and contemplation. The intuitive type raises unconscious perception to the level of a differentiated function. (CW6, 242:146) One might compare this, says Jung, to the daemon of Socrates. This would also be, as Nietzsche states, what poets of a stronger age referred to when they spoke of inspiration.

Jung asserts that Nietzsche’s lack of rational moderation and consciousness (particularly evident during the writing of Zarathustra) argues for the intuitive type in general. In accordance with the intuitive, Nietzsche’s work perceives the outer primarily through the medium of the inner, sometimes even at the expense of reality. By means of this attitude he gained knowledge of the Dionysian qualities of his unconscious, the crude forms of which only reached the surface of his consciousness after the outbreak of his illness. (CW6, 242:146)

In a chapter entitled "The Type Problem in Modern Philosophy", Jung states that by making great use of the intuitive, Nietzsche freed himself from the bonds of the intellect in the shaping of his philosophical ideas. This was so much the case, in fact, that his intuition carried him outside the bounds of a purely philosophical system, to the creation of a work of art largely inaccessible to philosophical criticism. That work, of course, is Thus Spoke Zarathustra. (CW6, 549:320) In Jung's opinion Zarathustra is the best example of the use of the intuitive method. It is a vivid example of how a
problem can be grasped in a nonintellectual way. As forerunners of the intuitive approach, Jung names Schopenhauer and Hegel. (CW6, 540:320) In the case of both of these men, however, intuition was subordinate to the intellect, but with Nietzsche, intuition ranked above the intellect.

It was really Nietzsche, who with a violence peculiarly his own, who struck out on a path to the future... (he) transcended the barren one sidedness and unconscious conceptualism of Post-Abelardian philosophy. (CW6, 541:321)

CONCLUSIONS

Jung's final evaluations of Nietzsche's philosophy are perhaps best stated in the Tavistock lectures and his forward to Neuman on "Depth Psychology and a New Ethic". In the Tavistock lectures Jung compares Nietzsche's philosophy to psychology in that he too fosters an approach which moves beyond a "you ought" based morality. This is one of the reasons Jung credits Nietzsche with being one of the indirect fathers of modern psychology.

It is sufficient that the goal of psychoanalysis is a psychic state in which "you ought" and "you must" are replaced by "I will" so that, as Nietzsche says, a man must become the master not only of his vices but also of his virtues. In as much as psychoanalysis is purely rational - and it is so by its very nature - it is neither moral nor antimoral and gives neither prescriptions nor any other "you oughts." (CW18, 930:395)

If this is the case, one might ask Jung why he sees fit to criticise the amorality of
Nietzsche's Dionysian artist who does not concern himself with conscience, but in fact, Jung makes it clear that he has reservations about Nietzsche's quest for moral freedom.

It is perhaps a good idea, says Jung, to liberate man from all inhibitions and prejudices that hamper, torment and disfigure him. But to what end? In certain cases it looks as if one has thrown away the best elements of human society. Liberation can be a very good or a very bad solution. It largely depends upon the choice of one's further goal whether the liberation has been a boon or a fatal mistake. (CW18, 1454:634) In Nietzsche's case, as his goal was what Jung terms "the fake Superman" (CW18, 1375:600), liberation turned out to be, at the very least, extremely problematic. The Superman was the new human being who was responsible for the creation of his own values. Unfortunately, according to Jung, Nietzsche thought that this Superman could create through the conscious ego alone. This is what made him, in Jung's eyes, fake. This is also meant that liberation, through the ideal of the Superman, was destined to lead to a disastrous truncation.

In the forward to Neuman on "Depth Psychology and a New Ethic" it becomes evident that while Jung may believe in stepping from a "thou shalt" morality to an "I will" morality for a specific kind of problem solving, no one stands entirely beyond good and evil. If we were to stand outside of good and evil we would be out of this world. Jung tells us that life is a continual balancing of opposites like any other energetic process. The abolition of opposites would be equivalent to death. Nietzsche eventually escaped the collision of opposites by going insane. The Yogi attains the state of nirvana (freedom from opposites) in the rigid lotus position of "nonconscious nonacting samhadi."
ordinary man, however, stands between opposites and knows he can never abolish them. "There is no good without evil and no evil without good. The one conditions the other but does not become or abolish the other." (CW18, 1417:620) In Jung's eyes we are destined to remain in a state of conflict. There is no real way around it. Aesthetics and the Eastern conception of enlightenment both amount to what Jung considers divorcing one's self from life. Jung is in agreement with Western philosophy's enthusiastic hope that our reach will always exceed our grasp. We may hold the unity of opposites as an ideal, but in our earthly lives we may only approximate this unity. We cannot ourselves, in this every day world, be Gods.

If a man is endowed with an ethical sense and is convinced of the sanctity of ethical values he is on the surest road to a conflict of duty. This looks like a fact which will set us on the road to moral catastrophe but it alone makes possible a broadening in consciousness. (CW18, 1417:620)

A conflict of duty forces us to examine our conscience and thereby to discover the shadow. This in turn forces us to come to terms with the unconscious. (CW18, 1417:620)

For Jung the total cessation of suffering, the total liberation from conflict, means death. (C,148)
CONCLUSIONS PART I

Jung’s commentary on Nietzsche often seems contradictory. This, however, is no surprise as Nietzsche’s works themselves are rife with paradox. While Nietzsche’s ontology is arguably deterministic with the unconscious holding the reins, his philosophy puts great focus on the individual’s conscious ability to create their own innovative approaches to viewing the world. There is a tension in Nietzsche between fate and freewill, between our abilities to affirm the essentially painful nature of the universe and our ability to create beautiful illusions which act as healing salves. Nietzsche’s philosophy does not honour our ability to look truth in the face, but rather our ability to remain within and affirm life.

Nevertheless, I would agree with Jung’s assertion that this paradox may have emerged from the fact that Nietzsche stands astride two zeitgeists. He stands with one foot in the Nineteenth Century and one in the Twentieth. Jung congratulates Nietzsche for bringing the contents of the Shadow to light, but states that in the end the philosopher failed to accept the Shadow. While Nietzsche’s doctrine of eternal return advises that we affirm both our ascending and descending qualities, descending qualities such as pity and collectivity are still described as essentially negative. Whether this qualifies as what Jung would call the acceptance of the Shadow, let alone its affirmation, is questionable. Nietzsche vividly describes the experiential nature of the spirit. He embraces the vital over the rational and the true, but ultimately his ecstatic experiences are ‘cleansed’ by rational intellectual criticism. While it was Nietzsche’s crusade to affirm the powers of the unconscious, he ultimately refused to let go of certain conscious prejudices.

Jung’s interpretations of Nietzsche are at times uniquely insightful but at others
questionable or even downright incorrect. Jung saw Zarathustra as the incarnation of the Superman, just as Jesus was an incarnation of God on earth. He thus took Zarathustra's words, not as the possibly flawed statements of a human protagonist, but as Nietzsche's declaration of 'gospel truth'. Jung took at face value Zarathustra's proclamations that a select elite, a few generations along the line, could indeed become Supermen. This to Jung meant that Nietzsche believed that we might indeed become Gods, full masters of our own will and creators of our own lives and destinies.

Jung believed that we will forever be Rope Dancers strung between the ego and the Self or man and God. What he failed to realise was while Zarathustra might preach the end of conflict, Nietzsche himself, like Jung, did not see an ultimate end. The Superman, or the man with the well ordered soul, is at last an ideal to be constantly striven for but never reached. According to Nietzsche, to be permanently perfect is to stagnate in a static lifeless state. The best we may thus hope for, and in fact should hope for, are brief moments of the ecstatic experience of Divinity within the Self.

This question of how much Jung's negative criticism of Nietzsche's is the result of a misinterpretation on Jung's part and how much is the result of an honest difference in opinion, will be explored in Part II "A Response From Nietzsche."
PART II
A RESPONSE FROM NIETZSCHE

CHAPTER 1
JUNGIAN SLIPS

There are some aspects of Jung’s commentary on Nietzsche which reflect misinterpretations rather than differences in opinion. Most of these relate to Jung and Nietzsche’s conception of God. I believe that Jung’s archetypal definition of God blurs important distinctions between figures such as Zarathustra and Dionysus as well as Zarathustra and the Superman. The fact that a God can be both active and reactive in Nietzsche’s view is also ignored by Jung. There are other cases in which Jung’s methodology causes oversights but I believe that the cases discussed below are the mistakes which effect Jung’s most central arguments.

ZARATHUSTRA; A PROPHET NOT A GOD

Jung saw Zarathustra as Nietzsche’s God on earth, the first incarnation of the Superman.(S2: 845, 852, 1531) While it must be explained that Jung did not see God as a transcendent entity, but rather as the ruling archetypal force in an individual’s life, the assertion that Zarathustra is the incarnation of the Superman is simply incorrect. The Superman is a perfect ideal figure. Zarathustra is not.

Jung asserted that Nietzsche identified with Zarathustra and that Zarathustra is a God. According to the psychologist this could only lead to a severe case of inflation and megalomania. It is true enough that near the end of his life (when he had lost his sanity) Nietzsche did identify with his philosophy's God, referring to himself as “the
dismembered Dionysus-Zagreus.” (B, 120) However, Zarathustra should not be put on
the same level with Dionysus. Zarathustra was only a prophet, a flawed human
protagonist capable of error. Therefore, not all his statements should be taken as
definitive proclamations by the philosopher (if one can use the term definitive at all with
Nietzsche). Zarathustra struggles with the ascending and descending qualities within
himself like any other human being.

Zarathustra is not a God but a prophet and educator. We must remember the fact
that Zarathustra cautioned his students that “One repays a teacher badly if one remains
only a pupil.” (Z, 103)(T, 173) He did this lest their belief in him become a hindrance
to their own development. Zarathustra also says, “I am a law only for my own, I am not a
law for all” (Z, 296)(T, 173).

Like the old Zen parable of the master pointing to the moon and the
disciples gazing at his finger, Zarathustra’s teaching is often mistaken as
truth itself, when in fact it only points to the means by which each may
find his own truth. Zarathustra’s life and actions are not to act like a blue
print.(T, 173)

Zarathustra is related to the Superman only in a conditional way. Deleuze
contrasts Dionysus’ and Zarathustra’s relations to eternal return and the Superman. He
states that “In a certain way Zarathustra is the cause of eternal return and the father of the
Overman.” (D, 192) He is the father of the Superman in a sense of precondition, but in
another sense, in which eternal return and the Superman are unconditioned, Zarathustra is
himself subject to this affirmative force. Eternal return and the Superman as
unconditioned are represented by the God Dionysus. Zarathustra is the cause of eternal
return but a cause which delays producing its effect. He is flawed; he is a prophet who
hesitates to deliver his message, who knows the temptation of the negative. He must be encouraged by his animals which Deleuze explains are posited as an abstract ideal. He is a father whose products are ripe before he is, he lacks the final metamorphosis. (D, 192)

In contrast, states Deleuze, we may relate to Dionysus as an unconditioned principle of absolute character. Thus there are two genetic lines to the Superman, the first, through Dionysus the God, and the second, through the imperfect prophet Zarathustra. Dionysus is the absolute without which conditions themselves would remain powerless. (D, 193)

Zarathustra, however, while not a God, certainly qualifies as an archetypal figure or as a figure through whom the archetype may speak. He is the prophet with the voice of one crying in the wilderness. He is the criminal or trickster figure who lives outside of the law. He is the saint and the wounded healer. Zarathustra was for Nietzsche the wise Persian magus. He was incestuously begotten and thus received his Dionysian wisdom through a crime against nature. He is the breaker of the consecrated tables of natural order. He commits Promethian crimes against the Gods like an alchemist. (BT, 61) Thus Spoke Zarathustra is about the prophet’s relationship with nihilism or the demon. It is an age old archetypal story of walking into the darkness, descending into madness, ripping oneself to bits, dying in order to come back out into the light, to be enlightened, to finally become whole or to truly live. Of course Nietzsche puts his own modern spin on the old, old story.

Whether any of these archetypal figures take on a God-like role is another question. And as anchorites and shamans are not mythological characters but people who actually exist, or once existed, one is also inclined to ask whether these practitioners face the same dangers Jung believed Nietzsche did in his identification with Zarathustra.
Pathology has often been identified with shamanism as well as other mystical experiences. Though many contemporary anthropologists have done their best to quell this identification, claiming it is a result of Western prejudice against altered states of consciousness, research has shown, that at least in some cases, the initiatory illness encountered by shamans shows all the characteristics of an identifiable mental illness. (RW, 112) I would suggest that the strong reaction against the description of shamanism as "culturaly sanctioned pathology" shows a prejudice against mental illness as an opportunity for growth and creativity. (RW, 117)

THE SUPERMAN; AN IDEAL NEVER ENTIRELY ACHIEVED

Jung asserts that the human condition involves perennial struggle, that opposites can only be conjoined in the event of the full realisation of the Self, an event which never occurs. Jung believed that Nietzsche, in contrast, asserted that we can indeed reach a state of perfection, that we can indeed be Supermen, or at least that future generations, due to our present efforts, will accomplish this ideal. If we take Zarathustra's statements as Nietzsche's, it does sound as if the philosopher indeed held this optimistic view. "Ye could well create a Superman. Not perhaps ye yourselves, my brethren! But into fathers and forefathers of the Superman ye could transform yourselves." (Z, 82) The accomplishment of ultimate perfection, however, runs contrary to Nietzsche's philosophy. Perfection would entail a static state which to Nietzsche meant lifelessness. According to Paul Thiele, for Nietzsche, whatever his aspirations the higher man is no God. As long as he remains a suffering mortal, as long as his apotheosis remains limited to the elusive Dionysian moment, he remains imperfect, a non-God man. As long as a
man remains self-conscious, he remains imperfect. (T, 192) "Consciousness is always the recognition of limits. Nietzsche denied outright that anything can be made perfect so long as it is still made conscious." (T, 193)

As Thiele explains it, Nietzsche believed that mankind is only the means of pursuing a goal.

This goal is the Overman; but the goal is never reached, only striven for. As an ideal the Overman is approached, even touched, but not possessed. He is occasionally glimpsed, and lived for a moment in rapturous passion and thought. But the Dionysian moment is just that, momentary. (T, 184)

What stands in the way of the Superman is one's humanity.

One is not the Overman; therefore one must will him, and this willing is always an overcoming of the self, the creation of a better more powerful self. In this willing the suffering mortal partakes of Divinity. His willing is an act of creation. The joy of willing is what lured Zarathustra away from the gods, 'for what would there be to create if gods-existed!' (Z, 83) (T, 185)

Nietzsche often speaks of the affirmation of the Being of Becoming, the constant process of creation, of struggle and play, the constant state of flux which defines life. A biologist will tell you that life is impossible without movement. Thiele asks, what would there be to create if the perfectly ordered soul, the Overman, existed? (T, 185)
DIVINITY, NOT SIMPLY TRANSFERRED TO HUMANITY, BUT REDEFINED

Jung criticises Nietzsche for relocating Divinity within the ego. He also asserts, like Karl Jaspers, that the location of God within man and atheism are merely the continuation of Christian and particularly Protestant philosophy. Nietzsche knew this. Nietzsche agreed that the relocation of God within man was merely a change in geography and that it did not necessarily entail liberation. The celebration of God's death was premature. The Superman replaces God, it is not simply God the Father again in a new location. If it is in fact a new Divinity, it is a different kind of Divinity.

As stated earlier, Jung does not give enough attention to the fact that Nietzsche makes a distinction between the nihilistic belief in a reactive Divinity, like the Christian God the Father, and an active Divinity like Dionysus. Jung states that though Nietzsche proclaims God dead, he still seems to hover in the background of Thus Spoke Zarathustra as an archetypal impulse. In the Seminars, Jung equates Zarathustra's "Unknown God", who is in fact Dionysus, with the same God whom Nietzsche proclaims to be dead. This unknown or unfamiliar God represents a negation of values which have been known up to the present. He is unknown because he represents Dionysus' active process of transmutation which we have yet to learn about. Like nirvana or Nirguna Brahman, Dionysus can only be described in terms of negation. This does not mean, however, that he is a God of nothingness or nihilism. He is the rejection of what the dead reactive God stood for and the affirmation of new values.

Deleuze states that Nietzsche does not entirely forbid positing the existence of Gods if they are the right sort of Gods. He also explains that Nietzsche warns that if we
merely import a God within ourselves as an abstract ideal, such as scientific law or an unchangeable code of morality, our outlook on life hasn’t much improved. Scholars today do not lack piety; they have merely invented a new theology which no longer depends upon the heart. (D, 73)

We oughtn’t attempt to become Gods unless we are speaking of an affirmative Dionysian breed. When Nietzsche speaks of us becoming Gods, the key facet of Divinity which he alludes to, is the power to create. We ought to become Gods in the manner of the Dancing Shiva who dances the world in and out of existence. He is the God of both destruction and creation, sacred play, reinterpretation and revivification, ever living and ever changing. His power is that which Jung as describes as the amoral force of nature. (S2, 1391) This is the life of the artist creator God, acting not reacting, not good or evil, but affirmative and full of life.

---

CHAPTER 2

AFFINITIES

THE SELF AND THE UNCONSCIOUS

Perhaps Jung’s most insistent criticism of Nietzsche is that he locates the Self in the ego. Ontologically Nietzsche did not locate the Self in the ego, and at times Jung congradulates him for it. (S1, 370) This is one of the many places where Jung’s commentary seems contradictory and Nietzsche’s teachings seem paradoxical. In the Seminars, Jung quotes “The Despisers of the Body’, ‘Ego’ sayest thou, and art proud of that word. But the greater thing - in which thou art unwilling to believe - is thy body with its big sagacity; it saith not ego but doeth it.” (Z, 30)

Following this quote Jung says,

Here Nietzsche or Zarathustra prepares our minds for a very important insight; namely it is not “I” (the ego) which is intelligent...It is a great discovery that below or aside from one’s psyche, or consciousness, or mind, is another intelligence of which one is not the maker, and upon which one depends. (S1, 370)

This greater thing is explicitly identified as the Self, with a capital “S”. “Ever hearkeneth the Self, and seeketh; it compareth, mastereth, conquereth and destroyeth. It ruleth, and is also the ego’s ruler. Behind thy thoughts and feelings, my brother, there is a mighty lord, an unknown sage.” (Z, 30)

Jung knew that Nietzsche posited the existence of an unconscious, though he may not have called it by the same name. It is in fact possible to draw many parallels between
Jung and Nietzsche’s assertions on the relation between the conscious and unconscious. The will to power acts on our conscious egos like an unconscious creator attempting to manifest and become conscious. To Nietzsche consciousness is always the consciousness of an inferior in relation to a superior, a superior to which it is subordinated and incorporated. “Consciousness is never self consciousness but the consciousness of an ego in relation to a Self which is not itself conscious. It is not the master’s consciousness but the slave’s in relation to a master who is not himself conscious.”(D, 39) Here the philosopher, like Jung, sounds similar to Jacob Boehme.(JD, 432)

Nietzsche, unlike Jung, claims he does not wish to draw up a detailed map of the unconscious regions. He believes that any attempt to do so would amount to a lot of unverifiable speculation. But just as Jung, the doctor, states that he would not presume to speculate about God (a subject better left to theologians), Nietzsche, the philosopher, often steps out of his defined career parameters and plays the psychologist. Nietzsche called himself a nutcracker of souls and, as Thiele puts it, he subsequently engaged in vivisection. (GM,113)(T, 54) The object of the game, however, was not to create a scientifically grounded theory. Nietzsche acknowledged that the substrata of the Self are ambiguous and undefined, that the atoms of the community of the Self are essentially unknowable. (GM, 113)(T, 54)

Although Nietzsche attributed relative powers to the conscious will, he also asserted that our inherent unconscious contents have a tremendous effect. Paul Thiele states that Nietzsche believed the individual to be a product of nature not nurture. Our inherited character is destiny. “The task of ordering one’s souls above all requires self-knowledge-an awareness of one’s drives, their respective strengths, weaknesses and
interactions." (T, 207) “Nietzsche held that philosophy was simply a conceptualization and intellectualization of one's spiritual constitution. The order and rank of men is by and large a product of birth or inheritance.” (T, 208) Thiele asserts that Nietzsche believed that a man may discover noble drives within himself but he cannot create them. (T, 208) Jung would certainly concur with this statement. All this is part of fulfilling Zarathustra’s commandment to “Become what thou art!” (Z, 230) or becoming who you are. We ought to become well disposed to our eternal fates. (Z, 231) Jung described this as the discovery and development of the Self.

Nietzsche advised that man must effectively acquire what he already owns. Moral duty lies in that higher egoism that induces the individual to fully develop himself. (T, 210)

The self is not so much created as unfolded.... As the individual creates himself over time facet after facet of preexisting self is revealed. Yet the Self, however, is never completely discovered. Its unfolding is as the paring of an infinitely large onion. The sense of penetration is ever present but the core is never reached. (T, 215)

Zarathustra himself admitted to not knowing the height of his own mountain peaks (Z, 168). Thiele goes as far as to claim that Nietzsche asserted that the true Self lies, not so much within, as above and beyond one. “It is glimpsed during flights of spirit and cannot be captured or harnessed. The true Self is the seed of aspiration.” (T, 216)

While Jung may be criticised for binding us to unconscious mythologies, Theile argues that, from a certain perspective, Nietzsche’s process of becoming who one is, is predetermined. So far as Nietzsche believed that to deny the will’s lack of freedom is stupid (GW, 14:58) (T, 72) and that noble traits are biologically inherited not
developed, (T, 208) I would argue that Thiele’s assertion is more or less accurate. Because of this determinism Nietzsche’s “name has come to be identified with the very radical historicism and cultural relativism which he sought to combat but had also uncovered with his descriptions of unconscious forces.” (T, 219)

As stated above, in both Jung and Nietzsche, the ego is subject to the greater power of the Self. As Deleuze explains it, consciousness is born in relation to a ‘being’ of which we could be a function. (D, 39) The question is, what is the nature of this superior body? Nietzsche does not define it by saying that it is a unified field of forces or a nutrient medium fought over by a plurality of forces. Deleuze states that for Nietzsche “There is no medium there is no quantity of reality, all reality is related to a quantity of forces.” (D, 39) The universe and our psychology is made up of nothing but forces in mutual relations of tension. Every force either obeys or commands. A living being is the arbitrary product of the forces of which it is composed. (D, 40) Clarke would argue that Jung and Nietzsche are largely in agreement on this point. Clarke states that Jung saw the psyche as containing within itself a plurality of centers and functions, both conscious and unconscious. (C, 74) I would argue, however, that while Jung does posit a plurality, it is a plurality which speaks with the unified voice of the libido, rather than the will to power, the dominant voice among many voices.

Despite all this psychological speculation, as stated earlier, both Nietzsche and Jung agreed that the Self had depths which were too deep to be plumbed. For Nietzsche the soul is a conglomerate of passions, desires, affects, forces, feelings, emotions, drives, and instincts. He did not claim to have discovered the structure of the soul but only to have observed its effects. (T, 53) “Thinking represents only the perceivable effect of an
imperceivable process.” (T, 55) “Everything that comes into consciousness is the last link of a chain...Each thought, each feeling, each will...is a composite...of our constituent drives.” (GW 16:61) (T, 55)

Drives, instincts or affects constitute an irreducible substratum (which is only to say that by definition we are incapable of discerning their probable components). Feelings or emotions form the next level. They are the products, composite and complex, of conscious and unconscious drives. (T, 55)

Jung too asserted that the deeper into the unconscious one proceeds the more “primitive” the instincts, drives and emotions one encounters. He too believed that... “Thoughts are shadows of our feelings - always darker emptier and simpler.” (GS, 203) (T, 55) iii

FORCES AND ARCHETYPES

Jung’s metaphysics, like Nietzsche’s, involve a universe of forces. The forces for Jung are the archetypes. Nietzsche’s forces exist as a result of their differentiation from one another. Jung’s archetypal forces are the dichotomies or oppositions in the unconscious which demanded the creation of consciousness and the universe. Jung, like Nietzsche, states that these forces are capable of possessing various phenomena and giving them a certain character (for Nietzsche a type). Both the philosopher and the psychologist agree that these phenomena, which the forces are capable of possessing, are not neutral. The traces of the forces which previously possessed them remain. For example when Christianity failed German pagan forces were reawakened.
Both the philosopher and the psychologist would concur that there is a force most essential to each phenomenon, which allows it operate most effectively. Nietzsche defines essence as that one among all other senses of a thing which gives it the force with which it has the most affinity. There are forces which can only get a grip on something by giving it a restrictive sense and a negative value. A religion may be created and acted on by numerous archetypes or forces, but there are forces most essential to it.(D, 4) Jung complains about the German faith movement of the early twentieth century being acted on by pagan rather than Christian forces.

Nietzsche’s philosophy reveals its complexity when we realise that a force can only appear in consciousness, societal or individual, by first of all putting on the mask of the forces which already possess consciousness. Eventually the mask is conquered by these new forces.(D, 5) Pagan forces were manifested in Germany under the guise of the modern German faith movement. The art of interpreting such things is the art of piercing masks. Jung might call this piercing of masks the art of discovering unconscious forces, the archetypal interplay. Nietzsche considers the recognition of these unconscious forces active and not passive.(D, 5)

Nietzsche’s forces are aggressive. He states that all force is appropriation, domination or exploitation of a quantity of reality. “The history of a thing in general is a succession of forces which take possession of it and the coexistence of such forces which struggle for possession. The same object, the same phenomenon, changes sense according to what force possesses it.”(D, 3) Archetypal forces are similarly at work in history. Jung describes the enantiodromia as a battle of archetypal forces, a process of
death and rebirth in which forces wax and wane, hopefully in a movement toward some kind of synthesis.

The "will to power" is the intention which drives Nietzsche's forces. The will to power is the will to be oneself, to manifest the Self. The will to power is the most dominant among all other will acting within the psyche. Nietzsche states that the will to power is the victorious concept of force by which our physicists have created God and the world, because they could not imagine forces operating without some sort of great underlying intention. Force however is not the one that wills, will to power is the one that wills. (D, 49) Jung too sees his archetypal forces as manifestations of the Self. The Self acts as an unconscious God still led by an intention, manifesting himself in conscious phenomenon. Nietzsche's Self, however, is essentially pluralistic. Whereas in Jungian psychology, the Self singular does have a universal intention to bring its many components into synthesis and unity, in Nietzsche's philosophy there are many Selves and many wills. In fact it is only the differentiation or conflict between these wills and Selves which allow them to exist at all. Differentiation is the genealogical factor.

With both Jung and Nietzsche the interaction of forces in society is analogous to the interaction of forces within the psyche. Just as Jung speaks of the transfer of archetypal powers from their symbolic association to the exterior world to the minds of human beings, Nietzsche speaks about the injection of the conflict of politics into the soul. Thiele states that the world of politics serves as a conceptual and terminological resource for the "reader of souls." (T, 52) "The politics of statecraft and soulcraft are analogous. The city is the soul writ large." (WP, 303)(T, 52)
While I do not believe that Jung would concur that the soul is merely a projection or rather an injection of exterior struggles, he would certainly agree that the battles once played out by Gods and Goddesses have since been internalised, that what was once left for the Gods to squabble over, thanks to Zarathustra, has now become a moral battle within the individual. (In this case ‘Zarathustra’ refers both to Nietzche’s character and to the historical Zoroaster.) Nietzsche speculated that all moral and spiritual designations, most notably the concepts of good and evil, were the historical developments of political categories and struggles, namely, those between aristocracy or nobility and plebeian commoners.(GM 24-31ff)(T, 54). Metaphysical concepts, such as freedom of will, also have their origins in the “social political domain.”(HH, 305)(T, 54) Political organizations, however, could not tolerate the uncontrolled discharge of instincts so, instincts were turned inward. Individuals, states Thiele, pitted their passions against each other rather than loosing them in the public realm...(T, 54) “Thus it was that man first developed what was later called his ‘soul’.”(GM, 84)(T, 54)

THE DEATH OF GOD

As stated above, Nietzsche knew that the transference of the powers of God to humanity was merely a change in geography unless a transmutation of the nature of Divinity also occurred. As Deleuze asks, so man and God are unified, but who is man, and who is God? Which is particular and which is universal? The fact of the matter is, he who is man has not changed. The only thing that has changed is the intermediate concept, who is subject and who is predicate.(D, 158) The transcendent remains transcendent at the heart of the immanent.(D, 161)
The weakening of the hold of the Christian God the Father alone was not a cause for celebration. Nicholas Davey states that Nietzsche was haunted, not so much by God’s death, but by the fact that the full consequences of that death had not dawned upon a civilization as yet unaware of the incipient calamity surrounding it. (Davey, xiv) Deleuze states that the murderer of God committed a sad crime because his motivation was sad. He remained negative while taking on the attributes of Divinity. The death of God needs time to finally find its essence and become a joyful event. Time is needed to expel the negative and to exorcise the reactive. (D, 190)

Nietzsche hated Christianity for its nihilistic proclamation of the sinful nature of human life, but the pronouncement of life’s guilt is certainly not restricted to Christianity. As Karl Jaspers explains in *Nietzsche and Christianity*, Nietzsche had nothing but contempt for the psuedo-morphosis of Christian ideals in secularised morality. (J, 36) Nietzsche tells us that even in modern times existence is not seen as innocent, as moral codes or the scientific method are held above it as a source of salvation. While Nietzsche would deny Jung’s assertion that being an atheist made him a good Christian,(S1, 72) he would agree that many atheists were Psuedo-Christians in that they were still supplicant to an objective transcendent morality. We must stop being slaves to the idea of something superior which makes us reasonable beings. Any philosophy which simply serves to install a priest, or God, or legislator within us is simply a renovated theology. We have not stopped being subjects. (D, 93) As Deleuze explains, we have split the world in two inventing a neutral subject endowed with free will to which we give the capacity to act or refrain from acting. In denying the will’s bias we deny existence itself. We deny
difference. We invent neutrality as a means of interpretation and evaluation, but it is really a depreciation. (D, 23)

THE NATURE OF CHRISTIANITY

While Christianity is not the only culprit of reactive philosophy, it does however represent the high point in history for the accusation of life. As stated in Part I, Nietzsche and Jung found similar faults within Christianity. They both criticised its hatred of the body, and its emphasis on an ideal otherworld at the expense of the here and now. They both criticised the diametrical opposition of good and evil in Christianity. Jung, however, calls Nietzsche a good Christian. One of the reasons for this is that Nietzsche uses Christian metaphors. In a similar manner to Jung, Hollingdale in his introduction to Thus Spoke Zarathustra, parallels Nietzsche’s concepts to Christian concepts. Amor fati (love of fate) is likened to the Divine will, eternal recurrence to eternal life, the will to power to divine grace, the Great Noontide to the second coming, the Superman to God and the Son of Man as God. Paul Thiele relates Zarathustra’s down going and subsequent resurrection to the Christian imperative of dying in order to be born again. (T, 144nt)

Nietzsche’s use of Christian metaphors is satirical, however, and meant to enact a transformation. Just as Nietzsche proclaims a new sort of Divinity, he proclaims a new sort of religious sensibility and a reinterpretation or revaluation of Christian symbols.

Dionysus and Christ both experience passion and martyrdom, but, states Deleuze, in two opposed senses. In Christianity suffering indicates that there is something fundamentally wrong with life. From Gnosticism, Jewish Wisdom, Apocalyptic writings and the Mystery Cults of the crumbling Roman Empire Christianity took on the attitude
that the earthly universe was a dark place and salvation should be sought in the other
worldly. In Christianity life must be saved or justified. We must repent and be saved by
affirming God. Blessed are those with the guilty conscience, blessed are the poor in
spirit. Christianity is the religion of the slaves. Christ loves life as the bird of prey loves
the lamb he devours. (D, 15) Dionysus, in contrast, sees life as essentially just. Pain is
joyously affirmed. Dionysus suffers from the abundance of life where as Christ suffers
from its impoverishment. Zarathustra searches for something higher than
reconciliation. (D, 16)

As Paul Thiele states, the Dionysian man lives in the same world as his decadent
counterpart but he is strong enough to transform the meaninglessness of life into a cause
for celebration. All who cannot affirm life in and for itself imagine an afterlife and
redemptive Gods as compensation. (T, 77) Those who imagine these fictions deserve to be
called nihilists because they have glorified the concept contrary to life, with nothingness
as an end, as the highest good called God (GW, 14:328) (T, 78) Zarathustra, in contrast to
the Christian priests, encourages his followers to remain true to the earth and forego the
temptation of metaphysics and theology, of superterrestrial hopes. This is a blasphemy
against life. (T, 78) “Once blasphemy against God was the greatest blasphemy, but God
died, and there upon those blasphemers died too. To blaspheme the earth is now the most
dreadful offense.” (Z, 42) (T, 78)

Nietzsche did not deny the fact that religion was capable of fostering positive and
active forces, but he did assert that religion is essentially reactive. A religion’s nature
depends upon the force that takes hold of it. There are religions of the strong. Religion
itself, however, is also a force with a greater or lesser affinity for the forces which take
possession of it and of which it takes possession. As long as religion is possessed by forces of a different nature than itself, it does not reach its higher degree where it would cease to be a means, where it would be possessed by its own essence. When Nietzsche speaks of an active religion, he is talking of a religion subjugated by forces of an entirely different nature from its own. (D, 143) An example of an active religion is religion as "a procedure of selection and education in the hands of philosophers." (BGE, 33) (D, 144) vi On the other hand, when religion seems to act sovereignly a terrible price is paid. This is why religion and bad conscience have an essential link. When religion acts sovereignly it is not merely a force but a will which leads reactive forces to triumph. With the ascetic ideal there is a complicity between reactive forces and a form of will to power. (D, 144) The ascetic ideal relies on the fiction of a world beyond and consequently depreciates life and all that is active in it. (D, 145) It also is generally linked with the lack of innocence related to bad conscience, self denial and punishment.

GOOD AND EVIL AND THE SHADOW

As mentioned above, an aspect of Christianity which Nietzsche and Jung are both critical of, is the diametrical opposition of good and evil. The doctrine of the projection of what Jung calls the Shadow is at the heart of his criticism of this opposition. All qualities which we refuse to acknowledge and accept in ourselves we project onto others as our opposite. We are good and they are evil. All the viewpoints and characteristics of another human being or another culture which differs from ours, which we don't understand, become evil as well. The resentimental person needs others to be evil, in order to be considered good. In order to exist slave morality needs a hostile world.
1, 10 pp. 36-37)(D, 119) "The slave needs to set up the other from the outset. The good of one is precisely the evil of the other." (D, 119) The man of ressentiment needs to conceive of a non-ego, then to oppose himself to this non-ego in order to posit himself as self. (D, 120)

Nietzsche's alternative system of morality is based on affirmation. He emphasises what is appreciated now (rather than sought for), what is put into action (rather than found), what is enjoyed (and cannot be lost.) Nietzsche's moral man creates values. Everything he knows to be a part of himself he honours. Evil in this system of morality is secondary, rather than being the beginning factor which good is defined against. Evil is only a secondary consequence; those who do not enjoy the joyous plenitude of self affirmation are evil. Evil is what is negative, passive and unhappy. (D, 120) Jung admires Nietzsche's assertion that whatever is vital is of moral importance. (S1, 568 ) Jung agrees with Nietzsche that life itself should decide as it always does in reality. (S1, 570)

As Deleuze explains, forces are inseparable from the differential element from which their quality derives, but reactive forces project an inverted image of this. Rather than affirming their own positive nature and criticising others for not sharing in that nature, reactive people begin with the idea that others are evil and define themselves as good because they differ from the other. This leads to the fiction of the supersensible which is set up in opposition to this world. A new positive otherworld is defined in opposition to the negativity of this world. As Deleuze states, Nietzsche distinguishes this projection from the active power of dream and even from the image of positive Gods who affirm and glorify life. "Whereas the world of dreams reflects reality, the world of fiction falsifies, depreciates and denies it."(AC, 15, 16, 18)(D, 125) "Through this fiction
reactive forces represent themselves as superior. The instinct of ressentiment here invents another world where life affirmation would appear evil. (D, 125)

When an active force is deprived of what it can do it turns back against itself, then it becomes reactive and this is the origin of bad conscience. In ressentiment reactive force accuses and projects itself, but it would be nothing if it did not lead the accused himself to admit his wrongs. According to Jung, Nietzsche chose Zarathustra as his prophet because of the prophets belief that moral attitude was more important than external works. "His teaching was that as you commit sin outside in reality, so you can commit sin inside as a conscience, and it is the same thing and just as bad." (S1, 9) The new Zarathustra returns to remedy this internalisation.

Turned back against itself an active force produces pain. Pleasure is sought in decay, pain and voluntary self mortification. (D, 128) Pain is interiorised, sensualised, spiritualised and made the consequence of sin. Christianity is the centerpiece in the history of the internalised pain called sin. (D, 129) It is the end result of the Judaic vengeful God. The whole power of ressentiment ends with the God of the poor, the sick and the sinners. (D, 132)

Jung is particularly appreciative of Nietzsche's criticism of the neglect and degradation of the self in favour of the neighbour in Christianity. As Thiele explains, healthy egoism should not be equated with petty selfishness. The happiness of a man with strong, healthy instincts is beneficial to those around him. "His love of self translates into an affirmation of the world." (T, 75) On the other hand, the unordered soul is spiteful and dangerous, like "a knot of savage serpents that are seldom at peace among themselves- thus they go forth and seek prey in the world." (Z, 66) (T, 75) We have cause
to fear him who hates himself, for we shall be the victims of his wrath and revenge. (T, 207) One turns outward because one lacks the courage to face one’s solitude, or because nothing worthy of attention is found within. This love of neighbour arises from bad love of the self. (Z, 86) (T, 75) The distinction of Slave morality and master morality, Thiele explains, is based on the distinction between a higher and lower egoism. (T, 75)

Like Jung, Nietzsche had less of a problem with Christ than he did with the institution of the Christian Church. In Nietzsche’s philosophy Christ must be separated from Christianity. If we consider Christ as a personal type, distinguishing him from Christianity as a collective type, we must admit that he in fact lacked ressentiment and bad conscience. He said, love your enemies, love your neighbor as yourself, he defined himself in terms of glad tidings. A religion of Christ, possessed by an active force, would be characterised by a force or practice which gives the feeling of being Divine. (AC, 33) (D, 143) The trouble is, according to Nietzsche, the real inventor of Christianity is not Christ but St. Paul, a man of bad conscience. With Paul championing his ascetic ideals Christianity became a will leading reactive forces to triumph. (D, 144) St. Paul made Christ’s death the central feature of Christianity. Christ is said to have died to pay for our sins. We feel guilty about this death, and yet it is a debt we can never repay. This makes life essentially reactive. Life dies but it is born again as reactive, this is the content given to the resurrection by Paul. (D, 153)

THE CHRISTIAN WILL TO TRUTH

Nietzsche hated Christianity but according to Karl Jaspers he had a certain respect for the Christian will to truth. Though Nietzsche ultimately abandoned the ‘truth’ in
favour of the vital, he did see the unflinching quest for truth as a necessary step in the process of philosophical development. The search for truth eventually leads one to the nihilism of atheism, a stage that one must pass through before reaching the Superman. Jaspers states that Nietzsche regarded his own Protestant background and his proximity to persons practicing the Christian way of life as invaluable. (J, 5) He realised that it took the moral impulse of Christianity to evoke the boundless will to truth and that even atheists and antimetaphysicians like himself took the fire from the brand kindled by a faith of many centuries. (J, 6) When Nietzsche states “We are no longer Christians,” he is quick to add, “It is our very piety more rigid and more demanding which today forbids us to be Christians still.” (J, 6) Jaspers argues that Nietzsche’s fight against Christianity was waged from Christian motives. The Christian motives, however, were drained of Christian content and became merely propulsive energies. (J, 11) Nietzsche may not have been a ‘good Christian’ but he certainly did not see the religion as worthless.

The propulsive forces of Christianity in effect destroyed the religion’s content. The cause of God’s death is ultimately Christianity. According to Nietzsche it was this religion which destroyed all the truth by which man had been living in pre-Christian times, above all the tragic truth of life, as understood by the Greeks before Socrates. To counter this destruction Christianity put into place fictions; God, moral world order, immorality, sin, grace and redemption. Ironically, it was the sense of truthfulness engendered by Christianity, which forced society to recoil from these fictions. The logical end product to Christianity’s will to truth is nihilism and nothingness. It is thus the Christian religion which is responsible for the crisis which we face in the present era. (J, 15) While Nietzsche did not consider this crisis and the nihilistic atheism settling
on society the answer, he did consider it a stepping stone, a point of realisation and
tension necessary on the road to the Superman. As Thiele explains, Nietzsche's
"transvaluation of all values" is both the heir of nihilism and its overcoming.
"Characterised by the death of God and the negation of all hitherto reigning values,
nihilism is the necessary forerunner to Nietzsche's philosophy. The revaluation of this
world is possible only once the devaluation of the 'other world' is complete."(T, 79)

Christianity is only now being lived to its end, only now do we see what it actually
is. Modern humanism and its egalitarian ideals in particular are Christian ideals in
disguise. Now is the best time to know the religion as we are no longer guided by any
prejudice in favour of Christianity, but are still able to understand it.(J, 39) "Christianity
has prepared us for what can now, at this moment of its immanent demise, be done with
the impulse it has created."(J, 43) Though the formal premises of Western philosophy and
science may turn out to be false, belief in the truth of those premises has harnessed
enormous powers of disciplined observation which have enabled humanity to overcome
its most immediate and instinctive reactions to their environment.(Davey, xv)

Christianity has brought about a moment of supreme self-examination, a great noontide, a
view of total history. The Christian impulse will carry the lately risen nihilism to its
logical and psychological conclusion and bring about a counter-action within nihilism
itself.(J, 44) Jung would explain this counter action, at this ultimate end, as the workings
of the enantiodromia. He would criticise it as dangerous as it involved only a movement
from one extreme to another. While Nietzsche was a man of extremes, Jung did prefer
the ideal of balance and synthesis.
SUFFERING AND SELF SACRIFICE

Nietzsche is famous for his criticism of the self abasement involved in Christianity and the degradation of life involved in asceticism. Nevertheless, he would be the last to deny the existence of holy suffering or the wounded healer. If Nietzsche did take on an initiatory illness in order to learn spiritual secrets, I would argue, he did so gladly. If he was, as Jung says, as much the victim of Thus Spoke Zarathustra as he was its author, he was gladly its victim. If he was an anchorite suffering marginalisation and isolation (S1, 425) and even madness, this was a role he gladly took on.

Nietzsche was entirely ready to accept the role of the suffering hero, although the philosopher would claim that the suffering that he advocated is very different from that advocated by Christianity. Christian suffering negates life, but Dionysian suffering celebrates it. As explained in the section on Christianity, there are two kinds of sufferers. There are those who suffer from the overfullness of life who rely on Dionysian art and possess a tragic view of life. And then there are those who suffer from the impoverishment of life and seek rest, stillness, calm seas, redemption from themselves through art and knowledge, or intoxication, convulsions, anesthesia, and madness.(GS, 328)(T, 77) As stated earlier, the Dionysian man lives in the same world as his decadent counterpart but he is strong enough to transform the meaninglessness of life into a cause for celebration.(T, 77)

Nietzsche admired the passion behind religious asceticism. Not unlike Christ's dictum that one must be hot or cold, Nietzsche’s philosophy was also one of extremes.(T, 80) The nonreligious culture which becomes nonspiritual has thrown the baby out with
the bath water. Thiele explains that modern culture is decadent because it has proved incapable of sublimating religious passions. Jung would certainly agree that it is vital that humankind learn to rechannel its religiosity. The use of religious passions in the service of the Dionysian experience is the force behind Nietzsche’s own ascetic tendencies. (T, 146) The artist and philosopher are typically portrayed by Nietzsche as anchorites whose sensual self-denial allows greater creativity and spiritualisation. (T, 147) In Nietzsche’s philosophy, ascetic self-denial begets a spiritualised hedonism. This is not practiced as a means to some experience of a higher world, but as a means and ends which arrange a self-overcoming as a self-fulfilling activity. (T, 148)

Like anything else asceticism has its decadent form. Religious asceticism in particular the Christian form of it, was the misdirected reaction to suffering. Instead of being accepted in all its meaninglessness, suffering was bestowed with the meaning of punishment for sins committed. (T, 148)

Ironically, the Christian priest’s yearning to escape the human condition brought about the greatest development of man’s urge to live. (T, 148) Nietzsche asserts that the ascetic priest represents the incarnate desire to be different, to be in a different place, and indeed this desire to its greatest extreme. Even when he wounds himself, this master of destruction, of self-destruction, the very wound itself afterward compels him to live. (GM. 120-121) (T, 149) The purpose of self denial should be an increased capacity for affirmation. The ascetic does not feed on the brief pleasures of the senses because he wants them to grow more powerful. (T, 149)
Jung describes the enantiodromia as occurring in the individual when they are pushed to the limit and find their opposite. (S1, 439) Though Nietzsche did not have any interest in the synthesis, which Jung saw as the ultimate conclusion of the enantiodromia, the philosopher was certainly interested in this shift at the limit of opposites. Nietzsche throws a positive light on illness, asceticism and even Christianity with this very idea. All forces whose reactive character Nietzsche exposes, he later admits fascinate him. Illness, being reactive, separates us from what we can do, but in another way, it reveals a new capacity. It endows us with a new will that we can make our own. In going to the limit of illness, or some other such base thing, we discover a strange new power. Looking from the perspective of the sick, we discover healthier concepts and values. A sublime new perspective is opened to us because of the disturbing will to power base experience bears witness to. Not just the sick man but the religious man present us with this double aspect. (D, 66) As Nietzsche rather humourously explains it, “Human history would be altogether too stupid a thing without the spirit that the impotent have introduced into it.” (GM I, 7 p.33) (D, 66)

Nietzsche believes that there are reactive forces that become grandiose and fascinating by following the will to nothingness. Conversely there are also active forces which subside because they do not know how to follow the powers of affirmation. The problem of culture involves the fact that the rich and healthy look down, and the poor and sick have few places to look but up. (D, 67)

Jung argues that Thus Spoke Zarathustra was both a product of neurosis and an act of self-destruction on Nietzsche’s part. Nietzsche was well aware of the fact that he was walking on dangerous ground. Both the philosopher and the psychologist agree that
in order for something new to be created, the old must be destroyed. However, while perhaps Nietzsche expected the tragic fate that awaits the hero to be more of a metaphorical occurrence, Jung understood his fate in terms of a violent psychological death. Both the philosopher and the psychologist agree that to be in life is to suffer. We suffer because as human beings we strive for a goal attainable only to Gods. The goals of the Gods can only be approximated by humans.

Nietzsche states that destruction and creation are inseparable within the dynamic of self-overcoming. “You do not have the courage to burn up and perish: and so you never know that which is new. What today are my wings, power, clothes, and color, shall be my ashes tomorrow.”(GW 14:13)(T, 24) The imperative is to be a phoenix. “All great things bring about their own destruction through an act of self-overcoming,” wrote Nietzsche, foreseeing and lauding his own destiny.(GM 161)(T, 24)

The fruit of the hero’s struggle is unattainable; he is a mortal who seeks immortality, a man who desires to be a God.(T, 24) As he reaches for what he cannot grasp he grows in strength and therefore welcomes the temptation to overstep his limits. “That his fate is preordained, that he is doomed to perish through his own excesses, is a matter of indifference...Heroism is the good will to self-destruction.”(GW, 14:52-53)(T, 25) As Thiele explains, self-sacrifice is not in itself desired; it is simply the by product of a struggle to attain a goal that is forever out of reach.(T, 25) The hero must justify his existence a posteriori, by setting himself a noble goal, by making of himself something that redeems life, and by risking and often loosing his life as a result. Jung would certainly agree with Thiele’s assertion that “Divine ends and mortal means ensure a tragic fate.”(T, 26)
Jung states that Nietzsche preaches an extreme individualism, a uniqueness which fosters an intense isolation, loneliness and differentiation. According to Thiele, this is all part of Nietzsche's modern "heroism of knowledge" which requires all the courage possessed by its classical forerunner, but it has "at length grown subtle spiritual and intellectual." (Z, 313) (T, 23) From the greatest dangers the greatest glory is won. The great dangers of the modern world are not to be found at the end of a spear, but with pen in hand on solitary walks. (T, 23)

The modern hero finds his nemesis in himself as he totters on the edge of nihilism. His payment for glory is not in the coin of sweat and blood, but in isolation, anguish, spiritual torment, and perhaps ultimately in the loss of sanity. Valor's task is to seek out this strife and walk this precipice. (T, 23)

Nietzsche's descriptions of the trials and tribulations of the modern hero echo the accounts given by the solitary anchorites of the early Christian church, who claim to be attacked by hoards of demons. Shirley Toulson states that this was an accepted hazard, a risk taken by those who isolated themselves from their fellows; and it can be explained by the psychological fact that, as natural projections onto other people are necessarily withdrawn, they take on a more sinister form. These solitaries were not recluses cut off from the miseries around them. They withdrew from the business of the world in order to confront its suffering. (ST, 98) Thiele explains that this path will be trod only by those whose strength allow the transformation of existential pain into spiritual pleasure. (T, 24) "What makes one heroic? - Going out to meet at the same time one's highest suffering and one's highest hope." (GS, 219) (T, 24)
The Nietzschean anchorite goes out into the wilderness, “To struggle to be a law unto oneself, to speak of one’s way, but not the way, is to experience the force of Nietzschean solitude.” (T, 173) Theile states that the “whole of Zarathustra is a dythyramb on solitude.” (EH 234)(T, 174)\textsuperscript{ix} He explains that “Zarathustra’s first words indicate the educator is a lone star that wishes to shine for others; its internally produced light testifies that it is a sun, subject to no laws but its own, revolving around nothing but itself.” (T, 174) It is very important that his own ideals, rather than the force of the zeitgeist, pull him along.(T, 176)

He strives to assert his individuality, to distinguish himself. He therefore excludes himself from the common life. Yet without the security of group identity he becomes susceptible to the seductions of fame. Morality and customs are the means whereby the worth, dignity, and function of the common man are acknowledged. The solitary must live without these forms of social recognition. He seeks to be honoured by the rejection of these standards.(T, 178)

Thiele states that one of the most enduring images of Nietzsche’s work is the shadow, which follows the wanderer as his alter ego. We meet this figure not only in Zarathustra but in “The Wanderer and the Shadow” in Human all to Human. The wanderer cannot run away from his shadow, it is both his comforter and constant critic.(T, 179) “But yourself will always be the worst enemy you can encounter; you yourself lie in wait for yourself in caves and forests.”(Z, 90)(T, 179) Jung argues that Nietzsche does not ultimately accept his Shadow. Whether this is true or not, Nietzsche’s solitary leaves society, at least in part, to encounter this very being. Just as Christian anchorites encountered demons during their sojourns to the deserts, in the forests
Zarathustra encounters his shadow, part of which, if we use the Jungian definition of the term, includes his devil. For both Jung and Nietzsche, the encounter with one’s devil is the basis for a fuller consciousness.

Nietzsche’s anchorite Zarathustra differs from the Christian anchorite in that he does not fend off his demons, but rather affirms them as his new God. “Thou lonesome one,” says Zarathustra, “thou goes the way of the creating one; a God wilt thou create for thyself out of seven devils.” (Z, 61) It is in the shadow that Nietzsche meets the Superman. In “the Happy Isles,” Zarathustra states, “The beauty of the Superman came to me as a shadow. Ah my brethren of what account now are - the Gods to me?” (Z, 84)

The trials of Nietzsche’s anchorite are very perilous. Some perish from solitude descending into madness, others survive: their works of genius evidence of their victory. Thiele asserts that Nietzsche experienced both of these fates. (T, 180) He goes on to say that,

In this matter the appropriate question is not why Nietzsche became insane, but why he became incapable of bearing his insanity. For the solitary is always courting madness. His self-challenge is to see how much truth can be endured, and this truth is none other than his life sentence of spiritual solitude. The extent to which he can transform this condemnation into a triumphant celebration of the self is the mark of his heroism...When the truth becomes more than he can bear, his work of genius founders. He looses his sense of limits, of style. He can no longer present the chaos he is as a cosmos, an aesthetic whole. (T, 180-81)

As with sickness, Nietzsche possesses a love-hate relationship with madness. While he is critical about madness in some circumstances, he views it like he does sickness. He views it as an opportunity for insight. He states that “All superior men who were irresistibly drawn to throw off the yoke of any kind of morality and frame new laws
had, if they were not actually mad, no alternative but to make themselves or pretend to be mad."(Daybreak, 14)(T, 181)\textsuperscript{x}

Thiele asserts that for Nietzsche, madness proved to be the final release from the individual’s perpetual struggle.(T, 181) He cites the following quote from Daybreak to illustrate his point.

Who would venture to take a look in the wilderness of bitterest and most superfluous agonies of the soul in which probably the most fruitful men of all times have languished! To listen to the sighs of the solitary and agitated minds: Ah give me madness, you heavenly powers! Madness that I may at last but believe in myself! (Daybreak, 14,15)(T, 181)

But whom, Thiele asks, does he petition? What is a devout atheist doing crying out to heavenly powers. We learn from Zarathustra that the solitary appeals to the deity within to lift him above himself and beyond himself.(T, 182) “Behold I teach you the Overman: he is the lightening, he is the madness.”(Z, 43)(T, 182)

ENANTIODROMIA

Prompted by a question from Mrs. Cowley on why Nietzsche seems to contradict himself, Jung explains that Nietzsche stands at the end of an old epoch and the beginning of a new one. He states that “Whatever one says about Zarathustra must immediately be contradicted, as he contradicts himself in every word, because he is at an end and a beginning.”(S2, 1132) As Peter Bishop states, “According to Jung the underlying psychological dynamic in Zarathustra is that of enantiodromia, or the emergence of the unconscious opposite in chronological sequence.”(B, 277) “It expresses renewal and self
destruction, the death of a god and the birth of god...The end is a beginning: what has come to an end is reborn in the moment when it ceases to be.”(S2, 1132)

This supposition is certainly confirmed by Nietzsche’s belief that one must pass through a stage of nihilism before one can come to a philosophy of affirmation; that one must pass through a period of nay saying before one is able to say ‘yea’. Here again we see the pattern of ascent and descent, of death and rebirth.

Just as Christianity leads to atheism, nihilism is in fact defeated by itself. As Deleuze explains, transmutation constitutes completed nihilism.(D, 172) Nihilism expresses the quality of negation, but it cannot be brought to completion without transmuting itself into the opposite quality. Dionysus transmutes pain into joy. Ariadne says we must first hate ourselves if we are to truly love ourselves. But how is this to be accomplished?(D, 173) When reactive forces break their alliance with the will to nothingness, the will to nothingness in turn breaks its alliance with the reactive. This inspires man with a new inclination to destroy himself, but to destroy himself actively. Zarathustra praises the man of active self-destruction.(D, 174) “I love him who liveth in order to know, and seeketh to know in order that the Superman may hereafter live. Thus he seeks his own down going.”(Z, 8)

Destruction becomes active when the negative is transmuted and converted into affirmative power; the eternal joy of becoming. This eternal joy of becoming is avowed in the instant of the “joy of annihilation.” This, explains Deleuze, is the decisive point in Dionysian philosophy at which negation expresses an affirmation of life, destroys reactive forces and restores the rights of activity.(D, 174) Nihilism reaches completion by passing through the passive nihilism of the last man, but also in going beyond him to the man
who wants to perish. In the man who want to perish, to be overcome, negation has
broken everything which still held it back. It becomes a power which prepares us for the
Superman.(D, 175)

Zarathustra asks not, how man shall be preserved but how he shall be overcome.
The Superman is defined as a new way of feeling and a new way of thinking, other than
in terms of Divine preservation. It involves not a change of values but a new way of
evaluating.(D, 163)

Deleuze states that the higher man is the underlying theme in Zarathustra.(D, 163)
Different manifestations of the higher man are the prophet, the two kings, the man with
the leeches, the sorcerer, the last pope, the ugliest man, the voluntary beggar and the
shadow. The fact that there are so many variants of this one phenomenon shows us the
ambivalent and reactive character of the higher man. Zarathustra himself is working his
way through the existence the higher man in order to the break through to the Superman.
As such, he has both differences and similarities with the characters he encounters in the
process of the story.

One of the aspects of nihilism, which the higher man is connected to, is the death
of God. In the chapter entitled "Higher Man" Zarathustra says, "Now however this God
hath died! Ye higher men, this God was your greatest danger. Only since he lay in the
grave have ye again arisen."

(Z, 276)

The prophet (or the soothsayer) is a passive nihilist. From his mouth come the
words, "And I saw a great sadness come over mankind. The best turned weary of their
works...A doctrine appeared 'All is empty, all is alike, all hath been. Verily, even for
dying have we become too weary; now do we keep awake and live on in sepulchers.'"
132) The prophet goes on to enact the last temptation of Zarathustra, to seduce him to his last sin, pity. Zarathustra refuses to be tempted.

The sorcerer or magician betrays Dionysus, he is the falsely tragic one. From him we hear the lines. “By thee, cruelest huntsman, Thou unfamiliar God. But torture, torture? For why me torture, thou mischief loving unfamiliar God.”(Z, 243, 244) As Deleuze states, the ugliest man represents reactive nihilism; “the reactive man who has turned his ressentiment towards God, he has put himself in the place of the God he has killed, but he does not stop being full of bad conscience and ressentiment.”(D, 165) The two kings are the two extremes of morality and culture. “They represent species activity grasped in the prehistoric principle of determination of customs but also the post-historic product where customs are supressed.”(D, 165) The kings are very disillusioned with their own kingdoms. Their power seems very empty to them. They approve of short periods of peace, but long periods of peace make them ashamed, because the occurrence of war makes one love life more.(Z, 238)

Deleuze asserts that the “Man of Leeches” is a man of science. The knowledge that is provided by leeches is the sort of knowledge that cuts life.(D, 165)

For the sake of the leech did I lie here by this swamp, like a fisher, and already had mine outstretched arm been bitten ten times, when there biteth a still finer leech at my blood, Zarathustra himself… I am the spiritually conscientious one… and in matters of the spirit it is difficult for any one to take it more rigorously, more restrictedly and more severely than I… How long have I investigated this one thing, the brain of the leech, so that here the slippery truth might no longer slip from me! Here is my domain! For the sake of this did I cast everything else aside, for the sake of this did everything else become indifferent to me, and close beside my knowledge lieth my black ignorance. My spiritual conscience requireth from me that it should be so - that I should know one thing, and not know all else…
Because thou once saidest, O Zarathustra: ‘Spirit is life which itself cutteth into life’ - that led and allured me to thy doctrine. And verily with mine own blood here I increased mine own knowledge!”(Z, 241-42)

Through striving for certainty, he, the man of science, learns that science is not even an objective knowledge of the leech and of its primary causes, but only a knowledge of the leech’s brain, knowledge which is no longer knowledge because it must identify itself with the leech or the scientific method.(D, 165)

The last pope represents the product of culture as religion, he served God until the end and in doing so lost an eye. The lost eye, asserts Deleuze, is undoubtedly the eye which saw the active affirmative Gods, the remaining eye follows the God of Christianity and Judaism throughout history.(D, 165)

‘The Voluntary Beggar’ once cast away great riches, but then became ashamed of his wealth and cast it away. He then “fled to the poorest to bestow upon them his abundance and his heart...but they received him not.”(Z, 260) The voluntary beggar was seeking ‘the kingdom of heaven,’ or ‘happiness on earth’ as a product of human, species and cultural activity. He wanted, however, to know who this ‘kingdom’ belonged to and what this cultural activity represented; science, morality, religion, poverty or work? He eventually discovered that the kingdom of heaven is no more among the poor than it is among the rich: everywhere there is a mob, “populace above, populace below.”(Z, 261)

Deleuze maintains that the shadow is species activity itself, culture and its movement. One could argue that this description parallels Jung’s description of the movement of the collective unconscious into consciousness. As the shadow wanders it looses the product and principle of species activity and hunts for them desperately. (D, 166) “Let it run after me;” says Zarathustra, “I run from it.” Zarathustra laughs at himself
for being afraid of his own shadow but then turns and is frightened by it. "Who are thou," Zarathustra asks, "What doest thou here? And why callest thou thyself my shadow? Thou art not pleasing to me." (Z, 263) The shadow answers,

A wanderer am I, who have walked long at thy heels; always on the way, but without a goal, also without a home...With thee I have pushed into all the forbidden, all the worst and the furthest: and if there be anything of virtue in me, it is that I have had no fear of any prohibition. With thee I have broken up whatever my heart revered; all boundary-stones and statues have I o'erthrown, the most dangerous wishes I did pursue - verily, beyond every crime did I once go. With thee I did unlearn the belief in words and worths and in great names...Nothing is true all is permitted: so said I to myself. (Z, 264)

The shadow experiences, along with Zarathustra, the homelessness due which resulted from his refusal to submit to any one system of belief. "To such unsettled ones as thou, seemeth at last even a prisoner blessed. Didst thou ever see how captured criminals sleep? They sleep quietly, they enjoy their new security. Beware lest a narrow faith capture thee." (Z, 265)

Deleuze explains that higher man is made up of two things, reactive forces and their triumph, as well as species activity and its product. This is why Zarathustra treats the higher man in two ways, as the enemy who will consider any trap to divert him from his path and as companion who is engaged in enterprises similar to Zarathustra himself. But why are folk bearing the name 'Higher Men' prone to reactive forces at all? (D, 166) The answer to this question is that man is reactive by his very essence. (D, 167) "Overmeu" or Supermen are people who have gone beyond the essentially human trait of being reactive. They have overcome their human essence.
Reactive forces lack a will that goes beyond itself, but becoming active only exists in and through the will to nothingness. An activity which does not raise itself to the powers of affirming an activity, which trusts the labour of the negative, is too, destined to failure. In its very principle it turns into its opposite. (D, 169) Reaction, Deleuze explains, will never become action without deeper conversion. The negative must first become the power of affirming. The conditions which would make the enterprise of higher man viable are conditions which would change the very nature of higher man. Here Nietzsche speaks about a superhuman Dionysian power of affirmation, which man, and above all higher man, lacks. Higher man does not know how to laugh and play and dance. “To laugh is to affirm one’s life even in suffering. To play is to affirm chance and the necessity of chance. To dance is to affirm becoming and the being of becoming.” (D, 170)

THE AFFIRMATION OF THE SHADOW

Jung argues that while Nietzsche does much to bring the Shadow of bourgeois Christianity or of conventional modern morality out into the open, he is ultimately unable to accept his own Shadow. According to Jungian psychology, a major step towards individuation or Self realization, consists of recognising and integrating the Shadow, the negative or the inferior, that is, the undeveloped or undifferentiated side of the personality. (W, 424) In the Psychology of Religion Wulff states that,

The shadow is made up of all the reprehensible qualities that the individual wishes to deny, including animal tendencies that we have inherited from our infrahuman ancestors, as well as all the modes and qualities that the individual has simply not developed, some of which may be wholly good and desirable...The more unaware a person is of the
shadow, says Jung, the blacker and denser it will be. The more it is
dissociated from conscious life, the more it will display compensatory
demonic dynamism. The unrecognized shadow is projected upon persons
or groups who are then thought to embody all the immature, evil, and
repressed tendencies that are actually resident in an individual’s own
psyche...It occasionally happens that the ego identifies with the shadow,
producing ‘the moment of Dionysian frenzy,’ in which the victim of the
archetype feels like a godlike being who is beyond good and evil.(Jung,
1943, 1951a, 1954a)(W, 424)\xii

The Shadow of bourgeois Christianity involves Dionysian vs. Apollonian
qualities. It involves qualities long associated with the devil such as the earthly, the
bodily, the feminine as well as passion verses intellect. The Shadow of Christianity is also
bound up with concern for the self versus concern for the neighbor. Nietzsche, as stated
earlier, affirms egoism. According to Nietzsche there is a hierarchy of instinct. Some
instincts are decadent, some are life affirminng. There are no selfless actions but one has
the choice to follow one’s higher life affirming instincts or to give way to one’s lower
decadent self - there is both good and bad egoism.(T, 74) As stated above in the section
on Christianity, healthy egoism is not to be equated with petty-selfishness. Today healthy
egoism is termed self-esteem. We can describe it as an underdeveloped quality which
“may be wholly good and desirable.” Nietzsche, however, takes this love of self to
extremes which are hard to accept. His conception of love to others is also difficult to
accept.

Because “True self-love ‘presupposes an unblendable duality (or multiplicity) in
one person” (HH, 230)(T, 151), it ought to involve an interplay of self-love and self-
contempt. True love to another human being elicits that person’s individuality. For
Nietzsche to love is to idealise, to desire the birth of that which rests in a state of
pregnancy. It marks an active, participatory relationship. Love become decadent is
pity. (T, 151) “All great love is above pity,” Zarathustra says, “for it wants-to create what
is loved.” (Z, 114) (T, 152) Nietzsche was a great advocate of what might charitably be
called ‘tough love.’ Thiele states that Nietzsche’s infamous admonitions to cruelty are
not justifications of the feelingless affliction of pain for its own sake. Cruelty is one of
the forms love takes in the struggle to realise ideals. It is actually a form of compassion
which uses suffering to elevate man. (T, 152)

If bourgeois Christianity’s Shadow encompassed qualities such as the bodily and
the egotistical, Nietzsche’s own personal Shadow involved characteristics which
Nietzsche designated as making up slave mentality. Slave mentality features pity and
collectivity. While its true that Nietzsche did consider these qualities essentially decadent,
he also saw them as necessary components of the psyche. Just as Jung’s psychology
advises us to accept our Shadow or our demon, Nietzsche’s philosophy of eternal return
advises that we accept both our ascending and descending qualities. We need our weak
points to remind us that we are not perfect, that we still have something to strive for.
Great love is complimented with great contempt. The doctrine of eternal return is
integrally connected to what Jung terms the enantiodromia. Carried to an extreme, a
force or phenomenon passes into its opposite. If you go to the very end of a thing it must
change. (S1, 439)

Thiele explains that Nietzsche’s interpretive dualism gives rise to much of the
ambiguity and outright contradiction in Nietzsche’s writings. Philosophy, art, morality,
even pessimism and nihilism all have their higher and lower forms. Just as a phenomenon
is characterised by the forces possessing it, be they active or passive, the value of a virtue
depends on he who is exercising it. According to Nietzsche, the mark of a higher thinker is his ability to do without Manichean conceptualisations, or to put it more simply, to do without opposites. The need for a fixed value is a symptom of weakness and decline.

Would not a completely ordered soul do without ...reveling in meaningless chaos without trying to establish any philosophical ground upon which to stand? The answer is yes, but the completely ordered soul does not exist. Man like all other life forms is in a constant state of becoming. There is no stability only ascent or decline.

Nietzsche held all ordered society to be in a state of decline. The soul which has reached a steady ordered state has ceased to grow and is thus already decaying. For the soul, as for society, the aim is not so much the establishment of order, as the act of establishing order. Decadence is thus not to be avoided but combatted, sickness is a stimulant to life. The only difficulty is one must be healthy enough for the struggle. Only by allowing oneself to experience decadence can it truly be understood and overcome. The proper attitude for the Superman is summed up in the assertion, “What does not kill me makes me stronger.”

“Nietzsche at once celebrates and loathes the modern world’s spiritlessness: it is a world pregnant with greatness, although its pregnancy will be marked with suffering and naseau.” According to Nietzsche, to exist is to suffer. The more developed the consciousness, the greater the affliction; for it is not physical pain per se, but its lack of significance that is the greatest torment. Thus the greater the suffering the greater the potential for joy, the greater the potential for learning.
human happiness, you comfortable and benevolent people,” Nietzsche observed, “for
happiness and unhappiness are sisters and even twins that either grow up together or as,
in your case shall remain together.”(GS, 270)(T, 93) “All growth, all health, all wisdom,
and in the end, all higher pleasure and joy are the products of suffering and its
transformation through will.”(T, 95)

As Thiele explains, because love is effectively a yearning and struggling for
perfection, it is inseparable from contempt, that is, the distaste for exhibition and
leadership of the lower self.(T, 150) This is not the priestly contempt which eats away at
self-esteem but rather “the great loving contempt which loves where it despises most.”(Z,
239)(T, 150) One does not wish to eradicate lower tendencies. What one wishes, is to
overcome them, realising that the dynamics of ascending and declining drives define life.
Jung, like Nietzsche, seeks to affirm both the dark and light aspects of the human being.
The Self must be affirmed as a whole. Self-love, Nietzsche explains, must counteract the
gnawing guilt known to the religious man. He who is Godless must be his own pardoner.
In Nietzsche’s philosophy self-forgiveness becomes the joyful acceptance of one’s
decadence as an opportunity for growth. Here we have a description of Nietzsche’s
concept of eternal return. As Thiele explains, to love one’s fate means to fully affirm
one’s life, not to resentfully oppose it. But only a changing self, who goes through
difficult and weak periods in his or her life can accept what is. It is through the eyes of
deficiency that ideals are seen.(T, 200) It seems in this context that even the poor in spirit
may indeed be blessed.

While Zarathustra begins by running from his “Shadow” he eventually turns to
meet it. As Thiele explains, because of his solitude, he is forced to encounter his shadow.
The wanderer cannot run away from his shadow, it is both his comforter and constant critic. (T, 179)

“But yourself will always be the worst enemy you can encounter; you yourself lie in wait for yourself in caves and forests.” (Z, 90) (T, 179)

---

CHAPTER 3

DISAGREEMENTS, THE OTHER SIDE OF THE PARADOX

Jung asserts that everything one says about Nietzsche must immediately be contradicted because Nietzsche is always contradicting himself. Nietzsche’s writings are full of paradoxes. Jung argues that the reason for this is Nietzsche had one leg in the Nineteenth Century and one leg in the Twentieth. I would argue that the reason for the paradoxes in Nietzsche’s philosophy is that what is vital and healthy takes precedence over ontological truth.

Nietzsche states that, “Who feels the will’s lack of freedom is spiritually ill: who denies it is stupid.” (GW, 14:58) (T, 72) While Nietzsche acknowledges the influence of an unconscious Self, he advises us that it is unhealthy to be conscious of that influence. Nietzsche had much to say about the ontological or biological goings on of the instincts and forces which inhabit the unconscious, but to be conscious of these goings on, to be conscious that our actions are being dictated by activities of the unconscious, will make our actions reactions. This leads to the profoundly unhealthy life of the ressentimental man.

This does not mean that creative forces come from the conscious mind; quite the contrary is the case. Conscious forces are reactive, unconscious forces are active. It is the healthy creative person who is led by unconscious instincts. What this means, is that Nietzsche is against acting with the consciousness of a two tiered system. He is against the policy of paying homage to a metaphysical World of Being. Nietzsche is against the
idea that our conscious world is a secondary World of Becoming, a world in which we live among second class replications or manifestations of a greater World of Forms.

Nietzsche does not locate the Self ontologically in the conscious ego, but it is important that we experience life as if it were located there. Once we believe that the Self is separate from our ego, the ego loses its vitalising connection with the Self. The reason it is important to perceive active power, as being located in conscious action and conscious creation, is that creative power is kinetic. It lies not in the mediation of a power which has previously existed in potential, but in the action of the actualisation of that power. To lie, to forget or to imagine are our only weapons against the knowledge of the deterministic forces of the body and the essentially painful nature of life. Creativity and health lie in the philosophy which maintains the experience that we are indeed free individuals, whose lives are not dictated by unseen forces we have no control over. The will to power must be perceived as our own. The perception of the freedom of our will emancipates us from our fate, or at least it allows us to affirm it.

On one side of Nietzsche's philosophy is the ontological acknowledgment of the power of the unconscious. On the other side of the paradox is his insistence on maintaining the experience that the individual is in full control and full ownership of the creative powers he wields. On one side of Nietzsche's philosophy is the acknowledgment of the inherently painful and chaotic nature the universe. On the other side of the paradox is the artist's ability to create illusory images and thought constructs which act as a healing salve for this pain and chaos. On one side of Nietzsche's philosophy is a begrudging respect for the will to truth which leads to nihilism. On the other side of the
paradox is the affirmation of that which allows us to go on living, that which is vital, not that which is ontologically true.

At the moment of eternal return, the individual affirms his fate, not as the result of biological determinism, but as the chance throw of the dice. The acknowledgment of either determinism or a metaphysical teleology, however positive, leaves us with the same result, the detraction from the individual of the freedom to write his own life story. The individual acknowledges the inherently chaotic nature of fate and the universe, because it is only the acknowledgment of the illusory or provisional nature of rules and intelligible forms that allows us to gain the freedom to reinterpret and recreate.

There is no such paradoxical divide in Jung’s philosophy. Meaningful forms are not merely the creation of the conscious but result the result of the cooperation of the conscious and unconscious. In Jung’s view, the acknowledgment of the teleology inherent in the psyche, is not synonymous with being bound to determinism. The unconscious dictates our actions only when we are unconscious of them. Once we become conscious of unconscious forces we may engage them in discussion. For this reason Jung is in direct disagreement with the advice that we remain unconscious of the influence of unconscious forces. It is a mistake to believe that their power belongs to ego consciousness. It is vital that we recognise that our will is not fully free, because if we do not, it will act on us in a destructive manner. We must differentiate our ego from the forces of the unconscious or we will be overrun by it. Zarathustra himself says, “All suppressed truths become poisonous.” (Z. 113) If we do not acknowledge that the will is not fully free it will eventually be robbed of all of its freedom.
While Jung and Nietzsche agree in many respects on ontology, Jung saw a positive balancing and ordering force proceeding from the unconscious and Nietzsche saw order as being entirely an illusory product of the conscious mind. While Jung’s philosophy describes a cooperative action between the conscious and unconscious leading to a state of balance and equilibrium, Nietzsche’s philosophy tells the tale of the individual’s struggle to affirm the ontological truth of chaos through the joy of the recognition of his conscious creative abilities.

THE DIALECTIC

Jung believes that a synthesis or reconciliation of opposites, may be actualised in the Self through the use of transcendent symbols, which bring together the conscious and unconscious. Nietzsche believes in periods of Dionysian ecstasy when ascending and descending qualities are both entirely accepted in eternal return. In this event, opposites are joyously affirmed as existing within the whole of an individual. The Nietzschean endeavors to makes a cosmos out of the chaos of the psyche through the creative process of revaluation. He attempts to “compose and collect into unity what is fragment in man…” (Z, 193)

Deleuze maintains that Nietzsche was starkly opposed to the Hegelian struggle of the Dialectic. According to Nietzsche, life struggles with another kind of life, and these differing forms of life should not be reconciled. This reconciliation is the will to death. The concept of the Superman is directed against the Dialectical conception of man and directed towards the affirmation and enjoyment of difference. Deleuze asserts that seeing differences as being involved in opposition, is the nihilistic way of perceiving the
situation. What a will truly wants is to affirm its difference. But the Dialectician no longer has the strength to affirm it, so instead it reacts in opposition to the forces which dominate it. This is the character of slave morality. (D, 7) In this way, reactive forces produce an inverted self image. Genealogy, as opposed to the Hegelian Dialectic, is described by Nietzsche as a active process. Genealogy's reflected image appears as Evolution. Evolution is sometimes seen as the Hegelian development of contradiction. (D, 55)

Nietzsche is a pluralist. He believes that differences should be affirmed not eliminated. In the *Seminars*, Jung explains that Nietzsche seeks to name and affirm the many virtues within the psyche, until the individual is crucified and torn apart by those virtues. (S1, 448) This would be fine if this *sparagmos* led to a later reunification, but Nietzsche, it can be argued, does not crave unity. Jung believes this pluralism is a recipe for schizophrenia. Nietzsche in contrast, believes that it is the tension and conflict between our many forces which keeps us vital. While Jung assents to the fact that this tension can provide whoever houses it in his psyche with a certain energy, he also asserts that this energy will ultimately work to his own undoing.

If a scholar wishes to assert that it was Nietzsche's intention to synthesise opposites, she could base her argument on Nietzsche's first major work, *The Birth of Tragedy*. Deleuze states that *The Birth of Tragedy* was written before Nietzsche came out against the Dialectic. In the course of the bood Apollo and Dionysus are eventually synthesised. The pain of individuation is resolved in the higher pleasure of the superabundance of universal willing, which Nietzsche (under the influence of Schopenhauer), called the ground of being. (D, 11) Greek Tragedy embodies this
reconciliation. Apollo develops Dionysus' tragic suffering into a drama of images. Kant, Schopenhauer and Wagner are modern representatives of this sort of process. They all attempt in their own way to reproduce and resolve contradiction. (D, 12) However, Deleuze assures us, The Birth of Tragedy also points to a new un-Dialectic approach. (D, 13)

A key difference in Nietzsche and Jung's understanding of the struggle of forces is, although he may not have admitted it, Jung's understanding is similar to that of Hegel's Dialectic. In Jung's view, the conscious and unconscious, the Shadow and the ego come into conflict and ultimately ought to be reconciled. According to Deleuze, Nietzsche would say that the conflict and reconciliation of opposites is only an appearance. He states that the Dialectic thrives on oppositions because it is unaware of far more subtle and subterranean differential mechanisms. According to Deleuze, in Nietzsche's opinion, Hegel's talk of universals and particulars does not even skim the surface of interpretation, and it never goes beyond the domain of symptoms. It confuses interpretation with the development of the uninterpretable symbol. The Dialectic talks about contradiction because it only knows of what goes on in intermediate regions. (D, 157) Deleuze states that Nietzsche's work is directed against the Dialectic for three reasons. It misinterprets sense or the nature of the forces which concretely appropriate phenomena. It misinterprets essence because it does not know the real element from which forces derive. It misinterprets change and transformation because it is content to work with permutations of abstract and unreal terms. (D, 158) In Nietzsche's view phenomena, such as social constructs, religions and even language, should be regarded in terms of the intentions and volitions which either begot them in the beginning, or have
come to possess them in the present. There is no such thing as a phenomenon which is abstract and objective. It is always run by one force or another.

Thiele disagrees with Deleuze's assertion that Nietzsche was essentially anti-Dialectic. I would agree with Thiele's argument that Nietzsche was only anti-Dialectic in anti-Socratic anti-Hegelian sense. Not Dialectic negation but affirmation is held to be the project. Thiele argues that Deleuze ignored the inseparability of destruction and creation for Nietzsche, just as he ignored the creative and affirmative aspects of Dialectical thought. Nietzsche's description of Dialectic as "an erotic contest," and "a new artistic form of the Greek agon" (TI, 81), identify it as a heroic mode of philosophizing. (T, 81) The "erotic contest," of which Thiele speaks, is creative. It creates more difference. It does not end in a Jungian or Hegelian synthesis. It does not conclude in a final state of serenity, the purpose of life is the battle itself. (T, 82) "Divinely," states Zarathustra, "We will strive against one another." (Z, 99)

Thiele states, that not unlike Christ's dictum that one must be hot or cold, Nietzsche's philosophy was also one of extremes. (T, 80) His virtues are actually sublimated vices. The capacity of self-sacrifice, self-denial, and self-discipline, for example are actually higher forms of cruelty. (GM, 88) (T, 80) Thiele asserts that good and evil develop in a Dialectical fashion, as do all so-called opposites. (T, 80) One cannot exist without the possibility of the other. (T, 81) "All good is the transformation of evil; every God has a devil as a father." (GW, 14:24) (T, 81) The Dialectic works in both directions, good is the parent of evil, evil the parent of good. "God the father" created "God the Son" in order to think of himself, and subsequently created "God the devil," realising he could not think of himself without thinking of his opposite. (GW 14:307, GM
16-17)(T, 81nt) Those who would erase evil from the face of the earth are ignorant of its necessity for the continued development of goodness. (WP, 164)(T, 81) Absence of struggle is also the absence for the possibility of advancement. (T, 81)

To affirm life as a whole is to affirm even decadence. In society, decadence is the harbinger of progress. This dialectic also displays its effects within the individual. Inner degeneration shows signs of possible growth, an opportunity to increase strength through struggle. (T, 81)

Nietzsche states that one should not even desire a weakening in one’s elements of decadence, for the greater their strength, the greater the victory of mastering them. (WP, 197)(T, 82) Vice is as important as virtue. The greater the chaos within, the more worthy the inner struggle. Nietzsche’s hero is not the one who is fearless, but he who overcomes great fear, not he who is pitiless, but he who overcomes debilitating pity. The purpose of human life is not the establishment of a Utopia in which strife is eliminated. “Life has no purpose but itself. The battle of good and evil is not some prelude to a later state of passivity. Indeed to posit a purpose in life is to demean it to a mere means. Life is struggle nothing more, nothing less.” (T, 82)

Man should work towards the triumph of his higher self. To be sure the lower self is necessary for this achievement. Its extermination is not part of the project nor is its tyrannization. Pluralism within the soul is to be maintained. The good of the whole through the rule of the best is the aim of aristocratic politics...Whoever demands greatness from himself will be subject to unending struggle... (T, 67)

One must love oneself; one must love the plurality one is enough to want to see the drama of life played out. (T, 151) True self-love “presupposes an unblendable duality...
(or multiplicity) in one person.” (HH, 230)(T, 51) It involves the interplay of self-love and self-contempt. The ongoing battle of a world rich in contradictions demands “a lot more spiritual reflection.”(HH, 75)(T, 151) The hero, Thiele asserts, both negates and affirms himself, endlessly struggling to be at rest, waging an inner war that he may truly love himself. And tragically this love of fate is only won temporarily in this ongoing battle for peace. _Amor Fati_, love of one’s fate, the affirmation of eternal return, is the disposition of the Superman, but for man it is only a fleeting mood.(T, 200)

Nietzsche affirms conflict and plurality. He affirms tension as a source of creativity. While Jung would agree that conflict is not resolved within the life time of a human being, the psychologist definitely strove for the unification of opposites. Although to the rational mind, the opposites, which include the fundamental antinomies of masculine and feminine, matter and spirit, good and evil are distinct and irreconcilable, to the unconscious, whose own contents are paradoxical or antinomial by nature (Jung, 1948a, p. 230)\[;\] the unification of opposites is an ever present possibility.(Wulff, 431) The Self seeks their unity. While the analytical capacities of the conscious mind allow us to distinguish, develop and contrast the individual components of the psyche, the creative forces of the unconscious provide symbols that bring these one sided opposing elements together on a higher level, that of consciousness.

As we read in Wulff, “These symbols direct the energy created by the temporarily incapacitating dividedness of thesis and antithesis into a common channel, and life flows again renewed and transformed.”(Jung, 1921, p. 480)\[;\] Jung calls this process the transcendent function. This complex function brings the conscious and unconscious together and allows for an organic transition from a lower attitude to a more unified
The countless archetypal symbols that express and bring about the union of opposites, that mediate the process of individuation, are, according to Jung, none other than the images, dogmas and rites that make up the religious traditions. General psychological education toward psychic wholeness, says Jung (1952b), belongs to the very nature of these traditions, "for religion excels all rationalistic systems in that it alone relates to the outer and inner man in equal degree." (p. 7)(Wulff, 431)

As stated earlier, in contrast to Jung, Nietzsche does not define the unconscious by saying that it is a unified field of forces or a nutrient medium fought over by a plurality of forces. Whereas for Jung, the Self is a kind of ground of being, for Nietzsche, "There is no medium there is no quantity of reality, all reality is related to a quantity of forces."(D, 39) The universe and our psychology is made up of nothing but forces in mutual relations of tension. Every force either obeys or commands. A living being is the arbitrary product of the forces of which it is composed.(D, 40) Though Jung too saw the psyche as being made up of a plurality of forces in mutual relations of tension, I would argue that Jung's world view resembles that of a Hindu, in that the libido, which encompasses all archetypal forces, acts to unify. In contrast, Nietzsche's world view is closer to that of a Buddhist, in which nothing exists but the codependent arising of causes and conditions. There is no overarching unifying force which is existent in the unconscious. The will to power is the winning or dominant will, rather than the sum total of all wills and forces. Unity comes only in the conscious decision to affirm differences and conflicts.

For Nietzsche, the existence of forces is defined by their very conflicts with other forces. Life flows as a result of tension and conflict, not as a result of the synthesis of thesis and antithesis. According to Jung a human being is only capable of withstanding a
certain amount of conflict, that is why we strive towards the peace of the unification of opposites. Jung asserts that Nietzsche’s philosophy causes one to remain fragmentary, putting one on the road to pathology.

Paul Thiele would object to Jung’s reading of Nietzsche as fragmentary. According to Thiele, Nietzsche’s philosophical system does finally draw the plurality into unity. He states that the Nietzschesian’s project is indeed to unify the soul, but not however by the same means that Jung or Hegel would recommend, that is, not through a reconciling synthesis. Thiele states that “The (Nietzschesian’s) self-appointed destiny is to make a cosmos of his chaotic inheritance.” (T, 212) He also remarks that much of recent (deconstructionist) writings on Nietzsche are occupied with his diffusion, dispersion, fragmentation, or destruction of the subject or self. Nietzsche did plan a creative reunification. (T, 212n) As in a piece of art work, many disparate elements are intertwined, seemingly unrelated events are woven together to tell the tale of our lives, a beautiful tale of an unending battle.

TRANSVALUATION AND THE TRANSCENDENT FUNCTION

According to Peter Bishop, Jung believed that Nietzsche put valuation in the place of the transcendent function. He states that Jung implicitly rejects a simple revaluation of values and aims to preserve one set of (conscious) values whilst also acquiring another (unconscious) set. (B, 122) He quotes Gesammelte Werke 7 (the Collected Works in the Original German).

It is of course a fundamental mistake to imagine that when we see the non-value in a value or the untruth in a truth, the value or the truth ceases to exist. It has only become relative. Every human is relative, because
everything rests on an inner polarity; for everything is a phenomenon of energy...The point is not conversion into the opposite but conservation of previous values together with the recognition of their opposites. (GW7 ~ 115-16)

Bishop states that,

In Jungian psychology the values must be revalued not just once, but ceaselessly; the opposites must be overcome over and over again; and the dialectic between conscious and the unconscious is a life’s work. The god must be born, die and be reborn, again and again. (B, 123)

I do not believe that Nietzsche believed in one single transvaluation either. His new value is not one new God or one new set of ideas which oppose the ones that have been held in the past, but rather the act and the energy of revaluation. His message is - it’s not that things held to be “truths” in the past are now seen to be useless but rather that they are now seen to be only tools, not objects which should be worshipped or clung to. As Thiele explains, Nietzsche holds laws to be acceptable conventions, useful for the purposes of sustaining life and human community. Man’s inability to survive or prosper without such beliefs, however, does not justify their enshrinement. What is available to man is not truth but interpretation, not explanation but the creative introduction of meaning. (WP, 327) (T, 108) Cause and effect should only be used as conventional fictions useful for communications. (T, 108) Nicholas Davey states that according to Nietzsche,

Humanities ‘truths’ need to be seen for what they are, namely, creative devices which have enabled it both to transform and discipline itself and to take an interest in the rich contradictions and struggles of existence...The creativity of the Übermensch (Superman) demonstrates that the worth of humanity does not derive from the fictions of Being and truth which it
creates in order to believe in itself but from the creativity which produces such fictions in the first place. By revealing that its own creativity is the primary source of its value the (Superman) allows humanity to overcome its need to create the fiction of something other than itself in order to believe in and justify itself. (Davey, xvi)

**RELATING TO THE UNCONSCIOUS**

As Deleuze explains, Nietzsche’s philosophy reveals its complexity when we realise that a force can only appear appropriate to an object by first of all putting on the mask of forces which already possess the object and eventually conquering the mask. The art of interpreting is the art of piercing masks. (D, 5) Jung might call this piercing of masks the art of discovering unconscious forces, the archetypal interplay with consciousness. Nietzsche uses various archetypal figures as elements in the creative game or experiment of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. Employing the irrational genre of myth, he wrote a new legend reflecting the modern spiritual questions and the journey to reach the Superman. Jung believed that Nietzsche was playing with fire. He believed that Nietzsche did not have enough respect for the autonomy of archetypal powers.

Nietzsche himself certainly realised the dangers of the psyche. The ressentimental man, who continuously lets memory run into the present, is always bound by the past and is never able to act decisively. When Nietzsche describes this man it often sounds as if he is talking of a man on the edge of madness, who is inundated by unconscious forces. Jung, however, would state that simply being unconscious of the fact that one is acting on these forces doesn’t make him a healthy individual. If we are obsessed with our past and are unable to live in the present or look forward to our future, we are in an unhealthy
state, but if we ignore our past and suppress psychological forces, this does not make for a healthy person either.

Jung and Nietzsche’s practical advice on how to deal with the unconscious are in sharp contrast. Nietzsche explains that we react to unconscious traces. So long as we react to these traces without being conscious of our reactions, our reactions too, are in fact actions. However, as soon as we become conscious of these traces we begin reacting and we become ressentimental men or women. We are bound by the fate of determinism. We become the effect of a cause rather than a free beings. The ressentimental man is conscious of being led by fate. Jungian psychology conversely is all about coming to some realisation about the unconscious forces which are acting on us. The unconscious will always be heard. If we do not come to some kind of direct conscious understanding of its forces, it will act on us in some other more dangerous form.

As Deleuze explains, according to Nietzsche, in a normal healthy state, the role of reactive forces is to limit action. Conversely, active forces produce a burst of creativity. In the active type both active and reactive forces are involved. This process involves the ‘normal’ relation between a reaction that delays action and an action that precipitates reaction. The master acts even his reactions, thus reaction does not constitute ressentiment. “Ressentiment is when reactive forces prevail and cease to be acted. Reactions cease to be acted in order to be something felt”. (D, 111) Nietzsche subscribed to a topical theory of the relation between the conscious and unconscious. Our memories are by nature unconscious; consciousness is born at the point where mnemonic traces stop. The formation of the conscious system may be seen as a process of evolution at the boundary between the external and internal world. Consciousness retains only a direct
and changeable image of the objects it perceives as distinct from the changeless image in the unconscious. Although, says Deleuze, Freud was far from accepting this topical hypothesis without reservation, we find this hypothesis in Nietzsche.(D, 112) Clearly here he and Jung would come to a disagreement. Jung believed that, as the relationship between the conscious and unconscious changes, forces in the unconscious will either grow or dwindle in relation to the events going on in the conscious world. Nietzsche’s view of the unconscious is biologically deterministic. Its unchanging world causes changeable effects in the conscious world. Jung in contrast sees cause and effect as going both ways. The conscious and unconscious can engage each other in a mutual dialogue.

In Nietzsche’s psychology there are two systems within the reactive apparatus of the conscious and unconscious. The reactive unconscious is defined by mnemonic traces, lasting imprints. The reactive unconscious is digestive, vegetative and ruminative. It is purely passive. It is impossible to escape an impression once it is received.(D, 112) The other system involves present occurrences where a reaction becomes a reaction to a present excitation in the conscious.(D,113) It will be remembered, states Deleuze, that Nietzsche wished to remind consciousness of its need for modesty; in its origin, in its nature and in its function it is wholly reactive, but it can nevertheless claim a relative responsibility. When reactive forces take conscious excitation as their object then the reaction is acted.(D, 113) In this way the conscious appropriates unconscious powers as its own.

The systems of the two kinds of reactive forces must still be separated. The memory traces must not invade consciousness.(D, 113) There is an active superconscious force which serves to prevent this disaster from occurring, however, that faculty is called
forgetting. It is a plastic, regenerative and curative force which keeps the reactive traces which lead to action in the unconscious, at bay. (D, 113) "There could be no happiness, no cheerfulness, no hope, no pride and no present without forgetfulness." (GM II, 1pp. 57-58) (D, 113)vi This faculty unfortunately is prone to failure and functional disturbances. (D, 113)

When the apparatus of repression is damaged, excitation tends to get confused with its trace in the unconscious, and conversely the reaction to these traces rises into consciousness and overruns it. At the same time as reactive traces become perceptible, reaction ceases to be acted. (D, 114) Nietzsche describes the person afflicted by this dysfunction as the ressentimental man. He describes the situation so vividly I can only assume he is speaking from experience: "One cannot get rid of anything, one cannot get over anything, one cannot repel anything, everything hurts. Men and things obtrude too closely; experience strikes one too deeply; memory becomes a festering wound." (EH 16 p 320) (D, 116)vi This is the nature of ressentiment even when its realisation remains spiritual, imaginary and symbolic in principle. It is this undigested memory which Nietzsche names the Tarantula, the spirit of revenge. (D, 116)

Nietzsche claims, that the extent to which one attempts to act consciously constitutes the measure of one's immortality. Higher morality is instinctive and unconscious, free of intellectual and reflective interference. (T, 68) It is my belief that Nietzsche would appreciate the pagan moral code that advises "Do what thou wilt, shalt be the whole of thy law."

As explained in the section on the Self, Nietzsche states that our conscious acts are driven by bodily instincts. "The activity of man then, does not first begin with birth,
but already in the embryo and perhaps - who can decide - already in the parents and forebears,” (GW, 1:68)(T, 70) Thiele asserts that Nietzsche proposed a sort of physiological determinism. He reduced mental and spiritual activity to the status of physiological events, though he remained skeptical as to the possibility of determining their origins.(T, 70)

Having posited a sort of biological unconscious, and yet telling us it is better not to be aware of its influence, Nietzsche leaves us with a conflict. To experience one’s freedom of will is a sign of spiritual health, even though intellectual integrity prompts one to deny it.(T, 72) “Who feels the will’s lack of freedom is spiritually ill: who denies it is stupid.”(GW,14:58)(T, 70) Nietzsche states that one feels most free, when acting in accordance with one’s dominating passion (will to power), not when one accepts the dictates of a concluded process of ratiocination. Decadence in a people or individual is a sign of the deterioration of instinct.(T, 72) “Everything good is instinct - and consequently easy, necessary and free.”(TI, 48)(T, 73)

Nietzsche, like Jung, recognises that there is no perfection in the realm of the conscious. For this reason, Dionysus is a God of the Unconscious. Thiele states that whatever his aspiration, the higher man is no God. As long as he remains a suffering mortal, as long as he remains self-conscious, he remains imperfect.(T, 192) Because consciousness is always the recognition of limits, Nietzsche denied outright “that anything can be made perfect so long as it is made conscious,” (TI, 125)(T, 193) thus the need for Nietzsche’s recommendation of forgetfulness.(T, 193) “He who cannot sink down on the threshold of the moment, and forget all the past, who cannot stand balanced like a goddess of victory, without growing dizzy and afraid, will never know what
Unhistorical living is characteristic of the heroic existence. "Only heroes are truly alive. In them, does the present recognize health itself and live on." (GW, 2:382)(T, 193) The hero must be able to say, "Today I love myself as a god." (GW, 14:43)(T, 193)

Nietzsche called himself a nut cracker of souls, who looked behind the masks of phenomena to see what forces were truly affecting them. He advises us that the Superman has full knowledge of the instincts and unconscious forces operating within him. However, he still advises us to forget the contents of the unconscious. Jung's psychology, in contrast, is all about becoming aware of the contents of the unconscious. Without this awareness, we risk the unconscious entering through the back door. If we are not conscious of the unconscious we will be influenced by it unconsciously. We may even become possessed by it.

Walter Kaufmann, who mentions Jung's interest in Nietzsche in his three volume book Discovering the Mind, states that Jung is a case study in ressentiment and is thus profoundly un-Nietzschian. (B, 8) I would agree that in Nietzsche's eyes, Jung's constant exploration of the unconscious would be profoundly ressentimental. According to Nietzsche this would make Jung a very psychologically unhealthy and unhappy individual.

CULTURE AND COLLECTIVITY

According to Nietzsche, all metaphysical knowledge may be reduced to metaphor. According to Jung, the irreducible feature in human experience is the archetype. While Nietzschean metaphors can be considered individualistic, artistic and created, Jung's
archetypes are universal and collective. According to Jung, symbols, the manifestations of the archetypes, are not created by the individual. Symbols, though they have particular nuances when experienced by each individual, usually emerge from religious and mythological traditions. For Jung, individuation involves collectivity, not just individuality. There is a certain collective dimension in Nietzsche's species activity and instinct. The instincts, however, are forces within a psychic chaos, rather than the key to the transcendent function through which the psyche may become whole.

Jung argued that Nietzsche refused to acknowledge his Shadow. One of the main aspects of this unacknowledged Shadow was collectivity. Jung asserts, that Nietzsche's distaste for the collective aspect of humanity was one of the key factors which led to his ultimate demise.

It should be noted here that Nietzsche does acknowledge the importance of fellow feeling in his writings. He acknowledges the importance of friendship in particular in Thus Spoke Zarathustra. The philosopher, however, was too sensitive for his own good. If one were to attribute Nietzsche's extreme individualism to his life and personal disposition, it would definitely be wrong to blame this individualism on lack of feeling for others. It is a well known story that Nietzsche finally lost his sanity over his pity for a beaten horse. The reason for Nietzsche's philosophical and personal isolation was not a hatred for humanity but his tendency to feel things far too deeply. The philosopher likely saw pity as a descending or unhealthy quality because for him it was all consuming.

Jung argues, however, that it was Nietzsche's isolation which was ultimately to blame for his loss of sanity. Jung states that Nietzsche lost the ground under his feet because he possessed nothing more than the inner world of his thoughts. He was
uprooted and hovered above the earth, and therefore he succumbed to exaggeration and
irreality.\textsuperscript{ix} Jung, like Nietzsche, went through a period of mental
breakdown. However, the psychiatrist suggests in his autobiography that his psychic
stability was guaranteed, partly by the presence of his family, and partly by the routine of
this psychiatric practice. The lonely and nomadic Nietzsche, on the other hand, had
nothing to anchor him to reality.\textsuperscript{(B, 74)} Nietzsche lost his connection with the collective
aspect of humanity, both philosophically and in his personal life.

For all his similarities to Nietzsche, Jung was still a humanist. He compares Faust
to Nietzsche, and according to Jung, Faust was sorely missing a respect for the eternal
rights of man and a recognition of the ancient and the continuity of culture and
intellectual history.\textsuperscript{(MDR, 262)(B, 76)} Jung states that,

\begin{quote}
The less we understand of what our fathers and forefathers sought, the less
we understand ourselves, and thus we help with all our might to rob the
individual of his roots and his guiding instincts, so that he becomes a
particle in the mass, ruled only by what Nietzsche called the spirit of
gravity.\textsuperscript{(MDR, 263)(B, 76)}
\end{quote}

In the chapter entitled 'The Spirit of Gravity', in \textit{Thus Spoke Zarathustra}, we
read of the individual who has escaped the spirit of gravity and flies high in the sky. He
takes all landmarks with him into the air, and is christened with a new "light body."\textsuperscript{(Z, 187)} He who would become a bird, is not ruled by the spirit of gravity because the earth
and life to him are no longer an unpleasant heavy load, because he has learned to love
himself.\textsuperscript{(Z, 188)} Jung disagrees with Nietzsche's goal of leaving landmarks or laws and
conventions behind because, he believes, this will leave things in a chaotic mess. There
will be no creative soil left under our feet. (S2, 1470) Jung says that the spirit of gravity is Nietzsche's Shadow pulling him down. (S2, 1463) In this context the Shadow is the collective side of inferior man that is unable to cope with the total lack of orientation which will be caused by the loss of all landmarks.

But Nietzsche does not throw religion and culture out the window. For Nietzsche, culture means a training and a selection, a morality of customs which we are violently trained to accept. Nietzsche states that that which is obeyed by a people, race or class is always historical, arbitrary, grotesque, stupid and limited. It is made up of reactive forces. Nevertheless, there is something within culture, that goes beyond people races and classes. Law does possess a certain active force. Beyond convention is the primitive or prehistoric morality of customs where culture is a generating activity. Culture is the prehistoric activity which serves a positive function. It gives man habits and makes him obey laws. It trains him to act his reactive forces. (D, 133) It strengthens the active power of his will.

Culture can attack reactive forces of the unconscious, but its principle is to reinforce consciousness. Culture's original memory of species activity is no longer a function of the past but a function of the future. It is not a memory of a sensibility but a will. It is a memory of commitment to the future. This cultural memory gives license for much. Nietzsche states that "Man could never do without blood and torture and sacrifice when he felt the need to create a memory for himself." (GM, 2, 3p 61) (D, 134)

Out of the reactive debtor/creditor, crime/punishment system comes the final product of the active man. The morality of customs is not an end but a means to the sovereign individual, like only unto himself, liberated from morality, autonomous and
supramoral. (D, 135) He has his own independent will. The finished product of species activity is thus, not the responsible man or the moral man, but the autonomous and supramoral man, who acts his reactions. He alone is able to make promises precisely because he is not responsible to any tribunal. This man defines himself by the power over his own destiny and over the law. He is the irresponsible author and actor. His debt has disappeared. The means of culture disappear into the product or the spirit of the law. This all amounts to the self-destruction of justice during which history arrives at it posthistoric period. (D, 137) At this point, as Zarathustra explains, man learns that there is no reward given or paymaster, because virtue is its own reward. (Z, 91)

In history, culture take on a sense which is very different from it own essence, having been seized by forces of a different nature. Instead of species activity, history presents us with peoples, classes, church and state, communities of a reactive character grafted like parasites onto culture. Instead of justice and its process of self-destruction, history presents us with societies which cannot imagine anything so superior to their laws. (D, 138) History presents us with domesticated man. The selection of culture becomes only a means of preserving, organising and propagating the reactive life. Nietzsche, says Deleuze, speaks about the degeneration of history as being related to Hegel's Dialectic process of history. (D, 139) The story of thesis and antithesis is be a story of reactive and abstract scientific knowledge and laws rather than a poetic myth which tells the tale of the current of species activity. The story of species activity is about instinct driven wills leading human individuals to creative innovations. While species activity wills a movement toward the future, history merely looks back on the sensibilities
of the past. Degenerate history, speaks not of great innovations and revelations, but of the reactive institutions which were built after them.

In Thus Spoke Zarathustra species activity is represented by the Fire Dog. The Fire Dog represents man's relation to the earth. There are in fact two Fire Dogs, one who relates to the degrading process of history and state and one who truly speaks from the heart of the earth, who is prehistorical, nonhistorical or even suprahistorical.(D, 139)

PASSIVE VERSUS ACTIVE HISTORY

It is a mistake to believe that Nietzsche did not see history as capable of serving active powers. In fact, he saw history as a necessity. In Human all to Human, Nietzsche states that we need history to flow through us in a hundred channels.(GC, 246)\textsuperscript{x}

In Thoughts Out of Season, Nietzsche talks about the use and abuse of history. We need history for life and action, not as a way of avoiding action. “We would serve history only so far as it serves life: but to value its study beyond a certain point, mutilates and degrades life...”(GC, TOS, 217)\textsuperscript{xi} Nietzsche states that there is a degree of sleeplessness, of rumination, of “historical sense” that injures and finally destroys the living thing, be it a man, a people or a system of culture.(GC, TOS, 220) Nevertheless, to be absolutely unhistorical is to be a beast. “Man can only become man by first suppressing the unhistorical element in his thoughts, comparisons, distinctions and conclusions and letting a clear light break through these misty clouds by his power of turning the past to the present.”(GC, TOS, 221) History is of use as long as it is a means to life, as long as life dominates it, rather than it dominating life. History reduced to scientific knowledge is dead.(GC, TOS, 224) History is a reactive memory which can protect us from
becoming mere animals, but being reactive, it is something we must be cautious of. We must learn to act history's reactive memories.

History is necessary to a living man in three ways. Monumental history aids man in his action and struggle. Antiquarian history aids him in his conservatism and reverence. Critical history aids him in his suffering and desire for deliverance. All three forms of history can either be used or abused. (GC, TOS, 225)

The man of action and power needs teachers and comforters. Monumental history shows him how to bear steadfastly the reversals of fortune reminding him how others before him have suffered and endured. "The great moments in the individual battle for a chain, a high road for humanity through the ages, and the highest points of those vanished moments are yet great and living for men...this is the source of belief human kind finds in monumental history." (GC, TOS, 225)

Nietzsche acknowledges that history tends to have fictitious elements. Monumental history brings together things which are incompatible and generalises them into compatibility, weakening the differences of motive and occasion. Effects are depicted at the expense of causes. Although, Nietzsche's goal is not to uphold the truth but life, and thus he considered a certain amount of fiction acceptable; he does state that monumental history should not stand alone. If it was the only method used to view history, whole tracts would be left out. (GC, TOS, 227)

The slave mentality can abuse monumental history. In the custom of egalitarianism, the masses may take credit for a misunderstood moment in history. They may revere the past, as sacred and impossible to duplicate, never seeing anything in the
present which might nourish them. These people live in the past. (GC, TOS, 228) They let the dead bury the living. (GC, TOS, 229)

The antiquarian historian has a conservative and reverential nature. He looks back on the past with love and trust. "Through it he gives thanks for life." (GC, TOS, 229) He tries to preserve what survives from ancient days and tries to reproduce the conditions in his own upbringing. The history of a town or a house becomes important because it is also the history of himself. It is a bad thing, says Nietzsche, when a nation loses its roots. "The fruit and the blossom of the past does not merely justify but crowns the present." (GC, TOS, 230) Nietzsche believes that a personal relationship with one's history is better than a scientific one.

The antiquarian too may distort history. Values and perspectives change with the individual who is looking back on the past. "There is again the danger that everything ancient will be regarded as venerable and everything of a new spirit will be rejected as the enemy." (GC, TOS, 231) It is important that we know, not just how to preserve life, but how to create it. It is important that we do not undervalue present growth. (GC, TOS, 231)

The third method of viewing history described by Nietzsche acts as a check on the other two. We are not surprised to hear Nietzsche describe the critical method. Nietzsche tells us that man must have the strength to break up his past and reapply it in order to live. (GC, TOS, 232) Here we are confronted again with the spargmos of Dionysus. He is torn apart that he may be brought back to life. We must, says Nietzsche, "bring the past to the bar of judgment, interrogate it remorselessly and finally condemn it. Every past is worth condemning, this is the rule of moral affairs." (GC, TOS, 232)
However, it is not justice that sits in judgment, but only life. Nietzsche proclaims that life decides the verdict. Here we encounter the dancing Shiva. Here again we encounter the force of nature which Jung sees as a profoundly dangerous thing with which to identify the conscious ego. Nietzsche states that the sentence given by life is always unmerciful and unjust. Nietzsche turns the words of the Satyr Silenus on their head stating that, "everything that is born is worthy of being destroyed; better we are destroyed than that nothing should be born." (GC, TOS, 232) It requires great strength, Nietzsche states, to live and forget how far life and injustice are one. "The same life that needs forgetfulness, needs destruction." (GC, TOS, 232)

The critical method of history can go wrong as well. In Nietzsche's explanations of how this can happen, we see similarities between his views and Jung's. As the philosopher explains,

For as we are merely the resultant of previous generations, we are also the resultant of errors, passions and crimes; it is impossible to shake off this chain. Though we condemn the errors and think we have escaped from them we cannot escape the fact that we spring from them. (GC, TOS, 232)

Nietzsche describes a conflict between our innate inherited nature and the new knowledge we acquire, between new discipline and ancient traditions. Second natures are always weaker than the first, it is dangerous to deny our past. (GC, TOS, 232) However, Nietzsche says hopefully, second nature was once a first. (GC, TOS, 233) He argues that when one plants a second instinct it withers the first. (GC, TOS, 232)

Here Jung would disagree. Firstly, according to the psychologist, one cannot plant an instinct. Instinct is an unconscious force which conscious knowledge cannot affect.
Secondly, a new viewpoint does not necessarily whither those held in the past. According to Jung, we are wired with our history. This does not mean we cannot reevaluated things and discover the truths hidden beneath centuries of falsity. But for Jung, a Westerner cannot be successful in Eastern practices such as Yoga. These practices are simply too much in conflict with his historical heritage both conscious and unconscious. Jung states that,

Any one who believes that he can simply take over Eastern forms of thought is uprooting himself, for they do not express our Western past, but remain bloodless intellectual concepts that strike no chord in our innermost being. We are rooted in Christian soil. *(CW9, 273)(C, 154)*

Nietzsche believes it is important to begin with a positive personal relationship with one’s history, as opposed to the cold scientific knowledge of universal evolution. Honouring one’s heritage is a positive thing so long as it allows one to be active and creative in the present. Nevertheless, there comes a time when the past should be dealt with critically. An individual’s heritage, religious or otherwise, provides useful direction when one is young. “One must have loved religion and art like mother and wet nurse - otherwise one cannot grow wise...But one must be able to see beyond them, outgrow them; if one remains under their spell, one does not understand them.”*(HH, 135)(T, 143)*

Nietzsche states that the drives once directed by religion should not be lost, but redirected. Skepticism, such as that found in critical history, is the nemesis of religion, or other forms of cultural convention. At the same time, the religious instinct stimulates the skeptic’s passion. His intellectual integrity is nourished by his sense of higher morality and religiosity. Nietzsche sought to secularise piety, not exterminate it.*(T, 143)*
“Nietzsche did not escape religiosity, he transformed it.” As Thiele states, “he well deserves the oxymoronic epithet of the most religious of atheists.” (T, 144) Nietzsche’s religious or God forming instinct led him to the hope of the creation of new Gods.

I would assert that what Nietzsche meant by the critical reconstruction of history can be found in Thus Spoke Zarathustra. In it the history, religions and myths which made up the societal context in which Nietzsche lived are broken up and reapplied. Thus Spoke Zarathustra represents Nietzsche’s attempt, not only to return to more active and immediate experience of history, but to free himself from history entirely. Jung would have no problem with the endeavor to bring one’s past to the bar of judgment and tear it to shreds, but the ego should not be the only party involved in the reconstruction which afterwards occurs. As Nietzsche states, though we condemn the errors and think we have escaped from them, we cannot escape the fact that we spring from them. (GC, TOS, 232)

For this reason we must remain in continuous dialogue with the collective unconscious. I would argue that Jung, at the very least, would be extremely skeptical as to the possibility of an individual becoming entirely suprahistorical. As there will always be forces of the psyche which remain unconscious, there will always be historical influences acting upon us of which we are not aware. Jung argues that Nietzsche did not recognise the Shadow side to his own psyche which remained dependent on collective structures such as history. Cutting ourselves off from the collective portion of our psyche is like cutting ourselves off at the roots.
ARCHETYPES AND METAPHORS

Jung saw symbols as being manifestations of archetypes. Nietzsche saw symbols as being artistic devices or metaphors. "All Gods," says Zarathustra, "are poet symbolizations, poet sophistications."(Z, 126) In order to understand this difference in conceptualisation and to understand Jung's criticism of Nietzsche's conceptualisation, we will examine a lengthy quote from Ecce Homo,

Has anyone at the end of the nineteenth century a clear idea of what poets of stronger ages have called inspiration? If not I will describe it. If one had the slightest residue of superstition left in one's system, one could hardly reject altogether the idea that one is merely incarnation, merely mouthpiece, merely a medium of over powering forces. The concept of revelation in the sense that suddenly and with indescribable certainty and subtlety, something becomes visible, audible, something that shakes one to the last depths and throws one down -- that merely destroys the facts. One hears one does not seek; one accepts, one does not ask who gives; like lightening, a thought flashes up with necessity, without hesitation regarding its form - I never had any choice...Everything happens involuntarily in the highest degree but as in a gale of the feeling of freedom, of absoluteness, of power of divinity; - The involuntariness of image and metaphor is the strangest of all; one no longer has any notion of what is image or metaphor: everything offers itself as the nearest, most obvious simplest expression. It actually seems to allude to something Zarathustra says, as if the things themselves approached and offered themselves as metaphors. 'Here all things come caressingly to your discourse and flatter you; for they want to ride on your back. On every metaphor you ride every truth...Here the words and word shrines of all being open up before you; here all being wishes to become a world, all becoming wishes to learn from you how to speak.(EC, 3)(Davey, xviii)\textsuperscript{xii}

Here, Jung would assert, the forces of the unconscious make their autonomy obvious, and here metaphors become far more than conceptual devices. He would be hard pressed to find a clearer description of what he would term an archetypal experience. In the Seminars Jung describes this passage as Nietzsche's description of the coming of Zarathustra, who is driven by the archetype of the wise old man.(S2, 25) Nietzsche states
that he feels as if an autonomous power is using him as a mouthpiece, that he is acting involuntarily and that the involuntariness of image is the strangest of all.

In the **Will to Power** Nietzsche describes an inspired state of wonder called "symbol intoxication," which is the highest pleasure of most spiritual men. (WP, 540) Thiele explains that according to Nietzsche, the philosopher's life as a whole is sublimated to the symbolic; the creative force of metaphor is celebrated as the greatest truth. Indeed, in a state of philosophical inspiration, the distinction between reality and symbol, truth and metaphor, dissappears. (T, 116)

Nietzsche's understanding of symbols, however, runs contrary to what one might expect from a man who has experienced what he described. He apparently does not, as he says in Ecce Homo, "possess the slightest shred of superstition." Symbols for him do not possess autonomous power. The reason for this is his insistence on skepticism but also more importantly his assertion of the nihilism inherent in metaphysics. The power of the symbol may come from the unconscious level of the psyche, but its power is affirmed as belonging to the conscious ability to reevaluate and reinterpret our view of the world.

Nicholas Davey calls **Thus Spoke Zarathustra** a text which brings to fruition a long standing meditation on the existential and cultural significance of creative power. (Davey, xix) Nietzsche describes his philosophy as an inverted Platonism. According to Nietzsche's philosophy, the further we get from actuality, the more pure, the more beautiful and the better state we are in. (UW, 38) (Davey, xix) In the **Birth of Tragedy**, Nietzsche claims: "There is one world, and this is false cruel, contradictory, seductive, without meaning - A world thus constituted is the real world. We have need of lies in order to conquer this reality, this "truth", that is, in order to live." (Davey, xix)
After hearing such claims from the philosopher we should expect that symbols do not possess any autonomous power. If all truth, all knowledge is illusion, the symbols shouldn’t be any different. The symbols, for Nietzsche, like all other human conceptins, are merely metaphors. (T, 225) The idea that the symbols are connected with a power independent of the conscious will, such as the power of the ideal forces of the archetypes, runs contrary to Nietzsche’s effort to do away with metaphysics. As stated above, Nietzsche describes his philosophy as an inverted Platonism. (UM, 38) (Davey, xix) Jung would be opposed to the archetypes being described as similar to the forms in Plato’s World of Being and the symbols similar to second class replications in the World of Becoming. The archetypes are dependent on the symbols to reach any form of concrete manifestation. The symbols, because of this concreteness, because they can be encountered and understood by the conscious mind, are arguably, not less, but more important than the archetypes. The archetypes’ manifestation in the symbols is not a descent. They are not made lesser, merely by virtue of the fact that they have taken on an earthly manifestation. However, the archetypes are characterised by a universality and permanence while the symbols are imperfect and appear in infinite variety. The archetypes are “definite forms in the psyche, which seem to be present always and everywhere.” (Jung 1936, 42) (W, 423)” In Jung’s system the reality of the unconscious powers of the archetypes is used to validate the conscious symbols and not the reverse. They remain the kernel of truth within badly corrupted religious systems.

Jung speaks about the symbols as manifestations of the definite, numinous power of the archetypes. In contrast, Nietzsche speaks about the need for getting away from the real, the actual need for lies. Nietzsche also speaks about leaving behind the ideas of
permanence and stability. "All is flux," we read in Zarathustra, "Fundamentally standeth everything still, but contrary thereto preacheth the thawing wind." (Z, 197)

I would assert that Nietzsche described the powerful experience of "symbol intoxication" as being the result of conscious kinetic powers, versus unconscious powers which already existed in potential. When reactive forces take conscious excitation as their object, then the reaction is acted. (D, 113) This a description of the conscious kinetic, creative power to make things up and to revaluate. Symbols are merely tools of conventional truth, which is illusory. To posit the metaphysical ideal of the archetype would be profoundly nihilistic.

Wulff describes the manifestations of the archetypes (such as symbols) as historical formulations which have evolved through conscious elaboration. He also describes them as images of the archetypes, coloured by the personal unconscious. (Wulff, 423) Instead of putting unconscious power at the center of his system, Nietzsche sets in place the conscious power of the artist. And as Nicholas Davey explains, according to Nietzsche, the values which inspire and structure the work of art are not subjective appendages to the world of objective fact. They are instead, the ground and substance of those perspectives, and interpretations through which possible experiential worlds become apparent. (Davey, xxiv) For Nietzsche, all the creative power ought to be seen as lying in the activity of becoming manifest. Instead of a World of Being set in contrast to a World of Becoming, in Nietzsche we find the World of Being is the World of Becoming. All power lies in the kinetic creative power of willing, which is appropriated by the conscious. In Thus Spoke Zarathustra becoming is likened to the continuous movement of the light of a star, "And like the star that goeth out, so is every work of your
virtue; ever is its light on its way and traveling - and when will it ever cease to be on its way?"(Z, 91)

In "The Happy Isles" (Zarathustra) we read, "But of a time and of becoming shall all similes speak; a praise shall they be and a justification of all perishableness."(Z, 83)

According to Nietzsche, similes or symbols, should be seen as a justification of perishableness, not the proof of something imperishable. Davey states that Nietzsche creates, not through a mediation of reality, but through a oneness with the process of actuality itself.(Davey, xxv) The activity of becoming, of actualising, is the greatest thing there is. It is being.

Thiele asserts that according to Nietzsche, the self-conscious power to give meaning to the world through the pleasures of thinking, to justify it through its sublimation in symbols and metaphor, carries the philosopher into a rapturous state of life affirmation. For Nietzsche such a state, such feelings, were the very essence of philosophy. "Philosophy as love of wisdom...not love of men, or of gods, or of truth, but love of a condition, a spiritual and sensual feeling of perfection; an affirmation and approval out of an overflowing feeling of the power to accept."(GW, 16:70)(T, 117)

Jung and Nietzsche's difference of opinion on the matter of creative power lies at the very center of Jung's criticism of Nietzsche. As stated in Part I, according to Jung, creative powers are not something one possesses, but rather something which one is possessed by. His exploration of the unconscious convinced him that the archetypes are powers independent of the conscious ego, though they need the ego to become manifest. If we deny this autonomy, and try to subsume archetypal power under the heading "conscious ego" we are doomed to become inflated by the archetypes. Jung make a good
case for the statement that Nietzsche suffered from inflation (the identification and subsequent possession by an archetype). When Nietzsche neared death, he began to call himself the dismembered Dionysus - Zagreus.

Interestingly, Paul Thiele describes Nietzsche's descent into madness as being evidenced by the acceptance of some of the very same suppositions that Jung criticises him for not accepting. Thiele states that, "We might learn from Nietzsche's tragic example to be wary of the temptation to enshrine the sculptures of our speculation. For in the end the coins Nietzsche had stamped with his image were manically peddled as truths, as natural metal unformed by human hands."(T, 225) Jung in his doctrine of the archetypes, does, I would argue, enshrine "sculptures of speculation" and would certainly consider archetypal forces unformed by human (or at least the ego's) hands. Jung did not see the enshrinement of the archetypes as a problem. What he did see as dangerous, was the identification with the archetypes. Nietzsche wrote, "Around the hero everything becomes a tragedy, around the demigod a satyr play; and around a God everything becomes - what?" Perhaps a world?"(BGE, 84)(T, 225)xvi Thiele asserts that "Eventually Nietzsche’s metaphors were transformed into a world around him, a world he had created for himself in thought and experience, but a world in whose transcendence he ultimately came to believe. As either the cause or the effect of his madness, Nietzsche’s skeptical probity disintegrated."(T, 225)

Jung explains, that though the archetypes are really components of our own psyches and not metaphysically transcendent, it is important not to identify with them. In Memories, Dreams and Reflections Jung explains that during his encounter with the anima he learned that,
The essential thing is to differentiate oneself from these unconscious contents by personifying them, and at the same time bringing them into a relationship with consciousness. That is the technique of for stripping them of their power. It is not too difficult to personify them, as they always possess a certain degree of autonomy, a separate identity of their own. Their autonomy is a most uncomfortable thing to reconcile oneself to, and yet the very fact that the unconscious presents itself in this way gives us the best means of handling it. (MDR, 187)

Though Nietzsche did posit the existence of the Self with the power to influence the ego in an autonomous manner, he asserted that creative power ought to be experienced as being in the hand of the conscious will. Jung in contrast asserts that the Self, with its unconscious powers creates through us, though with our cooperation, and that we ought to be aware of this. In Ecce Homo, Nietzsche describes the experience of metaphorical powers which seem autonomous. According to Jung, it would have been much healthier if Nietzsche had not only accepted symbolic rapture as proceeding from something beyond the ego on an ontological level, but embraced it as the proper means of experiencing the phenomenon. Jung would argue that the forces of the Self must be respected. Archetypes are wild animals that will not simply sit or stay in the process of our invention. Religions point to a God above because we cannot possibly entirely comprehend or possess the numinous, and we certainly should not identify with it.

---

2 "The Phenomenology of the Spirit in Fairy Tales" in CW9 (2nd ed.), 1998 (The Revised German Edition.)
3 "The Psychology of Types" in CW6, 1971(German Edition 1921).
xiii Die Unschuld des Werdens, (Stuggart: Kromer, 1968).
xv "The Concept of the Collective Unconscious" in CW9, (2nd ed.) 1968, (Originally Published in English in 1936).
xvii Memories, Dreams and Reflections (Ed. Aniela Jaffe), (New York: Pantheon).
CONCLUSIONS PART II

I would assert that on an ontological level Jung and Nietzsche’s views are quite similar. A large part of this is due to the fact that Jung was heavily influenced by Nietzsche, particularly in regards to his conception of the Self. However, while Nietzsche wanted at all costs to do away with humankind’s dependence on metaphysics, Jung replaces the metaphysics of a transcendent God with a metaphysics of the psyche. Nietzsche argued for the essentially unordered nature of unconscious forces, so the conscious might have the freedom to create and recreate conceptual order rather than merely researching a preexistent order. Jung, in contrast, saw order as inherent in the unconscious Self. It was the creative task of the ego to facilitate the emergence of this order at a conscious level.

Both Jung and Nietzsche posit the existence of a capital ‘S’ Self which is beyond the control of the ego. In Nietzsche’s words, the ego’s relationship with the Self is similar to a slave’s relationship with a master, in Jung’s words, an unconscious God’s relationship with a conscious subject. The task in life is to become one’s Self or to become what we are. In Nietzsche’s view, however, the Self and the unconscious are the same thing. The Self, Zarathustra informs us, is the body.(Z, 30) The natural instincts which proceed from the body, through the unconscious, make up the Self. On the ontological side of Nietzsche’s paradox, the Self is that which is yet to be discovered, on the practical or soteriological side, however, the Self is that which is invented. The Superman is the version of the Self which we consciously construct and choose to move towards. The biological Self is deterministic but also equipped with the innocent active powers of the unconscious. The Superman is the denial of that determinism, the denial of
one’s lack of spiritual freedom. The Superman is invented when we make an effort to create ourselves beyond ourselves, when we act the conscious’ reaction to unconscious powers. Through the artistic affirmation of his fate, the Superman engages in the creative activity of the conscious’ appropriation of unconscious forces. This is what happens at the moment of eternal return.

In Jung’s view, the Self does not simply exist in the unconscious, nor is it purely a product of bodily instincts. The Self is at once the driving force and the destination point. The destination is the total integration of the ego and the unconscious. There is no paradoxical divide between what is and what we declare through artistic license for the process of soteriology. We do not need to create ourselves beyond ourselves as all we need exists in potential and simply must be brought to consciousness. The facilitation of the emergence of the Self is not simply determined by preexistent unconscious contents, the ego and the unconscious may engage in a dialogue, each making contributions. The recognition of the autonomy of unconscious powers does not result in a loss of freedom.

Both Jung and Nietzsche agree that our conscious is bombarded by a multiplicity of forces which proceed from the unconscious. The will to power, the driving force in Nietzsche’s world view, is the one among these many forces which is the most dominant. It is the individual’s defining passion. In the healthy individual, the will to power is active and life affirming, it is a will to creation. In a weak individual it is the will to safety; it is the will to the least amount of duress. Jung’s libido, like Nietzsche’s will to power, pushes us to discover the Self, but unlike the will to power, it is not one in a numerous array of forces or archetypes, but the sum total of all archetypal powers. Jung compares the libido to the Hindu Brahman, the universal creative power.(CW6, 336:}
The libido acts to compensate for imbalances. It acts to compensate for the conscious tendency to focus on one force at the expense of the others. It is the self regulating mechanism inherent within the psyche.

While in Nietzsche’s view both the exterior universe and the psyche are inherently chaotic, in Jung’s view the psyche has an inherent teleology. The Self naturally seeks unity. While today’s divided and conflicted psyche is the acorn, the Self is the tree it naturally moves to become. The Nietzschean in contrast affirms the chaos and chance native to our lives as an endless opportunity for conscious creative invention. Because there is no potential order which must be brought to consciousness, the individual has free reign on the story she wishes to tell.

Nietzsche while he appreciates the symbols as metaphors and conceptual means, he emphasises the fact that they should not be clung to. What should be honoured with piety instead is our very ability to construct these metaphors, our ability to reinterpret and recreate. What should be honoured, is our ability to see order in a fundamentally chaotic world. Symbols or artistic images should not be seen as important because they allow us to dialogue with or relate to subterranean or superterrenean level of reality, but as a justification of our own perishable level of existence in the here and now. Religious traditions speak of upperworlds; political systems speak of golden future times, science speaks of abstract universals, held away from us like ‘backworlds.’ Our emphasis on any of these degrades the actuality of the present.

I believe Jung’s archetypes would likely have been looked upon by Nietzsche as elements of a ‘backworld’, and his ideal of the unification of opposites and the achievement of a state of equilibrium, would have likely been looked upon as a
destination which degraded the journey. While Jung stated that the destination of the
total unification of opposites was a goal which could never be reached, he held it as an
ideal nevertheless. The Superman, Nietzsche's goal, was characterised not by an ability
to unify opposites or to manage an equilibrium but by the ability to affirm life, conflict
and all.

Nietzsche's God Dionysus justifies life by living it, not by holding a table of
values above it in judgment. In a similar manner, Nietzsche's artist acts rather than
reacts. Merleau Ponty, who was heavily influenced by Nietzsche, states that the artist
lives the embodied life. He does not separate himself from the world through the use of
abstract systems. The painter takes his body with him. It is by lending his body to the
world that the artist changes his world into paintings.(P, 162) The artist becomes a
catalyst in the process of creation. Rather than letting the symbols embody archetypal or
unconscious forces, the artist embodies them within himself. As Jung states, when
Nietzsche says "thus spake Zarathustra", he often means, "thus spake Nietzsche." This
to Jung was profoundly problematic. The identification of oneself with an archetype
could lead to inflation, possession, or even psychosis. In the hands of the artist a symbol
may be employed in a purely individualistic manner, but this does not mean that its
inherent collective dimension has ceased to be an influence. The artist who identifies
with a symbol embodies, not only the warring forces within themselves, but the warring
forces of the society which begot the symbol to begin with. The artist becomes a prophet.
He suffers not only for himself but for the sake of all of society, whether he realises it or
not. Because this collective dimension does not cease to influence a symbol, its users
should keep the lines of communication between the individual conscious and the collective unconscious open.

While Parts I and II focused on Jung and Nietzsche's theories and ontologies, touching on their soteriologies, Part III will investigate in more detail the practical application and ramification of their soteriologies. Part III will investigate Nietzsche's replacement of religion with aesthetics. It will explore the reasons for Jung's criticism of Nietzsche’s emphasis on art as well as Jung's own use of art. A careful examination of Jung's criticism shows once again that if Jung had better understood Nietzsche's views, he would have been in greater agreement with him. A careful examination of Jung's use of symbolic systems, such as alchemy and mandalas, and Nietzsche's use of art, shows many similarities. And predictably once again there are differences.

Lastly, the investigation of the adequacy of Jung and Nietzsche's attempt to replace religion with new modern alternatives begs a comparison to traditional methods of engaging the spiritual. Religion’s task is not only to explain the spiritual dimension of reality but to facilitate direct experience of it. Jung and Nietzsche are set apart from their peers by the fact that they experienced what could be called, for lack of a more neutral term, altered states of consciousness. How do Jung's use of symbols and Nietzsche's use of art stand up in the event of ecstatic or mystical experiences? How do their descriptions of the relationship between conscious and unconscious stand up?

Jung compares Nietzsche's use of aesthetics to that of the Eastern Yogi, not to show how inadequate Nietzsche's approach was in comparison to a traditional spiritual practice, but to complain that both of their systems were equally escapist and amoral. Again Jung's comparison of Nietzsche's philosophy and Eastern tradition shows both a
disagreement and misunderstanding of Nietzsche on the psychologist's part. While Nietzsche was influenced by Eastern thought and understood it in a way that Jung did not, he also saw certain aspects of it as being life negating or nihilistic. Both he and Jung were strongly adverse to the Eastern ideal of stepping off the wheel of life.
PART III

ART, ALCHEMY AND MYSTICAL EXPERIENCE

To understand Nietzsche’s world view and his final recommendation of how we may engage a world so wrought with suffering, it is crucial that we understand his concept of the artist philosopher. Nietzsche criticised metaphysics and rejected the search for universal truth, but this does not mean that he did not draw any practical conclusions. Nietzsche does not simply leave us with a post-modern series of open ended questions but rather, in the fine tradition of modernism, offers a solution, a brave new method of perception. This method of perception, or way of engaging life, is the life of the artist. In the hands of the artist philosopher, the act of evaluation and the act of creation become two aspects of the same act. Davey states that Nietzsche refuses to distinguish between these two kinds of thinking. As Davey explains, Thus Spoke Zarathustra represents Nietzsche’s great attempt to combine the powers of art and philosophy. Davey states that,

Nietzsche the philosopher may have had a theoretical grasp of the need for an awakening of a profound and pervasive existential creativity, but as a theoretician he cannot strictly speaking bring it about. However, as a poet he can attempt to give voice to, invoke and celebrate an affirmative mode of existence purged of the despair of nihilism. As a text therefore, Thus Spake Zarathustra embodies Nietzsche’s understanding that in order to respond to the world-historical crisis posed by nihilism he must turn from philosophy to artistic creativity...Nietzsche’s juxtaposition of the theoretical and the creative shows how philosophy too stands upon imaginative forces of world-creating proportions.(Davey, xvii)

While Jung was influenced by Nietzsche in many ways, and can provide us with many insights into Nietzsche’s thought, he shows both a lack of understanding and a
fundamental disagreement with Nietzsche's proposition of the artist philosopher.

Nietzsche, Jung states, was a great artist, but he was also a philosopher, and we expect a
philosopher to think. (S2, 1255) It is because it is so difficult to distinguish where Jung's
misunderstanding ends and his disagreement begins, that this section on art was not
simply placed under the heading 'Jungian Slips.' If Jung had seen the role of the artist as
encompassing what Nietzsche did, he would not have had as much difficulty with the role
Nietzsche gave to aesthetics. Part III will expound on this.

Jung did not have a problem with the use of intuitive or artistic means, in fact, he
believed that they were essential in communicating with the unconscious. Nietzsche's
use of art is comparable in many ways to Jung's use of symbols. It is Jung's interest in
symbols and mythology which made Thus Spoke Zarathustra so fascinating to the
psychologist. As is often stated in this paper, Jung and Nietzsche certainly had common
ground when it came to their appreciation of the forms of discourse which rely less on
rationality and more on the intuitive. While Nietzsche emphasises the transformative
capabilities of art and metaphor, Jung emphasises the transformative capabilities of
symbolic devices and processes such as alchemy and mandalas. As established in Part II,
symbols and metaphors have both similarities and differences.

Jung believed the use of intuitive devices or media was important but he also
believed that it is important to step out of the intuitive frame of mind to analyse one's
intuitive or unconscious experiences with rational scientific analysis. He believed
Nietzsche, because of his reliance on art, failed to do this. Dreams, art or mystical
experiences must be interpreted. Art may provide us with revelation, but art remains
amoral in that it is not capable of aiding us in the the conscious intergration of
unconscious contents. Morality for Jung consists of the analysis and implementation of what is learned during a less conscious, intuitive experience. One might ask if Jung saw the aesthetic as amoral because he defined it in terms of looking at art rather than creating it. The answer to this question is no. Jung compares the act of the creation of art to the amoral forces of nature. He compares it to the act of the Hindu God Shiva who dances the world in and out of existence, who creates and destroys without mercy. This is how he saw Nietzsche’s Dionysian artist.

Nietzsche believed in the importance of conscious analysis following an altered state of consciousness as well. Nietzsche was wary of becoming a holy fool. He believed that conscious skepticism must be used to cleanse ecstatic experiences. This skeptical cleansing consisted of the affirmation that any force encountered in an altered state, though it may appear to be autonomous, is actually native to our own psyche. Jung agreed that autonomous forces encountered in altered states were actually native to the psyche but he disagreed with what he saw as Nietzsche’s efforts to ignore the perception of this autonomy. According to Jung, these energies are perceived as separate because the Self, which causes these experiences of autonomy, is far more immense than the ego, which experiences them. The ego should not be identified with unconscious forces it experiences.

In a similar manner Jung disagrees with Nietzsche identification of the creation of a work of art with the conscious individual. According to Nietzsche, the process of creating one’s life as a work of art ought to be perceived as being the work of the ego. Nietzsche does attempt to blur the divide between conscious and unconscious acts. He identifies himself as a work of art, a work of art which he himself is in the process of
inventing or creating. Zarathustra may be seen as Nietzsche's life as a work of art, a
mythical heroic tale. This to Jung amounts to the identification with archetypal powers,
an act which ultimately leads to pathology.

As stated previously, Nietzsche's use of art is comparable in many ways to
Jung's use of symbols. If this is the case why doesn't the use of symbols lead to
pathology? What is the difference between an artistic image and a symbol? What is the
difference between Jung's symbol and Nietzsche's metaphor? I believe the answer to
this is, while the symbol, as the artist's tool, embodies the unconscious archetypal force,
the metaphor allows the artist to embody the archetype within herself. As Merleau Ponty
states, the artist lends himself to the world in order to complete his paintings. Nietzsche's
artist creates himself as a work of art.

The other difference between symbol and metaphor, is again, Nietzsche's artist
affirms the creative act as his own doing, while Jung in his use of symbols, is wary that
he is dealing with a power which proceeds from beyond the conscious.

Jung and Nietzsche both use alchemy as a means to explain psychological
transmutation. This makes alchemy an ideal heuristic framework to compare the two
men's systems of thought. This chapter will use the differences and similarities between
Jung's alchemist and Nietzsche's artist-alchemist to show the differences and similarities
between the Jung's conception of the use of symbol and Nietzsche's conception of the
use of art. Jung both respected the symbolic process of alchemy and feared the Godlike
power it put into the hands of the individual. The same can be said about his feelings
toward Nietzsche. Jung goes as far as to express the belief that perhaps temporary
inflation is necessary in the process of alchemy, as it allows one to take the laboratory of
transmutation into his own psyche. Jung, however, fears Nietzsche's Faustian attempts to take on the creative role of a God. In the Birth of Tragedy Nietzsche writes that according to Goethe, "man raised to titanic proportions, conquers his own civilization and compels the Gods to join forces with him, since by his autonomous wisdom he commands both their existence and the limitations of their sway."(BT, 62)

Finally Part III will investigate the practical ramifications of Jung and Nietzsche's methods of dealing with the relationship between the conscious and unconscious. It will investigate their reactions to their own first hand experiences of altered states of consciousness. Both the philosopher and the psychologist have a mystical bent. Both suffer the challenge of having to incorporate experiences which seem to defy logic into their own logical system. Both restrict the source of their experiences to the psyche. Both see the importance of not divorcing themselves from vital spiritual powers by attributing these to a transcendent God who dwells somewhere up in the heavens. Nietzsche was one of the first philosophers to have the courage to acknowledge these irrational experiences in his philosophy, though he did assert his concern that they could not adequately be expressed in words. Jung refuses to reduce these experiences to the result of pathology as Freud would likely have done.

However, as explained earlier, both Jung and Nietzsche see the need of answering back these experiences with conscious skepticism. Contrary to what Jung states, Nietzsche does see the importance of not being swept away by intuitive experience. Ecstatic experience, though it is not essentially delusional, must be cleansed by the use of skeptical conscious logic. The cause of the ecstatic experience should not be mistaken for the effect; the effect being the sense of an autonomous force, such as that described in
Ecce Homo. While Nietzsche trusts conscious experience enough not to 'cleanse it' with an abstract logic, the same cannot be said for superconscious, or what Jung would term, unconscious experience. Nietzsche, who worked so hard to return all drives, forces and creative functions to the World of Becoming (the plane ego consciousness), was not about to acknowledge a transcendent autonomous power. He wished at all costs to do away with our reliance on 'backworlds' of being, metaphysical seconds and abstract ideals, be they transcendent Gods or the scientific method. He condemns the emphasis on ends at the expense of means and the emphasis on goals at the expense of the process and the experience of life. This is what the affirmation of the life of the artist is all about. The artist acts in the present, rather than reacting to a goal which is the only point in life. The artist creates his own world, rather than referencing a set of prescribed values or ideals located in the World of Being. The artist if he is to discover the Self, must first invent it.

Jung admires Nietzsche's attempts to return the power of the spirit to humanity and the natural world, but Jung does not admire Nietzsche reduction of the supposition of 'backworlds' to a nihilistic desire to run from the real world. The effect of the experience of 'other' is something that ought to be respected, not simply cleansed away. Though Jung, like Nietzsche, claims that the experience of 'other' proceeds from within the psyche, namely the unconscious, he asserts that the sense that we are encountering something autonomous should not be ignored. We should not identify the contents of the unconscious with the ego. The unconscious is full of forces we cannot control with skeptical conscious means.
The question of the psychology behind altered states of consciousness, begs a comparison of the methods of Jung and Nietzsche those of traditional spiritual practitioners. Do shamans, mystics and monks take the same risks that Jung criticised Nietzsche for taking? Both Jung and Nietzsche were influenced by Eastern philosophy, but neither had formal Yogic training. Jung and Nietzsche sought to replace religious traditions with new and improved modern substitutes. Part of a religious tradition's role is to deal with the experience of altered states of consciousness. This essay will conclude by asking the question as to whether Jung and Nietzsche's psychological health vouch for the possibility that either of them had come up with adequate means to deal with these altered states. If either of them suffered from neurosis or psychosis is it comparable to the psychological states experienced by spiritual practitioners in the past?
CHAPTER 1

JUNG ON ART

The central question on art, for Jung, is from where does it proceed? If it is purely the creation of the individual or a product only of ego consciousness, art is necessarily shallow and superficial. If, on the other hand, the artist becomes a vehicle through which the Self may create, art does have a worth while role to perform. In this case the artist may become a creator of symbols which allow us to perceive the archetypes. However, the creation of an artistic image remains amoral and detached from reality if it is not later morally integrated by the individual conscious mind.

In The Birth of Tragedy Jung finds his greatest point of agreement with Nietzsche because in this book the artist is the instrument of a deeper force. Here, the philosopher speaks of the Dionysian artist becoming one with “the ground of being.” (BT, 39) Jung asserts that Nietzsche proved he had an inkling of the way things worked when he said that the antagonism between the Apollonian and Dionysian was bridged, not by art, but by a metaphysical miracle of the Hellenic will. Here, Jung states, Nietzsche may be speaking of Schopenhauer’s metaphysical unconscious will. Jung calls this will an unconscious miracle, which occurs without the assistance of reason and conscious purpose. It grows like a phenomenon of nature, not from any clever trick of human wit. (CW6, 143)

In Memories, Dreams and Reflections the topic of art comes up when Jung is explaining the methods he employed during his own confrontation with the unconscious. During the period of psychological turmoil, following his break with Freud, Jung found
himself inundated by archetypal forces which took the form of "fantasies." In the following passage, Jung speaks about his encounter with an autonomous archetypal force.

When I was writing down these fantasies, I once asked myself, 'What am I really doing? Certainly this has nothing to do with science. But what then is it?' Whereupon a voice within me said, 'It is art.' I was astonished. It had never entered my head that what I was writing had any connection with art. Then I thought, 'Perhaps my unconscious is forming a personality that is not me, but which is insisting on coming through to expression.' I knew for certain that the voice had come from a woman. I recognized it as the voice of a patient, a talented psychopath who had a strong transference to me. She had become a living figure within my mind.

Obviously what I was doing wasn't science. What then could it be but art? It was as though these were the only two alternatives in the world. That is the way a woman's mind works.

I said very emphatically to this voice that my fantasies had nothing to do with art, and I felt a great inner resistance... 'No, it is not art! On the contrary, it is nature.' (MDR, 186-87)

For Jung great art is produced when nature, the Self, speaks through the individual. When a work of art is a work of nature, rather than a conscious invention, art aids in Jung's project of individuation. However, because the creation of a great work of art is necessarily a product of unconscious contents, this also makes it essentially amoral. Morality for Jung is something which must be introduced by the conscious examination of an unconscious event. The unconscious creation of art should not be equated with conscious moral construction.

In this passage of Memories, Dreams and Reflections Jung decides that the voice of his former female patient, was in fact, the voice of an unconscious archetypal force, which he named the anima.

...I was greatly intrigued by the fact that the woman should interfere with me from within. My conclusion was she must be the soul, in the primitive sense, and I began to speculate on the reasons why the name 'anima' was
given to the soul. Why was it thought of as feminine? Later I came to see that this inner feminine figure plays a typical, or archetypal, role in the unconscious of a man, and I called her "anima." (MDR, 186-87)

The anima, not because she is female, but because she is a force of the unconscious, is amoral. Jung often mentions the fact that Nietzsche did not acknowledge the anima. It is true that Thus Spoke Zarathustra doesn’t feature many female characters. An exception to this is the ring maidens featured in the “Dance Song.” Jung describes them as manifestations of the anima. (S2, 1153) Jung’s description of their dance is comparable to his description of the dance of Shiva or Kali. Shiva and Kali’s dance is aesthetic because it is wreckless and inconsiderate. It is an expression of the cruelty and indifference of nature that destroys with no regret. (S2, 1391) Jung states that the maidens dance too, is suspect. It is representative of the superficial joyous or the aesthetic aspect of life. He compares Zarathustra’s encounter with the maidens, to Krishna’s Divine play with the milk maidens (the gopis). He compares it to the playful Shakti’s creation of a world of illusions. (S2, 1173) I would argue that though Nietzsche seems to have avoided consciously acknowledging the anima, the fact that he considers all good philosophers to be artists, indicates that he is being directed by an animistic impulse. This would be consistent with Jung’s supposition that if we ignore something on a conscious level, it will manifest through unconscious means.

In Memories, Dreams and Reflections Jung states that if he had taken the fantasies of the unconscious to be art, they would have carried no more conviction than visual perceptions one looks upon while watching a movie. “I would have felt no moral obligation toward them. The anima might then have easily seduced me into believing I
was a misunderstood artist, and that my so called artistic nature gave me the right to neglect reality." (MDR, 187) Jung describes the aesthetic approach to things as being merely a matter of observation, involving no moral evaluation or transformation.

Nietzsche's definition of the aesthetic is very different, he believes the very act of artistic creation is profoundly moral. Seeing one's self and one's life as a work of art, creating one's self as a work of art, is the substance of Nietzsche's morality. Rather than attempting to separate unconscious and conscious forces or artistic and analytic functions, Nietzsche sought to draw them together.

**POSITIVE COMMENTS ON ART**

As stated above, some of Jung's statements on art are quite positive. Peter Bishop explains that Jung distinguished two different kinds of art. First there is Naive or Introverted art, in which the artist's material is governed by the conscious intention of artist. (B, 160) The second category of art, the Sentimental or Extroverted, includes works such as Goethe's *Faust* and Nietzsche's *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. In this second type of art, the artist finds himself possessed by autonomous powers. "Here the artist is not identical with the process of creation; he is aware that he is subordinate to his work or stands outside of it, as though he were a second person, who has fallen within the magic circle of an alien will." (GW15, German Edition, 110)(B, 161) As Bishop asserts, this description of the individual under the control of unconscious powers, hearkens back to Jung's description of cryptonesia, which drew from Nietzsche's *Ecce Homo* and on the composition of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. 
In Collected Works 6, we read a view on art which contrasts with the negative view from Memories, Dreams and Reflections expressed above. In the section entitled “Psychological Types” (CW6), Jung again talks about fantasies. Bishop states that,

According to Jung ‘phantasie’ is the power which both integrates the psychological function of the individual and constitutes the psychological reality of the world...According to Jung’s view of art, the importance of the artist resides in his ability to develop such symbols in his works, and in as much as he creates the symbols which point the way to the future, the artist is said not merely to represent but also to educate.(B, 156)

If art is capable of carrying out such an important and productive role, why is Jung so frustrated with the role Nietzsche gives it in his philosophy? The reason is that Jung saw the creation of a good work of art as intuitive. He saw it as being a result of the fact that the artist was acted upon by the autonomous forces of the collective unconscious. This sort of event, in Jung’s opinion, must be followed by conscious rational analysis. Nietzsche, on the other hand, did not believe that a work of art should be seen as an event in which the unconscious acts upon the conscious. He believed that the unconscious creation of a work of art should be affirmed as the work of conscious creativity.

The criteria by which Jung judged a work of art was based on whether it expressed concerns which went beyond the individual and personal concerns of its creator.(B, 159) Here I would surmise, art becomes what Jung had previously described, as not art but nature. Following the creation of this sort of art, Jung believed the individual ought to step back from his creation and view it as an autonomous entity. As he explains, “For the purposes of cognitive understanding we must look at the creative process from the outside; only then does it become an image that expresses significance.
At the point we may not only but are indeed bound to speak of meaning." (GW15, 121)

Jung repeatedly criticises Nietzsche for remaining in an intuitive state in his production of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*.

Jung asserts, Nietzsche successfully conveyed his imagery but failed to come back with rational analysis. Peter Bishop states, that according to Jung, in order to understand a work of art it is necessary to detach oneself from the creative processes which have produced it, and look at it from an external position. (B, 160) This external examination is the project of Jungian psychology, and according to Jung it ought to have also been a component of Nietzsche's philosophy.

Though Nietzsche was not adverse to the conscious examination or conscious integration of the ecstatic moment of eternal return, the affirmation of eternal return necessitates the affirmation of life as it is, not life as it studied or dissected. While Nietzsche's artist did in fact step away from the constant process of creation or becoming, he did it to affirm the Being of Becoming. The affirmation of eternal return did not involve looking to any abstract ideal or 'backworld,' such as the scientific method, a transcendent God or the collective unconscious. The artist continued to affirm his life and his world as his own creation. The embodied, participatory activity the intuitive and artistic, is not left behind in favour of a more detached scientific examination. Nietzsche did not, in this respect, separate art from philosophy. In fact, he believed, the problem with philosophy, up to and within his lifetime, was that it lacked artistic dimension.

Davey states that,
Whereas the philosophical mind strives to dispel the unintelligible in order to create new forms, the creative mind has in a certain sense to embrace it... What is exceptional about Nietzsche's writings is that these two modes of 'knowing' fuse, charge and provoke each other. (Davey, xiii)

It is incorrect again, however, to state that Nietzsche applied only categories gleaned from experience while Jung applied an abstract method which was alien to the intuitive experiences he encountered. As Jung states, in his description of the encounter with the anima and as Nietzsche states in his description of "symbol intoxication" in Ecce Homo, spiritual experiences involve the perception of an autonomous force, an "other." Jung does indeed try to incorporate this aspect of intuitive experience within his psychology. The same cannot be said for Nietzsche. It seems while Nietzsche was ready to embrace certain aspects of intuitive experience, he wished to ignore others.
CHAPTER 2

NIETZSCHE AND ART

Chapter 2 will study Nietzsche's incorporation of art into his philosophy. The statements made by Paul Leslie Theile and Nicholas Davey will be used in this endeavour. Merleau Ponty's phenomenology was heavily influenced by Nietzsche's descriptions of the artist philosopher. This Twentieth Century philosopher's writings will be used as an example of how dimensions of the artistic can successfully be incorporated into rational philosophical analysis.

Nietzsche does not see the artist as neglecting reality. According to the philosopher, the artist lives within life and improves it, while the scientist keeps his distance and writes reports. Nietzsche does state that art involves the creation of an illusion as a means of temporarily escaping from the tragedy of life. He does state that art often involves the creation of a fiction, but this does not make it amoral or counter productive. We must remember that Nietzsche's morality makes vitality the ultimate ideal rather than truth. Often fictions are more vital than truths. True art does not refer back to established moral codes, but rather creates a new morality through affirmation, evaluation and interpretation. Dionysus temporarily abandons himself to life and fixes his gaze upon it. The artist is provisionally both in his work and above it, just as a child plays a game and withdraws from it. (D, 24)
This is the morality of dance and play, akin to Victor Turner’s liminal stage in ritual, which involves casting aside normal societal constructs and morality. It is in this liminal stage that new chapters of the cultural myth are written. This creative activity, this amorality, can indeed, be compared to the dance of Shiva, which seems cruel and heartless. Shiva is called the destroyer, but destruction always precedes creation, just as birth and death are always connected. This is the force which characterises Dionysus, Nietzsche’s God. This is the force which Jung saw as inhuman, fine for the archetypes and, of course, ever present in the depths of the unconscious, but not something with which a conscious human being should identify. As Jung states, “The unborn work of the psyche of the artist is a force of nature that achieves its ends either with tyrannical might or with the subtle cunning of Nature herself, uncaring about the personal fate of man who is a vehicle of the these creative forces.”(GW15, 115)(B, 162)

ACTIVE AND REACTIVE

The reacquaintance with the life of the artist, is a reacquaintance with the active and the actual world of present experience. It was for this reason, in Nietzsche’s view, that all good philosophers were artist creators and not simply scientists conducting an analysis. Nietzsche asserts that we should cease to focus our attention on abstract Worlds of Being or “backworlds,” which include both the realms of transcendent beings and the abstract ideals stated in the scientific method. “Suffering it was, and impotence” says Zarathustra, “That created all backworlds...Weariness, which seeketh to get to the ultimate with one leap, with a death-leap; a poor ignorant weariness, unwilling even to will any longer, that created Gods and all backworlds.”(Z, 27) The physical existence in
the here and now is emphasised over any fantasy of an abstract metaphysical second or spiritual realm.

According to Nietzsche, it is the artist rather than the scientist, who works with active rather than reactive forces. As Deleuze explains, reactive forces exercise themselves by securing mechanical means and final ends, by fulfilling the conditions of life which are conservation, adaptation and utility. (D, 40) We usually understand things in terms of these reactive forces, neglecting the active forces which are, in contrast, dominant, spontaneous, aggressive and expansive. These forces are harder to study because they often escape consciousness. "The great activity is unconscious." (VP II, 227) (D, 41) Jung would likely compare these active forces to the numinous forces at work in the unconscious. Consciousness merely expresses the relation of certain reactive forces to active. (D, 41) Consciousness is essentially reactive. Science nearly always sees things reactively.

Reactive force limits active force, imposing upon it limitations and partial restrictions which are already controlled by the spirit of the negative. (GM III, 11) (D, 56) The reactive produces an inverted self image at which science looks. Genealogy's reflected image is evolution, sometimes seen as the Hegelian development of contradiction. (D, 56) Hegelian evolution, instead of respecting differences, attempts to synthesize them. Because difference breeds hatred, we often do not want to accept our differences and instead we turn against each other. This mediocrity of thought, Deleuze explains, reflects the mania for interpreting and evaluating phenomenon in terms of reactive forces. We cannot measure forces in terms of a fictional abstract unity. The
struggle, the interaction of differences, is what decides what is active and what is reactive. (D, 56)

The trouble is the becoming of forces, or the coming to consciousness of forces, appears as becoming reactive. We do not feel, experience or know anything but this. It is this becoming reactive, or coming to consciousness, which is the very constitution of man. It is because of this that Zarathustra speaks with great disgust of man. (D, 61) If there was another becoming it would not be man's but the Overman's. (D, 62) This is why Dionysus is described as an unfamiliar God who we only understand in terms of descriptions of what he is not. The trouble with utilitarianism and the scientific approach is that they are marked by distance. They are carried out by a third party. They are carried out by an individual who does not perform the action, but believes he has a natural light over the action. Real relations are replaced with abstract relations. Real activities (creating, speaking, loving etc.) are replaced by a third party's perspective on these activities. The essence of the activity is confused with the gains of the third party, be that party God, objective spirit, humanity, culture or the proletariat. (D, 74) As Zarathustra states, "Like those who stand on the street and gape at the passers by: thus do they (reactive persons) also wait, and gape at the thoughts that others have thought." (Z, 123)

PHENOMENOLOGY AND LINGUISTICS

Nietzsche's influence on Merleau Ponty's phenomenology is not hard to recognise. Merleau Ponty states that if we want to subject science to rigorous scrutiny and arrive at a precise assessment of its meaning and scope we must begin by
reawakening the basic experience of the world of which science is only a second order experience.(Y, 6) Phenomenology involves the study of the subject as subject, in terms of whatever patterns of interrelatedness it seems to exhibit. Rather than imposing on it a system of analysis, the subject is examined in terms of groupings which are fundamental and actual, combining empirical data with an intuitive grasp. Merleau Ponty also insists on the necessity of studying the manner in which the phenomena appears in human experience; he emphasises our active involvement as body subject.(WC, 115) He states that "...the intention of life can be rediscovered because we carry in our incarnate being the alphabet and grammar of life."(WC, 116)

Merleau Ponty wanted to return to the study of life as lived, the world as it is naturally experienced, rather than the world dissected on a laboratory table, or disconnected from concrete reality a world of abstract ideals. Science, Merleau Ponty states, manipulates things and gives up living in them. It makes its own limited models of things, coming face to face with the real world only at rare intervals. Science treats everything as though it were an object in general, as if meant nothing to us and yet was predestined for our own use.(M, 159) As Zarathustra states, when describing the abstract approach taken by academics, "they sit in the cool of the shade; they want in everything to be merely spectators, they avoid sitting where the sun burneth in their steps."(Z, 123)

The alternative approach to that of the scientist, is that of the artist. The painter, asserts Merleau Ponty, takes his body with him. It is by the lending of his body to the world that the artist changes his world into paintings.(M, 162) Art ideally is about reconveying a certain dimension of observed experience, verses converting the observed experience into objective data. The prehuman way of seeing things is the painters
way. (M, 167) The direct sensuous quality of this mode of perception is seen by many scholars as earlier and more fundamental.

Leslie Paul Thiele explains that the philosopher-artist is his own experiment in living. (T, 119) He is in effect, his own artistic creation. "The product of the philosopher is his life (first of all, before his works). That is his work of art." (GW, 7:19) (T, 119) Experience is not to be equated with purely intellectual activity; it is the incorporation of one's thoughts into life. "I have always written my writings with my whole body and life," Nietzsche states, "I do not know what purely intellectual problems are." (GW, 21:81) (T, 131)

Zarathustra declared that "he who writes in blood and aphorisms does not want to be read, he wants to be learned by heart." (Z, 67) (T, 131) "The philosopher whose chief artistic creation is himself cannot separate his writing from his experiences, nor can his readers understand him unless they have shared his experiences." (T, 131)

Nietzsche uses linguistics to explain witnessing the active versus the reactive. The transformation of the sense of a word, means that some one else (another force and another will), has taken possession of it and is applying it to another thing because he wants something else. When a new force or will takes possession of a word it changes. (D, 75) This is a good linguistic explanation of how Nietzsche's philosophy works. This is a good explanation of how the will to power and the forces effect the phenomenon we are looking at. A word's meaning always changes with the intention of the speaker, just as a phenomenon is effected by the forces which possess it. We should not separate a word from the context of its use. We learn more about an animal by observing it in its habitat than we do by killing it and observing it in our laboratory.
A word’s sense thus changes over time. Denotative and structuralist theories of language tend to look at language in terms of hegemony; words are static references to static cultural realities and view points.

Linguist Charles Taylor focuses on the artistic dimension of language. He sees language as originating with the expressive and the evocative, rather than the designative and the denotative. The designative theory is referential, it sees each word as pointing to an object or idea. In ‘the Convalescent’ Zarathustra remarks sarcastically, “How charming it is that there are words and tones; are not words and tones rainbows and seeming bridges twixt the eternally separated?” (Z, 210) The expressive theory is reverential, it sees language as creative. Using words and language calls into being various realities, be they social or perhaps spiritual. According to the expressive theory, there is little or no separation between language and our cultural environment. Designative theories tend to see language as something which at all costs must be domesticated and controlled. Rather than being seen as a living whole, language was dissected into static components. This entirely counters the advice of the phenomenologist. To know what language is, says Merleau Ponty, is first of all to speak it. It is only by making contact with the speaking subject that one can get a sense of what languages are and move around in them. (M, 80)

Phenomenology and the expressive theory of language study life in action, the involvement of the subject and the intention behind phenomenon. Nietzsche’s new active science comes down to a battle of wills. We ask of what force is the phenomenon a symptom, is the force active or reactive, and is the origin of the force noble or base. (D, 75) If we are going to ask what is beauty? We ask what will possesses it? What will
expresses it? What will is hidden behind it? From what standpoint does this appear beautiful? What are the forces which make it appear beautiful by appropriating it?(D, 76) Nietzsche pronounces an embodied sight specific definition of beauty rather than an objective ideal definition of beauty. This pluralistic definition of a phenomenon does not deny essence, but rather the essence is determined by intention. Nietzsche's method involves asking the question; what does he will, the one who speaks and loves and creates? Willing is the critical and genetic instance of all our feelings and thoughts. What a will wants is not an object or an end. Ends and objects are still just symptoms seen by the reactive eye. Only qualities are ever willed, be they negative or affirmative.

I would argue that Jung's theories lie somewhere between structuralism and phenomenology. In Jung's view, symbols are creative but not in and of themselves. The symbols are manifestations of the archetypes. They are the conscious evocation of an unconscious power. While the only way an archetype is ever witnessed is in symbols, which vary according to time and place, at an unseen potential level, they are the same for all times and all peoples.

MODERN CONCEPTS OF MORALITY AND KNOWLEDGE AS REACTIVE

Deleuze explains that both morality and knowledge are the continuation of religion's reactivity in the modern world.(D, 98) In modern morality truth is still held above the world as an abstract ideal. Nietzsche takes Socrates to task for measuring and judging life. When life is put to the service of knowledge, the whole of life becomes reactive. Knowledge sets itself up as an end, a judge, a supreme instance. Knowledge gives life laws that separate it from what it can do, keep it from acting, maintaining it in a
narrow framework of scientifically observable reaction; almost like animals in a zoo. (D, 100) Knowledge is thought subject to reason and to all that is expressed in reason. Knowledge is thought in relation to reactive forces which seize and conquer it. (D, 101)

Nietzsche critiques knowledge itself attempting to find new forces capable of giving thought another sense. He searches for a way to make thought an affirmative power of life. Thinking would then mean new possibilities of life. This kind of thought would allow life to go beyond the limits that knowledge fixes for it. Life would cease to be reactive. Nietzsche describes a new active life affirming thought which is representative of pre-Socratic thought par excellence, and also the very essence of art. (D, 101)

Art, Nietzsche tells us, is the opposite of disinterested operation. It does not heal, calm, sublimate or pay off. It does not suspend desire, instinct or will. This is in obvious opposition with every reactive definition of art including Kant's. "When Kant distinguished beauty from all other interests even moral ones, he was still putting himself in the position of the spectator, but of a less and less gifted spectator who now has only a disinterested regard for beauty." (D, 102) Art for Nietzsche was not a spectator sport. Nietzsche, says Deleuze, demands an aesthetics of creation, an aesthetics of Pygmalion. (D, 102)

According to Nietzsche, we have not yet understood what the life of the artist means. The activity of this life serves as a stimulant to the affirmation contained in the work of art itself. (D, 102) Art should not criticise but affirm all terrors and joys as acts of creation.
ART AND THE CREATION OF ILLUSION

Nietzsche also described art as falsehood. Art can sanctify the lie. (D, 102) This was a difficult idea for Jung to accept. In this second principle of art, deception is turned into a superior ideal. The younger more idealistic Nietzsche, who wrote The Birth of Tragedy, described this dimension of art as the Apollonian. Later in his life Nietzsche concluded that art had as much capability as religion to foster a reactive approach to life. It can allow us to cling to false, nihilistic, abstract ideals. Wagner’s musical drama Persival, with all its Christian mythological content, to Nietzsche was a clear demonstration of this. It was not the ability to maintain falsehood which Nietzsche criticised. Falsehood could act as a vessel of vitality.

For the artist, appearance no longer means the negation of the real world. The truth takes on a new sense; truth here means raising to a higher power. Artists are seekers of a new knowledge and a new truth. They are the inventors of the new possibilities of life. (Here Nietzsche’s promotion of irrationalism comes into play.) “.we the artists,” states Nietzsche, “.are told we fall into error diverted by forces foreign to the truth. We are told to think well or to think truthfully is a method.” Truth is always referred to as an abstract universal, valued for all time and all places. The real forces that form thought are never referred to. (D, 103) Nietzsche appreciates not the conceptual ‘truths’ which make up the world as we perceive it, but rather the force which drives us to create new concepts.

Culture expresses the violence of the forces which seize thought in order to make it something affirmative and active, but we only understand culture in terms of the way in
which it is opposed by method. The trouble is method always presupposes the good will of the thinker. (D, 108)

As Paul Thiele explains, for Nietzsche, the philosophical life is necessarily an artistic one. (T, 119) Artistic philosophy evolves a new approach which does not involve the above mentioned abstract methodology. As stated, Jung believed that Nietzsche was a great artist, but he was also a philosopher, and we expect a philosopher to think. (S2, 1255) In Jung’s opinion, Nietzsche all too often, did not carefully analyze the events he wrote of in Thus Spoke Zarathustra but rather “danced over them.” For Nietzsche, who called himself an artist-philosopher, Jung’s statement would speak of the reactive definition of philosophy which he sought to combat. As Nicholas Davey states, to question whether Nietzsche’s writings are artistic or philosophical is profoundly misleading. “Though Nietzsche once lamented that he wrote rather than sang, for most of his creative life there was never any rigid distinction between the literary and philosophical dimensions of his thinking.” (Davey, xii)

ART AS THE CREATION OF NEW MORALITY

Jung’s main objection to the aesthetic, as a solution for the ills of life, was that it was amoral and escapist. (S2, 1391) (MDR, 187) We have already explained that Nietzsche viewed art as the creator a new morality and as the vehicle of the ultimately moral action of affirmation. If the artist God seems cruel and destructive it is because destruction is necessary before new creation is possible. Nietzsche explains that art, rather than projecting abstract metaphysical meaning onto an essentially meaningless and tragic existence, allows one to bear that meaninglessness. It allows one to step back and
affirm life aesthetically as it is. In this act of aesthetic affirmation we create meaning. Rather than looking to an ideal world devoid of imperfection, the artist makes his life into a beautiful work of art, which acknowledges and incorporates all sorrows and imperfections within its composition.

Nietzsche would certainly admit that art has the capability of allowing us to run away from life. Nietzsche criticises the dysfunctional nature of art of his time, namely Romanticism. Nietzsche believed the purpose of the art of his time was to put to sleep or intoxicate. (UM, 220)(T, 130) As Nietzsche explains, the Romantics sought to “scare away their discontent, boredom and uneasy conscience for hours at a time.” For the ancient Greeks, on the other hand, “art was an outflowing and overflowing of their own healthiness and wellbeing...[They] loved to view their perfection repeated outside themselves:-self-enjoyment was what led to art, whereas what leads our contemporaries to it is self disgust.”(HH, 251)(T, 130)

Jung would argue that Nietzsche did want to escape his conscience and scare away his discontent, and that creating representations of one’s ‘perfection’ amounted to ignoring one’s Shadow. Nietzsche said that good art must represent an artist’s health and strength, that is, his victories over sickness and weakness. “One should speak only when one may not stay silent; and then only of that which one has overcome - everything else is chatter, ‘literature’, lack of breeding. My writing speaks only of my overcomings.”(HH, 209)(T, 133) In any great work a ‘subtler eye’ will perceive “that here a sufferer and self-denier speaks as though he were not a sufferer and self denier.”(HH, 212)(T, 134) Is this then not all false pretense, pretending we are is okay when we are not, pretending all our problems are solved, when they’ve only just begun?
Jung was a doctor; he examined and treated problems, Nietzsche's stance was thus problematic.

I would disagree with Thiele's statement that the accounting of one's victory over decadence is not the victory itself. I think he's wrong in his assertion that, if one can represent an experience, it signifies that it is no longer present. (T, 134) Nietzsche stated that one does not get over a passion by representing it: rather it is over when one is able to represent it. "(WP, 431)" (T, 134) I think what he means here is, not that the artist is recounting a past victory but rather that one cannot recount it properly unless one is victorious. A bad work of art is a defeat. But a successful representation, a successful expression, a successful act of creation, allows one the victory of seeing the beauty of their life. If art were only a recollection of a victory already accomplished it then wouldn't be creative; it would be simply taking dictation. Ills are dealt with through the representation of our struggle. Ills are dealt with by seeing our misfortunes as part of the greater whole, as episodes in a great tale, a wonderful piece of mythology. Great style or great art is the evidence of this enlightenment.

Problems are in effect solved through affirmation of the process of getting to the point where we are now, the affirmation of eternal return. Nietzsche wants us to say, "If I had to do it all again I wouldn't change a thing. How can I regret even a second of the series of events that brought me here to this present moment in time?" The chronicle becomes affirmed through heroic myth. Thiele states that,

Art is defined as that which allows us to make life an aesthetic phenomenon... The Dionysian artist is he that makes life beautiful because he perceives it that way. To revitalize an old cliché, beauty is in the eye of
the beholder. If one does not see beauty in nature and man, the problem is not with life but with your eyes.(T, 136)

As Thiele explains, to make one’s life aesthetic is not to sculpt oneself into some preconceived form. It is not the process of molding oneself to match a foreordained ideal. The life of the artist is not tangled in a teleology or a striving for ends. The ends depreciate the means; having a goal in life makes the actual living purely secondary.(T, 136) "One lives life aesthetically not to arrive at an end called the self-as-art, but because only life lived aesthetically yields its fullest realization at every moment. There is no purpose to life as a whole and Nietzsche did not suggest that we install an artificial one."(T, 137) For Nietzsche art is like dancing. "The disciplined, purposeful movements, stylistically unified, create a work of art. The end however is not a completed performance, but the activity itself, the dance in its performance."(T, 137) If Nietzsche seemed like he was dancing over what was problematic in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, it is because dancing was the solution to the problem, not a means of turning away from it.

---

CHAPTER 3

SIMILARITIES IN JUNG AND NIETZSCHE’S APPROACHES

JUNG AND THE USE OF SYMBOLS

While Jung criticised Nietzsche’s use of art, the symbolic processes to which Jung lends so much of his writings can be likened to the processes Nietzsche describes as being enacted by the artist. For Jung the use of symbol, not only allowed one to communicate the contents of the unconscious, but to transform them. If the use of symbol is not significantly different from the use of art, this would seem to contradict Jung’s description of art as merely passive and escapist. Moral transformation seems to be simultaneous with creation.

For Nietzsche good style, a healthy birth of an idea versus a still born, means a battle won. A good expression of the inner in the outer, the successful act of expression, is central. I would theorise, that the same activity afoot in Jung’s usage of ‘phantasies,’ is present here too.

In the Memories, Dreams and Reflections, in the chapter entitled “Confrontation with the Unconscious,” Jung explains how after his break with Freud, and during the period of psychological turmoil which ensued, he built structures out of stone. During this time of crisis from 1912 onwards his imagination was invaded by frightening fantasies. Overwhelmed and left with nothing to hold onto, he followed the first impulse which came to him. He returned to his childhood memories of playing passionately with building blocks. He realised that the small boy who manned these constructions was still within him, perhaps possessing the creative life which he lacked. Though he found it a
be a terribly humiliating experience to admit that there was nothing to do but play like a small child, he submitted to the activity. (MDR, 173-74) He states that “In the course of this activity my thoughts clarified, and I was able to grasp the fantasies whose presence in myself I dimly felt.” He realised that he was “on the way to discovering his own myth. For the building game was only a beginning. It released a stream of fantasies which (he) later carefully wrote down.” (MDR, 174) He used his stone constructions in a similar manner after his wife’s death. He stated that, “It cost me a great deal to regain my footing and the contact with the stone helped me.” (MDR, 174-75)

Jung’s return to his playful acts of building again bring to mind Victor Turner’s theory of art as play. He stepped out of his normal life practices and acted on impulse. This seemingly useless activity allowed him to reorder his thoughts, to create a new mythology. Here the creation of art is proven to be something other than a merely escapist activity.

JUNG AND MANDALAS

Another artistic means which Jung employed during his confrontation with the unconscious was drawing and painting. It was during this activity that he found himself creating regular symmetrical images which he later identified as mandalas. (C, 134)

The mandala is one of the oldest religious symbols of humanity. (C, 134) Clarke states that mandalas are cosmological maps which provide a symbolic guide to the structure of the world, human and divine, in which each devotee will have to undertake his life’s journey. They also act as reference guides for meditation. Jung believed that these images sprung from an archetypal source, that they originated not in Lammaist
dogma, but in dreams and visions. "The true mandala is strictly speaking, not an
observable image but 'is always an inner image which is gradually built up through
(active) imagination."(CW12, 123)(C, 135)¹

Jung later came to describe mandalas as cryptograms of personality and as
expressions of the Self. Mandalas all lead back to a single point in the center.(C, 134)
For Jung, mandala's represented an union of opposites which allow the consciousness of
Divinity to incarnate in man.(CW91, 633)(C, 135) In the center of mandalas we often
find Divine figures such as the Buddha or Shakti in an embrace with her consort. In
either case Jung associated these figures with psychological wholeness.(CW91, 630)(C,
138) The mandala embodies the process of 'becoming what one is', or the individuation
process as an approximation of the Self.(CW18, 271)(C, 139)

Jung saw the creation of a mandala as involving the dissolution of opposites into a
whole and a realisation of an already existant potential ideal, the Self. Though both of
these activities seem to reflect a project which runs contrary to that of the pluralistic
approach of Nietzsche, it must be noted, that the mandala image is not only a symbol of
wholeness and healing, but a means to conduct the process of individuation. As Clarke
explains,

The mandalas drawn by his patients suggested to Jung not only a
representation of a state of psychic wholeness, but rather a striving to
overcome inner chaos, and the search for some form of integration...the
use of mandala drawings expressed a need to resolve psychological
tensions, and acted as 'an antidote for chaotic states of mind.(CW91, 16)
(C, 139)

I would suggest that the creation of a mandala in Jungian psychology functions
similarly to the creation of art in Nietzschean philosophy. The creation of a mandala is an
attempt to see and put together apparently irreconcilable opposites and bridge apparently hopeless splits. (CW91, 718)(C, 139) The importance of the mandala lies not so much in the ends, as the ends are never arrived at, but in the activity of a striving to put the chaos of our minds into order. I would argue that when Jung states that the mandala is a means by which one may carry out the activity of individuation, rather than simply a representation of ideal, he ceases to be a structuralist. The mandala is not just a signifier of something that already exists, but a means of working through imbalances. It operates like a magical implement which calls into action various powers. The mandala operates in the creative and evocative manner, described by Charles Taylor, rather than the denotative manner, described by semiotics.

NIETZSCHE AND OUTWARD EXPRESSION

An indication that, for Nietzsche, the activity of outward expression is the victory itself can be found in Thoughts Out of Season. (This material was previously touched on in Part II in the section on history.) In this text Nietzsche's comments on the problems of cultural pluralism and the cult of inwardness in the modern era, reflect concerns similar to those raised by Jung. In Thoughts Out of Season Nietzsche explains that the borrowing of the outward trappings of other societies is the sign of a sick culture. He would certainly agree with Jung's criticism of the inadequacy of "bloodless intellectual concepts". However, while Jung shows more concern that theosophical cosmopolitanism involves external trappings without true inner kinship to a cultures ideas, Nietzsche is concerned that the inner is the only thing which is seen as important.
For Nietzsche, the artist, it is the unity of inner nature and outward expression that is truly necessary.

Nietzsche believed that in his time the purity of the connection between history and life had vanished. The problem was the demand for history to be a science, a science of universal evolution. (GC, TOS, 233) "We moderns," says Nietzsche, "Have nothing of our own. We only become worthy of notice by filling ourselves to the brim with foreign customs, arts, philosophies, religions and sciences." (GC, TOS, 235) Modern man says he already has the inner substance and thus he only wants the form. This causes quite an unreal opposition in a living thing. Our modern culture is not a real culture, but a kind of knowledge of culture, a complex of thoughts and feelings from which no knowledge can come. Nietzsche criticises the very superficial pluralism that we are witness to today. We sport wretched imitations of convention. (GC, TOS, 234) The whole of modern culture, Nietzsche complains, is internal, the external is only superficially applied, not expressed. We have lost our ability to express ourselves. We, says the philosopher, are like walking encyclopedias which ought to read on our flimsy covers, "Manual of internal culture for external barbarians." (GC, TOS, 235) In "the Land of Culture" Zarathustra complains of the modern age.

Written all over with characters of the past, and these characters also penciled over with new characters...All times and peoples gaze divers-coloured out of your veils; all customs and beliefs speak divers coloured out of your gestures. He who would strip you of veils and wrappers, and paints and gestures, would have just enough left to scare the crow...All periods prate against one another in your spirits; and the dreams and prattlings of all periods were even more real than your awakness!(Z, 117-18)
I believe Nietzsche may well have held Jung as being a propagator of this cult of internalism. He might consider Jung’s theory of the archetypes an example of possessing the substance and seeking out the form. According to Nietzsche, this made for a divided and unnatural approach to life. Jung was conscious of the dangers of which Nietzsche spoke. He would be the first to state that one must be conscious of our own psychological heritage. While the archetypes of the collective unconscious are universal, collective consciousness is culturally specific. It is different as each people’s history is different. (C, 153)

GERMANY AND HISTORY

According to both Jung and Nietzsche, the opposition of inner and outer in the modern world, is a very real danger. External matters become less real. Men become careless and accommodating in external matters. A large cleft grows between substance and form until we no longer have any feeling towards our external barbarism. What should be put in place to combat this fragmenting opposition? Nietzsche’s answer is the “unity of artistic style in every outward expression of peoples life.” (GC, TOS, 235)

Nietzsche states that the Germans, more than anything else, are suffering from the problem of external barbarism. He states that the foreigner had some warrant for his belief that the German’s inward life is too weak and ill organised to provide form and external expression for itself. (GC, TOS, 236) Nietzsche warns that this disorganised inner life might one day vanish and leave behind only external life, with its vulgar pride and vain servility to mark the German. “We feel theory,” he states, “We hardly know anymore how our contemporaries give expression to their feelings.” (GC, TOS, 237)
What was needed more than political unity in Germany, was the unity of spirit and life. This could only come about after the annihilation of the antagonism between form and substance, inward life and convention. (GC, TOS, 238)

Both Jung and Nietzsche believed that the Germans were handling their cultural identity badly. They both believed that there was a great cleft between substance and form in the German people’s cultural identity. What should be put in place to combat this fragmenting opposition?

Nietzsche’s answer is the “unity of artistic style in every outward expression of people’s life.” (GC, TOS, 235) The trouble with modern society, German society in particular, was that the abstraction of the theoretician was emphasised over artistic expression. The act of expression, the process of expression was replaced with a fragmented game of mix and match. The act of creation was almost entirely removed. In a similar manner denotative theories of language, which were popular at the time, ignored the process of creation enacted by the use of a word and replaced it with static parts which referred to each other, the signifier and signified. Words were no longer inhabited by the forces of intention. The cultural process which involves the creation of art is an essential part of a society’s creation of its sense of Self. The act of creation is an essential part of becoming aware of, and coming to terms with, the unconscious contents of the psyche.

Though, as established earlier, Jung gave much attention to the internal in the form of the archetypes, he considered external expression important as well. Archetypes are dependent on the ego to become manifest. In fact, while Jung said the West could learn much from Eastern religions’ emphasis on the internal he criticised their neglect of
the external. As Clarke explains, Jung saw the East as problematic in its own way.

While the West is one-sidedly external, the East is one-sidedly internal. (C, 72) He saw the East as being excessively introverted and as failing to give enough interest to every day things.

---

CHAPTER 4
THE REMAINING DIVIDE

While Jung’s theory of symbols and Nietzsche’s theory of art have much in common, a fundamental divide still remains. This difference lies not in the question of whether the use of symbol is always followed by conscious rational analysis. (Creation and moral transformation are shown to be simultaneous in Jung use of symbols.)

The difference lies, firstly, in the fact that Jung always saw the symbols as relating to powers beyond those of the ego. Just as much as Nietzsche is decidedly against the division of reality into a ‘Backworld’ of Being and a World of Becoming, Jung insisted on the differentiation of ego and unconscious. I would assert that this insistence on the conscious acknowledgement of the autonomous power of the unconscious, would very likely make Jung a ‘backworldsman’ in Nietzsche’s eyes.

According to Jung in an ideal situation, the individual is a work of art, or the vehicle of the work of art and not the artist. According to Jung the individual should not see himself as a creator God. In contrast, Nietzsche’s philosophy fosters precisely this role in the artist-philosopher.

Secondly, the difference between Jung’s symbols and Nietzsche’s aesthetics is that a symbol is suprapersonal. The symbol is not only the product of society as a collective unit, but it remains in dialogue with that dimension of collectivity. The use of symbols in the process of individuation involves a continuing dialogue between the ego and the collective unconscious. Nietzsche, in contrast, may harvest a symbol from a collective tradition, but it eventually becomes a metaphor used in individual artistic
creation. It would be wrong to say that its connection to the collective unconscious is lost. What is lost is the Nietzschian artist’s conscious realisation that the collective unconscious is still acting upon it.

ALCHEMY

Alchemy provides an excellent hermeneutic to compare Jung and Nietzsche’s points of view, as both the philosopher and the psychologist use it in their systems of thought. The differing approach of Jung’s alchemist and Nietzsche’s artist-alchemist’s transmutation indicate bedrock differences in these two men’s soteriologies. Jung’s alchemy is enacted through the conjunction of opposites via the use of the transcendent function. Nietzsche’s alchemy involves moving beyond opposites through the recognition that they are only conventional realities. Nietzsche’s artist-alchemist reevaluates concepts and myths, revivifying them. There is no transcendent function involved. The transmutation is enacted through the individual’s will to power. Both Jung and Nietzsche experienced a psychological breakdown and a confrontation with the unconscious. Jung believed that because he had his family and his psychiatric practice to ground him, he did not become permanently insane, while Nietzsche did. Jung criticises Nietzsche for not acknowledging the collective side of humanity, his need for other human beings and the continuity of culture and intellectual history. *(MDR, 263)* Without any landmarks and conventions, we are left with a chaotic mess and no creative soil beneath our feet. *(S2, 1463)*

The Jungian alchemical process of individuation involves the conjunction of both conscious and unconscious, as well as both individual and collective forces; this is the
key feature of the transcendence of opposites. Only in the unconscious can we move beyond opposites. According to Clarke, Jung wished to enact a dialogue between conscious and unconscious, as if they were two autonomous individuals having a conversation. The Nietzschean relationship between conscious and unconscious is less idealistic. While Jung hopes to initiate a conversation between the two sides of the psyche, with Nietzsche it appears that the two sides refuse to sit down at the same table.

While we can improve our lot by recognising the unconscious forces behind conscious phenomenon, Nietzsche also asserts determinism. The creation of the Self is at the same time an unfolding of the Self, but it is better that we believe that we are consciously creating ourselves rather than being deterministically acted upon by a set of biological forces. In contrast, for Jung, the very knowledge that those forces are acting upon us allows us to change things. For Nietzsche, the knowledge that we are being affected by the forces of the unconscious divorces us from their powers and makes us into bereft ressentimental men and women.

Jungian individuation involves the conjunction of individual and collective forces. Becoming whole people involves acknowledging both sides of ourselves. This reflects another significant departure from Nietzsche's position. While the philosopher does admit the importance of history, culture, religion and upbringing; they are all ultimately left behind in critical history. Though we may reapply our history, this reapplication is a matter of individualistic artistic creation, not a dialogue between the collective and the individual. While Nietzsche does not deny the metaphysical bedrock of biological instincts which affect all of humanity through the process of species activity, he condemns collective conceptual systems such as religions. He sees religion and the state
as corruptions of our natural instincts, while Jung sees these systems, when they function as they should, as means of encountering the natural and primal powers of the archetypes. Nietzsche asserts that we ought to live on one plane of existence, one kinetic, active, creative plane with the one voice of what is perceived as our conscious will to power.

JUNG AND ALCHEMY

In the Collected Works 12 Jung explains that alchemists, like depth psychologists, deal with the problem of opposites. The alchemists taught that every form of life contains its own inner antithesis, thus anticipating the problem of opposites in modern psychology. According to Jung, the union of opposites takes place in a middle realm which is neither material nor spiritual but that of both; that of the symbol. \(GW_{12}, 394\) The symbol is the mediating link between matter and spirit and so works this mediation in the consciousness of its possessor. \(B, 225\)

While the alchemists projected psychological realities onto nature and the Philosopher's Stone, Nietzsche, according to Jung, attempted to do the reverse. He wished to pull the spirit from the stone. “Nietzsche wanted to snatch the spirit - identified by Jung as the Superman - from the stone.” \(B, 227\) “Ah ye men,” says Zarathustra, “within the stone slumbereth an image for me, the image of my visions! Ah that it should slumber in the hardest ugliest stone.” \(Z, 84\) The Superman may be equated with the eternal life or the Divine Man which the alchemists sought after.

For both Jung and Nietzsche, the goal of the alchemical procedure was the redemption of mankind. In Jung's view there are two kinds of redemption. There is the redemption which involves a transcendent Divine figure and the alchemical redemption
in which Man takes upon himself the work of salvation. According to Jung, there can be no reconciliation between these two soteriologies. (B, 229-230) While, as Peter Bishop explains, Jung clearly leans toward the immanent conception of redemption, he also considered it problematic. (B, 230) There was a danger in taking on a God like role, be it the work of creation or the work of salvation.

NIETZSCHE AND ALCHEMY

Nietzsche often referred to himself as an inner alchemist. Graham Parks observed that Zarathustra is,

a text that contains dozens of images that figure importantly in alchemy - and especially in alchemy understood as a symbols system for psychological transformation - such as chaos; the stone, fire, sun, and moon; the dragon, eagle, lion, serpent, and ouroborus; the child and of course lead and gold. (B, 224)

Nietzsche’s alchemy is art. Only art is capable of transforming the curse of life into a blessing. As Thiele states, “In art is found the true philosopher’s stone that transforms the leaden heaviness of existence into the brilliance and richness of gold.” (T, 137) Nietzsche does speak of escape as stepping back and seeing life from an aesthetic distance. However, the refuges of perfection in which Nietzsche sought in art, are not serene paradisic landscapes, but the terrifying beauty of tragedy and its bloody victories over fear and suffering. Truth and beauty are not one, truth is ugly. “Hence the need for art. For art is that which casts truth goodness and beauty into a unity. The value of art lies in its transformative power.” (T, 138)
In the life of the artist, in the affirmation of eternal return, each action must be justified on its own merits apart from its purely utilitarian function as payment for future good. (T, 203) Herein lies the feat, to live life as a series of aesthetically self-fulfilling moments, without expectations or hope. “Every word and deed provides a snap shot of the soul.” (T, 205)

Art, however, not only veils life that we may endure it, but that we may live it more fully. “Life is worth knowing says science.” But only art, “the most beautiful seductress,” proclaims: “Life is worth living”. (GW, 2:6)(T, 138) Perhaps for Jung, as a scientist and psychologist, knowing life was still the top priority.

ALCHEMY, THE EARTH AND COLLECTIVITY

Both Jung and Nietzsche explain their soteriologies using the rubric of alchemy. Both Jung and Nietzsche’s philosophies involve a departure from the old alchemist’s literal belief in the human soul’s conjunction with nature and the literal process of turning lead into gold. Jung, however, sees this departure as a loss of safety. According to the psychologist humanity was in a safer place when the force of the spirit was seen as being embodied in matter. (CW10, 431: 212)

As explained in Part I, in the time of the Renaissance humanity and all the objects in the universe were seen as magically connected. The human individual, the microcosm, mirrored the cosmos, the macrocosm. Alchemists of the time may have truly believed that they were affecting their own psyches through the manipulation of natural elements. Whereas, in Nietzsche’s time, the microcosm of the individual was considered the origin of the macrocosm. The individual gave the universe meaning. (S1, 670)
According to Jung, it was with this view point in mind that Nietzsche began to interject the whole of metaphysics into his own life. (S1, 671) When God was declared dead, the individual was filled with all the things in the universe. In Collected Works 10 Jung states that in earlier times nature was considered to be filled with spirit. Now for the first time we are in a lifeless nature bereft of Gods. The Enlightenment may have destroyed the spirits of nature but not the psychic factors that correspond to them. The demons that make possession possible remain as unconscious psychic forces. (CW10, 431:211) As Jung explains, the spirits who once flitted about in attics, were now in the minds of apparently normal Europeans. (CW10, 342: 212)

The old alchemist saw the powers of the Self as being embodied by nature. Jung states that neither Faust nor Nietzsche present a very encouraging example of what happens when we attempt to embody this secret within ourselves. (CW12, 564:481) More precisely, neither Faust nor Nietzsche is a very encouraging example of what happens when we attempt to pull all the powers from the philosopher stone and attribute them to consciousness. If nature is no longer acting as a mediator for the powers of the psyche, some replacement must be found.

I believe that Jung did not really believe that a replacement must be found for nature. We must merely realise that we are dealing with a symbolic embodiment of the spirit in nature rather than a literal one. With this belief one is able to perceive the archetypes as possessing a certain autonomy; the landscape of our symbolic homelands allows us to keep these unconscious forces differentiated from our own conscious ego. So long as we are able to provisionally posit these unconscious forces as ‘other’, to
maintain the experience that they are differentiated from our ego, we can prevent our
conscious from being inundated by the unconscious.

As stated earlier, there are similarities in the way in which Nietzsche and Jung
believe the symbols to function. Nietzsche proposed that good style, a healthy birth of an
idea, versus a stillborn, means a battle won. The same activity occurs in Jung’s usage of
fantasies. However, as stated in Part II, the Nietzschean symbol does not operate as a
mediator of a force which already existed in potential, but as the means of kinetic
actualisation. Nietzsche is not interested in the conscious acknowledgment of an
autonomous force creating through the artist. He is interested in maintaining the
experience of conscious individualistic invention. Certainly, Nietzsche sees the
advantage of the use of symbols, but he is interested in their artistic invention as
metaphors rather than as the means of differentiating unconscious forces from the
ego. They are a justification of their own perishable relative level of existence.

Metaphors are conventional illusions like any other human conception.

Jung believed that the archetypes could not be ignored. The symbols themselves
are connected with forces independent of the ego and this should always be duly noted.
Jung appreciated the old alchemist’s perception of the conjunction of the microcosm and
the macrocosm or the conjunction of the forces of the psyche with the forces of nature.
The reason for this was the alchemical rubric allowed for a symbolic acknowledgment of
the influence and the usefulness of something immovable as the earth, the archetypes and
our symbolic-cultural landscapes. Nothing can argue the world out of existence, says
Jung in the Collected Works, just as nothing can argue the effects of the unconscious out
of existence. (CW7, 397:237)
Jung's use of the mandala, a visual depiction of the Vajrayana Buddhist alchemical system shows well Jung's understanding of the relationship between the individual and the archetypes. Jung describes the mandala as an attempt of self healing on the part of nature, which does not spring from conscious reflection, but from an instinctive impulse. (CW91, 714) (C, 139) Traditionally the alchemist needs the powers of the earth. Though he is the instigator, he only speeds up a process already occurring. One might say he allows the powers of the earth to transform him by placing himself in the center of their activities. One lies within the Self at the central point of our inner cosmos. (MDR, 367) (C, 135) The mandala happens to one just as the Self happens to one. Powers are called into being which were already there in potential.

Jung saw the many cultural symbolic systems as evidence that his psychological system had historical precedent. He also saw them as evidence that the same archetypes were at work in the world universally, though in various manifestations. Though we may, in our study of the archetypes, open a dialogue between conscious and unconscious, peeling back the layers of a symbol's history, according to Jung; the archetypes influence on symbols is nonnegotiable. Even if we consciously deny the archetypes' autonomy, their influence still remains in some shape or form. They are posited as psychic bedrock. As well, Jung believes we are wired with the symbolic systems of our particular cultures.

As stated in Part II, Nietzsche agrees that the influence of our cultural mind set continues even after its conscious rejection. Nietzsche' quote on this issue bears repeating.

For as we are merely the resultant of previous generations, we are also the resultant of errors, passions and crimes; it is impossible to shake off this chain. Though we condemn the errors and think we have escaped them we cannot escape the fact that we spring from them. (GC, TOS, 232)
This is why it is important that a Nietzschean pierce masks and discover the forces beneath them, lest the substance of his culture be incompatible with the forms he uses to express its contents. Nietzsche does assert that our first nature, which we receive from our history, can eventually be analysed and left behind for a second nature. Critical history involves a sparagmos during which one tears his history apart to prevent it from imprisoning himself.

Though Jung agrees that we need to revision our histories, he considers Thucydides Spoke Zarathustra a very problematic revisioning. If we tear apart and reapply our cultural inheritance it cannot be merely the ego that is responsible for this reconstruction. We must remain in conscious dialogue with the collective unconscious.

Jung believes that we should always remain in dialogue with our cultural inheritance. Because the Self is never fully realised, and it is impossible to bring all the contents of the collective unconscious into the light of consciousness, there will always be cultural influences that we are subjected to of which we are not entirely aware. Even in the process of individuation, as we discover our own individual means of using the symbols to communicate with the archetypes, we need to be conscious of our cultural landscapes. Individuation honours both the collective and individual side of humanity. The spirit of gravity cannot be ignored. We cannot survive as isolated individuals; collectivity is a fundamental part of our psyche which we cannot ignore.

Nietzsche, in contrast, took a profoundly individualistic approach. Zarathustra states “Joys and Passions,” “My brother when thou has a virtue, and it is thine virtue, thou has it in common with no one.” (Z, 32) Nietzsche asserts that all histories deserve to
be destroyed. History must be torn to shreds like Dionysus. We do not, however, throw away Dionysus' bit and pieces. History is torn apart that it might be reapplied, reevaluated, but this reevaluation is a matter of individualistic invention. While Thiele states that for Nietzsche the Self is not so much discovered as unfolded, Zarathustra states that, "Many a soul one will not discover, unless one first invent it." (Z, 38) The nature of the Self is physiologically determined but the constant knowledge of this would make our lives reactive and the will to power would cease to be our own. In the chapter entitled "Backworlds", in which Nietzsche voices his criticism of our reliance on 'other' power, the importance of our reliance on the ego and its connection to the here and now is affirmed.

Yea, this ego with its contradiction and perplexity, speaketh most uprightly of its being - this creating willing, evaluating ego, which is the measure of all things. And this most upright existence, the ego - it speaketh of the body, and still it implieth the body...Always more uprightly learneth it to speak, the ego; and the more it learneth, the more it doth find its titles and honours for the body and the earth. A new pride taught mine ego, and that teach I unto men: no longer to thrust one's head into the sand of celestial things, but to carry it freely, a terrestrial head, which giveth meaning to the earth! (Z, 28)

On a functional level, Nietzsche is what Jung would term, a Faustian alchemist who takes the alchemical process entirely onto his conscious ego. According to Jung, this puts him in great danger. Nietzsche becomes the magician who fails to pay homage to God and the universe. Because he considers the symbols only conscious metaphors, he has lost a fruitful alliance with the earth. He does not recognise that the earth and its symbols have autonomy. Nietzsche is like a man dawning a shaman's cloak and picking up his drum without the recognition of the fact that these objects are already inhabited by
spirits. Nietzsche cannot recognise the macrocosmic collective unconscious' influence on the microcosm of the conscious ego, because this would involve the metaphysical supposition of an autonomous World of Being.

This is the difference between the artist's stance and that of the metaphysician. For the Nietzschean artist, there is one world, one world of suffering which we must transmute into something joyous without the help of any autonomous powers. This transmutation must be set in motion through a sheer act of will. "But so willeth my creating will, my fate," says Zarathustra, "Or to tell it to you more candidly: just such a fate - Willeth my will. All feeling suffereth in me, and is in prison: but my willing ever cometh to me as mine emancipator and comforter."(Z, 83)

THE JUNGIAN DIALOGUE

As stated earlier, Jung did not see any problem with Nietzsche's advice to tear ourselves to shreds in order to undergo recreation. As Clarke states, the emergence of a fuller more balanced Self was by no means smooth and easy, but required the breaking down of the ego, and the revelation of multiplicity within the apparent unity.(C, 85) Jung was a firm believer in the process of the psychological death and rebirth of the psyche, he saw sparagmos as necessary event in the enantiodromia. However the reconstruction which occurred afterward should not be carried out by the conscious ego. The ego alone cannot transform every 'It was,' into a 'Thus I would have it.'(Z, 138) It was essential that this reconstruction was brought about through a dialogue with the collective unconscious. The movement toward the Self necessitated the recognition of both the individualistic and collective aspects of humanity.
Jung's view on the development of the Self is comparable to his whole academic approach. Jung took a macrocosmic approach to psychology, "In the process of formulating his theory of the archetypes and the collective unconscious, he sought to relate his own insights to a whole range of philosophical, historical and mythological precedents." (C, 48) Jung saw his psychology as leading beyond the psyche of his individual patients and embracing collective or cultural meanings. He wished to enact the synthesis of the individual with the collective psyche. (CW7, 479) (C, 51) Jung sought to clarify mental contents by linking them with an ever widening context of meanings expressed in symbols and images through the use of symbols derived from all kinds of mythological and cultural parallels. (C, 51) Unlike Nietzsche, Jung was not willing to throw away the grandfather, whose time, Zarathustra argues, has ceased. (Z, 197)

As Clarke explains, Jung did not see the ego as a sovereign legislator to the personality, but rather as a facilitator of the emergence of the unconscious into conscious. He saw this process as a dialogue or a partnership. (C, 112) Jung states that,

> It is as if a dialogue is taking place between two human beings with equal rights, each of whom gives the other credit for a valid argument and considers it worthwhile to modify the conflicting standpoints by means of thorough comparison and discussion or else to distinguish them clearly from one another. Since the way to agreement seldom stands open, in most cases a long conflict will be born, demanding sacrifices from both sides. (CW8, 186) (C, 48)

Jung did not simply want to revive past belief systems. He was very critical of the Theosophists and Anthroposophists who, in his opinion, were simply putting on "outworn" clothes rather than using past traditions to develop new ideas of their own. In
a true dialogue, explains Clarke, the individuality of the participants is retained even though, in the end, they are transformed in the interaction. (C, 50) The dialogue Jung speaks of is, according to Clarke, no fire-side chat. It is not a meeting of mutually compatible minds, but an encounter from which there is not necessarily a fully satisfying outcome. (C, 53)

Jung's doctrine of dialogue and transmutation may sound comparable to the interaction of forces which Nietzsche describes, but the psychologist and the philosopher's description of the relationship between the conscious and unconscious are very different. The unconscious for Nietzsche was biologically determined, we do not have the capability of discussing things with it. Nietzsche warns that we should avoid a conscious recognition that the unconscious is acting on us, because this robs us of our freedom and makes us resentimental. The acknowledgment of unconscious influence, in Jung's view, does nothing to detract from our freedom.

TELEOLOGY AND DETERMINISM

Perhaps the aspect of Jung's philosophy, with which Nietzsche would have the most disagreement, is his belief in teleology. The supposition of a teleology proves that Jung asserted the existence of a metaphysical order in the cosmos, even if that cosmos was wholly confined to the psyche. Jung asserted that a goal or end was being striven for, even if that goal was never reached and never could be. This goal or order was not simply a product of conscious innovation, it was the motivation of the Self.

Though Nietzsche believed in the will to power and the instinctual drive of species activity, he was in fundamental disagreement with the supposition of an
overarching teleology. To posit a meaningful drive at work in the universe would be to posit a metaphysical second proceeding from a 'back world'. To posit a meaningful drive metaphysically inherent in the universe, would rob us as individuals, of the ability to invent our own destiny. Nietzsche would likely describe a teleology as determinism dressed up to look pretty. Though in Nietzsche's philosophy the unconscious acts on the conscious in a deterministic manner, he argues that it is unhealthy to be conscious of this fact. Here again lies Nietzsche's paradoxical divide between what is ontologically true and what is true because it is vital or promotes life.

Though Jung's concept of the Self was profoundly influenced by Nietzsche's concept of the Self, there remains some important differences. Jung and Nietzsche's descriptions of the relationship between the Self and the ego are comparable to Jacob Boehme's description of the relationship between humanity and God. An unconscious God makes itself known or discovers itself through conscious humanity. (JD, 432) In Nietzsche's view "Consciousness is never self consciousness but the consciousness of an ego in relation to a self which is not itself conscious. It is the not the master's consciousness but the slave's in relation to a master who is not himself conscious." (D, 39) "The self saith unto the ego: 'Feel pain!' and thereupon it suffereth..." (Z, 30) As Jung puts it "the ego stands to the self as the moved to the mover, or as an object to subject..."(CW11, 391)(C, 74) The Self for Nietzsche is the source of an individual's will to power. But for Jung it goes beyond that to a teleology.

The Self for Jung is the totality of psychic function, "the sum total of (the individuals) conscious and unconscious contents."(CW11, 391)(C, 74) It is not simply the mover but the destination the moved is moving towards. Jung believed that in the
natural course of development the psyche seeks to bring the diverse elements in the psyche into some kind of unity, a state of balance a state of equilibrium. Jung called this state of balance approximation. (C, 74) The pattern found in a mandala is a manifestation of a means to the psyche’s ends. Nietzsche, in contrast, believed that an ends or goal detracted from the importance of the present business of living one’s life. Jung (as Clarke would argue), may assert the existence of a plurality of centers and functions but he also asserted that the harmony of forces is something discovered, not orchestrated or invented, by the ego. The construction of a mandala, the birth of the Divine child in alchemy, the creation of a beautiful work of art, are attempts of self healing on the part of nature. Nature here is not a biological determinism which would rob us of our freedom. The Self is not a static entity but a dynamic process; ‘an active force; whose essence is one of the continual transformation and rejuvination.”(CW9ii, 411)(C, 74)
CHAPTER 5

MYSTICAL EXPERIENCE

While the Nietzschean artist-alchemist acts singlehandedly, the Jungian alchemist has a partership with the earth. Jung sees a partership between ego and unconscious, the individual and the collective. The symbol enacts the transcendent function, it transcends conscious and unconscious, it transcends the individual and the collective. It is transformative but it is also relational. It is creative but is also referential. The symbol embodies creative forces, but it does not call them into existence. It rather facilitates their emergence to the conscious from the unconscious, where they already existed in potential as the archetypes. Jung stands at a cusp between structuralism and phenomenology. But the metaphor or the artistic image in the hands of Nietzsche, in contrast to the symbol, does not embody creative forces but rather allows the artist to embody creative forces within herself. The Nietzschean is both the artist and the work of art, willing her own emancipation.

While Jung would not admit that the act of artistic creation can simultaneously cause moral transformation, as we revision and revaluate our lives as works of art, his descriptions of the uses of mandalas and alchemy do seem to point to some form of moral transformation occurring. The liminal practice of art as play allows us to both rip ourselves apart and put ourselves back together. The reconstruction is moral in and of itself. The only difference in Jung’s case is that this project of reconstruction cannot be solely the project of the ego.

The question remains, however, as to whether one can consciously integrate an intuitive or partially conscious perception. The question remains as to whether one can
bring the ecstatic artistic perception of eternal return back into conscious life without lowering the threshold of consciousness. I would argue that the answer to this question is yes, but to explain why we must venture out of the realm of the philosophy of religion and into the psychology of altered states. It is one thing to philosophise about unconscious or superconscious states, it is quite another to experience one.

Carl Jung sought to investigate whether Nietzsche's philosophy was an adequate replacement for religion. One of religion's roles is managing ecstatic or mystical experiences. Jung compares Nietzsche's aesthetic approach to the Eastern techniques of Yogis, not to show how much less adept Nietzsche was with altered states, but to show that the approach of both Nietzsche and the Yogi was amoral and escapist. This criticism shows not only a lack of understanding of Nietzsche's views on Jung's part but a lack of understanding of Eastern spiritual traditions as well as limitations in Jungian psychology's ability to explain altered states.

Jung and Nietzsche both suffered the difficulty of incorporating their own 'mystical' experience into their systems of philosophical logic. Nietzsche calls these events, experiences of the spirit or ecstatic experiences. Jung calls these events, encounters with the unconscious. Both explain their experiences in naturalistic terms, restricting the occurrences to goings on within the psyche. Both see the importance of not disconnecting ourselves from vital spiritual powers by attributing them to a transcendent God. Neither of them see these experiences as lying entirely outside of the scope of their systems of thought, nor do they see them simply as products of a sick mind as had so many thinkers before them. Nietzsche repeatedly describes the importance of the spirit and of the ecstatic moment of eternal return. Jung describes his encounters with
the unconscious fantasies, as if they were autonomous beings. While neither Jung or Nietzsche would reduce these experiences to pathology, as Freud would likely have done, both of them see the importance of answering back these experiences with conscious regulation. Their approaches to this necessity differ greatly.

AESTHETICS AND EASTERN PHILOSOPHY

It is not my intention here to provide a full account of Jung’s commentary on Eastern thought, but I do think it is important to clarify Jung’s comparison of Nietzsche’s aesthetics to the acts of an Eastern God or Yogi. Part of the reason for Jung’s comparison of the Dionysian artist to the Dancing Shiva of Eastern Religion stems from the fact that Jung knew that Nietzsche’s aesthetics were influenced by Schopenhauer. Schopenhauer, while he was influenced by the Eastern viewpoint that life is essentially painful, believed that art rather than meditation, should be used as a treatment for this pain. I would also argue that Jung’s comparison of Nietzsche’s aesthetics to Yogic thought is the result of the fact that Jung turned the Eastern technique of Yoga on its head, in order to make it understandable to the Western mind.

The state of profound wakefulness achieved by the Yogi is equated by Jung with a deep sleep. As we read in J.J. Clarke’s Jung and Eastern Thought, Kundalini Yoga offers a path to enlightenment which begins deep down in the unconscious and rises up beyond this into a state of super consciousness in which the ego attains unity with the universal Self. Jung, stated that in the East, “the unconscious is above, while with us it is below.” (Jung, 1975: 12-13)(C, 116) This means, explains Clarke, that effectively Jung viewed the ascent toward the higher chakras as a path, not toward super consciousness,
but rather toward a greater integration with the unconscious. He believed that because the procedure of Yoga lowered the threshold of consciousness one could integrate the unconscious.(C, 116)

I would argue that, while Jung’s concern over Nietzsche’s identification of the ego with God-like creative powers is legitimate, when Yogis identified themselves with the universal creative force of Brahman, it was their Atman or greater Self rather than their ego which was the subject of their identification. Nietzsche, on the other hand, wished to affirm the powers of the unconscious, the powers of the Self, as belonging to the conscious individual. In the words of Eastern philosophy, one could argue that he was still clinging to the ego.

According to Clarke, Jung argued that the danger of Kundalini Yoga for the Westerner is that it encourages the total immersion in the unconscious state and hence the ultimate dissolution of individual consciousness in a cosmic participation mystique; the trance state which Jung imagined was the final goal of Yogis. Jung believed that the Yogi’s concentration exercises facilitated a dream state which removed him from the world and its illusions. He stated that “the goal of Yoga is a deep sleep - unsuitable for the occidental mind.(C, 117) Jung warned that the European who tried to banish all thought of the outer world, and to empty his mind of everything outside, would fall prey to his own subjective fantasies.(CW11, 939)(C, 117) It must be pointed out the concentration exercises which Jung mentions here are methods to keep the mind objective and wakeful. These methods include the use of mantra’s as well as the concentration on the breath.
In the *Seminars*, Jung speaks about Shakti, the feminine power of kundalini, comparing it with the anima and the aesthetic. As Clarke explains, in Yoga, Shakti power is raised from the lowest to the highest chakras, there to be united with Shiva, the male principle. This union brings about a state of supreme bliss beyond all dualities. (C, 110) The serpent power of kundalini is also personified as the Mahadevishakti, the Goddess who brings everything into existence by means of maya, the building material of reality. (*CW16*, 561) (C, 111) Jung describes Zarathustra’s dance with the maidens in the “Dance Song,” as a descent into Yin (Yin being related to the feminine or anima), and as a sort of aesthetic, divine play. He describes the ring of maidens as “a kind of shadowy maya.” (*S2*, 1173) In as much as Zarathustra was divine, Jung argues, he could remain in such a world, he could remain a “playful Shakti creating a world of illusions...as God can remain in the changing colours of the world, surrounded by the images of becoming and vanishing.” (*S2*, 1173) But, Jung argues, the trouble is, Nietzsche, who identifies with Zarathustra, is not a God; he is human, so he sinks down into the singleness of man unable to see the universe as Gods do; as a sort of mirror image of themselves. They don't suffer from the world, argues Jung.

Because they assume it is their own mirage. The Yogin is naturally always striving to reach a condition in which he might be able to envisage the world as his own creation, or his imagery, a self-reflection; but he can only do that- if he can do it at all - by the complete sacrifice of his human existence. He must transcend humanity in order to attain to the vision of God. (*S2*, 1173)

Because Jung turned the Eastern system of Yoga on its head, seeing the ascent to super consciousness as a descent into the unconscious, and because he had great
difficulty believing in the Eastern ideal of leaving the ego behind and becoming one with Divinity, he equates Kundalini Shakti power with the world of dream images we discover during the descent into our own unconscious. Jung argues that Nietzsche, in his identification with Zarathustra, becomes part of that illusory maya, a human being among human beings, not a God. Thus he falls, not into Divinity, but deep into the darkness of the unconscious.\(\text{(S2, 1173)}\) He becomes prey to his own subjective fantasies.

Nietzsche, Jung argues, makes a mistake in believing that he can step out of maya, the illusory stuff of life, because he is only a human being. It is dangerous for him to see himself as a creator of his own world. Though Zarathustra may not have been a God as Jung supposed, I would agree that the Dionysian artist did identify with God-like powers. The Dionysian artist did indeed mean to become a creator of his own world. He becomes Shiva, who dances the world in and out of existence. He partakes of the amoral creative forces of nature. For Jung, this God-like identity had serious ramifications. If an artist, like Nietzsche, acts as a vessel for the forces of the unconscious and identifies with these forces, as if he himself were a creator God, he risks inflation. He risks being inundated by the contents of his own unconscious fantasies. He also risks suffering the fate of a creator God; he risks dying in order to create a new world.

Jung saw Yoga as a means by which the libido is "introverted and liberated from the bondage of opposites...\(\text{(opposites) are to be understood (as) every sort of affective state and emotional tie to the object.}\)\(\text{(CW6, 189-90)(C, 104)}\) He believed, that the monistic power of Brahman coincided with the dynamic creative principle which he called libido.\(\text{(CW6, 336)(C, 105)}\) Jung said that, "The fusion of all of the self with its
relations to objects produces the identity of the Self (Atman) with the essence of the world (Brahman). (CW6, 189)(C, 105)

Clarke explains, that the immersion in the unconscious is the closest thing we can find in Jungian psychology to the Hindu closing of the subject/object split called moksa. (C, 105) Unfortunately this comparison meant that the Eastern tradition’s final goal was seen as a profound introversion, an inundation into one’s own fantasies and a loss of consciousness. Hindu Yogis sought, in opposition to this, a heightened consciousness. It was their goal to see the world as their own creation, not so they might wallow in self-aggrandisement, but so they might cease to cling to it and rid themselves of suffering. What they were letting go of was, not so much the world itself, but their illusory conceptions of it. Jung had great difficulty grasping, or at least believing in, a state of superconsciousness, in which the maya of human conceptions of the opposites, the separate units of existence, were left behind. He believed the only way to escape the opposites was to plunge deep into the unconscious.

Nietzsche appreciated the Eastern, and especially the Buddhist, conception of the world. The Buddhist sees the world as defined by our false assumptions that the objects we perceive have their own inherent existence, that they are permanent. In Thus Spoke Zarathustra he makes statements very similar to the Buddhist declaration that everything is continuously coming into being and passing away. In the ‘Convalescent’ Zarathustra seems to be describing the wheel of samsara. “Everything goeth, everything returneth; eternally rolleth the wheel of existence. Everything dieth, everything blossometh forth again, eternally runneth on the year of existence.” (Z, 211) Nietzsche’s description of Dionysus as an unfamiliar God, who could not be understood by an
individual with a reactive mentality, echoes descriptions of the Hindu Nirguna Brahman. Dionysus is not a God of Nihilism; he is simply a God which must be described in terms of the negation of everything we have previously known. This knowledge reflects a heightened awareness of reality, not a descent into the unconscious.

Neither Nietzsche nor Eastern philosophy would agree that seeing the world as ones own creation meant dropping into a deep sleep or being swallowed up by subjectivity; it meant rather, a greater clarity of thinking. In Eastern philosophy the closing of the subject/object split, the realisation of the oneness of Atman and Brahman (or in the case of Buddhism, the impermanence and interrelatedness of all things), is about achieving wakefullness. The Yogi returns from mystical experience with this new nonegocentric perception to their conscious life. Nietzsche, in a similar manner, wished to alter our conscious understanding, rather than permanently lower the threshold of consciousness. When Nietzsche describes the moment of the affirmation of eternal return when the individual affirms his life and his fate as a work of art, this does indeed include ecstatic experiences, or experiences of altered states. I would argue that the affirmation of one’s life as a work of art, of which one is the artist, involves a certain closing of the subject/object split. Affirming the forces of the symbols encountered in symbol intoxication as ones own, involves a closing of a subject/object split. Embodying the forces of nature or the forces of the collective unconscious which create and destroy also involves a closing of a subject/object split.

As stated in Part I, Nietzsche, unlike the Yogi, did not have any intention of leaving ego or the world wrought with the conflict of opposites behind. While he was interested in Schopenhauer’s quest to impliment art as salve for the suffering in life,
rather than meditation, Nietzsche was certainly not interested in adopting Schopenhauer’s will to cease willing. Nietzsche’s philosophy in contrast revolves around the affirmation of the will to power. He had no intention of stepping out of the opposites. The volitional energy of karma, which causes us to create concepts and feel great pain, the will which Schopenhauer intended to leave behind, was exactly what Nietzsche held in highest regard. As Nicholas Davey states, Nietzsche asserts that,

humanity’s truths need to be seen for what they are, namely creative devices which have enabled it both to transform, discipline itself and to take an interest in the rich contradictions and struggles of its existence... The creativity of the (Superman) demonstrates that the worth of humanity does not derive from the fictions of Being and truth which it creates in order to believe in itself but from the creativity which produces such fictions in the first place. By revealing that its own creativity is the primary source of its value the (Superman) allows humanity to overcome its need to create the fiction of something other than itself in order to believe in and justify itself.(Davey, xvi)

Nietzsche acknowledged that the world we live in is only a mass of illusions, of conventional concepts, but he was willing to embrace it any way. The universe may be filled with suffering but that does not make it unsatisfactory. In the ‘The Preachers of Death’ Nietzsche makes a direct reference to the four sights seen by the Buddha when he chose to become an ascetic. “They meet an invalid, or an old man, or a corpse – and immediately say: ‘Life is refuted!’ But only they are refuted, and their eye, which seeth only one aspect of existence.”(Z, 41) Nietzsche finanlly judged Buddhism, like most other religions, as nihilistic or world negating.

As stated in Part I, many branches of Eastern philosophy would deny the charge that they advocate stepping out of life. According to Nagarjuna the Buddhist does not
step out of life but rather out of the ego centered perception of it. (PW, 69) However, neither Jung nor Nietzsche was willing to leave this ego centered perception behind.

Nietzsche assented to the Buddhist tenet that all the things perceived in the universe are in a state of flux, that they are impermanent, and he likely ascertained to the idea that the Self too is impermanent, a continuum which is constantly being destroyed and recreated. However, regardless of this, Nietzsche still clung to egocentered living. He had no interest in letting go of suffering, desiring and attacheds. He did not wish to reach nirvanda, a state beyond pairs, but preferred to remain within the world of conflict. In Buddhist terms he affirmed the illusory construct of “I, mine” as a positive creative force. He affirmed the mentality of the ego while simultaneously attempting to identify with experience and knowledge which were the result of the loss of ego consciousness.

In Hindu terms when Nietzsche affirmed the world creating powers of the unconscious as his own, he affirmed them as belonging to what is experienced as the conscious ego, not the Self or the Atman. What is experienced as the ego, becomes the creator God. Here is where Nietzsche runs into problems.

When a Buddhist arises from a meditative state in which all artificial conceptions of inherent existence are completely eradicated and returns to ‘normal’ consciousness he still sees inherent existence. However, he knows how thing really are. As Paul William states he is like a magician viewing his own creations. (PW, 73) “There is still a very long way to go, however, for he has now so to refine his perception that he eradicates even the innate moral cognitive taints (including the innate conception of inherent existence).” (PW, 74) This would include the innate conception that “I, mine” has inherent existence. “He must attain omniscience, Buddhahood, such that he no longer
sees inherent existence but sees emptiness in the very same perceptual act he sees objects." (PW, 74)

While the integration of superconscious experience beyond opposites into a conscious state, which is still able to perceive objects, may be entirely possible, the healthy integration of these experiences is synonymous with letting go of the ego. I would argue that so long as the construct of the ego is maintained it is better to assent that the forces encountered in altered states are autonomous or are differentiated from oneself. The ego consciousness and monism or ego consciousness and emptiness are not compatible. The sense of ‘other’ universal to religious experience should not be reduced to a side effect of nihilistic philosophy. In this respect Nietzsche clings to conscious prejudice in a way Jung did not.

**THE ROLE OF CONSCIOUS SKEPTICISM**

Jung often criticises Nietzsche for remaining in the intuitive-artistic-ecstatic sphere and never looking upon his artistic creations with a scientific eye. This to Jung was as tragic and dangerous as a dream left unanalysed. The fact of the matter is that Nietzsche asserted that it was very important to look upon one's artistic visions with skepticism. The philosopher component was not to be left out of the role of the artist-philosopher. One could argue that Nietzsche is guilty, not of refusing to attend to unconscious experience with conscious analysis, but of refusing to acknowledge the validity of certain aspects of unconscious experience. And as Jung would say, if we do not consciously acknowledge an unconscious force it will come in through the back door.
According to Nietzsche an ecstatic experience could very well be a positive thing, if we examine it with the correct measure of skepticism. Thiele states, that according to Nietzsche, the saint whose mysticism is not matched with skepticism, will likely be duped by his own spiritual infatuation. (T, 157) "Mystical explanations are considered deep. The truth is that they are not even superficial." (GS, 182) (T, 157) This, Thiele says, is because they are not explanations at all. (T, 157)

In Day Break Nietzsche explains that ecstatic experiences, or rather our perceptions of these experiences, must be cleansed through the use of our skeptical conscious logic.

It is a sad fact, but for the moment the man of science has to be suspicious of all higher feelings, so greatly are they nourished by delusion and nonsense. It is not that they are thus in themselves, or must always remain thus: but of all the gradual purification awaiting mankind, the purification of the higher feelings will certainly be one of the most gradual. (Day Break, 25)

The mystic believes his elevated state to be the product of Divine inspiration. According to Nietzsche, the mystic's belief in these deities is merely the result of his elevated state. Nietzsche states that this is the most vivid demonstration of 'psychology of error' manifested in all religious activity; "In every single case cause is mistaken for effect; or the effect for what is believed to be true is mistaken for the truth; or a state of consciousness is mistaken for the causation of this state." (TII, 53) (T, 157).

Nietzsche did not have any intention of leaving intuitive experience untouched by the hands of philosophical logic. As Thiele explains, Nietzsche's aim was to incorporate the philosopher and the artist, and the saint as well, into one person. Saintly moments of
ecstasy must be integrated with philosophical skepticism and artistic creativity. The goal is a tensioned inner plurality. The proof of such integration would be an enduring and repeated state of spiritual elevation. (T, 163)

So what is involved in Nietzsche's philosophical skepticism? As Thiele asserts, rather than denigrating himself to the status of a tool in the hands of deity, the skeptic-ecstatic comes to view his experiences as the products of his own heightened spiritual powers. (T, 158) Jung has no problem with the argument that ecstatic experience is really a product of our own psyche. What he has a problem with is identifying ecstatic experience with the powers of the ego. He believed that this was just what Nietzsche did.

Jung was not willing to write off the importance of the 'effect' that one is being acted upon by an autonomous force. Even if the cause is mistaken for the effect, the effect still has important information to convey. Jung maintains a strong pious fear of the experience of 'other.' Unlike Nietzsche, he refuses to tamper with the perception that we are tools in the hand of a deity, though he denies our passivity. He believed that our egos are very much like subjects in the hands of a God, the God being the Self. It is true that the Self is like an unconscious God who is dependent on his conscious creations to become conscious. It is true that the archetypes are dependent upon the cooperation of the ego to become manifest or expressed, but it is also true that this expression, this creation should not be seen as something which is occurring in isolation. The belief that ecstatic experience is the result of a Divinity acting upon one, may be an intellectual error, but isn't really a psychological error. The perception that the powers of the unconscious are autonomous points us to a psychological reality we cannot ignore. Jung argues, that by ignoring the perception of the forces of the unconscious as differentiated
and in identifying unconscious experiences with the conscious, Nietzsche caused himself to become inflated, possessed by the powers of the unconscious and a victim of megalomania.

This was Jung's psychological analysis of what brought on Nietzsche's final fate.

In Thiele we read,

By late 1888 Nietzsche proved increasingly incapable of maintaining a skeptical distance from his own feelings of aggrandizement and personal providence. Not only his powers of interpretation but reality itself was seen to develop to the point where the world revolved around this relatively obscure, very ill and impoverished university professor...

In December 1888 Nietzsche reveals that his pluralism has been lost, his philosophy of eternal return has ultimately been swallowed by a solipsistic monism.

Now I have the absolute conviction that everything has turned out for the best, from the beginning on, - Everthing is one, and wants one (NB, 22.12.88)...With each glance I am treated like a prince, - there is an extreme distinction in the way a door is opened for me, a meal is set in front of me.(NB, 29.12.88)(T, 159)

As Paul Thiele states within weeks of writing these letters Nietzsche became hopelessly insane.(T, 159)

Jung advises that whether or not we believe in a transcendent 'other' we should always be conscious of the way things are experienced because this experience indicates to us the best means of dealing with the situation at hand. Nietzsche would agree that one set of suppositions, based on a particular situation, may very likely become a static, abstract, inappropriate methodology when applied to another circumstance. A static methodology should not decide our evaluation or judgment of an experience. Just as
Jung stated, while explaining Nietzsche’s morality of vitality; life should be what decides, as it always does in reality.

---

i "Psychological Commentary on Kundalini Yoga, Part 1" (1975), Spring: A Journal in Archetypal Psychology and Jungian Thought.

CONCLUSIONS PART III

Nietzsche’s Dionysian artist attempts to integrate the intuitive and the analytic. He attempts to affirm unconscious forces as belonging to the conscious so the individual may act their reactions. Unlike Jung, Nietzsche sees the the act of creation as synomous with moral integration. The artist’s life is justified in the moment of eternal return, when his fate is seen as a great heroic myth. Thus Spoke Zarathustra, among other things, is Nietzsche’s life affirmed in such a myth. In the act of the will to affirm his fate, to see it as beautiful, the artist makes his life his own work of art. Nietzsche’s life of the artist is a new morality, a new soteriology.

Jung did not have a problem with the use of the intuitive and artistic as means of dealing with unconscious forces. In fact, he saw them as ideal means for unconscious archtypal forces to be brought to the surface in the form of symbols. Nevertheless, for Jung, artistic creation alone was amoral and escapist. He believed that artistic creation, an event in which the threshold of the conscious is lowered, should be followed by conscious analysis. Yet Jung’s descriptions of his usage of symbols, such as mandala’s and alchemy, indicate that the process of integration took place, during the act, as well as during the analysis. Jung’s symbols are both relational and transformative. Jung’s alchemy is both an act of creation and a procedure of transmutation.

There is a difference in the function of a symbol and the function of an artistic metaphor. A symbol embodies a creative force, it allows its user to differentiate the forces of the collective unconscious from the user’s conscious ego identity. Whereas the metaphor, in Nietzsche’s hands, allows the individual to embody creative forces within
himself. As Merleau Ponty states, the artist lends himself to life in order to create his paintings. (P, 162)

Jung’s alchemist, who allows his own psyche to become a laboratory of alchemy, recognises that the forces with which he is working are independent of his conscious mind. As with the old alchemist, who respected the powers of the earth, the psychologist alchemist respects the forces of the collective unconscious. A continious dialogue must be established between the ego and the collective unconscious, the individual and collective traditions. Because the Self is never entirely uncovered, this conversation must go on indefinately. If humankind’s unconscious collective side is not consciously acknowledged, its influence does not fade away; it simply finds another unconscious way to reassert itself. A symbol is different from an artistic image because it is created by and is connected with the collective dimension of the psyche. If the symbol is used in an entirely personal individualistic manner, this does not mean that the influence of its collective dimension is lost; this simply means the artist has lost the conscious understanding of the fact that the symbol’s collective dimension is still having an effect.

I would argue that is possible to integrate a perception encountered in an altered states back into one’s conscious mind. I would also argue that artistic and intuitive experienced may very well be used to rewrite rational conscious analtyic approaches to life without lowering the threshold of consciousness. Phenomenology is an example of such a rewriting. I would also argue that Jung’s statement that we should respect the perception of ‘other’ encountered in altered states is valid.

In the case of Eastern Religion, the conscious Yogi retains his superconscious perception that all thought constructs are illusory, that everything is continuously coming
into being and passing away. In the case of Hinduism, he retains the knowledge that his Atman is one with Brahman; in the case of Buddhism, he retains the perception that there is no reality but interconnectedness. However, in order to do this, the spiritual practitioner must let go of his ego. The individual may retain an intellectual or conceptual understanding of an experience beyond the subject/object split without letting go of their ego, but moving on to an active, experiential or perceptual understanding of reality, beyond this split, means that the ego must be left behind. In traditional spiritual systems, the movement from the initiatory stage of tumult and suffering to a state of spiritual health is almost universally synonomous with letting go of the ego. While Jung has great difficulty with the Eastern ideal of the dissolution of the ego, he does realise that the world creating powers of Brahman ought to be identified with the greater Self, the Atman. He recognises that the idenification of such world creating powers with the ego could be disasterous. If one identifies with the creative powers of God, one will also undergo sacrifice like a God. The trouble is the ego may not survive this process of sparagmos.

As stated earlier, I would assert that Jung’s views fall some where between structuralism and phenomenology. Though Jung would object to a static signifier and signified, he would maintain the necessity of the differentiation of the psyche and the mechanism of artistic creation into two parts. The symbol is a necessary point of mediation between conscious and the unconscious phenomenon, the archetypes. Jung did not put all the honour and importance on the unconscious. The symbol and the archetype are mutually dependent. Without the archetype the symbol has no power, but without the symbol the archetype has no way to manifest.
While Jung would argue that Nietzsche did not give the unconscious enough attention, Nietzsche would very likely see Jung’s reverence of the archetypes as being a case of the dependence on a ‘backworld’. According to Nietzsche, a symbol should be seen as the locus of kinetic creative energy rather than as the conveyor of potential energy which proceeds from another source. Nietzsche might argue that in Jung’s system the power is removed from the world of experience and is attributed to its relationship with autonomous universals. Nicholas Davey states that the Nietzschean artist,

achieves through the creation of possible experiential worlds not only a mediation of actuality but a oneness with actuality itself...the fusion of ‘willing, suffering and Becoming’ does not strictly solve the question of art’s relation to existence. It dissolves it. It is no longer an issue of art relating to existence but of art articulating it.(Davey, xxv)

According to Jung the symbol ought to remain relational. The artist’s differentiation between herself and the creative forces she encounters should not be dissolved. In as much as Jung would perceive this sort of identification with nature as dangerous and amoral the psychologist was less a phenomenologist and more a structuralist. The symbols allow us to experience the archetypes, but they also allow us to distance ourselves from the unconscious powers of the archetypes. Although there is much to make the phenomenological approach to life preferable to the abstract structuralist approach, I would accent that distancing ourselves from what we study sometimes allows for a certain objectivity. Looking at things as if they are not apart of ourselves (but not as if they have nothing to do with us) has its advantages too.

Is this objectivity the reason for the differentiation between the symbol and archetype in Jungs system? In part, yes. Backworlds are often posited in hopes of
maintaining uncorruptable ideals. Objective frameworks which are not subject to
personal intentions or situational prejudices, are applicable on a cross cultural or
universal scale. In Jung's view, however corrupt a religion may be the archetypal forms
which it serves to manifest are still worth experiencing. (Jungian psychology sees all
religions as being manifestations of the same phenomenon.)

Nevertheless, it would be quite incorrect to state that Jung described the world the
way he did in order to divorce it from the world of experience. On the contrary, the way
he describes the world is the way he did experience it. According to the psychologist,
his supposition of the autonomy of the unconscious does indeed reflect lived experience,
another level of lived experience. Jung describes to us the world he experienced on
another level of consciousness. As he explains in *Memories, Dreams and Reflections*,
the reason he posits the archetypes as autonomous powers is because that is the way he
experienced them. Nietzsche experienced the unconscious in a similar manner, as he
explains in *Ecce Homo*. He describes this as 'symbol intoxication.' Yet Nietzsche
refused to assent to any autonomy on the part of the forces he encountered.

Here, I would argue, it is Nietzsche, who goes against the grain of experience by
refusing to recognise a second autonomous voice, as Jung does. In making the conscious
level of experience the skeptical meter upon which every ecstatic experience, of what is
arguably another level of consciousness, is measured, Nietzsche favours metaphysical
supposition over the presently encountered reality. The ego remains 'the measure of all
things' on principle. Assumptions based on conscious experience become an abstract
static system when applied to 'symbol intoxication.' Though Nietzsche posits the
existence of the unconscious, he does treat it with the prejudice of conscious experience.
Nietzsche tells us that every history, every system of thought deserves to be torn apart when it ceases to function. "Whatever I create," says Zarathustra, "and however much I love it - soon I must be adverse to it, and to my love, so willeth my will."(Z, 113)

"Everything, deserveth to perish."(Z, 118) Rather than creating a new framework with which to examine superconscious experience based on superconscious experience Nietzsche clings to the categories of conscious experience.

Religions are not just metaphysical speculations based on a nihilistic hatred of the here and now, though they may certainly take on this role. Religions are also systems of thought based on the experience of an 'other', be it that of the collective unconscious or a transcendent entity.
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

The difference between Jung and Nietzsche's approach to spiritual experience comes down, on a practical level, to the difference between symbol and metaphor. The Jungian symbol relates to the autonomous forces of the archetypes. Though the archetypes are dependent on the conscious to become manifest in the form of symbols, even when a symbol's influence wanes the archetypes remain in existence at an unconscious potential level. The power of Nietzsche's artistic metaphor is purely kinetic. The metaphor is illusory like any other human conception. The universe, in Nietzsche's view, has no inherent teleology, nor self balancing mechanism, which exists in Jung's system. The only thing Nietzsche's universe blesses us with is the vital and active forces which proceed from the unconscious. However, as conscious human beings we are also cursed with the need for a sense of unity and order. This is where the use of art, metaphor and human conception comes in.

While Jung posits a metaphysics of the psyche, Nietzsche sees the universe as fundamentally chaotic. Thiele explains that art allows us to embrace this chaos, to see the beauty of our fate and our own life. It allows us to see all the unending conflicts occurring in our lives as the battle within a heroic myth. It allows us to bring the inherent chaos of our lives into a certain unity. The inherent chaos in the universe, however terrifying, also leaves us in a state of complete freedom. In order to remodel or reinterpret our perception of the universe, old intelligible forms must be dissolved. Thus it must be recognised that they have no permanent inherent existence. The creative element within the ordering and articulating enterprise of philosophy is dependent on our ability to embrace the reality of chaos. (Davey, xv) The positing of an inherent metaphysical order
removes from us our ability to create our own order. The positing of a transcendent God removes from us our ability to act as creators. "What would there be to create," asks Zarathustra, "If there were - Gods?" (Z, 83)

Mythological systems often speak of Cosmos emerging from the flux of the Chaos. Jung and Nietzsche would agree that cosmos can be identified with the conscious and chaos with the unconscious. In Nietzsche's philosophy, what proceeds from the chaos is not order and forms but wills and forces. The will to power, an individual's dominating passion, proceeds from the unconscious. While the intelligible order and unity, of which we human beings are in need, may preside in the conscious, the creative forces, wills and intentions, which begot these constructions, proceed from the unconscious. Davey states that the belief in the fiction of human conceptions has freed humanity from being a passive subject in the flux of actuality. (Davey, xv) However, these very fictions were only made possible by the creative forces which swim in this flux. These fictions do not free us from the forces of actuality but rather free us from the perception that we are being led by them. The unconscious acts upon us in a deterministic fashion. The Nietzschean artist, when he sees himself as a creator God, identifies not only with conscious conceptions, but with the creative forces welling up from the unconscious. He claims both of these as his own conscious ego, he claims them for that which he perceives as "I, mine."

The Jungian symbol acts to bridge the gap between the ego, that which we perceive to be I, and the unconscious, that which is still a part of our psyche but remains unknown and out of the control of our conscious. Nietzsche considers the conscious knowledge that our conscious is being acted upon by our unconscious, reactive. Rather
than partaking of and identifying with the unconscious active force of the will, we merely react or respond to it. We become the effect of a cause rather than beings who act freely. For this reason Nietzsche does not describe the symbol as bridging two worlds. This would make it essentially reactive. This would make its user a ‘backworldsman’ taking orders from a metaphysical second. The artist’s similes are a justification of their own perishable level of existence. (Z, 83) They are a justification of the kinetic activity of creation. They do not relate to an order inherent in the universe or the psyche as none exists. Their user does not assent to the autonomy of the powers which begot them as this would amount, in Nietzsche’s view, to a psychological determinism.

The Jungian archetype, though dependent on the conscious to become manifest, is in a certain manner, imperishable. It exists in potential like a dry river bed until conditions occurring at the conscious level warrant its re-emergence. Though the archetypes are experienced in infinite variation as symbols, at a potential level, they exist as a universal substratum which is the same for all times and all peoples. The archetypes are patterns which occur in every culture. The Jungian symbol enacts the transcendent function. It acts as a bridge between the universal, collective, imperishable dimension of the psyche, which exists in the collective unconscious, and the fluctuating dimension of the individual ego. Jung would object to archetypes being compared to forms in Plato’s World of Being. The archetypes are not more real and more important than their symbolic manifestations witnessed at the conscious level. The fact that the symbols may be encountered and understood arguably makes them more important and more real. Though the symbols may be corruptible, perishable and relative versus universal, this is the price they pay for reaching the importance of visible actuality. Nevertheless, while
Jung would have objected to the titles World of Being and World of Becoming, he would still insist on the differentiation of the psyche into two parts: the conscious and unconscious.

Nietzsche would likely have seen even this division as nihilistic. He wished to bring everything up to the perishable, relative, corruptible plain of existence. Nietzsche's philosophy does not speak of a World of Becoming, which refers back to an ideal world of Being, but rather of Becoming and the Being of Becoming. There is no backworld where things exist in an ideal imperishable state. There is only this realm where things are constantly coming into being and passing away, where things are always being created and destroyed. Nietzsche's artist embodies this sacred flux. When Nietzsche advises us to become Gods he does not mean that we should simply import a system of abstract ideals into our own psyches (as he might have argued Jung did) but that we should see ourselves as one with the kinetic cycle of creativity inherent in the cosmos and the psyche.

At the ecstatic moment of eternal return the artist sees his own life, his own fate, as a work of art. Due to the fact that this one moment in the now is experienced as perfect and beautiful, the entirety of the artist's life is redeemed and made innocent. The Nietzschean artist says "How could I regret a single moment or action, I would do it all the same again an infinite number of times." The life of the artist is not redeemed through the judgment by a table of values held above it, it is not contemplated from a place of neutrality, but rather it is redeemed through affirmation. Nietzsche's God Dionysus justifies life by living it. The artist does the same thing, he acts spontaneously rather than reacting to a set of rules.
The artist becomes a creator of his own life through the recognition of the beauty of his fate. The artist, rather than using the symbol as a means to relate to the archetypal powers active in his work, uses it as a means with which to embody these archetypal forces within his own conscious self. He becomes the catalyst in the creative process. The will to power, which proceeds from the unconscious, is appropriated for the conscious, through the artist’s identification with the ruling passions which begot the images, characters and events within his work. As Jung states, when Nietzsche says, “thus spake Zarathustra,” he often means “thus spake Nietzsche.”

According to Jung this identification is a fundamental problem. Jung’s main criticism of Nietzsche is that he did not respect the autonomy of the forces of the collective unconscious. According to Jung one does not possess an archetypal force but rather is possessed by it. One does not invent new myths and new Gods but rather they are created through him by the unconscious, with conscious cooperation. Unconscious powers should not be identified with the conscious. A clear distinction should be made between Zarathustra, the archetype, and Nietzsche, the man. The use of a symbol is as much about making the distinction between the conscious ego and unconscious creative forces as it is about allowing archetypal forces to manifest in a form that the conscious mind can understand.

The Jungian alchemist, as opposed to the Nietzschean artist alchemist, does not fly solo. Though he does take his salvation into his own hands, he does not become the master of his own world and everything in it. Though he does allow his psyche to temporarily become a laboratory of alchemy, he does so while acknowledging the fact that he is not working alone. He recognises the autonomy of archetypal forces.
Another important difference between the symbol and the artistic image or metaphor is that the symbol, very often, is the product, not simply of the individual’s mind, but of society at large. It emerges from collective history and remains connected with it still. The appropriation of a collective symbol for the processes of individual creation does not remove the influence of the symbol’s collective dimension, it simply removes the user’s conscious knowledge of this influence. While collective consciousness is left behind, the influence of the collective unconscious remains.

Thus Spoke Zarathustra is Nietzsche’s own history reevaluated and reinterpreted. It incorporates figures, images and symbols taken from Christian, Zoroastrian, Buddhist and Pagan sources. For Nietzsche, history, religion and other societal constructs were a good beginning. They train the individual to become disciplined and strong, so he may one day rely entirely upon his own devices. An individual studies history so he may one day become unhistorical. An individual is responsive to a prescribed set of values so he may one day become free and irresponsible. The antiquarian and monumental forms of history must be followed by critical history. According to Nietzsche every good history deserves to be torn apart and reapplied. Collective symbols eventually become the property of individual revaluation and reinterpretation. Symbols once of use in community ritual and societal myths become artistic images used by an individual.

According to Jung, the collective aspect of humanity cannot be left behind, as the contents of the unconscious will never be fully brought to light. We can never entirely leave behind traditional and societal influences as they will always continue to influence us on an unconscious level. This does not mean that we must remain restricted to them, but rather that we must continue to remain in dialogue with them, as we make our own
individual innovations. Jung would not agree that we can ever become unhistorical or purely individualistic. The collective is an essential aspect to humanity and will continue to remain so. Jung does not deny the fact that our histories need to be torn apart, but what occurs afterwards must be a rebirth and not simply a reconstruction. The reapplication of history cannot be merely a process of conscious invention. The Jungian process of individuation involves the integration of the ego consciousness and the collective unconscious.

The process of the recreation of one's self and one's history must be the product of a partnership. The Jungian alchemist, in his endeavor to transform the soul, enacts a partnership with nature, a partnership with the collective unconscious. The symbol acts as the transcendent function which bridges the two sides. A symbol, as opposed to an artistic image, is defined by the fact that it sprung from a collective source and continues to be connected with that dimension of collectivity. The use of a symbol implies an autonomous influence whether it is acknowledged or not. The use of a symbol not only allows one to facilitate the emergence of unconscious contents on a conscious level, but it allows one to differentiate the collective from the ego, the ego from the Self. Again, while the Nietzschean use of the artistic image consists embodiment and identification, the Jungian use of symbol consists of a relation, or dialogue between two voices.

The crux of Jung's argument against Nietzsche's approach, is Nietzsche identifies his ego with the forces of the unconscious rather than maintaining the distinction between the two. This according to Jung led to Nietzsche's undoing. Towards the end of his life it does appear that Nietzsche was overrun by the unconscious. He lost his ability to
distinguish between himself and the forces he identified with. He did indeed begin to refer to himself as the crucified Dionysus-Zagreus.

While it may be relatively safe to affirm Nietzsche’s philosophy on an intellectual level, it must be remembered that Nietzsche wished to return to the concept of spirit as something other than purely cerebral. *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* represents an effort to integrate the irrational, the intuitive and the unconscious into philosophy. Jung states that Nietzsche attempts to return spirit as a living force to philosophy. In Nietzsche’s time spirit had come to be identified with intellectual and rational thought only. Jung states that each chapter in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* is like a stage in the process of initiation into the secrets of the spirit.

The individual who is well on the way to becoming a Superman has not simply accomplished an advanced level of intellectual understanding. He experiences ecstatic moments of eternal return. Nietzsche’s philosophy thus takes on the responsibility of dealing with altered states of consciousness. It is certainly possible that an artist identify with the characters, the themes or the images in her work and arrive at the conclusion of their creative process unscathed. It is another matter, however, to identify with the creative forces encountered in altered states of consciousness.

Jung sees Nietzsche’s embodied artistic approach as the wrong way of dealing with spiritual experience. Jung compares the mystical states achieved by Yogis to Nietzsche’s aesthetics. Jung sees Nietzsche’s experiences and those of Yogis as being similarly amoral and escapist. The first question which arises is, why does Jung consider aesthetics escapist? Jung did not believe that aesthetics are useless, but rather that the use of aesthetics alone is problematic. Aesthetics alone are amoral because they do not
include the conscious integration of the information gleaned from intuitive or
unconscious experiences. Jung makes sharp divide between the perceptive, artistic and
intuitive and the contemplative, analytic and rational. I would argue, however, that
Jung’s own descriptions of his use of art, would seem to indicate that art alone is not
simply perceptive. Jung’s mandalas not only relate information from the Self, but aid in
bringing the psyche into order. Jung’s use of symbols is not simply structuralist or
denotative, it is also creative and transformative.

Nietzsche’s use of the artistic is likewise transformative. The act of creation for
Nietzsche is profoundly moral. The artist, in envisioning his life as a work of art, in his
revaluation and reinterpretation, does indeed consciously integrate these changes into his
psyche. Nietzsche does not want to draw a hard and fast division between the artist and
the philosopher, or between the analytic and the intuitive. He wishes, rather, to
incorporate the life of the artist into his philosophy because the artist acts rather than
reacts. When he sees the world, he sees the wills, and the forces which inhabit
phenomena. He does not see the world as divorced from intention, as intentions and
ruling passions are exactly what he is trying to portray and participate with, through the
creation of his work. He participates with the forces he perceives rather than looking
upon them from a point of neutrality.

Why is this artistic approach similar to the altered states of consciousness
experienced by Yogis? The Hindu Yogis, of certain idealist schools of thought, and the
Mahayana Buddhist Yogis of Yogacara sects, did indeed attempt to view the universe as
their own creation. They, like Nietzsche, recognised that the universe they perceived was
nothing more than the sum total of their illusory human perceptions. However, while it
was their objective to remove themselves from conflict through this new understanding, Nietzsche had no such intention. While, for the Yogi, the recognition that thought constructs were illusory, human constructions was the impetus to leave them behind, for Nietzsche, this was not the case. He embraces the beauty of these illusory, constructions, as they allow us to endure the suffering inherent within the universe.

Nietzsche would have agreed with the Buddhist tenet that everything we perceive in the universe is coming into being and passing away. He also would have agreed that the self is likewise impermanent. It too is continuously being created and destroyed. It too bears only the inherent existence that we assign to it. However, this was no reason to let go of it. The universe may be filled with suffering but this does not make it unsatisfactory. Nietzsche had no intention of permanently stepping out of the conflict inherent in the universe of human conceptions. He had no intention of letting go of the perception of “I, mine” which defines the ego.

While the Hindu Yogi may identify with the creative force of Brahman, it is his Atman or greater Self, with which he identifies it and not his ego. He hasn’t so much closed the subject/object split as he has left behind his attachment to himself as a subject. The Buddhist Yogi may identify with Buddha nature (the interrelatedness of all things), but he again does so by leaving his ego behind. In Part III it was argued that the careers of Eastern Yogis demonstrate that it is indeed possible to integrate the perceptions experienced in altered states of consciousness into conscious understanding and contemplation, without lowering the threshold of consciousness. The most defining aspect of the new perception which these Yogis returned with, however, was the loss of ego-centered consciousness. I believe it is safe to say that the fiercely individualistic
Nietzsche had no intention of leaving his ego behind. A world creating force, comparable to the Hindu Brahman, is indeed not only identified with the Self, by Nietzsche, but with the ego. This, I would agree with Jung, is a fundamental mistake.

Nietzsche’s philosophy exists at a tension between the affirmation of the necessity of illusion, because it allows us to remain within life, and the affirmation of the actuality of life, as it is. Nietzsche’s artist envisions ideals which he has not yet achieved and identifies with them. He attempts to stand both beyond and between opposites. Zarathustra looks down on the world from 6000 feet above good and evil, and yet he still affirms the tension between the two as a source of great creative energy. Nietzsche wants a knowledge which comes from the movement beyond opposites, but he prefers to continue to remain within them. Leaving them behind would be misanthropic and generally life negating. Jung states that only a God, if he existed, could stand beyond good and evil. We as human beings, so long as we remain conscious, are bound to remain within the conflict of opposites. I would argue that we as human beings, so long as our consciousness remains egocentered, so long as we define ourselves in terms of “I, mine,” so long as we define ourselves in opposition to everything we encounter, will remain within opposites. I would agree with Jung, that Nietzsche cannot both attempt to look upon the universe, as if he were a God beyond opposites, and hold onto his ego, not if he steps beyond intellectual conjecture to spiritual practice, not if he wishes to remain mentally healthy.

So long as Nietzsche wishes to hang onto ego-centered consciousness he ought to not behaved like a Monist. He ought to, like Jung, respected the experience of the autonomy of the creative forces of the unconscious, rather than attempting to identify
with them. The proof of the incompatibility of ego consciousness and the identification with world creating powers, is demonstrated in Nietzsche's final loss of sanity. His insistent pluralism was swallowed up by a solipsistic Monism.

I would also argue that this does not mean that the only way to deal with spiritual experiences, and yet remain joyously grounded in ego consciousness, is to remain reactive and supplicant to an unconscious God. It bears repeating that Jung did not believe that conscious knowledge of the fact that the unconscious is acting upon us forces us to become the effect of a deterministic cause. The conscious and the unconscious may engage in a dialogue. Jung, in contrast to Nietzsche, does not hold that the unconscious is essentially unchanging. The conscious has just as much ability to effect the contents of the unconscious as the reverse.

I do not believe that the assent to the autonomy of creative forces means that we are barred from returning to a more active, artistic form of perception. With Zarathustra, Nietzsche returns to an active mode of history: the epic, the heroic myth. The active mode of history, with species activity at its helm, is not about institutions built on reactive systems of thought. It is about great men and great innovations. It is about the return to the world of first order experience, before intentions, wills and forces were divorced from phenomenon, before events were separated from the ruling passions which begot them. The artist would never aim to regard a phenomenon as devoid of the will which created it, as it is this very will which he wishes to identify with in the production of his work. While the identification with these forces would be restricted if the artist were to respect their autonomy, this does not mean that he could not interact with these forces and participate in the mythology.
It can be argued that even before Prometheus stole fire or Adam and Eve committed the original sin there were Gods around. But at this point humans and Gods were on more conversational terms. Mythology presents us with a world before intentions and wills were divorced from phenomenon, when one acted rather than reacted to systems of abstract thought. The Gods encountered in mythology, as such, were not simply abstractions of ideals, but characters one could interact with.

Before the loss of innocence, spoken of by Nietzsche, when Gods such as Dionysus justified life by living it versus holding a table of values above it, Gods still held autonomous powers. They were autonomous and powerful but not unapproachable. Human beings had relations with Gods as they had relations with friends, family members and rivals. I would argue that if the Dialectic may take an active creative form, there is no reason that a relationship between a God and human being, which is progressive and equal, cannot be active as well. It merely necessitates that we relinquish a certain amount of control.

Jung suggests a dialogue between conscious and unconscious, Self and ego. Just as the old alchemist had a partnership with the Divine powers of the earth, the new alchemist, through the use of the transcendent function of the symbol, enacts a partnership between the conscious and the collective unconscious. The alchemist can yet allow his psyche to become a laboratory of alchemy, just as the artist allows his life story or history to become a laboratory of transmutation. The artist, however, should recognise that there are independent forces at work in the symbols and characters which inhabit his story. At the moment of eternal return the individual may yet affirm his life and his fate
as a work of art. The individual, however, ought to recognise that though they may participate in this work of artistic creation, they are not its only author.

Before closing I feel it is important to point out the fact that Nietzsche and Jung’s states of psychological well being may not necessarily reflect whether the practical applications of their theories proved them successful. Though Nietzsche eventually went insane and Jung lived to a ripe old age in relative mental health, we must remember that Nietzsche’s philosophy was not based on self preservation but on truly living, regardless of the possibility of risking insanity or early death. The will to love and create is also the will to death. (Z, 121) “I love those,” says Zarathustra, “Who do not wish to preserve themselves; the down going one I do love with mine entire love, for they go beyond.” (Z, 194) There is, however, Jung’s argument that while Nietzsche spoke of yea saying, he lived nay. I would answer this with the assertion that Nietzsche’s life can be described as that of a modern anchorite driven by his own kind of piety. The ascetic Nietzsche followed his own sort of yeay saying, which involved the affirmation of sensuous pain and suffering, the affirmation of riding into battle with not just his own demons, but the demons of all of society. The will to power of the healthy individual is the will to truly living, not the will towards the least amount of duress.

It may be argued that Nietzsche, partially consciously and partially unconsciously, sentenced himself to the duty of the modern age’s wounded healer. However, from the perspective of the psychology of religion and anthropology of consciousness, it might be asserted that the theory of shamanism as culturally sanctioned psychopathology has largely been debunked. While the initiatory illness is common among folk healers it is generally moved beyond at a certain point, again, when the ego is transcended. Nietzsche, I
would assert, chose to remain within his creative illness. However, from the perspective
of Nietzsche's philosophy alone, this question is mute. Nietzsche did not wish his system
of thought to be justified through a comparison to an established tradition, nor did he
wish to follow in the footsteps of any particular tradition. He wished instead to invent his
own.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


______. Memories, Dreams and Reflections. Ed. Aniela Jaffe. Trans. Richard and


_______. *Thoughts Out of Season*. (1873-1876; from The Philosophy of Friederich


