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EUROPEAN SECURITY AND POST-COMMUNIST CONFLICT

THE CHALLENGES OF THE POST-SOVIET WORLD

by

PATRICK J. MORRIS

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of
Graduate Studies in partial fulfilment
of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts

Institute of Central/East European
and
Russian-Area Studies

CARLETON UNIVERSITY

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European Security and Post-Communist Conflict

The challenges of the post-Soviet World

submitted by Patrick Morris, B.A. Hons. in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

Thesis Supervisor

Director, Institute of Central/East
European and Russian-Area Studies

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To my mother and father who, in spirit and in pocketbook, made it all possible.

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ABSTRACT

Following the 1991 Persian Gulf War, it was asserted that the world was entering a 'new order'. The collapse of the USSR, and the end of the Cold War were to give way to a world where individual states would henceforth co-operate in a number of multilateral institutions to rid the globe of aggression. Nations would now enter into co-operative, rather than confrontational, negotiations and military power would, by and large, be replaced by economic power. Nowhere was this dream more real, than in Europe, where half the continent was emerging from Soviet tutelage, returning to its European roots, and hoping to integrate with its Western counterparts.

The post-Soviet world has, undoubtedly, bequeathed a 'new order' but its legacy is not fulfilling the optimistic dreams which some thought it might. The new realities of the international order - the configuration of the international system, altered strategic perceptions and debilitating domestic conditions - have led to a great deal of uncertainty in the post-Soviet world. Indeed, the long repressed desires and hatreds of the peoples involved have led to a variety of security risks from Zagreb to Dushanbe. These events are occurring not within a 'new world order', for it has not yet arrived. It is within a breakdown of the previous order that the Western security architecture has attempted to respond to these challenges. Proponents of liberal notions of the 'new order' would be dismayed with the results.

EUROPEAN SECURITY AND POST-COMMUNIST CONFLICT

THE CHALLENGES OF THE POST-SOVIET WORLD

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GLOSSARY

ACE	(NATO's) Allied Command Europe
BTO	Brussels' Treaty Organization (later WEU)
CFE	Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (Treaty signed in 1990)
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy (of the EU)
Cocom	Co-ordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (concerned with exports to the former Soviet bloc of technology, with military applications)
CSCE	Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe
CSCM	(Proposed) Conference on Security and Co-operation in the Mediterranean and the Middle East
CSFR	Czech and Slovak Federal Republic
EBRD	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
EC	European Community
ECHR	European Convention on Human Rights
EEA	European Economic Area
EMU	(European) Economic and Monetary Union
EU	Future European Union (based on EC)
'Five plus Five'	Informal dialogue of South European and North African States
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
G-7	Group of Seven (major industrial countries)
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IGC	Inter-governmental Conference (of EC member states)
IMF	International Monetary Fund
MTCR	Missile Technology Control Regime
NACC	North Atlantic Co-operation Council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NPT	Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
Schengen Group	EC countries which have agreed to abolish all frontier controls between them
START	Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (signed 1991)
Visegrad States	CSFR, Hungary, Poland
WEU	Western European Union

INTRODUCTION

The destruction of the Berlin Wall, in October 1989, marked, in a symbolic way, the beginning of the end of the Cold War. That momentous occasion, preceded by the policies of *glasnost* and *perestroika* of Mikhail Gorbachev, set the stage for the eventual reunification of Germany and the complete crumbling of the Soviet Empire, followed, in December 1991, by the demise of the USSR itself. Taken together, these unprecedented developments became cause for celebration, especially in Europe, so long situated in the front-line of potential East-West conflict.

In the closing decade of the twentieth century, however, one should never view political events as static. Indeed, the course of history has trod very rapidly in the recent past and what may once have been deemed the 'news of a lifetime' is quickly relegated to the back page. Thus, the euphoria generated by much-vaunted visions of 'new world orders' ¹ may indeed, prove to be myopic optimism as the certainties of the Cold War are superseded by the unprecedented and potentially harsh realities of the international realities in 1993.² Nowhere are the new ground rules so vitally important as in Europe where a budding 'superpower' ³, (United Europe), or a collection of Great Powers, must learn to deal with the vagaries of national security and conflict in a world, no longer 'tamed' by the 'indivisibility of peace', which dominated the four decades of the Cold War, but are perhaps, somewhat reminiscent of the first half of the twentieth century.⁴

The subject matter, for the present study, is European security and its stability in the 'post-Soviet order'. Such a study is warranted since the last few years have eroded much of the foundation upon which the post-war security system was built. The bipolar Cold War, its strategic realities, domestic imperatives, and the international system it fostered is over and, with

its passing, Europe has been greeted by a variety of new security challenges. These threats necessitate a fresh look at security maintenance in the 'new Europe'.⁵

The challenges to security and stability, in the 'new world order', are occurring in a much smaller and more interdependent world. This implies not only a geographical but a political and cultural widening of the security horizons to a point where Europe's security interests extend beyond the continent itself; specifically, in this context, it is related to the upheaval in the former USSR on the Eurasian land mass.⁶ It is of the utmost importance that those, involved in European security maintenance, seriously consider the potential ramifications of the ethnic conflicts, civil wars, and weapons proliferation presently occurring from Zagreb to Dushanbe. The Yugoslav example clearly illustrates the potential of any given ethnic conflict, or territorial grievance, to escalate until it threatens to draw in outside powers. The civil war in Tajikistan or the military conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, although immediately less pertinent, could prove no less troublesome, and as such, command the attention of the security actors in the West. In the 'new world order' what may once have been deemed 'out of theatre', is now of more immediate concern to the citizenry of Europe and North America, due to its potential to escalate unchecked, in the turmoil of the post-Soviet world. This fact is evidenced by the application and the acceptance to the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), and the North Atlantic Co-operation Council (NACC), by the new 'nation-states' of Central Asia.⁷

The post-Cold War world promises to provide a very different forum for international relations. In its structure, it is perhaps, comparable to pre-War systems. The first chapter will attempt to establish a theoretical base for international relations in the emergent international system, via a discussion of the systemic constraints, strategic perceptions and domestic conditions that act as 'determinants' of peace and/or war. These factors will be studied, in relation to the

major international orders of twentieth century Europe, in an attempt to illustrate their impact on the security situation today. The intent is to delineate the systemic and/or behavioural factors and conditions, which led to, or prevented, conflict in the past, and those that allow for conflict in the 'new Europe'.

The immediate security challenges that will be discussed in the second chapter are, predominantly, a result of the above mentioned alterations in the international order and the 'unleashing' of the nation-states of the former members of the Soviet bloc and the demise of the USSR itself. It should be clarified, at the outset however, that, while the present challenges stem from a variety of sources, this study will focus on an analysis of possible military threats to security, not on the many other challenges faced by the citizenry of Europe.⁸ The threats analyzed herein, will be of two varieties:

- 1) the plethora of regional military conflicts, spurred on by ethnic rivalries and fuelled by malevolent nationalism, territorial grievances and economic deprivation in East-Central Europe and the former USSR, and to a lesser extent;
- 2) the proliferation, by legal or illegal means, of arms and weapons technology, both nuclear and conventional, emanating from the formerly Soviet military-industrial complex.

These are the most pressing 'military' challenges facing Europe and its periphery at present. Events in Yugoslavia, as elsewhere, have served to elevate their pertinence.

Having enumerated the immediate and future challenges to European security, one must discern how the present security architecture has dealt with the various crises, or whether it is capable, or willing, to take action to rectify the situation. Contemporary wisdom has dictated that the new 'globalism' will result in swift and decisive multilateral condemnations and/or

confrontations of human rights abuses and violations of international borders.⁹ It would appear however, that today's reality stands in contrast to such theories and, indeed, calls them into question. Do the present institutional actors possess the political resolve and the military capability to maintain security in the region? If not, is there a need for a new European Security Organization?¹⁰ Or, does the 'real' power, remain in the hands of individual states whose singular, or joint, actions still provide the impetus for resolute action in the international arena? Such questions will be studied in a discussion of the European security architecture, and its responses to recent security challenges, in chapter three.

Finally, what steps should be taken by the security actors, (by the institutions, such as the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, or individual states, such as the United States and/or Germany), if their collective aim is the stabilization and security of the continent.¹¹ The fourth chapter will identify the aims and policy prescriptions of those actors working to foster and expand the security blanket, while illustrating some of the realities of maintaining security in Europe today.

It is a necessity of the 'new world order' that the prominent international actors re-think the security architecture. While the security institutions and their patrons in the post-war era proved capable of maintaining security, (if and when they so desired), such is not the case today. That era - the Cold War - has ended; its death has produced a radically different international system, with new strategic perceptions and domestic realities, especially in Europe. Contrary to optimistic assertions that this 'new world' would replace military conflict with economic competition, the amount of conflict in Europe (and/or on its periphery) today, threatens the continent more than at any other time since the end of World War II.

This study offers an illumination of the security realities in Europe today - discussing the systemic changes, alterations in strategic perceptions and domestic conditions, the resultant

conflict, and critiquing the architecture that is expected to respond to such challenges. Thus far the response has not been dazzling, highlighting perhaps, serious flaws in euphoric assertions of 'globalism' and 'new world orders'.

ENDNOTES - Introduction

1. The now famous term 'new world order' was first coined by the Bush Administration in the wake of the collapsing Soviet Empire, and the successful multilateral response to Iraq aggression in the Persian Gulf. According to Bush, the term signified, "new ways of working with other nations ... peaceful settlement of disputes, solidarity against aggression, reduced and controlled arsenals, and just treatment of all peoples". Thus, the American Government envisioned, in this 'order', a world where security threats from would-be aggressors would be met with a quick and effective response from multilateral security agencies and/or alliances. See Joseph S. Nye Jr., "What New World Order?", Foreign Policy, (Vol. 71, No. 2), Spring 1992, p. 83.
2. Undoubtedly, the distribution of power in the international system facing Europe in 1993 is radically different than it was in 1983 and thus, calls for different behaviour from its actors. See John Mearshimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War", International Security, Summer, 1990, (Vol. 5, No. 1). See also, Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics, (New York, 1979, and Robert Keohane, Neo-Realism and Its Critics, (New York, 1986). See also Joseph S. Nye Jr., c.p. cit.
3. The evolution of 'united Europe' toward 'superpower' status has been questioned in 1992 due to the troubled progress of the Maastricht Treaty, but it appears Europe's pro-Europe stance will further integration. See James Laxer, Inventing Europe: The Rise of a New World Power, (Toronto, 1991), pp. 48-52. See also, "Treaty on European Union", Europe, Documents 1759/60, February 7, 1992. Regardless, the present stature of Europe, and its component parts, has radically altered the international system and the role of European nations will play within it.
4. In the face of Nazi aggression in the mid-to-late 1930's, then Soviet foreign minister, Maxim Litvinov, declared that "peace is indivisible". He asserted that the Western Powers could not 'pass the buck', but must unite in confronting Germany. His rationale was that any war would lead to total war. See Adam Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence, (Chicago, 1974). During the Cold War as well, any conflict in Europe could potentially embroil the world in war along the East-West axis. This state of affairs has disappeared with the East-West balance of power.
5. In talking about security in the 'new Europe', and the post-Soviet world, it is necessary to determine what exactly constitutes this targeted region. Throughout the post-War period, Europe has been identified with Western Europe - its ideas, values and institutions. Europe however, is a geographical, cultural and institutional term. In this paper, in terms of its security, Europe refers to the area of application of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) and the Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), as well as NATO and the North Atlantic Co-operation Council (NACC). This includes the land between the Atlantic Ocean and the Urals, including ex-Soviet Transcaucasia and Turkey. In its' security concerns however, Europe stretches further. See Edward Mortimer, "European Security After the Cold War", Adelphi Paper, (No. 271), Summer 1992, pp. 5-6.

6. In the post-Soviet world, the terminology for defining once obvious geopolitical entities, has become quite confusing. In this study the former Soviet Union will refer to just that; the former Soviet bloc will include the East European members of the CMEA and/or the Warsaw Pact. The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), refers to a loose confederation of all former Soviet republics, excluding Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Georgia, while Russia encompasses the one-time republic and now sovereign state.
7. See Edward Mortimer, op. cit., pp. 25-28.
8. While recognizing that Europe today is subject to a number of 'security challenges' including nuclear and chemical fall-out (via environmental deprivation), mass refugee movements, and urban violence, such threats are beyond the scope of this paper. 'Physical security' stemming from the potentiality of military conflict and weapons proliferation will provide the main focus.
9. See Fen Osler Hampson and Christopher J. Maule, "After the Cold War", in Canada Among Nations 1990-1991, (Ottawa, 1991), p. 1.
10. Such is the conclusion reached by Richard H. Ullman, Securing Europe, (Princeton, 1991).
11. These will be general policy descriptions to aid the forces of stabilization in the affected areas as the policies of individual states and/or institutions are not identical.

CHAPTER 1

SECURITY IN CONTEMPORARY EUROPE

THE DETERMINANTS OF WAR AND PEACE

The twentieth century in Europe has provided a dramatic contrast, illustrating how various international systems affect the onset of peace and/or war in a given region. The international security regimes at the end of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century were deliberately designed by the great statesman Bismark in 1871, and later by the likes of Woodrow Wilson in 1919, in the interests of avoiding war indefinitely.¹ Indeed, the German victory in the Franco-Prussian Wars of 1870-1871, and again, the Allied victory in 1918, were both seen as the end to all wars.² The great destruction of human life in World War I had inspired statesmen to work towards the eradication of war, and to this end, detailed security systems were designed - the League of Nations being the most elaborate.³ Neither was successful however, and WWI and WWII serve to illustrate that point. It is odd then, that the 'peace' carved out of the WWII settlement managed to virtually eradicate military conflict on the continent. Carved not from the "dictates of justice" but rather upon an "arbitrary and strikingly artificial division" of Europe into spheres of influence, rife with "persistent antagonisms just short of war"⁴, the system survived in tact as long as the peace concluded in 1871, and twice as long as the Versailles settlement of 1921. So too, the Cold War, or the 'Long Peace', as it has been coined by some, seemed to be strengthening its aversion to superpower conflict as time passed rather than deteriorating as was the case in the pre-1914 era, and throughout the life of the League.⁵

Instead, the Cold War was ended by the internal demise of one of its two main participants, without resulting in an international war as many 'empires in decline' have been wont to do. Whether or not one approves of the means by which this peace occurred, the simple fact is that the Cold War did evolve into a 'long peace' in Europe.⁶

Europe has now undergone a dramatic change that has buried the Cold War rivalry and, with it, the systemic characteristics the system produced. In many ways this is a positive transformation but, before succumbing to this euphoric state, students of European history, who share a concern for the present, must ponder what a return to the pre-war distribution of power, and a releasing of new forces into the international system, entails for Europe and the security of its citizenry. Today, in Eastern Europe and in the former USSR, newly independent nation-states are beginning to exert themselves in a new international system, roughly defined as multipolar. Subject to severe economic deprivation and a plethora of territorial grievances, after decades of Communist rule, these new states have adopted a fervent nationalism to maintain their status. Together, a variety of phenomena - an alteration in the polar construction of the international system, changing perceptions of the military offense-defense balance, a resurgence of hypernationalism and, to a less extent, militarism, aggravated by ethnic and territorial squabbles and economic deprivation - have coincided with a breakdown of the international order. These events have produced a very precarious security situation in East-Central Europe and the formerly Soviet periphery - one that has already erupted in various locations from Zagreb to Dushanbe.

It is the intent of the present chapter to illustrate the systemic, strategic and domestic, determinants of security. European security in the twentieth century will be discussed in an attempt to illustrate the impact of the international system, domestic conditions and strategic

perceptions on security. By doing so, the author hopes to convey the severity of the present situation, one combining the negative components of multipolarity with malevolent domestic factors and different perceptions of potential conflict.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY AND THE DETERMINANTS OF WAR

In assessing the factors and conditions whose presence dramatically escalates the chances of war in the international system, much of the scholarly debate has focused on systemic determinants. More precisely, a large number of academics, most notably from the 'Realist' school of thought, have asserted that the configuration of the international system is almost solely responsible for the onset of war and/or peace in the international system. The nature of that system is dictated, precisely, by the number of 'Great Powers' or 'poles', in the system.⁷

In the past, systems have either been dominated by two or more powers. In the first instance two major and approximately equal states or poles, dominate in a bipolar international system, such as that which has existed, dominated by the United States and the Soviet Union, throughout the Cold War period. The other experience - the multipolar system - is typically dominated by three or more, approximately equal and dominant powers. It should be noted, however, that there is also the possibility of the emergence of a 'unipolar' system, when one 'superpower', (perhaps the Roman Empire at its height or the U.S. following the dissolution of Soviet power), has achieved a position of relative hegemony vis à vis the other states in the system.⁸

The position of a state in the international system is dependent on their possession of power. Power, in this sense, can be defined as, "the ability to force others to act as they would not have done otherwise".⁹ States obtain, and maintain, this ability to project their power through a variety of means: via military; economic; or political clout, depending upon the task at hand.

International relations theory will play a large role in any discussion of European security in the wake of the Soviet demise, since in our discussion, we are attempting to assess the advent of peace and/or war in East/Central Europe, and the Russian periphery, in a 'new world order'. International relations theory, in conjunction with a number of additional strategic factors and domestic conditions, offers helpful insight into the present predicaments and perspective evolutionary paths of the region in question, a region that is exiting a tight bipolar construction and, arguably, is in the process of forging some new form of multipolarity.¹⁰

This transformation is viewed by many scholars to be an extremely dangerous one. It has been asserted by John J. Mearshimer, and the disciples of Kenneth Waltz, that bipolar systems are inherently more stable than multipolar configurations.¹¹ The empirical justification for this conclusion relies on the multipolar systems that preceded the two world wars, and the relatively pacific bipolar Cold War, of this century.¹² In his seminal work, *Theory of International Politics*, Kenneth Waltz argues that a single variable - polarity - can explain the level of instability, or war, in a given system.¹³ He argues that this stability is directly associated with great powers' strategies toward each other and toward their allies. Waltz concludes that a bipolar system is much more stable than its multipolar counterpart. Simply stated, Realist theory asserts that a bipolar system is more peaceful than a multipolar system

for three main reasons: First, the number of conflict dyads is fewer, leaving fewer possibilities for war; second, deterrence is easier, because imbalances of power are fewer and more easily averted; and third, the prospects for deterrence are greater because miscalculations of relative power and of opponents' resolve are fewer and less likely.¹⁴

The Realist school therefore, views the present shifts in global power as fostering the growth of instability, especially in the former Soviet Bloc and within the former USSR itself.¹⁵ Whereas, the balance of American and Soviet power, and their co-ordinate 'spheres of influence' virtually eliminated the notion of European and/or 'inter-polar' war in the Cold War era, this stability has been undermined initially, by the demise of the Soviet Empire, followed by the dissolution of the USSR itself, and perhaps, by an alleged reduction in relative American power.¹⁶ The product of the Realist equation is a European, and global, condition that, in its multipolarity, is much more conducive to war, including 'great power' war. The consequences, according to Realist theory, are manifest in the international systems, and the events leading up to both world wars in this century.

Although Realist 'balance-of-power' theory has dominated diplomatic thinking for centuries, it does not hold a monopoly on international relations theory. Throughout the post-war period the 'superiority' of bipolar systems has become a very much contested issue. It has long been an assumption of more liberal or pluralist notions of international relations that the more extensive the contacts that take place between nations, the greater are the chances for peace. Economic or security interdependence, it has been argued, makes war less likely because nations that have come to rely upon one another, for vital commodities, will not disrupt that arrangement by waging war amongst themselves. Also, cultural exchanges are deemed, by some, to cause peoples to become more sensitive to each others' needs and thus, "reduces the

likelihood of misunderstandings".¹⁷ Such thinking has been sponsored and evidenced by the benefits of international co-operation through multilateral organizations such as, the European Community or the United Nations. Contrary to Realist state-centred or power-based thinking, liberal-democratic institutionalism allows us to view international relations in a more positive light.

Strong arguments against the superiority of the bipolar system include the work by Karl Deutsch and J. David Singer.¹⁸ In their study, the authors conclude that, at least in the short-run, multipolar systems are more likely to produce a stable international system. One logical correlation between the increased number of independent actors and the probability of armed conflict "is the realm of enhanced interaction opportunities".¹⁹ Thus, each and every increase in opportunities for co-operation, (i.e. to engage in mutually advantageous trade-offs), will diminish the tendency to pursue conflict, up to and over, the threshold of war.²⁰ Also, the authors feel that to reach a threshold of war, a dominant amount of a nation's external attention is required; an increase in the number of independent actors in the system however, diminishes the share that any nation can allocate to any other actor, and therefore, acts as a stabilizing factor.²¹

Deutsch and Singer are not alone in their critique of 'bipolar superiority'. Indeed, a great number of specialists concur that the end of the Cold War "signals a new era of peaceful international co-operation".²² Like Deutsch and Singer, these theorists believe that the growing interdependence and institutionalization of world affairs "increasingly inclines states towards co-operation and collective responses to international problems", rather than zero-sum, state versus state, competitions, in an anarchic international system.²³

Unlike the Realists, this school of thought believes, to varying degrees, that the stability of the system is not pre-ordained solely by the number of 'poles' in that system. Instead, factors and conditions, within the multipolar configurations that led to both world wars, were largely responsible for the initiation of hostilities between the 'great powers'.²⁴ Conversely, factors other than the strict bipolarity of the post war world have aided in the maintenance of the 'long peace'. These scholars assert that the European wars of this century resulted mainly from military factors such as, the offense-defense balance, and domestic conditions, such as, hypernationalism, militarism and economic deprivation, as well as alliance patterns within the multipolar systems.²⁵ For many scholars, these factors and conditions are 'things of the past'. They argue that the nuclear revolution has dampened security motives for expansion and the domestic orders of most European states have changed in ways that make renewed aggression unlikely. Opponents of Realist or pessimistic Weltanschauung assert that technological modernization has dealt a blow to offense oriented military strategies, and domestic changes have, to a large extent, included the waning of militarism and hypernationalism.²⁶ "Secondary changes include, the spread of democracy, the levelling of highly stratified European societies, and the disappearance of pariah states".²⁷ Since it was these social evils and military stances that were the deciding factors in the road to war previously, the multipolar system is not solely to blame. Therefore, a return to some form of multipolarity poses no special risks today, in the absence of the above-mentioned malaises and indeed is enhanced by the postwar move toward interdependence and multilateralism. Hence, the euphoria that greeted the 'reunification of Europe' and the 'end of the Soviet Empire'.²⁸

In assessing the security environment in Europe today, it is the assumption of the author that war is the result of a number of factors and conditions, in individual states and the international arena, occurring in a certain environment - the configuration of that system. While Western Europe may have progressed to a point where all or most of the above-mentioned conditions will help to foster the development of a co-operative and productive interdependent international system within some form of multipolar configuration, this is not entirely the case in East/Central Europe and the former USSR.²⁹

In certain states and/or regions of Eastern/Central Europe and the former republics, many factors, conducive to war in the past, are once again prevalent or, at least, threaten to return. Even avowed sceptics of the Realist notion of the post-Cold War world assert that East/Central Europe will be subjected to the "risks of imperfect or stunted democracies".³⁰ Even though the post 1945 "communist experience" has removed much of the social and economic stratification that gives rise to hyper-nationalism, militarism and 'aggressive practorianism', the region in question will be subject to a variety of economic, political and security shocks which could undermine the alleged foundation on which altogether optimistic views of the 'new world order' are viewed.³¹

According to Realism's critics, the case for optimism about Europe's future in the newly evolving international system rests chiefly on the dissolution of many of the principal causes of war in the past. Yet, many of these factors, absent in the West, persist in the targeted region. Perceptions of offense-dominance, militarism, hyper-nationalism, social stratification and economic deprivation continue to play a role in the formerly communist world.

Thus, the risks of renewed and/or continuing ethnic conflict in this region constitute a major concern for Europe. The immediate dangers of the break-up of the Soviet Union and resurgent border and inter-ethnic conflicts in the Balkans are not confined to that region, but could spread. The dissolution of the post-war bipolar world, whether superior or inferior to its multipolar counterpart, has allowed this to happen. The dominant characteristic of today's international system is the breakdown of the previous international order, with no new ground rules, as yet established. In this dramatically less-understood international arena, even certain critics of Realist thought observe that, "overall, the risk of war in the new Europe, may be greater than under the Cold War order. The main dangers lie in the East, where potential causes of war are more potent, and the West has less capacity to promote peace."³²

What follows is a brief study of the paths to past conflict, (primarily the two World Wars), in twentieth century Europe. Such an exercise is intended to give us a better idea of the factors and conditions which facilitated war in the past, thus enabling a more accurate assessment of the European security landscape in 1993.

In undertaking such a study, one must be wary not to superimpose events from a distant past on the present. History however, can offer helpful insights on current events. Certainly, in a world of flux and volatility, the outward surfaces of these events appear to be a constant stream of surprises. Yet, such 'surprises' are created and driven by deeper political, economic and social forces. These forces are 'knowable' and exhibit themselves in a certain pattern and consistency. By identifying similarities between evolving systems and past systems and the behaviour of the actors, one can aid in the identification of problems and, in response, formulate viable policies. Such a practice is an identification of historical fault lines. Just as in geology, fault lines do not disappear, but must be monitored according to

their past activity and probable course of action. Such is the purpose of this chapter - a study of security maintenance in pre-war multipolar Europe, Cold War Europe, and the evolving Europe.

MULTIPOLAR EUROPE

Multipolarity is defined as the international system which exists when three or more 'Great Powers' have the power in the system, distributed somewhat equally, between their number. It is argued by Realist theory that multipolar systems are inherently less stable than bipolar configurations of power.³³ In multipolarity, states are "said to be structurally prone to either of two opposite errors that destabilize the balancing system".³⁴ According to Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, states under multipolarity may "chain themselves unconditionally to reckless allies whose survival is seen to be indispensable to the maintenance of balance".³⁵ This process, known as 'chain-ganging' is deemed to have been largely responsible for the path to World War I. Conversely, states in the same systemic conditions, may choose to 'pass the buck', counting on third parties to bear the costs of stopping a rival to the status quo, as was the case preceding World War II.³⁶

Multipolarity then, in and of itself, did not lead directly to two world wars. It is prone to certain instabilities, as illustrated by the major wars of this century, but in both cases additional 'variables' intervened to aid the onset of war. The other factors involved in the evolution of international relations prior to both world wars include the offense-defense balance and domestic conditions characterized by nationalism and militarism.³⁷ It will be argued, here, that given the multipolar configuration of Europe prior to both world wars, the perception of

offensive military advantage gave rise to alliance 'chain-ganging' before 1914, whereas the perception of defensive advantages gave rise to buck-passing before 1939. In both cases, these perceptions, or misperceptions, within the systemic conditions, were aggravated by hyper-nationalism and militarism in the case of WWI, (and also in WWII, in the case of the Axis Powers), and engrained shared experiences and changes in the nature of civil-military relations prior to WWII.³⁸

In the multipolar 'checkerboard' of Europe in 1914, the existence of many 'dyads' of conflict provided for a variety of potential paths to war.³⁹ The distribution in 1914 was divided between five Great Powers; - Britain, France, Russia, Austro-Hungary and Germany; and two minor powers; - Serbia and Belgium. The result was a number of different adversarial relationships including: Germany versus Britain, France, Russia and Belgium; and Austro-Hungary versus Serbia and Russia. Prior to WWII, a similar situation existed with Germany faced off against Britain, France, the USSR, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Austria; Italy versus Britain and France; the USSR against Finland and Poland; Czechoslovakia facing Poland and Hungary; and Romania against Hungary.⁴⁰ Even more so than in 1914, the plethora of potential rifts made war a distinct possibility.⁴¹

In the multipolar system prior to WWI the approximate equality of alliance partners led to a high degree of security interdependence within the alliance; each state felt its own security was integrally intertwined with the security of its alliance partners. As Christensen and Snyder asserted, - no state felt it could restrain a reckless ally "by threatening to sit out the conflict, since the demise of its reckless ally would decisively cripple its own security".⁴²

Waltz describes the situation as follows:

"If Austria-Hungary marched, Germany had to follow: the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire would have left Germany alone in the middle of Europe. If France marched, Russia had to follow: a German victory over France would be a defeat for Russia. And so it was all around the vicious circle. Because the defeat or the defection of a major ally would have shaken the balance, each state was constrained to adjust its strategy and the use of its forces to the aims and fears of its partners."⁴³

Contrary to the hyperactive balancing behaviour that preceded WWI, the multipolar system in the 1930's gave witness to an alternative systemic phenomenon - buck-passing. In the face of a rising German threat, the future allies failed to perceive the future course of events and therefore effective alliances failed "to form in a timely fashion".⁴⁴ Instead, some states in the system attempted to "ride free" on the balancing efforts of other states. As an example of pre-World War II 'buck-passing', Waltz illustrates that:

"As the German threat grew, some British and French leaders could hope that if their countries remained aloof, Russia and Germany would balance each other off or fight to the finish. Uncertainties about who threatens whom, about who will oppose whom, about who will gain or lose from the actions of other states accelerates as the number of states increases."⁴⁵

In the case of WWII, the attempts at 'buck-passing' by Britain, France and the USSR further aggravated the situation by "giving the aggressor a chance to overturn the balance by eliminating the system's opposing poles through piecemeal aggression".⁴⁶ Due to the failure to balance, Germany was able to consume the Rhineland, Austria, Czechoslovakia, (with the aid of Poland and Hungary), and Poland, (with Soviet aid), thus increasing its power in the system.⁴⁷

The above-mentioned systemic conditions, leading up to both World Wars, illustrate that multipolarity created two contrary trends that facilitated the advent of war. Why did these two conditions occur? Why did states that formed 'chain-gangs' prior to WWI, 'pass-the-

buck' in the 1930's? These are the conditions lying outside systemic theory and therefore not paid special attention to by Realist theory.

In addition to the configuration of the international system, a number of perceptions of the international environment, or the offense-defense balance, as well as domestic conditions factor in to the policy decisions of individual states.⁴⁸ In multipolarity, the greater the vulnerability of states, (or the more offensive measures are deemed to be advantageous), the greater is the desire to align unconditionally and "to fight all-out" in defense of an ally from the first moment it is attacked. Thus, there exists a connection between offensive advantage and chain-ganging within a multipolar system, such as the case prior to WWI. In 1914, the perception of easy conquest led states to 'chain-gang' to prevent the overthrow of the status quo.⁴⁹ Conversely, the less the vulnerability of states, the greater is the tendency to 'pass-the-buck', as in the late 1930's. States, in this instance, feel that by not participating in a potential conflict they will emerge all the stronger, vis à vis the combatants.⁵⁰

Perceptions of the strategic balance are formed in a number of ways. It is commonly believed that these perceptions are formed by the previous experiences of statesmen, or of a certain society. Thus, German policy-makers, in 1914, looked at war as "short and decisive", with a good chance of success as had occurred in the Franco-Prussian wars of 1870-71. Following the long stalemates of the Great War however, most policy-makers expected defenses to hold out in 1939 and therefore decided to 'pass-the-buck'.⁵¹

Apart from the systemic and strategic causes of war, a number of domestic conditions have also served to reinforce or impede a nation's will to wage war. This point is sufficiently illustrated by the militant and nationalist fervour that gripped German society following the forging of the empire in 1871, and lasted until its defeat in 1945. This intense 'pride',

devolved into a malevolent behavioral pattern, which induced a feeling of superiority, translated at the national level, into an overtly aggressive foreign policy.⁵² These domestic forces can be 'plugged into' international system theories to help explain the onset of war.

Militarism, as well, played a large role in the events leading to WWI. In militarist societies, such as Germany prior to both wars, uncontrolled militaries favoured offensive strategies. By infusing their nationalistic society with self-serving myths, militaries in WWI, and in the fascist states prior to WWII, helped persuade the rest of society that war was necessary, desirable and easily winnable.⁵³ Following WWI, the move toward civilian-based militaries, as in modern democracies, led to a more cautious approach or 'buck-passing'.⁵⁴ The civilian public sectors influence tended to view war more hesitantly and only as a last resort.

It is hoped that this explanation has illustrated how the international system, which was multipolar in nature, and tainted with strategic misperceptions of the offense-defense balance, and also domestic conditions characterized by malevolent nationalism and militarism, furthered the chances of war in 1914, and again in 1939. This system and its' internal conditions, as described, stands in sharp contrast to those factors which moulded relationships in the Cold War era.

BIPOLAR EUROPE: THE COLD WAR

The Cold war was many things to many people. Its onset in the post-war period divided the world into two hostile camps, strictly polarizing Europe into two opposing antagonistic spheres of influence. The competition between the two poles, led by the U.S. and

the USSR, was an ideological contest between capitalism and communism, or, as some prefer, between democracy and authoritarianism. In the 'game' the leaders of the two blocs competed for the allegiance of, and influence over, all other actors in the bipolar international system. And yet, throughout the Cold War era the 'superpowers' refused to engage each other, leaving Europe virtually conflict-free.

To many, the passing of the Cold War and the system it fostered, is greeted with relief, or euphoria perhaps, over the cessation of 'cold hostilities' between the world's superpowers and the potentiality of military conflict. To others, however, and increasingly so, the Cold War is treated quite differently. For all the doomsday predilections and prophecies of all-out nuclear and/or high-technology conventional warfare leading to 'Armageddon', Europe and the world have survived. For the first time in modern history, the world's Great, or 'Super' powers 'chose' not to enter into direct military conflict. As illustration, Europe - the perennial battleground of the Great Powers and home to the 'no-man's land' dividing Soviet and American troops between 1945 and 1991, - provided the turf for only two minor and short-lived conflicts, in Hungary, in 1956, and in Cyprus, in 1974.⁵⁵ As any student of European history can verify, forty-five years is an admirable length for a peaceful interlude.

Although this study is primarily concerned with European security, it must be noted that conflict certainly occurred outside the European theatre, but even these wars rarely involved the superpowers directly. This has led some historians to refer to the Cold War as a 'Long Peace', much as we refer to that era of European history preceded by the Congress of Vienna.⁵⁶ In the interests of aiding the prospects of peace in present-day Europe it is necessary to understand what maintained stability for the past five decades in contrast to the conditions and conflict that proceeded it.

With the defeat of the Axis Powers in September, 1945, the European international system began a dramatic alteration from a multipolar to a bipolar distribution of power. Three factors were responsible for that change: the destruction of German power, the explosion of Soviet might and the firmness of the American commitment to European security.⁵⁷

In the interests of avoiding any future war, at the hands of German aggression, the victorious powers completely dismembered their adversary, creating, in the end, two German states, themselves opposed to each other. With the power vacuum created by the absence of German might, and the wartime destruction of the nations of East-Central Europe, the Red Army 'liberalized' and then occupied the nations of the region, amalgamating them into the Soviet bloc. Through its military might, and sheer size, strengthened by its imperial acquisitions, the Soviet Union became the dominant power on the continent, rivalled only by its one-time ally, the U.S.⁵⁸

The anomaly of the Cold War, as many scholars have pointed out, is that the Soviets, unlike their predecessors in dominating Europe, (the Habsburgs, the French, and the Germans), made no overt military attempt to attain continental hegemony. There is no deep-seated psychological reason why the Soviet leadership, (or the Russian *narod*), would not have made this attempt. The Bolsheviks, after all, had asserted their philosophy of spreading world revolution, and they had already subjugated many of the 'soviet nations' by military force; they were, by no means, pacifists.⁵⁹ Yet, they did not attempt to dominate the continent. Why?

In the world from the mid-1940's to their demise, the Soviets simply did not believe that they could win a hegemonic war.⁶⁰ Depending upon which approach one adheres to, this condition was the result of a number of global changes from the first half of the twentieth

century. On the whole, the systemic factors, of the new international system, strongly influenced by new and dramatic changes in strategic perceptions of the offense-defense balance, and in collusion with radically altered domestic conditions, simply 'forbade' war in the European theatre. The systemic and strategic factors included, tight bipolarity, rough military parity, as well as "the ultimate in strategic defensive advantage", the nuclear deterrent.⁶¹ It is noteworthy, as well, that several domestic or behavioural factors encouraged the Cold War system to produce different results than its predecessors.⁶² As a result of these determinants, the USSR and the U.S. resigned to co-exist in a system under a given set of rules which they came to develop and perfect.

The lack of security in pre-war Europe, was the result of a variety of factors, but the distribution of power in Europe - its multipolarity and the imbalances of power that often occurred among the major states in that system - was an important condition, allowing for destabilizing trends. By contrast, especially according to Realist theory, the Cold War 'long peace' was, in part, maintained and strengthened by its structure.⁶³ In a systemic and strategic sense the virtual absence of war in Europe from 1945 until the end of the Cold War, has been a consequence of three major factors: the bipolar distribution of military power; the rough military parity between the super powers; and the fact that each pole in the system was armed with a large and effective nuclear arsenal.⁶⁴

In the post-war bipolar system, the U.S. and the USSR dominated, and generally demanded the allegiance of lesser states, with which varying degrees of rigid alliances were forged.⁶⁵ As far as 'inter-polar' war is concerned, this has been a stabilizing factor for a number of reasons. First, in the bipolar system, there existed only one 'dyad' across which war might break out, since only the two major powers contended with each other and the

minor powers were not likely to be in a position to attack each other.⁶⁶ Conversely, a multipolar system is said to possess many potential axis of conflict thus, increasing the chances of war. Also, due to the lessened rigidity, conflict could also break out between major and minor powers, or amongst minor powers. In post-war Europe however, peace was deemed to be 'indivisible' - alliances were strict and any inter-alliance war would inevitably involve the super powers.

Secondly, deterrence is likely to be more difficult in the multipolar, than in the bipolar system, due to the fact that imbalances, and/or perceived imbalances, are more likely and more difficult to rectify given the increased number of actors. The resulting power imbalances can lead to conflict. In the bipolar system, deterrence is simplified by the number of actors; the existence of only two poles facilitates the balancing of power by internal means rather than by the constantly shifting alliances of the multipolar world.

Finally, deterrence is deemed to be simpler in bipolar systems because the system is relatively rigid. One power knows that it must contend with the other 'pole' if it decides to assert its authority. Knowing the probable consequences, lessens the chances of underestimating one's opponent in the bipolar system. Such miscalculations are felt, by many, to be much more common under multipolarity where the configuration of the international system is much more fluid, and the rules of the 'game' alter constantly.⁶⁷

A second reason proffered, for the absence of war in Europe since 1945, is the rough military parity that existed, or at least was perceived to exist. Both systems, bipolar and multipolar, are more stable when equality is greatest among the poles; the obverse - power inequities - increase the chances of war by enhancing the probability of success. Under bipolarity, an equal balance of power creates an equal system. Equality is enhanced by the

attempts of the powers to address balances internally. If this status is approximately maintained neither of the two can be assured of victory and huge losses are a foregone conclusion. Thus, parity of militarily fungible resources, by maintaining equality, acts as a deterrent to aggressive actions.⁶⁸

In averting war, the purpose of deterrence is to escalate the costs and risks of going to war. The more horrible the prospect of a given conflict, the more remote the chance of success, the less likely it is to occur. Here then is the main strategic stabilizing factor of the post-war era - the nuclear deterrent. Nuclear weaponry, being weapons of mass destruction and promising to produce unprecedented devastation if put into use, weigh heavily on the side of conflict aversion. So too, if both sides' nuclear arsenals are secure from attack, creating a "mutually assured retaliation capability", (mutually assured destruction, MAD), nuclear weapons make any potential conflict infinitely more costly.⁶⁹ This nuclear capability and its deterrent affect on international conflict has been further enhanced in the last two decades through a technological advancement known as the 'reconnaissance revolution'.⁷⁰

A number of theorists, breaking from the Realist emphasis on systemic determinants, have asserted that the strategic alteration in the offense-defense balance provides the key to post-war stability in Europe. In acquiring nuclear capabilities, the post-war system "achieved the ultimate in strategic defensive advantage - the ability to destroy the other, no matter what the other chooses to do".⁷¹

Ted Hopf argues that bipolarity, by itself, had "little to do with the absence of war between the Soviet Union and the United States".⁷² Hopf asserts that strategic defense dominance has acted as "the main limitation on instability".⁷³ Beyond nuclear capabilities, stability has been enhanced by technological changes and alterations in the global economy.

In the 'third industrial revolution' which has occurred in the post-war period, the "cumulativity of power resources" has decreased dramatically. Whereas it was once deemed feasible and economically beneficial to occupy and administer a territory for a much-needed commodity, the "economic power that undergirds a state's military capacity, today is most rapidly advanced through technological innovation and invention".⁷⁴ In effect, international trade has, in many ways, supplanted military intervention as a viable option to access goods or markets. Together, these shifts in the offense-defense balance, the basis of power and strategic beliefs have reinforced the stability of the post-war system.

There are, of course, numerous additional stabilizing factors that occurred within the Cold War system. In short, domestic conditions in the post-war period have altered radically from those in the first half of the century. Most important, among these, was a marked decrease in hypernationalism throughout Europe following WWII.⁷⁵ This is due, partly, to the collective realization of the devastation wrought by malevolent nationalism and the fact that the two new 'super powers' were not as prone to fervent and/or negative nationalism. This can, perhaps, be partly explained by the fact that neither 'power' was composed of a single nation or homogenous population.

Whereas nationalist propaganda previously "poisoned" international relations by convincing each state of its innate superiority and thus, of the legitimacy of its claims, post-war Europe witnessed a remarkable decline of this phenomenon. This event resulted, in part, from the "social and economic levelling of European societies", following the war, and the "less competitive relations that developed among West European states after 1945".⁷⁶ In part, this was achieved by allied intervention in the domestic affairs of the worst perpetrators and also through the concerted efforts of international agencies, such as the United Nations

Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).⁷⁷ These actions, in collusion with varying degrees of mature interdependence, have virtually rid Western Europe of hypernationalism. In East-Central Europe, the Soviet system and communist ideology did much to level the former social stratification of the independent societies. Although, the efforts of the state also managed, (with few exceptions) to hold nationalism in check, this condition can legitimately be questioned, in the region, now that rugged national self-determination is the norm.⁷⁸

Another factor has been the "moderation of ideologies".⁷⁹ Indeed, it seems inconceivable that war would have been avoided had the Soviet leadership maintained its self-proclaimed intention to overthrow the opposing system.⁸⁰ Since the 1950's, both states have demonstrated "an impressive capacity to subordinate antagonistic ideological interests to a common goal of preserving world order".⁸¹ They have respected the spheres of influence, avoiding direct military confrontation, conventional and nuclear, preferring the "predictable anomaly over unpredictable rationality".⁸²

Along with the decline of nationalism, the decline of militarism has fostered stability in the post-war period. Whereas militaries in the first half of the century were, in many ways, segregated from the general populous, and thus, infused with their own interests, the post-war era has witnessed the end of "deep social barriers between the military establishment and civilian society".⁸³ As a result of the spread of democratic institutions and a general social levelling process, militaries have become more interconnected with society. This has led to a growth industry in civilian defense analysis, "combined with democratic processes and norms of free speech".⁸⁴ Together, these changes guaranteed that militaries and their propaganda would face greater public criticism than before. It should be noted however, that this is not a guaranteed permanent condition.

In areas where these changes have been less pronounced, (i.e. East-Central Europe and the former USSR), the yearning to provide security, may result in larger militaries playing disproportionate roles in their societies.⁸⁵

Together, these systemic, strategic and behavioural constraints operated, to varying degrees, to maintain peace in the Cold War era. The decline and demise of the USSR, compounded by numerous changes in strategic beliefs and realities, as well as radically altered domestic conditions, have confined the Cold War system to the proverbial 'dustbin of history'. A new Europe and a new system are evolving, with new security challenges. Alarming, the new international condition in the 'post-communist' world possesses many of the same forces which have led to war in the past.

EUROPE TODAY: THE OLD WITH THE NEW

In the strict bipolarity and nuclear diplomacy of the post-war world, the principal combatants defined the emerging international system and established the parameters within which the other, lesser powers, would act. The international system today however, differs greatly from that of the past forty-five years. As Otto Von Bismark noted, "the stream of time" has wrought changes in the power of nations and international system. With the decline of Soviet power, followed by the demise of the USSR, and the inherent erosion of power of any successor state, traditional East-West tensions have become less of a factor in international relations. This trend has been compounded by the relative decline of the United States from a position of hegemon to that of 'primus inter pares', bequeathing to the previous 'lesser powers' an exceedingly evident power vacuum.⁸⁶

A new world order is being forged. Noticeable shifts in the global balance of power have made it quite evident that the future will not be bipolar, but will instead, entail some form of multipolarity.⁸⁷ With the demise of the USSR and perhaps a slight relative decline in the stature of the U.S., a number of new 'challengers' will, (and in many ways already are) assume the residual power transforming the world into a multipolar system. According to Joseph S. Nye, these new "challengers" include Russia, China, Germany and/or the European Community and Japan.⁸⁸

As has been pointed out however, a return to multipolarity, in and of itself, is not sufficient evidence to charge that the European future will be ridden with war. Indeed, many theorists assert that a multipolar system possesses a number of advantages over its bipolar counterpart.⁸⁹ These 'optimists' therefore, have predicted a multipolarity, not identical to previous systems, but a new phenomenon. They foresee a new type of system, one in which military power has surrendered its primacy to economic power, and enhanced interaction opportunities will allow for multilateral and co-operative institutional approaches to problems.⁹⁰ In that the new system will be prone, to a certain extent of instability endemic to the multipolar system, increased economic interdependence and security institutionalization will temper these tendencies.⁹¹

Theorists who hold these views, assume that the factors and conditions that led to war in the past have largely been erased and thus, the forging of a new system poses no special problems. For the most part however, these 'rosy' predictions are only valid for Western Europe.

While the traditional powers in the Western world have come to view their intra-regional relations in a co-operative, rather than confrontational manner, these trends in the

West cannot be seen as guarantees against the outbreak of war. The risks of renewed ethnic conflict in Eastern Europe are very serious, as are the immediate dangers raised by the break-up of the USSR and by resurgent border and inter-ethnic conflicts in the Balkans. War is not only a distinct possibility, but a reality, in a variety of 'hot spots' throughout the 'post-communist' world. Even avowed sceptics of Realist predictions admit that potent causes for war are prevalent in this region, making the risk of war "greater" in the post-Cold War world.

The first destabilizing factor is the breakdown of international and domestic order. With the end of the Cold War and the, at least partial withdrawal of the United States and the Soviet Union from Europe, a much less stable order is evolving, in which the "ground rules" are less defined.⁹¹ The disappearance of the strictly bipolar distribution of power and the allegiances it enforced, have allowed for a 'divisible peace' throughout East-Central Europe and the former USSR. Conflict can now ensue between Greece and Macedonia, for example, without ensuring war between Great, or 'super' powers.⁹² This process has been exacerbated by the demise of the Soviet Empire which, through its domestic breakdown has disrupted the international order by introducing a mass of newly independent states into the system.⁹³ In the emerging multipolar system, peace has become divisible - the afflicted areas are now 'safe' for local wars.

A particular systemic structure however, is not the only cause of conflict, indeed, some theorists assert that the multipolar system, emerging, will initiate positive change. Many believe that strategic conditions and perceptions bear more responsibility for the stability of a given era.⁹⁴ Ted Hopf asserts that due to the static state of the offense-defense balance, "a multipolar world is nothing to fear", and predicts "a continuation of post-war stability".⁹⁵ But, the security situation in the Balkans and along the formerly Soviet periphery in 1993, give

evidence to an alteration in the perception of the offense-defense balance between new adversaries. Nuclear weapons do not deter Moldavians from engaging the Russian army, and arguments concerning "cumulative power resources" to the contrary, many in Belgrade support the acquisition of territory for a 'Greater Serbia' at the expense of Bosnia-Herzegovina.⁹⁸

The breakdown of the international order, in the post-communist world, in a systemic and strategic sense, has changed the "rules of the game". In this ambiguous state, in a region festering with old wounds, each state will "tend to define its own rights broadly and others' narrowly, and to dispute the others' definitions".⁹⁹ This ambiguity, and consequent actions, raises the risk of misunderstandings and collisions, as states inside and outside the region struggle to establish their rights.¹⁰⁰

The various armed disputes, as well as potential conflicts elsewhere, are also fuelled by certain domestic conditions. These conditions include, to varying degrees, the return of malevolent nationalism and militarism, supported by territorial grievances and economic deprivation, and may continue to provide the impetus for ethnic conflict. Whereas, Western Europe's long history of open democratic politics and decades of relative economic prosperity have done much to drain the poison from the bitter rivalries of the past, East-Central Europe and the former Soviet republics have experienced no such evolution. On the contrary, no such process of detoxification had time to occur. Until 1918, the disparate 'nations' of the region were components of the German, Russian, or Austro-Hungarian empires. The 'nations' of East-Central Europe then enjoyed a brief period of national self-determination.¹⁰¹ In 1939, imperial power - first Nazi and Soviet, then Soviet alone - returned, and with it came the suppression of national self-expression.¹⁰² The Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Europe uncovers border disputes and revanchist claims that were suppressed, but will now emerge

among new nation-states or pockets of minorities within the 'post-communist world'. These ethnic rivalries will use nationalism as a support base, and inevitably increasing the size of their militaries to effect change.¹⁰³

Although our theoretical assumptions allow for conflict, even large-scale conflict, in the 'new order', it is doubtful that these wars will involve the traditional Western 'Great Powers' as combatants.¹⁰⁴ Western Europe's long history of open democratic politics and decades of relative economic prosperity have done much to drain the poison from the bitter rivalries of the past. Plainly stated, it is most difficult to conjure up any reason for these powers to undertake any military ventures into the region other than in a peace-keeping or a 'peace-making' capacity. In 1993, the interests of Bonn, Paris, London and Washington, in the region can be described as 'negative interests'. Namely, these nations are mainly concerned that "activities originating within, or passing over, the borders of the region's states should not diminish the well-being of their citizenry."¹⁰⁵

Thus, Moscow's primary security concern, barring any extreme change in government, is that the military forces in the afflicted regions would not be so large, nor deployed in such a fashion, as to pose a potential threat to Russian security. Also, Russia is unique, among the powers, in that it is concerned about the treatment of ethnic Russians dispersed throughout the former republics of the USSR. Germany, has also dropped any ambitions of expanding eastward. Even ambitions for former German territory in present-day Poland have been renounced.¹⁰⁶ The Western powers and Russia then, have an interest in isolating Eastern conflict so that conflagrations will not spread.

Thus, we are able to draw certain generalizations about the type of conflict endemic in the 'new order' in Europe. Future conflicts should follow these general typologies:

- 1) As a general premise one must draw the conclusion that due to the evaporation of bipolarity and its accompanying military blocs, peace in Europe has become a 'divisible' one.
- 2) The locus for conflict will be in the geographical entity of East-Central Europe and the former USSR.
- 3) Such conflict will probably not involve the Great Powers as combatants. Their joint and/or individual armed forces could be used as peacekeepers or, at most, 'peace-makers'.¹⁰⁷

It is precisely these threats, come to fruition, that are now aggravating the security landscape of the new Europe, or Eurasia.

CHAPTER TWO

THE POST-SOVIET CHALLENGES

The death of the Cold War has bequeathed to Europe a new and radically different international system. With the advent of this 'new world order', a variety of liberal theories have proclaimed the 'obsolescence' of war in an interdependent world engaged in economic competition, rather than military conflict.¹ Future aggressors were to surmise from the events of the Gulf War that future human rights abuses and blatant violations of international borders would be met with swift and decisive action from the international community and its security institutions.² Yet, a plethora of international conflicts from Zagreb to Dushanbe have marred this idealistic view of the post-Cold War world, and perhaps illustrated the fallacy of altogether optimistic notions of 'new world orders'.

True, a variety of factors today have aided the forces of political and economic integration in Europe. Many have correctly asserted that, in the 'new world order', Europe's 'Great Powers' have come to view their intra-regional relations in a co-operative, rather than a confrontational manner, and there is less perceived conflict of interest among the major European states.³

The preceding suppositions, however, cannot be viewed as guarantees against the outbreak of war in Europe and its periphery - war and other security threats will continue to emanate from the newly independent lands of the Soviet bloc and the now sovereign states of the former USSR. These are the conflicts and crises that have resulted from the new international system, and the new conditions in East-Central Europe and the former USSR.

The threat of large-scale violence can, and has, manifested itself in many ways - the deliberate use of force by one state against another, or by a complete breakdown of order and authority. Obviously, the breakdown of order in any state, creates insecurity for its peoples, and the image of conflict or instability spilling over into neighbouring states is a potent one.⁴ These are the security predicaments facing the inhabitants of the formerly 'Soviet' world and Western policy makers.

This Chapter will offer a synopsis of the actual and potential military conflicts and security risks that have resulted from the breakdown of international order and have been aggravated by the renewed hypernationalism and economic deprivation endemic in the former Soviet Empire. These malaises have sponsored a wide array of ethnic rivalries and territorial grievances throughout the region. The nuclear and conventional arms proliferation, stemming from the implosion of the formerly Soviet defense industry will also be discussed. It also has been identified as an immediate security concern and could have a tremendous impact on the future of military conflict within the region, as well as in other areas of the world. There are, of course, a number of other potential security problems facing Europe today. For the most part, these too, emanate from the 'post-Soviet world', but also from Europe's southern periphery. In his analysis of European security in the post-Cold War era, Edward Mortimer correctly includes potential aggressors from outside Europe, nuclear and chemical fall-out, and mass immigration as very real potential security threats to Europe. Although the above-mentioned conditions all play a role in European security, they fall outside the scope of this study which will focus on "physical" security threats resulting from ethnic and/or territorial military conflict, as well as weapons proliferation.⁵

In East-Central Europe, and the newly independent nation-states of the former USSR, a wide array of hypernationalist groups or 'national salvation fronts' have formed the governments in the as yet imperfect democracies. With these authoritarian governments in control, or in a position to gain legitimacy as conditions worsen, renewed ethnic conflict, as has been the case in Yugoslavia, constitutes the most immediate reason for concern in Europe. As our study will illustrate, there is no shortage of conflict in the 'new order'. Such conflict is, in a sense, 'allowed' by the characteristics of this 'new order' discussed in the previous chapter. Indeed, the notion that war is 'obsolete', or will be quickly extinguished by multilateral institutions, is not in tune with reality. This dream not only 'died in Sarajevo', it has met its end in a variety of 'hot spots' from Zagreb to Dushanbe. In Eastern Europe, it should come as no surprise that Yugoslavia has provided the most critical threat to European security, and the challenge to the 'new world order'. (See Map Appendix A & B)

To any but a student of East-Central European affairs, Yugoslavia is a bit of a puzzle. Only a decade ago, at the death of its post-war 'creator', Josip Broz Tito, in May 1980, Yugoslavia appeared to be a stable federation playing, perhaps, a disproportionate role on the world stage.⁶ Today again, Yugoslavia attracts an overwhelming amount of international attention. Since June 16, 1991, Yugoslavia has provided the turf for the most destructive and sustained military conflict in Europe since the end of World War II, resulting in the deaths of tens of thousands of people.⁷

In its upheaval, the former Yugoslav Federation has vividly illustrated that undercurrent of European Affairs - the 'ugly' forces of fragmentation along tribal lines, fuelled by nationalism, perceived territorial grievances and economic deprivation. These forces, where in power, have extended their hypernationalism, utilizing war as an extension of their

revanchist foreign policy. The civil/international war in Yugoslavia has provided a glimpse, or a throwback, to an earlier Europe, when the Balkans were rife with ethnic conflict.⁸ In their tragedy as well, the Yugoslav 'nations' have illustrated the security threats to the 'new world order' in the European region and perhaps, the instability of the status quo in the former Soviet bloc. The break-up of Yugoslavia offers valuable insight into the myriad of problems faced by the states of East-Central Europe, and the former USSR, now that self-determination is the order of the day. While indeed, the inauguration of a new international system, and new international and domestic realities, has rendered Eastern Europe "safe for local wars", the escalating Yugoslav experience has illustrated that these conflicts can escalate and will continue to threaten the 'disorder' of the region.⁹

The break-up of Yugoslavia should have come as no surprise. Its predominant unifying factor in the post-war era had been its charismatic leader - Tito. Beset by grave economic problems, mounting social unrest and bitter ethnic strife among its disparate nations throughout the 1980's, Yugoslavia seemed to be well on the road to disintegration.¹⁰ Any truth behind the '*sliyvonie*' or melting together of a Yugoslav nation was as much a fiction in Zagreb as it was in Vilnius.¹¹ The disturbing factor, however, is the method by which the federation 'came undone'.

Perhaps the most prophetic event occurred in 1986, with the appointment of Slobodan Milosevic as General Secretary of the Serbian Communist Party.¹² Ominously, Milosevic ignored the 'confining' boundaries of Serbia proper, and began to speak for all of Yugoslavia's 8.1 million Serbs, in Serbia and without. By articulating Serbian frustrations over the treatment of Serbs outside of Serbia and the separatist tendencies of certain republics,

Milosevic reaped huge political advantages, culminating in his ascension to the Presidency of Serbia in 1989, though at considerable cost to the federal system and Yugoslavia as a whole.¹³

From the mid-1980's, all aspects of life in Yugoslavia came to be viewed through the prism of 'national calculations', a fact reflected in the evolution of the governing parties. Like Serbia, both the Croats and the Slovenes, in their original bid for greater autonomy within a loose Yugoslav confederation and a greater share of the wealth, elected nationalist governments in 1990. After their respective victories, both the Demos Alliance under Milan Kucan in Slovenia, and the Croatian Democratic Union, under Franco Tudjman in Croatia, adopted a more nationalist platform to 'face off' against Milosevic.¹⁴

This antagonism explains why Yugoslavia, instead of concentrating on the economic reform agenda, followed a complex political agenda, often apparently 'flying in the face' of economic logic.¹⁵ These factors, and their outcome, warrant careful study, since what continues to occur in the former Yugoslav lands could easily provide a precedent for other scenarios in the afflicted region.¹⁶ It is precisely these economic and political factors that induced first Slovenia and then Croatia to declare independence on June 15, 1991. It is these same factors that convinced Milosevic to 'send in the troops'.¹⁷

The initiation of hostilities between Serbia and Croatia in June, 1991, has sparked a military conflict that still shows no signs of ending.¹⁸ In its ferocity, the war has claimed tens of thousands of casualties in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The conflict broadened, with Serbia and Croatia battling Moslem forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina in an attempt to 'carve out a Greater Serbia and/or Croatia' from a former republic that has virtually ceased to exist.¹⁹ Alarmingly, the crisis in the former Yugoslav lands could further threaten the stability of Eastern Europe, spreading beyond the conflicts' present borders.²⁰

In its attempt to forge a 'Greater Serbia', it is feared that when Serbia has achieved its ends in Bosnia-Herzegovina it will turn its attention to the troublesome Kosovo and Vojvodina within its borders, and the independent state of Macedonia.²¹ The dangers of these moves are obvious to one acquainted with the security landscape of the Balkans. Any actions against ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, or ethnic Magyars in Vojvodina would draw a response from Tirana and Budapest, thus engulfing the Balkans in a broader international war. Potential action against Macedonia is also a distinct possibility, since Macedonia is home to many Serbs.²² Macedonia's independent stance is also viewed unfavourably by Greece, which is opposed to its chosen appellation. Bulgaria, too, has taken a large interest in Macedonia. Its foreign minister has expressed concern for the large number of Bulgarians in Macedonia, a region still termed 'the Western lands' in Bulgaria.

In an area replete with "unsettled scores, unfilled national dreams, racial and religious differences, ethnic groups, torn apart by borders, and pocket imperialisms", the Yugoslav war has waged on.²³ In the face of U.N., C.S.C.E., and E.C. involvement, the war has escalated, widened, and indeed, threatens to broaden its path.²⁴ Perhaps the prime cause for the fighting is the malevolent nationalism of Serbia and, to a lesser extent, Croatia, fostered by their leaders.²⁵ But the war is a more complicated eruption of ancient religious, ethnic and territorial hatreds, maintained by Serbia's determination to annex 'portions' of other, now independent, nation-states, populated by Serbians. This activity promises to continue to threaten European security, but especially in the Balkans, where neither strict bipolarity nor the awesome potential of a nuclear deterrent exist to subdue or arrest conflict. Domestic conditions, as well, have deteriorated to the point that, in many cases, they justify the conflict via nationalist calculations.

Yet former Yugoslav lands, and their Balkan neighbours, do not offer the only security threats in the former Soviet bloc. Central Europe, a region that once promised to be a showcase of "democratic change and neighbourly co-operation", possesses the potential to be the "weak and unstable backyard" of Western Europe, and of Germany in particular.²⁶ The initial euphoria over the collapse of communism is coupled with fears that clashes and splits over economic, ethnic or political issues may occur in the near future. Any dramatic developments in Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, or the Czech Republic would have direct implications for any neighbouring states, including Western Europe.²⁷ (See Map, Appendix C)

Instability in Central Europe is generated by a variety of different factors - economic, ethnic, cultural and political. The very possible failure of reforms, in any of these areas, would fuel ethnic conflicts in the region, and perhaps, invite foreign involvement.

In assessing the security environment of Central Europe, the new Czech Republic and its neighbour, Slovakia, represent one of the most severe ethnic problems in the region. The post-communist Czechoslovak experience has, since January 1, 1993, resulted in the emergence of two separate states.²⁸ Even though the Czechs, and perhaps, the Slovaks, are often perceived as "Europe's Canadians, - pragmatic, cool and not much given to flag-waving", there may yet be some "bruises" emanating from the as yet 'Velvet Divorce'.²⁹ Specialists have asserted that although "Nationalism wasn't the cause of the split, it may very well be its result."³⁰

Indeed, it will be most difficult in the coming years for the two new states to follow any solution to such complicated issues as the division of federal property, the future of the state of the armed forces, citizenship, foreign debts, or international treaties.³¹ Economic

discrepancies will aggravate this situation as the more modernized and productive Czech economy is more closely integrated with Western Europe, while Slovakia battles to convert its inefficient focus on heavy industrialization to encourage market reforms.³²

These economic gaps and federal power struggles combine with a number of cultural and religious differences to resemble a smaller northern version of Yugoslavia. A Yugoslav-type solution however, is not to be expected. Unlike the Croats, Serbs and Bosnian Muslims, Czech and Slovak relations have seldom been violent, and the borders between the new states generally reflect the ethnic divisions.³³ Therefore, the situation today in the Czech and Slovak states is not likely, in and of itself, to involve violence. It may create a "security vacuum", however, to be exploited by other adversarial states in the region.³⁴

Hungary is the state which has shown the most interest in the partition of Czechoslovakia, particularly in Slovakia. Budapest's main interest stems from the fact that ten percent of Slovakia's present population is Magyar in composition.³⁵ In Hungary, the foreign minister has warned that Magyars living in Slovakia could be the "Jews of the 1990's". Since the Magyar minority in Slovakia is settled along the Slovak-Hungarian border, territorial claims cannot be discounted.³⁶

Budapest has also been quite attentive toward the treatment of the 400,000 Magyars living in Vojvodina, in Serbia.³⁷ This land, lost in the Treaty of Versailles, is not likely to be 'grabbed at' by present-day Hungary, but Serbian treatment of this contingent has tested Budapest's patience. The two-year old war in Yugoslavia has forced thousands of Hungarians to return to Hungary. Also, the Yugoslav/Serbian military has "repeatedly violated Hungarian airspace and even bombed a Hungarian village".³⁸ Any escalation or widening of the Yugoslav conflict could definitely include the participation of Hungary.

Hungary's most difficult foreign policy problem, however, is to the southeast with Romania.³⁹ Ethnic problems in Transylvania, with its 2-2.5 million Magyars, could produce a large-scale conflict between the two.⁴⁰ Since the bulk of ethnic Magyars do not live close to the borders, territorial changes would entail large-scale conflict. The potential for such a conflict will depend on Romanian treatment of the Magyar population and, to a large extent, Hungarian restraint.

In addition to the number of conflicts, real or potential, between the states of Central Europe, there exists a plethora of disputes over the future borders between this region and the states of the former USSR. The Ukraine borders not only Hungary, but also Slovakia and Poland; in addition Poland borders Byelarus, Lithuania and Russia. A number of territorial disputes could emerge as relations between these states evolve.⁴¹

This is not to say that war in Central Europe is inevitable. It is merely to illustrate that should these states not experience relatively smooth political and economic transitions, their efforts may fuel ethnic conflicts. As we have seen, a number of possibilities exist, and could explode now that various international and domestic conditions have allowed for more tensions and uncertainties in their bilateral and multilateral relations.

National problems in Central Europe, however serious, are not as bitter or intense as those in the former Soviet Union. In their intractability, they resemble the post-Yugoslav quagmire. In the former USSR, the conflicts wrought by ethnic strife, territorial disputes, and economic deprivation have created a precarious situation with potentially unprecedented consequences, for international security.

From a geopolitical point of view, the dissolution of the USSR has heralded a number of security challenges for its primary successor-state, Russia. Russia today has 'lost' major

parts of the Baltic Sea coast, which had provided the basis for its role as a 'Great Power' in Europe. To the south, portions of the Black Sea coast and the entire Crimea have become Ukrainian - foreign - territory.⁴² As well, within Russia, there are not distinct boundaries for what is actually *Russian*.⁴³ The fear of a 'domino effect' increases when national groups and/or administrative territories, (such as Tatarstan and Chechnia), demand increased autonomy or independence and adopt military methods to pursue that objective. To be sure, Russia's approach to these issues depends on the composition of its government.⁴⁴ If Yeltsin were to be ousted, or forced to harden his position, the regime would, undoubtedly, adopt more of an expansionist position. Even without these occurrences, Russia is, at present, involved in several conflicts in its dealings with the "near abroad" and faced with separatist tendencies within its boundaries which threaten, (and have potential to further threaten), regional security.⁴⁵

Perhaps the most serious crisis is the quarrel between Kiev and Moscow over the Crimea and the Black Sea Fleet. The 'Crimean imbroglio' has proved to be a formidable barrier to the establishment of normal relations between the Ukraine and Russia. The dispute is two-pronged. First, the Russian government, (and the populace), refuse to recognise, and have officially 'annulled', the 1954 legal transfer of the Crimea to the Ukraine.⁴⁶ Instead, the Russian government has worked to maintain the Crimea's image as a "sacred and eternally Russian land" that will never be abandoned.⁴⁷

Aside from the fact that the Crimea is primarily populated by ethnic Russians, the second prong of the argument is the status of the port city of Sevastopol, home to the Black Sea Fleet. Clearly, whoever "owns" the Crimea has considerable advantage in the fleet negotiations. Since August, 1992, Russian President Boris Yeltsin and his Ukrainian

counterpart, Leonid Kravchuk, have decided that the fleet will reside under joint Ukrainian - Russian command for three years, after which, it will be divided by the two sides.⁴⁸ This settlement has not ended the dispute, however. In preparation for the December, 1992, and April, 1993, meetings of the Congress of People's Deputies, Yeltsin shifted the stance of his government to protect it against the growing "dark forces" or "red-brown" opposition of patriots and nationalists.⁴⁹

The escalating conflict between Russia and the Ukraine is quite serious, given that the political climate in both countries demands a highly nationalistic posture, from their Presidents, and a degree of sabre-rattling.⁵⁰ Thus far, the difficulties have barred the second largest member of the CIS - Ukraine - from entering into the CIS collective security agreement. In Russia, even 'moderate' elements of the government have asserted that the Crimea, (and the Black Sea Fleet), "were never to become Ukrainian".⁵¹ Such difficulties pose huge security challenges to the region.

Aside from its problems in the Crimea, Yeltsin's government faces a myriad of challenges within 'Mother Russia'. Even before the dissolution of the USSR, a number of national groups, within separate administrative territories, repeatedly asserted their desire for increased autonomy.⁵² Since the demise of the Union, these movements have only increased. To date, the autonomous republic of Tatarstan, within the heart of Russia, has adamantly requested economic and political autonomy from Russia, although it has recently begun seeking an agreement with Moscow. In the Russian Caucasus, three ethnic territorial units - Karachai-Cherkess, Kabardin-Balkhar and Chechen-Ingushetia - have declared their independence from Moscow.⁵³ Given the seriousness of the demands, which have been supported by military efforts, (especially in Chechnia), and the already precarious security landscape in the Caucasus,

Moscow has treated these crises very seriously, and has reinforced the region with Russian troops.⁵⁴ As feared however, the strength of the centrifugal forces in Russia has seriously undermined the Federation Treaty, negotiated by Yeltsin in March, 1992.⁵⁵ Continued quarrelling will only aggravate an already tenuous political and military situation within the ethnic patchwork of the Russian Federation. (See Map Appendix D & E).

There is a high possibility of losing control over ongoing conflicts elsewhere in the former USSR, especially in Moldova, the southern Caucasus and Tadzhikistan. Here too, Russia is deeply involved. Russia's entanglement stems from its status as the successor-state to the USSR and its military architecture, as well as the fact that Russia feels compelled to defend the interests of the approximately twenty-five million ethnic Russians scattered throughout the CIS. As such, the Russian government refuses to believe that its political-military interests and responsibilities cease at the Federation's borders.

Such is the case in Moldova, where a minority of Russians, in the eastern Dneistr republic (approximately 13% of the population), have been engaged in an escalating civil war against Moldovan forces since the dissolution of the USSR.⁵⁶ In their bid for autonomy the Russians and Russified Ukrainians have been overtly aided by Russia's Fourteenth Army.⁵⁷ Initially proposed as a 'peacekeeping' force, the Russian forces have illustrated the complexities of CIS peacekeeping initiatives, due to the 'excessively politicized', (or Russified), status of the peacekeepers.⁵⁸ The situation has attracted the attention of Romania, (ethnic kin of Moldavians), but repeated resolutions and peacekeeping efforts have only fuelled the conflict.⁵⁹

In desperation, Moldova has turned to European institutions such as the CSCE and the UN to mediate. Both organizations refused to support more than 'fact-finding missions' due to the continuation of hostilities.⁶⁰ The conflict shows no signs of ending since elements

within the Russian government, including Vice-President Rutskoi, "whole-heartedly support the Russian-speakers seeking independence".⁶¹ Yeltsin has been forced to placate these factions, prohibiting any conclusive talks or neutral mediation.

The Dniestr republic is not unique in providing cause for civil war in Moldova. In the south, the Gagauz, a Turkic-speaking people, are seeking independence.⁶² Although their numbers are small, (approximately 153,000 in Moldova), the Gagauz have attracted support for their cause from ethnic kin in Bulgaria and Turkey.⁶³

The newly independent Moldova, an artificial creation of the CPSU, has provided a disproportionate crisis on the security landscape of a very volatile region. Requests for mediation and neutral peacekeeping forces from Europe and the CIS have both failed, thus the war will continue.⁶⁴

In Transcaucasia, the growth of nationalism, fuelled by territorial grievances and economic deprivation throughout the region has also led to a wide array of inter-ethnic conflict in Transcaucasia. South of Russia, all three states of the Caucasus - Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan - are at various stages of war. In Georgia, the conflict is one of civil war, with Georgian troops battling would-be separatists in Abkhazia in the northwest, and South Ossetia in the north. Also, official Georgian troops, loyal to Shevardnadze, are constantly engaging the loyalist troops of deposed President Zviad Gamsakhurdia.⁶⁵ Further south, Armenia and Azerbaijan remain at war over the status of Nagorno-Karabakh.

Tension within Abkhazia, an administrative unit in Georgia, between ethnic Abkhazians and Georgians, has existed for decades. Reminiscent of their independent status in the 1920's, Abkhazians launched a campaign for their secession from the Georgian SSR in 1978. The dispute continued until the demise of the USSR but was dramatically escalated by the election

of Zviad Gamsakhurdia to the Georgian Presidency in November 1990. Since then, a state of civil war has existed, due to Georgia's rabid nationalism, and each ethnic group has become convinced that it has been victimized by the other. At various times, Georgian troops have been dispatched to the region to 'protect' ethnic Georgians and have engaged Abkhazian militia. The situation is further muddled by the existence of Russian troops in Abkhazia, which State Council Chairman Eduard Shevardnadze feels are aiding the separatists. The conflict continues to escalate, and there is not a foreseeable conclusion.⁶⁶

Since the Spring of 1989, there has also been a battle in Georgia between the South Ossetians in the North, and the Georgian authorities. South Ossetia seeks to unify its autonomous region with the North Ossetian Republic in Russia. The casualties caused by the conflict led Shevardnadze and Yeltsin to sign an agreement on settling the conflict in June, 1992. Thereafter, South Ossetia became the first conflict zone to receive a CIS 'peacekeeping' force, even though Georgia is not a member of the Commonwealth.⁶⁷

The primarily Russian force was authorized to "take urgent measures to restore peace, law, and order", but it has met with only minimal success.⁶⁸ As in other cases throughout the former Union the 'peacekeeping' units are accused of actively 'taking sides' in the disputes. Shevardnadze has admitted that "it would be good to rely, in this case, on UN peacekeeping forces, but that is impossible now".⁶⁹ The UN and the CSCE have refused involvement due to the extent of the ongoing hostilities.⁷⁰

Further south in the Caucasus, the age-old dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan has evolved, since the dissolution of the Union, into a full-scale war. The conflict concerns the status of Nagorno-Karabakh, an Armenian enclave within Azerbaijan. Moscow's continued inability to resolve this issue has bequeathed an international war to a very volatile region of

the world.⁷¹ As in other cases throughout the former USSR, there is no foreseeable conclusion to the conflict. Both states possess formidable well-armed 'national armies' which are financed, in part, from abroad.⁷²

The alarming factor in the war has been the support Baku has received from fellow Moslems in neighbouring Iran and ethnic kin in Turkey. The Armenian-Azeri conflict is thus an example of the type of conflict that shows potential for spreading in an already politically sensitive region. To date, the Armenians have attempted to invoke the CIS collective security pact, (which Azerbaijan has not endorsed), against Azerbaijan. The CIS military leader, Evgenii Shaposhnikov, has thus far declined involvement.⁷³

In the formerly Soviet Central Asian republics, Tajikistan has provided a volatile example of the possible evolutionary routes of these new states. In the last days of the USSR, the Tajikistan electorate elevated Rakhmon Nabiyev, (one time Communist boss, but self-declared nationalist), to the post of President. Nabiyev's support was gained from the large ethnic Uzbek minority and by pro-Communist factions.⁷⁴ The opposition, composed of pro-democracy and Islamic fundamentalist forces, united to produce a political stalemate. In this situation the President was forced to introduce members of the traditional Islamic Renaissance Party into his government in May, 1992.⁷⁵ The fundamentalists effectively succeeded in removing their opposition, seizing Nabiyev in Dushanbe, in October, and forcing him to resign. Since then, Tajikistan has been engaged in a civil war, intensified by ancient religious and ethnic feuds. primarily between the Islamic fundamentalist Garbs and the pro-Nabiyev Kulyabs.⁷⁶

Not surprisingly, the Tajikistan civil war will be very difficult to end. Russian forces are attempting to mediate, but are simultaneously providing a target for the antagonisms of both sides. The civil war is supported by a huge influx of weaponry across the Afghan and Pakistani borders. It is feared that these arms, sent from Iran, Afghanistan and others, will aid the consolidation of Islamic fundamentalism and foreign influence in Tajikistan and throughout the Central Asian states. Russia is very fearful of the growing influence of the Moslem world throughout its southern periphery. As Islam Karimov, Uzbekistan's President, asserts, an expansion of the conflict could bring militant Islamic forces to power.⁷

In its dissolution, the USSR has bequeathed to the new world order a myriad of destabilizing conflicts which only promise to spread. These disputes have offered a variety of serious threats to regional security, while all attempts to moderate them have failed. They are not the only 'time bombs' to emanate from the former Soviet Union. The implosion of the gigantic Soviet military-industrial complex has produced a huge surplus of advanced arms and weapons-technology. These commodities are presently being dispersed throughout the region - a region that is anxious to provide a market.

POST-SOVIET ARMS PROLIFERATION

The dissolution of the USSR and the chaos within the former Soviet defense industry have created considerable concern over the fate of the USSR's weaponry, both nuclear and conventional. Specifically, Western specialists are concerned about three issues: 1) the 'loose nukes' or the intra-CIS proliferation of primarily nuclear weapons; 2) the marketization of Soviet weaponry due to the collapse of the USSR's export control system; and 3) 'white collar mercenaries' - the possible exodus of Soviet weapons engineers and nuclear scientists abroad.

In view of the military aspirations of some 'pariah' states, especially in the Middle East and Asia, and the need of 'hard currency' in formerly Soviet lands these post-Soviet scenarios dramatically raise the spectre of nuclear proliferation. These developments seriously exacerbate security conditions in the region and globally.⁷⁸

In the case of the first problem there would seem to be little need for concern. After almost two years in the post-Soviet world, Russia appears to be the only de facto successor nuclear state. Ukraine and Belarus agreed to join the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as non-nuclear states on December 21, 1991.⁷⁹ Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine also agreed to transfer all tactical nuclear weapons from their soil to Russia, to be disassembled under joint control.⁸⁰ By May, 1992, all of these weapons had been removed, except for those of the Black Sea Fleet in the Ukraine.⁸¹ Finally, the Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan pledged that all nuclear weapons on their soil are to be eliminated, after ratification of START I.⁸² This pledge was made to George Bush, in Lisbon in May, 1992. In their pledge, the Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan also indicated that they would enter the NPT as non-nuclear states 'as soon as possible'.⁸³

Thus, after the implementation of START I, no nuclear weapons will remain in the CIS states except for those in Russia. These agreements, however, have yet to be fully implemented. The Ukraine has provided the largest problem due to its tense and unpredictable relations with Russia. It is certain however, that the most alarming 'pro-nuclear status' statements emanating from Kiev are from the conservatives in the defense industry, or the nationalist Rukh party, not the government of Kravchuk.⁸⁴

The marketization of Soviet weaponry has proven to be a more formidable security problem. There are two sides to this issue - legal arm sales by the Russian, or individual CIS,

government(s), and sales of strategic material on the black market. For its part, the Russian government has seized on arms sales to turn surplus weaponry into cash. In the face of Western opposition, Russia is fulfilling the arms contracts it inherited from the USSR - and looking for new customers. It is selling military aircraft and naval vessels to China, Iran, India and most other applicants who can afford to pay hard currency.⁸⁵ The problem lies in the criteria by which an 'eligible, responsible buyer' is chosen. The West looks with disfavour on some of these sales - sales which may provide up to ten billion dollars per annum for Russia, but promise to change the regional balance of power, aiding the military build-ups of countries such as Iran.⁸⁶

On the other side of the issue, there has been 'indirect evidence' that a black market for sensitive items is already emerging. This activity has been strongly motivated by the desire for hard currency. This illegal route for sensitive or dual-use material has also been aided by the rate of privatization in the CIS. While those enterprises which are still state-run are politically controllable, newly privatized industries are much less so. The CIS has as yet failed to produce an effective export control system to control trade of sensitive material. Political instability within the Commonwealth has complicated this process. Thus, militarily sensitive material will continue to emanate from the former USSR until an effective export control process is put into place - one which ties compliance to economic aid.⁸⁷

The third problem is perhaps the most difficult to thwart. The military-industrial complex of the USSR directly employed ten million people, including the most highly trained scientists and best-educated workers, and accounted for twenty-five percent of the Soviet Union's gross national product.⁸⁸ Alone, it provided for half of all manufacturing in Russia.⁸⁹

These scientists and technicians command some of the most advanced nuclear 'know-how' in the world - 'know-how' that might be spread by hundreds of thousands of jobless engineers, specialists and scientists. Monitoring such activity has proven to be a formidable task, and there is certainly no lack of employment opportunities in a plethora of nuclear aspirants. This threat poses a particular challenge to a world where many nations may be on the nuclear threshold.⁹⁰

The proliferation of nuclear weaponry and weapons 'know-how' thus constitutes multifold threats to regional and global security. The issue of preventing an 'internal' dissemination of ex-Soviet nuclear weapons has apparently been settled, but a high demand, compounded by an acute cash shortage, complicates the maintenance and destruction of surplus weaponry and the career paths of its 'creators'.

The end of the Soviet empire, and the demise of the USSR itself, has placed 'Eurasia' and the world at a critical crossroads. It has provided an opportunity to move ahead and forge a new world order, a new era of peace and co-operation; these however, are not the only options. The end of the USSR, and the Cold War it helped to foster, has bequeathed a very complex world, riddled with acute regional conflicts. It would seem, then, that the optimistic 'new world order' is not to be, at least not yet. Sarajevo, Sukhumi and Dushanbe serve as reminders of that fact; they offer glimpses of the ethnic conflict fuelled by renewed hypernationalism, economic deprivation and territorial grievances. In addition to these challenges, the demise of the USSR has exacerbated the security threats by the chaotic handling of its former military-industrial complex. These are the issues which must be dealt with by the members and institutions of the international community if there is to be a 'new world order'.

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**THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO CONFLICT IN THE
NEW WORLD ORDER**

Throughout the Cold War, conflict was averted by a number of international and domestic conditions. As far as large-scale military conflict in Europe was concerned, this 'peace' was maintained by two institutions - the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Warsaw Pact. The structure which characterized European security in the Cold War no longer exists, however. The Warsaw Pact is dead as a military organization, and since July 1, 1991, it has ceased to exist even as a political forum.¹ NATO's predicament is quite different. It has survived as the one alliance to emerge from the conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union and, as such, is "flushed with success".² It has been said, however, that "its very success creates the conditions of its growing irrelevance, and therefore of its atrophy".³ Some have asserted that the end of the traditional East-West conflict makes the division of Europe into military blocs "not only purposeless but also potentially harmful."⁴ Thus, they suggest that other, more universal, international institutions will assume a heightened role in preserving the 'new world order'. Proponents of this view feel that organizations such as the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, (CSCE), the Western European Union, (WEU), and the European Community, (EC), and/or the United Nations will now provide for security. Indeed, contemporary wisdom has dictated that, with the demise of the USSR and the alleged relative decline of America, a new 'globalism' will result. In this 'new world order', human rights abuses and violations of international borders will draw swift and decisive action from multilateral organizations such as those mentioned above.⁵

The real and potential security risks in Europe and its periphery outlined in the previous chapter demand an effective response from the international community. It is not entirely clear, however, from where this response will emanate. This chapter will offer a synopsis of the

organizations presently involved in the European security architecture, and analyze, on an individual basis, their responses to the international conflict and security threats described in the previous chapter. In studying the present security actors and their responses to actual conflict, we will be attempting to reach a number of conclusions. Do the present institutional actors possess the political resolve and the military capability to maintain security in the region? If not, is there a need for a new European Security Organization? Or, does the 'real' power remain in the hands of individual states, whose singular or joint actions still provide the impetus for resolute action in the international arena? Indeed, the tragedy of Yugoslavia, among others, has questioned the effectiveness of multilateral institutions and the security assumptions of the 'new world order'. (For an account of membership in these institutions see Appendix F).

NATO: THE BIPOLAR HERO

An immediate consequence of the political restructuring that has transformed Europe has been uncertainty over the future of NATO. Originally formed in 1949 to defend the West from the Soviet threat, many feel the communist withdrawal from East-Central Europe and the demise of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact have eliminated NATO's *raison d'être*.⁶ Indeed, the Alliance itself declared the Cold War over on July 6, 1991.⁷ For some, then, NATO's role has been nullified; energies previously devoted to security concerns can now be devoted to arms control and reduction. Spending the 'peace dividend' resulting from the pacification of East-West relations, they feel, will result in a new Europe, one in which states can coexist in peace and harmony under all-embracing organizations such as the CSCE.⁸

To be sure, the traditional threat of East-West military confrontation has all but disappeared, but in its place, there have emerged a host of problems which suggest that the new Europe may remain an uncertain, and potentially unstable place. Proponents of the Alliance have suggested responding to this changed Europe with "more and better NATO".⁹ Citing NATO's past success

in "reconciling former adversaries ..., counteracting neo-isolationism ... and in promoting new standards of consultation and co-operation", they insist that the Alliance possesses the ability to perform a variety of functions in the new environment.¹⁰ Indeed, it is difficult, at present, to foresee any defence-oriented collective security organization to replace NATO. While its original mandate may have been to deter and defend against the Soviet threat, (although this was never mentioned explicitly), NATO does fulfil several contemporary duties.¹¹

First, NATO is the only organization in the world capable of providing insurance against the threat of aggression against Alliance territory. In this context, Russian and/or CIS military capabilities, nuclear and/or conventional, will continue to provide the focal point for NATO planners. This threat will only become evident should a dramatic change occur in the Russian government - a fact the Russian President, Boris Yeltsin, does not discount. A case could be made for threats emanating from other former members of the USSR, but this is viewed as less realistic. There remains an atmosphere of political uncertainty in the region - a "vacuum into which NATO finds itself irresistibly drawn".¹²

Secondly, NATO is the organ which ensures the American commitment to European security. It is instructive to note that only peripheral members of the Alliance (France, Spain and Portugal), have even questioned the value of NATO and the American commitment.¹³ Even East-Central European leaders are adamant that that situation remain intact, so much so that all states in the region, including Russia, have requested membership in the Alliance.¹⁴

Third, NATO provides a framework of stability. Its integrated military structure and collective defence planning arrangements, in unison with the peacetime national command and control, are instructive for any future 'peace-making' initiatives.¹⁵ As well, the sixteen member-states of NATO view the organization as providing a convenient and effective framework within which they can meet, consult and co-ordinate policies in diverse fields, such as arms control - a valuable tool in co-ordinating a response to the arms proliferation from the former USSR.¹⁶

Finally, time and time again, NATO has facilitated the military operations of its members in 'out of theatre' conflicts, such as the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, the 1982 Falklands War, and the 1991 Persian Gulf War, and could do so again, in response to escalating conflicts in the Balkans.¹⁷

For these reasons, it is generally accepted that NATO will continue to play a role in preserving stability and security in Europe. In this regard, it is supported even by the former member-states of the Warsaw Pact who, "far from demanding the dissolution of NATO, actively sought membership".¹⁸

At present, then, NATO faces a variety of new security challenges. Perhaps the most threatening menace involves aforementioned ethnic violence and political instability in East-Central Europe. NATO's response to conflict in Yugoslavia was virtually non-existent as Western powers preferred to endorse the political and diplomatic efforts of the U.N., the E.C., and the CSCE. Originally, a NATO response was not even a serious option. Since NATO was committed specifically to the defence of its members' territory, it was difficult to see any role for the Alliance in a conflict confined to Yugoslavia.²⁰ With the continuation of the conflict and its potential to spread to Kosovo and Macedonia, however, NATO action has been proposed. Its main role could be strictly enforcing the 'no-fly zone' to prevent the spread of war, or air strikes against 'belligerent' parties.²¹ This course of action has been lent validity by American hints of use of force against Bosnian Serbs within a NATO framework.²² Caution is being exercised over the use of force, however, since Western governments fear NATO action could provoke Serb attacks on U.N. peacekeepers. It is nevertheless clear that NATO is the one organization which possesses a potent military capability which could effectively react to such security challenges.²³

The demise of the USSR it seems, has not terminated NATO's concerns in that region either, as a number of local conflicts as well as the threat of a 'resurgent Russia' are correctly deemed Western security threats.²⁴ Although it has been requested, it is not likely that NATO will

welcome new members from the region or become embroiled in the conflicts. The situation(s) are too far removed from the Western focal point of the Alliance. Since most specialists in NATO feel that these are the threats that will most affect Western security in the near future, some have suggested that NATO expand eastward, with membership open, theoretically, to all CSCE members that desire it, providing they meet the criteria of stable democracy and are able to accept the obligations of membership.²⁵ In this way NATO could evolve into the defence component of the CSCE as a true, collective security organization for 'greater Europe', as well as its more historic 'mutual defense' role for the region.²⁶ NATO would then provide an even better architecture than at present for joint American-Russian discussions on the handling of formerly Soviet weaponry.²⁷

Although NATO has stopped short of giving explicit guarantees to come to the assistance of the formerly communist states if they are attacked, Manfred Wörner has noted that this region is of "particular concern" to NATO leaders. The member-states are aware that the "immediate threats" to Western security will emanate primarily from instability in the formerly Soviet world, not from Russian expansion.²⁸ In recognition of that fact, NATO has offered a form of 'associate status' via the new North Atlantic Co-operation Council (NACC) as a confidence and security-building measure, to all the former Soviet republics and members of the Warsaw Pact. NACC is meant to provide an institutional framework for co-operation between NATO and its former adversaries, without fully integrating these states into the Alliance structure.²⁹

Although NATO will continue to play a role in preserving European security, it will not occupy the central position it has since 1949. The 'altered state' of the international system has 'allowed for' a more truly European voice to partake in European defence matters. This may suggest somewhat of a contradiction - NATO is still capable of performing several roles, but it is doomed to decline in importance anyway. NATO is 'doomed to decline' because it represents the pre-eminent institution by which American influence was maintained in Europe and thus, it stands

as an obstacle to the E.C.'s entry on the global scene. NATO will attempt to take on new functions (as it has done) to adapt to the new Europe but when it acts (if it does), it will be via CSCE or UN requests.³⁰ Thus, the CSCE or the UN may define the mandate for peace-keeping or peace-making operations, such as the forceful implementation of the 'no-fly zone' in Yugoslavia and NATO will act.³¹ The speed and nature of its decline will depend perhaps, upon the evolution of a parallel institution within the European Community. It is likely that NATO will remain as more of a political consultation body with influential military input, representing the particular interests of its members within a more all-encompassing body. If the Alliance is to take resolute action in deterring a widening of the Yugoslav conflict, this is likely to be its last 'active' hurrah. With the growing diversity within its ranks, it is not likely that NATO, as it now stands, will often possess the political resolve to take collective action in the international arena.

THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

In his 1984 proposals for a "common European home", Jacques Delors proposed to rebuild the EC around a common European defense policy and security system.³² This idea, which gained momentum, but has never been fully accepted in Europe, was to revolve, in part, around the Western European Union, an organization little-known outside the capitals of Europe.

The WEU was formed on October 23, 1954 by NATO leaders.³³ It was charged with controlling Germany's armed forces, as the FRG was being admitted into NATO. The WEU was a spin-off of an earlier, pre-NATO, agreement, known as the Brussels' Treaty Organization, which had been formed as a collective security alliance against Germany.³⁴ It modified its predecessor by admitting Germany and Italy, but more importantly, it created the Agency for the Control of Armaments. The purpose of the agency was to assure that all member states did not violate the number of troops allotted to them by the organization, nor the types and amounts of weapons. In

addition, the WEU stipulated that, within its ranks, all troops of member-states of NATO stationed on the European continent would be directly under NATO command.³⁵

The WEU never turned out to be as essential as its initiators intended, however. West Germany's rearmament proceeded slowly and by the time its military approached the ceilings set by the WEU it was already a solid partner in NATO and the European Community. Thus, the role of the WEU's Control of Armaments (ACA) was reduced, at its 1984 meeting, to monitoring and controlling atomic, biological and chemical weapons and removed all quantitative controls on conventional weapons.³⁶

Since the 1984 meeting, the WEU has played a different role. It has become a forum in which European powers discuss and co-ordinate their security concerns outside of the European theatre. It was the WEU that played host to the debates on the co-ordination of European naval operations in the Persian Gulf, both during the Iran-Iraq War and during the Gulf crisis, following Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, and the subsequent Allied action.³⁷ Many specialists feel that the WEU has been on the periphery of the decision-making process, but it has served to bring together the solely European security concerns. Also, the WEU has served as an institution capable of tacitly making the point that Europeans have security interests abroad (especially in the Middle East) that are not fully congruent with those of the United States.³⁸

So much for the history of the WEU. What can it offer to the future of European security? Is it an effective model for a European security organization? Due to the fact that the WEU is the least known of the wide array of European security organizations to survive the Cold War, it is surprising to many that the institution would require remarkably few changes to resemble the charter of a new European security regime. Originally endowed with sweeping powers (which it has never used) to curtail any unauthorized rearmament by the Federal Republic, the WEU controls the composition and deployment of the military forces of all its member states. Unlike NATO, then, the WEU has the authority to carry out inspections on any of its member-states. In

an era when proliferation of nuclear and chemical/biological weapons is of increasing concern in security relations, President Ronald Reagan commented that it is important to "trust but verify".³⁹ The WEU would allow its member-states to do just that.

Along with arms control, the WEU was imbued with another function, that of collective security.⁴⁰ On this issue, the WEU "mandates very far-reaching commitments" and "permits no wobbling".⁴¹ If any signatory state "should be the object of an armed attack in Europe", the others "will ... afford the party so attacked, all the military and other aid and assistance in their power".⁴² It should be noted that, unlike the articles of NATO, the provisions of the WEU allow no room for 'national discretion'. There is no room for abdication of responsibility - actions in the WEU require only weighted majorities, not unanimity.⁴³

Indeed, to some the architecture of the WEU looks impressive, as a framework for future European security, but it too has its defects. Although the provisions of the WEU are impressively obligatory, they are also, as yet, only declaratory. A future security crisis involving a member state of the WEU may illustrate that the unproved declarations are not so fervent. The situation in Yugoslavia has illustrated the ineffectiveness of the EC and the WEU in meeting the security challenges of today.⁴⁴

Since the outset of war in Yugoslavia, the EC has taken a keen interest in ending the conflict. Its efforts, however, have remained only political and diplomatic and therefore have not, as yet, entailed a major role for the WEU. Even in this regard, EC efforts have been fairly ineffective. Since September 1991, the EC has led the European Community Conference on Peace in Yugoslavia, chaired by Lord Carrington.⁴⁵ The mandate of the EC initiatives revolved around three conditions:

- 1) That there should be a genuine cease fire
- 2) That none of the six republics be recognized as independent and sovereign states, except as part of an overall settlement, agreeable to all six republics

- 3) That there should be no change of boundaries, except by peaceful means and by agreement ⁴⁶

In August, 1993, there has yet to be a lasting cease fire in Bosnia-Herzegovina, four of the six republics are widely regarded as sovereign states and, as for border alterations, the Serbian military commander in Bosnia, General Momir Talic, assures us that, "the war is over and Bosnia has lost".⁴⁷ The war now also threatens to spread to Kosovo and Macedonia. The EC, it seems, has been unable to foster positive change in the Balkans.⁴⁸ This summary offers a brief overview of the record of the EC and its WEU on the Balkan crisis.

From the outset, the prospect of recognition had been the one real instrument to keep the parties engaged in the negotiating process. Any proposal to solve the situation, however, was not pleasing to Serbia.⁴⁹ In January, 1992 after the failure of the Peace Conference, the EC, under German pressure, invited the Yugoslav republics to apply for recognition, even though a settlement had not been achieved.⁵⁰ The original concept of the EC Conference was undermined; once independence was recognized, the EC lost all leverage. Since then, and the subsequent recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina on April 7, 1992, the main aim of the Conference "was to see a quick and equitable division of the assets ... of the former Yugoslavia".⁵¹

Throughout the summer of 1992, Lord Carrington's conference, and the individual EC governments, continually attempted to produce conclusive talks between the three rival factions within embattled Bosnia-Herzegovina. Regardless of their efforts, it has proven impossible to procure a consensus between Alija Izetbegovic, the President of the Muslim Party of Democratic Action; Radovan Karadzic, head of the Serbian Democratic Party, and Milenko Brkic of the Croatian Democratic Commission.⁵² Even the individual members of the EC cannot come to a consensus on a desired outcome in these talks, with France originally favouring the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina into ethnic partitions, while London and Berlin along with Washington originally refused to endorse such a settlement.⁵³

Indeed, throughout the summer of 1992, the EC and its individual members showed "signs of fatigue", as round after round of talks in Brussels failed to have a lasting effect.⁵⁴ To this end, Portugal's foreign minister warned that the EC "should seriously reconsider the usefulness of its future mediating effects".⁵⁵ The one strong action taken by the EC Council of Ministers was the economic sanctions imposed on Serbia and Montenegro on May 30th, 1992. Instead of issuing a strong united front however, the twelve decided not to freeze Yugoslav assets abroad and left it to the UN Security Council to decide if an oil embargo should be put into effect.⁵⁶ Regardless, the sanctions put into effect remained difficult to enforce. Only in mid-November did the Western powers resolve to impose the sanctions and administer them effectively.⁵⁷

In early 1993, the EC became involved in what was considered to be the final major effort to find a diplomatic solution to the Yugoslavian quagmire.⁵⁸ The Geneva Convention, which began in October, was a joint effort with the U.N., chaired by Lord Owen of the EC, and Cyrus Vance of the UN.⁵⁹ The convention attempted to address the differences between the three warring factions in Bosnia, through an ethnic division. The Bosnian delegation, however, originally refused to endorse a plan that would have rewarded Serbia for its successes on the battlefield.⁶⁰

The EC sponsored Geneva plan would have divided Bosnia into ten provinces, three each for the Muslim, Croat and Serb populations, with the tenth being a demilitarized, jointly administered area around Sarajevo, (see Map Appendix 'G'). Even if accepted by the Serbs and the Bosnians, implementation of the plan would have been difficult, to say the least, on the battlefield. It would have required a major pullback by Serb forces, and the abandonment of the war's key objective and achievement: a contiguous Serb-controlled area linking Serbia proper with Serb-controlled areas of Croatia through a crescent-shaped swath of northern Bosnia.⁶¹ The plan was finished with its rejection by a referendum held by Bosnian Serbs in May 1993. Since then the EC has receded from the diplomatic forefront, endorsing UN initiatives instead.⁶²

If the crisis in Yugoslavia is viewed in terms of a test for the EC, the jury is still out.

Obviously, the combined political, diplomatic and military might of the twelve have done little to curb Belgrade's policies. While military action, (i.e. with WEU forces), was not a consideration, even efforts to enforce sanctions took eighteen months to solidify. The EC may be an economic giant, but it remains a political 'worm' in its resolve, if not in its ability.⁶³

In short, the 'twelve' have found it most difficult to 'act out' a co-ordinated 'security policy' towards a 'hot war' in their own backyard. First, in many instances, individual member-states, such as Greece, or Germany, will view such, and future, conflict through a radically different lens, hindering any effective co-ordinate policy.⁶⁴ Second, the lengthy domino-type pattern of EC negotiated cease-fires illustrate that when the community does resolve to act as one, it has no vehicle (apart from the questionable economic sanctions) to enforce such policies.⁶⁵

This is not to say, however, that the EC has been, and will continue to be, completely ineffectual in decreasing the risks of several security concerns emanating from the 'post-communist' world. The EC is not, as yet, a security institution. Yet it does possess an abundance of economic power and political clout. It is through these mediums that the 'twelve' must integrate with the emerging states of the region, at an economic, political and cultural level, through a variety of 'carrot-and-stick' measures to ease their transformation.⁶⁶ The Community has illustrated its proficiency in this type of involvement in its 1991 extension of 'associate status' to the Visegrad states - Poland, Czechoslovakia (sic), and Hungary.⁶⁷

The key question for the EC today is whether it is capable of acting as a bulwark of democracy and 'rule of law' against the forces which now threaten both. The savage war in Yugoslavia and its potential to spread illuminate the absence of a coherent and/or timely response from Western Europe and its primary institution. This absence illustrates how far the EC

leadership has shrunk from assuming responsibility for the social and political health of the continent.

THE CSCE

The origins of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) can be traced back to the early 1950's when the USSR proposed a conference aimed at the establishment of a system of collective security in Europe. Following another such proposal at the XXIIIrd Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in April 1966, a feeling began to emerge among European states that such a conference would be beneficial and should be arranged in spite of the barriers existing between East and West. By 1971, normalizing relations allowed for a pan-European conference. At the formal invitation of the Finnish Government, on September 9th, 1972, the CSCE talks began.

The CSCE was comprised of thirty-four states, including all of Europe and the U.S. and Canada. The Conference was organized in three stages for the production of a Final Agreement. The agenda was divided into four main areas or Baskets:

Basket I: problems of security in Europe - ten basic principles and confidence-building measures.

Basket II: co-operation in the field of economics, science and technology, and the environment.

Basket III: co-operation in the humanitarian and other fields.

Basket IV: follow-up to the conference.⁶⁸

The rules of procedure provided that all countries would participate as sovereign, independent states under conditions of full equality. The conference was to be held outside the framework of military alliances and the decision-making was based on the process of consensus. The CSCE

assembled in various working bodies - the co-ordinating assembly, committees, and working groups - open to all participating countries. The chairmanship was to rotate.⁶⁹

Since this study is exploring the relevance of the CSCE to European security, we will remain primarily concerned with the contents of Basket I. In regards to security the participating states expressed their will "to improve relations among each other and to overcome the confrontation stemming from the character of their past relations".⁷⁰ They refer to the history of the European states, to the common traditions and values, but also note "the individuality and diversity of their positions and views."⁷¹ The members call for joint efforts to increase confidence, solve problems and improve co-operation, and to this end, there exists a declaration of ten principles which should guide relations between member-states.⁷²

Also, the participating states agreed that it was necessary to reduce the danger of armed conflict and the possibility of surprise attack by preventing a misinterpretation or miscalculation of military activities. Thus, they promised to give prior notification of major military manoeuvres involving more than 25,000 troops, twenty-one days in advance, and encouraged the invitation of military observers to such manoeuvres.⁷³

The CSCE process has since continued to function through meetings in Belgrade, in 1977; in Madrid, in 1980; Vienna, in 1986; and in Paris, in 1990. Until quite recently, however, the CSCE has been overshadowed in the international arena by NATO and the Warsaw Pact. It is the hope of many nations in Europe that the CSCE may gain new importance as 'the' security regime in Europe. It is the intention here to assess the suitability of the organization to serve this function.⁷⁴

In providing a forum for security negotiations in the new Europe the CSCE has several advantages. It is the only institution whose members include all the states of Europe, in addition to the U.S. and Canada. As a decision-making body, "it has the advantages of a clear mandate and unparalleled legitimacy ... since all states potentially subject to its actions and decisions are

also members".⁷⁵ As has been continually pointed out, however, the CSCE has serious drawbacks, including poorly developed and virtually untried procedures, the 'paralysing unanimity rule', and the lack of credence lent to the CSCE by the larger powers.⁷⁶

To date the CSCE has been empowered to perform three major security functions: managing and negotiating the implementation of confidence-and-security-building-measures, (CSBM's); providing a forum and umbrella for disarmament negotiations; and peacefully settling disputes.⁷⁷ In two of these functions, the CSCE has proved useful. In 1990, the CSCE oversaw the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, thus aiding the de-escalation of tensions. Until quite recently, however, it was virtually untried in its capacity for settling disputes.

At the Paris Summit, in November 1990, the CSCE sought to institutionalize its chief functions by arranging regular inter-governmental meetings, organizing a secretariat in Prague, establishing an office for Free Elections in Warsaw, and creating a Conflict Resolution Centre in Vienna.⁷⁸ So too, the CSCE has begun to detail precise mechanisms for peacefully settling disputes. As the Yugoslav crisis, and various crises among its other members in the former Soviet lands have illustrated, however, the CSCE is not as yet prepared to assume the security duties for the continent.⁷⁹ It has, however, been active on the political and democratic front. Apart from helping to establish the EC Peace Conference on Yugoslavia, the CSCE has pursued other avenues toward ending the war in Yugoslavia, as well it should. The CSCE, which remains the only all-embracing forum for European security negotiations, is at a crossroads. Given its depressed status during the Cold War era, it is a body which is supposed to be coming of age. Anxious to shed its reputation as a 'debating society', conducting fruitless diplomatic efforts, the organization is attempting to exert a greater influence through a variety of new institutions. Yugoslavia has thus put the CSCE on a "delicate and serious trial".⁸⁰

Through its Conflict Prevention Centre in Vienna the CSCE reacted strongly to the initiation of hostilities in Slovenia and Croatia and then Bosnia-Herzegovina. With the introduction of the war in Bosnia, the Conference was quick to concur with the UN, and most Western powers, that "Serbia is the real culprit in Bosnia ..., it must show respect for Bosnia-Herzegovina as an independent state, its territorial integrity and government legitimacy", while also calling for the withdrawal of Serbian troops, regular and militia.⁸¹ Never in the history of the organization had one state been the target of such bitterness. The CSCE called on the entire international community to "in the strongest terms condemn Serbia, the Serbian policy and the occupying of the Yugoslav National Army".⁸²

Once conflict began in Yugoslavia, as elsewhere, events had already overtaken the CSCE. In its capacity for settling disputes, the instruments of the CSCE proved 'lamentably weak'.⁸³ The primary vehicle for conflict resolution - The Vienna Conflict Prevention Centre - represented a modest attempt at confidence and security-building measures, but could not act as a 'collective security' organization in the settling of disputes.⁸⁴ An alternative, and more recent option - the Emergency Mechanism - was also invoked at the Prague meeting in July, 1991, but could only "appeal" to the combatants for a cease fire, and subsequently endorse EC missions and UN efforts.⁸⁵ Since then the CSCE has "receded into the background" of the Yugoslav quagmire, thus illustrating some of the organization's drawbacks.⁸⁶

Apart from stern condemnations, Yugoslavia is 'drastically and dramatically' illustrating that the CSCE is incapable of resolving such situations. In its actions too, the CSCE is "encountering great risks that could kill the Helsinki spirit which has long resisted impositions ... and ultimatums from the powers".⁸⁷ The meetings of the organization have provided for continual debate over the unanimity rule. Serbia's occupation of the 'Yugoslav' seat in June, 1991, allowed Milosevic a virtual veto over any CSCE policy aimed at his new Yugoslavia. This incident led many participants, sponsored by the U.S., to call for a policy of "consensus minus one" in the

Conference due to the illegitimacy of Serbia's membership.⁸⁸ This activity resulted in a call to oust Yugoslavia from the CSCE, due to non-recognition of truncated Yugoslavia as a continuation of the former state. These debates occurred simultaneously with the granting of observer status to Croatia and Slovenia.⁸⁹

Yet CSCE participants could not agree on the expulsion of Serbia and Montenegro. Russia, it seems, disagreed with its familiar rival, the U.S., providing the first serious crisis in the body. Russia has continually disagreed with the imposition of sanctions, and the terse treatment aimed at Serbia by the CSCE and the UN since Yeltsin, for obvious reasons, does not wish to set a precedent for foreign involvement in ethnic conflicts. At the end of June, however, Belgrade informed Helsinki that it would not be attending the CSCE Summit.⁹⁰

In its concentration on problems of security, preventing and overcoming critical situations and conflicts, the CSCE must illustrate a certain flexibility in order to integrate with other institutions in the European-Atlantic structure. It must, in the words of Bulgarian foreign minister, Stoyan Ganev, "not only be adequate to the new realities but also to form them in compliance with democratic values."⁹¹ The CSCE has not proven altogether successful in its handling of the Yugoslav debacle. Upon becoming involved, it formed an EC Peace Conference, targeted prevention of the spread and escalation of the war as its goal, and vowed to protect human rights in the embattled regions under the Sarajevo Agreement. In regards to its objectives its record has not been dazzling: the Peace Conference, in the opinion of its chairman, Lord Carrington, proved an utter failure; Bosnia-Herzegovina has almost ceased to exist, consisting of small urban pockets of conflict surrounded by Serbian and, to a lesser extent, Croatian occupation; and the CSCE had confirmed reports of ongoing 'ethnic cleansing' and the use of concentration camps in Brcko and elsewhere.⁹²

In the former USSR as well, the CSCE has proven ineffective in curbing conflict among its new members. Instead, it has refused to send more than fact-finding missions to embattled

regions. The Conference holds that it cannot become involved in areas where conflict ensues.”

In other areas however, where conflict is not ongoing, the CSCE will be able to play a positive role. As an organization which now includes all the ex-Soviet republics, and states of Eastern Europe, the CSCE represents a commitment to basic human rights and multi-party democracy, to which all member-states have theoretically subscribed.⁹⁴ Thus it provides an institutional framework within which it may be possible to pursue political co-operation on volatile issues before the shooting starts.⁹⁵ By monitoring the treatment of ethnic minorities, the nature of territorial disputes and the size and behaviour of armed forces and weapons systems, the CSCE could go a long way in averting future conflict. At some point, this may translate into an effective pan-European security organization, charged with the responsibilities of conflict aversion and/or management via NATO or WEU troops.⁹⁶ Today however, when conflicts, perceived as internal, continue to pose difficult problems for international organizations, this is not the case.⁹⁷

In a sense, Yugoslavia has provided the first 'guinea pig' for new institutions such as the CSCE. It is the case-study for the testing of the crisis mechanism of the organization. The case-study has demonstrated that not only economic and political weight will matter in today's Europe. Political resolve and military 'peace-making' capability will also have a role to play. Far from delivering decisive international responses to conflict then, the CSCE will need much improvement if it intends to carve a competent and useful niche in the European security architecture and not become a victim of the new world order.⁹⁸

THE COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES

One year after its creation by Russia, Byelorussia and the Ukraine, in December, 1991, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) remains an amorphous body. The first year of the Commonwealth, (composed of all former Soviet republics, except Georgia and the Baltics), witnessed a continuation of the centrifugal forces that led to the breakup of the USSR. Non-Russian member states hoped that they could strengthen their new-found independence by

establishing economic and other links with countries outside the CIS. It has become clear to them however, that for the time being at least ties with Russia remain vital. This fact has even forced the Ukraine to improve its relations with Moscow, thus deferring the demise of the CIS to a later date. Yet the Commonwealth still remains an "uneasy compromise" with a variety of issues separating the members.⁹⁹

A variety of security issues have impeded progress in the CIS. As outlined in the previous chapter the CIS is presently home to a number of serious conflicts and the largest nuclear arsenal in the world. On both counts, the CIS has illustrated its ineffectiveness in resolving disputes among its member states or protecting its signatories from outside aggression.¹⁰⁰

Although the CIS concluded a collective security pact in July, 1992, it has failed to prevent the escalation of armed conflict involving a number of its members.¹⁰¹ Armenia has attempted to invoke the pact against Azerbaijan but has been denied. Elsewhere, 'CIS peacekeepers', (virtually Russian in composition), have been deployed, ostensibly to quell conflict, in the Moldovan Dniestr republic and South Ossetia. It is generally felt, however, that the idea of the CIS neutral mediation in inter-ethnic conflict is impossible, given the politicization and Russification of the 'peace-makers'.¹⁰² The deployed troops have only increased the level of the conflict in their attempts to protect ethnic Russians. It has thus been openly asserted that CIS 'peacekeeping' is more akin to Russian "imperialism".¹⁰³

Disagreement over the status of the formerly Soviet nuclear arsenal has also plagued the CIS. With Byelorussia and Kazakhstan foregoing any nuclear ambitions, the problem has evolved into a bilateral dispute between Russia and the Ukraine with very little institutional participation. To a large extent, the dispute over nuclear weaponry and potential proliferation has been overseen by the U.S. which is anxious to see only one nuclear successor to the USSR.¹⁰⁴ To this extent the Bush administration obtained agreements from all parties signalling Russia as the only nuclear state. Also, the U.S. has appropriated \$400 million to facilitate the elimination of warheads, and

has begun developing two international Centres for Science and Technology, in Moscow and Kiev, for employing ex-Soviet nuclear scientists previously involved in arms development. Since these developments, the CSCE has adopted a Declaration on Non-Proliferation and Arms Transfers to include such matters into CSCE deliberations.¹⁰⁵

The CIS thus seems to have accomplished very little in tackling the tough security challenges within its borders. Given its present state, it is not altogether likely that it ever will. The Commonwealth still has no charter and no mechanisms to ensure that agreements reached by its member states are observed. Russian - Ukrainian relations will provide the axis on which the CIS will turn and a definitive improvement of relations there is not in the offing. As a result, the CIS will probably remain a 'toothless' structure, unable to effectively mediate its plethora of conflicts or nuclear quagmire, without a great deal of help from the West.

THE UNITED NATIONS

The United Nations became instantly involved in the situation in Yugoslavia as it evolved in the spring of 1991. Secretary-General Butros-Butros Ghali constantly stressed that the republics should exercise caution in their approach to independence.¹⁰⁶ With the advent of war, however, the UN took the usual stance of sending observers to the affected area and the observers confirmed that the ethnic tensions posed a significant threat to all of Yugoslavia. It was in response to requests for peacekeeping forces from the Croatian Foreign Minister, Zvonimir Separovic in late 1991, that the UN began to move.¹⁰⁷ In October, it dispatched UN envoy Cyrus Vance to oversee settlement negotiations between Serbia, Slovenia and Croatia. The war in Yugoslavia confirmed, however, that a 'peacekeeping process' can only be initiated with the agreement of both parties. It was only with Slobodan Milosevic's consent that the UN began to increase its 'observer forces' in the region, until peacekeepers arrived to maintain a demilitarization zone in Krajina and East/West Slavonia to 'keep' the peace, in December 1991.¹⁰⁸

While still placed in Serb-dominated areas of Croatia, the UN commanders, like the EC, pinpointed Bosnia-Herzegovina as the greatest potential source of large-scale ethnic conflict.¹⁰⁹

But the UN was not in Croatia, or elsewhere, to 'make peace'. A UN official asserted that the "role will be to inform of hostilities so that we can be sure that cessation of hostilities is respected".¹¹⁰ Thus, the 'blue helmets' were, and are, only "observers of peace". The problem in Yugoslavia, however, is that, by and large, there has been no peace to observe. This has also been the case in Bosnia-Herzegovina where the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) has repeatedly been sidelined, while action on the battlefield continues. The UNPROFOR itself "acknowledges its ineffectiveness in disarming Serbian militia".¹¹¹

It is a significant fact, however, that the Yugoslavs opted for the UN as the only international body "fit to supply a peacekeeping force".¹¹² This fact obviates the perceived inadequacies of regional organizations such as the CSCE and the EC. It should be mentioned, however, that the combatants in Yugoslavia did not choose the UN merely for its international stature and competence. It has been alleged that the Yugoslav nations reached out to the UN, and its main representative, Cyrus Vance, in an attempt to garner American support.¹¹³ For whatever reason though, the choice of the UN to mediate and observe in the first major European war in decades, is significant. Obviously, the various regional organizations were perceived to be 'too close' to the conflict, or would be more likely to take sides.¹¹⁴

UN involvement in Yugoslavia has vividly illustrated a number of realities. First - that the UN is ready to become engaged, at short notice, in an area "ethnically so complex and politically so fragile".¹¹⁵ Second - that the UN, as it stands, is not prepared to evolve into a collective security organization for a 'new world order'.¹¹⁶

Despite the much-vaunted, UN sanctioned, collective security action in the Persian Gulf, the UN is unlikely to play such a role in Europe or the former Soviet lands. If it does act, it will merely be lending official sanction to a primarily American response, supported by other Security

Council members. Alone, the UN does not possess the will or the capability to 'make peace'.¹¹⁷ It is important to understand however, that it is not ineptitude on the part of the UN that has allowed for the continuation of the war in Yugoslavia. The bloodshed in Yugoslavia, as elsewhere, simply reveals that the international community does not have the security mechanism that would be required to control civil violence. The available apparatus of diplomatic mediation, backed by threats, or actual imposition of economic sanctions, or even by threatened military intervention, requires a corresponding political and military structure to achieve its goals, such as that found in certain nation-states. Thus, the UN's more brazen attempts at 'peacekeeping' (Korea, Kuwait, Somalia) have not been truly UN. Although excellent in election monitoring, civil policing, and refugee resettlement, (as in Angola, Namibia, and Cambodia), the UN is not ready to offer a collective security guarantee for a variety of reasons.

First, it must be remembered that the UN is not a collective security organization specific to Europe, thus European powers are hesitant to place all of the security decision-making power in the hands of the UN.¹¹⁸

The other problem with the UN is its membership. Since most nations are represented in the General Assembly, there is no common, or collective view of a given situation. Just as the current Security Council does not enjoy the "minimum of political solidarity and moral community" necessary to make it effective on highly politicized issues, neither does the General Assembly.¹¹⁹ Like the United States, Britain, France and Russia, who cannot come to terms with China on any issue, certain coalitions within the UN, (such as the member-states of NATO) are inclined to put their faith in other bodies, such as NATO, for guarantees of collective security or defence.¹²⁰

So too, there exist membership problems in the UN at the highest level. While Russia has occupied the seat left vacant by the USSR, its status as a Great Power, militarily or economically, is open to doubt.¹²¹ It is mind boggling to some that Moscow assume a seat among the power-

brokers, when Germany and Japan, new and powerful 'poles' in the system, are, as yet, excluded. There also exist struggles over whether or not a united Europe will obtain a seat, (one that will supersede those of Britain and France), and whether regional powers such as Brazil should obtain permanent status.¹²² Thus, the "failure to adjust Security Council representation, to reflect changing global realities, threatens to undermine the organization's legitimacy".¹²³

Another problem with the UN is the lack of support lent to it by the worlds only remaining superpower - the United States.¹²⁴ In discussing the ramifications of the "new world order" George Bush, like his predecessor, gave no indication that he considered the United Nations the "centrepiece of that order".¹²⁵ This is a problem since, as UN diplomats have testified, "unless the U.S. is actively involved in it, nothing much that is real happens here".¹²⁶ The Gulf War attests to the power of the U.S. in the UN, not to the UN itself.¹²⁷ This situation is again making itself evident, as the West, led by the U.S. and NATO, have begun to warn that they may respond to increased Serbian aggression. Again, as in Korea, Kuwait and Somalia, the American Government has indicated that it would consider taking joint action against Serbia but only if 'sanctioned' by the UN.¹²⁸

In early 1993, the UN in collusion with the EC, was attempting to carve a settlement out of the Bosnian quagmire. The plan to divide Bosnia into ten provinces had, until May 1993, been paid lip service by all parties involved but, admittedly, would have been very difficult to put into effect. These discussions were undermined, however, by renewed fighting between Croatia and Serbia. Defying international pressure and UN peacekeepers, Croatian forces broke a twelve-month UN brokered peace, invading the Serb-held enclave of Krajina. Serb forces raided UN arms depots to respond to the incursion. Surveying their successes on the battlefield, Bosnian Serbs rejected the UN peace plan, signalling a reversal of any advances made by the UN, and leaving its ground-forces scrambling to maintain 'safe-havens' for the victims.¹²⁹

This is not to belittle the role of the UN in Yugoslavia; it is simply meant to illustrate that the UN, through its political edicts and peacekeeping role, will not bring a cessation to hostilities in Yugoslavia or ensure that those hostilities do not spread. The UN, and its peacekeeping corps, have served other purposes, however. The UN High Command for Refugees (UNHCR) has succeeded in opening and maintaining routes out of embattled areas for certain refugee groups but even this ability has ground to a halt in the face of Serbian resistance.¹³⁰

The UN, and its Security Council, also declared economic sanctions against Serbia. The results are questionable, due to the, until very recent, lackadaisical enforcement of that embargo. Also, as economists have pointed out, "the more primitive the economy, the more impervious the country is to boycotts".¹³¹ The less than whole-hearted resolve is a direct result of the lack of cohesion in the Security Council where China, Russia and Greece have moderated efforts to penalize Serbia.¹³² The economic sanctions, while hampering the Yugoslav economy, do not appear to have decreased its ability to carry on the war.¹³³

The UN has illustrated, in Yugoslavia, and in its responses to conflicts in the former USSR, that it cannot ensure, make, or even 'keep' peace in the 'new world order'. If indeed, it were to meet with success in these areas, it would be a result of individual actors, not of the UN itself. The UN will serve a purpose in the new order, however. In the emerging nation-states, the UN will be useful in nation-building functions, such as election monitoring, civil policing, and refugee settlement; but it is as yet unprepared to decisively moderate international conflict or offer security guarantees.

CONCLUSIONS

This study was not meant to provide an absolute indictment of all institutions involved in European security maintenance. The 'new world order' of the post-Soviet world, far from ushering in an era in which "nations settle disputes through co-operation, not confrontation", has

provided a plethora of complex security issues that the international community is, as yet, incapable of resolving, especially when such conflicts have devolved into states of civil or international war.¹³⁴ Indeed, when the adversaries maintain their will to fight, the much-vaunted multilateral responses have had little effect. In the face of heavy sanctions and repeated condemnations, doled out by the multilateral security institutions, fighting in Yugoslavia, as elsewhere, has not ceased. Instead, it threatens to broaden in scope, setting unsettling precedents for the numerous other potential security risks in the post-communist world.¹³⁵

It is hoped that this Chapter illustrated that the philosophy behind the new, liberal, interdependent world order is unsuited to the security realities of today. In a sense, the multilateral institutional response to security risks, (real and potential), in the new Europe illustrate that the 'new world order' has not yet arrived. Thus far, the international community, via the UN, the EC, the CSCE, or NATO, does not possess an effective security mechanism to enforce, or maintain that order in the civil disorder that is occurring today in parts of the formerly Soviet world. The present apparatus available to the international community has, at times, exerted diplomatic pressure, imposed economic sanctions, or even threatened military intervention, but these steps have not had an altogether constructive effect.¹³⁶ Even diplomatic consensus and agreements on sanctions were very difficult to arrive at, and have never been applied effectively. Military power, contrary to popular opinion, continues to 'count for something' in international relations and the united actions of the multilateral security architecture have done little to curb its potential for destruction.¹³⁷

For the most part, security institutions have utilized peacekeeping, as the method to protect human rights and counter violations of international borders. Peacekeeping, the CSCE and UN feel, must be based on the agreement of all involved parties. But when all parties agree, there is precious little need for peacekeeping. It is when disagreement leads to sustained, destructive military conflict that action is needed. But in these instances, the 'peacekeepers' withdraw, citing

military conflict as incompatible with their role. International security institutions and the nations of which they are composed are, as yet, ill-prepared to take effective action in an alien war. This is realism. It is precisely the kind of realism that the world can use to dispel some of the myths about the post-Cold War world. The chief myth is that the world can now embed its "collective security" in the existing multilateral security architecture.

The dream of the 'new world order' in 1993, as it was Woodrow Wilson's dream in 1919, and that of the UN architects in 1945, is 'collective security' - a multilateral system aimed at all un-named aggressors who violate international norms.¹³⁸ This would differ from the Cold War reality, which although theoretically governed by "collective security" under the UN charter, was more practically governed by a system of "collective defense", which was aimed at a specific aggressor.¹³⁹ Collective security, it is argued, is "an old idea whose time keeps coming".¹⁴⁰ In George Bush's rhetoric, it would "provide the weak with protection against the strong, in the post-Cold War era".¹⁴¹

In order to work, however, collective security requires the co-operation of most, (or all), major states and an impartial application of common principles.¹⁴² Its achievement would signal a major change in the 'fates of nations' and 'international relations, since it would entail an alteration from the 'national to a transnational' focus on security problems.¹⁴³ Such a change would move radically away from the Realist tradition of viewing international politics as occurring only among sovereign states balancing each others' power. Since the demise of the Cold War system, this shift to a more interdependent multilateral view of security problems has become quite popular. This evolution makes more realistic the liberal conception of order resting on values and institutions, but this change is not complete.¹⁴⁴

Whereas common 'western interests' solidified organizations such as NATO for a long time, the dissolution of the Soviet threat has now allowed new differences to appear.¹⁴⁵ Questions of Croatian or Slovenian independence, the boundaries between Hungary and Romania, or the

treatment of Moslems in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the new Europe, however, are not likely to generate any unanimity of opinion between the U.S., Germany, Greece and Turkey.¹⁴⁶ In short, instead of providing Europe with a mini-version of the 'global village', interdependence and national revival have combined to produce a number of 'villages' that are still different, but more aware of those differences.¹⁴⁷

Disagreements among those involved in Europe security maintenance are still evident today. These differences will hamper any collective security venture, as many states will be prone, in following their own interests, to support different measure via their supposed 'collective' security organs.¹⁴⁸ Indeed, the failure of collective security organs to deliver in the past, fuelled the expansion of regional alliances, just as today's security risks have compelled numerous states to seek American and/or NATO support.¹⁴⁹ Indeed, the 'new' multilateral institutions have had trouble asserting their competence in the post-communist world.

Yugoslavia has made this point abundantly clear. The conflict there is exactly the kind of problem that these organizations were supposed to address - small, isolated, manageable, involving none of the 'great powers'. So too, the escalating conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, among others, has not attracted an overwhelming interest by the international institutions. But, as Lord Carrington has asserted, "It is very difficult to act while they go on fighting".¹⁵⁰ This is the problem! The UN, the EC, and the CSCE are virtually powerless in the face of actual conflict. They serve a purpose in conflict aversion, as yet, in a diplomatic capacity only - before conflict has begun or after it has been ended.

The difficulty, in a variety of present conflicts, lies in making a peace, not in 'keeping or observing' peace. The European security architecture, if it is ever to be effective, must be endowed with the ability to make peace via effective means to stop conflict. These steps would only be taken if multilateral conflict aversion initiatives have failed. It would appear, however, that for the foreseeable future, this ability to convince aggressive states to forego military

incursions is often beyond the power of the various institutions. These institutions do not possess the political resolve or, (for the most part), the military capability and preparedness to take decisive action against such conflicts. First, they have great difficulty agreeing on which policies to pursue, due to the divergent interests of their member-states, and therefore they do not possess the coherent and precise interests that individual states or small alliances do.¹⁵¹ Unlike Iraq's grab for oil-rich Kuwait, Serbia's depredations against fellow 'Yugoslavs', or Georgia's treatment of South Ossetians, do not, as yet, strike a consensus among European states, nor do they directly threaten the strategic interests of the Western powers enough to justify the risks of military intervention. These differences are most evident when military options are considered. Military intervention, many believe, would be likely to land outside powers in a Vietnam-style, or Afghanistan-style quagmire, costing heavy casualties and huge economic costs for questionable gains. True, there may be universal outrage at the human carnage, but it seems multilateral institutions do not possess the solidarity, resolution, or military capability to take these actions in defence of human rights or liberal-democratic values.¹⁵²

The wars in Yugoslavia, and elsewhere, will, most likely, continue until the belligerents have achieved their goal or until individual powerful states, or coalitions thereof, decide to take resolute action because it is in their national interest(s), albeit, perhaps, in operations 'sanctioned' by the UN.¹⁵³ Unlike multilateral institutions, individual states possess clear and common goals and will act if these interests are directly threatened, but may 'shy away' from being drawn into 'collective security' actions, simply for that purpose and not for any national gain.¹⁵⁴ In Europe today, multilateral 'collective security' organizations are not prepared to maintain stability at any cost. To a large extent, 'peace-making' power remains in the hands of the 'great powers,' or most notably, the U.S. and its allies.¹⁵⁵

Proponents of this view have asserted that, if the Persian Gulf promised a new era of collective responsibility, Yugoslavia heralds its early demise. Indeed, it does, if the Gulf War

ever truly promised a new era of collective security. To informed observers, the Gulf War was no more collective than the Korean War, also fought under the UN flag. But, as in 1950, it was not the UN 'collective' which reversed Iraq's annexation of Kuwait.¹⁵⁶ It was the U.S., supported to varying degrees by allies whose interests were dramatically threatened by a heightened role for Iraq.¹⁵⁷

The Gulf War helped create the illusion that in the post-Cold War world, collective security agencies would secure the peace. Yugoslavia, most dramatically, exposes the emptiness of that dream. When and where these institutions have attempted to end conflict, they have consistently come up short and thus, the conflicts have continued. When institutional negotiators stall or fail to produce conclusive talks, threats of Western military intervention are heard.¹⁵⁸ It has even become less important to cloak these Western, or American initiatives in the garb of the UN. Somalia has undoubtedly been an example of . American initiative, commanded by the Pentagon and performed almost entirely by Americans. It is the Americans, British and French that will play the primary role in enforcing 'no-fly zones', and stopping aggression, a step the UN rejects for the present.

Today, as always then, threats are met, and conflicts continued or halted, for the most part, by individual powers or alliances. For now, it is the U.S. that is relied on to play the role of 'Globocop', but it will only do so in response to its challenged interests or moral outrage.¹⁵⁹ The international security architecture has a role to play in the new Europe, but divisions among its membership have caused it to fail in providing effective security in even small-scale conflicts. These institutions can be very effective, however, in taking steps to remove the root causes of conflict before it is translated into an armed struggle.

POLICY PRESCRIPTIONS: CONFRONTING THE CHALLENGE

Having outlined the various forces aggravating and debilitating the 'outbreak of peace' in the new Europe and the inadequacy of the international response, it is hoped to illustrate that Europe - its powers and multilateral organizations alike - now stands at a crossroad. As Western Europe did in the early postwar era, the recently expanded Europe must try to recognize the economic and social benefits of a secure continent. Just as the postwar detoxification period allowed Western Europe to virtually discard any notion of military conflict among its member-states, so too, today's states in Eastern Europe and the former USSR can be aided in a transformation removing some of the root causes of military conflict, perhaps resulting in alternate methods of resolving territorial disputes and inter-ethnic conflict. Also, individual powers such as the United States, in unison with a variety of international organizations, must continue to play crucial roles in curtailing arms proliferation, and the risks associated with it.

Such steps will not be easy or fast in coming. The aforementioned threats to security are genuine, and in many instances, show an immediate potential for escalation. It is the intent of this chapter, however, to illustrate that certain policies can, and will, strengthen the trend toward political and economic integration if preceded by steps fostering security and the capability to maintain that security. The aim of such policies is primarily, to reduce the factors leading to the present conflict - weapons proliferation, territorial disputes, ethnic conflict and economic depravation - in an attempt to avoid unwarranted conflict. Secondly, if conflict exists, effective, cohesive and timely policies, if warranted, stand a chance of channelling the prospective developments toward peaceful solutions, again avoiding war. Third, appropriate actions by individual powers or institutions, through preparedness, can effectively maintain the capability of limiting and/or isolating conflict before it devolves into a major security risk.

Individual states will not adopt these measures or follow through on them merely to aid a foreign people with problems quite alien to their own. Indeed, in the recessive 1990's, citizens

have understandably tended to concentrate on their own problems. The election of Bill Clinton, on November 3, 1992, was a clear sign to the American government that Americans want to concentrate on American problems.¹ But, as Bill Clinton acknowledged during the campaign, Americans, and Europeans alike, can afford to do so only to the extent that the rest of the world remains stable.² It is common knowledge in Berlin and Washington, that the more successful the states of Eastern Europe and the former USSR are at avoiding or ending conflict and transforming into free-market democracies, the more time and money Clinton and Kohl can devote to domestic concerns.³ Ensuring a stable and potentially prosperous former Soviet bloc is, therefore, of vital interest to the Western powers and their multilateral organizations. These newly formed states are home to millions of soldiers, disgruntled citizens, a plethora of nuclear and conventional military gadgetry, and the potential to flood Central Europe with hundreds of thousands of refugees.⁴ Conversely, these states promise to become large willing markets for Western goods and staunch political partners, if efforts to reform and avoid conflict, materialize.

The collapse of the Soviet Empire has, on the surface at least, done much to enhance the security of the West. As we have established however, while Western security is no longer threatened by the prospect of Soviet hegemony over Eurasia, the post-communist world has bequeathed an order where Europe is affected by a rash of territorial and ethnic disputes, and the threatened proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, in a region where such malaises are aggravated by economic deprivation. These occurrences and the international condition in which they occur, provide the premise for a serious look at European security maintenance. At present, in the 'new Europe', a conglomeration of these negativities have produced, or presently threaten to produce, conflict. The reaction of the international community to these problems obviates the need for some new ideas.

If is the intent of this chapter to proffer certain 'prescriptions' that the West should follow in 'managing' security problems in Europe. Such actions will most likely be multilateral and

unilateral in their steps to prevent conflict, but it is doubtful that these measures will be effective once conflict ensues.⁵ While we have established that power, to a large extent, still rests in the hands of individual 'powerful' states, this is changing. As Joseph S. Nye Jr. asserts, the 1990's are viewing a shift in global concerns, from the "national to the transnational".⁶ Even though the institutional response to conflict, such as that in the Balkans, has been abysmal, these organizations do have a role to play. This role begins long before conflict ensues, and it consists of multilateral co-operation in eradicating the factors and conditions that will lead to war. For the present, however, it is doubtful that the efforts of international organizations will respond effectively once conflict ensues - such measures would require a new or very different security architecture than Europe possesses. Hence, in the face of real conflict post-Cold War optimists have, perhaps, placed too much faith in multilateral security architectures. To a large extent, power, especially military power, still resides, as Realists believe, in the hands of individual states, who have not yet decided to relinquish that position for membership in international security organizations. They will act when their interests are sufficiently threatened, unilaterally, collectively, or under the guise of international organizations. This retention of power and decision-making, however, should not preclude their participation in international/multilateral or institutional efforts to ease the precarious security situation in the post-Soviet world.⁷

First, European leaders must conclude a 'general settlement', putting an end to 'Cold War' thinking, and enshrining the rights of new nation-states, and their respective minorities, in the context of the new Europe. Such a settlement can begin to lay the groundwork for resolving complicated disputes. Next, the involved parties must come to an agreement on how to minimize the negative effects of hyper-nationalism, and the militarism it spawns. A connected issue, of course, is the economic and political 'rebuilding' which must take place in the former Soviet empire. A nation that is economically satisfied and feels itself a participant in a legitimate system is not likely to attempt to overthrow that system.

The West should attempt to establish standards of conduct dealing with the domestic and foreign policies of the emerging nation-states of the post-Soviet world. The accepted behaviour could establish a 'benign security environment' for the region which would alleviate many of the security dilemmas.⁸ Also, Western states should reward adherence to these rules via a 'carrot-and-stick' approach.

Yet, even in attempting to channel potentially volatile issues through peaceful means, Western security actors must retain the capability of ensuring stability in the region should it seriously challenge Western security. In this regard an American commitment is a definite necessity to Europe. The U.S., being the only remaining 'superpower', possesses unmatched military potential and thus, can diminish the threat of conflict in Europe. So too, the American government, through its expertise in arms control negotiation and verification, is a desired element in the new multipolar Europe. Thus, the West must act individually and multilaterally to foster security in the new Europe.

A GENERAL SETTLEMENT

With the dramatic changes in the distribution of power in Europe, and in the international system as a whole, the 'powers that be' must act early to agree on the rights and responsibilities of all actors in the new order. Yugoslavia is the end result of a region in transition where anarchy, in its rawest form, has become the order of the day.⁹ Like Yugoslavia, Eastern Europe and the territory comprised by the Commonwealth of Independent States, (CIS), has acted and will continue to act, as a magnet for outside interference, and a possible wellspring of general conflict, unless the present Western security powers and Russia, and/or the CIS, come to a prompt agreement on the rights of all powers in the East. This need is illustrated by the present and potential conflicts in Eastern Europe and the former USSR over borders and between ethnic groups, which have been supported, and/or encouraged by regional powers, such as Turkey and Iran.¹⁰ Without prior understandings, these heretofore uninvolved powers might be drawn into

these conflicts, perhaps in response to pleas from states, or ethnic groups within the region, who are exerting themselves to find outside allies.¹¹

These dangers could be reduced by a comprehensive post-Cold War settlement forming a vital component of any future European security settlement. Any such agreement must attempt to draw a balance between the security interests of the involved states and the human rights of the concerned populations. The main issues to be settled include the status of the emerging democracies of Eastern Europe, and likewise, the status of the former republics of the USSR. A third issue, of course, could be the status of the unified Federal Republic of Germany, but instead of providing a third difficulty, the Bonn government has put forth an example of the way in which these problems may be handled.

DIPLOMACY

Although not formally a peace treaty, the Four-Plus-Two Agreement solved the post-war dilemma of reconciling Germany's reunification with the requirements of European security.¹² Bringing together the four security guarantors in Europe - the U.S., the U.S.S.R., Britain and France - with the two concerned parties - Germany and Poland - the Agreement managed to meet the needs of all concerned parties. As well, the agreement succeeded in reinforcing European security by incorporating arms control, disarmament, and confidence-building measures. In effect, the Four-Plus-Two talks solved the problem of the German-Polish frontier, maintained German membership in NATO (although it prevents NATO forces from advancing beyond the Elbe River to enhance Eastern Europe's and Russia's sense of security), and established a nuclear-free zone in East Germany.¹³ In addition, the treaty stipulated that reunification would occur on the basis of self-determination, reaffirmed Germany's commitment to the UN Charter, and confirmed earlier German decisions to renounce the acquisition of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons.¹⁴

MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS
STANDARD REFERENCE MATERIAL 1010a
(ANSI and ISO TEST CHART No. 2)

Laying the foundation for the development of broad co-operation among all the states of Europe, this agreement could serve as a model for further settlements and co-operation in rebuilding Eastern Europe. Now that Russian and Western interests favour stability in Eastern Europe, and around Russia's southern periphery, the Great Powers could pool their resources to enhance security.¹⁵

Had such agreements been made earlier, perhaps more effective action could have been taken by the international community to prevent the outbreak of hostilities between Serbia and its neighbours, or Georgia and its ethnic neighbours in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.¹⁶ Even UN insiders and diplomats in the EC agree that their organizations can "justifiably be criticized for failing to end the fighting in Bosnia ... and are paying a heavy price for our earlier inaction".¹⁷ Such admissions should not be forgotten as multilateral institutions and concerned states alike observe the increasing chances of war in Yugoslavia spreading to Macedonia and/or Kosovo. Also, attention should be paid, and action taken, by parties concerned over rising tensions between Hungary and Slovakia, Hungary and Romania, and a number of places in the former USSR.¹⁸ If a potential aggressor is made to understand the view of the international community, its actors, and their conviction, the potential consequences may curb aggressive action.¹⁹

The Western powers should also seek an accord with Russia and the CIS on the rights of all powers in the newly independent republics. The reasoning is that the multitude of ethnic conflicts, and the international effects of the demise of the Soviet Empire, are best dampened by reaching an understanding before these crises are manifest.

The conflicts in Tajikistan, and between Armenia and Azerbaijan, clearly necessitate action from the international community. These conflicts have already drawn the attention of outside powers, such as Iran and Turkey. An increase in the influence of Islamic fundamentalist forces on the southern periphery of Russia could have dire consequences for security.²⁰

As the West and the CIS should aid in brokering peace, and/or border agreements in Eastern Europe, so should they aid in the stabilization of events in the former Soviet republics, where a plethora of disputes also threaten regional security. Several measures must be undertaken to ensure the success of any such understanding. Throughout the troubled area, the West must work to dampen hyper-nationalism and militarism, whilst simultaneously leading economic aid to foster democratic reforms and decrease tension. It will be suggested here that this can best be handled through a broad-based multilateral institution - one that would "lay out the rights and responsibilities of ethnic and religious minorities ... to head off nationalistic conflicts before they get started".²¹ These policy prescriptions will ideally form important components of any future mandate of a European security organization.

DAMPENING HYPER-NATIONALISM AND MILITARISM

The twentieth century has offered countless examples of both nationalism and militarism combining as potent causes of aggressive foreign policies.²² If we assume, as most scholars do, that mainstream Western politics are virtually devoid of these malaises, we are left to centre our attention, again, on Eastern Europe and the former Soviet republics.²³ In these areas, militaristic policies fuelled by malevolent nationalism have led to great human suffering among the Magyar population of Transylvania, all facets of the former Yugoslav population, the non-Georgian 'citizens' of Georgia, and minorities in all nations.²⁴ As yet, these malaises have resulted in 'only' limited international wars, but the situation, as it stands, can only deteriorate. In the former USSR and in various spots in East-Central Europe, the abuse of minorities who have protectors in other areas or countries is a very dangerous situation.²⁵ In the general interests of European security then, future security actors must take seriously the task of dampening the negative effects of extreme nationalistic fervour and its resultant policies. How is this to be done?

Nationalism and militarism are not easy problems to solve. It is recognized, however, that both are best contained by early action and may become increasingly uncontrollable once they are unleashed. The recent 're-election of Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic' attests to this fact.²⁶ Once in power, fervent nationalistic and militant regimes are extremely difficult to remove, thus, their aggressive policies will continue through authoritarian measures. In an attempt to remove the root causes of nationalism, some have suggested that Western agencies monitor historical education in an attempt to foster the teaching and study of 'truthful' history.²⁷ Prevention of this sort may be the best medicine, but many nations might, rightfully, refuse to comply with educational guidelines.²⁸ In addition, many scholars have suggested that nationalistic fervour is carried to its apex by disenchanted 'local intellectuals'. Thus, it can be 'uprooted' by encouraging such individuals to exit their "self-created hot-houses of nationalistic mythology", for involvement in the broader European intellectual community.²⁹ Also, the traditional nation-building functions of the UN, such as election monitoring and civil policing, will aid in keeping track of the political situations and the policies of different governments in various states.³⁰

In attempting to dampen nationality conflicts in the emerging democracies, the West should take several steps. Specifically, the Western European states, as well as the United States, should seek compliance to the protection of national minorities and individual rights. The Western states, via certain UN articles, do have the power and legitimacy to pursue such policies. Article 39 of the UN allows the Security Council to determine that any situation is a threat to peace and security. This, in turn, opens the doors to Articles 41 and 42, which permit the use of economic sanctions, severing of diplomatic relations and military force, to meet those ends.³¹ Through these measures, East European governments should be urged to accept current boundaries, following on the example of the Four-Plus-Two Agreement, and adopt further democratic reforms.³² To increase the attraction of such measures, the advantageous economic relations with the West could be made conditional on compliance with these measures. In addition, the foreknowledge that

international regimes and a number of individual states view the extreme practices of nationalistic regimes as, in the least, quite distasteful, the potential for backlash should temper the actions of these regimes. These incentives should serve as effective tools, since the concerned states are eager to draw on Western resources to rebuild their dismal economies, and are not interested in being isolated politically, economically and militarily from the West.

ECONOMIC AID

It is the feeling of the author that, failure on the part of the Western nations to assist in the stabilization and reconstruction of the Eastern economies will serve to intensify the ethnic strife in the region, with the resultant negative impact upon European security. The rebuilding of the former command economies, after forty years of economic mismanagement, will present a formidable challenge to the members of the European Community, as well as North America; this dilemma has been exacerbated by the recessions of the early 1990's.³³ Reconstruction will be a tremendous task, but it has begun. The contributions of the EC, and Germany alone, have been quite significant, but their present, and justifiable, preoccupation with the (Western) European Monetary System, (EMS) and the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, and also, in Germany's case, the rebuilding of the eastern Lander, has resulted in a decreased emphasis on aiding the East.³⁴

All Western governments agree that present leaders in the former Soviet bloc need a great deal of aid in their restructuring processes, but economic experts continue to debate on how best to extend that help. Western policies are also devoid of any widespread agreement on how much to give, knowing that any amount given will be insufficient for the colossal task at hand. To gain an inkling of the enormity of the economic morass, the FRG's attempts to reconstruct its Eastern Lander offers a helpful analogy. In the two and one half years since reunification, the German government has extended \$100 billion per annum in an attempt to integrate the sixteen million

former East Germans.³⁵ This amount has proven insufficient, even though the GDR was, perhaps, the most advanced of Communist states, and via the FRG, was able to 'plug into' a ready-made legal and commercial system. At the present rate, and with the continuation of present expenditures, the German government believes integration will take twenty years. A comparable effort to restructure the former Soviet republics would require \$1.8 trillion per annum.³⁶

For obvious reasons, the former USSR has not been receiving that amount of aid from the West. The present Western recession and fears that chaos in the former Soviet empire provide only a 'bottomless bucket' for Western aid, have tightened purse strings. Together, Europe, Japan, Canada and the U.S. have given \$81 billion, in loans and/or grants to the ten members of the CIS, since 1990.³⁷ The mismatch between the needs of the new states and the foreign resources is enormous. Western states must view aid to the East as an investment in their own future interest, however. Western dollars and humanitarian aid during the last year have provided food and medicine to disgruntled Russians, who might otherwise have wreaked havoc, with the resultant negative effects on global security and humanitarian concerns.³⁸

The problems involved in the rebuilding of Eastern Europe impose a special responsibility on the Western nations to co-operate and compete in its completion. These funds, like the Marshall Plan expenditures of 1948-1952, will not only contribute to economic reconstruction but will also help to sustain the peace and security of Europe.³⁹ On the other hand, if the reconstruction of Eastern Europe is too slow, and if the economic misery of the region is prolonged, the introduction of democracy may well prove abortive. The failure of economic and democratic reform might lead to a massive wave of immigration from the East, which in turn, would create major political and economic problems for Europe as a whole.⁴⁰

The tasks of attempting to rebuild the former Soviet republics are even more precarious due to the sheer size and devastation of their respective economies. While many of the East European economies began to utilize some form of market mechanism while still under Soviet tutelage, the

Soviet system itself remained relatively backward.⁴¹ It is likely that the governments of some of the successor states will continue to receive assistance from abroad, but in dramatically insufficient amounts. In all probability, any substantial amount of Western aid and direction will be earmarked for those nations "deemed most likely to succeed", namely Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic and perhaps, the Baltic states.⁴² If they are ever to succeed, however, the EC countries, as well as the U.S., (and perhaps, Japan), must be willing to make significantly larger contributions to the regional recovery. Recently, Western donors have looked to long-term assistance plans to aid the former command economies in building the basic institutions of market economies and learn how to run them. It is hoped that these steps together with humanitarian aid will placate the populous and allow reforms to continue, bringing these new states into the Western fold.⁴³

The post-war era has shown that Europe thrives best if an over-arching political, economic, and security system provides a basic framework for the region. The political and economic institutions of the EC might well develop into such a system for the new order, by incorporating the states of Eastern Europe, beginning perhaps with Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. Although only a partial solution, such action would aid in integrating West with East. Eventually, the aim of such an institution would be to widen its economic and security zone to include the remainder of Eastern Europe, Russia, and the other former republics.⁴⁴ It has already been discussed in the EC, that different East European countries could be granted different levels of association with the EC and integrated into its institutions at varying paces. Progress toward market reforms and full-fledged electoral democracy would be the price of further involvement and greater participation, thus reinforcing the security aspects of integration.⁴⁵

Without a doubt, the strategy of extending Western economic institutions eastward must include the European sector of the former USSR. Otherwise, the widening core of prospective prosperity would be viewed by Moscow as threatening, especially if its economy continues along

its abysmal trajectory. Such exclusion of Russia would not promote regional security and indeed, could provoke a backlash.⁴⁶

The success of constructing economies, Western-style market economics in the former Soviet empire is certainly no foregone conclusion. Even if eventually successful, the targeted states have many painful and potentially disruptive years ahead of them. Thus, an evolving security organization must continue to maintain the capability to respond to conflict in the new Europe, while simultaneously acting to prevent it. For the present, this can best be accomplished if all actors in the field of European security maintain their respective commitments and capabilities in the region, while working to overhaul the dismal economies of the former Soviet bloc.⁴⁷

WEAPONS PROLIFERATION AND ARMS CONTROL

Although nuclear weapons have performed a vital deterrent role in the 'long peace', it is no surprise that they carry with them dangers as well. If one assumes that proliferation may occur in the new multipolar 'Eurasia', the risks must be measured. If proliferation were to allow responsible liberal-democratic states to build a viable nuclear defensive deterrent, which they could protect from terroristic extremist elements, then proliferation should not be barred.⁴⁸ True, Europe, and the world, would be considerably safer from a nuclear catastrophe with 'fewer fingers on the button', but the members of the 'nuclear club', (i.e. France), would find it exceedingly difficult to explain to the German government, which has demonstrated its international responsibility, that it is not entitled to a nuclear deterrent, as is France.⁴⁹

The break-up of the USSR has vividly illustrated the dangers of maintaining a large nuclear arsenal in an unstable political environment. Following the Soviet demise, the Ukraine and Kazakhstan, both highly unstable, ranked third and fourth in nuclear capability in the world.⁵⁰ While Marshall Shaposhnikov, the Minister of Defense for the CIS, has questioned their ability to

utilize such sophisticated weaponry, the resultant proliferation illustrates the dangers of nuclear

arsenals in unstable political environments.⁵¹ This situation is made more potent when those in possession of nuclear weapons, or technology, decide to pass on, or sell that information or hardware to other, potentially hostile states in the international system. Situations such as this have already occurred in the former Soviet Union, and pose dramatic challenges to, not only European, but global security.⁵² The most prudent course is to stop the proliferation process before it gets started. The West should seek to ensure that Russia is the only nuclear successor state to the USSR and that it abides to international norms signed by its predecessor.⁵³

Generally, the West should establish standards for each of the state's armed forces and their weaponry. First, states emerging from the Soviet world, including Russia, should be required to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty on nuclear weaponry.⁵⁴ This would grant the world with the right to carry out inspections on these territories to ensure proliferation is not occurring under the guise of civilian nuclear energy programs. The new states should also be required to sign international conventions, "renouncing the right to produce, acquire or possess", chemical and/or biological weaponry.⁵⁵ To enforce such agreements, an international agency similar to the International Atomic Energy Association will have to be created.⁵⁶

In the area of conventional weapons, each East-Central European, and post-Soviet state should sign the Conventional Forces Europe, (CFE) Treaty, which would severely limit the level of conventional forces each republic can deploy and where such forces can be stationed.⁵⁷ Huge transfers of weaponry and manpower, say to the Serbian-Bosnian border, or to the Turkish-Armenian border, would require the prior knowledge of the international community. In essence then, a number of confidence- and security- building measures should be adopted by the post-Soviet world.⁵⁸ These measures, (partially incorporated in the CSCE), include advance notification of any movement of troops and weaponry to an extent that is deemed threatening, obligatory inspections by international observers to weapons sites, civil nuclear sites and training sessions, and the prohibition of various kinds of exercises deemed provocative by neighbours.⁵⁹ These

steps, taken together, and enforced by the international community and powerful states, should entail a shift away from an offensive focus in military policy, thus minimizing the proliferation of weaponry and the escalation of security dilemmas or perceived threats into full-scale conflict.⁶⁰

In the murky world of nuclear and conventional arms proliferation, it is most definitely the large powers that will play the major roles. Since the breakup of the USSR in 1991, it was primarily the American government that has secured agreements from Byelorussia, the Ukraine and Kazakhstan, that Russia would be the sole nuclear successor to the USSR.⁶¹ It is also the U.S. and Britain, sometimes within a CSCE context, that have allowed Russia the technology and indirectly, the funds, to dispose of nuclear arms.⁶² The American government has also established two centres for nuclear research in Moscow and Kiev. This initiative originated to curb the exodus of scientists and technologists to third countries viewed as potentially dangerous.

This activity between the former 'superpowers' is merely a continuation of Cold War politics. The Cold War may be over, but in the armaments field, the U.S. and Russia still reign supreme. This fact was evidenced in the first days of 1993 when George Bush and Boris Yeltsin concluded an unprecedented nuclear arms reduction pact. The second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty - START II - promises to slash the strategic arsenals of both nations by two-thirds over the next decade.⁶³ This is the type of activity needed in the post-Soviet world of chaotic arms shipments. Thus, for the time being, the U.S. will remain dominant in arms diplomacy and the leader of any multilateral initiatives via the IAEA, or any new agency.⁶⁴

ADMINISTERING BEHAVIOUR

It is very easy to discuss what policies the emerging states of East-Central Europe should undertake to enhance Western security interests. It is difficult, however, to foresee that these frail 'democracies', with dismal economic systems, will agree with Western decision-makers. Many specialists feel that the 'prescriptions' listed above are admirable in theory, but will be impossible

to implement, since these new states, so long repressed by Soviet tutelage, will not accept the obvious infringements on their sovereignty.⁶⁵ Indeed, some commentators on West-West relations assert that the West does not possess a common perception of its security risks, due to the varied interests of its primary actors, and therefore cannot act cohesively in implementing or administering change in the post-Soviet world.⁶⁶ More than anything else, however, the emerging states of the targeted region desire to rejoin 'something' they feel they were cheated out of by decades (or centuries) of Russian/Soviet rule. In most cases, this is a reaffirmation of 'being European' in the many senses of the word.⁶⁷ In cases where this doesn't apply, such as in Central Asia, states such as Kazakhstan have set their sights on at least the economic trappings of what is perceived to be Western culture. Thus, there will be a variety of ways to use a 'carrot-and-stick' approach to political, military and economic reform in the region.

The states which agree to the above stipulations on their domestic and foreign behaviour will do so in the hopes of Western benefits, for both short and long term gains. The gains achieved by adherence to Western/international norms will be of a political and economic nature. First, the state would be accepted as a legitimate actor in the international community and allowed to join (within reason) the international organizations in which it can play a role.⁶⁸ Secondly, the state's compliance with international constraints would have an impact on the amount of aid given it, as well as its chances of receiving bilateral trade or investment. For example, an individual state could be rewarded with a 'special status' (akin to most favoured nation status [MFN]) for exemplary conduct in its internal and foreign affairs.⁶⁹ As an addendum to this, states which act according to international norms and maintain their reforms, could be rewarded with inclusion in Western economic circles, such as membership in the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). Participation in such organizations would have a cumulative effect on the economic progress of certain states. Along with the increased confidence and self-importance

attached to such membership, participation would foster freer trade relations, alleviate balance-of-payments deficits, and offer financing for specialized projects.⁷⁰

Following this 'prescription' agreeable, stable states would be offered normal political and enhanced economic relations with the West based on their economic, political and military behaviour domestically, in addition to official aid. Conversely, states that behave in contrast to international norms would risk being isolated from the economic and political benefits offered by Western states, provided that the West remained united in its stance.⁷¹

In following these 'prescriptions', the main problems that new states will encounter, as we have already discussed, is fear for their security or sovereignty. Following Western directives however, would lead to the acquisition of sensitive material on potential adversaries. Within the CFE and IAEA framework, European security would become somewhat more transparent - intrusive on-site inspections, permanent observers, and restrictions on troop and weapons movements, (the norm in Western Europe), would allow all states to recognize that no one country is gaining a significant unilateral military advantage.⁷²

If the West can act cohesively in responding to potential security problems in the post-Soviet region, it can offer the emerging states very impressive incentives, (both short and long term) not to create conflict. The states which make up the West however, must realize the benefits of their multilateral action, at least, in this regard. So too, the new states of East-Central Europe and the former Soviet Union must be made to recognize the capital, technology, advice, and aid to be had from the West.

THE UNITED STATES, THE 'NEW EUROPE' AND COLLECTIVE SECURITY

For over four decades, the heavy presence of American and Soviet troops, armed with their nuclear deterrent in a tight bipolar system, acted as the main stabilizers in European security. The huge Soviet and/or CIS troop withdrawals from East-Central Europe, the Balkans, and

Russia's southern periphery will, however, also allow a large portion of American forces to withdraw.⁷³ This fact, combined with significant defense spending cuts, has resulted in a decreased American military presence on the continent.⁷⁴ Most commentators would prefer that the U.S. maintain a commitment to European security, not as "onshore organizer" but evolving towards the role of "offshore guarantor".⁷⁵

Most Europeans would prefer to see a new, more 'collective' European security architecture, in which the roles of individual states more accurately reflect the realities of the 1990's. The U.S., of course, would remain the 'star player' on the collective security team, but would not be perceived as the all-powerful state it was throughout the Cold War. The international responses to the conflict, and potential problems, discussed in this study, however, illustrate that Europe is not ready to adopt the responsibility for security concerns.

In response to any serious security threat emanating from the post-Soviet world, only America is presently prepared to respond effectively. As far as military power, political influence, global reach and economic power, America is unrivalled, leading some to proffer the notion of a 'unipolar' world.⁷⁶ In the Persian Gulf, the U.S. demonstrated what it can achieve upon mobilizing its resources, and that no other nation or institution has the political and military skills that it possesses. The international community, (in the UN), reaffirmed this fact when they asked the U.S. to play a 'special' role in Somalia, as did the Yugoslav states and all the states of East-Central Europe and the former Soviet Union, when they pandered for American (or NATO) security assurances.⁷⁷ The U.S. however, is not ready, or willing to adopt the role of 'Globocop', doling out security assurances to fragmented states and acting on all transgressions of sovereignty. The U.S. will maintain forces in Europe to protect its security interests, acting if it deems necessary, and will remain active in the handling of post-Soviet nuclear and conventional arsenals, but will recede somewhat, from its former role in the years to come.

The simple fact is that global disorder per se does not automatically indicate that American or Western security interests are at risk, or demand intervention. The new proposals for 'collective security, however, assume just that - that it is in Western interest to eliminate international disorder and instability by preventing aggression. Collective security will be very difficult to establish in Europe, via any institution, for the simple fact that regional disorder does not automatically threaten the continent, or more precisely, the U.S.⁷⁸ The end of the Cold War, its bipolar system and strategic perceptions have "terminated the potentially zero-sum nature of international relations and thereby reduced the value of stability in distant lands".⁷⁹ This is precisely why the U.S. and Europe, (which has more at stake), has been able to stop short of taking effective military action in Yugoslavia and Nagorno-Karabakh, etc. When a situation such as this has escalated to a point where the benefits of intervention outweigh the costs, they will act, but not before.⁸⁰ The Persian Gulf stands as an example of a state, the U.S., taking action, (albeit under a nominal UN framework), when its interests are threatened.⁸¹ If an incident occurs again, when American, or any state's vital, rather than peripheral interests are challenged - warranting the sacrifice of life, potentially huge expenses, and other risks inherent to foreign interventions - the U.S. will probably organize an ad hoc force, or pursue unilateral action to respond, as it has done in the past, not partake in institutional collective security actions.⁸² Setting such precedents could involve the U.S. in other conflicts where its interests are not at stake.

Collective security also faces a number of practical problems. To work, collective security requires the co-operation of most major states and an impartial application of common principles.⁸³ Today, differences among the major states, who would be obligated to form these common policies are still very real. The U.S., Germany, Russia, France, (and China, on a global scale), have very different perceptions of events in other lands and have encountered great difficulty in belittling those differences. Collective security therefore, would likely, be wholly ineffective as long as the aggressor was a major player in the security system, or a close ally of one.⁸⁴

Collective action will still occur in the 'new world order', but this action has not, and will not, entail swift multilateral responses to any, and all conflict as was proposed in the 'new world order'. Security concerns in the post-Soviet world will best be handled by multilateral attempts to alleviate the malaises which can, and have, led to conflict. In this forum, international institutions will play an important role, but most foreign security concerns, once surpassing the threshold of war, will be handled locally and regionally. Thus, conflict will be met by neighbouring states that have the most at stake. In most cases instability per se is perceived, correctly or not, to pose little danger to Western Europe and the U.S. For all the rhetoric about human rights and democratic principles peripheral stability in the 'new world order' can be contained, met by sanctions or simply ignored.

This is not to say that collective security agencies will never rise or that the international community will turn inward and ignore any and all conflict. Major powers like the U.S. however will, in the shift from the 'national to the transnational', prefer to act within more familiar environments or instruments such as NATO or ad hoc alliances.

In the end, however, the need is not for seeking out convenient enemies, resulting in more conflict, even under the guise of collective security. To stamp out security threats in 'Eurasia' the need is for a 'general settlement', followed by effective and sustained diplomacy leading to economic and political renewal in the post-Soviet world. If these measures are taken no-one can assure that conflict will never again occur as it has in 1993, but the number of such events can be reduced, thereby enhancing the security of the new Europe.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 1

1. For the breakdown of the international order prior to WWI see, "Detente and Deterrence: Anglo-German Relations, 1911 - 1914", International Security, Fall 1986 (Vol. 11, No. 2), in International Security Reader: Military Strategy and the Origins of the First World War (ed) Steven E. Miller, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Stephen Van Era, (Princeton: 1991), pp. 165-194. For the breakdown of the League of Nations see Winston Churchill, The Gathering Storm (Boston, 1948).
2. One of the main problems in deterring or preventing war is the belief that every war is so horrendous that there can never be another. Even in 1898 W.T. Stead concluded that war between great states was now impossible or suicidal. See Michael Howard, "Men Against Fire: Expectations of War in 1914", in Military Strategy and The Origins of the First World War, op. cit., pp. 3-4.
3. For the breakdown of the League of Nations see Winston Churchill, The Gathering Storm (Boston, 1948).
4. John Lewis Gaddis, op. cit., p. 2.
5. See Winston Churchill, op. cit.
6. It must be stressed here that the 'Long Peace' refers only to the aversion to conflict in Europe. There were other wars outside of the European theatre.
7. For the seminal work on Realist international relations theory see, Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics, (New York, 1979).
8. The notion of a unipolar world will be discussed below in detail.
9. Joseph S. Nye Jr., Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power. (New York, 1991), p. 26.
10. The term 'multipolarity' is questioned by some academics when applied to the present international system, since the U.S. possesses a preponderant amount of power. This issue will be addressed below.
11. See John J. Mearshimer, op. cit. For the seminal work on Realist Thought and Bipolarity see Kenneth Waltz, op. cit.
12. For an assessment of Waltz's argument see Ted Hopf, "Polarity, The Offense-Defense Balance, and War", American Political Science Review, (Vol. 85, No. 2), June 1991. Also see J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity", International Organization, (Vol. 44, No. 2), Spring 1990. See also John Lewis Gaddis, op. cit.

13. This structure comprises a constant element, anarchy, and a variable element, polarity. The fundamental, invariant structural feature, international anarchy, generally selects and socializes states to form balancing alignments in order to survive in the face of threats from aggressive competitors. However, a variable structural feature, polarity, affects the efficiency of the balancing process. See Waltz, op. cit. pp. 167-170.
14. The key works on bipolarity and multipolarity, apart from Waltz include: Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity", International Organization, (Vol. 44, No. 2), Spring 1990, pp. 137-168; Karl W. Deutsch and J. David Singer, "Multipolar Power Systems and International Stability", World Politics, (Vol. 16, No. 3), April 1964, pp. 390-406; Richard N. Rosecrance, "Bipolarity, Multipolarity, and The Future", Journal of Conflict Resolution, (Vol. 10, No. 3), September 1966, pp. 314-327; Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Stability of a Bipolar World", Daedalus, Vol. 93, No. 3, Summer 1964, pp. 881-909; Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics, op. cit.; John Lewis Gaddis, "The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International System", International Security, (Vol. 10, No. 4), Spring 1986
15. See J. Mearshimer, op. cit.
16. The 'decline' of the American power has fostered much academic debate since Paul Kennedy fostered the notion that America was presently in a state of decline. This however, is a contested issue and will be addressed in more detail below. See Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of Great Powers, (New York, 1987). Also see Joseph S. Nye Jr., Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power, (New York, 1991).
17. John Lewis Gaddis, op. cit, p. 13, Also see Deutsch and Singer, op. cit.
18. Karl Deutsch and J. David Singer, "Multipolar Power Systems and International Stability", World Politics, (Vol. 16), 1964, pp. 390-406.
19. Ibid, p. 392.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid. pp. 396-397.
22. David A. Welch, "The New Multilateralism and Evolving Security Systems", Canada Among Nations 1992 - 1993, A New World Order, (Ottawa, 1992), p. 67. See also Stephen Van Era, "Primed for Peace", International Security, (Vol. 15, No. 3), Winter 1990/91.
23. David A. Welch, p. 68.
24. These factors and considerations are treated only superficially in purely 'Realist' accounts but are the focus of a number of other studies. See Ted Hopf, op. cit. See also Christensen and Snyder op. cit. For an account, taking into consideration both theories, see also Van Era, op. cit.

25. Ibid.
26. Stephen Van Era, op. cit., p. 195.
27. Ibid. p. 195.
28. In reference to more liberal or pluralist notions of international relations, and its stated preference for multipolar configurations and the inherent interaction opportunities, Realist theory would assert that there is remarkably little historical evidence to validate that "knowing", "understanding", and "interacting" with others more will lessen the chances of war. As Kenneth Waltz has pointed out, "the fiercest civil wars and the bloodiest international ones are fought within areas populated by highly similar people whose affairs are closely knit". See Waltz, op. cit, p. 138.
29. For an account of the present integrative force in Western Europe and their result in international relations see James Laxer, Inventing Europe: The Rise of a New World Power, (Toronto, 1991).
30. Stephen Van Era, op. cit., p. 196.
31. See David A. Welch, op. cit.; John J. Mearshimer, op. cit.; and Stephen Van Era, op. cit.
32. Stephen Van Era, p. 196.
33. Kenneth Waltz, op. cit., pp. 167-170. See also John J. Mearshimer, op. cit.
34. Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity", op. cit. p. 138.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid.
37. For a thorough account of the offense-defense balance and how it pertains to conflict and the scale of that conflict, see Ted Hopf, op. cit. For an account of strategic perceptions and domestic influences see Van Era, op. cit.
38. Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, op. cit., p. 143.
39. The most obvious effect of a large number of independent actors is an increase in the number of possible pairs, or 'dyads', in the total system. Dyads, in this instance refers to the number of 'pairs' which may approach the threshold of war. The standard model for possible pairs in the system is $N(N-1 \text{ over } 2)$ where N represents the number of states. See Karl Deutsch and J. David Singer, op. cit., pp. 392-394. See also Kenneth Waltz, op. cit.
40. John J. Mearshimer, p. 158.

41. Ibid., pp. 158-159.
42. Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, op. cit., p. 140.
43. Kenneth Waltz, op. cit., p. 167.
44. Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, op. cit., p. 141. For an account of the Allies collective failure to coalesce or balance against Hitler see Winston Churchill, The Gathering Storm, (Boston, 1948).
45. Kenneth Waltz, op. cit., p. 165.
46. Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, op. cit., p. 141.
47. Austria is not a good example, since Hitler did not 'conquer' or invade his homeland; he created an Anschluss, with much public support in Austria.
48. See Ted Hopf, op. cit. for a thorough discussion of strategic perceptions, or misperceptions and their impact on the advent of war.
49. See Christensen and Snyder, op. cit., pp. 144-145.
50. Ibid., pp. 144-147.
51. It should be noted, that in both cases, these strategic perceptions turned out to be incorrect. The great 'offensive advantages' perceived by Generals such as Schlieffen and Ludendorff were nullified by the advent of trench warfare. Conversely, the defenses, which were held in much faith in 1939, were quickly crushed by new mechanized warfare, or Blitzkrieg.
52. For an account of the development of German nationalism into a malevolent force see, Gordon Craig, The Germans, (New York: 1982), pp. 31-34.
53. For an account of militarism and its effect on the decision-making processes prior to war see, Stephen Van Era, op. cit., pp. 204-206.
54. See Christensen and Snyder, op. cit., pp. 145-146.
55. There were approximately 10,000 battle deaths in the Soviet-Hungarian conflict of October - November 1956. The Greek-Turkish war in Cyprus claimed approximately 1500-5000 deaths in July - August 1974. These figures are given in Ruth Leger Sivard, World Military and Social Expenditures 1989, (Washington: 1989). Also, they are briefly outlined in Mearshimer, op. cit., p. 146.
56. The congress of Vienna of June 8, 1815 was the conference at the conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars. Through a high degree of diplomatic measures a diplomatic status quo was carved which maintained peace until the Franco-Prussian wars of 1870-71. See Charles Breunig, The age of Revolution and Reaction, (New York: 1982).

57. John J. Mearshimer, op. cit., p. 162. For an in-depth account of the alterations that occurred in the immediate post-war era, see Walter Lafeber, The origins of the Cold War 1941-1947, (New York: 1979).
58. By its acquisitions at the end of the war, the USSR became the largest power on the continent. Although the U.S. projected a more immense power, it was dispersed globally and not on the continent. See Hugh Thomas, Armed Truce, (New York: 1987). See also Vojtech Mastny, Russian Road to the Cold War, (New York, 1979).
59. Adam B. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence, Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-73, (Chicago: 1974), pp. 75-110.
60. For an analysis of the arguments against the military pursuit of hegemony, see Matthew A. Evangelista, "Stalin's Post-War Army Re-appraised", International Security, Winter 1983. (Vol. 7, No. 3), in the International Security Reader - Soviet Military Policy (ed). Sean M. Lynn-Jones, Steven E. Miller and Stephen Van Era, (Cambridge: 1989), pp. 283-311.
61. Ted Hopf, op. cit., p. 489. Hopf, according to his offensive-defensive balance theory, argues that the acquisition of nuclear weapons, providing a strategic defensive dominance, explains the post-war stability. As well, he asserts that the "relatively non-cumulative character of power resources" has aided this same stability. The empirical justification for his theory lies in studies of past cases of multipolar and bipolar systems in Europe, where he finds that the offense-defense balance determines the extent of stability. For an alternative explanation of the systemic and behavioural elements of post-war stability see John Lewis Gaddis, op. cit., and Stephen Van Era, op. cit.
62. For an excellent account of the changed domestic conditions that altered the behaviour of states within the international system see Stephen Van Era, op. cit., pp. 204-216.
63. The extent to which this is true, depends upon the school of thought to which one adheres. See the prescribed literature on multipolar and bipolar systems.
64. John J. Mearshimer, op. cit., pp. 162-165. See also John Lewis Gaddis, op. cit.
65. These rigid alliances, NATO and the Warsaw Pact divided Europe into two camps. Peace was, in fact, indivisible since war between members of the alliances would inevitably draw in the super powers. In their international relations, especially inter-polar, the alliance states were watched closely by their power. For the development of this system see Hugh Thomas, Armed Truce, op. cit. For a discussion of the degree of autonomy allowed members of the alliance see Waltz, op. cit.
66. See John J. Mearshimer, op. cit., pp. 162-165.
67. John Lewis Gaddis, op. cit., pp. 34-42. The 'game' here refers to an understood set of rules by which the super powers abided in the Cold War World, such as respect for each other's sphere of influence.

68. See Ted Hopf, *op. cit.*, pp. 476-477. See also John Lewis Gaddis, pp. 10-12.
69. This is due to the destruction they promise to deliver. See Robert Jervis, "The Political Effects of Nuclear War", International Security, Fall 1988, (Vol. 13, No. 2).
70. This acute awareness of one another's capabilities has been most pronounced in recent years, due to a third industrial revolution. See Gaddis, *op. cit.*, p. 25.
71. Ted Hopf, *op. cit.*, p. 489.
72. *Ibid.*, p. 489. In fairness to Waltz, Mearshimer and Realist or neo-Realist thinking, it should be mentioned that Realists have considered that nuclear capabilities, along with the bipolar structure have maintained the stability. In Mearshimer's 'Waltzian' argument, he asserts that a multipolar world of Russia, U.S., Germany and Japan would not automatically be unstable as long as they all possessed a nuclear deterrent. See Mearshimer, *op. cit.*, pp. 173-176.
73. Ted Hopf, *op. cit.*, p. 489.
74. *Ibid.*
75. See Stephen Van Era, *op. cit.*, pp. 209-211. See also John Lewis Gaddis, *op. cit.*, pp. 216-221.
76. Stephen Van Era, *op. cit.*, p. 210. See also Paul M. Kennedy, "The Decline of Nationalistic History in the West, 1900 - 1970", Journal of Contemporary History, (Vol. 8, No. 1), January 1973, pp. 77-100.
77. A survey of this process is offered in Nicholas Pronay and Keith Wilson (editors), The Political Re-education of Germany and Her Allies After WWII, (Totawa, N.J., 1985).
78. See Zbigniew Brzezinsk, "Post-Communist Nationalism", Foreign Affairs, Winter 1990, (Vol. 68, No. 5).
79. John Lewis Gaddis, *op. cit.*, pp. 27-33.
80. Adam B. Ulam, *op. cit.*, pp. 130-131.
81. John Lewis Gaddis, *op. cit.*, p. 29
82. *Ibid.*, p. 40
83. Stephen Van Era, *op. cit.*, p. 207. For an excellent account of militarism and it's impact on the decision-making processes leading to the war, see Van Era, *op. cit.*, pp. 204-209. See also Barry Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine, (Ithacca, N.Y., 1984).
84. *Ibid.*, p. 207.

85. Ibid., p. 208.
86. As was stated before, there has been a great deal of debate over the nature of the American power base. Even if one adheres to the anti-declinst theories it is still correct to see that America's power, (i.e. its present world product, the size of its GNP, its military spending, the attraction of its ideology, its human resources and its technological edge), has declined in the last two decades vis á vis a number of other powers. This is not to say that U.S. is encountering "free-fall" in the international system; it may only be returning to its natural, powerful position among the 'Great Powers'. If the other states have 'caught up' slightly, this may be due to the 'World War II' effect. For a full outline of the argument see Joseph S. Nye, op. cit.
87. There has been some disagreement on these questions. Certain specialists have proffered the idea of a 'unipolar' world. The U.S. does remain the only true 'super power' in the economic, political and military sense, but it is no longer able to bend the 'will' of other nations to its own designs as easily as it once could. Witness the trade wars between the U.S. and the E.C., (primarily France), in the GATT for the past six years. See, "1010: Will It See a New Great Power Lineup?", Rand Research Review, Summer 1989, (Vol. 13, No. 2), pp. 6-7. See also Joseph S. Nye, op. cit., and Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion", International Security, Spring 1993, (Vol. 17, No. 4).
88. In his book, Mr. Nye includes the USSR, (his book was written in 1990), but primarily as a military power into the next century. China is included, but more as a 'regional power' due to the colossal problems it will face in economic reform. Mr. Nye is more serious about the potential of German or Japanese power, but discounts them, (for now), militarily. See Joseph S. Nye, op. cit., Chapters 4 and 5. The European community would be the closest to a 'Great Power', if the Maastricht Treaty is fully endorsed, (and followed), and the resultant European Union is further enhanced. See the "Treaty on European Union", Europe Documents, (February 7, 1992). If these events do not proceed as planned, Germany, certainly, and perhaps France and Britain, are 'great powers', in their own right.
89. See Karl Deutsch and J. David Singer, op. cit. See also, Stephen Van Era, op. cit., pp 222-224. See also David A. Welch, op. cit.
90. See David A. Welch, op. cit.
91. Stephen Van Era, op. cit., pp. 231-233.
92. See Edward Mortimer, "European Security After the Cold War", Adelphi Paper, (No. 271), Summer 1992, pp. 11-13.
93. Ibid.

94. Greece and Macedonia are just two of the states which find themselves pitted against each other in the wake of Yugoslavia's demise. Greece objects to the name of the new state due to the fact that 'Macedon' refers to the northern part of Greece. Any state calling itself Macedonia therefore, must harbour irredentist claims against the Greek Province. Athens has used this fact to delay EC recognition of Macedonia. See Mortimer, op. cit., p. 18. For more examples of this type see John J. Mearshiner, op. cit.
95. Stephen Van Era argues that order unravels with the domestic collapse of imperial states, and the secession of outlying provinces. The Soviet Union has done just that, leaving fifteen independent republics with ill-defined and/or unaccepted boundaries, intermingled with countless minority groups, which will threaten international order for years to come. See Stephen Van Era, op. cit., pp. 232-234. See also Ted Hopf, "Managing Soviet Disintegration A Demand for Behavioural Regimes", (Vol. 17, No. 1), Summer 1992.
96. See Ted Hopf, "Polarity, The Offense-Defense Balance, and War", op. cit. See also Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, op. cit.
97. Ted Hopf, "Polarity, the Offense-Defense Balance, and War", op. cit., p. 490.
98. The domestic weakness of a state, in collusion with other factors, creates a domestic-political version of offense-dominance: the state is insecure not because military or diplomatic factors favour the offensive, but because its own domestic weakness enables an "offensive" against it. This vulnerability will cause conflict. See Stephen Van Era, op. cit., p. 232.
99. Van Era, op. cit., p. 231.
100. Ibid.
101. This is not meant to say that that period was an ideal time in national development. In many cases, the nations of East-Central Europe were under authoritarian governments, but they were independent. For a brief summary of the inter-war years in Eastern Europe, see Joseph Rothschild, A Political History of East-Central Europe, (New York, 1989).
102. For an account of the Soviet-Nazi dividing up of Eastern Europe in 1939 see On the Political and Legal Assessment of the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Treaty of 1939, Materials of the Second Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR, (December, 1989). For an account of the Soviet takeover of Eastern Europe following the war see Vojtech Mastny, Russia's Road to the Cold War, (New York, 1979).
103. This trend signals a rise in nationalism and militarism. See Van Era, op. cit., pp. 204-209.

104. Some theorists have gone so far as to assert that war between Western liberal democratic states today is not feasible. See Michael Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs", Philosophy and Public Affairs, (Vol. 12, No. 3), June 1983, pp. 200-235.
105. Richard H. Ullman, Securing Europe, (Princeton, 1991), p. 33.
106. This feat was accomplished in the early 1970's but was confirmed by a reunified Germany in the Four-Plus-Two Agreements. See Hermann - Josef Rupieper, "After the Cold War: The United States, Germany, and European Security" in Michael Hogan (ed), The End of the Cold War, (Cambridge, 1992), p. 179.
107. These generalizations are outlined in Richard H. Ullman, op. cit., p.28.

ENDNOTES - Chapter Two

1. See Carl Kaysen, "Is War Obsolete?", International Security, Spring 1990 (Vol. 14, No. 4), and International Security Reader 1991, pp. 81-103, (Cambridge, 1991, p. 83.
2. Fen Osler Hampson and Christopher J. Maule, "A New World Order?" in Canada Among Nations 1992-93, op. cit., p. 7.
3. Richard H. Ullman, op. cit., pp. 41-42.
4. For a thorough outline of the "Sources of Insecurity" in post-Cold War Europe see Edward Mortimer, op. cit., pp. 7-18. In his study, Dr. Mortimer includes "state-to-state" violence and the "breakdown of order" as the most pressing European security issues.
5. See Edward Mortimer, op. cit., pp. 7-16. In his study, Dr. Mortimer refers to European security as, "the ability of people, living in the area described, to lead their lives free from the threat of large-scale violence". See p. 6.
6. Yugoslavia's 'disproportionate role' derived from its position in the neutral and non-aligned club and its proffering of a 'third way' between communist and capitalist development. See J.F. Brown, Surge to Freedom, (London, 1991), p. 221.
7. See Patrick Moore, "The London Conference on the Bosnian Crisis", RFE/RL, (vol. 1, No. 36), September 11, 1992.
8. For an in-depth analysis of the Yugoslav war and the ethnic antagonisms which have led to Balkan conflict in the past, see John Zametica, "The Yugoslav Conflict", Adelphi Paper, No. 270, Summer 1992.
9. For an assessment of how post-Cold War realities have rendered East-Central Europe safe for local wars, see Jan Zielonka, "Security in Central Europe", Adelphi Paper, No. 272, Autumn 1992. See also, John J. Mearshimer, op. cit.
10. See John Zametica, op. cit., pp. 9-11. For an in-depth account of Yugoslavia's post-War evolution see J.F. Brown, Eastern Europe and/or Communist Rule, (New York, 1988), pp. 336-370.
11. 'Sliyvonie' was the Soviet policy by which the disparate nations would blend together into a Soviet people. For an explanation of this Soviet policy see,
12. Milan Andrejevich, "Nationalist Movements in Yugoslavia", Report on Eastern Europe, (Vol. 1, No. 8), February 23, 1990, p. 29.
13. Christopher Cviic, "Yugoslavia As An Evolutionary Model", in The Lost Empire, (ed) John Hemsley, (London, 1991), p. 242.

14. For the evolution of the political and 'nationalist' scene in each of the six republics leading up to the wars in Slovenia, Croatia and finally Bosnia-Herzegovina, see John Zametica, *op. cit.*, pp. 12-45.
15. Yugoslavia, and/or its component parts, refused to abide by economic plans laid-out by the IMF, the World Bank, etc. See Christopher Cviic, *op. cit.*, pp. 239-240.
16. For an assessment of the 'lessons for the international security' emanating from events in Yugoslavia, see John Zametica, *op. cit.*, pp. 46-47. For detailed assessments of parallel dangers in the rest of East-Central Europe and the former USSR, see Jan Zielonka, *op. cit.*, and Ted Hopf, "Managing Soviet Disintegration", *op. cit.* See also, Edward Mortimer, *op. cit.*, pp. 19-34.
17. The build-up of tension between Slovenia and Croatia, on the one hand and the remainder of Yugoslavia, but especially Serbia, is covered in Zametica's "The Yugoslav Conflict". See especially Chapter Two.
18. Although certain stages of the war, (i.e. in Slovenia) have ended, the war continues in Bosnia-Herzegovina and, at times, Croatia. At present, it is threatening to spread to Macedonia.
19. See Patrick Moore, "The London Conference on the Bosnian Crisis", *op. cit.*, p. 1.
20. On the potentiality of the expansion of the Yugoslav conflict and the regional ramifications, see Zametic, pp. 46-82. See also, Dan Ionescu, "Romania's Quandary", RFE/RL, (Vol. 2, No. 12), March 19, 1993. See also, Kjell Engelbrekt, "A Vulnerable Bulgaria Fears a Wider War", (Vol. 2, No. 12), March 19, 1993.
21. FBIS, EEU, 92-040, February 28, 1992, p. 40. For a better understanding of the international ramifications of Serbian treatment of Kosovo, see Zametica, pp. 25-27; on Vojvodina, see *Ibid.*, pp. 27-30; on Macedonia, see Zametica, pp. 34-36.
22. For an in-depth account of all the potential regional axes of conflict see Zametica, *op. cit.*, pp. 46-82. See also, Mortimer, *op. cit.*, pp. 17-18. In his analysis Mortimer illustrates that the Balkans are presently dividing into two mutually antagonistic blocs, with a Greek-Serbian axis on one side, and a Turkish-Macedonian one, supported by Bulgaria and Albania on the opposing side.
23. John Zametica, *op. cit.*, p. 47.
24. The reaction, to the conflict, of the international community and its multilateral institutions, will be discussed in the next chapter. For a discussion of the potential of widened conflict, see Zametica, *op. cit.*, pp. 47-72.
25. Croatia, under Franco Tudjmann, is not innocent of extreme nationalism. At present, Croatia, as well as Serbia is actively involved in the 'carving up' of Bosnia-Herzegovina. See Zametica, *op. cit.*, pp. 16-20.

26. Jan Zielonka, "Security in Central Europe", op. cit., p. 3. Poland, Hungary and (formerly) Czechoslovakia were the first to embrace market reforms and democracy in Eastern Europe and were deemed to have the best chances of completing the unprecedented political and economic reforms.
27. These 'dramatic implications' would, at least, include a mass flow of refugees but could also include Western states, most notably Germany, taking steps (including intervention.), to manage any conflict. See Edward Mortimer, op. cit., pp. 7-9 and pp. 11-16.
28. Since the Czechoslovak parliamentary elections in June, 1992, the leaders of the two republics - 'Vaclav Klaus' in the Czech lands, and 'Vladimir Meciar' in Slovakia - agreed to dissolve the Czech and Slovak Federation by January 1, 1993. This date gave birth to two new nation-states; the Czech Republic and Slovakia. For background see Zielonka, op. cit., pp. 10-13.
29. Richard Gwyn, "Velvet Divorce Could Leave Behind a Few Bruises", Toronto Star, November 25, 1992, p. A25.
30. Ibid.
31. See Zielonka, op. cit., p. 10.
32. Due to the 'modernized' state of the Czech economy and infrastructure within the Czech and Slovak Federation, Czechoslovakia was included, with Poland and Hungary, into the so-called 'Visegrad Triangle'. In November, 1991 these states were given associate status in the EC. Following the split however, it is likely that the Czech Republic will be maintained as an 'associate member', while Slovakia will be forced to wait. See Zielonka, op. cit., pp. 10-12.
33. See J.F. Brown, Eastern Europe and Communist Rule, op. cit., pp. 294-315.
34. This 'security vacuum' would be a result of the destabilizing consequences of the partition of the Czech and Slovak republics. See Zielonka, op. cit., pp. 12-14. See also Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Post-Communist Nationalism", op. cit.
35. Jan Zielonka, op. cit., p. 12. See also, J.F. Brown, op. cit., pp. 294-315.
36. Jan Zielonka, op. cit., p. 13.
37. Ibid., p. 15. See also, John Zametica, op. cit., p. 50-52.
38. Jan Zielonka, op. cit., p. 16.
39. For an account of Hungary's dispute with Romania over the status of Transylvania, since the Treaty of Versailles, see J.F. Brown, Eastern Europe and Communist Rule, op. cit., pp. 200-229, and pp. 263-293.

40. Jan Zielonka, op. cit., p. 16.
41. It is not within the scope of this study to go into detail of border alterations between the various empires and nation-states of East-Central Europe. For a good survey see, Jan Zielonka, op. cit., pp. 19-28. See also, Zbigniew Brzezinski, op. cit.
42. Roman Solchanyk, "The Crimean Imbroglio: Kiev and Moscow", RFE/RL, (Vol. 1, No. 40), October 9, 1992, p. 6. See also Ted Hopf, "Managing Soviet Disintegration", op. cit., and Edward Mortimer, op. cit.
43. Alexander Likhotal, "Eurasia", Security Dialogue, (Vol. 23, No. 3), September, 1992, p. 10. There exist a number of fears, within the Russian government, that centrifugal tendencies within the Russian Federation are increasing to the point that, "what is Russian is not exactly clear". See Vladimir Lysenko, Deputy Chairman of the State Committee for International Relations, in *Rossiiskaya gazeta*, January 14, 1993.
44. In the April meeting of the Congress of People's Deputies, Yeltsin was heavily challenged by 'hardliners'. They, indeed, proffer a different approach to Russia's 'foreign' policy and security problems. For the opinions of Sergei Baburin of the patriotic-statist opposition, see *Moskovskie novosti*, February 9, 1992. In March 1993, it was mentioned that Yeltsin might be forced to accommodate more conservative notions by appointing Vice President Alexander Rutskoi as Prime Minister. See *Argument: fakty No. 8, 1993*. For a general overview of the severity of Yeltsin's political problems, see Alexander Rahr, "Yeltsin and Khasbulatov: Anatomy of a Power Struggle", RFE/RL, (Vol. 2, No. 12), March 1993, pp. 1-5. For another account of how a change in the Russian government could affect the security of the formerly Soviet World, see Edward Mortimer, op. cit., pp. 7-10.
45. The 'near abroad' is a term referring to the former republics of the USSR, but now foreign states. For Russian predicaments in the 'near abroad', see Yeltsin's speeches on foreign policy in *Rossiiskaya gazeta*, April 8, 1992, pp. 1 and 3-4. See also, Suzanne Crow, "Russia Seeks Leadership in Regional Peacekeeping", RFE/RL, (Vol. 2, No. 15), April 9, 1993.
46. See Roman Solchanyk, op. cit., p. 6.
47. Ibid.
48. Andrei Zagorski, "Post-Soviet Nuclear Proliferation Risks", Security Dialogue, (Vol. 23, No. 3), September 1992, p. 29.
49. See Alexander Rahr, "Upcoming Congress Will Test Yeltsin's Loyalty to Democrats", RFE/RL, (Vol. 1, No. 38), September 25, 1992, pp. 910 and Rahr, "Yeltsin and Khasbulatov: Anatomy of a Power Struggle", RFE/RL, (Vol. 2, No. 12), March 19, 1993, pp. 19-21.

50. Ibid.
51. Roman Solchanyk, op. cit., p. 9. The above quote was uttered by Vice-President Alexander Rutskoi in June 1992. See *Moskovskie novosti*; May 31, 1992, and *Literaturnaya gazeta*, May 27, 1992.
52. In Russia, Tatarstan, Chechen-Ingushetia, Mordovia, Mari-el, Chuvashia, and Komi-Permyak, have all declared independence. See Ted Hopf, "Managing Soviet Disintegration", op. cit., p. 49.
53. "CIS, and the Future", Security Dialogue, (Vol. 23, No. 3), pp. 24-25.
54. See Suzanne Crow, "Russian Peacekeeping: Defense, Diplomacy, or Imperialism?", RFE/RL, (Vol. 1, No. 37), September 18, 1992.
55. Dagfinn Stenseth, op. cit., p. 25. It shou'd be pointed out here that Tatarstan did not sign the Federation Treaty.
56. Suzanne Crow, "The Theory and Practice of Peacekeeping in the Former USSR", RFE/RL, (Vol. 1, No. 37), September 18, 1992, pp. 34-35.
57. Ibid., p. 34.
58. Ibid., p. 35. For the activities of the Russian Army in the 'near abroad' see Stephen Foye, "Russia's Fragmented Army Drawn into the Political Fray", RFE/RL, (Vol. 2, No. 15), April 9, 1993.
59. Romania is intimately involved in the 'Moldovo situation since Moldavians are actually ethnic kin of the Romanians. Until the 1939 Nazi-Soviet Pact present-day 'Moldovo' was the Romanian province of Bessarabia. For an overview of this potential conflict, see Jan Zielonko, op. cit., pp. 19-25.
60. Suzanne Crow, "The Theory and Practice of Peacekeeping in the Former USSR", op. cit., p. 35. See also Ted Hopf, "Managing Soviet Disintegration", op. cit., pp. 52-58.
61. It is rumoured that Rutskoi even considered sending more Russian troops to Moldovo while Yeltsin was in the U.S. in June. See Rutskoi in *Izvestiya*, April 6, 1992, and *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, July 1, 1992.
62. Vladimir Socor, "Gagauz in Moldavia Demand Separate Republic", Report on the USSR, (vol. 2, No. 36), September y, 1990, p. 8.
63. Ibid.
64. Suzanne Crow, "The Theory and Practice of Peacekeeping in the Former USSR", op. cit., p. 35.

65. Since his fall from power Zviad Gamsakhurdia has still commanded loyalty from a great number of followers. Arguing that Gamsakhurdia is the true democratic President of Georgia, they continue to attack Shevardnadze.
66. As a result, Abkhazia has been considered as a potential CIS 'peacekeeping zone'. For the possibilities of this prospect, see Charles William Maynes, "Containing Ethnic Conflict", Foreign Policy, op. cit. See also, Suzanne Crow, op. cit.
67. Georgia, along with the three Baltic republics, did not ratify the Minsk Treaty in December, 1991. See Ann Sheehy, "The CIS Charter", RFE/RL, (Vol. 2, No. 12), March 19, 1993.
68. Suzanne Crow, "The Theory and Practice of Peacekeeping in the Former USSR", RFE/RL, (Vol. 1, No. 37), September 18, 1992, p. 33.
69. Ibid., p. 34.
70. For the complications of UN and CSCE involvement, see Charles William Maynes, op. cit.
71. The war only increased under Gorbachev's reign. Any attempts at mediation were met with charges of 'taking sides'. Gorbachev was repeatedly charged by Armenia for siding with Azerbaijan since it supported Gorbachev's Union Treaty. See Elizabeth Fuller, "Paramilitary Formations in Armenia", Report on the USSR, (Vol. 2, No. 31), August 3, 1990, pp. 20-22. For a complete background to the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, see Ronald Suny, "Transcaucasia: Cultural Cohesion and Ethnic Revival", The Nationalities Factor in Soviet Politics and Society, Lubomyr Hajda and Mark Beissinger (ed.), (San Francisco, 1990), pp. 228-252.
72. While the Armenians receive aid primarily from emigre groups abroad, the Azeris have been aided by their ethnic kin in Iran and Turkey. On potential Turkish, Arab and/or Islamic Fundamentalist activity in the former USSR, see Edward Mortimer, op. cit., pp. 10-11 and pp. 35-46.
73. See Suzanne Crow, "The Theory and Practice of Peacekeeping in the Former USSR", op. cit., p. 36.
74. Yuri Zarakhovich, "Tajikistan: War in a Vacuum", Time, October 12, 1992, p. 66.
75. Ibid.
76. Ibid.
77. For an account of how conflict in the former republics of Central Asia will affect Western security, see Mortimer op. cit., pp. 10-11, and Ted Hopf, "Managing Soviet Disintegration".

78. For an account of the problems associated with Post-Soviet weapons proliferation and its global implications, see Ted Hopf, "Managing Soviet Disintegration", op. cit., and Edward Mortimer, op. cit., pp. 13-14.
79. See Andrei Zagorski, op. cit., p. 28. See also, Ted Hopf, op. cit.
80. Andrei Zagorski, op. cit., p. 28.
81. Ibid.
82. The START agreement refers to the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks. For its pertinence in this case see Andrei Zagorski, op. cit., p. 28, and Ted Hopf, op. cit., pp. 50-52.
83. Ibid.
84. Dagfinn Stenseth, op. cit., p. 22.
85. Bruce W. Nelan, "The Military: An Army Out of Work", Time, December 7, 1991, p. 55. See also Edward Mortimer, op. cit., p. 14, and Ted Hopf, op. cit., pp. 50-52.
86. Bruce W. Nelan, op. cit., p. 55.
87. Andrei Zagorski, op. cit., pp. 35-37. See also Ted Hopf, op. cit., for the use of economic levers.
88. Bruce W. Nelan, op. cit., p. 55. See also Ted Hopf, op. cit., pp. 50-52.
89. Ibid.
90. Recently, global nuclear powers and adherents to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty have become quite concerned with the number of states that may be on the verge of acquiring a nuclear potential. The exodus of former Soviet specialists would most assuredly facilitate this trend. See Ted Hopf, op. cit., pp. 50-52, and Edward Mortimer, op. cit., pp. 13-14.

ENDNOTES - Chapter Three

1. David A. Welch, "The New Multilateralism and Evolving Security Systems", op. cit., p. 80.
2. Richard H. Ullman, Securing Europe, op. cit., p. 63.
3. Since NATO, throughout the past four decades, has been so effective in countering the Soviet threat (to the point that it no longer exists), it is left with no one antagonist to justify its continued existence. See Richard H. Ullman, op. cit., p. 63. See also Edward Mortimer, "European Security After the Cold War", op. cit., pp. 25-26.
4. See Ullman, op. cit., p. 63.
5. This, indeed, is the thinking behind optimistic visions of the 'new world order'. See Joseph S. Nye, "What New World Order?", op. cit., p. 83.
6. "Staying On?", The Economist, May 4, 1990, p. 14. For the 'NATO debate', see also Edward Mortimer, op. cit., and Richard K. Betts, "Systems For Peace or Causes of War?", International Security, Summer 1992, (Vol. 17, No. 1), and Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, "Concerts, Collective Security and the Future of Europe", International Security, Summer 1991, (Vol. 16, No. 1).
7. David A. Welch, op. cit., p. 80.
8. For 'collective security' proposals as solutions to Europe's security future see, Kupchan and Kupchan, op. cit., Richard K. Betts, op. cit. Also see Gregory F. Treverton, America, Germany and the Future of Europe, (Princeton, 1992), as well as Richard H. Ullman, op. cit.
9. Jan Zielonka, "Security in Central Europe", op. cit., p. 43.
10. See Otto Pick, The Cold War Legacy in Europe, (London, 1992), p. 23.
11. Although understood as an 'obvious truth', the perceived Soviet threat in the post-war era was never specified as the sole reason for the establishment of the Treaty. See the North Atlantic Treaty in The North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Facts and Figures, (Brussels, 1976), pp. 300-303.
12. This 'security vacuum' is put forth by proponents of the Alliance as its primary need to adapt, but maintain its role in the preservation of European security. See Mortimer, op. cit., p. 32.
13. Some members of the European Community, primarily France, have fought for years for a reduced American (and therefore) NATO role in European security affairs. At times this had led to a West-West axis of conflict within the Alliance, which has been exacerbated at critical junctures such as the present. See Mortimer, op. cit., pp. 53-56.
14. For the enthusiasm of the former members of the Warsaw Pact and the emerging states of the former USSR, towards NATO. see Zielonka, op. cit., pp. 43-45.

15. NATO is the sole institutional body with such military potential. This potential has been used to facilitate 'alliance' activity in the Persian Gulf in 1991 and in offering aid in Yugoslavia and Russia in 1992. See Doug Bandow, "Avoiding War", Foreign Policy, op. cit., pp. 157-159.
16. For an explanation of the weapons proliferation dilemma in the wake of the Soviet demise, see Ted Hopf, "Managing Soviet Disintegration", op. cit.
17. Otto Pick, op. cit., p. 26.
18. David A. Welch, op. cit., p. 81. For the inclusion of these states within NACC, see Edward Mortimer, op. cit., pp. 25-26.
19. For a discussion of NATO's measures taken to keep the Alliance "alive", see Mortimer op. cit., pp. 51-53.
20. NATO would face a number of difficulties regarding its present mandate, in becoming embroiled in a 'Yugoslav' conflict. See John Zametica, "The Yugoslav Conflict", op. cit., pp. 65-66.
21. Ibid.
22. In the winter of 1993, and again in the summer, following the refusal of the Bosnian Serbs to pay heed to the UN brokered cease-fires, the American government initiated, and continues to do so, talks concerning the use of NATO to deter attacks on Muslim 'safe-havens'.
23. See John Zametica, "the Yugoslav Conflict", op. cit., p. 65.
24. For an outline of the threats emanating from the former USSR, (as outlined in the previous chapter), see Edward Mortimer, op. cit., pp. 7-19 and Ted Hopf, op. cit. See also Jan Zielonka, op. cit., pp. 5-31.
25. See Edward Mortimer, op. cit., p. 33.
26. In this way NATO would become the 'teeth' of a truly 'collective security' system for most of the Eurasian landmass - those areas included in CSCE. As a collective security organ, it would be responsible for guaranteeing its members protection against aggression by each other, while simultaneously, maintaining its status as a 'mutual defense pact' in guaranteeing members of the CSCE against aggression from outside. See Edward Mortimer, op. cit., pp. 33-35. For an in depth discussion of 'collective security' systems and their potential role in Europe's future, see Kupchan and Kupchan, op. cit., and Richard K. Betts, op. cit.
27. The 'associate status' bestowed on Russia and the Ukraine, and NATO's creation of NACC creates a co-operative forum, supplanting the former antagonistic stance, to discuss multilateral and global concerns, such as the proliferation of weaponry and nuclear management. See Ted Hopf, op. cit.
28. See Manfred Wörner's comments on NATO's security interests in Edward Mortimer, op. cit., p. 37.

29. Ibid., p. 32.
30. Ibid., pp. 32-33.
31. Ibid. See also, John Zametica, op. cit., pp. 65-67.
32. When Jacques Delors approached European leaders, in the summer of 1984, he took with him four proposals for successful unity. The second proposal was for a common European defense policy and security system. This was one of the tenets of the Maastricht Treaty, presently under review. See Daniel Burstein, "Euroquake", op. cit., pp. 40-41. See also James Laxer, "Inventing Europe", op. cit. On the CFSP see Edward Mortimer, op. cit., pp. 57-61.
33. See Richard H. Ullman, op. cit., p. 50.
34. For an outline of the development of the Brussels' Treaty Organization, see Walter LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War 1945-1984, (New York, 1985), p. 74.
35. Richard H. Ullman, op. cit., p. 52.
36. Ibid., p. 53.
37. Ibid.
38. For the differences, past and present, between the U.S. and Western Europe in determining 'Western' security policy, that have at times, resulted in a West-West rift see Sverre Lodgaard, "Europe: The CSCE, NATO and the European Union", Security Dialogue, September 1992, (Vol. 23), pp. 57-68. See also James Laxer, op. cit., pp. 294-295.
39. Richard H. Ullman, op. cit., p. 42.
40. On the notion of collective security, see Kupchan and Kupchan, op. cit. See also Richard K. Betts, op. cit. As it pertains to the function of the WEU see Edward Mortimer, op. cit., pp. 54-62.
41. Richard H. Ullman, op. cit., p. 65.
42. Ibid.
43. This 'unanimity' issue stands in obvious contrast to the rules of procedure within the CSCE which will be discussed below.
44. In response to the conflict in Yugoslavia the WEU was more flexible than NATO regarding the Theatre of Operations, but it did not and, as yet, does not have a command structure. Much work would have been required to make it operational. France did propose a WEU military role originally but it was not deemed feasible. See John Zametica, op. cit., pp. 63-64.
45. See Lord Carrington, "Turmoil in the Balkans: Developments and Prospects", RUSI Journal, October 1992, (Vol. 137, No. 5), pp. 1-5.

46. Ibid., pp. 2-3.
47. See FBIS EEU-92-200, October 15, 1992.
48. For a general account of E.C. involvement in Balkan security developments since June, 1991, see Zametica, op. cit., pp. 59-63.
49. The same situation remains true today. While Serbia seemed to be the original culprit, it has been Serbian and Croat residents of Bosnia-Herzegovina that have rejected most serious attempts to end the dispute since it would result in a loss of what they have already achieved on the battlefield.
50. It was primarily German pressure, due to their close relations with Slovenia, that forced the EC to recognize the breakaway republics. See John Zametica, op. cit., pp. 59-63.
51. See Lord Carrington, op. cit., pp. 2-3.
52. See Patrick Moore, "The London Conference on the Bosnian Crisis", RFE/RL, August 1992, (Vol. 1, No. 28), pp. 1-7. It should be noted that Izetbegovic did agree with the Vance-Owen plan in March, 1993 with American security guarantees.
53. See FBIS EEU-92-062, March 31, 1992.
54. See FBIS EEU-92-104, May 29, 1992, pp. 47-48.
55. This statement, by Portugal's Foreign Minister was recorded in FBIS-EEU-92-104, p. 48. It was indicative of a feeling, adopted by many viewing the dismal performance of the international community in the conflict, that nothing could be done if the combatants maintain their will to fight. See Charles William Maynes, "Containing Ethnic Conflict", Foreign Policy, op. cit., and Doug Bandow, "Avoiding War", op. cit., pp. 159-160.
56. The EC has hesitated often in the imposition of sanctions on Serbia and/or Montenegro throughout the war and has tried to involve the UN Security Council to avoid the problems of deciding upon, and administering sanctions. EC problems lie in enforcing their policies on states outside of their circle, while even the UN Security Council cannot take effective action. For an account of the differences of opinions, see John Zametica, op. cit., Chapter Three, pp. 46-74. Some states, contrary to the alleged international community's viewpoint, refuse to brand Serbia, and Bosnian Serbs as blatant aggressors; they include Russia (at times), Greece and Romania.
57. Still, there existed problems in the administering of the sanctions, due to possible transport on the Danube from Russia, through Romania, to Serbia. See Don Ionescu, "Romania's Quandry", RFE/RL, (Vol. 2, No. 12), March 19, 1993.
58. The Geneva Convention, chaired by Cyrus Vance and Lord Owen, was a joint effort by the UN and the EC, to draw a new political map for Bosnia, thereby ending the quagmire. For the aim of the plan, see Paul Korning, "The Bosnian Jigsaw", The Globe and Mail, January 15, 1993, p. A9.
59. Ibid.

60. After heavy fighting in the spring of 1993, the Bosnian delegation opted to support the Peace Plan, after an American security assurance was given. See Linda Diebel, "Plan Would Send Sixty Thousand to Bosnia", Toronto Star, May 5, 1993, p. A1.
61. See Paul Koring, op. cit.
62. Since the rejection of the Vance-Owen Plan, the international community has scrambled only to maintain safe-havens for enclaves within Bosnia-Herzegovina. This has been attempted by UN peace-keeping missions.
63. This witty analogy was offered by the Belgian Foreign Minister, regarding European involvement in the Persian Gulf in 1991. See Daniel Burstein, op. cit., p. 8.
64. See John Zametica, op. cit., pp. 46-74, for an outline of the different perspectives which hinder joint action.
65. See John Zametica, op. cit., pp. 59-63. See also Edward Mortimer, op. cit., pp. 53-57.
66. See James Laxer, op. cit., pp. 289-314. See also, Edward Mortimer, op. cit., pp. 23-25.
67. Ibid. The Visegrad Treaty began a political and economic union between these three states, named after the Hungarian town where it was signed in 1991.
68. See, CSCE: Final Act, (Helsinki, 1975).
69. Ibid. (Recommendation 70-71).
70. See, CSCE: N & N Perspectives, (December, 1989), p. 9.
71. Ibid.
72. Ibid., pp. 11-12.
73. For a general account of the CSCE process and its impact on security matters in Europe, see Richard H. Ullman, op. cit., pp. 63-73.
74. Those who desire a larger role for the CSCE hope that it will become a legitimate body for conflict aversion, management, and/or collective security for the greater part of the Eurasian landmass, as defined earlier in this study. See Edward Mortimer, op. cit., pp. 25-34.
75. See David A. Welch, op. cit., p. 78.
76. Ibid., p. 79.
77. Edward Mortimer, op. cit., p. 29.
78. FBIS EEU-92-021, January 31, 1992, p. 4. See also, Edward Mortimer, op. cit., p. 29.
79. This is the assessment of almost all commentators on European security. See David A. Welch, op. cit., p. 78; Edward Mortimer, op. cit., p. 29; John Zametica, op. cit., pp. 58-59.

80. FBIS EEU-92-104, May 29, 1992, p. 48.
81. FBIS EEU-92-74, April 16, 1992, p. 40.
82. Ibid.
83. See John Zametica, op. cit., p. 58.
84. Ibid.
85. Ibid., p. 59.
86. Ibid.
87. FBIS EEU-92, March 31, 1992, p. 44. On this "spirit" of 'collective security' see Kupchan and Kupchan, op. cit.; see also Richard K. Betts.
88. In many ways it was viewed as impossible to come to any agreement on proposed action in Yugoslavia, due to the Serbian/Montenegrin virtual veto. The ludicrousness of this paralysis sponsored calls for change. See FBIS EEU-92-063, April 1, 1992, p. 40. For an outline of the problem see Richard H. Ullman, op. cit., p. 63-64.
89. See John Zametica, op. cit., pp. 58-59. See also FBIS EEU-92-021, February 29, 1992, p. 3.
90. For an outline of Russia's views on the Yugoslav conflict, and its differences with the international community, see Vladimir P. Lukin, "Our Security Predicament", Foreign Policy.
91. Stoyan Ganev's comments were listed in FBIS EEU-92-021, February 29, 1992, p. 3.
92. See Patrick Moore, "Ethnic Cleansing in Bosnia", RFE/RL, August 1992, (Vol. 1, No. 28), pp. 1-7.
93. See Suzanne Crow, "The Theory and Practice of Peace-keeping in the Former USSR", op. cit., p. 34. See also Edward Mortimer, op. cit., pp. 27-29.
94. See, The Final Act, op. cit. See also Richard H. Ullman, op. cit., pp. 63-65. See also Edward Mortimer, op. cit., pp. 28-29.
95. It may, for example, moderate Romanian treatment of its Magyar minority in Transylvania in the interests of easing tensions between Budapest and Bucharest and thus, evade conflict.
96. This 'collective security' has been preferred by some specialists. For an analysis of collective security, see Kupchan and Kupchan, op. cit., and Richard K. Betts, op. cit.
97. Many of the security risks emanating from the post-Soviet World are emerging from 'divided societies' within a state structure. Such problems pose huge obstacles for multilateral organizations due to their sheer complexity. See Charles William Maynes, Foreign Policy, op. cit., pp. 11-15. See also Doug Bandow, op. cit.
98. FBIS EEU-92-062, March 31, 1992, p. 45.

99. See Ann Sheehy, "The CIS: A Progress Report", RFE/RL, September 1992, (Vol. 1, No. 25), pp. 1-6.
100. The failure of the CIS to deter internal disputes is evident. The outside aggression refers to Georgian aggression, (Georgia is not a member), Azerbaijani attacks on Armenia, (Azerbaijan is not a member of the CIS Security Pact), and the Moslem influence from south of Tajikistan. See, "The CIS Charter", RFE/RL, (Vol. 2, No. 12), March 19, 1993. See also, Ted Hopf, "Managing Soviet Disintegration", op. cit.
101. See Suzanne Crow, "The Theory and Practice of Peacekeeping in the Former USSR", op. cit., pp. 32-34. See also Vladimir P. Lukin, "Our Security Predicament", op. cit.
102. See Suzanne Crow, "Russian Peacekeeping: Defense, Diplomacy, or Imperialism?", RFE/RL, September, 1992, (Vol. 1, No. 37), pp. 37-40. See also, Lukin, op. cit. For an in depth discussion of how the West should respond to these challenges emanating from the former USSR, see Ted Hopf, op. cit.
103. Suzanne Crow, "Russian Peacekeeping: Defense, Diplomacy, or Imperialism?", op. cit., p. 37.
104. See Ted Hopf, op. cit., p. 45. Also see Andrei Zagorski, "Post-Soviet Nuclear Proliferation Risks", op. cit., p. 27. By ensuring only one nuclear successor state, the U.S. will go a long way in ensuring security in the region. These efforts should be augmented however, by established standards of conduct on domestic and military policy.
105. See Andrei Zagorski, op. cit., p. 27. See also Ted Hopf, op. cit.
106. The UN felt that too hasty a decision on recognition would have a destabilizing affect on the evolution of the Yugoslav state. Also, Russia was opposed to such ratification due to the dangerous precedent it would set for the Russian Federation. See Charles William Maynes, op. cit.; see also Vera Tolz, "The Role of the Republics and Regions", RFE/RL (Vol. 2, No. 15), April 9, 1993, pp. 8-13.
107. See FBIS EEU-92-021, January 31, 1992, p.3.
108. See Lord Carrington, op. cit., pp. 2-3.
109. FBIS EEU-92-063, April 4, 1992, p. 28.
110. See UN officials comments in FBIS EEU-92-063, April 4, 1992.
111. See UNPROFOR in FBIS EEU-92-169, August, 31, 1992, pp. 46-47.
112. On the administration of the UNPROFOR in 'Yugoslavia' see John Zametica, op. cit., p.67.
113. Ibid., pp. 67-69.
114. Ibid. For an in depth account of the implications of EC, CSCE or the involvement of individual European states in the affair, see Zametica, op. cit., pp. 46-80. See also Doug Bandow, op. cit., pp. 161-166.

115. See John Zametica, *op. cit.*, p. 67.
116. See Charles William Maynes, *op. cit.*, pp. 6-11; also Doug Bandow, *op. cit.*, pp. 161-164.
117. As UN spokesmen have constantly asserted - in their present capacity, the 'blue helmets' are to act only as 'preservers and observers of peace'. See FBIS EEU-92-063, April 1, 1992, p. 28. Any UN action that has gone beyond this role - such as Korea, the Persian Gulf and Somalia - has primarily been an American led 'collective' action. A more direct or pro-active military role requires more of a common perception, (by mostly the Security Council) than the UN can presently provide. See Edward Mortimer, *op. cit.*, pp. 25-33; Charles William Maynes, *op. cit.*; Doug Bandow, *op. cit.*; and for the Yugoslav crisis specifically, see John Zametica, *op. cit.*, pp. 65-68.
118. Large powerful states have always been hesitant to fully integrate themselves in multilateral international organizations, such as the UN since it would entail balancing their specific interests with those of other nations. This was particularly prevalent during the three prior American administrations, but has changed somewhat with the more liberal approach of the Clinton Administration. For an account of 'Great Power' or American antipathy towards the UN see Doug Bandow, *op. cit.*, p. 164.
119. See David A. Welch, *op. cit.*, p. 74.
120. Ibid. See also Charles William Maynes, *op. cit.*
121. For an account of the resources necessitated by 'Great Power' status and Russia's status in that capacity, see Joseph S. Nye Jr., Bound to Lead, *op. cit.*, pp. 115-130.
122. For an account of the power resources, and their fungibility, of all of these states, see Joseph S. Nye Jr., *op. cit.*, Chapter Three. Regarding their potential Security Council status, see David A. Welch, *op. cit.*, pp. 74-75.
123. See Welch, *op. cit.*, p. 74.
124. Great powers are almost always 'Realists' in international affairs and the U.S. is no exception. Having the fungible resources and global reach at hand, the U.S. has had, until quite recently, little use for true multilateral institutions, such as the UN. Instead, they are sometimes viewed as impediments to the pursuit of their unilateral goals. See Douglas Bandow, *op. cit.*, pp. 164-166.
125. See Joseph S. Nye Jr., "What New World Order?", *op. cit.*, pp. 83-84. See also David A. Welch, *op. cit.*, p. 75.
126. See Gwynne Dyer, "A Reborn UN", The Toronto Star, November 17, 1990.
127. The Gulf War is only one example of the U.S. illustrating its politico-military might and global reach within a multilateral framework. See Doug Bandow, *op. cit.*, pp. 163-164.
128. Following the failure of the 'peace talks' in the Spring of 1993, this indeed may again be the scenario, as America hints at a military response and has placed American troops at the Macedonian-Serbian border.

129. At present UN forces are working only to stave off attacks on small pockets of refugees in designated safe areas.
130. Even small crowds of Serbian civilians have successfully held UN forces at bay on numerous occasions via human road-blocks. See FBIS EEU-192, September 30, 1992, p. 25.
131. For an account of the economic sanctions and their affect on the Yugoslav economy and war effort, see FBIS EEU-92-169, August 31, 1992, p. 39.
132. On co-operation in the Security Council between Washington, Beijing and Moscow see Charles William Maynes, op. cit., pp. 6-9. On Greece's particular stance toward Serbia, as opposed to Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and Germany, individually and within the international community, see John Zametica, op. cit., pp. 46-70. See also Doug Bandow, op. cit.
133. See Zametica on Serbia and the Yugoslavian People's Army (JNA), op. cit., pp. 20-22 and pp. 40-45.
134. Joseph S. Nye, "What New World Order?" op. cit., p. 83.
135. For an account of these risks see John J. Mearshimer, "Back to the Future", International Security, Summer 1990, (Vol. 15, No. 1). See also Jan Zielonka, "Security in Central Europe", Adelphi Paper, Autumn 1992, No. 272, and Edward Mortimer, op. cit. See also Ted Hopf, "Managing Soviet Disintegration", op. cit.
136. For an account, (other than the present one), of the effects of the actions of the international community on these events, see the sources listed in the above note. Also see Doug Bandow, op. cit.
137. Ibid.
138. For an account of 'collective security' - a system with many promoters in Europe today - see Kupchan and Kupchan, op. cit. See also Richard K. Betts, op. cit. For a critique of this proposal, (from a detached state - the U.S.), see Doug Bandow, op. cit.
139. See the "North Atlantic Treaty", in NATO: Facts and Figures, (Brussels, 1976), Appendix A.
140. Richard K. Betts, "Systems for Peace or Causes of War?", op. cit., p. 5.
141. Charles William Maynes, op. cit., p. 3.
142. See Kupchan and Kupchan, op. cit., pp. 114-116. See also Doug Bandow, op. cit., pp. 164-173.
143. See Kupchan and Kupchan, op. cit., pp. 116-125. See also Richard K. Betts, op. cit.
144. See Joseph S. Nye Jr., "What New World Order?", op. cit., pp. 89-91.

145. What is referred to here is the West-West axis of conflict which has often occurred in 'Western' decision-making processes during the Cold War. By and large it was abetted by similar goals and American leadership. These differences however, have been exacerbated as of late, with a variety of global alterations. See Richard H. Ullman, *op. cit.*, pp. 3-23. See also Edward Mortimer, *op. cit.*
146. See Doug Bandow, *op. cit.*, pp. 167-168.
147. *Ibid.*
148. *Ibid.* See also Charles William Maynes, *op. cit.*
149. Almost all Central-East European states and/or ex-republics of the USSR have requested American and/or NATO assurances. In response to this request NACC was created. See Edward Mortimer, *op. cit.*, pp. 25-26.
150. See Paul Korning, "Bosnian Jigsaw Puzzle", The Globe and Mail, January 15, 1993, p. A9.
151. Witness the institutional approach to the conflict in Yugoslavia, as opposed to the resolve of the American government, and its forging of an effective political, military and economic alliance against Iraq in 1991-1992.
152. This, indeed, was the idea behind the 'new world order', and the role multilateral institutions were to play in that order. See Joseph S. Nye Jr., "What New World Order?", *op. cit.*, pp. 83-84. See also Edward C. Luck, "Making Peace", Foreign Policy, pp. 137-139.
153. These actions would follow the Persian Gulf style of operation, or occur within an altered NATO mandate as has been hinted at.
154. See Doug Bandow, *op. cit.*, pp. 164-174.
155. See Joseph S. Nye Jr., Bound to Lead, *op. cit.*, pp. 107-112. See also Doug Bandow, *op. cit.*
156. On American action within a UN framework in Korea, see Walter LaFebr, America, Russia and the Cold War 1945 - 1984, (New York, 1980), pp. 99-124.
157. For American involvement within the UN framework in Iraq see Doug Bandow, *op. cit.*
158. Witness American hints at using American air power within a NATO framework in the spring and summer of 1993.
159. While Kuwait would illustrate American interests being challenged, Somalia indicates an example of action due to 'moral outrage'.

ENDNOTES - Chapter Four

1. Indeed throughout the American Presidential election, there was much talk of America turning inward and isolationism. In the election itself, an Administration with very impressive credentials in the foreign policy department was defeated by a candidate who promised to concentrate on domestic problems.
2. Clinton went further, saying that it was necessary for Americans, "to lead a global alliance for democracy". This he said would foster the growth of 'freedom' in the post-Soviet world. See Charles William Maynes, "Containing Ethnic Conflict", Foreign Policy, (No. 90), Spring 1993, p. 3.
3. This is true to the extent that political and economic problems in East-Central Europe are not so exacerbated as to undo any Western security advantage gained by the collapse of the USSR. For example, if Western states failed to aid the emerging states in their political and economic reforms, resulting in a declining political and economic atmosphere in the East, the West would also lose. The unpleasant conditions would result in conflict, and refugee flows to the detriment of Western Europe (predominantly Germany). See Ted Hopf, "Managing Soviet Disintegration: A Demand for Behavioural Regimes", International Security, (Vol. 17, No. 1), Summer 1992, pp. 48-49.
4. For an explanation of the potential threats emanating from the targeted region, see Edward Mortimer, "European Security After the Cold War", Adelphi Paper, (No. 271), Summer, 1992, pp. 7-16. See also John F. Mearshimer, "Back to the Future", International Security, (Vol. 15, No. 1), Summer 1990.
5. While Western states may agree to common action through a multilateral institution in applying economic or political norms on the region, this will prove challenging. Even in the face of the Soviet threat throughout the Cold War, there existed an axis of West-West conflict - this will continue in the application of behavioural regimes on the post-Soviet

world. Witness the different perceptions of Russia, the U.S., Britain, Germany, Bulgaria and Greece in applying sanctions to Serbia. See John Zametica, "The Yugoslav Conflict", Adelphi Paper, (No. 270), Summer 1992, pp. 47-65.

On the West-West axis of conflict in the past and its relevance today, see Ted Hopf, *op. cit.*, pp. 71-73. It is certain that these differences will be clearly evident, when and if, involvement ever approaches military intervention. In these cases a state's interest must be directly confronted. See Doug Badow, "Avoiding War", Foreign Policy, (No. 89), Winter 1992/93, p. 167.

6. In his article, Nye asserts that although powerful states, (i.e. the U.S.), are still the major entities of an international system, a number of issues are becoming too all encompassing for states to approach individually and thus, multilateral efforts will increasingly become the norm. See Joseph S. Nye Jr., "What New World Order?", Foreign Affairs, (Vol. 71, No. 2), Spring 1992, p. 86.
7. The state of international relations is presently involved in a shifting of responsibility from the state level to the, perhaps, multilateral level. Whereas Realists see international politics occurring among sovereign states balancing each others' power, Liberals look at relations among peoples and values, as well as states, and thus, look more favourably on institutional approaches, such as that proposed in notions of 'new world orders'. International relations are presently caught in a shift between these two trains of thought. Many states therefore abdicate their former responsibility for multilateral responses which are not, as yet, prepared to adopt this role. Therefore, it is likely that institutions will play an important function in establishing and administering behavioural regimes, but will run into more difficulty when military decisions are to be made. See Joseph S. Nye Jr., *op. cit.*, p. 84, and Doug Badow, *op. cit.* See also Charles William Maynes, *op. cit.*, pp. 6-9.

8. A security dilemma arises when a state, while arming itself for purely defensive reasons, unintentionally makes its neighbours feel more insecure, resulting in arms races, provocative military postures and their attendant dangers. See Ted Hopf, *op. cit.*, p. 52.
9. Hobbesian anarchy, in this respect, refers to the anarchy of states striving for power in the international system. See Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics, (New York 1979).
10. For the involvement of powers on Europe and the former USSR's southern periphery, including Turkey, Iran and Islamic fundamentalism see Edward Mortimer, *op. cit.*, pp. 35-46.
11. Such a scenario is plausible in the former Yugoslavia, where Bosnia has appealed on numerous occasions to Turkey and Albania for aid. The same is true in Tajikistan where rebels have been aided by Afghanistan and Iran, among others. See Edward Mortimer, *op. cit.*, pp. 35-46.
12. In this case, reconciling meant satisfying the requests of all European states that Germany, once reunited, would not return to familiar behavioural patterns. Also, several East-Central European states, including Russia, wanted limitations placed on NATO involvement in a reunited Germany. See Richard H. Ullman, Securing Europe, (Princeton 1991), pp. 43-62.
13. Herman-Josef Rupieper, "United States, Germany and European Security", in The End of the Cold War: Its Meaning and Implications, Michael J. Hogan, (ed.), (Cambridge 1992), p. 179.
14. *Ibid.*, pp. 178-179.
15. Although the powers do favour stability and could perhaps, pool their resources to this end, their perceptions and abilities to effect change do differ. See Edward Mortimer, *op. cit.*, pp. 47-65.

16. If prior agreements had been reached, outbreaks of violence in these states, and others, may have been stopped by the international implications for any aggressor. See Ted Hopf, *op. cit.*, pp. 54-58.
17. See "Violence Caps UN Head's Trip to Hot Spots", Toronto Star, January 5, 1993, p. A13.
18. Action should be taken by the international community in these areas to monitor treatment of minorities before the changes of conflict increase. See Jan Zielonka, "Security in Central Europe", Adelphi Paper, (No. 272), Autumn 1992, pp. 10-31.
19. In the present desperate economic plight of the states in the targeted region, very few could afford to ignore the West. Serbia too, would probably not have incited its ethnic kin in Bosnia if they were made to understand the consequences and if these sanctions could be effectively enforced.
20. See Edward Mortimer, *op. cit.*, pp. 35-46. See also Vladimir Lukin, "Our Security Predicament", Foreign Policy, (No. 89), Winter 1992/93, pp. 137-155.
21. See Jack Snyder, "Averting Anarchy in the New Europe", International Security, (Vol. 15, No. 3), *op. cit.*, p. 133.
22. For an excellent account of the inherent dangers of praetorian politics and aggressive foreign policies, see Jack Snyder, *op. cit.*, pp. 123-127.
23. Although these disaffections may not be commonplace in Western Europe, they do exist. Witness the Basques in Spain, the Bretons in France and the Catholics in Ulster.
24. For an account of the excesses of nationalistic behaviour, see Zbigniew Brezezinski, "Post-communist Nationalism", Foreign Affairs, Winter 1990, (Vol. 68, No. 5). On specific accounts in the abovementioned theatres, witness the Georgian legislation which declares that only those who can trace their ancestry back over 200 years can be eligible for

citizenship or property. See James Brooke, "Four Die in Georgia as Military Units Clash", New York Times, September 26, 1991, p. A8.

25. The present international wars include the various conflicts in the former Yugoslavia covering a number of international borders, the Armenian-Azeri conflict, and at times, the conflict in Georgia, Tajikistan and Moldova. For an account of the minority dissipation that could result in further wars, see Appendix D. See also Ted Hopf, *op. cit.*, pp. 60-64.
26. In May 1993, Slobodan Milosevic stood for 'election' and retained his seat as the President of Serbia. The election was contested however, by all international monitoring agencies. Their combined power however, with a degree of Serbian support, was unable to deter his resumption of power.
27. See Stephen Van Era, "Primed for Peace: Europe After the Cold War", International Security, (Vol. 15, No. 3), Winter 1990/91, *op. cit.*, pp. 209-210. See also, Ted Hopf, *op. cit.*, p. 65.
28. As it has been noted however, nations in the past, (i.e. Germany), have accepted infringements on their sovereignty in the field of education with very positive results. See Paul M. Kennedy, "The Decline of Nationalistic History in the West, 1900-1970", Journal of Contemporary History, (Vol. 8, No. 1), January 1973, pp. 77-100.
29. See Stephen Van Era, *op. cit.*, pp. 238-239.
30. See David A. Welch, "The New Multilateralism and Evolving Security Systems", *op. cit.*, p. 74.
31. See Doug Bandow, *op. cit.*, p. 162.
32. For suggestions, such as on Western monitoring of the treatment of national minorities and boundary settlements, see Ted Hopf, *op. cit.*, pp. 62-64.
33. The colossal amount of time and money needed to aid the former Soviet bloc in its attempted transformation has not been forthcoming, due to the enormity of the task, the

uncertainty of how to perform it, and the constraints the international recession has placed on the Western economic powers. So too, Europe's focus has concentrated on 'Europe 1992' and reacting to the Yugoslav war not aiding the remainder of the region.

34. See James Laxer, Inventing Europe: The Rise of a New World Power, (Toronto 1991), pp. 117-121.
35. J.F.V. McAllister, "A Two Trillion Dollar Wish List", Time, December 7, 1992, p. 49.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid.
38. On potential refugee and associated problems due to failed reform efforts, see Edward Mortimer, *op. cit.*, pp. 14-17.
39. For an outline of the Marshall Plan and its successes in helping to rebuild a shattered European economy, see Walter LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945 - 1984, (New York 1985), pp. 49-73.
40. Such difficulties have already arisen in countries like Germany and France, spawning the expected backlash. The inherent economic and political problems of massive immigration have led many West European nations to stiffen their immigration laws. See James Laxer, *op. cit.*, pp. 177-220.
41. For an account of economic management in the CMEA, as opposed to in the USSR, see J.F. Brown, Eastern Europe and Communist Rule, (London: 1988). See especially Chapter Six on Hungary.
42. These three states have already agreed to co-ordinate some of their economic policies with the EC, forming the so-called 'Visegrad Triangle'. See Jan Zielonka, *op. cit.*, pp. 3-4.
43. J.F.V. McAllister, *op. cit.*, p. 50.

44. For an explanation of how European economic institutions should aim to broaden their scope, see James Laxer, *op. cit.*, pp. 287-288.
45. For a discussion concerning reinforcement of reform in the post-Soviet world via an economic and political 'carrot-and-stick approach', see Ted Hopf, *op. cit.*, pp. 66-69.
46. Western security precautions can no longer only concentrate on East-West scenarios. A build-up of economic and military, (i.e. inclusion in NATO or an extension of a security assurance) to Poland, while Russia continued to disintegrate, would draw a negative response from Moscow. It is for this reason that the West has created NACC for all the emerging states and allowed them to join the CSCE. See Edward Mortimer, *op. cit.*, pp. 25-27.
47. The Western multilateral security actors have maintained their capabilities in attempting to adapt to the new security environment. In doing so, NATO has created a new Rapid Reaction Corps. See Doug Bandow, *op. cit.*, pp. 160-161.
48. See John J. Mearshimer, *op. cit.*, pp. 167-176.
49. *Ibid*, p. 173.
50. For a discussion of the nuclear and conventional capabilities of the emerging republics following the dissolution of the USSR, see Ted Hopf, *op. cit.*, p. 50 (Note 12). Hopf asserts that although 85% of the former Soviet nuclear arsenal was maintained in Russia, the remainder, (a significant amount), was located in Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus.
51. See Ted Hopf, *op. cit.*, pp. 52-56. Hopf asserts that even though the probability of a nuclear exchange between one of the former republics, Russia, and/or a European state is small, the prospects are scary, especially when one considers the security dilemmas in the region.
52. On the proliferation of the post-soviet nuclear and conventional arsenals, see Andrei

Zagorski, "Post-Soviet Nuclear Proliferation Risks", Security Dialogue, (Vol. 23), September 1992, pp. 27-40.

53. Primarily, this refers to the plethora of bilateral and unilateral agreements and cuts approved by Gorbachev in the final years of the USSR. See Ted Hopf, *op. cit.*, pp. 59-60.
54. Ibid.
55. Ibid.
56. Ibid.
57. Ibid.
58. By increasing the participation of Western states and institutions in their measures, the new states of the former Soviet bloc would feel more secure and potential aggressors would be less likely to act.
59. See Ted Hopf, *op. cit.*, pp. 61-62.
60. Ibid.
61. See Andrei Zagorski, *op. cit.*, p. 28.
62. Ibid., p. 27.
63. On the implications of START II, see "Reducing Nukes Raises New Hopes", The Toronto Star, January 65, 1993, p. A12.
64. It is obvious that the Americans, (and the Russians), would be far better prepared to tackle the problems attached to arms control and disposal. See "Reducing Nukes", *op. cit.* See also Ted Hopf, *op. cit.*
65. It is quite probable that many governments in the post-Soviet world will, initially at least, attempt to rebuff attempts to intrude on their new-found sovereignty. The proper utilization of the 'carrot-and-stick' approach, mixing Western restrictions with economic aid and investment, should help. Also it is instructive to note that state barriers have often let their guard down to Western institutions, such as the IMF in the Third World. Also, since the

1970's, the two superpowers, along with their allies, submitted to on-site intrusive inspections and formal warnings of troop transfers. See Hopf, op. cit., pp. 70-71.

66. Indeed, this will be a formidable problem, but one that can be overcome. See Edward Mortimer, op. cit. See also Doug Bandow, op. cit., and Charles William Maynes, op. cit.
67. Gorbachev first referred to this in his policy of 'new thinking', when he referred to Europe as a 'common home'. For the feelings of East-Central Europeans on the prospects of rejoining Europe and its many meanings, see Edward Mortimer, op. cit., pp. 5-6.
68. See Ted Hopf, op. cit., p. 68. This, of course, would not include all organizations, but only the ones in which the state was prepared to play a productive role. No doubt, many of the concerned states would enjoy belonging to the G-7, but it is simply not feasible.
69. Throughout the Cold War, American policy-makers utilized MFN states as a political lever to attempt to mould a foreign state's domestic activity on human rights issues.
70. For a discussion of the actual and potential roles of the IMF and the EBRD in the 'new Europe', see James Laxer, op. cit., pp. 275-290.
71. This is certainly no forgone conclusion. Witness the Western attempts to impose and administer sanctions on the rump state of Yugoslavia. Certainly, non-conformity of opinion has had a role to play there. For the differing interests, see John Zametica, op. cit., pp. 46-66.
72. See Ted Hopf, op. cit., pp. 64-66.
73. See Thomas L. Friedman, "Pact on European Armies", New York Times, September 12, 1990, p. 3.
74. This action, begun in earnest by George Bush, was accelerated by the Clinton administration. See Charles William Maynes, op. cit.
75. For a description of this transition, see Richard H. Ullman, op. cit., p. 80.

76. The notion of American power leading to a unipolar world in the wake of the Soviet demise is a fallacy. This is not because America's stature has fallen so greatly, as many assume. By and large, America has simply returned to its natural position among the ranks of nations, following the 'World War II Affect'. For the debate on American power from the declinist and non-declinist points of view, see Joseph S. Nye Jr., Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power, (New York 1990). See also, Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, (New York 1987), and Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise", International Security, (Vol. 17, No. 4), Spring 1993, pp. 5-51.
77. For a discussion on the pursuit of the emerging states of East-Central Europe and the former Soviet Union, for American (or NATO) security assurances, see Edward Mortimer, op. cit., pp. 30-32. This call resulted in the creation of NACC. For another example, see the Yugoslav nations attempt to garner American support through the UN envoy, (and former Secretary of State), Cyrus Vance. See John Zametica, "The Yugoslav Conflict", op. cit., pp. 67-68. On Somalia, and the U.S.'s 'special role', on any collective team, see Doug Bandow, op. cit.
78. See Doug Bandow, op. cit., pp. 164-174. It is the threat of these conflicts expanding, which must be guarded against, if prior conflict aversion efforts do not materialize.
79. See Doug Bandow, op. cit., p. 165. This, of course, is the topic of much debate. Many scholars feel however, that with the passing of the Cold War, the justification for interventionist military strategy is gone. With the dissolution of the Soviet/Totalitarian threat, the U.S. need no longer follow a policy of global 'containment' but can simply look after its own interests.
80. If the Yugoslav conflict were to widen, America and its allies, would act via an ad hoc

collective action, but they will not do so on a large scale while the conflict remains confined to the former Yugoslav nations.

81. The Persian Gulf stands as an example of an ad hoc response initiated by the U.S., and its allies in the region, against an aggressor. While it was a collective action, it was not an example of 'collective security'. See Kupchan and Kupchan, *op. cit.*, for an explanation of collective security systems.
82. See Doug Bandow, *op. cit.*
83. *Ibid*, p. 169.
84. To use the UN as an example of 'collective security' - it would be very difficult to foresee it taking action against any Security Council member, (permanent status), or any of its allies, or any state that could garner eight votes in the Security Council. Any attempt to attack would be vetoed.

Yugoslavia, 1945-91

APPENDIX A

APPENDIX B

THE BALKAN CONFLICT

The Former Yugoslavia and the Danube River

APPENDIX C

BORDERS

- — — International
- Others

[1] Moravia

[2] Czech Silesia

[3] Limit of Hungarian
population

[4] Transcarpathian Oblast

[5] Limit of former Hungarian
autonomous region
(pre-1965)

APPENDIX D

Republics of the Russian Federation

APPENDIX E

Table 1. Where Are Minorities in the Former Soviet Union?

	Population total (in millions)	Titular nationality as % of total	Main minorities as % of total
Russia	147	82	
Ukraine	52	73	22% Russian
Uzbekistan	20	71	8% Russian
Kazakhstan	17	40	38% Russian
Belarus	10	78	13% Russian
Azerbaijan	7	83	6% Russian, 6% Armenian
Georgia	5	70	8% Armenian, 6% Russian, and 6% Azeri
Tadjikistan	5	62	23% Uzbek, 7% Russian
Moldova	4	65	14% Ukrainian, 13% Russian
Kirghizia	4	52	22% Russian, 12% Uzbek
Lithuania	4	80	9% Russian, 7% Polish
Turkmenistan	4	72	9% Russian, 9% Uzbek
Armenia	3	93	2% Azeri
Latvia	3	52	35% Russian
Estonia	2	62	30% Russian

SOURCE: Adapted from *The Economist*, August 31, 1991, p. 38.

Map: Potential New States Within Russia.

**Appendix F Membership of main European organizations
(as of 1 August 1992)**

	CSCE	Council of Europe	EC	EFTA	NACC	NATO	WEU
Albania	x						
Armenia	x				x		
Austria	x	x		x			
Azerbaijan	x				x		
Belgium	x	x	x		x	x	x
Bosnia-Herzegovina	x						
Bulgaria	x	x			x		
Byelarus	x				x		
Canada	x				x	x	
Croatia	x						
Cyprus	x	x					
CSFR	x	x			x		
Denmark	x	x	x		x	x	
Estonia	x				x		
Finland	x	x		x			
France	x	x	x		x	x	x
Germany	x	x	x		x	x	x
Georgia	x				x		
Greece	x	x	x		x	x	
Holy See	x						
Hungary	x	x			x		
Iceland	x	x		x	x	x	
Ireland	x	x	x				
Italy	x	x	x		x	x	x
Kazakhstan	x				x		
Kyrgyzstan	x				x		
Latvia	x				x		
Liechtenstein	x	x		x			
Lithuania	x				x		
Luxembourg	x	x	x		x	x	x
Malta	x	x					
Moldova	x				x		
Monaco	x						
Netherlands	x	x	x		x	x	x
Norway	x	x		x	x	x	
Poland	x	x			x		
Portugal	x	x	x		x	x	x
Romania	x				x		
Russia	x				x		
San Marino	x	x					
Slovenia	x						
Spain	x	x	x		x	x	x
Sweden	x	x		x			
Switzerland	x	x		x			
Tajikistan	x				x		
Turkey	x	x			x	x	
Turkmenistan	x				x		
Ukraine	x				x		
UK	x	x	x		x	x	x
USA	x				x	x	
Uzbekistan	x				x		
Yugoslavia*							

~~Continued on page 72.~~

Edward Martimer, op. cit., p. 71.

YUGOSLAVIA BEFORE THE WAR

APPENDIX G

FORMER YUGOSLAVIA TODAY

APPENDIX G

PEACE PLAN PROPOSAL FOR BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

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