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SCUTTLED DIPLOMACY:

A Study of Intervention by the United Nations in Rwanda

by

ROBERT EDEN ASTROFF, B.A., LL.B.

A thesis submitted to
the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

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of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Martin Rudner', written over a horizontal line.

Professor Martin Rudner, Director
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Professor D. Carment, Supervisor

ABSTRACT

The genocide in Rwanda will be remembered as one of the greatest atrocities of the twentieth century. It should also be recalled as an instance of indifference by the international community in general and by the United Nations in particular. The aftermath of this tragic event continues to present complex problems for the country, the region and a multitude of international actors.

The case raises critical questions for policy makers in terms of intervention by third parties in violent intergroup conflicts. In particular, how could timing and strategy have been combined more effectively to stem the tide of violence? The study suggests that serious attention should be given to timing when considering whether to undertake a de-escalation effort, but greater emphasis must be placed on determining which strategy to pursue.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

BBGNU	Broad-Based Government of National Unity
CDR	Coalition pour la Défense de la République
CIA	Conflict Intensity Abatement
DPKO	Department of Peace-keeping Operations
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
FPR	Front Patriotique Rwandaise
FRY	Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
IMF	International Monetary Fund
MDR	Mouvement Démocratique Républicain
MRND	Mouvement Républicain pour la Démocratie et le Développement (formerly Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement)
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NMOG	Neutral Military Observer Group
NORAD	North American Aerospace Defense
NSC	National Security Council
OAS	Organization of American States
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PDC	Parti Démocrate Chrétien
PDD-25	Presidential Decision Directive 25
PJBD	Permanent Joint Board of Defense
PL	Parti Libéral
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
PSD	Parti Social Démocrate
RPF	Rwandese Patriotic Front
RTL	Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines
SAP	Structural Adjustment Program
UN	United Nations
UNAMIR I	United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda I
UNAMIR II	United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda II
UNEF I	United Nations Emergency Force I
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNOMUR	United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda
UNOR	United Nations Office in Rwanda
UK	United Kingdom
US	United States
WEU	Western European Union
WTO	Warsaw Treaty Organization

INTRODUCTION

The delay in reaction by the international community to the genocide in Rwanda has demonstrated graphically its extreme inadequacy to respond urgently with prompt and decisive action to humanitarian crises entwined with armed conflict. . . . We all must recognize that, in this respect, we have failed in our response to the agony of Rwanda, and thus have acquiesced in the continued loss of human lives. Our readiness and capacity for action has been demonstrated to be inadequate at best, and deplorable at worst, owing to the absence of the collective political will. While attempting now to redeem these failings in the Rwandese crisis, the entire system requires review to strengthen its reactive capacity.

Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Rwanda*, 31 May 1994 (UN Doc. S/1994/640)

No introduction can adequately prepare one for an examination of genocide. No words can do justice to the memory of the victims or the anguish of the survivors. Only fifty years after the Holocaust, the world allowed another genocide to take place. Within a three month period in 1994, between 500,000-800,000 people were murdered in Rwanda.¹ Countless numbers were physically and psychologically traumatized, as a result of maiming, rape and other crimes; over two million people were forced to flee to neighbouring countries and perhaps half as many became internally displaced within Rwanda (Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda 1996a, 5). The legacy of violence has led to continued suffering, heightened tension and economic loss, both in Rwanda and in the broader Great Lakes region.

The genocide in Rwanda will be remembered as one of the greatest atrocities of the twentieth century. It should also be recalled as an instance of indifference by the international community in general and by the United Nations (UN) in particular. As the tragedy unfolded, the world watched, seemingly unable or unwilling to establish an intervention force capable of ending the bloodshed.

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¹ The exact number of Rwandan men, women and children who were killed in the frenzy of massacres will probably never be determined accurately and estimates vary widely. Based on the analysis in the *Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda*, this study uses the range 500,000-800,000. To focus on numbers alone, however, is to do an injustice to those who died. While the number of people who were killed is significant, so too is the experience of each person who was murdered, as well as those who survived the genocide.

Rwanda is a glaring contemporary example of the international community's practice of intervention without responsibility. As a result, the case raises critical questions for policy makers. In particular, how could the international community have better crafted a response to the vicious cycle of economic decline and political tension that ultimately led to the genocide?

Specifically, this study investigates the following research question: what is the relationship among the timing, strategy, and outcome of third party intervention? The primary objective of this research is to enhance the ability of decision makers to intervene more effectively in intergroup conflicts.² Based on this research question, a series of hypotheses will be deduced from the literature review that will be systematically applied to the case study. This thesis adds to the study of conflict management by offering a theoretical framework for evaluating the outcome of third party intervention.

The study begins with an exposition of concepts. Chapter I provides an overview of the methodology and theoretical literature. Based on this research, a model will be designed to evaluate the relationship between the independent variables—timing and strategy, and the dependent variable—outcome. These variables were selected, as their importance is emphasized in both theory and practice, but the relationship among them is not clearly understood.

Chapter II documents the history of the intergroup conflict in Rwanda; the events that occurred during this time will form a series of case studies. For the purposes of

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² The study of conflict abounds with terms that seek to describe violence among state and substate actors, spanning the spectrum of intensity from minor unrest to full-scale war. Rather than attempting to classify conflict narrowly as "ethnic," "religious," "social," "economic," or otherwise, this work seeks a definition that is broadly inclusive. Most conflicts prevalent in the current international environment occur between groups (Huntington 1993, 38). Compared with interstate conflict, intergroup conflict poses more complex problems for third party intervenors because it requires a more sophisticated application of solutions. For example, recent events in Rwanda between Hutus and Tutsis were affected by cross-border activities of group members in neighbouring Zaire, Burundi, and Uganda, without the express involvement of the political elite or state infrastructures of those sovereign entities. The international community sought to contain the conflict within the borders of Rwanda, however, it soon became apparent that these administrative boundaries were quickly traversed by violence and intragroup affinities. The extraterritorial aspects of the Rwandan conflict suggest that the term "intergroup conflict" has greater analytical utility than "intrastate conflict" for the purposes of this study.

analysis, efforts by the UN to manage the conflict are divided into four phases, each representing a different intervention.

Chapter III discusses the application of the theoretical model to the case studies through the lens of the hypotheses developed earlier in the thesis. It will be demonstrated that both timing and strategy affect outcome, but that the strategy employed by a third party has a greater impact on the outcome of the intervention.

Finally, chapter IV summarizes the results of the analysis and concludes with policy recommendations for improving the effectiveness of third party intervention. These insights will be relevant not only to the on-going tensions in the Great Lakes region, but also to the management of protracted intergroup conflicts. The chapter also offers suggestions for future inquiry, in order to encourage further examination of the dynamics of third party intervention. It is argued that policy makers must take heed of the lessons learned in the Rwandan tragedy and remember that once the UN makes the commitment to intervene in a violent intergroup dispute, it must stay the course of conflict resolution.

CHAPTER I: METHODOLOGY AND THEORETICAL OVERVIEW

A man should live if only to satisfy his curiosity.
Yiddish Proverb

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the regimes of its satellite states marked an important turning point in international relations. For more than forty years, the promise of world order heralded by the birth of the UN in 1945 lay unfulfilled, caught between competing East-West ideologies. Powerful states, capable of projecting military force abroad, spoke in terms of political, social, or economic justice, but almost always acted in a manner that perpetuated the bipolar balance of power.

With the erosion of superpower tensions, hopes reemerged for a "new world order" (Bush 1991), where the dictates of ideological competition would give way to greater political, social, and economic cooperation, built on the pillars of international law and multilateral organizations. A resurgent UN, a dramatic reduction in nuclear and conventional weapons, and a wave of democratization provided new opportunities for achieving these goals.

In early 1991, a coalition of states, operating under the formal authorization of the UN, successfully responded to Iraqi aggression in Kuwait. This action raised hopes that the prohibition on the use of war as an instrument of national policy had finally moved from ideal to reality (Malone 1998, 78).

Unfortunately, a genuinely cooperative world seems as elusive as ever. The demise of the bipolar world has presented different threats, including ethnic, religious, economic, and cultural clashes all over the globe. As Yugoslavia disintegrated during the early 1990s, the international community watched and wondered whether this anarchy was the beginning of a disturbing new trend toward intergroup conflict.

The conflict in the former Yugoslavia, however, has not turned out to be an isolated event. The Middle East continues to smoulder. Regional conflicts in the former Soviet Union, including Chechnya and Nagorno-Karabakh, are numerous and continue to fester.

Many post-colonial African states, such as Somalia, Sudan, Liberia, Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and Sierra Leone suffer from intense contention for state power among communal groups. In Asia, the struggle over Kashmir between India and Pakistan and the cycles of violence in Afghanistan and Sri Lanka are indicative of a much larger number of potential crises. Although the bloodshed in El Salvador has subsided, parts of Latin America regularly experience political upheaval, including protracted guerrilla struggles in Columbia, Mexico, Guatemala and Peru.

No state is immune from conflict, including what are perceived as the world's most stable countries. Within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) alone: Turkey battles the Kurds; Spain strives to quell the Basques, and more peacefully the Catalans; Great Britain struggles with Northern Ireland, and to a lesser extent Scotland; Greece feuds with the Macedonians; the United States (US) confronts deep racial and ethnic cleavages; Canada contends with a secessionist threat from the Québécois; Belgium seeks a compromise between the Flemish and Walloons; France faces down Corsican nationalists; and in Italy, the Lombardy League looks to separate the north from the south. The prominence of these conflicts and their drain on the political, economic, and human capital of individual states and international organizations makes the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts a timely and important issue.

This chapter provides a foundation for the analysis that follows. The first part presents the research questions that will be studied in this thesis. The second part explains the methodology employed and the choice of variables to be examined. The third part discusses a definition of third party intervention. The fourth part surveys the independent variables—timing and strategy, and the dependent variable—outcome. The fifth part lists the hypotheses that will be evaluated in this research. The final part justifies the selection of Rwanda as the case study for analysis.

I. Research Questions

Conflict is one of the most pervasive features of all social systems. Whenever it occurs in the international context, it is significant, newsworthy, and challenging. To understand this approach to conflict management more completely, one needs to investigate the following *research questions*, deductively derived from the scholarly literature: *What is the most effective time to intervene in a conflict? What functions do third parties perform? In what context are these tasks carried out? What are the consequences of actions taken by third parties?*

While the connection between intervention and outcome is often mentioned, it is rarely defined, and frequently misunderstood. In an attempt to bridge this gap, this work focuses specifically on the central question: *What is the relationship among the timing, strategy, and outcome of third party intervention?* It is argued that timing and strategy link the context to the practice of third party intervention in moving the disputants from conflict to conciliation.

II. Methodology

The framework for this thesis will follow Alexander George's method of "structured, focused comparison" which makes it possible to draw generalizations from a small number of cases by evaluating a small number of variables (1979, 43-68). The methodology is "structured" as it employs a set of standardized questions that guide the analysis, and "focused" as it deals selectively with only certain aspects of the case. This approach is useful as it allows lessons to be derived from a single case study.

In order to provide the theoretical underpinning for this study, the independent and dependent variables that will be tested must be identified. It is impossible to examine every potential explanation for the outcome of third party intervention, because the processes, context and actors involved are intrinsically complex. As Jacob Bercovitch notes, "[t]he number of variables which impinge on this process is immense"; accordingly, consideration can only be given to some of them (1984a, 116). The task, then, is to choose

specific variables that will change over the course of intervention efforts, while holding others constant, and to provide justification for why these particular factors have been selected and how they best capture variation in the dependent variable.³

(a) Independent Variable 1: Timing

The timing of intervention initiatives appears to be a critical factor in determining the potential impact of third party efforts to resolve disputes. This variable has only recently become the focus of systematic attention by international relations theorists (Kleiboer and t' Hart 1995, 307-348). Kriesberg defines timing as "recognizing whether or not the adversaries are ready to move away from escalation or down from stalemate" (1987, 375). The question that has dominated the discourse, thus far, is whether it is possible to identify particular moments in the evolution of a conflict when third party intervention will be most effective. This study will use the concepts of "ripe moments" and "triggers" to determine if third party efforts were initiated at an opportune time during the course of a conflict. Timing is related to the strategic role of a third party, as it influences when intervention takes place, and accordingly what strategy is appropriate under the circumstances.

(b) Independent Variable 2: Strategy

Evaluating the relationship between the strategy employed by a third party and the outcome of intervention is a difficult task. Although conceptualizing or measuring the behaviour of third parties and strategies is challenging, it is arguably the most important variable affecting outcome. Accordingly, examination of this variable is critical to gaining a more complete understanding of the success or failure of third party initiatives. The appropriateness of the strategy is determined by comparing the optimal type of intervention predicted by the theoretical model with the tactics that were actually employed. Strategy is

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³ The importance of timing and strategy has been emphasized by Louis Kriesberg and Stuart J. Thorson (1991, 1-24).

linked to outcome, as the tactics employed by a third party affect the method and manner in which intervention is carried out.

(c) Dependent Variable: Outcome

The formulation of specific criteria to analyze the effectiveness of third party intervention has presented difficulty to both scholars and practitioners. Touval and Zartman rightly note that "[w]hat constitutes successful mediation is of course debatable" (1985, 14).⁴ Given that the objective of third party intervention is to achieve a "successful" outcome, logic dictates that outcome must be considered the dependent variable for this study. The success of third party initiatives will be assessed by a rank order scale measuring the abatement of conflict intensity.

III. Third Party Intervention

The scholarly literature on third party intervention cuts across many disciplines: as a result, confusion can easily arise from the imprecise use of terms. Accordingly, it is both necessary and appropriate to define "third party intervention" for the purposes of this study.

The involvement of third parties in the management of international conflicts has been an enduring part of world politics. The historical roots of this type of intervention originate in ancient Greece (Claude 1971, 217), and ever since, it has remained an important tool of statecraft. In the twentieth century, third party intervention was enshrined in the Covenant of the League of Nations and, after World War II, in the UN Charter. Regional organizations such as the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Organization of African Unity (OAU), together with security organizations such as NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO), have played significant roles as third parties in regional conflicts. Finally, individual states, notably (but not exclusively) the great

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⁴ This debate and the formulation of specific criteria for assessing interventions by third parties will be addressed more fully on pages 45-46 of this chapter.

powers in the interwar period and the superpowers since 1945, have also been deeply involved in attempts to mitigate crises, conflicts, and wars among states. Since the end of the Cold War, third party interventions have focussed primarily on intrastate and intergroup conflicts.

Many scholars have advanced definitions of third party intervention: deciding among them is ultimately subjective. The number of meanings attests to the complexity of contexts, processes and outcomes involved when a third party intervenes in a violent intergroup conflict.

At its most general level, to "intervene" means "[t]o come in or between so as to affect, modify, or prevent a result, action, etc." (*Oxford English Dictionary*, 2d ed., s.v. "intervene"). In the context of international relations, third party intervention denotes the involvement in a dispute of "a person or an agency whose purpose it is to act as an instrument for bringing about a . . . settlement to that dispute, while creating structures whereby the foundations of a lasting settlement can be laid" (Harbottle 1979-80, 120).

A widely employed definition of third party intervention takes the following form: "[A]ny action taken by an actor that is not a direct party to the crisis, that is designed to reduce or remove one or more of the problems of the bargaining relationship and, therefore, to facilitate the termination of the crisis itself" (Young 1967, 34). This characterization regards third parties as intermediaries pursuing two distinct purposes—to help regulate and terminate a crisis and to establish a substantive settlement and limit its destabilizing impact. The rationale for such intervention is grounded in realist thought, highlighting the essentially anarchic nature of the international system.

Davis Bobrow provides a useful summary of the functions that third parties can perform:

In principle, third parties can contribute to crisis regulation and settlement in two ways. First, they can make a direct positive contribution. Familiar examples include focusing the parties on a particular termination agreement, devising a formula to avoid hard issues, providing an agenda, and manipulating timing. Second, third parties can work to weaken constraints on the primary parties; that is, they can make it easier for the primary parties

to do what they would in some sense like to do anyway. Third parties do this by lowering the net costs associated with a more flexible bargaining position, including the internal political penalties. In effect, third parties provide face-saving assistance for the primary conflict participants. They do so by providing rationalizations for the disavowal of previous stands, by certifying the benefits of an agreement, and by providing insurance against the risks should an agreement fail (1981, 188).

Third party intervention may embody strategic action by either unilateral or multilateral actors. It is acknowledged that achieving consensus among multiple actors is more challenging than pursuing unilateral action by a neutral and impartial actor. For example, in the current NATO intervention in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), determining the appropriate alliance strategy has proved difficult, given the fact that 19 countries are involved in the decision-making process.

For the purposes of this study, "third party intervention" refers to the deliberate actions taken by individuals, states, coalitions, or organizations to assist other states, national entities, or groups move toward the resolution of pressing matters of international concern. This definition is particularly useful, as it encompasses a variety of third party activities ranging from peaceful efforts to de-escalate conflicts to initiatives involving the use of force.⁵

The most common form of third party intervention is *mediation* (Bercovitch and Langley 1993, 670).⁶ There is, however, some disagreement on the precise meaning of "mediation" in the international context.

The scope of mediation activities is truly immense. This is reflected in the abundance of definitions offered by various scholars. William Zartman and Saadia Touval note the distinction between mediation and other types of third party intervention:

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⁵ For the sake of conceptual clarity, third party intervention is assumed to be benign, that is, absent of political, legal, or ideological bias. Moreover, it is suggested that third parties intervene with the intention of doing good- as opposed to inflicting further harm upon societies and states threatened with intergroup conflict.

⁶ The word derives from the Latin root *mediare*- to halve. The connotation of the term varies according to the cultural context. For example, in the Chinese language it means to step between two parties and solve their problem, whereas in Arabic it indicates manipulation (Wall and Lynn 1993, 160).

Mediation differs from other forms of third-party intervention in conflicts in that it is not based on the direct use of force and that it is not aimed at helping one of the participants to win. Like good offices, mediation is concerned with helping the adversaries to communicate, and like conciliation, it emphasizes changing the parties' images of and attitudes toward one another—but it also performs additional functions. Mediators suggest ideas for a compromise, and they negotiate and bargain directly with the adversaries. Mediation differs from arbitration in that the latter employs judicial procedure and issues a verdict that the parties have committed themselves to accept, whereas the former is basically a political process without advance commitment of the parties to accept the mediator's ideas (1985, 31-32).

Leonard Doob uses the term in a very broad sense. He defines mediation as "the efforts of one or more persons to affect one or more other persons when . . . the former, the latter, or both perceive a problem requiring a resolution" (1993, 1). Mediation thus purports to offer a solution to any matter of contention arising between or among the disputants.

Some definitions are process-oriented and place emphasis on the act of intervention itself. Ann Douglas defines mediation as "a form of peacemaking in which an outsider to a dispute intervenes on his own or accepts the invitation of the disputing parties to assist them in reaching agreement" (1957, 70). Similarly, Linda Singer sees it as a "form of third party assistance . . . [that] involves an outsider to the dispute, who lacks the power to make decisions for the parties" (1990, 20). Process-oriented definitions are helpful in evaluating the proactive features of mediation, but have little reactive analytical function.

Other descriptions of mediation stress its outcomes. Christopher Mitchell views it as "intermediary activity . . . undertaken by a third party with the primary intention of achieving some compromise settlement of the issues at stake between the parties, or at least ending disruptive conflict behaviour indulged in by both sides" (1981, 275). Accordingly, the concept focuses on what mediators hope to accomplish and how they may go about achieving this result. Outcome-oriented definitions are useful from the standpoint of assessing the reactive aspects of mediation, but have little proactive analytical utility.

Still other characterizations are method-oriented, stressing the pacific nature of mediation initiatives. Marieke Kleiboer considers mediation or intermediary intervention as "a means of conflict management in which a third party assists two or more contending parties to settle or resolve their conflict without resorting to force or authoritative rules" (1997, 2). Method-oriented definitions assist scholars as they focus on the peaceful tactics employed by mediators. There is little emphasis on context, however, which results in little reactive analytical utility.

The meaning proposed by Bercovitch will be employed in this work. He defines mediation in the following manner:

[A] process of conflict management, related to but distinct from the parties' own negotiations, where those in conflict seek the assistance of, or accept an offer of help from an outsider (whether an individual, an organization, a group, or a state) to change their perceptions or behavior, and to do so without resorting to physical force or invoking the authority of law (1997, 130).

This construct was selected for three principal reasons: (1) it recognizes that mediation is a dynamic and complex process involving the parties in dispute, a social environment or context, a specific dispute or problem, and a mediating agent; (2) it recognizes the nature of a "successful" mediation outcome; and (3) it acknowledges the peaceful character of mediation. The value in using this definition is that it incorporates the proactive function of process-oriented approaches, the reactive utility of outcome-oriented approaches, and the nonviolent emphasis of method-oriented approaches.

IV. Independent and Dependent Variables

(a) Independent Variable 1: Timing

The timing of third party initiatives has significant policy implications. Evidence supports the notion that when intervention fails, it can be counterproductive: it may exacerbate tension between the disputants; it may decrease the credibility of the third party and subsequently detract from future initiatives; and, in some instances, failure may foster

conflict escalation (Zartman 1989a, 258-259). Accordingly, the study of timing is important from the standpoint of managing international conflict.

The emphasis placed on timing is motivated by both theoretical and practical concerns. The first arises out of the current scholarly debate on the importance of timing to the success of intervention efforts. Some scholars suggest that the most opportune time for intervention arrives with the emergence of a "ripe moment" or moments, which signal the necessary conditions for success (Zartman 1989a; Haass 1990; Stedman 1991). Critics, however, contend that the process of de-escalation varies according to the context (Kleiboer and t' Hart 1995, 307-348).

The second concern involves the significance of timing to the practice of conflict management. It has been argued that it is difficult, if not impossible, to judge when a ripe moment has arrived in the context of an emerging crisis (Kriesberg 1987, 383). If this criticism is correct, timing becomes a secondary consideration to policy makers—one intervenes until a ripe moment arrives and the initiative bears fruit. Conversely, proponents of the theory suggest that the conditions attributed to ripeness provide useful indicators for when third party intervention will be most effective (Haass 1988, 232-251). If timing influences outcome, it becomes important to identify what kinds of strategic interventions are best suited for different moments in the conflict de-escalation process.

Timing may determine the success of third party intervention to a great extent (Zartman 1989a; Haass 1990; Stedman 1991). Empirical evidence indicates that third party effectiveness is greatest when employed after negotiations have stalled (Bercovitch 1984a, 77-78 and 107-108). Many scholars suggest that conflicts pass through a life cycle that encompasses a number of distinguishable phases, with certain stages more amenable to third party intervention than others (Young 1967, 19-20; Lund 1996, 31-49; Brecher and Wilkenfeld 1997, 10-17). How the parties arrive at that phase, and whether that stage is early or late in the conflict, is the subject of considerable debate.

Some scholars contend that conflicts follow the logic of "clock" time, whereby the duration of the dispute is linked to the persistence or change in the attitudes of the adversaries toward one another (Kleiboer 1996, 362). This position, which supports intervention late in a conflict, is based on the notion that initiatives are most effective when failure to reach an agreement carries growing costs for one or both parties. Accordingly, a feeling of urgency will strongly increase the disputants' motivation to moderate their intransigence and revise their expectations. Alternatively, some theorists claim that efforts by third parties are more likely to be successful if they are initiated at an early stage, that is, well before the adversaries cross the threshold of violence and begin to suffer heavy losses (Bercovitch, Anagnoson and Wille 1991, 7-17; Lund 1996, 31-49). At such an initial, pre-violence stage, it is still possible to consider possibilities for settlement before the conflict has become too entrenched and the parties too inflexible in their positions.

Other scholars advocate the concept of "social" time (Lauer 1981, 21-51). These scholars believe that a conflict is ripe for resolution if certain events have taken place that affect the perceptions and attitudes of the disputants. William Zartman views the most effective time to intervene in relation to critical changes in the intensity of a conflict. Zartman argues that a ripe moment occurs when three conditions are present: (1) a hurting stalemate marked by a recent or looming catastrophe; (2) a way out of the conflict; and (3) a valid spokesperson for each side (1987, 283-285). Although not explicitly stated, it is implied that perception of these criteria rests with senior decision makers, rather than with elites or the population at large. Zartman's conception of a ripe moment constitutes a useful framework for assessing the timing of peaceful third party initiatives, as it places emphasis on the behavioural changes of the disputants, while accounting for the dynamic nature of conflicts. Accordingly, this study will build upon this foundation.

(i) Hurting Stalemate and Looming Catastrophe

The first characteristic of a ripe moment is a "hurting stalemate." Zartman defines this term as a situation in which "both parties . . . cannot extricate themselves by normal,

conceivable means of escalation. A hurting stalemate is not just an impasse: it is a deadlock that is uncomfortable for both sides" (1987, 284). This deadlock is created when the disputants have roughly equal military and economic resources to perpetuate the conflict, without one side having the distinct ability to defeat the other at any point in the foreseeable future. Stalemates "hurt" to the extent that maintaining the conflict incurs "intolerable" political, economic, and human costs which lead to a perceptual shift among the parties that adds de-escalation to their list of possible options.

Zartman describes a hurting stalemate as a "plateau" in the conflict which occurs when neither side is able to achieve its objectives or to win by itself. Accordingly, "[e]ach party must begin to feel uncomfortable in the costly dead-end into which it has gotten itself. A plateau must be perceived by both not as a momentary resting ground, but as a hurting stalemate, a flat, unpleasant terrain stretching into the future, providing no later possibilities for decisive escalation or graceful escape" (Zartman 1989a, 268).

While a hurting stalemate provides the combatants with unattractive unilateral options, it is not a sufficient source of motivation to prompt the active consideration of de-escalation. The explanation for this begins with the observation that, "the disputants [in intergroup conflicts] tend to have a disturbingly high absorptive capacity for collective suffering" (Mandell 1989, 9). Feeding this tendency is the development of perceptual biases among decision makers and their inclination to "overestimate the attractiveness of their alternatives to negotiated agreement" (Lax and Sebenius 1985, 170). For example, in the current conflict between FRY and NATO, the regime of Slobodan Milosevic has shown a willingness to absorb military punishment in its attempt to drive ethnic Albanians from Kosovo.

These observations suggest that, given a hurting stalemate, parties may perceive that their best option is to delay meaningful moves toward de-escalation in the belief that time favours their own bargaining position. What is required is an additional source of situational pressure that places the question of de-escalation under the immediate

consideration of decision makers. According to Zartman, "[w]hat is needed is a sharp change in costs, a catastrophe that makes matters worse if a way is not found to come to agreement" (1986, 220).

Zartman's requirement of a hurting stalemate is shared by other scholars. Hizkias Assefa notes that the "existence [of a mere stalemate] may not necessarily lead to a search for mediation unless the state of deadlock created exacts a 'high and rising cost' from the protagonists. The desire to cut the rising cost provides an incentive to settle the conflict" (1987, 17). Furthermore, Northedge and Donelan state that as long as one or both of the parties is confident that it has the capacity to act unilaterally, it will see no benefit to intervention by an outside party (1971, 307).

The perception of a "looming catastrophe" is necessary in determining when intervention is appropriate because "[p]eople learn to live with stalemates, even unpleasant ones" (Zartman 1986, 220). Whereas the hurting stalemate is compared to a "plateau," the looming catastrophe is analogous to a "precipice," as "[i]t represents a realization by both sides that matters will swiftly get worse if they have not gotten better in ways that negotiation seeks to define" (Zartman 1989a, 268).

A looming catastrophe involves two conceptual dimensions: "perceptions of crisis" and "attached costs." Crises are ultimately a subjective phenomenon, involving high stakes, uncertainty, narrowing options, and a perceived scarcity of time (Ury and Smoke 1985, 93-100). In the context of a looming catastrophe, crises are interpreted narrowly to mean time pressure, defined as the realization that a decision (on whether or not to de-escalate the conflict or to pursue an alternative course of action) is required in the immediate future. Conversely, crises are interpreted broadly with respect to their potential source. A crisis may be triggered by the perception of a military and/or political threat to the core interests of decision makers on the basis of constituency considerations, adversarial relations, and/or the rapport between the third party and the disputants (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 1997, 4-5 and 785-786). A "looming catastrophe" thus entails the belief by parties that costs will be

incurred in the immediate future if the *status quo* is not altered. When time is seen to be working against the interests of the parties, a delayed decision is not an option.

(ii) A Way Out of the Conflict

The second characteristic of a ripe moment is an appropriate formula or "a way out." This involves a perception on the part of the disputants that they can reach a negotiated agreement that will end their hurting stalemate and provide them with a means of avoiding the consequences of a looming catastrophe. This formula, however, must be mutually acceptable to the belligerents and their constituents. In addition, this alternative must fall within a "zone of agreement"—the area in which acceptable concessions for both parties merge or overlap. It is important that the option be considered the best alternative under the particular conditions. If either party decides that the concessions it must make are too great, it will find an alternative to a negotiated agreement, such as a return to violence. Conversely, a party will accept a proposal for a negotiated agreement when the perceived value of de-escalation is greater than the perceived value of its best alternative. A formula, or a way out, must therefore be found that meets the interests of both parties.

According to Zartman, "a way out" entails the emergence of "perceptions of potentiality" based on: "(1) a subjective perception that the other party is willing to provide its opponent with an acceptable outcome and (2) a more objective sense that the positions of the two sides are within reach of each other" (1987, 285). This conception of a way out, however, begs the question: when and how do these objective and subjective aspects of potentiality develop? Zartman's answer is that a way out emerges from the ripening process, when the narrowing of potential outcomes and alternative solutions culminates in "the emergence of a resolving formula" (1986, 218).

Several issues are raised by Zartman's formulation of a way out. First, the link between "a way out," "ripening," and "formula" runs the risk of tautology: a moment is ripe for "successful" de-escalation when a "successful" resolving formula is present. De-escalation efforts, however, may still fail to culminate in agreement even after the elements

of a resolving formula have emerged. Thus, a "resolving formula" is not sufficient for success.

Second, and more significantly, a way out does not appear to be a necessary precondition for the initiation of de-escalation moves. The emergence of a way out or resolving formula necessitates some prior interaction, or prenegotiation moves, between the disputants on the subject of de-escalation.

Third, while Zartman does note that, "[t]he pace of the ripening process is determined by the learning and perceiving of the parties" (1986, 218), he fails to address the psychological barriers that tend to reinforce conflicts and cause resistance to de-escalation moves. Psychological impediments may serve to block de-escalation efforts, even in the presence of conditions of ripeness. Essentially, these barriers are associated with an "increasingly dangerous and costly [social process] . . . from which the participants see no way of extricating themselves without becoming vulnerable to an unacceptable loss in a value central to their self-identities or self esteems" (Deutsch 1983, 4). These barriers result from the intense mistrust and hatred between the disputants, and essentially function to increase the perceived costs and risks of de-escalation. Psychological aspects of a conflict may block the emergence of a way out by increasing the perceived risks of insecure contracts, precedents and/or diplomatic failure.

To begin to address these issues effectively, the concept of a way out must be defined more rigorously relative to the phase of de-escalation. A review of the scholarly literature suggests that the key condition for the initiation phase of de-escalation is a psychological shift on the part of one or more of the disputants which results in a willingness to consider de-escalation as a potential option (Zartman 1989b, 243). This shift may be marked by an invitation to a potential third party to intervene, or by publicly issued tentative offers or proposals by one of the disputants that indicates an interest in de-escalation. While the parties may not demonstrate flexibility in their position, what is important is the signalled desire to consider de-escalation as an option. In practice, it is

unlikely that the disputants will overtly exhibit their desire to reduce tensions: the challenge of the intervenor is to recognize and cultivate such interest.

The second component of Zartman's formulation of "a way out" (a more tangible perception that the positions of the parties are within reach of each other) is the key indicator which signals that the moment is ripe for the culmination of de-escalation initiatives. While this may or may not entail the emergence of a "resolving formula" (*i.e.*, a possible settlement), it does suggest that all of the disputants engaged in de-escalation efforts have started to move from their maximum bargaining positions toward a potentially acceptable solution.⁷ In practice, this is likely to require a shift in behaviour marked by some initial concessions that start to close the gap between the conflicting positions of the parties. In this study, the term "secure way out" will be used to refer to this change in attitude.

(iii) Valid Representatives

The final characteristic of a ripe moment is the availability of valid (*i.e.*, acceptable) representatives. As used by Zartman, the term "valid representatives" refers to the presence of decision makers who have the authority to negotiate on behalf of their respective constituencies or the capacity to enforce an agreement if one is achieved (1987, 284-285). Of particular concern is the level of constituency support for these decision makers. As Kriesberg notes, "units [parties] with clearly differentiated leaders who are relatively secure from constituency challenges are freer both to escalate and to de-escalate than are units with vulnerable and relatively undifferentiated leadership positions" (1982, 191). Thus, valid representatives are leaders who the disputants believe can bring about a de-escalation of the conflict, in a manner that responds to their interests.

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⁷ Harold Saunders argues that before the parties will commit themselves to negotiate, the "leaders must be able to see that they could live politically with the shape of a settlement that might emerge from negotiation" (1985, 26).

Employing Zartman's criteria in a practical context, an example of a conflict reaching a ripe moment occurred during the civil war in Nicaragua between the Sandinista government and the Contras in early 1988. The two parties had achieved a hurting stalemate, due to the fact that after six years of costly war, victory remained out of sight for each side. In addition, both adversaries potentially faced a looming catastrophe. The Sandinista government was confronted with a deepening economic crisis which had led the country to ruin and eroded political support, while the Contras were faced with a winding down of East-West tensions and a potential reduction or elimination of US aid, as a consequence of the Iran-Contra debacle in 1986-1987. Thus, valid representatives of both sides took advantage of a way out and agreed to a cease-fire in March 1988, which led to negotiations on free multi-party elections.

(iv) Other Scholarly Constructs

Other theorists have also contributed to the concept of a ripe moment for intervention by third parties in international conflicts. Richard Haass considers a conflict ripe for intervention when four prerequisites are met: (1) a shared perception among the conflicting parties of the desirability of a settlement; (2) the ability of political leaders to agree to an accord; (3) formulas or agreements are based on a sufficiently favourable compromise that allows leaders on all sides to persuade their constituencies that their respective interests are protected; and finally, (4) disputants agree on an acceptable procedure to further deal with the conflict (Haass 1990, 27-29).⁸

Both Zartman and Haass emphasize that the belligerents need to believe a settlement is necessary, that they will be worse off in the future if no agreement is concluded, that such an accord needs to be considered reasonably satisfactory to all parties, and that an acceptable policy track on which to arrive at a solution must be found. The principal difference in the views of these scholars is that although Zartman acknowledges that

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⁸ In an earlier work, Haass adds a fifth elements to the framework—there must be no major diversion to distract the third party or the disputants (1988, 246).

internal politics affect the process of managing conflicts, he addresses the relationship between the disputants primarily in terms of balance of power. Haass, on the other hand, focuses on the internal politics of the parties, placing emphasis on the position of the leaders.

Stephen Stedman's work may be viewed as an attempt to link the perspectives of Zartman and Haass. Stedman takes Zartman's concept of ripeness as a starting point for his analysis and attempts to refine it. He challenges Zartman's implicit assumption of disputants "as unitary actors that perceive or calculate the gains and losses of combat, negotiation, and surrender in terms of the government or insurgency as a whole" (Stedman 1991, 26). According to Stedman, combatants consist of many coalitions, factions, and individuals. This view of actors in conflict leads to a different notion about ripeness, as intervention by a third party can be a function of internal political changes.⁹

In assessing the concept of ripeness in the scholarly literature, the main difficulty seems to be that two different underlying ideas are intertwined. On one hand, theorists refer to ripeness as a moment in a conflict when circumstances are conducive to conflict management. They present *objective* indicators, such as a stalemate in a military situation and the existence of a rough power parity between the disputants. On the other hand, scholars also acknowledge the importance of *subjective* criteria, as expressed in individual and collective perceptions of the dispute, the willingness (for a multiplicity of reasons) to search for a joint solution, and assessment of the possibilities for conflict management.

The key to addressing this apparent clash may be to view these notions as complementary, rather than distinct.¹⁰ Each conflict is a unique event; as a result, the

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⁹ This observation alludes to the ongoing debate among international relations theorists over the levels-of-analysis problem. During the Cold War, scholars suggested that the causes of war could be found at the levels of the individual, the nation-state, and the international system (Waltz 1959). In the post-Cold War period, much greater emphasis has been placed on societal-level variables (Levy 1996). This neither implies the irrelevance of resolving disputes among states, nor lessens the responsibility borne by each state in the prevention of intergroup conflict; rather it illustrates that the focus of conflict intervention has changed and that third party efforts must now respond to factors at the sub-state level.

¹⁰ Loreleigh Keashly and Ronald Fisher argue that all conflicts contain both subjective and objective elements and that effective intervention must therefore involve a "contingency approach": a series of strategies that can be applied at different phases of a conflict depending upon which issues are more salient

emergence of a ripe moment will vary according to the context. While objective criteria provide a useful guide to recognizing ripe moments in general, the addition of subjective elements completes the framework by tailoring the theory to fit the particular characteristics of each individual dispute.

The relative importance of objective and subjective factors will depend, in part, on who is responsible for determining the appropriateness of timing for intervention initiatives. If the disputants themselves must recognize the ripe moment, subjective elements may be more relevant. For example, when President Jimmy Carter took office, he sought a comprehensive peace in the Middle East through the vehicle of an international conference co-chaired by the US and Soviet governments. Egyptian President Anwar el-Sadat did not regard the timing of this initiative as appropriate; instead he took the extraordinary step of travelling to Jerusalem, and in so doing created the conditions for ripeness that paved the way to further negotiations with the Israeli government. Sadat's dramatic gesture illustrates the importance of subjective perceptions of ripeness.

Conversely, if a third party must assess the conditions for ripeness, objective factors may be paramount. For example, the US and Soviet governments attempted to capitalize on a ripe moment by initiating the Madrid Process in October 1991, to facilitate a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. At the time, all sides faced a hurting stalemate. After years of fighting, neither the Arab states, the Palestinians, or Israel seemed capable of ending the conflict. In addition, the situation for both sides was marked by a looming catastrophe. With the demise of the Cold War, the Soviet Union had reduced its arms supply to the Arab states, while the new spirit of cooperation that emerged after the 1991 Gulf War threatened to upset the balance of power in the Middle East, posing a possible risk to Israel's security. As a result, valid representatives from all sides met at a peace conference in an attempt to reach a comprehensive settlement. While the Madrid Conference

ultimately produced no concrete results, it illustrates the importance of objectively recognizing or engineering a ripe moment.¹¹

In practice, the actual recognition of a ripe moment presents some analytical challenges. The time that seems right for one party may seem quite wrong to another, or the moment may be recognized only after it has passed. However, a ripe moment cannot be identified and perhaps engineered at all unless it is clearly defined.

One of the most problematic aspects of ripeness is that "[c]onceptually, the moment stands out, but in reality it is buried in the rubble of events" (Zartman 1989a, 273). There is rarely a time when a conflict is ripe for resolution in each and every respect. There are usually countersignals and practical problems. Consequently, the disputants may fail to seize the moment without third party assistance. Given that ripeness is a dynamic concept, an opportune moment may come and go if not acted upon in a timely manner.

For example, identifying a ripe moment to achieve a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict has proved to be particularly difficult, due to the complexity of issues involved and countersignals between the numerous parties embroiled in the dispute. Third parties face the challenge of ascertaining the bargaining positions of the governments of Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and Israel, as well as the leadership of the Palestinian Authority and *Hamas*, in order to end this protracted conflict.

A further problem may occur if the peace process turns sour during the settlement phase. Fen Osler Hampson argues that the possibility of "unripening" is "a real risk in civil conflicts where the basic infrastructure of the conflict is marked by a shifting constellation of group loyalties and identities that are not necessarily eliminated or abated by formal attempts at cooperation" (1996, 16). For example, the process of unripening took place after the war between Israel and Lebanon in 1982. During talks between the two governments about the possibility of signing a formal peace treaty, President Bashir

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¹¹ An important role of a third party is changing the disputants' perceptions of each other, in order to move the parties beyond the notion of "enemy images" (Stein 1996, 93-111).

Jumayyal of Lebanon was assassinated. Following this event, there was no longer support in the Lebanese government to enter negotiations with Israel.

A final danger inherent in the notion of ripeness is that the disputants and/or the third party may delude themselves into believing that "tomorrow is better than today," even if this means trading-off a present certainty against an unpredictable future (Rubin 1991, 239). Scholars address this concern by advocating the existence of multiple ripe moments, so that missing out on one does not eliminate the next opportunity. For example, in 1947, Arab leaders rejected resolution 181, the UN plan to partition Palestine into separate Arab and Jewish states. At the time, Arab leaders traded-off the certainty of a specific amount of territory and instead pursued an unpredictable future by going to war against the fledgling State of Israel. Following a lengthy military campaign, additional ripe moments emerged, allowing most of the disputants to conclude armistice agreements.¹²

The progression of a typical conflict is graphically depicted in the Conflict Intervention Curve (**Figure 1**). As the figure illustrates, the course of a protracted intergroup conflict can be plotted in terms of two dimensions: (1) the intensity of the conflict (y-axis)—measured by the number of people killed; and (2) the evolution of the conflict over time (x-axis). The path of a conflict is represented by a bell curve. This shape was chosen as it captures the dynamic nature of conflicts which vary dramatically in terms of intensity over time.

Figure 1 divides the timing of intervention strategies into two phases: *mediation* and *belligerence*. The *mediation phase* encompasses peaceful (*i.e.*, nonviolent) efforts to de-escalate conflicts, while the *belligerence phase* involves forceful (*i.e.*, potentially violent) initiatives to reduce conflict intensity.

While the full life-cycle of a conflict is provided, this study will be confined to the blue-coloured area in the upper portion of the diagram. The enclosed box highlights the

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¹² Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria signed armistice agreements with Israel. However, no official truce was reached between Israel and Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and the Arab Legion.

Figure 1:
Conflict Intervention Curve

stage where mediation and third party intervention meet. This area was selected as it encompasses both nonviolent as well as violent tactics available to intervenors. Timing is particularly important in this region, as involvement at an inopportune time can have serious repercussions on the ground that will determine the success or failure of the initiative. It is suggested that timing dictates when intervention by a third party is most opportune, and accordingly the type of strategy that is most appropriate to the intensity of a conflict.

In concluding this section, a summary of the framework that will be used to evaluate ripeness is warranted. The study hypothesizes that there is a relationship between timing and outcome, such that the recognition or engineering of a ripe moment in the *mediation phase* of a conflict is necessary for a successful outcome. More specifically, it is postulated that ripe moments are characterized by the following conditions: (1) a hurting stalemate; (2) a looming catastrophe; (3) the potential for agreement at the initiation of third party intervention; (4) a secure way out at the culmination of third party efforts; and (5) valid representatives. This model is utilized as it provides a systematic framework for assessing the importance of timing in relation to strategy and outcome.

(v) Triggers

Zartman's notion of a ripe moment provides a useful framework for determining the appropriate time for intervention in the *mediation phase* of a conflict. However, this construct fails to provide guidance as to when intervention is appropriate once a conflict has crossed the threshold of sustained violence and pacific intervention is no longer an option. In order to complete the model, this gap will be bridged by drawing upon the concept of "triggers."

Brecher and Wilkenfeld suggest that "a trigger denotes *escalation* in perceived threat, time pressure, and a likelihood of war" (1997, 9). Similarly, Barbara Harff and Ted Robert Gurr characterize a "trigger" as a "significant single [event] whose occurrence is

likely, given the presence of other theoretically specified conditions, to propel a crisis to the next phase of escalation" (1998, 570).¹³

Building upon the foundation laid by Zartman, it is suggested that the perception of a "trigger" is an appropriate time for a third party to intervene in the *belligerence phase* of a conflict. Accordingly, this study hypothesizes that there is a relationship between timing and outcome, such that the recognition or engineering of a trigger in the *belligerence phase* of a conflict is necessary for a successful outcome. More specifically, it is postulated that triggers are characterized by the perception of the following conditions: (1) a major shift in power that favours one side over the other; (2) the occurrence of a catastrophe; (3) no potential for agreement at the initiation of third party intervention; (4) the only possibility of a secure way out is through continued fighting (*i.e.*, a disputant may not win, but continued hostilities are perceived to be the only option); and (5) no valid representatives are available (possibly due to assassinations, threats, or lack of institutional capacity).

This framework is advantageous as it employs a modified version of the same factors used to evaluate ripeness. This demonstrates the utility of this set of criteria in assessing the appropriateness of timing in a wide variety of circumstances, ranging from peaceful to violent interventions.

(b) Independent Variable 2: Strategy

The following section examines how third parties can influence the process of de-escalation and cultivate ripeness in order to capitalize on the emergence of an opportune moment or respond to a trigger. In essence, it shows how third parties can manage the timing of their actions in order to facilitate a successful outcome.

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¹³ Harff has refined this concept by employing "accelerators" in her model for early warning of genocides. "Accelerators" are defined as "the immediate events that lead to escalation . . . feedback events that rapidly increase the level of significance of the most volatile of the general conditions" (1993, 28). Such events may include aggressive actions by, or clashes with, opposition groups, or empty threats of external involvement against elites.

The intervention of a third party transforms the negotiating structure from a dyadic into a triadic relationship (Touval and Zartman 1985, 10-11). As a result, Thomas Princen notes that at least three types of bargaining may occur:

The mediator can bargain directly with a disputant to strike a side deal. It can form a coalition with one disputant to compel a concession from the other disputant. Or it can create a three-way, circular bargain in which the mediator makes a deal with one disputant who, in turn, makes a deal with the other disputant who, to complete the circle, makes a deal with the mediator (1992, 23).

According to Stein, important bargaining dynamics derive directly from this altered structure. First, given the significance attached to the relationship, each of the disputants seeks to secure the third party's support and assistance. Thus, the third party has substantial leverage. Second, although direct bargaining between adversaries is theoretically possible, the importance of the third party predisposes each of the belligerents to deal directly with the mediator; this also serves to enhance the influence of the third party (Stein 1985, 333). As such, the relationship between the third party and the disputants may take on as much significance as the interaction between the disputants themselves. Consequently, the triadic structure of negotiations may influence the bargaining strategies of both the third party and the disputants.

A significant difficulty with the concept of ripeness is that it implies a form of strategic passivity that makes neither conceptual nor practical sense. If there really is a ripe moment or moments to address a conflict, it suggests that a mediator must wait for this time to arrive before intervening in a dispute; but waiting for the ripe moment is arguably the wrong course of action to pursue, given that a ripe moment may pass and many people may die while the third party deliberates. Instead, scholars and practitioners may choose to search out strategies of inducing ripeness.

Leading theorists advocate an active role for third parties in creating a ripe moment. As noted by Zartman: "Only time resolves conflicts, but time needs some help" (1989a, 273). How can a third-party create favourable conditions for effective intervention?

In general, the scholarly literature draws a distinction between strategies which entail passive or indirect intervention and those which involve active or direct initiatives. For example, Bartunek, Benton and Keys distinguish between process and content strategies. Process interventions are designed to facilitate the relationship between the disputing parties and help them resolve the matter on their own. Content interventions, on the other hand, seek to deal with the specific issues in the conflict, usually by offering proposals or suggestions on substantive issues (Bartunek, Benton and Keys 1975, 533-535). The implication of this dichotomy is that process-related strategies lend themselves to passive interventions, while content-related strategies require more active involvement by third parties.

Most theorists tend to classify intervention initiatives along a continuum or spectrum, ranging from less direct or passive strategies to more direct or active techniques. One of the earliest typologies was developed by Kressel (1972, 13). This framework involves three kinds of strategies: (1) reflective; (2) nondirective; and (3) directive behaviour. Reflective behaviour, the least interventionist method, consists of attempts by third parties to gather information and familiarize themselves with the dispute, in an effort to minimize problems caused by ignorance and misunderstanding. Nondirective behaviour sees third parties taking on a more active role as they try to provide the disputants with the tools to solve the dispute themselves: examples of such activities might include controlling the bargaining environment and publicity surrounding the negotiations. Finally, directive behaviour, the most aggressive form of intervention, involves strategies in which third parties push the belligerents toward a specific solution by offering proposals or exerting pressure (Kleiboer 1996, 374-375).

In a later study, Kressel and Pruitt group the actions of third parties under four general categories, each involving specific strategies: (1) establishing a working alliance with the parties; (2) improving the relationship between the disputants by facilitating communication and minimizing misunderstanding between them; (3) addressing the issues,

by clearly identifying the matters under discussion and helping to formulate proposals; and (4) applying pressure by actively encouraging a specific solution or manipulating the parties directly into ending the dispute. This construct illustrates an ascending scale of third party involvement, from passive to active (Kressel and Pruitt 1989, 407-408).

The "strategic choice" model proposed by Peter Carnevale also views the efforts of third parties on a continuum from passive to more active strategies, namely: (1) inaction; (2) integration; (3) pressing; and (4) compensation (Carnevale 1986, 41-56). Inaction involves the third party acting as a passive observer, gathering intelligence while the belligerents try to settle the dispute themselves. Integration entails searching for consensus and formulating proposals that bring together the disputants' interests. This may involve such techniques as "logrolling" (trading issues off against one another) and drafting "bridging" proposals which span and satisfy the interests of both parties. Pressing strategies involve restricting the range of options available to the adversaries, either by increasing the cost of a given alternative, or by raising the penalty of not accepting a particular option. In either case, the third party applies pressure and/or sanctions to directly influence the behaviour of the disputants. Finally, compensation entails providing something desirable to one or both parties in order to make a particular alternative attractive. This can be achieved through such methods as guarantees, expansion of a given resource, or side payments.

According to Carnevale, third parties choose among these strategies depending on their perceptions of agreement between the belligerents, and the value which they place upon seeing the disputants achieve their objectives. When the interests of the parties appear to be irreconcilable, it is common for a third party to choose a coercive strategy (Carnevale 1986, 49). In order to apply these tactics, however, a third party must possess the necessary resources.

One of the most recognized typologies of third party behaviour is that advanced by Touval and Zartman. According to these scholars, a mediator may operate as either a

communicator, a formulator or a manipulator (1985, 10-14). These functions represent a range of increasing levels of intervention. In a communicator role, a third party may establish contact between the disputants, exchange proposals and concessions, and reduce misperceptions and biases. As a formulator, a mediator becomes more active and may provide new definitions, formulas and solutions. Finally, a mediator may attempt to compel the parties into an agreement by using its position and other available resources. By employing such a manipulation strategy, a third party can gain some control over the content as well as the mediation process. This framework is representative of the progression of actions characteristic of UN initiatives to de-escalate conflicts—moving from "good offices" to mediation to negotiation.

In their study of how a mediator can foster new norms in conflict management, Mandell and Tomlin cross-reference Carnevale's model with the framework advanced by Touval and Zartman. Mandell and Tomlin classify the strategies of pressing and compensation as casting the third party in the role of manipulator, while a strategy of integration corresponds to a third party's role as a formulator. Mandell and Tomlin argue that a third party will usually have to manipulate the disputants before a formulation strategy can be used; the mediator has to apply pressure and/or compensate to encourage consensus before they can integrate and formulate new proposals (1991, 46-47). These observations are helpful as they suggest that a third party's strategy is not necessarily static, but may shift as the circumstances of the conflict change. This confirms Bercovitch's statement that "[e]ach role may have its place in the life-cycle of a conflict, but it seems unwise to talk of 'the mediator' carrying on 'the role'. [sic] The empirical reality is that of many mediators fulfilling a range of roles" (Bercovitch 1992, 15).

The strategies available to third parties to promote the de-escalation of conflicts are graphically depicted in the Conflict Intervention Cycle (**Figure 2**). These tactics are grouped into three broad categories (corresponding colours appear in *italics*): (i) diagnostic (*green*); (ii) intercessory (*yellow*); and (iii) military (*red*). Intervention by a third party can

Figure 2:
Phases of Intervention

take place either in the *mediation phase* (encompassing diagnostic and intercessory strategies, *i.e.*, nonviolent tactics), or in the *belligerence phase* (encompassing military strategies, *i.e.*, potentially violent tactics). The study hypothesizes that there is a relationship between strategy and outcome, such that the more intense the conflict, the more forceful the strategy needed to restore order.

(i) Diagnostic Strategies

Diagnostic strategies help third parties obtain information about the positions, goals, needs, perceptions, and motivations of the principals to a conflict.¹⁴ These tactics may be employed to answer the following questions: Are the disputants ready and willing to seriously consider the option of de-escalation? Are they capable of reaching an agreement without assistance? What issues are and are not amenable to management under current circumstantial and perceptual conditions? What third party actions may be required before progress can be made or an agreement reached? Diagnostic strategies may be grouped under the categories: *inaction* and *enhanced communication*.

Inaction

Intervention by third parties may not always be the best alternative, particularly where involvement in the conflict means preserving a social system of structural violence. Accordingly, "[t]here may be cases where the mediator's values may be best achieved by allowing a conflict to run its course rather than intervening to prolong a damaging and inequitable relationship" (Webb 1988, 17). By using this strategy, a new reality may emerge, one that makes intervention look either unnecessary or more attractive than before (Carnevale 1986, 47-52).

In adopting this approach, a third party can determine the degree to which the antagonists are ready and able to deal constructively with the dispute. In this context, it is

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¹⁴ It is acknowledged that assessment and revision of strategies occur throughout the intervention process, however, for the purposes of this study, "diagnosis" takes place during the initial phase of a conflict.

important that inaction be succeeded by a more assertive strategy once the third party has assessed the situation. Inaction may otherwise be viewed as evading the problem. If the belligerents are ready to consider de-escalation, inaction may prompt them to actively seek the aid of a mediator. In addition, this strategy may increase the leverage of a third party by creating or reinforcing the perception that the disputants need the mediator's assistance in order to reach an agreement.

Conversely, placing too great an emphasis on such a "wait and see" strategy may give rise to serious problems. Inaction may increase the possibility that the adversaries will reach an agreement on their own that is contrary to the interests of a potential third party.¹⁵ Moreover, inaction may result in failure or delays that prompt perceptual changes that decrease ripeness, move parties away from de-escalation, and possibly lead to increased tension between the disputants. Most importantly, inaction may lead to more death and suffering as the violence continues unabated.

Enhanced Communication

Tactics that promote communication among conflicting parties offer mediators an additional source of diagnostic information that may assist them in inducing ripeness. When employing this strategy, a third party acts as a communicator using this position to facilitate understanding among the disputants and clarify misperceptions. In the process, mediators can obtain information with respect to the positions, goals and attitudes of the adversaries. Empirical evidence suggests that improved communication and a mutual understanding of interests contribute to successfully negotiated outcomes (Burton 1969; Deutsch 1973).

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¹⁵ A third party may derive benefits from a settlement that protects its material interests or increases its influence over one or all of the disputants. The regional environment may stabilize as a result of de-escalation and other interested parties may welcome the mediator's intervention as opposed to the *status quo*. Moreover, alliances may be strengthened when the intervention is considered in the interests of its members, and the global and domestic prestige of the third party may be improved by acting as an effective peacemaker (Touval and Zartman 1985, 9; Mitchell 1988, 40-43).

(ii) Intercessory Strategies

When the use of diagnostic strategies reveals that the positions of the disputants are too divergent for agreement, third parties may choose to employ intercessory techniques. These peaceful tactics may be used to affect the range of potential agreement through manipulation of the parties' perceived alternatives. Examples of intercessory strategies include: *bridging* and *pressuring*.

Bridging

After third parties develop an understanding of the positions and sensitivities of the disputants, they may pursue a bridging strategy (Touval and Zartman 1985, 11-12; Pruitt and Rubin 1986, 143-148). In using this tactic, mediators try to creatively redefine issues and positions in an attempt to find a potential solution.

In their efforts to develop bridging options, third parties often try to control the agenda (Carnevale 1986, 47-48). One technique that has proven useful in this regard is "fractionating" the conflict. This strategy entails structuring the issues "in a way that permits a confidence-building process to emerge over time as the parties move from resolution of marginal issues to those representative of core issues" (Mandell 1989, 10). This strategy was employed during the Madrid Process, in an attempt to reach a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Third parties may also choose to promote bridging solutions through the use of a "single negotiating text." When using this technique, the mediator formulates an agreement, or text, and presents this document as the basis for negotiation. Each party then "edits" this coordinating text in an effort to obtain a settlement favourable to its own position (Fisher 1981, 107-110). The strategy of using a single negotiating text was used successfully in the Lancaster House negotiations between Rhodesia and Zimbabwe in 1979.

The main advantage of bridging tactics are that they facilitate the development of joint agreements to which the conflicting parties are more likely to be committed, because they have a stake in their development. Moreover, as Pruitt and Rubin note, integrative

solutions produce the highest joint outcomes possible and tend to strengthen the relationship between the parties (1986, 141-143). Bridging strategies were successfully employed in the negotiations leading to the 1994 peace treaty between Israel and Jordan.

Despite these positive aspects, the formulation of bridging agreements tends to be time consuming. As a result, when the third party or the disputants face severe time constraints to conclude an agreement, integrative solutions may prove difficult. Finding bridging options may also be undermined by the deep-rooted hatred and mistrust that characterize many conflicts. These attitudes and perceptions tend to promote a win-lose, zero-sum, approach to de-escalation that may hinder the search for solutions (Bercovitch 1984b, 129).

Pressuring

If the disputants refuse to concede on bargaining positions or alternatives, a third party may attempt to induce ripeness through pressuring tactics.¹⁶ When employing this strategy, a third party uses its position and resources to increase the perceived costs of non-agreement (negative pressure). The use of pressuring tactics requires that mediators possess political, economic, and/or military resources to exercise leverage over the disputants. Third parties must, therefore, conduct a careful assessment of their objectives and determine if they possess adequate capabilities. The combination of resources needed to exert influence on the disputants will depend on the unique characteristics of each conflict.

Pressuring tactics serve two primary functions. First, third parties can attach costs to an alternative or issue desired by one party, but opposed by another, in an effort to remove that option from the agenda (Carnevale 1986, 44). For example, in the Yom Kippur War in 1973, Israel was in a position to destroy the Egyptian Third Army, which at the time was surrounded. The US threatened to slow down military aid, and the Soviet Union

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¹⁶ It is not suggested that pressure is only applied at this stage of a conflict, rather that pressuring is the most appropriate intervention strategy as a conflict escalates towards violence.

warned of possible involvement if the Egyptian troops were not relieved. Attaching penalties to the Israeli option had the effect of removing the alternative from the agenda.

Second, pressure may be employed simply to increase the costs of continued conflict. The use of pressure may entail withholding resources valued by one or all of the disputants. In some instances, a third party may have to carry out these threats in order to increase the costs of non-agreement and to demonstrate its own commitment to de-escalation. A third party may also form a coalition with one of the disputants and support it politically, publicly and materially, so as to pressure the other party to move toward a more conciliatory position (Touval and Zartman 1985, 10-11). For example, this strategy was employed by the Bush administration in 1991, when US loan guarantees to Israel were withheld, as a result of the Shamir government's policy of building new houses in the West Bank.

A mediator can also attempt to pressure a party through the mobilization of public support for its de-escalation initiatives, both in the international community and the domestic constituencies of the disputants. Third parties must be cautious, however, since the media and public opinion may be used to undermine its own "bargaining position." Accordingly, when a mediator employs this type of strategy, it should seek to protect itself from retaliatory pressures.

For example, during the negotiations leading to the Camp David Accords between Egypt and Israel, President Carter's attempts to pressure Israel were often conducted without adequate effort to build support for his initiatives in Congress or in the media. Consequently, he was insufficiently prepared to face enormous domestic counterpressures (Quandt 1986, 336-337).

While applying pressure may provide a valuable option to third parties, use of this strategy entails some disadvantages. First, a mediator's need for acceptance and consent by the disputants may limit its ability to exert pressure (Touval 1982, 328). Second, pressuring tactics may lead to resentment and consequently decrease the perceived value

that the adversaries place on their relationship with the third party (Touval and Zartman 1985, 13). When this occurs, it may limit the capacity of a mediator to influence the belligerents. These drawbacks may hinder a third party's future de-escalation efforts.

Alternatively, pressuring strategies may be used to reward the disputants (positive pressure). For example, a third party may use economic incentives to expand the resources available for trade-offs or to reduce the costs of material concessions. These tactics were used extensively during the process leading to the Camp David Accords, when President Carter promised considerable economic assistance to both Egypt and Israel in order to make settlement a more attractive option (Rubin 1981, 27).

A third party can also provide political guarantees to the belligerents in order to decrease perceived risks. Specifically, mediators may link the disputants' decision to comply with an agreement to its continued goodwill, offer "side agreements" in the form of confidence-building measures, or promise diplomatic support to the de-linking of concessions with feared future precedents. For example, Israel found it easier to withdraw its forces from the Alma oil fields in Sinai after the US promised to extend its commitment to supply oil if Israel was unable to secure sufficient quantities in the future (Carnevale 1986, 46).

Moreover, third parties can provide psychological compensation. In this sense, the mediator may serve as a face-saving conduit through which concessions between the disputants can be exchanged. This mechanism provides a psychological support for concession-making that allows the parties to reach an agreement without appearing weak to their opponents or respective constituencies (Touval and Zartman 1985, 11-12). This technique was used by the Norwegian government during negotiations between the Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) leading to the Oslo Accords in 1993.

The major advantage of providing rewards is that they offer a way to overcome psychological barriers to peace through the reduction of perceived risks, while simultaneously increasing the value of de-escalation. Use of these tactics, however, may

incur substantial material and political liabilities. In addition, these costs may be increased when recourse to compensation strategies encourages disputants to withhold concessions in order to obtain third party "payments" for agreement. Finally, use of this strategy presumes the good faith of the disputants.

(iii) **Military Strategies**

If intercessory tactics are ineffective in reducing tensions, third parties may resort to military intervention, in an attempt to move the combatants from the battlefield to the negotiating table.¹⁷ The use of this type of strategy marks a significant change in the dynamics of a conflict, as it signifies that the disputants are engaged in combat or the possibility of violence is imminent. As a result, employing these tactics entails greater risk to third parties. Military intervention may take the following forms: *peacekeeping*, *peace enforcement*, and *war*.

Peacekeeping

Peacekeeping is defined as "the deployment of military or police, and frequently civilian, personnel to assist in the implementation of agreements reached between governments or parties who have been engaged in conflict. . . . [This type of intervention normally] presumes cooperation and its methods are inherently peaceful: the use of military force, other than in self-defence, is incompatible with the concept" (Evans 1993, 11).¹⁸ In this context, peacekeeping is mitigative in nature: it provides a stable environment in which the de-escalation of conflict may be achieved.

Peacekeeping traditionally involves the interposition of modestly armed forces between the combatants. In some cases, peacekeepers may take on specific tasks, such as

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¹⁷ Third parties may also use the threat of military action as a deterrent against continued hostilities. This approach combines intercessory (pressuring) tactics and the potential use of military strategies. See (Harvey 1998, 230-264).

¹⁸ This definition echoes many of the key points expressed by Boutros Boutros-Ghali in his 1992 report, *An Agenda for Peace*: "Peace-keeping is the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well. Peace-keeping is a technique that expands the possibilities for both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace" (UN Doc. A/47/277 [1992], p. 6).

monitoring elections, the withdrawal of troops, or the decommissioning of weapons. The key, however, is the neutrality of the mission and the willingness of the disputants to accept foreign intervention (Haass 1996, 197-198). The classic example of a peacekeeping mission took place in 1956 when the UN deployed a hastily assembled emergency force (UNEF I) to the Middle East to keep the peace between Egyptian and Israeli forces following the Suez War.¹⁹

Peacekeeping operations are normally associated with actions authorized under Chapter VI of the UN Charter.²⁰ In terms of skills, equipment, and professional orientation, peacekeeping missions require personnel trained in the maintenance of law and order. Military police, and to a lesser extent, combat forces are best suited to this task. The use of military police is preferable due to their training in law enforcement and ingrained appreciation for the restrained use of force (McLean 1996, 328). Moreover, deploying military police clearly distinguishes the mission of peacekeeping from that of peace enforcement, by providing less opportunity for the mission to "creep" towards enforcement should violence resume (Malone 1998, 82).

Peace Enforcement

Peace enforcement involves the forcible interposition of a third party between combatants in order to facilitate the cessation of hostilities, deter renewed aggression, and create an environment conducive to the declaration of a cease-fire and the commencement of de-escalation efforts. Unlike peacekeeping, peace enforcement requires neither the consent of the disputants, nor the cessation of hostilities. Peace enforcement requires the skills, equipment, and professional orientation of combat forces; consequently, the same personnel utilized for enforcing the peace may be inappropriate or poorly suited to the tasks

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¹⁹ The efforts of Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs Minister Lester B. Pearson were instrumental in the establishment of UNEF I. Pearson was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1957 for his work.

²⁰ Chapter VI missions may take the form of "muscular peacekeeping," commonly referred to as Chapter VI 1/2 operations.

of peacekeeping, given that their training is likely focussed on fighting wars, not keeping peace.

The political, military, and legal implications of peace enforcement are tantamount to an international declaration of war against one or more of the combatants. These operations are normally undertaken pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN Charter (Haass 1996, 198). A recent example of a peace enforcement mission was Operation Desert Storm in 1991, where the UN authorized a coalition of states to forcibly respond to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait (UN Doc. S/RES/678 [1990]).

The combative nature of peace enforcement often requires military forces to retain the command, control, communication, and intelligence gathering functions of a mission. Further, the rules of engagement prescribed for peace enforcers are permissive—that is, commanders of peace enforcement operations are authorized to use force in carrying out their mission until all parties have acceded to the cessation of hostilities and a transition to traditional peacekeeping activities can be made. This permissive engagement policy is crucial to establishing the credibility of the enforcement effort between groups engaged in violent conflict.

Peace enforcement is not unconstrained warfare; nor is it neutral intervention. Operating without the consent of one or more of the disputants makes peace enforcers partisan from the perspective of an aggrieved and unyielding combatant. If peace enforcement occurs with the willing agreement of only one side, those who conduct the intervention may be viewed as favouring that side and as acting belligerent toward the other. This perception of unfairness may be impossible to overcome and may be reinforced if the intervening body applies its rules of engagement unevenly between the parties.

The transition from peace enforcement to peacekeeping should occur only after the implementation of a cease-fire; disengagement of the combatants; and consent from the disputants for the interposition of peacekeeping forces (Holsti 1992, 368-369). In other

words, there must be a peace to keep, in order for peacekeeping to have any chance of success.

War

The most violent form of intervention by a third party is war, characterized as "sustained fighting between organized armed forces" (Lund 1996, 39). In essence, the critical distinction between peace enforcement and war is that peace enforcement is sanctioned by international law, whereas war is an act of aggression unauthorized by the international community. While traditionally not employed as a method of conflict de-escalation, this strategy is presently being used by NATO in an attempt to end the conflict between Serbs and Kosovars in FRY.

Based on the review of the scholarly literature, the study hypothesizes that there is a relationship between timing and strategy that affects outcome, such that: (1) intervention at a ripe moment with a diagnostic or intercessory strategy in the *mediation phase* of a conflict is likely to result in a successful outcome; (2) intervention at a ripe moment with a military strategy in the *mediation phase* of a conflict is likely to result in limited success or failure; (3) intervention at an unripe moment with a diagnostic or intercessory strategy in the *mediation phase* of a conflict is likely to result in limited success or failure; and (4) intervention at an unripe moment with a military strategy in the *mediation phase* of a conflict is likely to result in a failed outcome.

The study also hypothesizes that there is an additional relationship between timing and strategy that affects outcome, such that: (1) intervention at a trigger with a military strategy in the *belligerence phase* of a conflict is likely to result in a successful outcome; (2) intervention at a trigger with a diagnostic or intercessory strategy in the *belligerence phase* of a conflict is likely to result in limited success or failure; and (3) not responding to a trigger in the *belligerence phase* of a conflict will likely result in a failed outcome.

(iv) Summary

Diagnostic, intercessory, and military strategies provide third parties with the tools needed in order to cultivate and recognize the emergence of opportune moments to intervene. The management of the process of de-escalation involves the tactical use of time to delay or force strategic considerations. Time pressure, both real or perceived, can occur in three general forms: absence, implicit, or explicit. The absence of time pressure refers to situations where the parties feel free to delay concessions or negotiations indefinitely. *Implicit time pressure* refers to circumstances where the parties recognize that decisions will have to be made in the near future, but, as yet, no specific deadline exists. *Explicit time pressure* denotes the existence of a specific deadline for agreement (Carnevale and Lawler 1986, 637).

In the *mediation phase*, third parties can manipulate time pressures to pace de-escalation efforts. Mediators can delay a turning point when they take actions that remove implicit or explicit time pressures or slow down the peace process. Strategically, when the disputants are unable to reach an agreement without the assistance of a third party, the clearest form of delay is inaction. Mediators may also choose to withhold an expected proposal, thus prolonging efforts at reaching a solution.

Alternatively, when de-escalation initiatives are proceeding slowly, or stall, third parties may use time pressure to hasten the pace of mediation and encourage concessions from the disputants. Mediators may use implicit time pressure to create perceptions that a deadline for reaching a decision exists. Third parties may also push the adversaries toward a decision when they impose a deadline. According to Zartman: "[O]ne of the mediator's crucial tasks is to impose a deadline . . . [the] element of skill required is the ability to perceive the most propitious moment for the deadline: too late, and it prolongs negotiations and invites breakdown; too early, and it invites formal, superficial agreements and mistrust" (Zartman 1981, 156).

Tactically, this may be achieved in three ways. At the onset of intervention, a third party can set a specific time for the conclusion of an agreement. Hence, as parties approach the deadline, time pressure increases. Alternatively, mediators may force a decision by presenting a compromise or bridging proposal and imposing an ultimatum or deadline for parties to accept or reject the proposed agreement. Finally, third parties may threaten to withdraw their services completely, unless the disputants decide to make the concessions required.

Pressure can be removed when a mediator encourages the antagonists to believe that it will continue its efforts until an acceptable outcome is achieved, regardless of time. When adversaries make progress through their own initiatives and a third party thinks these efforts will result in failure or damage to its own interests, a mediator may also move to slow down the progress of negotiations. A third party can accomplish this task by persuading the combatants that it can deliver a preferable solution or by attempting to block the negotiation efforts of the disputants themselves, possibly through the use of pressure.

Empirical evidence points to the notion that explicit time pressure promotes agreement by hastening the pace of concession exchange. This general observation, however, is tempered by studies that suggest that the effect of time pressure on negotiations is contingent on the orientation of the antagonists (Carnevale and Lawler 1986). Specifically, time pressure hinders the conclusion of agreement in the absence of a cooperative orientation and/or a belief that failure to meet the deadline will have negative consequences. Thus, while explicit time constraints may be necessary to conclude a settlement, it is an effective form of pressure only when parties are ready and willing to move toward conciliation.

In the *belligerence phase*, a third party can move the disputants through the de-escalation process by the strategic use of peacekeeping, peace enforcement, or war, thus forcibly establishing the conditions required for settlement. If a third party perceives these efforts as the basis for agreement, they can assume the role of mediator and present a

bridging proposal, impose explicit time pressures on the disputants with attached costs, and press for a decision. In short, third parties can manage the process of de-escalation, and to some extent cultivate timing, in order to capitalize on the emergence of an opportune moment.

(c) Dependent Variable: Outcome

An enduring problem faced by international relations theorists has been the lack of a precise definition for "effective" or "successful" intervention. For instance, Bercovitch describes a successful mediation outcome as "[a]ny mutually acceptable compromise that restores conditions and stops hostilities and violence" (Bercovitch 1984a, 113). Meanwhile, Touval and Zartman define mediation success as "the conclusion of an agreement promising the reduction of conflict" (1985, 14).

The paucity of specific definitions reflects the difficulty in distinguishing between the different levels of intervention outcome. Bercovitch points out that "[o]f all the aspects of third party intervention, the most difficult to study is the relationship between third parties and conflict outcomes" (1984a, 112). The problems include knowing what variables are attributable to the intervention effort and which variables result from the dynamics of the conflict itself. There is also the difficulty of knowing when an intervention initiative begins and when to assess the effects of the effort. Should this be done immediately following the intervention, or should one look at the long term consequences of the third party's actions? There is also the problem of perceptions—one outcome may be perceived as successful by one party and as a failure by the other.

In spite of these conceptual obstacles, it is both necessary and possible to develop a model that captures the nuances of success or failure. The *Conflict Intensity Abatement (CIA) Index* is designed to measure the level of intergroup conflict—immediately before and after intervention by a third party.

The CIA Index is organized into three categories representing the possible outcomes of third party intervention, as measured by a change in the level of conflict intensity. The

categories describing success and failure are further subdivided in order to allow for gradations in possible results. Each potential outcome is assigned a point total in order to facilitate comparison across case studies.²¹

The categories describe the military, political, and social conditions at different levels of conflict intensity as perceived by a neutral analyst. It is acknowledged that certain outcomes may be more desirable for specific types of disputes. Contemporary examples are provided to place the model in a practical context.

Table 1:
Conflict Intensity Abatement (CIA) Index

Category 1: Failure	
(a)	<u>Total Failure</u> - unabated military hostilities; political repression; anarchy (<i>Sierra Leone</i> , 1998) [-3 points]
(b)	<u>Preponderant Failure</u> - sporadic overt violence; limited political accommodation; high levels of tension and suspicion (<i>Rwanda</i> , 1994) [-2 points]
(c)	<u>Partial Failure</u> - some prospect of violence; no institutional capacity to deal with political conflict; wary interactions (<i>Bosnia</i> , 1997) [-1 point]
Category 2: Status Quo - no change in the military, political, or social dimensions of the conflict (<i>Cyprus</i> , 1999) [0 points]	
Category 3: Success	
(a)	<u>Partial Success</u> - cessation of overt violence; lack of established political communication; continuing mistrust (<i>Israel/Syria</i> , 1999) [+1 point]
(b)	<u>Preponderant Success</u> - efforts to de-escalate military tension; institution-building toward effective political discourse; tentative consensus (<i>Northern Ireland</i> , 1998) [+2 points]
(c)	<u>Total Success</u> - no prospect of violence; established institutional capacity to deal with political conflict; consensus (<i>United States/Canada</i> , 1999) ²² [+3 points]

²¹ For example, if a dispute moves from nonviolence to violence after the intervention of a third party (*i.e.*, a net negative change in the CIA Index), this would represent a failure of the initiative to de-escalate the conflict.

²² While "total success" is the optimal result in terms of the relationship between former adversaries, it may lead to potential problems regarding integration and interdependence. For example, this argument may be made concerning Canada's reliance on the US for military and economic security. This dependence is manifested in Canadian membership in NATO, North American Aerospace Defense (NORAD), the Permanent Joint Board of Defence (PJBD), and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).

V. Hypotheses

Based on the preceding discussion of the scholarly literature, the following hypotheses will form the central focus of this study:

HYPOTHESIS 1. There is a relationship between timing and outcome, such that recognition or engineering of a ripe moment in the *mediation phase* of a conflict is necessary for a successful outcome. More specifically, it is postulated that ripe moments are characterized by the perception of the following conditions:

- H1a. a hurting stalemate;
- H1b. a looming catastrophe;
- H1c. the potential for agreement at the initiation of third party intervention;
- H1d. a secure way out at the culmination of third party efforts; and
- H1e. valid representatives.

HYPOTHESIS 2. There is a relationship between timing and outcome, such that recognition or engineering of a trigger in the *belligerence phase* of a conflict is necessary for a successful outcome. More specifically, it is postulated that triggers are characterized by the perception of the following conditions:

- H2a. a major shift in power that favours one side over the other;
- H2b. the occurrence of a catastrophe;
- H2c. no potential for agreement at the initiation of third party efforts;
- H2d. the only possible way out is through continued fighting; and
- H2e. no valid representatives.

HYPOTHESIS 3. There is a relationship between strategy and outcome, such that the more intense the conflict, the more forceful the strategy needed to restore order.

HYPOTHESIS 4. There is a relationship between timing and strategy that affects outcome, such that:

- H4a. intervention at a ripe moment with a diagnostic or intercessory strategy in the *mediation phase* of a conflict is likely to result in a successful outcome;
- H4b. intervention at a ripe moment with a military strategy in the *mediation phase* of a conflict is likely to result in limited success or failure;
- H4c. intervention at an unripe moment with a diagnostic or intercessory strategy in the *mediation phase* of a conflict is likely to result in limited success or failure; and
- H4d. intervention at an unripe moment with a military strategy in the *mediation phase* of a conflict is likely to result in a failed outcome.

HYPOTHESIS 5. There is a relationship between timing and strategy that affects outcome, such that:

- H5a. intervention at a trigger with a military strategy in the *belligerence phase* of a conflict is likely to result in a successful outcome;
- H5b. intervention at a trigger with a diagnostic or intercessory strategy in the *belligerence phase* of a conflict is likely to result in limited success or failure;
- H5c. not responding to a trigger in the *belligerence phase* of a conflict will likely result in a failed outcome.

VI. Case Study: Rwanda

Given that intervention efforts vary according to the context, it is important that variables such as the primary actors, nature of the conflict, and issues involved in the dispute remain constant. This can best be achieved by examining the same conflict at different points in time. As a result, this work will focus on a single "longitudinal" study involving a series of embedded phases within one primary case (Yin 1989, 49-50). Accordingly, the timing and strategy of intervention efforts by the UN will be compared, contrasted, and evaluated at several points over the course of the intergroup conflict in Rwanda.

Rwanda was selected as the subject of analysis for three principal reasons. First, the country has a long history of economic and political rivalries between its two main ethnic groups, the majority Hutus and minority Tutsis. As a result, the dispute has moved through a number of phases ranging from prevention and reaction to post-conflict peace building. Accordingly, this case provides an opportunity to examine intervention efforts in a protracted intergroup conflict.

Second, in Rwanda, as has increasingly been the case in many post-Cold War disputes, the conflict manifested itself in violent internal strife where civilians were the principal targets. Given the present volatility in the Great Lakes region—involving many of the same actors and issues—renewed hostilities are a distinct possibility. As such, the conclusions reached in this thesis may be applied in a broader context.

Finally, the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 was one of the greatest tragedies since the Holocaust. The grave violations of human rights that occurred, along with the scale of violence, created a crisis of unprecedented proportions. The sheer magnitude of the conflict demands consideration by international relations scholars.

CHAPTER II: HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

[I]f a house be divided against itself, that house cannot stand.

Bible, Mark 3:25

In order to place the theoretical framework in a practical context, it is necessary and important to understand the events that precipitated the 1994 genocide and efforts by the UN to end the bloodshed. Accordingly, the following chapter documents the history of the Rwandan conflict. The events that occurred during this time will form a series of case studies constituting the subject of investigation.

For the purposes of analysis, efforts by the UN to manage the conflict are divided into four phases, each representing a different intervention. Phase 1 encompasses initiatives leading to the Arusha Accords in August 1993 and the subsequent establishment of UNAMIR I. This intervention was selected as it was the first major attempt by the UN to end the Rwandan civil war. Phase 2 considers the intervention of UNAMIR I after the onset of genocide in April 1994. This initiative was significant as it marked the initial attempt by the international community to stop the massive violence that engulfed Rwanda. Phase 3 involves the intervention of UNAMIR II. This initiative merits consideration, as it represents the response by the UN to the drawbacks of UNAMIR I. Finally, Phase 4 examines *Opération Turquoise*. This mission was the final attempt to halt the killings before world attention shifted to the humanitarian emergency that was unfolding beyond Rwanda's borders.

The following chapter consists of five parts. The first part provides a brief survey of Rwandan physical and social geography. The second part chronicles the period of colonial rule and the events leading up to independence. The third part discusses the Rwandan civil war, the 1994 genocide, and the subsequent international response. The fourth part describes the humanitarian crisis that followed the genocide. The final part assesses the aftermath of the conflict and the present state of affairs.

I. Physical and Social Geography

The Republic of Rwanda is distinctive for the small size of its territory and the density of its population. Covering an area of only 26,338 square kilometres, Rwanda had an enumerated population of 7,142,755 in 1991. Located immediately south of the equator, Rwanda borders on the Democratic Republic of Congo,²³ Uganda, Tanzania, and Burundi.

Before political and ethnic violence in 1994 altered the country's demographic profile, Rwanda's population was composed of three groups: the Hutus (approximately 85 percent); the Tutsis (14 percent); and the Twas (1 percent) (Gourou 1998, 847). Historically, Rwanda's nobility, military commanders, government officials, and cattle owners were predominantly Tutsi, while most Hutu were subsistence farmers. The Twas were a small minority of hunter-gatherers, who were regarded as inferior by both Tutsis and Hutus (Destexhe 1995, 39).

Over time, the distinctions between Tutsis and Hutus blurred until the differences between the two were based on economic status rather than ethnicity. The two groups spoke the same language—Kinyarwanda, and essentially represented different classes of the same society.²⁴ Hutus were generally bound to Tutsis in a patron-client relationship, however, social mobility was possible.²⁵ Although the pre-colonial government was dominated by Tutsis, with Hutus appearing in relatively minor positions of authority, there is no record of violent conflict between the two groups (Clapham 1998, 197).

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²³ At the time of the civil war and genocide in Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo was known as Zaire.

²⁴ There is an unresolved debate as to whether Hutus and Tutsis are ethnically distinct. One position suggests that the two groups are, in fact, different races. The contrasting view, maintains that there are no significant differences between Hutus and Tutsis—they are both Banyarwanda, speak the same language, and share the same culture and territory; as such, the distinction between the two groups is the result of the divisive politics of colonial rule and indoctrination by extremists. This debate is not solely the matter of academic discourse, but is the basis of political ideologies that are shaping Rwanda's future (Seybolt 1997, 3). See also (Minorities at Risk Project 1999).

²⁵ For example, Hutus who acquired a large number of cattle or other wealth could be labelled as Tutsis and impoverished Tutsis could be regarded as Hutus (*New Republic* 1994, 19).

II. Colonial Rule and Independence

In 1890, the two neighbouring kingdoms of Ruanda and Urundi were incorporated into German East Africa.²⁶ Discovering that the kingdoms functioned as nations prior to the arrival of Europeans, and due to a shortage of colonial personnel, the Germans instituted a policy of indirect rule that relied heavily on the governing system already in place.²⁷

Following World War I, the League of Nations mandated Belgium to administer Ruanda-Urundi, and in 1946, the region became a Belgian trust territory under the UN. During the period of Belgian rule, colonial administrators further reinforced ethnic distinctions by requiring that an individual's ethnicity be specified on identity cards.²⁸ From this point onward, membership in an ethnic group was employed for administrative purposes; as a result, social categories became increasingly rigid, with Tutsis favoured over Hutus in the educational system and civil administration (*African Rights* 1995, 5-7).

The introduction of European racial theory into Ruanda-Urundi was disastrous. According to the so-called Hamitic hypothesis, "everything of value ever found in Africa was brought there by the Hamites, allegedly a branch of the Caucasian race" (Sanders 1969, 521). For colonial powers, the attractiveness of this theory lay in the fact that it linked physical characteristics, such as height and shape of faces, to intelligence. The Tutsis were immediately designated superior as a result of their perceived Hamitic descent, and the Hutus were deemed inferior due to their Negro lineage. This racist theory was

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²⁶ During the period of colonial rule, the region was referred to as Ruanda-Urundi; following independence, the states have been officially known as the Republic of Rwanda and the Republic of Burundi.

²⁷ In many territories in Africa, European powers sought to use existing chiefs as agents of their rule. This system, known as "indirect rule" was viewed by the colonizers as preserving existing structures; in reality, however, it often imposed or strengthened hierarchies that had little traditional legitimacy. For a comprehensive examination of the German occupation of Ruanda-Urundi see (Louis 1963). Donald L. Horowitz notes the difference between ranked and unranked ethnic systems. If ethnic groups are ordered in a hierarchy, with one superordinate and the other subordinate, conflict moves in a vertical direction; but if groups are parallel, with neither subordinate to the other, conflict takes a horizontal course. Accordingly, under this framework, the conflict between Hutus and Tutsis involved ranked groups in a hierarchical (vertical) ordering (Horowitz 1985, 16-36).

²⁸ Ethnic identity cards played a large role in the genocide that took place in 1994, as victims were often killed at roadside check points where they were forced to show their identity papers. Those who refused to hand over their cards were presumed to be Tutsi and were put to death.

expressed in countless ways, but, in short, the Tutsis were considered relatives of the Europeans and as such, the colonizers believed they could easily work with them. Consequently, this ideology supported the colonial policy of divide and rule (Prunier 1995, 5-9; Horowitz 1985, 156-157). While the Hamitic hypothesis has been comprehensively discredited, it left the region with a bitter legacy of hatred.

European colonization fundamentally altered the traditional patron-client relationship between Tutsis and Hutus, upsetting a delicate balance that had largely contained intergroup hostilities.²⁹ As the Belgians, with the assistance of Tutsi elites, gained control of the territory's economic resources, the Hutu population was increasingly disenfranchised from the emerging political order; Catholic missionaries also favoured the Tutsi over the Hutu, deepening the division and inequities between the two groups.³⁰

In 1959, Hutu insurgents organized a bloody rebellion that killed an estimated 20,000 Tutsi and forced another 150,000 into exile. A week later, the Belgian government released a policy statement outlining reforms designed to establish a system of local government that would progressively lead to autonomy. This series of events marked the beginning of the Hutu Peasant Revolution that ended domination of political and economic life by the Tutsi minority. The revolt was provoked by the intransigence of the ruling elite, who resisted any moves toward democratization. Tension arose between the Belgian administration and the Tutsi leadership over the planned implementation of majority rule. As a result, the Belgians switched sides to support the Hutus (Newbury 1998, 9). Attempts to maintain power led to fierce clashes and the exodus of a large number of Tutsis to

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²⁹ Catharine Newbury (1988) examines how the traditional patron-client relationship transformed under colonialism. Originally, Hutu clients gave cows to their Tutsi patrons in exchange for protection. Following the advent of colonial rule, the system changed whereby an individual Hutu received a cow from his Tutsi patron in exchange for client loyalty. Newbury argues that the individualization of the patron-client relationship disturbed the social order in preindependence Ruanda-Urundi, ultimately weakening the ability of the Tutsi to control the Hutu and providing Hutu elites the opportunity to mobilize and organize an opposition movement just as the territory was moving toward independence.

³⁰ For a thorough discussion of the causes, options, and consequences of bringing ethnicity into the political arena, see (Rothschild 1981).

neighbouring countries (Adelman 1996, 4-5). These events spawned a cycle of violence that has plagued Rwanda since its independence.

The Trusteeship Agreement for Ruanda-Urundi was terminated on 1 July 1962, and Rwanda and Burundi each became sovereign states. Both states were granted membership to the UN on 18 September 1962. In the years that followed, the situation remained tense, as exiled Tutsis formed guerrilla bands and attacked from neighbouring states, hoping to return by force. These raids led to ferocious and indiscriminate reprisals against Tutsis within Rwanda (Melvern 1997, 3-4).

In July 1973, the Minister of Defense, Major-General Juvénal Habyarimana, seized power in a bloodless *coup d'état*. He established an authoritarian government dominated by a single party, the *Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement* (MRND). Habyarimana surrounded himself with an inner circle of advisors called the *Akazu* or "Little House." *Akazu* cabinet ministers were known to be Hutu extremists who actively supported political and economic policies that reinforced Hutu domination. The regime was adamantly opposed to the reintegration of exiled Tutsis into Rwandan society.

Under Habyarimana's leadership, ethnic discrimination was institutionalized through a policy known as "establishing ethnic and regional balance," whereby a substantial part of the country's political and social life became subject to quotas enacted according to "ethnic proportions" (UN Doc. E/CN.4/1994/7/Add.1 [1993]). Accordingly, the long-established colonial practice of government-sanctioned political and economic disenfranchisement continued, only this time the marginalized population group was Tutsi rather than Hutu. To a lesser extent, the consolidation of power also introduced regional rivalries to the existing animosity, with Hutus from the north, the President's home region, enjoying privileges in relation to Hutus from the rest of the country.³¹

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³¹ Prior to the colonial era, Hutus from northern and southern Rwanda had different histories—the northern Hutus were independent, whereas the southern Hutus were ruled by the monarchy. Hutus from northern Rwanda regarded their southern counterparts as being too closely associated with the Tutsis and criticized them for their failure to pursue a true republic; more extreme Hutus from the north even viewed southern Hutus as being barely distinguishable from the Tutsis. These tensions did not result in violence until the 1994 genocide.

Rwanda made significant economic gains from 1976 until the late 1980s. As a result, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), multilateral agencies, and bilateral donors came to view Rwanda as a relative economic success compared to many other African countries. Nonetheless, there were difficulties.

One major problem was scarcity of land. Between 1940 and 1991, Rwanda's population swelled from 2 million to 7.15 million, with an annual population growth rate of 3.1 percent (International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies 1995, 6). This made Rwanda one of Africa's most densely populated nations, a fact that greatly contributed to the country's declining food production capability and accelerated rate of environmental degradation throughout the 1980s (Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda 1996a, 37; Percival and Homer-Dixon 1998, 201-222).

In November 1990, the World Bank and the IMF agreed to fund a macroeconomic structural adjustment program (SAP) in Rwanda. The economic crisis that precipitated the decision to implement the SAP was triggered by plunging prices for coffee throughout the 1980s. Coffee (and, to a lesser extent, tea) accounted for approximately 45 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and 80 percent of exports. The Rwandan government was unable to make the economic policy adjustments necessary to offset the devastating impact of declining terms of trade for the products of its most important industry.

The SAP required two immediate economic reform measures: a civil service wage freeze and a currency devaluation. Moreover, the plan stipulated the removal of regulatory obstacles that inhibited the liberalization of trade and the development of the private sector (Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda 1996a, 37-39). The SAP, therefore, stressed greater reliance on market forces and the private sector to guide the economy, as well as an increased role for export-oriented industry to generate growth. To be achieved, each of these measures entailed significant economic change and thus required broad-based political support and managerial commitment.

The implementation of the SAP had a dramatic and immediate impact on Rwanda. The emphasis on the role of the market, rather than the state, in generating growth required a fundamental restructuring of the economy; the government was expected to downsize, balance the budget, slash spending, promote free enterprise and export-led growth, eliminate subsidies, relax tariffs and other trade barriers, and devalue the currency. Rwanda was similar to many other African nations whose post-independence governments heavily subsidized vital sectors of the domestic economy such as food production, the construction and maintenance of transportation systems, and the provision of health and education services.³² The abrupt imposition of austerity measures sent the Rwandan economy into a downward spiral (Chossudovsky 1997, 111-122).

In addition, the terms of the SAP stipulated that the Rwandan government introduce a multi-party political system. However, members of Habyarimana's own government were deeply opposed to political liberalization of any kind. The combination of economic and political reforms placed tremendous institutional strain on the Habyarimana regime, ultimately undermining the president's authority.

III. Civil War, Genocide, and the International Response

Adding to this period of instability was the ongoing question of the return and resettlement of Tutsi refugees from neighbouring countries. According to estimates by the UN, approximately 7 percent of the total Rwandan population, accounting for roughly half of the Tutsi community, had become refugees. The majority of people fled to Burundi (280,000), while others sought refuge in Uganda (80,000), Zaire (80,000), and Tanzania (30,000) (United Nations 1996, 11-12).

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³² Robert H. Jackson (1990) examines the normative framework that upholds sovereign states in the Third World—using what he terms as "negative sovereignty." These "quasi-states" lack many of the characteristics of statehood postulated by "positive sovereignty"—the structure that emerged in Europe along with the modern state and was expressed in Western colonialism. According to Jackson, negative sovereignty is a crucial and overlooked framework which not only helps sustain many of those states, but impinges on human rights and socioeconomic development within them.

On 1 October 1990, civil war broke out between French-backed Rwandan government forces and the *Front Patriotique Rwandaise* (FPR),³³ which launched an invasion from Uganda. The FPR explicitly projected itself as multi-ethnic, however, the vast majority of its leaders and members were Tutsis. The primary aims of the offensive were the settlement of the refugee crisis and the overthrow of the Hutu regime (Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda 1996b, 18-20). As a result of this protracted guerrilla conflict, as well as pressure from the OAU, neighbouring states and the international community, the Rwandan government agreed to begin negotiations with the FPR.

Attempts to find a solution to the crisis were carried out against the backdrop of increasing international concern about peace and security in the Great Lakes region. The initial deployment of an international peacekeeping force to Rwanda occurred in July 1992. Fifty soldiers from Senegal, Congo, and Tunisia, sponsored by the OAU, were tasked with overseeing a cease-fire prior to the beginning of negotiations. Although the first efforts of the OAU's Neutral Military Observer Group (NMOG) failed to prevent a resumption of hostilities, a second OAU contingent of 130 soldiers was credited with establishing a demilitarized zone between the Rwandan army and the FPR long enough for the discussions to get underway (Stearns 1994, 35). This intervention is significant, as it marked a serious attempt by African states to resolve the problem before UN involvement.

(a) Phase 1: Arusha Accords/UNAMIR I

Peace talks were held in Arusha, Tanzania, with the intention of ending the civil war. Under the auspices of the government of Tanzania, the OAU, and the UN, an agreement was successfully concluded in August 1993. The Arusha Accords stipulated that both sides were required to demobilize and disarm their troops. In addition, the terms of the settlement called for the Rwandan army to be reconstituted into a unified Hutu-Tutsi force,

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³³ The rebel group is also referred to by its English name, *Rwandan Patriotic Front* (RPF). The FPR was comprised primarily of Tutsi refugees who had been living in Uganda since Rwanda's independence.

for the Rwandan-Tutsi refugees scattered throughout the region to be repatriated, and for a transitional government (led by Habyarimana) to assume power by mid-September 1993.³⁴ Finally, the provisional government was mandated to hold multi-party elections within 22 months (UN Doc. A/48/824-S/26915 [1993]).

To oversee the agreement, the UN Security Council established the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR I) in October 1993, under the command of Canadian Major-General Roméo Dallaire. Among its numerous duties, UNAMIR I was mandated to undertake the following tasks: (1) to mitigate the military conflict between Rwandan government forces and the FPR; (2) to maintain subsequent cease-fire agreements; (3) to provide humanitarian assistance to refugees; and (4) to support the process of political reconciliation (UN. Doc. S/RES/872 [1993]). UNAMIR I evolved from the United Nations Observer Mission to Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR), created in June 1993 to ensure that no military assistance reached Rwanda through Uganda (UN Doc. S/RES/846 [1993]). The force was established under Chapter VI of the UN Charter and after full deployment in March 1994, reached a strength of about 2,500 personnel (United Nations 1996, 25-27).³⁵

UNAMIR I was unable to implement its mandate due, in part, to a deadlock in the political process in Rwanda. The success of the mission was predicated on the assumption that there would be continued cooperation between the parties and with the UN in carrying

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³⁴ The transitional government was to consist of the president's party—*Mouvement Républicain pour la Démocratie et le Développement* (which by this time had changed its name from the *Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement*, but retained the acronym MRND), the *Mouvement Démocratique Républicain* (MDR), the *Parti Social Démocrate* (PSD), the *Parti Libéral* (PL), the *Parti Démocrate Chrétien* (PDC), as well as the FPR.

³⁵ Chapter VI of the UN Charter, "Pacific Settlement of Disputes," enjoins the parties to an international dispute to: "first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means." The UN Security Council can recommend or implement supportive actions, such as the establishment of UNOMUR or UNAMIR, when one or more of the parties report failure in their peaceful efforts to resolve the dispute. Chapter VII, "Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression," provides a basis for greater action. Article 42 enables the Security Council to "take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security." For the development of the mandate that authorized UNAMIR, see UN Doc. S/RES/872 [1993], UN Doc. S/26488 [1993], and S/26488/Add.1 [1993].

out their respective commitments under the Arusha Accords. Deep-rooted mistrust, delaying tactics, and constantly shifting political alignments in Kigali, however, undermined the implementation of the transitional arrangements.

While the international community applauded the Rwandan government and the FPR for reaching a peace agreement, militant Hutus plotted to derail the reforms forged at Arusha. An early indication that hard-line cabinet members would not accept a negotiated settlement was the formation of a Hutu extremist group, the *Coalition pour la Défense de la République* (CDR). Both the MRND and the CDR founded militias known respectively as the *Interahamwe* ("Those Who Attack Together") and the *Impuzamugambi* ("Those Who Have A Single Aim").³⁶ Moreover, when it came to executing the timetable stipulated in the Accords, the Habyarimana government engineered and exploited the factionalism which characterized the major opposition parties. This postponed the process of forming the broad-based transitional government and national assembly (Gasarasi 1998, 19).

On 11 January, Force Commander Dallaire sent a fax to Major-General Maurice Baril, his superior at the Department of Peace-keeping Operations (DPKO) at the UN Secretariat in New York (Dallaire 1994).³⁷ The memo warned of an impending genocide in Rwanda and drew attention to the fact that the Hutu government was compiling lists of Tutsis and training militiamen to kill them. It further cautioned that the Hutu government planned to force the UN to withdraw by killing Belgian peacekeepers, who were the backbone of the 2,500-member mission. The withdrawal of these troops would permit unrestricted killing (Human Rights Watch 1999; *National Post* 1999a, A3).

Dallaire received this information from a "former security member of the president" who wanted to stop the genocide. The informant said that he had been "ordered to register

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³⁶ By April 1994, 10,000 Hutu militia members had been armed by the Presidential Guard and the Rwandan army (Leitenberg 1994, 6).

³⁷ General Baril is presently Canada's Chief-of-Defence-Staff. At the time of the genocide, he was the senior military advisor to Kofi Annan, UN Under-Secretary-General and Director of the DPKO.

all Tutsi in Kigali," suspecting that "it is for their extermination." As evidence, he stated that "in 20 minutes his personnel could kill up to 1000 Tutsis" (Dallaire 1994).

In the fax, Dallaire said that he intended to begin raiding the Rwandan government's weapons caches to thwart the genocide plan. However, he was told in a reply from DPKO not to seize any arms or take aggressive action against the Hutu government, but rather simply ask it to stop arming civilians (Annan 1994).³⁸ Essentially, the response at the UN headquarters was to treat the fax as a routine bureaucratic matter: it set off no special alarm bells, nor was it disseminated. The results were catastrophic.

Political frustration erupted in February 1994. With no legitimate government in place and the president accused of interfering with the transitional process, political violence culminated in the assassination of two prominent politicians, Félicien Gatabazi of the PSD and Martin Bucyana of the CDR who were killed by rival Hutus (UN. Doc. S/1994/360 [1994]).

Despite international pressure, efforts at mediation by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Rwanda, Jacques Roger Booh-Booh of Cameroon, produced no tangible results. The parties were therefore warned of the potential of a UN withdrawal due to the impasse. This threat was repeated by the Security Council in early April when it conditionally prolonged the mandate of UNAMIR I for a four month period (UN Doc. S/RES/909 [1994]).

In an effort to break the stalemate, President Ali Hassan Mwinyi of Tanzania, the facilitator of the Rwandan peace process, convened a one-day summit in Dar es Salaam to identify a regional approach to preventing what he called a "Bosnia on our doorstep" (*The Times* 1994, 15).³⁹ All promise of progress was abruptly halted when the aircraft carrying

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³⁸ It is unclear who actually saw the fax at the UN. Secretary-General Annan and Generals Baril and Dallaire are potential witnesses at an inquiry trying to uncover the answer, and at the time of writing, they are under an obligation not to discuss the particulars of the case.

³⁹ In a communiqué issued at the summit, the leaders resolved: (a) to support the transitional government and call on all political and security forces to fully comply; (b) to reaffirm the role of the OAU, including the deployment of a military contingent from the organization to assist in the peace process; (c) to call for the reform of the military; and (d) to demand full support from the political and security forces for unimpeded functioning of stable institutions (UN Doc. S/1994/406).

President Habyarimana and Burundian President Cyprien Ntaryamira was shot down on its approach to Kigali airport on 6 April 1994.⁴⁰

Different theories have been advanced about who was responsible for the incident (*New York Times* 1994a, 1). The most widely held view attributes the attack to Hutu extremists within the Presidential Guard, intent on pre-empting any move toward power-sharing with the Tutsi.⁴¹

The Rwandan government and security forces blamed the FPR, which categorically denied involvement. The Hutu elite also accused Belgium of complicity in an alleged FPR plot (Hilsum 1994, 17). The unsolved mystery of the plane crash, with France and Belgium widely associated with opposite sides, was exploited by several parties in the ensuing chaos.

The suspected murder of the Rwandan president unleashed two parallel processes of violence which continued unabated for the next three months—massacres of the civilian population and a resumption of the civil war. Within hours of the assassination, militant Hutus initiated a brutal campaign of violence against Tutsis and opposition politicians. Kigali quickly descended into disorder, as soldiers and gangs of youths wielding machetes, clubs, and firearms rampaged through the streets. On 8 April, an interim government was established, headed by the former Speaker of Parliament, Théodore Sindikuwabo. The cabinet was composed primarily of Hutu extremists who had held positions of power during the Habyarimana regime.

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⁴⁰ Given that the ethnic balance in Rwanda and Burundi is roughly the same, international concern that the genocide in Rwanda would spill over into Burundi was palpable. Despite its fragile domestic situation, Burundi did not explode into state-sponsored killing, although the death toll in successive violent episodes between 1993 and 1997 is believed to be at least 150,000 people. The reason for this lesser number may be ascribed to the promotion of democratic reforms between 1989 and 1993. The establishment of a multi-party system reduced animosity between Hutus and Tutsis, leading to a lower intensity conflict than in Rwanda (Evans 1997, 7-26).

⁴¹ The Presidential Guard was an elite unit drawn almost exclusively from President Habyarimana's home region in the northern prefecture of Ruhengeri. These forces were trained and supplied by the French army. According to UN spokespersons, the Presidential Guard prevented UNAMIR from investigating the wreckage (*Africa Confidential* 1994a, 8).

The worst perpetrators of the attacks on civilians were the *Interahamwe* and *Impuzamugambi* militias. The Presidential Guard bore the main responsibility for the murder of opposition politicians in early April, while the gendarmerie, often mobilized by local government officials, took part in the killings in the countryside. The atrocities committed were shocking in their brutality. In one incident, Ugandan officials reported that as many as 10,000 bodies had floated down the Kagera River into Lake Victoria. One eyewitness was quoted as follows: "One time, I found a woman. . . . She had five children tied to her. One on each arm. One on each leg. One on her back. She had no wounds" (*New York Times* 1994b, 1).

The interim government claimed that the killings were the result of a spontaneous expression of the people's animosity toward the FPR, however, there is strong evidence that the massacres proceeded according to a preconceived plan (Human Rights Watch 1999; UN Doc. A/50/709-S/1995/915 [1995]). Roadblocks were set up in Kigali even before news of the plane crash had been announced. Attackers then pursued victims listed by name while broadcasts by the extremist *Radio-Télévision Libre des Mille Collines* (RTLM) incited the population to eliminate the Tutsis.⁴² The first people to be killed were the leaders of political parties, mostly moderate Hutus, opposed to the extremists within the MRND and CDR. Among the initial victims were Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana and 10 UN soldiers from Belgium assigned to protect her.

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⁴² The Commission of Experts established by the Security Council to investigate evidence of grave violations of international humanitarian law in Rwanda, including possible acts of genocide, concluded that:

Racist hate propaganda was disseminated on a widespread basis as far back as 1993, especially by Radio-Télévision des Mille Collines, a private radio station owned by members of President Habyarimana's party. These incitements branded Tutsi as well as certain Hutu opponents of the President as "enemies" and "traitors" who "deserved to die". [sic] The radio referred to all Tutsi as "the enemy" and accused them of siding with [the] RPF. It called for all "enemies" to be "exterminated". [sic] Posters, leaflets and radio broadcasts on Radio des Mille Collines dehumanized Tutsis as "snakes", [sic] "cockroaches" and "animals". [sic] Individuals targeted in the radio broadcasts were among the first to be killed (along with their families) in April 1994 (UN Doc. S/1994/1125 [1994]).

The next casualties were other opposition politicians, lawyers, intellectuals, human rights activists, and members of the business community. For the first time in Rwandan history those seeking protection from the Roman Catholic church came under sustained attack (National Film Board of Canada 1996).⁴³ There were also deliberate attacks on hospitals and patients. By the end of April, it is believed that approximately 200,000 people had been massacred. By mid-summer 1994, estimates of the number dead had been revised upward to 500,000-800,000. Some relief organizations operating in Rwanda placed the number as high as one million people (*Washington Post* 1994a, A1).

(b) Phase 2: UNAMIR I

Efforts by the UN to respond to the crisis were halting, confused, and ineffective. Due to its mandate under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, UNAMIR I could not use force to protect civilians from the campaign of violence. Without Chapter VII authorization to use force, Dallaire had little choice but to order the UN soldiers to withdraw to their barracks.

The inability of UNAMIR I to stem the slaughter was further compromised by the unilateral withdrawal of Belgium's 440 troops from the peacekeeping force in mid-April 1994, precipitated by the murder of 10 Belgian soldiers earlier in the month (UN Doc. S/1994/430 [1994]). The departure of the Belgians from UNAMIR I prompted signals from other contingents that they wished to do likewise.

The assessment of the deteriorating situation by UN officials differed sharply, notably between Dallaire and Special Representative Booh Booh. Dallaire interpreted his mandate as broadly as circumstances would allow, negotiating between the combatants in an attempt to protect civilians. While his actions were able to save some lives, a strong case can be made that if UNAMIR I had possessed a broader mandate with more robust rules of engagement, the international force could have protected many more people.

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⁴³ It is alleged that some Catholic clerics were involved in the killing, see (Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda 1996a, 53).

Booh Booh, in contrast, focussed on a narrow range of peripheral issues. In particular, almost all his attention was directed at obtaining a cease-fire, even though it was clear that efforts toward a political settlement at this point were futile. Moreover, Booh Booh and his superiors refrained from criticizing the interim Hutu government (Human Rights Watch 1999; African Rights 1995, 1116-1120).

On 20 April, UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali presented the Security Council with three policy options for peacekeeping operations in Rwanda: (1) change the mandate of UNAMIR so that adequate troops and equipment could be provided "to coerce the opposing forces into a cease-fire, and to attempt to restore law and order and put an end to the killings. . . . [Such a] scenario would [have] require[d] several thousand additional troops and UNAMIR . . . to be given enforcement powers under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations;" (2) reduce UNAMIR from 2,500 troops to 270, leaving a small force to act as an intermediary between Rwandan government forces and the FPR to broker a cease-fire agreement; or (3) a complete withdrawal of all UNAMIR troops (UN Doc. S/1994/470 [1994]).

Previous research has suggested that a force of at least 5,000 personnel with a broader mandate and sufficient equipment could have made a significant difference (Feil 1998). This would have required much greater participation by Western nations, particularly the US. In the end, Security Council members determined that the complete withdrawal of UNAMIR forces would be too great an admission of the UN's limitations, thus the second option proposed by Boutros-Ghali was eventually adopted (UN Doc. S/RES/912 [1994]). Simply put, the Security Council was unable to reach adequate consensus on the terms of a UN peace enforcement mission to Rwanda because no UN member state was willing to shoulder the burden of such an effort.

The US was largely disinterested in becoming engaged in an international intervention effort in Rwanda following its disastrous experience in Somalia.⁴⁴ As one of

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⁴⁴ On 3 October 1993, an operation to capture Somali warlord Mohammed Farah Aided, turned into a tragic

the most influential nations on the Security Council, the Americans' lack of resolve to stop the genocide was arguably a critical factor in the UN's slow, and ultimately ineffective response to the crisis.

There was heated debate among the members of the Security Council over use of the word "genocide" (Melvern 1997, 341-342). Employing this term would have invoked the *Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide* and legally obligated the signatories to take action against the mass murderers in Rwanda. Although the Security Council did issue a Presidential Statement with words from this law, the word "genocide" was conspicuously absent. As a result, intervention by the international community was not required according to international law.⁴⁵

The initial scaling down of UNAMIR I constituted a crucial turning-point in the crisis, as time was of the essence in any effort to protect the civilian population. In the face of the mounting death toll, the Secretary-General urged the Security Council to reverse its decision. In a letter to the President of the Security Council on 29 April he noted that "it has become clear that [the] mandate does not give UNAMIR the power to take effective action to halt the continuing massacres." He reported that UNAMIR I had lost credibility, with both government forces and the FPR, and called for strong action to restore law and order. He recognized, however, that "such action would require a commitment of human and material resources on a scale which Member States have so far proved reluctant to contemplate" (UN Doc. S/1994/518 [1994]). The same day, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported the outpouring of 250,000 Rwandan refugees into Tanzania within a period of 24 hours, the largest and fastest exodus ever witnessed by the world body at that time (*Washington Post* 1994b, A1).

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firefight that lasted 17 hours and left 18 Americans dead and 84 wounded. Television reports showed the body of an American serviceman being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu before a jeering and jubilant crowd. The legacy of Somalia continues to haunt the US military and has cast a long shadow on American decision making about humanitarian/peacekeeping operations, e.g., PDD-25.

⁴⁵ The statement read, in part: "[T]he Security Council recalls that the killing of members of an ethnic group with the intention of destroying such a group in whole or in part constitutes a crime punishable under international law" (UN Doc. S/PRST/1994/21).

(c) Phase 3: UNAMIR II

From the outset, Western countries indicated that they would be unwilling to commit troops to stop the killing in Rwanda. The Secretary-General, therefore, consulted with the OAU "on ways to restore law and order" (UN Doc. S/PRST/1994/21 [1994]). Planning proceeded toward implementing a strengthened force composed of African contingents with Western financial and logistical support. On 13 May, the Secretary-General submitted a plan that called for sending 5,500 soldiers to Kigali under an expanded UNAMIR mandate that would protect refugees and assist relief workers in the capital and in the countryside (UN Doc. S/1994/565 [1994]).

The US, in particular, took a firm position within the Security Council against the immediate deployment of additional UN peacekeeping troops. The timing of the crisis was a significant factor in the American reaction to the tragedy. In May 1994, the Clinton administration issued Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25), a guideline drafted in response to the American experience in Somalia; the document stipulated sixteen specific considerations used to determine whether the US would engage in international peacekeeping missions. Rwanda was the first test of PDD-25; consequently, the US would only agree to participate in an expanded UN peacekeeping mission after the conditions set forth in the document had been satisfied.⁴⁶

On 17 May, after lengthy debate, the Security Council established UNAMIR II, consisting of 5,500 troops with an expanded mandate, although not under Chapter VII of

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⁴⁶ The rationale behind PDD-25 is as follows:

When deciding whether to support a particular UN peace operation, the United States will insist that fundamental questions be asked before new obligations are undertaken. These include an assessment of the threat to international peace and security, a determination that the peace operation serves U.S. interests for dealing with that threat on a multilateral basis, identification of clear objectives, availability of the necessary resources and identification of an operation's endpoint or criteria for completion" (White House 1994, 13).

These criteria are significant in that they reflect the incorporation of military and strategic concerns into the political determination of essentially policy objectives. However, they can also be seen as a re-statement of long-standing military involvement in the Washington policy process, *inter alia* through the National Security Council (NSC).

the UN Charter. According to its new rules of engagement, UNAMIR II was authorized "[t]o contribute to the security and protection of displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk in Rwanda, including through the establishment and maintenance, where feasible, of secure humanitarian areas; [and] . . . [t]o provide security and support for the distribution of relief supplies and humanitarian relief operations." In addition, an arms embargo was imposed on Rwanda under Chapter VII (UN Doc. S/RES/918 [1994]).⁴⁷

At US insistence, however, it was agreed to initially send only 150 unarmed observers to assess the military situation and to supplement the peacekeeping force with 500 additional Ghanaian soldiers to bring the unit up to battalion strength (*New York Times* 1994c, A1). Authorization for the deployment of the bulk of UNAMIR II was contingent on a further report regarding the cooperation of the parties, the duration of the mandate, and the availability of troops. The prudence demanded by the US was not shared by the Secretary-General or Force Commander Dallaire, who promptly criticized the phased arrival of troops, arguing it would allow the FPR time to consolidate its military advantage.

The Security Council later passed resolution 925 on 8 June, authorizing the full deployment of 5,500 soldiers to Rwanda (UN Doc. S/RES/925 [1994]). However, difficulties in obtaining logistical support (particularly from the US) severely impeded the operation and made it impossible for the bulk of additional forces to be deployed until October (*New York Times* 1994d, A10).⁴⁸

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⁴⁷ Ironically, Rwanda had a seat on the Security Council at this time, which was occupied by a representative of the besieged Hutu government. Moreover, Rwanda was due to take over the Presidency of the Council in September 1994. This resulted in a highly unusual situation, as the Rwandan government was privy to the strategies being considered by the international community to respond to the crisis.

⁴⁸ In order to circumvent some of these problems, the Canadian government along with other UN member states, has proposed the establishment of a rapid reaction force under UN command, see (Government of Canada 1995). There was also a proposal made by Prime Minister Chrétien at the meeting of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in Madrid in 1996. It called for like-minded middle powers to band together as a means of reducing their reliance on American logistical support in future crises. The initiative met with little success.

(d) Phase 4: *Opération Turquoise*

On 15 June, France announced that it was prepared, "along with its main European and African partners," to intervene in Rwanda to protect groups threatened with "extinction" (*New York Times* 1994e, A12). Arguably, this action was taken to enhance France's image both domestically and abroad, given its earlier role in arming the Hutu extremists.

The willingness of France to take the lead in such an intervention was met by other states with some misgivings, as France had played a major role in arming and training the Hutu-dominated Rwandan government forces, which were responsible for many of the killings (Goose and Smyth 1994, 88-89).⁴⁹ Consequently, there were suggestions that the French might seek to bolster the Rwandan army in their fight against the Tutsi rebels. While most of the atrocities had been inflicted on the Tutsis, France was concerned that the FPR would retaliate against defenceless Hutu civilians. The FPR immediately declared its opposition to any French intervention.

France initially insisted that it would not act alone, but it soon became clear that none of its Western allies intended to join the intervention. The Western European Union (WEU) met, and while some of its members offered to provide equipment, no state offered to provide troops (*Washington Post* 1994d, A9). The US supported the idea as a means of bridging the gap before the planned arrival of the 5,500 UN peacekeepers, but also declined to contribute its own forces (*Washington Post* 1994e, A10). The OAU criticized the initiative, stating that unilateral action might be a hindrance to arriving at a solution (African Rights 1995, 1141). Three of Rwanda's neighbours—Burundi, Tanzania, and Uganda—denied France permission to stage operations from their territory (*New York Times* 1994f, A8).

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⁴⁹ French Foreign Minister Alain Juppé sought to allay concerns that France was intervening in support of the Hutu government, contending that France was acting impartially and was "not going to Rwanda to engage in war but to save the population. . . . This is not a political intervention to separate belligerents but to protect civilians" (*Washington Post* 1994c, A17).

French President François Mitterrand declared that, regardless of whether other states responded positively, France would act. French Defence Minister François Léotard, however, asserted that "France won't go alone," stating that it was necessary to "get a mandate from the international community and the help of African countries" (*Washington Post* 1994f, A25). By 21 June, 1,000 French troops were positioned in Zaire and the Central African Republic, but France wanted explicit Security Council authorization before intervening (UN Doc. S/1994/734 [1994]). As the Security Council considered the draft French resolution, the rebel Tutsi force vowed to "do all we can to resist this French invasion" and urged the Council not to authorize it (*Washington Post* 1994g, A16).

On 22 June, the Security Council passed resolution 929 under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, authorizing the French to use "all necessary means" to protect Rwandan civilians, but called for a "strictly humanitarian . . . impartial and neutral" operation that would not interfere in the fighting between the rebel and government forces. Further, the resolution kept the troops under "national command and control" and stated that the duration of the intervention would last only two months (UN Doc. S/RES/929 [1994]).⁵⁰ The operational mandate was reportedly less than the three months sought by the Secretary-General, apparently due to a need to ease French domestic concerns about being involved in a prolonged conflict (*New York Times* 1994g, A8; *Washington Post* 1994h, A24).

Opération Turquoise was launched the same day that authorization was given by the Security Council. The FPR demanded that French aid workers, medical personnel, and journalists leave areas under Tutsi control, an order subsequently retracted. Within days, French soldiers were joined by a small contingent of Senegalese troops, and both forces made contact with Hutu civilians (*Washington Post* 1994i, A26). In order to appease international concern about the impartiality of the mission, the French made efforts to show

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⁵⁰ The Security Council vote was ten in favour, none opposed, and five abstentions (Brazil, China, New Zealand, Nigeria, and Pakistan), an unusually tepid outcome to intensive French diplomatic lobbying. Despite falling under French national command, *Opération Turquoise* is nonetheless considered intervention by the international community, in much the same way as Operation Desert Storm was considered an action by the UN. In each case, rather than being placed under UN command, the responsibility for upholding the UN Charter was essentially "contracted out" to member states.

that their tactics were evenhanded by confronting the Hutu irregular militias, disarming them, and telling them to go home (*New York Times* 1994h, sec. 1, p. 10). Reportedly surprised to find that widespread massacres of Tutsi, not Hutu civilians, was ongoing, they also acknowledged that this killing needed to be stopped (*New York Times* 1994i, A1; *Washington Post* 1994j, A27). French operations, however, were limited to the western portion of Rwanda and were not adequate for ensuring the protection of civilians or relief operations throughout the country.⁵¹

The besieged Hutu government urged France to intervene in order to prevent a Tutsi victory (*New York Times* 1994k, sec. 1, p. 6). At the same time, French efforts to assist Rwandan civilians resulted in armed clashes with the FPR (*New York Times* 1994l, sec. 1, p. 2). As the rebels continued to advance, France requested that the Security Council authorize the creation of a safe haven in southwestern Rwanda, but the FPR rejected this proposal, arguing that France was seeking to assist the rapidly weakening Hutu government forces (*Washington Post* 1994k, A14).

On 4 July, the FPR gained control of Kigali as well as Butare, Rwanda's second largest city. Without waiting for UN approval, France unilaterally declared a safe zone in southwestern Rwanda for the protection of civilians. France's military commander in Rwanda stated that any Tutsi rebel forces entering the safe zone would be fired upon "without any hesitation" if they threatened the population (*Washington Post* 1994l, A1). Most of the people in the safe zone were Hutu, including some 250,000 refugees who had fled from parts of Rwanda controlled by the FPR (*New York Times* 1994m, A1).

The French government announced its intention to begin a reduction of personnel by the end of July, with a view to complete withdrawal by the end of August. In mid-July, France began to equip a force of 500 troops drawn from Senegal, the Republic of Congo,

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⁵¹ French Defence Minister Léotard candidly admitted: "We cannot evacuate everybody. We've only got hundreds of people here; there are hundreds of thousands who need help" (*New York Times* 1994j, A11).

Chad, Niger, and Guinea-Bissau, to assist the French contingent and facilitate the eventual transfer of responsibility to UNAMIR II (United Nations 1996, 53-58).

IV. Humanitarian Crisis

The withdrawal of French forces from a large area of western Rwanda led to a routing of the Hutu army and the collapse of the government. Within days, a quarter of a million Hutus, fearful of retaliation by advancing Tutsi rebels, fled into Zaire (*New York Times* 1994n, A1; *Washington Post* 1994m, A1). Many of these fears, in retrospect, seem unfounded and were fueled by rumours spread by Hutu extremists, but by the time the FPR announced a cease-fire on 18 July, more than a million Hutus had crossed over into the Zairian border town of Goma, while an additional million had sought refuge inside the French safe zone (*Washington Post* 1994n, A1).

The influx of refugees caught the international community off guard (Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda 1996c, 111-141; *Washington Post* 1994o, A1). Unable to cope, the UNHCR appealed to governments to intervene directly: only a rapid and massive military operation was deemed capable of rushing in the food, medicine, water, trucks, planes and helicopters needed in Goma to bring relief to the thousands of people dying of exhaustion, hunger and disease (*New York Times* 1994o, sec. 1, p. 1; *Washington Post* 1994p, A28). In addition to the activities of UN bodies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the humanitarian effort was supported by civil defence and disaster response agencies from donor countries, as well as several national military contingents, including: the US, the United Kingdom (UK), Canada, the Netherlands, Japan, Germany, New Zealand, Australia, Israel, and Ireland (Minear and Guillot 1996).

The arrival of foreign logistical support created an urgent need for communication and liaison with UNAMIR II, which was also providing security and support for humanitarian operations. Force Commander Dallaire was not notified of the arrival of foreign troops in Goma. As a result, UNAMIR II was unable to develop a coordinated plan

for the delivery of humanitarian relief. The Secretary-General expressed his concern, urging all foreign forces to become part of UNAMIR II (UN Doc. S/1994/924 [1994]); despite his pleas this action never came to pass.

On 19 July, the FPR announced the formation of a broad-based Government of National Unity (BBGNU), composed of both Tutsis and Hutus (*New York Times* 1994p, A6). The new regime was recognized by most states and subsequently gained representation at the UN (*New York Times* 1994q, A14). The BBGNU sought to allay the fears of the majority by promoting a multi-party government and appointing Hutus to 12 of 21 senior posts, including those of Prime Minister and President. Political parties represented in the previous government were included, with the notable exception of the MRND and CDR, which the FPR held responsible for planning and inciting the massacres. The FPR retained nine positions for itself, appointing its leader, General Paul Kagame, as both Vice-President and Minister of Defense (*Africa Confidential* 1994b, 2-4).

France announced that it would withdraw its forces from the safe zone by the original two-month deadline of 22 August. While the new Rwandan government agreed that the French force could be replaced by 2,200 troops from Ethiopia and other African countries, UN officials and some states expressed concern that the departure of French soldiers would spark another exodus of Hutus (*Washington Post* 1994q, A12). The new Rwandan government, however, favoured French withdrawal from its territory (*Washington Post* 1994r, A21).

As the deadline approached, the fear of another crisis materialized, as thousands of Hutus fled from the safe zone in Rwanda into Zaire (*New York Times* 1994r, 3). Nevertheless, as planned, all French forces left Rwanda by 22 August (*Washington Post* 1994s, A14).⁵² In the wake of the French withdrawal, disturbing reports emerged both about the new government's treatment of ethnic Hutus (*New York Times* 1994s, A7) and

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⁵² In a joint statement, French President Mitterand and Prime Minister Edouard Balladur declared that "France has fulfilled its duty. . . . It is now up to the Rwandan authorities and the international community to assume, as of today, all of their responsibilities" (*Washington Post* 1994t, A1).

about the violence committed by soldiers of the former Hutu regime (*New York Times* 1994t, A1). The Secretary-General appealed to sixty countries for an international force to be sent to the camps in Zaire to control the violence; none responded positively, leaving the task to Zairian and Tanzanian troops (*Washington Post* 1995a, A12).

The Security Council took some steps to encourage the refugees to return to Rwanda. UNAMIR II maintained its presence, charged with contributing to the security and protection of displaced persons and providing support for relief operations (UN Doc. S/RES/965 [1994]). As a means of demonstrating that war criminals would be brought to justice in an orderly fashion, rather than indiscriminately punished by the new Rwandan government, the Security Council voted to establish an International Tribunal for Rwanda to prosecute persons responsible for genocide and other serious violations of international humanitarian law (UN Doc. S/RES/955 [1994]).⁵³ Separately, Rwandan courts proceeded to try persons suspected of genocide (*New York Times* 1995a, A1), amid criticism that its overburdened penal system was incapable of dispensing justice to the vast number of people held in custody (*New York Times* 1995b, 1).

As the year drew to a close, the security situation both inside the country and especially on its borders remained volatile. By 1995, some 250,000 people, primarily Hutus, remained displaced within Rwanda, fearful of returning to their homes and intimidated by Hutu militants in the camps.

The presence of Hutu extremists among the refugees was regarded as a serious threat by the new Tutsi regime; consequently, in April 1995, the government began a campaign to close the camps and force the dislocated Hutus to return to their homes. In doing so, chaos ensued at the largest camp at Kibeho, when hundreds of Hutus were trampled to death or shot by government forces, in part, because they were used as human

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⁵³ Although Rwanda had asked for the establishment of the Tribunal, it cast the only negative vote in the Security Council. The new government objected to the exclusion of the death penalty, and to the possibility of trials being held outside Rwanda. Nevertheless, it later announced its intention to co-operate with the Tribunal's investigators.

shields by Hutu militants (*Washington Post* 1995b, A1); within weeks, the camps were closed (*New York Times* 1995c, A3).

On 9 June 1995, the Security Council voted to cut the troop strength of UNAMIR II by more than half, reflecting a desire by the Rwandan government that the force be reduced and even withdrawn (*New York Times* 1995d, 5). The deterioration in relations between Kigali and the UN can be attributed to the perception among many Rwandans that the UN had failed them in their time of need. Ultimately, despite the continuing fear of Hutu refugees that returning to their homes would subject them to reprisals, the Rwandan government insisted that the UN peacekeeping force leave its territory. UNAMIR II subsequently completed its withdrawal on 19 April 1996.

Since this time, the UN has maintained a small presence in Rwanda in the form of the United Nations Office for Rwanda (UNOR). This agency is tasked with: supporting the efforts of the Rwandan government to promote national reconciliation; strengthening the judicial system; facilitating the return of refugees; and rehabilitating the country's infrastructure (UN Doc. S/RES/1050 [1996]).

V. Aftermath

While the international community has recognized the importance of a speedy investigation of human rights abuses for Rwanda's rehabilitation, the pursuit of this goal has proved difficult in practice. The events of April-June 1994 devastated the judicial infrastructure and deprived it of most of its personnel.⁵⁴ To date, Rwandan courts have tried more than 7,000 cases, and elicited more than 3,143 confessions, however, over 152,000 detainees remain in jails awaiting trial (*Associated Press* 1999, <http://www.wire.ap.org>). Prosecution of those responsible for the genocide is an essential component of the healing process necessary for national reconciliation (Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda 1996d, 72-86).

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⁵⁴ For a review of the problems presently facing the Rwandan justice system see (Schabas 1998, 67- 97).

On 23 March 1999, it was reported that Secretary-General Kofi Annan would announce his intention to investigate the UN's failure to prevent the genocide in Rwanda. In a confidential letter addressed to the President of the UN Security Council, Annan wrote that the inquiry would aim to "establish the facts" of the Organization's response to the events that resulted in the genocide (*National Post* 1999b, A1; *Globe and Mail* 1999, A14). To do this and to "draw conclusions," the Secretary-General stated that he is prepared to give the inquiry's investigators access to any staff members or records they require, including "internal documents and cables" (*National Post* 1999b, A3). At the time of this writing, the decision to launch the inquiry is being discussed by members of the Security Council.

CHAPTER III: ANALYSIS

If I had the mandate, the men and the equipment, hundreds of thousands of people would be alive today.

Major-General Roméo Dallaire, Force Commander of UNAMIR, 24 July 1994

The following chapter combines the analytical framework developed in chapter I with the case study discussed in chapter II. The integration of theory and practice will contribute insights into the relationship among the timing, strategy, and outcome of third party intervention.

The chapter is divided into four parts. The first part provides an overview of the variables examined in the study and their application to the case study. The second part evaluates the hypotheses derived from the scholarly literature and explains why certain hypotheses were supported by the case study while others were unsuccessful. The third part discusses the results of the analysis. The fourth part assesses the overall effectiveness of the model developed in chapter I and proposes revisions where appropriate.

I. Overview of Variables

(a) Independent Variable 1: Timing

In chapter I, the argument was advanced that conflicts pass through a life-cycle and that specific stages are more conducive to third party intervention than others. These stages are referred to as "ripe moments" and "triggers."

When intervention takes place in the *mediation phase* of a conflict, the significance of timing is often evaluated by the recognition or engineering of a ripe moment. A moment is considered ripe for de-escalation efforts by a third party if: (1) a hurting stalemate eliminates alternatives for the disputants; (2) a looming catastrophe removes delay as a possible option for the disputing parties; (3) the potential to reach an agreement is perceived at the initiation of third party efforts; (4) a secure way out emerges or seems possible at the culmination of de-escalation; and (5) valid representatives are available to negotiate de-escalation moves.

When intervention occurs in the *belligerence phase* of a conflict, the importance of timing is assessed by the perception of a trigger. A trigger is considered present when: (1) a major shift in power favours one side over the other; (2) a catastrophe occurs; (3) no possibility of reaching an agreement is perceived at the initiation of third party efforts; (4) the only perceived option is through continued fighting; and (5) valid representatives are not available due to assassinations, threats, or lack of institutional capacity.

(i) Phase 1: Arusha Accords/UNAMIR I

Phase I took place during the civil war between the Rwandan government and the FPR. The period leading up to the Arusha Accords and the establishment of UNAMIR I was marked by intermittent violence between the disputants, characterized by guerrilla attacks by the FPR and retaliatory raids by the Rwandan army. The sporadic nature of the war accounts for the placement of the initiative in the *mediation phase* of the diagram representing Phases of Intervention (**Figure 3**), immediately below the *belligerence phase*. According to the model, timing is assessed by the recognition or engineering of a ripe moment.

After three years of costly war, the Rwandan government and the FPR reached a hurting stalemate in August 1993, as victory remained an unreachable objective for each side. In addition, both adversaries faced a looming catastrophe. The Rwandan government was in the midst of a devastating economic crisis precipitated by the decline in the world price of coffee and the subsequent imposition of a SAP—these conditions led the country to ruin and eroded political support for the president. On the other hand, the FPR faced a possible shift in the balance of power if France decided to supply the Rwandan government with more equipment. Perceiving a window of opportunity to reach an agreement, representatives of both sides signed the Arusha Accords, paving the way toward the promise of free multi-party elections. These conditions satisfy the criteria for a ripe moment, as a result, the intervention was opportune from the perspective of timing.

Figure 3:
Phases of Intervention

Table 2:
Phase 1- Timing

Hurting stalemate	√
Looming catastrophe	√
Potential to reach agreement	√
Secure way out	√
Valid representatives	√
Result	√

(ii) Phase 2: UNAMIR I

The breakdown of the Arusha Accords and the political violence leading up to the genocide in April 1994, marked a significant increase in the intensity of the conflict. As a result, the intervention of UNAMIR I at the time of the genocide is positioned in the *belligerence phase* of *Figure 3*. According to the model, the assessment of timing is based on the recognition or engineering of a trigger.

Following the assassination of the Rwandan president, a major shift in military and political power took place, favouring Hutu extremists over Tutsis and moderate Hutus. A catastrophe occurred with the onset of the genocide and the beginning of systematic killing. There was no possibility of reaching an agreement between the disputants, as the objective of the Hutu extremists was to murder all Tutsis and moderate Hutus. As a result, the only option was continued fighting. Finally, no valid representatives were available as moderate Hutu politicians had been assassinated and the leaders of the FPR were mounting a counteroffensive. These conditions indicate the presence of a trigger, accordingly, the intervention was opportune from the perspective of timing.

Table 3:
Phase 2- Timing

Major shift in power favouring one side	√
Occurrence of a catastrophe	√
No possibility of reaching an agreement	√
Only way out is through continued fighting	√
No valid representatives	√
Result	√

(iii) Phase 3: UNAMIR II

From the onset of the genocide (6 April 1994) until the Security Council authorized the deployment of UNAMIR II (17 May 1994), conditions on the ground rapidly deteriorated, marked by the staggering number of people killed. The increase in the intensity of the conflict is reflected in the placement of the intervention in the *belligerence phase* of Figure 3, at a higher point than UNAMIR I. As the conflict remained in the *belligerence phase*, the recognition or engineering of a trigger is the standard for assessing timing.

During the intervening period between Phases 2 and 3, the shift in power favouring Hutu extremists was consolidated and the genocidal campaign against the Tutsis and moderate Hutus gained momentum. This was due, in part, to the withdrawal of 440 Belgian troops from UNAMIR I after 10 peacekeepers from this contingent were murdered. There was no possibility of reaching an agreement between the disputants given the intensity of violence. Moreover, representatives of both sides believed that their only option was to continue fighting—the Hutu extremists wanted to complete the genocide, while the FPR sought to end the killing and overthrow the government. As a result, representatives from both sides were either unwilling or unable to negotiate. These conditions indicate the existence of triggers throughout the period. Accordingly,

intervention at this point, although not initiated at the earliest possible moment, was nonetheless opportune from the perspective of timing.

Table 4:
Phase 3- Timing

Major shift in power favouring one side	✓
Occurrence of a catastrophe	✓
No possibility of reaching an agreement	✓
Only way out is through continued fighting	✓
No valid representatives	✓
Result	✓

(iv) Phase 4: *Opération Turquoise*

At the time of *Opération Turquoise* the intensity of the conflict escalated as the death toll from the genocide rose. As a result, this intervention is located in the *belligerence phase* of *Figure 3*, at a higher point than UNAMIR II. Accordingly, the recognition or engineering of a trigger remains the measure for assessing timing.

When *Opération Turquoise* began in June 1994, the FPR had achieved significant military gains. The shift in military power in favour of the FPR marked a major turning point in the conflict, although the genocide continued at this time, representing the persistence of a catastrophe. Continued fighting remained the only option available for both the Hutu extremists and the Tutsis, as representatives of the FPR, sensing military victory, were unwilling to negotiate. These conditions satisfy the criteria for a trigger, as a result, the intervention was opportune from the perspective of timing.

Table 5:
Phase 4- Timing

Major shift in power favouring one side	√
Occurrence of a catastrophe	√
No possibility of reaching an agreement	√
Only way out is through continued fighting	√
No valid representatives	√
Result	√

(b) Independent Variable 2: Strategy

Strategy is evaluated by comparing the optimal type of intervention predicted by the theoretical model with the tactics that were actually employed by the UN in Rwanda. If the strategy expected in theory matches the tactics used in practice, the strategy is deemed appropriate for the purposes of analysis. Conversely, if the strategy envisioned in theory is different than the tactics employed in practice, the strategy is considered inappropriate for the purposes of the study.

(i) Phase 1: Arusha Accords/UNAMIR I

The negotiations leading to the Arusha Accords took place simultaneously with battles between Rwandan government forces and the FPR. As a result, the intervention is located at the *mediation phase* immediately below the *belligerence phase* in *Figure 3*. According to the theoretical model, the optimal strategy to employ at this point is pressuring and/or peacekeeping.

In practice, the strategy of pressuring was used extensively by the OAU and UN, to persuade the FPR to demobilize and to convince the Rwandan government to liberalize the country's political system. Since disarmament of the warring factions was an integral part of the Arusha Accords, UNAMIR I was deployed as a peacekeeping force to oversee the

implementation of the agreement. Since the tactics predicted in theory match the ones employed in practice, the choice of strategy was appropriate.⁵⁵

Table 6:
Phase 1- Strategy

	Theory	Practice	Match
Phase 1	Pressuring/Peacekeeping	Pressuring/Peacekeeping	√

(ii) Phase 2: UNAMIR I

After the start of systematic killing by Hutu forces and paramilitary groups, the Rwandan conflict crossed the threshold of sustained violence and thus entered the belligerence phase of *Figure 3*. In this context, the theoretical framework suggests the necessity of military intervention by a third party. According to the model, the optimal strategy to employ at this point is peace enforcement, based on the fact that there was no peace to keep at this point in time.

The strategies used in practice by the UN may be viewed from two different perspectives, referred to respectively as Phases 2a and 2b. In Phase 2a, the strategy of peacekeeping was employed by the UN in the form of UNAMIR I. Shortly after the onset of violence, however, the conditions for sustaining a traditional peacekeeping operation were no longer present. Given the non-permissive operational environment, it was clear that UNAMIR I was unable to intervene in the massacres without a revised mandate and a substantial increase in its size and military capability. Since the tactics predicted in theory do not match the ones employed in practice, the choice of strategy was inappropriate.

Analyzed from a different perspective, an argument can be made that *no new intervention occurred* at this point, given the fact that the operational mandate and rules of engagement of UNAMIR I were not modified following its initial deployment in August

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⁵⁵ It is acknowledged that an effective strategy ideally leads to a de-escalation in the intensity of a conflict. However, while the Arusha Accords subsequently broke down, it is argued that the use of pressuring tactics followed by peacekeeping was nonetheless the correct choice of strategy in light of the prevailing conditions in August 1993.

1993. According to this interpretation, the strategy of inaction was used in Phase 2b. Since the tactics predicted in theory do not match the ones employed in practice, the choice of strategy was inappropriate.

Table 7:
Phase 2- Strategy

	Theory	Practice	Match
Phase 2(a)	Peace Enforcement	Peacekeeping	X
Phase 2(b)	Peace Enforcement	Inaction	X

(iii) Phase 3: UNAMIR II

The authorization for UNAMIR II was given in May 1994 as the campaign of genocide against Tutsis and moderate Hutus was gaining momentum. As a result, the Conflict Intervention Cycle places the intervention in the *belligerence phase*, at a higher level than UNAMIR I. According to the theoretical model, the optimal strategy to employ at this point is peace enforcement.

In practice, the UN employed a peacekeeping strategy. The inability of UNAMIR II to de-escalate the conflict was not surprising given the scale of violence and its Chapter VI mandate. A mission lacking more robust rules of engagement was doomed to fail from the start. Since the tactics predicted in theory do not match the ones employed in practice, the choice of strategy was inappropriate.

Table 8:
Phase 3- Strategy

	Theory	Practice	Match
Phase 3	Peace Enforcement	Peacekeeping	X

(iv) Phase 4: *Opération Turquoise*

At the time that *Opération Turquoise* was launched, the campaign of genocide was still in progress, although the FPR had made significant military advances. As a result, this

intervention is situated in the *belligerence phase* of *Figure 3*, at a higher level than UNAMIR II. According to the model, the optimal strategy to employ at this point is peace enforcement.

Due to continued fighting and the opposition of the FPR to French intervention, different tactics were called for than the failed peacekeeping efforts of UNAMIR I and II. As a result, the French government, under the authorization of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, launched *Opération Turquoise* as a peace enforcement mission with broad rules of engagement. Since the tactics predicted in theory match the ones employed in practice, the choice of strategy was appropriate.

Table 9:
Phase 4- Strategy

	Theory	Practice	Match
Phase 4	Peace Enforcement	Peace Enforcement	√

(c) Dependent Variable: Outcome

The success of third party initiatives is assessed by a rank order scale measuring the abatement of conflict intensity. The categories describe the military, political, and social conditions at different levels of conflict intensity as perceived by a neutral analyst. The level of conflict is measured at two points—immediately before and after intervention by a third party; the net change that results indicates the success or failure of the intervention.⁵⁶ The following scale is used for the purposes of analysis:

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⁵⁶ The formula for determining intervention success or failure is as follows: (Conflict intensity after intervention) - (Conflict intensity before intervention) = Intervention result

Table 10:
Conflict Intensity Abatement (CIA) Index

Conflict Intensity	Intervention Result	Net Change
<i>Category 1a-</i> unabated military hostilities; political repression; anarchy	Total Failure	-3 points
<i>Category 1b-</i> sporadic overt violence; limited political accommodation; high levels of tension and suspicion	Preponderant Failure	-2 points
<i>Category 1c-</i> some prospect of violence; no institutional capacity to deal with political conflict; wary interactions	Partial Failure	-1 point
<i>Category 2-</i> no change in the military, political, or social dimensions of the conflict	<i>Status Quo</i>	0 points
<i>Category 3a-</i> cessation of overt violence; lack of established political communication; continuing mistrust	Partial Success	+1 point
<i>Category 3b-</i> efforts to de-escalate military tension; institution-building toward effective political discourse; tentative consensus	Preponderant Success	+2 points
<i>Category 3c-</i> no prospect of violence; established institutional capacity to deal with political conflict; consensus	Total Success	+3 points

(i) Phase 1: Arusha Accords/UNAMIR I

Prior to the negotiations leading to the Arusha Accords, Rwanda was wracked by violence as a result of the protracted struggle between government forces and the FPR. There was only limited political accommodation of Tutsis, as policy dictated that Hutu officials occupy all senior government posts. Moreover, the relationship between Hutus and Tutsis was characterized by high levels of distrust and suspicion, due to the continual threat of military hostilities. According to the CIA Index, these conditions place Rwanda in Category 1(b) [-2 points] prior to intervention by the UN.

Following the ratification of the Arusha Accords, a formal cease-fire was reached between the Rwandan government and the FPR, and a provision was made for limited political accommodation of Tutsis (although this never materialized, due to constant maneuvering by the Habyarimana regime). While this situation was an improvement, relations between Hutus and Tutsis were still tense. This slight change is reflected in the

CIA Index by a positive move to Category 1(c) [-1 point] following intervention by the UN. The net change of +1 point indicates that Phase 1 was a *partial success*.

Table 11:
Phase 1- Outcome

Conflict Intensity Before Intervention	Conflict Intensity After Intervention	Net Change	Intervention Result
-2 points	-1 point	+1 point	Partial Success

(ii) Phase 2: UNAMIR I

As discussed in the analysis of Phase 1, Rwanda was under Category 1(c) [-1 point] prior to the onset of genocide. After the killings started, however, the situation rapidly deteriorated—military hostilities continued unabated, Tutsi and moderate Hutu politicians were murdered, and the situation was characterized by lawlessness. Under these circumstances, according to the CIA Index, Rwanda fell to Category 1(a) [-3 points]. The net change of -2 points indicates that the use of peacekeeping (Phase 2a) or inaction (Phase 2b) at this time resulted in preponderant failure.

Table 12:
Phase 2a- Outcome

Conflict Intensity Before Intervention	Conflict Intensity After Intervention	Net Change	Intervention Result
-1 point	-3 points	-2 points	Preponderant Failure

Table 13:
Phase 2b- Outcome

Conflict Intensity Before Intervention	Conflict Intensity After Intervention	Net Change	Intervention Result
-1 point	-3 points	-2 points	Preponderant Failure

(iii) Phase 3: UNAMIR II

As noted in the evaluation of Phase 2, following the onset of genocide the CIA Index characterized the situation in Rwanda under Category 1(a) [-3 points]. Due to its

Chapter VI mandate, and numerous delays in sending personnel and equipment. UNAMIR II had little impact de-escalating the conflict. The consequences for Rwanda were severe, as effective intervention may have saved the lives of hundreds of thousands of people. As a result of this ineffective effort, the conflict remained at Category 1(a) [-3 points] according to the CIA Index. The net change of 0 points indicates that the use of a peacekeeping strategy at this point produced no change in conflict intensity, or *status quo*.

Table 14:
Phase 3- Outcome

Conflict Intensity Before Intervention	Conflict Intensity After Intervention	Net Change	Intervention Result
-3 points	-3 points	0 points	<i>Status Quo</i>

(iv) Phase 4: *Opération Turquoise*

As determined in the examination of Phase 3, following the onset of genocide, the CIA Index characterized the situation in Rwanda under Category 1(a) [-3 points]. Due to its Chapter VII mandate and robust rules of engagement, the *Opération Turquoise* was successful in reducing the level of conflict intensity. This change is reflected in the CIA Index by a positive move to Category 1(b) [-2 points] following intervention by the UN. The net change of +1 point indicates that *Opération Turquoise* was a *partial success*.

Table 15:
Phase 4- Outcome

Conflict Intensity Before Intervention	Conflict Intensity After Intervention	Net Change	Intervention Result
-3 points	-2 points	+1 point	Partial Success

(d) **Summary**

The results of the preceding analysis are presented in the following table:

Table 16:
Summary- Independent and Dependent Variables

	Timing	Strategy	Outcome
Phase 1	√	√	√ (+1) Partial Success
Phase 2(a)	√	X	X (-2) Preponderant Failure
Phase 2(b)	√	X	X (-2) Preponderant Failure
Phase 3	√	X	— (0) <i>Status Quo</i>
Phase 4	√	√	√ (+1) Partial Success

II. Evaluation of Hypotheses

HYPOTHESIS 1. There is a relationship between timing and outcome, such that recognition or engineering of a ripe moment in the *mediation phase* of a conflict is necessary for a successful outcome. More specifically, it is postulated that ripe moments are characterized by the perception of the following conditions:

- H1a.** a hurting stalemate;
- H1b.** a looming catastrophe;
- H1c.** the potential for agreement at the initiation of third party intervention;
- H1d.** a secure way out at the culmination of third party efforts; and
- H1e.** valid representatives.

Of the interventions evaluated in this study, only Phase 1 took place during the *mediation phase* of the conflict. Accordingly, the discussion of Hypothesis 1 is restricted to this initiative.

At the time of the Arusha Accords and the establishment of UNAMIR I, all the necessary conditions for a ripe moment were present: (1) after a protracted war between Rwandan government forces and the FPR, victory remained an unachievable goal for each side, accordingly, the dispute was characterized by a hurting stalemate; (2) the Rwandan government faced a looming catastrophe due to the fall in the price of its major export—

coffee, while the FPR faced a possible shift in the balance of power based on the possibility of greater French military assistance to the Hutu government; (3) potential for agreement was perceived at the beginning of negotiations; (4) a secure way out emerged at the culmination phase with the ratification of the Arusha Accords; and (5) valid representatives with the capacity to act on behalf of their respective constituencies took part in the negotiations.

Prior to Phase 1, Rwanda was characterized as Category 1(b) [-2 points] on the CIA Index. Following the ratification of the peace agreement and the establishment of a peacekeeping force, the prevailing conditions in Rwanda produced a move to Category 1(c) [-1 point], resulting in a net change +1, or *partial success*.

According to Hypothesis 1, the recognition or engineering of a ripe moment in the *mediation phase* of a conflict is necessary for a successful outcome. Phase 1 took place at a time when the conditions for a ripe moment were present and the resulting intervention led to partial success. While a single case cannot prove or disprove a hypothesis, Phase 1 does provide evidence that a causal relationship exists between timing and outcome. Since timing dictates when intervention takes place, it influences what strategy is appropriate under the circumstances, thus likely affecting outcome. As a result, this case provides support for the hypothesis and subsidiary hypotheses.

HYPOTHESIS 2. There is a relationship between timing and outcome, such that recognition or engineering of a trigger in the *belligerence phase* of a conflict is necessary for a successful outcome. More specifically, it is postulated that triggers are characterized by the perception of the following conditions:

- H2a.** a major shift in power that favours one side over the other;
- H2b.** the occurrence of a catastrophe;
- H2c.** no potential for agreement at the initiation of third party efforts;
- H2d.** the only possible way out is through continued fighting; and
- H2e.** no valid representatives.

Intervention in Phases 2, 3, and 4 all occurred in the *belligerence phase* of the conflict. Accordingly, these three cases are used to evaluate Hypothesis 2.

The characteristics of a trigger were present in all three cases. First, a major shift in power occurred in Phase 2 when Hutu extremists took control of the government following the assassination of the Rwandan president; this shift in power was consolidated in Phase 3; and in Phase 4, the FPR achieved significant military gains, marking a shift in power in favour of the Tutsi rebels.

Second, the campaign of genocide constituted a catastrophe in all three phases. The sheer number of people murdered, the anguish of the survivors, and the considerable task of post-conflict peace building, are evidence of the enormity of the tragedy.

Third, there was no potential for reaching an agreement at the initiation of third party efforts in any of the cases, as the genocidal violence that engulfed Rwanda did not make negotiation possible. The objective of the Hutu extremists was to eliminate all Tutsis and moderate Hutus. As a result, Hutu representatives refused to negotiate when military and political power favoured their side in Phases 2 and 3. When power shifted toward the Tutsis in Phase 4, the FPR, sensing a military victory, were unprepared to negotiate.

Fourth, in all three cases, no side wished to secure a cease-fire. In Phases 2 and 3, Hutu extremists sought to perpetuate the genocide; this left the FPR with no option except armed struggle. Conversely, in Phase 4, the FPR refused to cease hostilities, as they wanted to end the genocide and overthrow the government; this presented the Hutu extremists with no choice but continued fighting.

Finally, there was no support for de-escalation among the representatives of each side in any of the three cases. In Phases 2 and 3, no valid representatives were available, as moderate Hutu politicians had been assassinated and the leaders of the FPR were mounting a counteroffensive. Moreover, in Phase 4 the FPR was unwilling to negotiate as they believed military victory was imminent.

According to Hypothesis 2, the recognition or engineering of a trigger in the *belligerence phase* of a conflict is necessary for a successful outcome. Triggers were recognized in all three phases, however, the CIA Index indicates mixed results with regard

to outcome. For example, the intervention in Phases 2a and 2b resulted in a preponderant failure (net change -2 in each case); third party efforts in Phase 3 produced no change in conflict intensity (net change 0); and the initiative in Phase 4 was considered a partial success (net change +1).

The recognition of a trigger in conjunction with the successful outcome in Phase 4 provides support for Hypothesis 2. Given that the hypothesis does not preclude the presence of a trigger for failed or *status quo* outcomes, Phases 2 and 3 neither support or refute the proposition. As a result, the Rwandan case study provides limited support for the hypothesis and subsidiary hypotheses.

HYPOTHESIS 3. There is a relationship between strategy and outcome, such that the more intense the conflict, the more forceful the strategy needed to restore order.

The four interventions evaluated in this study occurred at different points in time, resulting in a variance in the level of conflict intensity. Phase 1 is located on *Figure 3* between the strategies of pressuring and peacekeeping, on the border separating the *mediation and belligerence phases*. Compared to the other three initiatives, Phase 1 occurred at the least intense level of conflict and a combined strategy of pressuring and peacekeeping resulted in partial success.

The interventions at Phases 2 and 3 took place at a higher level of conflict intensity; this is depicted graphically by their placement in the *belligerence phase* of *Figure 3*. The peacekeeping strategy in Phase 2a and inaction in Phase 2b resulted in preponderant failure, while the peacekeeping initiative in Phase 3 produced no change in the level of conflict.

Efforts to reduce tensions in Phase 4 also occurred during a period of intense conflict, as such, this initiative is situated in the *belligerence phase* of *Figure 3*. The choice of peace enforcement as a strategy proved effective, as the intervention resulted in partial success.

Phase 1 shows that pressuring and peacekeeping may be effective strategies in reducing tensions between disputants at relatively low levels of conflict. Phases 2 and 3 illustrate that peacekeeping and inaction are ineffective tactics at higher levels of conflict, when the adversaries are engaged in violent conflict and there is no peace to keep. The failure of these initiatives to reduce the intensity of the conflict suggests a more forceful strategy is more appropriate in this context. Finally, Phase 4 demonstrates that peace enforcement may be an effective strategy at high levels of conflict, when the disputants are committed to continued military hostilities. Accordingly, the Rwandan case study illustrates that as conflict intensity escalates more forceful strategies are needed to restore order, thus providing support for Hypothesis 3.

HYPOTHESIS 4. There is a relationship between timing and strategy that affects outcome, such that:

- H4a.** intervention at a ripe moment with a diagnostic or intercessory strategy in the *mediation phase* of a conflict is likely to result in a successful outcome;
- H4b.** intervention at a ripe moment with a military strategy in the *mediation phase* of a conflict is likely to result in limited success or failure;
- H4c.** intervention at an unripe moment with a diagnostic or intercessory strategy in the *mediation phase* of a conflict is likely to result in limited success or failure; and
- H4d.** intervention at an unripe moment with a military strategy in the *mediation phase* of a conflict is likely to result in a failed outcome.

Of the four cases of intervention evaluated in this study, only Phase 1 took place during the *mediation phase* of the conflict. Therefore, the discussion of Hypothesis 4 is restricted to this intervention.

According to Hypothesis 4a, intervention at a ripe moment with a diagnostic or intercessory strategy in the *mediation phase* of a conflict is likely to result in a successful outcome. Phase 1 provides support for this hypothesis, as the intervention occurred at a time when the conditions for a ripe moment were present. The strategy employed by the UN at this time was a combination of pressuring—an intercessory strategy, and

peacekeeping—a military strategy. As a result of these actions, the situation in Rwanda improved (net change of +1 on the CIA Index); indicating that the initiative was a partial success.

Hypothesis 4b states that intervention at a ripe moment with a military strategy in the *mediation phase* of a conflict is likely to result in limited success or failure. In light of the fact that peacekeeping was used in conjunction with pressuring to produce a partial success, Phase 1 also provides support for Hypothesis 4b.

Efforts to address the conflict in Phase 1 took place at a ripe moment; accordingly, no intervention at this time occurred at an unripe moment. As a result, the Rwandan case study did not produce evidence to either support or refute Hypotheses 4c and 4d.

HYPOTHESIS 5. There is a relationship between timing and strategy that affects outcome, such that:

- H5a.** intervention at a trigger with a military strategy in the *belligerence phase* of a conflict is likely to result in a successful outcome;
- H5b.** intervention at a trigger with a diagnostic or intercessory strategy in the *belligerence phase* of a conflict is likely to result in limited success or failure;
- H5c.** not responding to a trigger in the *belligerence phase* of a conflict will likely result in a failed outcome.

According to Hypothesis 5a, intervention at a trigger with a military strategy in the *belligerence phase* of a conflict is likely to result in a successful outcome. The analysis provides mixed support for this proposition. While responding to a trigger with a peacekeeping strategy, Phase 2a nevertheless resulted in preponderant failure (net change of -2 on the CIA Index). Similarly, despite using a peacekeeping strategy after the recognition of a trigger, Phase 3 resulted in *status quo* (net change of 0 on CIA Index). The only intervention that provides support for Hypothesis 5a is Phase 4, which employed a peace enforcement strategy leading to a partial success (net change of +1 on the CIA Index). The mixed support for Hypothesis 5a is likely due to the inability of decision makers to accurately match timing with the appropriate strategy under the circumstances.

Hypothesis 5b states that intervention at a trigger with a diagnostic or intercessory strategy in the *belligerence phase* of a conflict is likely to result in limited success or failure. Of all the interventions evaluated in this study, only Phase 2b involves intervention with a diagnostic strategy in the *belligerence phase* of a conflict. Accordingly, the discussion of Hypothesis 5b is restricted to this initiative.

Phase 2b employed a diagnostic strategy—inaction in the belligerence phase of the conflict, leading to preponderant failure. As a result, Phase 2b provides support for Hypothesis 5b.

Hypothesis 5c is a further refinement of Hypothesis 5b. The proposition suggests that not responding to a trigger in the *belligerence phase* of a conflict will likely result in failure. Phase 2b followed a strategy of inaction in the belligerence phase of the conflict. This is evidenced by the withdrawal of 440 Belgian peacekeepers from UNAMIR I, after the murder of ten soldiers from the contingent. By not acting, Phase 2b resulted in preponderant failure. As such, Phase 2b provides support for the hypothesis.

The results of the hypothesis testing are presented in the following table:

Table 17:
Summary- Results of Hypothesis Testing

Hypothesis 1 (√)	Hypothesis 2 (√)	Hypothesis 3 (√)	Hypothesis 4 (√)	Hypothesis 5 (Mixed)
H1a. (√)	H2a. (√)		H4a. (√)	H5a. (Mixed)
H1b. (√)	H2b. (√)		H4b. (√)	H5b. (√)
H1c. (√)	H2c. (√)		H4c. (-)	H5c. (√)
H1d. (√)	H2d. (√)		H4d. (-)	
H1e. (√)	H2e. (√)			

III. Discussion

All of the interventions examined in this thesis took place at a ripe moment or a trigger. Given that the outcome of the interventions varied widely, this study suggests that while timing influences the outcome of third party intervention, strategy likely has a more significant impact. This proposition is supported by a review of the cases.

The partial success of the Arusha Accords and the establishment of UNAMIR I may be attributed to employing a combination of strategies that were well-suited to the situation. While pressuring was used to bring the disputants to the bargaining table, once there was a peace to keep, the UN deployed a peacekeeping force to monitor the cease-fire. This intervention reflects an accurate assessment of the conflict at that time. The problems later encountered by UNAMIR I developed as a result the hesitancy of the UN to change the operational mandate and rules of engagement to fit the rapidly changing conditions on the ground.

The failure of UNAMIR I was due, in part, to the assumption that there would be continued cooperation between the parties and the UN in carrying out their commitments under the Arusha Accords. Deep-rooted mistrust, delaying tactics and continually shifting political alignments, however, undermined implementation of the transitional arrangements. Moreover, UNAMIR I faced serious problems from its establishment—primarily its Chapter VI mandate which restricted UN troops from forcibly responding to occasional violations of the cease-fire agreement. The use of a peacekeeping strategy when there was no peace to keep proved catastrophic.

Once the magnitude of the genocide became undeniable, the UN reversed itself and accepted an obligation to protect civilians. However, UNAMIR II was hindered by the unwillingness of key member states to pay for or provide troops and equipment in an expeditious manner. As a result, the force was deployed only after the genocide and the civil war had run their course, accordingly, the use of this strategy had little impact on the conflict.

The partial success of *Opération Turquoise* may be ascribed to the fact that military force was used to achieve *limited* goals, and the attempt to conduct the mission as impartially as possible. France did not hesitate to use force when it saw its objectives threatened; those military goals, however, were limited in geographic scope. The safe area established by France primarily affected the FPR's ability to advance, but France refused the Hutu government's appeal to use the French forces for military gain. Indeed, when the French forces initially intervened, the Hutu Foreign Minister noted: "We would like this operation to go beyond a humanitarian intervention. We would like to see the French force the R.P.F. to accept a cease-fire" (*New York Times* 1994h, sec. 1, p. 10). France did not allow itself to be drawn into the conflict in such a manner, nor did it see the pursuit of a process of national reconciliation as one of its objectives. Instead, it used military force in a limited, effective fashion to address human rights concerns. The UNAMIR forces in Rwanda had no such mandate and, consequently, their influence was far less than that of *Opération Turquoise*.⁵⁷

At the same time, part of the weakness of *Opération Turquoise* arose from the desire by the intervening force to minimize its involvement both in terms of the scope of activities undertaken and the duration of the mission. By establishing a safe zone in just the southwestern part of Rwanda and declaring that troops would be present for only two months, the impact of the intervention on the protection of civilians and the creation of conditions for national reconciliation was significantly reduced.

France left Rwanda at a time when millions of people remained displaced, when the newly recognized government had yet to establish effective mechanisms for peace and stability, and when Hutu extremists had fled to the mountains or to neighbouring countries while remaining a potent guerrilla threat. Not only was the humanitarian crisis far from

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⁵⁷ As the French forces were withdrawing from Rwanda, a member of Concern (an Irish NGO) lamented the lack of respect for the authority of the UN forces: "The French were a protection force and drew the line, and everyone knew not to cross it. Everyone knows that the U.N. has no spine, that's the bottom line" (*New York Times* 1994s, A6).

over, but the French withdrawal itself fostered a greater sense of insecurity among the approximately one million Rwandans that had sought shelter in the safe zone: it also prompted another wave of refugee flows into neighbouring countries. As a result, while the strategy of peace enforcement was a partial success, its short duration and restricted scope limited the effectiveness of the intervention.

In summary, each of the above cases demonstrates the importance of strategy to outcome. Without suitable tactics, the impact of timing becomes a secondary consideration.

IV. Revision of Model

The application of the model to a practical case study reveals that while timing influences the outcome of third party intervention, strategy likely has a more significant impact. As a result, the framework must be revised to reflect this finding. Three changes are necessary in order to refine the analytical utility of the model.

First, given that strategy likely has a greater influence than timing on the outcome of third party intervention, a change in emphasis in the theoretical framework is required. Timing dictates the strategic role of a third party, as it influences when intervention takes place, and accordingly what strategy is appropriate under the circumstances. As a result, rather than evaluating timing as an independent variable, it should be assessed as an *intervening variable*. This change is useful as it underscores the importance of timing, while placing greater emphasis on strategy.

Second, this study has demonstrated the effectiveness of the model against a single case study, however, in order for the framework to have broader applicability, it must be applied to additional conflicts in different contexts. While this study focussed on efforts by the UN to de-escalate a violent intergroup conflict within a specific section of the Conflict Intervention Cycle, the framework is designed evaluate a wide range of disputes varying in conflict intensity. As such, the model should be used to examine a larger number of cases involving different types of third parties and different levels of conflict intensity. In

addition, the framework must be adjusted to reflect institutional decision making processes, rather than relying on a rational actor model.

Finally, the variable of strategy must be examined in greater detail. This may be accomplished by further subdividing the range of strategies discussed in this paper and thus increasing the number and type of tactics that may be evaluated. Moreover, the expansion of the CIA Index into further gradations will provide for an even more nuanced assessment of intervention by third parties.

CHAPTER IV: CONCLUSION

The world must deeply repent this failure. Rwanda's tragedy was the world's tragedy. All of us who cared about Rwanda, all of us who witnessed its suffering, fervently wish that we could have prevented the genocide. Looking back now, we see the signs which then were not recognized. Now we know that what we did was not nearly enough—not enough to save Rwanda from itself, not enough to honor the ideals for which the United Nations exists. We will not deny that, in their greatest hour of need, the world failed the people of Rwanda.

Kofi A. Annan, *Address to the Parliament of Rwanda*, 7 May 1998.

The following summary is divided into three parts. The first part reviews the key findings of the study in relation to the empirical argument. The second part evaluates implications for theory and for policy. The final part provides directions for future research.

I. Key Findings

Several conclusions can be drawn from the preceding study. First, serious attention must be given to timing when considering whether to undertake a de-escalation effort, but greater emphasis should be placed on deciding which strategy to pursue. The research suggests that time is never simply right or wrong for de-escalation. Rather, the time may be right for a specific strategy and not for another. Therefore, the failure to effectively de-escalate a conflict does not necessarily mean that the time was not right: it may mean that the wrong strategy was employed. The variety of possible strategies reveals opportunities for intervention over a wide range of times.

Second, no third party intervention can succeed in de-escalating a conflict unless there is some political will among the parties. Political will does not have to exist among all the protagonists—in fact it rarely does—but there must be some moderate leadership with whom the intermediary can interact. The challenge for the third party in those circumstances is to draw out the moderates without making their position vis-à-vis the extremists untenable.

Third, dispute settlement cannot be imposed on recalcitrant parties. Success requires patience and a keen sense of knowing when the moment is opportune. Recognizing that moment and acting quickly and creatively when it arrives is the art of the peacemaker. There are no lack of opportunities for failure, but resilience and resourcefulness can improve the chances of success.

Fourth, the process of third party intervention is not value-free. Efforts to de-escalate a conflict have different implications for all the parties involved. Deciding whether or not to try to de-escalate a conflict and which strategy to pursue, necessarily involves value preferences regarding an acceptable outcome.

Finally, the Rwandans who planned and carried out the genocide of Tutsis and moderate Hutus must bear full responsibility for their crimes, however, this analysis suggests that, to a certain extent, the international community is also accountable.

II. Implications for Theory and Practice

What are the contributions of this study to the understanding of third party intervention? The answer to this question is divided into two parts. The first part focuses on the intellectual contribution of the theory, that is, the extent to which it enhances the understanding of conflict management. The second part emphasizes the practical implications.

The first and most important contribution of the model developed in this study is that it provides a point of departure to assess the appropriate tasks and tools of intervening over the course of a violent intergroup conflict. Accordingly, this fresh perspective allows for meaningful evaluation of the relationship among the timing, strategy, and outcome of third party intervention.

The second contribution of the theory is that it reflects the dynamic nature of intergroup conflicts and attempts by third parties to de-escalate them. The framework may be used to evaluate a specific phase of a dispute or the entire life cycle of a conflict. Accordingly, the model has applications at both micro and macro levels of analysis.

How can theory be useful in aiding the process of decision making? The practical implications primarily concern ways in which policy makers can use the ideas and logic of the theoretical model to make better strategic choices. Ideally, it may assist decision makers avoid costly mistakes that carry severe repercussions.

Theory can also help policy makers in two additional ways. First, theory can assist decision makers to analyze problems in a manner that may be superior to previous approaches. Second, empirical research may make policy recommendations more persuasive to decision makers in the sense that it shows specific linkages between procedures and outcomes. Accordingly, the combination of theory and practice is essential to making informed policies.

III. Where Do We Go From Here?

The scale and speed of the Rwandan genocide raises the interrelated problems of how timing and strategy could have been combined more effectively to stem the tide of violence. Information was available that would have permitted policy makers to draw the conclusion that genocide might occur.

In the months immediately preceding the genocide, numerous signs indicated that the implementation of the Arusha Accords was faltering and that massive violence was being planned. Unequivocal warnings reached the UN Secretariat on 11 January 1994 regarding a planned coup, an assault on the UN forces to drive them out, provocations to resume the civil war, and even detailed plans for carrying out genocidal killings in Kigali. Officials at the UN Secretariat, however, questioned the validity of the information and made no contingency plans for worst-case scenarios.

Without contingency planning, the UN was left with a short time frame and few resources to respond to the sudden changes in the situation. This point is critical for two reasons: first, even under the best of circumstances, it is impossible to pin-point specific future outcomes of complex social conflicts; and second, the absence of contingency

planning limits both what the decision makers will hear and the options they are willing to consider.

The failure of the international community to anticipate the planned and targeted mass murder of Tutsis and moderate Hutus was particularly significant for three reasons: (1) the political commitment and actual involvement of the UN in Rwanda; (2) the legal right and moral obligation to act to prevent genocide according to the Genocide Convention; and (3) the enormous cost of a miscalculation.

Why were these signals ignored? Why were they not translated into effective conflict management? The failure of early warning is attributable to many factors. First, the UN was poorly organized to collect and evaluate information about human rights violations and genocide. Second, a predisposition existed among a number of key actors to deny the possibility of genocide, because facing up to it would have required them to alter their course of action. Third, the focus on the success of the Arusha Accords and the failure in Somalia together cast long shadows and distorted an objective analysis of Rwanda. Fourth, crises occurring in other areas of the world preoccupied world leaders.⁵⁸ Finally, a general desensitization developed with respect to the mass slaughters in Rwanda, and the possibility of a massive genocide actually occurring seemed incomprehensible.

The shortcomings of early warning in Rwanda go much deeper. The issue is not better quantitative data or formal modelling. The UN lacked a system for drawing on existing information sources, in the region and outside, from specialists in state agencies, academic institutions, human rights monitoring organizations, and the various bodies of the

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⁵⁸ The difference between Western concern about the killing in Rwanda and the killing in Bosnia-Herzegovina did not go unnoticed. As Charles Krauthammer observed:

... Bosnia has a vocal, articulate constituency. Rwanda has none. Bosnians are white, European, familiar. Rwandans are black, African, foreign. For Western intellectuals, Sarajevo evokes Spanish Civil War romance. Kigali evokes nothing more than Heart of Darkness nihilism.

It is curious humanitarianism, however, that advocates humanitarian intervention on grounds of familiarity, race and romance. What counts is the scale of the violence and the suffering. Rwanda is the unequivocal case of genocide occurring in the world today, and genocide demands intervention (Krauthammer 1994, A25).

UN itself. The UN lacked a specialized unit, without operational responsibilities, for analyzing such information and translating this knowledge into evolving strategic options that could be channelled directly to the Secretary-General. Research directed toward streamlining this system is important and much needed.

Despite its importance as a method of mitigating disputes, the precise formula for achieving successful intervention has not been found. International conflicts are unique events. They vary in terms of the parties, intensity, and possible response. These features define the nature of a dispute and affect the course of its outcome. In other words, intervention is shaped by the context and character of a conflict.

Rwanda is a tragic example of the complicated and disjointed policy making process that often dictates the timing, strategy, and outcome of intervention efforts by third parties. The aftermath of the genocide in Rwanda has continued to present complex problems for the country, the region and a multitude of international actors. The Rwandan government is faced with the task of broadening its constituency and establishing its legitimacy both with the majority population and international donors in order to garner the human and material resources necessary for rebuilding the country. The international community must carry out its commitment to break the cycle of violence, otherwise, the promise of "never again" will be replaced by the anguished cry of "once again."

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