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**Local Administration Reforms
for Rural Development in Tanzania
1962-1982**

by

Cosmas A. Mogella, B.A., M.A.

A thesis submitted to the Faculty
of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
Department of Political Science

Carleton University
Ottawa, Ontario
June 24, 1987

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ABSTRACT

Decentralization and development are two themes which have dominated the development debate over the past decade. In this study on Tanzania's experience with decentralization, we are examining critically the claimed correlation between decentralized administration and development in developing countries. The correlation has been strongly suggested by the proponents of the development administration school. Central to their approach is the proposition that administrative incapacity is the crucial obstacle to stimulating and sustaining development. A decentralized administration, therefore, is thought to be the most viable for improving administrative capacity for dealing with development. It has further been proposed that a decentralized administration promotes local democracy and participation.

Over the past two decades the Tanzanian government has been experimenting with two different forms of decentralized administration. Neither has had much success in improving the administrative capacity necessary for promoting rural development in the country. Similarly, local democracy and participation have not been enhanced through the decentralized systems of administration.

In an attempt to provide an explanation for this failure, the study focuses on the colonial legacy of local administration and on the Tanzanian political and economic systems, both of which have been overlooked by exponents of the development administration school. Our findings strongly suggest that the failure of the decentralized administration in promoting rural development as well as local democracy and participation, is largely attributable to this colonial legacy and to the Tanzanian political and economic systems.

The study concludes that decentralized systems of administration are not shortcuts to rural development or to development in general. Furthermore, there is need for the development administrationists to make critical analyses in future of the political and economic systems of the developing countries before making general assumptions about the correlation between decentralization and development.

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LIST of ABBREVIATIONS

AC	Area Commissioner
ADB	African Development Bank
ASP	Afro-Shiraz Party of Zanzibar and Pemba Islands
BRALUP	Bureau of Resources Assessment and Land Use Planning
CALF	Commonwealth Assistance Loan Funds
CCM	<i>Chama cha Mapinduzi</i> ("Party of the Revolution"), formed from a merger of TANU and ASP in 1977
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
DANIDA	Danish International Development Agency
DAO	District Administrative Officer
DC	District Commissioner
DDC	District Development Council/Committee
DDCo	District Development Corporation
DD	District Development Director
DDPIC	District Development, Planning and Implementation Committee
DED	District Executive Director
DEO	District Executive Officer
DHV/ILALO	A Dutch company specialized in water supply installations
DMT	District Management Team
EEC	European Economic Community
FAO	Food and Agriculture Agency (of the United Nations)
FAO/ODG	FAO/Overseas Development Group
FINNPLACO	Finnish Planning Company of Finland
FINN/CONS	Finnish Consultant Firm of Finland
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNP	Gross National Product
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development

IDA	International Development Agency (the "soft loan" branch of the IBRD)
IFHC	Irish Freedom from Hunger Committee
IULA	International Union of Local Authorities
JUWATA	<i>Jumuiya ya Wafanya Kazi Tanzania</i> ("Union of Workers of Tanzania")
KADU	Kenya African Democratic Union
KANU	Kenya African National Union
KARADHA	Karadha Company Limited (a subsidiary of NBC)
KFW	International Development Agency of West Germany
LEGCO	Legislative Council (of Tanganyika)
LGLB	Local Government Loans Board
MCRS	Minimum Compulsory Reserves
NBC	National Bank of Commerce (Tanzania)
NCB	National Cooperative Bank
NCDB	National Cooperative and Development Bank
NDC	National Development Corporation
NDCA	National Development Credit Agency (Tanzania)
NEC	National Executive Committee (of the Party)
NESP	National Economic Survival Program (of Tanzania)
NMC	National Milling Corporation
NORAD	Norwegian Agency for International Development
NUTA	National Union of Tanzanian Workers (from 1964 to 1977)
OXFAM	Oxford Committee for Famine Relief
PC	Provincial Commissioner
PMO	Prime Minister's Office
RAO	Regional Administrative Officer
RC	Regional Commissioner
RDC	Regional Development Committee
RDD	Regional Development Director

RDF	Regional Development Fund
REC	Regional Executive Committee
RFC	Regional Financial Controller
RMT	Regional Management Team
RPLO	Regional Planning Officer
RPO	Regional Personnel Officer
RTC	Regional Trading Corporation
SAP	Structural Adjustment Program (of Tanzania)
SIDA	Swedish Agency for International Development
TIB	Tanzanian Investment Bank
TRDB	Tanzanian Rural Development Bank
TYL	TANU Youth League
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNCRO	United National Communication and Research Organization
UNESCO	United Nations Education, Scientific, and Cultural Organization
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
UTP	United Tanganyika Party
VDC	Village Development Committee
WDC	Ward Development Committee
WHO	World Health Organization

CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

This thesis is about local administration and rural development in Tanzania. It seeks to explain why decentralized administration had little or no success in promoting rural development in the country.

Tanzania is an agrarian country with about 90 per cent of its population rural. The majority of this rural population is engaged in agricultural production of both cash and food crops, as their main occupation. Concomitantly, their total production contributes over half of the major export crops and about 75 per cent of the marketed food crops [Msambichaka and Chandrasekhar, 1984:8]. Furthermore, the whole rural sector contributes about 50 per cent to the country's GNP and about 75 per cent to the country's foreign earnings [Ministry of Agriculture, 1984:2].

These indicators point to but one thing; that is, the rural sector, agricultural production in particular, is the backbone of the country's economy. Stated differently, the future of the country's economic growth and development depends on the growth and development of the rural sector in all its dimensions.

However, the Tanzanian government inherited multifaceted characteristics of the rural sector which by and large had contributed to the underdevelopment of the rural sector and its inhabitants. First, about 90 per cent of the cultivated land estimated at 5 million hectares was under small-holding independent peasants. The methods and techniques employed by these peasants in agricultural production were still basically traditional. Secondly, the rural population was unevenly dispersed in the administrative regions established during the colonial period. The size of the country and the inadequate infrastructures, such as roads, transportation and a communication network, caused the central government to be far removed from the local areas where most of the productive activities took place. Thirdly, about 90 per cent of the rural population was illiterate, with subsistence economy as the dominant form of production. And, finally, it inherited a disarrayed system of local

administration characterized by poor administrative capacity in organizing rural production.

The Problem

Immediately after independence in December 9, 1961, rural development was given the utmost attention by the Tanzanian leadership. For it was envisaged that the development of the rural sector was the most realistic approach to the future economic development of the country. In other words, the inherited economic structure provided no industrial base which could have offered the new government an alternative approach to the economic development of the country.

The underdeveloped nature of the rural sector and the disarray of the inherited system of local administration, however, presented a major problem to a rural development approach. In an effort to solve this problem, several policies were initiated by the new government. These included: the transformation and improvement approaches to rural development, and village settlement schemes in which co-operative work and self-help in social production were emphasized. Later, the policies for rural development were more clearly enunciated in a number of policy documents of the Party: Socialism and Self-Reliance in 1967, and Socialism and Rural Development, and Education for Self-Reliance, both in 1968.

In order to implement these policies, the government also saw the need for reorganizing the inherited system of local administration. In other words, the local institutions were to play an important frontal role in stimulating and enhancing rural development, while at the same time implementing these policies. To this end, a local administration reform program was initiated and carried out during the early years of independence.

Thus, in 1962, the government abolished all existing local institutions which had been operating under the Native Authorities Act of 1926 and the Local Government Act of 1953. In their place a local government system and local government authorities were established throughout the country. Further changes were introduced in

1965, which sought to strengthen and ally the leadership of the local government authorities with that of the Party organs in the districts. Likewise, the regional and district administrations were reorganized.

The ultimate goal of the reform program was to instil two basic values in the local institutions: an administrative capacity for managing and administering rural development; and participatory democracy, which was considered a prerequisite for attaining meaningful development.

A decade later, the experiment with the local government system seemed to be unsatisfactory. The leadership described the system's institutions as inadequate and incapable of promoting rural development. Further, they had failed in fostering local democracy and local participation. Hence, in 1972, the government introduced another administrative reform program, which was restyled a "Decentralization" program or *Madaraka Mikoani* ('power to the regions'). All local government authorities were abolished and replaced by district development councils. Both the regional and district administrations were reorganized, and planning committees known as development committees were established from the regional to grassroots levels. The catalyst for the program was the institutionalization of local participation by creating what were termed village assemblies and village governments or councils.

Apparently the decentralized system of administration did not produce the expected results from the program. It was described by many critics of the program as a total failure, while the government expressed its frustrations with the decentralized institutions for failing to promote rural development, as well as local participation. Amidst these frustrations, the government opted for a middle alternative. Instead of abolishing totally the decentralized system of administration, some changes were made in the district administration to accommodate the reintroduction of the local government authorities. Thus, in 1982, the third administrative reform of local administration was carried out. The regional administration retained its decentralized [

structure, whereas the district development council was abolished and replaced by a district council which operated and functioned as a local government authority. The district administration was reduced to an administrative organ as most of its functions, especially planning and implementing rural development, were transferred to the district council. The results of this experiment have yet to be seen.

All these administrative reform programs in Tanzania point to the widespread belief that rural development can be managed and administered by institutions or the administration of a given country. Similarly, the shift from one administrative system to another in Tanzania suggests strongly that there is either something missing in this belief or there has been something wrong with the administrative reforms carried out by the Tanzanian government. Otherwise, the rural question would not have been so problematic in Tanzania.

The main purpose of this thesis, therefore, is to try to explain why the various systems of local administration which have been introduced and reintroduced, have failed to meet the objectives stated by the government. Thus, the study has the following objectives:

1. To investigate the genesis of the administrative problems with respect to rural development. In order to study this, the colonial system of local administration and its legacy in the administrative systems established during and after independence will be discussed.
2. To identify and explain the factors responsible for the noted failure of both the institutional and administrative forms of decentralization of 1962 and 1972, respectively.
3. To examine whether, in reinstating the institutional form of decentralization or local government system in 1982, the government has taken into account the factors which previously had crippled the same type of administrative system. In the event the government has not, what are the prospects for the present system of local government to succeed?

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In the light of these objectives, we will argue that the institutional problems related to rural development emanate from the colonial legacy of a local administrative system. And the administrative reforms introduced have had little success in breaking through this legacy. Secondly, although the administrative reforms did not produce the results of the stated objectives of the reforms, we will show that there were other unstated objectives which were achieved through these reforms. And thirdly, we will argue and demonstrate that the local institutions introduced through these reforms have performed poorly in promoting both rural development and participatory democracy, mainly because of the political and economic context. This political and economic context evolved immediately following independence, or soon thereafter. And it was characterized by centralization of political power by the Party, which was constitutionalized after the country became a one-party state. It was also characterized by a centralized economic system in which the state was the principal entrepreneur of all economic activity. This system was established after the Arusha Declaration of 1967. Both characteristics militated against a devolution of autonomous and participatory local institutions under both the local government and decentralized systems. Similarly, they restrained these institutions in their role in promoting rural development in the country.

The Theoretical Perspective

The above concerns and other related issues will be discussed in this thesis within the context of the development administration school. Central to this school is the emphasis given to a decentralized system of administration to promote both development and democracy. The latter have been regarded as mutually dependent, with a cause-effect interrelationship. Thus, they ought to be simultaneously attained through decentralization. And for this reason, perhaps, the Tanzanian leadership became interested in decentralization from the beginning of independence. In his early writings, for example, the then President Nyerere argued that if development was to be development of the people, the people had to participate in all stages of

development initiatives. Hence, he argued,

... there must be also an efficient and democratic system of local government, so that our people make their own decisions on things which affect them directly, and so that they are able to recognize their own control over community decisions and their own responsibility for carrying them out.

[Nyerere, 1967:11-12]

And development was defined as the eradication of poverty, disease, and ignorance, along with the elimination of inequality and material deprivation [Nyerere, 1971:9]. With respect to the need for democracy as a condition for development, Nyerere stated "... development of the people can only be effected by the people ... [and therefore] ... The people must make decisions about their own future through democratic procedures" [Nyerere, 1968:61-62].

This view of decentralization, regarded as a necessary condition for economic, social and political development, runs through all the administrative reform programs carried out during the period between 1962 and 1982. This study, therefore, covers this period in order to critically analyze the Tanzanian experimentation with various forms of decentralization and the fruition of this experimentation with respect to development in the country. The whole period is important in order to provide a coherent explanation for the institutional problems related to rural development, as well as for the lessons learned from these administrative reform programs. The need also arises from theoretical considerations. Decentralization has become the object of much optimism throughout the developing countries with respect to their own development. The nexus of the widespread administrative reform programs carried out elsewhere in these countries has been decentralization. The exponents of "development administration", the decentralists in particular, have put emphasis on the benefits to be derived from decentralization. It is argued, for example, that decentralization provides a mechanism by which the administration can be more

effective and responsive to local needs, and can make development plans relevant to the variety of circumstances encountered from place to place [Phillips, 1963; Conyers, 1981; Smith and Owojuiye, 1981; Maddick, 1981].

Others have proposed that decentralization increases local autonomy and participatory democracy, which are both necessary if development is to meet the relevant needs of the majority of the poor people in developing countries [Rondinelli, 1983]. In socialist-oriented countries such as Sudan and Tanzania, decentralization is a fundamental ideological principle and is regarded as a prerequisite for establishing a system of government whereby the masses exercise power and control over their own government [Rondinelli, 1981a; 1981b; Samoff, 1979].

Other promised benefits of decentralization include: that it improves the accessibility of the administrative agencies to local areas [de Mello, 1981], and that it overcomes rural conservatism, indifference, and pessimism, as it allows the involvement of the rural people in the process of social change through their local institutions, thereby eliciting their support for development initiatives [Conyers, 1981; Gorvine, 1965]. Decentralization, it is argued, reduces tension and congestion at the centre by providing flexibility and speed in decision-making in the areas where decisions have to be made and implemented. And finally, that decentralization enhances a process of political unity, mobilization, legitimation of a regime, and arouses and fosters the civic consciousness and political maturity of the rural people [Alassam, 1981; Aliyu, 1978; Bonney, 1982]. These theoretical considerations will guide the discussion and analysis of our study.

The literature on the Tanzanian decentralization programs is enormous. It is, perhaps, one of the areas which has been overly researched and written about. Yet, there has been no study that has covered in a consistent fashion the entire period on the Tanzanian experience of decentralization to provide a coherent explanation as to why the experience has not produced a desired system of local administration capable of promoting development and participatory democracy. This study,

therefore, seeks to provide this kind of explanation.

The information to be derived from this study will be useful not only for future analytical purposes, but also for the government before it contemplates abandoning the existing administrative system and replacing it with another, by helping it avoid the same mistakes which made the previous systems fail. Furthermore, since the Tanzanian approach to development, as well as the Tanzanian venture with decentralization programs, have been closely observed by other leaders of the developing countries such as Zambia [McHenry, 1979:3-4], the lessons to be drawn from this study might also be useful to other developing countries with similar administrative problems related to rural development.

Source of Information

Much of the information and data for this study have been obtained from interviews with government officials, particularly those involved in both systems of decentralization in varying capacities. Also, we have consulted past records in the government files and documents, and regional and district books.

The information sought through interviews covered such issues as the planning and implementation of the local government and decentralization programs, the resources (both human and material) of the institutions under both types of decentralization, why they were abolished, and the central-local relationship. Others interviewed were officers who had been involved either in local government or in the decentralization of 1972, heads of institutions dealing with local administration, and private citizens, including villagers, in order to get an independent view concerning the functioning and failures of the two systems of local administration.

With respect to the current system of local administration, I shall be using much of the information and data obtained from the Morogoro and Kilimanjaro Regions. Of interest is to see how the local governments were established, how they function, and what constraints confront them in these two regions. Also of interest is the difference between the current system and the previous ones, and what the

reactions of the local people were to the reinstatement of the local government authorities. These regions were chosen not for any sophisticated methodological reasons, but because they were within my economic reach, and it was easy to make field trips to them. Besides, Morogoro is my home region and I had done research there previously, related to this thesis. In both regions I visited several villages in order to see how their institutions were related to the current local government authorities.

In order to get as much direct information as possible, I conducted my research for a period of six months within the regions of Dar es Salaam, Kilimanjaro, Dodoma and Morogoro. The experience was not without its difficulties. Bureaucratic red-tape, last minute cancellations by officials of scheduled interviews, missing or displaced needed files or records, and withholding information or records under the pretence of confidentiality, are some of them. But most disappointing were the bureaucratic procedures prevailing in the National Archives, which stores most of the files and records that are accessible to the public. It takes about two to three days to obtain a file or files. And each time a reader is allowed to request only three files, which must be read during the official working hours (in Tanzania, from 7:30 a.m. to 2:30 p.m.). Furthermore, many relevant records on local government, which were deposited at the Institute of Local Government, were either destroyed or dispersed elsewhere after both the Institute and the local government system were abolished in 1972. Finally, all attempts to locate the McKinsey & Company, Inc., *Report on Decentralization*, which was the basis of the 1972 decentralization program, were futile. Both the Prime Minister's Office and the President's Office indicated to me that the Report could not be traced in their libraries. And the only copy of the Report, which was supposed to be in the University of Dar es Salaam Library, was appropriated by someone whose whereabouts could not be traced. In short, these are some of the difficulties encountered in the research. Nonetheless, I believe that I have managed to obtain a reasonably complete picture.

The materials obtained from my research and other sources to form the basis of this study are analyzed and presented in the following pattern. Chapter Two discusses the theoretical perspective of decentralization for development. Meanings of development, decentralization, and the relationship between a decentralized administration and development, are explored and analyzed. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the theory and practice of decentralization; to identify the flaws in the theory of the decentralists with respect to the Tanzanian experience.

The colonial experience with decentralization and the colonial legacy of an administrative system of local administration are presented in Chapter Three. The substantive nature of this legacy and its influence are the central themes of this chapter.

Chapter Four examines in detail the institutional decentralization of 1962. Regional and district administrations are briefly discussed, while much of the discussion focuses on the local government system. The main concern here is with the structure and functions of the local councils, central-local relations, local councils and rural development, and why the whole system of local government was abolished in 1972.

The decentralization program of 1972 is discussed in Chapter Five. Central to this chapter are the new administrative structures that came with decentralization; changes in central-local relations, if any; decentralized structures and rural development; and the reasons for abandoning the administrative form of decentralization.

The current system of local government and its prospects are discussed in Chapter Six. The main focus in this chapter is to compare and contrast the present system of local government with that of 1962 in order to explain whether the government has taken into account the factors which contributed to the failure of the 1962 system, and to determine the prospects of the present one. The information and data obtained from Morogoro and Kilimanjaro regions are used extensively in this chapter.

And Chapter Seven is the conclusion. It summarizes all the materials presented in the preceeding chapters. The findings of and lessons from the study are drawn. The chapter concludes with the implications of the findings and conclusions for rural development in developing countries in general.

CHAPTER TWO

Decentralization for Development

Almost from the inception of "development administration" as a sub-field of Public Administration, decentralization has become a magic word for practitioners, policy-makers, analysts, and other international observers interested or involved in development in the developing countries. It was indeed as if the development administrationists had come to grips with the problems of development in the developing countries after long laboratory research and analysis of the problems.

The purpose of this chapter, therefore, is to examine and analyze the theoretical aspects of development administration. Central to these theoretical trappings are the propositions that administrative incapacity is the key factor in the problems of development and that a decentralized administration not only improves administrative capacities but is also the most viable for stimulating and sustaining development.

The chapter begins with a brief discussion on the emergence of the new approach to development, followed by the concept of development as defined by development administration. Next will be a detailed analysis of the theoretical underpinnings. The discussion concludes with a note on theory and practice, before relating the whole theoretical analysis to the manner in which it will guide the rest of the study.

The Emergent Approach to Development

Since the late 1960s and early 1970s, two important observations can be made with regard to the experience with development in the third world. In spite of the widespread application of western models of economic growth and development, supported by a massive transfer of foreign capital investments in the form of aid, loans and/or grants, and technical assistance, development had eluded most of the third world countries by the end of the United Nations Development Decade (1960-1970). What is more frustrating is that these economic models, together

with their investment packages, have hardly been able to stimulate the process of development. At worst, they can be said to have contributed to the perpetuation and maintenance of underdevelopment. For example, even in those countries of the third world, such as India, the Philippines, and Northeast Brazil, which have recorded significant economic growth in their national economies, the characteristic features of underdevelopment (such as social deprivation, rural poverty, illiteracy, and social inequalities) are still widespread [Gilbert and Goodman, 1979].

This negative experience has raised serious theoretical questions about the usefulness of economic models such as those of Rostow (1960) and the "trickle down" approaches to economic growth and development in third world countries.¹ Consequently, a new development thinking emerged among theorists of development, which was characterized by a departure from economic growth to a "basic needs" approach to development in the third world countries. To this end, new and more ethical, populist-oriented notions such as basic needs (food, shelter, and clean water) and other ramifications of poverty (viz. illiteracy, malnutrition) were used in redefining development in the context of the third world countries. Concomitantly, at the national level, development was viewed primarily as the capacity of a country to produce enough to feed its population, as well as to provide the basic needs for the majority of its poor people.

The exponents of the new development thinking were equally concerned with identifying the key agents for promoting such development in the third world countries. The administrations, particularly local administrations, of these countries, together with popular participation, were identified as instrumental for fostering development which is ethically and populist oriented [Bryant and White, 1982:13 19].

¹ For useful reflections on these models and approaches, see, for example, Michael P. Todaro, *Economic Development in the Third World*, (New York: Longman Inc., 1981), p. 57-69; Richard A. Higgott, *Political Development Theory*, (London: Croom Helm, 1983), p. 1-26; C. Bryant and L.G. White, *Managing Development in the Third World*, (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1982), p. 4-13; and Aidan Foster-Carter, "From Rostow to Gunder Frank: Conflicting Paradigms in the Analysis of Underdevelopment", *World Development* vol. 4(3), (March, 1976), p. 167-80.

The new development thinking found much of its clout in the "Development Administration School", which is primarily concerned with improving and increasing the administrative capacities of the administrations of the third world countries in dealing with all aspects of development. The exponents of this school diagnose the problems of development chiefly from the institutional perspective. They have argued, as we shall see shortly, that institutional weakness and administrative incapacity are among the core causes of the on-going problems of development in the third world countries. In other words, they see a causal linkage between institutions and the process of development. In order to improve and increase their administrative capacity, they have called for administrative reforms.

Because of the various and differing approaches,² our attention will be confined to the decentralization approach which is dominantly featured in the Tanzanian experience with administrative reforms in that country. It is argued by the exponents of this approach that a decentralized administration is more viable for administrative capacity, as well as for promoting both popular participation and development that addresses the basic needs of the majority of the rural people in the third world countries. And in this context, decentralization is considered to be both a form of government organization and a tool for development [Conyers, 1984:187].

Before examining critically these propositions, we shall discuss the meaning of development as it has been viewed by the Development Administration.

Development in Development Administration

Streeten, one of the chief exponents of development administration, has stressed the need to redefine the term development:

Development must be redefined as an attack on the chief evils of the

²For a good summary of the competing approaches of the "Development Administration School", see, for example, Diana Conyers, "Decentralization and Development: A Review of the Literature", *Public Administration and Development*, vol. 4 (1984), p. 187-97; Nasir Islam and G.M. Henault, "From GNP to Basic Needs: A Critical Review of Development and Development Administration", *International Review of Administrative Sciences*, vol. XLV (3), (1979), p. 253-67; J.F. Springer, "Observation and Theory in Development Administration", *Administration and Society*, no. 9 (1977), p. 13-44.

world today: malnutrition, disease, illiteracy, slums, unemployment and inequality. Measured in terms of aggregate growth rates, development has been a great success. But measured in terms of jobs, justice and the elimination of poverty, it has been a failure or only a partial success.

[Streeten, 1981:56]

Forecasting the logic behind the new development thinking, and hence the need for a redefinition of development, J.P. Nettle has commented, "an increasingly realistic concept of development emerged . . . people saw development as having to do with what was hopefully described as the attainment of specific and identifiable societal goals" [Nettl, 1969:71].

These societal goals have been identified as the availability of the basic needs for the majority of poor people living in the rural areas of the third world countries. Anthony Hall, quoting different sources, observed that "about 85 per cent (550 million people) of those living in absolute poverty (defined as an annual income of less than US \$50) reside in rural areas. Some 75 per cent of this total is concentrated in Asia . . . In Africa large numbers of rural poor are to be found in Ethiopia, Sudan and Tanzania . . ." [Hall, 1986:87]. Other societal goals include the eradication of illiteracy, disease, malnutrition, social injustices, rural and urban inequalities, and so forth, which Julius K. Nyerere has identified as the major enemies of development in Tanzania [Nyerere, 1971:9].

Likewise, Bryant and White view development in the context of these societal goals. They maintain that deprivation, degradation and poverty are the chief indicators of underdevelopment whenever they are found. Development, therefore, means an increase in the capacity of people to deal with these evils. Or, stated otherwise, it means the attainment and sustainability of the people's capacity to deal with the problems of scarcity and finite resources [Bryant and White, 1982:14-19].

It is these societal goals which have captured the attention of the development administration school in its concerns for development in third world countries. That

is, development must reach out to the majority of the impoverished rural masses in these countries. Although they agree on the target of such a development, they have not come up with a unanimous and coherent definition of development to operationalize its process. However, Todaro's definition sums up the meaning of development, which is commonly shared within the development administration school. He defines development as:

... a multidimensional process involving major changes in social structures, popular attitudes and national institutions as well as the acceleration of economic growth, the eradication of inequality and eradication of absolute poverty.

[Todaro, 1981:70]

Because of the complexities still looming around this new notion of development, emphasis was put on rural development, rather than on development in general. The former was defined simply as development that occurs in rural social systems, which are characterized by subsistence economies, inadequate and poor public services and utilities, high illiteracy rates, malnutrition, disease, and so forth, leading to absolute rural poverty [World Bank, 1975:15; Harriss, 1984:15]. It is this kind of development which the development administration school became increasingly concerned with. And, in the same vein of concern, its exponents became engaged in the search for solutions for problems related to rural development in the third world countries.

Administration as an Agent for Rural Development

The administration, particularly local administration, of third world countries, was identified as the chief institution for promoting rural development, because it is this institution which is responsible for implementing, (and in most cases for planning also) policies and development programs which are, or have been, formulated by the national governments of these countries. In an effort to explain why rural development has not paralleled the apparent economic growth recorded

in some of the third world countries, the development administration school has zeroed in on the administrative incapacity which has been symptomatic of most of the administrations of the third world countries since their independence.

This administrative incapacity is characterized by poor planning and implementation of development projects; inefficiency and ineffectiveness of the administration to respond to rural needs; bureaucratization and centralization of development planning agencies; shortages in skilled manpower; mismanagement of the scarce resources for development, and a host of other factors [Bryant and White, 1982:24; Montgomery and Esman, 1980].

The total sum of these characteristics of administrative incapacity has been viewed by the development administration school as the major cause for stagnation of rural development in the third world. And Moris supports this view when he emphatically noted:

If the administrative capabilities are not present when the state tries to accelerate development, its interventions will have adverse and largely unanticipated consequences throughout the rural sector.

[Moris, 1981:5]

The identification of the causes for administrative incapacity, and hence for stagnation of rural development, led to the search for remedies. However, the search for remedies precipitated a split among the advocates of development administration into three major groups, each with competing approaches: diffusionists, institutionalists, and decentralists. Coincidentally, the split occurred in a sequential fashion.

Improving Administrative Capacity: Competing Approaches

The first group could be identified as diffusionist. It is represented largely by members of the Comparative Administration Group which is supported by some international agencies (mostly U.S. based agencies) involved in development. Their starting point is that development can be administered, given a proper mix of ad-

ministrative tools and skills. Development is viewed as social change which is stimulated, or set in motion, by infusion of new ideas into a social system. This leads to increased per capita incomes and living standards of the majority of the population because, as these new ideas are introduced, more and more people will shed traditionalism and conservatism, thereby applying more modern production methods and improved organizational techniques in social production [Rogers, 1969:216-17]. The problems with this kind of development lie in the weakness of the administrations of the developing countries, which inhibits them from being efficient and capable agents for transmitting new ideas into their social systems.³ Although this weakness is associated with several other factors, it is contended that it originates largely from what Subramaniam (1977:15-23) has eloquently described as the "derivative, imitative, lopsided and frustrated" character of the administration in developing countries.

Thus, the group has proposed the diffusion of new ideas concerning western administrative methods, skills, and techniques in areas such as planning and budgeting for development, public policy and decision making, management and organization, information and data gathering and restoration, into the administrations of the developing countries. Training, technical assistance in both administrative technology and personnel (for example, the American Peace Corps) were part of a package contained in the diffusionist approach to development in the developing countries.⁴ The ultimate goal of the massive administrative programs initiated by C.A.G. and largely sponsored by international agencies during the 1960s and 1970s, was to improve and increase the capacities of the administration in overseeing development

³For useful insights on the position of the Comparative Administration Group (C.A.G.), see, for example, the Symposium Papers of C.A.G., edited by Dwight Waldo, especially the article by Brian Loveman, in *Public Administration Review*, 36(6), (1976), p. 615-54; Ferrel Heady, *Public Administration: A Comparative Perspective*, (New York: Marcel Dekker, 1984).

⁴For a detailed discussion on the diffusionist approach and the consequential activities of some of the international agencies and governments (e.g. U.S.A.), see, for example, Nasir Islam and Georges M. Henault, (1976), op. cit., p. 254-58; L.D. Stifel, et al. (eds.), *Education and Training for Public Sector Management in Developing Countries*, (New York: Rockefeller Foundation, 1977); and David Korten (ed.), *Population and Social Development Management*, (Caracas: Estudios Superiores de Administracion—IESA, 1979).

or social change in developing countries. Once the administration was fully armed with new ideas and newly acquired skills and techniques, it was expected that they would be able to transmit the new ideas on social change, as well as manage and administer such changes.

The second group comprises the institutionalists. Those who belong to this group include Brokensha (1969), Esman (1978), Heady (1984), Huntington (1968), LaPalombara (1963), and Riggs (1964), just to mention a few. They all share a common concern; that is, "a good administration as the missing factor in development" [Brokensha, 1969:105]; but they differ in terms of their approaches to finding the remedies for the problem. Here we find essentially two approaches: the administrative systems approach and the social systems approach. The former, influenced largely by systems theory, is concerned with the interrelationships and interactions among the various sub-systems and with the national system; how these affect development in terms of planning, managing and administering resources, and the responsiveness of these systems to the development needs and demands of the people.

The latter approach, using more the paradigms of organizational theories, and some theoretical underpinnings of sociology and anthropology, focuses on the socio-cultural factors under which these systems operate, and how these factors affect the behaviour and attitudes of those who manage the systems. Equally emphasized is the stability and democratic nature of the systems of the developing countries.⁵ The main concern of those using this approach is with the rational capabilities of the national and sub-systems in dealing with development, as well as how to make these systems stable and democratic. In other words, it is viewed that rationality in planning and budgeting, for example, increases the capacity of the system and

⁵For a useful discussion on the distinction between these two approaches and their exponents, see, for example, Warren Ilchman, "Rising Expectations and the Revolution in Development Administration" (a review article), *Public Administration Review*, 25(4) (Dec. 1965), p. 314-28; also, John D. Montgomery and William J. Siffin (eds.), *Approaches to Development: Politics, Administration and Change*, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966).

its sub-systems in implementing development. Besides the application of western management and organizational techniques, such rationality is furnished in a system which is stable and democratic. Thus, for example, Riggs has argued that where political systems are unstable and undemocratic, there is always a tension between the principle of "capacity" (which comes through administrative rationality) and the principle of "equality" (which is only possible where a system is democratic) [Riggs, 1970:573].

In short, both groups have strongly supported the idea of transferability of western management and organizational skills and techniques to the developing countries as a new enlightenment to these countries in reviving and stimulating their development. The influence of both groups can be seen in the widespread movement of administrative and institutional reform programs, technical assistance programs in administrative skills, and training institutes, during the period of the 1960s and 1970s. Hammergren (1983), for example, provides a good and insightful case study on the success and failures of these programs with respect to the Latin American countries. Similar programs have been initiated in Zambia, Tanzania, Kenya, Sudan, Nigeria, Ghana and in other countries of Sub-Saharan Africa.

The third group, with which we are mostly concerned in this study, can be described as decentralists. Acknowledging administrative and institutional weakness as the crucial impediment to development, they propose a different approach to its remedy. In addition, they put great emphasis on notions such as local democracy, popular participation, and so forth, as necessary prerequisites for people-oriented development to occur. In other words, although they concur with the other two groups on the need for improving and increasing administrative capacity to manage and administer development, they strongly maintain that the whole process of initiating and stimulating development should start from below, supported jointly by the local administration/institution and the local people themselves. Conversely, they are against induced social change from above.

The decentralists also share a common premise; that is, values, tasks and organizational structure for development should be interrelated in and by an effective organization which commands the trust and support of the local peoples. Such an effective organization can be created through decentralization. And they view decentralization as both a tool for development and a form of organizational structure through which administrative capacity and participatory democracy (defined simply as the involvement of local people in decision-making and implementation of development plans) can be brought into full fruition [Conyers, 1984:187]. Underlying this premise is the relationship that is established between a decentralized administration and development, meaning here rural development. The administration is envisioned as the principal agent or tool of development, whereas decentralization is perceived as the umbilical cord which ties together the relationship between the two.

Decentralized Administration for Development

Before pursuing further the above premise and its theoretical basis, there is a need to highlight briefly the various different meanings attached to the term "decentralization". The idea is to draw attention to some of the sources of confusion which are often times found in decentralization literature. Some of this literature tends to oversimplify decentralization by applying it to any kind of organizational structure with some characteristics of decentralization. From here they expect or anticipate the same results as if decentralization has but a single meaning. In order to understand why one particular decentralized administration has succeeded or failed to foster development, it is important to delineate the meanings of decentralization. It is from these meanings that a decentralized administration can be judged whether or not it is for development.

Meanings of Decentralization

Decentralization has been used in a number of ways. We shall identify those

which are commonly used to denote the term, and which will be used interchangeably in this study.

As a political phenomenon, decentralization means both a deconcentration of administration from a single centre and a form of government organization through which powers are conferred to local units, generally known as local governments. Used in this sense, decentralization, Smith explains, "involves the delegation of power to lower levels in a territorial hierarchy, whether the hierarchy is one of governments within a state or offices within a large-scale organization" [Smith, 1985:1]. This kind of decentralization is also known as devolution. It normally exists in a federal system of governments wherein there is a fair amount of power-sharing between the central government and the state or regional governments.

As a functional phenomenon, decentralization usually refers to the transfer of authority to perform specific tasks to specialized institutions or field officers operating or working at local levels. Such institutions or field officers normally act as agents of the central government. As agents they owe their responsibility and accountability to the central government while executing their delegated powers. This kind of decentralization is also known as "deconcentration" or administrative decentralization. It differs from "devolution" in that the former involves only a minimum transfer of power to local officials to implement certain functions or services within a given plan and budgetary resources. Within their assigned local jurisdiction, they exercise some element of discretion and responsibility over the nature of the services provided at the local level. Their discretion may also vary from pro forma rulings to more substantial decisions [Bryant and White, 1982:161].

Deconcentration also involves either of the following: It may entail the shifting of the workload of the central government ministry/department to staff located in the offices outside the capital either on an ad hoc basis, or as a permanent and formalized system of field administration. In the former case the field officials have minimum power to decide on how their functions should be performed, whereas in

the latter case, they may enjoy a greater degree of decision-making to plan and adjust the implementation of the central directives to local conditions within the broad guidelines set by the central government/ministry or department.

Decentralization has also been used to describe an organizational form for development, especially in dealing with the problems of development in third world countries. Used in this sense, decentralization is seen not only as a form of government organization but as a tool or strategy for development [Conyers, 1984:187]. As a tool for development, decentralization is seen as a means for improving the capacity of the (local) administration in planning and implementation of national development - rural development in particular. In this sense, decentralization is defined as:

... the transfer of planning, decision-making or administrative authority from the central government to its field organizations, local administrative units, semi-autonomous and parastatal organizations, local governments, or non-governmental organizations.

[Cheema and Rondinelli, 1983:18]

The application of this kind of decentralization aims at increasing the effectiveness and responsiveness of the administration to rural needs, thereby making rural development programs more relevant; enlisting the support and participation of the local people in implementing rural development programs; and promoting participatory democracy by involving directly the rural masses in planning and implementing development programs from which they are the immediate beneficiaries.

From an administrative perspective decentralization is a mode of administration through which certain social, economic, political, and administrative goals are sought to be attained and sustained in a given social system. These goals may be complementary, exclusive, or inclusive. Thus, decentralization as a model of administration may seek to promote political unity in a social system where major elements of the social system are diverse and cannot be centrally controlled with-

out paying the cost, in terms of political instability or unity [Studenski and Mort, 1941:1]. The Nigerian federal government with its partner state governments is one example of a decentralized administration for meeting the political goals of the Nigerian social system. For economic goals, decentralization may aim at creating an equitable distribution of essential social services and wealth of the country to all groups in a society. Supported by empirical evidence from the countries of Asia, Montgomery makes a strong case for decentralization, arguing that it had a major impact on the success in distributing development benefits, as well as in the reduction of concentration of power in those countries [Montgomery, 1972:62-75].

Other social and administrative goals which can be attained through a decentralized administration have been rationalized by Rondinelli (1981:35-36), McNamara (1975:90-98), and some international development agencies such as the United Nations Development Program (1979:104), and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) (1979:25).

As for the policy-makers and practitioners of development in the developing countries, decentralization has come to mean almost everything that has been included in the above meanings of the term. In Tanzania, for example, decentralization is used to refer to a strategy of rural development to register popular support and participation in implementing rural development programs. The manner of expediting such support and participation has varied from one period in time to another, as we shall see in Chapter Four and others. At another juncture, decentralization has been used to declare the government's intentions to promote meaningful local democracy and popular participation. The local government program of 1962, the Decentralization program of 1972, followed by Village governments and Village Managers programs of 1975 and 1977 respectively, all were referred to as decentralization for promoting local democracy and local participation in development. Decentralization has also been used as a strategy for the Tanzanian model of "planned development". This kind of decentralization has been featured in the de-

velopment and planning committees which have been established from the national to grassroots level. These will be discussed in the next chapters.

The vagueness of the notion "decentralization" is not unique to Tanzania. It is found in almost every developing country where decentralization has been viewed as a "magic" word for development. Nevertheless, in some cases, it has been used to attract foreign aid, or to meet the conditions attached by the foreign donor of the aid. For example, Cohen and Uphoff (1980:213) have observed that the U.S. Congress, in its 1973 Foreign Assistance Act, had inserted participation (i.e. through decentralization) as a precondition for all future American development assistance.

Forms of Decentralization

Nonetheless, from the above meanings of decentralization, we can distinguish two major forms of decentralization: institutional and administrative decentralization. The distinction is purely a technical one because the two forms are usually complementary or inclusive. In other words, an institutional decentralization can be for administrative purposes. A brief analysis of each will perhaps clear up some of the confusion that may arise from this distinction.

Institutional Decentralization

Institutional, also known as areal or territorial decentralization, is the oldest form of decentralization that has existed since the Aristotelean era. It embodies both the political and administrative aspects of decentralization. By definition, it means a division and distribution of government powers among areas which are within the same geographic boundaries of a country. Where it exists, the primary goal is to safeguard democracy through the promotion of the democratic principles of liberty, equality and welfare of all citizens of a country [Maass, et al., 1959:9-10].

The traditional institution which has been styled institutional or areal decentralization is commonly known as "local government" which, in turn, signifies another level of government, yet it remains an integral part of the body politic of a society.

It can be recognized as such in the constitution of a country, or established by law, for the management and administration of the local affairs of a human settlement with recognized geographic boundaries.

The modern version of institutional decentralization is commonly known as "devolution". This term finds its clout among the contemporary decentralists who apparently attempt to avoid the use of "local government" because of its colonial connotations, while dealing with decentralization in the post-colonial countries. Nonetheless, devolution is not always synonymous with institutional decentralization. According to the contemporary decentralists, devolution may or may not exist within a legally formalized institution, whatever label is attached to this institution. To this end, they distinguish two operational meanings of devolution.

The first is that devolution refers to a transfer of some of the government powers and authority to formally constituted local authorities to discharge specific or residual functions within their given jurisdictions. This occurs usually through a system in which the central or national government shares its powers with its legally constituted local units as partners. These local units can be states, regions, districts, municipalities, counties, and so forth. Both levels of government co-operate in a system of partnership, and complement each other in promoting national and local interests. However, the local units of government enjoy a latitude of autonomy in respect to acquiring their own resources, control, management, and the manner of utilizing these acquired resources.

This kind of devolution is synonymous with the institutional form of decentralization or local government. It is overwhelmingly political, as it involves a division and distribution of political power among the different levels of government within the same body politic of a society. Even its principal characteristics point to the overwhelming political configurations. These include autonomy and independence of the local units as separate and distinct levels of government over which the central government exercises minimum control; clear and legally recognized geograph-

ical boundaries within which they exercise authority and perform public functions; and a statutory basis of power and authority, with a corporate status and power to secure resources to perform their functions [Cheema and Rondinelli, 1983:22].

The second meaning of devolution entails a transfer of some decision-making authority and control over resources to regional and local officials acting as agents of the central government. Such a transfer is aimed at facilitating the decision-making process and implementation of development plans and projects in order to avoid or reduce unnecessary delays. Here devolution means simply an administrative procedure which permits the local officials some autonomy in executing their functions but not necessarily through a system of power-sharing with the central government (Bryant and White, 1982:161). However, the distinction made is just a matter of degree and not of kind.

Administrative Decentralization

An administrative or functional decentralization usually is an organizational phenomenon which is found in small-scale or large-scale organizations, and in public or private enterprises, including governments. As an organizational pattern, therefore, such a decentralization refers to a transfer of some responsibilities and authority from the parent organization, departments, or central government to the subsidiaries, local units, or local officials to make decisions, and/or perform specific tasks and activities within the broad goals or policies already set by the centre.

In a government system, such a transfer may occur in either of the following ways: through deconcentration, or through delegation. Deconcentration involves the actual transfer of certain functions (such as education, health, water) from the centre, and/or together with the central personnel, to the local administrators. If the local administrators work under a framework of local administration, they usually also possess some latitude of discretion to plan, make routine decisions and adjust the implementation of these functions according to the local environment. But, if the central personnel are to perform these functions in the field on behalf of

the centre, then there is little room for change in the guidelines which have already been set by the centre for implementing these functions. In both cases, however, the administrators assigned to perform the functions remain agents of the central government [Rondinelli, 1981:137].

Delegation, on the other hand, involves a transfer of powers and authority from the centre to institutions such as public corporations, semi- or non-governmental organizations, including foreign agencies, to plan and implement a specific function or functions—viz. rural water supply—on the basis that these authorities have the technical and administrative capability to do so within specific spatial boundaries without direct supervision by a higher government administrative organ [Cheema and Rondinelli, 1983:20].

And, therefore, it differs from deconcentration in that in the former case the organizations are not under the direct control of central government ministries, and may not necessarily be located within the regular government structure.

In short, the essential difference between an institutional form and administrative form of decentralization lies in the characteristic features of the institutions. Under an institutional form of decentralization, the institutions, commonly known as local governments, have these characteristics: a) are defined by formal geographic boundaries, b) have an electoral mandate and legislative powers to make by-laws, c) are multi-purpose in their functions, and, d) are empowered to raise their own revenue. The institutions under an administrative form of decentralization, on the other hand, may have some of these characteristics, but not all.

Models of Decentralization for Development

As one can note from the above discussion, the notion of decentralization has already been over-conceptualized by those who advocate a decentralized administration for development. Although we have discussed two major forms of decentralization, there are several variants in each form, which are often treated as mutually exclusive while soliciting decentralization of the administration in the developing

countries. In addition, the confusion is likely to be exacerbated by the variety of models of decentralization which have been suggested in the literature of decentralization.

For example, Smith (1967) has categorized three models of decentralization. The first of these is the functional model in which local institutions are agents and functional to the central government, regardless of the technicality of their position with the centre. The second is what he calls the "integrated prefectoral" model, whereby an appointed officer of the central government becomes the chief representative and executive of the central government in a prefecture, region, or district. By virtue of his position, he is the vital link between the central and local, as well as between the local officers and the people. The model has also been known as the "Prefect-Governor" model. It has been used mostly in French colonies, as the model originated from France. And the third model is the "unintegrated" prefectoral model which is a hybrid between the functional and the integrated prefectoral model. Under this model, each specialist local administrator maintains a direct and independent link and relationship with his parent centre/ministry, even though there is one chief executive and representative of the central government [Smith, 1967:11-123].⁶

Another model has been suggested by the theorists of local government. It is described as the "local autonomy" model which seeks to strengthen local institutions (traditional or modern) and increase their autonomy in matters of a local nature through decentralization of the central government's power and authority. In other words, the model is for promoting local autonomy and local democracy.

Amidst all these models, there is yet another model which has been restyled the "Indirect Rule" model by the British. The model was imported from India by the British who have modified and used it in the governance and administration of their

⁶ For a detailed discussion on these models and their application, see, Alfred Diamant, "The Department, the Prefect, and Dual Supervision in French Administration: A Comparative Study", *Journal of Politics*, vol. 16, (1965), p. 472-90; Merle Fainsod, "Bureaucracy and Modernization: The Russian and the Soviet Case", in Joseph LaPalombara (ed.), (1968), *op. cit.*

colonies such as Nigeria, Kenya and Tanzania. The Germans used the same model in Tanzania but under a different label: the *Akida* system, as we shall see in the next chapter. The model makes use of the native leadership and their institutions in the administration of the native affairs.

All these models have perhaps added to the confusion that surrounds the relationship between decentralization, or decentralized administration and development. Central to this confusion are the questions: how to decentralize, what to decentralize and which of the two main forms of decentralization can best promote and sustain development and participatory democracy, on the one hand, and improve and increase administrative capacity on the other hand. We shall analyze two major positions.

The Position of Local Government Theorists

The position of local government theorists and those advocating the notion of "development-from-below" seems to be quite clear. They strongly maintain that development can best be promoted and sustained through an institutional form of decentralization. And the institution they have in mind is local government. Hence, any decentralization effort or program should aim at strengthening and increasing the capability of this institution so as to make it an effective and efficient tool for fostering development. One way of doing this is for the national government to grant this institution power and authority to generate its own revenues, and control over its human and material resources; and to give it more responsibilities in development matters at the local level, with the full support and assistance it needs from the centre. In other words, more local autonomy of local government and more local democracy through this institution should be the ultimate goal of decentralization.

Several arguments have been put forward to not only justify but promote the institutional form of decentralization as the most viable form of administration for promoting development and local democracy in the developing countries.

One such argument is put forward by Lewis. Drawing on the experience of

the advanced countries, he argues, "if an underdeveloped nation wants to achieve economic development, it must first change its governmental structure so as to provide local self government for its villages and rural districts", and he concludes by arguing that the adequate provision of basic social services such as education, health, water supplies, feeder-roads and local markets is only possible when local people have the power and responsibility to tax themselves to pay for these public services [Lewis, 1958:54-57].

Hicks, one of the staunch supporters of "development-from-below", has also argued that local government "is an attempt to give the people their own socialism . . . economic activity by local government," she adds, "may well be the best way in which people can play a part in the organization of their own development" [Hicks, 1961:6-7].

Arguing from a functional point of view, Muttalib and Khan state that local government can perform "four-fold development functions in addition to the traditional regulatory functions: promotion of popular participation; spurring of economic development; social transformation; and equitable distribution of the fruits of development" [1982:30].

Similar supportive arguments have been echoed elsewhere in the early writings on local government in the developing countries. These include Alderfer (1964), Maddick (1963), Riggs (1964), and Wraith (1966). Likewise, the International Union of Local Authorities (IULA) has argued strongly for local government as a promoter of social and economic development. To this end, decentralization should seek to improve and increase the capacity of this institution in its developmental role.⁷

In short, there is no doubt among the theorists of local government and "development-from-below" that a decentralized administration can promote development and participatory democracy, if it exists within an institutional framework which is

⁷ Detailed arguments are made by several members of the Union in various papers published under the title, "Local Government as Promoter of Economic and Social Development", by IULA, (The Hague Holland, 1971).

the local government.

The Position of the "Contemporary" Decentralists^a

The position of the decentralists, on the other hand, is ambiguous; and this is not accidental. To begin with, they view decentralization from an organizational perspective. Accordingly, decentralization is seen as an administrative system through which the process of decision-making and planning for development can be streamlined from the centre to grassroots level. It seeks to distribute the power and hence the responsibility of making decisions on, allocation of resources for, and implementation of, development initiatives to the people who are the immediate beneficiaries of the development efforts. This will not only increase the capacity of the administration in identifying and setting priorities which are more appropriate to the needs of the people, but will also promote local support and participation in development initiatives taken by a national government. Furthermore, such an administrative system can be effectuated through either restructuring the existing institutions so as to make room for participatory democracy, or by creating new ones for the same purpose.

Thus the question of which form of decentralization can best promote development, and increase administrative capacity, is of relative importance to the decentralists. Their main concern and interest is in administration in general, and local administration in particular. And the latter may or may not have institutional configurations such as village councils, village committees, district development and planning committees, county councils, and other national and regional committees, depending upon how decentralization is sought to affect the re-organization of the whole administration from the national to local level. There is no specificity on how to decentralize or which of the two forms of decentralization is most desir-

^a "Contemporary" refers here to the "Development Administration" literature which deals specifically with "Decentralization" in third world countries. For a brief and detailed summary of this literature, see, Diana Conyers, "Decentralization and Development: A Review of the Literature", *Public Administration and Development*, vol. 4, (1984), p. 187-97; —, "Decentralization: The Latest Fashion in Development Administration?", *Public Administration and Development*, vol. 3, (1983), p. 97-109.

able, although there is a general consensus among the decentralists on the need for decentralizing the administration for development.

Some of their arguments for decentralization have already been raised earlier. However, for analytical purposes, we shall present and paraphrase a synopsis of the main arguments of the decentralists, as they have been summarized by Rondinelli (1981:135-36). These arguments can be divided into three main groups.

The first group of arguments rationalizes decentralization as a strategy for improving the techniques and skills in planning and implementation of development, as it allows a greater latitude of local input into the process of planning, management and implementation of development projects. Hence, the arguments may be elaborated as follows:

- (i) Decentralization is a means of overcoming the severe limitations of centrally controlled national planning that have become evident in most developing nations over the past two decades, by delegating greater authority for development planning and management to officials who are working in the field, closer to the problems. Decentralization to regional or local levels allows officials to disaggregate and tailor development plans and programs to the needs of heterogeneous regions and groups within a country.
- (ii) By decentralizing functions and reassigning central government officials to local levels, their knowledge of and sensitivity to local problems and needs will be increased. Closer contact between government officials and the local population would allow both to obtain better information with which to formulate more realistic and effective plans for government projects and programs.
- (iii) Decentralization can also provide a structure through which activities of various central government ministries and agencies involved in development could be coordinated more effectively with each other and with those of local leaders and non-governmental organizations within various regions. Regions, provinces or districts provide a convenient geographical base for coordinating the myriad spe-

cialized projects that many governments in developing countries are undertaking in rural areas.

The second set of arguments appeals to decentralization as a strategy for improving the administrative capacity by making the administration of both the central and local government more responsive, innovative and penetrative. These arguments include:

- (i) Decentralization would lead to the development of greater administrative capability among local governments and private institutions in the regions and provinces, and thus expand their capacities to take over functions that are not usually performed well by central ministries, such as the maintenance of roads and infrastructure investments in areas remote from the national capital. It would also give local officials the opportunity to develop their managerial and technical skills.
- (ii) The efficiency of the central government could be increased through decentralization by relieving top management officials of routine tasks that could be more effectively performed by field staff or local officials. The time released from routine administration would free political and administrative leaders to plan more carefully and supervise more effectively the implementation of development policies.
- (iii) Decentralization is a means of cutting through the enormous amounts of "red tape" and the highly structured procedures characteristic of central planning and management in developing nations, which result in part from the overconcentration of power, authority and resources at the centre of government in the national capital.
- (iv) Decentralization would also allow greater political and administrative "penetration" of national government policies into areas remote from the national capital, where central government plans are often unknown or ignored by the rural people or are undermined by local elites and where support for national

development plans is often weak.

- (v) Decentralization can lead to more flexible, innovative and creative administration. Regional, provincial or district administrative units may have potentially greater opportunities to test innovations and to experiment with new policies and programs in selected areas without having to justify them for the whole country. If the experiments fail, their impacts are limited to small jurisdictions; if they succeed, preconditions for their success can be tested or created for replication in other areas of the country.
- (vi) The creation of a regional, provincial or local structure of government through decentralization of development planning and management functions allows local leaders to locate services and facilities more effectively within communities, to integrate isolated or lagging areas into regional economies, and to monitor and evaluate the implementation of development projects more effectively than can be done by central planning agencies.
- (vii) As societies, economies and governments become more complex, central control and decision-making becomes more difficult, costly and inefficient. By reducing diseconomies of scale inherent in the overconcentration of decision-making in the national capital, decentralization can increase the number of public goods and services—and the efficiency with which they are delivered—at lower cost.

The last set of arguments concedes that decentralization promotes participatory democracy and national unity, and diffuses concentration of power and control on central or local elites. This set includes arguments such as:

- (i) A decentralized governmental structure is needed to institutionalize participation of citizens in development planning and management. A decentralized government structure can facilitate the exchange of information about local needs and channel political demands from the local community to national ministers.
- (ii) Decentralization can increase political stability and national unity by giving groups in different sections of the country the ability to participate more directly

in development decision-making, thereby increasing their "stake" in maintaining the political system.

- (iii) Decentralization would allow greater representation for various political, religious, ethnic and tribal groups in decision-making that could lead to greater equity in the allocation of government resources and investment.
- (iv) By creating alternative means of decision-making, decentralization can offset the influence or control over development activities by entrenched local élites who are often unsympathetic to national development policies and insensitive to the needs of the poorer groups in rural communities [Rondinelli, 1981:135-136].

Theory vs. Practice

The arguments presented above leave little doubt about decentralization as an ideal for development, rural development in particular. What is not so obvious is which among the competing forms and models of decentralization can best promote development in the developing countries, given that the administrations to be decentralized are already classified as deficient in administrative capacity. However, because of this open discord among the decentralists, there have arisen two major trends in the practices with decentralization in the developing countries.

The first trend is a move towards an institutional form of decentralization with a combination of the local autonomy model and one or two other models. This trend has been initiated and influenced mostly by the theorists of local government. The results of their influence can be seen in several developing countries which, after their independence, have attempted to re-organize and restructure their local government institutions with intent to break off their colonial trappings of rigidity, inflexibility and legalistic orientation, and make them more democratic and development-oriented. This trend is seen in countries such as Sudan (Norris, 1983), Kenya (Hyden, et al., 1970; Oyugi, 1983), Nigeria (Gboyega, 1983), Ghana (Harris, 1983), Cameroon (Mawhood, 1983), Botswana (Reilly, 1983), Ethiopia (Koehn & Cohen, 1975), Sri Lanka (Mathews, 1982), and Tanzania (Dryden, 1968; and Chapter Four

of this thesis), just to mention a few.

The lessons learned from all these countries suggest a gloomy picture of the success of institutional decentralization programs in these countries. The rural areas of most of these countries are still plagued with massive and absolute rural poverty. And, as most of these studies jointly concur, the institutional decentralized programs have led to centralization of power and control at the centre, as opposed to increasing local autonomy and local democracy, let alone fostering development [Kasfir, 1983:25-47].

Numerous reasons have been given by the writers cited above for the failures of the institutional decentralization programs in meeting the expected results with respect to development and local democracy. It is not the intent of this chapter to analyze the validity of each of these reasons. However, one explanation given by the United Nations Report on Local Government reforms in the developing countries is worth noting here. In its evaluation of the experiences from several developing countries across the Continents, the Report explains that, among several other factors, there has been "a considerable pragmatism in considering the many variables that affected the substantive focus of local government reform. For example, no firm formulae were considered in deciding on patterns of distributing responsibility for public functions . . . Some countries included in the study experienced a considerable stripping of the functions of local government units, an action reportedly taken by the national governments concerned in an effort to improve the manner in which the functions were being carried out" [UN Report, 1975:73-74]. In short, therefore, the experimentation with decentralization has not produced the expected results in most of the developing countries.

These observations bring us back to our theoretical questions: what should be decentralized and how, and whether an institutional decentralization is the best form of decentralization for promoting development and participatory democracy in developing countries. We shall examine these questions more critically shortly.

The second trend is a move towards an administrative form of decentralization, which seeks to re-organize the existing systems of decision-making and planning for development so as to allow more local input and participation in the process. The assumption is that where local people are more and more involved in decision-making and planning for their own development, they will be motivated in not only supporting but also implementing the development initiatives of their national governments. What is required is for the administration to be so re-organized and structured that local participation and involvement are made possible in all phases of development.

This trend of decentralization has been solicited and influenced largely by the contemporary decentralists. The manner of carrying out this form of decentralization has usually been through transferring part of the central government bureaucracy to the regions and districts in order to strengthen and increase the capacity of the bureaucracy in these administrative units in planning, organizing and implementing development projects designed for rural areas. Another complementary way of carrying out an administrative decentralization is through a replacement of local governments by a number of functionally specific local institutions such as regional and district development and planning committees, local or village councils, and village development committees, which can be controlled from the centre, or infiltrated by central government administrators or national political party representatives.

The Zambian administrative reforms (Conyers, 1981; Chikulö, 1981 and 1985), the Tanzanian decentralization programs of 1972 and 1975 (see Chapter Five of this study), and the Latin American administrative reforms (Hammergren, 1983), all represent this trend of decentralization. What we see in all these countries and in some others also, is that administrative decentralization has been applied as a strategy and administrative method for a control-oriented system of planning and managing for development in order to meet primarily the goals and objectives set

by the national governments, while the initiative for local participation is at best at the level of implementation.

The euphoric optimism of the contemporary decentralists about administrative decentralization as the appropriate form of decentralization for development and local democracy was sooner or later quashed. The experiences from various developing countries, including Tanzania, caused a widespread scepticism about administrative decentralization as being capable of improving administrative capacity, fostering development, and promoting participatory democracy in the developing countries [United Nations Report, 1981a; UNCRO Report, 1981b].

Again, there are many explanations which have been pointed out by the contemporary decentralists for the failure of the administrative decentralization programs in meeting their intended objectives. Conyers, for example, looks at sets of problems contributing to this failure. The first set are problems derived from the application of one form of decentralization to the exclusion of other forms. And she argues that the application has been a failure, because "either the proposed reforms have not been implemented as intended or because the initial proposals did not provide for significant decentralization". The second set are problems related to the failure of the decentralization programs to redress the problems of administrative incapacity. Thus she explains: "... there are claims that decentralization has done little to improve the planning and implementation of local development programs and, therefore, to contribute to rural and national development." And the third set are problems concerned with the promotion of participatory democracy. Again she notes, "... there are complaints that powers have been decentralized to the 'wrong people'—and so there has been no meaningful increase in the participation of the mass of the people" [Conyers, 1983:106].

Looking at the way decentralization programs have been used as a strategy for planning and managing development, Rondinelli provides a more critical explanation for the failure of these programs in promoting development. He states:

Conventional planning and administrative methods have resulted in costly but ineffective analysis, greater inconsistency and uncertainty, the delegation of important development activities to technical experts, inappropriate and sometimes harmful intervention, the failure to include beneficiaries in decision-making, and reluctance on the part of administrators to detect and correct errors. The prospects of improving control-oriented management are constrained by the difficulties of defining objectives concisely, lack of appropriate data, inadequate understanding of local social and cultural conditions, ineffective means of controlling behavior, the dynamics of political interaction, and low levels of administrative capacity in developing countries.

[Rondinelli, 1983: viii]

What is suggested here by Rondinelli sums up precisely the main criticisms which could be raised against the exponents of development administration in general, and the decentralists and theorists of local government in particular. However, two or three criticisms should be added here. From the experiences with decentralization in developing countries, the relationship between a decentralized administration and development is theoretically obscured. This is partly due to the poverty of the concept of decentralization which has been so elusively theorized, and partly due to undue optimism by the decentralists and development administrationists over what decentralization can do with respect to development in the third world countries. In short; there is still a big gap between theory and practice of decentralization and development. And, hence, the relationship between decentralized administration and development remains theoretically unsound.

Although decentralization is a universal phenomenon, the fallacy of the development administrationists (including here the decentralists) is their general assumption that decentralization always and everywhere produces the same ideals and values of development and democracy, regardless of the political systems; and that,

therefore, decentralization programs, wherever they are carried out, promote these ideals and values. This fallacy can be seen in their construction of the whys and wherefores of decentralization in developing countries, which accords little or no recognition of the varied political systems in these countries, some of which are averse to an institutionalized form of local autonomy and local democracy for political reasons. We shall see this adverse tendency in the case study of the Tanzanian experience with decentralization. It suffices to note here that, by overlooking the varied political systems and, in turn, how they affect decentralized administration and development, the development administrationists have down-played one of the key factors contributing to the success or failure of the decentralization programs in the developing countries. And that is why this study sets as its principal task, to provide a different explanation for the failure of the decentralization programs in Tanzania, by focusing upon the Tanzanian political system.

And, finally, there is another fallacy derived from the general hypothesis of the development administrationists that the administration is the prime agent of development or social change, and that once this administration is fully equipped with administrative capacities through decentralization, development is likely to occur.

A final point relating to the flaws is the inadequate understanding of the unstated objectives of the decentralization programs in the developing countries. Whatever decentralization program, initiated from outside or within, is carried out by a developing country, it is judged in a simplistic fashion as primarily for development. When the program fails to deliver the expected results of development, it is said to be a failure. But, in actual fact, the program might have been a success in terms of the unstated objectives which, in most cases, were not told to the designers and/or sponsors of the program, if by doing so it might jeopardize the attainment of the unstated objectives. For example, most of the developing countries were confronted with the problem of legitimacy and political unity almost immediately after their independence.

Conclusion

Development administration has indeed provided a different approach to analyzing the problems related to development in the developing countries. The approach departs from the orthodox theories of economic growth and development in that it views administrative incapacities as the nexus of the problems. The theoretical underpinnings of this approach and its main flaws, as we have discussed in the chapter, will therefore now be tested, demonstrated and analyzed in the next empirical chapters.

CHAPTER THREE

Local Administration During The Colonial Period

Tanzania (up to 1964 Tanganyika) was colonized by both Germany and Britain in successive periods. It was a German Colony from 1885 up to the end of the First World War, when it became a British Colony, until December 9, 1961. Each of these colonial powers had different policies and programs for the colony, but more specifically so with respect to rural development. Concomitantly, each had established its own system of local administration for implementing its policies and programs. Common to both, however, was some form of decentralization in their systems.

The purpose of this chapter, therefore, is to trace and discuss both with intent to explain how they have had an influence on the Tanzanian system of local administration. The discussion focuses on the content of the colonial systems, rather than on the specificity of the colonial policies and programs for rural development. Hence, for this purpose, it is argued in this chapter that the structures of colonial administration have left their legacy of influence on the institutional forms of the Tanzanian system of local administration. Stated differently, the colonial style and practice of decentralizing the local administration have had a profound impact on the Tanzanian practice. This, in turn, has contributed to the on-going administrative problems with regard to rural development in the country.

In order to investigate these concerns, the chapter focuses on the following aspects of the colonial system of local administration: the structure and functions of the administration; style and effects on rural development; and its legacy.

The chapter begins with a discussion of German administration which, by and large, was responsible for the disintegration of the indigenous political institutions, thereby imposing an alien organizational pattern. First, however, we shall briefly look at the social context before the German administration.

The Social Context of Tanzania Before the Germans

Pre-colonial Tanzania was occupied by discrete, compact, and identifiable tribes or ethnic groups. By conservative figures there were about 120 tribes,¹ about a dozen of which made up roughly 50 per cent of the population.

For both historical and economic reasons, none of these tribes had arisen to predominance over other tribes, even though there were some tribes which through their powerful tribal leaders (chiefs) controlled large areas of the country. For example, the Hehe, under their warrior-chief Mkwawa who died in 1898, controlled the area from Lake Tanganyika and Lake Nyasa eastward to Kilosa and Ifakara [Listowel, 1965:24]. Likewise, the Nyamwezi, under *Ntemi* ('chief') Mirambo, controlled most of the Tabora and Lake Tanganyika areas [Bennett, 1971].

Each tribe or a combination of several tribes occupied a marked territory, and possessed a distinct language, culture, and social organization. Although these territorial boundaries were not legally drawn until the colonial period, each tribe respected the others' territories, and defended its right of occupancy against any outside intrusion or invasion. The quest for territorial expansion was not uncommon. And it often led to tribal warfare. The Ngoni invasion is one of the historical legends of such a quest [Gulliver, 1955:16-30; Sheriff, 1980:31-35]. However, a stable and peaceful co-existence among the diverse tribes was the norm rather than warfare. With the exception of the hunting-band communities, most of the ethnic groups lived in permanent, or semi-permanent (in the case of the pastoralists) settlements.

Indigenous Social Organization

Because of the diversity in ethnic and other social factors [Sheriff, 1980:11-31],

¹The actual number of these ethnic groups has fluctuated from one census to another because of the difficulty in differentiating them. For example, in 1921, 68 ethnic groups were recognized, 137 in 1931, 117 in 1948, 123 in 1957, and 130 in 1967. See, *Tanganyika, Report on the Native Census, 1921* (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1921) p. 11-12; *Tanganyika, Census of the Native Population, 1931* (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1932), p. 23-25; and Bertil Egero and Roushdi Henin (eds.), *The Population of Tanzania, Census vol. 6*, (Dar es Salaam: Bureau of Statistics, 1973), p. 160-61.

the ethnic groups evolved different forms of social organization. However, these can be grouped into two dominant forms: state, and stateless or acephalous social organization. In this context, a state social organization is characterized by a presence of an institution headed by a chief,² with an elaborate system of administration consisting of a host of functionaries other than the chief. Such functionaries include sub-chiefs, an army, police known as *ruga ruga* in some tribes, and village headmen, with a fairly organized judicial system for adjudicating tribal affairs.

This social organization was found among the tribes living in the interlacustrine areas, western and northern parts of the country, and in the southern highlands to further south of the highlands to Ruvuma region. The central role of the institution was to foster tribal cohesion and integration; to organize social production, including its distribution during a catastrophe or famine; to defend tribal territory against outside invasion; to adjudicate all tribal affairs within the tribe and with other neighbouring tribes; to promote the general welfare of the whole tribe; and in some tribes such as the Nyamwezi, Yao, Sukuma and Haya, to organize internal and external trade.

Unlike the state social organization, a stateless or acephalous organization is characterized by a loose and weakly integrated institution which is based on kinship, or clan, and on age-set system. Under the latter the institution consists of different layers of councils which represent the age-sets, at the top of which is a council of senior elders of the tribe. In the former case, each kin or clan was headed by an elder of the kinship, who exercised his own autonomy from other elders of other kins or clans. In other words, horizontally, each elder of a kinship was autonomous, although vertically one kinship elder might be recognized by the others as senior by virtue of commanding or possessing some magic powers or taboos unknown to the others [Fosbrooke, 1948; Young and Fosbrooke, 1960]. The basis of tribal

²The term, "chief", means here also "king". Both terms are used loosely here because traditionally the persons holding this position were known by different titles in each tribal group. For example, *Niemi* among the Nyamwezi, *Nkosi* for the Ngoni and Fipa; *Mangi* for the Chagga; and *Mukama* for the Haya.

cohesion and integration among these ethnic groups, therefore, was mainly the claim of a common ethnic origin and ancestry, sharing a common tribal language, culture, traditions, customs, and above all, common tribal territory or land. Their institutions performed functions similar to those under the state social organization. And these were to be found among the societies in the hinterland and the coastal belt areas of the Indian Ocean.

Indigenous Economies

Although there were some variations, most of the indigenous economies were largely based on agricultural production, pastoralism, and/or a combination of both. In the case of agricultural production, there were also several agricultural systems and practices which were deployed invariably from one area to another depending upon the environment, ecology, and the availability of land which could support the members of a particular territory. Among the most common agricultural systems were shifting agriculture, mixed farming, and crop rotation. Agricultural practices involved ridging, terracing, furrowing, irrigation, and use of animal or home-made manure [Ruthenberg, 1964:32-34]. And the common agricultural crops which were grown by the indigenous communities comprised tobacco, cotton, coffee, millet, banana, casava, maize, sorghum, rice, groundnuts, and a variety of vegetable foods and fruits.

Nonetheless, most of these economies were subsistence. Only a few tribes were able to produce surplus enough to support the specialization of non-agricultural activities such as iron-smelting, blacksmithing, salting-making, and cloth making. From these activities most of the much needed tools for agricultural production, warfare, and other social needs, were produced locally and exchanged internally among the tribes. Thus, for example, it has been estimated in 1892 that about 150,000 locally made iron-hoes were sold each year on the Tabora market alone [Kjekshus, 1977:90]. Likewise, products such as salt, spears, axes, arrowheads, daggers, knives, sickles, muzzle-loading guns, and a variety of ornaments added to

the agricultural products which were exchanged in both internal and long-distance trade. This means there was a lot of interaction not only within the various ethnic groups, but also with the outside world. For example, the ethnic groups in the coastal belt of the Indian Ocean had commercial contacts with the Arab, Portuguese and European merchants and traders, supplying them with food grains, and mangrove poles, and ivory for manufactured goods such as textiles, arms and ammunitions, beads, and other luxury products.

The catalyst of the interaction, however, was the development of the long-distance trade between the peoples of the coast and the hinterland on one hand, and the foreign merchants and traders, particularly the Arabs, on the other.

* Because the ethnic groups were developing at different rates, their participation in the long-distance trade and its impact on them varied from one area to another. For ethnic groups such as the Nyamwezi, Sukuma, and Yao, who participated actively as caravan porters and suppliers of ivory and slaves, their political institutions became more consolidated and powerful, whereas those ethnic groups which were the object of slave raidings had their political institutions disintegrated or weakened.

To sum up, the social context of pre-colonial Tanzania was a complex one during or around the partitioning of Africa South of the Sahara by the colonizing powers. By then, virtually all indigenous societies in Tanzania had evolved their own systems of social organization. And the institutions emerging from these systems were active in setting in motion social change in their respective ethnic groups. Though in varying degrees, the participation of these ethnic groups in both internal trade and long-distance trade is a clear sign that the indigenous societies were not stagnant but in a process of change or transformation.

Nonetheless, these numerous ethnic groups had little in common as peoples of one country because none of their institutions, including those governing the larger tribes, was able to unite and integrate all the various and diverse ethnic groups. The

consequence of this was that each ethnic group responded differently to the German occupation of the country. It was this varied response by the various ethnic groups which by and large influenced the structure and style of the German system of local administration.

The German System of Local Administration

... The study of German Administration is a study in reactions ... for Germany's African empire did not last long enough for an administration theory to gain acceptance. Indeed, it was only shortly before 1914 that the Germans of East Africa formulated a coherent policy to guide their actions.

[Iliffe, 1967:557]

The German colonial system of local administration evolved simultaneously with the conquest of the country, which began around 1885. But it took its formalized structure and form in 1906 when the whole country fell under German control.

The reactions referred to by Iliffe involved actual military resistances by indigenous societies against the advancement of the German occupation of the country. These were mostly organized by larger ethnic groups with centralized and powerful institutions. Between 1888 and 1906 there were at least eleven such resistances. Some of these include Mkwawa's Rebellion in the Southern Highlands, 1894-1898; the Ngoni Rebellion in the Southern areas, 1890-1898; the Unyamwezi resistance in West Tanzania, 1889-1894; and the Maji Maji Rebellion which began along the south-coastal areas and spread over the eastern and southern parts of the country, 1905-1907 [Friedland, 1966; Redmayne, 1968; Roberts, 1968; Iliffe, 1979].

Because of these local resistances, the patterns of local administration varied from one area to another during this period of the conquest. Thus, the policy on local administration at this period was that each conquered or occupied area was placed under the control of a German administrator, usually military or Company

personnel. He became responsible for maintaining law and order, the collection of local tax, and other administrative matters of the area, including the exploration of the area for agricultural production. If the area was of strategic importance for military logistics, the area became also a garrison for supplying military hardware, food and personnel, and for military explorations into the hinterland.

In administering the area, the local German administrator was assisted by a few German officers and a police force. Others included local functionaries of different grades, such as *Liwalis* (equivalent to a chief), *Akidas* (equivalent to a sub-chief), and *Jumbes* or headmen. In areas where the ethnic groups had offered no resistance to the Germans, these functionaries were recruited locally. But in most cases they came from the coast and were recruited from the people of Arab and Swahili origin. Their main functions included the administration of law and order, collection of local tax, recruitment of African labour, enforcement of agricultural production, and adjudicating all judicial matters of the African population which fell under customary laws.

In order to equally promote white settler economy alongside African peasant production, the German Administration had encouraged planters of German origin to start estate farms in areas which were alienated from the Africans specifically for this purpose. And the German local administrators were ordered to provide the new German planters with African labour and other assistance they needed. The introduction of communal leagues (*Kommunal-Verbañde*) or communes in 1897 was one of the strategies for promoting planters' or settlers' economy. At the local level, these leagues were seen as the economic backbone of the districts, receiving 50 per cent of the hut tax, 20 per cent of the poll tax, and 30 per cent of the business tax collected in their respective districts [Pierard, 1967:34]. In return, they were responsible for functions such as maintenance of feeder roads, local markets, furthering agricultural production, and furnishing other social services [Bald, 1970:44].

However, it should be emphasized here that the pattern of local administration

during this period differed from area to area. The military importance and economic profitability of an area were the chief determinants for establishing a district post with its administrative personnel, as well as the organization of a communal league. How the German local administrators governed and administered their districts was not the primary concern of either the central administration or the German government. In other words, the German administrators enjoyed an enormous degree of autonomy with minimum control and interference from the central administration. And the absence of a central institution to co-ordinate and supervise the activities of the district administrators made it all the more difficult for the central administration to counter-balance the autonomy of these administrators.

This uncontrolled autonomy apparently led to a series of maladministrative practices and abuses by some German administrators, including the planters and settlers. These maladministrative practices and abuses ranged from confiscation of property of the indigenous people in order to force them to pay their hut tax [Iliffe, 1969:160]; indiscreet use of corporal punishment such as whipping or flogging of the natives, even for trivial cases [Müller, 1962:114; Shorter, 1972:333-34; Austen, 1968:46]; conscription of the natives to compulsory labour in the white settlers' plantations, and for public works, through a system known as *Kipande* ('card') [Townsend, 1966:285-86; Iliffe, 1969:137; Bald, 1970:172]; to compulsory production of certain cash crops, and/or forcing the natives to register themselves to collective village plots under a program of village settlements and migratory settlement or 'colonial life work' (*Kolonial Lebensaufgabe*) [Austen, 1968:74; Iliffe, 1967:560].

To illustrate how common these practices and abuses were, one German senior official, Bernhard Dernburg, after his visit to the country, reported to the German Parliament (Reichstag) in the following words:

... [I] saw too many whips in the hands and on the tables of the planters and colonizers. ... In Dar es Salaam nearly every white man walks around carrying a whip. I even found one lying on the table of the main

pay office. In the station office of the Usambara Railroad one lay directly beside the inkstand. Almost every white takes the liberty to strike any Black whom he pleases.

[Quoted in Buell, 1928:499]

The widespread malpractices and abuses were part of the reasons for the re-organization of the colonial administration, which was undertaken by the German government itself in 1906. The central focus of this re-organization was the district or local administration.

Re-organization of Local Administration

The State Secretary in the Colonial Secretariat, Bernhard Dernburg, stated in the Reichstag:

... I have become convinced that this country [Tanganyika] must be developed according to its natural resources, to its own products and to the natural experience of its native population. I am further convinced that, coupled with all due care to protect European capital, development of the native economy is the surest way to clear the ground for a broadly based colonial policy.

[Quoted in Bald, 1970:209]

This conviction was instrumental in the formulation of the economic policies for the colony, as well as in the re-organization of its administration. In both, Dernburg was the architect. With regard to the administration in the colonies, the German government later instructed all the colonial administrators that

... the Natives were to be regarded as the most valuable assets of the colonies, they were no longer to be destroyed but preserved and their rights guaranteed and protected, while a measure of self-government among them was to be encouraged.

[Townsend, 1966:247]

In line with the above statements, both peasant production and the district became central in the re-organization of the administration, as well as in the formulation of policies for the economic development of Tanganyika. In other words, peasant production was to be the basis for the future economic development of the country, and the district where the majority of the native peasants lived was to be the central institution for fostering and organizing peasant production.

In order to make this institution more effective and efficient in organizing peasant production, a uniform system and structure of local administration was introduced throughout the country.

Structure of the District Administration

The German system of local government had only one administrative unit: the district administration. Accordingly, the country was divided into twenty districts. Each district administration was responsible for both urban and rural affairs; and for that purpose it had two component parts: the district government headquarters and various forms of native administration.

The structure of the district administration was simple. It was headed by a district commissioner (*Bezirksamtmann*) as the chief representative and executive of the German colonial government in political, military, judicial, and administrative matters concerning the whole district. He was appointed directly by the Imperial Colonial office in Germany, but his powers were delegated by the Governor to whom each district commissioner was responsible and accountable. His powers and functions included maintenance of peace, order and good government; to give law and order; administration of hut and poll taxes; construction of roads; enforcement of agricultural regulation and production on the natives; and a host of other administrative matters within and outside the district headquarters. In addition, he possessed judicial powers through which he presided over the district magistrate court in all appeal cases, with powers to commute death sentences [Sperber, 1970:20].

The district commissioner was assisted by a small group of functionaries comprising a secretary, a police officer who commanded a police station of native *Askaris* (police force), junior clerks and *Liwalis* who were attached to the district headquarters as court assessors and advisers to the district Commissioner on native affairs and customary laws. Likewise, there were a number of departmental heads, mostly for agriculture, health, veterinary, water and civil engineering, and education, representing central government departments (Referates) in the district. These officers, however, worked under the direct control and supervision of the district commissioner to whom they owed responsibility and accountability.

District Advisory Council

Where it was established, the district advisory council was part of the structure of the district administration. Following the abolition of the communes or communal leagues in 1907, the council was introduced in order to incorporate various economic interest groups into the governance and administration of a district. Ideally, it was meant to be a replica of the Governor's advisory council which acted as a Legislature. Thus, it was directed by the colonial administration that in every district where at least thirty adult male Germans resided, there should be a district advisory council. The council was to consist of three members elected locally, and one member appointed by the Governor, presided over by the district commissioner [Sperber, 1970:20]. The main function of the council was to advise the district commissioner on the administration of the district's affairs; and to relay the concerns and demands of the German people in the district to the district administration.

It was intended by the colonial administration that such councils would gradually develop into more democratic institutions which would eventually be based on multi-racial representation in the districts. However, until the end of German rule, only Tanga and Dar es Salaam had larger elected councils established [Bald, 1970:207]. But these were not multi-racial.

The Native Administration

The administration of the natives was effectuated through a system known as "the *Akida* System". The system was imported from Zanzibar where the Arab Sultans used it in the administration of the coastal towns and trading centres which were under the Sultanate jurisdiction. The functionaries who served under this system were known, in the order of precedence, as *Liwalis*, *Akidas* or *Wandewa*, and *Jumbes* or village headmen.

Under the German administration, however, the system was used with some modifications. All functionaries employed under the system were used by the district administration as agents or intermediaries between the district administration and the local communities. In other words, de jure they had no powers and authority over the local communities, unless delegated so by the district commissioner for specific functions. Conversely, although their jurisdiction was attached to geographic areas, they did not form a separate administration from the district administration. Likewise, with the exception of the *Jumbes* or village headmen, the other functionaries were on a monthly district pay-roll.

The *Liwalis*. These were equivalent to a chief, with jurisdiction over a division or county. They were employed specifically as court assessors in the district court and as advisers of the district commissioner in customary laws and tradition. In some areas the post of *Liwali* was held by people recruited from the Swahili-speaking people of African and Arab origin. And in areas where the German administration entrusted the indigenous leadership, the local chiefs or some prominent natives were recruited as *Liwalis*.

The *Akidas*. These were field functionaries, responsible for relatively smaller areas compared to areas under a *Liwali*. Although they worked in the areas under the jurisdiction of a *Liwali*, they were not directly responsible to him. They were accountable and responsible directly to the district commissioner. Their main functions included maintenance of law and order, supervision of the collection of

the hut tax, recruitment and/or mobilizing free labour for public works and for plantations, construction and maintenance of public roads, especially the feeder roads, and enforcing and supervising agricultural production. They were also made "Justice of the Peace", by virtue of which they presided over primary courts, tried minor crimes, and imposed fines and/or imprisonment for a period not exceeding six months.

Initially, these were recruited from the Swahili-speaking people of African and Arab origin. With the spread of formal education, most of them were later replaced by the natives with either primary or secondary education.

The *Jumbes* or Village Headmen. These were the local leaders of the various villages in an *Akidate* or 'ward', and their leadership was recognized as such by the colonial administration. It was perhaps this recognition which motivated them to work for the district administration under close supervision of the *Akidas*, even though they were not on a monthly pay roll. Working as messengers, their main functions included enlisting all the members of their villages who were eligible for hut tax; arbitrating trivial matters among the village residents, with the power to impose minimum fines when necessary; to organize and mobilize native labour for road construction or any public work; to protect forest areas from human-caused fires, or felling of trees; to control animals predatory of crops; to enforce agricultural regulations, including the growing of new cash crops; and relaying orders and messages from above. In short, they were the vital link between the local communities and the district administration, although the link was characterized by one-way traffic from above to grass-roots.

What can be learned from the above description is that the district, under the German system of local administration, was the centre of everything. It was responsible for administrative matters, organization of rural production, and for generating its own local revenues through the collection of various forms of taxes, including hut, poll, and produce cess taxes. It was through these taxes that the dis-

trict had to meet most of its administrative expenditures, including the salaries of the *Liwalis* and *Akidas*. All other sources of revenues, such as subsidies and grants from the central government for capital development were channeled to the district through the district commissioner who became the chief co-ordinator between the activities of the central government and those of the district, especially with regard to development projects in the district. It was perhaps through this role that a strong relationship between the centre and local administration was cultivated and maintained. Most important, although there was some form of native administration, the district administration was the only institution which was responsible for generating revenues and for meeting the needs of the local communities. As an institution, however, it depended largely upon the locally generated revenues accrued from local taxes for its self-maintenance.

Central-Local Relationship

As stated earlier, there was no level other than the district between the central and local administration. This, on the one hand, maximized the autonomy of the district administration, and on the other hand, furnished a direct relationship between the centre and local level. It made it easier for the central government to set its eyes and ears to the concerns of its periphery because there was only one institution to listen to or set eyes on. Likewise, as noted, the district commissioners were under the direct control and supervision of the Governor. But, because of the size of the country and poor communication networks, these commissioners were required to report to the Governor only on the most important matters, such as the security of their districts [Iliffe, 1969:143].

Perhaps the only effective central-local controls were contained in the fiscal arrangements between the central and local administration. Herein, all district commissioners were required by law to submit annually to the central government the budget estimates and expenditure of their districts, accompanied with an audit report of the previous year. The central government, in turn, scrutinized and compiled

all the districts' budget estimates into a single budget estimate for the whole country, and forwarded it to the Imperial Colonial Office for approval by the Reichstag (German Parliament).

In short, the central-local relationship reveals on the one hand a system of administrative decentralization whereby the local institutions enjoyed an enormous degree of autonomy from the centre. On the other hand, it was a highly centralized system with respect to fiscal arrangements between the central and local administration. In fact, both were again centrally controlled by the Reichstag through the Imperial Colonial Office. Such controls were minimal during the period which preceded the re-organization of the local administration. Thus, what could be considered as significant in the re-organization of the local administration was the establishment of a uniform system of local administration with central controls over the local institutions, which stretched all the way through to the Imperial Colonial Office in Germany.

In the re-organization some attempt was made by the colonial administration to incorporate some form of native administration into the district administration. The incorporation restored some recognition of the traditional leadership, even though the use of this leadership was purely for administrative purposes. Subsequently, even though the leadership might have gained some confidence with the colonial administration, it alienated itself from its subjects because it was serving now the interests of the colonial administration, and hence, it was identified with the foreign rulers.

Furthermore, in an effort to instill discipline in the administration, the Imperial Colonial Office laid down a code of conduct related to the administration of native labour and corporal punishment for the natives. Compulsory labour was made legal only for public works, and illegal for private work in estate farms and domestic work. Further, the practice of forcing the natives into compulsory labour in lieu of hut tax was abolished, except in the most extreme cases where a native had no other ways

of obtaining cash for paying his tax. Likewise, all labour agreements and contracts had to be signed before a magistrate, which should include provisions for wages, duration of contract, working conditions, and signatories of all parties concerned. To this end, labour commissions were established in the predominantly labour-reserve districts to supervise and control the administration of the new labour code by the district administration, as well as the recruiting agencies. The latter had to be officially registered before conducting their business [Austen, 1968:80-81; Townsend, 1966:286-87; Iliffe, 1969:103-7].

On the administration of corporal punishment, only an authorized government officer was to administer such a punishment which was permitted only for punitive and not disciplinary purposes. The maximum number of strokes which could be administered by such an officer was not to exceed 25 to be executed in two installments within an interval of at least two weeks. And sentences of flogging were prohibited for Arabs, Indians, native women and children [Townsend, 1966:287-88].

Local Administration and Rural Development

The German policy on rural development was contained in a five-point economic program for the development of the country:

1. special regard for African agriculture in relation to overall economic policy
2. depriving European plantation managers of the right to punish the natives, and setting up District Commissioners to protect them against maltreatment
3. preparing for extensive afforestation, and development of water supplies, by setting up a land improvement section within the Government
4. laying and quickly constructing the second phase of the railway lines—Central Line from Morogoro to Lake Tanganyika, and the Usambara Line from Tanga to Arusha—along with road construction
5. financial reform through the re-organization of district and municipal authorities [Bald, 1970:208].

In the light of this broadly defined economic program, rural development meant simply a development of rural production through independent peasants, as the basis of the country's economic growth and development. In other words, it meant a rural transformation from a predominantly subsistence to a cash economy, thereby integrating the peasants into a global market economy, as well as making them viable assets to the German economy. Such a transformation ultimately would not only make expansion of the domestic market possible, but would also improve the lot of the peasantry and enable them to pay their taxes.

The re-organization of the local administration, therefore, sought to improve its local institutions so that they could effectively foster the organization of rural production, particularly of cash crops, as well as protect the peasants from deterioration of one kind or another.

The role of these local institutions in the organization of rural production involved, among other things, providing incentives to peasants, such as free seeds and seedlings of coffee, cotton, and rubber; a continuous inspection of peasants' farms; providing instructions to the peasants in agro-education and techniques through agricultural extension officers; enforcing regulations on agriculture through persuasion, using force only when necessary; disseminating information on crop diseases; and providing small credit facilities especially to progressive peasants. In order to increase their capacity in this role, the central government undertook to build agricultural training centres for training both extension officers and progressive peasants, and a research institute for soil and crop research. Further, it undertook the development of infrastructures such as roads, railways, transport and communication in order to facilitate the moving of agricultural products from the rural areas to the ports of Dar es Salaam and Tanga, as well as the expansion of the domestic market network [Rodney, 1980:134-37; Bald, 1970:211-12].

In order to protect the rights of the natives, new land laws concerning ownership were introduced in 1907. Among other changes contained in the new land laws

were the restrictions put on land alienation, lease, or sale. For example, a sale of land already belonging to a native was prohibited. Likewise, if any alienation of land from the natives had to be done, the district administrators were obliged to ensure that special areas of land were mapped out for the communities affected, on the basis of future growth of the communities, before such an alienation was effectuated. Another change was the establishment of land commissions in the districts, consisting of a local chief, or a traditional leader, a district land officer and other appointed officers. Each commission was authorized to declare or reserve for native use four times the amount of suitable land in addition to existing arable land under cultivation by the natives. It was also responsible for ensuring that some compensation was duly paid to those natives whose land had to be alienated [Townsend, 1966:281-82; Buell, 1965:486-87; Iliffe, 1969:127-31].

There were some immediate effects from the German policy on rural development on the one hand, and from the role played by the local institutions in implementing it on the other hand. To mention the most obvious, the amount of land acreage under peasant production of cotton increased from less than 3,000 hectares in 1906 to 16,000 hectares in 1912. Peasant production of the same crop also accounted for five-sevenths of all the cotton exported to Germany in 1912. Similarly, in the same year, the proportion of peasant production in other crops, such as coffee and vegetable oils, had equalled that of the white settler production [Bald, 1970:144-60]. Exports of cash crops had also increased significantly. Between 1902 and 1914, exports of coffee increased ten times, rubber quadrupled, and bales of hides increased eight times, more than 60 per cent of which was from peasant production [Coulson, 1982:40-43; Austen, 1968:80-81; Townsend, 1966:258-59].

Some of the spill-over of these achievements could also be seen in the rise of local revenues collected by the district administration throughout the country. Between 1905 and 1912, about 40 per cent of the government's total revenues came from local rates, compared to only 15-20 per cent in the previous period [Bald, 1970:55-57]. Of

course, the increase could be attributed to the increase of taxpayers. Nonetheless, the fact that these taxpayers could pay their taxes was a sign that the natives had gradually begun to be active participants in the cash economy to which they were being directed by the German administration through the district institutions.

Conclusion

From the above discussion, the German system of local administration can be described as simple in structure, but effective in implementing the colonial policies for which it was established. This is, perhaps, most obvious from the role it played in fostering a cash economy largely based on peasant production by extending certain important agricultural services and providing necessary linkages, such as roads and market centres, between the productive rural areas and the centre, thereby opening new avenues and opportunities for the rural peasants to advance themselves economically.

From the point of view of administrative theory, the German system of local administration possessed the characteristics of administrative decentralization in which local institutions and their functionaries are agents of the central government. Under the German system, however, these local institutions enjoyed some degree of autonomy from the centre in most administrative and decision-making matters which concerned the localities. But the system was highly centralized with respect to economic policies and fiscal arrangements.

Most important to our study, the introduction of the system of local administration marked the end of the indigenous institutions and their leadership, whatever their structure and form were, as well as the end of their role as legitimate spokesmen for the concerns and needs of the indigenous communities they governed and led. From that time on, they were to be governed and administered by a centrally controlled institution imposed on them from above. Natives who became part of this imposed institution were alienated from their communities and made to serve primarily the interests and needs of the centralizing authority. Concomitantly, the

local institution was alienated and divorced from the indigenous patterns of social organization. This is perhaps the most important aspect of the legacy of the German system of local administration which has had an influence on the Tanzanian system, a legacy of creating a centrally controlled institution and imposing it on the indigenous communities without regard for their local mores and values.

The British System of Local Administration

Our first aim is not to convert the Natives into 'Cultivators and Stock-owners' . . . Our present objective is to lay the foundations of a system of administration (exercised through the people themselves as far as possible) and a system of education . . . My fear is that we are rushing at the material development of the people without laying any foundations at all.

[Governor Cameron, 1939:69-70]

The above official statement became instrumental in the formulation of the British system of local administration in Tanganyika. The structure and functions of the system, however, were formalized when Sir Donald Cameron became the Governor in 1926. Unlike the German system, the British system of local administration comprised three tiers—provincial, district, and native—in which the provincial tier became central; the district remained central for development and organization of rural production; and the native administration became functional to both but focusing on collection of local revenues and provision of basic social services to the natives. For the purpose of analysis, each will be treated separately, but the native administration will be given greater emphasis because of its centrality to this study.

Provincial Administration

For administrative purposes, the country was divided into eight provinces. The

provinces did not represent another level of government, because they did not have the power to make provincial laws, nor to generate their own local revenues. In other words, they were purely administrative units and their institutions were functional to the central government, as it will be explained shortly.

Each province was headed by a Provincial Commissioner. He was the chief representative of the Governor, responsible for all political and administrative matters in the Province. By virtue of his position, he supervised and controlled not only the provincial bureaucracy but also the bureaucracy of all the districts in his province, including the District Commissioners and the Native Authorities. Accordingly, he was responsible for, among other things, controlling and approving the budget estimates and expenditures of all his districts and native treasuries; giving orders to the District Commissioners and the Native Authorities; and suspending or dissolving any incapacitated Native Authority, in his capacity as the "Proper Officer" of all Native Authorities in his province.

The structure of the Provincial Administration consisted of three organs: the Administration, Provincial Council, and Provincial Council of Chiefs. The Administration was the principal organ of the Provincial Administration, located at the provincial headquarters where all provincial matters, political, financial, administrative, or otherwise, were handled, co-ordinated and dealt with. Besides the general Administration Office or the provincial office, there were several departments such as Agriculture, Veterinary, Water and Civil Engineering, Communication, Health, Education, the heads of which represented some ministries of the central government. As in the German system, these officers were under the Provincial Commissioner to whom they were directly accountable.

The Provincial Council miniaturized the Governor's Advisory/Executive Council. Although detailed arrangements of its composition varied from province to province, in a typical province it consisted of nine official members (out of whom six were ex-officio) and nine unofficial members and was chaired by the Provin-

cial Commissioner. Both categories of members were appointed by him, though from different circles. The official side was drawn from the provincial bureaucracy and the unofficial side represented the various interest groups of all races in the province. The usual ratio of representation was two Europeans, two Asians, and three Africans representing the Native Authorities, and two others from any race, representing the urban population.

The Council was organized into several committees for specialized tasks. And when the whole council met, its main function was to review and scrutinize development plans and their capital budget as presented by its specialized committees; to review and make recommendations of the annual budget estimates and expenditures of the province and its districts and Native Authorities; and to supervise and assess the performance of the implementation agencies in the province.

In spite of its apparent importance, the Council was primarily advisory. Its decisions or deliberations were not binding on the Province, District, or Native Authorities: for one thing, it did not control the finances of any of the three tiers.

The provincial Council of Chiefs and elders was also chaired by the Provincial Commissioner. In theory, it was supposedly to advise and consult with the P.C. in provincial matters that directly or indirectly affected the interests and needs of the natives in the province. In other words, it was meant to be a forum where the natives, through their local leaders, participated in the governance and administration of the province. In practice, however, the council was no more than a gathering of an extended family where the head of the family usually demonstrated his paternalistic hegemony. It was in this council that the P.C. reasserted the authority of the colonial government by reminding the council members of their imperative duty of enforcing law and order, and how they should enforce them; and urging them to efficiently supervise the collection of taxes within the areas of their jurisdiction [Liebenow, 1971:113; Schanne-Raab, 1944:51]. Thus, even its advisory and consultative role was undermined by the authority and control of the P.C. over the

members of this council.

In short, the provincial administration represented one level of central controls over the local areas and their institutions. On the one hand, it played a central role in co-ordinating and supervising all the activities of all local institutions below it; on the other hand, it was functional to the central government because it was administratively and financially controlled from and by the central government. All its senior staff, including the P.C. and middle functionaries, were centrally appointed and likewise suspended or dismissed by the central authority.

District Administration

The district administration formed the second tier of the British system of local administration. By 1932, there were 42 districts and on the eve of the country's independence, Dec. 9, 1961, their number had reached 58.

Each district was headed by a District Commissioner, also known as District Officer, representing the central government in all political and administrative matters pertaining to the district. By the same token he possessed powers and authority similar to those of the P.C., but he was directly responsible and accountable to the P.C., even though the latter had no power to dismiss or suspend him from office.

Some of his principal functions were: to maintain law and order; supervise and give advice to the native authorities by assisting them in the preparation of their budgets and projects of a local nature; ensure a smooth and effective way of collecting local taxes by the native authorities; draft and approve by-laws, especially those legislated by the native authorities; supervise the organization of rural production; and supervise and co-ordinate the day-to-day business of the district administration.

The structure of the district administration replicated that of the provincial administration, and its functionaries performed tasks corresponding to those of their seniors at the provincial level. What should be emphasized here is that the entire district administration was hierarchically subordinate to the provincial administration. Although it was the vital link between the central government and the local

communities, the district administration was far removed from the centre in administrative terms. It communicated with the central government, or vice versa, only through the provincial administration. Furthermore, in the line of controls, the district commissioner became the chief roving ambassador between the district administration and the native authorities in his district on the one hand, and between the native authorities and provincial/central administration on the other. Thus, from the administrative perspective, the centrality of the district administration stemmed from the position it held in the British system of local administration. From the point of view of development, it retained the same central role as that during the German period. But, like the provincial administration, the district administration had no power to generate its own revenues.

Native Administration

In contrast to the Germans, the British formalized the various indigenous institutions as a third tier, by making them a separate administration, below the district level. Under the British policy of "Indirect Rule", (meaning simply ruling and administering the natives through their own indigenous institutions), these institutions were restyled "Native Authorities". They all operated under a common label, "Native Administration", and were centrally controlled through the district administration.

The application of "Indirect Rule" was intended to achieve two main objectives. The first was to effectively expedite British authority and control over the territory with only a handful of British officers. While explaining the need for Native Administration, Governor Cameron stated:

... It is quite impossible for us to administer the country directly through British officers, even if we quadrupled the number we now employ, and I cannot foresee any future political state in which it would be possible to do so except under a completely Europeanized system of government in

which the native would express himself through the ballot box.

[Government Circular No. 50 of 1925].

The second objective was to preserve intact the indigenous institutions as foundations upon which political modernization and a western type of democratic government by the natives could evolve and develop. In this connection, Governor Cameron stated:

... our object is to teach these people and train them so that eventually in the end, however far removed in time that day may be, they may be able to stand by themselves. Let us leave their own past in which their own nationalism may eventually evolve by natural growth under our stimulation and guidance . . . For the present and for many years to come the only way in which we could prevent the Natives from going under and becoming a servile people; the only way of keeping his society together; the only way in which he could be trained in public affairs - however simply in the earlier stages - was by the system of Native Administration that we have introduced . . . Above all, we are using their own indigenous institutions in order to promote higher standards of civilization amongst them.

[Cameron, 1937:7 9]

Because of the heterogeneity of social organizations of the indigenous people, the Native Administration consisted of a conglomeration of diverse native authorities which were established by the Native Authorities Ordinance of 1926. In turn, what constituted a Native Authority varied from one district to another according to the existing traditional/tribal institution in a given local area. However, at the time of their creation, and thereafter, there were four main categories of Native Authorities:

1. Paramount chiefs, each gazetted as the Native Authority. Under each were a group of sub-chiefs who were appointed by him usually under the tribal norms

2. A federation of chiefs so gazetted as the Native Authority. The chiefs were pooled together in order to maintain a stable and strong native treasury. They sat jointly as a Council for common purposes; but each exercised authority over his own area of jurisdiction
3. Tribal Councils consisting of petty chiefs or headmen, such as *Liwalis* or Sultans, who were either appointed and installed, or acknowledged and supported by the colonial administration. Unlike the chiefs in the first and second categories, these petty chiefs, or headmen, possessed a collegial, and not an individual, authority as Native Authorities
4. individual persons, or village headmen, with no tribal status but with demonstrated qualities of leadership, were declared so under the Ordinance as Native Authorities [Hailey, 1950:218; Friedland, 1966:265]

The first two categories were in place in areas where the native communities were traditionally organized under chieftainships, whereas the last two categories were established in areas inhabited by dominantly acephalous communities. In either category, however, a Native Authority was created along the lines of tribal boundaries. Concomitantly, district boundaries were reconstituted to coincide more closely with major ethnic or tribal divisions, and thereby each tribe was considered as a distinct unit. Where small tribes were neighbouring a particular major ethnic group, these were asked to freely amalgamate. Otherwise, they were considered as one tribe, and asked to choose a chief to head their Native Authority.

In spite of their diversity, all Native Authorities were vested with the same authority that covered three major areas which were accredited to the Native Administration. These areas involved the general administration of the day-to-day affairs of the Natives, the administration of Native Courts, and the administration of Native Treasuries. Correspondingly, each Native Authority had the same functions, which can be divided into three principal groups.

1. To maintain law and order, and to prevent crimes, within the area of its jurisdic-

tion. In order to effectuate this, each chief, or headman, as a Native Authority, was empowered to make by-laws. These by-laws had to be approved by the Governor through the district and Provincial Commissioners before they became effective. The Governor retained the right to disallow the use of such by-laws. Most of these by-laws, however, were prohibitive, or punitive, or restrictive, intended to regulate and control the conduct of the societal fabric. For example, some by-laws dealt with fines for committed crimes; others put restrictions on fire-burning of bushes, forests, or even farms; and still others restricted the social mobility of individuals from one area, where they had been registered as tax-payers, to another. If it happened that an individual moved from an area of his native authority to another, he was obligated to identify himself to the chief of the area where he moved, and show his tax-card *Kadi Ya Kodi* before he was allowed to reside in the new area.

2. The second principal function was the administration of justice through the Native Courts. These native courts were not run under a separate judicial system, nor did they constitute a formal institution of the Native Administration. Rather, as Lord Hailey [1950:220] noted, they were a continuation of the judicial functions of the tribal authority held by a chief, or tribal elder in every community, ever since the emergence of customary laws in that community. Hence, the demarcation between Native Courts and ordinary Courts was one between the kinds of crimes and the laws governing the prosecution of these crimes. In this regard all native courts had the jurisdiction to hear and decide on both civil and criminal cases which were on the plane of customary laws. Thus the former, for example, involved cases:

- (a) in which the amount or subject matter did not exceed in value two hundred, or in some cases six hundred shillings
- (b) relating to personal status, marriage and divorce under Mohammedan or native law;

- (c) relating to inheritances which were not governed by the provisions of the Deceased Natives Estates Ordinance of 1922

And, the latter related to cases in which the punishment did not exceed either a period of one to six months imprisonment, and/or a fine of fifty shillings and not more than two hundred shillings, or whipping not exceeding six to eight strokes, provided that the sentence of whipping had been confirmed by the Supervisory Court prior to its execution [see, Native Courts Ordinance No. 5 of 1929]. All sentences commuted by the Native Courts were subject to appeals to the district courts chaired by the district magistrates of the ordinary courts. Furthermore, the native courts had no jurisdiction in cases involving the death penalty, imprisonment for life, or cases which involved civil or Christian marriages in which one party was a non-Christian. Thus, the system of native courts was designed to ensure that the conduct of the natives, which perchance destabilized law and order in the native communities, was adequately handled by the Native Authorities [Hailey, 1957:475].

3. The third principal function was the administration of Native Treasuries. These were established in order to enable the authorities to manage their own financial commitments in disbursing salaries of their functionaries, including the chiefs, and other expenses related to the general administration, as well as the provision of certain social services which they were bound to provide. Such services involved primary education, water supplies, health, management of livestock markets, maintenance of feeder roads and bridges, conservation of public forests, and prevention of soil erosion, and so forth.

The internal composition of each Native Authority varied according to the category to which it belonged. In general, however, a Native Authority was composed of a chief, or an elder, or a council consisting of several elders. Others included several sub-chiefs, village headmen, a treasurer, messengers, a native court clerk, a tax-clerk, and few supporting staff [Hailey, 1950:220-60]. Each Authority was

closely supervised and monitored by the District Commissioner. And in matters pertaining to the provision of social services, the district supporting staff, such as the Education Officer, Water Engineer, and so forth, provided assistance and advice to the Authorities in those particular fields. As for financial matters, the District Commissioner was the chief controller and auditor, responsible for auditing and approving their budget estimates and expenditure.

Financing of Native Authorities

Under the Native Authorities Ordinance of 1927, the Native Authorities were to be self-financing. To this end, the burden of collecting local rates was shifted from the district administration to the Native Authorities. Accordingly, the Native Authorities were empowered to collect hut and poll taxes from which a portion of 20 to 30 per cent was retained by the native treasuries, and the rest retrieved by the district administration. By 1942 they were also empowered to levy local rates on certain items: produce cess, court fees and fines, trading and business licenses, local market fees, slaughter-house fees, hide drying fees, dipping fees, marriage and divorce fees, entertainment fees, and livestock fees. In total, taxes collected from all these sources accounted for 50-60 per cent of a native treasury revenue.

Another major source of financing was grants and loans from the central government. These were granted usually for capital expenditure for primary education, water supplies and health.

It is in this area of finance that the Native Authorities were in direct contact with the central government, and the latter exercised its control over them. Even then, such contacts were always made through the District Commissioners.

In short, although the native administration was a separate administration, its institutions, the Native Authorities, were not autonomous, but functional to the district administration. All Native Authorities had to be approved by the central government before operating as Native Authorities. The district commissioners were empowered to remove and replace the leadership that constituted a Native Au-

thority, thus the responsibility and duties of any native authority were placed under the direct control and administration of these commissioners [Heussler, 1971:22-29]. Above all, like the district bureaucracy, all personnel, including the chiefs, were on a monthly pay roll, thus prohibiting the chiefs or any other traditional elders from demanding or receiving tribute of any kind from the indigenous communities they administered. Consequently, the native institutions were enmeshed in the district administration, and its bureaucracy was incorporated into the district administration for functional duties. Ultimately, therefore, these native institutions, though apparently their traditional status had been restored, were still alienated and divorced from their indigenous communities, because they now primarily served the interests of a foreign power and less so those of their respective communities.

What the British achieved, therefore, through the application of Native Administration was the fragmentation of the various ethnic communities, with institutions which overtly were seen as indigenous, but covertly were part of the huge colonial bureaucracy. This fragmentation, in turn, inhibited the imposition of another system of local administration based on local government.

Transition from Native Administration to Local Government, 1959

The first signs of change from a system of native administration to local government were echoed by the Minister of State for Colonies in 1944, while addressing the Governors of the British Colonies and Territories. He stated:

We are already in a position in which constitutional reform is not merely a matter for the educated elements of the population, or for the chiefs and native authorities, but one which closely concerns the ordinary people who form the bulk of the population of each territory. This leads naturally to the conception of sound Local Government institutions in Africa as the only healthy basis for political advance. The aim is to secure an effective system of Local Government not only in the towns but in the rural areas,

and representatives not only of the traditional elements of the population but of the rising middle classes, the farmers, industrial workers and the educated minority, all of whom have an important part to play in the growth of these institutions in their home areas.

[Quoted in *Journal of African Administration* 1(3), 1949:104]

Six years later the Colonial Government introduced a system of local government in the territory, following the recommendation of the Committee on Constitutional Development and of the Mackenzie Commission on the same.

Thus, in 1953 the Tanganyika Legislative Council (LEGCO) passed a bill known as the Local Government Ordinance, No. 35, of 1953. The Ordinance was to provide for the establishment of county, town and local councils, all of which were to be based on multi-racial representation. These councils were to replace the existing authorities which were established by the Native Authority Ordinance of 1927. But the process of replacement or transition was to be gradual and with the full cooperation and wishes of the authorities to be affected by the transition. Emphasising gradual transition, Governor Twining stated in the Legislative Council that,

... It is the intention of the Government of Tanganyika to maintain the tribal system, but to ensure that such changes as may be desirable to meet modern conditions are made when people feel themselves able to agree. It is Government's intention, too, to maintain the authority of the chiefs, but to ensure that there can be no tyranny, and, indeed, that they are guided and advised by a council which wherever possible has a majority of representatives of the people elected in a democratic way.

[LEGCO Debates, 30th. Sess., 1955/56:14]

The Government's option for gradualism had eventually bred another tier (the local government) in the system of local administration. The Government reasserted its option by enacting the African Chiefs Ordinance No. 27 of 1953, which was passed

simultaneously with the Local Government Ordinance. The former provided for the appointment, recognition, supervision and deposition of chiefs, together with their powers and functions in both the old Native Authorities and the new local (district) councils that were to be established under the new ordinance of local government. At the same time, the Native Authority Ordinance of 1927 was amended, thereby redefining "native authority" as "any chief or any other native or natives or any council or group of natives declared to be or established as a native authority under this Ordinance for the area concerned" [Tanganyika Government, Revised Laws, 1950-54. Cap. 72]. The amendment was intended to accommodate new elements from the educated Africans in the Native Authorities as part of their being modernized, as it provided the colonial government with the power to appoint any educated African and declare him as a Native Authority.

The application of the Local Government Ordinance of 1953 led to the establishment of both urban and rural (local) councils based on multi-racial principles. The former dealt with urban residents and did not affect the Native Authorities. The latter replaced the Native Authorities but only in those districts where they [local councils] were established.

Initially, the local councils were intended to have two tiers: a federated council, and individual district councils. A federated council, restyled county council, covered a number of districts within two or more provinces. The ability to meet and command its own financial and personnel requirements, and the capability to perform the functions of a local government were the two main pre-conditions for establishing one. It is important to note that county councils were multi-racial in composition, and served both African and non-African groups. The main functions of such a council included the prevention of crimes and the maintenance of law and order within the zonal area of its jurisdiction, and control over the disposition of important local revenue generated from the zone. It was also to be self-financing through requisitions from local councils' or native treasuries, and from town coun-

cils' revenue within the districts under its control.

The detailed arrangements for each federated council varied from area to area. But an example from the Lake Province will throw some light on how these councils were supposed to be organized.

In July 1955, the Southeast Lake county council in Lake Province was formally established as an experiment. The council covered an area of 25,000 square miles, with an African population of almost a quarter million. It was comprised of five Sukumaland districts, and the districts of Musoma, North Mara and Ukerewe Island. The council had 54 members, 17 of whom were government officers, including the P.C., the D.C.s and other senior officers of the districts. Of the remaining 37, 28 were Africans, many of whom were chiefs, and the rest were drawn from the European and Asian population living in the districts. All members, except the ex-officio ones, were appointed by the Minister for Local Government, or by the Provincial Commissioner. The council had also several specialized committees such as the Standing Executive Committee, consisting of officials and two non-officials from the African and Asian group, the Education Committee, Land Usage Committee, Finance Committee, and so forth. Beyond emergency cases, the council met twice a year, for a period of one to two days. English was the official language at all meetings, which left many illiterate chiefs and African delegates unable not only to follow but to contribute meaningfully during the proceedings.

As early as 1959, however, the council was dissolved by the Colonial Government, mainly because of the mounting opposition from the African Nationalists and the local chiefs. The former were strongly against the multi-racial principle, envisaging that its gradual acceptance by indigenous communities through local institutions would undermine the transfer of political power to the African majority. And the local chiefs were opposed to such councils because they were gradually eroding the chiefs' powers. The dissolution of the Southeast Lake county council, therefore, put an end to the experimentation with county councils. They were to be revived by

the new independent government, but only under a new form; that is, divisional committees.

The second tier consisted of the district councils. Wherever they were established they inherited all the powers, functions, personnel and property of the Native Authorities. The only difference from the Native Authorities was the composition of the councils, which consisted of popularly elected and appointed people from all races, resident in the districts. In addition, a committee system was introduced in each council, so that five committees—Finance and General Administration, Health, Education, Water Supply and Communications, and Natural Resources—were established as specialized agencies of a council. Likewise, the judicial powers previously exercised through the native courts system were separated from the new councils, as the colonial government moved towards establishing a single judicial system. This meant that the local councils, including the Native Authorities, would no longer be involved in, or deal with, judicial matters in the areas of their jurisdiction.

However, in terms of the central-local relationship, the new councils remained in the same position, subservient to the district administration. That is, they fell under the direct supervision and control of the district commissioners in all administrative and financial matters.

In conclusion, neither the native administration nor the local government system of 1953 was an instrument for training the natives in the art of self-governance, as stated by the colonial government to be the objective when the British took power over Tanganyika. The local institutions that emerged from both systems of administration failed to promote local autonomy or democracy because they were centrally supervised and controlled. In other words, these institutions became functional to the colonial administration, and their bureaucracies were at the service of the colonial bureaucracy. Most important, the entire system of local administration produced several hierarchical tiers of administration, which were weakly integrated at the centre. From these hierarchical tiers there emerged a huge bureaucracy which

was dependent for its maintenance largely on local revenues accrued from various forms of taxation on local communities.

Furthermore, the system of native administration had bred tribalism with strong tribal sentiments and ethnic cleavages by splitting further the more than 120 tribes into 679 Native Authorities in 1927 [Friedland, 1966:271]. There were 435 such authorities in 1930 [Stephens, 1968:54,57]; by the 1950s there were 329 Native Authorities under traditional chiefs, 34 councils under appointed groups of individuals, and 44 Native Authorities under non-traditional chiefs [Hailey, 1957:471-76].

In short, by the eve of the country's independence, the British system of local administration had produced a gigantic galaxy of local institutions, at the top of which was the provincial administration, followed by the district administration, which was above local government councils and numerous differentiated Native Authorities.

A Summary of the German and British Legacies

To sum up, at the eve of independence, Tanzania had already experienced two different colonial systems of local administration. What was similar about them was the use of traditional institutions, though under different labels: the "Akida system" under the Germans, and "the Native Administration" under the British. In the former case, it was rather the traditional leaders who were incorporated into the German system of local administration. In the latter, it was both the leaders and the varied indigenous institutions, all designated as native authorities, which became part and parcel of the British system of local administration. But the end results were the same; namely, the leaders and their traditional institutions were made agents and agencies of the colonial bureaucracy of the local administration. And the colonial powers used them in the governance and administration of the country. Thus, they were gradually identified by the indigenous communities as surrogates of foreign rulers.

Another similar legacy deriving from both colonial powers was the tendency to

establish local institutions which were centrally controlled, and imposing them on local communities, regardless of their diverse patterns of social organization, their traditions, mores, and values. As shown in this chapter, one of the consequences of this imposition was the alienation of the leadership and the institutions from the people they were supposed to serve. Eventually, they lost the confidence of, and their legitimacy with the indigenous communities, as they increasingly sought to be loyal to and popular with the colonial rulers.

And, finally, both colonial systems were premised on administrative or functional decentralization, whereby all local institutions became the agents of the central government. In order to provide them with some leverage of legitimacy over their subjects, under both systems these institutions were given some statutory powers to make by-laws covering various aspects of their functional role in the rural areas. But these by-laws had to be approved by the centre. Likewise, in order to enable them to maintain themselves and perform their assigned duties, local institutions were given powers to collect local rates. In the case of the Germans, however, the responsibility for collecting local taxes was on the entire district administration, together with its functionaries. Under the British system, only the native authorities and district councils were vested with the powers, and hence the responsibility, to collect local taxes. Another major difference between the two colonial systems was: under the German system, the local leaders and the indigenous institutions were incorporated into the district bureaucracy and district administration. Under the British system, the local leaders and their institutions were provided with a statutory basis which permitted them to operate and function as autonomous bodies separate from the district administration. It could be said, therefore, that under the British system, the local leaders and their institutions had more autonomy than during the German period.

In summary, the German system characterized much of the administrative form of decentralization, whereas the British system featured those of the institutional

form of decentralization. The latter, however, was no better than the former with regard to promoting rural development in the country. Both produced much the same legacy: the local institutions were centrally controlled and their primary role was to serve the interests of the colonial governments. Some of these interests were the legitimation of colonial rule at the local levels and the organization of rural production for increased productivity. The latter was necessary for the colonial governments to extract surplus for maintaining their bureaucracies, rather than for improving the lot of the rural masses.

This was the generic nature of the local administration which was inherited by the Tanzanian government at independence in 1961. Were the administrative reforms initiated by the new government during and after independence able to alter this generic nature of local administration? This and other related questions will be discussed and analyzed in the next chapters.

CHAPTER FOUR

Local Government for Development

1962-1972

At independence, the new government inherited a local government system. From the previous chapter two legacies inherent in the system were described. One legacy involved the prevalence of two countervailing institutions: namely, the Native Authorities based on traditional principles of Native Administration or "Indirect Rule", and the district councils under the modern form of local government. A common characteristic of both is their total dependence on extraction of surplus from the rural areas for self-maintenance. The other legacy represented the dominance of the administrative role of the local system in the governance of the country over its developmental role in fostering social and economic development in the rural areas.

Soon thereafter, several administrative reforms were carried out by the government, which included changes in the inherited system of local government. First, both regional and district administrations were re-organized. Secondly, a uniform system of local government was put in place by establishing rural and urban councils throughout the country. These replaced all native authorities and district councils which until then operated under the inherited system. Thirdly, the Tanganyika African National Union was re-organized as a mass political Party by establishing Party organs from the national to the grassroots level. These Party organs ran almost parallel to the structure of the government institutions at all levels. And, finally, the Constitution of the country was reformed, thereby making the country a One-Party State with a political system in which the Party, TANU, has dominance over all other institutions of the State.

The purpose of this chapter, therefore, is to study the impact of all these developments on local government with intent to explain, (a) the extent of the break from the colonial legacy of local government; (b) the new position of local government as

an institution for promoting local autonomy or local democracy; (c) the developmental role of local government in fostering rural development in the country; and (d) why it was abolished in 1972.

Local government usually has two component parts—rural and urban. My main concern in this chapter is the rural component of local government. Therefore, unless otherwise stated, the term "local government" will be used in this context throughout the chapter.

This concern is not incidental. From the beginning of constructing a local government system, the government's intentions were stated clearly: to establish a system of local government which would be democratic and efficient in fostering development and social change in the rural areas. And its re-organization in 1965, following the constitutional reforms, seemed to suggest that the government was, indeed, serious in trying to make the local government system more democratic and efficient in fostering rural development.

Nonetheless, it will be shown in this chapter that, in spite of all these changes, the local government system was a system of control over the rural areas by the Party and government in order to solicit increased productivity. This happened because of the political system on the one hand, and political concerns over political and national unity on the other hand. Both had pre-occupied the leadership during the early period of independence. Furthermore, it will be shown that, as an institution, local government retained the same colonial legacy of institutional dependence, and its administrative and functional roles for the central government and the Party. Its ineffective role as instrument for fostering rural development, and the abolition of local government, will be analysed, therefore, in the context of these compounded factors which have largely emerged from the above changes. Our discussion proceeds now with the position of local government in the Tanzanian political system.

Local Government and the Tanzanian Political System

The position and status of local government in the Tanzanian Constitution is

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both ambivalent and confusing. The country attained its political independence on December 9, 1961. The Interim Constitution of independence provided for a unitary system of government in the governance and administration of the whole country. It also provided for the division of the country into territories, regions, districts, and other areas; but such divisions were not recognized as distinct units of governance in partnership with the national government.¹

In 1965, the country became legally and constitutionally a one-party State, following the reforms of the Constitution of the Republic and the Party in 1964/65. This development pushed the position of local government into further oblivion. For, since then, the sovereignty of Parliament according to the inherited Westminster model of parliamentary government was altered by institutionalizing the supremacy of the Party over the parliamentary institution and all other government institutions at all levels. According to the theory and practice of Party supremacy, the National Executive Committee (NEC) of the Party became the supreme organ charged with the responsibility of formulating and defining in broad terms national policies and direction with respect to the socio-economic and political development of the country. The Government and its national and local institutions were responsible for planning and implementing development plans according to the defined policies. And the Parliament maintained its legislative function and control of the public purse. In addition, the Parliament acted also as a planning and development committee of the Party, responsible for scrutinizing and approving the annual, and/or Five-year national development plans, in a "committee system" which was adopted by the Government as a strategy for planned development in the country.

The NEC was replicated at local levels by establishing regional, district, and branch executive committees which performed somewhat similar functions but in a much narrower scope. In more specific terms, these executive committees were the watchdog of the Party at various local levels to ensure that the local institutions of

¹See, Tanzania: Interim Constitution of Tanzania, 1965, (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer), Chap. 1, pt. 1, Sec. 1 and 2 (1 and 2), p. 7.

the Government implemented to the letter the Party policies.²

Another development which implicated the position of local government in the Constitution was the incorporation of the Party organs into the structures of government institutions at the local level. This incorporation was effectuated in two ways. The first involved the establishment of Party branches from the regional to the grass-roots level. Although these branches were located in separate loci, their operations and activities concerning social, economic and political development in the rural areas oftentimes overlapped with those of the regional, district, and local governments, and village institutions. In fact, at the village level, it was difficult to differentiate the activities of the Party branch from those of the local government. The second way was the appointment of political cadres or Party-members to head the leadership of these local institutions. In the case of the local government institutions, the incorporation of the Party was further stretched by making the district Party Chairman an ex-officio chairman of a local government council. Furthermore, the councillors were to be Party-members, scrutinized and approved by the Executive Committee of the district prior to their election to councillorship. This point will be elaborated further in the chapter.

Thus, from the perspective of the Tanzanian political system, there was little or no hint that supported the notion of local government as an autonomous and representative institution whereby the local populace could exercise some control over their own local affairs and express their concerns, especially when they were dissatisfied or disaffected with the policies of the central government.

Stated differently, the Tanzanian political system militated against the development of an autonomous and popularly representative system of local government during the period under discussion. Other factors which worked against it included

²For an inside Party view on Party supremacy, see Pius Msekwa (former National Assembly Clerk, 1961-67, the Secretary to NEC, 1976-70), *Towards Party Supremacy*, (Dar es Salaam: Eastern Africa Publications, 1977). For a scenario description of Party supremacy, see H.U.E. Thoden Van Velsen and J.J. Sterkenburg, "The Party Supremacy" in Lionel Cliffe and John S. Saul (eds), *Socialism in Tanzania*, Vol. 1: *Politics*, [Dar es Salaam: East African Publishing House, 1972], p. 257-264.

the non-recognition of the local government institutions in the constitution of the country as a territorial area separate from the district. Likewise, the organizational structure resultant from the re-organization of the local administration, placed the local government institution below the district administration. Consequently, while it was being constructed, the local-government system emerged as an agent of the national political system, on the one hand, and an administrative system for the central government, on the other hand. The complementarity of the two galvanized not only the localities and the nation to work together as a single system, but also the local government, the central government, and the Party to perform as a single institutional system but with asymmetrical power relations between them. That is, the power of the Party remained absolute; and the central government maintained the power to grant or withhold power from local government authorities and to create or abolish them as it chose. The relations were set further apart by the existence of two superior administrative tiers at the local level.

In short, the Tanzanian local government system does indeed represent a decentralized form of administration. But, because of the Tanzanian political system which was evolved simultaneously with the local government system, the local government institutions came to be instruments through which the Party and government exerted their authority and control over the local areas. The structure and functions of these institutions will show more clearly their instrumental role for the Party and government, rather than in fostering local autonomy. Before proceeding with this, however, let us see where and how these institutions fit in the entire system of local administration.

The Position of Local Government at the Local Level

The inherited system of local administration consisted of three differentiated and hierarchical tiers—the regional, district, and local councils (rural and urban). Following the 1962 administrative reforms, all three tiers were re-organized in both quantitative and qualitative terms.

Regional Administration

The then Provinces were restyled Regions, and their number was increased from 8 to 17 by 1963. Political cadres, rather than professional and career personnel, were appointed directly by the President as regional heads, known as Regional Commissioners. They represented the government as both chief executive and administrative heads of the regions, and the Party as Regional Party Secretaries in the regions.³ They inherited nearly all the powers of their predecessors (who were made Regional Administrative Officers), including the power to detain any person for a period of 24 hours.⁴ In order to give them more time for political functions in the regions, they were exempted from all judicial powers and functions which were then transferred to the Judiciary. Likewise, under the Local Government Ordinance (Amendment) Act No. 4, of 1962, all regional commissioners became the "Proper Officers" of the local government councils, responsible for approving and auditing their budgets, supervising and controlling all their activities, and suspending and/or dissolving any incapacitated council.

District Administration

The district administration was almost a carbon copy of the regional structure. At the time of the reforms there were 58 districts. As in the regions, Party cadres were appointed as district heads, Area Commissioners, replacing their predecessors, who became district Administrative Officers. Under the Area Commissioners Act No. 18, of 1962, the Area Commissioners inherited all the powers and functions of their precursors, except the judicial powers. In other words, they replicated the powers of the regional commissioners in the districts, including the power to detain. They also acted as Assistant "Proper Officers" of local government councils,

³See, The Interim Constitution (Amendment) Act No. 1, of 1962, and The Regions and Regional Commissioners Act No. 2, of 1962.

⁴See, Regions and Regional Commissioners and Area Commissioners (Amendment) Act No. 49 of 1963, following the enactment of the Preventive Detention Act No. 60 of October, 1962 on Presidential Powers to Detain.

responsible for, among other things, supervising the business and conduct of the councils, and approving the appointment of junior staff employed by the councils.

However, in the exercise of their powers, as well as in performing their functions as commissioners, they were supposed to act as "Junior Ministers", responsible and accountable to their Regional Commissioners.

What was novel from the re-organization of both regional and district administration was the leadership, which was political; the extension of the "committee system", which led to the establishment of regional and district development committees which will be discussed shortly; and a weak integration of the Party organs into the administrative structures of the regional and district administration. All these developments together affected the position of the local government institutions both structurally and operationally.

The Local Government, 1962-1965

At independence, the inherited colonial system of local government was in disarray. It consisted of two categories of local authority: ten urban councils, one city council of Dar es Salaam and six rural councils, all established under the Local Government Ordinance of 1953, Cap. 333; and more than fifty other rural councils operating under the old Native Authority Ordinance of 1926 [Dryden, 1968:98].

Following the recommendations of A.W. Kent, the government introduced a uniform system of local government by amending the Local Government Ordinance of 1953, thereby setting forth the general framework of the new urban and rural councils. Subsequently, 58 district councils replaced the former native authorities in the rural areas, and 13 urban councils were established in the urban areas, including one city council, in Dar es Salaam; and one Municipal council of Tanga.

Each council was established by an individual instrument issued by the Minister for Local Government and approved by the National Assembly. Once established it inherited all the powers and functions previously possessed and performed by the Native Authorities, regardless of its capability.

The colonial legacy that influenced the new councils during the early period can be seen in the following areas. The old district council boundaries were retained. By the same token, the ethnic cleavages coinciding with these boundaries were maintained. All councils were exclusive from each other, even those operating in the same region. That is, all councils began operating at the same old development stage—those relatively prosperous and advanced, and those which were poor and underdeveloped. This mutual exclusiveness militated from the start of these councils against any movement toward integrated development among the district councils. All councils had the same statutory basis and before the law they were all equal regardless of their size, population, wealth or economic resources. And, finally, all councils, poor or rich, had the same sources from which to generate their own revenues for financing their administrations and the services they had to provide by law. These sources were mainly local taxes and grants from the central government.

Thus, the local government system in this period differed little from the previous colonial system. The only difference, perhaps, was the democratic process in electing the leadership. According to the Local Government Election (Rural Areas) Act, No. 3 of 1962, the councillors were to be popularly elected under the principle of universal suffrage by eligible voters resident in the districts. The same Act also laid down the rules and procedures governing candidature, campaigns, and electorate, which were different from those governing the General or National Elections for the President and Members of the National Assembly. Once an entire council was elected, the councillors chose among themselves a chairman to the Council for a period of three years (the lifespan of a council), and a vice-chairman for a period of one year. In order to facilitate their operations, all councils were allowed to establish some committees as functionary agencies for specialized functions of the councils.

Up to this time, the councils were weakly integrated into the district administration. For each council had its own administrative staff headed by a District

Executive Officer, a treasurer and other supporting functionaries, and the district, likewise, employed its own administrative staff and heads of departments. According to the practice, integration was effectuated through central government officers who were attached to the districts to assist the local councils and the district as a whole. Though working with the local councils, they remained employees of the central government, responsible and accountable to the ministries of the central government, which they represented in the districts.

The structure and function of a local government council will be discussed shortly. But, for a while, let us look at the system during and after the first major constitutional reforms in the country.

The Local Government, 1965-1972

As stated earlier, major constitutional reforms were carried out by the government in 1964/65. To recap the most salient consequences of the reforms, a one-party State was institutionalized, the Party supremacy were formalized in the Constitution of the country, and a weak integration between the Party and the government was effectuated by merging the leadership of the two institutions, as well as by establishing Party organs parallel to the government structures at all levels. These developments affected the local government system in terms of leadership, structure, functions, and inter-institutional relationships.

Leadership

As in the regional and district administration, the leadership of all local government councils was made political, or, to be more precise, politically oriented. This was effectuated through the establishment of a single Electoral Commission and a single electoral roll for Presidential, Parliamentary, and Local Government elections, and putting the entire electoral process under the control of the Party. Subsequently, the old Elections Act governing rural areas was replaced by a new Local Government Elections Act No. 50 of 1965. Among other things, the following-

electoral procedures were contained in the new Act:

- 1) Every candidate must be at least 24 years of age and must be a member of the Party. And while submitting his name for candidature he must have the support of 25 eligible voters.
- 2) All names of the candidates are to be submitted to the annual Conference of the Party Branch for the ward, where a pre-selection is made by ranking the candidates according to the number of votes received in the pre-selection exercise.
- 3) The full list of the ranked candidates is then to be submitted to the district Executive Committee of the Party. The Executive Committee then nominates two candidates for each ward from the submitted list. The nomination of these two candidates does not always follow the number of scores each candidate has obtained in the pre-selection exercise. The committee also designates an election symbol—a hoe or a house—against each candidate's name or picture. And the voters cast their votes by ticking a sign ✓ on the election symbol of the candidate of their choice. The nomination of the committee, however, can still be reversed by the Central Committee of the Party, which retains the right to do so for all nominations.
- 4) There are no manifestos for local government elections. All campaigns are to be conducted under the rules of the General Elections Procedure; but they are organized and supervised by the Executive Committee of the Party Branch in every ward. And each candidate is treated equally with fairness during the campaigns. Where a dispute arises, the district Executive Committee acts as a "court of appeal".
- 5) The elections are to be supervised by two returning officers who are non-residents of the ward where they supervise the elections.

As a final point on the leadership, two-thirds of the councillors were to be elected and one-third to be nominated from people of different walks of life, including civil servants. Likewise, all district Party chairmen were to become ex-officio chairmen

of the councils.⁵ The inclusion of these political cadres was intended to bridge the Party and the councils, as well as to effectuate the control of the Party inside the councils themselves.

The Structure of Local Government Councils

Common to all councils, the structure was simple and non-hierarchical. It consisted of three distinct components: the council itself, the administrative machinery, known as the district council office,⁶ and the committee system. There is no hierarchical order in the council itself, since all members have the same electoral mandate and work as a "team" under a chairman who acts only as "primus inter pares" with no binding authority or control over the rest.

The administrative machinery was the "think-tank" of the council. In a typical council it consisted of a District Executive Officer (D.E.O.), a treasurer, and other supporting junior functionaries. The D.E.O. was the chief advisor to the council, co-ordinator between the council and the district administration on the one hand, and between the council and its specialized committees on the other hand. He was responsible for preparing agenda and meetings of the council, writing reports on the deliberations made by the council, and ensuring that each committee implemented what had been decided and approved by the council, or by other top channels. And finally, he was responsible for the day-to-day office matters, including the activities of the council's staff. The treasurer, on the other hand, second most senior officer, was the caretaker and trustee of all the monies of the council. He was also responsible for tax-collection. All other functionaries worked under the supervision and control of the D.E.O.

⁵This was in line with the Government proposals, contained in the White Paper No. 1 of 1966. These proposals were later incorporated into two separate bills: The Local Government (Elections) and Local Government Laws (Amendment) Bills of 1966. For details, see, Belle Harris, "Government Proposals on Local Government Councils", *Mbioni*, Vol. 3(5), (Oct. 1966), p. 4-13.

⁶This should not be confused with the District Headquarters, Boma, which houses the district administration and its departments. In some cases, the district council office is also located in the same building.

The Committee System

There are two sets of the committee system. One is internal and the other is external to the council. According to the Local Government Ordinance, Cap. 333, S. 30(4), 1963, all councils have been authorized to form council committees. In a typical council there were at least five committees: Education and Culture; Communication and Building; Finance, Establishment and General Purpose; Natural Resources; and Public Health. The committees corresponded to the major social services which all councils were bound to provide. By the same token, these committees acted as functional agencies for doing all the preparatory work in the fields they were assigned, and their reports usually formed the main agenda of the planning sessions of the councils. If any planning was done by the councils, then such a planning process began at committee level. And to assist each committee were the officers of the central ministries, attached to work with the councils, or co-opted as members of these committees in order to provide the necessary expertise and skills in the field each committee dealt with. The committees were jointly responsible for implementing or overseeing the adequate provision of social services. Each committee met individually at least six times a year; whereas the entire council met at least four times in a year, and each session usually took between two to three days.

With the exception of the district council staff, neither the chairman nor any other member of the council received a monthly salary covered by the council. They only received honoraria and other allowances at the time the council or a committee was in session. The honoraria and allowances were usually shown under the General Administration Vote of the Council's expenditure.

The other set of committees external to a district council were the district development committee, division development committees, and village development committees which were later replaced by ward development committees. These committees were extensions of the committee system which stemmed from the national all the way through to the grass-roots level. And, as stated earlier, the idea

of the committee system was to facilitate the process of "planned development" on the one hand, and to provide the central government with up-to-date information on the needs of the local people. Thus, the committees were essentially part of the machinery for national planning, rather than assisting local government councils in planning for development.

The District Development Committees. Its members were the Area Commissioner as chairman, all members of the finance committee of the district council, all the departmental technical officers in the district, the district Party chairman if he was not in the finance committee, and the executive officer of the district council. Its principal tasks included preparing annual estimates for rural development, and supervising projects planned and approved by the council through its functional committees and subsequently approved by the regional development committee. In addition, it was responsible for reviewing, scrutinizing, co-ordinating and compiling into a single master plan all development projects submitted by the various village development committees.⁷

Although the committee had such enormous responsibility, the committee did not itself generate local resources, nor control over those which had been allocated for development purposes. Likewise, it did not make binding decisions on either the district council, district administration, or the villages. Nonetheless, it was a vital link between them concerning development matters in the rural areas. The committee, however, was deficient in its composition because of the absence of village representation.

Divisional Development Committees. These were featured briefly in the committee system. And their formal re-organization and functions were specified in the Local Government Circular No. 29 of 1962. But a year after, the government abolished them for the reason that their role was being confused with that of the village development committees, and that these committees were causing unne-

⁷ See, Ministry of Local Government Circular, No. 20 of February 28, 1963

essary delays in the submission of village development plans, and hence in the formulation of development plans for the whole district.⁸ The divisions, however, were retained as administrative units of the district government system and not of the local government system. And they formed the electoral constituencies in the national elections.

Ward Development Committees. A ward stands for a sub-unit of a division. Until 1969 it functioned only as an electoral constituency for local government elections. In 1969 the administrative posts of Divisional Executive Officer and village executive officer, including all village development committees were abolished and replaced by ward executive officers and ward development committees respectively. From 1969 till 1972, the ward served as the final link between the villages and both the district council and the district administration. And the ward development committees were the final stretch of the committee system.

The ward development committees were accorded a statutory basis through the Parliamentary Act of 1969. Once established, each committee consisted of a ward executive officer, ward Party branch chairman as ex-officio chairman of the committee, district councillor of the ward, extension workers and two village headmen representing the villages under the jurisdiction of the ward.

The main functions of the committee, as provided in the Act, were: to organize agricultural production; prepare and set priorities of village development plans which require financial assistance; to encourage and mobilize local people for self-help schemes, communal or co-operative work, and living together under *Ujamaa* village settlements; to collect taxes; to maintain security and control the influx of strangers in the villages; and to promote industrial activities in the villages. Under Presidential Circular No. 2 of August 24, 1968, these committees were empowered to prosecute in traditional fashion any person refusing or discouraging others from participating in self-help projects which had been declared so by a ward develop-

⁸ For detailed reasons for their abolition, see, Local Government Circular No. 50 of 1963, Ministry of Local Government.

ment committee,⁹

However, these committees, together with their functionaries, made only a brief appearance in the picture of the local government system in the country. For, in 1972, they were abolished, along with the entire system of local government.

Village Development Committees. A village means here a nucleated settlement consisting of several households of between 15 to 25-houses, or more. These households may be concentrated in one location or adjacent locations, with a residential area usually separated from the main village farms.

During the formation of the local government councils, the villages were left without any formalized organization. It was the Party, in an effort to reach the villages, which initiated some formal organization of the villages by establishing village Party branches, headed by village chairmen and village Party branch secretaries. These Party cadres worked also as district council functionaries, especially in the collection of local taxes and mobilization of villagers for self-help and communal work. The Ten-Cells, each consisting of ten-households, headed by a Ten-Cell leader, completed the Party organs at the grass-roots level.¹⁰ From this initiation by the Party and its Youth wing, village development committees began to spring up throughout the country. And in May 1966, these committees were officially launched by the then Prime Minister, R.M. Kawawa, as grass-roots of a national network of the development committee system. They were to be "a chain of command providing the essential two-way flow of ideas between government and its people."¹¹

Although there were variations, in a typical case a village development com

⁹See the abridged version of this circular in *The Standard* (Tanzania) of Oct 18, 1968, Heading "Measures to Stop Shirkers" — President Nyerere. Also in the Penal Code (Amendment No. 3) Act, No. 6, of 1962, which provides, among other things, that obstruction of a self-help scheme by any person was a criminal offense punishable with a fine up to Shs. 200/-, and/or six months' imprisonment.

¹⁰For an in-depth analysis of the Ten-Cell system in Tanzania, see, J.H. Proctor (ed.), *The Cell System of TANU*, Dar es Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, 1971; also, W. Kierruu "Whys and Wherefores of TANU Cell System", *Mbioni*, Vol. III (June 1966), p. 3-11.

¹¹Although the launching was made earlier, the statement by Kawawa was reiterated in the Parliament in September, 1962. See, *Tanganyika Hansard*, First Meeting (3rd Session), Sept. 25, 1962.

mittee had 20 members. These included the village executive officer, village Party branch chairman and his secretary, and other members drawn from the Ten-Cell leaders, extension workers in the village, including teachers of primary school, and other interest groups or organizations in the area. The main functions of the committee were basically: to draw up and set up village priorities of development projects to be carried out in the village; to submit these projects to the district development committee; to mobilize people and locally available materials for self-help schemes; to encourage people to pay their local rates; and to supervise the implementation of projects approved from above for the village.¹²

In spite of the official rhetoric attached to the vital role of these committees, the government momentarily abolished them in 1969 apparently because they were ill-organized and functioning poorly, too numerous to handle and tended to feed the committee system with too many demands which the central government could not meet [Biener, 1979:350-51; Ingle, 1972:154-57; Dryden, 1968:111-23]. What remained at the village level from then until 1972, were the Party organs—Party branches and Ten-Cells—with their corresponding functionaries.

The picture that emerges from the above discussion is that of a local government system with an amorphous structure or double-edged leadership (i.e., political and administrative), which was enmeshed between the district administration and a network of committees in which the local government operated or functioned as a transmission-belt. From this picture little can be learned of its role in rural development. Maybe this role can be deduced from the functions of local government councils themselves, as they were so defined in the instruments of their establishment.

¹²For a well documented study on village development committees, see, James R. Finnane, *Rural Development and Bureaucracy in Tanzania, The Case of Mwanza Region*, (Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1974), p. 83-107; and, E.K. Mwalujume, "The Role of Village Development Committees in Tanganyika", *Mwenge*, Vol. 4, (Dar es Salaam, 1964).

Functions of Local Government

Virtually all local governments in the world perform similar basic functions: maintenance of law and order; and collection of taxes, by virtue of which they are obligated to use part of the monies for providing essential social services to the public they serve. The local government in Tanzania was no exception to these traditional functions. In fact, there were over one hundred and fifty more functions which the local government was either obligated or permitted to perform according to the Local Government Ordinance (Amendment) Act No. 53 of 1962.

We shall not deal with all these functions and how the councils performed them. For the purpose of this study, therefore, two major functions are considered and analyzed here. These are the political socialization and mobilization function and the extraction function. The former is perhaps unique to the Tanzanian scene, and will highlight the argument that local government in Tanzania was an instrument of the Party and the central government. The latter will shed more light on the dependent nature of the local councils and how these were financed in Tanzania.

Political Socialization and Mobilization Function

In developed countries and in most of the developing countries this function is usually done by a political party rather than by administrative institutions. In Tanzania, it was one of the main tasks assigned to local councils because of their defined status as modern social institutions replacing the tradition-based social organizations, and because of the Party system.

With independence, there arose a need not only for nation-building, but also for transmitting new values which emphasized national unity and identity. This need became more imperative particularly after the Arusha Declaration of 1967, on "Socialism and Self-Reliance". The new values contained in this declaration, which the Tanzanian communities were urged to aspire to as a nation, could be described briefly as communal living under *Ujamaa* settlements as opposed to the traditional

social setting; communal farming and/or co-operative work in the organization of social production, followed by a communal sharing of what was socially produced; and self-reliance, which meant simply the dependence on people's own efforts—"hard work"—as the primary foci, with money and foreign aid as secondary, in the struggle for social and economic development of the whole country.¹³ These values were ideological and political in content. To facilitate their transmission and dissemination there was need to restructure the social organization of the Tanzanian communities, a function which involved the local institutions. Hence, the local councils were to perform the political function of political socialization and mobilization in order to foster new socialist-oriented values, national cohesion, and national identity. In order to ensure that the local councils performed this function, their leadership was made political by appointing to the leadership people who themselves were loyal and committed members of the Party.

Likewise, the local councils were designated for this function because of the Party system which evolved immediately after independence. As a result of the Party system, the Party organs were incorporated into the structure of the local councils. This incorporation was much more visible at the regional, district, local council and the grass-roots levels than at the national level. The fusion was not only intended to bridge the Party and the government at these levels, but also to command unreserved support and co-operation from the local institutions in the process of political socialization and mobilization. The Party needed badly the support and co-operation of the local institutions, local councils in particular, because membership-wise it had no solid roots at the grass-roots level in many parts of the country. For example, at independence there were fewer than 2 million Party members out of more than 8 million of the Tanzanian African population, although it was the only party, since the other small parties—the United Tanganyika Party (UTP), and the Muslim League—had failed to secure even a single seat in the

¹³ For details, see, TANU, *The Arusha Declaration and TANU's Policy on Socialism and Self-Reliance*, Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1967, p. 3-18.

pre-independence elections. Even the efforts made by the leadership of the Party in 1962 to establish Party branches at all levels did not automatically lead to the consolidation of the Party at these levels. Hence, the local councils as institutions were still needed for political socialization and mobilization of the vast majority of the population who were still non-members of the Party.

Because of this function, the local councils were instruments and affiliates of the Party, responsible for promoting the political agenda, ideology and values set by the Party. One obvious mark of this instrumentalist position was the role of the local councils in arousing and sustaining popular enthusiasm for self-help schemes, co-operative or communal work, and voluntary *Ujamaa* village settlements, which had spread throughout the country during the mid-1960s. And comparatively, the local councils had more success in this function than in any of their other functions.

Extraction Function

The extraction of revenue is perhaps the most common and important function of local government institutions in all countries. In Tanzania, this was the major source for self-financing and self-maintenance of all local councils, as well as of the social services which these councils were bound by the law to provide their subjects. It was also the extraction function which merged the interests of the central government and the regional and district administrations with those of the local councils, as each of them depended by and large on extraction for maintaining the bureaucracy and for development purposes. In addition, it was through extraction that the local councils were brought in direct contact with the rural masses.

Because of its importance there were numerous acts subsequent to the Local Government Ordinance (Amendments) Act, No. 58 of 1963, which bound the local councils to this function, as well as the local people to complying with it. Thus, Section 74 of the Act made it obligatory for all councils to raise revenue by means of extraction from local rates or otherwise, sufficient to discharge their financial responsibilities. And Section 95 of the Local Government (Rating) Ordinance of

1962 defined a failure to pay district council rates as a criminal offence for which a defaulter could be arrested without warrant and be prosecuted. Furthermore, the Local Government Ordinance (Amendment No. 4) Act No. 72 of 1962 simplified the procedures for extracting local rates from employed persons. One of its provisions, for example, provided that a ratepayer who was an employee could have his local rates compulsorily deducted by his employer from his monthly wages. The employer, in turn, was bound to make all the returns of such deductions to the district council office, together with the list of all employees. For the unemployed and those not engaged in agricultural production, the Local Government Ordinance (Amendment No. 3) Act, No. 64 of 1962, empowered the local councils to distribute land held under customary law to such persons, and even to force them to grow certain crops, so that they could pay their local rates. Section 52 (152) further provided the councils with power to exact unpaid communal labour from their subjects for mostly self-help projects.

In accordance with the law, there were two forms of extraction from which every local council was permitted to accrue its revenue. The first was the direct tax imposed on all adult persons of 18 years or above, including unmarried women who were employed or had an independent source of income. This form of tax was commonly known as local rate or head tax—*Kodi ya Kichwa*. The amount to be levied had first to be approved by the Minister for Local Government and varied from one district to another, including districts within the same region. Common to all local councils, however, the direct tax could be exacted through one, and/or a combination of the following methods:

- a. A uniform per capita rate with a fixed flat rate regardless of one's income. As Table 1 shows, this method was used by 32 of the 58 district councils. Out of these, in 22 districts the fixed flat rate ranged from Tz. Shs. 24/- to Shs. 36/-, while in the other ten districts the range was from Shs. 36/- to Shs. 60/-.
- b. A graduated per capita rate based on a person's annual income. As Table

Table 1
District Council Local Rate Minimum Tax Imposed, 1964

Minimum Tax Shs./Year	Number of District Councils	
	With Flat Rate	With Graduated Rate
24	1	
25	2	2
26	3	
27		1
28	1	1
30	7	5
32	3	
33	1	
34	1	
35	2	
36	1	1
37		2
40	1	1
42	2	2
45	4	4
46	1	
50	1	3
55		2
60	1	1
62		1
Total	32	26

Source: Reproduced from Lee, *Local Taxation in Tanzania*, 1965, Table XV, p. 31

1 shows, twenty-six districts used this method. There were also variations in these districts. Table 2 shows the minimum and maximum range of graduated rates for each of these districts. About 20 per cent or 0.9 million of the rural population were eligible for either method of taxation in 1963 [Lee, 1965:28].

- c. A local rate imposed on the value of immovable property owned by a ratepayer. This involved corporate institutions, such as co-operative societies, estates, etc., owning buildings, plantations, industrial establishments, which were not subject to either municipal or urban taxation. Wherever such immovable property was found, a local council was permitted to levy a local rate on the owner of the property.
- d. A levy imposed on earnings, livelihood, or possession of any person residing

Table 2

District Council Local Rate Minimum and Maximum Rates Imposed in
26 Councils with Graduated Local Rate, 1964

Minimum Rate		Maximum Rate	
Shs./Year	Number of Councils	Shs./Year	Number of Councils
25	2	50	2
27	1	80	2
28	1	100	2
30	5	130	1
36	1	150	1
37	2	151	1
40	1	160	1
42	2	170	1
50	3	200	7
55	2	205	1
60	1	250	4
62	1	300	1
		open	1
Total	26	Total	26

Source. Reproduced from Lee, *Local Taxation in Tanzania*, 1965, Table XVI, p. 32.

or conducting a business in the district.¹⁴ Livelihood or possession included livestock such as cattle, sheep, and goats owned by a rate-payer. The amount of local rates levied on livestock varied from district to district. For example, in Iramba District, the rate was Shs. 32/- for every 1 to 4 cattle, and Shs. 2,013/- for a person with over 949 cattle. In Mbulu District, it ranged from Shs. 50/- for up to 35 cattle, and Shs. 130/- for over 150 cattle. In other districts, the rate was Shs. 2/- for every head of cattle and every 5 head of sheep or goats regardless of the number of cattle, sheep, or goats owned by the rate-payer.¹⁵

Indirect taxation featured the second major form of the extraction function of the

¹⁴Section 103A of the Local Government Circular, "Local Rate Collection", No. 18 of 1964 instructed all local councils "to require an employer who carries on his business in its area, to deduct the rate payable to that council by giving the employer a written notice to this effect". See, File No. LG 12/67/04, Ministry of Local Government, Dar es Salaam.

¹⁵See, Ministry of Local Government, *Local Government in Tanganyika*, Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, (1964), Appendix J.

councils. It was effectuated through cess rates or produce cess imposed on several agricultural crops and livestock *ad valorem*;¹⁶ and through fines, fees, and charges imposed on a wide range of activities, such as court proceedings, marriages, divorces, school fees, sales, trading licences, permits for firearms, local market rentals, abattoirs, and so forth. Table 3 shows a list of the agricultural products and livestock products which were subject to cess rate, together with the percentage *ad valorem*.

Table 3
Stated Produce Cess Rates

Beans	5 per cent <i>ad valorem</i>
Beeswax	3
Cashew Nuts	5
Coffee, clean, parchment, and cherry	1
Cotton	2
Gum Arabic	3
Maize	4
Paddy	4
Pyrethrum	1
Sisal Fiber	1
Sugar	1
Tobacco, flue cured	1/2
fire cured	1/2
aromatic	nil
Tea	1/4
Vegetables	2
Grains	4
other	5
Hides	10 cents per pound

Source: Government Notice 171/65 as amended by 75/66, 158/66, 195/66, 250/65. A large number of notices were issued in 1966 and 1967 which applied to particular districts. For example, see 150 156/67. Some of these allow a 5 per cent rate of tax on specified vegetables, but note from the above table that the tax is supposed to be 2 per cent if the vegetable is not specified. Reproduced in Penner, *Financing Local Government in Tanzania*, 1970, Table 4.4, p. 43.

Table 3 also shows that virtually every agricultural produce was subject to a cess rate so as to involve every district council in extraction through produce cess. In turn, produce cess accounted for 10 to 20 per cent of the council's total revenue

¹⁶ Local Government Act No. 53 of 1962 empowers the Minister for Local Government, after consultation with the district councils, to impose a tax with respect to any agricultural produce, fish, or livestock sold within, or exported from the district.

in those districts which are predominantly cash-crop producers, or are surrounded by large-scale estates, such as Morogoro, Tanga, Korogwe and Handeni, whereas in the poor districts it accounted for 0.2 to 10 per cent only. As for fees, fines, charges, and/or dues, these accounted for 5 to 10 per cent of the council's total revenues. In total, the direct and indirect taxes together accounted for 50 to 60 per cent of the total revenue in the relatively prosperous districts, and between 25 to 35 per cent in the poor districts [Penner, 1970:34-49; Lee, 1965:29-37].

The importance and necessity of the extraction function cannot be overemphasized. One thing though is obvious. The extraction function through various forms of taxation was the major source of financing the district councils. And the capability of a council to not only maintain itself but also to adequately perform its other obligatory functions, such as the provision of social services, depended upon how a council effectively performed its extractive function. By the same virtue, its survival and usefulness were judged by the central government. To facilitate this function the councils mobilized personnel from their subordinate institutions—division, ward, village, ten-cells, including the party branches in the villages.

Nonetheless, the local councils were not wholly self-financing. According to the fiscal arrangements laid down between the central government and the local councils, the former financed the latter through grants-in-aid. These grants were provided in any of the following forms:

- (a) "Assigned Revenues". These were revenues accrued from fines and license fees and were transferred from central to local government councils when the latter were allowed to retain 50 per cent of certain fines and a number of license fees, such as bicycle licenses, licenses for bars, and other trading licenses [Penner, 1970:47-48]. The central government matched the amount needed for an approved capital project, say, road construction, if a district council could not carry out the project through its assigned revenue alone. The formula of equalization was that, if the assigned revenue provided a district council with Shs. 400

per mile for the road to be constructed or maintained, no grant was provided by the central government. If the assigned revenue fell short of the amount, the difference was equalled by the central government, provided that the district council justified the need for the number of miles of road and the size of its assigned revenues.[Penner, 1970:70].

- (b) Subvention Grants. These represented the central government's contribution towards the maintenance and expansion of education in the rural areas. In most of the districts, these grants covered 50 per cent of the average teacher's salary, school equipment, maintenance, capital expenditures for classrooms, and approved administrative costs, including 50 per cent of the salaries of the high rank-and-file civil servants attached to the local councils. The fifty percent, however, was not rigid; it was negotiable and could go up, especially in the needy districts [Penner, 1970:69].
- (c) Cess Grants. The source of these grants was a levy which was initially imposed on four agricultural crops—sisal, sugar, tea, and pyrethrum—and collected by the central government. Following the decentralization of the system of collecting levies from the four and additional other agricultural crops and livestock, each council was required to contribute 30 per cent of its revenues derived from cess collection to a special fund, known as "cess grants". The fund was administered by the Local Government Loans Board; and solely used for equalization purposes; that is, to assist the poorest districts in which there were very few agricultural products on which a levy could be imposed. The idea was to reduce the existing disparities among the districts, and, hence, to balance the pace of economic growth and development in the rural areas.

The ultimate objectives of the three types of grants were: to encourage the maintenance and expansion of certain services; to assist councils to perform their obligatory functions, and to spread, in as fair a manner as possible, the cost of providing public services in all districts [Handbook for Local Authority Council,

1962:21, para. 57]. In short, grants were an extra-ordinary source of revenue for the councils.

Finally, loans and bank interest were another source of council revenue, which in turn buttressed the dependence of the councils on the central government. According to the law, each council was permitted to secure a loan for its capital development projects—viz. building new schools, dispensaries, or water installations—provided that the Minister for Local Government approved. In addition, the Minister retained the right to inspect all contracts and be consulted on all major changes in a project worth more than Shs. 200,000 [Handbook, 1962:22, para. 60].

Because the domestic capital markets were underdeveloped and the local councils were not creditworthy to international credit loans at the time of independence, the councils could secure loans only through the state-controlled financial institutions. These were mainly the National Development Credit Agency, the Rural Development Fund, and the Local Government Loans Board. The latter was in fact the major trustee and banker of the local council monies and deposits. It administered the cess grants and financed certain services, including the Local Government Training Institute at Mzumbe, Morogoro. As a banker, it was responsible for the council deposits, known as "Minimum Compulsory Reserves" (MCR), to which all councils were obliged to contribute at a rate of 25 per cent of their estimated recurrent revenues for the current year, excluding grants and assigned revenues. The councils could retrieve their deposits only in the form of a loan charged at a 6 per cent annual interest rate and payable within a period of 20 years [Penner, 1970:56-59].

In summary, several observations can be made regarding the functions of the local government councils, including those listed in their individual instruments of establishment.

There is little that suggests that the post-independence local government institution was different from the one which existed prior to independence. Both share

common characteristics in terms of their obligatory and permitted functions, as well as in terms of their dependence on local rates for their self-maintenance. The only difference, perhaps, lies in the political mobilization and socialization functions. But even in this function the previous local government authorities performed a similar function through the provision of education which fostered colonial values and subordination to colonial rule.

Likewise, the role of the new local government authorities in rural development remained as ambiguous as ever before. Apart from the field of education, I could not find any recorded evidence which showed that the local government authorities were engaged in a massive scale of rural development programs which were intended to transform the predominantly subsistence rural economies, or the predominantly tradition-based organization of rural production. On the contrary, what can be learned from the permissive functions with reference to rural development, are the prohibitive and regulative by-laws aimed at enforcing or persuading the rural peasants to produce more. The previous authorities played the same role. Curiously enough, most of the permissive functions related to agriculture and livestock are a reproduction of those provided in the Local Government Laws of 1953. This means that there had been no significant change in the functions of the new local government authorities to reflect their new role, if any, in rural development and in meeting the new development needs of the rural communities.

And, lastly, the local government was simply a functional institution at the service of the central government and the Party. With respect to the former, the local government held a position similar to one held during the colonial era. Similarly, the local government was created or abolished by the central government without consultation with the rural communities which these authorities were supposed to serve. And what the local government authorities should or should not do, was ultimately decided by the central government. This situation of the local councils is revealed much more clearly in the central-local relations on which our discussion

will now focus.

Central-Local Relations

Before discussing these relations, one important point should be noted. There is a strong tendency among both the orthodox and contemporary theories to make prescriptions for an ideal type of relations between central and local government institutions. Along with these prescriptions are models to explain either how these relations should be, or why they are strained or otherwise in a particular country. Another tendency is to regard a given country with its political system as a model to explain and prescribe the relations for another country, which may perhaps have a different political system. Both tendencies are strong in the analyses of the local government systems of the developing countries. In most cases, the French or British model is used because many of the developing countries have derived their systems of local government from either of these colonial powers. Since it is not my intention to make prescriptions, or to construct a model for Tanzania, none of these theoretical models will be used here. My task will be to describe and explain the relations. This is done by looking at the actual situation as it existed in the Tanzanian political system, which was instrumental in determining the nature of the relationships between the government institutions and how they interacted with each other.

As stated earlier, the position of local government in the Constitution of Tanzania is anomalous. Similarly, the structure of local government, discussed above, does not provide us with a clear picture of how the local government institution related to and interacted with the central government. What is obvious, though, from the structure is an organizational hierarchy wherein the local government institution was subordinate to the district institution or administration. The ambiguity surrounding its relationship with the central government can perhaps best be clarified by looking at the Tanzanian situation at the time of establishing the local government institutions.

The Tanzanian practice revolved around two principal values. One was the need to promote equality in the country, which inherited great disparities among regions, districts, and rural and urban people. This value was highly esteemed by the new leadership as a way of meeting the new demands, needs and aspirations of the people as a result of independence, as well as in legitimizing the authority of the new regime. And second was the desire to promote democracy whereby citizens, wherever they lived, could have a right to participate in decisions which affected them most. Along with this right was the government's expectation that the people would be responsible for the decisions they made or participated in, even if it meant paying higher local taxes as the price for their implementation. At independence, local government institutions were seen as the most viable instrument for practising these values.

However, given the colonial experience with local government institutions, the government deliberated seriously on the sort of relations between the central and local governments which would be more appropriate to the Tanzanian situation. One proposal was made by A.W. Kent, the chief architect of the local government system of 1962 in the country. In his report, Kent strongly proposed central-local relations in which local authorities became the partners of the central government in providing services for the public. With respect to power-sharing, the arrangement was to be that the central government would define the broad outlines of the national policies, whereas the local authorities would exercise some freedom in interpreting these policies according to their local situations, mobilizing the resources needed to bring them to fruition. This partnership relationship, in Kent's vision, would eventually lead to local autonomy and to a meaningful local democracy [Kent Report, 1962:2, para. 8]. Although this proposal accorded with official rhetorical sentiments, it was rejected by the government for political concerns which were more pressing at the time of independence, namely, the need for political unity and national identity.

Another alternative was to maintain the same inherited position of local government, in which central-local relations were defined and governed by the principle of "ultra vires" and not "primus inter pares". That is, local authorities act, or should act, primarily as agents of the central government; and their role was the efficient administration of policies decided at the centre, as well as the provision of social services to the local people. For example, the Education Committee of a local authority was to act as a channel to the district Education Office, the Regional Education Office, and so on, up to the Ministry of National Education which laid down the broad lines of education policies for the whole country. And this was to apply to all other committees of the council.

The organizational structure and functions of local government, as so discussed above, featured greatly the functional-agent relationship between the central and local governments, making it easier to translate the first value. Nevertheless, the promotion of democracy was covertly covered in the Local Government Elections (Rural Areas) Act, No. 3, 1962. The Act provided for popular elections of council members, to be chosen by and from the rural people themselves under the electoral procedures and rules contained in the Act. Until 1965, these elections were truly popular as there was no interference from either the central government or the Party. However, popular participation in electing the council members in no way altered the functional-agent relationship between the local and central government authorities. What it significantly represented though was a distinction between local government as an institution representing the local people and the Party institutions on the one hand, and the district administration as an institution representing the government at the local level on the other hand.

Thus, in the Tanzanian experience with the local government system, we see that central-local relations emerged on the one hand from the administrative and organizational norms and procedures common in every complex organization or system. Hereby the relations were subordinate and functional in that local government

was a sub-system of the larger system which was the central government. The basic provisions of the Instruments of its establishment, Presidential Circulars and Directives, already referred to above, and of its organizational structure, all indicate the subordinate functional relations between the central and local governments. On the other hand, these relations emerged from the practice by which local government was also invested with an electoral mandate. Accordingly, the central-local relations featured local government as another level of government in partnership with the national or central government. Both levels of government possessed an electoral mandate with which to claim their existence and legitimacy even though with varying parameters of jurisdiction. And both shared and depended upon the same electorate as the local base of their electoral mandate. But, because of the drastic changes in the political system, subsequent to the constitutional reforms of 1963/64, the electoral mandate of the local government was obfuscated by formalizing the supremacy of the Party, thereby making the elections of local government councillors synonymous with the elections of Party cadres. This, in turn, effaced the distinction then prevailing between the two institutions, and thus implicated further the relationship between the local and central governments.

Hence, in the Tanzanian practice the central-local relations could be described as ambivalent. Viewing the central-local relations as a process of mutual exchange between two institutions with the same electoral mandate, there is no doubt about this ambivalence. The established structure of local government illustrated the extent to which these two institutions were remote from each other. Coupled with the bureaucratic and hierarchical procedures to which local government authorities were subject, the process of mutual exchange between local and central governments was further constrained by the anomalous position of the former in the Constitution of the country. This yielded, in turn, an imbalance in power for determining the resources available to both institutions as participants in the relationship, and how these resources should be utilized for the mutual benefit of both. Five kinds of

resources will be considered here, which determined the imbalance of power between the central and local governments.

Legal-Statutory Resources. All the powers of the local government authorities stem ultimately from central legislation. Once granted, the local government authorities, however, were not free to use and administer their powers as they saw fit. For example, they could not use any of these powers as a weapon to be deployed against the central government even if the local interests overrode those of the central government, because the use of the legal-statutory resources was constrained by another legal resource which empowered the Minister for Local Government to control and supervise the conduct and business of the local authorities.

Political Resources. Both the central and local governments owed their legitimacy to the electoral mandate. The Ministers and Members of Parliament could criticize alleged inefficiencies and injustices of the local authorities, but the councillors could not do the same or even defend themselves, or campaign against central decisions by lobbying the Parliament or interest groups close to the central government. In short, the electoral mandate of the local authorities had little or no influence over government decisions either within or outside the Parliamentary process.

Information Resources. Because of the remoteness of local government from the centre, local authorities were handicapped from having direct access to government information. And oftentimes, the central government withheld vital information from the local authorities. For example, I have found no evidence which suggests that the central government engaged at any point in time in a consultative process with the local councils before the central government or Party announced any major policies such as "Socialism and Rural Development", and "Education for Self-Reliance". The common means of obtaining information by the local councils from the central government were the press and government circulars and directives.

Financial Resources. It is perhaps in this area of finance that the local author-

ities interacted directly with the central government. Likewise, the local authorities enjoyed a relative autonomy by raising their own funds from local sources. But, they were not at all autonomous in the management and utilization of their financial resources since the central government dictated how these financial resources should be used or spent. This point will be elaborated in detail under the section on central control over local government.

Hierarchical Resources. Despite the electoral mandate of the local authorities, the central government possessed strong hierarchical resources. The central government alone could legislate to create, change or abolish them, grant them powers or withdraw them, and/or provide new sources of finance or take away the existing ones. In addition, it was the central government which appointed, replaced or transferred all senior staff of the local authorities without any obligation to consult with the latter.

Thus, from the viewpoint of resources, central-local relations were basically those existing between a superior and a subordinate institution. The only link, perhaps, which brought and maintained a close relationship between the central and local governments in Tanzania, was the organizational "operative" principle. This principle was put into effect through the "committee system" whereby the central government was kept abreast of what the local authorities were doing in the peripheries, and the latter were constantly made aware of the national priorities defined by the central government. Hence, it was through the committee system that the process of mutual exchange between the two institutions maintained its vitality.

Local Government Autonomy

According to the central-local relations thus established, local government was neither an autonomous institution nor could it be instrumental in promoting local autonomy or local democracy. This challenges the contention commonly held by virtually all theorists and practitioners of local government, who maintain that local government is the most viable instrument for promoting local autonomy or local

democracy. Jeffrey Stanyer, however, makes a useful and important qualification to this commonly held belief. He explains that autonomous local authorities, and hence local autonomy or democracy, exist only where local government is regarded as a political system whereby the local government possesses its own political life-style and characteristic approaches to dealing with problems of its locality, and discharges its functions with no or minimum coercion or pressure from the centre. Furthermore, as a political system, local government is an autonomous actor in the field of government, possessing its own resources with which it may seek to influence the course of central policies, or even be able to resist them if they tend to conflict with local interests [Stanyer, 1979:25ff].

The essence of Stanyer's qualification is found mostly in federated and unitary governments of the developed countries. For example, Britain and Canada have unitary and federated systems of government, respectively, in which local governments are autonomous political systems. In the developing countries this is applicable in federated systems of government such as in India and Nigeria.

In Tanzania, local government has been treated not as a political but as an administrative and functional system, even though local autonomy and local democracy were regarded as esteemed values to be pursued by and through the local government in the country. In the minds of the Tanzanian leadership, local autonomy or local democracy meant simply a "guided democracy", whereby the local people could express their wishes, concerns, or discontent *solely and uniquely* through the formalized institutions of the Party, or Party-affiliated institutions, or Party-controlled institutions. And local government was one of those Party-controlled institutions. [See Part 1, Sect. 3(3) of the Interim Constitution of Tanzania, 1965:7.]

Central-Local Control

The obverse of local autonomy is central control. In all political systems where local government exists some central control is inevitable. Political unity and stability, national sovereignty, a single national development and economic plan with

some national economic objectives are but some of the most important factors precipitating the need for central control over the peripheries or the sub-systems which make up the whole system.

To this end, there are also traditional means, common to all political systems, by which the centre controls its peripheries. These means involve one or a combination of the following: legislation, finance, ministerial sanctions for local government expenditures, administrative controls, and hierarchical supervision [Elcock, 1982; Muttalib and Khan, 1982]. However, the pattern and degree of central control vary from country to country (either developed or developing), depending much upon the political system of a country.

In Tanzania, the Government has also used these traditional means to control the local governments. But what is unique in the pattern of this control is the institutional duality which has escaped the attention of both the orthodox and contemporary theories of local government. This duality of control exists through the presence of the central government and the Party within the local government institutions. Their presence, in turn, effectuates institutional control within and outside the local government. Thus, legislation, financial resources, various forms of ministerial and administrative supervision, and hierarchical resources are the common means by which the central government exerts its control over the local government councils. On the other side of the duality is the Party's control over local government councils by virtue of the formalization of the supremacy of the Party in 1965.

This kind of duality of central-local control is unique to Tanzania because of the political system. This duality in turn counteracts any potential for the local government councils to develop into autonomous institutions. Instead, they have become as one among the rigidly controlled departments or institutions of the central government.

In summary, much of the above discussion has focused on the institutional as-

pects of the local government system in Tanzania. The intention was to underscore the significant changes in the system, the influence of the colonial legacy on the institution, and whether or not the local government system was for fostering local autonomy and local democracy in the country. With respect to the latter it can be stated in a few words that the association by the leadership of local autonomy and local democracy with local government was purely rhetorical. In short, local governments in Tanzania were neither autonomous institutions, nor conducive to promoting local democracy. They were probably meant for promoting rural development in the country. Our discussion will now, therefore, focus on this point.

Local Government and Rural Development

It is often said that local government can be an effective instrument for fostering rural development if it acts as an autonomous institution with self-sufficiency in human and material resources. This institutional relation to rural development has been postulated by both development and local government theorists concerned with the problems of development in the developing countries. Captured by the notion of "development-from-below," which emphasizes the optimization of the rural areas as forces for social and economic growth and development in the developing countries, they view local government as the most viable institution for this task. For example, Ursula Hicks explains that local government "is an attempt to give the people their own socialism, not to rely upon a central government socialism, which must seem to be (and would no doubt for some time have to be) imposed from outside." And, she adds, "economic activity by local government may well be the best way in which the people can play a part in the organization of their own development" [Hicks, 1961:6-7]. Similar sentiments have been expressed by some renowned international organizations.¹⁷

¹⁷ See, for example, Summer Conference Papers on "Local Government in Africa", Overseas Study Committee, 1961, Cambridge University, London; The Proceedings of the International Union of Local Authorities (IULA), Jubilee Congress, Brussels, June 17-25, 1963, on "Local Government in the 20th Century", The Hague, Netherlands, 1964; IULA Papers on "Local Government as Promoter of Economic and Social

The notion was very strongly supported by the Tanzanian leadership, while redesigning the system of local government for this purpose. "While other countries aim to reach the moon," President Nyerere declared in 1961, "we aim to reach the villages . . . if development is to benefit the people [in the villages], the people must participate in considering, planning and implementing their development plans . . . and therefore there must also be an efficient and democratic system of local government, so that our people make their own decisions on the things that affect them directly . . ." [Nyerere, 1967:11-23]. Apparently, the move of the government and the Party to make the leadership of the councils politically oriented, in 1966, was to reinforce the institutional role of the councils in fostering development from below, or simply rural development.

The facts of economic life at independence provided the reason for this unre-served support. Some of these facts have already been mentioned in the introductory chapter. Added to these, the eve of independence was greeted with a financial crisis which was instigated by the out-going colonial power. At the last minute, the British had removed their support for a Three-Year Development Plan to begin in 1961. The new African leaders-to-be had demanded an expenditure plan of £240 million in order to raise the living standards of the majority of the poor people. The British instead supported a hastily drawn-up plan compiled by their out-going Chief Secretary, Sir Ernest Vasey in 1960, which involved an expenditure of £8 million a year for three years. Nyerere and his colleagues visited the U.S. and West Germany, after the negotiations with Britain backfired. The two countries promised some aid only on condition that a favourable agreement be reached with Britain, and that the plan be administered and managed by foreign expatriates.¹⁸

Development", *ibid.*, 1971; and the United Nations Document on "Local Government Reform. Analysis of Experience in Selected Countries", prepared by the UN Division of Public Administration and Finance, New York, 1975.

¹⁸ Britain ultimately caved in before relinquishing its power, by increasing its contribution to the plan to £8.7million a year in grants and over £13 million in loans. For details on this financial crisis, and settlement, see, Judith Listowel, *The Making of Tanganyika*, New York: London House and Maxwell, 1965, Ch. 37, p. 391-398.

The facts of economic life of pre-independence in Tanzania explain why rural development was given a high priority over all other models of social and economic growth and development. Nonetheless, it is highly dubious whether the Tanzanian leadership had an equivalent esteem for the institutional role of local government as an instrument for promoting rural development, regardless of the official rhetoric prevalent during the construction of local government councils in the country. I intend to examine this in order to explain why the local government councils were not primarily for fostering rural development in the country. My analysis focuses on four main areas.

Institutional Legacy

The structure of the post-independence local councils exhibits the same colonial system of local government. Accordingly, these councils could be described as "floating boats" amidst what Paul D. Collins has described as "a weakly integrated phalanx of administrative and political agencies each with different capabilities, resources, and even interests" [Collins, 1976:6].

Functionally, the new local councils inherited all the functions previously performed by their predecessors. Besides, the laws and Instruments of Establishment, defining so meticulously these functions, were a carbon copy, with some amendment, of the previous colonial laws on the same institutions. And, as I have pointed out earlier, there was no provision in these laws, which defined, articulated, or reflected in any specific manner the institutional role of the new councils in rural development. Likewise, the functions which more or less had a bearing on agricultural production fell under the permissive category.

The most, and perhaps only, significant change in the new system of local government was the leadership. But this change came incidentally, after the constitutional reforms of 1965. However, making the leadership political did not alter the position of these councils as administrative and functional agencies of the district administration. Nor did it solicit a rethinking by the leadership of the importance of the

local councils as instruments for fostering rural development. On the contrary, what the changes did was to impose surveillance and control by the Party over the local councils, thereby rendering them powerless in making their own decisions which could have reflected the needs of their local areas. After that the trend was for the administrative functionaries of local councils to continue performing their function bound by the laws, while the leadership joined forces with the Party organs in mobilizing and encouraging people to support projects initiated by the Party or the central government.

More surprising is the fact that, in spite of being made political, the local leadership was excluded from participating in the policy-making process of the Party. Unlike the leadership of the district administration, the local councillors were not accorded any participatory forum in the various district meetings of the Party. This exclusion made the local councillors all the more implementors of decisions made elsewhere (a functional role), and not decision-makers or initiators of decisions (an instrumental role). The latter role was necessary if the local councillors were to effectively play their role in rural development.

Institutional Dependency

Throughout the colonial period, institutional dependency was the dominant feature of the then native authorities. This situation did not change after independence. The local governments continued to depend upon the central government for human and material resources necessary for performing their functions, at least with minimum bottlenecks. They also depended on the central government for expertise and technology for organizing rural production.

Their dependence was aggravated further by the massive exodus of many of the expatriates who until then manned the entire local administration and thereby provided their expertise, advice and supervision to the local councils. In the wake of this exodus, the government put its priority on filling the gaps within the central, regional and district administration, by recruiting even from those Africans who

possessed a long experience in local government matters. The establishment of the Local Government Service Commission, together with its Service Regulations, did not resolve this problem either. For one reason, since the local councils were under the district administration, they were not able to attract recruits from the secondary school graduates whose ambitions and expectations stood a better chance of being fulfilled elsewhere [Dryden, 1968; Resnick, 1967; Thomas, 1965; Tobias, 1963].

The problems related to local rates and grants as major sources of council revenues have been extensively analyzed in the works of R.G. Penner (1970), and Eugene Lee (1965). I shall therefore focus on a different set of problems which the local councils had from the beginning of their establishment, with respect to their role in rural development.

The first set of problems derived from the elasticity of local rates and produce cess, and the burden confronted by most of the local councils in collecting these taxes. One may wish to delineate local rates from produce cess. Technically this may be correct. But to most of the taxpayers who depended on the sale of their produce in order to pay their local rates, the separation is meaningless. Stated differently, the formula used in estimating revenues of the councils, accrued from both local rates and produce cess, was the total number of eligible taxpayers in each district. The flaw in this formula was that it failed to take into account the disparity of the districts in terms of what was being produced and sold in each district. Thus, the formula favoured more the relatively prosperous districts, especially those specialized in cash-crops, or surrounded by large estates, while putting much of the burden on the poor districts, or those with seasonal products whose market prices were subject to uncontrollable fluctuations. And the equalization grants did not help these poor districts either, as Penner and Lee have shown in their works.

Consequently, with the exception of a few, most of the district councils were forced to squeeze much harder on their local taxpayers in order to reach as much as possible the estimated target of their revenues. This fact alone made the councils

as infamous as they had been during the colonial period. However, even with their hard efforts, many of the poor districts could not reach even half of their estimated targets because of the poverty of their taxpayers. Shortage of personnel and the scattered nature of the rural communities made the task of collecting taxes from both local rates and produce cess a burdensome task to most of the councils.

Consequently, most of the councils were forced either to overspend their budgets, or to concentrate their resources on the development of one or two particular services such as education and health and neglect others [Dryden, 1968:101]. Either way, the financial picture for the councils was bleak. For example, an internal auditor report of 1965, on the accounts of Chunya district council lamented, "financial instability is worse than ever. Only 45% of total revenue estimate has been collected up to the end of July, 1965. Bank overdraft has existed since April with large sums charged monthly as interest" [quoted from Dryden, 1968:99]. Stanley Dryden provides another example of the pathetic financial condition of other councils. "In the Mbeya and Nachingwea districts during 1964," he writes, "there was unauthorized expenditure exceeding Shs. 30,000/ (£1,500). . . . In May, 1964, the Regional Commissioner of Mbeya took drastic action to keep Rungwe district council in a state of solvency. No expenditure of any kind was to be incurred without authority from his office—even staff salaries must stop for a while" [Dryden, 1968:99–100]. A much more telling picture of the pathetic nature of the councils can be seen from the magnitude of debts incurred by all district councils, prosperous or poor. The central government was forced to write off these debts just before the councils were abolished. The debt for each district council is shown in Table 4.

The second set of problems emanated from the government's desire for uniformity and a single system of local administration. To this end, local councils were established throughout the country, and powers and responsibilities were handed over to them without taking into account the differing capability of these councils to perform their tasks. Colonial experience had shown that most of the councils (then

Table 4
District Council Debts "Written Off".
Mainland Tanzania, April 1971
in shillings

District	Amount	District	Amount
Dodma	10,748,356	Kilimanjaro	240,295
Mpwapwa	5,479,377	Shinyanga	222,036
Kondoa	4,968,322	Mbeya	181,858
Manyoni	1,670,038	Mbulu	140,400
Singida	1,585,995	Nachingwea	59,881
Iramba	1,381,800	Mwanza	55,947
Kilwa	797,845	Kilosa	45,000
Masai/Sonjo	657,731	Arusha	36,000
Bagamoyo	539,030	Meru	12,000
Pare	466,910	Morogoro	8,804
Handeni	465,320	Pangani	7,960
Chunya	250,712	Rufiji	3,358
TOTAL		30,275,537	

Source: Reproduced from McHenry, *Tanzania's Ujamaa Villages*, 1979, Table III 20, p. 72

native authorities) were incapable of taking up such enormous responsibilities, even though the colonial administration had miraculously kept them alive up to the end of the colonial rule. Similarly, A.W. Kent had cautioned in his report the dangers of an all-out transfer of power and responsibilities to the new local councils-to-be. He had suggested a system of local government with a gradual transfer of power and responsibilities, to those district councils which demonstrated or could demonstrate the capability to adequately and efficiently perform them.

In spite of the colonial experience and the advice of the expert on local government, A.W. Kent, the government decided otherwise. The consequence of this decision was that many of the local councils started with institutional weakness or administrative incapacity. And this was one of the predicaments contributing to their failure in initiating rural development.

Proliferation of Institutions

Another predicament affecting the role of the local councils was the proliferation of institutions which eventually capsized the developmental role of the local government councils. In order to explain this point, I shall look at two different periods: the pre-Arusha Declaration (1961-67) and post-Arusha Declaration (1967-72).

The 1961-1967 Period

At independence, the TANU government inherited two policy legacies. One focused on the future of the country's social and economic development; and the other one was on rural development.

The former was contained in a Three-Year Development Plan, 1961/62-1963/64. The Plan, hastily prepared by the Colonial Administration in 1960, was essentially based on the recommendations of a World Bank Report¹⁹ on the future of Tanganyika's economic development. With regard to rural development, the plan involved a total additional expenditure of £24 million within a three-year period, of which £5.7 million was for agriculture, £0.9 million for forestry and wildlife, £4.2 million for construction of roads to improve the internal market for agricultural products, and £0.229 million for Community Development.²⁰

The TANU government was very critical of this Plan because its planners did not allocate resources to industrial development nor did they provide for a planning machinery for the future [Bienen, 1970:280]. Discontented with this failure in the Plan, the TANU government launched a supplement to the Plan in mid-1962 which was described as a "People's Plan". It established a planning machinery through a "committee system" from the national to the grass-roots level, thereby formaliz-

¹⁹The Report was prepared by a Mission organized by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development at the request of the Colonial Government of Tanganyika and the United Kingdom. It is entitled, "The Economic Development of Tanganyika", (Baltimore, 1961).

²⁰See, Development Plan for Tanganyika, 1961/62-1963-64, (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1962), p. 2-5.

ing village development committees throughout the country. In an effort to arouse people's enthusiasm for setting their own production targets and self-help projects, the plan emphasized communal or co-operative work in the organization of production, as well as living together in communal villages. The main objective of the Plan was to increase agricultural production through collective farming, and thus to gradually relieve the pressure on the Treasury by optimizing the people's own contribution to the implementation of development programs. It is this plan which set in motion the proliferation of institutions, as we shall see shortly.

The second policy legacy involved rural transformation with the intention of increasing productivity and improving the living standards of the rural masses. The TANU government inherited a number of rural programs and schemes. These included settlement schemes, irrigation schemes, destocking, bench terracing and furrows programs, tie-ridging, groundnuts schemes, and many others. Along with these programs were two dominant approaches to rural development; the "transformation" and "improvement" approaches.

Among all these programs, collectivization and co-operative farming programmes were given first priority by the TANU government. Aroused by the President's call,²¹ there was a flurry of village settlement and co-operative farming schemes throughout the country, to the extent that the rural scene was dominated by settlement and co-operative farming schemes in the period of 1961-1967. Table 5 reflects this situation. These schemes also show how the government and the Party were committed to rural development with the intention of transforming the rural peasants from their conservatism to social change through the collectivization program.

However, the central question is: where did the local government councils fit into these rural-oriented programmes? Looking closely at the table, one can see that a number of institutions and agencies were instrumental in initiating, planning, organizing and implementing these programmes. And one point should be emphasized

²¹ President Nyerere's call is contained in his first Document Paper, "Ujamaa: the Basis of African Socialism", of 1962, [Dar es Salaam: Tanganyika Standard Ltd., 1962].

Table 5
Village Settlement Schemes, September 1965

Village	District	Year Founded	Approximate Population
<i>Pilot Village Settlement Schemes:</i>			
1 Upper Kitete,	Mbulu	1963	400
2 Rwamkoma	Musoma	1963	456
3 Mlale	Songea	1963	880
4 Kingongurundwa	Lindi	1963	600
5 Kabuku	Handeni	1964	724
6 Kerege	Bagamoyo	1964	764
7 Bawakria Chini	Morogoro	1964	120
8 Kiwere	Iringa	1963	936
Under TAC			
<i>Assisted Schemes:</i>			
1. Buyombe	Geita	1963	304
2. Matwiga	Chunya	1964	400
3 Mkata	Morogoro	1963	364
4 Galu	Ukerewe	1964	316
5. Amani	Muheza	1965	
<i>Ex-TAC (Tobacco):</i>			
1 Urambo	Tabora	1956	5180
2. Lupatingatinga	Chunya	1962	720
<i>Ex-TAC (Ranching):</i>			
1 Kongwa	Mpwapwa	1962	600
2 Matongoro	Mpwapwa	1962	360
<i>Ex-TAC (Mixed Farming):</i>			
1. Ichonde	Ulanga	1960	1000
2. Sonjo	Ulanga	1960	1000
3. Kichangani	Ulanga	1960	1000
4. Nachingwea	Nachingwea	1952	528
<i>AGRIDEV:</i>			
1. Nyatwali	Musoma	1963	200
2. Kalamera	Mwanza	1963	400
3. Mbarika	Mwanza	1963	200
TOTALS: 24 schemes			15,412

Source: Reproduced from McHenry, *Tanzania's Ujamaa Villages*, 1979, Table 11.2, p. 26

here concerning these institutions. Although they interacted among themselves in the rural areas, they were weakly integrated, and least so with the local government councils. If any co-ordination occurred, then that co-ordination was more through the central government, rather than through councils where these programmes were being implemented. The most the councils did, or were supposed to do, was for their

leadership to be active in mobilizing and eliciting the enthusiasm and voluntarism of the local people.

One would, perhaps, be tempted to suggest that the local government councils were the financing agents of these programmes. This was not the case. For, besides the Food and Agriculture Organization (F.A.O.), there were other international agencies financing the program, such as the Irish Freedom from Hunger Committee, the Commonwealth Assistance Loan Funds, and the Oxford Committee for Famine Relief (OXFAM) [McHenry, 1979:24].

Therefore, as a result of the proliferation of institutions which operated independently in the rural areas, the role of the local government councils in rural development was gradually being eroded by the government institutions and some international agencies with little or no effort made by these institutions to integrate their programs with the local councils.

The 1967 1972 Period

This period saw a further deterioration in the local government councils as rural development "agents", while other government institutions increasingly took over this role. Two main developments were responsible for this. One was the government's policy shift on rural development; and the second was the expansion of government institutions as a consequence of the nationalization program launched immediately after the Arusha Declaration of 1967 on "Socialism and Self-Reliance".

Although the village settlement schemes continued throughout this period, there was a dramatic policy shift by the government, from a "transformation" approach to an "improvement" approach to rural development. The former was by and large responsible for the highly capitalized and planned village settlement schemes. These were criticized as "capitalist" oriented, and hence retrograding the development of "ujamaa". Furthermore, experience showed that they were too costly and their agricultural output was far below the anticipated yield [McHenry, 1976; Newiger, 1968; Thomas, 1966]. Hence, the emphasis was now on an "improvement" approach,

with communal or co-operative work in agricultural production.

In future it has been decided that, instead of establishing highly capitalized schemes and moving people to them, emphasis shall be on modernizing existing traditional villages by injecting capital in order to raise the standard of living of the villagers. It is envisaged that such improvement might take the form of provision of water supply; better layout of villages, improved farming and production methods, and reorganization of land holdings.²²

The local councils could not play this new role of being modernizing agencies because of their inadequate revenue capacity, personnel and expertise. Understandably, therefore, this was a new pledge by the government to the institutions already involved in various village development schemes to divert their human and material resources to modernizing the majority rather than a selected minority of the peasantry.

The aftermath of the Arusha Declaration, on the other hand, was the nationalization program. As all the key sectors of the economy were placed under the direct control and command of the State, so the public sector expanded. New parastatals, corporations, and authorities were created to organize and manage all the key aspects of the economy on behalf of the government. Concomitantly, the rural areas were invaded by a multitude of government-controlled institutions, covering all the essential aspects of rural production. These institutions can be grouped into two major categories.

The first category includes those institutions whose primary operation in the rural areas focused on organizing rural production. Organization means here expertise as a factor of production, which embodied specialized administrative, professional, and scientific skills common to all specialized institutions and agencies [Hodges,

²²R.M. Kawawa, 2nd Vice President, "Address" to Rural Development Planning Seminar, April 4, 1966, at the University College of Dar es Salaam, quoted from Press Release, Ministry of Information and Tourism, Information Services Division, Dar es Salaam, 1966, p. 4

1981]. In Tanzania, these included the Crop Authorities- Tobacco, Sugar, Coffee, Sisal, Tea, Cotton, Cash-Coconut, and Pyrethrum. Others were the National Agriculture and Food Company, the National Agriculture Products Board, the National Milling Corporation, and the Regional and District Trading Companies. Their activities ranged from gathering and storing, buying and marketing, transportation and distribution, to providing the inputs necessary for production.²³ By virtue of their tasks, they are permitted by the State to exact a direct surplus from the producers. This meant the local councils were not the only institutions through which the State could exact a surplus from the rural areas. And since they had demonstrated unforeseen inability in collecting the badly needed surplus, the government ultimately excused them from this task, as we shall see shortly.

The second category covers the financial institutions. Their main concern was improving labour and techniques in rural production. They included the National Co-Operative Bank, the National Development Credit Agency, which was replaced by the Tanzanian Rural Development Bank (TRDB) in 1976. Others were the National Bank of Commerce (NBC), which provided agricultural production loans to small-scale farmers and co-operative farms, the Tanzania Investment Bank (TIB), the NBC/KARADHA Company which provided credit facilities for purchasing transport trucks and/or buses to the registered *Ujamaa* villages. And the Rural Development Fund whose operational capital came from the central government. Their main activities involved mainly financing rural production collectively or individually through agricultural credits and loans for purchasing agricultural supplies and technology such as tractors, ploughs, and other modern farm implements. They also exacted surplus generated from credit and loan interests. But part of this surplus was retained by the institutions themselves, while the other part of the interest was transferred to the foreign financial institutions and agencies. The latter, as John

²³ For useful reflections on the scope of activities of some of these institutions, see, for example, Herbert C. Kreisel, et al. *Agricultural Marketing in Tanzania, Background Research and Policy Proposals*, 1970; Peter E. Tema, *Marketing Board Pricing and Storage Policy with Particular Reference to Maize in Tanzania*, 1977; and G.K. Helleiner, *Agricultural Export Pricing Strategy in Tanzania*, 1972.

Loxley explains, were the main donors of the initial capital needed by the major Tanzanian financial institutions to finance credits and loans for rural production. The major foreign institutions and agencies included the International Development Bank, the World Bank, the African Development Bank; and NORAD, KFW, SIDA and CIDA (aid agencies of the Norwegian, German, Swedish, and Canadian governments, respectively). For example, he observes, "... by June 1975 the TIB had financed 66 million Tz. Shillings or 26 per cent of its total assets by foreign loans and grants (Sh 16m from the International Development Agency, Sh 14m from CIDA, and Sh 32m from NORAD) ... By 1973, 47 per cent of the TRDB's outstanding loans by value had been financed by overseas loans and grants, mostly from the International Development Agency, the soft-term financing arm of the World Bank [Loxley, 1981:83-84]. To underscore how the surplus was split, the NBC/KARADHA Company, for example, charged its village-clients an 8 per cent interest rate over its loans, out of which 5 per cent was retained by the Company and 3 per cent was transferred as repayment to the foreign financing donor [Mogella, 1980:117-18].

The role and need of the institutions discussed above cannot be disputed. And had there been a well-conceived structural relationship in which integration and co-ordination prevailed, these institutions could have been highly supportive to the local councils in their role in rural development, by providing or making available to them all the expertise, resources and personnel they needed. But, as the situation was, these institutions were centrally controlled, managed and co-ordinated; and thus, their interaction with the local councils was purely at the level of implementation. Even then such interaction was called for only when the local councils were needed for mobilizing people for communal labour. Gradually, therefore, the local councils lost their centrality in rural development. The government treated them as ancillaries to the more capable central institutions and foreign agencies in fostering rural development. The local people, on the other hand, perceived them as colonial remnants. Besides, virtually all the needs of the local people as producers were (at

least presumably) better and more adequately met by the central institutions than by the local councils themselves. In short, the presence and active participation of the central institutions and foreign agencies in rural development pushed both the councils and their role in rural development into a state of oblivion.

Systematic Erosion of Local Councils

Finally, the government's own actions during the 1967-72 period reveal a systematic weakening of local councils, which ultimately led to their abolition in 1972. I shall examine some of the most important actions to elaborate the point.

One was the dichotomy usually maintained by the government, between the formulation of social, economic and political policies and institutional changes. It was the practice of the government to separate these policies and changes as if they were two independent processes. Thus, for example, the institutional changes of 1962/63 had little or no bearing on the formulation of the Supplementary Development Plan of 1962, made by the new government. Consequently, no institutional linkages were envisaged in the Plan, for not even the regional administration, let alone the local councils, were mentioned in the Plan. The same problem existed in the first Five-Year Development Plan, 1964-1969. Again the formulators of this Plan failed to recognize the new political and institutional arrangements existing then in the regions, districts and local levels where the rural programs indicated in the Plan were supposed to be implemented.²⁴

The same situation can be seen in the formulation of the major socialist-oriented policies—viz. Socialism and Self-Reliance (1967), Socialism and Rural Development (1967), Education for Self-Reliance (1967), and the Leadership Code—*Mwongozo* or the TANU Guidelines (1970). Operationally, there was no accompanying policy formulation to alter the existing administrative structures of the local institutions, including the local councils, so as to improve or facilitate the implementation of these

²⁴ For details on this point, see, Henry Bienen, *Tanzania, Party Transformation and Economic Development*, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1970), p. 261-333.

policies at the local level. And, as I have pointed out above, these institutions were constructed and re-organized long before such policies were under consideration.

The second, perhaps the most important, series of actions was the unprecedented centralization of the major source of the council revenues. Until 1969, local rates and produce cess accounted for 70 to 80 per cent of the total revenue of the local councils. Besides this, between 1963 and 1964 the councils collected, in the form of taxes, about 21 per cent of the total government revenue [Ingle, 1972:208]. In June, 1969, the government repealed the authority of the local councils to collect local rates and produce cess as of 1970. Likewise, the government took over council responsibilities for education, roads, health and water supply, and subsequently abolished the local rate and produce cess.²⁵ As indicated in the minutes of the Association of Rural Local Authorities meeting held at Morogoro in September, 1969, the councils were not informed of the government's decision prior to the announcement. It was not until November, 1969, that the government issued a communiqué to officially inform the councils of the government's decision and the new financial arrangements.²⁶

In the same year, the government abolished the village development committees and the village executive officers who were responsible for collecting local rates, and replaced them with ward development committees and ward executive officers, respectively, through the Parliamentary Act No. 6 of 1969. The government also encouraged the local councils to establish district development corporations as trading agencies for the councils. But this was a token solicitation because these corporations were earmarked by the government as replacements for the councils. And, indeed, in 1972, following their abolition, the councils were replaced by district development corporations which were supposed to function in a role similar to that of the National Assembly at the centre [Nyerere, 1978]. They were later renamed district development councils similar to the colonial district councils which

²⁵ The government's decision was announced by the Minister of Finance in his June Budget Speech to the National Assembly, 1969. Reprinted in *The Standard*, June 20, 1969.

²⁶ See, Local Government Circular No. 24 of 1969, Ministry of Local Government, Dar es Salaam, to All Rural Local Authorities

were advisory to the District Commissioners.

Ultimately, the government actions brought the Tanzanian system of local government into line with that of many other African countries where local government bodies had no powers to collect taxes, spend money, and/or employ their own staff. Several district councils which had begun to show some signs of vitality and capability in managing and administering their own local areas were punished by these untimely actions. These included Moshi, Mwanza, Geita, Ukerewe, Kwimba, Bukoba, Iringa, Songea, Tanga, Morogoro, and several others [Finucane, 1974; Bienen, 1970; Samoff, 1974; and Mutahaba, 1973]. In 1972 these and all other district councils were abolished and replaced by district development councils, as we shall see in the next chapter.

Conclusions

The main concern in this chapter was with the local government system and its role of the local governments in fostering rural development in Tanzania. Our discussion leads to the following conclusions.

The Tanzanian system of local government illuminates one form of decentralization, which has been described in chapter two as an institutional form of decentralization. But in practice a devolution of power from the centre to the local institutions had been curtailed by a counter evolution of a one-party political system in the country. The emergence, and constitutionalization thereof, of the one-party political system led to the monopoly and hegemony of the Party over the government institutions at the national and local level. Concomitantly, local autonomy and local democracy could not be ensued through the local governments which themselves fell under the reins of the Party. Ultimately, therefore, the local governments became agents for administering policies and decisions made by both the Party and the central government, rather than for promoting local autonomy and local democracy.

Was this the original intention of the government while constructing the local

governments? The answer to this question lies in whether or not local autonomy and local democracy can be promoted through a local government institution which exists in a one-party political system. This is a question which requires a thorough theoretical analysis because it has escaped the attention of the local government theorists, as well as the decentralists. In our opinion this is possible in countries, such as Kenya, where the political party becomes active only during the elections period. After that the party usually stays in the background, leaving the government and its institutions (national and local) to run the country in all policy and development affairs. In Tanzania this has not been (and will not be) possible. As we have explained in this chapter, from the beginning of independence the political Party increasingly ascertained its centrality and primacy in all political, economic and development matters of the country. To ensure that no institution (national or local) in the country challenges its centrality and primacy, the monopoly and hegemony of the Party was constitutionalized in the Constitution of the Republic. We have also pointed out the implications of this to the local government institutions, especially with respect to local autonomy and local democracy. And, for that matter, we doubt the sincerity of the leadership which, on one hand, was constructing a local government system seemingly with an intention to promote local autonomy and local democracy through the local government institution. Simultaneously, on the other hand, the same leadership evolved a one-party political system which tarnished the capacity of the local government institutions in promoting local autonomy and local democracy. We therefore conclude by reiterating our initial position that the local governments, like all other local institutions which are not Party organs, were agents of the Party and the central government.

Their role in rural development was an ambivalent one. And, in fact there was no consistent government policy to guide the role of the local governments in initiating and soliciting rural development in the country. As we have pointed out, the institutional changes, including those affecting the local governments, were

directed towards an increasing attack on the ways of life of the rural people by the central government. A change in rural conservatism towards social change was the core of the Tanzanian operational definition of rural development. The ultimate goal was, of course, to increase rural productivity and to improve the living standards of the rural population.

The strategic zone for launching this attack was the district, which has been described as a "development front." For this reason, perhaps, the district was overloaded with institutions and committees, all concerned with development. And the early village settlement schemes and the TANU-spurred spontaneous *Ujamaa* villages were all part of this attack against rural conservatism towards social change. Both the district institutions and the Party organs had to work co-operatively in this onslaught against rural conservatism. This co-operation, as Cliffe and Saul have correctly pointed out, lay in

... the intention to co-ordinate as closely and fruitfully as possible the activities of all institutions with a presence in the Tanzanian countryside. Ideally this is designed to achieve the construction of an integrated phalanx of "development agencies" over a broad front (district councils, co-operatives, government ministries) capable, in turn, of presenting a uniform set of stimuli to Tanzanian peasants, one designed to encourage their adoption of novel patterns of behaviour desired by the central government. Equally important, primary responsibility for achieving such co-ordination and galvanizing the related agencies into action rests, at least theoretically, with the ruling political party.

[Cliffe and Saul, 1972:322]

Initially, the local government institutions (councils) were to be the frontiers of the attack for social change and rural transformation. But, as we have pointed out in the chapter, inadequate capacity in financial and human resources, an increasing burden of their recurrent expenditures, and the falling size of their capital bud-

gets, all together constrained the capacity of the councils to undertake development projects on their own, thereby reducing their leverage in project decisions made from above. At the same time, the presence of other central institutions with more reliable financial and human resources, replaced the councils as frontiers of rural development. Ultimately, the needs and goals of the local population were determined by the central and not local government institutions. By the same token social change and development were to be initiated, planned and organized from above. This reversed the previous notion of "development from below", held during the construction of the local government system in Tanzania.

In summary, the Tanzanian system of local government was par excellence a replica of the British legacy of the same system. It is, perhaps, for this reason that it became inappropriate and deficient to serve a social, economic and political system which was socialist oriented. Nonetheless, in theory the system could be characterized as institutional decentralization, while in practice it was an administrative system for administering and implementing policies and decisions made by the Party and the central government.

In 1972, the system was abolished apparently for officially stated reasons that it failed to promote local democracy, or popular participation, failed to foster rural development in the country; and the institutions born from it were inefficient in generating local revenues and inadequate in providing social services in the rural areas.²⁷

Indeed, these deficiencies were common to many local government councils; but they were not inherent in the system of local government *per se*. Had the government been serious in its intent to make the system work efficiently, steps could have been taken to correct these deficiencies. But, as shown in the chapter, from as early as 1967 the government had injected into the system an infectious virus which caused

²⁷ From an interview with J.C.A. Max, held in Dar es Salaam, on August 17, 1984. Mr. Max was a former senior Local Government Officer, later transferred to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as Personnel Officer in the Manpower Division. At the time of the interview, he was retired officer on secondment with the Prime Minister's Office, in the Local Government Division.

a slow deterioration of even those councils which were showing signs of health and prosperity. The decision to cut off the main sources of council revenues, and to centralize their major functions, was a catalyst to quicken their slow-moving death. It was the same government that had established the system in the first place that decided to undo it, regardless of whether its deficiencies could be remedied. And the decision came at a time when political unity and the legitimization of the régime were no longer a primary concern of the leadership. By then the leadership was contemplating another form of decentralization, which will be the central theme of the next chapter.

CHAPTER FIVE
Decentralized Administration
for Development
1972-1982

In 1972 the Tanzanian government abolished the institutional form of decentralization, thereby dissolving all local institutions which had been operating under the Local Government Act of 1962. In its place, another form of decentralization was introduced through a program restyled "Decentralization" or *Madaraka Mikoani*, meaning literally 'power to the regions'. This chapter, therefore, examines and discusses the administrative changes resultant from the decentralization program and the impact of these changes on rural development. Although the changes affected the government administration as a whole, for the purposes of this thesis our main concern is with the local administration. To this end, the discussion focuses on the administrative structures to explain how democratic and participatory the regional and district institutions were; central-local relations and the extent to which these relations promoted or constrained local autonomy and local democracy; how successful or unsuccessful the decentralized administration was in promoting both rural development and participatory democracy; and, finally, why was it abolished in 1982.

In order to situate the discussion on decentralization in its proper context, the chapter begins with a brief examination of the meaning and objectives of decentralization within the Tanzanian context.

Decentralization in the Tanzanian Context

In the minds of the Tanzanian policy-makers, decentralization is multi-dimensional or multi-purposeful. It is a means or "input" for the management and administration of rural development in all its multifaceted dimensions. It is a strategy for planning and implementing development, which takes into account the importance

and significance of local inputs and local support for both the planning process and implementing development. There is also the ideological element attached to decentralization. According to the Tanzanian blueprint of "Socialism and Self-Reliance", participatory democracy at all levels is a prerequisite for egalitarianism and equality which are the essential principles of socialism and self-reliance, as well as for building a socialist society in Tanzania. "Democracy," Nyerere emphasized, "is another essential characteristic of a socialist society. For people's equality must be reflected in the political organization; everyone must be an equal participant in the government of his society" [Nyerere, 1968:5]. In this context, decentralization is regarded as a means for institutional reorganization (be it political or governmental), through which participatory democracy is made possible. And, finally, decentralization is also seen as an administrative system through which the capacity of both the central and local administrations in managing development and making them more responsive to local development needs could be improved.

All these meanings of decentralization are contained in the presidential document, "Decentralization", which was made public in May, 1972. Herein President Nyerere explained first the whys and wherefores for decentralization, spelled out the goals and objectives of decentralization, and outlined the institutional arrangements to be made through decentralization.

The President began with an acknowledgement of the failures of the previous system of administration. Among them, he noted, power and control over development matters were still being exercised at and by the centre, and/or few administrators at the local level. This was contrary to the spirit and ideals of the Arusha Declaration of 1967 and the Mwongozo (TANU-Guidelines) of 1971. Secondly, there was poor co-ordination at all levels concerning development efforts in the country as each ministry tended to perform its development initiatives in the regions, districts or villages independently. And, thirdly, the planning for and implementation of the development exercise had also tended to ignore local inputs and initiatives, thereby

causing frustrations to local people, local administrators and the government itself. Therefore, the President observed, "for all these and many other reasons, it is necessary that we should re-organize the administration of government so as to make it more appropriate to our socialist development" [Nyerere, 1972:1 2]. The following goals were anticipated to be attained through the re-organization of the government administration:

- (a) More local autonomy in making decisions and taking action on matters which were primarily of local nature and impact, but within the defined framework to ensure that national policies of socialism and self-reliance were followed everywhere
- (b) Central government remained the controlling authority, providing more effectively guidance and assistance to local people, as well as in checking their work but with a minimum of bureaucratic red tape which until then had been responsible for strangling the enthusiasm of the local people
- (c) Reduction of regional imbalance and inequality by transferring resources (human and material) from the relatively advanced regions to regions with special difficulties or special needs
- (d) Maximization of scarce resources by optimising the present bureaucracy, thereby countervailing any tendency of its expansion
- (e) A greater delegation of authority and responsibility to local officials in making decisions on development projects (of both local and national importance), with regard to the control of funds allocated for these projects by the central government [Nyerere, 1972:2].

Underlying these goals, a decentralized government was to foster the following mutually inclusive objectives:

- (a) To promote development in the rural areas and the whole country in general, which is egalitarian and socialist oriented
- (b) To enhance local development initiatives by assisting and guiding the local peo-

- ple in self-help development undertakings so as to make them the principal actors of social change and rural transformation in the country
- (c) To provide a mechanism for a fair allocation of the scarce resources for development, as well as for an equitable distribution of the benefits of development
 - (d) To democratize the planning and implementation of development so as to allow more local input and initiatives in development efforts at all levels
 - (e) To provide a better system of co-ordination, information flow, and integration concerning development activities throughout the country
 - (f) To improve and increase the administrative capacity and responsiveness of both central and local administrators in dealing with development concerns in the rural areas

The successful attainment of the above goals and objectives of decentralization required a total change in attitudes and behaviour of the leadership, as the President cautioned in his concluding remarks. Thus he stated:

The organization which is still being worked out will be important in the new development. But the attitudes of officials, and of TANU leaders and members will be even more important. For the really vital element in decentralization is that we have to drop our present apparent urge to control everything from the centre. At the centre we can prod, urge and help, but not control. Ultimately, people can only develop themselves.

[Nyerere, 1972:12]

As it can be noted, the spirit and content of the above goals and objectives of decentralization in Tanzania reflect substantially the theoretical underpinnings of the theorists of decentralization, as well as development administration. We shall, therefore, now discuss the extent to which these goals and objectives were achieved through the decentralization program by describing first the administrative structures of the regional and district administrations.

The Regional Administration

The decentralization program of 1972 had no impact on the legal status and position of the region. Regional boundaries were retained as they had been prior to decentralization, and by then there were 20 regions. Likewise, the Regional Commissioner maintained the same position as the chief representative of the central government, and the chief executive of the regional administration, with the same powers and functions as had been defined in the Regions and Regional Commissioners Act of 1962.

However, there were several major changes in the regional administration as a whole, consequent to the enactment of the Decentralization of Government Administration (Interim Provisions) Act of 1972.

First, the Act provided for the appointment of a Regional Development Director (RDD), with three other senior staff - the Regional Financial Controller (RFC), the Regional Planning Officer (RPIO), and the Regional Personnel Officer (RPO). The first was a generalist by profession, whereas the latter three were drawn from specialized professions. The last three officers were directly appointed by the Prime Minister's Office (PMO), while the RDD was appointed by the President.

The purpose of appointing these senior officers was to improve and strengthen the capacity of the regional administration in planning, implementing and managing development in the region and its peripheries. To this end, the RDD inherited all the powers and functions of the then Regional Administrative Officers (RAO). In addition, his position was equal to that of a Principal Secretary in a Ministry. By the same token, he became the Chief Executive Officer in the region with respect to day-to-day business and conduct of all other government functionaries (see Chart 1). His main functions included supervising the preparation of the regional annual plans to ensure that all aspects of development were covered; to supervise and co-ordinate the implementation of the approved plans; to provide direction of the regional and district functionaries charged with the implementation of development

plans; and, above all, he was the Accounting Officer for the region, responsible for all the monies voted by the Parliament for recurrent and development expenditures in the region.

The RFC (Regional Financial Controller) was responsible for bookkeeping, accounts, and financial management in the region, including the preparation of annual estimates for the region. The RPIO (Regional Planning Officer) was basically responsible for preparing regional development plans on the basis of the development priorities submitted by the districts within the region, and making these plans in tune with the regional targets which had been pre-set by the national development plan. The functions of the RPO (Regional Personnel Officer) included personnel management, training, transfers, salaries, and all other matters pertaining to all regional functionaries.

In 1976, however, the posts of RFC and RPO were abolished. As one government officer explained, confusion seemed to have arisen between the roles of the RFC and RDD, who was at the same time the Accounting Officer, and the RFC had apparently the same role. The only difference was that one was a generalist and the other a specialist, a fact which might have created a problem concerning the management and administration of finances of the region. With regard to the RPO, his post became redundant following the creation of the Ministry of Manpower Development, which then posted its representatives in the regions and districts. Consequent to the abolition of the two posts, the functions of both officers were incorporated into those of the Planning Officer and of Manpower Management Officer at both regional and district levels. The officer who held the new post, however, did not retain the status of his predecessor under the decentralization program. This meant that four years after decentralization, both the regional and district administrations had begun to experience some setbacks in staff who were supposedly to strengthen the administration.

Another major change involved the regional functionaries, until then regional

Chart 1
Organizational Structure of Regional Administration, 1972

heads representing their ministries in the region. As Chart 1 shows, these functionaries were part of the regional organization, and each was now directly responsible to the RDD for planning, implementation and administration of development in his own respective field. Consequently, the ministries represented in the regions communicated with their respective functionaries in the field through the RDD, or through the PMO if it concerned a development project to be carried out by a ministry in a region.

Furthermore, a Regional Development Team was established as part of the regional administration. As a technical and specialized organ of the Regional Development Committee, the Development Team was responsible for considering, preparing, and compiling development projects in the order of their priorities, including their estimates and making a single fiscal regional development plan. The Team was made of the RDD as its chairman, the Planning, Financial and Personnel Officers, together with other functionaries responsible for health, education, agriculture, natural resources, water, land development, Public Works, and *Ujamaa* and Co-operative Development.

The composition of the Regional Development Committee, on the other hand, was enlarged to include all district development directors in the region, besides those mentioned in Chapter Four. However, although it varied from region to region, in general the committee consisted of between 60 and 80 members, most of whom were bureaucrats and technocrats of the regional and district administration.

According to Section 10 of the Decentralization Act of 1972, its main functions were: to consider, advise upon, formulate and implement development projects in the region; to provide advice and assistance to the district development councils in the implementation of their development projects; and to do other functions as directed so by the PMO, or make its own deliberations on matters deemed necessary for the efficient performance of its functions.

Apart from these changes, the structure of the regional administration remained

basically the same as prior to decentralization. The regional committee system was overwhelmingly bureaucratic and technocratic. The only representative element in the regional development committee was the inclusion of the MPs residing in the region or districts. The general picture, however, was that at the regional level where most of the executive decisions were taken on development matters, there was little or no participation of the local people. Stated differently, the new machinery of the decentralized structure of the regional administration was not conducive to participatory democracy.

The District Administration

At the district level, the new administrative structure replicated that of the regional administration. The Area Commissioner retained the same powers, authority and functions which had been defined in the Area Commissioners Act of 1962. As in the region, the administration of the district was strengthened by the appointment of the District Development Director, Financial, Planning, and Personnel Officers. These and other district functionaries had responsibilities and performed tasks similar to their counterparts at the regional level. As a team, all were responsible and accountable to the District Development Director (DDD) who, in turn, was accountable and responsible to the RDD.

To replace the defunct local government council, a district development council was established as part of the district administration. The council inherited all the powers and functions of the previous council, except the power to collect local revenue. Similarly, all by-laws, licences, registrations or permits issued or granted by the former council continued to be legal or effective until their specified period expired. Among other things, the new council was responsible for planning and implementing projects and programs affecting agriculture, public health, primary education, commerce, industry, promoting *Ujamaa* and co-operative villages, natural resources, public works, water and land development, and so forth.

In order to assist the new development council in its functions, the former district

development committee was renamed District Development and Planning Committee (DDPC). Its members now included also the officers who were appointed under decentralization. The committee was charged with the same tasks and duties as those of the regional development committee. Furthermore, a district development team was created as a technical or specialized organ of the district development council, in the same fashion as the regional development team.

Finally, district development corporations were established in every district, as an economic wing of the district development council. Although it was not part of the district administration, each corporation was owned by the district development council, and the DDD became the chairman of the Board of Directors of the Corporation. As an economic enterprise, the corporation engaged in a wide scope of business, trading and commercial activities within and outside the district.

In brief, these were the major changes in the district administration. However, one important thing should be noted here with respect to the extent to which the new administrative structure of the district was not representative, democratic and participatory. Attention is drawn here to the composition of the new district development council. Section 7 of the Decentralization Act of 1972 stated that "every district development council shall consist of" the district Party chairman as the chairman of the council, the Area Commissioner, all constituency members of the National Assembly representing the constituencies within the district and all National members of the National Assembly ordinarily resident within the district, all district personnel newly appointed under decentralization, including the DDD, and all councillors of the dissolved district or local government council. The latter, however, were to retain their memberships only until new elections were held for electing new members to the new development council. The District Development Councils (Elections) Act of 1975 provided for the elections of these new members. It also provided the Regional and District Working Committees of the Party with the authority to scrutinize and make final nominations for contesting candidates.

In spite of these new arrangements, there were no elections held throughout the life span of the district development councils. Instead, the practice was that a new member was appointed by the Minister whenever and wherever there was a vacancy. Consequently, up to 1982 when the whole system of decentralization was dissolved, the district development councils consisted largely of bureaucrats, technocrats and appointed members. And these councils were the executive decision-making bodies in the districts. Since the decentralization program provided no other mechanism for local participation below the district level, one wonders how the new administrative set up of the district administration could initiate and promote local participation, as well as local democracy.

Several government officials interviewed on this issue were also surprised to note that neither the Party nor the government had followed up on the issue, especially after Parliament had enacted the District Development Councils (Elections) Act in 1975. One official put it simply that the whole question of elections was overshadowed by the euphoria of "Operation Vijiji" (i.e. villages). The operation began in late 1969, but gained special momentum after President Nyerere declared in November, 1973, that "to live in villages is an order" and directed that by the end of 1976 all people in the rural areas of the country must be living in *ujamaa* villages [*Daily News*, Nov. 7, 1973]. This meant the party leaders and bureaucrats in the regions and districts were all preoccupied with the operation, with the intention of beating the Presidential deadline. One account by a district development director, Juma V. Mwapachu, captures eloquently the glamour of "Operation Vijiji" after the Presidential Order. He describes it thus:

Apart from declaring 1976 the target date for full rural villagization, neither TANU nor government at the national level gave any guidelines for the implementation of the programme. The implementation strategy was virtually left to each region and to each district to formulate. Most districts throughout the country were, of course, perplexed as to how they

could go about implementing the programme. Some districts sent teams of officials to see how Operation Kigoma (the World Bank supported project in the region) was implemented . . . there was a competitive attitude (particularly between regions) with all its political overtones. Here was a moment for self-aggrandizement by proving ability to mobilize a rural population wholesale . . . Top party officials were heralding and positively reinforcing the achievements of resettlement . . . Who, in such circumstances, would have wished to lag behind? Political leaders, therefore, called for quick measures to complete the resettlement exercise in a short period.

[Mwapachu, 1979:117]

The euphoria of "Operation Vijiji" might be part of the reasons for not holding elections. However, another possible explanation is the absence of an electoral framework for electing new local councillors during and shortly after implementing the decentralization program. The Act which provided such a framework was enacted in 1975. By then the decentralized system of administration was functioning. And so the government probably thought that there was no need to organize elections at that juncture, especially when the country was preparing for Presidential and General Elections.

In short, the end-line of the decentralization program of 1972 was the re-organization of the district administration. From what has been described, neither the regional nor the district administrative structure possessed any organizational characteristics conducive to the popular participation these administrations were supposed to promote. Apparently, this was in line with the chief designers of decentralized administration.¹ For what followed was an idea of the Party and government

¹The McKinsey & Co. Inc., a Management Consultant Firm based in New York and London, was the chief architect of the Tanzanian system of decentralized administration of 1972. Professional in business organization and management skills, the firm was initially invited by the government to advise on and assist the National Development Corporation (NDC) and the State Trading Corporation (STC) in matters related to the management of NDC's parastatal companies, and how the STC should run its business more efficiently

leadership in an attempt to fill the gap by institutionalizing popular participation outside the framework of the decentralized structure of the regional and district administration. We shall now examine these attempts of the government and the Party.

Village Administration for Popular Participation

Until 1975, both the scattered villages and the organized villages under "Operation Vijiji" and settlement schemes were like floating boats. They had no formalized system of administration. Their then village development committees were dissolved just on the eve of the decentralization program. The decentralization program of 1972 set further adrift the villages and the new administrative set-up of the district. The general affairs of these villages, until then entrusted to the Co-operative Movements and Unions by the Co-operative and *Ujamaa* Societies Act of 1968, were inadequately and improperly dealt with. The only form of leadership and administration in the villages was provided through the village party branches. These branches did initiate and promote local participation but mostly among the members of the village party branches. Above all, the implementation of "Operation Vijiji" campaigns throughout the country began to show some results. By 1975, for example, about 8 million people were registered as living in villages.²

In order to expedite popular participation in these villages, and also to ensure that the local people remained in their new village settlements, the government felt there was an impending need of formalizing the administration of these villages. Hence, in July 1975, the National Assembly passed the "Villages and *Ujamaa* Villages (Registration, Designation and Administration) Act, no. 21, of 1975. The Act sought to institutionalize popular participation of all rural people living in the villages by providing a legal institutional framework through which these people could

and profitably. The firm left the country in 1975

²This was reported by the Prime Minister while addressing the National Assembly during its Parliamentary session, held in Dodoma, on April, 16, 1975. See, *Tanzania Hansard*, Seventh Session, 15 April 5 May, Dodoma, 1975. [Dar es Salaam Government Printer]

make decisions on matters affecting their immediate local concerns, and implement the decisions within the capacity of their local resources. It also sought to provide the villages with legal status and protection, as a corporate or co-operative society, while engaging in development activities which required some legal and statutory backing.

According to the same Act, a village was defined as a geographical locality with identifiable and defined boundaries, inhabited by a minimum of 250 *kayas* ('homesteads') and recognized and registered according to the provisions of the Act [see, Part II, sec. 4(1) and 16(1) of the Act]. An *Ujamaa* village, on the other hand, was defined as one with the same characteristics of a village, but a substantial portion of the economic and agricultural activities as such were carried out on a communal basis.

However, in terms of a formalized system of administration, both had the same hierarchically ordered institutions: the village Assembly, and the village council (government). According to the Act, the village Assembly was the supreme decision-making organ which dealt with a broad spectrum of economic and social activities of the village, including the general welfare of its residents. Every person with a permanent residence in the village, and of an apparent age of 18 years, was a member of the Assembly. Its main functions included: to elect the members of the village council; to ratify the constitution of the village; to approve the development projects and annual estimates for the same, presented by the village council; and to exercise supreme authority over all other committees and leaders of the village. It usually met twice a year, although the village chairman could convene a meeting of the Assembly at any time there was an urgent matter which had to be decided by the whole Assembly.

The village council, on the other hand, was a representative organ. Besides the village chairman who was also the chairman of the village Party branch, (thus elected by the members only of the Party branch), and the village secretary who

was also the secretary of the Party branch and appointed by the Headquarters of the Party, there were 25 members in the council. These were elected annually by the whole Assembly, usually through a popular vote. The candidates had to be permanent residents of the village, and of an apparent age of 21 years.

The council was empowered by the Act to legislate by-laws necessary or expedient for promoting economic and social development, as well as for the smooth administration of the village and its residents; to initiate and undertake any economic venture or enterprise within the confines defined by the Act; and to establish committees in order to facilitate the performance of its designated tasks and functions. Although the council could have as many committees as it deemed necessary, the following committees were obligatory: Finance and Planning, Production and Marketing, Education, Culture and Social Welfare, Works and Transport, and Security and Defence. Each of the twenty-five members of the council had to belong to either one of the committees. In other words, a committee system was the operational format of the village council. It met, usually six times a year, as a whole body when it had to make deliberations and recommendations to be presented to the village Assembly, or when a particular matter required a decision or action by the whole council.

Other responsibilities of the Council included: (a) organizing and mobilizing the villagers for agricultural production and other economic ventures undertaken by the whole village on a communal, or self-help basis; (b) preparing and setting of agricultural production targets for the village; (c) planning, supervising and implementing annual development projects approved by the Assembly, or any other project as directed by an executive authority other than the village council; (d) providing assistance and advice in agricultural, horticultural, and forestry activities, including small-scale industrial ventures; and (e) securing and guaranteeing financial assistance for the village, such as loans, from district, or state-controlled financial institutions.

To assist the village councils there were several functionaries of the central government, who were seconded to the villages, such as Ward Secretaries, primary school teachers, health officers, and agricultural extension officers (*Mabwana Shamba*). Others were employed by the villages themselves. These included village accountants, shopkeepers, storekeepers, mill attendants, watchmen, and drivers in cases where villages had tractors, a bus, or a lorry.

In addition, in late 1977, the government appointed about four thousand village managers to various registered villages throughout the country.³

The village managers program completed the process of institutionalizing popular participation in the villages. The appointment of these managers, on the other hand, was intended for strengthening the village administration, because most of them possessed a university or college education. Others still possessed some managerial and/or administrative experience in various fields prior to their appointment as village managers. Nonetheless, most of them had no previous experience in village administration. But their educational backgrounds were thought or expected to be a great investment and assistance to the villages. To that effect, they were charged with the responsibility of assisting the village councils in planning and implementing development projects in the villages. They were also responsible for initiating and proposing new development projects; advising and directing the village councils in the preparation of their development budgets and production targets. And, finally, they were to act as secretaries of Finance and Planning Committees of the village councils [Mayaya, 1981:111].

Although the presence of these managers had brought the central government much closer to the villages, it did not improve, nor initiate, a closer relationship between the village administration and the district one. In other words, the participation of the villagers in the decision-making process at the district level had

³See, PMO Circular letter, "Distribution of Village Managers," sent to all RDDs, dated December 12, 1977, Dodoma, Tanzania. For a critical view of the Village Managers' Program, see, R.M. Mayaya. "Public Policy Implementation in Tanzania: The Case of the Village Managers Policy", Dar es Salaam, 1981].

remained still a problematic one. First, the village managers were not part of the district administration, nor members of the district development councils and the district development committees. And, secondly, their accountability and responsibility were directly to the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) and not to the District Development Directors (DDD's) to whom all other central government employees in the districts were responsible and accountable.

Thus, both the Villagization Act of 1975 and the Village Managers Program of 1977 did not make (and could not have made) the decentralized institution of the district participatory and democratic, as it was anticipated in the decentralization program and/or in the process of institutionalizing popular participation. Instead, there emerged two kinds of institutions at and below the district level. One was the district institution which was structured on technico-organizational principles with intent to improve the capacity and rationality of the institution in planning and managing rural development. The other was the village institution which was based on the politico-ideological tenets of the Tanzanian blueprint of Socialism and Self-Reliance. The purpose of creating this institution was to promote popular participation which, according to the politico-ideological tenets, is a pre-requisite for rural development and socialism in the country.

The anomaly, however, was that the village institution, which apparently was participatory and democratic, possessed no executive powers and authority over the district institution which was a non-representative one, as well as impenetrable to local participation. Therefore, it can be argued that, although the village institution was participatory and democratic, it was essentially a functional institution to the district in terms of its hierarchical position and power-relationship with respect to the district institution. And thus, the efforts of the government to institutionalize popular participation did not help in making the decentralized administration participatory and democratic. Furthermore, the entire decentralized administration did not facilitate the autonomy of the regional and district institu-

tions. On the contrary, these institutions became all the more functional to and dependent upon the central government. The central-local relations which emerged from decentralization, reveal this phenomenon.

Central-Local Relations under Decentralization

Madaraka Mikoani, 'power to the regions', was the slogan of the decentralization program of 1972. After a meticulous and eloquent explanation of the goals and objectives of the program by the President himself, there was every reason to believe that the central government was now ready to relinquish some of its powers to the people in the regions, districts and villages. Stated differently, it was hoped that decentralization would bring about a devolution of power, thereby unleashing and releasing the potential and capabilities of the local people in the struggle for social and economic development. Likewise, the local people through and with their local institutions would be in command of the resources necessary for development, and/or determine how to generate these resources, and if necessary how much they should tax themselves for their own development.

Following the same line of thinking, the local institutions were to be representative so as to make participatory democracy by the local people in these institutions possible. In this way, while exercising their power, the local people could effectively influence the decision-making process at the centre.

Such a transfer of power would have involved not only an administrative but a political reform, thereby altering significantly the central-local relations. Unfortunately, this is not what happened after the program was implemented.

First, the regional and district institutions retained their non-representative character. The heads and the new senior personnel of both institutions were all appointees of the President, and/or the Prime Minister. They owed their primary responsibility and accountability not to the public they served but to the President and the Prime Minister. Herein lies the first element of subordinative relations between the centre and local institutions.

Second, the various development committees at both local levels, including the district development councils, were overwhelmingly bureaucratic and technocratic. At the regional level, the representation of the local people in these committees was non-existent, whereas at the district level, it was at a ratio of five to one in favour of the bureaucrats and technocrats. But most important, these committees had a functional role with respect to both the regional and district administrations, since they were not empowered to make any binding decisions over administrative matters of the regions and districts, as well as over development matters, including the development funds allocated to the regions and districts. It was the same functional role these committees had played during the previous system of local administration. This same role, in turn, further reinforced the subordinate position of the local institutions, which became a dominant feature in the central local relations after decentralization.

And, finally, although the regional and district bureaucrats had some leverage over development funds,⁴ there was no fully fledged local autonomy. Both the regions and districts did not have the power to generate their own local resources, or collect local rates to meet their own development or administrative needs. In fact, what decentralization did was to restructure the previous institutional dependence by placing the regions and districts under a single institution, the Prime Minister's Office which became responsible for all their funds, recruitment and training of manpower, tools and equipments. Concomitantly, the nexus of central local relations was shifted from numerous central points to a single institutional base. But, at the same time, these relations were now governed by a multiplicity of hierarchical tiers beginning with the Parliament, the Cabinet, the PMO at the national level, and the regional and district institutions, including the village one, at the local level. This made it more difficult for the regional and district Authorities to have any

⁴Section 16(1,2) of the Decentralization Act of 1972, provides that all funds allocated to a region will be under the direct control and administration of the RDD as Accounting Officer, with some discretion in the system of expending the funds. The DDD has similar powers over district funds.

influence in the decisions made by the central government.

In summary, the central-local relations which prevailed after decentralization reveal little of a significant transfer of power to the regions and districts. In other words, if any power had been transferred through decentralization, central-local relations have revealed that this power was an administrative one. And it pertained to the senior civil servants who exercised this power on behalf of the central government. Secondly, although the government's efforts in institutionalizing participatory democracy in the villages were successful in principle, relations between the district and village administration militated against any meaningful translation of this participatory democracy to the district administration itself. The absence of a formula for this in both the Decentralization and Villagization Acts sent further adrift the possibility for the local people to participate fully in the district administration. Furthermore, even the localized participatory democracy through the village institutions was closely monitored and supervised by centrally appointed personnel known as village managers. These latter eventually came to control all village funds, the formulation and implementation of village development projects, and all financial dealings between the villages and the government financial institutions.

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It can be concluded, therefore, that the decentralization program of 1972 produced a decentralized administration which was not itself participatory in character, nor conducive to local participation. The idea of local autonomy and local democracy through a decentralized administration was therefore self-defeating in the Tanzanian model of a decentralized administration. Likewise, the institutionalization of participatory democracy by creating popularly elected institutions in the villages was a strategic mechanism invented by the government in order to reach out to the newly re-organized and registered villages. The intention was to control effectively the organization of peasant production, an attempt which was described by Hyden (1980:129-53) as the "capturing" of the peasants by the government in

the quest for increased productivity in the rural areas.

Decentralized Administration for Rural Development

From the above discussion it can be noted that both the concept of power to the region and participatory democracy had already been mitigated by institutional re-organization and unaltered central-local relations. Whether decentralized administration was meant for rural development in the country is the next question for discussion. However, it should be noted that this question is highly hypothetical. First, the Presidential document on "Decentralization", of 1972 did not make any direct reference to rural development. And, second, apart from the Presidential document of September, 1968, entitled "Socialism and Rural Development", there had been no coherent policy on rural development before and even after the decentralization program of 1972. For these two reasons, it is almost an impossible task to correlate the Tanzanian decentralized administration of 1972 with rural development, and thereby assess the impact of the former on the latter.

Nonetheless, it can be assumed that the need for decentralizing the administration was based on rural development because the Tanzanian development policies and strategies had emphasized rural development, as opposed to any other models of economic growth and development. Furthermore, the need could be deduced from the document on "Socialism and Rural Development", which broadly defined the policy of rural development in the country. Accordingly, rural development had been broadly regarded as a prerequisite for building a socialist and self-reliant society in Tanzania. By the same token, it had been viewed as a rural transformation which ultimately ought to lead to:

- (a) an improved or modern system of social production which would be characterized by a widely based application of modern tools and techniques in production
- (b) a democratic social setting in which egalitarianism and equality of all members of the society prevailed

- (c) an increased productivity with a simultaneous mechanism of an equitable distribution of wealth produced, in order to raise the living standards of all people, especially those in the rural areas, and to enable all Tanzanians to develop socially, economically and politically at an equal pace of development
- (d) a reduction of rural-urban inequalities in terms of real incomes, the extent to which supported taxation activities would serve the interests of all, and accessibility of basic social services and amenities which until then had been available only in the rural areas
- (e) the replacement of the traditional patterns with communal forms of production through organized communal or *Ujamaa* villages in which the dominant mode of labour would be communal, co-operative, and/or block [Nyerere, 1968:337-66].

These ideals of rural development have invariably been reiterated in the Decentralization document. And the desire to decentralize the administration might have evolved from these ideals. However, while implementing the decentralization program itself, the government paid much attention to controlling and/or improving certain variables which had to do with the institutions rather than with rural development. The variables can be elucidated from both the Decentralization document of 1972 and the Decentralization Act of 1972; and they fall under four categories: institutional co-ordination and integration of development activities; a democratized system of planning for development; financial and decision-making autonomy; and participatory democracy. Because of their significant importance to our study, we shall discuss each in detail.

Institutional Co-ordination and Integration

Before decentralization, development activities were virtually unco-ordinated and unintegrated in the regions. Each development ministry planned and implemented its own development projects or programs through its administrators in the field. Concomitantly, the field administrators had direct contact and were account-

able to their respective ministries in Dar es Salaam in all matters which pertained to the performance and implementation of their tasks and duties. Nevertheless, a vertical relationship between the field administrators and other regional and district administrators prevailed in matters of consultative significance.

Following decentralization, a Prime Minister was appointed, whose office, restyled the Prime Minister's Office, was accredited with full ministerial status. Since then, the PMO became the central co-ordinating and integrating institution for all development activities in the regions, whether these had been initiated, and/or planned, by individual development ministries, public institutions, foreign development agencies and institutions, or by the regions, districts and villages. The only development activities exempted were the national development projects such as industrial establishments, construction of major roads, exploration and extraction of natural resources, and so forth.

Furthermore, the PMO became the only spokesman for the regions in all administrative, financial and development matters before the central government and the Parliament. By the same token, all regional current and development budgets constituted part of the PMO's budget. In addition, recruitment and training of manpower for the regions and districts were under the responsibility of the PMO. All negotiations with foreign development institutions approached for financing rural development projects were carried out by, and/or under the auspice of, the PMO. And, finally, the PMO was responsible for providing assistance, monitoring and supervising the implementation of development projects and programs in the regions.

After the introduction of the village administration in 1975, about 8,000 registered villages and their institutions (village councils) were under the PMO's control, being responsible for all their activities, recruitment and training of village managers, *Ujamaa* and Co-operative Development officers, and other village functionaries such as accountants, shopkeepers, storekeepers, bookkeepers, and the village

leadership itself.

Thus, what was initially planned as a co-ordinating and integrating institution, the PMO emerged as a new "kingdom" with decentralization--"the kingdom of the PMO" consisting of 20 regions, 58 districts, and approximately 8,000 registered villages, not counting the 1000 or more scattered and unregistered villages. The "kingdom" was enshrined with administrative institutions such as the regional and district administrations, numerous village councils, and others, including the regional and district development corporations, co-operative societies, and folk training institutes.

In short, the decentralization program succeeded in one of its stated objectives; that is, to bring about an effective co-ordination and integration of development initiative in the country. How effective this co-ordination and integration was is another issue altogether, which will be discussed shortly. But, from the other side of the coin, the picture showed the centralization of power and control resting on the supposedly co-ordinating and integrating institution, the PMO, over all administrative, financial and development matters in the regions, districts and villages. In other words, what decentralization did was to shift power and control over development activities in the rural areas from the then multivariate centres to a single centre, the PMO. The PMO, in turn, became the only institution responsible and accountable to the central government and the Parliament with respect to development funds and development activities in general. Noting the enormous powers and control this institution was vested with, it is not possible to conclude that decentralization did indeed transfer power to the regions and the local people, unless the term 'power' meant simply the opportunity of the local people to express their development concerns and priorities.

A Democratized System of Planning for Development

Indeed, the opportunity of the local people to express their development needs and priorities to the central government prevailed in what could be described as a

democratized system of planning. President Nyerere rationalized the system in the following way:

... One of the major purposes of this re-organization [i.e. Decentralization] is to ensure that future economic planning stems from the people and serves the people directly ... The district Staff will be responsible for ensuring that ideas are sought from, and collected from, the people in the villages and the Divisions before the District Development Councils discuss these ideas and decide upon the problems and priorities for that District.

[Nyerere, 1972:5]

Interestingly, what is being described here by the President had already been in place through the committee system discussed in Chapter Four. What was therefore new, was the centrality of the PMO as the supervisor and controller of planning and implementation of development projects and programs in the rural areas. Also new was the involvement of the new local councils in planning and implementing development projects in their respective villages. This, in total, defines the nature and contents of the democratized system of planning for development, resulting from decentralization.

From an impressionistic view, the texture of the system is illustrated in Chart 2. Before decentralization, Central government Ministries played the primary role of decision-making units for development projects in the rural areas. Each ministry handled project proposals within the purview of its specialization, as they were so collected and submitted by ministry field administrators in the regions and districts. The Ministry then made its final decisions after negotiating with the Treasury. The then district or local government councils were responsible for projects in the areas of primary schools, dispensaries and health centres, although from 1968 on, these too fell under the direct control and responsibility of the central government.

With decentralization there was a separation of responsibilities and control with

regard to planning and implementation of development projects and programs in the country. The planning and implementation of parastatal and large national projects came under the central government. These projects constituted almost 86 percent of the national development budget [Coulson, 1975:13]. The planning and implementation agencies included individual ministries, public institutions, and/or foreign development agencies and institutions. The regions were usually involved in these projects at the implementation stage when some kind of local input such as the acquisition of land, or involvement of the local people, was needed by the implementing.

The planning and implementation of rural-based projects and programs, on the other hand, were charged to the PMO and its administrative institutions the regional, district and village institutions. Within this category of projects and programs, the whole idea of a democratized system of planning and implementing development evolved and was emphasized in the decentralization program of 1972.

As Chart 2 shows, at the base the local people, through their local institutions Village Assemblies and Village Councils which totalled by then about 8,000 performed two principal tasks in the whole exercise of planning: preparing the annual production targets for both cash and food crops for each village; and making proposals for development projects, together with estimates of their expenditure, according to the priorities of the village. The former was obligatory because the information was needed by the district authorities for preparing the production targets for the entire district, as well as for ensuring that each village in the district implemented its assigned production targets. The latter provided the district authority with information on the specific problems and needs of a particular village, whereas the estimates of their expenditure helped in the formulation and preparation of the district development budget.

The proposed production targets and projects were then forwarded to the ward development committees. Each of these committees compiled into a single devel-

Chart 2

**Flow Chart Presentation of Regional Authority Planning
During Decentralization Period, 1972-1982**

opinent plan all the proposals submitted by the village councils (usually between 5-10) under its jurisdiction.

Up to this stage the involvement of the local people was still in place and active, because most of the members of the ward development committee were also sitting on the village councils and village assemblies. But, at the district level and upwards, the involvement of the local people changed dramatically. First, their role was replaced by the bureaucrats and technocrats. These became the major players in both the District Development Council (DDC) and the District Development and Planning Committee (DDPC), as they constituted almost the majority against the elected members in both bodies. Further, they were the only players in the District Management Team (DMT) which dealt with the technical and fiscal aspects in the formulation and preparation of the district development plan. Second, the involvement of the local people in both the DDC and DDPC took a new dimension: a representative participation through the District Councillors, and/or constituent MPs, and not a direct one through their elected village leaders.⁵ And, third, the rules of the game for setting up development priorities were altered at the district level without the knowledge of the village councils. But most important, the exercise, at the district level, had been one of reconciling the district priorities and interests with those contained in development plans submitted by the villages. The district priorities were usually based on either the previous incompleeted projects, or the recommendations or targets set by the regional authority and/or the national development plan, or from a well-placed interest group in the district. Thus, the concept of sponsorship had become the major influencing factor in the final decision on whether or not a proposed development project (especially from the villages) should be included in the district development plan [Leonard, et al., 1975:8-12]. In

⁵Section 44(9, 10) of the Constitution of the Party provides that all village chairmen and secretaries are members of the District Executive Committee in their capacity as chairmen and secretaries of the Party branches in the villages. See, the Constitution of Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM), part III, Sect. 44(9, 10), (1982), p. 29. But these were not members of the DDC and DDPC, nor were they invited as observers in these decision-making bodies of the district.

addition, the process of screening and scrutinizing done by the DMT and other district organs—the DDC and DDPC—threw out many of the proposed projects of the villages mostly because of the financial constraints of the district.

Hence, by the time the process of formulating and preparing the district development plan was completed, much of the euphoria of the democratized system of planning had lost its glamour. Although the district development plan reflected basically the development problems and needs of the district, it did not directly represent the expressed wishes and priorities of the villages. And the information obtained from various regional and district officials showed that there was no formula by which a district used this information to ensure that the priorities of each village were given equal and fair treatment while formulating and preparing the district development plan for each year. Admittedly though, the priorities set by the villages constituted vital inputs in determining and formulating the major goals and objectives of a district development plan.

At the regional level, the involvement of the local people was marginal, as their representation in the Regional Development Committee (RDC) was limited to the constituent MPs residing in the region, whereas their elected district councillors were excluded. Although the region had no particular territory other than the district territorial areas, the development plans of the districts were also subjected to scrutiny, screening and a shelving out process by the regional authority. This process was not just a matter of exercising authority over the planners of the districts, but more so because the region itself had its own development priorities drawn largely on the basis of the financial ceiling given to each region by the central government on both current and capital development expenditure. Furthermore, it was the responsibility of the regional authorities to ensure that the regional development priorities were in tune with the goals and objectives of the national development plans.

In the light of both, therefore, the process of planning for development at the

regional level became a complex one, in that it involved a process of reconciling different sets of interests: the national, regional, and consolidated district interests. And, secondly, the proposed regional development plan had to accommodate these various sets of interests within the allocated regional ceiling of funds, given the fact that neither the regions nor the districts were empowered to generate their own local resources whether for current or capital development purposes. In other words, all financing for development and regional and district administrations was under the central government. The outcome of both exercises was the production of a single regional development plan which was submitted to the PMO.

The PMO represented the national level in this democratized system of planning for development. After receiving all development plans from the regions, another process of planning began. The PMO first balanced three sets of interests—those of the national development plan, the ministries, and the regions—and then compiled and produced a development budget for the regions in consultation with the functional ministries. The next step involved bargaining and negotiating with the Treasury for allocation of the needed funds to finance the development budget of the regions. And, finally, the Prime Minister submitted the development budget of the regions to the Parliament for approval.

In order to assist the PMO in this process of planning, McKinsey & Co. had produced a planning guide manual. It contained a plan with six steps to be followed while co-ordinating the three sets of interests mentioned above. The steps were:

- (a) compiling current development status
- (b) proposing development objectives
- (c) determining resource requirements
- (d) agreeing on objectives and funding
- (e) preparing implementation plans
- (f) controlling implementation [McKinsey & Co. Inc.,

1974:1-5, and Exhibit 1-1].

These planning guidelines applied also to the regional authorities while preparing their regional development plans. However, they were never followed because, as one senior official in the PMO put it, "they were too technical, formalistic, and time consuming." A similar view prevailed among several regional planners [Hyden, 1976:44-45].

Nonetheless, what should be emphasized here is that the participatory character of the decentralized system of planning, as it was so anticipated in the decentralized program, diminished gradually from the district to the regional level. It reached a state of oblivion by the time the development plans of the regions were in the hands of the PMO. The PMO was completely autonomous in making the final decisions concerning the development proposals of the regions because the regional authorities, or their senior officials, were not represented in the decision-making process by the PMO. Their only guarantee that their development proposals would receive a fair and favourable treatment in terms of funding, was the principle of 'Incrementalism' used by the regions and the government ministries in budgeting for current and capital development expenditure. Accordingly, if a region received, for example, for a given year, T2. Shs. 27.5 million for its current and capital development expenditure, in the following year the same amount would be the starting point of its ceiling during the formulation of its development budget for the second year. Any increment to this amount would have to be justified by the Regional Development Director. Apart from this surety, the regional authorities remained powerless in influencing either the PMO or the central government on decisions which affected their financial situation.

The above presents a general picture of the democratized system of planning for development and how ideally it was to be operationalized. There were several advantages derived from it. It provided a mechanism by which the central government was kept constantly aware of the imminent and most pressing problems of the rural areas. Additionally, it enabled the central government to obtain various

demands from the rural areas before formulating and preparing a national economic development plan which would reflect the rural needs. The approximately 35-45 per cent of the national development budget,⁶ which had always been allocated annually for regional development budgets, points to the significance given by the central government to these demands.

Also, the decentralized system of planning provided an organized and manageable method of allowing various social groups in the rural areas to express their most immediate and pressing problems and needs through their organized institutions to the central government, even though the central government could respond to only a few within the immediate future.

Indeed, from the advantages which arose from the decentralized system of planning, decentralization had achieved one of its objectives. This was getting central and local institutions involved simultaneously in the process of planning for development. At the same time, this process was to be controlled, co-ordinated and integrated by a single central institution. Our observations on how the whole system actually functioned have verified this involvement of the local institutions in planning for development, though with varying degrees and capacities. In the villages, districts and regions which have been observed, there has been both an impetus and enthusiasm for planning for development. And often times the enthusiasm had led to what Hyden [1976:17-18] has described as "*Homa ya Miradi*" ('Projects Fever'), as each institution became engaged in formulating new development projects every year. Furthermore, the impetus was boosted in the villages as the government deployed planning and implementation of development projects in the villages as one of the principal indicators for selecting the best village(s) in a ward, district, region and the whole country.

Nevertheless, the local institutions were merely engaged in identifying and proposing their priorities without even knowing the capacity of the central government in

⁶This is an aggregate percentage derived from the Annual Plans of Tanzania for 1973/74; 1974/75; 1975/76; 1976/77; 1977/78; 1978/79; 1979/80; 1980/81 [Dar es Salaam: Government Printer].

financing the final product of their planning exercise. The actual planning, as we have pointed out, began with the PMO, and was finalized by the central planning machinery. The whole purpose of involving the local institutions was to expedite the process of identifying development problems and needs in the rural areas. And through the local institutions themselves, the central government obtained all the information and data necessary for formulating and preparing a national economic and development plan. Looking at it from this perspective, therefore, the entire decentralized system of planning was a servicing system to the planning machinery of the central government. And to emphasize its servicing character, the local institutions were permitted to deal only with the agricultural sector and its ancillary services while planning for development. This was evident in all regional, district, and village development plans. For example, we have found in both Morogoro and Kilimanjaro Regions that the development projects planned and proposed in their annual, or five-year development plans focused on the promotion, and/or development of livestock, agricultural production of both cash and food crops, irrigation, horticulture, agricultural pilot villages, natural resources (such as forestry, dam rehabilitation), gardening of fruits and vegetables, feeder rural roads, and small-scale cottage industries.⁷ All other sectoral linkages had been left out of their development plans. Noting with concern the problems they faced with this exclusion, the planning officials of Morogoro Region, in the five-year development plan of the region, pressed for a change in the current marketing system to allow greater autonomy and control by the regions over the marketing system in the country. The suggestion was entitled "Freedom in the Marketing system", and contained the following:

⁷These have been extracted from: Morogoro Region Five Year Development Plan (1984/85-1989/90), "Development Programmes and Identified Projects, Vol. II, mimeo, (Morogoro Region: Office of the Regional Commissioner, 1984), Appendices 1-6; and, Kilimanjaro Region, Annual Development Plans for 1977/78, and 1984/85 [Moshi, Kilimanjaro Region: Office of the Regional Commissioner, 1977 and 1984], File No. KR/D30/55/V, May 1977 and 1984.

The present marketing arrangements are too inflexible, unfavourable to efforts to increase production in agriculture. Hence the need to relax price controls and allow competitive marketing as an incentive to peasants to increase agricultural production.

The above suggestion, though not heeded by the central government, strengthens further the point that the local institutions were involved in planning for agro-centric development projects. Likewise, it demonstrates how the local institutions were not interactive with other institutions which dealt with the sectoral linkages of agriculture.

Therefore, it can be concluded from the above discussion that the Tanzanian system of planning for development was basically centralized. What was improved in the system through decentralization was the establishment of a single central institution for co-ordinating and integrating development activities in the rural areas; the involvement of the local people in identifying and proposing their development needs and priorities through their local institutions—the village councils; and the commissioning of the regional and district institutions to implement the centrally approved development projects rather than by individual ministries of the central government. From this perspective, it could be said that decentralization brought about a significant change in the Tanzanian system of planning, which has been characterized by the Tanzanian leadership as a democratized system of planning for development. But, as we have demonstrated above, it was simply a mechanism by which the planning machinery of the central government obtained vital ingredients from the rural areas, necessary for formulating a national economic and development plan reflecting the rural needs. To that effect the administration was decentralized in order to manage and administer this mechanism of transmitting rural needs and demands to the central government.

Financial and Decision-Making Autonomy

Although decentralization was a success in terms of having a co-ordinated system of planning, there was a tremendous regression in the transfer of financial and decision-making autonomy to the regions and districts. It could further be said that the village institutions enjoyed more autonomy than the regional and district institutions, because they financed several local development projects on their own, such as village shops, stores, godowns, storages, and so forth. This autonomy has been observed in several villages in Moshi and Morogoro districts. To illustrate the point, the village councils of Mkuyuni, Tandai, Kinole, Bagilo and Tegetero in Morogoro District had each decided to purchase a lorry for transporting crops from their villages to Morogoro and Dar es Salaam. Each council could make this decision because the village had enough savings of its own for the down-payment required before filing for a loan from NBC/KARADHA. Only the implementation of this decision was unduly delayed in each village because of the bureaucratic red-tape at the district level, which had to endorse their application forms for a loan. For example, Bagilo and Tegetero villages had their application forms held up for a period of 8 to 12 months.⁸

Similarly, the enormous economic activities,⁹ planned, financed and implemented by the villages throughout the country, could be used as further proof of the rural dynamism resultant from the exercise of their autonomy. Had decentralization been a political program, this was the kind of rural dynamism which the leadership should have capitalized on to unleash, nurture and sustain the potential of the rural people in every way possible, so that it could act as a force for rural transformation in the country. Unfortunately, this political will was lacking, in spite of the rhetoric of transferring power to the people through decentralization; and, hence,

⁸This observation has been made from the documents of the two villages. File No. MG/KIJ/BA 400/79, Kijiji cha Bagilo, 1979; File No. KIJ/MHT/TE/2/1/79, Kijiji cha Tegetero, 1979.

⁹For details of these economic activities, see, PMO-Nordic Project, Report on Village Survey, 1979, Appendix, mimeo, [Dodoma: PMO, Ujamaa and Co-operative Development Department, April, 1980], Appendix V(3.1-4.5).

the emergent rural dynamism remained underdeveloped.

With respect to the regional and district institutions, their financial and decision-making autonomy was at best nebulous. They were directly financed by the central government. By the same token, each of their development projects and programs had first to be approved by the central government which, of course, provided for its funding. Their budgets were also itemized into votes and the funds had to be expended in compliance with the votes. Thus, for example, if vote A were exhausted for some reasons before the end of the fiscal year, the vote had to be closed, together with the item which fell under that vote, even if the item represented an ongoing development project. If the vote was one which could not be closed, then a request for emergency funds had to be submitted to the PMO. Only in cases where savings from one vote had accrued was the RDD, or DDD, authorized to transfer the savings to an ailing vote without asking permission from the PMO, or the RDD in the case of the DDD; provided that such a transfer would be shown in the annual financial statement.

The only autonomy these institutions possessed involved the authority to determine and decide which specific development projects and programs should be awarded high priority, and, therefore, be included in the development project proposals to be submitted to the PMO, or to the Regional Development Committee in the case of the district institutions. Likewise, they had the power to decide on strategies and methods for implementing the approved development projects, as well as for enforcing increased productivity in the rural areas. For both the regional and district bureaucrats needed no permission from the PMO, or from the central government. Otherwise, it is difficult to comprehend the financial and decision-making autonomy of these institutions, said to be decentralized, without a meaningful transfer of power to generate and control their own resources for development purposes, or at least to have full control over the resources allocated to them for the same purposes. This was one of the greatest failures of the decentralization program. By

the same token, the so-called decentralized administration became functional and administrative to the central government. It served the central government rather than the local people in managing and administering both the mechanisms of planning for development in the rural areas, and the development funds allocated by the central government for implementing the centrally approved development projects and programs.

Participatory Democracy

In contrast to financial and decision-making autonomy, participatory democracy made great strides, at least at the village level, through decentralization. In spite of imperfections such as poor leadership, inadequate resources and facilities, the village institutions were centres of not only economic and development activities, but also demonstrated participatory democracy in the villages. High levels of attendance, free discussions and debates on village issues, participation in self-help schemes and communal work were some of the characteristic features of participatory democracy observed in several villages in Mbshi and Morogoro Districts. And what made these institutions participatory and democratic was the fact that the leadership had to account for all major decisions, particularly concerning financial matters, to the village assemblies. Failure to do so led, often times, to not being re-elected. In short, participatory democracy in the villages embodied not only the mobilization and involvement of people in self-help schemes, but also the power of the people in influencing decisions made by their village leadership. Through this power the local people were able to decide who should, or should not, be their leaders.

At the regional and district level, however, the power of the local people was transformed into the modern version of representative democracy. Even then this representative democracy was marginal at both levels for reasons discussed earlier. To reiterate the key one, both regional and district administrations were not representative institutions, except for the district development council which yet had no executive powers over the Area Commissioner and his administrative institution.

Thus, there was no way in which the local people could meaningfully influence the regional and district administrations through their representatives who themselves possessed no executive authority. To that effect, participatory democracy was confined to the villages, while representative democracy became featured marginally in the district institutions. And the regional institution, which was superior to all other local institutions was divorced from both participatory and representative democracy.

It is not our intention here to engage in a theoretical discussion on whether representative democracy is, and/or should be, the same as participatory democracy, or whether participatory democracy equally means the involvement of people in the implementation of development projects. From what we have attempted to demonstrate, our position should be clear; that is, participatory democracy prevailed in the village institutions, whereas it was marginal in the regional and district institutions because the local people had no influence in decisions made by these institutions, nor were these institutions representing the people they served. In short, decentralization had little impact on participatory democracy; and this impact was at the level of the villages.

In summary, although these variables are important for development, they are insufficient for several reasons to make a decentralized administration a viable tool for rural development. Rural development is a multi-faceted process influenced by many factors other than institutional ones, if the process is to lead to the desired goals. Secondly, the decentralized administration in Tanzania had been made to operate under a tightly controlled and centralized economy in which all economic sectors were beyond the control and power of the decentralized administration. All were centrally controlled and managed by the State immediately after the Arusha Declaration of 1967, on "Socialism and Self-Reliance." And among all other public institutions which controlled and managed one sector of the economy or another, the decentralized administration was virtually excluded from controlling and managing

any economic sector. Even the regional and district development corporations, and the Regional Development Fund, decentralized in 1968, were not under the direct control and management of the regional or district administration. Finally, the decentralized administration had been evolved in a political system which was (and still is) autocratic in character, in which the Party was the supreme overlord in all local and national matters ranging from policy to endorsing permits for conducting a petty business. Even after ten years of politicizing the public, the institutions and the bureaucracy of the State, the Party was still wary and distrustful of the decentralized administration. Consequently, only administrative (and not political) power was transferred from the centre to the local authorities.

Demise of the Decentralized System of Administration

The marginal success in controlling, and/or improving, the four variables seemed to have carried little weight in the continuity of the decentralized system of administration. The apparent success was further overshadowed by the failure in achieving the other objectives of decentralization, which were anticipated by McKinsey & Co. Inc. and the government, once the four variables had been effectively controlled or improved.

For example, it was anticipated that rural-urban inequalities, especially income differentials, would gradually be reduced through a decentralized administration. But, by 1979, statistics showed a widening of this gap, as real income dropped from 20 to 25 per cent below 1973 levels for minimum wage earners,¹⁰ 5 to 10 per cent for most peasants, and over 50 per cent for the majority of salary earners [Green, 1980:8]. It was also expected that the government bureaucracy would be reduced in the regions, as development tasks were integrated into fewer departments. Here again, it has been shown that employment rates in the regions had increased by approximately 28 percent from 1973 to June 30, 1980, or from 472,503 in 1973 to

¹⁰ In 1973 the minimum wage was Tz. Shs. 380/- per month for urban areas, and Shs. 230/- for rural areas. See, memo No. KMU/S/11/103, of June 20, 1979, *Kamati ya Rais ya Mashirika ya Umma kwa Wakuu wote wa Mashirika na Makampuni ya Umma*, Dar es Salaam, 1979

603,193 on June 30, 1980 [Bureau of Statistics, 1982:71; Annual Manpower Report, 1977:21], whereas the agricultural GDP tended to decline at a rate of 5 per cent in the period between 1976 and 1981 [Ministry of Agriculture, 1982:21]. Finally, it was anticipated that decentralization would increase, and/or improve, the capacity of the administration of both the PMO and the regions and districts in planning and implementing development projects and programs. The Prime Minister reported in the Parliament in 1979, that the overall performance of the PMO in supervising development projects in the region has been in the range of 70 per cent capacity or 14 out of 20 regions in every year, whereas implementation performance in the regions ranged from 65 to 75 per cent capacity annually. This performance was described as unsatisfactory which ought to be unproved in the future [PM's Budget Speech, 1979:8]. These few examples certainly have overshadowed the partial success of the decentralization program in the country.

Many critics have painted a similarly gloomy picture of the program since its inception. For example, Mapolur and Philippon [1975:28] have argued, from an institutional point of view, that, the successive institutional changes in Tanzania, especially the establishment of a chain of development committees and decentralization, have had a negative impact on rural production, as well as on increasing citizen participation. Viewing decentralization from a class perspective, Samoff contends that the failure of decentralization was in itself associated with "the very character of the national ruling class," which was itself a focus for conflict. And he concludes: "It would seem clear then that decentralization programs, undertaken within the setting of a ruling bureaucratic class and a dominant ideology of technology, are unlikely to achieve the goal of increased production and productive capacity" [Samoff, 1979:56-57]. Others have focused on decentralization vis-à-vis popular participation. For example, Mosha [1976:64] concluded: "Popular participation does not appear to have increased as a result of the re-organization" [i.e., Decentralization]. Mayaya [1976:54] made a similar comment: "... as far as Tanzania's decentraliza-

tion is concerned . . . the newly established rural-government structure [i.e., Village Council] is not conducive to enhancing popular participation". Mayaya refers here to participation of the villagers at the centre. Kundi [1976:39] also observed "that the decentralization measures proclaimed in 1972 have not so far succeeded in facilitating popular participation in decision-making." And Lobulu [1976:46], arguing from the same decision-making perspective, concluded: ". . . substantive decisions are made by the bureaucrats at the district headquarters rather than the people as stipulated in the decentralization blue-print."

Still other criticisms, which cover all aspects of the decentralization program, are found in the well documented Decentralization Research Projects carried out by R. Baguma (1975, 1974), G. Hyden (1976), D G.R. Belshaw (1977), D. Leonard et al. (1975), A. Coulson (1975), and S.S. Mushi (1978, 1979). In all these research projects, decentralization has been generally described as a failure in reducing regional disparities; increasing agricultural production of both cash and food crops; minimizing rural-urban inequalities; transferring power to the regions and districts; promoting popular participation at the regional and district level; and improving administrative capacity in the regions and districts, particularly in project implementation performance and supervision. According to these researchers, the problems associated with these failures were multiple. Some derived from the institutional arrangement which centralized power and control over development resources to the centre. Others emanated from the application of the technico-management model by administrators who were not trained in management and organizational skills and techniques. Still others originated from the usually acclaimed administrative incapacity of the administrators, particularly in managing development funds and project performance in planning and implementation of development projects. And, finally, other problems emerged from the non-participatory character of the decentralized institutions.

All these criticisms are valid, and they seem to indicate that the decentralization

program in Tanzania was not all that plausible an effort to undertake. However, such an interpretation might be correct when one looks at the stated objectives and goals which were expected through decentralization. The questions then which have never been probed are: why did the government remain adamant in the face of all the criticisms raised, including those of McKinsey & Co. which had been monitoring the decentralized system up to 1975; and why, instead of correcting and improving the weakness of the system, did the government decide to abolish it in 1982? The answers to these questions might reveal government intentions different from those stated in the decentralization document. And this is what we intend to do here.

We shall examine first what was decentralized. Decentralization involved basically the establishment of the PMO whose role and functions in the new decentralized system of administration have been explained earlier. Secondly, it entailed the creation of four senior posts at the regional and district levels, which were filled by senior civil servants from the central government. And thirdly, the regional and district planning machinery was strengthened by the appointment of these four senior bureaucrats, as well as by establishing regional and district management teams for planning purposes. The other nominal change was the restyling of the defunct district councils as district development councils. Apart from these changes, the institutional power-structures and central control over development resources, remained unaltered, as they had been before decentralization. In short, the designers of the new decentralized administration had constructed an organizational structure which was not conducive to popular participation. When the decentralization program was being implemented the government and the Party kept a close watch on all these changes. And it would be naïve to suggest that both were not happy with the changes because participatory democracy and real transfer of power to the regions and districts had not been adequately dealt with in the new changes. Every indication pointed to the contrary. For example, the same government and Party had earlier rejected completely the recommendations made by the Pratt Commission on

"Decentralization of Government in Tanzania", which had sought to grant more autonomy to the regions in financial, planning, and administrative matters in order to make them real "development-fronts" in the country [Pratt, et al., 1969:37-67]. Yet, the same government and the Party accepted most of the recommendations made by McKinsey & Co. Inc., and charged the consultant firm with the responsibility of not only designing the decentralized administration, but of monitoring its functioning and performance for a period of three years. Three years were enough for the government and Party to detect any shortfalls in the transfer of power to the regions and district, as well as in the extent to which the decentralized administration was participatory and democratic.

The fact that this was not done suggests strongly that the government was satisfied with the new institutional arrangement. It also points out that the government was not all that serious in transferring real power to the regions, districts, and eventually to the people. In other words, it all amounts to saying that there was no political will among the leadership to share their political power and control with the local institutions. The above changes, therefore, could in no way effectuate a transfer of power to the regions and districts, including financial autonomy and participatory democracy. Unfortunately, most of the criticisms raised against the decentralization program are centred on these aspects. But these criticisms could be regarded as uncalled for because none of these aspects were mapped out by the government as essential for decentralization to succeed in its objectives and goals, while the administration was being reorganized.

Thus, what needs to be examined in all these changes are the unstated intentions of the government for introducing decentralization. Here we reiterate our initial position that decentralization was primarily for creating an effective and efficient administrative system by which the central government could monitor, supervise and control agricultural production in the rural areas. Such an administrative system was imperative especially in the wake of the villagization programs nicknamed

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"Operation Vijiji" (Villages) or "Operation *Sogeza*" ('moving')—which began on the eve of decentralization, and became forceful by 1973. Likewise, decentralization was to offset all the preliminary work of planning for national economic development, which until then was overly concentrated in the central institutions, particularly after the nationalization programs of 1967 and thereafter. Under decentralization the local institutions were charged with the responsibility of performing this preliminary work which was referred to as a democratized system of planning for development. And, as we have pointed out, this had successfully been achieved through the establishment of the PMO, and the involvement of the local institutions from the regional down to the village levels. Therefore, the decentralized administration was essentially for managing and administering both the sought for control and supervision of the rural areas for increased production, and the preliminary work of planning on behalf of the central planning machinery. By the same token, the decentralized regional and district institutions were administrative agents of the central government, whereas the village institutions became agencies of the district institutions. In other words, the Tanzanian decentralization program was a functional or administrative form of decentralization.

Viewing it from this perspective, we strongly maintain that the decentralized program had achieved the objectives intended by the government and the Party. These objectives unfortunately had been camouflaged by the publicly stated objectives and goals contained in the decentralization document. Concomitantly, the success of these unstated objectives has been overshadowed by the failure of most of the stated goals and objectives, thereby generating criticisms of the entire decentralization program.

This brings us to our second question: why did the government abolish an administrative system which had apparently been promoting the interests and unstated objectives of the government? There are no straightforward answers to this question. One possible answer lies in the onslaught of criticisms mounted by critics

in and outside the country concerning the too many failures of the decentralized administration. Another possible answer can be deduced from the apparent mistrust the political leadership had of the technical planners and functional managers for being too technical, thereby slowing the pace of development [Mushi, 1978:79]. However, the government gave its own version of the issue. First, it admitted that it was a mistake in the first place to have abolished the local government system whose institutions had really represented the people. Second, the decentralized system of administration was basically a system of deconcentration designed so by McKinsey & Co. Inc., which was inappropriate for the Tanzanian situation. And third, the system failed to promote and consolidate democracy in the country according to the principles of Socialism and Self-Reliance [PMO, 1980:6, 11-14; *Tanzania Hansard*, 1982:26-68].

In the absence of supportive evidence, we have no reason to doubt the veracity of the government's version concerning the abolition of the decentralized system of administration. Its version also makes a clear admission of the failure in the experimentation with a functional form of decentralization in the country for a period of ten years. We therefore contend that the decentralized administration was abolished because the government had good reasons for doing away with it, just as it did with the local government system in 1972.

Conclusion

We have been concerned in this chapter with the second form of decentralization—the functional administrative decentralization—which was in place after the abolition of the institutional decentralization. We have identified three main goals for this second attempt by Tanzania to decentralize its administration. These are: promotion of local autonomy and democracy; improvement of administrative capacity in dealing with development in the rural areas; and promotion of rural development. All these goals were intended to be mutually inclusive, and hence to be achieved simultaneously through a decentralized administration.

From the beginning of the discussion we have argued that the decentralized administration of 1972 was essentially functional to the central government and the Party; and, therefore, the local administration was substantially the same as previously. We have focused on the organizational structures and central-local relations to demonstrate the argument. And it has been shown here that the organizational structure of the regional and district institutions was not conducive to participatory democracy. On the contrary, it reinforced the subordinate nature of these institutions to the central government institutions. Likewise, the central-local relations were based on a superior-junior type of relationship. Consequently, local autonomy and democracy, as well as real transfer of power to the regions and to the people was never effectuated through decentralization.

With respect to rural development, we have pointed out that the same factors which inhibited the previous system of administration from playing an effective role in rural development prevailed in the decentralized local institutions. Nonetheless, an attempt was made by the government to improve the administrative capacity of these institutions for this purpose. Unfortunately, the marginal success of this attempt was inadequate in making the local institutions effective instruments for promoting rural development. In other words, the failures outweighed what was apparently achieved through decentralization.

In spite of these failures which were admitted later by the government, we have argued and demonstrated that the decentralization program had achieved the unstated intentions of the government in decentralizing the administration, one of which was to make the local institutions centres for collecting information and primary data necessary for national economic and development planning.

It would seem that the abolition of the system was a result of the government's own ultimate recognition of the failure of a system which was so popularly promoted. In the next chapter we shall see the extent to which the lessons learned from this failure have been influential in the reconstruction of the local government system.

CHAPTER SIX

Reinstatement of Local Government System

1982

This chapter deals with local governments which were reintroduced by the government in 1982. It focuses on the major changes which were entrenched in the local government system in order to explain and analyze: a) the difference between the local governments of 1982 and those of 1962, and b) the prospects of the former for promoting rural development and participatory democracy.

Apparently, the lessons derived from the failures of the previous two systems of local administration had provided the government with enlightenment in the reconstruction of the new local governments. Our discussion, therefore, will begin with a brief description of the kind of information the government had before introducing changes in the system of local government.

Lessons Learned from Past Experience

On May 13, 1980, the government appointed a committee of 23 members drawn from different walks of life. It was charged to look into:

- a) the possibility of changing the existing decentralized system of administration in order to make possible the re-establishment and incorporation of local governments into the decentralized structure of the regional and district administration
 - b) the practicability of re-establishing district councils which would have full powers and authority exercised by popularly elected councils and not by the bureaucracy, and thereby make suggestions on how this could be implemented
- [Committee's Report, 1980:IV(a)]

Before making their recommendations on both terms of reference, the committee mapped out the major weaknesses which, according to its members, had by and large contributed to the failures of the previous systems of local administration. We shall summarize the weaknesses identified in each system of local administration.

Weaknesses of the Local Government System of 1962

With respect to the Local Government system of 1962, the committee observed that:

- a) The activities of the local governments were focusing virtually entirely on the provision of social services and minimally on production
- b) Their development plans and projects were short-term and goal-oriented, not interactive with those of the district, and not integrated into the regional and national development plans and projects, including those carried out by individual ministries in the districts
- c) The district councils lacked expertise and technology in planning and implementing development projects because they did not have qualified and trained manpower
- d) The entire system made the poor districts poorer, while the prosperous ones could not play a supportive role in reducing district inequalities, because each district council was treated the same before the law, regardless of its potential and ability to function as a district council
- e) The government's decision to revoke the powers of the districts to generate their own local revenues through the collection of local rates and produce cess in 1969 and 1970, respectively, prevented the smooth functioning of the councils, including those which had been performing relatively well [Committee's Report,

1980:7-8]

These were perceived by the committee as the chief weaknesses which had contributed to the failure of the local governments of 1962, both as instruments for promoting rural development and for functioning as government units of the local administration.

Weaknesses of the Decentralized Administration of 1972

Concerning the decentralized system of administration of 1972, the committee

noted that:

- a) The organizational structure of the decentralized administration was based on management and organizational principles of western-type productive establishments, thereby turning the regions and districts into industrial enterprises
- b) The whole concept of viewing the regions and districts as production organizations was distorted by McKinsey & Co. Inc. which had designed the organizational structure of their administration
- c) A deconcentration, rather than a devolution, model was used by McKinsey in designing the organizational structure which ultimately was not conducive for popular participation to prevail
- d) Power and authority over development resources were essentially retained by the central government, whereas at the regional and district levels decisions over development issues were increasingly made by unelected organs such as the Regional Development Committees, and the bureaucracy, contrary to the spirit of Section 19 of the Decentralization Act no. 27, of 1972, which urged that such decisions be made by the people or by their elected organs [Committee's Report, 1980:15-19]

Although there were several other weaknesses, these were cited as the principal ones contributing to the failure of the decentralized administration.

Hence, drawing from both experiences, the committee suggested a retention of the decentralized system of administration, but with modifications which would make possible the incorporation of local governments into the system. To this end, it recommended:

- a) changes in the structure and functions of the decentralized institutions in the regions, districts and villages
- b) the establishment of district councils under the previous laws of local government to replace the existing district development councils
- c) the restoration of the powers and authority of the local governments with respect

to finance, employment of personnel, and to legislate by-laws. By the same token, they should be empowered to collect local rates as a means of generating their own local revenues.

The committee further recommended the appointment of District Executive Directors as senior civil servants to head the administration of the district councils, as well as the appointment of a Commissioner for Local Governments to ensure the local government authorities function according to the "instruments" of the establishment. Finally, the committee proposed that the District Executive Directors be employees of the district councils to which they should also be responsible and accountable. In addition, they should be the Executive Employment Officers and Accounting Officers of the monies of the district councils. And, the district Party chairmen should continue to be ex-officio chairmen of the district councils, while the vice-chairmen were to be elected by and among the elected members of the councils [Committee's Report, 1980:19].

Reinstatement of Local Government System

The government responded favourably to most of the recommendations and proposals made by the committee. In mid 1982, the Parliament enacted a series of Parliamentary Acts related to local government. These Acts provided the statutory basis for the re-establishment of local governments, their negotiating machinery as employers, financial powers and resources, and a local government commission. Likewise, some of the provisions of the Decentralization Act no. 27, of 1972, were repealed and/or amended in order to incorporate the new local governments into the district administration.¹

Although most of the substance contained in these Acts was the same as in the previous local government acts of 1962, there were a number of significant changes.

¹ These Acts are: The Local Government (District Authorities) Act no. 7; The Local Government (Urban Authorities) Act no. 8; The Local Government Negotiating Machinery Act, no. 11; The Local Government Finances Act, no 9; The Local Government Service Act no. 10; and The Decentralization of Government Administration (Interim Provision) (Amendment) Act no. 12, of 1982. All these Acts became law on June 28, 1982.

First, the Decentralization Act no. 27 of 1972 was not completely repealed. Instead, some provisions relating to the district development council, and the post and functions of the district development director, planning officer, district development and planning committee, and district management team were repealed. Other provisions relating to regional and district development committees, and the powers and functions of the Regional and Area Commissioners in relation to district councils were amended, as we shall see shortly. This meant that, in principle, the government had decided to merge the institutional with the administrative form of decentralization. In other words, at the regional level the decentralized structure of 1972 remained virtually intact, whereas the local government structure was made to interlock with the decentralized structure at the district level. This is the novelty of the current system.

Apparently, the retention of the decentralized structure was partly in response to the recommendations of the committee, which had urged the government not to abolish it, but to make modifications which would make the incorporation of local governments possible. Its retention was also to satisfy the critics from inside the Party, the Government, and particularly the Parliament. A member of the committee explained that the issue of reintroducing the local governments along with local rates and other forms of local taxation had generated a serious opposition among the members of the committee, which had threatened a breakdown of the committee's business. Several members of the committee had voiced their reservations on the re-establishment of local governments, arguing that this would be a step back to the colonial era during which these institutions had first been created.

Similar reservations had been echoed by members of the Parliament while debating the various local government acts. Some had strongly suggested the abolition of the entire decentralized system of administration because it had failed to promote development in the rural areas. Others expressed concern over the possibility of the new district councils having full powers and authority under the decentralized

structure of the regional administration. Still others questioned the rationality of the government's decision to re-introduce the district councils amidst the serious economic crisis facing the country, thereby making them start functioning in an already economically crisis-ridden environment.² In spite of these concerns, the government decided to go ahead with the local government system.

Another significant change contained in the acts involved the integration of the ward development committees and village institutions into the district councils. Previously, these tended to oscillate between the district administration and the district development council. Under the Villagization Act of 1975, the village institutions became further separated and semi-autonomous with powers to levy and tax themselves for their own local development projects. But, as of 1982, the Villagization Act of 1975 was repealed. All village institutions, including the ward development committees, were placed under the district council. Thus, the village institutions and the wards became lower institutions of the district council, instead of operating and functioning as separate administrative units.³

This change curtailed the semi-autonomy by then enjoyed by the village institutions, particularly in matters of generating their own revenues. On the other hand, it was necessary in the wake of the powers granted to the district authorities for the latter to collect local rates and other levies. Villages were the principal assets and sources from which the district councils were empowered to effectuate all forms of levies and taxation. Had it not been for this integration, the power of the local governments to levy and tax the villagers would have generated a legal conflict between them and the village institutions. Furthermore, the integration consolidated the relationship between the district councils as senior partners and the village institutions as junior partners in their common struggle for development in the rural areas. In addition, it provided for a direct participation of the village

²For details on these debates, see, *Tanzania Hansard*, The Local Government (District Authorities) Bill, 1982, 1st Reading, p. 26-68.

³For details, see, The Local Government (District Authorities) Act, no. 7, of 1982, Sections 55-62, 103-110, 141-46, and 163-67, p. 66-67, 78-79, 92-94, and 101-02, respectively.

institutions in the district councils. Section 35 (1,f) of the Local Government Act provided that other members to be elected by the district council, and thereby sit on the council, were to be drawn from the village chairmen. Their membership was to be in rotation so as to ensure that each village was represented in the council at least once.⁴ Their inclusion added a new element to the status of the councils as truly representative institutions of the local people, to which they had direct access.

Major Changes in the Local Administration

The implementation of what is contained in the new Local Government Acts and the amended Decentralization Act precipitated major changes in the local institutions. Most affected by these changes were: the structure of the regional and district administration, including the district council; the institutional relationship between the central and local institutions; and the institutional role in planning for and implementation of rural development. In order to highlight these changes, we shall deal with each separately.

The Regional Administration

The structure of the regional administration remained virtually intact and as it had been under the decentralized system. However, there were two important changes which involved the Regional Commissioner (R.C.) and the Regional Development Committee (RDC). In relation to the local governments, the Regional Commissioner became the "Proper Officer" responsible for:

- a) ensuring the proper management of the finances of the local government authority
- b) facilitating the securing of funds for the operations of the local government authority
- c) promoting the timely preparation of the authority's annual budget and ensuring

⁴See, The Local Government (District Authorities) Act, no. 7, of 1982, Part III, Section 35 (1,f), p. 58.

that the authority operate within the limits of the budget as prepared.⁵

His authority over the councils was limited to approving, varying or disapproving their estimates in accordance with the principles laid down:

- a) No major change in policy is introduced without reference to the Ministry
- b) No liability, direct or indirect, for increased expenditure falls upon the Government
- c) Estimates presenting any unusual difficulties or disclosing any serious cause for anxiety are referred to the Ministry⁶

In other words, the Regional Commissioner possessed no executive authority to overrule at will the estimates of the councils without being accountable to the Minister. Furthermore, the post of Regional Local Government Officer was created. The officer was to assist the R.C. in his functions as the Proper Officer, as well as to provide a link between the local governments and the regional administration.

The second major ~~change~~ in the regional administration affected the Regional Development Committee. Its composition now included the chairmen of all district councils and urban authorities, the chief executive officers (District Executive Directors and Treasurers) of all district councils and all urban authorities, and two members from each district council and urban authority within the region. And the Regional Development Director became the secretary of the committee.⁷ The functions of the committee were also modified. Those related to local governments were:

- a) to interpret for local government authorities within the region the policy of the Government on any matter in any sector in relation to which any authority performs its functions
- b) to consider and provide advice to local government authorities regarding their

⁵ See, The Local Government Finances Act, no. 9, of 1982, Part IV, Sec. 34 (1), p. 205-06.

⁶ See, District Councils' Financial Memorandum, Parts I-II, 1984, p. 11

⁷ See, The Decentralization of Government Administration (Interim Provision) (Amendment) Act, no. 12, of 1982, Amendment no. 6 of Section 6 of the principal Act, (2) (g,h,i) and (3), p. 255.

development plans and to seek the attainment of the targets set in relation to any project or programme of a local government authority

- c) to consider and make recommendation to the appropriate proper officer and to local government authorities on the development budgets of the authorities

In respect to its overall functions in the region, the committee was charged:

- a) to consider and advise upon all economic and development affairs in the region
- b) to consider reports and advise the Government on ministerial development projects, programmes and activities affecting or relating to the region
- c) to consider reports and advise the Government on the activities of parastatals and of co-operative societies operating in the region
- d) to promote and supervise the execution of government plans and programmes within the region
- e) to do all such acts and things as it may be directed to do by the Minister or which, in its opinion, are necessary for the efficient and effective performance of its functions⁸

The inclusion of the chairmen and two members from each district council and urban authority was indeed a significant breakthrough toward democratizing the Regional Development Committee which until then was predominantly a bureaucratic organ. Similarly, from the perspective of its new functions, we note a shift in the role of the committee from that of being an executive decision-making body to an advisory and supervisory role in matters concerning development in the region. This meant, as of 1982, the regional administration, district councils and urban authorities met together under the auspices of the RDC and made decisions on development issues without one imposing its decisions on the other. In theory, therefore, the principle of *primus inter pares* governed the process of decision-making at the regional level, even though the regional administration was superior to the other

⁸ Quoted directly from: The Decentralisation of Government Administration (Interim Provision) (Amendment) Act, no. 12, of 1092, Replacement no 10 of Section 10 of the principal act, (Sec. 10, a-h), p 255-56.

two institutions. This was, perhaps, one of the most significant changes which facilitated the incorporation of the local governments within the decentralized system of the regional administration. And this incorporation did not disturb the balance of power and authority between the regional administration and the local government authorities.

The District Administration

In contrast to the regional administration, three important developments took place at the district level. First, the structure of the district administration was overhauled. Secondly, the centrality of the district institution in matters concerning planning and implementing development projects and programs was shifted to the district councils and urban authorities. And, thirdly, there emerged a disequilibrium of power relations between the district administration and the local government authorities. Subsequently, all these developments together made the district administration, and particularly the Area Commissioner, appear redundant. We shall elaborate each of these developments

Structure of the District Administration

As Chart 3 illustrates, the district administration was still headed by the Area Commissioner (renamed District Commissioner, as of 1987). He retained all the powers, privileges and authority which he had possessed before and after decentralization. However, with respect to local government authorities, he was referred to as "Assistant Proper Officer" with no specific powers and authority over the district councils. For section 34 (3) of the Act states: "An assistant proper officer shall exercise all the power vested in him by this Act and shall perform such other functions in relation to a local government authority as the proper officer may delegate to him or direct him to perform." And in another section the Act puts further limitations to the power of the assistant proper officer. It states: "The assistant proper officer in relation to a township authority and a village council shall at all

times (our emphasis) be subject to the general or specific directions of the Regional Commissioner and also the decisions of the district council in which the township authority and the village council are established."⁹

While interpreting the specificity contained in these sections of the Act, the Area Commissioner of Moshi District, Mr. R.R. Matango, explained to me that the Assistant Proper Officer possessed and exercised power and authority similar to those of the Proper Officer, only that the former is always responsible and accountable to the Proper Officer. In addition, he was the vital link between the central government in the district and the local government authorities in all development activities carried out by these authorities. Besides, he added, the district council and urban authorities depended on the instruments of law enforcement to enforce their by-laws. These instruments were under the control and responsibility of the Area Commissioner.¹⁰

However, what should be underscored here is that the position of the Area Commissioner in the local government authorities is ambiguous. This ambiguity was further reinforced by the appointment of a Local Government Officer who is an employee of the central government but seconded to the district administration.¹¹ He acts as a liaison between the central government and the local government authorities. He is also to assist the Assistant Proper Officer by providing him with all information and reports on the activities of the district council. But in performing his functions he receives all instructions pertaining to his duties directly from the Regional Local Government Officer, Regional Commissioner, and the Minister.¹² This means that the relationship between the Assistant Proper Officer and the district Local Government Officer is set apart in terms of responsibility and accountability

⁹ For both quotations, see, The Local Government Finances Act, no. 9, of 1982, Part IV, Section 34 (2 and 3, respectively), p. 206.

¹⁰ Interview with R.R. Matango, Area Commissioner of Moshi District, Kilimanjaro Region, Area Commissioner's Office, September 4, 1984.

¹¹ There were 80 districts at the time the research was carried out in 1984. By then approximately 20 per cent of the districts had a Local Government Officer, as reported by the Regional Commissioner of Kilimanjaro Region.

¹² See, District Councils' Financial Memorandum, Parts I-II, 1984, p. 4.

Chart 3

**Organizational Chart Showing the New Structure
of the Local Government and District Administration**

while dealing with the local government authorities.

Because most of the functions of the district administration had been transferred to the district councils and urban authorities, the district departments were reduced. Those which had remained included the departments of accounting, finance ~~and~~ auditing, security, stores and supplies. As the chart shows, the post of the District Development Director was abolished, together with all the powers and functions granted to him under decentralization. He was replaced by a District Administrative Officer (DAO) who became responsible only for administrative matters in the district, and second in command after the Area Commissioner.

The functionaries whose departments had been transferred were seconded to the district council for a period of one year. After this they were free to choose either to remain as full employees of the council under the Local Government Service Commission Act, no. 10, of 1982, or to seek re-employment in their respective ministries. However, the transfer of both departments and functionaries was a gradual one which could not be observed empirically because the new district councils began to function by 1984.¹³

Centrality of the District Administration

As stated earlier, most of the functions of the district administration were transferred to the district councils. With them the centrality of the district institution in planning and implementing development in the districts was redirected to the district council. The planning for urban development and services was now charged to the urban authorities, whereas the district councils became the principal planners for and implementors of rural development projects and programs. The district administration was involved in development programs and projects which were carried out by the central government, and/or foreign development agencies, in the districts. Good examples of such programs are the rural water supplies in Mtwara,

¹³The instruments for establishing district councils in all 80 districts were approved by Parliament on July 16, 1983, and became effective on October 1, 1983. See, The District Councils' Establishment Order, 1983, in Supplement No. 32 of Subsidiary Legislation of September 2, 1983.

Lindi, Morogoro, Dodoma and Shinyanga regions.

As a result of this shift, the district administration was least involved in planning and implementing development projects and programs in the district. It only met with the district council and urban authority through the District Development Committee which replaced the former District Development Council.¹⁴ The meetings of the committee, however, were basically informative, focusing on reviews of various reports on each other's development activities in the district, because the committee had no authority to approve, alter, or disapprove the estimates and development budgets of the district council and the urban council, or to make executive decisions to that effect.

In order to permit the participation of all three institutions in these meetings, the membership of the committee was changed to include: chairman and mayor of the district council and urban authority, respectively; all members of the finance and planning committee of the district council; all members of the finance and administration committee of the town or municipal council; the chief executive officer of the district council and the town or municipal council; and all divisional secretaries (these were Party functionaries) within the district. The committee was chaired by the Area Commissioner, and the District Administrative Officer became its secretary.¹⁵

✓ The functions of the district development committee were redefined. In relation to the district council and urban authority, the functions of the committee were:

- a) to assist and advise the district council and the urban council in the formulation of their development budgets
- b) to consider reports and advise on the implementation within the district of the plans, projects and by-laws of the district council, the township authorities, and

¹⁴ See, Section 21 of the Decentralization of Government Administration (Interim Provision) (Amendment) Act, no. 12, of 1982, p. 258.

¹⁵ See, Section 12 of the Decentralization of Government Administration (Interim Provision) (Amendment) Act, no. 12, of 1982, p. 256.

the village councils¹⁶

And those related to overall development matters in the district included:

- a) to consider and advise upon all economic and development affairs in the district
- b) to consider and advise the Government on ministerial development projects, programmes and activities affected by or relating to the district
- c) to consider reports and advise on the activities of parastatals and of co-operative societies operating in the districts
- d) to do all such acts and things as it may deem necessary or desirable for the economic development or the maintenance of order and good government within the district¹⁷

In the context of its stated functions, the committee was still an important body in the district, acting as a co-ordinating and integrative organ for all development activities carried out by different institutions in the district. But the exclusion of the district bureaucrats and technocrats from the new committee points out that the district administration was no longer the focal point where major decisions on development matters were to be made. This was equally reinforced by a change in the central role of this committee from that of being an executive decision-making body to that of an advisory and supervisory body. Thus, in both ways, the specific role of the district administration in promoting rural development in the district was obscured.

Confusion of Power Relations in the District

Besides the loss of its centrality as a development front, the district was affected by yet another development. That is, the district became a potential place for a power struggle between the district administration and the local government authorities on one hand, and between the Area Commissioner and the executives of

¹⁶ See, Section 12A of the Decentralization of Government Administration (Interim Provision) (Amendment) Act, no. 12, of 1982, p. 257.

¹⁷ Quoted directly from: Section 12A of the Decentralization of Government Administration (Interim Provision) (Amendment) Act, no. 12, of 1982, p. 257.

the district council on the other hand. The potential for a power struggle resided in the confusion of power relations resulting from the new arrangements established by the Local Government Acts, as well as by the amendments contained in the Decentralization Act of 1982.

According to these arrangements, the following situation arose in the district. There was, on the one hand, the district administration which had become a typically administrative institution. It lacked an electoral mandate and legislative powers. In addition, it had no powers to levy, tax, and generate its own revenues. Its centrality as a development front virtually disappeared from the district scene, while its executive decision-making body—the district development, planning and implementation committee—was abolished. Similarly, the powers and authority of the Area Commissioner were nebulous with respect to the local government authorities, although he remained the central figure in the district as the chief executive and mouthpiece of the central government in all district matters. Even then, with the separation between political and administrative functions in 1980, the Area Commissioner lost his political status as the District Party Secretary, thereby becoming only the executive chief administrator of the central government in the district. In other words, his legitimacy in the political affairs of the district was removed.

The local government authorities, on the other hand, were re-established with full legislative powers and an electoral mandate. These powers gave them autonomy from the district administration, for the Acts had vested in them the powers to hire their own employees, to levy and tax their subjects, and to raise other local revenues through local rates and other kinds of financial undertakings. In other words, as institutions, they were completely separated from the district administration which had previously held a superior position in the district. Similarly, their executives, known as District Executive Directors, were directly appointed by the President, with powers and functions equal to those of the Area Commissioner. As employees of the district councils, they were responsible and accountable in all matters

of the councils to the local government authorities and to the Minister of Local Government, without passing through the Area Commissioner. In other words, the District Executive Directors were also separated from the Area Commissioner. Each exercised powers within his own sphere of jurisdiction in the district.

Thus, as a result of these arrangements, the district was placed in a position of a disequilibrium of power relations. Although it was a necessary change in order to make the local government authorities possess full powers and authority in the districts in accordance with the spirit of the laws which had created them, the change had a negative effect on the previous existing equilibrium of power relations between the district institutions and their officials. Central to the confusion was the question of legitimacy. That is, which of the institutions and their officials could now legitimately claim to speak, make decisions and act upon them on behalf of the people in the district? Stated differently, was it to be the district administration and its Area Commissioner by virtue of their legal status as representing the central government, or was it the district council and its executive director by virtue of their electoral mandate, legislative power, and financial autonomy from the district administration?

The confusion may not necessarily lead to a power struggle in districts where cooperation and team work are displayed by the officials of both institutions. A good example of this situation is Moshi District in Kilimanjaro Region. However, this has been possible apparently because the District Executive Director and the District Administrative Officer come from the same district and are old-time schoolmates. The Area Commissioner, though from another region, is a long-experienced official in matters of local administration. He had held a senior position in the previous local government system and had been RDD during the decentralization period of 1972. By contrast, the situation was fragile in Morogoro District in Morogoro Region. The situation in this district was similar to one which has been described by several MPs as a "confusing situation" which prevailed in many districts. And

the MPs had urged the Government to either clarify the situation, or re-examine the positions of the Area Commissioner vis-à-vis the District Executive Director vis-à-vis the District Administrative Officer, including the Regional Development Director and the Regional and District Local Government Officers.¹⁸

These observations provide some evidence of the confusion over power relations now existing in the districts. Its potential for generating a power struggle vulnerable to the proper functioning of the local governments cannot and should not be taken lightly by the government. Unfortunately, at the time of the writing of this thesis, the problem had not been attended to. In other words, the district where the decentralized administration and the local government functionally dovetail is still plagued with this confusion in power relations.

The District Council

As stated above, the district council, as an institution, was loosely interlocked with the district administration through the Area Commissioner or Assistant Proper Officer. Chart 3 illustrates the manner in which the two are related. The district councils inherited all the powers and functions of the local government authorities of 1962. As a matter of fact, the new Local Government Acts referred to earlier were almost carbon copies of those of 1962. The only significant changes, perhaps, involved the election of the chairman and vice-chairman, who were not elected by and from the elected councillors. It also involved the introduction of a Standing Committee system in the organizational structure which the district council is required by law to operate under and perform its functions and duties. To this end, the elected and appointed members of the council are grouped into five Standing Committees: Finance and Planning, Administration and Establishment, Social Services, Educational Affairs, and Economic Services.¹⁹ The departmental heads of the

¹⁸ These concerns and recommendations were raised and made by the MPs while debating on the fourth reforms of the Constitution of the Republic during the 17th. Parliamentary Session. For details, see, *Tanzania Hansard*, 17th. Session of October 29 to November 1, 1984, p. 436-92.

¹⁹ See, The Local Government (District Authorities) Act, no. 7, of 1982, Section 74, p. 71.

central government functionaries in the district (see Chart 3) have been incorporated into these Standing Committees in order to provide advice and assistance in accordance with their specialized fields. However, in the performance of their day-to-day duties, these departmental heads are responsible and accountable to the District Executive Director. Another change entailed the structure of the district council, which is now better organized than before. As the chart shows, it is headed by a District Executive Director whose powers are similar to those of the Area Commissioner in the district administration. He is responsible for all council matters pertaining to finance, administration, personnel, collection of taxes, properties, liabilities and assets of the district council. In short, the executive director inherited all the powers and functions of the then District Development Director (DDD) with respect to the administration and functioning of the district council.

The structure of the district council was further strengthened with the establishment of a number of key departments such as Treasury, Planning and Personnel, headed by professionally trained officers. Although paid by the central government from the annual subventions given to the district council, these officers are employees of the council; the terms and conditions of their employment are subject to those laid down in the Local Government Services and the Local Government Negotiating Machinery Acts of 1982. Other officers representing the central government in the district are supposed to extend their expertise and assistance to the district council in their specialized fields, thus improving the potential of the district council, particularly in planning and implementing development projects and programs. The term 'potential' should be emphasized here because it was not possible to assess the ability of the district council in this particular area. The period between their establishment and our research was too short to make a meaningful and critical assessment of it.

Another important change which affected all district councils involved the planning and implementation of development in the district. Under the local government

system of 1962, the district councils had been least involved in planning and implementing development projects in the district. Likewise, under decentralization the district development councils did not finance any of the planned development projects, although they were involved in the whole exercise. And the planning machinery was part of the district administration. However, as of 1982, the district councils have themselves become the planning machinery in the districts; they also finance most of the development projects and programs which are of a local nature. In other words, the district councils now occupy a central role in not only planning but also financing and implementing development programs in the rural areas. This will be elaborated shortly.

Finally, the wards and village institutions have been integrated into the structure of the district council. The significance of this change has already been explained. It suffices to note here that these lower institutions are now operating under the control of the district councils. In addition, the district development corporations, which until then operated as autonomous business and commercial enterprises separate from the district councils, were put under the direct control and supervision of the local government authorities.

Hence, from a structural point of view, there have been major changes in the regional and district administration, as well as in the new local government authorities. These changes are a consequence of the merger between the decentralized system of local administration and the local government system. This merger, in turn, has affected the relationship between the local institutions on the one hand and the central institutions on the other.

Changes in the Institutional Relationship

During the decentralization period, the relationship between the central and local institutions were based on the principle of subordination. Characteristically, these institutions were placed in vertical and hierarchical order according to their precedence, and each exercised and performed a different set of commands and

controls over the other in a subordinative succession. Thus, at the top was the Prime Minister's Office (PMO), followed by the regional and district administrations. The former district development council was under the district administration as one of its central decision-making organs. Subordinate to this council were the wards, below which were the numerous village institutions.

Following the merger between the decentralized and the local government systems, these relations were altered. As Chart 4 shows, the PMO, the regional and district institutions maintained their hierarchical and vertical relationships. To that effect the PMO still exercises control over the regional and district administrations. For example, their budgets are still part of the PMO's budget, and the PMO has to approve their development budgets, as explained in Chapter Five. The region exercises similar controls over the district administration.

The relationship between the local government authorities and the central government is similarly governed by the same principle of subordination. But, instead of the PMO, the Minister of Local Government exercises control over these authorities. For example, among other things, the Minister is responsible for providing the instruments of their establishment. By the same token, all by-laws and development budgets of the authorities have to be approved by the Minister. He also has the power to suspend and/or dissolve any malfunctioning local government authority; and is responsible for monitoring and supervising the functioning of the local authorities, including the proper management of their finances and all other activities.²⁰ Thus, an important change made here was the creation of the Ministry of Local Government which was to be responsible for the Local Government Authorities, instead of the PMO.

At the local level, a major change involved the relationship between the local government authorities and the regional and district administrations. As the

²⁰ For details, see, The Local Government (District Authorities) Act, no. 7, of 1982, especially Sections 168-74 of Part VII, "Provisions regarding Relationship between Local and Central Government Organs and Officers", p. 102-04, for other powers of the Minister, see elsewhere in the Local Government Finances Act, no. 9, of 1982.

Chart 4
Organizational Chart Showing the Relationship
Between Central and Local Institutions

DECENTRALIZED SYSTEM**LOCAL GOVERNMENT SYSTEM**

chart shows, the relationship is maintained through the officers known as Proper and Assistant Proper Officers, and not through the administration which these officers command or head. This relationship seems to be governed by the principle of mature cooperation by which the local government authorities share power and responsibility with the regional and district institutions, especially in matters of rural development in the district. Although the Proper and Assistant Proper Officers have been vested with some powers and authority over the local government authorities, they no longer have the power to make executive decisions which are binding on the district councils. Furthermore, the local government authorities now enjoy a reasonable amount of autonomy from the regional and district administrations. This autonomy is manifested by their exclusion from the region's and district's current and development budgets, as well as by their financial and administrative independence. As we have explained earlier, these authorities have the power to collect local rates and/or impose any other form of taxation on the subjects under their jurisdiction. They have equally the power to raise revenues to finance their administration and development programs. None of these powers has been availed to the regional or district administrations. Administratively, their primary responsibility and accountability are to the Minister and not to the district or regional administrations.

With respect to other district organs, such as the district development committee, ward and village institutions, and the district development corporation), all have been placed under the district council, thereby separating these organs from the district administration. And finally, the new institutional relationship among the local institutions is noticeable in the different roles played by each institution in planning and implementing rural development.

Changes in Planning and Implementing Development

Under decentralization, planning for development was characterized by multi-staged, hierarchically integrated organs of decision-making. At the local level,

these organs were involved mainly in identifying and setting development priorities, whereas the central institutions made the final decisions on and financed them. Furthermore, with the exception of the villages, a district development plan was a component part of the regional development plan and, therefore, it had always to be approved by the regional authorities. Although the process of planning for development remains the same, there has been a change in the institutional role in this process, following the reintroduction of the district councils in 1982. At the local level there are now three main institutions involved in development planning. These are the regional administration, the district councils, and the village institutions. Apart from this role, each institution is involved in planning for development from a different context.

The regional institution deals with planning for the entire region. Its development plan can be described as a conglomeration of national, regional, district (including local government authorities), and village interests. What are dominant though in this plan are the national and regional interests. This plan is financed 100 per cent by the central government. By the same token, it has first to pass through the PMO and the central planning machinery for approval and allocation of funds before it becomes a development policy of the region for implementation. The implementation agencies include the regional, district, ministerial and/or foreign development agencies, depending upon the origin and sponsor of the projects to be implemented.

The role of other local institutions in the formulation of the regional development plan is to provide information and data on the most pressing problems and needs of the rural areas, which cannot adequately be met by the local government authorities alone or by the village institutions. The regional administration usually obtains such information through the development plan proposals of the local government authorities in the region. According to the District Councils' Financial Memorandum of 1984, such proposals ought to be submitted to the regional

authorities by October 15 of every year,²¹ during which time the regional development plan is supposed to be in the process of formulation. In short the formulation of the regional development plan follows the same process as under the decentralized system of planning, described in Chapter Five. The plan remains instrumental in the formulation of national economic and development plans.

At the district level, this is different. The district administration as such is no longer involved in planning for development to the extent of formulating its own district development plan. Only at the district development committee are district officials, members of Parliament residing in the district and other Party officials involved in development planning. However, as seen in Chapter Five, their role is to advise and make recommendations where necessary on the development plan formulated by the district council. The institutions which formulate and propose development plans are the district council for rural development concerns and the urban council for urban development.

With respect to the district council, the process followed in the formulation of its development plan is similar to the decentralized system of planning, followed by the regional administration. It starts from the villages where the village councils and their committees make proposals on their development targets and priorities. These proposals are then submitted to the ward development committees. Each ward development committee compiles and formulates into a single development plan all proposals submitted by the village councils within the ward. After receiving the development plans from all the wards within the district, the district council through its technical committees prepares the estimates of its development budget, which is then submitted to the district development committee for scrutiny, adjustment and preliminary approval.

Before it is adopted as a development policy of the district council for implementation, the proposed development plan is forwarded to the Assistant Proper

²¹ See, Section 29 (vi) of the Memorandum, p. 11.

Officer through the district Local Government Officer. This is the first check-point where the government's development policies are matched with the contents of the council's development plan. The financial capacity of the council to implement the plan is given great emphasis at this point to ensure that the council does not engage in formulating an ambitious development plan which it cannot adequately implement, or which requires extra taxation of the people, thereby making the central government unpopular with the local people. In either case, where discrepancies are found, the Assistant Proper Officer is obliged to advise and instruct the district council to make adjustments in the plan.

Once the development plan has been cleared, it is forwarded to the Proper Officer through the regional Local Government Officer. Here again it is checked to see whether or not the development plan is in tune with the overall regional and district interests as defined in the annual and five-year economic and development plans for the whole country. Most important, the following are looked into carefully:

- a) revenue estimates that are unlikely to be fulfilled
- b) expenditure estimates that are likely to prove inadequate
- c) working balances that are likely to be insufficient
- d) estimates that do not conform to the country's policy²²

The Proper Officer on behalf of the Minister for Local Government then, usually, does one of the following: approves, varies, or disapproves the plan. Copies of the approved plan are then sent to both the PMO and the Ministry of Local Government. The submission of the approved plan is intended to provide full information to the PMO on the development activities of the district councils.

In contrast to the regional development plan, or the district development plan during the decentralization period, the approved development plan becomes wholly a development policy of the district council, which is separate from the regional development plan. It normally contains estimates of (a) services, activities and

²² See, District Councils' Financial Memorandum of 1984, Section 29 (vi), p. 11.

development projects, including a proposed timetable for implementation, (b) expenditure requirements, and (c) resources available for their support.²³ The plan is financed by the district council mainly through local revenues generated from the collection of local rates, produce cess and other local taxes. The central government only assists in financing it through subventions, grants and loans. The implementing agencies are the district council's organs, including the village councils, and their functionaries. However, where implementation of a particular development project requires a specialized expertise which the district council does not possess, assistance is usually sought from the specialized institutions of the central government, or from foreign development agencies. In the latter case, such assistance is sought through either the PMO or the Ministry of Local Government.

* In short, the major change in planning and implementing development is found at the district level. Previously the district administration was central and instrumental in the process of planning and implementing development in the district. Its development plan, however, was a component part of the regional development plan, and it was wholly financed by the central government. Under the new system of local government, the district council assumed a central role in development. But its development plan was no longer part of the regional development plan. Furthermore, the district council itself became the major actor in financing development activities in the district. Thus, the district regained its central role as a 'development front', which had been lost during the decentralization period.

Prospects of the Local Governments

The changes discussed above expose an important difference between the local government system of 1962 and the current one. The former system of local government could be described as a colonial legacy, existing along with an inherited system of local administration in which district councils were agents of the district administration. The present system of local government, on the other hand, can be said

²³ See, District Councils' Financial Memorandum of 1984, Section 27 (i), p. 9.

to be novel and indigenous. It is both, in that it has been grafted onto an already existing decentralized system of administration which is different from the inherited colonial one. In other words, the present system of local administration in Tanzania features both the institutional and administrative forms of decentralization. It is yet to be seen how the system will work.

As for the district councils, they are now operating as institutions separate from the district administration. What is still more important, they can now plan and implement their own development projects and programs with little or no interference from the district administration. Their autonomy is more far reaching than previously in that the new Local Government Acts reasserted the classic principles of local government in a number of ways: the district councils will not as before be bureaucratically controlled institutions but will be largely representative bodies. Thus, with the exception of the Area Commissioner, all other bureaucrats and technocrats of the district administration cease to be ex-officio or nominated members of the district development committees or ex-officio chairmen of the district councils, and no longer is there ex-officio membership from the district Party executives in the district councils or their development committees. Above all, the district councils have a monopoly over local rates and taxes. As well, they are the only rural local government bodies with the power to employ their own fully qualified staff. All other organs below them are subordinate to the district councils. Thus, for example, if the Minister wishes to make or alter rules of procedures for the village institutions, he must consult the district councils first. Likewise, by-laws made by the village councils have to be approved by the district councils. In short, the district councils now have full-fledged powers and authority which neither the regional nor the district administration possess.

These changes have definitely paved the way for the local governments to operate side by side with the decentralized administration. The reinstatement of these authorities under this arrangement was also, perhaps, less costly in financial terms

than if the government had decided to introduce an altogether new administrative system. However, the changes by themselves have not necessarily improved or increased the capacity of the district councils in promoting rural development. Their potential for initiating local democracy and local participation is also highly questionable. Several indicators lead to their inability to do so.

One is the political and economic context in which the district councils now operate. This has not altered with the local administrative reforms of 1982. Politically, power is still highly centralized under the enigma of Party supremacy. Economically, the state still controls all the resources for development, as well as all other key sectors of the economy. Consequently, the district councils will continue to be servicing rather than initiating instruments for the economy. In other words, their role in rural development will still be dependent upon what the central government wants them to do, and hence provide them with the resources. This is exactly what had been happening previously.

Other indicators are embodied in the compounded problems arising from the unchecked institutional weaknesses which the government seemed to have taken for granted or ignored at the time of reinstating the district councils. As in 1962, the government has made the mistake of assuming that all 80 districts in the country have substantially the same ability to operate and function as local government authorities. At the same time though, the government is quite aware of the existing disparities among the regions and districts. Population, availability of usable agricultural land, the nature and type of productive activities, proximity to the centre and/or an urban area, availability and accessibility of infrastructures (such as durable roads, transportation, communication), are some of the compounded factors defining and perpetuating disparities among the districts. Definitely this problem could not have been solved through the structural changes implemented while reconstructing the local government authorities. But efforts should have been made by the government to find a permanent solution to the problem either be-

fore or immediately after the establishment of these authorities. On the contrary, by imposing the same powers, functions and responsibilities on all district councils, knowing they have different capabilities, district councils in the poor districts began to operate and function under the same situation which had previously contributed to their failure; we have dealt with this problem extensively in Chapter Four. It suffices therefore to state here that the problem has recurred and still haunts many district councils, particularly those in the poor districts.

Another problem is the inherited financial weakness. This problem emanates essentially from the under-developed nature of the economy. As in the past two decades, the government has maintained its conventional wisdom of centralizing the direction of the economy and coordinating nationally the deployment of the extremely scarce resources. This centralization has been rationalized as a strategy for arriving at an equitable pace of development throughout the country, as well as for ensuring that there is fair distribution of the scarce resources to all parts of the country, especially those which needed most. Thus, some of the key variables of the economy which have been (and still are) centralized include capital, skilled personnel, technology, and the tax system. The other side of centralization is the limitations put on the district councils. These limitations relate to their accessibility to capital (domestic or foreign), acquisition of technology and expertise necessary for playing an effective and efficient role in rural development, and the scope of taxation under their jurisdiction.

The main source of capital for the district councils is still local taxation on personal rate, produce cess, property, and income or possessions. In whatever deficiency confronted by the district councils in this capital formation, the councils depend entirely upon the central government's subsidies, grants, and loans from the domestic financial institutions. In addition, the capital formation through the above means has not been without difficulties beyond the control of the district councils. Regardless of the ability or inability of the district councils to collect

taxes, the areas in which local taxation could be effectuated by the councils are highly elastic and conditional. For example, a personal rate depends on the number of eligible taxpayers resident in a district and on a minimum or controlled social movement of the eligible taxpayers from one district to another, or from the rural to urban areas. It is equally conditioned by the relative wealth of a district, which can allow a district council to tax more than otherwise permitted, without imposing an unbearable burden on the taxpayers. In short, there are very limited guarantees on capital formation based on the four areas mentioned above.

Government subsidies and grants are indeed a more stable and reliable means of capital for the district councils. But the more these become the major source of revenue for the councils, the more their dependence grows. This dependence, in turn, will undermine or diminish the desired or expected autonomy of the councils. Unfortunately, this is exactly the situation in which the councils are now since their re-establishment. In 1982/83, the government had set aside Shs. 800 million as initial operating capital for all 80 district councils. The amount was distributed in direct proportion to population, size of the district, infrastructure inherited by a council, and number of employees retained by a council. Although the district councils had received the same amount in the following two consecutive years, it is the government's intention to reduce the amount of its subsidy to the councils in order to force these latter to increase their efforts in local taxes.²⁴ How successful the district councils will be in becoming self-reliant through local taxation rather than through government subsidies and grants remains to be seen in the years to come. As for the present, it is obvious that the district councils have started with a financial weakness which was one of the principal factors incapacitating the previous local governments.

With respect to technology and expertise, the district councils are in a worse

²⁴ This information was obtained through interviews with P. Kimiti, the Regional Commissioner of Kilimanjaro Region; Idda Mmari, the District Executive Director of Moshi District Council in Kilimanjaro Region; and E.W. Munuo, the District Planning Officer of Morogoro District Council in Morogoro Region.

situation than before. Most of the staff are new, with no previous experience in local governments. This applies also to the newly elected councillors. The hurriedly organized training programs ranging from three weeks to three months were inadequate for providing all the expertise necessary for managing effectively the operations and activities of the local governments. In matters of planning and implementing rural development programs, the district councils still depend upon the expertise and technology to be provided by the central government. This situation will also remain for a long time. Although the district councils have been empowered to hire and employ qualified people, their ability to attract qualified people to work with the councils has been dismal. The district councils do not possess an expanded infrastructure which might provide better prospects for qualified people than the public sector does. Besides, the most senior posts in the local governments are those of the District Executive Director, Treasurer, Personnel and Planning Officers. The last three are ministerial appointments rather than promotional and the first post is a presidential appointment. This means that an officer working with a district council cannot aspire to becoming a District Executive Director through the normal channels of promotion and professionalism in the job. Therefore, the power that the councils have, to hire qualified staff is just nominal.

Yet another major problem was resultant from the timing of re-establishing the local government authorities. By the beginning of the 1980s, Tanzania's economic crisis had reached its peak. Although not intended to deal with all the dimensions of the crisis, the following are some of the most crucial indications of the seriousness of the crisis. For the first half of 1979/80, the national recurrent budget deficit was about Tz. Shs. 75 billion. Output in the manufacturing sector fell by 20 per cent in the first quarter of 1979 and 25 per cent in the first quarter of 1980, with a parallel fall in sales tax receipts. By 1982/83, the falling rate of output in the same sector had risen to 27.4 per cent. From mid-1975 to mid-1979, the rate of inflation rose from 8 to 10 per cent a year, to over 20 per cent by 1980/1. The consumer market

was severely hit by shortages in essential commodities, including food, especially in the years 1982 and 1984. Other social service sectors such as health, education, transportation, and communications, were equally affected by shortages in spare parts, equipment, drugs, and other essential supplies.²⁵ President Nyerere (until 1985) described the seriousness of the crisis bluntly in the following words:

Our problems are very serious, and very real . . . But the basis problem is that our earnings and our consumption are out of balance; we are consuming more than we are earning . . . as we are not earning enough to buy these spare parts and raw materials for our young industries, or enough transport and fertilizer and insecticide for our agriculture, we are producing less and less of the consumer goods made or grown in Tanzania

[Nyerere, 1982:7-8]

These are just a few economic facts to highlight the nature and seriousness of the economic crisis. It was in the midst of this economic crisis that the local government authorities were revived. Their reinstatement was somewhat of a paradox, as the government was at the same time introducing austerity in its expenditures, and other measure to combat the crisis. For example, in March 1982, the President announced a suspension of all new (national and local) development projects and programs which were to be started in 1982/83. Every ministry, department, and all public institutions were urged to practise austerity in their expenditures. Between 1981 and 1982 the government introduced two different economic programs: the National Economic Survival Program (NESP) and the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP). Both programs contained measures aimed at reviving the collapsing economy of the country. In other words, both the Government and the people were engaged in the struggle for *survival* and not for economic development.

Several members of Parliament questioned this timing of reintroducing the local

²⁵ For details of the economic crisis and its causes, see, for example, R.G. Green, 1980; M. Bisnefeld (ed.), 1982; Economic Survey of Tanzania, 1982; R.H. Green, et al., 1980a; and Budget Speech of the Minister for Planning and Economic Affairs, 1983. The figures quoted above have been extracted from these sources.

government authorities. They feared that reinstatement would add another burden to the already collapsing economy of the nation. Further, they expressed their concern over the potential of these authorities to operate and function well under such critical economic conditions. In addition, reinstatement would have to be accompanied by the reintroduction of local rates if these authorities were to be self-financing.²⁶ In spite of the MPs' concerns, the government reintroduced the local government authorities and assured the MPs that these authorities were now here to stay forever. To my question on whether or not their revival was part of the Government's response to the economic crisis, one official in the Prime Minister's Office replied positively. The local government authorities were necessary at this juncture in order to assist the central government in the struggle for economic survival, he explained. The central government intended to focus more on national matters of the economy and leave to the local government authorities all matters of a local nature.²⁷

The timing, however, will have a long-term negative effect on the local government authorities. Virtually all have inherited infrastructures which have been deteriorating as a result of the economic crisis. For example, many primary schools we visited in Moshi and Morogoro Districts had experienced shortages in classrooms, school materials such as writing books for students, chalk, blackboards, and desks. Other districts in the rest of the country were facing similar problems. They have also inherited many development projects and programs, incomplete because of the Presidential Order of March 1982. All these projects and programs had previously been fully financed by the central government. Furthermore, as predicted by some of the MPs, the reintroduction of local rates, a development levy, and other fees such as school fees for both primary and secondary education, was coldly received by the people. The officials of both Moshi and Morogoro Districts with whom we

²⁶ For details of these concerns, see, *Parliamentary Debates (Tanzanian Hansard) Session 7, of April 27-May 5, 1982*, p. 26-68.

²⁷ Interview with Mr. B. Nchimbi, Prime Minister's Office, Dar es Salaam, September 29, 1984.

talked, explained that rural people in general were not enthusiastic about the revival of local government authorities because to them it meant the return of a local rate, "Kodi ya Kichwa", which had been out of their memories for the fifteen years.

In short, the timing has already begun to have a negative impact on the local government authorities in several ways. For example, in Kilimanjaro Region some district councils had no office buildings of their own because the districts were created just on the eve of the re-establishment of the local government authorities. All district councils in the Region began operating with inadequate materials, vehicles, office supplies, and funds. One of the consequences of this situation, as the Area Commissioner of Moshi District, Mr. R.R. Matango explained, was the postponement of collecting local rates for a year, because the district councils had no tax register and receipt books. Because of this, the registration of the eligible taxpayers could not be finalized at the time the government announced the reintroduction of local rates throughout the country. In Morogoro Region, all the district councils experienced similar problems of inadequate materials, vehicles, and office equipment and supplies. In the rest of the country, virtually all district councils started to function with inadequate subsidies from the central government. The effects of this poor financing were soon felt even by district councils in relatively wealthy districts and regions. For example, in Moshi, one of the advanced districts, the district council had a deficit of Tz. Shs. 27 million by mid-1984.²⁸ And the District Executive Director of Moshi District Council explained to me that the central government's subsidy of Shs. 17 million received in the same year was inadequate compared to the expenditures the council would have to incur in order to maintain the inherited infrastructures and other social services.

Finally, the timing has seriously affected the local government authorities in the area of local revenues. The economic crisis has affected not only the government, but first and foremost the people in the rural areas. Their incomes have been declining

²⁸This figure was revealed by Mr. R.R. Matango, the Area Commissioner of Moshi District during an interview in his office.

since the economic shocks began to be felt in the national economy by 1978. These are principally the people the district councils depends upon for local rates. It became difficult, therefore, for the local government authorities to demand local rates from people who had barely enough for their own survival. Consequently, the district councils and their councillors became, from the beginning, unpopular with their subjects. This unpopularity could be seen in the resentment of the people in paying their taxes. For example, in Moshi District, 180,000 eligible taxpayers were registered. The flat rate for each taxpayer in 1984 was Shs. 250/. The district council had estimated that Shs. 45,000,000/ would be collected during 1984. But by October 1984, the council had been able to collect only half of the amount.²⁹ Morogoro district council had 142,000 registered eligible taxpayers in 1982/83, with an estimated revenue of Shs. 28.4 million, or a flat rate of Shs. 200/ for each taxpayer. By October 1984, the council had collected only Shs. 1.8 million.³⁰ In both districts the officials explained that the people were reluctant to pay their taxes, in spite of repeated threats of taking them to court. And, indeed, some districts had resorted to the use of force. For example, in March 1986, Dar es Salaam city council using militiamen cracked down on more than 200 people and sent them to court for failing to pay their development levies [*Daily News*, March 4, 1986:3].

The experience of Moshi, Morogoro and Dar es Salaam councils should not be taken as isolated cases. The successful collection of local rates is a serious problem which poses a major threat to all local government authorities. These authorities are now caught in a dilemma not of their own making. The central government expects them to be efficient in the collection of local rates so that the local government authorities do not become themselves a financial burden to the central government, which is already overwhelmingly heavy under the on-going economic crisis. On

²⁹See, Moshi District Council, *Estimates of Revenue and Expenditure for July/December 1984 to January/December 1985*, p. 2-5.

³⁰See, File RDC/MOR/17/84, "By-Laws of Morogoro District Council", 1984.

the other hand, ~~the more~~ the councils demand local rates the more unpopular they become, and thus lose the support and confidence of the people they serve. In short, the timing has indeed created a vicious circle for the local government authorities.

Conclusions

In this chapter we have been concerned with two interrelated aspects: the major changes introduced while reconstructing the district councils, and the prospects for these councils as viable institutions for promoting rural development. In other words, we were concerned with two main objectives. The first was to explain how the present local government system differs from that of 1962. The second was to assess the extent to which this difference makes the current district councils viable for initiating development in the rural areas.

The changes which have been identified and discussed fell into two categories. First, there were changes in the Local Government Acts and the Decentralization Act of 1972; other changes affected the structure of all local institutions, the institutional relationship among them, and the institutional role especially in matters of planning and implementing rural development. From all these changes we have concluded that the present Tanzanian system of local administration is novel in that it forms a unique combination of institutional and administrative forms of decentralization. For this reason, the present system of local government is completely different from that of 1962. Similarly, we have concluded that the current district councils are different from those of 1962. This difference is not only in their structural position, but first and foremost in their centrality in planning and implementing development in the districts.

Nonetheless, the local government authorities are still agents of the central government, as had previously been the case. As we have pointed out in the chapter, the new local government institutions are still treated as administrative bodies rather than as levels of government. This is evident from the fact that at both the regional and district levels, the central government is represented by institutions other than

the local governments. Furthermore, although they enjoy an extensive degree of autonomy from both the regional and district administrations, the local governments still lack control over capital formation, expertise, technology, and personnel, factors which will increasingly undermine their autonomy in the immediate and mediate future. Most crucial and important, the political and economic context of Tanzania has not changed over the past twenty years, particularly with respect to the power relationship between the central and local institutions. Stated differently, the political power is still highly centralized. This means that, in spite of official rhetoric, a devolution of power from the centre to local level is most unlikely to occur with the reintroduction of the local governments. Similarly, the economy is also centralized, whereby the central government has overall control and hegemony over the resources for capital formation, as well as for development purposes. In this political environment, the local governments can only be but instruments of the Party, rather than autonomous institutions. In the same vein, these authorities can promote local autonomy and local participation as directed by the Party and not as liberal institutions. In terms of the economic environment, the local governments' potential for promoting rural development in the country will be concentrated in the area of servicing the central government's decisions on rural development, rather than acting on their own in initiating such development.

Because the political and economic context has not changed, it would be totally unrealistic to paint a rosy picture of the present district councils. It would be equally unfactual to hold out great prospects for these authorities. The problems identified and discussed in this chapter add further to this unpredictability. Even if the government and the Party were sincere in their ideological commitment to local autonomy and local participation, the lack of political will on the part of the leadership leads to one logical conclusion; that is, the present local governments cannot be instrumental in enhancing local autonomy and local participation. Similarly, their role in rural development will continue to be one of administering development

policies initiated by either the central government or the Party.

The past experience has shown that this is the role the local governments and other local institutions played in rural development. To recapitulate this experience, in the mid-1960s and 1982, for example, there were more than twenty programs and campaigns initiated by the Party and government. Some of these included the early village settlement schemes of the 1960s, the villagization program of 1970 to 1975, literacy campaigns, *Mtu ni Afya* ("Life is Health"), and *Siasa ni Kilimo* ("Politics is Agriculture"); all were initiated in the early period of the 1970s. Others were *Kilimo cha Kufa na Kaporha* ("Agriculture for Survival"), *Kilimo cha Kiangazi* ("Dry Seasonal Agriculture"), Universal Primary Education (UPE), the National Economic Survival Program (NESP), and the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP). The local institutions were never involved in the formulation of these programs and campaigns. Their role was that of implementing agencies. Since almost every year the government or the Party had come up with a program or campaign of one kind or another which had to be implemented, the local institutions had virtually no opportunity to formulate and implement their own development programs.

Most of these government or Party initiated programs and campaigns were enforced in response to prevailing situations such as famine, or when the government and the Party felt a need to encourage increased production in the rural areas, to counteract a decline in foreign earnings. Under the present economic crisis, there is every reason to believe that the new local governments and other local institutions will be subjected to similar pressures from the government and the Party.

In summary, the prospects for the local governments in meeting the stated objectives are very bleak. What will likely become of them is the administrative role they are now playing in assisting the central government to combat the economic crisis which has plagued the country. If they effectively perform this role, their fate will be credited with a durable lifespan. But at present their intricate position in the current decentralized system of local administration had imminent challenges

beyond the control of the local governments. Above all, from the theoretical perspective of decentralization, the merger between administrative and institutional decentralized systems of local administration is most unlikely to bring about the acclaimed results of decentralization, as well as the officially stated objectives by the Tanzanian leadership.

CHAPTER SEVEN

An Assessment: Tanzania's Experience with Local Administration Reforms

The purpose of this concluding chapter is threefold. First, the materials discussed in preceding chapters will be summarized. Second, the findings of the study will be presented. And, finally, the lessons learned from Tanzania's experience with local administration reforms and their relevance to other developing countries with similar situations will be drawn. The chapter will conclude with a general summary.

As stated in the introductory chapter, the study was concerned with local administration and rural development in Tanzania. Its central theme was the institutional problems related to rural development, and to explain why the local administration reforms carried out by the government since independence have had little or no success in making the local institutions viable for promoting rural development. The reasons for the centrality of local administration in this study have also been pointed out in the chapter, including the traditional role of the local institutions in the organization of rural production, which is the backbone of Tanzania's economy.

In order to guide our study, the perspective of the development administration school, particularly its decentralist theme, has been used. We have chosen this perspective not because of its strength and utility in providing a better understanding of the problems of development, but because it has been very influential in initiating local administration reforms in Tanzania and the third world in general, and most importantly because the approach and axioms made by the proponents of this perspective have appealed to the Tanzanian leadership. They have viewed the problems of development from an institutional perspective and their approach focused on institutional reforms. From the beginning of independence, the Tanzanian leadership's approach to solving the problems related to rural development corresponded to this view, and the objectives set for local administration reforms were in tune with the axioms of this school. In short, the theoretical perspective of

the study were presented in Chapter Two.

The origin of the institutional problems related to rural development in Tanzania was traced and analyzed in Chapter Three. The continuum of the colonial legacy as seen in the local institutions and the underdeveloped nature of the economy was noted as the principal source of these problems. Also noted was the impact of this legacy on the transformation of the Tanzanian system of local administration after independence in 1961. Another related issue discussed in the chapter was the kind of decentralization deployed by both the German and British colonial powers in the governance and administration of the country. The chapter concluded with a comparison between the systems of these two colonial powers in order to determine which one most influenced the construction of the Tanzanian system.

Chapter Four described and analyzed the local government system and its institutions. Central to the discussion were the structure and functions of the local government institutions, the central-local relationship, and their overall impact on rural development. Also considered was the Tanzanian one-party political system and its effect on the local government institutions as autonomous and democratic organs of the local people.

Apparently, the inability of the local governments to promote rural development led to their abolition in 1972. They were replaced by a decentralized system of administration, which was discussed in detail in Chapter Five. We have identified the system as an administrative decentralization in which the local institutions (except for the village councils) had no legislative powers, nor the power to collect (and retain for their own use) local taxes, or other revenues. Other related issues discussed in the chapter concerned local participation and local democracy, and the role and the performance of the decentralized institutions in rural development. Concerning their performance, great emphasis was given to reasons why these institutions could not have been effective in promoting rural development. The whys and wherefores of the change in the decentralized administration concluded the chapter.

Finally, Chapter Six discussed the present system of local administration. Introduced in 1982, it featured elements of both the administrative and institutional types of decentralization. Central to this chapter are the institutional changes which made the local institutions different from those under the two previous systems of administration, and the prospects of these institutions for promoting rural development. The discussion concluded with a conditional note on the future of the local governments in Tanzania.

Assessment of the Tanzanian Experience

The Tanzanian experience reveals a sharp contrast with what has been predicted by the exponents of the development administration school. They thought that a decentralized system of administration would improve the capacity of the administration in dealing with development, as well as foster local democracy and participation. For the past twenty years Tanzania has been experimenting with various forms of decentralized systems of administration, with little or no success in rural development, or in local democracy and participation. This failure raises a number of unanswered questions. One is whether the correlation between decentralization and development has been correctly conceived, and the other is whether a decentralized system of administration always leads to local democracy and participation. From what can be learned from the Tanzanian experience, the correlation has been either oversimplified or misconstrued altogether. The same can be said about local democracy and local participation.

It should be emphasized that the Tanzanian experience is not unique. Elsewhere in the developing countries decentralized systems of administration have recorded similar failures. For example, in Zaire, Sudan, and Thailand, the decentralized institutions of these countries have failed badly in promoting participatory democracy, in spite of the ideological commitment of the governments of these countries. It has also been found in these countries that the decision making process in their institutions has increasingly been dominated by the centrally nominated bureaucracy⁶

rather than by the elected representatives (Chicula, 1980; Roth, 1975; Saxena, 1980; Rondinelli, 1981a).

A similar negative picture has been observed in other countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin America, where local governments featured as the dominant form of a decentralized system of administration. It has been found that no significant transfer or devolution of power has been effectuated through the local government institutions of these countries. Instead the trend has been towards centralization of power by the central governments (Tennant, 1973; Reddy, 1981, 1978; Humes, 1973; Stubbings, 1975). Other failures which have been observed are in the areas of local autonomy, local participation, control over financial and personnel resources by the centre, and unchanged power relations between the centre and the decentralized administrations (Howell, 1973; Henderson, 1967; Folson, 1981; Friedman, 1983; Mathur, 1983; Ramusson, 1975).

Besides registering failures, various explanations have been provided for these failures. The explanations have been derived from factors such as lack of a political will on the part of the leadership of the developing countries in not sharing power with the leadership at the local levels. Poor planning and implementation of the decentralization programs is yet another contributing factor. Others include inadequate financing of the decentralized administrations, poor performance in planning and implementation development by the decentralized institutions, and poor budgeting and staffing (Rondinelli and Mandel, 1981; Reilly, 1981; Smith, 1982).

Most of these factors which have been used to explain the failures, also apply to our case study. However, we have emphasized the colonial legacy and the post-independence political and economic system as the most crucial factors contributing to the failures of the decentralized systems of administration in Tanzania. From this perspective this study departs from the generally held reasons given for the failures of the decentralized systems of administration in developing countries. It is also from this perspective that we intend later to provide a critical note on the theoretical

underpinnings of the development administration school concerning development.

The decentralized system of administration in Tanzania, as in all post-colonial countries of Africa south of the Sahara, is not novel. On the contrary, like the administration itself, it has taken its roots from the colonial experience. It was used by both the Germans and the British, although each for different objectives. But, as demonstrated in Chapter Three, under both colonial powers the decentralized system of administration fell short in promoting rural development, as well as local democracy and local participation. Had it been that a decentralized system is always associated with development, and/or local democracy and local participation, the colonial experience would have instilled into the administration of Tanzania at least the initial expertise and aptitude for promoting this acclaimed association. Unfortunately, this did not happen during the colonial period.

Consequently, the inherited local institutions, as forerunners of the post-independence local governments, lacked the experience of how to promote local democracy and local participation within the communities they served. Concomitantly, their functionaries had eventually developed attitudes and behaviour which tended to be anti-political and opposed to the democratic process in their dealings with the local communities. These attitudes manifested themselves particularly at the time when the nationalist movements had increased the momentum of political activities throughout the country. Many leaders of the native authorities and their functionaries openly opposed the leaders of the nationalist movements. Thus, at independence the new political leadership became increasingly distrustful of the local institutions, regarding them as potential for breeding a new kind of opposition to their political legitimacy. Any attempt, therefore, to make them autonomous was henceforth disdained.

In short, we have concluded in Chapter Three that the colonial experience with decentralized systems of administration has negated most of the propositions of the development administration school. That is, at the time of independence, the

inherited local institutions and their functionaries were technically and aptitudinally ill-prepared for dealing with development, as well as for initiating democracy and participation within the local communities. This was the genesis of the institutional problems related to rural development as well as local participation. The problems have not been resolved by the institutional reforms, as the colonial legacy continued to have its influence upon the construction of the decentralized systems of local administration.

Under the decentralized system of 1962, three local institutions, the regional and district administrations, and local governments, were retained. The first two represented the administration of the central government in the regions and districts. Although there was a change in the leadership, the structure and functions of these institutions and the central-local relations were all shaped and organized along the colonial pattern. The local government institution was initially treated as a liberal organ representing local interests, thereby replacing all other forms of traditional leadership and their institutions regardless of diverse mores and customs existing in the country. It was then contended by the new leadership that in order to overcome and contain the existing regional, religious, racial, and ethnic divisive elements, it was necessary to have a uniform system of local government in the country. But this objective was only partially achieved. The new local government institutions were established along the inherited boundaries which corresponded to the ethnic boundaries. This was also the trend in the creation of new districts, and hence new local government authorities. Further, like the colonial administration, the new government paid no heed to the inherited district inequalities while introducing a uniform system of local government.

As liberal institutions, the local government authorities were left alone during the first five years of independence. As it was during the colonial period, the local people elected their own representatives in the local government councils under the inherited system of free campaigns and elections which were participated in by

all races. This was, perhaps, the only democratic element manifested in the local governments. Nonetheless, the local governments were far from being autonomous institutions. In spite of the change in régime, the instruments of the local government authorities, their powers and functions, and their relationship with the central government, were all a reproduction of the colonial experience with these institutions. Similarly, they were excluded from the planning process of development in the country, as well as from the policy and decision-making institutions. Consequently, their role in rural development was limited to that of administering and implementing policies or development programs initiated at the centre. In other words, no efforts were made by the government to integrate them into the planning machinery, or even to improve their administrative role in rural development. On the contrary, they were left to operate as much as possible within the same old environment represented by the same traditional means of financing and a subordinated position to the district administration.

Indeed, one might argue that there was no compelling reason for the new government to retain most of the configurations of the colonial system of local government. But the retention itself is one of the manifestations of the legacy in the administration of the developing countries, the chief characteristics of which have been described eloquently by Subramaniam (1977:17) as "derivative, imitative, lopsided, and frustrated". The administration of the new government of Tanzania was no exception to these inherited characteristics. Above all, the majority of the functionaries who manned the new local governments were those who had acquired their administrative skills from the colonial masters. A change in régime did not necessarily mean a change in their acquired attitudes and behaviour.

Clearly, then, the colonial legacy was very instrumental in the construction of the local governments and the local administration in general after independence. It is this legacy which ultimately was responsible for the failure of the local institutions and local democracy and participation. One possible way by which the government

could have thrown off this legacy would have been to abolish altogether the three-tier system of local administration and create representative institutions at the regional and district levels. The institutions at both levels should have been vested with legislative powers, authority to raise their own revenues, and power to control the resources necessary for their own maintenance and the development of their areas. All these would have placed the local institutions in a bargaining and influencing position with the central government. But, because of the colonial legacy and the mistrust the leadership had of the local institutions, this possibility stood no chance.

The influence of the colonial legacy also permeated the decentralized system of administration which was introduced in 1972. The regional and district institutions were retained but strengthened by the appointment of senior and qualified personnel of the central government to assist in the administration of these institutions. The local government institutions, on the other hand, were eliminated from the scene. In an effort to instil a democratic element into the district institution, a district development committee was established. Three-quarters of its members were to be elected by the local people themselves. But throughout the ten-year period no elections were held for that purpose. As if to resolve this, the government moved towards localizing democracy and participation by establishing village assemblies and councils, with powers and authority similar to those enjoyed and exercised by the former native authorities. These village institutions were loosely integrated into the district institution through hierarchically ordered committees. But their influence on the decisions made by the district institution or by the district development committee was dismal. The only significant change in the regional and district institutions was their involvement in identifying the development priorities and needs of their respective areas of jurisdiction. But in all other areas the same continuum of the colonial legacy permeated through the local institutions. Both the regional and district institutions had now power to raise their own revenues. The powers and functions of their administrators were virtually the same as those

inherited from the colonial period. Similarly, the previous power relations between the central and local institutions were maintained. That is, the decentralized institutions continued to be treated as administrative units of the central government, wholly dependent on the latter for finance, personnel, technology, and expertise. In short, the central government financed one hundred per cent of their maintenance and development programs, thereby preventing them from becoming autonomous. Consequently, it was almost an anomaly for dependent institutions to enhance local autonomy, and their bureaucratic structure made it impossible for them to foster local participation.

The current system of local administration also has some remnants of the colonial legacy. With the reintroduction of the local governments, the inherited three-tier system of local administration was reconstituted, together with a tripartite bureaucracy. Although the local governments have now more autonomy from both the regional and district administrations than previously, they are still grafted onto the district administration. Accordingly, the latter still represents the central government. Another remnant of the legacy is the restoration of the local governments as subordinate institutions to the district administration, in spite of the fact that the former have legislative powers and an electoral mandate.

In summary, the colonial legacy has had an enormous impact on both the construction of the system of local administration and the decentralized systems in the country. It is this impact which by and large has contributed to the failures of the various decentralized systems in fostering rural development, as well as in initiating local democracy and local participation. This impact was much more manifest in the local government system of 1962 than in the decentralized system of 1972, whereas it is even more vivid in the present system of local administration than it was in the 1962 system.

The other most profound factor contributing to the failure of the decentralized systems, is the Tanzanian political and economic system. Its most salient feature

is the centralization of political and economic power. The former is under the hegemony of the Party, while the economy is rigidly controlled by the central government, in terms of capital formation and its ancillaries, technology, personnel, and expertise, among other things.

The Political System

Decentralization usually involves two main processes—administrative, and political. Both processes lead to one form or another of a decentralized system of administration. But it is only the political one that can lead to a decentralized system whose institutions can truly possess some autonomy by sharing political power with their superior institution. This kind of decentralization could not (and cannot) occur in Tanzania because of the Tanzanian one-party political system. Although one-party political systems are common in many African countries, such as Zambia, Zaire, Zimbabwe, and Kenya, the Tanzanian political system has characteristics which are unique and peculiar, compared with the systems of these countries.

One of the paramount characteristics of the political system of Tanzania is the supremacy of the Party. To ensure that all other institutions of the state and the citizenry accede to it, this supremacy has been embodied in the Constitution of the Republic since the country became a One-Party State in 1965. Article 3 (2 and 3) states: "CCM is the only political Party in the United Republic. The Party is the only organ which has the ultimate authority over all affairs in accordance with the Constitution of the Republic and that of the Party." Article 10 (1, 2, and 3) defines further the specific role and authority of the Party:

all political activities in Tanzania, and related to the United Republic, shall be conducted by or under the auspices and supervision of the Party. Without prejudicing the spirit of the Constitution, all activities entrusted to all public institutions in the Republic shall be carried out under the auspices and supervision of the Party; and the Party shall be responsible

for ensuring that these public institutions conduct their activities in accordance with the laid down provisions of the Constitution and the laws of the country.

[Constitution of the Republic, 1984:2-3, 5]

The embodiment of the Party supremacy in the Constitution led to several consequences which affected the existing power relations among the principal apparatuses of the state, the electoral process, and the mode of political participation by the citizenry. First, there was a departure from the inherited model of parliamentary democracy in which the sovereignty of Parliament prevails. Consequently, the Party became the prime institution of the state vested with this sovereignty. Through its National Executive Committee (NEC), the Party has been (and still is) the organ that decides and formulates policies on all major social, political and economic affairs, whether domestic or foreign, in the country. Some of these policies include the Arusha Declaration on "Socialism and Self-Reliance", Education for Self-Reliance, Socialism and Rural Development, the Leadership Code, *Mwongozo* (The TANU Guidelines), the decision to move the national capital from Dar es Salaam to Dodoma, the CCM Guidelines, the decision on Universal Primary Education, and the compulsory villagization program. All these policy documents and decisions were never discussed by Parliament before their implementation by the implementing agencies and institutions of the government. In short, it is the Party (through NEC) that sets the direction of the economy and of all social and political matters of the country.

Parliament, on the other hand, has retained its traditional role as legislative body of the country, and controller of the public purse. But, with the changes in power relations with the Party, all members of Parliament, excluding the President who constitutes the other component of Parliament, together form a special "Standing Committee" of the National Conference of the Party. It is charged with the responsibility of ensuring that the National Assembly exercises its functions in

accordance with the policies of the Party, and of supervising the implementation of the Party's policies by the central government and its public institutions (Constitution of the Republic, Article 63, 1984:27; CCM Constitution, Article 67, 1982:32). Making the members of Parliament a Standing Committee of the National Conference of the Party ensures that the National Assembly is not being used as a forum to challenge the Party, as well as to emphasize its subordination to the Party in matters of parliamentary democracy in the country.

The central government and its national and local institutions are the implementing agencies of the Party's policies. Section 108 of the CCM Guidelines of 1981 reiterates this role of the government and its institutions.

The government is the major instrument for the implementation of the Party policy. The party leads the government and its institutions first by formulating broad objectives which are operationalized into programmes of implementation and legislation. This means that it is the party which has the responsibility for discussing and making decisions on grave and major issues of national importance before they are passed on to the government for analysis and implementation.

[CCM Guidelines, 1981:43]

To ensure that the government and its institutions abide by this kind of relationship, party patronage and loyalty are used for appointing people to all important positions in the government and public institutions. Section 109 of the Guidelines states:

By its very nature the government is a coercive instrument. . . . Therefore even in our situation of a democratic and socialist society, it is always important for the party and the masses to be sure and have confidence with those entrusted with the powers and responsibility of the government for they could fall into the hands of a reactionary who could turn and use those powers and responsibilities against the interests of the masses.

Therefore, for the party to lead, also means ensuring that important positions and offices in the government and parastatals are entrusted to the people who, in addition to expertise and technical competence, are also committed patriots and are loyal to the party and to the peasants and workers of Tanzania.

[CCM Guidelines, 1981:43]

By implication this section means that only the Party has the authenticity of standing for and protecting the interests of the masses of Tanzania, and no other institution, including the elected government, can have the necessary trustworthiness without the supervision of the Party. In essence, this was another way for the Party to reassert its supremacy over the government and its institutions, and to ensure that nobody could challenge the Party by using his/her position or office in the government or the parastatal.

The Party seemed to have been content with this kind of power relations with the government and its institutions for more than two decades, using its National Executive Committee, Central Committee, Leadership Code, and two commissions—National Defence and Security, and Control and Disciplinary—to enforce its supremacy. But, in 1982, the Party decided to establish seven secretariats to be responsible: for the Party ideology, political education and training; the economy and planning; organization and membership, finance and administration; social services; foreign affairs; and propaganda and mass mobilization. Each secretariat is headed by a Party loyalist, with a status equal to that of a minister. In fact, most of these secretariat heads are also ministers with or without portfolio, and are members of both the Cabinet and the National Executive Committee. Some still sit in the Central Committee of the Party. The secretariats exemplify, more or less, the key ministries or departments of the central government, and have basically two main functions: to prepare and formulate policies and programs in their respective fields, and to supervise and make a follow-up of the implementation of the approved

policies and programs. In order to ensure that the Party commands its own expertise, technology and personnel in these fields, Party cadres, with a university degree or diploma, have been recruited to work in these secretariats. It has also sent several Party cadres for training abroad in various fields such as finance, management, planning, personnel, administration, economics, and political science. The objective of establishing these secretariats, as one Party cadre, working in the secretariat of ideology, political education and training, explained, was to strengthen the Party in leading and controlling the process of constructing a socialist and self-reliant society in Tanzania without depending on the central government or its implementing agencies for expertise and technical know-how. Certainly, with this move by the Party, we shall still see much of Party supremacy in the next decade or so.

At the local level, the Party supremacy has permeated through the Party organs which run parallel to the structure of the local institutions. Party headquarters have been established at the regional and district levels, headed by regional and district chairmen, respectively, and Party secretaries and Party functionaries who together formed the bureaucracy of the Party at these levels. As of 1982, the regional and district headquarters have also been strengthened by the establishment of the secretariats, except the one which deals with foreign affairs. Another exception is that these secretariats are headed by heads who are junior to the national heads. The organs which replicate the national ones are the Regional and District Conferences, Regional and District Executive Committees, and the Regional and District Working Committees. These organs perform functions similar to those of the national organs, but are subject to the directives defined in the Constitution of the Party. However, in principle, they are to supervise and control the implementation of the Party's policies and programs by the local institutions and agencies of the government. For example, all regional and district development plans and programs must be submitted to the regional and district organs of the Party before they are forwarded to the Prime Minister's Office. Likewise, these organs may order

the local institutions to implement a certain program without first consulting the institutions.

Most important though, these organs are responsible for scrutinizing and making the primary nomination of all those seeking election to the National Assembly, local government, and Party leadership or leadership in the mass organizations affiliated with the Party. They also supervise the election campaigns of all those whose candidature has been accepted and approved by the national Party organ. In short, the regional and district institutions have been tied to the Party supremacy just as the national institutions have been.

Below the district are the Party branches established in every village, or in every working place in the case of the urban areas. At the village level, the Party branch is headed by a chairman who is elected by the village residents who are members of the Party. He also becomes automatically the village chairman of the village council and Assembly. Besides the chairman, there is a village Party secretary who is appointed directly by the national headquarters of the Party. He too becomes the secretary of the village council and Assembly. In addition, every village Party branch has three organs: the village branch conference, the village branch Assembly which is different from the village Assembly, and the village branch executive committee. In accordance with the Constitution of the Party, the village Party branch is the supreme organ in all matters of the village, whereas the village Assembly and its organs are the implementing agencies. Both the village Party chairman and secretary are on a monthly payroll of the Party.

The lowest Party organ is the "Ten-Cell". At the village level, a Ten-Cell consists of "all members living in each group of ten houses designated for the purpose", and in order for a group of ten houses to qualify for designation as a Party Ten-Cell, not less than five of the residents of the group have to be members of the Party (CCM Constitution, Article 23, 1982:12). Each Ten-cell is headed by an elected cell leader. The Ten-Cell has basically two main functions: to defend and maintain

the policy of the Party and of the government in its area of jurisdiction; and to maintain security in cooperation with the relevant state security organs in the area (CCM Constitution, Article 24, 1982:12). The Ten-Cell leader, on the other hand, is responsible for disseminating to all residents of his cell, information relating to all decisions of the government and of the Party, and to provide guidance to his residents and involve them in the implementation of those decision and in other public affairs. He is also required to keep track of all persons residing in his area, those departing and coming to visit or reside in the cell, and to inform the relevant authorities on any suspicious characters (CCM Constitution, Article 25, 1982:12).

The above organizational structure of the Party shows how seriously the Party leadership was committed to making the supremacy of the Party, felt not only in the institutions, but also in the households, to ensure that it should not be taken or considered as an ideology of the Party but a reality. Consequent to this organizational structure was the emergence of the bureaucracy of the Party. This bureaucracy, together with all institutions and mass organizations affiliated with the Party, is financed largely by the government or monies from the public purse, and also through membership fees and contributions. In every annual budget the government allocates a sum of money as subsidy or its contribution to the Party. The amount varies from year to year. For example, in 1981/82, the amount was Tz. Shs. 185.3 million, Shs. 244.6 in 1982/83, Shs. 391.4 in 1983/84, and Shs. 1363.4 in 1984/85 (Annual Budget Estimates of 1981/82 to 1984/5:28, 19, 72, respectively). Although the money was submitted to Parliament for approval, the Party was not obligated to account for it. This is yet another example of how the Party enforced its supremacy. The government was obliged to finance the Party, but in accountability the Party made itself above Parliament, which is constitutionally responsible for safeguarding the public monies from usurpation by any institution of the state.

Another major effect resulting from the formalization of Party supremacy involved a change in the electoral process through which the representatives of the

National Assembly and local governments are elected. To ensure that all those seeking to be representatives in these institutions are Party loyalists, the electoral process is rigidly controlled by the Party. First, all those seeking parliamentary or local government seats must be live and active members of the Party. Secondly, they must abide by the leadership code which, among other things, prohibits one from having more than one source of income or salary, and from owning a property from which an extra income is accrued, or from acquiring shares, or shareownership, in any economic enterprise inside or outside the country. If a candidate has been engaged in any of the above, he/she must put it into ~~a~~ blind trust. This code applies also to all leaders of the Party, ministers, leaders of the mass organizations, and all those who hold important positions in the government and public institutions. Thirdly, all candidates must be accepted and approved by the National Executive Committee of the Party which makes the final nominations and provides an election symbol to each nominated candidate. And, finally, all nominees must use the election manifesto prepared by the Party in their election campaigns which again are supervised by the Party organs in their constituencies (Constitution of the Republic, Articles 66-82, 1984:28-43). Apart from these qualifications, each candidate has to meet other qualifications and conditions stipulated in the Constitution of the country and by the national electoral commission. In short, the electoral process is another method which the Party uses to ensure that it remains supreme. For this reason, if a member of Parliament, or any person categorized as belonging to the leadership, is expelled from Party membership, he/she automatically ceases to be a member of the National Assembly, or loses his/her office.

The formalization of Party supremacy has subsequently altered the mode of participation in political activities by the citizens. Elsewhere in its Constitution, it is stated that one of the objectives of the Party is "to ensure that through the use of procedures duly established, every citizen enjoys the right to fully participate in the making of decisions on national affairs and on matters affecting him; and

that he enjoys the freedom of expression, the freedom of movement, the freedom of conscience, and the freedom of association, *subject to compliance with the law and procedures established by law*" (CCM Constitution, Section 5(8), 1982:5 emphasis ours). In order to effectuate this compliance, five designated mass organizations were established to cater to all the major social strata of the society.

Umoja wa Vijana ("CCM Youth League") was established to cater for the interests of all youth in Tanzania, and it is only through this organization that the youth can freely exercise their freedom of expression and participate in all political activities in the country. To make this possible, youth branches are found in all schools, colleges, universities, and other institutions, including places of work where a significant number of youth are employed. The national and local leadership is elected according to the procedures explained earlier. As a mass organization, it has been granted by the Constitution of the Republic the right to sponsor five candidates, among whom one is elected by the members of Parliament to be an MP representing the youth. The sister organ of the Youth League is *Chipukizi* ("Young Pioneers") which is for all young children between seven and eighteen years of age. The basic purpose behind this organ is to instil the ideology and philosophy of the Party into the young people and involve them in Party activities at an early age. In other words, it serves, among other things, as an organ for political education and preparing the young people for the leadership of the Party and government.

The role and participation of all women in the country have also been designated to a single mass organization: *Umoja wa Wanawake wa Tanzania* ("Union of Tanzanian Women"—UWT). The role of women in not only social production, but also in the early struggles for political independence, has been recognized by both the Party and the government. It is for this reason that the organization was one of the earliest to be affiliated with the Party, and it plays a more obvious and active role in national politics than any of the other mass organizations. It has national, regional, and district chairpersons who are elected according to the electoral proce-

dures of the Party, whereas the secretaries at all three levels are appointed directly by the national chairman of the Party. It also has branches in the rural areas and all places of work where there is an adequate number of employed women to form a UWT branch. Like the Youth League, the UWT also has an MP elected through a UWT sponsorship.

Until 1964, there were many trade unions, the majority of which constituted the Tanganyika Federation of Labour, formed in the early 1940s. Although the relations between the trade unions and the Party were smooth during the struggles for political independence, their close relationship began to deteriorate during the early years of independence. The trade unions increasingly became dissatisfied with the then TANU government. Their dissatisfaction was marred by continuous demonstrations, strikes, and labour unrest. The attempted coup of 1964 in which some of the leaders of the trade unions were alleged to have been involved, ended the patience of the Party and government with the trade unions. Consequently, in mid-1964, the government imposed a ban on all trade unions and on all forms of labour associations. In replacement, a single mass organization was designated to represent the interests of all workers in the country. The organization was first termed the "National Union of Tanzanian Workers" (NUTA), and later in 1977 it was restyled *Jumuiya ya Wafanya kazi wa Tanzania*—JUWATA ("Union of Tanzanian Workers"), following the merger between TANU and ASP to form CCM. It is through this organization that the workers have now to express their labour interests or grievances, and participate in other political activities. The organization is headed by a General-Secretary who is appointed directly by the national chairman of the Party, and he is also usually given the portfolio of the ministry of labour. As the only national trade union, its branches are in all places of work or establishments which employ not less than 25 employees, and in every region and district there is a headquarters of the organization headed by a regional or district secretary, and a handful of functionaries, responsible for establishing branches and controlling

labour in the regions and districts. Like the other two organizations, JUWATA also sponsors or has an MP to represent the interests of labour in the Parliament

The mass organization that represents the interests of the elderly is *Jumuiya ya Wazazi Tanzania* ("Tanzania Parents' Association" TAPA). The leadership of the association is elected, subject to the electoral procedures of the Party. It too has an MP who is sponsored by the association, and it has offices in the regions and districts.

The fifth mass organization is *Muungano wa Vyama vya Ushirika* ("Co-operative Unions of Tanzania"). This organization is for all the rural producers, regardless of their specialization in production. In other words, any group of producers wishing to form some kind of a co-operative association must be affiliated with the national co-operative union. The General-Secretary of the Union is appointed directly by the national chairman of the Party. The Union has a national headquarters, with offices in the regions and districts. It also has an MP sponsored by the unions to represent them in the National Assembly.

Each of these mass organizations has been designated "for the purposes of executing a specific purpose or activity, and whose business shall be conducted under the auspices of the Party". The Constitution of the Party further states: "Each designated mass organization may make its own regulations and rules of procedure for the conduct of its affairs, but such regulations and rules shall not come into operation until they have been consented to by the National Executive Committee". Furthermore, "the designated mass organizations shall perform their functions subject to the supervision and direction of the Central Committee of the National Executive Committee" (CCM Constitution, Articles 79 and 80, 1982:41).

Following student unrest in the universities, colleges, and in some secondary schools between 1966 and 1978, the government imposed a ban on all forms of student associations, and created a single organization, *Muungano wa Wanafunzi Tanzania*—MUWATA ("Union of Students of Tanzania"), to cater to the interests

of all students in the country. Those seeking the leadership in the union in their respective educational institutions have first to be approved by the Party branches of these institutions before running for election.

The last group to be affected by the Party supremacy consisted of the sportsmen and women in the country. The elections of the leaders of their various clubs are supervised by the Party branches in the areas where the club offices are located. Likewise, those seeking election must also be approved by the Party branches, to ensure that nobody is using sportsclubs to further his/her political interests contrary to those of the Party.

The establishment of the mass organizations and the subjection of all other non-partisan organizations show how the Party has used decentralization to demarcate the society into various distinct social interests. The official stated objective of this kind of political arrangement is to enable every interest group in the country to be involved in the political process. But their involvement has to be supervised and controlled by the Party. In other words, although the political system is claimed to be democratic, the democratic process is what we have termed a "guided" one, in which the Party is able to spot and crack down on any elements within the society suspected of being reactionary. The decentralization further serves the Party by containing any concerted challenge by a particular interest group or groups because one of the functions of the mass organizations is to promote the ideology and principles of the Party.

What does all this mean to the decentralized systems of administration? Whether their institutions are called local governments, or by any other name, in the eyes of the Party (and constitutionally so) they are just like any other institution of the central government, that is, instruments for implementing the policies and decisions of the Party. What is more crucial still, the Party relies on its organs and the mass organizations in promoting participatory democracy across the diverse social strata in the country, and the local institutions are only to assist these organs and mass

organizations, just as any government institution is expected to. Stated differently, the primary role of the local institutions as instruments for fostering participatory democracy, or through which the local people can be involved in decision-making, has not been recognized by the Party, although the stated official objectives have emphasized this role. This has been so because the Party itself does not need these institutions ~~after~~ establishing a consolidated system through which it is able to control and direct the process of participatory democracy throughout the country. As for the local people themselves, the local institutions were perhaps redundant. Besides the mass organizations, the local areas have been flooded with institutions the Party branches and their organs, village assemblies and their organs, and a host of central government agencies. Each of these institutions is charged with, among other things, the responsibility of promoting participatory democracy in the rural areas. Whether the promotion of participatory democracy was so complex as to deserve all this attention remains a puzzling question.

Apart from the non-recognition of the local institutions by the Party, there has been a lot of confusion arising from the conflicting official position on whether the local institutions or the Party organs have the primary role in promoting local democracy and local participation. In his policy document of 1967, "Socialism and Rural Development", President Nyerere stated: "... there must also be an efficient and democratic system of local governments so that our people make their own decisions on things that affect them directly . . ." (Nyerere, 1967:11). Here the President made a direct reference to the local institutions which were to promote such a democratic system. In another policy statement made in 1967, the President referred to the Party and its organs which have to foster a democratic system in the country. He stated: "Democracy is another essential characteristic of a socialist society. For the people's equality must be reflected in the political organization; everyone must be an equal participant in the the government of his society" (Nyerere 1967:5). Because of this duality in his thinking, the role enhancing local democracy

and local participation has increasingly fallen into the hands of the Party. Consequently, neither the local governments of 1962 nor the decentralized institutions of 1972 could in any way effectively promote local democracy and local participation. Since the political system has not changed—on the contrary, we see a continued consolidation of the supremacy of the Party—the present decentralized system of local administration should not be expected to do the impossible.

In short, the Tanzanian political system has a built-in contradiction to a decentralization which aims at transferring power from the centre to the local institutions. Concomitantly, the decentralized institutions of 1962 and 1972 could in no way promote local democracy and local participation. Their failure, therefore, ought to be seen from this perspective of the one-party political system of Tanzania.

The Economic System

The Tanzanian economic context is another crucial factor contributing to the failure of the decentralized institutions in their role in rural development. We have already highlighted some of the principle features of it. However, there are a number of issues which should be emphasized here.

Financial autonomy is a crucial factor which enables and increases the ability of a decentralized institution to function and perform its developmental role adequately and efficiently. But in an underdeveloped economy, such as that of Tanzania, it is the last thing a central government would desire to grant to its local institutions. Of course, there are many justifiable reasons for this. One of them is the need to have an efficient system of control over the extremely scarce resources to ensure the optimal deployment of them for development purposes. To decentralize such a system might be detrimental to the economy of the country. It is, perhaps, against this background that the Tanzanian government had decided from the early years of independence to centralize control over the resources for economic development of the country. Subsequently, the entire economic entrepreneurship for capital formation was put in the hands of the central government. Surprisingly, most of the

public institutions the government had established over the period were involved in varying capacities in the process of capital formation; but the local institutions were totally excluded from it.

Capital formation is vital not only for economic growth, but also for the institution involved to be able to invest or reinvest in its economic activities, thereby stimulating economic growth and development. If an institution does not engage in this process, then its developmental role can only be lopsided one, and this is exactly the role that the decentralized institutions in Tanzania have been playing. The central government determined and decided on all capital development projects which contributed to the formation of capital. It decided also where to reinvest, which of the natural resources found in the regions should be explored and extracted, and what kind of industry should be built and in which region, and so forth. In most cases such decisions have been taken without consultations with the local institutions. Of course, the influence of the foreign agencies and donor countries on government decisions should not be overlooked altogether. However, this is not our crucial point, because no foreign agency or country would have been interested in joint economic ventures with local institutions in which the host government had little or no trust. The local institutions, for their part, have been on-lookers of the whole process of capital formation. Every year they looked upon the central government to provide them with capital, part of which they used to maintain themselves, and the other part was spent to service development projects and programs into which they had minimum input. Most important, these development projects and programs were geared not only towards increased production in the rural areas, but also towards facilitating the process of extracting what was produced in these areas. Whatever accrued from rural production in the form of capital was retrieved by the central government.

In summary, the centralization of economic entrepreneurship and control over the principle resources for development severed seriously the ability of the decentral-

ized institutions to foster development in the rural areas. Throughout the period under discussion, these institutions continued to be dependent upon the central government for finance, expertise, technology and personnel. Their exclusion from the process of capital formation crippled further their potential. Ultimately, all these institutions could do was to act as agencies for servicing rural development projects and programs. Even in this role they performed poorly because of their financial dependence and constraints.

Lessons from the Experience

There are a number of lessons which can be drawn from the Tanzanian experience. First, over the past two decades the Tanzanian leadership has been too preoccupied with institutional reforms, as if the institutions were the principal obstacles to an accelerated rural development. The approach of the leadership to these institutional reforms has been a lopsided one because it was counteracted by the evolution and consolidation of a political and economic system which inhibited the success of the intended objectives of the reforms.

Secondly, it is obvious from the Tanzanian experience that institutional problems are just part of the many and complex problems related to rural development and development in general. Similarly, there is no particular decentralized system of administration which can be claimed to be the most viable for accelerating rural development. If by rural development is meant increased productivity to enable the government to accrue more revenue, then any system of administration can effectively promote such a desired goal, provided that the administration is given the appropriate skills, techniques, and technology. But, if rural development means rural transformation, then no system of administration should be expected to effectuate this process of transformation within a period of ten to fifteen years. For example, it took Western Europe and the Americas more than a century to transform their agrarian economies. The process of rural transformation in these countries, however, was less initiated by their administrations than by industrialization and

the forces of social production. Therefore, the emphasis given to a decentralized administration as the principal agent of rural development or rural transformation is just a myth, or rather, an oversimplification of the complex nature of the process.

Finally, it is also evident from the study that decentralization does not always and necessarily lead to local autonomy, local democracy, and participation. Decentralization is not just a contemporary phenomenon. It has existed, and still exists, in all societies, whatever their level of development. In all these societies, however, decentralization exists mostly for administrative purposes, rather than as a political phenomenon. The most serious theoretical flaw made by the proponents of the development administration school lies in their generalizations concerning decentralization and development in the developing countries on the one hand, and democracy, on the other. They are flaws because decentralization is just a concept and not an economic or development theory; and no distinction has been made between administrative and institutional (devolution) decentralization, as to which of the two is associated with, or most viable for, development and democracy.

But, most crucial and consequential to these flaws is the generalization made by the exponents of the development administration school that decentralization produces the same results (developmental or administrative) in every developing country. We have seen that in Tanzania decentralization could not be associated with development because the economic system of that country severely constrained the decentralized administration from playing an effective role in development. Similarly, decentralization could not effectuate a transfer of power from the centre to the local people because of the political system.

Conclusions

What we have done in this concluding chapter is to provide a summary of the preceding chapters, present our findings, and draw some important lessons from our case study. From what has been learned from the whole study, we now make general conclusions.

The local administration reforms in Tanzania have had little or no success in improving the capacity of the local institutions to promote rural development in the country. The shifting from one decentralized system of administration to another every ten years indicates that there have been ongoing institutional problems related to rural development. These problems have their origin in the colonial legacy which by and large had its influence upon the construction of the decentralized systems of administration in the country. Equally responsible for their failure is the Tanzanian political and economic system. Politically, the chances for the decentralized institutions to become autonomous are simply not there. The chances are further removed because of the existing Party organs and mass organizations which perform exactly the same political functions supposedly to be performed by the decentralized institutions. The economic system is equally centralized, thereby making the local institutions almost wholly dependent on the central government for their human and material resources.

For all the above reasons, there is a great uncertainty as to whether or not the current decentralized system of administration will have a permanent lifespan. It is already predictable that it will fail in promoting rural development, as well as local democracy and participation in the country.

The Tanzanian experience is very telling regarding the postulated correlation between decentralization and rural development. The experience is significant for several reasons. First, it confirms beyond doubt that rural development is a complex and multi-facted process which cannot be dealt with by a decentralized system of administration alone. Indeed, administration may be instrumental, but it is not the only determinant for the process to occur and be sustained. Stated differently, institutional problems in the developing countries are just part of the compounded problems affecting the process of development in these countries.

Secondly, the experience has challenged some of the basic propositions found in the decentralization literature of the development administration school. It has

been strongly suggested in this literature that, among other things, decentralization improves and increases the capacity of the administration for dealing with development; and it also enables the administration to enhance local democracy and participation, both considered as necessary for rural development. None of these results have been forthcoming through the decentralization programs in Tanzania. Therefore, there is a need for further re-examination of the theoretical underpinnings found in this literature, because the Tanzanian experience strongly suggests that these theoretical underpinnings are wrong. What we do propose here is that, in order to have a clear understanding of what decentralization programs can and cannot do with respect to development, there is need to comprehend the political and economic context of the country where these programs are initiated. As pointed out earlier, a highly centralized political system, with a centralized economy, is an anti-pole of decentralization which is intended for transferring power from the centre to local institutions. In this case, decentralization is a political process which cannot occur in a centralized political system. It is also an economic process because the politics and economy of a country are inseparable, and to think of them as two separate processes is a misconception.

It is true that centralized political and economic systems have been successful in promoting development. The Soviet Union and China are two good examples of these systems. But the historical context of both countries is completely different from that of the present developing countries. Also, there are many examples of decentralized political and economic systems in which decentralized administration has played an effective role in promoting development. The now developed countries fall under this category. But in the latter case, their decentralized administrations were not the principal determinants for the development stage at which they are now.

Thus, although we have models from both centralized and decentralized systems, the application of either one to a developing country, and its success in promoting

development, will depend upon the political and economic context of the country. There is no universality here, because each country has its own past history or social experience which by and large shapes the political and economic context of a country. For example, both Tanzania and Kenya have a one-party political system. But the difference in their social experiences has led their political and economic systems in different directions. In Kenya, the Westminster model of parliamentary democracy has been retained. The Party system is essentially used for electoral purposes, and after the elections the Party normally stays on the sidelines, thereby leaving the entire process of policy-making in the hands of the government and its institutions on all matters concerning social and economic development of the country. It has an open economy based largely on private entrepreneurship in the process of capital formation, along the lines of the capitalist economic system. A decentralized system of administration whose institutions are known as local governments has also been tried out and it is still in place. Tanzania, on the other hand, has taken a different path both politically and economically as we have discussed in the preceding chapters. Although both countries share common features today—that is, their economies are underdeveloped and dependent—the decentralized administration in Kenya differs tremendously from that in Tanzania. In the former case, it is autonomous from the Party, though not necessarily so from the central government. In fact, the national party politics take their base and strength from the local institutions, as most of the national political figures of Kenya have their political base from the local levels. It was this local political base, translated as *Majimboism* ("Regionalism"), which formed the principal ideology of the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU), which had been fighting for strong and autonomous regional governments until it was banned by the dominantly KANU (Kenya African National Union) government. In short, what should be emphasized here is the fact that the decentralized administration in Kenya has a greater potential for promoting local autonomy and democracy than is the case in Tanzania,

because the political system of Kenya permits such a devolution of power to occur. Furthermore, because the economic system is an open one, in which the local institutions are allowed to participate fully in the process of capital formation, the potential of the decentralized administration to enhance rural development is also greater than it is in Tanzania.

This comparison of the two countries proves the point that there are no identical political systems even if they have a common label. It also strengthens our position that decentralization should not be considered as having universal results in all political and economic systems; rather, the desired results from decentralization will depend upon the interaction between the decentralized institutions and the political and economic systems that exist in a country.

It is from this perspective that it becomes difficult to postulate the applicability of Tanzania's experience to other developing countries with a similar situation. It is problematic not only because we have some reservations about the universal applicability of models, however theoretically sound they may be; but also because we consider the Tanzanian experience as an "anti-model". The experimentation with various decentralized systems of administration has not provided a permanent solution to rural development problems in the country. At the same time, the rural areas have been flooded with institutions, many of which are counter-productive because they are there primarily for lubricating the supremacy of the Party, and less so for development purposes. Therefore, the institutional approach to rural development, which has been adopted by the Tanzanian leadership over the past two decades, cannot, and should not, be treated as an ideal model for promoting rural development in any developing country. What the developing countries could learn from it is that institutional reforms or decentralized systems of administration are not short-cuts to rural development or development in general.

As for Tanzania itself, the lessons are obvious. It is now incumbent upon the leadership to convince itself that institutional problems are just part of the com-

pounded and complex problems related to rural development. What is more important is for the leadership to assist the existing local institutions in every way possible, so that they can play their full part in stimulating and fostering rural development. Such assistance, however, will have to be accompanied by a political will on the part of the leadership.

From the theoretical perspective, Tanzania's experience has provided us with a lesson which might be useful for future inquiry in the field of the relationship between decentralized administration and development in developing countries.

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