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ENVIRONMENTAL INFLUENCES ON THE EXTERNAL
RELATIONS OF THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

BY

ESSA JUMA FARAJ

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE
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UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

submitted by Essa B.J. Faraj, M.A.,
in partial fulfilment of the requirement for
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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AUTHOR'S NOTE

We must take note of the variation in the definition of the term "the Gulf". Sometimes the usage of the term is rather restrictive, literally referring to the Gulf water in the region's centre. In a broad sense, the term is used to mean all of the countries in the Gulf area (Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the Trucial States, and Muscat and Oman). In the West and in Iran, the Gulf has generally been called the "Persian Gulf". The Arabs, for nationalistic reasons, speak of the "Arabian Gulf". The usage of the term "Gulf states" is a much narrower concept than "Gulf region". "Gulf states" or "Lower Gulf states" implies the nine shaikhdoms (Bahrain, Qatar, Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Umm al-Qaiwain, Ras al-Khaimah, and Fujairah).

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The United Arab Emirates - a confederation of Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Umm al-Qaiwain, Ras al-Khaimah, and Fujairah - came into formal existence in December 1971 - when the Trucial States gained final independence from Britain. European interest in the Gulf region goes back to the seventeenth century, when Portugal, Holland, Britain, and France joined forces to patrol the Gulf region.

Out of the competition among the European states for influence in the area, Britain emerged with the upper hand. In actual fact it was the British East India Company which was incorporated in 1600, and not the British Government, which attempted to regulate trade in the Gulf region.¹

¹ Muhammed T. Sadik and William P. Snavely, Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, (Toronto: D.C. Heath and Company, 1972), P. 3.

Early in the nineteenth century, after great struggles with the "pirates"², Britain signed a number of treaties (over a period of time) which normalized the relations with the rulers in the Gulf and which gave Britain legal control in the area until December 1971.³ The withdrawal of British forces from the Gulf states created a political vacuum. This fact is of great concern for the United States and Western Europe (NATO depends on the Gulf region for a large part of its oil). American oil companies have large investments in the Middle East oil operations, although their oil

2

Despite the presence of the British East India Company, incorporated in the early seventeenth century to regulate trade in the Gulf area, political instability continued to prevail. The diffusion of political authority among a number of Shaikhs resulted in a power vacuum in which piracy began to flourish with greater than usual vigor in the eighteenth century and in fact caused European mariners to name the southern shore of the Gulf as "the Pirate Coast". The waters around the small coastal settlements provided a protective refuge for pirate ships and though piracy had been practiced for centuries, piratical activities became particularly serious in the eighteenth and the first half of the nineteenth century.

3

The British still maintain their interests in the area by having signed "friendship treaties" with individual rulers just before their withdrawal. A treaty of friendship between the United Arab Emirates and Britain, replacing Britain's individual treaties with the Trucial States, was signed by the UAE President, Shaikh Zaid, and Sir Geoffrey Arthur, British Political Resident in the Gulf region, on December 2, 1971.

import from the Gulf region is rather small.

Britain also depends upon the Gulf for a large portion of her oil supply. The Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China have also expressed interest in the Gulf although so far they have not succeeded in making official contact in the area. On the other hand Japan seems to have benefited greatly from the British withdrawal -- it has gained oil concessions which were formerly held by Abu Dhabi Marine Areas Limited (ADMA) -- partially British and French. Other important political factors are the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Buraimi Question (UAE versus Saudi Arabia), The Irani Question (UAE versus Iran).

The British forces withdrew from the Gulf states in December 1971 after some 150 years. What do we expect the foreign policy of the UAE to be since Britain's

departure? Where will the UAE stand, when or if the Arab world comes into conflict with the "West"? During the last few years a number of articles have been written about the Gulf states and how much money the rulers are making, but it seems that no attempt has been made to establish the roles these states can play in international politics.

The growing world oil shortage, which has attracted so much recent publicity, gives the UAE a strong economic base and a bargaining weapon. How will the UAE use this weapon? Among the Arab nations there are "radical regimes", "moderate regimes", and "conservative regimes". Where can we expect the UAE to fall? To what extent will concepts such as "Arabism", "Islam" and common heritage influence the UAE decision-makers?

When the British Labour Government in 1968 declared that the British forces would be withdrawn from the Gulf region by 1971, a number of countries expressed interest in the Gulf States. Since the UAE became independent a number of diplomatic missions have been established but there are others who have expressed an interest in establishing diplomatic relations with the UAE and as yet have neither been accepted nor rejected. Why?

In this thesis I will attempt to account for all these questions. We should be aware that the formulation of the Foreign Policy of the United Arab Emirates is being influenced simultaneously (and will continue to be so for some time) by the other Arab countries on the one hand and the Western nations on the other.

It is assumed in this thesis that the United Arab Emirates Foreign Policy will remain "pro-west" in the general sense. British withdrawal from the Gulf states in

December 1971 was merely (a) in keeping with the overall "East of Suez" policy, and (b) in order to quell any possible move on the part of the "radical" element in the Gulf states against the British.

The United Arab Emirates will, in my view, maintain positive relationships with the Western nations because of the need to market oil which is their only export commodity and also because the elites recognize their need for continuing British protection as seen in the "friendship treaties".⁴ By these friendship treaties Britain seeks to maintain her influence in the Gulf states, reduce the possibility of the Soviet Union's military aid, secure the flow of oil to the West, and above all, assure political

⁴ See page 2.

stability in the Gulf region. Political stability in the United Arab Emirates will also be affected by the social changes accompanying economic development. As the United Arab Emirates become more developed, the more the ruling elites will feel the need for closer ties with Western nations. The more developed the United Arab Emirates become, the more likely a new "educated elites" will appear as an opposing element to the royal families, the tribal nobility, the native landlords, economic elite, the ulama, and foreign capitalists.⁵

During the past ten years or so the Gulf states, particularly Abu Dhabi and Dubai, have gained a dramatic increase in the literate and semi-literate, professional

⁵ James A. Bill, "Class Analysis and the Dialectics of Modernization in the Middle East", International Journal, Vol. 3, No. 4, (October 1972), P. 428.

and artisan elements as the result of an increase in educational opportunities for the citizens of the area. This new elite based largely on advanced education is likely to seek assistance from outside in changing the political regime in the United Arab Emirates. The basic cleavages within the international politics of the region will have a major influence on the United Arab Emirates foreign policy at the most general level.

The United Arab Emirates will need to maintain a close and positive identification with the Arab states because of "Arabism", religion, history, geography, language, and culture. It is significant that the first move after independence from Britain in December 1971 was to join the League of Arab States. On issues such as the Arab-Israeli conflict, the UAE will side closely

with other Arab states in support of the Palestinian cause. As oil increasingly is seen as a weapon to pressure the West to reduce its support for Israel, the United Arab Emirates will be influenced by other Arab states to implement this type of policy.

Egypt's central position in the Arab-Israeli conflict cannot be ignored by the United Arab Emirates. This trend can be seen in the communique issued in June 1972 at the end of a week's visit to Cairo by the Prime Minister of Abu Dhabi, Shaikh Khalifa bin Zaid al-Nuhayan. The communique said that the United Arab Emirates and Egypt regarded aggression against any Arab territory as an aggression against the Arab World. The UAE paid tribute to Egypt's steadfastness, which

acted as a "protective shield to all Arab states."⁶

As a means of gauging the relative impact of these outside forces I have undertaken a study of the international visits in the Gulf states starting from the time when Britain announced her intention of withdrawal from the Gulf area (1968) until the end of 1972. The information collected for the five year study (1968-72) is based on the Middle East Economic Digest and Arab Report and Record. The source used for charting these visits is the Middle East Economic Digest and Arab Report and Record described by Robert G. Landen as "indispensable for the student who wishes current data"⁷ on the Gulf states.

⁶ Arab Report and Record, London, (June 1972), P.290.

⁷ Robert G. Landen, "Gulf States", Abid A. Al-Marayati and others, The Middle East: Its Governments and Politics, (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1972), P. 316.

The close association with a distant republican Egypt rather than the monarchies of Saudi Arabia, Jordan, or Iran is also dictated by the fact that the ruling elites in the United Arab Emirates have had their sharpest disagreements in recent years with Saudi Arabia and Iran over territory. As pressure increases for a common defence against radicalism at home, the elite in the UAE may be expected to play down these past territorial problems.

The most important aspect of this thesis is to establish how the Foreign Policy of the United Arab Emirates is being formulated. However as published material on the Gulf states is so sparse and because of the generally limited knowledge of the area even

on the part of most area observers, I have included background material on the history and geography of the area (Chapter 2), the domestic, economic and social environment (Chapter 3), and on the political and military structures of the regime (Chapter 4).

With this setting in space, time, and domestic social structures, the reader can then move to a discussion of specific local foreign policy issues - the Buraimi question (Chapter 5), and the Iranian question (Chapter 6). In Chapter 7, the study of international interaction in the Gulf area is presented, followed by a study of the United Arab Emirates (Chapter 8). The conclusion presents an estimation of the relative weight of these competing external influences (Chapter 9).

The title is carefully chosen to reflect that there is very little documentation on the United Arab Emirates' foreign policy. We lack the regular articulation of goals and objectives of the foreign policy by key decision-makers in the United Arab Emirates. This is due in part to the relative newness of the United Arab Emirates. Secondly the Government of the United Arab Emirates has not yet provided a record of their statements. Thirdly there are very few secondary sources that we can rely on.

A principal purpose of this thesis is to provide a systematic description of various environmental influences on the United Arab Emirates' foreign policy. On the basis of this descriptive work and with later articulation of foreign policy by the United Arab Emirates' leaders later study will be required to establish the actual foreign

policy of the United Arab Emirates. At this stage it is more appropriate to talk about influences rather than specify policy which is in its embryonic stage. Whatever further elaboration is needed of the United Arab Emirates' foreign policy we can say that the United Arab Emirates' leaders share the common policy task of all national leaders viz., to preserve the territorial integrity of the state and to maintain the regime in power.

CHAPTER 2

GENERAL BACKGROUND

"No arm of the sea has been, or is of greater interest, alike to the geologist and archaeologist, the historian and geographer, the merchant, the statesman, and the student of strategy, than the inland water known as the Persian Gulf."

Sir Arnold Wilson, 1928

Geography

The Trucial States extend for about 400 miles covering an area of 30,000 square miles, and stretching east from Qatar to the Peninsula of Oman. They are from north to south: Abu Dhabi (26,000 square miles), Dubai (1,500 square miles), Sharjah (1,000 square miles), Ajman (100 square miles), Umm al-Qaiwain (300 square miles), Ras al-Khaimah (650 square miles), and Fujairah (450 square miles).

The coast consists of rather shallow seas, sandbanks, spits, and coral reefs and there are many offshore islands. The coastline is arid with high temperatures and high

humidity. The Gulf waters cover an area of 97,000 square miles with a northern limit of 30 degrees. At the extreme south of the Gulf is the Strait of Hormuz which separates the "Persian" Gulf from the Gulf of Oman. The Gulfs cannot be wholly disassociated from each other. The length of the Gulf is over 500 miles and its width varies from 180 miles to a mere 26 miles at the Strait of Hormuz.¹

History

The Trucial States, which have also been known as "Shaikhdoms" or "British Protectorates" were, only quasi-sovereign states in that they did not possess all the attributes of statehood in the international sense of the word.

The British political administration in the Gulf region owed its existence to the early commercial activities of the

¹ Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, The Gulf: Implication of British Withdrawal (Washington, D.C.; 1969), P. 31.

British East India Company which was established in 1763. During the fifty years before 1820 these states were said to be "lawless" and life was more of a nomadic nature. The shallow creeks scattered along the coast formed ideal bases for "pirates" who did much damage to shipping in the Gulf region. This activity came to a head during the Napoleonic Wars when the powers of the day were too pre-occupied with their own quarrels to have time to spare for other matters, and the "pirates" became sufficiently strong to be able to overpower well-armed western ships.

In 1809 and 1819, however, the problem of subduing the "pirates" was tackled by the British and after one rather unsuccessful attempt to destroy their bases they were finally brought to heel in 1820. The British relations with the rulers of the Trucial States were based on a

series of treaties and agreements and undertakings which were concluded at various times between 1806 and 1923.

The documents fall in the following three categories:

- i) The Maritime Treaties (1806-1853). These were basically to suppress piracy and slave trade and to maintain peace in the waters of the Gulf. In this period, there were two important maritime treaties: the General Treaty of Peace of January 1820 and the Treaty of Peace in Perpetuity of May 4, 1853. Through these treaties the maritime truce was made permanent. These treaties were signed by the rulers of the Trucial States, Bahrain, and Qatar.
- ii) The political agreements (1861-1916). Here the relationship between the British Government of India and the Gulf states was generally broadened, they became much closer as a result of the conclusion of these agreements. In other words, the so-called "exclusive agreements of 1892" which called for special attention since they form the basis on which the British government virtually assumed control over the foreign affairs of the Trucial States and other "Shaikhdoms".
- iii) The economic agreements (1902-1923). These include various agreements and undertakings signed by the rulers of the Trucial States and aimed at giving the British Government certain privileges and preferential rights with respect to the granting of postal and telegraph services, pearling and oil concessions in the Trucial States. The most important agreement was signed in 1922 by the rulers and was related to oil concessions.

With the agreements reached above, the rulers of the Trucial States surrendered to the British government their

rights and sovereignty in the following matters: (1) the establishment of direct diplomatic relations with foreign powers, (2) the negotiation or conclusion of treaties or agreements with foreign powers, other than Britain, without Britain's consent, (3) the cession or disposal of their territories, through any means, without Britain's consent, and (4) the grant of mineral or oil concessions to foreign governments or foreign nationals, without prior British consent.

The rulers of the Trucial States in return for these obligations received British government protection against foreign aggression, safeguarding of their individual independence, attention to their political and economic interests, the extension of British protection of their nationals abroad, and the conduct of their external affairs. The British assistance to the rulers in their dealings with

foreigners and other nations was given through political agents who also carried out normal consular functions.

British influence in the Gulf has been directed as far as possible to stimulate progress in the area. An attempt was made to create a large and modern fishing industry but was unsuccessful. Pearling on the other hand was an important activity in the Gulf for many years. But since the Second World War the trade has declined considerably partly due to a decline in the price of pearls, and partly because divers could find easier and less hazardous jobs in the oil industry. Around 1935, the Gulf was crowded with pearling boats; now perhaps only a dozen sail each year for the banks.

The Discovery of Oil

The possibility of the Trucial States as an oil producing territory was recognized by major oil companies

early in this century. Forty years before any oil was discovered, the rulers signed an undertaking not to grant concessions other than those accepted by the British Government. The undertaking of May 1922 was at the request of Britain as a protective measure, and it was another thirteen years before the granting of concessions became of practical interest or importance.

Table 1-2
Dates of Oil Discoveries and First Shipments

<u>Country</u>	<u>Date of Concession</u>	<u>Date of Discovery of Oil</u>	<u>Date of First Shipment</u>
Bahrain	1928	1932	1934
Qatar	1935	1939	1949
Abu Dhabi	1953	1958	1962
Dubai	1952	1966	1969

Source: Middle East Economic Digest and Arab Report and Record Survey, Bahrain, 1969, December 1969, P.10; Middle East Economic Digest and Arab Report and Record Survey, Qatar 1969, October 1969, P. xii; Arab Report and Record, Abu Dhabi, June 1, 1969, P. 226; Middle East Economic Digest and Arab Report and Record Survey, Dubai 1969, July 1969, PP. x-xi.

The first concession was given in 1935 to the Anglo-Iranian Company and the following year to Petroleum Development (Trucial Coast), a wholly-owned subsidiary of

Iraq Petroleum Company. In January 1939 Shaikh Shakhbout, then ruler of Abu Dhabi, consented to a seventy-five year concession. With the intervening of World War II it was another ten year before Petroleum Development (Trucial Coast) was able to start exploration. PDTC, was renamed Abu Dhabi Petroleum Company Limited in 1962. In 1938 the rulers of Dubai, Sharjah, and Ras al-Khaimah concluded similar agreements to that of Abu Dhabi.

Under the 1939 agreement, reached with PDTC, Abu Dhabi was to receive a rental fee until the discovery of oil in commercial quantities, when it would receive three rupees per ton (Indian Rupee in those days, five rupees equalled one U.S. dollar). Therefore three Indian rupees equalled to sixty U.S. cents. The company started producing in 1963 but the 1939 agreement remained in force until September 1965, when a fifty-fifty profit sharing agreement was made. This raised the royalty to about 29 Indian Rupees per ton (about \$4.75 per ton).

Abu Dhabi Marine Areas (ADMA) - two thirds owned by British Petroleum Company and one-third by Compagnie Française des Pétroles, started oil exploration (offshore) in 1953 after a dispute over offshore rights was settled in that year through arbitration. Abu Dhabi Marine Areas drilled its first well in 1958 and the company struck oil in the same year although it was not announced until 1960.

Abu Dhabi Marine Areas also signed a fifty-fifty profit-sharing agreement in November 1966 and relinquished areas in 1967. The Petroleum Development (Trucial Coast) relinquished its other concessions in the Gulf area in 1962 at the time when it changed its name to Abu Dhabi Petroleum Company Limited. The relinquishment of areas by PDTC and ADMA agreement to provide for the relinquishment of parts of the concessions every three years gave Abu Dhabi a greater opportunity and since then it has concluded three agreements of more favourable terms.

In 1967 the areas relinquished in 1965 by Petroleum Development (Trucial States) which was renamed Abu Dhabi Petroleum Company (ADPC)² were taken over by a consortium of Italy's Ente Nazionale Indrocarburi (ENI), and American owned Phillips Petroleum and Aminoil. The drilling had begun and Abu Dhabi would receive 50 per cent stake in the operation.

What was relinquished by ADMA (offshore area) in 1967 was awarded to Daikyo Oil and Nippon Mining, a Japanese consortium of Maruzen Oil. It is now drilling in the area under the name Abu Dhabi Petroleum Development Company. The ruler of Abu Dhabi, Shaikh Zaid bin Sultan, signed another agreement in May 1968 with the Japanese Mitsubishi group, who formed the Middle East Oil Development Company, which has already started drilling in the area.

2

ADPC ownership is: 23.75 per cent British Petroleum, 23.75 per cent Compagnie Française des Pétroles, 11.875 per cent Standard Oil of New Jersey, 11.875 per cent Mobil, 23.75 per cent Royal Dutch/Shell, and five per cent Partex (Gulbenkian interests).

According to Ragaei El Mallakh

"Abu Dhabi is moving³ toward a position which may lead to the development of a national oil company along the lines of Petroleum in (Saudi Arabia), Kuwait National Petroleum Company (Kuwait), and Lipetco (Libya). The Department of Oil and Industry is seeking to negotiate the purchase of one million tons of crude oil annually over a two year period from ADPC and ADMA. A preliminary feasibility study on marketing has been submitted for a refinery to be constructed under the Five Year Development Plan."⁴

The Government of Abu Dhabi plans to build an oil refinery with an output of 13,000 barrels a day at a cost of \$30 million. This plan was confirmed in August 1972 and Abu Dhabi decided to proceed in March 1973 with construction of the refinery. The Minister of Oil and Industry Mani al-Utaiba, after returning from Britain, in October 1972, told reporters that the Government of Abu Dhabi adhered firmly

³ The Minister of Oil and Industry, Mani bin Said al-Utaiba, arrived in Baghdad on April 6, 1972 to attend the celebration marking the start of production by the North Rumaila field. He told reporters that "Abu Dhabi planned to establish its own national oil company and certainly would benefit in doing so from the experience of Iraq". Arab Report and Record, (June 1972), P. 194.

⁴ Ragaei El Mallakh, "The Challenge of Affluence: Abu Dhabi", Middle East Journal, Vol. 24, (1970), P. 139.

to the principle of participation in the capital of foreign concessionaires, and would implement it within the framework of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Arab countries are united in their negotiations, recently Middle Eastern governments bargained to receive a larger share of the profits. Now they seek a greater role in management. The windfall gives a mighty boost to basic development and armaments and a trump card in diplomacy.

Abu Dhabi and three other Gulf states signed a "declaration of intent" in October 1972 bringing in a new era of oil participation. With Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar, Abu Dhabi declared after the OPEC meeting that it would adhere to the broad lines of agreement reached with the major oil companies, providing for eventual control by the producing countries of the assets and output of the companies.

"Abu Dhabi, like the other signatories to the declaration, will make separate agreements with each of the companies operating in its territory. The participation agreement will mean that Abu Dhabi will,

in 1973, a 25 per cent holding in ADMA and ADPC and will have the right to sell (or sell back to the companies) a quarter of their output. It has been estimated that the cost to Abu Dhabi of this initial 25 per cent acquisition will be a little over BD.60 million⁵ but it is most probable that payment will not be in cash but in term of crude oil to an equivalent value sold back to ADMA and ADPC. Abu Dhabi will acquire an additional 5 per cent interest in the companies in each of the (following) years: 1979, 1980, 1981, 1982, and a 6 per cent in 1983, to give the Emirate a controlling interest by that year."⁶

The same, will be, for Dubai. It will acquire a holding in Dubai Petroleum Company. Table 2-2 below gives Abu Dhabi oil exports and revenues during 1966-1971. In 1975, it is

Table 2-2
Abu Dhabi Oil Exports and Revenues, 1966-1971

Year	Exports (million barrels)	Gov't Receipts U.S. cents per bbl.	Gov't Oil Revenues (\$ millions)
1966	133	75.3	100
1967	138	76.3	105
1968	181	84.5	153
1969	218	87.3	191
1970	254	92.0	233
1971	339	127.2	431

Source: Middle East Sketch "Abu Dhabi" in Transition", (Beirut: Bedros A. Kazandjian, 1972), P. 24.

⁵
Approximate rate: BD 1 (Bahraini Dinar) equals to U.S. \$2.37.

⁶
The United Arab Emirates, (Abu Dhabi: Ministry of Information, 1973), P. 10.

expected that Abu Dhabi's oil revenue will double that of 1971. Dubai's oil revenue in 1971 was \$50 million and it is most likely that it will follow the same trend as Abu Dhabi.

The Government of Dubai granted the sea-bed concession to Dubai Marine Areas Limited. This concession was previously granted to Superior Oil Company in 1954. The concession held in Dubai by Petroleum Development (Trucial Coast) was obtained by Continental Oil Company (one of the American independents) in 1963 and was named Dubai Petroleum Company for local operation.

It has been stated early in this Chapter that PDTC signed agreements with Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Sharjah, and Ras al-Khaimah in the nineteen thirties. PDTC also signed agreements with the three other Trucial States: Umm al-Qaiwain in 1945, Ajman in 1951, and Fujairah in 1952.

Although only Abu Dhabi and Dubai have joined the other oil producing countries, it is anticipated the other five Trucial States will soon strike oil. Oil has been discovered recently in Sharjah's continental shelf but the quantity still unknown.

Oil and International Politics

The United Arab Emirates did not establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. This shows that the British withdrawal from the Gulf states did not provide the Soviet Union an opportunity to get a footing in the Gulf area. As a matter of fact, according to John Barry⁷

⁷ John A. Berry, a U.S. Army officer, was assistant professor for Middle Eastern Studies at the U.S. Military Academy from 1969-71.

the Soviet Union is gradually acquiring a need for oil. The UAE (Abu Dhabi and Dubai, especially) seem to be future leading oil producers in the Gulf region. However, John Berry stated that,

"The Soviet Union has recently taken an unexpected interest in Middle Eastern oil. During the decade of the 1950's and into the early 1960's, a Soviet surplus in oil permitted the USSR to export oil to world markets at an increasing rate. The Soviet's only interest in the Middle Eastern petroleum industry was in its contribution to Western military and industrial power. (It did not need the oil for its own use, and accused the Western oil companies of being agents of Western imperialism), however, ... By the middle 1960's, Soviet oil exports to the West had reached their peak. European countries such as Italy, Austria, West Germany, and Greece imported oil at reduced prices from the USSR in those years, as did Japan. The Western oil companies became alarmed at this apparent 'oil offensive' not so much for the loss of markets or for concern over national security, but for the threatened disruption of the carefully balanced oil pricing system. Western observers also feared that the USSR sought a political gain from this economic offensive, namely replacement of Western oil companies by Soviet ones in the uncommitted nations in order to gain political influence."⁸

According to Berry, the Soviet oil exports did not have any political purpose but rather came as a result of large surplus.

⁸ John A. Berry, "Oil and Soviet Policy in the Middle East", The Middle East Journal, (Washington), Spring 1972, P. 149.

Eventually, by about 1966 onward, "Soviet oil consumption increased faster than production, and the whole pattern of Soviet oil policy began slowly to shift."⁹ In 1960 the Soviet Union's oil production was 148 million tons and by 1970 it had increased by 140 per cent to 353 million tons. It is assumed by western intelligence that the same growth rate will not be sustained in the next ten years.¹⁰

According to Soviet sources, the target for 1975 is 490 million tons, and if this growth is met, the five year growth will be 38 per cent. This is fairly large by normal standards but it is clear that there is a decline in growth. The production is expected to reach 600-620 million tons by 1980, which means an increase of 70-75 per cent over 1970, but at the same time it is only half the growth of the previous twenty years.¹¹

⁹ Ibid., P. 150.

¹⁰ Ibid., P. 150.

¹¹ Ibid., P. 150.

The UAE's oil production is growing and is likely to supersede that of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. At the same time the European NATO countries will be directly affected should the Soviet Union succeed in establishing "friendly" diplomatic relations with the UAE. At present NATO receives about 90 per cent of its oil from the Middle East. It is expected by 1980, according to John Berry, that the Middle East oil production will reach approximately 1,500 million tons per year and that the USSR will import 100 million tons from the Arab countries.

"...Soviet intentions are often hard to clarify, and the Russians could still hope to use oil as a weapon against the West. Their intentions do not always coincide with their capabilities, and in this particular case, their capabilities for mischief seem to fall considerably short of whatever level of gain their intentions may seek to achieve. The possibility of an internal upheaval, sweeping aside the kings (Saudi Arabia and Jordan), Shaikhs (Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman) and shahs (Iran) of the Persian Gulf, always exist, but such an event depends far more on internal than external causes."¹²

However, the UAE oil production is on the increase while on the one hand, the United States, Western Europe and Japan

¹²

Ibid., P. 160.

are becoming more and more dependent on the UAE as a supplier, and on the other hand, the UAE is gaining more and more control over its oil industry. This is due to the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) which was founded in Baghdad in 1960. Since then it has been suggested that there should be an organization of importing countries.¹³

Table 3-2
"Sellers" of the United Arab Emirates Oil¹

<u>Country</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
United Kingdom	41 per cent
France	26 per cent
United States	19 per cent
Others	14 per cent

¹

Indicates, approximately, national interests, through shareholding in operating companies, 1971 production.

Source: The Ministry of Information, Abu Dhabi, The United Arab Emirates, (December 1972), P. 7.

¹³

J.E. Hartshorn, Oil Companies and Governments, (London: Faber and Faber, 1962), P. 257.

Table 4-2
"Buyers" of the United Arab Emirates Oil, 1971

<u>Country</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
Japan	28 per cent
United Kingdom	16 per cent
France	23 per cent
United States	11 per cent
Others	22 per cent

Note: The main purchasers of Abu Dhabi oil exported in 1971.

Source: The Ministry of Information, Abu Dhabi, The United Arab Emirates, (December 1972), P.7.

With reference to Table 3-2 and Table 4-2, Japan is a leading importer of oil from Abu Dhabi. "In terms of 1,000 barrels a day in 1971 Japan imported 262 from Abu Dhabi, France 207, Britain 151, U.S.A. 105, Netherlands 44, Africa 42, West Germany 39, and Italy 21."¹⁴ According to the UAE Government, regardless of the discovery of North Sea oil, "the countries of Western Europe will still require large quantities of oil from the Arabian Gulf, and

¹⁴ The Ministry of Information, Abu Dhabi, The United Arab Emirates, (December 1972), P. 9.

Japan's requirement will outstrip the quantities she may possibly obtain from closer resources of supply."¹⁵

However, as a result of the Teheran and Geneva agreements (see page 25), we can see that oil is going to be an important bargaining weapon for the UAE in the international scene. With respect to proven oil reserves at the end of 1971, there were 90,000 million barrels for Abu Dhabi and 1,500 million barrels for Dubai, but more reserves are expected to be found.

Sharjah has already confirmed its oil find and will soon join the petroleum exporting countries. Table 5-2 below, shows that in 1971 Abu Dhabi received nearly 180 million pounds sterling, and this amount is expected to more than double by 1975. Dubai on the other hand, received over 20 million pounds sterling in 1971, and is following the same trend as Abu Dhabi.¹⁶

¹⁵

Ibid., P. 9.

¹⁶

Ibid., PP. 9-10.

Table 5-2
The UAE Oil Production, 1962-1972 (Million Tons)

State & Oil Company	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972 ¹
Abu Dhabi											
ADMA	0.7	2.2	3.0	4.3	5.1	5.7	8.7	11.5	12.6	16.9	21.5
ADPC	-	0.3	6.0	9.0	12.1	12.2	14.9	16.8	20.1	27.2	29.0
Dubai											
DPC	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.5	4.3	6.5	6.5
Total	0.7	2.6	9.0	13.3	17.2	17.9	23.6	28.8	37.0	50.6	57.0

¹
Estimated figures for full year 1972 based on January/September Production.
Source: The Ministry of Information, Abu Dhabi, The United Arab Emirates, (December 1972), P. 10.

The interesting aspect of the oil development in the United Arab Emirates is that the "declaration of intent" which was signed at the end of October 1972 (see pages 22-25), gave Abu Dhabi,

"the first steps towards the formation of its own state oil corporation, the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company. ADNOC will represent the Emirate's interests on the boards of foreign oil companies and will be responsible for the marketing of Emirate's share of output of crude oil. It will also be responsible for implementing plans for oil-based industries and a petroleum college is being set up under its aegis to train qualified staff."¹⁷

¹⁷
Ibid., P. 10.

There is no doubt that oil is an important factor in the United Arab Emirates' foreign policy. It is interesting to take note of what the Time has said recently,

"Some news for the 1980s: Two Saudi Arabian princes have just joined the board of directors of General Motors, in which they are major shareholders. The Kuwait Investment Co. is erecting a chain of "Arabian Nights" motels across the U.S. The Shaikh of Abu Dhabi has bought a 30% interest in the Columbia Broadcasting System, to add to a communications empire that already includes the Washington Star-News and Metro-Goldwyn Mayer. The White House issues a statement welcoming the huge investments by 'our Arab allies' as a way of stopping the dollar drain ('If they cause us trouble,' adds one White House economist, 'we can nationalize them'), but expresses some concern at reports that Libya and Iraq are negotiating with France to obtain nuclear weapon."¹⁸

We need not emphasise that it is a remote possibility that the United Arab Emirates or the rulers of the UAE will take any step which might cause a problem for the Western oil companies. At the same time, internal "upheaval" as Richard Johns puts it, is a remote possibility because the UAE Government has taken very important steps in

¹⁸

Time, "The Arab World: Oil, Power, Violence", (April 2, 1973), P. 20.

education, health, power, water, low cost housing, and agriculture. "The UAE's Budget last year was 19 million pounds sterling, and Abu Dhabi, whose share was apportioned at some 16 million pounds sterling, paid it all."¹⁹

Both Shaikh Zaid, the UAE President, and Shaikh Rashid, the UAE Vice-President, are well known as "progressive" rulers. Over and above, Saudi Arabia and Iran are also making certain that there is no change in the status quo in the Gulf states. On May 8, 1973 a decree was issued by Shaikh Zaid on the annual budget of Abu Dhabi, totalling BD. 281 million. Some BD. 95 million is allocated for new projects, BD. 101 million for the general budget and BD. 44 million as Abu Dhabi's contribution toward the UAE budget.²⁰

¹⁹ Richard Johns, "The Emergence of the United Arab Emirates", Middle East International, No. 21, (March 1973), P. 10.

²⁰ Arab Report and Record, London, (May 1973), P. 215.

Note: for BD (Bahraini Dinar) rate, see page 26.

We can conclude then that the UAE Government is aware and is doing its utmost to quell any "internal upheaval" which might interfere with the new nation's foreign policy. The Arab Report and Record quoted Shaikh Zaid at a press conference in London on June 19, 1969 as saying "We regard...any legal British Government.... as our close friends in whom we have full confidence."²¹ Shaikh Zaid was asked about the Soviet penetration in the Gulf and the spread of "liberation movements" he replied, "We do not know of any active nationalist organization in the Gulf...We respect those who respect us and we are on the alert for those who are against us."²²

Furthermore it is interesting to take note of the Abu Dhabi Government's expenditure for 1968 on police and

²¹Arab Report and Record, London, (June 1969), P. 255.²²Ibid., P. 255.

public security and intelligence which totalled about

BD. 1,542,046 (see Appendix).

CHAPTER 3

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT

Economic Status

The discovery of the oil has changed the economic face of the Trucial States. As was indicated in the previous Chapter the pearl-fishing "industry" literally vanished as a direct result of the oil industry and indirectly because of the development of cultured pearls by Japan. If we look at the economically active population we can see that Abu Dhabi has 63 per cent of its population economically active and 37 per cent inactive. Dubai has 41 per cent active and 59 per cent inactive, in Sharjah 34 per cent of the population is active and 66 per cent inactive, the state of Ajman has 29 per cent of its population active and 71 per cent inactive¹, (see Table 1-3).

¹ Muhammad T. Sadik and William P. Snavely, Bahrain, Qatar, and The United Arab Emirates, (Toronto: D.C. Heath and Company, 1972), P. 28.

Table 1-3
Economically Active Population by State and Status

	Abu Dhabi 1968		Dubai 1968		Sharjah 1968		Ajman 1968		Umm al- Qaiwain 1968		Ras al- Khaimah 1968		Fujairah 1968		Total	
Economic Status	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Employer Self-	559	2	1,134	5	302	3	82	7	55	5	419	6	81	3	2,632	3
Employed	3,133	11	4,516	19	2,436	23	384	31	382	32	2,862	38	1,551	50	15,264	20
Employees	23,942	82	17,046	71	7,346	69	654	54	639	54	3,626	48	1,015	33	54,270	70
Family Workers ¹	407	1	641	3	206	2	24	2	45	4	435	6	413	13	2,171	3
Unemployed	1,243	4	675	3	352	3	78	6	59	5	243	3	26	1	2,676	3
Economically Active population (Total)	29,284	100	24,014	100	10,642	100	1,222	100	1,180	100	7,585	100	3,086	100	77,013	100
Economic Status	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Economically Active Population (Total)	29,284	63	24,014	41	10,642	34	1,222	29	1,180	32	7,585	31	3,086	32	77,013	43
Economically Inactive (Total)	17,091	37	34,957	59	21,026	66	3,024	71	2,564	68	16,802	69	6,649	68	102,113	57
Total Population	46,375	100	58,971	100	31,668	100	4,246	100	3,744	100	24,387	100	9,735	100	179,126	100

Unpaid domestic workers. Note: Percent column may not add to 100 because of rounding.
Source: Trucial States Census, 1968 (Unpublished).

"Fujairah and Umm al-Qaiwain have similar levels of economic and social development, and they also have identical ratios of economically active population to total population, 32 per cent active and 60 per cent inactive."² Ras al-Khaimah has 31 per cent active and 69 per cent inactive. In terms of the extent of their economic development, Ajman is the most underdeveloped whereas "Ras al-Khaimah and Sharjah have about the same level of development."³

We can see that Abu Dhabi has the highest economically active population percentage (see Table 1-3) and that Dubai falls next in line. This is because of the oil discoveries which brought in an influx of Pakistanis, Indians, Iranis, Arabs and other nationals. Foreigners account for a little

²
Ibid., P. 28.

³
Ibid., P. 28.

44

less than 50 per cent of the population. It is expected that this ratio will change in the near future as immigration laws become tighter. The rush into the Trucial States in the sixties, to find employment was similar to that which had taken place in Bahrain in the forties and fifties.

Although in Abu Dhabi there are no major industries in operation, it is expected that within the coming few years an oil refinery, a petro-chemical plant and a cement factory will come into operation.⁴ Dubai also has no major industries but a cement factory is due to come into operation in 1973. An aluminium factory which will produce household items is under construction. In February 1973 a contract for building a dry dock in Dubai was signed in London, with the Director of Costain's Company and the

⁴ Ibid., P. 61.

Director of Taylor and Woodrow Company Limited. The projected Dubai Dock is considered to be the largest of its kind in the world. The Dock will handle ships upto one million tons and the project will cost BD. 162 million.⁵

Sharjah can be regarded as a more "affluent" state. Outside the "Big Two" (Abu Dhabi and Dubai) it is relatively more developed than the other states. We can see that its receipts (see Appendix) are increasing but as yet not enough for major projects. It is expected that with the oil discovery, Sharjah will be able to compete with the "Big Two" in terms of political power. Ajman being the ~~smallest~~ state (100 square miles) and having a population of about 5,500 has to depend on "external" aid.

⁵
The Ministry of Information, Abu Dhabi, Abu Dhabi News, Vol. 3, No. 137, (February 3, 1973), P. 4.

By looking at its 1966-68 revenues and its 1971-74 estimates (see Appendix) we can see that it is not possible for Ajman to finance its infrastructure without the assistance from "outside".

Ras al-Khaimah can stand on its own feet although it may not be possible for it to develop much needed projects without some assistance. It can maintain itself without "external" assistance, but with "external" assistance things will be much brighter for its people.

Fujairah's public revenues (1966-68) were BD. 1.01 million which is not enough to maintain its needs. The estimates of revenues of BD. 1.14 million for the period 1971-74 are not likely to be maintained without aid from "outside".

Umm al-Qaiwain, covering an area of 300 square miles and having a population of about 4,500 has nothing to depend

on but fishing in which almost the whole population is engaged. Umm al-Qsiwain has no sufficient source of funds for development and therefore it has to depend on "external" aid.

I have spoken consistently of "external" aid or assistance. This is because, apart from Abu Dhabi and Dubai, the other states receive assistance from Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, or Qatar, although this dependence on "external" help has been replaced by local aid since the formation of the United Arab Emirates.

The People

The Trucial States are peopled almost exclusively by Arabs (see Table 2-3), but there are alien elements, mostly in the large towns. The Arabs of Oman belong, according to tradition, to two racial groups: Yemeni,

which are said to have been the first Arab settlers in the area of the Gulf, and Nizari or Nasiri, less purely Arab and for the most part, later immigrants. Beside these main elements, there are, at various places, communities of Baluchis, Pakistanis, Indians, Iranis, and people of African descent (the latter is a remnant of the slave trade).

There are also the Baharanah (these people are mostly found in Bahrain, in the oases of Hasa in Saudi Arabia, and in Qatif, Iraq). This race of people, according to the late Sir Arnold Wilson, can be regarded as a "clan" or as an aboriginal tribe conquered and absorbed by the Arabs, or as a "class" formed by the conversion of certain Arab tribes to shiism, about 300 years ago.⁶

⁶ Arnold T. Wilson, The Persian Gulf, (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1928), P. 8.

Table 2-3

Tribal Population of the Trucial States, by State and Tribe, 1968

Tribe	Abu Dhabi		Dubai		Sharjah		Ajman		Umm al-Qaiwain		Ras al-Khaimah		Fujairah		Total	
	1968		1968		1968		1968		1968		1968		1968		1968	
1. Ahbab	319		1		25		-		7		-		-		352	
2. Al-ali	60		155		508		85		2,862		1,445		3		5,118	
3. Al-Awamir	1,721		69		37		7		19		34		5		1,892	
4. Biduwat	42		450		-		1		-		-		6		499	
5. Dahanimah	9		59		13		7		-		551		94		7,333	
6. Dahababiha	3		-		2		6		-		-		8		19	
7. Dhawahir	2,844		42		109		41		-		9		57		3,102	
8. Ghafalah	96		6		34		5		127		25		-		293	
9. Habus-Shihuh-Dhahuriyin	147		74		74		13		-		5,845		244		6,177	
10. Bani Jabir	49		8		4		-		5		15		-		81	
11. Bani Kaab(inc. Shwaihiyin)	217		16		197		39		-		189		59		717	
12. Muhariza	17		-		12		-		-		312		10		351	
13. Manasir	3,224		275		49		21		-		38		-		3,607	
14. Masafarah	6		-		39		-		7		19		1		72	
15. Mazari	1,287		271		293		17		38		1,062		76		3,044	
16. Naaim (inc. Khuwatir)	325		171		219		616		25		968		10		2,334	
17. Najadat	662		29		5		1		-		11		85		793	
18. Nagbiyin	16		-		1,345		-		-		541		3		1,905	
19. Qawasim	101		108		3,592		8		3		1,055		14		4,881	
20. Bani Qitab	617		156		1,458		21		6		112		-		2,370	
21. Quwaid	3		1		162		-		4		19		6		195	
22. Shahairah	-		3		1		11		-		69		-		84	
23. Al bu Shamis	370		769		689		190		12		408		-		2,438	
24. Sharqiyin	80		65		116		69		25		82		8,372		8,809	
25. Tunaij	13		2		372		7		-		21		22		437	
26. Bani Yas	4,597		3,913		1,424		213		1		290		27		10,465	
27. Zaab	22		27		710		7		4		2,455		-		3,225	
28. Other	903		1,194		1,280		226		69		2,366		256		6,294	
Total	17,750		7,864		12,769		1,611		3,209		17,941		9,138		70,282	

Source: 1968 Trucial States Census (unpublished).

At the tip of the Gulf lives an indigenous population which is principally Arab while along the Persian littoral from Shatt al-Arab as far as the Strait of Hormuz, lives a mixture of races, and racial blends, of which the most important elements are Persian and Persian-Arab, the latter of whom might be described as Arabs under Persian rule and who have been denationalized by settlement, or by inter-marriage.

It is estimated that there are more than 100,000 Palestinians in the Gulf region, and it is expected that more will be seeking the opportunity to settle in the Gulf the more developed the area becomes. This, of course, might accelerate the rate of awareness among the indigenous population and therefore effect a change in the pattern of the traditional political system in the Gulf states.

An important observation worth noting is that the

individual ruler is rather "liberal" with his subjects: the majlis remain open for anyone (local citizen) where the ruler is ready to help those who seek help. This kind of "traditional" politics makes it difficult for individuals who try to foment an internal restlessness in the foreseeable future.

Of course one cannot underestimate the

"long-mercantile activities, education, industrialization, travel, the entry and residence of tens of thousands of more advanced Arabs, Europeans, Americans, and nationals of other countries, and the new and expanded range of jobs in the oil producing countries have begun, though in varying degrees, to erode the tribal structure and values."⁷

Education

The first school built in Dubai was al-Ahamedia School. It was founded in 1912 by Ahmed bin Delmook, and most of those who graduated from this school formed part

⁷ Michael Adams (ed.), The Middle East Handbook, (Gt. Britain: Anthony Blond, 1971), P. 452.

Table 3-3

Education Statistics for the Gulf City States
1969-1970

<u>Country</u>	<u>No. of Schools</u>	<u>No. of Classes</u>	<u>No. of Students</u>	<u>No. of Teachers</u>
Bahrain	107	1,313	47,666	2,313
Qatar	88	690	17,223	956
Abu Dhabi	22	193	6,096	320
Dubai	10	142	5,627	231
Sharjah	12	126	4,829	214
Ajman	3	24	796	42
Umm al-Qaiwain	2	17	465	29
Ras al-Khaimah	10	82	2,007	145
Fujairah	2	14	382	22
<u>Total</u>	<u>256</u>	<u>2,601</u>	<u>85,091</u>	<u>4,272</u>

Sources: Government of Bahrain, Education Department (unpublished material);
Government of Qatar, Ministry of Education (unpublished material);
Government of Abu Dhabi, Education Department (unpublished material).

of its later teaching staff. Official education did not start until 1957 and it was with the aid of the Kuwaiti Ministry of Education. At the time when al-Ahemadia School was founded there were approximately 245 students but with the advent of the Kuwaiti Aid enrollment began to soar. Kuwait supplied the school textbooks and other school supplies. In 1959 the state of Qatar began to supply Dubai with teachers and school buses.

The United Arab Republic also aided Dubai with teachers. The sudden educational expansion in Dubai was due to its progressive ruler, Shaikh Rashid bin Said al-Maktoum. We can see (Table 3-3) that Abu Dhabi has 88 schools whereas Dubai has 22 schools only. This is due to a recent expansion in Abu Dhabi's school system. However, in the five years after elementary schools opened in Dubai, secondary schools began opening their gates all over the state.

During the 1958-1959 school term, Dubai saw its first girls' school being opened and the number of school children rose to about 3,000 (boys and girls), with six schools and 70 teachers (men and women).⁸

In Abu Dhabi schooling also began about the same time as in Dubai but progressed at a slower rate than that of Dubai. Since the removal of Shaikh Shakhboud in 1966 the school system in Abu Dhabi has changed radically. Recently the United

⁸
The Trucial Oman Coast, (Beirut: M. Dean al-Khadri, 1965?), P. 42. (Published in Arabic).

Arab Emirates Consultative Assembly approved a draft law making it compulsory for all children above the age of six to attend school. The UAE government also built the first Arab military college in the Gulf region. It was opened at al-Ain in Abu Dhabi on May 3, 1972. The college was named Zaid College, after the ruler of Abu Dhabi, the first President of the UAE.

In Sharjah the school system followed the same pattern as in Dubai. The Kuwaiti government aided Sharjah as it had aided the other states. In the fifties there were only a few hundred students by 1971 the number of school children had risen to 6,000 (boys and girls) and more schools are still needed. According to al-Arabi Magazine, 26 men and women were receiving higher education at Kuwait University in 1971 and a total of 80 students were attending foreign universities⁹, see Table 16-3. There were also 72 students at Sharjah Tech-

⁹ Salim Zabil, "al-Sharjah" in al-Arabi, Vol. 156, (Kuwait, 1971), P. 116. Translated from Arabic.

nical College which was staffed by those who graduated from it and then received further education or technical training in Sudan and Britain. There were three technical colleges in the Trucial States in 1971 and at the same time the Kuwaiti government was building the largest secondary school in the Gulf states at Sharjah. The secondary school was opened in

Table 4-3

Number of Students Receiving University Education abroad
and Number of University Graduates in the Gulf States

Country	Number of students receiving university education abroad	Number of university graduates in the country
1. Bahrain (1969)	n.a.	263
2. Qatar (1969)	175	42
3. Abu Dhabi (1969)	64	4
4. Dubai	n.a.	-
5. Sharjah (1969)	110	17
6. Ajman (1970)	-	3
7. Umm al-Qaiwain	-	-
8. Ras al-Khaimah (1970)	38	2
9. Fujairah	-	-

Source: Government of Bahrain, Dept. of Finance and National Economy, Statistical Abstract 1969, August 1970, P. 14;
Ministry of Education, Qatar;
Government of Bahrain, Dept. of Education, unpublished education statistics, P. 11;
Al-Shirook, Municipality of Sharjah, Vol. No. 2, July, 1970, P. 46;
Government of Ras al-Khaimah (unpublished material).

1972 with 48 classrooms. In Sharjah the age for entry into

school has been raised from six years to seven years in order

to ease the pressure on school facilities. With 6,000 school children enrolled in 1971, there were still about 4,000 more children awaiting admission.¹⁰

International Trade

We can understand that the oil wealth also brought with it people from other countries and so an increase in demands for consumer goods. However, we do not want to place much emphasis on international trade. The UAE's small population does not make it an important consumer. The purpose of devoting this section of the thesis to trade is mainly to give the reader an idea about the UAE in the area of trade and consumer goods. Tables 5-3 to 8-3 show that Dubai is the centre of trade for the UAE.

10

Talk had started in Dubai on February 18, 1972 on schools and hospitals financed and administered by Kuwait Government as "gifts" to the former Trucial States. The UAE now began to take over the schools and hospitals, which would automatically come under the UAE budget. It was estimated that some 18,000 children attended the schools and the hospitals provided more than 200 beds. Arab Report and Record, London, (February 1972), P. 96.

Dubai had established itself as an entreport as early as

1833. The absence of trade restrictions and low tariff

Table 5-3

Abu Dhabi Imports, 1969-71 (BD Million)

	1969	1970	1971
Oilfield equipment	0.1	1.1	8.5
Machinery	14.3	7.6	5.5
Foodstuffs	4.3	3.7	4.9
Vehicles	6.3	3.5	4.2
Spare parts	4.1	2.5	3.3
Building materials	5.2	2.1	2.3
Electrical Goods	2.5	2.1	2.0
Tools and Hardware	1.5	1.1	1.2
Other categories	21.0	11.5	15.0
Total Imports	59.3	35.2	46.9

Source: The Ministry of Information, Abu Dhabi, The UAE, (December 1972), P. 27.

rate no doubt have attracted a great variety of consumer

goods. Switzerland, for instance supplied the Gulf states

Table 6-3

Dubai Imports, 1969-71 (QDR Million)¹

	1969	1970	1971
Household Goods	202	179	208
Machinery	187	156	192
Foodstuffs	114	133	150
Building Materials	101	139	142
Clothing and Textiles	164	145	134
Oil Field equipment	45	64	90
Electrical Goods	44	63	55
Other categories	65	81	88
Total Imports	922	960	1059

1. QDR 10 equals to \$2.37

Source: The Ministry of Information, Abu Dhabi, The UAE, (December 1972), P. 27.

mainly with watches whereas Japan supplied cloth, and tea came from India. Britain dominated the machinery. The

Table 7-3
Suppliers to Dubai, 1971 (Machinery and Building Materials)

Country	Percentage
United Kingdom	29 per cent
Japan	18 per cent
United States	12 per cent
Other countries	41 per cent

Source: The Ministry of Information, Abu Dhabi, The UAE, (December 1972), P. 26.

United States on other hand supplied cigarettes and tobacco.

In 1971 Dubai imported a total value of Qatar/Dubai Riyal

(QDR) 676 million (approximately, \$170 million). Abu Dhabi

Table 8-3
Dubai Imports (Household Goods and Textile), 1971

Suppliers	Percentage
Japan	28 per cent
Switzerland	26 per cent
Hong Kong	9 per cent
United Kingdom	8 per cent
Other countries	29 per cent

Source: The Ministry of Information, Abu Dhabi, The United Arab Emirates, (December 1972), P. 26.

started importing its own materials direct as of 1972 since the opening of Port Zaid. By looking at the trade figures,

we can see that the United States in 1971 moved into third place as a UAE supplier and this is of course was to be expected. The United States is expected to increase its oil imports from the Gulf states and therefore it is obvious that the U.S. will seek to increase its exports to the the Gulf States in return for oil. But the most important point is that the UAE signed a trade agreement with Rumania in August 1972 and this may be the start of contact with other Eastern European countries. Rumania also increased its share in terms of feedstuffs to the UAE in 1971, although, Australia supplies the UAE with a large portion of feedstuffs.

CHAPTER 4

THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

Political Structure

The British withdrew from the Gulf region after 150 years but before they withdrew (in terms of military and international relations), they signed a friendship treaty with the rulers concerned.

"It will be recalled that the decision to withdraw British forces from the Gulf by the end of 1971 was taken by the Labour Government in January 1968, barely two months after that same Government had assured all the Gulf rulers that they had no intention of leaving the area in the foreseeable future. Many, especially those of us serving there at the time, deplored this sudden volte face. We believed the decision to be premature, given the lack of political cohesion among the shaikhdoms, their lilliputian size and the many unsolved disputes both between themselves and with their larger neighbours, notably Iran and Saudi Arabia."¹

The signing of the friendship treaty with the rulers

¹
Elizabeth Monroe, The Changing Balance of Power in the Persian Gulf, (New York: American Universities Field Staff, 1972), PP. 13-14: Introduction by Sir Denis Wright.

came as a result of Prime Minister Edward Heath's grave concern over the British withdrawal from the area. Heath, immediately upon succeeding Harold Wilson as Prime Minister in 1970, moved very quickly to review the situation. He sent Sir William Luce (he was former Governor of Aden and Political Resident in the Gulf) to the Gulf region. His discussion with the rulers (and also with Iran and Saudi Arabia), after nearly a year, produced a satisfactory outcome. The treaty of special relations was formulated and signed, thus giving Britain the old "privileges" such as military intervention, should the need arise.

This was a very important agreement for both the rulers and the British. It gave the United Arab Emirates' Government a sort of "reserved" force to help curb unrest in the region which might threaten the continued existence of their states in their present territorial and political forms.

What were formerly known as the Trucial States (1806-

1971): Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, (Ras al-Khaimah did not join the UAE until three months later), Umm al-Qaiwain, and Fujairah became independent under the name "The United Arab Emirates", on December 2, 1971. This came about after almost four years of "secret" negotiations among the rulers and the British Government.

As the United Arab Emirates proclaimed independence a treaty of "friendship" was signed with Britain to replace a number of treaties signed since 1806, but particularly, the General Treaty of Peace under which the British government originally became responsible for the Trucial States defence and the conduct of their foreign affairs. On December 8, 1971, the UAE became the 132nd member of the United Nations and the 18th member of the League of Arab States.

In 1968, negotiations (see Appendix B) started among all the nine Lower Gulf States' rulers (the seven Trucial States, Bahrain, and Qatar). There were, obviously, several problems

which faced the rulers as they began to establish a framework. The first problem was the distribution of powers between individual rulers and the Union Government. The second was the basis of representation, should it be (1) wealth, (2) prestige, (3) size of territory, or (4) proportional according to population. The third problem, how would the Union be financed? The fourth where would the permanent capital be located? The fifth how would defence and foreign affairs be controlled? Lastly, how would ministerial responsibilities be allocated?²

Among the nine states engaged in the negotiations, four were very wealthy, that is Bahrain, Qatar, Abu Dhabi, and Dubai. During the negotiations one could sense a feeling of competition among the rulers in matters of wealth and prestige. It was obvious, then, that each of the four rulers favoured his own shaikhdom as the site of the permanent federal capital.

² John Duke Anthony, "The Union of Arab Emirates," The Middle East Journal, (Washington, D.D., Summer, 1972), P. 271.

Due to an understanding that Abu Dhabi's wealth should finance the federation, Abu Dhabi was chosen as the first federal capital for a period of seven years, "with the agreement that a permanent capital would be constructed on the land donated by Abu Dhabi and Dubai from both sides of their joint frontier at a place called al-Karamah."³ Because of this agreement, Bahrain and Qatar decided not to join the federation. Bahrain proclaimed its independence on August 14, 1971; Qatar proclaimed its independence on September 1, 1971.

The seven rulers then agreed on a modified form of proportional representation which was then embodied in the constitution. The seats in the forty-member Federal Council were distributed as follows:

Abu Dhabi	8 seats
Dubai	8 seats

³ Ibid., P. 272.

Sharjah	6 seats
Ras al-Khaimah	6 seats
Ajman	4 seats
Umm al-Qaiwain	4 seats
Fujairah	4 seats

"As had been anticipated, federal financial arrangements were resolved without much difficulty. Abu Dhabi and Dubai, with estimated incomes in 1971 of \$336 million and \$50.4 million respectively, agreed to absorb the major expenses, with the other five shaikhdoms - whose combined revenues in 1971 were estimated at a meager \$1.2 million - contributing nominal sums based on a formula proportionate to their state revenues."⁴

There is no question that the basis of representation in the Federal National Council is based on **three** factors: (a) wealth, (b) prestige, and (c) territory. The federal supreme council is composed of the seven rulers, see Table .1-4. This

⁴Ibid., P. 272.

Table 1-4 +
Rulers of the Gulf States and Their Ages, 1972

Country		Date of Accession	Ages (1972)	Heir
Bahrain	Shaikh Isa bin Sulman al-Khalifa	1961	39	Shaikh Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa
Qatar	Shaikh Khalifa bin Hamad al-Thani	1972	37	N.A.
Abu Dhabi	Shaikh Zaid bin Sultan al-Nuhayan	1966	67	Shaikh Khalifa bin Zaid
Dubai	Shaikh Rashid bin Said al-Maktoum	1958	67	Shaikh Maktoum bin Rashid al-Maktoum
Sharjah	Shaikh Mohammed bin Sultan	1972	30	N.A.
Ajman	Shaikh Rashid bin Humaid al-Na'imi	1928	72	Shaikh Hamad bin Rashid al-Na'imi
Umm al-Qaiwain	Shaikh Ahmed bin Rashid al-Mualla	1929	82	Shaikh Rashid bin Ahmed al-Mualla
Ras al-Khaimah	Shaikh Saqr bin Mohammed al-Qasimi	1948	62	Shaikh Khalid bin Saqr al-Qasimi
Fujairah	Shaikh Mohammed al- Sharqi	1952	72	Shaikh Hamad bin Mohammed al-Sharqi

is the highest organ in the federation - it is a successor to the former Trucial States' Council which was established in 1952 by Britain.

Nonetheless, the "Big Two", Shaikh Zaid bin Sultan al-Nuhayan, ruler of Abu Dhabi (see Appendix A1), and Shaikh Rashid bin Said al-Maktoum, ruler of Dubai (see Appendix A2) possess a veto power which is denied to the other five rulers. According to J.D. Anthony, it was in July 1971 that the six rulers met in Dubai and agreed finally that a provisional constitution be modified to allow, "a substantial concentration of authority in the presidency and between the wealthiest shaikhdoms."⁵

The rulers, at their meeting in Dubai agreed that Shaikh Zaid bin Sultan al-Nuhayan, ruler of Abu Dhabi, become the President of the United Arab Emirates, and that Shaikh Rashid bin Said al-Maktoum, ruler of Dubai, become the Vice-President

⁵
Ibid., P. 273.

of the UAE. Each would serve for five years and then would be eligible for reappointment to the same positions when their terms of office expired in 1976. With all being equal, the two rulers would maintain the status quo, for although Abu Dhabi is larger and wealthier than Dubai, the latter still has the edge over the former in terms of federal appointments (see Table 2-4). Shaikh Rashid bin Said is a business-like man and it seems his people have a high regard for him.

Table 2-4.

Shaikh Zaid bin Sultan al-Nuhayan President of the UAE	(Abu Dhabi)
Shaikh Rashid bin Said al-Maktoum Vice-President of the UAE	(Dubai)
Sh. Maktoum bin Rashid al-Maktoum Prime Minister of the UAE	(Dubai)
Sh. Hamadan bin Rashid al-Maktoum Deputy Premier, Industry, Finance and Economy	(Dubai)
Sh. Mohammed bin Rashid al-Maktoum Minister of National Defence	(Dubai)

It is quite clear that Dubai is on the winning side in terms of representation in important office. The important

point is that the average age among the three brothers is: 28.1 years. Shaikh Maktoum (the Prime Minister) is only 31 years old, Shaikh Hamadan (the Deputy Premier, and Minister of Industry, Finance and Economy) is 28 years, and Shaikh Mohammed (Minister of National Defence) is only 24 years of age. Wealth, power and prestige all appear to come at an early age!

This recent development in the Gulf states in terms of power structure is not unusual according to James Bill,

"...the traditional ruling class can^{be} broken into six major components: (1) the ruler (sultan, shah, or shaikh); (2) the ruling families; (3) tribal nobility; (4) native landlords; (5) system-supporting high ulama (clerics); and (6) military elite...an indigenous economic aristocracy and a landless rentier elite have become part of the upper class relatively recently. There has been also a group of foreign industrialists and businessmen that has been symbolically combined with other upper-class groups which reinforces and supports the indigenous ruling class."⁶

⁶
James A. Bill, "Class Analysis and the Dialectics of Modernization in the Middle East," International Journal Middle East Studies, Vol. 111, No. 4, (October 1972), P.428.

Much of what James Bill has said, if not all, is true in the power structure of the United Arab Emirates and other Arab states in the Gulf region. It is evident from recent diplomatic and high civil servant appointments in the UAE that James Bill statements hold true.

The ruler of Abu Dhabi, Shaikh Zaid bin Sultan who succeeded Shaikh Shakhboud in 1966 started to organize and enlarge the government as oil revenues increased. Shaikh Zaid issued Decree Number 3 in September 1966. The decree created a number of departments and their heads. All the department heads were responsible to the ruler. There were nine shaikhs appointed from the royal family to take charge of these departments:⁷

- (i) Shaikh Khalifa bin Zaid, Crown Prince, Head of Defense, Viceroy in the Eastern Province and Head of its Courts.
- (ii) Shaikh Hamdan bin Mohammed, Head of the Departments of Education, Health, Public Works and Water.
- (iii) Shaikh Mohammed bin Khalid, Head of the Departments of Finance, Customs and Ports.

⁷ Muhammad T. Sadik and William P. Snavely, Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, (Toronto: D.C. Heath, 1972), P. 160.

- (iv) Shaikh Mubarrak bin Mohammed, Head of the Departments of Police and General Security, Nationality, Passports and Residency.
- (v) Shaikh Tahnoun bin Mohammed, Head of the Departments of Agriculture, Animal Resources, and Labour in Al-Ein town.
- (vi) Shaikh Saif bin Mohammed, Head of Abu Dhabi Municipality.
- (vii) Shaikh Khalifa bin Mohammed, Head of the Electricity Department.
- (viii) Shaikh Sroor bin Mohammed, Head of the Justice Department.
- (ix) Shaikh Ahmad bin Hamid, Head of the Departments of Labour and Social Affairs, Information and Personnel.

"This pattern of appointments is significant; for the relative positions of the Shaikhs who were appointed heads of government departments is reflected in it. Shaikh Hamdan has a superior position compared to the other heads. He is next only to Shaikh Khalifa bin Zaid, the Crown Prince."⁸ In Dubai, Departments of Lands and Property, Municipality, Customs, and Police and Public Security are headed by members of the royal family.

Areas of Dispute

The Trucial States, according to Donald Hawley, were marred by family feuds, while Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain,

⁸Ibid., P. 160.

and Qatar were thriving because of oil discoveries. In the Trucial States from early years of the present century until the 1940's there was little change in the traditional patterns of life, although fighting was on the diminishing side. Feuds, intrigues and petty wars continued to prevail until the formation of the Trucial Oman Scouts in the early 1950's.

However, these wars were of minor significance except those of 1939-40, and 1945-48. The British had intervened in dynastic and other internal quarrels but had no force to compel the rulers to keep the peace. Only in the 1940 war between Sharjah and Dubai, and in the 1945-48 clash between Abu Dhabi and Dubai did the British consider the wars to be a breach of the Maritime Truce. The ruler of Dubai (see Appendix A2) was ordered to withdraw by the British Political Agent in Bahrain. The hostilities continued until 1948 when the ruler of Abu Dhabi (see Appendix A1) accepted the responsibility for preventing raids on Dubai by the Manasir

tribesmen and so, peace was restored.⁹

The struggles in the Trucial States were taking place at a time when Britain was increasing its commitments on the account of oil and civil aviation. The British Political Agency moved from Sharjah to Dubai in 1953, and came under the direct control of the Political Resident. The Trucial States at the time did not receive their share from the oil revenue but the rulers were encouraged to participate in international conferences and in the establishment of trade offices. The Trucial States' Council was established in 1952 as a chamber in which the rulers dealt with administrative matters. The British Government announcement in 1968 that there would be a British forces withdrawal from the Gulf region by 1971 was not unexpected as everyone predicted that Britain would not and could not remain responsible for the Trucial States indefinitely.

⁹ Donald Hawley, The Trucial States, (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1970), P. 171.

Military Structure

On November 4, 1971 it was reported that an organization headed by Colonel F. de Butts would take over control of the Trucial Oman Scouts, on behalf of the federation of the six Trucial States, (the seventh, Ras al-Khaimah joined the UAE, three months later), when the British withdrawal took place. Colonel de Butts had commanded the TOS from 1964 to 1967 and had later served as British military attache in Cairo. Colonel de Butts, on his appointment to the Union Force, became an employee of the United Arab Emirates.

The TOS was formed in the early 1950's and had the strength of 1,630 men, with 30 British officers on secondment, 30 Arab officers and 70 British non-commissioned officers. The cost of the force was estimated at 1.5 million pounds sterling a year, which was shared by the British Ministry of Defence and the British Foreign Office. Major-General

Sir John Willoughby, a former Commander of British Land Forces in the Middle East, was invited to become senior military adviser to the proposed Gulf Federation. Sir John Willoughby had retired from the British Army in 1967. It was understood that he would recommend measures for a unified command of the nine states and advise on defence after the British military withdrawal. At the time of the British withdrawal,

*The United Arab Emirates received the Trucial Oman Scouts numbering about 1,400 men with some British officers on detached duty. Equipment includes Land Rovers and armored scout cars. There is a gradual switch toward *Arabizing*¹⁰ the officer corps.¹¹

10.

This is very true indeed, and the concept of *Arabizing* goes back to the mid-1950's when Bahrain began replacing *foreign* teachers with locals. Also the Bahraini Government brought in a rigid immigration policy. The Bahrain Petroleum Company (BAPCO) started the gradual replacement of Indians and Pakistanis with local people.

11.

The Gulf: Implications of British Withdrawal, (Washington: the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, 1969), P. 83.

In Abu Dhabi some 600 men forming the ruler's private army, which since independence has been expanded to brigade group strength with small naval and air components. Under an agreement signed on December 22, 1971 by the President of the United Arab Emirates, Shaikh Zaid bin Sultan, and the British Political Resident in the Gulf region, Sir Geoffrey Arthur, the Trucial Oman Scouts were taken over as the nucleus of the United Arab Emirates' defence forces. At the Sharjah headquarters and at outposts throughout the seven states the 1,700 members of the Trucial Oman Scouts, who still included 33 officers and 55 non-commissioned officers seconded from the British Army, took the oath of allegiance to the new state.

The Trucial Oman Scouts were to be known as the Union Defence Force, under Shaikh Mohammed bin Rashid al-Makteum, some of the ruler of Dubai, UAE Minister of Defence. In

November 1969, it was announced that the Abu Dhabi Defence Force had purchased two Canadian-built Caribou transport aircrafts. The two aircrafts had flown from Canada to Hurn Airport in England and were handled by Airwork Services of Britain.

In March 1970, the Abu Dhabi Defence Force had placed an order for 12 Hunter jet aircrafts from a British company. In January 1971, Abu Dhabi also made "a large order" to the British Aircraft Corporation for Vigilant anti-tank missiles. The French company Marcel Dassault received an order from Abu Dhabi for 12 Mirage-5. The order was won in competition with British, American, and Soviet suppliers, and was estimated to be worth six million pounds sterling (about \$15 million).

The UAE Defence Minister, Shaikh Mohammed bin Rashid, in an interview with the Dubai weekly Al-Akhbar on June 22,

1973 was quoted as saying,

"the Arab states of the Gulf were working towards closer relationships and should seek to establish military co-ordination. The Gulf, with its vast reserves of oil, is a sensitive region, and both the East and the West seek to dominate it. It is up to the people of the area to safeguard their countries and protect their interests. We can preserve the integrity of the region, provided the impetus to do so comes from within and not from outside."¹²

An interesting development took place recently when Shaikh Khalifa bin Zaid, Abu Dhabi's Prime Minister, issued a directive to the Defence Force on May 17, 1973 for an immediate change from English to Arabic for all its communications. The Gulf Mirror on May 20 commented that the ratio of Arab officers had recently increased with the cancellation of some British secondments and the arrival of a group from Sudan.

CHAPTER 5

THE BURAIMI QUESTION

The Buraimi oases dispute is one of the two major problems which the Government of the United Arab Emirates has inherited. Abu Dhabi's boundaries, which are not marked but are well known to the bedouin tribes, extend inland for more than a 100 miles and include both the scattered settlements and oases of Liwa and a portion of the fertile Buraimi valley. Much of the territory is very barren indeed consisting of salt swamps near the coast and of great sand dunes in the interior.

There was little fresh water to be found, but where there was any steady supply, settlements sprang up. As the race for oil began in the 1930's, it brought with it border problems. The exact borders between Saudi Arabia and the various British protected states to the south and southern Arabia had never

been determined, thus creating the difficulty of knowing the exact limits of the various oil concessions. The oil explorers continued exploration while on the diplomatic front they were trying to find a solution to the border dispute. "The riggers moved much faster than the foreign offices."¹

In 1934 a year after an oil concession involving Eastern Arabia was signed by Saudi Arabia and an American Oil Company (Aramco), negotiations started between the British Foreign Office and the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in an attempt to settle definitely the boundaries of the southern portion of the Arabian Peninsula.²

These talks went on until 1938 and nothing had been accomplished when the World War II intervened. Only after Petroleum Development (Trucial Coast) resumed its search for oil in 1947 in the Trucial States and Buraimi districts,

¹ R.G. Landen, Oman Since 1856, Disruptive Modernization in a Traditional Arab Society, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1967), P. 415.

² Ibid., PP. 415-16.

whose area or boundaries were still unclear, was the oil race and the border dispute revived. An Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco) survey teams began moving into the regions along the eastern limits of al Rub al Khali and into places adjacent to the Trucial States' (Abu Dhabi) border with a high hope of finding oil.

In April 1949 the British political officer in Abu Dhabi demanded that the Arabian American Oil Company survey leave the place which he (the British officer) claimed to be part of Abu Dhabi. According to Landen, "the British authorities were particularly disturbed because this party was accompanied by armed Saudi Arabian soldiers and were evidently unaware that such an escort was standard on all Aramco survey operations in Arabia wherever these happened to be located."³

³
Ibid., P. 416.

According to Donald Hawley (the Political Agent in Dubai, 1958-1961), the survey team was

"north of the Ryadh Line⁴ which was regarded by the British Government as Abu Dhabi's territory. Mr. Patrick Stobart, then, political officer in the Trucial States, visited the party to protest, but was detained for some time by the Saudis and his guards' rifles were temporarily seized. The British Government made a formal protest, but King Abdul Aziz ibn Saud reacted by claiming an area even more extensive than his 1935 claim, including the Buraimi oasis, as well as the southern and western parts of Abu Dhabi."⁵

The Buraimi itself is one village out of the nine which form the oasis, six of which belong to Abu Dhabi and three to Muscat and Oman. The basis for the Saudis' influence in the Trucial States goes back to 1800-1870 and traces of this influence remained in the area until the 1940's and 1950's.

Britain and Saudi Arabia opened negotiations in 1950

⁴ In 1935 the British Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Sir Andrew Ryan, conducted the negotiations with the Saudis in Ryadh, the capital of Saudi Arabia. The agreement they made became known as "Ryadh Line."

⁵ Robert Landen, Oman Since 1856, P. 416.

but without success. In August 1951, the "London Agreement" was reached which stated that both sides should exclude troops and oil company personnel from the disputed area as long as the boundary question remained unsolved. Again in January and February 1952 a conference to settle the boundaries took place at Dammam, Saudi Arabia but this conference produced nothing.

Another attempt was made in October 1952 and a "Stand-still" agreement was reached which gave the Saudis a temporary control over Hamasa in Buraimi. According to Donald Hawley, the Saudis did not abide by the agreement in many ways, and so, "the British Government after further protests, informed Saudi Arabia in April 1953 that they and the rulers reversed their freedom of action, since the Saudi Government had destroyed the basis of the 'London Agreement' and seemed to

lack any intention of honouring the Standstill Agreement."⁶

The situation was at a stalemate:

"...Until a formal Arbitration Agreement was signed on July 20, 1954. Under this agreement, oil operations were barred, and the Saudi force and the Trucial Oman Levies were to be withdrawn and replaced by a joint police force. An international Arbitration Tribunal of five members: British, Saudi, Canadian, and Cuban, with a Belgian President - was set up to decide the frontier between Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi and sovereignty in the Buraimi area."⁷

The meeting took place in Geneva but soon ran into "difficulties" - the British representative, Sir Reader Bullard, resigned on September 16, 1955, followed by the Belgian President, Dr. Charles de Visscher, and the Cuban member. Their reason was that the Saudi representative, Shaikh Yousef Yassain, "openly admitted personal responsibility for Saudi operations in Buraimi and for having told witnesses what to say in evidence."⁸

⁶

Donald Hawley, The Trucial States, PP. 189-90.

⁷

Ibid., P. 190. The wording of the Tribunal's terms of reference were (a) the location of a common frontier between Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi within the line claimed by the Saudi Arabian Government in 1949 and that claimed on behalf of Abu Dhabi at the Dammam Conference in 1952; and (b)

The British Prime Minister, Sir Anthony Eden, stated that the arbitration had failed "like the earlier attempt to settle the dispute by negotiations", and therefore, the British Government would regard the 'Ryadh Line' "as amended in 1937" as the boundary. The failure of the arbitration was because "the evidence that the Saudi Arabian Government was suborning and bribing the inhabitants of Buraimi became incontrovertible."⁹

The charges against the Saudis were serious, and with the resignation of the three members of the tribunal, an armed clash took place between the Trucial Oman Levies and the Saudis and the village of Hamasa was regained. The people of Hamasa

Sovereignty in the area comprise within a circle whose centre was in Buraimi village and whose circumference passed between the point of junction of latitude 24 degrees 25 minutes north and longitude 55 degrees 36 minutes.

⁸

Ibid., P. 190.

⁹

W. Gordon East et al, editors, The Changing Map of Asia, A Political Geography, (London: Methuen and Company, 1971), P. 105.

were given the option of living under the rulers of Abu Dhabi, the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman, or Saudi Arabia. The people of Hamasa chose Abu Dhabi through the mediation of the United Nations Secretary General, Dag Hammarskjold. And so the control of Buraimi reverted back to pre-1952 under Abu Dhabi.

In 1956, and prior to the Suez crisis, the British and the Saudis did get together in an attempt to settle the "Buraimi refugees" and access to Khor el Odaid (Khor means creek) region. Although troubled, the negotiations were still going when the Suez crisis broke out. This resulted in Saudi Arabia's breaking off diplomatic relations with Britain. In 1959, the late Dag Hammarskjold, then Secretary-General of the United Nations, offered his good office to help reach an "area of agreement". Dag Hammarskjold was basically interested in having the two countries re-establish diplomatic relations.

Britain and Saudi Arabia in 1960 agreed that Dag Hammarskjold should appoint a 'neutral personage' to examine the

'refugees problem' and then offer possible suggestions to solve the problem. The Swedish Ambassador to Madrid, Mr. Herbert de Ribbing, was appointed as Hammarskjold's representative. Mr. de Ribbing visited the disputed area, including Buraimi itself, in the summer of 1960.

In 1962, Mr. de Ribbing again visited Saudi Arabia and the Gulf region in his attempt to study the refugees problem. The attempt was considered to have been "fruitful" and it resulted in a joint body being set up to consider the list of refugees submitted by Saudi Arabia. By May 1962, Mr. de Ribbing had enumerated the refugees and produced the following findings:

Total interviewed	Heads of Families	Persons
Original:	422	1516
Abu Dhabi villages of Buraimi	9	44
Sultanate villages of Buraimi	294	1135
Outside Buraimi	119	337

Mr. de Ribbing also established a large measure of agreement on both sides concerning the refugees' return.¹⁰

British diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia were established in 1963; Sir Colin Crowe was appointed the Ambassador. In the meantime Shaikh Shakhboub bin Sultan, then ruler of Abu Dhabi, "had several friendly meetings with Prince Faisal of Saudi Arabia in April 1964."¹¹ In 1966, Shaikh Zaid bin Sultan (then vice-regent over the villages of Buraimi) became the ruler of Abu Dhabi. A year later Shaikh Zaid bin Sultan visited King Faisal (became King after the death of King Abdul Aziz ibn Saud), thus establishing a stronger relation between the two Arab states.

¹⁰

Donald Hawley, The Trucial States, P. 192.

¹¹

Ibid., P. 193,

But according to the Arab Report and Record,

"King Faisal is understood to have said in February (1972) that there could be no settlement of outstanding disputes between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, specifically his country's claims on Abu Dhabi's territory - if the Federation established ties with Russia."¹²

¹²

Arab Report and Record, London, (April 1972), P. 218.

CHAPTER 6

THE IRANI QUESTION

"We need them; we shall
have them; no power on
earth will stop us".

The Shah of Iran,
September 1971.

Many students are familiar with the term "Scramble for African colonies" which took place in the nineteenth century. With this concept in mind we can say then that there was a "scramble for three islands" recently in the Gulf region. A former British Political Agent in the Gulf summed up the situation in the following manner:

"There are a number of islands in the area off the Trucial Coast which belong to one or other of the states, although in some cases ownership is claimed by other states. Nearly all the islands lying between the Qatar and Musandam Peninsulas south of latitude 26 degrees have long been regarded as

belonging to Abu Dhabi. The exceptions are Abu Musa and Seir Abu Na'ir, which Britain has long recognized as belonging to Sharjah; Tumb and Nabiyu Tumb, which belong to Ras al-Khaimah.¹

The Iranians first claimed that Bahrain had been an integral part of Iran and that if Bahrain wanted to change its status to become an independent state, it had to be with the wishes of the people of Bahrain. At the request of Iran and Britain ^a the UN mission visited Bahrain and had talks with several Bahraini representatives at the end of March 1970. The United Nations' mission was headed by 57 year old Guicciardi, who was the Italian Ambassador in Prague until his appointment to the UN in 1968. The people of Bahrain were asked to choose one of three courses: union with Iran, continuation as a British protectorate,

¹ Donald Hawley, The Trucial States, (London: George Allen and Unwin Limited, 1970), P. 287.

or independent status, as a sovereign state or as a member of the proposed Gulf Federation. The people chose to become an independent state.

On May 23, 1970 the Financial Times reported that Britain had been informed by the Iranian Government that the occupation of the three small islands in the Strait of Hormuz at the mouth of the Gulf. The islands concerned were Abu Musa, which Britain had long regarded as belonging to Sharjah, and the two Tumbs, which Britain regarded as belonging to Ras al-Khaimah.

There are great possibilities of offshore oil being found at a point nine miles from Abu Musa's coast, and both Buttes Gas and Oil (holding concession from Sharjah), and Occidental Petroleum (holding a concession from Umm al-Qaiwain) are anxious to carry on drilling for oil. Iran took control over the three islands in question, and the legal controversy began.

It was in September 1969 that the Ruler of Sharjah, Shaikh Khalid bin Mohammed al-Qasimi, issued a decree extending his state's territorial waters from the normal three miles to twelve miles from both Sharjah and Abu Musa. The island Abu Musa is 43 miles offshore from Sharjah.² Shaikh Khalid declared that the validity of his decree has been recognized by Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Iraq and "fifty other members of the United Nations."³

The problem now automatically came under British jurisdiction. Therefore, Sir Gawain Bell was appointed as mediator in the dispute between Sharjah and Ajman and Umm al-Qaiwain over the rights to prospect for oil in the offshore waters of Abu Musa. The appointment of Sir Gawain Bell was accepted by the three Rulers and by the two oil companies involved - Occidental Petroleum (concessionaire

² The Imperial Iranian Aggression on the Three Arab Islands in the Arabian Gulf (Baghdad: Ministry of Information, 1972), No. 29, P. 9. (in Arabic).

³ "Islands in Dispute" Arab Report and Record, London, (16-31 May 1970), P. 291.

of Ajman and Umm al-Qaiwain), and Buttes Gas and Oil (concessionaire of Sharjah).

On the first of June tugs towing a drilling platform and barges carrying other equipment for the Occidental Petroleum Corporation of California, bound for waters some five miles off the coast of Abu Musa island which were in dispute between Sharjah and Umm al-Qaiwain, were boarded by Royal Navy officials from a British minesweeper and asked to halt all operations in the area. Occidental complied but immediately proceeded with legal matters against the British Government for "trespassing and interference".

It has been stated that the British Government was in favour of letting the Occidental proceed with its exploration but, according to a British Foreign Office spokesman, "reassertion of the Iranian threat of force was a major

political factor* in causing it to send four minesweepers to the disputed waters. Shaikh Rashid bin Ahmed bin Mullah, the Ruler of Umm al-Qaiwain, was at first adamant that the corporation should start drilling as planned, and it was only after a meeting with British Political Agent, Julian Bullard, that the Ruler agreed to give written instructions to Occidental not to go ahead with the operation.

However, early in June, Britain was able to announce that under its treaty obligations to settle disputes between the Trucial States, it had recommended to the Rulers of Sharjah, Umm al-Qaiwain and Ajman that operating limits should be imposed on oil companies working in the disputed region for a period of three months effective May 31, 1970. The proposal was accepted by the three rulers. The standstill idea could be called a cooling off period while clarification was made of the areas in dispute between Sharjah and Umm al-Qaiwain. During the first week of June the two oil companies

agreed to the British suggestion and they withdrew from the disputed waters. The British minesweepers also left their posts.

In the meantime, the Ruler of Ras al-Khaimah was accused of having 'sold' the two Tumbs to Iran for \$2 million, a large quantity of machine-guns and a number of Cadillacs. This accusation was denied by the Ruler's son, Shaikh Khalid bin Saq al-Qasimi, at a press conference in Kuwait on 6 June, stating that "We are not empowered to dispose of any of the emirate's territories, dependencies or waters."⁴

The United States Under-Secretary of State, Elliot Richardson was on a visit to Iran in April and he gave a press conference in Tehran on 22 April. He said that the United States was unlikely to establish a Gulf presence

⁴ "Drilling Banned in Disputed Waters" Arab Report and Record (1-15 June 1970), P. 318.

after the proposed British military withdrawal in 1971, the London Times reported. Richardson said, "I would not go so far as to say the matter had not been considered at all but I think it is quite unlikely...that this would be more clearly consistent with the purposes and objectives of the Nixon doctrine that we should look to countries in the area and to the leadership of Iran in particular..."⁵

Sir Alec Douglas-Home, while on a visit to Belgium, had a meeting with the Shah of Iran in Brussels. The Shah was in a private visit to Belgium on July 10. It was reported that they discussed the problems of the Gulf and the political stability of the area, in which Britain, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the Rulers are concerned.

In October the London Financial Times said, 'highly-placed sources' had reported that Iran had warned Britain

⁵
"Under-Secretary of State Outlines US Policy" Arab Report and Record (16-30 April 1970), P. 234.

that it would refuse to recognize the proposed Federation of Arab Emirates if Iranian claims to the islands of Abu Musa and the two Tumbs were not accepted.⁶ On November 10 1970, a ten-day naval exercise involving ships of Britain's Royal Navy, the United States' Navy, and the Imperial Iranian Navy began in the northern sector of the Gulf of Oman.

According to Eugene M. Fisher and M. Cherif Bassiouni,

"Abu Musa, Greater Tumb, and Lesser Tumb, the three islands, are very close to Sharjah across the promontory of the Gulf of Oman. They had always been inhabited by Arabs. Iranian armed forces took over forcefully on November 30, 1971, and shipped the Arab occupants of the two larger islands to the Arab mainland. The plot came to light when the Iranian government announced that its operation was done with London's prior agreement."⁷

⁶
P. 548. Arab Report and Record, London, (October 1970),

⁷
Eugene M. Fisher and M. Cherif Bassiouni, Storm Over the Arab World: A People in Revolution, (Chicago: Follett Publishing Company, 1972), P. 233.

On July 17, 1971, explosives were placed under a chair habitually used by the Ruler of Sharjah, Shaikh Khalid, causing extensive damage to a reception room in his palace. The Ruler was not present at the time of the explosion, and casualties were limited to two servants who were slightly injured by flying glass. An official statement said that the Ruler used the room to receive large groups of leading Sharjah personalities, and the explosion had been fortunately, mistimed. It was clearly intended to "kill as many of them as possible" as well as Shaikh Khalid. A few days later it was reported that Shaikh Abdul-al-Aziz bin Mohammed, a brother of the Ruler, who had returned to Sharjah after nine months' absence to congratulate him on his escape, had been arrested.

The Iranian Ambassador to Britain, Amir Afsher, in a speech at a dinner attended by members of the Iran

Society in London, on November 6, 1970, stated "tiny islands in the Gulf which belong to Iran and in no circumstances, nor at any cost would Iran overlook its rights to them."⁸

The Ambassador also spoke of the British "presence" in the Gulf region. He said,

"I hope that at the appointed time the British Government will withdraw its military forces as expected. There would be no danger of a defence vacuum resulting, for Iran was undoubtedly able, preferably with the co-operation of other riparian states, to do the job."⁹

A few days after the Ambassador's speech in London, both the Kuwaiti daily Al-Rai-Aam and the Tehran daily Keyhan International reported that Iran would be prepared to use force to maintain its sovereignty over Abu Musa and the two Tumbbs if its claim to the islands was not accepted.

⁸ "Iran Maintains Claims to Islands", Arab Report and Record, London, (November 1970), P. 605.

⁹ Ibid., P. 605.

Kayhan International stated that the Shah had conveyed a warning to this effect to the Rulers of Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah through the British and Saudi Arabian Governments respectively.¹⁰

On June 5, 1971, the Kuwaiti daily Al-Khaliq reported that Sir William Luce, Britain's special envoy to the Gulf region, had told the Rulers of Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah, during his recent tour of the Gulf area, that Iran would occupy the islands of Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tumbs by the end of 1971. The report went on to say that Sir Luce had advised the rulers to negotiate with Iran, who was willing to offer compensation to the Islands' inhabitants plus a percentage of oil revenues resulting from off-shore drilling. The two rulers, Shaikh Khalid and Shaikh

¹⁰

Ibid., P. 605.

Sagr, told Sir Luce that they did not possess the forces to repel armed occupation: nevertheless, they considered the islands to be Arab territory and their defence a n Arab responsibility.

The Foreign Minister of Iraq, Abd-al-Karim Shaikhli, in a statement broadcast by Baghdad Radio on June 29, rejected the Irani claims to the three islands, Abu Musa and the two Tumbs. He called on Arab countries to unite against the Iranian Government's "expansionist schemes". Shaikhli, went on to say that the three islands "were, and are always will be Arab. (The fact that, at one time, they) came under colonialist Persian control" did not give Iran any right to claim ownership of them. ^{III}

The Shah, interviewed by the weekly Jeune Afrique published in Paris on July 6, said that the Iranian forces

^{II} "Iran's Claim to Islands Desputed" Arab Report and Record (16-30 June 1971), P. 321.

would "double and even treble their armaments" to ensure the defence of the Gulf. Iran wanted no other foreign country to replace Britain in the area, and would if necessary defend it alone when the British forces left, if its "policy of co-operation in the defence of the Gulf with other bordering states was to be modified."¹²

Baghdad Radio, on October 21, in a commentary broadcast said, "The threads of the plot concocted in London, Tehran and other places against the Arabism of the Gulf are being revealed daily. British and Iranian officials at various levels have held suspicious meetings over the last three weeks. These meetings are evidence that there are vicious intentions against the Arabism of the three islands which the Shah seeks to devour. There have been press reports to the effect that Britain intends to hand these

¹²

"Shah Interviewed on Gulf Defence" Arab Report and Record (1-15 July 1971), P. 347.

islands over to the Shah. William Luce's recent tour and his meetings with the Shah and his proteges shed light on the scheme being prepared by Iran's ruling reaction and its imperialist allies.

"Therefore Iraq finds it necessary to express directly and firmly its anxieties at these reports. Iraq also feels it necessary to restate that it will not accept anything short of preserving the Arab character of these islands."¹³

In November it was reported by Sharjah's daily Al-Khaliij that the Ruler, Shaikh Khalid, had said that he would not relinquish the island of Abu Musa to Iran. The Ruler of Ras al-Khaimah, Shaikh Saqr, also had declared he would not yield the Greater and Lesser Tumbs to Iran. Al-Khaliij also had reported that Sir William Luce, Britain's special envoy to the Gulf region, had suggested to t h e

¹³
 "Iraq's 'Anxiety' over Islands" Arab Report and Record (16-30 October 1971), P. 550.

Ruler of Sharjah that Abu Musa should be partitioned between Sharjah and Iran, with Iran taking "the lion's share, including the strategic sites and the deep underground waters of the island."¹⁴

At the same time, Sharjah would have the right to name a company to explore for oil offshore, but the firm's activities would come under Iranian laws. Income from the oil discovered would be divided equally between Sharjah and Iran, and Iran would give Sharjah 1.5 million pounds sterling annually for a period of nine years, renewable for a further period.

"The proposal affected our sovereignty and demanded selling the island, otherwise it would be taken over by force. Our reply to Luce was that we would never give up

¹⁴ "Rulers Will Not Yield Gulf Islands" Arab Report and Record (1-15 November 1971), P. 574.

our sovereignty and rights in the islands, " said Al-Khalij.

Furthermore, Al-Khalij quoted Shaikh Khalid as saying that he called on all Arab countries to adopt a unified stand on the issue.¹⁵

The ruler of Ras al-Khaimah, Shaikh Saqr, also was quoted by Al-Khalij as saying that Sir William Luce had suggested to him (Saqr) that he should cede sovereignty over the two Tumb islands in return for annual payments of 1.6 million pounds sterling by Iran and a 49 per cent share of the income from any oil discovered in their offshore waters. "We rejected this offer and told Luce we would never give up our land, nor were we ready to enter into deals to sell our islands," said Shaikh Saqr according to Al-Khalij.¹⁶

The Kuwaiti Foreign Minister, Shaikh Ahmad Jaber al-Sabah, was reported by the Beirut Daily Star on November 9

¹⁵ Ibid., P. 574.

¹⁶ Ibid., P. 574.

as saying that Iran had rejected several tentative solutions in the dispute over Abu Musa and the two Tumbs. One was that it should rent the three islands from Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah for 99 years, another that they should be garrisoned by joint Arab and Iranian forces. Although Iran currently stood firm by rejecting the preceding alternatives, Shaikh Sabah said, he believed Iran would at length agree to a settlement of the issue without force, in order that "it might not lose the friendship of 100 million Arabs."¹⁷

The London Financial Times on November 11 confirmed that Iran had rejected proposals that the islands should be leased to it or else that a mixed Arab-Iranian force should be stationed in them. The confirmation came from

¹⁷

Ibid., P. 574.

the Iranian Foreign Minister, Abbas Khalatbari. On the other hand the Iraqi acting Education Minister, Ahmad Abd-al-Sattar Jawari, was quoted to have said that "the dangers of foreign ambition are well known, and Iraq fears that Britain's coming withdrawal will be exploited just as it was in other Arab areas."¹⁸

On November 25 a statement was issued in Abu Dhabi saying that the projected federation of the Trucial States, to known as the United Arab Emirates, would be proclaimed a free and sovereign state at a meeting to be held in Dubai on December 2. And on November 29 the Ruler of Sharjah Shaikh, Shaikh Khalid announced that he had reached an agreement with the Iranian Government in the dispute over the island of Abu Musa. Iranian forces would be stationed in certain areas and have full jurisdiction over them, but the rest of

¹⁸
Ibid., P. 574.

the island would remain under Sharjah's jurisdiction and flag. Both Sharjah and Iran recognized a twelve-mile territorial water limit, and the United States company Buttes Oil and Gas would continue to explore for oil onshore and offshore. The revenues from its operations would be divided equally between Sharjah and Iran, and Iran would give Sharjah 1.5 million pounds sterling a year until the emirate's annual receipts from oil totalled 3 million pounds sterling.¹⁹

As a result of this agreement, Iranian troops landed on Abu Musa on November 30. At the same time, the Iranian troops occupied the two Tumbs but without prior agreement or arrangement with the Ruler of Ras al-Khaimah, Shaikh Saqr. Police on the islands resisted the Iranian invasion, and this resulted in the death of four of them and also three of t h e

¹⁹

"Abu Musa Dispute Settled" Arab Report and Record (16-30 November 1971), P. 598.

Iranian soldiers.²⁰ Shaikh Saqr immediately complained to the Arab League and the British Government about Iran's action.

The interesting reaction from London as reported by London press was that Ras al-Khaimah, the only Trucial State to reject membership in the United Arab Emirates, had been told that its treaty with Britain would end as soon as the Union had been proclaimed. The London Financial Times suggested that Iran had occupied the two Tumbs when it did because, once Ras al-Khaimah was independent, its act would be more offensive in an international context than if the state's foreign policy and defence were still technically in Britain's hands.²¹

The Times went on to say that, while Britain was still technically responsible for the islands' defence at the time

²⁰
Ibid., P. 598.

²¹
Ibid., P. 598.

of the landing, Shaikh Saqr had 'declined many opportunities to settle the dispute on much the same lines as the settlement...between Iran and Sharjah over the island of Abu Musa'. The paper went on to quote a Foreign Office spokesman as saying that 'the British Government could hardly be expected to exercise their treaty responsibilities on their final day.'²²

The Iranian Government's action and the British Government's stand on the situation, led to the Iraq's decision on November 30, to break off diplomatic relations with Britain and Iran. On December 1, the Deputy Ruler of Sharjah, Shaikh Saqr bin Mohammed al-Qasimi, had four shots fired at him by an unidentified gunman. Three shots missed, but the fourth grazed his shoulder. This action, apparently, could be related to the fact that Shaikh Saqr represented

²²

Ibid., P. 598.

his brother the Ruler, Shaikh Khalid, in receiving t h e Iranian landing party which took over part of Abu Musa island.

The Arab League took up the issue and it met in an emergency session in Cairo on December 6 to discuss Iran's occupation of the three islands. Delegates from Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah were present as observers. The United Arab Emirates had already been accepted as a League member. Ras al-Khaimah was represented by the brother of the Ruler, Shaikh Abdul-al-Aziz al-Qasimi, who said that the Iranian forces, when occupying the Greater Tumb island, had ferried 350 inhabitants - members of Arab tribes which had been settled there for two hundred years - to the Arab mainland. Ras al-Khaimah called on Britain to protect the two Tumbs from the Iranian invasion, but were told that no British troops were available as they had already been withdrawn

from the area. "The matter is one for the Arab countries to resolve, but we want the problem solved by peaceful methods," said Shaikh Abdul-al-Aziz.²³

It was reported that Ras al-Khaimah and Iraq proposed that league members should break off diplomatic relations with Iran and Britain (as Iraq already done), and submit the issue to the United Nations Security Council. The conference ended on December 7 with the acceptance of a number of secret resolutions drafted by representatives of Egypt, Sudan, Tunisia, Algeria, and Iraq for submission to Arab governments.

Prior to the Arab League conference on the islands' issue and immediately after Iran's occupations of the islands (on November 30, 1971), the Ruler of Ras al-Khaimah, Shaikh Saqr, sent a telegram to the President of Libya, Qadafi. In it he said that Iran's occupation of Greater and Lesser Tumbs was an act of "overt aggression, not only

²³ "Emergency Arab League Session" Arab Report and Record (1-15 December 1971), P. 623.

against Ras al-Khaimah but against Arabs everywhere," and he appealed to Qadafi, "to shoulder his full national responsibility before God and history" by taking an immediate actions to repulse the invaders, and to bring the issue to the attention of the United Nations Security Council, the General Assembly and the Arab League. It was reported by Kuwait Radio that Shaikh Saqr, had sent a similar message to the Amir of Kuwait.

On December 10, 1971, the heir to the Ruler of Ras al-Khaimah, Shaikh Khalid bin Saqr al-Qasimi, went to Benghazi to "explain the situation regarding Iran's occupation of the Arab islands...and to ask fraternal Libya to back and support us", said Shaikh Khalid. But it seems that following the recent visit by the Libyan Economy Minister, Major Abd-al-Salam Jaloud, to the Gulf

region, that Libya was willing to act in support of Ras al-Khaimah. It was reported by Libyan Radio on December 8, 1971 and confirmed by the Kuwait daily Al-Rai-al Aam, that Libya had intended to land forces on Abu Musa and the two Tumbs two days before they were occupied by Iranian troops. The Radio quoted Major Abd-al-Salam Jaloud as saying, in an interview with the Kuwaiti paper, that "the Libyan Arab Republic asked permission from the Iraqi authorities to land airborne forces at Basra Airport, preparatory to moving them to the islands. The Iraqi authorities approved Libya's application, but some in the Gulf refused."²⁴

A few days later Libyan Radio reported that Jaloud had denied that there had been any opposition from Arab

²⁴ "Shaikh Saqr Appeals to Arab States" Arab Report and Record, London, (December 1971), P. 623.

states in the Gulf to Libya's plan to defend the islands.

Libya was prevented by a lack of adequate staging bases as the Gulf states at the time were under the British responsibility.

In the meantime, the President of the United Arab Emirates, Shaikh Zaid bin Sultan al-Nuhayan, was visited by the Assistant Secretary-General of the Arab League, Salim al-Yafi, in Abu Dhabi. Al-Yafi said, "I am convinced that our Iranian brothers want to retain Arab friendship and to find an amicable solution to the problem of the three islands."

This optimistic attitude was further voiced in January 1972 when Cairo Radio answering listeners' questions on Iran's occupation of the three islands said that,

"Iran is a Muslim and friendly country.
The Arab and Iranian peoples have managed
to solve various problems in the past,

such as Bahrain...Our people adhere to the Arabism of these islands (Abu Musa, Greater Tumb and Lesser Tumb), and insist that they return to their rightful owners. At the same time, our people look forward to retaining the friendship of the Iranian people and the historic ties that link them." 25

Apart from this opinion expressed by Cairo Radio, Morecco, Saudi Arabia, and Tunisia were all in touch with the Iranian Government in efforts to secure a satisfactory solution to the problem of Abu Musa and the two Tumbs.

While all these good efforts were being made, Libya already had announced (December 7) that it had nationalized the assests and operations of the British Petroleum Company in its territory, and proposed to withdraw its deposits from British banks, in retaliation for Britain's failure to prevent Iran's occupation of Abu Musa and the two Tumbs. While Iraq and Libya ("the radicals") joined

forces in making life difficult for Britain, the Kuwaiti National Assembly ("the moderate") on December 12 called on the governments of Arab countries to break off relations with Britain and Iran in retaliation for Iran's actions on the islands. The Ruler of Ras al-Khaimah, Shaikh Saqr, led an estimated 1,000 people in an anti-Iranian march through the streets of Ras al-Khaimah town on December 3 (a day after the UAE became independent).

On January 25, 1972 the Ruler of Sharjah, Shaikh Khalid bin Mohammed al-Qasimi, was found shot dead after "rebel forces" holding him hostage had surrendered to security guards and men of the recently formed Union Defence Force. Shaikh Khalid was 45 years of age. It was reported that eighteen "rebels" led by Shaikh Khalid's cousin Shaikh Saqr bin Sultan, who had been deposed as

ruler in June 1965 and had since lived in exile in Cairo, attacked the palace on January 24 with hand-grenades, and succeeded in entering the palace.

The report went on to say that Shaikh Saqr bin Mohammed, Shaikh Khalid's brother, immediately surrounded the palace with local forces, and fire was exchanged throughout the night. The following morning, when the Union Defence Force arrived, the "rebels" surrendered and were taken to Abu Dhabi. Shaikh Zaid bin Sultan, the President of the United Arab Emirates, said in a broadcast that Shaikh Saqr bin Sultan "and his gang" would stand trial.

Apart from Shaikh Khalid's death, the casualties were limited to something like eight or nine. They were identified as Shaikh Khalid's relatives, and four servants were also killed. Four security-men at the palace were

wounded, and a British officer seconded to the UDF, Captain Cameron, was wounded in the leg.²⁶ Shaikh Khalid's younger brother, Shaikh Sultan bin Mohammed, had been elected "interim ruler" of Sharjah, although Shaikh Saqr bin Mohammed had long served as Deputy Ruler.

Shaikh Khalid was buried on January 26. In attendance were the Rulers of Abu Dhabi, ~~Bubai~~, and Fujairah. On January 29, the Kuwait daily Al-Rai-Aam reported that Shaikh Saqr bin Sultan had told his interrogators in Abu Dhabi, that he had first planned to launch a coup against ~~Sharh~~ Khalid after the British forces had left the Gulf region, but he had abandoned the plan. It was assumed that Shaikh Khalid's decision to share the island of Abu Musa

²⁶ Arab Report and Record, London, (January 1972), P. 39.

with Iran had to do with the plot in which he lost his life. The Iraqi News Agency said, "It is not yet known whether Shaikh Saqr entered Sharjah via Oman and Ras al-Khaimah or whether his cousin, the Ruler of Ras al-Khaimah, Shaikh Saqr bin Mohammed al-Qasimi, paved the way for his entry."

Within months after Shaikh Khalid's death Umm al-Qaiwain had decided to sue the Sharjah Petroleum Company, a subsidiary of Buttes Gas and Oil, for alleged infringement of drilling rights in the offshore waters of Abu Musa island. The SPC, acting on behalf of Sharjah and Iran, was preparing to drill in waters nine miles from the islands, and the decision to start legal proceedings had been taken only after mediation had failed, according to Umm al-Qaiwain government spokesman. Umm al-Qaiwain had hoped that the

UAE Government would intervene to bring the two sides together, but this had not been done, "the Umm al-Qaiwain Government and people are therefore compelled to seek justice elsewhere," the spokesman continued. The offshore drilling rights in the region of Abu Musa had been in dispute between Umm al-Qaiwain and Sharjah, and between Buttes Gas and Oil and Occidental Petroleum Corporation, for the past two years when Sharjah and Iran divided the island between themselves in November of 1971.

The Ruler of Sharjah, Shaikh Sultan, on October 9, 1972, announced in a broadcast that oil had been discovered in the offshore waters of Abu Musa. One well, Shaikh Sultan said, was likely to produce from 13,000 to 20,000 barrels a day, and prospecting was continuing.

The Kuwait daily Al-Sisyassah reported on December 5 that on December 3, during the celebration marking the

UAE's first anniversary, demonstrators in Ras al-Khaimah had torn down and burnt a UAE flag. However, the Ruler of Ras al-Khaimah was not involved because he was visiting London.

The Islands' Question and the UN

On December 9, 1972 the UN Security Council began consideration of a complaint presented by the Arab states of Algeria, Iraq, the Libyan Arab Republic, and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen concerning the Iranian occupation by force of the three Arabian Gulf Islands of Abu Musa and the two Tumbs. The complaint as presented by the Arab states represented a criticism of not only of the military occupation of the islands by Iran but also of Britain's responsibility and the failure of the Security Council to act in strict conformity with the UN Charter.

According to the Algerian representative, Abdellatif Rahal, territorial acquisition by force could not be recognized as legal or valid and as such the resort to force by Iran called for condemnation on the part of the Security Council. All of the complaints called for an immediate withdrawal of Iran, and Iraq even implied that a failure to withdraw would cause her to resort to a similar use of force.

Algeria also felt that there was an obligation on the part of the United Kingdom to ensure that the newly created Federation of the Emirates suffered no territorial dismemberment. Iraq levelled an even harsher complaint against Britain stating that there was a connivance on her part with the United States to place Iran in control of the region. The United Kingdom was committed to respect and preserve the territorial integrity of the states

concerned and her failure in this concern showed her lack of responsibility. It seemed that the United Kingdom allowed violations of agreements as long as the violations furthered her own interests.

The violation of the U.N. Charter by certain states, in this particular case Iran, resulted in a certain loss of respect for some of the U.N. institutions, especially the Security Council. Libya drew the conclusion that small states should hit hard rather than present their case to the United Nations.

Kuwait joined in the discussion by levelling complaints against Iran for threatening the security of the Gulf by her occupation of the islands, and also against the United Kingdom for her policy of pulling out of territories and leaving behind explosive situations. In this particular case it seemed that Britain had attempted to enlist Kuwaiti

aid in order to satisfy Iran an attempt which had been flatly refused by Kuwait.

Adnan Bachachi, the UAE representative, indicated that the problem was of vital concern to the United Arab Emirates and that Iran's refusal to negotiate with the UAE had led to a certain ill-feeling between the two countries.

Having examined the complaints, what were the responses to these criticisms by the nations involved, that is of the United Kingdom and of Iran? The United Kingdom accepted responsibility for the creation of the conflicting situation but she recalled to attention the fact that she had advised that she would be unable to continue to protect the islands in question if an agreement had not been reached by the time of her withdrawal. Iran, also

remaining evasive called to mind matters of more immediate importance that the question of the islands, problems such as the war in Viet Nam and Cambodia. Iran condemned Iraq for taking up the Council's valuable time recalling that this was not the first time that Iraq had tried to create a hostile situation in the Gulf area. Iran also reiterated the fact that the islands were Iranian territory, constituting a part of a group forming a virtual archipelago that had been Iranian.

The UAE decision-makers were more interested in winning friends than complying with "radical" Arab states. Thus after a decent interval of time, one year, the UAE took the sensible step of establishing diplomatic links with Iran. On December 23, 1972 the UAE Foreign Ministry issued a statement saying that Shaikh Hashir bin Maktoum bin Juma al-Maktoum, had been appointed as the UAE's

Ambassador to Iran, and Manuchehr Benham as the Iranian Ambassador to the UAE. According to Richard Johns, "the Tumbs were of no particular concern to Shaikh Zaid or Shaikh Rashid, whose links with Iran have always been close. It is fair assumption that Shaikh Saqr of Ras al-Khaimah was not consulted but merely told of the decision once it had been made."²⁷

Iran's Military Build Up

We might recall that we quoted the UAE Defence Minister, Shaikh Mohammed bin Rashid al-Maktoum, as saying that "the Arab states of the Gulf were working towards closer relationships and should seek to establish military co-ordination."²⁸ Iran, on the other hand, is going ahead

²⁷ Richard Johns, "The Emergence of the United Arab Emirates", Middle East International, No. 21, (March 1973), P. 10.

²⁸ Arab Report and Record, (June 1973), P. 282.

along with its military build-up. During the Shah of Iran's recent visit to the United States, the U.S. News and World Report said that,

"In efforts to maintain peace and protect its own interests in the Middle East, the United States is placing more and more of its chips on Iran. This becomes increasingly apparent in the wake of the visit to Washington by Iran's ruler, Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlevi, from July 24 to July 28."²⁹

The Shah made it clear that he wants to buy a number of F-14 Navy fighter planes and may purchase the Air Force's newest fighter, the F-15. The U.S. already said earlier this year that it would sell 2.5 billion dollars worth of modern weapons to Iran.³⁰ The reasons given by the United States that the Shah and his country are regarded

29

"Iran's Shah: Key to U.S. Aims in Mideast" U.S. News and World Report, (August 6, 1973), P. 44.

30

Ibid., P. 44.

as vitally important to the U.S. for these reasons:(1)

Iran is a major Western source of oil. Unlike most of Arab producers, it has not threatened to use oil as a weapon against Washington - and it is planning to increase output at a time when the U.S. will be increasingly dependent on imported oil. (2) The U.S. desperately wants to keep peace in the "turbulent Persian Gulf area without getting directly involved on its own". Officials feel that Iran is the only nation there rich enough in human, as well as economic, resources to act as "Western policeman" - a longtime assignment abandoned by Britain in late 1971.³¹

It is expected that the Iranian Air Force with this "build-up" will have 10 squadrons of Phantom fighter bombers, 8 squadrons of F-5E interceptors, 100 C-130 troop

³¹
Ibid., P. 44.

transports, more than 700 helicopters, some of the "smart" laser-guided bombs of the kind used in the later stages of the Vietnam war - and the F-14s and F-15s, unless their purchases fall through.³²

The Army with the modernization has "800 old American tanks and the purchase of another 800 from Britain. London is also helping build up Iran's Navy to twice its former size."³³ As we will explain later, Iran maintains that it is her responsibility to ensure stability in the Gulf region. The Shah made it plain that he does not intend to allow any "subversive or radical" groups to gain a foothold along the shores of a waterway through which passes 20 million barrels of oil a day. Iran with its 5 million barrels a day is the second largest exporter, after Saudi Arabia, and is expected to reach 8 million barrels a day in the near future.

³² Ibid., P. 44.

³³ Ibid., P. 44.

The Shah was also reported to have disclosed that he signed an oil agreement while he was in Washington with an American oil firm, Ashland Oil Company, on a 50-50 basis in purchasing oil from the wells for the filling station. With this contract, Iran will contribute greatly to a "stable flow of oil to the West". The U.S. is aware of the fact that "Iran is the only country in the Persian Gulf which is not Arab and therefore not emotionally involved in the Arab dispute with Israel."³⁴

Other reasons were also given as to why Iran is coming closer to the U.S. camp, for instance, the Soviet Union's support for Iraq. The Shah also has internal "upheaval". The Shah seems to be building an international front in order to cover or over shadow the domestic restlessness. "About 70 persons have been executed for

³⁴
Ibid., P. 44.

subversion in the last few months, and recently terrorists murdered an American military attaché - despite an earlier claim by the Shah that urban guerrillas had been 'reduced to silence'...."³⁵

We have noticed that Iran is also receiving military aid from Britain and we can only assume that Britain is like the United States, anxious to see a "friendly" nation to take care of "policing" the Gulf region. We know from recent history that Britain, France, and the United States have suffered set backs from "limited wars". Therefore we can understand why the United States and Britain are interested in Iran doing the job for them.

³⁵
Ibid., P. 44.

CHAPTER 7

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE UAE

In this Chapter we will look on the one hand into the number of visits made by officials from the Gulf states, and on the other the number of visits made to the Gulf states by foreign missions, diplomats, or foreign trade missions for the period 1968-1972. What can we learn from the data charted in Table 1-7 and Table 2-7? What is the significance of these visits in an analysis of the Foreign Policy of the United Arab Emirates?

International Activities

We have conducted a general survey based on activities reported by the Middle East Economic Digest and Arab Report and Record in the Gulf region during the five year period (1968-72). We have noted the number of visits by

Table 1-7
The Number of Visits to the Gulf States (1968-1972)

Visits to the Gulf States from:	No. of Visits 1968	No. of Visits 1969	No. of Visits 1970	No. of Visits 1971	No. of Visits 1972	Total No. of Visits
United Kingdom	3	3	4	4	0	14
United States	1	0	0	1	3	5
France	0	1	2	0	2	5
Soviet Union	0	0	0	0	1	1
Egypt	2	0	1	2	3	8
Syria	0	0	0	0	1	1
Jordan	4	0	1	0	1	6
Iran	1	1	1	1	0	4
Iraq	1	1	1	2	1	6
Lebanon	1	0	0	0	0	1
India	0	0	1	0	0	1
Pakistan	0	0	0	0	1	1
Indonesia	0	0	0	0	1	1
Libya	0	0	0	0	1	1
Morocco	0	0	0	1	0	1
Sudan	0	0	0	2	2	4
South Korea	0	0	0	0	1	1
Romania	0	0	0	0	1	1

Source: Based on author's survey.

Table 2-7
The Number of Visits from the Gulf States (1968-1972)

Visits from the Gulf States to:	No. of Visits 1968	No. of Visits 1969	No. of Visits 1970	No. of Visits 1971	No. of Visits 1972	Total No. of Visits
United Kingdom	6	7	1	4	3	21
United States	0	1	0	0	0	1
France	2	1	0	0	2	5
Soviet Union	0	0	0	0	0	0
Egypt	0	0	1	3	4	8
Syria	0	0	0	1	3	4
Jordan	2	1	0	1	0	4
Iran	8	4	7	0	0	19
Iraq	0	2	1	2	1	6
India	0	0	0	0	0	0
Pakistan	0	1	1	2	4	8
Indonesia	0	0	0	0	0	0
Saudi Arabia	6	4	2	2	1	15
Lebanon	5	2	2	1	0	10
Libya	0	0	0	0	3	3
Morocco	0	0	1	0	0	1
Sudan	0	0	0	0	2	2
South Korea	0	0	0	0	0	0
Romania	0	0	0	0	2	2

Source: Based on author's survey.

the rulers or envoys, (trade, economic, political, or diplomatic) to a selected number of countries from the Gulf states and we have also noted the number of visits made to the Gulf states from those same countries (see Table 1-7 and Table 2-7).

In order to make the task simple we have counted visits (to and from) Bahrain and Qatar. We did so because the two states in question had entered into general negotiations (see Appendix B) along with the rulers of the seven Trucial States and Britain in 1968. In the end both Bahrain and Qatar decided not to join the proposed federation, Bahrain, proclaimed independence on August 14, 1971 and Qatar on September 1, 1971.

This survey gives us a general idea about international activities in the Gulf region. We will be able to see how many pro-East and how many pro-West activities

were generated in the Gulf region immediately following Britain's decision to withdraw from the Gulf states and during the first year of the United Arab Emirates independence. Thus, we will also be able to establish what the future foreign policy of the United Arab Emirates will be.

Looking at Table 1-7 and Table 2-7 we can see that the United Kingdom is leading in terms of visits (to and from) the Gulf states (14 to, 21 from). It is quite understandable because of the United Kingdom's direct involvement in the proposed federation negotiations. The second in line with a high number of visits (to and from) the Gulf states is Iran, (4 to, 19 from) and here of course, many of these visits have to do with Iran's cardinal interest, her foreign policy after the British departure.

*It may be professed that Iran's current

desire to play a leading role in the Persian Gulf is to no small extent aided by its consciousness of this apparent hands-offs attitude. This is not to suggest that the attitudes of the superpowers determine Iran's present posture in the Persian Gulf, but they do exert a significant effect."¹

The third in line with the highest number of visits (to and from) the Gulf states is Saudi Arabia, (2 to, 15 from), and this is also easily understood.

"The first significant step was taken on October 24, 1968, when Iran and Saudi Arabia resolved their long-standing conflict over the continental shelf in the Persian Gulf. Iran and Saudi Arabia had granted concessions to two oil companies for the exploration and exploitation of oil resources under the seabed in the Persian Gulf. The interests of the two countries overlapped."²

The fourth and most important, with the highest number of visits is Egypt. In five years there were 16

¹ Rouhollah K. Ramazani, The Persian Gulf Iran's Role, (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1972), P. 102.

² Ibid., P. 49.

visits (8 to the Gulf states and 8 from the Gulf states).

"Relations with Egypt, which were good, have been reinforced. Since well before independence the presence of Egyptians at all levels of state service - which once might have seemed somewhat sinister - has become almost reassuring."³

With regards to Jordan, a long time "friend" of the Gulf states, there have been only 4 visits from the Gulf and 6 visits to the Gulf. Jordan supplies the Gulf states with trained personnel and King Husain depends heavily on the rulers' financial assistance. He visited Bahrain, Qatar, Abu Dhabi, and Dubai from 17 to 20 April 1968, and during that visit he received \$14 million from Abu Dhabi. It is believed, however, that he played an important

³ Richard Johns, "The Emergence of the United Arab Emirates" Middle East International, No. 21, (March 1973), P. 9.

political role between the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia at the time when Saudi Arabia expressed dissatisfaction over the United Arab Emirates' proposal of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.

With regards to Syria it interesting to note there were a total of four visits from the Gulf states and only one visit from Syria to the Gulf states, "The visit of President Assad of Syria in November was followed by a sudden toning down of hostile Damascus media (against Abu Dhabi)".⁴

Iraq on the other hand maintained good contact with the nine rulers: a total of 6 visits to the Gulf states and a total of 4 visits from the Gulf states to Iraq. The United Arab Emirates' and Iraq relationships present us

⁴
Ibid., P. 9.

with an interesting situation. The UAE is regarded as a "conservative regime" and Iraq as a "radical regime" and yet the relationship on the diplomatic front seems rather ideal. But we are reminded by Richard Johns that this is not in reality the case,

"On the surface relations with Iraq are satisfactory, but no one in Abu Dhabi has any real illusions about the Baathist regime in Baghdad, with its commitment to revolution in the Gulf. Iraq as a littoral state of the Gulf has a legitimate and undeniable diplomatic interest in the UAE. However, given the Baathist proclivity to interfere in the internal affairs of other states and commitment to revolution in the Gulf, the fact that Iraq has the biggest diplomatic representation in Abu Dhabi is not necessarily reassuring."⁵

With reference to Libya, we can see that Libya made a single visit to the Gulf states whereas the Gulf states made three visits to Libya. It seems to be that all the

⁵
Ibid., PP. 9-10.

visits between the Gulf states and Libya had to do with Iran's occupation of the three islands, see Chapter 6.

It is certain that Colonel Gaddafi would like to see the United Arab Emirates governed by his Islamic type of Arab socialism but at the present his activist foreign policy is keeping him occupied with much more pressing priorities elsewhere.

There were five visits made to the Gulf states by the United States. These visits were mainly concerned with "familiarisation" of the area. Among these visiting were Secretary of State, William Rogers, Frank Shakespeare, and the Chairman of the U.S. Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, Senator William Fulbright. The United States maintained a "hands-off" policy concerning the Gulf states because of its involvement in Vietnam and also because

American public opinion has been very strong against any U.S. foreign involvement. The Gulf states' single visit to the United States could be regarded as paving the way for the establishment of a diplomatic mission. The U.S. did not play an active role during the proposed federation negotiations. This is because the U.S. had confidence in Britain's ability to protect U.S. interests in the area.

France also did not play an active role during the proposed federation negotiations. The five French visits (five visits both ways), can not be emphasised as important as France had had an interest in the area for many years and her visits were not initiated by the British withdrawal from the Gulf states. Apart from the trade missions which visited the Gulf states, we can regard the visits on both sides as good-will visits.

The Soviet Union's only visit to the Gulf states was in January 1971 by a delegation headed by the Deputy Director of the Middle East section of the Soviet Foreign Ministry. They discussed in "detail" relations between the United Arab Emirates and the Soviet Union. The Beirut daily al-Hayat reported on April 25, 1972, that the UAE Government had abandoned its plans to enter into diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, "as a result of pressure by certain Arab states which opposed the establishment of close relations with Moscow."

The second communist country with one visit to the Gulf states and two visits from the Gulf states, is Rumania. In May 1972 a Rumanian delegation led by the Deputy Foreign Trade Minister, Petre Yorlacu, visited Abu Dhabi for talks with the UAE ministers on means of

expanding relations with the United Arab Emirates. There were two visits from the Gulf states to Rumania in 1972 to discuss the purchase of equipment and services for development projects and in return Abu Dhabi will supply Rumania with crude oil. The agreement was signed by the Oil and Industry Minister of Abu Dhabi, Mani bin Said al-Utaiba, who was received by the Rumanian President, Nicolae Ceausescu on August 25, 1972.

The visits by South Korea, India, Pakistan, Sudan, Morocco, and Lebanon were of minor importance. We have accounted for these visits because they have fallen within the period of our survey. What is more important from this survey (Table 1-7 and Table 2-7) is the eventual establishments of diplomatic missions. The UAE "has pursued an active and positive policy in winning friends" according

to Richard Johns, but the interesting thing is that the UAE has not established diplomatic relations with either of the two "communist" countries which expressed interest in the UAE. The UAE has established diplomatic relations with all these countries mentioned in Tables 1-7 and 2-7 except Rumania, the Soviet Union, and South Korea. However, a number of other countries, not listed in the two Tables, have since established diplomatic missions in the UAE. For instance, Algeria, Tunisia, Japan, and West Germany. But there are still "no" relations with the Eastern European or "communist" countries.

CHAPTER 8

UAE ALIGNMENT

UAE and Israel

The United Arab Emirates' policy on the question of the Arab-Israeli conflict is straightforward, the UAE adheres to the policy maintained by the majority of Arab countries. As early as 1968, Shaikh Zaid bin Sultan donated 120,000 Bahraini dinars to Al-Fatah, the Palestine National Organization. At the Arab Defence Council meeting in Cairo towards the end of January 1972 the UAE committed itself to a fairly heavy contribution to the collective Arab "battle plan". In fact in 1972 Shaikh Zaid distributed over 30 million pounds sterling in aid abroad.¹

In November 1971, the Ruler of Fujairah, Shaikh Mohammed contributed 10,000 pounds sterling towards the

¹ Richard Johns, "The Emergence of the United Arab Emirates", Middle East International, No. 21, (March 1973), P. 9.

Arab cause. The Lebanese Government received \$1 million for the relief of victims of Israeli attacks on Southern Lebanon, from Shaikh Zaid. The UAE National Consultative Assembly, on February 13, 1973, denounced Israeli tactics to change "religious and archaeological character of the occupied Arab territories, especially Jerusalem."² The Assembly called on the government to "do its utmost in co-operating with other Arab countries to put an end to Israel's aggressive actions against our religious heritage."³

In April 1972 it was announced by the Commissioner-General of the Arab Boycott of Israel Offices, Muhammad Mahgoub, in Damascus that a central boycott office, attached to the UAE Government, would be established in

² Arab Report and Record, London, (February 1973), P. 66.

³ Ibid., P. 66.

Abu Dhabi with branches in UAE member states. The Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), Yasir Arafat, visited Abu Dhabi and Dubai in January 1970.

Although Arafat's arrival in the Trucial States was "unexpected" he did meet with government officials in Abu Dhabi and Dubai.

Recently the UAE President, Shaikh Zaid, called for a conference of Arab rulers in the Gulf region and one of all Arab heads of states.

"There are mutual economic interests and other matters connected with the security and stability of the Gulf on which an exchange of views would be advisable. I believe that such meeting...would bring about unanimous agreement among the Gulf states on a single political plan and would achieve economic benefits that would be profitable to everybody, including the non-Gulf Arab countries....I believe that an Arab summit conference is a necessity dictated by our common destiny, the responsibilities of the present and the hopes of the future."⁴

⁴
Arab Report and Record, London, (June 1973), P.282.

Shaikh Zaid was asked about oil being used as a weapon in the battle against Israel, the President replied,

"Undoubtedly our Arab brothers are well aware that the vast resources exist, particularly in the UAE. What they should understand is that these resources are not ours alone but that they, too, have a share in them. They are entitled to these resources, which would have no value if they did not contribute a positive asset to the Arab effort. We in the UAE will never hesitate in bolstering Arab strength to confront these enemies who are also our enemies."⁵

We can see clearly that the UAE's policy towards Israel is based on the overall policy of other Arab countries. The UAE President is consistent on the Arab-Israeli conflict. In May 1971 Shaikh Zaid visited Pakistan and at the end of his visit a joint communique was issued which expressed the concern of the UAE and Pakistan at the deteriorating situation in the Middle East

⁵
Ibid., P. 282.

"resulting from Israel's defiance of the United Nations resolutions" and emphasised their support for the Arab cause.

UAE and the Superpowers

In 1968 when Britain announced her intention of leaving the Gulf area by 1971, it was feared that the British withdrawal from Gulf might imply an open invitation to the Russians. In the light of the experience in Korea it may seem as a declaration of disinterest by the West and could well be read by the Soviet government as equivalent to the granting of a carte blanche, and would almost certainly encourage that party within the Soviet leadership which desires a more active and more forward policy.⁶

⁶
Centre for Strategic and International Studies,
Georgetown University, The Gulf: Implications of British
Withdrawal, (Washington, D.C., 1969), P. 8.

The superpowers, however, have so far maintained a "hands-off" policy in the Gulf. This has added more problems to what Ramazani calls the five types of revolutions. These types of revolutions exist in the societies of all "new nations". These new nations must cope in varying degrees with "national", "authority", "participation", "welfare", and "foreign policy revolution".⁷

With regards to the power vacuum left by the British forces' withdrawal from the Gulf area, Iran is not in favour of either one of the superpowers filling the power vacuum. Iran maintains that the security of the Gulf is the responsibility of the Gulf states themselves. In the absence of an alliance of the Gulf states Iran is preparing to rely on its own strength to maintain the security of the Gulf area.⁸

⁷ Rouhollah K. Ramazani, The Persian Gulf Iran's Role, (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1972), P. ix.

⁸ Ibid., P. 90.

Iran will continue to develop its defence capability so that its military strength can match that of "all potential trouble makers in the area combined". The Shah was interviewed by the Washington Post in June 1969 and stated that Iran would have to develop such potential to keep the area secure after the British withdrawal and therefore that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union should attempt to fill the power vacuum left by the British forces' withdrawal.

The U.S. Under-Secretary of State Elliot Richardson told a press conference in Tehran in April 1970 that the United States was unlikely to establish a Gulf presence after the proposed British military withdrawal in 1971. He said, "I would not go so far as to say the matter had not been considered at all but I think it is quite unlikely... that this would be a decision on the part of the United

States". Richardson went on to say, "I think it would be more clearly consistent with the purposes and objectives of the Nixon doctrine that we should look to countries in the area and to the leadership of Iran in particular."⁹

The Soviet Union policy towards the Gulf is "unpredictable". Its relations with Iran cannot be regarded as "friendly" because of a number of reasons, such as Iran's close association with the United States or the West in general, and because of the Soviet Union's support for Iraq. The Soviet Union early in 1972 attempted to set up a full-scale embassy in the UAE but this attempt was thwarted, although a proposal for establishing diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union was earlier accepted by the United Arab Emirates. It is assumed that the reversal in

⁹

"Under-Secretary of State Outlines US Policy", Arab Report and Record, London, (April 1970), P. 234.

the UAE's decision to establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union came as a result of "pressure" or "warnings" from King Faisal of Saudi Arabia. "The United Arab Emirates will continue to reflect the pressures of outside powers interested in the area."¹⁰

Alternative Security Arrangements

Since Iran has repeatedly stated that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union should attempt to fill the power vacuum, we should therefore examine other possible security arrangements in the Gulf region. The first possible arrangement is "the creation of an all-encompassing security system includes, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates."¹¹ But the difficulty with

¹⁰ Robert G. Landen, "Gulf States" The Middle East: Its Governments and Politics, (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 1972), P. 313.

¹¹ Ramazani, The Persian Gulf Iran's Role, P. 91.

this arrangement is "the numerous land and sea boundary, territorial, political, and ideological problems involved, would definitely militate against the realization of such an arrangement in the near future."¹²

The second alternative is the formation of a system comprised of the larger Gulf states only, - Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia, but again, the possibility for this system to succeed is not likely at the present,

"The basic Iranian-Iraqi political differences as exhibited in the Shatt al-Arab problem present a major stumbling block to the membership of the two countries in the same security system, and Iraq's latent claim to Kuwait further complicates the problem. The exclusion of Iraq might make an arrangement among the other three states more feasible, but this would still leave Iraq's claim to Kuwait an impediment, along with the presence of anti-Iranian sentiments in some influential Kuwaiti circles."¹³

¹² Ibid., P. 91.

¹³ Ibid., P. 91.

The third alternative is the creation of an alliance between the "Big Two" Gulf states: Iran and Saudi Arabia. The two countries have the longest coastlines on the Gulf, similar interests in the integrity of their forms of government, and in a way have similar attitudes toward the West and the Arab "revolutionary" states. The two countries have resolved their differences over the continental shelf and are engaged in utilization of seabed oil resources on a mutually agreed basis. The landing of Iranian troops on the three islands did not seem to ruffle irreparably the basic friendly relations between Tehran and Riyadh. This "friendly" relations will probably continue as long as the existing regimes in the two capitals maintain a firm control over possible internal political "upheavals".

The last alternative seems to be the most promising at the present situation. We have to remember that

such prospects for a Saudi Arabian-Iranian formal alliance are limited by two important considerations. (1) The Iranian policy towards Israel. All Arab states will continue to be guided to a great extent by this consideration in relations with Iran. (2) The major problem is that an alliance between Saudi Arabia and Iran is not likely to succeed because of the pressure of Arab "revolutionary" states on Saudi Arabia. It is very clear that no Arab country can remain immune to the "vicissitudes" of inter-Arab politics, and Saudi Arabia is by no means an exception.

CHAPTER 9

CONCLUSION

The withdrawal of British forces from the Gulf area created a political vacuum in the region. American oil companies have large investments in the Middle East oil industry although American oil import from the Middle East is rather small: 4 per cent in 1972. Britain depends on a large supply of her oil from the Middle East. The Soviet Union and People's Republic of China who expressed interest in the Gulf area have as yet made no official contact. Japan has so far benefited very greatly in terms of oil from the UAE since the British withdrawal from the area in 1971.

Other important political factors for the UAE are the Arab-Israeli conflict, territorial disputes with Saudi Arabia and Iran, and the general problems of

modernization in a new nation. There is a growing world oil shortage which we must translate as a strong economic base and bargaining weapon for the new nation.

The United Arab Emirates are sandwiched between "radical" regimes, "moderate" regimes, and the "conservative" regimes. Although the Foreign Policy of the United Arab Emirates is being influenced by other Arab and Gulf states, it is likely that the conservative regimes who are basically aligned with the West will continue to influence the UAE foreign policy in a generally pro-West direction:

Figure 1

In our estimation of the relative weight of competing external influences as shown in Figure 1, the Arab-Israeli

conflict and the global energy crisis represent a potentially explosive mixture which cannot be ignored. It is a question of the petroleum rich Arab world versus oil-thirsty industrialized West.

The Western nations can either cut down on their oil consumption or conduct their foreign policies under the thumbs of the oil rich Arab countries. There is no prospect of settlement with Israel by force of arms. The Arabs only real potent weapon is oil.

With the loss in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, the eventual death of President Nasser, and the rise of Colonel Gaddafi, the race for Arab leadership had begun. At the present there is a tri-cornered race for the Arab leadership:

(Egypt)	-----	(Libya)	-----	(Saudi Arabia)
Sadat		Gaddafi		King Faisal

The U.S. war in Vietnam and domestic crises left the U.S. ("energy") policy, which has now emerged as a crash programme for energy self-sufficiency, in the background.

There are certain very unfortunate "upheavals" which make Arab unity almost impossible. The Palestinian freedom fighters or Fedayeen, are blamed for many of these "upheavals". There is no justification for an outside observer to condemn the Palestinians for their "irrational" or "terrorist" behaviour without consideration of the circumstances under which these acts are performed.

If Israel can ignore U.N. resolutions and act irrationally I cannot see why the Palestinian freedom fighters cannot do so by ignoring Arab governments' calls for "reason" and take the matter in their own hands. The dentist may diagnose the pain of his patient but he himself does not

feel the pain. We can talk of "rational" and "irrational" acts but we will never know what they are in reality.

We have to note that nothing can alter the fact that the West needs oil and that the Arab control it. Israel claims to be the lone democratic bastion of holding back a Soviet advance in the Middle East, but a blossoming East-West détente may soon falsify this claim. Military intervention would seem to be a self-defeating solution and in the wake of the Vietnam war would most likely prove disastrous domestically for the United States. An oil boycott is also definitely not the answer. The Arabs control the oil market and Western Europe and Japan are ready to buy Arab oil at any cost. The basic issue for the U.S. is how to increase supply and decrease demand.

The leaders of the United Arab Emirates have so far behaved calmly and cautiously in their internal and external affairs. American and French diplomatic relations have been established. In the sphere of Arab relations, the UAE has pursued an active and positive policy in winning friends. It has been quick to establish contacts in the socialist Arab world. The UAE leaders realize that no nation can survive without paying, at least, lip service to the "revolutionary" objectives of "liberation", "unification", and "socialism".

There are a number of "major" issues which the UAE have to tackle: Iran's occupation of the three islands, Saudi Arabia's claim on the Buraimi, the possibility of Sharjah and other smaller states striking it rich in

terms of oil and thereby demanding parity with Abu Dhabi and Dubai, the harbouring of the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arab Gulf by the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen.

The UAE will continue to carry on, on a basis of trial and error. The foreign policies of the new independent states, to a large extent, seem to be characterized by an ad hoc decision-making. This is due to an absence of foundations on which to base an overall foreign policy which appears at times to be contradictory. It is nearly two years since the UAE have started to establish themselves on the map and have succeeded.

We can conclude then that the United Arab Emirates have proved to the world since December 1971 that they are able or capable of handling their own affairs. We can

assume that should there be an issue which they cannot handle, they will turn to the British for help. It would definitely be misleading to say that Britain "left" the Gulf when she withdrew most of her military contingents and recognized the unconditional independence of the Gulf states, as she retains important economic interests and political influence in the area.

Iran's military build-up has no real immediate effect on the UAE foreign policy because the two countries maintain "friendly" relations. We must remember, although Iran is not considered "Arab country", it shares many important features with "Arab" countries: Iran shares religion, geography, and above all, a long social and commercial intercourse with the Arab Gulf states.

The United Arab Emirates appear to be a buffer zone in the increasingly sensitive area of the Gulf. The United Arab Emirates' decision-makers' basic problem is survival as a separate entity among competing powers in the Gulf area. To do this the United Arab Emirates must avoid aligning themselves with any one of these powers for any extended period of time.

At some point we can expect the United Arab Emirates' leaders to rely on Britain for continuing protection. At other times the United Arab Emirates will show a common Arab alignment on such matters as the Arab-Israeli conflict and also in some cases with OPEC members. When the question of the legitimacy of the regime arises the United Arab Emirates can be expected to close ranks with other traditional leaders in the area against republican forces. Like

Switzerland in earlier centuries the United Arab Emirates are trying to maintain their coveted position by not becoming embroiled too deeply in the quarrel of the "great" powers in the area.

AL BU FALAH FAMILY OF ABU DHABI
(Bani Yas)

Source: Donald Hawley, The Trucial States

THE RULERS OF ABU DHABI

Thaiyab bin Isa*	
Shakhbout bin Thaiyab	1793-1816
Mohammed bin Shakhbout	1816-1818
Tahnoon bin Shakhbout	1818-1833
Khalifah bin Shakhbout	1833-1845
Said bin Tahnoon	1845-1855
Zaid bin Khalifah	1855-1909
Tahnoon bin Zaid	1909-1912
Hamdan bin Zaid	1912-1922
Sultan bin Zaid	1922-1926
Saqr bin Zaid	1926-1928
Shakhbout bin Sultan ¹	1928-1966
Zaid bin Sultan	1966-

*According to Donald Hawley, Thaiyab bin Isa was murdered in 1793, Hawley also stated that in 1845 Isa bin Khalid and Thaiyab bin Isa came from outside the main branch of the ruling family and that each of them ruled for two or three months and was murdered.

¹Salim Zabill (writing in Al Arabi, No.121, December 1968, Kuwait - published in Arabic) indicated that Shakhbout's mother made an agreement with her other two sons (Zaid bin Sultan and Khalid bin Sultan) when Shaikh Shakhbout began to rule that should a cleavage develop between them and Shakhbout there should be no killing. Apparently, Shakhbout was her favourite son. This is why in 1966 Shaikh Shakhbout was deposed (with his two sons: Said and Sultan) without bloodshed.

AL BU FALASAH FAMILY OF DUBAI
(Bani Yas)

THE RULERS OF STATE OF DUBAI

Maktoum bin Buti	1833-1852
Said bin Buti	1852-1859
Hashir bin Maktoum	1856-1886
Rashid bin Maktoum	1886-1894
Maktoum bin Hashir	1894-1906
Buti bin Suhail	1906-1912
Said bin Maktoum	1912-1958
Rashid bin Said	1958-

AL QASIMI FAMILY OF SHARJAH & RAS AL KHAIMAH

RULERS OF SHARJAH

Sultan bin Saqr	1803-1866
Khalid bin Sultan	1866-1868
Salim bin Sultan	1868-1883
Saqr bin Khalid	1883-1914
Khalid bin Ahmed	1914-1924
Sultan bin Saqr	1924-1951
**Saqr bin Sultan	1951-1965
*Khalid bin Mohammed	1965-1972
Sultan bin Mohammed	1972-

INDEPENDENT RULERS OF RAS AL KHAIMAH

Humaid bin Abdullah	1869-1900
Sultan bin Salim	1921-1948
Saqr bin Mohammed	1948-

INDEPENDENT RULERS OF KALBA

Said bin Hamad	1936-1937
Hamad bin Said	1937-1951

Source: Donald Hawley, The Trucial States.

¹Wali of Dibbah 1871

²Wali of Kalba 1871

**Deposed in 1965

*Killed by the above (Shaikh Saqr bin Sultan) in January 1972.

[illegible]

AL QASIMI FAMILY OF SHARJAH & RAS AL KHAIMAH
 *RAS AL KHAIMAH BRANCH

*These were the descendants (see Appendix A3).

¹Sultan was recognized in 1921 but in 1948 he was deposed, according to Donald Hawley.

AL BU KHURAIBAN (NA'IM) FAMILY OF AJMAN

THE RULERS OF AJMAN

Rashid bin Humaid*	1820-1838
Humaid bin Rashid	1838-1841
and again	1848-1872
Abdul Aziz bin Rashid	1841-1848
Rashid bin Humaid	1873-1891
Humaid bin Rashid	1891-1900
Abdul Aziz bin Humaid	1900-1908
Humaid bin Abdul Aziz	1908-1928
Rashid bin Humaid	1928-

*It is presumed that he was the ruler of Ajman from before 1820.

THE RULERS OF UMM AL QAWAIN

Majid

Rashid bin Majid

Abdullah bin Rashid, from before 1820 until about 1854

Ali bin Abdullah, from about 1854 until about 1872

Ahmed bin Abdullah, from about 1872 until 1904

Rashid bin Ahmed 1904-1929

Ahmed bin Rashid 1929-

THE SHARAQI FAMILY OF FUJAIRAH

*Ruler since 1952

FEDERATION OF ARAB EMIRATES
AGREEMENT OF 27 FEBRUARY 1968

- 1 There shall be established a Federation of the contracting Arab Emirates of the Arabian Gulf which shall be called "The Federation of the Arab Emirates". The purpose of this Federation is to cement ties between them in all fields, to coordinate plans for their development and prosperity, to reinforce the respect of each one of them for the independence and sovereignty of the others, to unify their foreign policies and representation, and to strengthen the collective defence of their countries with a view to safeguarding their security, safety and mutual interests in such manner as to ensure the fulfillment of their aspirations and realize the hopes of the greater Arab homeland.
- 11 The affairs of the Federation shall be supervised by a Council called the Supreme Council, which shall be composed of the Rulers of the Emirates. The Council shall draw up a permanent charter for the Federation, and formulate higher policy on international, political, economic, cultural and other affairs. The Council shall be responsible for issuing the requisite federal laws and shall take its decision by a unanimous vote.
- 111 The chairmanship of the ~~Supreme~~ Council shall rotate annually among the Rulers of the Emirates and the Chairman shall represent the Federation both internally and before foreign states.
- 1V The general budget of the federation shall be issued by a decision of the Supreme Council; the sources of revenue and the share to be contributed by each of the Emirates shall be fixed by law.
- V The Supreme Council shall be assisted in the exercise of its powers by a Council called the Federal Council which shall be the executive organ of the Federation. The Federal Council shall carry out its functions in conformity with the higher policy determined by the Supreme Council and with the federal laws. Decisions of the Federal Council shall not be deemed to be final unless approved by the Supreme Council.

- VI The councils and agencies required to assist the Federal Council in the performance of its functions shall be set up and organized by federal laws.
- VII The contracting Emirates shall cooperate in strengthening their military capabilities in accordance with the right of legitimate defence, both individual and collective, of their exercise and their common duty to repel any armed aggression to which any one of them may be subjected. The Emirates shall also cooperate, according to their resources and needs, in developing their individual or collective means of defence to meet this obligation.
- VIII The Federation shall have a supreme court called the Supreme Federal Court and its formation, organization and functions shall be defined by law.
- IX The Supreme Council shall issue a decision determining the permanent headquarters of the Federation of (the United) Arab Emirates.
- X The government of each Emirate shall take care of its own affairs which do not fall within the scope of the Federation's prerogatives.
- XI This agreement may be amended by a decision of the Supreme Council of the Federation, but any decision in respect of such amendment may only be taken at the session following the one at which the amendment in question was put forward.
- XII This agreement shall come into effect as from the First Day of Moharram 1388, corresponding to 30 March 1968, according to the systems in force in each member Emirates and pending the drawing up of a charter for the Federation.

Zaid bin Sultan al Nuhayan
(Ruler of Abu Dhabi)

Ahmed bin Rashid al Mualla
(Ruler of Umm al Qawain)

Isa bin Sulman al Khalifah
(Ruler of Bahrain)

Khalid bin Mohammed al Qasimi
(Ruler of Sharjah)*

*He was killed in 1972.

Rashid bin Said al Maktoum
(Ruler of Dubai)

Sagr bin Mohammed al Qasimi
(Ruler of Ras al Khaimah)

Ahmed bin Ali al Thani
(Ruler of Qatar)

Moh'd bin Mohammed al Shariqi
(Ruler of al Fujairah)

Rashid bin Hamid al Nuaimi
Ruler of Ajman

APPENDIX C

ABU DHABI CONFERENCE RESOLUTIONS

A legal adviser will be appointed to draft the Federation's permanent charter, to be completed within six months.

A liaison committee will be appointed, to work between the legal adviser and the Supreme Council, one member from each state.

A provisional Federal Council will be formed, with one member and up to three assistants from each state.

The Chairmanship of the Supreme Council will change each session.

The meeting place of the Supreme Council will change at each session.

Ad hoc committees, responsible to the Federal Council, will be formed to study such matters as a common currency, unified postal services, a Federal flag and a national anthem.

These committees will meet in Abu Dhabi until the next Supreme Council session.

A budget has been approved. It will be financed by Abu Dhabi, Bahrain, Qatar, and Dubai and the funds will be banked in Abu Dhabi.

The legal adviser will be Mohammed Sanhoury, the Egyptian author of the Kuwaiti constitution. Principal members of the liaison committee will be: Abu Dhabi - Saleh Farah (a Sudanese); Bahrain - Mustafa Nimr; Qatar - Dr. Hassan Kamel (an Egyptian); and Dubai - Ahmed Bitar.

GULF COUNCIL MEMBERS

The provisional Federal Council representatives are:

Qatar: Crown Prince and Deputy Ruler Sahikh Khalifah bin Hamad al-Thani, cousin of the Ruler, who will be Council Chairman; and Ali al-Ansari.

Bahrain: Yousif al-Sherawi; and two others not yet nominated.

Abu Dhabi: Shaikh Ahmed bin Hamad; and Khalef Odeibi.

Dubai: Crown Prince Shaikh Maktoum bin Rashid, son of the Ruler; and Ahmed bin Sultan.

Sharjah: Shaikh Mohammed bin Sultan.

Ras al-Khaimah: Crown Prince Shaikh Khalid bin Saqr al-Qasimi, the Ruler's son.

Ajman: Crown Prince Shaikh Hamad bin Rashid al-Nuaimi, the Ruler's son.

Fujairah: Crown Prince Shaikh Hamad bin Saif al-Sharqi.

Umm al-Qwain: Shaikh Rashid bin Humaid, or Shaikh Sultan Ahmed al-Mu'alla.

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES GOVERNMENT
(Formed 9 December 1971)

Prime Minister	Shaikh Maktoum bin Rashid al Maktoum
Deputy Premier, Finance, Economy and Industry	Shaikh Hamdan bin Rashid al Maktoum
Minister of Interior	Shaikh Mobarrak bin Moh'd al Nuhayan
Minister of Defense	Shaikh Mohammed bin Rashid al Maktoum
Minister of Foreign Affairs	Ahmed bin Khalifah al Suweidi
Minister of Health	Shaikh Sultan bin Ahmed al Mullah
Minister of Public Works	Shaikh Moh'd bin Sultan al Qasimi
Minister of Education	Shaikh Sultan bin Moh'd al Qasimi
Minister of Communicat- ions	Shaikh Abdul Aziz bin Rashid al Nuaimi
Minister of Agriculture & Fishery	Shaikh Hamad bin Moh'd al Shariqi
Minister of Resources	
Minister of Information	Shaikh Ahmed bin Hamid
Minister of Electricity (acting)	Mohammed bin Said al Mullah
Minister of Planning	Mohammed al Kindi
Minister of Housing (acting)	Mohammed al Kindi
Minister of Justice	Abdullah bin Umaran
Minister of Youth & Sports	Shaikh Rashid bin Humaid

Minister of Labour and Social Affairs	Shaikh Sami bin Isà bin Harith
Minister of State, Financial and Economic Union and the Gulf	Ahmed bin Sultan bin Sulayim Mohammed bin Said al Mullah
Supreme Council (acting)	Mohammed Habrush al Suweidi
Council of Ministers	Utaiba bin Abdullah al Utaiba

Appendix E

Oil Statistics1. United States Petroleum Supply-Demand
(in million barrels per day)

Petroleum Demand	1970	1980
Conventional Uses	14.8	24-26
	<hr/>	<hr/>
Totals	14.8	24-26
U.S. Production		
Lower 48 States	11.3	10
Alaska North Slopes		2
	<hr/>	<hr/>
Totals	11.3	12
Imports		
Western Hemisphere	2.5	4
Eastern Hemisphere	1.0	11-14
	<hr/>	<hr/>
Totals	3.5	15-18

2. World Crude Oil Reserves, 1971
(in billion barrels)

Western Hemisphere	
Canada	8.5
Caribbean	1.5
Mexico	4.5
Other South America	9.2
United States (incl. Alaska)	37.3
Venezuela	13.9
	<hr/>
Total	74.9

Eastern Hemisphere.

Arab Middle East	311.2 ¹
Arab North Africa	41.9
Australia	2.9
Europe	14.2
Indonesia	10.4
Iran	56.0
Nigeria	11.7
Other Africa	5.4
Russia, other Communist Nations	99.0
	<hr/>
Total	554.7

¹ Includes Saudi Arabia, 145; Kuwait 66; Iraq, 36.

Source: Elizabeth Monroe, The Changing Balance of Power in the Persian Gulf, PP. 78-79.

Appendix F

Table 1
Expenditures of the Government of Abu Dhabi, 1967 and 1968
(in Bahraini Dinars)

Department	1967	1968
Agriculture	33,320	122,505
Civil Aviation	20,116	125,752
Civil Service Commission	7,453	33,756
Customs	94,023	125,567
Defence Force	1,218,762	5,606,892
Development Headquarters	20,432	98,764
Education	129,442	657,905
Electricity	146,220	462,693
Finance	36,510	156,344
Guest House	99,322	112,171
Health	319,996	1,289,197
Justice	35,171	71,085
Labour	22,959	103,706
Municipalities	168,808	1,155,871
Petroleum Affairs	36,962	131,664
Planning and Co-ordination	7,672	29,267
Police and Public Security	642,285	1,503,015
Post Office	66,213	86,584
Public Works	215,675	842,187
Water Supply	155,988	346,834
Privy Purse	12,691,827	18,324,511
Miscellaneous	9,546,081	10,522,072
Development	16,037,659	30,512,225
Intelligence	-	39,031
Labour and Social Affairs	-	27,807
London Office	-	11,364
Palace Office	-	811,156
Ports and Harbours	-	225,782
Telecommunications	-	6,056
Total Expenditure	41,752,896	73,512,864

Table 2
Revenues of the Government of Abu Dhabi, 1967 and 1968
(in Bahraini Dinars)

Department	1967	1968
Customs	275,639	534,299
Civil Aviation	21,360	46,435
Interest on Public Account and investment income	894,205	830,276
Electricity Supply	25,249	38,399
Health	-	5,229
Justice	4,998	28,826
Labour	1,177	1,374
Municipality	100,686	155,807
Post Office	80,077	115,412
Police and Traffic Fees	16,256	34,302
Water Supply	44,297	31,915
Petroleum Royalties and Taxes	49,592,865	71,607,972
Miscellaneous	19,924	337,118
Donation by H.H. the Ruler	2,007,000	-
Total Revenue	52,993,733	73,767,362

Note: All items are given to the nearest Bahraini Dinar.
 Source: Government of Abu Dhabi, Statistical Abstract,
 Vol. 1, July 1969, PP. 47-48.

Table 3
Dubai's Revenues, 1966-68 (in BD million)

Source	1966	1967	1968
Duties	1.10	1.60	2.80
Oil Concessions	0.19	0.31	0.31
Stamps and Miscellaneous	0.10	0.13	0.17
Municipal Revenue	0.21	0.28	0.45
Total	1.60	2.32	3.73

Source: Middle East Economic Division, British
 Embassy, Beirut, "An Economic Survey of Northern Trucial
 States", 1969 (Unpublished), Vol. 1, P. 9.

Appendix E

Table 4
Estimates of Dubai's Public Revenues, 1971-74

Source	(in BD million)			
	1971	1972	1973	1974
Oil Concessions	13.88	19.79	19.79	19.79
Duties	1.50	1.50	1.50	-
Municipal Revenues	0.70	0.80	0.90	1.00
Other Income	0.35	0.40	0.45	0.50
Total	16.43	22.49	22.64	21.29

Source: Middle East Economic Division, British Embassy, Beirut, "An Economic Survey of the Northern Trucial States", 1969, (Unpublished), Vol. 1, P. 32.

Table 5
Estimates of Sharjah's Public Revenues, 1966-74

Source	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974
Rents	0.14	0.14	0.14	n.a.	-	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.09
Oil Concessions	0.05	-	-	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.09
Municipal Revenues	0.08	0.09	0.12	n.a.	0.14	0.15	0.16	0.17	0.18
Other Income	0.35	0.40	0.46	n.a.	0.69	0.74	0.65	0.70	0.75
Total	0.62	0.63	0.72	0.09	0.92	0.98	0.90	0.96	1.02

Source: Middle East Economic Division, British Embassy, Beirut, "An Economic Survey of the Northern Trucial States", 1969, (Unpublished), Vol. 1, PP. 10 and 32.

Appendix E

Table 6
Ajman's Public Revenues, 1966-68 (In BD million)

Source	1966	1967	1968
Oil Concessions	0.02	-	-
Other income	0.06	0.07	0.08
Total	0.08	0.07	0.08

Source: Middle East Economic Division, British Embassy, Beirut, "An Economic Survey of the Northern Trucial States", 1969, (Unpublished), Vol. 1, P. 12.

Table 7
Estimates of Ajman's Public Revenues, 1971-74
(in BD Million)

Source	1971	1972	1973	1974
Oil Concessions	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
Other income	0.11	0.12	0.13	0.14
Total	0.13	0.14	0.15	0.16

Source: Middle East Economic Division, British Embassy, Beirut, "An Economic Survey of the Northern Trucial States", 1969 (Unpublished), Vol. 1, P. 33.

Table 8
Ras al-Khaimah's Public Revenues, 1966-68

Source	1966	1967	1968
Oil Concessions	0.10	0.20	0.10
Stamps and other revenues	0.12	0.16	0.18
Municipal Revenue	0.02	0.02	0.02
Total	0.24	0.28	0.30

Source: Middle East Economic Division, British Embassy, Beirut, "An Economic Survey of the Northern Trucial States", 1969 (Unpublished), Vol. 1, P. 12.

Appendix F

Table 9
Estimates of Ras al-Khaimah's Public Revenues, 1971-74
 (in BD million)

Source	1971	1972	1973	1974
Oil Concessions	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.13
Stamps and other revenue	0.21	0.22	0.23	0.24
Municipal Revenue	0.02	0.03	0.04	0.04
Total	0.36	0.38	0.39	0.41

Source: Middle East Economic Division, British Embassy, Beirut, "An Economic Survey of the Northern Trucial States", 1969, (Unpublished), Vol. 1, P. 33.

Table 10
Fujairah's Public Revenues, 1966-68 (BD million)

Source	1966	1967	1968
Oil Concessions	0.48	0.14	0.14
Stamps and other revenues	0.07	0.08	0.10
Total	0.55	0.22	0.24

Source: Middle East Economic Division, British Embassy, Beirut, "An Economic Survey of the Northern Trucial States", 1969, (Unpublished), Vol. 1, P. 12.

Table 11
Estimates of Fujairah's Public Revenues, 1971-74
 (in BD million)

Source	1971	1972	1973	1974
Oil Concessions	0.14	0.14	0.14	0.14
Other revenue	0.13	0.14	0.15	0.16
Total	0.27	0.28	0.29	0.30

Source: Middle East Economic Division, British Embassy, Beirut, "An Economic Survey of the Northern Trucial States", 1969, (Unpublished), Vol. 1, P. 33.

Appendix E

Table 12

Umm al-Qaiwain's Public Revenues, 1966-68 (BD million)

Source	1966	1967	1968
Oil Concessions	0.03	-	-
Stamps and other revenue	0.06	0.07	0.08
Total	0.09	0.07	0.08

Source: Middle East Economic Division, British Embassy, Beirut, "An Economic Survey of the Northern Trucial States", 1969, (Unpublished), Vol. 1, P. 12.

Table 13

Estimates of Umm al-Qaiwain's Public Revenues, 1971-74
(in BD million)

Source	1971	1972	1973	1974
Oil Concessions	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04
Other revenue	0.11	0.12	0.13	0.14
Total	0.15	0.16	0.17	0.18

Source: Middle East Economic Division, British Embassy, Beirut, "An Economic Survey of the Northern Trucial States", 1969, (Unpublished), Vol. 1, P. 32.

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