A GENERAL MODEL OF REFUGEE MIGRATION:
HOME, DISPLACEMENT, AND HOST-RELATED FACTORS IN THE
RESETTLEMENT OF SOMALI REFUGEES IN OTTAWA

by

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Abstract:

An improved understanding of recurrent refugee migration requires more comparative research on the causes and outcomes of involuntary migration. As a contribution to the construction of a comprehensive model of forced migration useful for cross-case studies, this research project provides a general framework of home, displacement, and host-related migration factors and resettlement outcomes, along with insights gained from a preliminary field test to fine-tune the model. The general refugee migration model is applied in an analysis of qualitative data obtained from interviews with a strategic sample of thirty Somali refugees during resettlement in Ottawa. The explanatory value of the model is assessed, and its usefulness as a tool to improve our understanding of the causes and consequences of forced migrations is evaluated. Results of the analysis are also reported to contribute to an understanding of links between factors of migration and outcomes of resettlement for Somali refugees in Ottawa.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

In the last twenty years, the study of refugees from political, economic, or geographic perspectives helped to explain some of the problems faced by refugees and the consequences of their migrations. A number of empirical studies of forced migration proved useful, but the lack of theoretical coherence in the growing field of refugee studies as a whole is seen as a problem (Black 1991). The shortcomings of restricted viewpoints revealed the need for broader multi-disciplinary approaches to further our understanding of refugee migrations and to foster solutions to growing humanitarian crises around the globe. Considerable effort has been expended to develop theoretically sound and empirically validated models for explaining refugee migrations, but thus far attempts have not been entirely successful.

The formulation of a comprehensive framework of refugee migration remains a serious challenge to refugee theorists. While the design of theoretical models is time-consuming and complicated, encouraging advances have been made to facilitate the process for future refugee theorists. Rather than abandon model building altogether, revised designs may be developed with guidance from the lessons learned from past failures. Moreover, refined or novel research methods can reveal new information, and permit a reworking of old categories in useful and insightful ways. Recent interdisciplinary studies of refugee migrations may foster the elaboration of innovative and meaningful descriptive categories

that provide fresh insights into refugee problems and suggest workable solutions.

As this study demonstrates, the foundations for a refugee theory have been laid. A brief discussion of current refugee issues will include coverage of the debate over definitions of who is a refugee. Then readers will be introduced to early models of refugee displacement, exile and resettlement, followed by a presentation of recent refugee resettlement models incorporating psychological and sociological approaches. It is argued that these models help to expand our understanding of refugee migrations and enable better treatment of previously unworkable subjective aspects of refugee experience.

This study attempts one further step in the development of a multi-level model of refugee migration by incorporating different elements from three different models into a single hybrid framework of refugee migration comprised of home, displacement, and host-related factors. The primary goal of this study is to test the applicability of the hybrid model using a small, purposive sample of Somali refugees resettling in Ottawa to determine its significant strengths and weaknesses for the study of larger numbers of refugees and comparative cross-country studies. Analysis of the major variables of refugee migration and outcomes of resettlement will also shed some light on contentious issues related to the treatment of refugees in Canada and provide insights into refugee resettlement in Ottawa which may be of interest to policy makers and support agencies.

Migration and Geopolitics

Humans are mobile creatures, and migration is not a new phenomenon. Accounts of ancient migrations in texts like the Old Testament support claims that human history has been an history of migration (Rystad 1992:1168 in Tesfahuney, 1998:502). Migration has played a major role in colonialism, industrialisation, the emergence of nation-states, and the development of global capitalism (Castles and Miller 1993:261 in Tesfahuney, 1998:502). Given that migration is both a response to social change and a catalyst of change in areas losing or gaining migrants, a knowledge of population movement is of fundamental importance to a more complete understanding of social change, economic development and political organisation (Claeson & Ergo 1972:1 in Lewis, 1982:3).

Migration is associated with many of humanity's most acute social problems, but the urgency, scope, causes, effects, and resolutions of the problems of migration continue to be debated from a variety of perspectives. Whereas migration studies are often interdisciplinary efforts, different disciplines in the social sciences have taken distinctive approaches. Economists tend to look at migration in terms of employment and economic opportunities, and demographers have been more concerned with the impact of migration on population growth. Many sociologists have focussed on the character of migrants, while anthropologists have looked at problems of migrants in host communities (Lewis 1982: 4).

Popular thinking about migration “remains mired in nineteenth century concepts, models, and assumptions” (Taylor 1993:432). Classic migration theory is based on Ravenstein’s concepts of economically motivated, voluntary “relocation” of individuals with little or no regard for the borders which divide peoples and serve to maintain inequalities between them (Zolberg 1989: 405-6). Mobility and the permeability of national territories are intrinsically geographical issues (Tesfahuney 1998:501), and geographers studying migration have focussed on the effects of distance and borders crossed by migrants (Gardener and de Jong 1981).

The main contributions of geographers have been to emphasise the spatial patterns of migration, the locational decisions involved, and the impacts of the migrants on places. The traditional geographical approach tended to be based on aggregate ideas and concepts which assumed that migrant populations were homogeneous, and considered patterns of migration to be the result of differences in economic opportunities between areas. In order to identify factors involved in decisions to move, geographers adopted a behavioural approach to the analysis of migration which involved the disaggregation of large populations into smaller groups and individuals (Lewis 1982:5). Migration studies have increasingly distinguished between: the determinants of migration which concentrate on the initiators of movement; and the consequences of migration which deal more with adjustment activities and societal responses to migration (Gardener and de Jong 1981).

A broad motivation based migration typology divides migrants into voluntary and involuntary groups. Objective differences between refugees and migrant populations include their original motives and their characteristics upon arrival (Black 1993b:93). “International migration has a two-part structure: On the one hand, it is composed of the labour streams seeking jobs in foreign countries; on the other, it is composed of the increasing flows of refugees from war and political disruption” (Clark 1986: 74).

While international migration studies still tend to focus on decision-making, economic trends and labour market theories, some of the current language and viewpoints used to study “migration systems”, “networks”, and “flows” of people across borders are innovative (Taylor 1993; Boyd 1989; Fawcett 1989). Looking at the cultural dimensions of globalisation, Appadurai explores emerging ethnoscaples comprised of tourists, business travellers, labour migrants, immigrants and refugees (Appadurai 1996). To shed light on the effects of globalisation, geographers are busy analysing flows of people, information, products, and capital as key aspects of the repositions of power, society and space along the global-local continuum (Teschauer 1998:500; Luke 1994).

Standard works of international relations tend not to discuss international migration and refugee flows (Weiner 1993a:31), but mass population movements within and across borders, and the interplay of power, space, and mobility are important geopolitical issues currently being examined by a small but growing

group of critical political geographers (Teschauer 1998). Migrations, displacements, and refugees are major concerns in the post-Cold War era, and questions of “differential mobility empowerments –who moves, where and why”-- are major geopolitical issues (Teschauer 1998:501).

Critical geopolitics has been particularly concerned with issues of changing global configurations of power and hegemony in the ‘new world order.’ In more contemporary texts, migrants appear as geopolitical actors who affect the conduct of geopolitics at local, regional, and global levels and thereby impact on the evolution of geopolitical order (Teschauer 1998:501). In particular, migrants have been portrayed as dangerous geopolitical actors, as security threats to nations, as destabilisers of weak southern states, and as handicaps to the global hegemony of the north (Widgren 1989; Black 1993b; Soguk 1997; Wilkinson and Jacobsen 1993).

Citizenship is one of the discourses of international migration used by the media, politicians, and academia in the west to regulate population mobility. Citizenship has always laid down boundaries between those who are included and those who are excluded (Kofman 1995:121). Whereas state controls over transnational flows of capital and information have declined, nation-states have maintained considerable control over population movements (Findlay and Gould 1994b). As a result, not all people enjoy the same freedoms of movement and access to space. “In the transnational economy, spaces of circulation and mobility rights are structured by aspects of age, race, gender, and class” (Teschauer

1998:501).

As a concept citizenship may appear clear, but membership is more problematic (Brubaker 1989 in Kofman, 1995:122). Citizenship viewed as the attribution of entitlements and duties is a legal status, but in its fullest sense it is the culmination of incorporation into society. "Citizenship is generally defined as the rights and obligations that accrue to individuals as full members of a community, normally the nation-state" (Kofman 1995:122).

Refugees and asylum-seekers, and the ethnic minorities associated with them, have ambiguous and ambivalent relationships with states (Kofman 1995:122). As non-citizens who do not fit into this world of nation-states, special rules and categories of citizenship have been created for refugees in order to regulate their movements and regularise their situations through administrative processes, to fix them in one or another territory and thereby repair their ungoverned condition.

This study discusses Canadian refugee policies and refugee admission processes as sub-issues of citizenship and immigration. It reveals that Canadian refugee policies are oriented by national security goals towards protecting the country from refugees, while the provision of protection for refugees seems to be a secondary obligation. Unfortunately, the focus of the study on migration models permits little treatment of several contentious issues of refugee immigration in Canada.

One such issue concerns the special class of undocumented refugees

created by the Canadian government to deal with Somalis and Afghanis who made claims for asylum without proper identification documents. The enactment of the undocumented class of refugees may be viewed by human rights critics as yet another mechanism for restricting benefits to refugees in need of protection and support. From the point of view of the refugee, the undocumented class is certainly another barrier to resettlement which forces some refugees into situations of unsupported limbo for up to five years while awaiting security clearance needed for permanent immigrant status (CIC 1997:31; Vincent 1996). However, like most other extensions of citizenship that resulted from struggles and negotiations with states by marginalised and oppressed groups (Kofman 1995), some 7,000 undocumented refugees in Canada backed by humanitarian rights groups appear to have found an entry into the country which may not accord them all the social assistance benefits available to landed refugees, but still provides them with protective refuge.

Tesfahuney clarifies that in immigrant receiving countries in the west, it is not refugee migration per se that is the problem, but rather it is the conflation of refugees with terrorists, enemies, menaces, criminals, and sources of disease based on racial confusions over their identity and origin. To divert attention away from real causes of social and economic crisis, migrants in general are constructed

Refugees in particular are singled out for their

and South (Tesfahuney 1998:505-7). Refugees are no more dangerous or criminal than average citizens: so, . . . who are they then?

Who Is a Refugee?

In Canada, the answer to the question “who is, and who is not a refugee?” is controversial. In its common usage, the word refugee conjures up familiar images of starving children begging for food shown in news media stories and relief agency fundraising campaigns. However, a review of literature concerning refugees reveals a variety of meanings which are used for an assortment of sometimes conflicting purposes in different political jurisdictions. In its legal and political applications, it appears that the meaning of the term refugee changes to include/exclude particular groups of individuals.

To seek refuge is to seek security, and most people who become refugees are usually just trying to get out of harm’s way. The popular media definition of refugee is “a person fleeing life-threatening conditions” (Shacknove 1985:274). The definition adopted by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). states that:

the term refugee shall apply to every person, who, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside his country of nationality (From the OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, *September 10, 1969* in Shacknove 1985:275-6).

Refugee is a label or a classification created to serve the purposes and interests of states. Refugees are non-citizens, who abrogate their obligations and

lose the rights of citizenship when they cross international borders (Harrell-Bond 1989:59). The broad OAU definition recognizes that conditions of security for citizens within a state depend on bonds of trust, loyalty, protection, and assistance between citizens and agents of the state; and the definition accepts that bonds of security can be severed in diverse ways (Shacknove 1985:275).

Canadian immigration laws follow the United Nations' persecution-based definition of refugee, which is more restrictive than the OAU's. Canada refers to the definition of refugee found in the United Nations' 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, which states that refugees are:

persons who by reason of a well-founded fear of persecution based on race, nationality, political opinion or membership in a particular social group, are: outside the country of their nationality and unable or, by reason of that fear, unwilling to be protected by that country; or, not having a country of nationality, are outside the country of their former habitual residence and are unable or, by reason of that fear, unwilling to return to that country (CIC 1997:28).

The determination of who is a refugee has important financial and political implications for individuals seeking protection as refugees, and also for the non-governmental, governmental, and inter-governmental relief agencies which provide assistance. Extreme misery, unmet basic needs, and severe economic or environmental insecurity are not sufficient conditions for classification of affected populations as refugees. The UN definition regards persecution by a predatory government under tyrannical conditions as a necessary condition of refugeehood, but the Convention does not necessarily extend refugee assistance to the millions

of citizens of countries like post-1991 Somalia, where the state has failed, and where citizens need refuge from the chaos and insecurity which reign in the absence of state protection (Shacknove 1985:277).

States which use the UN Convention to define refugees include “alienage” of populations from their territory of habitual residence as a further necessary defining condition to distinguish refugees from internally displaced persons (Shacknove 1985:277). Only part of the insecurity problem is resolved when refugees escape danger in their homeland. The poorest refugees in transit frequently have little choice about where they will stop. But, at some point in their search for secure surroundings, refugees must make critical decisions about when and where to go, and what resources they will spend to get to a safe haven. A decision to seek refuge in a hostile environment, where social, political, or economic rights are not extended to refugees could be fatal, or at least cause as many insecurity problems as migration was intended to resolve.

Refugee law arbitrarily assigns full legal responsibility for protection of refugees to whatever state the asylum seekers are able to reach (Hathaway 1996:14). Beyond the legalistic and political considerations which determine who is a refugee and who gets refugee-aid according to the geographical location of the people in question (Shacknove 1985:276), there are moral humanitarian arguments that accept an obligation to provide assistance to any unprotected persons whose basic needs are not being met and who are situated wherever physical access by international aid is possible (Deng 1993). To humanitarians,

the concept of refugee is based on “the premise that people experience a generalized condition of insecurity when outside the protective confines of society” (Shacknove 1985:278).

It is widely accepted by civilized states that refugees have the fundamental right to safe asylum and human rights stress the right of individuals to life, liberty and security (Goodwin-Gill 1989:532). The humanitarian concept of a refugee is rights-based: it considers that refugees are unprotected and involuntary migrants who are first of all humans, with the same foundational, rational, objective rights and needs irrespective of culture, creed or circumstance¹ (Plant 1993:105). This conception of a refugee reflects the Hobbesian view of life in the state of nature as ‘solitary, brutish, nasty, and short.’ Survival for humans requires the reduction of vulnerabilities to threats from other humans, resource scarcity, and natural hazards. It is the purpose of civil society to reduce each person’s vulnerability to every other, although even in well-ordered societies a level of insecurity will persist (Shacknove 1985:278).

¹ Refugees have rights of liberty and personal integrity, including freedom of movement and the rights to leave and return to one’s own country, to seek refuge and asylum, not to be expelled, and not to be returned to a country in which life or freedom may be endangered; procedural rights, for example equal protection of the law, access to courts and tribunals, remedies; status rights, as resident, refugee with asylum, or of the child to a nationality; family rights, including reunification and special protection for children; employment rights, such as the right to work, to fair conditions of work; political rights, including freedoms of thought and conscience, expression, assembly and association; and cultural rights, relating to language, education, and community rights. See Goodwin-Gill (1989).

The problem with humanitarian-oriented definitions of refugees is that they tend to be ethnocentric and paternalistic, and they often present refugees as an undifferentiated mass of helpless victims (Harrell-Bond 1989). At any rate, refugee issues clearly exceed the bounds of humanitarian providence since they bear directly on national and international security, nationalism, ethnicity, development, citizenship, and democracy (Soguk 1997:314).

In the world of nation states, refugees are portrayed as national security risks, and in the rich countries of the north, refugees are often derided as fortune seekers. The citizen occupies the central place as the constitutive element of community in the territory of the state. The territorial state provides and protects space for citizens, and the legitimacy of the state depends on the claim that it, and it alone, is able to allow citizens to participate in broader humanity (R.B.J. Walker 1991a:252 in Soguk, 1997:318). And in the modern world of states, statelessness is considered to be a condition of extreme danger. Whereas a country's "citizens represent the qualities of intelligence, stability, security, cooperation, and democracy", refugees lack these qualities since they are not properly rooted inside the national space (Soguk 1997:318).

The language used to define and discuss refugees tends to define the actions taken to resolve the consequences of refugee migrations rather than promote the resolution of refugee's problems. In all cases, refugees are non-citizens, non-persons who are not consulted in the development of policies which affect their future, and marginalised by state-sponsored assistance programmes

(Harrell-Bond 1989:59).

Tesfahuney points out that refugee discourses which blame migrants as the cause of international crises omit other important international flows by remaining silent on the huge transfers of capital from refugee producing countries in the form of debt and interest repayments. As well, shipments of arms sold by Western military-industrial complexes to oppressive regimes in the generation of millions of refugees gets overlooked, while the abuse of asylum rights makes headline news (Tesfahuney 1998:53).

Pundits try to raise support for refugees by alerting the public to the dimensions of the crises, but the north has been insulated from the most pernicious human and environmental costs from mass migrations. Some receiving countries have even derived benefits from selective admissions of refugees as productive sources of labour. Since 1945 refugee movements have accounted for the majority of international migrations, and the number of refugees rose dramatically in the 1980s and 1990s. Contrary to reports foreshadowing a massive influx of refugees from the Third World into more prosperous economic regions, only a fraction of the refugees migrated to advanced industrial countries (Weiner 1993a:2). In the 40 years from 1950 to the end of 1989, net South to North migration of voluntary and involuntary migrants totalled about 37 million people (Coleman and Macura 1994). In 1992 alone, compared to 40 million asylum-seekers, refugees, and internally displaced persons in Third World countries, only 1.8 million –fewer than 5% of refugees-- were in western Europe

and North America combined (Overbeek 1995:1 in Tesfahuney, 1998:503). Clearly, “refugees are in effect confined within the developing world itself” (Zolberg 1989:424).

While most refugees are stuck in the south, there is no doubt refugee issues have global implications. The World Refugee Survey of 1996 lists 119 different countries hosting refugees including: 36 countries in Africa, 34 in Europe, 20 in the Americas, 10 in East Asia, 9 in South and Central Asia and 10 in the Middle East. As well, the survey lists 42 principal source countries of over 15 million refugees and asylum-seekers, and 32 countries where significant populations of internally displaced total over 20 million people (USCR 1996). The complicated interconnections between refugees and other migrants at the international level demand intergovernmental cooperation in prevention and in remedial efforts tailored to regional and local contexts. But costly and difficult international relief will only provide temporary respite to a portion of involuntary migrants as long as the underlying conditions which push refugees from their home remain unaddressed (Wood 1994:629).

CHAPTER 2

REFUGEE MIGRATION MODELS

Disagreements about who is a refugee and who is an economic migrant, discrepancies over refugee aid obligations, and debates over the most effective ways to reduce and resolve refugee problems, are all rooted in theoretical ambiguity over the causes and consequences of non-voluntary migrations. Refugee migrations have been conceptualised as cross-border movements resulting from the interrelated effects of political, economic, and environmental factors, which are mediated through “sets of multiscalar linkages that range from micro family relationships to macro government policies” to influence individual relocation decisions and provide forceful motivations to leave home (Wood 1994:608). Kunz argues that our understanding of refugee migration can be improved through the development of a “workable theory of refugee movements, based on a fruitful refugee typology and resting on suitable conceptual categories” (Kunz 1973:125). Wood counters that a comprehensive refugee theory is difficult to formulate because forced migrations involve complex decision-making processes at the household level and stem from diverse, multi-level causal factors (Wood 1994:608).

Crude and general migration models tend to overlook multiple reasons, and hide underlying causes of migration (Gould 1994). Most migration theories overemphasise economic factors at the expense of coercive forces, although some theorists do take into account cultural, ethnic, and political influences (Wood

1994; Aguayo et al. 1989; Adelman 1992; Bariagaber 1994; Weiner 1993b).

Various models conceptualize causal processes of migration at individual, household, national, or international levels (Taylor 1993:433). However, not all of the people affected by violence or political oppression, economic penury, or environmental disaster actually react by migrating (Gardener and de Jong 1981). Since groups such as non-governmental organisations (NGOs) which provide assistance and employers who hire refugees also influence relocation decisions, individual migrations must be viewed as collective processes (Snowden 1990 in Wood, 1994:608). Given the complex, multi-faceted nature of contemporary migratory processes, a theory of migration should not focus on a single level of analysis, but must incorporate a variety of perspectives, levels and assumptions (Taylor 1993:432).

Geographers have documented different migrations and the aerial distribution of refugee populations in all parts of the world. Geographical models have tended to treat refugee flows separately as single, one-off occurrences (Black 1991: 281). But, refugee migration is not an isolated event, and like the countries they come from and go to, refugees also have a history (Black 1993b:9). Kunz argued that refugee situations must not be viewed

“as individual historical occurrences, each distinctly different and circumscribed in its locus and time, but as recurring phenomena, with identifiable and often identical sets of causalities bearing on the selectivity of participation and flight patterns, all of which in the long run affect refugee outcomes” (Kunz 1973:127).

A review of different refugee flows shows that they are often induced by similar economic and political forces (Aguayo et al. 1989). Indeed, part of the confusion in the identification of refugees stems from the fact that they move in reaction to many of the same macro-level factors as so-called voluntary migrants.

In the absence of a comprehensive refugee theory, involuntary migrations continue to be studied from divergent disciplinary perspectives. In the following pages, three different models are presented which look at refugee migration from different theoretical approaches. Each of the models examines pre-flight, displacement and resettlement phases of the refugee experience.

First Kunz applied geographical concepts to identify patterns and forms of refugee displacement (Kunz 1973), and sociological, political concepts to study relations and organisations of refugees in exile and resettlement (Kunz 1981). Kunz's model enhances our understanding of the ways refugee populations move and resettle and adapt (Kunz 1981:50).

With Kunz's model to work from, Ruben Rumbaut developed a general model of migration and adaptation which incorporates psychological theory to explain refugee behaviour (Rumbaut 1991:386). Rumbaut's model contributes to our understanding of the motivations for refugee flight and the links between migration distress and the mental health of refugees (Rumbaut 1991:386).

Also starting with earlier models by Peterson (1958) and Kunz (1973), Bascom combined human geographical perspectives with a political economy framework to formulate an updated model of variables and outcomes in refugee

resettlement (Bascom 1993:324). Bascom's model identifies basic causes of forced departure by refugees, refugee attributes, host-related factors, and resettlement outcomes (Bascom 1993:324)

The repatriation of refugees is not included as a separate phase in the selected models, although it is incorporated as an outcome of resettlement in the combined framework. Repatriation may be the final objective of homeward oriented refugees, and voluntary return is recognized as "the most desirable solution to the refugee phenomenon" (Opondo 1991). However, countries which discourage temporary asylum and provide social and economic assistance to refugees to foster integration may regard repatriation as a failure of resettlement programmes. In other cases, host governments who fear opposition and see refugees as malcontents and political agitators may not be prepared to admit returnees (Akol 1989:196).

Kunz's Analytical Framework For Refugees

In answer to a call for an organised body of advice for dealing with refugees, Egon F. Kunz, undertook a theoretical study towards the development of a comprehensive approach to past and present refugee phenomena. Kunz argued

"It is only through the analysis of many past refugee movements that recurring elements of refugee phenomena can be conceptualised. Such conceptualisation is necessary in order to create a theory of refugee migrations which would be capable of resolving apparent contradictions and would lead to typologies and models with power to explain causalities and capacity to predict should similar situations occur" (Kunz 1973:144).

To facilitate comparisons of different refugee migrations and permit a wider application of lessons learned from observations of refugee movements and settlements, Kunz sought to develop a refugee typology and conceptual categories as the foundations of a workable refugee theory needed a workable theory of refugee movements (Kunz 1973:125). Kunz's analytical framework for refugee migration is reproduced on the following page.

HOME-RELATED FACTORS OF REFUGEE MIGRATION

The refugee migration model devised by Kunz is comprised of three main parts, home-related, displacement-related, and host-related factors, which apply less to temporal phases of migration than to the spatial locations of factors. The home-related factors include three sub-categories which cover refugees' changing social relations with their home nation. Firstly, the sub-category of identification-marginality refers to pre-migration levels of integration or marginality by refugees. Secondly, attitudes to displacement looks at the strength of refugees' emotional links with the home nation during involuntary flight. Thirdly, ideological-nationalist orientation abroad gauges the political and philosophical attachments of refugees to the home nation during resettlement (Kunz 1981:43).

The sub-categories of home-related factors do not directly refer to refugees' backgrounds, but they are assumed to be important migration factors. Alluding to the influence of macro-level home factors on refugees, Kunz pointed out that an individual's involvement in migration is governed by social relationships,

Figure 1: An Analytical Framework of Refugees in Exile, Flight, and Resettlement. Source: (Kunz, 1981:50)

positions relative to historical forces, and identifications with their environment (Kunz 1973:144). Kunz argued that a comprehensive theory of refugee movements must include individual perceptions, ideological stance, feelings and attitudes as factors which influence their decisions to participate in a refugee movement (Kunz 1973:142).

Identification Marginality

The three classifications introduced by Kunz to differentiate between the social relationships of refugees with the population of their home country prior to migration cover two broader types of refugees, those who identify with the majority of their compatriots and those who are alienated from the home nation. The first classification, majority-identified refugees, are convinced –perhaps mistakenly-- that their opposition to events is shared by the majority of their compatriots. According to Kunz, majority-identified refugees tend to align enthusiastically with the nation, but stand apart from its rulers (Kunz 1981:43).

The second classification, events-alienated refugees, covers those who are rejected by the nation or by a section of its citizens. Events-alienated refugees may have suffered overt discrimination as members of minority racial or religious groups, or latent discrimination suddenly manifested during events immediately preceding flight. Kunz noted that whether they are offended by one or a series of rejections, events-alienated refugees commonly feel irrevocably estranged from fellow citizens and rarely entertain the desire to return to live among former compatriots (Kunz 1981:43).

The third classification is self-alienated refugees, and they depart from home because of strongly felt ideological, philosophical reasons, deep political opposition, or individual revulsion to conditions. Self-alienated refugees may retain attachments to place, but they do not wish to be identified with the nation (Kunz 1981:43).

Refugees' attitudes to displacement

Kunz understood that a refugee's attitudes to displacement greatly affect her/his participation in refugee movements. Not all refugees are passive victims of events; they are also social, economic, and political actors with various levels of control over their departure. By their attitudes toward displacement, refugees can be divided into purpose groups and reactive-fate groups (Kunz 1981:43).

Self-fulfilling purpose groups are generally made up of refugees who became alienated by their adherence to minority beliefs, dogma, or an alternative lifestyle inconsistent with ideals predominant in their homeland. Purpose groups may also comprise active revolutionaries. Some self-alienated revolutionaries who wish to start a new way of life leave voluntarily to avoid a violent clash of ideologies, but harassed and persecuted refugees may be forced to leave home (Kunz 1981:43).

Differing sharply from the purpose groups which are usually the makers of their own political situations, reactive fate groups of refugees are formed by populations fleeing wars or revolutionary changes, or expelled populations. Reactive groups are pushed by acute circumstances to leave, and migrate away

from an intolerable situation without solutions in mind or specific destination in sight (Kunz 1981:44).

Ideological-nationalist orientation abroad

A refugee's feelings about being forced from home, and their positive and negative affiliations with the home nation will inevitably change following the departure event. Evolving emotional links with home continue to determine the location decisions of ongoing refugee movements following their initial displacement, and still influence activities and beliefs of refugees years later during resettlement. Looking at refugees in situations of exile, Kunz attributed their ongoing emotional dependence on their past to their strong identification with majority beliefs. On the other hand, he considered that the level of alienation of refugees from their former compatriots is related to their marginality within their former homeland (Kunz 1981:42).

From his studies of refugees in host-countries, Kunz surmised that resettlement outcomes were influenced by ideological-nationalist orientations which could be divided into six distinct, but not fixed, categories (Kunz 1981:44). These categories are essentially based on differences in the long-term objectives of migration by refugees. Even after years in exile, "restoration activists" may be concerned to revive the old order, reestablish links with groups within home nation and promote conditions in their homeland to permit their return (Kunz 1981:46).

The same ideological pursuits that motivated self-alienated refugees to

leave home tend to continue to influence them during resettlement. Revolutionary activists” are homeward oriented, but look to promote new conditions and support sometimes radical changes in the homeland from abroad (Kunz 1981:46). Zealous “revolutionary activists” looking homeward will often become active organisers of assistance to hasten a change of rulers, and install a new order at home (Kunz 1981:46). Dedicated idealists will tend to persist in attempts to fulfil utopian aims. “Founders of utopias” are unlikely to look homeward, but may try to create desired conditions in the host society, or continue migration in pursuit of the same ideological objectives which motivated their departure from home (Kunz 1981:45).

In contrast to homeward oriented refugees are the alienated individuals who will try to distance themselves from their past losses by working to accumulate material wealth, practising new traditions, and adopting new values. “Eager assimilationists” may attempt to leave their past totally behind them while they focus all attention on cultural adaptation, social integration, and economic success in the host country (Kunz 1981:46).

In between the extremes of alienated and homeward oriented refugees, are the reactive-fate groups of refugees whose ideological orientation in resettlement changes and may remain uncertain. Some refugees may give up all hope of return and become uninterested in events back home. Others may retain active interests in homeland affairs so long as their integration efforts and security in resettlement are not compromised (Kunz 1981:47). “Integration realists” may strive to achieve

some socio-economic success, while maintaining their cultural identity and even reinforcing links with their homeland (Kunz 1981:46). Following hardships and distress, “passive hurt refugees” may become detached from their past and apathetic about a positive future at home or in the host society (Kunz 1981:46).

DISPLACEMENT-RELATED FACTORS OF REFUGEE MIGRATION

Kinetic types: anticipatory and acute movements

The middle portion of Kunz’s model concerns displacement-related factors. The central focus of Kunz’s studies was on types of refugee movements, and he detected two basic “kinetic types”: anticipatory and acute movements (Kunz 1973:131). Kunz theorised that anticipatory refugees movements are undertaken when refugees leave their home country prepared, before the deterioration of the political situation prevents orderly departure, with some or all transport arranged, with some prior knowledge of destination and host-country language, usually with some finance, and sometimes with information about employment or business opportunities (Kunz 1973:132).

The primary difference between anticipatory refugees and voluntary migrants is the motive force behind their departures. Anticipatory refugees react to push forces and are compelled to leave home by fears of anticipated dangers. Anticipatory refugees include threatened individuals and families who seek suitable safe havens. The time to find an asylum among feasible destinations depends on the perceived imminency of danger. Choice of an end-point by anticipatory refugees is determined by the “the degree of the perceived push”

and the right to enter a country and settle in a host society, rather than the desire to live in a particular place (Kunz 1973:132).

Acute refugee movements were seen by Kunz to result from momentous political changes, military activities, or rapid-onset environmental disasters. In reaction to an overwhelming push to leave their homes and to reach their ultimate goal of security, refugees flee to the closest safe haven in a neighbouring or nearby country. In ongoing crises, when the passage of large numbers of displaced persons across borders is blocked, individuals and small groups arrange escapes (Kunz 1973:132).

Forms of displacement

Kunz not only distinguished between two kinetic types of refugee movements, he linked the composition of refugee groups to particular forms of displacement (Kunz 1973: 143). Kunz observed that displacement may take four basic forms: disciplined movements, directly forced displacement, absence from the home country, and displacement by flight.

Civilian evacuations, mobilisations of military personnel attacking or pursuing objectives, and prisoners of war are typically displaced in ordered and disciplined movements. Coercive force displaces expelled populations, banished dissidents, deported foreigners and minorities, and involuntary labourers. In large scale migrations, the majority of refugees are displaced by flight and cross borders in disorganised masses. More or less prepared individuals and small groups of escapees are also displaced by flight (Kunz 1973: 140-2).

People who are outside of their home country at the time of a crisis, such as students, business people, diplomats, and tourists can be displaced by their absence. People who are displaced by absence and left stranded outside their country by military or political events are grouped along with refugees who participate in acute movements. Displaced while abroad by unforeseen threats and dangerous circumstances in their place of origin, absentee-type refugees are usually unprepared for long-term migration. Those displaced by absence may join compatriots in flight. They will share the fate of similarly deterritorialised compatriots, and may find safe refuge in their country of first asylum, or be pressured to move on to a more secure haven (Kunz 1973:135).

Associative patterns

Kunz studied numerous mass migrations of refugees and discerned three basic “associative patterns” (Kunz 1973:138). From large numbers of refugees from the same country, he discerned that participants in acute movements often escaped in “fate-groups” simultaneously with other groups of “associative cohorts”, which may combine in flight to form “vintages”(Kunz 1973:138). Participants in anticipatory movements were grouped together as one vintage based on their “affinity to those who had chosen to escape the same situation” (Kunz 1973:138). In settlement locations, refugees were grouped into “waves” which formed from a combination of different vintages of refugees that departed about the same time from their home country, or from refugees who arrived in the host-country during the same general period (Kunz 1973:138).

Once refugees are pushed into flight, refugees may find favourable forces “permit” them to settle, or they may succumb to negative “pressures” in the country of first asylum to either stay, to return home, or to continue flight (Kunz 1973: 131-3). Still looking backwards to where their home was, but increasingly aware that return is not possible, temporary refugees who departed from home in acute movements redefine relations with their country of origin and eventually become exiles (Kunz 1973:136). Where conditions of temporary asylum are intolerable, an opportunity for assisted passage is presented, or protection elsewhere is offered, refugees may “plunge” ahead to another country (Kunz 1973: 132). Information about a destination—whether correct or misleading—may “pull” refugees to a desirable location for resettlement. Kunz stresses however, that for refugees, “while the push is overwhelming, and the pressure is intense, the pull is either lacking in intensity or is totally absent” (Kunz 1973: 133).

HOST-RELATED FACTORS OF REFUGEE MIGRATION

Cultural compatibility

Kunz considers that the host factor most influential in the satisfactory resettlement of refugees is the cultural compatibility between the home society and the new society confronted by refugees (Kunz 1981:46). In spite of the considerable capacity of refugees to adapt to changing circumstances and environments, “cultural conflict could precipitate problems which are not possible to overcome” (Kunz 1981:48). The closeness or distance between two cultures

are determined with reference to characteristics of cultural compatibility, including language, values, traditions, religion, politics, food, and interpersonal relations (Kunz 1981:47).

Population policies

Host-related factors which affect refugee outcomes include official state population policies and legal refugee determination processes. Different states accept or deny claims for asylum according to more or less restrictive refugee definitions. As well, refugee claims may be processed slowly and carefully on an individual basis, or entire waves of displaced persons may be conferred with asylum status by virtue of membership in an identified oppressed or affected group. “Augmentative” societies like Canada offer opportunities for citizenship and resettlement assistance to convention refugees who are treated as permanent immigrants and are valued for population growth and economic productivity (Kunz 1981:48). Overpopulated or demographically “self-sufficient” countries like Germany do not offer citizenship even to long-term immigrants who are not of German descent, but do provide sanctuary for refugees (Kunz 1981:48).

Social receptiveness

The members of host societies may be more or less receptive to refugees than official immigration policies indicate. Some societies like the Swiss or Dutch may be “tolerant” towards refugees without expectations of cultural assimilation but also with limited opportunities for social integration (Kunz 1981:48).

Monistic societies may give preference to asylum-seekers from sib-societies and

countries of affinity, and are likely to demand conformity from refugees. Multi-ethnic communities with a fluid order may be more open to refugees, but even in pluralistic societies discriminatory behaviour against visible minorities and refugees who strive to retain different cultures occurs (Kunz 1981:49).

The analytical framework of refugee movements proposed by Kunz is designed primarily for the study of large-scale movements, and for the comparison and analysis of migrations from different countries. His view of home-related factors of refugee migration is focussed on obscure categories of refugees which do not refer to any widely recognized criteria. Levels of identification, attitudes towards displacement, and nationalist orientations are neither readily observable nor quantifiable traits. The distinctions between identified and alienated refugees, assimilationist and integrationist resettlers, anticipatory and voluntary migrants, pluralist and tolerant societies can be very fuzzy because they are based on mutable perceptions, opinions, sentiments, dispositions, and viewpoints.

However, it is not clear how the model might be applied to existing sources of data about refugee migrations which were not collected with reference to the model. For example, demographic data concerning refugees are notoriously flawed due to the mobile nature of refugees and because many displaced persons remain wary of state oppression and unwilling to submit to administrative controls. Information about refugee movements and settlement activities from relief programmes tends to treat refugees as political neutrals and

avoids politically divisive labels which might be useful for classifying groups by identification and ideological-national orientation.

Moreover, reports by refugee assistance agencies or immigration departments focus on post-entry factors and objective measures of migration outcomes rather than on subjective aspects of forced displacement and pre-entry factors. Qualitative methods appear to be most appropriate for gathering the type of information needed for the application of the model: however, comparative cross-case studies will likely require years of well-coordinated efforts by large research teams to gather sufficient information from widely dispersed samples of different vintages and waves of refugee migrants from various countries.

Kunz's framework for refugee movements overlooks the importance of underlying macro-level causal factors and micro-level refugee attributes and motivations in forced migration. Contrary to most models, it underestimates economic factors of migration. As well, while Kunz's treatment of refugees' ideological-nationalist orientations abroad comes close to describing micro-level political psycho-social consequences of migration in resettlement, the framework stops short of any classification of the typical outcomes of refugee movements.

Figure 2: Migration, Adaptation, and Mental Health: A General Model
Source: (Rumbaut 1993: 387)

A. Motivation:

1. Political/Economic motives

2. Targets

3. Rebels

4. Victims

5. Seekers

B. Migration:

1. Family loss/separation

2. Stressful exit events

3. Time in refugee camps

4. Year left, year arrived

C. Demographic:

1. Age

2. Gender

3. Ethnicity

D. Physical health (pre-arrival)

1. Chronic health problems (pre-arrival onset)

E. Socio-economic (pre/post-arrival)

1. Urban/rural background

2. Education

3. Occupation

4. Income

5. Time in the United States

F. Cultural (pre/post-arrival)

1. Language (English proficiency)

2. Religion

3. Acculturation (attitudes)

G. Social support (post-arrival)

1. Marital status

2. Relatives (at home)

3. Close friends (American, co-ethnic)

H. Physical health (post-arrival)

1. Chronic health problems (post-arrival onset)

2. Physical health status (symptoms/ dysfunctions)

I. Mental Health:

1. Psychological distress (depression, anxiety; affective measure)

2. Life satisfaction (cognitive measure)

Rumbaut's Model of Migration, Adaptation and Mental Health

Most American policy-oriented research on refugee migration focusses on objective dimensions of adaptation such as welfare dependency or employment rates. Rumbaut studied subjective factors of migration such as migration motives, acculturative attitudes and mental health (Rumbaut 1991:382).

Ruben Rumbaut's study of mental health of Indochinese refugees in the United States contributes to our understanding of refugees' motivations for departure (Rumbaut 1991). Rumbaut's general model of refugee migration, adaptation, and mental health is presented above.

Rumbaut's model suggests that the refugee experience is shaped by the interplay of multiple factors, including antecedent, mediating, and outcome variables. The model depicts migration from the point of view of the individual refugee, and focusses on mental health outcomes rather than objective dimensions.

PRE-ARRIVAL CONTEXT

At the top of the model is the pre-arrival context of exit, which includes political, economic and social factors such as government policies, labour market conditions, racial discrimination, and ethnic communities. It also covers individual characteristics.

The main antecedent variables listed in the model include: motivations for departure, events related to migration, demographic characteristics, and the physical health of refugees, socio-economic factors in the home society, and

cultural factors in the host society. Pre-arrival context of exit directly conditions the migration process and the context of entry into host society, and it also directly and indirectly influences the adaptation process.

The significant mediating variables in the adaptation process include socio-economic factors, cultural factors, social support and physical health after arrival. Political, economic, and social factors such as government refugee resettlement policies in the host country, labour market conditions, racial and cultural tolerance are covered. Individual variables might include traumatic events upon departure and in flight, losses en route, time spent in refugee camps, year of arrival in the host society, family supports, and physical health status.

POST-ARRIVAL CONTEXT

The post-arrival context of entry directly influences the adaptation process, and it also has a direct and indirect affect on the mental health of refugees. The main mental-health outcome variables are psychological distress and satisfaction.

Rumbaut's general model of migration concentrates on factors related to the mental health of refugees in the United States. The framework is based on narrow western understandings and measures of health without an attempt to incorporate relevant views of healthcare held by the study subjects. Without modification, the model's applicability is also limited due to its inclusion of specific references to the United States. The psychological focus of his study excludes geographic variables as factors in mental health, and negates the importance of attachments to place and of familiar home spaces in the well-being

of refugees. As well, the model examines mental health as an outcome of refugee migration, and does not treat mental health as a factor in broader socio-economic integration and cultural assimilation.

Bascom's Model of Refugee Resettlement

Following a review of refugee literature by geographers, anthropologists, psychologists, and political economists, Bascom pieced together a model of refugee resettlement which covers flight, migrant and resettlement variables and outcomes (see Figure 3 below) (Bascom 1993:322-3).

FLIGHT AND MIGRANT VARIABLES

From the diagram below, the list of causes of displacement includes political factors such as war, unrest, ethnic expulsion, oppression, and violations of human rights. Government resettlement programs and natural disasters are also mentioned. The model of migration factors extends to cover flight conditions including speed, distance, obstacles, and losses en route (Bascom 1993:324).

Refugee Attributes

Migrant variables include several important attributes which a refugee brings to resettlement. The refugee characteristics itemized by Bascom cover commonly recognized variables of education, occupation, age, sex. Other attributes encompassed in this resettlement model are transfers of money and in-kind resources accompanying population flows, and previous travel by refugees in the host country (Bascom 1993:324).

Figure 3: Schematic representation of variables and outcomes in refugee resettlement. Source (Bascom, 1993:324)

RESETTLEMENT VARIABLES

In the middle portion of the model, Bascom distinguishes aspects of the host economy, state policies, international aid, and cultural relations encountered by refugees. These resettlement variables require individual and communal adjustments and responses. Resettlement is also mediated by time spent in exile; by population factors such as the size, concentration, and type of refugee settlements; and by media coverage of refugee issues and refugees' perceptions of resettlement and home-country conditions (Bascom 1993:323).

RESETTLEMENT OUTCOMES

The final section of Bascom's resettlement model focuses on outcomes. A functionalist perspective is represented by the outcomes of cultural assimilation and economic integration, and a conflict perspective is shown by results of social differentiation of refugee populations, by political, economic, social and psychological marginalisations, and by individuation of refugee households.

In his diagram of refugee flight and migrant variables, resettlement variables and outcomes in refugee resettlement, Bascom emphasises the importance of post-flight variables, with less attention given to pre-flight, background factors of migration and only cursory attention to displacement factors. Derived from refugee literature, and with respect for political distinctions between refugees and other asylum-seekers, Bascom's list of causes of refugee migration is limited to primarily political forces, to the exclusion of important macro-economic and environmental factors forcing displacement of large

populations. As well, unlike the models which show the potential for idealistic, revolutionary, rebellious, and farsighted refugees to influence conditions at home prior to involuntary displacement, in Bascom's model flight factors are depicted as exogenous variables, and as events which act upon individuals.

Bascom highlights the large role that economic factors in the host country play in determining resettlement outcomes, but his study of resettlement in Sudan focusses narrowly on factors which apply to rural based settlements in agrarian societies. In urbanised societies and industrialised economies, different macro-level economic factors influence local employment and income earning opportunities for refugees. Bascom looks at international aid, but overlooks non-governmental community aid programmes.

This brief overview of models of refugee movements, adaptation, and resettlement examined the main features covered by each perspective. The discussion showed that each model comprised general factors of migration as well as selected variables related to particular research goals. The following chapter presents a general model for refugee migration derived from these models.

CHAPTER 3

A GENERAL MODEL OF REFUGEE MIGRATION

Notwithstanding contributions from existing formats of refugee migration models, there remains a need for a general framework of refugee migration models to guide the design of refugee studies and facilitate comparisons of migrations from different refugee producing areas and/or in different resettlement locations. Among current models, some appear either crude and too imprecise to be useful as research guides, and more specialised models designed for particular research tasks are too specific for application to the broad range of circumstances where refugees are involved. To construct a detailed but widely applicable framework for refugee migration, a hybrid form was pieced together by combining main migration factors related to resettlement outcomes identified by Kunz (1981:50), Rumbaut (1991:386), and Bascom (1993:324).

Home-Related Factors of Refugee Migration

MACRO-LEVEL PUSH FACTORS

In order to develop an understanding of the main causes of refugee migration, the complex interplay of direct forces and indirect, structural conditions must be examined. Direct causes of refugee migration may include political forces such as persecution and violence; and environmental forces such as earthquakes. As well, refugees may be forcibly displaced by government resettlement programmes and infrastructure development mega-projects.

Figure 4: REFUGEE MIGRATION MODEL

Even so-called natural disasters are directly or indirectly linked with human activities (Varley 1994). Environmental forces of migration include rapid-onset natural hazards like seasonal rains or flash-floods, as well as human-caused ecological crises such as pollution, landmines, desertification, and floods.

Mass migrations are also caused by indirect, structural economic forces which threaten the lives of populations. Migration may result from socio-economic crises due to unequal wealth distribution, underdevelopment, explosive urbanisation and unemployment. Economic marginalisation, unfulfilled basic needs, and agricultural collapse leading to widespread famine and excess demand of populations on land and resources can become ecological disasters. When “citizens rebel against the institutions which contribute to their poverty,” political forces such as instability and violence are unleashed which force populations to flee from affected areas (Wood 1994:617).

Studies of mass migration require a basic knowledge of the underlying conditions which led to the displacement of affected populations. The overlap of macro-level forces of migration and circularity of indirect and direct causes of displacement are essential characteristics of the factors which push populations to flee their homelands. The need to make clear distinctions between specific direct and indirect causal factors is less important than an appreciation of the “cumulative effects of two or more causal factors” (Wood 1994:615).

INDIVIDUAL LEVEL ATTRIBUTES

Within a given country or nation, macro-level political, economic, and

environmental factors may affect entire populations, including migrants and non-migrants. Within countries, the crises which directly cause mass migrations may build slowly or emergency situations may develop rapidly. Economic social, and political systems place people at different levels of risk in crises (Varley 1994).

Taking the analysis of push-pull forces of migration beyond simple economic cost-benefit calculations, Lee's seminal studies of individual migrants showed that intervening obstacles to migration impede some individuals more than others. Lee highlighted the influence of personal traits such as marital status, stage in the life cycle, information, and personality on migration decision-making and behaviour (Lee 1966 in Pedraza-Bailey, 1985:5). Kunz agrees that an individual's participation in refugee movements is governed by his/her perceptions of events, position vis-à-vis historical forces, ideological stance, sentiments, disposition, origins, age, sex, and education (Kunz 1973:142). Rumbaut considers the influence of ethnicity as an influential antecedent migration variable (Rumbaut 1991:386). Bascom adds that occupational status, resource transfers, and previous travel in the host country are important individual attributes affecting migration decisions (Bascom 1993:324).

HOUSEHOLD VULNERABILITIES TO CRISIS

In any society or nation, some individuals are more vulnerable than others, that is they are more susceptible or prone to threats, coercion, loss, damage, suffering, or injury. The determination of vulnerability clearly involves some form of measurement or evaluation of magnitude. Vulnerability to disaster results from

the combination of characteristics of a person or group, which give them the capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist and recover from crises (Varley 1994). Vulnerability can be contrasted with capability—the ability to protect one’s community, home and family, and to re-establish one’s livelihood (Anderson 1989). Social and environmental relationships are key determinants of vulnerability/capability (Varley 1994).

Along with factors such as race, clan², class, occupation, gender, disability, ethnicity, age or seniority, household relationships are prime determinants of vulnerability/capability. Individuals join with others in common residences or households based on ties of kinship, marriage, or economic cooperation (Schraml and Back 1992:328). Individual behaviour is constrained and patterned but not absolutely determined by household obligations and dependencies (Schraml and Back 1992:331). The living level of a household is determined by their sustenance strategies (Schraml and Back 1992:331).

Refugees react to push factors from sending countries, but still exercise some degree of decision-making concerning their destination. Lee recognized that “not all persons who migrate reach that decision themselves. Children are carried

² A clan is a large group of people believed to be descendants of a common ancestor, whose name is also the name of the clan. Several clans constitute what is called a clan-family, a group of clans believed to be linked ultimately by descent from a common ancestor. Each clan is divided into a number of lineages, or groups of persons tracing descent from a common ancestor; in Somalia the ancestor is male, and descent is traced through males. The group carries his name. A lineage may be part of a larger one and may consist of several smaller ones (Metz 1992:261).

along by their parents, willy-nilly, and wives accompany their husbands though it tears them from environments they love” (Lee 1966:51 in Pedraza-Bailey, 1985:5). Based on decision-making authorities for different age and gender groups, the intra-household forces of migration may be more significant than macro-level forces.

A household’s overall vulnerability/capacity to anticipate and cope with crisis will largely determine their survival strategies. Migration from one’s homeland is a common security strategy adopted in response to impending and ongoing crises.

While economic migrations are more frequently composed of individuals, “structural factors explain why refugee migrations are more frequently composed of families” (Hein 1993:50). The household mediates between individual and macro forces and is the key unit of refugee migration (Wood 1981 in Schraml and Back, 1992:328). Migration is selected as a survival and security strategy when the household is unable to defend itself from dangers and sustain itself despite the livelihood security strategies adopted within the socio-economic and physical environment, and when potentially viable opportunities are perceived to exist in other locations (Schraml and Back 1992:324).

HOUSEHOLD LEVEL MOTIVATIONS FOR DEPARTURE

While Rumbaut’s general model focusses narrowly on mental health outcomes, it is adaptable for broader studies. Of prime interest to this study are the types of motives given by refugees for leaving home. These were categorised

as broad political/economic motives. Rumbaut provides an empirical typology of refugee household motivations (see Figure 5 below).

An analysis of refugees' motivations for leaving their homeland requires a compilation and classification of reasons for exit. Classification was facilitated by the use of Rumbaut's socio-psychological typology of refugee exit motives, which was based on labels for categories proposed by Aguayo, Zolberg, and Suhrke (1989). However, instead of classifying individual refugees in one dimensional categories, the typology classifies motivations for departure, which allows for multiple motives for each respondent (Rumbaut 1991:394). This characteristic of the model is advantageous for the analysis of complex and varied responses from respondents about the reasons they left home.

Respondents' exit motives were separated into four main types: target motives, victim motives, rebel motives, seeker motives. Political type motives for migration included: target motivations involving "specific perceptions and experiences of fear or force, past political associations," and rebel motivations covering "explicit forms of protest and ideological reasons" (Rumbaut 1991:393). Victim and seeker motivations for refugees to leave their homes were "clearly more socio-economic" than political (Rumbaut 1991:393). Victim motives include harsh material and dismal economic conditions. Seeker motives encompass various forces pulling refugees from their homes, such as a desire to improve education and the maintenance or achievement of family unity.

Figure 5: Typology of Exit Motives of Refugees

ENDANGERED	INNOVATORS	Type of force impelling exit
TARGET MOTIVES <i>high degree of perceived danger /lowest control in exit decision</i>	REBEL MOTIVES <i>high risk/ controls exit decision</i>	<i>political</i>
VICTIM MOTIVES <i>life threatening situation/ some control over exit decision</i>	SEEKER MOTIVES <i>lower level danger/ planned departure</i>	<i>socio-economic</i>

adapted from Rumbaut (1991:394)

Each type of motivation also reflects a different level of perceived danger and level of control over departure decisions. Target motives were associated with high levels of perceived danger and the lowest control over exit conditions. Victim motives also represented serious threats to the lives of refugees, but dangers were less violent and urgent, and this afforded some control over the timing if not the means of their exit. Rebel motives covered high risk refugee situations with controlled exit decisions. Seeker motives grouped together situations of relatively distant threats and remote dangers with controlled departures (Rumbaut 1991:394).

Displacement-Related Factors of Refugee Migration

FLIGHT CONDITIONS

Flight conditions drawn from Bascom's model include speed, distance, obstacles, and losses en route. In this model, the pecuniary costs of migration have been included as flight variables, and along with speed and borders crossed,

transport costs tend to indirectly define distance. Flight conditions will affect the physical health, morale, and mental health of refugees (Rumbaut 1991). The acute events which force mass migrations may result in traumatic life threatening events or the death of significant others. “Refugees are by definition losers of socio-political conflict. They lose or are separated from home and homeland, family and friends” (Rumbaut 1991:384).

A refugee’s prime motive for movement is security or “personal safety” (Kliot 1987:109). Whatever combination of coercion and underlying economic or ecological factors force refugees to migrate from their homelands, the key factor in movement is the refugee’s belief that they must flee to survive (Wood 1994:609). The first step for refugees is to get away from the local dangers. Not all involuntary migrants want to leave their country, and some cross borders inadvertently. Potential political refugees, including anti-state political activists and targeted members of social or cultural groups, and victims of violence may remain internally displaced persons still vulnerable to persecution if they are unable to cross international boundaries.

In the evaluation of any alternative courses of migration open to refugees, travel cohorts appear to try to maximise short-term security, firstly by leaving dangerous situations at home; secondly by reaching a safe location using a low visibility means of transport on an obstacle free route; thirdly by choosing a safe means of transport and a danger free route. Given security risks in refugee producing environments, refugees in flight may use unsafe means or risky or long-

distance routes which offer some chance of escape in lieu of more certain dangers from remaining in an insecure zone or taking a short-cut towards a frontier. Slow and arduous travel on foot may be preferable to motorised travel due to the need for stealth during escape. Transportation means may also be determined by cost, by the number of travel cohorts, the condition and surveillance of transport routes and transit stops. Refugee migration decisions are frequently sub-optimal in terms of security due to their lack of complete knowledge of obstacles they will encounter and lowered capacity for processing information in flight.

Locations which afford temporary safety do not always provide asylum to refugee claimants. Statelessness is a condition of extreme danger, and refugees are particularly vulnerable because they are outside the protection of states (Walzer 1983:38 in Soguk, 1997:318). Whatever means of transport used by refugees, their flights are not unbounded, since states exercise controls over cross-border movements.

Zolberg emphasises that only “some countries restrict exit”, whereas “all the countries to which people would like to go restrict entry” (Zolberg 1989:406). In the final analysis, it is the potential receivers of refugees which have the greatest effect on determining the type, frequency, and volume of migration movements. Bhagwati notes that the process of international migration is characterised by “disincentives” against trying to enter the territory of another (Bhagwati 1984:684 in Zolberg, 1989:406). Regardless of the combined force of home factors of migration, flows of refugees are produced “only if people have a

place to go” (Zolberg 1989:406).

Findlay and Gould believe that although certain types of international migration have been facilitated by increased and improved air travel, the “constraints on mobility have never been greater. . . in limiting and moulding the patterns and processes of international migration in the 1990s” (Findlay and Gould 1994a:279). The “governments of the industrialized world have new options to prevent refugee flows” and many states use advanced technologies to stop “asylum seekers from ever reaching their territories” (Hathaway 1996:15). Migration controls include visa requirements imposed on travellers from countries likely to produce refugees, and immigration officers from refugee receiving countries posted at airports in refugee producing zones to check the documents of travellers before they board planes. Sanctions and fines are imposed on carriers transporting passengers without proper documents (UNHCR 1995:8). Some states also rely on “forcible interdiction of refugees at frontiers and in international waters” (Hathaway 1996:16). Unfortunately for affected populations, the measures imposed by countries against false-asylum seekers also served to deny access for genuine refugees.

According to Petersen, “one consequence of the increasing state supervision of migration is a greater propensity to evade controls” (Petersen 1978:547). Wood is concerned that despite controls, the numbers of illegal immigrants who circumvent border checkpoints and underground refugees who avoid deportation in destination countries is greater than the total of asylum

seekers, and that the total number of legal and illegal migrants is growing uncontrollably (Wood 1989:183).

Of course, just getting to a country of asylum does not guarantee entry. To receive protection from governmental and intergovernmental agencies, once across international borders, displaced persons must be officially admitted to the country where they seek refuge. Asylum seekers are international migrants who request permission to remain lawfully in a foreign country on the grounds that they are unable to return to their home country because of a well-founded fear of persecution, or because their homeland is unsafe due to civil war. Under UN provisions, countries have the right to grant asylum but although individuals are protected against return to the country where they fear prosecution, refugees do not necessarily have the right to be granted asylum (Melander 1987:39 in Wood, 1989:183).

The protection of refugees is the fundamental task of the United Nations' High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR 1982:8). On-the-spot presence of UNHCR in receiver countries is often enough to ensure that refugees are granted at least temporary asylum, and protected from *refoulement*, human rights abuses, arbitrary detention or mistreatment (UNHCR 1982:10). The "location of asylum-seekers should be determined by their safety and well-being, and they should be provided with the basic necessities of life, including food, shelter, sanitary and health facilities" (UNHCR 1982:11).

In more developed countries, regulatory mechanisms at border crossings

which control immigration, and check residence and work permits are more sophisticated and better enforced than in the past (Findlay and Gould 1994a). Following a general consensus between Germany, France, and the Benelux countries on the need for stricter entry controls against illegal migrants, the Schengen Agreement of 1985 set out common rules for dealing with refugees and asylum-seekers (Findlay and Gould 1994a:280). To expedite asylum determination procedures, reduce the refugee status criteria, and prevent the access of asylum-seekers to their territory, Western European countries developed the concept of the “safe third country” which stops asylum seekers from making claims for asylum in one country after protection has already been granted or an opportunity for protection has been previously available in another country (Abell 1995:1).

Rumbaut’s general model of migration and adaptation suggests refugee experiences are shaped by the interplay of multiple home and host factors, and also by “traumatic events during flight, time spent in refugee camps” and “family loss and separation during migration” (Rumbaut 1991:385). Rumbaut emphasises that some refugees overcome hardships, beat the odds against their survival, gain self-confidence, and become stronger and more self-reliant following experiences in flight and resettlement. However, the findings from Rumbaut’s study show that the psychological reactions to distress among refugees “may entail a long-term process of grief and mourning, heightened anxiety and depression, and an overwhelming sense of helplessness and hopelessness”

(Rumbaut 1991:385).

Refugees from war-torn contexts, who lose or are separated from family members or friends in flight, and/or succumb to intolerable pressures during temporary asylum are particularly vulnerable to distress. Women may be more vulnerable than men to particular forms of duress and coercion, including sexual violence. In her study of refugee aid, Harrell-Bond presents evidence of mental illness, psychological stress, and clinical levels of depression and anxiety among refugees in asylum (Harrell-Bond 1986). Survivor guilt has been observed and post-traumatic stress disorders are common among refugees who spend time in camps (Nethercut 1994; Rumbaut 1991).

FORMS OF DISPLACEMENT

“The form of displacement acts as a powerful selector of participation”, stress, deprivation, etcetera on refugees and thereby affects resettlement opportunities and outcomes (Kunz 1973:141). Refugees who participate in anticipatory movements may be less psychologically affected or physically endangered than participants in acute movements by the form of displacement because they migrate under less restrictive and more secure conditions. On the other hand, displacement by flight following acute events may take place in mass movements impelled by fear, and participants may be in shock or overcome by hysteria during departure. When exit is restricted or denied, individual and small groups may arrange escapes (Kunz 1973:141).

Disciplined movements occur when refugees are moved by the force of

discipline in the case of military personnel. The threat of force may be used to coerce prisoners of war and other captive populations, civilian evacuees, forced labour gangs, deportees, or designated religious/ethnic groups singled out by enemy forces or dictatorial regimes for expulsion (Kunz 1973:142).

Members of delegations, diplomats, touring groups, students, and business travellers who left their home country peacefully but refused to return following a negative turn of events can be displaced by their absence (Kunz 1973: 142). They may have some advantages and suffer less stress than refugees who fled from home following traumatic events, but refugees displaced by absence face similar difficulties as their compatriots in gaining asylum in foreign countries (Kunz 1973:135).

DISPLACEMENT ATTITUDES

The relationship of refugees with their home nation, and subsequently with the host society is influenced by their attitudes towards displacement. Reactive-fate groups of refugees flee in response to a situation which they perceive as intolerable. The borderline between political refugees and migrants fleeing economic hardship can be blurred when large populations depart following an acute event. However, they all depart from home country “reluctantly, without a solution in sight” (Kunz 1981:44).

In contrast, refugees in self-fulfilling purpose groups have considerably more control over their migration situations. They may be easily recognized and more acceptable to host countries as political refugees alienated from the home

nation by their opposition to dominant ideologies; they may choose to leave home to pursue a lifestyle unacceptable in their homeland (Kunz 1981:43).

PRESSURES IN ASYLUM

Once in flight, refugees are largely at the mercy of their hosts. Kunz determined that pressures in asylum led to four different results: in response to pressures, refugee either stayed put; moved to another temporary location; returned home; or if offered an opportunity, they resettled in a host country.

In countries of temporary asylum, interrelated macro and micro level pressures may force refugees to disperse into the host society, settle marginal unoccupied lands, concentrate in refugee camps, or move onward to find a country and society willing to accept them. Refugees faced with intolerable conditions in refugee camps or similar situations of hardship in temporary asylum often try to continue their search for a safe haven, and may accept offers of resettlement in little known and distant countries in the hope of realizing better living conditions. In reaction to negative pressures in asylum many refugees take advantage of even moderate improvements at home to attempt a return. Refugees who exit from their homeland in anticipatory movements are more likely to pre-arrange residence permits in host countries and less likely to face the same pressures as compatriots who leave in acute movements (Kunz 1973:133-5).

Host-Related Factors of Refugee Migration

The stance of employers, governments, and the surrounding local

population, and the existence of compatriots or characteristics of existing ethnic communities are important aspects of the situation confronting refugee newcomers during resettlement. Refugees face these realities as *fait accompli* which may encourage or dash their aspirations and give rise to or undo their plans, and channel resettlement activities towards many different outcomes (Borocz and Portes 1989:618).

INCOME EARNING OPPORTUNITIES

Whereas refugees forced from their homelands react more to the negative push than to the pull of host countries, once they arrive in the host society, the outcomes of their resettlement efforts will depend greatly upon their ability to earn a living. Rural refugees who move between similar economies may settle in a spontaneous fashion where they have access to land, a modicum of agricultural inputs and perhaps some food aid until their first harvest. However, when refugees leave one type of production system and resettle in an economy where livelihoods are conditioned by a different system of production, economic self-sufficiency can be much more difficult to achieve (Bascom 1993:323).

Economic self-sufficiency for refugees is the goal of all the benefits and services provided under the US Refugee Act, and refugees are expected to pull their own weight (Potocky 1996). However, "people work not only for income, but also for the accumulation and maintenance of social status" and prestige (Taylor 1993:441). Refugees may enter the bottom of the job hierarchy which offers few opportunities for upward mobility, but target earners who take low-

level jobs as a means to earn money and get experience can improve their status. Rumbaut considers labour force participation an indicator of socio-economic adaptation and a determinant of increased satisfaction among refugees (Rumbaut 1991). He concludes that depression and demoralisation among refugees are consequences of unemployment or welfare dependency, and also subjective conditions that may lead to job loss (Rumbaut 1991:421).

CULTURAL COMPATIBILITY

The arrival of refugees in host societies is often marked by a clash of conflicting norms or values (Borocz and Portes 1989:614). The magnitude of the cultural shock and the ability of refugees to cope with it are determined by the social distance between the home and host societies. When the host society is rapidly changing, adaptation may be complicated because the target is constantly moving, and culture shock may be compounded by future shock (Rumbaut 1991:384). The initial social disequilibrium created by the cultural clash may be resolved by cultural and social absorption into mainstream society.

The time it takes for a refugee to be absorbed into the mainstream will depend on factors such as language, religion, political ideologies, and race of refugees (Borocz and Portes 1989:614). Refugees from rural backgrounds may make a smooth transition to rural situations in host countries (Bascom 1993:323), but refugees of rural origin may be distressed to find themselves in urban settings (Rumbaut 1991:418). The preparation and consumption of food are socially integrative rituals (Winson 1993), and access by refugees to sufficient amount and

types of food can be important for their physical and psychological well-being.

Once the process is initiated, the results of acculturation are not reversible (Borocz and Portes 1989). But, even if refugees are forever changed by their migration experiences, the resilience of cultural identity indicates that patterns of refugee adaptation need not proceed in a unilinear sequence from acculturation, through structural assimilation, amalgamation, and end with full identificational assimilation (Borocz and Portes 1989:615).

STATE POPULATION POLICIES

Migration location decisions by refugees depend less on preferences to live in a particular country than on “the availability of a landing permit” (Kunz 1973). In recent years, numerous European countries have taken openly anti-immigration positions, (Coleman and Macura 1994) and countries have increased efforts to reduce, contain, divert, and stop uncontrolled arrivals by refugees (Tesfahuney 1998; Findlay and Gould 1994b). In some countries citizenship rights may be conferred upon admitted refugees who are expected to adopt the political culture and values of the host society, whereas other states reserve citizenship for members of a restricted cultural group or community of descent (Kofman 1995).

The state remains a factor in the social organisation of migration and in the creation of migration identities. The admission of refugees remains closely tied to foreign policy interests (Hein 1993:55). Refugee admission policies have real consequences for refugee adaptation. Asylum seekers constitute a special class among immigrants, subject to particular administrative processes and benefits to

regularise their situation. In Canada, refugees may even be divided into separate “designated classes” such as “Convention refugees”, “refugees selected abroad”, “political prisoners and oppressed persons”, “self-exiled persons”, and the newly created “Undocumented Convention Refugee in Canada Class” with different rights and benefits of federal settlement assistance pertaining to each group (CIC 1997:28-31). In the United States, refugees have access to resettlement assistance, but other immigrants are ineligible for public assistance for five years (Hein 1993:53).

Once refugee flows have begun, the first arrivals form migration networks. Members of kinship networks have special rights to entry according to Canadian immigration policies. Governments will have difficulty controlling migration flows started by refugees, because the process of network formation lies outside the domain of regulation and occurs regardless of the policy regime pursued (Taylor 1993:450).

SOCIAL RECEPTIVENESS

The first refugees who arrive in a host country have no social ties to draw upon, and must establish links with non-migrants to gain access to employment and assistance. Later arrivals may get some help from those who arrived in earlier waves, but will also need to establish relations with members of the host society.

Three polar positions illustrate possible contexts of refugee reception. Mono-ethnic societies which may demand cultural and racial conformity, and could be inhospitable to non-sib refugees (Kunz 1981). Low receptivity on the

part of assimilationist societies results when refugees are negatively typified by the native population. The condition is worsened when employers are prejudiced against refugees seeking work and economic mobility is blocked. Refugee households seldom arrive with sufficient resources to sustain themselves, and may become mired in poverty, which then reinforces negative stereotypes (Borocz and Portes 1989:619).

A typical tolerant society provides sanctuary for refugees, without forcing the adoption of their way of life (Kunz 1973:48). Where no strong stereotypes exist about the characteristics of particular refugee groups, refugees may be free to compete with nationals on the basis of educational achievements and skills. Impartial contexts might exist where immigrants with occupational skills settle away from areas of co-ethnic concentration (Borocz and Portes 1989).

DURATION OF EXILE

Bascom identifies the temporal factor as an important resettlement variable in refugee resettlement, but he looks at the duration of exile without differentiating between time in flight and time in resettlement (Bascom 1993). Also recognising time as an important variable in resettlement, Rumbaut collected longitudinal data from respondents. In his general model of the process of migration and adaptation, he included time in the host society and time in refugee camps among specified key antecedent and mediating variables hypothesised to influence psychological outcomes of refugees in resettlement (Rumbaut 1991:386). On the other hand, while Kunz implies time is a significant migration

variable in discussions of processes of adaptation and integration by refugees, he does not explicitly refer to time in exile as a host factor related to resettlement.

POPULATION FACTORS

Bascom explains several ways that size, concentration, type of settlement and ratio of refugees to hosts influence resettlement outcomes of forced migrants. The number of refugees, and location may affect their ability to earn income, agricultural capacities and food security (Bascom 1993:325). In rural based resettlement schemes, over concentration of refugees on land may lead to housing problems as well as health problems related to diseases from contaminated water supplies, low nutrition diets, and inadequate food preparation where household fuel supplies are limited due to deforestation and degradation, especially in already marginal zones (Goode and Goldensmith 1994; Young 1985). Influxes of large numbers of refugees in areas can over-tax social services and infrastructures which may jeopardize their resettlement capacities. Furthermore, local populations beset by economic hardships may resent refugees who appear better off due to access to resettlement assistance, and conflicts can result which increase the marginalisation of refugees.

IDEOLOGICAL-NATIONALIST VIEWS

Following their urgent or prepared departures from home, refugees begin a process of redefining their relations towards people and places left behind in their country of origin. Refugees may maintain kinship, cultural, economic, and political links with the home nation from resettlement locations. Kunz observed

that the relationships with the home nation of reactive and purpose group refugees often changed during flight and resettlement, but even after years in exile, majority-identified and alienated refugees continued to look homeward during migration (Kunz 1981:46). Once they arrive in host countries, faced with administrative, economic, and psychological pressures, refugees start to build new social and environmental relationships (Kunz 1973:133).

New relations with the state and governmental organisations may be conditioned by previous experiences, and a refugee's willingness to form a new allegiance to the host nation will depend partly on their emotional links to their home nation. An understanding of refugees' identification with their former home country can provide insight into problems experienced by refugees during resettlement (Kunz 1981:42).

The six types of ideological-nationalist orientations identified by Kunz are: restoration activists, the passive hurt, integration realists, eager assimilationists, revolutionary activists, and founders of utopias (Kunz 1981:44). These categories are discussed on page 24 in the presentation of Kunz's model.

Resettlement Outcomes

There are a multiplicity of different possible results of refugee resettlement, and only five types of situations are illustrated here. Each refugee household may realize a unique combination of outcomes based on the particular blend of orientations, experiences, achievements, and capacities of its members.

Cases of unsuccessful resettlement may result in chain-migration, or asylum-shopping by refugees looking for suitable locations to build new lives. Resettlement efforts may also result in repatriation to the homeland. Repatriation may occur as a consequence of negative pressures such as cultural conflict and socio-economic marginalisation in the host country. Even refugees successfully integrated into host societies may react to positive pull factors to return home such as commitments to family, pursuit of political goals, and participation in post-crisis rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts in their country of origin. However, while repatriation is an option for refugees who remain in countries of first asylum, and increasingly the only choice open to refugees held in care and maintenance camps, “refugees permanently resettled abroad usually cannot return to their homeland” (Hein 1993:49).

The most successful outcome from resettlement occurs when the host society becomes home rather than a place of exile. “Identification assimilation” is considered to be the highest level of cultural adaptation (Borocz and Portes 1989:615). Assimilation implies that refugees espouse host values, practice traditions of the host society, adopt host nationalist political orientation, develop strong local networks, and achieve economic self-sufficiency if not the accumulation of material wealth. Some refugees go so far as to downplay or negate refugee background and even deny their cultural heritage.

Between these extremes are the resettlement outcomes which result from different levels of marginalisation and integration. Although Samuel cautions

that ethnic retention and social incorporation are not necessarily opposite ends of a continuum, it appears that ethnicity impedes incorporation into the larger society (Breton 1990:256 in Samuel, 1993:52). Integration may result from economic achievement, labour force participation, education, religious group participation, language learning and skills training, and the adoption of dominant values and customs (Samuel 1993).

Marginalisation of refugee households might be the outcome of hidden forms of discrimination or more overt racism, class differentiation, impoverishment, limitation of political and legal rights and social benefits, social isolation and psychological distress from traumatic experiences. Refugee households from cultures which value collective goals may also undergo a process of individuation in which the decision-making, income-earning, gendered labour and other roles of individual members change, and family functions are modified in conjunction with support from social service agencies. Individuation may be positively or negatively viewed by different members in a household.

The outcomes of the resettlement process change over time as refugees gain from new experiences and adapt to conditions in the host society. Refugees from marginalised households may become increasingly integrated into the host society as they become more proficient in the local language, gain marketable skills, learn to use social support systems effectively, build social networks and attain prestigious positions, earn income and accumulate wealth, contribute to community development and participate in political activities. The reverse may

also occur, in which integrated households may become increasingly marginalised due to unemployment, loss of income and wealth, stress related disorders, and local pressures building against refugees and concentrated immigrant settlements.

CHAPTER 4

RESEARCH METHODS

Objectives

The primary focus of this research is to formulate a workable model of refugee migration. The main part of this research project is “confirmatory” work which seeks to further “explicate existing conceptualisations” of refugee migration and test the applicability of the general theoretical model through a preliminary field study of a limited number of actual cases of forced migration (Huberman and Miles 1994:17). This will permit an evaluation of the explanatory value of the model, and reveal its usefulness as tool to improve our understanding of the causes and consequences of forced migrations.

Before attempting to undertake a major research effort to test the model empirically through cross-country comparisons, it was deemed prudent to fine-tune the model and see how it worked when applied to a strategic sample of refugees from a single country. My choice to study Somalis as opposed to refugees from other countries resettled in Ottawa was made largely for logistical reasons, because several families lived my community. I was curious to know my neighbours, but mostly their proximity to my house and school permitted low cost and rapid access to them as information sources. The convenient location of an estimated 7,000 Somali refugees in the Ottawa region was helpful in soliciting the participation of 30 individuals as a study group.

The research plan required the participation of a diverse group of refugees.

This study included thirty Somalis who were self-identified refugees and also characterised by compatriots as refugees. By accident more than design, the respondent group extended to cover various categories of involuntary migrants who participated in planned migration movements and gave socio-economic motivations for exit, and also included students and expatriate workers outside of Somalia who became refugees when acute political events impeded their safe return home. These forced migrants might not be accepted as political refugees using Canadian Refugee Determination Board criteria. The group also comprised involuntary migrants who are now landed immigrants, Canadian citizens, refugees admitted to Canada as dependent family members of already admitted asylum-seekers, government assisted refugees selected abroad, and refugees in the undocumented class.

This study also seeks to contribute to an understanding of refugee migration from Somalia by examining the primary causes of involuntary departure, and the links between selected migration variables and outcomes of resettlement for the refugee study group. Relations will be examined between resettlement outcomes and home factors, displacement factors, and host factors of migration reported by 30 Somali refugees in residing Ottawa. However, while the model depicts simplified links between outcomes as consequences of causal factors, the reality of the refugees' migrations and the relations between interrelated causes and effects for each individual are considerably more complex. This study does not permit an examination of the particulars of each case

necessary for a more complete understanding of complicated relations between causal factors and unique outcomes, nor can cross-case comparisons be made.

Qualitative Research

Detailed information about forced migrations from Somali refugees was obtained during semi-structured interviews. This method was chosen for the collection of evidence from refugees that would allow events to be linked with consequences, and permit the examination of variables and processes towards the revision of the migration framework.

SELECTION OF RESPONDENTS

The selection of respondents was guided by a strategy to maximise the range of experiences and diversity within a comparable group to enable the identification of patterns of behaviour and/or the construction of categories and concepts useful for the study of refugee migrations. The views of Somali refugees in the process of resettlement in Ottawa were sought through the formation of a “purposive” sample of respondents differentiated by age, and sex (Huberman 1994:27). All thirty respondents are ethnic Somalis who resided in Ottawa in 1997. In the formation of a balanced, broad-based Somali study group, fifteen female and fifteen male participants were selected from four age categories: 15-25, 25-34, 35-44, or over 45 years old. Participants were then reclassified based upon their age upon departure into six age categories: under 15, 15-25, 25-34, 35-44, over 45 years old.

Respondents over 45 years old and under 15 years old at the time of their exit from Somalia were sought based on the assumption that they would have widely different motivations for migration and experiences in different phases of migration due to particular vulnerabilities, capacities, and household roles. Similarly, it was considered important to maintain a gender balance in the study group to permit an analysis of gendered aspects of refugee migration. As well, to contrast with migration experiences of young, healthy refugees, respondents with health problems in Canada were deliberately included in the study group.

In an attempt to include refugees from a broad range of backgrounds and different migration experiences, respondents were “strategically selected” based on geographic origins and to a lesser degree on clan affiliations (Johnson 1990). The study group comprised respondents who originated from various geographical regions of Somalia (see Table C on page 230), and included people from four of the six major clans (see Table D on page 231). After the pre-study trial interviews, it was decided that the selection of respondents should not be based on a pre-determination of clan affiliation. According to Somali project advisors, the application of clan-based selection criteria raised unnecessary suspicions about the purpose of the study, and promoted artificial divisions within the study group.

My first contact with the Somali community in Ottawa was a classmate at Carleton University, who provided information concerning sensitive and taboo discussion topics, helped in the selection of appropriate interview settings, and

suggested refinements in the style of presentation and the wording of interview questions. Similar assistance was provided by two Somali-Canadian university students enlisted as paid interpreters and cultural advisors.

It was not feasible to simply introduce myself to Somalis in public places and then begin interviews. In order to locate potential participants, a “snowball referral method” was used (Ostrander 1980 in Johnson, 1990:28). The first step in locating participants involved meetings with Somali community leaders in Ottawa, including: members of the board of directors and staff of The Somali Center for Youth, Women and Community Development; The Somali Centre for Family Services; The Somali Center for Research and Development; The Pinecrest-Queensway Community Health Centre; Ottawa Islamic School; Catholic Immigration Services Adjustment Assistance Program.

Community leaders provided me with a short list of Somalis from different clan groups who became the first four interview subjects. Initial contacts with respondents were made by telephone, or through appointments scheduled by contacts. Meetings were arranged in person at cafés, community centres, and workplaces.

The interview chain referral process built upon the trust established with members of a growing network of Somalis. At the end of the interview, each respondent was asked if they knew of one friend or acquaintance of a specified age/gender who might be willing to participate in the study. However, finding Somali refugees willing to complete the interviews from among the hundreds of

contacts made was the most significant obstacle to the timely completion of this project. The most difficult group to access among the members of the Somali refugee community in Ottawa were female refugees over 45 years old. The research assistants proved to be indispensable in identifying and referring the final respondents.

SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS

Discussion sessions with respondents commenced with introductions of the research team, and a brief explanation of the interview process and the purpose of the study to obtain the informed consent of participants. The private discussions with individual respondents were oriented around the following themes: geographical origin; international mobility; forms of migration; national, religious, and clan identities; notions of home; occupation; education; causes and locations of conflict in Somalia; sources of current information about Somalia; familial relations; remittances; return and repatriation to Somalia; locations and conditions of temporary asylum; refugee camps; crime; resettlement outcomes; mutual assistance networks; household roles; primary fears, worries, concerns in resettlement; survival mechanisms; emergency planning; protective measures; basic human needs; and perceptions of security.

The interviews loosely followed an established format, with considerable scope for variance, especially in sessions with more effusive respondents who tended to broach themes themselves and lead discussions. A total of 90 questions were prepared to ensure adequate coverage of the 26 sub-themes listed above.

Each theme was introduced using open ended questions to elicit narrative responses. For example, respondents were asked “how many people are in your family?” A direct answer –a number-- might be given, but more often it would begin discussion of nuclear and extended family networks and continue with follow-up question like “how did your family escape from Somalia?”, or “where do the members of your family live now?” In the open-ended questions, broad terms were used like ‘family’ or ‘security’, ‘worries’, ‘assistance’, ‘difficulties’. These terms were not defined by the interviewer; they were interpreted by the respondents in their own fashion. Answers to open-ended questions were clarified and verified were using probing questions to follow-up on subjects of interest. Closed answer questions were used to obtain further detail and specific information.

INTERPRETATION AND TRANSFORMATION OF DATA

Following the research plan, in order to overcome language barriers and enable explanations of difficult concepts with respondents still learning to speak English, Somali-English translators were on hand. The interviews were conducted without much difficulty, and all of the respondents spoke some English, so third person translations were not a significant issue. For two respondents, some Somali to English translations were used to describe situations and conditions at home which the respondents had no terms to describe because they had no parallel experiences in Canada.

Initial data were collected in note form. During two trial interviews, it

was determined that the utilisation and display of a cassette recorder distressed respondents. It was suggested by Somali advisors that the cassette recorder would be counter-productive and could effectively silence respondents, especially individuals who recently underwent nerve-wracking immigration interviews to determine their citizenship or refugee status. As a result, data from the interviews was collected by handwritten notes rather than recorded on tape.

Keywords, terms, idioms, phrases, and some verbatim replies were written down during the interviews, which lasted between 1.5 and 2.75 hours. With few exceptions, following each discussion, on the same day, the responses were entered into a word processor, annotated with an age and gender code.

Transcription was completed without any aid from research assistants or other persons. During the transcription the information was grouped into files by theme and classified based on noted differences and commonalities in respondent's comments.

The first level of analysis was the comparison of the words used by respondents to discuss each theme. Theme files were then analysed to determine if response patterns were correlated with the respondents' gender, age, origin, and duration of residency in Canada.

I have never been to Somalia, so all I know is what I have read and heard about the country and its people. It is recognised that different respondents may have had particular personal reasons for participating in the study. For example, aid workers might have responded in ways that serve to reinforce their positions

and promote their influence in refugee assistance planning, and recipients of resettlement assistance may have ensured their replies could not jeopardise their access to supports.

The respondents demonstrated a great desire for respectability and a good social reputation, and tended to present Somalia and Somalis in a favourable manner which was sometimes at odds with the sensationalist media reports and academic accounts of the war torn country and people. And, despite my assurances of privacy and confidentiality—or perhaps because of the attention focussed on secrecy as part of the informed consent procedure—several respondents were suspicious of the purpose of the interview, and wary about sharing their views on sensitive issues concerning pre-migration security issues, motivations for migration, temporary asylum, and border-crossing. Less direct interview questions about pre-migration events, and interviews completed by Somali research assistants in my absence did not produce more detailed information. Several males who refused to be interviewed inquired if the research was a government project to investigate illegal immigration or problems related to welfare.

The reliability of responses was confirmed by asking similar questions in different ways to cross-check details. Participant feedback sessions verified some information. As well, background research helped to fill in gaps or imprecisions in the knowledge of respondents concerning macro-level factors that affected their situations. Published and verified accounts of events confirmed rumours and

speculations about the sources, locations, and effects of refugee producing occurrences.

Two focus group meetings were scheduled with participants, but only one focus group meeting was held to review and discuss the preliminary findings. The focus group was not well attended by respondents, and therefore it did not adequately meet its designed objective to provide a favourable opportunity for Somalis to participate in the analysis of information.

The focus group exercises did produce a prioritized list of assistance needs for resettlement; lists of the capacities and vulnerabilities of Somali refugees in Ottawa; and an inventory of the attributes, attitudes, resources related to integration in Ottawa, and a contrasting list of characteristics and problems related to marginalisation during resettlement.

One of the constraints in the reporting of the research results was to conceal identities of subjects but still describe their experiences in a meaningful manner. Of specific interest are age and gender differences as indicators of the distinct ways individuals experience forced migration.

Out of respect for privacy and confidentiality of the participants in the study, this report will not refer to the respondents by name. References to the respondents are de-personalized, and they are variously called refugees, and categorized according to types, classes, and groups based on the organisation of information from interview sessions within the refugee migration framework. The respondents themselves did not select their ultimate designations, which

were derived from their responses.

In the classification of respondents within subjective categories, care was taken to avoid stigmatizing Somalis while maintaining accuracy in reporting information. Based on feedback from participants some information was omitted from the report. However, while the use of new classifications in the refugee migration framework may serve to break down some refugee stereotypes, it is inevitable that some Somalis will be offended if they perceive that their reputations are tarnished by any unfavourable characterisations of refugee motivations, attitudes, nationalist orientations, or resettlement outcomes.

Respondents were not approached to repeat their personal stories publically. This research is not designed to uncover the injustices of the Canadian immigration system, nor is this a study of the changes refugees have helped to bring about in communities in Ottawa. The participation of Somali refugees in this research project was considered an important contribution to the empowerment of refugees as agents in their own development rather than helpless victims of tragedy. This research project hopes to contribute to the study of refugees as a part of history and society rather than as a problematic category that crosses so many academic disciplines.

CHAPTER 5

REFUGEE MIGRATION FROM SOMALIA: HOME-RELATED FACTORS

Refugee studies have shown that in many different cases of mass migration similar types of factors force people from their homelands. To begin the examination of home-related factors of refugee migration from Somalia, macro-level factors contributing to recent out-migration from Somalia will be outlined. The following section does not provide an in-depth historical analysis of conflict and crisis in Somalia, but summarizes main events leading up to crisis situations and briefly identifies the major threats and dangers to explain what created the conditions from which so many Somalis departed. First, macro-level environmental factors related to forced displacement from Somalia will be outlined, followed by overviews of macro-economic and then macro-political push forces contributing to involuntary migration by Somalis.

Macro-level Push Factors

ENVIRONMENTAL FORCES OF MIGRATION

Somalia is a harsh and inhospitable land located on the tip of the Horn of Africa. Localised droughts occur in some part of Somalia virtually every year, and droughts lasting two years or longer have produced famines in large regions of the country at least six times since 1900 (Lewis 1975).

In fragile arid and semi-arid lands, under harsh climatic conditions, Somalis adapted to their situations by evolving nomadic pastoral and agro-pastoral ways of life. Nomadic pastoralism is the dominant land use system in

Somalia and forms the economic base of the country. "Nomadism is a survival strategy in response to drought and a fragile environment that provides insufficient resources for the people and the herds" (Arkow 1993:11). Agro-pastoralism is "a zero input, low output shifting cultivation system" practised in the inter-riverine region, eastern Gedo, the central coastal plains, and part of the northwest (Arkow 1993:11). Along with sheep, goats, some cattle and even some camels, agro-pastoralists in Somalia produce maize and sesame as primary subsistence crops, and sorghum, beans, other vegetables and fruits as minor crops (Unruh 1993:311).

The 1975 Land Reform Act pushed pastoralists and small-scale agriculturalists onto marginal lands (Unruh 1995:83). By altering the land tenure patterns, dispersing nomads and severing the ties with the land, the land act increased rangeland degradation (Riddell 1989:83).

The 'long-tailed' drought from 1974-76 was disastrous for Somalia, wiping out the herds of as many as 250,000 nomads throughout the north and central regions. Populations were also displaced during less severe droughts in 1979-80, 1983, and 1986. Other environmental disasters in Somalia included flooding along the Juba and Shabelle Rivers in 1981 (Hutchison 1991:84).

Environmental disasters were directly related to the displacement of millions of marginalised Somalis throughout the Horn of Africa to meet basic needs. In Somalia, some of the famine relief camps set up during the 1974-76 drought were never disbanded, and were later used by more than one million

refugees from the war with Ethiopia in 1977-78 (Riddell 1989:80). Refugees collecting firewood and building materials denuded the land around camps for up to 15 kilometres. Problems of severe soil erosion near refugee settlements were caused by standard Somali agricultural practices such as the removal of all natural vegetation from farmland (Young 1985:128). Especially around the older camps, as the refugees built up small livestock herds, they created a bleak, empty landscape, with large areas of bare ground where shrubs and grasses were removed by overgrazing (Young 1985). Near larger urban centres like Hargeisa, Kisumayo, Burao, and Mogadishu, tens of thousands of nomads squatted on lands in peripheral districts not serviced by water, electricity, or rubbish collection, with the hope of gaining free long-term rights to building on the site from the municipality (Janzen 1986:80).

Along with recurrent drought, government settlement policies, degradative land-use practices, and influxes of large refugee populations contributed greatly to the destruction of livestock herds, rapid sedentarisation of pastoralists, widespread famine, and economic insecurity in Somalia (Riddell 1989; Hutchison 1991; Bennett 1991; Young 1985; Arkow 1993; Keddemman and Haaland 1984). “Demographic change and environmental degradation in Somalia have altered the traditional community and family structures and left people more vulnerable to the tyranny of warlords” (Kane 1995:20).

ECONOMIC FACTORS LEADING TO MIGRATION

Looking at the underlying causes of forced displacement of over 38 million

persons in 33 different countries, Wood concluded that it is clear that “forced migration occurs disproportionately in the countries with the most miserable living standards” (Wood 1994:609). Economic insecurity contributed to recent refugee migration from Somalia, and has been identified as an underlying cause of the civil war; economic collapse is seen as a outcome of internecine fighting.

The seeds which gave rise to the distorted Somali economy were planted by colonial powers at the end of the 19th century, and economic growth was stunted by natural calamities (Hutchison 1991). The self-sufficiency of nomadic and pastoral food producers was eroded by modern market mechanisms, defective land-use policies, and by the increased role of international aid organisations and state controlled agencies in disaster relief programmes (Unruh 1995:25; Riddell 1989).

The Unified Civil Code of 1973 abolished traditional clan and lineage rights of use and access to land and water resources. From then on, all land was state owned. Land could be leased by pastoralists, but corrupt officials allowed outsiders to gain access to huge tracts of productive land previously utilised by small-farmers and pastoralists (Riddell 1989; Unruh 1995).

The 1975 Land Reform Act formulated by the Barre regime benefited state enterprises and mechanised agricultural schemes, but limited the size of private farms to 30 hectares in irrigated areas and 60 hectares for dryland farms (Riddell 1989:83). Pastoralists were not given land rights except through approved grazing associations and government sponsored cooperatives. Dislocated

pastoralists and agriculturalists were relegated to more marginal land, and food security for pastoralists and agriculturalists declined (Riddell 1989:83).

Poverty among pastoralists is directly linked to losses of their livestock from drought, disease, theft and death of animals, as well as expulsion from grazing and watering territories. Successful water development and veterinary programmes in the early 1970s resulted in animal population growth rates of 4%-6% per year, but the pastoralists' vulnerability to drought increased along with pressures from growing herds on limited grazing resources. In the 1974-76 drought, animal losses were estimated to be as high as 50% of the total, although the human mortality rates were low (Keddeman and Haaland 1984:855).

The Barre regime set up a state agency to control all agricultural exports, and also imposed controls on grain production (Lewis 1981:12). Livestock exports constantly accounted for 60% to 80% of total exports until trade disputes with Saudi Arabia and closure of the port of Berbera after 1983 caused significant reductions in foreign livestock sales (Hutchison 1991:81). At the best of times, Somalia was a poor, food importing country, but government import/export and price controls further constrained self-sufficiency in food production (Metz 1992).

The weak economy that was a legacy of British and Italian colonialism was crippled by years of scientific socialism (Lewis 1981) and contorted by the excess militarisation and international aid under the Barre regime. Competition between American and Soviet superpowers escalated and expanded military crises in the Horn of Africa by shipping up to two billion dollars of armaments to Somalia and

as much as ten billion dollars of arms, jet fighters, tanks, and ships to Ethiopia from 1970 to 1990 (Lefebvre 1991:32-34).

Throughout the 1980s, Somalia received more foreign aid per capita than any other country in sub-Saharan Africa, and at one point aid imports equalled the value of goods and services produced in the formal economy. Food was Somalia's largest import item, yet refugees continued to suffer from protein energy malnutrition because of inefficient and corrupt aid distribution systems (DeWaal 1993). Aid programs were blamed for contributing to the economic crisis in Somalia and the disempowerment of many Somalis (Omaar 1993:199).

By the late 1980s, what little life was left in the formal economy following calamities and the influx of millions of dependent refugees was soon bled dry by corruption. In a process of commercial predation, business elites expropriated money by price gouging, and state officials sold trade permits or seized assets. An alternative, black-market economy grew in place of foundering formal trade. The "shadow economy" was centred on a small elite group connected with President Barre who relied on secret and illegal dealings, inside information, family links to important ministries, and sanctions of violence (DeWaal 1993:1). Urban survival strategies depended greatly on the remittances from overseas workers, which were estimated to equal 40% of Somalia's GNP (DeWaal 1993:2). The process of a shrinking formal economy and an expanding hidden economy reached its logical conclusion: there were no national accounts, no official gross national product, the markets stayed well-stocked, but the strong and rich

prospered while the weak and poor starved (DeWaal 1993).

Finally, the Somali economy was bludgeoned by war and internal violence. The scourge of clan-based factions, abetted by criminals and bandits, created economic chaos and insecurity in Somalia. Average Somalis could no longer meet basic needs, and in terms of human suffering, Somalia was considered one of the worst places in the world to live (Wood 1994:612). The population became increasingly reliant on foreign aid, but humanitarian assistance destined for civilian populations was also the main source of sustenance for parasitic factional forces. From her home in Mogadishu, Miriam Gassem reported that:

While the world as a whole, without distinction of race, creed, or religion was sympathetic with our agony and willing to reach across vast distances to reach us, we the Somali people were not ready to help ourselves. Instead, it seemed that we intended to exterminate our own people with unreasonable, meaningless and suicidal actions. Looting of aid supplies, robbery, armed banditry and general lack of law and order were the main obstacles to organized relief efforts. . . relief organisations were fired upon... Relief ships were threatened and even shelled. . . Large amounts of cash were extorted from donor agencies and NGO organizations. Moreover, the lives of these very special and good-hearted people were in constant danger. Some of them were barbarically murdered while on duty pursuing this dangerous humanitarian cause (Gassem 1994:113).

By the end of 1991, 2.5 million Somalis were affected by food shortages, and 2.5 million Somalis had been displaced from their homes (Hasci and Waldron 1994). In 1993 alone, “300,000 Somalis died of starvation, warfare, or disease” (Geshekteer 1997).

This section provided a summary of the macro-economic factors related to the forced displacement of millions of Somalis from their homelands. From weak roots in colonial trade and agricultural policies, economic instability in Somalia was increased by defective government policies in land-use, economic and industrial underdevelopment, food security, international aid/trade, and militarisation under scientific socialism. These combined with widespread corruption to bring about virtual economic collapse. Severe economic hardship, and lack of income earning opportunities in Somalia led to extensive labour migration and impelled economic migration from Somalia. The macro-structural environmental and economic conditions increased the vulnerability of Somali households to shocks and stresses of oppression and terrorism, and to devastation from violence and war. In the next section the political factors forcing individuals to migrate will be outlined.

POLITICAL FORCES OF INVOLUNTARY MIGRATION

In a global survey of the causes of refugee movements, Wood determined that “most forced migrations are rooted, at least partially, in ethnic conflict” (Wood 1994:609). Somalia is a case in point, where in addition to life-threatening economic and ecological crises, inter-clan conflict, organised insurgency, and governmental oppression combined to displace 14% of Somalis from their homes (Wood 1994:610,612).

After President Shermarke was killed by one of his bodyguards in October of 1969, army units deposed Somalia’s civilian government. Major General

Mahammad Siad Barre assumed power over the military officers who staged the coup and formed a new governing body, the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC), which ruled Somalia for more than two decades. In February 1970, Somalia's democratic constitution was repealed, and in early 1971 Barre proclaimed Somalia a single-party socialist state and began the organisation of a vanguard party composed of a socialist elite drawn from military and civilian sectors (Metz 1992:44).

“The most significant political consequence of Siad Barre's twenty-one-year rule was an intensified identification with parochial clans” (Metz 1992:163). The dissolution of political parties and the prohibition of political activity enhanced the importance of clans because family gatherings became the only regular venues for political debate. Moreover, although Barre formally opposed clan politics on the grounds it impeded national integration, he distributed political offices, powers, and rewards disproportionately to members of the Darood clan-family, including his own clan, the Maraheen; the clan of his son-in-law, the Dulbahante; and his mother's clan, the Ogaden. The Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party (SRSP) failed to fill the void created by the lack of political parties, and rather than debating policy it implemented dictates of the SRC. Dominated by members of Maraheen, Ogaden, or Dulbahante clans, the SRSP excluded other clans from any meaningful political role (Metz 1992:164).

In April 1970, the Ruling Council established the National Security Courts (NRC) to deal with political offences against public order, activities against the

state, and crimes by government officials. The verdicts of the NRC could not be appealed, and included prison terms for a broad range of proscribed activities classified as tribalism, and sometimes death for political crimes (Metz 1992:39, 162). The National Security Service (NSS), headed by Barre's son-in-law, was given powers to arbitrarily arrest and detain "any such person necessary in the interests of peace, order, and good government" (Lewis 1981:10; Somalia 1970). Immune from prosecution, the army, police, and military police stamped out dissent and eliminated government critics through extreme systematic oppression (Deng 1993:57). In 1973, Barre's regime introduced a uniform civil code to replace inherited colonial laws, and extended the death sentence and prison terms to individual offenders to eliminate collective responsibility through *diya* payments of blood money called for in traditional conflict resolution mechanisms (Metz 1992:39). To repress political opposition, Barre's regime used "jailings, torture, and summary executions of dissidents and collective punishments of clans" (Metz 1992:45).

In October 1970, Barre's regime adopted the ideology of scientific socialism, "a political instrument to repress the civil rights and freedoms of the citizens" (Gassem 1994:24). Thereafter, citizens were divided into revolutionary and anti-revolutionary groups which persecuted or indicted each other on the basis of cultural, political, or tribal lineage (Gassem 1994:25).

To prop up his dictatorship, from the late 1960s to 1990, Barre successfully negotiated a total of \$2 billion in military training, support and weapons, in part

from the USSR, then after 1978 from the USA (Lefebvre 1991:32). His regime also purchased hundreds of millions of dollars in arms from Egypt and Sudan in 1977, from Italy and China in the early 1980s, and from Libya in the late 1980s (Lefebvre 1991:45).

From 1967 to 1978, Somalia's National army more than tripled in size, and even after the war with Ethiopia, the standing military was maintained at 45,000 men through forced conscription (Lefebvre 1991:45). Refusal to fight was a treasonable offence punishable by death, and casualties were usually left to die unattended in battlegrounds. Cruel treatment of the military conscripts led to considerable desertion, and many soldiers who left the army later instigated uprisings against the Barre regime (Gassem 1994:35).

Somalia's defeat in the Ogaden war by Ethiopia in 1978 precipitated an increase in insurgency and focussed opposition against the Barre government. After the retreat of the Somali army from Ethiopia, in April 1978 the Somali Salvation Front (SSF) staged an unsuccessful coup and began a low intensity sabotage campaign against Barre's regime. The Ethiopian-based SSF joined with radicals based in Yemen to form the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) (Metz 1992:190). The Majeerten-dominated SSDF maintained armed opposition and continued raids on government forces throughout the 1980s (Metz 1992:189).

In April 1981, the Somali National Movement (SNM) was formed by Isaaq clan members from the north in opposition to the Darood and Hawiye clans which

favoured southern development. The SNM set up headquarters in Addis Ababa to obtain Ethiopian military assistance. In January of 1982, they launched their first military operation against the Somali government, and the Barre regime responded by declaring a state of emergency, imposing a curfew, and banning movements in or out of northern Somalia (Gassem 1994:52-3). In late 1984, the SNM commandos attacked government military posts around Hargeisa, Burao, and Berbera, and this time the Somali army replied by shooting 300 demonstrators in Burao, arresting rebel supporters, sentencing 7 youths to death for sedition, and then executing 28 people for anti-government activities (Metz 1992:192). Between July and September 1987, the SNM attacked 30 government positions in the north. Once again, the military reacted harshly and forced nomad communities suspected of supporting the SNM to leave border regions and cross into Ethiopia. In April 1998, after Barre and Ethiopian President Mengistu agreed to end subversive activities against each other, the SNM were forced from sanctuary in Ethiopia, so they launched a major offensive in northern Somalia (Metz 1992:193).

On May 27, 1988, the Isaaq dominated SNM captured the town of Burao and the city of Hargeisa in the north. In a counter attack by the Somali military, government forces launched an air raid and dropped bombs on Hargeisa, and any Isaaq –even women and children-- became a target for torture and assassination because they were seen as an inexhaustible source of recruits against the Barre regime (Gassem 1994; Gersony 1989; Samatar 1991:19). Altogether, in a

horrific period from 1988-90, the Somali government murdered 60,000 civilians in the northern towns, destroyed buildings, poisoned wells, and planted one million land mines to culminate the most repressive period in Somali history (Geshekte 1997:79).

Siad Barre's responses to guerilla movements only intensified opposition to his regime (Metz 1992:166). In the late 1980s, the SNM encouraged the formation of other clan-based factions, and provided them with military and political support to hasten the overthrow of the military dictatorship. By 1990, relatively intense fighting spread throughout Somalia: the SNM wrested control of the northwest, the SSDF dominated the northeast, the United Somali Congress (USC) controlled extensive areas in central Somalia, and the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) commanded large parts of the south (Metz 1992:167).

Violence escalated as Barre's government enacted new measures in an attempt to destroy the opposition. Soldiers in the national army and members of the various security agencies regularly robbed, raped, and killed civilians. In the central region, hundreds of civilians were killed because they were suspected of supporting anti-state factions. Government troops ambushed cars and killed or injured passengers, and sometimes they hanged victims from trees to terrorize local populations (Metz 1992:224).

In September of 1990, the SNM formed a military alliance with the Hawiye dominated USC and the Ogaden dominated SPM in opposition to Barre's government (Gassem 1994:53-4; Metz 1992:195). In December 1990, they

increased military-terrorist activities, and in January 1991, during a final assault on Siad Barre's forces by the Abgaal faction of the USC, the Somali Armed Forces finally collapsed. On January 26, USC forces stormed the presidential palace and took over the capital of Mogadishu (Metz 1992:195).

On January 26, 1991 the USC formed a provisional government which was not recognised by its allies, and temporary factional unification agreements quickly unravelled. In May of 1991, the SNM completely broke with supporters of a unified Somalia when they declared independence in the north and unilaterally formed the Republic of Somaliland (Metz 1992:195).

To make matters worse, guerilla groups vying for power in Somalia proliferated after the fall of the government. New armed factions formed which spilt clan affiliations and divided clan territories, and internecine battles over control of the capital and war booty intensified and expanded to other parts of Somalia when ordnance from the military and security forces was recovered by insurgents, clan militiamen, guerilla groups or bandits (Metz 1992:187). Muktar lists 16 different major armed factions, their clan affiliations, regional strongholds, and leaders which were still fighting in November 1993 (see Table A: Clan-Based Armed Factions, 228; Muktar 1997:60-1).

Geshekteer argues that beyond clan-based enmity, internal conflict in Somalia was also kindled by a severe clash of political discourses. Civil servants and educated Somalis who held that nationalism was necessary for entry into the world of progress, reason and development, followed a 'modernist' agenda using

the theoretical bridge of reunification of divided Somali territories to link nomads to city dwellers. Bureaucrats formed a government clan which appropriated state resources, and as their dependence on foreign consultants and development projects grew, they became increasingly removed from pastoral production strategies (Geshekte, 1997).

“Local Somali politics are rooted in consensus and decentralization, while two generations of Somalis experienced modern government as a heavily centralized, unaccountable system” (Geshekte 1997:85). Most Somalis did not speak the language of development or follow the plans and procedures of the new bureaucracy. The majority of Somalis felt excluded from modernisation programmes, and they formulated a counter discourse of disenfranchisement and rage. After the collapse of the Somali government, displaced rural youth without city-skills and urban youths who felt they had no future in modern Somalia flourished as marauders called *mooryaan*, a Somali term which means blood-sucking tick. The streets of the capital were ruled by dangerous teens with guns, mixed with drug addicts, violent criminals freed from prisons, and psychiatric patients loose from hospitals. (Gasse, 1994:87)

The capital city and other major urban centres held little importance for most Somalis because “local identity and the sense of community among kinsmen is very narrowly conceived” (Geshekte, 1997:66). The parasitic factions feasted on cities like vultures, taking whatever they desired, destroying any symbol of Somali nationalism, including monuments, libraries, schools, post-offices, and

government buildings. In a process called *bililiqo*, which means to swallow evil things, armed guerillas plundered farms and towns of all kinds of material wealth (Geshekte, 1997:87).

Though the activities of looters appeared unpredictable, looting was not a random offshoot of fighting; it was the way militias and leaders sustained themselves. In the cities, looting took the “form of systematic commercial acquisition of goods with a resale value,” and in the rural areas, it “consisted chiefly of armed roadblocks for extorting payment from merchants, and night-time attacks on villages” (DeWaal 1993:6).

This overview of political events in Somalia revealed numerous sources of political insecurity and instability in the country. As oppression by the state augmented, opposition to the state mounted, and an increasing number of political conflicts occurred which disaffected and displaced local populations. As the scope of violent opposition expanded throughout the country to become civil war, the levels of alienation and forced displacement in Somalia increased. Some observers estimated that more than 50 percent of Somalia’s people were displaced in 1992 (Deng 1993:52). By one count in 1993, an estimated 600,000 were internally displaced, and over 700,000 were forced out of the country and became refugees (Wood 1994:610).

In the case of Somalia, the interrelations between the global and national macro-level causes of migrations are highly evident. Moreover, in Somalia, the nomadic traditions of the Somali people and regional level interactions in the

Horn of Africa further complicate an understanding of the complex movements and motivations of Somali refugees.

Voluntary short-term and long-term regional migrations by Somalis between different ecological regions and settlements were common as part of economic, environmental, and food security strategies practised by nomadic pastoralists and agro-pastoralists (Cassanelli 1982). Traditional migrations of nomads within Somali were not controlled by state military and police to the same extent as out-migration by labourers, yet despite border controls set up to block labour migrants, over 200,000 workers left the country in the mid 1970s (Metz 1992:162). On a much smaller scale, wealthy families sent children abroad to complete their education or get technical training unavailable in Somalia.

Waldron and Hasci identify two main exoduses of involuntary migrations from Somalia between 1988 and 1994. In 1988, several vintages of Somali refugees were displaced in mass flight when the Somali National Army bombers and ground forces pushed 300,000 Isaaq and Ogaden clan members into refuge in camps in eastern Ethiopia (Hasci and Waldron 1994:53). Another vintage of 67,000 refugees flowed into Ethiopia from Somalia when Ethiopian government troops retreated from border zones in the north in 1990, bringing the total number of Somali refugees in Ethiopia at that time to over 575,000 (Hasci and Waldron 1994:63).

Numerous large vintages of refugees began to flow out of Somalia after the fall of the Barre regime. At the beginning of 1991, widespread insurgency by

armed clan factions in southern Somalia intensified and displaced hundreds of thousands of Somalis from Mogadishu and towns in the inter-riverine areas (Hasci and Waldron 1994:63). By 1992, it was estimated that up to 1 million Somalis had been displaced within Somalia as a result of the conflicts (USCR 1992:34).

In addition to the thousands of Somalis who had already escaped from fighting and famine from 1988 to 1990, the civil war forced an estimated 717,600 Somali refugees into asylum (USCR 1992:32). While huge waves of Somali asylum-seekers flooded into neighbouring countries in the Horn of Africa (see Figure 6 on the following page), smaller waves streamed into nearby countries in the Arabian peninsula, and mere ripples of Somali refugees reached more distant countries.

This review of the global, regional, and national level factors contributing to refugee migration from Somalia outlined the complex interrelated effects of political conflict, economic instability, and environmental disaster which forcibly displaced millions of Somalis throughout the Horn of Africa. Despite these threatening conditions of hardship, the majority of Somalis did not flee from their homelands. Macro-level factors are perceived by individuals with particular attributes which determine their propensities to migrate, and by households with different motivations which determine their capacities to stay in their homeland. The following section discusses individual level attributes which influence refugee migrations and resettlement outcomes.

Refugee Attributes And Resettlement Outcomes

Migration is a crisis coping scheme or survival strategy employed by individuals and households. Forced migrants opt to move to avoid dangers when they have no better alternative strategies to ensure their survival. The propensity of an individual to migrate is related to her/his capacities to anticipate, cope with, resist, and recover from crises; her/his ability to defend themselves against dangers; and her/his vulnerabilities to threats, coercion, loss, damage, suffering, or injury. Social and environmental relationships are key determinants of vulnerability and capacity (Varley 1994).

Once in flight, individuals must overcome obstacles, losses, and pressures in their search for a safe haven. After entry into host countries, government policies, social receptiveness, and cultural compatibility also affect adaptation by migrants. Throughout the migration process, individual attributes affect the attitudes, perceptions, motivations, activities, vulnerabilities and capacities of refugees to adjust and integrate.

The general model of refugee migration lists a dozen individual attributes which influence resettlement outcomes, including more commonly studied characteristics such as age, gender, language and less widely recognized traits such as previous international travel. To determine the applicability of the model and evaluate the importance of individual attributes as factors of refugee migration, the outcomes in resettlement reported by the Somali respondents were analysed in relation to age, gender, religion, education, occupation, wealth,

language, ethnicity, urban or rural background, previous international travel and information about destinations. Findings from these analyses are included in the tables in the report or in adjoining appendices.

CLANS AND RESETTLEMENT OUTCOMES

Traditionally, Somali political identity rests on membership in a discrete kinship group based on descent traced through the male line (Cassanelli 1982:16). The clan system “pits large groups of people against one another” (Samatar 1991:10). The civil war in Somalia has been called a clan war, a conflict centred essentially on the politics of power principally fought among the Hawiye, Darood, and Isaaq clan-families (Abdullahi 1997:3).

The significance of clan membership as a factor in out-migration from Somalia was highlighted by the considerable controversy surrounding the interview discussions about clans. Clanism or tribalism was seen by 80% of the respondents as the major cause of the civil war in Somalia and as an impediment to a peaceful resolution of the conflict. In particular, four respondents who are members of the Isaaq clan felt they were targeted for violence in Somalia due to their clan membership.

A total of 57% of the respondents identified themselves according to clan affiliations (see Table C on page 230 for a list of respondents’ stated clan). It appears that the strength of clan support has tended to wane over time, since nine of thirteen respondents who denied clan affiliations had been in Canada over five years. Affiliations with specific clans did not appear to be correlated with

resettlement outcomes. However, only strong clan supporters were actively working towards repatriation, and clan supporters in general were somewhat less likely than anti-clanists to report social integration or cultural assimilation in Ottawa.

Strongly held views against clanism were reflected in the refugee outcomes of the five respondents categorized as assimilated refugees, all of whom denied clan membership and negated the importance of clans for Somalis in Canada. Dissociation with clans appeared to be related to gender, and nine females (60% of female respondents) but only four males (27% of male respondents) indicated alienation from clans. These thirteen respondents came to Canada to avoid clan-based violence and they believed clan groups are exclusionary and divisive. Somali social workers assisting refugees in resettlement argued that adherence to clan-based politics and identities were not conducive to resettlement because it diverted attention and resources from local development efforts.

AGE AND RESETTLEMENT OUTCOMES

The age of respondents at the time of their departure from Somalia appears to influence the outcomes of their resettlement in Ottawa (see Table F on page 233). Young age upon migration appears to be strongly related to assimilation, while more mature income-seeking respondents responsible for several dependents tended to report marginalisation during resettlement. Among the five assimilated respondents, four are females who were under 20 years old when they departed from Somalia. A total of 89% of the respondents under 25

years old when they departed Somalia reported they were integrated during resettlement in Canada.

Respondents over 25 years old when they arrived in Canada tended to report more negative outcomes in resettlement. Among the three respondents who felt their household roles and functions were diminished and down-graded during resettlement, two respondents were older than 45 years old when they left Somalia. All three of the respondents who were professionally marginalised during resettlement were over 36 years old when they departed from Somalia. One respondent noted that “so many Somalis are facing unemployment, and it is especially hard for older men to adjust.” A total of thirteen of seventeen respondents over 25 years old, 76% of that age group, reported marginalisation during resettlement, compared with five of thirteen or 38% of the respondents 25 or under who reported negative outcomes. It appears that younger respondents tended to encounter more racism than their older compatriots during resettlement in Ottawa.

GENDER AND RESETTLEMENT OUTCOMES

An analysis of the relations between gender and the outcomes of resettlement of respondents shows that men tended to be more likely than women to devote efforts towards repatriation. The direction of this relation is not clear, and negative outcomes in resettlement may be seen as a factors contributing to respondent's desire to return and an effect of their priority attention to homeward oriented activities over integration efforts in Ottawa.

Among the respondents, more Somali men reported they were economically and racially marginalised than women during resettlement. Conversely, among the five respondents who were assimilated during their resettlement in Ottawa, only one respondent was a man, and four respondents were girls or women (80% of assimilated respondents).

RELIGION AND OUTCOMES OF RESETTLEMENT

Somalis are a linguistically, and religiously, homogeneous people (Samatar 1991). Religion provided a link between different political groups, and Somalis adopted common Islamic institutions and practices (Cassanelli 1982). Virtually all religious Somalis belong to the Sunni branch of Islam (Poulsen 1990:143).

Whereas some respondents reported religious discrimination by employers who were not tolerant of Muslim daily prayer rituals and holidays, a total of nine of ten respondents with strong affiliations to local Islamic groups reported positive outcomes of resettlement. These respondents all benefited from Islamic community development and family supports networks. Several respondents reported that they returned to their faith after departure from Somalia to help cope with migration distress. One female respondent said, “when we left Somalia, I went back to religion for strength and support. I learned to see again.”

Pre-migration religious intolerance appeared to be an important factor related to the integration of an alienated non-Muslim Somali woman who adopted many Canadian traditions, accepted pluralist and feminist values, divorced her husband, returned to school, participated in community

development activities, and was well integrated in Ottawa during resettlement. She stated that “Somalis don’t have one community, they have maybe 100 groups that don’t respect each other. They are intolerant of others like Jews and gays. Somalis do not believe strongly in Islam, they just want four wives. If they were true believers the war would be over.”

PREVIOUS OCCUPATION AND RESETTLEMENT RESULTS

Data on income levels and wealth of the respondents in Somalia were not collected in the interviews. It was assumed that only individuals with cash savings or easily convertible wealth on hand could afford to pay the high costs of travel, accommodation, and related legal and extra-legal fees for documents, visas, as well as permits required for the journey through one or more countries, across continents and oceans to reach Canada.

When analysed separately from other variables, pre-migration occupation seems to be strongly related to refugee’s outcomes during resettlement. The only pastoralist who participated in this study was an economically marginalised teenager unable to find income earning opportunities or achieve success at school during resettlement in Canada.

The respondents of working age had primarily white collar occupations: among the respondents were 2 male lawyers, 1 male engineer, 2 female and 1 male healthcare professionals, 2 male technicians, 3 female and 2 male government officials, 2 male and 2 female business owners. None of the participants in this study were able to open businesses or rejoin their professions.

Ex-professionals tended to report economic and professional marginalisation during resettlement in Canada. All six of the respondents who were professionals in Somalia reported that their political influence and social prestige had diminished, and that their roles in the community and household had changed during resettlement in Canada. They reported they were economically marginalised due to reduced incomes since their departure from Somalia.

Conversely, previous business ownership was strongly related to integration. All four ex-business owner/operators (2 males and 2 females) demonstrated adaptive capacities which enabled them to gain work experience in Canada through entry level and volunteer positions that led to better employment later during resettlement.

Affi writes about the extreme difficulties Somali women have in finding decent employment at every level of the Canadian labour force because they are Somali, Muslim, black, and female. Affi points out that whereas “[t]he majority of Canadian employers inevitably ask for Canadian work experience and are not likely to acknowledge previous work experience and educational experience of refugees,” many Somali women never worked outside their homes in Somalia (Affi, 1997:445).

PRIOR EDUCATION AND RESETTLEMENT OUTCOMES

The CIC considers secondary and post-secondary education to be chief determinants of an immigrant’s ability to resettle and integrate effectively in Canada, and to make economic and social contributions to Canada during

resettlement (CIC 1997). Employers value more current education, and English/French prior to arrival in Canada is more of an asset to refugees than most technical training in non-official languages. Even among respondents educated in English, the transferability of their academic credentials must be determined on a country by country basis.

Table 1: Respondent by last year of school completed prior to arrival in Canada

Level of schooling	F	% of total respondents	M	% of total respondents	Total M + F % of respondents
no schooling	2	7%	0	0	2=7%
2 nd	1	3%	1	3%	2=7%
3 rd	1	3%	0	0	1=3%
6 th	1	3%	0	0	1=3%
7 th	1	0	1	3%	1=3%
8 th	0	0	1	3%	1=3%
9 th	0	0	1	3%	1=3%
high school	9	30%	11	37%	20=67%
technical college	2	7%	4	14%	6=20%
university abroad	3	10%	5	17%	8=27%

Pre-migration educational attainments of respondents is shown in Table 1 above. In Table 2 below, education prior to migration is related to resettlement outcomes. An analysis of negative outcomes reported by respondents appears to show that the marginalisation of adult refugees is strongly influenced by lack of

formal education prior to migration. An illiterate, adult female respondent with little formal education reported isolation and marginalisation during resettlement.

Table 2: Education prior to migration and resettlement outcomes

Last level of education	Positive resettlement outcomes and % of total		Marginalisation in resettlement and % total ³					
	integration	assimilation	Role	Eco	Race	Poli	Psy	Pro
part of primary school	2, 7%	4, 13%	2, 7%	2, 7%	2, 7%	0	1, 3%	0
part of high school	1, 3%	0	0	0	1, 3%	0	0	0
high school	6, 20%	0	0	3, 10%	2, 7%	1, 3%	1, 3%	0
technical college	5, 17%	0	0	2, 7%	1, 3%	0	0	1, 3%
university abroad	5, 17%	1, 3%	1, 3%	4, 13%	4, 13%	0	1, 3%	2, 7%

Marginalisation of refugees was also clearly related to a lack of current or transferable academic credentials. Of the respondents who had a university education, those who graduated ten years prior to arrival were economically marginalised in Canada. Conversely, for young respondents, positive outcomes of

³ In all tables showing resettlement outcomes, six types of marginalisation are included: **“role”** refers to diminished authority and respect in household roles; **“eco”** refers to decreased wealth and income; **“race”** refers to overt racial discrimination; **“poli”** refers to reduced legal and political rights of non-citizens; **“psy”** refers to debilitating depression or anxiety and psychological marginalisation; and **“pro”** refers to non-recognition of professional credentials and exclusion for professional associations.

resettlement appear to be achieved through continued education in Canada. Among five assimilated respondents, four females completed primary school in Canada. This includes one adult female continuing her education, and three teenaged respondents in high school. Previous secondary and post-secondary education appears to be positively linked with integration. A total of five of the six respondents who completed high school but did not attend post secondary institutions in Somalia were socially integrated since resettlement in Ottawa. Similarly, five of six respondents with technical diplomas prior to their exit from Somalia, and five of eight respondents with university degrees, were socially integrated during resettlement in Ottawa.

Technical college graduates were less likely to report economic marginalisation than the other groups. Altogether among the respondents who graduated from post-secondary schools prior to their departure from Somalia, eleven of fourteen respondents (78%) achieved positive outcomes during resettlement. Six different respondents among the fourteen with post secondary education prior to arrival (42%) did report some form of marginalisation during resettlement.

PROFICIENCY IN ENGLISH AND RESETTLEMENT RESULTS

Canadians strongly believe that immigrants to Canada should be competent in one of the official languages upon arrival (Palmer 1997:37). None of the respondents spoke French prior to their departure from Somalia. Three of the respondents (10% of the total) who initially set up in Montreal

reported that due to their lack of proficiency in French, they were economically and socially marginalised during their temporary resettlement in Quebec.

English skills prior to arrival in Canada were strongly related to social and economic integration during resettlement in Canada. Table 3 below shows that all eleven respondents who already spoke some English before their arrival in Canada reported positive social integration and acculturation during their resettlement in Ottawa, and only two reported they were economically marginalised.

Table 3: English skills prior to migration related to resettlement outcomes

Language skills	Positive resettlement outcomes and % of total		Marginalisation in resettlement and % of respondents					
	integration	assimilation	Role	Eco	Race	Poli	Psy	Pro
11 some English	9, 30%	2, 7%	1, 3%	3, 10%	4, 13%	0	0	1, 3%
21 No English	12, 40%	3, 10%	2, 7%	8, 27%	6, 20%	1, 3%	3, 10%	2, 7%

The respondents who spoke no English prior to exit from Somalia reported fewer positive outcomes and higher levels of marginalisation during resettlement than compatriots with some English. Younger student refugees who had no previous English were more likely to report integration or assimilation after a shorter period of resettlement than older compatriots who tended to learn English more slowly and report economic marginalisation.

URBAN BACKGROUND AND RESETTLEMENT OUTCOMES

Along with other refugee attributes, the successful adaptation of refugees in host countries may be related to the type of settlement and level of transition required from previous urban or rural lifestyles. Rumbaut confirms that refugees of rural origin found resettlement in cities to be distressing (Rumbaut 1991:418).

No strong relations were noted between pre-migration urbanisation of the respondents and particular resettlement outcomes; however, the only respondent who reported difficulty adapting to urban Canadian lifestyles was a pastoralist from a rural area, who reported economic marginalisation and loss of status and influence due to his lack of valued knowledge and lack of contribution of income in his household in urban Canada. He stated that “raising sheep is not just a job, it is a way of life. The hardest part here is not the language, for me it is no sheep, no friends, and not living in the country.”

LINKS WITH CANADA AND RESETTLEMENT RESULTS

Migration networks are sets of interpersonal ties that connect migrants, former migrants, and non-migrants in origin and destination areas through ties of kinship, friendship, and shared community origin. They increase the likelihood of international movement because they lower the costs and risks of movement, and increase expectations of household security during migration (Taylor 1993).

Altogether ten respondents (33% of the total, six males and four females) joined family or friends already in Canada, while twenty respondents had no acquaintances or family in Canada prior to their arrival. Respondents with access

to networks of family or friends in Canada prior to arrival appear to be less marginalised than respondents who had to develop all their own networks after arrival. However, respondents who forged their own migration networks reported higher levels of positive outcomes than those with access to networks.

DESTINATION INFORMATION & RESETTLEMENT RESULTS

Information about Canada prior to arrival appears to be strongly related to successful integration during resettlement (see Table 4 below). Among the seventeen respondents who had some information about Canada from published sources, friends or family, before arrival and application for refugee status, one female respondent was assimilated, and ten males, six females were integrated during resettlement. Three respondents with information about Canada prior to arrival but marginalised during resettlement claimed they were given misleading information about Canadian pluralism and hospitality towards refugees.

Table 4: Information about destination and resettlement outcomes

Level of information about Canada	Positive resettlement outcomes and % of total		Marginalisation in resettlement and % respondents					
	integration	assimilation	Role	Eco	Race	Poli	Psy	Pro
14 Some valid information	13, 47%	1, 7%	0	2, 7%	6, 20%	1, 3%	2, 7%	1, 3%
3 Misleading information	2, 7%	0	0	3, 10 %	2, 7%	0	1, 3%	0
13 No information	4, 13%	4, 13%	3, 10%	6, 20 %	2, 7%	0	0	2, 7%

Levels of marginalisation among uninformed migrants were higher than for informed migrants. A total of 46% of uninformed migrants reported economic marginalisation. Among the thirteen respondents who came to Canada with no knowledge of what to expect during resettlement, only three of thirteen uninformed respondents reported they were integrated. All four uninformed respondents who assimilated during resettlement were primary school students when they arrived in Canada.

INTERNATIONAL TRAVEL AND RESETTLEMENT RESULTS

Previous international travel also appears to be strongly related to integration during resettlement. Table 5 below shows that among eleven respondents who had travelled internationally prior to their migration from Somalia, none had ever been to Canada, but nine integrated successfully during resettlement in Ottawa.

Table 5: Previous international travel and resettlement outcomes

Travel experience	Positive resettlement outcomes and % of total		Marginalisation in resettlement and % respondents					
	integration	assimilation	Role	Eco	Race	Poli	Psy	Pro
11 Previous int'l travel	9, 30%	0	1, 3%	5, 17%	5, 17%	0	2, 7%	2, 7%
19 no previous int'l travel	10, 33%	5, 17%	2, 7%	6, 20%	5, 17%	1, 3%	1, 3%	1, 3%

The analyses of individual attributes of refugees revealed that personal

traits strongly influence resettlement outcomes. Data on the health and wealth of respondents was not collected. Among the ten individual characteristics examined, occupation, relevant language skills, information about destination, and previous international travel showed the strongest relations to resettlement outcomes. Refugee migration networks did not seem to be related to outcomes; however, the study group had access to governmental and community supports which may have reduced the role of family and friends in providing economic assistance and basic needs for newly arrived refugees.

The general model of refugee migration also includes household level motivation among home-related factors. The household mediates between individual and macro forces and is the key unit of refugee migration (Wood 1981 in Schraml and Back, 1992). The following section discusses household level motivations for departure from Somalia.

Household Level Refugee Motivations for Exit

Migration decisions are typically made by families or households which act collectively to maximize security and minimize risks. Households reduce constraints to migration, and can diversify the allocation of resources by sending family members to different destinations to ensure some remittances for support, and by assigning different economic activities to members located at home and in one or more host countries. Moreover, households are part of larger clans, which may provide extended mutual supports and entail obligations (CARE 1995).

As Rumbaut points out, “being a refugee is not a motivationally homogenous experience” (Rumbaut 1991:393). In his research, and also in this study of refugee migration, the respondents clearly differed in the degree of “motivational duress” that they had experienced; that is, they differed in the “degree of perceived danger and lack of control over threatening events that set in motion their decision to leave” (Rumbaut 1991:393). The reasons for leaving home given by respondents will be analysed using Rumbaut’s typology of refugee exit motives (Rumbaut 1991:394), and then each type will be analysed in relation to refugee outcomes.

The refugees’ reasons for leaving home are classified below into political and socio-economic motivations. Political motivations are categorized as rebel or target motivations depending on the degree of danger and the level of control over exit decisions perceived by respondents. In a similar manner, the perception of risk versus opportunity and the amount of time for migration planning determine whether socio-economic motivations are classified as victim-push motives or seeker-pull motives.

The Somalis refugees who participated in this study did not provide simple, one-reason explanations of their motives for leaving home. The 78 separate reasons cited by 30 respondents for leaving home were divided between 38 target and 1 rebel motives, and 2 victim and 37 seeker motives using Rumbaut’s typology of exit motives (see Table 6 below for lists of reasons by type). An equal number of political motivations (1.3 per respondent) and socio-

economic motivations (1.3 per respondent) were reported. Within the diverse motives for exit by Somali refugees, 1.26 target motives and 1.23 seeker motives were reported per respondent, more than double the 0.06 victim motives per refugee or 0.03 rebel motives reported per respondent.

Table 6: Lists of exit motives by type

<u>Political</u> Targets type reasons:	<u>Political</u> Rebel type reasons:
imprisoned prior to exit, specific fear of harm from the regime, fear of arrest, fear of socialists, past political involvement in regime, conscription for military service, general harassment, forceful destruction or confiscation of property, wealth, or business closure loss of position, violence, fear of violence, membership in a minority clan, religious persecution.	pursuit of freedom, oppressive regime, hatred/revenge against regime, membership in an opposition party, protest against conditions, refusal to join a clan-based faction, political-ideological reasons.
<u>Economic</u> Victim type reasons for exit	<u>Socio-Economic</u> Seeker type reasons for exit
lack of food, lack of healthcare, lack access to income, orphans.	family unity, persuaded by family or friends, better education, better prospects for children, better future, offer of support opportunity to leave.

The higher numbers of target motives for leaving home reported per respondent appears to reflect the high levels of distress from pervading fear among respondents due to widespread violence in Somalia in the late 1980s and

early 1990s. The high levels of seeker motives for exit from Somalia reported by respondents seems to show that education is highly valued and family unity is very important to respondents.

The low number of victim motives reported by Somali respondents may be explained by high cost and difficulty of reaching Canada from Somalia, which severely limited the number of refugee claimants in Ottawa from impoverished backgrounds. The low level of rebel motives reported by respondents follows years of political instability, ongoing violence and insecurity in Somalia which may have discouraged rebellious individuals from seeking asylum and encouraged them to actively participate in Somali power politics.

The nine respondents who were between the ages of 15 and 25 when they left Somalia reported more seeker motives (1.4 per person) than target motives (0.8 per person). The five respondents who exited Somalia when they were aged 36 to 45 reported more target motives (2.2 per person) than seeker motives (1.2 per person). This contrast in the types of motives reported by respondents of different age groups indicates that refugees who were young and actively building careers and starting families were more likely to report future-oriented seeker motivations for leaving Somalia. Conversely, respondents who were more mature and advanced in their careers, who had time to accumulate wealth and establish prestigious reputations which they would lose in migration, were more likely to report target motivations for departure from their homes.

Analysis of the responses from Somali refugees indicates that 63% of the

respondents (19 of 30) cited one or more of the list of political target or rebel motivations among their reasons for departure. As in Rumbaut's study of Indochinese refugees, Somali males reported significantly more political motives than females. In this study, twelve male respondents listed 29 separate political exit motives, whereas seven female respondents gave only 10 political reasons for leaving Somalia.

Table 7: Motivations for exit from Somalia, by type and respondent

Type of motivations	#, % citing type	age breakdown of respondents	gender breakdown of respondents
target	4, 13%	2 x 15 to 25 2 x 36 to 45	2m 2f
victim	0, 0		
seeker	10, 33%	5 x 15 to 25 5 x 26 to 35	3m 7f
rebel	0, 0		
target & victim	1, 7%	1 >45	1m
target & seeker	13, 40%	4 >15 2 x 15 to 25 3 x 26 to 35 2 x 36 to 45 2 >45	8m 5f
victim & seeker	1, 3%	1 x 26 to 35	1f
rebel & seeker	1, 3%	1 x 36 to 45	1m

No significant gender differences were noted among the Somali respondents in Ottawa who reported socio-economic reasons for their departure. A total of 80% of the respondents (24 of 30) stated seeker or victim motives in

their reasons for leaving home.

A review of the reasons for leaving home given by Somali refugees shows that the exits of 13% of the respondents (4 of 30) were motivated by strictly political factors limited to the target type. Economic seeker-type motives pulled another 13% of the respondents (4 of 30) to depart from Somalia. In addition, seeker motives were attributed to the six respondents (20%) who were sent abroad to school or who chose to pursue university studies overseas.

Contrasting these seemingly straightforward exit motives, in sixteen (53%) of the cases examined in this study, respondents cited motivations for departure from their homes which were compound and considerably more complex (see Table 7 above). A total of thirteen respondents gave target and seeker motives, compared with one respondent who gave rebel and seeker motivations, and one other respondent who detailed victim and seeker reasons for migrating from Somalia. One respondent also stated both victim and target motivations for leaving home.

Analysis of the complex and compound motivations for exit revealed that half of the thirty refugees who participated in the study were motivated to leave Somalia by a combination of political and socio-economic reasons, citing target-seeker, target-victim, and rebel-seeker motivations. For example, 40% (6 of 15) of respondents who were forced to leave home by violence and fear of violence were also attempting to reunite with members of their families in temporary asylum; 27% (4 of 15) were invited to resettle in Canada by family sponsors; and

20% (3 of 15) were strongly persuaded by parents or spouses to leave Somalia. In these cases, it appears that social-type attractions contributed to migration in addition to political motives pushing respondents from their homes.

Violence and the fear of violence were clearly the most widely reported factors forcing seventeen respondents (57%) to leave Somalia, but economic factors did provide a partial motivation of attraction in seven cases (23% of the total). For example, an older male reported that after his release from prison for supposed anti-government activities, he was unable to earn a living, and he eventually decided to migrate overseas because he was attracted by the possibility of a better life in a peaceful, prosperous, and free country.

Altogether, fourteen respondents (46% of the total) with political-type motives to leave Somalia also had economic-type motives to migrate. These findings support Rumbaut's contention that political and economic considerations are not mutually exclusive but that they may be linked, additive factors causing duress at the point of exit (Rumbaut 1991:393).

Problems arose using Rumbaut's typology because socially oriented seeker motivations such as "family unity" and "persuasion by family" are misleadingly grouped together with motives like "better future" and "better education" and given the label of "economic" motivations (Rumbaut 1991:394). Individual refugees may migrate with or join family members in asylum, and leave behind other loved ones. For respondents motivated to leave home to reunite with family already beginning to resettle in some safe haven, the existence of networks

within a host country implies that some risks associated with migration were reduced and travel plans were more firm.

The distinction between social and economic sub-types of seeker motives could very well be decisive in the outcome of refugee migration and resettlement. Controls prevent asylum shopping by economic victims merely looking for a better future, but with adequate proof to support family relationships, host government sponsorship is available to support family reunification during resettlement in countries like Canada.

The sometimes subtle differences between seeker and victim motivations may be largely related to household wealth, and to the duration of time and degree of control that money and resources afforded them in exit decision-making. Middle and upper class households may have resource entitlements, buffer stocks and assets upon which they can subsist for some time following the onset of a crisis, while some family members migrate to seek out economic opportunities in other areas. Lower class households in marginal zones are vulnerable to disaster, and may be forced to migrate just to meet subsistence needs because they lack networks, income and food reserves to endure hardship or overcome crises.

This discussion of the respondent's motivations for departure from Somalia permits an analysis of the relations between motivations for exit and outcomes in resettlement in Ottawa.

TYPES OF MOTIVATIONS RELATED TO OUTCOMES

This section seeks to identify and analyse relations between the outcomes of resettlement of the 30 Somali refugee respondents, and the types of motivations for their exits from home. The table of motivations for exit from Somalia, on page 114 above, reveals the types of reasons individual respondents reported for leaving home. In the table below, the motivations for departure are shown in relation to resettlement outcomes reported by Somalis in Ottawa.

The relations between respondents' motivations for leaving home and the outcomes of their resettlement were discernible, but not strong. Respondents who reported seeker and target-seeker motives for exit from Somalia tended to report positive outcomes in resettlement. However, only four of ten respondents (40%) who reported seeker motives reported entirely positive outcomes, and only six of thirteen (46%) respondents who reported target-seeker motivations reported only positive outcomes with no marginalisation during resettlement. Over half the respondents who reported seeker or target-seeker motives reported also reported that they were marginalised in one or more forms.

The respondent who reported rebel-seeker motives for departure from Somalia was well integrated in Ottawa during his resettlement. This positive outcome in resettlement is not unexpected, since the respondent was strongly opposed to the Barre regime and left Somalia seeking improved economic opportunities.

The outcomes of all eighteen respondents who reported target, or target

and other motives, for leaving Somalia tended to be more positive than negative. This group included thirteen respondents (72%), eight males and five females who integrated and assimilated well. However, half of the eighteen respondents (50%)-- seven males and two females--were also economically or racially marginalised.

Table 8: Types of motivations for exit related to resettlement outcomes

Type of motive	Positive resettlement outcomes and % of total		Marginalisation in resettlement and % of respondents					
	integration	assimilation	Role	Eco	Race	Poli	Psy	Pro
10 Seeker	7, 23%	2, 7%	0	2, 7%	5, 17%	0	2, 7%	0
1 Rebel-Seeker	1, 3%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1 Seeker-Victim	1, 3%	0	0	1, 3%	0	0	0	0
13 Target-Seeker	5, 17%	3, 10%	2, 7%	4, 13%	3, 10%	0	1, 3%	1, 3%
4 Target	4, 13%	0	0	2, 50%	2, 7%	1, 3%	0	2, 7%
1 Target-Victim	1, 3%	0	0	1, 3%	0	0	0	0

Twenty five respondents, 83% of the total respondent group, stated that they were motivated, at least in part, to leave Somalia for seeker-type reasons. The outcomes of their resettlement activities appear to be more positive than

those who reported target motives for exit described above. Positive outcomes during resettlement were reported by 76% of this group, including seven males and seven females who integrated well in Ottawa. Negative outcomes were reported by six males and two females in this group who were economically marginalised, and also by six females and two males who were racially marginalised during resettlement in Ottawa.

Somali respondents reported more target and seeker type motives, which reflects the danger from violence the refugees left behind, and the difficulty in reaching Canada from the Horn of Africa for more impoverished refugees motivated by victim motives. The analysis of refugee motivations in relation to outcomes during resettlement did not reveal strong links, but this lack of correlation is not unexpected given the predicament of forced migrants, who react with little planning to move away from negative push forces, more than they move towards pull forces in the destination. In the following section, refugees' identification with the home nation will be examined in relation to resettlement outcomes.

Identification/Marginalisation and Migration

In his studies of refugee migrations, Kunz observed that the level of desire to stay in the home nation or the degree of marginalisation in the home society are important home-related factors which affect refugees throughout migration. He presented refugees' national identification/marginality upon departure as a

determinant of both attitudes towards displacement, and of ideological-national orientation of refugees during resettlement abroad (Kunz 1981:44).

The determination of levels of national identification by Somali refugees becomes convoluted because there is a weak national consciousness among members of rival clans, although Somalis belong to the same religious, linguistic and racial groups. On the basis of these similarities, Somalis have often been represented as a homogeneous people (Abdullahi 1997:1), but “far from being a unified people” Somalis are divided into several structurally similar groups capable of combining or dividing at various levels into distinct groups, depending on circumstances (Cassanelli 1982:16). A much quoted Somali proverb states: ‘I and my clan against the world, I and my brother against the clan, I against my brother’ (Cassanelli 1982:21).

The different clans (see Table B on page 230 for a list of major clan families) are able to transform their relations based on kinship into political identities which are sufficiently strong to divide Somalis into groups of friends and enemies (Mouffe 1994:107). As in the fight against foreign colonialists, clans can unite against a common enemy, when it benefits both clans, and if circumstances require.

Samatar explains that the division of Somalis into clan families began a process of ruthless political manipulation which resulted in the empowerment of some clans and the persecution of others (Samatar 1991). The Somalis have been unable to form the clans into a nation of sympathetic members endowed with

feelings of comradeship and united for a common future. In fact, “beyond the redemption of the Somali lands, there were few national objectives that Somalis could agree upon” (Gesheker 1997:78). In the absence of a central government or higher external authority, clans and sub-clan groups have been easily drawn into the spiralling civil war as they continue to retaliate in kind for insult, injury, and homicide.

Even the identification of self-alienated ideological refugees from Somali is confounded. Barre’s military socialist regime was opposed by more than a dozen so-called united, national, or alliance movements (see Table A on page 229). However, not all political activists who were strongly ideologically opposed by scientific socialism were willing to take up arms in support of democratic or other political ideals. Many opponents of Barre’s regime who were forced into exile to avoid persecution continued to support factions by sending money and supplies from abroad. As well, the end of socialism and the fall of the corrupt government may have presented an opportunity for more dedicated revolutionary activists to repatriate.

However, among the respondents, politically active Somali refugees indicated that the fall of socialism was a necessary condition, but not a sufficient one for their return home. Like their compatriots in Somalia, the respondents appear to be divided along clan lines, and also along ideological lines: some support a return to some form of democratic rule, others call for the introduction of some type of Islamic rule, while some respondents advocate a division of the

country into an independent Islamic state and a secular republic.

Following repeated reviews of the information from interviews with respondents, their national identification or marginality at home which contributed to their departure was determined, and the results are shown in Table 9 below. A total of 66% or twenty of the thirty respondents reported that they identified with the majority of Somalis who were opposed to the ongoing civil war. This group included eight males and twelve females from all age groups. Testimony from respondents indicates that especially female refugees are strong adherents to pan-Somali nationalism and opposed to clan politics.

Table 9: National identification/marginality of respondents prior to exit

Level of identification or marginalisation with home nation	m	f	total	% of respondents	respondents by gender, age group
Majority-identified refugees	8	12	20	66 %	3f/1m <15 4f/3m x 15 to 25 3f/2m x 26 to 35 1f x 36 to 45 1f/2m < 45,
Events-alienated refugees	4	1	5	17 %	1f/1m x 26 to 35 3m x 36 to 45
Self-alienated refugees	3	2	5	17 %	1f/1m x 15 to 25, 1f/1m x 26 to 35, 1m x 36 to 45

The remaining third of the respondents indicated that they were alienated from the Somali nation. When asked under what conditions they would return to Somalia, these respondents reported that they would “never go back.” They stated they did not wish to repatriate to Somalia “to live” or “to settle” because

they had “nothing to go back to” and “no reason to go there anymore.”

Altogether five respondents or 17% of the study group said they were irrevocably alienated from Somalia following events which forced their departure. The events-alienated group was predominantly male, and all five respondents were between 26 and 40 upon departure. Two males who were alienated by events were members of the Isaaq clan persecuted by the Barre regime, one female was a victim of years of religious discrimination, one male was violently attacked and another male imprisoned prior to departure.

Among the respondents, three males and two females testified that they were self-alienated refugees from Somalia who strongly opposed Barre’s military regime. All these respondents left Somalia for ideological or personal reasons between 1982 and 1987, and as Kunz points out, they may be easily confused with voluntary migrants. One female respondent left Somalia to build a new life in a democratic and egalitarian society, along with her husband who was forced to exit to avoid military service. One self-alienated male youth left Somalia prior to forced recruitment in the army after his father was killed in fighting in the north. One female and one male self-alienated respondent were ex-government officials forced to leave to avoid becoming implicated in corrupt activities, and one male anti-socialist left after his assets were seized by the government. One respondent explained that “we predicted trouble and left because we were so distressed. At work the tensions kept building. The bosses were corrupt and we were all fed up but we couldn’t say anything. We hoped things would change for the better and

then cool down when they chased out the old regime but since the tribal wars, neighbours are fighting and there's lots of uncertainty about what will happen."

All five of these respondents were alienated from Somalia primarily because Somalia is too militaristic. Lewis characterised Somalis as a "warlike people" (Lewis 1981:241). Alienated respondents tended to support this assertion, explaining that "everyone has a gun there, and mines are everywhere." "As long as the old generation is still there, things won't change. The old set of values is rigid and never changes. Some of the values and customs were bad, and the war brought out things in the closet. Tribalism is a tool for knowing your background, but the negative aspects must be destroyed. Tribalism is used for killing others and it is deadly and dangerous." "No one can deny that you get victimised because of the clan you belong to. It is not the way it was meant to be." "Somalis always fight. Even before, one man would steal camels and then two tribes would be in a war because of it." "Even before the civil war there were problems. I don't feel safe to go back, they might kill me."

The results of the determination of the respondents' marginality within Somali society prior to departure were analysed in relation to their outcomes during resettlement (see Table 10 below). Respondents' alienation from Somalia was related with higher levels of integration during resettlement in Canada. All five respondents who were self-alienated from Somalia reported positive outcomes, including two males and two females who were integrated and one male who was assimilated during resettlement in Ottawa. Four of the five

respondents who were alienated from Somalia by events reported positive resettlement outcomes, compared with 65% or thirteen of twenty respondents who were majority-identified refugees who reported positive outcomes.

Table 10: National identification/marginalisation and resettlement outcomes

Type of National relations	Positive resettlement outcomes and % of total		Marginalisation in resettlement and % total					
	integration	assimilation	Role	Eco	Race	Poli	Psy	Pro
20 Majority-identified	9, 30%	4, 13%	3, 10%	8, 27%	6, 20%	1, 3%	3, 10%	2, 7%
5 Events alienated	4, 13%	0	0	3, 10%	2, 7%	0	0	1, 3%
5 Self-alienated	4, 13%	1, 3%	0	0	1, 3%	0	0	0

Furthermore, the level of marginalisation during resettlement appeared to be somewhat higher among home oriented majority-identified respondents than among the alienated group. Altogether, 55% or eleven of twenty of the majority-identified respondents, including five males and six females, reported that they were marginalised in one way or another during resettlement in Canada.

Among the alienated groups of respondents, half reported that they were marginalised in some way during resettlement in Ottawa. Only one self-alienated respondent reported racial marginalisation. Negative results were reported by four different respondents who were events-related refugees, including two males and one female who attested to economic marginalisation and one male who

stated that he was racially marginalised during resettlement

Summary of analysis of home-related factors of Somali refugee migration

Refugee migration appears to result from complex, interrelated cumulative causes. An overview of macro-level factors related to the forced migration of Somalis showed that the departures of waves of refugees were triggered by political threats and dangers which occurred during periods of economic, and environmental hardship. This was demonstrated in a review of particular events linked to two major waves of migration of Somalis in the Horn of Africa since 1988.

Macro-level factors are perceived by individuals with different attributes. Analysis showed that individual refugee attributes included in the general model of migration were strongly related to outcomes during resettlement, particularly the characteristics of age, occupation, education, language, destination information, and previous travel experiences. Surprisingly, resettlement outcomes did not seem to be strongly indicated by the family support networks in Canada.

Households mediate between macro-level forces and individual responses. Refugee households are the key units of migration which determine the capacities/vulnerabilities of individuals to cope with emergencies and strongly influence the survival strategies of individuals. At the household level, an analysis

of respondents' reasons for leaving home showed that most refugees were motivated to depart due to multiple, additive and complex reasons. Somali respondents in Canada tended not to report either victim or rebel motivations for exit from their homelands. Unexpectedly, types of motivations for exit did not appear to be strongly related to outcomes during resettlement.

The next part of this study will look at displacement-related factors of migration. Forms of displacement, kinetic types of refugees, attitudes to displacement, and post-displacement identification with the homeland, as well as flight conditions and pressures in asylum will be analysed in relation to refugee outcomes to test their predictive value as refugee migration variables.

CHAPTER 6

DISPLACEMENT FACTORS RELATED TO MIGRATION BY SOMALI REFUGEES

To help evaluate the explanatory capacity and applicability of the concepts contained in the general model for refugee migration, each of the 22 variables identified in the six different categories of the displacement-related factors of refugee migration was analysed in relation to resettlement outcomes reported by Somali refugees in Canada. The following section presents highlights from the analysis process, including problems encountered while breaking down and evaluating data according to the conceptual categories comprised in the model, and clear or unexpected relations noted between resettlement outcomes and forms and attitudes of displacement, kinetic types of refugees, flight conditions and pressures in asylum.

Displacement by Flight or Absence, and Resettlement Results

Geographers studying refugee migrations have shown interest in aspects such as methods of transport, distances, and routes of displacement categorized in the general model as flight conditions. From a slightly different perspective, Kunz undertook a broad review of refugee migrations and determined that forms of displacement were significant factors related to refugee outcomes. Looking at the movements of diverse migrant groups, he identified four main types: displacement by discipline, force, absence, and flight (Kunz 1973:139-142).

In the last two decades, Somali refugees have been displaced by any one of these forms. During the Ogaden war with Ethiopia, refugees in camps, and possibly Somali military personnel and populations of border towns were forced to cross borders (Keonhulz 1980). As well, thousands of refugees were forcibly resettled in Somalia, while the alternative to participation in relocation programmes was expulsion back to Ethiopia (Hasci and Waldron 1994). After the fall of his regime, Barre, his family members, and high ranking officials in his government were effectively banished to Kenya on pain of death (USCR 1992).

Only two forms of displacement, by absence and by flight, were reported by Somali refugees who migrated to Ottawa. Table 11 below shows that 83% of the respondents (15 males and 10 females) were displaced by flight, and 17% (1 male and 4 females) were displaced by absence.

Table 11: Forms of displacement of respondents from Somalia

Form of displacement	m	f	m + f	% of total respondents
Displaced by absence	1	4	5	17%
Displacement by flight	15	10	25	83%
sub-group: Mass flight	5	6	11	37%
sub-group: small group escape	9	5	14	47%

Analysis of forms of displacement in relation to outcomes of resettlement reveals that four females were integrated out of the five respondents who were displaced by absence. Unexpectedly, among the respondents displaced by absence, two out of five (one male and one female) were psychologically

marginalised (40% of respondents displaced by absence). The two respondents who were displaced from their homelands by absence rather than by plan or by an event are among the total of three respondents who were psychologically marginalised (66% of psychologically marginalised respondents). This appears to indicate that home and/or host-related factors of migration affect the mental health of refugees during resettlement.

The mixed outcomes reported by respondents who were displaced by flight seem to indicate that in many cases, the tendency for positive results during resettlement by refugees who escape from dangerous countries may be undermined by influential host-related factors of migration. As Table 11 above shows, fourteen respondents (47% of the study participants) reported that their flight from Somalia was undertaken alone or in small groups.

Overall, eleven out of fourteen respondents (79% of respondents displaced by flight) who escaped from Somalia individually or in small groups reported positive results in resettlement in Ottawa. But, high levels of marginalisation were also reported (see Table I on page 234).

Table 11 above also shows that eleven respondents were displaced from Somalia in mass refugee movements. A total of eight out of eleven respondents, 73% of those displaced en masse, reported positive outcomes during displacement. However, more than half of the respondents displaced in mass waves reported some form of marginalisation during resettlement.

It appears that even respondents who reported that they had virtually no

control over their departure integrated into Canadian society despite their lack of preparation for migration from Somalia. The outcomes of resettlement cannot be adequately explained by forms of displacement alone.

In addition to the forms of displacement which influence the composition of groups of refugee migrants, Kunz discerned that the “kinetics of refugee movements” which carry involuntary migrants from their homelands to host countries of resettlement “have a selective effect on participants and in turn also condition eventual refugee outcomes” (Kunz 1981:146). The kinetics of the movements of Somali refugee respondents are examined below.

Kinetic Types of Refugee Movement

In his model of refugee movement, Kunz contrasts “acute refugee movements” which “arise from great political changes or movements of armies” and “anticipatory refugee movements” which take place before orderly departure is prevented by a “deterioration of the military or political situation” (Kunz 1973:132-3). While in theory these kinetic refugee movements are easily differentiated, the relative significance of violent political events and the determination the last date for planned departure before acute conditions impede exit becomes complicated in long, drawn-out situations of widespread insecurity from political oppression, factional fighting, civil war, chaos and instability such as those faced by Somalis in the 1980s and 1990s.

From an international perspective, the collapse of the Somali armed forces

and the downfall of Siad Barre's regime in January of 1991 was undoubtedly a momentous political event. From a national perspective, the May 1988 uprooting and destruction of Hargeisa by government forces is also included as an historically important date for Somalis. Finally, from the perspective of a supporter of the Somali National Movement or a citizen of the northern region of Somali, the first organised military attack against the government in January of 1982 and the state of emergency which followed can also be justifiably deemed important political events (Metz 1992:192).

From the point of view of individual respondents who participated in this study, any involuntary, unplanned cross border escape from unanticipated "military pressures" in the "absence of positive original motivations to settle elsewhere" was classified as an acute refugee movement (Kunz 1981:130).

Table 12: Types of kinetic refugee movements by Somali respondents

Kinetic refugee movements by Somali respondents in flight	m	f	total	% of total
Acute movements	9	6	15	50 %
Pushed-planned movements	5	5	10	33 %
Absent and stranded respondents who joined acute movements	1	2	3	10 %

Table 12 above shows that, altogether, among the 25 respondents who were displaced from Somalia by flight, a total of fifteen respondents or 60% exited Somalia in acute movements. Table 12 also indicates that one male and

two females respondent displaced by absence and stranded outside of Somalia at the outset of the civil war “joined acute refugee movements in the midway-to-nowhere stage” by their refusal to return to their homeland (Kunz 1981:135).

Respondents’ movements were classified as pushed-planned if they left Somalia after preparations for migrations were undertaken, including gathering information about transportation to different destinations, selling property, converting or transferring wealth, and pre-arranging support from friends or family. Ten of 25 respondents displaced by flight successfully departed from Somalia in pushed-planned refugee movements (see Table J on page 235).

Analysis of outcomes during resettlement in relation to the kinetic movements of the respondents displaced by flight appears to indicate that refugees who made pushed-planned movements tended to achieve slightly more positive results in resettlement than refugees who migrated across borders in acute movements. All of the respondents who made pushed-planned refugee movements reported positive outcomes, compared with 67% of those who exited in acute movements. Eight of ten respondents, 4 males and 4 females who made pushed-planned movements in migration reported to be integrated, and one male and one female said they were assimilated during resettlement in Ottawa.

However, the group of respondents who made pushed-planned movements also reported a higher level of negative outcomes in resettlement. A total of 60% or six different respondents from the group of ten pushed-plan migrants reported that they were marginalised during resettlement.

Kunz assumes that anticipatory migrants arrive “door-to-door” in the host country, well prepared, with knowledge of the language and able to re-enter the employment occupation (Kunz 1973:131). This is not the case for the pushed-plan respondents who reported negative resettlement outcomes. After initial migration plans went awry, three of six pushed-plan respondents who reported negative outcomes took a “plunge” by seeking asylum in Canada with virtually no information about resettlement conditions. Two pushed-plan respondents reported that they were misinformed about opportunities and conditions in Canada: one male reported that he “believed Canada was an easy place to live, where I would be able to live a comfortable life, but now that I am here it is totally different.”

Rather unexpectedly, psychological marginalisation was reported by two out of the three respondents who were displaced by absence from Somalia, but later joined acute movements when they were unable to return home following non-accepted claims for asylum in other countries. One female who departed from Somalia in an acute movement reported she was psychologically marginalised during resettlement in Ottawa. Her depression and despair during resettlement may be related to traumatic experiences prior to and during flight, including violence during the years she spent in a refugee camp in Kenya.

Kunz contended that displacement forms “may influence the composition of the displacement groups” (Kunz 1973:146). Following observations of refugee movements, he predicted that “anticipatory refugee moves are composed almost

solely of the well-informed, well-to-do and well educated” (Kunz 1981:49). Analysis of the education and information about Canada obtained by the ten respondents prior to their migrations from Somalia in pushed-planned movements appears to reveal some evidence to support this predictive hypothesis. Among the ten pushed-plan migrants, 50% were well informed about Canada prior to arrival, and 70% had post-secondary education prior to their migration from home. However, only 40% of pushed-plan migrants were both well-informed about Canada and post-secondary school graduates prior to their departure from Somalia.

The examination of kinetic refugee movements by Somali respondents reveals evidence that does not corroborate Kunz’s hypothesis that anticipatory refugee moves tend to include an overwhelming proportion of events-alienated persons (Kunz 1981:49). A total of fifteen different respondents reported that they were resentful against compatriots in Somalia due to violence, robbery, murder, imprisonment, or injustices committed by clan militants against them or their families. These refugees were “ambivalent or embittered in their attitude to their former compatriots” due to events immediately preceding their flight or because of past discriminations (Kunz 1981:43).

It appears that time in exile has mellowed bitter attitudes and reduced ambivalence of five respondents against Somalis away from their country of origin more than ten years. During their exile some respondents gained solace by the fall of the government, or the declaration of the independent Somaliland

Republic. Altogether only five of these disaffected respondents reported that they were irrevocably alienated from their compatriots at home. Among the ten respondents who exited Somalia in pushed-planned movements, only two respondents were events-alienated refugees. Among five events-alienated respondents, three exited from Somalia in acute movements.

Kunz believed strongly in the predictive capacity of his framework, and based on his studies of different migrations he hypothesised that “the events-alienated settler, who arrives as an anticipatory refugee, is most likely to become a successful settler: the background combines both a motivation of *tabula rasa* towards the host society and the most favourable pattern of refugee kinetics” (Kunz 1981:51). To test this hypothesis, the kinetics of respondents’ refugee movements, and their identification with Somalis at home, was examined in relation to their resettlement outcomes in Ottawa. The results of the test find no evidence to prove Kunz’s prediction was correct.

On the contrary, the findings from this study seem to indicate that the most positive outcomes and least negative results were reported by respondents who were self-alienated Somalis who arrived in Ottawa as pushed-planned refugees. One other well-integrated respondent who left Somalia in a pushed-planned movement was a majority-identified refugee. Two events-dislocated respondents who left Somalia in acute refugee movements also reported that they were well-integrated and non-marginalised in Ottawa. In addition, reports of strongly positive resettlement outcomes and no complaints of marginalisation were

received from two majority-identified respondents who were forced from Somalia in acute movements.

Neither of the events-dislocated respondents who arrived in Canada after a pushed-planned departure from Somalia reported entirely positive outcomes. They both reported that they were integrated as well as economically marginalised and racially marginalised. One female respondent dislocated by events considered herself well integrated at university and in her multi-ethnic community in downtown Ottawa, but she also reported that she “lost everything, including a great big home, and now I am living below poverty. . . Tolerance is very low here, it is a cultural thing. Some Canadians won’t even accept my help, they always think someone is taking advantage of them. No one accepted my qualifications. My main concern now it to finish school and find a job, to raise my children here in Canada and stay in Canada.” A male respondent dislocated by events was well socially integrated said, “I have family and lots of friends here. After I donated time as a volunteer to help out other refugees, I got a job as a paid employee, but the project won’t last forever. Before I had to depend on my sister and my uncles, now I send a bit of money to family at home. . . I got in fights before with some guys, they were racists and I phoned the police. One time I locked my keys in the car and I was using a coat hanger to open the door. Some prejudiced whites thought I was trying to steal the car and reported me without even trying to help.”

According to Kunz, regardless of whether refugees leave their homeland in

anticipatory or acute movements, they appear to fall into one of three different categories based on their social relationship to the population of their country of origin (Kunz 1981:42). The following discussion of respondents' attitudes towards displacement will examine the respondents' identification with home-country populations in relation to outcomes during resettlement in Canada.

Attitudes Towards Displacement and Resettlement Outcomes

In a discussion of the importance of refugees' attitudes towards displacement as one of the defining factors in refugee migration, Kunz reveals that relations to home may change over time but nevertheless, they continue to affect refugees in different phases of migration regardless of the form of their departure (Kunz 1973:41-6). Especially immediately following involuntary flight, the strength of a refugee's desire to stay at home is reflected in their disposition to wait for changes at home which will permit their successful return, or to begin building a new life in some other countries.

In general, active, forward looking refugees feel forced to leave home in pursuit of an ideological purpose; while reactive, backward looking refugees flee involuntarily in response to an acute event at home. Following departures from home, refugees begin a process of redefining their relations towards the people and places they left behind in their country of origin. After a time, even strong nationalists who were forced to flee to temporary safety can become demoralised when conditions of insecurity in their homeland continue to block their

repatriation. In this period of displacement, refugees who cannot turn back are left disoriented, dislocated, floundering in a “spiritual, spacial, temporal, emotional” place halfway-to-nowhere (Kunz 1973:133).

Dislocated refugees become increasingly disconnected with home nations as they step from temporary asylum towards long-term or even permanent exile. This may occur when they are required to deal with flight-related economic, legal, administrative and psychological issues of survival, and they start to build new social and environmental relationships (Kunz 1973:133). A refugee’s attitude towards displacement reflects their “marginality within or identification with their former home country” (Kunz 1981:42). And in turn, the duration of the dislocation phase and the level of dissociation with the home nation during displacement may be reflected in their attitude towards resettlement.

After identifying reactive-fate groups and purpose groups as two main types of refugee groups based on their attitudes towards displacement, Kunz further discriminates between two sub-types of purpose group refugees. One sub-type of purpose groups is self-fulfilling, and the other is made up of revolutionary activists.

Among the Somali respondents, a total of fifteen respondents or 50% of the study group departed from Somalia in reaction to acute events: these nine males and six females were classified as a reactive-fate group. The other half of the respondents were categorised as purpose group refugees, including one male and four females refugees who left Somalia for educational or work purposes and

who were displaced by absence, and five males and five female refugees who recognised trends of increasing political oppression, governmental corruption, economic deprivation, militarisation, destruction of property, confiscation of wealth, social intolerance and crime and therefore departed in pushed-planned movements.

Table 13 below shows the respondents' attitudes towards displacement related to the outcomes during their resettlement in Canada. Analysis of these results appears to show a strong tendency for positive outcomes during resettlement by refugees classified in the purpose group, including the respondents displaced in prepared movements and by absence from Somalia.

Table 13: Attitudes towards displacement and resettlement outcomes

Fate group	Positive resettlement outcomes and % of total		Marginalisation in resettlement and % of respondents					
	integration	assimilation	Role	Eco	Race	Poli	Psy	Pro
15 Reactive	7, 23%	3, 10%	3, 10%	5, 17%	2, 7%	1, 3%	1, 3%	2, 7%
15 Purpose	12, 40%	2, 7%	0	6, 20%	8, 27%	0	2, 7%	1, 3%

Altogether, among the fifteen purpose group refugees in this study, 80% or twelve reported that they were integrated and an additional 13% reported that they were assimilated during resettlement in Ottawa. In contrast, only 47%, or seven of fifteen refugees in the reactive-fate group reported integration, including six males but only one female. The 20% of reactive refugees who reported that

they were assimilated were children refugees who departed from Somalia following acute events but then benefited from direct transit, integrative school settings, strong community and family supports in Ottawa to facilitate their assimilation.

The level of marginalisation was lower among the respondents in the reactive fate-group than for the purpose group refugees. Reactive fate-group refugees appear to have lower expectations than purpose-group refugees. Lower levels of marginalisation reported by respondents in the reactive fate-group may reflect perceptions that, relative to conditions which forced their departure and those experience during temporary asylum, their situation in Canada was better.

This examination of displacement-related factors of migration has focussed primarily on categories of forms of displacement, kinetic refugee movements, and refugees' attitudes towards displacement. The following section examines different conditions of flight experienced by individual respondents and macro-level pressures in asylum in relation to resettlement outcomes.

Flight Conditions and Resettlement Outcomes

For any traveller, a long-distance journey may entail "stressful life events" (Rumbaut 1991:383); indeed, the word travel--to journey-- comes from old French *travail*, which means work, task, effort, agony, and torment (Gilman 1983:1256). However, refugees may be more vulnerable than other travellers to difficulties while in transit. Involuntary migrants may be forced to accept high

levels of risk and discomfort in their flight to a safe haven in order to overcome obstacles between areas of origin and asylum destinations.

Difficulties experienced by refugees in flight may derive from lack of sufficient preparation for long-term and long-distance travel, inadequate access to resources necessary to sustain health and activities after their departure from home, and increased exposure to unknown physical dangers, diseases, and crimes in new lands. Among the most unrelenting impediments to refugee travel are governmental controls on immigration which increase the psychological and material cost of migration.

Refugees in flight are “overloaded by compelling pressures to survive” (Rumbaut 1991:384). Refugees from war-torn contexts, including many of the respondents who fled from Somalia, are often traumatised by violent events, life-threatening experiences, and the deaths of significant others (Rumbaut 1991:384). This section discusses major obstacles to safe and rapid travel by respondents, and examines some of the links between flight conditions and refugee outcomes. In additions to the respondents’ descriptions of problems encountered in travel, indirect evidence from published sources was used to determine the types of obstacles to refugee flight. Analysis of flight conditions for the Somali respondents is limited because many of the flight histories given by respondents were not sufficiently specific concerning precise distances of travel, perceived opportunities or obstacles to movement or resettlement, traumatic experiences in transit, and losses en route to Canada.

DEPARTURE AND SPEED OF FLIGHT

The review of macro-level home-related factors of migration from Somalia showed that pressures forcing Somalis to migrate increased throughout the early 1980s. Forces for out-migration intensified considerably from 1988 to the end of 1990, then peaked during the civil war crisis in 1991. In 1992, United Nations' operations in UNOSOM I, and UNITAF were unable to provide security for civilians and aid workers in Somalia, then fighting escalated under UNOSOM II, and forces pushing Somalis from their homelands were not significantly reduced until 1993 peace accords (Cohen 1995).

It appears that female respondents tended to migrate from Somalia before their male counterparts (see Table J on page 235). Eleven or 73% of female respondents, and seven or 47% of male respondents left Somalia prior to 1991; whereas 27% of female respondents left after the fall of the Barre regime in 1991, and 53% of males respondents departed during the civil war.

Half of the thirty refugees who participated in this study of refugee migration departed before 1991. Not surprisingly, there appears to be a strong relation between early departure from Somalia and positive resettlement outcomes in Ottawa. A total of 93% of the respondents who exit before 1991 reported positive outcomes of resettlement, including 80% who reported they were integrated and 13% who reported to be assimilated. Only 7% of those who departed from Somalia prior to 1991 reported economic marginalisation during resettlement in Ottawa.

The thirteen respondents, 43% of the study group, who left Somalia during the peak period of factional fighting and political insecurity between 1988 and the end of 1992 tended to report more negative resettlement outcomes than respondents who departed earlier. Seven, or 53% of the respondents who left Somalia during this highly chaotic period were economically marginalised, while 22% or two respondents were psychologically marginalised.

The average duration of flight from Somalia to Canada was about 18 months. Five respondents arrived to meet relatives in Canada after just a few days in transit, while other respondents sought asylum in as many as five countries over periods several years before finally entering Canada.

Among the 25 respondents who were displaced from Somalia by flight, twelve refugees, or 48%, remained in flight for more than one year prior to resettlement in Canada (see Table L on page 236). A total of 75% of the refugees who were in flight for more than one year were largely successful in their resettlement in Canada.

More direct and speedier flights from Somalia to Canada resulted in mixed positive and negative outcomes. On the whole, the outcomes reported by respondents who remained in flight for up less than one year tended to be more negative than for those who took more than a year to migrate to Canada. Of the thirteen respondents in flight for less than one year, 46%—five males and one female—reported they were economically marginalised.

INFORMATION ABOUT DESTINATION

The positive resettlement outcomes reported by respondents who remained in flight for more than one year may be attributed to their adaptive capacities, indicated by their ability to successfully overcome barriers to travel and endure hardships en route to their destination in host countries (Rumbaut 1991:385). However, positive outcomes of permanent resettlement in Canada may also reflect effective selection of asylum locations based on informed decisions resulting from the elimination of unacceptable locations for resettlement after experiences in different temporary asylum situations, along with information about their ultimate landing location gathered while in flight. Partial support for this tentative conclusion comes from reports by 58% of the respondents who were integrated during resettlement, and who chose to seek asylum in Canada based on its reputation as a safe haven for refugees after more than one year in flight.

Overall, information about the destination appeared to be a strong indicator of positive outcomes in resettlement. All of fourteen of the respondents with some correct information about Canada prior to arrival reported that they were integrated or assimilated compared with less than a third of respondents without information who reported positive resettlement outcomes. All of the misinformed respondents reported negative outcomes during resettlement.

DISTANCE OF MIGRATION

All of the respondents who left Somalia by flight took short routes to find a safe haven by travelling via direct land routes from Somalia to one of three

countries bordering Somalia, including Djibouti in the north, Ethiopia in the west, and Kenya in the south and west. Only 16% of respondents continued their transit directly to Canada, while 84% or 21 of the 25 respondents who left Somalia by flight, sought temporary asylum in one or more other countries prior to their resettlement in Canada. All four of the respondents who resettled in Canada without any interim stays in other countries reported positive results during resettlement in Ottawa. A total of 15 of 21, or 71% of respondents who sought temporary asylum elsewhere prior to making a refugee claim in Canada, later achieved positive results during resettlement in Ottawa.

An analysis of the long trans-Atlantic, intercontinental migration patterns by refugee respondents from Somalia suggests that the distance of travel was a primary factor in the selection of initial safe haven, but not a determining factor in the migration of the Somali respondents who resettled in Canada. It appears that the first priority of Somali respondents' was to evade danger, and then once respondents were away from serious threats to safety, they made decisions concerning locations where they would attempt longer-term if not permanent resettlement.

Kunz hypothesised that the "distance overcome" by refugees in flight "and the quality of the refugee are positively related." It could be argued that all Somali refugees who resettled in Canada are long distance migrants, and that the overall positive outcomes reported by the study group as a whole serve to support his hypothesis. Kunz's hypothesis was drawn from a comparison of migrations by

refugees from different homelands; however, when it is applied in a comparative analysis of resettlement outcomes in relation to distances migrated by Somali respondents, the evidence does not appear to support his prediction. Of the respondents who travelled the longest distances by travelling away and then towards Canada in migration, 60% reported positive outcomes in resettlement, compared with 81% positive outcomes for migrants travelling steadily towards Canada with stops en route and 100% positive resettlement results reported by respondents who migrated directly to Canada.

Resettlement outcomes for shorter distance migrants also tended to be less negative than the results of resettlement of respondents who travelled longer distances. While 63% of longer distance travellers complained they were marginalised during resettlement, only 40% of the shorter distance travellers reported that they were economically marginalised during resettlement in Canada.

OBSTACLES TO MIGRATION & ASYLUM OPPORTUNITIES

Under the Barre regime, the borders of Somalia remained porous to waves and streams of involuntary migrants, but cross-border movements were still risky due to blocks set up by the Somali National Security Service (Metz 1992:162). In their flight to personal safety, it is not clear how many of the 600,000 internally displaced Somali were unable to leave the country, but some 700,000 forced migrants exited Somalia (Wood 1994:610).

An examination of the turmoil throughout the Horn of Africa in the 1980s

and 1990s shows that nearby destinations open to refugees from Somalia were far from secure (Hasci and Waldron 1994; Hutchison 1991). While the civil war raged in Somalia, the late 1980s and early 1990s were also periods of confusion and lawlessness from civil war in Ethiopia. In 1991, an estimated six million people living in Ethiopia were at risk due to food shortages, drought, and political upheavals throughout the region, and refugee aid convoys were favoured targets of bandits (USCR 1992:41). Despite these dangerous conditions, most Somali refugees ended up in Ethiopia, and by 1995, there were still approximately 50,000 refugees living in the Hartesheik camp, while two other Ethiopian camps each hosted more than 40,000 refugees. Many new arrivals to the camps exhibited severe malnutrition. In addition to the officially recognized refugees, about 15,000 unassisted Somalis lived in precarious conditions in the extreme southeast corner of Ethiopia (USCR 1996:48).

Journeys by sea from Somalia were harsh, and for some even fatal. Boats filled with Somali refugees were refused docking rights in Kenya, in April 1992 vessels were towed out to sea and cut adrift by the Kenyan navy, and in May, 37 refugees drowned when their boat sank off the Kenyan coast (USCR 1992:49).

Somalis who entered Kenya were not welcomed with typical "African hospitality" (Bascom, 1993:323). Local authorities in Kenya pressed for the closure of refugee camps located near urban centres, and police swept city streets to apprehend undocumented refugees not residing in camps. Tensions between locals and refugees competing for land and aid resulted in acts of arson and

violence in camps along the coast. Residents of coastal camps were transferred involuntarily to join insecure compatriots isolated in the northeast. In 1993 and 1994, thousands of Somalis were forcibly repatriated from Kenya, when the government of Kenya advocated publically for the immediate expulsion all refugees from Kenyan soil. Nonetheless, by 1995, about 120,000 Somali refugees still lived in the eastern regions, and an additional 50,000 unassisted Somali refugees lived in urban areas (USCR 1996:52).

Like its belligerent neighbours, in 1991 Djibouti was also on the brink of civil war (USCR 1992:40). Over the years the Djibouti government reluctantly accepted some waves of refugees, and also forcibly repatriated and harassed other groups of refugees (USCR 1992:39). Recognized refugees were required to live in four designated camps in the southern part of the country, where malnutrition rates over 40% were reported in 1991. Somalis were refused official refugee status in Djibouti since they were regarded as economic migrants rather than refugees. As a result, some 20,000 Somalis lived without relief assistance in camps or with relatives in Djiboutiville (USCR 1996:46).

For Somalis who made it to Arab countries, welcomes were not as warm as Somalis expected. In Egypt, Somalis were luckier than other refugee groups, and although the Egyptian government did not grant them permanent residence, it did issue six-month renewable residence permits to Somali refugees (USCR 1996:47).

The peak war period in the Horn of Africa coincided with the Gulf War, effectively closing off traditional international labour migration systems used by

Somalis, and reducing the options open to Somali refugees searching for a safe haven. In the build-up to the Gulf War, 960 Somalis were expelled from Saudi Arabia (USCR 1992:35). More recently, Yemen has also expelled more than 400 Somali refugees (USCR 1996:7).

Along the Mediterranean Sea at the border between impoverished Africa and wealthy Europe, the “rich countries have very restrictive immigration policies and well-policed boundaries and ports of entry” (Findlay and Gould 1994b:120). In Europe, 90% of the applications for asylum from Somalis were refused entry, many right at the border (UNHCR 1994:4). It appears that European states applied a restrictive interpretation of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees to deny Somali claims. Excluded from entry were asylum seekers who were victims of generalized violence in the civil war following the fall of the Barre regime, but who could not establish that they were persecuted or threatened by the state.

The overall patterns of Somali refugees in flight show that modern technologies were effective in “ordering, constraining, and channelling migration” (Findlay and Gould 1994a:279). Migration controls blocked refugee flows out of the Horn, and further constrained the already limited migration capacities of impoverished Somali households, such that in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the vast majority of Somali refugees were concentrated in hazardous, high-risk destinations in hostile or warring neighbouring countries within the Horn of Africa.

It is wrong to assume that refugees are victims who have no options about where to find asylum (Gardener and de Jong 1981:15). While migration controls were effective against waves of refugees with limited access to resources and migration networks, trickles of better off Somalis did migrate further than the neighbouring countries in Horn of Africa. Since 1990, Somalis have sought asylum in 31 one or more countries, including: Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Eritrea, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Libya, Lebanon, Syria, Egypt, Tanzania, Swaziland, Malawi, Zambia, Pakistan, India, Italy, Holland, Germany, France, Belgium, Russia, Romania, Hungary, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Norway, Finland, Denmark, the United States, Canada, Australia (UNHCR 1996b; USCR 1992; USCR 1996; Utteh 1997).

The migration system examined in this study connects North America with the Horn Africa. No direct, regularly scheduled airlines or passenger ships run between the Horn of Africa region and Canada, and as discussed previously, all of the Somali respondents had to cross more than two borders en route to Canada.

Kunz links a refugee's capacity to resettle successfully to their capacity to overcome the difficulties and obstacles in travel (Kunz 1981:50). The Somali respondents reported that they faced numerous obstacles and impediments in transit and in situations of temporary asylum. A variety of methods were used to evade intermediate border controls impeding travel to North America, including extra-legal strategies.

A total of 84% or 21 of these 25 respondents displaced by flight, including

fourteen males and seven females, were chain migrants who sought temporary asylum in at least one other country before their arrival in Canada (see Table M on page 236). From this study, it appears that male refugees may be somewhat more mobile than female refugees. Among the respondents who were chain migrants, 66% were males. Eleven respondents who were involuntary chain-migrants sought temporary asylum in just one country before they applied for asylum in Canada, and a total of ten respondents sought temporary asylum in two or more countries.

An analysis of chain-connections during forced migrations did not show any significant relations between the number of borders crossed or obstacles overcome by respondents before resettlement and the outcomes of their resettlement (see Table O on page 237). Still, of the ten respondents who migrated through two or more countries, 80% reported positive outcomes and only 40% reported economic, racial or political marginalisation during resettlement in Ottawa, compared with 63% positive outcomes and 45% negative resettlement results reported by respondents who sought temporary asylum in only one country prior to Canada. This evidence appears to support Kunz's hypothesis that "the number of countries the refugee has to cross" is positively related to the quality of the refugee.

TRAUMATIC EVENTS IN FLIGHT

The general model of migration and adaptation suggests refugee outcomes are influenced by traumatic events such as violence, residence in refugee camps,

and family loss and separation during migration (Rumbaut 1991:385). Many Somali refugees throughout the Horn of Africa went through harrowing experiences, witnessed killings, and were victims of violence (USCR 1996; Watch 1994; Watch 1991; USCR 1992).

In this study, fourteen or 46% of respondents, described experiences of duress during flight. It appears that males followed flight strategies which left them particularly vulnerable to obstacles and dangers, and 78% of the reports of traumatic experiences in flight came from male respondents: however, it is clear that female respondents were particularly vulnerable to trauma from sexual violence, but less likely than their male compatriots to report this experience (see Hamdi Mohamed, 1997 for a description of the experiences of Somali women in Kenyan refugee camps during their flight to Canada). Twenty-one respondents were chain migrants who did not adequately prepare to start a new life in Canada prior to their departure from Somalia or during temporary asylum. Altogether ten respondents (33% of total and 48% of chain migrants) reported that they were highly anxious about their future when they came to Canada with no prior knowledge of what to expect upon arrival. This study included two respondents who were denied asylum rights in countries in the Arabian Gulf, and five respondents who faced intolerable conditions in countries in camps in their voyage between home and asylum.

It appears that respondents who experience distress during migration are just as likely to achieve positive outcomes as negative outcomes. Among the

Somali refugees who reported duress during exit or flight, over half the respondents reported positive outcomes. A total of 67% of respondents who experienced both duress prior to arrival and distress after arrival were able to integrate or assimilate in Canada.

Even where links between negative outcomes and distress were most evident, the direction of the relation was not clearly indicated. It seems that negative outcomes during resettlement may be consequences of distress as well as contributing causes of distress for respondents. A vicious circle may be formed by mutually reinforcing distress and marginalisation, and Rumbaut warns that “depression and demoralisation are not only consequences of unemployment or welfare dependency, but also subjective conditions that may *lead* to job loss” (Rumbaut 1989b in Rumbaut, 1991:421).

FAMILY SEPARATION DURING MIGRATION

Ten respondents joined family members already in Canada, and fourteen arrived with family members. At the same time, separation from family was a problem faced by all the respondents in some form or another. Mothers left Somalia with their youngest children, but were forced to leave older children and loved ones behind. In similar situations, fathers reluctantly elected to reduce risks during their flight by exiting apart from family and then reuniting with them in asylum, perhaps months or years later. One polygynous male made the difficult choice to exit with his younger wife and children, leaving his first wife and independent adult children in Somalia. Youths were persuaded to leave

surviving family members in Somalia to join relatives in asylum.

No links between family separation and resettlement outcomes were evident. For respondents motivated to leave home to reunite with family already in a host country, the existence of family networks within a host country implies that some risks associated with migration were reduced and travel plans were more firm. Among the respondents who came with or joined with family already in Canada, resettlement outcomes were mixed. However, among five respondents in Ottawa who remained separated from their family overseas, all reported positive resettlement outcomes.

On the whole, flight conditions were measurable factors which were amenable to analysis. Flight conditions were shown to be important determinants of resettlement outcomes. In particular, this overview of flight conditions showed that pre-war departure, longer distance migration, and mastery of obstacles appeared to be strongly related to positive resettlement outcomes. Information about destination appeared to be strongly related to positive outcomes.

Departure during the height of the war, and indirect flight to permanent resettlement including temporary asylum lasting less than a year, appeared to be related to negative outcomes. Separation from family and traumatic events in flight seemed to result in mixed outcomes, and the direction of the relation between distress in flight and marginalisation during resettlement was not clear.

Flight conditions comprise many of the sub-factors which might be used to determine pressures in asylum. The following section examines pressures in

asylum as the final displacement-related factor in the general model of migration.

Pressures in Asylum

The general model of refugee migration is designed to cover diverse migration scenarios. Kunz reviewed different refugee migrations and discovered that waves of involuntary migrants moved in stages, from home, to temporary asylum, to exile. Kunz observed that, in some cases, the location of temporary asylum became permanent, but with the realisation that the doors to repatriation are closed, the attitudes of refugees towards home and the demoralising effects of dislocation changed them from temporary migrants into exiles (Kunz 1973:133).

In other cases, the location of first asylum is temporary. Refugees may seize upon opportunities such as cease fires or a return to some semblance of normalcy at home to repatriate to their homelands; or they may be forced by “administrative, economic, and psychological pressures” to take a “further step and to become an immigrant in a country willing to receive” them (Kunz 1973:133).

PUSH-PERMIT

The study group represents three types of flight arrival patterns. The first group is comprised of eight refugees pushed from home or displaced by absence who were permitted to stay in Canada. All the respondents in what Kunz called the “push-permit group” are females (Kunz 1973:134). Three respondents in this group under fifteen when they arrived in Canada reported that they were

assimilated, while the five adult respondents reported both negative outcomes in resettlement (Kunz 1973:134).

PUSH-PRESSURE-PLUNGE

A second group is comprised of five refugees who were first pushed from home in acute or prepared movements, next they were pressured to move from temporary asylum, and then they plunged forward to Canada with no prior knowledge of what to expect. The “push-pressure-plunge” group tended to report positive outcomes, including one male who reported he was integrated, one male and one female who reported they were assimilated (Kunz 1973:134). One other female who plunged to Canada was socially integrated but economically marginalised, and one male who plunged to Ottawa reported he was racially, economically, and professionally marginalised during resettlement.

PUSH-PRESSURE-PULL

The third group includes seventeen refugees (11 males and 6 females) pushed from home in acute or pushed-planned movements who were pressured to move from temporary asylum, and who pulled towards resettlement in Canada by offers of assistance in travel and information about support for integration and/or high rates of acceptance of refugee claims. This last group of refugees includes ten respondents who joined family in Canada, and six respondents who had prior opportunities to claim asylum in countries such as the United States, Italy, and the United Kingdom before entry into Canada. Among the group of “push-pressure-pull” refugees (Kunz 1973:134), resettlement outcomes were mixed. Six

respondents or 35% of the push-pressure-pull group reported that they were integrated or assimilated. Another 35% of the group, six respondents reported both positive and negative resettlement outcomes. A total of eleven respondents or 65% of those who were pulled to Canada reported that they were marginalised during resettlement in Ottawa.

Analysis of pressures in asylum related to outcomes reveals that respondents who plunged to Canada without prior expectations tended to report more positive outcomes (see Table P on page 238). Conversely, respondents pulled to Canada with expectations of support, assistance, and hospitality tended to report more negative outcomes during resettlement.

Resettlement in the West was a permanent solution available to only a small percentage of Somalis forcibly displaced from their homes. As insecurity spread throughout Somalia, Ethiopia, Kenya and Sudan, the borders between countries disappeared and so did the theoretical distinctions between refugees, displaced and repatriated persons who wandered between war and famine in search of food and safety (Jean 1992).

PRESSURES TO AVOID REFUGEE CAMPS

The previous discussion of obstacles to migration clearly showed that a vast majority of the 700,000 Somali refugees remained in the Horn of Africa. Although the UNHCR strongly advises against the establishment of refugee camps (UNHCR 1982:19), in order to deal with the problems created by refugees in areas neighbouring refugee producing zones, camps are the most common form of

shelter and settlement provided for refugees (Zetter 1994:47). “In general, the temporary measures of containment in camps and settlements within refugee-producing areas became the goal of international refugee policy” (Black 1993b:87). Refugee survey data indicates that about 10% of Somali refugees resettled spontaneously among host societies without assistance, while roughly 90% of Somalis were relegated to care and maintenance camps (see Figure 6 on page 95 for the locations of refugee camps) (USCR 1996).

Perhaps the most comprehensive coverage of conditions faced by refugees around the world, including Somalis, is published in the annual World Refugee Survey by Immigration and Refugee Services of America’s United States Committee for Refugees Program (USCR 1996). Numerous studies have been completed which describe different aspects of situations faced by Somali refugees in the Horn of Africa. Discussions of sources of insecurity and hardship endured by Somali refugees resettled in the Horn are covered by Hasci and Waldron (1994), Unruh (1993), and UNHCR (1994). Detailed description of life in a Somali refugee camp can be found in works by the UNHCR (1996); by Christensen (1982) who also focusses on refugee household survival strategies; and by Young (1985) who examines Somali refugee agricultural programmes. Food insecurity issues for inhabitants of refugee camp are covered by Caputo et al. (1992). Problems of insecurity from attacks by rebel and military forces on refugee camps are discussed by Gersony (1989), Mtango (1989), and the UNHCR (1987; 1981). Additional risks and dangers faced by Somali women in camps are

covered by Mohamed (1997).

In theory refugee aid programmes are designed to save lives. While upwards of \$90 million dollars per year have been spent on refugee assistance programmes for Somalis (USCR 1996), at different times in the last decade, less than half of the aid planned for distribution by implementing agencies was actually received by Somali refugees due to inefficiency, corruption, looting and generalised insecurity (USHOR 1993; Watch 1994:14). Band Aid type solutions and international relief may have contributed more to the institutionalisation of violence and the support of militaries than to the basic needs of designated beneficiaries (DeWaal 1994). Overall, it is widely agreed that while aid may have prolonged the survival of many thousands of involuntary migrants in the Horn, the living conditions in aid dependent households were at best minimal and for the most part unbearable.

Since 1994, conditions of widespread terror from factional fighting have given way to more localised pockets of violence and lawlessness in Somalia, although the nation remains divided and unstable without a central government. It is generally the poorest and weakest who were forced live in refugee camps in asylum, and it is the most vulnerable refugees who remain in camps because they cannot risk leaving without some outside assistance (UNHCR 1996a).

The pressures to leave refugee camps in host countries in the Horn of Africa were so great that tens of thousands were forced to repatriate spontaneously to disaster prone and sometimes still insecure homelands (USCR

1996). However, thousands of other Somalis fleeing intolerable conditions in the Horn of Africa determined that a safe return home was impossible, and sought safe passages to other countries. Together, the dangers faced by involuntary migrants at home and in temporary resettlement, and the deprived and intolerable conditions in refugee camps and squatter settlements combined to create intense and overwhelming pressures for continued migration by refugees in search of a secure destination for resettlement.

This review of pressures in asylum demonstrated that refugees are often faced with insecurity and intolerable living conditions, but only a trickle of refugees from massive flows of forced migrants have the capacity to reach host countries without outside supports. It might be argued that an opportunity for resettlement in more developed host societies is in itself a favourable outcome for forced migrants from less developed countries, however, analysis of pressures in temporary asylum did not show any strong relations to subsequent resettlement outcomes in host countries.

Summary of analysis of displacement-related factors of Somali refugee migration

The analysis of displacement-related factors of migration related to the outcomes during resettlement of Somali refugees in Ottawa appeared to show a strong link between the attitudes of refugees in purpose oriented migrants groups and positive resettlement outcomes. Analysis of displacement-related factors of

migration also revealed shortcomings in their application to studies of refugees from civil war situations. Rather than simplifying the understanding of refugee migrations, the determination of refugees' relations to the majority of the home nation appears to make analysis more complex where sub-national loyalties divide populations into rival groups competing for control of the same country or territory. Similarly, the determination of the permanence of alienation from the home nation was difficult to discern in the case of Somali respondents given continued factional fighting and declarations of unilateral secession by the northern region.

The utility of the concept of anticipatory movements is weakened because it presupposes a precise determination of the time when "the deterioration of the military or political situations prevents" a refugee's orderly departure (Kunz 1973:131). In low intensity civil conflicts especially, war may not be openly declared and pre-war regional and local battles can also displace large populations. The term anticipatory refugee is contradictory because it implies voluntary exit by migrants before they are forced from their homes, and hence undermines an understanding of refugees as involuntary international migrants. It was replaced in the general model by the term pushed-planned movements.

Since the beginning of the 1990s, thousands of Somalis displaced from their homes have endured pressures in asylum and overcome obstacles to migration in their flight to safety in host resettlement countries. The next section examines host-related factors of settlement.

CHAPTER 7

HOST FACTORS RELATED TO MIGRATION BY SOMALI REFUGEES

To help understand outcomes of refugee migration, the general model proposes three main sets of variables related to home, displacement, and host country environments and relationships. The previous two chapters evaluated the applicability of the home and displacement-related factors to a study of migration by a group of refugees and presented the results of a step by step analysis of relations between resettlement outcomes and key variables in the pre-migration and in-flight phases. The following pages assess the practicality and workability of the host-related variables contained in the general model of refugee migration.

Canadian Refugee Policies

State population policies are important to refugee outcomes because they define the official recognition of refugees' legal status and rights of entry, protection, government assistance. Most states deal with refugees as issues of immigration and citizenship.

The initial Canadian Immigration Act was passed in 1869, but Canadian immigration policy first became concerned with refugees following World War II. From the original focus on the resettlement of European refugees, Canadian refugee policy has evolved as a humanitarian policy with annual plans for refugee admissions and assistance (Girard 1990:113). Canadian assistance to refugees includes preventive and protective measures.

PREVENTION OF REFUGEES

Canada voluntarily provides overseas protection to refugees through humanitarian aid programmes (Trempe et al. 1997:86). In 1998, about \$2 billion in international relief and development assistance to other countries was sent to help prevent, reduce, and remove the conditions that cause refugees to leave their homes (Gebresellasie 1993:3; CIDA 1997).

Overseas refugee assistance is funded out of international humanitarian assistance (IHA). In 1998, about \$70 million in IHA funds were channelled through multilateral agencies, international organisations, and Canadian non-governmental aid organisations to help meet basic needs of people affected by natural and human-generated disasters, including refugees (Hart 1991:115). Along with other forms humanitarian aid used to help displaced persons, Canada's annual contribution to UNHCR is about \$18 million (Trempe et al. 1997:78).

The prevention of refugee migration can be initiated long before conditions require urgent response, but rather than addressing root causes of involuntary migration, most efforts to control refugee movements focus on immediate causes when flight is imminent or has already started (Newland 1994:19). Canadian overseas development assistance (ODA) to Somali refugees has been provided indirectly to pay for emergency relief delivered in the Horn of Africa through international organisations and NGOs; secondly ODA funded agencies operating refugee programmes of voluntary repatriation, third country resettlement abroad, and the local integration of Somalis in Kenya or Ethiopia; and thirdly, Somali

refugees received Canadian assistance directly in the form of Canadian food, supplies and services to care for and maintain populations in camps in Ethiopia, and Kenya.

PROTECTION FOR REFUGEES

Canadian policy on the protection of refugees has evolved from earlier traditions of immigration control. Since 1966, refugee policy has changed substantially from an “outgoing and aggressive means of supplementing the Canadian labour force to a passive and controlled device for shaping immigration flows to suit demographic objectives and more narrowly defined economic goals” (Girard 1990:113). Over the past 30 years, successive governments shared the costs of refugee assistance with other donor countries as one of Canada’s international humanitarian obligations (Hathaway 1992:71).

The Canadian government considers refugees to be forced migrants who suffer from unprotected statelessness based primarily on political persecution or threats to life caused by the rupture of political relationship between citizen and state, but not due to economic or environmental insecurity. Protection in Canada is accorded to refugees selected abroad and claimants in Canada who are found to be Convention refugees (CIC 1997:28).

Claims for asylum by refugees who are deemed to pose a serious danger to Canada or Canadian citizens are not accepted. Refugee status can be withdrawn when protection is no longer needed, or if it was obtained by misrepresentation (CIC 1997:29). Furthermore, claims for refugee status can be refused if it is

believed that the claimant could be removed to a region of a country where he/she would not be exposed to compelling personal risks (CIC 1997:32).

Ideally, refugees are treated like other immigrants to Canada: they are not short-term visitors dependent on Canadian good will, but longer term contributors to Canada's diverse society. "Canada's policy with regard to immigrants in general and refugees in particular has not included the offer of temporary refuge" (Wasserlauf 1989:52).

There is no centralised system for distributing the asylum seeking refugees between safe countries around the world. Each year the Canadian government establishes limits on the number of immigrants to be accepted, including the number of government assisted refugees selected abroad under the overseas refugee resettlement program (CIC 1997:23-25). In 1999, out of a total of 225,000 immigrants, Canada will follow its "great humanitarian tradition" by taking in up to 29,300 refugees, including 7,300 refugees selected from abroad for assistance (Cohen 1998:1-2).

The stated objective of Canadian immigration policies is to "facilitate entry for persons who would enhance Canada's cultural and economic well-being, including family members" (Cohen 1998:5). In the last twenty years Canada has granted safe haven to over 150,000 refugees from camps (Trempe et al. 1997:78), but no more than 25% of refugees are selected and assisted abroad for resettlement. Canada is rarely viewed as a country of first asylum, and few refugees come to Canada because of its proximity to the country from which they

are fleeing. The refugees expected to reach Canadian borders are “the able bodied, the affluent, and the resourceful” and not those who most need assistance (Girard 1990:116).

According to immigration figures, about 75% of refugees who are admitted to Canada seek asylum upon entry or once in the country (CIC 1996b; Cohen 1998). In-land admissions are difficult to regularise, and remain largely outside of the control of the government (Samuel 1993:57). Most Somalis are inland refugee claimants, including 93% of the respondents in this research project.

The refugee resettlement process in Canada has been criticised as overly expensive, and inefficient, partly because it placed too much emphasis on misuse of the system rather than focussing on the potential refugee. After February 1993, changes were implemented to eliminate backlogs of claims, deal with claims swiftly (IRB 1997c); “discourage those who seek to use the system for purely economic reasons;” and impose controls against persons exceeding time limits and those granted prior attention in another country (Plaut 1985: 49-52). At the same time, critics emphasised that adjudication of refugee status “must begin by assuming the good faith of the claimant” (Plaut 1985: 52).

PROTECTION AGAINST REFUGEES

Regardless of the causes of involuntary displacement, refugee flows are only produced when forced migrants have a viable destination (Zolberg 1989: 406). As the discussion on obstacles to migration showed, Somalis refugees sought asylum in several countries where their claims for asylum were not

accepted.

Immigration policies collectively constitute a protective wall against self-propelled migration, but with small doors that allow for specific flows of certain types of labourers and small numbers of asylum-seekers (Zolberg 1989: 406).

Many Third World countries accept refugee movements *en masse*, granting status to groups of refugees. Like most First World countries, Canada deals with refugees on an individual basis, case by case, whereby each asylum seeker is required to demonstrate that they have suffered from individual persecution under the terms of the 1951 Convention before they are granted the refugee status (Black 1993a:7).

Governments of host countries, including successive Canadian governments, appear less concerned with the problems faced by refugees and more worried about protection from the problems caused by refugees. Refugees are treated by state representatives as a problem, an anomaly requiring therapeutic intervention (Malkki 1992:33). The refugee event is inscribed and represented in institutional discourse as a specific problem of and before the sovereign state, to be formulated and channelled into statist solutions (Soguk 1997:323). Stateless refugees are “suspected of political irresponsibility that endangers national security” (Simpson 1939:9 in Malkki, 1992:32).

Canada’s immigration objectives “address the necessity for protecting our society from those whose entry into Canada could result in harm or danger to others” (Cohen 1998:5). Faced with unwanted and uncontrollable flows of

refugee immigrants, host governments have increasingly turned to strategies for halting emigration. Weiner describes how economic aid, diplomatic coercion, and armed interventions in sending countries were used to forestall the arrival of involuntary migrants to asylum destinations from refugee producing countries (Weiner 1993b:21-26). In recent years Canada, the United States, and European nations began devising measures collectively to deter refugees (Hathaway 1992:71).

In addition to fines of up to \$500,000 and imprisonment of up to ten years for migrant smuggling, (CIC 1997:16) the prevention of refugee migrations to Canada is partly achieved through the overseas screening of international travellers from refugee producing regions of the world, which obstructs refugee inflows into the country (Newland 1994:19; UNHCR 1994). Canadian missions abroad now use modern technologies in immigration selection and control. Interdiction activities include specialized programs like "Operation Shortstop,"⁴ in which immigration officers are posted at airports in refugee producing zones to check the documents of travellers before they board airplanes, and fines are

⁴ Operation Shortstop is an immigration enforcement program. Information about the program is protected in order to remain effective in detecting and stopping illegal entry into Canada. The program is implemented by Immigration Control Officers, strategically placed where there is known traffic in false documents and smuggling of aliens. Based on immigration control records, program locations are selected based on the places of origin of apprehended illegal aliens and seized documents from Canadian landings. The Immigration Control Officers focus on training airline and airport staff in foreign countries to check passports and visas in order to ensure all travellers to Canada have valid visas and to detect false documents. (Hurteau, 1997)

imposed on carriers transporting passengers without proper documents.

Refugees have been forcibly interdicted in international waters by Canadian officials (Hathaway 1992:16; Wood 1989:190).

Taylor et al. argue that governments can expect difficulties in controlling migration flows once they have begun because the process of migration network formation lies outside the purview of governments and occurs regardless of the policy regime pursued. Canadian immigration policies intended to promote reunification of refugee families work at cross purposes to refugee controls since they reinforce and extend migration networks by giving kin special rights of entry. On the one hand, stricter immigration policies are met with resistance from humanitarian groups, and on the other, immigration controls only serve to create a black market due to the profits to be made from smuggling migrants (Taylor et al. 1993:451).

Cohen thinks that more resources should be directed towards the identification and protection of refugees abroad, and to assist those who need resettlement in Canada without forcing them to use the expensive and risky services of illegal smugglers. "In this way, Canada can focus on assisting the most vulnerable, overwhelmingly women and children, as close as possible to their home country" (Cohen 1998:9).

PROTECTION THROUGH PLANNED RESETTLEMENT

After comparing refugee admission policies of different states, Kunz determined that underpopulated countries which support population growth

through immigration treat refugees quite differently than demographically self-sufficient countries (Kunz 1981). He noted that demographically self-sufficient countries may be more tolerant to homeward-oriented refugees, whereas growth-oriented societies short in labour may exploit refugees, and tend to select healthy and young refugees over the old and ill (Kunz 1981:48).

Canada is an “augmentative society” which depends on immigration to increase population and economic growth (Kunz 1981:48). Canada actively seeks immigrants as human resources and economic contributors for permanent settlement (CIC 1997:1-2). One out of six Canadian residents was born outside of the country (CIC 1996b), and Canada is second in the world to the United States as a host country for refugee resettlement. The Canadian government budgets over \$40 million a year for assistance to 7,300 refugees selected abroad for resettlement, which works out to more than \$5,400 per refugee (CIC 1997:23-25). Since 1947 more than 500,000 refugees have resettled permanently in Canada (Dirks 1990:88).

“From the point of view of the refugees of the world, Canada is a rather ideal country” because it not only provides asylum, “it also has a policy to accept refugees as landed immigrants” (Samuel 1993:56). If it is determined that a refugee claimant is a “convention refugee, he or she is eligible to apply for permanent residence status”, but must do so within 180 days (CIC 1997:31). Refugees selected from abroad “are landed on arrival at the point of entry” (Trempe et al. 1997:97).

Before admitted refugees are granted landed immigrant status, they cannot get student loans or subsidized daycare, vote, hold public office, work for the federal government, or sponsor immigration by relatives, but they are permitted to work. Canada's response to refugees is considered generous by international standards. Several services are in place to assist refugees in resettlement: the transportation loan program, temporary accommodation, a refugee host program, a handicapped refugee program, along with immigration settlement, adaptation, and language training programs are available to all immigrants (Samuel 1993:57).

These benefits are important to refugees in resettlement, especially forced migrants displaced from their homelands in acute movements who arrive in Canada with few resources. And, just as welfare and unemployment insurance programmes can significantly increase the incentive for international migration, (Taylor et al. 1993:440) "asylum shoppers" are attracted to make refugee claims in Canada in order to access employment, welfare, health and education and other benefits (Trempe et al. 1997:81).

It appears that some of Kunz's criticisms of the population policies promulgated by growth-oriented societies with relatively small populations may apply to Canada. Canadian humanitarianism has its limits, and to stop visitors from taking advantage of Canada's refugee system, and "prevent social system abuse", "visitors to Canada who would be expected to cause excessive demand on health or social services can be removed" (CIC 1997:16). Humanitarian refugee

policies seem to favour the rich and capable. The majority of in-land refugee claimants in Canada are male, while the majority of refugees in camps are women and children who never make it to Canada's borders (Trempe et al. 1997:81). Furthermore, while the selection of refugees abroad for resettlement could provide assistance to disadvantaged infirm and orphaned refugees, the process effectively screens out those in greatest need by giving preference to refugees "able to demonstrate the basic skills to settle successfully in Canada" (Trempe et al. 1997:81).

Despite these limitations, compared with other countries, Canada has a "generous immigration policy which includes reasonably-open borders and an equitable system of justice and appeals" (CIC 1997:13). Canada is an immigrant country attempting to administer fair and open assistance programmes that reunite families and "provide a safe haven for refugees" (CIC 1997:1). Figures obtained from Standards, Analysis and Monitoring at the Immigration and Refugee Board Canada indicate that since 1989 over 16,000 refugee claims by Somalis were accepted and fewer than 7% of Somali claims were denied (IRB 1997b; see Table S on page 239). Records also show that from 1987 to 1997, a total of 17,438 Somalis in all immigration categories were admitted as permanent residents from abroad and from within Canada (IRB 1997a).

Analysis of the data obtained from the interviews with Somali refugees in Ottawa tends to support the claims by Citizenship and Immigration that refugees are treated fairly and with generosity in Canada. Findings indicate that compared

with inhospitable receptions and/or hostile rejections in countries of temporary asylum, the majority of respondents felt that the Canadian refugee immigration processes were justifiable and unbiased. Whether they arrived by airplane or crossed the border from the United States, a total of twenty respondents (67%) felt that entry into Canada was an easy and fairly administered process. An opposite view of entry into Canada is held by five respondents (17%) who were subjected to lengthy and humiliating interrogations by unsympathetic immigration officials.

UNDOCUMENTED REFUGEE CLAIMANTS

One of the most problematic aspects of in-Canada determination of refugee status has been the consistent, fair, efficient treatment of asylum-seekers without identification documents (Trempe et al. 1997:81). Claims for refugee status normally require supporting documentation to prove the identity of claimants. Based on weak documentary evidence, some claims demand further research by the IRB and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service in order to determine if claimants have criminal records, or participated in terrorist acts or war crimes outside of Canada.

Hyndman considers the visa controls used by Canada to be crude methods which screen out many genuine Convention refugees (Hyndman 1996:5). According to one immigration official, even with programs to detect and deter the arrival to Canada of travellers without visas, "most refugees arrive at Canadian entry points without documents" (Hurteau 1997). It is assumed passports and

visas used for embarkation are destroyed by refugees in transit or given to smugglers who accompany refugees to points of entry into Canada. The advantage of having no legal documentation upon arrival at a point of entry into Canada is that refugee claimants can say they originate from any country to avoid return to safe third countries, and they may be able to hide their identity, so as not to reveal that they were officials of a repressive regime who would be denied entry into Canada (Hurteau 1997).

To deter the arrival of refugees, Canada practices an official policy of categorical detention to deal with cases where refugees or asylum seekers have destroyed their travel and/or identity documents (Helton 1991:264). In the interests of national security, immigration officers are empowered to detain a person unable to provide documentary proof of their identity (Helton 1991:261). Regular jails and isolation techniques are used for asylum seekers who exhibit symptoms of stress. For asylum seekers, access to legal counsel is discouraged, and access to religious counsel is variable (Helton 1991:263).

In the early 1990s, there has been an influx of an estimated 14,000 refugees without proper documents (Trempe et al. 1997:81; Peirol 1996). Prior to February of 1993, Somalis without travel and identity documents had the opportunity to be landed (CIC 1996a). In 1993, Canada established the Undocumented Convention Refugee in Canada Class Regulations to handle cases of refugees who are unable to obtain identity documents due to sustained civil war in their country of origin or the lack of central government authority. These

regulations permit Somalis to apply for landing within five years of the IRB decision that they are Convention Refugees (CIC 1997:31).

According to newspaper reports, in 1996, there were 6,800 Somali refugees in Canada who arrived without proper identification waiting for the right to apply for landed immigrant status in Canada (Peirol 1996). Roughly 40% of the undocumented Somali refugees are women and another 40% are children who, “do not pose any significant security or criminal risk” to Canadians (CIC 1996a).

One male respondent made his claim for asylum upon arrival without proper identification documents. However, he was not among the 17% of respondents who criticised the Canadian refugee admission and adjudication process as discriminatory against Somalis. According to one respondent “the refugee process is flawed, and immigration officials don’t apply rules fairly to Somalis, especially related to documents. They look at us, and if we have documents, they look for other clauses to keep us out. And the refugee determination is slow, but it is better than landing which takes years.”

This overview of Canadian refugee policies revealed the extensive nature of state strategies to prevent, contain, control, naturalise and plan the resettlement of forced international migrants. Refugee outcomes are influenced by activities in refugee producing areas: to meet international humanitarian obligations, Canada supplies aid to refugees through implementing agencies and supports overseas refugee repatriation, care and maintenance, and resettlement

programmes. Refugee outcomes are influenced by state immigration controls: the priority of national security concerns and desires to prevent abuses of social assistance are reflected in deterrent activities and regulations which appear to increase anxiety and lead to marginalisation among undocumented refugees, while they also serve to exclude the most needy, legitimate refugees from entry. State citizenship policies influence the outcomes of refugee migrations by limiting their rights or naturalising their situations of statelessness, and by providing refugees assistance through planned resettlement programmes.

Social Receptiveness

Following the legal recognition of refugees' rights for protection and the official governmental acceptance of refugees' claims for asylum, positive resettlement within a host country also implies a modicum of tolerance for refugees, if not a warm welcome from common citizens. Where the option is available, asylum seekers are attracted to locations where there is already a community of compatriots or where the population has similar cultural heritage.

For Somali refugees, social receptiveness was perhaps optimal among communities of related clans living in parts of Ethiopia and Djibouti. Levels of social receptiveness for Somalis and other refugees may have been less than accommodating in European societies where extremist nationalists blamed domestic economic woes on foreigners flooding in to steal their jobs. Refugees were targets of racial violence in parts of the United Kingdom, France, and

Germany, where host societies showed low levels of tolerance for refugees of a different race and culture than host populations (Wood 1989:193).

Where a particular refugee group encounters a host society for the first time, the determination of social receptiveness is more difficult. Manifestations of racism/pluralism, discrimination/tolerance, cooperation/conflict may be used as direct indicators of social receptivity. Indirect indicators of social receptivity may include levels of membership of refugees in existing clubs/parties, overall refugee employment rates, and the diversity of occupations and management level positions open to refugee groups.

Further complicating calculations of social receptivity is its dynamic nature. Although first impressions are important, the reception accorded refugees by members of host societies is an evolving relationship rather than a fixed, one time event. Hence, the receptiveness of a society is a quality which is not readily measured. In the general model of refugee migration, the concept of social receptiveness is perhaps most useful as a relative measure of openness towards refugees in comparative case studies. The following discussion demonstrates the importance of social receptivity as a factor in resettlement, while revealing the difficulties trying to determine the level of receptiveness of a pluralist society with any precision.

STEREOTYPES OF REFUGEES AND DISCRIMINATION

The existence of negative stereotypes is an indication of discrimination against refugees. Zetter wrote that the term refugee is a stereotype more than a

useful description (Zetter 1988 in Black, 1991:285). Indeed, refugees have been commonly portrayed in the media as impoverished, hungry, needy, diseased, helpless; and as an undifferentiated mass of people who do not fit in the order of nation states (Malkki 1992:33; Harrell-Bond 1986; Mazur 1987).

Literature on refugees presents them as uprooted people, without the ordinary loyalties of citizenship in a homeland (Malkki 1992:31). "The refugee subjectivity is inscribed negatively, as a lack, as an aberrance, suspended indefinitely in a void cut off from the land, the home, the homeland, the bounded community, the nation" (Soguk 1997:324). Lacking citizens' ties and qualities, refugees are seen as incapable of participating as effective, knowledgeable actors in the tasks essential to the effective and orderly organisation of the community—obtaining security, stability, welfare, and self-governance. Due to the loss of moral bearings, refugees are not deemed trustworthy as honest citizens, and without roots they are linked with "the underworld of terrorism and political crime" (Simpson 1939:9 in Malkki, 1992:32).

Refugees have been depicted as the barbarian horde, uncivilised, voracious monsters, heading from the South and the East to the North and the West (Malkki 1992:31). Poor statistics, media hype, and political interests have combined to portray asylum-seekers as threats to host societies (Black 1993b:87). Citizens of host countries are told that refugee immigration might cause rising unemployment, increasing pressure on the social and welfare institutions, and crime (Soguk 1997:330). The effects of refugees are "construed generally as

being negative”, disruptive of the national order, and burdens on host countries (Soguk 1997:315). As such, refugee intakes by resettlement countries like Canada are governed by the principle of “burden sharing” with countries of first asylum (Girard 1990:113; EIC 1985:4).

Societies may react negatively towards refugees because of the economic costs they impose or because of their purported criminality, welfare dependency, and delinquency (Weiner 1993a:18). Canadian taxpayers appear to be concerned that the numbers of impoverished immigrants entering the country cause a substantial strain on social service facilities. Working Canadians in particular seem resentful of the admission of welfare recipients into the country. “The vast majority of Canadians indicated that welfare recipients should not be permitted to sponsor a spouse or child until they were off welfare” (Palmer 1997:37).

Under the ideology of individualism which seems predominant in Canada as well as the United States, individuals such as children, homemakers, the elderly, the disabled and refugees are devalued as dependency burdens (Potocky 1996:166). It seems that refugees are assumed to be dependent merely by the fact that they receive relief. Refugees who receive welfare are seen as “passive, lethargic, and indolent but on the other hand adept at playing the system and finding ways to take unfair advantage” of social supports (Turton and Allen 1996:22).

INTOLERANCE AND PREJUDICE AGAINST REFUGEES

The lack of receptiveness of Canadian society towards refugees may be

inferred from the reports from respondents of racism, employer discrimination, and religious intolerance, cultural bigotry against them during resettlement in Ottawa, along with the findings from studies about public attitudes towards immigration. Kunz argues that augmentative societies like Canada may exact the price of assimilation in exchange for the privilege of admission, but he assumes that demands of conformity are lower and chances for advancement are better in pluralistic, multi-ethnic societies than in monistic, mono-ethnic communities (Kunz 1981:48-9).

Canada's pluralistic, integrationist, multi-ethnic society appears to be at least partly closed to refugees who are members of visible minorities. Studies in Canada have found that "while outward expressions of racial attitudes are generally covert or polite, there is overwhelming evidence that discrimination does occur, and that visible minorities experience disadvantages on the labour market, sometimes hate literature, and police harassment" (Samuel 1993:53). A total of thirteen respondents, 43% of the Somali refugees interviewed reported experiences of what they considered to be overt racism or blatant discrimination since their arrival in Canada.

Since refugees are immigrants, studies of Canadians' attitudes towards immigration provide reasonable measures of Canadian receptivity to refugees. A series of phone surveys recently undertaken to determine what Canadians thought about immigration levels and policies revealed that although Canadians prize tolerance, racism is fairly widespread in the country, particularly among about a

fifth of urban dwellers, who tend to display greater levels of racism than residents of smaller communities (Palmer 1997:30). It appears that racism in multi-ethnic urban centres in Canada is linked with an increased consciousness of ethnic differences between newcomers and long-standing residents, which results from increased local presence of immigrants (Palmer 1997:29).

The findings of the immigration surveys imply that Somali refugees, as members of visible minority immigrant groups, face considerable challenges from racism in resettlement in larger Canadian cities, including Ottawa. Indeed, among the respondents, ten or 33% of the study group reported that they were racially marginalised in Ottawa. Among the racially marginalised respondents, 70% were males. Overall, 50% of racially marginalised respondents also reported that they were economically marginalised.

Aside from issues of racial affinity, Canadians' receptiveness towards Somali refugees may be reflected in some of their attitudes concerning the impact of immigration on culture, employment, and crime. Recent studies revealed that about 40% of Canadian households surveyed said that immigration strengthened Canadian culture, compared with 30% who felt it weakened Canadian culture. About 50% of those Canadians surveyed said immigration increased unemployment, and about 20% said it reduced unemployment. Around 20% of Canadians surveyed stated that immigrants are more likely than Canadian-born citizens to commit crimes and about 15% said they were less likely than Canadian-born citizens to commit crimes. About 20% of Canadians in one of the

surveys considered the effect of immigration on their community to be negative (Palmer 1997:5-6).

Canadian hospitality appears to be warmest for refugees who are able to speak one of the official languages. Overall, Canadians strongly believe that immigrants arriving in Canada should be competent in one of the official languages upon arrival (Palmer 1997:37). All but two of the respondents spoke English reasonably well at the time of the interviews; however, five or 17% of the study group reported that their lack of English proficiency resulted in their rejection, total neglect or open hostility from intolerant Canadians.

The immigration surveys in Quebec suggest that most Quebecers are more receptive to newcomers in the province who are competent in French (Palmer 1997:32). None of the respondents speaks French, and three respondents who tried to resettle first in Montreal reported that they were motivated to move to Ottawa primarily because they were economically and politically marginalised in Quebec.

It is not surprising that Canadians appear to be more receptive to refugees willing to adopt Canadian values over refugees who hold on to values which conflict with dominant social values. Among the 24 Somali refugee respondents who reported that they had adopted Canadian values or balanced Canadian with Islamic-Somali values, a total of 21 or 88% also reported that they were socially integrated or culturally assimilated in Canadian society (see table 14 below).

Perhaps a better measure of Canadians' acceptance of Somali refugee

respondents may be indicated by the positive resettlement outcomes of 50% of those who were unwilling to adopt Canadian values. Three female students reported that they were integrated in Ottawa from among four females and two males who reported that they had difficulty agreeing with Canadian materialism, individualism, feminism, and/or secularism. Among the 20% of respondents who reported that they preferred to adhere to Islamic-Somali values as opposed to Canadian values, female respondents in particular reported that they were unwilling to give up Somali family values which emphasise the importance of the collectivity over the individual. Respondents who rejected Canadian values and promoted Islamic-Somali values tended to report higher levels of marginalisation and lower levels of integration than Somali co-respondents who adopted Canadian values.

Table 14: Values and resettlement outcomes

Level of Adoption of Canadian Values	Positive resettlement outcomes and % of total		Marginalisation in resettlement and % respondents					
	integration	assimilation	Role	Eco	Race	Poli	Psy	Pro
13 adopted Canadian values	8, 27%	5, 17%	0	2, 7%	3, 10%	0	0	1, 3%
6 unwilling to accept Canadian values	3, 10%	0	2, 7%	2, 7%	3, 10%	0	3, 10%	1, 3%
11 Canadian-Islamic values	8, 27%	0	1, 3%	7, 23%	4, 13%	1, 3%	0	1, 3%

The lack of receptiveness by Canadians to Somali refugees may be indicated by the high level of economic marginalisation and also the significant level of racial marginalisation among Somali respondents who professed a willingness to adopt at least some basic Canadian values. Among the 24 respondents who reported that they had adopted Canadian values or adhered to Canadian-Islamic values, nine or 38% reported that they were economically marginalised, including seven male respondents.

Overall, this analysis of social receptiveness of Somalis in Ottawa appears to confirm that racism and discrimination against visible minorities constitutes a formidable barrier to integration and resettlement by non-white refugees in Canada. Nonetheless, with noted social preferences for English/French speakers and refugees willing to adopt Canadian values, it appears that Canada's multi-ethnic, pluralistic society does provide opportunities for integration by economically productive and well-educated refugees.

The analysis of values as an important determinant of Canadian receptiveness to Somali refugees also highlights the importance of values as a determinant of the cultural compatibility between Somalis and mainstream Canadians. Acceptance of refugees by Canadians and willingness to adopt Canadian values by refugees may facilitate their integration, but resettlement outcomes may be more influenced by the "social distance" which must be overcome between place of origin and the destination host society (Rumbaut 1991:384).

NEGATIVE ECONOMIC VIEWS OF REFUGEES

The cool reception from upwards of 20% of Canadians towards refugees

seems to stem from their “predominantly negative economic view” of new immigrants (Palmer 1997:9). The immigration surveys found that Canadians make fairly strong demands for economic contributions from newcomers in the form of business investments or productive labour (Palmer 1997). The negative economic view of refugees in particular may be promoted by media reports which stereotype refugees as unemployed, poor, needy rather than productive, contributing members of society (Miller 1996; Sarick 1996; Vincent 1996).

Nearly half of the study group did not fit into the dependent refugee stereotype. A total of thirteen of thirty respondents (43%) were employed, including seven males and six females (see Table 15 Employment status and resettlement outcomes on page 191). Six were employed full-time and five part-time in the minority service support sector, one worked full-time in retail sales sector, and one was a civil servant. These Somali respondents showed strong adaptive capacities, but only two of the respondents reported that they belonged to households with financial resources to purchase a home in Canada. Even well-off refugees are unlikely to meet the requirements of the investor programme, particularly those who took flight from their homeland following acute political events without time to sell property, convert assets and transfer wealth out of the country. Indeed, none of the four former business owners who participated in this study were able to start businesses in Ottawa.

The reported lack of hospitality shown by some Canadians to Somali refugees may be linked to their high levels of unemployment and social assistance

needs, and low levels of business investment. The ratio of the rate of unemployment among Somalis in Canada appears to be higher than for non-Somali immigrants (Opoku-Dapaah 1995:50). In this study of Somali refugees in Ottawa, the rate of unemployment was reported to be 37% among respondents eligible to work. Altogether five males and two females were unemployed welfare recipients. Four of the unemployed males were over 36 years old.

Due to the mutually reinforcing nature of poverty and poverty stereotypes, impoverished refugees may be particularly vulnerable to exclusion in host societies. For example, high unemployment among Somali refugees serves to reinforce their stereotype as welfare dependents. Unemployment for refugees can become a vicious circle: Somali respondents report that employers often require Canadian experience, and are not willing to provide opportunities to refugees to gain the experience. Gold determined that one of the causes of “welfare dependence among refugees is discrimination by potential employers” who believe training and assisting refugees in adapting to their work environment is disruptive and not cost-effective (Gold 1992 in Potocky, 1996:166).

According to reports from respondents, voluntarism by refugees providing resettlement assistance to newcomers may be accepted by prospective employers as Canadian experience; but, volunteer work itself does not resolve problems of economic marginalisation and it is not counted in employment calculations. A young, male school dropout and a retired female respondent who were sponsored by family members to come to Canada reported difficulties adapting to their new

household roles. While neither of these two respondents reported experiences of hostility or discrimination due to racial or religious difference since their arrival in Canada, both were excluded from mainstream society due to illiteracy, and lack of language proficiency. The retired female reported that she was isolated from social activities due to infirmity from age and psychological reactions to stress. The male dropout was excluded from school related social activities and also from the labour force due to lack of marketable skills and age. Unemployed respondents cited racism, religious discrimination, lack of Canadian work experience, lack of appropriate job skills, and lack of proficiency in English among the main impediments to their employment in Ottawa.

The preceding discussion showed that refugee stereotypes, racism, discrimination, and intolerance were useful indicators of social prejudice and exclusion of refugees. Immigration surveys, and other research techniques were used to gauge approximate levels of social receptivity, but as this study demonstrated the quality of social receptivity is difficult to measure, particularly in pluralist societies like Canada. From an analysis of discrimination against respondents and resettlement outcomes, it appears that racial marginalisation was linked to economic marginalisation in half the cases.

Income Earning And Educational Opportunities

Refugees face similar challenges of employment as other immigrants in host societies. Illegal migrants will likely be more vulnerable to exploitation by

employers, while legal immigrants and refugees admitted to host societies may be relegated to low-wage, labour intensive, entry level jobs with few avenues of social mobility which do not attract most native workers except teenagers and part-timers (Taylor et al. 1993:440-444).

Unemployment rates among refugees are indirect indicators of employer discrimination, and direct indicators of refugee marginalisation during resettlement. Table 15 below shows respondents' employment status and levels of integration, assimilation, and marginalisation. Economic marginalisation appears as both a cause or consequence of discrimination, and the relation between unemployment and marginalisation is positive and strong: 100% of unemployed respondents reported that they were economically marginalised. In addition, 43% of unemployed respondents reported that they were also racially marginalised.

Table 15 below shows unemployed respondents tended to report high levels of marginalisation of all forms. Among the unemployed respondents, 85% were male. While all unemployed respondents reported that they felt excluded from Canadian society, particularly male unemployed respondents over 36 years old tended to report high levels of ostracisation by Canadians.

Three unemployed, male respondents described Canadians as openly racist, whereas one respondent felt discrimination was against "Muslims" rather than "blacks." Frustrated male Somali respondents who saw themselves as patriarchs in their family and who were unable to find an acceptable job, also blamed "the

system” for their economic marginalisation. Somali refugees encountered delays of up to a year before they were legally authorized to work (Opoku-Dapaah 1995:6). One racially marginalised male respondent in his thirties complained about distrust and discrimination by “welfare people always looking for Somalis to cheat”. He contended, “Canadians are not used to Africans and Asians, you let them in, then don’t like them. The system looks good, but there is no willingness of people to help, and this shows Canadians aren’t prepared.”

Table 15: Employment status and resettlement outcomes, by gender

Employment Status	Positive resettlement outcomes		Marginalisation in resettlement					
	integration	assimilation	Role	Eco	Race	Poli	Psy	Pro
1f retired	0	0	1 f	0	0	0	1f	0
2f, 5m unemployed	3m, 1f	0	1m	2f 5m	3m	0	0	2m
7f, 6m part or full time employed	6f, 6m	1m	0	2m	2f 3m	1f	1f	0
1m dropout	0	0	1m	1m	0	0	0	0
6f, 2m students without paying jobs	2f, 1m	4f	0	1f 1m	1f 1m	0	1m	1f

It appears that employment of refugees is strongly associated with positive outcomes during their resettlement. Among the thirteen employed respondents,

levels of social acceptance in Ottawa appear to be high. Among employed respondents, 100% reported that they were socially integrated or assimilated. Only 31% of employed respondents reported that they were racially marginalised by Canadians in Ottawa.

Among the students without paying jobs, seven reported overall positive social relations in Canada. Education in Canada was found by Opoku-Dapaah to have a strong positive influence on integration in Canada by increasing the level of social participation in activities outside the Somali community (Opoku-Dapaah 1995:61). Half of the non-employed, full-time students reported that they were assimilated, with “lots of friends at school” despite initial language problems. Another three students reported they were well integrated into society in Ottawa. However, two full-time students reported that they were racially and economically marginalised during resettlement in Canada.

Cultural Compatibility and Resettlement Outcomes

Kunz argues that among host factors of refugee migration, cultural compatibility between home and the society of destination is perhaps the most influential on the satisfactory resettlement of the refugees (Kunz 1981:46). Cultural differences have been identified as one of the root causes of resettlement difficulties for refugees (Potocky 1996:163) and several studies show refugees often experience “culture shock,” which may be compounded by “future shock” due to rapidly changing conditions in the receiving societies itself (Rumbaut

1991:384).

Cultural compatibility may be enhanced by linguistic and/or religious affinities, as well as shared values, traditions, lifestyles, political views, and food habits between refugees and hosts (Kunz 1981:47). Cultural incompatibility may reflect differences between attitudes held by members of host society and refugees' attitudes towards women, senior citizens, children, public authorities, and collectivities versus individuals. These attitudes influence what Kunz refers to as "interpersonal relations" (Kunz 1981:47). A comparison of these cultural characteristics for hosts and refugees will determine whether cultures are close and compatible, or distant and incompatible.

This study does not permit a full treatment of these elements of cultural compatibility or incompatibility between Somali refugees and long-term residents of Ottawa. However, an assessment of the potential for cultural conflict can be completed, and this will help to reveal areas requiring further research.

Language skills of respondents were discussed among home-related factors of migration and also as one of the factors influencing social receptiveness of refugees by host societies. It was shown that English/French proficiency prior to arrival in Canada was strongly related to social and economic integration during resettlement in Canada. Somali is considered a distant language from Canada's official languages.

The discussion of values as a factor in social receptiveness focussed on the willingness of respondents to adopt Canadian values. A full examination of

cultural compatibility would look at the levels of commonality or conflict between values held by refugees' and members of the host society. Although similar to questions of social receptiveness, cultural compatibility shifts the onus from hosts' acceptance of difference to the relative adaptive capacities of refugees grouped by ideology, age, gender, and education.

The results of this study appear to indicate that the potential for cultural conflict between Somalis and Canadians is quite high. Cultural differences may be greatest between devout Muslim Somalis and evangelical Christian Canadians. Religious differences may lead to disputes over work exemptions due to the celebration of holidays, and work interruptions from daily prayer rituals. As well, value clashes may occur between Canadians and Somalis--and apparently between different generations within Somali households-- over acceptable pre-marital sexual relations, or levels of deference and respect for elders. Canadians and Somalis may contest appropriate styles of dress, and some Somali customs such as female gender mutilation are outlawed in Canada (Hurley 1996). Other large cultural gaps appear between rural-pastoralist Somalis and urban Canadians virtually connected through television-computer networks. Cultural incompatibility between Somalis and Canadians does not appear to stem from dietary customs or food rituals.

Evidence from interviews with respondents highlighted contentious cultural differences between Somalis and Canadians related to gender roles and relations, and women's rights. Two female respondents mentioned that in

Somalia women are muted and have no direct voice in political decisions. On the positive side, they reported that resettlement in Canada has provided younger Somali women with more political rights and representation, increased lifestyle choices, and better educational and occupational opportunities.

On the down side, it appears that the sudden increase in choices for Somali women in Canada may lead to increased uncertainty and anxiety over their future. One female university student explained that whereas in Somalia all she was worried about was getting married when she left school, in Canada she was also highly concerned about finding a good job. Furthermore, two female respondents reported that their income earning responsibilities and increased social leadership roles in Ottawa conflicted with their devotion to children and family.

One female student respondent felt that acculturation was most difficult for Somali girls in Canada because of the conflicts between the hedonistic values espoused by friends, and the restrictions on sexual and social activities enforced by family members and religious leaders. A Somali woman who recently withdrew from the workforce to care for her infant children said it was normal for a woman in Somalia to be working at home but here women look down on homemakers. She believed that culture shock was greatest for the unemployed men who stayed at home while their wives worked. For two males, one unemployed patriarch and the other a school drop-out, the empowerment of women did lead to problems of gender related conflicts concerning appropriate

household roles.

Samuel cautions that ethnic retention and social incorporation are not necessarily opposite ends of a continuum: however, it appears that public displays of ethnic difference impedes incorporation into the larger society (Breton 1990:256 in Samuel, 1993: :52), and the persistence of ethno-religious characteristics presents an obstacle to economic mobility in Canada (Kalbach and Richard, 1990 in Samuel, 1993:52).

Cultural compatibility appears to be a practical, useful concept included as host-related factor in the general model of refugee migration. For country level studies of resettlement, cultural compatibility-- the distance or closeness of two cultures-- can be determined through a fairly straightforward comparison and contrast of cultural characteristics. Whereas it appears the Somali culture is quite distant from mainstream Canadian culture and the potential for conflict seems quite high, this single country study does not provide any basis for comparison.

It appears that the determination of cultural compatibility appears much more complex at the individual level due to the infinite variations in individual refugee's willingness and capacities to adopt new lifestyles, traditions and values and learn languages. Information from respondents appears to confirm that the variables specified in the general model are influential host-related factors of migration, however, further research is needed to develop a better understanding of the relations between outcomes of refugee resettlement and different cultural variables.

Population Factors and Resettlement Outcomes

Bascom considers that size, concentration, types of settlements and ratio of host populations to refugees are important host-factors of migration which determine resettlement outcomes (Bascom 1993:324). It appears that attempts to determine the size of Somali refugee populations have been fraught with great difficulties, largely due to their highly mobile nature (UNHCR 1996b). This study obtained incomplete and conflicting data about Somali refugees in Canada and inconclusive information concerning residence patterns of Somalis in Ottawa.

From all accounts, Somalia is not a major source country for immigrants to Canada (CIC 1996b:7). Figures from the Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board's Standards, Analysis and Monitoring office indicate that just over 19,000 applications for asylum from Somali refugees were submitted between 1989 and 1997 (see Table T on page 240). Previous to 1989, reports prepared by the Canadian Refugee Status Advisory Committee do not note any asylum requests made by Somalis (RSAC 1985). The peak period of the civil war in Somalia was between 1988 and 1991, and from 1992 to 1995 conditions remained highly chaotic and insecure. Corresponding to political events in Somalia, the numbers of Somali refugee claims in Canada rose each year from 1989 to peak in 1993. The time lag between departure from Somalia in 1991 due to widespread factional fighting and the arrival in Canada may be explained by extended flight paths followed by Somalis through one or more countries of temporary asylum.

Estimates from a study of Somalis in Toronto commissioned by Citizenship

and Immigration Canada and the Ontario Ministry of Citizenship indicate that “some 25,000 Somali refugees have resettled in Canada since 1981. Most of them live in Metropolitan Toronto” (Opoku-Dapaah 1995:1). “Over 80% of Somalis have been in Canada since 1988, while another 18% arrived between 1981 and 1987” (Opoku-Dapaah 1995:2).

A report prepared by the Immigration and Refugee Board’s Standards, Analysis and Monitoring breaks down permanent residents admitted from Somalia by intended destinations to show that 3831 Somali refugee claimants intended to settle in the National Capital region (IRB 1997a). According to local newspaper reports, the Ottawa office of CIC knew of 350 additional Somalis living in the region area who were undocumented refugees waiting for landed immigrant status (Miller 1996).

In addition to these official statistics, there are also unconfirmed reports that the total population of Somalis in Ottawa could be far higher than the number of declared permanent residents. Ladan Affi, a Somali who worked at the Catholic Immigration Service in Ottawa providing assistance refugees during resettlement, estimated there were 70,000 Somalis in Canada, and 13,000 in Ottawa in 1997 (Affi 1997:442).

None of the respondents was homeless at the time of the study, however more than half of respondents did spend a few days in homeless shelters immediately upon their arrival and 27% of respondents reported that they did not have access to affordable, suitable housing during resettlement. Of the

respondents relegated to sub-standard housing, 75% reported they were marginalised, but 50% reported that they were socially integrated.

Reports from respondents indicate that most Somali refugees live in Toronto, Vancouver, and Ottawa. Within Ottawa, refugee households tend to locate in numerous government assisted housing projects dispersed throughout the city. Further evidence is needed to confirm that social integration by Somali refugees is promoted by the provision of subsidized housing and low national levels of immigration. Concentrations of Somalis in urban communities may facilitate the formation of mutual support networks, but it also tends to increase the visibility of Somalis as a particular visible minority group in these large urban centres. Home ownership and membership in housing cooperatives were strong indicators of integration in resettlement.

In this limited study, inter-city and cross-country comparisons were not possible, so the importance of relations between population factors and resettlement outcomes is difficult to assess. Anecdotal evidence from respondents and information concerning pressures in asylum appears to suggest that the dispersal of small communities of refugee households within host-societies is more favourable to refugee assimilation and integration than the concentration of large numbers of refugees in any single area or the confinement of refugees to camp settlements.

Duration of Exile and Resettlement Outcomes

Studies of refugee adaptation indicate that the duration of exile is one of the best predictors of refugee outcomes (Hein 1993:52). Rumbaut's studies of Indochinese refugee adaptation in the US show that in most instances, during resettlement refugees' feelings of distress decrease and levels of satisfaction increase over time (Rumbaut 1991:412).

Based on the assumption that refugees learn about and adapt to host societies and environments from experience during resettlement in the host country, it was expected that time would be positively related to the integration of Somali refugees in Ottawa. Half the respondents arrived in Canada in 1991 or earlier (see Table U on page 241). These fifteen respondents, including six males and nine females, had each spent more than five years in Canada. The other half of the respondents, nine males and six females, had been in Canada between one and five years.

Surprisingly, the duration of resettlement in Canada does not appear to be strongly related to positive outcomes by Somali refugee respondents. Among the fourteen respondents who lived in Canada for more than five years, twelve or 85% reported positive outcomes, including eight females and only four males. The level of positive outcomes reported by those in Canada longer than five years is only slightly higher than the 75% of respondents who lived in Canada for up to five years who also reported positive outcomes, including seven males and five females.

Furthermore, a total of nine respondents or 64% of the respondents who lived in Canada for more than five years reported that they were marginalised. But among respondents who lived in Canada for five years or less, 57% or eight different respondents reported that they were marginalised.

Even levels of marginalisation among Somali respondents in Canada for ten years or more indicate that increased time in resettlement was not in itself sufficient to ensure that refugees could overcome economic marginalisation and integrate socially in Ottawa. Evidence from Europe suggests that refugees need long-term assistance, sometimes for decades (Westermeyer 1987 in Potocky, 1996:168).

This study appears to show that early arrivals in Canada who departed in pushed-planned movements from Somalia before the peak of the war tended to integrate socially and assimilate culturally in resettlement. However, whereas the earliest arrivals did receive some financial support from relatives abroad, they reported that they experienced economic hardships in their first years in Canada because they were unemployed or underemployed and not able to claim refugee status or access resettlement assistance available to later arrivals.

Moreover, temporal factors alone do not explain the higher than expected levels of positive outcomes by respondents in Canada for less than five years compared with respondents who resided in Canada for longer periods. Despite the deterioration of departure conditions for Somalis who left home after 1988, some advantages were available to the respondents who arrived in Canada after

1989. Unlike many Somalis who departed from home in pushed-planned movements prior to 1989, those who departed after clan-based factional fighting became widespread were able to make justifiable claims for asylum immediately upon arrival in Canada. The 23 respondents who arrived in Canada during or after 1990 also benefited from migration networks, community groups, and religious organisations previously set up by Somalis which assisted them in resettlement.

One respondent who arrived in Ottawa years before the post-war waves of Somali refugees commented that she was more marginalised now than in the past. Compared to the 1980s, she reported increased racism against Somalis by white Canadians in the 1990s. She claimed that she felt less accepted by Canadians as the media increased coverage of the war, including coverage of UN and American military involvement in Somalia. Further, she said Canadians became even less sympathetic to Somalis following media reports about undocumented refugees.

Ideological-Nationalist Orientations and Resettlement Results

Refugees may maintain kinship, cultural, economic, and political links with the home nation despite their forced displacement and overseas resettlement. Kunz saw that refugees continued to look homeward during migration, but he noted that reactive and purpose group refugees' relations with home often changed during temporary asylum and resettlement. In host countries, refugees

are required to build new social and environmental relationships in order to survive (Kunz 1973:133). A refugee's willingness to form a new allegiance to the host nation will depend partly on her/his emotional links to the home nation. Hence, an understanding of refugees' identification with their former home country can provide insight into problems experienced by refugees during resettlement (Kunz 1981:42).

From his studies of refugees in host-countries, Kunz surmised that refugees abroad achieved different outcomes based on six distinct but not fixed ideological-national orientations (Kunz 1981:44). The categories of ideological-national orientations are based essentially on differences in the long-term objectives of migration by refugees. Even after years in exile, restoration activists may be more concerned to reestablish links and conditions in their homeland to permit their return. Following hardships and distress, passive hurt refugees may become detached from their past and apathetic about a positive future at home or in the host society.

Integration realists may strive to achieve some socio-economic success, while maintaining their cultural identity and even reinforcing links with their homeland. Eager assimilationists may attempt to leave their past totally behind them while they focus all attention on cultural adaptation, social integration, and economic success in the host country.

Revolutionary activists are homeward oriented, but look to promote new conditions and support sometimes radical changes in the homeland from abroad.

Founders of utopias are unlikely to look homeward, but may try to create desired conditions in the host society, or continue migration in pursuit of the same ideological objectives which motivated their departure from home.

The respondents did not themselves select the category of ideological-nationalist orientation into which they were classified. Instead, the determination of their homeward orientation was inferred from discussions about their desire for return, conditions necessary for their repatriation, the importance of nationality in their identity, and the types and currentness of links they maintained with Somalia. It is clear that the process of transformation of ideological-national orientations by respondents is ongoing, such that respondents may be classified in different ideological-nationalist categories in the future.

Among the respondents, there were no founders of utopias (see Table W on page 243). As well, although several respondents could be classified as revolutionary activists based on their common pacifistic humanitarian stance and their demand for a negotiated peace and a democratically elected government in Somalia, none of the Somali refugees who participated in the study continued to hold out hope that these conditions would ever be met by vengeful, militaristic clan members fighting for retribution not peace, and trying to impose power over opponents.

Among Somali respondents, more females than males reported that they maintained strong family links, but perhaps because the relatives of many female respondents were also displaced by the war, they were somewhat less homeward

oriented than male respondents. More males than females tended to report strong desires to retrieve property and/or return to their clan's territory, to rural-based Somali lifestyles, to roles within geographically specified communities, or to the hot, dry climate of the Horn.

Among the passive hurt, the youngest respondents reported that they felt powerless to change conditions in Somalia and Canada. Three passive hurt females seemed to be fatalists resigned to the will of Allah, whereas males who noted they were unsure of the future made no religious references.

An analysis of the resettlement outcomes for each ideological-nationalist orientation group appears to indicate that realist integrationists and eager assimilationists tend to achieve more positive results during resettlement than restoration activists or passive hurt respondents (see Table X on page 243). The positive outcomes of two of the restoration activists attests to the adaptive capacities of the youngest respondent and the ex-businessman, who were both able to establish strong local support networks and achieve success in economic and educational endeavours in Canada while they also raised money and promoted international support for particular groups in Somalia. It appears that the marginalisation of the eldest restoration activist was related in part to duress from imprisonment and violence prior to departure and distress due to changed household roles and loss of status in Ottawa. However, his efforts to integrate were limited given his primary focus on raising funds, resources, and support for political associates in Somalia in preparation for his eventual return home.

The respondents in the passive hurt group were much more inclined to focus on the present than those in the other groups. The three young female respondents tended to dissociate themselves from the television images of impoverished and sick Somalis, and focussed on short-term concerns, and current personal relations rather than longer-term career objectives or skills development. Among the nine passive hurt respondents, a total of six or 67% were economic dependents and not decision-making heads of households. A total of 55% of passive hurt respondents reported they were economically marginalised. Three of nine were unemployed heads of households and two were psychologically marginalised.

The five eager assimilationists all achieved considerable success in the efforts to integrate socially and achieve economic self-sufficiency in Canada. However, although all five eager assimilationists reported a willingness to practice Canadian traditions and adhere to Canadian values, two male respondents complained that they were racially marginalised.

Each of the thirteen respondents in the group of integration realists reported that they were fairly well integrated in selected communities in Ottawa. Although 42% of the group did report they were racially marginalised, they generally agreed that they could bring about slow improvements towards increased tolerance in Canada's multicultural society through local political activism in support of minority rights. As well, four respondents reported they were economically marginalised, including two who also reported professional

marginalisation. The realist integrationists generally expressed optimism that they could overcome economic and professional marginalisation through educational success, cooperative community development, and voluntarism to gain Canadian experience and job skills.

Summary of analysis of host-related factors of migration by Somali refugees

Analysis of host-related factors of migration related to the resettlement outcomes of Somali refugees in Ottawa suggests that the duration of respondent's exile was not a strong indicator of resettlement results. Compared with other host-related factors from the general model of refugee migration, employment and educational opportunities appeared to be most strongly related to positive resettlement outcomes.

From the framework of host-related factors, the conceptual category of cultural compatibility seems ideal for use in cross-country comparisons of refugee migrations to different host societies. However, as this study determined, an understanding of the relations between specific cultural characteristics and patterns of outcomes of refugee resettlement within any group of refugees requires more detailed and complicated analysis than this study allows. Similarly, an understanding of the influence of population factors on resettlement outcomes requires research of larger refugee groups in different types of settlements which was not possible in this limited study of Somali refugees in Ottawa.

The analysis of ideological-nationalist views emphasised that refugees often remain reactive migrants with limited capacities to realize plans and achieve their goals. The sub-categories of ideological-nationalist orientation were fairly well defined and they combined to cover a wide range of possible relations between refugees and the home nation. The insightful categories facilitated an understanding the results of refugees' resettlement efforts by directing examination towards the objectives of resettlement or repatriation efforts by refugees in association with populations from host and home nations.

The population policies of willing and unwilling host governments are the prime determinants of protection for refugees. In conjunction with NGO supports, state resettlement programmes are most important for ensuring that refugee households are able to meet basic needs. State refugee policies are fairly easily researched and applied to migration studies because they are generally codified in government documents. Social receptiveness may influence refugee outcomes as much as state policies, but the concept is imprecise and hard to apply in studies of refugee resettlement in pluralist societies. However, the importance of factors such as racism and discrimination cannot be discounted, and analysis of social prejudice to resettlement outcomes indicated that half of the respondents who were racially marginalised reported negative economic outcomes.

CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSIONS

In the two years it took to complete this study, millions of people were forced from their homelands. When they were pushed across state borders, their problems became international concerns. Forced migration is a recurrent problem with complex causes and often devastating consequences. Due to the severity of intractable refugee disasters and the global repercussions of refugee movements, theoreticians, policy makers and practitioners have devoted considerable attention towards the resolution of refugee issues, and increasingly to the problems of internally displaced persons as well.

While post-modernists explore new methods for understanding involuntary migrations, the field of refugee studies continues to be dominated by realist theories. Theoretical research into involuntary migration has largely focussed on the identification of causal forces towards the development of preventive measures. Meanwhile, impact studies have tended to focus on relations between migration factors and resettlement outcomes towards the design of controls to reduce the spread of refugees and the development of effective, low-cost interventions to mitigate the negative consequences of forced international migrations. The formulation of durable solutions to refugee crises requires a solid understanding of involuntary migrations, and the plethora of academic perspectives on forced displacement should be informed by the views of the refugees and internally displaced persons.

Yet, refugee studies continue to suffer from theoretical confusion because there are so many voices vaunting the virtues of their particular disciplinary perspective and clamouring to reveal the discoveries from their research on a unique group of involuntary migrants. Due to interdisciplinary disorder and a lack of coordinated research, the ever expanding field of refugee studies has realized only moderate theoretical advances.

For decades, refugee theorists have argued that a general framework for refugee migration is needed to help guide disparate research efforts and facilitate comparative, cumulative studies. However, as Wood (1994:608) explains, the formulation of a comprehensive theory is difficult and time-consuming work because involuntary migrations are based on complex spatial behaviour, complicated decision-making processes, and a variety of interrelated and mutually reinforcing causal factors.

Efforts to develop a comprehensive model of refugee migration have tended to produce either overly generalised or excessively specialised designs. In Kunz's innovative, three-phase model of refugee movements, inadequate attention was focussed on home-related, macro-level variables, individual attributes, and resettlement outcomes (Kunz 1981). Rumbaut's general model of migration and adaptation gave insufficient recognition to refugee movements, while it neglected the influence of state refugee policies altogether and focussed narrowly on the mental health of refugees as an outcome of resettlement (Rumbaut 1991). Bascom's resettlement model also under-emphasised displacement factors, while

it over-concentrated on political causes of forced migration and agrarian economic factors in host countries (Bascom 1993).

Nonetheless, each of the source models presented transferable constructs useful for the examination of separate but not totally distinct refugee movements and resettlements in diverse contexts. By combining concepts from refugee models proposed by Kunz (1981), Rumbaut (1991), and Bascom (1993), this study makes a modest contribution to the construction of a general model of refugee migration. Along with factors contained in all three models, the general model of refugee migration comprises home, host, and displacement-related variables contributed by Kunz (1981); the typology of refugee household motivations offered by Rumbaut (1991); and flight factors, refugee attributes, and resettlement outcomes presented by Bascom (1993).

Repatriation is not included as a separate phase of migration in any of the source models, although Kunz depicts the return of refugees to their homelands as a result of intolerable pressures in asylum (Kunz 1973:134). In the general model, repatriation is recognised as the main objective of migration for many homeward oriented refugees, and it is incorporated as one of the outcomes of resettlement. And, while voluntary return home is widely touted as “the most desirable solution to the refugee phenomenon” (Opondo, 1991:23), this study of migration by Somalis suggests a more cautious endorsement of repatriation. Additional research on the contributing forces and outcomes from spontaneous and involuntary repatriation is required to make up for the “scanty evidence”

concerning refugee reintegration (Harrell-Bond, 1989: 59).

Following the introduction of each of the three progenitor models, the conceptual categories combined in the general model of refugee migration were discussed. The explanation of the components of the general model showed the advantages gained by merging aspects from the three source models into a single extended format, and demonstrated that the general model of refugee migration is more comprehensive than any of the constituent frameworks.

The amalgamated general model provides a multi-disciplinary perspective on refugee migration. Because it includes macro and micro-level perspectives and covers such a broad range of variables which influence involuntary flight and resettlement, it can be applied in diverse studies of migration to help illuminate the specific interrelations, causes and consequences at work in various migrations. Whereas the general model does not explicitly treat unregulated refugees, the parallel economy, or the criminal underworld as migration factors, the broad conceptual categories of home, displacement, and host-related variables can even be stretched to cover illegal migrations. The versatility of the general model makes it an effective tool for use in comparative studies of forced migrations.

A disadvantage derived from using a no-risk, inclusive strategy in an attempt to formulate an all encompassing, multi-purpose refugee migration model, was that it resulted in an overcrowded format which presents unweighted migration factors as if they are of equal importance in the migration process. The overly simplistic, unsophisticated lists of factors also fail to adequately depict the

interrelations between the different variables and the dynamic nature of migration processes.

The general model of refugee migration formulated in this study serves a heuristic purpose by illustrating the principal factors of refugee migration affecting resettlement outcomes in host countries. The range of variables included in the general model is not intended as an exhaustive description of reality, but rather to bring together main factors identified by different studies into an organised conceptual space.

In the general model, refugee migration is presented as a constructed scenario, and this permits a sense of causation by ordering events into a sequence. The model offers a representation of migration processes: it does not really give a full picture of the events and experiences which make up refugee movements, but it does provide approximations of moments or stages of the migration process, including pre-flight, displacement, temporary settlement, resettlement, and repatriation. These stages of migration are neatly separated into boxes that appear as links in a causal chain of events. The migration chain appears to resemble the process of forced departure because it is forged from observed patterns of movement.

The model allows information about migration to be organised into useful segments and facilitates an ordered description of the conditions of refugee migration. Though each refugee's migration experience was unique, the reconstruction of migration scenarios according to the model allowed some sense to

be made of events which occurred in different times and places by arranging them according to the home-displacement-host sequential logic.

However, through the imposition of bounded theoretical classifications in the transformation of data to fit within the model, the sense of personal historical logic and the voices of individual Somalis were lost. The dynamics of an individual's survival and her/his own history are hidden below the various categorical labels for refugees in the model (Mazur, 1987:443). Each person who contributed to this study is clearly far greater than the sum of numbers and descriptive facts, but during the process of analysis, Somalis were transformed from participants in the research project into objects of study.

The main task of this study was the calibration of the general model of refugee migration. A preliminary field test was undertaken to identify modifications necessary for the development of a comprehensive framework for refugee migrations which would be useful for more elaborate, comparative studies. To fulfil this objective, the general refugee migration model was applied in an analysis of qualitative data obtained from interviews with thirty strategically selected Somali refugees in Ottawa. Following a step-by-step examination of the relations between home, displacement, and host-related variables of migration contained in the refugee model, the explanatory value of each component factor was assessed, and the relative importance of different variables towards refugee resettlement outcomes was evaluated. The analysis process provided an opportunity to gauge the usefulness of the model as a tool to improve our

understanding of the causes and consequences of forced migrations.

An evaluation of the applicability of concepts concerning types of refugee movements revealed that some further work is needed to facilitate their application to studies of non-cohort refugees from civil war situations. This is especially important because in recent years, large scale population displacements and mass refugee migrations have been produced primarily by internal conflicts. This study suggests that a more localised view of political allegiances and social relations is required in order to understand refugee migrations resulting from situations of internecine warfare. Where sub-national loyalties divide populations into rival groups competing for control of the same country or territory, rather than looking at national-level orientations, analysis should focus on refugees' relations to the dominant groups in more circumscribed areas or homelands, and identification with popular beliefs and conflicting views held by segments of the home society.

Similarly, in the calibration of the general model, the concept of "alienation" from the home nation fits poorly in the study of Somali refugee resettlement in Canada (Kunz 1981:43). Compared with conflicts which have been fought for generations, the civil war in Somalia has been relatively short in duration, and the resulting involuntary displacement is still quite recent. The determination of permanent alienation of purpose-group refugees from their home society was difficult to discern in the case of Somali respondents because declarations of unilateral secession by the northern region antagonised pan-

Somali nationalists and further factionalised rival clans, and continued conflict and instability in Somalia remain disincentives to immediate return.

Analysis showed that the sub-category of “self-fulfilling” or “self-alienated purpose groups” is too easily conflated with voluntary migration (Kunz 1981:45). Instead of a restrictive interpretation of refugee alienation, the model was made more widely applicable to forced migrations from long-lasting civil wars by the incorporation of a category of long-term but not permanent migrants called events-dislocated refugees. Events-dislocated refugees are different from events-alienated refugees because they remain intent to return home eventually, and they may identify with a segment of the home society rather than sympathising with the majority. Unlike purpose-group refugees, events-dislocated refugees do not remain totally indifferent nor completely alienated from their homeland. Events-dislocated refugees are likely to visit their homeland prior to repatriation, and they may maintain dual citizenship or some lifeline in the host-society during tentative movements to repatriate.

The evaluation of the usefulness of the concepts in the general model also revealed the potential for problems related to the term “anticipatory refugee movements” (Kunz 1973:131). The concept of anticipatory refugee is based on the assumption that it is possible to determine with some degree of precision when “the deterioration of the military or political situations prevents” a refugee’s orderly departure (Kunz 1973:131). Especially in low-intensity civil conflicts, before war is openly declared, regional and local battles can displace large

populations. The term anticipatory refugee is contradictory because it implies voluntary exit by migrants before they are forced from their homes, and hence undermines an understanding of refugees as involuntary international migrants. To replace the term anticipatory refugee movements, the less misleading term pushed-planned refugee movements was introduced.

An assessment of the applicability of Rumbaut's typology of motivations for refugees' departures from home for studies of forced migration demonstrated that the inclusion of family unity as an economic type motive was misleading, and overemphasized the importance of economic reasons for refugees leaving home (Rumbaut 1991). The classification of all motivations into either political or economic categories disavowed the validity of social-type motives for refugee migration and detracted from the significance of justifiable, household-level motivations for involuntary displacement. The typology of exit motives was slightly modified by renaming the category for economic type motivations as socio-economic motives.

From an evaluation of the applicability of host-related factors from the general model for studies of refugee migrations, it was determined that the conceptual category of cultural compatibility seems ideal for use in comparative studies of refugee migrations to different host countries. However, an understanding of the relations between specific cultural characteristics and patterns of outcomes of refugee resettlement within or between groups of refugees requires more detailed and complicated analysis than permitted in this

study. Similarly, an understanding of the influence of population factors on resettlement outcomes requires research on larger refugee groups in different types of settlements and different locations beyond the limits of this study.

Ideological-nationalist orientations were helpful in understanding refugees' resettlement outcomes because the well-defined sub-categories provided insights into the objectives of individual refugee's resettlement efforts and also reflected the attitudes of respondents towards host and home nations. In contrast, the imprecise concept of social receptiveness seemed applicable in comparative studies of resettlement in different host-societies, but it appeared to be more unwieldy and harder to apply in studies of integration by refugees from a single country in a pluralist society.

Analysis is described by Wolcott as a "cautious, controlled, structured" process involving "systematic procedures followed in order to identify essential features and relationships" (Wolcott, 1994:24-5). On the positive side, in this study, the analysis of refugee movements within a three-phase model of refugee migration allowed the identification of major factors of refugee migration and an exploration of some of the relationships between home, displacement, and host-related migration factors and resettlement outcomes.

The breakdown and evaluation of disparate information published on forced migrations along with a mountain of qualitative data collected from interviews with Somali refugees in Ottawa was complicated. Indeed, the incorporation of the information from respondents into the refugee migration

model required an extensive re-organisation and transformation of descriptive data to render it ready for analysis, and the effusiveness of the general model of refugee migration partly undermined advantages gained from its use in analysis.

The model of involuntary migration ordered a process that is confused and distressing for refugees, and convoluted for analysts. This study revealed that Somalis forced to leave their homelands acted according to complex intentions, in reaction to multifarious threats to survival and security, and in interaction with others in a complicated world. Within the framework, the typology of motivations provided an increased “intentional understanding” as well as a rational explanation of refugee location decision-making behaviour (Schweizer, 1998:58). Thus, while respondent refugee movements appeared frenetic, analysis showed that they were not “kinetic movements” like the motion of billiard balls devoid of inner direction and governed by kinetic factors and the outside forces applied on them (Kunz, 1973:131 fn 17).

The most obvious weakness in the analysis of refugee migration factors in general model stems from the subjective determination of integration and marginalisation outcomes in the evaluation of the relative importance of variables of migration for the resettlement results. Hence, the correct determination of cause presumes a correct diagnosis of consequence. This indicates that more work is required to improve the resettlement-outcomes portion of the migration model by including more objective measures of refugee integration and marginalisation.

Moreover, within the refugee model, the outcomes of the migration process tend to discount mundane everyday affairs and occurrences, and to overvalue negative aspects of pain, loss, separation, distance from home, deviation, disharmony, discord, disparity, difficulties and other elements of personal disaster which are widely accepted as standards of refugee migration experience. On the other hand, the breakthroughs by strong, capable refugees who successfully integrate into host societies become idealised as triumphant endings of heroic voyages from danger, depravity, and chaos in Third World countries to freedom found only in the modern, comfortable, secure, advanced countries in the First World. Through detailed analyses of individual refugee migrations, this study revealed that the process of resettlement often leads to mixed results for refugees who slowly achieve success in daily struggles to adapt in host-societies but also succumb to forces of marginalisation in involuntary migration.

The analysis of home factors related to the migration of Somali respondents showed that refugee migration usually results from the cumulative effects of complex and interrelated variables. The overview of macro-level factors related to the forced migration of Somalis demonstrated that departures by vintages of refugees were triggered by political threats and dangers which occurred during periods of economic, and environmental hardship.

The migration model presents macro-level factors which push migrants from home, and emphasises the importance of refugee attributes in adaptation,

and household vulnerabilities in coping with conditions which force migration. Analysis showed that refugee characteristics were strongly related to outcomes during resettlement. From this study of Somali refugees, it appears that respondents younger than thirty-five years old tended to report more positive outcomes but high levels of racial marginalisation, compared to respondents over thirty-five years old who tended to report more negative outcomes during resettlement. Males tended to report more marginalisation, compared with females who tended to report higher levels of integration and assimilation in Ottawa. Ex-business owner/operators from Somalia tended to report higher levels of integration, compared with ex-professionals who tended to report marginalisation during resettlement in Canada. Students tended to integrate and assimilate well, while illiterate, adult Somalis tended to be isolated and marginalised in Ottawa. Respondents who spoke some English prior to arrival in Ottawa tended to achieve positive resettlement outcomes, and younger respondents with no prior English skills tended to realize more positive results in a shorter period than respondents over 35 years old who did not speak English before their arrival.

Surprisingly, resettlement outcomes did not seem to be strongly indicated by family support networks in Canada. Not surprisingly, refugees with information about Canada and previous international travel experiences by refugees appear to be positively related to integration by Somalis who resettled in Ottawa.

The model depicts households as mediators between macro-level forces and individual responses. Refugee households are the key units of migration which determine the capacities/vulnerabilities of individuals to cope with emergencies and strongly influence the survival strategies of individuals. At the household level, an analysis of respondents' reasons for leaving home showed that multiple, additive and complex reasons motivated the departure of most refugees. Somali respondents in Ottawa tended not to report victim or rebel motivations for exit from their homelands. Older Somali respondents reported more target reasons for exit, while younger refugees claimed seeker motives impelling their pursuit of asylum outside of Somalia. Males tended to report more political type motivations for exit compared with female respondents. Family unity was a strong motive for departure among respondents. Unexpectedly, motivations for exit did not appear to be strongly related to outcomes during resettlement.

The study of the forms of movement and flight factors related to the migration of Somali respondents revealed that although displacement-related factors did influence migration results, they appeared to be less important than home-related factors as determinants of resettlement outcomes. The analysis of respondents' attitudes towards displacement suggested a strong link between the movements of purpose groups of refugees and integration or assimilation by respondents during resettlement in Ottawa.

Overall, it appears that host-related factors of migration have a more significant impact than displacement-related variables, but are not as important as

individual refugee attributes as factors influencing resettlement outcomes. In particular, it appears that restrictive definitions of citizenship and high-technology immigration controls act as effective disincentives to asylum seekers, whereas welfare programmes which help meet basic needs and entry policies which support family unity attract involuntary migrants searching for refuge. Compared with other host-related factors, employment and educational opportunities appeared to be most strongly related to positive resettlement outcomes. Conversely, racial prejudice and intolerance of religious, cultural differences seemed to be important negative influences impeding the assimilation of thirty percent of the respondents in Ottawa. Rather unexpectedly, duration of exile did not appear to be a strong indicator of resettlement outcomes by Somalis in Ottawa.

The examination of state population policies as host-factors of migration revealed that overall, Canadian refugee policies favour limited refugee immigration and promote refugee integration during resettlement. Policy changes proposed in a recent review of immigration legislation would shift more protection to refugees selected for admission overseas (Trempe et al., 1997:78-99). The proposals to extend refugee protection to refugee producing areas overseas recognise the importance of displacement-related migration factors such as obstacles in flight and pressures in asylum, which effectively limit the capacities of the most vulnerable groups of refugees to find a safe haven. The prioritisation of a refugee's needs for protection over her/his demonstrated capacity to adapt to

Canadian lifestyles in the selection of overseas candidates for resettlement assistance should increase the numbers of needy refugees protected by Canada. However, it would be a mistake to deny protection to more independent and less-needy refugees who depart from homelands in pushed-planned movements and arrive in Canada better prepared for resettlement because of the essential leadership roles they play in the establishment of community supports for disadvantaged compatriots who arrive in subsequent waves of refugees. Further research is suggested in order to compare the outcomes of refugees selected abroad for assistance and inland arrivals.

Within Canada, refugees should be more involved in the determination of the types of benefits and services they receive and the manner in which they are delivered (Potocky, 1996:169). As well, it appears that levels of receptiveness for refugees may be improved through more resettlement in smaller urban centres, as well as through the expansion of host-programs and education about refugee resettlement issues.

The analysis of individual cases of displacement within the general model of refugee migration necessitated a consideration of many of the same migration questions posed by refugee determination boards in the adjudication of claims for asylum. The process of classifying refugee movements as pushed-planned versus acute migrations, and categorisation of refugees in self-alienated purpose groups versus reactive-fate groups required an accurate interpretation of cumulative causes and mutually reinforcing motivations for involuntary displacement. This

study demonstrated that even minor misinterpretation or careless categorisation of reasons for involuntary departure or types of forced movement could result in the mis-determination of refugees as voluntary or economic type migrants. When people's lives are on the line, determination should be guided by a refined and detailed model of migration rather than a less cumbersome, streamlined format.

The general model of refugee migration highlights the protection needs of forced migrants by presenting numerous and complex causes of forced migration, as well as multiple, additive motivations for involuntary departure from home. This study of refugee migration revealed that the basic requirements of forced migrants cannot be confined to narrow state-centred responses which seek to rectify problems of political persecution and alienation.

In the twentieth century, states have favoured trade and aid flows over population flows. Policies employed by states to prevent refugee migrations have failed because inflows of international development assistance to poor countries have been continually undermined by even greater outflows of debt and interest payments to donor institutions. At the same time, the North-South arms trade has also contributed to the creation of conditions compelling mass involuntary migration by reducing productive investments that foster economic growth and increasing wasteful purchases of destructive weapons used to oppress needy populations (Tesfahuney 1998).

In unstable states, minor conflicts can spark an expanding spiral of violence when political dissent is oppressed and turns into armed resistance. Then

resistance is met with coercive force, and localised insurgency spreads into civil war. In the last decade, militarists have repeatedly justified armed interventions as humanitarian activities designed to prevent human rights abuses and refugee migration. While it is true that the overall results of preventive interventions by outside forces are difficult to gauge and the successes of crisis aversion mechanisms are less sensationalised than disasters, at each stage of conflict, the scope for involuntary displacement and the humanitarian costs of failure are increased.

Necessitated by the failures of preventive measures, refugee containment policies have been devised by affluent host-countries to reduce the cost and impact of resettlement. Containment efforts have resulted in increased suffering by displaced populations due to inadequate care and maintenance of migrants in temporary camps, and also due to heightened insecurity and distress from the militarisation of humanitarian aid in refugee producing areas. Improvements in assistance for selected political refugees seeking asylum have not been available to the increasing numbers of internally displaced populations and international migrants involuntarily displaced by generalised violence, civil war, and environmental disaster. Without better opportunities for survival, unassisted forced migrants resort to illegal international travel, and rely on underground, untaxed and unregulated labour to secure their subsistence.

The overflow of forced migrants' requirements for food, shelter, healthcare, education, income opportunities, and decision-making powers beyond states'

capacities to provide protection has resulted in the rapid growth of humanitarian aid organisations since World War II. The inadequacy of combined post-crisis responses to resolve humanitarian disasters, and the growing numbers of involuntary migrants in the world system of states, attest to the need for structural changes which penetrate deeper than international humanitarian laws to promote personal sovereignty and support human security over state sovereignty.

In the meantime, several types of assistance which would reduce the hardships of forced migrations are spotlighted in the general model, such as safer flight conditions, increased support and space for spontaneous settlement in temporary asylum, and increased education, training, employment and resettlement opportunities for refugees in host-countries. Until some resolutions are successfully implemented, the pressures created by involuntarily displaced populations continue to build.

As refugee crises become more urgent, demands for new programmes to treat problems of involuntary migration will increase, along with additional opportunities to invent and improve methods to prevent and control migration. Refugee studies must provide practitioners and policy makers with some guidance in dealing with refugees issues. Black (1991) argues it is important to examine the relationship between refugee reception and resettlement policies and employment, household livelihood, education, culture, and identity. More studies are needed which focus on interactions between refugees and host populations.

In addition to country specific refugee studies, geographers must continually update regional studies of changing refugee producing regions (Kenzer 1991). In addition, geographers must promote a global overview of forced migration flows, and main migration circuits must be closely monitored because the “magnitude of forced migration will serve as a barometer of global and regional political and economic instability” (Wood 1994:630).

Medical, regional, social, political, cultural, economic, and population geographers deal with key refugee themes and concepts such as access to healthcare and housing, boundary and land use disputes, cultural diffusion, settlement patterns and migration flows (Kenzer 1991). This places geographers in an optimal position to lead theoretical development and to map out research priorities to facilitate complementary and comparative work that will further our understanding of complex issues of involuntary migration.

By examining the relations between environment, politics and society, a geography of forced migration will help to clarify the relations between political instability, economic and ecological decline and ethnic conflict (Wood 1994).

Within refugee studies, geographical perspectives are needed for research concerning flight conditions, settlement types and locations, types of movement, forms of displacement, chain migration, repatriation, and the directions and patterns of both regulated and clandestine flows of people, arms, finances, goods and services.

APPENDIX

Table A: Clan-Based Armed Factions and their leaders, by region in 1993

Name	Clan Base	Area	Leader
Somali Afrikan Muki Organisation	Jareer	Lower Shabelle, Lower & Middle Juba	Mohamed F. Abdullahi
Somali Democratic Alliance	Gadubursi	Borama	A. Haji Hersi
Somali Democratic Movement	Reewin (Dighil)	Benadir, Lower Shabelle, Lower & Middle Juba	Ali Ismail Abdi
United Somali Congress (USC: Ethiopian sector)	Hawiye (Habar Gedir)	Mudug	Gen. Mohamed Farrah Aidid
Somali National Front	Darood (Maraheen)	Gedo Mudug & Lower Juba	Gen. Omar Haji Mohamed
Somali National Movement (SNM)	Isaaq	Northwest	Mohamed Ibrahim Egal
Somali National Union	Reer Hamar	Benadir	Mohamed Raji Mohamed
Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF)	Darood (Majerteen)	NE Galgadood, Nugal, Mudugh & Kismayo	Gen. Mohamed Abshir Mussa
Southern Somali National Movement	Dir	Lower Shabelle & Juba	Col. Abdi Warsame Isaaq
United Somali Congress (USC: Mogadishu sector)	Hawiye (Abgal)	Galgadood, Middle Shabelle & Benadir	Mohamed Qanyare Afrah
United Somali Front	Isse	Awdal	Abdurahman Duale Ali
United Somali Party	Darood (Dulbahante Warsangali)	Sool, Sanaag	Mohamed Abdi Hashi
Somali Democratic Movement (SDM)	Reewin (Elay)	Bay, Lower Shabelle	Col. Mohamed Nur Alio
Somali Democratic Movement (Brinka)	Reewin (Mirifle)	Bay, Bokool, Gedo	Abdulah Mohamed Idris
Somali Patriotic Movement	Darood (Awlihan)	Lower & Middle Juba	Gen. Aden Abdullahi Nur
Somali Patriotic Movement(SNA)	Darood (M. Zubeer)	Lower Juba	Col. Ahmed Omar Jess

(Muktar 1997:60-1)

Table B: The six major clan families and clans in Somalia ⁵

DAROOD	Isaaq	HAWIYE	DIR	REEWIN	DIGIL
Ogaden	Habar Yoonis	Garre	Gadabursi	Eelay	Tunni
Majeerten	Habar Awal	Habar Gidir	Iise	Hareyn	
Maraheen	Habar Tol	Abgaal	Biimaal	Laysan	
Dulbahante	Jaalo Habar	Biyamaal		Geledi	
Warsangali	Jaalo	Hawaadle		Gasar Gudda	
Yuusuf	Iidagale	Murursade			
Kablalah		Ujuuraan			
		Wacdaan			
		Mobilayn			

(adapted from Metz, 1992:72; Muktar, 1997; Cassanelli, 1982)

Table C: Geographic origin of respondents

Region of origin	total	% of respondents
Lower Juba	1	3%
Middle Shabelle	1	3%
Mogadishu	10	34%
Bay	1	3%
Hiran	2	7%
Mudug	1	3%
Nugal	1	3%
Eastern	5	17%
Sanag	1	3%
Togdher	2	7%
North-west	5	17%
Total	30	100%

⁵ Muktar explains that *Reewin* is pronounced and ascribed mistakenly as *Rahanweyn* or *Rahhanwein*. They are agro-pastoral and speak a language of their own, *Mai*. Unlike the nomadic clans of Somalia, the *Reewin* developed a political structure that transcends lineage systems in a system of territorial identity, using terms like *Reer Bay* (people of the Bay), *Reer Ghedo* (people of the other side of the Juba River), (Muktar, 1997:63). See also (Cassanelli, 1982).

Table D: Origin of respondents, by stated clan affiliation

Stated clan affiliation	total	% of respondents
Darood	7	24%
Darood sub-clan Ogaden	1	3%
Darood sub-clan Majeerten	3	10%
Isaaq	4	14%
Hawiye	1	3%
Dir sub-clan Gadabursi	1	3%
Reewin	0	0
Digil	0	0
Somali	2	7%
Peace	1	3%
Refused to indicate clan	10	33%
Total	30	100%

Table E: Resettlement outcomes of respondents

Positive resettlement outcomes and % total		Marginalisation in resettlement and % respondents					
integration	assimilation	Role	Eco	Race	Poli	Psy	Pro
	4, 13%						
	1,3%			1, 3%			
8, 27%							
3, 10%			3, 10%				
3, 10%				3, 10%			
2,7%			2,7%	2,7%			2,7%
			2,7%				
1,3%				1,3%		1,3%	
		1,3%	1,3%	1,3%			1,3%
		1,3%				1,3%	
1,3%					1,3%		
		1,3%	1,3%				
1,3%			1,3%	1,3%			
			1,3%	1,3%		1,3%	
TOTALS positive	12,40%						
negative	6,20%						
mixed	12,40%						
19, 63%	5, 17%	3, 10%	11, 37%	10, 33%	1, 3%	3, 10%	3, 10%

Table F: Age upon departure from Somalia and resettlement outcomes

Age group	Integrated during settlement and % of total	Assimilated during resettlement and % of total	Individuation of household roles and functions	Marginalisation in resettlement, % total		
				Eco	Racial	Pro
4 < 15		3, 10%	1, 3 %	1,3%	1, 3%	
9 15 to 25	8, 27%	1, 3%		1,3%	4,13%	
9 26 to 35	6, 20%	1, 3%		5,17%	4,13%	
5 36 to 45	4, 13%			2,7%		2, 7%
3 > 45	1, 3%		2, 7%	2,7%	1,3%	1, 3%

Table G: Gender related to resettlement outcomes

Gender	Positive resettlement outcomes and % total		Marginalisation in resettlement and % respondents					
	integration	assimilation	Role	Eco	Race	Poli	Psy	Pro
Men	10, 33%	1, 3%	2, 7%	7, 23%	7, 23%	0	1, 3%	2, 7%
Women	9, 27%	4, 13%	1, 3%	4, 13%	3, 13%	1, 3%	2, 7%	1, 3%

Table H: Migration networks before arrival and resettlement outcomes

Status of Net-works	Positive resettlement outcomes, % of total		Marginalisation in resettlement and % respondents					
	integration	assimilation	Role	Eco	Race	Poli	Psy	Pro
10 had Links Set up already	5, 17%	2, 7%	2, 7%	4, 13%	2, 7%	1, 3%	1, 3%	1, 3%
20 had No prior links	14, 47%	3, 10%	1, 3%	7, 23%	8, 27%	2, 7%	2, 7%	2, 7%

Table I: Forms of displacement and resettlement outcomes

Form of displacement	Positive resettlement outcomes and % of total		Marginalisation in resettlement and % of respondents					
	integration	assimilation	Role	Eco	Race	Poli	Psy	Pro
5 Absent from home	4, 13%	0	0	2, 7%	2, 7%	0	2, 7%	0
11 Mass flight	5, 17%	3, 10%	2, 7%	3, 10%	3, 10%	1, 3%	1, 3%	2, 7%
14 Lone or small group escape	10, 33%	1, 3%	1, 3%	5, 17%	6, 20%	0	0	1, 3%

Table J: Kinetic movements and resettlement outcomes

Kinetic type	Positive resettlement outcomes and % of total		Marginalisation in resettlement and % respondents					
	integration	assimilation	Role	Eco	Race	Poli	Psy	Pro
3 Absent acute	3, 10%	0	0	2, 7%	2, 7%	0	2, 7%	0
10 Acute moves	7, 23%	3, 10%	3, 10%	3, 10%	2, 7%	1, 3%	1, 3%	2, 7%
15 Pushed planned moves	8, 27%	2, 7%	0	5, 17%	4, 13%	0	0	1, 3%

Table K: Departure from Somalia of respondents by year, gender

Year of Exit	M	F	M + F	% of respondents
1968	0	1	1	3%
1982	1	2	3	10%
1984	1	1	2	7%
1986	1	1	2	7%
1987	0	1	1	3%
1988	2	2	4	13 %
1990	1	1	2	7%
1991	1	2	3	10%
1992	3	2	5	17%
1993	4	2	6	20%
1995	1	0	1	3%
TOTAL	15	15	30	100%

Table L: Speed of flight and resettlement outcomes

Duration of flight	Positive resettlement outcomes and % of total		Marginalisation in resettlement and % respondents					
	integration	assimilation	Role	Eco	Race	Poli	Psy	Pro
5 <1 mo	1 3%	3 10%	0	2 7%	1 3%	0	1 3%	0
5 1-6 mo	3 10%	0	1 3%	3 10%	2 7%	0	0	1 3%
13 < 1year	4 13%	3 10%	2 7%	6	3 10%	1 3%	1 3%	1 3%
12 >1 year	7 23%	2 7%	1 3%	2 7%	4 13%	0	1 3%	1 3%

Table M: Chain migration by respondents prior to arrival in Canada

Number of countries of temporary asylum prior to arrival in Canada	m	f	total	% total of 21 chain migrants
one country	9	2	11	52 %
two countries	2	2	4	19 %
three countries	2	2	4	19 %
four countries	0	1	1	5 %
five countries	1	0	1	5 %

Table N: Countries of temporary asylum for respondents

Country of temporary asylum	m	f	m+f	% of 25 respondents in flight
Kenya	1 0	4	14	56 %
Ethiopia	1	2	3	12 %
Djibouti	2	2	4	16 %
Yemen	2	0	2	8 %
Saudi Arabia	2	1	3	12 %
Egypt	1	1	2	8 %
Tanzania	0	1	1	4 %
India	0	1	1	4 %
Italy	2	0	2	8 %
United Kingdom	0	1	1	4 %
United States	3	4	7	28 %

Table O: Borders crossed and resettlement outcomes

Number of countries of temporary asylum	Positive resettlement outcomes and % of total		Marginalisation in resettlement and % respondents					
	integration	assimilation	Role	Eco	Race	Poli	Psy	Pro
11, 1 country	7, 23%	1, 3%	2, 7%	5, 17%	2, 7%	0	1, 3%	0
4, 2 countries	2, 7%	1, 3%	1, 3%	1, 3%	1, 3%	1, 3%	0	1, 3%
4, 3 countries	3, 10%	0	0	2, 7%	1, 3%	0	0	1, 3%
1, 4 countries	1, 3%	0	0	1, 3%	0	0	0	1, 3%
1, 5 countries	1, 3%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Table P: Duress during flight from Somalia prior to arrival in Canada

Description	#, % total	age breakdown	gender breakdown
Chain migrants who stayed in countries between Somalia and Canada (not including pre-arranged stops).	21, 70%	1 < 15 7 x 15 to 25 5 x 26 to 35 5 x 36 to 45 3 > 45	14 m 7 f
Stayed in refugee camp	6, 20%	1 < 15 1 x 15 to 25 1 x 26 to 35 1 x 36 to 45 2 > 45	4m 2f
Violence in camp	1, 3 %	1 > 45	2f
Threats of violence, sexual violence, imprisonment, or forcible return to Somalia	4, 10 %	3 x 15 to 25 1 > 45	2m 2f
Arduous journey, lack shelter, food, water	3, 10%	2x 15 to 25 1x 36 to 45	2m 1f

Table Q: Pressures in asylum and resettlement outcomes

Flight arrival pattern	Positive resettlement outcomes and % of total		Marginalisation in resettlement and % of respondents					
	integration	assimilation	Role	Eco	Race	Poli	Psy	Pro
8 Push-permit	5, 17%	3, 10%	0	3, 10%	5, 17%	0	1, 3%	1, 3%
5 Push-pressure plunge	4, 13%	2, 7%	1, 3%	1, 1%	1, 3%	0	0	1, 3%
17 Push-pressure pull	10, 33%	1, 3%	2, 7%	7, 23%	4, 13%	1, 3%	2, 7%	1, 3%

Table R: Somali Claims for Refugee Status in Canada, claims referred and finalized January 01, 1989 to July 10, 1997

Year	Referred	Accepted	Denied	Withdrawn Abandoned	Total Finalized	% accepted of total finalized	total pending
1989	2076	935	26	8	969	96.49%	1107
1990	2762	2245	167	23	2435	92.20%	1434
1991	2842	3018	256	56	3330	90.63%	928
1992	3021	2724	249	73	3046	89.43%	903
1993	3343	2228	105	127	2460	90.57%	1786
1994	2104	2398	82	146	2626	91.32%	1264
1995	1680	1212	37	126	1375	88.15%	1569
1996	964	893	208	204	1305	68.43%	1228
1997	320	496	139	106	741	66.94%	807
total	19112	16149	1269	869	18287	88.31%	

(Source: Standards, Analysis and Monitoring, Immigration and Refugee Board Canada)

Table S: Permanent residents admitted from Somalia, all immigration categories, by intended destination in the National Capital Region

Year of Arrival	Ottawa	Nepean	Gloucester	Kanata	Vanier
1987	17	0	0	0	0
1988	19	0	0	0	0
1989	39	0	0	0	0
1990	154	0	1	0	0
1991	776	2	13	0	0
1992	1328	66	197	0	7
1993	596	43	63	0	1
1994	139	8	13	0	0
1995	142	13	18	0	1
1996	152	12	11	1	0
TOTAL	3362	143	316	1	9

(Source: Standards, Analysis and Monitoring, Immigration and Refugee Board Canada)

Table T: Duration of resettlement period and resettlement outcomes

Duration of residence in Canada	Positive resettlement outcomes and % of total		Marginalisation in resettlement and % of respondents					
	integration	assimilation	Role	Eco	Race	Poli	Psy	Pro
14 over 5 years in Canada	10, 33%	2, 7%	0	5, 17 %	7, 23%	0	2, 7%	1, 3%
16 2 to 5 years in Canada	9, 30%	3, 10%	3, 10%	6, 20 %	3, 10%	1, 3%	1, 3%	2, 7%

Table U: Duress upon departure from Somalia, duress during interim flight, distress during resettlement

Description	#, % total	age breakdown	gender breakdown
Total respondents under duress prior to exit	14, 47%	4 < 15 4 x 15 to 25 1 x 26 to 35 2 x 36 to 45 3 > 45	7m 7f
Total respondents under duress during flight, or in temporary asylum	14, 47%	1 < 15 6 x 15 to 25 1 x 26 to 35 2 x 36 to 45 4 > 45	10m 4f
Total respondents under duress upon entry in Canada	5, 17%	1 x 15 to 25 2 x 26 to 35 1 x 36 to 45 1 > 45	3m 2f
Total respondents distressed during resettlement in Canada	22, 73%	3 < 15 6 x 15 to 25 7 x 26 to 35 3 x 36 to 45 3 > 45	11m 11f
Total respondents under duress upon departure or in flight and also distressed during resettlement in Canada	12, 40%	3 < 15 3 x 15 to 25 1 x 26 to 35 2 x 36 to 45 3 > 45	6m 6f
Total respondents distressed during resettlement in Canada but not under prior duress	10, 33%	3 x 15 to 25 6 x 26 to 35 1 x 36 to 45	5m 5f
Total respondents who reported neither duress nor distress	3, 10%	1 x 15 to 25 1 x 26 to 35 1 x 36 to 45	1m 2f

Table V: Duress, distress and resettlement outcomes

Sources of duress or distress reported by respondents	Positive resettlement outcomes and % total		Marginalisation in resettlement and % of respondents					
	integration	assimilation	Role	Eco	Race	Poli	Psy	Pro
5 Duress upon entry	2 7%	0	1 3%	3 10%	3 10%	0	1 3%	1, 3%
10 Distress after arrival in Canada	6 20%	1 3%	0	4 13%	4 13%	0	2 7%	0
12 Duress prior to arrival and distress after arrival	6, 20%	2, 7%	2 7%	6 20%	3 10%	1 3%	1 3%	3 10%
22 Distress during settlement in Canada	13, 43%	2, 7%	3, 10%	11, 37%	9, 30%	1 3%	3, 10%	3 10%

Table W: Ideological-nationalist stance of respondents in resettlement

Description	#, % total	age breakdown	gender breakdown
Restoration activists	3, 10%	1 x 15 to 25 1 x 36 to 45 1 > 45	3m
Passive hurt	9, 30%	4 < 15 3 x 26 to 35 1 x 36 to 45 1 < 45	3m 6f
Eager assimilationists	5, 17%	2 x 15 to 25 3 x 26 to 35	3m 2f
Integration realists	13, 43%	6 x 15 to 25 3 x 26 to 35 3 x 36 to 45 1 > 45	6m 7f

Table X: Ideological-nationalist orientations and resettlement outcomes

respondents ideological-nationalist orientation	Positive resettlement outcomes and % of total		Marginalisation in resettlement and % of respondents					
	integration	assimilation	Role	Eco	Race	Poli	Psy	Pro
3 restoration activists	2, 7%	0	1, 3%	1 3%	1 3%	0	0	1 3%
9 passive hurt	1, 3%	3, 10%	2, 7%	5, 17%	1, 3%	0	2, 7%	0
13 integration realist	13, 43%	0	0	4, 13%	5, 17%	1, 3%	1 3%	2, 7%
5 eager assimilationists	3, 10%	2 7%	0	1 3%	3 10%	0	0	0

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