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**Cinematic Regimes of Light/Power/Knowledge:
The Political-Economy of Secrecy**

by

Daniel M. O'Connor, B.A., M.A.

A thesis submitted to
the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfilment of
the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy
Department of Sociology and Anthropology

Carleton University
Ottawa, Ontario
March, 1998

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External Examiner

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April 20, 1998

ABSTRACT

Contra Denzin's claim that cinema simply reiterates the disciplinary division of labour by multiplying the number of voyeurs, I propose that cinema is a new post-disciplinary apparatus of light/power/knowledge with a different spectatorial division of labour. By developing further Foucault's notion of power-relations and specifying the elements of the social apparatus, I explore how these processes and social devices have worked historically, and the ways in which cinema deploys these processes differently. By keeping open the possibilities of change and focussing on the strategies deployed to control its flow, I provide an analysis of governmentality as it operates in the cinema apparatus. I argue that cinema governs by means of a new and heretofore un-noticed mechanism of power I call montage.

While Baudrillard and others characterize mass-media as sites of pornographic hyper-visibility where everything is given, and where secrecy and the public theatres of sociality are eliminated in favour of isolated consumers, I propose an alternative hypothesis, notably that cinema's movement-images are marked by the deployment of a new social 'inter-face' that changes the dimensions of social space rather than eliminating it. Theorists of cinema and Deleuzian social theory are drawn upon to argue that cinema, through its moving visual apparatus, creates a virtual public space where (in the inter-face) we encounter an "otherwise-other" (Boundas 1993) that structures audience perceptions and expectations. Cinema's power derives not from simple over-exposure, but by a relation of what we see and what could be seen by this 'other' as it circulates between the frames, selectively discloses the secret potentials of what lies beyond, and produces social events. Through a review of a number of American (Hollywood) examples, I explore the sociological significance of cinema in terms of the power of its inter-face to move people and to shape our sociable sentiments into regimes of truth and forms of sociality.

Acknowledgements

I would like to extend my gratitude to my supervisor **Dr. Rob Shields** for his exemplary direction in this project. His innumerable contributions to this dissertation went far beyond the call and deserve the highest praise. His work on the margins and enduring support for those who follow the flow are what warrant the distinction in this case.

For his unrelenting intellectual support and for his outstanding editorial contributions I would like to acknowledge the work of my committee member **Dr. Barry Rutland**. In addition, and for his pivotal and timely assistance in this project, I would like to thank my committee member **Dr. Charles Gordon**.

In admiration of his work, his profound insights into Deleuzian philosophy, and for inspiring this research, I would like to acknowledge and thank **Dr. Constantine Boundas**.

For their unwavering encouragement and support throughout the duration of my studies, I owe a debt of inestimable gratitude to my parents, **Dolores and Bud O'Connor**.

I would also like to offer a special thanks to **Doug Booker** and **Nona Grandea** for their friendship, generosity, and hospitality over the years, and to **Nazira Conroy** for her expertise in assisting graduate students through the process.

Mostly, I would like to reserve my deepest, heartfelt thanks for **Suzan Ilcan**. Without her meticulous reflections and knowledgeable counsel the opening that this work occupies would not be possible.

In memory of Gilles Deleuze.

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INTRODUCTION

In comparison with the childish stage in which every conception is expressed at once, and every undertaking is accessible to the eyes of all, the secret produces an immense enlargement of life. Numerous contents of life cannot even emerge in the presence of full publicity (Simmel, 1950: 330).

It is suggested in the literature that the forces of globalization, that is, the movements of capital, of commodities and people, combined with changes in production, have virtually eliminated local culture. These forces not only displace people but they are involved in the conquest of space whereby local cultural markers and regional sign-posts are uprooted and strewn about as *simulacra* in their wake. Mass media are implicated in this spatial conquest at the same time as they are taken as passive reflections of them. Consequently contemporary media culture is seen as a fractured ideological mirror for a homogeneous mass of isolated, disaffected, and dissociated individuals who consume displaced signs and mass produced cultural artifacts. In contrast, other literature suggest that there are numerous sites within a mass society that are responsible for the appearance of new cultural localities, new forms of local communities with new forms of social relations. Different from status groups whose ties are based on social positions or class locations, and are identified by their consumption practices, these

mysterious, transient, and heterogeneous assemblages are said to be bound by affective ties that cross existing social boundaries.

In assessing the power of the modern mass media, many scholars adopt a one-sided, fetishistic view (e.g., Barthes, 1973, 1977; Baudrillard, 1983, 1988; Bhabha, 1994; Denzin, 1995). In these views, cultural productions are treated as if they were things, as finished products or finished works of art, that circulate, are disposed of, and are consumed as such. Reduced to inert figures and stills, these cultural artifacts wait for movements to be added to them, for power to motivate them, and for forces to set them in motion. Like the passive surface of a mirror (even a cracked one), culture cannot produce anything, it can only reflect an external image, or record or echo the movements of other, more productive agents, bodies, and forces. From this standpoint, culture is an image of external movements. It is a “mirror of production,” or a “mechanical reproduction,” that simply reproduces social estrangement and reflects back a fractured image of self.

Are these reproductions good or bad copies? Are the reflections accurate? Do things appear as they really are? That depends on the *trueness* of the surface, the smoothness of the reflective plane, and the qualities of the medium itself. A good medium, as a perfectly subservient scribe or inscription machine, neither adds nor subtracts anything and makes it impossible to tell the difference between

the original and its forgeries. Why, then, would we need to see the original when we already have an image of it -- a slavish imitation or copy that is made to correspond to it point for point? The perfect copy can make the original obsolete, superfluous, or even redundant. It can replace it, stand in its place (as a representative), and take over for it like a double. This image can have as much authority as the original it replaces (or displaces). The problem of the image is a problem of knowledge, but also of power and resistance.

The problem of the image is redoubled when we approach that form of popular cultural production known as cinema. Cinema is an apparatus that produces images, but of what? Some (like Metz, 1982; 1974) would have it be a kind of transcription machine whose images reproduce external movements by means of coded communiques. The resemblance in this case is external and indirect, not point for point. If these bad copies are decipherable it is because another oblique medium is in operation. In this particular semiotic approach, the organization of images and the organization of things are brought into correspondence through the medium of their structure -- their reasonable content. While images and things may be different in their appearance, in terms of their structure, they are identical. It is a cunning logic (see Tucker, 1956) that establishes these correspondences and makes differences comparable

(homologous). Whether we locate these structures of identity in the psychology of mind, in its laws (reason), its deep grammatical structures, or in the nature of things generally, these codes are legislative mechanisms designed to order the world and overrule its differences.

Bad copies, like the distorted reflections of the fun-house, can also be amusing and laughable (see Arendt's [1970:45] discussion of power, representation, and the authority/laughter relationship). Clearly, some reproductions are better than others and manifest the difference between what they express and what they are supposed to represent. But what if the medium were to act and move on its own account? If there is some distortion, refraction, or resistance owed to the medium itself, then, not only does the idea of a faithful servant of reproduction become problematic, but the whole nature of representation itself can be thrown into question. Such is the character of the simulacra discussed in Baudrillard. These displaced signs simply do not refer, or rather, only refer to other signs. But the problem of simulacra becomes even more complex as we enter the domain of cinema, and more specifically, cinema's movement-images.

Instead of seeing cinema as yet another forum for capturing and reflecting images of movement that are external to it, I will argue that cinema is a productive,

social apparatus, that it is active rather than passive, and that because it has an active-side it has the potential to “make a difference” and to produce independent socio-cultural effects. At the theoretical level this analysis requires a qualitatively different conception of cinema’s images (as outlined in Deleuze), a different conception of power (developed by Foucault), and a conception of the social mechanisms that link the image and power together.

Foucault (1983) argues that power is activity in a double sense and cannot be reduced to the ability to act on still, stable or inert matter, nor the ability to simply dispose of finished products. It is action on an actual or potential action and thus does not work through capture or consent. The principle of power lies somewhere in the interval between these extremes. Power presupposes resistance as the condition of its exercise. Incapacitation always does violence to objects or things. Consensus reigns over those unable or unwilling to resist. By dispossessing the other of the will to respond or the means of flight, these mechanisms eliminate the very conditions necessary for the exercise of power. Violence and submission are power’s absolute limits, not the basis of its exercise (cf. Weber [1978] on the monopolization, rationalization and traditionalization of *macht*). The real, material basis of power is the potential to move or act (*puissance*). Power works on this potential and aims ultimately, not to eliminate it.

but rather to control its flow (O'Connor, 1997b). The processes and flows of work (labour-processes) and its products (commodities) are, of course, included in its domain, but so are other kinds of activity. All manners of movement (of bodies, knowledge, images, even light) are potential subjects of power.

Foucault's conception of the *dispositif* or social apparatus (Foucault, 1980; Deleuze, 1992a; Shields, 1991; Patton, 1994; Rella, 1994; Bhabha, 1994; Escobar, 1995) is a general device for analysing the structures and processes involved in any specific regime of power. This conception also fosters a comparative approach to the different modalities of power (e.g., sovereign-, sign- and disciplinary-regimes) in terms of the transformation-spaces and the control of flows. The structures and processes of social apparatuses are not identical with the positions (offices) and role-constraints of formal institutions (e.g., prisons, schools, factories, hospitals) nor are they closed systems (cf. de Cauter, 1993) or total institutions (cf. Goffman, 1961). Instead, social apparatuses, such as discipline, are strategies of movement populating the openings in the frameworks of social institutions shaping motor-tendencies and practical dispositions (cf. Bourdieu, 1993 on the *habitus* as a structuring-structure). It is because the spaces of places of the social institution are only relatively closed that they are subject to flows of all kinds which cross their boundaries. Parsons (1960), an early

sociological *media* theorist, already understood that social systems are engaged in a process of continual exchange with their outside. Because the Parsonian model presupposes a balanced and symmetrical system of exchange (of information for energy), it misses an analysis of the structures and processes which produce dissymmetrical flows (Foucault, 1979) and unequal exchanges or distributions. Power, understood as an active, productive relation rather than an act of seizure, arrest (cf. Barthes, 1973), fixation (cf. Bhabha, 1994), or repression, always occupies intervals of movement or the spaces of flow between the spaces of places of the institutional framework.

Boundaries, often considered as rigid territorial frames in need of constant protection and maintenance (to avoid spillage; Bauman, 1997), are being revisited and reconceptualized. They are variously understood as permeable (Grosz, 1995) or osmotic membranes (Virilio, 1995), marginal sites and liminal spaces (Shields, 1997), intervals of movement and change (Deleuze, 1991), thresholds (Foucault, 1979), doorways (Simmel, 1994a) places of passage (Massumi, 1996), places where many spaces converge and become entangled (Soja, 1989), interfaces between moments of closure (Stewart, 1996), and surfaces where the inside and outside meet (Probyn, 1996). Once exclusive and exclusionary, boundaries have become *surfaces* and *interfaces* between adjacent places, regions, bodies,

substances, phases (of training), or stages (of development). They are potential sites of research into the innumerable points where supposedly independent, differentiated, often polarized substances, bodies, ideas, images, individuals, groups, and systems make contact, interact, mix, and intermingle. They are potential sites of research into the dynamics of power.

The argument that I put forward in this thesis is that cinema is an example of a Foucauldian/Deleuzean social apparatus of power. Denzin (1995) has already initiated a sociological investigation of cinema along this line. Drawing from Metz's (1982) psychoanalysis of the cinema and, at least in part, from Baudrillard's conception of the *pornography* of information technologies (i.e., the fetishism of partial-objects produced by eliminating distance and bringing everything close-up), Denzin sees cinema as an extension of discipline. In this view, cinema repeats discipline's surveillance function by socializing an army of anonymous voyeurs with a *surveillance gaze*.¹ In contrast to Denzin and following Deleuze, I present cinema, not as an iteration of discipline, but, as an *itineration* of the Foucauldian social apparatus. After all, it was Eisenstein (1942, 1949), and not Bentham, who outlined the cinema apparatus and understood the power of

¹ That is, in spite of Williams' (1989:119) claim that "running 'spectator' and 'voyeur' together" simply gives currency to an absurd confusion.

montage (see Aumont, 1987). In this montage apparatus, as in the disciplinary apparatus, the relation of visibility and invisibility figures prominently. However, in Eisenstein's understanding of this new machine, the close-up would play a dual role, drawing together the visible with what lies beyond it.

The Eisensteinian close-up is not at all like Baudrillard's. For Baudrillard (1988, 1990) the effect of the close-up is the production of partial-objects (objects of consumption/collection). For Eisenstein, and other key cinema theorists (e.g., Bergman, Balázs) the close-up forms a kind of interface, or what Deleuze and Guattari (1987) call by the generic name, *Faciality*. *Faciality* defines a distinctive *cinema gaze* that sees beyond the frame, into the past or future, to the side or elsewhere. As such, it constitutes a structure of possibilities that parallels Boundas' (1993) conception of the otherwise-other. I argue that the concept of *faciality* is far more revealing of the processes of power in this medium than any of the political-economic (Baudrillard, 1975), psychoanalytic (Žižek, 1989; Bhabha, 1994), or hybrid (Kaite, 1991) variations on the theme of fetishism.

While textual based media work through narrativity, a process of relating concept-signs in the production of cognitive ideologies (Barthes, 1977; Fiske, 1989), cinema involves relating moving-images to produce moods, *ambiance* (Maffesoli, 1993; Deleuze, 1991), intensities (Lyotard, 1993), or affects

(Massumi, 1996). Cinema works at the level of bodies and their capacity to be affected. The close-up produces the flood of affections while strategies of montage work to control the flow. As a regime of power, cinema does not leave *marks* on the body nor *traces* of a disciplinary self-consciousness. Instead, it leaves *impressions*.

Montage works by relating spatial perceptions to an interval of movement. Faciality is that which occupies the interval. The interval defines a space of possibility and potential (O'Connor, 1997), or what Barthes (1973) has called a "halo of virtualities." The face/close-up, or its structural equivalent (the sound-out-of-field, the flashback), when inserted into the flow at critical junctures suggests ways one might live the seen/scene. It structures expectations, anticipates events to come, and provides a sense of process and continuity (cf. Foucault, 1979, Deleuze, 1992b on the discontinuities of discipline). Inscribed by signs which are iconic and indexical (Pierce, 1955), it tell tales of what must have happened, warns of what could happen or what has happened in the past and could happen again. In the montage apparatus, it is not simply the *pornography* of the seen, the *mise-en-scène*, or what goes on inside the frame, that is important. Equally important is what we don't see and what goes on in that space of possibilities beyond the frame. Montage produces *events*, that is, those singular and remarkable instances

and moments that defy repetition (Lyotard, 1993) and which are assessed in terms of their qualities, intensities, and impressions. As I define them, events are assemblages of actual and virtual elements. They are conjunctions of seeing and foreseeing, of the inside and the beyond. I argue that this conception of the event specifies a new kind of popular spectacle, a different kind of social apparatus, and a new regime of power.

Just as discipline crosses instructional boundaries, the strategies of montage cross the boundaries of genre. Montage defines a style, not so much of punishment (though producing bodily effects), but of post-disciplinary manners of being with and dealing with others (as in Bauman, 1997, 1992). Moving away from the notion of a homogeneous and global notion of culture (see Giddens, 1994; cf. Jameson, 1990 on local culture) and moving at least part way to the analysis of these manners and habits, Maffesoli (1996) argues that new kinds of superficial communities of taste and distinction have emerged out of modern social life. These sociable forms (neo-tribes) are characterized as imaginary (rather than territorial) communities (Bourdieu's [1977] class-bound conception of the habitus notwithstanding). The affective, transient, and nomadic character of these alliances have, for the most part, exceeded the explanatory power of conventional demographic and structural variables (which can account for only a small

proportion of the variance of opinions, beliefs, values, and so on).

However, and in contrast to Maffesoli (and Simmel, 1950), I argue that these forms do not simply spontaneously appear above the contents of social life. Such an analysis presumes a sociability drive (or instinct) that draws people together. Instead, I argue that cinema produces sociability, and that the so-called “sacred sites” or “public squares” (Maffesoli, 1996) where this tribus is assembled, are new forms of *cultural locality* produced by faciality and its iconic signs. Furthermore, because these post-structural groupings and alliances are grounded on affective ties and opinions (rather than ‘truths’) they cannot rule out the possibility of rival groups and competing alliances with different affections and different opinions. While these mobile and transitory neo-localities are potential sites of ‘unicity’ they are also potential sites of struggle, resistance, conflict, and power.

The cinema is, after all, the art of the masses (Eisenstein, 1949). For more than 100 years it has occupied the public square and transformed it. It is not surprising that, like the public squares of old, those popular sites of mixture and intermingling (Foucault, 1979) are also subject to a regime of power, one which is neither predominantly of violence, pornography, nor of rationalities and consensus. However, the new regimes of specularity are designed to control the

flow of affections/impressions which haunt the horizon of the frame. I call this regime the cinema of the duel. As Virilio (1989) has defined it, the duel, like discipline, is primarily an optical strategy (rather than an exchange of firepower). However, while discipline works through the dissymmetries of seeing and being seen, the duel works through the dissymmetries of seeing and foreseeing. Bakhtin has already done much to show how this optical strategy, and visibility generally (1986:27), is deployed in the novel. For example, Bakhtin locates the source of the power-relation in the popular novel in the difference between the hero's visual field and the author's "surplus knowledge" of that which the hero does not see (1981:22). In a similar fashion, cinema also deploys a surplus. Beyond what is given in the visual field cinema brings into play elements of the *out-of-field*. Corresponding with all that is given, seen or disclosed, and alongside every framed and finished matter, there is a horizon of possibilities and a potential for that which is given to become other, to change its value, significance, meaning or import. The beyond possesses a secret life of possibilities, which, Simmel argues, acts to enlarge life (1950:330). The capacity of cinema to shape perceptions, expectations, and to produce events is derived from the interface of these actual and virtual aspects of the *scene* and in the power to forge relations between them. By introducing signs of the unseen into the scene, potential *lines of flight*

(O'Connor, 1997b) from the discipline of everyday habits and time-tables are structured and controlled. It is through montage that the affective potential is transformed into a duel of forces.

Turning Simmel's (1950) perspective on its head (so to speak), I argue that the duel is a form of *sociality* (a disposition of manners, habits, and spatial practices [Shields, 1991] for relating to others, like courtesy, politeness, hospitality, and conflict in general [see Amirou, 1989]), that has crystalized out of the affective basis of *sociability*, because the latter is both *product and subject* of a regime of light/power/knowledge, what I call montage. In this thesis I show how the duel moves through a variety of cinema genres, past and present. It appears not only as the central feature of the western, but also appears in comedies, detective, drama, and action films. While other audio-visual media (esp. television) may deploy similar or even the same means of control, cinema was primary in producing these tendencies. Consequently, this thesis is an investigation of the media-control processes that have developed in this local site.

In chapter one, I take up the problem of cinema in relation to mass society. Given that cinema is a very popular mass media form, the question is to what extent is it implicated in a regime of spatial conquest that brings everything close-up and produces or reproduces the consumer self-image, or, conversely, to what

extent can it be implicated in the production of neo-localities and the formation of affective communities? Does cinema socialize consumers or produce new forms of sociality? What is the power of this medium in relation to the masses? These questions and problems cannot be addressed solely in the context of modern society. The history of cinema is the history of social regimes of light, power, and knowledge.

In chapter two, I introduce the concept of social apparatus and survey the spectacular, audio-visual elements embodied in them as they have historically occupied the public square and the popular imagination. This provides a comparative basis for later introducing the cinematic case as a distinct apparatus.

In chapter three, I argue that simply applying the analytical frameworks of these other apparatuses to cinema is insufficient to generate a full account of the effects of this new audio-visual machine. While the elements of the social apparatus are the same in all cases, from sovereignty to discipline and beyond, the difference is the way these elements are assembled and the kind of assemblages that this produces. In this regard, I show how cinema forces a reconceptualization of the frame and locality, how cinema puts a new 'face' on the public square, and gives it a new look. It is not the face of the sovereign, nor is it the innocent look of signs imagined by democratic reformers. It is also not the shadowy face of the

panoptic voyeur. I suggest that previously held conceptions of the image as partial and fetishistic, and of the close-up as pornographic, do not hold in this venue of cultural production. I argue that faciality (the face or close-up) defines the primary, abstract *mechanism* of cinematic motion, that it mobilizes perception, determines the conditions of vision, and produces a distinctive cinema gaze.

In its concrete application as a lateral insert in the flow of images, faciality has the power to forge various kinds of relations with other images by extending beyond the frame into space and into action. In chapter four I show how faciality effects a spatialization of the image by surrounding it with a virtual presence and an affective ambiance. In chapter five I show how action-images are similarly motivated by faciality and are a means of actualizing its powers and qualities in specific ways. Between space and action, or conversely, there is a regime of faciality that both separates and unites the before and the after and constitutes an image of the whole as a continuous process.

In chapter six I develop cinema's concrete machines, that is, the various ways spaces and actions are separated and associated through the affective medium of faciality. I argue that these concrete assemblages constitute an image of sociality that I call the duel (duel of forces). Rather than just reiterating the conventional image of the duel as a polite exchange of firepower, I show it as a

complex set of optico-spatial practices and strategies deployed in the encounter with others (other bodies and forces). Because the duel is a strategy of seeing *and foreseeing*, it cannot proceed without ties to faciality. Since it involves an action on the possible actions of others, it is a form of power. In this chapter and chapter seven I illustrate how the various strategies of the duel move through and are reiterated in a variety of films and film genres.

As with other social apparatuses, cinema is a forum of power-relations. It is not deployed primarily to terrorize the masses, to arrest and overrule their motions, nor to train their cognitive postures. More than this, cinema has been deployed to structure our expectations, to train our perceptions, and to govern the way we are disposed to see ourselves in relation to others. In chapter eight I attempt to move beyond the cinema of the duel and this form of sociality and to explore the possibilities cinema offers for alternative visions and forms of sociability.

CHAPTER 1

CINEMA AND MASS CULTURE

There seems to be a growing feeling within the media, literary and art theory that the affect is central to an understanding of our information and image-based late capitalist culture, in which the so-called master narratives are perceived to have foundered. Fredric Jameson notwithstanding, belief has waned for many, but not the affect. If anything our condition is characterized by a surfeit of it. The problem is that there is no cultural-theoretical vocabulary specific to the affect. Our entire vocabulary has been derived from theories of signification that are still wedded to structure even across irreconcilable differences (Massumi, 1996: 221).

In order to get beyond monolithic explanations of contemporary society and the reduction of its cultural forms to responses to the logic of capitalistic movements (circulation of a mass of fetishized partial-objects, the movements of labour included), it is necessary to show the tensions (the play of active and reactive forces) which animate the masses and its popular cultural forms. In many ways, the study of cinema is equivalent to the (Foucauldian) archeological investigation of an ancient or modern culture through its architectural forms and discursive formations (social apparatuses). The architectonics of cinema, the assemblage and inter-assemblage of its frames and planes, openings and closures, the manoeuvres

which express these, and the expressions they produce, has much to say about the tenor of the times. If cinema is to be considered in relation to (mass) society, it is not because it is simply a passive mirror, slavishly reflecting or reproducing movements which are external to it, but because it is a mobile, porous (sur)face through which the inside and its exterior enter into intimate contact.

The argument put forth in this chapter is that motion -- in particular that which moves the cinematographic apparatus -- cannot simply be reduced to the one-dimensionality of mechanical reproduction nor does it proceed without developing internal tensions. Furthermore, it is reasonable to assume that mechanical reproduction is the link between motion and the masses only if both motion and the masses are taken as largely undifferentiated totalities. Similarly, what we call masses are more than simply serially linked individuals sharing a singular sentimental attachment to fetishized, partial-objects (simulacra in the conventional sense). Different forms of associations and affective alliances have coalesced out of this undifferentiated mass. What is important, therefore, is to determine the nature of the relationship between these new social groupings, the places and spaces in which they abide (different from sedentary abodes and the sense of proximity which bound former local cultures) and the moving-images

which form the art of these folk, or what Maffesoli (1996) calls “neo-tribes.”

When we come round to thinking about cinema as a particular form of popular culture, three aspects form the point of departure. First, cinematography is an art of motion. Motion is the basis of its power. Second, the images we see are already in motion. They are movement-images, and thus a problem of power/knowledge. Third, if box-office receipts are any indication, cinema has retained a certain mass cultural appeal, greatly exceeding those so-called high-cultural productions such as theatre, opera, symphony, dance and ballet. In mapping the convergence of motion, images, and masses, this dissertation links the work of philosophers such as Deleuze, Guattari, Foucault, and Grosz, among others, with theorists of sociality and sociable encounters such as Simmel, Maffesoli, and Bauman. Specifically, parallels are drawn between Maffesoli’s sociality of the *tribus*, its affective basis and imaginary spaces, Foucault’s regimes of power/knowledge, and Deleuze’s perspective on montage as it operates in cinema.

With ever increasing speed and volume, information circulating in the mass media has unsettling effects on local cultures. This is especially the case when *local* is taken to mean a relatively closed, fixed, and territorially bounded space

for idiosyncratic events and activities that are peculiar to its inhabitants. The very idea of a local culture, with its folk-ways and folk-art has been rendered largely obsolete by the global flow of bodies and information, not to mention the commodification, packaging and circulation of culture and the proliferation of tourist sites. Jameson, for example, distinguishes contemporary cultural forms from “folk art” practices. While he sees folk art as both “popular” and “organic expressions of distinct communities and castes” (Jameson, 1990: 19), he argues that

[t]he historically unique tendential effect of late capitalism on all such groups has been to dissolve and to fragment or atomize them into agglomerations of isolated and equivalent private individuals . . . thus the ‘popular’ as such no longer exists, except under very specific and marginalised conditions (1990: 15).

Globalizing tendencies not only shatter the boundaries of local culture, they also break its bonds and transform its cultural expressions. In their wake they leave only an estranged and fragmented mass of individuals.

In many ways, Jameson views the mobility of the mass media simply as a metaphor for production under late capitalism, since it is the motion of mechanical reproduction itself and the repetition it entails that serves as the source of public entertainment and enjoyment. This repetition is as much a matter of creating always ‘the same old thing’ using stereotyped plots or genres as it is a matter of

repeating, in the sense of duplicating or imitating an original. Jameson argues that “the atomized or ‘serial’ public of mass culture wants to see the same thing over and over again When you watch a cop show or detective series, you do so in the expectation of the stereotypical format and would be annoyed to find the video narrative making ‘high cultural’ demands on you” (Jameson, 1990: 19).

Similarly, Eco (1985: 166-71) argues that the pleasure of contemporary mass-media forms (films, television, novels) derives from “narrative repetition,” and from the many “devices” used to make the expected, the stereotypical, or clichéd appear unexpected. The popularity of modern remakes, retakes, and series is a function of the mass of “naive readers” who get “to recover, point by point, what they already know, and what they want to know again” (Eco, 1985: 164). Either we are satisfied because we find again what we expected or, as in the case of parody, because we appreciate the clever ways in which our expectations are tricked or frustrated, that is, the many ways in which “our cultural competence is tested” (Eco, 1985: 171). This idea of *testing* is taken up and elaborated by Baudrillard. He suggests that the mass media subjects everything, audiences included, to a perpetual *optical examination* (1983: 117-130).

The ability of information and images to cross great territorial expanses and spatial boundaries instantly, and with more and more sites linked to communication and information networks, various forms of mass media are implicated in this regime of spatial conquest. Just as the internet was initiated for strategic purposes, Virilio argues that other vanguard media technologies are historically correlated with machines deployed in military conquests of space (1991: 23). For example, the development of the machine gun correlates with the emergence of cinematography machines, nitrocellulose with celluloid film,² and radar with video (see Virilio, 1995: 54). As Virilio claims:

Alongside the ‘war machine,’ there has always existed an ocular (and later optical and electro-optical) ‘watching machine’ capable of providing soldiers, and particularly commanders, with a visual perspective on the military action underway. From the original watch-tower through the anchored balloon to the reconnaissance aircraft³ and remote sensing satellites, one and the same function has been indefinitely repeated, the eye’s function being the function of a weapon (1989: 3).

² Nitrocellulose is a highly flammable, pulpy synthetic polymer used in manufacture of explosives and solid propellants (more commonly known as guncotton). Combined with camphor it was the first synthetic plastic, patented in 1855 and commercially produced under the trademark name *celluloid* in 1872.

³ As early as WWI, film sequences were used in aerial reconnaissance. As Virilio argues: “the general staffs had no other means of regularly updating their picture of reality, as artillery constantly turned the terrain upside down and removed the topographical references crucial to the organization of battle” (1989: 1).

From this perspective, the arsenal of the war apparatus comprises both machines for projection (firepower) and reception (its seeing machines). Virilio also supposes that a day will come when ubiquitous seeing machines will supplant projectile delivery systems as the primary weapons of war, when strategies of deterrence (firepower symmetries/dissymmetries) will give way to strategies based on differentials of “seeing and foreseeing,” and where winning will be equivalent to “keeping the target in constant sight.” In short, the war of projectiles and missiles will be replaced by “a war of pictures and sounds” (1989: 2-3).

Not only has there been a watching machine alongside the war machine, so there has been an ‘amusement machine’ in which the visual technologies of representation and surveillance – comprising *both projective and receptive* aspects, have served as a medium for diversions, material advertisement, and mass cultural forms of entertainment, such as the movies. Designed primarily for war, in their local deployment these optical machines have also had a profound effect on culture. We know, for example, that the enhanced motion/motoricity of modern vision machines have effected conceptions of space (see Murdock, 1993: 535) as they tend to displace former ideas of exteriority and distance with a kind of virtual presence, or a proximity which brings everything close-up. For Virilio

this process of techno-mobility and its “overexposure” has resulted in a net loss of spatial dimension through the progressive disappearance of local “cultural markers” (1991: 23). For Baudrillard, the increasingly “pornographic” (i.e., the excessive, over-exposed, overly visible) nature of information has led to the elimination of “stage distances” and “social horizons” (1987: 42-43). This visual presence has been linked to the development of what Kellner calls “media culture” (1995: 35) where heterogeneous, localized community customs and practices are increasingly displaced in the homogeneous totality of a global media village. By means of these optical machines, spatial and territorial boundaries, once considered structural barriers for maintaining the distance of inside and outside, the difference of insiders and outsiders, as well as for preserving the “reflective distance” between self and other (see Falk, 1993), have been virtually shot full of holes. Now they function more like “osmotic membranes” (Virilio, 1991: 17) or “limen” (Shields, 1992: 195) where differences enter into frequent contact.

With the image of society reduced to an aggregation of particles, mass media forms, such as cinema, are not organic cultural expressions. Instead they are celebrations of simulacra. For Baudrillard simulacra are variously conceived as stereotypical or analytical models, abstracted of use or functionality, without an

original or a referent (1983: 120), also as technical- or pseudo-objects (1990: 55-75). While the real reveals as much as it hides, simulacra hide nothing. Without a secret or referent, they have nothing to disclose other than what is already there (see also Butler, 1987: 108). They are ready-made and are given all at once as objects of *fascination*, preoccupation, and *obsession*.

I envision simulacra as uprooted sign-posts in the wake of a violent storm. Torn from their place and free to move with the next strong gust or to float along with the prevailing winds, these vagabond signifiers have nothing to say. They reveal nothing and advertise nothing (except themselves). With no sense of direction, they neither indicate a place nor mark the route to one. They do not warn of conditions nor tell of events to come. They have no content or context and are completely devoid of sense. Be they words, images, or things, simulacra are displaced, fetish objects, cut out of their place in the scheme of things, and cut loose from their moorings. In this dizzying whirlwind, signs only makes sense in relation to other uprooted signs. They are not so much consumed as *collected and assembled*. As Baudrillard argues, “the single object is not enough: there always has to be a succession of objects, with the ultimate aim of having a complete set” (1990: 44). Just as one might try to re-collect the pieces of a ‘life in fragments’ (to

borrow Bauman's [1995] expression) the aim of collection is to assemble something resembling a whole, or to form from the puzzle of fragments an image of it. Baudrillard suggests that this collecting project is organized around an obsession with an absent, final term. This final term or piece in the puzzle is necessary to complete the project and produce, what Baudrillard calls, an image of the "person of the collector" her/himself (1990:47). But because the final term is elusive, the project of recollecting the modern persona remains unfinished and unfinalizable. Consequently, simulacra stimulate an ever renewed search for the missing piece that will complete the narcissistic mirror and reflect back a totalized image of self.

I agree that modern media machines are powerful mechanisms of cultural displacement, and that they are implicated in modern schemes to conquer the space of local culture. But if they are indeed powerful they cannot be slavish mirrors copying and reproducing images of movements external to them, nor can they be simply reflections of the atomized mass that they are supposed to produce. The conception of simulacra as fetishized partial-objects only adds to the confusion. Fetishism, as I understand it, refers to products independent of processes, to dead labour, rather than the sensuous activity of production, change

and transformation. Dead labour is monumental and timeless, a passive object of contemplation, while activities and processes are only conceivable in the moment of their passing. This distinction is especially pertinent to cinema, for the images of cinema cannot be reduced to 'stills' or mere 'objects of contemplation' without separating them from the motion and processes which make them unique. The simulacra of cinema are qualitatively different because they are in motion and in process. They cannot be thought outside their production process without transforming them into something else. If the images of cinema are signs of the times, it is not because they are passive objects for individual collections, or reflection of mechanical reproduction, but because they form a kind of local culture equivalent for the dis-located masses who collect and assemble round them.⁴

To the mass society thesis and its reliance on serial recognition (repetition of the overdone and overexposed) by atomized individuals must be added a paradoxical corollary: from the growing massification of society there have

⁴ If 'local culture' exists anywhere it is as a neo-local culture in the abstract locality of cinematic moments. For the ways in which the media effect a change of dimension can be understood in two ways. On one hand, the change could be quantitative and relative, consisting in the microscopic/telescopic magnification of detail -- a form of cutting out which produces partial or fetish objects. On the other, this change of dimension could be qualitative and absolute, consisting in forms of cutting which produce new images of the whole.

crystallized a variety of heterogeneous, unstable micro-groups which Maffesoli terms “affectual tribes” (1996: 6).⁵ The paradox, as Maffesoli sees it, is that the very processes involved in the massification of culture are both cause and effect of such tribalism (1993:12). Not to be confused with Bourdieu’s distinction grouping,⁶ these tribal groupings tend to cross class, intellectual, moral, political, and local boundaries (see Shields, 1991: 2), and coalesce instead around imaginary, mythical and sacred forms (e.g., heroes, saints, emblematic figures) which serve as matrices (empty forms) for their *collective sentiments* and the experience of communing with others (see Maffesoli, 1996: 10; 1993: 10). Maffesoli employs the term “sociality” to distinguish the habits of these deindividualized, affective ensembles from the more rationalized, individualized, and disciplined social bodies which tend to arrive only after the event of sociality (1993: 14).⁷ As Amirou defines it, socialities are manners of relating that derive

⁵ See also Collins’ (1995: 44-45) discussion of the emergence of “mass-folk hybrids.”

⁶ While Bourdieu (1993) counters the tendency to homogenize culture with a conception of the habitus as a means of entrenching cultural distinctions between different groups in society, these varieties of taste and manner really only serve as metaphors for objective social arrangements including social class -- i.e., their habits are codes which serve to naturalize ready-made hierarchical differences.

⁷ Weber, in discussing the relation between temporal orientations and social organization, notes that an orientation to the present (or presence) characterizes those temporary forms of community that remain largely undifferentiated in terms of a hierarchy of social roles (1968: 243). At the same time, however, he argues

from forms of sociability. He argues that sociality is the “result of sociabilities crystallized in different types that historians can easily describe (courtesy, politeness, seduction, conflicts between people, pilgrimages, hospitality, and many other social habits of hypothetical origin and meaning)” (1989: 118). Simmel initiated the distinction between these two concepts. From his perspective, socialities are the socializing manners of polite society, whereas sociabilities are the play forms of sociation that spontaneously emerge in these social encounters. Amirou, therefore, turns this distinction on its head by giving primacy to sociability and making it the basis for other, more ritualized forms of encounter.

Sociability characterizes those forms of encounter which occur on the margins, or at those nodal points (Taborsky, in press) where territorial planes and orbits overlap and intersect. Simmel calls these nodal points “sociability thresholds” (1950: 47), referring to those sites where pragmatic interests are suspended or set aside and the spell of normal interaction is broken. Sociability takes place in a space beyond the limits of normal interaction. Normal interactions are those forms of communication which are largely motivated by the

that this type of communal action repudiates any involvement with the everyday world of the routine or ordinary (1968: 245). Its solidarity is based on affective ties to the *extraordinary* which must be constantly renewed if the community is to persist.

practical demands, aims, and interests of the “contents,” or the “objective aspects of situations” in which they are caught, and to which they are responses. In contrast, sociable encounters (often characterized by the circulation of rumours, small-talk or gossip, rather than simply transmitting information) are not motivated by the demands of a determinate milieu. They lack a sense of coordination with structured and bounded (striated) social places. The sociable occupies (or carries with it) its own indeterminate space-time, which lacks motivation (extension or direction), but is none the less “moving” (intentional) or “pathetic” (in the sense of pathos) (see Deleuze, 1991: 96). The sociable therefore moves along a “line of flight” that “escapes” the motivated “laws of the milieu” (Maffesoli, 1996: 16), its logos, and its habits, though not simply in order to pass into another milieu or territory, but in order to surpass territorialization and occupy the open (smooth) spaces in-between. So long as the sociable encounter retains its marginal or deterritorialized *dis-position*, and therefore refrains from expressing, acting out, or responding to, or even enjoying the logos or truth of ready-made situations, it retains its potential (*puissance*, force) to constitute an *event* which I argue is the affective basis of tribalism (and the tribal *esprit de temps*; Maffesoli [1996: 73]). At its most minimal, sociability inheres in the

alternative logic which goes beyond the coded norms of formal, even ritualized, situations. Thus when Princess Diana spontaneously extends a caring hand in the midst of a formal hospital tour or otherwise breaks the formal protocol of a situation, we can see this sort of “pathos” -- what is often referred to as the “human element” -- which cuts right through the formalized “plot” of roles and assigned places. This remains the case even when such gestures are later appropriated by the media and other institutions to become “expected” gestures or staged photographs. At its maximal, sociability amounts to a swelling of affection, rather than an up welling of emotion, between people in the face of a common event, even a media event like the burial of the Princess of Wales.

Without ever completely abandoning the mass society thesis, Maffesoli (1996) argues paradoxically that, in many ways, and in many different sites, neo-tribal, affective associations have coalesced out of this mass of individuals. While this perspective forms an interesting counterpoint to theories of massification, individualization, and alienation under modernity, there is little research, except in the way of sporadic claims, on what role, if any, mass-media forms play in the formation or facilitation of this deindividualizing tribalisation process. This question may be all the more poignant when applied to cinema, since above all

other art forms, cinema has proven to be the “art of the masses” both in the sense of their patronage, and in the sense that they, like capital, have become increasingly mobile whether for work, travel, or leisure. Is this simply because it celebrates the unfinished project of the modern individuum of mass culture, or is there an undercurrent of sociability that draws people together in affective sociations? Does not cinema allow people to abandon the objective aspects of their situation and their pragmatic interests in it, at least for a time?⁸ More than simply reiterating ready-made formulas, cinema fosters a sense of participation in the working up of a whole, a carnival of sorts, perhaps paralleling the way television treats its audience as active participants in the so-called “semiotic democracy” (see Fiske, 1989a: 95). In addressing these issues, parallels are drawn between the imaginary spaces of sociability and Deleuze’s perspective on montage as it operates in cinema.

⁸ It has long been noted that the ‘suspension of disbelief’ also plays a significant part forging affiliations with ‘what goes on in the image’ and in establishing a feeling of commingling or mixing with a whole which is in the process of formation. This process of suspending disbelief unsettles the so-called ‘natural faculty’ of ‘dubious judgements’ characterizing the abstract Cartesian individuum, its supposed duality in relation to the ‘objects of cognition,’ and its effort to overcome this duality by mental (cognitive) efforts. To counter this characterization, Boundas (1993) argues that the act of perception needs to be conceived differently (see also Rella, 1994). This argument will be taken up in relation to cinematic perception-image and the problem of differential perception (Deleuze).

Deleuzian cinematic theory, following Eisenstein's (1942, 1949) early work on the subject, focuses on a conception of montage as the basis of cinematography. Early, single-point-of-view cinematography comprised fixed, spatial shots, allowing movements to remain the property of the figures it framed. Characters and bodies changed and exchanged their relative positions while the camera simply recorded these changes and exchanges. The fixed, spatial shot was soon replaced by montage: by selecting and assembling separate shots, most of which could remain fixed and spatial.

By means of montage, movement was liberated from the bodies the camera framed and became an important element of filmic composition. Montage effectively displaces the *mise-en-scène*, or what goes on in the set or in the frame, as the unit of analysis. The territorialized movements in the frame are not as important as what comes next or what lies beyond the frame, that is, the osmotic relations between the frame, the shot, and what is beyond it (its outside), or what takes place between successive framings and shots (in-between in the interval or gap). The analysis of montage begins outside the frames and settings in the any-space between these structured enclosures, since this is where the deterritorialized cinematic movement occurs. Montage, through a variety of technical means and

image forms, constitutes what is moving in the image (as opposed to the movement of, say, characters). But this motion-image has a dual character which defines a fundamental cinematic tension. On one hand, movement appears as a velocity or potential that moves without going anywhere, and, on the other, as directed or motivated movements which always go from one point to another. In the former sense, montage is responsible for defining the space of the affect, an essential filmic discontinuity or interval of movement cut from its situational moorings. In the latter sense, montage defines various forms of movements which are actualized, that is to say, placed or stitched into a setting or milieu in order to constitute an overall sense of coordinated motion and filmic continuity. This dual quality introduces an important tension or “duel” (a pun which will be more significant below) into cinema. Deleuze argues that this tension is the basis of cinematic motion - a movement which is specific to cinematic form and quite separate from the mechanical passage of frames before a projector lens.

Methodologically, montage serves as the object of investigation for moving pictures because it is the method which moves the visual apparatus in the sense of its entire set of scenes, frames, and actions. Montage works because it captures (albeit indirectly and by means of likeness) the interval of motion or that which

passes between shots. Deleuze argues that the primary image of in-betweenness in cinema is the affect-image. The affect-image is defined by the close-up (also known as an affective insert⁹) and its substance is the face (typically the human face, though Deleuze suggests that any object can be “facified”). For Bergman, the possibility of drawing near to the human face constitutes the “primary originality and distinctive quality” of cinema (cited in Deleuze, 1991: 99). As Rutland (1997) argues, the face, our relation to it and the responses it evokes, constitutes a primordial, pre-discursive potentiality (an otherness) that haunts all discursive (trans)formations. The face, therefore, expresses qualities and emanates power. It is both capable of being moved, that is, reflecting movements or actions that are external to it, and motivating movement; through the pores of the eyes it exudes a sovereign gaze (in the Foucauldian sense) and through the mouth, orders and commands (sign regimes). The face is verbose and sociable; it emits and receives, releases as well as captures, signifying signs. Signifiers

⁹ Some feel that in the close-up, because it involves a cut, or a cutting out of an image from the profilmic material of the set (see Aumont, 1987: 35), that they have discovered a cinematic illustration of a psychoanalytic structure of the unconscious (e.g., castration; see Kaite, 1991: 176). Others, Baudrillard for example, associate this process with the process of fetishization of the partial-object (simulacrum) corresponding to commodity relations under capital (see Kroker and Levin, 1991; also Debord’s discussion of the partial-object/image; 1994: 12,43), while Barthes (1977: 66-67) sees the fragment or ‘cinematic still’ as an act of quotation, forming the basis of cinematic parody.

always reterritorialize (“take place”) on the surface of the face -- *the signifier is always facified* (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 115). In relation to the face and its emanations, there is also the face of the subject, who, caught in a sovereign gaze (the determinate situation), gathers up what is given (or said) and emits a response or expression, an action or a speech act. By the same token, we can read-off (indexically) from a subject’s expression or action (habitus), a sense of the situation in which the subject finds her/himself, which motivates their actions or speech acts, and to which these actions or speech acts are responses (e.g., the look of terror). The face is both moved and motivates movement, it influences and is influenced, it directs and is directed, it touches and is touched, but none of these links to the exterior account for its capacity to affect and be affected. For the face is not simply a passive mirror reflecting movements that are external to it, but is a mobile surface that selects, distorts, and translates received excitations, transforming them into expressions. Expressions are movements (changes, transformations) that are peculiar to the face. The movements of the face are intensities or affects (see Massumi, 1996: 221). They are not exactly passive, because they are filled with motion, and not yet active, because the motion is not of a kind that is directed toward practical aims, objects, or ends (1996: 220). The

affect, or its likeness in the expression, is an undirected, non-linear form of motion that has the potential to make contact, to move, to touch, or to extend (spread out) into action -- it is potentially contagious.

Between the polarities of received and ordered movements there is the face in the threshold¹⁰ in-between the moving and the moved, in the interval between that which is reflected and that which is reflecting. By itself it is indeterminate (unfinalizable in the Bakhtinian [1981] sense), expressing a non-discursive potency which can only be controlled by strategies which suture it to its surroundings or link it to a given state or affairs. Ordinarily, the face is understood in relation to the settings in which people act and perceive, where it serves to distinguish individuals as well as a means of identifying their place or post within the coordinated space of the social structure. But, as a supplement to the coordination of the facified expression as a response to the global (encompassing) state of affairs, there is also an *expressed* state of affairs. Framing the face in close-up suppresses its individuating and socializing functions by dissolving spatio-temporal coordinates (i.e., its relationship to a particular body as a specific individual's face) in order to call forth a pure affect (e.g., shock,

¹⁰ The close-up, or affective insert is typically employed in cinema to stake out the threshold, the point of change, turning point or critical instant.

surprise). Even though an expression might direct us to an event which has occurred or anticipates one which could, it is nevertheless different in kind from that which affirms or *realizes* it. Decisiveness, for example, is qualitatively different from any actual decision (directed action) since it is an undirected motor-tendency - the potential for directed action.

By itself, captured in close-up, this pure affect is a potentiality that is both impersonal and distinct from every individuated state. As Balázs states, “. . . the expression of a face and the signification of this expression have no relation or connection to space. Our sensation of [place] is abolished. A dimension of another order is open to us” (in Deleuze, 1989: 96). For Deleuze, the affect is a nomadic singularity that can freely enter into combinations and conjunctions with other affects (1991: 98). The overall effect is the formation of new complex entities¹¹ where faces begin to resemble one another, though not because they merge into a unity of the one, but because they have lost all individuation. These

¹¹ See also Eisenstein (1942: 7): “the juxtaposition of two separate shots by splicing them together resembles not so much a simple sum of one shot plus another shot -- as it does creation. . . the result is qualitatively distinguishable from each component element viewed separately.”

affective/expressive compositions have a close parallel in Maffesoli's notion of the affective tribus, its "unicity"¹² and its expressed *esprit du temps*.

The undirected motion that occupies this deterritorialized space constitutes an affective ambiance, irreducible to the practical demands of moving on to the ordinary business of everyday life. Sociologically, this affective-space and the icons it produces may, hypothetically, constitute the matrices around which the neo-tribes coalesce in their celebration of sociality, puissance, or an "undirected being-together" (Maffesoli, 1996: 81). In many ways, the interval is a site of collective movements which would be the medium for a return of the "vitality" of the "market place" (see Bakhtin, 1981); the sociable encounter (see Simmel, 1950); the "public square" (see Maffesoli, 1996: 157) and its "public ways." This any-space-whatever of the affect is neither a sedentary place of habitual, instrumental responses, nor simply a functional or utilitarian site to be moved through in order to reach some transcendent goal. Rather, it is a space of biding time.

¹² Unicity is best defined as harmonious togetherness, without implying univocality: in musical terms, a chord (accord) or counterpoint rather than a single note sung in unison.

This characteristically postmodern lack of urgency or goal-directedness may well arise out of the crises and failures of the *grands récits* of modernity.¹³ Under postmodernity, little faith is accorded those ready-made formulas that purport to understand the seriousness of the global milieu and authorize the appropriate response necessary to bring about change. Even the former grand spectacles, in their strategic function as emanations of sovereign power, could not police the meaning of the event, nor ensure an unequivocal response on the part of those who gathered to witness it (see Foucault, 1979: 263). In spite of the failures of the grand strategies, there have emerged a variety of subtle, minor strategies aimed at policing crowds, controlling or sanitizing the public ways, breaking up the mixture and its potentials for contagion (Foucault, 1979: 195).

Parallel strategies also appear in cinema. They too converge around a sense of movement, but in this case what is moving in the image is made use of, that is, channelled and directed, reterritorialized or supplied with bodily

¹³ Hebdige (1988: 186) outlines the ‘founding negations’ of postmodernity as follows: (1) the negation of totalizing discourses which prescribe human goals (‘socio-fictions’) or define essential human nature (the idea of a unitary subject, capable of intentional, transparent communication and unmediated action on the world); (2) negation of teleology, (a scepticism regarding the ideas of decidable origins/causes, authorial purposes or historical destiny) and; (3) negation of utopia, or what Lyotard (1984: xxiii) calls the “grand narratives” of faith in progress, science, or class struggle.

motivations. Such manoeuvres are characteristic of power relations. Power does not simply repress bodily forces (see Foucault, 1979) but acts on them, analysing, dividing, coordinating, and orchestrating their movements to enhance their effectiveness and economize their operations. Power operates on *puissance*. It is responsible for variously actualizing the pure potentiality of the affective association (in the case of cinema: the insert, cut, interval, or gap; in the case of the public square: the coordination, opposition, and geometry of bodies and goods [Shields, 1997]), such that it becomes *framed up*, reconciled with or seamlessly sutured into the overall continuity of the seen/scene (see Aumont, 1987: 65). It is this other sense of montage that holds out the possibility for the suturing of the *tribus*, “the little masses” (Maffesoli, 1996) into more orderly social groupings (the “mass” in its traditional sociological sense [Le Bon, 1960]), serving to naturalize or routinize (traditionalize or rationalize) the tribal *puissance* by assigning habitats, that is, by dividing up the whole into shares.

While the montage involves an operation (selecting) which liberates motion from the movement of bodies and the camera, and captures that which is moving in the image, the other side of montage involves the deployment of this potential through the assembling of shots. It is through the deployment of *this* motion, that

is, through the cutting and suturing together of separate shots that the affect is divided across the cuts and is set-up as a relation between opposing qualities. This act of cutting and suturing together the aspects of motion eliminates every trace of likeness with its other side. This polarization of movement-image, a product of the strategies of montage, turns the free-action of the affect into a system of differentiation. In so doing, the *modern* cinema directs the potential against itself, transforms puissance into a force-relation and turns the potentials for alliance into a struggle for dominance over the other.

While the analysis of montage differs from textual analysis, it does not surrender what has been won in the post-structural critique of power-relations in literary texts. Instead it complements it. This is especially the case in a current perspective of “scheme analysis.” As Chevalier (1990: 68) defines it, scheme analysis,

brings into question two opposite views of symboling; one that emphasizes the internal coherence of the code, and another that stresses the polysemic fluidity, fuzziness or uncentredness of the sign process. . . . On the one hand, the concept of schema involves a sense of direction that prevents words from drifting aimlessly about, into a chaotic sea of splits and cleavages . . . On the other hand, every schema is also driven by an opposite impulse, which is to tempt the flood -- letting the floating body of words keep on moving and tipping at the risk of losing its centre of gravity. . . .

In this case, the *motion* of the text is double-sided, for along side the centripetal movements which aspire toward a unified whole there are centrifugal movements which aim to hurl apart all these unifying tendencies. What scheme analysis is to processes of semiosis in literature, montage is to cinema. Yet within this order of similarities, there are also differences. If we take seriously the fact that the essential feature of cinema is its *moving pictures*, then it is the “plottings” of montage rather than the script or textual narrative which constitute its method, and therefore the subject matter of the investigation.

In this regard, and to reiterate the main point, cinema is the art of the masses because its inherent motoricity not only passes and surpasses boundaries and distances as with other mass-media forms, but also because it forms the matrices which draw the estranged or isolated into the tactile proximity of the facial encounter. Cinema not only imagines the (directed and undirected) motions of being-together, and forms an integral part of the communal imaginary of mass society, but it also works as a social apparatus which aims to control these tendencies. In this regard, and in the chapter which follows, cinema is a visual apparatus which has emerged from the shadows of other social apparatuses that have shared the same aim.

CHAPTER 2

LINES OF F(L)IGHT: THE VISUAL APPARATUS

If we forget the theory of visibilities we distort Foucault's conception of history, but equally we distort his thought and his conception of thought in general . . . Foucault continued to be fascinated by what he saw as much as by what he heard or read, and the archaeology he conceived of is an audiovisual archive (Deleuze, 1986: 50).

This chapter explores the relationship between cinema and society by taking the point of view that cinema is an example of a Foucauldian/Deleuzian social transformation or apparatus. To assess the extent to which cinema constitutes a social apparatus, it is important to consider what components are necessary to take into account in their analysis. I argue that social apparatuses comprise more than simply discursive regimes. They comprise both discursive and non-discursive dimensions (see Patton, 1994: 158; Shields, 1991: 43).¹⁴ As Deleuze claims, they are “machines which make one see and speak” (1992a: 160).

Social apparatuses are not identical with formal social institutions, those apparently homogenizing systems of interiority (Goffman, 1961) and equilibrium,

¹⁴ The Foucauldian “shift to include the non-discursive was signalled by the introduction of the term *dispositif*... . *Dispositif* is distinguished from *episteme* primarily because it encompasses the non-discursive as well as the discursive” (Shields, 1991: 43).

defined by the constraint and consistency of moral rules and roles (Durkheim, 1951, 1933), positions and offices (Weber, 1978: 217-254), and distinguished by their variable patterns of temporal or value orientation (Weber, 1947:112, Parsons: 1951: 169). Social apparatuses are drawn from “diagrams” (abstract machines) or “maps of the social field” (Deleuze, 1986: 34-35). Discipline, for example, one of Foucault’s most noteworthy social apparatuses, is not identical to its form of actualization in the concrete mechanism of the panoptic prison, nor in its realization in schools, factories, and barracks. Each actualization of the social cartography produces a different set of structures, architectures, processes, and relations (“You are in school now, not at home;” “You are in prison now, not at school;” “You are in the army now, not at work;” . . .). In fact, discipline has as its diagram the alternative cartography of the social world that followed in the wake of the great plagues that swept through Europe. The great confinements which followed did not so much produce an interiority as structure the exterior and disperse its forces. If we follow Foucault closely, we will see that disciplinary confinements are not at all synonymous with systems of (en)closure. They are systems of exteriority and are shot through with lines of f(l)ight. As Foucault argues, social apparatuses are heterogeneous ensembles:

consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions -- in short, the said as much as the unsaid. Such are the elements of the apparatus. The apparatus itself is the system of relations that can be established between these elements . . . whether discursive or non-discursive (1972: 194-95).

There are no apparent analyses of the relationship - and possible overlap - of the sociological concept of “institution” and the Foucauldian concept of “apparatus.”

I submit that, unlike institutions and the a priori bodies that they are charged with socializing and whose social function it is to differentiate and control (by establishing and imposing limits), the investigation of social apparatuses attempts to enter into the domain (the strategic situations) where these *essential* bodies are produced as objects of knowledge and power prior to their subsequent marshalling in institutions. All the supposed spawn of nature, the delinquent, the hysteric, the criminal, and the individual (possessed of that so-called natural faculty of ‘thinking without certainty’) are products of social apparatuses.

The history of social apparatuses is also unlike the history of institutions. Institutional histories tend to be little more than linear rationalizations for the way things are or should be. For the history of the state and civil society (property relations), Rousseau and Hobbes had to imagine the state of nature (as a timeless state of pleasure/plenty or a restless state of war/scarcity, respectively). Durkheim

had to imagine an exceptional community of (potentially deviant) saints to explain the divisions of the organic social body and its new *esprit de corp* (morality),¹⁵ while Weber (1967) had in mind a most exceptional (though short-lived) figure to break the chains of despotic unreason, only to guide the enthralled into the bureaucratic cage (or, depending on the strategy of succession, return them to their chains). Hegel and Marx, for their part, proposed a dialectical institutional development which passed through the respective stages of family/humanized-nature, civil society/socialized-nature, the state/socialized-wealth, and finally intellectual life/socialized-humanity (art, philosophy, religion).

While the historical approach to social apparatuses shares an affinity with Marx's history of productive relations, the primary focus is not the (objective) forms of wealth, but rather the strategies, techniques, arrangements, and ensembles that produce the objectivities of perception, consciousness, reflection,

¹⁵ Contemporary neo-functionalists have argued against the idea of a *master trend* of social change, that is, the relentless process of the division of labour whereby multi-functional institutions and roles are invariably replaced by specialized ones. Aiming at greater historical specificity and the attempt to (arguably) gain a more supple theoretical framework, neo-functionalists have introduced notions such as 'uneven differentiation' to take into account differential speeds of institutional change, and 'dedifferentiation' to designate those 'reactionary syndromes' which reject institutional complexity in favour of less differentiated forms of social organization in order to enhance adaptive, goal-attainment, or integrative functions (see Colomy, 1986).

and knowledge. Relations of power are responsible for producing these objectivities, for constituting the domains of visibility which bring them to light as *objects* (or figures) of investigation, for producing *bodies of knowledge*, and for constituting *subjects* of power. The historical analysis of the social apparatuses of power/knowledge does not seek to uncover the secret, methodical plottings of an ordered, arranged or systematic history which develops teleologically, or gradually unfolds its Reason in a variety of (sublatable) forms or modes. The pretensions of historical method aside, this perspective is primarily methodological, insofar as it seeks an understanding of the *different* methods of power/knowledge which have been deployed historically as well as a reflexive understanding of the objects, subjects, and bodies produced by them. Rather than constituting a hierarchy of forms, or a history of the past in terms of the present, the aim is a “history of the present” (see Foucault. 1977: 31) in terms of the multiple social apparatuses which compete for the governmentality of social bodies, for the regulation of their capacities for movement, spatial, and temporal displacements, deterritorializations and reterritorializations, and their mixtures and intermingling. Social apparatuses are media of control that operate in the spaces between institutions, but also within and through them. Institutions, the spaces of

places, are shot through with openings, with places of entry and exit, as well as spaces of possibility and points of resistance. These provide the fertile ground of the social apparatuses which exercise their power everywhere and only on a body's *puissance*, that is, its capacity or potential to act and move.

All social apparatuses, from sovereignty to discipline and beyond, feature regimes of light, regimes of enunciation, as well as lines of force that cross between the visible and the utterable and constitute their power dimension (see Foucault, 1977). My argument is that each apparatus therefore comprises, firstly, an optical machine. An optical machine consists of lines or planes (plans) of light which structure fields of visibility and invisibility, illuminating some objects and causing others to disappear. Secondly, each apparatus includes a sonorous machine, comprising lines of enunciation, or that which can be enunciated in discourse or uttered in a system of signs. These "modes of symbolic expression" (Patton, 1994: 163) often serve to authenticate or authorize presences and absences in the visual field. Each social apparatus is an audio-visual machine whose specificity lies in its (1) particular regime of light, (2) its style or form of enunciation (i.e., discursive regularities) and, finally, (3) in the lines of force

which forge links between the seen and the said (e.g., between situations and responses¹⁶ and between the visible and its representations).

But why emphasize visibility? As Escobar (1995) argues, the idea of visibility and its specific deployment (as a panoptic gaze) has become synonymous with the apparatuses of social control and the emergence of what Bogard (1996) terms the “surveillance society.” Escobar also suggests that the role of vision extends far beyond these technologies:

The birth of science itself was marked by an alliance that almost two centuries ago ‘was forged between words and things, enabling one to *see* and to *say*’ (Foucault, 1975, xii). This alliance was enacted by the empirical clinician upon opening the corpse for the first time “to really see” what was inside. The spatialization and verbalization of the pathological inaugurated regimes of visibility are still with us. From the analysis of tissues in nineteenth-century medicine through the microscope and the camera to satellite surveillance, sonography, and space photography the importance of vision has only grown (1995: 155-56).

While previous physiological and anatomical experts were largely resigned to the analysis and interpretation of the extrusions (e.g., phrenology) and humours that characterized a body’s disposition, the flaying and slicing clinician opened new pores in the body’s already porous surface which would allow the light of the truth to penetrate and illuminate, chart and *organize* its darkest regions. The early

¹⁶ Responses do not have to be verbal. Visual expressions (e.g., gestures, actions, looks) can constitute signs of reaction.

social physicians (Saint-Simon, Comte, Spencer, and Durkheim) would apply the same strategy to the social body by identifying its primary and necessary organs (institutional patterns), tending to its *needs*, and deciphering its disposition or state of health.

The analysis of this social body required a reassessment of its founding institutions, conventions, contracts, and accords though not in terms of their rationality, but rather in terms of their observable regularities, the persistence of their patterns, and the visible organization of things generally. These observable regularities would stand as the limit of what could be legitimately said or claimed about the social body. These ‘social facts,’ Durkheim (1982) claimed, exert a force that is beyond doubt, and do so only when we attempt to move against them. You can feel their force because they occupy space in much the same way that walls do. As physical barriers, constraints, or limits, they cannot simply be wished or reasoned away; they can only be overcome by the application of a superior force. Like overriding laws of nature, these facts are external to the will and consciousness. They impose on the latter, on bodies, and on the observation (Durkheim, 1982: 69), in an undeniable way. They determine the conditions of vision. The externality and reality of social facts are *visible* in collective patterns

of action (collective representations) and *verifiable* in the way that aberrant motions are forced to deviate, move around them, or are channelled by them. Images are different. They are internal, do not occupy space, and therefore offer no resistance to the will that creates them or dreams them up. If an image were able to effect a body's way of moving, either the image would have to be considered an external, physical presence, or the effect would have to be considered erroneous, mistaken, a *mere* deviation based on fantasy or opinion rather than the solid reality of the fact. Deviation in and of itself is not enough to confirm (affirm) or deny the solidarity of the social fact, or differentiate the factual from the imaginary. The difference between the fact (collective representation) and the image (the fictitious, no less than individual representation) is one of degree. The difference is only quantitative and therefore only affirmed via statistical enumeration. The social fact is a statistical regularity or statistical artifact. What counts as a social fact is an opinion, belief, or practice with numbers on its side. It is a form of orthodoxy which has assumed the status of reality, one which is said to enclose and circumscribe the basic institutional patterns of society and to determine which practices are necessary for its continued functioning. What Durkheim misses, however, are the forces that

produce the fields of visibility he describes, the various ways in which visibility itself is structured and deployed to bring some objectivities, behaviours, and practices to light, to hide others, and the various force-relations involved in determining the dominant conditions of vision. Durkheim describes institutional patterns and then articulates their relevance and necessity in a discourse of morality. I analyse social apparatuses as regimes of luminosity, power, and knowledge.

All social apparatuses are underscored by the tactile encounter of bodies, by the effects of one body on another, and by the kinds of force-relations these bodies compose as a consequence of their intermingling, or, conversely, the force-relations which organize and coordinate their effects. Discourses are not simply imposed on bodies nor do they order their relations. Discourses, narratives, and texts do not move or circulate freely, nor do they act on their own accord. Their momentum is derived externally. That which incites, seduces, and constrains discourse is an ensemble of force relations. Discourse is the archive of these relations, but in itself it is insufficient to account for the *dimensions* of power/knowledge. Spatialization of the non-discursive field is also important:

Anyone envisioning the analysis of discourses solely in terms of temporal continuity [i.e., narrativity] would inevitably be lead to approach and analyse it like the internal transformation of an

individual consciousness. Which would lead his erecting a great collective consciousness as the scene of events . . . Endeavouring on the other hand to decipher discourse through the use of spatial, strategic metaphors enables one to grasp precisely the points at which discourses are transformed in, through and on the basis of relations of power (Foucault, 1980: 70).

Force relations are constituted at the interstice of the discursive and the non-discursive, where the non-discursive is the space (territory, terrain, body, domain, soil, horizon, region, site, landscape) for the production and deployment of the discursive realities (e.g., for the delimitation and demarcation of its objects/subjects).

The relative stability of discursive enunciations (regimes of truth and the certainties of knowledge) signal the relative stabilization of an ensemble of force relations (strategies of domination) by embedding them in the spatial and ensuring their lasting visibility. Similarly, changes in the discursive regimes of enunciation signal changes in the exercise of force relations. These discursive/non-discursive strategies of domination are never absolute, since total victory means eliminating the opposing force, eliminating the force relation, and at the same time the subject/object of knowledge and the means of producing truth(s). As Foucault argues, power is exercised only over individuals or collective subjects faced with possibilities (1983: 225) or lines of flight. So, for example, Foucault describes

torture as *the art of maintaining life in pain* (1977: 33). It is a form of force relation which delays or defers death and thereby produces calculated openings for the development of knowledge, that is, the extraction of truth from the body in the form of confession. Strategies of force-relations, joining regimes of light and enunciation, form mobile strategies of power/knowledge that cut across structured, institutionalized frameworks and transforms them. This conception of the social apparatus is fruitful for comparing strategic relations across a number of dimensions/directions, and especially useful in exploring the deployment of vision machines and their local si(gh)t(e)s.

Theatre I: The Sovereign Apparatus

The social apparatus of sovereignty included a visual machine, the scaffold: a raised platform *designed to be seen* while maintaining the integrity of the *mise-en-scène* (or staged spectacle) by keeping spectators at a safe distance. This is a mechanism to frame, that is, to divide and differentiate seeing and scene and so to limit participation. This distance, often reinforced by the presence of border guards, established a kind of spectatorial division of labour or a “division of spectatorial tasks” as Debord (1994:37) defines it.

Primarily an apparatus of projection, this form of sovereignty emanates images and signs (see Rutland, 1997), casting its radiant, stellar force in all directions for all to see in the form of these images and signs. It is nothing, however, without an *impressionable* body/surface, and a white-screen so to speak, on which its projected image is reproduced (vectors of the impression) and which is only there to reflect back its omnipotence.

It is by way of the spectacular marking of the body/surface that sovereignty displays its capacity to unite sonorous and visible elements. Each act of directly inscribing on (adorning) the body's surface not only affirmed a dissymmetrical and irreversible power relation, it also produced meaning -- indelibly linking signified and a material body.¹⁷ Yet sovereign power also has to be seen to be effective, for it also has a strategic function: "an execution that was known to be taking place, but which did so in secret, would scarcely have any meaning" (Foucault, 1979: 57-8). Sovereignty has a necessary connection to the public square,¹⁸ for while it acts directly on body/surfaces, as an apparatus of power/knowledge, it indirectly targets the undifferentiated mass of witnesses to its

¹⁷ Like the fantastic inscription-machine in Kafka's *The Penal Colony*.

¹⁸ See Foucault (1979: 58). The public square can be instantiated anywhere, at the scene of the crime, at important crossroads or crossing points, or any other place of meeting.

display; it is indiscriminate in its application. In this aspect, the power of the spectacle is limited to containing the meaning of the event and preventing the staged-order from being flooded and becoming ambiguous. As Nelson argues, “the technological function of any viewing screen is to be blank, a surface of nothingness, upon which can be projected images that originate from a different source, the projector” (1992: 64-5). To equate a spectatorial crowd, a population, a country with a screen is “to recognize that it plays the role not of originating any images, for after all, a screen cannot do that, but only of receiving the projected image” (Nelson, 1992: 64-5). The “good screen” is, therefore, the one whose surface is free from all imperfections or protuberances, that is, anything that might interfere with the flow of representations or the spectacle’s “totalitarian monologue.”¹⁹

In its restrained and planned excesses, sovereign power needed to be spectacular, that is, to be both visible and verifiable to the homogeneous social body which was its subject. This same social body served as a relatively effective projectile-mass when launched at enemies, though potentially unruly, it could also reverse its field and turn against that which incited it or set it in motion.

¹⁹ As Trinh (1991:93) argues, the totalitarian monologue is based on the blind denial of the spectator as “reading subject and meaning maker-contributor.”

Resistance to sovereignty and its spectacle of violence came in the form of carnivalesque plays of meaning (see Foucault, 1979: 63) whereby the crowd would reflect back inverted and deformed images. For example, turning criminals into heroes helped to break the chains and erase the dividing lines which limited popular participation as well as travesty the established, hierarchical order and its entrenched spectatorial division of labour.²⁰ The inability to maintain the staged-boundaries, to contain the meaning of the spectacle, and prevent the spread of *interpretosis*, were the crises that both hastened the collapse of the sovereign project and constituted the diagram of the sign-regime.

At its extreme point of application, the power of the sovereign theatre of force lies in its capacity to segment and distribute the body it targets (see Foucault, 1977: 227). Sovereignty also has a jurisdiction²¹ which limits it to the power of life and death: "a body destroyed piece by piece by the infinite power of the sovereign constituted not only the ideal, but the real limit of punishment" (Foucault, 1977: 50). This form of cutting and dissemination of the body is an act ultimately ending in death. As Foucault notes here, sovereign-power, in its grand

²⁰ See also Bakhtin's (1984) discussion of the popular-festive, parodic forms of resistance.

²¹ See Shields (1991: 44) for more on the judicial, jurisdictional, and strategic aspects of the social apparatus.

theatric design, also reached its limits over the social body in its ability only to cut out and eliminate any excrescent element, and cut off any line of flight that might exceed the integrity of its boundaries. The same act served to re-mark or re-inscribe the limits of its jurisdiction.

Theatre II: Text/Myth

The analysis of cinema and other audio-visual medium has been largely dominated by *formal* semiology and meta-linguistics (see for example, Stam, 1992; Fiske, 1989, 1989b, 1978; Kaplan, 1987; Metz, 1974). The dominant tendency has been to treat cinematographic images as if they were signs. On the one hand, this has resulted in attempts to show a mimetic relationship between images and reality by articulating the synchronous analogical codes which link images to a reality (everyday experience) they are supposed to refer (Metz, 1974). In this sense cinematographic images are placed within the classical semiotic framework comprising signifiers, signifieds, and their arbitrary relations.

On the other hand, contemporary non-referential semiology treats only sign fragments and their digital codes. From this point of view, signs have achieved a high degree of deterritorialization for they are no longer placed in a

relation of designating bodies and things or even indicating a state of affairs.

Instead, these deterritorialized signs only refer to other signs²² in syntagmatic *signifying chains* or circuits (as in Fiske, 1978: 54). Because the signifying chain has effectively displaced the signified (along with any sense of paradigmatic support) the result is an infinite postponement or deferral of meaning. Refusing to be tied down, the signifier flees its body as much as its embodiment. Like the name that survives its owner, or the statement, its author, the restless signifier glides along a slippery, smooth surface, easily jumping from one signifying circuit to another.

In Levi-Strauss (1969), the problem of the relation of signifying chains is solved by the invention of totemic messages whereby the (binary) opposition of one set of signifiers is made homologous or analogous to another by the logic of a code. For example, the statement “We are wolves” is rendered reasonable (i.e., analogical) by translating the statement into the template A is to B as C is to D, or “We are to others as wolves are to sheep.” Here the problem or tension between One and an Other is explained or solved elsewhere, that is, by the natural relation

²² When signs only refer to other signs, the sign, every sign, becomes a signifier, its signified, another sign, which in its turn becomes a signifier and so on. This makes the ultimate signified the Signifier itself and establishes the redundancy or circuitousness of the sign process.

of wolves and sheep. To say that clan A is descended from wolves, and clan B from sheep “is nothing more than a concrete and abbreviated way of stating the relationship between A and B as analogous to a relationship between species” (Levi-Strauss, 1969: 100), that is by imposing on this relation a set of ready-made, structural contrasts that a culture has tacitly agreed to (such as raw/cooked, inedible/edible, nature/culture, etc.). This mythic system (*bricolage*) makes possible a system of reference which equates one signifying chain to another or perhaps to many others on many different registers, planes, or circuits.

Similarly in Barthes (1973: 177), the language sign becomes impoverished, is emptied into a ‘form,’ and is reduced to a mere signifier as soon as it is captured by myth (a second-order system of signification). For example, Barthes illustrates this by ‘reading’ an image, a Panzani advertisement (1977: 33). In this case, “the bringing together of the tomato, the pepper and the tricoloured hues,” that is, the yellow, green and red of the background poster, constitutes a signifying chain. At the same time, however, this signifying chain, the linguistic message of the first-order, is emptied of its significant content, in order to become a pure signifier (a form) of another second-order signified (the concept; see Table 1).²³ This

²³ In Barthes, either a word, gesture or a whole book can become a signifier for a single concept (see 1973: 120).

impoverished, empty signifier then serves as a means, a stolen vehicle, which is filled with ideological import and used to promote and circulate the concept *Italianicity* (see p. 34), that is, by drawing upon a familiarity with certain (French) cultural stereotypes (Barthes, 1977: 34). This second-order sign system (i.e, the relation of empty form and concept) “stands in a relation of redundancy” (1977: 34) with the first-order visual/linguistic message (its substance/meaning) which it uses as an *alibi* (see Barthes, 1973: 121-23) for its *sign-crime*. Myth’s alibi is meaning, defined by Sartre as “the natural quality of things situated outside a semiological system” (in Barthes 1973: 133, n. 11). By emptying the sign of meaning, myth uses the remaining shell, the *empty set*, the *spatial form*, or the haemophilic *open framework* of the sign-structure as a natural abode to house its concept. This process (of interpretation) turns the impoverished, hollowed-out sign-body, this expressive substance, into a signifier of a formal (or foreign) language.

Table 1: Stratigraphy of the Sign²⁴

Second-Order (Myth)	Sign (Signification)	
	Signifier (Form)	Signified (Concept)
First-Order (Language)	Sign (Meaning)	
	Signifier	Signified

Nothing, it would appear, is safe from the larcenous schemings of myth and the *formalization of expression*.²⁵ While myth prefers to work with already impoverished, *incomplete* images “where meaning is already relieved of its fat, and ready for signification” (Barthes, 1973: 127), even the most fiercely guarded and firmly bounded language system is vulnerable to its *interpretations*. Around any finished, completed, or finalized meaning, there always remains “a halo of virtualities where other possible meanings are floating” (1973: 127). These virtualities can either *infect* meaning (robbery by colonization) or encompass it and direct it off course (by abduction or press-ganging²⁶).

²⁴ See Barthes (1973: 115).

²⁵ As Collins argues, “One of the great truisms regarding cultural production . . . is that all forms of art and entertainment have become one form of appropriation or another, whether it be called pastiche, parody, revivalism or just plain retro” (1995: 92).

²⁶ See Foucault’s (1983: 82-94) discussion of the popular illegalities and the problem of *vagabondage* (e.g., the wayward workers who leave their employ, servants who flee their master, ill-treated apprentices or deserting soldiers, i.e., “all those who wished to escape the press-gang”). See also Chambliss (1964) for a detailed socio-historical account of the various legal responses inspired by those

When meaning is too full for myth to be able to invade it, myth goes around it, and carries it away bodily. This is what happens to mathematical language. In itself, it cannot be distorted, it has taken all precautions against *interpretation*: no parasitical signification can worm itself into it. And this is why, precisely, myth takes it away en bloc; it takes a certain mathematical formula ($E = mc^2$), and makes of this unalterable meaning the pure signifier of mathematicity (Barthes, 1973: 132).

Even the resistance that modern poetry offers, that is, its “apparent lack of order of signs,” is captured by myth and transformed into an empty signifier “which will serve to signify *poetry*” (Barthes, 1973: 134). Resistance is futile: “myth can always, as a last resort, signify the resistance which is brought to bear against it.”²⁷

The means of inf(lection notwithstanding, the (apparently) closed or disordered language systems, as well as the open systems like the expressiveness of articulated language and the expressive image, are treated equally as the substance/subject, or empty gestures, for the play of mythic transformations and as vectors for the dissemination of its concepts.²⁸ Any expression or expressive

wayward folk who attempt to escape capture.

²⁷ Barthes' solution, drawing on Flaubert, is to constitute a third-order system which would rob myth in its turn. The first term in this semiological chain is the second-order myth-sign, consequently impoverished in its mythical significance, it is turned into mere *ornamentation* -- the term Barthes employs to designate the *empty form* of the third-order process of de-mystification.

²⁸ As Deleuze and Guattari argue, the “pure *formal redundancy* of the signifier could not even be conceptualized if it did not have its own substance of expression” (1987:115).

entity can be *formalized* and enlisted in the service of the signifying regime, as a substrate to which its deterritorialized signs (concepts) affix themselves.

(N)ot only written discourse, but also photography, cinema, reporting, sports, shows, publicity, all these can serve as support to mythical speech . . . (I)t is because all the materials of myth (whether pictorial or written) presuppose a signifying consciousness, that one can reason about them while discounting their substance . . . We shall therefore take language, discourse, speech, etc., to mean any significant unit or synthesis, whether verbal or visual: a photograph will be a kind of speech for us in the same way as a newspaper article; even objects will become speech, if they mean something (Barthes, 1973: 110-11).

Because of the “generic way” Barthes applies the concept “language,” everything is already interpreted as a signifier of *linguagicity*. It is, after all, the “analogy of meaning and form” (1973: 126) which establishes the crossing and mixing of strata, of first-order signifying chains with those of the second-order, and turns the signifier into something duplicitous: with one facet turned toward the materiality and particularity of meaning as the other “turns away” and assumes “the look of generality” while seeming “neutral and innocent” (1973: 125). In any event, the result is a *poorly framed* concept.

Perhaps we can simply forgo the expressive altogether and no longer count on reaching something like a first-order message. In a world of *simulacra*²⁹ there

²⁹ See Baudrillard’s (1983a: 102-3) discussion on the *implosion* of media and message and the *catastrophe of meaning*. In this context, Baudrillard’s *simulacra*

is no longer anything to interpret that is not already itself interpretation, where the ultimate signified is the great empty signifier itself which goes on copying itself to infinity.³⁰ Even silence itself can be carried away by the signifier and made to signify *repression*.

are considered as either a lack or excess of meaning. In fact, the implosion of lack and excess (i.e., the effacement of the difference between the “poles of a differential system”) produces something analogous to Barthes’ second-order signifier which is simultaneously empty (or emptied) and therefore potentially full (of excess signification) (see Barthes, 1973:122).

³⁰ The problem of interpretation (Verstehen) took a related turn with the advent of movable type and a mechanism of reproduction, the printing press (the basis of McLuhen’s Gutenberg revolution). The printing press made it economical to copy and disseminate the root text of a tradition. The words that had once been the closely guarded secret of an elite order became accessible to the masses, and a religion that was once “scarcely perceptible in practice” (Weber, 1958) earned a new, practical significance. Instead of relying on the medium of priests, others would have direct access to the order-words. Interpretations would spread like a disease. New interpretative mediums like Luther and Calvin were formidable in decoding the word. Their respective reiterations of the calling and fate would later combine to venerate both common labour (this-worldly practices) and its products (wealth). Just as labour becomes prayer, its products take on ethereal values (“metaphysical niceties” as Marx would have it), which estranges their utility as objects of consumption or as means of subsistence. Wealth becomes a *sign of election*, an *image of salvation*, a *marker of status* in the other-world. Securing one’s future, by producing ever more signs of it, becomes the object of relentless activity. Idleness and its associated consumption habits (the enjoyment of wealth, greed, gluttony, etc.) became the deadliest of sins. Later, Weber argues, this process turns irrational. Whereas reason, in its practical formulation, is the ability to distinguish means from ends, the ‘great signifier’ (wealth), formerly a means (of grace), is transformed into an end in itself as the forces of tradition and habit begin to inf(l)ect it and take it over.

Sign-Crimes/Cross-Roads

As Foucault (1979) illustrates, the analogical model revealed by Barthes and Levi-Strauss (amongst others) was pursued extensively by the legislative 'sign-regimes' of the 18th and 19th centuries. These regimes emerged in the face of a badly distributed system of justice.³¹ Subsequent reform movements planned a new 'economy' of criminal justice, primarily

to assure its better distribution, so that it should neither be concentrated at certain privileged points, nor too divided between opposing authorities; so that it should be distributed in homogeneous circuits capable of operating everywhere, in a continuous way, down to the finest grain of the social body (Foucault, 1979: 80).

Central to the development of this economy was, firstly, a new sensibility; one which would no longer perpetuate the idea of an unbridgeable gulf between the law-maker's arbitrariness and those subject to it (nor the idea of a law-maker's reasonableness opposed to the criminal as a monster vomited by nature -- an idea that would come much later). Rather, this new 'general' economy was to set itself against the very 'reasons' (interests, motivations, values) which lead the criminal to commit the crime. Secondly, in this new economy it is the social body as a

³¹ Sovereign power, in an effort to cover its excesses, had appropriated the right to sell legal offices. The resulting multiplication and dispersion of the number of judicial authorities created a discontinuous, overlapping and conflictual legal apparatus (see Foucault, 1979:78-80).

whole which is attacked by the crime, rather than the sovereign. Punishment, therefore, had to be shifted from the vengeance of the sovereign to the defence of society (Foucault, 1979: 90). Crime was now injurious to the social body because of the scandal it produced, the whole “series of disorders that it is capable of initiating,” and the danger that “everyday offences might multiply” (Foucault, 1979: 90). Punitive strategies should not therefore target the crime *per se*. Crime is dangerous in its pedagogical function, in the examples that it sets, the models that it constructs, and therefore because of the contagion, the repetition, the dangerous copies, or the *representations* that it is capable of engendering. As Foucault argued. “one must punish exactly enough to prevent repetition” (1979: 93) yet the “penalty must have its most intense effects on those who have not committed the crime” (1979: 95). Therefore, in its specific point of application, this new punitive economy should also produce generic effects.³² This strategy of linking the specific and the general (i.e., the two faces of deterrence³³) required,

³² In Canada, for example, Charles Duncombe’s (1836) *Report on Prisons and Penitentiaries* suggested that the goals of the new punitive strategy should be threefold; to deter others from crime, to prevent the repetition of offences by offenders, and to effect the moral reformation of those who break the law (see Ekstedt and Griffiths, 1988).

³³ According to Baudrillard (1983: 66), deterrence is *simulated* conflict, a product of the collapse or implosion of polarities which excludes any real clash: “a huge involution makes every conflict, every opposition, every act of defiance contract in proportion to the blackmail which interrupt, neutralizes and freezes them.”

what Foucault calls, a *semio-technique*, as well as a whole apparatus of representation.

As Foucault defines it, the semio-technique proposed by the penal reformers rests on the hypothesis that the motivation or reason that incites the criminal action is the same as any other normal action; it is motivated by the advantage (pleasure, reward, convenience, value, etc.) one associates with it or expects to gain by it. Put differently, the signifier 'action' has an associated signifier 'pleasure' which constitutes the sign pleasured-action.³⁴ The *habit of meaning* formed by this primary chain of associations, establishes the path or circuit which carries the action (crime included) along a specific line, in a specific direction. In criminal matters this directed flight must also be subject to verification and the signifying-chain reproduced for all to see. It is therefore necessary "that the legal procedures should not remain a secret, that the *reason* the defendant is condemned or acquitted should be known to all" (Foucault, 1979: 96).

³⁴ See Barthes' (1973) discussion of 'passionified-roses.' Pleasured-action is distinct from the sign *crime passionnel* in that the latter does not signify a rational motive.

While there is always a risk of glorifying and celebrating the actions of a defendant by this public representation (as was the case under sovereignty), the ultimate aim of this strategy is to set up a counter-sign system that would essentially *rob* the crime of its momentum, namely, to find a punishment for the crime whose idea is such that it robs forever the idea of a crime of any attraction (see Foucault, 1979: 104). To counter the trajectory of crime-pleasure associations, a crime-punishment association should be established. In order for the latter association to be effective it should: first, have at its disposal slightly more force than the former, that is, there should be a *quantitative difference* between the opposing forces so that one would be lead to the conclusion, by simple penal arithmetic, that the displeasure of possible penalty was more weighty (by degree) than the possible pleasure to be derived from the crime.³⁵

Second, if crime was to be recoded in the popular imagination, that is, emptied of its meaning and supplied with another significance, the counter-sign should also be disseminated or circulated as widely as possible. The publicity of

³⁵ For an elaborate discussion of this form of ‘penal arithmetic’ and the specific conditions that foster its repetition in different situations -- the formation repetitive actions or habits -- see Homans (1961:1-83). For a discussion of the theoretical influences (i.e., Skinner vs. Levi-Strauss) which lead Homans’ to develop this perspective see Ekeh (1975).

this *punishment-sign* should *arrest*³⁶ any further representations or copies. As Foucault argues, long before s/he was regarded as an object of science, the criminal was imagined as a figure of instruction (1979: 113):

‘Let us conceive of places of punishment as a Garden of Laws that families would visit on Sundays’ (Brissot, 1781). Punishments must be a school . . . where everyone may learn the significations . . . This, then, is how one must imagine the punitive city. At the crossroads, in the gardens, at the side of the road being repaired or bridges built, in workshops open to all, in the depths of the mines that may be visited, will be hundreds of tiny theatres of punishment (Foucault, 1979: 113).

It was the business of these instructional media, these *telling penalties*, to arrest and invert the popular discourses and tales that celebrated criminality. In order to do so, the captured signs had to be returned to circulation. To make them most visible and achieve the most rapid and widest broadcast, the reformers favoured public works as one of the best possible penalties:

Public works meant two things: the collective interest in the punishment of the condemned man and the visible, verifiable character of the punishment. Thus the convict pays twice; by the labour he provides and by the signs that he produces. At the heart of society, on the public squares or highways, the convict is the focus of profit and signification. Visibly, he is serving everyone; but, at the same time, he lets slip into the minds of all the crime-punishment sign: *a secondary, purely moral, but much more real utility* (Foucault, 1979: 109, emphasis added).

³⁶ This idea of arresting meaning also leads Barthes to favour the ‘still,’ the frozen figure, as subject matter of his analysis (see Barthes, 1973: 125).

By these mechanisms a large mass of signs was made available for appropriation and service in the circuits of another, legal/moral discourse.

Third, for the crime-punishment association to be effective it would have to *background*³⁷ the force-relation that produced it. The links between crime and punishment should not appear as an arbitrary (despotic) chain, nor as a political proposition. The links should be immediate and the sutures, seamless. It should appear as if the signifier-body naturally called up its punishment. If punishment followed crime as certainly and inevitably as night followed day, then the application of the penalty would be simply a *natural consequence* of pursuing a prohibited line of action. No one could be held responsible for a relation which derives from the very nature of things. As Barthes argues, myth systems do aim to hide anything (1973: 129), so there is no need of an unconscious to explain how it works. Myth works by exposure: “its function is to distort, not to make disappear” (1973: 121). It does not efface the crime, nor eliminate the offending body; it deforms its meaning while retaining its remaining framework (signifier) to broadcast an image.³⁸

³⁷ See Fiske’s discussion of backgrounding/foregrounding production processes (1989a: 239).

³⁸ Image is used here in the Sartrean sense of presentifying-absence. As Barthes argues, the mythical signifier plays on this difference; its form is empty but

By forcefully re-routing the signifier and then dissimulating this act of transgression, any trace of intervention is removed. It is as if something took over the sign-body of the criminal, arrested its movements, turned it away from its intended course, pointed it in another direction, along another path, toward another goal, and then removed the indicating force lest it get bound up or confused with the direction indicated. The overall effect is to make the discrete, parallel signifying chains reach a natural junction or crossroad (typically in the public square). This meeting place would be populated by innocent looking or benevolent warning-signs indicating the presence of future obstacles and the necessity of taking detours to avoid them.

Any definitive mode of linking across the gap separating the signifying chain constitutes a narrative scheme. While such “schemings of language” (Chevalier, 1990) are acts of transgression, constituting a “leap,” as Barthes (1974) puts it, “over the wall of antithesis,” their aim is also to naturalize flows across the gap. The logic of the legislative sign regime is analogy. Its formula (A

present, its meaning absent but full (Barthes, 1973: 124) and can therefore serve to summon up (in the mind) the presence of the generic concept (e.g., French *imperiality*).

is to B as C is to D) is designed to establish one plan of transgression as the *preferred* mode of movement and transit (or reading; see Fiske, 1989a: 133-4).

By dissimulating the work of transgression, the act of encoding relations appears seamless and governed by natural, ready-made formulae. By combining schemes of transgression and naturalization, language is reduced to the deontological function of *order-words* (see Deleuze and Guattari, 1987), a mythological imperative designed to govern and master relations, associations, and movements across the gap. However, narrative mastery does not simply imply that there is one preferred manner of linking sign fragments, but rather commands or authorizes certain performances (readings) *at the expense of others*, and thereby tells us what we must think or how we must act. As an exercise of power, the aim of the master narrative is to constitute habits and maintain orderly associations through circulation and by dint of repetition in a *variety of forms*.

The metaphors used to describe such language schemes centre on the tactical deployment of space and strategic movements. These manoeuvres go from place to place, and set up potential obstacles in the interval or gap which constitutes the *space of transgression*. Between one fragment (of experience) and another, narratives code the *spatial practices* or movements through the interval.

To normalize transgressive space is to restrict or prohibit unwarranted (carnavalesque) collisions or encounters which might occur there and maintain orderly flows of traffic through the interval.

Modern architecture is far removed from this simple, isolated act of framing and the idea of a fixed, closed space. By using the frame in novel ways, Bentham, perhaps the first, modern city planner, created a panoptic space. This space was achieved not simply by eliminating all frames from the enclosure, as de Cauter (1993: 2) argues, but by assembling frames to constitute a singular, all encompassing event-horizon which might function as an artificial moral milieu.

Theatre III: Discipline

*Up to this point, it requires manual labour, but from now on, the apparatus works automatically.*³⁹

Disciplinary apparatuses also have optical machines. These give a selective spatial presence. The school has an optical machine for creating systems of presence and absence, the prison, a dissymmetrical “seeing machine” (Foucault, 1979: 207).

³⁹ Excerpt from Kafka’s “In the Penal Colony.”

The panopticon is a machine for dissociating the see/being seen dyad; in the peripheric ring, one is totally seen, without ever seeing. . . . It is an important mechanism, for it automatizes and disindividualizes power. Power has its principle not so much in a person as in a certain concerted distribution of bodies, surfaces, lights, gazes Any individual, taken almost at random, can operate the machine (Foucault, 1979: 201-2).

It is in this sense that Virilio defined the “vision machine” as realizing a self-sufficient spectatorless gaze (1988:5).

The panopticon is the exemplary disciplinary apparatus. Its optical machinery reverses the principles of the dungeon (to enclose, deprive of light and hide [Foucault, 1979: 200]), as well as the principles of the palace (designed to be seen) and the fortress (designed to survey an exterior). Premised on the notion that light was more powerful than (despotic or signifying) chains, the *encompassing* space of Bentham’s *enlightened*, ideal⁴⁰ prison-city was doubly functional. On one hand, the panopticon served to trace out a territory, to control movements in and out of the territory and structure the lines of flight. The panopticon defined an image of a *relatively closed* universe in which space curved in on itself, with a *focal point* of illumination (point of convergence of the lines of light) occupying the city-centre or public square. The focus of attention was a

⁴⁰ Though ideal in design, a working embodiment of the panopticon which followed Bentham’s specifications almost to the letter was constructed in pre-Castro Cuba.

non-luminous, dark body⁴¹ (that could potentially capture all the images of movement (like the ‘eye of the camera’) and from which no movement (nor light) could escape. On the other hand, the many partial frames (back-lit cells) on the horizon of the enclosure constituted spaces of subjective habitation. These frames were designed to control the lateral flows of communication between denizens,⁴² while one frame opened to the centre, establishing an interface or means of communication with it.

As a strategy of normalization (Foucault, 1979), the aim of the panoptic regimen was to constitute an organized body where all partial, confined, and

⁴¹ Something akin to a black-hole, a dark object formed after the collapse of radiant stellar matter, which neither emits nor reflects but rather captures all forms of radiant energy and is therefore only detectable in its effects (i.e., in the distortions of light and movement it produces -- like an independent variable).

⁴² Canada’s first experiment in the scientific management of criminals, Kingston Prison (1835), was designed to reflect the latest in penological reforms. Prisoners were not allowed to communicate with one another in any way. In the dining hall they sat in rows with their backs to each other, and in the chapel the prisoners were arranged so that they could see the preacher but no one else. Prison rules forbade the inmates to “exchange looks, winks, to laugh, nod or otherwise gesticulate to each other.” The success of the system was dependent on the “absolute prevention of intercourse among the convicts.” If communication was necessary, in the workplace for example, it could only take place by means of signs, or under the direct monitoring by the guards. Any infraction was punished by a public flogging, 6 to 12 lashes -- public in the sense that it was to be seen only by the rest of the inmates. With so many silent-rules, there was also a lot of infractions and the frequency of punishments escalated from the time the prison opened; by 1843 there were 770 punishments, 2,102 in 1845, 3,445 in 1846 and 6,063 in 1847. One prisoner, during an 8 year stint in Kingston had been whipped 35 times, receiving a total of 1,182 lashes. (See Carrigan, 1991).

limited subjective perceptions would be linked in perpetual communication with another, privileged, objective perception which encompassed them. The economy of operation of this surveillance apparatus rests on one-way flows; the visibility that flowed from the centre to the frames should retain only a virtual presence, one which would be invariant to the subject's point of view. "Bentham laid down the principle that power should be *visible and unverifiable*. Visible: the inmate will constantly have before his eyes the tall outline of the central tower from which he is spied upon. Unverifiable: the inmate must never know whether he is being looked at, at any one moment" (Foucault, 1979: 201). Unlike a theatrical space where there are as many scenes as points of view, and everyone sees a different play, the panoptic space was designed such that any point of view was subject to the same vision, much like the all-seeing-eyes in the picture which appear to follow you about the room. The design was intended to provoke a permanent feeling of visibility and its accompanying effects, quite independent of any actual (and verifiable) seeing or spectacular application of power.

The panoptic apparatus relies on images of movement as a means of inducing or producing self-consciousness (though perhaps a more apt term is *camera- or surveillance-consciousness*, that is, an awareness of the 'third-eye' and

its anonymous gaze). In this case a virtual record-of-movement (the potential *trace* -- like a virtual 'bug' or listening device) acts on the actual and potential movements of those encompassed by the sphere and its one-way flows. The strategy of the panoptic machine is to turn the virtual *image of movement* into a force which will affect the actual and potential movements of bodies in its space (and beyond). Far from simply containing, capturing, or immobilizing bodies, the panoptic machine, as a form of *disciplinary power*, deploys a body's own capacities to move and to act both as a means and instrument of domination and subjectification.⁴³ Under the auspices of the panoptic regime, the body-image, the image of a body capable of acting (an image of what a body can do), is the infinitely renewable, material condition of this exercise of power. As Foucault argues, power is "a set of actions on other actions" and so presupposes that "*the other* (the one over whom power is exercised) be thoroughly recognized and maintained to the very end as a person who acts" (1983: 220).

⁴³ In this aspect the panoptic regime is a rough analogue of the sign regime. However, in the latter case the excess or redundant information is *stored* in the body which is then used as a means of circulation, while in the former the excess or redundant information which radiates and escapes the body is stored elsewhere, in virtual memory. Confronted with a mute, non-responsive overseer instead of an analyst who interprets, the subject now does all the interpreting (see Deleuze and Guattari, 1987:138).

The Art of Assembly

As I have illustrated above, discipline is not a grand scheme which has as its target the undifferentiated mass of the social body as a whole. Discipline works through division, through dividing and further sub-dividing space, time, and motion. As Foucault puts it, discipline works on the ‘little things’ and the small details. As a micro-strategy, discipline operates on a *segmented social body*, decomposing it into smaller and smaller fragments (which also serves to multiply and disperse the number of sites for its implementation and exercise). But this mastery of art of distribution is only part of the disciplinary strategy. While sovereign power (and the political-economy of the mark) reached its limit in the spectacular theatrics of decomposition and dispersion, an act ultimately ending in death, disciplinary regimes aim to master the art of (re)assembly and of rank, of arranging, ordering, and linking fragments of space, movement, and time, in a reconstituted image of the whole.⁴⁴

⁴⁴ This reconstituted whole parallels Durkheim’s image of the organic society and the specialized institutions he describes: each with its own specialized functions to perform as determined by the presumed *needs* of the whole; its own highly specialized legislative and judicial apparatus; and each acting as a repository (with its share) of the collective force of the social body. To these diffuse institutions a discourse of *systemic needs* added symmetry (a form of teleological determinism often offered instead of an explanation [see Turner and Maryanski, 1988: 112]). But the organism also needed a history. For Durkheim, the (equally discursive) history of organic society is the division of labour (i.e., the specialization of tasks

Discipline is a strategy of enclosure, programmed to constitute, illuminate, interrogate and police the smallest movements in the interior space it frames. Discipline works by division, and by breaking up wholes (i.e., ‘dangerous mixtures,’ ‘contagions,’ ‘mysterious associations,’ and ‘intermingling bodies’). It “dissipates the compact grouping of individuals” into discrete and elementary singularities and terminates any mixture that is not supervised by authority or arranged according to the dissymmetries of hierarchy (Foucault, 1977: 170, 202 n.3, 219, 239). Unlike the indiscriminate application of sovereign power, the discriminatory apparatus of the prison tailors punishments to the *singularities* constituted and framed in its spaces. Also different from sovereign power, the point of application of disciplinary power is the ‘image of delinquency’ rather than the body of the criminal. Discipline punishes *life-styles* rather than crimes (Foucault, 1977: 252-255).

The optical machinery of discipline is micro/telescopic. It divides up space and movement, into smaller and smaller fragments, subjecting each to intense and

and functions). The division of labour is the equivalent of an overriding law of nature. It is linked to the idea of natural human imperfections (differences), which were *crimes* from the point of view of the putative mechanical *society of saints* and *dilettantes*. Under the new, organic morality the saints would no longer be venerated nor would those (undisciplined ones) who refused specialization.

extensive scrutiny.⁴⁵ It makes things that were not visible before, observable and measurable, by dividing constellations and assemblages into innumerable points of illumination. In line with Foucault, these actions specify surveillance and make it functional (1977: 174).

More than just a building or institution, discipline is a strategy of ‘traces’ (see Foucault, 1977: 131). Traces are the visible inscriptions or imprints left by the passage of a body. They are records of its style of operating or habits of moving and its possible directions -- traces are after-images of a body’s “way.” Since every body (human or social) has its own unique *modus operandi*, ambulatory style and sense of direction, its traces are its *signature* -- the inscriptions which identify its individuality (see Deleuze, 1992b: 5). Different from the sovereign line of force, where marks are directly emblazoned on the body’s surface, discipline’s ‘soft touch’ establishes a connection with a body-image rather than a body-sign. It does this by inscribing (or at least potentially inscribing) an image of a body’s motion on a receptive surface. If every action or decisive movement is *potentially* inscribed and stored *somewhere* as signature (objectified trace or memory), and therefore potentially punishable *at some point*,

⁴⁵ That is, to the long exposure of the disciplinary gaze.

then it is the possible objective consequences, or, rather, the *projections of these consequences on the screen of the imagination*, that influence decisions to act in the present. No spectacular display of force has to reach the body. Discipline is a form of power that goes beyond the polarities of meaning and violence. It does not act directly on the body but acts on its past and future actions, what it has done and what it is capable of doing.

Disciplinary power is predicated on what bodies can do, not what they are or what they mean. If the other (its subjects) were predetermined in such a way as to be incapable of action or reaction, i.e., inhabiting a closed system lacking a field of possibilities from which to actualize one or several possible reactions, then the conditions favourable to this power-relation would not be present. Power is exercised only over individuals or collective subjects faced with possibilities. In other words, "*there is no relationship of power without the means of escape or possible flight*" (Foucault, 1983: 225).

By simply recording these signature-traces, the disciplinary apparatus affirms the *assignment* of motion to these figures. It *holds* them accountable for their movements, both past and future, and evaluates their ability to hold these movements, that is, to display appropriate postures, to hold a pose or maintain

their composure. Under discipline, figures are distinguished in terms of their *form or composition*, that is, comparatively, as a system of rank-ordered deviations from a pure form or an ideal state (i.e., a model or template⁴⁶), either of body-type (as in early criminological theories⁴⁷) or bodily *postures and attitudes* which illustrate either good or bad form (i.e., good or bad copies of the model). Good copies are rewarded by changes in rank. Bad copies (*simulacra*), or those that deviate from the model, are set back to begin a process of training over again.⁴⁸

Discontinuous by the very nature of its exercise, each disciplinary internment has its own plan, habits to be acquired, and forms of knowledge. From one system of internment to the next, from one apparatus to the next (from family,

⁴⁶ See also Deleuze's (1986: 22-25) discussion of the 'disciplining' or 'appropriation' of the Templar's stone-cutting craft by imposition of a 'static model of forms' (stone-cutting by means of a template). This resolved the problem of the tactile "encounter of cone and plane" in a different way, by developing a model for reproduction.

⁴⁷ See, for example, Lombroso's, *Criminal Man* (1911; New Jersey: Patterson Smith) and Sheldon's *Varieties of Delinquent Youth* (1949; New York: Harper).

⁴⁸ The idea of enforced training and of imposing a reformed life-style on inmates is largely obsolete. In Canada, under the new 'opportunities model' (Ekstedt and Griffiths, 1988: 329), it is now up to the inmate to change her/his 'ways.' A whole 'case-management team' (guards, 'living unit officers,' parole officers, parole tribunals, and probation officials) subjects offenders to a battery of tests as they observe and assess the life-style of offenders in and outside the institutions to see whether self-inflicted treatment initiatives have modified the offender's disposition. Failure at any point can lead to the offender being sent back a level to begin again the process of classification and to work through the graduated hierarchy of punishments.

to school, to factory, barracks or prison), from one rank in the internal hierarchy to the next, one begins again, from a zero-point, and ends with an examination designed to evaluate a body's disposition (e.g., its "taste for work;" see Foucault, 1977: 234).

So, not only are these spaces of internment *closed sets*, each frame is potentially divisible into an infinite number of smaller subsets (a function of micro/telescopically "zooming in") of a larger whole. But the whole is not a closed system. Disciplinary enclosures, as with all closed systems, are only ever "relatively enclosed" (Foucault, 1977: 276). As Foucault argues, it was the dungeon that was premised on a simple schema of enclosure, with thick heavy walls designed to prevent entering or leaving, as well as to hide and conceal. In contrast, Bentham's original design for backlit cells shows conversely that disciplinary enclosures are full of "calculated openings" (1977: 72). These relative openings allow light to pass to the interior and converge on a central point. It is an illusion to suppose that the disciplinary gaze emanates from within the enclosure. Rather, the disciplinary gaze is a centre where lines of light converge, where the motor-tendencies or signature-traces of a body's motion are (potentially) recorded. This receptive apparatus stands as the central repository of

virtual perceptions, observations and information that *any body* can occupy. It is virtual because it is screened off from investigation: one should not know whether one is being seen (or recorded) at any given moment. The disciplinary gaze is anonymous.⁴⁹ It has to be in order to function as it does. For discipline to work it has to see without being seen⁵⁰ and hear without being heard.⁵¹

The disciplinary dream of continuous control or seamless visibility remains elusive. At best, discipline produces a carceral archipelago, a discontinuous series of structured enclosures. And any series of enclosures, no matter how close together, will never be continuous: they will have gaps, intervals, marginal sites, places of lateral and asymmetrical mixtures, in short, places beyond, between or outside the horizon of visibility. Between and beyond the “spaces of places” of disciplinary enclosures, there are “spaces of flow” (to borrow Arrighi’s [1994: 23]

⁴⁹ As nameless as the masked face behind the surveillance camera or its equivalent, the one-way mirrored glass, which functions as central repositories of images of motion.

⁵⁰ See Bauman’s (1994) analysis of the modern *flâneur* in the context of his/her ability to see without being seen.

⁵¹ Bentham’s plan to incorporate listening devices in the enclosure (plumbing by means of ‘tin tubes’ which would link centre and cell) was scrapped since there was no available technology to establish telemetry and allow for the one-way flow of information necessary for the anonymous, virtual application of power. Consequently, curbing lateral communication had to be achieved by other, legislative means (e.g., Philadelphia’s silent system; the rule of speaking only when spoken to and isolation for those who violated the hierarchical principle).

dichotomy) that cannot, however, be reduced to inter-apparatus (or inter-state) relations or their “foreign policies.”

In social apparatuses light pours through openings, it is projected across gaps, and is distributed across surfaces. Light encounters various impediments, obstacles, and traps in the field of visibility which produces perceptions, reflections, and images. Fields of visibility are shot through with lines of light. Signs are also fashioned. They are emblazoned or projected on surfaces. They are captured, ordered into formation, and redistributed in networks and circuits. The conditions of the sayable or expressible are structured by sign-regimes of enunciation. Social apparatuses are also characterized by lines of force which pass between statements and visibilities, between moving bodies and bodies of words, establishing correspondences here, producing dissonance there. Social apparatuses are dynamic systems not inert structures. They are systems of mobility and forms of mobilization. They are regimes of light, enunciation, and force, but they are also regimes of flow. Flow constitutes the forth (analytic) dimension of the spacing of the social apparatus.

Flow is a dimension of movement that passes between interior and exterior spaces, sometimes following the normal pathways and migration routes,

sometimes going beyond the norm and the convention. Disciplinary apparatuses, as relative enclosures, are full of holes which allow lines of light from the exterior to pass, and at the same time to fall strategically on certain points. These lines of light are also potential lines of flight, a means of escaping the enclosure -- the condition which also makes the exercise of disciplinary power possible. Its calculated openings are designed to structure the flow and distribution of bodies and light, while its panoptic centre serves as an apparatus for potentially capturing and recording these flows. This double strategy of calculated openings and an apparatus of capture ensured that the movements of bodies, light, and information were directed and channelled one-way, authoritarian flows.

Flow is an important analytic dimension (direction) of all social apparatuses. Whether we speak of the movements of images or signs, information or light, bodies or energy, or even energetic-bodies (agents collective or singular) with a rich capacity for movement and potential for change (i.e., for movements of deterritorialization), all these matter-flows are caught up in complex apparatuses that have mechanisms to control the flow incorporated into their design. As Virilio has pointed out, on numerous occasions, ours is the society of motoricity, of acceleration and change, but it is also a visual culture (what moves faster than

light?). What we need to do is to bring our analysis of it up to speed.

In many ways, the functioning of the disciplinary apparatus surveyed to this point could be seen to parallel the functioning of the early *cinématographe* machines. Edison's first machines were bulky, immobile and confined to the studio. Like the ubiquitous, contemporary systems of surveillance⁵² (e.g., video cameras positioned in shopping malls, parking lots, gaming houses, corner stores, etc.) early cinematography, comprised fixed, single-point-of-view, spatial shots, which allowed movements to remain the property of the figures in its frame (a central feature of the disciplinary strategy). In single-point-of-view cinema, characters and bodies change and exchange their relative positions, while cameras simply record their spatial displacement. Consequently, cinema has been seen as an extension of the disciplinary apparatus, one which reproduces the disciplinary division of labour and redeploys its strategic features by multiplying the number of surveillance satellites.

⁵² As Bogard (1996: 77) argues, "surveillance is a central, constitutive feature of all modern organizations. More individuals are targets of surveillance than in any other point in history."

Theatre IV: (Re)visiting the Disciplinary Apparatus

In the early days of Kingston Prison the majority of the sentences were of short duration, from one to three years, during which time prisoners were prohibited from having visitors or contact with the outside. The only visitors to the institution were those curious individuals who, having paid an admission fee,⁵³ came to take in the sights. This sport was open to the public six days a week from 10:00 am. to noon, with a matinee from 1:00 to 3:00. To the *light-side* of the disciplinary apparatus and the self-consciousness of those all-too public bodies caught in its orbit, must be added an analysis of the *dark-side*, that is, those *random, anonymous any-bodies* who operate the surveillance machine and populate its black hole (those *in camera* vs. those perpetually on camera). The disciplinary apparatus not only produces delinquency it also produces the *guardians* of its order, its *voyeurs*.⁵⁴ Presumably, like the delinquent, the *shadowy figure* of the voyeur is not the spawn of nature, nor upbringing, but is produced by an apparatus of power/knowledge and is therefore *subject* to it.

The disciplinary apparatus supports a hierarchy of vision and a highly specialized spectatorial division of labour. On one side there is the receptive

⁵³ A means of defraying some of the operating expenses (Carrigan, 1991).

⁵⁴ This is an extrapolation of Denzin's (1995) analysis of cinema-discipline.

surface that functions as a mnemonic, recording device, on the other, the expressive surface that has nowhere to hide. In the case of the Kingston prison, this is the prisoners and the guards and voyeurs, respectively. Between the poles of reception/expression there is a shutter-screen, a specialized interface: admission times and a viewing gallery. This interface comprises those aspects which control the flow of light and maintain the dissymmetry of seeing/seen, darkness/light, private/public, investigator/investigated, and the voyeur/delinquent.

One could make the argument that this division of labour remains in force in spite of the technological changes that discharged the camera-machines from the studio (the heavy houses of confinement) and allowed their inscribed information to be projected and *re-screened* in other houses of darkness *and* light (cf. Denzin, 1995: 101). In this “cinema of discipline” the emphasis turns, or rather returns, to the anonymous voyeur-bodies who come to take in its sights, that is, the would-be guardians of the disciplinary city, or, as Denzin (1995: 100) prefers to call them, “surveillance agents of the state.”

This voyeur would gaze into the sacred, hidden places of society. In so doing, the voyeur would reproduce the concepts of public and private life which were central to the cultural logics of capitalism; that is capitalism and the liberal, democratic theory of the state required that a division between the public and the private be maintained (Denzin, 1995: 102).

Perhaps this explains the spread of panoptic regimes: they produce the most *democratic* of institutions.⁵⁵ However, and because of the technological interventions which subsequently set things in motion, the voyeur can no longer be considered *in camera*. As subjects of new regimes of power/knowledge, the anonymity and the place of these *life-style* consumers⁵⁶ is no longer secure. Much like their delinquent counterparts, they too are surveyed, prodded, and wired by an array of surveillance techniques and machines in order to test and measure their *receptivity*. They have also been carved up, ordered, and ranked into *imaginary* communities of taste and preference by an army of marketeers and analysts (see Shields, 1992b: 14-17; Denzin, 1995:117). Suddenly the distinction between the poles is not as clear as it was once thought to be. Who is the *subject of perception*? Is it possible to reach such a point of identification, or is everybody simply caught in a Benthamian light-trap (or carceral chain)?⁵⁷ I propose that

⁵⁵ Denzin (1995: 121 n. 8), following Metz's (1982) history of *literary figures*, argues that the *voyeur*, *cinema*, and *psychoanalysis* all emerged at the same time (1900-1913) and that cinema was made *for* private individuals (p.113). By assuming that the 20th century cinema created this *new social type* (i.e., the voyeur or Peeping Tom) Denzin misses both the history of the voyeur and the apparatus which produced the voyeur-individual pair.

⁵⁶ See the discussion of discipline above (also Shields, 1992b).

⁵⁷ According to Relativity Theory, there are some points in space where the gravity is so intense it forces rays of light to form a circle. Anyone placed in such a circuit and who would look straight ahead would see another, who is actually themselves from behind. Thus the object of investigation disappears as something

cinema is different from discipline in that it goes beyond the disciplinary division of labour and changes again the conditions of spectatorship and visuality.

It was the Lumière brothers' invention, unveiled one hundred years ago, on March 22, 1895, that was to change the functioning of the cine-apparatus. Unlike Edison's stationary camera, the Lumière's *cinématographe* machine was lightweight and mobile. It liberated them from the studio. It allowed them to take to the open space of the Parisian streets and to follow, rather than simply capture, its mundane movements and flows.⁵⁸ By this movement of deterritorialization, that is, by following a flow or a line of flight, the entire panoptic mechanism was broken and transformed into something else (see Patton, 1994: 158). Fixed, spatial shots were soon replaced: first, by moving the camera, by panning, zooming and altering the depth of field; and second, by stealing motion from other bodies, by mounting cameras on transportation devices or other vehicular contrivances. Not only had the Lumière's found an effective way to transport the volatile plastic film past the shutter (Lumière's claws) they also made the whole

other, and one only ends up observing and policing themselves.

⁵⁸ After the initial public success of their invention and its display at the Paris Exhibition of 1900, they turned their attention to the more practical demands of its manufacture and sale. It was left to others to exploit its potential for composing and decomposing the movement of bodies and their relations.

assemblage transportable and the camera was licenced to become a *roving eye*.

Consequently, the problem of spectatorship has also been reframed in terms of the identification *with* the camera, rather than simply identifying the camera-eye.

Benjamin (1968:228) explains:

The performance of the movie actor is transmitted to the public by means of an array of technical instruments, with a twofold consequence. The camera that presents the performance of the film actor to the public need not respect the performance as an integral whole. Guided by the camera[person], the camera continually changes its position with respect to the performance. The sequence of positional views which the editor composes from the material supplied [him/her] constitutes the completed film . . . Also, the film actor lacks the opportunity of the stage actor to adjust to the audience during the performance, since he does not present his performance to the audience in person. This permits the audience to take the position of the critic, without experiencing any personal contact with the actor. The audience's identification with the actor is really *an identification with the camera*.

While this perspective aims to take into account the movements of the camera, it does not go far enough since it still resounds with discipline's optical division of labour.⁵⁹ The objectivity of the film critic, the detachment of the analyst, and the voyeur who lurks in the shadows are all privileged figures of the old regime of light. The new cinematic regime does not simply survey and record the motion of bodies and produce images of motion that are external to it, nor can it be reduced

⁵⁹ Bogard (1996: 54-75) also extends this 'disciplinary focus' in his conception of 'simulated surveillance' as a 'higher and purer' form of discipline's supervisory gaze.

simply to movements of the camera, to panning, zooming, and stealing (and directing) the motion of other bodies. Its primary and distinctive quality is to constitute new forms of motion and new kinds of perception which are not reducible to the conditions of natural perception or to the normal movement of bodies. Its method is montage, that is, the selection and assemblage of separate shots, most of which are fixed and spatial (i.e., with very little camera movement). I argue that this method makes movement a property of the image itself and liberates perception from the privileged vantage points which confined (and naturalized) it.

The images of this cinema are movement-images. It is this perspective which I think fruitful for understanding cinematic forms of encounter in society today. One of the key, often under-theorized, aspects of cinema is that it does not require additional motion or motivation for its images to make sense. The material of cinematography is neither textual, nor narrative, but mobile sections or shots which already express relations of change and transformation. These shots are not stable surfaces for reflection or interpretation. To reduce the shot to the still is to eliminate what is specifically cinematographic. A methodology for studying cinema must go beyond the analysis of captured figures (including the

linguistic figures and tropes) and the idea of frames with impermeable boundaries. The work of cinematography is not the work of narration but rather of montage, which selects and assembles mobile sections to constitute a movement-image which passes through each shot and each frame. To conceive cinematic motion it is necessary to consider boundaries as a fluid media or as inter-faces rather than empty points on a passage from one fixed state to another.

In the following chapter I argue that a cinematic apparatus comes into existence and produces a different kind of public spectacle with a new face and a new look. It is an apparatus with a distinctive gaze, one which is qualitatively different from discipline's. This gaze opens up new dissymmetries in the field of visibility and produces a different spectatorial distinction. Its specificity lies in its ability to incorporate the distinction between seeing and foreseeing in a continuous *lateral* flow of moving images and shots stitched together through montage. This spectatorial distinction is very different from the hierarchies which characterized both the seeing/seen dyad of the panopticon and the language/myth hierarchy of the sign-regime.

CHAPTER 3

CINEMA'S OTHER GAZE: LOOKING BEYOND

There are various ways of *looking at* cinema. It could be seen as a kind of sovereign spectacle for framing and limiting meaning, perhaps a sign-regime of deterrence, or even a disciplinary apparatus producing voyeuristic self-consciousness. Sovereignty fixes the frame of reference and smooths out the screen, the sign-regime adds motivation to (overcodes) captured motion and redirects it, while the disciplinary apparatus breaks up motion into elementary units and, in the silent observatory, subjects them to a permanent optical test.⁶⁰

Cinema, with a whole arsenal of projective, receptive, and reflective machines at its disposal, may be argued to have incorporated not only the frame and screen, but also techniques of deframing and re-framing. If you arrest its motion, then you eliminate what is specific to it and it becomes a ready-made poster or picture, a figure or still (an empty form for mythological interpretations). If you divide up the motion into its cells or frames, then you have a similar

⁶⁰ As Baudrillard argues, “everywhere the test [or *referendum*] functions as the fundamental form of control, by means of the infinite divisibility of practices and responses” (1983: 116).

problem, the problem of the partial-fetish-objects (uprooted signs, torn from their place in the whole) and the necessity of an external collection agency responsible for assembling them into a whole.

These perspectives reduce cinematic images (shots) to fragments (textual or otherwise) and the analysis of them to signifying chains. In a medium such as film the process that underscores the selection and assemblage of visual sections is *montage* as opposed to *analogy* (the favoured analytic of, for example, Barthes, as we have seen). Montage is a process which is neither identical to the semiotics of the script nor reducible to it. If there was an overarching semiotic governing both the narrative and montage, forging their identity, then the overall composition would have to be read; that is, it would have to have movement added to it. Such an analysis forgets that the cinematographic image is already in motion and that this is its distinguishing feature. Alternatively, one could imagine a double semiotic, one coding the montage associations and another coding the semiotics of the narrative. This hypothesis would underscore the possibility of the audio and visual entering into a variety of forms of contrapuntal, polyphonic relations within the same composition, and would preserve their independence. But the hypothesis to be explored in this chapter is that the relationship between montage and the

script is not one of equivalence within one semiotic regime, or a relation among many regimes. Instead, I will argue that the image/sign, montage/narrative relation is equivalent to the various apparatuses in which relations between non-discursive and discursive fields are either forged or found lacking. Under this hypothesis, we are no longer in the semiotic domain of the image/sign equivalence established by Metz (1974). Instead we enter into the domain where this dependency is reversed, where images and their relations are treated like bodies and their (force) relations, and where discourses and signs are produced from such tactile encounters.

While at first sight it may seem odd to equate images with bodies, since the conventions of phenomenology and existentialism suggest that images are simply *figures of consciousness*.⁶¹ Because such imaginary figures lack extension, they are unable to inhabit or occupy space the way bodies do. As merely intentional figures, images also suffer from a fundamental poverty of relations. Although one can, for example, recall (presentify) a subjective image of the Parthenon, it is not possible to count the number of columns in the image as one could when in its

⁶¹ In contrast, Jameson (1990: 1-2), though only going part way in the analysis of the relation between bodies and images, makes the counter claim that “movies are physical experiences, and are remembered as such . . . film is an addiction that leaves its traces in the body self.”

physical presence. Bodies, such as the Parthenon, are characterized by an infinite number of relations with other things and therefore constantly overflow or go beyond the frames and horizons of consciousness (see Sartre, 1991: 127). Owing to the positional or selective character of consciousness (its intentional *poses*), its figures possess only a finite number of relations with other things which act on it and to which it reacts. For Sartre, images are identical with the consciousness we have of them (1991: 20). The poverty of images is a consequence of the fact that they are always partial, selective, restricted to *single points of view* or frames of reference, and the particular (and subjective) interests, aims, goals and purposes that correspond to them. But in relation to selective perception and its point of view, there are virtual perceptions, that is, other poses, or points of view, which one could adopt, and from this *other* vantage point one could see different aspects of the phenomena under investigation (e.g., reverse sides and hidden columns) much like the halo of virtualities (possible concepts) which surround the sign in Barthes' analysis, or the virtual subjects of perception that hide in Bentham's panoptic machine. What renders this type of perception distinct from the *subjective* image is this structure of alterity, that is, the *possibility of others* (other bodies, other aspects) populating the horizon *beyond the frame* or boundary of

what is given in experience. According to Boundas (1993), the structure of alterity (and not simply the presence of empirical others) is a structure already implicit in the phenomena of perception.

Alterity, the other side (or outside) of the image, and the possibility of joining with others already residing there (either in reality or in the imagination) is the means of turning subjective images into perception-images (as Deleuze calls them). Without this structure of alterity, Boundas argues, consciousness would only ever retain partial, fragmentary, and incomplete images. Alterity adds depth and dimension (extension) to the image. The ability to link-up with these virtual others helps smooth the transition from one point of view to another. It establishes both the seamlessness of natural perception and the potential for *images of the whole*.

Like the view from a prison cell, the difference between the image and perception (part and whole) is dependent on a conception of confinement which fixes the frame of reference and encloses the point of view. The fixed frame of reference is also responsible for capturing the interest: the partial, subjective, and dubious image is essentially a reflection of (on) confinement (immobilized space or the space of immobility). Movement, in contrast, produces an image in

extension. Perceptions of depth and dimension are dependent on mobility, on the possibility of changing one's position (vis-a-vis an immobile figure), or moving from one vantage point to another, passing through thresholds and collecting and assembling these changing frames.⁶² The other way to constitute a perception would be to have the image itself move and constantly change its frame. To move the image is to create a kind of virtual perception that undoes the image/perception opposition.

Mobility is the key to establishing this virtual whole and for forming the basis of a kind of experience that is de-subjectifying, dis-interesting, and dispositional.⁶³ Yet this whole can only ever maintain a virtual existence, since it cannot be given in the immediate, monumental sense. To do so is to change it qualitatively. To take the whole into fragments, to immobilize, isolate or otherwise fix it in place is to produce a fetishized partial object. Since the whole

⁶² Conceptions of space are intricately intertwined with movement. With acceleration the spatial distinctions of proximity, of near and far, and of present and absent, become unsettled (see Virilio, 1995: 35; also Shields, 1992: 190). The same can be said of the categories of the actual and the imaginary, since these differing conceptions of 'being-in-the-presence-of-something' are also dependent on movement or its lack.

⁶³ *Fascination*, the term Baudrillard (1983: 62) uses to describe such experiences is unfortunate since it implies a lifelessness, a freezing motion (spell-binding, dumbfounding, charming), and "a generalized deterrence" (1983: 64). *Abandon* is perhaps a better term. It connotes flight, nomadism, deterritorialization, vagabondage, itinerant and fugitive flows as well as sensuousness movement.

lacks particular goals, aims, or purposes (direction) it can never be associated with practical objects of utility or even a collection of objects (on this point Marx was instructive). While confinement establishes figures and poses which capture and frame-up the imagination, the mobilized image opens up the potential to explore the regions beyond the territorial limits, frames, boundaries, and divisions which constitute subjectivity. As Grosz argues,

the boundary between inside and outside, just as much between self and other and subject and object, must not be regarded as a limit to be transgressed so much as a boundary to be traversed. . . .
Boundaries do not so much define routes of passage; it is movement that defines and constitutes boundaries. These boundaries, consequently, are more porous and less fixed and rigid than is commonly understood, for there is already an infection by one side of the border of the other, there is a becoming otherwise of each term thus bounded (1995: 131).

Perception is essentially a form of encounter with Otherness and therefore contains a germ of difference in itself. Perception is not subjective and partial without at the same time possessing a virtual (objective) element which renders the whole-image possible. The subjective and objective do not constitute a duality of privileged, fixed centres of determination; they are polar elements necessary for perception. The domain of the perception-images lies somewhere between the rigid subjective and objective poles of perception, in the interval or interface across which the poles communicate and by means of which a number of possible

forms of linkage can occur. According to Deleuze, it is this conception of the perception-image (as a relation between the actual and virtual, part and whole) that forms the basis of montage as it operates in cinema. Another consequence of this mobilized-perception is that the role of the frame changes.

The Frame of Reference

According to Deleuze and Guattari, architecture was the first *art of the frame* and of the inter-assemblage of frames and planes, designed to carve out territories and constitute places of dwelling and habitats. “Art begins. . . with the house. That is why architecture is the first of all arts. . . . It can be defined by the ‘frame,’ by the interlocking of differently oriented frames, which will be imposed on all arts, from painting to the cinema” (1994: 186). The frame of the picture, of the pose or the ready-made figure, was instituted to delimit the identity of a given experience. The picture frame functions as a boundary, not only to “exclude all that surrounds it” (Simmel, 1994) and avoid intermingling or “spillage” between the inside and outside (Bauman, 1988),⁶⁴ but also to provide viewers with a frame of reference, to help them maintain their distance and to prevent excessive

⁶⁴ Much like the impermeable framework of the early gaols whose function was merely to code and secure the binary opposition of inside/outside.

excitation which might extend beyond the frame into stimulus evoking (bodily/sexual) responses (see Falk, 1993: 9-11). But architectures also include other kinds of frames such as windows and doors. These frames are more like thresholds, points of interchange between inside and out, or interfaces between the limits of enclosure and what lies beyond. As Simmel argues, “life flows forth out of the door from the limitation of isolated separate existence into the limitless of all possible directions” (1994a: 8). While the physical barriers of walls portion out a mute cellular or insular existence, “the door speaks” (Simmel, 1994a: 7). The door is a kind of frame whose significance lies somewhere between the poles of limitation and freedom.

Whether as architecture, art, or cinema, boundaries and structures are shot through with a variety of openings, thresholds, and gaps through which the inside extends outward and by which the outside or alterity enters. The interval or margin is an open space of mixture, a place of hybrids, composites, and assemblages where new bodies are created and new wholes are constituted. In cinema, the frame is a space which produces a variety of cinematic composites (perception-images, affection-images, and action-images). As in *modern* architecture, the idea of “calculated openings” (see Foucault, 1979: 207) is an

important analytical device in understanding modern exercises of power. These are openings designed to regulate mixtures and control flows, to legislate and coordinate the movement of bodies, to create dissymmetry in the flows of light and information, to instill habits, to mark out the stages in the hierarchical evolution of moral subjectivity, and to produce organized bodies. But since power is a relation and is only exercised against recalcitrance, it is important to understand the inherent contradiction between spatial and temporal relations, that is, relations which work to regulate movement and control flows across openings versus those that work to disturb the flow and to interrupt the normal motion of bodies and things by occupying these openings.

While disciplinary strategies are concerned with the *mise-en-scène* (movement in the set or what goes on inside the frame) and with exercising power over that which can be interiorized, internalized or appropriated locally (see Deleuze, 1986: 15), cinema strategies are concerned with *montage*, or controlling what comes next, that is, the *osmotic* relation between the frame, the shot and what is beyond it (its outside), or what takes place between successive framings and shots (in-between in the interval or gap). The analysis of montage begins outside the frames and settings in the “any-space” or “interface” between

structured enclosures, since this is where movement-images occur. Even if one were to stop the cinema apparatus, and analyse the *still* thus isolated, one would invariably come across certain remarkable instances to contemplate, for example, “when the horse has one hoof on the ground, then three, two, one” (Deleuze, 1991: 5). But these remarkable singularities are not forms actualizing or embodying an eternal standard, model, or template, nor do they await a narrative to order their arrangement or distribution (cf. Metz, 1974). Under a system such as discipline, the parts are related to a fixed centre of determination. This system of coordination provides a clear cut mechanism for determining the exact placement, position or location of each part in relation to the array. This optico-spatial arrangement forms a coordinate-system (a coordinated space of visibilities) which, in turn, supports the interminable ‘body-count’ (the attendance-taking ritual for establishing presences and absences) and the idea of a serially-linked collection of ones. The singularities of cinema have nothing in common with the order of long-exposure optics nor with the spaces of confinement. They are singular points of a movement, that belong to movement, and are immanent in it. For no matter how remarkable, unique, interesting or ordinary from the point of view of their immobilization, each instant is simply an any-instant-whatever

whose only distinguishing feature is that it is equidistant from all the other instants in the moving duration of the shot. And every shot is a qualitative multiplicity of any-instants-whatever. When approached as a mobile section, each frame is transformed from an enclosure that immobilizes movement into a moment in passing. To reduce the shot to the still would indeed be pornographic (or photographic) and would miss movement at every point. For every frame communicates with an outside, just as every closed set refers to an out-of-field, or larger, unseen (virtual) set which encompasses or modifies it.⁶⁵ This is also why 'content' analysis can never reach completion, nor contain the meaning of an event; the idea of a completely closed set with an impermeable boundary that could provide consciousness with a stable frame of reference is erroneous. One never looks at the same picture or reads the same words twice. The whole is never simply given all at once. There are always breaks in the presumed continuity of the enclosure; the outside penetrates and the inside escapes through its porous openings in a process of continual exchange and transformation.

⁶⁵ For example, sound in the out-of-field, can extend the scene beyond the visible frame. The sound of traffic or sirens emanating from beyond the frame can invoke the feeling of a larger urban setting, effectively displacing, qualifying and reterritorializing the scene. The out-of-field has transformative powers over the visual field. Consider how the haunting musical score in *Jaws* changes the intensity of what would otherwise be banal scenes.

Cinema Beyond the Frame: Open Systems

Through montage, and because shots are selected and assembled (independent of the fact that each shot is already a mobile section), openings are introduced into filmed motion (in the interval between mobile sections) and new techniques and strategies are invented for dealing with the movements that pass in the interval. Cinematic motion comes in three distinct forms which also constitute three different levels of analysis. First, there are images of motion, or what goes on inside the frame or the shot as bodies and things change and exchange their relative positions in the frame or set. Second, there are movements of the camera, which change the set and modulate the frame of reference.⁶⁶ And third, there are the movement-images which are a consequence of relating movements (of bodies or the camera) to the intervals of motion which pass beyond the frames and between the shots. Instead of simply positing montage as one image following and requiring external links added by the script or narrative, in the special case of the movement-image we have images acting and reacting on one another independent of the script or narrative. If an image were to extend into the space beyond its enclosure, to escape the containment of its frame and begin to act on

⁶⁶ See Denzin's (1995) discussion of voyeur-gaze as 'identification' with the movements of the camera. There is no 'cutting' at this level of analysis.

other images (or bodies in space), or if the mechanical mirror-image of movement were suddenly to begin to move on its own account, then a whole set of taken-for-granted distinctions between the internality, poverty, and immobility of images and the externality, richness, and motive force of the real would have to be reconsidered.

Cinema is an example of what Virilio calls an “open system” (1995: 125) where the whole is never fixed, neither given nor giveable, but is itself variable. In an open system a part can belong to various relative sets simultaneously. By refusing settlement in any one place (set, setting, or situation) such *nomadic singularities* always transform their places of spaces into in-between or threshold spaces (see Grossberg, 1996: 180). By subjecting each place or locale to a relentless process of opening or deterritorialization, space no longer functions as a fixed system of coordinates to define, position, or delimit movements. Instead, space itself becomes a variable of movement and “boundaries are only produced and set in the process of passage” (Massumi, in Grosz, 1995: 131).

The old dualities of space, or inside/outside, close/distant, present/absence, and the related categories of past and future (that is, “categories of absence”⁶⁷; see

⁶⁷ One could include ‘desire’ among the categories of absence, since desire is typically defined as ‘lack,’ by a lack of being or a lack of presence which implies

Shields, 1992: 187) are all derived from the relative safety of the enclosure and the point of view of confinement. Mobility changes all that. As Virilio argues, media mobility has the effect of changing old notions of proximity and distance along with the classic distinction between inside and outside (1995: 106). Such notions bring us very close to Baudrillard's image of a collapsed universe, to the implosion of social/spatial dimensions, and to the field of pornographic visibility which it defines. In this field (of simulacra) everything appears close-up, all-too-visible, or given all-at-once. It is a "state of pure presence . . . without even the faintest glimmer of a possible absence," where there is no longer even anything *to see* because everything is already there (Baudrillard, 1988: 32). The overall effect of "traversing all horizons," limits, and boundaries is that "others have virtually ceased to exist" (Baudrillard, 1988: 41) -- *ominous signs* for sociality, *symptoms* of its collapse.

The social void is scattered with interstitial objects and crystalline clusters which spin around and coalesce in a cerebral chiaroscuro. So is the mass, an *in vacuo* aggregation of individual particles, refuse of the social and of media impulses; an opaque nebula whose growing density absorbs all the surrounding energy and light rays to collapse finally under its own weight. A black hole which engulfs the social (Baudrillard, 1983a: 3-4).

distance.

This perspective always leads back to the light-trap, to the image of the closed universe where nothing escapes exposure, and to an analysis of the fetishized-partial-objects that inhabit it.

Far from being simply a closed universe, or an apparatus for staging the visible, cinema keeps open the possibility of deterritorializing and reterritorializing the seen/scene. It is montage that operates these movements which threaten to leave the territorial principle behind. Cinema is, after all, a moving scene/seen, not just a surveillance apparatus for capturing movements (or their reflections) in a pre-defined scene or ready-made enclosure.

The optical machinery of cinema therefore functions differently from both sovereignty and discipline. Sovereignty defined a spectacular regime of power that had to be seen to be effective. Discipline structured light to fall on an interior and illuminate its details, like a searchlight, or an intensional, though nonsubjective⁶⁸ consciousness which summoned objects out of their essential darkness (see Boundas, 1993: 35). It established a hierarchical system of non-reciprocal, one-way gazes which see without being seen. Cinema, by way of contrast, operates by *introducing signs of the unseen to the seen*. Without

⁶⁸ Intentional and non-subjective is the way Foucault characterizes power-relations in his *History of Sexuality* (1980b: 94).

reducing scene to seen, it makes us grasp what we do not see but what is perceptible to another (Deleuze, in Boundas, 1993: 36). The *other*, in this sense, is not simply an empirical object populating our field of vision, as in the face to face encounter of gazes doing reciprocal perspectives (interactionism) or engaging in a subject/object dialectic (existentialism). This other is not necessarily actualized or materialized in one's visual field, nor does it have to be in order to make its affects felt.⁶⁹ The disciplinary regime already established the fact that the other was most affective and influential *when it was not seen*. Moreover, the empirical Other must be "foreclosed" (Boundas, 1993) or displaced for this other to make its affects felt. It also does more than reflect back a self (cf. Denzin, 1995: 112). It is a *structure of alterity* living the margins and constituting the horizon of visibility beyond the frame. It is like a spectre haunting the seen. It conveys a *Zeitgeist* (or Maffesoli's *l'esprit du temps*), an *esprit de corps* (a form

⁶⁹ Compare, for example, Urry's (1995) discussion of the tourist gaze, the place-image, and necessity of empirical others. He argues that it is the "presence of a large number of other people, as are found for example in the English seaside resorts. . . [that] give atmosphere to a place" . . . "It is the presence of other tourists, people just like oneself, that is actually necessary for the success of such places" (p. 138). In contrast, one could argue that the ambience of a place is also due in part to the others who are not figures in the landscape. One's image of place, its intrigue, and popularity can derive from traveller's tales (those who have seen and who convey its image), from rumours, gossip, folktales, and seductive advertisements, from the artifacts and memorabilia collected there, and the pictures we take to show the folks back home (see Shields 1991: *passim*).

of togetherness or sociability, as in Simmel), and the *ambiance* or *sense* of space and place (see Lefebvre's [1991:31] discussion of *lived space* and Maffesoli's [1993] sacred any-places). But it is also a *poltergeist* that makes its presence felt by stomping round, whispering, and *rattling chains* beyond the frame. Film-makers have long been acquainted with it and have deployed it in numerable ways (as we shall see).

Put simply, in a world where the structure of alterity ceased to function, that is, in a world of isolation *without* others, we would be constantly bumping into the unseen and the unknown, which would strike us with the force of projectiles. "The absence of the other is felt when we bang against things, and when the stupefying swiftness of our actions is revealed to us" (Deleuze, 1990: 306). The entire structure of anticipation and expectation of what comes next, what is beyond, what we don't see and don't know (the horizon of possibilities) is a function of this structure.

The part of the object that I do not see I posit as visible to Others, so that when I will have walked around the object to reach this hidden part, I will have joined the Others [already there] behind the object, and will have totalized it in the way that I already anticipated. As for objects behind my back, I sense them coming together and forming a world, precisely because they are visible to, and are seen by, Others (Deleuze, 1990: 305).

Similarly, the depth of our perception is a possible width for others, thus enabling us to relativize proximities, to distinguish foreground and background and to know when objects are hidden behind others. This other illuminates the margins of the world that we do not see, warning of assaults from behind or the side, smoothing transitions from one perception to another, and filling the world with benevolent murmuring (see Deleuze, 1990: 305). For as Deleuze argues, “[w]hen one complains about the meanness of Others, one forgets this other and even more frightening meanness -- namely, the meanness of things were there no other” (1990: 307).

Surely anyone who has seen a film is made aware of all these dimensions, dimensions of depth, of space and duration, and of course anticipation. None of these effects, *realism* included, would be possible if the screen were simply flat and the frame fixed in its boundaries. Contemporaneous with all that is seen there is a “virtual” unseen set, a beyond or out-of-field, that wards-off (en)closure, prevents the set from closing in on itself, and precludes the mere (voyeuristic) identification of the *scene* with the *seen* or with what the camera sees. Like a line of f(l)ight, this virtual cinema-other passes through the porous membranes of the

seen, and at the same time is that which allows the seen to pass into what comes next and warns of events to come.

Interpretation, typically undertaken from a fixed standpoint (i.e., from the point of view of confinement or the ‘standpoint of civil society’ as Marx [1978: 145] put it), is made all the more difficult when its subject-matter is porous (see Grosz, 1995: 131) and actively resists capture by constant flight, by changing its shape or form, refusing to settle, to be pinned down or naturalized. Since it is a structure, the question is not who this other *is*, but *what it can do*. Nor is the problem one of trying to contain or locate its source since it refuses settlement, but, rather one of assessing its *affects*. We can, however, give it a sur-name: *faciality*. As Deleuze and Guattari argue, “certain assemblages of power require the production of a face” (1987: 175). Perhaps nowhere is the difference between the regimes of en-closure and the open, cinematic system more apparent than in the place faciality occupies therein.

The Face Out-of-Frame

The face can be individuating (Deleuze, 1991: 99). It can serve as a means of distinguishing or characterizing a person. Synonymous with the signature,

mug-shot (*photo de pose*) or fingerprint, the face serves as a means of identifying individuals. The face can be socializing, in the sense that it manifests a social role or a social location. Taken as a reflection of the settings in which people normally act and perceive, the face becomes *habitus* (see Bourdieu, 1993) where *looks* distinguish the place one belongs or the group one belongs to. The face can also be communicating, not only between characters or roles, but also as an expression of the internal consistency (auto-communication between a character and its role - when one looks the part) or its lack (as in the automaton or the face that fails to reflect the other, or simply fails to respond appropriately to its scene).

The face is verbose. It emits and receives, releases and captures, gathers and expresses many signifying signs. As Deleuze and Guattari argue, signifiers always reterritorialize on the surface of the face such that signifiers are always facified (1987: 115). Signatures (a means of individual identification), the *habitus* (a means of group identification), and signs of communication (identification or the failure to identify with an individual or a group) are examples of the face *captured* and *inscribed* by a particular regime of enunciation. It is made to bear these inscriptions though no actual physical force ever touches or 'marks' its surface. *These* signs should be understood in terms of the particular apparatuses,

the regimes of enunciation, and the lines of force which make it signify or “induce it to speak” (so to speak). In the cinema apparatus the face takes on a different complexion.

As Bergman defines it, “the possibility of drawing near to the human face is the primary originality and the distinctive quality of the cinema” (in Deleuze, 1991: 99). It is typically the face which populates the cinematic *close-up*, but Eisenstein (1942) goes further. For him, the close-up *is* the face, suggesting that any close-up calls forth either a face or a facial equivalent. More than just a quantitative enhancement of detail, or a moving nearer, for Eisenstein the close-up marks a “transition from quantity to quality,” (1949: 123). It is a “qualitative transformation” or “a leap beyond the *limits of the possibilities* of the stage -- a leap beyond the *limits of situation*: a leap into the field of the montage *image*, montage *understanding* . . .” (1949: 239; emphasis original). What Eisenstein advances is a new way of understanding the *dimensionality* of the cinematic close-up and the *change of dimension* that it brings about. This change of dimension can be understood in two ways.

On one hand, this change could be quantitative and relative. It could consist in the magnification of a part of the set and serve as a means of optically

enhancing its little details -- in much the same way that one might apply a microscope or telescope to zoom in on, and isolate, an interesting bit from the rest, or the way a drover might isolate an individual from the flock or herd for special treatment. The resulting close-up is an image of a partial object or fragmentary element that has been abstracted, cut or torn from its place in an overall constellation of elements. It is an image of an *individuality*, a unique but partial element separated from its place and its relations to other elements in that place. The effect is an image that is both small and large at the same time, one which displaces elements and dislocates the field of visibility -- as is the case in Baudrillard's conception of the abstracted signifier and its corollaries: the pornographic, fetishistic gaze of sign consumers, their taste for collecting, and their fascination with the series or the serial project of collecting a self.

On the other hand, this change of dimension could be qualitative and absolute. Like the proverbial straw that broke the camel's back, at some point an increase or diminution of quantity will pass a threshold and bring about a qualitative, irreversible change of state or qualitative deformation. This is how Eisenstein envisions the close-up, as a turning point, a threshold, a point of qualitative transformation. In as much as it dislocates, it also opens up a new kind

of dimensionality and a new kind of space, namely, a 'milieu of becoming' (Grossberg, 1996: 179) or a transformation space -- a space of possibilities between the state of the before and the state of the after. For this reason, I consider it a space of becoming and of movement rather than a space of being or settlement. It forms a conjunction between this and that or, in Simmel's terms, an opening or doorway between here and what lies beyond. From this perspective the close-up defines a qualitative locality and a location of qualities. Whatever occupies this interval or threshold space will not only have to forego placement, it will have to surrender its identification or the identifying marks which determine where it belongs, its place of origin or the group it belongs too, as well as its individuality. Probyn understands this dynamic image of inbetweenness as "the moment when the trapeze artist has let go of one ring but hasn't yet grasped the other" (1995: 42). Here, the size of the gap, the space between one ring and another, between one state and another, may very well be measured and quantifiable (sometimes large and sometimes small), but the space of the interval can also be assessed in other terms. It can be assessed in terms of its intensity, and the intensity of the scene/seen can be different, singular and unique, each time it is experienced. In cinema, the close-up does not simply isolate the part from the whole. Because of its location in the interval the facified

close-up determines the value of the whole scene in terms of its intensity and affective qualities.

To illustrate this notion of the close-up as *facification*, we can turn to the example of the clock-striking-midnight (Eisenstein, 1942: 21; Deleuze, 1991: 87). The clock, in this example, is shown in several shots which gradually draw near to its *sur-face*. One of its fixed traits is to be reflective, to reflect back light and *information* (to tell the time). Its other trait is dynamic and expressive. Because its hands form a series of micro-movements, even virtual, imperceptible ones, it marks an accent toward a critical instant, to the point where midnight becomes affective, intensive, not only reflecting the hour and telling the time, but also expressing the *quality* of midnight as a *fateful* hour and determining the “*value* of what is seen” (Eisenstein, 1949: 238). Scenes such as a clock-face at midnight, a close-up, are typically employed to stake out such critical instants,⁷⁰ turning points or to prefigure paroxysms (Deleuze, 1991: 89). Facification is preparatory, either of the progress toward a limit or of crossing a threshold. Moreover, it expresses these virtual qualities (virtual *deformations*) without ever actualizing them in the visual field. The face is a movement-image: a surface of capture and inscription,

⁷⁰ For example, “those *instants* in which water becomes a new substance -- steam, or ice-water, or pig-iron -- steal” (Eisenstein, 1949: 173).

and a surface of expression, transformation, and change. Whole buildings are often facified: they have a *look*, an expression all their own; their *façades* are illuminated, sometimes polished to a highly reflective gloss (corporate faces), sometimes worn and tired; their surfaces are adorned and decorated, painted and made-up, inscribed, re-inscribed, and over-scribed (with graffiti); they are populated with control surfaces, windows, doors (bars and cameras), places of entry and exit (for controlling flow); populating the cityscape they modify the “atmosphere” of a place or space (the ambiance of the city). Whole landscapes can be facified. Eisenstein (1949: 237-8) calls them “large scale” objects or faces, primarily to distinguish them from those poorly framed, photo-graphic close-ups that only display or present.

Another example of facification occurs in a scene from Eastwood’s (1992) film *Unforgiven*. The scene comprises a series of four shots (the cut “⌘” defines the shot):

A shot of the rain at night. The hero, Munny and his sidekick the Schofield Kid ride into the frame of the shot and stop. Munny hands the Kid a whiskey bottle, and keeps one for himself. They exchange dialogue then the Kid rides off. Munny continues to ride into the town (Big Whiskey), the bottle in hand. ⌘ The camera tracks slowly, pointed toward the ground made wet by the rain. A whiskey bottle is thrown into the frame. It hits the ground and splashes as the camera continues to track along the ground (with jerky movements as if mounted on a horse), then pans up to see the town. Two

torches can be seen in the distance in front of the town's saloon. ✂ A shot closer to the torches which frame and illuminate a coffin stood up on end. ✂ A tracking-shot as the camera very slowly comes round to face the coffin, as if caught in orbit around its centre of gravity. The body in the coffin comes into view. It is Munny's other sidekick, Ned. A plaque is nailed across the coffin. It reads: "this is what happens to assassins around here." The shot is framed by sounds out-of-field -- thunder, music, and voices raised in celebration.

This sequence of shots is the final turning point of the film. Together these shots produce an image of the fateful hour. Several shots draw near to this "clock-face," which expresses, not the time per se, but the qualities of it. Midnight or high-noon (the time of the final showdown), the time of day makes no difference. What matters is the sense of anticipation that facification produces. What of the coffin/body/plaque in the scene above? Is it an object designed to deter or warn others, or a monument, ornament, decoration, or trophy, marking a victory in the duel of forces? If the body of Ned is indeed a decoration, then it is worn by the saloon and is indicative of its superordinate position (rank) in the order of things (the site where a coming duel will be fought and the plot resolves). Is the coffin a general sign (of deterrence) or a general's insignia? Either as a mark of what has happened or what could happen again, it directs the attention to something (some place or some event, past or future) which is elsewhere. Its substantiality is verbose. There is no containing it. This face-shot produces all kinds of signs and

the dead man is made to continue to fuel the process of interpretation even in death. Why? Because his whole body is facified. Because of its odd position in a coffin, propped up in front of the saloon, all these possible meanings are deterritorialized from the dead man and reterritorialized on the saloon. The saloon is a “clock-tower,” not because it bears resemblance to one, but because it too expresses qualities and powers. It is a monument decorated with a “clock:” its face is illuminated for anyone to see the dead man in the coffin.

While some might say that the Deleuzian face is a signifier, I would argue that the signifier (and the signify-regime) needs a face, not only to fuel the process of interpretation, but as a substance/subject to territorialize and reflect its concept. But the arrested, immobilized face (the still) is still a *poor frame* for the concept (see Barthes’ analysis of myth above). More than reflecting, the face also resists capture by the sign-regime, by language. While the close-up may appear as an act of arrest or enclosure *par excellence*, it is not a matter of cramming and arranging so many elements inside pre-existing boundaries (e.g., the stage production), but is a special case of cutting out or extracting a *composition unit* from the set (Aumont, 1987: 36-7). Similarly in Eisenstein, framing is a matter of “hewing out a piece of actuality with the axe of the lens” (1949: 41). Because the close-up

involves a cut, or the cutting out of an image from the materiality of its set, some argue that they have discovered a cinematic equivalent of a psychoanalytic structure of the unconscious (e.g., a castration complex; see Kaite, 1991: 176), and, as in Baudrillard, associate this with the fetishization of the partial-objects, which in turn corresponds with *poses* of the commodity -- when it is *immobilized* [see also Kroker and Levin (1991) and Debord's (1994: 12,43) discussion of the partial-object/image]. Others, Barthes (1977: 66-67), for example, understand the cinematic fragment (the still) as an "act of quotation" forming the basis of cinematic parody, an analysis which is extended into Fiske's (1989: 95) treatment of the media as "semiotic democracy."

While one certainly grants the fact that the close-up involves a change of dimension vis-à-vis the set, it does not follow that the image is therefore immobilized. It is my contention that, instead of (or in addition to) simply magnifying the "small details" of the ready-made set, or enlarging the seen (pornographically), the close-up is an act of "deframing" *par excellence*. Since it cuts the image from its moorings and removes it from its spatiotemporal coordinates, it is able to display its own micro-movements of transformation.

In a world of complete enclosure (dungeons or “total institutions”) where walls are without doorways or windows, the only way out is over the wall, an act akin to Barthes’ (1974) notion of transgression. But in a world of relative enclosures, there are all kinds of openings (calculated or not) and marginal sites through which movements and flows of all kinds pass. Unlike the surface of the mirror, the *photo de pose*, or the passive gaze of the other which simply reflects back or records movements that are external to it, the face (close-up) is a mobile surface of micro-movements (as is the translucent film surface mobilized by the Lumière’s claws). It *interrupts* the flow of the seen and the light which would otherwise reflect back or pass in one direction. Faciality defines an interval, an opening between that which is reflected and its reflection. The close-up constitutes an interval-space, or the space in-between-beyond-the-frame, where suspense and expectation are suspended. As Bhabha argues:

‘Beyond’ signifies spatial distance, marks progress, promises the future; but our intimations of exceeding the barrier or boundary - the very act of going *beyond* - are unknowable, unrepresentable, without a return to the ‘present’ which, in the process of repetition, becomes disjunct and displaced. The imaginary of spatial distance - to live somehow beyond the border of our time - throws into relief the temporal, social differences that interrupt our collusive sense of cultural contemporaneity (1994: 4).

It is only by dissolving (deframing) its spatiotemporal coordinates that the 'identity' functions of the face disappear. Thus, the facial close-up is also its individualizing, socializing, and communicating effacement, for it aims at nothing beyond its own proliferation and expansion (cf. Grosz, 1994: 195 on desire). In normal (or normalized) perception people are assumed to have individual characters or social roles, and objects have "real uses," which stand in "real" connections to people, who stand in real relations with one another in a whole actual state of affairs. But there is also an *expressed* state of affairs. Standing on a precipice, for example, may be the *cause* of vertigo,⁷¹ but this state of affairs does not explain the expression produced by the face. Vertiginousness is a quality, a way of *living* or experiencing the scene of the precipice -- its qualitative transformation.⁷² Additionally, while this *expressed* quality might anticipate an action or event that will take place in this state of affairs (e.g., actually falling over the edge) it lacks the necessary coordinates and correspondence rules required to embody the situation's truth, reason, or *logos*.⁷³ For, this image does not *live* in

⁷¹ As in Hitchcock's (1958) film of the same name.

⁷² Hitchcock's *Vertigo* is exemplary in its use of the close-up, or affective deframing. In this film there are two worlds, one of affection and dizzying desire, the other, an actual world bound by rules and roles. Repeated close-ups (inserts) show the *difference* between the actual world and how characters live it.

⁷³ The truth-value of any statement (any virtual propositional relation) rests on the premise that it indicate a state of affairs that makes it true (see Wittgenstein, 1958:

the rule- or role-bound enclosure of the scene, but in the 'virtual world': a conjunction of past and future which is beyond the reach of normal communication or judgement, and therefore beyond the laws or codes of normal interaction. What emerges close-up is a deterritorialized image occupying a virtual *any-space-whatever* grasped as the pure locus of the possible (Deleuze, 1991: 96,109). Because the close-up is inserted into the flow of the scene, it forms an interval, a moment between past and future states, or between a situation and an action that will take place in it or modify it. It infects both sides of the border. It fills situations with sense and supplies actions with momentum. In other words, the close-up remaps the topography of the scene on an affective plane.

In the Eastwood illustration, the grizzliness of the close-up on the dead man, Ned - his coffin, body, face - remaps the social relations amongst the characters. It turns the actions to follow toward revenge instead of the original objective of the protagonists. This close-up/face effaces all other functions of the face which either belong to, are derived from, or indicate its place in a the coordinated space of the relative enclosure. Like a nomadic singularity that

33). Statements of truth require a structural homologue (common code) to ensure that the representative sign-order (propositional relation) and the order of the world share a *syntactical form* in common.

refuses to settle (or be captured) its significance cannot be secured in advance. As Balázs states: “. . . the expression of a face and the signification of this expression have no relation or connection to space. Our sensation of place is abolished. A dimension of another order is open to us” (in Deleuze, 1989: 96). By occupying the openings or margins, rather than inhabiting the enclosure, the signs which scribe its surface do not simply characterize or secure its identity (an individual representation). Nor are they just cliché or stereotypical responses (good habits) that would identify the place, location, or group that it belongs to (a group representation).⁷⁴ The displaced face sheds all its ‘traces.’ It is no longer a functionary, deputy, or subject of the enclosure. Instead it has become a seer of that which we do not see, and the virtual embodiment of the power of the out-of-field. Like a subservient, averted gaze, it turns towards-turning away (*tournement-détournement*⁷⁵; see Deleuze, 1991: 104) to illuminate the horizon of

⁷⁴ While Bourdieu (1993) counters the tendency to homogenize culture with a conception of the habitus as a means of entrenching cultural distinctions between different groups in society, these varieties of ‘taste’ and ‘manner’ really only serve as metaphors for objective social arrangements including social class -- i.e., ‘habits’ are simply ‘codes’ which serve to ‘naturalize’ ready-made hierarchical differences. Belonging can therefore be assessed in terms of whether or not one has acquired the appropriate ‘know how,’ (*savoir-faire*) that is, whether or not one displays the appropriate *badges*, *labels*, or other visual cues.

⁷⁵ As Debord defines it, *détournement* “occurs within a type of communication aware of its inability to enshrine any inherent and definitive certainty” (1994: 146).

invisibility. Without faciality there would be no transitions, no intervals, no warnings, only the shock of successive projectiles or incarcerations.

The face or its equivalent does not exist independently of that objective state of affairs which it expresses, yet is, at the same time, distinct from it and irreducible to it. It expresses potentials rather than actuals. The kinds of signs this face/image produces are icons. According to Pierce, an icon is a kind of sign which refers to an object by virtue of a quality which it possesses, and which it possesses independent of whether any such object actually exists or not. Similarly, qualities cannot act as signs unless they are embodied: such 'quali-signs' are necessarily iconic (Pierce, 1955: 115).

The face/close-up is a type of movement-image and an expressive substance that does not simply allow external movements and flows to pass, nor does it simply deflect, reflect, or turn them back. As an interval of reflection the face distorts⁷⁶ lines of (f)light by turning them into affects and expressions. Movements never leave or enter the scene without passing through this interval.

⁷⁶ Similar to the Lacanian *objet petit a*, which as Žižek (1989: 34) argues "is always, by definition, perceived in a distorted way, because, outside this distortion, 'in itself,' *it does not exist*, i.e., because it is nothing but the embodiment, the materialization of this distortion . . . an object that *does not exist* for the 'objective' look."

Through montage, the close-up, as a cut-out/insert (simultaneously inside and outside), controls the flow by carrying out ‘virtual conjunctions’ in the gaps or openings between the scenes, prior to any actualization. By structuring expectations, the close-up smoothes the transitions from scene to scene, and constitutes a continuity lacking in the mechanical organizations of discipline’s broken up motions. Rather than simply making the gaps and intervals of the system of montage “invisible” so that events flow (cf. Trinh, 1991: 164-65), signs of the *virtual scene* are inserted in these gaps to direct and channel the powers beyond the frame to *make* the event flow.

The face in close-up, the sound-out-of-field, and the flashback ⁷⁷ are *surface structures* inserted into the flow of the movement-image to qualify the scene and motivate responses to it, that is, to variously link situations and the actions which modify them. These affective-inserts smooth transitions and lateral connections that would otherwise remain a discontinuous series of *presents*. The power to virtualize an actual image, to surround or encompass what is in the scene with affections, anticipations, qualities and memory, is to introduce elements which belong to the past or future into present perceptions and so to potentialize

⁷⁷ Like the close-up, flashbacks are attempts to concentrate the power of the virtual in the scene (as discussed *infra*).

its movement, change, and transformation. For the present would not pass if it were a closed system and did not already contain an immanent potential for becoming-other. Montage releases the potentials of the image so that they move (pass on) and at the same time authorize their passage by structuring the openings through which they pass.

Conclusion

Since every bounded system is only ever relatively closed, it is under constant threat of spillage across its boundaries. This is true both of the staged spectacles of sovereignty and the hier-architecture of the disciplinary enclosure. The power of these apparatuses is both defined and limited by the way they structure the field of visibility, the kinds of surfaces caught in this regime of light, and the kinds of inscriptions left on these surfaces which make them signify in regimes of enunciation. Power, understood as a relation, always attempts to control the space between (e.g., between signs and things). To go beyond the enclosure, to control events outside the boundaries of the factory, prison, school, or barracks, or to control events in the interval between successive enclosures, a different social apparatus is required. Montage, by constituting an interval-space, and by relating all movements to this interval, produces a form of 'moving' image

that sees into the beyond, either the past or the future, to the side or elsewhere, and structures the expectation or anticipation of events to come. I have argued that the face close-up, or its equivalent (the sound-out-of-field or the flashback), does not structure the seen, nor delimit its meaning, but rather suggests ways one should live the scene. It structures the possible. This is the face of the otherwise other, a benevolent face with a distinctive 'cinema gaze' (i.e, distinct from the more *objective* "eye of the camera"). Inscribed by signs which are iconic, it tells tales which have not happened, which could happen, or which have happened in the past and could happen again.

CHAPTER 4

SPACES, FACES, AND THE MOVEMENT-IMAGE

The close-up has the effect of displacing quantitative and metred conceptions of space as it unsettles distinctions between near and far, close and distant, and large and small. At the same time, however, the close-up also opens up and mobilizes a space of qualitative transformations. As a movement-image the close-up defines a conjunctive interval between states of things, effects how they are lived on an affective plane, and determines the qualities of events. In this chapter I explore the relation between this affective/intensive interval and the spacing of events, how it effects what is seen or what goes on in the *mise-en-scène*, and how images transform space and shape fields of visibility. Here I show how the close-up produces a new kind of local site that acts as an inter-face and controls the flow.

Realist conceptions of space are strictly relative. The relativist position is that space only exists where it is constituted by matter (Shields, 1991: 49). Space (proximity/distance) is therefore defined by the empirical relation of objects in it. It is constituted by objects in their relative position *vis-à-vis* one another and cannot exist independently of the objects (positional points) which make it up.

Any conception of space that posits it as something independent of the objects involved reduces it to a “contentless abstraction.” Unobservable without its objects, it is presumed not to exist. The illusion of empty space is a problem solved by suppling a *framework* of positioned objects (or subjects) placed in proper spatial relations. From the realist perspective, space is a system of quantifiable coordinates (an ordering grid or plan) that puts everything in its place and is visible only as the product of these relative placements. The coordinate system is a trap for the look. Nothing can escape its centre of gravity (point of origin) and its axes which extend to infinity from this point.

In contrast to the relativist position, I argue that the face in close-up, or its equivalent, constitutes and occupies an interval-space characterized by absolute distance or difference (cf. Urry, 1995: 65). The face/close-up divides the stream of reflection into reflected and reflecting by the active micro-movements which ripple across its surface. I also suggest that, as a nomadic singularity, this polarized face does not inhabit, act or live in relative space, but rather constitutes ways in which space could be *lived* simultaneously as its expressed and its expression. As an equivocal singularity that simultaneously turns-toward-turning-away, its qualitative dimension transforms what could be seen, potentially, while

its power dimension supplies motivation to the scene. Unlike the mirror-image that passively reflects movements that are external to it, the face, as movement-image, acts on its own account. Neither copying, representing nor acting as a deputy of the visual scene, this benevolent gaze or primary montage element is a pure simulacrum, “transgressing spatial conventions of modes of figuration and representation” (Shields, 1991: 54). Following Lefebvre’s conceptions of the formal facets of *l’espace* (in Shields, 1991: 50-58), the ‘spacing’ of the interval is neither a mere abstraction nor is it empty. Nor should it be problematized simply for lacking ontological coordinates. And while the interval may be occupied, it is not a habitable space -- it is a world too hot for *solid figures* to form. The interval is a facet of space-as-lived and it will be argued that it is from this *locus* that forms of *spatialization* are produced.

The Cool Medium

Standing as the dividual⁷⁸ moment of reflection, the face *deforms* the movement of light. Instead of light diffusing or extending in all directions,

⁷⁸ That which is neither *individual* nor *divisible* without changing qualitatively (Deleuze). Every divisive cut will reveal an opening or space of possibilities between that which has been parted as moment between separation and unity.

encountering (illuminating) other images which respond to it immediately, it encounters a special *living-image* which redirects its motion. This living-image responds to the set of images which act on it *mediately*. The equivocal nature of the face means that, on the one side, a set of images act on it and it *reacts without extension* producing an *expression*. On the other side of the face, there is the set of images which are, in their turn, effected by this living-image and actualize its reaction by way of extension. Between received movement and its extension, executed movement, there is the facial-interval which receives movement on its receptive facet and expresses it on another. Without this interval (time-out) all images would act and react on all others in all their facets. When the face is *cut* into its facets it imposes a delay on motion, thus slowing down or *cooling off* the causal chain of events, of actions and reactions. This separation (gap) can be *enlarged* to such an extent that it becomes questionable whether an action at one point could even find an appropriate reaction (response) at a distance, or if it does, the distance between action and reaction might be too great to be apprehended by a singular perception or to be seen as a face-to-face encounter. It is in this interval of motion that actions and reactions are potentialized, and it is the cooling effect of the face/close-up that allows other kinds of images to form.

Since montage proceeds by relating shots to this active interval, all other forms of the movement-image are made relative to the face/interval which in turn acts as a *centre of indetermination or contingency*.

Spacing the Movement-Image

By slowing down the motion of images, two other kinds of images form in relation to the facets of the face. The receptive facet of the face is sufficient to constitute the difference between the objective set of images which diffuse in all directions and are virtually indistinguishable from the thing-in-itself, and that which is selectively registered or received by the face. The receptive facet of the face is both light-sensitive (impressionable) and subtractive. By virtue of the interval, the face has time to select aspects, allowing those external influences that are indifferent to pass, while other images are isolated and absorbed. It is the difference between the *objective set* and the facial expression that constitutes a *perception-image* (see Deleuze, 1991: 64). As Shields (1991: 57) argues:

[S]patialization is not just a matter of Realism's contingent arrangements of objects in space [nor the putative 'causal' powers granted the *mise-en-scène*], it includes *normative perceptions* . . . In spite of the veneer of empirical rationality (space is a void), people treat the spatial as charged with emotional content, mythical meanings, community symbolism, and historical significance (emphasis added).

What is retained or absorbed by the face is a partial, virtual action of that which is undergone. Light which diffuses from the objective set in all directions encounters a special *living-image* that retains a partial image of it, as the lines of (f)light which deterritorialize (leave) the scene are reterritorialized (inscribed) on its surface. It is the *relation* of the face (its subtractive facet) to an objective set (of images) that constitutes the perception-image as normative perception, since only a subset of the actions undergone (received excitations) are isolated by it. The perception-image is formed at the juncture of two processes of movement, i.e., deterritorialization and reterritorialization. The space between these movements, a *milieu* in the strict sense of the term, is thereby territorialized, or landscapified, in the sense that it becomes defined as *this kind* of lived-place with a particular set of expectations.

Žižek's contention that the subtraction or cutting-out of the close-up, *objet petit a*, leaves a hole, a *blot* or *stain*, in the landscape (1986: 109), misses the fact that what is cut out is also inserted into the flow.

While the process of cutting-out de-naturalizes (as well as de-individualizes and de-socializes) the close-up and makes it *wholly other*, it

Žižek's *Objet Petit a*

nevertheless stands in relation to the scene. From the point of view of the still, *objet a* is absent, and desire the empty place or void left by it (making it desirable). From the point of view of montage, however, the *otherness of this other* (the face-out-of-frame) continues to make its presence felt. It defines how the scene might be lived, and so supplies the milieu with a mood or affective ambiance. It is this *ensemble* of movement-images that constitutes a *place-image* -- a result of “over-simplification (i.e., reduction to one trait), stereotyping (amplification of one or more traits), and labelling (where a place is determined to be of a certain nature)” (Shields, 1991: 47).

In a parallel discussion of place-images, Urry argues that it is *others* that “give *atmosphere* to a place” (1995: 138) and supply the “anticipation” of place (1995: 132). But I would argue that it is only when the other is really otherwise in relation to the scene, rather than simply appearing as a *naturalized* element of the *mise-en-scène*, that it fulfills this barometric function. It is through a process of *becoming-other* that the face/close-up *tempers* spatialization and *qualifies* the milieu as an *imaginary-seen*. The close-up is a movement of deframing and re-framing *par excellence*. Anyone who has seen *The English Patient* will be made aware of the power of the close-up to qualify space. In a single insert, fingers

gently push a piece of fruit into an open mouth. A small detail in an otherwise ordinary scene is all the more striking in the way it fills the space of the silver screen. “Pornographic,” Baudrillard might say. It is, after all, an image isolated from the rest, cut from its moorings in the set, and set outside the everydayness of the scene. But in its inside-outsideness it also has the remarkable quality of tempering the scene as a whole, of producing and releasing an affective charge that exceeds its own boundaries. It spreads out and fills its surroundings with an ambient energy. A simple slice of life reverberates through the remainder. It unsettles the setting and its elements just as an unseen explosive charge ignited out-of-field might be expected to displace everything in the field of vision.

Relative to the face in the milieu, the objective set of images (which are *light* and which would go on diffusing endlessly) becomes qualitatively transformed into a *setting* for possible actions. Perception-images are characterized by the difference and relation between objective and subjective (subtractive) dimensions, that is, as a relation between the scene and how it is lived. They are produced by “large-scale” close-ups, that is, by a qualitative transformation formed by facializing the milieu. The cross-product of face and set is the landscapification of the scene, a form of qualitative fusion and a form of

qualified vision which gathers and releases potentials from the set, casting an otherwise undefined (or open-to-interpretation) topology or scene as a specific kind of place or scenario.

While the receptive facet of the face inscribes milieu with an ambiance and a sense of expectation, its expressive facet supplies motivational force. This motivational force, however, is only a tendency, or an, as yet, unrealized potentiality. It is suspended on the surface of this living-image as a motor-tendency. It is only when this image encounters another image that can enact or extend this expressed *potential* in a particular state of affairs, that an *action-image* is formed (see Deleuze, 1991: 65). In the film *Unforgiven* the following set of shots illustrates the summoning up of this potentiality without realizing it.

A long-shot of the town of Big Whiskey. ⌘ A shot of a room in the brothel. The camera pans the women who have gathered there, round their wounded colleague, Delilah. ⌘ Strawberry Alice (seated) talks to the women. ⌘ Reaction-shot inserts from the women. ⌘ Alice writes on the notepad in her lap . . .

More than simply conjuring a plan, they are summoning up and pooling their collective material and affective resources in response to the assault on their colleague. The pooling of the affect is produced in the following series:

. . . ⌘ A series of intensive looks (close-ups) are exchanged between Alice and each of the women in turn. ⌘ Then a shot of Alice turning towards . . . ⌘ a shot of the despoiled face of Delilah

⌘. . . then Alice as she turns and looks beyond.

This scene is marked by an intensive series of close-ups, a heterogeneous conjunction of singularities, producing a front of unicity, which express a potential -- a plan or scheme. Already, in its receptive facet, the face has absorbed what is given in the scene, and taken in or collected its motion, but that does not explain the look(s). A collective response is not forthcoming, at least not in the immediate sense. In turning away it anticipates a change or a response that will bring about change. The response is there, but it is suspended on its surface rather than acted out in the scene. It will need to reach some-body capable of act(ualiz)ing its ‘expressed’ (powers and qualities) in a particular manner. The look beyond is not addressed to anyone in particular. It simply escapes the scene/seen and diffuses in all directions.

When the expressive power emitted by the face reterritorializes on a body in space capable of *enacting* the tendency, the result is a territorialized performance. These territorial performances, “spatial practices,” or “place ballets” are particular enactments of spatialization which *articulate* the multitudinous possibilities of any given site (see Shields, 1991: 53). For example, and following from the previous scene in *Unforgiven*, the expression reaches an addressee across an indeterminable gap of space and time:

A long-shot of Munny's shack. ⌘ A series of shots of Munny and his children tending to domestic affairs and attempting awkwardly and unsuccessfully to cull the diseased hogs from the drove.

Munny's pastoral milieu has thrown him many challenges, including the loss of his spouse, the need to care for his children, poverty, and now the sickness of his animals. He struggles for survival against the forces of a hostile space. The powers and qualities of his former life have been held in suspense (a form of struggle with the past, with alcohol and a wayward, intemperate lifestyle). His mode of behaviour has been modified in response to the challenges thrown him. But the milieu and its forces are too strong. It takes all his strength just to parry them. His actions are slow and decrepit as a consequence. Cracked by the stress of opposing forces and his attempts to parry them, he is on the verge of breaking. The following introduces the notion of sound-framing the seen. Quite independent of its embodiment or its content (however impoverished), sound deterritorializes the scene, opens up a space of possibilities, and constitutes a new challenge.

⌘ The pastoral struggle is interrupted by sounds from out-of-field. Munny rises slowly, and turns to locate their source. ⌘ The sound is personified in the figure of the "Schofield Kid".

The Kid, a would-be gunfighter, relays Alice's summons, though the Kid's translation is somewhat deformed or impoverished -- an index of either the great distance the communique has traversed to reach its addressee or of his proclivity

for making up stories. In either case the summons is Munny's call to action (his calling or "calling out"), as the Kid tries to enlist him as a second (aide-de-camp) in righting the wrong done to Delilah. This is timely for Munny, for it is a break in his line of action, a possible opening that he desperately needs, but also another challenge. An opening (horizon of possibilities) has been prepared for him (to get a better life for his children), but it is his quandary whether to occupy this space or whether he is even capable of rising to the challenge.

⌘ Munny returns to his ongoing struggle with the milieu, only to fall again into the hog-wallow, then he slowly rises up, and looks.
 ⌘ A shot of what he sees, the Kid riding toward the horizon. ⌘ The camera pans in for a close-up of Munny looking toward the horizon and then slowly looking down.

The motion or motivation of the scene comes from the beyond and, insofar as it finds a body able to carry out its motor-tendencies, a regime of enunciation is formed. But *this* form of enunciation is embodied not so much in words or grammatical structures, but in bodily dispositions and gestures toward the world, that is, in habits or modes of behaviour. Action-images are reterritorializations of space-as-lived, a process which reduces the image to relative movements in a coordinated space -- the formation of a "practical paradigm" as Shields puts it, after Bourdieu (Shields, 1991: 63).

By virtue of the interval, such practical paradigms or executed actions are not directly linked to those undergone. Consequently, some unexpected response will appear on the other side of the interval. This response ('action' in the strict sense) will be the delayed reaction of the centre of contingency directed toward an end or result. Such actions are characterized by extension or release of the motor-tendencies (potentials) suspended on the face in a given setting. They are typically produced by "medium-scale" shots (mid-shots or action-shots), another form of qualitative transformation which I call *facialized-practices*. They are produced by the fusion of the close-up and the body. Like milieu, whole bodies can be facialized. They too have a *look*, an air, an appearance, and they emit a *manner* of signs.

The space between received and executed movement (perception- and action-images) is occupied by the *affection-image*. The affection-image is that which establishes the relation between milieu (the qualities/potentials of lived-space) and modes of behaviour (the enactment as spatial performance) by relating movements to a centre of contingency. The affection-image is that part of movement which is neither reflected nor acted, but *inflected*, that is, absorbed and expressed as a potential. It supplies the milieu with sense and bodies seen with

motivation. It is a mutation or deviation of movement that does not go anywhere, that ceases to be acted in order to become the *expressed*. Massumi (1996: 222) equates the affect-image with “passion” or “intensity” in order to distinguish it from both the passivity of emotion (that which is already “owned” or embodied as a “recognized intensity”) and the activity which actualizes the intensity in a place or space. This chimera occupies the interval of the movement-image, spacing points of contact, mixture or intermingling and carrying out the metamorphosis of received and executed movements. It is where suspense (the anticipation, the potential, and the possible) is suspended.

Table 2 illustrates how the whole of movement is *cut* into three shots and assembled to produce a reconstituted image of the whole -- a movement-image.

Table 2: The Movement-Image

Received Movement Objective Scene (deterritorialization)	Affection-Image (Faciality) Centre of Contingency		Executed Movement Motor Activity (reterritorialization)
	<i>tournement</i> - Receptive Quality Mobilized Reception (reterritorialization)	<i>détournement</i> Expressive Power Motor Tendency (deterritorialization)	
Perception-Image Setting or Situation		Action-Image Mode of Behaviour	

Movement as a whole, or the line of f(l)ight, in this composition is established by two processes. One, the process of deterritorialization, transforms the movement of the scene/seen into an expression or pure quality. The other, the process of reterritorialization, transforms the virtual potential or tendency into a motivating action or executed movement. By means of the interval, movement is both forestalled and anticipated. The interval, as affective insert, both divides up the movement-image *and* establishes relations across the gap thus formed -- the *lateral insertion* that separates perception-images and action-images also ties them together. But this 'leap' across the gap, from situations to responses, is only possible because the cut or "bar" which separates the sides is also "inherently two-sided," as defined in Chevalier's (1990: 42) *scheme analysis*. In cinema, the primary cut is the close-up since it brings *affective forces* (qualities/powers) into play. By attending to these forces of difference which move about the cinematic plane, I am suspending those forms of textual analysis that concentrate on the narrative. Narrative attention focuses precisely on those processes that "overrule" the affective forces (Chevalier, 1990: 42), that is, those analogical coding processes of *external* resemblance or likeness (1990: 74) that legislate one

relationship by means of another.⁷⁹ Analogy knows the middle ground only as empty space.

Between movements received and executed, an image of time (a delay or time-out) is formed, but this image of time is not *something added* to movement (e.g., by the narrative). Time is already immanent in motion -- there is no need to add something when it is already there. Instead, montage bears on the movement-image in order to release an image of time from it. It is a matter of extracting time from movement in order to develop its qualities and powers, and then inserting it into the flow where it will serve to *measure, evaluate or adjudicate* the differences *in motion* (i.e., movements undergone and undertaken).

Facing the Interval

Let us turn to the details of the human face in close-up. Its qualities are the root of the technical notion of “faciality.” The face comprises two facets; one isolates qualities and therefore qualifies the scene, the other expresses power and potentializes the scene. The face/close-up is not, however, an element residing in the scene, but is rather that which is cut-out (set aside, sublated, *subtracted*, and

⁷⁹ See also Foucault’s discussion of the apparatus of the “chain-gang” as a relatively brief historical experiment in analogical sign-machines.

ex-communicated) from the scene as a deviation from the normal, linear or planned flows. The place left by this excluded other is not simply a blank or empty space (the emptiness of desire), nor does it signify repression or the presence of latent or lost values. This excluded otherness continues to exert its *all-to-visible* effects from beyond the frame, stage, set or setting (cf. Baudrillard 1987: 21-22 on the close-up and the elimination of stage-distance).

Because the face is also inserted into the flow of the movement-image, it divides up motion into mobile-sections (shots) and forms lines of communication and relations between that which has been divided. As an obstacle in the path of light, it *curbs* the flood of impressions by holding back (reflecting) certain qualities while allowing others to pass or pass on unattended. And, just as any point outside a line (a beyond, between two points) marks a point of deviation from linearity, the face/close-up will introduce *curves* and distortions in linear movements (orderly or normal distributions). It seduces things from their normal course, though in a smooth, continuous fashion. Deviations, and *turning points*, presuppose the presence of such outlying values, and the face/close-up is typically employed to stake out critical turning points, sudden changes, recurrences or intensifications. The resulting curvatures define trajectories of movement through

and around the interval. Taken as a whole, i.e., in relation to the images that form on its sides or round it, the face governs movements of qualitative change by occupying the threshold and extending its dimensions. As the interval of the movement-image, the face is pathetic and therefore both moving and moved. It gathers *imperceptible qualities* that *qualify* what comes before and *motivates* what comes next -- though the actual enactment of this quality/power requires a *facial equivalent* (a setting, landscape, action, gesture, mode of behaviour, speech-act, etc.) that will serve as a vehicle to embody it and give it expression in the scene.

The face in close up is evaluative. It attends to situations and actions and captures the attention long enough to take account and consider certain aspects, to recognize or appreciate certain qualities and characteristics. It appraises, estimates, assigns values, forms the basis of opinion as well as judgments of difference and distance. The face is also the promise of things to come or to return since its imaginings can be 'thrown forward' or extended into the future and assimilated by subjects in concrete situations. These pure values can be said to subsist, but only in the interval or on the margins, that is, as values independent of particular situations (locales) where they are actualized (embodied or enacted). Brightness, for example, is not the same as a particular sensation, nor is

decisiveness the same as a particular form of action which expresses it or calls it into being. Yet these itinerant qualities can be *signified* in any number of discrete ways to define a milieu or motivate a state of affairs. They can take on many forms of being (*esses*) and can *assign* many places, but they are never exhausted by so being. These nomadic singularities are not, however, the sliding signifiers identified by some post-modernists. Rather, it is the moving-image of the face that constitutes the imaginability which forms the basis of semiotic processes and the pure qualities and potentialities of semiosis. The face captures and emits many signifying signs, but as the *qualitative tribunal* it always occupies the openings, gaps, and intervals between the order-words of *la langue*.

If cinema constitutes a social apparatus of control, it is not because it simulates spectatorship, forging an identity between the audience and movements of the camera (cf. Benjamin, 1968, Baudrillard, 1983). Movements of the camera can be continuous; as in the tracking-shot where the camera is mounted on an ambulatory apparatus and follows the movement of bodies or circulates in a situation or among the characters. They can be discontinuous; as in the jump-cut which indicates a movement (process of change) has taken place. Or when the camera can remain fixed; leaving motion attached to the bodies of the figures it

frames (thus mimicking *real* motion; see Virilio, 1995: 69). What cinema has invented by means of montage is a way to release *potentialities of motion* from the movement-image, to isolate what is moving and motivating and to deploy it strategically.

The face is the basis of montage because it moves without going anywhere. It is an aspect of motion that is neither conditioned by nor derived from the scene - the face in close up is a radical alterity occupying the deterritorialized *any-place* of the interval. To control the interval is to control the process of movement, for if to move means to change then it is necessary to go beyond the limits or horizons of the enclosure. The possibility of being outside makes qualitative transformation possible. If cinema is a truly mobile apparatus it is not because it produces images of motion, or because it mobilizes the camera, but because it relates motion to the interval of motion. In so doing, however, a way to control the openings, gaps, thresholds and points of transformation has been invented - a process Baudrillard calls *social control by anticipation* (1983: 111). What is important to show is how these nomadic singularities have been appropriated and the ways in which these potentialities are structured, made use of, and put to work qualifying scenes and motivating events to take place there.

Facialization: Modes of Expression and Recognition

In summary, there are three distinct modes of recognition/expression which relate to the face/close-up. These include: 1) perception-images; the recognition of a quality in perception, 2) affection-images; the recognition of common or generic qualities and powers in affection and, 3) action-images; the recognition of powers by a body capable of embodying/conveying them. For example, in a given perceptual situation someone might react by subtracting a quality from it and at the same time identify him/herself as a generic subject living an affection presumably shared by others (the qualitative tribunal). Extensions of this affective ambiance might take the form of an opinion (a *body of words* to prolong or extend the affection less it disperse into air). Conflict might take the form of a *difference of opinion* between rival affective groups each motivated by its own distinctive ambiance or way of living the situation. Consequently, the differential actualization of powers and qualities in particular settings constitutes a force-relation, a duel of forces, or in Baudrillard's terms, a *referendum* (1983: 101). No matter how personal and subjective the opinion appears, it expresses a will to

majority, a taste for unanimity and therefore aims to be the prevailing (public) view, that is, to dominate the fields of visibility and enunciation.

In any event, opinions are modes of enactment or embodiment which extend the powers of the ambient situation as forces in concrete situations. And yet, since these expressions are *one-sided accents*, opinions are always open to dispute, either on the basis of the quality extracted or the qualities/powers of the subject advancing them (their credibility, expertise, ability to persuade, etc.). While the certainty of opinion cannot be guaranteed (primarily because they presuppose the possibility of other qualities and powers and therefore other opinions) its *truth-value* can be. The guarantor of opinion is the affective group presupposed by its expression. Similarly, a difference of opinion is a function of the heterodox rival groups with different perceptive-affective modes of recognition and expression. These practical modes of recognition/expression serve not only as a means of identifying the group one belongs to, but also of distinguishing members of rival groups. But the real triumph of opinion comes when the extracted quality ceases to be simply the condition of an affective tribunal's constitution, and becomes instead the ambiance that one must absorb, the *airs* that one must put on, and the mode of expression, *emblems* (see Ferguson,

1992: 37) or labels one must acquire to be recognized for membership in the *imaginary community*. What I will be proposing through this discussion of group processes is that whole communities can be facified.

CHAPTER 5

SOCIABILITY OF THE FACE AND THE ACTION-IMAGE

I have argued that the dimensionality of the close-up is neither small nor large. Its importance lies beyond conventions of these relative dimensions. The close-up does not simply magnify the details of an interiority, nor does it simply define a fragment cut from its milieu -- the fetishism of the close-up begins and ends with the contemplation of the finished work of art, with the practico-inert object situated in a fixed frame of reference. I suggest that the significance of the close-up lies somewhere between the small and the large, between the inside and its exterior, in the margin between these polarities or states of being. The faciality of the close-up defines a space of transformation. The face/close-up is an interval of movement inserted between the scenes. It is the primary element of cinema because it controls the flow of movement between the here and there, the before and the after. Movement is, after all, transitory and nomadic. It is a process of change and transformation and is always between states of being. Movement can be understood only in passing, in the transition from quantity to quality and vice versa.

In this chapter, I take up the problem of image transformation, how the qualitative changes induced by the interval are released into circulation, how they form circuits with other images, and produce assemblages of motion or montage formations. This discussion relates the movement image to the production of Piercean indices and concludes with an analysis of the action film and some of its classic exemplars. Specifically, what is of interest here are the ways in which images are brought into relation through and by means of this interval space. The images of cinema are not simply isolated fragments or scattered bits that wait to be collected and assembled by external agencies; they are already collective assemblages of vision and enunciation. I argue that we don't move and arrange them, they move and arrange us. They are not images of the self, nor do they simply reflect one back. They are not simply images of object-others which are kept at a safe distance by the impermeable frame.

Cinematic images are media in the literal sense. They mediate between the poles of self and the empirical other, subjective and the objective, internal and external, and the imaginary and real. A medium cannot be the sum of the terms it mediates, or a means of their identity. The medium is external to, that is, different from, the parts it mediates. It makes a difference and at the same time determines

the relation among the parts. It is also not a thing. Anyone who has tried to grasp and hold a cinematic image (or possess a relationship, such as a power relation) can tell you that. This medium has no objectivity outside of the relations it mediates. But it is nevertheless external to the parts because it is internal to their relation. The images of cinema are movement-images. They constitute relations. Cinema does not divide without relating what has been divided and mobilizing these divisions. This is why it is erroneous to treat these images as inert objects of contemplation or reflection. Outside the relations they mediate and the apparatus that mobilizes them they simply melt into air. These movement-images only appear in circulation and in the circuits they form with other images.

Facing the Situation

Between the situation, its forces, and the kinds of responses formed in relation to it, there are faces. Places and situations, in and of themselves, do not define the kind of behaviour which might take place there. Every act of framing space defines not only a *mise-en-scène*, but also opens to a potentially larger, unseen (virtual) set: every set is a subset of a larger set which encompasses it. All sets are in virtual communication with their horizon. To define a situation as

containing a specific sense or sensibility, it is therefore necessary to define or delimit its horizon of possibilities. This is where the face comes into play. In normal perception the face may only be a subset contained by a larger set and is typically positioned or situated within the coordinates of a given, partitioned (coordinated) field of visibility. In cinematic perception this relation is reversed as normal spatial perceptions are suspended.

Perceptions become *perception-images* when the field of visibility is opened to its virtual milieu beyond the dimensions of the frame. This *supplement* to the field of visibility is not so much seen as it is sensed and anticipated, in the same way that we sense a depth to the world or anticipate things having other sides, that is, other than what we see at the moment. One could say that this supplemental dimension is perceived without being seen and therefore possesses a mode of presence. It is an unseen mode of presence (rather than absence) that coexists with the visibility and (f)actuality of the seen. Deleuze and Guattari (1987: 492-3) define this supplement as *haptic* rather than optical. Distinct from visual perception, haptic (a)perception is not characterized by quantifiable dimensions, but rather by the sense of qualitative change it discloses, the potentials it contains, and the virtual transformations it directs.

The space beyond the frame, the space out-of-field, is the space of qualitative change. It is not identical with the eye of the camera or what *it* sees. No matter how quick or deliberate the camera's movements are or how wide its angle of vision, it cannot capture it. This space escapes its field of visibility and its visual perception. It is a montage-space, a movement and transformation space. The out-of-field keeps the scene from imploding in on itself and becoming pornographic or (en)closed: it prevents the *scene* from being identical to the *seen*, and keeps open the possibilities and lines of f(l)ight. The out-of-field defines an excess of vision and an excess of seeing, but it is not the same excess that Baudrillard has in mind (nor is simply the alien, technical distance Williams [1989: 15] imagines). It is a space of potentials, a potent space, and an open space. It is the space of the face, in close-up, which escapes the enclosure and its coordination with its visual scene. Like a local site that has been radically displaced (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 494) the face ceases to be identified by its location in the coordinate system of the visible.

In Chapter 4, it was argued that, occupying this deterritorialized *any-place* on the horizon of the field of visibility, the face (as a radical alterity) gathers and

expresses⁸⁰ something beyond that which is given in the interiority of the *mise-en-scène* (i.e., pure qualities and potentials). By exceeding the limits of spatial coordination and instead of settling into a landscape, whole landscapes are facified, that is, infused with quality-powers that come from beyond the perceived domain or delimited territory. The face, therefore, is not defined by the field of visibility it inhabits, but rather by the way it modifies the field of perception. The face *out-of-field* (out of frame) surrounds visibility and fills it with sense and possibilities. As Deleuze and Guattari suggest, without these surroundings and the encompassment of virtual space, there would be no possibility of a global situation (1990: 494). The global situation is not simply given, nor is it a ready-made territorial domain contained within fences, walls, or borders. It is constituted by a continual process of controlling and incorporating the virtual domain, that is by reterritorializing the virtual as *local movements*.⁸¹

⁸⁰ An excellent example of this 'respiration-action' is supplied by the character 'Johnny' in Dmytryk's classic western *Warlock*.

⁸¹ Local is usually taken to mean a space or place (a partial-object) within a larger, limited, and ready-made whole or *global scene* (a subset of the homogenized global village in McLuhan's terms). This is a relative definition of locality. In contrast, I use the term to connote the Deleuzian sense of deterritorialization, that is, an *absolute locality*. To say that there is no *local* culture left (as in Jameson) is to presume a closed-system (itself a poorly framed notion). In this latter sense there are local cultures everywhere. The question is which one will come to occupy and dominate or control the out-of-field, the horizon of possibilities, and structure our possibilities and our cultural imaginary.

The face, as cut-out, qualifies the scene by selecting or extracting pure qualities from it. Via its insertion in the flow, these virtual affections infect the boundaries of the *objective mise-en-scène* or the scene-as-optical-perception and fill it with an affective ambiance of that anybody *qualified to see* and capable of qualifying the seen. It is by means of montage (cutting-out and inserting, selecting and assembling) that the formally fixed, naturally perceived boundaries between adjacent or successive shots are traversed or moved through. The presumed *objective* landscape shot and the subjective (selective) face/close-up are not linked by a leap over the wall (cf. Barthes, 1973) or by a cognitive association. The actions of montage cause the infection of inside and outside such that what, in normal perception, would be inside and dependent becomes autonomous and independent -- a variable permeating the objective scene. Separated from its point of anchorage in the visual field, the deterritorialized face breaks all ties and dependencies with the seen/scene to become-other, to haunt the seen, and to effect its qualitative transformation.

The power of the face out-of-field to affect the scene closely parallels both the role of sound out-of-field and the flashback. Sound, for example is most affective when its origin or source is not seen. The sound of traffic or sirens

emanating from beyond the frame can invoke the feeling of a larger urban setting, effectively displacing, qualifying, or reterritorializing the scene. Similarly, the sound-off of a heart beat can even potentialize and mobilize a field of corpses (as in the opening shot of Hertzog's sonorous remake of Murnau's silent film *Nosferatu* -- Murnau used shadows to create the sound-off effect). The out-of-field has transformative powers over the visual field. By occupying the out-of-field the scene extends beyond what is given and provokes a mood of anticipation without the necessity of this virtual aspect having to be located anywhere. The haunting musical score in *Jaws* is exemplary in the virtual qualification of the visual scene. It extends the horizon of the scene and fills it with a sense of expectation, unsettling the parameters of the given with what could be or what could come next (i.e., what is beyond the frame). In the out-of-field, the virtual sound-image has the power both to constitute and fill the space of the actual image by extending the horizon of the actual framed scene with a virtual, unseen set (background and foreground thus enter into relations which displace their normal coordination, role, and function -- they intermingle in various ways). The sound-out-of-field is typically deployed as a means of linking one actual scene to another actual scene. In which case, the virtual out-of-field establishes a motor connection

between separate shots or between one state and another transformed state. But sound can fill the scene with potential qualitative transformations and express this potential without the necessity of either indicating or referring to any actual state of affairs. Sound possesses this power to anticipate a change of state (e.g., a shark attack) quite independent of whether this potential is actualized in subsequent scenes or not -- an actual shark attack may not be forthcoming.⁸² It induces its effects because it defers (sometimes indefinitely) the ties that bind it to its origin, its referent, or its source.

Like the sound-off, flashbacks are attempts to concentrate the power of the virtual in the scene. The conventional flashback usually carries with it signs which distinguish it from an actual perception and *warn of its coming*, for example, changing from colour to black-and-white, distorting (clouding) the boundaries of its frame, by adding a dissolve-link or dissolve-fade, or prefiguring the flashback to come by inserting a close-up of a face in REM-sleep as in Weir's (1993) film *Fearless*.

Wilder's *Seven Year Itch* (1955) is exemplary in its deployment of the flashback-insert. In this case the flashback returns from beyond to haunt the

⁸² As Eco argues, sometimes we enjoy the way our expectations are thwarted (1985: 171).

scene, to reterritorialize it, and to combat the unsettling effect of another strange presence -- the iconic character played by Monroe. Wilder's flashbacks are either audio or visual images which, though on holiday from the scene,

return occasionally to haunt the set, to define or redefine its situation, and affirm its normal (i.e., civilized) manners and habits. In this film, the flashback is capable of traversing great distances in an instant to reinstate a threatened order.

Comprising either sonorous or visual images, the out-of-field or the virtual space beyond/between the frame exerts a power of qualitative transformation over the *mise-en-scène*. These qualitative transformations express *virtual changes* in the image as a whole (the whole is not defined by the frame. It is an ensemble of virtual and actual elements). These virtual changes are different from the quantitative and relative changes of position which occur between or among elements of the set, as they move about and exchange positions within the space or framework of the *mise-en-scène*. While the close-up also involves a change of dimension, this change is not quantitative. It is not a matter of reducing or enlarging the set. Beyond quantity, and the conventions of small and large, the overall effect of the close-up is an absolute change of dimension. The face in close-up is not simply a part of the set, it is an opening that communicates with the

virtual unseen whole beyond it. It establishes lines of communication between the inside and outside, or between what is and what could be. The face is therefore an interface. On the one hand, the face is turned toward the interior, where it takes in what is given in the scene and qualifies it. On the other hand, it turns toward the outside and expresses potentials for change and becoming. These movements of transformation are only virtual, and sometimes even so small as to be imperceptible (as in the movements of Eisenstein's clock-face).

While the face expresses potential changes, these tendencies are *intensive* and affective expressions suspended on its motor surface. As Deleuze argues, its "power-quality must not be confused with the state of things . . . brightness is not the same as a particular sensation, nor is decisiveness the same as a particular action . . . a colour like red, a value like brightness, a power like decisiveness, a quality like hardness or tenderness are primary positive possibilities which refer only to themselves" (Deleuze, 1991: 105) and cannot be dissociated from the movements which express them. At the same time, "the affect is impersonal and is distinct from every individuated state of things" (Deleuze, 1991: 98). A virtuality like decisiveness is a mixture and intermingling of all possible decisions to act and is therefore distinct from a specific action taken individually. Deleuze

suggests that the affect is singular and unique. Their qualities and intensities make the difference. Qualities make one body or experience different from another, and make one experience in-exchangeable for any other. Qualities may inhere in bodies, but they do not belong to them. At every moment of embodiment (actualization) in individual things qualities undergo a qualitative transformation and become this kind of decision, this kind of hardness, this kind of thing with this kind of utility. Therefore, we need to differentiate the anticipation of what comes next from its realization in a particular state of things. It is external and indifferent to all its specific differentiations. There is, for example, a moment of anticipation that surrounds the secret ritual of gift-giving, one which is different from movements which realize that secret, that is, when you are either satisfied because you got what you expected, are disappointed by the result, or are amused by the way your anticipations have been thwarted (when you are tricked with the empty box in the empty gesture).

Corresponding to Peirce's notion of Firstness and its iconic signs (introduced in Chapter 4), a value or quality like decisiveness is what it is -- regardless of anything else. It is a pure possibility that has not yet come into relation with anything else. It is a capacity or potential not actualized in any

relation while defining the qualities of relations to come. Each qualitative *expressed* is removed from its normal habitat and usual contexts, that is, from every particular form of its embodiment or placement. The face/close-up is an intensive potency occupying the any-place out-of-field. It is a line of flight or escape from enclosure that opens up a field of possibilities beyond what is visibly present or by *what is given in the scene*. By creating openings and gaps in the enclosure, the face structures the field of possible actions and responses, while nevertheless remaining distinct from any specific form of action or mode of response.

The sociological importance of the face lies in its power to condition perceptions by incorporating the power of the out-of-field, that is, to incorporate the perceptions of another in the perceptual field. Facifying a situation inserts this other element into it, and defines a way of living it which is anticipatory. It is an anticipatory moment or an anticipatory event, whose qualities and power have yet to be realized, and so maintain their difference and externality to any particular mode of enactment, embodiment, or realization. The value of the seen is not so much defined by what it is or what it means, nor by what it will become, but by this mo(ve)ment of becoming, by what could be called its change-value. This

anticipatory moment is fleeting and only perceptible in passing. It is not before, nor is it after. It is here, in this moment, where all the different and individual perceptions of place and space, with all their various interpretations and responses, coalesce and, as it were, gather together in the otherness of this undifferentiated singularity and its power to make a difference. This space of transformation is a *common place and interface* that draws together all separate and individual perceptions in a process of othering. It is the common element in the field of perception. The perception-images of cinema and experiences of them are not simply individual and partial, they are simultaneously collective perceptions. Our subjective seeing is mixed with a foreseeing which is no one's possession or property because it can't be contained in any frame nor associated with any individual frame of reference. This conjunction of the one and other, of inside and outside, is a form of sociability inherent to cinema. It defines the specificity of the sociable moment.

This image of sociability has a close parallel with Maffesoli's notion of "unicity." Maffesoli defines unicity as "whatever brings various elements into coherence, while at the same time leaving them in their specific qualities, and maintaining their oppositions" (1993: 8). However, it should be noted that the

autonomy and externality of the sociable moment as I define it, does not mean that it should be granted logical or historical priority over the elements which actualize it in various ways. I disagree with Maffesoli's functional claim of granting "priority to the global structure over the various elements that compose it" (1993: 8) or any other teleological vision or socio-fiction which assumes a whole before its parts. In my view, the whole is contemporaneous with the parts and is formed in the moment of their active relation -- a relation is always external to its terms but has no existence apart from that relation. Furthermore, as has been suggested above, the global cannot be formed prior to and without recourse to locality. Let me reiterate the key point: the whole is formed by the interval in relation to its polarities or sides. Outside this relation there is no interval, only inert fragments or objects of contemplation. This conjunction is a form of sociability.

Faciality and the Action-Image: From One to Two

Faciality and its affections correspond with Peirce's (1955) notion of firstness. The face/close-up is a nomadic singularity expressing pure powers and qualities (deterritorialized potentialities) which are what they are independent of anything else -- they are suspended on its surface. The signs of firstness are *icons*.

According to Peirce, a possibility alone is an icon purely by virtue of its quality (1955:105) and qualities are what they are independent of anything else (1955: 101-102). An icon is a kind of sign which has as its object a qualitative character. Like all signs, the icon requires a body. But in the case of the icon, its body is an image, a nomadic movement-image. The icon is a kind of sign produced (expressed) by the face/close-up.

For example, as I have argued, a terrified countenance is not just a reflection of a thing or a place. The thing or place does not explain the expression, nor does the expression passively reflect an image of it (as a mirror would). It is not the case that we look at the terrified face and see the precise image of what has terrorized it. If the thing were not given or not seen (something out-of-field), there would be no way to identify it based solely on the expression of terror it produces. The face is not a mirror of the world, nor is it a fragment of one: it is an interface. Its expressions are external to and independent of what is expressed. It has an active side and an autonomy that is lacking in the passive mirror-image.

If things are what they are, and if we can only distinguish one thing from another because of their qualities, then the process of qualification becomes very

important for our understanding of things generally. The problem is that things (also places, spaces, actions, and events) do not have qualities by nature. It was the presumption of natural-qualities that lead materialism and political economy to posit an inert object of contemplation, to conclude that substantiality and subjective activity were parted and therefore partial, and to reduce knowledge to fetishistic reflections.

The chief defect of all hitherto existing materialism . . . is that the thing, reality, sensuousness, is conceived of only in the form of an object or of contemplation, but not as human sensuous activity, practice, not subjectively. Hence it happened that the active side, in contradistinction to materialism, was developed by idealism -- but only abstractly, since, of course, idealism does not know real, sensuous activity as such (Marx, 1978: 143).

This is Marx's contribution to the sociology of knowledge: Marx's active materialism is based on the proposition that qualities (values) are properties of relations rather than things (even social relations between things express value).

Hegel was first in asserting the basic principles of the new method:

"everything depends on grasping and expressing the ultimate truth not only as Substance but as Subject as well" (1967:80), and that the void between substances (objects, things, reality as such) and the subject was, in principle, the space of movement -- though not simply a negative movement of thought (doubt or the unhappy consciousness) which renders only partialities and incomplete beings

(see Hegel 1967:97). For Hegel the productive interval was the work of Reason objectifying itself in the world and its becoming conscious of itself through working up a world as the objective form of its own (subjective) activity -- the historical project of forging an identity. For Marx, the productive interval was Labour (human sensuous activity) which becomes conscious of itself, as subjective activity, through the process of changing matter and changing the world. What had been hitherto parted and partitioned into separate spheres or poles (i.e., subject and object, mind and matter) were becoming associated (matter was becoming more mindful, and mind more material) through the interval and the dynamic, relational forces (Reason or Labour) which moved there. If we take this method of analysis (rather than its resulting forms) and apply it to cinema, the role of the interval is clear. It is neither the economy of Reason nor Work which occupies the interval of movement in cinema. It is faciality.

Because it qualifies, faciality makes a difference: it differentiates. The face close-up or its equivalent expresses qualities and therefore produces things as events and as eventualities. What we see by means of faciality is not the inert reflection of the thing, but an image of the terrifying-thing or the terrifying-event - its metamorphic form. Even if the thing-event itself is not given in the visual

field we still have an image of it in its faciality. When the thing does come into the field of vision it will be different in kind from what it would be in isolation -- the expression directs us to *see* it differently.

When I suggest that the signs of faciality are icons, media-icons, I differentiate them from clan- or class-totems. Totems, in the Durkheimian sense, are normal, everyday (profane) objects or things that have been set aside (abstracted) from their everydayness (Durkheim, 1915). As such they are sacred signs (food only for the gods), images of solidarity, and collective representations of a fundamental commonality or oneness. In Levi-Strauss (1969) they serve both as a means of identity and of difference, they become analogical signs of the partition between groups of ones and form the basis of intergroup relations (e.g., We are to others as wolves are to sheep). This latter assessment is taken up again in Bourdieu's notion of the cultural commodity. These signs are markers of class distinctions, or they are the habitus-signs which serve as a means of partitioning *the ways or know-how* of one group from another. In all these cases, signs serve as boundary ma(r)kers, as a means of mapping out a singular territory or domain, for distinguishing the one, and for differentiating the other. These signs are not like (Baudrillard's) simulacra. They have grown roots, are firmly planted, and

affirm the placement of things in the order of things. Like figures on the landscape, they mark out no-go zones in an partialized and partitioned terrestrial domain. These sign-fixtures are stabilizing structures (structuring-structures as Bourdieu prefers to call them) whose function is to naturalize the boundary and arrest movements which go between and beyond. As walls rather than doors, they don't address the problem of the interval space and the flows that pass there. The icon, as a concept, is much more fluid and dynamic than the totem. It is also difficult to grasp and hold as a consequence. The icon, like the face whose likeness it represents, is always passing through and allowing things to pass. It is a sign of the threshold, a sign of transformation, and a sign that things are changing.

The affect, by itself, is not a force. It is a pure potentiality. It only becomes force in the encounter with that which resists it. It becomes bodily in and through resistance. Force is a relation of difference and cannot be conceived outside the relation of one body acting upon another. Affects become real or realized in the encounter with something else, just as any actual sensation (emotion) is the expression or reaction of a body to something external to it. This gives credence to the claim that affects are both external and (potentially) moving. Yet the

actions which realize the affections do not simply embody them, but rather are bodily forms of resistance and reactions to them. Furthermore, every specific realization of the affect is a qualitative change and therefore an expression of this process of differentiation. There is no relation of resemblance or similarity between the affect and the particular subjective reactions it evokes.

Massumi (1996), for example, has documented both the primacy of the affect in image reception, and the fact that an image's content and its intensity do not correspond in any conventional or straightforward manner. In a German study of responses to a short film, children were asked to rate the content of its scenes on a scale of happy-sad, and the intensity of its scene on a scale of pleasant-unpleasant. Much to the surprise of researchers, "sad scenes were rated the most pleasant, the sadder the better" (Massumi, 1996: 218). These findings suggest that the intensity of the image is experienced differently from its cognitive content and that "emotion and the affect follow different logics and pertain to different orders" (Massumi 1996: 221). On one plane we have, what Deleuze and Guattari (1987) call, the *form of content*, on the other, the *form of expression*, that is, an extensive, emotional content on one side, and an in-tensive, affective expression on

the other. These two planes are different *tenses* (or tensors) that coexist and constitute the *tension* of the filmic experience.

Situations and the expressions or actions which realize them are different as opposed forces, in the same way that the terrified countenance bears no relation of likeness or similarity, internally or externally to the content of the experience it undergoes. This difference is especially pronounced when the image of content *only* appears in and through the affections which resonate on the surface of a body/face, that is when the actual content of the expression is not seen or experienced as such. The process of sociating content and expression, seeing and saying, or situation and reaction produces an event. It is the interval of faciality which draws these parallel lines of force together, to the point where they meet, where the tensors of the before and the after cross in the tension of the moment. Situations (contents) and actions (expressions) do not simply come together to form a unity. Rather, they reach a point where the force of the situation is transformed into the reaction of action which, in its turn, modifies that situation. As for the final convergence (of the seeing and the saying), much like a vanishing point of perspective, this point can forever be forestalled to a point in the distance. The point of unity (identity) between a situation and an action is the point of

absolute confinement or complete enclosure, where all possible lines of flight, means of resistance, and opposition have been eliminated. This is the moment of complete subordination or servitude and the moment when power ceases -- a moment of consensus or of death. Prior to these end-points there is an interval between situations and actions. The interval is faciality. The montage of the action-image requires faciality as a moment of reflection between situations and actions, between the seeing and the saying, between the content of experience and its expression. The action-image is a relation between forces, or the effect of one body on the actions of another. The signs of these relations and confrontations are indices.

Indices possess three characteristics: (1) they have no significant resemblance to their object; (2) they refer to singularities, singular events, single units, single collections of units, or single continua, and; (3) they direct the attention to their objects by blind compulsion (Peirce, 1955: 108). According to Peirce, an index is a sign of a material relation which is at the same time 'imaginary.'⁸³ It is an imaginary relation because an association is established before an actual experience either confirms or denies it. "A tremendous

⁸³ In Pierce's semiology, images, and the relations between them, produce signs.

thunderclap [i.e., anything startling which induces a change of state or reaction] indicates that *something considerable happened* though we may not know what the event was . . . [though] it may be expected to connect itself with some other experience” (Peirce, 1955: 109). In this case, one could say that the action or reaction is an index of a situation which has changed, and that this changed situation is apprehended before it is perceived and grasped before it is understood. The reaction itself marks the juncture of two experiences, the before and the after, and serves as an index of this change. A change in behaviour, sudden movement, change in appearance or expression (a *habit-change* in the Piercean sense), or change in the direction of movement, no matter how slight, or infinitesimal, is indicative of a changed situation or of the *difference* between one situation and another in terms of their qualities/powers. But the action of indices is even more complex than this. In all cases, the index (as the relation of two) is an action of one body on the possible actions of another. Insofar as the action of shouting “Look Out!” effects a change in another’s behaviour by forcing them to attend to their situation differently, then it is an index. Similarly, the change in an interlocutor’s expression which causes us to turn round and attend to what s/he sees is also an index. An index is the mode of expression of a material (though

non-cognitive) link between a situation and a response. Indices appear whenever the power/qualities of the affect is placed in relation with something else, that is, when it divides into different, opposing moments or forces. An index is a kind of sign generated in force-relations, that is, when a change in behaviour is directed by the action of another force and only makes sense in relation to the force which induced that response. As Pierce states: "The index is physically connected with its object; they make an organic pair, but the interpreting mind has nothing to do with this connection, except remarking it, after it is established . . . Every physical force reacts between pairs of particles, either of which may serve as an index of the other (1955: 114).

Actualizations of the affect in a determinate space and time, that is, the varied manners of facifying the interval between space and action, correspond with Peirce's notion of *secondness*. Secondness is a force-relation which takes place between two. It is a modification and specification of potentialities. I say that secondness is a force because, following Foucault, a force is what it is only by virtue of its relation to something else. Force is dependent on other forces for its mode of being. Unlike the singular quality of decisiveness, every *decision* presupposes another which would oppose it, confront it, contradict it, resist it, and

so forth. If we relay this image of secondness to cinema we arrive at Deleuze's conception of the action-image. Like the perception-image, an action-image is a relation of virtual and actual elements. It comprises modes of behaviour relative to a field of possibilities.

While the affect is primary and first, it is only a pure quality/potential and is therefore independent of anything else: it is singular. The affect relates to actual movements as a specific transformation of the capacity for a body to move or be moved. Yet, by itself, the affect is an undirected potentiality in an open field of possibilities. The affect is therefore a quality of movement which is different from movements which are directed to particular aims or which follow determined paths. Directed, oriented movements, that is movements which go from one point to another, are never singular or by themselves. Directed movements presuppose the existence of another body which attracts or repels, just as a falling body presupposes the attractive pull of another (gravity as a force-relation of bodies). Actions require a second. Therefore, action is not internal to the body that moves, but presupposes another external body which acts on its capacity to act or move and to which it reacts. Action is the qualified (facified) movement of a body in relation to another, or the reaction of one body to the actual or potential actions of

another. Any *determined or decisive* movement is an image of the obstacles or opposing forces encountered in a field of possibilities. This sociological conception of action presupposes a relation with an other who can do otherwise.

The Action Film

In the montage of the action-film all movement can be seen as taken up with a central problem, that is, the necessity of establishing some sort of correspondence between a milieu and a mode of behaviour, or a situation and an action. The problem is not one of simply placing an action within a ready-made system of coordinates. The action-image involves more than movements about the set or the relative changes of positions in a fixed frame reference (the surveillance of a single-point-of-view). Just as a situation can extend into an action, action, in turn, can effect a change in a situation. Actions produce change, by definition. All action-films, whatever their genre, deal with this problematic since *action-images* are mobilized responses to the *potentials of situations*, which mobilize or actualize these potentials, and produce modifications. The space of action is a place-image. The scene of action must be seen in terms of its possibilities, that is, by some body qualified to see. The qualities of the scene

potentialize and transform it into a situation that will motivate the invention of a behavioural response. Depending on the qualities of the scene and the respondents' ability to see and actualize them, the response will either: (1) modify that place and produce a different situation (with new potentials), or (2) leave the initial situation unchanged, in which case the response will have proved its inadequacy in practice (for example, when the forces of the situation are too strong, or the response is too weak to overcome them).

This situation-response relation constitutes the primary circuit of the action-film. Its flow can be traced through several moments. First, an initial situation develops by being charged with potentials, filled with possibilities, or shot through with openings. A space becomes a place of possibilities with potential lines of flight, ways of escape, or ways out (of a bad situation, for example). Second, when this charge reaches or encounters a body capable of absorbing it, it will accumulate there, and fill the body with motor (motivational) energy -- charge it up, so to speak. Third, at a certain point the body will reach saturation, the accumulated energy will pass its threshold, and will be discharged in bursts of motor-activity (a response) aimed at realizing the potentials and transforming the situation. Between the initial situation and its subsequent

modification there is an interval or gap. Whatever body occupies this interval will be constantly on the move, even if it doesn't go anywhere. It will either be actively absorbing or actively expressing, charging or discharging, for example, just as one might be charged with an obligation at one point, only to discharge that obligation at another. The interval between is the space of the action-image. It is a particular mutation of the movement-image which involves the facification of a body, any body.

If we only consider movements in the *mise-en-scène*, all we have is images of movement restricted to a finite space. From the point of view of montage, however, movement exceeds the bounds of the single frame, takes on a new dimension. The interval of movement between the initial charged situation and the final discharge can be quite large. In fact, an action-image can span the whole breadth of a film, from its opening shot to its finale. Without spoiling the ending, you can typically tell an action-film because the opening shot or initial scene is typically repeated at or near the end *with a difference*, to affirm that something has in fact changed. For example, in Eastwood's *Unforgiven* the first shot is a fixed long-shot. In silhouette are framed a shack, a tree, and the figure of man digging under its broad canopy. The film's pretext (de)scribes the scene like an

anonymous someone writing on the landscape. The final shot fades-in to a repeat of the opening shot (complete with pretext). The shack appears in silhouette, as does the tree. There is a headstone under its canopy. The same figure walks across the frame, from the shack to the grave, stops at the grave, and removes his hat. His image fades-out of frame as the credits roll. Similarly, in Fincher's *Alien3*, the film begins and ends with shots of the EEV Unit, the emergency evacuation unit or escape pod -- the means of Alien transport from situation to situation. Likewise, in Ford's *Two Rode Together*, we are shown the same silhouette with the sheriff in the same posture, but is no longer the same sheriff (Deleuze, 1991:147). In the economy of making an action film, it only makes sense to shoot the first and last scenes together, and to insert the 'body' of the film latter. This body, because it is an insert between the scenes, between the before and the after, it can be considered a form of close-up whose dimensionality is one of 'large scale'⁸⁴ -- provided that the close-up is understood as a movement-image, a process of transformation rather than an fixed form, and that its size (its dimensionality) is determined by movement.

⁸⁴ For Eisenstein, there was something very Western (i.e., American) about this large-scale act of framing/deframing. See Eisenstein on the "Griffith-esque close-up" (1949: 199) and Deleuze on the *plan américain* (1991: 104).

Action-images are responses which actualize, explicate, or *unfold* one of the multiple lines of possibility of a situation. Given that a terrified countenance, for example, bears no resemblance to the terrifying thing (see Deleuze, 1990: 307), and that standing on a precipice does not explain the expression on the face, the actions which unfold these potentials also do not resemble it. The relation between the virtual expression and its specific actualization is not a relation of resemblance or representation, but rather a relation of differentiation and division. Every response or decision alters the decisiveness and carries it away on a different tangent. Like so many lines of force emanating from a centre of indeterminacy, each actualizes the virtual by a different way of moving, and extends these as forces into the field of visibility. Each line thus mobilizes power-qualities of what could potentially be seen in order to affirm this condition of vision. The possibility of bringing to realization an image of a changed scene is what motivates the action in the action-film. The difference between two situations stands as an index of the actions which have brought it about.

Action is not simply a programmed reflex, nor a mechanical reflection of a given stimuli. Actions are modes of behaviour relative to a horizon of possibilities. Openings are challenges confronting action, and the latter is a way

of response. Situations or places do not merely act on characters and bodies and invoke immediate reactions. Instead, the indeterminability of situations (their gaps, openings, and potentials) are *forces* which extend beyond the horizon of visibility. Responses are embodiments of these forces which escape the seen. Force, in this sense, is not a product of a closed system nor does it aim to restrict or repress movement. It is an opening which incites, motivates, and mobilizes movement. Force is productive: it only manifests in relation to a body capable of moving and acting.

Situations in the action film are not simply places of habituation, nor are they places of settlement. There are no settled ways, or permanent habits relative to it, only modes of behaviour which actualize different potentials. Openings are places to act or move, but not to be. One can abide in this interval of motion, but only temporarily. Since places are always in transition they do not lend themselves to the more orderly dispositions characteristic of enclosures (e.g., prisons, factories, schools, etc.) and their ready-made institutionalized patterns (organized forms of behaviour). They are the sites where modes of life communicate and interface in various ways. The action film is composed by different *ways of living the scene* and the potential for these ways of life to enter

into forms of alliance and conflict. It is an image of these conflicting forces and their various ways of meeting and mis-meeting. Primarily, these images are of sociality, and of a particular form of sociality I call the duel. It is to this discussion in the context of the action-film that we shall now turn.

CHAPTER 6

FACIFICATION AND THE DUEL

Under the sign of fetishism, 'local' culture gave way to the processes of massification and the production of *massive*-individuals. The twin regimes of capital and mass-media are chief among the forces of cultural dislocation. Under these regimes, communities are largely reduced to serial assemblages of producers and consumers, feeders and collectors, on the circuits and flows of capital-media. Baudrillard's collector system is part of this massification process. It is established in relation to partial objects (1990: 43-58). In the never-finished serial-game of collection, the goal (the object of the game) is a "re-collected self" and a regained composure in the face of one's fractured image. It is a strange, *circular* game, where the object turns out to be the self-image, and the goal, self-possession. But fetishism, and its accomplice, voyeurism, are, to borrow Virilio's term, systems of *passive optics* (1989:3). While passive optical systems, such as the micro-telescopic machines (not to mention the panoptic machine), certainly changed the way the world was seen and the conditions of vision, new optical machines are different again. They are active systems that have

transformed visual culture: new community forms have grown up round them and new strategies of control work through them. Cinema and its movement-images are one example of these new strategies.

The sociological significance of cinema lies in its integration of media-relations and the movement-image. Because the cinematic gaze is an otherwise-other, it produces and reproduces cultural strategies for encountering and interfacing with others rather than just reiterating images of the self. Its images are of the manners and habits of sociation, more specifically, they are images of socia(bi)lity. In the following, I will show how, what is primarily a sociable encounter with otherness (a displaced form of undirected being together as Simmel defines the relation) is transformed, by montage, into a form of sociality called the duel.

For Virilio, the deployment of new visual apparatuses has changed the shape of power-relations. As he argues, strategies of deterrence,⁸⁵ based on accumulation of object-weapons, are gradually giving way to those based on vision. "Rather like the Western gun-duel, where firepower equilibrium is less important than reflex response, eyeshot will then finally get the better of gunshot.

⁸⁵ See the previous discussions of Baudrillard and Barthes.

It will be an optical, or electro-optical confrontation” (1989: 2). It has already been suggested that cinema’s optics are very different from the “*longueurs* of the old photographic pose” and the “static and rigidly ordered environment” of the architectural set with all its partitions (see Virilio, 1989: 13). The stability of cinematic perceptions has nothing to do with fixity. The motor mechanisms of the camera are part of this process of differentiation, but cameras can also “share the speed of moving objects” (Virilio, 1989: 16). Not only have cameras been mounted on almost every conceivable means of transport, they have also been directly incorporated into the newest projectile weapons, ones which trace the process of aiming all the way to the point of impact -- images of the “gulf war.”

The act of taking aim itself is a “geometrification of looking, a way of technically aligning ocular perception along an imaginary axis” (Virilio, 1989:2). This line of sight is also a line of faith when the target is at a distance. For example, older artillery pieces required a complex itinerary. Aiming trajectories had to be worked out in advance, by combining considerations of the distance between here and there with the thrust of the projectile and the elevation of the projectile machine. The process was complicated by variables of windage, the speed and accuracy of reconnaissance, and projections of where the anticipated

target might be. Now, however, the line of sight is a variable that can be adjusted and corrected in flight -- the line of sight is on the line of flight.⁸⁶ The speed of reconnaissance and projection have been combined such that in the new optical confrontation *seeing and foreseeing* tend to merge so closely together as to be virtually indistinguishable (see Virilio, 1989: 3-4). When we reach the point where what is perceived is already lost, the most obvious counter-strategy is to manufacture decoys, enter into the game of doubles, multiply the number of sights, and disperse the number of sites. In these economies of dissimulation, as in the shell game, the problem is to determine where the real targets are.

Stealing motion from other mobile bodies is as much a part of the development of cinema as it is war. But the identity of the means of reception with the means of projection is only part of the story. Montage works at another level. It intervenes between reception and projection to produce an ocular division of labour. The action of selecting and assembling both separates and combines seeing and foreseeing to produce a confrontation of ocular forces on a new mobile terrain. In this confrontation, the gaze -- the looking and the look --

⁸⁶ Huston's *African Queen*, for example, is a film about a projectile (the epinymous boat) launched on a line of flight. Its aim, that is, its trajectory and terminus, is determined *en route*, and is corrected on the fly -- in order to counter the forces that might turn it off course.

takes on the form of a duel of forces. It is a duel of optical and sonorous images. The weapons of choice in this glancing duel are indices. They are the signs of this form of sociation or of its formation. Unlike exchanges of fire-power and optico-ballistic weapons, the aim is not simply to eliminate the opponent and realize closure, but to forestall the ultimate confrontation indefinitely.

In extending Virilio's conception of the optical confrontation into various manners and strategies of seeing and foreseeing, I present the duel as a form of sociality of the unsettled. Unlike settled relational patterns, rigid hierarchical structures, the fixed mechanisms of surveillance and control, and the stability of consensus that reign in the familiarity and relative enclosure of the inert institutional frameworks, the duel is characterized by transitory forms of alliance, reversible hierarchies, strategies of openings rather than closure, and unsettled ways of relating to others. Stability no longer implies fixity, neither the fixity of place nor the fixity of viewpoint. There are moving manners that only a mobile vantage point can envision. Also unlike forms of sociality between others, such as hospitality and politeness, whose origins are uncertain (see Amirou, 1989), the duel is a strategy of montage produced and reproduced in an open architecture of cinema. The duel, as I define it, is an audio-visual style of spatial practice. It

comprises an optical regime (of seeing and foreseeing), a regime of enunciation (it produces signs), a regime of force which links the seeing and the saying together in a determinate way, and a means of directing these movements to control the flow across the interval or gap. It is a social apparatus for shaping cultural manners and directing practical dispositions in the open.

The transition from the sociability of the face/close-up to the sociality of the duel, or from the primary cinema image to its secondary image form(ul)ations, will be developed by means of the Peircean notions of firstness and secondness and the kinds of signs these moments produce (icons and indices respectively). I will focus on examples of the duel-form in the action-film, leaving a wider sociological reflection for Chapter 8. It should be noted that the movement from firstness to secondness, from one to two, is a process of qualitative transformation, rather than the quantitative addition of another extraneous element, and that secondness is derived by the internal differentiation of the one (the primary) into two aspects that relate to one another because they are forms of the same substance (As Peirce argues, there is an element of firstness in secondness [1955:108]). The movement from one to two, from the sociability of the facial encounter to the sociality of the duel, is a dialectical process. It is by means of

specification (or spacialization) that the primary image of faciality (the “first firstness of the image” as Peirce calls it) comes to form the *diagram* (see Peirce, 1955: 105) of force relations in the cinematic apparatus.

These places and spaces of the action-image are constituted on the horizon of dimension between the scenes. The initial or inertial situation of the action-image is defined by a scene or situation whose borders are broken or breached. Here, the inside escapes in various directions and the outside enters in various uncontrolled and unsettling ways. The fractures which appear in the scene allow various forces to come into contact and collide with its occupant or occupants. It is *local site* of struggle, a situation of differentiation, or a situation cut by opposing forces which does not lend itself to the formation of fixed, settled ways.

The horizontal milieu of action is defined by the difference between this initial open situation (S1) and the subsequent actions which either bring about, or fail to bring about, a situation of homogeneity (S2). An action (response) appears (is inserted) in this opening and either fails to resolve existing divisions and brings about further disintegration, or resolves the breaches by reestablishing a secure horizon. Typically this horizontal interval between S1 and S2 is characteristically large. This gap constitutes the film’s *global space*. *Inventing* a response or means

of crossing the gap is its *global project*. But this gap will be full of challenges, populated by various forces and obstacles (or obstacle-signs) to be overcome. These will constitute the various minor contests or *local missions* within the global project.

In the action-film, action-images not only and always appear in a landscape (large-scale or long-shot) which encompasses them, but they are also modes of response to the scene. Landscapes are spaces of contest characterized by a multiplicity of force-relations. These milieu serve as both the medium of force-relations and the space of their encounter. The modes of behaviour that occupy the scene are already *suspended responses* to the presence of opposing potentials and forces. Consequently, the force-relations that occupy it are the agents of change which constantly bring about its transformation.

The milieux of action are not merely fixed frames of reference or an inert media: they are *living*, breathing spaces constantly expanding, contracting, and changing their shape in relation to the forces moving within it. They are *organic*, but organicism takes on a special significance here. Movement defines space. As I illustrate below, the organic milieu expands and contracts depending on the antagonism or affinity of forces at their points of contact as they pass from

moments of difference to moments of unanimity in a continuous and potentially reversible cycle of transformation and change.

A Duel of Forces

In action films, modes of behaviour are relations of forces. These force-relations have specific and definable characteristics. Duels, for example, are relations between forces. The characteristic feature of duels is that the forces of response or reaction do not act directly and immediately on bodies or things, nor are they simply face to face confrontations between adversaries or rivals. Duels are reflexive-relations which only take shape in relation to a field of possibilities. They are modes of behavioural response that are not based on the meanings ascribed or attached to another (what it is), but rather on the expectation and anticipation of what another is capable of doing, potentially. If the other were predetermined in such a way as to be incapable of action or reaction, i.e., inhabiting a closed system and lacking a field of possibilities from which to actualize one or several possible reactions, then the conditions favourable to the duel would not be present. In line with the Foucauldian conception of power, the

essential condition of the duel is the presence of *independent* forces, each capable of acting and reacting to the potential movements of the other.

Duels are based on the capacity to foresee or anticipate the exercise of another, to guess where they are and what they will do (see Deleuze, 1991: 142; Virilio, 1989:2). *Feints*, for example, are strategies of diversion designed to provoke a defensive reaction which will produce an opening either for attack or flight. *Parries* are defensive strategies which attempt to evade or avoid an anticipated attack or ward off a potential blow. *Traps* are strategies of anticipating or closing off potential lines of flight as a means of capturing or tricking an unwary opponent. My argument is that all modes of the duel are actions which act on the potential actions of another. Duels are therefore two-sided or bi-polar.

One side involves seeing or rather *taking in* the situation, and becoming acquainted with its potentials in order to formulate an appropriate response. Seeing which takes the neutral or external viewpoint remains unqualified and indifferent. Rather than simply a state of passivity or reflective contemplation, *seeing* also involves the action of affective permeation (see Deleuze on the training techniques of the Actor's Studio; 1991: 155-159). Qualified seeing occurs on the margins. It determines the possibilities of a given locale, and

potentializes the scene. It takes in the scene at the same time that it draws in its possibilities. Qualified seeing determines the horizon and produces an encompassing vision. Quite literally, it takes in the surroundings. The action of seeing is therefore both optic and haptic; it involves seeing what is and its affective ambiance. Seeing is therefore an action of intension rather than a passive mirror of reflection. It produces an image of encompassment (a perception-image) by absorbing the qualities and potentials of the scene. Seeing is the virtual action of a situation on a body capable of being affected and of suspending (holding up) this reaction. This virtual action on an action, this virtual encounter of bodies, produces signs. The signs it generates are the visual *impressions* which typically register on, and ripple across, the surface of the face. It is not hard to envision a face which has been impressed (in one indeterminate way or another) by what it has undergone (e.g., shock, surprise, distaste, etc. -- fuel for the process of interpretation). These signs are indices of a virtual encounter.

The other side of the duel-relation is extensive. After a period of affective permeation, once a body has absorbed sufficient motivation and has become a qualified seer (has seen clearly *what is possible* in the situation or acquired the appropriate *look*), it will enact or actualize a response to its encompassing

situation. This reaction will come by a way of practical extension (expressions through words or gestures) of the suspended potentials. The force of these extensions are often explosive. They can appear at discontinuous intervals and even in places far removed from the initial, impressive ones (again, the interval of action can be quite large). The extensive side of the action-image serves to actualize a determinate line of possibilities in a given situation in order to realize its transformation.

The Interface: Violence and the Duel of Forces

When the body is not extending its forces in relation to another, it is being moved or inspired by the situation and its forces. Action is always in relation and is never simply by itself. The action-image, in its double sense, forms a continuous link between *sensory* situations and the responses which affirm and extend its potentials (by breaking out or overcoming). Consequently, “the actor is never neutral, and never stationary” (Deleuze, 1991: 155). Actors are always either being acted on by the force of their *surroundings* (affective permeation) or are extending this affection as a *global response* to a local scene/seen. Because these responses are formulated in relation to a global situation, they surpass or go

beyond what is given (in the visual field). But this excessive response, which constitutes the violence of the duel, is very different from the impulse-violence of the horror film.

In sharp contrast to the duel-form of the action-image, the impulse-violence is predicated on the repetition of coded elements. In films such as *The Terminator*, *Halloween*, and *Friday the Thirteenth*, 'monsters' pursue this relentless, serial logic of depredation, even to the point of continuing in sequels (see Jancovich, 1992). The machinic quality of the monster is formed by repetitive behaviour and by the relentless return of the same in all situations -- like the monster in *Alien3* which copies itself repeatedly and in accordance with its genetic code. In the violence-image, behaviours take the form of habits (predetermined or coded responses) whose origin is unknown or secret. The repetition of these coded elements establishes the relentless ritual, a ritual of behaviour that derives from an *originary world*, and not from intercourse with forces in an actual milieu. The dis-placement of the gestures and behaviour of an originary world into an actual world of rules and roles produces signs that are *symptoms*. In effect, the monster is the product of montage, of the process of

cutting and inserting. It is a kind of close-up, that is, an insertion of a segment of the out-of-field, and one that interfaces differently with its milieu.

Counter to Jancovich's claim that modern monsters are "machines which lack subjectivity" (1992: 5), they are more properly characterized as machines of pure subjectivity, machines that select (subtract) from the scene only what is interesting and in accordance with their ready-made perceptions. They perceive only in clichés, partially or stereotypically, and therefore take indiscriminately what their situations offer. This form of violence is an action on a thing or body (object) which is non-responsive, or has been rendered powerless to respond. Incapacitation is the *law of violence* and the condition of its manifestation. Violence-images are formed by the hierarchical encounter of bodies in relations of pure-subjectivity and partial-objectivity.

The violence-image is impulsive, where the impulse is a force that is inseparable from the modes of behaviour that produce or express it. Impulses always obey a secret source, which is either internal to the character (an innate or *natural disposition*) or completely other-worldly (an alien presence which takes over the body and its capacities for acting). In either case, impulses are modes of behaviour that occur *in* ordinary places and spaces, but they are not *of* these

places. For the impulse does not live in this world, but rather inhabits an originary world, a past or distant place that is either isolated or beyond the reach of normal communicative interventions. Impulse-behaviours, because they exceed what is expected in a given situation, produce signs that are *symptomatic of this dislocation*. The target of the violence-image is a fragment torn from its milieu by the impulse. The object which violence aims to take possession of is always partial, a scrap, a deformed object, or fragment cut from a whole. It is the only case where the close-up constitutes a fetishized partial-object, and only then because its scene/seen is defaced and de-potentialized. It is the relation of the impulse-behaviours and *its* partial-perceptions that produce the signs of *fetishism*.

Contrary to Baudrillard's conception of the fetish as the pornographic *attention to detail*, the violence-image is not characterized simply by an immediacy, over-proximity, or absence of distance of subjects and things but rather by the presence of a translucent interval or zone of selective (hierarchical) incommunicability between the poles forming this assemblage. The interval between the poles is occupied by *masks* as opposed to faces. For example, the monster's face is a mask that provides only spurious information of its social role expectations (when they take on 'human form') and neutralizes any

communicative interventions as in the case of Dracula's mesmerizing gaze -- this monster also lacks an external reflection, thus precluding auto-communication or internal dialogue.

The mask is a particular kind of interface. Its role is not to hide, conceal, or repress, at least not absolutely. A mask can be defined as a relatively permeable membrane (screen) or shaped object between a source of illumination, projection, or reflection (an expressive surface or scene) and a photo-sensitive body (a receptive surface). Masks are media designed to control the processes of exposure between a milieu and a mode of behaviour, or between a mode of behaviour and the milieu it modifies. They are a means of selectively screening-off the - influences of actuality and its forces while permitting partial visibility. It is by means of the mask that the impulse keeps it secret (i.e., it is screened-off from investigation) and the object becomes a partial-object (or subset) isolated from whole. Impulse-behaviour enacts habits that are born of an originary world and transposed to another world where their appropriateness is dubious.

Consequently, the impulse will always appear out of place, disproportionate (under or over reactive) to the actual milieu, either because it exceeds or remains indifferent to its *normal* requirements or limits. Whether in the form of an

executioner's dissemblance, those who hide in the *camerae obscurae* of the bunker (see Virilio, 1989:49), or the virtual-any-one behind the *surveillance screen* of Bentham's panoptic machine, violence is always a masked relation of transcendence (the code) and dis-membering (fetishizing) the whole.

The duel, in contrast, is predicated on a deferred response rather than simply a repetition of those found ready-made. While the violence-image is the predictable return of the same (the identical or its analogue) in all situations (based on the timing of the code or even its time-table), the duel is an action on a future action, and is the capacity to respond with a difference and to make a difference. The predictability of violence contrasts with the duel whose very strength lies in the power not to respond or inventing and reinventing different responses so as not to be either predictable or timely. The duel is a mode of behaviour that has discovered a *mobile and flexible mask* that can change its shape and therefore interface differently with its situation and the forces encountered there (see also Shields' discussion of the *dramatis persona*; 1991: 269). While impulse-violence brings its preassembled set of conventions (codes and habits) to all performances, the duel is marked by a refusal of origins, by constantly reshaping interfaces, and by extending openings.

This distinction notwithstanding, both violence and the duel share one common characteristic. While both modes of behaviour are responsive, the whom or the what these behaviours are responses to is not simply conditioned by the scene or what is in the frame but by something beyond the frame. For violence sees the other as a type or analogue of the code, while the duelist sees in terms of what others are capable of or what they might do. If the latter were to become violent, as is often the case, it is not because of some preassembled code but because of some potential action that the response aims to ward off. In both cases, however, the power of response is always formed in relation to what is not seen, or what is not given, but which is nevertheless there. The other for whom the response is assembled is an otherwise other. It is this structure of alterity which occupies the out-of-field that determines both modes of behaviour and the nature of their response to whatever appears inside (which is at the same time outside) their respective milieux. Violence and the duel are two modes of behaviour and two force-relations mediated by the structure of alterity which resides in the virtual past or future beyond the scene and outside the frame. The interface, in its dual or duel role, potentializes and qualifies the modes of behaviours that occur in the scene, while maintaining a virtual relation to them.

Through a variety of techniques and strategies the actions of montage are realized by the various ways in which the virtual is related to the actual scene, or the various ways in which the scene is prevented from closing in on itself. By means of montage, the set is always put in motion and at the same time made to communicate with its outside. In the absence of any stable and solid boundary, it is impossible to presume any natural correspondence between a situation and the action which responds to it or modifies it. The broken link between situation and action is occupied by various virtual conjunctions that both motivate the scene and mobilize the action, forming and forging many lines of force between them.

In action films, the process of affective permeation/extension is relentless. It covers more (space) than just the final scenes of confrontation. The whole of the action-film is a duel, and a series of duels which converge on a final duel. Moreover the duel can extend beyond a given filmic experience and can continue across a *series* of films (the *Alien* series is an example). Why? Because the duel-form itself is like a set of moving lines of light, which invariably bend toward one another, crossing and converging at certain points, only to diverge again. It's like walking down parallel lines of a train-track. Somewhere off in the distance there is a vanishing-point of perspective where the lines converge. Moving closer only

moves it further away, as the lines divide and the point of convergence is deferred (or differed) infinitely to a point *beyond*. The point of convergence is actual, because it is part of the conditions of vision, and yet it is virtual, because it is always just beyond reach. The ultimate showdown, the *final* confrontation, is therefore both envisioned and postponed: it is *anticipated*. Understood in this way, Eco's (1985) claims about the extent and character of repetition (retakes, remakes, and series) in cultural productions make a lot of sense. So too does Deleuze's claim that, since Griffith, "American cinema constantly shoots and reshoots a single fundamental film" (1991: 148). This film, what I call Cinema of the Duel, is constituted not so much from stories or scripts, but by montage, by a regime of *parallel-convergent*⁸⁷ lines of f(l)ight.

⁸⁷ The technique known as cross-cutting (see Gessner, 1970: 323-4) is used to produce an image of different, though parallel, situations (parallel differences in time, theme or action – for example a pastoral scene might be cut contiguously with an urban scene to show that they are synchronous, or, as in Griffith's *Intolerance* (1916), the cross-cut is used to depict intolerance across four different settings in four different centuries). The convergent aspect of this montage technique involves drawing these parallel lines (or sides) ever closer together -- for example, moving from cross-cut long-shots, through cross-cut mid-action-shots, to cross-cut close-ups (perhaps only to diverge again, to repeat the process of convergence, and forever forestall the final resolution).

Shooting and Reshooting the Duel

While the duel has always been a dominant theme of the American westerns, this form of the action-image is also taken up in many other recent popular films from a variety of genres. While sets, settings, and situations change, as do the scripts, characters and the actors involved, the process of montage is virtually identical in each case. Every scene involves the mobilization, motivation, and dispersion of forces which anticipate points of convergence in a series of duels, culminating in a final point of contact between the opposing poles. The space of the duel is prepared long before the hero knows or has the 'know how' (manner) to occupy it, and the typically reluctant hero needs both motivation and support to develop forces and acquire the powers of response that will be equal to the those of the global situation. In this regard, the role of the second is important. While subordinate in the order of rank of the duel, the role of the second provides necessary support to the movement, endorsing and sanctioning the actions, and stabilizing the relation by consensus. Seconds also provide instrumental support as well as acting as go-betweens, bringing challenges, information and supplying reconnaissance. The alliance of seconds can also be considered force-relations, since their subordinate status also makes these relations

potentially precarious and often reversible -- their consensual stability could turn out to be illusory. Without the possibility of recalcitrance (secondness) there would be no force relation, and no strategic action, merely a physical relationship of constraint (see Foucault, 1983: 225), that is, a mere property relationship -- a relation of violence in the aforementioned sense. Unruliness, insubordination, or the possibility of doing otherwise, are at the heart of every duel.

Every duel is a question of rank. Any action which effects a change in one's regard or how one is perceived by others puts rank into question and is the basis for further action. The forcible modification in one's prestige, reputation, or esteem in the eyes of others constitutes the basis of the duel, which at the same time implies resistance and counter-attack, that is, the efforts which oppose such changes. Rank, in this case, is not determined by the quanta of possessions or properties⁸⁸ which can be measured on a line or continuum, but by the quality of one's expression and its difference in kind from other qualities or qualitative traits. Rank is an encounter of qualities and expressive traits.

⁸⁸ Relations of property (the parcelling, division, and distribution of the whole into private shares and regulating the relations and communications between the shares) presuppose a state-form (as in Rousseau and Marx) and its order-words (analogical codes or models). While the state-model presupposes the duel-relation-of-difference as the condition of its narrative over-coding, the duel itself is anterior and opposed to such regulation.

Eastwood's production of *Unforgiven* (1992; Warner Bros.) and Reiner's *A Few Good Men* (1992; Columbia) are exemplary in (re)shooting the duel. While neither film is a horror film, they both have their monstrosities. *Unforgiven* has a heavy-handed sheriff (Little Bill) who deals with all violations of 'the law' with excessive displays of force, while *A Few Good Men* has an equally heavy-handed colonel (Col. Jessep) who deals with challenges to 'the code' with much the same dispatch (i.e., the 'code red' system of punishment). But monstrosity is more than an individual; it is an over-coded ensemble of forces. It is constituted by a precarious alliance of seconds, a community of deputies and followers of the word who are arranged and placed within a rigid order. The object of violence is always the weak link in the chain of associations organized by the code, that is, violence aims at the occasional act of insubordination.⁸⁹ Any act that doesn't go *by the book* means that the code is not able to organize all its segments. Any act of insubordination, no matter how 'small,'⁹⁰ can displace that segment from the

⁸⁹ The alliance of seconds proves itself to be precarious and reversible, but not only through the original act of insubordination. In *A Few Good Men*, further acts of insubordination (cracks in the code) are revealed when Jessop's second in command, Markinson, after realizing Jessop's deception, eventually converts to the side of the defence, and in *Unforgiven*, when Beauchamp surrenders his place as English Bob's chronicler upon discovering Bob's deception (he converts to the side of Little Bill and agrees to inscribe his words, at least for a time).

⁹⁰ In *Unforgiven*, Delilah becomes the object of violence and of dis-memberment because she inadvertently questioned the size of "Big Mike's pecker" -- thus

rest. Consequently, that segment ends up dismembered, disqualified, cut from the whole. It becomes an element whose rank or place in the order of things is brought into question. This is the equivalent of losing one's face, being faced with a discharge, or with the loss of one's duties, abode, or livelihood. The process involves the displacement of a segment of the set and of its becoming-other, or becoming close-up. Violence is incorporated in the action-film as a means of freeing up this radical, mobile segment -- the face which has shed all its traces.

This facialized segment is a crack in the code. It reveals an opening in the over-coded arrangement of things and acts as an interface between the internal order and what is beyond. It expresses the qualities of the scene and produces a global situation. It expresses a potential for change but by itself it produces no actual response. The response is suspended on its surface rather than acted out in relation to the scene. Its look will have to reach a body or bodies capable of organizing a response to the situation (S1) as it is given. It is in relation to this facialized situation, and as a formulation (actualization) of its response, that another

bringing his status in the eyes of others (his honour) into question. His act of violence, in turn, scars her face and so threatens her occupational status within the monstrous order -- Her "pimp," Slim, questions the value of "a cut whore."

ensemble of forces is formed. This ensemble will form an instrumental alliance, or as Deleuze calls it, a misfit alliance. It too will be an alliance of seconds and will be equally precarious.

The first body to be mobilized into response is typically an unqualified seer, one which lacks the ability or experience (owing to some character flaw) to see what is in the situation and to organize an appropriate response. In *A Few Good Men* this character is Lt. JoAnne "Jo" Galloway. While eager to play the hero, she lacks the qualifications to play the part. In *Unforgiven* this character is the "Schofield Kid," an equally eager hero, but one who also lacks the experience and 'foresight' to embody the potential. These want-to-be heros will act as go-betweens, and will bring the challenge to another capable of acquiring the right look – Lt. Daniel Kaffee ("Kaffie") in the former case, and William Munny in the latter.

For these heros, an opening has been prepared and a place has been cleared for them, but it is their quandary whether or not to occupy it.⁹¹ These

⁹¹ One shot in *Unforgiven* begins with a close-up of a framed picture of a woman. A hand reaches toward it and picks it up. The camera tracks the movement of the hand/picture as it moves toward a face coming into the frame. The face is Munny's and the shot becomes a two-shot of Munny in a face to face encounter with the countenance of his dead wife. In the same shot, the hand-picture moves down and out of field, as the other hand appears with a gun in it, forming another two-shot of Munny face to face with the gun. In this single shot Munny confronts

heros are already in a degraded or degrading situation, and have already developed habits relative to its challenges, demands, and forces. For example Kaffie, a Harvard law school graduate, and the son of a great Supreme Court justice, finds himself in a situation of dealing with trivial offences, in the face of which he has acquired a habitus limited to a proficiency in negotiating plea bargains. For his part, Munny's pastoral milieu has thrown him many challenges. He is involved in a struggle for survival against the forces of a hostile milieu. His mode of behaviour has modified in response to the challenges thrown him. But the milieu and its forces are too strong. It takes all his strength just to parry them. His actions are slow and decrepit as a consequence.

As a consequence of their current situations, the powers and qualities of their heritage, or former lives, are held in suspense (which in itself constitutes a duel with the past, with the image of a great father, or a wayward and intemperate lifestyle). But neither the old habits, nor the ones developed as responses to their current situation will suffice in the challenge of the new space of possibilities.

the duality of past forces which could potentially move him, that is, the moral force of his dead wife and the forces of his former intemperate life. He tries on one, then the other, in an effort to see which ensemble will look better in the face of the challenges he confronts. Unlike Little Bill's inflexibility (inflexible mask), Munny has a variety of looks which he can adopt in response to the situations and forces he confronts. This variability does not illustrate a depth of character: it is a surface variability.

Kaffie, for example, tries to use his habits of plea bargain to solve his defendant's case, but his defendants are obstinate and refuse to submit or move from their position in spite of his repeated efforts. Munny, for his part, tries his hand-gun to see if it will be suitable to the situations he anticipates. In spite of his repeated effort to knock the can from the post, his aim is off -- his present struggle has taken its toll, the inability to aim his hand-gun is an index of this changed situation. His old hand-gun alliance proves unreliable (as does the horse-rider alliance: he falls off it) and he casts it off in favour of a more reliable shot-gun ensemble.

Given that the ready-made behaviours (the old-fashioned ones) prove inappropriate or insufficient, new modes of behaviour, new alliances and ensembles will have to be forged. Rising to the challenge will require more than resuscitating old myths or recalling archaic practices. It will require a habit-change.⁹² Much of the body of these films is taken up with this process, that

⁹² In a scene in *Unforgiven*, Munny adorns his wife's grave with flowers. This act of adornment takes on a double sense. On the one hand, it is a change of appearance, an act of decorating (dressing up) which anticipates a departure (a departure from the old ways or from the old habitat). On the other hand, to adorn or decorate is to designate rank, either as a show of respect or, conversely, to mark a demotion. In either case it is an act which marks a difference or expresses (produces) a distance. This habit-change is an index of disjuncture and anticipates a change (of face, place, or rank) -- cf. Barthes' (1973) analysis of the double-significance of the soldier's salute on the cover of *Paris Match*.

is, with fashioning the right kind of image, developing the right kind of look or outlook, and constituting the ensemble that will prove appropriate to the occasion (i.e., the response or expression that will bring about S2).

The go-betweens (Jo and the Kid) form part of the misfit alliance. They provide an expertise and instrumental support for the development of the heros' powers and qualities. In both films, another second is added to the misfit alliance; in *A Few Good Men* it is Kaffie's friend Sam, and in *Unforgiven* it is Munny's old partner, Ned. The alliance of three, in each case, constitutes an ensemble of forces with a more or less clearly defined division of labour which includes reconnaissance and information gathering and projectile weaponry. This division of labour is especially pronounced in Munny's alliance. It is characterized by a specialized, ocular division of labour, with highly differentiated projective implements, differentiated in terms of focal length and scope, and combined to form a particular optical ensemble (i.e., a habitus, or manner of looking, in the broad sense of the term). The Kid, for example, is quick with a handgun, which is good for close-up shots, but he lacks long-range vision. Ned, on the other hand, possesses the Spencer rifle which will prove instrumental in carrying out the 'landscape-shot,' but his character is short on conviction. For his part, Munny

bears the double-barrel shot-gun. Though limited in range, it has breadth, and a stereoscopic field of projection which makes it suitable for moving shots or moving targets (i.e., action-shots). It is almost foolproof in the appropriate circumstances.

The integrity and instrumentality of the ensemble is put to the test in a series of minor forays which test the heroes' ability to formulate a response (the initial encounters between the hero and the "law men" are successfully parried), and minor skirmishes which test the solidarity of the misfit alliance. The heroes will have to deal with acts of insubordination by the seconds, either their reluctance to follow orders, their lack of conviction, or lack of courage, as well as develop their powers to respond. In *Unforgiven* the 'character flaws' which render the seconds unable to rise to the challenge leads to the eventual collapse of the alliance under the situational forces. But by this time the hero has already appropriated his "optical instrumentality" and has assembled a series of looks to face the final convergence.

In both films, the final showdown brings all the forces together in the public square (the saloon/courthouse of Big Whiskey in one case, the military courtroom in the other). The 'law man' and the 'hired gun' square off against one

another in the midst of the crowd of spectators. The hero summons up all the powers and qualities of the scene for the final explosive series of strikes. The final inspiration in *Unforgiven* is revealed in the two preceding scenes where the hero finally takes a drink of alcohol, and then sees Ned's body decorating the saloon. In *A Few Good Men* the final inspiration comes after the Colonel has parried the initial strike, when the hero looks around one last time and takes in the scene. In both instances the initial charge is parried (in *Unforgiven* Munny's shot-gun misfires and Bill orders the deputies to kill him), but the heroes quickly regroup. This opening, the open moment, is where the habit-change takes place, where Munny switches weapons -- drawing the Kid's surrendered sidearm -- while Kaffie pulls out his alternate weapon -- the log book discovered by his second, Sam). In the opening revealed, the final blow is struck, a blow so effective as to render the adversary unable to parry it. In *A Few Good Men* the Colonel is displaced by the court officers who take him into custody, while in *Unforgiven* Little Bill is removed using Ned's long-shot rifle at close range.

In all cases of the duel it is the segment that is displaced from the order of things that serves to potentialize both the situation and the response that modifies it. Between the image of a cracked community that cannot organize all its

segments and the fusion of minorities (the misfit community) that acts to recode it, there is an excluded middle term that serves as a link between the situation and its response, or between the actions of the situations and the reactions which change it. This medium changes situations by virtue of its displacement and at the same time foresees (envisions) a change by virtue of the response it anticipates. It invokes and provokes habitat- and habit-changes and oversees the processes of differentiation.

The medium itself is an image of unity (or unicity) that always remains a potential and is therefore always just out of reach. What occupies the interval is an image of the offence or an image of effacement that departs (is cut out) from the scene and returns with a difference. The offending or offended segment never simply goes away but maintains a virtual relation to the actual scene. From its displaced place in the interval it continues to make its effects felt as it qualifies places and mobilizes reactions. It makes a difference and continues to haunt the scene from a distance. It retains its value character by its insertion into the flow, its circulation, and in the circuits it forms with other images. Every actualization of its qualities as a determinate place or the embodiment of its potentials in an determinate action involves a deformation which produces and reproduces the

duel of forces. All the images that deform in relation to it are images of sociality and secondness that serve to indicate its absent-presence. These are images of sociation that are haunted by the crime and which reproduce themselves in its image. It is the face in its effacement, that is, in its faciality traits, that forms the basis of the duel and constitutes the primary element of this cinematic apparatus. The duel centres on losing face, on that which brings about this loss, and on the responses that are formed in relation to it. It is this face -- of crime -- that is on display in cinema's public square, that occupies its local sites, and forms the basis of the action film.

Summary

Each cinematic shot is a mobile-section that is potentially singular and affective, where the affect is a simple quality/power or undifferentiated potential. In cinema, the face/close-up constitutes an affect-image because of its expressed likeness to an undifferentiated singularity (a nomadic quality which escapes all coordination with the scene -- an absolute locality) and because of its expressed capacity to move and be moved (where the affect is deterritorialized motion which moves without going anywhere as a potential for change and transformation). The

face/close-up, because it expresses the physical movement of the affections, produces signs that are iconic. As the first movement-image, the face captures and expresses the movements (quality/powers) of the affects. The power of the cinema apparatus comes not from the narrative or script (an ideological function), but from this elementary capture of the affect on film (a surface), by means of the camera (a device of surveillance for recording external motion), a projector (the mechanical apparatus which puts the film in motion and supplies the light-source), a screen (for reflecting light), and the strategies of montage (selecting mobile-sections) which release the power of the affect.

As I have shown, the real power of cinema (i.e., the power of realism) comes not (solely) from the strategies of capture, but from the ability to direct the affections by means of the assembly of separate mobile-sections. Cinematic realism comes about not as a consequence of simply splicing together separate affection-images (adding motion to motion), but by differentiating or dividing the affection-image. The act of differentiation (or different/ciation; see Boundas, 1996: 91) breaks up the affection-image into its poles of reflecting and reflected motion. It is by this means that the primacy of the affect becomes two and produces a relation of secondness. In this relation of seconds, the affect, the

material or physical qualities of movement, will always appear indirectly as the interval between the shots. In the domain of secondness there is no relation of likeness (mimesis or representation). Instead, the relation is between two qualitatively different (opposed) facets of motion whose relation is characterized by force. A force-relation always implies two, and it is disclosed by the action/reaction of one (body) to the actions of another, where the former is different from the latter, but could not have occurred but for the latter's action. In the force relation, each action/reaction is a reply or formulated response to another which directs it. Any habit-change (a change of appearance, expression, gesture, or mode of behaviour) which is also an image of that something which induces the change of direction, is an action-image. Action-images produce signs that are indices. It is this action-image/index-sign ensemble that produces the cinema of the duel.

Duels and their dualities are indirect (differentiated/antagonistic) expressions of a singular virtual, and undirected motion. Dividing motion up into (indexical) force-relations, directs the attention from the expression, reaction, or response to the event, situation, or action responsible for initiating it. The response thus affirms the reality or truth of the event, since the event must have

happened to produce the reaction. The event is therefore expected before the event is given or before we know precisely what the event was (even though the event and reaction are different in kind). The duel-relation is a little more complex than this, however, because it works in both directions (it is inherently reversible). As I have illustrated, in the duel, either side can serve as an index of the other -- a changed situation indicates an action which brought it about, and a modified action indicates a modified situation. The duel form of the action-image thus structures the expectations in a complex manner, and at the same time it structures the field of possibilities by virtually and imperceptibly linking response and situation together.⁹³

What should be clear in all this is that the duel-relation is a product of (a) strategy of montage (selecting and assembling shots) rather than of the narrative or script. Montage both generates signs and establishes their relation to movement quite independent of any external narrative motion. What should also be clear is that this form of realist cinematography fits well with the global projects and plans of modernity, since modernism clings to the idea of a master plan, i.e., that the

⁹³ Conversely, not possessing the know-how of response or failing to anticipate the actions of the other can have disastrous consequences, leading to an ever more problematic situation or a situation of degradation.

global situation could be given, or at least understood, and could 'inspire' a corresponding system of action capable of modifying it, or conversely, that an action, or series of actions, of great effort could potentially reveal the truth of the global scene. This latter aim, the aim of revealing the truth by means of action, is expressed by another montage variation that I call the inter-action-image. This analysis of this variation of the movement-image is taken up in the following chapter.

CHAPTER 7

MICRO-MOVEMENTS AND THE INTER-ACTION-IMAGE

The preceding analysis has shown the duel to be an indexical relation which ties situations and modes of behaviour together in a complex of opposing forces.

Every situation is a space which throws down a challenge, either as a distance to be crossed or as a difference/obstacle to be overcome, while modes of behaviour serve as responses to the challenge. In the absence of a prearranged response, one must be fabricated, and all the space of action is taken up with the problem of forming an appropriate response which allows movement to continue or to pass (i.e., to traverse boundaries or overcome obstacles). In the large-scale action film the habitus is the secret that has to be discovered and expressed in order to bring about a change of place or situation. It constitutes the response to the givenness of the situation and its challenge. In this chapter, and by extending Deleuze's analysis of action images, I will outline what I call the action-image in small-scale. The distinguishing feature of this montage form is that the situation is not given beforehand. Since it is not given, the situation takes on the form of a secret. Its truth is disclosed, but only indirectly, by means of the small differences in

manners and habits that form circuits around it.

Montage understanding is an understanding of movement, change, and the processes which permit things to pass or to pass on. From this mobile vantage point there are no fixed orders or structures. Stability no longer implies the fixity of structures whose function is to arrest movement and produce an inert frame of reference for the production of identities. The problem of power is no longer one of issuing commands (order-words) and then figuring out the reasons for obedient-agreement -- the fashions of a consensual world and the habits of unanimity. Under the optical-mobile regime, the order-word has already been displaced by the watchword, and the fixity of the code has been replaced by the temporary, changeable, and disposable password.

Secret Variables and Missing Links

Rather than a response to a command, the password is a reply to the challenge (e.g., the question: Who goes there?). It is a *secret variable* that serves as a means of identification, not of the individual, but of the *camp* to which one belongs by expressing it (as in the shibboleth or catchword). It permits passage or allows one to pass, just as a theatre ticket allows one past the security control of

the box office, or the badge/label allows one to cross boundaries, surmount obstacles, or move between situations. Passwords serve to modulate the flow of bodies through an open space by controlling the margins (see Colwell, 1996: 211). In the duel form of the action-image it is the invention of gross physical movements (habit-changes) that serve as motor-responses to the challenge. The invention of a mannerism (a look) are the signs that permit passage. Any mode of behaviour, speech-act, or equivalent gesture, even a costume (a *texture* of movement), can produce openings and enable passage through the interval, between one situation and another no matter how different or distant they are. In the action-image it is the action which occupies the interval between situations and produces their differentiation. The problem is to invent a mode of behaviour or acquire the right 'look' to rise to the challenge. But there are also cases where different actions are cut close together (in contiguity) in order to produce an image of a situation which is not given or seen, but is nevertheless disclosed in the interval between them.

In the inter-action-image two differentiated actions (A1 and A2) that are relatively close together and only slightly different, serve to disclose either a fragment of a situation, two very different, even opposing, situations, or a

situation charged with ambiguity. Inter-action-images are not structured around situations and events, but *construct* situations and events. These small-scale inter-action-images often feature the ‘deviant characters’ favoured by interactionist sociology (e.g., vagrants, tramps, wanderers, or other wayward persona).

This action-image follows the modified montage formula A1-S-A2, where “the action [A1] discloses the situation, a fragment or an aspect of the situation [S], which triggers off a new action [A2]” (Deleuze, 1991: 160). In the large-scale action-film the hero’s task was to see what was there in the situation and then to assemble a response appropriate to it, or to ‘take in’ what was given (the charge) and wait for the appropriate moment to formulate the explosive response (the discharge of the obligation). Here, on the other hand, action advances blindly, and through its course comes to disclose situations or fragments of situations which are not otherwise given. Detective genres are typical of this kind of montage: the whole situation is disclosed gradually through the assemblage of discontinuous pieces and segments (though in the end the whole may retain its mystery -- the secret may not be revealed). Unlike the action-image, where the movements follow the progressive actualization of the hero’s responsive powers to the situation, the powers and qualities of the hero in the inter-action-image are

constant, fixed, or ready-made. It is the situation which is variable, and the qualities of the spatial environment or social location (position or rank) are the elements of change (see also Bakhtin, 1986: 21). Like a disinterested adventure where there is nothing at stake, and no advantage is to be either won or lost, movements follow a broken line whose course is unpredictable.

In Chaplin's rags to riches film *Gold Rush*, for example, the hero moves (swaggers) blindly. His defective compass/map serves as an index of the lack of direction, and his wanderings serve to disclose one situation after another. While movements in the action-image go from here to there, and the place that the hero will occupy is determined in advance, movements in the inter-action-image are elliptical. More like blindly feeling one's way around a dark setting, every tactile encounter might indicate some aspect of the situation, and help to disclose, in piecemeal fashion, what its secret is or what kind of place it is. Preceding situations never set precedents and never determine the kind of action or the mode of response to it. It is, rather, the response (or the differences between two responses) that indicates the nature of the situation. The situation is the excluded, variable segment that serves as the *missing link or intermediary*, which explains

the response or the differences in response. The action is always organized in relation to this absent element.

Inter-action-images also produce indices. Anything which marks a vicissitude, turning-point, or qualitative juncture in experience, or which imposes contrasts of perceptions, regardless of any sort of medium, is an index (see Pierce, 1955: 89-90). For example, “a piece of mould with a bullet-hole in it is a sign of a shot; for without the shot there would have been no hole” (Pierce, 1955: 104). The difference between the mould with a hole in it and one without, indicates the necessity of an actual event (a forcible modification) occurring somewhere in the interval between the disparate experiences. The actual event can be disclosed either by immediate reference or through complex reasoning.

Like tracks in the snow, an index is anything that points or turns the attention to some object, situation, or event which is not, strictly speaking, an object of perception or is not given as such. The index forces us to *see* (attend to) what is not seen, but which *must* be there or *must* have happened. Indices are blindly directive. They fill the gaps in actual perceptions with *virtual perceptions* (of objects, events or situations, even ambiguous ones) which they call forth, in much the same manner that a clever mime can, with a minimum of gesticulation,

conjure up a different character or distant situation and make you feel as if you were in its presence. This mode of “presentifying” absent or distant objects (see Sartre, 1991) serves also to unsettle the spatial categories of near and far (see Shields, 1992: 189,192) by bringing a distant or distant image virtually close-up.

In the simplest sense, the inter-action-image forms as an ellipsis between one action and another modified one (as in the ellipsis form; A1 . . . A2). For example, a character may appear in one shot dressed in rags, only to appear in the next dressed in finery. The two shots may appear infinitely close together. They may boarder one another and may be so immediately contiguous such that even a razor’s edge wouldn’t fit between them. But even in this infinitely small space there is an interval, and in the interval (out-of-field) *something* has happened and one is drawn to the conclusion that the character’s rank or social position has changed. In this case, differentials of the character’s habitus indirectly disclose a spatial displacement and the crossing of a large gap of space-time from one situation (S1 = poverty) to another modified one (S2 = wealth).

This cinematic *jump-cut* between two actions (gestures, costumes, or expressions) produces an index of an event (a transformative moment). Even though the event itself is not given, it may be deduced *retroactively* from the

habit-change or the modified behaviour. It is this ‘dance of indices’ which further specifies Fiske’s notion of ‘writerly text’ (i.e., gaps in narration that invite participation in the creative process). But, I would argue that gaps are not dependent on the narrative process or the script; they derive from montage, from the ‘directorly’ forms of cutting and assembling shots that precede and incite this form of narrativity. The change is registered quite independent of the ‘accounting practices’ that rationalize exactly *what happened* to produce it, that is, quite independent of any number of *ex post facto* interpretations. I say this because sometimes the habit-change is cut so close together that it can even appear within the duration of the same shot. A slight change in look, or an infinitesimal change in expression, can indicate *some* radical change in the out-of-field. In this case the action of montage, of cutting together (directing) separate shots, appears within the single shot as the out-of-field comes into the frame, unsettles it, and changes its dimensions (directions). I call these forms of montage *small-scale* because they involve the insertion of a micro-interval of movement or a micro-moment of transformation that is infinitely small but produces dramatic effects in terms of spatializing and displacing the scene of action. Here, we are still in the domain of

the close-up/face/insert, but the insert is so small as to be virtually imperceptible (though not to the senses or the affect).

Disclosing the Paradox

The more complex form of inter-action montage goes beyond the simple ellipsis or the indexical jump-cut. In the *equivocal* form of the inter-action-image, a slight change in action or an infinitesimal difference between two actions or gestures, *simultaneously* indicates two very different or opposed situations, or a situation charged with ambiguity. It is through the construction of the equivocal form that Chaplin displays his true comedic and directorial talents.

In *Gold Rush*, for example, the hero finds himself trapped by a storm in a cabin with another prospector, Big Jim. In this classic sequence, the starving hero is seen pulling a shoe from a pot of boiling water, then a shot of his bare foot, and then a shot of him sitting down at the table, gently carving the shoe, proportioning out a share of the shoe/turkey to his equally starving colleague, biting the remaining bits of leather off a nail/bone, and offering his partner an opportunity to divide the nail/wishbone. While the idea of transposing dispositions (a cliché-reaction) from one situation to another where you would not expect to find them

may also create a comedic effect, in this case it is not simply the reaction which is inappropriate to the situation, but it is the habitus, or slight modifications of it, that serves to make the situation ambiguous and to make it oscillate between scenes of feast and famine. This feast/famine situation is repeated in another montage sequence where Big Jim, in a famine induced delusion, attempts to hunt after the hero who now appears as a chicken; the hero wrestles with the hunter who turns out to be a bear, until the bear departs the scene. This is followed by a shot of the hero (hunted turned hunter) firing a gun out the door (in the direction of the bear's departure), then a shot of the hero setting the table and sharpening the carving knife -- in the manner of preparation for the feast.

Another sequence from the same film comprises the following shots; a shot where the hero sees his secret love, Georgia, walk across the dance hall. She reaches the bar, turns and faces him -- a frontal shot of the hero looking at her with an adoring gaze -- a frontal shot of her looking at the hero with equal adoration. Georgia walks toward the camera and extends her hand -- then a shot of Georgia, from behind, walking away from the camera (which has assumed her previous position) and toward the hero. He extends his hand as she comes close to him. But she continues to move past the hero into the arms of the 'rogue'

behind him. In this sequence, the smallest difference in behaviour (the smallest deviation from the line) makes the situation fluctuate between mutual desire and unrequited love. Deleuze provides the following, equivalent example: “viewed from behind, Charlie, deserted by his wife, seems to be shaking with sobs, but as soon as he turns round we see that he is in fact shaking himself a cocktail . . . the action is filmed from the angle of smallest difference from another action . . . but in this way discloses the enormity of the distance between the two situations” (1991: 169).

The essence of equivocal montage is to make situations oscillate, to indicate various situations or the *difference* between different situations by slight changes in the action or the habitus. To produce the effect, the habit-change must be well-chosen: it must be a micro-movement that crosses or transgresses a boundary-line such that with a minimum of gesticulation a displacement occurs, a threshold is traversed, and a maximal distinction is effected. The action must, therefore, be very close to the threshold and very close to its modified form. The habitus, in this case, is a mobile sign-post that traces out a territory or habitat. It marks the limits of a territorial domain. Any small deviation in the tracing of a territory or the slightest misstep while patrolling the boundary will cross a

threshold and enter into a new domain. Perhaps the habitus is best conceived as a mobile ma(r)ker of limits and always in very close proximity to the threshold. For example, an object bearing the logo BMW may very well belong to (i.e., designate or indicate) a group, and allow the occupant to pass as a member. But a minor imperfection in the object's appearance could also signal a change of status and an inability to pass. Entering the wrong password on a computer terminal, bearing the wrong ticket stub, wearing the wrong costume, being unable to reply to the challenge or responding inappropriately, can result in being turned back by the guardians at the door. Keeping up or maintaining appearances requires effort and an attention to the small details.⁹⁴

There is no territoriality without the marks that designate and constitute it. The habitus is a habitat marker, but it is also a marginal- or limit-object (see Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 438). Limit-objects are penultimate because any movement further or beyond *oversteps the bounds* and enters a new domain, a new situation, a new territory (or new assemblage). The *threshold*, like the proverbial straw, is therefore the ultimate point of change lying just beyond or

⁹⁴ See the previous discussion on the 'small details' and their relevance for progress through the ranks of the disciplinary apparatus and Baudrillard's discussion of the optical or media test.

after the limit-object (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 440). The habitus is a *territorializing expression* because it is always at the margins and walks a fine line very close to the point of change.

While the habitus bears no resemblance to that which it expresses, it is nevertheless ‘naturally’ associated with a given space (see Maffesoli, 1993: 10). Displaced from *its* space, and transposed into another which it does not belong, the habitus will always appear clumsy or gauche (Maffesoli, 1993: 10), that is, it will produce signs that are *symptomatic* of its dissociation. As a limit-marker (cf. Bourdieu’s discussion of distinction), the habitus sets up stakes, indicates a domain, defines a locale or habitat (place of belonging), and establishes a post, rank or station. It exposes situations and discloses (local) *states*, even inward ones -- as in the qualities/matters of expression which indicate disposition, temper, or mood. However, because it is always so close to the threshold, it doesn’t take much to displace it. A minor slip, deviation, or slight change in manner can be a major *faux pas* and cause it to fall outside the bounds of qualified behaviour (as is the case in Durkheim’s imaginary “community of saints” where the appearance of a “minor imperfection” -- the sign of the crime of differentiation -- serves as a constantly renewable source of fundamentalism and *likeness*).

The habitus is indexical insofar as it inclines the attention to something not in the field of perception, which has no likeness to it, but which nevertheless has a mode of being; an anticipatory mode of being (as in apprehension⁹⁵). As with all forms of the index, it warns (like a barometer) of things to come. And like all placards or similar such advertisements that throw out suggestions or warnings, they effect a territorialization, as the following example illustrates:

When a driver, to attract the attention of a foot passenger and cause him to save himself, calls out . . . so far as it is simply intended to act on the hearer's nervous system and to rouse him to get out of the way, it is an index, because it is meant to put him in real connection with the object, which is his situation relative to the approaching horse (Peirce, 1955: 109).

Such *warning-shots* assign space. They not only parry potential blows or ward-off incursions of those who come too close (producing signs that they should keep their distance), they spatialize. They delimit situations as they indicate changed ones, i.e., that one has crossed a threshold and is in a qualitatively different situation which requires a change of habit, attention, or manner. As in the above example, the action/expression of calling out (A1) is linked to the modified action of the foot passenger (A2). A1 warns of a situation (S) which is then 'picked up' by the foot passenger who responds appropriately (A2), moving from the path of

⁹⁵ Apprehension is both an act of anticipation (foreseeing) and of capture (i.e., to grasp, take possession of, or assume ownership).

the horse (an act of resistance/escape), perhaps only to be struck from above by a falling piano -- some indices provide better, more detailed directions than others, but they still only direct the attention to their object (the horse or the falling piano?) blindly.

The action of indices is two-sided; one side concerns the territorializing expression (A1-S), the other, its reception and the changed habit (S-A2). Their inter-action sets up the following sequence: action-capture/resistance-modified-action. The element of struggle (one thing acting upon the actions of another) which characterizes the action of indices (see Peirce, 1955: 89) occurs in the interval between one action and another, and through their indirect, yet tactile encounter. Indices always act in purely brute or dyadic ways (Peirce, 1955: 275). Indexical interaction does not therefore encompass giving or exchanging (cf. Bourdieu, 1977: 73) since these imply thirdness (or a relation external to the sides). Indices are ballistic and therefore involve directed motion whereas there need be no motion of that which is given or exchanged (see Peirce, 1955: 92). For example, if person A throws B and person C picks it up this is not an exchange, but rather one dyadic event (A-B) followed by another (B-C). The same holds if A throws B and by blind action produces the event B-hitting-C. Event B-C is a

forcible modification brought about by the index A-B (just as the changes in a barometer are forceful modifications brought about by the pressure of the air).

Indices have a positive relation with projection. They are cast-off or shed, just as one might cast-off an old *habit*. They also cast light on (uncover or expose) situations which are not otherwise given. They illuminate space, cast or shape habitats, and fore-cast (anticipate) events or situations to come. Insofar as they are cast-off, they are destined to be picked up or *slipped on* by others (as discarded clothes). Perhaps the most familiar indexical situation concerns the 'sight-gag' where the cast-off banana peel (A1) is inadvertently slipped on by another (A2). While there may be no intention, there is still a force-relation where one action acts on another. But this relation is established by means of a situation.⁹⁶ In this case the situation acts as a hydraulic mechanism to transmit the small action of one body to another at a distance. It therefore occupies the interval between executed and received movements. Another familiar example is the character who lets slip an index in a moment of inattention (*lapsus habitus*) and discloses her part in the murder. In this case, the distance/difference between guilt

⁹⁶ Without the presence of this virtual link, actions would be little more than a heterogeneous collection of archaeological remnants or sign fragments.

and innocence is revealed by a simple economy⁹⁷ of manners, gestures, or appearances. Typically, a minor change in habit (as in *dressage*), a slight defect, flaw, a break in the action, or a crack in behaviour is enough to carry out a large movement or global displacement. For example, in Chaplin's *The Great Dictator* "the difference between the little Jewish barber and the dictator is as slight as that between their two moustaches. However, two situations arise from this which are infinitely far apart, as opposable as those of victim and the executioner" (Deleuze, 1991: 171). The smallest difference in action or between two actions can act to carry the attention away in different directions or set up incommensurable situations. Chaplin is a master of the habitus and its blind directives. He is capable of locating that infinitesimal distinction of manner that will betray the fiercest opposition.

Since the space between the different actions is infinitesimal and the action itself is always encroaching on the limit, the act of overstepping the bounds produces a qualitative shift -- the changes are different in kind rather than different

⁹⁷ From the point of view of production-cost, the inter-action-image has a certain economy, where for example, a shot of a face in rapid alternation of light and shadow is probably more economical than a shot where an actual train passes before a character. Yet this economy of cost may not hold in all instances, and is therefore insufficient to distinguish this kind of composition. Instead, what characterizes the inter-action-image is an *economy of local movements* to effect *global shifts*, as in the Archimedean principle of leverage.

in degree. The difference between famine and feast, poverty and wealth, or victim and executioner are not placed on a graduated continuum of more or less. They are sudden differences. In the equivocal form, the smallest difference or variation of action exists only to be rapidly expanded into infinitely distances and differences of situation. Thus, the smallest difference in *manner* (modes of behaviour, dress, expression, or look) produces indices of qualitatively different lived situations.

It is the fluidity of situations that constitutes the 'missing' intermediaries, that links heterogeneous behaviours together, and makes them communicate. It is not the case, therefore, that links are simply omitted, and that the resulting empty-space must be filled by the spectator (see Fiske, 1989). Rather it is a case of being incited to speak or reason the gap, to produce an after-image of (or recognize) the underlying discourse (or the difference of discourse) corresponding the virtual event or situation which is not given to perception but is nevertheless indicated and therefore *perceived without being seen*. For what is not present is nevertheless *presentified*. The space (interval) between the actions is not empty but full of anticipatory percepts or virtual perceptions. Deleuze and Guattari call it *haptic space* (1987: 479): it is a space of affects. Different from optical space

where differences and distances can be measured (stepped off or metred), in haptic space large distances/differences come together in infinite proximity without merging. Haptic space is qualitative, a space and spacing of qualitative distinctions, as well as a space of thresholds, sudden changes, turning-points, or crises.

The interval between the actions is a discursive space (lit. to run apart, to branch or fork). It is a point where different *ways* (the lines traced by the moving points) happen to encounter one another, cross paths (momentarily disclosing a crossroads), or swerve to ward off an anticipated collision. In the interval of the action-image, places act as challenges while actions constitute habit-changes whose appropriateness is determined by the ability to foresee and bring about a change of place. In the inter-action-image, an image of place (or of displacement) is produced by the action differentials which direct its disclosure. Like the signs of metonymy, antonomasia, and synecdoche where, for example, titles stand in place of proper names or elements or an element of a set stands in place of a larger set, these action differentials or habit-changes serve as *place-holders* for changes in the unseen set, setting, or situation. They serve to indicate changes in the out-of-field, just as a shot of a face in rapid alterations of light and shadow might

serve not only to indicate a train station, but also anticipate a change of state (leaving one place or arriving at another), an arrival and a possible meeting of ways, or a departure and a parting of ways, or even to indicate having reached a critical juncture or crossroads and an anticipated change of direction. Since the object, event, or situation is not given but rather indicated, and thus *reasoned* to exist, this indexical scene/seen is also the basis of a difference of opinion. I say this because opinion is typically supported by *grounds or premises* which are not firmly anchored or set in place, and cannot, therefore, rule out other opinions and the possibility of dispute (see also Bourdieu, 1977: 164). This is not to suggest that opinions are groundless, but rather that they incline towards a virtual ground (a *field of opinion*, the *locus of possible discourses or things that can be stated*, Bourdieu, 1977: 168-9). So, for example, the image of Jack, holding a bloody knife, walking from a house, is an index that points to *something* in the virtual frame of reference, where some event must have taken place.

The index discloses a change in direction or a tendency, an inclination, a slope. It is a line of (f)light which turns towards (expresses) and illuminates the out-of-field (the virtual set) but which can also fork or diverge in different directions (disclosing a situation of ambiguity). As an expressive element, every

index contains an element of firstness⁹⁸ and is therefore a facial equivalent expressing qualities. But insofar as the expressed qualities are virtually correlated with a place and a time, and are explained or accounted by their spatialization, they become indices. Indices always conjure and inhabit locales or particular regions of space and are *bound* to express these *spatializations* or, as in the case of the habit-change, geographic transitions. Like the habitus which produces these expressive signs by motion or change (i.e., by motor-tendencies), it actualizes a place-image by its operations.

In the inter-active form, the actions of the habitus signal a change of place and a change in the out-of-field (the super-set). The space between these locations can be infinitely large, but the spatial transformation occurs instantaneously and the shift between one position and another is sudden. Contiguity is the norm of the inter-action film. The movements that indicate this shift are movements which travel at infinite speed. By these speedy movements, near and far lose all sense of proportion and distance loses its quantitative dimension. This space of transformation is qualitative and the movements are expressions of the changing qualities of lived space. In its equivocal form the roving habitus indicates a space

⁹⁸ See Peirce (1955: 108).

of confrontation. It brings qualitative differences together in the same location without merging them. It is in this space of encounter where different forces meet, collide and bifurcate in other and opposable directions.

The opposable determinations produced by this montage ensemble are intensive rather than extensive. When the differences of manners or habits are close together, the distinctions of location (of place, rank, social position, or social class) are sharper, and the intensity (virtual experience) of the scene is heightened. Whether this intensity is actualized as happy or sad is a matter of interpretation. What is important is that this montage form produces the locus of difference between different opinions, between potentially different discursive enunciations, or possible articulations of the affect. It is because the situation has been facified that these different potential expressions are fostered. The face fuels the process of interpretation. Consider, for example, that one of cinema's favourite vehicles for the inter-action-image is the party or dinner-party (as in the preceding scene from Chaplin's *Gold Rush*). The contiguity of habits and the opposable territorialisations that they establish makes the dinner party an excellent occasion for producing intensive situations and for their actualization as a difference of opinion (i.e., for the duel of forces on a small-scale). "Kazan advised that people

in conflict should be made to eat together: the common absorption would make the eruption of duels even stronger” (Deleuze, 1991:156).

At the dinner party, the smallest difference in manners, know-how, or cultural competence can serve to disclose a large difference between lived situations. The ensuing ‘table talk’ typically takes the form of a difference of opinion between rival groups based on the different qualities of the situation each recognizes. There are many examples of the dinner-party scenario. In Donaldson’s (1984) remake of *Mutiny on the Bounty* for example, there are several dinner-parties where the different potentials and ways of living the situation (different affective actualizations) come into contact. It is here that the fractures of the scene and among the ship’s company are not only revealed but are intensified (these fractures are also the ‘openings’ prepared for the reluctant hero who will subsequently engage in a duel against the captain’s excessive ‘alien code’ -- this film illustrates the small-scale insert in the large-scale action film). In Edward’s *The Party* (1968), minor variations in the habitus (the variety of ‘slips’ and ‘sight gags’ that populate the film) serve to disclose the enormity of the distance between the insiders and the ‘cultural incompetent’ or foreigner who tries to pass.

In all cases of inter-action montage, the differences of culture, social position, social class, and rank, as well as the differences between such opposed figures as good and evil, master and slave, victim and executioner are presented as itinerant distinctions. According to the structural models of culture, such as the one proposed by Levi-Strauss and adopted by a host of other analogical thinkers, these differences are supposed to be as different as night and day, or raw and cooked. Cultural codes and the totems which support them are supposed to maintain firm distinctions and preserve boundaries between self and other. Inter-action montage does not undo these distinctions but rather locates that interval where the boundaries between them are adjacent and come infinitely close together. These marginal locations are places of passage between vastly different states (of being). They are intervals of movement between the scenes. Movements through these permeable membranes, between very different situations, can be the result of very small modifications. Minor changes in habit can produce major changes in one's habitat, and the smallest modification of manner can have global consequences, can produce a global shift, and radically alter one's position.

As I suggested at the close of the last chapter, the inter-action image is a

variation on realist cinematography and strikes a chord with the ongoing plans and global projects of modernity. The large-scale action-image is premised on the notion that the global situation could be given, or at least understood, and could 'inspire' a corresponding system of action capable of modifying it. Conversely, the inter-action image is premised on the idea that even the slightest change in action, of a series of such small-scale actions, can reveal the truth (secret) of the global scene or situation, either by directing its disclosure in a piecemeal fashion (one [mis]step at a time), or by exposing its underlying contradictions. The secret revealed in the inter-action film is that the difference and distance between different states (of things) while apparently large, is actually quite small. For example, what are we to understand from that most famous scene in Chaplin's *Modern Times*? That the machine is really an instrument of torture? It doesn't take much to reveal the other face of the machine, or to force it to reveal its ambiguous truth. A minor change of habit or a moment of inattention is enough to change the tool into a weapon.

Summary

The power of the inter-action-image is mobilized to produce an image or place, space or situation, and where such an image is not given in advance of the action, but is expressed by it. The space expressed by the inter-action-image is not the space internal to the frame or *closed-system* -- such conceptions of space always lead us back to an image of a static or firmly bounded system, from which nothing escapes, in which everything is firmly anchored in place (contained in coordinates) and subject to illumination and observation (the erroneous dream of the panoptic state). There will always be something that escapes the fixity of boundaries and totalizing points of view. It is to this space beyond the frame that the inter-action-image turns. The inter-action-image *sets up* an indirect image of whole (the virtual, super-set out-of-frame) by means of the difference within an action or between two actions (i.e., the habit-change). This set is disclosed without being seen, and presentified without being present (in the mode of an absent presence or mimetically).

Whether as an action that responds to a given state of affairs in or to bring about another, or as the difference of action that discloses a state of affairs or the difference between two states, movement-images always forge links between

space and action. In the action-image, space extends (or contracts) into the movement of the characters caught up in it as they see what is given and invent responses to it (even untimely, inappropriate ones). In the inter-action-image, actions extend into spaces and places (even different or ambiguous ones) which are blindly opened up or dis-closed by it.⁹⁹ Consequently, actions are always migratory and go from place to place, following lines of f(l)ight which reterritorialize them (even if the course they chart is not determined in advance).

Taken in its conceptual sense the habitus is an *assemblage* of space (habitat) and movement (motor-tendencies) which are bound together by lines of

⁹⁹ The effects of action may be 'unintended' (not seen, known or 'given' beforehand) but they are not 'unanticipated.' Rather the effects are given in the mode of certainty we call anticipation. For an action which did not produce an effect, that is, an 'action' which did not change anything (even if only to restore or reproduce the conditions of action -- as in the cyclical struggle to survive) would hardly qualify as such. While *this* effect may surprise, *some* effect is certainly anticipated. Furthermore, *intentionality* is a matter of opinion and requires a law or *norm of foreseeability* in order to make such a judgement. Such is the figure of the 'reasonable man' used to measure liability in civil proceedings (in the absence of a preestablished relationship, contract, undertaking or implied duty to care). This figure, aptly described by Herbert, is: "Devoid ... of any human weakness, with not a single saving vice, sans prejudice, procrastination, ill nature, avarice, and absence of mind, this excellent but odious creature stands like a monument in our courts of justice, vainly appealing to his fellow citizens to order their life after his own example" (cited in Fleming 1968: 30). Invoking this alien *law-man* as a model avoids the invidious task of scrutinizing dispositions (or dispositives) and instead measures the *external* manifestations of conduct as good or bad copies of an abstract code: i.e., could a 'reasonable man' have anticipated the effects of this action?

force (constituting a *sensory-motor connection* in Deleuze's terms) and which produce indexical signs. Binding space and motion produces coordinated and qualified actions that are more than just images or figures of consciousness. Since these images *have extension* and inhabit or stake-out regions of space they are 'realist.' Realist action-images are not defined by the frame of the shot (or set). Instead, they are produced dynamically, by the lines of force that pass through, overflow and escape the boundaries of the frame, only to reterritorialize on an action or a situation. These lines of force forge links between space and motion (though in an indeterminate,¹⁰⁰ inferential, anticipatory manner which structures possibilities rather than outcomes) and so constitute those ensembles of situation-action, those movement-images we call *habitus*. The *habitus* is a manner of seeing and speaking about movement (change and transformation) as inextricably space-bound, and where change is equivalent to changing places, or migrating from one place to another. There is, however, another kind of motion, one which escapes territorialization, breaks the links that constitute the *habitus* and its spatial

¹⁰⁰ That is, not in the same way that the spatial machinery of the disciplinary apparatus assigns places by means of a structure grid, plan, or time-table (see Shields, 1991: 40)

practice, and undoes the subordination of movement to space. A discussion of the 'third' form of the movement-image is taken up in the following chapter.

CHAPTER 8

SYMBOLIC RELATIONS: TOWARD A VIRTUAL SOCIOLOGY

In the same way that light from an object is perceived by us not as the subjective excitation of the optic nerve but as the objective form of something outside the eye itself. But in the act of seeing, there is in all events, an actual passage of light from one thing to another, from the external object to the eye. There is a physical relation between physical things (Marx, 1978: 321).

The power of cinema, as distinct from the still, the picture, or the finished work of art, is a consequence of the fact that movements escape the frame and pass through it. This out-of-field (interval or gap) is of fundamental importance in the cinematography of the movement-image. Its powers/qualities are made use of in many ways to structure expectations, to direct motion, and to produce the overall effect of seamlessness. In the conventions of cinematography, however, the out-of-field (in all its externality and otherness) has simply been used as a means of establishing habitual links and their corresponding indexical signs. In this chapter, what will be considered is the problem of the return of the out-of-field (the return of the *expressed*, the other, or the nomadic singularity) and the unsettling effects and the kinds of signs it produces.

Just as objects of perception have an existence outside perception, so do objects of thought, mental-images, have an existence outside thought. This is a materialist conception, no doubt, but one which stands apart from all those common materialists who attempt to derive thought-objects from perception. The 'objects' of thought are relations, or rather a manner of envisioning relations beyond the habitual associations and the clichés which masquerade as thoughts (i.e., reasons, justifications, opinions, as well as the difference of opinions or contradictions). A relation is a manner of sociating beyond the norm, the rule, or the code (see Chapters 3 and 5). It cannot be a property or attribute of one or the other terms, objects, or parties involved in it, nor can it be an attribute of their set, setting, or situation. It is independent of the terms and external to the set. It is a thirdness which cannot be reduced to one or the other or even to the duality of pairs (opposition) or the duel or forces.

Since a relation is a process that covers time, it cannot be immediate nor a property of things in isolation. The relational quality must be external to the terms and different from *their* difference. It is only through the *difference of difference* that a relation endures. The difference of difference is not an 'identity.' Identity itself is a badly framed concept. It is a reflection of confinement or an enclosed

universe. It is an image of the settled and of the stability of those who settle, and the denial of difference that comes at the end of a struggle, that is, when further recalcitrance is made impossible (or appropriated and brought into service; see Chapter 2 on the sign-regime), when there are no other foreseeable possibilities, or when all lines of flight have been foreclosed or exhausted. Identity is the product of capture or surrender. For example, Weber's (1978: 212-254) theory of authority and the orders of domination (i.e., the bureaucracy, charismatic community, and traditional office of dominance) revolves round an identity politic. From this perspective, the structures of ruling are based on 'accounts' of the 'motivations' (rational or otherwise) which lead people to surrender to, 'subject' themselves to, or identify with the will of another.

These legitimate forms of rule, like their opposite -- brute force, are totalitarian forms of governance since they only reign in the absence of resistance. Weber's reflections on these settled mechanisms are therefore very one-sided (admittedly so: "one-sided accentuations" form the basis of his method; Weber, 1949: 90). Whether as force or authority, these structures of domination are variations of the apparatuses of capture (variations on the theme of the iron cage). They are at the extreme limits of the exercise of power. However, between the

polarities of capture/consensus there is an interval space where settlement is not realized and where the limits of closure have not yet been achieved. This unsettled margin is a terrain of open contest; it is a place of challenge and response where everything is not already solved or worked out in advance, the place of the difference of difference, and the locus of power relations.

A relation can only occur between unlike things (or different tendencies; see Boundas 1996: 86). There is no difference between one and one. To simply repeat the same (to match blow for blow) is to deny a relation, just as to return or respond with the same (an eye for an eye) is to refuse the gift. The gift relation is a form of repetition-difference. The gift is different each time it returns, and must be if the gift-relation is to endure. It is the difference of two which makes a relation possible, but the mere appearance of difference is insufficient to explain the relation itself. For a relation to occur each must partake in a common quality, a likeness which neither term can possess as a property or an attribute.

A relation is a conjunction of differences in kind, and, as Peirce would say, between things that are distant and yet not naturally/physically connected in the mind. Indexicality does not constitute a relation. It is only a 'indirect reflection' of the motion of 'habitually' associated pairs. To establish a complementarity

between things that are different in kind it is necessary to find a common ground which will act as a denominator of their distance, and serve as a meeting place of their antithetic difference. Neither side can lay claim to this space nor possess it. It must be indifferent to their contents, interests, directions or motivations (see Simmel's discussion of sociability), and independent of their relative properties or qualities (it is the properties or qualities of things that make them relatively different). This 'third' element will always be somewhere between or beyond the relative terms of the relation and will only ever be expressed in their open, public encounter. It is here, in the open, unsettled space between terms, where this 'other difference' lives. It penetrates every association and acts as a virtual third party. This third term (the *interpretant* in Peirce) interrupts the flow of normal associations and disrupts the movement of *information*.¹⁰¹ All *exchanges* pass, indirectly through the interval of the third. Thirdness therefore introduces a relation-image (an image of the whole) as a supplement to the habitual

¹⁰¹ Information is that which moves or passes indexically between two, from one who has seen or experienced something to one who hasn't seen or experienced, or where one constitutes or fills out the scene in which the other acts, reacts, or responds. The information relation has a close parallel in Bakhtin's conception of the monological (and hierarchical) relation between author and hero, where the author knows or sees more than the hero, and therefore constitutes the scene or setting (the encompassing space) in which the hero acts (or fails to act or see clearly what is given).

association, and which penetrates and transforms the latter.¹⁰² It adds an air of *formalism* to the contents of the actions, reactions, or interactions. The relation-image is external to the terms which make it up, but an internal aspect of their relation. As a dynamic element, it cannot be expressed by the parts taken separately or outside of their relation. The third is therefore an *external* quality of resemblance or likeness. But this resemblance is not forced (or indexically disclosed). Rather, it is entirely superficial (from the Latin, *superflueux* = to overflow) and is a surplus or excess quality that can only be the symbolic expression of the relation itself. The symbol is different from both the icon and the index.

The icon is first. It is a likeness, the bearer of pure qualities and powers which constitute the 'expressed' and which cannot be reduced to situations, since it is turned-toward the potentials in the out-of-field beyond the frame. It has an anticipatory role. It prepares the event. The index is second. It is the habitual association between unlike things, and constitutes the realization of the expressed as turning toward (or indicating) something in a particular place and time. The symbol is third. It is a concrete object bearing relations. Three is a synthesis of

¹⁰² According to Maffesoli (1996: 104), "with the figure '3,' society is born and therefore sociology."

one and two which breaks down the latter and transforms them.¹⁰³ It appears only when the habitual tendencies are eliminated or diminished, when the index is denatured or rendered *unfit* for use either as a means of direction or a projectile promoting distinctions.¹⁰⁴ A symbol is a kind qualitative relation which has broken its ties or liberated itself from the gravitational forces which bind it to space or place. The third is the return of firstness (the cinematic face) with a difference. It is a return from the space out-of-field where it developed its qualities and powers (potentials). It retains its power/qualities but comes to occupy (rather than inhabit) space, to unsettle as much as open up its possibilities by the importation of qualities -- much like the stranger that comes to stay.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰³ As Maffesoli (1996: 105) points out, the third is indeed paradoxical, in that it breaks up, splinters, and diffuses the dyadic relation (or the duel of forces).

¹⁰⁴ See Simmel (1955: 338-340) on the radiation (projections) of adornment (or decoration). Adornment operates by a "radiation which it emanates." It is therefore designed for others (being-for-others) and serves as a means of difference/distinction (creating or enlarging a "precinct") but only in so far as it is an object of attention and a form of giving that "others do not *receive*," or which they merely reflect back by their reactions.

¹⁰⁵ There are interesting parallels between this kind of return and the notion of gift-giving (as discussed in Simmel, 1950: 392). The *first* gift, because of its spontaneity (its purity or freedom) is fundamentally different from the one returned (the possibility of the simple refusal -- the return of the same -- notwithstanding). The *second's* rebuttal is always a *forced reply* which stems from the moral imperative to respond or react to what is *given* (like the debt to be discharged). The problem is, how can the first return without establishing a force-relation (and the duel of forces). As I see it, the solution is found when the return is not to the first, but to another who is external to the parties involved (the diffusion or spreading effect which *short-circuits* the exchange process). It is this

Symbolic Displacements

What produces the symbolic? I argue that it is a movement of deterritorialization. A symbol is a kind of sign that neither inhabits a region of space nor indicates one. It flees spatialization. In this respect it bears iconic qualities. It is nevertheless an ordinary object (rather than something set aside or abstracted from the mundane) that bears a likeness to the everyday. At the same time that it retains its everydayness, it suspends its normal associations to the everyday. It is *in* the everyday but it is *not part* of it. A symbol therefore bears the territorializing marks of the index and would constitute the habit of moving from one thing to another (i.e., from an action to a situation or conversely), but it holds these markers in suspense, refusing to settle into the normal series of action-reactions or inter-actions. A most peculiar object no doubt, very restless, neither completely inside nor outside. By departing from the everyday, it leaves the habitus behind. It is as if it forgot, or suddenly lost interest in, what it was suppose to be doing, or what it might be expected to do. It is a kind of movement which diffuses (see Simmel, 1950: 43), spreads and grows (Peirce, 1955: 115),¹⁰⁶

multiple relation that surpasses the conditions of the duel.

¹⁰⁶ It is this kind of growth or evolution that surpasses the Durkheimian sense of growth which is synonymous with diversification, an increase in specialization and in variety, and where a relentless force of evolution (the division of labour) is

or effervesces (Maffesoli, 1996: 105), in the form of an uncontrolled flow that breaks or surpasses boundaries and territorial principles. Like a contagion or flood, it comes to fill or occupy space and to displace normal reactions and responses. It is the movement of the fluid medium which overflows the sections and crosses the instants. It is whatever is beyond the frame, which nevertheless returns to the frame, makes its presence felt as a visible, unsettling force.¹⁰⁷ Like the weathercock which no longer faces (indicates) the prevailing winds or the windmill which turns against it, a symbol is any ordinary object which has undergone a radical displacement, and which is unbound from its place in the normal sensory-motor flows (S-A-S or A-S-A).

There are many examples of symbolics in the films of Hitchcock. There is the pass-key which does not fit the lock (in *Dial M for Murder*) and so does not permit passage between one state and another (it opens up a multiplicity of possibilities), or the crop-spraying plane which suddenly appears at the crossroads and in the barren landscape where there are no crops to spray (in *North by*

a movement from less organized to more organized (likeness to difference), from natural liberty to social bondage (less bound together to more bound together), from the jack-of-all-trades to the master of one (undisciplined to the disciplined self-control).

¹⁰⁷ While Maffesoli deals with the importance of intrusions of the 'outsider,' here we are dealing with the importance of intrusions of the 'outside.'

Northwest), and, of course, there are *The Birds* who come like a flood (or contagion) to occupy all the spaces of action-reaction, who spill through every crack and crevice and chase off their human counterparts. Have these birds suddenly broken their normal pattern of migration in order to become bird-colonizers? Are they an inversion of normal relations or an upside-down image -- the inverted image of the scarecrow perhaps? Have they simply exchanged one habitus for another, a more insidious one? Or, is it a matter of inserting a filmic discontinuity, a matter of breaking the flow, interrupting the normal sequence of events, or suspending the suspense interminably? How does one respond to these familiar elements that refuse to settle into the order of things and that resist its flow? What secret situation do they disclose?

We can again draw some simple examples from cinema in order to illustrate the social context of the symbol. Hitchcock has long been known as one of the masters of the art of suspense. This is because of his understanding of montage, and most of all because he understands the faciality of the close-up. The key, the plane, and the birds are facified objects. They are objects with real uses, which stand in real relations to other things and bodies, and are elements that are connected to a set of relations to which they belong. But they are also elements

that have suddenly forgone or forgotten these connections, have turned against their former dependencies, and have decided to exert their independence. They are not, therefore, aliens that suddenly appear on the scene. They are elements of the set that depart from it, and return to it with a difference, in order to make a difference.

In *Vertigo*, Hitchcock introduces a twist in the detective genre. In this film the hero does not appear ready-made, but rather has an affliction, a flaw or fault that renders him powerless to act in key situations (similar to the 'detective' in *The Rear Window*) and to see clearly what is his situation. In his detective role he is also given to protracted bouts of blind direction (the 'tracking shots' in which he follows the character Madeline) which aims toward the piecemeal disclosure of a situation. In the typical detective fashion, he feels his way around in the dark (the dark situation), gradually picking up clues to illuminate the puzzle he has been enlisted to solve. For him everything is an index, pointing to *something* just over the horizon. And, being a detective, his job is to muse on (and exploit) all of those things or expressions that the other does not expressly reveal or show to us (the reserve or surplus), or whatever the other *lets slip* in the normal course of things. The master of indiscretion, no *expressed* is allowed to pass or to escape

the attention. Everything is recorded, trapped, or absorbed, and section by section the whole is gradually assembled or pieced together. In the art gallery scene, several shots establish the link between Madeline's flower, the curl of her hair, and the flower, the curl of the hair of the woman in the painting. Montage establishes the link between the images as smooth transitions from one to the other, much like making a photograph where model and copy are forced to correspond point for point, or where one naturally goes from model to copy in a seamless manner. Here the habitual series is established. Further archival investigation will disclose a potentially deeper resemblance (historical link) between model and copy (the inherited tendency). In the end the expected happens and the anticipated event is finally disclosed. Or is it?

The hero's affliction also makes him powerless to save the police officer on the roof top, or to stop Madeline's apparent suicide from the bell tower. In fact his vertigo renders him unable to continue his pursuit to the top of the tower, and therefore unable to see or act as an eyewitness to the event. The event itself has to be blindly deduced from the chain of shots which indicate it and motivate the reasoning (the *truth* of the opinion is later affirmed by tribunal at the coroner's inquest). Later the hero is struck by the image of a women (Judy) he encounters

in the street. It is her resemblance to Madeline (an ambiguous situation) that turns him off his course of despair as he follows her back to her apartment. This time the investigation provokes a change of habitus as the hero goads Judy into taking on Madeline's habitus (her hair, her clothes) until she is made-over into her image. When the habit-change is near completion, it is then that Judy delivers up her role in the crime -- by means of a flashback insert where the excluded shot from the bell tower scene returns. Then she lets slip an index of her complicity in the crime through the necklace that she wears, which, it turns out, resembles the one in the portrait of Carlotta -- again this link is affirmed by means of a flashback insert.

The necklace is the key or cipher, the crucial element and the turning point (much like the earring discovered under the bed in *Sex, Lies and Videotapes* which discloses the infidelity). It is the point at which relations depart from their normal series, and suddenly change or reverse. The necklace serves as a badge of rank, status, or distinction. It is also a memento of the crime and an expression of a secret criminal association. It is by means of adornment/expression that Judy delivers up (or gives away) to the hero her complicity in Madeline's murder -- as if unable to bear the weight of the secret any more. In the act of adornment she

simultaneously gives up her secret and *loses her charm*. But it is only when they return to the bell-tower (the scene of the crime) that the hero's affliction -- his vertigo and his desire for the women (they are like affections) -- is overcome and he begins to see clearly. This character flaw or crack initially serves as an opening to be explored or exploited, which allows him to be seduced or taken advantage of (as a dupe or patsy), and makes him a second (accomplice) in the production of an elaborate feint. But this inability to see clearly also fosters the attractional relationship with Carlotta/Madeline/Judy. His vertiginousness encourages a kind of *natural discretion* that forces him to keep his distance, to maintain *the* secret, to keep open the possibilities of their relationship, and to preserve its *formal qualities*.¹⁰⁸ However, this natural discretion runs counter to the acts of *indiscretion* and *closeness* required by his social role as detective. The discreet-detective is precariously perched on the margins between these opposing forces, that is, between the normal requirements or conventions of his actual social position and the unsettling effects of his other disposition. He lives simultaneously in two worlds.

¹⁰⁸ See Simmel (1955: 40-43) on the content/form distinction and on his discussion of the importance of discretion (1955: 320-21), rather than desire, in the sociable relation.

When he is finally overcome by a clarity of vision (in accordance with the practical, habitual requirements of his social role) the *reserved* shot (the secret) is fully actualized. The gap or opening is filled in, first by means of the flashback and then the hero's verbal 'recollection'. His recollection of events (the secret returned or expressed) strikes Carlotta/Madeline/Judy with the force of a projectile. It sends her into a vertiginous spin, as she fails to see clearly, loses her orientation, and falls out of frame. The secret, that is, the *reserved, unseen* virtual link (a lie or a truth), when it returns to the frame, is too powerful to be contained by the frame and so overflows its bounds.

Virtual Worlds

The secret offers, as Simmel argues, the possibility of a virtual world alongside the actual world (i.e., alongside the official world of rules and roles), one which "produces an immense enlargement of life" (1955: 330). The sociological significance of the secret is this: the secret is a relation, and so does not belong to anyone, nor is it the property of that omnipotent figure of the unconsciousness (which in itself is another fetishistic form, a product of reification or naturalization). The secret is a relation of thirdness. Even if it is kept, it is

always kept from another. If it involves the exclusion of another from 'knowing' or 'seeing' (i.e., the one who doesn't have the 'know-how' or this 'other-knowledge') then this other remains a fundamental element in a secret relation.

"However often a lie may destroy a given relationship, as long as the relationship existed, the lie was an integral element of it" (Simmel, 1950: 316). The secret is the excluded third-party who can serve as a means or instrument of the duel, but it is also the inside-outsider, that synthesis of the near and far,¹⁰⁹ or close and distant, who produces its suspension, however temporary the respite. Thus, the secret excludes but at the same time possesses a strange inviting quality: it potentializes relations. This is its charm, so to speak -- like the attraction of those secret associations that are 'known' to exist but whose reason, purpose, rules or manners remain a mystery.

We already know from Baudrillard the importance of the secret. It is the opposite of pornography and its hyper-realism. A world without secrets is a world without possibilities -- where there is nothing to know because everything is already there. For Baudrillard the hyper-real is a world of capture and its exposure in the circulation of information (a perspective roughly equivalent to

¹⁰⁹ See Simmel's (1955: 404) discussion of the Stranger.

Barthes' notion of the circulation of the arrested elements and Foucault's chain-gang). But as Foucault has argued, the production of the official world is never simply a matter of enclosing the secret, nor keeping it locked up in the dark. Counter to the repressive hypothesis, he argues that the official manners and habits are also produced through exposure, but in this case it is through controlled exposure to the secret gaze (the unverifiable, anonymous look). Here the power of *secrecy in general* is deployed as a counter-strategy to police all those mysterious associations and bodies that are caught in its omniscience. This is not simply a problem of knowing too much, or seeing too much, but, rather, one of an exposure/secrecy, or power/knowledge relation. Even in the most obsessive exposure there is a reserved element. While, as Simmel (1950: 347) claims, secret societies tend to emerge as the counterpart to despotism and police restriction, in the disciplinary apparatus, exposure to the face of alterity is a means of permanently exposing the secret of these virtual relations. In this case the virtuality of the secret, the form of resistance, and the possibilities of escape to another world are made to serve as instruments of control. Cinema goes even further. Here the face of alterity and the power/qualities of the out-of-field work differently, and secrecy takes on another form, one "which constantly receives and

releases contents” (see Simmel, 1950: 335). By selectively incorporating virtual elements into the flow, processes of exposure and disclosure, of gathering and releasing the secret, are used to produce a variety of manners, actualities, events, and scenarios. The power to control the out-of-field, the horizon of possibilities, or the common *other* in perception, is the power to structure events, to determine the possibilities of action, and to link these determinations together in various ways. The resulting circuits of motion are constituted by the strategy of relating virtual and actual elements, that is, by variously deploying the secret in order to construct regimes of truth. It is only when the secret returns from the out-of-field, when it exerts its independence from any form of actualization, that it acts to interrupt the flow and break the normal circuits of action and reaction or situation and response.

While the password (the gesture, signal, or habitus) is a secret, it is one that is expressed in response to a challenge. It is a secret that controls passage through the interval, and, like the pass-key, it permits passage from place to place. Similarly, the expression of the password (or the appropriate habitus) can serve as a means of disclosing the group or place one belongs. As Simmel argues, secrecy itself constitutes a sort of transitional moment between being and not-being (1950:

347) and as such surpasses the limits of territorialization. While the secret is kept from others, and serves to keep others at a distance, it is also given, offered up, passed on, or shared. It only has value in relation to others. It is the expression of other-knowledge, which forms the basis for the habitual know-how to respond. The secret is the expression of a relation of displacement. It is a form of awareness of the third, of being-for-others, or *publicity*. It is a form of relation that is constituted in the open, in the openings between sites. The place of the symbolic relation is deterritorialized. It is a virtual space, a space of *occupation* which cannot be *inhabited*, since it lacks the necessary boundaries to provoke the fixed habits. These spaces are temporary sites where one might abide without constituting a place of abode (see Simmel, 1950). While these uninhabitable regions may serve as migration routes for directed movements, where the flow of bodies and information are often policed, they are also places of mixture and intermingling. These symbolic spaces are characterized by their break with the sensory-motor space of the habitus. But unlike the sacred site which is set aside from the everyday, symbolic space can rise up anywhere, in the most profane of sites.

Symbolic space is divorced from the practical and serious business of getting on with things and pragmatic aims and ends. A characteristic feature of this space is that it can be anywhere (see Maffesoli, 1993b), in the horizonlessness of any-place-what-ever, rather than a given situation. As Simmel defines them, they are spaces of playful, sociable, rather than social encounters, because they represent the “pure form that is raised above all contents such as characterized by those more concrete ‘societies’” (1955: 44) and are therefore “free from the entanglements of practical life.” As an aesthetic dimension they are “far from copying any reality” (Simmel, 1955: 55). In such liminal spaces, normal movements (situated responses) are held in suspense, as situations no longer embody the implied interests which provoke practical extension or ‘legitimate’ actions.

In liminal spaces, the habitus fails to function normally and produce the appropriate extensions. At the same time, the structure of normal perception changes. Without the structure-other populating the boundary or horizon of a given experience, softening the transition from one point of view to another and regulating one’s subjective perceptions, one finds oneself caught in a pure optical situation and forced to become a “pure seer” (Deleuze, 1991: 41). The effect is to

create another perception, closer to the genetic basis of perception itself, or what Deleuze refers to as *differential perception*.

In differential perception the otherwise distinct poles become blurred and so enter into *free and familiar contact* with one another. In a pure optical situation one not only sees, but also sees oneself seeing from another vantage point. Bakhtin defines the literary equivalent of differential perception as “free indirect discourse” -- a state of becoming where characters do not simply react mechanically to the ready-giveness of their objective situation, but simultaneously constitute the scene for themselves. As a means of undoing the rigid polarities of the authorial (objective) and heroic (subjective) points of view, Bakhtin defines the poetic situation as follows: “There is literally nothing that we can say about the hero . . . that he does not already know himself” (1984: 52). When the habitus fails to translate situations into action, or vice versa, the power of the action to go from milieu to milieu, across the gap, is likewise suspended.

Filmically, the symbolic power of sound was developed in the virtual space of the out-of-field. The powers and qualities of the sound-off, even music-in-the-background, are typically used as a means of linking one situation to another, virtual one. As mentioned previously, in the film *Jaws* Spielberg deployed the

sound-image to envision further scenes, and to provoke an anticipation of another visual situation independent of whether these events are realized or not. The inserted sound-image is preparatory, either of progress toward a limit, or crossing a threshold. It serves as a warning-shot, a means of knowing-beforehand, tipping-off or letting lose the secret of what is to come. The sound-image discloses or makes visible (at least potentially) something which is not seen, or not in the scene, but which could be seen (by another) -- and therefore deframes and reframes the set by its own virtual movements.

The power of sound in the out-of-field is comparable to the role of the face close-up. The close-up has the effect of abstracting the image from its spatio-temporal coordinates (coordinated space) in order to call forth a pure affect. The close-up is both a passive reflecting surface and an active surface of reflecting micro-movements, and therefore breaks the stream of reflection. The face occupies the interval of reflection, between the reflected and the reflecting. Affect-framing makes the normal functions of the face disappear, by dissolving the normal spatio-temporal coordinates (definitive milieu) in favour of the appearance of a pure quality. This affect-image does not *live* in the present or actual but in the 'virtual world'; either a past or future which is beyond the reach

of normal communication or judgement, beyond the laws or codes of normal interaction. What it gathers and expresses is too great to be derived from the milieu or even controlled by it; it is a deterritorialized image which occupies the region of the gap, the virtual, any-space-whatever on the margins between situations.

The pure affect is like a threshold, a point of change, occupying the space of transgression. Like the virtual sound-image, it is typically *inserted* in a sensory-motor scheme as a means of linking a perceived actual milieu and a practical extension which modifies it. In this case the power of the virtual affect-image is harnessed and made to function as a means of information between a received excitation (perception-image) and its practical extension (action-image). It is only when the sensory-motor scheme breaks that the affective insert or sound-image realizes its true potency as an unstable, heterogeneous surface, with a richness of potential capable of forging an infinite number of virtual links with its milieu. In the symbolic space of the pure optical or sound situation, there is a marked absence of a social space to structure actions, interactions, or invoke cliché responses. Characters caught in the virtual any-place-whatever are forced to become pure seers, and, having abandoned both the objective aspects of the situation and their subjective (selective) interest in it, they are no longer compelled

to speak or act its truth, but rather to make up stories. Here, it is as if the virtual conjunction returned to the scene in order to become its *founding act* (see Maffesoli's [1993: 14] discussion of founding myths). No longer content to populate the horizon of experience, otherness comes back into the frame, unsettling the normal parameters and boundaries of experience.¹¹⁰ This displaced space is the place of meeting, of a direct symbolic encounter with otherness. As a consequence, movement in the any-space-whatever is always abnormal, aberrant, and acentred, as unpredictable as the nomads who occupy it. In the any-place-whatever it is impossible to read-off from the behaviour the situation which induced them and which they are destined to represent. Symbolic any-place-whatevers do not induce habits.

The *normal* role of the virtual in relation to the actual is to provide a space of linkage, for without the virtual any-space-whatever occupying the regions between them, these places would remain disconnected, fractured and fragmentary figures, without a means of communication. In this case montage indirectly discloses the virtual as a means of connecting actual spaces to one another as movement through time. When the virtual any-space-whatever returns to the

¹¹⁰ The effect is one of *unbinding* established spatiotemporal relations (Shields, 1992: 193).

scene it ceases to function as a thread linking scene to scene. It is as if the actual and virtual now enter into intimate contact, opening up a new dimension of the image where virtual and actual coexist in time. In symbolic space the virtual and the actual are laid down archaeologically, adding a depth or dimension to the visual field. Characteristic of playing with the depth of field is to bring the foreground and *background* into a direct tactile encounter, that is, where the normal spatial arrangements of foreground and background become indiscernible as they recede into one another, come to occupy the same place, and change or exchange their relative positions. Symbolic space is the gathering place of the polar differentials of the actual/virtual, objective/subjective, real/imaginary, self/other in relations of unicity.¹¹¹

Sensory-motor schemes indissolubly link perceptions with action, since action either occupies the gap between opposable sensory situations or discloses a situation from the difference between situations. In either case, the interval stands as an external centre of force around which normal movements revolve. In liminal spaces (see Shields, 1991), the normal movements (situated responses) are held in

¹¹¹ While unity expresses a closed condition, the notion of unicity summons up a more open, heterogeneous situation (Maffesoli, 1991: 19, note 2). Unicity refers to a type of unity where various elements cohere, while at the same time retaining the qualities which make them different (see Maffesoli, 1993: 8).

suspense as situations no longer embody the implied interests which provoke practical extensions and *legitimate* actions. Similar to Baudrillard's conception of the crystalline objects which are "devoid of function or abstracted of use" (1990: 44), "pure optical situations" do not provoke necessary or utilitarian responses, but are open to a multiplicity of responses, each of which is equally probable and co-possible, though not at the same time. Pure optical situations therefore constitute a 'break' in the normative demands of the sensory-motor scheme, opening up co-extensive dimensions beyond the linear association. The possibility of a multiplicity of co-extensive responses or 'contingent futures' sharing the same universe of probability also discounts the governing principle of 'master narratives' (*grands récits*). Master narratives rely on the principle of falsification, that is, "any new statement that contradicts a previously approved statement regarding the referent can be accepted as valid only if it refutes the previous statement by producing arguments and proofs" (Lyotard, 1984: 26). Narrative mastery invokes the necessity of a singular appropriate response or 'truth.' Truth or meaning is authorized by a single (monological) point of view and is dependent on a fixed frame of reference which allows no displacement.

Symbolism, on the other hand, creates the very possibility for multiple “schemings of language” (see Chevalier, 1990) or multiple, non-truthful narratives. Symbols do not extend into movement of the character(s); they tend to circle back on themselves, forming circuits with other virtual images from other planes or regions of the past. Instead of passing from a present perception to a recollection which has the practical effect of extending the scene into a clichéd, familiar reaction (the structuring structure of memory as *habitus* which conserves only the sensory-motor link, the practical extension of the bygone scene or situation), actions are turned back toward the image, beginning perception all over again to emphasize certain other features that do not belong to the first perception. Each image therefore replaces the scene as something which might extend into movement, with a ‘provisional description’ which is in turn displaced by another description as the possibilities of the interval are penetrated in depth.

Flashbacks were early attempts to concentrate the power of the virtual in an actual perception. However, the conventional flashback-insert always carried with it signs which warn of the difference between perception and the specific recollection which the former called forth. In contrast, pure optical situations are constituted by disturbances of memory, that is, when memory-based ‘recognition’

fails to provide the appropriate motor extension or the know-how to respond. The habitus fails to actualize 'normally' when it is unable to transmit the cliché response from the scene to a body at a distance. Normal communicative interactions typically transmit information from one party that has seen something, to a second party, at a distance, which has not seen. As in the indexical warning or warning-shot, the second party is forced to attend to something beyond the horizon of their experience. In this kind of encounter, the response or reply to the unseen, or to the changed qualities or powers of the scene, will be based on the authority of the seer to define the scene and the ability of the second to follow with an appropriate response, or to produce the cliché reaction. The typical sociable encounter, in contrast, presupposes an exchange between a second party and a third, neither of whom has seen or experienced the subject-matter of their communication (as in the circulation of rumours and gossip). A sociability threshold (Simmel, 1950: 47) is achieved at the point when all practical or pragmatic interest is suspended and the spell of normal interaction is broken.

We enter the domain of virtual sociology precisely at a point when actions are not conditioned by pre-existing or ready-made social structures or situations, and no longer serve as a means of disclosing those that are not. The more

autonomous the speech-act, the more it gets beyond the determinate situations, and opens up a new dimension of the visual field. When individuals abandon their identity, the objective aspects of the situation, and their personal 'interest' in it, they encounter one another in a virtual world and produce purely sociable relations. The less pre-existing social structure there is, better revealed are the forms of sociability which pass through conversation. As Simmel argues, any interest expressed in the sociable encounter passes again the threshold of sociability and transforms it instantly into something qualitatively different (1950: 47).

Sound proved to be most affective when its source was not seen or not in the scene. From its displaced space it has the power to change the qualities and intensities of the lived scene, to constitute situations, to fill the seen with anticipation, to foresee events which haven't happened, and to warn of things to come. This power, the power of the out-of-field, has been deployed extensively as a means of linking one scene to another, of motivating actions and constituting situations (even ambiguous ones). Having developed its powers in the out-of-field, what happens when these virtual and virtualizing images return to the frame? Simply put, they retain their power to displace space, to fill the space of

the actual image, and, more importantly, to occupy all the room or place of action.

What could be called a voice-in, or cinematographic utterance, likewise has the power to take over the actuality of space (or the space of actuality) and to reduce the visual scene to a virtual, any-place-whatever. This any-place is devoid of ready-made structures, determinate situations, and is consequently void of any habits or determinate responses. How could one be inspired to act or possess the know-how to respond in this other-place or this open space where everything is possible? Duras defines the voice-in as a pure speech-act, as an act of resistance, one which is torn from its mooring or coordination with the visual image and imposes itself on that which resists its independence (in Deleuze, 1989: 250). In this regard, the American *talking comedy* is a good example of the resistance associated with the voice-in.

In the American small-scale comedy, the close encounter of others (other genders, classes, regions, nations, worlds, etc.), and bringing these distances and differences close-up, constituted the basis of the comedic form. As discussed in the previous chapter, these inter-action films are largely comedies of manners. The encounter of the other also forms the basis of the American *talking comedy* (see also Deleuze, 1989: 230). But in the talking comedy, the more dispersed and

independent these others are, and the less pre-existing social structure there is to condition their interactions, the better are revealed the forms of sociability which pass through their conversations. In this kind of space

It is not conversation which provides the model of interaction, it is interaction between separated people, or within one and the same person, which is the model of conversation. What we might call sociability, or small talk, in a very general sense is not identical with society: it is a matter of the interactions which coincide with speech-acts, and not actions and reactions which pass through them according to a prior structure (Deleuze, 1989: 231).

The talking comedy is defined by the way the pure speech-act comes to occupy space and overflows situations. Either everybody talks at once, or the speech of one person fills the space so completely that it reduces the other to vain attempts, stammerings, stutterings, or efforts to interrupt. Speaking instead of 'acting' or 'action' is the essential condition of the talking comedy. For example, "an actress like Katherine Hepburn reveals her mastery of the sociability stakes through the speed of her retorts, the way she disorients her partner and ties him in knots, the indifference to contents, the variety of reversals of perspective through which she passes" (Deleuze, 1989: 232). In Huston's classic *African Queen*, Hepburn (as Rose Sayer) is thrown-together (as a stranger or third) with Mr. Allnut, his habits, and mobile habitat (the boat with the film's moniker). The latter gets caught up and carried along on the flow of conversation. Her sonorous presence unsettles

the normal routine, takes over the situation, makes it problematic (or finds a problem in absence of one found ready-made), and reduces his response to vain efforts. The new course she plots will require him to surrender the habitus (in all senses of the term). One by one the old habits are shed and are left populating the river like so many cast-off bottles of rum.

Either the ordinary madness of family interactions, the intrusion of a stranger (as in the preceding example), or the abnormal can determine the craziness of conversation which is the essence of the American talking comedy and which opposes it to inter-action rituals and their dependence on a common measure or structure. In the talking comedy the power of voice spreads through the visual field and fills it. It reaches across obstacles and diversions, traversing paths through the archaeological ruins of the discontinuous visual field that have been deprived of their power to enact ritualized responses. The speech-act (a form of the symbolic-act or expression) returns to the visual field in order to become its founding act, with the power to constitute events in places that have been evacuated of their cliché responses.

Because the sensory-motor formula retains essentially what is interesting in the scene, it is poorer than the description which returns to the inexhaustible

surplus of the deterritorialized image. In the case of symbolism, the situation is not a problem to be solved, nor an obstacle to be overcome, but a secret in the form of the question: “what has happened here,” or “how did we get to such a state?” -- the formula of the short-story or novella (see Deleuze and Guattari, 1987). Framed as a question, the pure optical situation replaces action with the necessity of description, and characters who have the know-how to respond, with the necessity of making up stories. In this sense the symbolic-image is different from the inter-action-image, where, as in the detective genre, a situation already took place, and its enigmatic character is dispersed over a variety of inter-actions which progressively disclose its truth. In the symbolic-image the enigma just keeps getting deeper, since characters are no longer forced to ‘speak the truth’ of the situation in keeping with practical demands, aims, and interests. Instead they have the task of making up stories and fabricating legends (Deleuze, 1989).

Welles’ *Citizen Kane* is exemplary in its presentation of the symbolic. Similar to the structure of the inter-action-image, an event has taken place, and an ensuing investigation aims to disclose its secret. In this case, Kane is dead, and witnesses to his life offer their recollections in a series of subjective flashbacks. But the whole assemblage is more complex than this. The investigation is

focussed on the secret of *Rosebud*: What is it?; To what situation does it refer, and from what situation could it possibly derive its meaning? Instead of extending into a response which changes or fails to modify the situation, the situation becomes a point of contraction, a starting point for a renewed search and continual return to the same point -- but it is a return with a difference. Each witness questioned provides an equivalent slice of Kane's life. Each flashback is a leap to a particular region of the past to reconstitute the sensory-motor activity of former presents (i.e., in terms of their situations and habits). This effort of evocation, or summoning up, is aimed at determining which particular region of the past produces an image of *Rosebud*. Each time the question is the same: "Is this thing *Rosebud* in this region or not?"

The effort of evocation does not result in the formation of serially linked presence which actualizes the truth of the encompassing situation, nor is the action directed toward the piecemeal disclosure of a situation. Instead, each recollection constitutes a continuum on its own, and each refers to a discrete region of the past, all of which are equally coexistent, each containing the whole of Kane's life in one form or another and therefore each equally 'true' (and therefore equally false). Each evoked region of the past has its own story and possesses its own

‘legendary’ significance, and therefore its own contingent future. Even when another Rosebud is disclosed from among the immense collection which is Kane’s life, there is no one around for which it holds any particular interest.

By breaking with the sensory-motor conventions of ‘modern’ cinema, Welles was perhaps the first to empty out the ‘realist’ response and its subjectivity (i.e., as the gap between perception and reaction or situation and response), and to fill this hollowed-out interstice with the necessity of forging new relations and creating virtual events in places devoid of events. We saw this in Welles’ cinema of the question, where the meaning of Rosebud was simultaneously relayed into a multiplicity of possible connections and relations, each one incapable of exhausting, by itself, the whole meaning of the term. The whole, in this case, is not assembled in such a way as to constitute Kane as an organism or a machine, nor are the events linked together by a sensory-motor scheme. Instead, the whole comprises an ensemble of independent and coexisting singularities and a collection of truths each of which is co-possible.

This development is closely bound up with the crises and failures of the *grands récits* of modernity. The postmodern condition offers little faith in the possibility that the givenness of a global whole, or an all encompassing situation,

could ‘inspire’ or give rise to a corresponding system of action capable of modifying it. Similarly, little faith is accorded the possibility that any action or series of actions, no matter how great the effort, is capable of disclosing the truth of that situation, even partially. There is instead a problem of looking deeper into the situation for the possibilities of encounters which hide in the cliché responses and ready-made formulas of the modern strategies of power. Clichés are sensory-motor images of perception which actualize (extend) certain forces implicit in perception and necessarily hide others, that is, everything that has been removed (subordinated) in order to make the image *interesting*. Powers have an ‘interest’ in hiding in clichés, and aim to actualize certain truths at the expense of others. It is only when sensory-motor schemes break, that the image is opened to the excesses of seeing and saying.

Summary

The distinction between bodies and images can only be maintained within a particular conception of the fixed frame of reference or confined point of view. Beyond these static figures, poses, and signs of conscious life, which need to have movement added to them in order to make them significant, lies an immanent

domain of bodies already in motion, ones which move through space, get carried along on flows, and enter into encounters with other bodies where they act and react on one another. Within the domain of the tactile encounter lies the conception of montage as it operates in cinema. Montage does not operate simply to link perception-images (framed situations) to one another, without at the same time establishing a virtual space (beyond the frame) as a space of transition, translation, and virtual encounter. In the aesthetics of perception, an image is not actual without at the same time possessing a virtuality as its *other* being. To go from one perception to another it is necessary to pass through virtual (imaginary) space and risk losing one's sense of direction, even the frames and boundaries which constitute the modern individuum. The constitution of the modern individual is a consequence of inhabiting one of a multiplicity of ready-made situations and being constrained (disciplined) to abide by all the habits and norms associated with them (see Colwell, 1996: 211). The power of the modern cinema does more than just reflect links between situations and *their* programmes for action and response; it directs these associations *and* affirms their coordination. It has the power to motivate both our seeing and sayings. It orders an objective vision and organizes timely responses. The power of the modern movement-

image is premised on the ability to control the virtual horizon and to surround, limit, and contain events. As I have argued, the face in close-up, the sound-out-of-field, and the flashback are all conventional strategies to encompass the visual, to fill it with sense (to qualify the scene), and to motivate a response. The importance of these formations lies in their ability to construct cultural cosmologies which form the basis of perception and orientations to the world. As Shields (1991: 63) argues, cultural formations are embodied not so much in learned rules, but in bodily dispositions and trained postures; that is, in the more practical paradigms which coordinate group activities and sites.

It is the possibility of the virtual and actual entering into direct contact that unsettles both situations and responses. By breaking the spell of the sensory-motor formula the possibility of establishing precise coordinates (for action) is constantly deferred. Consequently, both the *seeing* what there is in the situation and the *know-how* to respond becomes open to question. This creates a space for inventing new modes of behaviour and for creating new forms of encounter that exceed established truths, norms, conventions, and interaction rituals. Opening up the horizon of possibilities decentres and unsettles the existential coordinates necessary for situating the self in relation to others. What is at stake in all this is

the possibility of losing one's self, and the self-assurance of one's actions, responses, and ways of being. But perhaps the real power is not in the self, but in becoming-other, or going beyond the horizons of experience. Becoming-other involves more than just moving from one subject position to another (from place to place), or sloughing off one identity in favour of another, but of finding that point of dislocation or dis-position, that other-place where the precluded visions, voices, and counter-memories meet and entertain alternative lines of flight.

CHAPTER 9

CONCLUSION

The main problem this dissertation addresses is the relationship between the productions of cinema and those who gather to take in its sights. I argue that cinema constitutes a new focus of culture and produces a virtual public square which serves as a meeting place for the mass of isolated, positioned, and estranged inhabitants of modern society. Cinema has the power to draw together this mass of individuals in a common space. It is a displaced, virtual space of images and virtual action. Nonetheless, it has real power. It produces a space to forget or forgo, at least for a time, the partitions and property lines that divide and differentiate a people as it forges a common ground of experience beyond modernity's relative enclosures.

Cinema transports us across these seemingly vast and unbridgeable differences and distances. Like the doorway which opens up a space of possibilities beyond the norm of the everyday, cinema produces a shared, affective space and entices us to join with the others already there, and become others to ourselves. This space of possibilities is both qualitative and affective. It is a

dimension of space which I define as an absolute locality and which serves as a focal point (of transformation) for the development of the tribus.

The tribus, as I define it (a derivation of the Maffesolian neo-tribe and its undirected being-together), develops out of the mass, and constitutes singularly affective ensembles which form in the space between the differences and distinctions that modernity has ordered, that is, in the intervals between its enclosures. The tendencies and possibilities that form in the interval also form the basis for the deployment of power-relations. Power-relations, defined as actions on the actions of another, work only insofar as the other's capacity to act and move are maintained. By relaying this notion to cinema, I locate not only the basis of cinema's power, but also the sites where strategies of control are exercised. Local sites/sights, with their undirected potential for mixing, intermingling, and movement, are also sites for the deployment of power-relations. The problem of understanding the power of this medium is a problem I solve by developing a conception of the social apparatus. I have used this concept comparatively to analyse the different apparatuses that have constituted the sites and sights of publicity, and the different techniques, mechanisms, and processes which have been deployed there to shape the socius and the social imaginary

generally. I have argued that the local sites of cinema are also made to serve as the conditions for the exercise of power. The power of cinematic apparatuses derives from the ways in which its potentials for affective alliance -- its deterritorialized root-system -- are structured and directed in various ways.

Historically, the public square which has formed the site for the deployment of various strategies of governance has been occupied by various regimes of power. Sovereign spectacles, such as the spectacle of the scaffold, legislative sign-regimes, and disciplinary panoptics are some of the main ways in which power has been exercised over sociable bodies. Many scholars have attempted to show how the strategies and tactics of power that have formed in these sites can be applied to, or have spread to, cinema. I have argued that the cinema is a different kind of social apparatus. While cinema can be understood as a reiteration of the sovereign spectacle, a form of textual or scriptural arrest and over-coding, or a means of spreading surveillance satellites beyond disciplinary interments, none of these interpretations has anything to say about cinema's specific differences, nor do they draw on film makers or film theorists in any significant way to make the case. Cinema is not a text, a picture in a magazine, a statue in the public square, nor another form of Benthamian inspired architecture.

Its images are movement-images and must be understood at this level.

Furthermore, power is not a generic strategy. Even the mechanisms of discipline change depending on the institutions they infiltrate (schools are not prisons and workplaces are not health care institutions). It is on this basis of understanding that I have argued that power is exercised in specific ways and has many changing faces. Analysing its points of application requires the development of new analytical tools.

Various approaches to understanding cinema can be seen as strategies of power borrowed from other models (e.g., sovereignty, sign-regimes, discipline) and from competing apparatuses. But I have shown that the social apparatuses of cinema work differently. While the aim may be the same, the means of taking aim, the lines of sight and lines of flight are not. The strategies of cinema are not sovereign, sign, or disciplinary mechanisms. Cinema works through montage. The various strategies of montage that I have outlined all work by relating movement to the interval of movement (the space of affection). By producing and incorporating the interval, montage does not eliminate possibilities, immobilize the frame of reference, nor repress or arrest movements, but, rather, controls the flow of movements by structuring its possibilities. Montage is a strategy for

controlling the flow in the open, and for controlling the openings through which movements pass.

I have argued that the importance of cinema lies in the relations it establishes. These relations are formed in the processes of circulation and on the fly. To see them requires a moving line of sight and a mobile vantage point that can follow their flow. Outside of these circuits and apart from their motion the objectivities of cinema simply do not materialize. They are matters which belong only to motion. It is equally important to discriminate the various forms of motion which comprise this apparatus and the different levels of analysis required to address each (i.e., movements in the frame, movements of the camera, and montage). The mobile vantage point I adopt shows cinema in a different light. The close-up, for example, changes when it is not simply cut-out from the process. Because it is inserted into the flow, it takes on a different complexion and a different sense.

I have argued that the close-up is central to a montage understanding. While others have focussed on the role of the media in bringing things close-up, the approach they take is based on a conception of framing space that does not apply to cinema. The importance of the close-up in cinema lies in the power of

deframing and the power to open a space of possibilities beyond the frame. In this regard, my analysis challenges previous conceptions of the close-up and the textual-semiotic approach to culture from which they derive. I also challenge the related conceptions of pornography/fetishism/voyeurism because these too are badly framed in relation to moving images. They are reflections of confinement and the return to the same -- the politics of identity. The cinema is not a passive surface which reflects back or mirrors a self, nor is it a cracked surface reflecting the fragments of a life. Rather, it opens up the field of perceptions to include a virtual other in it. The problem of this other is not one of identity, of who they are supposed to represent, or where they belong. If the other keeps its identity a secret, then the question is not what this other is, but what it can do. If cinema is a politic, it is a politics of alterity -- the politics of the face out-of-frame. In cinema the problem of fetishism's secret has been displaced by the problem of faciality and the way its secret is deployed and its qualities and potentials are expressed.

The challenge of understanding cinema in all its specificity and in terms of its sociological significance has lead to the introduction of new concepts and has necessitated a reconceptualization of others (and the 'other'). Concepts derived from the enclosure or based on a fixity of viewpoint are of limited value when

confronted with an apparatus whose *differentia specifica* is its motion or motoricity. In process, the close-up does more than define a field of pornographic visibility, it also establishes the out-of-field and the secret space beyond the frame. In motion, it ceases to define a figure of reflection (a pose or a still), nor does it simply define a partial-object of fetishistic consumption or collection. It is not an object of fetishistic contemplation; it is a moment of faciality. In its radical alterity, the face or its equivalent possesses neither the distinction of being at the distance of an alien or alienated object, nor is it simply too close. Its significance lies somewhere between the near and far, close and distant, the related spaces of global and local. It doesn't simply belong to a space, it spatializes places. It does not act in the scene, it mobilizes reactions. Faciality is a locus of change and a focal point of transformation. What I have shown empirically, through my analysis of several popular films, are the various ways faciality (or its equivalent) is produced and deployed through montage.

In the large-scale action-image the power of the face is used to define a global project. The place-image is potentialized (by its excluded segment) and action is taken up with the necessity of formulating a response that will bring about its transformation. Between the forces of a situation and the response that

modifies it, there is a large interval wherein the forces of response are developed and actualized. It is in the interval that the qualities of the global situation are absorbed in order to be expressed in a decisive action which will actualize the true response. No other response will permit passage from one situation to its other, modified form. While the initial situation (problem) is given or ready-made, the response is not. The response is a secret that solves the global problem and allows the action to pass beyond its limits and to surpass its obstacles. There is only one appropriate response, but its secret will have to be discovered, formulated, and assembled in the absence of those found ready-made or the inadequacy of cliché reactions already assembled. The large interval of the action film is taken up with the problem of response, its formulation, and the project of acquiring the right look (changing the habitus) that will serve as a rejoinder to the challenge posed by the facified place.

In the small-scale inter-action-image, it is the response, the series of responses, or the difference between different responses which are given or found ready-made. It is the situation which is not given and which constitutes the secret. Exposing the truth of the global situation, revealing its basic contradictions, ambiguities, or the difference between situations, is a reflection of the changes in

the habitus that are formulated responses to it. The question is always this: what is the situation to which these actions correspond, and if these two actions are different, what must have changed in the situation to bring about this difference? Actions which vary only slightly, or small changes in expression (the differentials of the habitus) are blindly directive toward that which is not revealed (but only 'expressively' revealed). Minor variations in action or slight changes in expression can serve to expose the deepest ambiguities or the fiercest contradictions and make what is infinitely far apart seem infinitely close together (or contiguous). This is possible because the habitus lies very close to the boundary between situations and because the habitus, as I have argued, is a mobile boundary marker which is always very close to the threshold of changing places.

Either as small or large, the action film revolves around the necessity of connecting space and practices or conversely. In these films, the two poles of the face, its selective and expressive facets, are actualized as opposing forces. The problem is, how does one respond to the excluded face or what is the excluded face to which this response belongs -- how does one respond to the other? This cinema of seconds constantly reiterates a duel of forces as the form of sociality that develops in response to the face of alterity and in the interval of a place and

an action. It is the face which serves as an interface and ties together situations and actions. Either modifications of response disclose a situation's secret or the modifications of a situation are brought about through the development of a secret response. These are the formulas which circulate in the modern film. As such, they are part of the projects of modernity which affirm either the subordination of action to space or the reverse. It is the face of alterity that is made to serve as the means to link and join together the forces of place and the forces of response which correspond to them. These force-relations form in relation to the excluded face and serve as the forceful revelation of its secret. The secret is always actualized or enacted as a relentless duel of forces or difference of opinions and is always placed in a relation of opposition.

In the cinema of the third, the secret returns to the frame to unsettle the forces of response and the forces of the situation. It is the cinema of the false insofar as the secret can be expressed in innumerable ways, each of which is equally valid, but none of which is able to exhaust all of its potentials. What truth does the secret contain? It contains innumerable possibilities and it discloses all kinds of situations and all kinds of responses. No one situation or response, no single sensory-motor connection, is capable of exhausting all its possibilities.

Each time it returns, it returns with a difference. It does not belong to any one situation but can appear anywhere; nor can any one response solve its problem. It is the source of vitality and of a constant renewal. There is no single truth to the secret, only a proliferation of stories. Each actualization of it brings about something new, a new situation and a new set of responses. The secret is a common element that spreads from scene to scene and ties together their differences. It belongs to all situations and all responses and serves as an ever renewed source of place- and action-images. Consequently, it refuses identification as much as it refuses to be habituated. It is the subaltern ground of sociability which circulates as a secret. It keeps changing its form (of actualization) so as to resist capture by any regime of truth. This underground, undercurrent of sociability can rise up in any-place-whatever in order to unsettle the dominant ways, manners, practices and bring about change. It is this potential for becoming other, for moving through boundaries and passing beyond them, that constitutes the secret. The secret belongs to movement. It is a movement-image whose ontology is a function of passing, and which only exists to be passed on and to circulate in the form of rumour, gossip, and story-telling. The secret is at the basis of all those temporary, affective associations that run counter to regimes

of truth and identity. Their power is the power to spread the secret, to fabricate legends, create events, and produce change. While the secret/out-of-field can be used by the social apparatus as a means of producing the truth and for socializing these potentials (as various forms of sociality), no one response or situation can exhaust the possibilities for change it contains. These nomadic singularities and displaced tribes always escape capture by the social apparatus. The new social apparatus of the cinema (and later television) does not seek to eliminate or repress the secret, nor the forms of sociability it entails, but rather to make use of its potential and affective qualities to produce regimes of truth.

This dissertation contributes to and synthesizes the literature on the sociology of power/knowledge, the history of social apparatuses, and builds toward a new understanding of cinema and its relation to popular culture. In this context, I have shown how the different modalities of power move through a variety of cinema genres, past and present, and feature regimes of light, enunciation, and lines of force that cross between the visible and the utterable. Further, I have illustrated the way in which social apparatuses not only comprise an optical, sonorous, and audio-visual machine but contain the quality of flow as an important analytic dimension. From this perspective, and through the

application of Deleuzean concepts in the development of a virtual sociology, I have argued that cinema's method of montage makes movement a property of the image and liberates perception from the vantage points which confined it, from the images of motion, and from the movements of the camera. Based on my understanding of optical apparatuses, and of the movements and the processes which make events flow, I have attempted to develop an alternative methodology for the analysis of new, audio-visual cultural productions that pass beyond the boundaries of the 'enclosure' and into the political-economy of the out-of-field.

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