Pathways from the Semi-Periphery: The Cases of Japan (1853-1905)
and Tonga (1770-1900) in the Modern World System

by

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Abstract

This dissertation examines the issue of societal change due to semi-peripheral action, and asks why it is that some societies managed to avoid colonization at the hand of the western powers during the colonial period. The issues at hand include the question of how to bound world-systems in order to determine when a society fully enters the modern world-system which Immanuel Wallerstein describes as a bounded entity that constitutes a social system based on capitalism. In addition, the issues include the question of core/periphery structure – that is the position of a given society in the modern world-system, and the question of agency that a given society is able to exercise when being incorporated into the modern world-system. This dissertation uses the empirical case studies of Japan and Tonga in order to propose an explanatory framework of semi-peripheral change that explains why some societies were colonized and others were not. This dissertation argues that each society was semi-peripheral at the point in which they were incorporated into the modern system, and because adaptability is a key feature of semiperipheral action, these two societies were able to avoid colonization. This dissertation argues that societies that transform their dominant mode of production by creating a developmental state while also transforming their political systems in order to conform to Westphalian notions of the nation-state were able to adapt to the modern world-system, and were able to not only avoid colonization, but were able to set themselves on the path to eventual core status. Those societies that only opted for political change but did not transform their mode of production avoided colonization, but were relegated to the extreme periphery of the modern world-system. Societies that did neither were colonized and became peripheralized. This dissertation aims to be a contribution to world-systems theory that examines change in the world-system.

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Chapter 1 - Introduction

The primary purpose of this research is to advance understanding about the way in which the modern world-system came to be the way it is today. This dissertation situates itself into the period of European expansion into Asia during the colonial period. The primary questions that this research is concerned with are the issue of why some societies were not colonized while the majority were, why some societies became core in the modern world-system while others were relegated to the periphery, and what role does the exercise of agency in the context of societal change generally and in the context of world-systems theory specifically play. A secondary question is concerned with the issue of why some societies, while managing to avoid colonization were not able to achieve core status and were peripheralized. In order to answer these questions, this research proposes to examine the cases of Japan and Tonga in West Polynesia through the lens of comparative world-systems theory, particularly with respect to semi-peripheral development and transformation. As such the fundamental issue that this dissertation will examine is how the modern world-system came to be the way it is today.

Chapter 1 lays out the problem that this dissertation is concerned with, and then goes into further detail of the background context that informs this dissertation. Following this, I will present the main argument of this dissertation, and then will present a brief explanation of the methodology employed. Finally I will provide a chapter outline which will examine the key issues of this dissertation which include the conditions that existed in each case prior to the arrival of the West, the specific forms of the changes employed by each case and the ideational basis for them.

1.1 Background

The modern world can be characterized as being deeply divided and unequal. The inequality lies with the ever widening gap between rich and poor – not just in terms of rich and poor people, but also in terms of rich and poor nations. This wealth gap is in many ways related to an ever connected global economy, which is the result of a historically contingent set of processes that involved the formation and adoption of capitalism as the dominant mode of production, in other words as a social system, in Western Europe which was, during the medieval period, based on a tributary mode of production and a mercantile economy (Wolf, 1982). This switch from the tributary mode of production to the capitalistic mode of production led to the ascension to hegemonic status first by the Netherlands, then by Great Britain, and then by the United States. The formation of the global capitalist economy was also influenced by historical events such as the growth of the Islamic Empire (Karatani, 2014) which necessitated the need of Europeans to find new access to Asian markets, the Chinese market in particular. Finding new access routes led to the voyages of discovery by Magellan, Columbus, and others (Marks, 2007). These voyages of discovery ultimately led to the incorporation of other societies in the global economy during the colonial period.

During this period, some societies became colonial possessions and other societies did not. This brings to mind a number of questions: what were the processes by which other societies from around the world became incorporated into the modern world economy? Why did some societies become incorporated into the modern world economy as peripheralized colonial possessions while other societies did not? What was it about

those societies that did not become colonial possessions that made them different? Why did some societies that were not colonized become peripheral to the modern world economy?

In order to answer these questions this dissertation engages in a comparative analysis of two non-European societies that were incorporated into the modern world economy during the 19th Century, Japan and Tonga. The reason why these two societies were chosen for this research is because they have a number of similarities as well as a number of differences. In terms of their similarities, both societies had a dual 'chiefly' governance system. By dual I mean that both societies prior to the arrival of Western powers had two main types of leaders which had different societal functions. In the case of Japan the two leaders were the Emperor and the Shogun, and in the case of Tonga, two paramount chiefs, known as the Tu'i Tonga and the Tu'i Kanokupolu. In Japan the Emperor served primarily as a ceremonial and religious leader and the Shogun served as the everyday governing and military leader. In Tonga the Tu'i Tonga had a role that was similar to the Japanese Emperor, that is as a ceremonial and religious leader. Similarly to the Japanese Shogun, the Tu'i Kanokupolu did the day to day governing and also served as the military chief.

Secondly both societies were able to adapt to the arrival of the Western powers in such a way as to avoid being colonized. The difference here is that while Japan became a core global power; an integral economic powerhouse in the modern global economy, Tonga became peripheralized and relegated to the very edges of the global world economy, both in terms of economic participation, but also geographically. In other words

Japan became important in the global economy while Tonga became unimportant and had little impact on the modern world-system. In this regard Japan and Tonga were also similar in while each society was under the paramount chiefs, each 'district' essentially governed themselves, and adaptation to the modern world involved a process of unification.

The third similarity that is of importance is the fact that upon the arrival of the Western powers in the East Asian/Oceania region, both societies embarked on their own programs of expansion as part of their adaptation processes. In the case of Japan, this expansion was first into Korea in 1875, and then China, and ultimately involved the conquest of large parts of East Asia, South East Asia, and Oceania before being defeated by the Allies in 1945. In the case of Tongan region, Tonga's expansion was into the Fijian archipelago, including the Lau Islands Group, and the main Island of Fiji itself. This expansion into Fiji would have continued but for the intervention at the request of Cakombau, the King of Fiji, by the British in return for ceding Fiji to the British.

Generally speaking, this is a work of historical sociology. It is an examination of the issue of the incorporation of polities into the modern world economy through the lens of world-systems theory as it pertains to external processes of societal change, in particular the role that semi-peripheries played in the formation of the modern system. As such it will examine the shift in the mode of production from tributary to capitalistic. Secondly, this dissertation examines the internal processes of societal change by using an Historical Institutional approach as a visual tool to examine how the convergence between ideas and exogenous shocks as they relate to adaptation can vary in their effects,

depending on the decisions made by political actors.

The first approach identified above is concerned with the external processes of societal change in general. One major limitation of world-systems theory, however, is that it does not place much emphasis on the internal factors that affect societal change, and so I contend that the matter becomes a matter of public policy analysis in the sense of analyzing the decisions that are made and the underlying ideas and interests that occur as a result of an exogenous shock. As such a major focus of the re-formulation of the world-systems approach is the role of decisions and the decision making process, what kinds of decisions are made, and the ideas that drive them. As such I am interested both in the process of institutional innovation at the societal level, economic, industrial, and military, and also the role that ideas played in the transformation of the two societies in question. It is my hypothesis that the ideational aspects of societal change are an indispensable part of semi-peripheral change.

What is needed is a theoretical framework that explains and analyzes both the external processes involved in the incorporation of these societies into the modern world-economy, and the internal processes involved with the adaptation of these two societies in terms of the decisions made and the role that ideas played in their adaptive processes. The significance of this is that by understanding the processes in question, we can start to make predictions in other cases. Thus it my intention to answer the following questions: What is it about these two societies that allowed them to respond to the arrival of Western Powers in the region in such a way as to avoid colonization? What was it about these two societies that allowed them to initiate expansionist policies of their own? Why was Japan

able to become a core nation while Tonga did not? What was the role of ideas in the decision making processes of both societies? Finally, what was the process of incorporation into the modern world-system? This dissertation argues that the salient issues of semi-peripheral development in the context of the modern world-system are the ability for a society to exercise agency in order to successfully adapt to new systemic conditions and the decision to industrialize by creating a form of a developmental state. This last issue is important because it is this voluntary industrialization that is a key aspect of becoming an eventual core society in the modern system.

This dissertation will demonstrate the close and necessary relationship between ideas, political decisions, and semi-peripheral development. This dissertation seeks to create an explanatory framework that can be applied to different cases in the modern period, and in pre-capitalist contexts. Chase-Dunn and Hall provide a number of definitions of 'semi-periphery', including the idea that a semi-periphery is a region that may be intermediate in terms of institutional forms (Chase-Dunn and Hall, 1997: 37). Karatani (2014) argues that semi-peripheries in terms of the modern world-system are those polities that were the sub-marginal areas of older world-empires. Taken together in accordance with these general definitions, this dissertation will demonstrate that both cases qualify as semi-peripheries. Both Chase-Dunn and Hall, and Karatani make the case that semi-peripheries are those polities that are able to adapt to new systemic realities by affecting change in themselves and in the system as a whole. World-systems theory as an approach tends not to focus on the internal domestic politics of component societies, and so tends to emphasize structural change over agency due to the focus on the

system as a whole as the unit of analysis. I think this is a mistake, because this removes the question of agency from the equation, and makes it difficult to provide an analysis of societal change because societies and the human beings that make up the societies are not simply mindless and agent-less automatons, simply reacting to events. In short it is the exercise of agency that drives the manner in which adaptation takes. This then means that an examination of agency is important to understanding how societies change generally speaking, and how they change in the context of semi-peripheral development specifically.

This dissertation treats societies as institutions and as such views societal change and the exercise of agency through the lens of Historical Institutionalism. An examination of institutional change through this lens reveals that institutions do not change unless they have to. This is because of the constraints on action and ideas by institutional culture, and that there are only very short windows of opportunity when the institutional constraints are lowered and change is possible. Similarly, when one considers the life of a given society through Braudel's *longue durée* which is concerned with material life, it becomes clear that in terms of social norms, societies also do not change much, except at very specific times. So this means that the explanatory framework of semi-peripheral change can be viewed through the lens of a critical juncture.

By examining the relationship between agency that allows for decisions to be made, and the ideas that underlay the decision, we can examine how different decisions have a different set of outcomes that affect the structure of the system. Kōjin Karatani

makes the point that the cores of world-empires are usually peripheralized upon incorporation into the modern world-system (Karatani, 2014: 163). This is due to the non-adaptive nature that they have because of particularly strong and unyielding sets of institutional constraints. Similarly the margins of world-empires are unable to adapt due to their institutional culture being subsumed into the culture of the core, and are also usually peripheralized. From that theoretical position two statements can be formulated. 1) Those societies that could exercise agency were not peripheralized, and 2) those societies that could not exercise agency were peripheralized. The first statement needs to be altered slightly because this dissertation is distinguishing between the political and economic changes. Those societies that can exercise agency and that opt only for political adaptation and form a new kind of nation can potentially avoid colonization but not peripheralization. In order to avoid peripheralization the society must also adapt by fully adopting the capitalist mode of accumulation.

1.2 Significance

This line of research is an ongoing contribution to world-systems theory. World-systems theory does not currently have a unified explanatory framework that takes into account both internal and external processes of societal change due to its focus on external interactions. It does not place emphasis on states or by extension societies even though in a system changes to one society will have an effect on both the other constituent parts of the system and the system as a whole (Chase-Dunn and Hall, 1997: 28). It does not take into account decision making and human agency and thus is in danger of being overly deterministic. This work is also of significance because current

events indicate that the global system is undergoing a change in terms of a shifting of hegemonic power globally, and so the issue is how emergent powers adapt to changes in the new world-system in a beneficial way. This is important because it is clear that the modern world system is shifting in terms of the rapid rise of East Asia, with China possibly becoming the new hegemony (Arrighi, 2007: 1, 2). Others disagree and propose that the modern world-system is shifting possibly to a world government based on “transnational socialist organization” (Chase-Dunn and Hall, 1997: 241, 246). Whatever the case may be, it is true that at this point there is no way of knowing. This is because at this time there is not enough information about processes of change in a world-systems context in order to answer that question. This dissertation attempts to shed some light on the matter. The implications are academic, but there are also 'real-world' implications. For example, the information gained through the creation of the proposed framework could provide policy makers information on which to base public policy decisions with respect to a nation's place in the changing world-system in a favourable manner.

From the two cases under examination in this dissertation, I advance the following two hypotheses that the crucial internal aspects to semi-peripheral development are:

- 1) The ability for decision makers to imagine a new type of nation. The ability of a semi-peripheral society being able to imagine itself as something new (in terms of being a 'Westphalian' nation state during the 17th, 18th, and 19th Centuries) is the key to being able to adapt to new systemic situations. This is also a key to understanding the ability of actors to exercise agency in a way that wasn't constrained by the old social norms and institutional contexts. In other words the

new ideas and 'imagining' are what gave the actors the ability to act. This ability to act is the prerequisite for any decisions to be made.

- 2) Secondly, for a society to adapt in a way that might lead that society to eventual core-status in the modern world-system, that society must adapt by creating a form of developmental state. This is a key aspect of semi-peripheral development as it is this that allows a society that is in the process of being incorporated into the modern world-system to do so on its own terms.

1.3 Empirical Cases

1.3.1 Japan

In 1853 the Americans under the command of Commodore Mathew Perry landed at Uraga, which is located at the entrance of Tokyo Bay, on July 8th. The purpose was to force open Japan to foreign trade, after 250 years of relative isolation. This event would go on to have the profound effect of completely changing Japanese society, especially in the areas of governance, finance, industry, and foreign trade, after a period of instability and civil war.

Westerners had first arrived in Japan in 1543 when the Portuguese set up trade relations with the Japanese. The Portuguese acted as a sort of a middle-man trading Japanese silver in China in return for Chinese silks. With the Portuguese traders came the Jesuit missionaries who zealously set about converting the Japanese to Christianity. This became a problem to the new Tokugawa Shogunate in the early Seventeenth Century, who had just come to power following the Battle of Sekigahara in 1600 CE. The Christians were seen as a disrupting factor in Japanese society and ultimately the

Portuguese were expelled from Japan.

The issue for the Shogunate was not simply the disrupting influence of Christianity on Japanese society, but also that the Shogunate had seized power and needed to be able to legitimize itself, both in the eyes of other polities in North East Asia, but also in the eye of the elites at home in Japan. As such, the ability to control who could enter or leave Japan was seen as a legitimizing factor. This policy of exclusion was known as *Sakoku*, but in reality, Japan was not completely isolated. Japan maintained full diplomatic relations with Korea, maintained trade with the Ryukyu Islands and the Dutch, who were confined to Nagasaki. The presence of the Dutch is important, because elements of Western science made their way into Japan through the Dutch at Nagasaki (Yukawa, 1958; Hagemann, 1942; Gordon, 2003: 17 – 18; Tashiro and Videen, 1982: 288; Iwata, 1964; Toby, 1977)

Japan's seclusion lasted for about 250 years until 1853, as I mentioned, when the Americans under the command of Commodore Perry arrived in Japan with the intent of forcing the Japanese to end their policy of *Sakoku*. This event was to set in motion a series of events that would fundamentally change Japanese society forever.

One result of the arrival of the Americans was a wave of anti-alienism that was the start of what would become nothing less than a civil war. Fighting under the banner of *Sonnō Jōi* (“Revere the Emperor, Expel the Barbarians”), relatively low-ranking samurai from many clans, in particular the Chōshū clan, tried to use the Emperor in order to force the Shogunate to enforce the *Sakoku* edicts, which the Shogunate seemed unable to do, and expel the foreigners. The attempt by the Chōshū clan was unsuccessful. Another

result was a power struggle within the Shogunate which ultimately resulted in the appointment of Ii Naosuke as *Tairō*, (Chief Minister). Ii Naosuke set about arresting and executing the anti-alienists during the *Ansei* purges, which made him very unpopular and as a result he became a target for assassination. His assassination came when the Shogunate under his direction signed the Treaty of Amity and Commerce with the United States, and as a result he was attacked and killed by a group of Mito clansmen. Following this the focus shifted from anti-alienism to the overthrow and the removal of the shogunate from power. During this phase erstwhile enemies, the Satsuma and Chōshū clans became allies through the mediation of Sakamoto Ryōma from Tosa. Together with the cooperation of the Imperial Court these two clans fought a war that resulted in the end of the Shogunate, and the restoration of the young Emperor Meiji in 1868 (Totman, 1980; Jansen, 1961; Craig, 1961).

After the overthrow of the Shogunate and the defeat of those clans that had allied themselves with the Shogunate, the new government which was comprised of the leaders of the Restoration who primarily came from the Chōshū and Satsuma clans, and members of the Imperial Court, particularly Prince Iwakura embarked on a series of policies that entirely transformed Japanese society from an isolated island empire to a modern state. Among those changes was a period of rapid industrialization and institutional change. New government ministries were set up to facilitate this rapid industrialization. This transformation took four forms: industrialization, formation of modern financial institutions, militarization, and the unification of Japan from a series of autonomous feudal domains into a single nation.

Industrialization started with the textile industry, particularly automated silk production for export. This was needed in order to bring to Japan hard currency in order to build iron and steel works, and other heavy industries. The second aspect was the formation of new institutions. These institutions – specifically the Ministry of Industry, the Ministry of Home affairs, and the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce, and modern banks, were needed in order to oversee the changes in Japanese society. The third aspect was the Military. It was believed by the Japanese that the best way to defend themselves against the arrival of the Westerners was to become like them. This necessitated the building of the military and the enactment of universal conscription, and ultimately also involved the formation of expansionist policies. The fourth aspect involved the unification of the nation, which involved the removal of the caste system, and the institution of compulsory primary education in order to standardize the language. All four of these aspects of the changes to Japanese society lead to Japan becoming a modern state (Devine, 1979: 53– 54; Kobayashi, 1986: 59, 63; Ishida, 1999; Marks, 2007; Crawcour, 1963; Tamaki, 1995; Takewaki, 1991; Tsutsui, 1988; Anderson, 2006).

1.3.2 Tonga

The case of Tonga is a good case for comparison, because of the similarities and differences that I mentioned earlier. These include a dual “chiefly” governance structure, the ability to adapt themselves to the arrival of the West by transforming their societies so as to avoid being colonized, and embarking on their own programs of expansion. It is important to mention that there are two very important differences, firstly while Japan was able to become an economic power-house as a core polity, Tonga became a part of

the periphery of the modern world-system. The other difference that does need to be mentioned is the difference in societal and institutional complexity. Japan was a tributary based society with a certain amount of formal institutions centred both on the Shogunate and on the feudal domains which were largely self-governing, and a merchant-based, commercial economy. In comparison, Tonga was a complex chiefdom whose main economic logic was a mixture of tributary exchange and kin-based exchange, with no formal government institutions in the sense of a public service.

Tonga itself is an archipelago of about 200 islands that extends about 300km from north to south, and has been in constant occupation for about 3000 years (Davidson, 1978; Kirch, 1984). The first European to discover Tonga was Abel Tasman in 1643, and after a period of 130 or so years, Captain James Cook arrived and provided in his diaries descriptions of Tongan life. Following Cook were a veritable host of explorers, beachcombers, and missionaries who also observed Tongan society (including the interactions that the Tongans had with their neighbours), and ethnographers (e.g. Sharpe, 1968; Ferdon, 1987; Smythe, 1864; Diapea, 1928; Martin, 1981; Beaglehole, 1999; Bott and Tavi, 1982; Kaeppler, 1978).

Tonga itself was at the apex of a triangular exchange network that also included Fiji and Samoa (Kaeppler, 1978; Sutherland, 2015; Sone, 2006). This exchange network consisted of the exchange of spouses and of prestige valuables that were connected to the marriage exchanges and that were important to the maintenance of the social reproduction and the reproduction of chiefly authority. Because there was little in the way of regularized exchange between Fiji and Samoa directly, the exchange routes ran

through Tonga, which was the centre of accumulation due to the exchange in spouses and prestige valuables being of particular benefit to Tongan social reproduction and chiefly authority due to their geographical location in the network (Kaepler, 1978). Because these linkages were indispensable to Tongan social reproduction in particular and to the social reproduction of the other two archipelagos, they can be shown to be systemic, and as such the region can be considered a small world-system. This is in accordance with the definition provided by Christopher Chase-Dunn and Thomas Hall: a network displays systemic processes when “the interaction (e.g. trade, warfare, intermarriage, information) are important for the reproduction of the internal structures of the composite units and importantly affect changes that occur in these local structures” (Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997: 28)

Other important interactions that are of most relevance are the military and conflict interactions that occurred between Tonga and Fiji. These interactions centred around the needs of the Tongans, in particular the highest ranked Tongan chief, the Tu'i Tonga, for canoes. These canoes were Fijian *Drua* that could carry between 100 and 150 men and were needed so that tribute could be collected within the Tongan archipelago. These canoes could only be manufactured in Fiji due to the lack of the right kind of trees in Tonga. Initially the Tongans would trade prestige valuables for these canoes, and would also offer their services as mercenaries in Fijian wars in order to acquire them. Also it would appear that the Tongans had become tired of simply trading for the canoes and would simply force the Fijians to build them. This participation in Fijian wars became so commonplace that young Tongan chiefs were sent to fight in Fijian wars as a

form of education (Derrick, 1946; Lawry, 1852; West, 1865; Martin, 1981; Diapea, 1928; Spurway, 2002; Smythe, 1864).

One effect of this involvement in Fijian wars was that when the Tongans returned home they found the peaceful situation to be somewhat boring and so a series of civil conflicts broke out over the issue of chiefly succession. The outcome was that the Tu'i Tonga lost power to the Tu'i Kanokupolu, Tāufa'āhau, who crowned himself King George Tupou I of Tonga. It needs to be said that the issues that the civil war was concerned with was the importation of Christianity by the Wesleyans. Tāufa'āhau had converted to Christianity, which was something that he initially hid. However he forced the other chiefs to convert. Tāufa'āhau saw Christianity as a unifying force – a way to return Tonga to a state of peace. He also saw that the adoption of Christianity as a way to give himself political power. Tāufa'āhau sought the help of the missionaries in gaining political and legal advice from the British in New Zealand in order to transform Tonga into a modern Kingdom based on Western ideas, which resulted both in his coronation as King George Tubou I, but also the promulgation of a new, British influenced legal code in 1847 (West, 1865). Through the adoption of British legal and political ideas Tāufa'āhau was able to transform Tonga into a modern nation-state, similarly to the Japanese transformation into a modern nation-state.

Christianity is of great importance in this case, because Tongan expansion into Fiji was related to the missionaries' activities in Fiji. The Fijian chiefs resisted conversion, and so the new Tongan king was very interested in supporting the missionaries (Derrick, 1946; Waterhouse, 1866). In the process, the Tongans conquered many of the Fijian

islands – particularly those in the Lau Group and made a number of changes which include the way that production of coconut oil was organized, particularly on the island of Moala, in order to meet the needs of Tongan tribute extraction (Sahlins, 1962: 373 – 375), which represents a fundamental change in the mode of accumulation in the region. This expansion only ended because the Tongans were thwarted due to the ceding of Fiji to the British by the Fijian king, Cakombau in 1874 (Derrick, 1946: 130 – 131).

The aim of this study is to understand how, in the political realm, societies negotiated the incorporation into the modern world-system that is based on the capitalist mode of production. As Chase-Dunn and Hall point out, the goal is to produce a set of accurate generalizations about how small non-state societies and small, indigenous world-systems over time merged into one global world-system (Chase-Dunn and Hall, 1997: 4, 5). There have been many different approaches that have been taken in order to try and answer this question, including approaches based on geopolitics, rational choice, capital imperialism, cultural ecology, population pressure as a cause of social change, and so on (Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997: 21-23). The approach that is being utilized in this dissertation is a focus on domestic political choices that political actors make in order to respond and adapt to external stimuli, which I think is often under-specified in world-systems theory.

As Chase-Dunn and Hall point out, the processes of change can vary depending on the context. They point out that the transition from hunter-gathering groups to sedentary villages would be different from the transition from a tributary empire being incorporated into the modern world-system. The process of change is going to be

different in different cases. However the goal is to build a generalized framework that takes into account the similarities that exist in social change that comes about as the result of interactions between societies (Chase-Dunn and Hall, 1997: 5-6) One similarity is that there necessarily needs to be some kind of political decision-making, since it is often political elites who have the ability to affect change, and so this dissertation examines political agency and decision-making.

Chase-Dunn and Hall use the analogy of many tributaries and streams flowing into a river to describe the merging of world-systems. While many world-systems theorists start with systems that already contain cities and states, they decided to focus on small-systems that merged over time to create larger systems, which they express as a good starting point to the examination of societal change (Chase-Dunn and Hall, 1997: 6). However even they are examining this in a gradual approach. However what happens when a complex chiefdom has to negotiate the incorporation into the modern-world system in one jump? Or if a society has shut itself away (although I doubt they would be able to do this completely)? This dissertation accepts Chase-Dunn and Hall's point about starting with small-scale systems as a challenge for there to be more work on smaller systems, rather than focus on interaction between nations and societies in more modern contexts. As such this dissertation focuses on the incorporation of one tributary based system with a commercial economy (Japan), and a complex chiefdom in the Pacific based on a combination of gift-exchange and the extraction of tribute (Tonga).

Both cases are reasonable to examine in light of Chase-Dunn and Hall's challenge for more research to be done on smaller systems. The comparison of Tonga and Japan

may seem to be non-commensurate in terms of the scale. However I do not think it is necessarily the deciding factor in these cases. Both Japan and Tonga came face to face with the Western powers during the colonial period, and both cases were in the position of potential dominance and colonization at the hands of the colonial powers. Japan's military methods had hardly changed in 250 years, and its technological development was far behind Europe and the United States. Tonga was far too small to be able to withstand colonization, and so both Japan and Tonga could have quite easily suffered the same colonial fate as so many other societies during this period. However neither case became colonial possessions and both remained politically independent, although Tonga did become a protectorate of Britain (I will deal with this in much more detail in chapter 4).

As such I do not think that scale is the deciding factor in this case. This then brings up the question that if scale is not the deciding factor, what is the deciding factor? In order to answer this question the cases under examination in this dissertation are appropriate as cases for comparison. A comparative analysis based on a difference between types of societies (or even scale) can be problematic when one compares two societies in a static way, and in this case it would seem that scale would be an issue, however when the focus is on the processes of change then some valuable generalizations can be extracted. Some generalizations can be made from before-and-after comparisons too, but do not provide much in the way of intermediate steps (Moore, 1964: 18). The point being that when a comparison is being made with respect to processes of change, then a generalized schema of change can be extracted from the cases under examination.

In such a case I do not believe that scale is that important.

Indeed a focus on small-scale processes is useful because small, local-scale processes provide the foundation for larger scale processes. Small-scale processes are not the result of the effects of large-scale processes but are an integral part of the larger scale-processes, and so the understanding of large-scale processes necessitates the understanding of small-scale processes (Hanagan, 2011 :145). In other words it is entirely appropriate to compare cases that are not of commensurate scale, particularly when the goal is to extract generalities in processes of change in the context of asymmetrical cases.

To summarize then. The two cases that I have chosen constitute an acceptable comparative analysis. Firstly on the basis that a comparison with different cases based on different modes of production and that are asymmetrical in terms of scale is entirely in keeping with the stated goals of Chase-Dunn and Hall in their study, and indeed takes up their challenge to empirically analyze tributary and kin-based systems. Secondly, because an analysis of processes of change even when the scale is different can yield important insights into the process of political and economic change, particularly when there is a relationship between small-scale and large-scale processes and that one is needed to understand the other.

1.4 Methodology

The main focus of this research is the connecting of the ideational component to the world-systems issue of semi-peripheral development and takes the form of an historical narrative. The main approach will be qualitative in nature that will compare the historical information from two cases. The sources drawn upon include both primary and

secondary sources concerning the historical formation of capitalism, the theoretical and empirical issues involved in the formation of world-systems theory itself, the mechanism of transformation of Holland, Britain, and the US from being semi-peripheries to hegemonic powers. These are then compared to the cases Japan and Tonga.

In terms of the ideational approach, the approach is archival, and will focus on the thoughts, ideologies and motivating narratives that drove Yoshida Shōin and other Meiji officials to bring about the end to the Shogunate and to restore the Emperor to power. The focus is on ideas surrounding industrialization, financial and monetary innovation, military transformation, and the Neo-Confucianism of the Mito School. Furthermore the focus is also on those in the Meiji government and their moods, ideological inclinations, and reactions to external factors, in order to see what kinds of decisions they made and how they came to make them. In the case of Tonga the focus is on the documented relations between King Tubou I, the Wesleyan missionaries, and the British government, and on the role played by Shirley Baker and Charles St. Julian, and the diaries of those involved.

From these sources, the writings of the thinkers will be analyzed and compared to the historical data. From these comparisons, this dissertation will connect them in a causal manner. For instance, as will be shown later, the policies of the Meiji government and the men who made those policies will be connected to the thinking of Yoshida Shōin who had operated a school in Hagi, in what is now Yamaguchi Prefecture, where many of the Meiji government members and other imperialist fighters were educated. The case will be made that the influence of Yoshida through his teachings had a

causal link to the policies were made. Similarly this dissertation will examine the influence that earlier writers had on Yoshida, and will create a kind of genealogy that takes into account the influences on Yoshida, Yoshida's influence on his students, and the events surrounding the arrival of Commodore Perry as the event that represents the incorporation of Japan into the modern world-system. This analysis will also be applied to other key figures in order to take into account the influences of Western thinking on the reformers, and those of visionaries such as Shimazu Nariakira on the formation of the Japanese Meiji-Period developmental state.

In the case of Tonga, the same process will take place. That is in the sense that the events and thinking of various actors will be connected by an analysis of the events, and an analysis of the thinkers and political advice that they provided George Tupou I. In addition to this, the status of Tonga as the core in an indigenous world-system will be established through a static analysis of the Tonga-Fiji-Samoan region and the interactions between the island groups of that region.

There is one final, but important point to make here, and that is the issue of the difference in approaches taken with each case. In the case of Japan the sources of evidence are historical in nature. I use a combination of historical secondary sources and archival primary sources in order to uncover the processes of change that the Japanese political elites took in order to change from a feudal, tributary country to a modern nation-state. As such the approach I take as it pertains to Japan is an analysis of the historical record.

The case of Tonga is different, not only because I needed establish through a static

analysis of the Tonga-Fiji-Samoan world-system as it existed prior to the arrival of Europeans, but because of the type of evidence used. This is a consequence of the fact that Tonga had no written history to draw from. As such archival sources do not exist for that period. Instead, the static analysis had to rely on genealogies gleaned from conversations with Queen Salote of Tonga (as such then, this is an admittedly elite perspective), ethnographic studies, and the accounts of those Western travellers, such as Cook, who made meticulous observations of life and politics of Tonga. Following the arrival of Europeans, more archival evidence comes into existence in the form of diaries and letters, as well as the reports of British colonial officials in the West Polynesian region. As such the evidence that this dissertation relies on is not just on historical sources but anthropological sources as well. This is not an issue, indeed this is in keeping with Wallerstein's view that the best approach is a multidisciplinary approach. This is a view I share because any information that can offer insights into the topic this dissertation is concerned with is useful information, and there is no reason to exclude certain sources of information in order to conform to a particular disciplinary bounding.

1.5 Chapter Outline

Chapter 2 will lay out the theoretical approach used in the course of this dissertation. This chapter will also provide a review of the literature that is relevant to each theoretical element under consideration. These elements include modes of accumulation and the transformation from the tributary mode of accumulation and the mixed mode of Tonga comprising kin-based and tributary components to the capitalistic mode. The second element pays attention to the bounding of the modern world-system

and makes the distinction between capitalism as an economic system and capitalism as a social system. The second theoretical element is concerned with the issue of core and periphery hierarchy, and the shift in status from semi-periphery to core and semi-periphery to periphery. In other words why some societies were able to achieve core status while others were peripheralized. The third element is concerned with the use of Historical Institutionalism as a way to visualize societal change, and the decision making processes. The last aspect concerns the role that the creation of the developmental state has on the future status of a society in terms of core and periphery. This chapter will then put these discrete elements together to form a proposed explanatory framework for simultaneously understanding external processes of societal change and internal domestic and political processes.

Chapter 3 examines the two empirical cases presented in this dissertation. The chapter is roughly divided into two parts. The first part of the chapter is concerned with Japan, and the conditions that existed prior to the Meiji Restoration, and the decisions made in order to adapt to the arrival of the Western powers. The focus is on the issue of core/periphery status and the semi-peripherality of Japan at the point at which Perry arrived in Japan. This dissertation bases Japan's semi-peripherality on Karatani's analysis of Karl Wittfogel's (1957) work concerning hydraulic societies, that suggests that the adaptability of semi-peripheries is based on how closely the society was connected to the core of an existing world-empire, in this case China. Chapter Three also examines the mode of production of each case, and the steps taken by Japan to transform its mode of production. This chapter will show that there were pre-existing capitalistic economic

forms that were constrained by a caste system and as such had not been transformed into a social system. This chapter will show that the transformation of the Japanese state into a capitalist social system was at the behest of and in the interests of the state. In other words it was state action that transformed Japan into a capitalist nation. The crucial part here was the formation of the developmental state, which is key to semi-peripheral innovation.

The second half of the chapter is concerned with the case of Tonga. Similarly to the examination of Japan, the focus is on the semi-peripherality of Tonga at the time of contact. Unlike Japan, Tonga was not in proximity to a world-empire, but rather was core of its own mini-system, and its adaptability is based on that. This chapter will provide a static analysis of the region in order to demonstrate this. It will also examine the question of the change of mode of production and conclude that Tonga voluntarily chose to maintain its existing kin-based gift-exchange system, which ensured that it would become peripheral, even though the political steps Tonga took to adapt included political and social change that allowed it to maintain its political independence.

Chapter 4 is concerned with the more political and ideational aspects of societal change and as such focuses in on the ideas that each society had about itself, and the ideas that they adopted from foreign sources. The first part of Chapter 4 is focused on the ideational aspects underlying the Meiji Restoration that include on the one hand ideas and national narratives based on Mito School neo-Confucianism and Shinto religiosity. On the other hand this chapter will also focus on ideas that originated from outside Japan, such as knowledge of the West originating from the Dutch, from ideas originating with

the experience of Japan with the Ryukyu Islands, and finally ideas originating from Japanese travels abroad for study and diplomatic purposes such as in the case of the Iwakura Mission. In so doing, this chapter will show that it was the presence of these ideational factors that allowed the Japanese to adapt to the arrival of the Western powers in such a way that they not only maintained independence but also managed to modernize into a modern industrial and fiscal state. As such this chapter demonstrates that the exercise of agency in terms of adapting to new systemic realities requires the presence of these kinds of ideational considerations because they provide actors with the motivation to change and the direction in which to travel.

The second part of this chapter will do the same with respect to Tonga. This section will show that it was the willingness of King George Tupou to seek help from foreign advisors, including the missionaries and legal scholars that led to the transformation of Tonga from being a complex chiefdom to a modern kingdom based on the principles of sovereignty and diplomacy that was recognized by the British, and thus was able to maintain political independence. This section will show that it was the ideas underlying the advice George Tupou was given that drove the way in which adaptation would take, that is political rather than any emphasis on economic change in terms of the mode of production.

Chapter 5 will take the conclusions from the previous two chapters, and integrate them into the framework outlined in chapter 2. This chapter will use the schema used in Historical Institutionalism of path-dependency/critical juncture/ path-dependency to propose that for societal change to occur there needs to be both an event that sets of a

period of change coupled with a contingent set of ideas. This is the heart of the critical juncture which is a period when institutional constraints are lowered often as the result of an exogenous shock (Thelen 1999: 387), such as the arrival of Commodore Perry at Uraga in 1853. The exogenous shock lowers constraints imposed by institutional culture and can lead to a change of institutional culture based on a different set of norms. Norms are a part of the ideational foundation of institutions and the exogenous shock can be thought of as an event that shakes the ideational foundation upon which institutions are formed, and when those ideational forms are disrupted, change become possible (Thelen, 1999: 397). Ideas can be used as both a road map to change and discursive tools to make the avenues of change more palatable for political actors (Campbell, 1998: 381) Because ideas thus serve as a foundation for institutional forms and as a road map that lays out what changes need to be made and how they are to be made, the adoption of new ideas can lead to new institutional forms. Thus it can be seen that the critical juncture involves two aspects, the exogenous shock and the contingent role that new ideas can play in institutional and societal change, and this dissertation proposes that in the context of the two cases under examination it can be seen that there was such an ideational aspect to the changes that were made in the two cases. Furthermore, it is proposed that the adoption of different ideas, both originating internally and externally, led to different results. This chapter will show that when both ideas pertaining to political governance and to economic change are adopted, the result is the start of a pathway of development that eventually leads to core status in the modern world-system. When ideas that only pertain to political governance are adopted, then the result was political independence, but not

eventual core-status.

Chapter 6 will present the conclusions of this dissertation that were built in each of the preceding chapters, and shows that both Japan and Tonga were able avoid colonization at the hands of the West, and were able to maintain both independence and achieve core status in the case of Japan, and in the case of Tonga, maintain political independence due to their ability to adapt. The exercise of agency in the form of the creation of a 'developmental state' at the very specific period of the critical juncture is thus presented as a key feature of semi-peripheral development. This framework then can be compared to other cases of semi-peripheral action in order to determine if the role of ideas and the exercise of agency during the critical juncture is consistent in other cases.

Chapter 2: Literature Review and Theory

2.1 Introduction

This chapter provides a review of the relevant literature that is concerned with the explanatory framework of societal change by semi-peripheral innovation. It discusses the various theoretical approaches involved in the proposed framework and the building of the explanatory framework itself. This chapter will begin with a discussion of the formation of historical sociology and the origins and criticisms of the world-systems approach. Following this, there will be a discussion of the issues surrounding how world-systems can be bounded. This is important because it delineates a world where capitalism as an economic system exists and the formation of capitalism as a social system. Two issues will be examined in this context, firstly the issue of the mode of production. The issue at hand is the incorporation of two cases into the modern world-system that is based on capitalism, and so the point at which each case is important, especially when one case eventually became core and the other did not. The second issue that this chapter will discuss is the issue of core and periphery status of the cases at hand. The main focus of this section is on the role of the semi-periphery which because of their adaptability, political actors can exercise agency such that decisions can be made to adapt to systemic changes. This will determine the outcome of the course of action taken by each case as they adapt to the arrival of the colonial powers.

This section will be followed by a section on political change, decision making, the role of ideas in the decision-making process, and the use of Historical Institutionalism as a visual tool for the proposed framework. Following this will be a discussion of the

Developmental State model the formation of which is key to understanding the position of a newly incorporated society in the modern, capitalist world system. After this section the framework itself will be presented where aspects of each approach outlined will be assembled, and finally this chapter will conclude with a discussion that summarizes the elements and significance of the proposed framework.

The framework that I intend to offer is one that will explain both internal and external processes of societal change by semi-peripheral development. Firstly the framework will be primarily based on world-systems theory proposed by Wallerstein, particularly focusing on the issue of a world-system as a self-contained social system, and the comparative model of world-systems theory proposed by Christopher Chase-Dunn and Thomas Hall (1997). Among the issues that are of relevance is the issue of the bounding of the modern world-system, and the approach that I am taking comes very much from a modes of production perspective. This is important because in order to compare world-systems of different types it is necessary to examine what it means to be a capitalist world system. This then brings in the question of what exactly capitalism is, because this has a direct bearing on the question of when the modern world-system came into being, whether or not the world system has always been capitalist, and indeed whether there is only one type of world-system or different types based on different economic logics. This entire issue is important because if there has only been one world-system that was based on capitalism, then it becomes difficult to compare world-systems of different types. Marx himself talks about different modes of production including what he termed the Asiatic mode of production, however his analysis of capitalism in *Capital*

effectively brackets off the Asiatic mode (Karatani, 2014: 28) from consideration. The second issue is the issue of the structure of world-systems. This includes two things: first is the issue of centre/periphery structure, that stems in part from dependency theory, and Andre Gunder Frank's metropolis/satellite schema.

One of the strengths of this approach is its emphasis on historical analyses and historical processes. As Ibn Khaldun noted in the Fourteenth Century, many historians were prone to a great many errors because they simply did not have an adequate appreciation of the fact that societies and civilizations change over time. Ibn Khaldun's point is to say that it is necessary to have an understanding of the processes of societal change in order to come to the correct explanation of historical events (Ibn Khaldun, 1958 [1377]). In the same way social scientists today are prone to error when social theory is not grounded in historical understanding. Thus it is important to link social theory with the proper historical understanding. This is needed to provide understanding of both historical events and social theory. Historical sociology is one such discipline that seeks to link together historical particularities with the relationships between events and the causal forces that influence events.

The early days of the discipline consisted of approaches that were considered to be historical in that they dealt with material and events of the past. This was within the context of the writings of Weber, Marx, and Durkheim, who grappled with questions about the rise of capitalism in the West, and how this affected the lives of ordinary people, and the political realities in which they exist (Skocpol, 1984: 1). But history was treated as a series of stages through which societal change could be analyzed. When

historical topics were researched, it was usually within an evolutionary modernization approach which effectively laid out the stages through which societies go through and assumed this was a universal set of stages which came to be seen by scholars dealing in development or modernization as representing specific types by which societies are classified and ordered (Clemens, 2007: 529-530; Skocpol, 1984: 3). One example of this that is of specific relevance to this dissertation is the formulation of modernization theory after the end of WWII by theorists such as Walt Whitman Rostow whose overarching argument posited that all societies went through the same stages of development regardless of their particular historical contexts (Rostow, 1960).

While the early approaches of what became historical sociology may have dealt with historical stages of societal development, they were ahistorical in that “they did not attend to the temporal character of the subject at hand” (Clemens, 2007: 530). An historical approach must go beyond the linearity of stage theory, and must not simply try to fit an analysis of change into the gaps in between the stages. In order to overcome this, the job of historical sociology is to study “sequences of conditions, actions, and effects that have happened in natural settings, in sufficient detail to get signs of sequences that are causally connected” (Stinchcombe, 2005: 5).

2.2 Origins and Criticisms of World-Systems Theory

World-systems theory stemmed from theories of development that were popular during the period following the end of World-War II. It was believed that the best way to lift the population of the Third World out of poverty was to inject development aid and foreign direct aid into poor nations in order develop their economies so that they could

leave their 'traditional' economies and become high consumption societies like the West.

A number of development programs were put into place to solve what might be termed the 'problematization of poverty' as global poverty became 'discovered' and the globalization of poverty became the focus of much scholarship following WWII (Escobar, 2012: 21-24). In 1949 the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development sent out a mission to Colombia in order to formulate such a development program that was designed to reform and restructure the economy of that country in accordance to Truman's vision of lifting the third World out of poverty (Escobar, 2012: 4, 24-25). The United States became a proponent of such development programs even to the extent of using military intervention in order to force development to occur (Escobar, 2012: 3-4, 27-28). However these development programs rather than lifting poor countries out of poverty, had the opposite effect: not only did poor countries remain poor, they became even more impoverished (Escobar, 2012: 4). According to Andre Gunder Frank, this was due to the very structures that formed as a result of development programs which led to the “development of underdevelopment” where the rich, core nations siphoned of wealth from the peripheral countries (Frank, 1966).

The modern global system is characterized by this core/periphery structure based on a global division of labour, that can be explained by long-term historical processes of exchange and trade relations among societies and an international division of labour that is the result of the social concept of labour, and the ability of constituent groups to “exploit the labour of others”, and as a result reap a larger share of the rewards (Wallerstein, 2011: 349). The world system is a self-contained social system that “has

boundaries, structures, member groups, rules of legitimation, and coherence”

(Wallerstein, 2011: 347), and that has a similarity to an organism. The resulting structure formed through trade is one of the central ways that nations relate to each other, and that power can be considered to be related to the ability to acquire and control resources – in other words, rich countries are in a position of power over poor nations due to the control of the global economy at the hands of the rich nations.

Wallerstein (2011) states that he was largely formulating world-systems theory in response to Weberian categories and ideas such as that development should be studied in terms of values, or the emergence of values, nation by nation. This type of analysis created a chronological hierarchy of progress as a result and the questions were about which nation developed first and which came next, and what was needed for a nation to be next and so on. Wallerstein sought to challenge this kind of value narrative by demonstrating a) that this kind of analysis could not be done on a nation by nation basis, but only within a context of a particular world-system; b) that values followed economic change rather than coming first. Only by relating them to each other in a system could the question of why some nations became economic leaders be answered; and c) that he sought to challenge the Weberian idea of a modern vs. traditional scheme by suggesting that both emerged in tandem thus allowing for an analysis of 'the development of underdevelopment' (Wallerstein, 2011: prologue).

Critiques of Wallerstein's approach stem from three different frameworks. Firstly the Marxists whose critiques can be summarized as ignoring internal processes and the role that class relations play in the maintenance of economic inequality, including class

struggle, the ideational superstructure of the nation and state which supports capitalism, and the role of historical stages (Wallerstein, 2011: prologue; Brenner, 1977: 40, 61, 91). Bergensen (1984) softens this critique by pointing out that both world-systems theorists and the Marxists are correct. He does so by pointing out that core/periphery relations are global class-relations, while maintaining that Marxist were too limited by only considering internal class relations (Bergensen, 1984: 367-368). Secondly, those who adhere to the Ricardian idea of comparative advantage who maintain that world-systems theory did not explain why there exist different levels of development or why some nations improve and others do not (Wallerstein, 2011: prologue).

The third type of criticism came from the neo-Hintzians who charged that Wallerstein had combined the political and the economic arenas into one, and in the process he had falsely created a sort of hierarchy of types with the economy at the top. In response to this Wallerstein points out that this was true, but that he was not wrong to do so. Wallerstein had always been in opposition to the idea that, a) the political sphere is autonomous, and b) that the political sphere and the economic sphere operated by different rules that are in some way opposed to each other. Wallerstein's contention is that political institutions are simply one type of institution among others in the modern world-system (Wallerstein, 2011: prologue). It turns out that the neo-Hintzians were incorrect, and that Otto Hintze believed that the economic and political arenas were not separate as Wallerstein did:

All in all, the war years and the decade that has elapsed since offer no evidence of autonomous economic development of capitalism, wholly detached from the state and politics. They show rather that the affairs of the state

and of capitalism are inextricably interrelated, that they are only two sides, or aspects, of one and the same historical development. (Hintze, 1975, quoted in Wallerstein, 2011: prologue).

Another source of criticisms come from Critical IR theorists, who object to world-systems theory on the grounds that it is Eurocentric. John Hobson (2012) for example, presents a narrative of Eurocentricism in international relations theory. His point is that the entirety of IR theory presents a picture of human history that is in effect, nothing more than a Eurocentric construct. While there is certainly much truth to this assertion, for some reason he includes world-systems theory in this category of Eurocentric IR theory. The specific complaint about world-systems theory is that it treats the rise of the West as the result of endogenous processes that in turn are the result of European exceptionalism. This, he says, has the tendency of reifying European dominance in such a way that ignores the agency of Eastern societies and the connections that have existed between Eastern and Western societies, with the result of peripheralizing non-European societies (Hobson, 2012: 253-254).

This analysis ignores the stated intentions of a number of world-systems theorists. A. G. Frank (1998), for example, states in the preface of *ReOrient* that the entire intention of his work is to overturn the Eurocentric conception of historiography and social theory. His intent is in keeping with the ideal that the whole is more than the sum of its part. That is in order to understand the history of social and economic development a global approach, which he calls a 'globalological' perspective, should be taken. This is necessary because in order to understand economic development of any one area of the globe, and analysis of its connections with other parts of the globe presents a more accurate picture,

particularly because historically speaking, Europe was the periphery for most of its history, and so more important than what happened in Europe is the question of what happened in Asia (Frank, 1998: xv).

Similarly Janet Abu-Lughod's (1989) work shows that while the 'Third World' of today appears to be lagging behind the West economically speaking, this was not always case, and that there were flourishing trade and other interaction networks around the world, and that the European world-economy, to use Braudel's term can be thought of as a subsystem, in this global trade network. Abu-Lughod points to what is now termed the 'Middle East', particularly Cairo, which was a highly developed “system of urbanization” (Abu-Lughod, 1989: x), which would tend to contradict a Eurocentric perspective that would describe the non-European systems as peripheral to the European system.

Following on from Abu-Lughod is Robert Marks (2007), who also argues against Eurocentricism, makes the case that while Europe was the place where the industrial revolution started (in Britain specifically), it was not because the British had some special qualities that the rest of the world lacked which imbued the British with a special place in history, but rather because of developments and events that were occurring in other parts of the world that had an effect on the developmental path of Europe (Marks, 2007: 6, 9-16). In this sense, then, Marks is specifically stating that Eurocentric approaches should be overturned in the interests of presenting an accurate picture of human history and of social theory.

Other criticisms of world-systems theory concern the three part core/periphery/semiperiphery structure of world-systems. One set of disagreements come

from archaeologists, and I include them here since because world-systems theory should be a theoretical framework that can be generalized in terms of time and space, they are of some relevance. Some archaeologists critique the structure proposed by world-systems theories on the grounds that there is no evidence in the archaeological examination of early societies that a core/periphery exists at all. In the case of the social development of the Iroquois, Williamson and Robertson for example (1994) suggests that there is no evidence that the societal development of the Iroquois was affected by core societies to the south. Instead they point out that it is more likely that Iroquoian societal development had more to do with the presence of a multitude of local and independent groups mutually affecting societal development. They also point out that there is no evidence in North America of mid-continental societies or more localized societies in the North-East that had the capability of acting as a core in terms of imposing influence at long distances (Williamson and Robertson, 1994: 29). Instead Williamson and Robertson point to an alternative structure devised by Colin Renfrew and John Cherry (1986) called the peer polity interaction model.

The peer-polity model is one that is intermediate to those explanations that emphasize exogenous change and those that emphasize endogenous change. Instead it suggests that change is not exogenous from the perspective of the region that is being studied as a whole rather than as a conglomerate set of polities. By the same token, change is also not endogenous when considering single polities. Rather it suggests that societal change is exogenous from the perspective of individual societies but endogenous from the perspective of the region as a whole. In other words change comes from within

regions but from outside individual polities. This regionally endogenous change is the result of interactions among polities that make up the region under question (Renfrew, 1986). The polities within a given region are autonomous, independent, and there is no great power differential among the societies within a given peer-polity interaction region. Institutional innovations are transmitted among the peer-polities by way of a number of methods which include warfare, competitive emulation where polities as a result of competing with the other polities will race to out-do each other in order to achieve “higher inter-polity status”, and through the transmission of innovation, by which Renfrew means the societal acceptance of an idea or invention will facilitate its use in other polities as well (Renfrew, 1986). Williamson and Robertson suggest that in the context of the Iroquois, this model has better traction than core/periphery because there is no evidence of a core-like society, but rather the polities in the region were of a similar level of societal complexity (Williamson and Robertson, 1994: 29).

There is some merit to this argument. After all it is hard to make an assertion that does not have the backing of empirical evidence, and the further back in time one goes, the less evidence is available. But Chase-Dunn and Hall have a solution to the question of societies being seemingly equal in terms of societal complexity. Their solution was to divide core/periphery into two different aspects which they termed 'core/periphery differentiation' and 'core/periphery hierarchy'. The former refers to the relative level of social complexity between a core and a periphery, and the latter refers to the degree that one society is able to influence the social reproduction of the other (Chase-Dunn and Hall, 1997: 36). Thus it is possible under this differentiation to have two societies that are

equal – that is low core/periphery differentiation – and still have a higher degree of influence moving from one society to the other.

One of the case studies that was utilized by Chase-Dunn and Hall (1997: Chapter 7) was the case of a small world-system in Northern California where the Wintu¹ were part of both localized and long-distance trade network, conflict networks, and marriage networks. The Wintu were a group of sedentary hunter-gatherer groups that were able to increase their influence on the area in relation to other linguistic groups. Chase-Dunn and Hall examined a number of the interactions between the Wintu and other societies in the region including conflict, trade, expansionism, and marriages, and also an instance of deliberate apparent non-interaction with the Yana. These two groups had access to high-quality obsidian in Medicine Lake, but neither groups traded each other for it or even went on procurement trips to obtain this obsidian, but rather relied on inferior but local sources. This is an indication of a conflict interaction rather than a non-interaction (Chase-Dunn and Hall, 1997: 143). Chase-Dunn and Hall conclude that in the context of the Wintu and Hoka speaking societies, the Wintu had a higher population density and more resources including both protein and the ability to make alliances that bound villages, compared with the other groups, which they describe as constituting a mild core/periphery differentiation which in turn allowed for the spread of the Wintu into other areas. However this spread was slow enough that it could only constitute a mild core/periphery hierarchy. In terms of marriage interaction between the Wintu and the Yana who were mutually antagonistic, Chase-Dunn and Hall conclude that this represents a core/periphery hierarchy because the Wintu were taking more brides from other groups

¹ See Chase-Dunn and Mann (1998)

and thus were able to form more alliances. Finally they conclude that the Wintu were able to exert more influence because they had better access to shell-money that they acquired from their inclusion in long-distance exchange networks that facilitated more local exchange networks (Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997: 143 – 148; Chase-Dunn and Mann, 1998).

This case certainly does not negate the idea presented by Renfrew and Cherry of a regional peer-polity model. It does, however, show that even when considering interactions among seemingly equal polities, it is possible to uncover inequality, even if that inequality is mild. It is possible that early societal interaction starts off as a peer-polity structure and then becomes core/periphery as time goes on. However this question is outside the scope of this dissertation.

One major criticism that has been directed at world-systems theory, in particular Wallerstein's conception of it, is that it is a deterministic model. Peter Worsley (1980) strongly criticizes the framework on this very ground – that it is over deterministic. It is overly deterministic because of the emphasis that it places on the role of capitalism. Every type of human and societal interaction historically was “swept away” by capitalism to the extent that the model paints a picture of a world where everything is determined by capitalism, so much so that it “leads logically to fatalism and resignation, for it becomes difficult to see how any part of such a close-knit system can possibly break away” (Worsley, 1980: 305). It treats the system as having a kind of personality and decision making abilities, but of course no system can have these abilities – only political actors have decision making ability and so the theory “underestimates” the role of agency, in

particular the agency of those who wish to resist against capitalism (Worsley, 1980: 306).

This is a fair criticism of world-systems theory, but it is a consequence of the unit of analysis that is needed for an examination of the system as a whole. Wallerstein's purpose was to find a level of abstraction that would allow for an examination of the structure of the world-system as whole. The reason for this is simply because Wallerstein wanted to avoid the problem of having multiple units of analysis. It is much simpler to have one unit as opposed to having “units within units” (Wallerstein 1974: 7), and so he decided to focus on the analysis of social systems, the characteristics of which are a division of labour whereby the constituent parts of the system depend on interactions between the parts of the system for smooth running (Pieterse, 1988: 252). In this case, according to Wallerstein the only social system is the modern world-system, and within this framework it becomes possible to explain the evolution of the world-system and to explain the changes in nation states being caused by interactions within the world-system (Wallerstein, 1974: 7). This avoids the complications, for example between a comparison of India in the 20th Century and France in the 17th Century in their own terms by adding the factor of the global context of these given time-frames (Wallerstein, 1974: 6). In short, by setting the level of analysis at the system level, the analyses of social change are very much simplified. However, this is a somewhat problematic assertion. Wallerstein's conceptualization works in terms of the bounding of a world-system as a social system based upon a particular mode of production. However this is not to say that there cannot be smaller units. Indeed there needs to be some smaller units in order avoid a deterministic analysis, which is a valid objection to world-systems theory.

A system-level analysis is appropriate when considering how the modern world-system came to be as a result of interactions among societies which have a relationship with each other, and so a common frame of reference is needed. However to avoid the trap of being deterministic and failing to take into account the agency of component parts of the system it is necessary to examine how changes in one component part affect conditions in both the system as a whole and the social reproduction of other component parts of the system. To effectively do this I believe that the agency of component societies needs to be examined in order to see exactly how systemic conditions have an effect on decision making in those polities, and this necessitates smaller units of analysis. There is a relationship, after all, between domestic and international politics, just as international/external factors affect domestic politics (Gourevitch, 1978: 883). Domestic responses and decisions affect larger systemic structures. In other words, to get a full understanding of societal change and systemic change one needs to examine the domestic politics of component polities. This is a gap that I intend to fill during the course of this dissertation by examining the external stimuli that my two cases were subject to, and by examining the role of ideas and how these ideas influenced political decisions that were made as a result of external stimuli. In order to fill that gap I will now turn to the issue of the bounding of world-systems.

2.3 The Bounding of World-Systems

One important issue that needs to be examined is the question of the bounding of world-systems. What do we mean by world-system? Before answering that there is one issue that needs to be addressed and that is the issue of the hyphen in the word “world-

system”. This may be a very small issue but it is important because it is related to the question of what a world-system is. Very simply, the term “world system” without the hyphen refers to the total global system. It is this definition that makes it difficult to compare different types of exchange systems that have existed during the course of human history. It is this definition that lays at the heart of A. G. Frank’s conceptualization of a 5000 year old world system based on commercialized exchanges in various forms (Frank and Gills, 1992).

On the other hand, the term “world-system” with a hyphen, refers to what Wallerstein refers to as a total social system. Wallerstein’s conceptualization of a world-system is a system that is bounded by a specific mode of production and constitutes a world in itself that is self-contained. Because a world-system is bounded by a specific mode of production there can be many different types of system each based on a different mode of production which means they can be compared. This is important if one wishes to analyze changes from one type of system to another type of system. As such it is much more conducive to a historicist approach because the processes of change and the motivations and forces causing change can be examined.

Finally, in the context of the modern system, both terms can be used. This is because there currently is only one globe in which a system can exist and also because the modern world-system is a bounded exchange network that is based on one mode of production, the capitalist mode, and also encompasses a global social system. There are a few exceptions to this, such as a relatively small number of tribal societies that may not have fully transitioned to become capitalistic such as the small Pacific Island nation of

Tonga, which remains the only Pacific Island nation to have not been subjected to a colonial status.

The next thing that needs to be examined is what constitutes a system. Sutherland (2015) uses the definition of system suggested by Chase-Dunn and Hall (1997), to demonstrate that the West-Polynesian region that comprises Tonga, Fiji, and Samoa was a system and not simply an exchange network. In this context, Chase-Dunn and Hall define systems as, “intersocietal networks in which the interactions (e.g., trade, warfare, intermarriage, information) are important for the reproduction of the internal structures of the composite units and importantly affect changes that occur in these local structures” (Chase-Dunn and Hall, 1997: 28). In the case of the West Polynesia system as we shall see, the interactions that existed in the region among the three island groups were important to the reproduction of chiefly governance, in particular as Adrienne Kaeppler (1978: 246) points out, these interactions were of importance primarily to Tongan social reproduction.

It is this definition of ‘system-ness’ that forms the underlying basis of the argument of this dissertation; that exogenous shocks were the impetus for social transformation. The point of departure is that system shocks and transformations that have an effect of initiating a societal change is coupled with a requisite set of internal ideational factors, and the willingness to adopt new ideas from external sources, in other words to learn from the experience of other nations. Together these initiate a specific set of changes that alter a given society’s institutions and social norms in a way that a society might adapt to a changing set of systemic conditions. These changes include fundamental

changes in the mode of production.

2.3.1 Modes of Production

The issue of the bounding of a world-system is of importance when one is considering the question of how the modern world-system came to be in its current configuration. Because the modern world-system is a capitalist system, two important questions arise: firstly, what is capitalism, and secondly, when did capitalism as an economic system transition into becoming a social system? The following discussion examines these questions and will suggest that the point that capitalism became a social system is when the state adopts the principles of capitalism as a way in which to raise money. This was accomplished in Britain with innovations in state finances such as the formation of the Bank of England in 1694. This would lead to innovations in industry² which would culminate with the advent of the Industrial Revolution, and an increase in

2 A good example of the capitalists of this period who benefited from the financial innovations that came about as a result of the creation of the Bank of England was one Ambrose Crowley. Ambrose Crowley made his fortune from naval contracts. His first naval contract was signed in 1693 (Flinn, 1962: 44; Flinn, 1960: 51), the year before the creation of the bank, but subsequent to this he would go on to corner the market on the production of nails when 1699-1700, he and another iron works owner, Isaac Loader received 88% of the payments for ironware by the navy (Flinn, 1960: 54).

He had already set up his factory at Sunderland, probably in 1682 but the date is unknown, which was a centre for coal production. At the time this was seen as madness, due to the fact that the Midlands had been the traditional centre for nail production. According to Flinn, Sunderland was not seen as an ideal place for the production of nails since it is a remote location, far from the sources of raw materials. Furthermore there were not many skilled workers in Sunderland for the production of nails, and so Crowley imported migrant workers from other parts of the country and from other countries and by 1688 he was employing over one hundred workers (Flinn, 1962: 39-40).

In 1691, he abandoned the factory at Sunderland due to a religious dispute and opened a new factory in Winlaton, with the express purpose of making nails. It is this factory in Winlaton that according to Flinn would make his name throughout the country (Flinn, 1962: 42). How he initially raised capital is unknown, but what is certain is that after 1694, his naval contracts had made him extremely successful. The key to his success was the fact that he create a cheap transportation network from his manufacturing sites to his warehouses in London, where four of the six naval dockyards were situated. As for the other two in Portsmouth and Plymouth, it was easier and more convenient to supply them from London rather than the iron-making places (Flinn, 1962: 44-43). So successful was Crowley and his naval contracts that his factory at Winlaton was soon found to be inadequate and he decided that he could no longer be dependent on slitters (who cut the iron into rods used for nail-making, and so he built his own slitting plant in the Derwent Valley in what is now Tyneside. Ambrose Crowley built what was to become the largest iron manufactory in Europe (Flinn, 1962: 46; Flinn, 1960: 51).

Britain's share of global trade (Roulleau-Pasdeloup, 2016: 2-5; Lavery, 2012: Chapter 5; Buick, 2014: 268-271; Von Philippovich, 1911; 69; O'Brien and Palma, 2020: 2, 26, 27; John, 1955: 344; Rostow, 1962: 159-160). This demonstrates two important things, firstly that there is a necessity for financial innovation to occur in order for industrial innovation to occur. This goes directly to the issue of Japan's industrial policy following the Meiji Restoration in 1868. The second thing that this demonstrates is the linkage between finance and production, since both are important factors in the formation of capitalism as a social system. As a result there must be a clear description of capitalism going forward in this dissertation.

The importance of a proper definition is that in a world-system where societal change occurs as a result of semi-peripheral action, there need to be world-systems that are based on different modes of production, because the change involved when a polity becomes incorporated into a dominant world-system is a move from one mode of production to another mode of production. In this case this is a move towards capitalism as a systemic logic. This very move implies that there are different types of systems not based on capitalism, a fact that can be demonstrated by an examination of societal exchange networks, such as in the case of a small indigenous world-system in West Polynesia, where the exchanges that have the greatest systemic significance are marriages, prestige goods exchange, and conflict, and not capitalist accumulation (Sutherland, 2015). This indigenous system was self-contained and was not connected to the world-systems that existed in Europe and Asia until the arrival of Europeans in the 18th Century.

There are a number of different approaches that Chase-Dunn and Hall describe (1997), but it is sufficient to point to two sets. The first set of approaches can be broadly described as ‘lumper’ approaches which would posit the existence of a small number of world-systems. This kind of approach can be represented by A. G. Frank’s concept of a single, five thousand year old world system that has been based on commodity exchange and accumulation – that is to say capitalistic (Frank and Gills, 1992; Gills and Frank, 1990). However, this approach is insufficient for an analysis of this type. If there has only been one world system then it is difficult to analyze differences in modes of production. This also leaves out the myriad societies where labour has been organized around different principles such as in gift-exchange based economies. The existence alone of these types of societies demonstrates that there could not have been a single world system based on capitalism. It is also difficult to describe processes of change which include the incorporation of ‘mini-systems’ into the modern system.

Those that may be referred to as ‘splitters’, who posit a larger number of smaller mini-systems, generally speaking, present a far more useful view of world-systems history. The idea is necessarily predicated on the view that there have been different world-systems based on these different modes of production, which is useful when analyzing systemic change. The central issue is the formation of the modern world-system and the formation of capitalism as a social system. There are two approaches that are of particular relevance. The first of these is Marx's analysis of capitalism, and the second comes from Fernand Braudel. The issue at hand concerns the position of the social organization of labour in society, that is to say production as it relates to capitalism.

To start with the Marxian position, the concept of the mode of production is useful because it allows for comparisons of different societies based on certain economic factors. An analysis, for example, that includes discussions on the Asiatic mode of production allows for comparisons with countries such as Japan prior to the Meiji Restoration where capitalism did not form as the dominant mode of production but rather whose economics were based on what Wolf terms the tributary mode of production (Wolf, 1982: 79-88). This is not because the Japanese lacked the ability to form capitalism, but rather it was because of the presence of the strong caste system and efficient domain bureaucracies that had formed. These were able to place limits on the activity of merchants and the mercantile class. The problem that Marx had was that even though he recognized that accumulation, production, and exchange were tributary in nature prior to the formation of capitalism, he bracketed off the concept of the Asiatic mode from discussion, choosing to focus solely on capitalism. According to Karatani this limited the discussion of capitalism by Marxists to the extent of simply taking as a given that the nation and the state were nothing more than ideological constructs whose purpose it is to prop up a capitalist system. Karatani's point is that this is not useful when analyzing modern capitalist states and the manner in which they became capitalist within the modern world-system. This is because simply ascribing the nation and the state to the status of the 'ideological superstructure' prevents an analysis of the roles that these categories played as active agents (Karatani 2014: 268), and as such presents a distorted view of the formation of the modern world.

Marx's analysis involved the idea of production as representing a particular set of

social relationships. The particular set of relationships involved the ownership of the means of production, that is to say the tools and resources needed for production. In medieval Europe, which was largely agrarian, the peasants had access to the land – either as serfs, or as free yeomanry – which allowed them to scratch out some sort of a living, even if, in the case of serfs, most of their produce was extracted from them by feudal lords. The point was that they had access to the means of production and as such they would have little reason to accept wage labour as a way of subsisting. This presented a problem to capitalists who needed labour in order to produce commodities for sale. This meant that the course of action that was needed was to separate people from the means of production, which was now owned by capitalists, so that they would have no recourse but to sell their labour for a wage which was, according to Marx, less than what their labour was actually worth. Their surplus labour was extracted by the capitalists (Marx 1887; Wolf 1982: 85 - 86).

This means that there is allowance for economic systems that are not capitalistic, but are still mercantilist in nature. In other words it is a distinction that allows for an examination of how mercantilism was practiced in the context of tributary systems. In this context, as Eric Wolf maintains, the merchants of the medieval period went to great lengths to amass wealth, but cannot be called capitalists because they bought and sold products at local prices from primary producers and did not control production (Wolf, 1982: 84). Under Marx's conceptualization, this means that merchants and capitalists are not the same, and by extension it means that the activities of merchants and capitalism are not necessarily the same.

Braudel's conception of capitalism is different from Marx's in that he sees the society of a world-economy as a three tiered structure with material life at its base, the tier that is “the stratum of the non-economy, the soil into which capitalism thrusts its roots but which it can never really penetrate” (Braudel, 1982: 21 – 2). The next tier is the level of the market economy where there are connections between merchants that “link supply, demand and prices (Braudel, 1982: 229 – 30). It is out of this level, Braudel suggests, that capitalism emerged. If capitalism emerges from the level of the market economy, then it is necessarily something different. Indeed Braudel himself treats it as something different in that he describes the top tier to be the capitalist tier which he describes as being “anti-market, where the great predators roam and the law of the jungle operates. This – today as in the past, before and after the industrial revolution – is the real home of capitalism” (Braudel, 1982: 229 – 230). This is the tier of the money-lenders and the bankers which suggests that capitalism is not primarily about the ownership of the means of production, either by capitalists under Marx's conceptualization or the primary producers that sold to the merchants who in turn resold products to European markets for a profit, but rather that capitalism is about finance.

Giovanni Arrighi (1994) echoes Braudel by stating that capitalism becomes capitalism when money is used to generate more money in banking systems. The reason for this lies in a distinction that Arrighi makes between money capital and commodity capital. Money capital means “liquidity, flexibility, freedom of choice” whereas commodity capital is tied into a specific investment designed to make a profit, and because of this commodity capital means a lack of options, and so therefore the M' in

Marx's M-C-M' formulation means an “expansion of liquidity, flexibility, freedom of choice” (Arrighi 1994: 5).

Uno Kōzō (1964) also makes the distinction between merchant capital and what he calls 'money-lending capital'. He makes the case that the capitalist tendencies that merchants have lies in their pursuit of increasing value. They make profit by buying products at low prices and then selling them at higher prices. This practice requires price differentials, both geographical and temporal. Merchant capital positions itself between buyers and sellers, and so does not increase in value in and of itself. Kōzō suggests that “it lacks a real foundation inside an economic community for the pursuit of increased value” (Kōzō 1964: 14). However he suggests that as capital (in terms of M-C-M') transforms over time: it gives rise to a form of capital that stands above or apart from mercantilist forms of capital. In this he is consistent with Braudel's formulation of a three-tiered market economy. This form of capital is characterized as being the *forté* of the money lender. This capital is unrelated to the buying and selling of products, rather it is an increase in value by virtue of interest on loans. In this respect it is a self-increasing profit growth that according to Kōzō is unrelated to capitalist activity. He suggests that ultimately both this kind of capital and merchant capital are antagonistic to themselves:

It is clear that both merchant capital and *money-lending capital*, to say nothing of usurer capital, are forms of capital that are self-defeating: They can only grow in value by depriving others of their own kind i.e., by undermining the collective foundation upon which they themselves stand. Hence neither of them can be regarded as an accomplished form of capital, possessing in itself a real source of surplus value. (Kōzō 1964: 15).

In order to secure such a firm foundation, it must go beyond the buying and selling of commodities, it must produce the commodity that it sells, but it must also produce a commodity that is of higher value than the initial commodity in order for profit to be earned. This, according to Kōzō, can only be done in the context of industrial capitalism (Kōzō 1964: 15). In this Kōzō agrees with Braudel that capitalism is different to a market economy characterized by merchants and mercantilism. But while Braudel suggests that capitalism is about finance, Kōzō departs from his agreement by stating that capitalism must be in the context of industry, and he follows Marx by stating that the necessary ingredient to the formation of capitalism is production.

This is a distinction that is needed if one is to differentiate, in the context of comparative world-systems theory, between different world-systems that are based on different modes of production. The kind of capitalism that Braudel is talking about is the same, in essence, that Frank is talking about, the only difference being is while Braudel suggests that capitalism can be pushed back to the 13th Century with all its connections and linkages and money-lending, Frank's world system is pushed back to 5000 years (Frank and Gills, 1992). The important question that needs to be asked when considering the current formation of the world-system is how it got to be this way. If Frank is correct and there has only been one type of world-system, then the question of formation becomes completely meaningless: how can the world-system become the way it is currently if it has always been this way?

The question as to whether capitalism is based on production or on the circulation of money-lender capital is important because if the world system is a five thousand year

old system, then we are unable to even ask the question as to how the modern world system came to be, in terms of the processes of change because there can have been no change in this specific regard. On the other hand the question also goes to the bounding of world-systems. Wallerstein answers the question by suggesting that because a world-system is a self-contained social system then it can only be based on one dominant mode of production (Wallerstein 1974; Chase-Dunn and Hall, 1997: 32). He echoes Braudel's suggestion that a world-economy is a self-contained unit, which also suggests that a world-system is a self-contained unit. This means that in terms of the bounding of world-systems, it is not just a matter of spatial bounding but also of the temporal bounding of world-systems. In this regard the defining of capitalism to be about production primarily presents us with a time frame with which to discuss when the modern world-system came to be. Once we have set the lower limit, temporally speaking, of the formation of the modern world-system, we can then examine what the changes were that led to this transformation of the mode of production.

There is one more aspect of the formation of capitalism that Braudel talked about, and that is an issue of the role of the state in the economy. Arrighi for example, disagrees with the notion that the formation of world-economies and the cyclical restructurings of world-economies are the outcomes of autonomous actions by individuals, but rather these changes have come about as a direct consequence of the actions of states. In this he echoes Braudel that the development of capitalism is related to state formation (Arrighi 1994: 10 – 11). Karatani also makes this point that the point in time that a society becomes a capitalist society is when the state adopts the use of capitalism as a way to

raise funds that had been usually raised by direct taxation by tributary rulers (Karatani, 2014: 172).

This leads to two possibilities in the formation of the modern capitalist world-system. If one takes Braudel's and Arrighi's position that capitalism is capitalism when capital is used to make more capital directly without an emphasis on production, then it become possible to move that lower end of a temporal bounding to the 12th Century Northern Italian city states. By any measure they adopted the principles of finance capitalism as the central economic logic of the city states. This according to Arrighi also necessitated the very early stages of the formation of the sovereign nation-state within an interstate system in order to maintain the capitalistic system that the Northern Italian city states put in place (Arrighi, 1994: 38-40). This demonstrates the link between the formation of capitalism and the formation of the nation-state which Arrighi suggests is the very foundation of a capitalist world-system. A further examination of the rise of the Netherlands and the rise of Britain show similar developments such as the formation of the Dutch East India Company, the Amsterdam stock-exchange and the Bank of Amsterdam, from which the British learned. (Arrighi, 1994: 143-162; Bagchi, 2000: 405-407). These innovations show a linkage between the actions of the state and the formation of capitalism. The formation in Britain of the Bank of England clearly shows the role of the state in the transformation of England into a capitalist society, and which would have a huge knock on effect in terms of production.

The formation of the Bank of England is tied directly to the issue of production. The reason for this is that the initial formation of the Bank of England was tied to the

need to rebuild the Royal Navy following the defeat by the French at the battle of Beachy Head in 1690. This allowed the government to raise funds for various projects by borrowing from the Bank at modest interest, and the result was a strong navy and a major overhaul of the English industrial structure that would pave the way for the Industrial Revolution (Roulleau-Pasdeloup, 2016: 2-5; Lavery, 2012: Chapter 5; Buick, 2014: 268-271; Von Philippovich, 1911: 69; O'Brien and Palma, 2020: 2, 26, 27; John, 1955: 344). The important takeaway from this point is that the Bank of England was formed and functioned to further the military aims of the British state, which in turn aided with the expansion of British trade networks (Arrighi, 1994: 216 – 218). As such the Bank of England was the foundation for Britain as a capitalist society. Firstly because it shows the link between the development of financial capitalism as it related to the power of the state, and secondly, it shows a link to production.

This means that modern world-system can be bounded, as Wallerstein points out, by the dominant mode of production. This in turn means that the inclusion of a given society in the system can be determined. Chase-Dunn and Hall's emphasis on the interactions between societal units in a given system rather than on the bounding of a world-system based on the mode of accumulation can be reconciled with Wallerstein's focus on the mode of production by simply pointing out that they are not mutually exclusive concepts. Within a capitalist world-system the interactions among the constituent parts of the system would be predominantly commercial and commoditized exchanges whereas in systems based on a different mode of production, the exchanges would take on a different form such as the exchange of prestige valuables and/or gifts.

One of the foundational principles of world-systems theory is that the modern world-system is a capitalist one (Wallerstein, 1976). Wallerstein while making the case that the modern world-system can only be capitalist in nature, rejects the idea of a feudal system where agricultural surpluses are extracted using political coercion (Wallerstein, 1976: 234). The problem with this is that under Wallerstein's conception, the modern world-system stretches back to the 1500s. His implication is that mercantilism and capitalism are the same thing, which is a point that Eric Wolf (1982) disagrees with. Wolf's point is that merchants would amass a great deal of wealth garnered from long distance exchange networks, where they would buy and sell goods directly from the primary producers, and make a profit from differential value in terms of the geographical location. Merchants would often act with the tributary extractors in order to facilitate the sale of surplus goods purchased from those tributary extractors, who tolerated the merchants since it allowed them to be able to access financial resources with which they could fund armies that were engaged in conquest of other areas and the extraction of surpluses from the producers (Wolf, 1982: 79-88). This is true even taking into account Braudel's concept of capitalism based on finance and in accordance to Uno Kōzō's merging of finance and production.

Because the merchants around 1500 did not own the means of production, they cannot be properly called capitalists. However since the merchants were used by the European rulers at the time, similarly to the situation in other parts of the world such as Japan, in order to mediate the economic activity between the producers and the surplus extractors, I would suggest that at most mercantilism can be seen as a type of "proto-

capitalism”, but the important thing is that they existed within the context of a tributary mode of production. Janet Abu-Lughod (1989) describes the situation in medieval Venice and Genoa with respect to the activities of merchants in those locations. Abu-Lughod shows that the activities of merchants included the pooling of resources in order to raise capital for high-profit trade opportunities, and demonstrated a sophisticated system of banking that in many cases resembles the highly developed capitalism of today was in existence. However, even she points out that this situation cannot be properly considered to be capitalism, but rather a form of pre-capitalism because the surrounding social order was still a feudal system, which as I have mentioned, is part of the tributary mode of production (Abu-Lughod 1989: 115 – 120; Wolf 1982: 85, 87). Societies become capitalist-based social systems when the state adopts capitalistic principles, which means that there are three interrelated factors that are involved: state-action, the role that finance plays, and production.

2.3.2 Core/Periphery Structure

The second central issue of world-systems theory is the issue of the core/periphery structure. The dependency theorists, including Frank (1966) provided an explanation for the persistent under-development in third-world countries that suggested it was the very policies set in place regarding economic relations between rich countries in the core and poor countries that comprised the periphery. The explanation of under-development was that the extraction of resources and agricultural production for export from the periphery in return for the importation of manufactured goods from the core caused a net flow of wealth from the periphery to the core. The solution, they proposed, was to implement a

policy of import substitution in the peripheral countries in order to build up a surplus. In effect the policy would allow the countries to be able to extricate themselves from the state of under-development. This, in effect, would involve the formation of a form of developmental state, and I think this is important to mention, because this dissertation will show that this course of action was instrumental in Japan's ability to maintain its independence.

Wallerstein added to this structure the semi-periphery which is those countries that are exploited by the core states while at the same time exploit peripheral areas (Wallerstein, 2004). According to Wallerstein the semi-periphery acts as a stabilizing force. In pre-capitalist societies, potential leaders of rebellions in the semi-peripheries which “contribute political cohesiveness in isolated clusters of primary producers” (Wallerstein, 1974: 306) and which maintained long-distance exchange, were effectively bought off by the core elites who allowed urban areas limited access to some of the surplus extracted from tribute collection. In the case of the modern world economy, the presence of a semi-periphery is politically stabilizing because the core is not faced with “unified opposition” due to the middle layer being both the exploiter and exploited (Wallerstein, 1974: 307; Chase-Dunn and Hall, 1997: 78). That the modern world-system tends to be stable is demonstrated by Arrighi and Drangel (1986) who analyzed the differences in GDP over the course of many decades and found that there was very little change in terms of the GDP of core and peripheral nations. They also found that the incidence of nations moving from one category to either of the other categories was rare. In this they found that the modern world-system tends to be stable (Arrighi and Drangel,

1986).

However, where systemic change does occur, it is in the semi-peripheral areas that such change is initiated due to their adaptability. Semi-peripheries are better able to adapt to economic downturns than either cores and peripheries because “[they] can usually expand control of their home market at the expense of core producers, and expand their access to neighbouring peripheral markets, again at the expense of core producers” (Wallerstein, 1976: 463 – 464). Chase-Dunn and Hall state that semi-peripheries within a core/periphery structure are “important loci of forces that transform world-systems” and that the transformation of world-systems due to semi-peripheral action lies in *institutional development* [emphasis is mine] (into new types) affecting “system structures and modes of accumulation” (Chase-Dunn and Hall, 1997: 78; 79). In other words, the process of the transformation of world-systems through semi-peripheral action lies in the creation of new economic, financial, industrial, and governmental institutional structures. Because of this it becomes necessary to examine the role of ideas in institutional development and transformation.

This institutional innovation in Chase-Dunn and Hall's schema is the mechanism of semi-peripheral development. This is due to the ability to a society to adapt. Adaptation is different to adaptivity. 'Adaptation' refers to a change in institutional form in response to a change in the system. 'Adaptivity' refers to the ability of a society to undertake change in response to a systemic change. A society that is highly adapted usually has a low level of adaptivity. The reason for this is that a specific adaptation to a specific set of conditions constrains the adaptivity of the society in question as later

changes in systemic conditions occur. Those polities that are in the process of developing are able to pick and choose institutional forms (Chase-Dunn and Hall, 1997: 81). In the context of the modern world-system, Chase-Dunn and Hall argue that the most successful capitalist nations in the core, in particular those nations that are or were hegemonic, were at one time semi-peripheral. They do not argue that semi-peripheral status necessarily means a successful adaptation to the modern world-system, but they do argue that those which did manage to adapt successfully were at one time semi-peripheral (Chase-Dunn and Hall, 1997: 98). When linked to the issue of the mode of accumulation, we can see that successful adaptation to new systemic conditions involve not simply institutional transformations but more specifically institutional change that is related to a change in the mode of accumulation (Chase-Dunn and Hall, 1997: 249).

This mechanism of semi-peripheral change is echoed in the work of Carroll Quigley (1961; 1979), who argues that semi-peripheries account for civilizational change because they tend to innovate in institutional forms that are related to political expansion. According to Quigley, a civilization is made up a number of different cultural groups. This does not necessarily mean cultural change will happen, but when such a mixture of cultural forms occurs in such a way as to develop into a new cultural form which results in new ways of getting things done, so to speak. This includes the possible change in the mode of production. This admixture occurs on the edges or borders of civilizations, and so the new civilization that appears when the original decays is always in a different geographical location (Quigley, 1979: 147-148).

Carroll Quigley's work suggests that there is a geographical component to semi-

peripheral change, a point that is expounded at length by Kōjin Karatani (2014). Drawing from the work of Karl Wittfogel (1957), Karatani offers an analysis of core, margin, and sub-margin as pertaining to world-empires. These are analogous of the core, periphery, and semi-peripheral structure of the modern world-system. In the case of world-empires, the relation between the core and the margins, situated around the edges of the empires and which were mainly made up of pastoralists and other nomadic peoples, were absorbed into the core of the world-empires. Both the cores of the world-empires and their margins were incorporated into the modern world-systems as peripheries. Karatani adds an extra category that he refers to as “out of sphere” which he maintains were made up of peoples that were not absorbed by the cores of the world-empires, although they were peripheralized, for the most part, upon being integrated into the modern world-system (Karatani 2014: 107 – 108).

What makes the sub-margins different was their geographical relationship with the world-empires. Sub-margins, particularly in the case of maritime polities, for example Great Britain and Japan were not strongly connected to the cores of world-empires, and were thus not absorbed into the core. At the same time they were not completely cut off from the cores either, and were linked through trade. Because of this, the sub-margins were able to pick and choose which elements of the core that they adopted. These elements generally included cultural elements from the core, which included language, writing systems, religion and so forth. At the same time, centralized bureaucracies were not generally adopted. In this way, sub-marginal polities were able to maintain independence due to this adaptability, which was based on the relatively weak

connections to the core. As a result, sub-margins became semi-peripheries when incorporated into the modern world-system (Karatani 2014: 107 – 108, 110).

Wittfogel's argument is based on the role of irrigation in agriculture. China had invested heavily the building of a complex irrigation system and a bureaucratic system that facilitated this. Japan differed from China in one important aspect, that is it had a less developed bureaucratic infrastructure. During the Taika Reform in 646 CE, Japan adopted a bureaucratic program. That included the mandatory building of dykes, canals, and a road system. It included a regular census with the imposition of *corvée* labour, and a tax system that was levied on peasants based on the size of the land that was assigned to them. However, this program lacked one very important ministry that China had instituted whose purview was the construction and maintenance of water works. Japan had adopted other ministries that China had, but not this one. Also, *corvée* labour could be alleviated by paying a tax and so Japan became more interested in revenue. This, coupled with the tax-free status of those with high rank, meant that there was a growth of a feudal class and a collapse of the census system, which in turn meant that Japan was unable to create a strong bureaucracy (Wittfogel, 1957: 198 – 199; Karatani, 2014: 125).

This discussion of Karatani's geographical component to core, margin, and sub-margin is important because it goes directly to the issue of adaptivity. As in the discussion of the distinction between adaptation and adaptivity, it can be seen that sub-margins, by virtue of not being so completely tied to the core of a world-empire that they are completely dominated, are able to pick and choose the institutional forms that fit the specific context of the society in question – which means that they have a high level of

adaptivity. In the case of Japan, it meant that Japan was able to adapt to the arrival of Perry in 1853. Japan could retain the institutional forms that worked best in their context. The historical example of the Taika Reform in 646 CE is important because the consequence of those reforms was that Japan became what can be described as a feudal society and as such was not a centralized society. This is important because even though the Tokugawa shoguns attempted to form such a centralized state, the feudal domains were largely self-governing. I submit that this made it possible for Satsuma and Chōshū to form a successful opposition to the shogunate. The second consequence of the Taika reforms was that it meant that while Japan adopted many cultural forms from China, it never became dominated politically by the East Asian Tributary network. This meant that Japan retained an ability to adapt.

Based on this, the adaptivity of polities as a central characteristic of semi-peripheral societies and a prerequisite to any action by a given society to transform itself is of central importance. I also take as a fundamental aspect of semi-peripheral change the institutional innovation that leads to a shift from one mode of production to another, in this case the adoption of capitalism as a social and economic system upon being incorporated into the modern world-system. It is important to add that this does not necessarily work in the case of a polity that historically had no contact with any of the exchange networks of Asia and Europe such as the case of small island societies of the Pacific, in particular those that comprise Polynesia. Chase-Dunn and Hall point out that it is a mistake to simply apply the concept of core/periphery as a given, but rather it is important to empirically make that determination for each world-system and each societal

unit of a given world-system (Chase-Dunn and Hall, 1997: 35). As such while I accept the definition of semi-peripheral development as it pertains to the case of Japan the core status of Tonga in its own indigenous world-system needs to be established. Rather than being loosely tied into an exchange network with a strong world-empire as the core, Tonga was itself the core polity within the small regional world-system in West-Polynesia. A static analysis of that system shows that during the period between 1770 and the dissolution of that system in 1874, Tonga was in a dominant position and the centre of accumulation in marriages and prestige goods exchange (Sutherland, 2015). In terms of a centre/periphery hierarchy, the historical sources show that due to the interactions between Tonga and Fiji specifically, Tonga was clearly the core of the system both in terms of tribute, military and tribute collection items but also in terms of relative power. This can be inferred by the rapid expansion into Fijian waters which led to the ceding of Fiji to the British. This means that the characterization of Tonga as a semi-periphery is based on its relative position of centrality in the Tonga-Fiji-Samoan system.

I will show that the reason why Tonga remained a peripheralized state had to do with the nature of the political changes as laid out in the Constitution of 1875. Land tenure laws in this constitution and in subsequent laws provide for access to the land by Tongans, while making the sale of land illegal, which meant that the social relations of labour in Tonga never became capitalistic. This retention of the gift-exchange system, as I will demonstrate, was also converted to the relations of the people to the Church. Offerings of food during feasts and the redistribution of gifts to the people also included cash, but because of the nature of the gift-exchange system and the exchange of

preciosities, cash offerings became simply another form of prestige good, with no commercial meaning (See Chapter 3).

The maintenance of traditional gift-exchanges meant that Tonga never became a capitalist social system and as such never became a part of the modern world-system, which is according to Wallerstein, a self-contained social system based on the capitalistic mode of production. So while Tonga became connected to the modern world-system, the interactions could never be such that Tonga could be anything other than a peripheral nation. This is not to say that Tonga would not have been peripheral even had they converted to a capitalist system given the low amount of trade between Tonga and the rest of the world, but I argue that the main reason why Tonga is not peripheral has more to do with the fact that it never fully adopted capitalism as the dominant mode of accumulation, and that the reason for this is that Tongans had continuous access to the means of production, and thus never had to be obliged to sell their labour in return for wages. This is not to say that there is no wage labour at all – there is, but Tongans are not dependent on wage labour to live, and most of the wage labour that does exist is in the context of government bureaucracies.

2.4 Political Change, Historical Institutionalism, and the Role of Ideas

2.4.1 Agency

The question of agency is an important one. World-systems theory has often been criticized as being deterministic due to the unit of analysis being societies and a reliance on economic exchanges as the driving force of system change. This is a fair criticism and as such it is a hole that needs to be filled, and this hole can be filled with an examination

of the internal aspects of a given society. This is important because if the point of world-systems theory is that the external interactions between societies are the cause of societal stability or change, then an understanding of the internal aspects of any given society is needed. This represents a change in the unit of analysis from the system as a whole to the level of the constituent part of the system. This is wholly consistent with the definition of 'systemness' that Chase-Dunn and Hall provide which states that a system is an interaction network between societies that affect both the social reproduction of the constituent societies within the system, but are also interactions that affect changes within the constituent system (Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997: 28). The converse is also true, meaning that just as systemic conditions affect the internal workings of the constituent part of the system, changes in the local conditions will have an effect on the system as a whole. These changes in the local society as a result of external stimuli do not simply happen in a way in which people have no control over. Rather the reactions to the external stimuli are very much the product of human agency. And so structural explanations in no way deny agency as the criticisms allege. However having said that, explanations of societal change that have as their primary focus the role of human agency also do not negate structural explanations, but rather there is a relationship between the two.

The criticisms levelled against rational actor models, which in many cases are at the heart of structural theories, can serve to illustrate my position of agency. Rational Choice models of decision making are predicated on the idea that individuals will make decisions based on self-interest (Hay, 2004: 41). Rationality in this context means that

individuals behave in self-utilizing behaviour, that is to say behaviour that benefits the individual's interests. However this perspective makes a couple of very important assumptions. Firstly it assumes that an individual's notion of what constitutes rationality involves self-utilizing behaviour in all cases. This of course is not necessarily the case. Elinor Ostrom points out that in many collective action problems, self-utilizing actions are characterized as non-cooperation (Ostrom, 1998: 1). However, particularly in the case of repeated games where the players can learn from the previous game, where players can confer with each other, and where players can engage in trust building strategies, there is a tendency of players to cooperate. In terms of real life political action, cooperation is often in the form of institutions, which can be defined as "scripts that constrain behaviour" (Shepsle, 2006: 26; Ostrom, 1990: 3 - 5; Ostrom, 1998: 5). The other assumption that is central to the Rational Choice model is that the actors are in possession of all of the facts needed to make decisions.

However, human beings are never in full possession of the facts and in fact do not have the cognitive ability to be in full possession of the facts that might affect their decisions. As Reinhard Selten puts it, the fully rational actor is a "mythical hero who knows the solutions of all mathematical problems and can immediately perform all computations, regardless of how difficult they are." He continues by pointing out because of the cognitive limitations of human beings, they can never be considered to be fully rational beings (Selten, 1999: 3). Rather the decisions that actors make are constrained by this cognitive limitation which results in incomplete information and "unclear linkages between decisions and outcomes (Frederickson *et al.*, 2016: 174). Apart from the fact that

human beings are never in full possession of facts, actors' decisions are also constrained by the institutional culture in which they exist. Institutional culture includes various factors including the rules that are adopted as a result of the identities formed by inclusion in institutions (March, 1994: 60; March and Olsen 1984: 742). These rules include a wide variety of issues that they are concerned with, ranging from rules about how to make rules, to rules that limit or allow decisions to be made, and so on (Frederickson *et al.*, 2016: 183). Following the rules however does not imply that actors always agree on what those rules should be, and conflict is an integral part of the decision making process (March and Olsen 1984: 742).

There are behavioural considerations as well. Decisions that actors make in game theoretic situations are affected by certain behavioural factors including the building of trust among the players, and also whether or not players reciprocate, whether or not the games are repeated, and how many times the game is repeated, which is important since it goes to the issue of learning and its relation to cooperation and overcoming collective action problems (Ostrom, 1998: 13; Ostrom, 2010: 159).

The above examples serve to illustrate that in the context of making decisions, there are many factors affecting the decision making process that act as a constraint. This means that rationality is at best bounded. In the same way, in the context of social theories of societal change, agency, is not something that human beings possess in totality. Agency is similarly constrained by factors that include institutional culture.

2.4.2 Historical Institutionalism

In creating an explanatory framework of societal change, there needs to be a way

of visualizing the various elements. The issue at hand is the mechanism of societal change that occurs as a result of political and economic decisions made in response to an external stimulus. The very idea of a response to a sudden issue that has come up that needs to be solved precludes slow and incremental change as an explanation. This does not mean that institutions do not change incrementally over time - they often do, but slow and incremental change cannot account for responses to exogenous shocks, and so another explanation of change needs to be utilized. Historical Institutionalism provides such a way to visualize sudden changes. Institutionalism (HI) is an approach that describes institutional change over time. Temporality is at the heart of HI and not equilibrium which is central to rational choice institutionalism (Orren & Skowronek, 1994: 312, in Thelen, 1999: 382). In so doing HI also seeks to explain why it is that institutions remain stable. This would at first glance appear to be somewhat of a contradiction, but it really is not. It describes institutional change as occurring only in very specific situations when change is an absolute necessity. Generally speaking, an institution will remain stable and resistant to change during long path-dependent periods. The reason why institutions are unchanging during these periods is because of institutional culture and the logic of appropriateness. This concept can be defined thusly: “decisions are thought to be appropriate when choices are based on shared understandings of the decision situation, the nature or “identity” of the organization, and accepted rules of what is expected in particular situations” (Frederickson, Smith, Larimer, and Licari, 2016: 172).

In other words, it is a set of social norms and standard operating procedures that

provide institutions with stability in that decisions that are made within any given institution are constrained. This in turn means that an institution will in all likelihood not make changes unless the constraints that are imposed on the decision making process by institutional culture are removed or at least sufficiently lowered in order for changes to occur. HI describes this situation as the critical juncture, which is in essence a small window of opportunity where such constraints are indeed lowered. Temporally speaking, the critical juncture is of relatively short duration in comparison to the path dependent state that existed prior to the critical juncture. The critical juncture comes about as the result of an exogenous shock which can be thought of as causal event that leads to decisions which in turn lead to a new institutional set of norms. This needs to be coupled with another existing and contingent factor. In other words, I submit that it is not enough to have an exogenous shock, which is only one component of the critical juncture, but there must be another component involved, one which allows for adaptation and transformation (Thelen 1999: 387; Campbell, 1998: 381; Sanders 2006: 39; Capoccia and Kelemen 2007: 348, 368; Mahoney, 2000: 511). Put more simply, one component can be thought of as the event that brings up the need to change, and the other component that provides a way forward, or put another way, one that is material and the second which is ideational.

Punctuated equilibrium theory posits that change, in this case institutional change, occurs in what may be termed as spurts – relative periods of stability followed by short period of change (Princen, 2013: 854). As such it is related in form with Historical Institutionalism the pattern of path-dependency/critical juncture/path-dependency. Often

when change occurs in an institution, it is usually in accordance with the idea of longer periods of stability punctuated by shorter periods of instability and change. As Lundgren, Squatrito, and Tallberg (2017) found in their study of international organizations, agendas tend to be stable, but occasionally there are shifts in attention that lead to a change in the agenda, which conforms to the idea of punctuated equilibrium (Lundgren, Squatrito, and Tallberg, 2017: 549). Baumgartner, *et al.* suggest that the changes that happen through government action are not carried out because of the real world, but due to political signals that accompany institutional friction related to social mobilization (Baumgartner *et al.*, 2009: 616). Both HI and punctuated equilibrium suggest that institutional change occurs in this manner and not gradually over time. There have been many studies that back up this claim such as the Baumgartner *et al.* study, and the Lundgren, Squatrito and Tallberg studies above-mentioned, and also Park and Sapotichne (2020), Citi (2013), Princen (2013), and many others, and so it would appear that institutional change and by extension societal change occurs in this manner. Baumgartner, *et al.* suggest that the changes that happen through government action are ideational in nature and are not carried out because of the real world, but due to political signals that accompany institutional friction related to social mobilization (Baumgartner *et al.*, 2009: 616). These political signals thus are founded in perceptions concerning the need to change and also suggest that ideas play a significant role in institutional change, which I will cover below.

Because of the schema that comes from Historical Institutionalism, that is the path-dependency – critical Juncture – path-dependency scheme, HI is a useful approach because it provides a way to visualize societal change and in this case societal change due

to semi-peripheral development. Because of the ease by which this schema can be used as a visualization aid, it will be utilized in this dissertation as such – it is not so much an element of the framework itself, but rather is a visual aid.

2.4.3 Ideas

The main hole that exists in the world systems framework is the role of agency that policy makers exercise in response to a change in the system, that is to say an exogenous shock. World-systems theory does not address this question due to the unit of analysis chosen. However interactions between societies are systemic if they affect the social reproduction in the component parts of the system, and *vice versa* (Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997: 28). This, in my view, necessitates an examination of the internal cultural and political realities of the component parts of the system. This includes an examination of how the arrival of Commodore Perry in Japan in 1853 affected the politics of the country, but also how the internal politics affected the way in which the Japanese responded. In world-systems theory, the society is treated as a unitary entity, and the reaction is usually explained in the context of the rational actor approach. Even an examination of the developmental state does not really change that by itself, it is only when one considers the internal politics in the context of how decisions are made. In this regard, I propose that an examination the role of ideas and interests will shed light on how it came to be that the Japanese and the Tongans reacted the way they did. In this regard I believe that the ideas that were already present had a profound affect on how certain interests formed in response to the arrival of the West and in response to the presence of these pre-existing ideas.

According to Jacobs (2009), the causal role that ideas play in decision making is that ideas direct the attention of the policy-maker in a specific direction. This is done in such a way that other possibilities are occluded and disappear from consideration. The idea forms a mental map that is the directional guide of the policy maker's attention, and as a result the policy maker's attention is drawn to the course of action that is the most clearly signalled, particularly those which have short term consequences. In contrast attention is drawn away from those possible courses of action that are distant or ambiguous in terms of consequences (Jacobs, 2009: 273). According to Campbell (1998), ideas are ways of framing a problem that needs to be solved. As a framing device, and idea serves to direct the attention of the policy maker by constraining the range of solutions that are available. An idea is most likely to affect policy change if it fits in with a set of clear and simple solution that is credible to the policy-maker and that it is an effective course of action. Policies also must conform to general public sentiment and social norms and if it does not, then it must be framed in such a way as to make it a good fit with the policy maker's preference, and so the role of the idea is as a framing device. It is the interaction between political preferences and societal sentiments and norms which are thus mediated by ideas that is important in policy making (Campbell, 1998: 398-402).

The way that new policies are framed have an effect on whether new ideas gain support. According to Kangas, Niemelä, and Varjonen (2014), if the framing of an idea relies too much on facts and figures, then it is less likely to gain societal support. On the other hand an appeal to morality and moral sentiments is more likely to gain support for a new policy (Kangas, Niemelä and Varjonen, 2014: 88-89). Richardson (2000) argues that

ideas, particularly policy ideas that have an external origin, serve to disrupt and destabilize established policy regimes. As such new ideas are a threat to older, more established policies. As policy makers come into contact with ideas from outside their own communities they bring them home with them, and so Richardson argues that they have virus-like properties and that they spread in much the same way as viruses do (Richardson, 2000: 1017-1018).

Thus it can be seen that the role of ideas is important to consider, especially in the case studies of this dissertation, when it is apparent that the role that ideas play has an effect on the exercise of agency. Ideas on the one hand can serve to constrain which policy decisions are made by focusing attention on those solutions that are simple, clearly articulated and that conform to social norms. On the other hand ideas can have the 'virus-like' property of drawing the attention of policy makers to new possibilities. These new ideas can be framed in such a way as to offer new possibilities which can in turn lead to an overthrow of a previous policy regime and replace it with a new policy regime. Agency thus can be more easily exercised if there are new possibilities to consider. This would have the effect of potentially changing the governance of a society. This is especially true if the new ideas were actively sought, as was the case of the two societies in question here.

In the case of Japan, new possibilities presented themselves with the arrival of Westerners. These new ideas were ultimately seized upon by a group who wanted to overthrow the existing governance that the shogunal system represented. These ideas proved to be disastrous for the Shogunate which was replaced by the new government

that based many of its policies on ideas adopted from foreign sources that were actively sought out. It is also clear that the way the rebels who became the new Meiji government did not appeal to facts and figures for support, but rather they framed their ideas in moralistic terms. In the case of Japan an appeal to morality was the key to the acceptance of the idea of removing the shogunate. Similarly in the case of Tonga, new ideas entered the island group from foreign sources, such as the missionaries. These new ideas had the effect of opening up the Tongans to new possibilities that allowed them to voluntarily formulate a solution to the problem of the encroachment of Western powers in the region. These new possibilities led Josiah Tupou and George Tupou to reach out for more ideas with the expressed purpose of changing their governance in order to become more like the Western powers in institutional form. This exercise of agency allowed them to remain independent.

It should be noted that just because an idea exists does not mean it will be placed on the agenda. An agenda is a set of topics, problems, and solutions which the political and bureaucratic elites pay attention to at any given time (Kingdon, 2011: 3). There are three processes by which an issue finds its way onto the agenda: first, a major event takes place that requires some sort of a response which moves it onto the agenda; secondly, the gradual accumulation of knowledge by experts that over time lead to a particular issue finding its way onto the agenda; and thirdly there could be changes in factors such as a change in government, a change in the mood of the public and so on (Kingdon 2011: 16 - 17). This means that for an issue to be placed on the agenda, it must be as a result of a specific event taking place. In the case of Japan, that the arrival of the West powers was a

major enough event to cause consternation, and ultimately a violent overthrow of the existing Shōgunate government. How to deal with the Western powers became the most serious problem of the day and demand a great deal of attention. This fulfills the first process, but subsequent events also resulted in a major item finding its way on the agenda, and that was the overthrow and replacement of the Shōgunate with a new governmental configuration, which stemmed from the Shōgunate's failure to enforce the country's isolation policy, which caused a change in the public mood. Thirdly, it will be shown that scholars in Japan and certain *daimyo* who had some contact with the West through knowledge transmitted by the Dutch in Nagasaki, the only Westerners allowed to openly trade with Japan, and from contact with foreign nations by way of trade with the Ryūkyū Islands (modern day Okinawa) which was controlled by the Shimazu family, the Satsuma *daimyo*. These scholars and the Satsuma clan observed the rise of the West through its incursions in China and consequently advocated better knowledge of the West, and saw the danger of Western encroachment.

Once the problem of the West made its way onto the agenda, a certain set of ideas led to the huge societal changes. Ideas are important because political elites base their decisions on pre-existing beliefs, and so their ideas draw their attention to a specific set of solutions in response to the events that occur, and that need to be examined. As Jacobs puts it, "ideas shape the decision making by structuring and constraining actors' causal reasoning and information processing. Elites' mental models of the field in which they are operating guide their attention toward certain causal logics ... it leads them to weigh most heavily those data and outcomes implied by their mental model while discounting

other potential outcomes...” (Jacobs 2009: 2 - 3). Japanese superiority through loyalty to the Emperor of an unbroken divine dynasty became the central idea that was politicized by one Yoshida Shōin. This became the driving force behind the acts of those who wished Japan to once again be closed to foreigners. Other actors promoted loyalty to the Shōgun and wished to preserve the old order. Yoshida Shōin's promotion of the idea that loyalty should be directed to the Emperor as an alternative to the political authority of the Shogun paved the way for institutional innovation that would lead to the Meiji Restoration.

2.5 The Developmental State

A key aspect of this dissertation is a model that was proposed by scholars after the Second World-War to explain the economic development of Asian countries. This developmental trajectory was different from the paths taken by capitalists in countries such as the US and the UK³, and communism that was the path taken by the USSR. The developmental path taken by East Asian countries did not follow the orthodoxy of neo-liberal, free market approaches promoted by the US and other nations, and also seemed to defy the deterministic arguments put forward by dependency theorists (Johnson, 1999: 33; Wong, 2004: 349). What was needed was an analysis of the path taken by East Asian countries, and it concerned the role that the state played in the economic development of those nations. This model was dubbed the “Developmental State Model” by Chalmers Johnson, who noted that the role that the state was playing was not really state control of the economy, but rather the role was one of guidance. However without state involvement

3 Although it will be shown that both, in particular the UK, are starting to be recognizes as developmental states (Bagchi, 2000: 406)

in setting developmental goals, particular in the case of later industrializing countries, there can be no developmental state (Johnson, 1999: 33-34; Sinha, 2003: 460-461; List, 1996 [1885]: 178, in Leftwich, 1995: 402; Gerschenkron, 1962: 44, 358).

Johnson's examination showed that the role that the Japanese state played in the nation's economic development after WWII involved a separation of the bureaucracy from the government, that is the legislative and executive branches, and created a developmental state. Johnson noted that the developmental state undertakes many activities where the bureaucracy is able to operate autonomously. It forms financial institutions that are owned by the state, and is involved in the extensive use of creating tax policies that promote growth. It is involved in economic planning and plays the part of providing venues for discussions between the state and industry. Finally, it is involved in the formulation of investment budgets that are separate from the general finances of the state (Johnson, 1999: 37-39; Leftwich, 1995: 405).

In order to accomplish this the Japanese government formed the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), which was a fully autonomous ministry which fulfilled the requirements for the developmental state, and that combined "indirect control of government funds [...], 'think-tank' functions, its vertical bureaus for the implementation of industrial policy, and its internal democracy" (Johnson, 1999: 39). This model has been successfully implemented in other Asian states including South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and China. In addition to those, the model has been implemented by some Indian states, and it has been shown to be used in Brazil and Mexico (Johnson 1999; Sinha, 2003; Leftwich, 1995). Leftwich provides a definition for

the developmental state:

The developmental state... may be defined as [a] state whose politics [has] concentrated sufficient power, autonomy and capacity at the centre to shape, pursue and encourage the achievement of explicit developmental objectives, whether by establishing and promoting the conditions and direction of economic growth, or by organizing it indirectly, or a varying combination of both. (Leftwich 1995: 401)

Or to put it more simply:

It is a state that puts economic development as the top priority of governmental policy and is able to design effective instruments to promote such a goal. The instruments would include the forging of new formal institutions, the weaving of formal and informal networks of collaboration among the citizens and officials and the utilization of new opportunities for trade and profitable production. (Bagchi 2000: 398).

As noted by Johnson, this is done through the creation of an independent bureaucracy and importantly does not draw its actors from the landlord or commercial/industrial classes and who do not form a close relationship with these classes (Trimberger, 1978: 4).

Leftwich outlines six components of a developmental state: firstly, the presence of a developmental elite, who in the case of Japan consist of senior politicians and bureaucrats who are considered to be the best and the brightest and who often are graduates of Tokyo University (Wong 2004: 346). Secondly, there should be autonomy for the bureaucracies involved. Thirdly, there should be a powerful, competent and insulated economic bureaucracy. Four, there would be a weak and subordinated civil society which can clamp down on anything that might disrupt the functioning of the economy. Fifthly, there should be the effective management of non-state economic

interests, and finally a lower amount of repression, and there needs to be legitimacy and good performance (Leftwich, 1995: 405, 419). In addition there appears to be a need for some form of nationalism as a key component of the developmental state, and often there is the dominance of a single political party (Wong, 2004: 352).

Even though the model itself was formulated during the post war period and as Gerschenkron put it, “actual historical cases cannot, of course, conform with precision to the postulates of an analytical pattern” (Gerschenkron, 1962: 36), as a model it can be adapted to fit different situations. It is clear that it is a model that can account for the way in which some societies in the past went along the route to development. It is not a model that can only be thought of in the context of industrialization, but also in the context of pre-industrial societies.

As such, 17th Century Netherlands can be included in the category of the developmental state on the grounds that the state was strong enough to wrest control of the running of the nation from the landed classes. The state was heavily involved in the encouragement of economic growth and trade, and were instrumental in the formation of the Dutch East India Company, which was the first stock issuing company in Europe, and was also involved in the formation of the Bank of Amsterdam which was in control of a system of public and private loans at low interest which had the effect of encouraging accumulation (Bagchi 2000: 399-403).

Britain can also be placed in the category of the developmental state. The conditions of growth included the conversion of land into a commodity that was “transferable, saleable, except for restrictions which sought to preserve large properties in

their entirety” (Bagchi 2000: 404), and freed labour from non-market bondage and the replacement of the nobility by owners of property to positions of political power. Other measures included the protection of trade by the military, and the adoption of measures first put in place by the Netherlands such as the creation of the Bank of England had the effect of transforming the British economy and sowing the seeds of the Industrial Revolution, and the investment in the East India Company and in the South Sea Company (Bagchi, 2000: 403-409; Arrighi, 1994; Buick, 2014). Finally, Germany can likewise be placed in this category as well. This is particularly important to this dissertation because Japan's industrial policy was adopted from the experiences of Germany, as I will show in Chapter 4 (Bagchi, 2000: 412-416). The key here is that one important aspect of the developmental state is the process of learning, where developmental states adopt ideas from other, previous developmental states (Bagchi, 2000: 411; Wong, 2004: 348). This means that while it is hard to squeeze historical cases into a particular framework, a case can be made that Meiji Japan represents an earlier iteration of the developmental state model. A generalized developmental state concept is one which refers to the proactive steps that the state takes in order to engage in institutional and industrial innovation in order to develop the country economically.

These examples, and the Italian city states, have been described as semi-peripheral as a result of reacting to conditions in Europe and other parts of the world by engaging in economic and institutional innovations that resulted in those states being classed as hegemonic (Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997: 94; Arrighi 1994: 28, 37-59). The East Asian nations in the post-WWII period have been also classed as semi-peripheral. As

such these cases imply that the economic development of the modern world-system as been the result of semi-peripheral development. This means that semi-peripheral development would involve the creation and implementation of a developmental state. These cases also demonstrate that the developmental state model is an appropriate model to use in an analysis of the domestic politics of semi-peripheral development. This is the case since the model provides a starting point for such an investigation into the internal processes of change that are involved in semi-peripheral development. In other words it provides a starting point for an analysis for the types of decisions that are made as the result of an external stimulus that result in an adaption to a new systemic condition in such way as to avoid peripheralization. There is only one more aspect in the investigation of the politics of semi-peripheral development, and that is the role that ideas play in the decision making processes. This is in accordance with the idea that the presence of a particular set of ideas are a contingent part of the very small window of change that is the critical juncture.

2.6 The Explanatory Framework

Based on the literature reviewed above, an explanatory framework of change can be conceived. From the HI, we can visualize societal change in the following manner:

Fig. 1: Basic pattern of societal change as institutional change using path-dependency/Critical Juncture/Path-dependency model of Historical Institutionalism.

This investigation is specifically examining how actors make specific decisions during critical junctures in order to respond to exogenous shocks that lead a society onto a new trajectory. In this case the incorporation into the modern world-system. The framework becomes as follows:

Fig. 2: Critical Juncture as represented by external activity

A main feature of institutional innovation that accompanies societal change often involves borrowing and adapting ideas from external sources as necessary contingent factors, often from the previous hegemonic power (Bagchi, 2000: 411; Wong, 2004: 348). In this framework, I am proposing that the contingent factors must be of an ideational nature, because of the learning that takes place during the transition to a new systemic cycle of accumulation. The presence of ideas as the contingency in the critical juncture are not restricted to external ideas, but can also include internal ideas. Indeed I am specifically proposing that the ideational contingencies include ideas whose origins are both external and internal. The important point here is that ideas are the motivating forces that drive adaptation in a particular direction. In this way it can be visualized in the following way:

Fig.3: Critical Juncture as external activity and contingent ideas.

Both the exogenous shock and the presence of certain ideational factors shape the manner in which a society is incorporated into the modern world-system. The critical juncture is that point in time when the constraints to exercising agency are lifted temporarily. It is during this period when the society in question is able to adapt if the above conditions are met. It is very important to note here that the adaptation and societal change needs to be voluntary, and not imposed from without, as was often the case of those societies that did become colonial possessions. The reason why this is an important note is because this entire explanatory framework is at its heart about the exercise of agency. If societal changes are being made as a result of domination by another society then by definition agency is not being exercised by that society and thus cannot be said to be engaging in a process of semi-peripheral transformation.

There are a large number of potential decisions that political actors in a given society can make in order for that society to adapt, and so it is necessary to narrow this down into types of decisions. This dissertation narrows the number of types of decisions to two: Political decisions and economic decisions. By economic, I mean those decisions regarding the dominant mode of production and changes in the mode of production. The reason for this is political decision making and economic decision making in capitalist societies are often seen as separate. This is of course demonstrated by the way in which academia differentiates between economics and politics. On the other hand, political and economic decision making could often not be separated. For example, in the case of gift-exchange, the exchange may be seen as purely economic, but as Marcel Mauss (1990) observed gift-exchange in many societies is an overtly political act that is used to form

alliances, to refuse alliances (if one does not reciprocate), and to assert dominance by placing the recipient under an obligation to a donor. This is because if the recipient cannot return the gift with interest, he will lose face (Mauss, 1990: 42). Similarly the extraction of tribute is also an overtly political act.

Narrowing down the decision types to political and economic decisions presents us with three decisions and outcomes which are as follows:

- 1) Political change and shift in mode of production
- 2) Political change but no shift in mode of production
- 3) No political change or change in mode of production.

The critical juncture, as noted previously, is conceived as being characterized either as both an exogenous shock and a contingent set of ideas being present (which allows for agency to be exercised), or only the exogenous shock being present (and thus no way to exercise agency). In the case of neither political change nor shift in mode of production, the society in question could either have simply decided not to change, or lacked an ideational way of exercising agency leading to a decision to change. *Fig. 4* shows from the perspective of the HI approach a way to visualize semi-peripheral development. In this visualization, the proposed outcomes of particular adaptive decisions made by societies in response to incorporation into the modern world-system are shown. This dissertation proposes that there are three outcomes:

- 1) A society decides to adapt to incorporation into the modern world-system by transforming their society both in terms of the political/social as well as adopting capitalism as the dominant mode of production, in which case it can successfully maintain independence and take the trajectory of achieving at core status within the modern world-system at some point
- 2) A society decides to adapt by instituting political and social changes but still maintains its customary mode of production, in which case it successfully

maintains political independence but becomes peripheralized in the modern world-economy

- 3) A society decides not to adapt or lacks the requisite ideational basis to make the decision to change in order to adapt, in which case the most likely outcome is colonialism and peripheralization.

This last outcome also includes resisting by force of arms incursions by colonial powers.

Figure 5 shows a modified version of figure 4. The difference between the two is slight,

but it is necessary to provide a more generalized model that is not only relevant to the

modern world-system. By this I mean that the explanatory framework must not be

fig. 4 – Diagram showing the different results of the different decisions taken by societies when incorporated into the modern world-system.

restricted to entry into the modern system, but into any system based on a particular mode of production. In any event the framework shows the different outcomes that occur in the event of one of three decisions. In summary, these choices are political and economic decisions, political decisions only, and no change.

Fig. 5 -Generalized Framework of societal change show the different outcomes that are the result of different decisions

2.7 Discussion and Conclusion

Taken together, the different theoretical frameworks that I have used in order to explain societal change from both the internal and the external factors of change point to a very narrow set of conditions that allow change to take place. It can be seen that world-systems are stable entities that are structured as cores and peripheries, with Wallerstein's third category of the semi-periphery. The study by Arrighi and Drangel shows that this structure is generally stable (Arrighi and Drangel, 1986) although there are periodic changes to the configuration of world-systems in a cyclical manner (Arrighi, 1994: 374-378). What kind of system change occurs is due to that action of semi-peripheries which affect change by innovating institutionally speaking (Chase-Dunn and Hall, 1997: 79). The reason for the ability of semi-peripheries to affect change in world-systems lies,

according to Karatani, with its position geographical with respect to world-empires. Using Wittfogel's work, Karatani makes the point that the adaptability of the semi-periphery is because it was not tied so closely to a world-empire that it was dominated completely, but rather the ability to pick and choose which of the core's social, cultural, political, and institutional forms that it adopts (Karatani, 2014: 107).

Historical Institutionalism provides a way in which to visualize how institutional change takes place. When considered in the lens of Historical institutionalism, adaptation and change cannot take place during a period characterized by path-dependency – that is to say during periods when institutional culture is strong and stable (or if it does then such change is incremental). The critical juncture, though, relies on other factors to be present, such as the existence of a specific set of ideas that propel a society, or a government into a particular new direction. This in turn suggests that in the absence of such ideas the result is a failure to adapt to a new systemic reality in a favourable way. In HI, because the period of change that occurs when institutional barriers to change are weak, and thus when agency is more likely to be exercised, it makes sense to study that period of time when the society undergoes change. In this case the critical junctures occurred during the colonial period when the spread of European influence and power was resulting in the subjugation of most of the Asian and Pacific Island cultures.

The important part of this is concerned with the ability to exercise agency. It is clear that one of the things that societies that have undergone change have was the ability to imagine themselves as a new kind of polity. In that case, the contingent set of ideas need to be related to the imagining of oneself as a new kind of polity. Without that

imagining, there can be no impetus for change in a particular direction. This dissertation will show that the very specific set of ideas that the anti-alienists who then advocated an overthrow of the Shōgunate had the imagining necessary to transform Japanese society in such a way that it avoided domination at the hands of the West, and one of the most important was the imagining of Japan as a unitary society, that is to say a nation-state in the Westphalian sense. This had its roots both in the idea of Japanese moral superiority and in observations of Western nations in particular the great powers who the Japanese ultimately chose to emulate.

The developmental state model is of importance, because the way in which Japan reacted was in the context of a specific set of institutional change that was designed to set Japan on the road to economic development in the capitalist sense. This is in common with the hegemonic powers in Europe which went through similar institutional changes such as the formation of the central bank, the government company, and the stock holding company, as well as a reorganization of labour and production in Britain which ultimately led to the Industrial Revolution. Each of the hegemonies learned from the previous one, and in the same way Japan learned from Britain and Germany primarily, but also from other European countries and the US. In the case of the European hegemonies, each had to imagine itself as something new, which includes but is not limited to, the idea of transitioning from a feudal kingdom to a modern Westphalian state and a liberal democracy.

The developmental state model also is useful because it gives us a starting point for an analysis of the decision making processes and the ideas that influence them. It

suggests that the emphasis should be on the relation between ideas and the formation of new institutions, in terms of industrialization. It suggests that the ideas are related to changing institutions and governance structures in order to encourage development and the maintenance of national sovereignty and independence. This is the key component of the way the semi-peripheries affect change, both as a systemically, but also domestically. As such the model is one that should be able to be applied to a variety of cases throughout the course of human history.

In conclusion, this chapter has combined in a world-systems context the idea of semi-peripheral development as a function of the geographical location of a polity in relation to an older core empire with an historical institutionalist perspective that directs us to examine societal change as institutional change. This institutional change can only happen during a short period of time known as the critical juncture, which in the context of the case-studies presented here is the arrival of Westerners. However change only occurs in the presence of a certain set of contingent ideas that allow for the imagining, institutionally, of political and societal change, that is the ability to exercise agency, and to avoid domination by colonial powers. As such this chapter has set up an explanatory framework that can explain both internal and external processes of societal change in a world-systems context.

In order to do this, this chapter has laid out the elements of the framework, and as such has examined the literature concerning the bounding of world-systems, including the issues of the mode of production, and core/periphery structure. following that this chapter has examined the issues of political change, decision making, the exercise of agency, the

use of Historical Institutionalism as a visual aid, the role that ideas play in decision making, and the issue of the developmental state. Following that this chapter presented the proposed framework, and then summarized the elements of the issues examined in this chapter.

Chapter 3: Semi-peripheries, Modes of Production, and Incorporation into the Modern World-System.

3.1 Introduction

This chapter takes the discussions that were the focus of Chapter Two and applies them to the case studies contained within this dissertation. More specifically, this chapter focuses on the issues surrounding the incorporation of the two cases into the modern global system that are of a more structural nature. This chapter examines the issue of core/periphery structure, and asserts that it is the status of each case as semi-peripheral *at the point that incorporation took place* that is key. Chase-Dunn and Hall, as we saw in the previous chapter made the case that semi-peripheries were the locus where systemic change takes place due to the ability of semi-peripheries to adapt to new situations, as does Wallerstein. In order to show that each of the cases in this dissertation were semi-peripheral at the point of incorporation, this chapter will use the work of Chase-Dunn and Hall, Wallerstein, and Kōjin Karatani in particular to make this case. Karatani bases his analysis on the work of Karl Wittfogel, in order to show that the key to Japan's status is that the adaptability of sub-margins of world-empires directly translates into semi-peripheral status in the context of the modern world-system. This chapter thus accepts the case made by Karatani that Japan's semi-peripheral status is the result of its former status as a sub-marginal polity connected to the Sino-centric East Asian tributary system. In the case of Tonga, a different approach was needed. Tonga, rather than having been a sub-margin (indeed was not connected to any external tributary network at all), was able to adapt due to its position as the core of its own indigenous world-system that also encompassed Fiji and Samoa. There is potentially more than one reason why a society

may be adaptable, but in any event the key to understanding semi-peripheral change is the issue of adaptability of the society in question. Under the right circumstances, societies that can adapt will be able to maintain their independence and potentially become a core society in the modern system. Those which could not during the colonial period became subsumed into the global system as colonial possessions.

This chapter also examines the events surrounding the change in the mode of production in the case of Japan that allowed it to change path to one that would eventually result in its present day core status. The case of Tonga is used as a contrast because it did not engage in such a transformation. This chapter makes the case, as a result, that the decision to transform the mode of production or not is one of the key aspects of a transformation from semi-peripheral status to eventual core or peripheral status in the modern global system. The key to this is the decision to industrialize and take on the characteristics of a developmental state, which Japan did and which Tonga failed to do. As such I suggest that the formation of a developmental state is the key to semi-peripheral development and change. This chapter will show that Japan's decision to change its dominant mode of production in addition to the political changes it underwent is the key to its rise over time to become core. Conversely this chapter concludes that Tonga's decision to only change itself politically but not in terms of the mode of production, resulted in political independence while also setting it on the path to peripheral status based on Wallerstein's assertion that a world-system is a self-contained social system based on a single mode of production. By not becoming a capitalist society, Tonga could not be a part of the modern world-system even though it is connected to and

interacts with the modern system.

In order to describe the changes made by both the societies in question, this dissertation uses the path-dependency/critical juncture/path-dependency schema of Historical Institutionalism as a tool to visualize the events. As such, the structure of this chapter will be a kind of ‘before/during/after’ structure and will examine the political and economic changes made by each society through this lens. The next chapter will focus on the contingent ideational factors driving the particular route to change, but this chapter only focuses on the changes made and the effects of those changes. This chapter makes the case that for a semi-periphery to set itself on the path to eventual core status, it must firstly have made political changes in order to become a nation-state in the context of the Westphalian international system. Secondly it must also have made economic changes in terms of the mode of production in such a way that it would become a type of developmental state. In this case Japan made both changes and Tonga only made the political changes necessary to become a modern nation-state within the Westphalian international system. In the event the polity makes no change, either politically or in terms of the mode of production, then the likely result would have been colonization and/or domination. With regard to these issues, this chapter will first examine the case of Japan as it adapted to the arrival of the Western powers, and then will examine the case of Tonga in the West Polynesian region.

3.2 Japan

3.2.1 Edo Period and *Sakoku*

Prior to the closing of Japan by the Tokugawa, Japan had been open to intercourse

with Asian nations for centuries. This contact with the rest of Asia, in particular China and Korea predated the so-called voyages of discovery by European explorers including the Portuguese, who were the first Europeans to reach Japan in 1543. Japan had been tied to China's tributary network, and had adopted many characteristics of Chinese imperial governance, including the formation of a bureaucracy during the Taika reforms that were, in part, concerned with the building of an irrigation infrastructure. According to Wittfogel (1957), Japan was a sub-marginal polity of the Chinese tributary network, thanks to its position as an island nation, and as such was not so closely tied to China that it was completely under Chinese domination. As a result of this Japan was able to pick and choose which aspects of Chinese governance that was adopted (Wittfogel, 1957; Karatani, 2014).

During the Taika Reforms Japan successfully adopted five of the six T'ang ministries, Taxation, War, Justice, Administrative Personnel, and Rites. However, the Japanese did not create a ministry concerned with public works due to skepticism that existed about 'useless' projects such as a canal constructed in 656AD and an artificial hill built at the same time. This was coupled with a shorter period of required corvée labour which could be bypassed by paying a tax instead, which shows that the Japanese establishment was more interested in collecting revenues than in large infrastructure projects. These centralized systems that were enacted during this period broke down as concessions were made to local leaders in the form of gifts of tax-free land, who then set themselves up as hereditary holders of the land. The census system similarly broke down and as a result, Japan came to resemble much more the European feudal system than a

bureaucratic system (Wittfogel 1957: 197-200), and ultimately never became a centralized society.

With the arrival of the Portuguese in 1543 came a new set of influences, which significantly included the introduction of Christianity. Yukawa (1958) and Hagemann (1942) describe the experience of Christians in Japan during this period. The first Christian priest to arrive in Japan was Francis Xavier in 1549 who began the process of converting the Japanese to Christianity. The new religion was accepted by some and rejected by others. Those who rejected Christianity did so because they saw it as a destructive or polluting influence on traditional beliefs. However despite some opposition, the conversion process was successful enough that by 1605 there were over seven hundred and fifty thousand Japanese converts, including more than twenty *daimyos*⁴. By 1639, despite some purges of Christianity and of missionaries, the number of different groups of missionaries had increased sharply, thanks in part to the first Tokugawa Shogun, Ieyasu, wishing to take control of foreign trade. However, due to the increasing number of competing Christian groups, conflict between the various groups, and probably among their followers as well, had become a serious problem. This situation was further complicated by the arrival of the Dutch and the English, who were at war with the Portuguese. Finally, it was accepted by the *Bakufu*⁵ in 1614 that enough was enough, and that Christianity was causing disharmony, and the result was the expulsion of over 400 missionaries. This, however did not end matters, and despite the persecution of Christians, the new religion persisted. In 1637, there was an agrarian riot and siege by

4 Feudal lords who were of samurai origin, and thus not to be confused with the Court Nobles who mostly lived in Kyoto.

5 Literally “Tent Government”. This refers to the term used by the first shogunate set up in Kamakura in AD 1185 by Minamoto No Yoritomo. The term was used to refer to subsequent shogunal governments.

those who were protesting bad governance at the hands of their *daimyo* in Northern Kyushu, which had nothing to do with Christianity, but the incident was used as a pretext to close the country to foreign influences, and so, in 1639 the *sakoku*⁶ policy was implemented that closed the country to foreigners, with the exception of the Dutch and the Chinese, who were confined to Nagasaki (Yukawa, 1958: 373-380; Hagemann, 1942: 151-160).

The importation of new ideas into Japan was interpreted as a polluting of traditional cultural mores, and thus were seen as a destabilizing element, particularly to the authority of the new *Bakufu* set up by Tokugawa Ieyasu in 1603. Catholicism in particular was seen as a challenge to *Bakufu* authority due to the position that the Pope plays in Catholicism, and so any loyalty to an outside authority could not be tolerated. It would be reasonable to assume that, due to the connections to Catholicism that the Portuguese had, that there would be some suspicion as to whether loyalty to the Pope would extend to the Portuguese in general. Certainly, it was seen that way by the *Bakufu*, who indeed saw Christianity as a threat to their authority, and as a result expelled all foreigners who often tied the importation into Japan of various trade goods with the importation and proselytizing of religion (Tashiro and Videen, 1982: 288; Gordon 2003: 17).

In addition to the expulsion of the Catholic practising nations, the practice of Christianity within Japan was prohibited, its adherents were brutally persecuted, and the Japanese were forbidden to leave the country in order to prevent Christianity from

6 The policy enacted by the Tokugawa shogunate that expelled foreigners from the country and closed it from the rest of the world.

entering Japan. As a result of these policies, intercourse with the West dropped sharply over the next two centuries (Gordon 2003: 17 – 18; Tashiro and Videen 1982: 288; Toby 1977: 325). This state of affairs became so ingrained over time, that by the early 18th century, it became a commonly held view that good governance necessarily involved keeping foreigners away from Japan, and that the arrival of Europeans in Asia was seen as ‘insolence’ that challenged Japan's ‘exalted’ position in the world (Gordon 2003: 19).

However it would be a mistake to conclude that Japan isolated itself completely, as is generally accepted. The intent was not to do so, but rather the intent was to limit exposure to the outside world. In the case of Westerners, only the Dutch, and for a very short period of time the British (Murakami and Murakawa, 1900) remained and maintained trade relations with Japan. They were, however, constrained in that they were confined to a small, man-made island called Dejima (or Deshima) that was located in Nagasaki harbour. The point of the *sakoku* policy was not to completely close the country to the outside world, but rather it was to severely control the contact between Japan and the West specifically. The predecessors of Tokugawa Ieyasu (1543-1616), Oda Nobunaga (1534-1582) and Toyotomi Hideyoshi (1537-1598), had unified Japan after a period of civil war. Hideyoshi had then set his sights on Korea and launched an invasion in 1590, which ended in defeat after a prolonged conflict. It was therefore in Japan's interest to repair its damaged relations with North-east Asia, and so the first three Tokugawa Shoguns worked hard to restore diplomatic relations between Japan and the countries in the region, and to build a distinct foreign policy of its own with Japan as the centre of the region. Part of this creation of Japan's foreign policy was the necessity of eliminating

from the region the presence of the Europeans (Tashiro and Videen, 1982: 288). Japan as a result maintained trade with only selected foreign nations. At first, they had sought to re-enter into relations with China, because such relations would offer Japan's new Tokugawa government some legitimacy in the eyes of Asian nations. However, Japan ultimately rejected the normalization of diplomatic relations and formalized trade relations with China, because the Chinese system was based on tributary relations, and a formal trade agreement would have meant that Japan would have had to have been content with being a tributary state of China's. The *Bakufu* was not willing to do this, because it would not have accepted by the ruling elites at home, and so Chinese merchants, who were seen as smugglers by the Chinese Imperial government, were confined, like the Dutch, to Nagasaki harbour (Tashiro and Videen, 1982: 288).

Japan did, however, open up formal diplomatic relations with Korea, which included the presence of Korean embassies who dealt with the *Bakufu* directly. The economic activities between Japan and Korea were not directly mediated by the *Bakufu*, but rather were mediated by the Sō Clan in the province of Tsushima (Tashiro and Videen 1977: 288 – 289). The resumption of diplomatic relations came about with the arrival in Japan from Korea of an embassy in 1617 that was accompanied by a parade of four hundred and twenty-eight individuals. However there was some difference in how this embassy was viewed. The arrival of the embassy was the result of a forged letter sent to the Korean king, purportedly from the Shogun. However the letter in fact originated from the Sō Clan, which the Koreans took to be a suit for peace. On the other hand the Japanese saw the embassy as a congratulation from the Korean king for the unification of

Japan under Tokugawa rule, which served to strengthen and legitimize the prestige of the Shogun (Toby 1977: 338 – 340).

The other Asian nation that Japan dealt with was the Ryukyu Kingdom, which would later become Okinawa Prefecture after the Meiji Restoration. The relationship was one of conquest and subjugation of the islands by Japan, and similarly to Korea, trade was not mediated directly by the *bakufu*, but by the Satsuma Clan (Toby 1977; Tashiro and Videen 1982: 289). The activity of Satsuma in the Ryukyus is of great importance to this dissertation, because it is partially through Satsuma's presence in the archipelago that knowledge of Western ideas entered Japan, including a realization by the *daimyo* of Satsuma, Shimazu Nariakira, in the period directly leading up to the overthrow of the *Bakufu*, that Japan was not in a position to ward off the West if the West chose to treat Japan in the same manner as it did China following the Opium Wars. As we shall see in the next chapter it was Shimazu Nariakira's move to modernize Satsuma that would be a major contribution to the direction taken by Japan during the course of the *bakumatsu*⁷ and the Meiji Restoration.

From these trade arrangements it can be seen that the goal of the *sakoku* policy was not the complete isolation of Japan, which is the generally accepted reason for the policy. Rather, the goal of the *sakoku* policy was twofold. Firstly, according to Tashiro and Videen, the goal of seclusion was to break free of the Chinese controlled tributary network. After a prolonged period of conflict, Japan was interested in formulating a foreign policy which included trade with Asian nations, to ensure both profits and domestic peace, and peace in the region, but on its own terms (Tashiro and Videen 1982:

7 The period between the arrival of Perry in 1853 and the overthrow of the Shogunate in 1868.

304 – 305), and it would appear that the expulsion of Westerners with the exception of Holland was necessary because they represented disharmony which would have made domestic peace and unity harder to accomplish. The second important goal of *sakoku* was the quest for legitimacy. Because Tokugawa Ieyasu became shogun in 1600 as a result of conquest, his *Bakufu* had no legitimacy in itself since it contradicted Hideyoshi's will which was to have his son inherit the title of *kampaku*⁸. Most arguments of the legitimacy of the shogunate rests on discussions of Confucian hierarchy, but as Toby points out, the new government had to legitimize itself in the same way as any new government following a coup needs to legitimize itself through propaganda and political action (Toby 1977: 328 – 329).

Initially, the *Bakufu* toyed with the idea of re-entering the Chinese world order in an effort to gain some kind of derivative legitimacy, but given the opposition that such a move would have faced among the ruling elites at home, to re-enter the Chinese world order would have served to de-legitimize the new shogunate. However success in developing its own foreign policy removed the need for such a derived legitimacy, and instead the seeking of legitimacy based on the power and prestige of the *Bakufu* became the emphasis. The *Bakufu* was able to do this by developing its own foreign policy, and the example of the Korean embassy in 1617 was seen as an extension of shogunal power over foreign nations (Toby 1977: 362). By extension, the expulsion of the Portuguese, a necessary act that was part of the development of an independent foreign policy, can also be seen as a legitimizing act in its own right, because similar to the Korea embassy in 1617, the act of expelling the Portuguese can be seen as an assertion of power over a

8 Advisor and Regent.

foreign nation. This was implicitly admitted by the *Bakufu* in 1858 according to Toby, in its incompetence in the matter of the unequal treaties (Toby 1977: 362). This is important because it was the inability of the *Bakufu* to respond to the arrival of the European powers that led to the collapse of the shogunate and the restoration of nominal political power to the Meiji Emperor. The inability to respond necessarily meant that the legitimacy of the shogunate had disappeared, because its legitimacy had been based on its ability, prior to Commodore Perry arriving in 1853, to control the relations with foreign nations.

3.2.2 Commodore Mathew Perry and the Opening of Japan

The arrival of Perry had the most profound effect on the course of Japanese history, and provided a host of political issues that the *Bakufu* was unequipped to handle and therefore could not respond to the intrusion of the Western powers (Totman 1980: xiii). This failure to deal with the situation resulted in an increasing amount of anti-alienist sentiment under the slogan of *Sonnō Jōi* (Revere the Emperor, Expel the Barbarians) which in turn led to a violent period of shifting loyalties, a rise in pro-imperial sentiment, and ultimately to a revolution led by Satsuma, Chōshū, and Tosa clans. This revolution had the dual goal of the overthrow of the Shogunate and the restoration of the young Meiji Emperor to power (although as a figurehead). In 1868, this objective was achieved and the Shogunate capitulated (Totman, 1980; Jansen, 1961; Craig, 1961).

The arrival of the Western powers laid bare the divisions that existed. One thing that was immediately clear was that there was no unified reaction by the Japanese given

that they squabbled among themselves over how to respond (Satow, 1921: 43). From the perspective of the Europeans, relations with Japan and the Japanese authorities were trying at best. Interactions were marked by often inaccurate translations that had to be made from English to Dutch, and then Dutch to Japanese and then back again from Japanese to Dutch followed by the Dutch to English again (until translators such as Ernest Satow had become proficient in Japanese, that is), dealings with corrupt shogunate officials, intransigence, contradictions, requests for delays which were seen as playing for time so that the Japanese could act against the foreigners. Also contributing to the somewhat awkward relations between the Europeans and the shogunate was the constant threat of violence from those who wished to eradicate the foreigners. This threat of violence often turned into assassinations and the murder of Westerners (Satow, 1921: 46-47). The Richardson case is a good example to highlight. According to Satow, Richardson was a Shanghai merchant who was riding with a group on the Kanagawa-Kawasaki road when they met a procession of Satsuma retainers and were set upon, and Richardson was assassinated even as they tried to move out of the way of the procession (Satow, 1921: 51-52). They demanded reparations from the shogunate despite calls by the foreign community to use the might of the Western militaries to arrest those responsible. The calls for the arrest of the samurai in this instance were rejected since it was felt that such an act would in essence be an act of war against Japan (Satow, 1921: 52-54). All of these issues caused tense relations and distrust of the shogunate by the foreign powers, and a growing realization, at least by the British who eventually came to realize that dealing with a centralized government would be ideal, and that the shogunate was not the power

to support.

The situation was such that despite their best attempts to deal with the arrival of the West, it became increasingly clear that the shogunate was ill-equipped to act on Emperor Komei's instructions to expel the barbarians (Kim 2003: 217; Satow, 1921: 44). The shogunate was well aware of their inability to beat the Western powers in a fight, and saw that their only path was eventually to open Japan, despite the opposition and the increasing violence of the anti-alienists. Eventually the shogunate reluctantly signed the unequal treaties, the major one being the signing of the Treaty of Amity and Commerce with the Americans by the *Bakufu* regent, Ii Naosuke, without first gaining the approval of the Imperial Court. This was seen as disrespectful to the Emperor, and was opposed by middle and low ranking samurai, particularly in Chōshū and Satsuma, who emerged as a political force in this struggle using the slogan, *Sonnō Jōi* (Craig 1961: 92 – 93; Kim 2003: 216; Satow, 1921: 45). Ii Naosuke responded to the increase in opposition by purging the reformers in the *Bakufu*, opposing *daimyo*, led initially by the former Lord of Mito and certain members of the Imperial Court (Satow, 1921: 44-45). It was at this point that the *Sonnō Jōi* movement became more hostile to the shogunate and, as a result of collaboration between some of the Imperial Court nobles, decided to eliminate the shogunate.

3.2.3 The End of the *Bakufu*

As a result of the signing of the signing of the Treaty of Amity and Commerce by the *Bakufu* regent, Ii Naosuke, the *Bakufu* had become perceived as weak, and so it tried to implement some reforms, such as mandatory education and a strengthening of the

military. This resulted in more internal problems including increasing fiscal strain which meant that the shogunate could not balance its books. In order to do so it would have needed to unite the entire country and thus make use of the totality of the tax resources, but all it could do was increase the taxes from its existing tax base, which resulted in a demoralized group of liege vassals, and ultimately it meant cuts to the very military that it was attempting to strengthen, leaving it without weapons and ammunition that it needed (Totman 1980: 456). This weakness was one of the factors that prompted Satsuma and Chōshū to remove the *Bakufu*, coupled with a belief that national independence, free of Westerners, was the most pressing issue that could not be solved in the context of a dual *court/Bakufu* system of government (Kim 2003: 219 – 221)⁹.

During the period of 1863 and 1864, in the spirit of *Jōi*, both Satsuma and Chōshū separately had conflicts with the British, French, and Americans that resulted in the defeat of both clans. Both clans saw that expelling the foreigners was impossible and so their policy of *Jōi* was abandoned and they became focused on overthrowing the shogunate, and they officially became allies in 1864 (Kim, 2003: 218 – 219). Initially the Chōshū and Satsuma clans had been opposed to each other. Satsuma's *daimyo*, Shimazu Nariakira had been in favour of changing Japan's governance from the current structure to one known as *kōbu gattai* where the Tokugawa clan would be simply one of many in a

⁹ Imperial order to overthrow the Shogunate, November 9th, 1867: "Minamoto Yoshinobu, borrowing the authority of successive generations and depending on the strength of his pack of bandits, has wantonly impaired the loyal and the good, and has frequently disobeyed imperial commands. In the end, not fearing to distort the edicts of the late emperor [Komei], and not caring that he has plunged the populace into an abyss, his all-pervasive evil threatens to overturn the Land of the Gods. We are father and mother of the people. If We fail to strike down this traitor, what excuse shall We have to offer to the spirit of the late emperor? How shall We make Our profound amends to the people? This is the cause of Our grief and indignation. It is unavoidable that the period of mourning be disregarded. Implement the wishes of Our heart by slaughtering the traitorous subject Yoshinobu. When you have speedily accomplished this great deed to save the nation, you will enable the people to enjoy the lasting peace of the mountains. This is Our wish. See to it that you are prompt in carrying it out' (de Bary, Gluck and Tiedermann, 2005: 670).

unified system that would be combined with the imperial court. The Chōshū clan by contrast advocated the full implementation of emperor Kōmei's expulsion edicts, and went so far as to try and kidnap the emperor in the mistaken belief that they were protecting him. This brought them into conflict with Satsuma, who had sided with the shogunate forces headed by the Aizu Clan. The shogunate immediately called up an expeditionary army to punish Chōshū, and at first Satsuma was in favour of this. However as time went on Satsuma grew evermore suspicious of the shogunate. This distrust was not without merit. The shogunate was moving closer to an alliance with France in order to prevent the collapse of the shogunate in return for territorial concessions (Satow, 1921: 176). Some *daimyo* were beginning to see that the new shogun, Yoshinobu, had no intention of sharing power, and the British began to shift their policy to one of supporting the Satsuma-Chōshū alliance, which had been formed when

Sakamoto Ryoma¹⁰ brought the two clans together to form an official alliance¹¹ (Jansen,

10 "Sakamoto Ryoma was assassinated shortly after bringing Satsuma and Chōshū together. His vision for a new modern Japan included the 8 point plan: 1) Political power of the entire country should be returned to the Imperial Court, and all decrees should be issued by the court. 2) There should be established an Upper and a Lower Legislative House which should participate in making decisions pertaining to all governmental policies. All governmental policies should be decided on the basis of deliberation openly arrived at. 3) Men of ability among the court nobles, daimyo, and people at large should be appointed as councillors and receive appropriate offices and titles. Those sinecure positions of the past should be abolished. 4) In dealing with foreign countries, appropriate regulations should be newly established which would take into account broadly the deliberation openly arrived at. 5) The laws and regulations of earlier times should be scrutinized, and a great new code to last forever should be promulgated. 6) The navy should be properly expanded. 7) An Imperial guard should be set up to defend the capital. 8) There should be a law established to equalize the value of gold, silver, and goods with those of foreign goods.

The above eight-point program is proposed after due consideration of the present state of affairs of the nation. When this is proclaimed both internally and externally to all the countries, it becomes inconceivable to think of engaging in the urgent task of alleviating the current crisis outside of this program. If with determination these policies are carried out, the fortunes of His Majesty will be restored, national strength will increase, and it will not be difficult to attain the position of equality with all other nations. We pray that based on the enlightened and righteous reason, the Imperial Government will act decisively to undertake the path of renewal and reform of the country" (de Bary, Gluck, and Tiedemann, 2005: 661-662)

11 Letter from Sāigo Takamori and Ōkubo Toshimichi to the Imperial Restoration, 1867 – addressed to Iwakura Tomomi, a leading member of the Imperial Court: "When with great resolve, a policy of establishing the foundation for the imperial restoration is proclaimed, there is bound to be a great deal of confusion. People have been contaminated by the old habit of settling down into the more than two hundred

1961: 186). The British wished to remain neutral in Japanese domestic affairs, but the French had decided to offer troops to the shogun in order to set the shogunate as the central government in return for territorial concessions. The British much preferred that the shogunate be replaced by a new Imperial government, because it wanted to trade Japan as a whole in accordance with the treaties, and not a hodge-podge system of autonomous *han*. As such they supported the Restoration, after which the French were kicked out of Japan due to their support of the shogunate (Satow, 1921).

The interests of the Western powers to open the country added to the political years of peace. If we decide to resort to arms, it can conversely have the salutary effect of renewing the spirit of the people under Heaven, and pacifying the central regions of the country. Therefore we deem it the most urgent task to decide for war, and to find victory in the most difficult situation. It is a well-established principle that one must not take up arms because one loves warfare. However, if everything is allowed to proceed as it is, and the great issue of how to govern the country is delegated merely to the hard work of the Imperial Court and to the consensus reached by the three highest positions within the Council of State (Dajōkan), then war is to be preferred. In the olden days, when the great works were begun, how to conserve such great works was hardly decided by debates. Even those who were exceptionally well-endowed did not escape criticism from later generations of scholars. The situation is even more critical today with the deteriorating conditions. We urge you to think through the matter carefully and consider all the alternatives. It is most important that the first step in the new government is not a mistaken one.

On the important matter of how to deal with the Tokugawa family, we have been informed of the outline of a secret decision. We heartily concur with your decision through a secret edict to order the [former] Lords of Owari [Tokugawa Yoshikatsu, 1824-1883 and Echizen Matsudaira Yoshinaga, 1828-1890] to become intermediaries in arranging for the shogun's immediate repentance and restitution. This is indeed an appropriate and magnanimous gesture.

The danger which has befallen our imperial country today is due to the great crime committed by the *Bakufu*. This fact is very well-established, and two months earlier on the thirteenth day, you did reach a decision to impose certain penalties. At the present time, regardless of whatever arguments may be advanced, it is necessary to demote the shogun to the position of a mere daimyo, reduce his official rank by one degree, let him return his domains, and let him argue pardon for his past sins. Unless these measures are followed, whatever we do will be contrary to the consensus and there is no way the public can be satisfied. These secret understandings which we reached previously must not be changed in any manner.

If the mediation through the Lords of Owari and Echizen does not succeed, it shows very clearly that the shogun fails to appreciate the magnanimity of the Imperial Court, works against the consensus, and is not truly penitent. In that event an imperial command must be given immediately and resolutely to implement the above measure

If we fail to take these appropriate measures, we will be acting contrary to the principle and the consensus at the initial phase of the imperial restoration. Then the fortunes of the imperial power will suffer, and the great ills of the past years will resurface.... May we beg you to consider the matter carefully, and also consult with the three ministers to arrive at a resolute decision....” -- *Eighth day of the twelfth month, 1867, Iwashita Sajiueemon, Saigō Kichinosuke (Takamori), Ōkubi Ichizo (Toshimichi)*. (de Bary, Gluck, and Tiedermann, 2005: 662-664)

chaos and also added to the financial troubles that were facing Japan and caused problems such as inflation (Kim, 2003: 222). This in turn meant that the various *han*, realizing that the *Bakufu* could no longer represent their needs, aligned themselves with the Court and the Satsuma-Chōshū alliance. The end result was a complete defeat on the field of battle at Fushimi-Toba in 1868. The last Tokugawa Shogun, Yoshinobu, withdrew to dismantle the *Bakufu* and surrendered¹²(Totman 1980: 457). The Tokugawa Shogunate was no more, and was replaced by Satsuma, Chōshū, and the Imperial Court as the new Meiji Government, which ended up opening Japan to the world and pursuing modernization (Kim 2003: 222).

3.2.4 The Meiji Government and Industrialization

The governmental changes coincided with a program of industrialization. According to Robert Marks (2007), private business was not by itself, able to industrialize the country, and so Japanese industrialization was driven by the state (Marks 2007: 134), and as production increased so too did the need for government intervention in the economy. This was needed to meet the demand for labour, and so they set out to develop a skilled labour force which included the institution of mandatory education and military conscription (Karatani 2014: 198). Other measures that the new government adopted included the formation of three particular government ministries, the Ministry of

¹² Yoshinobu's resignation letter November 9th, 1867: "My ancestor [Tokugawa Ieyasu] received more confidence and favor from the Court than any of his predecessors, and his descendants have succeeded him for more than two hundred years. Though I fill the same office, almost all the acts of the administration are far from perfect, and I confess it with shame that the present unsatisfactory condition of affairs is due to my shortcomings and incompetence. Now that foreign intercourse becomes daily more extensive, unless the government is directed from one central authority, the foundations of the state will fall to pieces. If, however, the old order of things be changed, and the administrative authority be restored to the Imperial Court, and if national deliberations be conducted on an extensive scale, and the Imperial decision be secured, and if the empire be supported by the efforts of the whole people, then the empire will be able to maintain its rank and dignity among the nations of the earth" (de Bary, Gluck, and Tiedermann, 2005: 670-671)

Industry, the Ministry of Home affairs, and the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce. The government sent out over fifty officials as part of the Iwakura Mission as emissaries to Western nations with the goal of observing industrial and military methods. These emissaries had the added task of trying to negotiate revisions of the unequal treaties that Japan had been compelled to sign. Finally, the new government revised the tax system in a way that benefited the banks. Prior to the Meiji Restoration, peasants had been paying a portion of their rice production as taxes, and now they had to pay 3% of the assessed value of their land, which meant they had to sell their rice before the tax was due, which in turn meant they had to borrow in order to pay the taxes, which allowed the banks to accrue huge profits (Kobayashi, 1986).

The program of industrialization began with the mechanization of their textile industry, specifically the silk industry which then expanded into cotton (Marks, 2007: 134 – 135; Ishida, 1999; Kobayashi, 1986). The silk trade was successful, and aided by poor silk crops in Europe, increased significantly. According to the Japan Weekly Mail on January 13th, 1877, the price of silk in 1876 was \$450 per picul¹³ which over the course of a single year rose to \$1200 per picul, and exports rose from 4000 bales in October of 1875 to 14,000 bales in October of 1876 (“1876”, 1877: 3). With the profits they then revamped their iron production by buying British equipment (Kobayashi, 1986: 59).

Ultimately though, the state-owned industries proved to be inefficient and expensive to run, and so the Meiji government decided to sell the enterprises to private interests who had advocated getting government out of business, along with some officials who also advocated this course of action, forming companies such as Mitsubishi

¹³ 1 picul = 60.5kg

(Kobayashi, 1986), and the Okayama Spinning Company, whose owner wanted to import cotton from China and India, and who advocated for tax-exempt status for imported cotton (Ishida 1999: 894). This program was very much motivated by a desire to form a strong, independent country that withstand pressures from the West, and as we shall see, Bismarck's belief that independence required both a strong military and a strong economy, was adopted by the Meiji Government. However, even more significant than the rapid industrialization in the context of entering the modern capitalist world-system was the creation of what may be termed a modern fiscal state, and the role that financial development played in the economic growth of Japan after the Restoration.

3.2.5 Banking and the Shift to the Capitalistic Mode of Production

Up until now, it can be seen that as a result of institutional change that facilitated the incorporation into the modern world-economy and the participation in trade with the west, one level of the question of semi-peripheral transformation can be demonstrated. It was the ability of Japan to adapt, institutionally speaking, to the arrival of Western powers in such a way that Japan was able to not only avoid peripheralization but also to become core-like over time. This adaptability is one of the characteristics that are necessary for a polity to be considered as semi-peripheral according to Karatani (2014). However, this physical adaptation and participation in the modern world system, is only one layer of semi-peripheral transformation. What is more important to this is the transformation through institutional change from one mode of accumulation to another. This means that the incorporation of Japan into the modern world-system and not being peripheralized in the process was not simply a matter with physically opening its doors

and engaging in trade with the west, but also involved a change in the mode of accumulation. So in order to discuss this, an examination of banking institutions and monetary policy is important. It is also important to take into account the economic conditions prior to the Meiji Restoration during the Tokugawa period because the capital accumulation by merchants and those engaged in finance that supported the financial structure of the Meiji period, without which the Restoration could not have taken place (Asakura, 1967: 274)

The origins of the Japanese banking system lay in the Tokugawa period between 1603 and 1868, and grew out of the need of the *daimyo* to perform their duties to both the shogunate and the running of their respective *han*, and formed out of rice merchants, and traders in gold and silver. (Crawcour, 1963; Tamaki, 1995). The main merchant families were based in Edo and on the island of Dojima in Osaka. Taxes were collected in the form of rice which was shipped to each clan's warehouses at Dojima, in Osaka, and also in Edo in the case of the Eastern *han*, for sale (Asakura, 1967: 275). The clan's warehouse would issue to the buyer a promissory note called a 'rice-ticket' with which the clan would promise to deliver to the buyer the amount of rice specified in the ticket by a certain date. The tickets were traded as negotiable instruments. This resulted in an increase in speculative transactions and in transactions involving deliveries on rice not yet made. This meant that the commodity market grew significantly and thus the volume of transactions resulted in a large accumulation of capital. This in turn resulted in a division of labour within the merchant class, with huge profits accumulating among those engaged in these activities (Wakita, 2001: 537; Asakura, 1967: 275). The profits were

then loaned at high interest rates to various *daimyo*, and was invested in ventures that included land reclamation for agriculture, real estate, and industry, which further increased capital accumulation (Asakura, 1967: 275),

From the examination of the merchants of Dojima and Edo one can see that relationship between the state and these merchants was one of control by the state and therefore was a political relationship. Because the samurai as a caste could not engage in commercial activities as a result of the cementing in the social make-up of Japan's strict caste-system this relationship was a necessary one. This was a problem because taxes were paid in the form of rice which needed to be converted into specie so that each *han's daimyo* could carry out their duties to the shogunate. In return for these financial services, the *ryogai* were allowed to exist and were compensated by receiving a salary and certain political privileges including in some cases the right to adopt surnames and samurai status and the right to wear the two swords (Crawcour, 1963; Tamaki, 1995: 4). However it would be wrong to suggest that the various financial and rice brokers were without power, the truth is that the Meiji Restoration would have been quite a bit more complicated without these financial services. These merchants served the needs of the various *daimyo* in that they converted rice taken in taxes into cash which the *daimyo* could use, however there is more to that story. The relationship between merchant and *daimyo* was also driven by the *sankin kōtai*, or the requirement for alternate residence in Edo by the *daimyo*. The costs accrued by the *daimyos'* processions to and from Edo were incredibly high. The revenues required to both run the *han* and to be able to ostentatiously display their status as they travelled between Edo and their *han*

necessitated the borrowing of cash, and so a system of credit formed where liquid cash would be loaned at high interest - 15-20% to the *daimyo* with future rice harvests as collateral. This period was characterized by a huge expansion of commodity markets, finances and capital accumulation, which also saw loans that went to land reclamation, real estate, and industry, and also saw a flourishing of currency and credit markets (Asakura, 1967: 274-276; Crawcour, 1963: 392). Because the specie was in the form of gold and silver, it was cumbersome due to the weight of the coinage, and so this accumulation of capital and the increase in financial transactions resulted in a marked increase in the use of bills, facilitated by the fact that there were few bankruptcies and thus credit had a firm foundation (Asakura, 1967: 276).

In terms of the loans that the merchants made to the individual *han*, so great was the amount loaned that, after the Restoration, the loans could not be recovered. All loans issued prior to 1843, which amounted to thirty-seven million Yen, were cancelled. Loans issued between 1844 and 1872, about eleven million Yen, were to be paid within fifty years at zero *per cent* interest, and loans issued between 1868 and 1872 (after the Restoration) were to be paid within twenty-five years at four *per cent* interest (Crawcour 1963: 395). As a result most of the merchant families were wiped out, with the exception of the largest such as Mitsui. This early relationship between the state and these merchants is important because it is the hallmark of state involvement after the Meiji Restoration, and indeed after WWII. These merchants were crucial to the creation of modern banking and the link between the *ryogai* and the first half of the 20th Century is such that the largest banking houses were directly descended from the *ryogai* (Tamaki

1995: 8).

In the period between the arrival of the West and the Restoration, the first transformation of the surviving rice-merchants commenced. The most important change was in the way that the shogunate used them. Because the value of gold in Japan in terms of exchange rate was low in comparison to the international rate, an enormous amount of Japanese gold was siphoned out of the country by foreign merchants. In order to combat this, the shogunate set up the large merchant families, particularly the House of Mitsui, as the middlemen between Japanese merchants and foreigners. It was illegal for foreigners to possess Japanese currency, and so they had to exchange Mexican silver for paper currency with which they could buy Japanese goods. Japanese merchants, who were likewise forbidden from taking foreign coins, then exchanged the chapter currency for Japanese coinage (Tamaki, 1995: 14).

Initially after the Restoration, the new government worked to establish itself as a centralized state. This was not an automatic event, however, and the political scene was somewhat chaotic. Kido Kōin noted in his diary his frustration of the state of affairs as the various *han* continued to make their own decisions in the advancement of their own interests at the expense of national unity (Kido, 1983: 409-410). He pushed for unity starting with the idea of returning of all the fiefs of the various *daimyo* to the Emperor. The only way in which Japan could begin to succeed in becoming a new nation was if loyalty shown to the *daimyo* was transferred to the emperor and the central government (Kido, 1983).

In terms of the nation's financial and economic development, the early part of the

Meiji period saw taxes continuing to be collected by the *han* in the form of rice. When the feudal system was abolished and the *han* were converted into prefectures, the central government took up the task of collecting taxes, and continued to collect them in the form of rice. This resulted in the merchants and financiers continuing to be the financial mechanism by which fiscal tasks by the Ministry of Finance was conducted. The financial life of the Meiji government was carried out by the merchants who had secured special privilege by virtue of not being charged interest (Asakura, 1967: 277). This was not a very satisfactory state of affairs. Indeed it was downright inconvenient because it was dependent on the quality and quantity of the harvest and resulting price fluctuations, and so in 1872 the government changed the taxation system into one that collected taxes in cash. The Land Certificate Law was enacted. This law meant that the value of the land was assessed and property rights protected, which in turn meant that land could now be bought and sold, used as collateral in the securing of loans, and in 1873 the Land Tax Law was enacted which now meant that taxes could be collected at a fixed rate depending on the value of the land that had been assessed. Thus it was a stable taxation system that was created and which was not dependent on harvests. The work still was handled by the merchants who continued to collect rice that was paid as tax and pocketed the difference between the amount of tax owed and their profits from the resale of that rice (Asakura, 1967: 277-278).

The new government took an active role in the transformation of the rice-brokers into modern banks in much the same way that they took an active role in the rapid industrialization of the nation. Even though the merchants were resistant to many of the

Meiji government's experiments in banking, they did succeed in transforming them into the national banks and private banks (Tamaki 1995: 208). The government introduced the Yen as a unified currency in 1871. The government's National Bank Act encouraged the formation of the National banks, based on American banks (Asakura, 1967: 281), which were allowed to issue their own notes, and then in 1882 in response to hyper-inflation the government formed the Bank of Japan which had the sole authority to issue bank notes that were backed up by specie (Tatewaki 1991; Nakakita, 2002: 48-49).

The reliance on paper money was simply the result of a lack of revenue. The Meiji Government was not prepared financially for the war that overthrew the shogunate and had no tax revenue at all. Its credit worthiness was therefore very low. As a result the amount of money they took in through 'forced loans' was only just under two-hundred and fifty thousand Ryo out of the three million Ryo that they had estimated that they would need, and so they were forced to issue paper money to meet its needs and had issued forty-eight million Ryo in non-convertible notes by 1869 (He, 2013: 86-87). After 1869, the most powerful of the ministries and one to which the modernizers flocked was the Ministry of Finance, and one of their most pressing tasks was to increase government income, and they did this by investing in railway building and mining. Investment in railways soon proved to be unprofitable and only acted to exacerbate the financial problems of the early Meiji period. Compounding their problems were various peasant and samurai uprisings. In order to put down these rebellions, the government had to rely on troops from the various *han* because they could not afford a centralized army, and even the *han* were required to keep their military expenditures low. The fact that Japan in

1870 resembled a federal type system did not help because the domains could not borrow. They agreed to the centralization of the money, but still retained their old powers (He, 2003: 89-90).

The solution to this was the de-mobilizing of the samurai armies which led to violence and assassinations, and the abolishment of the feudal system which people like Kido had advocated from the beginning (Kido, 1983). This meant that the central government took over the liabilities and debts of the domains, which in turn meant that it had to issue twenty-five million Yen in paper notes in order to redeem the domains' paper notes on top of the twenty-four million Yen of domain debt. The problem of how to deal with the issue of inconvertible paper notes was a large hurdle to overcome. One of the solutions they tried was the adoption of the gold standard. Originally they considered using a silver standard given the scarcity of gold and the abundance of silver in the country, but instead they followed what they thought was a growing global trend and adopted the gold standard in 1871 with the value of the Yen being set at one-and-a-half grams of gold. However changing prices of gold and silver on the international market meant that gold drained from Japan. In 1874 there was no more gold and Japan could only mint silver coins. This also made it much more difficult to redeem paper money denominated in gold which made the monetary and fiscal issue the most important facing the Meiji government (He, 2003: 98-99).

A number of solutions were proposed, such as a return to the silver standard - if they had used coins as currency they could have done that by only printing silver coins but the amount of paper denominated in gold made a return to the silver standard

impossible, remaining in the gold standard but raising the price of gold (which did nothing to ease deflationary pressures), and collecting customs duties in gold - which they could not enforce. In order to increase gold stocks, the Meiji government decided to keep to the gold standard but focus on increasing targeted imports in order to raise cash in the form of gold, while instituting a program of import substitution in products like silk and cotton that used raw materials that were not imported. The government also turned the stipends of the samurai into bonds and invested the bonds as capital in order to facilitate the import-substitution program (He, 2003: 100-101).

As a further way to solve the convertibility issue, the government vigorously encouraged the formation of the new banking system, and had successfully encouraged the setting up of no fewer than two thousand and fifty-eight banks by 1901, the majority of which did not succeed; by 1941 this number had dropped to two hundred and sixty-seven (Tamaki, 1995: 224-225). The banks proved that they also could not solve the problem because rising gold prices meant that account holders exchanged their paper for gold. The maintenance of the gold standard also resulted in fiscal deficits (He, 2003: 102), which meant that one of the biggest problems was in how to find a system that did not result in currency devaluation and the resultant hyper-inflation (Tamaki 1995: 208). The government thus returned to the silver standard. Furthermore, while the government was vigorous in the formation of modern banking, their involvement in the internal affairs of the banks was minimal, with no legislated regulations relating to standards of practice or credit limits. This meant that the government (and the Bank of Japan after 1882) had to periodically bail them out. As a result of rapid industrialization, there was a

huge demand for credit, and together with a lack of portfolio diversification, the “aggressive” credit practices led to over-loans, where the banks would loan more money than they had deposited (Tsutsui, 1988: 2 – 4).

However, while these banks suffered from major problems as a result of their practices, they were still a crucial part of the industrialization of Japan. Businesses at the time did not raise much money through the issuing of securities and stocks and so on, but rather used the indirect method of raising capital through bank loans, since they found this method more dependable even though stock exchanges had been in existence since 1878. One result of this was that Japanese banks did not form simply as commercial enterprises but also engaged in other activities such as “long-term [lending] for fixed investment and subscribing to corporate securities in addition to engaging in short-term commercial financing” (Tsutsui, 1988: 4). This in turn created an interdependence between banks and clients, which made the system vulnerable, but in actuality was conducive to the industrialization of Japan (Tsutsui, 1988: 4 – 5), which was entirely consistent with the goals of the Meiji government, that is rapid industrialization.

Many of the problems were solved by the formation of the Bank of Japan. Some of the measures put in place included the promotion of borrowing from the central bank, the reduction in discount rates, the issuance of government bonds, and new tax measures such as increasing duties on alcohol. The first set of solutions stimulated investment and spending with the result of industry growing, and the second set meant the creation of fiscal institutions that allowed it to centralize and reduce its reliance on the private banks and placed the entire revenue system of the government under the control of the central

bank, which in 1886 took on the sole right to issue bank notes (He, 2003: 126-128).

Because the involvement of the state in the industrialization process was unprecedented in the modern world economy, according to Tamaki, the state control of the financial sector was well established by the turn of the 20th Century. This transformation was not a new innovation that came with the new banks, but was a feature of the relationship between financial institutions and the state before the Restoration with the state and the *ryogai* acting together (Tamaki, 1995 208 – 209; Sudo and James, 1999: 177).

This process of innovation in the financial system was the necessary first step before economic growth in Japan really took off. Figures before 1879 are virtually non-existent, but the figures after 1879 show marked increases in investment by private business and the government. There were two peaks, 1879-1892 and 1909-1913 where economic growth reached a hundred and seventy-five *per cent*. It is the increase in the Japan's residual and savings that are the causal link (Suto and James, 1999: 165-166; Rousseau, 1999: 195-196). There is increasing data that shows that finance is a major factor in economic growth. Suto and James cite a number of sources that show that the financial development has a causal effect on economic growth that does not feed back into further financial development (e.g. King and Levine, 1993; Wachtel and Rousseau, 1995; Rousseau and Wachtel, 1998). In Japan during the Meiji period, as we have seen, there was such an increase in financial services, and the increase in the amount of financial services, innovations in banking, and efficiency in financial transactions led to an increase in savings and investment. It was this increase in financial mediation and the resultant increase in savings and investment that led to the growth of the Japanese

economy following the Meiji Restoration (Sudo and James, 1999: 180-181; Rousseau, 1999: 195-196; Ott, 1961: 136). As such it is the consideration of finances and fiscal innovation that is more significant than the industrial growth since the financial innovations led to the rapid industrial growth of the country.

This chapter has, up to now, examined the events and decisions that led to the Meiji restoration, including the policy contexts of the Tokugawa period concerning isolationism, and the formation of financial services of the period, and how they relate to the formation of a new Japan after the Restoration and the changes in institutional forms leading to rapid industrialization and the creation of the modern state. I now turn my attention to the events occurring in the second case highlighted in this study, Tonga and the West Polynesian region.

3.3 Tonga, Fiji, and Samoan World-System

3.3.1 Pre-contact systemic properties

Adrienne Kaeppler has outlined some of the exchanges that had occurred in the Tonga-Fiji-Samoan region, and as such has demonstrated that the region included an extensive exchange network (Kaeppler 1978). Tamara Sone (2006) in an unpublished master's thesis has also provided an overview of the interactions that occurred in the region. While Kaeppler describes the region as a social system, she stops short of making the statement that the interactions were systemic in the sense of comprising a world-system. This goes to the central issue at hand: were the interactions among the three island groups systemic? Was this exchange network a world-system?

In order to address this issue, I refer to the definition of systems provided by

Chase-Dunn and Hall: they define a system as “intersocietal networks in which the interactions (e.g. trade, warfare, intermarriage, information) are important for the reproduction of the internal structures of the composite units and importantly affect changes that occur in the local structures” (Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997: 28). In other words, an exchange network becomes a system when the interactions have an effect on the social reproduction of the constituent societies, and also when changes in the social reproduction of the composite societies affects the system as a whole, and so this work, drawing on Sutherland (2015) takes the next step and shows that this network and the interactions between the three island groups do indeed demonstrate systemic properties, and that the region is a world-system.

In order to analyze these interactions in order to determine if they meet this standard, Chase-Dunn and Hall provide a methodological framework which is well suited for this kind of analysis, and that takes each type of interaction and examines them individually. Chase-Dunn and Hall conceived of the following categories of interactions. The first set of interactions is the exchange of bulk-goods, which include food and raw materials. The second type of interaction is the exchange of prestige items. The third type of interaction is concerned with political and military interactions, and the fourth type of interaction that they examine is concerned with the ideational interactions. Because Chase-Dunn and Hall also point out that marriage is among the possible interactional relations between societies, I will examine the role that marriages played in the maintenance of this indigenous system and I will demonstrate that the movement of spouses was the underlying factor in the interactions among the three island groups that

comprise the region. The exchange in bulk-goods is not of any great significance in the systemic interactions between the three island groups, and so I will not be focusing on these exchanges. The exchange of prestige valuables is of importance because they maintained and upheld the reproduction of chiefly governance in each of the three island groups. This is important because the movement of spouses was the foundational set of interactions, since they were accompanied by the movement and exchange of prestige valuables, and are important in the determination of centrality within the West-Polynesian world-system.

In terms of centrality, an analysis of each of these interactions demonstrates that Tonga was the main beneficiary of the interactions and was thus the centre of accumulation within this world-system. In terms of the movement of prestige valuables, there was little regularized exchange between Fiji and Samoa directly, rather the movement of prestige goods moved through Tonga, which benefited by being the recipient of prestige valuables coming from both Fiji and Samoa. In terms of political and military interactions, the evidence shows that due to the need for long-distance canoes for the purpose of tribute collection within the Tongan archipelago, the Tongans inserted themselves into the internal affairs of Fiji. This insertion into Fijian affairs included participating in Fijian wars and the control of canoe building in Fiji. The ultimate result was by the time of the break up of the system, Tongans were well on their way to conquering the Fijian group. Finally in terms of marriages, the evidence shows that the practice of spouse taking by Tongans accompanied by the associated movement of prestige valuables ultimately served the needs of the reproduction and maintenance of

chiefly authority in Tonga, as Kaeppler has pointed out (Kaeppler 1978). The analysis of each of these classes of interactions taken together shows that within the Tonga-Fiji-Samoan regional world-system Tonga was the dominant society within the system, thus demonstrating that this world-system had a distinct core/periphery structure with Tonga as the core societal unit in this system.

3.3.2 The Tonga, Fijian, and Samoan Region

The Tonga-Fiji-Samoan region is a roughly triangular region that incorporates three island groups. The region has been in continuous habitation for about 4000 years (Davidson, 1978; Kirch, 1984; Burley, Sheppard, & Simonin, 2011). Taking each archipelago in turn, the Tongan group consists of between 160 and 200 islands in a roughly north to south orientation contained within three main groups: Tongatapu, Ha'apai, and Vava'u, with Tongatapu being the core group which the others were politically and culturally connected to. Niuatoputapu, Niuafo'ou, and 'Uvea are major outliers that are also connected to Tongatapu (Davidson, 1978; Kirch, 1984; Burley, Sheppard, & Simonin, 2011). The Samoan group consists of four volcanic islands, Savai'i, 'Upolu, Tutuila, and Manu'a (Davidson, 1978; Sone, 2006). Finally the Fijian group consists of 332 islands (Central Intelligence Agency, 2016).

Early explorers in the region, such as Abel Tasman, Captain James Cook, William Mariner who had been captured by Tongans after an attack on his ship “Port Au Prince”, and many other European observers, noted that there were many connections between the three island groups including the residence in Tonga of people from Samoa and Fiji, and the residence in Fiji by Tongans (e.g. Beaglehole, 1999b: 1043; Cargill and Schütz, 1977:

64; Diapea, 1928: 99; Martin, 1981: 153; Smythe, 1864; Sharp, 1968; Ferdon, 1987: 235; Holmes, 1982: 35). David Samwell, Surgeon's Mate on the HMS Resolution in 1777, observed for example, that:

During our stay among them they did not seem to have any quarrels on their hands either foreign or domestic, however they informed us that a little time before our Arrival they had been at War with the People of an Island called Fidgee which they say lay to the WNW at a distance of five day's sail which may be abt 200 Leagues...At this time there were some of the Natives of that Island at Tongataboo, & it is probable that the two Isles carry on a Trade in time of peace. We saw some pieces of Cloth very curious & prettily painted which they told us came from Fidgee & that none like it was made at Tongataboo. (Beaglehole, 1999b: 1043)

3.3.3 Marriage Interactions

According to Kaepler (1978), patterns of marriages are directly linked to the exchange of prestige valuables (Kaepler, 1978: 246), and so form the basis for the acquisition of prestige goods that accompanied the marriages. As such Kaepler makes the case that due to the needs of Tongan social reproduction the rest on the issue of marriages, the interactions among the three island groups primarily served Tongan interests of maintaining titles, and lineages, and chiefly governance. Kaepler provides an explanation of the Tongan ranking system that is necessary to understand the significance of marriages in the region.

Before diving into marriage patterns, it is necessary at this point to define some terms:

The Tu'i Tonga - the principal chief who functioned as a sort of priest-king and who mediated between the gods and the people.

The Tu'i Kanokupolu - the 'every-day' governing and military

chief.

The Tu'i Ha'atakalaua – the previous governing and military chief whose lineage was replaced by the Tu'i Kanokupolu whose lineage was an offshoot of the Tu'i Ha'atakalaua.

The Tu'i Tonga Fefine - the oldest sister of the Tu'i Tonga.

The Tamaha - the oldest daughter (or son in at least one case) of the Tu'i Tonga Fefine.

Fale Fisi - the House of Fiji, and usually refers to the Tui Lakeba, or chief of Lakeba in the Fijian Lau Islands group.

The *Hau* – This refers to the Tu'i Ha'atakalaua and then later the Tu'i Kanokupolu.

The *moheofo* was the principle wife of the Tu'i Tonga.

The *matapule* (or *tūlāfale* in Samoan), refer to the ceremonial attendants of Tongan chiefs.

There were two aspects of rank structure in Tonga, the *kāinga*, or social ranking, and the *Ha'a*, or societal ranking. The *Kāinga* is based on a landholding controlled by a particular chief. It is a social group that is divided into a number of extended family groups which are in turn under the control of lower-ranked chiefs. The *Kāinga* has three main principles, the first of which is that one's father and paternal relatives outranked the maternal relatives, secondly that sisters outrank brothers, and thirdly that older same-sex siblings outranked younger same-sex siblings (Lātūkefu, 1975: 2; Kaeppler, 1971a: 177; Bott and Tavi, 1982: 57-58). The important principle here is the second one, particularly when one considers societal ranking.

The *ha'a* is a genealogical group of related titles that could only be passed through the male line. Taken together that while sisters outranked brothers and as such had certain political rights including a say in successions, they could not inherit titles (Bott and Tavi, 1982: 58-59, 78-80).

There were three main *ha'a*, one of which is the Tu'i¹⁴ Ha'a Takalaua that is not so relevant to this discussion, but the other two, the Tu'i Tonga and the Tu'i Kanokupolu are. These three lineages were the highest ranked lineages, and the Tu'i Ha'atakalaua and the Tu'i Kanokupolu lines were offshoots of the Tu'i Tonga line - The Tu'i Kanokupolu is an offshoot of the Tu'i Ha'atakalaua (Bott and Tavi, 1982: 169; Kaeppler, 1971: 180). The highest ranked line was the Tu'i Tonga who was the religious chief, followed in turn by the Tu'i Ha'atakalaua who became a sort of elder statesman and who was replaced by the Tu'i Kanokupolu who became the military chief. The *kie hingo*a (or *'ie toga* in Samoa) refers to a class of mats that originated in Samoa which are attached to names that represent historic events of persons connected to the mat. These mats are the most important prestige item in Tonga.

In terms of marriages, the most important relationship was between the Tu'i Tonga and his sister the Tu'i Tonga Fefine. She outranked him and as such her children – in particular, her oldest daughter, the Tamaha – would outrank his children. This reverence of sisters was noted by members of Captain Cook and his crew:

In order to be present the whole time, I dined a shore, the King sat down with us, but neither eat nor drank. This was in account of a Woman which he desired might dine with us, who, as we afterwards understood, was of superior rank to himself; as soon as she had dined she stepped up to the King who put his hands to her feet and then she retired. He immediately

¹⁴ Tu'i translates as 'prince', 'lord', or 'king' (Bott and Tavi, 1982: 169).

dipped his fingers into a glass of wine and then received obeisance of all her followers. This was the only time and only person we ever saw him reverence. (Beaglehole, 1999c: 136)

and

It was discovered one day by a woman before whom Poulaho would not eat though she made no scruple to do so before him, and to whom when she left the house he paid the usual mark of respect as his superior – a respect we never saw him pay to any other person though as was said before he acknowledged a woman living at Vavaoo to be his superior. It was also accidentally discovered that a person named [Latinipulu – a male Tamaha], the brother of this woman, who is called [Moungalakepa], was of the same rank though we never saw him touch his foot, for Poulaho would never come to a house where he knew he was, and if the other came into a house where the King was eating the last immediately left off and had the victuals put aside. He also made no scruple of taking anything from the people even if it belonged to the King, and though in other respects almost disregarded everyone seemed to allow him this mark of superiority, notwithstanding at the ceremony called Natche [the 'Inasi] he assisted only in the same manner as the other principal men. We enquired of Poulaho the reason of such an odd custom and were told that when his father was alive the sister of his father, who is the woman mentioned at Vav'vao, reigned jointly with him at Tonga, and that a man who came from the island of Feejee had these two persons by her with a third called Tooeela'kaiba [Tu'i Lakeba], their sister now living at Vavaoo, who were all distinguished by the name of Tammaha [Tamaha] and the only persons possessed of a title of such dignity.” (Beaglehole, 1999b: 954).

Others including Jacques Labillardière, a member of Admiral d'Entrecasteaux's expedition in 1793, after Captain Cook's visits (see Labillardière, 1800: 128-129) have made the same observation¹⁵.

Even though she and her children had no claim on the title (Kirch, 1984: 226) of

15 “Tineh [The Tu'i Tonga's sister] was very tenacious of the honours which the chiefs did not dare to refuse her when they met her; accordingly some avoided being in her presence. Feenou, and the King's brother Toobou, were on board, and had just promised to stay and dine with us when she came alongside; they immediately urged us not to let her come upon the quarterdeck; however she soon made her appearance there, and we saw these two chiefs precipitately retreat into their canoes; for they would have been obligated...to come and take hold of her right foot and very respectfully incline their heads towards it, as an acknowledgement of their inferiority. This Queen Tineh informed us with an air of satisfaction, that king Toobou even was compelled to pay her these marks of respect, because it was from her that he held his dignity” (Labillardière 1800: 128 – 129).

Tu'i Tonga, the fact that she outranked him presented the potential for instability in the maintenance of chiefly authority especially when one considers that there were some cases, albeit extremely rare, of women assuming titles (Erskine, 1967 [1853]: 158; Bott and Tavi, 1982: 14; Gunson 1979: 40; Herda, 1987). This instability had the potential to completely change the ruling lineages, and the problem was resolved by marrying her to a Fijian chief, the Tu'i Lakeba. This mandatory marriage saw the creation of the *Fale Fisi* (House of Fiji) which meant that the children of the Tu'i Tonga Fefine in essence became foreigners. As such they were outside the Tongan political system (Bott and Tavi, 1982: 33; Derrick 1946; Kaepler, 1978: 246; Kirch, 1984: 226). In addition, in terms of *Ha'a* ranking, the *Fale Fisi* line is lower in rank than the Tu'i Tonga line even though in terms of their *kāinga* ranking, they rank higher (Kaepler, 1971a: 181). The creation of the *Fale Fisi* line was not a mere result of the marriage of the Tu'i Tonga Fefine to the Tu'i Lakeba, but was a deliberate creation in order to provide a Tu'i Tonga Fefine with a supply of spouses and to also provide for a political solution to the problem of instability by removing her children from the ruling lineage (Campbell, 1992; Gunson, 1997: 149).

The next issue that the Tongans had to deal with was the issue of finding brides with sufficiently high rank for the Tu'i Kanokupolu. There were two main solutions to this: firstly the holders of the Tu'i Kanokupolu title married the daughters of high ranking Tongan chiefs including the Tu'i Ha'atakalaua, and the genealogies compiled by Bott and Tavi show that there were three instances of a Tu'i Kanokupolu marrying a Tamaha – the eldest daughter of the Tu'i Tonga Fefine (Bott and Tavi, 1982: 12, 64, 89-87). The second solution was to import brides from Samoa (Campbell, 1992: 15; Kaepler, 1978: 248 –

249; Kirch, 1984: 226), as was observed by William Mariner: “The two brides were conducted by their female attendants from the house of Finow...they were dressed in their finest Hamoa mats” (Martin, 1981: 109-110). The mention of the Samoan mats is important because it ties in the movement of prestige valuables that accompanied these Samoan marriages, and I will discuss prestige valuables later. The Tu'i Kanokupolu line was originally a Samoan line due to the fact that social rank in Tonga passes down the female line. The first Tu'i Kanokupolu, Ngata was the son of the Tu'i Ha'atakalaua and Tovia, the daughter of 'Ama, a chief in 'Upolu¹⁶ (Kaepler, 1996: 478; Bott and Tavi, 1982: 113) who had been appointed the everyday governing chief of Tonga when the Tu'i Ha'atakalaua decided not to carry out that function (Kaepler, 1971a: 180, 184; Lātūkefu, 1974: 3).

These Samoan marriages were important because in addition to providing a Tu'i Kanokupolu with a sufficiently high ranking brides, they brought to Tonga two things: prestige valuables, in particular Samoan Named Mats known as *kie hingoa* (or *'ie toga*, as they were referred to in Samoa) and *matapule*. As I will discuss later, these mats were the most important part of female bridal wealth and were indispensable in marriages and investitures in Tonga. The mat brought to Tonga with the marriage of Ngata's mother and father for example, was called Maneafainga'a and is still in use today (Kaepler, 1996) which highlights the importance in the reproduction of chiefly authority and inheritance. The second thing of importance that these marriages brought to Tonga were the ceremonial attendants called *matapule* (*tūlāfale* in Samoan). These *matapule* were of intermediary rank between chiefs and commoners and carried out tasks that Tongan

¹⁶ Kanokupolu translates as 'Flesh of 'Upolu' (Kaepler 1999: 147)

commoners could not carry out due to the Chiefs being *tapu* or taboo, and who thus could not be touched by a commoner. The functions that they carried out included cutting the hair of a chief and preparing a chief's body for burial for which they would receive various rewards including land (Kaepler, 1978: 248). *Matapule* still carry out these functions in Tonga today.

The final marriage arrangement that needs to be examined is the marriage of the Tu'i Tonga to the *moheofo*, which translates as 'principal wife' (Bott and Tavi, 1982: 36). Originally the Tu'i Tonga had also taken brides from Samoa, but that changed when Fatafehi became the 30th Tu'i Tonga. At that time it became customary for the Tu'i Tonga to take as his principle wife the daughter of the *hau*, that is the daughter of either the Tu'i Ha'atakalaua or more importantly the daughter of the Tu'i Kanokupolu. The Tu'i Kanokupolu had originally married the daughter of the Tu'i Ha'atakalaua which had the effect of raising the Tu'i Kanokupolu's rank to sufficient level that the Tu'i Kanokupolu's daughter would become the customary principle wife (*moheofo*) of the Tu'i Tonga (Gunson, 1979: 38; Bott and Tavi, 1982: 59, 60; Lātūkefu, 1974: 3). This marriage also had the effect of maintaining the rank and status of the Tu'i Tonga and it did so based on the fact that the Tāmaha had a higher *kainga* rank and that her children with the Tu'i Kanokupolu had a lower *ha'a* rank (Bott and Tavi, 1982: 36).

In terms of the systemic importance of marriage nets in the region, the marriage of the *moheofo* to the Tu'i Tonga is significant because it completed the marriage patterns in the region. In other words it connected the marriages of Samoan women to the Tu'i Kanokupolu to the marriage of the Tu'i Tonga Fefine to the Fijian Tu'i Lakeba, and in so

doing linked the three archipelagos together in a systemic way, which can be demonstrated by the fact that the move away from the marriage of the Tu'i Tonga to Samoan brides to the *hau* marrying Samoan brides was caused by the creation of the *hau* titles.

An examination of the marriage patterns confirms the position taken by Adrienne Kaeppler that the marriages *primarily* served the needs of Tongan social reproduction (Kaeppler, 1978: 246). They do so because the patterns were a response to the principles of rank and the potential for disorder that came along with sisters' *kainga* rank being higher than brothers' – particularly in the case of the authority of the Tu'i Tonga being challenged by the children of his sister, the Tu'i Tonga Fefine. Similarly the taking of brides from Samoa solved the issue of finding sufficiently high ranking brides for the Tu'i Kanokupolu. These marriages, I submit, not only demonstrate the systemic nature of the marriage patterns, but also that the marriage patterns demonstrate that Tonga was the centre of accumulation (in this case in terms of marriages) and therefore that Tonga was core (we will return to this later). Furthermore, these were strategic marriage that were tied to maintaining rank and titles. The prestige goods that accompanied the marriages were necessary items for investitures and other ceremonial functions. As such the basis for the maintenance of chiefly titles and lineages, and therefore chiefly power.

3.3.4 Prestige Goods Exchange

The marriage patterns outline above were often accompanied by exchanges in prestige valuables. These valuables included fine mats, sandalwood, kava bowls, whales' teeth, canoes, wood bowls, wooden neck rests, and slit gongs (Vason, 1810: 161; Martin,

1981: 190; Sone, 2006: 101; Kaeppler, 1978: 248, 249, 250). Strictly in terms of prestige valuables, I focus on those items that I believe are the best suited for demonstrating the systemic properties of the region. My primary focus is on those items that moved to Tonga itself, and those items include red feathers from the Collared Lory – *Phigys solitarius* (Clunie and Morse, 1984: 58), and fine mats that originated in Samoa. In the case of the red feathers, it would be reasonable to classify them as bulk goods instead of as prestige goods because they were used in the manufacture of prestige items. However, I classify them in this case as prestige goods because throughout Polynesia they had inherent prestige value, and so even though they were used in the manufacture of prestige goods, their use was because of the inherent value that they contained, and so I classify them here as prestige goods. I will also examine the importance to the Fijians of whales' teeth as prestige valuables, but I will include them in the discussion on political and military interactions.

These red feathers originated in Fiji and were an important item to the Tongans (Labillardiere, 1800: 105; Ferdon, 1987: 235; Derrick, 1946: 120; Kaeppler, 1978: 250; Campbell, 1992: 33; Kirch, 1984: 239). Captain James Cook during his visits to Tonga had received as gifts items made from red feathers. On one occasion the father-in-law of the Tu'i Tonga presented him with “a new piece of cloth, on the skirts of which were fixed six pretty large patches of red feathers (Cook, 1997: 341). On another occasion he was gifted with a feathered head dress:

Poulaho, the King as I shall now call him, came on board betimes and brought, as a present to me, one of their caps, made, or at least covered, with red feathers. These caps were much sought after by us for we knew they would be highly valued at Otaheite. But, though very large prices

were offered, not one was ever brought for sale which showed that they were no less valuable in the estimation of the people here; nor was there a person in either ship that could make himself the proprietor of one, except myself, Captain Clarke, and Omai. The caps, or rather bonnets, are composed of the tail feathers of the Tropic bird, with the red feathers of the parakeet wrought upon them, or jointly with them. They are made so as to tie upon the forehead without any crown, and have the form of a semicircle, whose radius is eighteen or twenty inches. (Cook 1997: 333)

That these items were so highly valued by the Tongans that it shows the level of respect that they had for Cook. So valuable were the feathers that William Anderson noted that the Tongans were willing to go to war over the feathers: “[The Tongans] cultivate the friendship of those of [Fiji] apparently out of fear, though they sometimes *venture to skirmish with them on their own ground* [i.e. in Fiji] *and carry off red feathers as their booty* [emphasis mine], which is found in great quantity there and highly valued at Tonga” (Beaglehole, 1999b: 958). These items that James Cook and his crew observed were the most highly ranked items in Tonga, in particular the apron-like *sisi fale*, which was used in dances and ceremonies by chiefs, and was in particular the investiture garment for the Tu'i Tonga (Kaeppler, 1999: 173; Kaeppler, 1971b: 212 – 213).

In addition to the Tu'i Tonga, the *sisi fale* was worn by his sister, the Tu'i Tonga Fefine, and the Tamahā (Kaeppler, 1999: 173). This garment was described in 1773 by Captain Cook: “They have a curious apron, made of the outside fibres of the cocoanut shell and composed of a number of small pieces sewed together in such a manner as to form stars, half moons, little squares &c, and studded with beads of shells and covered with red feathers, so as to have a pretty effect” (Beaglehole, 1999a: 272). The description matches that provided by Kaeppler who points out that all of the materials used in the manufacture of these items were considered to have been “sacred materials throughout

Polynesia, and their fabrication into chiefly articles was considered to be a sacred act known to only a few specialized individuals” (Kaepler, 1999: 173 – 174). In particular the red feathers were “sacred activating ingredient[s] in Polynesia” which were the sacred source of a chief’s right to rule, and were therefore a necessary item in investiture ceremonies (Kaepler, 1996: 479).

These red-feathers were not only important to Tongans but were also important to Samoans as well. In Samoa the feathers were used in the manufacture of fine mats called *'ie toga* that were used as female dress well into the 20th Century (Holmes 1958: 8 – 9). The red feathers were used in the borders of the fine mats (Moyle, 1984: 255; Ella, 1899: 169; Ferdon, 1987: 235; Krämer, 1994b: 344 – 345). These mats were entirely made by high-ranking women in specialized weaving houses called *fale lalaga* in a lengthy process that could take up to two years, and were of such fine quality that they could have been made using a loom, but in fact were made entirely by hand. Furthermore due to the fact that high-ranking women made the mats, they became taboo so that commoners were excluded from what in effect was a monopoly (Krämer, 1994b: 345; Stair, 1897: 143; Holmes, 1958: 10; Moyle, 1984: 82; Turner, 1884: 120; Su'apa'ia, 1962: 48; Martin, 1981: 110 fn; Ella, 1899: 169). In Samoa, as in Tonga and other parts of Polynesia these red feathers were the “imprimatur”, that is to say the objects that conferred political legitimacy (Mageo, 2002: 507 – 508). Derek Freeman points out that this was because of the position of the *taupou*, or 'sacred virgin' who was the favourite daughter of a highly ranked chief. The red feathers were the representation of hymenal blood which means that the feathers represented virginity. This representation tied social reproduction to

biological reproduction. The *taupou* occupied such a favoured position, that her virginity served to raise the rank of the chiefly family to the level of divinity. Because the feathers represented virginity they were the symbol of high rank, which meant that the mats themselves came to be the symbols of the chief's high rank (Freeman, 1983: 228 – 233; Erskine, 1967 [1853]: 411). This therefore means that the red feathers were the most import item in the manufacture of these fine mats that were used in marriages and investitures.

In Samoa the importance of these *'ie toga* were such that they represented the principle measure of wealth that a chief could have, and would allow them to acquire land and even to save the life of a condemned man (Su'apa'ia, 1962: 48; Turner, 1884: 120; Stair, 1897: 143 – 144; Kramer, 1994a: 30; Ella, 1899: 169). The value of these mats did not only lie with the legitimizing red feathers but also because of the way in which they were attached to a name that was of significance to specific high ranking families and historical events, and only a small number of orators who are attached to specific chiefly families (Ella, 1899: 169; Mageo, 2002: 507 – 508; Kaeppler, 1999: 176). As a result the value of the *'ie toga* only increased and an old and tattered fragment of a named mat was more valuable than a newly manufactured mat (Ella, 1899: 169; Turner, 1884: 120).

The *'ie toga* were a much needed ingredient in the ceremonial life of Samoa. They were used in an assortment of rituals that included being part of offerings to the gods, in weddings, funerals, rewards for services rendered, and in investiture rituals (Moyle, 1984: 78, 83, 255; Churchward, 1887: 394; Kramer, 1994a: 30 – 31). In terms of the

investitures of chiefs, in particular any chief that would be king who had to secure four titles, he would be presented with *'ie toga* in each of the districts in the four islands and he would signify his acceptance of the titles by sitting on the increasing pile of mats. These mats, according to Mageo, were “requisite to signifying and brokering political power (Stair, 1897: 79 – 82; Mageo, 2002: 495). Thus the mats were the indispensable prestige goods in investiture ceremonies. During funerals, following the offering of the finest mat that a chief owned. His other mats were distributed to all who had served the chief. This practice had been in use for at least five generations prior to Krämer's ethnography originally published in 1901, and had been strictly adhered to by successive chiefs (Krämer, 1994b: 31, 46 note 64). Finally in the case of high-ranking marriages, the *'ie toga* were the most important part of the bridal goods without which the bride could not marry. Male marriage goods included the red feathers that were used in the manufacture of the mats (Krämer, 1994a: 37 – 38). In the case of the marriages between Tongan chiefs and Samoan brides this meant that the bidirectional movement of the mats and red feathers demonstrates the systemic properties of the marriage interactions between the two archipelagos. These three different ceremonies thus had one commonality and that was the exchange and distribution of the Samoan fine mats and as such these ceremonies demonstrate the importance of these mats in of Samoan social reproduction.

With respect to Tonga, mats were observed to have been items of clothing as well (Beaglehole, 1999a: 266; Beaglehole, 199b: 1041). Not all of the fine mats that Cook and his crew observed in Tonga originated in Samoa; many were manufactured in Tonga. The

fine mats made in Tonga were called *ngafingafi* and were primarily associated with the Tu'i Tonga line (Kaeppler, 1999: 187). This chapter does not examine those because they do not demonstrate the systemic movement of mats from Samoa to Tonga. The Samoan named mats in Tonga, called *kie hingoa*, were the most highly ranked prestige valuables. It was considered to be a taboo for commoners to have any association with them. These mats “carried the reproductive power of Tongan society” according to Kaeppler and were passed down through chiefly families associated with the Tu'i Kanokupolu line and were used, as in Samoa, in a wide range of ceremonies including investitures, weddings, and funerals (Kaeppler, 1999: 168, 186, 187; Labillardière, 1800: 118).

In funerals, the bodies of chiefs were wrapped up in the *kie hingoa* after being washed and oiled with sandalwood, and were buried with the body and represented gifts to the gods (Martin, 1981: 222, 350; Smith, 1813: 165). In the case of weddings and investitures, these mats were used both as displays and as clothing for the bride. As Lawry put it while observing such a wedding, “the female was so large with the mats wrapped around her, that it required three women to support her during the service” (Lawry, 1852: 301) which matched the description of another such marriage observed by William Mariner:

The young lady having profusely anointed with cocoa-nut oil, scented with sandal-wood, was dressed in the choicest mats of the Navigator's Islands [Samoa], of the finest texture, and as soft as silk. So many of these costly mats were wrapped round her, perhaps more than forty yards, that her arms stuck out from her body in a ludicrous manner; and she could not, strictly speaking, sit down, but was obliged to bend in a sort of half-sitting posture. (Martin 1981: 96 – 97)

These mats were used as bridal wealth and were associated with the chiefly families that were in turn associated with the Tu'i Kanokupolu line. Indeed, they originated with the

creation of the Tu'i Kanokupolu line. The mother of Ngata, the first Tu'i Kanokupolu, came from the Samoan island of 'Upolu, brought the mat “Maneafainga'a” as part of her bridal wealth, and the mat became associated with the Tu'i Kanokupolu because Ngata was known as *Kano 'Upolu* which translates as “Flesh of 'Upolu” and because it was worn in various ceremonies including his own investiture (Kaepler, 1996: 478; Kaepler, 1999: 147). This mat also, because of the use of the red feathers that symbolized hymeneal blood in its manufacture came to represent the reproduction of the Kanokupolu line, and as such it (and other associated mats) became necessary investiture items (Kaepler, 1996: 479, 480; Kaepler, 1999: 174). The mat, Maneafainga'a, is still in use today as the primary investiture item for the Tu'i Kanokupolu (who is also the Tongan king). This mat is an important part of Tongan governmental ceremonies, and as such has a similar status to the British Crown Jewels (Kaepler, 1999: 175).

The exchange of red feathers and named mats represented a systemic interaction between the two island groups, and this characterization is further cemented when one considers that since only high ranking women could make them in Samoa, the effect was that they gained control of a monopoly. This monopoly meant that marriages to Tongan chiefs was reserved for certain families. The conclusion that this exchange was systemic is also cemented by the fact that the mats became necessary items in Tonga without access to which meant that Tongan chiefs could not marry or become invested in chiefly titles. This is particularly true of the mat Maneafainga'a and the Tu'i's Kanokupolu, and so the exchange of these mats became the crucial ingredient in Tonga social reproduction of chiefly authority.

3.3.5 Canoes, Tribute, and Conflict

In addition to the marriage interactions and the exchange of prestige valuables, there was one final set of interactions that held the three island groups together. I say three, but at the time frame which this chapter is concerned with Samoa did not play much of a role, and so the interaction that I will now turn to is concerned with military and political interactions between Tonga and Fiji. In any maritime environment there is an overwhelming need to have access to sea travel, and West Polynesia is no exception. In this region the role that canoes play cannot be understated. Canoes were of vital importance to the Tongans because they allowed them to dominate the three island groups that make up the Tongan archipelago. The exercise of authority came in the form of tribute gathering within the Tongan archipelago, in particular in the context of the *'inasi* which was the annual first fruits ceremony when produce from all over the Tongan islands was sent to the Tu'i Tonga. This was an internal tribute collection that relied on the larger political and military interactions as a means of support.

The *'inasi* was the most important ceremony associated with the Tu'i Tonga. The primary crops were yams. In some instances bundles of sticks that represented yams were used as substitutes, and they were offered to the Tu'i Tonga at the grave of his ancestors (Bott and Tav, i 1982: 36; Kirch, 1984: 221; Luke, 1954: 35; Smith, 1813: 155; Vason, 1810: 158 – 160; Cook, 1997: 359, 366; Beaglehole, 1999b: 917). Vason describes the scene thusly:

It was the time of making the yearly offering to Duatonga [Tu'i Tonga], which was called the natche. He was the high priest of the island, and on this occasion was superior to everyone...as he was descended from the family, who were thought originally to have come from the sky. Duatonga

as priest of all the islands, and their mediator to converse with the Deity, and insure them plenty, was greatly revered throughout the island, and supported in splendour and dignity by the contributions of the different districts, as well as by the productions of his own ample estate. So like the ancient priests of Egypt, he was a prince as well as a priest... If he was journeying, no native dared to walk or stand while he remained in sight.

The period of the annual oblation being arrived, all the Chiefs from the Arbai Narou, and all the other neighbouring isles, assembled together at Mooa in the falee or mansion of Duatonga, to present him with their first ripe yams and other first fruits of their fields; a custom, which, however remote the island, seems derived from original tradition... On this occasion, Duatonga personated the Deity of their fields, who they supposed caused them to be fruitful. They paid him the homage due to him whom he represented. With the fruits in their hands, the chiefs, arrayed in their various dresses, which distinguished the districts over which they presided, reverently approached him in regular rotation, in a slow, solemn pace, with a kind of monotonous song, and upon their bended knees, presented the first productions of their abbees. They then rose up and passed off in the same order, and with the same solemnity” (Vason, 1810: 158 – 160).

The *'inasi* ceremony was ostensibly a religious ceremony whereby first fruits were offered in order to appease the gods so that they would allow a bountiful harvests and also so that the gods would not subject the people to disasters. It was the role of the Tu'i Tonga as a descendent from the gods to act as the intermediary and the offerings, in the religious sense, were to the gods and not to the Tu'i Tonga himself (Ferdon, 1987: 90; Campbell, 1992: 31; Martin, 1981: 246). Although the *'inasi* was on the surface a purely religious ceremony, it was clear that the ceremony had a very distinct political purpose, as was noted by members of Captain Cook's expedition who observed what turned out to be a special *'inasi* ceremony, for example Captain Clerke of the *Discovery*: “The Purport of the ceremony seems to me...the Nobles paying their Allegiance to the Heir apparent of the Crown; the Samples offer'd him [are] Imitations of their future Intentions of supplying him with these Matters” (Beaglehole, 1999b: 1308). Anderson:

I apprehend it as a sort of oath of allegiance which they take to the heir of the crown (who seem'd the principle person concern'd), and that the cloth, mats, yams & other things are merely representations of what they engage to furnish him in future, as they have done his father, who either from an ancient custom or perhaps to insure the succession wishes to see it done whilst alive. (Beaglehole 1999b: 917 – 917)

The ceremony was framed as being voluntary, but in fact it was an obligation of the lower-ranked chiefs to provide such tribute, and it was seen as an act of rebellion to withhold such tribute (Martin, 1981: 147 footnote), and which some chiefs saw as a tax (Martin, 1981: 252). The *'inasi* was therefore a method of maintaining and reproducing the authority of the Tu'i Tonga, and some chiefs such as Finau 'Ulukalala II who made sure that the *'inasi* ceremony was abolished, which resulted in the decline of the Tu'i Tonga's power and authority (Martin, 1981: 252).

The *'inasi* however could not have been performed if Tonga did not have access to large ocean-going canoes, which observers noted them to have used (Martin, 1981: 243 – 244 Beaglehole, 1999a: 254; Dillon, 1829a: 295; Beaglehole, 1999a: 263 – 264). The canoes that were described by observers as being used in the *'inasi* were called *kalia* (or *drua* in Fijian) and were able to carry between a hundred and a hundred and fifty people and were about ninety feet in length consisting of two hulls that were connected by a platform. Upon this platform was a deck-house and a single mast with a triangular sail. These canoes took about six or seven years to manufacture (Beaglehole, 1999a: 264; West, 1865: 48 – 50; Labillardière, 1800: 135; Erskine, 1967: 132; Lawry, 1852: 63; Diapea, 1928: 110 – 114). These canoes were not just a necessity in tribute gathering, but were also a sign of prestige and were thus only owned by chiefs.

What ties the collection of tribute to Fiji was the fact that the large ocean going

canoes could not be manufactured in Tonga itself. The reason for this is that there was not sufficient wood available to the Tongans at home. The wood that they were made from was called *vesi* which was a good material since it was not prone to being eaten by worms (Martin, 1981: 359; Williams, 1958: 76; Lawry, 1852: 451 – 452) and so they had to find other sources of wood. They also saw the design of the *drua* as being superior to anything they had even though they had better carpenters. As a result, the *drua* were made in Fiji by Tongan carpenters who, because each canoe took between four and seven years to build, had to live in Fiji and so set up what were in effect Tongan colonies (Beaglehole, 1999b: 958; Diapea, 1928: 77, 99, 110 – 114; Cargill, 1977: 61, 64; Erskine, 1967: 132; Brewster, 1922: 73, 78; Derrick, 1946: 121).

Permission to manufacture the *drua* had initially been granted by the Fijian chiefs in exchange for gifts of prestige valuables which included *tabua*, that is the teeth of the Sperm Whale (Dillon, 1829b: 78 – 79; Diapea, 1928: 114; Martin, 1981: 359). *Tabua* were considered so valuable in Fiji, that they were used to atone for bad acts, to save or condemn a man to death, as peace offerings, and most importantly, secure alliances (Diapea, 1928: 17, 22; Williams, 1858: 40, 44). This peaceful arrangement would not last, however, and it was not long until the relationship became violent. The violence came in two forms.

Firstly the Tongans started to simply take the canoes by force as a form of tribute as they assumed a position of dominance (Derrick, 1946: 121; Smythe, 1864: 127, 128; Dillon, 1829b: 78 – 79; Martin, 1981: 359; Moyle, 1984: 213). This dominance was also demonstrated by the fact that the Tongans effectively controlled the use of canoes and in

effect the travel by canoe between Fiji and Tonga. All the canoes were crewed by Tongans (Dillon, 1829b: 78 – 79; Lawry, 1852: 451 – 452). Secondly, the Tongans began to involve themselves in Fijian wars in order to take plunder, including *drua* (Martin, 1981: 69, 182 – 183; Labillardière, 1800: 94; Smythe, 1864: 107 – 109; Brewster, 1922: 78; Erskine, 1967: 132), and also as part of voluntary exchanges of Fijian canoes and Tongan military aid, as in the case of the Tongan king, George Tupou I, who received a canoe from the Fijian King Cakobau in 1855 in return for aid in quelling a rebellion by his brother (Smythe, 1864: 125).

The involvement in Fijian wars by Tongans became so frequent and commonplace, that it was considered to be an integral part of a young Tongan warrior's education to involve them in Fijian conflict. This also allowed the young warriors to make a name for themselves by proving themselves in battle (Derrick, 1946: 121; Brewster, 1922: 78; Martin, 1981: 69; Spurway, 2002: Smythe, 1864: 125). Their presence became a constant (Martin, 1981: 227) and they became so successful that they gained a reputation of being unbeatable (Smythe, 1864: 125) although that was not always the case, such as when canoe load of Tongans were killed and eaten by Fijian warriors (Diapea, 1928: 75). The constant stream of Tongan warriors in Fiji, in particular the island of Lakeba in Fiji's Lau group, was a major source of conflict as they would generally act as if they owned the place and even fought each other (Lawry, 1852: 349; Martin, 1981: 69) and were known for their lawlessness: “A great deal of mischief is done by them. The missionaries at Lakemba speak very strongly of their lawlessness, and the oppression they exercise on the Fijians. They will land at a town, enter the houses,

and say, 'Let this part of the house be mine!' and there remain, taking the lion's share of the food and causing much evil” (Smythe, 1864: 126 – 127)”.

Greed and renown were not the only motivations of Tongan warriors. Boredom was a significant factor which would have a knock-on effect that resulted in conflict at home as young warriors found the peace they found at home upon their return to be intolerable, and so began to involve themselves in plots and intrigues (Derrick, 1946: 122 – 123), which resulted in the civil war that broke out in 1797. There were many chiefs involved, most notably Finow 'Ulukalala II who had previously confined himself to annual raiding trips due to the impregnability of the defences at Tongatapu. His chance came when he captured the “Port-au-Prince” at Lifuka and killed the crew with the exception of William Mariner¹⁷, whom he adopted as his son. Finow 'Ulukalala II used the canons to attack Tongatapu in 1806. Finow 'Ulukalala is noteworthy because his grand nephew was Tāufa'āhau, who would become King George Tupou I and transform Tonga in to western style kingdom (Derrick, 1946: 123 – 124).

While conflict, military and tributary interactions between Tonga and Fiji are well documented, information about such interactions between Tonga and Samoa during the period in question is sparse and contradictory. Some sources say that while there were many attempts to subdue Samoa, the Tongans failed to do so (Stair, 1897: 241), and others dismiss such reports as unreliable (Gunson, 1990: 181). Gunson describes many incidences of Tongan domination of Samoa during this period (Gunson 1990), and points out that Captain Cook was informed that Samoa was subject to Tonga, which echos the reports of Cook's expedition saying so (Beaglehole, 1999b: 957). Beaglehole disputes this

¹⁷ Whose account is found in Martin (1981).

by pointing out that while Tonga had probably conquered Samoa during the Twelfth Century, they were driven out in the Thirteenth Century and it does not seem as if Tongan rulers visited Samoa in the Eighteenth Century (Beaglehole, 1999b: 957 fn.; Su'apa'ia, 1962: 24 – 25). Russian explorer Otto Von Kotzebue states that a source informed him that the Samoans paid annual tribute to Tongatapu, however Gunson more cautiously states that this *may* have been the case (Von Kotzebue, 1967: 215; Gunson, 1990: 179 – 180, 186 – 187), but does not say anything definite about the subject. Von Kotzebue further states that he witnessed Tongan involvement in Samoan wars (Von Kotzebue, 1967: 277 – 281), but it is not clear whether that means that Tonga was dominating Samoa or if there were some isolated cases of interference at the hands of some Tongan chiefs. Given the contradictory nature of the information, all that can really be said about conflict between Tonga and Samoa is that it is likely that there was conflict, but how systemic such conflict was is open to debate.

3.3.6 Tongan Domination

One of the results of the increase in demand for canoes was in effect the colonization by Tongans of parts of the Fiji Islands. Tongan residence in Fiji had been noted, as mentioned above, by many observers, as far back as Captain Cook's time, and maybe even further back than that (Beaglehole, 1999b 958; Diapea, 1928: 77, 99; Cargill and Schutz, 1977: 61, 64; Brewster, 1922:73, 78). The reason for this was that the manufacture of the Fijian *drua* took many years. The increase in demand of canoes meant that there was a corresponding increase in the numbers of Tongans living in Fiji, in particular the Lau group. This increase meant that in turn there was an increase in the

amount of influence and power that the Tongans gained.

I discussed earlier the behaviour of the Tongans in Fiji. Various observers such as Sarah Smythe, the wife of Col. W. J. Smythe, the British Commissioner to Fiji, noted the bad behaviours which in many cases included taking over people's homes and demanding food (Smythe, 1864: 126 – 127). Sarah Smythe also noted that the Fijians were seemingly powerless to prevent the Tongans from doing as they pleased. She noted that the chief of Lakeba, the Tui Nayau, was “a man of very weak character, and entirely under the influence of the Tongans” (Smythe, 1864: 128). The result was that the Tongans, in particular Tāufa'āhau, who later became George Tupou I, was seen to be their superior (Williams, 1984: 213).

As a further indication of the dominance of the Tongans in the region, I point to the increase in the demand for and the control of the building of canoes in Fiji, coupled with the superior navigation skills of the Tongans, which meant that the Tongans were able to control the travel between the two groups. According to Dillon, the only way that the Fijians could travel to Tonga were in canoes that were always crewed by Tongans (Dillon, 1829b: 78 - 79). Lawry made note of the same thing saying, “[The Tongans'] superiority [in navigation] was so great [at the time of Mariner] that no native of Feejee would venture to Tonga, except in a canoe manned with Tonga people; nor return to his own islands , unless under the same guidance and protection. This is still the case” (Lawry, 1852: 451 – 452).

The involvement of the Tongans in Fiji was of particular concern to the British as it interfered with British trade interests in the region and also with the plantations that

were starting to be created:

Having been informed by Mr. Pritchard that the trade in “bêche-de-mer ” and sandalwood on the north-west coast of Vanua Levu was entirely stopped in consequence of a war which was being carried on there between two rival chiefs, one of whom was supported by a body of Tongans, whose usual residence is on Lakemba, one of the Windward Islands, I decided on endeavouring to put a stop to a state of affairs so prejudicial to British interests, and in order that my measures should be backed by the highest native authority in Fiji, I requested Mr. Pritchard to propose to Thakombau, King of Inbau, and Maafu, the principal chief of the Tongans resident in Fiji, to accompany me to the Mathaata district in the Pelorus...

...On sending on shore to ascertain the state of affairs, we found, as I had anticipated would be the case, that the combined force of Tongans and Fijians had driven their opponents off the main land, and that the latter had taken refuge on Kea Island, about 10 miles from our anchorage. Since their expulsion their enemies had committed great havoc amongst their plantations, had destroyed nearly all the large canoes for which this district was formerly famous, and almost daily put one or more persons to death whose only crime was being related to the vanquished party. In these outrages the Tongans were the most prominent actors, and I may here state my opinion, that in the event of Her Majesty's Government accepting the protectorate of the Fijis, it will be necessary, from the very first, to put a stop to the raids which the Tongans have for the last five years been in the habit of carrying into the various islands lying to the west of Lakemba. (Parliament, 1862: 22)

The situation regarding the Tongans in Fiji was such that it was noted that “Tongans are now owners of land – buyers of tribute – ruling Fijians; but not allowing themselves to pay tribute or be ... controlled by the chiefs and owners of the lands where they reside and visit” (Spurway, 2015: 210). Furthermore Ma'afu, George Tupou I's brother, who had been sent to Tonga in order to support the missionaries, had started a campaign to try and conquer Fiji apparently with the approval of George Tupou I (Parliament, 1862: 31; Sahlins, 1962: 6). After the initial decision to not accept Fiji's cessation to Britain, which had been sought by the various Fijian chiefs as a defence against foreign aggression

which included the French, the Tongans, and the Americans, and based on the advice of William Smythe in 1861 (Parliament, 1862: 18, 19, 23, 24, 27, 29, 33), Ma'afu had arrived in Fiji with George Tupou's European made schooner and four canoes and had brought with him a document that threatened Fiji with a full-scale attack if the Fijian chiefs did not formally hand over to the Tongans the lands that they claimed (Spurway, 2015: 211). Ultimately it was the actions of Ma'afu that resulted in the Fijians negotiating with the British on the issue of ceding Fiji to Britain in 1874, which was eventually also agreed upon by Ma'afu who signed the Deed of Cession on 30th October, 1874 (Spurway, 2015: 425 – 426).

3.3.7 Transformation, break-up, and Peripheralization

The arrival of the West had a profound effect on what had been a stable system for many centuries. One of the first effects that the European arrival had was the injection of many different trade items. These items include mirrors, nails and beads during the first European visit by Abel Tasman in 1643 (Sharp, 1968). Later items would include hatchets, muskets, and axes, some of which were in turn introduced to Fiji by Tongans in return for canoes, spars, sail mats, pottery, mosquito curtains, and sinnet (William, 1958: 94). Among the most important items were whale-teeth (*Tabua*) which were exchanged for canoes, and which resulted in an increase in political/military interactions, and in the exchange of prestige valuables. The increase in exchange interactions, noted by Lawry¹⁸, likewise resulted in an increase in the demand for certain items such as canoes by the Tongans in particular which in turn led to an increase in conflict and increased Tongan

¹⁸ “When Captain Cook was at [Tonga], little was known respecting the Feejee Islands. Thirty years afterwards, when Mariner resided on the Tonga Islands, intercourse has increased” (Lawry, 1852: 452)

domination in the region.

3.3.8 Tonga in the Modern World-System.

In 1900, however, Tongan domination in the region ended with an agreement to become a British protectorate. I will deal with this question in more detail in chapter 4, and the other islands becoming colonial possessions of Germany and the United States. Since that time, Tonga has found itself on the extreme periphery of the world-system as the result of the break-up of the indigenous small world-system of which it was core. In order to see the consequences of that societal path, we need to jump ahead and examine Tonga today. In terms of GDP (PPP) it is one of the poorest countries on the planet ranked at number 211 (\$591 million) (Central Intelligence Agency, 2019). Its main products are agricultural, including squash, bananas, coconuts, vanilla, cocoa, coffee, sweet potatoes, cassava, taro, and kava. Its main industries are tourism, construction, and fisheries. Tonga's main exports amount to eighteen point four million US Dollars as of 2017 and consist mainly of agricultural products and fish, with no significant manufacturing (Central Intelligence Agency, 2019; Jayaraman, Choong, and Kumar, 2010; 'Esau, 2004). Tonga's imports, which show a huge trade deficit, as of 2017 amounted to two hundred and fifty point two million dollars, and mainly consists of foodstuffs, machinery and transport equipment, as well as fuels and chemicals (Central Intelligence Agency, 2019). These indicators show that Tonga is a peripheral nation that exports high labour intensive products such as agricultural and fishery products, in exchange for manufactured goods.

While commodity exchange has entered into the lives of Tongans and the social

relations that go along with it, a capitalist economy has failed to completely replace the traditional gift-exchange economy and the social relations that go along with that. Gift-exchange still plays an enormous role in Tongan ceremonial life such as in the case of gifting money to the churches. According to Paul Van der Grijp (1993: 207 - 210) in an ethnography, the motivation is entirely in keeping with Tongan social norms concerning gifts and reciprocity. There are two main narratives in this case. In one narrative the faithful see the ministers as the intermediaries between them and God, and since God does not eat food, the faithful gift the ministers with food, which are passed on in the form of prayers in order to bless and reward the faithful. In the second narrative, the main starting point is a debt to God who had given the land to the Tongan people and had created all life, and the people pay off this debt by presenting the gifts of food to the ministers who then transmit that gift in the form of prayers, and in return God provides them with continued use of the land.

According to Van der Grijp, there is a secondary motivation which is the need to be seen to be generous in order to gain prestige in the eyes of other people which transfers into a certain amount of power. Those people who do not contribute to the gift-exchange system are seen as lazy and as a result are seen as people who will not benefit from any blessings that God may bestow. They also suffer from social sanctions that often takes the form of gossip and is designed to instill shame and guilt in those who do not contribute (Van der Grijp, 1993: 210-211).

The gift-exchange system is fully on display in providing gifts for nobles and the King, for example the Royal Agricultural Show during which the king tours the various

islands of the Kingdom. During this tour, the best of the peoples' produce is judged by the King. The King and his retinue are provided with tables of food that are presented as gifts four times a day, and also pigs, uncooked yams, Kava, tapa cloth and mats. These gifts are then redistributed among the King's relatives and "political friends" (Van der Grijp, 1993: 212). According to Van der Grijp, the Royal Agricultural Show bares a strong resemblance to the *'inasi* ceremony that had been a tribute gathering exercise involving the presentation of the first fruits to the Tu'i Tonga. While there are surface differences between the *'inasi* and the Royal Agricultural Show, structurally speaking they are so similar that the Royal Agricultural Show is the modern form which the *'inasi* has taken (Bataille, 1976: 85, in Van der Grijp, 1993: 213 - 214).

In terms of land tenure, where the law prohibits the sale of the land, title-holders are able to get around the law by accepting gifts (as discussed above) in return for the granting of a plot of land. This gift is sometimes in the form of cash, which at first glance seems to be an obvious sale, but it is never framed in this way, but rather as a plot of land being given as part of a reciprocal exchange of gifts (Van der Grijp, 1993: 224) and is thus, not officially at least, seen as a contravention of the Lands Act of 1927. In terms of the social relations involved in cash cropping, it is seen as perfectly acceptable to treat a relative who might be working in a commercial venture to not be given a wage, but rather any recompense is seen to be in keeping with Tongan gift-exchange and varies week by week even as workers who are not related are paid a regular wage (Van der Grijp, 1993: 224 - 225).

This is an important point. Even in the context of a commercial venture, the

traditional norms intrude in a way, and prevent the full realization of a particular commercial business and even in general terms this is the case. The reason is that relatives expect to be given services free of charge, even as they are often initially relied upon during the early life of a business venture. The major part of gift-exchange is a set of obligations, including the obligation to give, and so a person is unable to turn down requests by relatives for goods and services, and as a result many business ventures fail to get off the ground. Van der Grijp, discusses the case of a bus driver who had returned from abroad and had enough money to buy a small bus or a van, and who wished to start up a privately owned bus company. This bus driver had to purposely exclude his home village from the bus route in order to make a go of his business and as a protest for the non-payment of fares by his relatives (Van der Krijp, 1993: 220, 225)

3.3.9 Remittances

In recent decades Tonga has found itself increasingly reliant on remittances from out-migration. In this regard Tonga is in the same boat as many other Pacific Island nations. Out-migration began in the region with a small number of migrants, a “mere trickle” as ‘Esau put it (‘Esau, 2004: 353), and since then has grown significantly. Because the majority of nations in the region had been colonial possessions, the migrants in many cases were able to relatively easily obtain visas from the old colonial powers. New Zealand for example, gives citizenship to migrants from the Cook Islands, Nuie, Tokelau, and Western Samoa (now just called Samoa) (‘Esau, 2004)

Tonga was the exception to this because despite being a British protectorate until 1970, was never a colonial possession and was thus politically and economically

independent. As such Tonga did not have political ties to the United Kingdom as a colonizing power. This has led to difficulties in obtaining visas. As such out-migration from Tonga was not an issue until the 1970s when the kingdom ceased to be a protectorate. New Zealand became the top destination for Tongan migrants ('Esau, 2004: 353 - 353).

The main sectors which the Tongan economy is based on are agriculture, forestry, and fisheries which in 2001/02 accounted for 28% of gross GDP. During the same period government services accounted for 18.5%, finance, real estate and services accounted for 15.1% , and commerce, hotel and restaurant (tourism) accounted for fourteen point 2% of gross GDP. Foreign aid during this period was relatively low, accounting for only 3.02% of gross GDP. According to the Asian Development Bank, remittances accounted for 50% of GDP in 2002, and 40% the previous year (Asian Development Bank, 2003). The average remittance flows to Tonga in the three decades prior to 2010, have been about 35%. The remittance flows, according to Jayaraman, Choong, and Kumar have risen from 7.5% in the period 1970-1974 to 36.9% in 2008 (Jayaraman, Choong, and Kumar, 2010).

These figures indicate that the role of remittances in the economies of Pacific Island nations such as Tonga is significant, but the official balance of payments figures underestimate the gross number and value of remittances. According to Brown (1995), the out-migrants often prefer to use unofficial channels for different reasons which range from "financial advantage" to simple convenience. Other factors that can play a part in the use of unofficial channels are a lack of banking and foreign exchange institutions

which may have the effect of an increased use of informal channels. For instance, in the case of remittances being directed at remote islands the remittances are made through international retail merchants who have branches in both the sending and receiving countries, and is a more efficient channel than banking services. Finally remittances can be sent either by cash or as goods carried by the migrant on home visits which can then be resold. These kinds of remittance channels are not recorded in the official figures as remittances (Brown, 1995: 39). While remittances in Tonga account for 26% of household income, unofficial remittances account for 51% of total remittances to Tongan households and to churches and other social organizations (Brown, 1995: 42, 47, 48).

The motivation for sending remittances has been assumed to be an altruistic compensation for poverty. The implication of this, according to Brown, Connel, and Jimenez-Soto (2014), is that the lower a household is below a particularly defined poverty line, the more the remittances become in value. The other implication is that if there are social welfare services available to the household then the remittances will decrease. However in Tonga that was not the case. When household income increased in Tonga, the remittances also continued to increase, which would imply that the motivation is not simply altruism. While it is true to say that remittances are effective poverty reduction mechanisms, and while it is also true that households are reliant on remittances due to increasing poverty rates in the region, altruism does not appear the important motivation in Tongan society, but rather reciprocal obligations as implied by the increase of remittances corresponding to household income increases (Brown, Connell, and Jimenez-Soto, 2014).

The reason for this lies with the Tongan gift-exchange and kin-based relations. According to Evans (1996). Tonga has been an exporter of cash-crops since the colonial period. This exportation of cash-crops has always been within the context of the Tongan social system. The response of the Tongan people to the reforms of King George Tupou I was to adapt by shifting the foundations of social organization from the Tongan chiefly hierarchies and kin-groups to a more loose and flexible participation in Churches and the new political system. As such commodity production did not replace traditional kin-based exchange but instead became linked to them (Evans, 1996: 244). Chiefly politics began to take on less importance as politics shifted to the level of the village and kin-based reciprocal relations and obligations transformed in order to include cash. Cash, however, did not replace traditional prestige valuable and kin-based exchange and so the traditional prestige exchange system retained its traditional importance. Production became individuated but distribution of goods continued to be mediated by kin-ship relations. The distribution of goods also became to be mediated by relations between commoners and nobles, and commoners and God. In this way state and God entered into Tongan understandings of social relations without transforming those understandings (Evans, 1995: 244-245).

Wendy Cowling (1990a; 1990b) argues that the purposes of out-migration include an escape from the Tongan social system and the accumulation of capital. She argues that while traditional exchange is an important factor, cash is replacing prestige valuables in terms of their importance and that traditional exchange will eventually be replaced (Cowling, 1990b: 205). Evans disputes this position in his ethnographic study of a small

atoll in the Tongan archipelago called Ha'ano in the Ha'apai group.

In his ethnography, Evans demonstrates that while cash received as part of remittances is certainly used in capital accumulation, commodity exchange, and household expenses, the primary use of the cash is in the context of village ceremonial life and in particular in the context of religious life. The use of cash in this context is in the form of gift-exchange rather than in commercial transactions, and is therefore based on obligations of reciprocity (Evans, 1996: Chapter 8). In this way the motivation for out-migration, particularly for the purposes for education which would tend to also generate cash, is formed by ceremonial exchanges (Evans, 1996: 246). Feasts, which draw the church into ceremonial life, are held for the benefit of the children to be sent abroad for education. These feasts create the “bonds of mutual aid which subsequently potentiate reciprocation by children” (Evans, 1996: 246). This reciprocation is demonstrated by sending cash back which is then used in church offerings, which in turn maintains the institution of gift-exchange with God and others, which marks “social competence and prestige” (Evans, 1996: 246).

It can be clearly seen that Tonga has been integrated into the modern world-system. The trade imbalance as well as the class of goods imported and exported, as well as the reliance on out-migration and remittances demonstrates that Tonga is situated economically as well as geographically in the extreme periphery. However, it can also be clearly seen that being situated on the periphery has not caused the diminishment of traditional Tongan social systems and kin-based gift exchange. The role of chiefly hierarchies has diminished to a certain degree as village politics became more important,

but the underlying system of kin-based relationships and obligations remain strong even as they changed to include Christianity and commercial transactions, commodity exchanges and cash. It can also be seen that Tonga has increasingly become dependent on remittances, but the motivation for out-migration and remittances do not appear to solely be about poverty reduction and altruism but rather is based on kin-based relations and obligations of reciprocity. Thus while Tonga is on the periphery of the modern world-system, capitalism has not replaced the traditional social system, but rather has been included in them. This means that the Tongan system is a hybrid system that in the language of accumulation can be termed a mixed mode of accumulation.

3.4 Discussion and Conclusion

The premise of this chapter was to make the case that both Japan and Tonga took certain steps in order to avoid being dominated by the British and other colonial powers. This chapter focused on the issue of the changes in the systemic logic of each society, that is the mode of production, and on the issue of the core/periphery status of each country.

In the case of Japan, this chapter accepted the case made by Kōjin Karatani that Japan was a semi-periphery based on his analysis which focused on Karl Wittfogel's conceptualization of the core, margin, and sub-margin. Karatani concludes that sub-margins were able to resist being dominated by the core of world-empires. This adaptivity involves the ability to pick and choose the institutional forms best suited for the context of the sub-marginal society in question. The result of this was that Japan was able to adapt to the arrival of the colonial powers. Karatani makes the case that sub-margins tended to be incorporated into the modern into the modern global system as

semi-peripheries while the cores of world-empires and the margins of world-empires were incorporated as peripheries. Thus, he argued, semi-peripheries in the modern world-system are analogous to sub-margins in the older world-empires. As such Karatani ties adaptability to semi-peripheral development. This dissertation accepts Karatani's conclusion that Japan was therefore a semi-peripheral society and thus was able to adapt to the arrival of the Western powers and start its journey to core status, and the evidence presented in this chapter supports Karatani's conclusion.

In terms of the semi-peripheral status of Tonga, this dissertation had to first establish its semi-peripheral status. The case of Tonga is not so simple because it had not been in contact with the core of a world-empire, and thus the concept of margin and sub-margin can not apply to it. So what is the basis for concluding that Tonga was semi-peripheral at the point of contact? The answer lies in an analysis of Tonga's position in its own world-system that was proposed by Sutherland (2015). This analysis was based on an examination of the interactions between the three island groups of Tonga, Fiji, and Samoa by Adrienne Kaeppler (1978) in which she concluded that those interactions which included marriage and prestige goods exchange primarily served the needs of Tongan social reproduction.

Sutherland (2015) thus presented a static analysis (*fig. 6*) of those interactions in order to show that the interactions displayed systemic properties. Because Tonga was the centre of accumulation it was the core of this world-system. As such, similarly to Japan although for different reasons, Tonga had not been subsumed and dominated by the core of a world-empire, and was thus able to change itself in order to adapt to the arrival of

Fig. 6: Interactions among Tonga, Fiji, and Samoa. This shows the centrality of Tonga in West Polynesian small world-system

the British (primarily) in such a way as to avoid colonization.

The chapter provided a comparative analysis of the two cases under examination and showed that Japan was able to avoid colonization and peripheralization by affecting societal change through the transformation of its mode of production in order to become a capitalist society when it had previously been organized along tributary lines. Tonga by contrast, affected political change but did not have the effect of transforming the mode of production and the adoption of capitalism. Because the modern world system is a social system based on capitalism, Tonga did not become a part of the modern world system even though Tonga is connected to it. Tonga is connected to the modern system as a peripheral state as a result.

This lack of change in the mode of production was not a passive decision but an active one. The king of Tonga made the deliberate decision to put in place policies that meant that there would be no change in the underlying mode of production. He decided to specifically prohibit the sale of land. Because of this, and because of further legislation guaranteed access to the land for each Tongan man, the Tongan people were guaranteed access to the means of production which meant that there was no need to become reliant on wage labour. Furthermore, the decision to not commoditize the land meant that the means of production could not be owned by capitalists. Technically the land is owned by the King and the nobles, but land use laws are such that no one can be denied access to the land and therefore are able to subsist without resorting to wage labour. As such Tonga did not adopt capitalism but rather maintained its traditional gift-exchange system, although focused on the church and not the old chiefs, whose positions were eliminated.

Not only is Tonga a peripheral state based on the kin-based mode of production, the interactions between it and the modern-system are such that Tonga can only be described as peripheral. In particular Tonga is reliant on remittances. The assertion made by some economists that the remittances are used for capital and commercial purposes is contradicted by the ethnographic evidence. Instead the remittance money enters the traditional gift-exchange system as a prestige valuable. It is certain that at least some of the money is used commercially, but the experience of the Tongan man who had returned from New Zealand in order to start a bus company suggests that commercial ventures are difficult to initiate due to the traditional kin-based system of obligations and reciprocity remain intact. This evidence together with the persistence of the gift-exchange system

demonstrates that Tongans did not fully adopt the types of social relations that are part of the capitalist mode of production, and therefore Tonga cannot be considered a capitalist social system. As such Tonga cannot be a full part of the global world-system even though it is connected to it. As such Tonga's place in the global economic system is on the extreme periphery.

So as we compare these two cases we can see that there are a number of similarities and differences between them. Firstly, in terms of the differences, both Japan and Tonga reacted to the arrival of the Western powers by radically transforming their respective societies which resulted in their ability to maintain their independence. On the other hand, the main difference is that both made different decisions economically. While both societies altered their social and political systems, Japan was the only one that transformed their economic system which led, through financial changes such as the formation of banks, and through industrialization, to a change in the dominant mode of production. The result of this was that Japan was able to become a core nation. The changes that Tonga made were political only, and so they were able to maintain political independence but because the underlying mode of production was not changed they were left on the periphery.

Finally one major difference that can be identified is that in Japan, the knowledge of capitalistic forms that existed prior to the Meiji Restoration was a key factor in the formation of modern banks and credit which which was necessary for industrialization. Thus the Dojima rice merchants played a pivotal role in the modernization of Japan. Tonga by contrast did not have an existing merchant class and so there were no

commercial transactions beyond maybe barter between individuals. Rather commodities were exchanged within the context of kin-based obligations such as gift-exchange. As such there was no existing commercial system upon which financial change and industrialization could be based. This coupled with the fact that the commoditization of the land was specifically prohibited meant that a modern economic system could not be formed. This means that Tonga did not have any prior experience with commercial type economics upon which to economically innovate. The result was political independence but peripheralization.

The schema proposed by Historical Institutionalism involves a long path-dependant period of no institutional change due to the constraints that institutional culture places on the exercise of agency. This is followed by a relatively short period of time when the constraints to agency are temporarily lifted. This is then followed by another path-dependent state. This schema provides a good way to visualize semi-peripheral change. The idea is that societies are institutions in themselves and therefore act in much the same way. In this way societies do not change unless have to, during the critical juncture. In this case the critical juncture was in the form of an exogenous shock brought about by the Americans in the case of Japan and the British in the case of Tonga. It is during this period that adaptation must take place in order to avoid losing independence, and it is semi-peripheries that have this ability. Thus we can use this schema to visualize societal change in this context. We can see it thusly:

Fig. 7: Diagram showing the visual framework of Historical Institutionalism

In the case of Japan, Path Dependent State 1 (PD1) represents the Edo Period. This period is characterized as a feudal tributary system governed by the Tokugawa Shogunate and the *daimyo*. In the case of Tonga, PD1 represents the mixed mode of production system (kin-based/tributary) during which governance was at the hands of the chiefs and the T’ui Tonga and T’ui Kanpkupolu, and wealth, similarly to Japan was accumulated through political coercion. The Critical Juncture was the time in which Europeans were accumulating colonial territory, and so the arrival of the Western powers coincides with this period and so the arrival of the colonial powers in each of the cases occur during this period. In Japan this occurred with the arrival of Perry in 1853 and Captain Cook in the 1770s and the missionaries in the early 1800s. This was the period in which both societies adapted, and this adaptation took place in a relatively short period. This period was followed by PD2, in which there is not much of a focus in this dissertation except to demonstrate the results of the changes.

This dissertation is not providing a full Historical Institutional analysis *per se*, but rather is using the schema only as a visual aid. It can be seen that both societies had proceeded along their respective historical paths without much change taking place. With the arrival of the Western powers they both saw the need to adapt and change, and as we shall see in the next chapter both societies saw that they only had a relatively short period

of time to make those changes in order to adapt.

This chapter has only focused on the steps that both societies took in order to adapt, in the parlance of HI, to the critical juncture that the arrival of the colonial powers represents. This chapter has shown that both societies were able to adapt to the new systemic reality. This demonstrates that both were semi-peripheral at this time. This chapter has also shown that while the decisions made allowed for adaptation, the different types of decisions led to different outcomes. In order for a society to set itself on the path to eventual core status in the modern world-system, it would have to make decisions that transform its society AND to transform in terms of the mode of production – that is both political AND economic changes.

Both societies made the decision to politically transform themselves in such a way as to become a modern nation-state in the Westphalian sense. However only Japan made that leap in the mode of production. Because of this, the outcome in terms of their position in the modern system was different. In addition to the political changes that it underwent, Japan also made certain economic changes by becoming what Chalmers Johnson would term a developmental state. This is based on the role that the Japanese government played in terms of guiding the developmental process. The changes made were its rapid industrialization and the innovation in financial services, which was the necessary first step to full industrialization. As such Japan became a capitalist society rather than a feudal, tributary society. On the other hand Tonga did not become a developmental state, did not industrialize, and did not innovate in the area of financial services. Their political changes specifically prohibited such innovations. By actively

maintaining their traditional kin-based system, Tonga did not become a capitalist society and as a result remained on the periphery.

From these two cases it can be seen that when a society voluntarily made both political and economic changes, then it could potentially set itself on to the path to core status, but if it did not voluntarily do BOTH, then the likely outcome would be peripheralization. In the cases under consideration, this explains why both Japan and Tonga could retain independence but also why only Japan was able to become core.

As I said, this chapter has only focused on the decisions made. However this only tells half the story. A key aspect of the critical juncture is that it is a relatively short period of time where constraints to agency are lowered. As such, any examination of the critical juncture, according to Capoccia and Kelemen (2007), should include an examination of contingencies. In this case the contingent factors are ideational in nature, and so an analysis of the role that ideas play in political and economic innovation is critical. The ideational factors in the decisions made by each society is the subject of and are examined in the next chapter.

In conclusion, the focus of this chapter has been on the issues of semi-peripherality and adaptivity. In the process this chapter has affirmed Kōjin Karatani's assertion that Japan fits the criteria for semi-peripheral status at the time of the Meiji period, based on his analysis of Wittfogel's categories of core, margin, and sub-margin. However in the case of Tonga, this chapter had the task of establishing its position as a semi-periphery at the time of the arrival of the Western powers based on the fact that it was only connected to two other island groups, Samoa and Fiji. As such this chapter

based Tonga's semi-peripheral status on its previous core status in its own small world-system, which was not connected to the capitalist world-system.

This chapter has also focused on the decisions made to adapt favourably to the incorporation of each society into the modern system. This chapter has broken down these decisions into two main types – political and economic. Political change refers to changes in the political and social structures, and economic change refers to changes in the mode of production. As such this chapter has demonstrated the decisions made in BOTH these areas set Japan on the path to eventual core status through the modernization of the country and the formation of a developmental state through financial innovation and rapid industrialization guided by state policies. Tonga only made political changes that allowed it to maintain independence but did not change the mode of production and as a result remained on the periphery. It became connected to the modern world-system but was not a full part of it based on Wallerstein's assertion that a world-system is a self-contained social system based on a single mode of production. In other words, political and economic decisions together resulted in political independence and eventual core status for one society, and political changes only resulted in independence but peripheral status for the other.

Chapter 4 : Politics and the Role of Ideas in societal change.

4.1 Introduction

The previous chapter examined the changes that took place in the two cases presented in this dissertation with respect to the issues of core, peripheral, and semi-peripheral status of a society as well as the issue of the mode of production. This chapter focuses on the ideational aspects of change, and as such focus more on politics. This is particularly true of Tonga, which as we saw did not transform its economic foundation to the capitalistic mode of production. In the case of Japan, there is much more crossover, since the transformation to capitalism involved the very political decision to create what can only be described as a form of developmental state.

This chapter is divided into two parts, an examination of Japan and an examination of Tonga. With respect to Japan, this chapter focuses of the foundational thinking that would be used in the formation of the new nation. In order to accomplish this, this chapter focuses on some of the thinkers of the period, such as Norinaga Mootori, Aizawa Seishisai, Yoshida Shōin, Shimazu Nariakira, Tajiri Inajirō, and others. There are so many different people involved in the thinking of the time that it would be impossible to include all of them, and so I focus on those that I believe are representative of the thinking of the time, particularly if they personally had an impact on the changes that took place.

Aizawa himself is of significance, according to Bob Wakabayashi, because not only was he idolized by Yoshida Shōin by his views were popular with pretty much everyone involved in politics in the 19th Century from low ranking samurai who saw in

his views an opportunity for advancement, to *daimyo* who saw in his writings a justification for pushing for greater decentralization of Japanese politics (Wakabayashi, 1986: x). Moreover Van Straelen (1952) points out that the central foundation of Yoshida's thinking is the centrality of Emperor as an object of worship as expressed by the *Mitogaku* scholars including Aizawa and Norinaga (Van Straelen, 1952: 66). Yoshida is of significance, according to Van Straelen, not because he was all that original in his ideas, but rather through force of personality in the way that he transmitted the thoughts of the *Mitogaku* scholars to his students, many of whom became leaders in the new Meiji government, and his advocacy for uniting Japan under the emperor (Van Straelen, 1952: 66-67, 81; Earl, 1964: 133). Finally, according to Craig (1961), Yoshida was significant because his legacy was that many of his teachings remained an influence right up until the Second World War (Craig, 1961: 162-164).

According to Sagers (2006), the importance of Shimazu Nariakira lay in the fact that he attempted to modernize Satsuma in the same way that the Meiji government did with Japan as a nation. His modernization included opening up his domain for trade, import substitution, and a change in the education system to focus on ability rather than social position. His importance lies, according to Sagers, in that his followers, similarly to the followers of Yoshida, became high ranking members of the Meiji government (Sagers, 2006: 67-72).

Regarding my treatment of Tajiri Inajirō, he is representative of the younger generation of the the Meiji Restoration who became the bureaucrats who implemented the changes put in place by the government, and who had some influence on the policies

made. They also often became teachers and so passed on their knowledge. These younger members of the Meiji government were those that the shogunate, *daimyos*, and the Meiji Government sent out to foreign countries to be educated. According to Ferber (2006), Tajiri's generation is often overlooked by scholars, who have preferred to focus on the “great men” of the Restoration, but they are significant because they were able to shape the way that Japan's financial institutions came to be, both in their roles as bureaucrats and teachers (Ferber, 2006: 27).

This chapter will demonstrate, that in the case of Japan, there were already thinkers who were conceiving of a new nation, but who rose to importance due to the exogenous shock to the system that the arrival of Commodore Mathew Perry represented. This completes the requirements of the critical juncture in Historical Institutionalism that I have been using as a visual aid. This chapter shows that the role that these ideas played in the transformation of Japanese society was significant. These ideas were the driving force behind the way that Japan adapted to the arrival of the Western powers and allowed it to be incorporated into the modern world-system in the way that was most favourable to independence. This chapter will show that it was these types of ideas that allowed Japan to eventually become core. Japan would not become a core nation until the post WWII period, but the changes and the ideas driving those changes during the end of the shogunate and during the Meiji period acted to set Japan on that path.

The role that ideas played in the political transformation of Tonga was also significant. However it did not appear that there were many of the underlying self-thinking that Japan had beyond the religious aspects of Tongan society which were used

by George Tupou I to state his desire for an independent Tonga. The desire to transform the nation into a modern kingdom came with the arrival of the missionaries who sought to Christianize and civilize (which to them were the same thing). In this desire to civilize, the missionaries were quite open to the idea that George Tupou should seek legal advice from British experts, which as we shall see he did. It is also clear that he followed the advice he was given quite closely, such as the advice received from Charles St. Julian, and Shirley Baker, and created a new Tonga based on the information of the modern international system that they provided him with. One thing is clear, that because of the influence of the missionaries, Tonga embarked on its own program of expansion into and colonization of Fiji, and the effect of this was the break up of the indigenous world-system that Tonga was the dominant society.

As a result of following the advice that George Tupou received, Tonga remains today the only Pacific Island nation to avoid colonization. It did become a British protectorate in the early 20th Century and has since maintain close ties with Britain, but it maintained political independence. This point may seem to be a contradiction. Tonga remained politically sovereign thanks to treaties that it had signed with Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States in 1876, 1879, and 1886 respectively (Bade, 2021: 8, 9, 12). The treaty with the United States had the effect of guaranteeing Tongan independence since the United States rejected the proposals by both Germany and Britain in 1887. Instead, Tonga's independence was recognized as a neutral area (Bade, 2021: 12). After King George Tupou I died there was growing concern by the British that his successor, George Tupou II was become too pro-German, and so in order to prevent

growing German influence in the region, George Tupou II was pressured into agreeing to allow Tonga to become a British Protectorate. The subsequent treaty signed in 1900 maintained Tonga's status as an internally self-governing nation. In terms of Tonga's external politics, there was no provision that stipulated that Tonga's foreign affairs would be conducted by Britain. However, Britain did conduct Tongan foreign affairs despite there being no basis in the Treaty that allowed them to do so. As a result, sovereignty was “circumscribed”, but scholars maintain that Tonga remained the only Pacific Island state to remain independent – certainly the Tongans themselves did not see themselves as anything other than fully independent (Bade, 2021: 14-15).

In both cases presented in this chapter, expansion seemed to have been a common response by the two cases in order to become more ‘Western’. It is clear also that the ideational forces moulding the new Tonga were mainly borrowed from foreign sources. In this regard it can be seen both cases had to undergo a learning process in order to allow them to adapt, which they did by borrowing foreign ideas and concepts; this process may therefore be a feature of semi-peripheral development.

4.2 Japan

4.2.1 Ideas and Thinkers of the Meiji Restoration

This section will focus on some of the ideas that were in existence during the period leading up to the arrival of the Americans under the leadership of Commodore Matthew Perry in 1853. These ideas include both the Neo-Confucian ideas that stemmed in large part from the *Mitogaku* (Mito School), in particular the works of Aizawa Seishisai, which were then politicized by Yoshida Shōin into a movement dedicated to the

anti-alienist cause of expelling all foreigners from Japan, the slogan of which was *Sonnō Jōi*. These ideas also include new ideas that could be said to have stemmed from *Rangaku* (lit. Holland Studies), which will be examined separately. This section will examine these ideas in the context of the leading political and scholarly figures of the day. I will begin this discussion with an examination of *Mitogaku* and the work of Aizawa Seishisai, in particular his *Shinron* (New Theses) of 1825¹⁹ which led to Yoshida Shōin's work, and then I shall move onto the influence of *Rangaku*, and the call for modernization by the Satsuma Daimyo, Shimazu Nariakira and others.

4.2.2 *Mitogaku* and Aizawa Seishisai

Before delving into a discussion of *Mitogaku*, I would like to jump ahead to 1869, after the *ishin sishi* had achieved the restoration of the Imperial Court and the Emperor to power. During the period when the capital was being transferred to Edo from Kyoto, which had been the capital for a millennia or so. I am jumping ahead in this instance in order to highlight a pamphlet that had been published by the government that both stated the intent of the new Meiji government and also, in the opinion of the British, to placate the conservatives in the city of Kyoto in order to lessen their objections. The translation of this document was included in the diplomatic reports of Harry Parkes to the Earl of Clarendon, the Foreign Secretary (Parliament, 1870: 19, 19 - 23).

The pamphlet entitled “*Imperial precepts, published to the people by the government of Kioto [Kyoto]*” was intended to be disseminated by officials to the people in order to instruct all Japanese of the structure, intent, and principles of the new government. The pamphlet begins by extolling the virtues of living in what it describes as

¹⁹ The full translation of which is found in Wakabayashi (1986).

the land of the gods. As such it instructs people to live in accordance with the principles of reason which are what makes people different from the animals. It also instructs the people to live with virtue, singling out loyalty for special attention:

Man differs from the birds and from the beast, in that he can discern the laws of reason, and in that he has a heart capable of gratitude and virtue. Loyalty and filial piety are also the essence of the heart of man. He, who in ever so slight a degree is wanting in this heart, has the face of a man but the soul of a beast, and though he be shaped as a man, yet is he even less than the birds and the beasts. (Parliament, 1870: 19)

The pamphlet continues to make the case that since Japan is the land of the gods, the institutions that govern the country are inherently superior to those of other countries. The gods created Japan and set up the imperial form of government, the duties and relations between people and emperor were established, and that the line of emperors had never been broken and had always ruled with benevolence. The people in turn, it states, have revered the emperor, and have never wavered in that reverence. The pamphlet contrasts this with other countries where such loyalty was not shown due to the fact that the people periodically changed their governments, which makes the Japanese system morally superior, especially when the central principle in the Japanese system was the reciprocal duties between ruler and ruled.

If then a man wishes to fulfill his duties as a man, and having been born in the country of the gods desires not to turn his back upon the spirits of that country, let him above all things bear in mind the privilege of being born a Japanese, and set his heart upon repaying the debt of gratitude which he owes to his country. We have said that the institutions of the country of the gods excel those of other countries. The heavenly ancestors of the Emperor of old created this country, and established the duties of men in their mutual relations. Since that time the line of Emperors has never been changed. Generation has succeeded generation in the rule of this country, and the Imperial heart has ever been penetrated by a tender love for the

people. In their turn the people have revered and served generation after generation of Emperors. In foreign countries the lines of Princes have been frequently changed; the people owe their Sovereign a debt of gratitude which extends over two or three generations ; the relations of Sovereign and subject last for 100 or 200 years ; the Prince of yesterday is the foe of to-day; the Minister of yesterday is the rebel of to-morrow. In our country we have no such folly. Since the creation of the world we have remained unmoved; since the creation of the world the Imperial line has been unchanged and the relations of Sovereign and subject have been undisturbed; hence it is that the spirit of gratitude has intensified and grown deeper and deeper. The special point in which the institutions of our country excel those of the rest of the world, is the creed which has been established by the heavenly ancestors of the Emperor, and which comprises the mutual duties between lord and servant. Even in foreign countries where lords and servants have over and over again changed places, these mutual duties are handed down as a matter of weighty importance. How much the more does it behove us to pay a debt of deep and inexhaustible gratitude which extends over ages. (Parliament, 1870: 20).

I shall return to this particular document later. For now it suffices to use it as an example of the kind of ideals that are encapsulated in the Meiji Restoration. Why is the language in this document important? It is important because it is a very loud echo of the ideas that had been developing during the course of the Edo Period, and that became the basis for a political revolution. The above-mentioned document echoes the sentiments in the following memorial published at about the same time:

In the humble opinion of certain ministers (i. e., in our opinion) the Great Body (the Imperial Government) must not lose a single day, the Great Strength must not delegate its power for a single day. Since the Heavenly Ancestors established the foundations of the country, the Imperial line has not failed for ten thousand ages. Heaven and Earth (i.e., Japan) are the Emperor's: there is no man who is not his retainer: this constitutes the Great Body. By the conferring of rank and property the Emperor governs his people: it is his to give and his to take away: of our own selves we cannot hold a foot of land: of our own selves we cannot take a single man: this constitutes the Great Strength. In ancient times the Emperor governed the Sea-girt Land, and trusting to the Great Body and the Great Strength, the Imperial wisdom of itself ruled over all: truth and propriety being

upheld, there was prosperity under heaven. In the middle ages the ropes of the net were relaxed, so that men toying with the Great Strength and striving for the Power, crowded upon the Emperor: and half the world tried to appropriate the people and to steal the land. Beating, and gnawing, and theft, and rapine, were the order of the day. When the Great Body that should have been preserved, and the Great Strength that should have been maintained were gone, there were no means left for repressing these evils. Traitors encouraged one another until the strong preyed upon and devoured the weak. The chief traitors annexed province upon province (literally, tens of provinces), while the lesser maintained several thousand retainers. Upon this arose the Bakufu (Government of the Shoguns), which also divided territories and men, as seemed good to it, among private individuals, thus planting and defending its own power. Thus it was that the Emperor wore an empty and a vain rank, and, the order of things being reversed, looked up to the Bakufu as the dispenser of joy or sorrow. For more than 600 years the waters turned from their course have flooded the land and reached to heaven. During this time the Bakufu borrowed the name and authority of the Emperor to conceal the traces of thefts of lands and men, being forced to use the Imperial name as a blind, because the relations and duties of the vassal to his lord cannot be laid aside after ten thousand years. Now the great Government has been newly restored, and the Emperor himself undertakes the direction of affairs. This is indeed a rare and mighty event. We have the name (of an Imperial Government) we must also have the fact. Our first duty is to illustrate our faithfulness and to prove our loyalty.

When the line of Tokugawa arose it divided the country amongst its kinsfolk, and there were many who founded the fortunes of their families upon it. They waited not to ask whether the lands and men that they received were the gift of the Emperor ; for ages they continued to inherit these lands until this day.

Others said that their possessions were the prize of their spears and bows, as if they had entered storehouses and stolen the treasure therein, boasting to the soldiers by whom they were surrounded that they had done this regardless of their lives. Those who enter storehouses are known by all men to be thieves, but those who rob lands and steal men are not looked upon with suspicion. How are loyalty and faith confused and destroyed! Now that men are seeking for an entirely new Government, the Great Body and the Great Strength must neither be lent nor borrowed.

The place where we live is the Emperor's land, and the food which we eat is grown by the Emperor's men. How can we make it our own?

We now reverently offer up the list of our professions and men, with the prayer that the Emperor will take good measures for rewarding those to whom reward is due, and for taking from those to whom punishment is due. Let the Imperial orders be issued for altering and

remodelling the territories of the various clans. Let the civil and penal codes, the military laws down to the rules for uniform, and the construction of engines of war, all proceed from the Emperor; let all the affairs of the empire great and small be referred to him. After this, when the internal relations of the country shall be upon a true footing, the empire will be able to take its place side by side with the other countries of the world. This is now the most urgent duty of the Emperor, as it is that of his servants and children.

Hence it is that we, in spite of our own folly and vileness, daring to offer up our humble expression of loyalty, upon which we pray that the brilliancy of the heavenly sun may shine, with fear and reverence bow the head and do homage, ready to lay down our lives in proof of our faith (Parliament, 1870: 7)

It is important to note that this document, while unsigned, was attributed to Kido Takayoshi (Kōin) (Parliament, 1870: 7), which thus links the document to Aizawa Seishisai and Yoshida Shōin due to Kido being a student of Yoshida's.

The political movement had as its basis the idea of *Sonnō Jōi*, which would become a slogan for the expulsion of foreigners and the overthrow of the shogunate, which was based heavily on neo-Confucian ideals of reverence and loyalty to an unbroken imperial line and the reciprocal duties and obligations between the Emperor and his people. The reference to the reciprocal relationship between ruler and ruled is one of the five relationships that were formulated by Mencius, a disciple of Confucius. The five relationships were ruler/ruled, father/son, husband/wife, older brother/younger brother, and friend/friend. These relationships were the basis for an orderly and ethical running of society envisioned by Confucians and forms in large part the basis for the work of the *mitogaku*. It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to provide a full treatment of Confucianism as a whole, and so I am only focusing on the relationships. These relationships are the foundation of Aizawa's work which justifies the adherence

and loyalty to the Emperor. To Aizawa, this is a moral precept. The *mitogaku*, together with the *kokugaku* (“national learning”), both focused on the ancient text of the *Kojiki* and the *Nihon Shoki*, which both contained accounts of the mythological beginnings of the Japanese *kokutai*, and accounts of an unbroken imperial line. This imperial line gained its legitimacy from its ancient divine beginnings, and the truth of this could not be altered in any way (Kim 2003: 213).

4.2.3 Aizawa Seishisai

Aizawa Seishisai²⁰ was a *mitogaku* scholar, and as such he developed his ideas within this context. It is important to note that the goal of Aizawa was to develop a framework for governance that did not include what he saw as foreign ideas, including both Christianity and Buddhism. Both of these he thought were disrupting influences that in the past had led to trouble, strife, conflict, and war - all of which had destroyed the unity of the Japanese *kokutai*, or nationhood, sovereignty, national identity, and more importantly, the essence and character of Japan. To Aizawa, the solution to these problems lay in a restoration of the system of government embodied by the emperor.

The *mitogaku* was a historical project designed to classify Japanese history according to a system of ethics and morality, and so Aizawa provides an examination of history that is very much focused on these issues. “Moral” was what fitted with the emperor focused system, and immorality was any deviation from that system which resulted in self-interest and disunity and conflict due to a turning away from the Way.

In his *Shinron* of 1825, Aizawa lays out a framework for the governing of Japan. His framework was based on the *Kojiki*, which was in essence a ‘history’ of Japan, or

20 I use the Japanese naming convention of placing the person’s surname before their given name.

more accurately the book that contains the founding myths of Japan. To those of the *mitogaku*, the *Kojiki* was the literal truth as to the founding of Japan. Aizawa followed on from other scholars such as Norinaga Mootori (who was part of the *kokugaku* school) in this regard. Norinaga interestingly had some serious issues with Confucianism. He particularly took issue with the way in which the Confucians tried to inculcate Confucian ideas of morality into the *Kojiki*. He particularly took issue with the way in which Confucians disparaged past Japanese customs based on the Sino-centric conception of Confucianist morality. He instead makes the point that Confucians were being unfair to judge the Japan of Norinaga's day based on those perceptions of ancient customs. To Norinaga Japanese history was made up of a series of stages which were culturally distinct and should be judged by their own standards (Wakabayashi, 1986: 36). Norinaga also dismissed claims of Japanese superiority based on Confucian values. He believed that the Japanese had no need of Confucianism because they were naturally good, and he criticized Confucians for what he clearly saw was an hypocrisy: Confucians (particularly Chinese Confucians) used the five relationships to justify the loyalty of the ruled to a ruler while at the same time periodically changing their ruler, and in so doing made the point that Confucians were not moral at all, at least by Japanese standards. As such he believed that Confucianism was a foreign philosophy that drained the Japanese of all that made them good. Confucianism and Confucian scholars were placed in the same category as deceivers, who Norinaga denounced utterly.

The reason, according to Norinaga, that Japan was superior to other countries had nothing to do with Confucian ideas of morality, but rather because the Sun Goddess was

born there, and that Japan had an unbroken imperial line. In addition Japan was the only country that possessed the books in which the true intentions of the gods were revealed, the fact that Japan was unconquered, and finally that Japan had the best rice (Wakabayashi, 1986: 37 - 39). As such one would have expected him to wholeheartedly reject Western learning. However the West, according to Norinaga, did not challenge his belief in Japanese learning, but they did challenge what he saw as the literal truth of the *kojiki* and other works. He tolerated Western learning because he saw it as a way of showing the mistake in “slavishly [adhering] to Chinese ways and values”:

By learning about world affairs one ought to realize the excellence of our Divine Realm. But they [the *rangakusha* - those who studied Western learning] refuse to revere our Divine Realm because they believe slavish adherence to Chinese ways and values is bad. This makes them think that slavish adherence to anything is wrong. So they place ultimate value in slavishly adhering to this attitude of rejecting slavish adherence. (Norinaga in Wakabayashi, 1986: 39)

Returning then, to Aizawa. Aizawa in contrast to Norinaga, believed that the use of Confucian values were not in opposition to the ‘truth’ set out in the *kojiki*. Rather, the hierarchical relationships in Confucianism were a major part of justifying the adherence to the imperial system which he, similarly to Norinaga, believed was the basis of Japanese superiority. It is important to note that Aizawa was writing in the context of both the knowledge of the outside world that was entering Japan by way of the Dutch in Nagasaki, and also in reaction to the incursions into Japan by foreigners, in particular the Russians who were proselytizing Christianity and colonizing the Northern Islands of Japan. Aizawa, in common with other *mitogaku* scholars saw this a threat to the national essence of Japan and thus was a potential destabilizing influence. The solution to this was

an eradication of foreign ideas from Japan with the exception of those ideas that were useful, such as weapons, shipbuilding, military science and so on, in order to preserve Japanese *kokutai*, and an adherence to a strict hierarchical governance structure as exemplified in the shogunate coupled with the various domain governments. This was seen by *mitogaku* scholars as the ideal federated state (Wakabayashi, 1982: 53 - 57).

4.2.4 Aizawa's 1825 *Shinron*

We now turn our attention to Aizawa's own ideas as presented in his 1825 *Shinron*. To understand his work and ideas we must first understand what he meant by '*kokutai*'. The word '*Kokutai*' literally means 'the body of the state' and can mean in a general sense 'nationhood', but to Aizawa it meant more. According to Wakabayashi, "[Aizawa] construed *kokutai*, or what is essential to a nation, as the spiritual unity and integration that make a territory and its inhabitants a nation" (Wakabayashi, 1986: 69). In other words, *Kokutai* linked nationhood with its essential spirit that was embodied in the Emperor. This relationship provided the authority upon which all decisions could be made. Aizawa was very much afraid of Christianity, particularly since he believed that it had gained favour with the majority of the world's people, and so he was very keen to develop a specifically Japanese sense of nationhood. In this sense he was acting very much in the way in which Benedict Anderson described in setting up an imagined community as the basis of nationhood (Anderson, 2006).

The principles upon which Aizawa set up his conception of *kokutai* were based in large part on Shinto mythology as found in the *Kojiki*. These myths he combined with Confucian values of morality, in particular the five relationships. He opens the first part

of Shinron, simply entitled *Kokutai (I)* (Wakabayashi, 1986: 152 - 171), by stating that long term political relations are based on the benevolence of rulers:

The ancient sage kings (*teiō*) did not maintain the realm, prevent unrest, and uphold everlasting domestic tranquility by forcing their people into submission. Such methods may work for a single reign [but not forever]. Instead, the ancient sages relied on something else: “all people in the realm were of one heart and mind; they were so endeared of their rulers that separation was unbearable”. This is what we can really rely on. (Aizawa in Wakabayashi, 1986: 152)

He presents as evidence that Japan has had an unbroken Imperial line set down in antiquity by the Sun Goddess Amaterasu, who laid down the precepts for ethical rule that must have been benevolent because, according to Aizawa, there had never been any rebellion against it. He states that this loyalty to the Imperial line is the greatest morality there is, and couples it to the devotion between parent and child.

Loyalty of subject and ruler is the greatest moral precept of the cosmos. Affection between parent and child is the ultimate form of blessing within the realm. This greatest of moral precepts and this ultimate form of blessing exist together between Heaven and Earth; they slowly and steadily seep into men’s hearts in all places and eras. By understanding and utilizing these sentiments of loyalty and filial devotion, the ancient sage kings regulated the realm and forever upheld nature’s moral order among their people. (Aizawa in Wakabayashi, 1986: 152)

Essentially what Aizawa is saying is that the unity of the people should be based on Confucian ideas of morality and order and the relationships that Mencius articulated. However in this case Aizawa is taking two of the five relationships, ruler/ruled and father/son and is combining them into one single relationship; that the relationship between ruler/ruled is the same as the relationship between parent and child.

In making this case he cited the *Kojiki* which to Aizawa was actual history. His argument was simple. He cited the unbroken imperial line as his basis for Japan’s

superiority. He took as his starting point the creation of the world by the gods. Amaterasu, the sun goddess provided the land with everything the people needed to live, including the imperial rule, and the precepts of loyalty and devotion. According to Aizawa, Amaterasu provided the three imperial regalia, in particular the mirror to serve as reminder to emperors that when they were ruling, they were acting as if it was she who was ruling. In turn the emperors showed their loyalty to Amaterasu by engaging in various religious ceremonies such as the *Daijo* ceremony, where the emperor took the newly harvested rice and offered it to Amaterasu. In this sense he stated that religious ceremonies and government are the same, and that these reverences are continued by each successive emperor. To Aizawa this demonstrated the reciprocal nature of filial devotion and loyalty, and that this was why the people were united:

Amaterasu established the norms of human conduct -- the twin precepts of loyalty of subject for ruler and affection between parent and child -- and She bequeathed these to the myriad generations. These precepts constitute the ultimate Way of Heaven: affection between parent and child radiates inwardly, and the loyalty of subject for ruler manifests itself outwardly. Through loyalty, the honorable were honored; through filial devotion, parents were shown affection. Thus, for good reason, the people “were of one heart and mind” and were inseparably endeared to their rulers. Thus, for good reason, the ultimate ethic of loyalty and filial devotion existed without being expounded and was adhered to unknowingly by all.
(Aizawa in Wakabayashi, 1986: 153)

Citing historical precedent, Aizawa provides an account of the first *Daijo* Ritual (it is not necessary to go into great detail here, but the main points will suffice), Amaterasu had given the land to her grandson, Ninigi, who performed this ritual for the first time. Amaterasu had commanded the god Ame no Futotama together with his retainer Ame no Hiwashi to assist Ninigi in the performance of the ritual. Aizawa stated that ever since,

the emperor has been assisted by the ancestors of Ame no Hiwishi, which Aizawa saw as an example of “honoring and carrying on the hereditary calling established by their forbears” (Wakabayashi, 1986: 155). In so doing, the nobility, during the performance of this ritual, the participants, and by extension the other noble houses and *daimyo*, show their loyalty to the emperor, but at the same time show filial devotion to their ancestors (who likewise had divine ancestors, according to Aizawa) who in turn had shown loyalty to Amaterasu. In this way they honoured the emperor in the same way their ancestors did, and they honoured their ancestors by honouring the emperor. This is a clear example of combining two of the five Confucian relationships, and to Aizawa this represented the Way. In other words, this loyalty and filial devotion served as the moral foundations upon which Japan was founded, and he exhorted his readers to conduct themselves in the same manner:

When we recall how ancestors reverently served the progenitress of our Imperial Line and other Heavenly Deities, how can we ignore ancestral will? How can we turn against our ruler? Through such rituals, filial devotion is transmitted from father to son, and from son to grandson. Each carries the wishes of his parent and bids his offspring to do likewise. The passing of a thousand generations produces not the slightest change in their filial sentiment. Loyalty and filial devotion have always been one and the same: Filial devotion is transformed into loyalty to ruler, and loyalty is demonstrated by respecting the wishes of forbears. Edification of the people and the reform of their folkways is accomplished: The ruler places the people under his “inducing influence” (*kwa*) without recourse to injunctions or exhortations. Religious rituals are a means of political rule, and political rule is identical to ethical inculcation. Throughout history, edification and administration have been inseparable: When the people are taught to revere Amaterasu and Her Divine Imperial Line, their allegiances are undivided and they are blind to all heresies. Thus we achieve both spiritual unity among the people and the union of

Heaven and man. This was the ancient sage kings' one true reliance for maintaining the realm, and was the basis on which Amaterasu founded our nation. (Aizawa in Wakabayashi, 1986: 158)

Aizawa went on to argue that while no one ever actually rebelled against the emperor, over time governing became lax and fell to competing political interests that diverted attention from the Way that had been laid out by Amaterasu. Because of competing interests, wars broke out and lords started to govern their provinces in accordance with their interests, and vassals fought in the furtherance of their lords' interests. Everyone was fighting for themselves, and at one point this resulted in Ashikaga Yoshimitsu (the third Ashikaga shogun who ruled between 1368 to 1394) bowing down to the Chinese emperor and "demeaned himself as its vassal" and caused the Ming emperor to view Japan as tributary, which was nothing less than treason to Aizawa (Wakabayashi, 1986: 162). The Way became forgotten and the situation became so bad that Aizawa believed that the imperial line almost was wiped out. The situation was saved when Tokugawa Ieyasu became shogun in 1603 and reformed the country so that once more it was governed in accordance with loyalty and filial devotion (Wakabayashi, 1986: 163). But even if that was the case, Aizawa pointed out that once again administration became lax and certain foreign ideas which Aizawa saw as evil began to divert people away from the Way. Aizawa pointed to the adoption throughout history of Buddhism and other ideas as partly to blame for the disunity. Amaterasu's will was "disrupted by shaman cultists, transformed into something alien by Buddhist clerics, and debased by perverse Confucians and petty men of letters" (Aizawa in Wakabayashi, 1986: 168).

It is to Christianity and other Western ideas that Aizawa attached a special danger.

Westerners, he said, are all united in their adherence to Christianity, and because of this they went around destroying local beliefs and cultures around the world. Aizawa argued that Japan's administrators were wise in their eradication of Christianity, but because administration had become lax once again, the Christians "prowl" around Japan ready to distract the people from the way in order to destroy the Japanese way of life. With respect to *rangaku* (Holland studies), he did not believe there was much harm in it except in how it distracted the people, in particular commoners who he described as "stupid" (Wakabayashi, 1986: 169). The answer, according to Aizawa, was both an eradication of foreign ideas, but also that there should be policies put in place that would return Japan and her people to the Way, as set out by Amaterasu. In this way he was calling for a reform of the system and adherence to the principles of loyalty and filial devotion (Wakabayashi, 169 - 171). It was these principles that Yoshida Shōin took and combined with the knowledge he had gained from studying the West as well as *mitogaku* teachings in order to form a political movement that bore the slogan *Sonnō Jōi*, and it is to Yoshida that I will now turn to.

4.2.5 Yoshida Shōin

To Yoshida Shōin the legitimacy of the imperial line that was based on its divine beginnings and its unbroken nature was an incontrovertible truth, which informed his belief that Japan was superior to all others. Yoshida came from a relatively humble background in Hagi, the administrative seat of the Chōshū clan in Western Japan. He had the inherited position of teaching military science at the clan's school, the Meirinkan. This formed the basis of his early education, which over time was broadened to include

other subjects as a result of his travelling throughout Japan. This including learning Western science in Edo, and neo-Confucianism as a result of travelling to Mito, the home of *mitogaku* (Earl, 1964: 114 - 118²¹). It was this exposure to the *mitogaku* that would be the most important influence of his thought, and his proposals that led to the Restoration. Yoshida would have very little freedom during his relatively short life; he would be placed into house arrest for two years for travelling to the north without permission, during which he used the time to study Japanese history. He would later be imprisoned in Noyama Prison in Hagi and then placed under house arrest for attempting to stow away on Commodore Perry's ships (Earl, 1964: 123 - 130). It was during this period that he would become a teacher at the Shoka Sonjuku, a school started by his uncle, for a year. During this period he would make a name for himself as a teacher of many of the members of the new Meiji Government after the Restoration who were instrumental in bringing about the Restoration, so his importance can be not be understated. It was also during this period that he became more and more embroiled in national politics, often sending his students on secret political errands, and became convinced that the highest duty of a samurai was to the emperor and not to the Shogun (Earl, 1964: 133). This culminated in a plot to assassinate a shogunate official, for which Yoshida would be executed in 1859.

His political thought and learning was not confined to any one school of thought, but rather included many different influences but weighed them against what he believed were the precepts of morality found in Confucian values. He was very clear that these

21 This work by D. M. Earl together with Van Straelen (1952) form the basis of my treatment of Yoshida Shōin, due to the translated works of Yoshida that they provide.

scholars should not be adulated since even by their own standards they were not necessarily ideal:

In reading the classics, the point of fundamental importance is not to adulate the sages. If one feels even the slightest trace of adulation, the Way will not become clear; and even though one studies, in place of profit he will receive harm. (Yoshida Shōin, quoted in Earl 1964: 140)

However, even though he was not confined to any one school of thought, the most influential work to him was Aizawa's *Shinron*. His trip to Mito had exposed him to Aizawa, and he lamented the fact that he was "ignorant of that which makes [Japan] the imperial land" (Yoshida Shōin in Earl, 1964: 143). He then resolved himself to learn as much about Japanese history as he could, which in turn would fill him with patriotic inspiration (Earl, 1964: 143). At the heart of Yoshida's own philosophy, in keeping with Aizawa's work, was loyalty - loyalty of samurai to their masters:

People in general, when discussing the duty of serving one's lord, have the opinion that if great exploits are not achieved there is no profit to the nation. This is a serious error. The very concept of exemplifying the Way means to be oblivious to worldly achievement; and when one's concept of Duty is correct then he can not consider profit. (Yoshida Shōin, quoted in Earl, 1964: 159)

Nothing could exemplify this sense of duty and loyalty in Yoshida's mind more than the loyalty to the emperor, which can be found in the proper adherence to the five Confucian relationships. In particular ruler/ruled and father/son, which was in keeping with the *mitogaku* teachings that he adhered to:

Toward lord and toward father, it may be said that the obligation is the same. Calling one's lord foolish and unenlightened, and leaving one's native land to seek a lord elsewhere, is the same as calling one's father stupid and obstinate. (Yoshida Shōin in Earl, 1964: 177 - 178).

Loyalty is the heart of morality, and this is where his thoughts on foreigners, in particular the Chinese, but also by extension the West as well, in terms of morality, becomes clear.

In China...the way of the sovereign is different. He who surpasses others in intelligence and wisdom, becomes sovereign. Thus we can understand that Yao and Shun transferred their place to others and thus we can understand that T'ang and Wu, after having killed their sovereign, are still called saints. But in our country, from the Emperor down to the simplest daimyō, the succession is uninterrupted. This does not exist in China. In China the subjects engage themselves only for half seasons like servants. If their masters are good, they stay with them, if they are bad they leave them. The subjects of our country, however, being [hereditary] share with their lord life and death, joy and sorrow. These subjects will never leave their lords, even when they must die. Ah! To which country belongs my father and my mother? From whom do I get my clothes and food? Thanks to whom I read books and know "the Way"? When I leave my lord suddenly, because of some discord between us, what kind of man am I to be considered? On this point, I should very much like a discussion with [Confucius] and [Mencius], if I could make them come to life again. I heard that some foreign barbarians have recently insisted on their sages reshaping their manner of governing, and these countries have become so mighty that they now menace ours. How can we repel this threat? There is only one thing to do: To make clear to the people the difference of the nature of our state -- discussed before -- from that of foreign countries. The entire people sacrifice themselves for their fatherland, the people of a province for their province, the subject for his lord, the child for his father. If we are determined to this, then there is no reason to be afraid of foreign barbarians. (Yoshida Shōin quoted in Van Straelen 1952: 90 - 92)

In this it is clear that he considered foreigners to be immoral because they did not adhere to what he saw as the proper way to be in relation to one's ruler. The above passage comes from a work where he criticized the notions put forward by both Confucius and Mencius that it is acceptable to leave one's country in order to serve a different lord who is wiser. To Yoshida this was an error (Van Straelen, 1952: 90). To Yoshida this was immoral because it was an act of disloyalty. In essence he is saying that the Japanese are

morally superior to foreigners, based on this sense of loyalty and by extension that Japan was a superior nation.

This would have a profound affect on his views regarding the shogunate. Initially he had not been against the shogunate as an institution, because it coincided with his views of loyalty. He was not initially in favour of overthrowing the shogunate, but he was in favour of the shogunate showing loyalty to the Emperor, and that if the *Bakufu* did so, then it should be supported:

If the Imperial command is carried out in all particulars by the shogun and the various *han*; if the shogun leads the *han* in obedient service to the Imperial Court; and if the various *han* use their influence to mediate between the Imperial Court and the shogun, so that heaven and earth are associated in tranquility -- then will the Imperial Way not be reborn? (Yoshida in Earl, 1964: 194)

It was only when it became clear that the shogunate was not able to deal with the arrival of the Americans and Europeans in a manner prescribed by Emperor Komei, which was to expel the foreigners, that his support of the shogunate began to waver, and when the shogunate decided to sign the Treaty of Amity and Commerce, an act which was decried by those who advocated for the expulsion of the foreigners (Craig, 1961: 92 - 93; Kim, 2003: 216), including Yoshida who lambasted the shogunate for its disloyalty:

Ignoring the distress of the nation, heedless of the shame of the nation, he disobeys the Imperial command. This crime of the shogun's can not be contained in heaven and earth; gods and men are all enraged.

And:

The shogun is a national criminal. If we now let him go without chastisement, what will the nation say of us for all eternity? ... To serve the Imperial command is the Way; to chastise rebellion is Duty. (Yoshida in Earl, 1964: 207)

So how did Yoshida Shōin view foreign, in particular Western influences? He does seem to reject other foreign influences, for example Buddhism. It is clear from his writings that he saw Buddhism as a negative and destructive influence. This was because he believed that Buddhism had taken the people's focus away from reverence of emperors (Earl, 1964: 145-146). However he was not willing to throw it out completely:

The damage caused to us by Buddhism is obviously very great. However, the scriptures, for example, should not be indiscriminately discarded. What is to be deplored is only a failure to be informed on topics of current importance and not knowing how to make a selection. If, because an evil doctrine leads the masses astray, we should commit the error of becoming intimate with foreign countries, this would be a mistake. (Yoshida in Earl 1964: 146)

According to Earl, Yoshida's dislike of Buddhism was in keeping initially with Late Tokugawa thought (Earl, 1964: 145), and were in keeping with Aizawa's writings on the subject, but they were not as extreme as *mitogaku* scholars. As time went on, Yoshida apparently thought that Buddhism was not as big a problem as he had initially thought. He even went so far as to offer Buddhism tacit approval, which was more in line with the beliefs of the common people (Earl, 1964: 147).

His thoughts about other foreign ideas and influences were not so clear cut.

Yoshida was certainly aware of imperialist behaviour of the West. When Townsend Harris had made the statement that the U.S. had no territorial ambitions and had not taken any territory by military means, Yoshida responded by saying:

This is a complete falsehood. Aside from the events of bygone times, when the American official Perry came in 1854, among the books he presented to the Bakufu there was such a thing as a picture of the military victory over Mexico...Again, a drunken barbarian at the Yokohama Club,

drawing his sword, showed how the victory over Mexico was won, and was bragging of his own exploits - this I have heard directly from an eyewitness. When New Mexico was added to the United States, is it possible that this was done without the force of arms? Such is the duplicity of this statement.

From the foregoing, it appears that the general behaviour of the United States is a means for getting us to lick their candy. Who can be ignorant of the fact that they have placed poison in the candy? (Yoshida in Earl, 1964: 168)

In terms of Western ideas, Yoshida had been a student of Western learning, and so he was well versed in the kinds of ideas and science, and technology that had been filtering in by way of the Dutch in Nagasaki. As such he was well acquainted with the capabilities that Western powers had at their disposal, and so he recognized the need for an adequate military defence. This was consistent with his past experience as a teacher of military strategy at the Chōshū clan's Meirinkan. Because of this he was loath to eliminate all foreign ideas from Japan. Rather he advocated the use of certain influences in the defence of Japan, including more expansionist policies. This defense was a moral duty based on his belief that Japan was a morally superior polity, and because of this he was willing to adopt Western science in order to become like the West as a way to defend itself. Also because he saw expansionism to be the way that the Western powers were engaging in, this therefore meant that he saw expansionism to be a moral imperative (Van Straelen 1952: Craig 1961: 157):

The matter of the nation in its relationship to the barbarians is of course the responsibility of the ruler and his ministers, but at the same time, for those who have been born in the Land of the Gods, all the myriad people "under the whole heaven, to the borders of the land" must make it their personal responsibility. (Yoshida in Earl, 1964: 170)

Yoshida urged that in order for Japan to defend itself it would have to be quick about it,

since the Americans, and by extension the other Western powers, were not yet in a position to exert much power over Japan, as evidenced by what he saw as deception:

That the American barbarians have in truth not yet been able to get one inch of ground or one foot of land in the Orient is for the reason that so far, their strength is insufficient. If their strength were only adequate, would they not hope to emulate Spain in Luzon, Holland in Java, and the English barbarians in Ceylon? Merely because they are without power, for them to mouth the words of Benevolence and Righteousness instead, is detestable (Yoshida in Earl 1964: 168)

And so he advocated for a defense based on the technology and actions of the Western powers:

Those who know how to look after the welfare of their country should not be satisfied with maintaining and protecting that which their country already has, but at the same time should aim to reform and improve upon that which their country already possesses. They should also strive to gain and add that which their country has not, thereby extending the power and glory of the nation beyond its borders. Present day Japan should first of all complete her military preparations, by building the necessary battleships and by providing herself with all sorts of military weapons and ammunition. Then she should develop and colonize Yezo²² and entrust its rule to worthy feudal lords. At her earliest opportunity, Japan should occupy Kamchatka with an army and place the Sea of Okhotsk under her sole control. Ryū Kyū²³ should be instructed to make her king come in person to pay homage to Japan so that he and his kingdom may pay reverence to Japan as do all the feudal lords in the homeland. Japan should upbraid Korea for her long negligence in the observation of her duties to Japan, and have her send tribute-bearing envoys; Japan should also instruct Korea to give hostages to Japan for her good behaviour, as she did during the glorious Imperial period of ancient Japan. In the North, Manchuria should be sliced off (from China for the benefit of Japan). In the South, Japan should receive Formosa and the Philippines. In this way, Japan should demonstrate her policy of expansion to the outside world. We should always look after the interests and the welfare of our people. At the same time we should raise and train our fighting men to meet the needs of the nation. Then our country and the far-off lands in our possession will be well guarded and protected. By pursuing these policies, Japan may go forth into the world and proclaim that she is able to maintain her national standing.. If a nation in this struggling world should be surrounded by

22 The present day northern Japanese island of Hokkaido.

23 Present day Okinawa Prefecture.

nations of aggressive inclination and should remain inactive, she would certainly be destined to decline and become obscure. (Yoshida in Van Straelen, 1952: 79)

This was Yoshida Shōin's prescription for the defense of Japan which would eventually lead Japan to spread into Asia. The need to protect Japan from Western powers who had forced open the country would form the basis of Japan's defense at the Tokyo War Crimes Trial in 1948.²⁴

However this was not the position of the brand new Meiji Government upon the defeat of the shogunate. Initially the new government accepted that military confrontation with the Western powers was not a winnable proposition. The Iwakura mission, which I will discuss below, cemented in the minds of the new government, in particular Ōkubo Toshimichi, that in order for Japan to be favourably situated in the modern international system it would need to do much to modernize and develop its economy. In this he was in complete agreement with Yoshida's ideas. The importance of Yoshida Shōin, as I stated

²⁴ "The facts adduced in this trial definitely establish that within the prosecution's own definition the Pacific War was not a war of aggression by Japan. It was a war of self-defense and self-preservation, resulting from unjustified provocation.

[...]The Japanese people had been content with their own civilization, their ages of high culture and their reverence for the virtues and traditions handed down from time immemorial. They were satisfied to such an extent that they had closed their ports, shut themselves away from outsiders and blissfully enjoyed the frugality from the resources of their own islands. Their troubles did not commence until the Western Powers with their so-called civilization including a long history of wars and conquest by force, opened its doors and brought to its shores trade, commerce and contacts with the outside world.

[...]The ability of the Japanese industry to expand was practically wholly dependent on foreign raw materials which in turn was governed by the foreign exchange situation which was always acute from 1925 to 1940.

Japan had to face the issue squarely of how to take care of its teeming population since its own resources were inadequate.

[...]The defense contends that the prosecution has failed to sustain its burden of proof that beyond a reasonable doubt Japan's economy was geared for aggressive war. On the contrary a resume of the competent evidence discloses it was a normal development, except for a modest diversion for the necessities of the China Incident and designed to aid the civilian population. The evidence about to be reviewed also definitely establishes that by means of the economic blockade and military encirclement Japan was forced to act" (Kobori, 1995: 242 - 244)

earlier, is without question, given that in the short time that he was teaching many of his students would become members of the new Meiji government, including one Kido Koin, who would become known as one of the main intellectual members of the government. Among Yoshida's pupils there would be two prime ministers, four cabinet members, four prefectural governors, twelve diplomats, military officers of high rank, and technical experts who had been given Imperial Court rank - indeed, according to Umihara, these twenty-two individuals represented thirty percent of his students who survived to see the Restoration (Umihara, n.d.: 2). According to Craig, his influence as a symbol was considerable all the way up to World War II (Craig, 1961: 162 - 164). Certainly his influence on the new government can be demonstrated by the pamphlet published by the government that I cited above, although as I said, the government initially had a far more conciliatory tone towards foreigners, and called for peace:

There is a great principle existing over all the world which prevents civilized countries from being lightly and lawlessly attacked. This principle is called international law. How much the more then would our divine country, the institutions of which excel those of all other countries, be turning her back upon the sacred precepts established by the heavenly ancestors of the Emperor should she be guilty of violent and lawless acts. Such a thing would be the greatest shame and disgrace to the country of the Gods. Hence it is that the Emperor has extended a faithful alliance to those foreigners who come here lawfully and rightly, and they are allowed free and uninterrupted access to this country. Following this example set by the Emperor, his subjects when they receive no insult from the foreigner should observe the same principle and refrain from blows and fighting. If by any chance we should be put to shame before the foreigner it is hard to say what consequences may ensue. (Parliament, 1870: 21 - 22)

One thing that the above document, "*Imperial precepts, published to the people by the government of Kyoto [Kyoto]*" shows is that the new Meiji government was fully in line with the ideas that Yoshida Shōin politicized that came in large part from scholars such as

Aizawa and other members of the Mito school. This demonstrates the link between neo-Confucian scholarship and the beliefs of the new government. As I mentioned before, in time some of the more militaristic aspects of *mitogaku* and Yoshida's ideas would come about and lead to expansion into Asia, and ultimately to World War II, but at the time of the restoration the Japanese government was well aware of its relative weaknesses *vis-a-vis* the West.

4.2.6 The Iwakura Mission

One of the most important events during those early years of the Meiji Restoration was the two year long tour of the United States and Europe led by Prince Iwakura Tomomi. The purpose of the mission was two-fold: firstly the mission was charged with renegotiating the unequal treaties which the Shogunate had signed, and secondly to learn from the West in order to equalize their relationship with the Western powers. The Iwakura Mission included both Ōkubo and Kido and about 50 students and assistants, including future prime minister Ito Hirobumi. The mission left for the US from Yokohama on 23 December, 1871 and returned on 23 July, 1873. Kido's assignment and areas of interest included examinations of political systems, the various education systems of the West, and military matters. His primary interest was constitutional matters and his experiences in the West led him to be an advocate for separation of powers in that he was interested in implementing a system similar to the different levels of government in the US – National, State and Local – as part of bringing in a legislative process for law making and in implementing a constitutional system in Japan. Kido was advised against creating such a system too quickly by Maurice Block, who pointed out that too much

power in the hands of a legislature too soon could be quite dangerous, and so as such Kido became an advocate for a gradual process (Brown and Hirota, 1985: xxiv).

In terms of education, Kido believed that the exercise of the franchise required that the population was literate and educated. He believed that positions of power and responsibility in the government should be given to those who had the best ability to do the tasks that they were appointed to do, as opposed to the old way of bureaucrats inheriting their positions. This necessitated the creation of an education system that could facilitate this. In order to create such a system Kido took great pains to tour various schools and universities during the course of the Mission. A major aspect of this was language reform so that Japanese students could be prepared to read Western books (Brown and Hirota, 1985: xxiii-xxiv). In a letter Kido put it this way:

When it comes to things like schools and factories, it is impossible to tell you everything, for it defies description. From now on, unless we pay a great deal of attention to the children, the preservation of order in our country in the future will be impossible...Maintaining a stable state will be difficult unless we consider social conditions and pay attention to social evils. Nothing is more important than schools for improving social conditions and uprooting social evils. The civilization we have in our country today is not a true civilization, and our enlightenment is not the true enlightenment. To prevent troubles ten years from now, there is only one thing to do, and that is to establish schools worthy of the name. A long-range program for the stability of our country will never be carried out if we have only a small number of able people; we have to have universal adherence to the moral principles of loyalty, justice, humanity, and decorum. Unless we establish an unshakable national foundation, we will not be able to elevate our country's prestige in a thousand years. The creation of such public morals and the establishment of such a national foundation depend entirely on the people. And the supply of such people in endless numbers over a long period of time clearly depends on education, and on education alone. Our people are no different from Americans or Europeans of today: it is all a matter of education or the lack

of education. (de Bary, Gluck, and Tiedermann, 2005: 678-679²⁵)

Kido's other remit was the examination of military systems in the West, and so he spent a lot of his time in various countries viewing military maneuvers, examining the newest western weapons, and other advances in military technology. Of all the nations that the Mission visited, it was Germany and Germany's military that impressed Kido the most. This was because the European continent was dominated by the Germans particularly after their victory over the French during the Franco-Prussian War. As such, because of Kido's particular interest in the Germans, the German military became the model that Japan based its own military on (Brown and Hirota, 1985: xxv).

However, Kido believed that military leaders should be separated from civilian governance as he noted in his diary on 20th October, 1872, after being informed that Saigō Takamori had been given the position of Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Armed Forces while being an Imperial Councilor, which was a civil post:

[...] According to the government report which arrived today, Imperial Councilor Saigō has been appointed to the concurrent position of Commander-in-Chief...while Vice Minister of War Yamagata has been ordered to serve in the concurrent position of Lieutenant General. In my heart I must deplore this. Last year I was informed of this plan by Yamagata; so I immediately argued against it. One of the admirable things about the political systems of the enlightened countries is the fact that make a clear distinction between civil and military office; the Asian nations do not begin to measure up to them in this regard. Moreover, that in a monarchy the Emperor is the commander-in-chief, and in a republic the President is commander-in-chief is not by chance. Indeed, it is essential that the ancient practice in our own Empire should be restored. In the future, when our nation meets a crisis the Emperor should be commander-in-chief as he was in olden times, or else the Crown Prince should take this position on his behalf. No man can doubt that this is the basic principle of the Restoration, so I cannot understand why such

25 Letter from Kido to Sugiyama Takatoshi, January 26, 1872

appointments should be made at this time. Even if these appointments be withdrawn today, we shall regret for a thousand years that this precedent remains from the period after the Restoration. (Kido, 1985: 238-239)

While Kido was particularly interested in issues of governance and education, he was not inattentive to industry. However it was Ōkubo Toshimichi who paid particular attention to industrialization. He recognized early on that particular attention should be paid to industries that would advance the military preparedness of Japan, and so for this reason he toured a wide variety of industries including a carpet factory, a glass works, cotton and wool textile mills, shipyards (particularly in Britain), steel mills (particularly those that made parts for heavy weapons and steam engines, a sugar refinery, and even a brewery (Sagers, 2006: 95; Brown and Hirota, 1985: xxvi), and he methodically and faithfully copied down and made note of everything that he was told (Brown and Hirota, 1985: xvii). His two primary goals were to carry on Shimazu Nariakira's task of adapting Western industrial know-how and applying it to the military needs of Japan, and in adopting industries with which Japan could achieve a balance of trade with the West. Ōkubo recognized the need to move Japan to a capitalist system, but insisted that he would not simply follow the Western model. The adoption of capitalism was to be for the purposes of developing the state. He believed that there should be an alliance between the state and private enterprise but insisted that the state should have the final say in the final form of Japanese Capitalism. He defended this view that industry and capital should be run by the state rather than by liberal *laissez-faire* means by saying that "These industries are absolutely necessary even though they go against the laws of political economy" and because Japan was different, it required different kinds of laws for development to work

(Sagers, 2006: 95-96).

The Mission was influenced by the British in terms of wealth and power, but in terms of industrialization, they were more influenced by the experience of the Prussians, who were in the process of industrializing at that time. The Prussian model, they felt, was closer to the Japanese context as a later industrializing nation, and that the Prussians were exporting agricultural products in order to earn hard currency that was then used to buy industrial equipment and methods. The Mission was particularly swayed by Bismarck's comments on the need to be able to protect a nation's sovereignty with power and self-reliance. This fit in with the context of Japan because at the time it was a largely agrarian society, and so this led the Japanese to improve their agricultural output in order to achieve what the Germans were doing (Sagers, 2006: 96-98).

The Mission was probably the most significant event of the Restoration because it charted the pathway it would travel. It was during this Mission that the Japanese leaders were able to see the difference of Japan and the Western powers in terms of both wealth and power. From this tour the Meiji Government, with the exception of Saigō Takamori who had not been included in the Mission, became convinced that in order to become a nation that was on par with the West, Japan needed to advance in many areas including developing factories and industry, an education system, and a strong military. They recognized that Japan was still a weak country and that only a course of Westernization would put them in a position of equal footing with the Western powers. Kido and Ōkubo recognized that there was a link between wealth and power, and so it seemed obvious to them that Japan would have to undergo a process of industrialization, while at the same

time the military would need to be reformed so that the last vestiges of the old feudal system had been eradicated and this meant creating a new military based on conscription. It also meant that a new tax structure needed to be devised in order to modernize the government revenues. As Kido understood it, a new education system would need to be created so that an educated public could be created that would be able to live under the new system. In short, what was needed was for Japan to rid itself of its political past, and become a modern nation based upon Western principles (de Bary, Gluck, and Tiedermann, 2005: 681-682).

This respect for the power of the West resulted in, as Andrew Gordon puts it, “[the] experience powerfully motivated the ensuing shopping spree in the mall of Western institutions, from central banks and universities to post offices and police forces” (Gordon, 2003: 73). This respect was demonstrated by Kume Kunitake, the chief secretary to Prince Iwakura:

Most of the countries in Europe shine with the light of civilization and abound in wealth and power. Their trade is prosperous, their technology is superior, and they greatly enjoy the pleasures and comforts of life. When one observes such conditions, one is apt to think that these countries have always been like this, but this is not the case – the wealth and prosperity one now sees in Europe dates to an appreciable degree from the period after 1800. It has taken scarcely forty years to produce such conditions....How different the Europe of today is from the Europe of forty years ago can be imagined easily. There were no trains running on the land; there were no steamships operating on the water. There was no transmission of news by telegraph. Small ships plied navigable rivers; sailing ships crossed the high seas, horse-drawn carriages trod the roads, letter carriers ran between stations. Soldiers, using copper cannon or flint rifles, fought within a restricted battle area. Woolen cloth was the finery of the wealthy. Cotton was a rare good from across the seas....Although the fashions of France were the shining example for all of Europe, England was the first to break away and create out of its traditions the crafts and customs appropriate to itself. England had gradually stimulated other

nations to produce what they can do best. At present, the crafts of Europe vie in beauty with each other. It is just as if a variety of trees and flowers were growing profusely giving off a fragrance. These were our thoughts after seeing the Kensington Exposition. Those who read this record should reflect upon the lessons to be drawn for Japan (de Bary, Gluck, and Tiedermann, 2005: 680-681²⁶).

One of the more insightful observations that the members of the Mission had, and which is demonstrated in the above passage, came through the realization that not all of the Western states that they toured were at the same level of development. For example, compared to Britain or the US, it was clear that Germany (Prussia, rather) was in the process of industrializing. Others were still agrarian societies. The Mission realized that industrialization and development was a process, and because of that it could be learned (Sagers, 2006: 94). Kunitake, according to Sagers, was interested in reconciling Confucian values with the needs to transform Japan into a capitalist society, and came to the conclusion that in Japan and China, the adherence to Confucian values had led to a suppression of values based on human rights and property rights. He noted that Confucian values were useful when the society was an agrarian one, but when the economic foundation shifted to a more outward looking one, the government should put in place policies that would facilitate wealth creation, and as such would require a protection of human and property rights. In other words the Confucian values were out of date and inadequate in the task of setting Japan along a developmental and capitalistic one (Sagers, 2006: 95).

However impressed by the West and the wealth and power of the West that the Mission members were, there was an underlying current of anger at the West. The target

26 Taken from Kume Kunitake, *Tokumei*, vol 2. Pp. 58-59

of their ire and indeed the primary motivation of the Mission were the unequal treaties that had been imposed on Japan. The aim of the Mission in this case was to renegotiate the treaties (Gordon, 2003: 73). On the 11th March, 1872, Kido Kōin recorded in his diary that their bid to revise the unequal treaties had been rejected by Hamilton Fish, the then Secretary of State of the United States and his assistant Charles Hale. The reason given in Kido's words was "the fact that the text of our instructions in our letter of credence does not give us full authority to negotiate treaty revision" (Kido, 1985: 137). This necessitated the return of one or more of the Mission in order to receive the necessary permission to negotiate any revision. And so it was that Ōkubo and Ito Hirobumi returned to Japan to do so. Kido expressed in his diary on March 26th 1872:

I regret that we relied on Itō and Chargé Mori who know a bit about foreign lands, and accepted their opinions so hastily, without holding thorough discussions of the Imperial instructions two or three times. [They] insisted, without good reason, that it would be to our advantage to conclude treaties abroad. But in reality there is very little advantage to us. The issues before us—the opening of several new ports, the abolition of restrictions on travel to the interior and the establishment of new regulations which permit unrestricted travel, the expansion of foreign settlements, and the approval of a new law abolishing export duties—all will assist in the progress of our country toward civilization, of course, and will be of benefit to us; but they are all things which the foreigners would especially delight in having... While we have not lost our nominal independence, we have given up to foreigners our authority over customs, harbour regulations, local government, and criminal justice... We have not yet been able to regain any of these rights, and we have given up all there is to give...I vow, that, if we do not achieve our objective of recovering these lost rights, I shall never submit to their demands... We have already lost this round. We have yielded everything the other party wants, but we have not been able to get a single thing which we want. (Kido, 1985: 142-143)

Every time this subject was brought up, the Japanese were informed that they needed to

revise their legal and political standards so that they met those of the Western powers (Gordon, 2003: 73). The only concession that Japan was able to receive during this period was that foreigners should obey local laws (Kido, 1985: 143). Indeed the Iwakura Mission failed completely in winning any concessions about treaty revision whatsoever. In 1886 and then again in 1889, they managed to win some concessions. In 1886 the concessions were granted in terms of autonomy over tariffs and jurisdiction over the treaty ports. However there were two major conditions, the first being that Japan submit for inspection the completed draft of its legal code, and that foreign judges be appointed in matters pertaining to foreigners. This created an uproar and angry protests over what was seen as a breach of sovereignty. So angry were the protests over this that the Japanese government was forced to back down and abandon the treaty revision. Then, again in 1889, the Japanese managed to win some favourable revisions, but again the reaction by the public was anger. The public demanded completely equal treaties and would settle for nothing else. The extent of the opposition was such that there was even a bomb thrown at the then foreign minister, Okuma Shigenobu, who survived but lost a leg. Once again the government had to abandon the plan. Immediately after this the entire cabinet resigned (Gordon, 2003: 91-92). The revision of the unequal treaties would happen finally in 1894 as a result of a process begun almost 20 years earlier over an issue of foreigners and the publishing of Japanese-language newspapers (Hoare, 1975)

4.2.7 Shimazu Nariakira, Satsuma, Tajiri Inajirō and State-Guided Economy

Earlier I discussed the influence that Bismarck had on the Japanese Iwakura Mission on the relation between state power and influence and economic growth. Prussia,

under Bismarck, industrialized and grew its economy as a process of state policy, and can in some way be described as a developmental state. The Japanese delegation was swayed by this approach, since the context of Prussia selling agricultural produce in order to afford the costs of industrialization fitted in with Japan's own situation as an agricultural nation. However it would be incorrect to assert that the best way to proceed would be in accordance only with ideas of state-guided economic growth that came from outside of Japan. Indeed the members of the Meiji government who came from Satsuma were already to certain degree familiar with this idea. Satsuma, under the guidance of its *daimyo*, Shimazu Nariakira had already embarked on such a program of economic growth.

When Nariakira's father, Narioki was the *daimyo*, Satsuma was not in great economic shape. In the 1830s, the economic situation in Japan was nothing short of dire. In 1833 there was a severe famine which hit the country. It hit the Tōhoku Region to the north of Edo the hardest and resulted in a harvest of only thirty-five *per cent* of its normal rice yield. In 1836, approximately one hundred thousand people starved to death and the shogunate treasury's revenues fell from one point two five million *koku* to just one million *koku*. However in 1837 the price of rice tripled from its 1833 levels. During this period, 1836, there were four hundred and sixty-four rural disputes, four hundred and forty-five peasant uprisings, and one hundred and one urban riots (Sagers, 2006: 54-55). The shogunate attempted to reform in order to solve these issues, but failed to reassert control - measures which included austerity - Samurai and *daimyo* continued to fall into debt.

Zusho Hirosato²⁷, who served Shimazu Narioki, started to solve Satsuma's debt issue. Satsuma was in debt to the tune of five million ryo²⁸. Zusho proposed to repay this debt at no interest for two hundred and fifty years, during which time Satsuma would be unable to take out any new loans. The other requirement was that Satsuma impose austerity measures which included budget cuts and layoffs. At the same time Zusho put in place measures designed to raise funds by producing new products, increasing production efficiency, and improving products. He brought in new technologies and skilled workers from other parts of Japan. He also monopolized trade with the Ryukyu Islands in order to (illegally) bypass the shogunate's trade with the islands which included sugar in particular, which was the most lucrative trade item. Due to these measures, Satsuma's revenues increased significantly. However these measures were unpopular because of the added burdens it placed on the population (Sakai, 1970: 215; Sagers, 2006: 55-58).

The arrival of the West during this period would have a significant effect on the region. Before Perry's arrival in 1853, the Europeans were in Asia and were hoping to expand further. After the Opium wars had been concluded, Europeans turned their attention to the Ryukyu Islands, which were in a difficult position because while it was openly a tributary of China, it was also secretly tributary to Satsuma. The Western powers aggressively demanded that they open their doors to trade. The French were particularly aggressive in their approach, threatening to return in force if their demands were not met (Sakai, 1970: 211). Satsuma became alarmed at these events and reluctantly reported them to the shogunate and requested advice on how to handle matters. Shimazu Narioki

²⁷ Also Known as Zusho Shōzaemon.

²⁸ Generally speaking, 1 Ryo was roughly equivalent to 1 *koku* of rice - the amount needed to feed one family for one year

was reluctant to do this because he saw the Ryukyu Islands as part of his fief, and he did not wish for any interference by the shogunate. He was also reluctant because the clan had solved its debt issues by smuggling in contraband from the islands. As a result the report that he sent to the shogunate was missing many important details (Sakai, 1970: 214).

Narioki's son, Shimazu Nariakira, was placed in charge of resolving the matter, and he was a good choice since he was an avid student of *rangaku* and as such had a much greater appreciation than most as to the threat that the arrival of the West represented. Nariakira met resistance from both his father and Zusho who on the one hand had no real appreciation of the ramifications of the West's arrival and on the other hand they had no wish to provide aid to the shogunate. He was also opposed by Narioki's mistress who desired to see her own son Hisamitsu succeed Narioki as the clan's *daimyo* instead of Nariakira (Sakai, 1970: 222). This resistance would have a profound effect on the stability of the clan as two main factions formed and Narioki ordered many of Nariakira's followers to commit *seppuku*. This opposition ultimately led Nariakira to plot with the shogunate to have his father retire. This was a necessary step if the Ryukyu issue was to be resolved (Sakai, 1970: 232)

Nariakira recognized that if the matter was to be solved, then rivalry between the *han* and the shogunate (and among the *han*) needed to be put aside and a more national outlook should be adopted, and policies conducive to national unity should be adopted (Sagers, 2006: 60). Nariakira advocated for a middle of the road approach. On the one hand he did not believe that the hardline "Expel the Barbarians" factions' position of

enforcing the *sakoku* edicts was a helpful approach since it did not take into account the superiority of the West in terms of military and technological power. On the other hand he was not a proponent of those who favoured completely opening the doors to the world. What he was in favour of was a policy of limited concessions that would be incrementally increased in the event of European non-cooperation. (Sagers, 2006: 61: Sakai, 1970: 216-219). Nariakira advocated in the case of Ryukyu that the French should be allowed to trade in order to curb the aggressive tendencies of the West, at least until Japan was able to resist. The other reason to grant limited concessions was to prevent Western countries from approaching China directly since that would adversely affect Japanese interests in Ryukyu.

Nariakira stressed the importance of increasing military preparedness as well as industrialization, by building defenses at home, and many fortifications were built under his direction. In developing his industrial policy, Nariakira was cognizant of the fact that Satsuma's production was primarily in the form of agricultural products. He recognized that in order to develop a strong military, he would have to develop a strong economy (Sagers, 2006: 67). He continued many of the policies of Zusho and promoted agriculture and traditional products. He continued to import skilled labour and technical expertise from other parts of the country. However he did not stop there. In addition to importing technical expertise from within Japan, he advocated importing such expertise from the West. He advocated a policy of import-substitution in order to reduce Satsuma's reliance on imported goods and to promote self-sufficiency in order to improve the balance of trade. He was desirous of ensuring that the people of Satsuma gained technical skills

which would result in the creation of more industries in Satsuma. Nariakira also went about gathering samples of products, tools, grains etc, from around the world (Sagers, 2006: 68).

In terms of military technology, Nariakira was able to persuade the shogunate to de-restrict ship sizes in order to be able to build western style ships with the assistance of the Dutch and a Japanese cast-away named John Manjiro, who had resided in the US for many years and had become an expert seaman. In addition, Nariakira built a blast-furnace, and then later a reverberatory furnace in 1856 that manufactured cannon, cannon balls, and other items. He also created institutions dedicated to the translation of foreign books and to the experimentation in various technologies ranging from metallurgy, to small-arms, to photography, glass, drugs, telegraphy and so on (Sagers, 2006: 68-69). Finally he reformed Satsuma's education system in order to promote men of talent based on that talent rather than on the basis of their hereditary ranks. In addition to Western learning he encouraged Wang Yang Yangming Confucianism, which the shogunate considered to be subversive, but whose followers included reformers such as Yoshida Shōin, and which emphasized self-cultivation and action rather than adherence to textual authority (Sagers, 2006: 70).

The significance of Nariakira was that he cultivated many young samurai who would later become high-ranking members of the Meiji government. The majority of the Meiji government's members who came from Satsuma were members of the Nariakira faction such as Ōkubo Toshimichi and Saigo Takamori, who together with Kido Takayoshi from Chōshū, became the 'triumvirate' of the Meiji Government (Sagers,

2006: 71-72). In so doing, Nariakira's industrialization policy provided a firm practical foundation for the industrialization during the Meiji period.

4.2.8 Tajiri Inajirō

After the Restoration, Satsuma and the Meiji government continued to subsidize the education of young samurai in order to create an educated Japan. There was a growing class of educators and bureaucrats who were not necessarily a part of the Restoration itself, but who would have a profound effect on the direction that the new state would take, and in many cases placed loyalty to the modernization of the state ahead of personal loyalties (Al-Khaizaran, 2011: 160; Ferber, 2006: 27).

One of these was Tajiri Inajirō who received a scholarship to study at Fukuzawa Yukichi's *Keiō Gijuku*, which would become the prestigious Keiō University. Fukuzawa was himself an advocate of adopting foreign ideas in order to modernize Japan, and so his school offered English as a course as well as other Western subjects. Tajiri's Satsuma domain scholarship was converted into a government scholarship and he was sent abroad to study in return for working for the government. He initially attended a high-school in Hartford, Connecticut and then in 1874 entered Yale University and unlike most Japanese students who tended to study law, he opted to study economics and finance.

Tajiri became a strong advocate for cameralism, which is the internal counterpart of mercantilist policies. Mercantilist policies were designed to establish a favourable balance of trade which would result in the inflow of hard currency. By contrast, cameralism meant increasing the wealth of the administration by setting up government monopolies and creating state-owned enterprises (Ferber, 2006: 29). Satsuma had

embarked on a similar method of industrialization, and so the members of the Meiji government already had some knowledge of the West and as such were informed by their pre-Meiji environment. Their previous knowledge as a result formed their belief that economics needed to be run by the state in order to increase the nation's wealth. However, they were not united in how to go about implementing this type of approach (Ferber, 2006: 31-32). The early reformers such as Ōkubo had been involved with proto-cameralist policies during the course of his *han* position as a treasury official. As such he became convinced that in order to become militarily strong, promotion of industrialization by the state was necessary. This was also reinforced by Bismarck's approach to which the Iwakura Mission had been exposed.

In 1873, Ōkubo set up the Ministry of Home affairs that quickly became the hub of state-run industrialization and which eclipsed the Ministry of Finance. This according to Ferber clearly shows Nariakira's influence. It also shows that the Meiji government was already predisposed to accept cameralism as its operating principle (Ferber, 2006: 31).

Tajiri himself had no experience as a *han* administrator in Satsuma, so his influence was not the proto-cameralist policies of Shimazu Nariakira. Rather it is more likely that his experience at Yale was his primary influence. Tajiri was influenced by a number of scholars including Paul Leroy-Beaulieu and Wilhelm Roscher. Leroy-Beaulieu's central argument was concerned with raising French revenues without increasing tariffs within the context of huge war reparations to Prussia. Leroy-Beaulieu was focused on the need to create state-generated revenues, which included the need to

build state-owned enterprises which he believed was the best way to increase both income and tax revenue (Ferber, 2006: 33). Roscher's *Principles of Political Economy* also was a central source of Tajiri's ideas. Roscher was an advocate for an historicist approach to political economy, writing that one should examine the state of a society with respect to different stages of development as a basis for comparison in order to avoid distorted judgments. By analogy he wrote, "If there were inhabitants of the moon, and one of them should visit our earth, and find children and grown people side by side, while ignorant of the laws of human development, would he not look upon the most beautiful child as a mere monster...?" (Roscher, 1878a: 132). Roscher also was a proponent of comparing different societies in different times in order to produce a set of general laws of political economy. Roscher believed that the state and society was a single organic unit, and as such was a proponent of the provision of public goods such as in the case of state investment in infrastructure and the provision of aid to the poor as a crucial aspect of 'national wealth' (Ferber, 2006: 33; Roscher, 1878b).

Tajiri translated parts of Roscher's book and would later teach it to his students. Tajiri adapted the thoughts of Leroy-Beaulieu and Roscher to the Japanese context, and so their influence was more instrumental than conceptual. He used Roscher's concept of the organic unit as a way to understand the links between social and economic development, and provided a way to link financial networks of the state to society at large. This would in turn offer a way for state organizations access to a larger pool of capital. From Leroy-Beaulieu's focus on solving a state's debt, Tajiri focussed on state borrowing as a beneficial aspect of a state's finances and on the simultaneous

consolidation of state finances and the exchange rate of national currencies. This last point provided the justification of Japan's view that financial and fiscal authorities could both take notes out of circulation and restore parity of their old currency. Tajiri returned to Japan as a believer in the idea that the state should play a major role in finance in the sense that it should be used to manipulate the market to fit the needs of the state, while the state avoided directly running the market. Tajiri could thus be categorized as a neo-cameralist in terms of state finances (Ferber, 2006: 34).

Tajiri taught at Keiō University, co-founded his own school, Senshu University in Tokyo (Fuess, 2001: 41; Al-Khaizaran, 2011: 162), and taught economics and finance at Imperial University. He received a doctoral degree in legal studies and continued as a part-time lecturer at Imperial University until 1881, when he retired. As such he had an impressive academic career, and his students became a crucial part of the creation of finance law, economics, financial standards, and budgetary practices in the new Japan. But his contributions to Japanese development were not limited to academia. In 1880 he gained employment in the Finance Ministry headed by Ōkuma Shigenobu, who had been a member of the Meiji government from the beginning. The big financial issue facing Japan at this time was the need to achieve fiscal and currency stabilization. Ōkuma favoured borrowing, but this was opposed by his colleagues. As a result he was sacked and his successor was Matsutaka Masayoshi who had been personally trained by Shimazu Nariakira (Sagers, 2006: 70). Matsutaka believed in self-reliance and trade-surpluses, and thus was also an opponent of Ōkuma's focus on borrowing and at the same time opposed Ōkuma's idea of the state directly funding industry. Because of this he

ended up privatizing the state owned enterprises. However, he was a proponent of the state playing a role in modernization and proposed the formation of “quasi-governmental banks” in order to provide funding for projects deemed too risky for private enterprise (Ferber, 2006: 37).

Tajiri’s contribution to Matsutaka’s approach was his advocacy for returning the Yen to its original parity with silver. He also advocated transferring government liabilities into long-term debts coupled with taxation and fiscal austerity. Matsutaka’s final proposal for achieving economic stability called for parity (with silver), enforced austerity on ministerial budgets, and formed non-private financial institutions in order to finance agriculture and small-scale industries (Ferber, 2006: 37-38).

Tajiri’s influence in the formation of these non-private financial institutions in order to provide capital for weak sectors, can be seen in idea of the Roscher’s organic state and in Leroy-Beaulieu’s focus on state debt. Tajiri had the task of converting the state’s liabilities into debts and the task of setting up the Deposit Fund which raised capital for state-backed enterprises. During his life he worked in all departments of the Ministry of Finance and ended up as the Vice Minister. He thus had a major hand in all of the policies pursued by the Ministry of Finance (Ferber, 2006: 38) and was in a good position to guide the modernization and industrial development of the new Japan in the Meiji period.

4.2.9 Disseminating Ideas: The Press

The ideas that drove the Meiji restoration and the formation of the new system needed to be spread around to and understood by the entire Japanese population. This

section discusses the role of a new institution that had been formed. This new institution was an invention of the Western nations and proved to be ideal for disseminating the ideals and policies of the new Meiji society. This new institution was the press, and the press was used by the Meiji government and other elites as one of the tools to disseminate the new ideas to the entire population in order to promote the program of modernization.

During the Tokugawa period there had been some news-sheet type publications that had been heavily censored by the shogunate. Restrictions were lifted to some degree very early on, although press laws and restrictions would be later on enacted. Most of the early news-sheets (*shimbushi*) were very passionate and were for the most part started by those who were angry that the Shogunate collapsed as quickly as it did. These news-sheets were set up to combat the new Meiji government which according to Huffman, was viscerally hated by the editors of the news-sheets. The main sources of news during the early period, that is the period during which the Boshin War was still being fought, were actions from the battle zones, and mainly focused on defeats suffered by the Imperial troops and the successes of the Shogunate forces. Other topics were government decrees, memorials, and so on. In addition, there were less political topics, such as gossip, entertainment, and translations of articles in foreign language papers (Huffman, 1997: 39). However, even though the early Meiji period newspapers tended to be pro-Tokugawa, they were nonetheless cognizant of the need for Japan to remain independent and advocated for the creation of a strong Japan that would be equal to the Western powers. As such the purpose of the press was not for its own sake but rather for the sake of a growing nationalism. Huffman points out that this nationalism is a salient

characteristic of newspapers in this period, where editors would fight against policy and/or cabinet. The purpose was to instill a feeling of “nation-consciousness” that was already present. (Huffman, 1997: 43-44).

The newspaper as an instrument of public communication is a European invention, and in Japan in 1866 there were very few newspapers. Europe had about seven thousand newspapers, and the US had about five thousand. In the rest of the world there was a total of about five hundred (Altman, 1981: 865). The press in Japan came about at the same time as the Restoration and had a sort of ‘symbiotic’ relationship with the state up until about 1875. Initially the Press could be considered to be an organ of the state and newspapers were proposed and advanced by the ruling elites in order to inform the populace of the societal changes that were taking place and to promote new government policies. The changes embarked on by the government needed to be filtered into to consciousness of the people as a new set of norms in order to become permanent (Altman, 1966: 114; Altman, 1981: 866).

The idea that was driving the use of the press by the state was that in order for the country to be strong, the people needed to be educated. People in the country for the most part still couldn't write their names, and had no knowledge of the political life of the country including their own roles as citizens. In effect the people were disconnected from the centres of power by their own ignorance. There were tools for rectifying this, including the military and education, and the idea of using newspapers was seized upon by Meiji bureaucrats because of the potential for newspapers to reach the most isolated people quickly. Newspapers were seen as a good tool for informing the people about the

affairs of the world and also as a tool to say what was good and bad and what constituted good public morals. In essence the bureaucrats saw the potential of the newspapers in terms of propaganda value. (Huffman, 1997: 47-48).

While the modern newspaper is a European invention, the Japanese were still none-the-less aware of their existence, and this awareness of European newspapers goes back to about 1708 (Altman, 1981: 867, fn. 3), but they had been banned by the shogunate which had also banned any commenting on political and state affairs. After the opening of the country, the Dutch, who had been providing international intelligence to the shogunate, began to provide foreign newspapers (which were also being printed in the foreign settlements from 1861) to the shogunate who saw them first-hand for the first time as did those they sent abroad. One of these was Yukichi Fukuzawa who wrote about newspapers²⁹ in his book, *Conditions in the West*, which was extremely popular and as a

29 “Newspapers are published by companies that investigate new occurrences and writes [*sic*] them down. such matters as the deliberations of the Court, official announcements, the appointments and dismissals of officials, rumors circulating in the streets, the state of affairs in foreign countries, progress in the arts and sciences, fluctuations in foreign trade, good and bad harvests, the rise and fall of prices, the suffering and happiness of the people, births and deaths, strange events and unusual tales – if they are new, are described in great detail and illustrated, leaving nothing unclear. Even matters of no great consequence such as information about meetings, the names of newly opened shops and lost and found objects, are brought to the knowledge of newspaper offices and the news is printed. That is why, even though you remain indoors and do not see what is going on outside and even though you are miles from home and cannot get word of what is happening there, if you read a newspaper once, everything will be plain at a glance since the paper reproduces the true state of affairs in the world. It is almost as if everything were right in front of you. To Westerners, reading a newspaper is one of the pleasures of life. It is even said that when they read newspapers they forget to eat, which is natural. Although there are large numbers of Japanese and foreign books. both ancient and modern, when it comes to adding to experience, understanding the facts and studying how to get on in the world, generally there is nothing to match reading a newspaper.

Some newspapers are published everyday and others once in seven days. In countries of the West and wherever westerners live in foreign lands, they always publish newspapers. London in England and New York in America have the most newspapers of any place in the world. In London, there is a newspaper called the “London Newspaper” that collects the news of all countries, adds to it the news of England and then circulates it throughout the world. Newspaper reports are intended to be swift. newspapers are printed by steam and it is possible to print 15,000 copies an hour. As soon as the newspapers are ready, they are dispatched in all directions by express steam railroads or express steamboats. Their speed is a wonder. to take an example, once there was an all night debate in Parliament in London that ended at four o'clock in the morning. Without delay, the matter was written down, printed and circulated throughout the country, reaching Bristol which is 100 miles distant by noon the same day.

result newspapers, which were seen as a civilizing force by Fukuzawa, entered into the Japanese consciousness (Altman, 1981: 868-869).

In the case of Japanese language newspapers, priority was given by the editors to the needs of the state. This emphasis was seen as a necessary part of state policy making and led to the editors pointing to Western newspapers as a source of strength. As such they used them as the model for their own newspapers rather than the news-sheets of the Tokugawa era, which they saw as only catering to the masses and filled with trivia and entertainment, and thus not seen as improving the person, a view echoed by Westerners (Altman. 1981: 870; Hoare, 1975: 291)

In 1869 there were twelve Japanese-language newspapers launched, and that number increased in two years to twenty-four and again to forty-six in 1873. By 1887 there were four hundred and seventy, which meant that each of the present day prefectures had newspapers (Altman, 1966: 115; Huffman, 1997: 60). The early papers were elitist and Confucian – the product of the leaders of their generation and those who started them were at their hearts political and intellectual, including some of the members of the new government. They were Confucian in the sense that they were based on the principle of subordinating oneself to the “Imperial will”, the purpose of these papers was to transmit in large part the will of the government – not because they were forced to but because they saw it as their duty to serve the will of the nation. The front pages of these

The views expressed in newspapers depend on the country and the opinions of the people. None is impartial. nevertheless, they receive an official permit and publish. aiming to be objective in their arguments, and since there is not obstacle to passing judgment on the country's political affairs or expressing praise or blame of persons' character, everyone has great regard for newspapers. There have been instances where the reasoning in the newspapers has influenced public sentiment and changed even government policy. For example, when Country A is planning to mobilize an army and to invade Country B, if the people of Country B discuss the rights and the wrongs of the matter, publish it in the newspapers and circulate them, it will even help stop the mobilization” (Fukuzawa , quoted in Altman, 1965: 1667-168)

papers were filled with government decrees and political editorials. Loyalty and obligations were the watch-words of these papers, and the sole aim was to guide the people into modernity and development. They aimed to help the government turn Japan into a “civilized” nation by bringing the people enlightenment (Huffman, 1997: 61-62).

The main audience for these papers were the elites in society, but that this did not mean that ordinary people were not affected. The elites used these papers in order to drive policy changes which affected everyone. Furthermore, the newspapers, according to Huffman, were full of stories about what civilized people did – drinking beer and eating meat and such, and also about public morals such as not engaging in public nudity and so on in order to avoid the scorn of foreigners. This shows that the newspapers played a significant role in turning Japan into a modern nation and in turn had significant effect on Japanese culture. These papers would tell stories that would end in admonishment that the new ways were to be followed³⁰ (Huffman, 1997: Pp 65 - 66).

In 1871, a newspaper was launched by Kido Takayoshi and was called *Shimbun Zasshi* on May 1st. Kido provided the paper’s ideological slant and supported it financially. This he did in order to further the aims and goals of the new Meiji Government, of which he was a member. Kido’s intent was explicitly that the newspapers should be educational in order to “urge [the population] towards civilization” (Altman, 1966:117). As such it was a tool designed to explicitly disseminate the ideas that the new government was adopting and frames in such a ways as to gain support for the

30 “A typical *Yûbin Hôchi* article in the fall of 1872 told of a postal worker who found an envelope on which an ignorant commoner had attached 1.1 *sen* in coins instead of a stamp. The worker, who stole the money and replaced it with a cancelled stamp, was sentenced to sixty strikes with a cane. At the end of the story, the writer admonished readers to learn a lesson: if they followed postal regulations carefully, they might save postal workers from falling into temptation.” (Huffman, 1997: 66)

government's program of change. In order to accomplish this *Shimbun Zasshi* was filled with news of the West. Guidance was needed for the policy, institutional, and societal changes were to proceed smoothly (Altman, 1965: 117-118). The everyday running of this newspaper was by a group of bureaucrats from Chōshū. The main focus of *Shimbun Zasshi* was the importance of ridding Japan of old feudal ways, and the good things that Westernization could bring (or at least the trappings thereof) including western haircuts, pocket watches, Western clothing, Western food and so on (Altman, 1965 : 119).

The *Shimbun Zasshi* fairly quickly gained a circulation of thirty thousand. It was issued twice a month for the first month and the number of issues increased to about seven or eight issues a month by 1872, and twelve per month by 1874. However circulation during this period dropped to about five thousand in 1873 due to an inability to compete with the daily Tokyo papers which were formatted in the same way as Western publications and which had larger staffs. Kido sold the *Shimbun Zasshi*, and it was converted by the new owner Aoe Hide to a daily paper formatted as a Western paper, who renamed it *Akebono* (Altman, 1965: 120).

Not all papers had an official link to a government department as with the case of Kido's *Shimbun Zasshi*, but they still retained an identification with the need to transform Japan into a modern nation. The *Tokyo Nichi-Nichi Shimbun* for example became one of the leading daily publications until 1911 when it was sold and became the *Osaka Mainichi Shimbun* (Altman, 1965: 122). The paper was primarily founded as a side-project in order to provide the founders with some extra income, but quickly became so successful that the founders took it on as a full-time project. This paper made sure to print

excerpts of official government announcements and announcements from the Tokyo Administration. This paper also placed a great deal of emphasis on the transformation of society. This was of course, not at the sacrifice of popular issues and subject matter, and often had a moral message (Altman, 1965: 123). This paper accrued some prestige due to the high regard that the government had for it, and so was entrusted to get the message of modernization out to the public (Altman, 1965: 124).

The reading of newspapers was actively encouraged. One method of making newspapers available to the public was the introduction of the reading room in 1872 and they quickly spread throughout the country. Newspapers were relatively expensive and so these reading rooms filled the demand for them. The reading rooms were sometimes set up in bookstores, which was the case of Kyoto. Sometimes the reading rooms were set up by groups of book-dealers which had the added benefit of allowing students to read books that they could not otherwise afford. Others were set up by the newspapers themselves and who served tea to customers. Still other reading rooms were set up by prefectural governments which also in some cases ordered that newspapers be read to villagers in public buildings six times a month, and similarly teachers in schools were required to read the papers to illiterate villagers³¹. In short, there were many opportunities for people to have access to newspapers and the information that was disseminated in them for

31 The text of the instructions that were sent out to village headmen reads as follows: "In the present civilized times, people of the lower classes, children, have absolutely no knowledge of what is going on in the world...Nothing equals a newspaper for obtaining this knowledge. Newspapers describe in detail conditions in Japan and abroad. They report good faithfully. Good is praised and evil decried quite naturally. Newspapers are a shortcut to improving manners. Furthermore, they are often useful in the family enterprise. It is regrettable, however, that there illiterate and cannot themselves read and understand. It is decreed that henceforth, in all villages qualified persons from among the Shinto priests, Buddhist monks and farmers shall be selected to serve to explain (at lectures held six times a month) what is printed in the newspapers" (Altman, 1981: 874).

reasons which in large part included the maintenance of social order (Altman, 1965: 128-130; Altman, 1981: 873-875).

From all this it is clear that the role of the press was a very important role in dissemination of the government that was concerned with its goal of modernizing and transforming Japanese society. This formation of what Aizawa call *kokutai*, or the essence of being Japanese, necessitated the creation of a new imagined community called Japan, because without this the modernization goals could not have been realized. The press allowed the people to be moulded into the unified identity of being Japanese, in contrast to the past when they would be more identified with a particular domain. This means that the role of the press was vital to the creation of the new Japanese state. This was accomplished by not only the use of newspapers to disseminate information, but also necessitated the creation of the mean to access the newspapers in the form of the reading rooms.

Before moving on to West Polynesia, a quick summary of the people and ideas and the effect of the ideas would be of benefit. The ideational basis of loyalty to an unbroken imperial line has its origin with the *Mito* school. Aizawa Seishisai was was a member of this school, and his ideas were picked up by Yoshida Shōin from Chōshū who combined them with his knowledge of Dutch Studies in order to formulate and politicize the slogan, *Sonnō Jōi*. His importance in the transmission of idea to policy came about directly as a result of many of his pupils who went on to become high ranking officials in the Meiji Government. These included Kido Kōin, who was one of the three oligarchs of the Meiji Government. The influence of Yoshida can be most clearly seen in his diaries

where he continuously stresses the need for unified loyalty to the emperor. It can also be seen in the document “*Imperial precepts, published to the people by the government of Kioto [Kyoto]*” which had been disseminated by the new government in order to inform the populace of the new government's goals. Another of the three oligarchs, Okubo Toshimichi from Satsuma was influenced heavily by Shimazu Nariakira, who had early on recognized the danger that the West represented. He had responded by putting into place economic policies of a mercantilist nature into Satsuma and had begun a program of industrialization and import substitution. Okubo and the samurai who became government officials were all disciples of Shimazu, and so his economic ideas were continued by the new government. This is particularly the case after the Iwakura Mission where policies similar to Shimazu Nariakira's were being put into place, particularly in Prussia. This would serve to reinforce the influence of Shimazu Nariakira. Thus it can be seen that there is a key causal link between the ideas derived from the *Mitogaku*, and the modernization program of Shimazu Nariakira. These ideas were deliberately disseminated to the public through the advent of the newspaper. These papers were placed into public places in the various prefectures specifically to be accessible to the public. At the same time, elites such as Yukichi Fukuzawa promoted the uses and benefits of the papers in spreading the new ideas in order to modernize the nation.

4.3 Tonga and the West Polynesian Region.

The case of Tonga is different from the experience of Japan in that unlike Japan, Tonga had no prior experience with Europeans. Tonga also did not have the same experience with capitalist economic forms and modern political institutional forms, and

thus did not have a foundation to build a new, modern nation in the same way. In other words Tonga did not have an ideational foundation upon which to build a new nation, which they would need to have in order to avoid the colonial fate that so many pre-modern societies suffered. This means that any ideational bases of a new society apart from those rooted in indigenous religious observances and beliefs had to have come from external source. This section focuses on the external ideational influences that form the basis upon which a new society was created, and the primary influence was the role that Christian missionaries played in this societal transformation. It is important to note, and this section will show that of all the advice provided to the Tongans, none of it concerned with issues of industrialization. None of it concerns the setting up of a developmental state. Indeed the previous chapter showed that among the steps the Tongans took to modernize, all of it was concerned with political changes and no economic change was undertaken except in that commoditization of the land was expressly prohibited. The reason for this was to prevent the arrival of large numbers of settlers, and the result was no transformation of the mode of production.

4.3.1 The Influence of the Missionaries

Christianity is an extremely important ingredient in the transformation of the political/military interaction, because the introduction of Christianity led to a political change in Tonga. The first missionaries to arrive at Tonga were the Wesleyans in 1797 aboard the Duff (Campbell, 1992: 42). The missionaries saw this as part of the process of bringing civilization to Tonga: “Our object is not only to evangelize, but also to civilize...every encouragement is given to the poor natives in their attempts to imitate us

in all reasonable matters” (Lawry, 1852: 313). The process of converting Tongans to Christianity was complicated and there were many attempts to do so, many of which were abandoned because of factors including threats of death. It did, however, start to take hold when Aleamotu'a, later known as Josiah Tupou, converted to Christianity. There was a concerted effort on the part of chiefs to oppose the new religion, and to make him recant. These attempts included offering him the position of Tu'i Kanokupoku, which he accepted, and he was installed as such in 1827. However, he never did recant and had continued to worship in secret until six months after his installation, at which time he began worshipping publicly. Other chiefs started to show an interest in converting to the new religion including chiefs like Finow 'Ulukalala II, and Tāufa'āhau, who was Josiah's nephew and the son of Finow IV, who took over the governing of Vava'u after the death of Finow IV, as well as his own islands in Ha'apai. It was at this juncture that he introduced to Ha'apai and Vava'u laws that advanced the practice of Christianity there. There was some resistance to this, but ultimately, Josiah with the support of his nephew, managed to overcome all opposition. According to Campbell (1992), Josiah was a gentle ruler, and so it was Tāufa'āhau who actually won the wars on his uncle's behalf (Campbell, 1992: 52 – 62). From the Ha'apai Islands the Tupou dynasty expanded to control all of Tonga, and then expanded into areas of eastern and northern Fiji which was already tied to Tonga by existing networks, and tried to establish full control of those islands as well, which ultimately failed.

The role of Christianity, as I said is of critical significance when examining the transformation of Tonga from its system of chiefly governance to a polity governed by

Westphalian principles. This is for two reasons, firstly the role of Christianity had a systemic affect on the position of Fiji as it ultimately became a British colony. In this case it was the support of Christian missionaries that became a major factor in the expansion of Tonga into the Fijian islands which would lead to the ceding of Fiji to the British. The second reason why an examination of Christianity and the missionaries is needed is because they played a significant role in the formation of a new Tongan kingdom, which I shall come to later. For now I will briefly examine the role of Christianity as it relates to Fiji.

4.3.2 Christianity, the Tongans and Fiji

Christianity was introduced to Fiji from Tonga by Wesleyan missionaries (Smythe, 1864: 20, 124), who had originated in Tahiti, and who had resided on Tonga for four years (Derrick, 1946: 71). The first British missionaries were William Cross and David Cargill who arrived at Lakeba in the Lau Islands of Fiji in 1835 (Derrick, 1946: 71; Waterhouse, 1866: 69). When the missionaries arrived in Lakeba, they were welcomed by the chief who, even though he welcomed them, did not exhibit an interest in converting. The work of the missionaries in converting Fijians was a slow process, and while the people and the chiefs were willing to learn reading and writing, the chiefs proved to be quite resistant to converting to Christianity. This was due to the fact that what the missionaries were teaching, such as pacifism, was diametrically opposed to the traditional ways of ruling through violence. Increasing numbers of foreigners apart from the missionaries were arriving in Fiji, and it was not long until the Fijians chiefs found their old ways called into question. The British and the French in particular made it

abundantly clear that violence against their nationals would not be tolerated, and so it became apparent that it was in the best interest of chiefs to discard the old ways of doing things and embracing new ways, that came with Christianization, and that meant conversion (Derrick, 1946: 73 – 74).

Cakobau³², the Tui Viti or King of Fiji, was particularly resistant to the spread of Christianity, and had refused missionaries access to the island of Bau (Derrick, 1946: 73; Waterhouse, 1866: 70). Since he was the most powerful chief, particularly after George Tubou I helped him quell a rebellion, he was in a position to obstruct the missionaries, with whom he was angry because they would not treat him as a god, as he saw himself, but rather as just a mere man. He was also antagonistic to the missionaries because rebels used Christianity as their reason for rebelling (Waterhouse 1866: 187). He went so far as to order the removal of the missionaries – who were not to be harmed, and to order the massacre of the native converts (Waterhouse, 1866: 188 – 189).

It was the policy of the King of Tonga to support the missionaries, and as such was a major force behind the spread of Christianity in Fiji (Derrick 1946: 71, 128). Other chiefs also actively supported them, as is illustrated by the response of the removal of the missionaries from Bau, which was to appeal to the Tongans for help: “The missionaries now appealed to a Tongan chief, who was at Bau with three hundred men. With all their faults, the Tongans invariably rally round the missionary in the hour of danger” (Waterhouse, 1866: 187).

Initially the Tongan king sent Tongan teachers to assist the missionaries in order to not only convert Fijians, but the Tongans residing there as well. When the first set of

³² pronounced “Thakombau”

teachers returned to Tonga, their appointments were filled by the second group of Tongan teachers active in Fiji (Derrick, 1946: 129; Smythe, 1864: 126 – 127). These native preachers were one vanguard of Tongan expansion in the system.

The activities of the Tongans in Fiji with respect to Christianity is an important point. Their activities show that the Tongans were not the passive recipients of a foreign religion, but rather were active adherents who zealously supported the activities of the missionaries. This shows that their adoption of Christianity was voluntary, and this is a significant because it shows that the Tongan leadership was able to imagine a new type of state and system. This is a key aspect to the adaptivity of Tonga, and this adaptivity was due to the dominant position they had in the region.

4.3.3 Christianity and the Transformation of Tonga

When Josiah died in 1845, his successor was his nephew, Tāufa‘āhau, who according to West (1865) was reluctant to take on the position, but did so after wide acclaim and a unanimous vote from the Tongan chiefs, taking on the name George Tupou I (West, 1865: 58; Campbell, 1992: 62). According to Campbell, George Tupou saw the spread of Christianity as of vital political importance, because he saw it as a change from the old ways. It was also a way to gain more power than he would have had under the old ways and as such he desired to change his chiefdom into a Kingdom, in the European sense (Campbell, 1992: 63). He wanted his kingdom to have modern laws and in order to adopt Western ideas he was advised by the missionaries to seek legal expertise from New Zealand, which he did. The result would have the result of the promulgation of a new legal code in 1847 (West, 1865: 211 – 212). The introduction of Christianity was

important because George Tupou saw it as the way in which Tonga could be returned to a state of peace (Lawry, 1852: 326) after the long civil war and conflict that had been raging since 1797.

Tongan traditional governance had been very closely tied to religion, as demonstrated by the role that the Tu'i Tonga played in the *'inasi* ceremony (See Chapter 3). The missionaries sought to tie themselves into the politics of the islands. The goal of this was to transform Tongan society into a society where the rules and laws were based on Christian principles. Traditional principles were only kept if they did not explicitly go against the teachings of the missionaries. Because religion and governance had already been linked before the arrival of the missionaries, it was not a stretch for the chiefs to make alliances with the missionaries as they had done in the past with their own indigenous priests.

As a result, the chiefs relied on the missionaries for advice. The influence of the missionaries was enhanced by the relative lack of white settlers, unlike in Samoa and Fiji, which limited the choices of the chiefs for advice (Lātūkefu, 1974:119 - 121). According to Lātūkefu there is no documentary evidence that the missionaries explicitly informed George Tupou I when he was Chief of Vava'u before he became King of Tonga, of the British system but he points out that it is certain that they did, and that it is without any doubt that George Tupou who promulgated the first set of codified laws in Tonga known as the Vava'u Code in 1839 (Lātūkefu, 1974: 121).

An examination of the Vava'u Code, as with the later 1850 and 1862 codes, reveals the influence of the missionaries. It is a short document of only eight clauses, but

it represents a radical break from the past. The primacy of the Christian faith is placed at the very beginning in the preamble, and also in the second clause:

It is of the God of heaven and earth that I have been appointed to speak to you, he is King of Kings and Lord of Lords, he doeth whatsoever he pleaseth, he lifteth up one and putteth down another, he is righteous in all his works, we are the work of his hands, and the sheep of his pasture, and his will towards us is that we should all be happy. Therefore it is that I make known to you all, to the Chiefs and Governors and People, as well as the different strangers and foreigners that live with me. That the Laws of this our Land prohibit [...]. (Lātūkefu, 1974: Appendix A)

The preamble makes it clear that Vava'u was to be a Christian society. The invocation of God shows that he used his faith as the justification of his rule and this legitimized his position as King.

The second clause more explicitly makes this clear, as he exhorts the people to be attentive to religious duty, including the biblical stricture that the Sabbath should be kept holy.

My mind is this. That all my people should attend to all the duties of religion towards God; that they should keep holy the sabbath day, by abstaining from their worldly occupations and labour and by attending to the preaching of the word and the worship of God in their places of worship. (Lātūkefu, 1974: Appendix A)

The influence of the teachings of the missionaries is also evident in the declaration that abortion and suicide were henceforth illegal. The new law declared that in the case of a successful suicide, the body could not be buried in consecrated ground. The same clause (clause 1) declares that murder is also illegal. Other items included in this code, which the missionaries found to be objectionable on religious grounds were alcohol consumption, divorce, slavery, and idolatry. In the case of divorce, clause 8 declares that “[if] a man leaves his wife and escapes, she shall claim his plantations and whatever

property he may have left.” and “[if] a woman forsakes her husband she shall be brought back to him, and in case she will not remain with him, it shall not be lawful for her to marry any other man while her husband lives” (Lātūkefu, 1974: Appendix A).

More significantly, the code calls for another break with the past. It does so by limiting the powers of the chiefs and represents the beginnings of the shift to the village as the centre of local politics, and also the beginning of modern land tenure laws.

3. My mind is this. That each chief or head of a people, shall govern his people and them only: and it is in my mind that you each show love to the people you have under you, also that you require them to be industrious in labouring to support the government and in their duties to you their chiefs; and that you divide to each of them land for their own use, that each one may have a means of living, of supporting his family procuring necessities, and to the contribution to the cause of God.

4. ...I wish you to allow your people some time for the purpose of working for themselves; they will work for you as you require them in working your Canoe; in planting your yams, and bananas, and in what ever you may require their services; but I make known to you it is no longer lawful, for you to *hunuki*, or mark their bananas for your use, or to take by force any article from them, but let their things be at their own disposal. (Lātūkefu, 1974: Appendix A)

Even though there is no documentary evidence of George Tupou explicitly being informed of the British system of governance, as Lātūkefu points out, there is documentary evidence of George Tupou I actively seeking out the advice of the missionaries in the matter of modernizing Tongan laws after succeeding Josiah Tupou in 1845. The missionaries provided him a modified code based on the code used in Tahiti:

The king having repeatedly and earnestly requested the assistance of the Missionaries in preparing a code of laws for the government of his subjects this meeting appoints Bro. Rabone to prepare said code, and agree to follow as far as applicable to this people the code adopted in Tahiti... (Cummins, 1972: 113³³)

33 Friendly Islands Annual District meeting 20/4/1848, Re. Records of the Methodist Missionary Society

This was subsequently passed in 9th May, 1849, although apparently George Tupou did not completely follow the suggested code and as a result the missionaries were not entirely happy. However they were generally satisfied because they thought the promulgation of the 1850 Code was a “grand step towards the civilization of the entire nation...” (Lawry, 1851: 81 - 82).

Both the Codes of 1850 and 1862 reiterate the central premise of 1839 Code; that Tonga was to be a Christian kingdom. Both codes went into more detail than the 1839 Code, and even more clearly demonstrate the influence of the missionaries. Divorce was declared illegal in Clause 7, paragraph 8 of the 1850 Code and Clause 7, Paragraphs 10 and 11 of the 1862 Code, except in the case of adultery, which was also declared illegal (Lātūkefu, 1974: Appendix B; Appendix C). The reason for outlawing divorce was specifically that marriage is an institution that was created by God, and therefore only a church minister can divorce them:

VII. 8 (4): Let all know that the separating of man and wife is a difficult matter: since the marriage contract is a command of God, the Minister must first marry them; but, in case of trial, and the crime proved, then the Minister must pronounce them separated, in the large Chapel, before all the people, even as their marriage was performed. Then the writing of divorce shall be given to the innocent party. (Lātūkefu, 1974: Appendix B)

In keeping with marriage laws, the codes both prohibit the practice of polygamy which had been common place in the past.

Other laws that were put in place that Lātūkefu suggests were in accordance with religious views of the missionaries included the practice of polygyny, which had been commonplace in the past, strictures against abortion, fornication, laws demanding the

London. Mitchell Library Sydney, Microfilm references FM 4/1397 Reel 6.

sabbath be kept holy, strictures against murder, and a law that related to the position of women in society and their role in the home: “XXXVII - The law referring to women - you must work, women, and persevere in labouring to clothe your husband and children; unmarried women shall work to be useful to their relatives and parents. If they do not work, they shall not be fed or assisted; for our assisting the indolent, is supporting that which is evil” (Lātūkefu, 1974: 236). One law in particular displayed the missionaries’ influence was the law that prohibited dancing entitled “The Law referring to Dances, and other Heathen Customs” (Lātūkefu, 1974: 231), which was not included in the 1862 Code.

Both codes were a comprehensive set of laws that governed moral behaviour and also the behaviour of chiefs, judges, and police. These codes also contained laws pertaining to criminal procedures and taxation. Both codes placed the position of the king as primary:

I. The Law concerning the King

- 4) The King is the root of all government in the land, and it is with him to appoint those who shall govern his kingdom
- 5) But should the King intend any weighty matter to be done in his land, it shall be with him to assemble the Chiefs and Governors to take counsel with him upon it.
- 6) And whatsoever things are written in these laws, it shall not be lawful for the King to act contrary thereto, but to act according to them as well as his people.
- 7) The King is the Supreme Judge, and in any case which the judges cannot settle shall be brought to the King, and the King’s decision shall be final. (Lātūkefu, 1974: Appendix C (1862 Code))

The codes make no mention of the provision in the 1839 Vava’u Code that limited the power of the chiefs, but both codes make it illegal to sell land to foreigners (Lātūkefu, 1874: 234, 238). The 1862 Code did allow for foreigners to reside in Tonga but the most

they could do was to rent a plot to live on from the king (246 - 247). This severely limited the number of foreigners settling in Tonga, which is important to mention, especially when considering the numbers of settlers in Fiji and Samoa, because it lessened the likelihood of colonization. Finally, the code of 1862 made the implication that the land would be divided among the people:

When the land is divided among the people, if there be a part that is not used by the people, as farms, or in any way, it shall be resumed by the Government. And when anyone dies, leaving his land to no one in particular, it shall be claimed by the State. (Lātūkefu, 1974: 251)

This, coupled with the illegality of selling land at all as was declared in the Constitution of 1875 removed the need to exchange labour for wages, which in turn meant that Tonga was not transformed into a capitalist based society.

4.3.4 The Journey to Constitutional Governance

As critical as the missionaries were, the journey that Tonga underwent to form a new kind of government was not entirely influenced by them. George Tupou had sought through one of the missionaries, W. Lawry, legal advice from legal experts (West, 1865: 21 - 213). The king wrote to Charles St. Julian, the commissioner of the King of Hawaii whom he had also advised, and sent him a copy of Tongan law and requested his advice on the matter:

I greatly desire in these days to raise my people and my land that they may become civilized like the various kingdoms of the world. And I earnestly beseech you, the King of Hawaii [actually not the King but St. Julian as the King's representative] that you will not cease writing nor your desire to assist me, but write to me and cease not. And this is the Book of our Laws that I send you. Do you look into it, and if there be anything that seems strange or wrong you make it known to me and I will consider respecting it. (Cummins, 1972: 132³⁴)

34 M.S.S. copy. Foreign Office and External papers. Hawaiian Officials abroad. May 1855. Hawaii State

The response to George Tupou's request for advice came in 1855 (Cummins, 1972: 135 - 144³⁵). Charles St. Julian informed George Tupou that his desire for independence was an achievable goal, however he urged caution and careful consideration of all factors: "I must beg of you, however, to consider well ere you decide, for upon the course which you may adopt now will, in all probability, depend the future welfare of your nation" (Cummins, 1972: 135). St. Julian advised George Tupou that the accepted standard was that lands which were unproductive did not belong to any nation, and were therefore open to any nation to hold it if they wished to make the land productive. St. Julian invokes the idea of the ownership of property as the operating principle, and cites the examples of the colonization of the Americas and Australia which, according to the accepted standards of the day, was justified on balance by the non-ownership of land by the indigenous population (Cummins, 1972: 136).

St. Julian admits that this was not the case with Tonga, where the land was held and cultivated, but points out that in his opinion, the full productive potential of the land had not been met, and he pointed to examples of cash crops including cotton as examples of meeting the full productive potential of the land. As a result there existed the potential for the exploitation of Tonga by foreigners, unless the resources were administered by a well-organized government:

The only way, then, for your Majesty to secure the permanent nationality of your country is by the establishment of a Government upon such principles as are recognized as just and equitable by the great nations of the earth; and which shall not only be just and equitable but efficient. Of

Archives.

35 St. Julian to Tupou I. Foreign Office and External papers, Hawaiian Officials Abroad, Dec. 1855. Hawaii State Archives

such a government as will aid, as rapidly as may, the advancement of your People in civilization and the increase of the national wealth. Of such a government as will be capable of maintaining its political rights. With your Kingdom thus governed there can be no pretext whatever for any other power to attack its independence. (Cummins, 1972:136)

In this letter, St. Julian suggests that any government set up in Tonga should not be an absolute monarchy or be run as an absolutist state, but rather be a government based on the rule of law.

The nation which once existed that kings ruled by a divine right has long been discarded among all civilized nations. No one who did not wish to be deemed mad or laughed at would now contend that any individual or family, however exalted, could have any inherent rights which are inconsistent with the liberty and the welfare of a whole people. It is upon one principle and one principle only that the rights and powers of every sovereign are maintained; that by the will of his people he has been raised up from among them for the preservation of social order; as their agent in all dealings with other nations and as the general guardian of their interests. He is assumed to have been chosen for the purpose of exercising in reference to the nation those functions that are exercised by a parent in reference to his children. If, as in most cases, the Sovereign has not been actually elected the choice of the nation is implied by their permitting him to rule. Upon the same principle the laws or usages which regulate the ascension to the throne are assumed to have owed their origin to an exercise of the national will. And in all civilized countries the right of ascension to the throne is carefully regulated by law to prevent the contests and anarchy which would otherwise naturally ensue upon the death of each sovereign. (Cummins, 1972: 137)

St. Julian advised George Tupou that the form of government best suited to fit the accepted standards was one that legislates, administers justice fairly and in “strict accordance” with the law, represents its interests abroad and in relation to other nations, collects revenues and administers public property, and the promotion of the general welfare and institutional efficiency.

These functions would then require the formation of a system comprising three

branches, and executive branch, a legislative branch, and a judiciary. The executive branch ought to consist of a number of ministries headed by a minister who would administer that brief, but who would also be accountable to the king. St. Julian points out that as the nation developed it would need increase the number of ministries, but for the time being four such ministries would suffice: a prime minister (his phrase was “secretary general”), a financial secretary to administer revenues and expenditures, a secretary of the interior to administer law and order and sundry items such as building roads and the formation of a postal system and so on. Finally St. Julian stated the need for a military secretary. Each ministry would follow strict rules and procedures including the keeping of records of decisions, correspondences, and other government business.

The legislative branch of any government generally speaking is made up of representatives elected by the people, but St. Julian advised George Tupou that the Tongan legislative branch be made of ministers and “the wisest of chiefs” (Cummins, 1972: 141) who would have the duties of making laws and levying taxes. This would need to be a body that would not be presided over by the king since that might result having a dampening effect on the discussion of issues. However it should be opened and closed once a year by the king.

Finally the judiciary should be made up of judges who would administer justice under the principle that the law applies equally to all that reside in Tonga - both those born in Tonga and foreign residents. The position of judge should go to those who are competent and that could not be removed unless they had been proven to be incompetent or guilty of misconduct. St. Julian suggested that the Superior Court include one white

man in order to deal with disputes that might arise between Tongans and foreign settlers and who would have the knowledge of western systems of law and government, and two native judges.

St. Julian followed this letter with another in which he focused on Tonga's international relations and provided advice on Tonga's inclusion into the international community by way of treaties and its relations with other countries which would include residential diplomacy (Cummins, 1972: 429 - 434³⁶). The letter starts by outlining the form that international law and international relations should take:

It's chief governing principles are these:- I. Every nation [is] a community in which a government exists which is capable of preserving internal order and guarding the interests and promoting the happiness of the people who live under its rule, is entitled to rank as an independent nation. II. The rights of all nations are equal. Some of them are entitled to deference in account of there Superiority in Power and their advancement in civilization; but no state, however powerful, has any right whatever to control the lawful proceedings of another, however small or weak it may be, unless with the full and free consent of such smaller state. III. But it is only while a nation adheres to a just course of action that it is entitled to maintain intact those sovereign rights. (Cummins, 1972: 429)

He continues to offer information, which he concedes early in the letter that “many large books” had been written about treaties and international law.

IV. Contracts and agreements between nations for the purpose of mutual protection, for the regulation of trade or for any other matter as to which a clear and distinct understanding is requisite are made by treaties. And when once a treaty has been made each party must fulfill its stipulations with the utmost care and exactness. Any breach of faith in this respect is highly dishonourable. It is by entering into such treaties that nations recognize the sovereign rights of their fellows and pledge themselves to an observance of those rights. Consequently it is desirable especially in a young and small state, that such treaties should be made with all the more powerful sovereignties. (Cummins, 1972: 429 - 430)

36 Foreign Office and External Papers, Hawaiian Officials Abroad, Dec. 1855. Hawaii State Archives

After discussing and outlining the reasons and valid justifications for engaging in warfare, such as in the case of an attack by another nation, in the case of a pre-emptive attack where there is reason to believe that an attack is imminent, in the case of the enforcement of compensation, in the case of a punitive action, and in the case of the aiding in a just war of an allied state, St. Julian turned his attention to the question of diplomacy.

It is the custom of nations to carry on their communications with each other and to guard the interests of their subjects through the aid of residential agents;- such for instance as consuls. The resident agent of a sovereign power must be respected and aided in the fulfillment of his proper duties but he has no right whatever to interfere with the internal affairs of the country where he resides, and he cannot even exercise his own proper functions unless he has the permission of the sovereign or government of that country. But this permission is not to be withheld without good and sufficient cause; and once given it cannot be withdrawn unless the Foreign Agent is guilty of a gross abuse of his position or a breach of the local laws. (Cummins, 1972: 430).

In this section of his letter, St. Julian suggested that it would be to the advantage of Tonga to allow the presence of consuls because it would represent an acknowledgement and a recognition of the independence and sovereignty of Tonga, at the same time it would be of advantage to Tonga because while the Foreign Agent has the primary duty of representing and guarding the interests of his own country, he would be in a position to offer advice if such advice was sought. St. Julian then offered the following advice:

I should advise your Majesty to conclude treaties with all the Sovereign states which may be willing to enter into these compacts with you but to observe three precautions in every Treaty thus concluded. I. Be careful to secure a full recognition of the independence and sovereignty of your states. According to national usage the mere description of yourself as a King or of your country as a Kingdom in the naming of the contracting parties is such a recognition. II. See that there is a perfect equality of advantages: that nothing is exacted of your country and government for

which there is not an equivalent concession by the other contracting party.
III. Allow no stipulation to be inserted which will give an exclusive³⁷
advantage, - commercial or otherwise, to any one country so as to prevent
you from treating, upon terms of perfect freedom and equality with other
countries. (Cummins, 1972: 431)

In summary, the advice which George Tupou asked for and which Charles St. Julian provided was for the sake of the Tongans to radically transform themselves from a system of absolutist rule by the chiefs, to a modern kingdom based on the principles of rule of law, and a government based on the separation of powers. St. Julian also advised George Tupou to gain entry into the international system by way of international treaties and residential diplomacy. This kind of diplomacy, according to Arrighi (1994), forms the basis of the international system as we know it, and also the foundation upon which the modern capitalist world-system rests. However, we shall see that while George Tupou took the advice of St. Julian and others such as Shirley Waldemar Baker, he also presided over the inclusion of provisions in the 1875 Constitution that would prevent the full transformation of Tonga into capitalist state, which would be one major factor in the peripheral status of Tonga within the modern world-system.

4.3.5 Tongan Motivation for Societal Transformation

Before discussing the Constitution of 1875, some examination of the underlying motivation for modernization is in order. Despite the hospitality that the Tongans had shown explorers such as Captain James Cook, they had always been a little suspicious of the foreigners, even as far back as the 1700s. Finau 'Ulukalala II who had destroyed the *Port au Prince*, related to William Mariner, the circumstances of a conflict between a group of the very first missionaries in Tonga, and a British exile named Morgan (Mariner,

³⁷ The underlined words were underlined in the original text.

1827 in Cummins, 1972: 414 - 415). The missionaries had accused Morgan of stealing pigs and had informed the Tongan chiefs that Morgan had been exiled for crimes committed and who had escaped execution of the penalties. As a result he found himself shunned. In return for this Morgan had informed the chiefs that the missionaries had been sent to Tonga by the British Government in order to bring pestilence to the islands through magical means. It is important to note that there was an epidemic ravaging Tonga at the time. The reason for this, according to Morgan, was so that the British could seize control of the islands. This resulted in the death of all but three of the missionaries at the hands of the Tongans. This particular account is corroborated by one of the missionaries in Tonga at the time who quotes a chief who manages to calm the situation:

But Mulkaamair³⁸, my friend and chief made them the following answer. "If the men of the sky³⁹, discovered by any attempts of violence, or secret whispering, that they meant to take our lands and kill us, we ought all to strike hands and root them out from among us; but they have brought great riches, they have given them to us freely, we reap the good fruits of their living among us, their articles are of great use to us, they behave themselves well; and what could we wish more?" (Orange, 1840: 117)

This desire to not be taken over by Britain was articulated by both Josiah Tupou and George Tupou.

On February 19th, 1844, Josiah (formerly Aleamotu'a, the 18th Tu'i Kanokupolu) wrote to Queen Victoria in which he expressed his fear of being conquered by the French and in which he requested protection by the British:

The Kingdom of Tonga has from old been a separate and independent kingdom...The Government has been in the hands of the Tonguese, and no foreign power has interfered either with our fathers, or with us; neither were we led to expect any would do so with a people so few in number, so

³⁸ Mulikiha'amea, the 11th Tu'i Kanokupolu.

³⁹ As the foreigners were referred to.

poor, and so feeble...[we] were far from expecting that any evil would arise towards us. But at this time the conduct of the people of France assumes to us a very unfavourable aspect, and we are now afraid; as we are by no means pleased at what we have been informed they have done at the Marquesas, their having made war on the inhabitants, taken their lands into their own possession, and removed all the foreigners away. We have also heard what they have done at Tahiti, and at other islands; and we now really fear that they have design to take Tonga. (Cummins, 1972: 421⁴⁰)

George Tupou in 1850, even as he expressed a desire to have friendly relations with Britain, stated his wish to maintain independence:

My mind is this, that I will not verily sell any piece of land in this Tonga; for it is small; then, what of it can we sell?

I verily wish to be the friend of Britain; in friendly alliance, with all fellowship; but it is not my mind, nor the mind of my people, that we should be subject to any other people or Kingdom in this world. But it is our mind to sit down (that is, remain) an independent nation. (Lawry, 1851: 71 - 72)

This plea for aid and the expression of the desire to remain independent was made many times: “we do not wish to fall into the hands of any other nation” (Cummins, 1972: 422⁴¹), and in order to secure the aid of Britain, the Tongans proposed a treaty in accordance with the advice provided by Charles St. Julian:

Christianity has raised our people, and we are anxious to cultivate our Lands, and pursue such Manufactures as are peculiar to our Country, that we may exchange our products for the Improvements and comforts and embellishments of Civilized Life. To secure this object all British subjects shall have Liberty freely and securely to come with their Ships and Cargoes to all our ports, to trade in the same, to hire and occupy warehouses for their Commerce and shall be granted protection for their Persons and Property to the uttermost of our Power. We are a small and weak Kingdom and fear the encroachments of a great foreign power. We

40 Memorial of Josiah Tupou King of Tonga, to her Majesty Queen Victoria. Nuku'alofa, Tonga, Feb. 19th, 1844. National Archives of New Zealand, Wellington.

41 King George Tupou to Sir George Grey. Nuku'alofa, Aug. 28th, 1847. National Archives of New Zealand, Wellington.

desire to retain our Lands, rule our people in the fear of God and live in Peace. And we entreat that our independent existence as a Kingdom may be recognized by your Majesty and granted to us. (Cummins, 1972: 425⁴²)

The desire for Tonga to be an independent nation is summed up in a speech given by George Tupou I in 1863, where he expressed gratitude for being able to take Tonga along this path:

Palace, June 4, 1863: - Today, the first anniversary, the first year of the freedom of Tonga, is passed. It is true we are a small government, a small nation, but I am thankful there are no slaves in the government. Thanks to the great God that I am alive to-day to see it a success. If I never accomplish anything else, I am grateful that I have been able to give to the Tongan people their freedom from slavery. This freedom I give to you all, will become the law of the government for ever and ever, and it will not be possible for anyone to make slaves of you again. And cursed be those who try to bind you up again in the bonds of slavery. (Baker, 1927: 7-8, in Cummins, 1972: 157)

This was not just a speech about the independence of Tonga, recognition of which had not yet occurred and wouldn't be until 1877 by the Germans (Cummins, 1972: 443⁴³), but also a statement that Tonga and Tongans should never be subordinated to any one.

4.3.6 The Influence of Shirley Baker

The 1875 Constitution represents the single most important tool in George Tupou's arsenal for the ultimate goal of independence. This goal of independence was actively supported by Shirley Waldemar Baker, who had arrived in Tonga as one of the Wesleyan missionaries. According to Noel Rutherford (1996), a biographer of Baker's, Shirley Baker was a somewhat controversial figure who had apparently not been entirely truthful about his background when he had arrived in Australia in the 1850s. However

42 King George Tupou to Queen Victoria. Nuku'alofa, Tonga. May 12th 1856. Wesleyan Mission Papers. Copy in English and Tongan. Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington, New Zealand.

43 Ko e Bo'obo'oi Vol. 11. November 1877

after a few years of obscurity he emerged as a highly respected teacher in Victoria. After a general reduction in pay of all teachers by the school board, he left teaching and, due to connections, was able to become a Wesleyan missionary. He was ordained and assigned to be a missionary in Tonga in 1860. Baker's arrival in Tonga coincided with a disease epidemic and even though he had little training in medicine, he had enough knowledge, which the other missionaries did not have, to be of use in alleviating the suffering of the Tongans. This had the result of bringing Baker to the notice of George Tupou I, who asked for his advice in forming a new legal code in addition to the advice of St. Julian, who had not been popular with the missionaries who had seen him as a meddler (Rutherford, 1996).

According to Rutherford, it had been Baker who had persuaded George Tupou I to free the people from involuntary servitude and to divide the land into plots so that people had a means to live in the 1862 Code:

After I succeeded in getting His Majesty to set his people free, one part of my scheme was that every native who paid his taxes should have the means of doing so by having a portion of land allotted to him. (Baker, in Rutherford, 1996: 32)

The results of the code were positive and had the effect of greatly altering the economic life of the country, including the growing of cash crops, which provide George Tupou revenues which allowed for the building of public buildings and harbour facilities and also received much praise in Australia and Britain, but did not immediately have the desired effect which was recognition of Tonga as an independent state (Rutherford, 1996: 33 - 34).

The actions of Baker also earned him the acrimony of his fellow missionaries who

accused him of many things over the years that he spent in Tonga which would ultimately result in him resigning from the Wesleyan mission and his closeness to George Tupou I. This closeness resulted in Baker being appointed Prime Minister in 1880 (Rutherford, 1996; Cummins, 1972: 275). These accusations included profiteering, exploitation of the Tongan, being sympathetic to the Germans over the British and acting for the Germans, which the Tongans denied:

I, King George, state as follows:-

- 4) Mr. Baker had nothing whatever to do in the obtaining, by the Kingdom of Germany, the lease of the coaling station in Vava'u. Before Mr. Baker knew about this matter, Uga and I had decided about it; and, therefore, he did not persuade us, or have anything to do with it, in any one thing. (Cummins, 1972: 278⁴⁴)

The fact that Baker had influenced George Tupou I is hard to deny, however he was accused of using his influence to wrongly interfere in the affairs of the Tongan King, something which he denied:

That I have great influence with the Tonga Government I do not deny; that I designed their flag I admit; that, at the King's request, I compiled the original draft of the Constitution I admit. That, at his request, I assisted him in reference to the laws I admit. That I corrected proof copies of the law I admit. That, at his request, I planned the present system of Police Courts and Debtor's Courts, and system of registration, I admit. That, as long back as 1862, I drew out the charter of their liberty, I admit. That I was editor of the Boobooi, and also of the Tongan Times, I admit; that I have tried to raise them as a nation and a people I admit.

When the Rev. B. Chapman was in the chair of our present District Meeting in 1874, I said I had two objects before me - to make Tonga a Church and a nation. But that I had used my influence to compel or to enforce, or to interfere, I deny. I have given my opinion, but I have never pressed my views either on the King or on chiefs... (Cummins, 1972: 287⁴⁵)

44 Resume of Enquiry in re Tongan Mission Affairs. October 1879. Mr. A.P. Maudslay, H.B.M. Vice-Consul v. Rev. S. W. Baker. Printed by Wilsons & Horton, "Herald" Office, Auckland, 1879. p.24.

45 Resume into Enquiry in re Tongan Mission Affairs. October 1879. Mr. A.P. Maudslay, H.B.M. Vice-Consul v. Rev. S. W. Baker. Printed by Wilsons & Horton, "Herald" Office, Auckland, 1879. P. 44.

This accusation would resurface in 1883 with the added twist that King George Tupou was reputed to be not of sound mind, and that Baker was simply taking advantage of the King's supposed infirm nature, based on the word of a medical expert (Cummins, 1972: 283⁴⁶). When the complaints against Baker were investigated in 1887 by Charles Mitchell, the High Commissioner for the Western Pacific and Governor of Fiji, this claim was discredited, and Baker was found to not be guilty of the majority of complaints against him:

On the afternoon of Tuesday I went, by appointment, to the Palace, accompanied by the Chief Judicial Commissioner and by the Secretary to the High Commissioner. I had arranged that, as Mr. Moulton was personally obnoxious to the King, a gentleman (Sir. Parker) should attend the meeting on Mr. Moulton's behalf, to check Mr. Baker's translation of my questions and of the King's replies. I append a copy of these questions and replies. The King's manner to me was courteous, and his replies straightforward and unhesitating. I may here remark that I saw no indication, either on this occasion or on that of any of the many subsequent interviews I had with the King, of his mental incapacity, or of his being under Mr. Baker's control. On the contrary, his mind appeared to me to be clear, his manner decisive, and his whole bearing [was] that of a man of strong will and independent character. (Parliament, 1887a: 3)

In spite of the complaints and charges against him by his fellow missionaries, and even though it cannot be denied that Baker was a figure of some controversy, the importance of Baker in the formation of a new modern Tongan Kingdom also cannot be denied. I now turn to the Constitution itself.

4.3.7 The Constitution of 1875

The 1875 Constitution was drafted by Shirley Baker at the behest of George Tupou, and was originally published in the Tongan Government Gazette on April 16th,

⁴⁶ Her Majesty's Vice-Consul Symons to His Excellency G. W. Des Voeux, Acting Consul General. 6th November, 1883. Archives of the Western Pacific High Commission, Suva, Fiji.

1883. The constitution is in two parts. The first part is a declaration of rights of all those residing in Tonga. This section of the constitution contains provisions that include the right to free speech, the right to *habeas corpus*, guarantees the right to worship freely, the right to not be tried twice for the same offence. It contains rules regarding conflict of interest of public officials, the right to not incriminate oneself, the right to life, liberty, and property. It contains rules regarding voting rights, the payment of taxes and so on. Section 1 guarantees that all people are free. Section 2 forbids any form of involuntary servitude. Section 3 allows for the importation of labour, but only in the presence of a strict contract stating for how long they are to labour for and for how much they are paid (Parliament, 1887b: 133).

The second part of the constitution is concerned with the form that the government should take. In this part it lays out that the Tongan Kingdom is a constitutional monarchy that is made of the King, the privy counsel, the cabinet, a single legislative house, and an independent judiciary. The privy council is made up of the cabinet, the governors, and the Chief Justice, and acts as the advisory body to the King. The Privy Council also acts as the final appeals court. The cabinet was to be made up of four ministers: Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Lands, and the Minister of Police. All members of the cabinet must be members of the legislative assembly - specifically Nobles of the Legislative Assembly.

The Legislative Assembly would be tasked with the creation and passing of laws. It was to be made up of an equal number of Nobles who are created by the King and representatives of the people who would be elected by the people, and was to meet every

two years. The judiciary was to consist of the Supreme Court, Circuit Courts, and Police Courts. The Supreme court is made up of the Chief Justice and two associate judges. These are appointed by the King with the consent of cabinet. The circuit courts try criminal and civil cases, but not on the same day, and trials are by a jury of 12. The Police courts acts as a sort of arraignment court, and commits cases for trial by the circuit courts. Defendants are free to to appeal to the Supreme Court if they think that they have been wrongfully acquitted.

The most important section in the 1875 Constitution is that which is concerned with land tenure. Ownership of the land was taken away from the chiefs and was taken over by the King, who could gift sections of the land to the Nobles whose heirs would inherit. The constitution, in keeping with the earlier codes of law forbade the sale of the land by anyone including the King. The land can only be leased and the leaseholds are inheritable, and in case of there being no valid heir, the land reverts back to the King (Parliament, 1887b: 141 - 142). The issue with the land tenure laws is that the earlier codes had provided for the dividing up of the land so that everyone who paid their taxes would have a plot of land. These earlier codes had not been acted upon in terms of the division of the land, and this issue was not solved by the 1875 Constitution. It wasn't until Baker had been appointed Minister for Lands in 1880 that the question of the division of the land was re-examined and by 1883 new laws had been put in place which officially delineated the division of the land, and each Tongan was granted by the holder of the land (ie. King or Nobles) a plot of land in a town and a plot of land in the countryside that was to be approximately 8 acres, and the tenure was guaranteed by the

government in exchange for two shillings per year in rent to the holder of the land (Rutherford, 1996: 132).

The land tenure system was finalized in the 1927 Land Act, which provided for the administration of the allotments by the Minister of Lands who oversees the division of the land by granting the allotments, leases, and administers the land titles and licenses (Maude, 1965: 97). Under the Land Act the Noble who owns the title to the particular piece of land has the right to be consulted and has the right to refuse title to someone who may be from somewhere else. The Act also provides for the creation of Land Courts that are tasked with adjudicating disputes that may arise, but according to Maude, these disputes including the refusal by a noble to grant an allotment is almost never contested by the commoner. It is the custom of having a probationary period, during which a commoner tries to increase his chances of receiving an allotment during this period by providing gifts of food to the Noble, and there have been cases of nobles demanding that money be paid before approving the granting of an allotment (Maude, 1965: 105). The authority of the chiefs and the nobles was severely curtailed by the constitution and the earlier codes of law, but the position of the nobles has also been enshrined in the constitution. Their ownership of title to the land gives them considerable power and control over the people, thus watering down the sections that declare all Tongans to be equal before the law. One of the ways in which the nobles were able to keep control over the people was not allow those who had managed to gain an allotment to register it with the Minister of Lands As a result much of the land remains unregistered (approximately half of the land in 1962), although there are other reasons for this such as uncompleted

land surveys (Lātūkefu, 1974: 213; Maude, 1965: 100).

But despite the issues that arose regarding the land tenure system after the Constitution was promulgated, the significance of the granting of land allotments to all those over the age of 16 is that it provided the people the means with which to make a living. In terms of the capitalist global system, it meant that the Tongan people were not reliant on wage labour, which in turn meant that the constitution and the earlier law codes prevented Tonga from completely switching to the Capitalism mode of production as shall be seen.

4.3.8 Recognition of Tonga

The first country to formally recognize Tonga was Germany in 1877. The British had initially declined to recognize Tongan independence because they were skeptical of the ability of the Tongan government to maintain a stable governing system. In a letter dated August 1876, R. H. Meade wrote:

His lordship is of the opinion that the information possessed by H.M. Government respecting the condition of the Friendly Islands and the power of the King to maintain order and good government under the form of administration now established is not such as would justify such a step and further that the present would not seem to be a fitting time for considering any such proposal inasmuch as a (new) Order of H.M in Council is to be issued which will give the Governor of Fiji as High Commissioner jurisdiction over the British population of this group. (Cummins, 1972: 442⁴⁷)

The recognition of Tonga by the Germans and the signing of a Treaty to that effect was of concern to the British. The Germans had signed a treaty with Samoa in 1879, that in the eyes of the British was simply a way to dominate Samoa and eventually annex it

⁴⁷ Meade, R.H., Colonial Office to the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Colonial Office. August 1876. Archives of the Western High Commission, Suva, Fiji.

(Cummins, 1972: 447 - 449⁴⁸). The British were very concerned that Tonga, particularly under the advice of Shirley Baker, was predisposed to allow German domination in the region, both as a way for Baker to better himself, and possibly due to a fear by George Tupou I of offending the Germans. However James Blyth, the H. B. M. Commissioner, was of the opinion that Tonga was already an independent and prosperous nation (Cummins, 1972: 446⁴⁹, 458⁵⁰, 459). Ultimately, in spite of the fact that many of the colonial governments in Australia and New Zealand had been pushing for British annexation of the entire region for three decades (Cummins, 1972: 474⁵¹), Tonga was recognized as an independent nation state in 1879 and the treaty between Britain and Tonga was ratified in 1882, which George Tupou I spoke of in a speech to the opening of Parliament:

The treaty with Great Britain has just been ratified, but it would be useless for me to express the pleasure of my mind in the ratification of the said Treaty of Friendship with Great Britain, and that Great Britain has acknowledged us as a Kingdom. (Cummins, 1972: 460⁵²).

The result of this was that Tonga ended up being the sole Pacific Island nation to have avoided annexation and colonization at the hands of the Western nations. However Tonga did end up becoming a protectorate of Britain in 1900. This brings up an important question about the degree of independence. It is often the case that being a protectorate

48 H.B.M. Acting Consul General, A.P. Maudsley to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Suva, Fiji, April 29th, 1879. Archive of the Western Pacific High Commission, Suva, Fiji.

49 James Blyth H.B.M Commissioner and Vice Consul to the H.B.M. High Commissioner. 3 July 1880. Western Pacific High Commission Archives Fiji

50 James Blyth H.B.M Commissioner and Vice Consul to H.B.M High Commissioner. British Consulate, Tonga, 19th June 1880. Archives of the Western Pacific High Commission, Suva, Fiji.

51 The Australian Colonies Case for British Annexation of Pacific Islands 1883. Intercolonial Convention in Appendices to the Journals of the House of Representatives (New Zealand). A-J. A-3. 1884. Pp. 128 - 135. General Assembly Library, Wellington, New Zealand.

52 Tonga Government Gazette. Vol. 2, No. 2, October 25th 1882.

involves a loss of sovereignty. So how do we reconcile the two positions, that on the one hand there is the proposition that Tonga maintained political independence as the only Pacific Island nation to avoid colonization, and on the other there is the view that it became a protectorate?

Even though both Britain and Germany had signed treaties that guaranteed Tonga's sovereignty, the realities in the region were such that the British feared the increase of German influence. This influence was aided by George Tupou II's pro-German leanings. The British put pressure on George Tupou II in such a way as to resemble a physical twisting of the arm in order to force compliance. The problem was the issue of Britain conducting foreign policy on Tonga's behalf. In the end what was agreed was British extra-territorial rights for its citizens in return for military protection (Bade, 2021: 14).

The terms of the protectorate agreement include the provision that Tonga remained internally self-governing, but makes absolutely no provision for Britain to run Tonga's foreign policy. In other words there is no provision in the text of the agree for Tonga to lose any sovereignty or political independence. Bade points out that while in practice Britain did interfere on occasion, this forms the basis for the position that Tonga maintain political independence despite having become a protectorate. Indeed, Bade points out that as far as Tongans were concerned, due to the literal interpretation of the text of the agreement, they had never lost independence in the first place, and so they never saw an end to their position as a protectorate as gaining independence (Bade, 2021: 15). In summary the basis for stating that Tonga remained fully independent lies in the

fact that apart from the issue of extraterritoriality, the protectorate agreement does not provide any legal basis for any loss of sovereignty.

4.4 Discussion and Conclusion

This chapter focused on the second aspect of semi-peripheral development as part of the critical juncture. It is not enough to examine the events that occur as a society adapts itself to a new systemic reality. There are two parts to the story, the shock to the system that requires adaptation and the decisions made in order to facilitate this, and the second part which is concerned with the ability to make those decisions in the first place. This is called agency, and it is this exercise of agency that lies at the heart of adaptation. This is the central political issue that allows for adaptation to take place – the contingent factors, as stated by Cappoccia & Keleman. The critical juncture is made up of two aspects, the need to adapt and change, and the ability to do so. In the first part, the need to change lies with the arrival in the Pacific region by colonial powers, which both cases faced. The second part is ideational. In order to adapt, one needs what can be best described as a motivational force.

In terms of the motivational force, both cases in question demonstrated that they had certain ideas about themselves and their position in the world. In both cases this was based on a set of religious principles that made the case that the leaders of the two societies were descended from the gods. In the case of Japan this can be seen in the idea expounded on at length by Japanese Mito school scholars that the reverence due to the Emperor was based on his being the descendant of the sun goddess Amaterasu in an unbroken imperial line. These scholars wrote that the proper way to conduct oneself is

though service to the emperor above all else. In this regard they combined two of the five Confucian relationships into two – the relationship between master and servant and father and son. The highest morality, according to Yoshida Shōin, was loyalty to one's master, in particular to the Emperor. Any disloyalty was seen as immoral behaviour, and this loyalty was what, in Yoshida's mind, set Japan apart from China and other foreign countries. It was therefore the duty of every Japanese to fight in order to preserve the essence of Japanese-ness, or *kokutai*. In a sense, what Japan needed as a motivational force was this self-image of societal supremacy.

In the case of Tonga, it is perhaps more difficult to get a glimpse of this kind of philosophy since Tonga at the time of contact did not have a written language, but rather an oral tradition, and it is to this tradition that George Tupou alluded to when he spoke of Tonga's history of having been independent. This has some religious elements, such as the position of the T'ui Tonga as the religious chief and the central role he played in various ceremonies such as in the *'inasi* where his position was based on his descent from the gods (see chapter 3). However it was not just traditional religious ideas that played a role, it was also the religious influence of the missionaries who proposed the idea that all men were equal before God. This is demonstrated by Baker's influence in freeing slaves in order to build a new country where everyone was free from bondage. It was on this basis that George Tupou asserted his belief that Tongan independence should not be denied, and it was on this basis that he took the advice of British legal scholars and entered into diplomacy as part of Tonga's entry into the international system. In this regard, both Japan and Tonga had an ideational self-image such that they were able to act.

However it is not enough to have such a self-image. What is also key is the ability to imagine their societies as different. In this regard, they had to create what Benedict Anderson termed the ‘imagined community’. Both societies had to have a clear vision of what they needed to be in order to adapt favourably. Both societies saw themselves as having to become modern societies like those of the West. In other words, in order to protect themselves from the Western powers they had to become like the Western powers to certain degree. Japan took this much further than the Tongans with different results. It was their preconceived self-image that would drive them down that path, and it was with this that the two aspects of the critical juncture were united – a need to change and a specific kind of supremacist view of themselves and associated ideas driving that point home. These had to come together at the same time. Japan had these self-images prior to the arrival of Perry, but they did not amount to much until there was a specific need to change. It may be hypothesized that those nations that did not adapt to the colonial period did not do so because in part they did not have quite the same kinds of self-image due to certain institutional constraints, or that they were unable to act on such self-image due to those same constraints. Thus we unite the role of ideas with the work of Karatani, who made the case that those marginal societies were unable to exercise agency due to the constraints placed on them by virtue of being too closely tied to the core of an earlier world empire and thus more easily dominated by the West, or that those societies that were cores of world empires could not exercise agency due to being too far entrenched in their institutional culture.

There are many different possible explanations as to why those societies that did

not adapt were unable to do so. The point of this exercise is to show why such different cultures and societies were able to adapt, and it comes down, I think, to a set of ideas about oneself coinciding with a need to change. The self-image acts as a motivating force that pushes decision makers to change. It is important to not restrict ourselves only to pre-existing ideational forces in the analysis. In order to change, the society in question needs to have a vision of change, and the creation of a new imagined community required the adoption of new ideas that often external.

In the case of Japan, those who wrote about their position in the world also advocated the adoption of new ideas, including military, scientific, and technological innovations and the need for expansionist policies in order to transform Japan into a more Western form. Other Japanese, such as Shimazu Nariakira in Satsuma, were already innovating in such a way as to create an early form of a developmental state and more modern financial forms. Shimazu Nariakira was a man ahead of his time in many ways, and his legacy would be the adoption of his innovations by the Meiji government, many of whom were directly influenced by him.

Others, mainly from Chōshū, were influenced by Yoshida Shōin and his assertion of the need to become like the Western powers in order to protect themselves. In this regard, the prevailing idea was the need to protect themselves by adopting Western ideas. Both Yoshida and Shimazu Nariakira based this on observations of European activities that they already had knowledge of and the science and news from the outside brought in by the Dutch, and they both had interpreted this knowledge as being a priority. After the Restoration, the Japanese government sent out young Japanese to go and study abroad, in

addition to the Iwakura Mission, in order to find out how the Western nations had modernized and to bring back this information in order for it to be adopted. The result was the financial innovations and the rapid industrialization guided by the government. From the Japanese case we can see that the ideational aspects of the exercise of agency were the ideational foundation for the political and economic decisions made by the Japanese.

Finally, in order for the societal change to be fully completed, the new sets of social, political and economic norms had to be disseminated to the people. In Japan this was done through the institution of the newspaper. As we could see, the use of newspapers was a deliberate choice on part of many bureaucrats including top members of the government of Japan such as Kido Kōin, who saw this method as the ideal way of not only informing the public of the changes that were taking place, but also an ideal way of directing changes in terms of the peoples' attitudes and in some ways to engineer the new society. This was coupled with compulsory primary school education and military conscription, and the result was an inculcation of the ideals of a unified nation into the minds of the people by the government of Japan.

The Tongans, similar to the Japanese, had a set of pre-existing ideas about themselves which contributed to the desire to maintain independence. Also similar to the Japanese, the Tongan king sought advice from legal scholars about how to transform into a modern kingdom in the context of rules that governed the international system that came about as the result of the Peace of Westphalia. However, the result of the conscious decision to prohibit the commodification of the land was that while they entered into

treaties with the Europeans and engaged in diplomacy, they did not transform into a capitalist, industrializing country. The ideational foundation of the new Tonga was such that emphasis was placed on maintaining their traditional kin-based system as part of their independence and their independent national identity, and so the result was political independence and economic peripheralization. In Tonga there were a couple of newspapers, they did not seem to be directed at ordinary people, and as such there does not appear to be evidence needed to make the case that newspapers were used in order to disseminate the new social norms. Indeed, since as we saw in the previous chapter, and as can be inferred in this chapter, that most of the changes that did take place were mostly religious in nature, and as we saw, traditional kin-based social norms have remained intact even as they have been inserted into a new context that is Christianity. However while the new norms were not disseminated through the press, the church appears to have served that purpose.

In terms of the temporality of the critical juncture, this period of time is roughly the half-century following the arrival of Commodore Perry in 1853, and it is during this period that the ideas that came from Aizawa, Yoshida, Shimazu Nariakira, and those ideas that entered Japan as a result of the many people, including the Iwakura Mission and young people like Tajiri, that were sent abroad. It is through these ideas that the Meiji government applied new knowledge to the formation of Western-like institutions including the promulgation of the Meiji constitution in 1889. It is during this period that the new Japan came into being and so the critical juncture can be delineated in this way.

It is a little more difficult to set the temporal parameters of the critical juncture as

it pertains to Tonga. Westerners had been visiting Tonga since Captain Cook in the 1770s (apart from Abel Tasman a century or so earlier). Missionaries had been present in Tonga since the early 1797 which coincided with the start of a civil war in Tonga in the same year, and so much knowledge of the outside world began to enter the country as a result. However, I would suggest that the starting point of the critical juncture can be set at about 1827 when Aleamotu'a was made Tu'i Kanokupolu and converted to Christianity. This led to a reliance on missionaries for advice which would lead to George Tupou as chief of Vava'u to promulgate a new Western-inspired legal code in 1839. George Tupou succeeded Aleamotu'a as Tu'i Kanokupolu who in consultation with the missionaries, St. Julian, and Shirley Baker promulgated Western-inspired legal codes in 1850, 1862, and finally the Tongan Constitution in 1875 that established Tonga as a constitutional monarchy. In 1877, Tonga was recognized as an independent nation for the first time by Germany, and then by Britain in 1879. As such I would suggest that the critical juncture in Tonga was of a similar period of time to that in the case of Japan, that is about a half-century. In both cases, the half-century period would also see the military expansion of both societies – Tonga into Fiji, and Japan into Korea and China, and so I maintain that there is temporal similarity of the critical juncture in both cases.

In conclusion, this chapter has examined the role that ideas play in the transformation of a society. We saw in the previous chapter that the critical juncture involved adaptation to a new systemic reality, and then we saw in this chapter that the role of ideas is crucial to understand adaptation. A society must have a certain view of itself and its place in the world in order to have a motivating force that is needed to adapt.

The society in question must also have the ability to imagine itself as something different while at the same time maintaining that view of itself in the world. Both Japan and Tonga had certain views that some might characterize as supremacist that acted as a motivating force. Both societies recognized that they would need to change in order to protect themselves, and so both societies borrowed certain ideas from the West. This would have the effect of adopting foreign ideas in such a way as to be able to maintain and reinforce its foundational view of itself. In other words it had to re-imagine itself in a way that foreign nations would recognize them as sovereign, while not losing themselves in the process. Different types of ideas would have different results. In Japan this involved political and economic change that the Japanese believed would turn Japan into a global power, and the result was independence and eventual core status. Tonga wanted to transform itself only in order to maintain independence, and so only made political changes and did not change the mode of production. The result was independence but peripheralization.

Both cases show that the ideas about themselves coincided temporally with the critical juncture, and from this we can hypothesize that it is not enough to have a set of ideas about themselves that would act as a motivational force for change, but they had to have come at a very specific time and in such away as to adapt to the new global system. If the ideas exist and there is no need to change then transformation will not happen, and if those ideas are not present at the time where change is required, then similarly, transformation will not occur voluntarily, and any change that does occur will be imposed from without, and not necessarily to the benefit of the society in question. The result in

that case would probably be domination by foreign powers. The exercise of agency thus needs both a reason and an impetus, and thus if we think of it in terms of HI, then the exercise of agency needs a shock to the system, in this case the exogenous shock that came with colonial powers, and a contingency, in this case a set of foundational ideas as a motivational force.

Chapter 5: Findings

5.1 Introduction

This chapter will apply the findings from Chapters Three and Four, and will apply them to the framework that was proposed in chapter two. This chapter will show that the evidence presented in chapters three and four support the proposed framework. The emphasis is on how political and economic decisions result in the favourable adaptation of the two cases as they became connected to the modern world-system. The other focus is on how the presence and utilization of various foundational self-ideas and the adoption of foreign ideas led to the specific set of decisions that each of the cases in the dissertation have made in response to the arrival of the Western, colonial powers into the region. This chapter will also show that the particular solutions that each society undertook would result in a different position in world-system in terms of core and periphery status.

The emphasis is on the roles that ideas have on the exercise of agency that drives the transformation of societies, and will show that without a contingent set of ideas that are contemporaneous with an exogenous shock no adaptation to the incorporation into a world-system is possible. This is because agency is constrained by events and social norms, and as such adaptation is similarly constrained. Secondly this chapter will show that where such a confluence of exogenous shock and ideas occurs then adaptation is possible. The nature of the decisions, whether they are political only or a combination of political and economic will determine the future path of the society in question.

When a society only engages in political change without a shift in the mode of

production then the possible result is political independence but also the likely peripheralization of the society. If the society engages in both political and economic change, ie. shift in mode of production, then the possibility exists that the society will not only maintain political independence but also will likely become a core polity at some stage in the future. I present this framework as a proposition. There is much more work that is needed to be done in order to determine whether this holds water when applied to other cases. Having said that I am confident that the results from my two empirical cases demonstrate the veracity of my findings. Possible future work would need to include on the one hand other societies such as Thailand that was not colonized by the Western powers, and on the other hand would need to engage with pre-capitalist systems to create a truly universal framework of semi-peripheral development and transformation. For the time being though I work to create what is in essence, a preliminary framework.

Finally, this chapter will address a number of objections and criticisms that could be levelled against this framework. I will show that even though such criticisms can be made, this framework remains viable even though there is need of further work in terms of other case-studies in order refine it into a polished framework. The purpose of this is to create a generalized explanatory framework of societal change that can help academics and policy makers to understand the mechanisms of semi-peripheral change in order to inform policy proposals in the future that will transform social and societal structure so that a more equitable world can be created for the benefit of all.

5.2 Modes of Production

In Chapter Two I examine how a modes of production approach was a necessary

aspect of the bounding of world-systems since according to Wallerstein a world-system is a self-contained social system based on capitalism. Firstly it is important to delineate at which time the modern capitalist world-system came to be. Secondly it is also important to determine at what point a specific society became a part of that modern capitalist system. Thirdly it is important to accurately determine when a capitalist world-system came to be as a social system. In other words in order to bound the modern world-system we need to understand it from both the temporal perspective and from the perspective of its capitalist form. I make the distinction between capitalism as an economic system and capitalism as a social system. This means that it is not sufficient to simply determine when capitalism as an economic system came into being, but to describe at what point capitalism became a social system, or in other words when societies and nations became capitalist societies. Marx's conceptualization of capitalism includes the issue of production, while Fernand Braudel's was based on finance and credit. This conceptualization allows for capitalism as an economic system to include the Italian city-states of the 12th Century, and cities in the Middle East during the same period (Arrighi, 1994; Abu-Lughod, 1989). However the modern world-system is also characterized by production, and what ties industrial production to financial capitalism is the action of the state. I used the example of the creation of the Bank of England to facilitate and fund the rebuilding of the Royal Navy after its defeat by the French at the Battle of Beachy Head to demonstrate that it is the state that switches from accumulation based on tributary means to capitalistic means, and in so doing transforms a society from a tributary system in which capitalism only exists as an economic system to a society that embraces

capitalism as a social system. In this particular case this transformation into a capitalist social system that facilitated reorganizations and innovations of production with the end result of production being controlled and owned by capitalists, which is in accordance with Marx's conceptualization of capitalism. This means that the definition of capitalism is not a binary choice between capitalism based on finance and capitalism based on production. As Uno Kōzō points out, production is still a necessary part of capitalism because producers still have to produce improved commodities in order to make continued profits (Uno, 1980 [1964]), which means that the definition of capitalism needs to encompass both aspects. The important point here is that a society becomes a capitalist society when the state itself adopts capitalistic principles in order to advance its interests.

This is also important to note because it also defines at which point a society enters the modern world-system fully, and I point out from my two empirical cases that the degree in which a society can be said to have 'fully' entered the modern world-system is dependant on the degree in which a society voluntarily becomes a capitalist society. This is of course not to say that societies cannot be considered to be fully integrated into the capitalist world-system if they do not make the switch voluntarily. After all the history of colonialism is rife with examples of societies being involuntarily integrated into the modern capitalist system, but it would seem to be the case that involuntary integration would severely limit a society's position in the modern system, with the most likely outcome of peripheralization and the development of and persistence of underdevelopment.

In the case of Japan, this voluntary switch to capitalism came about as one of the

measures put in place to rapidly industrialize the country in order to protect itself from the Western powers. It is important to note that the idea and the mechanisms of capitalistic accumulation were not entirely unknown to the Japanese. The experiences of the rice-merchants and brokers and the money changers show that these merchants were well aware of the capitalist concept. As such many of them would fit in with Braudel's concept of capitalism. The major factor that prevented the formation of capitalism as a social system was the tributary-based societal formation and the constraints imposed by political elites that were in existence at the time. This tributary context of the merchants being used by the domain lords in order to turn taxes in the form of rice into useful specie was constrained by the social conditions of the time, which also included the presence of a strict caste system. This rigid caste system was preserved by social norms that had not changed in the two hundred and fifty year period prior to the Meiji Restoration, as was the role of merchants.

After the Restoration, there was a short period of time during which the feudal system and the social norms that went along with it were transformed. Much is made about production in the discussion of rapid industrialization, and indeed it is a significant part of the modernization of Japan. The dismantling of the feudal system meant that people were able to throw off their hereditary constraints and find work wherever they chose in return for wages. However more significant than production was the adoption of modern financial and fiscal reorganization. The evidence shows that it was not the industrialization process that started of Japan's economic growth, but rather the development of modern finance including the state driven formation of banks and the

formation of the central bank that led to the economic growth of Japan, and this was what drove the industrialization process. This financial development was adopted by the state, which meant that the transformation of Japan into a capitalist social system came with the formation of the modern fiscal state.

This was a voluntary process. One may argue whether it was a true exercise of agency and one could even make the case that the need to adapt was forced on them by the Western powers, and as such their agency would have been severely constrained. However I would argue that even though there was a need to change due to external factors, the manner in which change occurred was not forced upon the new Japanese government from without. The Iwakura Mission demonstrates the exercise of agency because it was during that mission that they examined the way in which the Western powers operated their economies in order to pick and choose the approaches that suited the Japanese context. They could have chosen a trade system based on the British model, but instead chose to adopt the German model of producing agricultural products and selling them abroad to raise the capital that was needed to industrialize. This was also the result of the approach that Shimazu Nariakira was taking in the economic growth of the Satsuma Domain, which was very similar to the Prussian approach that was adopted on the national scale. This proves that they took matters into their own hands by making choices, which means that they were able to exercise agency.

This is a key component in semi-peripheral development, which in the case of Japan allowed them to favourably adapt to the new systemic conditions of the world as embodied in the capitalist West. One thing that was crucial was that they did not simply

start with a blank slate. Economically, they built their state-run economic growth on an already existing foundation that consisted of the financial mediation provided by the rice merchants which were in many cases transformed into banks, and on the import substitution approach advocated by Shimazu Nariakira. As such one can safely say that during this period Japan voluntarily fully transformed into a capitalist society and as such was able to maintain independence and transform itself over time into a core nation in the modern world-system.

It is necessary to add here that Japan's did not immediately become a core nation, but the Meiji period was the period when Japan's road to core status in the modern world-system started. This process was interrupted due to a focus on territorial expansion that resulted in WWII and Japan's defeat by the Allies in 1945. Japan eventually achieved core status after WWII due to the need of the Americans for strategic dominance in the region due to the Cold War. According to Chalmers Johnson (1993) the strategic needs of the US were met by allowing Japan to follow its already existing practice of state-guided economic development, which by the 1980s saw the achievement of Japan replacing the US as the world's largest creditor nation, while the US became the world's largest debtor nation (Johnson, 1993; Johnson, 2001: 61).

One could argue that the 'rise' of Japan that resulted in it becoming the world's leading creditor nation in the 1980s was solely the product of American financial aid and liberalization of Japanese politics following the war, and there would indeed be some truth to this. However despite efforts by American scholars to paint Japanese development and economic growth as following the American economic model,

Chalmers Johnson points out that there was a large ideological component to much of Western scholarship on Japan, which is understandable given the the Cold War context of the post-war era. This was despite the fact that, as Johnson put it, “small libraries grew up devoted to 'the art of Japanese management' and how 'the Japanese company' worked, as well as identifying a 'Pacific century' that was about to begin”. However the mainstream message was that there was only one kind of capitalism and that was the American kind. Scholarship devoted to Japanese economic growth was relegated to the realm of area studies (Johnson, 1993: 54). There were even many Japanese scholars posited that Japanese economic growth was due to restructurings in industry including the dissolution of the *Zaibatsu* (Johnson, 1993: 61). However Chalmers Johnson points out that this position ignores the pre-war industrial policy of the Japanese Government, and the links to the post-war industrial policies. Johnson argues that Japan's economic development was due to its state-guided model that during the post-war period was embodied in the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), which guided the 'producer' oriented economic growth in such a way as to benefit the Japanese themselves and as such were a means to an end rather than as “an end in themselves” as in the US (Johnson, 1993: 61-62).

The important takeaway from this discussion of the role of the developmental state model in Japan following WWII is that Japanese economic growth was not due to a *laissez-faire* classical liberal model, but clearly shows the role of the Japanese state in guiding the economic development and growth following the war. This should not be seen as the state directly controlling industry as was the case in the USSR, but rather it

took on the role of the mentor, the guide, if one can put it that way. The involvement of the state in Japan's economic growth after WWII was very much similar to its initial developmental and industrial policies of the Meiji Restoration, and it is clear that post-WWII Japan followed a similar state-guided path. During the Meiji period this developmental process was facilitated by both the Ministry of Finance and the Home Ministry, and thus did not involve an autonomous and independent bureaucracy as was the case with MITI. The involvement of such a bureaucracy is characteristic of the developmental state model, but the process of development was so similar in both periods that I can confidently conclude that the evidence presented in this dissertation demonstrates that Meiji Japan was a form of a developmental state.

In the case of Tonga, the first question that needs to be examined is concerned with Tonga's inclusion in the modern-world system. This question hinges on whose conceptualization of world-system one follows. In Wallerstein's conception of a world-system as a bounded social system, the modern world-system is a capitalist system. According to Chase-Dunn and Hall, Wallerstein's conceptualization is that world-systems are bounded by the mode of production, which means that there cannot be more than one mode of production in any given world-system, which is why he concluded that the European system and the Ottoman system for example, were separate systems (Chase-Dunn and Hall, 1997: 16). However Chase-Dunn and Hall regard this as problematic given that the European system and the Ottoman Empire were connected through trade. To them the exclusivity of the mode of production as the bounding principle of a world-system is therefore an issue that needs to be examined, and they

suggest that a better way to bound a world-system is through the examination of interactions that exist between societies within a system. In the case of Tonga it is clear that before the arrival of Europeans on the scene the West Polynesian system that Tonga was a part of was a self-contained, indigenous 'world' – that is a world-system, and had no interactions with any Afro- Eurasian system, and so can only be thought of as an 'external area'. However, with the arrival of European powers, they became connected to the modern world-system as represented by European colonial powers.

The evidence shows that while Tonga maintained its independence, it became a part of the extreme periphery of the modern world-system. Tonga is mainly connected to the capitalist system through some limited trade and more significantly the out-migration of labour. Tonga, similar to many Pacific Island nations, is heavily reliant on remittances and the fact that it is connected to the world-system in this way is a demonstration that the island nation is on the periphery of the modern system. However, while standard economic analyses make the case that these remittances provide capital needed for investment and for the purposes of commercial exchanges, anthropological evidence disputes this. The ethnographic evidence shows that for the main part, commercial activity plays only a small role in terms of what the remittances are used for.

Undoubtedly some of the remittance payments are used in commercial contexts, but for the most part the money becomes subsumed into Tonga's traditional gift-exchange system and is not used in a commercial way. In effect the cash remittances, as well as those remittances made in the form of goods, simply become another form of prestige valuable, and as such becomes a gift rather than a commodity, and because it is used in this way,

the exchange that occurs is not capitalistic.

This shows that Tonga, in fact, did not transform itself into capitalist society. The evidence of this lies in the fact that one of the deliberate choices that George Tupou I and his predecessor Josiah Tupou made when modernizing Tonga in terms of constitutional governance, was to make the commoditization of the land illegal. One of the ideological pillars upon which capitalism rests is the idea of private property, but there can be no private property in a system where one cannot buy or sell land. Secondly, in conjunction with making land sales illegal, the land-tenure laws provide each Tongan man with about eight acres of land, which while belonging to either the state or the nobles, provides Tongans with the means to subsist. This removes the need for a person to rely on wage labour to survive because the person is not dispossessed of the means of production.

This means that capitalism never became a social system in Tonga, and the maintenance of Tonga's gift-exchange system acts as a disincentive for investment. The evidence presented shows that the starting of a commercial venture, while not impossible, suffers because relatives in the person's *kāinga* or extended kin-group expect that commercial services will be free for them in accordance with the kin-based mode of production. So it can be seen that while Tonga is connected to the modern capitalist system, and is therefore a part of the modern world-system in accordance with the 'interactions' model of Chase-Dunn and Hall, one cannot ignore the social systemic conceptualization of Wallerstein, that while retaining its independence during the colonial period it was in effect peripheralized due to not converting to capitalism as the dominant mode of production.

This also demonstrates the state's role as a crucial factor in the formation of capitalism as a social system, because it means that the Tongan state decided not to make the transformation to capitalism, which in turn means that Tonga never 'fully' integrated into the modern world-system even though they are connected to it, and as a result remained on the periphery. In both cases it is important to reiterate that the direction that each case embarked on economically was voluntary. Neither the Japanese nor the Tongans were coerced to take a particular direction by external applications of power by the Western nations.

5.3 Geographical Component of Semi-peripheral Development

To Wallerstein the semi-periphery is that part of a world-system that serves as a stabilizing force. It does so by in a sense acting as a kind of intermediary through which the structural dynamics of a core/periphery structure are maintained. This structure is the result of the transference of wealth from peripheral societies whose industry is best categorized as labour intensive to core polities whose industry is best categorized as capital intensive. The stability of the system was demonstrated by a study by Arrighi and Drangel (1986) which compared GDP figures of several countries around the world over a period of several decades.

One aspect of semi-peripheral development that this framework relies on is the geographical structure of a world-system. To Karatani (2014) the types of industrial activities characteristic of the core and of the periphery was not the only consideration. The factor which Karatani focused on was the geographical positions of the constituent societies within a given world-system. Drawing from the work of Karl Wittfogel,

Karatani's argument is that the structure of a world-empire was made up of the core, the margins, and the sub-margins. These categories are analogous to the core/periphery/semi-peripheral structure of a world-economy. The core is the polity where political, military and economical power resides, and where the scholars, artisans, artists and other elites also reside. The margins consisted of those polities that were tied to the core through tributary exchange networks, and were thus drawn into and dominated by the core of the world-empire. The sub-margins were also polities connected to the core through participation in a tributary exchange network, but were geographically not so close to the core that they were able to avoid being completely dominated by the core, and as a result were able to pick and choose those structures of the core that they wished while still retaining their own institutional forms (Karatani, 2014; Wittfogel, 1957). This last point, according to Karatani is important because it allows the sub-margin (which he suggests became semi-peripheral in the context of a world-economy) to adapt to new situations, which is important because it goes to the issue of the agency of a society within a given system.

5.4 The Role of Ideas in Historical Institutionalism, Agency, and the Imagined Community

The role that the Historical Institutional approach plays could be applied to the issue of societal change on a national or even international level. Historical Institutionalism (HI) is an approach that describes institutional change over time. HI in so doing also seeks to explain why it is that institutions remain stable. This would at first glance appear to be somewhat of a contradiction, but it really is not. It describes

institutional change as occurring only in very specific situations when change is an absolute necessity. Generally speaking an institution will remain stable and resistant to change during long path-dependent periods. The reason why institutions are unchanging during these periods is because of institutional culture and the logic of appropriateness. This concept can be defined thusly: “decisions are thought to be appropriate when choices are based on shared understandings of the decision situation, the nature or “identity” of the organization, and accepted rules of what is expected in particular situations” (Frederickson, Smith, Larimer, and Licari, 2016: 172). In other words, it is a set of social norms and standard operating procedures that provide institutions with stability in that decisions that are made within any given institution are constrained. This in turn means that an institution will in all likelihood not make changes unless the constraints that are imposed on the decision making process by institutional culture are removed or at least sufficiently lowered in order for changes to occur.

HI describes this situation as the critical juncture, which is in essence a small window of opportunity where such constraints are indeed lowered. Temporally speaking, the critical juncture is of relatively short duration in comparison to the path dependent state that existed prior to the critical juncture. The critical juncture comes about as the result of an exogenous shock which can be thought of as causal event that leads to decisions which in turn lead to a new institutional set of norms. This needs to be coupled with another existing and contingent factor. In other words, I submit that it is not enough to have an exogenous shock, which is only one component of the critical juncture, but there must be another component involved, one which allows for adaptation and

transformation. Put more simply, one component can be thought of as the event that brings up the need to change, and the other component that provides a way forward, or put another way, one that is material and the second which is ideational.

HI is a useful approach, because it provides a way to visualize societal change and in this case societal change due to semi-peripheral development. Indeed it is an appropriate lens with which to visualize this because semi-peripheral development is about institutional transformation. It is also an appropriate approach when one considers that a society itself can be thought of as an institution. In the same way that an institution can be described as an organization with social norms that both proscribe and prescribe behaviour, a society also consists of norms and rules that have the same effect. Therefore under that definition the society itself is an institution, and as such can be analyzed in terms of the path-dependency/critical juncture/path-dependency lens.

This means that the Historical Institutional approach is well suited to the examination of issue of societal transformation by semi-peripheral development, and as such is a good way of examining the two empirical cases presented in this dissertation. In both cases the critical juncture occurred with the arrival of Western powers in the region following a lengthy period that can be described as path-dependent due to the relatively unchanging direction that both societies had been moving in.

In the case of Japan the evidence shows that Japanese society had some strong ideas about itself and its position in the world. These ideas included the Mito school ideology of loyalty to an unbroken imperial line as the basis for its morality and Japan's view that because of this loyalty it was superior to other nations. So coupled with the

exogenous shock of the arrival of the West, the contingency in this case was the existence of these particular supremacist views. There was one other set of ideas that would also drive the form that adaption took, and they have an external origin. The experience of Satsuma in particular as one of the domains that adopted Western ideas before the arrival of Perry is of crucial importance. The Iwakura Mission and others that Japan sent abroad to study were a continuation of the study of Western forms of industry and government that Satsuma pioneered.

In the case of Tonga and the West Polynesian region that also comprised Samoa and Fiji, the evidence shows that the three island groups were connected to each other through exchange in spouses and in prestige goods, as well as through conflict and political connections. This interconnected region comprised a stable regional world-system that had existed in this way well before the arrival of Europeans occurred in a way that was of systemic significance from 1770. Tonga reacted in such a way as to adapt to this intrusion of the Western powers on the scene by reformulating the governance system of their entire society. On the advice of the missionaries from the Wesleyan Society, including Shirley Baker, and other legal scholars from whom the Tongans sought advice, the king of Tonga, George Tupou I transformed Tonga from the complex chiefdom that it had been for centuries into a modern (read Westphalian) kingdom based on constitutional governance of the sort that was generally accepted by the British as being the requisite principles of international diplomacy and law.

In both cases there was a recognition that unless Japan and Tonga did not adapt to this intrusion by the West, then both societies would quickly become subsumed into one

or other of the European empires and lose their identities as they settled into their role as colonial possessions. Both Japan and Tonga had watched as the Europeans and the Americans had colonized the Pacific region, that is to say China in the case of Japan, and other Pacific Island societies in the case of Tonga. It is not enough for there to have been a recognition of the need to change, the real issue was this: was there a set of ideas present that could serve as a unifying and motivating force in order to facilitate adaptation? In both cases the answer is yes, there was.

In Japan the ideas that lead to the overthrow of the Shogunate by an Imperial force that had initially started life as a rebellion by a small handful of relatively low ranking samurai in Chōshū and in Satsuma provinces. Historically these domains had been at odds with the shogunate, but nevertheless comported themselves in compliance with the shogunate and its rules. One of the reasons that they did so is because the shogunate had legitimated itself by its control of its borders and enforcement of its isolation policies. This would become a delegitimizing factor for the shogunate as it became clear that it was unable to enforce the isolation in contravention of its own laws and the wish of Emperor Kōmei.

This contravention was framed by the anti-alienists as an act of disloyalty to the emperor, which had been preached by the Mito school neo-Confucianists such as Aizawa Seishisai, and those influenced by him such as Yoshida Shōin. These ideas preached the idea of the unbroken imperial line that had its origin in divinity. The use of two of the five Confucian relationships that taught obedience to a social superior and filial piety led to the idea that the emperor deserved loyalty because he was the direct descendent of

Amaterasu, the sun goddess, and should be revered on those grounds and on the grounds that Amaterasu also had lesser deities who paid her homage and who, according to Aizawa, were the ancestors of the nobility. In effect this meant that a person was not only paying homage to the emperor but they were also paying homage to their ancestors who had paid homage to previous emperors in unbroken lines back to the days of divinity. To Aizawa and Yoshida, this unbroken loyalty to an unbroken imperial lineage was the very definition of morality, and to them this is what made Japan different from all other nations such as China who, according to them, were taught that morality consisted of changing allegiances to rulers who had lost the Way. By extension this meant that any system where governments changed was seen as immoral and drove Aizawa and Yoshida to preach that it was the duty to protect the superior morality that was Japan and the Japanese *kokutai*. When it became clear that the shogunate was powerless in the face of the foreigners, it lost its moral claim on its position as the legitimate rulers of Japan, and so was overthrown and the Emperor was restored to power and prestige.

Yoshida Shōin was of particular importance because it was his students that filled some of the most important posts in the Meiji government, together with members from Satsuma who had been brought together by Sakamoto Ryōma, a *ronin* from Tosa on the southern shore of Shikoku. This direct connection of the Meiji government to Yoshida's work and ideas have been established by the fact that it was Kido Kōin (also known as Kido Takayoshi and Katsura Kogorō) who had been a student of Yoshida's, albeit briefly, and who had done all he could do to protect Yoshida from the wrath of the Shogunate, who had conceived of the idea of unifying Japan by getting the *daimyo* to voluntarily

return their fiefs to the emperor, and in so doing dismantling the feudal institutions and system of governance. To Kido, the only way to protect Japan from the designs of the foreigners was to form a unified and centralized system with the emperor at its head. This would be a show of loyalty to the unbroken line, and a legitimization of a modern Japan based on reverence to that unbroken line. The document presented in Chapter 4 entitled “*Imperial precepts, published to the people by the government of Kioto*” is evidence of this connection between the Meiji government and the ideas expressed by Yoshida, since according to The Japan Daily Mail it was Kido who wrote it. Of course this is only one document, and Kido was only one person, but the other students of Yoshida Shōin who had become members of the Meiji government would have been similarly influenced, and so this pamphlet is a good representation of what Yoshida’s students would have believed, and so as such it demonstrates an ideational link between Yoshida Shōin and the formation of a modern and unified nation.

Other crucial ideational influences on the creation of the modern Japan came from foreigners. As discussed in Chapter 4, Western studies (or as they were called, *rangaku* or Holland Studies) had been a part of Japanese intellectual life since the Dutch had been allowed to continue trading with Japan when the isolation policies were implemented. This meant that there was some familiarity of Western technology and science. There was also a growing recognition that in terms of technology and science Japan was relatively backward. This applied to Japanese military technology and strategies which had hardly changed in two-hundred and fifty years. Yoshida Shōin while on the one hand a student of the neo-Confucianists, was also a student of *rangaku*, and as such recommended that

Japan adopt Western science as a tool of keeping Westerners out of Japan. This recognition was also driven by observations made by Satsuma of foreign ships and technology during their suzerainty of the Ryukyu Kingdom (modern-day Okinawa) and which led Shimazu Nariakira to push for the reform of the Shogunate through *kōbu gattai* or the union between the imperial court and the shogunate.

The adoption of Western ideas was recognized by many students of *rangaku* and by those Japanese who had gone abroad at the behest of both the shogunate and the Meiji government, in particular the Iwakura Mission, which in 1871 embarked on a tour of the United States and Europe, as an absolute necessity in order to bring Japan up to the level of the Western powers, not just in terms of industry, but also of banking, finance, education, and military reformation, in order to protect Japan against the colonial practices of the West. It was these two sets of ideas that combined in such a way as to provide the Meiji government the impetus needed to adapt to the arrival of the West, and so Japan industrialized rapidly and formed a constitutional form of government with compulsory education and a fully functioning press, and in so doing not only preserved their independence but also set them on a path to core status in the modern world-system.

In the case of Tonga, it can be seen that they too had a central idea of themselves in the world. Similar to Japan, the idea of national pride as articulated by George Tupou I was based on the religious idea that Tonga was created by the gods and given to the people by them. There was also the idea that the chiefs, in particular the Tu'i Tonga as the island group's paramount chief and therefore religious intermediary, were descended from the gods. This also influenced their view of Tonga's place in world. It was these

ideas that transferred to the Christian viewpoint that everyone was equal under God that led George Tupou I to conclude that Tonga must change and become a modern nation that would be recognized as such by the West and thus maintain its independence. In order to achieve this, he and other chiefs consulted with the missionaries, and they suggested that George Tupou I seek legal advice on how best to achieve this transformation. The advice that was given to him by both by Charles St. Julian and Shirley Baker was firstly to create a constitution that would limit the power of the Crown in order to be legitimate in the eyes of the people, along the principles of constitutional monarchy as laid out by St. Julian, which included some kind of parliamentary structure. The constitution itself was drafted by Baker who had become an indispensable advisor to the king. The second piece of advice was that Tonga should engage in diplomacy by entering into treaties with the Western powers. In so doing, the Tongans were able to maintain their independence and avoid colonization by declaring themselves to be a sovereign nation in the community of nations, and by having that declaration be accepted through the use of diplomatic treaties.

The one thing that Tonga did not do, which Japan did do, was to adopt capitalism as the dominant mode of production in the kingdom. The central aspect of the Tongan constitution lay in its land tenure laws. Since the constitution prohibited the sale of land, private property rights were not institutionalized. This non-commodification of the land coupled with the allotment of eight acres of land to each male Tongan, meant that the Tongans were not displaced from the means of production. The allotment of land allowed the Tongans to subsist without having to rely on wage labour. Since this is a key

component to Marx's conceptualization of capitalism as a social system, this meant that Tonga never became fully capitalist and as a result has remained on the extreme periphery of the modern world-system. I would argue that this also meant that cash didn't really become the universal commodity used in commercial exchanges, but as seen from the ethnographic evidence concerning remittances, became another prestige item that was included in the traditional gift-exchange economy. This non-commoditization of the land was a conscious choice and was deliberately included in the constitution. It is difficult if not impossible to suggest that this was because the Tongans rejected capitalism, or to suggest that they really had an understanding of capitalism given that Tonga had never had a economy based on commodity exchange, and certainly had never had money in the modern sense, and so were probably not familiar with the concept. What is clear from the documentary evidence is that the decision to prohibit the buying and selling of land was to prevent foreigners from taking over the country bit by bit. However the effect of that decision was peripheralization of Tonga in the context of the modern world-system, which was a completely different direction from the one that Japan took which led to its present day core status.

In terms of HI, we can see that both societies had a relatively long period of incremental change (if any), where each society remained pretty much the same over time, followed by an exogenous shock which led to a complete transformation of the two societies in question. During the critical juncture it is clear that both societies had a particular set of ideas that acted as a sort of impetus for change. In order for change to occur during the critical juncture, there must be a contingency (Capoccia and Kelemen,

2007). In the case of Japan and Tonga the contingency was set of ideas about themselves as different and somehow superior to other societies around them that allowed for institutional constraints to be lifted for long enough for them to voluntarily adopt some foreign ideas in order to transform themselves into something new in terms of an institutional configuration. Also because HI is about temporality, it is important to note that the contingent ideas were present at just the right time. The different decisions that were taken in regards commoditization and industrialization can be seen to have had wildly different outcomes. In other words the decisions taken resulted in widely different directions regarding core or peripheral status. However in both cases what is important is that during the relatively short period of time, the institutional constraints on society were lifted in order for the agency of the political actors in Japan and Tonga to be expressed and acted upon.

Benedict Anderson (2006) wrote about the role of creating an imagined community in the context of nationalism and the transformation of societies. Both Japan and Tonga were able to imagine themselves as something different, and were able therefore to work to become that different type of society. It was contact with the West that showed both polities the possibilities of becoming something new. They were both able to recognize that they would need to change or lose their independence, and knowledge of the West and Western societies showed them the way. The evidence shows that their exercise of agency based on knowledge of Western forms and the pre-existing ideas about themselves allowed them to maintain independence based on the recognition by the Western powers that Japan and Tonga were able to change in order to conform to a

Westphalian form of nationhood, and because they engaged in Western ideas of statehood by signing treaties and engaging in diplomacy while changing their societies that prompted the West to recognize this independence. Because of the ability to exercise agency that allowed them to remain independent, I must conclude that the ability to exercise agency is a key feature of semi-peripheral change, and because change only occurs during a relatively short period of time during the critical juncture, the ability to exercise agency only exists as a possibility during relatively short windows of opportunity. Japan and Tonga were both able to seize the opportunity and react. As a result they avoided colonization, although their exercise of agency took them down different economic paths. The flip side of this is that countries that were not able to exercise agency due to structural or ideational constraint, the result would be both colonization and peripheralization of these countries during the colonial period of the late 19th Century.

5.5 Explanatory Framework of Semi-Peripheral Development.

The evidence that comes out of the comparative analysis of Japan and Tonga shows that this analysis of semi-peripheral change is valid. Firstly in terms of semi-peripheral status, both polities can be demonstrated to be semi-peripheral. In the case of Japan this status is derived from Karatani's examination of the proximity of the Japan to the Chinese tributary network drawing on the work of Wittfogel. Karatani maintains that because Japan was a sub-margin it was able to adapt itself to its own institutional needs, and this adaptability implies that sub-margin and semi-peripheral are analogous, and that sub-margins of world-empires become semi-peripheral with respect to the modern world-

economy. This is also based on Chase-Dunn and Hall's point that semi-peripheries are the locus of systemic change due to adaptability. I accept this basis. Tonga was a semi-periphery due to its position in its own mini-system as the core, which enabled it to assert itself and adapt. Both are therefore taken to be semi-peripheral during the colonial period.

Secondly in terms of the mode of production, Japan decided to shift to the capitalist mode of production as part of its political and societal transformation. Tonga opted for only political and social change, but not for a shift to capitalism. Japan thus became capitalist and independent and over time rose to attain core status in the modern world-system. Tonga managed to attain political independence, but because it did not switch to the capitalist mode of production, it cannot be considered to properly be a part of the modern capitalist system even though Tonga is connected to it. As a result it exists on the very periphery of the modern world-economy.

Moving on to the framework then, the evidence shows that there are three main

Fig. 8 – Diagram showing the different results of the different decisions taken by societies when incorporated into the modern world-system.

conditions to be considered with three possible outcomes. They could conceivably be more possible outcomes, but it would be impossible to account for all outcomes and still

be left with a framework. For the sake of simplicity I limit the framework to three conditions and three outcomes. The conditions are the decisions that are taken, and they are as follows: 1) Political change and shift in mode of production, 2) Political change but no shift in mode of production, and 3) No change politically or in mode of production. The critical juncture is conceived as being characterized either as both an exogenous shock and a contingent set of ideas being present (which allows for agency to be exercised), or only the exogenous shock being present (and thus no way to exercise agency). In the case of neither political change or shift in mode of accumulation, the society in question could either have simply decided not to change, or lacked an ideational way of exercising agency leading to a decision to change. *Fig. 6* shows from the perspective of the HI approached used as a way to visualize semi-peripheral development, the proposed outcomes of particular decisions in the adaptation to new systemic conditions represented by the arrival of an expanding world-system and the incorporation of societies into it.

From the evidence presented in this dissertation the following hypothesis shown in *fig. 8* that can be reached is that when 1) a society decided to adapt to incorporation into the modern world-system by transforming their society both in terms of the political/social as well as adopting capitalism as the social operating system on which it functions, then it could successfully maintain independence and take the trajectory of achieving at some point core status within the modern world-system, 2) a society decided to adapt by instituting political and social changes but still maintaining its customary mode of accumulation, then it could successfully maintain political independence but

become peripheralized in the modern world-economy, 3) A society decides not to adapt or lacks the requisite ideational basis to make the decision to change in order to adapt, then the most likely outcome would be both colonization and peripheralization.

The question of agency is important in this consideration. The study of internal domestic politics is important, and its lack of attention in world-systems theory results in world-systems theory being in danger of being deterministic. This lack of attention to the question of the internal politics of a society results in a picture where people are simply reacting to structural changes. However it is important to remember that people do have agency. They are able to make decisions and act on those decisions and indeed the exercise of agency results in new structures being formed. If people are able to exercise agency then the decisions that political actors makes determines the outcome and thus the form that the new structure takes. However in order to exercise agency, there needs to be some form of ideational basis. In other words, there needs to be a set of contingent ideas that give impetus and direction. In *fig. 8*, one of the conditions is that there is a lack of such an ideational basis, but I do not mean to say that there are no ideas at all, but they simply might not be connected temporally to the exogenous shock. This means that the presence of the right ideas needs to be at the right time in order to be acted on. Ideas by which to affect change can appear after the fact, but in that case it might be too late for action because that window of opportunity would have closed. Contrariwise, those very same ideas might appear prior to the exogenous shock, in which case the need to change might be a very difficult case to make. This all implies that for a society to change the contingent ideas must coincide temporally with the exogenous shock. The ideas and the

shock must come together at exactly the right time, otherwise a society might not be able to exercise agency.

In the context of pre-capitalist systems, it is somewhat harder to form a generalized framework similar to the context of incorporation into the modern-world system, and that is because the political and the economic are not separated. Both the tributary mode and the kin-based mode are characterized by the ownership of the means of production by the state (in the case of the tributary mode) and kin-groups (in the case of the kin-ordered mode of production) (Wolf, 1982: Chapter 3). As such economic adaptation and political adaptation would be the same since the concern would be on the exercise of political agency. However the experience of Tonga with respect to its relations

Fig. 9 – Diagram showing a hypothetical visualization of the decisions and outcomes in the context of pre-capitalist systems.

with Fiji might provide a clue as to what that might like.

The difference between the two diagrams is very slight, but the first is applied specifically to incorporation into the modern capitalist world-system. The second is an

attempt to frame in terms of incorporation into a pre-capitalist world-empire. This admittedly does not include incorporation into a world-system based on kin-based relations or complex chiefdoms which are characterized by a mixed kin-based and tributary mode of production. In this context, more work needs to be done.

In the case of Tonga the island nation was not isolated from Fiji, and so it is not a case of a dominant society coming across a new, weaker society. However, during the colonial period, probably with influence from the West, Tonga proceeded to try and conquer Fiji which resulted in Fiji being ceded to the British. This is not the case in all examples throughout history and this framework only applies to incorporation of polities into a world-system in a kind of first contact situation. However the example of Tonga and Fiji serves to illustrate that the decisions needed to resist incorporation would be more related to political change and not necessarily economic, given that the economic and political are combined. *Fig. 9* illustrates what such a framework might look like.

Finally I would like to conclude this chapter by presenting the following proposition based on the two cases in this dissertation. I propose that the above framework presents in a visual way how the exercise of agency results in the favourable adaptation to new systemic realities by a society in the process of being incorporated into a given world-system. For a society to change because of semi-peripheral development the evidence must first show that the society under investigation is indeed a semi-periphery. Secondly there needs to be some external stimulus such as the expansion of the given world-system. Coupled with the exogenous shock there needs to be a contingent set of ideas that inspire and give direction to decisions designed to make favourable

adaptation possible. In the absence of these ideas it is proposed that the exercise of agency is constrained to the point that favourable adaptation is either not possible or very difficult. The types of ideas must be those that inform a society of its place in the world, and that gives that society the impetus to protect its ideas about itself, that is the societal 'essence' (such as the *kokutai*, or essence of Japanese-ness in the case of Japan). The ideational basis for change optimally would inform the decisions taken by the society. These decisions would need to be changes to economic systems, the change of political systems, institutional changes, and the willingness to make changes to societal forms in order to preserve that sense of self, but in a re-imagined way. In other words the society must imagine it self as institutionally different from before. If those conditions are met then it is possible for the society in question to favourably adapt to new systemic conditions and to take advantage of any opportunities that the new configuration has to offer.

There is much more work to be done in order to confirm the validity of this framework. For instance, in order to confirm the conclusion drawn from the evidence presented in this dissertation I would suggest an examination of the experiences of the other major cases of societies not colonized by the West, such as the experience of Siam (Thailand), in order to see if the processes are similar. Secondly, much more work needs to be done in the case of semi-peripheries in pre-capitalist world-systems, and so some examples of cases could be an examination of the internal politics of the Sumerians that led to the rise of the Akkadian Empire. Other possible cases could involve an examination of the internal politics of various tribal societies around the world and in

different times.

There are a number of objections that can be made concerning this framework. One objection concerns the unit of analysis. Wallerstein chose the system as the unit of analysis rather than constituent societies within the system. The reason for this was that he and other world-systems theorists questioned the usefulness of the standard units of analysis of the nation and the state, and indeed the concept of the academic discipline and disciplinary boundaries (Wallerstein, 2004: 16). Social change is applicable to a social system, and a world-economy is a social system that is bounded and based on a division of labour that extends beyond the nation-state. So this framework can be critiqued on the grounds that it appears to focus its unit of analysis on the society, which is only one part of a world-system. My response to this would be that in a system, as defined by Chase-Dunn and Hall (1997: 28), changes in the constituent parts of the system have an effect on the system as a whole and *vice versa*. This dissertation as a result does not seek to invalidate the idea of the system as the unit of analysis in world-systems theory. However, if there is to be an examination on social change within constituent parts of the system and how they affect the system and how the system affects the society, then there necessarily has to be an examination of the constituent parts of the system. This is particularly true when one considers that that social change is linked to political and economic decisions that are responses to systemic conditions. Furthermore, societies that are part of a system are not unitary actors, but are an aggregate of diverse interests and ideologies which affect how social change as a response to systemic conditions takes place. As such, this dissertation adds to an understanding of how the modern world-

system came to be in its current configuration, in particular how a specific society fits into it in terms of core/periphery status.

A second criticism that comes to mind is that the framework is somewhat parsimonious and simplistic. There are an immense number of ways in which societal change can be explained, and there are an equally large number of ways in which a society can adapt (or not) to new systemic conditions. For one thing, no two cases will be the same in terms of social, political, and economic structures, and for another, history does not repeat itself on a case by case basis. Taking account of all the possible particularities would not result in a generalized framework that has any kind of predictive value. As a result, this dissertation has opted for a simplified framework that can be used in order to investigate the patterns of societal change through semi-peripheral action, and that can be used to make some predictions about other cases.

A third criticism could be made concerning the use of the developmental state model. As noted, the developmental state model was proposed by Chalmers Johnson to explain the miracle economic growth of Japan and posits a particular idea of state guided capitalism and industrialization. Also as noted it is hard to shoe-horn a historical case into a model that has temporal particularity. However, the developmental state model can account for state-guided economic change in areas where industrialization does not take place, as Bagchi and others have noted (Bagchi, 2000: 405-407). It can, for example account for the reorganization of coconut-oil production for the purposes of tribute to a dominant society as part of state interests instead of the use by kin-groups, as was the case of the island of Moala at the hands of the Tongans (Sutherland, 2015: 6; Sahlins,

1962: 373-375). All this means is that the notion of a developmental state has to be generalized in such a way as to account for any economic change of the mode of production by the state for the purposes of the state. This was beyond the scope of this dissertation, and so would be an area of work in the future.

In conclusion, this chapter has engaged in a discussion of the evidence presented in the two empirical cases in order to propose a hypothetical framework of semi-peripheral development and transformation. The proposed framework places emphasis on the role that ideas have on the exercise of agency that drives the transformation of societies and has posited that without a contingent set of ideas that are contemporaneous with an exogenous shock no adaptation is possible due to agency being constrained by events and social norms. Secondly this chapter has shown that where such a confluence of exogenous shock and ideas occurs then adaptation is possible. The nature of the decision, whether it is political only or political and economic will determine the path of the society in question. When the society engages only in political change without a shift in the mode of production then the result is possible political independence but also the peripheralization of the society is likely. If the society engages in both political and economic change, ie. shift in mode of accumulation, then the very real possibility exists that the society will not only maintain political independence but also will likely become a core polity at some stage.

Chapter 6 – Conclusions.

6.1 Introduction

This dissertation investigates an under-specified set of issues in world-systems theory. The issues at play here are the issues of the exercise of agency by societies as represented by political elites in each of the cases, and the issue of why some societies become incorporated into the modern world-system in such a way as to either become colonial possessions and peripheralized, independent states and on a path to core-status, or why some states maintained independence while being relegated to the periphery of the modern world-system. These issues are explored through an engagement with two cases, Japan and Tonga. The purpose of this was firstly to determine which factors existed at the time of the arrival of the Western powers that allowed the two cases under consideration to avoid being colonized. Secondly the purpose was to examine why one achieved core status in the modern world-system while the other did not. The main focus of this dissertation has been on the issue of societal change as a result of semi-peripheral innovation, including the issue of the transformation of the dominant mode of production. Secondly, the focus of this dissertation was on the role that ideas play in decision making processes, and how these decisions related to the structural factors of incorporation.

The main purpose of this comparative analysis was to propose an explanatory framework with which to study the issue of societal change due to semi-peripheral activity. As such this dissertation presents such a proposed framework that takes into account primarily whether or not the cases had agency such that they could act on and the manner in which they acted. This dissertation shows that in the case of a society reacting

to new systemic shocks, adaptation by political change and transforming the mode of production resulted in an avoidance of colonization and the achievement of core status in the modern world-system. In the case of a society that only engages in political change, colonization could be avoided, but peripheralization would likely occur. This dissertation proposes that in the event that changes in either the mode of production or political system, colonization and peripheralization is the most likely event.

The purpose of this dissertation was not to contribute to the understanding of the histories of Japan and Tonga, in other words the purpose was not to rewrite the histories of each case. Rather the purpose is to use certain aspects of the history of each nation to glean insights into the processes of change that is inherent in semi-peripheral development during the colonial period. The approach that I take is an examination of these issues through the lens of Historic Institutionalism in order to extract a generalized framework of the question of semi-peripheral change, avoidance of political domination and the issue of achieving core status or the relegation to peripheral status. As such this dissertation hopes to add something new and valuable to the understanding of how semi-peripheral change takes place. As such this dissertation adds the experience of both cases into world-systems theory in a way that combines external forces of societal change and internal, and domestic political action by elites as they engage with being incorporated into the modern world-system.

6.2 Methodology

The main focus of this research was to connect ideational issues to the world-system's issue of semi-peripheral development in the form of an historical narrative. The

main approach was qualitative in nature and provided a comparative analysis of two cases, Japan and Tonga, during the colonial period. The sources drawn upon included both primary and secondary sources concerning the historical formation of capitalism, the theoretical and empirical issues involved in the formation of world-systems theory itself, the mechanism of transformation of Holland, Britain, the US from being semi-peripheries to hegemonic powers, and the thinking that political actors engaged in societal change had. The evidence consisted of both historical and ethnographic sources that were found in online databases, online archives, published governmental documents, and diaries and accounts of those who witnessed and recorded the events.

In terms of the role of ideas in political change, the approach is archival, and the focus was on the thoughts, ideologies and motivating narratives that drove Yoshida Shōin, Kido Kōin, Saigō Takamori and other Meiji officials in bringing about the end to the Shogunate and the restoration of the Emperor to power. The focus was on ideas surrounding industrialization, financial and monetary innovation, military transformation, and the Neo-Confucianism of the Mito School. Furthermore the focus was also on those in the Meiji government in order to examine their moods, ideological inclinations, reactions to external factors and to see what kinds of decisions they made and how they came to make them. In the case of Tonga the focus was on the documented relations between King Tubou I, the Wesleyan missionaries, and the British government, and on the role played by Shirley Baker and Charles St. Julian, and the diaries of those involved.

From these sources, the writings of the thinkers were analyzed and compared to

the historical data. From these comparisons, this dissertation connected them in a causal manner. For example, the policies of the Meiji government and the men who made those policies were connected to the thinking of Yoshida Shōin who had operated a school in Hagi, in what is now Yamaguchi Prefecture, where many of the Meiji government members and other imperialist fighters were educated. The case was made that the influence of Yoshida through his teachings had a causal link to the policies that were made. Similarly this dissertation examined the influence that earlier writers had on Yoshida, and created a kind of genealogy that took into account the influences on Yoshida, Yoshida's influence on his students, and the events surrounding the arrival of Commodore Perry that represents the start of the incorporation of Japan into the modern world-system. This analysis was also be applied to other key figures in Japan in order to take into account the influences of Western thinking on the reformers, and those of visionaries such as Shimazu Nariakira and his influence on the formation of the Japanese Meiji-Period developmental state.

In the case of Tonga, the same process was applied. That is in the sense that the events and thinking of various actors were connected by an analysis of the events, and an analysis of the thinkers and political advice that they provided George Tupou I. In addition to this, the status of Tonga as the core in an indigenous world-system was established through a static analysis of the Tonga-Fiji-Samoan region and the interactions between the island groups of that region at the time that Europeans arrived in the region.

There is one final, but important point to make here, and that is the issue of the difference in approaches taken with each case. In the case of Japan the sources of

evidence are historical in nature. I use a combination of historical secondary sources and archival primary sources in order to uncover the processes of change that the Japanese political elites took in order to change from a feudal, tributary country to a modern nation-state. As such the approach I take as it pertains to Japan is an analysis of the historical record.

The case of Tonga is different, not only because I needed establish through a static analysis of the Tonga-Fiji-Samoan world-system as it existed prior to the arrival of Europeans, but because of the type of evidence used. This is a consequence of the fact that Tonga had no written history to draw from. A such archival sources do not exist for that period. Instead, the static analysis had to rely on genealogies gleaned from conversations with Queen Salote of Tonga (as such then, this is an admittedly elite perspective), ethnographic studies, and the accounts of those Western travellers, such as Cook, who made meticulous observations of life and politics of Tonga. Following the arrival of Europeans, more archival evidence comes into existence in the form of diaries and letters, as well as the reports of British colonial officials in the West Polynesian region. As such the evidence that this dissertation relies on is not just on historical sources but anthropological sources as well. This is not an issue, indeed this is in keeping with Wallerstein's view that the best approach is a multidisciplinary approach. This is a view I share because any information that can offer insights into the topic this dissertation is concerned with is useful information, and there is no reason to exclude certain sources of information in order to conform to a particular disciplinary bounding.

6.3 Empirical Findings

Chapter 2 set out the theoretical approach used in the course of this dissertation. This chapter provided a review of the literature that is relevant to each of the theoretical elements under consideration. These elements included modes of production and the transformation from the tributary mode and the kin-based mode to the capitalistic mode that characterizes the modern world-system. The second issue examined was the issue of the bounding of the modern world-system and established a distinction between capitalism as an economic system and capitalism as a social system. The reason for this was to determine at which point each society was incorporated into the modern system. The third theoretical element was concerned with the issue of core and periphery hierarchy, and the shift in status from semi-periphery to core and semi-periphery to periphery. In other words the issue was why some societies were able to achieve core status while others were peripheralized upon being incorporated into the modern world-system. This chapter then integrated these different aspects into an explanatory framework that made three claims:

- 1) In order to avoid colonization AND to eventually become core, the society would have to create a developmental state and transform both politically and economically.
- 2) A society that only transformed themselves politically but not in terms of a change in the mode of production, could achieve political independence, but would be connected to the modern system as a peripheral society.
- 3) A society that took no steps to adapt, would most likely be colonized AND

peripheralized.

Chapter 3 examines the events that took place as each society worked to adapt to the new systemic conditions. The issues that this chapter focuses on are the empirical application of the bounding of world-systems, shifts in the mode of production, and the issue of the formation of the developmental state. The first part examines the events and important issues during the Edo or Tokugawa period that preceded the arrival of Commodore Mathew Perry in 1853, and shows that while the formation of capitalism was constrained by the strict caste system, it still possessed capitalistic economic forms. These were within the context of a tributary social system, but these pre-existing capitalistic forms contributed greatly to the formation of a modern Japan. This chapter demonstrated that the transformation of the Japanese state into a capitalist social system was at the behest of and in the interests of the state. In other words it was state action that transformed Japan into a capitalist nation. The crucial part here was the formation of the developmental state, which is key to semi-peripheral innovation. In addition to this, this chapter demonstrates that the role of the banks and financial innovations were crucial to the formation of the developmental state. As such there was a focus on the role of merchants and banks. The financial issue was important to the process and became a concern. There was a need to mitigate the issues of currency devaluation, the redemption of paper money and the resultant outflow of gold from the country. The government made use of the merchants in order to first form national banks through which industrial ventures could be funded, and the formation of a central bank that would have the monopoly on the issuing of banknotes. It was at this point that many of the state owned

enterprises were privatized, even though development was still a state guided affair. In so doing Japan adopted capitalism as a social system, which is the main criteria for moving from a tributary mode of accumulation to the capitalistic mode of accumulation. In this way Japan fully and voluntarily entered the modern world-system and moved to eventually achieve core status.

The second part of the chapter was concerned with the case of Tonga, in West-Polynesia. A static analysis of the Tonga-Fiji-Samoa regional world-system was provided. The reason for this is that unlike the case of Japan which is generally accepted as a semi-periphery at the time of the Meiji Restoration, Tonga is a relatively unknown case within the specific context of world-systems theory. As such its status as a semi-periphery had to be first established. The evidence shows that due to its position in the region with respect to Samoa and Fiji and the exchange relations among them, both in terms of the exchange in prestige valuable such as red feathers and Samoan mats, to name the most systemically significant items, and in the movement of spouses. The position that Tonga held during the pre-contact period was that of the centre of accumulation based on the fact that regularized exchange moved through Tonga – there was little regularized trade between Fiji and Samoa directly, and also that the exchanges primarily served the needs of Tongan social reproduction and chiefly governance. Secondly with respect to political and military relations, the evidence shows, especially with respect to Fiji, that Tonga was the dominant power in the region based on the virtual subordination of Fijian canoe makers and colonization of parts of Fiji's Lau island group. This political relationship also primarily served the needs of Tongan social reproduction because it meant that Tongans

had access to large ocean-going canoes that were then used for tribute collection, and as a way to ship unruly young Tongan chiefs to Fiji and do their fighting there. This chapter concludes that Tonga was semi-peripheral at the time of contact with European powers based on its position as the core polity within the Tonga-Fiji-Samoan indigenous world-system, because at that moment the institutional governing form and the power hierarchy was intermediate between the modern world system and Fiji and Samoa . The status of Tonga as semi-peripheral was not something that could be presented *a priori* and so needed to be established. This chapter then examined the actions that the Tongans took to adapt, which only included political change, the most significant part of was the decision taken to not commoditize land. The basic kin-based gift-exchange remained in place, and as such this chapter demonstrated that capitalism as a social system never took hold. This meant that, even though Tonga is connected to the modern world-system, it cannot be considered to be a part of the modern system as a social system. As a result, Tonga became incorporated into the extreme periphery of the modern world system.

Chapter 4 is focused on the ideational aspects underlying that adaptive paths that each society undertook. The first half of the chapter examines the ideas surrounding the events of the Meiji Restoration that include on the one hand ideas and national narratives based on Mito School neo-Confucianism and Shinto religiosity, as evidenced by the writings of Aizawa Seishisai and Yoshida Shōin. On the other hand this chapter also focuses on ideas that originated from outside Japan. These include knowledge which originated from the Dutch and from the experience of Japan with the Ryukyu Islands, which in large part led to the implementation of import substitution in Satsuma, where a

large portion of the Meiji government originated. Other ideas came from Japanese who travelled abroad for study and diplomatic purposes (such as the Iwakura Mission), and knowledge of some capitalist economic forms that were employed by the rice brokers and merchants, including the world's first futures trading market at Dojima.

In so doing, this chapter demonstrates that it was the presence of these ideational factors that allowed the Japanese to adapt to the arrival of the West in such a way that not only maintained their independence but also managed to modernize the state. These ideas had the effect of leading the Meiji government to adopt a program of state led economic development that included in particular the adoption of what may be termed a Bismarckian model based on the targeted export of specific goods that were agricultural in nature rather than a general program of exports. In return for the export of agricultural goods such as silk and later cotton, Japan was able to earn hard currency with which they could buy the necessary industrial equipment with which to build their industrial and military base.

It could be argued that Japan was forced to industrialize by the arrival of Western powers, but the evidence shows that Japan, while acting out of necessity, was not forced to adopt any specific path to development, and due to this, Japan had agency and was able to exercise it fully. This means that the exercise of agency is a key feature of semi-peripheral development, and this chapter demonstrates that the exercise of agency in terms of adapting to new systemic realities requires the presence of specific kinds of ideational considerations described above, because they provide actors with the motivation to change and the direction in which to travel.

The second half of the chapter focuses on the ideas that shaped the Tongan response to the arrival of the colonial powers. In particular it is concerned with the political transformation undertaken by King George Tupou I and his predecessor Josiah. These political changes were influenced by the Wesleyan Church Missionaries who instilled in the Tongans a deep sense of religiosity and Christian based morality and which influence some of the political changes. Political change in Tonga was also influenced by British legal experts such as Charles St. Julian who was advisor to the King of Hawai'i, and one Shirley Baker, who was a missionary in Tonga and became the confidant of George Tupou I, even serving as his Prime Minister. It was Baker who drafted the Tongan Constitution, for instance, which arguably shows that his influence on Tongan transformation was a major ideational factor in the maintenance of Tongan independence. Wallerstein's point that the capitalist world-system is a self-contained social system necessarily means that other world-systems based on other modes of production are similarly self-contained social systems. It was the influence of Shirley Baker that resulted in the very deliberate decision to maintain Tongan traditional gift-exchange system based on a reciprocity system rather than switching to a capitalist mode. This chapter therefore demonstrates that it was the ideational influence of foreign advisors that ultimately resulted in Tonga changing only the political system and engaging in diplomacy as part of the international system, but not in adopting a modern mode of production. In effect it was the ideational influence of foreign advisors that ultimately determined Tonga's place with respect to the modern world system as a peripheral society.

Chapter 5 applied the conclusions in the previous two chapters to the framework that was outlined in chapter 2. The proposed framework provides an explanation that involves each society's decisions being related to the ideas present and the ability to exercise the agency needed to adapt. This chapter demonstrated that in order for the constraints of institutional culture to be lowered long enough for change to be affected, it is not enough for there to be an external event that presents a society with the need to change. There must also so be something that allows firstly for the understanding that change is necessary, such as the need to preserve one's nation and national essence, and secondly allows for the imagining of a new type of society which provides direction for that change. In other words there needs to be a motivating force coupled with a direction of travel. The case was made that if there is not a set of contingent motivating ideas present at the same time as the external force, then the institutional constraints will not be overcome. As such agency cannot be exercised and adaptation will not take place. This chapter proposes that the kinds of decisions driven by these ideas must be ones that involve political and social change, and in terms of the capitalist world-system, must be the adoption of capitalism and the formation of what could be described as a 'developmental' state.

6.4 Theoretical Conclusions

Drawing all of the evidence together, this dissertation has demonstrated the close and necessary relationship between ideas, political decisions, and semi-peripheral development. This dissertation seeks to create an explanatory framework that can be applied to different cases in the modern period, and in pre-capitalist contexts. Chase-

Dunn and Hall provide a number of definitions of 'semi-periphery', including the idea that a semi-periphery is a region that may be intermediate in terms of institutional forms (Chase-Dunn and Hall, 1997: 37). Karatani (2014) argues that semi-peripheries in terms of the modern world-system are those polities that were the sub-marginal areas of older world-empires. Taken together in accordance with these general definitions, this dissertation has demonstrated that both cases qualify as semi-peripheries. Both Chase-Dunn and Hall, and Karatani make the case that semi-peripheries are those polities that are able to adapt to new systemic realities by affecting change in themselves and in the system as a whole. World-systems theory as an approach tends not to focus on the internal domestic politics of component societies, and so tends to emphasize structural change over agency due to the focus on the system as a whole as the unit of analysis. I think this is a mistake, because this removes the question of agency from the equation, and makes it difficult to provide an analysis of societal change because societies and the human beings that make up the societies are not simply mindless and agent-less automats, simply reacting to events. In short it is the exercise of agency that drives the manner in which adaptation takes. This then means that an examination of agency is important to understanding how societies change generally speaking, and how they change in the context of semi-peripheral development specifically.

This dissertation treats societies as institutions and as such views societal change and the exercise of agency through the lens of the Historical Institutionalism. An examination of institutional change through this lens reveals that institutions do not change unless they have to. This is because of the constraints on action and ideas by

institutional culture, and that there are only very short windows of opportunity when the institutional constraints are lowered and change is possible. Similarly, when one considers the life of a given society through Braudel's *longue durée* period of social time that is concerned with material life, it becomes clear that in terms of social norms, societies also do not change much, except at very specific times. So this means that the explanatory framework of semi-peripheral change can be viewed through the lens of a critical juncture.

By examining the relationship between agency that allows for decisions to be made, and the ideas that underlay the decision, we can examine how different decisions have a different set of outcomes that affect the structure of the system. Kojin Karatani makes the point that the cores of world-empires are usually peripheralized (Karatani, 2014: 163). This is due to the non-adaptive nature that they have due to a particularly strong and unyielding set of institutional constraints. Similarly the margins of world-empires are unable to adapt due to their institutional culture being subsumed into the culture of the core, and are also usually peripheralized. From that theoretical position two statements can be formulated. 1) Those societies that could exercise agency were not peripheralized, and 2) those societies that could not exercise agency were peripheralized. The first statement needs to be altered slightly because this dissertation is distinguishing between the political and economic changes. Those societies that can exercise agency and that opt only for political adaptation and form a new kind of nation can potentially avoid colonization but not peripheralization. In order to avoid peripheralization the society must also adapt by fully adopting the capitalist mode of accumulation.

This distinction is borne out by the empirical cases. Japan, which adapted by both changing politically and by switching to the capitalist mode managed to not only avoid colonization but also managed to eventually gain core status in the modern world-system. By contrast, Tonga, which only opted for political change, managed to avoid colonization, but because it did not adopt capitalism as the dominant mode of production it was peripheralized. If there had been no ability to exercise agency, then it is clear that as a necessary opposite to the above statements, a society would have been unable to avoid either colonization or peripheralization. This also goes for a society that, for whatever reason, saw no reason to change and so did not do so.

The resulting framework which was presented in Chapter 5, lays out 2 types of conditions:

- 1) exogenous shock and the ability to act on agency
- 2) exogenous shock without agency.

Then it lays out three types of decisions:

- 1) Political and mode of accumulation transformation
- 2) Political change only
- 3) No change.

The framework proposes that in the case of agency and the exogenous shock being present, if the decision is both political change and mode of accumulation change, then the society would have avoided colonization and would have been able to change the trajectory of their society and potentially achieve core status at some point. When the decision was political change only, then colonization could have been avoided but the

society would be peripheralized. In the case of agency either being constrained or in the absence of agency, no change could have been made and the result would be colonization and peripheralization. This explanatory framework is in the context of the colonial period and incorporation in to the modern-capitalist world-system, but what about different types of systems? This is the challenge set up by Chase-Dunn and Hall (1997) who called for more work to be done on tributary and kin-based systems. I therefore present a second proposed framework that was adapted from the first, from which we can hypothesize three things. Firstly in the case of both political and mode of accumulation change, then the possible outcome could be semi-peripheral change leading to eventual possible core status as a new world-empire. This outcome is consistent with the evolution of a world-system, according to Eckholm and Friedman (1985) who describe a situation where competition between polities leads to the growth and the subsequent fall of a hegemonic power which further leads to more competition and the replacement of the hegemonic power with another hegemonic power (Eckholm and Friedman, 1985: 112). The second decision affecting political change only hypothesizes that that the outcome could possibly be political independence, and also could be subjugation, but that peripheralization would likely occur. Thirdly if no agency existed or if agency was somehow constrained, then subjugation and peripheralization would be the most likely outcome. It is hard to provide a framework similar to the first one, because in a capitalist system, the political and the economic are separate, but in a pre-capitalist system the political and the economic are not separated due to access of the means of production being controlled by political elites rather than capitalists. So in the second framework, political subjugation and economic

peripheralization could be one and the same. In such a case it would be entirely possible that the outcomes would either be independence and eventual core status, or subjugation and marginalization. However having said that I think it likely that if the geographic conditions are right, then the second outcome would be the formation of a sub-marginal polity, which would be able to adapt to future events in a way that is favourable to that polity, which at some future time could achieve core status as a result of a future exogenous shock.

In conclusion this dissertation has examined two cases and through a comparative analysis has presented a proposed explanatory framework that takes into consideration both structural factors and the role of internal domestic politics and decision making that emphasizes the role of ideas in the exercise of agency in reacting to exogenous shocks to the system.

This line of research is an ongoing contribution to world-systems theory. World-systems theory does not currently have a unified framework that takes into account both internal and external processes of societal change due to its focus on external interactions. It does not place emphasis on states or by extension societies even though when a system changes one society will have an effect on both the other constituent parts of the system and the system as a whole (Chase-Dunn and Hall, 1997: 28). It does not take into account decision making and human agency and thus is in danger of being overly deterministic and presents a distorted picture of societal change. This work is also of significance because current events indicate that the global system is undergoing a change in terms of a shifting of hegemonic power globally, and so the issue is how emergent powers adapt to

changes in the new world-system in a beneficial way. This is important because it is clear that the modern world system is shifting in terms of the rapid rise of east Asia, with China possibly creating a new hegemony (Arrighi, 2007: 1, 2). Others disagree and propose that the modern world-system is shifting possibly to a world government based on “transnational socialist organization” (Chase-Dunn and Hall, 1997: 241, 246). Whatever the case may be, it is true that at this point there is no way of knowing. This is because at this time there is not enough information about processes of change in a world-systems context in order to answer that question. This dissertation attempts to shed some light on the matter. The implications are largely theoretical, but there are also 'real-world' implications. The information gained through the creation of the proposed framework could provide policy makers information on which to base public policy decisions with respect to how societies and states navigate a changing world-system.

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