Pacification through humanitarian aid: Examining Canada’s security-development role in Haiti.

by

David Meinen

A thesis submitted to The Faculty of Graduate and Postdoctoral Affairs in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

in

Legal Studies

Carleton University
Ottawa, Ontario

© 2016 David Meinen
Abstract

This project investigates the ways in which the logics of security have influenced Canadian foreign development policies and practices. In particular, it examines what has become known as the security-development nexus (Duffield, 2001), and how this nexus has precipitated a shift in the role of Canadian nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) involved in the restructuring of Haiti. I offer a parallel reading of the history of policing/security and development and reposition questions about the contemporary security-development nexus within a long-established political and economic process anticipated by notions of security forged during the Enlightenment. This imperial thinking has produced a multiplicity of pacification projects that include Haiti. Thus, I show that the work of contemporary Canadian NGOs in Haiti can be better understood within the broad historical project of police science.
Acknowledgements

I owe a great debt of gratitude to many people for their help in starting and completing this thesis. Dr. George Rigakos’ early invitation to England to present my undergraduate work alongside the anti-security collective was momentous for me, and his tutelage over the last two years has been exemplary. I have gained knowledge, maturity, and a level of scholarly development that will forever remain with me. Likewise, Dr. Dominique Marshall’s guidance on matters of humanitarianism and truly genuine interest in my project and academic development is beyond measure. Combined, Dr. Marshall’s passion for the history of humanitarianism and Dr. Rigakos’ critical Marxist engagement with security and policing helped me to find and clarify my own research passion. Thank you both. And a warm thank you to Dr. Augustine Park for your insightful and challenging comments and questions during the defence. You have left me with much to think about moving forward.

To Ian, you’re excitement at the prospect of my return to school in 2013 and your assistance in the drafting of early graduate school proposals has not gone unnoticed. It was, in fact, one of the most significant contributions to my early success and transition back into academia. Indeed, you are a gentleman and a scholar.

To my mom and dad, you’re immediate encouragement of my, albeit slightly hesitant, decision to act on my inclination to pursue graduate studies is one of my fondest memories. I have always placed the greatest value in your opinions and perspectives on life. And Melanie, you are the best sister a brother can have and your regular iteration of your pride for me never grows old.

In many and often un-assumed ways, some of the most regular and passing interactions with my classmates, professors, and friends routinely provided the needed momentum to persevere through the trials and tribulations of graduate school. Also, I would be remiss if I did not extend my utmost gratitude to Kara Brisson-Boivin for her advice on how to approach potential interviewees and the resources she provided. Thank you, Kara.

Last, but certainly not least, to Hilary. You are the love of my life, my best friend, and my confidant. Just as my Master’s experience was getting started, yours was coming to a close, and I could not imagine sharing this experience with anyone else. I love you.
# Table of Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgements</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table of Contents</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 1: <em>Polizei</em>: Toward an Understanding of Security and Capital</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 2: Tracing Development: The Continuity of Narratives and Security-Development</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 3: Delusions of Global Society: Early Colonialism and the Co-Optation of Compassion</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 4: Haiti: A Life of Pacification and Weapons of Conciliation</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>References</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix A: List of Interview Subjects</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix B: Consent Form</td>
<td>176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix C: Research Instrument</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Introduction

Security and development have been theoretically framed alongside one another since the birth of development studies in the 1950s (Telatin, 2011). The interconnection of the two fields of study have undergone minor discursive and theoretical changes in response to the shifting political landscape post-WWII, yet it was not until the 1990s that the two were cast as mutually dependent in theoretical and operational terms (ibid, p. 8). This binding of security to development is now known as the *security-development nexus* (Duffield, 2001). The dominant conclusion in the development literature is that this shift was and continues to be represented by the concepts of human security and human development (see Telatin, 2011; Booth, 1991; Thede, 2013; Duffield, 2001; Bilgin, 2003; Charrett, 2009). Human security, one of many expanded security neologisms emerging from the period, was first amplified in the Commission on Global Governance’s 1995 report *Our Global Community* (Commission on Global Governance, 2016).¹ The report maintained that in order to further the agenda of global security, security policy needed to incorporate military and nonmilitary factors, turning on its head the “bedrock assumption of security… that what goes on inside the state is peaceful and what goes on outside is anarchic” (Bilgin, 2003, p. 213). Security was seen as fluid and as an evocative term to “direct attention to problems faced by individuals and social groups during humanitarian catastrophes” (ibid, p. 215).

¹ The commission was established in 1992 in the aftermath of two meetings of international representatives organized by West German Chancellor Willy Brandt. The Commission’s “understanding of security was based on a broad definition that included human and planet well-being” (Commission on Global Governance, 2016). The Commission was not a UN body, but instead resulted from a consolidation of members of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, the World Commission on Environment and Development, and the South Commission. Committee members believed that although there appeared to be an improvement in international affairs with the easing of East-West relations in Germany, there existed a pressing need, still, to improve upon multilateral action and global cooperation (ibid.).
This fluidity, so perceived, has formed the basis of Critical Security Studies, which for the past two decades has been heralded as the most progressive and wide-ranging analytical engagement with security (see Booth, 1991; Charrett, 2009; Bilgin, 2003; Krause, 1997). Critical Security Studies represents, at least hypothetically, the ‘new’ security agenda; a break from traditional security studies that analyzed only the state as an agent and provider of security. Critical Security theorists claim that there can be no pre-defined meaning of security; that the discourse can be unpacked and contextualized differently in various fields of study, particularly international relations and development studies that Postmodernists claim are “in a perpetual state of flux – of movement, change, and instability” (Telatin, 2011, p. 17 quoting George, 1994, p. 29). Central to the Critical Security theorist’s inquiry is the repositioning of the questions of security around the human referent, positing that citizen security does not follow naturally from the security of one’s affiliated state. The achievement of, and respect for, human rights becomes the obligation of the security researcher whose inquiry must account for a codified2 interest in ‘human security’ and human rights since the collapse of the Cold War security architecture (Booth, 1991; Bilgin, 2003). Yet, what conceptual mileage, if any, has the Critical Security perspective travelled when the only veritable difference between new and traditional approaches is that the framework for danger and threat (Telatin, 2011, p. 16) now concerns both the state and the sovereign human subject? The state is now one sovereign actor among many, responsible for

---

2 In 2004, the United Nations established the Trust Fund for Human Security (UNTFHS), which “finances activities carried out by UN organisations to demonstrate the added value of the human security approach” (UNTFHS, 2016). The precursor to the establishment of UNTFHS was Mahbub ul Haq’s (1994) 1994 Human Development Report on human security, which argues, in sum, that “[i]f security had to be meaningful, its definition and praxis had to appreciate the importance of the individual human, both as a subject and an object of security” (Mgbeoji, 2006, p. 860). Underwriting this philosophy was the notion that “[t]he sovereignty of the human being is inescapable” (ibid).
acknowledging and protecting an obscure ‘security concern’ where there was ostensibly no ‘security concern’ (i.e. human security, food security, economic security, etc.). The diffuse nature of Critical Security Studies seems but an enlargement of the turgid liberal engagement with security.

Security is not a fluid concept. It appears fluid in its power and capacity to act upon every conceivable stratum of social life. Absent from the mainstream security researcher’s analytical framework is an appraisal of the nature and meaning of security writ large, which this thesis, adopting the view of Rigakos (2016), considers to be an implement of classical and neoliberalism and capitalism for facilitating the ordering of populations. We are born and seduced into a tacit acceptance of security that has shaped our historical consciousness, such that security analyses like those emanating from the Critical camp become rooted in crude periodization, such as pre- and post-Cold War and pre- and post-9/11. They do not work to expose the historical roots of power and security, which appears to exist as an axiom that needs to be reconfigured in response to changing attitudes. As Haitian scholar Trouillot (1995) cogently observes in his reflection on Haiti:

the mere proposition that one could – or should – escape history seems to me either foolish or deceitful (p. xviii)… [T]he past does not exist independently from the present. Indeed, the past is only past because there is a present, just as I can point to something over there because I am here. But nothing is inherently over there or here. In that sense, the past has no content. The past – or, more accurately, pastness – is a position. Thus in no way can we identify the past as past (p. 15).

In the particular case of studying security, development, and Third World states, therefore, it is important that we do so through the extended political trajectory, as far back as pre-colonial times (Randall, 2004, p. 49). Yet, most liberal intellectuals seem to view security as something obscurely related traditionally to imperial military prowess in
a grand Weberian sense (Davis & Trebilcock, 2008), and having become political and worthy of critical inquiry post-WWII.

Liberal theory is rooted in the supposition that security is a public good – it exists as an unassailable entity while “it grafts itself onto almost every aspect of scientific endeavour” (Rigakos, 2011, p. 59). Analyses of security, in turn, are repositioned “in the form of some notion of governmentality – not as a critique of governmentality but as an instrumental, pragmatic method for projecting liberal discourse over every sphere of [such analyses]” (ibid, p. 59). These projections give rise to binary divisions, either temporally, as we have already suggested, (i.e. pre- and post-9/11) or spatially (i.e. public versus private), and specifically what Jackson (2011) refers to as the “security-liberty regime” (p. 167). The liberal reaction to this regime has served as a legitimating function in relation to the status quo, skillfully evading questions on human rights and abuses of sovereign power in response to unending ‘emergency.’ Routinely ‘balancing’ contraventions between security and liberty (among other popular dichotomies) is but an attempt to impose formal regulations upon the state, which ultimately legitimizes its colonial projects (ibid.) and maintains the right to break its own rules.

An excellent example of this balancing act is the notion of the security-development nexus. As the dominant theoretical tool in development discourse and practice, the security-development nexus promotes the idea that security must be established in developing regions of the world so that development initiatives can be realized (Hyndman, 2009). ‘Security,’ in this sense, is widely understood to mean ‘economic security,’ the metric by which all indicators of security and development (i.e. job security, human security, human rights, etc.) are to be measured (Rittich, 2014, p.
233). Achieving economic security necessitates the establishment of markets in strategic states whose lack of commitment to western capitalism is argued to produce disaffected supporters of terrorism and criminality (Simpson, 2007, p. 265). To be sure, development practitioners are cognizant of this. As one interview correspondent, former acting Commissioner of the Haitian National Police, put it: “[s]ecurity is the market. I need to present security as economics to interest people and help make a difference. The abuses in Haiti never go away, so I need to sell security and stability… If you want to start a business, then you need to consider the police as a primary source for donations” (RC, personal correspondence, February 9, 2016). It would follow that under the security-development nexus, theorists would reify dichotomies such as foreign versus domestic, traditional versus civilized, and us versus them in their scripting of the security dimensions of development like so many segments of the market. This nexus seeks to introduce a less-visible narrative of insecurity that equates underdevelopment with danger and risk, thereby justifying colonial impingement (Neocleous, 2011; Park, 2014).3

My research question focuses on how the security-development nexus is not in any way a new or progressive approach to studying, or ‘bettering,’ international development initiatives. My question is not focused on ‘security concerns’ insofar as liberal theorists and foreign policy-makers articulate them. I reposition contemporary questions about a presumed security-development nexus within long-established logics and practices of imperial thinking and their related pacification projects. I will show how

---

3 ‘Risk,’ of course, is not so cut and dry (Park, 2014). I do not utilize risk in the objective sense, but rather intend to elucidate the partial interpretations of mainstream liberal risk and security theorizing that is, in fact, built upon some objective, scientific, or otherwise ‘realist’ deployment of the term (ibid, p. 296).

4 In the liberal rhetoric, the impetus for establishing security in developing regions of the world is always to make Southern states ‘better’ in some broad objective sense (O’Connor, Brisson-Boivin, & Iican, 2014). Such is the ethical obligation of the liberal researcher and policy-maker.
references to longstanding Enlightenment notions of security, and concurrent political and economic processes, help make sense of recent history in Haiti.

The purpose of this research is twofold: 1) to explore how the conception of the security-development nexus has altered Canada’s foreign policy for ‘failed states’ and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) tasked with facilitating reconstruction projects in Haiti, and 2) to historicize security, particularly in the context of Haiti, in an attempt to extricate the idea of security from the false binaries that obscure rather than shed light on this pacification. In the context of Haiti’s reconstruction efforts, the fusion of security to development has precipitated a shift in the role of NGOs involved in the restructuring of failed states. Additionally, the tenets of security-development have emerged as the principle determinant of Canada’s provision of funds to NGOs in Haiti (Walby & Monoghan, 2011, p. 274), reinforcing an overtly political agenda and prioritizing the NGO governance function over functions more traditionally related to relief and assistance (Barnett 2010, p. 191; Zanotti, 2010, p. 759). In light of this development, I argue that the application of the security-development nexus via NGO governance in Haiti results in the explicit fabrication of a social order, the aim of which is to increase prosperity, the minimization of risks to the market, and to make subjects more ‘productive’ (Neocleous, 2011). However, the processes of security must be understood “as part of the long durée of the logics of capitalism through pacification” (Rigakos, 2016, p. 6). As such, I argue that the work of contemporary development practitioners, particularly Canadian NGOs, in Haiti is better understood within the broad historical project of police science rather than humanitarian projects that are purported to be guided by the founding humanitarian principles and expanded rubrics of security. Thus, my
project is not just focused on the security-development nexus, per se, but security in development – a security that is a hallmark of a much larger, pre-existing security-industrial complex that is conducive to pacification (Rigakos, 2016).

The impetus for this research is compounded by the fact that governance through NGOs is connected with the identification of Haiti as a failed state by Canadian foreign and development policy-makers. Failure, Chandler (2010) writes, provides “an ever-expanding platform for global threats to gain foothold, to develop, and then expand at the risk of the entire globe” (p. 124, quoted in O’Connor, Brisson-Boivin, & Ilcan, 2013, p. 311-2). This increased foreign policy focus on failed states has been utilized to reword foreign intervention into humanitarian intervention, resulting in an increased reliance on ‘humanitarian assistance’ (Drury, Olson, & Van Belle, 2005) and the re-purposing of NGOs as instruments of (neo-)liberal order-building. As a failed state, Haiti is said to lack the capacity to enforce security and provide basic services, and thus is in urgent need of precisely such order-building (CIDA, 2005). In this context, Haiti’s humanitarian challenges – such as food scarcity, abject poverty, and extreme unemployment (ibid.) – are defined as security threats – resulting in a general lack of drug interdiction capabilities (Sorenson, 2006) and an increased potential for organized crime and terrorism (Simpson, 2007; Randall, 2011). As Curtis (2001) aptly recognizes:

This ‘repackaging’ of security as a development concern means that enhancing security involved changing the behaviour of populations within countries… Domestic practices in recipient countries are increasingly seen as potential security threats. This has led to a situation where aspects of these practices, such as domestic economic policy, human rights, the status of women, poverty and psychosocial well-being, are open to monitoring by, and the involvement of, donor states (p. 5).

According to Canadian policy-makers, in order to mitigate such security threats, aid must
target ‘security,’ and aid effectiveness must be measured against economic growth and poverty reduction (Thede, 2013). This is put into practice by the alignment of NGOs with private capital in Haiti – such as mining and urban manufacturing industries (Mills, 2006; Fantino, 2013) – in order to alleviate unemployment and poverty, which is believed to result in increased stability in general, and the reduction of crime in particular. Conversely, NGOs that do not readily identify with the state logics of security find themselves increasingly reliant upon unpredictable sources of funds from the Canadian government (Audet & Navarro-Flores, 2014), further revealing the threat-centric nature of security-development as opposed to a new and progressive type of commitment to the world’s forlorn (Simpson, 2007, p. 271).

My aim is to explore the possibility that Canada’s foreign development policy in effect re-purposes NGOs as policing agents in an attempt to re-establish stability and ‘security’ in Haiti through development projects. To do so, I will extend the temporal limitations that have been imposed on discussions of security in the existing literature and broaden the scope of what is commonly perceived to be police action. The originality of this research stems from the fact that no study in the security literature has yet been conducted from a historical perspective that examines security in a development context as a critical tool for the realization of western imperialism. As I have already articulated, the dominant conclusion in the existing literature is that the transition to security-development as a ‘new’ construct, theorized and transmitted by both foreign development policy makers and academics alike, was an inevitability of the shifting security concerns and architectures since the end of the Cold War period, solidified in its current configuration post-9/11 (Thede, 2013; Duffield, 2001; Barnett, 2010). These myopic
expressions of security are taken as *de facto* starting points that stifle debate on the nature of security and foreign aid as a historical element of pacification intimately linked to police power. A new start is required that links the persistence of insecurity to capital accumulation and dispossession in Haiti since before its establishment as a free, self-governing nation up until and including present day.

To be sure, the redundancy of contemporary security analyses, those “that are continually occupied in a process of helping the state to ‘rethink’ its approach to security” (Jackson, 2011, p. 177), now appears without end. Spanning the blunt temporal frames in the contemporary security-development literature, we see the ‘developmentalization’ of security pre-9/11 (Telatin, 2011, p. 28), the securitization of development post-9/11 (Simpson, 2007), and the most recent theoretical manifestations that ‘re-balance’ security and development and call for increased policy coherence between states and aid agencies in order to make more objective decisions regarding security (Dandoy, 2014). Outside of the fact that security is never explicitly defined, each of these movements shares one common denominator – reliance on some notion of the market (Barnett, 2011). Achieving security and development simultaneously is almost without fail, predicated on re-thinking ways in which the market of developing countries can be manipulated to better reflect re-conceptualized security concerns. In this sense, these so-called new or ‘critical’ security perspectives are actually following a script laid down by the finest imperial planners of the Enlightenment era that explicitly linked police and capital. These were unapologetically pacification projects.

I offer a theoretical redeployment of the notion of *pacification*, which has recently been re-conceptualized by Neocleous (2008, 2011, 2013) and Rigakos (2011, 2013,
Pacification has been traditionally understood to have strong imperial-military connotations (Neocleous, 2011) and, as its own term, was adopted by the US in 1964-5 to replace ‘counter-insurgency’ as a strategy of the American-Vietnam war. It has since been the focus of international relations and strategic studies (ibid, p. 25). In its re-conceptualization, pacification requires the destruction and reconstruction of a specific socio-political order (ibid.). This is performed by mobilizing the discourses and logics of security and dispersing them through civil society in an effort to justify the (neo-)colonial intervention necessary to organize everyday life in the production, reproduction, and reorganization of what Enlightenment theorists imagined as “the ideal citizen-subjects of capitalism” (ibid, p. 198).

Pacification allows for radical inquiry beyond the liberal uses of security writ large and at the outset of theoretical speculation, does “not presuppose security for its objects. It only presupposes their pacification for the purpose of rendering them productive” (Rigakos, 2011, p. 59). More specifically, studying pacification is premised on four objectives: to “(1) problematize the objectives of security; (2) build analytical connections instead of masking them; (3) displace the ubiquity and reach of security; and anticipate (4) the state of war (including class war) viewing security as an active, unfinished project rife with resistance” (ibid, p. 61). Furthermore, pacification presupposes a negative connotation and thus avoids the roundly positive associations bound up in bourgeois notions of security; it exposes the false binary relationships that disguise the hegemony of security; and pacification cannot attach itself to every category of investigation in the same manner as security. It is fundamentally a materialist analysis, forcing to ask who is being pacified and why (Rigakos, 2016, p. 5-7).
Methodology

I have chosen to study three main areas – security, development, and humanitarianism – predominantly through a historical lens. Of course, these areas are broad, and interpretive stances on history vary significantly across disciplines and individual researchers (Snyder, 1980). Importantly, however, history and the historical dynamics of capitalism are often ignored in studies of underdeveloped countries. This is because, Snyder (1980) notes, the more critical scholarship that places a greater emphasis on the historical circumstances and experiences of the South derives largely from scholars in underdeveloped countries and is routinely outweighed by the dearth of ‘Weberian development scholarship’ (p. 734). This scholarship focuses on liberal legalism/institutionalism and theories of modernization, which dominates Western social sciences (ibid.). As such, as part of my historical analysis I elect to reject the methods of narrower empiricist social sciences in favour of a political economy analysis, which does not study phenomena in isolation from one another. As Marx (1973) wrote in *Grundrisse*:

> It seems correct to begin with the real and the concrete… However, on closer examination this proves false… The concrete is concrete because it is the concentration of many determinations, hence the unity of the diverse. It appears in the process of thinking, therefore,… as a result, not as a point of departure, even though it is the point of departure in reality and hence also the point of departure for observation and conception (p. 101, cited in Snyder, 1980, p. 742-3).

The purpose in moving from the abstract to the concrete is to expose the historical nature of our social reality and the confluence of larger political economic processes (Rader, 1979), which is critical in the reading of pacification, development, humanitarianism, and Haiti’s history. Drawing on the influences of Snyder (1980), Trouillot (1995), and Rader...
(1979), I move to disrupt the artificial distinctions between development, security, economics, humanitarianism, and policing and embrace a holistic approach (Snyder, 1980). In this way, disciplines can be merged in order to grasp the unity of social forms that are, under pacification, bound by materialist determinations.

In light of this historical method, my review of the literature centers on understanding security as a centuries-old mechanism for pacifying populations in the pursuit of productive labour; ‘productive’ predominantly in the sense to which Marx (1976) refers to it as that which produces a surplus value for capital accumulation (p. 1038, cited in Rigakos, 2016, p. 15). This includes a review of the emerging politics of anti-security (see Neocleous & Rigakos, 2011; Rigakos, 2016) that serve as the foundational aspect for the bridging of humanitarian projects and wider considerations of policing, as well as an engagement with the unreason of liberal interventions that have necessitated this anti-politics.

In this thesis I examine the development literature in order to provide an overview of the theoretical scenario that has both guided mainstream readings of Haiti’s history and served as the impetus for the establishment of the security-development nexus. This includes an analysis of the law and development literature and theories related to modernization and dependency. The purpose of this summary is to acquire an understanding of the changing nature of development studies and the teleological narratives of progress and modernity that colour our interpretations and policy directions for intervening in ‘underdeveloped’ nations. It is meant to expand the idea of development beyond what it was conceived to be post-WWII at the birth of development studies proper – to understand it, instead, in conjunction with pacification since pre-
colonial times. Concomitant with this review is a reading of the humanitarian literature that has more often than not been understood as a nineteenth-century outgrowth of Enlightenment thought (Fiering, 1976), in parallel with advances of development. The goal, here, is to read humanitarianism through pacification as well – as a concept that predates colonial liberations and as one that is most clearly manifest, in the case of this project, in the seventeenth century evangelism that eased colonial penetration in Haiti (Peabody, 2002).

As far as the history literature is concerned, I have focused my attentions on the better-known critical writers, whose work constitutes the bulk of my historical analysis of Haiti, such as Fischer (2004, 2013), Trouillot (1995), James (1989), Peabody (2002), and Hallward (2007). According to Fischer (2004) and Shilliam (2008), many uninspired fictional and non-fictional histories have been written of Haiti that overshadow or altogether omit its varied history in favour of arguments designed to characterize Haiti as a nation plagued with farcical elections, failure, natural disaster, and coup d’états (Logan, 1961, p. 435-6). Such histories, both non-fiction and fiction, Fischer (2004) argues, reduce Haitians through photographic, philosophical and rhetorical mediums to their mere physical being – their mortality, or what leading radical political theorist Agamben (1998) terms as “bare life” (p. 133, cited in Fischer, 2013, p. 71). They exist outside the political realm; they have no political goals and revolution in Haiti was but a result of historical necessity to modernize (Fischer, 2004). Histories presented in this way slight the holism of political economy and avoid “the complexities of historical roots and causes. We can speak of political catastrophes of the present without getting caught in miserly pity and compassion, or a human rights discourse that ultimately only testifies to
its own powerlessness” (Fischer, 2013, p. 75-6). By reading Haiti’s history as a history of pacification, I can open up analytical connections that are masked by isolated analyses.

The analysis of development in Haiti presented in this thesis is largely theoretical, utilizing the secondary literature and critical discourse analysis to make the connections between pacification and development/humanitarianism. As my aim, in part, is to explore the ways in which Canada’s foreign development policy in effect repurposes NGOs as agents of order-building in an attempt to re-establish stability and security in Haiti, I have also conducted a critical discourses analysis (Shwandt, 2007) of the relevant governmental documents pertaining to Canada’s foreign policy in Haiti. These documents speak explicitly either about security in underdeveloped nations, market objectives in underdeveloped nations, or both. This has included, for example, publications of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, media commentary, and public statements and funding guideline documents of Global Affairs Canada (GAC). In understanding texts as part of social events (Fairclough, 2003), critical discourse analysis provides an excellent methodological foundation. It prioritizes the need to integrate the analysis of texts to “theoretical questions about discourse” (ibid, p. 3), which meet the goals of the theoreticians of ‘pacification,’ such as: Whose security is promoted? What sort of security logic is constructed and legitimized? And how is it being implemented?

While the bulk of this literature review has been instrumental in my analysis of security and development, in order to enhance the understanding of this material, I have also used select interviews with key correspondents.

---

5 Global Affairs is the department title that replaced Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade Development, or DFATD, following the installment of the Liberal government in October 2015.
As a second component of my research strategy I have relied on interviews (Shwandt, 2007) in order to ask questions directly to senior members of GAC and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) who have participated in missions to Haiti, and members of medium and large Canadian NGOs, including both secular and faith-based organizations (FBOs). Contrary to what I had suspected at the outset, the process of securing participants proved rather difficult. Through a combination of referrals and cold calling, I contacted a total of thirty-four (N=34) potential interviewees (many repeatedly), securing eight in total (N=8). The initial target was ten to twelve interviews, although the final participant list did have a strong diversity of opinion and experience. All potential interviewees were approached via email, even if they were already referred to me. The reason for this approach was so that I could provide a written explanation about the sort of security analysis I was performing. Anti-security and pacification is not yet well understood in the academy, let alone among the professional actors that deal in matters of security regularly. Through this initial contact, I could help foster at least a preliminary understanding of my critique of security before the interview so as not to catch the participant off guard, and to avoid providing a less refined explanation verbally. Consequently, this preliminary intro may have also provided the impetus for some potential participants to not respond.

Since my investigation focuses on Canada’s involvement in Haiti, I selected Canadian government officials and Canadian NGOs/FBOs that had or continue to have extensive operations in Haiti in order to compare and contrast their insights on Haitian development, to see how their understanding related to what is found in official
documents, and examine how their own institutions and experiences reflect different points of view on the subject. The final list included: two senior foreign affairs officials (herein after referred to as ‘FA1’ & ‘FA2’) with specific experience in Haiti’s development before and after the 2010 earthquake; one ex-Head of Policy for a large Canadian secular NGO (herein after ‘HP’); one senior RCMP official/ex-temporary acting Commissioner of the Haitian National Police (HNP) (herein after ‘RC’); one director of a medium-size secular Canadian NGO with over thirty years’ experience in Haiti (herein after ‘NG1’); one humanitarian coordinator for a large secular Canadian NGO with extensive experience in Haiti (herein after ‘NG2’); one senior project manager of a medium-size Canadian FBO with extensive experience in Haiti (herein after ‘FB1’); and one country consultant/country director for a medium-size Canadian FBO in Haiti (herein after ‘FB2’) (see Appendix A).

I am cognizant of the fact that Haitian voices are absent from my analysis. Indeed, on the ground interviews and observations of Haitian grassroots NGOs and the diaspora community in Canada would have given greater context to the effectiveness of current development and humanitarian initiatives in Haiti and illuminate if, and how, such initiatives have been implemented and adopted. As a result, I cannot speak with any certainty to the ways in which the foreign development narratives that are constructed through humanitarian and security perspectives are received, or even subverted, by the Haitian beneficiaries on the ground. In consultation with a PhD candidate in the Department of Sociology at Carleton University currently conducting research on Haitian penal institutions, and with NG1, I was well informed that the legwork required for this undertaking at this stage would be simply too great for time to allow at the Master’s
level. In any case, this thesis is primarily concerned with the logics of police science evident in official considerations of security and the dynamics and resistance encountered by agents involved. Resistance is pre-supposed. As is the materialist focus of Canadian intervention.

Three interviews were conducted in person; four were conducted via Skype call; and one via telephone. All interviews were audio-recorded with the express consent of the participant except for the telephone interview, in which case I took hand written notes. In each case, the completion time of the interviews ranged from forty-five minutes to one hour. Each interview was preceded by an email correspondence with the interviewee. This correspondence included: 1) a formal letter of invitation containing information about: my background, the purpose of the study, the procedure of the interview, a statement of potential risks and discomorts stemming from the level of risk associated with participation in the project, potential benefits from participation, a statement of confidentiality, methods for participation and withdrawal from the project, a statement on how results of the project would be distributed to participants upon completion, and a statement concerning the subsequent use of collected data; 2) a copy of the research instrument for their review; and 3) a consent form (see Appendix B). In the case of telephone and Skype interviews, the consent form was sent to the participant via email, which was printed and signed, scanned, and subsequently sent back via email for my records. Participants were assured of complete anonymity, as is outlined in my approved ethics application. However, because of the ‘snowball’ method of interview collection, in which participants suggest other participants for the research project, individuals who chose to participate may be aware of other individuals taking part in the
study. Additionally, I reserve the right to keep the collected data for a period of up to six years for use in additional studies, after which point it will be destroyed. These factors, too, may have dissuaded some from participation in the project.

The interview consisted of open-ended questions and themes regarding the development work being done in the context of Haiti’s reconstruction (see Appendix C). They were semi-structured, meaning that I was allowed the freedom (while limited) to ask questions as they appeared relevant during the interview discussion. Further, I welcomed the input (while limited) of the participant to determine topics or questions of relevance to the interview. This interview style creates an open environment in which the participant can contribute information and actively participates in the construction of the interview itself. Additionally, the participants were encouraged to ask for clarification or re-structuring of particular questions or topics that were unclear and were given the opportunity to review their transcripts to make any additions, changes, or to altogether withdraw statements as they deemed necessary. Interviews were not coded; rather, the data analysis was used as raw data that has been inserted into the text (primarily chapter four) as direct quotations so as to provide direct evidence to my interpretations and draw the analytical connections between the literature and the actual development practitioners on the ground (Rubin & Rubin, 2005).

Case Study

While I am confident that the theoretical conclusions of my project can be applied to a wide array of development scenarios in the global South, I have chosen Haiti as a case

---

6 I have used, and will continue to use, the North-South language and its variants (i.e. ‘the West’, Third, Second, and First World, etc.). To be sure, it is representative of a damaging dichotomy, as the ‘South’ more often than not is distinctly marked out for of its non-alignment, economic dependence, and failure to
study because of its distinctive character as the first Latin American nation born out of resistance to European oppression (Fatton, 2007). Haiti’s early struggle against racial and class subordination was one of the first recognized radical challenges to post-Enlightenment political thought, and its experience with pacification over the last two centuries has been unique. Importantly, Haiti’s relationship with Canada is also unique – one ideologically forged in the French connection (Mills, 2013, p. 424), later to be re-ignite in the 1960s (ibid.), and finally recognized in its current frame by the 1990s once Canada made firm its intention to join the Americas’ institutions (Klepak, 2006, p. 681). This included Canada’s commitment to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and then its formal inauguration into the Organization of American States (OAS), which marked, according to the analysts who have inspired the present work, a new era of adventurism and colonial management for the traditionally ‘quiet’ Northern state (ibid.). Indeed, just as every colonial and occupying force in Haiti that preceded it, Canada was primarily interested in benefitting from the trade, investment, and political linkages that involvement in Latin America and the Caribbean could afford.

In addition, for centuries Haitians have demonstrated a remarkable, even curious, resolve to assume responsibility for their future and to confront the forces that perpetually threaten to erase their heritage and undermine their capacity for self-reliance (Schuller, 2007, p. 158). In this sense, as a case study Haiti makes the reason-why questions of pacification particularly interesting. For example, why does Haiti continue to bear the achieve a level of material prosperity that is the signifier of ‘advanced’ and ‘civilized,’ or otherwise ‘Northern,’ society (Randall, 2004). Critical scholars have debated whether or not this language is typical of the structuring mechanisms that are products of the Greco-Roman-Christian intellectual traditions (D’Souza, 2012), or, conversely, whether the Third World and North-South ‘discourse’ offers a powerful rhetoric and rallying point for Southern communities to reflect their political alignments and solidarities (Randall, 2004). Nonetheless, I have not actually found an alternative discourse that provides a more appropriate degree of intellectual perceptivity. It is the language used in the literature and in policy documents, and it will be used here for clarity.
brunt of what appears to be a failed pacification project? Suffice to say pacification, or even its appearance, is a productive endeavour in and of itself – a hypothesis that is later explored.

Yin (1984) defines a case study as “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (p. 13). Despite the aforementioned reasons for using Haiti as a case study, I am skeptical to identify Haiti as one. In testing my hypothesis on Haiti, as if by a calculated laboratory design, I automatically become implicated in the sort of ‘Northern-centric’ thinking and methodologies that privilege the Western voice. As such, I would propose that I am not writing for the Haitian – they have no voice in this project; I am writing to illuminate the destructive nature and implications of processes of pacification in the Haitian context. Nonetheless, Haiti is the crux of my investigation and I would be remiss to say that Haiti is not a convenient example for my purpose of studying pacification. This is the typical dilemma of reflexivity that must be disclosed, which, in the end, Lichtman (2014) writes, adds greater credibility to the study. Moreover, I defend my choice for examining Haiti, in light of Yin’s (1984) case study definition, through the fact that my investigation isn’t so empirical as it is theoretical, and pacification is certainly not a contemporary phenomenon. Pacification needs to be written into Haiti’s story. I aim to build on the critical narratives that have sought to illustrate the iniquity of Haiti’s experience and begin to suggest alternatives to mass pacification, ones that re-purpose security in a development context and harness its ubiquity and potential to form the core of an actual global democratic economic social order.
**Organization**

Chapter one begins with an engagement with the liberal security discourse in order to deconstruct the misguided assumptions that security is self-evident, that security ‘priority shifts’ have occurred distinctly in response to insecurities that have manifested post-WWII, post-Cold War, and post-9/11, and that security’s legitimacy must be measured against human rights (Beall, Goodfellow, & Putzell, 2006; Stern and Öjendal, 2011; Roland, 2001; Griffith, 2004; Mace, Thérien, & Gagné, 2012). This preceding section provides a segue into my overview of the theoretical framework of pacification and the politics of anti-security. This theory sets the groundwork for understanding development in the Haitian context and for reading humanitarianism as a police project. I move through the transition from policing as an informal process to one that became the most critical government technology of accumulation and worker productivity at the onset of industrial capitalism (Rigakos, 2016). Further, I elucidate how this transition was made possible under the auspices of security, which continues to function as a productive element of capital accumulation today, and abstract conceptions of the ‘natural’ individual derived from capitalism.

Chapter two reviews the development literature in order to give context to the shifting ideologies that have provided the pretext for the incursion into Haiti. Despite the changing rhetoric of development and the new directions it appears to have taken (conceptually and operationally), I demonstrate that development, and all that it entails, has long existed as a tool of pacification to further the objective of capitalism, which is accumulation and the procurement of productive labour. As a concept and as a practice, development has functioned as a method of accumulation since the capitalist modes of
production were exported to the colonies of Europe’s major powers. These modes of production were made possible by bourgeois insecurity (Rigakos, 2016), which has permeated and intensified the philosophical dualisms inherent to development that “dominate Modernist and Enlightenment thinking [and produce] conceptual deadlocks by locking binary categories into oppositional positions” (D’Souza, 2012, p. 427). As such, I argue that the security-development nexus does not represent a new era for development studies, even though this nexus has substantially re-configured the work of NGOs in its coding of insecurity as a humanitarian concern.

Chapter three includes a reading of the history of humanitarianism beyond an obvious compassion and inclination to protest against physical suffering (Fiering, 1976, p. 195). Through pacification, Neocleous, Rigakos, & Wall (2013) write, “[w]hat might be described as ‘pure’ military actions [need] to be combined with a wider and more diverse range of political technologies to create a viable social order” (p. 2). Humanitarianism has long existed as one such technology, particularly in the context of French Jesuits in Haiti, which is explored in chapter four. Barnett (2011) argues that humanitarianism is an industry imprinted by modernity and the Enlightenment, wrapped in the ideology of engineered progress, and undeniably connected to governance – “a creature of the world it appears to civilize” (p. 9). While this is a close capture of the nuances of humanitarianism, I argue that humanitarianism needs to be read as a product of capitalism, not as an age-old exercise of compassion that was unfortunately imprinted upon by it. As Marx (2008) wrote in The Communist Manifesto:

A part of the bourgeoisie is desirous of redressing social grievances in order to secure the continued existence of bourgeois society… To this section belong economists, philanthropists, humanitarians, improvers of the condition of the working class, organisers of charity, members of societies for the
prevention of cruelty to animals, temperance fanatics, hole-and-corner reformers of every imaginable kind (p. 76).

It is, as I point out, a police project designed to serve the interests of capital, whether humanitarian workers envision themselves as operating with state-delegated authority or not (Barnett, 2010, p. 188). As such, this chapter includes the task of locating NGOs in relation to the state and problematizing the popular conception of the ‘third sector’ (as existing independently from private and public) (Hilton, et al., 2012). I question what the difference is, if any, between actors in the overarching development scheme when an appeal to humanitarian considerations can simultaneously justify military and police operations, NGO monitoring, and corporate activity (Whittall, 2010, citing Weissman, 2004; Evans, 2010), rendering the dichotomy between public and private ineffectual.

Following the theoretical groundwork laid in chapters one, two, and three, chapter four offers an in depth engagement with Haiti’s story of pacification, beginning in the fifteenth century. Columbus landed at San Salvador where he was directed to Haiti by local natives that advised it was rich with resources. The Spanish annexed the Island, called is Hispaniola, enforced Christianity and slavery, and within fifteen years reduced the island’s population from an estimated half million to sixty thousand (James, 1989, p. 3-5). The French, the English, and the Spanish would quarrel over ownership of the Island over the years until the French buccaneers proved successful at last in forcing Spain to cede the Eastern third of the Island via the Treaty of Ryswick in 1697 (ibid.). The cultivation of coffee, sugar, cacao, and cotton began in earnest, which required a reserve army of African slaves, and hence began the drain of Africa. This story, of

---

7 It is widely accepted that Columbus’ first encounter with the ‘New World’ was an island in the Bahamas he renamed San Salvador, although there still exists some dissention in the literature on whether or not this was indeed his first siting (James, 1989).
course, is not new. Yet, it is one that is often told through a lens where struggles for emancipation and revolution are driven by historical necessity, after which point the range of human endeavours and perspectives cease to matter (Fischer, 2004, p. 263). The revolution is an important point in Haiti’s story, yet it is not the part of the story that captures hundreds of years of pacification. It is romanticized in the literature (Fischer, 2013), and failure to live up to the freedoms gained\(^8\) from the revolution is that of the Haitians’ alone.

Over the course of Haiti’s history, the conflict between the forces and relations of production has intensified and produced an inherent self-estrangement in both the proletarian and bourgeois classes (Rader, 1979, p. 19-20). The latter is persistently annihilated by this estrangement, while the bourgeois class continues to feel at ease and strengthened by the class structure that is perpetually reified as the relations of development ‘evolve’ (ibid.). This relationship has traversed the span of Haiti’s history. And indeed, Haitians are particularly aware that “their past is their present” (NG1, personal correspondence, January 16, 2016). Consistent efforts of pacification have been made over the centuries to preserve a class structure, which includes the utilization of aid and humanitarianism – an industry whose violence is masked by compassion and that can more sublimely police Haitians into the modes of capitalist production. As such, in the last part of chapter four, I expose through my key interview correspondents how

\(^8\) Freedoms were never actually truly ‘gained.’ While in 1794 the French National Assembly ratified the abolishment of slavery in Saint Domingue, early attempts at reinstating slavery were seen, for example, when in 1798 the elite French colonial planters in Saint Domingue appealed to the sympathies of British forces in Jamaica to restore order, and when Napoleon sent expeditionary forces in 1803 to recapture the Island. Both endeavours failed (Scott, 2011). By 1805, one year after the revolution, high-ranking French statesman and diplomat Charles-Maurice de Tallyrand (1754-1838) sent a plea to the U.S. Secretary of State Madison on the ‘Haitian question’ in which he referred to all Haitians as those ‘brigands who have declared themselves the enemies of all governments” (Bellegarde-Smith, 1974, as quoted in Lubin, 1968). This vengeful thinking would set the stage for another two hundred plus years of pacification that had to be greatly intensified.
humanitarian initiatives are not just a continuation of a centuries-long project of pacification, but also how they have been most explicitly co-opted by a security framework that now seems all too permanent.

I conclude by re-stating that studies of foreign development should be undertaken through the optics of policing and pacification. Such studies cannot be thoroughly conducted without consideration for the processes of dispossession and exploitation that are a central feature of both contemporary development initiatives and the long-established projects of policing. As a concept, humanitarianism has constituted a central feature of capitalism since its inception, and the security-development nexus has intensified and epitomized this feature. It has absorbed NGOs into a scheme of projects nefariously described as empowering, while imposing forms of order-building and surveillance over populations that are regarded as the quintessential risk to global capitalism (Duffield, 2008). This is not to say, however, that NGOs/humanitarian workers lack the capacity to sincerely commiserate and cooperate with their beneficiaries. What this analysis is meant to do is re-conceptualize the ways in which we view development acts; not as “acts of aid” (Hyndman, 2009, p. 877), or of “gift-giving” (Reith, 2010, p. 448), but as acts of pacification. It is an attempt to think a way out of security, and security-development, and to perhaps live up to the founding principles of humanitarianism, which exist now as a feigned smokescreen for projects that are designed to dispossess the beneficiaries of aid of their autonomy and freedom.
Chapter 1
Polizei: Toward an Understanding of Security and Capital

‘History is the fruit of power, but power itself is never so transparent that its analysis becomes superfluous. The ultimate mark of power may be its invisibility; the ultimate challenge, the exposition of its roots.’

Michel-Rolph Trouillot (1995, p. xix)

Connections between policing and foreign development projects ought to extend beyond a surface reading of ‘police.’ Considerations of ‘police’ and ‘policing’ are often attended by a particular rule-bound rationality that forces the bridging of the two distinct terms (Reiner, 2010). For example, police is most commonly associated with the familiar institutional arrangement of trained and specialized officers, and policing seen as only one aspect of social control – coupling surveillance and sanctions for socially constructed patterns of deviance that threaten the security, broadly speaking, of all aspects of social life (ibid, p. 5; Ericson & Haggerty, 1997). While policing research has varied in recent decades, more often than not such variations have materialized in response to the discursive contests taking place on criminal issues in the political arena (Reiner, 2010) – issues that at every turn are embedded in the axiomatic liberal logics of security (Jackson, 2011).

Thus, in this chapter I will lay the theoretical groundwork of pacification to later understand development as a field of study and as a process dedicated to pacification. Understanding pacification and the political economy of policing is also critical to later adding the conceptual mileage to my hypothesis that NGO/humanitarian projects are police projects. I will begin with a review of the security/security-development literature from the liberal circles. I will then proceed to develop an understanding of policing and
what was once widely understood as police science, or *polizeiwissenschaft*, as a more general historical project that constituted the foundation of eighteenth-century liberal concepts of security. This reading will set the stage for my analysis of pacification as a whole, which will constitute the last section of this chapter.

The Liberal Intervention

If, as Jackson (2011) states, “the saturation of the social and political landscape with the logic of security… has been greatly affected by the rapid and unfailing expansion of the [liberal] intellectual engagement with security” (p. 166), then we should begin with a brief analysis of the security arguments set forth by the liberal intelligentsia. For the past twenty-five years, theorists of the ‘new’ security agenda have maintained an inexhaustible reliance on pre- and post-Cold War and pre- and post-9/11 temporal distinctions (Booth, 1991; Bilgin, 2003; Charett, 2009; Eriksson & Rhinard, 2009; Ignatieff, 2004; Mgbeoji, 2006). For example, Bilgin (2003) argues that during the Cold War, security studies were consumed by the notion of ‘collective security’ – the trope that security must be established and maintained in conjunction with a state’s adversary9 – and ‘stable peace’ – the ‘positive’ dynamic of security that saw the establishment of the conditions for social justice as a necessary correlate to the absence of armed conflict (p. 206). However, the conclusion of the war prompted terms from academic circles such as ‘global security,’ ‘world security,’ and most prominently, ‘human security,’ in an attempt

---

9 This concept grew to a particular salience in Canada at the outset of the Korean conflict, such as outlined in a 1950 House of Commons debate where it was stated by Cromwell that “[t]he international crisis (of Korean communism) created by the aggression in Korea enabled the people of Canada to show a large measure of unity. I (Mr. Cromwell) believe that all parties in this house are now pledged to support the principle of collective action, collective security, and all that is implied in those terms” (House of Commons Debates, 1950, as cited in Granatstein, 1973). What was ‘implied in these terms’ was not articulated.
to undercut the state-centric focus that dominated the Cold War period (ibid, p. 207). The human security paradigm targeted the human being as the object of security, whose human rights now play a leading role in the security researcher’s inquiry, one which also must account for an increased public interest for humanitarian intervention (Booth, 1991; Bilgin, 2003).

Human security has served as a label for the study of non-military threats since its inception (Roland, 2001), although, many scholars have reached the conclusion that the military fixation of ‘traditional security studies’ has re-surfaced following the events of 9/11 (Niemetz, 2014; Griffith, 2004). In response, liberal academia has moved to re-privilege actors outside of the state and to develop alternatives to the overarching security models (pre- and post-Cold War, post-9/11) that appear to be clashing. For example, Bilgin (2003) has endeavoured to open up the analysis of Third World Security Approaches, the general argument being that security problems in the Third World are, at least in part, created and sustained by First World norms and institutional doctrines that unevenly assign security/risk identities to underdeveloped citizens (p. 205-6). In an effort to counteract this paradox, Bilgin (2003) argues, critical scholars must re-introduce the notion of human security in a way that can (re)acknowledge the human rights regime and effectively render visible the practices of non-state actors, such as NGOs and transnational citizens, and, subsequently, the “consequences of their own actions for international security” (p. 219-20). Taken one step further, we must also recognize human ‘insecurity’ – the way in which “people remain unaware of the ways in which they themselves constitute their own threats” (ibid, p. 217).
Chandler (2012) argues that human security has been transformed by the ‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P), which has been developed in recent years. R2P argues that a state’s legitimacy “is based on the way in which [it] treats its citizens” (Whittall, 2010, p. 1244), displacing the emphasis on the social and economic needs of populations in favour of military coercion (Chandler, 2012). This produces a tension between the resiliency paradigm of the mid-1990s security-development formulations – a paradigm that recognizes the agency of peoples most in needs of assistance and further stressing their empowerment – and the liberal internationalist paradigm – that which emphasizes the agency of external interveners and their agency in reacting post-hoc to protect victims of state-led abuses (ibid, p. 216). The power of human security, evidently, stems from the former paradigm that emphasizes preventative intervention and facilitates a shift away from liberal internationalism (ibid.).

Efforts have been made through securitization theory, as well, to counteract the reverted security model and restore security concerns (proper) to the human element. For example, Charrett (2009) has set out to develop a new method for writing securitization. Securitization is the process by which a threat to a “particular referent object is acknowledged and deemed worth protecting” (ibid, p. 13). Securitization theorists recognize that since WWII security has been militarily focused and dominated by Anglo-American thinking and ideology. Motivated by this problematic impartial analysis of security, and what Charrett (2009) refers to as the ‘normative dilemma,’ whereby any speaker or writer of security is implicated in producing a specific knowledge about security, she argues that the elite control over security must be recognized and disclosed (p. 25-6). Only this will allow the researcher to counter elite utterances of security and,
subsequently, explore marginalizing securitization moves and counter-securitization claims, thereby affording a voice to the powerless, as it were, in their securitizing initiatives along the metric of human rights and, ultimately, secure economic markets (Mgbeoji, 2006).

The renewed emphasis on military power is also thought to have re-established the ‘internal-external security nexus,’ which was characteristic of Cold War mentalities (Eriksson & Rhinard, 2009). Eriksson & Rhinard (2009) claim that this nexus cannot be re-constituted, though, because of the changing nature of threat perception at the end of the Cold War (global terrorism, global economic crises, global disease, and the like) has resulted in the permanent intermingling of domestic and foreign policy (or ‘low’ and ‘high’ politics), and thus, the transnationalization of security issues (p. 249). The problem, Eriksson & Rhinard (2009) argue, is that “forces of transnationalization are overshadowed by the prevailing dominance of states” (p. 250). Such is most certainly reflective of a wider concern among security theorists with the Realist camp that is accused of arbitrarily privileging the state as the primary unit of analysis. ¹⁰ Thus, rendering militaristic conceptions of security ineffectual can only to be achieved through ‘human security’ – only to be realized when the researcher engages in critical self-reflection and appreciates the rights of people (of the South) to organize themselves along resource and socio-economic lines (Mgbeji, 2006).

¹⁰ To confront this argument, Thomas (2014) aptly notes that changes in development and forces of transnationalization have produced concomitant shifts in the development ideologies of the UNDP and World Bank. Whether the former pushes for a shift to a ‘human rights state’ that is essentially implemented by non-state actors in addressing the social aspects of development, or the latter which seeks to maintain Hayek’s (1944) neoclassical state free from government regulation, both “are normatively oriented towards certain philosophical commitments of the state” (ibid, p. 1004).
Chandler (2009) confronts this apparent renewed emphasis on states by calling for a return to a ‘post-territorial politics’ that was developed in the 1990s. This politics stresses the possibility for a post-territorial community that moves beyond the confines of the nation state and existing relations of powers and oppression, which can be achieved by extending democracy beyond the state (p. 54). Yet, this sounds oddly imperial and clearly indicative of the prevailing methodology of the security-development discourse that “relies on a Kantian vision of universal peace, with the notion of peace being established among liberal regimes first, and then expanding as new liberal regimes appear” (Watson, 2006, p. 324; Patnaik, 2004; Byrne, 2000). Like all other liberal theories before and adjacent to it, it rests on a rights discourse and a growing, oxymoronic claim on the ability of a ‘global civil society’ (Dryzek, 2012) to represent the people who actually have no legal framework provided by a state to whom they can appeal. The gap between ‘law in action’ and ‘law in the books,’ or otherwise human rights in action and coded human rights, is seen by the liberal theorist not as an

---

11 Chandler (2009) does concede to the fact, though, that “[a]dvocates of global civil society… are keen to assert that global civil society is actively engaged in debating global issues, but they are much less specific when it comes to detailing the concrete nature of these ‘debates’: the content or ideas generated; if a record was kept; or if the debate had any consequences” (p. 63).

12 Ironically, the 2000 UN Human Development Report defined development goals as “claims to a set of social arrangements – norms, institutions, laws, an enabling economic environment – that can best secure the enjoyment of [civil, political, economic, social, and cultural] rights. It is thus the obligation of governments (emphasis added) and others to implement policies to put these arrangements in place” (UNDP, 2000, p. 73). These development goals are known as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), adopted in the Millennium Declaration by the UN General Assembly in 2000. These goals have proven quite pragmatic. As Alston (2005) states, “[i]n the human rights framework, an effective response to the growing role of the private sector in relation to activities impinging upon the realization of the MDGs would involve several different elements. The first is an insistence upon the state as an actor with the ultimate responsibility for ensuring respect for human rights” (p. 769). Yet the bodies that monitor the progression of these goals are the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, who in their 2004 Global Monitoring Report wrote that the first priority of the state is to enable the climate for private sector activity, achieved through “solidifying progress on macroeconomic stability, further reducing barriers to trade” (Alston, 708, quoting Global Monitoring Report, 2004). Continuing his reflection on the Global Monitoring Report, Alston (2005) notes that “the only reference to rights is to property rights and the rule of law is defined in relation to matters that will facilitate a better business environment” (p. 780). Thus the state and private enterprise appear one and the same, furthering the objective of capital through a human rights discourse predicated solely on property rights.
opportunity to question the efficacy of the human rights/human security approach (Evans, 2005). Rather, this deficit is seen, as Trubek & Galanter (1974) recognized over four decades ago, as “symptomatic of legal and social ‘underdevelopment,’ a malady to be cured by vigorous social engineering” (p. 1079).

Ignatieff’s (2004) approach to security is perhaps the most clever of contemporary accounts. In his The Lesser Evil, he rather heedlessly approaches the question of what lesser evils may be committed in a liberal democratic society when faced with the greater evil of its own destruction. This greater evil, he argues, is terrorism, which necessitates the suspension of democracy and the privileging of security over liberty, precisely because liberalism is utterly dependent upon it (ibid, p. 5). Most fortunately for the

---

13 This, in fact, accords with pacification. Suffice to say, it is imperative to excoriate the ‘rights’ component of liberal security reasoning and move forward in understanding pacification (below) as a process built on co-optation and persuasion. According to Pashukanis (2002), “if we wish to expose the roots of some particular ideology, we must first search out the material relations which it expresses” (p. 140). He forcefully rejects the notion that the legal relationship is both totalizing and natural. Instead, law, and hence ‘rights,’ must be acknowledged as a historical category that rose to prominence in an environment that is based on the conflict of private interests. Collective social life and relations of the fourteenth century were extinguished as the commodification of labour and land required new relationships between individuals, and a “relationship with nature through property relations” (D’Souza, 2012, p. 418). As a result, contemporary legal relationships are firmly fixed in private property and the “very form of law was derived from the acquisition of private property interests” (Head, 2008, p. 177). What rests at the center of legal conflicts, and hence conflicts of ‘rights,’ is our perception of rights, or the violation of our right to equal exchange. Capitalist economic relations are in fact the causal source of ‘rights’ and the “commodity form comes to define all social relationships” (Anderson & Greenberg, 1983). Law and rights appear as a distinct social phenomenon only once people are standing toward one another with rights and duties (Fuller, 1949). “[J]ust as the market functions by ignoring use value and concentrates on exchange value,” Yalvac (1981) writes, “so law operates in a similar way: it deals with the formal equality of citizens and ignores substantive inequalities” (p. 78). Such has allowed international financial and legal institutions to recognize and protect ‘rights’ that “create the framework conditions for the flourishing of markets” (Rittich, 2006, p. 234), trumping the efforts of reformists to utilize human rights as a counter-discourse to globalization and elevating “transactional freedom, property rights, and the entitlement to participate in the market to the level of basic human rights” (ibid, p. 241). Rights are, thus, a tool for interfering in the affairs of Southern states, and of cultural imperialism – for constructing norms of a global capitalist culture where people face each other ‘equally’ (Kabasakai & Kehra, 2006). Security and human rights, or liberty, should perhaps not even be measured against each other. At best, human rights appear irrelevant in the study of security; at worst, they are a powerful tool of pacification.

14 Rawls (1971) was one of the first theorists to interpolate the balance between security and liberty. As Patnaik (2004) sums up, to Rawls, “[t]he compromise between providing security to the citizens and ensuring human rights has to be carefully guarded. The western societies (in comparison to their barbaric counterparts) have also witnessed the crisis of democracy and human rights in the context of rising terrorism. Individual freedom is curtailed for the sake of state security” (p. 2004).
liberal citizens of Western democracy, the lesser evils committed by governments in their response to terrorism (read Islam) (Jackson, 2011) will never become the greater evils themselves because of “democracy itself” (Ignatieff, 2004, p. 11). Democracy, according to Ignatieff (2004), is the protectorate of ‘rights,’ which are the sole preserve of enlightened and civilized liberal society. Consequently, the inherent adversarial moral competition in liberal democracies will “always set the standards for a war on terror” (ibid, p. 23) and restore the rights of the victims of evildoers (not to be confused with democratic governments) to their pre-terror state. Williams (2011) picks up on this thread and suggests that fear itself can actually constrain the logics of extremity. While Ignatieff (2004) subscribes to the Schmittian15 conception of weak liberal pluralism that requires a politics of fear and security to overcome its vulnerability, Williams (2011) posits that fear can, and must, operate in normal politics (p. 456). Such is embodied in the ‘fear of fear,’ or fear of the power and consequences of security politics, which is a “core part of liberal theory and practice” (ibid, p. 456).

Ignatieff (2004) and his contemporaries repeatedly pit the doctrines (or myths) of security and democracy against one another, failing altogether to reflect, in any capacity, on the nature of capitalism. As Dupuy (2013) notes, if we are to understand sovereignty as the right of a government to rule over its territory, and democracy to mean the right of

15 Schmitt (1985) believed that the state was governed by a persistent possibility of conflict that would produce states of exception that could never be fully anticipated. For Schmitt (1985), sovereign authority transcends the legal order, even though it is bound to it, in ‘emergency’ situations (which is defined by the sovereign). As he wrote in Political Theology, “What characterizes an exception is principally unlimited authority, which means the suspension of the entire existing order. In such a situation it is clear that the state remains, whereas law recedes. Because the exception is different from anarchy and chaos, order in the juristic sense still prevails even if it is not of the ordinary king” (Schmitt, 1985, p. 12). The reader is left without knowing what ‘ordinary’ looks like. The increased sovereign power exists only to make itself superfluous in the end. There is no indication of what the end looks like or how it will make its appearance and this is precisely the type of cyclical, unending reasoning that contemporary liberal theory refuses to overcome.
the people to decide on the agenda of said government, then capitalism undermines both (p. 17). This is because: 1) capitalism is spread throughout a world economy, not a state, and thus “requires that the stronger or dominant states compel weaker or poorer states to conform to the rules and processes of production and circulation of capital on a world scale” (ibid.); and 2) the agenda cannot be determined by the people because the government must interfere with the right of private property in the means of production and processes of accumulation of both domestic and foreign capital. In a liberal democracy, which Ignatieff (2004) heralds as the pinnacle of civilization, the legitimacy of a government depends on the general performance of the economy, which is perpetually insecure and subject to the threat of terrorism and the underdeveloped, and, according to Ignatieff (2004), even the Left itself (Jackson, 2011). There is no moral competition inherent to liberal democracies, only a state power that pursues policies favourable to private enterprise that suppresses popular demands for policies that reduce the adverse effects of the market and of emergency powers on the welfare of the wider population (Dupuy, 2013; Held, 1995).

What should be clear (or rather unclear) at this point is that there is little indication of what security is, exactly, or what its function(s) might include. Regardless of how security is conceptualized within the various frames of liberal thought, it is perpetually cast and recast as a public good (Rigakos, 2011), existing as an amorphous spectre that casually drapes its shadow over every scientific analysis and reaffirming its permanence and inseparability from such analyses (ibid, p. 59). In order to move forward in elucidating how foreign development projects carried out under the banner of ‘security-development’ are rooted in the historical process of policing, we must abandon
the notion that the security regime is in some way an aberration from liberal principles (Jackson, 2011). This necessarily includes, first, an examination of the political economy of policing.

**Policing & Security**

As early as the fourteenth century, McMullan (1998) observes, “policing was the condition of order in a community… [and] its scope of regulation was general and wide” (p. 94, citing Knemeyer, 1980). This order persisted as an informal process of social regulation at the community level until the seventeenth century at the dawn of the industrial age when, in Europe, social surveillance was beginning to fall into the purview of the ‘Westphalian state.’ During this time, economic strength began to replace military prowess as the greatest indicator of stately power. As a result, surveillance and security was viewed as a governmental technology designed to protect a new vested interest in the well-being and productivity of its subjects whose labour power was critical to the functioning mercantile and cameral markets of England and continental Europe, respectively (ibid.).

Coming together in the coffee shops and salons in the seventeenth century, an emerging bourgeois began to constitute a public behind the closed doors of dynastic government (Habermas, 1991, p. 144). The bourgeois’ political consciousness would become fully developed within the seventeenth century as they were capable of influencing public power in their interest as property-owners. “The fully developed bourgeois public sphere was based,” Habermas (1991) observes, “on the fictitious identity of the two roles assumed by the privatized individuals who came together to form
a public: the role of the property owners and the role of human beings pure and simple” (p. 56). At the same time, the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) created miniature principalities, or what Foucault (2007) refers to as “micro-state laboratories,” in Germany, resulting in sites of experimentation with policing models for zones where both feudal and early-modern social structures still co-existed (p. 318). The German bourgeois required a particular brand of intellectual to carry out their experiments in the governing of ‘human beings,’ which was to be found in the universities. From here, *polizeiwissenschaft* was born – a science of the police linked to grand projects of statebuilding, prosperity, and security (ibid.; Rigakos, 2009). Simply stated, these police projects were concerned with “the order of everything that one can see” (Foucault, 2007, p. 319, quoting de Mayerne, 1611, p. 17), or rather, everything that lacked order and form with the dissolution of the Medieval period (Pasquino, 1991, p. 111). Establishing order was directly linked to the ‘splendor’ of the state – the police being “the art of the state’s splendor as visible and manifest force” (Foucault, 2007, p. 313). Police were not yet, however, the uniformed officers of contemporary imagery. They were administrative personnel, such as in France where various Bureaus operated under the authority of a Commissioner that overlooked everything from professional assignment to the productivity of the able-bodied, the functioning of markets, manufacture, and provincial trade, and the moral regulation of the King’s subjects (ibid.), all of which were pre-occupied with labour and wealth creation. Thus, we can see from this origin the police as a form of governing and not necessarily the exercise of the law (Neocleous, 2000). Yet, true to form, it was an act of property owners against ‘human beings,’ otherwise known as labourers.
During this period, prominent intellectuals such as William Petty, Johann von Justi, Joseph von Sonnenfels, and Patrick Colquhoun made their substantive contributions to polizeiwissenschaft by constituting “society as an object of knowledge and at the same time as the target of political intervention” (Pasquino, 1991, pp. 108-9). Through statistical record keeping (census et censura) of the unproductive segments of the population – those who clung to the last vestiges of the conventional practices of feudalism – the state came to “know” its subjects (ibid, p. 113). Subsequently, the state purposefully conflated the criminal and moral pathologies of the period to bolster the burgeoning capitalist work imperative and control the labour-time of a budding proletariat (Johnston, 1992; Rigakos, 2016). Criminalization served to inculcate a culture of insecurity (of capital) that could be dispersed through civil society (Neocleous, 2011), and the effects were significant: the idle and the criminal were branded as the most effectual threats to capitalist functionality, which, in turn, was intended to produce the “ideal citizen-subjects of capitalism” (ibid, p. 198). In sum, disorder was no longer seen as an unnatural affront to divine law, but was understood, instead, to be man-made, thus seen as being structured politically (Neocleous, 2000, p. 7).

Indeed, this new focus on labour, security, and docility is not mistakable in the writing of early police theorists. Already by the end of the seventeenth century, William Petty (1660) aptly observed that the European state’s disposition to killing and mutilating its subjects for the most minor of indiscretions served no purpose in a new economic regime where “Labour is the Father and active principle of Wealth…” (s. 10). Under the banner of this emerging capitalist ideology, Petty would propose grand projects of statistics and record keeping, such as his proposition to the English Crown for the
erection of a London Wall, with “Exact accompts to bee kept of the peoples, trades, religion, wealth, sex, ages, marriages, births, burials, housing, wealth [and] shipping of the Citty…” (ibid, s. 10). Subsequently, *polizeiwissenschaft* would establish itself as the major theoretical tool for bringing to reality Petty’s earlier ambitions. It was a science of police whose “great purpose” was to put into equilibrium the “conduct and sustenance of the subjects” so that they “will be useful, and in a position easy to support themselves” (von Justi, 1756, s. 60-2). *Polizei* (police) thus came to mean the “legislative and administrative regulation of internal life of a community to promote general welfare, the condition of order, and the regimenting of social life” (Neocleous, 2000, p. 1). More specifically, it was concerned with the “defense against intentional or fortuitous occurrences of a harmful nature” – ‘harmful’ being regarded as “every occurrence which hinders the accomplishment of the ultimate purpose of society” (von Justi, 1765, s. 44): wealth creation. ‘Peace’ is what is being guaranteed to maintain a new system of class organization. Indeed, as Pashukanis (2002) notes, “[t]he state of peace becomes a necessity when exchange becomes a regular phenomenon” (ibid, p. 135).

By the early nineteenth century, the tangible takeaway of *polizeiwissenschaft* manifested in Colquhoun’s (1806) Thames River Police, inspired by Jeremy Bentham’s legal theory and, to a lesser extent, architectural panoptic design. As a merchant and advocate of the free-market, Colquhoun (1806) argued that in order for the new political order of classical liberalism to be successful, it had to be enforced against the poor and would-be criminal through a “systematic, superintending police calculated to check and prevent the growth of vicious habits” (Chapter 3). He was successful in establishing what is regarded as the first specialized, salaried, non-local police force located at the Thames
River in England in 1798 (Rigakos, 2011, p. 66). For Colquhoun, Bentham’s utilitarianism coupled with panoptic monitoring served equally well as a police method for surveillance with a wide range of applications; in this case, instituting “a system of surveillance that eliminated compensation outside official lumping rates (wages)” (Rigakos, 2016, p. 53). The *polizei* of mercantilism and cameralism – administrative professionals organize around the raison d’état of the state – were replaced by the police of early capitalism – mechanisms of security to protect the ‘natural’ phenomena that were the market, private property, and the commodity-exchange relationships between men (Foucault, 2007). As per Foucault’s (2007) observation, and just as Pashukanis (2002) noted decades before, the state now “has to refer to the economy as a domain of naturalness; it has to manage populations; it also has to organize a legal system of respect for freedoms; and finally it has to provide itself with an instrument of direct, but negative, intervention, which is the police” (p. 354).

The police institution that we are familiar with today is a direct descendant of this Enlightenment model. Two hundred years of capital social reorganization has concretely produced an efficient and systematic method for protecting the capitalist “order of social *insecurity*” (Neocleous, 2011, p. 24). Yet, contemporary perceptions of the police are embossed by police fetishism, or, rather, the idea that the police exist as a pre-requisite to social order in a chaotic world (Reiner, 2010, p. 3). While it is true that at a base level the police may be fairly characterized by the discretion that they exercise, their inextricable link to the practices of state power cannot be ignored (ibid.).

To be sure, contemporary police theorists have offered reservations about such a historical analysis. Most prominent among their arguments is the idea than an explicit
private-public divide has effectively rendered the state powerless, predominantly as the result of the neoliberal political rationality that has undermined public police legitimacy since the 1960s (ibid., Johnston, 1992; Loader & Walker, 2001). Loader & Walker (2001), for example, suggest that state sovereignty has eroded under the burgeoning commercial markets in security. In light of their realization, they seek to reinstate the salience of Weber’s model for the state’s monopoly on violence. The state, they contend, continues to exist as the site for the articulation of public reason, which ties police intimately to the security of citizens who are enthralled by anxieties over life and death and order and chaos (ibid, p. 20). Thus, they argue, the police work to produce an emotionally charged collective/national identity in the service of the state. These sorts of analyses may be likened to a plea to return to this ‘lost’ conception of police as a “public good” (ibid, p. 18), or rather, something to be “valued for human society” (ibid, p. 25, quoting Waldron, 1993, p. 358).

On the other hand, Johnston (1992) tasks himself with reading the public and private histories of policing through an alternative lens in an attempt to undercut the predominant focus on sovereign decay. He notices that, indeed, there has been a peculiar preoccupation among police scientists with analyzing early forms of public policing, which, in turn, distorts the historiography of the impact of ‘new’ public forces, such as Colquhoun’s River Thames project, on private forms of social regulation (ibid p. 6). Johnston (1992) traces the genealogy of police with an added emphasis on private policing forms that emerged in eighteenth and nineteenth-century England, such as felons associations, vigilante groups, and thieftakers. All of these bodies operated under the
authority of the state – revealing early public-private partnerships in crime control.16 “From as early as the sixteenth century,” Johnston (1992) writes, “wealthy Londoners had paid young, healthy retainers to watch over their property, and consequently, the first organized forces arose from private initiatives” (p. 16).

Thus, exploring the ‘sovereign shift’ that is currently the source of the police and security researcher’s anxiety seems misplaced. To many, it appears as though private policing “opens up the possibility of direct control by capital over important aspects of social order” (Johnston, 1992, p. 204); yet, the public-private binary has never been distinct and capital has, to be sure, always piloted their police projects on either of these conceptual and legal planes. Johnston (1992) illustrates this well despite his reading of two alternative police histories: orthodox and revisionist. The first camp presents a functional, teleological view of history that sees police as a rational response to industrialization (p. 207). The latter offers the same functional arguments, but land on a different conclusion: as social ties were replaced by the cash nexus, social tensions were generated and police were utilized to discipline a working class (ibid, p. 208). In either case, both histories point to a similar conclusion – that public and private police operate with the legal ambit of the state, which has produced a “commercial compromise” with corporate entities and their common interests in maintaining the status quo (ibid, p. 190).17

---

16 For an excellent examination of early public-private policing partnerships and growth of the contemporary police in the U.S., see Churchill (2011).

17 I should note here that Johnston (1992) does mount a critique of the history outlined in this chapter. This historical model, he contends, “assumes that social control is inevitably malignant, sinister or negative, rather than benign or neutral,” and that it “grants a privileged role to the state… [relegating] informal mechanisms (family, peer group, community, religion] to the sidelines. Correspondingly, all social relations tend to be reduced to relations of power and domination and alternative bases for moral authority and order are ignored” (ibid, p. 214). I would respond that informal mechanisms were precisely what was being eradicated. The state made it its objective to oversee all forms of social control to maximize its treasury,
Here, we run afoul of another popular argument concerning legitimacy. If policing is defined through the legitimate capacity for coercion, how, then, are we to understand the state and political theory? In the Weberian sense: 1) the state is an apparatus that possesses the monopoly on violence; 2) police exercise the legitimate coercion of the state, and therefore is a public function; and 3) any agent that possesses constabulary powers is a public functionary (ibid, p. 218). Therefore, according to this logic, anyone wearing a badge resides in the ‘public’ sphere. As such, once private security personnel dawn a badge, the state loses its monopoly on legitimate force. Yet, as Johnston (1992) is quick to point out, this sovereign decay is yet again diverted: “Instead, one has a hybrid form of public-commercial coercion, and the conventional state-market distinction upon which so much political theory rests, is undermined” (p. 218). The bourgeois are compelled to adopt the state formation to protect property, and hence the market, and their associated interests (Rader, 1979). Police and military power is, whether ‘private’ or ‘public,’ the instrument of class domination that safeguards the privileges of the ruling class, both operating, again, under the legal ambit of the state. A state system of property necessarily requires a system of laws to define the rights of property, to which both ‘public’ and ‘private’ actors are beholden. This is an important point to take note of, as extinguishing this binary is critical in understanding the role of

including the family, peers, morals, and religion. Consider von Justi’s (1756) perspective on morals and religion for polizeiwissenschaft: “The relation which subjects must observe toward the state, as well as toward each other, is based on a moral foundation. A wise government therefore will have a care for the religious faith which the people possess” (s. 39); but, “[o]n the other hand the welfare of the state must be preferred to unity of faith” (ibid, s. 59). While the unity of faith could be useful for the purposes of the state, the welfare of the state is prior to the unity of faith. Thus, “freethinking appears as a political crime, because to a certain extent it robs the state of the means of guiding its citizens most completely” (von Sonnenfels, 1765, s. 64) – guiding citizens, as we know, to the new projects of state formation, prosperity, and stability in the interests of capital accumulation.
NGO actors vis-à-vis the role of ‘public’ and ‘private’ institutions as providers of security and statebuilding.

**Anti-Security: Policing as Pacification**

This political economy of policing may well be read as a history of pacification. In his introductory article to *Anti-Security*, Neocleous (2011) described pacification as such:

> at some fundamental level the order of capital is an order of social insecurity. Yet, this permanent insecurity gives rise to a politics of security, turning security into a fundamental concept of bourgeois society. It is through the politics of security that the constant revolutionizing of production and uninterrupted disturbance of capitalist order is fabricated, structured and administered (p. 24).

Importantly, it is the police who are the focus of authority for coordinating and mobilizing ‘security’ to ensure that the capitalist order remains undisturbed (Rigakos, 2016, p. 28-9). The logical question at this juncture is, however, why pacification? Pacification operates on a presumption of war/counterinsurgency and exposes how security is first and foremost concerned with the protection of private property relations, enforcement of the wage-labour system, and establishment of a commodity culture (ibid.). This capitalist order is established through police that serve as the repositories of the state’s monopoly on violence – the “Sisyphean labour” of unrelenting emergency alleviation (Reiner, 2010, p. 24). As the commodity-exchange relationship gives birth to a formal, possessive individualism (Anderson & Greenberg, 1983), it must be continually checked for its inherent ability to gravitate to the collective relationships that preceded it. These relationships ignite the possibility for revolt against inhuman conditions, or relations of production (Rader, 1979), and thus the police evolved as the instrument of the
ruling class to maintain control over a labour force necessary for producing surplus value and sustenance for this class (Robinson & Scaglion, 1987, p. 114).

The first extended treatment of pacification is found in Captain Bernardo de Vargas Muchacha’s *Milicia Indiana* of 1599 (Neocleous, 2011). In their New World colonizing efforts, the Spanish had to inflict a new political violence to confront the rebellious indigenous populations. This was spearheaded by King Phillip II of Spain, who reframed the New World conquests as pacification projects concerned with the “gathering of information about the population, the teaching of trades, education, welfare provision, ideological indoctrination, and, most importantly, the construction of a market” (ibid, p. 40). All of these practices are associated with police power that disperses “the mythical entity called ‘security’ through civil society and the fabrication of order around the logic of peace and security” (ibid.). By the seventeenth century in England, the new discourses of criminality and disorderliness that manifested under the new regime of accumulation constituted the disorderly and criminal classes as the immediate security problem, quickly prompting the internal pacification projects that would extend into modernity (ibid.).

Any cursory reading of world history will reveal that these New World pacification projects would, of course, span the centuries to current day. For example, by 1970, the U.S. military document *Organization and Management of the ‘New Model’ Pacification Program* expressed that the pacification of enemy insurgents (referring to Viet Cong) required a delicate combination of force and politics (including the combination of civil and military agencies), otherwise read as destruction and reconstruction (ibid.). In the case of Vietnam, pacification had to maintain a productive
element; it had to achieve the construction of a liberal welfare state, “one in which the violence of the state power underpinning its construction was far more apparent. So apparent, in fact, that it should be understood as a ‘militarized regime’ intent on producing a ‘modern’ distribution of persons and commodities” (ibid, p. 35). This has been the compulsion of development projects since the methods of pacification were exported to the colonies, and once they were first formally conceived as such when development studies became its own discipline.

We now see pacification played out simultaneously on domestic and international fronts, such as through the proverbial wars on terror, drugs, poverty, etc. Wars abroad are linked to order at home, particularly through the war on drugs that returns pacification to the domestic frame “via a replication of one of the most fundamental tropes of security discourse: the articulation of an ‘emergency situation’” (ibid, p. 45), which becomes permanent and normalized (Neocleous, 2006). Thus, “[t]he war has paved way for the fabrication of groups perceived as the least useful and most dangerous parts of the population, of regions regarded as ‘ungovernable’ and borders regarded as ‘insecure’” (ibid, p. 46). Another contemporary pacification project can be seen, for example, in the Broken Windows theory of policing (Wilson & Kelling, 1982), which is a form of “consistent and persistent proactive policing aimed at putting a lid on the antisocial behaviour (of the low-level criminal activity of the capitalist underclass) that forces respectable neighbourhood citizens off the city street” (Rigakos, 2011, p. 73). This tactic,

---

18 Emergency situations provide the impetus for the sovereign to declare a state of emergency, as illustrated through Schmitt (1985). “In order to take control of and dominate such a completely fluid situation (of exception),” writes Hardt & Negri (2000), “it is necessary to grant the intervening authority (1) the capacity to define, every time in an exceptional way, the demands of intervention; and (2) the capacity to set in motion the forces and instruments that in various ways can be applied to the diversity and the plurality of arrangements in crisis. Here, therefore, is born, in the name of exceptionality of the intervention, a form that is really a right of the police” (p. 16-7).
subsequently, went global with its use in the reformation of the Iraqi police force, demonstrating a “tactical interchangeability in either ostensibly democratic, peaceful, domestic urban environments [with] stateless, war-torn, overseas markets” (ibid, p. 77). Clearly then, we must begin to ask what is at the root of pacification, or, alternatively, what does security guarantee (ibid.)?

At the most fundamental level, pacification is performed in the pursuit of productive labour (Rigakos, 2016, p. 5). More specifically, it is manifested in its compulsion to transform labour into productive labour – that which Marx (1867) refers to as labour that produces a surplus value for capital accumulation (1038, cited in Rigakos, 2016, p. 15). The ‘savage and uncivilized’ concrete labour of pre-capitalist society must be tamed and subsumed by capital and incorporated as an internal force proper to itself (Hardt, 1995, p. 29). Of course, this concept was already recognized in earlier contributions to political economy. For example, in his *A Treatise on the Wealth, Power and Resources of the British Empire*, Colquhoun (1814) wrote that “[t]he resources of nations are derived from the productive labour of the people,” which is “augmented or diminished according to forms of government, and the intelligence, ability and zeal… in those to whom it is assigned to direct the state of affairs of states and empires” (p. 49). In the wider definition of policing, those assigned to direct the affairs of the state can include a wide variety of professionals, ranging from police to NGOs.

For clarity, Rigakos (2016) suggests that we need to ask what capitalism wants labour to be and how it goes about initiating this transformation (p. 9). As a category and as a process, Rigakos (2016) understands productive labour to be, in its ideal form, a labour that creates surplus value, which, in turn, must be fabricated by a “system of
police science that forcibly transitions all labour into wage labour” (p. 23). This transformation can only be adequately explored through three constituent layers of pacification: dispossession, exploitation, and commodification. While each differs in their targets of intervention, they continue to rely on: 1) the use of violence; 2) the suppression and eradication of all non-capitalist forms of subsistence (which, as I will demonstrate in the following chapter, is most clearly bound up in the eradication of ‘tradition’ in development) through institutional mechanisms such as the police; 3) the ideological indoctrination into the modes of capitalist production, exchange, and wage-labour; and 4) the establishment of “an institutional and ideological ethics of security that equates threats to any of these aspects as threats to the state of security and the private property relations it supports” (Rigakos, 2016, p. 28-9).

Dispossession is the confiscation of non-capitalist land through legislation and/or brute force (ibid, p. 38). It includes the establishment of a private property regime – a most critical component of capitalist functionality – whose heritage is premised on the wide-scale theft “via the crudest of methods – the use of force in practice and law with the express purpose of transferring land titles from farmers and peasants to a cadre of new and established landowners” (ibid, p. 34). This process was and continues to be dependent on the position of the state with its monopoly on violence and definitions of legality (a legality that is subject to that state’s broad interpretation of both domestic and international bodies of law) (ibid, citing Harvey, 2004).\(^{19}\)

Exploitation is premised on the control of labour time and the regimenting of workers’ lives. While dispossession produces a property-less, working class through the

\(^{19}\) As Adam Smith (1937) noted long ago, the market and private property “would not exist ‘a single night’ without government” (quoted in Dupuy, 2013, p. 39).
control of space, exploitation continues the pacification project by controlling time, or, more specifically, labour-time (Rigakos, 2016, p. 50). The subordination of classes in early industrial society was dependent on the successful implementation of this layer of pacification, which through the processes of imperialism and capitalism has gone global with the “subordination of societies qua societies” (D’Souza, 2012, p. 440), or, rather, the regimenting of entire states.

The last layer of pacification, the security commodity, is itself constituted by three compulsions: 1) valorization – the irresistible impulse to render all production into a saleable, ideal form; 2) prudentialization – the compulsion to saturate every aspect of production and consumption with security planning and risk calculation (or management); and 3) fetishization – the removal of security commodities from their intrinsic use values and elevation to the metaphysical (ibid). As a result of these perpetual processes, it becomes evident that security is not merely hegemonic; it is hegemony (Rigakos, 2016, p. 88). Despite the repeated crises of capitalism, any security analysis remains firmly embedded in a “political economy wherein the commodity broadcasts insecurity through the entire circuit of production to consumption [that] globally reinforces security and fuels its cyclical and insatiable demand” (ibid, p. 92).

With this preliminary analysis, we can begin to suitably hypothesize the connection between foreign development projects and police projects, where, as Duffield (2008) writes, “pacifying low-intensity insurgency [in the global borderland] is a long-term policing problem for the international community” (p. 159). Yet, before exploring this connection, it is first necessary to establish the context of development and humanitarianism and to locate NGOs/humanitarian workers vis-à-vis the state as
providers of security and order building. Tracing the genealogies of development and humanitarian thought will help to clarify how security-development constituted itself as the dominant theoretical and operational tool of pacification, which must be read alongside humanitarianism if we are to rank it as a police mechanism.
Chapter 2
Tracing Development: The Continuity of Narratives and Security-Development

‘There is a paradox in development experts relentlessly repeating that the cause for economic stagnation is local while frequently introducing a univocal agenda for reform designed elsewhere’

Alvaro Santos (2006, p. 299)

Since its introduction into the sphere of mainstream academic scholarship in the 1950s, development studies has suffered from a particular dissonance among its researchers, who through their various theoretical positions claim to know what development is and how to achieve it. Indeed, consensus on what might even be said to constitute ‘development’ and where one can begin their search increasingly appears unachievable. Yet, to be sure, one element for achieving development has remained constant: the establishment and manipulation of markets (Snyder, 1980). The legacy of colonial objectives has been to mark out a distinct Southern world characterized by its economic ‘backwardness’ and all matters of living that stem from this backwardness (Randall, 2004, p. 42). A certain dualist approach dominates the thinking of development theorists who, despite minor theoretical distinctions, ultimately seek to transpose Northern ways of living onto Southern inhabitants (D’Souza, 2012). These enduring visions of system transposition are precisely what herald the need to critically unpack development and, by extension, its security components that have steered development studies. Seen through the lens of pacification, security has always been the fundamental tool for producing a productive labouring force in the colonies. Now, under the ‘security-development nexus,’ this approach has only intensified the philosophical dualisms that “dominate Modernist and Enlightenment thinking,” solidifying the antagonism of binary categories, such as
developed versus underdeveloped and civilized versus barbaric (ibid, p. 427), that ultimately crystallize as either ‘secure’ or ‘insecure’. The constant regurgitation of these binaries through colonial and development thinking is made possible by a decided lack of theoretical reflexivity and myopic historical considerations.

Instead, I trace the political economy of development more broadly in order to set the stage for my analysis of security-development and humanitarianism through the lens of pacification in chapter three. I have conducted the analysis in this way so that I can later apply these principles of development in chapter four to Haiti’s development in order to illustrate how the grand narratives of progress and modernization are not antiquated concepts from the period of decolonization, but part and parcel to the imperialism of Western powers since the earliest days of conquest. In the second part of this chapter I provide an overview of the official development narrative since the 1950s, pointing to specific legal and international developments that exemplify the themes first discussed, and that will later be applied to the case of Haiti. I end with a brief introduction to the security-development nexus, the treatment of which will be extended in chapter three with my reading of humanitarianism, which plays an integral part of the security-development nexus.

A Grand Narrative: The Political Economy of Development

In the early twentieth century, what Lenin (1999) refers to as ‘old capitalism’ – the relationship between sovereign states, or the ‘community of nations,’ that was based on equal business transactions – was replaced by finance capital, bringing “into being a differentiation of states into debtors and creditors” (Lorimer, 1999, p. 14). Old capitalism
and free competition provided the impetus for the export of goods, yet under the latest stage of capitalism – imperialism and the rule of monopoly – the export of goods has been largely replaced by the export of more capital (Lenin, 1999, p. 40). Lenin (1999) further notes how a surplus of capital in Western states produced an inherent problem for lost profits. Surplus capital could not be used to raise the standard of living for the “half-starved and poverty stricken” global masses as such would directly correlate with a loss in profits for the bourgeois class (ibid, p. 70). As such, states and their corporate patrons utilized surpluses for the purpose of increasing profits by exporting capital abroad to the backward countries. In these backward countries, profits are usually high, for capital is scarce, the price of land is relatively low, wages are low, raw materials are cheap. The export of capital is made possible by a number of backward countries that have already been drawn into world capitalist intercourse (ibid, p. 71).

This is the heart of development ideology; one driven by a capitalist prudence that demands profits must be continually increased at the expense of ‘backwards’ peoples.\(^\text{20}\)

The relationship of state creditors and debtors as described by Lenin (1991) was the first bona fide description of a theory of Dependency, which was further developed in the 1960s shortly after the birth of development studies (dos Santos, 1970; Palma, 1975; Chilcote, 1974; Caporaso, 1978, 1980). Dependency theorists argue that to understand a nation’s development, one must first understand its historical trajectory and (forced) insertion into the world political-economic system established by European colonizers.

\(^{20}\) Of course, in liberal development discourse, this increase in profits is not at the expense of these peoples, but to their benefit. The export of capital comes replete with loan conditionalities as a means for encouraging the export of commodities in the backwards nations, which creates jobs and a favourable climate of accumulation for the host country (Harvey, 2003). In response to the problems of over-accumulation in the advanced capitalist economies in the 1970s, Harvey (2003) rightly notes, spatial reorganization and geographical expansion was the key to having these surpluses absorbed. Lenin (1991), however, recognized this long ago, asserting that the salvation of the capitalist system lied in monopolies and imperialism. Liberal development theorists have since turned this into a creed post-decolonization (Gordon & Weber, 2008).
since the sixteenth century (Valenzuela, 1978; Namkoong, 1999). More specifically, dos Santos (1970) summarizes the concept of dependency as “a situation in which a certain number of countries have their economy conditioned by the development and expansion of another… placing the dependent countries in a backward position exploited by the dominant countries” (p. 180, quoted in Valenzuela, 1978, p. 544). Dominant local interests that express the class relations of advanced capitalist countries are, however, co-opted by Northern interveners as they already favour the preservation of dependency in their own interests (Valenzuela, 1978). While Dependency theory has been criticized for its division of the world into two parts (the center-periphery relationship) and dialectic model that sees expansion of the advanced capitalist countries as producing the condition of underdevelopment in the Third World (Namkoong, 1999), many of its central tenets nonetheless continue to ring true. In any case, the prevailing theory of Modernization that eventually overtook Dependency theory now pits rival liberal intellectuals in a self-referential game divorced from the radical basis of the discipline’s original intent.

The dualities of development theory that Dependency theorists sought to critique became concretized in the flagrant oversimplifications of Modernization theory (Snyder, 1980), which provided a powerful intellectual heritage in contemporary development thought. Modernization theory rested on three foundational suppositions: 1) social change necessitated the integration of different (or, rather, backward) social systems; 2) there is

21 Indeed, as Duffield (2001) asserts, neoliberalism, dependency’s final incarnation, became the “dominant economic paradigm among the Southern elite as well” (Duffield, 2001, p. 28). System transposition could not be fully effective unless those who already wielded considerable economic power in the beneficiary state were co-opted and persuaded to grow their fortunes under neoliberalism. For example, while Haiti is the poorest country in the hemisphere, they also have the most millionaires per capita (Schuller, 2009) – “[t]he richest 10 percent of the population controls 47 percent of national income, and 2 percent hold 26 percent of the nation’s wealth” (Dupuy, 2010, p. 196). This bourgeois class did not make its fortune from the bottom, but existed already through a legacy of despots and military juntas.
an assumed truth to the ahistorical and teleological nature of modernity; and 3) development is an “evolutionary movement from an original state of underdevelopment to an idealized version of the United States or Western Europe” (ibid, p. 726). This view of the ‘original state’ – as something that existed as underdeveloped in the past – is conceptually meaningless. Now-developed states may have at one point been ‘undeveloped,’ but never ‘underdeveloped.’ Thus, underdevelopment and development are “simply two faces of one single universal purpose… [and] have been, historically, simultaneous processes… which have interacted and conditioned themselves mutually” (ibid, p. 748, quoting Sunkel, 1973, p. 135-6).

There is an element of ‘human nature’ that is taken for granted in liberal development theory, inspired largely by the pre-existing Enlightenment notions of human nature. Such speculation is built on the likes of, for example, Bentham’s legal theory (Rader, 1979). This particular theoretical orientation, Rader (1979) illustrates, was unable to distinguish between human nature in general and human nature as its substance was modified in each distinctive period of history through particular socio-economic formations. Consider Marx’s (n.d.) well-suited analogy:

To know what is useful for a dog, one must study dog-nature. This nature itself is not to be deduced from the principle of utility. Applying this to man, he that would criticise all human acts, movements, relations, etc., by the principle of utility, must first deal with human nature in general, and then with human nature as modified in each historical epoch. Bentham makes short work of it. With the driest naiveté he takes the modern shopkeeper, especially the English shopkeeper, as the normal man. Whatever is useful to this queer normal man, and to his world, is absolutely useful. This yard-measure, then, he applies to past, present, and future (Rader, 1979, p. 21, citing Marx, n.d., p. 668).  

22 Trubek & Galanter (1974) later drew a similar conclusion in their analysis of the crises in the study of law and development, wherein “[t]he elements of social thought we seek are rarely made explicit precisely because they are fundamental. They are rarely subjected to factual scrutiny because they are more than mere statements of what is true, and they usually elude normative analysis because they are treated as more
Societies are expected to move from tradition to modernity, thus every tradition left in pre-modern societies is an expression and cause of underdevelopment that must be overcome to enter into modern society by allowing for economic and political transformations (Valenzuela, 1978). The enmeshed binaries of this theory still ring true, and quite loudly. With regards to Haiti, one interviewee candidly asserted:

Every Haitian young man or village person would love to get connected with a patron [clion], which would be an outsider, a white guy who would then start sending him money. This is the dream… It’s one of those subconscious, sort of pre-modern concepts that is ingrained in Haiti… It’s a pre-modern society and that’s one of its delights, but also one of its huge frustrations for us from the outside (FB1, personal correspondence, February 3, 2016).

FB1 continued:

[Haiti] doesn’t fit our modern structure of what a state should look like. And some of these analyses (of state failure), other than the negative connotations, yeah, they’re accurate. The state is not functioning. And that’s one of the major challenges to the Haitian experiment of trying to be a people in a modern world (ibid.).

Indeed, this is an example of the imperial thinking that has dominated development thought for centuries. Some *a priori* notion of the natural human and their need to develop to the level of the ‘shopkeeper,’ as it were – enmeshed in the very frontline aid worker whose work is guided by an apparent altruism and compassion. Traditional versus civilized, developed versus underdeveloped, secure versus insecure – this is the ideology of development with which theorists have consciously, and unconsciously, concealed their class interests (Rader, 1979, p. 42).

Modernization theory did express a belief in the importance of the nation state as an analytical frame of reference, yet this reliance withered, Schuurman (2000) argues, as


than mere statements of what would be desirable. Rather, they establish the inherent and proper shape of social reality and thus require neither explanation nor investigation” (p. 1070).
the belief in progress was supplanted in the 1990s with the post-modern idea of the global risk society. Concepts of ‘human security,’ ‘job security,’ ‘food security,’ and the like made their entrance into the rhetorical medium of supposed post-Cold War security politics that vilified underdeveloped states for failing to deliver to their citizens the ‘sustainable livelihoods’ that neoliberalism was destined to afford (Parpart & Veltmeyer, 2011, p. 49). Because of the South’s (as one large homogenous entity) inability to ‘modernize’ (i.e. primary product prices were too low for commercial exploitation, labour forces consisted of unskilled and uneducated workers, markets were too narrow and risky, etc.) (Duffield, 2001), underdeveloped governments compromised the security of their own people and the institutions that sustain them. Yet, on closer reflection, there is little difference in the Cold War intellectuals’ security and the new security concerns centering on the human. In either case, the ‘fix’ is an assertion of Northern-style neoliberal re-organization of governments, workers, and markets to heal the wounds of ‘Third Worldism’ and international socialism that threaten to spread like a disease to the global North (Duffield, 2001, p. 28; Park, 2014, p. 294).23 If the state is not the most immediately apparent victim of insecurity, then it is the state’s important corporations and institutions that “crystallize class power” (Chimni, 2011, p. 264, quoting Poulantzas, 1975, p. 70) and organization, “whose highest form of expression,” Pashukanis (2002) advises, “is the state” (p. 118).

23 The re-organization of governments and workers is typically premised on democracy promotion, and yet, the promotion of democracy and ‘liberal peace’ occurs most often through violent methods of intervention that are ostensibly the antithesis of liberal practice (Park, 2014). Park (2014) thus refers to liberal democratization projects for Southern governments as evasive invasiveness – “the paradox of advancing liberal objectives through illiberal means, premised on the assumption that illiberal others are not yet fit for democracy” (p. 294).
The Official Narrative

In the colonial era, extending the categories of the public and private spheres to the ‘underdeveloped’ territories was a critical pre-requisite to the establishment of trading that would eventually become a foothold for exercising control through capital in contemporary development projects (D’Souza, 2012, p. 411). Various castes, communities, tribes and nationalities had to be consolidated “under the umbrella of the colonial state” so that the character of exchange relations could mimic the relations of private transactions (ibid, p. 429). With the onset of decolonization, a coalition of allied delegates would meet at the Mount Washington Hotel in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire in 1944 (famously known as the Bretton Woods Conference, through which the International Monetary Fund [IMF] was established). The goal of the delegation: to establish a new economic world order that promoted and, most importantly, protected the international investments of the global North (Chimni, 2011) – predicated on the need to transition post-colonial states into the Western model. In the colonial era, when trading companies exercised political power over foreign territories, bilateral treaty arrangements had no enforcement mechanisms other than the threat of brute military force, which was often employed. “This is the gap that modern investment protection,” writes Cross & Schlieman-Radbruch (2013), “evolved to fill” (p. 71). Once the UN Charter (1945) made all force in such matters illegal (although, to be sure, brute force has made its appearance time and again), “investment protection was… reduced to the realm of state diplomacy” (ibid.), or rather, a revised method of pacification that controls developing nations through capital (or the threat of withholding capital).
The establishment of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) Convention in 1965 would become the primary legal mechanism to which capital-exporting countries of the North could appeal if capital-importing states of the South refused to reform protectionist policies (ibid.). The neoclassical model that emerged from the Bretton Woods Conference, and which subsequently entrenched itself in ICSID, expressed a great deal of skepticism about the ‘benign’ regulatory framework of the Keynesian welfare state, calling for minimalist measures and an economic model based on globalization (Thomas, 2014, p. 974; Parpart & Veltmeyer, 2011). In this new geopolitical context, conditional terms dominated the perception of successful development, such as “relative progress in terms of per capita economic growth and in structural terms such as industrialization and modernization” (Parpart & Veltmeyer, 2011, p. 42).

The turning point in the relations between developed and underdeveloped capitalist economies came in the 1970s. The U.S. and Great Britain spearheaded the restructuring of capital and labour relations in the world economy in light of the 1973 regime of “flexible accumulation” (Dupuy, 2013, p. 20, citing Harvey, 1989, p. 147), which replaced the Fordist mode of labour production. The language of progress, growth, modernization, etc. was inherited by a new generation of scholars referred to as the neoclassicists (Thomas, 2014), who then posited it in what they referred to as the New International Economics (NIE). Motivated by the economic philosophy of Friedrich

24 This demand for legal and economic reform has since been intensified with the ascendance of the neoliberal political rationality of the 1980s under the broader fiscal arrangements colloquially known as ‘Reaganism’ and ‘Thatcherism’ (Thomas, 2014). A greater reliance on legislative force post-decolonization as opposed to military force pre-decolonization has not ushered in any particularly new or progressive North-South relations. Indeed, as Cross & Schlieman-Radbruch (2013) note, “[t]he dynamics of economic interaction between post-colonial states, capital-exporting states and investors… continue to bear ‘uncanny resemblance’ to the era of conquest and imperialism” (p. 72, quoting Anghie, 2005, p. 146).
Hayek, the ‘Chicago Boys,’ with Milton Friedman at the helm, developed the conceptual, and ultimately legal, framework of NIE, which would establish the components of what would become the Washington Consensus – the economic policy prescriptions for the global South that were co-developed by the IMF, the World Bank, and the U.S. Treasury Department in 1989 in response to the financial crisis of the 1980s (Thomas, 2014). They drew much of their influence from the Coase Theorem, which “provided an argument for refraining from governmental regulation or for not responding to every social harm with a regulatory solution, not only because the market could generate its own solution [but] because regulatory solutions might not solve the problem and might only create new ones” (ibid, p. 978). The Coase Theorem postulated that the domestic legal environment was a necessary tool to impose costs on market actors that determined economic output; NIE extended this hypothesis far beyond domestic law, however, seeking to “provide a basis for assessing governmental and legal order across space and

---

25 Just three years prior in 1986, the UN General Assembly passed the Declaration of the Right to Development (on a vote of 146 to 1, with the U.S. voting against and eight abstentions that included Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Finland, Iceland, Israel, Japan, Sweden, and the U.K.) (Chimni, 2011). Indeed, as Chimni (2011) makes clear, “the vote against and the abstentions reveal the anxiety of the global capitalist classes regarding a generalized right to development as it is seen as a challenge to the existing global capitalist order” (p. 285). This encoded ‘right’ likely provided some extra fuel for the vigorous social and economic re-organization of developing states where international economic law and policy theorists of the day (and today) can argue that “there is no need to address the impact of international economic law [IEL] on the protection and promotion of human rights, because it is in the very nature of the IEL regime to enhance human rights protection” (Harrison, 2014, p. 128). Indeed, IEL has assumed all matters of daily life and movement around the globe under its purview (Charnovitz, 2011), even though it developed in isolation from human rights and was born into a normative context that “has been to focus on global market outcomes” (Choudhury, 2009, p. 122).  

26 So named after its founder Ronald Coase, a social scientist of the second movement in law and development (Thomas, 2014).  

27 Thomas (2014) argues that Coase was actually misunderstood by the Chicago Boys. Coase did believe in some regulatory intervention, as social harms could not be market regulated. The market was described by Coase as a cold and calculated machine premised on a strict profit-loss dichotomy, and what the disaster laden, developing nations required for effective transition (into modernity) was organized labour to accommodate the re-regulation and increased foreign investment.
time” (ibid, p. 982). In its attempt to go global, however, NIE could not make sense of why states continued to fail to fulfill its ideal – why they could not produce efficient property rights in conformity with the natural market.

In response to NIE’s apparent glitch, second generation reformers developed what would be referred to as the New Political Economy (NPE). Like NIE, NPE focused on international trade law policy, but also property rights and contract regimes and argued that since trade lies at the center of economic growth in the neoclassical model of development, trade policy had to be subject to economic and development policy (ibid.).

‘Trade openness’ as the path to economic growth became its mantra. Subsequently, Anne Krueger’s appointment to the Chief Economist’s position at the World Bank in 1982, backed by the political momentum of the Reagan and Thatcher ‘revolutions,’ would “consolidate the influence of neoclassicism… through rent seeking analysis and trade theory… in development economics” (ibid, p. 991-2). In line with the neoliberalization of trade policy, development agencies (i.e. international financial institutions [IFIs] such as the IMF and the World Bank) made it their mandate to force beneficiary governments to drastically alter their economic policy to be consistent with the tenets of neoclassicism, “heavily imprinted in the structural adjustment programs that the World Bank

28 As Dupuy (2013) notes, this new regime was an assault against labour on behalf of the capitalist class by coding into the political order of classical liberalism the policies to reduce public expenditures (social, not corporate) and full employment, coupling such moves with the deregulation of economies and privatization of public enterprise. ‘Flexible accumulation,’ Dupuy (2013) further notes, also “involved the greater mobility of capital, of migrant labor, the transformation of work, occupations, management, labor processes, the organization of production, the emergence of new markets, technological and commercial innovations, new and faster means of communication, new financial services, and important shifts in the structuring of uneven development between economic sectors, countries, and geographic regions” (p. 21).

29 It is useful to not here where exactly these theories are originating from and to whom they are being applied. As Rader (1979) notes, Marx realized that the ruling class attains and perpetuates its power in two ways: “[o]n the one hand, there is the domination of the state with its police and military forces. On the other hand, there is the ideological control through education, language, culture, and the mass media” (p. 44). Thus, the class that owns material production also owns mental production, existing as the ruling intellectual force. One could say that there is perhaps no way to even rethink development without first dismissing the field entirely.
increasingly emphasized during the 1980s” (ibid, p. 992). Global governance was now officially consistent with the World Bank’s and other lending institutions’ mandate. Project-based lending was replaced by policy-based lending by the IFIs, and interventions became focused on market liberalization, privatization, de-regulation, austerity, tax reform, etc. – everything that came to define the 1989 Washington Consensus (Rittich, 2014, p. 206-7).

Since the 1990s, free trade has been utilized by lending states and corporations as a means of locking Southern recipients of funds into international commitments that are supposedly designed to promote economic growth and bring about desirable economic and, thus, social reform (Trebilcock, Howse, & Eliason, 2013). For example, since 1994 Canada has signed Foreign Protection Investment Agreements (FIPAs) with nearly two-dozen countries in the global South, including eight in Latin America (Gordon & Weber, 2008). FIPAs are essentially an outgrowth of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), specifically chapter 11, which has been “cited by critics for its establishment of a strong pro-corporation investment climate, including among other things guaranteeing foreign corporations whose states are party to the agreement the same treatment as domestic corporations” (ibid, p. 66). And to give these agreements the teeth they require to bind recipients to agreement conditions, the World Trade Organization was created through the combined efforts of member states of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD, comprised of a relatively small group of powerful states) in 1995 under the Marrakesh Agreement, which replaced the 1948 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) (Chimni, 2011, p. 265). Southern states are then reduced to the role of bargaining for a more favourable position in agreements
with the OECD countries and the transnational capitalist class who benefit from the accelerated rate of globalization and international trade finance and production (ibid.).

Indeed, as Pashukanis (1980) wittingly observed, capitalist states can apply their international laws and agreements in relation with one another, “while the remainder of the world is considered as a simple object of their transaction” (p. 172, quoted in Marks, 2003, p. 454). Without any counter power to the OECD, Northern states have been able to impose a litany of unbalanced agreements upon their Southern counterparts through, for example, Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs), Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMs), and the General Agreement on Trade in Services
(GATS), to name a few, each of which is acutely focused on the expansion of property rights (ibid.) and the abolishment of protectionism.\textsuperscript{31}

\textbf{Security-Development}

The second-generation reform movements of NEP have been a failure, at least for the states of the global South who for decades have been promised the gift of their self-reliance. Before the major neoliberal restructuring of beneficiary governments, when Southern states retained some semblance of nationalistic policies under the “‘permissive’ international system” (Chang, 2008, p. 63) in the 1950s and 60s, the global South as a whole actually experienced mild growth in ‘per capita’ terms (ibid.). This ‘per capita’ growth was decimated under neoliberal policies and continues to decline as income distribution scales are elevated to unprecedented levels. Yet, this failure did not encourage leading reformists to abandon their agenda. Approaching the end of the twentieth century, development theorists moved to explicitly endorse the issues of security that were most clearly the culprit of the South’s failure to develop, resulting in the widespread embrace of the security-development nexus (Duffield, 2001) and the \textit{failed} state typology that cast the blame on the Southern recipients themselves for deviating from the conditions handed to them that were the pre-requisites to establishing a strong state. This typology was preferred because it lends itself to an atomized and ahistorical understanding of Third World development and effectively replaces race – a

\textsuperscript{31} It is ironic, Chang (2008) notes, how the two most successful economies in history – the U.S. and the U.K. – have been and continue to be highly protectionist. It is not that they just were not ‘quite’ as protectionist as their counterparts. In fact, the U.S. and Britain’s industrial tariff rates in the two centuries leading to WWII significantly outweighed France, Germany, and Japan – the so-called ‘homes of protectionism’ (ibid, p. 61). Indeed, a critical “lesson of history is that rich countries have ‘kicked away the ladder’ by forcing free-market, free-trade policies on poor countries. Already established countries do not want more competitors emerging through the nationalistic policies they themselves successfully used in the past” (ibid.).
popular (even if latent) card in earlier manifestations of Modernization – with state failure, thereby promoting a benign imperialism that legitimizes economic and structural prescriptions as non-racist technical fixes to their failure (Shilliam, 2008, p. 779; Hardt & Negri, 2000, p. 191).

As was briefly outlined in the introduction, the security-development nexus was represented by the concepts of human security and human development that emerged in the early 1990s and which became canonized in UN doctrine (Telatin, 2011; Commission on Global Governance, 1995). This nexus includes a reversion to earlier concerns with poverty and productivity in the absence of what was considered to be the Cold War security architecture that was pre-occupied with the aggrandizement of state military power. Security became explicitly equated with the market-based processes of stabilization that grew to prominence in the 1980s under the World Bank, which advocated for the “primacy of the market and the incessant quest for any factors or processes that interfere with it” (Thede, 2013, p. 785). Such interfering factors are typically linked to “individual pathologies” and “lack of reason” among Southern beneficiaries that stifles their development, requiring the “tough love” of the intervening state (Schuller, 2008, p. 19; Park, 2010), which, as we can recall from chapter one, is known as R2P (Chandler, 2012). Because of their violations against the ‘human,’ these states are said to have forfeited their right to self-determination (Weil, 2001). As Duffield (2010a) articulates, “[t]he formative connection between liberal intervention and international security comes together in the familiar political refrain that not only is it ethically right to reduce global poverty, not doing so ‘leads to civil wars, failed states and safe havens for terrorists’” (p. 56, quoting Christian Aid, 2004).
In using security-development to establish a viable social order in the South, Northern donors had to combine their military and economic programs with a wider and more creative range of political technologies in order to eradicate the pathologies of the underdeveloped – a central feature to any project of pacification (Neocleous, Rigakos, & Wall, 2013). This political technology was, and continues to be, humanitarianism (Duffield, 2001). As we approach the ‘end of history,’ development theorists and practitioners have found the last piece of the puzzle that makes global capitalism function (Barnett, 2011). Humanitarian workers fill the vacuum of space left by the withdrawal of diplomacy during the era of neo-humanitarianism and, while appearing to assume the emancipatory role of liberal justice, became the mechanics of social control (ibid.). Thus, the security-development nexus and humanitarianism go hand in hand, which, true the mantra of Modernization, both predicate the insecurity of the human and state on individuals behaving “in ways that are ‘irrational’ or ‘non-rational’ as judged on economic (and, therefore, natural) grounds” (Moore, 1964, p. 292). In this sense, humanitarianism is more appropriately conceived of as a police project; increasingly institutionalized, intrusive, and absolute in its management of the ‘traditional’ practices of developing countries, which are viewed as threats to the global modernizing process (Duffield, 2011; Park, 2010). Yet, before exploring humanitarianism as a police project/project of pacification, it is first useful to trace humanitarianism and the position that humanitarian workers/NGOs occupy in what is increasingly referred to as an emerging global civil society (Dryzek, 2012). From here, humanitarianism and the security-development nexus can be read in tandem and applied to Haiti.
Chapter 3
Delusions of Global Society: Early Colonialism and the Co-Optation of Compassion

‘The humanitarianism of response suggests a world united by common humanity; the emergencies themselves reveal a world divided by a deep material inequality, by violent conflicts, and by illicit, exploitative trade.’

Craig Colhoun (2010, p. 29)

‘Humanitarianism is defined by the paradox of emancipation and domination... any act of intervention, no matter how well intentioned, is also an act of control.’

Michael Barnett (2011, p. 11-2)

Humanitarianism necessarily factors into the story of development because of its intimate ties with ‘development’ projects writ large. Bound to a politics of insecurity, humanitarian aid and its practitioners are implicated in states’ contrived development projects for the beneficiaries of aid that do not fully embrace Western standards of acceptable living. This politics demands the abandonment of the founding principles of humanity, neutrality, independence, and impartiality (UNOCHA, 2012) in favour for the promotion of structural adjustment, market (re)orientation, long-term accumulation through dispossession (Harvey, 1989), and incorporation into the global capitalist modes of production (Drury, Olson, & Van Belle, 2005). Despite the popular NGO claim of an aversion to all things political (ibid.), we witness their political orientation in their participation in past and present networked assemblages of donor governments and multilateral organizations (Duffield, 2011). To this effect, humanitarian projects are better conceptualized as large-scale police projects and exercises in imperialism that seek to inculcate a culture of obedient labour and govern, by extension of the donor state, ‘failed’ collectives.
In this chapter, I will first investigate and critique the claim that NGOs constitute their own sector of global civil society. These claims by NGOs and development theorists of the emerging discourses of transnational/global civil society position humanitarian workers/NGOs outside of the state apparatus, existing as its own distinct sector with twenty thousand plus organizations spread across the globe, in addition to the hundreds of thousands of local branches (Chambers & Kopstein, 2006). By critically assessing the weight of such arguments, I will demonstrate that no such third sector exists and through a tracing of the historical antecedents of humanitarianism, reveal how this enterprise fits into the overarching development schema. Last, I will make the argument that NGOs and humanitarian workers share a strong functional similarity with police, specifically under the weight of the security-development nexus and the typology of the failed state.

**Locating the ‘Third Sector’**

NGOs have become increasingly intertwined with state and capital in global liberal order-building projects, especially as their deployment in the developing regions of the world has increased exponentially since the second half of the twentieth century (Barnett, 2010). Additionally, there have been clear concomitant changes in the policies and practices of NGOs with the shifting foreign aid/development policies and political rhetoric of Northern states (Thede, 2013). This causal relationship is reflected in, for example, the distended practices of NGOs adopting social service provision roles in failed, fragile, underdeveloped, or developing states (a very fluid spectrum of demeaning designations), subsequently heralded as the harbingers of Western democracy and political participation (Gideon, 1998). Seen as efficient, small-scale, cost-effective, and
manageable agents of political decentralization with strong, usually pre-existing, grassroots relationships, NGOs are assigned quasi-governmental characteristics by Northern hegemons seeking to increase the extent of their colonial impingement into weak states (Mazlish, 2006, p. 49).

Yet, how might the NGO, or humanitarian class, view themselves and their roles in the foreign development initiatives of their donor governments? It is not surprising that NGOs do not prefer to imagine themselves as tools for the extension of state foreign policy (NG2, personal correspondence, March 9, 2016). Conversely, they often imagine themselves as occupying a distinct space, or as constituting a ‘third sector,’ in what is commonly referred to among theorists of global governance as the transnational civil society – existing at some degree from governments and governance alike (Dryzek, 2012; Boli & Thomas, 1999). Boli & Thomas (1999), for example, believe that in occupying this position, both past and present, humanitarians have laboured successfully to enact, codify, modify, and propagate world-cultural structures and principles. As the physical linkages of our homologous cultural foundations, and as the counterpart to powerful nation-states, NGOs effectively transmit the fundamental messages of peace and harmony. NGOs, these authors argue, construct the world polity as the promoters of human rights and humanity as a whole, and as the bearers of an ideal and egalitarian vision of social justice (ibid.).

These latter arguments, much like those springing from the liberal police and security theorists, work to underwrite the importance of the state in global civil society discourse, claiming that privileging the state as the unit of analysis in studies of global

---

32 Of course, as Rader (1979) points out, in capitalist social structure the real interests of the proletariat are substituted for the imaginary interests of human nature, which has no class or reality and thus has elevated itself beyond critique.
governance forgoes the possibility for a politics of unity and humanity (Boli & Thomas, 1999). It is my intention in this section to ground this debate through the lens of political economy. I will offer a critique of humanitarianism as a movement that eclipses political action around the questions of ‘security’ and argue that the actions of this sector do not differ in any substantive way from those of nation-states. Through their liberation theology and proliferation of ‘global society’ discourse, both NGOs and development theorists contribute to the destruction of what were perhaps once perceived as public and private spheres. As a centuries-old instrument of pacification, and now under the overarching “hierarchical” (Colhoun, 2010, p. 35) development projects, NGOs have become the strategic partner in the execution of development projects, disallowing political action in the recipient’s public sphere where they might have had a chance express their concerns and individuality. They are an outgrowth of Westernism, so to speak, “arising like the proverbial mushrooms in the rain as a result of the actions, or inaction, of other actors in the globalization process” (Mazlish, 2006, p. 42) and express the values of bourgeois society via covert imperialism as they transcend the boundaries of tribal, ethnic, religious, and national affiliations under the banner of neutrality (ibid.).

The Third Sector of Civil Society

What might be said to constitute the oft-cited third sector of transnational civil society is, at best, a highly contested and ambiguous discussion. As such, it is first useful to ask first what an NGO is. The Database of Archives of UK Non-Governmental Organizations since 1945 (DANGO) describes it as such: “[a]n NGO is a non-violent organisation that is independent of government and not serving an immediate economic interest, with at least some interest in having socio-political influence” (DANGO, 2016). Yet, at the same
time, the 2006 Charities Act in Britain, which outlines NGO, charitable organization, and ‘pressure group’ (Grant, 2004) definitions, indicates that “the promotion of the efficiency of the armed forces of the Crown” (Hilton, et al., 2012, p. 6) is one of the primary purposes of such groups. Moreover, pressure groups, or larger NGOs such as the Red Cross, which is actually part of the UN set up via international treaty, wield considerable power in their consulting practices with states through the establishment of ‘insider groups’ that are: “1. Recognized by government as being a legitimate representative of a given cause or interest; 2. Engage[d] in formal and informal consultation with government, by virtue of that recognition; [and] 3. [Agree] to respect the rules and norms of the above government” (Grant, 2004, p. 408). The areas of the voluntary sector are further categorized through the International Classification of Non-profit Organizations (ICNPO), which took shape from the UN’s International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) (United Nations, 1990; Salamon & Anheier, 1996). It was fully developed by Salamon & Anheier (1996) in 1996 as part of the Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project and in it they themselves acknowledge that “[m]any of the voluntary social services bodies – particularly the ‘brand name’ charities… have intimate links with local and central government arising partly through substantial inputs of finance in the form of grants, service level agreements and contracts” (Kendall & Knapp, 1995, p. 74). Certainly, it seems as though NGOs are anything but “independent of government” (DANGO, 2016).

Some authors have posited that that the boundaries of the third sector, often referred to as the voluntary sector, were once discernable at a time when the actions of member institutions – NGOs – were unquestionably value-based and guided by the tenets
of cooperation on local and international levels (Kendall & Knapp, 1995). Yet, categorization has since become overcomplicated by government intervention in this paradigm (ibid.). Others maintain that this sector is, indeed, definable when subject to rigid definitional criteria – that people, institutions, and organizations residing in this public sphere perform a distinct function outside of the normative public-private or market-state binary (Salamon & Anheier, 1992, p. 126). Salamon & Anheier (1992) assert that while there is a clear, or at least widely accepted, divide in our social lives between public and private, there is also a clear third complex of institutions that exist and occupy their own distinctive space in opposition to the dominant state apparatus. Enlightenment thinkers, they argue, continually sought to develop alternative ideologies for organizing, or reorganizing, the dichotomy of public and private life, be it through socialism, communism, liberalism, etc., yet never did consider a third sector (ibid.). This third sector, writes Salamon & Anheier (1992), has “given rise to a variety of social and political movements… that have successfully challenged the seemingly impregnable power of the market and state” (p. 127). Certainly, these authors represent what has become the dominant view of a growing cohort of scholars of global civil society.

Kendall & Knapp (1995) have set out to draw correlations between various so-called third sector bodies and establish a workable criterion for this segment of civil society. They analyze the social function of voluntary organizations/NGOs, such as service providing – providing a direct service to people either by in kind donation or by offering information, advice, and/or support, and pressure-group function – the application of group causes and interests to the public arena in an effort to facilitate social change (ibid, p. 66; Brenton, 1985). These organizations are differentiated by resource
and control dynamics, such as those that are considered democratic or oligarchic, professional, or voluntary. Along this resource-control scale, an organization’s source of funds and professional staff is the most salient indicator of where they reside in civil society. Moreover, these authors explore the values, norms and motivations of third sector organizations, quantifying, to an extent, the effect that the intrinsic moral and ethical code of individuals and organizations have on third sector activities floating amidst “the increasingly blurred economy of voluntary, private, and government providers [of aid]” (ibid, p. 72). Cognizant of the inherent dangers for “utopian social engineering” and “cognitive imperialism,” we are left with little substantial insight into the dynamism of these groups, as too many factors, such as degrees of bureaucratization and institutionalism, are present to distort any empirical claim (ibid, p. 73).

In their effort to address what might be seen as oversimplified conclusions concerning the diversity of the third sector, which is often studied in narrow and linear fashion, Salamon & Anheier (1992) establish patterns of differentiation. Such differentiations include, for example, sector versus subsector, wherein different NGOs hold very different legal personalities within a single legal system, let alone different legal systems operating in one country (ibid, p. 130). Academics theorizing this social phenomenon often overlook the level of an organization’s development as well. Thus, they consolidate the variety of prefatory definitions in the existing literature to develop what they call the structural/operational definition (ibid.). This definition takes into account the basic structure and operations of a third sector organization by establishing five comprehensive sub-features: 1) formal organization – the body has a charter, constitutions, sets of rules, etc.; 2) private – is a private organization, but only in structure
as it is still connected to government; 3) non-profit distributing – the net earnings of the organization cannot be distributed to those who control it, and trustees remain unpaid; 4) self-governing – they are constitutionally removed from government (yet still subject to government interference and influence); and 5) voluntary – put simply, that critical moral dynamic that nurtures trust and good will, even if only a small section of an organization is unpaid (ibid, p. 137-9).

Yet, despite the repeated attempts to define this sector and locate it, conceptually and physically, through legal definitions, constitutional statuses, specific charitable functions, and the like, few authors task themselves with uncovering how this apparent third sector really operates within larger frameworks of power and in what is referred to as the third sector of transnational civil society. We must take account of the greater forces of global governance, which ultimately support the view that the third sector is likely a discursive creation of governmental elites designed to pacify unruly population at arm’s length from official intervention into private affairs (Hilton, et al., 2012). As Reimann (2006) has noted in her analysis of the history of NGOs, while they have had some recognizable influence in constructing international opportunities for beneficiaries of aid, in the end, it is the decision of states that determine which opportunities remain open and those that remain closed (p. 64).

Transnational Civil Society

The term transnational/global civil society has emerged as a popular conceptual medium among academics and practitioners of foreign development in recent decades (Taylor, 1999). It is believed that NGOs have been most central in fostering this emerging (or pre-existing) order (Iriye, 1999) in a world where national identity is quickly eroding as the
central element in identity formation (Schuurman, 2000). Iriye (1999) has set out, rather ambitiously, to establish a quintessential relationship between the U.S. and world history. He describes liberal developmentalism as being appropriated in the 1960s by development theorists, particularly as modernization theory rose to theoretical prominence in liberal circles. However, he rejects the idea that liberal developmentalism was a tool of Cold War politics, positing instead that this concept has existed as a critical component of what he refers to as the “American century” (Iriye, 1999, p. 433). This American century was marked by a proliferation of social organizations, or NGOs, in the U.S., that operated under the geopolitical realities of state activity, with the rest of the Western world following suit in its benevolent wake soon after.

Mazlish (2006) more modestly seeks to map the lineage of NGOs through an empirical analysis combined with theoretical speculation about the place they have occupied in the twentieth century. For Mazlish (2006), they have largely existed part and parcel to the global governance initiatives of hegemonic world powers, filling the vacuous spaces of globalization – those spaces where governments have “faltered” (p. 48). In helping to manage the collective affairs of our global civil society, NGOs serve as the “handmaiden of ill-equipped nation-states… not to mention the hope for the whole of humanity” (ibid, p. 42), albeit a bit melodramatic. Similarly, Dryzek (2012) believes that while the locus of public authority in civil society may still largely be found within the sovereign state, we can embrace a “post-Westphalian” ontology, focusing on and stressing discursive representation and informal networks (p. 114). In this way, Dryzek (2012) argues, civil society is located both within and outside of the dominant state apparatus, depending on the discursive contexts taking place on particular issues. Such
issues, those that often run counter to state initiatives, are politicized by civil society to the benefit of the voiceless, as it were. As such, we can think about the third sector and transnational civil society not as a component of governance, but as previously mentioned, as constituting a public sphere at some degree from government (Dryzek, 2012). Without seeking a formal share of public authority, the third sector of global civil society can still orient itself to public affairs. It is this constructed public – the NGO class – that struggles on behalf of their recipients of aid and work to bring the plight of their insecurity to the attention of the global political system.

What these sorts of analyses fail to grasp is that the contribution of NGOs to an apparent and growing global civil society cannot be traced out in a linear fashion as if their increase often indicates a fragmented civil society over a growing one (Lundestad, 2004). In fact, there are many political factors that may contribute to the demise of the global civil society theory, such as decolonization, which as I have pointed out is intimately connected to Northern ‘insecurity.’ In this sense, globalization, or the integration of all national political and economic structures and the imposition of Western liberal democratic values on developing states (Reimann, 2006), exists “in a dialectical relationship with [fragmentation]…; when globalization is strengthened, so is fragmentation” (Lundestad, 2004, p. 265). Decolonization may have expanded the scope of global civil society rhetorically, yet at the same time split this society into regional blocs (ibid.) and gave rise to a politics of containment of the world’s ‘insecure’ and ‘uninsured’ (Duffield, 2008). As the flow of peoples shifted from a North-to-South axis to a South-to-North axis following decolonization (ibid.), Northern governments had to find new methods and systems of governance in order to (re)assert their authority.
(Duffield, 2001). Such was an invaluable opportunity to (re)establish networks with NGOs on a North-to-North axis while “enmeshing institutions and systems along a vertical North-South axis” (ibid, p. 8). An explosive growth in NGOs and other citizen-led interest groups in the twentieth century, or the ‘American century’ (Iriye, 1999), emanated from the opportunity structures that mass decolonization afforded, and promoting ‘civil society’ after decolonization was made NGOs’ business by the state (Reimann, 2006). As Habermas (1991) reminds us, a functioning civil society, having established itself as a realm of commodity-exchange in the transition from the feudal to capitalist social structure, is critical to the functioning of capitalism, which is set in contrast (in the Hobbesian and Rousseauian sense) to the “irrational disorder of natural society” (Hardt, 1995, p. 28). Promoting civil society has meant promoting a pro-NGO norm by international hegemons (Reimann, 2006), which through the processes of imperialism have been consolidating all national systems under their sphere of influence since the earliest stages of capitalism. This consolidating process includes an overt tendency to have poor states socialized into the appropriate behaviours befitting of international membership under the overarching rubric of security – and security-development – which is often met with moderate to intense resistance in developing countries whose fiscal climate for the work of NGOs is typically non-existent (ibid, p. 61). Indeed, civil society is often seen as the fragile achievement of a few ‘civilized’ Western societies and “because of the absence of an international counterpart to the domestic state, to apply the notion of civil society to development globally is a mistake” (Brown, 2000, p. 21-2).
Thus, NGOs are not the ideal outreach mechanism of the world’s poor, nor can they promise inclusiveness and values that established centers of power lack (Keane, 2003). Both the state and NGOs value security, or the eradication of insecurity in all of its unending configurations. To recall, this is particularly revealing with ‘human security,’ which subsumed threats from nearly everything imaginable, implying some sense of insecurity that was “more often the product of the concerns of daily life than of fear of some global cataclysm” (Commission on Global Governance, 1995, p. 80). NGOs are harnessed to the tasks of governing under liberal governance. Those that wish to adopt this task of resolving insecurities of the South must, in turn, pay a price – they must operate within approved models of actions, which Burchell (1996) refers to as a form of “responsibilization” (p. 29) in which NGOs are encouraged to freely conduct themselves, but within the prescribed areas of action that are consistently centered around market growth (Sending & Neumann, 2006).

Global governance initiatives by states, the UN, international financial institutions, and the like with particular concern for security will appear to remove global governance from the political realm because it is through NGOs – those charged with “policing the unpolitical” (Jaeger, 2007, p. 264) – that they are enacting such initiatives. Although NGOs may protest depoliticized issues as they fulfill their policing duties, their words are merely noise in the global political system. They do not speak the language of global politics that could be translated into action or program-conforming communications. Therefore, they do not constitute a third sector between the state and the individual. Their functional autonomy, harnessing those government tasks, results in a greater structural interdependence with the political environment, being the state system,
which is consumed by the capitalist social order of insecurity (ibid; Neocleous, 2011). By extending the techniques of public management to the supposed public, private, and third sector networks of aid that are being utilized as a policing authority, foreign affairs officials can establish a code of conduct to professionalize and standardize NGOs (Curtis, 2001). They may not imagine operating with delegated authority, yet their presence in ‘humanitarian’ interventions often require a network of, for example, complex military operations to facilitate the intrusion, resulting in what Barnett (2010) refers to as ‘mimetic isomorphism’ (p. 184). In situations of uncertainty, humanitarian workers model themselves after other successful bodies (be it a para-militaristic or corporate structure), regardless of whether or not this transformation in some clear or obscure way violates their principles (ibid.).

**Tracing Humanitarianism**

NGOs do not occupy a privileged sector in contrast to the state. In light of this understanding, I move to elucidate this historically and illustrate a continuity of humanitarianism as a centuries-long component of pacification. Fiering (1976) provides that “[m]odern humanitarianism may be defined as the widespread inclination to protest against obvious and pointless physical suffering” (p. 195). The etymological decomposition of the very sentiment that defines the core of humanitarianism, *compassion* – *passion* as suffering and *com* as with – provides a rather literal insight into the central ethos of humanitarianism. Though, as Barnett (2011) reminds us, “[i]f we equate humanitarianism with compassion, then humanitarianism is as old as history” (p. 19). What, then, is unique to humanitarianism beyond commiseration with the world’s
poor and subjugated? According to Barnett (2011), humanitarianism can be better defined as a practice imprinted by modernity and the Enlightenment and fueled by an ideology of engineered progress, and as an institution intimately connected to governance. While this definition holds to account many of its defining features, humanitarianism must be further, and more closely, analyzed as a critical component of capitalism – as a “global welfare institution” that may appear to proliferate an emancipatory politics when, in reality, it operates as the mechanisms of social control over the frustrated underclass that cannot enjoy the ‘benefits’ of capitalism (ibid, p. 24).

Three distinct phases of humanitarianism have received general recognition in the literature: 1) imperial humanitarianism; 2) neo-humanitarianism; and 3) liberal humanitarianism (Barnett, 2010). Imperial humanitarianism spawned from the technological, economic, religious, and ideological changes occurring at the middle of the eighteenth century and embraced the virtues of colonialism, the opening up of new markets, and civilizing missions (Barnett, 2011, p. 9). Imperial humanitarianism didn’t have NGOs as we would conceive of them today. Instead, it was newly formed charitable organizations that constituted the ideological core of this movement, organizations that had strong hierarchical understandings of humanity deeply embedded within them (Colhoun, 2010). The basic tenet was that those with more were supposed to give to those with less, producing a situation of dependency decried by the Enlightenment and Romantic thinkers as a menace to human and capitalist development (ibid; Neocleous, 2000). By the mid-1700s the anti-slavery movement was beginning to form in England, led primarily by Protestant evangelists that developed a new outward orientation and “addressed a world of strangers as potential converts. [They] saw slavery not as a
personal issue for slave owners, but as a national sin” (Colhoun, 2010, p. 36). As a result, charity began to mingle with the logic of ‘rights’ (albeit in a very infant stage) and an understanding of freedom that is borne ‘natural’ to mankind.

The irony of the abolitionist movement, and others like it, however, needs to be put into perspective. Barnett (2011) draws attention to these same evangelicals:

However expansive their moral vision, it was necessarily limited by culture, circumstances, and contingency. The abolitionists of the early nineteenth century were outraged by slavery on faraway plantations but, in retrospect, were remarkably dispassionate regarding the slavelike conditions endured by the working classes in Manchester and London (p. 9).

Referring once again to Lenin’s analysis of the expansionist dynamic of capitalism, monopolies produced an extended basis for the extraction of superprofits by the ruling bourgeoisies; and “to assure continued political stability bourgeois rule increasingly required that the sections of the working class that tended to spontaneously become politically active (i.e. protestant evangelicals and NGOs) – the better educated, better organised workers – be ideologically tamed into a loyal opposition” (Lorimer, 1999, p. 21). As bad as slavery was for the slaves, it also served no useful purpose to capitalism in an era where the circulation of wage-labour became the most critical component of capitalist functionality. Slavery was the one institution that charitable organizations were

---

33 Trouillot (1995) further illustrates that the advocacy for the abolishment of slavery should not be in any way equated to the abolishment of racism. “[O]ne could oppose the first (on practical grounds),” writes Trouillot (1995), “and not the others (on philosophical ones). Voltaire, notably, was a racist, but often opposed slavery on practical rather than moral grounds.” David Hume and Adam Smith followed suit and arguments for or against slavery became couched entirely in “pragmatic terms, notwithstanding the mass appeal of British abolitionism and its religious connotations” (p. 80). Moreover, while some ‘radical’ critiques of colonialism and racism appeared toward the end of the eighteenth century, most notably Abbé Raynal and Denis Diderot’s *L’Histoire des deux Indes*, such can be likened to guides on the proper use and effect of Western superiority. As Trouillot (1995) further elaborates, behind their radicalism stood, “ultimately, a project of colonial management. It did indeed include the abolition of slavery, but only in the long term, and as part of a process that aimed at the better control of the colonies. Access to human status did not lead *ipso-facto* to self-determination” (p. 81).
permitted, even encouraged, to transform, while they remained free to mitigate the suffering, only, of the proletariat (Colhoun, 2010).

Missionary/charity work is thus directly related to the genealogy of humanitarianism and, by extension, colonialism and imperialism. Importantly, the imperial ventures of the eighteenth century also “occasioned an important rethinking of the category of the human” (ibid, p. 38). We can actually extend our analysis further back, to the mid-sixteenth century and the famous Valladolid debate of 1550-1551. At Valladolid, Bartolomé de Las Casas, a Dominican Friar, argued with the secular priest Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda on the status of Amerindians, a debate that would have far-reaching implications for the fate of the indigenous peoples of the Americas. Both men drew on the humanist traditions of Aristotle and Aquinas, though reached vastly different conclusions. For Las Casas, the Amerindians were free men in the natural order; for Sepúlveda, they were naturally slaves. It was Las Casas’ argument that held favour with the King of Spain.34 It was built upon the emerging theoretical traditions of the School of Salamanca, which had pioneered natural rights theory and “an economic analysis that encouraged new degrees of commercialization based on private property. This reinforced the notions of the equivocally entitled human individual, the potential bearer of property as well as of a soul” (ibid, p. 39). This early humanitarian thought, then, underwrote “simultaneously new forms of commercial organization resistant to slavery and direct criticism of slavery as morally repugnant” (ibid.). As a result of Las Casas’ victory, from the seventeenth century onward humanitarianism presented itself as a rationale for colonialism and civilizing missions of all backwards people, further entrenched under the

34 To recall from chapter one, this debate is taking place just before what Neocleous (2011) has discovered as the first extended treatment of pacification in Muchacha’s *Milicia Indiana* (1599).
utilitarianism of Enlightenment thought. Indeed, this rationale remains widely popular in contemporary neo-imperial ventures that reach nearly every corner of the globe, especially as the ‘right’ to private property and participation in the market sets the standard for security, or economic security, in contemporary development thought. I will further reveal in chapter four how Haiti’s violation of these ‘rights’ in the eyes of foreign dictates and revolutionaries was justification enough for American and French re-incursion.

Following the conclusion of WWII, imperial humanitarianism gave way to neo-humanitarianism, which sought to meet the challenges of decolonization, the Cold War, and Third World nationalism (Barnett, 2010, p. 9). Common to this era was the spearheading of development projects by advanced Northern economic powers that sought to promote sovereignty and establish the state form among newly independent collectives. These projects were aided by humanitarian organizations largely of the Wilsonian persuasion such as Oxfam and World Vision International (Barnett, 2011). In addition, during this period the UN fastidiously evolved as the critical forum for addressing the challenges of rapid decolonization and consolidated NGO activity under

35 By the seventeenth century, already, France, England and the Netherlands had a strong presence in the Americas, and the eighteenth century saw an expansion of more of the same, but with a “touch of perversity: the more European merchants and mercenaries bought and conquered other men and women, the more European philosophers wrote and talked about Man” (Trouillot, 1995, p. 75). Confusion surrounded the philosophers of the Enlightenment around the question of Man, requiring the re-working of philosophical, ideological and practical schemes that could effectively recognize varying degrees of humanity. And, as Trouillot (1995) informs us, “[w]hether these connecting ladders ranks chunks of humanity on ontological, ethical, political, scientific, cultural, or simply pragmatic grounds, the fact is that all assumed and reasserted that, ultimately, some humans were more so than others” (p. 76).

36 Wilsonian organizations are so named because of their orientation to Woodrow Wilson’s belief in cultural, economic, and political liberation of war-affected countries following WWI that required a rigid program of socially engineered progress as a result of his “faith in market democracy as the lynchpin of domestic and international security” (Park, 2014, p. 293). Conversely, Dunantist organizations are those that purport to hold strong to Henry Dunant’s (founder of the International Committee of the Red Cross and “patriarch of modern humanitarianism” [Barnett, 2010, p. 181]) rigid commitment to the founding principles of humanitarianism and apolitical stance (lest their works be surreptitiously appropriated by the political maneuvering of corrupt state officials) (ibid.).
its sphere of authority, justifying intervention on the ground of principle and security.\textsuperscript{37} The UN referred to these interventions as second-generation peacekeeping operations (Duffield, 2001). “Between 1988 and 1994,” Duffield (2001) writes, “not only did peacekeeping operations multiply, but compared to the past they were intrusive and multi-leveled, requiring the creation of new forms of interaction between the military and civilian actors, especially aid agencies” (p. 57-8). This political exercise was intended to secure these new and ‘fragile’ economies that had become strategic in the widening communist-capitalist divide into the capitalist modes of production and liberal governance.\textsuperscript{38}

Finally, by the early 1990s, we have come to reside in the era of liberal-humanitarianism, or ‘new humanitarianism’ (Duffield, 2001) – the promotion of liberal peace and governance, globalization, and a newfound vigor for the acknowledgement of human rights (Barnett, 2011). The new humanitarianism is described predominantly as ‘rights-based’ and overtly political, arising from what Duffield (2001) refers to as the “bankruptcy of neutrality” (p. 91), as the traditional deontological ethics of humanitarianism have been supplanted by the teleological ethics of security-development and liberal interventionism. Organizations now venture into the territory of politics in conjunction with states and treat “moments of destruction as opportunities for political

\textsuperscript{37} Because of the apparent increase in humanitarian emergencies following the end of the Cold War (although that is, of course, debatable – humanitarian emergencies were only recognized as such under the new security-development framework that required humanitarian emergencies to justify intervention), the UN General Assembly passed a watershed resolution that made the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) the official coordinating body for international humanitarian action and affairs in the global South (Barnett, 2010).

\textsuperscript{38} Of great importance to this period was the formation of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Companies (OPEC) whose member states collectively raised the price of oil and caused a regression of global economic expansion for the global North. Western banks were left with significant investment deposits of petro dollars and to resolve this investment dilemma, banks recycled the deposits as loans to the Third World and socialist countries. As a result, internally consuming economies became ever more externally oriented, a phenomenon that ambitiously began, as we can recall from Lenin (1999), in the early 1900s (Duffield, 2001).
change, and [take] on functions that had once been the exclusive preserve of
governments” (Barnett, 2011, p. 5). This new adventurism has provided the opportunity
for expansion among NGOs, and current estimates put the amount of active aid workers
in the world at over 200,000 (Barnett, 2011, p. 3). But, as Barnett (2011) thoughtfully
reminds us, “it takes more than an army of well-intended people to fuel such an
expansion. It also takes money, and lots of it” (p. 3). As the North makes war under the
auspices of security, it also funds the humanitarian agencies that come in to clean up after
it, substituting charitable acts for radical change in invaded (either by the military or by
capital) countries, which becomes increasingly normalized through repetition and
desensitization.

The new humanitarianism (although an argument can be made that this applies to
the historical spectrum of humanitarianism) owes its salience in the modern world to
wars and emergencies (Colhoun, 2010), grasping the opportunity to effect change in (or
‘rationalize,’ as their Benthamite parentage would suggest) the social order, ethics, and
cognition of their distance recipients (p. 43). When ‘emergency’ is the lifeblood of the
humanitarian enterprise, then indeed the permanent state of affairs will forever fuel their
demand. As Neocleous (2006) rather frankly notices, we live in a state of permanent
emergency, thus there is no conceptual mileage to the idea of living in normal social
conditions. Is peace normal and war deviation? We are constantly on the battlefront of
some obscure ‘war on,’ be it drugs, terrorism, poverty, or childhood obesity. Colhoun
(2010) offers some clarity on the matter by simplifying the assumption of emergency and
normality down to (global) order and disorder. As Colhoun (2010) writes:

the phrase ‘global order’ often borders on the oxymoronic. Still for all the
upsets, the language of global order has survived. It is even carried forward
today into hopes for a new cosmopolitan order to replace the order of nation-states. Order is the realm of nomothetic generality; exceptions are ideographic particulars. Order is normal; disorder is exceptional, no matter how frequent (p. 47).

Any distinction between order and disorder clearly reflects the interests that are favoured by the existing ‘order’ and the specific relations of power that constitute it. The organization of these relations of power has its highest expression in the form of the state, which provides many humanitarian organizations with the majority of their funds. They then mimic these relations of power “by virtue of establishing boundaries, hierarchies of value, a space of positions, and competition for standing” (ibid, p. 51). The boundaries of their field may be ideologically drawn under the founding principles, namely neutrality. Yet, this realistically cannot be sustained, especially with the increased focus on policy coherence (Stepputat, 2012; Thede, 2013) and aid auditing (O’Connor, Brisson-Boivin, & Ilcan, 2014), which, true to the prudential and valorization layers of pacification, turns humanitarian work into a value-for-money project and creates the measures that identify failure and success for development organizations and the recipients of aid (ibid.).

**Security-Development: Pacification Through Humanitarianism**

Studies of the police, or policing, and international development and humanitarianism have largely been undertaken within separate disciplinary and theoretical domains. This is not to say that scholars have purposely sought to maintain these two fields of inquiry independently. Rather, it is to suggest that while the links between these two areas of study seem tenuous at a cursory glance, they do, in fact, hold considerable potential. Most fundamentally, both fields are pre-consumed by the concept of security, which exists as the overriding priority of their respective research agendas. Rigakos (2011, 2016) and
Neocleous (2008, 2011) have repeatedly illustrated well that grand projects of social fabrica
tion have rested heavily on a material sense of (in)security with the goal of creating and preserving social relations conducive to capital accumulation. Such projects are more generally linked to police and military powers of pacification (ibid.). Yet, when we begin to analyze the traditional functions that non-police or non-military actors perform though the optics of security and order-building, a striking resemblance to the ‘police function’ is clear. I argue that we need to begin to take stock of the ways in which Northern development projects involving NGOs in Southern locales are akin to Enlightenment policing initiatives. Their objective is to achieve ‘security-development’ – the widely popular theory that demands that without the reconstitution of security, development cannot be achieved and populations will remain unproductive.

Similarly, humanitarianism has been viewed primarily through a chiefly liberal lens – as a practice intended to be restricted to relief and emergency assistance (Barnett, 2010) and dealing exclusively in prosperity and stability (Beall, Goodfellow, & Putzel, 2006). Beal, Goodfellow, & Putzel (2006) believe that up until the last two decades, security concerns had existed as the special preserve of defense department and other ministries. Yet, because of the growing emphasis on security in foreign development initiatives, the usually separate agendas of the military and NGOs have become blended through the imposed measures of policy coherence. In other words, security has become the primary objective of development (ibid.). The popular deduction in the development literature is that this ‘priority shift’ was a response to the insecurity that manifested in the

---

39 I use ‘reconstitution’ here as it is often argued in the development literature that after decolonization, what are now regarded as developing states are thought to have withered in the absence of their colonizer’s moral trusteeship, which was central to the colonial project. As such, the security established by their masters was compromised and their (the beneficiaries of the Enlightenment spillover) education in matters of progress and self-reproduction (otherwise read security) remained incomplete (Duffield, 2008).
North post-9/11 (Beall, Goodfellow, & Putzel, 2006; Stern & Öjendal, 2011; Roland, 2001; Griffith, 2004; Mace, Thérien, & Gagné, 2012) and is built solely upon necessity. As such, it is my intention in this section to refer back to polizeiwissenscahft and the layers of pacification in order to illustrate how the call for security-development and the re-purposing of NGOs in foreign development initiatives is an incarnation of the Enlightenment police project.

**NGOs and Security-Development**

What prompted my analysis was the rise of the security-development nexus (Duffield, 2008; Stepputat, 2012; Reid-Henry, 2011). It has evolved as the yardstick by which satisfaction with, and the success of, development projects is measured. It is advanced by the idea that “development is almost impossible without security and, at the same time, security is not sustainable without development” (Duffield, 2001, p. 16). Security is largely understood to mean economic security in this sense, necessitating the construction of a market, or the neoliberalization of existing ones in states where the existence of terrorism and criminality (broadly defined) is argued to result in the production of disaffected sympathizers of terrorists, criminals, and autocracy (Simpson, 2007, p. 265). In this way, development has come to be seen as a line of defense, which, moreover, necessitates incorporating the expertise of NGOs on behalf of the state in its development objectives to alleviate the various emergencies of underdevelopment (Beall, Goodfellow, & Putzel, 2006).

The liberal intervention in the study of the security-development nexus has largely posited that while the inscription of security into development rationality may present some obstacles for traditional altruistic work, it is a “necessary evil of sorts”
(Weil, 2001, p. 91). As the popular rhetoric states, since security is a prerequisite to development, in areas lacking security, which can be justified on any conceptual plane, development resources must target ‘security.’ And since security cannot be achieved without development, a wider range of political technologies such as military and humanitarian action becomes a necessary prerequisite to development (Simpson, 2007). This conclusion is predicated on the assumption that the perpetual insecurity of Southern states is the primary reason that development initiatives since the period of decolonization have been ineffective (Duffield, 2008). To rectify this situation, the only logical course of action, it is argued, is to first address the insecurity by means of facilitating economic prosperity and democracy promotion, which involves the placement of NGOs into social service provision and governmental roles (Mace, Thérien, & Gagné, 2012). Neoliberal globalization continues to promote the rapid and unburdened exchange of money and goods, radical (in)equality, rejection of the state, and glorification of the private sector as promoters of diversity and progress, and NGOs are championed as the only force that makes this process bearable (Taylor, 1999, p. 271).

There have been attempts, however, at producing alternative readings of the security-development nexus that do not necessarily revert to a fixation with the market. For example, Stern & Öjendal (2011) argue that many analyses of the security-development nexus overlook issues of methodology and attempt to understand the ways that the nexus is imbued with different meanings by different actors in particular circumstances. The nexus, according to these authors, positions security and development as mutually reinforcing goals. Yet in many contexts of development in the global South, neither security nor development is achievable (ibid.). Thus, any attempt at producing a
roadmap for the study of the security-development nexus is redundant; it disallows the researcher to hypothesize ways in which the “‘nexus’ is negotiated, resisted, and reformed in distinct sites” (ibid, p. 108).

One of the primary faults in analyses such as Stern & Öjendal’s is that they are more often than not built on normative claims that reinforce the teleological narratives of ‘progress’ (Reid-Henry, 2011). And ‘progress’ is incontrovertibly measured along the line of economic progress/security/capitalism, which ultimately serves as the bulwark from which all other indicators of development, such as democracy and human rights, follow (ibid.). Moreover, “one of the principle advantages of the development-security nexus,”40 Reid-Henry (2011) observes, “is that by causing ever more things to be seen as security problems and in need of ‘security’ intervention, it also creates the very conditions of instability that ensure further, subsequent security attention will be required” (p. 98). This is what Rigakos (2016) refers to as the security industrial complex – as insecurity is perpetually reproduced, our desire for security can never be satiated and the preservation of an insecure order becomes an industry in itself (p. 81, 88), an industry very clearly manifest in an industrial complex of non-profit workers who can never be worked out of a job (Smith, 2011). Moreover, as has been recognized by Fischer (2013), Duffield (2010b), and Caple James (2012), NGOs grasp the figure of underdeveloped human life in its ‘bare’ form, who, then, “despite themselves, maintain a secret solidarity with the very power they ought to fight” (ibid, p. 58). Thus, as a result, the security-development nexus produces a geographical indexing of bare life as it plays itself out on the international stage for a domestic audience that can continue to donate and collect

---

40 Writing development-security as opposed to security-development here is not done with any particular purpose other than to demonstrate the cyclical and arbitrary nature of the phenomenon.
money from door to door and spectate at these global experiments in the governing of peoples (Reid-Henry, 2011, p. 100).

Perhaps most importantly, when asking what the costs of the security-development nexus are, the majority of current studies overlook its economic operations. This dynamic becomes most visible in the latest calls for ‘policy coherence’ between NGOs (civil society) and the military. As Reid-Henry (2011) writes:

> It is this need for coordination, I would suggest, that makes the development-security nexus particularly amenable to the promotion of processes of capital accumulation and regulation: to auditing procedures providing greater ‘accountability’, to one-size-fits-all policies in pursuit of ‘greater efficiency’, and so forth, even as the reality on the ground may be… a greater profusion of conflicting interests between development-security institutions and actors (p 102).

Indeed, this is a critical component of pacification. The need for ‘policy coherence’ (Stepputat, 2012) is inextricably linked to the compulsion toward prudentialization – “the process by which all commodity production in a capitalist economy is increasingly imbued with security planning and risk calculation within its circuits of production and consumption” (Rigakos, 2016, p. 71). Many Northern states have developed revised counter-insurgency doctrines for the plethora of ‘new’ wars devised in the past couple of decades, most of which include a turn away from armed combat and a turn toward capturing the hearts and minds of dissidents by giving higher priority to humanitarian aid (Stepputat, 2012). The first step involved in implementing these new doctrines is commanding and controlling humanitarian agencies that distribute aid (ibid.), a task that governments have pursued quite aggressively, and successfully (Duffield, 2008). And, if we can label development itself as a commodity, then indeed NGOs have become the latest repository of risk management – the police. A surplus for governments and
corporations is realized from their labour, valorized under the tenets of ‘aid-effectiveness’ (Hyndman, 2009), which ultimately produces vendible commodities as a result of their complicity in the neoliberal market restructurings that, for example, siphon Southern agrarian and industry funds into corrupt hands (Walby & Monaghan, 2011).

One of the most obvious manifestations of prudentialism is the insurance scheme. It is designed wholly to react to “harms against goods” (Rigakos, 2016, p. 72, quoting Rigakos, 2001) and produce technologies and knowledge that allay the human fear over the loss of said goods (Ericson & Haggerty, 1997). Here, Duffield’s (2008) incisive analysis of security-development is most revealing. He argues that, to be sure, development has always functioned as a liberal technology of security in an attempt to ‘complete’ the ‘incomplete’ and ‘uninsured’ South. From early modernity and the civilizing tutelage of the early eighteenth century that was inflected by the rise of industrial capitalism in Europe, development has existed as a “moral trusteeship over life experiences as either incomplete, redundant or somehow surplus to requirements… [b]ased on Enlightenment views of progress” (ibid, p. 148). In modernity, developed life is sustained by social insurance and bureaucratic protections that are more generally, and historically, associated with industrial capitalism. While the First World, and Second World to a lesser extent, is dependent on a contributory social insurance scheme, the majority of the world’s population lives outside of this social protection. Thus, underdeveloped life is ‘uninsured’ and inherently dangerous (ibid.).

Neocleous (2008) traces the notion of social security and insurance back to the 1930s as an answer to the woes of the Great Depression. The idea of social security “was very much aimed at the working class: it was some way to help reshape notions of responsibility and risk, independence and thrift, among the working class, and so foster new conceptions of citizenship and social solidarity. In so doing it helped cultivate the idea of ‘economic security’ and popularize the new means by which it could be achieved: through social, political and cultural reconstruction engineered by the state” (ibid, p. 87). This idea of social security...
Although slightly misguided in his periodization and temporal limit, Duffield (2008) argues that security-development has existed at least since the period of decolonization post-WWII. In considering the danger that underdeveloped life poses to Western capitalist prudence, he argues that the nexus is missing one often un-assumed element: containment. Containment refers to “those various interventions and technologies that seek to restrict or manage the circulation of incomplete or hence potentially threatening life, or return it from where it whence came. An expanded nexus would add the proviso that you cannot have development or security without containing the mobility of underdeveloped life” (ibid, p. 146). The ‘security-development-containment’ nexus, then, animates the technologies and interventions that discipline and regulate mass populations through aggregates, trends, and statistical norms (ibid.). It is the keeping of what Neocleous (2008) refers to as the security garden – one that must be internally ordered, but externally protected. And, as he further remarks, the more we surrender ourselves to security, the more we yield to authority and the violence that underpins it. This “constitutes the first key step in learning how to treat people not as human being, but as object to be administered” (Neocleous, 2006, p. 4). Indeed, as Hardt & Negri (2000) so eloquently point out,

Such humanitarian NGOs (such as Amnesty International, Oxfam, and Médecins sans Frontières) are in effect (even if this runs counter to the intentions of the participants) some of the most powerful pacific weapons of the new world order.” They are the “mendicant orders of Empire. The NGOs conduct ‘just wars’ without arms, without violence, without borders. Like the Dominicans in the late medieval period and the Jesuits at the dawn of modernity, these groups strive to identify universal needs and defend human rights. Through their language and their action they first define the enemy as privation (in the hope of preventing serious damage) and then recognize the enemy as sin (p. 36).
The global North consistently ‘rediscover’ poverty, which through its marginalizing effects cast the impoverished as strategic threats to liberal order, or as “objects of xenophobic excess” (Duffield, 2008, p. 154). Consequently, foreign development projects have been radicalized in the effort to promote domestic cohesion amidst the mobility of cultural radicalism, rediscovering “liberal practices of development traditionally associated with NGOs… as essentially civilian forms of counterinsurgency” (ibid, p. 156-7). While Rigakos (2016) writes that the “lead institution in the framing and response to risk are the police [as they] act as the hub for the coordination of security mobilizations in both public and private settings” (p. 75), the same can be said for NGOs on the development front. Humanitarianism is an industry, like the police and private security – the “de facto policy of a world that is unwilling to take decisive action to address the underlying causes of global poverty” (Jamieson, 2001, p. 157) precisely because poverty in the global borderland is necessary for accumulation in the center.

Neocleous (2000) reminds us that the early police (polizei) took the interests of the state as its starting point when determining what was necessary to effect the welfare and common good of society. Indeed, this is reflective of the contemporary aid industry that is consumed by the social order of insecurity produced by the state – a fear of underdevelopment as a source of conflict and terrorism that requires continued surveillance and engagement with the goal of transforming affected (or infected) societies into stable entities (Duffield, 2001). The North’s capacity for intervention on a humanitarian and development agenda is simply a re-working of imperialism where NGOs are “regarded as moral missionaries, playing a similar role to their nineteenth-century counterparts in providing the justification for domination” (ibid, p. 32). It is a
‘man-hunt’ (Neocleous, 2013), so to speak, where accumulation and productive labour must be found in new and more socially acceptable ways that don’t necessarily reflect the overt brutality of early capitalism, but succeed in meeting the demand for accumulation all the same. Such is visible in the fact that, for example, NGO participation in World Bank projects increased by 42 percent from the late 1980 to the late 1990s (Pierre-Louis, 2011), the very period when, which we can recall from chapter two, loan conditionalities and structural adjustment became the leading method of pacification for the Northern hegemons that sought to re-institute the neoclassical state among their Southern beneficiaries (Thomas, 2014).
Chapter 4
Haiti: A Life of Pacification and Weapons of Conciliation

‘On such a soil as San Domingo slavery, only a vicious society could flourish.’

C.L.R. James (1989, p. 27)

In this chapter, I will consolidate the information learned in the preceding sections and apply it directly to Haiti, past and present. In so doing, I intend to illustrate the continuity of Haiti’s struggle as the target of an intensive and unrelenting pacification project since before its tumultuous beginnings as the first free Caribbean nation, up until and including present day. I will illustrate how humanitarianism factored into some of the earliest French colonial initiatives in Saint-Domingue and proceed to cover, albeit rather expeditiously, Haiti’s centuries-long story of pacification that ultimately positioned it as a prime candidate for ‘security-development.’ I then shift my focus onto Canada’s engagement in Haiti, specifically as its involvement increased since 2004. I will utilize the data collected in my interviews, in combination with the humanitarian and security-development literature, to illustrate how a renewed focus on humanitarianism as an order-building technology has manifested under the security-development nexus and how NGOs, through the constituent layers of pacification, have become the global police aiding in the expansion of capitalism to the small, failed state.

A History of Pacification

Pre-Revolution: Saint-Domingue and The First Attempts at Pacification

Prior to Haiti’s independence, France had consummated its control of Saint-Domingue in 1697 with the Treaty of Ryswick, wherein Spain acknowledged France’s control of the
eastern third of Hispaniola (Schuller, 2007). However, before France formally forced Spain to cede the small portion of the island, a pacification project was well underway in what was quickly becoming France’s most lucrative colony. In the seventeenth century in the French Antilles, and the whole of the Caribbean for that matter (Peabody, 2002), the labour was still slave labour as the wage-labour form was still in its infancy in Europe. The police force, broadly conceived, utilized by the French political authorities, the “wedge that would ease French colonial penetration” (ibid, p. 59), was the Jesuits – the earliest visible version of NGO-type governance in Haiti.

The Jesuits in Saint-Domingue may not have embodied the professional adornment of the preventative policing institution as imagined by Colquhoun (1806) over a century later, yet they did anticipate this model as, indeed, their function was calculated “to [promote] and [excite] religious and moral habits among the inferior classes” (Chapter 3). For well over a century, French authorities orchestrated the use of Jesuits in an attempt to incite within them a fear of damnation, thereby enforcing strict religious observance in the Catholic faith whose indoctrinating power deepened the slaves’ acceptance of the status quo (Peabody, 2002). This is evidenced directly in King Louis XIV’s *Black Code* of 1685 – the reference for policing slaves in the islands of French America – particularly Article II, which stipulated that “[a]ll slaves that shall be in our islands shall be baptized and instructed in the Roman, Catholic or Apostolic faith” (CHNM, 2016). It was important that the slaves be deceived into bearing their condition as chattel in the material world in order to attain eternal bliss in the next life (Peabody, 2002), because, as James (1989) advises:

The sugar plantations demanded an exacting and ceaseless labour… Round every ‘carry’ of land intended for cane it was necessary to dig a large ditch to
ensure circulation of air. Young canes required attention for the first three or four months and grew to maturity in 14 or 18 months. Cane could be planted and would grow at any time of the year, and the reaping of one crop was the signal for the immediate digging of ditches and the planting of another. Once cut they had to be rushed to the mill lest the juice became acid by fermentation. The extraction of the juice and manufacture of raw sugar went on for three weeks a month, 16 or 18 hours a day, for seven or eight months in the year (p. 10).42

The central tenets of Catholic clericalism, which defined the moral and ethical standards of good behaviour, served well to meet the material and social needs of the imperial authority, which included the large-scale cultivation and trade of sugar. The Black Code was, thus, the law, and the Jesuits its enforcers, with an express interoperable dynamic whose utility was foreseen by a state that was consumed by a pervasive racism and fear of black revolution.

The clergy in Saint-Domingue were as much known for their irreverence and exploitation of the black slaves as the rest of the white colonial overlords (ibid, p. 32). And indeed, it was this class of priests, those ‘educators’ of the slaves, that would be quick to leave the colony as the looming threat of successful revolution approaching the end of the eighteenth century became ever more likely (Pierre-Louis, 2011). They shared in the privileges of their imperial benefactors and even established large slave plantations of their own to subsidize the cost of their work (in addition to their royal pensions),

42 “Prosperity is not a moral question,” writes James (1989), “and the justification of San Domingo (James is referring to Saint-Domingue) was its property. Never for centuries had the western world known such economic progress. By 1754, two years before the Seven Years’ War, there were 599 plantations of sugar and 3,379 of indigo” (p. 45). The Seven Years’ War (1756-63) disrupted the lucrative trade for a time, but by 1767 the colony “exported 72 million pounds’ weight of raw sugar and 51 million pounds of white, a million pounds of indigo and two million pounds of cotton, and quantities of hide, molasses, cocoa and rum” (ibid.). Just before the revolution, the French bourgeoisies (Nantes merchants) had 50 million francs invested in the West Indies and by 1789 Saint-Domingue received over 1500 ships into its ports annually, 750 of which were French, requiring a sailor compliment of approximately 24,000 men (ibid.). 500 U.S. ships had also visited the ports by 1790 (Fatton, 2007). By 1789, Saint-Domingue was, in fact, one of the greatest wealth-producing nations in the world, accounting for 40 percent of France’s total foreign trade and exporting half of the world’s coffee and sugar (Shah, 2009).
modeling themselves on the military chains of command (Peabody, 2002). Indeed, as I will later demonstrate, this modeling and inherent identification with the bourgeois class bears a striking resemblance to the contemporary ‘republic of NGOs’ in Haiti (Klarreich & Polman, 2012). Suffice to say the colonial administrators were partial to this organizational form that proved highly influential in controlling the time and space (Rigakos, 2016) of the slaves and socializing them “into the intended function of their economic purpose” (Bellegarde-Smith, 1974, p. 27). On the rising tide of Enlightenment anticlericalism in France, however, the Jesuits would begin to lose favour with the masses at home, halting the recruitment of new missionaries and debasing their powerful hold over the slave population, a fact that ultimately aided in the unfolding of the revolution (Peabody, 2002, p. 80).

The revolution is not the crux of the argument put forward in this project, yet I must give at least brief consideration for its uniqueness and power. The very reason why Haiti’s revolution was so unique and powerful was because it challenged everything that had come to be ‘known,’ or ‘unthinkable,’ since the Renaissance (and earlier) (Trouillot, 1995). As Trouillot (1995) puts it, the revolution

challenged that ontological and political assumptions of the most radical writers of the Enlightenment. The events that shook up Saint-Domingue from 1791 to 1804 constituted a sequence for which even the extreme political left in France or in England had a conceptual frame of reference. They were ‘unthinkable’ facts in the framework of Western thought (p. 82).

Of course, the revolution itself was fraught with its own inner agitations and confusions – wars within wars, or contingents of African-born blacks fighting with black Creoles (Trouillot, 1995); tensions in the relationships between Mulattoes with Big Whites based on property versus those of Mulattoes with the black slaves based on race (James, 1989);
Toussaint’s (the leader of the revolution) militarized plantation systems and statebuilding vision that undermined the social, economic, and cultural identities of the ex-slaves whose visions of freedom were formed by their own independent relationship with the land (Shilliam, 2008); and the establishment of free republics and monarchies in the North, South, West, and East, at odds with one another over concepts of black nationalism and each ruled by a revolutionary figure that wrote constitutions recognizing themselves as either governors or emperors for life (Trouillot, 1995; Shah, 2009; Fischer, 2004). This list of contradictions and internal strife is certainly not exhaustive. Yet, notwithstanding these destructive nuances of the revolution, what needs to be taken away from the movement as a whole is that what was ‘unthinkable’ has to be made acceptable once more (Trouillot, 1995).

Despite the recurring themes of Negro obedience and tranquility in the plantation society, the regular assertion in the historiography is that the revolution reduced these abstract arguments to insignificance (ibid, p. 72). Trouillot (1995) is not sold on this argument. Indeed, as he writes, “[w]hen reality does not coincide with the deeply held beliefs, human beings tend to phrase interpretations that force reality within the scope of these beliefs. They devise formulas to repress the unthinkable and to bring it back within the realm of accepted discourse” (ibid, p. 72). In this way, even as the events of the revolution unfolded, they were viewed as unthinkable. They violated the capital/labour relations forged on the island, even among the elite blacks and slaves – relations that needed to be re-established through re-forged narratives of Negro inferiority. The violation of the capital/labour relation in this historical episode of primitive accumulation (Shilliam, 2008) was so severe that it temporarily consolidated an alliance between
France and the U.S. who, together, would usher Haitians into the emerging capitalist modes of production through expropriation, dispossession, and privatization – methods of pacification that inflicted a new violence in the form of indemnities, blockades, and embargoes (Fatton, 2007).

**Post-Revolution**

By 1810 Haiti had dissolved into four separate political entities: a republic under Rigaud (Toussaint’s former rival) in the South; a republic under Pétion in the West; a black monarchical state under Christophe in the North; and the Spanish colony of Santo Domingo in the East, which was incorporated in 1822 (Fischer, 2004). The Western world refused to recognize Haiti as a legitimate state and continued to exact exorbitant profits and promote private business interests within the island (Scott, 2011). Denying the bounds of Haitian sovereignty devastated Haiti’s young, meager economy, preventing the transmission of goods and also disrupting the flow of ideas and technology (Pierre-Louis, 2011, p. 188). As the flows of international currency shifted on the island, corrupt shadow economies emerged to fill the space of industrial capitalism, resulting in “constant revolutions, military coups, and social, economic, and political instability [that] became the model based on which so many Haitian leaders govern” (ibid, p. 189). Such has served as the *leitmotiv* of Haitian politics with a recorded thirty-two *coup d’états* since Dessalines’ (independent Haiti’s first constitutional ruler) murder on October 17, 1806 (Schuller, 2007). Historical continuity was, unfortunately, efficaciously forced upon Haiti as soon as the Western world drew its name from the ostracon. Indeed, this is an

---

43 In 1844, Santo Domingo split from Haiti and the Dominican Republic was formed under the Spanish (Fischer, 2004).
important dynamic in understanding the trajectory of the Haitian state. As Fischer (2004) reflects,

the political instability and rampant authoritarianism in Haitian history are due to the fact that the ‘Haitian state and the Haitian nation were launched in opposite directions.’ Whereas the nation congealed around notions of liberty from slavery, the state in fact inherited the social and economic institutions from colonial times, which required a regimented labor force (p. 269, quoting Trouillot, 1990, p. 40).

To be sure, forced to reconcile their political ambitions for freedom with the capitalist form of social organization proved a fruitless endeavour.

By 1825, France formally recognized Haiti as its own independent state, but not without their imposition of a 150million franc indemnity, and the U.S. followed suit in 1862 in light of the Union’s growing need for cotton during the Civil War (Shah, 2009; Fischer, 2004). France’s recognition signaled the return of the Creole Haitian elites into the “orbit of French culture” (Fischer, 2004, p. 202), exacerbating the social and racial tensions on the island that led to the formation of two political parties: the Liberal Party (Mulatto elite) and the National Party (representatives of the black population). The Liberal elites forged an alliance with foreign merchants and effectively entrenched Haiti in a structure of import dependency that would define its economic relationship with the Western world for the rest of its ‘independent’ life. This alliance, writes Shah (2009), exacted punishments on the peasantry in the form of indirect taxation on imports and exports in order to supply the state with the luxuries of ‘European lifestyle’ (p. 23). The inequality of consumption led to consistent fissures between the opposing party factions, which provided the ease of access for the U.S. and its occupation of 1915-34, which

---

44 Haiti paid this debt from 1845-1947. Aristide calculated that in total the Haitian’s paid the French back what would equal to approximately $20billion U.S.D. during this period, resulting in a lack of infrastructure that continues to plague the nation today (Steckley et al., 2015).
“installed a puppet regime largely drawn from the rank of the mulattoes” (Fischer, 2004, p. 203) and premised its intervention on humanitarian grounds with the goal of restoring order and modernizing the fledgling state.

In reality, the U.S. was in competition with European powers for world markets and thus required mass territorial expansion to further their growing industries and commerce while restricting European interference in the Caribbean (Shah, 2009). To this end, they effectively utilized a growing German presence in the region as a pretext to invasion.45 Haitians resented the occupation as they were conscripted to work on development projects at the behest of U.S. political and military authorities. The Haitian gendarmarie was reinforced and surreptitiously controlled by the U.S. Marine Corps, which censored the press, imposed racial segregation, and forced crippling labour policies, such as the establishment of the corvee – “a massive mobilization of press-gang peasant labour to build roads that would reach remote areas of the territory” (Fatton, 2007, p. 161). These road-building projects were intended to create viable networks of transportation to reach remote areas of the island for the delivery of U.S. and other foreign, subsidized goods. At the same time, Haiti’s constitution was re-written (reportedly by Roosevelt himself), which specified the elite French language as the national language and opened up Haitian land for private and foreign ownership, a provision explicitly prohibited by the existing constitution (ibid, p. 149). U.S. charge

45 This logic has persisted into present day, with Canadian and U.S. foreign policy officials routinely citing an aggressive Russian presence in the region and the existence of supposed terrorist cells that do not heed the consequences of illegitimate activity that capital demands (Randall, 2010). Moreover, as Lenin (1999) notes, the U.S., Britain, France, and Germany had the largest surplus capital stocks, and by 1914 Britain had 75-100 billion francs invested abroad; France had 60 billion francs; and Germany had 44 billion (the total sum, at 5 percent interest, reaching 8-10 billion/year in return). Germany happened to be the only non-allied power to the U.S. for which the justification could be found legitimate. As of 1876, the U.S. had no colonies. By 1914, the U.S. controlled 9.7 million square kilometers of land outside of its territory that housed an estimated population of 106.7 million people (ibid.).
d’affairs and French diplomats alike argued that Haitians (or even the “Latin mind,” in general) (Schmidt, 1995, p. 146) could simply not ‘evolve,’ further mobilizing orientalist tropes to fulfill a ‘moral obligation,’ a responsibility taken up “in the name of humanity and international security” (Shah, 2009, p. 27). The occupation destroyed regional economies, made Haiti dependent on the export of a single crop (coffee), and reinforced a gendarmerie that had experience only in fighting Haitians and suppressing dissent, all of which opened the door for the brutal rule of the successive Duvalier regimes, which effectively closed the door to the modernizing efforts and influences of the outside world (ibid.).

Canada Shows its Face: Post-Occupation and the Ingression of Humanitarian Aid

Francois Duvalier’s (‘Papa Doc’) repressive dictatorship lasted from 1957 to 1971, and his legacy was continued through his son, Jean-Claude Duvalier (‘Baby Doc’) until 1986 (Schuller, 2007). Having extended his term in office in 1963, as had become a tacit tradition in Haiti, Papa Doc rewrote the constitution to solidify his ‘President-for-Life’ status (ibid, p. 154). To quell insurrection against his illegitimate rule and control his political opposition, he established the Tontons Macoute (Creole for ‘bogeyman’), a praetorian guard of sorts, to disappear opposition members and retain power. Critical to the maintenance of this menacing order was, in essence, the closing of the country to foreign influence and investment. In this ‘neo-humanitarian’ era (Barnett, 2011), the challenges posed by the First and Second World hostilities between capitalism and socialism were the priority of Western states. In 1962, Papa Doc, rather adroitly, cast what would be the deciding vote to keep Castro’s Cuba excluded from membership in the OAS, and so was rewarded in this context by the global North in turning a blind eye to
the massacre and wanton violence of Papa Doc’s secret police (Buss & Gardner, 2008, p. 28). Indeed, the humanitarian and security obligations of the North held little water for Haiti when these justifications were needed elsewhere, for a time.

Baby Doc’s assumption of power in 1971 brought with it the re-opening of the country to foreign investment and, subsequently, aid (ibid; Pierre-Louis, 2011). Canadian aid to Haiti began shortly after in 1973, with significant portions posited into the hands of NGOs, such as the Cooperation for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CARE). CARE and other organizations’ development activities during the Baby Doc administration sought to decrease Haiti’s dependence on subsistence agriculture and encouraged Haitians to migrate to Port-au-Prince to secure employment in newly fashioned assembly industries owned by foreign investors (Pierre-Louis, 2011; Mills, 2013). These concerted efforts by Canada and the U.S. resulted in a mass exodus of the rural poor to the urban centers, whereby those whom the factories could not support formed a new urban proletarian class (Mills, 2013).

From the early 1970s, then, we can begin to better understand the question of development in Haiti and its incapacity to exercise any measure of sovereignty in the face of Canada, the U.S. and France. The structured capitalist-labourer relation was re-ignited

---
46 At the same time, Canadian banks, specifically the Royal Bank of Canada (RBC), operated as what MacDonald (1993) refers to as “surrogate American bankers” (p. 176-7). The U.S. had not yet developed a strong banking presence (Canada had a lengthy history of maritime trade with the West Indies), and so the RBC “lent its machinery to American corporations facilitating US trade and commercial operations in the Caribbean and, occasionally, provid[ed] the financial machinery for US colonial governance” (Hudson, 2010, p. 36-7). Those in the Canadian banking/business community imagined themselves as the protectorate of the commonwealth’s darker subjects in the hemisphere, “[m]asking the less benevolent desire for an expanded market for Canadian manufactured goods and agricultural products” (ibid, p. 38). The RBC offered trust services to wealthy clientele, managed the estates of Caribbean elites (including those in Haiti, though under a different regional moniker so as to mask the ‘rapacious imperialism’), and drew in Indian and African peasants and workers by offering savings accounts with initial deposits as low as one dollar (ibid.). Indeed, as Lenin (1999) writes, “[a]t all events, banks greatly intensify and accelerate the process of concentration of capital and the formation of monopolies in all capitalist countries, notwithstanding all the differences in their banking laws” (p. 50).
in 1971 once Baby Doc inherited power from his father.\textsuperscript{47} He was quick to forge an alliance with the Haitian elite and foreign capital, securing the latter by accepting military and economic aid from the U.S., Canada, and France on the condition that he turn over the formulation of an economic policy to the IFIs (Dupuy, 2013, p. 22). Investors became attracted to Haiti thereafter because of its abundant supply of cheap, unskilled labour that was held in check by political oppression and because of Haiti’s proximity to the U.S. market (ibid.). ‘Sustainable development,’ of course, did not occur in Haiti. The assembly industry was failing,\textsuperscript{48} while the IFIs placed an undue emphasis on imports resulting in a negative effect on the balance of goods and services (ibid., p. 23). Additionally, because of the tax exemptions on profits (in addition to the subsidization of public services and utilities), government revenues dropped and profits for foreign investors and their Haitian subcontractors flourished. The military governments from 1986-90 were more or less the same and acquiesced to the U.S., Canadian, and French demands for privatization and trade liberalization. Yet, in November 1990 Jean-Bertrand Aristide, an enigmatic priest and statesmen, won a landslide election, who, true to his election word, immediately sought to overturn all existing neoliberal policies (ibid.). By 1991, there was a coup.

\textit{Aristide and the Turn Towards Humanitarianism}

The neoliberal economic measures enforced by the IFIs and NGOs during the 1980s, backed by the Canadian, French, and U.S. governments, resulted in the mass urbanization of Port-au-Prince and other urban centers. Schuller (2008) reveals how this transitional decade produced, in Marxist terms, a ‘reserve army’ of the unemployed, or the

\textsuperscript{47} It is well-documented that Baby Doc lacked the adeptness of his father to maneuver in the face of international pressure to embrace a completely open, and liberal capitalist economy (Hallward, 2007).

\textsuperscript{48} The assembly industry never actually employed more than 8 percent of the total labour force (Dupuy, 2013).
lumpenproletariat whose economic and social vulnerability could only be salved by the low-wage industrial jobs (p. 207). This shift and growing inequality provided the impetus for Aristide’s political platform, promoting a strong liberation theology and espousing a fervent disdain for capitalism and the Americanism that had so powerfully permeated the hemisphere. By an overwhelming majority, Aristide took office in 1990 and immediately began to undo the neoliberal policies of the 1980s. Concomitantly, the Bush Sr. administration supported the Haitian military (which Aristide was intent on dismantling) with strategies for carrying out what would be an effective coup, and by 1991 Aristide was ousted from office (Caple James, 2012). The Clinton administration remained indifferent to the terror apparatus, composed of the military and thousands of civilian paramilitary attachés that murdered, raped, and disappeared the poor in the years following the coup (ibid.).

In these years of terror, it was the pro-democracy followers of Aristide that needed to be pacified. Indeed, it was this large pro-democracy contingent, known as the Lavalas, that taught the army its most important lesson in the pacification of dissent – “in order to contain the popular mobilization, you must seal off and then terrorize the slums where its most determined partisans live” (Hallward, 2007, p. 39). This would be the precise strategy of Canada, France, the U.S., and the UN in the coup to come just over a decade later.49 In 1991, the U.S. was developing a large network of paid informants and

49 Indeed, this lesson would not be forgotten. As FA2 recalls, “we had a fairly large project (in 2009) with a Brazilian NGO that’s called Viva Rio. And basically Viva Rio made a name for themselves because they were able to pacify the favelas around Rio, or in Rio.” This NGO was first active in Bel Air where the Lavalas still maintained a strong hold. FA2 continued: “basically the logic is, from our perspective at START (Canada’s ‘Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force’ for Haiti and Afghanistan), you cannot have any kind of development if you do not have a minimal level of security and confidence. You won’t be able to attract foreign investors, you won’t be able to, you know, if people are just hiding in their houses then they are not creating jobs and creating opportunities for other people” (FA2, personal correspondence, November 26, 2016).
compliant military personnel to balance the Aristide movement, supplying Aristide’s kidnappers General Raoul Cédras and Police Chief Michel François with recurrent helicopter loads of ammunition from Guantanamo on the eve of the Aristide’s kidnapping and slaughter of innocents in the capital (ibid.). In addition, substantial amounts of money were posited into the hands of Macoute veteran Emmanuel ‘Toto’ Constant (ibid.). His payments were received directly from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), with which he developed the Front Révolutionnaire Pour l’Avancement et le Progrès Haïtien (FRAPH), and from 1993 to 1994 led a series of brutal invasions into the pro-Lavalas slums of Port-au-Prince (specifically Bel Air) (ibid.). Yet, without a figurehead for the Haitian government and calls for the return of Aristide by the popular vote in Haiti and critical outside observers, Aristide’s return grew imminent.

In October of 1994, on the heels of 20,000 U.S. Marines Aristide was reinstalled as President of Haiti, on the condition that he abandon his political principles and adopt the neoliberal policies to which he was so fiercely opposed (ibid.). This abandonment took place months earlier in August 1994, when Aristide signed an agreement known as the Paris Plan with the U.S. to guarantee his return to power. The Plan “obliged Aristide to agree to an amnesty for the coup makers (FRAPH). He had to concede US control over the development and training of a new police force.50 He had to share power with the opponents that he had defeated so convincingly in 1990, and to adopt most of their highly conservative policies” (ibid, p. 50-1).51 There was no real opposition to the U.S. invasion

50 Which Canada would take over in 2004 (Podur, 2012).
51 The Plan did stipulate crippling economic policies in exchange for nearly $770million in aid, such as the drastic reduction of tariffs, the freezing of wages, the mass lay-off of civil service employees, and the privatization of Haiti’s nine remaining public utilities (telephone, electricity, port, airport, cement, flour, a cooking oil plant, and two banks) (Hallward, 2007). Yet, the Plan was never an “unconditional surrender,” as Hallward (2007, p. 56) puts it, at least as it was written. The Plan made many stipulations about money being directed to the rural poor and that it was to be utilized in such a manner so as to prevent the increased
since the U.S. authorities were working closely with the pro-coup families and business elite in Haiti. As the soldiers departed in 1995, they left behind a swathe of para-civilian advisors, trainers, and consultants whose task it was to “administer the consequences of their work… and to prepare the ground for future doses of that ‘humanitarian intervention’ (in the name of human security) which has come to replace traditional forms of military action as the primary means of neo-imperial control” (ibid, p. 52).

Despite Aristide’s acceptance of the U.S. impositions and the Paris Plan, his first act in 1994 as President was to disband the army and reduce it to “nothing more than a marching band” (ibid, p. 54).52 This was seen as a great, albeit temporary, victory for the poor in their battle against the elite who traditionally retained control of the forces. In October 1995, he publically declared that “any official who tried to proceed with the untrammeled privatization of state assets would be jailed” (ibid, p. 58) and, as a result, the U.S. and IFIs immediately suspended payment of nearly all promised aid and loans, devaluing the Haitian gourde by over 20 percent nearly overnight (ibid.). Hence began the “less reversible invasion” (ibid, p. 60) of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID, the equivalent of Canada’s CIDA), IFIs, and the US National

---

52 This victory was achieved only on the surface. As Hallward (2007) writes, “[s]ince the army had been the only thing standing between Haiti’s system of socioeconomic apartheid and open revolution, its elimination by Aristide over the course of 1995 provoked something close to panic within the ranks of the ruling class” (p. 65). However, in 1995, foreseeing this possible glitch, the U.S. (State Department and the CIA) took it upon itself to oversee the “crucial stages of the initial PNH (Haiti National Police, or HNP) recruitment, and in line with an entrenched tradition that had helped maintain its working relationship with the Haitian army, ensured that many police units received training at Fort Leonard Wood in Missouri … [while also funneling] hundreds of military-style weapons to selected units of the PNH at least through to 1998” (ibid, p. 66-7). The HNP thus grew to resemble the old army every passing day through the end of the 1990s, and remained under the control of its international donors.
Endowment for Democracy, amongst a litany of other liberally funded technocrats and NGOs. As Hallward (2007) explains,

All these divergent agencies were authorized by their donors to bypass the elected government and to invest directly in a wide range of development projects designed… to impose a neo-liberal economic agenda, to undermine grassroots participatory democracy, to create political stability conducive to a good business climate, and to bring Haiti into a new world order appendaged to the US as a source for markets and cheap labor. As in other countries, this democracy promotion industry will support those projects and people willing to go along with its agenda will mold them into a center. In the crude old days grassroots organizers unwilling to be co-opted would have been tortured or killed. Now, they will simply be marginalized by poverty and lack of political clout (p. 60).

Humanitarianism as a police project is becoming most easily seen at this point, yet the Northern donors were not yet done with violent methods of pacification. This policing style would become most salient by 2004, at which point Canada would fully endorse the tactic of pacification through humanitarian aid.

**Leading to the 2004 Coup**

In 1995, Aristide’s term in office had expired and his close second, Rene Préval assumed the presidency. Préval didn’t possess the gumption of Aristide to act against external pressures, notwithstanding the fact that he had to face a five-year term under the intimidation of FRAPH and a host of other far-right political bodies established in both the U.S. and Haiti, particularly the *Organisation du Peuple en Lutte* (OPL) that undermined every political action coming from the president’s office that steered away from the mass privatization of state enterprise (Engler & Fenton, 2005). The OPL consisted of Aristide’s ex-ministers that split from the Lavalas to form a conservative party, further comprised of the liberal elite and traditional political class (Hallward, 2007,
p. 55). This group wielded significant power via U.S. backing through the late 1990s and paralyzed Préval’s government by freezing the disbursement of international aid funds and rejecting all of Préval’s nominees for Prime Minister (ibid, p. 64-5). The OPL terms, however, expired in January 1999, enabling Préval to rule by decree until the scheduled elections in May 2000. He took the opportunity to work with the Fanmi Lavalas and re-established Aristide’s 1991 reforms, such as limiting land reform and investing in education and health, while maintaining a fragile grip on the HNP, as Aristide had managed to do. Under the continued support of Aristide and Préval, the Fanmi Lavalas had also transformed itself from an informal, eclectic movement into a disciplined and organized political faction, “one capable of winning and retaining political power at all levels of government” (ibid, p. 72). It had the power of the people behind it. Thus, interveners, comprised on the surface by the aforementioned groups, but politically and militarily backed by Canada, the U.S. and France, had to decide whether to move forward with the Lavalas, or against them. In determining Préval’s successor, which would be Aristide, Hallward (2007) notes, “the great majority of the Haitian people made once choice but the elite made another” (p. 73).

Préval’s end-of-term reforms succeeded in the same ways as Aristide’s had – hints of positive social reform and social democracy began to appear, and the liberal elite grew furious. The 2000 elections ended up taking place in November, and the polls indicated a landslide victory for Aristide (Engler & Fenton, 2005, p. 30-1). Canada, the U.S. and France provided substantial funding to non-Lavalas political parties and

53 The OPL was backed primarily by the International Republican Institute (IRI) in the U.S., which formed in the mid-1990s and during this period funded opposition groups in Haiti under the banner of democracy protection. The IRI was a pillar organization operating under the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), which was legislated into existence in the 1980s under Reagan (Engler & Fenton, 2005).
candidates, and in September 2000 U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright convened a meeting between what she termed the ‘Friends of Haiti’ (ibid.). Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy\(^54\) was Canada’s representative, and the meeting determined that the U.S. would withdraw all assistance to Haiti for the November election. Aristide took the presidency once again, and in 2001 Canada, in conjunction with the U.S. and OAS, terminated aid entirely to Aristide’s government and began to deal directly with NGOs that were aligned with the anti-Aristide movement (ibid.).\(^55\)

By 2002, the aforementioned far-right political bodies, which included, for example, ex-Duvalierists, ex-putchists, the OPL, other ex-social democrats, bankers, media elite, intellectuals of both the liberal and conservative camps, and NGO administrators, formed what was termed the Democratic Convergence (DC) (Hallward, 2007). At the same time, the Haitian business elite spawned the Civil Society Initiative (ISC), consisting of the Group of 184 (the number of organizations that participated in the U.S.-designed ‘democracy enhancement projects’ since the mid-1990s). The

---

\(^54\) Lloyd Axworthy was also one of the pioneers of ‘human security,’ who claimed that post-9/11 terrorism had become a most critical component of Canada’s security strategy for the Americas because “government officials increasingly recogniz[ed] that any efforts toward promoting democracy and economic prosperity are undermined by insecurity, fear and corruption” (Mace, Thérien, & Gagné, 2012, p. 615). Such insecurity, fear, and corruption were the result of Aristide’s performance, according to the Friends of Haiti. As Duffield (2001) notes, labeling leadership as criminal effectively situates ‘criminal actions,’ which might simply include anti-Westernism and non-cooperation, outside of widely accepted social practices. These actions, then, can be circumscribed and policed, reinforcing “the need for global governments to intervene and separate the deserving poor from the undeserving leaders” (ibid, p. 131). As Duffield (2001) further articulates, “once violent, corrupt and criminal leaders are neutralised or removed, liberal peace, in alliance with the poor, can once again resume normal development. The idea that the new wars (i.e. war on drugs, poverty, crime, and the like – all carried out under the auspices of security) may be symptomatic of much wider societal and international transformations is not seriously considered. They remain a temporary aberration on the inevitable road to development and security” (p. 132).

\(^55\) For example, as Engler & Fenton (2005) write, “USAID [and CIDA]-funded organizations infiltrated grassroots organizations while developing propaganda campaigns (also known as ‘civic education’) for dozens of community radio stations throughout Haiti” (p. 40). In April 2005, for instance, the Quebec-based media NGO ‘Alternatives’ received $2 million from CIDA, which worked with fifteen anti-Lavalas media groups in Haiti to train journalists on how to cover elections. The Alternatives reports omitted any mention of political prisoners and the literal cleansing of Lavalas neighbourhoods in Port-au-Prince by the UN and HNP (ibid; Podur, 2012).
spokesman for the group was Andy Apaid Jr. – a Port-au-Prince factory/sweatshop tycoon who was also linked to funding and arming anti-Lavalas death squads (Engler & Fenton, 2005, p. 40). The opposition was finally consolidated in 2003 under the Democratic Platform (DP), which brought together the DC and ISC whose mandate was the unconditional removal of Aristide from office (ibid.). The DP mobilized large demonstrations and stirred up anxieties in the general population seeking to justify (successfully) what would be the final paramilitary incursion. And, in early February 2004, “Haiti’s ‘rebels,’ led by many of the same figures that participated in preceding military efforts, entered the country from the Dominican” (ibid, p. 46). Once again, Haiti became embroiled in armed insurrection, and in Gonaïves on February 5, 2004, insurgents murdered the police and took over the city (ibid.). They made their way to Port-au-Prince while the world’s most powerful nations ignored Aristide and CARICOM’s request for peacekeepers to put down the well-armed contingent (ibid.).

Canada, the U.S. and France were only prepared to move in to remove Aristide.

As usual, this coup, orchestrated by Canada, the U.S. and France, required a more specific justification, but, of course, one still built on the overarching theme of the insecurity of the state. It would be found in a fabricated story of a massacre at Saint Marc. CIDA provided $100,000 to the (now discredited) NGO National Coalition for Human Rights (NCHR), which was commissioned to develop a report accusing the Aristide government of orchestrating a massacre of civilians in Saint Marc (Podur, 2012; Hammond, 2010). This story was picked up by a large number of anti-Lavalas NGOs, including a number of Canadian organizations, but cited absolutely no evidence for its occurrence. NCHR’s report charged former Prime Minister Yvonne Neptune and former
Interior Minister Jocelyn Privert as the heads of a slaughter of fifty people by pro-Lavalas partisans. There is near universal agreement among journalists and human rights groups that this never happened (the NCHR claimed the evidence – dead bodies – was eaten by dogs) (Engler & Fenton, 2005; Podur, 2012).\(^{56}\) Nonetheless, this report has been used ever since as a ground for the Canadian government to detain former members of Aristide’s party and imprison these same officials without trial in Haiti’s National Penitentiary (destroyed in the 2010 earthquake) (Hammond, 2010). Canada contributed 500 soldiers to the coup force, and on February 29, 2004, Aristide ‘resigned’ and was picked up (kidnapped) by the U.S. Marines and Canadian soldiers and shuttled off to South Africa. Immediately following, the Canadian-U.S.-French force installed a new government, aided by the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) under UN Security Council resolution 1542 (Schuller, 2007).\(^{57}\)

Due to the limitations of time and space, the post-2004 experience in Haiti cannot receive the full attention it deserves. To put it plainly, since 2004 there emerged a two-year interim period wherein temporary Prime Minister Latortue\(^{58}\) was installed to oversee public administration, aid, and rebuilding (Schuller, 2008, p. 193). These aims were posited in the *Cadre de Cooperation Interimaire* (CCI – Interim Cooperation Framework), which called for, once again, mass privatization of nationalized companies

\(^{56}\) As Podur (2012) plainly iterates, “[a]s with many false accusations against Lavalas and Aristide, the lies about Aristide’s voluntary resignation had a shelf life, but they did not need to hold up forever; only long enough for the U.S./Canada/France force to take the capital and install a new government” (p. 56).

\(^{57}\) Trudeau’s Liberal government announced in March 2016 that Canada is planning to take over command of MINUSTAH, which was to be a six-month interim occupying force for the transition government, and replace the bulk of the troops on the ground from Brazil with its own. The Liberal government has also made clear its intention to shore up security in Haiti with the installation of 1000-2000 more police officers and soldiers to demonstrate a willingness to renew Canada’s engagement on the world stage and its capacity to hold a seat on the UN Security Council (AFP, 2016).

\(^{58}\) Latortue was the favourable candidate to Canada and the U.S. who hadn’t even been in Haiti in the fifteen years prior to his appointment (Engler & Fenton, 2005).
and the reversion to export-oriented development. “Capital interests,” Schuller (2008) notes, “were also served by a climate of repression, of workers and other populations” (p. 193).59 The HNP, with the full support of Canada, U.S., France, the UN (MINUSTAH), and the silence of supposedly progressive NGOs, cleansed the Haitian resistance to the occupation through the continued slaughtering of Lavalas contingents in Bel Air and Cité Soleil during the interim period.60 Years later, NGOs continue to work closely with MINUSTAH and the HNP on matters of ‘security’:

the police don’t operate in isolation either. We need NGOs to identify the target we need to address and treat. There is a very good relationship and created synergies. It’s a win-win situation… There needs to be a whole of government approach to development (RC, personal correspondence, February 9, 2016).

As Podur (2012) writes, “[i]t was not persecution, but security, that the UN and the Haitian Police were bringing. And the price of insecurity, MINUSTAH and the coup regime argued, was high” (p. 102). The conjuring of insecurity justified countless reversals of justice, elections fixing, raiding of the treasury, and the massacre of urban indigents (ibid, p. 87). RC concurred and took pride in the fact that there was no more opposition to Canada-French-U.S.-organized elections: “the UN mandate for MINUSTAH was to bring stability and security. It has been accomplished when you see

59 Many ‘plans’ were enacted for Haiti, such as the “economic governance plan,” “finish the peasantry” and “ready-to-wear” neoliberal programs, that flooded Haiti with subsidized food from the U.S. and Canada (Schuller, 2008). By 2008, the U.S. was averaging over $200million of exports to Haiti annually (ibid.) and by 2015 Canada exports to Haiti totaled nearly $56million (Government of Canada, 2016).

60 There were also many high-profile arrests at the beginning of the transition government. Mass torture, sweeps, and rapes were commonplace, always against the Lavalas. For example, in 2004 a 57-year-old Catholic priest sympathetic to the opposition was accused of importing arms and harbouring Lavalas gunmen. There was no trial or reason for incarceration. Once his lawyers secured the documents of his arrest, it was discovered he was being held of ‘disturbing the peace,’ which carries with it a 40 cent (U.S.D) fine. As of 2012 he was still being held (Podur, 2012). During the 2010 election, on November 8, Samba Boukman, who was the spokesperson of the Lavalas opposition group MRBP, sent a letter to MINUSTAH requesting permission and protection for a planned, peaceful demonstration. “On that day,” Podur (2012) writes, “demonstrators gathered to call for Aristide’s return. MINUSTAH was on hand, as requested, and proceeded to watch as the Haitian police arrived on the scene, killed seven people, and seized 180 more” (p. 79).
that you don’t have larger protests over elections” (RC, personal correspondence, February 9, 2016). In other words, MINUSTAH has been successful because the democratic opposition has been destroyed. Such is reflective of one of the most basic risk-management strategies of liberal ‘democratization’ – the calculated inclusion and exclusion of political parties as premised on whose “violence matters” and whose inclusion suggests a risk to the liberalizing objectives of the intervener (Park, 2014, p. 303).

Préval ran for the President’s office again in 2006, and was successful. Opposition parties, supported by Canada, France, and the U.S., criticized the landslide victory for Préval, yet ultimately had to accede to the victory. Nonetheless, Préval’s assumption of the presidency was of little significance in the face of a coup that had already been firmly consolidated from 2004-2006, which had given the World Bank and IMF de facto control over the country’s financial planning and made NGOs the de facto governance structure (Podur, 2012; Schuller, 2008).

Haiti has become permanently fixed in a cycle of neoliberal structural adjustment, fixed elections (2010 and 2011), and silencing. Any remnants of self-reliance and sovereignty, of social justice, appear to have been completely eviscerated. Indeed, the 2004 invasion was permanent. The critical question at this junction is what was so substantially different about this latest period of pacification from previous attempts? It is that the coup facilitators, especially Canada, left a police force. By police force, I do mean the Canadian police (in addition to MINUSTAH that currently has an operating budget of nearly $1billion/year [Ives, 2013]), correctional officers, and military personnel that continue to fulfill their pacification roles. But, more importantly, I speak of the
NGOs. At a 2004 Parliamentary Session, Guillermo Rischynsky, former CIDA Vice-President (Americas Branch), discussed the problems with Haiti’s fragmented and failed government: “in the absence of a strong institutional base, we demonstrated that results can really only be of a humanitarian nature” (Sorenson, 2006, quoting FAAE, 2004). This was to be achieved by not only positing funds with NGOs (as had been done in the mid-1990s), but also to shield them with a temporary-turned-permanent multinational occupying force (MINUSTAH) and, most importantly, to essentially legislate their permanence and interoperability with private capital. This would occur through the donor-devised Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (I-PRSP).

The I-PRSP was first formulated in 2004 and finalized in 2006 (having undergone minor revisions in proceeding years as the IMF reviews itself and its own progress). Underwriting the economic objectives of the paper was a single most important goal: to “establish an effective partnership with grassroots organization, the private sector, and in the international community,” and to “ensure consistency and coordination of programs, especially among NGOs and international financing agencies” (Buss & Gardner, 2008, p. 64, quoting IMF, 2006b). The report is littered with references to NGOs and their assumption of social service provision roles as the key to effective governance and rehabilitation (for example, see IMF, 2006a, paragraphs 4, 7, 47, 73, 94-5, 115, 120, 126, 156). NGO governance became written into the doctrine of development for Haiti in a new era where donors were ‘learning from past mistakes’ (ibid.; NG1, personal correspondence, January 16, 2016) – a highly popular rhetorical medium that, as I learned through my interviews and in the literature (Sorenson, 2006; Duffield, 2010a; Whittall, 2010), does not see past military incursion as a mistake, per se. Rather, it sees previous
pacification attempts as incomplete. ‘Security’ could not be found in the usual way (i.e. brute military and legislative force) – Aristide had proved this on two occasions. Haitians could not be ‘fixed’ and then left alone but required a constant surveillance that could be made visible and that could co-opt and maintain the fragmentation of a pestering opposition movement. Pacification is a cycle of destruction and reconstruction, and past efforts have been heavily based on the former. To complete the cycle, the NGO governance function became a permanent feature of the security-development landscape. NG2 recalled their experience with MINUSTAH and the international community after the coup and up until and following the earthquake:

we had a security officer – a focal points officer that was working on security full-time. And he was participating [in] the different UN meetings on security because NGOs shared a lot of information on security. Especially during the election period… So, our security focal point was connected to the UN. Maybe it was with MINUSTAH – but for security and information sharing and security mapping our information officer was really connected to MINUSTAH (NG2, personal correspondence, March 9, 2016).

By 2004, the need for security-development seemed more apparent than ever before, and now it had found its missing ingredient – the new police, or, as Duffield (2008) coins them – “civilian forms of counter-insurgency,” designed to pacify a population based largely on ‘lessons learned’ (p. 157). By the end of 2004, CIDA-funded ‘civil society’ organizations were providing 80 percent of Haiti’s basic services (Engler & Fenton, 2005, p. 49). And by the end of the interim period, in 2007, 70 percent of total NGO

---

61 It is interesting to note that leading to the coup it is surprising how Canadian federal money was so easily able to co-opt supposedly ‘progressive’ NGOs. Engler & Fenton (2005) provide a few notable examples: Rights and Democracy (Ottawa-based NGO) released a report titled ‘G-184 grassroots and a promising civil society movement.’ The G-184, as we know, was headed by an ultra-right wing conservative and sweatshop owner and heavily funded by the IRI; the L’Association Québécoise des Organismes de Coopération (AQOCI) called upon the Liberal government to withdraw any and all support for the ‘Lavalas party regime,’ citing the NCHR’s highlighting of human rights abuses and the St. Marc massacre (which had, of course, been condemned by international journalists, the National Lawyers Guild and Amnesty International for being entirely false and overtly partial); the Concertation Pour Haiti (CPH) built similar
funding in Haiti came from Canada and the US (CIDA and USAID) (Zanotti, 2010, p. 27).

**Canada’s New Police Force**

In 2006, Sorenson (2006), former chair of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, heralded the need for security-development most explicitly: “[i]n terms of where one would focus our efforts, on the development side there are security interventions, there is pure development and poverty reduction, and then there is the nexus of the two in areas like Haiti… where we actually need a combined approach” (p. 10). He illustrates what has become the quintessential priority of Canadian foreign policy for Haiti, wherein security, development, and humanitarian practitioners are consolidated into professional networks that “call forth the conditions of need and insecurity to which collectively, and in competition, they seek to provide solutions” (Duffield, 2010a, p. 56).

Canada’s strategy to inscribe ‘security’ into the development practices of NGOs has been to emphasize and analyze aid effectiveness and policy coherence among NGOs that receive funds from the Canadian government (Brown, 2012). Moreover, GAC’s most recent official mandate has expressly indicated that self-interest motivates their aid distribution, with recipients of aid targeted based on a perceived security threat (not

---

claims off the NCHR report; and in a 2004 Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, policy-makers used the testimony of the Canadian Catholic Organization for Development and Peace, the International Centre for Human Rights and International Development, and Oxfam-Quebec, who all accepted that Aristide resigned and was not kidnapped, justifying intervention. Coincidentally, in July 2005, Oxfam-Quebec received a sizeable portion of the two CIDA-funded projects in Haiti worth $15 million.

62 Particularly the 32 permanent members of the Humanitarian Response Network of Canada (HRNC) (HRNC, 2016).
The Canadian Trade Commissioner Service (TCS) is more explicit in its mandate, which is “to promote Canada’s economic interests in Haiti and support the efforts of Canadian companies who have selected Haiti as a target market for their products, services, or technologies” (TCS, 2016). In turn, NGOs such as Plan Canada (in partnership with both GAC and the private mining firms IAMGOLD, Barrick Gold, and St. Genevieve Resources Ltd., which possesses prospecting rights to 10 percent of the entire Haitian territory) (Klein, 2013), World Vision, and the Canadian Red Cross, to name but a few, who are funded to carry out development projects abroad must demonstrate their adherence to Canadian foreign development policies almost exclusively on the level of security and market liberalization (Brown, 2012, p. 9). And to be sure, these partnerships are one-sided, particularly since 2006 under the Conservative government:

[...]nder the Conservatives everything was difficult. The Conservatives just didn’t want to talk to anybody. I mean, they gave orders to the civil service not to talk to anybody. Well, I shouldn’t say anybody. They were warned not to talk to [my organization]. They talked to some other people.65 After the first few years, there was a bit of tentative exploring and no one was sure

63 At the time of writing, the DFATD/Government of Canada page has been decommissioned and no longer exists. The page has been re-written in the last few months to reflect the priorities of GAC and the Liberal government, whose priorities still rest heavily on security and promoting Canadian economic and security interests abroad (GAC, 2016a).
64 It is possible that we may see some changes in the emphasis on security (at least discursively) with the Liberal government, yet it is too soon to make any analytical judgment that isn’t built on campaign rhetoric. For example, in the previous 2014 Funding Guideline for project proposals under DFATD, ‘security’ was mentioned forty times, ‘terrorism’ fourteen times, and ‘risk’ seventy times (DFATD, 2014). GAC’s revised 2016 Funding Guideline for project proposals does not mention ‘security’ once, mentions ‘risk’ twenty-seven times, and ‘terrorism’ once (GAC, 2016b). This does not suggest, however, that ‘security’ is being displaced by a new Liberal altruism and humanity. As I will discuss in my exposition of NGOs as a police mechanism, the emphasis may have changed between the unabashed xenophobia of the Conservative government and the apologetic liberalism of the latest regime, yet the fundamentals of policing and pacification bleed through in the usual ways.
65 For a more in-depth analysis of funding ideology and politicization, see Francois & Navarro-Flores (2014). The Conservatives’ claim to depoliticize funding to NGOs allowed them to effectively hide their influence on smaller, evangelical organizations. Conservatives were, in fact, extremely fond of the FBOs. This is evidenced in, for example, the decision to transform the Rights and Democracy Office into the Office of Religious Freedom (whose underlying mandate was the protection of a threatened Christian identity), and to stop funding to the NGO KAIROS, which advocated for Palestinian human rights (ibid.).
what the boundaries were. Their order came down very clearly that they weren’t to talk. So I had to meet with people in the cafeteria. Some sent emails, but preferred to talk by telephone because their emails were being surveilled. Just a horrible atmosphere… They decide what they want and NGOs bid on jobs to get a chance to do it as if they were private companies… all the money comes from bids on contracts now. The larger NGOs now bid to be the executing agency (HP, personal correspondence, February 25, 2016).

Yet, for the FBOs it was a different experience. One of my FBO interviewees was a former factory manager in Port-au-Prince and had an excellent relationship with the Conservative government (FB1, personal correspondence, February 3, 2016). When I asked his Haitian counterpart if they had any ambitions for a relationship with private capital that was so favoured by the government, he replied:

That’s one of the goals. I myself have a business background. I have a PhD in business administration. Before I started working with [my organization] I was working with an organization that promoted social businesses. At that time I had a lot of contact with the hotels, with different corporations (FB2, personal correspondence, February 11, 2016).

In 2013, Former Minister of International Cooperation, Julian Fantino, echoed the objectives found in the original I-PRSP, publicly stating that Canada’s Department of Foreign Affairs needed to spirit money out of CIDA’s hands (now collapsed into GAC) into those of private foundations and NGOs while “convening innovative partnerships with the private sector” and leveraging their expertise (Fantino, 2013). And when there is no suitable NGO for the task, they are created66 to advocate the benefits of industry and dress up corporate intervention in the guise of development, whose contribution to

66 For example, the NGO ‘FOCAL’ (Canadian Foundation for the Americas, decommissioned in 2011), had billed itself as an independent NGO since 1990, while in reality it was a “Canadian government-funded think tank” that was established… as part of a cabinet strategy to deepen ties with Latin America and the Caribbean” (Joshi-Vihayan, 2008, p. 8). To recall, Canada’s interest in the region increased at this time as countries in the region were transitioning from protectionist to liberalized, free-market economies. FOCAL existed to promote the interests of the Canadian government and had repeatedly forged relationships with Haiti’s business elite and between Canada, Haitian corporations and IFIs such as the World Bank and IMF. They received 70 percent of their funding from the Canadian government, which, since 2004, had made Haiti their top priority (ibid.).
‘development’ is actually non-existent (Gordon & Weber, 2003). As of 2011, there were 312 NGOs in partnership with CIDA before its amalgamation, and this number continues to grow (Audet, Paquette, & Bergeron, 2013, p. 297).

After the earthquake in 2010, Canadian development authorities, in conjunction with their international partners, saw an opportunity in the destruction to further entrench NGOs into the Haitian governance structure. International donors spearheaded the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission (IHRC), which reported to the UN Security Council, with a focus on rebuilding infrastructure, increasing small loans to private entrepreneurs and, most predominantly, build an industrial park known as Caracol (U.S. Department of State, 2011; Steckley, et al., 2015). Caracol was built under the auspices of ‘opening Haiti up for business’ and was projected to provide 65,000 jobs (Steckley et al., 2015). The end figure landed 60,000 short at 5,000. The complex was built on the most prime farmland in Haiti (consisting of around 450 small, subsistence farmers that had been given five days’ notice to vacate the land after occupying it for decades). Peasant farmers’ livelihoods were destroyed and once again there was a mass exodus to Port-au-Prince where the NGO governance function – the single greatest function of the ‘police’ (Neocleous, 2000) – intensified. Canada and other occupying forces selected the NGO-governors precisely because they had little knowledge of what was being communicated by the Haitians to more grassroots NGOs at this time (NG1, personal correspondence, January 29, 2016). As NG1 confided, Haitians really wanted to be at the center of their

---

67 One of Caracol’s primary occupants was Montreal-based Gildan Activewear, which for years has been harvesting cheap Haitian labour and taking advantage of the “ability to export products tariff-free into the world’s largest markets [that offers] a competitive edge over other nations with low-cost labour” (Dwyer, 2012).
own development following the earthquake, and to not take the international pressure any
longer. They continued,

[that attitude came as a shock to a lot of NGOs… It’s both sad and amusing
to observe. There were some critical things that were coming that nobody was
really listening to. Number one is that Haitians wanted to be at the center of
development. Number two: reconstructing Haiti was not about building
houses or business parks; it was about building their confidence. Number
two: the sector that was going to lead them into their new development was
agriculture. On all of those fronts, the majority of NGOs in Haiti have no
experience (ibid.).

Despite some of the obvious imperial overtones, NG1 points out a very real problem.
Yet, to suggest that organizations were blind to this attitude seems naively presumptive.

The failure of the IHRC to live up to its stated objectives\(^68\) led the International
Development Bank (IDB), the UN, and the World Bank along with Canada, Australia,
Brazil, and Spain to establish the Haiti Reconstruction Fund, which would oversee the
financial arrangements for reconstruction (O’Connor, Brisson-Boivin, & Ilcan, 2014, p.
322).\(^69\) Almost immediately, despite the Fund’s claim to being in partnership with the
Haitian government (HRF, 2016), the largest source of financing for Haiti’s
reconstruction “became ensnared in a complex bureaucratic governance organisation
which has been termed a ‘republic of NGOs’” (O’Connor, Brisson-Boivin, & Ilcan, 2014,
p. 322). An unprecedented number of Western, international NGOs were enrolled to run
the Haitian state “like an international administrative enterprise specializing in
humanitarian response and transformation” (ibid, quoting Farmer, 2011). The HRF has

\(^68\) Not only did it not provide the jobs it promised, it did not provide any development benefit at all. With
Caracol as its largest contribution, it displaced farmers who weren’t affected by the earthquake, thereby
replacing productive agriculture in a country that has trouble feeding itself with factories that benefit
foreign companies (Sontag, 2012).
\(^69\) When the Haitian government ratified the transfer of its last morsel of power to the IHRC in 2010, it did
so with the expectation that power would be restored to them in October 2011. This would never happen, of
course, as the HRF simply assumed the IHRC mantle and retained all of its previous influence. (Dupuy,
2013).
maintained the IHRC Action Plan (despite the its flagrant criticism by earlier observers), outlining development objectives that are arbitrarily slated for achievement by 2030 and intended to contain the spillover effects of Haitian ‘failure’ (O’Connor, Brisson-Boivin, & Ilcan, 2014). To achieve this containment, the reconstruction is marked by

‘a society with a modern, diversified, strong dynamic, competitive, open and inclusive economy based on land,’ [which is] also seen to be indicative of ‘strong’ state agendas. Essential ingredients for these developments include: ‘a knowledge based society with universal access to basic education, mastery of qualifications based on a relevant professional training system, and the capacity for scientific and technical innovation fed by a modern and efficient university system, in order to create the new type of citizen the country needs for reconstruction (emphasis added) (ibid, p. 323-4, quoting IHRC, 2010, P. 9).

Indeed, the language of ‘modernity’ is very alive and well. The Plan for Haiti’s reconstruction and institution building\(^70\) is most certainly reflective of the tropes of insecurity and underdevelopment that have been used to define the capitalist underclass since at least the seventeenth century. And to police this pre-modern class into civilized society, the state returned to its latest pacific weapon to produce a ‘new type of citizen,’ one accountable to its constituent sponsor and able to wield considerable influence in local politics (Zanotti, 2010).

**The Final Layer of Pacification**

The dispossession and exploitation layers of pacification have been elucidated in the reading of Haiti’s history. And NGOs have been party to these processes, to be sure. Yet, where their incorporation into the Haiti pacification project – their police status – becomes most solidified, cyclical, and permanent is through commodification (Rigakos, 2016). NGOs are now permanently tied to Canada’s liberal order-building projects in

\(^{70}\) Fifteen out of the seventeen public ministries in Haiti were destroyed in the earthquake (Zanotti, 2010).
Haiti and, as a result of the security imaginary tied to Haiti’s underdevelopment, there is no foreseeable end to their occupation. All of my interviewees were quite explicit about it. For example,

we don’t see an end. My team goes in and out... There’s lots of opportunities for ways to connect and help with enterprise development. I actually managed a factory for two of the years I lived in Haiti. I don’t think there is a time when our community development work will be ending anytime soon (FB1, personal correspondence, February 3, 2016).

If an interviewee was not speaking directly to their permanence in Haiti in their current capacity, then they were often discussing the ways in which they could manipulate their work strategy to become relevant in another:

Many have taken over the work from [my organization] and get their own money from foreign government or donors and then [my organization] pulls back. So [my organization] has invented other roles for itself because there are always other roles to play (HP, personal correspondence, February 25, 2016).

Haiti’s ‘insecurity’ has produced the need for a professional and ‘expert’ nonprofit industrial complex (Smith, 2011) that “provide[s] high-paying jobs to an educated transnational middle class, reproducing inequalities inherent to and required by the contemporary neoliberal world system” (Schuller, 2009, p 85). This is a class ‘for itself,’ writes Schuller (2009), “sharing common interests with their benefactors, without whom this class could not exist” (p. 92).

Consumed by an ingrained obsession with insecurity, the Canadian federal government demands that post-disaster and long-term assistance must conform to the commands of the global (Canadian) market, leading to the commodification of Haiti’s natural resources, which are advertised, and subsequently, ‘marketised,’ as the “primary recovery strategy” (Gunewardena, 2008, p. 8). Subsequently, social relations, or
relational humanitarianism (Dandoy, 2014), becomes commodified as NGOs communicate through state-produced security technologies, audits, and the advice of private security industry professionals, such as CANPOL – a division of the NGO CANADEM 71 that provides retired police officers with international professional assignment (Donais, 2004; Gunewardena, 2008; O’Connor, Brisson-Boivin, & Ilcan, 2014).

**Exercises in Prudence**

To recall, prudentialization is one of three compulsions of commodification in the theory of pacification, wherein ‘risk’ becomes the mantle of commodity production (Rigakos, 2016). The making of goods and services is entirely defined by ‘risk,’ the framing of which is led by the police (ibid.), or in this case, NGOs. They produce a wealth of data for insurance purposes and develop risk-reduction strategies that reduce opportunity crime and, in the case of development, poverty and docility. And to be clear, ‘development’ is a good and a service. It is a police service, to be exact, that must conform to the dictates of the state that fund NGO operations. ‘Prudentialism,’ then, becomes most apparent in the moves toward ‘policy coherence’ (Stepputat, 2012) – the thread that links separate institutions responsible for economic, political, and security stabilization with one another (OECD, 2007; Thede, 2013).

Residing within the OECD is the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), which consists of twenty-two donor countries, including Canada, that periodically review the nature of aid and development programs. In 2007, a year after the Canada-U.S.-

---

71 CANADEM received its start-up funding from the Canadian government in 1996 and bills itself as “dedicated to international peace and security through rostering, rapid mobilization, and mission management of experts committed to international service with the UN, other IGOs, NGOs, and governments” (CANADEM, 2016).
France coup, the DAC outlined a number of principles for policy coherence among NGOs in the report *Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations* (OECD, 2007), which were field-tested by Canada in Haiti from the period of 2006-2007 (OECD, 2016). Of particular importance is Principle #5 with the heading ‘Recognise the link between political, security and development objectives,’ which stipulates that “[w]ithin donor governments, a ‘whole of government’ approach is needed, involving those responsible for security, political and economic affairs, as well as those responsible for development aid and humanitarian assistance” (OECD, 2007, p. 2).

The report has since set the standard for humanitarian co-optation in order to step away from enemy combat and to win the ‘hearts and minds’ of beneficiaries, yet all the while retaining a model-based knowledge of development with little effort to understand the contingencies and instrumentalities present in ‘underdeveloped’ nations (Stepputat, 2012). As Dandoy (2014) writes, “[i]t is not so much a question of resolving the ‘problem’ of insecurity, but of minimizing risks by disciplining the behaviour of humanitarians so that they are capable of making rational and prudent choice” (p. 1). Moreover, he writes, “in Haiti, the humanitarian community has become obsessed with the notions of risk… Public space is no longer a place of interaction and exchange but a place where there is risk, which needs to be controlled by building walls and limiting

---

72 It is ironic that Haiti never formally signed on to these principles for effective engagement, which were by and large designed for them. Haiti did not see itself as a fragile state. Rather condescendingly, FA1 relayed to me that “Haiti sort of put its own development process together (in 2011). They made a plan called ‘Haiti towards 2030’ and they created the plan ‘stratégique développement d’Haïti’ that was their kind of equivalent of a [PSRP]. And so there was in 2012 and 2013 a real effort to kind of articulate what Haiti’s vision for the future would be. And then an effort to try and get the international community to align some of its activities with those plans” (ibid.). The extent of this effort on behalf of the Canadian government to align some of its priorities was certainly less than palpable. Canada’s own Aid-Effectiveness Action Plan at the same time stressed on numerous occasions throughout the short document that Canadian strategies were to align with local priorities “to the greatest extent possible” and that the host government’s public system should be utilized, unless development authorities decided to “state to the host government the rationale for using any separate system” (CIDA, 2009). The Haitian plan was overwritten before it was even conceived.
movement” (ibid, p. 3). Any movement in Haiti is automatically saturated with security/risk concerns because movement can proceed in the wrong direction. The NGO function is to monitor and maintain the relations of forces of production. Once these relations and forces begin to move in opposite directions, such as when Haitians begin to think and act outside of the accepted development discourse enforced by NGOs on behalf of the state, the potential for revolution becomes all too real (Rader, 1979).

This risk is addressed through, for example, mandatory field training for NGOs operating under the UN system, which includes all of the brand name organizations (Duffield, 2010a). The conformist and risk-averse aid worker must undergo ‘Basic Security’ training that explicitly promotes insecurity by ensuring that all aid workers are now targets of an unpredictable, ‘underdeveloped’ enemy (ibid.). This training requires yet another layer of private security experts to determine what is the quintessential Haitian/Southern threat, with which they can then develop a training platform. Thus, NGOs have no choice but to fall in line with the state logics of insecurity. Such has been the result of Canada’s Action Plan for Haiti (CIDA, 2009), which stresses increased training for NGOs that monitor the implementation of the DAC principles. This Plan is in accordance with the Millennium Development Goals (2000), the Monetary Consensus on Financing for Development (2002), the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005) and the Accra Agenda for Action (2008) (ibid.). Indeed, prudence is self-evident when the state can claim that a plan of action is in accord with so many reputable, Western-devised ‘agendas.’

---

73 It should be further noted here that Duffield (2010a) emphasizes “through the spread of field security training, mandatory insurance requirements and centrally managed security protocols… risk aversion [is] not confined to obvious political hotspots. [It] now typifies the aid presence throughout the global borderland” (p. 60).
Valorizing the Development ‘Product’

Canada is buying pacification. NGOs are providing it (or a significant component of it). It is not a typical client-service provider relationship, though. NGOs offer the product of aid and development, but sell security at the insistence of the client. In fact, their operational structure and institutional mandates conform to the demands of the client so much so that their original ‘business plan’ is re-written to reflect the interests of the client entirely, which helps in the bid for contracts. NG1 says it quite clearly: “[h]ere in Canada, our primary purpose it to, first and foremost, to raise funds, and to be an advocate of best practices, particularly in Haiti and how we understand the psychosocial obstacles and challenges in Haiti” (NG1, personal correspondence, January 29, 2016). This conversation included a heavy emphasis on the selling of services and the love of “being in business” (ibid.). Such has been the effect of the Canadian state’s compulsion to valorize the unproductive elements of humanitarian work. This valorization has manifested most explicitly in ‘aid effectiveness’ and the audit (O’Connor, Brisson-Boivin, & Ilcan, 2014; Caple James, 2012; CIDA, 2009) – security products in and of themselves, but which are not actually set up as such.

Since the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in 2005, ‘aid effectiveness’ has been a supposed hallmark of Canada’s performance agenda in Haiti (CIDA, 2009). This was made clear in the aforementioned Action Plan of 2009-2012 (which has been reiterated in Canada’s Renewed Engagement in Haiti for 2015-2020) (Government of Canada, 2015), which is organized around seven key goals. Goals 1, 3, and 7 are of particular importance. Goal 1 stresses a new focus on providing aid to fewer countries in

---

74 The ‘psychosocial obstacles’ were those of the Haitians, and the challenge was that undertaken by the organization in dealing with them.
line with Canadian interests (CIDA, 2009). Goal 3 emphasizes the tracking and reporting of progress to Canadians through Country Report Cards, reports to Parliament (as per the ODA Accountability Act), and providing leadership as members of the Multilateral Organizations Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN), as well as implementing the MOPAN Common Approach for assessing effectiveness. NGOs have grown rather tiresome in their efforts to keep up with the complex web of agendas, networks, plans, and papers that have forced their bureaucratization and standardization of processes and responses and, ultimately, a propensity to drive means-ends calculations (Barnett, 2010). As a result, and clearly outlined in Goal 7, both Canadian foreign development officials and NGOs must bridge their modalities of development and engage a growing body of outside expertise (with a large focus on ‘security expertise’) (CIDA, 2009; Whittall, 2010), therefore producing a surplus-value for the components of development work that were previously unproductive. Indeed, this expansion is very much a part of ‘finding security,’ which often centers on “neutralizing the possibility of substantive changes to the existing order” (Churchill, 2011, p. 43) by establishing and maintaining Western bureaucratic norms among Canadian NGOs. Substantive changes are further avoided because the NGO has little time to work:

we just spend so much time on reporting to donors, especially because every donor we have has a different format. So there [is] a lot of wasted time just writing reports and making sure it was in the right format and in line with the specific requirements of each donor. Sometimes we [are] spending [more] time on that than spending more time with the beneficiaries (NG2, personal correspondence, March 9, 2016).

To determine whether or not the above Goals are being realized, Canadian foreign affairs officials, among every other major Western donor, perform the audit (O’Connor,
Brisson-Boivin, & Ilcan, 2014). The audit, put simply, is a receipt for their purchase. As O’Connor, Brisson-Boivin, & Ilcan (2014) write

[t]he aim of audit is not simply to measure conduct, but to shape and transform the environments into which it is introduced with the imperative of ‘making them auditable’, of making conduct fit to measure as ‘auditable performances’ and of promoting systems which make auditing possible, that is, to transform civic affairs into an array of accountable institutions and practices with the aim of maximising control (p. 313).

Audit processes require yet another body of experts to determine if auditable development goals are achieved, which focus on making poverty knowable through statistics and formulaic mechanisms, or ‘humanitarian early warning systems,’ that scientifically monitor humanitarian crises (Whittall, 2010). Aid agencies then become more interested in engaging in dialogue with the corporate sector and incorporate their practices in their development models (Duffield, 2001; NG2, personal correspondence, March 9, 2016). Once completed, audits and various ‘portfolios’ are circulated as commodities throughout the humanitarian market, which then “generate currency for the… interveners who [present] their [audits] as tangible icons demonstrating their competence and accountability in implementing postconflict reconstruction activities” (Caple James, 2012, p. 58). The client population, which is supposed to be the beneficiaries of aid, is in fact the Canadian government and corporate bodies that have stretched Canadian capital in Haiti through the introduction of a market culture built on audit and the selling of solutions (Taylor, 1999; Colhoun, 2010).

**Productive in and of Itself: The Unending Industry of Development and Failure**

There is one question left that, without redress, will make this analysis rather tiresome and uncongenial: if security has not been achieved in Haiti, then has pacification not
failed? In working through the ‘Palestinian problem,’ Rigakos (2016) all but conceded to the possibility that pacification had failed here. Yet, we should remember that resistance to pacification is expected and, in fact, a central dynamic to the pacification project. Therefore, Rigakos (2016) continues to ask:

[w]hat if the ‘Palestinian problem’ itself was productive? Palestinians had become the experimental subjects for a wide slew of military and security hardware that Israeli industries exported all over the world. This ($15 billion/year) industry was certainly productive… [Therefore, security] may be productive or may not be. This depends on whether a surplus-value is being extracted. This is what we have called the economic catalyst for pacification (p. 98).

Humanitarian action is spired in the ranks of government only when a ‘crisis’ is proven to affect global economic trends (Whittall, 2010). In other words, humanitarian action funded by governments is warranted when a surplus-value can be reasonably calculated. Since the 1970s, the Northern cohort of interveners has made this calculation simple, stressing the idea that knit and woven apparel, in addition to other goods, produced by an abundant, low-wage labour force is the key to Haiti’s salvation (Dupuy, 2013). Yet, this small industry is only mildly productive and has never really been a viable option for Haiti. As Dupuy (2013) made perfectly clear following the earthquake,

the whole plan to expand the garment industry in Haiti was a ‘race to the bottom. [It was not] really about creating jobs; [it was] about relocating them… [W]hen professors and politicians [said] they will help Haitian workers by giving them jobs, what they really [meant was] that they [planned] to take the jobs away from Dominican, Mexican, and Central American workers – and pay the Haitians even less for doing the same work’ (p. 26, quoting Wilson, 2010).

The failing garment industry, Dupuy (2013) writes, has nothing to do with the IFI plans for Haiti, which consists wholly of creating outlets for foreign capital and securing cheap labour. We see this with the HRF and its work so far, which is virtually non-existent
In 2011, at a donor’s conference in New York, many country donors, including Canada, committed to providing $10 billion total to Haiti ($1.1 billion of which was destined to debt relief). Of this total: $5.5 billion was to be dispersed over five years: 40 percent goes to paying salaries, insurance, cars, and rent for foreigners coming to provide humanitarian work; and $267 million was initially allotted for infrastructure, yet the only major piece of infrastructure that got rebuilt is the airport (ibid, p. 26). The airport project included the portioning of 1500 contracts, twenty of which went to Haitian firms, or approximately $1.60 out of every $100 (ibid.). The rest of the $267 million went to U.S. firms (including two major no-bid contracts) that bought goods and services almost exclusively from U.S. suppliers, while hiring Haitian on a mostly cash-for-work basis (ibid.). Canadian money that was not a part of this fund, and which wasn’t allotted to NGOs, was utilized to purchase U.S. security tech for the rebuilding of the Haitian coast guard, the Croix de Bouquets penitentiary (outsourced to the International Organization for Migration [IOM]), and border security enhancement (FA2, personal correspondence, November 26, 2015).

Forty percent of $5.5 billion is most certainly productive. The NGO take of foreign aid money in Haiti on the grand scale has amounted to hundreds of millions of dollars. They provide health care, schools, lodging, drinking water, sanitation, psychological counseling, and food distribution, etc. (ibid.). They employ hundreds of thousands of professionals, and there are more NGOs per capita in Haiti than anywhere else in the world (ibid.). Why would Canada, amidst the slew of Northern interveners, want true self-reliance and ‘security’ to rear its face in one of the most productive islands of the Caribbean? Aid is the industry and development is perpetually re-cast as the
necessary correlate to security, which can never be achieved. As Rigakos (2016) observes, we can never satiate our desire for security because this desire “can never be satisfied physically. It is a metaphysical want” (p. 81).

Development has thus become fetishized as we speak through development commodities, like trauma portfolios (Caple James, 2012), audits (O’Connor, Brisson-Boivin, & Ilcan, 2014), Report Cards (CIDA, 2009), and the like, all of which end up testifying to the need for more security-development commodities – new types of report cards and, for example, ‘logical framework analyses’ (LogFrame) (Colhoun, 2013). The call for aid is recycled over and over by the persistent insecurity of Haiti that appears without end. There seems to be little concern for establishing a mutual understanding and respect for cultural differences and the milieus of local life that conflict with development priorities. Haiti has become a “veritable graveyard of development projects” (O’Connor, Brisson-Boivin, & Ilcan, 2014, p. 323) while the North routinely casts Haiti as an insecure place that requires more security and, thus, humanitarian intervention. Former Secretary General of the UN Kofi Annan (2004) offers a good summation of this cyclical reasoning:

Haiti is clearly unable to sort itself out, and the effect of leaving it alone would be continued or worsening chaos. Our globalized world cannot afford such a political vacuum, whether in the mountains of Afghanistan or on the very doorstep of the sole remaining superpower. The spectacle of human misery is harder to ignore than it used to be, but the crucial difference from the past is that chaos can no longer be contained by frontiers. It tends to spread, whether in the form of refugee flows, terrorism, or illicit trafficking in drugs, weapons and even human beings. No one wants to intervene, but ultimately there is no choice (quoted in Shah, 2009, p. 21).

Annan’s quote clearly suggests that in leaving Haiti alone, the Northern community assumes no responsibility for producing the supposed crises of insecurity and
underdevelopment in the first place (Shah, 2009). The most Canada and other donors can do is rectify the Haitians’ mistakes.

Counter to what the liberal security-development literature indicates, my application of pacification theory reveals that a proper analysis of security in the development context, and indeed in all security studies, must begin with a historical and materialist framework. Nonetheless, the liberal academic recasts security as a dynamic process among social agents who, through their own identities and interests, seek to address security needs in different contexts (Bilgin, 2003, p. 208-10). These same theorists perpetually labour with and against one another to understand the latest contingency of security. For example, Eriksson & Rhinard (2009) argue that when people cannot maintain a distinction between known and unknown, they react with anxiety; therefore, by “defining all perceived security threats as either external or internal, a feeling of control, and thus a lower level of fear, is maintained” (p. 253). Ivelaw (2004) states as a matter of fact “international norms and international cooperation help small states to cope with their security challenges” (p. 8). He then proceeds to develop his ‘Discrete Multidimensional Security Framework,’ which boasts a ‘back to basics’ methodology (remembering security for what it really truly is – core threats that undermine territorial integrity) and complex algorithm to determine if a security challenge is “in” or “of” the state (p. 18-28). It appears that liberal security theorists are more interested to succeed in being a step ahead of their colleagues in fashioning the latest security threat built on the same typical, and cyclical, security imaginaries that – no matter what the latest iteration – justifies the next wave of security technologies and management strategies (Park, 2014).
By emphasizing the material conditions of exploitation and the search for productive labour that underpins the security-industrial complex we have seen how security has been re-worked for centuries, yet has succeeded only in further entrenching Southern populations into modes of dependence and abject poverty. And security-development is simply the latest line of new clothes in the emperor’s wardrobe. What do we have to gain from statements such as “security or ‘global security’… is quite clearly a response to the insecurity felt by the developed North in the post-9/11 environment” (Beall, Goodfellow, & Putzell, 2006, p. 53), or “Canada’s security policy seems to be spread too thin” (Mace, Thérien, & Gagné, 2012, p. 621)? These same arguments were made ‘post-WWI,’ ‘post-WWII,’ ‘post-Cold War,’ etc. Anyone can make these arguments because they lack the critical evaluation necessary to view security as anything other than what is has been made to appear to be. Indeed, Canada’s security-development role is but an extension of a long-developed police science that was brought to bear on indigent and criminal populations through Enlightenment notions of security (Rigakos, 2016).

It has been hypothesized that revolution hinges on the overburden of unproductive labour (Rigakos, 2016, p. 104). Yet, we have seen in Haiti, and worldwide for that matter, that this is not the case. There is no way to define labour as such any more or to determine which straw will break the camel’s back, as it were. As such, Rigakos (2016) notices, “simply pacifying a population can be an industry in itself” (p. 104). With development, there is no end because there is no chance of ‘real’ security (ibid; Caple James, 2012). As Steckley et al. (2015) realized, we cannot lose the Haitis of this world.’ Accumulation is too abundant, however unapparent it may seem on the surface. And,
more implicitly, the ‘Haitis of this world’ must be made example of. Any government that repeatedly “represents an alternative to globalization and corporate domination” (Hallward, 2007, p. 56) must be pacified. Even the appearance of pacification can be productive when it prevents like-minded governments from pursuing the same perilous path.

The Duvalier dictatorship between 1957 and 1986 inspired the mobilization of what would come to be known as ‘necropolitics’ (Mbeme, 2003), which Caple James (2012) describes as the “power of death to subjugate life itself, to terrorize the population and create a docile wage labor force for export assembly production” (p. 54). While the Canadian pacifying bodies may not claim the power of death, we might fairly imagine the politics of security-development as that of ‘necroaid.’ Through the logics of (in)security, the donor governments and, subsequently, NGOs can withhold the necessities of life. Any struggling nation that has become dependent upon foreign aid would do well to heed this comparison.
Conclusion

My primary argument in this thesis has been that studies of foreign development should be undertaken with a clear understanding of policing and pacification. The materialist basis of these processes cannot be divorced from considerations of dispossession, exploitation, and commodification that are a central feature of both contemporary development initiatives and the long-established projects of policing. Since its inception, the security-development nexus has absorbed NGOs into a new scheme of projects nefariously described as empowering, while imposing a new form of order-building and surveillance over a population that is representative of the permanent insurgency that stalls the fulfillment of modernity. In other words, the purpose of the NGO and development function has become, as von Sonnenfels (1765) put it over two hundred years ago, to “remove all occasions from which moral disorder may be increased” (s. 111) and to check and balance the idiosyncratic rebellions of oppressed peoples (Churchill, 2011).

Just as polizei was hypothesized in polizeiwissenschaft to be the mechanism of order-building and the “channeled growth of wealth” (Foucault, 2010, p. 277), NGO workers are now state-builders and architects of an emerging global (neo-)liberal social order (Duffield, 2001), or rather, (neo-)polizei. As has already been stated, this is not to say that NGOs and humanitarian workers lack the capacity to genuinely care about their beneficiaries, or to be sincerely concerned with the level of development of those who they are seeking to help. Too often NGOs are criticized for appeasing the demands of donors when, in reality, their responsibility to their beneficiaries is directly correlated with their responsibility to acquire funding on their behalf (Reith, 2010).
What this project is meant to achieve is to foster an understanding of development acts as acts of pacification. We have now witnessed security tighten its grip around some of the last measures of what arguably may be a genuine goodwill, notwithstanding the obvious imperial overtones and consequences of such measures. It has produced relationships that link the political and financial technologies of the state with surveillance over public and political ideology and Third World populations (Smith, 2011). In turn, governments can make war and expand the market economies under the veil of public-private partnerships (ibid.) and all other manner of alliances that fall under the government ambit.

In chapter one I analyzed the liberal intellectual engagement with security (Booth, 1991; Bilgin, 2003; Charett 2009; Eirksson & Rhinard, 2009; Ignatieff, 2004) as a way to elucidate the unreason of the liberal intervention into matters of security theory. The overarching conclusions in the security literature, most notably ‘Critical Security Studies,’ is that security’s fluidity in meaning and substance results from the changing intellectual traditions of various periods of recent history (Telatin, 2011; Charett, 2009; Krause, 1997). More generally, this includes a persistent focus on pre- and post-WWII/Cold War/9/11 temporality and the vague concepts of ‘new’ and ‘old’ security that lack explanation and critical examination. In response to this ambiguity, I utilized the theory of pacification to expose the nature and meaning of security writ large, which has existed as both a rhetorical medium and the most powerful pacifying weapon of bourgeois society in its protection of capital, which, at the most fundamental level, is an “order of social insecurity” (Neocleous, 2011, p. 24; Rigakos, 2016). This insecurity stems from the persistent threat that the dispossessed and exploited segments of the
population that make capitalism function pose to the processes of accumulation that define the status quo. In reading pacification, we come to understand security as the driver behind the acquisition and subjugation of productive labour since at least the seventeenth century, with its focus of authority being the ‘police’ that coordinate and mobilize security to ensure ‘peace’ for the capitalist order (Rigakos, 2016; Reiner, 2010).

Before the theory of pacification and our understanding of the ‘police function’ could be translated directly to NGOs in the contemporary development setting in Haiti, in chapter two I provided an overview of the development literature. This was done in order to provide: 1) an understanding of security in development, and the security-development nexus, and to excoriate the claims that security in development is a new phenomenon (Duffield, 2001; Thede, 2013); and 2) an understanding of the context in which we are to understand Haitian development and the forces of pacification that have guaranteed Haiti’s dependence and profitability for centuries. This engagement with the political economy of development added a critical piece to the puzzle in understanding the contemporary development situation in Haiti by drawing analytical connections between ‘development’ in its earliest, pre-colonial stages, and current development rhetoric and initiatives. This connection reveals the strong continuity of imperial thinking by development practitioners (in their various forms) across historical epochs, and the continuity of aid, charity, and humanitarianism as an instrument of pacification in eliminating the efforts of ‘underdeveloped’ peoples to become self-reliant (Duffield, 2010a).  

\[75\] Duffield (2010a) makes a keen observation in that self-reliance can never really be achieved in the South because it only occurs when the West says it does. Anything that resembles self-reliance that hasn’t been labeled as such by donors is radical autonomy – “this is the self-reliance of constantly mutating
Chapter three traced the historical antecedents of humanitarianism. This was performed with the intention of revealing how humanitarianism has long factored into the story of development and also to illustrate how humanitarian actors view themselves. At the outset of theoretical speculation, scholars of ‘global civil society’ too often take for granted the division of public, private, and third sectors (Boli & Thomas, 1999; Hilton, et al., 2012; Dryzek, 2012), with NGOs constituting the latter. Under pacification, these supposedly separate sectors typically function as one. In the overarching scheme of global capitalism and accumulation, each sector, despite their various institutional histories and mandates tend to produce and reproduce the same damaging binaries and tropes of traditionalism and underdevelopment for the imperial project. Each sector mimics the other (Barnett, 2011) and produces the discourses of Southern disorder (Colhoun, 2010) that threatens the security of global markets, despite the fact that the absence of ‘material progress’ has been in no way demonstrated to correlate with an absence of self-worth in Third World cultural traditions (Chimni, 2011). Indeed, material culture through labour exploitation has always been forced upon Haiti and the rest of the ‘developing’ world.

By chapter four I offer an understanding of pacification, development, and humanitarianism, which could be consolidated and applied in the Haitian context both past and present. The continuity of pacification through the medium of development and the insecurity that it entails is drawn well in the history of Haiti and, indeed, this story is long and complicated. The short of this story, however, is that the overarching scheme of pacification and the pursuit of productive labour has been Haiti’s siren call for centuries.

---

Transnational shadow economies, changing diaspora dynamics and complex adaptive systems that security actors worry are capable of sustaining adversary cultures” (ibid, p. 68).
Through the reading of development and Haiti’s history, we come to see pacification played out through various mediums in relation to the environment that the tactics of pacification are being deployed. Finally, by 2004, pacification was compelled to adapt again, this time to the failure of previous attempts and the increased public pressure in Canada and elsewhere to end violence (Engler & Fenton, 2005). In 1991, a supported military coup did not work; in 2001 it failed to achieve its full-intended results. Thus, 2004 marked a momentous shift in pacification as Canada and its allies incorporated one more political technology to establish a permanent, ‘peaceful’ force that has the capacity to recycle itself and more sublimely police Haitians into the modes of capitalist production. This continues to be the NGO era.

There are some clear limitations in this thesis. Specifically, there are three avenues of research that could yet bear fruit in the understanding of security-development in Haiti. First, while this thesis analyzes written government documents, it does not include an in-depth exploration of the written documents of NGOs. Located in organizational publications could very well be some more nuanced insight, beyond the interviews, into the humanitarian reaction to the security-driven policies of donor governments, and into how much confidence is actually placed in security constructs. Indeed, there is likely much to be gleaned from this body of literature, and perhaps key interviews with its authors.

Second, there is a clear and pressing need to perform more interviews, particularly with NGO and FBO workers whose insights and opinions on matters of development need to be compared and contrasted. The response to security and governance questions from foreign affairs and police officials were more or less in accord with the critiques
found in the literature. In other words, security was directly correlated to the market and Haitian political dissidents. Yet, when NGO and FBO workers were questioned about security and the Canadian government in Haiti more broadly, for example, NG1 replied:

really?! Really?! Like, Haiti, you know, the MINUSTAH is there and has been there for some time and Haitians largely view the UN as an occupation. MINUSTAH came in when Haiti had no war, no police force, no army. And yet we’ve got guns and tanks patrolling the streets of Haiti. For who?! (NG1, personal correspondence, January 29, 2016)

They shifted their focus onto the Canadian government:

They were giving away mining rights to Canadian companies and to ‘World Vision,’ you know, ‘God help us all’ (sarcastically). They wanted to get rid of that small to medium NGO, they just wanted to focus on big ones. (ibid.).

Conversely, FB1 expressed a perfectly comfortable working relationship with the government post-Earthquake:

I don’t think there’s any conflict. We’re sort of in some ways working on parallel tracks. I think we’re working towards the same general objective as, you know, sustaining human well-being and helping with development of the same (FB1, personal correspondence, February 3, 2016).

Indeed, similar sentiments were expressed among the other FBO and NGO participants. Why does one group criticize, even abhor at times, government development practices, while the other gives little mention? Consider HP’s candid summation: “Fantino (ex-Minister of International Cooperation) was a total loss. But he was no worse than the previous or the one who followed. You know, they’re all a bunch of losers. Sadly, they’re a bunch of losers” (HP, personal correspondence, February 25, 2016). Certainly, these divergent attitudes, and the role of security in their maintenance and production, requires further investigation.

Last, as I mentioned in the introduction to this thesis, the Haitian voice is absent. For Schuller (2007), this constitutes a methodological flaw that, to varying degrees,
hinders a more complete understanding of Haiti and its history. A full understanding, according to Schuller (2007), requires a tripartite conceptual framework that moves away from a global/state analysis and considers ‘the people’ (p. 146) and the *istwas* (stories) that are told in whispers among the mountainous peasant grassroots movements (p. 158).

There is a vibrant tradition of oral history, folklore, ritual practices, and music – *chan pwen*. According to this *istwa*, Haiti’s people are ultimately responsible for their past and future (ibid)… [For example,] there is a quiet, but strong and vital, grassroots movement of Haiti’s poor in various parts of Prótoprens and Haiti’s mountainous countryside, of peasants’, women’s, workers’ organizations, that continue to build a new society… This Haiti misses the attention of the elite Haitian media and foreign wire services, and even solidarity organizations that focus on the ‘political’ stage, available through lived experience and ethnography (ibid, p. 163).

Resistance comes in various forms such as “*bras elide* (conversations about ideas) or in more structured *tét ansanm* (literally meaning heads together/brainstorming)” (ibid, p. 164). These are heavily anti-imperialist sects that represent diversity in forms of resistance to imperialist development initiatives (Schuurman, 2000, p. 14).

Yet, despite this limitation, we must also remain cognizant that development initiatives are security dominated and will routinely contribute to new forms of inequality and domination even as others become successfully resisted. This is one of the greatest strengths of pacification – the ability to continually reproduce itself and rediscover security concerns that justify the imposition of an entirely new cluster of security technologies and interventions (Rigakos, 2016). Thus, while the exploration of ‘the people’ may very well add a critical dynamic to further understanding pacification and resistance not just in Haiti, but in all pacification projects of the global South, the
question of security is always developed and reimagined by those modern-day police scientists that seek to legitimate violence and exploitation.

The question of security, put plainly, is what do we do with our understanding of it as capitalism’s tool of accumulation? Security cannot be done away with. It is the overlord of the dominant ideology of capitalism and the state and corporate institutions that perpetuate it (Rigakos, 2016, p. 91-2). This consideration is lost among so many critical development scholars. For example, Parpart & Veltmeyer (2011) contend that in order to heal the practice of development the marginalized peoples of the South need to rely upon their own “political imagination and cultural resources,” which, in turn, must be respected by development practitioners who will “work with the poor rather than simply directing them from a position of expert knowledge” (p. 52; Zanotti, 2010). In the same way, Davis & Trebilcock (2008) recommend that development practitioners and the external (Northern) community at large should exercise a little more modesty in their transposition of the rule of law to ‘developing’ countries so that forced Western-style institutions can be a bit better shaped by the local culture (p. 60). Thomas (2014) offers that development agencies need to fundamentally alter their staffing priorities to incorporate a stronger element of local expertise (p. 1020). Others call for more technical ‘fixes’ to the development problematic, such as weakening the IMF and World Bank influence and debt payment frameworks (Jamieson, 2001, p. 169); giving Haiti more capital that is not in the form of aid or charity in order to create a base for its sovereignty (Podur, 2012, p. 157); and Haiti negotiating bi/multilateral agreements with countries that will not inflict crippling economic policies as a condition of the loan agreement and, once such agreements are brokered, launch massive public works projects and agrarian reform
(Dupuy, 2010, p. 202). This list of recommendations is not exhaustive, but certainly
typical of the sort of tunnel vision that blinds even the most critical of development
scholars. Entirely absent from their analyses is even the most remote consideration of
security as anything but a self-evident public good or necessity.

Clearly, as a concept, security is not going to be replaced and, thus, neither will its
ties to the institutional and ideological frameworks that govern contemporary society.
Overcoming alienation and actively promoting egalitarianism and participatory
democracy must come with the repurposing, or ‘socializing,’ of security (Rigakos, 2016,
p. 112). D’Souza (2012) makes a rather sage observation of this necessity:

[society] has dual ontological properties: it is the condition of Human Life…
and at the same time can be transformed by it. Human Life is concept-
dependent and impelled by the desire to be free from the constraints imposed
by social structures. Human beings must therefore always rethink philosophy
and theory for transformative action (p. 416).

We must rethink security, and not just in a development context but as whole.76 In
reflecting on his experiences consulting with the Syriza Party in Greece, Rigakos (2016)
discusses how he and his comrades began to advocate not only for a Left policy of
security, but a

new police science, indeed a socialist police science that would commit itself
to the technical aspects of fabricating a new social order. A social order that,
much like the capitalist police science before it, took seriously the legal,
economic and security planning necessary for the transition from one mode of
production to another (p. 109).

Rigakos (2016) continues to elucidate that we understand security to be productive
ideologically, economically and, indeed, even in its own right, therefore

we would be wise to begin with undermining the creation of surplus value at
the motor source for all other exploitative relations. Security must be

76 If security is to be successfully rethought, it must be as a whole and not isolated in particular contexts,
which would suggest that security is context-specific and fluid.
socialized, not in some generic sense but literally by undermining any capitalist enterprises that make profit off of human misery and subjugation (p. 112).

We need to make visible what security really is, how the liberal grip on its theoretical deployment is not as robust as it may appear, and, ultimately, how security is ripe for the taking. We must recognize how the privileges and disadvantages of the dueling castes are both produced and sustained by (in)security and the conditions of labour and production that occur both within and outside the relations of wage-labour (Hardt, 2010, p. 355). We must appropriate our own subjectivity and replace it with our own rational self-determination (ibid; Tay, 1971). This all begins by recognizing aid as a capitalist enterprise that profits off of human misery and, most importantly, with taking security seriously (Rigakos, 2016).
References


Reforms and the Incorporation of the Social. *University of Wisconsin Law School.*
Retrieved from

Roy Rosenzweig Centre for History and New Media (CHNM). (2016). The Code Noir
https://chnm.gmu.edu/revolution/d/335/


Salamon, Lester M. & Helmut K. Anheier. (1996). The International Classification of
Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project, No. 19.* Baltimore: The Johns
Hopkins Institute for Policy Studies.


Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Schuller, Mark. (2007). Haiti’s 200-Year Ménage-à-Trois: Globalization, the State and
Civil Society. *Caribbean Studies 35(1),* 141-79.

_____(2008). Haiti is Finished! Haiti’s ‘End of History’ meets Ends of
Capitalism. In Nandini Gunawardena & Mark Schuller (Eds.), *Capitalizing on
Catastrophe* (pp. 191-214). Maryland: Alta Mira Press.


## Appendix A

### List of Interview Subjects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Interview Type</th>
<th>Date and Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FA1</td>
<td>Senior Canadian foreign affairs official</td>
<td>In person</td>
<td>November 26, 2015, Ottawa, ON</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FA2</td>
<td>Senior Canadian foreign affairs official</td>
<td>In person</td>
<td>November 26, 2015, Ottawa, ON</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HP</td>
<td>Ex-Head of Policy for large Canadian secular NGO</td>
<td>In person</td>
<td>February 25, 2016, Ottawa, ON</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RC</td>
<td>Senior RCMP official/ex-temporary acting Commissioner of the Haitian National Police</td>
<td>Telephone</td>
<td>February 9, 2016, Ottawa, ON</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NG1</td>
<td>Director of medium-size Canadian secular NGO</td>
<td>Skype</td>
<td>January 29, 2016, Ottawa, ON</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NG2</td>
<td>Humanitarian coordinator of large Canadian secular NGO</td>
<td>Skype</td>
<td>March 9, 2016, Ottawa, ON</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FB1</td>
<td>Senior project manager of medium-size Canadian faith-based organization</td>
<td>Skype</td>
<td>February 3, 2016, Ottawa, ON</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FB2</td>
<td>Country consultant/country director of medium-size Canadian faith based organization</td>
<td>Skype</td>
<td>February 11, 2016, Ottawa, ON</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix B

Consent Form

Title: Security-Development and Canada’s Liberal Humanitarian Agenda in Canada (tentative)

Date of ethics clearance: September 25, 2015

Ethics Clearance for the Collection of Data Expires: September 25, 2016

I, ________________________________, choose to participate in a study on Canadian foreign development initiatives in Haiti. This study aims to examine the effect that security-development has had on NGO operations in Haiti and on foreign development more generally. The researcher for this study is David Meinen in the Department of Law and Legal Studies at Carleton University, Canada. He is working under the supervision of Prof. George S. Rigakos in the Department of Law and Legal Studies at Carleton University.

This study involves one 45-minute interview. With your consent, interviews will be audio-recorded. Once the recording has been transcribed, the audio-recording will be destroyed.

As this project will ask you about your employment and operations, there are some potential professional risks to you if your statements are critical of your employer. While these risks are expected to be minimal, I will take precautions to protect your identity. This will be done by upholding the confidentiality of all of the data collected throughout the research process and anonymizing all participants and responses. Please note that if another participant referred you to this study, they may know your identity and may or may not know that you have participated.

Once the data is collected I will not use your name and/or title in the final (thesis) project. If you would like certain responses to not be included in the final project, please indicate so verbally during the interview or at any time afterwards via telephone or e-mail.

You have the right to end your participation in the study at any time, for any reason, up until May 1, 2016. You can withdraw by phoning or emailing the researcher or the research supervisor. If you withdraw from the study, all information you have provided will be immediately destroyed.

All research data, including audio-recordings and any notes will be encrypted. Any hard copies of data (handwritten notes) will be transcribed and then destroyed within one day following the interview. Research data will only be accessible by the researcher and the research supervisor.
Once the project is completed, all research data will be kept for six (6) years and potentially used for other research projects on this same topic. At the end of six years, all research data will be securely destroyed. (Electronic data will be erased and hard copies will be shredded).

If you would like a copy of the finished research project, you are invited to contact the researcher to request an electronic copy, which will be provided to you.

The ethics protocol for this project was reviewed by the Carleton University Research Ethics Board (REB), which provided clearance to carry out the research. Should you have questions or concerns related to your involvement in this research, please contact:

**REB contact information:**
Professor Louise Heslop, Chair  
Professor Andy Adler, Vice-Chair  
Research Ethics Board  
Carleton University  
511 Tory Building  
1125 Colonel By Drive  
Ottawa, ON K1S 5B6  
Tel: 613-520-2517  
ethics@carleton.ca

**Researcher contact information:**
David Meinen  
Law and Legal Studies  
Carleton University  
Tel:  
Email:

**Supervisor contact information:**
Prof. George S. Rigakos  
Law and Legal Studies  
Carleton University  
Tel:  
Email:

Do you agree to be audio-recorded: ___Yes___No

__________________________________________  ___________________________
Signature of participant                      Date

__________________________________________  ___________________________
Signature of researcher                       Date
Appendix C

Research Instrument

Title: Security-Development and Canada’s Liberal Humanitarian Agenda in Haiti (tentative)

Themes:
• Security-development
• Foreign development practices, procedures, logics
• The main agents of the development and reconstruction and their relation to local Haitian experts and sources of capital revenue.
• Links to past development and reconstruction efforts.
• Liberal humanitarianism
• Nongovernmental organisations

Possible Questions for an interview with an NGO/humanitarian worker, RCMP or DFATD official, or a local member of the Haitian diaspora in Canada or the US:
• What does a typical day’s work look like for you?
• What is the best part of your job? What is the worst part of your job?
• What do you see your role being in Canada’s development initiative in Haiti? Do you see such initiatives impacting the Haitian state? How?
• What do you see your role being in your organisation’s development/humanitarian initiative in Haiti? Do you see these initiatives impacting the Haitian state? How?
• What is the top priority for development/reconstruction in Haiti?
• What are the goals of the development effort? What procedures are in place to achieve these goals?
• What regulations are in place and how do these impact the development process? What is the role of international standards in the reconstruction of Haiti?
• What are the institutions in Haiti that require the most resources for effective development and reconstruction to occur?
• What is your relationship with other NGOs operating in Haiti (local and international)?
• What is your relationship with Canadian government authorities operating in Haiti (i.e. the correctional service workers, justice workers, police [RCMP and MINUSTAH], border services, etc.)?
• What is your relationship with governmental authorities from outside of Canada?
• What is your relationship with private industry representatives operating in Haiti (ex. Corporations)?
• What is your relationship with multilateral institutions in Haiti (ex. IMF, World Bank, UN)?
• What are some of the benefits of the development process?
• How would you describe development in Haiti?
• Are these local forms of development compatible with Canada’s initiatives and priorities? If so, how? If not, why not?
• Are these local forms of development compatible with your organisation’s initiatives
and priorities? If so, how? If not, why not?
• What is the role of the Haitian people in the development process, if any?
• Has the Haitian conception of development and humanitarianism changed as a result of either Canada’s or your organisation’s intervention? Should it change? Why or why not? In what way(s)?
• How has the catastrophe of January 2010 impacted development and humanitarianism in Haiti? Is the current development effort the same or different from previous development and humanitarian projects?
• What are some of the challenges facing Haitian development and reconstruction today?
• In a development/humanitarian perspective, what does the term ‘security’ mean to you?
• How might you imagine security (or security-development) impacts you role in/for Haiti (either as a diaspora organisation member, NGO worker, or government official)?
• Haiti has a very long and storied history. How do you identify with this history?
• Does this history have an impact on the work you do or the way that you perceive current development projects in Haiti?
• What do you think are Canada’s interests in Haitian development?
• What do you think are other major donor’s interests in Haitian development?
• Do you see an end to your work in/for Haiti in the near future?

** This instrument was not followed exactly, and more often than not interviews would cover the bulk of questions relevant to the participant out of order through natural conversation.