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ORGANIZING FOR PEOPLE'S POWER UNDER MARTIAL LAW:
THE CASE OF THE CHURCH AND STATE IN THE PHILIPPINES

by

D.W. Booker, B.A.

A thesis submitted to
the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfilment of
the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts
Department of Sociology and Anthropology

Carleton University

Ottawa, Ontario

September 1986

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submitted by Douglas W. Booker, B.A.

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for

the degree of Master of Arts

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ABSTRACT

The thesis addresses the problem of participation by Philippine peasants and rural workers in the political and development process. It attempts to understand why these sectors have been excluded from participation and examines the possibilities for promoting genuine participation under martial law. The thesis compares the abilities of the church and the state in promoting participatory rural organizations.

The theoretical framework employed is centered on a Marxist analysis of the state which derives the nature of the state from its role in mediating the constant social crises produced by the articulation of capitalist and pre-capitalist modes of production. This framework provides a basis for understanding state interventions in the rural sector during martial law. The analysis of the state is followed by an historical examination of the church, focusing on its material interests and its relationship with the state. This analysis provides a basis for understanding the fragmentation within the church and the possibilities for promoting participation which this has created.

In conclusion, it is found that while the state offered no possibilities for promoting participatory initiatives, the church did provide some room for the development of participatory organizations. The ability of the church to facilitate the development of participatory organizations was a product of its fragmented nature. The inability of the state to promote genuinely participatory organizations was due to over-representation of the interests of the dominant classes.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

ACA	Agricultural Credit Administration
ACCI	Agricultural Credit and Cooperatives Institute
AMRSP	Association of Major Religious Superiors
ATM	General Workers Union
BCC	Basic Christian Community
BCC-CO	Basic Christian Community-Community Organizing
BGF	Barrio Guarantee Fund
BSF	Barrio Savings Fund
CBCP	Catholic Bishops' Conference of the Philippines
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CNL	Christians for National Liberation
COF	Congress Obrero Filipinas
CP	Communist Party
CPP	Communist Party of the Philippines
CSM	Christian Social Movement
DA	Democratic Alliance
DLGCD	Department of Local Government and Community Development
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FARM	Filipino Agrarian Movement
FFE	Federation of Free Farmers
FFW	Federation of Free Workers
GNP	Gross National Product
HMB	Hukbong Magpalaya ng Bayan (People's Liberation Army)
HUK	Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa Hapon (Anti-Japanese People's Ar
HYV	High Yield Variety

7-

ILO	International Labour Organization
ISO	Institute for Social Order
IRD	Integrated Rural Development
IRRI	International Rice Research Institute
KAP	Katipunan ng mga Anak Pawis (Society of Sons of Sweat)
KASAPI	Kapulungan ng mga Sandigan ng Pilipinas
KMPF	Katipunan ng mga Magbubukid (Farmers Association)
MASAKA	Malayang Samahang Magsasaka (Free Farmers Federation)
MISSSA	Mindanao-Sulu Secretariat for Social Action
MNC	Multinational Corporation
NAHFREL	National Movement for Free Elections
NDF	National Democratic Front
NPA	New People's Army
OLT	Operation Land Transfer
NASSA	National Secretariat for Social Action
PACD	Presidential Assistant for Community Development
PKM	Pambansang Kaisahang Magbubukid (National Peasant Union)
PKP	Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas
SN	Samahang Nasyon
SNDP	Samahang Nasyon Development Program
USAFFE	United States Armed Forces of the Far East
YCSP	Young Christian Socialists of the Philippines

THE PHILLIPINES

I.---INTRODUCTION

The focus of development strategy in Third World countries has shifted course in recent years, moving away from simple economic growth strategies towards a more specific emphasis on improving the position of the rural poor. This shift in emphasis has been accompanied by a re-definition of the meaning of development. Blondie Po, in Rural Organizations in the Philippines, notes that "development is increasingly being defined as the process whereby people progressively gain control over the social and material conditions which structure their lives." (1) Po's definition complements that of the I.L.O. which, in defining the problem of development, cites a need "to ensure there is effective participation of the rural population in the political process to safeguard their interests." (2) The thrust of this new strategy is toward empowering rural peoples to give them input into the development process, making them active participants rather than mere objects of development.

The need for employing such a strategy is nowhere more evident than in the Philippines. Here, the rural masses, constituting 70 per cent of the population, have been effectively

(1) Blondie Po and Chris Montiel, Rural Organizations in the Philippines, I.P.C., Ateneo de Manila, Quezon City, Philippines, 1980, p. 5.

(2) World Employment Conference, "Declaration of Principles and Programs of Action Adopted by the Tripartite World Conference on Employment Income Distribution and Social Progress and the International Division of Labour," Geneva, June 17, 1976, p. 4.

excluded from genuine political participation since the earliest western interventions some four centuries ago.(1) Throughout the periods of Spanish and American colonialism, a land tenure system evolved which concentrated economic and political power in the hands of a small land-owning elite. Through this process of monopolization, the masses were cut off from genuine political participation.

The extent of this concentration, manifested in land holdings, is well-documented. According to a study published in 1953, 13,589 landowners who held more than 50 hectares owned 42 percent of the total farmland, and the 221 owners who each held more than 1,000 hectares controlled just under 10 percent of the total farmland.(2) Land-ownership became more concentrated through the 1960's. By 1968, there were just 10,764 landlords owning 50 hectares or more who controlled 3,000,000 hectares or about 50 percent of the total agricultural land.(3)

Complementing this progressive concentration of land is a growing class of dispossessed rural peasants. One study shows that at the beginning of the U.S. colonial regime, 16.2 percent of the farms in the Philippines were operated by tenants or

(1) Ibon Data Bank Philippines Inc., Ibon Facts and Figures, November 15, 1984, p. 2.

(2) Makibaka, Join Us in Struggle, Unpublished Paper, p. 5.

(3) Makibaka, Join Us in Struggle, Unpublished Paper, p. 5.

sharecroppers.(1) By the 1930's, the proportion of tenants had risen to about 35 percent(2) of all farmers, and by 1960, tenancy rates were over 50 percent.(3)

The translation of this land concentration into political power is outlined by Gunnar Myrdal in Asian Drama where it is noted:

"All moves toward more general Agrarian Reform have been blocked or blunted by a Congress dominated by powerful landed interests. The latter control the Rural vote.... and often the police and courts as well.... The church is a considerable power on the side of the landlords. Acceptance by the Catholic hierarchy is an important avenue to office.... Even the beginnings of trade unions and peasant organizations are very much under the control of wealthy land-owners and churchmen. In sum, it is the almost baronical power wielded by the landed interests that explains why despite its comparative prosperity, the Philippines had experienced so little... agrarian reform, and democratization of its society.(4)

This statement describes the serious power imbalance existing between a land-owning elite and the rural masses. This elite, bolstered by the church, has controlled the rural sector to the point that even rural organizations of the peasants have fallen

(1) Francis J. Murray Jr., "Land Reform in the Philippines an Overview," Philippine Sociological Review, 20, 1972, pp. 151-163.

(2) Murray claims that in the 1930's, 36 percent of farms were tenanted, while government data, cited in Ernesto Valencia, "Towards a Philippine Political Economy," Diliman Review 29, July-August 1981, p. 44, puts the figure at 35.1 percent in 1939.

(3) Murray, op. cit., pp. 151-163.

(4) Gunnar Myrdal, Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations, New York, 1971.

Myrdal,
New

under its influence. While these observations pre-date the declaration of martial law, the exclusion of the peasantry from political participation has remained a reality up to the present.

While martial law served to restructure power relations within the bourgeoisie, Marcos' "New Society" never delivered on its promise to re-distribute political and economic power to the rural peoples. The re-distribution was to emerge from what Marcos termed as a "revolution from the center." This revolution was to come from neither the right nor the left but was to emanate from the state itself, as according to Marcos, the state was the only institution in society with the moral authority to initiate radical change. The meaningful participation of the rural people was to be achieved through both land reform and the empowering of peasants through grassroots organizations such as Samahang Naxon.

Unfortunately, the theory of the revolution from the center has not coincided with its practice. The most basic goals of the New Society remain unrealized and the rural sector remains cut off from any meaningful participation. The state-sponsored rural development program has further centralized control over the development process. The notion that changes could be carried out in the absence of violence was another fallacy as opposition to centralization and development has resulted in the progressive militarization of rural areas.

Some of the more successful attempts at promoting participatory organizations have resulted from increasing

repression in rural areas. In response to the increased militarization accompanying martial law, the Catholic church has promoted community organizing for self-defence. This organizing work has been carried out in the face of stiff opposition from both the state and sectors within the church. In fact, it may be the very divisions which developed within the church under martial law which allowed for this type of organizing to take place, as military rule helped transform certain sectors of the church into a progressive force for change.

The basic purpose of this thesis is to explore the possibility of and limits to promoting participatory organizations within the context of a peripheral capitalist social formation governed by a military state. This thesis will compare two attempts at developing rural organizations, one initiated by the state, and the other by the Catholic church. It will be argued that in the case of the state, such attempts led not towards greater democratization but served to further state control over the rural sector. In the case of the Catholic church, however, it will be shown that promoting organizations with some degree of relative autonomy was possible as a consequence of the fragmentation which took place within this institution under martial law. The major argument put forward is that the level of participation found in each organization reflects and is limited by the nature of the sponsoring institution, and its relationship to struggles among contending social forces.

The methodological framework employed in this study is both comparative and historical, examining both the evolution of the institutions engaged in rural organizing and comparing the efforts of the two institutions. In the second half of 1985 during the period of data collection and interviews a chaotic and repressive situation existed in the Philippines requiring that two separate methods of data collection be employed. Problems in getting information from the Bureau of Agriculture on the Samahang Nayon program resulted in data for this chapter being based primarily on archival work. The study of the church-sponsored BCC-CO program, on the other hand, combines archival work with interviews with program administrators, as well as a survey conducted in areas of three provinces in the Central Philippines. The survey was designed to examine the nature of the decision-making process within the local organization and to find out what types of actions were taken at the local level to deal with community problems.

The data being utilized to validate the proposed thesis will be organized as follows.

The second chapter begins by defining the meaning of participation within the context of this thesis. The definition will be followed by an examination of the problematic involved in developing participatory organizations through outside institutions. Attempts are made to theorize how the nature of institutions affect their relations with the rural sector and in turn their ability to promote participation. The focus is on the

need to develop an understanding of the particular form and function of the state, within the specific social formation, in assessing the possibilities for participation. At the same time, the chapter examines how an institution such as the Catholic church can effectively promote participation in light of its subordination to the state. This requires an understanding of the church as an organization with its own internal dynamic.

The purpose of the third chapter is to examine the historical role of the state in rural development. This requires a comprehensive historical examination of state interventions in the rural sector, specifically, examining state responses to peasant and tenant organizing. This examination covers the period from the Spanish colonial period to martial law and will provide a basis for understanding the relationship between the state and rural sector.

The fourth chapter begins by examining the nature of the state under martial law, paying close attention to its class character and military bureaucratic form. This is followed by an analysis of the "New Society's" rural development plan, focusing specifically on the Samahang-Nayon program and the nature of participation within this program. The purpose of this chapter is to assess the organization's ability to promote participation by looking at the program's structure and the nature of the decision-making process within the Samahang-Nayons.

Chapter five examines the nature of the church in the Philippines. This chapter is divided into two main sections: one

examines the evolution of the church in the Philippines, the other looks at attempts by Catholic organizations to promote participatory organizing under martial law. The initial section focuses on the ties between church and state and the evolution of this relationship under martial law. This helps to explain the fragmented nature of the church in the Philippines as many of the splits within the institution have developed in response to the social and economic realities of martial law. Understanding the fragmentation of the Catholic church provides a basis for understanding its potential for promoting participatory organizing at the specific conjuncture of martial law.

The second section focuses on the church's ability to promote participatory development through its Basic Christian Community (BCC) program. This involves an examination of how the structure of the BCC's can help to hinder or facilitate participation. The purpose is to discuss the possibilities and limits to this type of development imposed first by the church, and second by the state under conditions of martial law.

The conclusion begins with a comparison of the ability of each institution to foster the development of genuinely participatory organizations. It then re-examines how the nature of each institution affects its ability to promote participation. As a final point, the conclusion makes some speculations on the possibilities for rural reform under the Aquino government.

CHAPTER II

PARTICIPATORY ORGANIZING: A THEORETICAL OVERVIEW

The purpose of this chapter is to develop an analytical framework for comparing attempts by the church and state to develop rural organizations. The first task is to trace the evolution of the concept of participatory development, specifying the obvious shortcomings in the literature and clarifying a working definition of the term "participation" for this thesis. This examination demonstrates the inadequacies of existing theoretical literature in understanding the problems of implementing a participatory strategy. It is argued that there exists a dearth of analysis within development literature dealing with the structural problems of developing participatory organizations. In particular, the literature fails to address the problem of the state. This chapter shows the importance of theorizing the state because so many decisions with respect to development are implemented under the aegis of the state.

The argument put forward in this thesis is that participation is limited by the nature of the sponsoring institution and that institution's relationship to the social formation. Only through a framework of analysis which can examine the specific nature and historical development of the Philippine social formation can one explain the inability of the Philippine state to promote participatory development or how the fragmentation within the Catholic church gave it the autonomy to promote such organizations. Thus, in order to explore the possibility and limits to promoting participation, it is necessary to adequately theorize these institutions and their

relationship to one another. Before initiating the discussion on the state, this chapter examines the genesis of participation as a development strategy, as this is important for understanding what participation strategies are about.

1. Development of Strategies for Participation

One of the earliest concerns shown for promoting participatory development came from the United States Congress. Title IX of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1966 amended existing foreign assistance legislation to support more participatory approaches. The act stated:

"The great potential for planning and implementation of development activities contained in the mass of people of developing countries is still largely untapped, which slows down the achievement of objectives of the foreign assistance program."(1)

The act showed a concern for including the masses in the development process. The congressional strategy of promoting participation at this time went a step beyond dominant theories of development circulating at this time.

In the mid-1960's, the dominant development paradigm remained the Modernization school. The Modernization school defined participation primarily in political terms and regarded it largely as a consequence of economic and social development.

(1) Statements are from reports on the Title IX cited in D. Hapgood (ed.), The Role of Popular Participation in Development, Report of Conference on the Implementation of Title IX Foreign Assistance Act, Cambridge, MIT Press, 1969.

Participation was treated as a dependent variable not considered relevant to the development process.(1)

The Modernization school defined development in terms of increases in the G.N.P. per capita. Aggregate economic growth was seen as the means to achieving more widespread political participation, as their dichotomization of social phenomena equated underdevelopment with non-participation, and industrial modernization with democratic rights. A trickle-down effect was to ensure the gradual extension of these rights to all members of a society, but participation at a premature stage in this scenario was viewed as an unnecessary luxury and a possible impediment to growth in G.N.P. This particular conceptualization of participation fit into prevailing notions of development which stressed technology transfer, capital formation, and development from above through a strong central state.

The re-definition of participation from a variable dependent on economic growth to a definitional criterion of development emerged in the early 1970's. The recognition of a deteriorating situation among the rural poor resulted in a reassessment of development focus. Modernization concepts which required trickle-down effects were called into question, as it became obvious that the rural poor were not receiving the benefits of economic growth. Studies such as Poverty and Landlessness in Rural Asia demonstrate that the source of increasing poverty has

(1) Cohen and Uphoff, "Participation's Place in Rural Development: Seeking Clarity through Specificity," World Development, Vol. 8, 1980, p. 214.

more to do with the monopolization of economic power by a tiny elite than with aggregate rates of growth. (1)

In recognition of these problems, the focus of development shifted towards strategies aimed at improving the lot of the poorest sections of the rural population, a strategy directed at satisfying basic needs. One of the main thrusts of a basic-needs-strategy was to ensure effective mass participation of the rural poor in the political process in order to safeguard their interests. (2) A number of international development agencies (U.N., I.L.O.) adopted the basic-needs-strategy in the form of Integrated Rural Development (IRD). I.R.D. was seen as an instrument for state intervention in identified poorer sectors of society. (3) One of the cornerstones of the I.R.D. strategy was to decentralize the development planning process in an attempt to achieve greater participation in development.

The fundamental flaw with this approach is that the initiative for change is basically left in the hands of the state. In this regard, the basic-needs approach varies little in character from a modernization scenario, as participation is to be generated and directed from above. The central problem is that the theory puts a lot of faith in the ability of the state to act as the agent of change in the rural sector while it takes

(1) ILO, Poverty and Landlessness in Rural Asia, Geneva, ILO, 1977.

(2) ILO, The Challenge of Rural Poverty, Geneva, 1985, p. 2.

(3) U.N. Department of Technical Cooperation for Development, Towards Integrated Rural Development, New York, 1984, p. 11.

for granted that the state possesses the political will to initiate such changes. This emphasis put on central governments as facilitators of participation is, in many instances, misplaced as demonstrated in the case of the Philippines. Here, the particular nature of the social formation has spawned a state structure which is antithetical to the development of participatory organizations in the rural sector.

Recent literature on participatory development has been much more sensitive to the problems of the top-down approach utilizing the central state.(1) Marsden and Oakley note that "local government and international aid agencies which were to lead development can be seen as active agents in the process of underdevelopment."(2) Recognition of this basic problem leads logically toward abandoning of top-down strategies in favor of strategies that can bypass both these national and international agencies. The result has been an emphasis, among more progressive practitioners of development, on strategies aimed at building from the bottom up.

The new emphasis on the local level aimed at bringing rural peoples into a position where they could influence policies affecting their lives. The attractiveness of this strategy was

(1) See Rondonelli, "Implementing Decentralization Programs in Asia: A comprehensive Analysis," Public Administration and Development, Vol. 3, No. 3, p. 185.
Marsden and Oakley, Approaches to Participation in Development, ILO, Geneva, 1985
and Stohr and Taylor (eds.), Development from Above or Below?, 1981.

(2) Marsden and Oakley, op. cit., p. 9.

that it offered a vehicle for development which was not dependent on national governments, as it was based on developing political power at the grassroots. H. R. Amit, in his thesis, Participation in Asian Rural Development, recognizes some of the problems with such an approach stating:

"in order for a participation initiative to be successful the state must; first permit organised dissent and second not treat initiatives to organize as subversive and meriting of repression." (1)

Amit believes that if these conditions are not met, these initiatives will either fail or be forced underground. (2)

While the passive acquiescence of the state can be considered an important condition for the development of participatory organizations, the case of the BCC-CO program in the Philippines demonstrates that a lack of goodwill on the part of the state is not a sufficient condition to prevent the emergence of such organizations. In this case, even terrorism on the part of the state was unable to prevent development of rural organizations. The key to understanding how participation can be effectively cultivated lies within the particular social formation under study.

(1) H. R. Amit, Participation in Asian Rural Development: The Role of Non-Government Organizations, MA Thesis NPSIA, Carleton University, Ottawa, 1982, pp. 49-93.

(2) Amit, op. cit. p. 93.

2. Defining Participation

The outline of the evolution of participatory strategies shows that definitions of participation vary greatly from the early functionalist views which saw political participation as a product of development to more recent constructs which treat it as a development goal,(1) or as a necessary pre-condition to development.(2) It would appear that peoples' participation or participatory development is a term still very much in the process of definition. One of the more serious problems with debates about participation is the conflation of these various definitions in the literature. It is then essential when discussing the concept to develop a working definition.

One of the more illuminating definitions of participation is offered by the United Nations Administrative Committee on Coordination Task Force. It states:

"What gives real meaning to popular participation is the collective effort by the people concerned in an organized framework to pool their efforts and whatever other resources they decide to pool together to attain objectives they set for themselves. In this regard, participation is viewed as an active process in which the participants take initiatives and action that is stimulated by their own thinking."(3)

(1) Cohen and Uphoff, op. cit., pp. 213-235.

(2) Amit, op. cit., p. 43.

(3) Administrative Committee Task Force, Working Group on Program Harmonization, Rome, 1978, quoted in Anisur Rachman, Participatory Organizations and the Rural Poor, ILO, Geneva, pp. 1-2.

This characterisation of participation is reflective of the bottom-up approach that has attempted to shift the impetus for change away from the central government. Within this process, the local community is no longer viewed as the object of development but as a participant in the development process. Development in this conceptualization is being defined simply as a process through which people gain control over the social and material conditions which structure their lives.

In this context, participation is no longer viewed as an effect of development but as a political exercise designed to empower the disadvantaged through organizations which can challenge established structures. This conceptualization is supported by A. J. Ledesma in her book 350 Million Rural Poor which defines participation as the process by which the poor can organize themselves.(1) Participation is then most cogently defined as a form of political democracy centered in grassroots organizations. Through these democratic institutions, the people will, ideally, achieve a greater capacity to perceive their problems, articulate demands, and take collective action toward solving these problems.

Rural organizations then form an essential element in the process of overcoming poverty as they assist in the promotion of collective activity that makes participation an effective form of action. The ILO cites rural organizations as one of the means of

(1) A. J. Ledesma, 350 Million Rural Poor, cited in ILO, The Challenges of Rural Poverty, Geneva, 1985, p. 3.

protecting the interests of the rural poor against the structural imbalances inherent in the agrarian system;

"In view of the highly hierarchical political and economic structure of agrarian societies in some developing countries, measures aimed at re-distribution are likely to be thwarted unless backed by organizations of rural workers." (1)

Rural organizations are thus seen as an important mechanism for protecting the rights of rural peoples. The organization can provide rural people with collective strength, often a necessary prerequisite to taking action in defense of their interests.

While participation is being defined as a process by which the rural poor can organize themselves, organizations in themselves are not a sufficient condition for participation, as the example of Samahang Nayan demonstrates. Organizations will not automatically provide people with a voice and influence in decision-making. Whereas some formal organizations do facilitate participation, there can be little doubt that the vast majority do not. Proposals for decentralization and participation are often rhetoric for veiling other motives like centralizing state control. In these cases, organizations are often created and utilized to structure peasant participation in accordance with state aims.

The problems inherent in non-participatory organizations can be traced to the initial stages of organizational development. One of the most difficult tasks in promoting participation is to create an organizational framework in which participation can

(1) ILO, *Challenge of Rural Poverty*, p. 2.

take place and in which power can effectively be shared.(1) Ideally, the approach seeks to avoid the introduction of outside organizational forms. The promotion of participation in an initially nonparticipatory dependent situation, however, requires initial external assistance, often to raise awareness and capabilities for action, creating conditions for effective self-reliance.(2) The initial intervention serves to generate the organizational skills needed to combat oppression.

Participatory development then does not preclude external initiatives; but for participation to be genuine, these initiatives need to be adopted and adapted by the local people themselves. The process of external intervention to provide assistance defines one of the most delicate tasks in promoting participatory organizations. Rachman notes that, unless intervention is done carefully, it will merely shift dependence from one source to another.(3)

The notion of a necessary intervention to stimulate participation raises a question rarely dealt with in the literature which forms the focus of this paper, i.e., which outside institution can be most effective in promoting this form of development. The basic problem is that some external agents who initiate a participatory strategy may have their own agenda

(1) Traitler, quoted by Amit, op. cit., p. 25.

(2) Anisur
Participatory Organizations and the Rural Poor, 110 Rachman,
1984, pp. 3-4. Geneva,

(3) Rachman, op. cit., p. 4.

which conflicts with that of the target group. A Non-Government Organization such as the church may be more concerned with capturing souls than providing a forum for political mobilization, and the state may be more interested in organizing for its own objectives rather than empowering rural people through organizations which may later threaten the hegemonic position of those who control it. In this situation, understanding the nature of the sponsoring institution can be a powerful indicator of just how successful attempts at promoting organizations can be.

While the nature of sponsoring institutions is a strong indicator in determining if participatory organizations will emerge, a second factor can be considered equally important, and that is the nature of the social formation from which the organization emerges. In the case of the BCC-CO, it will be seen that even where an organization does emerge as genuinely participatory, it will have to confront enormous pressures. The basic problem lies in the fact that the very nature of the participatory strategy, empowering rural peoples through their own organizations, puts it into conflict with existing power structures and social relations. In the Philippines, it was these same factors which had prevented any form of participation by rural peoples in the first place.

3. Contextualizing Participation

The fundamental problems in promoting participation have now been identified as follows: first, who can generate the structures for participation, and second, in what context can it be achieved. In terms of identifying a context for participation, the most comprehensive analysis is provided by Oakley and Marsden who see obstacles to development associated with structural and institutional relationships at both the national and local level.(1) They state that the dominant relations of power and production and the ideological values legitimising them constitute powerful obstacles to the promotion of participation.(2) Recognition of these structural obstacles leads to the conclusion that understanding the success or failure of attempts to promote participation must begin with an analysis of the social formation. In the case of the Philippines, it would necessarily focus on the nature of the church and state as these are the two major institutions involved in the rural sector.

A critical question arising at this point is how to develop a framework for understanding the nature of church and state in a peripheral social formation. At one level, the study must analyse these institutions as exhibiting some degree of relative autonomy as the church and state do not respond in the same

(1) Marsden and Oakley, op. cit., pp. 29-30.

(2) op. cit., p. 31.

manner to the continuing agrarian crisis in the Philippines. At the same time, however, these institutions can only be understood in terms of their imbeddedness in larger sets of social relations.

In this sense, the church cannot be examined simply as a religious organization. It must also be examined as an institution with its own material and class interests. The fact that the church in the Philippines possesses extensive land and commercial holdings gives it an interest in the perpetuation of existing relations of both production and political domination. The church's material interests have produced an institution which had supported both the colonial and later the peripheral capitalist state in efforts to diffuse agrarian unrest.

While the material and class interests of the church have ensured a historical role for the church as a supporter of state policy, these interests at the same time have produced contradictions and struggles within the church. The members of the lower clergy, who have no control over the church's wealth, have increasingly allied themselves with the poor as they became more deeply involved in social development work. This growing conflict of interests within the church produced struggle and fragmentation within the institution, manifested in the radicalization of elements of the lower clergy. It was this fragmentation which created the possibilities for clerics to pursue development strategies which were antithetical to both the interests of the church hierarchy and the state.

While a separate treatment of the church is necessary to understand its growing independence under martial law, its role in the social formation cannot be understood without contextualizing it in relation to the state. This requires an adequate framework for understanding the Philippine state. Debates concerning the peripheral state have developed around two schools of thought; one labelled World Systems Theory and a second called the Historico-Structuralist Dependency School.⁽¹⁾ The fundamental point of disagreement between the two schools is the level at which they see international relations of dependency affecting the development of economic and political systems in the periphery. This difference is critical when evaluating the potential for transformation within Third World countries.

The World Systems theorists (Amin, Wallerstein, Frank) would define the functions and evolution of the state as conditioned through a relationship of dependency between the periphery and imperial center. This dependent relationship is historical in character, with different modes of accumulation evolving in the center reflected in different state forms in the periphery. In this sense, the theory is deterministic as it provides no explanation for the multiplicity of state forms which have evolved in the periphery. The state in the periphery, in this sense, is seen as operating in the general interests of world accumulation. The political system functions as an

(1) For a more comprehensive discussion of these two approaches, see Martin Carnoy, The State and Political Theory, Princeton, 1984, pp. 184-207.

administrative body over an economy which lacks any internal dynamic of its own.

The Historical-Dependency theorists (Cardoso, Falleto), like the World Systems theorists, regard dependency as an integral part of the analysis surrounding the explanation of the peripheral state, but find that this alone cannot account for the variety of forms the state has taken in the periphery. In order to understand the dependent state, they would argue that examining the internal class structure of the particular nation and the effects this has had on the accumulation process and development of the state is essential. The more complex formulation of the state, captured in the Historical-Dependency theory, will inform the present study of development strategies in the Philippines.

The key to determining whether or not the state is capable of promoting participation lies in understanding internal class structure, and class contradictions of a social formation situated at the periphery of the world capitalist system. Through a historical-materialist examination of these elements, one begins to come to grips with explaining the severe under-representation of the interests of rural workers and peasants within the state. This examination demonstrates how global capitalist relations of production are transformed into internal relations of domination. The historical analysis will provide a framework for understanding the possibilities and limitations for developing participatory organizations.

This approach draws upon analyses of the state in advanced capitalist countries (Hirsch, Holloway and Picciotto) and from the analyses of peripheral capitalist and post-colonial states (Ziemann and Lanzendorfer and Gittens). These analyses attempt to derive the state from the nature of production and forms of class struggle extending from its basic contradictions. State form and function are understood through an analysis of the relation between the state and the contradictions of capitalist accumulation. The state develops out of the need to mediate and reproduce the specific character of the accumulation process and system of class domination in society. Within peripheral social formations, understanding the reproduction function can be a highly complex process, as a number of modes of production, both capitalist and pre-capitalist, can exist in articulation.

The articulation of the modes of production can result in a number of contradictory tendencies which make it impossible for the market to ensure the efficient reproduction of the social formation. The constant intervention of the state is thus required to alleviate conditions of crisis and guarantee the general and external conditions of reproduction. In the Philippines, this has involved the state in both assisting in the subsumption of all labour under the capitalist mode production and in the reproduction of the pre-capitalist relations of production which have been predominant in the agricultural sector. These internal contradictions existing in the social

formation are reflected in the state structure as it mirrors the contradictions between the various fractions of capital.

The struggle between classes is another important element in the analysis of the state as it often produces state intervention. There have been a number of instances in the history of the Philippines where fragments of the rural masses have engaged in armed struggle against the system and this has had important effects on the state's role in reproducing relations of production in terms of both the development strategy and the utilization of the repressive apparatus on the rural population. The analysis of the state must then include an examination of both conflict between classes as well as between the different fractions of capital.

To situate the problem of implementing a participatory strategy, it is necessary to analyse the historical development of productive forces and the class struggle. Such an analysis would reveal the problems of non-participation developed in the rural sector as a result of a particular mode of production and particular forms of class domination. Secondly, it would provide an understanding of how these relations of domination were reproduced through social institutions such as the church and state. These elements are critical for understanding the impossibilities of the state implementing strategy designed to organize the rural sector and explaining why there is room within the church to promote development which is genuinely participatory.

CHAPTER III

THE STATE AND EVOLUTION: THE STATE RESPONDS TO AGRARIAN CLASS
CONFLICT AND RURAL ORGANIZING IN THE PHILIPPINES (1900-1972)

"Men make their own history; but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past. The traditions of all the dead generations weigh like a nightmare on the brain of the living."(1)

The nightmare of Philippine history has been four centuries of colonial domination. The present social situation in which the rural peasantry and proletariat remain cut off from political and economic power are legacies of a colonial past. The specific forms of class domination found in the Philippines have been tempered by a long colonial history, first by 333 years of Spanish rule and then by 48 years under American rule.

The purpose of this chapter is to trace how class relations in the colonial period have translated into a particular form of political domination in the present social formation which has excluded the rural masses from any meaningful participation. In doing so, the chapter examines the state and its role in the reproduction of specific forms of class domination. The historical analysis of the evolution of state and class provides the framework for understanding why the state is incapable of promoting organizational initiatives in the rural sector which are genuinely participatory.

One widely circulated answer to this question asserts that the specific character of the military state under martial law

(1) Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, Moscow, 1969, p.398.

prevented genuine participation. This view, however, fails to explain the fact that few participatory initiatives emanated from the Philippine state preceding military rule. The state was, in fact, extensively involved in suppressing the emergence of independent organizations in the rural sector. The chapter demonstrates that it has been a particular form of productive relations, which have existed and developed since the late 19th century, that prevent the effective participation of the rural masses in politics.

The analysis of the state focuses on its functions of reproducing the class structure and conditions of accumulation; looking at how these functions are conditioned by class conflict within the state. Determining how concrete functions of the state have been affected by class conflict requires a thorough examination of the evolution of class relations. The analysis examines the development of class relations in the rural sector through five periods of Philippine history. The analysis begins with a brief examination of the Spanish Colonial period (1565-1898); this is followed by an in-depth look at the American Colonial period (1898-1935), the period of Commonwealth Government (1935-1941), the Japanese Occupation (1941-1944) and the post-war independence period (1944-1972). The last four sections focus on the evolution of rural organizations within the context of changing conditions in the countryside and examine the state's responses to these organizations in the context of a class analysis.

This examination is of particular importance considering that the lack of political power on the part of the rural masses can be traced to a lack of control in the productive sphere, specifically, to the particular form of productive relations which evolved in the rural sector. Recognizing the particular form of class domination which existed in the rural sector provides a basis for comprehending both the emergence of martial law and the problems the regime encountered when it attempted to "democratize" the rural sector.

1. SPANISH COLONIALISM

The Spanish colonial period began in 1565 and lasted 333 years until the revolutionary war of 1898 when the Spaniards were effectively expelled from the Philippines by the Filipinos. (1) The development of the Philippine social formation was effectively stunted as a result of this long period of colonial domination. As a mercantilist power, Spain did not attempt to develop plantation or commercial agriculture until the turn of the 19th century. For the first two centuries of Spanish Rule, the main function of the Philippines was to serve as a transshipment center for goods between the New World and China in the Manila-Acapulco galleon trade.

In spite of this focus on the galleon trade, Spanish colonialism did have an impact on patterns of agricultural

(1) This revolutionary war was never completed due to the intervention of the Americans.

development. The main method of surplus extraction in the early years was the encomienda system. This was a feudal practice under which the Spanish crown would grant license to collect tribute from the natives. The native principalia class were not only exempted from payment of tribute but were also appointed as collectors, thus becoming a direct administrative link between colonial government and the masses.(1)

It was within the framework of the Spanish colonial state that the native elite began to reinforce and consolidate its position. For a long time, Philippine agriculture was dominated by small self-sufficient farmers. However, the expansion of commercial agriculture and trade links in the early eighteenth century resulted in increased scales of production in the form of haciendas and plantations. As a result, lands opened up by small farmers were absorbed into larger haciendas. Much of this absorption came in the form of outright land grabs. Such land theft became widespread in the second half of the eighteenth century when the Spanish colonial government allowed the free registration of land. The principalia used this opportunity to claim large tracts of land which had been worked on by small holders.(2)

(1) The principalia is a term used to describe the native economic and political elite, largely mestizo, which developed under Spanish colonial Rule.

(2) Marshall McLennan, "Peasant and Haciendero in Nueva Ecija: The Socio Economics of a Philippine Commercial Rice Growing Region," University of California Berkeley, Ph.D. Thesis, pp. 374-79.

The expansion of landholdings among the principalia consolidated their power, giving rise to a local elite within the Spanish colonial system. This in part accounts for the contradictory tendencies inherent in the Spanish colonial state, a tradition of strong centralization coupled with a significant degree of local autonomy. It was these land grabs which helped establish a landed oligarchy which would survive and thrive throughout the period of American colonialism.

2. AMERICAN COLONIAL PERIOD

The American colonial period was relatively short in comparison to Spain's long rule. It began in 1898 and lasted until 1946. During this period, however, the transformations in economic and social life exceeded those under Spain's rule. First, the structure and function of the colonial state changed under American rule. In the early years of American rule, the colonial state was dependent upon the local elite. This further reinforced tendencies toward local autonomy. The Americans also opened up the state apparatus to greater involvement from Filipinos. Under the Spaniards, political control outside the local level had not been open to Filipinos. With American colonial rule, however, positions in the state apparatus on both provincial and national level became open.

The Americans introduced a system of political parties and regular elections started in 1907.(1) The political parties were organized from existing political groups, in the provinces whose leaders belonged to the local land-owning elite. The local land-owners had at their disposal a personal following based on patronage relationships and coercion.

While the colonial state was open to nominal participation by the local elite, it still served the interests of the metropole as it had under the Spanish, though these requirements changed with the advent of American rule. Contrary to President McKinley's claim that the American mission was to "educate the Filipinos and uplift and civilize and christianize them", (2) the Americans were interested in the Philippines as a trading partner and as an outlet for investment. When America took possession of the Philippines in 1898-9, it is reported that the only corporations in existence were Spanish or English. (3) The Taft Commission, set up to investigate the conditions in the Philippines, recommended that a civil government was needed to pass laws which would facilitate American investment in the Philippines.

(1) Willem Wolters, Politics, Patronage and Class Conflict in Central Luzon, Quezon City, Philippines, 1983. p.15.

(2) Merlin Magallona, "A Contribution to the Study of Feudalism," in Feudalism and Capitalism in the Philippines, Quezon City, Philippines, 1982. p. 40.

(3) Constantino and Constantino, The Philippines: A Past Revisited, Quezon City, Philippines, 1975. p. 297.

The role of the colonial state in this process was to facilitate investment and ensure a suitable climate for it. This function was spelled out by incoming governor Cameron Forbes in his 1909 inaugural address. He declared that:

"Capital demands a stable government. Capital is not interested in the color or design of the flag. It wants just and equitable laws...and fair treatment in the courts. The faith of the United States is pledged that all these benefits shall be permanently assured." (1)

The capital Forbes referred to in his address was U.S. capital. The purpose of colonial rule then was to foster conditions for accumulation for American interests, rather than indigenous capital accumulation.

In carrying out its role in guaranteeing the conditions of accumulation, the colonial state became involved in certain functions of legitimation involving land reform of Friar agricultural holdings. (2) In 1900, the Friars were the largest land-owners in the Philippines, possessing over 420,000 acres of land. (3) The lands, which had been held by the friars for over 300 years, employed 60,000 tenants who had refused to pay their rents under the American administration. This forced the Taft

(1) Magallona, op. cit., p. 24.

(2) The Friars refer collectively to religious orders which emerged as the largest land-owners under the Spanish. The major orders were the Franciscans and Dominicans. Primarily absentee landlords, the Friars parcelled out the estates to inquilinos or lessees who paid fixed rent. The inquilinos in turn had the lands worked by sharecroppers.

(3) Usha Mahajani, Philippine Nationalism: External Challenge and Philippine Response 1565-1946, 1972, p. 283.

Commission to deal with the problem as they felt leaving the lands in the friars' hands would provoke an agrarian war.

Acting out of this fear, in November 1903, the U.S. government purchased about 166,000 hectares at a cost of \$7.5 million.(1) This land was gradually sold off in small parcels to small cultivators. By 1912, about 50,000 Filipinos had acquired title to these lands.(2) Small holders were not the only beneficiary of this massive land buy-back, as it allowed the American Sugar Refining Co. to purchase the 22,484-hectare-San Jose estate in Mindoro. Before this particular sale could be finalized, the colonial state had to re-define the Friar lands as non-public, as previous acts had limited Corporate holdings to 1,024 hectares.

In spite of these early attempts at land reform, the tenancy problem deteriorated further under American rule. One explanation of this process provided by McLennan was that after 1913, there was a major land grab due to the fact that colonial land registry surveys were corruptly carried out to the disadvantage of small farmers.(3) Constantino argues in addition that the growing concentration of land was a manifestation of a growing demand for export crops.(4) This demand was stimulated by new trading arrangements designed by the United States.

(1) Mahajani, op. cit., p. 286

(2) Mahajani, op. cit., p. 286

(3) McLennan, op. cit., pp. 374-379.

(4) Constantino and Constantino, op. cit., p. 303.

Two acts of the American Government, the Payne Aldrich Act (1909) and the Underwood Simmonds Act (1916), ensured a free trade system between the two countries. These acts ultimately defined the position of the Philippines in this relationship as the classical colonial economy, the exporter of raw materials and the importer of finished products. The colonial state thus reinforced traditional patterns of exchange to satisfy the reproductive requirements of the United States.

These economic developments in the colonial period are extremely important in understanding the evolution of both Philippine productive relations and the particular character of the state. The restricted and uneven pattern of development which characterized this period would produce the material conditions for structural stagnation and crisis. The process of uneven development was evident in the domination of commercial crops in trade relations. Through the period of U.S. colonialism (1899-1942), 90 per cent of all exports were composed of the top commercial crops which included sugar, abaca, coconuts, and tobacco. Capitalist development was restricted to this sector because it was the only sector critical to capitalist reproduction in the metropole.

These new trade linkages also had the effect of reinforcing pre-capitalist relations of production. Demand for export crops became a powerful stimulus for an increase in land purchases by the hacendados and more intensive exploitation of the tenant. These relations of production existed not only on the haciendas.

Under American rule there was a considerable expansion in corporate holdings, the majority of which was worked by cash tenants.(1) Trade patterns with the metropole then created conditions for the continued reproduction and extension of semi-feudal tenancy relations.

2.1. Evolution of Tenant-Landlord Relations

In the American colonial period, two very distinct trends were witnessed in regard to land tenancy. First, relations at the point of production were being transformed and second, the number of tenants in relation to the total number of agricultural producers was increasing rapidly. The changes in landlord-tenant relations actually pre-date the American colonial period. Brian Fegan, in his book The Social History of a Central Luzon Barrio, traces the beginnings of the transformation to about 1890. He says that from this point onwards, large land owners began to change the conditions of tenancy by raising rents and forcing their tenants to change to a sharecrop system.(2) Fegan viewed share-tenancy as a form of rationalizing the production process, as the share-tenancy system gave the landlord a vested interest in increasing levels of production to increase his share of the harvest. The new system, however, was detrimental to harmonious relations between landlord and tenant, as the sharecropping

(1) Karl J. Pelzer, Settlement in the Asiatic Tropics, New York, American Geographical Society, 1948, p. 91.

(2) Brian Fegan, "The Social History of a Central Luzon Barrio" in Philippine Social History, ed. McRoy, 1982, pp. 101-2.

system gave the landlord an incentive to evict any tenant who was an inefficient producer. Most often, this meant tenants who were sick or aged.

The transition to share-tenancy was also accompanied by the interposition of overseers. This was another indication of the rationalization of production, as it served to break down the longstanding patron-client relationship which existed between landlord and tenant. Under the huk system, the tenant paid a set fee and could count on the landlord for economic security. The landlord in turn would receive a ready source of free labour, financial profit and political benefits.(1) This transformation to a share-tenancy system, coupled with increasing absentee ownership, removed much of the reciprocity from the landlord-tenant relationship. The relationship became strictly oriented towards the extraction of surplus from the peasant with no obligation on the part of the landlord. These new terms were often insufficient to meet the peasants' needs.

Despite the increasing poverty of the tenants, the numbers of tenants increased due to a lack of occupational alternatives and this further undermined the bargaining position of established tenants. At the turn of the century, tenants were in demand. As a result, they could move from one area to the next in search of better working conditions. By the 1920's, however, a growing population and increasing pressure on the land left

(1) Ben J. Kerkvliet, "Peasant Society and Unrest Prior to the Huk Rebellion," Asian Studies, Vol IX, No. 2, p. 168.

tenants with few alternatives. Homesteading had been one alternative but in Central Luzon, small family farms were clearly the exception. This was a consequence both of the fact that large tracts of land were being purchased by the elite and that homesteaders could not survive the economic hardships and would be forced to give up their lands to pay back debts.

It appears that small-scale production of the family farm was uneconomical, and that the alternatives were to become a tenant-farmer or agricultural wage labourer. The majority chose to work as tenants to the point where the position of tenant-farmer became a commodity which could be bought and sold. Kerkvliet reports that in the late 1940's, a system called *Puesto* evolved whereby the tenant-farmer could sell his position as tenant to anyone wishing to take over his contract.⁽¹⁾ The increasing pressure on the land through the 1920's and 30's put the tenants in a poor bargaining position in relation to the landlord. If someone refused to accept conditions, it was easy to get a new tenant to take his place. So if tenants were bold enough to demand their rights, or attempted to organize workers on the *hacienda*, or refused to vote as directed, they could be ejected from their lands.

Throughout this period of ~~corrupt~~ political autocracy, the peasants lacked the power to attempt any constructive changes in

(1) Kerkvliet notes that the price of such a position in San Ricardo, Nueva Ecija had reached P1,000 (\$250 Cnd) per hectare in the early 1970's, op. cit., p. 170.

their situation.(1) A 1936 fact-finding survey into agrarian conditions found that in all provinces examined

"the average tenant did not enjoy his constitutional and inalienable civil and political rights.(2) He cannot openly join associations nor participate actively in any movement organized for his betterment without courting the displeasure of his landlord and running the risk of being deprived of the piece of land that he tills."(3)

Landlord pressure could not completely stifle peasant desires for participation in political life through their own independent organizations.

2.2--Organizing the Rural Sector

In the face of increasing hardships under the new sharecropping system, the tenants took initiatives to organize for self-defense. The organizations formed during this period can be viewed as the forerunners of contemporary attempts to develop grassroots organizations in the rural sector. The unions began initially as responses at the local level to worsening conditions on individual haciendas. By the late 1930's, however,

(1) Lacique was a term used to refer to a local chieftain in the early colonial period. In this century, it is used to refer to a local leader or land-owner who wields a considerable amount of political power.

(2) Along with the creation of the Commonwealth Government in 1935, the Americans also gave the Philippines its constitution patterned after the constitution of the United States.

(3) James S. Allen, "Agrarian Tendencies in the Philippines," Pacific Affairs, Vol. XI, p. 64.

these local organizations grew into inter-provincial, mass-based alliances.

The initial attempt to promote unionism in the form of the Union ng Magsasaka in 1917 was undermined by political factionalism. The union of peasants split into groups of Nationalista and Democratista supporters. This was followed in 1919 by attempts to unionize all the tenants and rural labourers in the province of Pampanga through the Iambulan Anak-Pawis (Association of Sons of Sweat).⁽¹⁾ The influence of Anak-Pawis stretched beyond the borders of Pampanga. As Fegan's study of San Miguel, Bulacan indicates, a local was organized there in 1919.⁽²⁾

The life of this early umbrella organization, however, was short-lived. It was soon replaced by the Kapatirang Magsasaka (Brotherhood of Farmers). The objectives of the Kapatiran were to get a 60:40 crop-sharing arrangement,⁽³⁾ maximum interest of 50 percent on loans, the equal sharing of expenses between landlord and tenant, no interest on loans after a crop failure, no more free labour to the landlord, and an end to landlords using force, authority and opportunity of domestic service to

(1) Constantino and Constantino, op. cit., 1975, p. 365.

(2) Fegan, op. cit., p. 106.

(3) This meant a 60 percent share of the harvest for the tenant and the remainder for the landlord. In this period, the tenant would be lucky to get a 50/50 split as no legislation yet regulated these arrangements.

rape and seduce peasant girls.(1) The union also wanted the right for its members to join the organization without threat of eviction and the right to vote without direction. The Kapalliran was the most influential of the early unions and the main force among peasants until 1935-42, when membership was shifted to the Kalipunan ng mga Magsasaka ng Pilipinas (KMPP).

The most notable feature of this early period of peasant organizing was the proliferation of organizations developing within a very localized context. In Nueva Ecija, there was the Union ng Magsasaka (Union of Peasants) formed in 1922 and the Union de Arrendatarias (1929); in Bulacan, the Pagkakaisa ng Magsasaka (1919); the Sociedad de Manggalan (1930) (Society of Land Tenants) in Pampanga; In Camarines Sur, there was the "Union" as well as the Apak-Pawis in Pampanga and Bulacan, to name a few.(2) During this period, peasant responses to worsening conditions of labour were limited to the local level. Acts were normally directed at the production process which included the burning of crops and the destruction of irrigation facilities.(3) As discontent and organization became less localized, however, a number of broad-based organizations began to emerge.

(1) Fegan, op. cit., p. 107.

(2) See: Kerkvliet, op. cit., p. 178

(3) M.C. Gurrero, "The Colorum Uprisings 1924-1931," Asian Studies, Vol. V, No. 1.

AREAS OF PEASANT ORGANIZING IN CENTRAL LUZON

The first attempt to organize a federation of unions came in 1919. It was called the Union de Agricultores de Filipinas. (1)

The objective was to unite all peasant organizations in the country. To achieve this aim, a Tenant Congress was held in Manila in August 1922. At this congress, a federation of peasants called the Katipunan ng Mga Manggagawa at Magasaka sa Pilipinas was formed. At a subsequent convention of the National Confederation of Tenants and Farm Labourers, the group changed its name to the Katipunan ng Mga Magbubukid ng Pilipinas.

Other major peasant confederations which existed before World War II were the Katipunan ng mga Anak-Pawis ng Pilipinas or K.A.P. The K.A.P. began as an offshoot of the Congreso Obbrero Pilipinas (C.O.F.). It was formed in 1929 as a result of a split within the C.O.F. led by a radical faction advocating class struggle. The aims of the K.A.P. included uniting peasants and workers in class organizations, struggle for the betterment of working conditions of these groups, struggle against U.S. imperialism and the establishment of the Soviet system in the Philippines. (2)

The principal actors behind the formation of the K.A.P., which included Crisanto Evangelista, organizer of C.O.F. and Jacinto Manahan, head of the National Confederation of Farm Labourers, went on to become members of the Central Committee of

(1) Constantino and Constantino, op. cit., p. 365.

(2) George Santayana (Jose Lava), Milestones in the History of the K.A.P. found in Ateneo University Library.

the Communist Party (C.P.) when it was formed in November, 1930. The legal life of the Party was extremely short. Evangelista and Manahan, along with other central committee members, were arrested in Feb, 1931. They were found guilty of sedition on the basis of party platform. At the same time, the C.P. was declared an illegal organization. Constantino notes that although the C.P. ceased to have a legal existence, its influence continued to be felt in various peasant organizations.(1)

3.1. COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENT

The establishment of a Commonwealth government under Manuel Quezon led to no noticeable relaxation of the repressive regime associated with the American colonial period. Allen, in his reflections on Philippine society, notes that in the early years;

"Quezon ruled with a dictatorial hand, zealous guardian of the privileges of local caciques and comprador merchants as well as U.S. military and business interests."(2)

His government met every new demand with new threats of suppression through insurrection and sedition laws passed under the former colonial regime.

Quezon himself did not consider the Commonwealth State to be of democratic form. In 1939, he commented that;

"The country had never been democratic, nor is it now democratic despite the pretensions of the constitution and the Commonwealth set up. Elections meant nothing

(1) Constantino and Constantino, op cit, 1975, p. 369.

(2) James

S.

Allen,

The Radical Left on the Eve of War: A Political Memoir,
Manila, 1985, p. 12.

since they are controlled by the landed rich and the local ~~carigue~~ and he himself can fire elected town and provincial officials if he so chooses." (1)

Quezon himself is described by Allen as the "supreme ~~carigue~~, a benevolent despot well aware of the complaints of the peasantry and the dangers of social unrest."

Quezon's awareness of the peasant problem did lead him to reform legislation passed under the U.S. regime, codifying the rights of tenants. In 1933, the colonial government had passed the Rice Share-Tenancy Act to regulate the increasing number of disputes in landlord-tenant relations. This law provided for a 50/50 sharing arrangement for costs and crops and a 10 per cent rate of interest on debts. The main problem with the Act, aside from a lack of substance, was that the law could only be invoked upon petition of the majority of municipal councils in a district. It is not surprising that not even one council petitioned for the application of the Act, since local land-owners usually controlled such councils.

In 1936, the law was amended to allow the President to put the law into effect in municipalities which he designated. The following year, Quezon ordered the enforcement of the Act in all Central Luzon provinces. Kerkvliet notes, however, that the law was merely a "rubber-stamped legal approval on existing relations between landlord and tenants."

The new tenancy act was the cornerstone of Quezon's "social justice program," which was designed to offset the growing unrest

(1) J. S. Allen, op. cit., 1985, p. 29.

which had been mounting through the 1930's. In the years following 1936, however, the social justice program existed largely on paper. It was a program not well-received by the peasantry of Central Luzon. Peasant leader Pedro Abad Santos vigorously opposed Quezon and his "social justice" program commenting:

We do not believe in social justice. We don't invoke social justice. We believe that if the masses have to be saved, it is by their own efforts; to organize and unite and their only weapon is the strike. We believe that ten years of Quezon's "social justice" preaching would not obtain for the workers what a single strike would accomplish for them.(1)

This rejection of Quezon's program was an achievement, indicative of growing membership in the organizations of the peasantry and their growing skepticism of the state which had either been incapable of controlling the land-owners or had consistently taken their side. The obvious bias in favour of the landlords was a major factor in the failure of the social justice program.

Another problem with the social justice program was that of enforcement -- a manifestation of the dual nature of the political system, tending towards both strong centralization and local autonomy. In the provinces, landlords had a monopoly on economic and political power which allowed them to ignore laws once passed and to utilize the Philippine Constabulary as personal armies.

(1) Quoted in Eusebio Macaspac Manuel, Manual for the Study of the Hukbalahap, (Unpublished Masters Thesis) Siliman University, Dumaguete, 1948.

The courts at the local level also operated in the interests of the landed class as the Justice of the Peace would normally owe his appointment to the local elite. Kerkvliet notes that this was frequently true of higher court officials as well.(1) Pedro Abad Santos commented on this fact in a letter to his brother Jose, then Justice Minister, stating ;

"the workers (farmers, agricultural labourers, and tenants) have lost faith in the courts...our ruling class has taken the place of the former colonial rulers and used the courts to further their interests and privileges."(2)

Even without the support of the courts, the reform laws provided built-in protection for landlords.

In those cases where tenants were well-acquainted with the law and bold enough to demand its application, the reaction of the landlord would be to threaten them with ejection at the end of the agricultural year. This was because sharecropping contracts only lasted one year and could be legally terminated at the end of that time. In the provinces of Central Luzon where the tenants were well-organized and not afraid to challenge the landlord, there was an epidemic of evictions affecting thousands of peasants from March through May of 1939.

The situation was very serious as the Department of Labour admitted it was helpless to prevent the evictions. The peasants, however, with some 40 organizations of rural workers and tenants operating in Central Luzon, were now gaining the ability to

(1) Kerkvliet, op. cit., p. 202..

(2) Constantino and Constantino, op. cit., 1975, p. 382.

defend themselves. The largest of these unions were the General Workers Union (ATM), an affiliate of the Socialist Party, which had 50,000 members in Pampanga, Bulacan, Tarlac, and Nueva Ecija; the Philippine Confederation of Peasants or K.P.M.P., an affiliate of the C.P. with 60,000 members; and the Sailorunag Anak-Pawis (K.A.P.) also under Communist Party leadership with 80,000 members.(1) These major unions, along with other associations of tenants and rural workers, banded together to form the United Peasant Center with C.P.P. member Juan Faleo as secretary.(2) This grouping threatened a general strike in Nueva Ecija, Pampanga and Bulacan, insisting on the implementation of tenancy laws and demanding that the ejections be stopped. To prevent the general strike, Quezon himself met with landlords and convinced them to abandon the practice of mass ejections.

Intervention in this crisis and the reform program were indications that the state was attempting to ameliorate the harsh conditions in the rural sector which had developed under American colonial rule. It should be noted that there was considerable opposition to these reforms, meagre as they were, from within the landed classes. In spite of landlord control over local courts and police, they saw their power being eroded by the increasing

(1) James Allen, op. cit., 1985, p. 53, and Constantino and Constantino, op. cit., 1975, p. 384.

(2) Constantino and Constantino, op. cit., 1975, p. 384.

legitimacy given to peasant organizations by the Commonwealth Government.

The landed classes reacted by promoting their own organizations in opposition to the growing power of the peasantry. One such organization named White Stone (Batung Maputi) had as its purpose:

"resistance of peasant aggression by setting uniform practice in payments to tenants and by agreeing not to accept tenants who left landlords without reasonable cause." (1)

Another more militant group known as Soldiers of Peace (Kawal Sing Kapayapaan) was started by landlords to solicit votes for their candidates during elections. The primary purpose of the well-armed Kawals was to oppose the Socialist organizations.

Big business and landed families such as the Elizaldes and Sorianos organized their own Falange party to mobilize against progressive legislation and impose their own rule of law in the countryside. Arrests and shooting of tenants and union members became commonplace in rural areas. The result of this was a movement towards forms of collective activity on one side and the increasing use of private armies on the other.

4. JAPANESE OCCUPATION AND PEASANT MOBILIZATION

The failure of Quezon's social justice program and the worsening conditions of production in the countryside pushed the left and the peasantry towards more substantive forms of

(1) A. H. Scaff, The Philippine Answer to Communism, Stanford, 1955, p. 17.

resistance. In the late 1930's, Abad Santos called on the government to allow the peasantry to carry arms and organize in self-defence. While the government never acceded to Abad Santos' request, the peasantry did begin organizing guerilla units prior to the Japanese invasion. The class conflict that had intensified in the pre-war period became open class warfare during the Japanese occupation.

The destruction of the Commonwealth government by the Japanese and its replacement by a puppet government dramatically altered conditions of accumulation in the countryside. The landlords, up to now dependent on private armies with the backing of the Philippine Constabulary (the repressive arm of the state) to ensure conditions of accumulation, were forced to turn to the Japanese puppet government for support. This particular government possessed very little legitimacy, and was therefore incapable of effectively controlling the countryside.

The lack of state control in the countryside resulted largely from the activities of the Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa Hapon (People's Anti-Japanese Army) formed by the Communist Party in 1942. The guerilla army included the combined Communist and Socialist Party, a section of the Democrata Party, groups from the University of the Philippines and organizations of tenants and rural labourers.(1) Its program was to drive out the Japanese and democratize Philippine agriculture.

(1) Harlan R. Crippen, "Philippine Agrarian Unrest: Historical Backgrounds," Science and Society, Vol. X, No. 4, 1946, p. 359.

The principal source of Huk power was in the organized barrios of Central Luzon. In areas where pre-war peasant organizations were not established and the people well-politicized, the Huk organization was weak. In areas under Huk control, residents were given the chance to participate directly in self-government and able to achieve a more egalitarian distribution of the harvest. In Huk barrios, land-owners still received a portion of the harvest provided they were anti-Japanese; collaborators received nothing. According to Po, "landlords who evacuated to the towns and were collaborating with the Japanese lost their lands to peasants who unilaterally took them over." (1) In areas where landlords remained and supported the Huks, fixed rents in favour of the tenants were established.

The success of the Hukbalahap shocked not only the Japanese and the landed elite but the U.S. Army as well. Returning U.S. soldiers landed with orders to disarm the Huks. Leaders of the guerillas, including Luis Taruc and Juan Feleo were arrested upon "liberation" by American troops.

5. THE POST-WAR PERIOD: DEMOBILIZING THE PEASANTRY

Retention of the Philippines as an American neo-colony required handing over power to the old political elite. Following the war, the American colonial state in the form of the

(1) Blondie Po, "Rural Organizations and Rural Development: A Documentary Study, in Rural Organizations in the Philippines, ed. Marie S. Fernandez, Manila, 1980, p. 28.

Commonwealth government was re-established and pre-war productive relations restored. Landlords were encouraged to take control of the lands they had been forced to abandon and demand rent arrears from the peasants.(1)

In Central Luzon, the landlords faced an openly hostile peasantry well-organized into local Huk militias. They were supported by a state military apparatus that could only be described as ineffective, so they organized their own private gangs known as civilian guards to help reimpose their rule. The civilian guards, many of them former U.S.A.F.F.E. guerillas, were organized into groups such as the Republican Social Movement in Pampanga. The Republican Social movement was organized along the lines of the Falange in Spain. In an attempt to dissolve HUK domination in the countryside, a campaign of terror was launched by the returning landed classes.

The Central government, unable to effectively control the rural sector on its own, encouraged (and depended on)(2) these private armies. The armed gangs were supplemented by military and police units as local governors and mayors had more control over these groups than did the state and military leadership.(3) All over Central Luzon, Military Police and civilian guards

(1) Dieter-Evers, Modernization in South-East Asia, London, 1973, p. 208.

(2) Willem Wolters, Politics, Patronage and Class Conflict in Central Luzon, Manila, 1983, p. 16.

(3) Benedict Kerkvliet, Peasant Rebellion in the Philippines, University of Wisconsin, Ph.d. Thesis, 1972, p. 876.

raided Huk barrios, arresting and torturing suspected "lawless elements" and shooting others. On June 10, 1946, the Communist Party submitted a note to President Roxas charging that in the two months following the national elections of that year, police and paramilitary guards had killed more than five hundred peasants and peasant leaders and had jailed or tortured three times that number.(1)

Growing repression in the countryside was coupled with fading legitimacy for both the state and electoral system. A major point of contention concerned the 8 members of the Democratic Alliance (D.A.) who had been elected to congress.(2) All of the D.A. members who were elected had been denied their seats in Congress. This measure was taken to give Roxas' Liberal Party a majority of the seats, thus ensuring passage of the Parity Amendment.(3) At this point, it appeared that the state under the Roxas administration was willing to go to any length to

(1) Constantino, Renato and Constantino, Letizia R., The Philippines: The Continuing Quest, Manila, 1978, p.207.

(2) The Democratic Alliance was a popular front party which ran candidates in cooperation with the Nationalista Party; specifically, in areas of Central Luzon where the left was strong. One of those elected to congress on this ticket was Luis Taruc, a member of the Communist Party's Central Committee and Huk leader.

(3) The Parity Amendment was an amendment to the Bell Trade Act passed in 1946. This amendment gave parity rights to American citizens in the exploitation of natural resources and operation of public utilities. The Bell Trade Act in addition prolonged free trade until 1954, and placed Philippine tariff and peso currency under U.S. dictation.

ensure the domination of a particular group of interests at the expense of the peasantry.

5.1. Peasant Rebellion

Under these conditions of increasing repression, support for armed struggle grew throughout Central Luzon. In May of 1946, some 20 leaders of the C.P. gathered in Pampanga and decided to reassemble HUK squadrons and reconstitute the command structure of the Hukbalahap.⁽¹⁾ The foundations of the social formation (land-ownership) were threatened by the Huks as they decided to back their calls for agrarian reform with the armed strength of the peasantry. The HUK army was renamed the HMB (~~Hukbong Magpalaya ng Bayan~~, People's Liberation Army). The HMB's mass base consisted of about 500,000 peasants belonging to the PKM (~~Pambansang Kalsahan ng Magbubukid~~, National Peasants Union). The PKM was formed on June 5, 1945 as a continuation of the pre-war KPMP. In the early years of the war 1948-50, the HMB's superior organizational development provided it with the advantage. Initial government attempts to dislodge the HMB from Central Luzon proved unsuccessful, further fueling peasant resentment against the state.

In the early 1950's, however, the state began to get a firmer grip on the situation as the military apparatus, with American assistance, had been centralized and reinforced. Locally organized militias and armies were placed under the

(1) Constantino and Constantino, op. cit., p. 208.

direct command of the military. By 1950, operations against the Huks were carried out strictly by state military personnel. This centralization of military power in the hands of the state, however, in no way implied an erosion of the power of local elites. It only implied a recognition on their part that the central state is better able to coordinate and bear the costs of such functions.

The only point where it appeared that the local elite's influence on the state may have been waning was early in the struggle when the state appeared to be on the defensive. At this point, the state appeared willing to negotiate landlord privileges, entertaining land reform as a means of diffusing peasant unrest. By 1952, however, with the social crisis caused by the Huk uprising abating and the foundations of the social order no longer threatened, land reform was no longer considered practical.

In that year, the U.S. government released the Hardie report recommending the break-up of feudal estates. The Americans felt that:

"until remedied the land tenure system stands as an obstacle thwarting all efforts of the United States to foster the development of a stable and democratic country... Unless corrected it is easy to conceive of the situation worsening to a point where the United States would be forced to take direct, expensive, and arbitrary action to ensure against loss of the Philippines to the Communist bloc in Asia - and would still be faced with finding a solution to the underlying problem." (1)

(1) R. S. Hardie, Philippine Land Tenure Reform: Analysis and Recommendations, Manila, 1952, pp. 7-8, quoted in Rene Ofreneo, Capitalism in Philippine Agriculture, 1980, p. 35.

Reform of the system was viewed as being in America's long term interests. The report was not considered that radical by its authors as they simply recommended for the Philippines what had already been accomplished in Japan and Taiwan.

The problem in the case of the Philippines, according to the U.S. report, was that the elite, holding political and economic power based on land-ownership, undermine its own economic, social, and political position. Seen in this light, it is not surprising that the report was attacked vigorously by representatives of the landed elite in Congress. The following year, a report of the Special House Committee on un-Filipino Activities attacked the report as being communist-inspired.⁽¹⁾

By 1954, when Magsaysay assumed office, the Americans had done away with the more radical features of the report. It appears that, as in the early period of American rule, a decision was made not to liquidate feudalism, in order to preserve a political alliance with the native landed elite. The decision was facilitated by the fact that any threat posed by the Huk rebellion had already receded.

The hardline position against land reform taken by the Philippine government was possible only as a result of an American-assisted counter-insurgency campaign which had helped to "stabilize" the rural situation. The counter-insurgency campaign began with the rise of Ramon Magsaysay to the position of Defence

(1) Ofreneo, op. cit., p. 368

Minister in 1950. His appointment is viewed by Constantino as a new level of American interference in Philippine affairs. Magsaysay was a product of the CIA and was accepted by Quirino only to gain American military Aid for the campaign against the HMB.

This aspect of his appointment was very successful as U.S. aid flowed into the Philippines following his appointment. From 1951-56, U.S. aid totalled \$500 million; \$38 million in economic assistance and \$117 million in military aid.⁽¹⁾ During this period, American aid provided roughly half the funds designated for agrarian projects in the government's counter-insurgency campaign.

The agrarian projects included extension services, cash credits, new bridges and roads as well as irrigation canals. These projects, coupled with an Agricultural Tenancy Act (1954), the establishment of a Court of Agrarian Relations and a new Land Reform Act (1955), formed the substance of a major propaganda campaign designed to win the hearts and minds of the rural masses. The impact of these reforms, however, were once again minimal as the substance of the reforms was removed before they could be implemented.

The Share Tenancy Act was supposed to reduce land rentals and prohibit ejections but it contained so many loopholes that it proved ineffective. The Land Reform Act was amended by Congress

(1) Kerkvliet, The HUK Rebellion: A Study of Peasant Revolt in the Philippines, 1977, p.244.

to exempt all estates under 300 contiguous hectares from reform. While these acts did little to reform productive relations or provide land to the landless, they were sufficient to improve the image of the state and thus weaken the HMB.

The real achievement of Magsaysay then was the mitigation of peasant unrest by building up the illusion that at long last the people had a government which was responsive to their needs. Complementing the rural development projects was the successful election campaign of 1953. This election, in which Magsaysay defeated Quirino for the presidency, had improved the government's image because: first, the corrupt Liberal regime had been replaced and second, compared to the widespread fraud and violence of the 1945 and 1949 campaigns, this election was relatively peaceful and honest. The success of this election came as a result of the supervision of NAMFREL, a CIA-sponsored group set up to ensure honest and open elections. The clean election provided new hope among the peasantry that the existing political system would provide them with a vehicle for participation.

A final reason for the success of the counter-insurgency campaign was the general war weariness of the peasantry.

Kerkvliet points out that supporting the thousands of HMB became a serious economic strain for the peasantry of Central Luzon. It was the combination of these factors which produced military reverses for the peasant army as mass support began to dwindle. By 1953, few new peasants were joining the Huks to replace those

killed in battle and by 1955-56, the once powerful army had been reduced to a few isolated bahdit units.(1)

The defeat of the HMB effectively ended a trend that had started in the early 1920's towards increasing peasant power and political participation. The organized mass movement of the peasantry manifested in the PKP which had developed in the late 1930's and grown through the war had become a powerful voice for the peasantry. It had forced the state to address the problems of the peasantry and though it is clear that this did not bring any substantive reforms for the peasants, state action was definitely tempered by the strength of the peasantry. Thus, the defeat of HMB was a tremendous setback for the peasantry as it effectively destroyed the unified organizational structure which had been set up.

(1) The Huks continued to operate as the guerilla army of the PKP in small units in Pampanga province until 1973 when they surrendered to the Martial Law government.

5.2. Peasant Organizing Under Marcos

In place of the HMB, the state attempted to erect their own organizational structures in the rural sector. One example was the attempt to organize the rural sector through the Presidential Assistant for Community Development (PACD). This CIA-financed program trained some 7,000 PACD fieldworkers in order to penetrate the rural sector.(1) The purpose of this program was to organize at the local level, and transfer control of the barrios from local political bosses to the fieldworkers' own chosen leaders, thus taking control of these basic units of Filipino society without the peasants or political bosses realizing what was happening.(2) In the process of assisting the barrio through PACD self-help projects, the fieldworkers would select candidates for barrio leader and then maneuver for their election.

The PACD was also mandated to bring in local control over community development projects through barrio councils. However, before any development programs could be implemented, they had to pass through a highly centralized bureaucratic structure. The central office in charge would approve resolutions in accordance with its own priorities. These priorities would often be coloured by political considerations, so aid would be extended only when it served the interests of politicians concerned.

(1) Constantino and Constantino, op. cit., 1978, p. 266.

(2) J.B. Smith, Portrait of a Cold Warrior, New York, G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1976, pp. 273-274.

The structure of the PACD program thus provided a clear example of attempts by the state, with assistance from the CIA, to promote counter-insurgency. Implemented under the guise of decentralization and local participation, the program provided a structure for furthering state control at the barrio level. The program proved to be an effective measure as the nature of its organization and leadership recruiting patterns precluded it from being utilized to further the interests of rural workers and peasants.

A second institutional actor in the counter-insurgency program was the church which helped organize the Federation of Free Farmers (FFF). The FFF was founded in 1953, following the suppression of the Huks, by a group of Catholic laymen headed by Jeremias Montemayor.⁽¹⁾ The FFF was organized specifically to fill the gap left by the defeat of the Huks and to prevent the reorganization of the Left in the countryside.

5.3--Post-Huk Reforms

The virtual elimination of the Huk problem in the late 1950's left the government with little incentive to follow up their reform program. Without genuine peasant organizations to articulate demands and defend their rights, the peasants were left at the mercy of the state. The 1955 Land Reform Bill was

(1) Blondie Po, "Rural Organizations and Rural Development: A Documentary Study", in Rural Organizations in the Philippines, IPC, 1980, p. 3. Po notes that Montemayor at the time of the FFF's founding was related to 3/4ths of the land-owning class in Pangasinan province.

hardly implemented because of landlord resistance. The only areas where land appropriations did progress were those where peasant unrest had been considerable.

Similar problems were evident in the second Land Reform Code of 1963. While its reduced 75-hectare retention limit did appear as a progressive measure, its half-hearted implementation, however, reduced it to a paper tiger. As a comment on the success of these early land reform packages, a Filipino legislator noted in 1971 that it would take 1,300 years before all tenants would be converted to owner-operators at the speed they were progressing.(1)

2.4 Crisis of Production

The existing relations of production within the food crop sector acted as a barrier to both political participation and to raising productivity. The tenant-farmers were too poor to invest in higher technology. In 1960, the number of tenant-farmers covered 50 percent of all agricultural land. The relations of production in the agricultural sector thus proved to be a significant barrier to raising productivity, and as tenancy rates increased, productivity not only stagnated but was eroding. Through the mid-1960's, output per unit of land, per unit of machinery, and working animal were much lower than in 1948.(2)

(1) Jose A. Laurel, Report on the Philippine Economy, Manila, Lyceum Press, 1971, p. 41.

(2) Hooley and Ruttan, 1969, cited in Blondie Po, op. cit.

The most significant effect of the crisis was a growing food bill in the form of food imports.⁽¹⁾ The increases in food imports tended to drive up the price of all commodities including labour.

The problem of deteriorating productivity was compounded by another problem: the exhaustion of the land frontier. The exhaustion of the land frontier, coupled with low productivity, created other problems such as stagnation in agricultural employment during the 1960's. In 1971, the number of people employed in agriculture was 6.4 million, virtually the same number as in 1960. The growing crisis had adverse effects for Philippine capitalism in general and this resulted in increasing state intervention to offset the crisis.

While the state made no serious attempts to alter the relations of production between landlord and tenant, it did become a central actor in initiatives to increase productivity. The attempts to raise productivity focused on the introduction of High Yield Varieties of Rice (HYV's) after 1966. The introduction of HYV's provided the impetus for the integration of the food crop sector into the Agribusiness system.

Up until the mid-1960's, the market for farm inputs had been restricted to the more capital-intensive cash crop sector. The only areas where commercial inputs were being used in rice production was in Central Luzon and near Iloilo in the Visayas.

(1) Rigoberto D. Tiglao, "Tenancy in an Underdeveloped Capitalism" in Feudalism and Capitalism in the Philippines, ed. Renato Constantino, Manila, 1982, p. 58.

In Central Luzon, inputs had been introduced at give-away prices during the counter-insurgency campaigns of the early 1950's.

These early attempts to promote the use of fertilizers resulted in only limited success. Even after 1966, the adoption of modern inputs was generally slow among tenant-farmers. One reason to account for this was cost. In one area of Central Luzon, material costs per hectare rose from \$90 to \$195 with the adoption of HYV's.(1) The transformation to a new technology thus required much greater capital input and for the tenant-farmer, deprived of institutional credit due to a lack of collateral, this meant greater indebtedness to the landlord. There was credit available to tenant-farmers through the Agricultural Credit Administration (ACA), but these loans were concentrated in Central Luzon as an extension of the counter-insurgency campaign.(2)

3.5. Independent Organizations Re-emerge (1964-72)

The concentration of government services in the Central Luzon provinces can in part be attributed to the re-emergence of peasant organizations. In 1964, the Malayang Samahang Magkasaka (MASAKA, Free Farmers Union) was founded as a mass organization

(1) Ronald A. MacIntosh, Land Reform and Rural Development: Experience and Prospects in Central Luzon, 1980, p.146.

(2) In Nueva Ecija, one province of Central Luzon where insurgency problems were serious, more than 18 per cent of ACA loans were disbursed. Cited in Brewster Grace, "Food and Small Farm Strategies in the Philippines" in Political Investments in Food Production, (eds.) Huddleston and McLin, 1979, p. 85.

of the Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP). The organization was formed from a regrouping of old PKM members who were released from prison about this time.

Within a few months of its creation, it established itself in 13 provinces of Central Luzon.(1) Most members of the FFF in Central Luzon soon shifted to MASAKA as the FFF in these provinces was made up largely of former PKM members. By 1968, the organization counted 68,000 members in Central Luzon.(2)

While MASAKA did engage in political activities, such as demonstrations for the implementation of the land reform code, it was largely unsuccessful at politicizing its members. For this reason, the union operated mainly as a pressure group. Like most rural organizations since the Huk rebellion, it became identified in the eyes of its members as a link between the peasantry and the state. As a pressure group, it was quite successful in obtaining the support of government agencies for its members. The organization came to rely on government structures relating to irrigation services, credit and cooperatives. In order to deliver these services, MASAKA would activate its membership to deliver votes for local and national candidates endorsed by the MASAKA leadership.

So despite promising beginnings, the organization deteriorated into just another fixture in the wheel of patronage politics. It was this characteristic which probably extended its

(1) *Por op. cit.*, p. 55.

(2) *Por op. cit.*, p. 66.

lifespan up to the declaration of martial law in September, 1972 as the Philippine state had shown a habitual intolerance for radical organizations. Even without impetus from the state, the organization began to fall apart of its own accord. In the 1970's, more radical chapters in Tarlac and Pampanga seceded from the organization. This split reflected a major schism within the ranks of PKP which had led to the formation of the re-established Communist Party of the Philippines.

The organization of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) in 1968 reflected a resurgent radicalism within the agrarian sector. The fact that this development did not occur until some fifteen years after the last serious challenge from the rural sector is indicative of the success of the state's counter-insurgency programs. To reiterate this fact, it should be noted that when martial law was declared, only two major peasant organizations existed; the FFF and the PKP's MASAKA. And of the two, the Federation of Free Farmers was the more radical one. In the years following the Huk rebellion, the state managed to both forestall the reorganization of the peasantry into an effective political force and avoided implementing any program aimed at restructuring productive relations in the rural sector.

9. Conclusion

The history of state intervention in the rural sector demonstrates how class relations have translated into a particular form of political domination by the landed elite of

Philippine society. Under the Spanish, commercial agriculture started to develop, and a land-owning elite was established. American colonialism reinforced the political and economic power of this class, allowing this class to consolidate and expand their property holdings. The result was a growing class of tenant-farmers. The long history of colonial rule has given rise to a particular form of the state which has precluded any meaningful participation by these rural producers.

With the gradual transformation from colony to neo-colony, the land-owning elite stepped in to replace the Americans and utilize the state structure to further their own interests. The elements of the state structure such as the courts and police, were utilized to circumvent the growing agrarian crisis under the Commonwealth government. The very nature of the agrarian system evident in the increasing polarization of land-ownership meant that the constant intervention of the state was required to blunt the aspirations of the rural population. The nature of the state under these conditions of heightened intervention was one of increasing repression.

The state would tolerate rural organizations only when they were not perceived as a threat to the status quo. In spite of these conditions, rural organizations did emerge in response to the changing conditions in the countryside. These organizations articulated peasant demands for better conditions in the tenant farms and plantations. At the local and state level, these demands were usually met with repression. Even under the special

conditions of the popular front, the legitimate representatives of the peasantry were excluded.

The repression of the peasantry continued into the post-war period. When peasant leaders were elected to seats in congress, the rules were altered to unseat them and protect the interests of the landowners. In spite of set-backs such as these, the war had provided the peasantry with the organizational capacity to exercise an increasing amount of control over the countryside. The war had given the peasantry the opportunity to develop a powerful military force of its own. With the Huk army, representatives of the peasantry were able to make demands upon the state for a more equitable settlement of the agrarian problem in the post-war period.

The particular nature of the state, however, made it incapable of reorganizing the rural sector as it nakedly represented the interests of the landed class. Its only alternative was to destroy the peasant army in a war of attrition and this is precisely what it did. The civil war signalled both the state's intolerance for militant peasant organizations and its own inability to negotiate the "agrarian question."

The eventual defeat of the HMB signalled the end of any independent initiatives on the part of the peasantry to fight for the restructuring of productive relations in the rural sector. In the post-Huk era, there were few attempts to deal with the longstanding grievances of the peasantry. In the absence of militant organization to articulate peasant demands, the state

was able to offer palliatives such as land reform programs which were never carried out. Instead of dealing with problems of land tenure, state concerns instead came to focus on productivity.

Another concern of the state was the setting up of their own groups, following the destruction of effective peasant organizations with the defeat of the HMB in 1954. State officials realized that if left to the peasantry, rural organizations would become radicalized. As a result, the state, with help from the CIA, set up the Presidential Assistant for Community Development (PACD) and supported the creation of the Federation of Free Farmers. The attempt by the state to organize the rural sector demonstrates the inability of the state to promote genuine participation. The PACD was organized specifically to support the state and was given little local autonomy and was thus incapable of articulating peasant demands.

These events point out the contradictions involved in the Philippine state engaging in both rural development and rural organizing. While martial law would alter the relationship of the land-owning class to the state, the state would still set the agenda for rural development and create it in its own image. This would quite obviously have very little to do with the aspirations of the rural people.

Clearly the lack of participation under martial law must be seen in the context of Philippine history. In this context, it can be viewed only as a legacy of the past, a history in which the state has been used almost continuously to protect the

interests of the landed class. The only difference under martial law is that the landed bourgeoisie had been edged out of their prominent position within the state. The institution now represents the interests of a different form of capital.

CHAPTER IV

7

MARTIAL LAW DEVELOPMENT: CENTRALIZED PARTICIPATION

It was noted in the last chapter that martial law represented a profound restructuring of the state. The declaration of martial law appeared to offer new opportunities for peasant participation in political and economic life. The landed elite who had effectively dominated the state since the early American period appear to have been edged from power in one sweeping blow. The Presidential ~~coup d'etat~~ paved the way for the revamping of the state's role in society. The restructuring was reflective of the ascendancy of a new power group, representing an export-oriented development program designed by the World Bank.

One of the manifestations of this new orientation law was the implementation of an aggressive agrarian reform package. The package served two major objectives of the government. First, it served to modernize the Philippine economy and thereby integrated it more firmly into the world system. At the same time, it was utilized by the government as a counter-insurgency measure. These objectives were to be achieved through intervention in the relations of production and by transforming the political organization of local communities.

The reform package was marketed to the local population as a means of ameliorating conditions of poverty in the rural sector. While it was initially successful at modernizing the process of production in the rural sector, it ultimately failed to quell dissent. The program's failure resulted from the fact that, instead of improving incomes and broadening participation, it

aggravated inequality and attempted to suppress local control of rural organizations.

The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the effects that these changes wrought on organizations in the rural sector, examining the possibilities and limits to participation within rural organizations under martial law. For this purpose, the chapter will be divided into two sections. The first section will deal with the emergence of martial law looking at its causes and characteristics and the second will focus on state intervention in the rural sector, examining specifically the Samahang Nasyon program.

1. EMERGENCE OF MARTIAL LAW

The emergence of the martial law state was the product of a number of factors produced by the contradictions inherent in the peripheral nature of the Philippine social formation. One key factor was the conflict within the bourgeoisie. This conflict divided the bourgeoisie into three camps: the representatives of transnational capital, the landed oligarchy, and the national industrial bourgeoisie. Another factor was the growing challenge from below in the form of a strong nationalist movement linked to progressive elements of the national bourgeoisie and a resurgent guerilla movement in the countryside.

The Martial Law state which emerged in the Philippines bore a resemblance to Bonapartism in achieving a degree of relative autonomy from the competing factions of the bourgeoisie through

the support of the military. This was a direct result of the paralysis of the state machine due to the intense contradictions within the ruling class. This period saw the state faced with a crisis typical of its dependent capitalist semi-feudal nature. The manifestations of this crisis were mounting inflation rates, increasing balance-of-payments deficits, growing unemployment and poverty, and struggles for the distribution of the social product.(1)

1.1 Divisions in the Economic Elite

As this crisis evolved, the state was unable to perform its task of guaranteeing conditions of accumulation in the industrial sector, as it could not extricate itself from the control of the land-owning oligarchy.(2) The oligarchy were interested in the state primarily for political-military protection and little else. The fact that the Philippines had one of the lowest tax rates in the world left it with the resources to do little more.

(1) Rolf Hanisch, 'Decision-Making Processes and Problems of Implementation of the Land Reform in the Philippines' "Asia Quarterly", 1977, No.4, p.310.

(2) According to David Wurfel, the landed oligarchy consists of 14 families who held more than 4,000 hectares of agricultural land and an additional 70 families who held more than 2,000 hectares. This list excluded the Aquino-Cojuangco, Ledesma, Locsin, Lopez, Madrigal, Montelibano, and Padilla families who, in addition to owning more than 4,000 hectares of land, held interests in two or more dominant corporations, as well as positions within the political elite. See: Wurfel, "The Changing Relationship Between Political and Economic Elites in the Philippines" in Poverty and Social Change in Southeast Asia, ed. Ozay Mehmet, Ottawa, 1979, pp. 156-158.

In addition, the local influence of the land-owning elite restricted the ability of the state to engage in rural development projects, to prevent conflicts between capital and labour or resolve them by means other than overt repression, or even to ensure the rule of law in general. (1)

Within the state, the representatives of the landed elite were opposed by elements of the national bourgeoisie. The national bourgeoisie had developed in the early 1950's as the result of exchange controls enacted to counter a balance-of-payments crisis. The policy of controls facilitated import substitution industrialization. In the first four years of the program (1950-54), more than 5,000 industrial operations were established. With import substitution, a class of Filipino capitalists and workers developed whose common interests placed them in opposition to export industries and foreign capital.

The land-owning oligarchy was not faced with a united front, however, as the particular political economy of the Philippines produced divisions within the business community as well. The division within the national bourgeoisie was largely the product of two IMF dictated decontrol (anti-tariff) and devaluation moves in 1962 and 1970. (2) In the two years following the institution of the first set of controls, an estimated 1,500 businesses were

(1) Hanisch, op. cit., p. 310.

(2) Robert B. Stauffer, "The Political Economy of Refeudalization" in Marcos and Martial Law in the Philippines, ed. D. A. Rosenberg, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, 1979, p. 193.

driven into bankruptcy.(1) These moves shifted benefits to the export-sector and at the same time, had highly destructive effects on the fledgling manufacturing sector.

Stauffer reports that the most dramatic effect of these changes was the movement of some entrepreneurs into the nationalist camp, supporting the more radical wing of the movement.(2) One of the more notable backers of the nationalist camp was the family of Philippine Vice-President in the period 1965-1972, Fernando Lopez. The Manila Chronicle, owned by the Lopez family, "embodied the temperament, spirit, and values of nationalistic entrepreneurialism."(3) Lichauco notes that the Manila Times and its sister paper, the Daily Mirror, had also shown concern over the problem of imperialism in the Philippines. According to Wurfel, these economic nationalists in the media encouraged economic nationalists in the business sector.(4)

The ideology of the national industrialists took the form of a bourgeois critique of U.S. imperialism.(5) This radical faction of the bourgeoisie believed that its progress was blocked

(1) BeTlo et. al., op. cit., p. 132.

(2) Stauffer, op. cit., p. 193.

(3) Lichauco, The Lichauco Papers: Imperialism in the Philippines, Monthly Review Press, New York, 1973, p. 80.

(4) Wurfel, op. cit., p. 146.

(5) The position of the nationalist bourgeoisie is outlined by the former President of the Philippine Petroleum Association, Alejandro Lichauco, in "The Lichauco Paper," a position paper submitted to the Constitutional Convention's Committee on the Declaration of Principles and Ideology.

by the Americans and pressed for their exclusion from Philippine economic life. Within the state, the representatives of this group favored greater protection of domestic capital. This put them in conflict with groups who believed economic development could be achieved through heavy reliance on external loans, combined with dependent industrialization for export.

The groups heavily allied with foreign capital and favouring the internationalization of the economy were the export bloc and the merchant communities; these sectors having been the primary beneficiaries of the nation's agro-merchandising economy. The interests of these groups were promoted by the Philippine Association. The association was controlled by a number of powerful inter-related families, which included the Sorianos, the Zobel, the Ayalas, the Roxases, and the Ortigas.⁽¹⁾ Through the Association and political representatives, such as Senate President Gil Puyat and Philippine President Ferdinand E. Marcos, this fraction of the elite attempted to influence legislation in opposition to the economic nationalists.

The nationalist camp appeared to be making significant gains in this internecine battle prior to the declaration of martial law. One example of this progress was a 1971 vote of the Constitutional Convention Committee on the Declaration of Principles and Ideology. The Committee voted that the new

(1) Lichauco, op. cit., p. 79. Note three of the families named here were listed by Wurfel (1979) as belonging to the Sycratic-Elite, composed of families controlling two or more dominant corporations and holding more than 2,000 hectares of agricultural land.

constitution contain a mandatory requirement for the government and people to "resist and repel imperialism".(1) This was followed in 1972 by the traditionally conservative Supreme Court's decisions which were unfavourable to foreign, in particular, American capital. That year, the Quasha decision ruled that private lands acquired by U.S. citizens and corporations since 1945 had been acquired illegally and was subject to forced sale or seizure by 1974.(2) This measure was indicative of the growing influence of that section of the bourgeoisie allied with the nationalist movement. The effect of this ruling was to accelerate divestment of foreign interests. At the height of social turmoil, between 1970 and 1973, foreign investment declined by \$55 million.

The problems inherent in this conflict were summed up by Vince Paterno, head of the Board of Investment. He states:

"Although in the past, there have been expressions of the desire to attract investment, these were negated by other statements in Congress and the Constitutional Convention proposing...to impose further restriction on foreign investment.(3)

It appears that the neo-colonial state was attempting to reproduce conditions for capital accumulation, which required opening up the economy to foreign capital. In contrast, a powerful faction of the national bourgeoisie attempted to extend

(1) Paul M. Sweezy and Harry Magdoff, Introduction to "The Lichauro Paper," op cit, 1973, pp. x-xi.

(2) Bello et. al., op. cit., p. 20.

(3) Bello, op. cit., p. 17.

its short-term interests by controlling foreign investment. This conflict ensured that no cohesive policy could emerge from the state.

As the elite divided over the nation's economic future, a radical nationalist political force emerged in the form of the student movement. Its influence was evident in the series of increasingly militant demonstrations known as the First Quarter Storm. This nationalist movement emerged from conditions of rising unemployment and falling incomes, products of stagnating industrial and agricultural sectors.

The emergence of the radical nationalist movement, combined with an emerging guerilla threat in the rural areas, showed that the government's ability to co-opt, fragment and diffuse mass demands was once again breaking down. As in the past, when the foundations of the social and economic order were threatened, the state increasingly resorted to violence. Growing state repression was evident in both government troops firing on crowds of demonstrators (May Day Massacre, First and Second Plaza Miranda Massacres, [1971]), (1) and the suspension of the writ of Habeas Corpus. Under increasing pressure from polarizing class and national popular forces, the "democratic form of the state" began to dissolve.

On September 21, 1972, this dissolution became complete with the declaration of martial law, suspension of civil

(1) Amado Guerrero, Philippine Society and Revolution, 1970, p. 57.

liberties and abolition of the Senate Congress, political parties, free press and all other trappings of a bourgeoisie democracy. The emergence of a new form of state within the Philippine social formation, the Authoritarian State, was produced by the contradictions existing within the state prior to martial law. The actions of various classes struggling in response to the crisis affecting the Philippines were primarily responsible for the evolution of an authoritarian state. The declaration of martial law was a consequence of both the class contradictions within the state and pressures from outside it.

At its declaration, martial law was hailed by the business sector, the church, the middle class and peasantry as the cure to the contradictions which threatened to pull the nation apart. One statement of support from the church issued by Cardinal Rufino Santos said:

"the establishment of a new society in our beloved country, as envisioned by the imposition of martial law, should be hailed by every peace-loving citizen". (1)

Martial law allowed the state to disarm private armies, re-establish the rule of law, and implement more consistent economic policies which provided incentives for attracting foreign investment.

In its economic policies, the regime represented a rising new class intimately linked to transnational (monopoly) capital. This change of guard had serious consequences for the rural

(1) Bolasco and Yu, The Church and State, St. Scholasticas, Manila, 1980. p. 98.

sector. It resulted in a transformation of agrarian policy and the role of the peasantry in the process of rural development.

Under the control of the landed classes, state policy focused mainly on counter-insurgency and creating the illusion that something was being done to improve relations of production in that sector. The martial law regime, however, sought a new role for the state in the rural sector; that of "propelling the development of pre-capitalist sections of the periphery into the more advanced neo-colonial capitalist mode."⁽¹⁾ From the state's perspective, the solution to the contradictions in the countryside required the restructuring of an increasingly inadequate mode of production. The state viewed its own role in this process as active, the impetus for change emanating from within the state itself, unlike in the past when the main force for social change had been the peasantry.

The peasantry was to serve a dual role under the new regime. They were to be both active agents in the process of modernization and at the same time be mobilized as a major sector of support for the regime. To ensure the peasantry could be mobilized in support of the regime, the state sought to silence criticism from the rural sector. The justification for Martial law had been to counter an alleged threat of revolution by communist groups in the countryside. Thus martial law provided an opportunity for the government to sanitize the rural sector of

(1) Arthur L. Magno, Developmentalism and the New Society: the Repressive Ideology of Underdevelopment, 1983, p.5.

independent voices and organizations. The government imprisoned some of the leaders of the largest peasant unions, including MASAKA and the Federation of Free Farmers, and outlawed groups concerned with peasant interests such as the Khi Rho Movement.(1)

The only group to survive this witch hunt was the Federation of Free Farmers, but only after a purge of the more radical officials and members at the local level. Hanisch notes that the cleansing of the FFF was in part a victory for its long time leader Montemayor, putting him in a position to declare his uncritical acclamation of the martial law regime.(2). After Montemayor's leadership was confirmed, the Federation moved increasingly toward activities which were supportive of the state such as providing peasant seminars explaining the aims of martial law.(3)

The state outlawed all other independent peasant unions and denied peasants and rural labourers the right to strike or demonstrate. This action suppressed the drive for rural reform which had been generated by peasant organizations and militant activism. Martial law effectively denied peasants what few avenues they had to speak for themselves and fight for change.

In place of the peasant unions, government organizations such as the Filipino Federation of Land Reformers and the Filipino Agrarian Movement (FARM) were formed. The situation

(1) Hanisch, op. cit., p. 317.

(2) Hanisch, op. cit., p. 318.

(3) Hanisch, op. cit., p. 319.

appeared to be a repetition of the early 1950's, when the old structures and organizations of the peasantry were destroyed and replaced by state-controlled enterprises. Through these new structures, the peasantry could be controlled and utilized as agents of both modernization and regime support.

Under the New Society, political support of the rural masses was to be delivered through citizens' assemblies called *barangays*. The purpose of the *barangay* was outlined in Presidential Decree 86 issued in December 1972. These assemblies were to:

"broaden the base of citizens' participation in the democratic process and to afford ample opportunities for the citizenry to express their views on important National issues." (1)

The decree seemed to be aimed at greater democratization of Philippine society. In reality, however, the type of expression allowed by these assemblies was simple ratification of referendums called by the President. This was evident in the ratification of the new constitution through the *barangay* assemblies. In January of 1973, voting through a public show of hands registered a 97 percent "yes" vote. (2) This tactic was used in February of the same year to make all formerly elected offices appointed and again in July to ratify the continuation of

(1) Presidential Decree No. 86, Malacanang Palace, Manila, Philippines, December, 1972.

(2) Glondie Po, op. cit., p. 74.

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MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS
STANDARD REFERENCE MATERIAL 1010a
(ANSI and ISO TEST CHART No. 2)

martial law.(1) While the barangays served other functions such as promoting community activities --e.g., beautification projects and backyard planting in conjunction with the green revolution, it was used primarily as a structure for the mobilization of the rural population in support of the regime.

2. AGRARIAN REFORM UNDER MARTIAL LAW

The support of the peasantry was to be garnered through a rural reform program. The reform package, introduced immediately after the declaration of martial law, served to legitimize the new regime and generate support among the peasantry. The reforms focused on areas producing rice and corn, primarily because agrarian unrest had been so persistent in these areas. The package included provisions for Land Reform, a credit extension program and, most importantly, a national cooperative scheme called Samahang Nayon. Since the cooperative program was part of a comprehensive government initiative aimed at modernizing the agricultural sector, it will be examined within this context.

(1) This author was present in 1977 at a vote ratifying the continuation of martial law and satisfaction with President Marcos. Surprisingly, the day before the ratification, the President was able to predict to the percent just how much support he would get, somewhere in the neighbourhood of 90 percent.

2.1--Operation-Land-Transfer

The land reform program was the most important element of the government's rural reform package. The reform package itself represented an intensification of efforts aimed at raising productivity in the faltering food crop sector. The role that land reform would play in this process was outlined by President Marcos in his 'Notes on the New Society'. Here he states:

"The idea that a tenant can produce more by the application of new technology is indeed a spur for increased effort, but the system of sharecropping serves at the same time as a likely deterrent. On the other hand, elimination of the pattern of inequalities, the raising of the individual farmer to a sense of status and dignity through ownership of the land he tills, is indeed a magical wand for change and lays the foundation for a healthier and more productive attitude toward work in the rural sector.

The motivation to produce more, to tend to the crops more diligently, keep irrigation canals in good repair, choose the right HYV seed, eliminate pests and the many varied tedious tasks of farming is thus raised to a very personalized degree."(1)

The reform package was clearly oriented towards creating a market for farm inputs among tenant-farmers, in effect integrating them into a market economy. The government believed that if these producers were to become owners, they would have a vested interest in raising productivity and adopting modern farm practices. In effect, these new owners would become a Kulak class and act as a barrier to the radicalization of the countryside.

(1) F.E. Marcos, Notes on the New Society of the Philippines-II, Manila, 1976, p. 106.

Initially, the land reform was announced as being universal in nature. Universality, however, by 1973, it collapsed under pressure from the export sector and landowners. The first exemption included all cash crops (4.1 million hectares) which was about 40 percent of the nation's arable land. Kerkvliet reports that this was a major concession to some of the largest land-owners and most wealthy families, as half of the country's approximately 500 millionaires were sugar planters.(1) Indeed due to the emphasis on export crops in the New Society, the sugar barons continued to occupy a prominent place in Philippine society.

The second major exemption was a seven-hectare-retention limit for land-owners which excluded 57 percent of all tenants from the reform. These exemptions make it clear that even though the landed elite had been edged from the center of state power, they still acted as a very powerful interest group. As a result of their efforts, some of the poorest sharecroppers and the landless proletariat in the export sector were excluded from the reform program. In the end, the total land transfer was directed at 393,778 tenants tilling 759,015 hectares of land.(2) This

(1) B.J. Kerkvliet, Land Reform in the Philippines Since the Marcos Coup, Pacific Affairs, Vol. 47, No. 3, p. 296. Cited in F. Sionil Jose, "Memo to the United States Congress," Solidarity, Manila, 6 (May, 1971), p. 4.

(2) Rene Ofreneo, Capitalism in Philippine Agriculture, 1980, pp. 63-64.

included about 20 percent of tenanted rice and corn lands and about 17.1 percent of all landlords.(1)

2.2--Masagana 99

A companion program to the land reform more directly tied to raising productivity was the Masagana 99 program. Its purpose was to promote the adoption of modern farm practices (buying of inputs) through the extension of production credit. The program consisted of low interest loans tied to the use of high yield varieties of rice, fertilizers, pesticides and herbicides. It was hoped that through this nationwide credit scheme, the small farmer would be able to make the jump to Green Revolution Technology.

The two programs provided the structural and technical reforms desired by the state to bring about the modernization of the agricultural system. The only thing lacking was the proper mechanism to ensure that equity improvement would result from these programs. Any agricultural modernization program needs to be buttressed by appropriate institutional re-organization and this was to be provided by the final element of the reform legislation, Samahang Nayon.

2.3--Samahang Nayon

While it has been reported that government-created peasant organizations survived under martial law, the implementation of

(1) Ofreneo, op. cit., p. 65.

its reform package required an organization of national scope. This need was a major motivation behind the creation of the ~~Samahang~~ Nayon program, a nationwide cooperative scheme.

The program was designed primarily to provide institutional infrastructure for the state in the rural sector. Its purpose was to assist with the transfer of land titles to the cultivator and to provide agricultural extension services, such as access to credit, and instruction in the use of high yield varieties of rice. In this role, it served as a mechanism to supervise forced savings that would pay for the land reform program. The land was not being given to the peasants. They had to pay for it at "fair market value." The ~~Samahang~~ Nayon was thus intended to provide the institutional framework for the restructuring of both productive relations and the process of production in the rural sector.

In order to understand how the cooperative structure was utilized to implement state development strategies, it is necessary to examine the design and functioning of the program. The Presidential Decree which established the intention of the government to promote cooperatives appears to favour local democratic control of the organization. Claiming:

"Each member can only cast one vote in deciding upon the affairs of the cooperative. The affairs of the cooperative shall be administered by persons elected or appointed in a manner agreed by the members and accountable to them." (1)

(1) F.E. Marcos, Presidential Decree No. 175, Section 3, Part b, April 14, 1973.

These good intentions were later contradicted by instructions in the same decree which left control of the structure to a government department. Here it was stated that:

"The Department of Local Government and Community Development through the Bureau of Cooperatives Development is vested with full authority to promulgate rules and regulations to govern the promotion, organization, registration, regulation, and supervision of all types of cooperatives."(1)

This type of structure provided for no local autonomy or grassroots initiatives and was not conducive to the type of "democratic control" described earlier by Marcos.

From the state's initial efforts to create rural cooperatives through Samahang Nasyon, the program appears to be a textbook illustration of the top-down approach. Councils set up under Presidential Decree 175 to control finances and training programs for cooperative leaders were manned by high level bureaucrats from the Central Bank, Philippine National Bank, and Department of Agrarian Reform.(2) Peasant participation in this process was non-existent as the government created an organization through which they could tell villagers what to do.

The program itself had two basic stages, the Samahang Nasyon or pre-cooperative which would provide a basis for the next stage, Kilusang Baysan (full cooperatives). The S.N.'s were to be organized in each of the country's 55,000 bacios. They would be transformed into Kilusang Baysan and provide a basis for the

(1) Presidential Decree No. 175, Section 8, op. cit.

(2) Kerkvliet, Land Reform in the Philippines, p. 294.

formation of 40 Cooperative Rural Banks and 60 Area Marketing Cooperatives. The whole structure was the brainchild of the Department of Local Government and Community Development.

Before the transition to full cooperatives, the S.N. was to fulfill a number of functions. To complement the Land Reform program, the S.N. was designed to both facilitate the transfer of land and provide a means for guaranteeing the land amortization payments of defaulting members. These functions were enhanced in significance by the fact they were used as a means of coercion to get members to join. Under Presidential Decree 27, membership in an S.N. was essential if an individual hoped to benefit from Operation Land Transfer. Utilizing the cooperatives as agents of land distribution served two functions for the government; it provided for the needed incentive for small farmers to join the S.N. and it provided a guarantee of payment for land as it was not being distributed to the tenants for free.

According to the program designer, Dr. Orlando Sacay, the Samahang Nayon was to fulfill other more basic functions as well. He conceptualized the 'pre-cooperative' as an educational stage in which "the S.N. members will do nothing but learn, save and practice discipline."⁽¹⁾ The stress on education complemented the government's definition of the rural problem as being one of the individual rather than structural. The premise was that previous programs had failed because the farmers had not run them properly.

(1) Gelia T. Castillo, How Participatory is Participatory Development? Manila, 1983, p. 15.

Another significant element of the cooperative plan was a Savings program. The Savings Program was of primary importance to the plan as a breakdown in this element would lead to the collapse of the rest of the structure. The problem with this element of the program was the dictatorial manner in which it was designed. The savings program was compulsory and was created for the specific purpose of enforcing savings among the farmers to generate funds for investment in cooperatives and to guarantee the land amortization payments of its members.

The two main elements of the savings programs were the Barrio Savings Fund (B.S.F.) and the Barrio Guarantee Fund (B.G.F.). The B.S.F. funds were collected either by an automatic 5 percent levy on all production loans (Masagana-99) deducted by the lending institution, or by a 5 peso per month contribution to be made by members who did not borrow. The B.S.F. was to be used either to buy stocks in Rural Banks, the government having set aside 40 percent of the equity in these institutions for purchase by the cooperatives, or to set up cooperative rural banks and marketing cooperatives which would form part of the national cooperative structure. The B.G.F. on the other hand was intended to guarantee the land amortization payments of the S.N. The fund was to be built up from member contributions of one cavan (44 kg.) per hectare per harvest.

A major problem of the savings program was that the Barrio Savings Fund was to be built up through automatic deductions by rural banks on production loans. Most rural bankers, however,

would not cooperate in the Samahang Naysa savings program, refusing to retain the 5 per cent of loans obtained by members of the cooperative. The bankers' antagonism towards the program resulted from the fact that the money was to be used to set up Credit Unions or to purchase equity in the Rural banks. It is reported that most bankers were against selling equity to the farmers.(1)

The ultimate purpose of the pre-cooperative stage was to transform the attitudes and values of the Filipino farmer, instilling a sense of discipline. It was widely believed that Filipino attitudes and values had been a major barrier to the modernization of the agricultural sector. Hunt points out that this rather simple understanding of the agricultural sector has been produced by the work of Philippine social scientists, whose analysis centered on 'depravity' of the individual Filipino.(2) As a result, the government sought to teach the farmer the discipline needed to overcome their poverty. State attempts to

(1) Samahang Naysa: Report to the Secretary for the Period November, 1972 to September 21, 1973, Department of Local Government and Community Development, Quezon City, Philippines, p. 6.

(2) Chester Hunt, "Philippine Values and Martial Law", Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, Vol XI, No.1, 1980. p.114. Hunt notes the contributions made by Mary Hollnsteiner, Commentary on "Barrio Institutions and Their Economic Implications" by Agaton P. Pal, Philippine Sociological Review, No. 7 (1959), pp. 2-11; Carl H. Lande, "Political Attitudes and Behavior in the Philippines," Philippine Journal of Public Administration, Vol. 3, No. 3, 1959, pp. 341-365; Frank Lynch and Alfonso de Guzman II, Four Readings on Philippine Values, 4th ed., Quezon City, Philippines, 1973, pp. 1-63.

instill discipline among the cooperative members centered on three basic rules:

- 1) the farmer must practise modern farm methods.
- 2) the farmer must save.
- 3) the farmer must pay land amortizations on time.(1)

To ensure member compliance with these rules, the S.N. was empowered to impose penalties ranging from fines to a take-over of the member's farm. Once the nature of the farmer had been transformed, the program sought to develop the organizational structures needed to propel the development of the rural sector.

The proper structures were to be established during stage two of the program when Samahang-Nayons would be converted into full-fledged cooperatives (Kilusang-Bayans). Program objectives at this level were to:

- 1) prepare farmers to be better producers through the introduction of modern production methods.
- 2) arrange for lower prices of production supplies
- 3) encourage farmers to perform activities collectively
- 4) develop market outlets for farm products
- 5) serve as an exercise in self-government.(2)

These objectives were to be achieved through a rigidly structured national cooperative structure.

2.4--Program Structure

The Samahang-Nayon was the basis of the cooperative; its incorporation required only 25 willing members, not necessarily farmers (in many cases community leaders joined and later

(1) Castillo, op. cit., p. 16.

(2) See Ofreneg, op. cit., p. 62 and F.A.O., Rural Poverty and Agrarian Reform in the Philippines, Rome, 1983, p. 10.

dominated the S.N.'s.). A newly formed pre-cooperative was classified as Grade C. To reach a Grade B status, the members had to undergo management training seminars. Once the organization had complied with the savings requirement, it would finally be categorized as Grade A.(1) Creation of a full cooperative required the participation of ten Grade A Samahang Nayons. The formation of an Area Marketing Cooperative required the accumulation in each S.N. of 1,000 pesos (\$200), representing 30 percent of the Barrio Guarantee Fund and, in addition, the ability to raise 100,000 pesos as paid-up capital.

The problem with the structure was that, while it may have looked good on paper, it denied the economic realities of the rural Philippines. The program was unresponsive to the regional diversity and disparity which existed in the rural sector. In the words of the Agricultural Credit and Cooperatives Institute,

"it consists of nation-wide recipes, inert to the differences in social and political structure, resource base, agricultural systems and other obtaining peculiarities."(2)

The structure was partial toward wealthier areas such as Central Luzon. In the more depressed areas, the pre-cooperatives would be less likely to establish Area Marketing Cooperatives or Rural Banks and therefore would not enjoy the benefits of the program.

(1) Warren Wong, The Philippine Land Reform Under the New Society: The Logical Framework Approach to Evaluation, M.A. Thesis, Carleton University, Ottawa, 1981, pp. 78-79.

(2) Agricultural Credit and Cooperatives Institute, The Samahang Nayan Development Program: An Evaluation, Executive Summary, University of the Philippines, Los Banos, Laguna, Philippines, 1978, p. 24.

Member organizations were forced to follow a rigid set of guidelines issued by the Department of Local Government and Community Development. The rules established that the S.N. could be deprived of its registry if at any one time over 20 per cent of the members were in default on land amortization payments. This would deprive all members of their right to acquire land under operation land transfer. It should be noted that some 80 per cent of those covered under the land transfer program defaulted on their payments. This regulation was biased against areas of low productivity and high poverty as the farmers of these areas were unable to keep up with amortization payments. The manner in which the program was designed made it unresponsive to local conditions, a major condition of participatory development.

2.5--Program Implementation

The method of implementation varied depending on whether a cooperative movement existed in an area prior to the Samahang Naxon program. In those areas where relatively strong cooperative movements existed, the government attempted to integrate or subsume them into its own program. The Department of Local Government and Community Development, in its scramble to centralize control over rural organizations, required all cooperatives to re-register in the Samahang Naxon program.

The process of re-registration was long and often alienated some of the better trained cooperative organizations and

personnel. In Mindanao, the cooperative movement refused to submit to state control. Here, the Mindanao Cooperative Alliance with some 40,000 members chose to dissolve and reform as a non-profit organization rather than submit to central authority.

The process of centralization also had a negative impact on the cooperatives who decided to join the government program. In San Jose, Antique, it is reported that "the work of the government had actually retarded the growth of existing cooperatives".(1) Fr. Leo Kellenaers complained that "the great plans the government had for the cooperative movement had not materialized and that the uncertainty of these plans had worked against the interests of [existing] cooperatives." (2)

While the state may have been uncertain about the integration of existing cooperatives, it showed no uncertainty in establishing new ones. The government took a very active role in the setting up of individual pre-cooperatives. The implementation of the plan was coordinated by fieldworkers from the Department of Local Government and Community Development, a Municipal Development Officer and a Barrio Development Worker. In a study of the ~~Sarangani~~ Sarangani ~~Nayon~~, the Agricultural Credit and Cooperatives Institute (ACCI) found that the inception of each SN observed had been implemented by either a DLGCD fieldworker or a

(1) Personal Correspondence from Leo Kellenaers, Mill Hill Mission, San Jose, Antique, April 16, 1985.

(2) Kellenaers, op. cit.

Municipal Development Officer in the barangay.⁽¹⁾ The fact that the program was being articulated in the countryside by government functionaries is evidence of the absence of a grassroots character within the program.

The mobilization cultivated by these government workers followed a fairly standard formula. The first step was to find a qualified person to be trained as a Barrio Development Worker to assist in the education program of the pre-cooperative. This was followed by an information drive, normally a radio blitz and poster campaign heralding the virtues of the Samahang Naysod program. After selling the idea through this information drive, a general meeting would be held in the barrio to explain the program and arrange for pre-membership training.

The involvement of government fieldworkers at every step in the formation of the Samahang Naysods is indicative of the degree to which the whole program was articulated and implemented from above. It might be argued that, in spite of overwhelming evidence that the structure was imposed on rural areas, the consent and participation of the farmer were required to implement the program. It could not literally be forced upon them. While this may be true, the state did have access to certain forms of coercion that could compel tenant-farmers to join.

(1) ACCI, The Samahang Naysod Development Program of the Philippines: Case Study Series, University of the Philippines, Los Banos, Laguna, Philippines, 1978.

The opportunity to join the Land Transfer Program along with the promise of access to production credit through Masagana 99 loans provided a strong incentive for the small farmers to join the program. A survey done by Douglas Gritzinger on reasons for joining the Samahang Nayon clearly shows these incentives were the main motivation for entering the program.(1)

TABLE 4.0 REASONS FOR JOINING SAMAHANG NAYON

REASONS	A *	B	C	D	E	F	TOTAL
LAND TRANSFER	19	19	13	1	31	0	83
ECONOMIC BENEFIT	0	0	55	0	1	12	68
BANK LOANS	21	40	3	18	21	76	179
ENCOURAGED BY							
FRIENDS/RELATIVES	8	10	3	5	2	0	28
CONVINCED BY							
BDW/MDO(*)	4	8	1	0	1	0	14
OTHERS	2	3	20	0	0	0	25
TOTAL	54	80	95	24	56	88	397

(*) Barrio Development Worker and Municipal Development Officer
Source: Gritzinger, op. cit, p. 23.

Note: A, B, and C are SN's SAN ISIDRO, PURO BATIA and CANDAYO in LIBMANAN CAMARINES SUR, and D, E, and F are SN's CALEPAAN, TOBOY, and SOBOL in ASINGAN, PANGASINAN. See Map 3.0 for locations.

Clearly the major motivation to join was the belief one had to be an SN member in order to qualify for production credit. In those areas surveyed, 45.1 percent of all members joined because they

(1) D. Gritzinger, "Agriculture Para-professionals in the Philippines: Farmer Scholars, Agricultural Counsellors and the Samahang Nayon Development Project," Rural Development Committee, Cornell University, November, 1981, p. 23.

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believed membership was necessary in order to receive crop loans. The next most frequently cited reason for joining was to qualify for Operation Land Transfer. This accounted for 20.9 percent of all respondents. Together, the government incentives accounted for 66 percent of the membership in those areas surveyed.(1)

In spite of these incentives, the study conducted by the Agricultural Credit and Cooperatives Institute showed there was considerable resistance to the programs on the part of the farmers.(2) The study showed that in half of the eight cases surveyed, there was opposition to the cooperative program.(3) In three of the cases, Maturanok, Lawak, and Loooc, farmer opposition was based on previous experience with government-sponsored farmer organizations. Other reasons given were that respondents were either unaware of the program or that non-members could obtain the same Masagana 99 benefits as the members of a Samahang-Nayon. In the cases where resistance to the program was found, interest

(1) Given that the term "economic benefit" is rather broad, the government incentives could have been a factor in the respondents' citing of this answer in the survey. This being the case, state incentives may have been responsible for more than 80 percent of those joining the Samahang-Nayons.

(2) Agricultural Credit and Cooperatives Institute, The Samahang Nayon Development Program of the Philippines: Case Study Series, (Volumes IIB and III), U.P., Los Banos, Laguna, Philippines, 1977.

(3) The study was conducted in 8 barangays around the Philippines. Included were Samahang-Nayons in San Isidro, Libon, Albay; Loooc, Calamba, Laguna; Lawak, Tayug, Pangasinan; Mahayhay, St. Bernard, Southern Leyte; Maturanok, Guimba, Nueva Ecija; Tabangka, Aklan; Panay, Parian, Calamba, Laguna; and West Carisac, Libon, Albay. The first four on the list were among the ten outstanding Samahang-Nayons in 1975.

developed only after it was made clear that Certificates of Land Transfer would be made available through membership in the S.N. /or where farmers had been convinced that production loans would be made available only through the pre-cooperatives as was the case in Maturanok.

Once the farmers understood the benefits the government claimed were available under the program, they appeared more willing to join. Only a year after the program's founding, in January 1974, a total of 9,504 Samahang Nayons had been organized with 463,264 members.(1) Membership continued to expand until its peak in 1979 when the number of S.N.'s totalled 21,235 with a membership of 1,028,927.(2) This apparent success of the program in its early years was area-specific. In some regions, the program thrived; while in other areas, it was virtually dead.

One explanation for this phenomenon floated by government officials was that the program was only able to succeed in areas where Huk activity had left a legacy of significant peasant organization.(3) This was based on the belief that an organizational capability was particularly required for the

(1) Pinaglabanan Research Committee, "The Samahang Nayan: A Preliminary Report," Journal of Contemporary Asia, Vol. 5, No. 4, 1975, p. 523.

(2)

Castillo, op. cit.

(3) Southeast Asian Development Advisory Group (SEDAG), Rural Development Panel Seminar on Land Reform in the Philippines, April 24-26, 1975, Pines Hotel, Baguio, Philippines, p. 7.

success of the land reform because without it, local peasants were vulnerable to landlord counter-action. The implication of this was that the state alone was incapable of implementing its own reform program. This, however, was clearly not the case as in areas of strategic importance, and not necessarily former guerilla strongholds, the state was able to successfully implement its reform program. In most areas it just lacked the inclination to carry out reform unless faced with a pressing security problem.

2.6 Reform as Counter-Insurgency

The initial strength of the cooperative program was concentrated in areas and provinces reflecting state security concerns. The program appeared to thrive in Central Luzon, the Southern Tagalog, the Eastern Visayas, and in Western Mindanao. The strength of the program in three of these areas appears to be no accident as the state faced major insurgency problems in three of the four areas, with the NPA in Central Luzon and the Eastern Visayas and with the Muslim-Moro National Liberation Front in Mindanao. In some of the provinces of these areas, the Samahang Nayons were formed very rapidly. As of September 1973, Nueva Ecija in Central Luzon had the highest number of S.N.'s with 262, followed closely by Isabela in Cagayan with 204.(1)

The concentration of the program in these areas was no accident. The New Peoples Army in 1972 was estimated to have

(1) Pinaglabanan Research Committee, op. cit, p. 524.

1,000 to 2,000 active fighters located mainly in Central Luzon, and Isabela Province.(1) After the declaration of martial law, the government mounted strong counter-insurgency campaigns and pushed the NPA out of these areas. In this counter-insurgency campaign, rural reform played an important role. The targetting of the Samahang Nayons in these areas shows that this consideration played an important role in the early development of the program.

Similar trends are evident in looking at land reform and the amount of lands affected by region (Table 4.1). Here the trend is perhaps more extreme with some 40 percent of the land reform concentrated in one of the nation's twelve regions. The focus was naturally Central Luzon where peasant unrest was an historical legacy. A further breakdown of these figures provided by Wong indicates that in 1973, a full 23 percent of all land affected by transfer was located in one province of Central Luzon; Nueva Ecija, the former hotbed of insurgency.(2)

(1) Melinda W. Cook, "National Security" Philippines: A Country Study, ed. Frederica M. Bunge, U.S. Government, 1984.

(2) Wong, op. cit. p. 231.

Table 4.1: PERCENTAGE OF LAND REFORMED BY REGION

REGION	1973	1974	1975
ILOCOS	7.9	3.6	13.1
CAGAYAN	9.9	6.9	9.9
CENTRAL LUZON	39.0	41.1	36.5
S. TAGALOG	6.1	7.8	6.7
BICOL	10.6	10.8	11.1
W. VISAYAS	9.4	9.2	5.5
C. VISAYAS	3.9	7.9	8.0
E. VISAYAS	8.9	1.1	2.4
W. MINDANAO	.2	.6	1.0
N. MINDANAO	1.5	5.0	1.8
S. MINDANAO	1.6	1.2	2.2
C. MINDANAO	.9	4.8	1.8

(Source: Warren Wong, Philippine Land Reform Program Under the New Society, 1982, pp. 231-233).

Note: For geographic breakdown of regions, see Map 4.0, p.103-A.

The counter-insurgency element of the reform package did produce some minor successes for the government outside of these specific areas. Many elements of the reform package were supported by the Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas, with certain

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reservations.(1) The Central Committee of the PKP objected to the Barangays and Samahang-Nayon's being the "only rightful organizations for the exercise of political power" and to the Coops being used as a collection agency for the amortization price of land holdings.(2) In spite of these reservations, the PKP supported both the Land Reform Program of the Martial Law government and the Samahang-Nayon program. The party even pledged to campaign for wider membership in the Samahang-Nayons.(3) The party's satisfaction with the reform program led to the eventual surrender of its guerilla army (Huk) in late 1973.

(1) It should be noted that the PKP was one of two communist parties which existed at this time. The other party was the Maoist-oriented Communist Party of the Philippines. The Pro-Moscow PKP was in its twilight when it surrendered to Marcos, retaining influence only in limited areas of Central Luzon, the revolutionary initiative having been lost to the CPP. One can only speculate that the PKP supported the Martial Law regime because first, it lacked the support needed to carry on a revolutionary war, and second, it believed that the Marcos government was sincere in its commitments to reform, and third, it hoped to obtain legal status under martial law and operate within the confines of a military state, hopefully, outmaneuvering the organizational initiatives of the CPP.

(2) Central Committee of the Communist Party of Philippines (pro-Soviet), Philippines: New Policy Orientation of the Martial Law Government and the Attitude of the Communist Party, in the Journal of Contemporary Asia, Vol. 5, No. 4, p. 514.

(3) Central Committee, op. cit., p. 515.

2.7--Rural Reform and Modernization Under Martial Law

While the state was not overly concerned with the equity elements of the reform package beyond their utility in the fight against insurgency, it was concerned about the modernization of the food crop sector. This concern was evident in the utilization of the cooperative program in support of the modernization program. One example of this support was the Samahang-Nayon Development Program (SNDP) initiated as a support program for the pre-cooperatives.

The SNDP was a joint undertaking of the Bureau of Cooperatives and United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the purpose of which was to provide support service technology to the Samahang-Nayons. The project involved training technicians to act as sources of information for farmers and as a link to specialists at the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI). This program was launched because "it was not clear that all beneficiaries could be reached and served by conventional means of technical assistance and input provision".(1) The focus of the program was to ensure the maximum utilization of high yield varieties of rice and the package of inputs which accompanied these strains. Under the support program, USAID loans were granted to the individual Samahang-Nayons to buy fertilizer and mechanical threshers.

(1) Gritzinger, op. cit, p. 7.

These support programs, combined with the emphasis on modern farm practices within the SN's, helped to contribute to the modernization of the food crop sector. The government's success in this area was evident in the expanding adoption of modern rice varieties and in increasing yields per hectare under martial law. These successes are evident in the figures shown below:

Tab 4.2: GROWTH IN RICE PRODUCTION AND ADOPTION OF MODERN STRAINS

CROP YEAR	PRODUCTION (1000 MT OF PALAY)	YIELD/HA (KG)	MODERN VARIETIES (PERCENT)
67/68	4,561	1,381	21.2
68/69	4,445	1,334	40.6
69/70	5,233	1,681	43.5
70/71	5,343	1,716	50.3
71/72	5,100	1,571	56.3
72/73	4,415	1,419	54.0
73/74	5,594	1,628	63.3
74/75	5,660	1,599	61.5
75/76	6,160	1,721	64.5
76/77	6,456	1,820	68.1
77/78	6,895	1,965	70.0
78/79	7,198	2,075	72.4
79/80	7,835	2,237	74.5

(SOURCE: RANDOLPH S. BARKER, "THE PHILIPPINE RICE PROGRAM: LESSONS FOR AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT" in p. 196.)

The figures demonstrate that under martial law, there was a remarkable reversal in the decline in productivity which had immediately preceded it.⁽¹⁾ After the two disastrous years (1971/72 and 1972/73), gross production increased annually. In 1975/76, production reached the point where the Philippines became an exporter of rice for the first time since the 1950's.

The increases in production can be linked to increases in yield per hectare (Figure 2.4) as productivity could no longer be increased by the traditional means of expanding the rice growing area. According to the data, the increases in yield can themselves be correlated to the adoption of modern varieties of rice being produced by the International Rice Research Institute. The adoption of these modern rice varieties, accompanied by their package of chemical inputs, increased nearly 20 percent under martial law. By 1980, 74.5 percent of all rice planted was of these new high yield varieties.

The main benefit in raising productivity, aside from achieving self-sufficiency in food production, was that it allowed for the expansion of other crops. This is evident in Table 4.4 showing the percentage of farm area planted to main crops.

(1) These declines in productivity, registered in crop years 1971/72 and 1972/73, had been the result of flooding caused by a number of typhoons in Central and Southern Luzon during those years.

Table 4.3: AREA PLANTED TO MAIN CROPS, 1970-1977

TOTAL AREA PLANTED	1970	1977
(MILLION HA)	8.9	11.8
PERCENTAGE IN:		
RICE	35	30
MAIZE	27	28
COCONUT	21	23
SUGARCANE	4	5
ABACA	2	2
ALL OTHERS	11	12

Source: National Economic Development Authority, 1979 cited in Krinks, op. cit., p. 103.

The table demonstrates that the percentage of area planted to rice decreased during the imposition of the martial law development program. The decrease in food crops allowed for the expansion of more lucrative export crops such as sugar and coconut. During this period, areas planted to sugar increased by more than 20 percent as a proportion of the total crop area.

These figures leave no doubt that the state's objectives of modernizing the process of production in the food crop sector was being achieved. It should be noted that the two major agro export crops which were able to expand their productive area under martial law were both controlled by close friends of Marcos. Robert Benedicto in sugar and Eduardo Cojuangco in coconuts were provided with government-controlled monopolies over the export of these commodities and associated products.

While the government was achieving its own objectives and assisting its supporters, its promises of increased standards of living through the development program were unrealized. In fact, under conditions of increasing productivity and the expansion of cash-cropping, the farmer seems to have benefited very little. If anything, the real wages of the rural farmer declined during this period. This is confirmed by data cited by both Walden Bello and Sobhan in the FAO study. (See Table 4.4)

Table 4.4: TRENDS IN POVERTY 1965-1980

YEAR	PER CAPITA	FAMILY POVERTY	% FAMILIES BELOW THE			% BELOW
	POVERTY LINE	LINE	PER CAPITA	POVERTY	FAMILY	LINE
			TOTAL	URBAN	RURAL	
1965	P312	P1,873	37.2	20.3	44.4	43.3
1971	500	3,000	38.7	17.6	47.8	44.9
1975	912	5,470	46.5	27.6	54.8	53.2
1979	1,376	8,204	N.A	N.A	N.A	62.6
1980	1,610	9,659	N.A	N.A	N.A	67.6

SOURCES: Bello, op. cit. p. 216. and R. Sobhan, "Rural Poverty and Agrarian Reform in the Philippines," FAO, Rome, 1983. p. 10.

Data from this study demonstrates a clear deterioration in rural living standards under the first few years of martial law. From 1971 to 1975, the number of families below the per capita poverty line increased from 47.8 percent of the rural population to 54.8 percent. During the same period, the number of families below the family poverty line increased by almost the same rate, from

44.9 to 53.2 percent. In this category, the percentage of families below the poverty line increased steadily reaching 67.6 percent of all families in the first quarter of 1980. While this figure cannot be broken down into its urban and rural components, the trend would indicate an absolute deterioration in the quality of both rural and urban life.

3.---DECLINE-AND-FALL-OF-CENTRALIZED-PARTICIPATION

In areas where counter-insurgency was not a major consideration, the program rarely survived on its own merits. While statistics for 1979 indicate an expanding and healthy program, by 1983 the government's own figures indicated the program was in decline. That year the number of pre-cooperatives declined to 18,614 from 21,235 in 1979, and the number of members declined in the same period from over one million to 888,480.(1) More recent literature from the Ministry of Agriculture and Food cites exactly the same figures.(2)

This can be confirmed by examining adherence to the savings schedule for the Barrio Savings Fund and the Barrio Guarantee Fund. Figures cited by the FAO show that savings from all

(1) National Economic Development Authority, Economic Report on the Philippines, 1982, p. 50.

(2) Ministry of Agriculture and Food, Bureau of Cooperatives Development Report 1984, Manila, 1984, p. 3.

sources amounted to over 95 million pesos (\$15 million) by 1979.⁽¹⁾ While these figures demonstrate the cooperative had been a positive force in mobilizing savings of the small farmer, more detailed figures show savings generation had declined substantially from the early years onward. In the fiscal year 1974-75, Barrio Savings Fund contributions had amounted to 9.58 million pesos (\$1.5 million). By the 1978-79 period, however, collections had declined significantly to the point where only P1.66 million (\$300,000) in new revenue was generated. A similar trend was evident with the Barrio Guarantee Fund. Here, savings generation reached its peak in 1976-77 when 58 million was collected, but within two years new deposits declined considerably to P1.29 million (\$220,000).

Similar trends are evident in the University of the Philippines study at the local level. In the collection of the Barrio Guarantee Fund (see Appendix 1.0), in all cases but one, collections peaked in either 1973 or 1974. In at least three of these cases, collection had ceased completely by 1976. The same is true in the case of the Barrio Savings Fund where collection generally peaked in 1974, and in two instances had ceased by 1976 (Appendix 1.1). The decline in the savings program, a necessary element in the expansion to Marketing Cooperatives and Rural Banks, was an indication the program was already in a crisis shortly after its inception.

(1) FAO, Rural Poverty and Agrarian Reform in the Philippines, Rome, 1983, p. 81.

The primary reason for its failure was the lack of responsiveness to local needs, a problem clearly evident in the savings program.(1) The money collected under the savings program was virtually inaccessible to the members. The design of the program was such that these funds were locked into special projects, and held in trust until a certain level of savings was reached and only then could it be allocated to a project. The members came to see the payment of dues and contributions to the savings program as a liability which was not compensated by adequate benefits.

The degree of liability is demonstrated by the fact that even in S.N.'s like those in Parian, West Carisac, and Mahayhay where there were no beneficiaries of land reform, the coop was still expected to comply with the conditions of the Barrio Guarantee Fund.(2) It makes little sense to ask farmers to make payments to guarantee land amortization payments in a barrio where there are no beneficiaries of land reform. This example makes it clear that at the local level, the organization lacked the autonomy necessary to make the program responsive to members' needs.

There were exceptions where individual Samahang Nayons got around the regulations on the Guarantee Fund, and used this fund for other projects. One example is found in the case of San

(1) FAO, op. cit., p. 77.

(2) A.C.C.I., The S.N. Development Program of the Philippines: Case Study Series, op. cit.

Isidro, Albay, where funds were freed up to pay premiums in a government Crop Insurance program and for capital build up in a marketing cooperative.(1) This case, however, was clearly the exception in the eight pre-cooperatives examined in the ACCI study. In most instances, the funds remained frozen in bank accounts either through government regulation or through the private banks' reluctance to allow for withdrawal of these monies. According to Grace, the banks froze the savings accounts as collateral against members defaulting on their Masagana 99 loans.(2)

The lack of access to members savings' meant that many of the pre-cooperatives were deprived of the capital required to initiate programs. As a result, cooperatives would quickly become inactive. Sobhan's FAO study reported that only 16 percent of the cooperatives initiated their own projects and only another 12 percent coordinated projects sponsored by private agencies. The lack of local direction and capital control appeared as the major structural defect of the program. Local autonomy was impaired primarily by the centralization of program planning within the state. This was a direct result of the government's fear of allowing the program to get out of control and develop into a genuine grassroots organization.

(1) A.C.C.I., op cit, Vol II B, pp. 451-452.

(2) Grace, op. cit., pp. 94-95.

3.1--Guaranteeing Land Transfer Payments

The decline of the savings program also meant that the Samahang Nayons would be unable to guarantee the amortization payments for the land reform program. This is confirmed by data collected concerning the average size of the Barrio Guarantee Fund per Samahang Nayon in the eleven regions of the country (Table 4.5).

Table 4.5: REGIONAL COLLECTION FOR BARRIO GUARANTEE FUND

REGION	AVERAGE BGF COLLECTION/SAMAHANG NAYON
I. ILOCOS	P608.3
II. CAGAYAN	1643.98*
III. CENTRAL LUZON	1801.81*
IV. SOUTHERN TAGALOG	615.43
V. RICAL	909.91*
VI. WESTERN VISAYAS	800.35*
VII. CENTRAL VISAYAS	236.55
VIII. EASTERN VISAYAS	353.49
IX. WESTERN MINDANAO	448.65
X. NORTHERN MINDANAO	286.44
XI. SOUTHERN MINDANAO	673.96
NATIONAL AVERAGE	747.47 (JUNE 30, 1975)

Note: P=Peso .

Source: "Current Anti-Poverty Programs" in Readings on the Peasantry Volume III, p. 80.

Based on Government estimates of annual amortization costs of P720.27 per hectare, it is evident that in seven of the nation's eleven regions, the savings program could not guarantee the annual amortization payment on even one hectare. Only in two of the nation's regions could the savings program cover the amortization payments on two hectares.

It is doubtful that the pre-cooperatives could have guaranteed the amortization payments of its members even if a better collection record had been established. A World Bank memo cited by Bello reports:

"Among the 20,000 tenants who have payments due, the collection rate has been only about 20 percent". (1)

This suggests a default rate of around 80 percent, a figure which would have been impossible for even the most well-organized cooperatives to cover under the terms of the program. The government's own calculations for the Barrio Guarantee Fund had been based on a modest 10 percent default rate.

This criticism that amortization payments could not be guaranteed by the individual Samahang Nayons is a non sequitur when one examines the limited extent of Operation Land Transfer. The land question was not pursued vigorously despite President Marcos' contention that land reform was the yardstick by which the success of his government would be measured. After the exclusion of commercial crops from the reform program and the addition of a seven-hectare-retention limit, only 390,000 tenants

(1) Bello, op. cit., p. 74.

were eligible for Operation Land Transfer.(1) As of 1980, only 88,321 tenants on 171,236 hectares had started the process of amortizing ownership.(2) According to Castillo, only 2 percent of Samahang-Nayon members became amortizing owners.(3) The ineffectiveness of the reform package can be traced in part to both the loopholes provided the landlord and the lack of organizations prepared to defend peasant interests.

3.2. Collapse of Samahang-Nayon

The slow progress of the land reform was a major factor in the rapidly declining interest in the Samahang-Nayons. This declining interest was evident in the fact that the government launched a Balik (return to) Samahang-Nayon program in 1979 to rekindle interest in the flagging organization. This is further confirmed by 1980 estimates that as many as one third of the cooperatives existed only on paper.(4) It should be noted that this estimation pales in comparison to that made by the Officer-In-Charge of the Bureau of Cooperative Development who

(1) Peter Krinks, "Rectifying Inequality or Favoring the Few: Image and Reality," in Lea and Chaudhri, Rural Development and the State, 1983, p. 114.

(2) Ernesto M. Valencia, "Philippine Land Reform From 1972 to 1980: Scope, Process and Results," in Feudalism and Capitalism in the Philippines, Foundation for Nationalist Studies, Quezon City, Philippines, 1982, p. 80.

(3) Castillo, op. cit., p. 20.

(4) Gritzinger, op. cit., p. 14.

admitted that less than one third of the Samahang Nayons existing on record were actually viable.(1)

In spite of declining interest and the program's inability to execute the most basic functions for which it had been designed, the government expected it to do more. In the 1982 National Economic Report, the National Economic Development Authority put forward a plan to bring the moribund Samahang Nayan program together with an Integrated Estates Development Project. The plan was designed to put the SN program in control of the Land Bank of the Philippines.(2) In the same report, the government confidently predicted "that after a decade of emphasis on organization the business character of the cooperatives would now be developed."(3) It is difficult to fathom such a transformation considering that the majority of members had financially opted out of the program five years earlier.

In the face of such problems, the government pushed ahead with its plans to expand the cooperative aspect of the program. As of December 31, 1984, government records indicated that the program had registered 43 Cooperative Rural Banks and 64 Area

(1) Interview with Nelia T. Gonzalez, Officer-In-Charge, Bureau of Cooperatives Development, Quezon City, Philippines, December, 19, 1985.

(2) NEDA, Economic Report on the Philippines, Manila, Philippines, 1982, p. 50.

(3) op. cit.

Marketing Cooperatives. (1) According to the figures provided by the government, a total of 5,099 Samahang Naysos with 803,473 members formed the backbone of the Area Marketing Cooperative System. The reliability of these figures, however, must be questioned as a closer examination revealed that one marketing cooperative with 157 SN's had 546,154 members. Even the Officer-in-Charge of the Samahang Naysos program admitted the figures provided by her department were optimistic, stating that "only 16 or 17 of the 63 Area Marketing Cooperatives listed were in any way viable." (2) These revelations make it apparent that the data provided by the government is for the most part unreliable, as it is concerned primarily with making propaganda points. For this reason, the state continues the charade, pretending that the organization is quite viable when in reality it is a paper tiger.

The reality of the failure of the state's organizational initiatives was evident in the comments of Jose Conrado Benitez, the Deputy Minister in Imelda Marcos' Human Settlements Ministry. In June of 1985, Benitez confided that his department had begun to study the community organizing techniques of the New People's

(1) Bureau of Cooperatives Development, Report 1984, Ministry of Agriculture and Food, Manila, Philippines, 1984, pp. 34-37 and p. 7.

(2) Interview with Nelia T. Gonzalez, op. cit., December, 1984.

Army (NPA). (1) The reason cited was that the NPA had a much more successful record of community organizing than the government.

4.2. Conclusion

The failure of state organizational efforts, under martial law should not be viewed as a simple consequence of the Marcos dictatorship. It should be seen as part of an historical legacy of failed state interventions in the rural sector beginning with the Rice Share Tenancy Act passed under American rule in 1933 and continuing through the 1954 Agricultural Tenancy Act, and 1963 Agricultural Land Reform Code. All of these reform packages failed due to a particular form of political domination by the landed elites characterizing this period. This domination deprived the rural masses from any political input into the state.

Although martial law curtailed the power of the landed class, it provided no new avenues for peasant participation. In fact, the few organizations which had represented the interests of the peasantry were either outlawed or had their independence severely compromised. The Marcos government believed this action was necessary to provide it with a free hand in restructuring the economic and political balance in the countryside. The problem with this top-down approach was that it was aimed at satisfying

(1) Conversation with Jose Conrado Benitez, Pasig, Manila, September, 1985.

the government's own development objectives in the rural sector ignoring the needs of the peasantry.

The major difference between the reform package offered by the Martial Law government and that of previous administrations was its content and not the nature of its implementation. As in the past, the reform package had been a response to a growing insurgency and like previous reforms, the "changes" had been handed down from above. The difference in the recipe under martial law was that reform served not only counter-insurgency functions but went beyond to include measures aimed at modernizing the process of production in the rural sector. This new function was the result of the state's desire to more closely integrate the Philippine economy into the world system. Modernizing the production process in the food crop sector allowed for both the expansion of export crops and the freeing up of rural labor for newly created export-oriented industries.

The Samahang Nayon Program as part of the reform package illustrates the ineffectiveness of state attempts to promote participation under these circumstances. While the state attempted to promote participation through a cooperative structure, it could not allow control of the organization to slip from its grasp. The state needed to control the organization because first, past experience had shown that independent organizations within the rural sector were prone to radicalization and second, the regime needed a structure through

which to implement its reform package and restructuring in the rural sector.

The result was an organization which did not represent farmers' interests independent of state control. The farmers were left instead with a cooperative structure concerned mainly with promoting new farm technology and with enforcing savings to guarantee payments on the government's moribund land reform program. Despite the government's lip service to participation and self-government, the Sambagang-Nayons served only as a vehicle for informing the rural population of their role in the development scheme.

This strategy was at best incapable of promoting participation, beyond utilising it as a tool for co-optation. This is illustrated in the fact that the program was pursued primarily in areas where there was an insurgency threat. The counter-insurgency aspects of the program functioned directly in areas like Nueva Ecija where the state used the program to undercut the growth of the NPA. Where the state was not faced with insurgency problems, it sought instead to legitimate martial law through the rhetoric of reform. In these areas, attempts were made to portray the state as being concerned with peasant issues and committed to reform in order to both validate the imposition of martial law and pre-empt the formation of independent organizations. It was this agenda which made the state incapable of creating an organization which was genuinely participatory.

The ultimate failure of the Sambang-Nayon program (as both a cooperative and independent organization) can be traced to the fact that it was never intended to do anything but fulfill state objectives in the rural sector. The state had two basic objectives through its reforms: that of satisfying the reproductive needs of monopoly capital, and at the same time legitimating its own position presenting itself as a reformist military state. The basic contradictions between the two positions within the Philippine social formation ensured that the reformist objectives of the state would remain largely illusory.

In the final analysis, it was the nature of the state existing within a peripheral capitalist social formation which ensured that it would be incapable of promoting participation. The limited latitude for participation within peasant organizations it did create, combined with an increasingly repressive state, turned the peasantry to more radical alternatives. The farmers quickly recognized the S.N. program for what it was, a government-inspired and controlled organization which was not theirs to control or direct, and soon opted out. With other alternatives destroyed or driven underground with martial law, the peasantry increasingly supported the New Peoples Army.

The expansion of the armed struggle in Mindanao, Samar, Leyte, and Northern Luzon bears evidence to the fact that the peasantry was not corrupted by the Martial Law government. The result was that the government was forced to turn to more

repressive measures to deal with an increasingly obstinate peasantry. The failure of the reform package to appease the peasantry led to increasing militarization and quickly brought the state into conflict with the second most powerful institution in Philippine society, the Catholic church.

CHAPTER V

THE CATHOLIC CHURCH AND RURAL ORGANIZING; THE STRUGGLE FOR
LIBERATION OR THE LIBERATION OF STRUGGLE.

"Where a movement springs spontaneously from an impoverished mass, it is often of a violent and bloody nature stimulated by radicals and extremists who espouse an atheistic ideology. [Therefore] if we do not capture the imagination of the impoverished and the underprivileged and offer them an attractive plan of amelioration to give some semblance of equality and justice then, we only have to look at Cuba, Guatemala, and Vietnam to see ourselves a decade hence." (1)

-NASSA Development Program (1968)

"Not until a gun is held to the head of the landlord will there be genuine social change."

-Visayan Priest (December, 1985).

In recent years, the Catholic church in the Philippines has become increasingly polarized between two interpretations of the scriptures. One sees the church's role as being a facilitator in the total liberation of the individual from his oppression, be it social, economic or political. The second and more traditional view sees the church as transcending these worldly events and focusing on more metaphysical concerns such as saving souls. These polarized positions translate into two very different political positions for the church in terms of its relationship to the state and its potential for intervention in labour and rural struggles.

Adherents of the first interpretation have attempted to get the church more involved in secular concerns such as human rights, the protection of slum dwellers, labour conflicts and

(1) National Secretariat for Social Action (NASSA) Development Program, Impact, July, 1968, p. 12, cited in Mario Bolasco, "Marxism and Christianity in the Philippines: 1930-1983" in Marxism in the Philippines, 1983, p. 117.

rural organizing. This group has moved beyond traditional solutions such as providing alms for the poor to a position of demanding and fighting for social change to improve the lives of the "poor, deprived and oppressed." At the same time, the conservative majority has attempted to put the brakes on the proponents of a liberation theology, taking a position of supporting the status quo, engaging in critical collaboration with the Marcos regime.(1).

The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate that conflicts within the church, as well as the nature of its relationship to the state at a particular conjuncture, affected that institution's ability to engage in development work which can be considered genuinely participatory. Specifically, I will examine and assess the nature of participation within one church-sponsored organizing program called Basic Christian Community-Community Organizing (sic). The chapter is divided into three separate sections. The first section examines fragmentation and radicalization within the church prior to martial law. The second section looks at the church under martial law, examining further divisions within the institution, and the relations existing between church and state. The final part of the chapter examines the Basic Christian Community-Community Organizing and assesses church attempts to engage in participatory organization under martial law.

(1) Critical collaboration was the church's policy of qualified support for the Martial Law regime and is explained further in this chapter.

1. EARLY FRAGMENTATION WITHIN THE PHILIPPINE CATHOLIC CHURCH

The major argument presented in this chapter is that divisions within the church produced largely by that institution's response to martial law promoted the development of participatory organizations. It should be noted, however, that the Philippine church had produced clerics who had turned "revolutionary" before the Marcos coup. To understand the evolution of these tensions within the church, it is important to look back at earlier periods of church intervention in the period preceding martial law.

The Catholic church has had a long history in the Philippines, arriving in 1565 as the ideological foot soldiers of Spanish imperialism. Throughout its history, the church has served many masters. From Magellan to Marcos, the church had acted as educator, tax collector, land-owner, and spiritual guide to the nation's population. The different roles the church has played, particularly in the service of the state, have generated conflict within this institution.

The church's position as a major land-owner was a source of conflict between Filipino Catholics and the church's Spanish hierarchy. By the end of the Spanish occupation, religious orders were the largest land-owners in the Philippines, possessing more than 185,000 hectares of land. This constituted

one-fifteenth of the total agricultural land under cultivation.(1) These lands were worked by tenant-farmers, making the church the largest landlord in the country. The resentment generated by friar landlordism was a major rallying point for the Philippine Revolution of 1896.

The equation of the church with Spanish imperialism and landlordism led eventually to the establishment of the Philippine Independent Church in 1902. The Independent Church, under the leadership of former revolutionary priest, Gregorio Aglipay, was very popular and by 1918, had 1.5 million members, about 15 percent of the population. The fracture which resulted in the formation of the Philippine Independent Church was a manifestation of the resentment towards the excesses of friar domination.

Attempts to diffuse the situation under American rule resulted in an agreement to purchase 166,000 hectares of friar land holdings for seven million dollars in 1903.(2) In spite of the purchase by the colonial government, the church retained substantial property holdings. Ofreneo, in his book Capitalism in Philippine Agriculture, notes that four areas of peasant unrest during the 1930's, Hacienda de Lian (7,799 ha.) in Batangas, Buenavista Estate (27,407 ha.) in Bulacan, San Pedro Tunasan Estate (2,286 ha.) in Laguna, and Dinalupihan Estate

(1) Constantino and Constantino, The Philippines: A Past Revisited, 1975, p. 74.

(2) Constantino and Constantino, op. cit., 1975, p. 303.

(4,125 ha.) in Bataan, were all owned by the church.(1) Peasant unrest in the church estates explains why the church was a strong voice against peasant organizations before World War II. The church voiced its opposition to the communist-oriented peasant alliances through the Philippine Ealangista movement.

1.1--The 1950's and the Rise and Fall of Militant Reformism

Opposition to Communism in the post-war period led to the church's first major interventions in the labour and rural sector in support of government counter-insurgency campaigns against the Huks. In the early 1950's, the church was ideologically united behind a banner of anti-communism, while at the same time divided in the nature of its opposition to the Left. Bolasco, in a lecture in 1983 on Marxism and Christianity, reported two main currents of anti-communism within the church. The first of these was "reactionary and backward-looking" and found concrete expression in anti-nationalist and anti-secular campaigns. The second tendency, characterised by groups like the Jesuit-run Institute for Social Order (ISO), leaned toward militant reformism evident in the formation of both the Federation of Free Workers (FFW) and the Federation of Free Farmers (FFF).

The initial purpose of these federations was to fill in a leadership vacuum left by the defeat of the communists in 1952. This goal was evident in the basic aims of the organization outlined as seeking to promote democracy, checking communist

(1) Ofreneo, Capitalism in Philippine Agriculture, 1980, p. 29.

infiltration and subversion, and organizing small farmers.(1) While this does not appear to be a very militant set of aims, they can be regarded as radical in this period because of the willingness to resort to the strike.

This militancy soon pitted the progressives against the church hierarchy after staff, organized by the FFW, went on strike at the church-owned University of Santo Tomas. The Jesuits who had initially helped in the organization of workers bore the brunt of criticism from the Archbishop over this contentious strike. In the aftermath, Archbishop Santos banned one priest from speaking publicly in Manila, ordered a number of individuals removed from the ISO's labour management school, and criticized the school for trying to ram their interpretation of papal encyclicals down peoples' throats.(2) These punitive measures effectively crushed militant reformism within the ISO as in the following decade it became concerned primarily with the promotion of cooperatives.(3)

1.2. Return to Activism

After a short hiatus, the church's rural development work continued and expanded largely as a product of Vatican II. The

(1) Blondie Poz, op. cit., p. 39.

(2) Bolasco, op. cit., p. 112.

(3) The promotion of cooperatives within the Philippines has been considered a more conservative activity than organizing workers and peasants due to the fact that they have primarily served economic functions while unions have played a much more political role.

Second Vatican Council tried to move the church away from a strictly spiritual understanding of salvation towards a more active role in society with a responsibility to work for social justice and structural change. Robert Youngblood notes that this move clashed with an older ecclesiastic orientation of the church that sanctioned the distinction of planes between sacred and secular.(1) The contradictions within these perspectives did not result in an open schism until the latter part of the 1960's, following a number of initiatives which increased social activism.

The initial expressions of this new social action orientation were largely initiated from the top down. The first evidence of this new activism came from the Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) in the formation of the National Secretariat for Social Action (NASSA) in 1966. The purpose of this new organization was to help "conscientize" farmers and workers for self-help.(2) This was followed up by the church hierarchy sponsoring a Rural Development Congress in February, 1967. This congress was organized to reaffirm the church's commitment to rural development work. The congress identified the main problem in the Philippines as being the inequitable distribution of land and urged all Christians to

(1) Robert L. Youngblood, Structural Imperialism and the Catholic Bishops Conference in the Philippines, Unpublished paper, obtained from NASSA library, p. 6.

(2) Conscientize is a word commonly used within the literature of the Church's Social Action Network, which refers to a process of education or consciousness-raising.

cooperate in the implementation of land reform. This orientation towards social action was premised on undercutting the growing attraction of the radical Left.(1) Seen in this light, it is not surprising that the two years following the Congress, 1967 to 1968, are described as a period of unprecedented cooperation between church and state.(2)

This period of cooperation was short-lived, largely as a result of the failure of the church to make headway under the program of action outlined at the Congress. While this Congress has been hailed as the primary stimulus to church intervention in the rural sector,(3) the extent of its impact is brought into question by Bolasco and Yu. They note that a 1969 editorial concerning the effects of the Congress reported:

- 2,000 church-sponsored projects such as credit unions improved rice production and cottage industries had been initiated.
- in 8 out of 48 dioceses, a social action center has been set up.
- only 1/2 per cent of the total 4,000 priests were engaged in social action work as compared with the 50 percent engaged full-time in schools.
- out of 1,650 parishes ... an optimistic estimate is that in 400 of these, the priests are involved in a socio-economic endeavors.(4)

(1) Bolasco and Yu, Church-State Relations, St. Scholasticas College, Manila, Philippines, 1981, p. 66.

(2) Bolasco and Yu, op. cit., p. 64.

(3) Makibaka, op. cit., p. 125.

(4) "What Happened After the Rural Congress," Impact, February, 1969, p. 5.

The article further comments that the church had failed to take an active role in land reform which had been identified at the congress as the major obstacle to rural development. In choosing to ignore the major socio-economic problem, that of land distribution, and opting for a piecemeal strategy of ameliorating these problems, the initiative of the hierarchy soon fizzled out.

With the failure of church initiatives, the impetus for rural reform was passed on to lay organizations. These organizations, including the Christian Social Movement (CSM), the Federation of Free Farmers, Young Christian Socialists of the Philippines, KASAPI, and the Khi Rho movement, attracted many priests, nuns and lay people into their ranks.⁽¹⁾ The distinguishing characteristic of these "social democratic" groups was their advocacy of non-violence and parliamentary struggle, as opposed to armed struggle, favoured by the "national democrats."

These organizations which opened up new channels for religious participation in social action opted for a variety of different forms of struggle. The CSM under Raul Manglapus opted for political struggle presenting itself as a third party to the dominant Nationalistas and Liberals. Other groups, including KASAPI, the YCSP, the FFF, and the Khi Rho movement, joined workers and students in street protests demanding reform.

In spite of their increasingly militant activism, these groups avoided revolutionary solutions to the problem (feudalism) which they identified as perpetuating cycles of wealth and

(1) Bolasco and Yu, op. cit., p. 69.

poverty. The notion that feudalism was at the root of society's problems can be traced to the works of Jeremias Montemayor, leader of the FFF. The FFF prided itself on being more radical than the national democrats because their solutions went to the real roots of society, while the national democrats focused on the abstract concept of imperialism as being the root of the problem.(1) While making a claim to be more radical than the radicals, the program of the FFF appears hardly revolutionary, premised on class consensus rather than class conflict. This is spelled out by Montemayor who wrote:

"What the religious pastor should do is to go to the oppressed masses and tell them to generate power through organization... This will result in a struggle between the oppressed masses and the oligarchs. If this struggle is characterised by parity of power through the education, organization and activities of the masses, it will eventually lead to the mutual recognition and mutual respect and justice... This will lead to unity between landlords and tenants, although this will eventually result in the disappearance of landlordism.(2)

It appears that the leadership of the FFF expressed some utopian hope that class antagonisms could be exorcised and that landlords would voluntarily engage in land reform at the behest of organized peasants. Hopes for such idyllic solutions were not shared by those clerics, nuns and lay people closely associated with the peasants and workers.

(1) Bolasco and Yu, op. cit., p. 72.

(2) Vide, Towards a Filipino Ideology, 1972, p. 142, cited in Bolasco and Yu, op. cit., p. 72 and Bolasco, op. cit., p. 117.

1.3--Crisis-of-Reformism

Within these organizations, the rank-and-file membership turned increasingly toward tactics of confrontation. These tactics had two apparent results: first, they began to sour the romance between church and state as church activists came increasingly into conflict with the government of President Marcos. Second, this period of resurgent activism sharpened the contradictions between progressives and moderates within these organizations and within the church itself. -

Nowhere were these contradictions more evident than in the FFF. Within this organization, a hierarchical leadership imposed strict limits on the ideological radicalization of the younger members. Maintaining such centralization became problematic due to prevailing social conditions which led the FFF toward more militant actions such as the 58-day occupation of the premises of the Bureau of Agriculture (known as the Agrifina Circle affair).

In Po's study of rural organizations and rural development, he describes the strain this action placed on the FFF.

"The Agrifina Circle affair ... precipitated the explosion of internal tensions within the FFF which had been growing between the radical and more moderate members and leaders.. A number of young FFF Affiliates started to question the effectiveness and correctness of the FFF's legalistic and reformist approach. Montemayor (the leader) responded by expelling members identified with "radical ideas." (1)

(1) Blondie Po, Rural organizations and Rural Development In the Philippines: A Documentary Study, in Po and Montiel, Rural Organizations in the Philippines, Manila, Philippines, 1980. p. 53.

While not all organizations were as centralized and autocratic as the FFF, it appears that there was a general reassessment of the reformist approach taking place within many socially active groups. This was particularly true of those organizations which had joined with students and workers and engaged in tactics of confrontation.

The result of these deliberations was a wave of defections to the national democrats in 1971. Among the first to defect was the Student Christian Movement which joined the left in May of 1971. They were joined by the cultural arm of KASAPI around the same time. Later in July of that year, YCSP disbanded and almost the entire core of the organization rejected Christian Socialism.(1) The final defection of that year was Khr Rho, the youth arm of the FFF, which went over to the left in December. These defections eventually led to the creation of an organization called Christians for National Liberation (CNL) in August, 1972.(2)

The CNL can be clearly differentiated from previous secular-christian organizations by its indictment of the church's traditional role in society as a tool of legitimation and in its identification of imperialism along with feudalism as the primary sources of inequality in Philippine society. The CNL's aims of social change through a revolutionary mass movement also

(1) Bolasco and Yu, op. cit., p. 83.

(2) KSP, "The Christians of National Liberation," Kilusan, Vol. III, No. 1, 2, pp. 39-42.

differentiated it from previous efforts of church activists. The roots of this new orientation within the church can be traced to the national democrats in the student movement who had formulated the anti-imperialist revolutionary line with the formation of the Kabataang Makabayan (Patriotic Youth) in 1964.

This radical line adopted by the CNL resulted in it being outlawed in September, 1972 with the declaration of martial law, just one month after its founding convention. Despite its illegal status, the CNL remained an active organization. In April 1973, the National Democratic Front (NDF) was established with the CNL as one of its founding members.(1) In addition, CNL members continued to engage in political work through legal church organizations. This involved members in three main activities under martial law: documenting and exposing human rights violations, working from within the church to make it more democratic (a people's church), and becoming involved in democratic protest movements.(2)

The establishment of the CNL was the product of a decade of church-oriented social activism. The social action programs

(1) The NDF was established to coordinate the actions of various underground organizations. Among them were the New People's Army, The Rebolusyonaryong Kilusan ng Magsasaka (Revolutionary Movement of Peasants), Rebolusyonaryong Kilusang Manggagawa (Revolutionary Movement of Workers), Kabataang Makabayan (Nationalist Youth), Katipunan ng Mga Gurong Makabayan (Association of Nationalist Teachers), the CNL, and the Communist Party of the Philippines. From E. San Juan, *Crisis in the Philippines: The Making of a Revolution*, Massachusetts, U.S.A., 1986, p. 30.

(2) KSP, *op. cit.*, p. 42.

adopted by the church hierarchy in the early 1960's put many church people in contact with the masses. These contacts led ultimately to a reassessment of the piecemeal nature of these interventions. Church activism premised largely on undermining the attractiveness of the national democrats came to be viewed as a bankrupt strategy by those who had actively integrated with the masses. The result was polarization within the church and the radicalization of many who had been moderate social activist members in the period preceding martial law.

2. THE CHURCH AND MARTIAL LAW

Under martial law, polarization within the church continued largely as a consequence of ongoing development initiatives. The work of the church in assisting the peasants and documenting human rights violations brought it into direct confrontations with the martial law regime. These contradictions further polarized the church between the hierarchy and the activist clergy, nuns, and laymen who worked with peasants and workers in the rural areas through the church and rural organizations like the FFF.

2.1 Critical Collaboration

The initial position of the church on the subject of martial law was one of grudging support. This was evident in a letter produced by the administrative council of the Catholic Bishops Conference (CBCP) one week after the declaration of martial law.

The council wrote:

"The church is committed to the defense and preservation of human rights and all areas of life.... On the other hand, the bishops... recognize the right and duty of civil authorities to take appropriate steps to protect the sovereignty of the state and to ensure the peace and prosperity of the nation within the law.(1)

This letter clearly aligns the church with the state in its blatant justification of martial law on grounds of some perceived threat to national security.

The bishops' support for martial law resulted from the fact that the hierarchy was concerned primarily with the protection of its material interests. One military strategist, Col. Galileo C. Kintanar, summed up how church material interest translates into political alliances stating:

"Apart from religious consideration, the Catholic church in the Philippines has temporal interests that apparently fix it on the conservative or even the reactionary side. It has tremendous assets in capital and land. It would not risk these in a violent revolution."(2).

While the church downplays the extent of its own material interests, a government study (1970) of 28 provinces showed that church landholdings amounted to 21,832 hectares.(3) In addition to substantial agricultural holdings, the church also owned the majority of the nation's universities and private schools, and held a majority interest in the nation's leading financial

(1) Cited in Bolasco and Yu, op. cit., p. 97.

(2) Fr. Pedro V. Salgado, Imperialism in the Church, Socio-Pastoral Institute, Manila, 1985, p. 26.

(3) Bolasco and Yu, op. cit., p. 64.

institution, the Bank of the Philippine Islands.(1) While the state had no interest in seizing these properties, the threat of proposed taxation of private schools and church property tempered any serious criticism of the state.(2)

The qualified support which the hierarchy gave the Martial Law regime is best described by the principle of "critical collaboration" outlined by Jaime Cardinal Sin. Cardinal Sin defines critical collaboration to mean that;

"The church will accept martial law as a necessary expedient to weed out the evils in the government and society provided it is not maintained longer than necessary. The church will collaborate with the state on all matters involving the welfare of the people in furtherance of their common good, but reserves the right to criticize any state policies which, in her opinion, are contrary to human rights and inimical to the public interest.(3)

While this is by no means a blanket endorsement of martial law, the threat of sanctions in the early years of martial law served to temper any major criticisms by the CBCP. In this period, the major contention was over state policies on birth control as the church opposed state attempts to promote population control through "artificial means."

(1) Mamoru Tsuda, A Preliminary Study of Japanese-Filipino Joint Ventures, 1978, p. 118.

(2) Note: According to statistics cited in Ibon Facts and Figures (April 30, 1984), 85.6 percent of all teachers were employed by private (religious) universities.

(3) Rueben R. Canoy, The Counterfeit Revolution, Manila, Philippines, 1981, p. 91.

2.2--State Repression of Religious Activists

The church hierarchy continued to give its collective support to the Marcos government up until the "lifting of martial law" in January of 1981. Following the suspension of military rule, church-state antagonisms intensified, primarily as a result of increased repression against the church. The list of church personnel to run afoul of the military was extensive. In April 1981, Fr. Godofredo Alingal was murdered for his Basic Christian Community activities and social work in the Bukidnon area. His death was linked to the military who had been responsible for an increasing number of deaths in the area.(1) A second incident was the expulsion of two Maryknoll Fathers in 1981 for subversive activities. More serious charges were laid against two sisters, Pilar Verzoso and Zenaida Pineda, and three layworkers. They were arrested in Batangas while investigating military involvement in a land dispute. The five were charged with being members of the NPA. Just two months later, two priests, Theodore Bandsma and Herman Sanderinck, were arrested on a charge of harbouring communists.

This state-orchestrated campaign against church activists culminated with the arrest of a number of church workers in Negros Occidental. In this instance, a Columban missionary, Fr. Brian Gore, the organizer of a number of successful BCC's, was

(1) R. L. Youngblood, "Church and State in the New Republic of the Philippines," Journal of Contemporary Southeast Asia, p. 207.

arrested on a charge of possessing explosives and inciting to rebellion. This was followed by the arrest of other missionaries, Niall O'Brien and Fr Vicente Dagan, and six lay workers who, along with Gore were charged with the assassination of a local mayor and four associates during a March 1982 ambush.(1) The case of the Negros Nine, as it came to be called, was eventually dismissed due to lack of evidence, though the foreign missionaries were eventually deported after lengthy incarceration.

Youngblood notes that imprisonments and deportations were only part of the government's attempt to silence the churches. In August 1982, the Minister of Political Affairs proposed "that the pulpit and similar religious forms" be made part of the mass media to ensure the government could deal with clergy who were critical of the government. In November of the same year, Marcos singled out 20 priests and nuns considered members of subversive organizations and claimed that 97 members of the clergy were suspected of aiding subversive organizations such as the Communist Party.(2)

The effect of this increasing challenge from the state was the gradual alienation of the church hierarchy. Individual members of the hierarchy spoke out more and more against the increasing abuses of the military. It is clear, however, from

(1) Youngblood, op. cit., p. 208.

(2) Philippine News, November 10-16, 1982, pp. 1-8, cited in Youngblood, op. cit., p. 211.

the statements of some bishops that this alienation was not making a progressive force out of the church's hierarchy. One example is a statement from one of the more moderate bishops, Francisco Claver. In a speech at Gonzaga University in Spokane, Washington, the Bishop, while criticizing Marcos authoritarianism, placed the resistance in the same category as the Marcos regime, claiming all were guilty of using violence.(1) According to San Juan, Claver's inability to distinguish between the violence of the Marcos regime and the struggle for liberation being carried on by the NDF played into the hands of the Marcos regime.(2)

While the increasing alienation of the church from the state did not produce support for the liberation movement in the Philippines, it certainly undermined support for the state within the hierarchy. This was evident in a series of actions taken by the Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines. The individual criticisms of the state were followed by more concerted actions on the part of the CBCP. In February, 1983, the bishops issued a pastoral letter criticising the regime's economic development priorities, its disregard for due process in arrests and detentions and for the suppression of legitimate dissent in the name of national security. These protests are indicative of the gradual ascendancy of the more progressive wing

(1) E. San Juan, Crisis in the Philippines, 1986, p. 39.

(2) San Juan, op. cit., p. 39.

within the CBCP, as the more numerous Conservatives and Moderates became alienated by an increasingly repressive state.(1)

2.3--Repression within the Church

The "rank-and-file" of the church, made up of priests, nuns, and lay workers, had taken a stand against the Marcos regime much earlier than their superiors. It was in fact their activism which had brought the repression of the state down on the church and eventually stirred the recalcitrant CBCP into action. In the early years of martial law, however, the activists had to suffer repression from within the church itself. Internal policing, which involved demotions, banishment to remote areas, and in serious cases, excommunication, were prompted by edicts from Rome and prodding by the state.

Bolasco and Yu note that the implications made by the state that the church was being utilized by the "Christian Left" assisted conservative elements within the church in suppressing social activism.(2) One of a series of articles in Focus Magazine reported that "priests and nuns were surfacing as leaders of leftist, if not subversive, organizations." (3) The

(1) Youngblood in an unpublished article "Structural Imperialism and the Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines" (Table 1), reports that in 1979, conservatives accounted for 58 per cent of the membership of the CBCP, Moderates accounted for 23 per cent of CBCP members and 19 per cent progressives.

(2) Bolasco and Yu, op. cit., p. 128.

(3) op. cit., p. 129.

effect of these charges was to strengthen the hand of the conservatives within the church who had always questioned the church's role in social and political affairs. The church in fact became so eager to avoid the stigma of Marxism that it agreed to undergo a province-by-province listing of priests and other religious workers suspected of links with the communist movement requested by the state.(1) It was agreed that the church would police its own ranks.

The church in Rome provided even more concrete support for the conservatives. In October 1975, two Roman offices, the Congregation of Bishops and the Congregation of Religious, headed by Cardinals Baggio and Pironio, sent a letter to the Philippine bishops berating the Association of Major Religious Superiors in the Philippines (AMRSP) for activities of a socio-political character. Rome called on the bishops to assert their authority and discipline the provocative activities of some church people.(2) Despite these obstacles, the clergy did become progressively involved in social activities under martial law.

2.4 The Radicalization of the Rank-and-File

Under martial law, the religious activists returned to the safety of the church and established new organizations from within that structure, through which they could fulfill their

(1) Estrella Consolacion, "An Unholy Dialogue: The Alienation of the Church from the State," The Diliman Review, Vol. 31, No. 3, May/June, 1983, p. 46.

(2) Bolasco and Yu, op. cit., p. 137.

social mission. How to proceed with a social action orientation was a point of debate within the church. At the first convention of the Association of Major Religious Superiors (AMRSP) held under martial law, a Sister Victricia questioned:

"What is our position now that non-government initiated programs are not so acceptable to the government. Shall we keep away from them and tactfully withdraw in our attempt to maintain credibility with the government?"(1)

The state itself soon assisted in answering this question with its increasingly repressive social policies. Under conditions of increasing repression, the initial attraction of the state's developmentalist ideology quickly wore out.

It was the AMRSP, representing 2,500 priests and 7,000 nuns, that was the most vocal critic of martial law. A decision was made at a 1974 convention to become more active in social and political affairs aside from speaking out against abuses of the regime. The convention established task forces to respond to conditions of need revealed in a 1973 AMRSP survey. These initial task forces were Justice and Peace, Data Gathering, Detainees and Conscientization of Ourselves and others. These committees acted as a monitor of government abuses and human rights violations. In September of 1974, the association began publishing and circulating Various Reports, a weekly newsletter, which published the findings of the committees. Through the work

(1) Proceedings of AMRSP Annual Convention, December 4-8, 1972, cited in Bolasco and Yu, op. cit., p. 101.

of these committees, the AMRSP quickly became a thorn in the government's side.

The criticisms of martial law by the AMRSP were buttressed by regional organizations such as the Second Mindanao-Sulu Pastoral Conference. The conference, held in late March of 1974, issued a statement deploring the fact that:

-a climate of fear still prevails, preventing the growth of farmers' and workers' organizations, despite assurances of freedom in this regard.

-many policies on cooperatives are imposed from above and the methods of implementation have resulted in a weakening of many of our cooperatives.

-there is still a glaring lack of participation in the decision-making process affecting the lives of communities.(1)

The statement is an indication that the church in the Southern Philippines was concerned about the lack of participation under the New Society and was ready to renew its commitment to rural organizing. This task was to be carried out through Christian Community Building.

The conference was followed up in 1975 by more intensified efforts at organizing Christian Communities. The Mindanao-Sulu Secretariat for Social Action (MISSSA) was joined by the CBCP's own National Secretariat for Social Action (NASSA) in a vigorous drive to promote Christian Community building among local communities. One manifestation of this new orientation was the formation of a Church-Labour Center in April 1975, the objective

(1) Makibaka, op. cit., p. 130.

of which was to assist in conscientization and organization work among industrial workers in Metro Manila.

This renewed activism of church workers, particularly in the urban centers, soon brought the clergy into deeper conflict with the state. This conflict was clearly evident in the La Tondena strike in October of 1975. In this dispute, the first major strike under martial law, 550 striking workers received food and moral support from about 20 priests and nuns. The most notable action of support occurred on the second day of the strike, when the religious supporters tried unsuccessfully to prevent the arrest of more than 500 strikers.(1) The military repeatedly ignored the pleas of the religious to be incarcerated with the strikers. Incidents such as these were a powerful tool in conscientizing church workers themselves to the plight of workers and peasants under martial law.

These actions served to provoke a response from the state. Later the same year, the AMRSP, which had organized support for the strikers, was accused of being infiltrated by subversives.(2) After receiving two orders from Hanz Menzi, head of the Philippine Council for Print Media, to stop publishing Various Reports and its successor, Signs of the Times, a decision was made to close down the paper and suspend the operation of all task forces.(3) Bolasco and Yu report, however, that these

(1) Makibaka, op. cit., pp. 43-44.

(2) Makibaka, op. cit., p. 135.

(3) Bolasco and Yu, op. cit., p. 132.

actions were not a result of Menzi's orders which had been defiantly ignored. They stemmed instead from the discovery of the National Democratic Front's "Ten Point Program of Action" found in a desk in the offices of Signs of the Times.⁽¹⁾ This communist-xenophobia within the AMRSP resulted in a rift developing among those opposed to martial law. When the operation of the task forces resumed one month later, many withdrew their support for mass actions complaining of manipulation by the Left. The progressives, however, continued their support for mass actions, convinced of the justness of the struggle.

This period of state repression reportedly peaked in November-December, 1976 with the shutting down of two Catholic publications in Manila and two Catholic radio stations in Tagum and Mati.⁽²⁾ During those two months, over one hundred church workers in the towns of Mati and Tagum were arrested and detained for several months. The arrests centered around the church's Basic Christian Community Program which the government disapproved of since the time of its inception.

3. BASIC CHRISTIAN COMMUNITIES

This local structure, which proved to be such an irritant to the state, started before the declaration of martial law. The concept of a Basic Christian Community (BCC) was developed in a

(1) Bolasco and Yu, op. cit., p. 132.

(2) E. San Juan, op. cit., p. 35.

pilot project of Maryknoll fathers in the Prelature of Tagum some time in the late 1960's. Missionaries gained experience from this ongoing experiment and soon grassroots structures were established in various dioceses throughout Mindanao including: Butuan, Kidapawan, Cotabato, Bukidnon, Iligan, Cagayan de Oro, and Ozamis.(1) This structure was first endorsed by the Mindanao Sulu Pastoral Conference in 1971, and shortly afterwards by the CBCP.(2)

3.1--Liturgical Orientation

The initial efforts of the BCC focused on the need to bring the people together to celebrate the liturgy each Sunday in their own chapels. Local community leaders were trained with the main objective being to "deepen their understanding of their mission within the Christian perspective." (3) This mission was to organize their local communities to be more attentive in the observation of Sunday worship and other Holy days.

The purpose of this exercise for the church was to revitalize sagging interest in religion. Traditionally, the church had been organized at the parish level, removing it from the barrio or local community around which political, economic

(1) Gaspar and Cacayan, "Basic Christian Communities as Vehicles for Salvation," Some Notes on the BCC-CC, Volume 1, No. 1, January, 1982, p. 4.

(2) Gaspar and Cacayan, MSPC COMMUNICATIONS, November, 1981.

(3) Gaspar and Cacayan, op. cit., 1982, p. 2.

and cultural life was organized.(1) The BCC was designed to bring the church down to this basic level and thus make it relevant to the members of the community. But the problem was that members' needs were not entirely spiritual and for this reason the program sought new directions.

3.2 Development Orientation

In its attempt to make the program more socially relevant, the church attempted to utilize the BCC structure for the implementation of both pastoral and development programs. In these attempts, links were made between diocesan social action centers and the BCC's. The structure was utilized to implement self-help projects. In some areas, communities went into poultry, pigery, and cooperatives, while others went into health and education projects.(2) Gaspar and Cacayan report that these attempts were characterized by poor planning and erratic management, factors which contributed to their failure and eventual abandonment.

3.3 Liberation Orientation

The failure of the development orientation and the increasing repression of martial law led those involved in the

(1) Fr. Sean Purcell, "Small Christian Communities," Selected Readings on Building Basic Christian Community-Community Organization, 1979.

(2) Fr. Rueben Birondo, personal correspondence outlining the structure of the BCC program in Tagum, November 25, 1985 and Gaspar and Cacayan, op. cit., 1982, p. 3..

BCC program to seek more comprehensive solutions to rural problems. These solutions involved organizing "the poor, deprived, and oppressed" into pressure groups and labour/peasant organizations through the BCC's. The organizational basis for a "liberation orientation" was established in some areas prior to the declaration of martial law. In Cagayan de Oro in Mindanao, sectoral organizing through Christian Community building had started as early as 1972. Within this diocese, organizations had been established for youth, professionals, farmers and workers.(1) In this early period, organizational activities centered mainly around support for the FFF in the form of both seminars and establishment of local chapters.(2) The focus of church-sponsored activities can be classified as being of a reformist nature, centering on the creation of cooperatives and credit unions or on social action projects in coordination with civic and government organizations.(3)

Initially, these reformist activities continued beyond the declaration of martial law. Military rule and the new development orientation of the government, however, quickly moved many BCC's toward a more complete liberation orientation.

Following the declaration of martial law, conditions worsened for

(1) Cagayan de Oro Archdiocesan Center for Community Action, CO-ACCCA Secretariat Organizational Structure, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, 1972.

(2) op. cit.

(3) op. cit.

rural farmers and workers. It has already been noted in the previous chapter that rural incomes declined substantially following the declaration of martial law.¹ According to the results of my 1985 survey of BCC's, the deteriorating economic situation at the local level was evident in the form of expensive commodities, low prices for agricultural products, lack of food, lack of land, and unemployment.⁽¹⁾ The deteriorating economic conditions of the masses were manifestations of much larger problems in the rural sector. The encroachment of transnational corporations in the countryside, escalating militarization and increased human rights violations were other manifestations of martial law experienced by the rural peasantry and proletariat.

One excellent example of this commercial genocide is the case of a joint venture between the government's National Development Corporation and an MNC called Gutrie.⁽²⁾ The joint venture was a plantation for the production of palm oil to be located in Loreto, Agusan del Sur. Hundreds of people resided on the lands chosen for the location of the plantation. There was strong resistance to forcible evictions, and the company hired a security force called the Lost Command to deal with obstinate tenants. In the span of three years beginning in 1980, the Lost Command, under the leadership of Col. Lademora, was involved in

(1) Results of Question #5 on an unpublished survey conducted in the Central Philippines in December, 1985. See Appendix 5.0.

(2) J. K. Laking, "Palm Oil Flows with Blood in the Land of Promise," Diliman Review, Vol. 32, No. 2, March-April, 1984, pp: 10-12.

killing of approximately 300 farmers and tribals in Agusan del Sur.(1) This process of land grabbing by MNC's under the protection of the military or para-military death squads, became commonplace under the export-oriented development programs of the martial law regime.

The inadequacies of the reformist and liturgical approaches under conditions of increasing repression led the BCC program to new directions in certain areas. Gaspar and Cacayan in their article "Basic Christian Communities as Vehicles for Salvation" sketch the process which led towards more concrete actions.(2) First, progressive elements in the church saw the need for the education of the people for justice, later known as "conscientization." This was followed by major advancements within the program in 1975, when tools for a structural analysis were adopted, and in 1976, when community organizing techniques were utilized. In the more progressive areas, program organizers introduced "structural analysis" to the ongoing conscientization program of the local lay leaders.(3)

The result of this was that people within the BCC's became more politicized. The people came to understand the "oppressive

(1) J. K. Laking, "Murderers as Heroes," The Diliman Review, Vol. 32, No. 2, March-April, 1984, p. 13.

(2) Gaspar and Cacayan, op. cit., p. 4.

(3) Structural analysis refers to the process of taking the understanding of poverty beyond analysis centered on the individual as the root of the problem towards an understanding of the structural nature of exploitation and oppression within the Philippines.

patterns and exploitative structures at work" and subsequently realized the need to organize themselves.(1) In the rural areas, it is reported that the people were conscientized to the feudal structure of land-ownership and to the "fascist nature of the martial law regime." (2) This politicization in rural areas led to the creation of organizations of peasants and agricultural workers.

The development of this liberation orientation or secularization of the program was the cause of some friction within the church. In areas such as Tagum, where the program was first initiated, the political-social action orientation was avoided by the organizers.(3) Progressive BCC's were a clear minority within the program. The activist minority eventually pooled their efforts to establish a new organization for better coordination of this liberation thrust in organizing. The result was the creation of the Basic Christian Community-Community Organizing (BCC-CO) program.

3.4 The BCC-CO Program

The BCC-CO program was created at a National Consultation in Cebu, held from November 26 to December 1, 1978. The new organization was the result of linking the Basic Christian

(1) Gaspar and Cacayan, op. cit., 1982, p. 4.

(2) Gaspar and Cacayan, op. cit., p.4.

(3) Fr. Reuben Bironzo, personal correspondence, November 25, 1985.

Communities with a community organizing approach, establishing sectoral organizations for support of the "peoples' movement." In adding this "educational conscientization component" to social action projects, members of the community were encouraged to both participate in the decisions that would ultimately affect them and to reflect on the basic causes of their poverty. The ultimate aim of the program was to break the dependency syndrome of the poor and assist them in becoming agents of their own liberation.(1) The remainder of this chapter will examine the success of the BCC-CO program in assisting the rural poor in achieving these aims.

3.5--Program Goals

In analysing the BCC-CO program, it is important to begin by looking at the initial premise on which the program was designed. The ideological foundations of the program were reflective of earlier currents in Christian Socialism in the Philippines where the feudalistic nature of the agrarian society was seen as a primary force behind poverty and social dislocation. The BCC-CO analysis went beyond this basic premise which had been central to previous "Christian analysis" of Philippine society. While their characterization of the capitalist economy as "sinful" lacked the analytical complexity of national democrats, their categorization

(1) R. L. Youngblood, Ideology and Christian Liberation in the New Society, (Unpublished), presented at the Second International Philippine Studies Conference June 27-30, 1981, Honolulu, Hawaii. p. 13.

of imperialism as one of the main social problems appears to close the ideological gap between the two groups.(1) The BCC-CO analysis of imperialism centers on an economy controlled by Marcos in the interests of foreign capital. It sees the state as manipulating laws and producing a situation where every sector of the economy has been opened up to foreign investment.

While these criticisms appear to align the church with the National Democratic Front, this is not necessarily the case. This is spelled out rather clearly in a BCC-CO publication where it states:

"There is now a new vehicle to ride, that of organizing communities. Let us not be alarmed that the vehicle may have some Marxist markings. People may ride the same kind of vehicle while travelling in opposite directions. And as Christians we know the direction in which we are headed."(2)

While the BCC-CO rejected any similarity between their program and that of the NDF, similarities continued to be found in their economic and political goals. In the economic field, they aimed for land reform, industrial agriculture owned by the Filipino People, and nationalization of all industries.(3) In the political field, they called for the active participation of all people in government decision-making and for the equal

(1) BCC-CO, The BCC-CO Program an Orientation, May, 1983, p. 8.

(2) BCC-CO Inter-Regional Secretariat, "Small Christian Communities," Some Notes on BCC-CO, Vol. 1, No. 6, June, 1982, p. 4.

(3) Visayas BCC-CO Regional Secretariat, BCC-CO Orientation, January, 25, 1983, pp. 26-27.

participation of all sectors in government.(1) The strategy through which this social transformation was to be facilitated was highly politicized local Christian community organizing and supporting the "people's movement."(2)

3.6 Building the BCC: Grassroots Organizing?

The process of building the BCC with a community-organizing component is much more time-consuming than state-sponsored initiatives like the Samahang Nayon program. The first stage of organization takes about three months.(3) This requires a catalyst or community organizer to move into an area targeted for organizing. Once established in the area, the organizer becomes a social scientist in the field engaging in social investigation and class analysis. It is crucial that the organizer develop an understanding of political, economic and cultural problems, as well as an understanding of stratification and local history.(4) From this initial study, the organizer selects a pilot area in the community. It is suggested that in the poorest areas including squatter communities, workers and peasants should be the priority sectors for a pilot organization.

(1) Visayas BCC-CO Regional Secretariat, op. cit., pp. 26-27.

(2) While the BCC-CO meticulously avoided any connection with the NDF, the "people's movement" was described by one director of the BCC-CO program as being the armed guerillas and other forces associated with the National Democratic Front.

(3) Interview with BCC-CO Organizer, November, 1985.

(4) Fr. Sean Purcell, op. cit., 1979.

After the pilot area is selected, the organizer contacts potential core leaders for the BCC. A minimum of three persons are chosen for the core leadership of the community .(1) The choice of leaders is a very important aspect as the leaders are the catalysts for change within the community. The basic criteria for being a core leader is that the person:

- is from the parish but not necessarily from the pilot area.
- is from the lower strata.
- need not have formal schooling.
- has no vested interests (i.e. links to the rich).
- is interested in serving the poor.(2)

These criteria ensure that the core leadership will be in touch with the local community and that the organization being established is not open to manipulation by local landlords or businessmen.

After the initial selection process has been completed, the core group goes through a 3-month-period of "initial consolidation." (3) This refers to a process of the core group repeating the initial integration and social investigation which the catalyst experienced. During this period, the core members go through a conscientization or educational phase involving class analysis, the re-orientation of values, development of a

(1) BCC-CO Inter-Regional Secretariat, "What is Building Basic Christian Communities?" Some Notes on BCC-CO, Vol. 1, No. 7, July, 1982, p. 5.

(2) BCC-CO Inter-Regional Secretariat, op. cit., p. 9.

(3) John Garillos, op. cit.

mass-oriented standpoint, and the utilization of a structural analysis of social conditions.(1)

After completion of the period of initial conscientization, the core group attempts to integrate with the targeted community. The integration of the core group centers on an activity initiated by the group. This first activity is important as it should generate reflection or interest within the community. Some suggested activities include: a community seminar on health or marketing, an X-Ray day, or something based on the social investigation of the target area.(2) It is further suggested in the same article that economic and political activities be avoided, unless a pressing matter like an immediate ejection of tenant arises, as at this point, corporate decision-making and people's power have not yet been developed.

This initial activity should attract more core members and input. The new core members after the activity go through the same process of conscientization. Seminars are offered on a variety of subjects including: Biblical and Historical Perspectives, Philippine History, History of the Filipino Church, and New Theological Concepts of the Sacraments (Liberation Theology). It could be argued that the educational component makes the pre-BCC stage very similar to that of the Samahang Naxos. There is, however, a qualitative difference between a government program

(1) BCC-CO Inter-Regional Secretariat, op. cit., p. 3.

(2) BCC-CO Inter-Regional Secretariat, op. cit., July, 1982, p. 14.

which locates social problems (i.e. poverty) within the individual, and the BCC-CO which locates it within the structure of society.

During the second educational phase, the members attempt to put theory into action and develop new activities. At this level, activities are determined through collective decision-making. Task forces are set up to oversee formation of the community and liturgy and to investigate community problems. The main task force of the community is the one concerned with sectoral organizing. The sectoral organization may take the form of an association of squatters, workers, or poor peasants. The purpose of this organization is to confront the problems of the poor. When the mass organization is established, the BCC is formed.

Garillos notes that while program organizers generally follow a step-by-step formula, the process is flexible. In many instances, this flexibility has hindered the development of the community organizing component.(1) The reason for this is that implementation of the program is dependent upon the community organizers and therefore reflects their conceptualization of the program. As a result, fieldworkers in some areas still concentrate solely on the organization of liturgically-based communities, while in others sectoral organizing is the focus.

(1) BCC-CO, Dialogues and Proceedings of the Inter-Regional Convention of BCC-CO Practitioners, October 4-12, 1982, p. 51.

The result of these divisions has been the development of two completely different types of Christian communities. The first type is reflective of the traditional BCC which clings to a spiritualist orientation, stressing religious services as the means to salvation. The second type is more indicative of a liberation theology approach, advocating a combined spiritual and material orientation. It aims for total human development, meaning the development, transformation, liberation and salvation of humanity in all aspects (economic, political, cultural, and spiritual).⁽¹⁾ The existence of these two polar tendencies shows that the fractionalism within the church, that is reflected among BCC organizers, can both hinder and assist in the formation of participatory organizations.

The fractionalism has generally proved to be a positive factor in areas such as the Visayas, but has produced mixed results in Mindanao. In Luzon, it has created a primarily liturgically-based program. Even within the Visayas, where sectoral organizing has progressed, the program has had mixed results in a number of areas. A 1982 survey of the BCC-CO program in the Visayas demonstrated this problem.

(1) BCC-CO, The BCC-CO Program: An Evaluation, BCC-CO Inter-Regional Secretariat, May, 1984.

TABLE 5.0: PROGRAM COVERAGE OF BCC-CO IN VISAYAS

Diocese	# of Parish	BCC-CO	BCC's with liturgical or development focus(1)
WESTERN VISAYAS			
Kalibo	10	32	48
Iloilo	9	69	-
Bacolod	7	21	50
CENTRAL VISAYAS			
Cebu	7	7	14
Bohol	6	-	16
Maasin	2	19	-
Dumaguete	7	30	86
EASTERN VISAYAS			
Catamaran	3	16	-
Borongan	3	6	-
Palo	4	11	52
Calbayog	19	68	-
Totals	77	279	266

Source: BCC-CO, Dialogues and Proceedings, op. cit., p. 50.

It is evident in this table that many of the dioceses are either highly polarized or completely polarized between the more conservative development or liturgical orientation and the liberation orientation of the BCC-CO. According to Fr. Ed Smith, this problem was in part a product of the hierarchical nature of the church.(2) Fr. Smith claimed that the sectoral organizing element of the program had not been implemented in many areas because of the conservative nature of the local bishop in these

(1) A liturgical focus refers to a strictly spiritualist or religious orientation within the BCC. A development focus refers to BCC's involved in coops and agro-herbal projects. These Communities are outside the jurisdiction of the BCC-CO program.

(2) Fr. Ed Smith, Interview by Author, October, 29, 1985. Note: The name of the person interviewed has been changed to protect his/her anonymity.

areas. He noted that only seven of the nation's one-hundred-seven bishops supported his program.(1)

A second priest, Fr. John Jones, complained that other Orders (of priests) were in fact attempting to undermine the work of the BCC's with the support of conservative local bishops. The Jesuits were singled out for having formed their own counter-organization called Active Non-Violence (AVN).(2) Jones noted that in Northern Samar, the Jesuits had been invited to organize at the behest of the local bishop, at the expense of the BCC's. The conservatives favoured the Gandhian principles of Non-Violence over the BCC support for the people's movement.

Bishops and local priests in many areas were suspicious of the program because they believed the church should concentrate only on spiritual matters. In areas under more conservative jurisdiction, the BCC was used as an instrument for furthering (the promotion of traditional "metaphysical idealistic activities within the church." (3) They see this orientation as opposed to the institutional interests of the church and view secularization of the BCC's as an invitation to leftist infiltration.

This particular view of the BCC's is shared by the Philippine military. Francoise Joaquin points out the suspicions of the military noting they refer to the BCC's

(1) Ed Smith, Interview by Author, December 17, 1985.

(2) Fr. Jones, Interview by Author, December 17, 1985. Note: The name of the person interviewed has been changed to protect their anonymity.

(3) Gaspar and Cacayan, op. cit., 1982, p. 5.

(Gagmay-nga-Kristohanang-Katilingan) as the small communist association (Gagmay-nga-Komunistang-Katilingan). (1) The military's suspicions of the BCC's were articulated by Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile in a 1980 statement, warning that a small section of the church has been victim to a political power play waged by the enemies of the state. The Minister claimed:

"The CPP/NPA planned to use NASSA to monitor activities of other church groups and organize power blocks within these organizations to aggravate the split between moderates and radical and thereby weaken the church hierarchy." (2)

Enrile noted that an important element in this strategy involved the BCC's which, in his words provided "a new breeding ground for dissent" within the church.

3.7--BCC's Local Control and Political Participation

The major objection to the BCC's with a community-organizing component by both the church and the state was the belief that these communities were open to control by the "national democrats." The suspicions of the military were rooted in a general suspicion of organizations operating in the rural sector and intensified by the BCC-CO aims of liberating the people from the oppressive system in the Philippines. The church's opposition to the program was based largely on a conceptualization of the BCC's becoming independent of the

(1) F. Joaquin, "Moving the Church from Convent to Community," Mr. and Ms., Vol II, No. 41, pp. 11-13.

(2) Cited in F. Joaquin, op. cit., pp. 11-13.

institutional church. The hierarchy felt that as long as the communities retained a religious base, they were secure from outside manipulation. However, if the BCC's became over-secularized, it was feared they could be radicalized.

While the results of my own survey (Appendix 5.1) are far from conclusive, it does suggest that within the program, there exist trends toward local control and secularization but these vary greatly from one area to the next.⁽¹⁾ While the majority of the community leaders completing the survey indicated that their organizations retained a religious orientation, all communities appeared to be involved in secular activities. In particular, communities were very active in developing sectoral organizations. Within the fourteen communities surveyed, the BCC's had organized themselves into ten farmer groups, five fishermen associations, nine youth groups, four mothers groups, five christian associations, one cultural group, and in one area, had organized a local of the National Federation of Sugar Workers. The extensive nature of sectoral organizing within all the communities surveyed is an indication of the growing secularization of these communities.

The survey attempted to determine the levels of participation within the individual BCC's to find out if the organization was centrally controlled from the regional

(1) The communities covered in this December, 1985 Survey, included Kabankalan, Negros Occidental; Escalante, Negros Occidental, Guthulungan, Negros Oriental, and Bantayan Island. Note: See Map 5.0.

headquarters, or influenced by either the initial community organizer, the community leader, or was controlled by the members. The results showed that only one of the fourteen community leaders felt that control over the local organization was exercised by the regional office in Cebu. Nine respondents said control rested with the community organizer, while five said that the local community leader was the controlling force behind the BCC. Only 3 leaders made the claim that in their community, the membership was responsible for the the directions taken by the BCC. These results once again confirm the importance of the local organizer to the community as in more than 50 per cent of the BCC's, this individual was perceived to be the motivating force behind the organization. The fact that only three of the communities were regarded as under membership control seems to indicate that in the majority of areas, the BCC-CO program has yet to achieve its goals of popular participation.

A further examination of the data (Appendix 5.1) reveals important trends toward local participation. In Bantayan Island, a community where organization had been initiated within the last three years, each of the BCC's responding reported that they were dependent upon the community organizer for directing the community. This response seems to indicate that early in its life, the BCC is highly dependent on its initial facilitator.

In areas where the BCC's were more established, evidence showed organizational control gravitating towards the membership. Among the four BCC's surveyed in Escalante, the newest

organizations showed control remaining with the organizer, while the more established BCC's identified the community leader and the membership as the controlling forces. Again, this seems to indicate that as the communities mature, they develop independence from the organizer and local control increases.

This process of increasing organizational control is most evident among the BCC's in Guihulngan, Negros Oriental. Here, the BCC program had been established for 10 years and the trend among those communities surveyed was toward local control and participation. Among the six communities surveyed, two claimed that the membership exercised local control, while the other four said that the orientation was determined by the community leader. A further indication of local control within Guihulngan is the fact that this was the only area where respondents indicated the focus of the community was non-religious. This response was received from communities which had been established from four to six years prior to the survey. This is a clear indication that among the more mature communities, local control was a reality.

The results of the survey also show that political activity, another important indicator of participation, intensified as the BCC's matured. Within the newly developed communities in Bantayan Island, political activity among the BCC's was at a rudimentary level. While a sectoral organization of small fishermen had been established in each of the three communities responding, political activity did not progress beyond the point of holding rallies. This low level of political activism can be

accounted for by both the immaturity of the organisation and the low levels of militarization in this relatively remote island.(1)

In areas that were both heavily militarized and had longer established communities such as in Escalante, Negros Occidental,(2) heightened political activity was evident even among newly organized BCC's. Here, the small communities became involved in protests against illegal (Japanese Trawler) fishing and actions which included pickets, petitions and rallies. Other more advanced forms of political activity included the endorsement of an election boycott by the oldest of the organizations surveyed. It should be noted that this endorsement supported a position taken on the issue by the NDE, suggesting a possible trend toward more radical actions among the more established BCC's.

(1) Militarization in the Visayas assisted in the political development of the BCC's as the Christian Community became an important element in efforts to expose and prevent human rights violations by the military. One of the major functions defined by the Visayan Region's Coordinators was its role in protesting increased militarization. See: Inter-Regional Convention, op. cit., p. 52.

(2) One concrete example of this militarization and ensuing repression was the Escalante Massacre in September 20, 1985. In this instance, a Civilian Home Defence force opened fire on a crowd of five thousand people involved in a general strike. The result was twenty-nine deaths and one-hundred-seventy-eight people injured.

That the boycott movement was a trend among the more mature BCC's was evident in a report delivered at the Convention of BCC-CO practitioners (1982). It stated that there had been "a boycott of elections throughout the region." (1)

The survey also shows evidence of increased political activism among the communities of Guihulngan. The increased political activism was largely a response to increased militarization in the Guihulngan area. This particular community had experienced militarization since 1980 when Scout Rangers of the Philippine Army began operating in the municipality and neighbouring mountains. According to my survey, political action in this community took the form of rallies and dialogues with the military. Specifically, the Community demanded the abolition of Secret Marshalls (Death Squads) and protested against the establishment of the military detachment in Guihulngan. (2)

Increased local control was also evident in Guihulngan in the form of increased organizational initiatives. Within all the BCC's surveyed in Guihulngan, farmer groups had been organized and had joined together to form a municipal organization. This organization had further affiliated with a provincial organization called the Future of Small Farmers in Negros Oriental. This provincial association was under the influence of

(1) Inter-Regional Convention, op. cit., p. 52.

(2) Information from the Guihulngan file at the BCC-CO Regional Office, Cebu City, Philippines.

the "people's movement" through the NDF.(1)

Further evidence of organizational development was provided by Fr. Smith. He noted that in this particular community, the whole structure of the BCC had been re-organized by the local community. Liturgy went from being the central focus of the BCC to being organized as only a committee of the farmer organization. Within other communities, the sectoral organizations are normally committees of the liturgically-based BCC. Thus, in Guihulngan, the organizational base of the community had become structured around production.

In sum, the trends evident in the survey indicate that fostering participatory organizations was possible through the structure of the BCC-CO. The survey showed that as the communities developed, local control increased. Manifestations of this local control included an increasingly secular orientation in the form of increased political action and organizational development. This increasing local control suggests that the program in selected areas provided local people with the skills and structure needed to confront their oppression.

4. Conclusion

In conclusion, it can be said that organizational initiatives sponsored by the church do provide room for participation as shown in the examination of the BCC-CO program.

(1) Fr. Smith, op. cit., October, 1985.

The success of these initiatives has been produced mainly by the church manifesting its own contradictions. The ability of progressive forces to act within the church is mainly a product of political fragmentation and decentralization within the church. The phenomenon of participatory organizing, however, has its limitations due to restraints on the program emanating from the church hierarchy. The hierarchy's concerns with its own material interests and the church's relationship with the state hindered the work of more socially active members of the church and the progress of the program. In areas where the conservative hierarchy was in control, the program was reduced largely to the function of evangelization, buttressing the traditional hierarchical nature of the church.

The contradictions which characterized the church in the 1970's were products of the church's responses to martial law. The conditions under martial law revealed the oppressive nature of the state as it worked in the direct interests of monopoly capital. The repression of the martial law regime accelerated trends toward division within the church. It produced a situation where a hierarchy, overly concerned with the church's material interests, placed itself virtually at the service of the state. Some segments of the lower clergy during this period integrated with the peasants and became increasingly involved in social action, which eventually brought them in conflict with the state. The combination of increased activism within the church and growing state repression served to further accentuate

divisions between the conservatives and the radicals resulting in the polarization of the church.

These divisions within the church were reproduced within the structure of the Basic Christian Communities. The result was two apparently diverging tendencies within the program. One tendency within the program was characterised by a liturgical orientation which was said to "strengthen the people's inclination towards spirituality rather than action for liberation". The other tendency reflected in the BCC-CO was oriented towards the liberation of humanity in this world. This approach analysed the structures of the people's material oppression and sought to confront it by creating organizational structures through which people could articulate their needs and demands.

This liberating tendency evident in the BCC-CO has developed largely as a response to the oppressive conditions of martial law. The origins of this program can be traced to the highly traditional liturgically-based communities. The BCC-CO broke away from this strictly liturgical orientation, however, in response to the deterioration in material and social conditions under martial law. These conditions led once again to the rejection of reformism towards the adoption of a more radical program of action in the form of support for the "people's movement."

While this second tendency was suppressed in many areas by the church hierarchy and confronted by the counter-organizing efforts of the Jesuits ANV and the liturgical BCC's, in some

cases it was successful. Participatory organizations have been established in some areas such as Guihulngan and appear to be developing in other areas such as Escalante. In the most advanced cases, local control had been established and sectoral organizations had gone on to establish links with the NDF.

In those areas where participatory initiatives have succeeded, they have been facilitated by a number of factors. The main factors in the development of genuinely participatory organizations were: First, the local hierarchy allowed the BCC-CO to operate and organize within their area. Second, the facilitator gave the local BCC a strong community-organizing component. And third, the objective conditions were conducive to community organizing; the combination of economic and military repression tends to assist organizing efforts. Under these conditions, which were clearly evident in the communities surveyed in Negros, participatory organizing was possible.

In conclusion, it should be reiterated that church-sponsored organizations provide room for genuinely participatory development. Clearly, the possibilities have been conditioned by fractionalism within the church, produced by that institution's relationship with the Martial Law state. The tendency which produced participatory development resulted from church members responding to the oppression experienced by workers and peasants. The universality of this form of development, however, is severely restricted by both an oppressive state and a recalcitrant hierarchy.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

The objective of this thesis was to compare the ability of the state and the church to promote participatory organizations during martial law. The study has shown that the state is incapable of fostering organizations which provide for local control, while the Catholic church has had a measure of success in this area. The contrast between the results of the attempts of these two institutions to promote genuinely participatory organizations can only be understood as a manifestation of the nature of these institutions and their imbeddedness in a peripheral capitalist society. The main contribution of this thesis is its demonstration that the nature of the interests represented within the sponsoring institution is a powerful indicator of its degree of success in promoting participatory organizations.

In the case of the state, organizational initiatives such as the Samahang Nayon program operated as a trojan horse. This program, dressed up in the rhetoric of popular participation, served only to centralize state control over the rural sector. While the peasantry did initially participate to gain access to land and credit, the unwillingness of the state to deliver on this promise, except to a few areas, revealed the true character of the program. The program represented another short-term attempt to co-opt the peasantry with no intention of transforming the relations of production in the rural sector.

A major contribution of this thesis is its development of a clearer understanding of the state's inability to promote genuine

participation. It was demonstrated that in order to understand the actions of the peripheral state, it was necessary to examine the internal class contradictions of the society mediated by the state, along with its relationship to the global capitalist system. Through a historical materialist analysis of the Philippines, it was demonstrated how the global capitalist relations of production are transformed into internal relations of domination. The articulation of capitalist and pre-capitalist modes of production produced a society characterized by extreme inequality and constant social crisis in the form of continued agrarian unrest. The economic relations of domination are reproduced within a state structure which appears instrumentalist in character as it severely under-represents non-dominant class interests. The over-representation of dominant class interests within the state explains why, in the process of reacting to both economic crises and the social movements which they spawn, the state is hostile to independent organizations of farmers and workers. The analysis demonstrates that obstacles to greater participation and rural reform lie in the nature of the state.

Throughout its history, the Philippine state has responded with hostility to independent organizations of peasants and rural workers. Under the control of the landed elites, the state violently opposed the organizing of peasants and workers as the power of these groups was perceived as a threat to the continued control of the state by the landed oligarchy. In cases where the state did promote rural organizations, (e.g. following the HUR

3 OF 3

MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS
STANDARD REFERENCE MATERIAL 1010a
(ANSI and ISO TEST CHART No. 2)

rebellion), it did so to forestall the reorganization of popular forces. The fear of independent organizations emerging from the rural sector continued under martial law. While martial law curtailed the power of the landed bourgeoisie, it did not open any new avenues of participation for peasants and workers but merely transformed the nature of class domination within the state. Martial law resulted in the expulsion of the representatives of the landed oligarchy and national bourgeoisie from their positions within the government and signaled the ascension of interests linked to monopoly capital. This transformation produced a regime that was similarly unwilling to tolerate independent organizations. In place of independent organizations, the state created centralized structures such as Samahang-Nayon through which it sought to control unrest and at the same time, modernize the process of production among small farmers.

While the state was unable to promote genuine participation, the study of the church-sponsored BCC-CO program demonstrated that there was room for participatory initiatives fostered by this non-state institution. The development of the BCC-CO program was the result of the internal contradictions within the church and its fragmented response to martial law. Initially, the Basic Christian Communities were promoted as a program of evangelization or deepening of spiritual consciousness to strengthen the grassroots support of the church. Under martial law, however, the more progressive elements within this program

split off to form their own program. The major objective of the progressive wing of the Basic Christian Communities was to raise people's consciousness to the nature of their systemic oppression. The educational component encouraged people to take part in decision-making processes and at the same time, provided them with the organizational structures needed to confront the inequalities inherent in the economic and political system.

The second major contribution of this thesis is its illumination of the nature of the church which provided a basis for understanding the church's initiatives in the rural sector. The thesis demonstrated that understanding the church required examining the institution not simply as a religious organization but as an institution imbedded in a larger set of social relations. The church must be seen as an institution with its own material and class interests and it is these extra-religious factors which produce contradiction and fragmentation within the church. The church's modest successes in generating organizations over which the masses exercised control and through which they could oppose the state was a product of the fragmentation within the church. As a result of this fragmentation, activist priests and nuns pursued development strategies antithetical to both the material interests of the church hierarchy as well as the state.

While the church does offer room for the promotion of genuinely participatory organizations, it is clear that local, popular control of development encounters definite obstacles.

One major limitation is the material interests of the church hierarchy. The church remains a large landowner, controls major financial institutions and most of the country's universities. These material interests have defined the church's traditional role as a strong supporter of the state. Throughout the church's history, these interests generated support for the Philippine republic in its struggle to put down an agrarian revolt in the 1950's, and for the Marcos government in its struggle against Communism. This factor will continue to limit the ability of the church to lead the struggle for agrarian reform.

1. Future Political Possibilities

It is unfortunate that, after bearing the brunt of the Marcos dictatorship's oppression, peasants and rural workers were unable to play a more prominent role in its downfall. While the recent change of government offers some possibilities for reform, the objective class bias of the state remains fundamentally unaltered under Corazon Aquino. Once again, the reorganization of actors within the state left the interests of the rural peasants and workers largely unrepresented. With the more progressive elements of the coalition having been marginalized prior to the coup, Aquino's government seems to be a mere change of guard, the coalition being a combination of members of the old pre-martial law political elite and former members of the Marcos cabinet. Big business and land-owners are well-represented within this coalition: the Finance Minister Jaime Ongpin,

president of Benguet Mining Corporation, one of the country's largest mining companies; the President, Corazon Cojuangco-Aquino, comes from one of the largest land-owning families in the country; and the Defence Minister, Juan Ponce Enrile, is one of the country's wealthiest citizens, having shared a monopoly over the coconut industry with Aquino's cousin Eduardo Cojuangco.

While the reconciliatory objectives of President Aquino herself may translate into short-term accommodations with workers and peasants in the form of less overt oppression, the long term prospects for genuine social change are at best tenuous. The limitations for real transformation were the subject of concern expressed by the Catholic Organization for Peace and Development (Canada) in a recent statement which criticized Aquino for failing to "live up to the promise of land reform for poor tenant farmers." (1) The article further noted that the areas targeted for land reform, from which peasants had been expelled, were being utilized by Massey Ferguson and other multinational corporations for cash-cropping. This is an indication that, in spite of the new government's best intentions, its ability to reform the rural sector is constrained by the same interests which had subverted previous reforms--the landed bourgeoisie and monopoly capital.

If any genuine reform is to take place under the new government, it must be undertaken at the behest of, and through the support of organized workers and farmers. It is unfortunate

(1) Ottawa Citizen, July 14, 1986, p. A11.

that many people tend to interpret the demise of Marcos as the end of the struggle. The tendency after such victories is to let down one's guard and enjoy the exhilaration of the moment. Yet, a major lesson to be learned from Philippine history is that whatever gains have been made in terms of agrarian reform, have been the product of organized worker and peasant struggles against the state. If any future reforms are to be procured, the masses should not count on the goodwill of their central government. They must remain organized and vigilant.

2. Possibilities for Future Research

The ousting of the Marcos regime does present many new opportunities for doing research in the Philippines. The possibility of collecting up-to-date and reliable data on government initiatives under Marcos presents itself with the change of guard. It also raises the possibility that groups engaged in organizational work such as the church would be more willing to make themselves accessible under the less repressive circumstances that exist at present. This being the case, I believe it would be important to look at the BCC-CO program on a wider scale. My own research concentrated on the Visayas, but the analysis could be extended to the BCC-CO program in other areas-- in particular Mindanao, where the conflict between military and guerillas had been more intense.

The recent change of government also raises some interesting problematics for future research. I think that if any new

research in this area is to be done, it would be important to re-examine the nature of the state, paying particular attention to its class composition and examine any changes in the state's relations with the rural sector. In terms of the relationship of the church to rural development, it would be important to document developments within the BCC-CO program under Aquino's government. It would be interesting to find out if the program retained the anti-imperialist, populist orientation which had characterised the organisation under Marcos or whether the activists within the church have been treading a more moderate line since the coup. One final area which requires detailed examination which has received only sketchy treatment in this thesis is the community-organising efforts of the New Peoples Army and the Communist Party of the Philippines. These organizations, along with their umbrella group, the National Democratic Front, were the leading opposition forces under martial law. They were a constant point of reference for the interventions within rural areas by both the state and the church, and they continue to present the best prospects for genuine social transformation. For these reasons, the organizational efforts of these insurgent groups represent a fruitful avenue for future study. The prospects for research in this final area, however, remain very limited by the underground nature of this organization.

APPENDIX 4.0

ANNUAL GROWTH OF REGISTERED SAMAHAN NAYON AND MEMBERS 1974 TO 1979

REGION	1974-5		1975-6		1976-7		1977-8		1978-9
	SN	MEMBERS	SN	MEMBERS	SN	MEMBERS	SN	MEMBERS	
I	83	6,607	215	5,411	36	4,401	3	2,607	48
II	157	8,521	58	5,201	64	3,160	35	1,997	2
III	123	13,912	155	17,204	129	10,554	6	1,646	11
IV	225	13,983	159	9,737	84	2,399	38	280	8
V	136	6,869	95	4,192	74	6,521	27	1,650	5
VI	163	8,766	636	31,507	27	5,155	49	683	2
VII	68	5,982	317	7,769	58	8,420	12	634	51
VIII	601	25,209	271	9,870	252	10,010	31	1,774	41
IX	81	4,481	45	3,928	69	3,373	11	551	25
X	150	5,275	137	23,577	85	3,680	132	7,603	4
XI	(37)	4,068	350	13,443	60	7,419	31	5,178	12
XII	786	37,546	142	10,308	126	2,668	26	3,067	15

TOTAL 2,536/141,219 2,380/142,147 1,064/ 67,760 401/ 27,650 224

SOURCE: GELIA T. CASTILLO, OP CIT, P.24

APPENDIX-5.0

Methodological Problems of the Survey

There are a number of serious drawbacks to doing survey analysis within rural areas of developing nations. Some of these problems are pointed out by Rogelia E. Pe-Pua, in her study of cross-cultural research.(1) The main criticism of this type of methodology is that it is overly structured and removes the researcher from the community which is under study. The removal of the researcher from the study precludes a comprehensive understanding of the group under observation. While this author is in agreement with Pe-Pua's formulation of the problem of non-participatory (survey) research, this methodology was employed in this instance due to constraints of time, language barriers, and the need to collect systematic data.

These larger methodological problems aside, the survey itself also presented some specific problems. The process of collecting data within the context of ongoing militarization is particularly problematic. These conditions raised two problems in particular. The first of these was that the National Office of the BCC-CO along with the National Secretariat for Social Action were both suspicious of outside researchers, fortunately one of the regional offices was much more accommodating. The second

(1) Rogelia E. Pe-Pua, *Pagtatanong-Tanong: A Potential Method For Cross-Cultural Research*, *Occasional Papers No. 1*, Department of Psychology, University of the Philippines, Diliman, Philippines, 1984.

problem was in the nature of the questionnaire. The political situation placed limits on the types of questions which could be asked in the survey. Questions concerning the organization's relations with the state, and possible links between the BCC's and the underground were avoided as the information could prove damaging in the wrong hands.

One final problem with the questionnaire concerned the respondents. In all cases, the respondents to the questionnaire were community leaders. This was a limitation of the questionnaire as it could only be filled out by respondents who were literate. For this reason the survey reflects only the opinions of the community leaders and not necessarily the membership of the community. In spite of these limitations the survey provides an one source for understanding the evolution of the BCC-CO program in the areas surveyed.

QUESTIONNAIRE (TRANSLATED FROM ILONGO DIALECT)

1. How long has the BCC-CO been operating within your community?
 - (a) 1 to 3 years.
 - (b) 4 to 6 years.
 - (c) 7 to 9 years.
 - (d) 10 years or more.

2. What is the most common occupation among the members of the BCC-CO?

- (a) Farmers (Rice)
- (b) Farmers (Coconut)
- (c) Sugar Workers
- (d) Fishermen
- (e) Other -----

3. What is the primary focus of your BCC?

- (a) Religious
- (b) Non-Religious

4. Who controls the decision making process with the BCC?

- (a) the leadership in Cebu.
- (b) community organizers.
- (c) the community leader.
- (d) community members.

5. What are the main socio-economic problems affecting the community?

What activities have been undertaken to deal with these
socio-economic problems? (Please list all activities).

(a) Economic Projects (eg. Cooperatives, Agro-Extension) Types _____

(b) Political Action _____

(c) Sectoral Organization(s) (Please name the organization) _____

6. Location of your BCC? _____

APPENDIX 5.2

RESULTS OF QUESTIONNAIRE OF BASIC CHRISTIAN COMMUNITIES

LENGTH OF OPERATION BY COMMUNITY

LOCATION	1-3 YEARS	4-6 YEARS	7-9 YEARS	10 YEARS PLUS
KABANKALAN			1	
BANTAYAN	3			
ESCALANTE	1	2	-	1
GUIHULGNAN	4	2	-	-
TOTAL	7	4	1	1

2. PRIMARY OCCUPATION BY COMMUNITY

LOCATION	RICE FARM	SUGAR WORKERS	FISHING	COCONUT/RICE	COCONUT/FI
KABANKALAN	-	1	-	-	-
BANTAYAN	-	-	3	-	-
ESCALANTE	1	-	1	1	1
GUIHULGNAN	3	-	-	3	1
TOTAL	4	4	4	4	1

3. ORIENTATION OF THE BCC BY COMMUNITY

LOCATION	RELIGIOUS	NON-RELIGIOUS	RELIGIOUS/NON RELIGIOUS
KABANKALAN	1	-	-
BANTAYAN	3	-	-
ESCALANTE	4	-	-
GUIHULGNAN	4	-	2
TOTAL	12	-	2

4. GROUP DETERMINING FOCUS OF BCC BY COMMUNITY

DETERMINANT	KABANKALAN	BANTAYAN	ESCALANTE	GUIGULGNAN	TOTAL
REGIONAL OFFICE	-	-	1	-	1
/COMMUNITY ORGANIZER					
COMMUNITY ORGANIZER	1	3	1	-	5
COMMUNITY LEADER/ COMMUNITY ORGANIZER	-	-	1	1	2
COMMUNITY LEADER	-	-	-	3	3
MEMBERS/COMMUNITY ORGANIZER	-	-	-	1	1
MEMBERS	-	-	1	1	2

5. MAJOR ECONOMIC PROBLEMS BY COMMUNITY

PROBLEM	KABANKALAN	BANTAYAN	ESCALANTE	GUIGULGNAN	TOTAL
EXPENSIVE GOODS	-	-	3	5	8
LACK OF FOOD	-	3	3	1	7
LOW PRICES	-	-	3	4	7
FOR PRODUCE, FISH					
LACK OF LAND	-	-	-	5	5
LACK OF CLOTHES	-	3	1	-	4
LACK OF MEDICINE	-	3	-	-	3
UNEMPLOYMENT	-	3	1	-	4
ECONOMIC CRISIS	1	-	1	-	2
LACK OF HOUSING	-	-	1	-	1
LACK OF FARM IMPLIMENTS	-	-	-	1	-
PRICES CONTROLLED	-	-	-	1	1
LOW WAGES	-	-	1	-	1

6. ECONOMIC PROJECTS BY COMMUNITY

PROJECT	KABANKALAN	BANTAYAN	ESCALANTE	GUIGULGNAN	TOTAL
CREDIT UNION	-	3	2	-	5
ALAYON	-	-	-	5	5
DAGYAW	-	-	-	5	5
COOP	-	-	2	-	2
RAISE ANIMALS	-	1	1	-	1
BCC-CO	1	-	-	-	1
PROTEST ILLEGAL FISHING	-	-	1	-	1
SECTORAL ORGANIZING	-	-	1	-	1

7. POLITICAL ACTION BY COMMUNITY

ACTION	KABANKALAN	BANTAYAN	ESCALANTE	GUIGULGNAN	TOTAL
PETITION	-	-	1	-	1
RALLY	-	3	2	6	11
PICKET	-	-	1	-	1
PROTEST	1	-	1	-	2
MARCH	-	-	1	4	5
ELECTION BOYCOTT	-	-	1	-	1
LAKBAYAN	-	-	-	3	3
DIALOGUE	-	-	-	5	5

8. SECTORAL ORGANIZATIONS BY COMMUNITY

ORGANIZATION	KABANKALAN	BANTAYAN	ESCALANTE	GUIGULGNAN	TOTAL
ASSOC OF FISHERMEN	-	3	2 (PROV)	2	5
YOUTH GROUP	-	3	2	5	10
CULTURAL GROUP	-	-	1	-	1
MOTHERS ORGANIZATION	-	8	1	-	1
CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION	-	3	2	-	5
FARMERS ORGANIZATION	-	-	2	6 (PROV)	8
SUGAR WORKERS	1	-	-	-	1

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