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**DEVELOPMENT AS A MODE OF RESISTANCE:
WOMEN AND STRUGGLE IN PALESTINE**

by

Pamela Scholey, B.A.

A thesis submitted to
the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfilment of
the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

Institute of Political Economy

Carleton University
Ottawa, Ontario
August 31, 1994
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DEVELOPMENT AS A MODE OF RESISTANCE;
WOMEN AND STRUGGLE IN PALESTINE

submitted by
Pamela J. Scholey, B.A.

in partial fulfilment of the requirements
for the degree of Master of Arts

Director, Institute of Political Economy

Thesis Supervisor

Dr. Necla Tschirgi, External Examiner

Carleton University
September 14, 1994

ABSTRACT

This thesis is dual in purpose, and is based on field research conducted in occupied Palestine during May-July and December 1993. First, the story of women's participation in Palestinian resistance since 1967 and what their activism has meant for Palestinian liberation and women's emancipation will be told; second, we will explore problems in development theory that Palestinian women's activity presents, particularly the link that women provide between the notions of "development" and "resistance". It will be found that "development", defined as equitable access to economic, political, and social resources, necessarily incorporates struggle, and that Palestinian women have not only been defying capitalist exploitation, but patriarchal oppression as well. The nature of this struggle demands that development theory incorporate analyses of women's position in production and in civil society, the nature of organization and democracy in society, and the location of struggle itself. Finally, the relationship between the epistemological stance of the researcher and the type and quality of the knowledge gained will be examined. It will be resolved that the research process must be something engaged in *with* the subjects of study rather than for or about them.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The product of a graduate degree is never the result of one person's labour. In recognition of this fact, there are several people and institutions that I would like to acknowledge and thank for their tireless support and unselfish effort. Without their contributions this thesis would have been impossible to research and write.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION AND THE PROBLEMS WITH RESEARCH

Over past decades the problem of occupied Palestine¹ has regularly been featured in the headlines as wars, oil crises, peace initiatives, and brutal violence hit centre stage and then recede. The most recent of these developments, the Oslo Accord of September 1993 and the spate of violence that has followed in its wake, currently occupies most of the Western imagination about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Now, we are told, the problem is finally solved and peace will ultimately triumph with the efforts and good will of all involved. Who have been historically, and are still, forgotten are everyday Palestinians, who though frequently seen on our television screens, remain nameless and unconsidered. Sustaining themselves through twenty-seven years of Israeli occupation, these Palestinians not only were the initiators of a process that has eventually led to the new peace, but they are also the ones who will have to live with the outcomes of this untried deal.

The Palestinian effort to remain *sumud* (steadfast) on their land has been a story obscured by the more prominent plot of Arab terrorism waged against innocent Israeli civilians. However, with the intifada of 1987-1990

¹ I define Palestine as the Israeli-occupied Gaza Strip and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, defined by the pre-1967 borders.

international perception of the situation of occupied Palestine began to change. Nevertheless, the stories behind the intifada are still largely untold. Sustaining the uprising was the activism of Palestinian women engaged in a whole host of activities too mundane to normally interest the Western viewer schooled in more exciting and brutal tales of Middle East conflict.

Palestinian women fed and nurtured the intifada through their efforts to disarticulate the Palestinian economy and society from Israeli control and oppression. Much of this disarticulation was achieved through the development of separate (from "official" Israeli arrangements) structures that were organized by various Palestinian political factions in order to meet the everyday needs of the Palestinian community in the West Bank and Gaza. These formations constituted a form of counter-development, created as they were to not only meet the development requirements of Palestinians, but their national liberation needs as well. Organized and engaged in projects supporting agriculture (including home economy and cooperative production), education, and healthcare, among others, women were key to this counter-development. While Palestinian women worked initially for the emancipation of their nation, they also found avenues of liberation for themselves.

In the months and years following their initial successes, years that saw the Gulf War fought and the

resulting peace talks initiated, women experienced an erosion not only of the gains made for their nation, but also of those made for themselves. A myriad of factors were responsible, including the rise of conservative and Islamist forces, economic hardship due to the Gulf War and the Israeli closures of their borders to Palestinian labour, increased political factionalization inside the West Bank and Gaza, and international pressure on Palestinian organizations and institutions to accept and support any deal possible. The current situation seems bleak, with a new modernizationist development agenda (as spear-headed by the World Bank and international donors and investors) in place, along with much uncertainty about the state of democracy and civil society in Palestine and the very limited degree of autonomy granted to the Palestinian authority. Nonetheless, Palestinian women continue with their multi-faceted struggle to sustain themselves and their families, support their community and nation, and fight for their human rights.

1.1 The Research Project and its Questions

This research project is an effort to fulfil a dual agenda. On the one hand, this is a story-telling venture about the Palestinian struggle and women's nationalist and feminist challenges. On the other hand, this story brings to light many theoretical questions left unanswered by conventional development paradigms. Women's resistance

activities in spheres normally considered as "development" and/or by development theory make this link clear. This project, then, is an analysis of Palestinian women's role in development as a mode of resistance or struggle, both for national liberation and for women's emancipation.

Two works, Maria Mies's "National Liberation and Women's Liberation" (1986) and Julie Peteet's Gender in Crisis: Women and the Palestinian Resistance Movement (1991), are taken as points of departure for analysis of development as resistance. Mies examines women's involvement in nationalist (and socialist) revolutions and concludes that little is emancipatory about them for women. The problem, she states, is that while

there may have been de facto changes in the sexual division of labour during the liberation struggle...neither men's nor women's consciousness had undergone a radical change....Such a change could only have been brought about if an independent women's movement had waged a struggle against patriarchal man-woman relations during and after the liberation war....such a change of consciousness could not take place because there was little change in the material production relations, of which the patriarchal man-woman relation is part and parcel. In the 'dual economy' established after the revolution, the maintenance or creation of patriarchal man-woman relations, as well as their institutionalization in the nuclear family are absolutely crucial for the building up of a 'modern economy', based on the growth model (1986:197-197).

Mies deduces that because the gendered division of labour remains fundamentally unaltered, a lasting and significant change in men's and women's consciousness regarding women's rights cannot occur. Such a change in consciousness and, one

assumes, a change in the division of labour, will only transpire as a result of feminist activism.

Peteet (1991) examines the nature of Palestinian women's nationalist resistance in the refugee camps in Lebanon and finds that Palestinian women in Lebanon have politicized their traditional roles, thus transforming domesticity to encompass political meaning and activism leading to feminist consciousness (Peteet, 1991:71-72, 148, 183-188). However, she does not deal with the argument that the political transformation of domesticity to meet nationalist needs can actually legitimize traditional roles. Nor does Peteet thoroughly analyze the exploitation that is implicit in the political transformation of women's domestic roles.

In occupied Palestine, there has been no significant change in the sexual division of labour. In fact, women's traditional roles have been reinforced and expanded. Nonetheless, there has emerged (in contrast to Mies's assertions), at least on the part of many women and some men, a new gender consciousness. This shift in consciousness is directly attributable to women's activism in the Palestinian resistance movement which managed to accomplish national and feminist goals. This does not mean to say that their participation in Palestinian struggle has not been exploited. But despite the increased burden of work, and the setbacks and backlash that Palestinian women have been subject to, certain openings have been forced open for women's emancipation.

This thesis seeks to understand how Palestinian women have achieved gender and national liberation victories. While Mies is not incorrect in her observation that women are exploited in nationalist revolutions and later "pushed back", this is not all that has happened in Palestine. As Peteet has noted, women are able to take advantage of revolutionary contexts in order to build gender consciousness. Though not complete, and in many cases deceptive, these gains must be understood within a larger context than conventional development theory allows. As we will see in the Palestinian case, issues of the state, civil society and local organization (particularly NGOs), democracy, and locations of struggle are important to consider if we are to understand the process of social transformation. Thus, the questions that this thesis seeks to answer are:

1. Usually resistance activities are seen as destructive and counter to development. How and why are development and resistance coincident?

2. Both development and resistance are perceived to be male-dominated and male-centred activities. What are the emancipatory and transformational possibilities of development as a mode of resistance for women and for society at large?

3. How must theory evolve and what does it need to incorporate in order to assist our fuller understanding of development processes?

The remainder of this chapter will concern itself with

epistemological and methodological issues. The next chapter will survey the major paradigms of development theory in an effort to identify its weaknesses and blind alleys as well as its important signposts. This discussion will provide us with some initial theoretical understanding of the case of Palestine. More importantly, however, we will approach Palestinian development and resistance with the theoretical task of developing a deeper understanding of women's role in development and its varied possibilities. The third chapter will provide the historical, economic, social, and political information necessary to understand the political economy of the occupation of Palestine. Special attention will be paid to women's responses to the occupation and to the outlook for Palestinian development and autonomous self-determination in the context of the Oslo Accord and the World Bank's recent involvement. The next chapter will examine three case studies in Palestinian development that features women's activism and/or concerns. Their past achievements, the constraints they currently face, and their future prospects will be examined as a way of understanding the terrain on which Palestinians now stand as they find their way forward. Finally, the last chapter will return to development theory with insights gained from the experience of women and the Palestinian struggle. Development theory, it will be found, must expand in several directions in order to incorporate factors not traditionally considered in any one paradigm.

Issues brought to the forefront by post-colonial, feminist, and civil society inquiry will broaden our understanding of the nature of development and its possibilities.

1.2 Epistemological Considerations

So saturated with meanings, so overdetermined by history, religion and politics are labels like 'Arab' or 'muslim' [or 'Palestinian'] as subdivisions of 'The Orient' that no one today can use them without some attention to the formidable polemical mediations that screen the objects, if they exist at all, that the labels designate (Said, 1985:108-109).

Rare are the scholars that I have met or read who work with issues of the Arab or Muslim world who are not subject to the pressure that Edward Said refers to in the above passage. Even while wrestling with the concrete information at hand--the reports of torture in Israeli prisons; the exploitive, repressive, and brutal nature of the occupation of Palestine; the studies of the damage sustained by the children of Gaza--the need to explain, to justify, to convince, a non-specialist mostly-Western (orientalist)² audience of the right of the Palestinian people to resist the military occupation they have

² "Orientalism" here refers to Edward Said's notion that it is

a collective notion identifying "us" Europeans as against all "those" non-Europeans, and indeed it can be argued that the major component in European culture is precisely what made that culture hegemonic both in and outside Europe: the idea of European identity as a superior one in comparison with all the non-European peoples and cultures. There is in addition the hegemony of European ideas about the Orient, themselves reiterating European superiority over Oriental backwardness [and despotism, sensuality, and cruelty]...(Said, 1978:7).

been subject to for over twenty-five years permeates and determines analysis of the situation. I first started this project in 1988 when I travelled in the Middle East and was forced to confront my own orientalist bias. The intifada had only begun months earlier, and when I came back to Canada I wanted to understand the contradictions and the inconsistencies between what I had learned in the West about the Middle East and the Palestine-Israel conflict and what I had observed and absorbed in Morocco, Egypt, Turkey, and Jerusalem. This thesis is a result of that exploration.

In order to analyze the constraints on and possibilities for Palestinian agency in the post-Gulf War conjuncture a combination of critical social theory and feminist theory seems most appropriate. I have chosen critical social theory particularly for its normative stance and for its appreciation of the fact that knowledge is constructed by sets of social relations. The counter-version of knowledge that critical social theory offers is critique (Harvey, 1990:1-3; Nielsen, 1990:9). This approach allows the researcher to put her biases/assumptions to the forefront of the research process, thus subjecting them, along with the data, to testing and analysis:

one cannot separate oneself from one's own historical, cultural context....In other words, one's prejudgements, or prejudices, makes one more open-minded than close-minded when one puts these prejudgements at risk, testing them through exposure to and encounter with others' prejudgements. ..we should use prejudgements as essential building blocks or components for

acquiring new knowledge. To know, one needs to be aware of one's own prejudice but one cannot, indeed, should not, try to transcend them. It is necessary to go back and forth between the old and new theories, paradigms, cultures, or worldviews to create a new synthesis (Nielsen, 1990:28).

This approach is particularly appropriate for this research project for several reasons. The Western view of the Middle East and the Palestine-Israel conflict is heavily overlaid with ideology and emotion. Any research of this area must navigate through these obstacles. It is best and easiest to place them up front so as to have a better view of them. As a Western researcher I am contending with an unfamiliar society and culture. It would be inconceivable, particularly in the face of my own orientalism and my efforts to overcome it, to be able to "bracket" my assumptions/biases off in order to attain some semblance of "objectivity". Again, it is best and simplest to self-consciously incorporate my perspective in the research rather than attempting to obscure it quietly somewhere else.

Having said all of this, it is somewhat contradictory to also attempt a feminist standpoint approach³ in this research. The contradiction between critical social theory and feminist

³ Sandra Harding explains that feminist standpointism borrows from Marx's idea, substituting "women" for "proletariat", that "the proletariat, guided by Marxist theory and by class struggle, became the ideal knowers, the group capable of using observation and reason to grasp the true form of social relations....Women are able to use political struggle and analysis to provide a less partial, less defensive, less perverse understanding of human social relations [because their perception remains unclouded by the prejudices that maintain male, or as in the case of the proletariat, bourgeois, privilege]" (1986:653-654).

standpointism lies in the fact that the former perspective assumes that all knowledge is informed by bias while the latter assumes that there are certain positions from which one may divine the truth of/in a situation. One way to bridge this seeming inconsistency is to borrow from Chandra Talpade Mohanty. In an effort to overcome divisions between feminists Mohanty borrows from Benedict Anderson's Imagined Communities and his term "horizontal comradeship". She suggests that feminists can overcome racial, national, and class divisions by constructing their own alliances based on shared perceptions and common political orientations:

The idea of imagined community is useful because it leads us away from essentialist notions of third world feminist struggles, suggesting political rather than biological or cultural bases for alliance. Thus, it is not color or sex which constructs the ground for these struggles. Rather, it is the way we think about race, class, and gender--the political links we choose to make among and between struggles (Mohanty, 1991a:4).

With its careful awareness of the danger of essentialism that the new post-modernist identity politics brings, this orientation is particularly useful to overcome these (un)natural divisions. While identity can be retained as a site of analysis, politics and alliance/solidarity need not be contained or defined by ethnicity/race/nation, class, or gender, but is instead constructed through commonalities of analysis. In this way identity/position can be maintained as a starting point for inquiry, but is still subject to critical examination of bias.

Nevertheless, the warning that standpointism reproduces patriarchal, Archimedean power-knowledge relations (through the assumption that feminists, through their subjugated position, have a more complete and less false understanding of the world) needs to be taken seriously (Harding, 1986:646, 653-657). Sandra Harding suggests that rather than try to resolve the contradiction between standpointism's reproduction of power-knowledge and post-modernism's rejection of the same, we hold this contradiction in light of the understanding that

at its best postmodernism envisions epistemology in a world where thought does not need policing [against regressive relativism]....The standpoint tendency attempts to move us toward that ideal world by legitimating and empowering the "subjugated knowledges" of women, without which that postmodern epistemological situation cannot come into existence (Harding, 1986:657).

Thus, an application of these insights to research of Palestinian resistance and women's activism means that while the Palestinian community's perspective, and the Palestinian women's standpoint within it, is privileged, it is not immune from critique. It is only in this way that a reproduction of power-knowledge can be avoided.

An additional strength of feminist methodology is the insistence that the researcher use the space within and between patriarchal discourses in order to create new insight. This approach forces a tolerance of ambiguity (Harding, 1986:647-649), which not only challenges the temptation to slip into power-knowledge patterns, but gives necessary creative space for the emergence of contradiction: "We need

to be able to cherish certain kinds of intellectual, political, and psychic discomforts, to see as inappropriate and even self-defeating certain kinds of clear solutions to the problems we have been posing" (Harding, 1986:649). An example of this type of analytical ambiguity is acceptance of the possibility that Palestinian resistance is both a feminist project and a process that exploits women. On the one hand it has expanded women's roles and developed feminist consciousness, yet on the other hand it has subjected women to a triple burden of work (domestic, public/productive, nationalist) without increasing women's formal political, social, or economic power or redefinition of women's domestic role. However, it is wrong and praxiologically detrimental to pronounce the Palestinian resistance "bad" for women, or inherently anti-feminist. Instead, more powerful insights can be created by allowing for the ambiguity of women's situation in the Palestinian resistance movement.

Feminist (and) critical perspectives are particularly valid for the study of the Middle East. As Hisham Sharabi notes,

the feminist critique's greatest contribution to the consolidation of a viable counterparadigm [for the study of the Middle East] derives from its ability to clarify the very nature of Western "male-stream" power-knowledge and the unity of the areas of its oppression and control: class, race, and gender, and the corresponding structures in which they are rooted--capitalism, imperialism, and patriarchy. Thus, for example, what the Arab critical intellectuals encounter in Western scholarship as Orientalism, the feminist critics experience as misogyny (Sharabi, 1990:45).

Both feminist and non-Western critical thinkers are outside of the dominant Western discourse, and both agree on the subjectivity of knowledge as opposed to the "objectivity" of masculine-Western-power knowledge (Sharabi, 1990:45).

1.3 A Few Words on Research and Fieldwork in Palestine

Before discussing actual case selection and analysis of findings it is important to highlight issues that are of general importance to fieldwork and that are specific to doing research in and on Palestine. Namely, the phenomena of "rural development tourism" (Chambers, 1983), the conditions of military occupation, the obstacles and hurdles that an outsider faces when trying to gather information in a community other than their own, and the issues of "advocacy" (Gluck, 1991), all have a role in the shaping of this research, its analysis, and its outcomes.

Occupied Palestine is underdeveloped. As such, there were myriad direct and indirect impediments to doing field research there. Many of these hindrances are found in many other "Third World" sites. Robert Chambers's notion of "rural development tourism" aptly describes many of these obstacles. The "urban trap" (in Palestine it is referred to as the Jerusalem-Ramallah-Beit Sahour triangle), and lack of ease of travel and access to more remote spots (in Palestine this would include both the Gaza Strip and refugee camps that although not remote, are not easily accessible for physical,

political, and social reasons), automatically bracket the researcher off from more remote, and usually more needy, geographical areas. Diplomatic and professional biases (things such as "courtesy" and "tact", as well as a shortage of research time, a draw towards informants that can speak one's own language and are often from the elite class, and a specialized perspective that narrows one's view of other factors that lie outside of it all shape the data one is able to gather) further serve to condition the information gathered to fit pre-conceived Western-biased notions (Chambers, 1983:1-27).

However, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are also under military occupation. As a result, many research obstacles were particular to the quasi-war conditions that exist there. Conditions of the occupation--curfews, strikes, the closure of the "territories", violence--all served to create an unpredictable and unreliable research environment. In addition, in the context of collaboration and uncertain political alignment of outsiders, a climate of fear and mistrust seemed to dominate social interaction.⁴ It was for

⁴ Occupied Palestine is a small community of less than two million inhabitants in the West Bank and Gaza combined. Social claustrophobia is often the result in a society where "reputation" is crucial. Nevertheless, in my case, this worked to my advantage as I made friends and contacts in the community. After the first month of research there was a relaxation in relations, as when I returned for another month in December booking and conducting interviews were easier still. Nonetheless, there can be no doubt that the information that I gathered through these interviews has been coloured by the quite legitimate distrust of the outsider (in this case, myself).

this reason that these interviews were not recorded, except in writing by myself, and most were anonymous and confidential. Very early on in the process of gathering interviews I quickly realized that the quality of information, both in terms of the personal opinions (as separate from the organization "party" line) of the interviewee and access to more confidential and official disclosure, radically increased when the tape recorder was turned off. Thus, I quickly made the decision to leave the machine at home and write copious notes during and after all of the interviews. As Sherna Berger Gluck concurs, "I was constrained...by the repressive political conditions that made it risky to record personal information" and "I have been at the mercy of events, including the availability and willingness of all groups to receive me with equal enthusiasm" (Gluck, 1991:212, 213). The outsider position is precarious; the onus is to be the non-expert, to be a beginner, to learn:

Now imagine yourself simply left out but wanting to do theory with us [a non-white/Anglo community]. The first thing to recognize and accept is that you disturb our own dialogues by putting yourself in the left-out position and not leaving us in some meaningful sense to ourselves.

You must also recognize and accept that you must learn the text. But the text is an extraordinarily complex one: viz. our many different cultures. You are asking us to make ourselves more vulnerable to you than we already are before we have any reason to trust that you will not take advantage of this vulnerability. So you need to learn to become unintrusive, unimportant, patient to the point of tears, while at the same time open to learning any possible lessons. You will also have to come to terms with the sense of alienation, of not belonging, of having your own world thoroughly disrupted, having it criticized and scrutinized from the point of

view of those who have been harmed by it, having important concepts central to it dismissed, being viewed with mistrust, being seen as of no consequence except as an object of mistrust (Lugones, Spelman, 1983:580).

Nevertheless, as an outsider I was also a safe repository for confidential official information, opinions and sentiments. As one Palestinian development professional confided in me, "I could never say these things to other Palestinians". Usually this type of information or disclosure, for example, fear of the Palestinian community itself, could easily be construed to be a betrayal of nationalist goals and aspirations.

The very process of attempting to set up and actually conducting interviews was a revealing and instructive part of the research. Interviewees' reluctance to answer certain questions, the interviewees' own interview agenda (i.e., the information that they felt it was important to convey during the course of the appointment), repeated difficulties in setting up interviews with particular subjects, and so on, were all factors that informed my own interpretation of information.

However, sometimes this aspect of the research and analysis has come into conflict with my position as political "advocate" of Palestinian nationalism and statehood. As Gluck reflects,

In interviewing women in a highly volatile political situation, and one in which I at least partially shared a political agenda with my narrators, could I bring my usual critical interviewing skills to bear? Could I continue to shape the interviews for broader historical

purposes and avoid becoming a mere conduit for political platforms? Would the very process of mutuality to which we aspire in most women's oral history projects undermine my ability to function as a scholar? With the political reality of occupation uppermost in the minds of Palestinian women, could I probe and prod without arousing their suspicion or undermining their trust...?

The dual goal of maintaining my scholarly integrity at the same time that I used my scholarship for overt and immediate political purposes led to a host of questions and problems that still perplex me (Gluck, 1991:206-207).

This, perhaps, is to some extent an unreconcilable contradiction. Gluck resolves it by shaping her information for the audience that receives it:

Because I am not simply a propagandist but also a scholar-advocate, I have had to construct, self-consciously, my public presentations and continually assess how to present my materials. Although we always pick and choose our illustrations and regularly make decisions about how to talk to different audiences, most scholars find refuge in a supposed stance of neutrality and do not openly acknowledge how they shape and mold their material (Gluck, 1991:213).

Here the resolution seems to lie in the epistemological approaches of critical social theory and tempered feminist standpoint theory discussed above.

1.4 Case Selection, Methodology, and Interpretation of Results

The case selection for this project consists of two Palestinian NGOs who have programs specifically geared to women's needs as they relate to economic and social development (Palestinian Agricultural Relief Committees [PARC] Women's Unit, and Bisan Center for Research and Development),

and another international NGO which has launched a program to address Palestinian women's needs in the political and social realms (United Nations Development Program [UNDP] Task Force on Women). All three organizations offer a variant of Palestinian counter-development⁵ inside the West Bank and the Gaza Strip that are focused on Palestinian development, nation- and state-building. This selection has been chosen because of their high profile during the intifada and/or because of their prominent involvement with women. These areas of political, economic, and social development are crucial in processes of nation- and state-building, not only to meet the population's needs, but also in order to foster social cohesion and commitment to a nation. In this way, these programs are meeting the needs of both development and resistance. The cases selected are all running "publicly" albeit their illegal or semi-legal status,⁶ also, PARC offers an example of an "affiliated" NGO while Bisan is an example of the new "independent" NGOs that have recently sprung up in

⁵ The process of disarticulation from the Israeli economy through the development of indigenous institutions and programs as a mode of state-building.

⁶ At this time of writing, although not at the time of research or during the conception of the actual programs researched, the legal status of the programs discussed is less precarious. However, for reasons which will be examined in the body of this work, their legal, political, and funding status is still subject to possible reversion.

Palestine in the wake of the intifada.⁷ It would be impossible to gain access to direct affiliate groups of the PLO and Hamas (i.e., political decision-making cells), without high-level connections--something this researcher definitely does not have. In addition, representatives from women's committees affiliated with the political parties were interviewed in order to gain as broad a picture as possible of women's activist terrain in Palestine. Finally, those working in NGOs dealing with agricultural development, broad economic development concerns, research centres, and information centres, and university-affiliated political scientists and sociologists were also solicited for their perspectives. This wide variety of analysts were able to provide a broad picture of the Palestinian society, polity, and economy which women are both surrounded by and articulate with through a variety of means.

This study is a macrohistorical analysis in that it attempts to explain how the Palestinian resistance movement articulates with larger world structures in order to achieve national goals, but it is also microhistorical because it analyzes the role of Palestinian women's activism in shaping the Palestinian resistance movement and relations within

⁷ PARC is the offspring of the Palestine People's Party (PPP), formerly the Palestine Communist Party. Bisan, an example of an "independent" NGO, is nevertheless associated with the Palestinian Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) by virtue of the political sympathies and work of the people employed there. For a deeper examination of the phenomena of "independent" NGOs, see Mona Marshy (1994) on the role of women's studies centres in Palestine.

Palestinian society: a "collection of uniform observations on individuals, relationships, groups, or events and their aggregation into collective portraits of the structures and processes in question....to answer questions about the connections between small-scale social life, on the one hand, and big structures or large processes on the other" (Tilly, 1984:63-65).

The high degree of political factionalization in Palestinian society will make the internal generalization of the research results difficult. For instance, someone interviewed from the Fatah faction would tend to see the intifada and the current peace process quite differently than someone from the PFLP. Therefore, it was incumbent upon this researcher to ensure that a wide "sample" of organizations were "selected" that managed to cross factions. In addition, non-affiliated organizations were also studied, allowing an even wider perspective and bases from which to compare and contrast the data collected from affiliated organizations. In this way results can be gathered that are valid for the general conditions of Palestinian resistance.

The external generalization of the results of this research may be difficult for several reasons. First, the research question was developed as a result of specific interest in the Palestinian situation and not a concern about generally-occurring processes. Second, the Palestinian situation is unique in the world's state of affairs. The

anti-colonialist era has passed, leaving only a few neglected and mostly-forgotten cases still under formal colonial domination. However, for those few--the Kurds, East Timor, Mozambique, and South Africa (the most celebrated case)--some parallels may be drawn and lessons learned. The experience of Palestinian women in particular, seems to follow some general trends noted in other nationalist struggles, but differs significantly from them in others. Third, the Middle East region as a whole often seems to lay outside of the rubric of general theory, possibly because of its intense Western penetration. Two effects can be traced to this penetration: the ideological and theoretical reification of the Middle East (Said, 1978), and the unique distortion of development patterns in the region (Sharabi, 1988). In response to the Middle East's position vis-à-vis general theory a small wealth of critical theory is being generated that is specific to the Middle East, particularly in the wake of Edward Said's Orientalism. While some of this new work can be universally applied, again Said's work is exemplary, much of it is not easily used to explain general phenomena.

In order to make the most of the cases selected, data was collected with the above epistemological and analytical considerations in mind. Evidence was gathered through interviews with activists, professionals, and academics in the occupied territories who are affiliated with or studying the effectiveness of Palestinian counter-development organizations

and women's activism. The interviews consisted of open-ended questions and were conducted within the interviewees' professional settings as often as possible. The choice of setting was intentional as a rejection of participant-observation methods where the researcher becomes a part of the subjects' lives (Nielsen, 1990:8; Kirby, McKenna, 1989:76-81). While the point is well-taken that the process of interviewing itself is involvement (Kirby, McKenna, 1989:79), I believe that full, total, and active participation is an intrusive, cooptative, and false approach in general, and for me in particular, for several reasons: as a foreign researcher I was only in occupied Palestine for three months--this hardly gave me the time to become an integral part of Palestinian society; as a Westerner and as an academic I hold power positions that are difficult, if not impossible to transcend through "participation"--I believe that it is better, and in keeping with the critical feminist approach, to put the power relations and biases up front so as to easier keep an eye on them;* there is also evidence that participant-observation methods yield no "truer" results than more formal methods of conducting interviews and gathering on-site data (Sayigh, 1991). As one analyst asks, "is the new participatory myth [participatory action research (PAR)] acting more like a Trojan horse which may end up by substituting a subtle kind of

* Sandra Kirby and Kate McKenna call this approach "non-invasive" and "non-colonial" participant-observation (Kirby, McKenna, 1989:79).

teleguided and masterly organized participation for the old types of intransitive or culturally defined participation, proper to vernacular societies?" To answer this question, he points to "the many cases where highly ideologized 'agents of change' or 'vanguards', have tried to use conscientization or participatory methods, simply as new and more subtle forms of manipulation" (Rahnema, 1992:124-125).

The research questions were constructed in order to enable the following types of discovery: "to explore, where possible, the inconsistencies between action and words in terms of structural factors; to see to what extent group processes are externally mediated; to investigate how the subjects see group norms and practices constrained by external social factors; to see how prevailing ideologies are addressed; to analyze the extent to which subversive or resistant practices transcend prevailing ideological forms" (Harvey, 1990:13); to understand the actors' consciousness of their situation, the resolutions they are proposing and/or acting on, and how obstacles both alter the actors' understanding of the circumstances and are overcome. This information is compared and contrasted with information gathered from other primary and secondary sources in order to get at existing and underlying anomalies, contradictions, and mediations.

Of particular interest and usefulness for the analysis of my data has been the recently published Norwegian FAFO report

(Heiberg, Øvensen et al., 1993). Titled Palestinian Society in Gaza, West Bank and Arab Jerusalem: A Survey of Living Conditions, the report is a broad collection of material, social, and attitudinal data that has proved most valuable for this project. In addition, the World Bank's six-volume report on the West Bank and Gazan economies, Developing the Occupied Territories: An Investment in Peace (1993) has been carefully scrutinized for the signs of things to come. A selection of secondary sources are also used, mostly from journals and magazines such as Journal of Palestine Studies, Middle East Report, The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, Middle East International, and Middle East Journal. Articles from Al-Fajr, a Palestinian English-language weekly published out of East Jerusalem, are also used, but this excellent source of information unfortunately ceased publication in August 1993 due to PLO funding constraints. All of the sources are remarkable for their pro-Palestinian bias and have been selected with this in mind. Nevertheless, their bias, similar to my own, is not anti-Israeli, but holds to the necessity of peaceful and just co-existence and is sensitive to the contradictions that Israeli society is facing in this conflict. It is precisely in these contradictions that some of the richest possibilities lie for a just solution to the Palestine-Israel dilemma.

The hypotheses of this project concern three theoretical areas: the nature of development, the relationship of feminism

to development and national resistance movements, and the potential of "liberatory" development in the face of "large" structures. Of particular note in this study is the exploration of the transformatory potential of feminism in Middle Eastern society. While the results may be inconclusive in regards to the general nature of development and the possibility of equitable self-reliance, the study of Palestinian resistance may yield rich information concerning the relationship of feminism and economic, political, and social development.

The Palestinian women's movement is being watched by other Middle Eastern women since it is one of the most progressive and successful feminist movements in the region. From a theoretical and practical standpoint, Palestinian feminism is interesting because of its self-conscious and determined stand to avoid the experience of their Algerian and Iranian sisters.⁹ The Palestinian women's movement can add to our knowledge about the impact of feminism on neopatriarchy and development in the Middle East (Sharabi, 1988).

In the current conjuncture, Middle Eastern civil society is facing serious challenges from external political economy constraints and from internal conservative forces. The

⁹ Algerian women played a central role in the revolutionary war against France. However, after independence Algerian women were forced back into the home. They are now confronting a large and popular Islamist movement that is struggling to take over the Algerian government. Women also played a key role in the Islamist revolution in Iran in 1979 only to find their freedoms seriously constrained after Khomeini's success.

Palestinian feminist movement is one of the most significant forces capable of dealing with these obstacles to progressive change. While the short-term prospects for the further development of civil society counter-development organizations and institutions are good, the long-term prognosis of the achievement of the Palestinian state is not so hopeful. This is because civil counter-development is a necessary but not sufficient condition for Palestinian statehood. The other necessary condition, consistent with the dependency paradigm and the ideological network¹⁰ that defines relationships in the Middle East, is political will on the part of Israel, the Arab world, and the West. This latter condition is conspicuously lacking, particularly on the part of the current Israeli leadership. In these times of growing economic disparity, political domination, social fragmentation, and cultural imperialism the room to manoeuvre is seriously constrained. The Palestinians may have to resort to a praxis of enlightened and progressive *sumud* (steadfastness) until a new conjuncture can be created with more scope and possibility.

¹⁰ For more information on the ideological intersections in the Middle East, consult Fouad Ajami (1987), Sylvia G. Haim (1962), Arthur Hertzberg (1959), Hassan Nafaa (1987), James A. Reilly (1989), and Edward W. Said (1978, 1992). The examination of the intersections of Orientalism, Zionism, pan-Arabism, and Islamism is a fascinating project all on its own. These sources merely provide a starting point.

CHAPTER TWO
PARADIGMS OF DEVELOPMENT:
FAILURES, INSIGHTS, AND POSSIBILITIES

This chapter will provide an overview of the major paradigms of post-WWII development theory, the aim being to identify the strengths and weaknesses of development theory, and to examine where additional analysis is in order. The primary critical concern here is that the major development paradigms have fallen short in their approaches towards issues of external forces, structures and pressures, the role of internal social forces, gender, and the achievement of social transformation. These issues, central to the understanding of the nature of development and its relation to resistance in occupied Palestine, indicate that conventional approaches towards the comprehension of development leave significant questions unanswered.

Development theory in this instance is defined by post-WWII thinking in the field. We will begin with a discussion of the modernizationist approach--important now because these ideas continue to have legitimacy within large international agencies such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF),¹ and also continue to be consistent with current

¹ The World Bank has recently become involved in the Palestine-Israel peace process. In the preface to its study on the economy of the "Occupied Territories" (1993a:vii) the World Bank states that their involvement was requested by the sponsors and organizers of the Middle East Peace Talks. The World Bank's study

American interests--as characterized by W.W. Rostow and Seymour Martin Lipset. The classical marxist perspective as typified by Bill Warren, will also be examined within the modernizationist paradigm. Eurocentric and economistic, this perspective has little to offer to the understanding of the transformation of non-Western societies, particularly with reference to the influence of powerful external actors and the impact of internal social forces. Nevertheless, a thorough deconstruction of this perspective is important in order to understand the current approaches of governing Palestinian and international decision-makers with regard to the development of Palestine.

The dependency school, particularly André Gunder Frank and Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, will follow and is an important contribution to the development debate as a perspective from some of those who are being "developed". Dependency perspectives most handily explain the nature of Palestinian development since occupation, and have most often been utilized as a mode of analysis by researchers of the West Bank and Gazan economies.

However, because dependency theory leaves questions about the role of internal social forces unanswered, the modes of production debate as introduced by Ernesto Laclau, Harold Wolpe and Aidan Foster-Carter will be examined. This

perspective leads our understanding of the ways in which social forces both participate with and challenge the current state of development in occupied Palestine. Nonetheless, articulation of modes of production perspectives also leave important questions unanswered with respect to gender and social transformation. It is from these gaps that we derive our inquiry.

2.1 The Modernizationist Paradigm

The destruction of the European economies as a result of WWII, the processes of decolonization, and the implementation of the Marshall Plan and the restructuring of the global liberal capitalist economy, as guided by new American hegemonic interests, all gave rise to the production of development theory by American academics in the post-war period. Two hallmarks of the type of theory being produced in this period are W.W. Rostow's "The Take-Off Into Self-Sustained Growth" (1963) and Seymour Martin Lipset's "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy" (1959). Rostow and Lipset will be discussed together before turning to Bill Warren's "Imperialism and Capitalist Industrialization" (1973) and critiques by Alain Lipietz (1982) and Manfred Bienefeld (1988) of both the classical liberal and the classical marxist approaches.

Magnus Blomström and Björn Hettne indicate that most

economists of the 1950s saw "no difference between 'underdeveloped' and 'undeveloped' countries" (Blomström, Hettne, 1984:12). Therefore, rather than locating the source of underdevelopment in historical, social, political, and political economic processes, these theorists explained underdevelopment as a problem of shortage--of capital and other resources (Blomström, Hettne, 1984:12-13). Development was inevitably defined as achieving a state of Western-style liberal capitalism, and was, then, a predetermined, imitative process (Blomström, Hettne, 1984:20).

These tendencies can be seen in both Rostow's and Lipset's work. Rostow (1963) isolates seven stages of development, based on the modern economic history of Europe, that each underdeveloped country must pass through in order to achieve "self-sustained growth". While Rostow's formula is mechanistic, and his definition of development, or "take-off" tends to be strictly economic ("an industrial revolution, tied directly to radical changes in methods of production, having their decisive consequence over a relatively short period of time" [Rostow, 1963:185]), he does recognize that there is some relationship between the economic and political, social, and cultural spheres. The "take-off", according to Rostow, will depend on "political, social and institutional changes which will both perpetuate an initial increase in the scale of investment and result in the regular acceptance and absorption of innovations" (Rostow, 1963:155). Additionally,

Rostow makes reference to "traditional values inappropriate to economic growth" (Rostow, 1963:159). Nevertheless, it is clear when examining Rostow's economic model that the changes necessary for "take-off" are those that would imitate conditions in Western liberal capitalist societies: surplus in the hands of a capitalist-entrepreneurial class, institutions that are able to provide adequate and cheap capital, and one or more rapidly growing sectors that are continually receiving "plough-back" (Rostow, 1963:176). These three preconditions directly imitate the experience of the transition of European economies from feudalism to capitalism,² but nothing in Rostow's formulation discusses the role, and perhaps necessity of, imperialism or the state in that transition. Nor does Rostow discuss the impact of that imperialism on the underdeveloped countries he is purporting to assist.

Lipset, too, is similarly ethnocentric. Like Rostow, he recognizes a relationship between the economic and the political: "the most widespread generalization linking political systems to other aspects of society has been that democracy is related to the state of economic development" (Lipset, 1959:75). For Lipset, economic development upholds political stability and democracy: "economic development involving industrialization, urbanization, high educational

² For a discussion of this process see Dobb (1963), Hobsbawm (1969), and Polanyi (1964).

standards, and a steady increase in the overall wealth of the society, is a basic condition sustaining democracy" (Lipset, 1959:86).

Lipset's vision is essentially a Western-style liberal capitalist transformation of the rest of the world. And in addition to increased wealth (though he fails to recognize problems of equitable distribution of that wealth), a quiescent lower class is also a prerequisite for political stability and "democracy". Not only does he say that "[i]ncreased wealth is...related causally to the development of democracy by changing the social conditions of the workers" (Lipset, 1959:83), but Lipset also advocates the development of a polity in which its citizens hold no clear or committed political values (Lipset, 1959:96). All the while, Lipset neglects the fact that in liberal capitalist systems of the type he is promoting a particular constituency with specific interests, the upper- and upper-middle classes of the dominant ethnic, linguistic, religious and gender groups, is clearly conscious and in pursuit of its interests in the political arena. In essence, what Lipset is promoting is a profoundly anti-democratic system where none but the most powerful have access to political resources. Additionally, his conception of economic development is too faulty and underdeveloped to guarantee any economic well-being for any but the upper strata of society.

The recent entry of the World Bank and large

international investors and donors into occupied Palestine's development arena ushers in the first large-scale comprehensive attempt to "modernize" the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Emphasizing limited state involvement, private sector development, the identification of leading industrial sectors (which happen to be those in which Palestinian firms provide sub-contracting for Israeli industries), the World Bank is advocating export-led, free market-driven development for Palestine. Nor are the troublesome lower-classes to be forgotten. Social welfare programs will be provided for families of martyrs and political prisoners³--all needy others will have to fend for themselves--and the Emergency Assistance Program, to be implemented by Fatah and non-Fatah NGOs⁴ during the first year of the execution of the Oslo Accord (1993-1994), will provide jobs, albeit temporarily, in small-scale projects developing infrastructure. All this is to convince Palestinians that they are better off with the new peace than without it, thus laying the ground (both in terms of basic infrastructural development and in the creation of a conducive investment climate) for the type of larger investments that the World Bank and international investors are typically interested in. Democracy is conceptualized in its most rudimentary and functional form⁵ in this new era of

³ This can be interpreted as a cynical bid to ensure the acquiescence of those most politically active on the street.

⁴ The issue of faction-related NGOs in Palestine will be discussed in greater detail in chapters 3 and 4.

Palestinian development. As one Palestinian official put it, the coming elections will legitimize the new political authority which is needed in order to sign international agreements. Stability and security are the priority here, not economic development, in the first phase of implementation (Anon. 12a, 12/20/93).

Rostow and Lipset both display the defining characteristics of the modernization paradigm--ethnocentrism, evolutionism, economism, mechanism--in their work. Nevertheless, these characteristics are not limited to works that could reasonably be called liberal capitalist in terms of defining ideology. Bill Warren's "Imperialism and Capitalist Industrialization" (1973), also falls into the same traps. His thesis is that Western imperialist relations with the "Third World" have been beneficial to the development of capitalist relations of production in these countries, and

that in so far as there are obstacles to this [capitalist industrialization] development, they originate not in current imperialist-Third World relationships, but almost entirely from the internal contradictions of the Third World itself...and that the ties of dependence binding the Third World to the imperialist countries have been, and are being, markedly loosened, with the consequence that the distribution of power within the capitalist world is becoming less uneven (Warren, 1973:3-4).

While Warren claims to employ marxist analysis to examine the nature of development in the underdeveloped world he instead focuses on economic growth measures such as the GNP and GDP; argues that the formal political independence of former

colonies signals the success of industrial advance and their increased bargaining power vis-à-vis the developed world (to a large extent by exploiting Cold War rivalries) (Warren, 1973:10-14); and he discusses the benefits of foreign portfolio investment, "export promotion industrialization", the proliferation of subsidiaries of multinational corporations in the underdeveloped world, and the transfer of foreign capital-intensive technology (Warren, 1973:23-35).

As Alain Lipietz notes in his critical article, "Marx or Rostow?" (1982), Warren cannot be criticized for not foreseeing the collapse of the "golden age" of capitalism, the Third World debt crisis of the 1980s, and the resultant devastation both have wrought in underdeveloped economies (even though he does note the rising debt incurred by many underdeveloped economies but dismisses its significance [Warren, 1973:38]). These crises, and the structural adjustment regime that has followed on their heels, have directly undercut many of the gains that Warren highlights, such as favourable balance of payments positions, a rise in reserves, stable terms of trade, and increasing trade between the developed and underdeveloped worlds (Warren, 1973:35-38). However, while Warren claims to use a marxist approach, there is no discussion of social forces, nor is there an examination of the modes of production in underdeveloped economies. These factors are missing from Warren's work even though he himself claims that the "obstacles to this development [capitalist

industrialization in the underdeveloped world]...originate...almost entirely from the internal contradictions of the Third World itself" (Warren, 1973:4). In fact, there is little to distinguish Warren's analysis from a classical liberal/modernizationist approach to development. Indeed, this is Lipietz's assessment:

Warren's return to 'original Marxism' is, in fact, a return to the nineteenth-century Marxism of Struve and Kautsky, which continued to flourish in the Third International, particularly in Stalin's writings. For Stalin declared his faith in limitless development of the productive forces, understanding by this a one-way, linear, quantitative growth in the mass machinery and the flow of commodities.... Such a religion, however, stands in no need of Marx. It has other high-priests in such traditional bourgeois growth-theorists as Walt Rostow, and all the modern apostles of 'industrialization' and 'supply-side' policies (Lipietz, 1982:49).

Here Lipietz makes the ontological connection between liberalism and marxism. Both paradigms espouse the inevitability of the dynamic of industrial capitalism, and its ability to produce, in the liberal view, a prosperous society for all hard-working and deserving individuals, and in the marxist view, the conditions necessary for the revolution that will ultimately produce communist utopia. These common roots of liberalism and marxism in the classical economic works of Smith and Ricardo are identified by Dudley Seers:

Both doctrines assume competitive markets and the over-riding importance of material incentives. They are both basically internationalist and also optimistic, technocratic and economistic. In particular, they both treat economic growth as "development" and as due primarily to capital

accumulation (Dudley Seers, 1978, cited in Blomström, Hettne, 1984:164).

Yet, there are inherent contradictions within both liberal and marxist modernizationist approaches. As can be seen from the discussion of Rostow and Lipset, the liberal modernizationist approach encompasses both economic and political "development". However, recent history in Chile, South Korea, and Iran demonstrates that the implementation of liberal economic solutions is often accompanied, perhaps necessarily, by repressive, anti-democratic political structures.⁵ The democracy that Lipset envisions may be an impossible partner to Rostow's "take-off". Conversely, the Warrenite school of marxism leaves behind the ethical concern for the welfare of workers that permeates Marx's theorizing. Lipietz sarcastically exclaims:

For Warren, it would be 'moralism' to condemn this mode of growth [industrial capitalism] by referring to the injustice and misery that it brings in its wake....How surprising that such a clear-headed thinker as Marx should have wasted his time in organizing the world workers' movement, and in supporting the Irish national liberation movement even against the British labour organizations (Lipietz, 1982:57).

In Palestine, the former Communist Party, now the Palestine People's Party (PPP), is in alliance with Fatah, the party of the bourgeoisie and co-architect with the World Bank of the new development plans. In interviews conducted in the summer and December 1993, analysts associated with the PPP

⁵ See Cumings (1989), Halliday (1979), and Waylen (1992).

spoke approvingly of free market and export-led development and the World Bank's plans for Palestine. One even spoke disparagingly about the masses seeking solace in Islam in the face of the coming economic hardship (Anon.: 11, 06/09/93; 15, 12/20/93).

The weakening of the dependency school, according to Blomström and Hettne (1984), made room for the retrenchment of neo-classical approaches to the study and practice of development. Just as Warren's work is a response to dependency theory, so is the rise of monetarist policy as promoted by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund as a development strategy for the underdeveloped world. In his "Dependency Theory and the Political Economy of Africa's Crisis" (1988), Manfred Bienefeld isolates the trends that have led to this re-advance of orthodox thinking. First, the failure of state intervention has led liberal thinkers to assert that

such intervention has not actually reaped...benefits, while the market has actually 'delivered the goods'. That claim rests first and foremost on the orthodox interpretation of the miraculous growth achieved by the Newly Industrializing Countries (NICs) of East Asia, but also on a long list of sector and project specific examples [that demonstrate a failure of state-interventionist policy] (Bienefeld, 1988:71).

As for left thinkers, there is either a retreat to Warrenite "Chicago Marxism", or a "refuge in a libertarian socialism in which popular grass-roots movements combine, without extensive state intervention, to produce a superior, more dynamic, more

socially desirable pattern of development than that associated with capitalism" (Bienefeld, 1988:80). While this position, with its roots in anarchist theory, denounces the state and "top-down" socialism, and also "refuses to embrace the market", it "extols the virtues of small decentralized markets that encourage participation and enhance flexibility" (Bienefeld, 1988:80). Bienefeld rightly challenges: "it is hard to see who but a strong and coherent state could create and defend the conditions needed for realizing that dream in the modern world" (Bienefeld, 1988:80). Local Palestinian NGOs are beginning to organize in the spirit of this libertarian socialist perspective, strategizing to confront both the emergence of market-led development as well as the nascent Palestinian governing authority. Most of these NGOs have a history of sponsoring small-scale development projects with marginalized groups in the absence of a legitimate state. However, as will be seen in chapter 3, in the absence of a state (although not solely because of this absence) these development initiatives failed for lack of funds (which a state could raise, in part, through taxation of its citizens) and as a result of a variety of external and internal forces and pressures.

Second, classical liberal and marxist thinkers have found the experience of the NICs (newly industrializing countries) useful fodder in the promotion of their particular variant of development theory. For the right, the NICs have been used as

evidence that "market forces could and would produce rapid and egalitarian development if only they were allowed to do so by states with the courage and the wisdom to pursue 'appropriate' market-oriented policies" (Bienefeld, 1988:71). Already, in the West Bank and Gaza one hears talk of the dream of becoming the new "Singapore". Of course, the historical evidence reveals that the NICs pursued a variety of state-led, nationally coherent development strategies. The East Asians were not willing to leave something so important as the development of their economies to the vagaries of an invisible hand.⁶ The lesson of the NICs actually disproves classical economic theory:

their [the NICs] relative economic success has allowed them gradually to liberalize their economies at the margins, so that this liberalization should be seen more as the consequence than as the cause of their success. Throughout the past twenty years, both of these NICs [Taiwan and South Korea] have consciously followed a 'Japanese strategy', just as Japan once consciously followed a 'German strategy' that was rooted in the nationalist economic theories of List. From this perspective, these economies actually illustrate the vital importance for successful development of strong, coherent, nationally determined and controlled policies that allow resource allocation and the links with the outside world to be managed in the national interest (Bienefeld, 1988:72).

As for Warren et al., "the phenomenal growth of the NICs was...widely accepted ...as evidence that capitalism had lost none of its power to act in a 'historically progressive'

⁶ For a discussion of the experience of South Korea as one of the East Asian NICs, and an examination of the policies it pursued, see Alice Amsden (1989).

manner" (Bienefeld, 1988:81). Further, the orthodox marxist argument goes, this capitalist development in the underdeveloped world replicates the experience of the early stages of capitalist development in the advanced industrial countries, and that this process inevitably demands suffering in the short-term in order to achieve eventual advanced (and more comfortable) capitalism, and ultimately, socialism. Again, Bienefeld challenges this assumption: "What assurance is there that, at the end of the road, lies the more acceptable form of capitalism generally associated with the industrialized countries, much less 'socialism'?" (Bienefeld, 1988:82). As Azmy Bishara of Birzeit University in the West Bank exclaims,

They [the leadership] are concocting economic fantasies now about becoming like Singapore and Malaysia. People are dreaming about being a cheap labor force--it's unbelievable! The dream of the capitalists is to have a cheap labor force. I don't understand why I should have this dream (1994:5-6).

Finally, Bienefeld dispenses with the practice of holding up as evidence "a seemingly endless catalogue of 'failed' projects or sectoral 'disasters' in which the state is said to have played a 'significant role" (Bienefeld, 1988:74):

this evidence only serves to knock down a quite absurd straw man who allegedly argues that any type of economic intervention by any sort of state is desirable. It does not challenge the argument that rapid and sustained development may require--or benefit from--the implementation of a coherent national strategy involving systematic intervention by a state representing a nation's long-term interests (Bienefeld, 1988:75).

While Bienefeld agrees that these cases deserve serious scrutiny, he also asserts that "serious debate must focus on defining that combination of states and markets that is most likely to achieve specific sets of objectives" (Bienefeld, 1988:83). However, Bienefeld's call for state involvement in the economy, while warranted by the historical evidence of Japanese, German, and East Asian NIC experience, does not address the problem of the captured state that he himself discusses:

the pernicious urban elites, who are made to carry such a disproportionate share of the blame for Africa's current troubles, were and are generally strongly encouraged and supported by forces emanating directly from the international economy. This is a serious problem, because although it would be wrong to present these domestic political forces as mere appendages of these international forces, it is much more indefensible to portray them as independent 'local' phenomena (Bienefeld, 1988:76).

How to accomplish the separation of the state from these urban elites who are, in turn, captured by international economic forces? Without this triple separation the coherent development strategy devoted solely to nationally desirable goals is impossible. Additionally, the state-led nationally coherent development strategies that Bienefeld so strongly advocates have hardly been benign experiences for the peasantry, the lower and working classes, and women, as demonstrated by the East Asian cases.⁷

⁷ For a discussion of the suffering endured by Japanese peasants during the Meiji Restoration, where they were squeezed so hard that "they could neither live nor die", see Norman (1975),

In Palestine, NGOs are attempting to confront this dilemma through the strengthening and development of civil society and democracy. Nevertheless, they have little faith in the abilities of the "state" (at least the one that they have now) to successfully develop the Palestinian economy without resorting to the types of social and political abuses that seem to commonly accompany free market-driven and export-led economies in the Third World. Already there are signs that the governing authority wishes to limit the ability of other social groupings to confront such abuses. The Palestinian governing authority finds itself under immense pressure from Israel and the international investment community to maintain order and create a conducive investment climate. Local NGOs hope that their organizing efforts will serve as a preventative to the civil and economic abuses usually associated with this type of mandate.

So, while Bienefeld argues for the implementation of nationally coherent development strategies that take into account each economy's particularities and which combine state and market forces in order to achieve specific economic and social goals, the dominant strands of liberal thought and a significant fraction of marxist thought argue for limited state involvement in underdeveloped economies. This perspective is shared by the large international development

especially chapter 5. Additionally, Cumings (1989) discusses the South Korean experience.

agencies--in particular, the World Bank and the IMF. The early failure of the modernizationist paradigm, particularly in Latin America, prompted critical response from those who were being "developed". In particular, modernizationist perspectives leave out an analysis of how non-economic and external factors play a role in development. The emergence of new thinking provided an invaluable counter-balance to the eurocentric and economistic modernizationist approach. However, while the fall of the Berlin Wall delegitimized marxist-style modernization, liberal modernizationism remains hegemonic in ideology and international structures.

2.2 The Dependency School

The dependency paradigm emerged as a Latin American response to and a critique of the modernizationist approach to development. According to Blomström and Hettne (1984), its theoretical roots lie in both the neo-marxist and the United Nations' Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) debates on development. This new marxism emerged in response to the challenge that "Guevarism" posed to traditional marxism in Latin America, while the ECLA debate on development took place between Chicago monetarists and the structuralist graduates of Chile's national university. We will briefly examine these intellectual strands before turning our attention to André Gunder Frank's "The Development of Underdevelopment" (1988) and Fernando Henrique Cardoso's and Enzo Faletto's Dependency

and Development in Latin America (1979) as two exemplars of the dependency school.

Closely associated with Paul Baran, who first introduced the idea that underdevelopment in the periphery followed development in the centre, Latin American neo-marxism dismissed the Latin American bourgeoisie as parasitic and unable or unwilling to "fulfil its historic mission of freeing the productive forces", and instead prescribed immediate revolutionary activity based on guerrilla tactics. Additionally, where marxists see imperialism as a stage in the development of capitalism in the centre, neo-marxists view imperialism from the perspective of the underdeveloped--or perhaps, the de-developed--periphery, and as such, are more amenable to nationalist revolutionary movements than are traditional marxists. Further, neo-marxists recognize the peasantry as potential revolutionary agents whereas orthodox marxists only assign this role to industrial workers; neo-marxists emphasize the potential of guerrilla warfare while marxists emphasize patient party work and organization of the workers in order to nurture the conditions necessary for revolution; and finally, marxists criticize the ecology critique of progress and development as a bourgeois construction that justifies economic inequality where neo-marxists are integrating ecological consciousness and a critique of the dynamic of progress in their development theory (Blomström, Hettne, 1984:27-37).

The ECLA theory of development, structuralism, which was most closely associated with the work of Raúl Prebisch, while never really abandoning the modernization approach, did locate the source of underdevelopment as the result of a process of development in the Western capitalist industrial world. ECLA advocated a Keynesian model of government intervention as well as a program of import substitution industrialization. Prebisch had concluded that the problem of underdevelopment in Latin American economies lay in their reliance on export of primary materials and the deteriorating terms of trade in these goods (Blomström, Hettne, 1984:38-44).

The dependency school, influenced by both the neo-marxist and structuralist theories, is most closely associated in the West with the work of André Gunder Frank. However, there are characteristics which most *dependencia* works share in common. Among these features are: an emphasis on the world capitalist system rather than a focus limited on a particular domestic socio-political-economic entity; largely attributing the nature and level of development of a domestic economy on factors external to it; a socio-political and/or a historical-structural analysis rather than one limited to the examination of economic conditions; a focus on sectoral/regional contradictions as opposed to class contradictions; a voluntarist prescription to disassociate from the world capitalist market and to strive for self-reliance rather than a determinist outlook on the unfolding of history that had

been found in the traditional Latin American communist parties (Blomström, Hettne, 1984:71-76).

André Gunder Frank (1988) introduces his analysis of dependency relations with a critique of traditional development theory. He indicates that most work on development issues is derived solely from the Euro-North American experience, and "therefore fails to reflect the past of the underdeveloped part of the world....our ignorance of the underdeveloped countries' history leads us to assume that their past and indeed their present resembles earlier stages of the history of the now developed countries" (Gunder Frank, 1988:109). Additionally, Gunder Frank asserts that most previous development theory fails to take into account how the capitalist system as a whole has developed and how that development has affected each of its component (country) parts, that is, "simultaneous generation of underdevelopment in some of its parts and of economic development in others" (Gunder Frank, 1988:109-110). *Underdeveloped* is a distinct phenomenon from *undeveloped*, the former being the direct result of development in the centre of the world capitalist system, while the latter is an original state of never having been developed or underdeveloped. This underdevelopment occurs through the process of surplus transfer from the "satellite" to the "metropole" through relations of exchange, in accordance with liberal economic theory, rather than within the relations of production, as marxist economic theory

conceptualizes it (Gunder Frank, 1988:112).^{*} It is on this point, and on Gunder Frank's broad definition of capitalism--it is his contention that the world capitalist system emerged coincident with the European age of imperialism in the sixteenth century, well before the development of capitalism in Great Britain in the eighteenth century--that marxist and neo-marxist scholars have criticized his version of dependency theory⁹. Finally, Gunder Frank rejects the "dual" societies thesis where two distinct economies co-exist, unconnected, in underdeveloped countries--one modern and capitalist and linked with the outside capitalist system, and the other a pre-capitalist, subsistence-based and isolated economy--within the same country. For him, the expansion of the world capitalist system has effectively penetrated even the most isolated sectors of the underdeveloped world (Gunder Frank, 1988:110-111).

While Gunder Frank's criticisms of traditional development theory are well-founded, there are some fundamental problems with his analysis. Traditional development theories, as we have seen above, are ahistorical, evolutionist, and eurocentric, with a narrow focus on individual domestic economies at the expense of an analysis of

^{*} This position is problematic insofar as Gunder Frank would position himself within the neo-marxist tradition which also locates exploitation primarily within the relations of production (Blomström, Hettne, 1984:89).

⁹ These points will be returned to in our discussion of Laclau (1971).

external socio-political-economic factors that may have an impact on, or are shaping, the domestic economy. However, Gunder Frank seems to focus on external relationships at the expense of any examination of internal factors. Most problematic is that, while Gunder Frank describes the satellite transfer of surplus to the metropole, he never explains how, or through what particular mechanism or set of mechanisms this transfer transpires. Traditional marxist theory explains the transfer of surplus through the exploitive relations of production between producer and owner of the means of production, but Gunder Frank is focusing on the relations of exchange without really explaining where surplus is located or how it is produced and/or transferred. So, while the schema of metropole-satellite is a useful starting point in terms of understanding the dynamic of unequal political and economic power relations in the international system, it is not adequately developed so as to give a thorough understanding of how this dynamic works. The second major problem in Gunder Frank's work is his loose definition of capitalism. As Laclau (1971) points out, Gunder Frank defines capitalist economies as those that are attached to a profit market as opposed to the existence of free labour and a specific mode of production that accompanies this phenomenon. If we are to take the profit market as the defining feature of capitalism, then all economies through most time and space would have to be considered capitalist

(Laclau, 1971:24-25).

A more sophisticated variant of dependency theory, and one that rectifies some of the major problems found in Gunder Frank's work, is that offered by Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto (1979). Like Gunder Frank, Cardoso and Faletto offer a critique of traditional modernizationist approaches to development, citing its ahistoricity, eurocentrism, and limited economic focus (Cardoso, Faletto, 1979:8-13). They rightly point out (this pattern can be observed in the urban communities in the West Bank), that it may happen

that a society modernizes its pattern of consumption, education, and so forth without a corresponding advance in development, if by development we understand less dependency and self-sustained growth based on the local capital accumulation and on the dynamism of the industrial sector (Cardoso, Faletto, 1979:10).

Dependence, according to Cardoso and Faletto, is embedded in class relations:

[dependence] impl[ies] a relationship between local and external classes, states,, and enterprises....Dependence thus finds not only internal "expression", but also its true character as implying a situation that structurally entails a link with the outside in such a way that what happens "internally" in a dependent country cannot be fully explained without taking into consideration the links that internal social groups have with external ones (Cardoso, Faletto, 1979:21-22).

Further, class relations in the underdeveloped world do not replicate the pattern of class relations in the developed world during the period of their early development. The national economies of the developed countries succeeded "in

part because they were consolidated at the same time that the world market expanded, so that these countries came to occupy the leading positions in the system of international domination" (Cardoso, Faletto, 1979:23). This leading position also afforded each national market and each country's class structure some autonomy from the international system, therefore allowing the market to act as "arbiter in the conflict of interests between the dominant groups" with maximum efficiency and rationality in terms of serving hegemonic capitalist interests. This same dynamic does not exist in peripheral countries as a result of penetration by the central countries in their economies (Cardoso, Faletto, 1979:22-23).

This penetration is manifested in political institutions and other structures of domination:

An economic class or group tries to establish through the political process a system of social relations that permits it to impose on the entire society a social form of production akin to its own interests; or at least it tries to establish alliances or to control the other groups or classes in order to develop an economic order consistent with its interests and objectives (Cardoso, Faletto, 1979:15).

It is in this way that internal and external structures are linked: "the external is...expressed as a particular type of relation between social groups and classes within the underdeveloped nations" (Cardoso, Faletto, 1979:15). Cardoso and Faletto put to rest the contention that dependency theory examines external relations at the expense of class analysis:

"Dependence should no longer be considered an 'external variable'; its analysis should be based on the relations between the different social classes within the dependent nations themselves" (Cardoso, Faletto, 1979:22). Unfortunately, Cardoso and Faletto never fully develop this approach to class analysis in their book, Dependency and Development in Latin America.

Nevertheless, Cardoso and Faletto introduced the important and valuable concept of "dependent development". Simply put,

In developing but dependent countries, social structures reflect the double edge of the economic system: its external links and internal roots. Thus, social dynamics and social conflicts usually express both kinds of interests and pressures, those that derive from external influences and those that are national. Yet, as we stressed before, foreign interests have internal expression through the action of groups and persons who represent them or have advantages in their presence. It is not necessarily foreign interests that are represented or sustained by "modernizing elites". "Traditional" groups--for instance, large landlords--are often the main sustaining force for foreign interests (Cardoso, Faletto, 1979:26-27).

Therefore, industrialization, middle and working class formations, and new Western-level consumption patterns can all emerge, but without the full autonomy necessary to direct national development and fulfil national development objectives.

The economies of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are most commonly characterized as "dependent" (Sayigh, 1986; Roy, 1987; JMCC, 1992). Even the World Bank, in their latest

report on the economy of occupied Palestine, indicates that "[a] striking feature of the OT [occupied territories] economy is its heavy dependence on the Israeli economy" (World Bank, 1993a:viii). Further, the World Bank's report indicates that

the extent to which the Occupied Territories are oriented toward Israel in their trading patterns is way above what would have been expected from international experience. Even under a scenario that assumes a common "language" (that is interpreted here as a proxy for the persistence of the history of economic interaction) and a free trade area (for all goods), the West Bank and Gaza would only purchase 36 percent of total imports from Israel and have 20 percent of its exports, compared with 90 percent of imports and 75 percent of exports in the mid-1980s [these actual trade numbers are "based on Israeli statistics that may underestimate trade that passes through Israel to the rest of the world"] (World Bank, 1993b:45).

When the Israelis invaded the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in 1967 they assumed all legislative and juridical control over the territories. As Salim Tamari reports,

At the structural level Israeli policy was formulated in the early years of occupation (1967-68), and continues to operate along these lines until today. It rests on a system of formal and informal control whose main features are

- 1 The physical control of land and water resources through a tight system of regional zoning and restriction of Arab building and water drilling permits
- 2 The integration of the Palestinian water, electrical and road network within the Israeli grid, thus making the Palestinian infrastructure dependent on Israeli services
- 3 Absorbing unskilled Arab labour into the Israeli economy, most notably in construction and services
- 4 The subordination of the occupied territories' economy as a tariff-free market for Israeli commodities, without extending the same benefits to goods produced in the West Bank and Gaza in the Israeli market (Heiberg, Øvensen et al., 1993:28).

Analysts of the political economic relationship between occupied Palestine and Israel suggest that it even goes beyond dependency to a situation of "pauperization" (Sayigh, 1986), and "de-development" (Roy, 1987). Unlike the interpretations of development in Latin America by Cardoso and Faletto, readings of both Sayigh and Roy leave the impression that there is no possibility of development--dependent or otherwise--in Palestine under conditions of occupation. Both Sara Roy and Yusif Sayigh report that the economies of the West Bank have been painstakingly constructed by the Israeli authorities through the mechanisms mentioned above to complement the Israeli economy, and worse, that the Palestinian economies have been tightly constrained in such a way that there can be no possibility of autonomous or even semi-autonomous development without substantial changes.¹⁰

Further, class and gender dimensions can be located in relation to Palestine's dependency dynamic with Israel. In line with Cardoso and Faletto's conceptualization of dependent development, some fractions of the Palestinian bourgeois class have profited from sub-contracting relations with Israeli industries and as contracting agents of Palestinian labour for Israeli construction and industrial sites. Much of the labour

¹⁰ Of course, it must be noticed by even the casual observer that unlike most other dependent economies in Latin America, Africa, and Asia, the Palestinian society, economy, and polity is controlled, and in many cases brutalized, directly by the military of the political and economic entity on which it is dependent. This, no doubt, is a key factor which has determined a dependency relationship between occupied Palestine and Israel.

used in sub-contracting is female and is often recruited through informal and family networks. While the Palestinian peasant has undergone proletarianization and wages earned in these sectors have contributed to Palestinian consumption (most notably in housing, household durables, and education), little autonomous development has occurred in the West Bank and Gazan economies.

The influence of dependency theory, particularly its more stagnationist variant as characterized by Gunder Frank, can be seen in the common Palestinian notion that development cannot occur while the conditions of occupation persist (Anon.: 11, 09/06/93; 12, 27/06/93). This belief contradicts actual experience in the West Bank and Gaza over the last decade and a half during which grassroots organizations have initiated projects in health, education, agriculture, and so on.

Dependency theory offers valuable insight into the impact of unequal power relations between the North and South, the West and East, the developed and underdeveloped. It provides a direct confrontation to traditional modernizationist theories, both liberal and marxist, by emphasizing the historical specificity and socio-political nature of development. Nevertheless, even more sophisticated variants of dependency theory, such as Cardoso's and Faletto's work (1979), do not stand up to the marxist and neo-marxist critiques concerning the nature of development as class-driven and located within the sphere of production rather than in the

sphere of exchange.¹¹ Nor does dependency theory explain social change within conditions of dependency. However, the emergence of dependency theory prompted theoretical critique which has led development theory to new and dynamic explorations. In the following section we will examine the articulation of modes of production theory and its value to development theory.

2.3 Articulation of Modes of Production Theory

The articulation of modes of production is one of the neo-marxist responses to the problems and questions that dependency theory posed to traditional development theories. In this section we will examine Ernesto Laclau's response to André Gunder Frank (1971) as well as Harold Wolpe's (1980a) and Aidan Foster-Carter's (1978) more developed theoretical considerations of articulation.

It is in Ernesto Laclau's "Feudalism and Capitalism in Latin America" (1971)--a critique of Gunder Frank's Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America (1967) and Latin America: Underdevelopment and Revolution (1969)--that one of the first strands of the theory of the articulation of modes of production can be seen. While Laclau agrees with Gunder Frank's rejection of dualism, he is severe in his criticism of Gunder Frank's conceptualization of capitalism. On the one hand, Laclau also rejects the thesis that two separate

¹¹ For an examination of this see Robert Brenner (1977).

economies, based on different modes of production, can co-exist without any connection to each other, while on the other hand he rejects Gunder Frank's solution of calling all capitalist penetrated economies "capitalist" (Laclau, 1971:22-30). It is from this point of departure that Laclau opens the debate on the articulation of various modes of production with capitalism:

Now this pre-capitalist character of the dominant relations of production in Latin America was not only not incompatible with production for the world market, but was actually intensified by the expansion of the latter....far from expansion of the external [capitalist] market acting as a disintegrating force on feudalism, its effect was rather to accentuate and consolidate it....[there is an] indissoluble unity that exists between the maintenance of feudal backwardness at one extreme and the apparent progress of a bourgeois dynamism at the other....development does generate underdevelopment, except that we base our reasoning on relations of production and not only on those of the market (Laclau, 1971:30-31).

Thus, Laclau contends that capitalist and pre-capitalist modes of production can co-exist, and indeed, interact or articulate in a single economy. Further, Laclau suggests that the capitalist mode of production relies on and intensifies the pre-capitalist mode in order to maximize profits. In the capitalist mode of production, the wage must be able to sustain the continuous reproduction of the labour force.¹² However, with rising capital costs associated with expansion, a contradiction emerges in which other costs must be cut in

¹² This issue will be critically explored further in the discussion on feminist political economy in chapter 5.

order to maintain and increase the rate of profit. The solution, contends Laclau, is the use of low technology or super-exploitation of labour. Super-exploitation can only be sustained over the long term as long as surplus is derived from other sources in order to reproduce the labour force. It is for this reason that the capitalist mode of production relies on and intensifies pre-capitalist modes of production (Laclau, 1971:35-36).¹³

Without criticizing Laclau directly, Harold Wolpe in his Introduction to The Articulation of Modes of Production: Essays from Economy and Society (1980a) asserts that the persistence of pre-capitalist modes of production cannot be attributed to their function for capital (Wolpe, 1980a:40-41). Rather,

[their] persistence must be analyzed as the effect of the struggle of agents organized under differentiated relations and forces of production. The relations of articulation are themselves relations of struggle and may have the consequence of disintegrating rather than maintaining the pre-capitalist modes...(Wolpe, 1980a:40).

In other words, as Wolpe discusses Marx's formulation of capitalism as a disintegrative force (Wolpe, 1980a:1-6), the persistence of pre-capitalist modes suggests a resistance to such disintegration. The meaning of the "notion of articulation", according to Wolpe, "refers to the relationship between the reproduction of the capitalist economy on the one

¹³ Harold Wolpe (1980b) has explored the dynamic of this relationship in the South African apartheid context.

hand and the reproduction of productive units organised according to pre-capitalist relations and forces of production on the other" (Wolpe, 1980a:41).¹⁴

This notion of struggle is also captured in Pierre Phillipe Rey's notion of articulation:

'articulation' specifies the nature of [the marxist concept of] contradiction. As Rey himself puts it, the idea is of 'the articulation of two modes of production, one of which establishes its domination over the other...not as a static given, but as a process, that is to say a combat between the two modes of production, with the confrontations and alliances which such a combat implies: confrontations and alliances essentially between the classes which these modes of production define (Foster-Carter, 1978:54).

Further, as Aidan Foster-Carter points out in his article "The Modes of Production Controversy" (1978), "contradiction without articulation (or transition without articulation) fallaciously implies that the waxing and waning of modes of production are quite separate entities each internally determined, whereas in fact they are linked as are wrestlers in a clinch" (Foster-Carter, 1978:73). In order to understand the implications of articulation, Wolpe defines and differentiates between "restricted" and "extended" concepts of modes of production. The restricted concept simply refers to a combination of forces and relations of production "within individual, isolated enterprises". The extended concept, on

¹⁴ As will be discussed further on, this notion of struggle is developed in structural terms rather than with reference to human agency. I find this problematic as abstract notions of modes do not "struggle", but people living within certain political and economic systems do.

the other hand, refers to the "mechanisms by which enterprises are linked", and "the processes by which the relations and forces of production are reproduced" ("laws of motion"). According to Wolpe, the extended concept relies on other concepts such as circulation, distribution, the state, and so on, in order to be fully understood (Wolpe, 1980a:36). After these definitions Wolpe arrives at an examination of a social formation based on "the co-existence of and interrelationship between a dominant extended mode and subordinate restricted modes of production" (Wolpe, 1980a:38-42). This is what Wolpe refers to when discussing what articulation of modes of production actually looks like.

The persistence of sharecropping in co-existence with increasing proletarianization of the peasantry in occupied Palestine is explained by Salim Tamari (1981) and Alex Pollock (1990) using modes of production analysis. Official Israeli intent has, until recently, been to discourage and even to prevent industrial capitalist development in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Except as it has supplemented the Israeli economy, development of any kind in occupied Palestine has been obstructed. Similar to Wolpe's (1980b) conceptualization of the South African economy, low wages paid to Palestinian labour in Israeli industrial and construction sectors, as well as by Palestinian sub-contractors, are supplemented by subsistence and sharecropping production. Thus, Israeli capitalism, a certain fraction of the Palestinian bourgeoisie,

large Palestinian landowners, and the Palestinian semi-proletariat/semi-peasant are articulated in mutual reinforcement and reproduction.

In this formulation of articulation, the reproduction of the subordinate restricted mode of production is dependent on the laws of motion of the dominant extended mode of production. Therefore, a subordinate feudal mode of production could actually be dependent on the laws of motion of the capitalist mode for its reproduction without necessarily experiencing any erosion or disintegration (Wolpe, 1980a:38-39). Of course, one of the most obvious problems with this idea is the definition of what constitutes the "dominant" and the "subordinate" modes of production; Wolpe never outlines the criteria for discerning this. Second, the veracity of restricting the definition of a mode of production to simple forces and relations of production must be questioned. Without the capacity to reproduce itself, can a collection of forces and relations of production actually be defined as a "mode" of production? Wolpe addresses this issue:

the notion of self-reproduction or autonomous reproduction is extremely unsatisfactory, for it either excludes the possibility of relations between the CMP [capitalist mode of production] and other modes on a tautological basis that the CMP immediately transforms all non-capitalist relations into capitalist relations...or it recognizes the possibility of relations between the CMP and other modes but contends that these are not necessary to the reproduction of the CMP, without, however, offering an explanation for their existence (Wolpe, 1980a:38).

Therefore, for Wolpe, the issue of self-reproduction is a red herring, used for the convenience of clinging to the traditional notions of the capitalist mode of production as a totalizing, disintegrating force.

Despite these problems, the articulation of modes of production concept provides a resolution, as Wolpe indicates in the passage above, to the dual problem of understanding "the continuing failure of capitalist relations of production to become generalized within Third World countries" and the "dynamic reproduction of non-capitalist relations within the historical process of capitalist expansion" (Glavanis, Glavanis, 1990:2).

The articulation approach can provide a theoretical solution to incorporating the insights of dependency theory while also maintaining rigorous analysis of social forces. However, if this endeavour is to be successful, Foster-Carter suggests two pitfalls to avoid. The first is "the sterile assertion of the analytical priority of relations of production over those of exchange and indeed all else" (Foster-Carter, 1978:76). Foster-Carter writes:

Granted that at a certain point in the debate this [reassertion of the primacy of production relations] introduced a necessary rigour into the argument, it may still be that on this issue Frank has the last word over Laclau....it may be possible to undercut a sterile debate by focusing not on production but on the reproduction of total systems, in which of course exchange plays a crucial part (Foster-Carter, 1978:76-77).

The suggestion here is that there be a new emphasis placed on

the reproduction of modes of production rather than a sole focus on the mechanics of production within any given mode. As we will see in chapter 5, this approach dovetails with feminist political economy analyses (Foster-Carter, 1978:77). Second, Foster-Carter warns against falling into "narrow economism". This warning fits with the criticism that

mode of production theorists ha[ve] a strong tendency to sidestep totally the central question raised by the dependency school: the question of dependency. They focu[s] on relations between modes of production as if no states and state boundaries [exist]. They focu[s] on the logic of economic structures as if no political relations [exist] (Mamdani et al., 1993:108).

Foster-Carter advocates instead the inclusion of politics, ideology, religion, kinship ideas, and anything else which "correspond[s] to peoples' own consciousness of their position", and sounds a "clarion call for class, seen as the key mediator between...modes of production and human action" (Foster-Carter, 1978:77).

Nevertheless, these prescriptions leave several gaps in our understanding of development and human agency. First, articulation of modes of production theory, along with dependency and modernizationist theories, do not address the real problems associated with achieving equitable access to economic, political, and social resources for all sectors of society. All three paradigms provide interpretations of present conditions, but none of them attempts a full analysis of the occurrence of positive social change. Second, returning to the notion of struggle introduced by Wolpe and

Rey, not enough has been said about what forms this struggle takes and who wages it. Is this struggle unconscious (as a result of the articulation of two separate modes of production), or can the articulation of modes of production give rise to intentional resistance? If the latter is true, then reproduction of modes of production should be given less primacy. Transformation of modes of production should be privileged if struggle and agency are the focus of analysis. The notion of struggle, then, can be the tool to use to address the first problem of explaining positive social change and a concept of development that is truly about improving people's living standards. Indeed, struggle is spoken about implicitly in both Mies's (1986) and Peteet's (1991) discussions of women's activism in revolutionary movements through their participation in "development"-style activities such as subsistence and income-generating endeavours, health, education, and social welfare projects.

Palestine as a case study provides a useful starting point for the examination of the notion of struggle in articulation of modes of production theory. Held in the "clinch" of Israeli capitalist development as a source of cheap labour, Palestinians have, since the late 1970s and 1980s, incorporated the development of mass organizations, popular committees, cooperatives, and so on, as part of the nationalist resistance. In essence, these groups have

constructed separate structures¹⁵ in several areas, including agriculture, health, education, and cultural production, both as a mode of popular mobilization and as a mode of resistance against Israeli authority and social, political, and economic control.

Women have been central to the process of development as a mode of resistance in Palestine. Their resistance activism in the development of the home economy and production cooperatives during the intifada is a case of struggle on the site of articulation between the Palestinian pre-capitalist agricultural mode of production and the Israeli capitalist mode of production. This example highlights several of the theoretical gaps left by the main paradigms of development theory: the role of gendered division of labour and women as a unit of analysis, the role of the organization of social forces and these organizations themselves, the relations--democratic or not--between these organizations and their constituents, the state, and other internal and external forces. These are all issues that arise out of the Palestinian case as we analyze transformational possibilities as a result of struggle.

The theoretical approach of this thesis will follow in

¹⁵ Separate structures here refers to the phenomenon of the development of alternative institutions to those set up by the state. In the Palestinian context, before the 1993 peace deal the state here refers to the Israeli state, and particularly the Civil Administration (the occupation arm of the Israeli military in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip).

chapter 5 with a research-and-praxis-led expansion of development theory to incorporate perspectives of feminist political economy, civil society, and democracy and power. As mentioned in the epistemological discussion in chapter 1, theory must be a response to reality, and so it is for this reason that further theoretical discussion will follow the discussion of the Palestinian case.

CHAPTER THREE

PALESTINIAN WOMEN AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF OCCUPATION

The Israeli occupation of Palestine in 1967 is most commonly explained in ideological and "security" terms, but is rarely understood within a political economy context. The attachment Israelis hold for "Judea" and "Samaria" will not be discussed in this chapter, nor will the "threat" that Palestinians and other Arab neighbours pose to Israeli survival. Rather, the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, as well as the current Oslo Accord and World Bank development plans, will be discussed with reference to the interests of dominant capital. Palestinian resistance, too, will be explained in a way that avoids the stereotype of irrational and violent fundamentalist reactionism in favour of a perspective that incorporates an understanding of the material bases for struggle.

This discussion will provide the background information necessary to contextualize three case studies, Palestinian Agricultural Relief Committees's (PARC) Women's Unit, Bisan Center for Research and Development, and the United Nations Development Program's (UNDP) Task Force on Women, all of which will be examined in chapter 4. It will be found that unlike many other "Third World" countries, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip have been subject to very little "development" activity. Primarily agriculturally-based economies, they have been

neglected and "de-developed" in addition to being exposed to the effects of the political and economic trends of the region, such as the booming Gulf oil economy and war. The way Palestinians have been affected by and responded to all of these factors has been largely dependent on their class and gender. Women's participation and activism, itself shaped by class position, has been of considerable significance, although frequently invisible or subsumed under their "natural" roles. Nevertheless, women's roles themselves have not been static, and a clear interplay between their responses to micro- and macro-contexts and the definition of these contexts will be seen.

3.1 The Political Economy of Occupation, 1967-1993

It is ironic that Israel's invasion of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in 1967, and their continued occupation of those territories in the name of Israeli "national security", should have created the conditions necessary for a sustained resistance movement against the Israeli government and a cohesive Palestinian nationalism. Ironical too is that the nature of Israeli repression of the activists, organizations, and institutions that emerged in the mid-1970s and which manifest Palestinian nationalism have only strengthened Palestinian resolve to continue their struggle and has caused

"Palestinianism"¹ to flourish. Between 1948 and 1967 Palestinians were scattered throughout the Middle East, in refugee camps in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria, or were located inside Israel's 1948 borders. Geo-politically, a definable Palestinian territory had ceased to exist; only diaspora Palestinians kept Palestine alive in their dreams, their hopes, and their despair. But their isolation from each other and the repressive conditions in which they found themselves in their host Arab countries prevented them from any meaningful or effective organization that would have as its aim the creation of a new Palestinian political entity. Although the PLO was formed in 1964 by diaspora Palestinians committed to armed struggle and the rejection of the Israeli state,² it did not gain any real currency until after the humiliating and dismal defeat of Arab military forces by the Israelis in 1967. Not only were the Palestinians united in their disillusionment and desperation in the loss of their faith in their Arab allies, but many were now geo-politically

¹ The term "Palestinianism" is borrowed from Deirdre Collings (1988). The following brief description of the evolution of Palestinian nationalism is an inadequate condensation of Collings's extensive and eloquent research on this subject.

² Although the original aim of the PLO in 1964 was to regain all of the Palestinian territory taken by the Israelis in 1948, the Palestine National Council officially declared on March 20, 1977 that it called for the establishment of "an independent national state" in Palestine and authorized Palestinian attendance at an Arab-Israeli peace conference. This declaration is in contrast to previous calls for an independent state of Palestine and the elimination of the state of Israel (Chomsky, 1984:68).

united by occupation under the Israeli military. Palestinians decided to take matters into their own hands (Khouri, 1985:356-57).

However, before engaging in discussion of this phase of Palestinian activism it is necessary to understand the economic, political, and social conditions that prevailed in the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip. Prior to its invasion of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip Israel had been on public record as having aspirations to economic relations with the Arab world "akin to the relationship between the United States and the Latin American continent" (Abba Eban, cited in Ryan, 1974:5). In other words, Israel saw, and continues to see as will be demonstrated later, its rightful economic position in the Middle East as being the purveyor of manufactured goods to its raw materials-supplying and sub-contracting neighbours. However, the Arab boycott, first instituted by the Arab League in 1946 in response to Zionist policies and actions in British mandatory Palestine, has interfered with these economic ambitions and the Israelis have had to rely on trade relations with Europe and the US, as well as colonial relations with occupied Palestine since 1967. With reference to its economic relations with the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, Israel's Ministry of Defense reported in its Development and Economic Situation in Judea, Samaria, the Gaza Strip and North Sinai: 1967-1969, A Summary (1970) that "[t]he areas are a supplementary market for Israeli goods and services on the one

hand, and a source of factors of production, especially unskilled labour, for the Israeli economy on the other" (cited in Ryan, 1974:9). This policy direction prevails to this day where the World Bank reports that as of 1993, 90% of occupied Palestine's imports are industrial products from Israel, and 70% of its exports go to Israel. Additionally, occupied Palestine exports unskilled labour to Israel and skilled labour to the Gulf (at least until the 1991 Gulf War). Certain agricultural goods and skilled labour are barred entry to Israel (World Bank, 1993b:27). Simultaneously, trade between occupied Palestine and other Arab countries, particularly Jordan and Egypt, as a result of both Arab and Israeli policy, has declined since 1967 (Ryan, 1974:9-10; JMCC, 1992:55, 94-95; World Bank, 1993b:27, 45). Perhaps Israel's economic policy towards occupied Palestine can best be encapsulated by these words of Minister of Defense Yitzhak Rabin in 1986:

there will be no development in the Occupied Territories initiated by the Israeli government, and no permits given for expanding agriculture or industry, which may compete with the State of Israel (cited in JMCC, 1992:69).

The results of this policy can be seen in the high rate of (male) labour migration to Israel and the Gulf, and the stagnation of the industrial GDP³ of the occupied territories from 6.7% in 1968 to 7.4% in 1990, and the equally stagnant

³ GDP figures for occupied Palestine are based on Israeli statistics which exclude East Jerusalem.

agricultural GDP at approximately one third from 1967 to the present (JMCC, 1992:101-102, 120-121, 122; World Bank, 1993c:28; World Bank, 1993d:1; World Bank, 1993f:10, 12-15).

However, the numbers within the numbers tell an even more interesting story. While the West Bank's industrial GDP rose from 6.6% in 1965/6 to a high of 9.4% in 1970, it has been on a steady decline ever since, falling to 5.9% in 1990. Conversely, the industrial GDP in the Gaza Strip has roller-coastered its way from 4.4% in 1965/6 to 12.2% in 1990. This discrepancy can be attributed to the scarcity of small family-owned farms in the Gaza Strip as compared to the West Bank, and to a preponderance of sub-contracting firms for Israeli industry in Gaza placed to take advantage of cheap refugee wage levels. By 1987, 88% of Israeli textile factories were dependent on cheap Gazan labour in sub-contracted firms in the Gaza Strip (Rockwell, 1985; JMCC, 1992:74, 79-80; World Bank, 1993c:28). As Susan Rockwell notes,

Israeli managers foresaw the need for Palestinian female labor and also realized that Arab tradition barred women from commuting to factories within the Green Line [the pre-1967 border]. They therefore sub-contracted instead of integrating Palestinians from the occupied territories into their plants (Rockwell, 1985:120-121).

According to Adel Samara, the "most developed industries in the West Bank are those that were sub-contracted, while industries which produce basic needs decreased [between 1975-1987]" (Samara, 1992:111). Israel began the process of transferring light industry to the West Bank and the Gaza

Strip, by selling the technology to Palestinian sub-contractors, in order to take advantage of cheap female industrial labour (particularly in textiles), and began to develop high-tech industry within its own borders and on settlements which use higher-wage Jewish labour (Samara, 1992:117-118; JMCC, 1992:76). Up until 1991, licensing for new firms was extremely difficult to obtain, with industries manufacturing "prohibited goods" ("prohibited" remains undefined by the authorities) still declined permission to operate (JMCC, 1992:81-82). This system has clearly given the Israelis much latitude to shape the Palestinian industrial economies according to its own needs.

As for agriculture, it can be noted that its GDP in the West Bank declined from 39% in 1968/9 to 26% in 1982/3, but steadily grew again over the 1987-91 period to about 33% (World Bank, 1993d:1). This pattern can be ascribed to a number of factors, including falling rates of profit in agriculture in the earlier period, and the later onset of the intifada and the mass number of returnees from the Gulf after the 1991 war looking for any kind of employment, both of which encouraged greater participation in agriculture. The constraints imposed by Israeli occupation such as unavailability of affordable credit, restrictions and quotas on production of certain agricultural goods, policies that prevent or hinder the development of agricultural infrastructure and services, a discriminatory trade policy

which restricts Palestinian exports while allowing for Israeli dumping on the Palestinian market, land expropriation, and restricted access to water,⁴ as well as restricted access to other markets, all contributed to the failure of the agricultural sector. The aim of Israeli restrictions has been to shape the Palestinian agricultural sector to support Israel's own agricultural sector (SAAR, 1992:269; JMCC, 1992:54-59, 60-62; World Bank, 1993d:11-24, 57-59).

The political and economic conditions of the occupation have had consequences for the capitalist bourgeoisie and for traditional ruling families, particularly large landowners and those loyal to the Hashemites.⁵ Certain class fractions, such as labour contractors for Israeli firms, owners of subcontracting firms, and distributors of Israeli goods in the occupied territories, have benefitted from relations with the

⁴ According to Kathryn Casa,

About 85 percent of the water in the large aquifer below the West Bank is currently used by Israeli settlers or pumped into Israel, while Palestinian water consumption in the occupied territories has been sharply curtailed. Average water use per capita among Palestinians is 25 cubic meters per year, whereas the average Israeli rate is 170 cubic meters annually. In some areas, Palestinian water use falls below the level necessary to maintain minimal health standards (1991:26).

Also see Jeffrey D. Dillman (1989) for information about Israeli use of domestic law and their violation of international law regarding their use of Palestinian water resources.

⁵ Much of the Palestinian middle- and upper-classes maintained loyal relations with the ruling Jordanians during the period 1948-67 (Smith, 1989; Samara, 1992).

Israeli economy (Samara, 1992:115). However, the blocking of trade to other Arab countries has had severe implications for commercial agriculture, particularly in the Gaza Strip where large citrus plantations dominate the agricultural sector, as have land and water confiscations and the dumping of Israeli cash crops in the Palestinian market. In addition, the export of skilled labour to the Gulf in response to both the economic conditions in occupied Palestine and the booming oil industry, the imposition of new taxes, and the neglect of infrastructure all limited willingness to invest in the economy. Moreover, after the civil war in Jordan in 1970-71 and the drive to "Jordanize" the Hashemite government by removing Palestinians from key posts, development funds, salaries, and subsidies were no longer readily available to the Palestinian middle- and upper-classes in the West Bank.⁶ This transition marked a shift in nationalist allegiance of much of this class fraction, believing that in order to protect their interests not only did they need a state, but it had to be one of their own. Thus, the PLO became much more appealing (Smith, 1989:167-168).

As for the rural lower- and middle-classes, especially in the West Bank where small landholdings and sharecropping

⁶ Jordan continued to pay salaries and pensions to Palestinian employees of the Jordanian civil service after the Israeli occupation of the West Bank in 1967.

dominate the agricultural sector,⁷ there has been an increasing trend towards proletarianization. Numerous factors account for this, including continued partition of landholdings due to inheritance, the demand for unskilled labour and higher wage in Israel (Tamari, 1981:35), as well as the other multitude of constraints on Palestinian agriculture imposed by the Israeli military ("civil") administration. As a result, one third of the male agricultural workforce has left this sector since 1967, when approximately 40% of the male workforce was engaged in it, to 25.8% in 1991 (JMCC, 1992:58; World Bank, 1993d:22).⁸

Nonetheless, the male exodus from agriculture does not mean that this sector has been abandoned altogether.

⁷ Currently, average landholdings in the West Bank per rural household average less than 50 dunams (1 dunam = $\frac{1}{4}$ acre). This includes 84% of all landholders and covers 34% of all possessed land. By contrast, 1% of West Bank landholders possess 38% of the land, with holdings in excess of 100 dunams. These large landholdings are concentrated in the Jordan Valley (Heiberg, Øvensen et al., 1993:23).

⁸ Nevertheless, the rate of employment shift from agriculture to other sectors has been occurring throughout the Middle East. It has been suggested that this shift has been occurring at a slower than usual rate in occupied Palestine because military restrictions have inhibited the growth of other, most notably industrial, sectors, and therefore has acted to keep labour on the land for lack of other opportunities (JMCC, 1992:58). Alternatively, other sources claim that the share of agricultural workforce is lower than the share in other developing countries as a result of the 1948 war which forced landlessness on a substantial number of the Palestinian peasantry (Heiberg, Øvensen et al., 1993:199). Finally, it must be noted that political and macroeconomic crises affect the rate of Palestinian employment in agriculture. For instance, during the intifada, the Israeli-imposed closures on the territories, and the 1991 Gulf War all acted to return male labour to the land (Anon. 3, 06/23/93; World Bank, 1993d:23).

Subsistence farming has been maintained, and traditional male tasks have increasingly been performed by women on family farms (Tamari, 1981:51). It is estimated that women perform 70% of all agricultural labour in the West Bank (World Bank, 1993d:22-23). A 1987 study of the household economy in the West Bank conducted by PARC indicated that 80% of agricultural work is done by women, particularly the planting and cultivation of graduated crops in cash cropping and all tasks involved in household crops, including ploughing in many cases (Anon. 5, 06/29/93). It seems that in families able to stay on the land, men most likely sought wage labour on nearby cash-crop estates or in cities and towns while the burden of agricultural work on the family land fell almost solely on women.⁹ In fact, a recent survey indicates that it is rare that agriculture is the sole source of household income, and is in the majority of cases a "supplement" to other forms of family income (Heiberg, Øvensen et al., 1993:172).

However, agricultural subsistence work is not the only way that Palestinian women have "supplemented" family income. Palestinian women compose a reserve army of labour, which in overall terms assists in keeping wages low, both by forcing down industrial wage levels inside occupied Palestine and by subsidizing the wage paid by Israeli employers to male

⁹ This pattern can be seen in Palestine (Tamari, 1981; Warnock, 1990:102-114) as well as in the Middle East generally (Hammam, 1981), and can also be observed in other locales (Deere, León de Leal, 1981; Bryson, 1981).

employees through women's other subsistence and wage labour. Recent studies indicate that women compose approximately 10% of the Palestinian workforce.¹⁰ When home-based work is counted, the proportion jumps to 25% (PASSIA, 1993:58; World Bank, 1993f:12). In relative proportions Palestinian women tend to be over-represented in professional work, likely due to the preponderance of labour force participation by educated women from wealthy households and the prevailing social attitude that most work, particularly work in factories, other than professional labour, is unacceptable for women (Heiberg, Øvensen et al., 1993:209-210). For instance, when women from Ein al-Sultan Camp were asked why they chose to work in an agricultural committee's cooperative rather than the factories the women responded that there are "many troubles" (sexual assault) in the factories. Two girls had been killed by their families because they were impregnated at the worksite (Anon. 6a, 07/10/93; Intissar, 07/10/93; Sadiya, 07/10/93; Um Ziyad, 07/10/93). Nevertheless, as increasing numbers of Palestinian men have been chronically unemployed, imprisoned, deported, maimed, and killed, Palestinian women from poorer households have taken on non-professional wage work. A 1983-84 survey

¹⁰ However, female labour force participation is notoriously difficult to count. In this instance labour force participation refers to wage-labour and neglects the work done by women at home either on the family farm and other subsistence or unpaid work such as participation in the family business or the husband's work, home production of foodstuffs (vegetable and animal) and crafts. The issue of the visibility of women's work and its relevance to theory will be addressed in chapter 5.

broke down women's labour force participation as follows: (wage) agriculture (57.5%), science, academic, and other "caring" professions (21.6%), industrial sector (9.4%), skilled labour (8.4%), service sector (5.2%), clerical work (4.3%), commerce (2%), and unskilled labour (1%). Many of these women were unmarried (85.8%), divorced (3%), widowed (3%), and the rest (7.6%) were married. Again, the proportion of wage-labour participation by female heads of households, as compared to married women, is relatively high, indicating that the social status of female wage-labour outside the home is dubious and only the poorest seek it (JMCC, 1992:110-112; Heiberg, Øvensen et al., 1993:209-210). A recent study of women and work in Shatti Camp in the Gaza Strip did not encounter any women who participate in factory wage-labour. This could indicate a possible decline in women's participation in this type of labour, in contrast to Rockwell's study (1985), due to either an increased unwillingness to engage in low status work, or an unavailability of such work due to fluctuations in the Israeli economy (Lang, Mohanna, 1992:73-74). If the latter is true, then this could mean that there is either an absolute unavailability of such work or a shift of male participation in work previously dominated by women.

From this brief overview of economic conditions in occupied Palestine it can be seen that due to the Israeli construction of a dependent and stunted Palestinian economy

significant changes have been wrought in women's economic position. Where previously women's labour was confined to the home or village,¹¹ women are now engaged in wage labour outside of the home. With the increase in nominal or actual female-headed households and male labour migration to Israel, women's division of labour is expanding to include not only the role of family bread-winner but also other more specific traditionally male-associated tasks. Not only is the Palestinian economy dependent (in structural terms), but it can also be seen that women's labour in non-capitalist agricultural production articulates with Israeli capitalist production in a way that is reminiscent of the South African economy (Wolpe, 1980b). In addition, however, these economic changes have also prompted certain political responses in which women play a major role. First, we will briefly examine the general political response before more closely surveying women's political activism.

3.2 Women and the Struggle for Palestine, 1967-1993

The struggle for Palestine has proceeded through many phases since its occupation in 1967. Women's participation in the public sphere in support of national goals, and later their own gender-specific aims, emerged out of the context of the occupation. Israeli policies of economic exploitation

¹¹ The *hamula* (village) was often comprised of one large extended family. For this reason it was acceptable for women to move unconstrained within village boundaries (Abdo-Zubi, 1987).

weakened the strength of the Palestinian bourgeoisie and middle class, thus allowing the lower classes from the cities, countryside, and the camps to come to the fore in activism and decision-making during the intifada (el-Khatib, 1990:5). Mustafa Barghouthi and Rita Giacaman (1990) argue that Palestinian resistance in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip has been a three-phased response to the conditions of the occupation. The first, an indication of vested Palestinian interests in acceptance of the status quo, was a call for adaptation to Israeli rule, "to make the best of it" (Barghouthi, Giacaman, 1990:76-77). It soon became evident that there were few ways available to "make the best of it", and this led to a second response. Located by Barghouthi and Giacaman in the 1970s and early 1980s, this phase was characterized by *sumud* ("steadfastness"), which meant exactly what the term implies--an almost static and stubborn rooted resistance. Steadfastness promoted a disengagement from Israeli military structures through the development of autonomous Palestinian structures. This response had not yet equated disengagement with the active process of building of a Palestinian state. Institutions and organizations were created to support steadfastness and were a preparation for the eventuality of a sovereign Palestine, but they were not articulated with the goal of creating an autonomous state and were established within the confines of the military government's laws and regulations (Barghoutni, Giacaman,

1990:77). Finally, the response that culminated in the intifada had its roots in the late 1970s and 1980s. It drew on the experience of steadfastness and went a step further in its articulation of the goal of statehood and institution-building, and in its willingness to defy Israeli authority. This response developed on the basis of grassroots participation through cooperation with mass organizations affiliated with Palestinian political parties, all associated with the PLO (Barghouthi, Giacaman, 1990:78-79). Here we see a clear objective in the building of a Palestinian state, supported by popular activism, that defined the spirit and intent of the intifada. The intifada was distinguished from the *sumud* of the 1970s and early 1980s, a phase of resistance which was led by the bourgeoisie and the middle class, by four factors: a continuity that was directly linked to the active participation of segments of Palestinian society who had nothing to lose by sustaining resistance; a coherent political focus on the establishment of a Palestinian state based on peaceful coexistence; a popular quality that engaged all sectors of Palestinian society; the peaceful nature of the struggle which became possible for the first time due to mass participation (el-Khatib, 1990:5).

While the intifada and its persistence puzzled many casual observers of occupied Palestine, for those more familiar with the situation in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip the surprise was that the uprising had not happened

sooner.¹² In fact, as a result of their organizational networks, the residents of occupied Palestine were ready and prepared for a sustained uprising. As one activist replied when a researcher asked her if she was unprepared for the intifada's spontaneity, "We were not surprised by the intifada, and we were quick to adjust our activities [to accommodate it]" (Hiltermann, 1990:34).

That the intifada was more complex than the mere angry throwing of stones superficially seemed to demonstrate is explained by Salim Tamari (1988). He contends that defining the intifada as an expression of frustration is a trivialization of the Palestinians' political statement:

Frustration is what you feel when your beloved has not returned your amorous overtures. What we have here is repression. It's not a psychological state of mind, but a political response to a physical state of affairs. The word frustration obfuscates the relationship between Israel and the occupied territories. One, because it obscures the hierarchical form of control. Two, because it misconstrues the nature of the response, which is not a mindless volcanic eruption but a politically motivated act, spontaneous but with a clear political objective: we want independence, we don't want you to be here, we want you to get out! (Tamari, 1988:28).

Tamari locates the intifada within the continuum of organizational activity that commenced in the mid-1970s in occupied Palestine with the development of local institutions

¹² See Hiltermann (1991a:1), as well as the interview with two West Bank activists, Mahmoud and Naji, by Beshara Doumani (1988:43). Both the activists and Hiltermann cite that there was "something in the air all of 1987" and though no one expected the uprising to begin on 9 December 1987, it was no surprise when the revolt proved to be something more enduring.

such as labour unions, student unions, women's federations, professional associations, universities, hospitals and clinics, and cultural institutions such as newspapers, theatres, dance troupes, and musical groups. With the defeat of the Arab armies in the October War in 1973 Palestinians began to lose hope in their reliance on any outside ally to grant them their right to self-determination. The PLO, in collaboration with activists inside the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, developed a strategy of building organizations and institutions in the territories to form a national front of resistance. This activity, as Giacaman and Barghouthi note, was dedicated to the creation of a political infrastructure that would be capable of supporting an independent Palestinian state (Tamari, 1988:26-27; Taraki, 1989a:436-437).

Nonetheless, Fatah, with the exception of its women's committee's activities, had no programs on the ground until the very recent establishment of pseudo-governmental ministries, to which we will return to later (these organizations have been established in order to solicit a share of the recent infusion of aid money to the West Bank and Gaza). Traditionally, Fatah has mobilized its followers simply through the use of popular slogans and platforming. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), which has generally appealed to Christians and the professional class, mobilized its followers through the revival of Palestinian culture in the form of theatre, music

groups, and dance troupes (the popular summer Palestinian Cultural Festival is a PFLP-sponsored event), as well as through some programs and organizations. The PFLP has maintained its independence by being relatively closed to working with foreigners, but this has also reduced its access to outside experience and knowledge. Interestingly, the PFLP also has the most number of actual or suspected collaborators due to their more relaxed attitude towards sexual mores which leaves them open to extortion at the hands of the Israelis.

It is the Palestine People's Party (PPP, formerly the Communist Party)¹³ which developed the largest number of organizations and institutions. They also have the most funding as a result of their outside linkages with international trade unions and socialist organizations. However, the PPP has no mobilizing nationalist figures, works openly with foreigners (which has been positive in that they have benefitted from exposure to outside knowledge, but has also left them open to "being led by the nose" at times), and the local "grudge talk" has it that they have the fewest political prisoners because of their stance against armed struggle, hence leaving them relatively untargeted by the Israelis (Anon. 9a, 07/22/93).

The PLO's decision to encourage development in occupied Palestine culminated in 1978 with the establishment of the

¹³ The Palestine Communist Party changed its name to the Palestine People's Party after the fall of the Berlin Wall.

PLO-Jordanian Joint Committee for the Support of Steadfastness, fed by a special fund that was set up and financed by Arab governments. Nevertheless, as one analyst in the West Bank indicated, the development initiatives funded by the steadfastness fund had an overall negative effect for several reasons (Anon. 11, 06/9/93). First, as 60% of its budget was spent on housing, the fund tended to encourage consumption rather than increase production. Second, only the middle- and upper-classes generally qualified for the housing money, and so, therefore, the fund only assisted people who already had alternate sources of support to "stay" on the land. The lower-classes, the ones who truly needed assistance in order to be steadfast, had little access to this money.¹⁴ Third, some money was given to businesses, but only those granted licenses by the Israeli authorities. Because the Israelis only tended to give licenses to Palestinian businesses compatible with their own economic needs, the strategy of restricting funds given only to licensed businesses could be said to have actually assisted Israeli economic occupation.¹⁵ Last, some of the funds were also

¹⁴ I know of one family who built their house with steadfastness funds. According to them, the money was distributed on a credit basis. This would certainly explain why the lower-class had little or no access to these funds.

¹⁵ Related to this point is the issue of collaboration, which another West Bank NGO professional claims has been widespread. Particularly susceptible, he claims, have been the bourgeois class seeking licenses for their businesses. For instance, collaboration in the form of providing information about local personages and organization is easily extorted out of those going to the Israeli

used to build infrastructure, but since under international law this is Israeli responsibility as an occupying power, the funds used in this manner actually subsidized occupation.

Nonetheless, organizations--most notably the Palestinian Agricultural Relief Committees (PARC) in 1983 and the Union of the Agricultural Work Committees (UAWC) in 1985/6--emerged during this period to support agriculture, the leading sector in the Palestinian economy. Both organizations are affiliated with political factions, the former with the PPP and the latter with the PFLP, and both arose to meet the needs of small farmers that had been left unmet or impeded by the occupation. For instance, both organizations cite the lack of and cutback of agricultural extension services as one of their reasons for originating (UAWC, n.d.; PARC, 1991). In addition, UAWC states its current goal as encouraging small-scale cooperative and self-sufficient development with an emphasis on achieving "food security" (Anon. 13, 07/12/93). As well, both organizations encourage smallholders and whole villages to practice land reclamation as a way to avoid land confiscation. This, however, brings with it a set of other problems, as spokespersons from both organizations indicate, including marketing surpluses¹⁶ and tree uprooting at the

Civil Administration seeking various licenses and/or travel documents (Anon. 9a, 07/22/93).

¹⁶ Marketing or otherwise making use of surpluses is no small problem for Palestinian farmers given the export restrictions that they have faced under Israeli occupation. With very little access to Israeli and Arab markets (given Israeli trade restrictions and

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hands of Israeli settlers and soldiers (Anon.: 3, 06/23/93; 13, 07/12/93). Curiously, while land ownership disparities exist in both the West Bank (see note 7) and Gaza, and each organization is affiliated with leftist parties, neither espouses land reform. Reasons cited included the fact that the issue was not pressing at this time and nothing could be done about it in this conjuncture (Anon. 13, 07/12/93), and more importantly, bringing the issue to the forefront at this time would only cause political disunity (Anon.: 3, 06/23/93; 13, 07/12/93). These reasons contrast to the one given by a prominent insider in the current peace and development processes, and member of a large land-owning family in the Jordan Valley: "There's no talk about land reform. We don't have large land-owners so there's no point in having it" (Anon. 12a, 12/20/93).

If economic and productive development throughout the 1980s was largely a failure, organizational and institutional development certainly was not. A measure of its success is the threat that Israeli authorities perceived in this development. The organizational and institutional resistance was (and still is) met with town arrests, imprisonment and unlawful detainment, and deportations. In the face of such repression the national movement chose to decentralize their organizational leadership, allowing it to evolve into more

the Arab boycott restrictions on importing products that have used or include Israeli-origin inputs), Palestinians have been mostly constrained by the limits of local demand.

open, democratic structures. This decision occurred for two reasons: first, to nurture the growing mass base of organization that was emerging, and to address the concrete needs of different sectors of Palestinian society; second, decentralization of the leadership structure would help evade detection by Israeli authorities, and would safeguard against the destruction of indigenous institutions at the hands of Israeli authorities by broadening institutional leadership and by strengthening the mass base on which their organizations rest (Taraki, 1989a:442-443).

These changes in political organization were accompanied by changes in women's participation. Through the 1970s, as women increasingly became involved in institutions of higher learning in the territories and more exposed to and engaged in public political activism, the Likud government launched a brutal campaign of political repression, which especially harmed political organizations with established hierarchies of internal authority as they were more easily detectable. Simultaneously the more traditional women's charitable organizations declined in effectiveness and the newer, more decentralized and democratic student and women's organizations, which managed to escape much of the political repression, ascended in influence. This laid the groundwork for a new vanguard of women's activism in occupied Palestine. The 1980s saw the emergence of mass women's organizations (women's committees) affiliated with each of the four main

parties associated with the PLO. Each of them shared the goal of involving as many women across classes as possible within their ranks, with the secondary aim to achieve equality for Palestinian women. Nevertheless, none of the organizations discussed personal status laws, traditional patriarchal values, or other gender issues (Anon. 20, 07/14/93; Jad, 1990:130-132).

Nonetheless, it was women, individually and collectively, who sustained the *intifada*, most notably in the areas of education, the home economy, agriculture, and even street activism. In the first year, and even up to the Gulf War, there was much optimism expressed in the numerous articles, books, and newspaper items that proliferated during this period, or about this period, concerning women's changing role (Giacaman, Johnson, 1989; Hamad, 1989; al-Helo, 1990; Abdo, 1991b; Hiltermann, 1991b; Salibi, 1993). This "euphoria" led to an exaggeration the permanence of women's new role and increased status; now, according to one Birzeit University sociologist, there is taking place a more "realistic" assessment of Palestinian women's position and what needs to be done about it (Anon. 18, 05/29/93). Perhaps, though, one statement about the articulation of the Palestinian nationalist movement and the Palestinian women's movement in one of those early articles, can still be held to be accurate:

The *intifada* combines the trajectories of two movements: a national liberation movement and a women's movement. While it is hard to conceive of the *intifada* without the decisive role of women, it

is equally difficult to perceive of the women's movement in isolation from the wider national liberation movement (Abdo, 1991b:22).

One of the most noted and important areas of women's activism was their participation in the home economy and production cooperatives. The home economy movement, a cornerstone of the intifada's program of disarticulation from the Israeli occupation and economy, was officially entrusted to women by UNLU (Jad, 1990:136).¹⁷ The goal of the home economy was economic self-sufficiency, encouraged through the dismantling of Palestinian dependence on the Israeli economy by boycotting Israeli goods and substituting and producing their own goods made in small-scale cooperatives, along with the practice of subsistence gardening and animal husbandry. Women often led neighbourhood committees for agriculture (which includes the home economy sector), conducted educational workshops on the home economy, formed production cooperatives, and were responsible for their families' gardens and livestock (Jad, 1990:135-37; al-Helo, 1990:8; Hamad,

¹⁷ The Unified National Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU) arose shortly after the onset of the intifada. It was composed of a rotating body of activists from each of the PLO factions inside occupied Palestine. This was the political decision-making body that composed political leaflets for distribution, called strike days, made strategic decisions concerning the resistance. Formally defunct since the White House handshake last fall, there have been renewed calls for a new UNLU by the Alliance of Palestinian Forces, a ten-group opposition body to the current peace deal (Jansen, 1994:6). There are reports that UNLU reconstituted itself in response to the Hebron massacre and issued a leaflet on March 1, 1994 that was critical of the PLO handling of the crisis as well as its entire diplomatic strategy and handling of the peace process. Interestingly, this UNLU, while composed of all parties, including the rejectionists, is dominated by Fatah (Usher, 1994a:5).

1989:8-9).

Most of the cooperatives were involved in food processing and livestock, but there were also sewing, embroidery, and picture frame production, as well as cooperatives involved in non-traditional industries such as copper carving (Abdo, 1991a:11; Hiltermann, 1991b:51-52). The production for many of these cooperatives was done in women's homes, but for some of them, notably Our Production is Our Pride in Beitillo and Sa'ir in the West Bank and in Jabalya Camp in the Gaza Strip, and the copper work project, al-Isawiyah, in the West Bank, women came out of their homes to produce goods in a central workshop (Abdo, 1991a:11; Hiltermann, 1991a:196; Hiltermann, 1990:35).

The cooperatives all seemed to share the aim of meeting the practical need¹⁸ of income-generation, traditionally a "productive" male role. The generation of income was also coupled with the ability to meet other "female" practical needs such as childcare, by being able to do the work at home, or by providing daycare in the workshop facilities, or allowing a flexible work schedule (Kuttab, 1989:137; Parnass-Honig, 1990:20). When the work was done outside of the home in a central workshop the cooperative also challenged the norm of seclusion, which was made acceptable by virtue of the fact

¹⁸ For a discussion of women's "practical" gender needs (those which are associated with women's traditional role) and "strategic" gender needs (those which challenge the traditional modes of subordination of women) see Caroline Moser (1989).

that women were involved in *nationalist work*.¹⁹ This fulfilment of multiple needs, and roles, combined as it was with the nationalist goal of disengagement from the Israeli economy through the pursuit of Palestinian economic self-sufficiency, can be seen as a challenge to women's subordination under both patriarchy and Israeli oppression. While the intifada continued, work performed by women outside of the home in cooperatives was acceptable, but many commentators and feminists became concerned that this freedom would be lost after the achievement of a state (Giacaman, Johnson, 1989:166).

One basis for the feminist concern was that, apart from the copper work project and a few others with a non-traditional orientation, most of the cooperatives did not challenge the traditional sexual division of labour. Jams, pickles, fruit juices, canned food, clothing, and embroidery made up the bulk of the cooperatives' produce and are all traditional products of women's labour. While the importance of these products was recognized and acknowledged in light of

¹⁹ However, one West Bank analyst contends that the cooperatives did not confront the traditional strictures on female space, saying that they were established as an ("inside") political venue because it was not acceptable for women to be active on the street (Anon. 8a, 07/17/93). While I believe that this argument has some merit, and is true to an extent, it does not address the fact of increased visibility of women on the street in the frontlines fighting against Israeli soldiers. Nor does this argument deal with the fact that while the actual work of the cooperatives occurred "inside", these became public spaces due to the widespread publicity and attention they received through local and international media and academic interest.

the boycott of Israeli goods and the movement towards economic self-sufficiency--indeed, UNLU praised women's efforts in this regard--this has not automatically led to an upward re-evaluation of women's productive role and a subsequent sharing of reproductive work by men and women that would lead to a greater degree of social emancipation for women (Hiltermann, 1991b:51-52; Jad, 1990:136-37).

In fact, as one women's committee activist reports, during the intifada, because men were sitting at home with "nothing to do" during strike days, they began doing domestic work. However, this did not fundamentally change gender roles as the men performed domestic work out of boredom rather than as a result of a redefinition of gender roles and division of labour (Anon. 19a, 06/16/93). Another activist reports that women are only talking about the double burden of working outside and inside privately with family--it has yet to become a public issue. While some young husbands "help out", they still do not see it as their responsibility to do this work. Indeed, family and society are still highly instrumental in maintaining the status quo, pressuring young newly-married women to abandon their challenges of traditional gender roles. This young activist believes that it is the responsibility of the women's committees to bring this issue to debate in the public forum (Anon. 19, 06/16/93). At least one women's committee activist is very critical of women's productive cooperatives that focused on traditional female jobs, claiming

that they did not address issues of self-esteem, confidence, and creating a new feminist consciousness. Women most often gave their income to their husbands or devoted all of it to family expenses. According to this activist, the only economically successful cooperatives have been exploitive and family-run, dependent on unpaid child and female labour. Ultimately, she concludes, the production cooperatives added to women's workload without reaping any additional emancipatory benefits, either in terms of disposable income or in a new understanding of women (Anon. 20, 07/14/93).

This economic activism also did not immediately lead to greater opportunities for political leadership for women on the national front. While the strategic involvement of women in the nationalist struggle was successful, women's participation in the upper echelons of decision-making in UNLU and in the PLO has not been significant (Giacaman, Johnson, 1989:165; Bisan, 1991:12-13).²⁰

It is a common strategy in revolutionary societies, Maria Mies tells us, to relegate women to the labour-intensive, subsistence production, "subsidiary" or "informal" sector that is seen to be a necessity to exploit in sustaining resistance and building up a modern economy. This is a problematic

²⁰ As of 1990 there were no women on the 15-member Executive Council of the Palestine National Council (PNC), the legislative arm of the PLO (Bisan, 1991:12-13). In addition, women's representation on the current technical committees, composed originally of internal Palestinian leadership to advise the delegates to the post-Gulf War peace talks but now fulfilling a pseudo-government ministry function, is low (Anon. 2, 07/20/93).

position for women because this sector is seen as non-productive and is not valued. Men move ahead into the modern and administrative sectors while women are "pushed back" (Mies, 1986:196-99). The Palestinian home economy remained within the female sphere of labour for several reasons. First, the home economy is traditionally a female sphere; it is generally seen as a part of or an extension of housework. Linked to this is the fact that as there are a number of *de facto* female-headed households where the women are forced to support their families, dictating that a significant number of women engaged in home economy production because it is a sector that is socially acceptable. Third, the home economy has little or no hierarchical structure for men to move into and assume positions in the upper echelons, thus rendering it unattractive in terms of possible status or income gains. Where there is a leadership structure, it lies within the women's organizations that have encouraged the development of cooperatives, and these are all affiliated with various male-dominated factions of the PLO. While the home economy is important as a nationalist concept, Islah Jad, a sociologist at Birzeit University, concludes, it has not challenged the hierarchical sexual division of labour because the home economy is seen as an extension of women's traditional (non-productive) role (Jad, 1990:135-37). In other words, while women's work load and responsibilities may have increased, their status has not significantly altered.

By and large the women's production cooperatives have ultimately met with financial and administrative failure.²¹ There seem to be two sets of reasons for this: technical and strategic. First, several analysts and activists cite reasons such as: a lack of training for the women in business administration, marketing, and advertising; market feasibility studies were not conducted and hence, there was much duplication of products; overly hierarchical internal organization; the products were priced too high (probably as a result of inefficient and too-small scale of production); some products were poor in quality; despite the intifada boycott of Israeli consumer goods,²² the cooperative products could not stand up against Israeli competition in terms of

²¹ The Save the Children and Shu'un il Mar'a study claims that "up to eighty percent fail altogether and are forced to close down after a short time" and that "[n]one...can be considered financially successful and sustainable". This study was conducted, in part, by representatives of women's committees and PARC, along with others, and PARC home economy activities were some of the cases selected for examination (1992:1, 3, 6). This information, then, becomes important when we read about the PARC case study in chapter 4.

²² An incident in Ramallah occurred the summer I was living there that indicates that the boycott was failing by 1993, and probably was quite "leaky" throughout the intifada period. According to three sources the Fatah *shebab* (young men, in this context meaning activists) went to seven stores and warned them that if they did not stop stocking Israeli goods they would torch their shops. All of these stores were owned or supplied by a Palestinian distributor of Israeli goods who also was an influential and powerful Fatah supporter, who contributed to the party from the profits that he made by marketing Israeli goods in the occupied West Bank. However, the leader of the Ramallah Fatah *shebab* also commanded a lot of respect in the community because of his integrity and commitment, and therefore posed a threat. The distributor had the Fatah *shebab* leader badly beaten. At last report, the young man had lost his sight in one eye.

price and quality (Anon.: 1, 06/15/93; 2, 07/20/93; 8a, 07/17/93; 19a, 06/16/93; 20, 07/14/93; Save the Children, Shu'un il Mar'a, 1992). In addition, a professional from the UNDP noted that NGOs also had a part in the failure of the cooperative projects by indiscriminately giving them money without ensuring they had a solid founding (Anon. 2, 07/20/93). Although it has affected their relationship with women's groups, the UNDP has stopped funding these ventures in order to restart slowly to build more solid foundations with these groups (Anon.: 1, 06/15/93; 2, 07/20/93). One activist said that her committee began training women in skills such as advertising, marketing, and business administration a year and a half after they started cooperative ventures. However, she remains pessimistic about the possible success of these projects, in terms of both emancipation (because these cooperatives reinforce women's traditional role) and economic success (claiming that with the political and economic situation the way it is right now it is difficult to establish successful projects for women) (Anon. 20, 07/14/93).

While in many cases the cooperative participants were not adequately trained for the work they had to do, their failure can also be attributed to the conceptualization and aims of the projects themselves. For instance, some analysts claim that many of the cooperatives were treated as social services rather than business ventures (Anon.: 1, 06/15/93; 2, 07/20/93). A contradictory explanation was that these

projects had no social programs attached (e.g., literacy, counselling, kindergartens, etc.), as well as the fact that they were sites for indoctrination in the political views of each particular committee's party. The focus was not on production or on women's liberation (Anon. 8a, 07/17/93). One committee member said that the idea of the cooperatives was to mobilize women and to talk about women's issues and social activities--on overtly social and political, rather than economic, agenda (Anon. 19a, 06/16/93/).

Nonetheless, there was resistance from the women as well. In one case, a UNDP employee reports, the project displayed "dependency syndrome" where the women wanted everything done for them. In another, the women could not face going to market (these were middle-class women who were subject to the social taboos against women working, particularly outside the home). However, this interviewee notes, in the villages it was even harder because women had no confidence to go out publicly (Anon. 2, 07/20/93).

In fact, as one study reveals, those associated with the projects had "sharply contrasting" objectives. While managers and supervisors of the cooperatives tended to stress the political agenda of mobilizing large numbers of women, the women workers participated in order to earn an income and improve their economic situation. Unmarried women often worked in the cooperatives because they provided an opportunity to "escape the confines of their home". Finally,

donors of the programs emphasized the importance of improving the social status of women while at the same time operating under the constraints of only being able to fund self-sustaining projects. While "these objectives are reconcilable," the study notes, "conflicts may arise when they are not expressed and communicated openly" (Save the Children, *Shu'un il Mar'a*, 1992:4, 8-10).

Whatever the reasons, the failure of these early income-generating cooperative projects had the effect of undermining women's, and society's, perceptions of women's abilities (Anon. 8, 05/26/93). This is in sharp contrast to the pronouncements made in some of the early newspaper articles from that time:

Now I feel that I'm able to fight as a woman and as a human being. I am no longer just a housewife. No, I'm part of the work force which is creating the direct change in my society (Um Khalid, cited in Hamad, 1989:8).

Not only were the production cooperatives failing, women found that after a few years they could not sustain their street activism because of household and working responsibilities. Intifada or not, one committee activist reported, families and employers were less tolerant of women's absences than they were of men's (Anon. 19a, 06/16/93). An activist from another committee indicated that the rise of Islamism, combined with the fact that women were not educated in their rights in Islam, sent them back to the home (Anon. 21, 07/22/93). The emergence of Islamism, coupled with the prolonged school

closures imposed by the Israeli authorities during the intifada, led to a rise in female drop-out rates and in early marriage, a reassertion of conservative values, and a decrease in women's public and political participation (Jad, Hammami, 1992:21; E. Kuttab, 1991:11; Anon. 8a, 07/18/93; Heiberg, Øvensen et al., 1993:288-289).

A strong illustration of how the feminist agenda is endangered by the triple articulation of the women's movement, the nationalist movement, and the Islamic movement is provided by Rema Hammami (1990). Beginning in September 1988, almost a year after the inception of the intifada, women in the Gaza Strip began experiencing overt social pressure in the form of heckling, threats, graffiti, and stone-throwing on the streets, to wear the *hijab* (headscarf) as a sign of political commitment to the intifada as a cultural struggle. Within another year most women began wearing the *hijab* out of concerns for their safety. Gazan women were angry about this pressure, not because they found the *hijab* itself oppressive, but because they were being ordered to wear it. UNLU did not respond to "hijabization" until August 1989, when by all indications, the *hijab* campaign was becoming uglier and spreading to the West Bank. Although UNLU condemned the persecution of women at this level, it blamed the *hijab* campaign on occupation forces and their collaborators (neither Hamas or Islamic Jihad have claimed responsibility for the campaign), with no criticism of the reactionism inherent in an

enforced *hijab*-wearing. This allowed UNLU to maintain unity within the national movement without having to confront sexism or conservatism within their ranks (or within groups with which they are aligned such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad). In explaining why it took UNLU so long to respond, some women and leftist secular men believed that UNLU, and especially Fatah, was tacitly supporting the *hijab* campaign, or considered it of secondary importance. UNLU's statement was entitled "A Call for Unity".

However, despite the failure of women's intifada activism, on economic, political, and ideological fronts, and the emergent strength of political Islam which provides the context for "backlash" reactionism against women's gains, the movement towards the establishment of expanded women's human rights did not recede. A conference held by the Bisan Center for Research and Development in East Jerusalem on December 14, 1990 explored the "hijabization" issue and women's role in the intifada. The conclusion of the conference was that the *hijab* campaign, coupled with the lack of a forceful counter-response from both UNLU and the women's committees, has had a sustained and negative impact on women's public activism, forcing them back into the private sphere (Bisan, 1991; Tawfeeq, 1990). According to Hamas, women's position should be limited to the home, reproduction, and in improving the quality of life; woman is a "factory of men" (Jad, 1990:139). As one women's committee activist has noted, the intifada was based on

women's activism (Anon. 19a, 06/16/93), and the Bisan conference emphasized "the importance of the remarkable role played by Palestinian women throughout the glorious Intifada in various realms--the political, economic, social and cultural areas--which of course strengthened the general national struggle" (Bisan, 1991:23). Hence, the subsequent decline in intifada activism after the first year may not be coincidental given the concurrent renewed imposition of traditional values on women.

The Bisan conference also made the links between women's rights and democracy. The director of Bisan, Izzat Abdul-Hadi, addressed the conference to stress

the importance of the Women's dimension in the struggle against Israeli occupation, making it clear that we are not dealing here with Women's Issues in the narrow sense, from a subjective point of view which is incapable of taking in all dimensions of the national and social struggle, and which underrates objective factors and social contradictions within the women's struggle. Nor are we speaking only of national servitude and oppression, pushing aside the importance of the role of social struggle and obscuring the clear conflicts among various social groups and strata, in the interest of political slogan (ie, demands, tasks and program). The striving after a solution to the national problem has resulted in the repression of various social movements in the Arab World, so that we find ourselves both without a solution to the national problem and with a new problem confronting us, ie, a social "body" cut off from its sources of energy. He concluded by stressing "the importance of strengthening the link between the mission of national liberation on the one hand, and that of striving towards the achievement of social and democratic goals on the other--between which the dialectic relationship is clear" (Abdul-Hadi, cited in Bisan, 1991:5).

Democracy as a concept continued to be linked to women's

struggle. On May 8, 1992 Bisan held another conference in East Jerusalem entitled "Mass-Based Women's Organizations and the Question of Democracy". This conference called for a unified, open, and democratic women's movement that addressed directly the needs of women as well as violations of women's human rights (Hasso, Abdul Hadi, 1992; Bisan, n.d.(a)). What is notable is that none of the conference recommendations directly confronted conservative political forces and their anti-democratic stance towards women, nor did they address the problem of male-dominated political malaise concerning the repressive activism of these conservative forces. Its sole focus was on fostering democratic processes within the Palestinian women's movement and women's organizations. Nevertheless, a few months later the women's committees held a press conference on July 13 in East Jerusalem to protest the receipt by the Women's Studies Center of death threats from "fundamentalist Islamic groups" when it attempted to show films in Ramallah as part of their annual Women's Film Festival. The center interpreted this incident as a breach of democracy and planned to organize "several committees designed to encourage democracy in an effort to stop what the organizers of the press conference called 'intellectual oppression'". As Suha Hindiye, the director of the centre, explained, "We do encourage people's freedom of expression, but we do not like their opinions to be forced on us" (Habash, 1992).

Since the intifada there has been an ongoing evaluation of the women's movement and its position in the larger nationalist struggle. Where originally the Palestinian women's movement was established in the 1970s in order to support the nationalist struggle, a new women's consciousness began to emerge during the intifada. Women found themselves doing many of the same activities against the occupation as the men were performing but their status did not change. In fact, they began to face a renewed social conservatism which led many to then begin to question gender issues, to agitate for reform of personal status laws, and to explore the experience of other Third World women. An anecdote which typifies women's intifada experience and their resultant raised consciousness is one told by a committee activist who was doing a workshop with village women. A woman attending the workshop told the story of soldiers coming to her door one evening seeking her husband and his friends. Her husband told her to talk to them long enough for him and his friends to hide or get away. After the soldiers had left he asked her to make coffee for him and his friends but not to show herself. She said, "Why, if I can talk to the soldiers, can I not show myself to your friends?" (Anon. 20, 07/14/93).

Nevertheless, not all female activists from the committees agree that women should bring gender issues to the forefront. One committee activist claims that patriarchy in Palestinian society is exacerbated by the occupation and when

women began to raise their specific gender issues it split the nationalist movement. She asserts, "We are not a feminist movement, we are a woman movement." She fears that if gender issues are raised women will be isolated and not part of Palestinian society or the nationalist struggle. The "woman movement" will not even then have the means to represent the grassroots: "We will become a movement of elites, of the middle-class" and, hence, will not be able to represent refugee women, village women, or poor women. Middle-class women, she says, do not have any real needs. If the feminist agenda is pursued now the women's movement will cease to be a reality on the ground and will become solely a theoretical movement. The priority now must be to assist lower-class women in the education of their rights. If this is not done she will become "an enemy to herself and to the woman movement." Certain issues can be raised now, such as female access to education, divorce, and violence against women, but free sexual relations or abortions cannot be discussed. So to be "balanced" it is necessary now to choose the issues wisely (Anon. 21, 07/22/93).

This new discussion in the women's committees about their representativeness of women's issues and the difficulties of reaching grassroots women emerged when the committees began to lose their membership. While one committee activist claimed that women had left the committees because they had unrealistic expectations of them, for instance, expecting the

committees to give them money or a job (Anon. 19a, 06/16/93), another analyst explains that up to and including now, the committees have not had a women's agenda (Anon. 1, 06/15/93). A recent study sampled in Shatti Camp in Gaza reveals that 57.8% of women questioned "were not even aware of the existence of women's committees", 25.1% "supported their activities but were not themselves involved", 7.5% of women "had no opinion [on the committees]", 3.2% "disagreed with their activities", 3.2% "were active members", and 2.1% "had at some time participated in their activities" (Lang, Mohanna, 1992:167). In their interpretation of these numbers, Erica Lang and Itimad Mohanna claim that

Women often gave the very same reasons for both support and disagreement of the committees. It was generally felt that the women's committees enabled women to get out of the house by increasing the need for movement....While the youngest group of single women were the most aware and supportive of committees, they also comprised the highest number of women who disagreed. Although it is predominantly young women who are active in the committees, this age group are also the targets and recruits of the new Islamic resistance movement in the region [my emphasis]....Consciousness and support for the committees did not in any way correspond to increased involvement or activity....For example, in this research it was the older age group of women who played the important part in terms of confrontation with the Israeli military. This group would assist in the street during clashes by guiding and hiding 'shabab' from the military and tending to the wounded. As the relationship is likened, in a collective sense, to the relationship between a mother and her sons, the involvement of this generation is perfectly acceptable. The relationship is not so clear cut for a young woman, particularly if she is unmarried. Participation on her behalf could attract criticism, provide cause for gossip and ruin her reputation. Therefore,

while the youngest women in the sample did not generally participate in popular activity, they were aware of, and indeed supported, the women's committees. By contrast, older women were the most actively involved in street action but had not heard of such organisations (Lang, Mohanna, 1992:167-169).

In addition, the women of Shatti Camp did not make the connection that many local services that they themselves had used (40% of present and 47.6% of past users), such as pre-schools, were actually run by women's committees (Lang, Mohanna, 1992:169):

A substantial number of women did not necessarily perceive of the women's committees in a localised sense at all. Instead they saw them as some high-up, detached and inaccessible body (Lang, Mohanna, 1992:169).

All of this seems to indicate that, indeed, the women's committees do need to reevaluate their mobilization strategy. While the youngest women surveyed are the most likely to agree with and be aware of the committees' stance, they are also the most likely not to. However, it is these young women's mothers (or women of that age), in contrast to their daughters, who are most likely to be involved in popular activity. Regardless, a large number of women seem to be unaware that the committees or their activities have any direct relevance to their lives.

The resolution of the women's committees' difficulties will be crucial to the success of keeping women's issues on the political and social agenda. Women have been pushed several steps back since the collapse of their intifada

activism. While there are progressive forces at work, conservative trends are also strong, with both competing for the female constituency. According to a recent study, Islam is the preferred political system of both men and women, however, men are more likely to view Islam as a political ideology and program while women are more likely to view it as a religious belief and practice. Nevertheless, higher levels of education seem to be negatively correlated with the choice of Islam (Heiberg, Øvensen et al., 1993:266-270). This information indicates that a valuable course for the committees to follow is to educate women in their rights under Islam and the value of democracy.

However, the committees' response to the problem of mobilization is varied. The Union of Women's Committees for Social Work (Fatah) in Ramallah seems to be maintaining the status quo by continuing to emphasize the foundation of kindergartens and nurseries in the villages and camps, as well as other activities such as visits by committee members to other women (and their families) not yet involved (in order to get women to participate in the committee's programs, as well as to deal with gender issues such as restriction of women's movement, individually and with the family), health programs, first aid and health courses, wool and sewing courses, social visits to prisoners and families of martyrs, meetings with committees in other villages and camps, bazaars and exhibitions, and running a sewing factory in Ballata Camp.

Obviously, these activities are consistent with women's traditional role and do little to challenge conservative forces. The one change seems to be a tightening up of the procedure to launch production cooperatives (Anon. 19, 06/16/93). However, activists in this committee also seem frustrated, believing that internal problems in Palestinian society need to be addressed (Anon. 19, 06/16/93), and noted that while there are conferences in Jerusalem to talk about women's problems, nothing is then done to reach women in villages and camps or to deal with such issues as rape and early marriage (Anon. 19a, 06/16/93).

In contrast, the Union of Palestinian Working Women's Committees (PPP) began taking a distinctly feminist approach in 1989. They recently held a secret workshop, closed to the media because the participants were afraid, on *shari'a* laws.²³ In 1991, with Bethlehem and Birzeit Universities and the Palestinian Family Counselling Center, they held a workshop to train 35 women in feminist counselling, and then in 1992 they established a feminist counselling program in Nablus and Jerusalem for women with sexual abuse, violence, and incest issues, to be further expanded and developed this

²³ In this instance, *shari'a* law refers to personal status legislation which governs issues of marriage, divorce, and child custody. Although found across the Arab world, these codes vary from state to state, giving validity to the contention that women's oppression is more often related to the state and its use of or interpretation of Islam rather than to the existence of Islam itself. For more information on this issue, see Nadia Hijab (1988), Deniz Kandiyoti (1991a), and Leila Ahmed (1992).

year. As one activist noted, many women use this counselling without the knowledge of their families. The issue of domestic violence is particularly difficult to solve in Palestinian society as there are few recourses for women to pursue. Women cannot go the Israeli police for fear of being accused of collaboration.²⁴ The only option is to talk to the local municipality to exert pressure on the family and the husband, but, notes a committee activist, this ultimately serves to reinforce the patriarchal structure that is the cause of such abuse (Anon. 20, 07/14/93). An activist from the PFLP committee also indicated that *shebab* would only attack a Palestinian founded and run shelter for battered women. She felt that it will only be when "we have our own authority we can raise the issue" (Anon. 21, 07/22/93).

However, the PPP activist felt that the first step is to build up women's self-esteem and confidence through the use of dialogue groups. Her sense is that there is support in the Palestinian community to deal with the issue, as evidenced by the attendance of 50 men and women at a public forum on the topic in Ramallah last year where "even men offered support", unusual in her eyes because "this is a very patriarchal society". This committee is attempting to link domestic

²⁴ According to local sources, during the summer of 1992 a Ramallah-area woman sought refuge in an Israeli home for battered women in Jerusalem. The staff there contacted some of her family who convinced her to go back home. She was killed by her husband, who used the justification that she was a collaborator (because of her use of this Israeli service).

violence with larger political aims. For instance, on one of their posters on the issue the caption reads that it is not democratic to beat your wife. In addition, by focusing on *shari'a* law and domestic violence this committee is directly challenging conservative trends and the patriarchal status quo. In the near future this committee will decentralize and form issue groups (literacy, violence against women, sexual abuse, etc.) instead. Each will form their own rules with the union offering support through training in leadership, working with women in groups, proposal writing, and management (Anon. 20, 07/14/93).

An activist from the Palestinian Women's Committee (PFLP) claims that the experience of Palestinian women and the Palestinian mode of resistance differs from Algeria and its women because they did not have a "woman movement". In her eyes, this committee's perspective straddles nationalism and gender issues, privileging neither. Nevertheless, the PFLP has coordinated with Hamas on nationalist issues, even though the female cadres are uncomfortable with this strategy (Anon. 21, 07/22/93). As one observer wryly notes, this alliance indicates just how much power PFLP women cadres hold in their own party (Anon. 2a, 12/14/93). If their coordinated opposition is successful it is possible that either the PFLP will have to make compromises on gender issues in order to maintain unity with Hamas, thus closely replicating the

experience of Algerian women.²⁵

This overview of the women's committees' responses to the problems faced by women in Palestinian society and in Palestinian political struggle indicates that there is no consistent approach or cohesive agenda. This, alleges one analyst, is one of the problems Palestinian women face in getting their issues addressed, as well as the fact that contradictions also arise between women's political affiliation and their gender interests (Anon. 8a, 07/17/93). Not only is there conflict between women about whether to prioritize the national struggle or the gender struggle, but there is also conflict about how to deal with gender itself. For instance, while some activists are opposed to traditional labour-based cooperative projects, others claim that this is where work must begin with Palestinian women. In this vein, one analyst explains that training women in non-traditional roles will not necessarily liberate them, make them more acceptable in society, or find them job opportunities. One cannot start vocational training for women when they are illiterate and have no mobility, and one cannot talk about equal employment for women when there is vast unemployment. It is necessary to start where the women are, this observer insists, with what they will accept (Anon. 8a, 07/17/93). For instance, while the majority of Palestinian women support the

²⁵ For a discussion of Algerian women's experience during and since the revolution see Marnia Lazreg (1990) and Marie-Aimée Hélie-Lucas (1987).

right for women to work outside of the home, this "support increases when the type of work specified is 'respectable', i.e., professional work". Work traditionally associated with the male domain is likely not to be deemed "respectable" (Heiberg, Øvensen et al., 1993:305-309). Working in traditional vocations can give women some mobility and income where they may not have had any before. Women are an integral part of the economy and placing and training women in non-traditional roles is "jumping the gun" (Anon. 8a, 07/17/93).

Regardless, while the previous income-generating projects were criticised for being treated as social services rather than business ventures, there is also recognition that support services for women, such as babysitting, legal services, and psychological counselling, are desperately needed by Palestinian women and must accompany income-generation opportunities (Anon. 1, 06/15/93). What seems to be key, as indicated by a 1992 study of income-generating projects in Gaza, is that women for whom these projects are devised have a say in the activities and structure of the venture. As has already been mentioned in the discussion of the failure of cooperatives, many of these initiatives were managed in a hierarchical manner which led to inadequate flows of information and "frequent misunderstandings between workers, supervisors and committee heads" (Save the Children, Shu'un il Mar'a, 1992:6). However, adequate communication is not enough. Projects designed to empower women in a strategic

sense (as part of a process to change society's perception of women and their perception of themselves) must also meet women's practical needs. As powerfully demonstrated by the Gazan study, projects that could not provide workers with a "stable and reliable income" lost the participation of these women, particularly if they were married:

The productive work on the project conflicts and competes with her [women workers] domestic duties, and she leaves her domestic responsibilities and children to earn a living. To justify this she needs to gain income. This point was illustrated by the fact that unmarried women were found to be more likely to continue working even if they did not receive any pay, while married women, and especially mothers, with more domestic duties could not afford to work without pay because their husbands would not allow them to "waste their time". Unmarried women may also use any of the few available opportunities to escape the confines of their home, be it with or without pay (Save the Children, Shu'un il Mar'a, 1992:9-10).

A less hierarchized and more inclusive system of communication that involves all participants in planning and decision-making could make for more efficient projects (because much production knowledge is lost without seeking the input of workers) (Save the Children, Shu'un il Mar'a, 1992:10, 14) that would provide adequate income for workers as well as foster increased social conscientization of women.

In addition, there is also the issue of women's human rights and democracy. As women's public and political participation increased, particularly within the production cooperative movement, they increasingly began to see that their position in the larger society had significance. As

their confidence grew, so did conservative reaction to it. Rather than having the effect of squelching women's activism, this conservative response gave rise to a variety of responses from women, including a new feminist agenda, as evidenced by the new discourse about patriarchal violence against women. Also, women's responses to growing conservatism has lent itself to a broader definition of democracy than normally used by Western analysts who mostly use the term to describe formal political organization. Palestinian feminists are linking democracy to women's human rights. As one Palestinian activist and academic explained, the development of democracy in Palestine depends on women's activism. Men must be acculturated to a radical democracy,²⁶ a "democracy of the subjugated". According to her analysis "women's lack of freedom also creates men's lack of freedom" (Anon. 17, 05/29/93).

²⁶ This "radical democracy" is one that must be differentiated from Chantal Mouffe's (1992) concept. Mouffe examines the nature of democracy from both liberal and communitarian perspectives, arriving at the conclusion that "the complete realization of democracy" is an "impossibility". For Mouffe, radical democracy ensures the rights of the collective identities that compose a society (women, minority groups, workers, etc.), while privileging no one group. The challenge is to "emphasize the numerous social relations where relations of domination exist and must be challenged if the principles of liberty and equality are to apply". While a useful and valuable interpretation of democracy, Mouffe needs to further examine and deconstruct these "relations of domination" in order to launch an effective challenge to them. Only then is it possible to have a true "democracy of the subjugated" as this Palestinian activist calls for. In her conception, democracy must spring from the aspirations and perspective of the least powerful in society. This issue will be explored in more depth in chapter 5.

What is clear is that women's political and economic participation in Palestinian society has given rise to a new feminist consciousness regarding the position of women in Palestinian society and what the shape of Palestinian society itself should be. This vision of a democratic Palestinian society incorporates access for all to political, social, and economic resources. Nonetheless, the way now for women certainly cannot be paved in linear terms. The context in which Palestinian women have gained a foothold on their path towards secure access to economic, political, and social rights has drastically changed in the post-Gulf War and Oslo Accords era. This new conjuncture poses the possibilities of a retrenchment of economic and political oppression for Palestinians, but in new forms, presenting new, and some old, challenges for women to overcome.

3.3 The Post-Intifada Context, 1990-1993

When Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990 it proved to have immediate and severe consequences for Palestinians and the intifada. The advent of the Gulf War closed the first phase of the uprising, and ushered in a new conjuncture for the entire region, and, in particular, for the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The Gulf War served to exacerbate latent trends that weakened, or had the potential to compromise, the Palestinian struggle, including political factionalization and the rise of Islamism, the oppression of women, and economic

hardship.

With the onset of the Gulf crisis, and later, war, international sympathy and solidarity with the Palestinian struggle was compromised. This loss of solidarity, especially from the Gulf states, has meant a significant loss of income for the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, both as a result of the loss of transfer payments from family members working in the Gulf states and now expelled,²⁷ and because of changed Arab policies towards occupied Palestine (Isaac, 1990; Abed, 1991; Abu-Amr, 1991; Collins, 1991; Miller, 1991). Saudi Arabian and other Gulf states' subsidies to the PLO (and their operations and projects in occupied Palestine) were not only cut off, but have been redirected to Hamas (Abu Amr, 1993:16-17; Roy, 1993:29).²⁸ Much of this lost income had funded resistance and self-sufficiency measures such as hospitals and medical outreach programs, cooperatives, education, and mass organizations. Jad Isaac reports, "as a result of the Gulf Crisis, the Palestinians have lost a major financial resource which they were counting on for building their independent state" (Isaac, 1990:2). George T. Abed describes the economic impact of the Gulf Crisis on Palestinians in the West Bank and

²⁷ A "dramatic reversal" occurred, where residents of occupied Palestine sent money to relatives who had been expelled from the Gulf states and fled to Jordan (Miller, 1991:6).

²⁸ This refunnelling of funds is a powerful explanation of the rise in strength of Hamas and the shifting ground of the uprising. One report indicates that since the Gulf War Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have contributed \$30 million dollars to Hamas, and Iran, a recent donor, has contributed \$13 million (Roy, 1993:29).

Gaza in this way:

These communities [Palestinian communities in neighbouring Arab countries] had long kept living conditions in the West Bank and Gaza moderately tolerable through remittances and other income transfers. The neighbouring Arab countries also constituted an important market for the principally agricultural exports of the occupied territories. Excluding labour income earned in Israel, annual flows to the territories from all external sources are estimated at about \$700 million. Slightly more than half of this income will cease as a result of the crisis in the Gulf.

...such a loss would reduce further the per capita income of the average Palestinian in the occupied territories by 15-20 percent, bringing it down to less than \$800 per annum, or about one-half of what it had been on the eve of the intifada....one may note that at this level, per capita income of a typical Palestinian in the occupied territories would be only one-tenth of that of an Israeli, and both face essentially the same cost of living since most markets, in goods if not entirely in services, are fully integrated.

Especially hard hit are the scores of health, educational, and social welfare institutions in the occupied territories. Always underfunded and suffering from a decline in Arab official support in recent years, these institutions have relied increasingly on transfers from Palestinians outside the territories and from quasi-official Arab international support (Abed, 1991:38).

Where previously the PLO had sent \$30 million per month to the occupied territories, by the time they had signed the peace agreement with Israel in September 1993 they were only able to direct \$7 million per month (Cook, 1993:48). According to one Fatah women's activist from Kuwait, in order to cope with reduced funding, Fatah had been rotating funding each month to different committees (Anon. 16, 05/23/93). Regardless, this sharp cut in funding severely affected the PLO's ability to maintain services and projects in occupied Palestine which had

been central to the sustenance of the intifada. In addition, losses in income and remittances, as well as the economic effects of the curfew imposed on the residents of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip during the Gulf War,²⁹ also had their costs. The hardship that Palestinians suffered as a result of these developments significantly affected solidarity at the local level and caused a general malaise, which in turn created social pressure leading to factionalization, the increasing use of lethal resistance tactics, rigidifying political structures, and the further repression of women.

While Palestinians had enjoyed a period of coordination of various political groups at the onset of the intifada, and even redoubled efforts at coordination between secular, Islamist, and nationalist activists during the Gulf Crisis (Husseini, 1991:104), inter- and intra-factional splitting significantly reemerged after the Gulf Crisis. Sara Roy notes that in Gaza renewed factionalized divisions had severe ramifications for the everyday lives of ordinary Palestinians:

Since socioeconomic and political activities and services in the occupied territories are organized along factional lines, the breakdown of authority both within and between the factions has affected delivery of such services in particular and social cohesion in general. Palestinians in Gaza frequently express their fear of complete social disorder. For them, this means the breakdown of the internal system of proto-legal

²⁹ Palestinian economist Abdel Fatah Abu Shukr estimated that the overall curfew-related financial loss (including lost employment income and lost crops) at \$50 million per week. The curfew lasted for six+ weeks in the Gaza Strip and three+ weeks in the West Bank (D. Kuttub, 1991:116).

appeal, dispute mediation, and social protection that emerged in response to the increasingly partisan and punitive nature of Israeli military law since the uprising. At a more mundane level, the weakening of internal institutional mechanisms affects the most basic functions of daily life such as grocery shopping, arranging a medical appointment, or simply locating someone. There is clear popular concern over the increasing "individualization" of the intifada and the lessening of its collectivist orientation. As Gazans become more and more vulnerable, they fear the loss not only of their institutional anchors but of their moral anchors as well (Roy, 1991:63-64).

Inter-factional splits intensified between secular-nationalist groups and Islamist groups, but there has been intra-factional splitting within both groupings as well, and strains have emerged between the "inside" and the "outside" of the leadership of several factions (Bishara, 1992:5, 6; Roy, 1991:63). While Fatah favoured participation in the international peace conference which commenced in Madrid, the PFLP and the pro-Hawatmeh DFLP were in agreement (thus further deepening the split within the DFLP) with Hamas and the Islamic Jihad in their opposition to Palestinian participation in the talks. The Palestine Communist Party (currently the PPP) at first opposed participation, but later aligned itself with Fatah and decided to attend the negotiations. Fatah itself experienced considerable internal tension over the personal and organizational aspects of participation in the conference (Jarbawi, Heacock, 1992:13-15).

The most prominent intra-factional split within the Islamist grouping occurred in Gaza with the reemergence of the

Islamic Jihad (after having been destroyed by Israeli authorities through deportation of cell members). Islamic Jihad reappeared and gained popularity at the expense of support for Hamas, both as a result of growing political and economic pressures, and because of dissatisfaction over Hamas's policies of denunciation of Saddam Hussein and its campaign, targeted primarily and directly at women through "hijabization", against moral and behavioural impropriety. Hamas responded by utilizing lethal means of resistance against the occupation, particularly against Israeli civilians and settlers, in an attempt to recoup popular support (Roy, 1991:64-65).³⁰ Indeed, this strategy has been successful, to the point now that Hamas garners more support in the West Bank and Gaza than any party other than Fatah. In addition to its strike action against Israeli civilian, settler, and military targets, Hamas utilizes its network of nursery schools, kindergartens, social and sports clubs, libraries, mosques, and the Islamic University in Gaza, to enlist support. In elections for university students' councils, professional associations, trade unions, chambers of commerce, and so on,

³⁰ The increased use of lethal tactics by "strike forces" in occupied Palestine is an expression of the despair, rage, and brutalization that Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are experiencing as a result of their political repression and is a manifestation of their frustration in not achieving tangible political goals (Husseini, 1991:104). While some of the violence has been fomented by undercover Israeli army units operating in the territories (Tal, 1991:10; Nuseibeh, 1991:16), it is also the reality that an increasingly brutalized and despairing Palestinian population has resorted to violence as a means of political self-determination.

Hamas typically wins from one-third to one-half of the popular vote (Abu-Amr, 1993:14-15; Roy, 1993:29-30).

While one consequence of the general malaise surrounding the intifada has been factionalization and the increased use of lethal violence, another has been the rigidification of political structures and the re-emphasis on, and the importance of, the outside leadership to the current process. This has severely hampered the participatory politics that had been prominent at the beginning of the intifada, and crucial in maintaining popular, grass-roots participation in the uprising (Bishara, 1992:5, 6). The Gulf Crisis and the subsequent peace talks served to divert Palestinians' attention from their internal dynamics and turned the focus outwards, thus enabling the shifting of power from the "inside" (where the intifada had wrested it) back to the "outside" (Abu-Amr, 1991:8). The consequences of the rigidification of political structures and the onus back on the outside leadership, in combination with the emergence of (and perhaps even the dominance of) often lethal militancy, is the disappearance of the cross-factional popular neighbourhood committees (as opposed to the party-affiliated committees) which had fuelled the uprising, and the loss of internal dynamism (Bishara, 1992:6; Hussein, 1991:102-03; Roy, 1991:63-64).³¹ What is also important to remember is that a

³¹ Roy mentions Rafah as an exception to the general trend occurring in occupied Palestine, citing the popular unity and cohesive organization in the community. She explains this anomaly

significant proportion of the membership of the popular committees was composed of women, who also did much of the work of these committees. The backlash against women's visibility had an effect on the utility and dynamism of these committees. The open and fluid internal political structures that had characterized the intifada at its inception, and which had contributed to the uprising's progressive, open, creative political organization, have given way to regressive structures and political violence which ultimately marginalizes women's political activity.

The repression of women also, in itself, debilitated the dynamism and affected the self-sufficiency of the intifada. Prior to the Gulf War, Palestinian activists and academics were already concerned about certain trends manifesting themselves through the course of the uprising. Women's access to formal political decision-making structures, their super-exploitation in achieving Palestinian self-sufficiency, and the *hijab* campaign were issues that feminists had voiced as causes for concern, both in regard to Palestinian women's status, and in terms of the sustainability of fluid and accessible political systems and of self-sufficiency measures (Tawfeeq, 1990:8). Since the Gulf War the factionalization and rigidification of political structures has not made

by Rafah's "relative isolation from the rest of the Gaza territory" and its absorption of released male prisoners who are "employed by the movement, both sustaining it and being sustained by it". This type of dynamic is reminiscent of the early years of the intifada in the rest of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

political decision-making any more accessible to women, and the worsening of the economy has put additional strains on women's performance of reproductive work (which is the foundation of most of the small-scale income-generation self-sufficiency measures). As well, many of the more progressive women's cooperative movements which had relied on funding for start-up and some operational costs were dismantled.²² Suha Sabbagh of the Institute for Arab Women's Studies links the failure to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict with the rise of Islamic fundamentalist political movements and a resultant erosion of women's human rights in the region (Gomez, 1992:7), and this process can presently be observed in occupied Palestine. With the strengthening of Islamist groups, especially in the Gaza Strip, coupled with worsening economic and political conditions, women have lost most of the gains that they had made in the early period of the intifada (Roy, 1991:65-66). Women have increasingly been forced back into the home, thus robbing them of newly hard-won freedoms and depriving the intifada of one of its major sources of political, economic, and social dynamism.

While the Gulf War obviously had an effect on inter-Palestinian politics and Palestinian relations with their Arab neighbours, it also redefined Palestinian-Israeli relations.

²² Mona Marshy's research of women's cooperatives in the West Bank led her to Eileen Kuttub, who reported that there was "nothing happening" with women's cooperatives since the Gulf War because of a lack of resources and the increased repression of women (Marshy, 1991).

The cessation of the Cold War, the Gulf War, and the "new world order", along with the decreasing utility of American retention of Israel as the most favoured ally in the Middle East and the increasing power of the EC and its influence in the region all created the conditions necessary for Israel to deal with the Palestinians (Eilts, 1991; Hadar, 1991; Fuller, 1990; Laipson, 1990; Telhami, 1990).³³ One Palestinian analyst outlines several internal trends that emerged from the Gulf War that led to the peace process and provided political-economic reasons for the shape of the new agreement. The economic hardship caused by the break of individual and state remittances from the Gulf after the war,³⁴ as well as the redirection of funds previously earmarked by the Gulf states for the PLO to Hamas, and the repatriation of \$40 million in 1990-91 from Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza to the

³³ There are some indications that Israel finally gave some grudging concessions in Oslo as a result of Washington's new policy to "get tough" on nuclear arms proliferators, including Israel. According to one US State Department source, "Every time we discover a new program in the Third World arms proliferation game, we always find that the Israelis have got some hand in it." Ironically, many of the countries that Israel engages in arms trade with, such as South Africa and China, then deal with Israel's neighbours in the Middle East (Iraq, Egypt, Iran, among others) (Kennedy, 1993). This should come as no surprise given the fact that the arms industry is a cornerstone of the Israeli economy, with military sales accounting for 9% of the Israeli GDP and accounting for 20% of its exports by the 1980s. As of 1984, Israel had become the world's fifth largest arms exporter (Steinberg, 1985; Pieterse, 1984).

³⁴ Before the intifada these remittances totalled \$400 million per annum, but as a result of intifada-inspired Israeli restrictions, this amount was halved during the years of the uprising, even before the onset of the Gulf crisis (Anon. 12, 06/27/93).

thousands of Palestinian Gulf expellees, mostly to Amman, intensified the adversity facing Palestinians and was accompanied by political oppression by the Israelis. The al-Aqsa mosque massacre in Jerusalem in October 1990, and the subsequent Hamas retaliatory actions, prompted Israel to impose closures on Palestinians in the occupied territories. This closure, and the curfews and closures the Israelis imposed during the war, gave the Israelis their first experience of non-access to cheap Palestinian labour since 1967, opening their eyes to this situation as a permanent possibility. Israeli businessmen, weaned off of their dependency on Palestinian labour, began to look for new options. At this point, the Ministry of Defense, anticipating the economic consequences of the war and the closures, hired economist Ezra Sadan to do a report on the Gazan economy and to investigate the possibility of reducing the number of Palestinians commuting to work inside Israel (Anon. 12, 06/27/93). According to one source, Sadan has argued for the last couple of years that it was to Israel's advantage to develop the occupied territories to benefit from its large supply of cheap Arab labour rather than pouring funds into occupation and defense (Anon. 9b, 12/13/93).

Professor Sadan submitted his report on March 8, 1991. His document suggests that substantial and liberalized changes be made in the economic relations between Israel and Palestine, including new outlines for investment (foreign and

domestic), taxation (to encourage foreign investment), an easier licensing process for Palestinian businesses, recommendations for the free flow of capital (at that time the source of capital had to be declared) to the Gaza Strip, an opening of trade in Gazan goods to Israel, suggestions for eased restrictions on banks, and the proposal that infrastructure be improved, particularly through the construction of industrial parks. The one area where Sadan recommends restrictions is in the access of Gazan labour to the Israeli market (Anon. 12, 06/27/93; D. Kuttab, 1991:117-118). These changes began to be implemented in 1991-92 with the prolongation of the Israeli closures imposed on the movement of Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza into Israel and occupied Jerusalem. One of the most noticeable and controversial changes has been the easing of the licensing procedure for new businesses. Whereas in 1990, 42 licenses were applied for and none were approved by the civil administration, in 1991, 95 out of 114 applications were approved, as were 71 out of 112 in 1992. However, according to a World Bank survey, many Palestinian businessmen have simply taken advantage of the loosened procedure to obtain licenses for already-existing businesses. Nonetheless, while the licensing procedure has eased, other regulations have not. This, in addition to the sense that the possible financial incentives to establish a business are far outweighed by political uncertainty, has not significantly increased the

number of new Palestinian businesses established by 1992 (Anon. 12, 06/27/93; Sadan, 1993:3; World Bank, 1993c:52-54).

Regardless, Sadan is one of the Israeli policy-shapers who has supported the current peace process for economic reasons (Anon.: 12, 06/27/93; 9b, 12/18/93). His report dovetails with the perspective guiding the World Bank's six-volume 1993 report on occupied Palestine entitled, Developing the Occupied Territories: An Investment in Peace. It is clear from a reading of both Sadan's and the World Bank's reports that they share a political and economic agenda with regard to the future management of occupied Palestine. With this shared programme in mind, the Oslo Accord makes sense as a tool of political and economic regulation rather than a plan for peace.

The World Bank advocates a limited public sector role in the development of infrastructure in Palestine, an "affordable social 'safety net' through targeted programs", and a "supportive business environment within which the private sector could flourish" (World Bank, 1993a:13). Moreover, the World Bank's suggested "strategy" for the development of the West Bank and Gaza clearly advocates a wide-open, unfettered economy (World Bank, 1993b:7):

it is essential that the public sector role not be overstretched. In particular, any involvement by the public sector in directly productive ventures or interference in the marketplace by propping up unviable private sector activities...would retard economic development and, therefore, should be resisted....

Regarding links to the outside world, in

economic terms, the option of turning inwards would clearly be very costly for a small economy such as that of the West Bank and Gaza. It would mean major efficiency losses and a sharp decline in living standards. The opening up of external markets to exports from the OT [occupied territories] is important if the economy is to achieve sustainable development....

Given the close economic relations with Israel that have evolved over the past 25 years, the economies of the OT and Israel are bound to be inextricably interwoven for the foreseeable future. While a major reorientation in trade--to the region and to the rest of the world--should occur over the medium term, any sharp cut in trade in goods to Israel could have large short-run costs, because of Israel's predominance as a trading partner. This implies the desirability of mutually beneficial arrangements between Israeli and OT authorities regarding the flow of goods, services, financial resources, labor and visitors in the post-peace period. Even if the loss of substantial labor access to Israel is permanent, it would make sense for the West Bank and Gaza to not only maintain, but expand trade access to the Israeli market. The key issue in the Israeli market is agriculture. The opening of the Israeli market to agricultural products from the West Bank and Gaza, where they are highly competitive, would have a significant positive impact on OT agriculture [my emphasis] by both increasing production and eliminating rents from illegal trade. Israeli consumers would also benefit significantly from easier access to OT produce (World Bank 1993a:13).

The World Bank is recommending that the West Bank and Gaza increase their export-production capacity while at the same time further developing their agricultural sector. Sadan, as well as Palestinian analysts, recognizes that the citrus industry in Gaza is unretrievable from its current decline, mostly due to increasing salinity in the Gazan water supply and competitive citrus prices from other producers. Instead, Gaza should focus on horticulture and other saline-resistant crops such as herbs and strawberries, as well as agro-

industrial food processing (Anon. 3, 06/23/93; Sadan, 1993:3-6). As one analyst notes regarding the utility for Israel in transferring their "industrialized agriculture" to Gaza, they are able to keep their European market share (in this case, in horticultural production), retaining the inflow of hard currency, while paying Palestinian labour low wages in shekels (Abd al-Shafi, 1994:12). The World Bank sees further utility in the agricultural sector, envisioning a two-track development:

On the supply side important aspects concern a reduction of regulatory constraints, improved access to natural resources, continued availability of relatively cheap labour, and introduction of a policy framework encouraging investment by the private sector....Nevertheless, in the short to medium the sector will remain critically important for the local economy, not only in terms of income, but particularly from an employment point of view. In many areas in the OT, agriculture is a way of life, deeply ingrained in the social and cultural fabric. The future of the agricultural sector should reflect those employment and cultural aspects, and this may enhance its dualistic character in the future. One part of the sector may evolve into a capital and knowledge intensive production system, focused on external and local markets, economically and technologically efficient. The more traditional part of the sector would also improve its technology and efficiency, but would operate on a smaller scale, and be more labour intensive. While competitive on the local market, its products may not be able to compete in world markets (World Bank, 1993d:25-26).

On the one hand, cash-cropping commercial agriculture should be encouraged, while on the other hand, subsistence and labour-intensive agriculture should also be maintained in order to absorb excess Palestinian labour. As noted in another volume of the study,

it is unclear how far employment will be allowed to rise, following the closure of the border in March 1993, but much tighter rationing of employment numbers has now become one of the probable scenarios....The reallocation of labor to domestic production--with the loss of labor opportunities in Israel, workers shift to work in domestic activities. This leads to expanded [their emphasis] domestic production but a lower income...(World Bank, 1993b:73, 74).

It seems clear that the World Bank anticipates the permanent closure of Israel to labour from occupied Palestine. This perspective coincides with a confidential follow-up report written by Sadan for the Israeli government in April 1993 which asserts,

in view of the ethnic antagonisms involved, employment in Israel [of Gazan Palestinians] is not necessarily a source of stable remuneration. hence, even if it cannot be replaced, at present, it should not serve as the foundation of future development.

In planning for the future, it seems desirable and opportune to rely on an expanded production of exportable goods [Sadan's emphasis] (Sadan, 1993:2).

In order to absorb Gazan labour Sadan advocates that the Israeli government should construct industrial parks that later could be transferred to a "local authority":

The government authorities should site and design industrial parks and carry the burden of developing the parks' infrastructure--including roads, water supply, sewage, electricity and telecommunication facilities. Under the present circumstances the authorities may be required to undertake the allocation of lots to private developers and entrepreneurs, and *transfer control over the park's infrastructure to a local administration* [my emphasis] (Sadan, 1993:6).

Nonetheless, while the Israeli government has started construction of these parks, with the first one scheduled to

be complete by 1994-95, possibly two more by 1996-97, and another two by the end of the decade (Sadan, 1993:17; World Bank, 1993c:37), the World Bank suggests instead that infrastructure and its development be privatized (World Bank, 1993e).

Whoever assumes ultimate control and responsibility of infrastructure, it seems clear that Sadan is promoting the development of export-processing zones in Gaza:

Refugees in Gaza constitute almost one half of the total population living in that densely populated strip. Under these circumstances, a program intending to increase durable employment in the production of exportables in the Gaza region--encompasses a predominant refugee dimension....it seems proper and timely to outline for the refugee-populated region programs which emphasize durable employment through the development of private enterprise....In spite of government policy, prior to 1992, these innovator industrialists [leading sub-contractors] and their counterparts elsewhere in the territories succeeded in obtaining licenses for new plants even though the major part of their production was directed, from the outset, at Israeli consumer and producer markets. Their eventual success, in production and marketing is indicative of a potential which has not yet been exhausted (Sadan, 1993:1, 2, 6).

The World Bank, too, recognizes that "[s]ubcontracting with Israeli firms has been a major activity in the industrial sector" (World Bank, 1993c:33), and that

[sub-contracting] Firms...are likely to develop into the industry leaders of the OT over the medium term, provided that the regulatory environment and political climate is sufficiently stable to encourage entrepreneurs to make investments in enhancing their technology, utilizing and expanding their capacity and diversifying into competence-related new businesses. These industries are likely to generate a momentum that could drive a fairly rapid development of industries (World Bank,

1993c:41).

As Sadan recognizes, control of these parks may have to be "transferred" to a "local administration". One prominent Palestinian analyst agrees, indicating that there is a dichotomy between traditional Israeli security measures and these new economic proposals and trends which require a new political arrangement between Israel and occupied Palestine (Anon. 12, 06/27/93). The World Bank concurs, that in order to be successful, "[p]rivate sector development requires as a critical condition the transformation--in the context of the peace process--of the existing governance system to one which is widely accepted by the population to be legitimate and supportive....As part of the peace process, crafting such a structure for the OT will require careful design of principles and procedures to impart credibility and substance to the new administration" (World Bank, 1993c:15). In this context, along with its increasing "ungovernability", it is clear why the Gaza Strip gained autonomy first in the recent peace agreement.

However, this new political arrangement need not be a sovereign Palestinian state. Many dissenters to the current peace process and the Oslo Accord, among them past delegation leader to the Madrid peace talks, Dr. Haydar 'Abd al-Shafi, contend that the agreement "fails to address Israel's illegal claim to the occupied territories" and is a "tacit acceptance of two separate entities in the Palestinian territories--two

separate administrations, two separate judicial systems--indirectly a kind of apartheid....Israel has no intention of ever allowing a state" ('Abd al-Shafi, 1993:14, 15). Palestinian analysts believe that many of these new initiatives have been directed to Gaza to strengthen the Gaza-Tel Aviv economic relationship, but with the aim of splitting occupied Palestine into "cantons" in order to redefine this relationship in a new, more convenient shape. The post-Gulf War closures have been experiments to see how the Israeli economy will react to Palestinian independence, particularly in terms of the loss of the reserve army of refugee labour (Anon.: 11, 06/9/93; 12, 06/27/93).

One analyst with a leading Palestinian research institute contends that Israel wants to reduce the Palestinian income standard through the closures. This is necessary in order to make Palestinian labour more competitive vis-à-vis Syria and Jordan in light industry with the aim of laying the groundwork for a Middle East trading bloc with Israel at its economic centre (Anon.: 11, 06/9/93; 12, 06/27/93). As the World Bank indicates, "Palestinian industries and farmers would have to compete with cheaper labor elsewhere, if there is an opening to the regional market" (World Bank, 1993b:52). Indeed, the World Bank contends that, at least in the short-run, competitive labour prices are Palestine's "primary source of comparative advantage" (World Bank, 1993c:41).

Since the Gulf War, mainly as a result of Israeli

restrictions on Palestinian access to the labour market, 2 out of 3 households in occupied Palestine reported a decline in household income, with a particularly substantial decline reported in Gaza (Heiberg, Øvensen et al., 1993:166-167). The World Bank sees this as a natural and necessary process, as indicated by their discussion of the scenario in the event that Palestinian labour access is permanently cut off from the Israeli market:

The economies of the West Bank and Gaza are reasonably flexible, and as economic opportunities in Israel are cut there will be reallocations to domestic activities. This is likely to be underwritten by consumption-smoothing: savings appear to be high in the aggregate and will be run down to smooth income shocks at the household level....The prevailing view is that extended family and kinship networks are strong, so inter-household transfers would be expected to rise to help those already hit. Both effects will help to sustain domestic demand. However, labor market adjustment will certainly not be instantaneous, and we would expect temporary rises in unemployment, followed by declines...as wages move slowly to a new, market-clearing position (World Bank, 1993b:75).

In contrast, according to a "Disaster Preparedness Report" researched and written in June 1993 by an OXFAM technical advisor, the second closure, imposed in September 1992 in Gaza (and on the West Bank in March 1993) and still in force, has initiated an "unnatural slow-onset disaster" in Gaza, characterized by: household sale of gold and other large durable consumer items such as videos, televisions, and cars; layoffs in Gazan workshops and factories due to the inability to export and a lack of internal purchasing power for

necessary inputs; a 70% fall in farm prices due to the inability to export and a fall in community purchasing power; shop sales only in essential food items and mostly on credit. The Gazan community is faced with the possible "total disruption of people's lives" and "the prospect of hunger and total immiseration if no action is taken" (Sexton, 1993:5-6).

In conclusion, Richard Sexton reports,

The overall picture presented by the case studies [illustrated in the report] is of a tremendous fall in purchasing power. Residual economic transactions are largely being conducted on a credit-debt basis. These indicators point to a relief situation rather than a development situation. Attempts to establish income-generating projects and entrepreneurial enterprises, or loan programmes against the background of a rapidly shrinking economy are not really feasible options. Such projects would only work if paralleled with a massive and continuing injection of funds to lift overall purchasing power. *The picture is therefore extremely bleak for any type of economic restructuring which aims to lessen the Gaza Strip's dependence on the Israeli economy* [Sexton's emphasis]. Indeed the closures are more likely to heighten the Gaza Strip's long-term dependence on the Israeli economy rather than to lessen it (Sexton, 1993:27).

In addition, Sexton contradicts the World Bank's assertion that the unemployed can resort to "domestic activity", by noting that no such immediate possibility exists:

the Gaza Strip possesses no resources to speak of, either to provide an income for workers displaced from their jobs, or to provide for an alternative means of subsistence. The population was entirely dependent on waged labour and the only prospect for waged labour and income in the short term appears to lie outside the geographical area of the Gaza Strip. The local economy was also largely dependent on financial resources and purchasing power which originated from outside the Gaza Strip area. A major section of the population which had

previously worked within the Gaza Strip also faces the prospect of permanent loss of income and livelihood (Sexton, 1993:38).

This comparison demonstrates the contrast between the World Bank's (and other liberal economists'), perspective on market-driven structural adjustment, and that of others with less tightly-held ideological positions on political economy. The World Bank seems to have a benign view of the process, believing that Gazans can rely on family and savings for "consumption-smoothing" relief and will find something else to do at home to replace employment in Israel while waiting for the situation to reach a "new, market-clearing position". Sexton, however, declares that Gaza is at the point of disaster where the population is facing "hunger and total immiseration" in the face of depleted "consumption-smoothing" resources and the lack of opportunity for other wage-earning activity.

In order to place the situation of the Gaza Strip into the context of the Oslo Accord we must look back to Sadan's and the World Bank's assertion that private sector industrial development in the Gaza Strip will need, in order to be successful, to be directly administered by a "local authority" which is "widely accepted by the population to be legitimate". The Gaza Strip has a long history of resistance and ungovernability (Lesch, 1990), and was the first site of the stone throwing that initiated the intifada. As an Israeli analyst tells us, the March 1993 closure had the dual purpose

of collective punishment in response to Palestinian violence and economic and social separation:

In March 1993 thirteen Israelis were murdered by knife-wielding fanatics [sic]. Rabin's response was to order on 30 March the closure of Israel's pre-1967 border to workers from the occupied territories. Nearly 120,000 families were punished for the deeds of a handful of killers. The closure achieved its immediate aim of reducing the incidence of violence but it also served Rabin's new aim of bringing about Israel's disengagement from the occupied territories. It recreated the 1967 border and led to the economic and social separation of the Jewish and Palestinian communities. The message was not lost on the Palestinian negotiators. Israeli disengagement could be the prelude to Palestinian autonomy in the occupied territories (Shlaim, 1994:16).

Indeed, Sexton reports that violence has not only been inflicted on Israelis by Palestinians, but that Palestinians, most notably children (under the age of sixteen and even as young as eighteen months), have been subject to increasing violence at the hands of the Israeli army and Israeli military sniper fire. Additionally, severe collective punishment tactics continue to be used, including the destruction of an apartment block in Gaza using "anti-tank artillery pieces and incendiary devices" (Sexton, 1993:9).

More significant for this study, however, are the political and economic motives for this violence. Sexton asserts, "As the economic situation gets more desperate the incidence of these [violent] events is likely to escalate". The closure, as far as the Israeli government is concerned, is permanent, reports Sexton. Moreover, the closure represents a precedent for Israeli withdrawal from Gaza. However, Sexton

cautions, this step could be a negative one if it leaves a political vacuum which is unmanageable or unfillable by some form of Palestinian authority (Sexton, 1993:9). The potential for general lawlessness in this context could be enough to justify

an Israeli refusal to grant any form of recognition for Palestinian self-determination. In other words, the situation would be taken as a portrayal to the international community that "Palestinians are incapable of governing themselves" (Sexton, 1993:9).

While Sexton sees the situation in either/or terms vis-à-vis Palestinian self-rule or lawlessness, a case can be made that both situations may occur simultaneously. A recent report claims that since the signing of the peace agreement Israeli arms dealers have suddenly found it surprisingly easy to smuggle arms caches into the Gaza Strip, and that "Gaza is currently awash with small firearms, rifles and machine guns". The speculation is that the IDF (who are responsible for policing the Israeli-Gaza border) is deliberately sowing the ground for chaos after their withdrawal:

During the stalled negotiations in Cairo the Israeli daily Yediot Aharonot quoted IDF sources that "the time has come to create a crisis in the territories to clarify to Arafat that Israel does not intend to make further concessions". If Israel Shahak is right that the PLO leader is currently without either arms or money for self-rule (MEI 468), then the only thing left to him vis a vis the Israelis is his nationalist constituency. Should this completely self-destruct--and in Gaza we are on the brink of this--politically and militarily he will be at the mercy of Israel to enforce his rule (Usher, 1994b:5).

Regardless of their motives, it is clear that conceding

limited self-rule to Palestinians in Gaza has been a convenience and a relief to the Israeli government in terms of direct policing of the region. In discussing the Oslo Accord and the Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip (but not from Israeli settlements there) Prime Minister Rabin told the Israeli newspaper Yediot Aharonot on September 7, 1993:

I prefer that the Palestinians cope with the problem of enforcing order in the Gaza [Strip]. The Palestinians will be better at it than we were because they will allow no appeals to the Supreme Court and will prevent the [Israeli] Association for Civil Rights from criticizing the conditions there by denying it access to the area. They will rule there by their own methods, freeing--and this is most important--the Israeli army soldiers from having to do what they will do (Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, cited in Shahak, 1993:15).

Clearly, from Rabin's statements, it is evident that Israeli decision-makers are now prepared to allow the PLO to be its enforcer in Gaza rather than continuing to perform this dirty task themselves. In addition, it is unlikely that an economic program such as the one that Sadan and the World Bank have in mind could be administered by an Israeli authority. It is much better, and in the long run more efficient and cheaper, for the Israeli government to allow a Palestinian administrative entity to take on the responsibilities of policing, feeding, educating, housing, and nursing the inhabitants of an export-processing enclave.

As for the Oslo Accord itself, a close examination reveals that the document is vague, referring to the "Palestinian" people but not their legitimate national rights,

and acknowledging UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 but no explicit interpretation of them. Most problematic, the Declaration of Principles defers solution of the issues surrounding the settlements, refugees, Jerusalem, security arrangements, borders, and relations and cooperation with other neighbours until the permanent status negotiations, to be held "not later than the beginning of the third year of the interim period" (which came into effect May 4, 1994, with the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Palestinian population centres in the Gaza Strip and Jericho) (Mideast Mirror, 1993). The Hebron massacre of 1993 demonstrates the difficulty of postponing these explosive issues that, aside from the fact of the occupation itself, are most often the spark for conflict in occupied Palestine and beyond, most notably in south Lebanon.

As for economic arrangements outlined in the Accord, much emphasis is placed on development of the territories. For instance, military withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho is being effected "with the view to promoting economic development in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip" with "authority...transferred to the Palestinians in the following spheres: education and culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation, and tourism". In order to foster economic growth, an elected Palestinian governing council will establish, according to the text of the Accord, a Palestinian Electricity Authority, a Gaza Sea Port Authority, a

Palestinian Development Bank, a Palestinian Export Promotion Board, a Palestinian Environmental Authority, a Palestinian Land Authority, and a Palestinian Water Authority. In addition, an Israeli-Palestinian Economic Cooperative Committee is also to be established in order to coordinate cooperation in the management of every conceivable economic and social area, including: management of resources, trade and economic sector development, social welfare and education, research and data collection, and communications. While an independent Palestinian council has been given the authority to deal with a whole host of issues, its powers and responsibilities are to be negotiated (Mideast Mirror, 1993). No doubt it will also be subject to the authority of the Israeli-Palestinian Economic Cooperative Committee.

Nevertheless, after the deal was signed, "expectations of economic improvement and even prosperity began to rise", and indeed, "the West Bank and Gaza have been witnessing unusual movement in the economic sphere". However, this increased activity, consisting of formulation of plans and consultation with visiting delegations of foreign investors, NGOs, and bankers, has not materialized in significant sums of money actually entering occupied Palestine. While the World Bank is concerned that the PLO will use the money inappropriately to pay old debts or fund projects that do not meet Bank guidelines, Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza are worried that the PLO will direct funds on a political basis rather

than on merit (Anon.: 10, 12/23/93; 13a, 12/08/93; 15, 12/18/93; Abu-Amr, 1994:82).

Despite these ambiguities and problems with the Accord, news of the deal was greeted with mass celebration in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (and mass protest from right-wing Israelis). For the first time, Palestinian flags and colours can be seen in every village, town, and refugee camp, flying from prominent institutions such as the National Palace Hotel in East Jerusalem and local mosques, and displayed in service taxis, Old City shops, and cafés. However, the Accord has not been greeted with unilateral approval. Edward Said terms the new agreement the "Palestinian Versailles", and highly critical of the leadership who negotiated it, claims that

for at least the past fifteen years the PLO could have negotiated a better arrangement than this modified Allon Plan, one not requiring so many unilateral concessions to Israel. For reasons best known to the leadership, it refused all such previous overtures....Except for the resolutions of the 1988 PNC, the gains of the intifadah were squandered away, and today advocates of the new document say, "We had no alternative." The correct way of phrasing it is, "We had no alternative because we either lost or threw away a lot of others, leaving us only this one" (Said, 1994:xxxiv-xxxv).

One of the Accord's most prominent and thoughtful critics has been Dr. Haydar 'Abd al-Shafi, former delegation leader to the Madrid peace talks. In his opinion, the Palestinian negotiators of the Accord "made terrible sacrifices" for a deal that "abandoned" Palestinian national rights. In essence, he argues, the Accord grants "the autonomy we had

always rejected" and "confer[s] legitimacy on what Israel has established illegally"--"a kind of apartheid" ('Abd al-Shafi, 1993). Nonetheless, 'Abd al-Shafi asserts,

I have said that I am in basic disagreement with the accord. But I will not actively oppose it. I will in no way be party to those who are throwing themselves against it. I am against any kind of violence. I strongly object to these calls for establishing a new PLO and so on. Before thinking about alternatives, we must give the authors of this agreement the chance to debate its implementation with the Israelis and see what comes out of it, to see whether it can develop into something better.

In the meantime, my call to the Palestinian people is not to passively wait for what's going to happen next. We must make every effort to organize our work, to make the best of the potential we have, to put the Palestinian house in order without waiting for Abu Ammar [Arafat] or anyone else to provide the context. The best thing we can do is to forge some meaningful unity for our people ('Abd al-Shafi, 1993:19).

Likewise, many of the opposition groups seem to be following 'Abd al-Shafi's lead. This is no surprise given his popular and respected stature throughout occupied Palestine, as well as the fact that polls taken in the West Bank and Gaza indicate that a majority of Palestinians support the agreement (65%) while a not insubstantial block (30%) oppose it (Abu-Amr, 1994:76). These numbers indicate that both supporters and opposition must tread carefully, keeping an eye on the popular mood.³⁵ Indeed, according to interviews conducted in December 1993 (Anon.: 10, 12/23/93; 15, 12/18/93), and Ziad

³⁵ A more recent poll, conducted in mid-July 1994, indicates that 58% of Palestinians still supported the Accord while 38% said they did not (Martin, 1994:A8). A slow shift towards opposition may be occurring.

Abu-Amr, "the opposition groups are resigned to the premise that the agreement is irreversible and cannot be aborted by their efforts" (1994:79). Hamas, while on the record as opposing a peaceful settlement with Israel, is contained somewhat by Jordan's Muslim Brotherhood which is concerned about alienating King Hussein, who supports the deal. As well, the Damascus-based secular nationalist groups, such as the PFLP, must also be mindful of Syria's position, which also supports a peaceful settlement with Israel. In this context, it is no surprise to note that, rather than eliciting discourse about the deal itself, oppositional groups--and even spokespersons from parties that have allied themselves with the current process such as the PPP and FIDA³⁶--are making public their fears that the current authority, the Fatah-led PLO, will suppress pluralistic and democratic politics (Anon.: 2a, 12/14/93; 10, 12/23/93; 15, 12/18/93; Abu-Amr, 1994:79). In response, a collection of non-Fatah and non-Hamas Palestinian NGOs are organizing in the interest of strengthening democratic and pluralistic civil society, as well as protecting their own position in the Palestinian polity and economy (Anon.: 9b, 12/18/93; 10, 12/23/93; 13a, 12/08/93).

³⁶ FIDA is the outcome of the Yasir 'Abd-Rabbuh-led DFLP. Prominent activists, politicians, and professionals are associated with this new party, thought to be targeting the "independent" vote. FIDA seems to be using an interesting mix of traditional Palestinian resistance party tactics, such as graffiti-spraying, combined with Western-style mobilization door-to-door canvassing strategies (Anon.: 9b, 12/23/93; 18a, 12/11/93; Abu-Amr, 1994:78).

In addition, there is much focus on the elections for the Council to be held as part of the implementation of the Accord. Originally scheduled for July, but now pushed back until at least December 1994, it is still unclear whether the opposition groups will participate (Anon. 18a, 12/11/93). As one PPP spokesperson noted, there are democratic and anti-democratic forces at work here. He speculates that Hamas will participate but that the PFLP will not, reasoning that Hamas is pragmatic while the PFLP has been weakened in occupied Palestine and this has resulted in their increased dogmatism. According to this interviewee, it is both necessary and possible that the leadership will, or has been, reconciling with Hamas in order to create a loyal opposition rather than leaving them to become a destructive force. Hamas is trying to strengthen its bargaining position by assuming a constructive opposition position (Anon. 15, 12/18/93). At the same time, the PFLP has been allying itself with Hamas, most notably in the 1993 fall Birzeit University student council elections. While the popular perception, even amongst progressives, has been that in the last two years Hamas is the only group that has actively resisted the occupation (Anon.: 21, 07/22/93; 24, 05/22/93), this alliance has isolated followers, particularly women, from the PFLP. Nonetheless, others defend the compact, claiming that it poses no danger to women, as indicated by the fact that in the recent Birzeit elections Hamas garnered the same vote-share that it has over

previous years (approximately one-third), and that two PFLP women also got seats on the student's council which Hamas will be forced to work with (Anon. 18a, 12/11/93). Others claim that an alliance with Hamas is no worse, and perhaps even better, than an alliance with Fatah. At least, the argument goes, with Hamas you know what you are dealing with. With Fatah there is no certainty because their word cannot be trusted. Citing the experience of the 1993 PFLP-sponsored summer Palestine Festival, one interviewee explained that Fatah protested it with "clubs and knives" in an attempt to disrupt it after saying that they supported it, while Hamas, though also disagreeing with it, protested it through democratic channels (Anon. 1a, 12/14/93). Regardless, with no links with Tunis or Orient House in East Jerusalem (the headquarters of the Fatah-led political authority inside), and with declining popularity, the PFLP has had little choice but to ally themselves with the more popular Hamas (Anon 2a, 12/14/93).

In terms of the relation of these parties to the development of plural and democratic society, one analyst with a research centre in the West Bank explained that support for civil society lies between the PLO Fatah-led authority and Hamas. All of the political factions are jockeying for position on the ground: Fatah represents mainstream hegemony and links with international business; the PPP and FIDA participate in the current governing process, but they also

support the development of civil society and maintain links with international social democrats; the PFLP is critical of the current process, but also promotes the building of civil society and is supported by international Marxist-Leninists; Hamas is critical of the current process in addition to their opposition to democratic and pluralistic civil society, and is connected with international Islamist groups (Anon. 10, 12/23/93).

With these configurations prominent in the current context it is clear that relations between women's emancipation, development, and civil society in occupied Palestine are in the forefront. Political alliances now shaping in the West Bank and Gaza seem to leave little room for women's and feminist movement. Non-Fatah NGOs, often the site of development that has been most liberatory for women and conscious of and sensitive to a feminist agenda, feel under siege in the current political terrain. Development in Palestine, up until this moment, has often gone hand-in-hand with women's activism. Now, with the Oslo Accord and the entry of the World Bank, the definition of "development" in the West Bank and Gaza has become bigger and more institutionalized, and is now the business of large investors, big international NGOs, Western political and economic interests, and Israel's own economic adjustment imperatives. Not only will this new development agenda have important implications for women's social emancipation, it also has

significant ramifications for the state of the Palestinian polity, society, and economy.

CHAPTER FOUR

CASE STUDIES IN STRUGGLE: WOMEN AND DEVELOPMENT

The history of Palestinian development this century has been marked by wars, disruption and dislocation, and occupation. Despite all manner of hardships, the Palestinian people have responded with determined resistance to the conditions they have been confronted with. In the West Bank and the Gaza Strip this struggle has been characterized by the establishment of indigenous organizations and other programs sponsored by international NGOs devoted to the development of a variety of sectors of Palestinian society. It is in this way that we can see the interlocking of resistance, development, and civil society. Women have played a central role in this formation, by being both the key players and the focus of the programs implemented. To illustrate this point we will examine three case studies: PARC's Women's Unit, UNDP's Task Force on Women, and the Bisan Center for Research and Development.

4.1 PARC's Women's Unit

PARC (Palestine Agricultural Relief Committees), affiliated with the PPP, was founded in 1983 by a group of volunteer agronomists in Jericho who began providing extension services to small farmers in the area. PARC was one of many mass organizations that emerged in the 1980s, devoting itself

to the business of reclaiming Palestinian society from the effects of Israeli occupation. In this instance, given the underfunded and restricted nature of (Israeli) government-run agricultural support services and development programs, as well as the other Israeli-imposed constraints on Palestinian agriculture, PARC began providing services to farmers that were not ordinarily available to them.

Today, PARC employs 70 full-time and volunteer agronomists--more than are employed by the Israeli Department of Agriculture for the region--of which 10 are women with 13 female assistants,¹ services 11 regions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in 130 locations, and assists in all aspects of the agricultural sector: crop and animal production, credit, local and international marketing and importing inputs, land reclamation, infrastructural development, experimental projects, and household economy and production cooperatives. PARC is largely EC funded, both by governments and by NGOs, but the long-range plan is to self-fund through the commercial arm of PARC (Anon.: 3, 06/23/93; 4, 06/24/93; PARC, 1992). PARC just concluded a five-year (1994-98) agreement with a consortium of funders. While 30-40% of their needs could be funded by the profits from their own production projects right now, this is currently being ploughed back into new projects. The projection is that they will be self-financing at the end

¹ In fact, 42.6% of PARC's employees are women and are spread throughout the organizational hierarchy (Anon. 4, 06/24/93).

of this five year period (Anon. 5a, 12/16/93).

From 1983-87 PARC worked solely with male farmers, but in 1987 they conducted a pilot study on women to examine their role in agriculture and the home economy. The results of this survey prompted PARC to start a women's program in 1987 (Anon. 4, 06/24/93). No other agricultural organizations at this time had women's services, and one of the first tasks PARC undertook was to train its own female agronomists and assistants, most of whom were originally from rural areas (Anon. 5, 06/29/93). In the beginning, PARC's Women's Unit focused only on the household economy, but with the onset of the intifada PARC's and UNLU's mandate coincided with the boycott of Israeli products and the encouragement of production and consumption of Palestinian-produced goods and PARC's household economy program took on an overtly nationalist tone. While at first this initiative was meant only for household use, women began to approach PARC about wanting income which eventually led to the establishment of the production cooperatives. This proved to be a challenge for PARC as none of the female staff had any training or experience in cooperative production and management, and in the beginning there were many problems with quality control, production to economy of scale, and management (Anon. 4, 06/24/93). The first production cooperative was established in the Ramallah area. Started in a home by a small group of five women, after the first year the women got a centre for

production (Anon. 5, 06/29/93).

The home economy and production cooperatives fit within the wider schema of PARC's mandate by processing produce grown by PARC farmers or using the surplus that PARC farmers are unable to market elsewhere. PARC buys the produce from farmers and provides it to the women's cooperatives to process. Once processed, the cooperatives sell the goods back to PARC which markets them locally and internationally. There are two kinds of cooperatives, central and seasonal. The central cooperatives are used year-round for production (the type of product rotates according to season), demonstrations, training, and lectures. They are managed by the women in an administrative committee consisting of executive positions which are chosen by election every two years, with each member having to invest upfront in the venture.² The seasonal cooperatives are not owned by PARC, although PARC pays for the equipment and training up front. The women gradually buy back the equipment and material through their sales, and the production sites are located in one of the women's homes. All of the cooperatives are on a graduated "independence track" so that eventually they will be able to operate with a minimum or no supervision from PARC agronomists and assistants (Anon.:

² For example, one bee-keeping project requires \$4000. PARC provides \$3000 while the cooperative members need to contribute the remaining \$1000, with each women investing \$100. PARC began a credit program for women for agricultural projects in March 1993. There is a \$5000 limit per woman, and as of yet, the loan criteria is flexible (Anon. 5, 06/29/93).

3, 06/23/93; 4, 06/24/93; 5, 06/29/93).

The PARC Women's Unit cooperatives have not escaped the problems encountered by other women's production cooperatives.³ One PARC employee reports that they have received much criticism from Palestinian economists about the viability of the household economy (Anon. 5, 06/29/93). Facing competition from lower-cost goods from Israel, Europe, and other Palestinian producers, PARC was forced to absorb the loss on failing cooperatives. However, rather than discouraging the development of women's cooperatives, this prompted a change in production and marketing strategy to one similar to that followed by flexible specialization industrial producers.⁴ PARC decided that rather than attempting to cut the high price of the cooperative goods, they would maintain their high quality production, but shift to the processing of more traditional goods not normally found for commercial sale, geared to a middle- and upper-class consumption market. While some jam and juice cooperatives were shut down, others were changed over to accommodate the new production strategy. This new strategy has been in effect since the beginning of 1993, and by June of that year results had already been seen in improved sales (Anon. 3, 06/23/93).

³ See chapter 3 for a more detailed discussion of this.

⁴ Although PARC produces non-industrial food goods, their marketing strategy approximates that of the new flexible specialization production: high quality and highly priced, targeted at a middle- and upper-middle class of consumers. See Piore and Sabel (1984) for an historical discussion of this trend.

PARC seems to be an economic success, displaying flexibility and an ability to problem-solve by adapting other's experiences and solutions to their own context. For example, PARC is trying to encourage farmers to care for almond trees, which in recent years have been neglected and cut down. In order to do this PARC must get the farmers a good price for their almonds by breaking the monopoly of the current Palestinian wholesalers in the almond market. They have had recent success in exporting 2½ tons of almonds to Europe last year where Equal Exchange in Scotland made them into almond butter. The almond project is continuing this year, with increased exports to Belgium, Scotland, and England, and new exports to Sweden and Holland, altogether totalling 12-14 tons (Anon. 3, 06/23/93). In this example PARC has solved the problem of land confiscation through reclamation by tree-planting, and securing a stable income for small farmers both by assisting them to diversify from the olive crop (which has alternating high and low yields, thus affecting prices and profits) and by breaking the almond market wholesaling monopoly.

In another example, PARC has responded to increasing salinity in the water supply in the Jericho area, as well as the price-competitiveness of fruits and vegetables from Israel and other countries, by starting a new herb project here. Herbs are a natural choice because of their saline-resistancy and their excellent price per weight. They are grown

organically in greenhouses and only marketed in Europe where they are being advised by one of their donors in Rotterdam. A women's cooperative works at drying and packaging the herbs. This project not only deals with three presenting problems, water salinity, profitability, and feasibility of the women's cooperatives, but it also provides a leading edge into the organic produce market in Europe. PARC hopes to transfer organic farming technology to other crops in the future in order to take advantage of this expanding market (Anon. 3, 06/23/93).

Nonetheless, PARC's stated mandate is not only economic and technological. PARC stresses the importance of community development:

PARC's philosophy is that agricultural development cannot be undertaken without the full participation of those involved with agriculture....PARC recognizes that technological advice is not in itself a sufficient prerequisite for agricultural development, this is why PARC stresses the importance of self-help and community participation in its work (PARC, 1991:6).

Further, PARC recognizes women's role in agriculture and the agricultural community, as well as the constraints that Palestinian women face:

Women are responsible for carrying out the most burdensome of tasks in agriculture which often involves heavy and repetitive manual labor. The contribution of women to agricultural work usually goes unseen and unrecognized. PARC recognizes that the type of productive role played by women in agriculture often determines their role and status. PARC also recognizes that rural women face very serious problems in having their needs and aspirations taken seriously.

The Household Economy Programme (HEP) was

established by PARC to try and address these issues directly. Its aim is to empower women, through the organization of collective small-scale production and food-processing activities, to give women some form of control and decision-making authority in their lives (PARC, 1992:10).

So we can see that, particularly with the Women's Unit, the aim is not just to develop agriculture, but also to "develop" the women themselves (Anon. 4, 06/24/93). To this end, most regions have a PARC women's committee made up of female residents in the area. Their task is to visit families in the villages with the goal of convincing them to allow their female relatives to participate. PARC training often works through the informal visiting network where the agronomists and assistants work as friends, know the women personally, and participate in family and village/camp events such as weddings and funerals (Anon. 7, 07/18/93). There are two training centres per region which are located in the central cooperatives where, in addition to production, lectures and training take place. While many of the lectures are for production and management training purposes, PARC also sponsors, often in coordination with other local organizations, educational lectures and training in issues such as literacy, shari'a laws and women's rights, and physical and psychological health issues (Anon.: 4, 06/24/93; 5, 06/29/93). A brief survey of the PARC Women's Unit activities in 1993 reveals that it sponsored several events that could be interpreted as "feminist" in nature: a workshop given in the Jenin region on the impact of early marriage

given by the director of the Jenin Red Crescent Clinic and a psychologist from the Palestinian Psychological Guidance Center; a lecture given in the Jenin region on family relationships between mothers and daughters given by a counsellor from Jerusalem's Palestinian Counselling Center; a series of women's health lectures given in the Gaza Strip in coordination with the Union of Palestinian Medical Relief Committees; a series of lectures on social, family, and child-care issues given in the Ramallah region; a program delivered in cooperation with the Family Planning Committee in the Bethlehem region on family planning and first aid; a lecture delivered in a West Bank village on interfamilial relationships with a focus on the "restraints adopted within the household" by a counsellor from the Palestinian Counselling Center; a discussion on women's rights presented in the Jenin region by a variety of local women's groups; a training course in social and health issues for women in Tulkarm (PARC NEWS, 1993a:3; PARC NEWS, 1993b:5; PARC NEWS, 1993c:2; PARC NEWS, 1993d:2, 3, 4, 6). In addition, PARC also participates on a new violence against women committee, associated with the Women's Studies Centre, the Women's Centre for Legal Aid and Counselling, the Family Planning Committee, and the Palestinian Counselling Center, and is actively delivering workshops on this issue (Anon. 5a, 12/16/93). These central cooperatives, then, are not just production sites, but are seen by the women in the community as "social

clubs" in which it is possible to network with other women, acquire new skills, and learn about themselves as women in Palestinian society. In addition, the central workshops also facilitate exchange days with women from other regions in order to provide them with an opportunity to share experience and knowledge (Anon.: 4, 06/24/93; 5, 06/29/93; PARC NEWS, 1993c:2).

Not only does it seem that the production cooperatives are finding success in an economic sense, but the Women's Unit is also fostering community and individual self-consciousness development amongst women in the areas in which they work. This experience stands in contrast to that of some of the women's committees described in the previous chapter. One employee of the Women's Unit explained their success by delineating four differences between PARC's cooperatives and the women's committees' cooperatives: first, the women's committees had no experience with rural women while PARC did; second, PARC's cooperatives had a small number of women which made it possible to be more "hands on" with the participants while the women's committees had too large a number of participants to be able to do this effectively; third, PARC used networking amongst the women across projects to problem-solve while the women's committees were isolated within their own individual projects and factions; last, PARC works consultatively with women while the women's committees had a more authoritative approach towards their participants (Anon.

4, 06/24/93). Another development worker associated with the Women's Unit explains their success as partially due to its independence from the political parties. For example, one woman from Abu Dis (a village just outside Jerusalem) reported that at first her husband would not allow her to participate in the program until she was able to convince him that it was not "political". After she started going he began to encourage her to continue and then also encouraged his brother to allow his wife to go because the information and skills his wife was receiving from the program were so useful (Anon. 5, 06/29/93).

PARC's Women's Unit has expanded rapidly, and even faster than they have wanted to in some cases, because women have requested their presence in their areas. Nonetheless, both interviewees stressed that work with Palestinian village and camp women is slow and open-ended. As both indicated, this kind of work must be subject to a different evaluative standard than mere "dollars-and-cents", but that the possibilities opened and the achievement of qualitative progress must also be taken into account (Anon.: 4, 06/24/93; 5, 06/29/93). This can be taken to mean that the productivity of the cooperatives are not the sole aim of the Women's Unit; like many of the women's committee's cooperatives there is another agenda at work. In PARC's case the stated aim is the "development" of women "through the organization of collective small-scale production and food-processing activities, to give

women some form of control and decision-making authority in their lives". In doing this, the production sites also provide the venue for social empowerment.

In order to properly evaluate PARC's record in accomplishing this task we will examine two Women's Unit projects. The first is located in Ein Yabroud, a small village in the Ramallah region, where an experimental fruit-drying unit is being tested. The second is located in a central cooperative in Ein al-Sultan Camp in the Jericho region, where a variety of income-generating products are made.

PARC came to Ein Yabroud 4 years ago. The work started with a needs assessment with a core group, which has now expanded to 15-20 women, who meet in rotating locations in the village for their meetings. A female agronomist trains the women in practical agricultural and home economy matters such as cultivation, pest control, production, and food processing. In addition, lectures on the "social situation" of the women in the village are given, dealing with such issues as patriarchy, *shari'a* rights, and early marriage, which are only held with the women. Asmahan, the key link between PARC and the village women, reports that there has been some change in Ein Yabroud where the women have begun to stand up to the men. However, she maintains that it is still difficult for women to assert their rights if they were not aware of their *shari'a*

rights before they got married.⁵ Interestingly, when asked why these changes were emerging for the women of Ein Yabroud, Asmahan identified factors such as increased access to education for women, changes in the times and custom, and the decreased isolation of villages as a result of improved transportation and communication, rather than specifically identifying the PARC program as a direct influence (Anon. 7, 07/18/93; Asmahan, 07/18/93).

Asmahan houses the first PARC enterprise in the village. It is a fruit-drying pilot project, and is the first of its kind launched by PARC in the occupied territories. Begun in May 1993, its aim is to run as a trial-and-error problem-solving and trust-building exercise with the village. Not only is the purpose to learn about and develop fruit-drying technology and to process and market the figs and grapes that Ein Yabroud is famous for, but the project is a social and political process as well where PARC is working with the women to "cultivate" them (Anon. 7, 07/18/93; PARC NEWS, 1993c:9).

Although Asmahan is the only one in the village now involved with the fruit-drying project, tracking and experimenting with the process, eventually she will train other women in the area in the technology. When asked what gains she has received from participating in the project she

⁵ It was unclear if this was so because their rights were not drawn up explicitly in their marriage contract (a common Muslim practice), or because, as in any relationship, certain trends tend to get set and rigidify.

lists extra income and a more "visible" and "local celebrity" status in the village where she has become the informal "spokesperson" for PARC in Ein Yabroud. The PARC agronomist working with Asmahan reinforces the fact that work with the women is a slow and an ongoing process; PARC does not just put them through a course and "graduate" them (Anon. 7, 07/18/93; Asmahan, 07/18/93; PARC NEWS, 1993c:9).

Nonetheless, PARC's Women's Unit's mandate is to take more seriously the "needs and aspirations" of rural women. Implicit in this aim is the reevaluation of their status. As part of this task PARC provides access to information on a variety of social issues pertaining to women's position in their community and family. However, the work that PARC encourages women to engage in, particularly in cases such as Asmahan's where the job site is located in the home, is traditional in scope and consistent with the perception of women's work as "natural", non-productive, and often invisible as an extension of housework. Not only does this leave society's understanding of women unchallenged, but it also does not challenge women to reexamine themselves and their role. For instance, when Asmahan was asked if her husband minded her activities with PARC she answered in the negative, saying

I have all this time to do what I please since my children are old enough and do not require much care. Why should I waste it in gossip and idle visits? I am very glad the Women's Unit is offering programs in our village that teach us something new (PARC NEWS, 1993c:9).

Asmahan, age twenty-eight, married for thirteen years, and mother of five children with another on the way, sounds more like she is describing her new hobby rather than detailing her pioneering effort in a new productive venture.

The second case, a central cooperative in Ein al-Sultan Camp, was established two years ago for needlework production, in cooperation with the Swedish Organization for Individual Relief (SOIR) with ten women, four who are mentally handicapped girls, and temporarily, one man who was a "hardship case". Now there are three farms producing pigeons, chickens and eggs, mint, za'atar (thyme), and *molokhaya* (Jew's marrow). As an example of how responsive PARC is to production problems, after six months the cooperative realized that rearing rabbits was too labour-intensive and so a year ago switched to pigeons. The cooperative has also, in response to dropping prices in the West Bank as a result of the closures,⁶ temporarily stopped egg production. This, however, has been timely as the cooperative is in the midst of

⁶ The military closures of the West Bank (excluding Jerusalem) and the Gaza Strip were imposed in April 1993, preventing free passage of Palestinians into Israel, between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and between the northern and southern halves of the West Bank (divided, as they are, by Jerusalem). The closures wreaked economic havoc in occupied Palestine, preventing 130,000 Palestinians from working at their jobs in Israel, and farmers from access to their markets in East Jerusalem, and other points in the occupied territories. Consequently, prices collapsed in some areas and inflated in others (CCINGO-Jerusalem, 1993:7-9). As for the cooperative, egg prices (4NIS/carton) dropped below the price of production (6NIS/carton) (Anon. 6, 07/10/93). This drop in price could be as a result of a drop in demand because of increasing poverty and/or an increasing reliance on home production.

switching from "Western-style" egg production to free-range hatcheries (Anon. 6, 07/10/93).

Other plans fit into a schedule of rotating seasonal production that is characteristic of PARC's central cooperatives: drying and grinding za'atar in the summer, making jam and juice in the winter, and baking date cake in the fall and winter. The specialization and high-end production and marketing strategy of the commercial arm of PARC influences the production decisions of the cooperative. For instance, the climatic and seasonal conditions are especially favourable in Jericho for the cultivation of za'atar, and the cooperative plans ahead each season to grow amounts according to demand from PARC's Agricultural Services Center. They plan to buy a grinding machine from Hebron in order to specialize in the marketing of ground and dried za'atar throughout the West Bank. The jam and juice are a specialty product made out of a unique graft of lemon and orange found only in Jericho, and the production and marketing of date cake, still requiring the purchase of an oven, has been carefully researched through a feasibility study (Anon. 6, 07/10/93).

The participants of the cooperative are drawn from Ein al-Sultan Camp and surrounding villages. Right now there are ten members that work in two groups, who rotate work schedules when the labour demand is down. PARC invested all of the upfront capital and provided a full-time agronomist to

establish and supervise the cooperative, which is gradually moving towards full independence. She reports that PARC makes a conscious attempt, through the location of work in a central site, to get women working outside of the home and to meet with each other. The women do all of the tasks required of the running of a cooperative and also hire extra labour when needed. They are paid on a profit-sharing basis, decision-making is based on consensus, and various women have administrative tasks which they rotate every three months. Childcare is handled privately by family or by the Jericho Ladies' Society which has one nursery.⁷ In addition, PARC has worked cooperatively with a special committee in Jericho for mentally handicapped children (5-16 years) and SOIR in providing skills- and job-training for them. This is pioneering work in the occupied territories and is the first project of its kind to work with the mentally handicapped in an integrated environment. PARC is also assisting mentally handicapped members to work their projects in their own homes (Anon. 6, 07/10/93; PARC NEWS, 1993c:6-7).

The participants have received extensive training through courses provided by SOIR in working with the mentally handicapped, PARC lectures and demonstrations in cultivation, irrigation, land preparation, and food drying and processing, OXFAM workshops on communication and cooperative working

⁷ However, the nursery keeps school hours (5 days/week from 7:30 a.m. to 12:00 p.m., only during school months), and so childcare for the women can be a problem.

environments, as well as courses on marketing, business interaction with farmers, and market feasibility and development. Besides training and education in skills directly necessary for the running of the cooperative, PARC has also sponsored workshops on human relations, first aid and diagnostics given by the Union of Medical Relief Committees, women's rights delivered by Jericho's branch of the Union of Working Women's Committees, and activities training for women inside and outside the cooperative in ceramics, painting material, wool spinning, embroidery, and clothing alteration. Additionally, PARC has set up exchange meetings with female PARC participants from other regions, such as Bethlehem, to trade ideas and problem-solving strategies concerning their cooperative work, and also about social issues, problems, and differences (Anon. 6, 07/10/93).

In order to evaluate whether PARC is achieving any success in enabling women to realize "some form of control and decision-making authority in their lives" we will examine the experience and perspective of some of the cooperative participants. Um Ziyad, a widow, was working with the Jericho Ladies' Society before joining the PARC cooperative which offered better working conditions and pay. She reports that she had enough leisure time independent from her reproductive tasks that she could take advantage of this opportunity. Um Ziyad explains that she had an opportunity to work in an Israeli factory but, although she claims that she is the

primary decision-maker in her home, she chose not to take the factory work because her young son threatened to disown her if she did. He approves of the work at PARC (Um Ziyad, 07/10/93).

Sadiya was invited by one of the other women to join the cooperative after she finished high school. Because she had free time, and her husband agreed, she felt able to participate. Although many of her friends work in Arab sewing factories, her husband would not allow her to work in a factory because "it isn't suitable work" (Sadiya, 07/10/93).

Intissar, a younger woman, joined the cooperative at its beginnings with her aunt. Her earnings contribute to the support of her 17-member family. However, her father at first objected to her participation in the cooperative because he did not want talk in the community that he could not support his family. He spoke to the PARC agronomist and they agreed that Intissar would not work outside the buildings where she would be seen, and that she would not get paid. Her participation was to be solely an educational opportunity. Nevertheless, she does get paid, and although everyone thinks that her father secretly knows it, he does not admit it. Her pay has contributed to the family buying a Moulinex and an iron, but these labour-saving devices are hidden from her father (Intissar, 07/10/93).

Najweh is one of four mentally handicapped members of the cooperative. She lives with her mother and joined the

cooperative as part of the PARC-SOIR training program for the mentally handicapped (Najweh, 07/10/93).

The women were asked if bringing home money to the household increased their family power. The general feeling was positive, and all the women except Najweh claimed that they kept their pay themselves as well as control over it. Um Ziyad said that being the primary decision-maker at home gave her the sole decision-making power about how money was spent. Intissar said that she spends much of her money on the family but also has control over that spending. Sadiya consults with her husband over her spending decisions but also said that her husband does the same with her. Najweh gives her money to her mother. There was agreement that when women bring money into the household it runs better than when only men bring home money. This question received the most prolonged and dynamic debate and responses of all the questions that had been asked of the women. One PARC employee explained that it was because this power is new and the women enjoy talking about it because it enhances their sense of strength (Intissar, 07/10/93; Najweh, 07/10/93; Sadiya, 07/10/93; Um Ziyad, 07/10/93; Anon. 6a, 07/10/93).

In the women's stories and perceptions we can see that not only do they play a significant part in the financial maintenance and decision-making of their households, but they are also aware of this fact and proud of it. It is also evident that the women are subject to certain patriarchal

constraints. For instance, Um Ziyad, although claiming to be the head of the household, was subject to her son's approval of her workplace. Sadiya, as well, needed to consult with her husband for his approval of her participation with PARC and is prevented from seeking other, likely better-paid work, in a factory. Both Um Ziyad and Sadiya claim that it was free time rather than economic need which prompted them to take work with the cooperative. This could be due to the social prejudice against women *needing* to work for income. Intissar, too, is constrained by her father's attitudes which prevent her from being able to take full pride in and receive recognition for her contribution to the family. In addition, her ability to work at the cooperative is conditional on her invisibility there, thus, in her case, maintaining the traditional spacial restrictions on women. However, it was explained with some pride by the other women that Intissar's income was an important component in the support of her 17-member family.

From this thumbnail analysis it is evident that the results from women's participation in this particular PARC cooperative are mixed. While the women are conscious of the importance of their role in the economic support of their families, they also seem to reap limited social and status benefits from being income-earners. Nonetheless, PARC's Women's Unit's agenda is aimed not only at bettering women's economic situation within the family context, but also women's

social position in the larger community context. Regarding the first aim, PARC seems to be reasonably successful, but in terms of the second aim the positive results are more limited.

While three employees of the Women's Unit explained that gleaming tangible benefits through their work with the women is excruciatingly slow (Anon.: 4, 06/24/93; 5, 06/29/93; 7, 07/18/93), it seems that work with the larger Palestinian community must also be a component of the emancipation of women. Not only do both men and women hold patriarchal attitudes, but these attitudes are sanctioned and reinforced by the larger society and its structures. For instance, in Intissar's case, not only does the entire family, and indeed, perhaps the whole immediate community, "protect" her father from the knowledge that she is paid for her work, but this deception and her father's attitude towards his daughter's employment is legitimized by prevailing social attitudes. A recent study of male attitudes towards women working outside the home reveals that men of all ages disapprove of this role for women, with over 40% in Arab Jerusalem, over 50% in the West Bank, and over 60% in Gaza citing disapproval. Conversely, women seem to overwhelmingly approve of work outside the home for themselves, with the most disapproval (over 20%) cited from Gazan women, and from young women.*

* This disapproval seems to be part of a larger trend, noted in the study, of increasing conservatism held by younger women (15-19), probably as a result of their exposure to conservative ideologies in the intifada era (Heiberg, Øvensen et al., 1993:307).

However, this approval is counter-indicated by the approval rate for use of daycare facilities, with approximately 50% of women and over 70% of men in East Jerusalem disapproving, approximately 40% of women and almost 70% of men in the West Bank citing disapproval, and approximately 40% of women and around 80% of men in Gaza also disapproving (Heiberg, Øvensen et al., 1993:252). Because daycare facilities are often a prerequisite for women with children to be able to seek employment outside their homes, approval of women's work outside the home is tempered by the attitude that women's primary responsibility is care of children. Needless to say, the study also revealed that the more in need women were of daycare, the more they approved of it. For example, while married women and women with children cited approval rates of 63% and 62% respectively, unmarried women and women without children disapproved (46% and 20% approval respectively) (Heiberg, Øvensen et al., 1993:307).

PARC attempts to address feminist issues with the women they work with through the use of workshops and lectures delivered by representatives from other community agencies and associations concerned with women's status and various needs, but seems to do little to address these issues in the community in which these women live. This strategy may be a useful next step. Signs of this type of movement are in evidence with PARC's recent involvement with the Women's Studies Centre's violence against women committee. In this

venue PARC delivers workshops and participates in press conferences on the issue (Anon. 5a, 12/16/93).

In the current context, the Women's Unit is busying itself educating rural women on the issues of the electoral process and the new laws to come and regulations already in place. Their concern is that many rural women do not understand the implications of the process set in motion by the ratification of the Oslo Accord. PARC's agenda is to inform women of the possible political ramifications for them in this new framework. Some of the workshops are being delivered by Hanan Bakri, a lawyer from the Women's Centre for Legal Aid and Counselling, with the aim of assisting women to make political decisions independent of their fathers, husbands, sons, and brothers (Anon. 5a, 12/16/93).

Not only has PARC been concerned with the position of women in the new context, they have also expressed concern for their own place within the current political authority structures. PARC plans to remain as an NGO. Whether this is a decision that PARC made itself, or one that has been imposed on them is ambiguous. Certainly the official story from PARC itself is that this is a decision that it made on its own (Anon. 5a, 12/16/93; De'aiq, 1993). Nonetheless, some PARC employees and others regarded PARC as an unofficial or shadow "ministry of agriculture" during the 1980s and 90s, and thus, an obvious candidate for an official ministry (Anon. 3, 06/23/93; De'aiq, 1993). However the decision was arrived at,

it was not made separate from considerations of the Fatah-dominated political authority. In a statement composed for distribution to their funders, mostly European NGOs and European state donors, the director of PARC expressed these concerns:

democratic practices in the Palestinian society, and respecting democracy and equality by the new Palestinian authority, will be the most essential elements needed for the success of various NGOs in their activity, needless to say that is also needed for the success of the nascent authority itself. Based on some previous malpractice and undemocratic attitudes by certain Palestinian figures and departments in exile, fears prevail among certain circles of the population that developments in the coming stage may take an undemocratic course of action. Such fears are justified. We hope however that such fears will prove false. We have reason to believe that indeed they will prove to be false....We also believe that establishing strong ties and relations between our NGOs and their European counterparts, as well as the European Parliament will certainly help guarantee that democracy will be protected. PARC is an NGO and will continue its role within this context....We believe those Palestinian NGOs which proved successful and dedicated to their society in the time of need, should have their voice heard, and role recognized and appreciated, in the coming stage (De'aiq, 1993).

It is clear that PARC has concerns about the quality of democracy in the current authority structures and is making that concern public to their European funders in order to safeguard their own position. Also in that statement is a recommitment to the development of agricultural infrastructure and a pledge to work cooperatively with the new national authority (De'aiq, 1993). Given PARC's historically good relations with European donors, their affiliation with the PPP

(which has allied itself with the current process), their record of accomplishment in the agricultural sector, and the World Bank's proposed program to develop infrastructure and to contract work out to the non-public sector as much as possible, PARC's position seems relatively secure. However, the World Bank and the West (given its historic propensity for tied aid) favour contracting out infrastructural projects to the private sector (World Bank: 1993d:30-35; 1993e:13-14). This trend, in combination with the already-demonstrated inclination for Fatah to shut out NGOs, also puts the security of PARC in some question.

From the Orient House circuit, word is that both private and NGO sectors should be encouraged in the agricultural sector, particularly in this first "emergency development" phase. Both sectors are vital because the government will have limited resources to devote to this sector, and because agriculture itself is so crucial to the Palestinian economy. From Orient House's perspective, only the private sector has the financial resources to be able to adequately develop the infrastructure needed in agriculture. Best of all, from the government's point of view, is the fact that what the private sector will do, the NGO sector will undo vis-à-vis the welfare of small marginalized agricultural producers (Anon. 12a, 12/20/93).

It is here that PARC's and the current authority's development agendas dovetail. PARC mostly works with

smallholders, and develops projects that will work well on smallholds (Anon. 3, 06/23/93). The new authority wants to "institutionalize" sharecropping (Anon. 12a, 12/20/93). Sharecropping has persisted as a mode of production for a variety of reasons, most notably: the introduction of intermediate ("green revolution") technology which requires minimal investment but produces larger yields; the military occupation which has actively discouraged large investment in agriculture leading to capitalist cash-cropping (Pollock, 1990:117-118); the rural-urban commuting and proletarianization of rural Palestinians making less than a subsistence wage; restricted access to wage labour in Israel combined with smallholdings that are insufficient to support a family (Graham-Brown, 1990:62, 67). As Sarah Graham-Brown reminds us, "The West Bank is still a land of smallholders-- 48% of holdings are 20 dunams or less and still employ family labour" (1990:62). Often this amount of land is not enough to provide for a large family, and in this instance, particularly if there is restricted access to wage labour in Israel, the option of sharecropping someone else's land is a usual choice (Graham-Brown, 1990:62). The very nature of male Palestinian labour in Israel--unskilled, often seasonal or contract as in construction--lends itself to dual employment in wage-labour in Israel and agricultural work at home. While Tamari found that the maintenance of the family farm was correlated with the level of insecurity associated with access to work in

Israel (1981:42-43, 51); this trend has likely shifted with the political emphasis placed on the importance of cultivation as a method to avoid Israeli confiscation (World Bank, 1993d:20; JMCC, 1992:15-17, 34).^{*} It can be expected that with the prolongation of the closures, and with the World Bank's recommendation to encourage a dual system of agriculture which incorporates both the traditional and larger capitalist cash-cropping sectors, the sharecropping system will persist. Certainly, PARC reports a substantial return to the land since the onset of the closures, prompting them to increase services in loans and extension work (Anon. 3, 06/23/93).

Sharecropping arrangements vary across the West Bank, from simple crop-sharing arrangements to sharefarming contracts. Simple crop-sharing is most often used with olive groves and vegetable crops. In dry-farming (rain-fed) the share is 50% to the cropper, who previously was expected to plough the land, but is now only responsible for the harvest. In the north, as with irrigated agriculture, the share to the cropper is only one-third of the net yield. The one-third

^{*} Israeli Military Order 59 (31 July 1967) declares that uncultivated, unregistered land can be seized as "state land". Israeli Military Order 291 (19 December 1968) halted the process of Palestinian land registration. As a result of continually changing imperial and occupying forces this century, from the Ottomans to the British Mandate, to the Jordanian regime, and now to the Israelis, there exists a patchwork of land registration. The resulting ambiguity offers the Israelis ample room to distort and blatantly contravene international law concerning land confiscation by military means (JMCC, 1992:10-17, 34).

share is also found in sharefarming arrangements, the exception being the Jordan Valley (where irrigation is prevalent), where it is 50%. Sharefarming requires the tenant to participate in the preliminary capital investment, most commonly by paying for all or part of the inputs, including extra labour and sometimes even water. While this arrangement provides access to "a type of agriculture which most peasants could not afford on their own" and also offers "a means of circumventing the chronic shortage of agricultural credit", it also has resulted in a growing differentiation between the better-off tenant who can afford to engage in sharefarming and the simple cropper who cannot (Graham-Brown, 1990:62; Pollock, 1990:109-110). In addition, the cycle of production and commoditization not only include the sharecropper and the landowner, but the commission agent as well. The commission agents operate as wholesalers who auction off the produce in the market, transport produce, and sell agricultural inputs. Vertical integration, where one commission agent performs all of these functions, is emerging as a trend amongst powerful merchant families. In the north Jordan Valley, one-third of all sharecroppers deal with a single family of commission agents. Horizontal integration of the market, where landlords also act as commission agents, affect 14.3% of all sharecroppers. The concentration of merchant and landlord functions has been inhibited as a result of the lack of a

property market in occupied Palestine.¹⁰ Where vertical integration "allows the merchant to extensify and intensify the process of unequal exchange", horizontal integration employs "dual exploitative processes of surplus appropriation and unequal exchange...unified in the figure of the merchant-landlord" leading to the "concentration and intensification of both processes" (Pollock, 1990:116-117).

The new Palestinian governing authority wants to maintain the sharecropping system by channelling credit to farmers through banks. Without incorporating subsidized credit, the new authority wants to control the outrageous interest rates that sharecroppers are now subject to by circumventing the current system. Also necessary is an insurance scheme to protect sharecroppers, and the regulation and development of facilities to support farmers. While the new development plans recognize that, in addition to improved land registration, sharecroppers need some legal protection and a framework acceptable to both sharecroppers and landowners will have to be developed, no land reform is planned. The justification is that there are no large landowners in occupied Palestine, and thus, reform is not necessary (Anon.

¹⁰ Sale of land makes it vulnerable to confiscation by the Israeli authorities. Many landholders do not have their land ownership formally registered as this process, taking place under the Jordanian regime, was interrupted by the 1967 invasion by Israel and was never resumed. Putting unregistered land on the market makes it more visible, and the Israeli authorities make it a practice to exploit this loophole as part of their arsenal of tricks used to confiscate Palestinian land. Also see note 9.

12a, 12/20/93).

The maintenance of sharecropping as a mode of production will act as a labour-absorption device, particularly if the labour-intensive irrigated sector is expanded. Nonetheless, "full-time" sharecroppers will also be competing against new smallholders seeking sharecropping arrangements and landless peasants who have lost access to wage-labour in Israel. The implication is that sharecropping percentages and/or agricultural wages will drop. Under Palestinian autonomy, which will likely lead to better access to land, water, and markets, there will also be increased investment in the agricultural sector towards the development of capital-intensive cash-cropping using seasonal wage-labour and the possible squeezing out of the sharecropping sector in the long-run.

This trend will have particular ramifications for women in agriculture. After occupation but before the closures, women's agricultural labour increased and their role expanded to include traditional male tasks such as ploughing (Graham-Brown, 1990:64-65; Pollock, 1990:112-113).¹¹ These changes occurred largely as an effect of male labour-migration to Israel, which meant that women had to replace men in the fields, and the introduction of "green revolution"

¹¹ However, this observation is not completely general. Analiese Moors reports that while women's labour has increased, her research during 1980-81 in the Djabal Nablus area, a hilly region in the north of the West Bank, it did not expand to incorporate men's tasks (1990:203).

intermediate technology, which increased women's traditional tasks such as weeding and harvesting, while at the same time reducing the labour demands of men's tasks as a result of limited mechanization. In at least one community, Zbeidat (researched as a model of drip-irrigated agricultural labour in the Jordan Valley), female labourers were widely used when extra workers had to be hired for tomato picking. These women, recruited from outside the village, were preferred because they worked for half the male wage. However, best of all was to use Zbeidati women because they would work longer than the women from outside the village for only a marginally higher wage and required no supplied meals or 20 k. basket of picked goods (as was the custom to provide them) (Tamari, Giacaman, 1980:35, 39-40; Moors, 1990:204; Pollock, 1990:112-113). The results for women, Analiese Moors reports, were a relative and visibly increased productivity of men's tasks, leading to a devaluation of women's work. Also, as a consequence of male wage-labour in Israel and increasing access to water and fuel inside or near village homes (making it unnecessary to seek these items outside the home/village), women were increasingly confined spatially and male status increased relative to women's as a result of their cash earnings (Moors, 1990:204-205). Even when women did the same tasks as men they were customarily paid much less for their performance. In addition, this high dependency on female labour acted as a "positive incentive to keep...daughters

illiterate", or out of school (Tamari, Giacaman, 1980:34, 41; Graham-Brown, 1990:66).

With the mass return of men to the land as a result of the closures there has likely been a displacement of women from agricultural work, both as sharecropping and wage labourers. In addition, as bids for sharecropping and wage-labour contracts intensify, income levels from these activities will be driven down. Certain effects on women are predictable based on previous Palestinian experience. As a result of decreasing household income, there will be increasing pressures on women's reproductive labour in subsistence agriculture and home economy activities on family smallholds as well as increased demand for women to engage in home-based income-generation work. Concurrently, women will be pushed out of the agricultural wage-labour market and will also be replaced in sharecropping activities as a result of the male return to this domain. While this may ease women's labour responsibilities in fulfilling family sharecropping duties, it will also mean increased hardship for poor families who need all family members to earn an income and for female-headed households who rely on female access to wage-labour. The retrenchment of women in domestic activities will also reinforce traditional views of women as spatially-confined housewife-mothers. It will also encourage early marriage, and subsequently, restricted access to education, as a result of reduced demand for female labour in the wage and sharecropping

spheres.

In the face of these effects, and the assumption by the new governing authority that the new liberal economy will not enable them to afford programs for marginalized groups (Anon. 12a, 12/20/93), there will be an increased demand for support programs provided by NGOs such as PARC. However, PARC will be under increasing financial pressure itself to fulfil its 5-year plan towards financial self-sufficiency. Part of this scheme relies on the sale of products made by women in small-scale agro-industrial food processing. As a result, there may be increasing exploitation of women's labour in income-generating schemes.¹² Already in many of the cooperatives women are paid per unit of production rather than an hourly wage, or more rarely, a profit-share (Anon. 3, 06/23/93). In addition, provision of other non-agricultural related services, such as workshops on women's and feminist issues, may be restricted due to their cost, as well as the development of services such as daycare, which is now absent in PARC's programs for women and sorely needed (Anon. 3, 06/23/93). The use of (female) family as childminders further stresses women in their reproductive/domestic function. Of

¹² Indeed, according to a study of women's income-generation projects in Gaza in which PARC participated, the "one advantage of women's projects...is that the opportunity cost of female labor is low, and group projects with a low financial return on labor which could not attract many male workers can succeed if implemented and managed by women". The study concludes, "While this may not be socially equitable in the long run, it can help make the products more competitive in the market in the short run" (Save the Children, Shu'un il Mar'a, 1992:24).

3

PM-1 3½"x4" PHOTOGRAPHIC MICROCOPY TARGET
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PRECISIONSM RESOLUTION TARGETS

priority may be expanded services for the male-dominated sharecropping agricultural sector, as opposed to the female-dominated home economy and subsistence agricultural sectors, as these income-earning sectors are seen as more important.

4.2 UNDP Task Force on Women

This program, originally formed as an ad hoc committee, was created to address the problems associated with women's income-generating projects. The first two meetings were held on April 7, 1992 with representatives from the charitable associations at the first meeting, and with representatives from research and development centers at the second. The original task was to investigate the contradiction of women working in income-generating projects, with the aim of women's social emancipation, but that actually serve to reinforce the patriarchal order. The third meeting was held with representatives from the women's committees on June 18, 1992, and a fourth was held on June 26, 1992 with representatives from all categories of organizations met with previously. UNDP believed that there was a need to coordinate on a strategy for women and development with all of the committees, charitable societies, studies centres, and independent women. While some saw this type of process as fundamental to the development of a coherent strategy in order to deal with the problems facing Palestinian women, others, most notably one very powerful and influential founder of one of the oldest

Palestinian charitable societies, felt threatened by the initiative and began questioning the UNDP's agenda (Anon.: 1, 06/15/93; 2, 07/20/93; UNDP, n.d.(a)). As this initial conflict illustrates, even basic attempts at cross-factional and organizational coordination impact against differing ideas about women and development, and women's role in Palestinian society.

Nonetheless, through the course of these discussions several valuable insights emerged. Central was the realization that not only was women's lack of technical and administrative skill responsible for the failure of the income-generating projects, but also that the larger system of patriarchy in Palestinian society imposed constraints on the possibility of women's individual and collective success in such ventures. This, it seemed, was the first cause that needed to be addressed. To that end, three working sub-groups of the Task Force were struck: one to formulate a broad women's agenda dealing with social issues facing Palestinian women, one on women in education, and one on women in small-scale income-generation projects. On January 15, 22, and 29, 1993 each working group sponsored public workshops to bring the work of the Task Force out to the larger community. They were attended by over 300 women from women's committees, charitable societies, research and development centers, universities, and other organizations dealing with women's interests. Questionnaires were distributed in that venue

which were to be filled out by the participants in order to identify the needs that they thought were important (Anon. 1, 06/15/93; UNDP, n.d.(a); UNDP, 1993).

One of the key questions of the workshops was the problem of bringing these discussions to the real grassroots. It was on this point that in the summer of 1993 the process seemed to be stuck. What has become clear is that there is a communication gap between the groups' leaders and the grassroots. This realization has prompted the prioritization of training in feminist communication. A new project has been formulated to reach out and sensitize people on a mass level on gender issues in the political, social, and economic spheres (Anon.: 1, 06/15/93; 2, 07/20/93).

However, the uncertain and ever-fluctuating nature of political developments in Palestine over the last couple of years has made this work both frustrating and slow, as well as critical, in terms of women's participation. The sense is that as new pseudo-governmental institutions are established it is crucial that women make their presence and their issues felt in the shaping of the Palestinian national and quasi-state agendas (Anon.: 1, 06/15/93; 2, 07/20/93). In order to accomplish this,¹³ the Task Force decided that it was

¹³ This strategy has been pursued in response to the PLO's justification of the minimal presence of women on the technical committees, other than the women's, on the basis of their lack of professional and technical expertise (this was communicated to my source by Zuhira Kamal who heads the women's technical committee) (Anon. 2, 07/20/93). Another source says that the women's technical committee was created by the men to "keep the girls away"

important to strengthen the capability of professional women with the aim of their inclusion at the highest government levels. The strategy as currently formulated is to reach top women in their fields in order to train them in gender-consciousness and to fortify their technical and professional skills. The objective is to get them onto the other technical committees through political pressure applied by the women's technical committee and by the UNDP's consultant to the coordinating technical committee. According to one UNDP employee, this is one of the most delicate projects that the agency wants to launch in the sense that they are attempting to alter the composition of pseudo-governmental institutions without being "seen" doing it (Anon. 2, 07/20/93; UNDP, n.d.(b)).

Nevertheless, this strategy is not without its problems. Where previously the UNDP had a "free hand" in their dealings in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the conclusion of the peace deal in September 1993 has restricted the UNDP to working with the PLO in Tunis. This limits the UNDP's creativity and flexibility in a significant way in that they are now not in a position to work with Palestinian NGOs. As an example of the UNDP coordination with the new authority, Zuhira Kamal, who coordinates the women's technical committee,

and was in response to pressure to include women on the other technical committees. Her sense is that the women's technical committee is not taken seriously and that the participation of Hanan Ashrawi on the delegation is no guarantee of women's human rights in the future (Anon. 8a, 07/17/93).

was hired by the UNDP in the autumn of 1993 to implement their Women in Development program which includes the Task Force on Women. This hiring decision raised a lot of political hackles, and there has been much community resistance against Kamal's involvement (Anon. 2a, 12/14/93). Relations between the women's technical committee and the UNDP Task Force on Women have historically been difficult because, according to one interviewee, the women's technical committee worked exclusively, omitting the UNDP and other non-Fatah organizations (Anon. 2, 07/20/93). However, the upper management at UNDP, being politically constrained, also felt that Kamal's connections would prove useful in accomplishing the objective of integration of women in the Palestinian political structure (Anon. 2a, 12/14/93). While the UNDP may gain abundant political access with this liaison, the women's technical committee has nothing to offer in terms of expertise in reaching the mass of Palestinian women (Anon. 1, 06/15/93),¹⁴ and the public perception of the committee is that it is an elite institution. Kamal's involvement may prove more negative than positive for these reasons and for the fact that her involvement affects the community perception of the UNDP as neutral. Women's groups in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, particularly those associated with the

¹⁴ The women's technical committee has a poor record of working with other organizations which work with rural, poor, or otherwise marginalized women. For instance, PARC reports that its relations with the women's technical committee are sporadic (Anon. 5a, 12/16/93).

political opposition to the PLO, are already refusing to work with the women's technical committee because of its overt political agenda of legitimizing the PLO and its political and diplomatic strategy, and so the Task Force is the only place for all women to work together (Anon. 2a, 12/14/93).

In addition, given that the women's technical committee and the UNDP's Task Force on Women have similar mandates--a broad agenda to address gender issues in Palestine--the women's technical committee perceives the Task Force as a threat. On two official occasions, once with Roger Guarda, director of the Jerusalem UNDP, and once in a meeting with a UNDP consultant, Kamal has suggested dismantling the Task Force (Anon. 2a, 12/14/93). When Zuhira Kamal was asked if the work of the women's technical committee and the UNDP Task Force had a lot of overlap she answered that it was a cooperative relationship where "one does not dictate to the other". Nevertheless, all probably has not gone smoothly for her there. When asked what obstacles she anticipates encountering in the Task Force's implementation she responded that it was too early to say, that first "I need to establish myself here" (Zuhira Kamal, 12/23/93), an odd statement coming from an extremely well-connected and high-profile Palestinian women's activist and politician.

Aside from the Task Force's internal problems, the program may also face obstacles pertaining to larger national political dynamics. Depending on the outcome of the elections

scheduled this upcoming December, Fatah may find itself having to compromise its policies to match Hamas demands. The PLO has already invited Hamas to join the PNC, but Hamas demanded 40-50% of the seats as a precondition. While this demand accurately reflects the yield of popular votes Hamas garners in elections held in occupied Palestine, Fatah found itself unable to meet this condition without seriously compromising its own power base in the PNC. Fatah's rejection of this demand also relieved Hamas of public criticism for rejecting national unity. Hamas has benefitted from playing oppositional and resistance politics, and has also been successful at exploiting the conservative ideological trend current in the West Bank and Gaza (Abu-Amr, 1993:15-16, 17-18). The recent FAFO study indicates that Islam is the most popular choice as a framework for the future Palestinian state amongst men and women in the West Bank and Gaza. Over 55% of men and over 60% of women rank Islam as their preferred choice, as compared to democracy, which ranked less than 30% for men and less than 20% for women, and with Arabism and socialism garnering even fewer percentage points: "Islam is the majority response of all Palestinians regardless of age, gender, education, locality of residence, refugee status and socio-economic position" (Heiberg, Øvensen et al., 1993:266-267). While the report explains that women tend to see Islam in religious rather than political terms, and are less politicised than their male counterparts and so tend to choose

what seems most familiar (Heiberg, Øvensen et al., 1993:267), the findings also suggest that almost 20% of Palestinian Muslims describe themselves as Islamist activists (24% of men and 12% of women), and 59% of women and 56% of men are observant Muslims (totalling approximately 55%). The remainder describe themselves as secular (Heiberg, Øvensen et al., 1993:260-261). This numerical breakdown, along with Hamas's historical success at capturing the popular vote, indicates possible electoral choices Palestinians will make in December 1994. If approximately 20% of Palestinians who identify themselves with political Islam vote for Hamas, with the addition of up to a possible 59% of Palestinian Muslim women, there is indeed the chance that Hamas will do well in the coming election.

How a substantial Hamas win could socially, politically, and economically affect women can be examined by first scrutinizing how religious observance is correlated to particular attitudes towards women. While patriarchal values already predominate in Palestinian society, with only 50% of secular men feeling that it is acceptable for women to work outside of the home, a full 58% of observant Muslim males and 63% of activist Muslim males feel that it is unacceptable for women to do so. In addition, 48% of non-religious men believe that the only acceptable role for women is housewife-mother, barring even home-based income-generating activities, with 59% of religious men sharing this view. In contrast, 64% of

secular women and 66% of activist women believe that while childcare is a priority, it is otherwise acceptable for women to work outside the home. Further, while 60% of secular men and 79-85% of all women feel that it should be a woman's choice to marry, only 48-49% of religious men believed this, preferring the father to have ultimate decision-making power on this issue. According to Bassam Jarrar, a "leading Islamist thinker" in the West Bank, the *shari'a*-based personal status code is "particularly important for Islamists" and that it would be unacceptable to "compromise on rights that are guaranteed by the *shari'a*" (Jarrar, 1994:28). Regarding mode of dress, a full 33% of West Bank women wear the *hijab* in public out of fear of the consequences for not doing so, with this trend also appearing in Gaza and East Jerusalem. Nonetheless, female Muslim activists report higher rates of feeling a sense of influence in their families, neighbourhoods, and villages/towns than religiously observant and secular women. Wearing the *hijab*, which also publicly signals ascription to religious (and therefore, "respectable") values, allows women to have spatial mobility without breaking spatial constraints--they can both participate in the public sphere without leaving the private, in a sense, without fear of harassment or reprisal¹⁵ (Heiberg, Øvensen et al.,

¹⁵ Fatima Mernissi (1987) explains that the veil, or in the Palestinian context, the *hijab* (headscarf) (in Palestine a full veil is extraordinarily rare), acts as an extension of female seclusion, and is only worn by women when they leave their home (or when an unrelated male enters a house and has contact with the

1993:263-265).

While Islamist struggles are often characterized as movements concerned with identity and cultural integrity, Islamist men can also be seen to be engaged in a class-gender battle with non-Islamist women. While the most common participants in Islamist movements are newly urbanized lower- and lower-middle class men,¹⁶ the most frequent targets of Islamist criticism and attack are urban middle-class unveiled women. These women are the concrete manifestation of the changing conditions effected by Western (and Israeli) political-economic imperialism. Their class position and resultant spatial mobility (consumerism, socio-political power, access to the public domain), and their Western dress and "behaviour" are the obvious foci of Islamist movements intent on reasserting cultural and political-economic autonomy from the West (Mernissi, 1988:9-10, 11; Sharabi, 1988:135-

women there). Mernissi explains, "The veil means that the woman is present in the men's world, but invisible" (143). Arlene Elowe MacLeod (1992) and Andrea B. Rugh (1985) both examine how lower-middle class women in Cairo use the hijab to negotiate freedom of movement for themselves.

¹⁶ The FAFO report indicates that Islamist activists are most likely to be men from the middle economic sector living in West Bank towns and refugee camps (Heiberg, Øvensen et al., 1993:260-261, 270, 275). The male middle-class from this regional sector is well-educated, and has been most prone to experience frustration in their attempts for upward socio-economic mobility, particularly with shrinking opportunities for white collar employment in the Gulf. In Gaza, upward mobility would seem less possible whereas in the West Bank the opportunities may seem more present. Additionally, it is not rare for young men from Gaza to relocate to the West Bank in an attempt to better their socio-economic position, either through employment or higher education.

136).

Aside from a gender-class struggle, Islamism successfully provides the ideology and resource mobilization necessary to respond to the "structural or cultural dislocation" occupied Palestine and other Arab states have been subject to as a result of changing domestic and international conditions, and which is creating widespread discontent, hardship, and confusion, both on an individual and on a national level (Snow, Marshall, 1984:138-139; Abu-Amr, 1993). In addition, occupied Palestine is currently exposed to international aid and diplomatic initiatives that carry Western values,¹⁷ along with returning workers from the Gulf region who carry with them Islamist ideologies, creating a cross-cutting challenge of adjustment for the new authority. Thus, Islamists and the secular-nationalist authority find themselves engaged in struggle to accommodate or oppose each other over issues of politics, economics, and culture. Historically, Arab states, which are most often enmeshed in dependency relations that severely restrict their autonomy, frequently attempt to assert their authority and legitimacy through tight control over

¹⁷ Except for aid supplied by Arab states such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Kuwait, directed to Islamist movements in occupied Palestine. This money carries with it Muslim values and increases Hamas's ability to garner support in the West Bank and Gaza. Nevertheless, these Arab states' intent in the provision of support is more likely the weakening of the secular-nationalist PLO, rather than the sabotage of the peace process, which Hamas is on the public record as opposing. These important US allies (Saudi Arabia, UAE, Kuwait) are pressing Hamas to cooperate with the peace process (Abu-Amr, 1991:8; Miller, 1991:6; Shahin, 1993).

women. Governments, as well as nationalist and religious movements, define women as symbols of cultural integrity (Mernissi, 1988:8; Kandiyoti, 1991b:12; Peteet, Harlow, 1991:4-5). Most often state-dominance over women is to be found in *shari'a*-based personal status laws. With Islamist groups on the rise in the Middle East, states have also had to challenge, accommodate, or abdicate to patriarchal interests in order to achieve their own national goals (Kandiyoti, 1991b:11). Algeria provides a good example of Islamist groups establishing parallel structures, such as charitable associations, neighbourhood self-help projects, conflict resolution mediation, education/tutoring centres, and job-creation, all which challenge the legitimacy of the state. Hamas, too, has provided social programs most often associated with secular-nationalist movements in Palestine (Abu-Amr, 1993:14). According to Sara Roy,

Hamas runs the best social service network in the Gaza Strip....Structured and well-organized, Hamas is trusted by the poor (Gaza's overwhelming majority) to deliver on its promises, and is perceived to be far less corrupt and subject to patronage than its secular nationalist counterparts, especially Fateh. Indeed, it is not only Palestinians who regard Hamas in this way, but a growing number of foreign assistance providers as well. Some senior officials at UNRWA in Gaza acknowledged that Hamas is the only faction they trust to distribute UNRWA food donations to the people (Roy, 1993:29).

The Arab state then, is caught in a situation where it must respond to the Islamist threat either through repression or accommodation (Bekkar, 1992:11-15).

Governments and state leaders often use Islam as legitimizing rhetoric to create political integration and/or solidarity, but this can be a dangerous tactic. In return for ideological support from Muslim clerics and Islamist groups, governments may have to incorporate religious doctrine into national law. As well, by encouraging religious revival for political legitimation or to fragment more threatening popular movements the government¹⁸ may inadvertently augment the national influence of Islamist groups. The dilemma for many Middle East governments is how to both utilize and control Islamist forces for political gain (Snow, Marshall, 1984:143-144). Certainly in occupied Palestine the beginnings of this trend can be detected. The "hijabization" campaign of the late 1980s and early 1990s in the West Bank and Gaza, and UNLU's muted response to it in the interest of national unity was the first indicator of secular-nationalist accommodation of Islamist doctrine. As Rema Hammami (1990) demonstrates, the "intifada hijab" has not only been about the restoration of patriarchy, but also about attacking secular-nationalism at its most vulnerable point, the women's movement. The trend of secular-nationalist accommodation of Hamas continues with the

¹⁸ Domestic and foreign governments have been known to encourage the formation of Islamist movements in order to diffuse "communist" or nationalist movements which appear to be more threatening to the political legitimacy of the current regime (Tohidi, 1991:259-260). The Israeli government has been accused of having tacitly supported the Muslim Brotherhood, now known as Hamas, in occupied Palestine in the 1970s and mid-1980s (Kuttab, 1987:9; Taraki, 1989b:175-176; Baram, 1993:3; Kuttab, 1993:4; Rashad, 1993:37; Shahin, 1993:7).

increased use of Quranic verses in UNLU-issued statements (Abu-Amr, 1993:18) and recent rumours that Arafat has conceded to the Islamists by agreeing to use the *shari'a* as the base of Palestinian law (Gröndahl, 1994).

In response to the possibility of *shari'a*-based personal status codes being entrenched in Palestinian legislation, the women's technical committee has prioritized the issue and has drafted its own report on women's human rights (Anon. 18a, 12/11/93; Giacaman, Johnson, 1994:24-25). In addition, women's committees and other Palestinian NGOs dealing with women have sponsored workshops in order to educate women in their rights under Islam. Despite these initiatives, the very structure, and its history, of the present Palestinian governing authority, represents and symbolizes the obstacles women face. The separate women's committee was formed a year and a half after the other technical committees and only as a result of internal pressure exerted by Zuhira Kamal in lieu of adequate women's representation on the other technical committees. It is marginalized from the governing structure and is funded, not out of the budget for the other technical committees, but by a foreign donor (Giacaman, Johnson, 1994:24). This committee is in danger of functioning as a repository of marginalized women's discontent rather than a force for positive feminist change within the Palestinian polity and society. The difference between the accommodation of women's and feminist interests by the governing authority

and accommodation of Islamist groups is that women are a marginalized group and feminist concerns a perspective that remains largely unintegrated in Palestinian society. Islamism and Islam, by contrast, reflects an ideology that is easier accepted in Palestinian society, particularly by young male (15-19 years old) Palestinian Muslims (the intifada generation) and their fathers and grandfathers who survived the 1948 war (Heiberg, Øvensen et al., 1993:261). These two groups wage a lot of influence in Palestinian society. Muslims constitute 96% of the Palestinian population, with young Palestinians (under 19) dominating, by over half, the population numbers¹⁹ (Heiberg, Øvensen et al., 1993:43-45). Thus, Islamist groups stand a better chance of inserting their agenda in that of the reigning regime, or indeed, even dominating the national agenda, than do feminists. While Islamism has of late been perceived as the vehicle that has kept the nationalist struggle alive, feminists have consistently had to deal with criticism, even from activists within the women's movement, that bringing their concerns to the nationalist agenda weakens the Palestinian struggle. The practical results of this can be seen in the "final resolution" of Bisan's "*hijab* conference" in 1990 where it was announced that "Palestinian women have chosen not to discuss

¹⁹ The youth factor is significant in its correlation with the acceptance of Islamist doctrine. The FAFO study indicates that conservative ideology is a dominant trend amongst the young (Heiberg, Øvensen et al., 1993:261, 281-282).

some of the social and women's issues, which might distract us from the main struggle against the Israeli occupation" (Bisan, 1991:23). Meanwhile, the outcomes of conservative and patriarchal ideologies such as early marriage, adoption of the *hijab*, lack of women's access to political, economic, and social resources, continues. As one employee at UNDF challenged, no one questions why women are not a part of the emerging structures (Anon. 1a, 12/14/93)--women's exclusion is taken for granted, or accepted as natural.

4.3 Bisan Center for Research and Development

Bisan Center for Research and Development was established in 1990 as one of the first "independent" study centres.²⁰ As one of their pamphlets indicates, Bisan was formed as part of a larger social attempt to overcome factionalization in Palestinian society and create a "non-partisan center and forum for the exchange of ideas related specifically to development issues" (Bisan, n.d.(b)). Of particular concern is "the search for long-term solutions to conditions of dependency, underdevelopment, and exploitation associated with prolonged occupation" (Bisan, n.d.(b)). To this end, Bisan's orientation is to integrated, holistic development in the social, political, and economic spheres that creates jobs, social change, and is in line with national resistance (Anon.

²⁰ Mona Marshy (1994) has conducted a more in-depth study of these new centres.

8a, 07/17/93).

Bisan has two internal structures that work interdependently, the economic development committee and the women's studies committee (Anon. 8a, 07/17/93). In the midst of recent political changes Bisan has itself been in the process of reevaluating its mandate. Traditionally its focus has been on human resources development and research through studies of marginalized and small organizations and businesses, and the sponsoring of conferences and workshops (Anon. 8a, 07/17/93). Through its reevaluation Bisan has decided to more closely define its mandate to the articulation of four goals: the strengthening of civil society through the promotion of local institutional development; to participate and facilitate in the process of a greater distribution of wealth and resources in Palestinian society across gender, class, and geographical cleavages; to foster self-reliance in Palestinian society through institutional and individual empowerment using training in economic enterprise, expanding institutional capacity, and by assisting local foreign aid-dependent organizations to "unhook" themselves by identifying existing human and material resources and maximizing them; and to decrease dependency by encouraging the development of productive industries in the cooperative model, thereby also providing a link to civil society structures. Bisan sees itself as providing coordination, education and training, and problem-solving services in these processes. In particular,

Bisan wants to focus on women in underdeveloped areas by facilitating linkages between them, local associations and institutions, and society at large. Key in all of this is the fostering of democratic processes (Anon. 9, 07/19/93).

Prompting this strategy and perspective is the anticipation of a repressive state mechanism in the near future. In preparation for this Bisan wants to build and strengthen institutions as a mechanism to break down social cleavage barriers and provide a counter-balance to state and big business (including big NGO business such as World Bank-style development initiatives) by research, training, and workshops that enhance individual and organizational consciousness-raising (Anon. 9, 07/19/93).

By way of example, the administrative and management courses that Bisan offers are part of this framework by producing empowered employees and self-employed men and women. Bisan worked with the YMCA Vocational Training Centre in Jericho to train employed and self-employed graduates of vocational schools in income-generation, mass production, management and administration oriented to small-scale businesses and organizations. This training was aimed at empowering the self-employed to be successfully reliant, and also at enhancing the mobility potential of employees. In addition, these workshops were meant to level out the hierarchical structures in the workplace and society by widely dispensing specialized knowledge (Anon. 9, 07/19/93).

Nevertheless, the democratization strategy underlying this training has not gone completely according to plan. Bisan has developed a new training program to be targeted at the upper management of organizations and institutions. This training will consist of education about the benefits of flattened organizational structures as well as consciousness-raising on class and political issues. The need for this program became evident when the previous training of workers did not effect positive change in the workplace because of class and political obstacles that reinforced the operating structures (Anon. 9a, 07/22/93).

A more successful example is the children's corner in el-Bireh. Bisan was approached by the el-Bireh village committee to create a children's space (a "children's corner") and some developmental activities in order to get the children off the street to play in a safe place. The "development activities" were to instill democratic leadership skills in the children. Bisan began to emphasize how this could be used to learn how to organize the whole community and village committee, and to problem-solve between the two neighbourhoods in el-Bireh. These two neighbourhoods, traditionally locked in rivalry and dispute, had to learn how to share and utilize the same area resources. This strategy turned out successfully and has been transferred to another village in the Jenin area. In addition, this venue offers opportunities to incorporate gender issues by encouraging women's access to education and

to the sports facilities, and by providing information in issues such as gynaecological health and early marriage. Again, Bisan sees this program as a non-threatening way to open democratic processes and community problem-solving procedures, and perhaps leading to the development of a Palestinian version of traditional American "town hall" self-governance in counter-weight to larger governmental structures (Anon. 9a, 07/22/93). This is a better example of Bisan's approach towards integrated, gender-sensitive development.

Besides its community development initiatives, Bisan first became well-known as a result of its workshops on gender issues. The "*hijab* conference", held on December 14, 1990 in Jerusalem, was key in bringing gender issues to the Palestinian consciousness and affected the way projects for women have been since conceptualized (Anon. 1, 06/15/93). Following this was another workshop on issues of democracy and gender held on May 8, 1992 in Jerusalem.²¹ Both workshops were timely responses to developments emerging during the course of the intifada and the nationalist resistance and have spawned wider discussion throughout the community on women's human rights, democracy, and the future shape of Palestinian society. Nonetheless, the relationship between Bisan and the larger women's movement, in particular the women's committees and the charitable associations, has not been conflict-free.

²¹ For a more detailed account of these conferences see chapter 3.

A competition has emerged between the women's committees and the studies centres because some women in some of the centres have "overstressed" the fact that they are (politically) "independent" (Anon. 8a, 07/17/93). This perception was confirmed by one women's committee activist who seemed jealous and suspicious of "independent" women and research centres. Her concern is that the advances the women's committees had made during the course of the intifada will be taken over by the studies centres. According to her, the committees had been working together since the beginning of 1993 in the face of this threat in order to consolidate their position (Anon. 19a, 06/16/93). It must be remembered that the women's studies centres, while they do have a political agenda in terms of gender and national emancipation, have no overt factional commitment.²² The women's committees of each political faction, on the other hand, have not traditionally held gender emancipation as a priority, especially if in the short-run this has seemed to conflict with nationalist resistance. One analyst working at Bisan envisioned the division of responsibility such that the committees should do the work reaching the grassroots while the centres are best equipped and oriented to develop theory (Anon. 8a, 07/17/93).

These divisions will have to be resolved if Bisan is to

²² Although some centres are or have been affiliated at arm's-length, such as the Women's Studies Center with the DFLP. Bisan is associated with the PFLP although there is no direct funding from this source.

successfully fulfil its mandate. Bisan has a publicly stated and explicit commitment to the development of the "popular sector", which the center's director defines in this way:

it is a sector which is distinctly different from both the private and public sectors of the economy. It is resource poor, both in terms of its possession and access to capital and in terms of its existing level of skills. We know that for the most part we are talking about people with limited educational levels and experience in carrying out their own economic initiatives.

In general, one can say that this sector consists of a number of economic initiatives and activities that are closely linked to the Palestinian grassroots movements or other community groups, which aim at supporting and strengthening the marginalized strata of Palestinian society by encouraging their participation and active involvement in various economic and social development schemes. projects sponsored by these organizations include a wide variety of types, in industry, agriculture, crafts and services, with the fundamental objective of attaining a fairer distribution of wealth in society and developing a democratic development vision. in this respect, these projects are perhaps most consistent with the general understanding of the purpose and goals of development (Abdul-Hadi, 1992:2).

This sector, by Abdul-Hadi's own definition, implies the inclusion of many of the women's committee's projects. Bisan's development philosophy stresses the need to have a concrete definition of development which incorporates an awareness of people on all levels--economic, political, social, and cultural. To fully implement successful development is to reject homogenous prescriptions in favour of tailoring projects and comprehensive strategies based on research of Palestine's own resource (human and material) uniqueness (Anon. 10, 12/23/93).

Further, the privileging of this sector, as well as its aim of fostering radical democracy and comprehensive and tailor-made development in Palestinian society, has interesting implications in light of the new political regime and the recent involvement of the World Bank in the economic development of Palestine. As was earlier noted in the PARC case study, the new governing authority anticipates having no funds available for the assistance for or the development of the small-scale, popular, and generally more marginalized sectors. These sectors tend to be dominated by women and/or rely heavily on women's unpaid reproductive labour, or poorly paid wage labour in "unskilled" jobs. The exception to the new authority's policy, according to one professional closely associated with the formulation of their development plans, is the provision of social welfare assistance to ex-political prisoners and families of martyrs. According to this source, the Palestinian authority is undertaking this task as a "social responsibility" to those who sacrificed for the nationalist struggle. Nonetheless, in accordance with a more cynical analysis of the authority's motives, this spokesperson admitted that because this group has political rather than professional expertise, and for this reason they "will not fit easily into the new society", they and programs for them are a first priority. In this instance, economic priorities come second to political and social priorities (Anon. 12a, 12/20/93). Everyone else, however, will have to fend for

themselves. In this context one can anticipate an increased demand for programs that NGOs, such as Bisan, have to offer.

However, there has also been much concern felt by the Palestinian NGO sector, particularly from those NGOs associated with political factions who have been critical of Fatah and the PLO during the course of the peace process and this new era of autonomy. Many NGO representatives have felt that their position on the peace talks has determined whether they have been included or excluded politically, both internally in Palestinian politics and externally in terms of their relations with external donors. This situation has created a particular contradiction for activists and professionals involved in the women's movement where even if certain groups may agree on women's issues they are divided politically because of their position on the current peace process (Anon. 8a, 07/17/93). Even before the Oslo Accord was announced and signed, non-Fatah NGOs were reporting that funding from foreign embassies was difficult to secure because it was based on support for the peace talks. Western governments used Orient House and the technical committees as the channel for their aid money, which ended up being delegated on a political rather than a need or merit basis. In addition, Fatah has begun to develop its own "NGOs" in order to capture valuable aid money and NGO-sector development contracts. As a result, some very good Palestinian institutions were being starved of funds. One observer

predicted that Palestinian NGOs "will become like NGOs in other Arab countries", that is, ineffective and disempowered (Anon.: 2, 07/20/93; 9a, 07/22/93; 13, 07/12/93; 13a, 12/8/93; Roy, 1993:25). As a reflection of this trend of state-favouring of certain NGOs with the right politics, a new joke was circulating in the West Bank and Gaza during the fall/winter of 1993: "We have two types of NGOs in Palestine--government and non-government" (Anon. 15, 12/18/93).

One prominent PPP²³ professional and activist has identified three main problems with the current process that have implications for the future of civil society and democracy in Palestine. First, an individualistic style of decision-making exists throughout the leadership hierarchy, but particularly at the top level. In addition, the inside leadership is being used by the outside leadership rather than being incorporated into the leadership structure; the perception seems to be that the inside leadership is the "muscle" of resistance and the outside leadership is the "brain". Second, current Palestinian governmental institutions are un'-factional and patronage-ridden. Third, the leadership and governmental structures are more reminiscent of those used in guerrilla resistance movements rather than a democratic state. This source notes, in the

²³ This source was recommended to me in particular because this individual's views were coming from inside the process--the PPP has thrown its support behind Fatah in supporting the Oslo Accord--but were critical as well.

past, structures could be simpler because the task of resistance was simpler. Now there is a state to build and run. There needs to be a constitutional base to define relations between government institutions as well as between civil society institutions and the state, and between the individual and the state. Also, an ongoing well-institutionalized structure must be put in place to supervise the continuing peace negotiations. Currently, all decisions go through Arafat (Anon. 15, 12/18/93).

These views are echoed, although perhaps in not so equivocal terms, by Edward Said:

After all the celebrating "the (supposed) first step toward a Palestinian state", we should remind ourselves that much more important than having a state is the kind of state it is. The modern history of the postcolonial world is disfigured with one-party tyrannies, rapacious oligarchies, economic ruin, the distortion of society caused by Western "investments", and large-scale pauperization through famine, civil war, outright robbery. Any more than religious fundamentalism, mere nationalism is not and can never be "the answer" to the problems of new secular societies. Potential statehood in Palestine is no exception, especially given so inauspicious a start, in which one can already, alas, see the lineaments of an appetizing marriage between the chaos of civil war in Lebanon and the tyranny of Saddam Hussein's Iraq. Is Arafat going to become Israel's Noriega? (Said, 1994:xlirii).

As harbingers of Said's vision are the penetration of Palestinian organizations and institutions by Fatah (including recent internal union elections where the list of candidates were subject to the approval of the political leadership), and the December 22 announcement by Nabil Kassis, director general

of the technical committees, that the political authority would monitor funds donated to NGOs in the West Bank and Gaza to see how they are spent (alongside a process already in place designed to gather information on NGO activity with requests for even more information they have been unable to gather by other means) (Anon. 10, 12/23/93).

What seems clear to Palestinian observers inside as well as outsiders is that the Fatah organizations have a political agenda first and foremost rather than an effective service agenda. In a meeting Palestinian NGOs had with the World Bank in the fall of 1993, the NGOs requested a direct relationship with their international partners and the World Bank in order to by-pass the new Palestinian authority. The World Bank was amenable to this because of their own mistrust of the PLO in terms of their professionalism and accountability (Anon. 10, 12/23/93). Daily the Palestinian authority is losing good, well-respected people over issues of competence, and worse, accusations of corruption. Reports from the December 16 meeting in Paris of the Consultative Group (chaired by the World Bank and attended by all the major donors) indicate that the international community is also worried. At that meeting it was decided to establish a trusteeship to steward the process. This group, the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee (AHLIC), consists of the six main donors (EC, US, Japan, Norway, Saudi Arabia, Canada) as well as Palestinians, Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and Tunisia. Its mandate is to "set objectives,

establish general guidelines for getting aid to the Palestinians, and to provide a forum where the major donors can keep completely informed at the economic level". The day-to-day coordination of the AHLC will be provided by the World Bank (Bouhabib, 1994:69-70; Anon. 15, 12/18/93). The establishment of the AHLC is perceived by Palestinians as the outcome of a lack of trust in the PLO's ability to competently manage development funds. While offended by this lack of trust and convinced that Palestinians should have some autonomy in deciding the management of aid, Palestinians outside of the Fatah circle also believe that the PLO cannot be trusted, particularly since in the PECDAR²⁴ hierarchy patronage appointments fill the top positions while all of the competent professionals are given secondary roles (Anon. 15, 12/18/93). While announcements concerning the PLO hiring of an independent international accounting firm in the face of

²⁴ The Palestinian Economic Council for Development and Reconstruction (PECDAR) is the Palestinian counterpart to the World Bank to be in charge of "aid coordination and policy formulation on the receiving end". While PECDAR is, on the one hand, described by the World Bank as the counterpart, on the other hand, the World Bank claims that there is no counterpart government in this situation, leaving the status of PECDAR ambiguous (Bouhabib, 1994:69, 73). PECDAR is the heir of PEDRA (Palestine Economic Development and Reconstruction Authority) which was initially formed for the same purpose but was rejected by donor countries because of its top-heavy patronage appointments and lack of professionalism. According to Frank Collins, Norwegian Foreign Minister Holst "admonished the PLO to 'get down to business' and establish a competent body". As with PEDRA, PECDAR is headed by Arafat, and there remain concerns about its structure. Of further note is the fact that there is not one woman appointed to the council (Collins, 1994:17; JMCC: 1993a:7, 1993c:9, 1993d:10; Anon.: 2a, 12/14/93; 15, 12/18/93).

foreign aid donor pressure date back as early as November 19, as of July 15, 1994 the bulk of pledged international aid had not been released due to the fact that the PLO had yet to establish satisfactory accounting procedures (JMCC, 1993b:8; Greenaway, 1994:B3; Ottawa Citizen, 1994:A6).

Of particular concern for Palestinians and Palestinian NGOs is the sense that the current leadership is influenced by the experience of other one-party systems in the region, as evidenced by the sole appointments of Fatah people. For instance, while one commentator suggests that Syria's Ba'ath Party has provided inspiration as an example of a one-party system that has allowed the co-existence of other parties, but disallowed their participation, another analyst is concerned that Arafat will adopt the same style as Nasser and Saddam Hussein: coopt all civil society organizations and institutions in an effort to implement state capitalism (Anon.: 10, 12/23/93; 15, 12/18/93). While it is doubtful that state capitalist initiatives will be permitted by the World Bank, key Western donor countries, or Israel, it is possible and likely that the current leadership is engaged in attempts to weaken independent and oppositional NGOs in an effort to strengthen its own hand. But in doing so, Fatah does not seem to be aware of the differences between the Palestinian public and other Arab publics, and therefore, what may be possible in Syria, Egypt, or Iraq may not be possible in Palestine as a result of their close observation of

Israel's democracy and their internal experience of grassroots organization and work at building from the bottom-up. While Palestinians' social and political outlook and experience may be enough to discourage Fatah from pursuing its autocratic style, this may not happen early enough before significant struggle, Palestinian against Palestinian, occurs (Anon.: 10, 12/23/93; 15, 12/18/93).

In response to these developments and to the more immediate threat to their status, a group of 15-18 non-Fatah Palestinian NGOs, including Al-Haq, the Early Childhood and Research Centre, Bisan, HDIP (Health and Development in Palestine), Union of Medical Relief Committees, and the Tamer Institute, began to organize in the fall of 1993 with the aim of strengthening civil society and NGOs. Initiated by Mustapha Bargouthi, a well-known activist and professional associated with the PFLP, his sincerity was in question. Many people thought that it was merely a PFLP strategy to mobilize opposition. In addition, according to one source, there was opposition to Bisan's participation because of its PFLP links. One factor that gives this grouping legitimacy is that the NGOs involved are all well-respected in their own right, with or without political affiliation. Nevertheless, these NGOs do not seem to present a political threat because their works have not traditionally translated into mass votes for their affiliate parties. Their only strength may come from organizing with each other in addition to feedback with their

affiliate party who will then mobilize the community. Still, the NGOs' affiliate parties remain uninvolved and uninformed about the workings of this new group. On the other hand, the NGOs will be unwilling to break their individual party affiliations because it gives them status in the community which enables them to be taken seriously. Historically, it has been important for acceptance in the West Bank and Gaza to have a community base and be perceived as integrated in the state-building process (Anon. 9b, 12/18/93).

The primary focus of this new NGO grouping is to educate and lobby the public and the governing authority on the issues of democracy, protection of NGOs, and strengthening of civil society. Its tasks now are to identify what civil society is, define the relationship of NGOs with the new authority, delineate what the NGO role is to be in Palestinian development, and to hold a conference to declare their aims and to explore these issues further (Anon. 10, 12/23/93).

In addition to these public aims, and analogous to the work Bisan is trying to do, is the need to strengthen NGOs from the inside-out, including the democratization of NGOs to avoid factionalization and clan-based organization, and the development of professionalism and accountability (which includes the development of such skills as strategic planning, cost-benefit analysis, evaluation techniques, etc.) (Anon. 10, 12/23/93). Ironically, the lack of these qualities are the focus of the criticisms that NGOs are levelling at the Fatah-

dominant governing authority. Professionalism, democratization, and accountability in the NGOs are necessary if they are to garner the necessary support of their clients that will guard against the authorities taking them over. Already, NENGOOT (Network of European NGOs in the Occupied Territories) and AIVA (Association of International Voluntary Agencies) have published a statement, in support of Palestinian NGOs and directed to the PLO, asserting their commitment to democracy and the freedom of movement of finances and people (Anon. 10, 12/23/93).

In addition to the fact that there are many links between economic and political power in the Palestinian context is the fact that the relationship between Palestinian NGOs and the current Palestinian governing authority remains ambiguous. While the strengthening of NGOs and the civil sector of society will weaken, in a zero-sum tallying, the governing authority by improving the quality of pluralism, the governing authority also needs Palestinian NGOs in order to implement its development agenda. The governing authority and its institutions will not be able to accomplish all necessary tasks for successful development, nor does it have the mandate from the World Bank and key donor countries to do so. These various contradictions have the potential to constrain both the governing authority and the NGO sector.

Development, too, will be constrained. The World Bank's first year in its 5-year plan for development in Palestine is

devoted to the improvement of infrastructure, and is engaging the participation of existing institutions in the West Bank and Gaza in small-scale projects such as expansion of classroom numbers and improving access to electricity and water. This first phase "has a political element insofar as it is particularly important in this case for the people to see very early that their situation will improve because of peace" (Bouhabib, 1994:66). In other words, the first phase of development assistance will only be enough to appease the local population in order to create the peaceful climate necessary for larger-scale investment. While infrastructural development is sorely needed in the West Bank and Gaza, this type of development only provides temporary employment to a population where unemployment is rampant and a lightning rod for further violence, as evidenced by the recent incident at the Eretz border on July 17. As well, the World Bank has been criticized for its universal advocacy of infrastructural development for all of the Third World on the basis that their prescriptions ignore small-scale, mass-based infrastructural needs and systems at the expense of the imperatives to implement large-scale multi-billion dollar macro-projects (Stackhouse, 1994:A1). It is also important to note that local firms rarely benefit from these types of development initiatives as most projects are contracted out through tied aid provisions to large Western firms. Already there is concern that this type of aid provision is shaping up in the

development plans for the West Bank and Gaza (Bouhabib, 1994:72). This large-scale tied-aid development is what is most likely to follow once "peace" has been established in Gaza and the West Bank. Palestine is now facing the prospect of the type of economic initiatives that have pauperized Africa, Latin America, and south and south-east Asia, which have further impoverished the poor and increasingly excluded the marginalized.²⁵ Following the conclusion of the first year Emergency Assistance Program will be a series of feasibility studies for investment projects for the medium- and long-term, and commencement of "the kind of major projects [the World Bank is]...usually involved in" (Bouhabib, 1994:66).

The typical World Bank style of development is in contradiction with Bisan's goals of developing the popular sector and fostering a wide-ranging democracy. However, after the international collapse of the left, explains one analyst at Bisan, Palestinian leftists could not find alternatives to capitalist development. At Bisan it was decided that rather than search for an alternative to capitalism it would be more fruitful to find ways to make popular sector cooperative development work in a free-market economy. Bisan's strategy

²⁵ See, for example, Kumar Rupesinghe (1985), John Loxley (1986), Diane Elson (1990), and UNECA (1991). While, as the World Bank (1993a) itself points out, occupied Palestine is free of debt, it will still be subject to the types of structural adjustment-spawned policies that other debt-ridden Third World countries have been forced to pursue throughout the 1980s and 1990s.

is to foster community empowerment through training and support in skills and micro-social transformation (at the organizational level), and sustainable, integrational and comprehensive development at the economic, social, cultural, political, and environmental levels. The priority is to avoid exclusion in the development process. As an NGO, Bisan will provide an alternative to privatization and attempt to address those sectors, communities, and demographic groups left out of mainstream development strategies. In any event, those at Bisan conclude, privatization cannot be bypassed and in fact may be better than "Abu Ammar-led development"²⁶ (Anon. 10, 12/23/93). This sentiment, reminiscent of Bienefeld's observation of the left rejection of state-coordinated development (1988:80), may be accurate, but neglects the experience of experiments in market-sector driven development. Those cases equally demonstrate repression and misery. The World Bank itself admitted openly to Palestinian NGOs in the fall of 1993 their awareness of their bad international image. However, the Bank told them, their development record in Africa and their consequent reputation was not at issue here. Palestinian NGOs were told to accept the current plans for development or take nothing at all (Anon. 10, 12/23/93).

²⁶ We have Edward Said's assessment of this mode of development to consider: "At least twice during the summer of 1993 Yasir Arafat said that his experience of government consisted of the ten years that he 'controlled' Lebanon, hardly a comfort to the many Lebanese and Palestinians who recollect that sorry period" (1994:xxxvii).

In this current context, then, it can be seen that NGOs and the current governing authority exist in uneasy co-existence. The Fatah-led authority is facing pressure from international donors to conform to their expectations and internal pressure from Palestinian NGOs to keep the political and development processes open and democratic. The oppositional and non-Fatah NGOs are also facing pressure, on the one hand, from international donors to support the current process while concurrently, if they conform, are receiving independent (of the current authority) support from those same donors. At the same time, these same NGOs are facing compression from the Fatah-led authority for political and economic reasons. However, the Fatah authority cannot squeeze the Palestinian NGO sector completely out of existence because of its utility in the overall development process (if nothing else, to provide safety valve measures for marginalized groups in the face of the hardship to come).

Bisan finds itself in a difficult position in this matrix of relations. Associated with the PFLP, a party which categorically rejects the current process and Fatah's authority, Bisan supports the Oslo Accord, but not the way in which it is being implemented (Anon. 10, 12/23/93). This position may safeguard its funding in the short-term, but Bisan is not interested in developing projects that are associated with large-scale capitalist development or that act as safety-valve, band-aid measures to address poverty.

Bisan's agenda is radical democracy, an approach that has never yet been associated with World Bank-style development. In the long-run, Bisan may be faced with the need to become a self-sufficient NGO, independent of external funding. Indeed, Bisan advocates this path in the medium- to long-term for other Palestinian organizations. However, the way to this achievement is as yet unclear. How NGOs in small, poor economies can achieve self-sufficiency when Western NGOs are unable to accomplish this, seems undecipherable.

4.4 Future Prospects

Over the past few years Palestine has experienced dramatic shifts on its development terrain. Palestine is in the midst of its transformation from a revolutionary society, in which small-scale projects were created in order to support disarticulation from the Israeli occupation, to a society engaged in the establishment of state-like institutions and internationally supported large-scale development. In the first instance, by combining the effort for national and women's rights, women were able to carve out a significant, albeit contradictory, position for themselves which fostered the beginnings of a feminist consciousness. Now, Palestinian women face an entirely different set of opportunities and obstacles.

Through the development of the home economy and production cooperatives in support of the intifada with

programs such as PARC, women were able to earn needed income to support their families, and confront social and spatial restrictions which enabled them to participate in and feel a part of the public sphere. Despite the fact that in the end analysis women's participation in this sector actually increased women's workload, women also feel a new sense of power as a result of their monetary contributions to the family income. Nevertheless, most cooperatives projects have been financial and administrative failures--PARC so far is a notable exception. Just as important, the cooperatives, including PARC, have made very slow progress in terms of fostering a reevaluation of women's status and role in the family and in society. In the new development context, where male access to wage-labour in Israel is restricted and investment in capitalist agriculture will be encouraged, rural women face the prospect of displacement from agricultural wage-labour, pressure to return to the private sphere, and a further reliance on their subsistence and reproductive labour as well their participation in home-based income-generation. The PARC program, with its emphasis on smallholders, the home economy, and production cooperatives, will be needed more than ever by women who will need the income that their projects can provide. Nevertheless, the PARC program, with its imperative to become financially self-sufficient in the next five years, may itself resort to super-exploitation of women's labour in the production cooperatives.

Moving from the circumstances of poor rural women, and the failure so far of any measures to secure lasting changes in the social and economic status of women, our attention is drawn to the efforts of the UNDP's Task Force on Women. The agenda of this program is to address the problems of women's social and economic status in the political realm through participation at the highest government levels, in order to influence official policy and the public perception of women. Directly aimed at professional women, largely drawn from the upper-middle and upper-classes in Palestinian society, the popular perception of this program is likely to be that it is far-removed from the lower- and middle-classes' reality. Indeed, so far, the Task Force and the women's technical committee, which it increasingly finds itself working closely with, is at a loss as to how to reach the grassroots. In addition, in this current political context, women find themselves to be marginalized more than ever. The women's technical committee, which the Task Force wishes to work through, is excluded from the current governing structure. As well, there are no women on PECJAR, Palestine's major body responsible for coordinating development efforts and direction of development funds. Finally, the current reigning authority, Fatah, finds itself under pressure from the opposition, in particular Hamas. In the near future Fatah may find itself in the position of having to make concessions to Hamas in order to secure its own authority, and these

concessions are most likely to be in the area of women's status issues.

The social and political obstacles that women face have prompted them to link the women's struggle with the contest for democracy in Palestinian society. Non-Fatah NGOs, many of them central to sectors impacting directly on grassroots women's lives, including Bisan, are also aligned in a confrontation with the governing authority over the issue of democracy. Concerned for their own political and economic survival, Palestinian NGOs are demanding that the Fatah-led government democratically distribute resources and open the governing process. Bisan, however, is also concerned about the internal state of the Palestinian community, and its institutions and organizations, and is working to foster democratic and horizontal structures. In this situation, NGOs have some advantage based on the international community's distrust of Fatah's accountability and competence, and in Fatah's own inability to be able to perform all necessary tasks in the development of Palestine.

Women and the popular sector, including the NGOs who work with them, are finding themselves now having to shift the spotlight of their opposition from the Israeli occupier to internal elements in their own society, including their own governing authority and conservative forces such as Hamas. While Palestinian struggle has historically focused on political and economic oppression, this has always been

formulated as a nationalist fight against Israeli occupation. Now, Israeli occupation is receding, allowing, in many critical minds, Palestine to become Israel's immediate enforcer in the Gaza Strip and Jericho, with more of the West Bank to follow. Already, this shift in the identity of the firsthand oppressor, is highlighting factional, gender, and class divisions in Palestinian society.

The recent FAFO study states, "In comparison to the results of an international survey of several different countries, the degree of perceived conflict in Palestinian society is high" (Heiberg, Øvensen et al., 1993:257). The study notes that women, more than men, particularly the older or more educated they are, tend be more acutely aware of social conflict (between the rich and poor, the old and young, the employed and unemployed, management and workers, urban and rural, men and women) than men, with the sole exception being between management and workers where 57% of men reported strong or very strong conflict as opposed to 43% of women.²⁷ The most glaring perceptual discrepancy was in the evaluation of existing conflict between men and women, where 42% of women reported strong or very strong conflict but only 26% of men did so. In regional terms, the Gaza Strip reported the lowest levels of conflict while East Jerusalem reported the highest.

²⁷ The conflict between management and workers was also reported as the most intense conflict. The study speculates that the gender reversal is due to the fact that fewer women than men have direct experience of the workplace (Heiberg, Øvensen et al., 1993:257-258).

The authors explain this in three ways: first, "older, well-educated women are over-represented in relation to the Palestinian population generally" in East Jerusalem, thereby pushing their reports of strong conflict upwards; second, East Jerusalem is "the region in which the process of change has been most profound, the competition between contending political and social ideas most enunciated"; third, violent nationalist-motivated conflict is a dominant feature of life in Gaza, and "[i]t could well be that the intensity of this confrontation generates a special feeling of solidarity which mutes Gazan perceptions of conflicts that are more internal to the Palestinian situation" (Heiberg, Øvensen et al., 1993:256-259). The results of this study reinforce the speculation that with the recession of the occupation in visible terms, other sites of conflict will intensify.

As a panacea to the current situation with its prospects for further internal conflict as an outcome of autocratic government and rapacious market-driven development, Edward Said calls for Palestinian solidarity across state borders in an effort to find alternatives to the currently reigning despotic Fatah, to assume sovereignty in determining Palestinian economic destiny, and to finally shake off the burden of Israeli occupation:

Palestinians can, indeed must...call assemblies wherever large populations exist (Jordan, Lebanon, North America, England) with enough clout, resources, and potential for contributions that will make a difference. In the territories, divisiveness and factionalism have compounded the

situation of helplessness and resentment in which most Palestinians find themselves. Systematic attempts must be made to bridge the distance between the diaspora and those Palestinians. Networks are forming, as are ever-expanding groups of citizens dissatisfied with the PLO's ineptitude. But the key thing is to stop thinking that Arafat and Co. can be reformed, and to begin an open and unafraid discussion about the alternatives, the need to go forward as a nation, and, most important, a strategy to end Israeli occupation....Palestinians must start thinking collectively and stop reacting individually. And the main question...is how to resist, not how to profit [my emphasis] (Said, 1994:419).

Said's plea is a challenge to the notion that, in the long run, class interests outweigh nationalist sentiment. Some of the wealthiest and most successful businessmen (as well as other professionals in the medical, legal, banking, planning, architectural, journalism, and educational industries) in the Arab world are diaspora Palestinians. Said himself notes that "[m]ost of these people have contributed only a tiny fraction of what they could contribute to the Palestinian national effort" (1994:418). It is unclear why he believes that now they would be willing to contribute, and more, even take an ethical stand, when lucrative opportunities await in the homeland. Even if Arafat and his friends are successfully deposed, the alternative leadership would be confronted with the same set of external pressures and the alternatives to deal with them. At hand may be a more efficient and competent governing authority, but one perhaps not any more concerned with the plight of the Palestinians who they lead in Gaza and the West Bank, nor with the refugees outside of occupied Palestine who await redress.

CHAPTER FIVE

DEVELOPMENT REVISITED: WOMEN, CIVIL SOCIETY, AND RESISTANCE

This project's points of departure have been in the contradiction between Maria Mies's (1986) conclusions about the absolute exploitive nature of women's activism in nationalist resistance, and the possibilities that Julie Peteet (1991) uncovered in Lebanese refugee camps for feminist consciousness in the Palestinian resistance movement. While the Palestinian struggle is most famous for its sensational and sometimes violent nationalist political nature, little attention is paid to the activities that actually have sustained Palestinian resistance. These endeavours, commonly termed "development" in other contexts, are most often associated with women's activism. It is for this reason that we surveyed the main paradigms of development theory both as a critical undertaking and as a search for explanations of the nature of development in occupied Palestine. As we have seen, until very recently (since the Oslo Accord), development, if it has occurred at all in the West Bank and Gaza, has been initiated in the name of nationalist resistance and feminist emancipation. While modernizationist perspectives explained the approach of current decision-makers vis-à-vis development in Palestine, it leaves unconsidered the particular historical context of Palestine and unanswered the role of internal social forces and external structures and pressures.

Dependency approaches take us forward in an understanding of the influence of historical context and the role of external forces, particularly Israel's occupation and the subjugation of occupied Palestine, but gives little insight to the role of internal social forces. Modes of production analysis provided more clues by positing an explanation in the articulation of capitalist and non-capitalist agricultural modes of production as a way of understanding the political economy of occupation, as well as the emanation of struggle from this articulation. Our point of departure has been the exploration of this notion of struggle as a conscious undertaking, particularly in light of Foster-Carter's insistence that development theory must focus on all spheres of existence: social, political, cultural, as well as economic. Nevertheless, articulation of modes of production theory leaves out considerations of gender and the nature of organization in civil society.

Palestinian women's participation in economic, social, and political development and resistance is a palpable example of the notion of struggle in modes of production theory. Israeli occupation has manifested itself most tangibly, after modes of brutal repression, in economic terms. Capitalist development in Israel has utilized not only an imposed system of dependent relations with the West Bank, but also has articulated itself with non-capitalist modes of production in occupied Palestine. Struggle against occupation, as fuelled by women, was based on development as a disarticulation from

Israeli oppression and its economy. Mainly focused in the non-capitalist agricultural sector, at least initially, this mode of resistance was performed by women because this particular economic sector is female-dominated and traditionally associated with women. However, women's participation in disarticulation has been contradictory, at once both exploitive and emancipatory. While in strict economic and immediate social and political terms this initiative was unsuccessful for women, it did pave the way for the development of a new feminist consciousness and activism for women's human rights. However, articulation theory leaves unanswered the nature of struggle itself. As we have seen, struggle in occupied Palestine has taken place on several different levels besides the economic. Women have struggled collectively to confront patriarchy and to redefine the nature of democracy to incorporate women's human rights. In the process, the nature of development, and how we approach it, is challenged. It is to these issues that we return in order to offer possibilities for the further expansion of development theory.

5.1 Critiques of Articulation of Modes of Production Theory

First, we turn our attention to two scholars who reject the ethnocentrism of Western political economy theory while at the same time are trying to reconstruct it in order to understand the Middle East. According to Kathy and Pandeli

Glavanis in their "Introduction" to The Rural Middle East: Peasant Lives and Modes of Production (1990), there is a paucity of competent political economy scholarship in the area of Middle East studies. Much of the work is informed by an ideological interpretation which contrasts an "essentialist, and ahistorical characterization of the region with Western progress and development":

Such an ideological approach to the study of the Middle East conceptually precludes any consideration of the changing relations of power and ability to exploit that has continuously transformed the political-economic structures and systems of classes in the region. What is lacking is the location of scholarly work within an analytical framework that posits the international division of labour and the unequal relationship between the Middle East and Western capitalism as the central problematics for analysis. Given the historical origins of the two primary components whose fusion constitutes the predominant paradigm in rural Middle East studies, functionalist social anthropology and Orientalism, it is not surprising that such a framework has failed to emerge (Glavanis, Glavanis, 1990:6).

Glavanis and Glavanis propose that a new paradigm be developed, based on "new interpretations" that are non-static, take into account the specificities of particular forms of production and the role of wider structures (such as the state and the international division of labour), and incorporate additional categories of analysis such as gender¹ (Glavanis, Glavanis, 1990:19-27). Articulation of modes of production is the starting point for Glavanis and Glavanis. It is their

¹ I would add that other categories such as ethnicity and religion would enrich analysis of the Middle East and their addition would not be inconsistent with the Glavanis' intent.

view that this approach best allows for the understanding of "the actual functioning of...forms of non-capitalist peasant production and their role within the wider capitalist economy" (Glavanis, Glavanis, 1990:23). However, as already noted, they accept the need for the incorporation of the feminist critique of this approach in order to ensure a wider understanding of the Middle Eastern political economy.

The most powerful critique of the articulation of modes of production theory comes from feminist political economy analyses. For radical feminist political economy scholars, articulation of modes of production theory does not go far enough: it does not ask who the non-capitalist producers predominantly are:

But who are these 'non'-capitalist producers, these people who do not produce commodities for a wage? They are the majority: housewives throughout the world, peasants of both sexes, mainly in the Third World producing for their own subsistence, and the army of male and female so-called 'marginalized' people, most of whom also live in the Third World (von Werlhof, 1988:14-15).

It is von Werlhof's assertion that capitalism relies on a continuing process of "original" or "primitive" accumulation, and that "the Third World and/or the agricultural areas--we would add: and the households--being locations for this process which has the purpose of facilitating accumulation in the First World and/or the urban areas" (von Werlhof, 1988:15). The real basis of this argument lies in the observation that what all of these producers have in common is that, unable to live on their minimal or non-existent wage,

they must produce goods for their own consumption without payment. At base, this is a

production relation in which life (for capital the potential-commodity labour power) is (re)-produced by unpaid, use-value orientated subsistence work; this relation is very convenient for capital precisely because of its difference from the wage labour relation. Without risking or paying anything, capital appropriates (it robs) the surplus labour made day in, day out by these subsistence producers, whose labour has been transformed into labour power usable for capital as wage labour, or in other forms. Only on this very basis does the 'real' process of capital valuation and accumulation begin.

The production and perpetual reproduction of this basis, therefore correspond to a kind of continuing process of original accumulation...(von Werlhof, 1988:16).

And so, original accumulation is perpetual in the unpaid "(re)-production" of the labour commodity--a task most often falling to women to perform.

Von Werlhof's second point of critique of articulation theory is the separation/definition of capitalist and non-capitalist modes of production. Citing Biermann and Kössler (1977) and Bennholdt-Thomsen (1976), von Werlhof asks, "how can capital accumulation result from a different mode of production still existing? How can relations be non-capitalist, when capital itself creates them outside the sphere of wage labour, in order to enforce the continuation of original accumulation, especially where all pre-capitalist relations have already been absorbed?" (von Werlhof, 1988:17).

The justification for this position is that

If...capitalism is viewed in its totality, relations must, therefore, be regarded not only as

economic but also as indispensable for accumulation relations which, until now, have been falsely considered 'extra-economic', or even 'natural' and, therefore, universally independent from historical changes, simply because they did/do not exist as a wage labour relation. An example of this is women's work (von Werlhof, 1988:17).

Nonetheless, while von Werlhof's point is well taken, that it is difficult to make a distinction between capitalist and non-capitalist relations when the functioning of capitalism itself relies on these "non-capitalist" relations, the distinction between capitalism and non-capitalism is useful for other reasons. First, the conventional definition of capitalist relations are those involving free wage labour exploitation by owners of the means of production. Super-exploitation, however, occurs when even the marginal rights and benefits of the capitalist system are not accrued by those engaged (women, in this case) in the system. The word "engaged" is used here as opposed to "participating" because, unlike their male counter-parts who work directly for an employer/owner of the means of production, women's production is appropriated second-hand through the reproduction of labour. Second, women's labour, and subsequent struggle, in our case takes place in a sphere where there is not a clear split between owner and non-owner of the means of production. For instance, the smallholding and sharecropping modes of production and the home economy initiatives that have resulted from organization in the peasant economy sphere, are instances where ownership is partially or wholly assumed by the women or families

involved in production.

Nonetheless, the point that articulation theory does not ever answer the question of *who* these producers are in the non-capitalist sphere is a valid and valuable one. In addition, von Werlhof's analysis of capital accumulation/expropriation from women's work is not inconsistent with Wolpe's (1980a) and Foster-Carter's (1978) notion of articulation as an explanation of how capitalist modes of production are reproduced. In the case of Palestine we can see this at work in women's struggles on the sites of subsistence and social reproduction. While originally labour in this sphere reproduced the capitalist mode of production, this sphere became a cornerstone of Palestinian resistance against Israel. Domestic reproduction became a form of activism through the home economy and cooperative production movement, a female-dominated sphere and one consciously engaged in as a way of disarticulating from the Israeli capitalist economy. This type of activism, or struggle, then begs the question of reproduction or transformation, and harkens back to the Glavanis' call for non-static interpretations of the Middle Eastern peasant political economy and the incorporation of gender as a unit of analysis. If articulation is the site of struggle between non-capitalist and capitalist modes of production, as both Wolpe and Foster-Carter indicate, then are we not sometimes examining dynamic transformation rather than reproduction? In the Palestinian

case it can be argued that women's struggle in the non-capitalist site of production was a necessary, though not sufficient, factor that contributed to the system transformation occurring now. Nonetheless, this struggle has not only been waged on the nationalist and capitalist fronts. There is still the issue of patriarchy.

The theoretical gap between feminist political economy and more traditional political economy theory is that many feminist political economists perceive capitalism as a mode of production that is necessarily linked with patriarchy. As Maria Mies observes in her Patriarchy and Accumulation on a World Scale (1986),

Women's problems today cannot be explained by merely referring to the old forms of patriarchal dominance. Nor can they be explained if one accepts the position that patriarchy is a 'pre-capitalist' system of social relations which has been destroyed and superseded, together with 'feudalism', by capitalist relations, because women's exploitation and oppression cannot be explained by the functioning of capitalism alone, at least not capitalism as it is commonly understood. It is my thesis that capitalism cannot function without patriarchy, that the goal of this system, namely the never-ending process of capital accumulation, cannot be achieved unless patriarchal man-woman relations are maintained or newly created (Mies, 1986:38).

For Mies, the level of surplus needed for the maintenance of capitalism can only be extracted if an exploitive social hierarchy is upheld. This hierarchy is patriarchal, where women are oppressed and exploited. Thus, if capitalism was eradicated it would not be enough to ensure women's

emancipation,² as this would only partially deal with women's position as free labour. Patriarchy as a system of oppression and exploitation within the "'private' man-woman relation" allows for the social order necessary to provide the super-exploitation that capitalism relies upon for its continued growth dynamic. According to Mies, this exploitation/oppression dynamic can also be expanded to understand the "overdevelopment"/underdevelopment global process if patriarchy as a concept encompasses man's conquest over nature and the "other" (Mies, 1986).

While the articulation of capitalism with patriarchy is a useful concept, there are two problems with this idea generally and with Mies's formulation of it specifically. First, the unification of patriarchy and capitalism within one system runs the danger of assuming that all women experience capitalism and patriarchy in the same ways (Tong, 1989:193). Class and ethnicity must also be taken into account when analyzing women's experiences both with capitalism and with patriarchy. Second, Mies never provides a full or clear definition of patriarchy. At one point she talks about "patriarchal modes of production, including capitalism" whose characteristic...is that those who control the

² See Croll (1986) and Molyneux (1981) for a survey of women's socio-economic position in socialist states.

³ Mies chooses to use the term "overdevelopment" rather than the more conventional "developed" to emphasize the never-ending growth dynamic that is an inherent, destructive, and super-exploitive fact of capitalist economies (1986:39-40).

production process and the products are not themselves producers, but appropriators. Their so-called productivity pre-supposes the existence and the subjection of other--and, in the last analysis, female--producers (Mies, 1986:71).

There is no well-developed difference between this definition of patriarchal modes of production and the capitalist mode of production except that women's productivity is appropriated. What needs to be explained is how women's productivity is appropriated and how this appropriation differs from the appropriation of men's productivity. Mies does examine how women have been equated with "nature", and how nature has been an object of male conquest, but so have men of colour been equated with "nature" by European culture. It needs to be explained how, or if, this dynamic differs from the oppression/exploitation of women, and how this articulates with capitalism. It is in this area that von Werlhof (1988) fills in some gaps by discussing the mechanism of capital's appropriation of woman-produced surplus.

Patriarchy is also at issue in Hisham Sharabi's Neopatriarchy: A Theory of Distorted Change in Arab Society (1988). He contends that modernization, in the form of dependent capitalist relations, has actually entrenched patriarchy, the rule of the father and the husband,⁴ in the Arab world. Sharabi defines neopatriarchy as the site of the articulation of modernity and patriarchy. For Sharabi,

⁴ This definition of patriarchy will be further explored in our discussion of Carole Pateman (1988).

neopatriarchy is a "specific psychosociological totality which is encountered in social and psychological structures.... a system of values and social practices belonging to a determinate economy and culture" that stands in dialectical opposition to modernity" (Sharabi, 1988:17). The neopatriarchal Arab world, according to Sharabi, is a structure composed of modernity and patriarchy, the former as "a unique historical development which occurred in its original form in Western Europe--the first historical break with traditionality", and the latter which "refers to a universal form of traditional society, which assumes a different character in each society" (Sharabi, 1988:3). In essence, neopatriarchy is the result of dependency relations that produce "modernized patriarchy", a "concrete historical formation shaped simultaneously by internal and external forces" (Sharabi, 1988:4-5):

over the last one hundred years the patriarchal structures of Arab society, far from being

⁵ However, Sharabi's use of the concept of modernity is remarkably uncritical. As Jacqueline Ismael notes in her review of Sharabi's book,

Sharabi's theory of distorted change is really only a resurrection of the old modernization paradigm. All of the normative assumptions about modernity and modernization are quite explicit...(Ismael, 1990:261).

Nevertheless, Sharabi's aim to integrate political economy and cultural theory is a necessary step in order to fully understand the development process. However, given the context of Middle East studies as analyzed by Edward Said in his book Orientalism (1978), cultural theoretical perspectives must be carefully handled in order to avoid orientalist explanations of change (or non-change) in the Arab world.

displaced or truly modernized, have only been strengthened and maintained in deformed, "modernized" forms. That is to say, the Arab Awakening or renaissance (*nahda*) of the nineteenth century not only failed to break down the inner relations and forms of patriarchalism but, by initiating what it called the modern awakening, also provided the ground for producing a new, hybrid sort of society/culture--the neopatriarchal society/culture we see before us today. Material modernization, the first (surface) manifestation of social change, only served to remodel and reorganize patriarchal structures and relations and to reinforce them by giving them "modern" forms and appearances (Sharabi, 1988:4).

The introduction of capitalism to Egypt and the Fertile Crescent region in the nineteenth and early twentieth century led to the development of "distorted, dependent capitalism" and the emergence of the "neopatriarchal petty bourgeoisie". This class holds "contradictory values and tendencies" that are characteristic of the "schizophrenic" nature of neopatriarchal society (Sharabi, 1988:5-6, 8). As Sharabi notes,

being "modernized" signifies an external agency acting upon an internal development, thereby transforming it. Whenever "modernization" sets in, internal, autonomous development is distorted, assuming the form of underdevelopment. The built-in distortion of "modernization" is due not merely to internal failure, but to something else....this "something else" is in part the fact that the success of modernization itself is *disabling* when carried out in the framework of dependency and subordination and resulting in neopatriarchy (Sharabi, 1988:22).

Borrowing from marxist dialectical method and dependency theory, Sharabi assembles a model of Arab society that has been constructed by external modernization forces and internal patriarchal structures and culture. The resulting

"schizophrenia" is embodied in the class behaviour of the "neopatriarchal petty bourgeoisie" which is neither "genuine traditionalism" or "authentic modernity" (Sharabi, 1988:23).

For women in particular the neopatriarchal system is based on "a conservative, relentless male-oriented ideology, which tend[s] to assign privilege and power to the male at the expense of the female, keeping the latter under crippling legal and social constraints" (Sharabi, 1988:33). Conversely, the most revolutionary movement in the Middle East, one "which will explode neopatriarchal society from within....the permanent shield against patriarchal regression [if allowed to grow and develop], the cornerstone of future modernity" is the women's movement (Sharabi, 1988:154).

Sharabi's conceptualization reinforces the validity and necessity of Palestinian women's struggle⁶ against both Israeli (and Western) capitalism and Palestinian patriarchy. According to his theory, the struggle must be on two fronts, even if fused: against dependency and against patriarchy. This makes sense as we realize that the political economy of occupied Palestine works as a triad: as a dependent entity in terms of externally-imposed and capitalist constraints; as a non-capitalist economy articulated with a capitalist economy

⁶ Here too, it must be noted, that given Sharabi's reflections on indigenous class behaviour, Palestinian women's struggle must also be one that is class-aware.

through internal production and reproduction dynamics;⁷ and as a patriarchal system in the sense that it exploits and oppresses women as well as suppressing truly democratic pressures and trends--(as evidenced by both the PLO's current governance in lieu of Israel as well as the popular rise of Islamism and their program regarding women and the ultimate acceptability of pluralism)--something which is necessary in order to successfully impose inequitable economic systems. Women's position links these three dynamics, and thus, feminist activism is central to their transformation.

5.2 Women and Civil Society

The political economy of the occupation of Palestine occurs on several fronts, with women at the centre and in ways that engage them in capitalist and patriarchal systems. Struggle, too, if it is to be effective, is necessary on these same fronts. In order to understand the nature of women's struggles against capitalism and patriarchy comprehension of their social location is necessary.

Carole Pateman (1988) reminds us that feminists define what is "private" differently than the way liberal scholars do. For instance, whereas feminists ascribe to the first

⁷ Sharabi would argue, in a similar vein as Cardoso and Faletto (1979), I believe, that dependency is mediated through class relations. Nevertheless, it is also important to remember that the Palestinian merchant and large land-owning classes are articulated with both Israeli capitalism (in the role of commission agents) and with Palestinian sharecropping modes of production.

meaning of civil society as delineated by the social contract stories--a separation between society and family--most other current discussions of civil society leave the realm of family, and therefore women, out of the discussion altogether:⁶

The meaning of 'civil society'...is constituted through the 'original' separation and opposition between the modern, public--civil--world and the modern, private or conjugal and familial sphere: that is, in the new social world created through contract, everything that lies beyond the domestic (private) sphere is public, or 'civil' society"....In contrast, most discussions of civil society and such formulations as 'public' regulation versus 'private' enterprise presuppose that the politically relevant separation between public and private is drawn within 'civil society' as constructed in the social contract stories....the separation between the family and the rest of social life is invariably 'forgotten' in arguments about civil society (Pateman, 1988:102).

This, she claims is one of the patriarchal roots of modern post- social contract ideologies. If modern ideologies are celebrating the end of political patriarchy with the end of the rule of men by kings, then they are neglecting the whole other aspect of patriarchy, that of the rule of women by their husbands' (Pateman, 1988:105). In addition, she claims that

⁶ Additionally, post-marxists conceptualize "civil society" as a "third sector", somewhere in between and distinct from the private (business) and public (government) spheres. Nevertheless, as Macdonald points out, "This is an area of frequent confusion, however, since what is meant by civil society is often undefined" (1992:22-23), thus, also risking the exclusion of women.

⁷ I would add here that rule of women by their fathers also should be included in any conception of patriarchy as it differs from the type of rule wielded by fathers over sons and by husbands over wives.

the absolute origin of patriarchal political rule lies in this second aspect of patriarchy, that is, that rule of the father presupposes the rule of men over their wives, including and especially the use of women's bodies for the exercise of male sexual and procreative rights (Pateman, 1988:106-107).

Further, Pateman claims that the original division of the public and private spheres through the social contract performs two functions. First, it maintains and upholds male access to female sexuality and reproductive powers, and second, it contains women's passions for the common good and protection of society:

Women are 'opposite' to and outside the fraternal social contract and its civil law in two senses. First, they are 'originally', necessarily, excluded from an agreement through which the brothers inherit their legacy of patriarchal sex right and legitimize their claim over women's bodies and ability to give birth. Secondly, the civil law encapsulates all that women lack. The civil law stems from a reasoned argument that it is to the rational mutual advantage of the participants to the contract to constrain their interactions and desires through a law equally applicable to all. Women's passions render them incapable of making such a reasoned agreement or of upholding it if made. In other words, the patriarchal claim that there is a 'foundation in nature' for women's subjection to men, is a claim that women's bodies must be governed by men's reason. The separation of civil society from the familial sphere is also a division between men's reason and women's bodies (Pateman, 1988:114-115).

Similarly, Fatima Mernissi (1987) explains female segregation in the Arab Muslim world as an instrument used to contain women's sexuality. Women's sexuality is seen as powerful and dangerous:

contrary to what is commonly assumed, Islam does not advance the thesis of women's inherent inferiority. Quite the contrary, it affirms the potential equality between the sexes. The existing inequality does not rest on an ideological or biological theory of women's inferiority, but is the outcome of specific social institutions designed to restrain her power: namely, segregation and legal subordination in the family structure....the whole system is based on the assumption that women are powerful and dangerous beings. All sexual institutions (polygamy, repudiation, sexual segregation, etc.) can be perceived as a strategy for containing their power (Mernissi, 1987:19).

As such, women's honour must be protected in order to uphold familial reputation:

The resistance to giving women complete freedom of movement in the public sphere stems from the social concern to maintain women's honour, which is key to the family honour, and from the belief that uncontrolled mixing of the sexes will lead to the breakdown of public morals and the social order (Hijab, 1988:89).

Nonetheless, unlike the societies that Pateman is referring to, in the Middle East, according to Sharabi (1988), modernization has only retrenched both the rule of the father and the rule of the husband. Therefore, women's struggles indeed hold the most potential to effect social transformation.

This brief survey of the various divisions of civil society demonstrates that "public" may indicate the government sector (as in the liberal and "modern" polity), or the non-family sector, and "private" represents either the unregulated

non-government sector or the family, respectively.¹⁰ In both contexts women are disenfranchised, either rendered invisible or disempowered through patriarchal social constructs. This disenfranchisement composes the social and political facet of the articulation between modes of production. When these divisions are conjoined with economic structures we can see that women are both disenfranchised and exploited.

This exploitation becomes particularly clear in the Palestinian case when we see that women in the West Bank and Gaza engage in a whole range of activities that are crucial to the functioning of the Palestinian and Israeli economies vis-à-vis the reproduction of labour. For instance, the authors of one study on the nature of Palestinian women's labour indicate that women's domestic labour is regarded as non-productive, and in fact, women are socially constructed as "kept" consumers, rather than producers, as a result of their location in the private sphere:

Housewives are assumed to be filling their 'natural' homemaking and childbearing role working for their husbands, children and households out of love and devotion. This picture reinforces a predominant image of women as consumers. Their work is neither seen to have any economic impact or productive value. Even directly productive work, for example the informal labour of women in agriculture, is hidden under the guise of domestic duty....The term 'housework' does not adequately reflect the multitude of activities entailed in the everyday maintenance of the household. Production, food processing, cooking, cleaning, laundry,

¹⁰ In subsequent discussion, unless otherwise noted, our use of "public" refers to the non-family, non-state sphere and "private" to the family.

nursing, childcare are just some of them....[and are included in the] concept of the 'domestic mode of production', in which those exploited by it, are, 'not paid but rather maintained'. Work is done for others and is thus not accounted or remunerated. This includes housework which is not considered to be productive [because it is done within the confines of the home and is performed for "free"] (Lang, Mohanna, 1992:52-53).

As another study of women's work indicates, "A female labour force participation ratio of a mere 14% shows that most [Palestinian] women have understood 'work' as paid work, primarily conducted outside the home", despite the fact that "the results for women's use of time show that women, on average spend almost 60 hours a week on housework and income generating activities" (Heiberg, Øvensen et al., 1993:209, 213).

As a result of their position as social reproducers, women, particularly of the less advantaged classes, come into contact with the non-family sphere as consumers of public goods necessary for the fulfilment of their domestic role. In her examination of women's resistance in Latin America, Elizabeth Jelin (1990) explains that women, as housewives and mothers, are most often the first to feel the deficiencies in state provision of public goods, and thus, are the most likely to first organize in protest:

As organizers of family consumption, women necessarily enter into contact with institutions in the distribution sector and with the state as provider of services. There is, in effect an obvious public dimension to women's role as housewife because they constantly relate to those offering goods and services and to other consumers. In addition, a large part of basic consumer

services are offered or regulated in a collective manner by the state (education, health, housing, transport, sanitation services, price control, and so on) and the absence or deficiency of these is also felt and shared collectively. This is why the organization and defence of living conditions is a real and potential sphere of participation for women in the popular sectors at various levels (Jelin, 1990:187).

In the Palestinian case, women and the rest of society had been subject to cuts in and denial of access to public services such as healthcare, education, water, electricity, and so on, since the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. As a result, women have a history of organizing, first in the charitable associations, and then later in mass political organizations, in order to meet social needs. This activism has had the effect of transforming women's labour into a "public politicized domesticity". Jelin notes that this transformation not only brings women's "private" activity into the public sphere, but it also fosters a new gender identity and opens the way for social change. Nonetheless, Jelin is careful to acknowledge that these changes do not necessarily lead to the acceptance of women's human rights, regardless of the fact that women are redefined from passive and non-public individuals to a more activist collective identity:

There are some irrefutable points concerning the effects of these collective actions. First, it forces political and social recognition of the public face of reproduction....Second, women learn about participation and solidarity, which is necessary to create a gender identity....Third, as the forms of association generated by these practices are inserted into pre-existing systems of

social relations based on traditional clientelistic channels, the tensions provoked in this way open-up a great potential for change in this type of social relation.

Conversely, it must be pointed out that this type of participation does not automatically lead to the recognition of women's rights....Over and above those achievements linked to the immediate socio-economic situation (that is, the justification for action: the crisis, poverty) is the shattering of the passive image of women and the transformation of this passivity into combativeness that is moving towards the redefinition of the collective practices of women (Jelin, 1990:192-193).

Again, in Palestine this transformation was noticeable as a result of women's participation in the intifada. Women not only were redefining themselves and their efforts as crucial to Palestinian society and national resistance, but Palestinian society itself also began to recognize the importance of women's efforts, and hence, their value.

Nonetheless, as Rosemary Ridd (1986) explains, the blurring of private/public spheres frequently occurs in conflictual society, while at the same time conservative forces attempt to reinforce the private/public boundaries:

when a community is involved in open conflict and all resources are directed towards countering an external threat and meeting a common goal, there is likely to be some fluidity in the social ordering unless steps are taken to prevent this. It is a curious paradox that conflict, however much it may be outwardly directed towards bringing about change in society, can be at the same time an inherently conservative agent. The sense of insecurity that accompanies such disturbances reflects strongly upon women, particularly where they are represented as the custodians of a society's cultural values which...are in constant need of protection and especially when that society comes under attack. Thus we may find at these times a tension existing between women who find new opportunities to express

themselves politically and men who step up their efforts to control women and try to reinforce the boundary that separates the domestic from the public sphere (Ridd, 1986:3-4).

In Palestine, Hamas's "hijabization" campaign represents this backlash tendency against women's intrusion into the public sphere and their growing social strength through civil society organization.

In light of the Israeli occupation of Palestine, women's traditional "invisible" position in civil society, and in Arab Muslim society, it is easy to agree with Jelin (1990:206) that women's social movements activism is a struggle for citizenship. Palestinian women have organized in struggle on behalf of their nation and on behalf of themselves. This struggle has taken place on two fronts: first, for the acquisition of goods necessary for the fulfilment of women's domestic reproductive role and second, for the feminist achievement of women's human rights. While women's reproductive role first became politicized through nationalist resistance, this led to the newer battle against patriarchy in Palestinian society.

The tendency towards the political mobilization of women in revolutionary struggles, according to Mary Ann Tetreault (1992), is more common in societies where the family has yet to become privatized and atomized. In these societies, the extended traditional family is connected to society (the civil, public sphere) as a result of its "base on contract rather than affection and [is] embedded in extensive social

and economic networks" (Tetreault, 1992:109). Consequently, the political mobilization of the family, and therefore women and their subsequent "revolutionization", is a key strategy in order to confront the state:

Congruence between relationships within the family and relationships in the larger society provides a point of leverage from which revolutionary groups can challenge the state. In addition, when the family is not simply a private affair but rather the locus of the socialization that produces cosmological beliefs and economic and political structures--and then becomes part of all of them--revolutionary transformation necessarily affects family life and women's roles as well as politics and the economy as a whole. When linkage between family relationships and those in the larger society is strong, it is "revolutionized" families or communities that, in producing the next generation, succeed or fail at preserving and extending what the revolution accomplished....Where the mobilization of families and family members is a rational revolutionary strategy, it is likely to be pursued. The tactics of such mobilization will be shaped according to the role of women in society (Tetreault, 1992:109-110).

Tetreault speculates that the process of privatization, as it occurs under structural adjustment economies and which isolates the state from social responsibility, may actually "insulate" the family from the oppressive state, thus preserving its position and utility as a force of confrontation (Tetreault, 1992:115). The Israeli state, ostensibly responsible for public service provision while occupying the West Bank and Gaza, failed in the delivery of such services while at the same time subjecting the Palestinian populace to political and economic brutality. This brutality had the effect of both disintegrating the

Palestinian family through imprisonment, deportations, killings, and labour migration, while at the same time reinforcing Palestinian reliance on the family and women's labour (as social reproducers) within it. While the family was not "insulated", it, and women's domestic roles, did become sites of struggle against Israeli state-military mechanisms.¹¹ As one analyst explains, the intifada as an unarmed resistance movement, relied on activism on "'bread and butter' issues" that had commenced almost a decade earlier and that were widely successful in the mobilization of women (Haj, 1992:773).

In addition, according to Tetreault, the mobilization of family, and women in it, serves a broader revolutionary function. As women are politicized and their domestic roles impacted upon, families themselves may become more egalitarian structures. As society rests upon the family this will ultimately have a transformational effect on authoritarian state structures:

The second way that families may challenge state power is less direct. It rests upon the congruence between theories and social structures that form their problematiques....Modern macrostructures such as the international system and the nation-state are based firmly on this pattern of dominance and submission, and are supported by the illusion that "dominance rests on values [that are] universal, eternal, and exclusive". The hegemony of this value system is challenged when it becomes possible

¹¹ With the advent of free market-led, export-driven development in Palestine it is quite possible that the family will continue to be preserved as a unit where struggle will or can occur.

to see that dominance is none of these things. Egalitarian family forms that subjugate neither women nor children refute the claim to universality underpinning dominance at other levels of society. Transformation of the family from an authoritarian to an egalitarian unit promises to cut new paths toward multiple patterns of autonomy and community, increasing the number of "vulnerable points" at which critics can challenge the status quo (Tetreault, 1992:115-116).

It is here that we see the link back to Sharabi (1988) with his assertion that the most revolutionary force in neopatriarchal Middle Eastern society is the women's movement. A related point is Samira Haj's comparison between the unarmed intifada and other armed revolutionary movements. She emphasizes the fact that, in contrast to the intifada, these armed movements tend to primarily attract the activism of young men, organized in hierarchical and authoritarian military structures: "Traditional power relations--including patriarchal relations--tend, then, to be upheld, not undermined" (Haj, 1992:772-773).

To summarize, we can understand the family as a private sphere, which not only facilitates the disempowerment of women, but acts as a location of economic exploitation of their labour for the task of social reproduction for both capitalist and non-capitalist modes of production--often simultaneously. In the Middle East, in particular Palestine, the family is tightly articulated with the public social and political spheres. For the purposes of resistance in those spheres, in addition to the economic sphere which we have already explored, women are key actors to mobilize. In

addition, just in the process of fulfilling their responsibilities as social reproducers, women are reliant on services and resources offered or typically found in the public sphere. In either case, women, then, are not totally isolated from the non-family and non-private sphere, and often must play a central role in successful social, political, and economic mobilization. Their position, not only affords the potential to transform society, but also the family, towards more egalitarian relations as a result of greater gender consciousness. Egalitarian family transformation too, has its own impact on larger social transformation as we will see in our later discussion of DuBois (1991).

The push towards egalitarianism in Palestinian society can be seen in some sectors of the women's movement linking Palestinian democracy with the achievement of women's human rights and in local NGOs' insistence on democratic development in the future regime. Local NGOs' activism is significant here as their own survival and effectiveness may rely on their success on this front in addition to the fact that many of their programs are woman-led and/or woman-directed. Additionally, women have not been acting alone or individually in resistance on patriarchal and capitalist fronts. Organizational activity has been prolific in occupied Palestine, and it is through this venue that women have pushed for significant nationalist, economic, and feminist gains.

5.3 Democracy, NGOs, and Civil Society

In Palestine, the creation and utilization of NGOs in the form of charitable associations, mass organizations, and popular committees has been prolific as a means of economic, social, and political struggle. Women have frequently been key players in this type of resistance, and it is through this venue that Palestinian women's private struggles with capitalism and patriarchy have entered the public forum. In recent months the struggle against patriarchy (both the rule of the father--"Abu Ammar" [Arafat], and the rule of the husband) has been articulated with the drive to create a democratic Palestinian society and polity.

As Laura Macdonald (1992) explains in the Latin American context, NGOs are increasingly turned to as a way of bolstering democratic civil society in the absence of any other credible social actors:

Some of the enthusiasm over NGO potential is also a result of widespread discontent with the performance of official aid agencies, and, more generally, with states themselves. Critics of statist development policies welcome NGO assistance because it is seen as providing critical support to "civil society" in opposition to authoritarian and bureaucratized state actors. NGOs are also frequently portrayed as participatory institutions, "schools of democracy" in a culture perceived as dominated by authoritarian institutions (Macdonald, 1992:4-5).

Certainly this is the case in Palestine, with the World Bank and other international funders setting up separate relations with local NGOs, motivated by mistrust of the official PLO regime. Indeed, the local NGO community itself perceives its

mission to be the democratization of Palestinian society. Nevertheless, there are a variety of ideological incentives that support NGO development. For instance, neo-conservatives--and in this camp we may place both the World Bank et al. and the current Palestinian regime--see that NGO activities smooth over the hardship faced by the poor in unrestrained, free market-led development, thus lessening the potential for political instability and resistance. As we have seen, PARC seems likely to run the risk of being used for these purposes. In addition, support of NGOs may be a political tool that legitimates authoritarian structures by funding only those that back the status quo (Macdonald, 1992:9-12). Already, this process is in place with the cash-starvation of Palestinian NGOs opposed to the current "peace" deal.

A different tack is that taken by liberal-pluralists who believe that "NGOs [can] take the place normally assigned to interest groups, as intermediaries between the unorganized masses and the state" (Macdonald, 1992:15). Certainly, this has been the traditional role of Palestinian NGOs who have been intermediaries,¹² and more, between the Palestinian masses and the Israeli Civil Administration. In this sense, Palestinian NGOs are practised in the role of state adversary. However, it must be noted, this adversarial role has been in

¹² Intermediaries in the sense that Palestinian NGOs have traditionally attempted to mediate the effects of the Israeli occupation.

opposition to an enemy state, not one that the NGOs themselves have been active in struggling for. The transition from being a nationalist resistor to national opposition front likely will be a difficult one for Palestinian NGOs to make. Nonetheless, some, as with the new NGO oppositional organization for democracy, are underway with this transition. Regardless, this perspective does not deal with the fact that pluralism on its own does not rectify social inequity. As Macdonald points out, better organized and financed groups tend to predominate over "organizations of the poor", often with the effect of further polarizing the social power differentials between the marginalized and non-marginalized, unless NGOs are consciously focused on long-term positive social change (1992:17-19).

Finally, post-marxists,¹³ in response to diminishing state power in the face of economic globalization and renewed efforts to locate the most effective sites of struggle, have also focused their attentions on the potential of NGOs. Rejecting existing power structures in the public and private spheres (in contrast to neo-conservative and liberal-pluralist conceptions), post-marxists see that NGOs demonstrate the flexibility to be able to direct resistance on a multiple of fronts in an effort to achieve a more radical version of democracy, distinct from the ballot-box variety (Macdonald,

¹³ For a good survey of the emergence and substance of post-marxist perspectives see Mahon (1991).

1992:21-23). Nonetheless, there is the danger that, with their focus on grassroots democratic development, these more progressive NGOs may increasingly turn inward:

State repression has also encouraged progressive NGOs to focus on the level of the grassroots, on personal empowerment and conscientization, rather than actions directed to the state itself. While this...has contributed to the development of more democratic and participatory institutions, the risk exists that micro-level strategies will never fundamentally challenge the macro-level structures of power in the [Latin American] region (Macdonald, 1992:26).

Bisan's agenda, as indicated in the previous chapter, is to foster civil society and grassroots democratization and empowerment; however, it is too early to tell whether this project will overshadow the imperative to confront macro-level state authoritarian and exploitive capital structures.

In Palestine it is possible to identify all three approaches to NGOs at work. While the neo-conservative approach works to maintain the status quo, upholding capitalist and patriarchal trends, the liberal-pluralist approach does not go far enough to effectively challenge existing power relations. The post-marxist approach has an analysis of power that extends the potential of liberal-pluralism, but also runs the danger of limiting itself to micro-level struggle. Nevertheless, if women are to effectively confront both patriarchy and capitalism it will require struggle on both micro-levels (family, community) and macro-levels (state, business, international development and aid organizations). In order to understand the potential for

NGOs to act as a venue of struggle for social transformation, two key issues emerge from this discussion: the nature of democracy and power, and the question as to where to locate struggle.

5.4 Power, Development, and Locales of Struggle

If development is to be understood as equitable access to economic, social, and political resources in a way that improves the standard of living of all sectors of society, particularly the most marginalized, then an analysis of power is in order. "Radical democracy", as conceptualized by Chantal Mouffe (1992), tries to incorporate the best from liberal and communitarian notions of democracy and society. While the best of liberalism secures pluralism, the separation of church and state, and the privacy of the individual, this often comes at the expense of identification with the community. On the other hand, the communitarian notion of the common good assumes that there is only one set of community values and goals at the expense of other, and others', aspirations and social needs, as well as those of individual liberty. Mouffe resolves these contradictions by keeping liberal pluralism but within the context of a community composed of a multitude of social identity groups. Unlike the communitarian community, however, these groups' demands are strung on a "chain of equivalence...so as to articulate them through the principle of democratic equivalence" (1992:230).

Radical democracy, according to Mouffe, "will emphasize the numerous social relations where relations of domination exist and must be challenged if the principles of liberty and equality are to apply" (1992:230). However, if Mouffe's project is to be effective, a more thorough analysis of these "relations of domination", and how best to "challenge" them, must be considered. Democracy as conceptualized by some Palestinians, for instance, Bisan and a sector of Palestinian feminists (as discussed in chapter 3), is a "democracy of the subjugated"--a system of democracy that has as its starting point the perspective and goals of the most marginalized in society. Otherwise, without this position, we risk operating on a libertarian, strictly pluralist, social "level playing field", where all the various groups with interests and goals must compete in order to have their needs recognized and met.

An analysis of power, then, must be incorporated. In "Third World" social contexts this analysis must include an examination of the politics of development. Using a Foucauldian analysis of power, Arturo Escobar (1984-85) likens the practice and discourse of "development" to a system of discipline, control, and exploitation. While not denying that there are actual material conditions of hardship, Escobar concludes that

development has been successful to the extent that it has been able to penetrate, integrate, manage and control countries and populations in increasingly detailed and encompassing ways. If it has failed to solve the problems of underdevelopment, it can also be said, perhaps with

greater pertinence, that it has succeeded well in creating a type of underdevelopment which has been until now, for the most part, politically and economically manageable (Escobar, 1984-85:388).

This result has been achieved through the "deployment of development" by three means: "the progressive incorporation of problems" where "a whole political anatomy of the Third World which sought not so much to illuminate problems and possible solutions as to give them a visible reality amenable to specific treatments" was developed, creating a "field of intervention of power"; "the professionalization of development...effected through the proliferation of development disciplines and subdisciplines....[allowing] experts to remove from the political realm problems which would otherwise be political, and to recast them into the apparently more neutral realm of science....[resulting in] a field of control of knowledge"; "the institutionalization of development" which refers to the incorporation of a variety of organizations, "ranging from the international organizations and national planning bodies to local level development agencies" that act as "the agents of the deployment of development, the network of new sites of power which, taken as a whole, constitute the apparatus of development", resulting in "the dispersion of local centres of power-knowledge" (Escobar, 1984-85:387-388). It seems clear that Palestinians are in the midst of the transition from being subject to discipline by way of occupation to being disciplined by way of "development". Where previously Palestinians experienced

control and exploitation through a variety of mechanisms of Israeli military occupation (regulations governing every facet of life, censorship, deportations, imprisonment, torture, restricted physical mobility, restricted access to resources, settlements, land and water confiscation, and so on), now Palestinians will experience a different type of control and exploitation through the practice of development.¹⁴ It will be remembered here that Ezra Sadan's report for the Israeli Ministry of Defense related that it would be more efficient to control the Gaza Strip through economic rather than military means. Sadan's recommendations are being executed through the current "development" process.

Escobar also recognizes that this discourse is attached to the imperatives of "capital accumulation on a world scale, and the contradictions inherent in such a process" (Escobar, 1984-85:389). The solution for the subjects of this discipline and exploitation, claims Escobar, is to develop many sites of struggle:

To the multiplicity of forms of power, we must respond with a multiplicity of localized resistances and counteroffensives. These localized resistances, however, must be of a radical and uncompromising character if they are to confront the totality of power. Rather than a massive revolutionary process, the strategy must be aimed at developing a network of struggles, points of

¹⁴ Control and exploitation under the discipline of development will enhance the class nature of Palestinian society. Certain class fractions will obviously benefit at the expense of others. This will tend to heighten class divisions in Palestinian society that had, up until recently, been de-emphasized in the face of Palestinian-Israeli struggle.

resistance, and popular bases. This does not mean, however, that global processes should be abandoned. Like power, the multiplicities of resistances may be integrated into global strategies....The important question then, is to analyze the specificity of power (among individuals, groups, activities, and so on) in order to develop a knowledge of strategies, and to bring about new schemes of politicization of individuals, intellectuals, workers and oppressed groups on whom power is exercised (Escobar, 1984-85:381).

Escobar's solution is consistent with the post-marxist strategy of locating struggle on many sites. In Palestine, while there have traditionally been many organizations dealing with issues such as education, healthcare, agriculture, human rights, and so on, the primary aim of these organizations has been to secure a Palestinian state. The challenge for these organizations now is to transform their own struggle from one that is devoted to achieving a Palestinian state to one, referring back to Edward Said, that is concerned with what kind of Palestinian state it is. To effectively address this, the post-marxist strategy is to build alliances between issue/community-specific groups and, in solidarity with each other, fight the fight on several different fronts. A sign that this may be the shape of things to come is a recent petition calling for action against violent "crimes against women". The text of the petition stated that women are always the first victims in an increasingly violent social context and demanded that all Palestinian sectors and institutions, including religious figures, intellectuals, teachers, and all popular and national forces, work to rid Palestinian society

of this phenomenon. Finally, the petition stated that violence against women was a human rights violation and its perpetrators were criminals. It was signed by 19 Palestinian organizations, including all of the party-affiliated women's committees, Bisan, PARC's Women's Unit, healthcare organizations, human rights organizations, and social services organizations (JMCC, 1994). Here, then, is a linkage between feminist, social, and nationalist groups launching a challenge against patriarchy and at the same time making this challenge a broad social and national responsibility.

The challenge to patriarchy is related to development and the struggle with capitalism through the location of resistance in the family. In another Foucauldian analysis of development, Marc DuBois reminds us that power is a relation, with its source in the micro-sphere from which influence radiates outward:

power consists of a set of relations rather than as a commodity and operates from the bottom to the top rather than vica versa....Relations of power do not determine other kinds of relations (economic, sexual, or family relationships) but are "immanent" in these microrelations. At a particular historical juncture some of these microrelations of power fit together or complement one another, a process that builds "strategies" of power--the weave of power relations that is the condition for macrorelations or power and more "general" or "global" forms of domination....In return, these superstructures of domination determine the environment of the microrelations and, hence, modify or influence them to a certain degree (DuBois, 1991:5).

Therefore, the state, being a macro-sphere structure, is not an effective location of struggle. Rather, the family, being

the original micro-sphere structure, is a more appropriate and effective place to start (1991:6). If capitalism is reliant on the appropriation of women's reproductive and subsistence labour, then the family as a site of resistance articulates the struggle with capitalism and patriarchy. DuBois, too, calls for local resistance "at the ongoing level of subjugation--the level at which one finds domination of everyday life being practiced" (1991:27). Again, the most common "level at which one finds domination of everyday life being practiced" is the family.

The prescription for micro-sphere-, including family, located struggle directs us back to our case at hand: women and the Palestinian struggle. As we have seen, Palestinian women's struggles have been multi-faceted in nature--against capitalist exploitation, Israeli occupation, and patriarchy--in efforts to maintain their livelihood and well-being, achieve national rights, and to secure democracy and human rights in Palestinian society. Nonetheless, although these are all "big" fights, the origin of their challenge has been in the imperative to fulfil their needs and meet their requirements as social reproducers. From this original impetus came a growing gender consciousness and feminist analysis of Palestinian society.

Nonetheless, women's role and imperative as social reproducers, the site of emancipatory action, is also one of exploitation and disempowerment. This contradiction underpins

Ridd's ruminations that women's power lies in their invisibility and separation from the public and formal sphere:

distinction between domestic and public orientations remains a useful model for understanding gender relations. This has been shown here to be particularly true when examining situations of political conflict where the line that divides the two spheres threatens to become blurred and where, as we have seen, strenuous efforts are made to restore it. But these chapters also suggest that such a division should not be correlated with non-political and political spheres of activity but rather with informal and formal spheres. The question may now be considered as to whether the raising of women's informal political powers to public awareness might reduce their effectiveness, for the evidence suggests that much of their strength lies in their diffuseness, intangibility, elusiveness and freedom from formal structures (Ridd, 1986:23).

The problem lies in the fact that, although it is true that women have learned how to use their "private" position in powerful ways, they are still denied access to the public, formal half of society. It is in the public sphere that men wield power over both the domestic (through legislation and other state mechanisms and public instruments) and non-domestic spheres (through their sheer domination of access to this arena). Women cannot claim this wide expanse of direct impact, although their activism certainly has been demonstrated to influence both private and public spheres.

In the Palestinian case, private sphere activity at once provided a venue for meeting both social reproduction and nationalist resistance needs. This was effected through the disarticulation from the Israeli economy and occupation structures, but in a way that both increased women's workload

and their gender consciousness. This contradiction heightened as women were increasingly "pushed back", thus intensifying their recognition of patriarchy as a site of struggle. While women found themselves even more exploited and disempowered (through extra work and signals, such as the hijabization campaign, that their status was subordinate) through efforts to retrench their domestic position, it became clearer that in order to confront these restrictions, women have to insist on their access rights to public social, economic, and political goods and resources.

5.5 Palestinian Women's Struggles: Implications for Theory and Research

This research project originally undertook to tell the story of women and Palestinian struggle, and along with that, attempted to answer a set of questions about development theory that emerged out of this account. In question was the relationship between development and resistance, the emancipatory and transformational possibilities of development as a mode of resistance for women and for society at large, and the direction in which theory must evolve and the perspectives it must incorporate in order to assist our fuller understanding of development processes. We may recall at this moment that our theoretical starting point was the notion of struggle in the articulation between capitalist and non-capitalist modes of production. Further, when adopting

articulationist theory, Foster-Carter (1978) cautions that one needs to be careful to avoid economism at the expense of analysis of other factors such as politics, culture, and ideology. Foster-Carter advocates the rejection of the analytical primacy of the relations of production "over those of exchange and indeed all else....it may be possible to undercut a sterile debate by focusing not on production but on the reproduction of total systems, in which of course exchange plays a crucial part. (How would you decide which of the heart or the stomach was 'basic'? The question is meaningless)" (Foster-Carter, 1978:76-77). Nevertheless, if the notion of struggle is our focus of analysis, then transformation, not mere reproduction, is at issue. Regardless, Foster-Carter's disposal of rigid marxist categories of analysis in favour of increased scope and flexibility of examination to include politics, ideology, and culture, open up the possibility of inserting other perspectives. Here can be added the critiques of articulationist theory that call for the inclusion of gender.

Returning to the theoretical questions then, we can now address the issue of struggle with a wider mandate than just an economistic analysis. Struggle can now also be about gender dynamics, and it can take place in the social, political, and ideological, as well as economic, realms. So, when answering to the issue of the relation between development and resistance, and indeed, the nature of

development itself, the answer seems to lie in the examination of struggle. In this sense, the notion of resistance transcends the boundaries of "armed struggle" to incorporate everyday, mundane, domestic acts (of defiance). In other words, struggle between non-capitalist and capitalist modes of production takes place on the site of social reproduction and subsistence production by women. This struggle both "subsidizes" capitalism as well as confronts it. Not only does this struggle occur on the economic level, but also on the social and political levels as well. For instance, both Mies (1986) and Peteet (1991) discuss how women's resistance activity often incorporates the politicization of their domestic roles. Where they differ is on the level of exploitation women experience as a result of this transformation and the emancipatory possibilities emerging as a result of it.

Planting a vegetable garden and canning the produce with other women becomes revolutionary *if* it challenges the capitalist and patriarchal status quo. In the Palestinian case this typical mode of struggle resisted articulation with Israeli capitalism and occupation as well as the patriarchal imperative to act as a house-bound wife. On the other hand, these acts reinforced, while all the while politicizing, women's domestic role and the very tasks and acts that subsidize Israeli capitalism and subscribe to patriarchal constraint. And so, the potential contained in these everyday

acts is both emancipatory and exploitive, and often determined by their direction and focus.

Nonetheless, without struggle it is nigh impossible to confront an exploitive and disempowering status quo. Again, this is why struggle is a necessary component of the kind of development that acts to improve communities' and individuals' equitable access to economic, political, and social resources. "Struggle" denotes a dynamism that "reproduction" (of a mode of production) does not. In turn, this dynamism creates possibilities for transformation whereas the implication is that reproduction is static. Returning to the case of Palestine, women began to direct their domestic labour to disarticulate from the Israeli economy and occupation. In turn, this had an impact on the direction of the Palestinian national struggle as well as the shape of Palestinian patriarchal society, if only in the emergence of women's gender consciousness as a result of their active participation in struggle. Even though this activity reinforced women's position as social reproducers, the society they were reproducing was transforming as a result of these same actions. However, in order to understand why and how this occurred, and is still occurring, we need to incorporate other factors beyond the economic into our analysis.

If the mechanics of reproduction and the dynamics of transformation are to be understood, then factors such as politics, ideology, society, gender, and so on, must be

examined, particularly if emancipatory potential is to be evaluated. Development, then, can be understood as a lateral rather than a (economistic) linear process, with many points and locales of struggle. For instance, Palestinian development cannot be understood without an examination of gender roles and the family, political dynamics, and the predominating ideologies of Palestinian nationalism and national unity, and conservatism. If these factors are left out of the analysis then all we are left with is how Palestinian women's social reproduction first "subsidized" Israeli capitalism, and then, redirected, helped to sustain resistance against the occupation. Only with an understanding of Palestinian political resistance and gender roles do we understand how women's redirected social reproduction became politicized to confront not only the occupation, but also Palestinian patriarchy. Subsequently, the emergence of Hamas is illuminated as a conservative reaction to women's empowerment and challenge to patriarchy, which in turn, both "pushes back" women's gains while at the same time heightens gender consciousness. Palestinian women have now begun to articulate this heightened gender consciousness with demands from other groups for a democratic Palestinian society. In this sense, it is clear, if we utilize many factors of analysis, that struggle implies a dynamism that has transformational potential on several sites: economic, political, social, and familial.

Not that all of this transformation is necessarily or immediately positive. For instance, women's politicized domestic labour sustained the intifada, which in turn contributed to the commencement of the peace talks that have yielded the new Palestinian autonomy and modernizationist development plans. In addition, women's public activism prompted a conservative response from sectors in Palestinian society. These developments have fostered change, though not necessarily progressive transformation. However, response to these changes has expanded Palestinian struggle to incorporate the nature of democracy in society and the achievement of women's human rights. Again, it is clear that struggle implies transformation rather than mere reproduction, and this struggle, on many sites, is key to development. Returning to Mies (1986) and Peteet (1991), it seems that the process of women's revolutionary struggles against capitalism and patriarchy are neither wholly emancipatory or exploitive, but hold the potential for both trends. With this equivocal conclusion it is useful to go back to Harding's recommendation that feminist analysis be capable of holding ambiguity.

Theory, then, must incorporate more than just economic factors in order to understand and explain the phenomenon of development. As we have seen, the struggle that is a central component of development takes place on several sites and through a myriad of venues. An understanding of gender, the family, civil society, the role of organizations, politics,

and ideology are necessary in order to decipher the Palestinian case. In contrast to traditional paradigms of development where the analysis is located primarily in classical economic knowledge, this critique of development theory has as its starting point an epistemological position that is positioned in other knowledge. So, not only must the factors of analysis be questioned and expanded, but the perspective from which development is examined must also be challenged. For instance, post-colonialist feminist theory has demonstrated that capitalist development in the underdeveloped world differs significantly from Western capitalism, both in historical formation, class formation, and structure. It is here that articulation of modes of production theory has been useful. In addition, post-colonialist theory has shown that Western ethnocentrism has been central to the Western capitalist system. Again, where few go far enough is in drawing the links between eurocentrism and sexism. Orientalism, as an imperial and as a male-dominated discourse, imposes power relations between nations and between men and women. As Irvin Cemil Schick notes,

As an ideology of colonization old and new, orientalism *makes use of* male-dominated discourse; but as male-dominant discourse *itself*, it serves to reproduce the skewed gender relations which it exploits. Thus, in power relations between nations and power relations between the sexes inheres a kind of dialectic that ought to imply a feminist agenda...(Schick, 1990:349).

Further, Reza Hammami and Martina Rieker explain, citing Claudia von Werlhof, that capitalism (which all traditional

development paradigms centre on), relies on these inegalitarian polar divisions that are imposed by orientalism and sexism:

Capitalism functions according to dichotomies, a principle of division. Philosophically, dichotomies never mean different but equal--they always imply hierarchy. The elimination of these dichotomies, male/female, First World/Third World, is thus not possible within a capitalist system (Hammami, Rieker, 1988:100).

Additionally, marxist perspectives are also frequently riddled with orientalist bias (Hammami, Rieker, 1988:96-97), and Western feminist writing on "other" women is certainly not exempt from these tendencies. Chandra Talpade Mohanty notes that Western women, as a product of the power relations that exist between First and Third Worlds, also reproduce sexist orientalist bias:

For in the context of a first/third world balance of power, feminist analyses which perpetrate and sustain the hegemony of the idea of the superiority of the West produce a corresponding set of universal images of the "third world woman", images such as the veiled woman, the powerful mother, the chaste virgin, the obedient wife, etc. These images exist in universal, ahistorical splendor, setting in motion a colonialist discourse which exercises a very specific power in defining, coding, and maintaining existing first/third world connections (Mohanty, 1991b:73).

The liberal women's movement, prominent in the West and among bourgeois class fractions in the South, in many cases acts to reinforce capitalist patriarchy, whereas it is the agenda of feminism to subvert patriarchal capitalism and to transform the current structures to create a more equitable and just society (hooks, 1984).

These considerations of the divisions and biases that power relations impose lead us to believe that theory is often more about its formulators than the problem or the subject at hand. Eliminating or expanding old perspectives to incorporate new epistemological outlooks radically alters the perception of development and appropriate locations of struggle. This discovery of the relationship between epistemology, theory, and practice, more notably elucidated by Edward Said in Orientalism (1978), is a caution to prompt researchers and practitioners to adopt more open, flexible, and responsive approaches to each development context.

An example of the contradictions inherent in the triangular relations between epistemology, theory, and practice is captured in an interview that I conducted in Rafah Camp in Gaza during the summer of 1993. More an exchange between two new friends than a formal interview, I met Majda through her sister in a social situation. However, as with much research, she related to me a story that I thought captured many problems involved with Western-perspective research of Middle Eastern women.

I travelled to Rafah Camp on the edge of the Gaza Strip with Selwa, who was going home to her family. As we left the taxi to walk to her home, she asked me to put on a headscarf. As a result of the *hijab* campaign it was exceedingly rare in the Gaza Strip to see women in public spaces without headcovering. I put on my headscarf that I had put in my bag

especially for this purpose and we proceeded. Later that evening her sister Majda, an activist with the local PFLP women's committee, and I spoke at length. She told me that she and another sister, Maha, had never worn *hijab*, unlike Selwa, until a couple of years into the intifada when "they" came to her father's house to ask him why his two daughters did not cover their heads. The father then approached Majda and Maha and told them that it would be a good idea to wear *hijab* outside. Now, Majda and Maha both wear the *hijab* outside, but not inside, even if non-family males are visiting (as Selwa does). Majda told me that she was happy to see that I was wearing *hijab* on the Gaza streets because it demonstrated a respect for their customs. It was at this point that she told me about a Western researcher, of Arab origin, who came to Gaza to hold workshops with women. Majda was insulted by this woman because of her immodest behaviour (she did not wear *hijab*, wore a low-cut shirt, and smoked cigarettes in front of male strangers). Majda also felt that her grasp of the problems facing Gazan women was superficial. As I sat listening to Majda I wondered if her perception of this researcher's understanding of the Gazan women's context was coloured by her sense of insult by the researcher's behaviour. I also wondered what kind of information this researcher was able to gather from women whom she had insulted, probably quite unwittingly. More importantly, this researcher's approach struck a blow at feminist solidarity and

solidarity between Palestinians and non-Palestinians. Despite this researcher's Arab origin, she was perceived as a Westerner and a crude outsider because of her insensitivity to the social, cultural, and political Gazan context. The importance of supporting (as opposed to leading or presumptuously urging them to fight battles in a way that I think appropriate) Palestinian women to fight their own battles against patriarchy and other forms of oppression struck me at that moment. The *hijab* is not *my* battle as a Westerner or as a feminist. When Palestinian women decide to launch protests by discarding the *hijab* then my responsibility will be to follow suit.

It is important here to remember that wearing the *hijab* has been a form of anti-colonial protest in other contexts, most notably seen in the activism of Algerian women (Fanon, 1967), and has also been an instrument of extended freedom as adopted by lower-middle class women in Cairo (Rugh, 1985; MacLeod, 1992). As Rema Hammami (1990) points out, it is not the object of the *hijab* itself that is oppressive, it is the fact that women are being forced to wear it. Of course, then, in the Gazan context the *nijab* becomes a tool and symbol of oppression. Nevertheless, the women of Palestine know this and are fighting this battle on other fronts--in our case study this contest is being waged by the UNDP Task Force on Women in their efforts to confront patriarchal structures in the formal and public sphere. The coalition between the

various women's organizations and other NGOs to link democracy and women's human rights is another example of this campaign. Too often Western feminism has lept on the facts of the *hijab* and political Islam without taking the time to thoroughly understand the complexities of the context in which they belong. Feminist research needs to be doubly sensitive to the matrix of forces, pressures, and opportunities women find themselves having to navigate; feminist research needs to be with women, not for them or about them. Only when object-subject research positioning is challenged will this transformation in the purpose of research come about and true solidarity with "other's" struggles emerge.

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