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**The Trend in Youth Non-Voting:
Redefining Youth Citizenship in a Neo-Liberal Canada**

by

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Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfilment
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Abstract

This thesis assesses the recent trends in youth non-voting in Canada and the definition of citizenship for young adults in light of the recent rise of the neo-liberal governing philosophy used by the Canadian government.

The research shows how recent trends in youth non-voting are a part of a much wider problem confronting the entire conception of youth citizenship as a whole. It also looks at how the definition of Canadian citizenship has evolved since confederation, especially for young adults and in light of the rise of neo-liberalism. This is supplemented with a discussion of proposed solutions to improve voter turnout among youth, mainly electoral reform and increased civic education. Though these two solutions may help to alleviate the concerns some have over the democratic condition of Canadian political institutions, they will not be as useful if the wider implications of culture and ideology are not considered.

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Introduction

The right to vote is the hallmark of a democracy, as it gives citizens the chance to express themselves politically by choosing their government. Voting has traditionally been associated with feelings of civic duty and pride, and as a right that each citizen should exercise and cherish. The Chief Electoral Officer of Canada explains the relationship between democracy and voting and the importance of the individual:

The basis of democracy – indeed, the purpose of democracy – is the recognition and respect for the intrinsic worth of each person. Many would say this is recognition of the soul in each one of us. This manifests itself in our society by the equality of each person before the law and the state. Democracy also entails the right of all of us to participate in the decisions that affect us and in determining the rules and the laws by which we agree to live together. These fundamental rights find full meaning only when one actively participates in public life. Therefore, to give true meaning to democracy, the engagement of all citizens is required. The essential first manifestation of that engagement is through the act of voting (Kingsley, 2003).

However, recent trends in non-voting in Canada and other countries challenge this ideal, and puts into question the idea of democracy as a whole. In particular, it is young people who are choosing not to exercise their right to vote, which has caused a great amount of concern. When only around 20 percent of eligible Canadian voters in the youngest age bracket turned out to vote in the 2000 election, “much ink flowed, and various explanations and remedies were evoked” (Verboczy and Giguère, 2005: 84).

As one of the principle actors in the search for a rationale for this non-voting phenomenon, Elections Canada commissioned a report entitled *Explaining the Turnout Decline in Canadian Federal Elections: A New Survey of Non-Voters* (hereafter the *New Survey of Non-Voters*). This report identified correlates of not voting and important attitudinal and behavioural factors that affect whether a citizen votes, which are: feelings

of inefficacy; civic duty and political interest; and the perception of the effectiveness of the vote (Pammett and LeDuc, 2003: 1). Voting patterns are a good indicator of how included citizens feel, and when citizens are not voting it questions not only the effectiveness of democracy, but the broader ability of a country to encourage active participation and a sense of belonging among its citizens. “Voting in elections is part of a larger cluster of values and beliefs that are a part of our political culture. We have seen that feelings of political trust and being represented are associated with voting, and that low feelings of efficacy are associated with not voting” (Pammett and LeDuc, 2003: 355). The term social capital is used when trying to quantify this idea of active participation, as it describes the value of social networks and the ability for the people within those networks to provide support for each other. The *New Survey of Non-Voters* concluded that not only were non-voters less likely to vote again, but they were also less likely to be active politically on any level, whether that be through signing petitions, participating in boycotts or demonstrations, attending meetings, or being involved in letter writing campaigns (Pammett and LeDuc, 2003: 43). Of all the socio-demographic factors that affect participation rates and the culture of voting, which include education level, income level, and recentness of immigration (Blais, Gidengil, Nadeau, and Nevitte, 2002: 50), it is the generational aspect that is most prevalent, as “older generations of Canadians [think] of voting in elections as civic duty and [display] higher levels of trust regarding politics” (Pammett and LeDuc, 2004: 347).

So what has been suggested to encourage active political participation among young people, and more importantly, how do any proposed solutions affect broader

conceptions of citizenship and belonging? The *New Survey of Non-Voters* allowed respondents to identify a number of ways to encourage greater interest in politics for youth, two of which being electoral reform and increased political education. Where electoral reform would augment feelings of representation, greater political education would allow for a better informed electorate, and together these would help to mitigate the negative aspects of the attitudinal and behavioural correlates mentioned above. Though electoral reform is not presently on the federal political agenda, provinces like British Columbia are taking real steps toward implementing electoral system change (through the Citizen's Assembly on Electoral Reform (British Columbia, 2004)) and it is likely that other provinces will follow suit, which could in turn put pressure on federal politicians. As for political education, Elections Canada spent a record amount of money on encouraging young people to vote for the 2004 federal election, and many media outlets produced programming aimed at reversing the trend of youth non-voting (Pammett and LeDuc, 2004: 338). Secondary schools across the country have also participated in electoral simulations during recent elections, which were the result of encouragement and materials from Elections Canada. Though electoral reform and increased political education would be greatly beneficial, the impact that they would have on Canadian citizenship (especially as viewed through the relationship of citizenship with governing institutions) is a point of question.

Taking into consideration theories of citizenship, the analyses of trends in non-voting among young people and subsequent proposals for solutions only address one aspect of citizenship: the political right to vote. Focusing on voting behaviour and what

might be done to reverse negative trends in voting ignores the larger affects of ideological trends and the impact they have on all aspects of citizenship, which include not only the legal right to vote, but also feelings of political obligation, the construction of identity, and the willingness to participate. The neo-liberal governing practices that have evolved over the past two decades have emphasized the importance of the individual's rights at the cost of social programs traditionally associated with Canadian citizenship, which has had a profound effect on attempts at defining a cohesive idea of Canadian belonging. For youth, this is compounded by the fact that in the turbulent time leading up to their eighteenth birthday, they have not been viewed as citizens capable of participating for themselves because of their cognitive inability to make responsible decisions. By examining the challenges faced by youth citizenship in the present political climate, it can be seen that encouraging increased voting among young people does not address any of these more complex ideas. Though trends in non-voting can be an indicator of wider feelings of disengagement, any type of reform with the goal of increasing voter turnout among young people would do only that. Even if young people began to participate in elections at a greater rate as a result of electoral reform or citizenship education, there is no guarantee that other factors that affect citizenship (especially ideological) will cease to have an influence on the lack of social capital among young people. So long as the reigning ideology encourages and emphasizes the importance of the individual at the cost of the community, Canadians will continue to feel disconnected from each other and their political institutions. The recent focus on improving rates of voter turnout emphasizes this conclusion, as it addresses the individual's responsibility to vote, but not the

responsibilities of the wider political community (especially governing institutions) to encourage a wider sense of citizenship and belonging. In other words, in regards to the relationship between trends in non-voting and broader conceptions of youth citizenship, the fact that young people are not voting at high rates in Canada is only a small part of a larger problem of youth feeling excluded in a broader sense of citizenship.

It will be the purpose of this research to show how through the wider framework of citizenship and ideology, attempts at increasing voter participation among youth through electoral reform and citizenship education only address the legal right to vote. By focusing on the legal right to vote, the wider implications of ideology on citizenship may not be addressed. This research will have three chapters: the first will be a theoretical discussion of citizenship and current governing ideologies; the second will be a critique of electoral reform and its ability to change how citizens are represented; and the third will be an evaluation of methods of political education.

Chapter One will discuss ideas of inclusion and exclusion, the various elements of citizenship, the history of citizenship in Canada the rise of neo-liberalism, and the decline in the emphasis of government on social citizenship over the past two decades. The focus of Chapter One will be on the interplay between youth and citizenship, informed by a critical feminist approach. The goal of Chapter One will be to provide a definition of citizenship and how it has changed over time and to provide a theoretical framework for the rest of the research.

Chapter Two will discuss the significance of electoral reform as a method by which to reverse the trend in non-voting. Though the focus of this research is on the

interactions of young adults and politics, there is very little research done in the arena of increasing the representation of young adults. For this reason, the focus of this chapter will be on the meaning of representation and the experiences of women and how their representation is affected by electoral reform. This chapter will examine definitions of democracy and the liberal democratic state, analyze the discourse on the democratic deficit in Canada, discuss the theoretical aspects of representation, and provide a critique of the effects of electoral reform on women. The goal of Chapter Two will be to show how because of its limits, better representation is not guaranteed by electoral reform, and therefore is not a reliable way to increase voter participation. This will show that not only is a focus on electoral reform with the purpose of increasing participation unable to address aspects of citizenship other than voting rights, it may not even be able to address the issue of encouraging voting through better representation.

Chapter Three will be an analysis of civic education as a means by which to reverse the trend in non-voting, as well as who is responsible for this education. Chapter Three will analyse the generational differences in feelings of civic duty and the corresponding levels of trust in politicians and political institutions, discuss general feelings of a lack of information among young people, critique the methods and effects of political education (through secondary schools and the media), and analyze the role of the citizen in the education process. The goal of Chapter Three will be to show that though various forms of political education very important in general, may be effective in informing youth about how and when to vote, and may build community through the

sharing of information, it will not have as great an effect on the Canadian community as a whole if it is not accompanied by a greater ideological shift in governance.

Though both electoral reform and political education may be beneficial to young people and all Canadians, it is the purpose of this thesis to only examine these two suggested solutions with the purpose of increasing voter participation. Though it may not be likely that many young adults will be physically represented in parliament, it does not mean that those politicians elected to office cannot bring to light and emphasize the importance of issues that deal with younger generations. The likelihood of this happening depends on whether youth are inclined to become more involved politically, the responsibility of which belongs not only to youth and their educators, but also needs the encouragement the governing institutions in which they participate.

It is difficult to predict the outcome of any change or reform. Though voter participation may be a good indicator of how politically involved citizens are in their country, it does not speak to the political environment in which these political activities take place. This is explained in the most recent prediction for the fate of voter turnout in the latest election study:

The circularity of the relationships between the forces surrounding the phenomenon of the turnout decline makes it possible to be optimistic or pessimistic about the future. At the moment, the pessimistic view seems more realistic. Whether the period of minority government that we are now entering can bring about some moderation of these trends, or whether it will in the end merely reinforce them, remains a question about which we can only speculate. Declining turnout, increasing regionalization, decreasing party competitiveness, lesser cultural importance given to civic attitudes and participation – all of these contemporary trends that have been developing for some time will not be dislodged by a single election result. And all of these developments appear to reinforce each other. But it is difficult to believe that these trends can continue indefinitely. Sooner

or later, voting turnout will stabilize, a coherent national government will emerge, competitiveness will improve, and exhortations toward civic-mindedness will have some effect, and some developments in one area can affect the others. The prospect of a trend reversal, operated by a virtuous circle as opposed to a vicious one, could be just beyond the horizon. Or further away (Pammett and LeDuc, 2004: 358-59).

This speaks not only to the interdependence of the choices that governments and citizens make, but also to the ambiguity of the future when trying to figure what might be a part of Canada's political future. To research a problem to which no one has a definitive answer may seem a frustrating task, but coming to an understanding about the complex interplay between the concepts of citizenship and suggested reforms is a step in the right direction.

Chapter One – Conceptualizing Canadian Youth Citizenship

The right to vote is only one legally defined aspect of citizenship, and though it is an important aspect of the relationship between individuals and the state, there are elements of identity and belonging that are a part of it as well. The focus of this chapter is citizenship, and it is not only important to understand the definition of what citizenship is, but the context in which these definitions take place. As with many countries, Canada is struggling to redefine itself in an age of globalization, and as a result there have been decisions made that go against views that Canadians have held about themselves and that others have held about Canada in the past, and this is especially true when it comes to the realm of social policy. “In the current literature on the place of equality in the development of social policy in Canada, there are many contrasts drawn between the achievements of the past and the limitations of the present” (Siltanen, 2002: 395).

The connection between citizenship and social policy is an important one, because while citizenship defines what rights and duties a citizen has as a member of a state, social and other government policies define what the state will provide for its citizens. The past two decades have been rife with governmental concern over debts and deficits, and it has been a priority of the Canadian government to ensure that Canada maintains a strong economy. However, these priorities are not always seen as the most virtuous goals to pursue. “For those with hopes for progressive change, a dominant theme [in government policy] is one of loss – of a shift away from a commitment to equality as a social policy goal, toward more minimal, and less morally worthy, policy ambitions” (Siltanen, 2002: 396). Canada has been steadily moving away from the post-World War II welfare state where the government saw benefit to collectively providing for the

citizenry into a neo-liberal state where the priorities are primarily with providing for the economy. This shift has heralded a change not only with government policy, but how citizens are viewed, and how citizens view each other within the Canadian community.

Many summarize this shift in the objectives of Canadian social policy as a move away from the social rights of citizenship: rights that enable citizens to participate fully in the resources and duties of their communities. Taking the place of the social rights-bearing citizen, it is suggested, is one who is re-familialized, individualized and marketized (Siltanen, 2002: 396).

This move from finding importance in the interests of the collective to giving priority to the interests of the individual has had consequences on how Canadians view themselves in relation to the state and each other, which has meant that more traditional views of citizenship have been questioned and redefined. It will be in these circumstances that this chapter will discuss the meaning of citizenship, and most importantly the meaning of youth citizenship in Canada.

There is an added layer of complexity when youth citizenship is added to this definition, as the transitional period of youth is complicated by varying levels of cognitive growth and identity building. Traditionally, citizenship as is related to younger generations has not been a part of the wider definition of citizenship, as they have not been seen having the capability to be responsible citizens. This exclusion can be compared to the exclusion of women and other disenfranchised groups of the past, and as a result the literature regarding those historical exclusions will provide a basis for much of the definition of youth citizenship. However, their exclusion differs on a major level, as the cognitive ability to make responsible decisions is dependant upon age. It is not within the scope of this research to discuss differing levels of cognitive development, but

it is important to understand how citizenship issues affect young people, whether they are below or above the age of majority. It has only been since the creation of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child that the literature has explored the basis upon which children (those who are under the legally defined age of 18) have claim to the rights of citizens. Though children do not have the ability to legally vote, a definition of youth citizenship that includes how children are viewed by the state acknowledges how future voters are viewed the time period leading up to when young people are permitted to engage directly through voting. Authors like Stasiulis (Stasiulis, 2002) and Chen (Chen, 2003) show how conceptions of children by the state affect who is deemed worthy enough of the protections of the state, namely children seen as victims, in a neo-liberal era. Making connections between child and adult citizenship helps to show what factors are at play during this time of transition, where young people move from being children seen as victims worthy of state protection to adults who have the responsibility to make decisions.

The connection between citizenship and voting behaviour is clearly that non-voting is an indicator of a loss of social capital, which signals the weakening of the social networks that connect individuals. Citizenship is one of these primary networks and it is something that individuals living in the same country do not choose to share, but share out of necessity as members of a wider global population. However, citizens can choose whether or not they wish to exercise the rights bestowed upon them as a result of their citizenship, and voting behaviour is an indicator of the satisfaction individuals feel about their citizenship as a whole. Those who do not vote are not otherwise engaging, which is

signalling a shift away from traditional forms of political engagement, especially by young people. This phenomenon will be explored in this chapter, which has five sections, will provide a basis for discussing how perceived solutions to the problem of youth non-voting.

The first section will explore the fundamentals of citizenship, and will explain the four elements of citizenship, which are: citizenship as a legal status, citizenship as a set of rights, citizenship as a mode of participation, and citizenship as a method of identification; the second section will add the layer of youth citizenship to the concept of citizenship as a whole, and will show the evolution of how young adults have been viewed by the state, and will discuss how this potentially affects future participation. The third section will describe the evolution of citizenship in Canada, which will begin with the loosening of ties with the United Kingdom after World War I and World War II and will end with the rise of neo-liberalism. An examination of this time period is crucial in understanding the reasons why some Canadians feel as though Canada has left a 'golden age' behind, as it was during this time where many of the social programs were created that many Canadians are proud of. The fourth section will address this decline in social citizenship, and will show how through the pressures of balanced budgets and debt reduction has taken a toll on the social programs that once defined Canadian citizenship and will provide a basis for how citizenship is constructed at the present. The final section will describe the decline in voter turnout, the birth of which parallels in many ways the decline of social citizenship. This section will explore the period between 1984

and the present, as it was during this time period that neo-liberalism was on the rise and voter turnout began to noticeably decline.

The Fundamentals of Citizenship

The meaning of citizenship is not an easy one to answer in any definitive way because it incorporates a number of different elements which may change within the life of a citizen. Definitions of citizenship also reflect competing political traditions, because of both its contextualized and contested nature (Lister, 2003: 13), especially in a country as diverse as Canada. Citizenship sometimes runs the danger of meaning what people choose it to mean if the elements of citizenship are not agreed upon, which again is a very difficult but important task. One of the major debates concerning the definition of citizenship is the balance of duties and rights, which translates into what citizens are entitled to and what they need to do in return (Lister, 2003: 15). This is often a point of contention between governments and those who are governed, an example of one such conflict is over the duty of the citizen to pay taxes and how the government sees fit to return those tax dollars into services. For these reasons, citizenship will be described as not only being a status given to residents of a country implying common governance, but also as having four elements.

Citizenship connotes membership within a bordered territory and an internationally recognized state and defines the relationship between the individual and the state, ever increasingly through the language of rights. Modern citizenship thus represents more than the right to hold a passport and to cross borders as a legally recognized national citizen...the study of modern citizenship [can be categorized] into four dominant perspectives – citizenship as legal status, citizenship as rights, citizenship as participation, and citizenship as identity and solidarity (Brodie, 2002: 379).

Jans (2004) describes these same four elements as such: (a) Citizenship as a whole of responsibilities (I have to be a decent citizen); (b) Citizenship as a whole of rights (I get to vote); (c) Citizenship as an identity (I am Canadian); (d) Citizenship as participation (I feel involved and can participate in community life) (Jans, 2004: 38). By citizenship as having responsibility for a legal status acknowledges that as a citizen, individuals act according to the laws as prescribed by governments, and is for the most part (not taking into consideration those who willingly break the law) a widely accepted feature of citizenship shared by all citizens.

Citizenship as a 'whole of rights' refers to all of the freedoms that citizens have an entitlement to, as well as all the actions that they have freedom from. This portion of citizenship includes what is often seen as the most fundamental right of citizens, the right to vote. For Canadians, these rights are prescribed most notably through the *Charter of Rights and Freedoms*, a constitutionally enshrined document that has been a corner piece of Canadian legislation since its inception in 1982. Citizenship as an characteristic of identification is an important aspect to discuss, but for the purposes of this research will not be an area of concentration insofar as to say that citizenship has an inextricable link to identity as it informs the social networks of individuals, which in turn influence the identity of these individuals. Though what young people identify with is important, it is not the purpose of this research to explore the identities of youth as it is not important if young people are individually identifying with being a Canadian citizen, but why they are not engaging with and whether they are viewed as belonging to and the wider Canadian community. Though the *right* to vote may be firstly associated with the aspect of

citizenship concerning the whole of rights associated with it, it is the *exercise* of the vote that is linked to the participatory element of citizenship. As such, it is this element that is most important when using voting behaviour as an indicator of belonging to the national community. This leads to a question not only of ‘what is Citizenship’ but also ‘who belongs?’

Contingent upon what citizenship entails is who has the right to claim benefit to the possession of it, which has historically been informed by what the governing philosophy views as public and private interests. Though the following diagram is premised on ideas that are no longer formal realities, it gives an example of what historically has constituted a citizen, and how the exclusion of certain groups (in this case, women) has been justified in the past.

Figure 1 – The Public-Private Dichotomy and Citizenship (Lister, 2003: 71)

PUBLIC (MALE) CITIZEN	PRIVATE (FEMALE) CITIZEN
- abstract, disembodied, mind	- particular, embodied, rooted in nature
- rational, able to apply dispassionate reason and standards of justice	- emotional, irrational, subject to desire and passion, unable to apply standards of justice
- impartial, concerned with public interest	- partial, preoccupied in the private, domestic concerns
- independent, active, heroic and strong	- dependant, passive, weak
- upholding the realm of freedom, of the human	- maintaining the realm of necessity, of the natural and repetitious

Though formal and legal barriers against discrimination of gender (as well as other factors) have been eliminated, the importance of this diagram is not to try and apply it to how men and women are seen today, but to show what historical attitudes have shaped present ideas of inclusion and exclusion. Historically, the ideal citizens were landowners, and for that reason came the exclusion of all those who were not able to do so, including

women and slaves. “Many Canadians, including women, were denied political rights on the grounds that they did not possess the necessary qualities to exercise the duties and enjoy the privileges of citizenship. The ‘ideal of citizenship’ resulted from a process that systematically excluded all but an elite class of male landowners” (Trimble and Arscott, 2003: 103). These public citizens were attributed with characteristics of rationality, impartiality and independence, and were seen to be the protectors of all those who could not speak for themselves. This characterization of the public contributed to the opposite characterization of the private, a sphere for the most part associated with women. The characteristics of these non-citizens spoke to the fact that they were unable to make the important decisions of political life, which included irrationality, partiality, dependence, and being overly emotional. Though this dichotomy is wholeheartedly stereotypical and full of negative gender stereotypes for both men and women, it is important to understand that it was this way of defining who was included and excluded from citizenship that was the basis for the rise of feminism.

The magnificent enterprise of women’s struggle has tried to tame the ‘daemonic turbulence of nature’—or at least to ensure that women do not continue to suffer economically, socially, and politically, simply because they are women. The feminist rallying cries have been: given women the means to control their bodies, to control their reproduction; give women the means to earn their living outside their homes, beyond the control of their fathers and the fathers of their children; give women the voice to proclaim their views in public places to contribute as lawmakers and regulators of the public sphere, to be politicians (O’Neil, 1993: 316).

This shows how historically women and others have been excluded on the grounds that they were unsuited to public life, and gives an example of the information put forward in Figure 1.

Though this may seem a figment of a distance past, it was not until 1918 that the franchise was awarded to women and until 1960 that the franchise was awarded to natives. It has taken less than 100 years to arrive at the legal definition of citizenship that Canada has today, and it has been the result of the work of many disenfranchised groups that the greatest changes have been made, and there are still many cultural and ideological barriers for those who still struggle to reap the rewards of citizenship. Up until the mid 1980s, women were not prominent parts of Canada's legislatures and, especially in leadership roles, have had difficulties dealing with sexism, gender-based assumptions and value judgements (Erickson, 2003; Everitt and Gidengil, 2003; Gidengil and Everitt, 2002; Pitre, 2003; Sampert and Trimble, 2003; Trimble and Arscott, 2003). Even though current practices may be inclusive, it was not so long ago that the opposite was true.

Historically, those who have the franchise have been those who are deemed to be deserving of the title of citizenship, a right that now includes those including and above the age 18. It is not the purpose of this research to argue for the further inclusion of young people, as they already have the right to vote, but to explore the reasons for which they are not exercising the franchise. This includes how those outside of the younger generations (mainly governing bodies) view 'youth' as a group, and what sort of encouragement there is for young people to become more involved at the political level. Before being able to fully understand how a conception of youth citizenship fits into Canadian citizenship as a whole, it is important to understand what exactly what is meant by the phrase 'youth.'

Negotiating Youth Citizenship

Generally speaking, groups are difficult to define. There are many different group characteristics that exist to disprove any sort of conclusions or generalizations that can be made about any type of group. For example, all Western Canadians have the fact that they live west of the Ontario border in common, but this does not mean that they are one homogenous group. This is the same for young voters, though they may have a certain number of birthdays in common, it does not mean that they are all the same. However, for the purposes of realizing why youth as a group are considered to be non-voters, the group definition is relatively easy. For the purposes of this research, youth will be defined as those Canadians who were between the ages of 18-30 for the elections of the past two decades. However, it should be noted that the age of 18 is not just a magical number that determines when a citizen is able to engage with society, but the legal age that allows them to participate *fully* through voting as defined by the state. There has been some debate as to whether limiting the vote to those over the age of 18 is against the *Charter of Rights and Freedoms*, but it was concluded that “it does not appear to be defensible given the current state of constitutional law to maintain that section 3 of the Charter requires that the voting age be lowered below 18” (Garant, 1991: 87). Garant argues that the idea of changing the voting age needs more research, including a more in depth look at the psychology of young people to “formulate the most precise possible definition of the time at which they are capable of moral and political judgement” (Garant, 1991: 87).

However, there are some authors who advocate for a more inclusive definition of citizenship that includes those under the age of 18. These authors believe that the “adult tendency to view those under the age of 18 primarily in terms of their future potential...belittles their present agency” (Stasiulis, 2002: 508). When thinking of young people as only future rights bearers, they argue that it may take away from any engagement they might have before they reach the age of majority (Roche, 1999: 482). Stasiulis describes the status of child citizenship after the 1989 adoption of the *United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child*,

Rather than viewing children as ‘pre-citizens,’ or as silent, invisible, passive objects of parental and/or state control and thus justifiably excluded from many civil and political citizenship rights, children are cast as full human beings, invested with agency, integrity, and decision-making capacities. In other words the convention not only constructs children as persons and as rights-bearing citizens with a range of social, political and civil rights, but also calls upon states to ensure that they are active, participating citizens, playing a role in governance ‘according to their age and maturity,’ rather than simply being passively governed (Stasiulis, 2002: 509).

This conception of children as citizens is often a difficult one to consider, as it goes against many of the values held regarding childhood. The main value associated with children is that of innocence, and sparing children the rigours of public decision making is often paramount in the minds of those who wish to protect them.

Innocence and victimization constitute the ethical and political foundation of the child-citizen’s claim on the public agenda and entitlements to collective resources...Children are blameless victims of, to name a few things, poverty, abuse, and neglect, drunken driving, and smoking in restaurants. Children’s victimization often presupposes losing the much-fetishized quality of innocence. The innocent, victimized child is a rare subject who can pass neo-liberal scrutiny and be recognized as the citizen with legitimate entitlements (Chen, 2003: 190).

It is not the purpose of this research to challenge the idea that children should be held responsible for what they do, or to argue for the inclusion of those under the age of 18 into the political sphere by lowering the voting age. However, it is important to realize that the characterization of children as victims may have consequences for how they are viewed by society as a whole in the future and when these children turn 18, because those who are characterized as victims at any age are seen as needing help and protection, and not able to make decisions.

Though there are varying degrees of cognitive awareness for anyone, regardless of their age, it is important to note that for the most part, citizens between the ages of 18 and 30 are going through a time of important changes in their life, moving from being children under the care of their parents and the state to being adults under their own care. What is most important about the category of 'youth' is that it is a time of transition.

The period of our lives between our twenties and our thirties is typically one of considerable change. This is the time when people are most likely to settle into a job, to marry, to purchase a home and to put down roots in their community. All of these changes may enhance people's sense of having a stake in the political process and may also expose them to social pressures that reinforce their sense of civic duty (Blais et al., 2002: 50).

This period before the age of 30 is also a crucial time where important ideas can be learned and challenged (Adsett, 2003: 250). The ability of young voters to tackle critical questions depends on whether they are viewed as being up to the task. As a result of adult constructions of what youth is, young voters might feel alienated because of how they were viewed as children in the past. Just as young people do not magically change the day they turn 18, the attitudes of institutions towards young people does not necessarily change at that time either. "Citizenship is a status traditionally reserved for adults.

Therefore, while many people might accept that youth are *citizens*, at the same time they might be sceptical of the notion that youth, even those over 18, are full citizens.

Somehow it seems that they cannot be more than ‘citizens-in-becoming’” (Beauvais, McKay, and Seddon, 2001: 1). The existing conceptions about children as immature and not being full citizens carry on into young adulthood, and this is why it is so important to make sure that young voters are fully included in a definition of citizenship. Young voters meet all of the requirements of citizenship, and as such are affected by how the definition of citizenship changes, as will be described in the following section.

The Evolution of Citizenship in Canada

When looking at the historical roots of citizenship in Canada, the themes present are legal responsibility, rights, identity, and participation, as well as how diversity over time has challenged definitions of who belongs. The definition of Canadian citizenship has evolved drastically since confederation and today, especially through the effects of neo-liberal governing practices, feelings of national community among Canadians is diminished (Brodie, 2002: 44). The number of individuals included in the definition of citizen has expanded, and now those who are allowed to enjoy the benefits of citizenship far outnumber those who cannot. However, with the focus on individualism put forward by governments of today and the erosion of many aspects of social citizenship, there are still challenges that face even the inclusive definition of citizenship that Canada has today. There will be four main ideas expressed in this section: the first will explore the concept of citizenship in general, the second will discuss early contradictions between citizen and subject in Canada, the third will look at the how the country went from ‘two

founding nations' to one with 'three nations' to one of diverse population, and the final will introduce the challenges that the neo-liberal and global politics of today present to citizenship. The purpose of this section is to see how citizenship in Canada has been defined in the past and present, as well as to lay the groundwork for the age cohort analysis of the following section on voter turnout decline.

It is easy to hope that all citizens might react in the same manner and feel the same way about their country. "Citizenship is a concept with even greater potential than a flag or a national anthem. Unlike our race, our ethnicity, our language, our religion, or any other personal or group characteristic, citizenship is a characteristic that everyone in the community can, in theory, equally enjoy" (Kaplan, 1993: 3). For the state to function there needs to be an assumption that all of those within the state have an equal basis for life. Without this idea that all citizens are equal before the law, national institutions are unable to function. For the introduction of his article on the diversity of the Canadian citizenry, Morton describes his ideal definition of citizen. Citizenship "is a means of categorizing individuals and of giving them an identity. Citizenship defines an individual's rights, responsibilities, and opportunities; it also implies loyalty and commitment to a national entity. A citizen can claim the protection of his or her nation, and by the same token, is compelled to contribute to that protection" (Morton, 1993: 50). This is very much a classical notion of citizenship, one that has been present since the early city-states of Athens and Rome. Classical ideals of citizenship bestowed citizenship rights only upon a select few, and along with the privilege of citizenship came political rights that were valued and carried great prestige. In ancient city-states, all

citizens participated in government, but the definition of citizen excluded women, slaves and foreigners. Throughout history, the notions surrounding the relationship of government to people has changed and evolved, including not only these early ideas of citizen, but later the ideas of subject under monarchs and then reincarnations of classic definitions of citizen as revolutions against the monarchy took place, most notably in France.

From the period of early colonization to after World War I, Canadians were a blend of both citizens and subjects. During this time, what would be Canada went from being colonies of France and England to a young country facing the World Wars. “In discussing the roots of Canadian citizenship, it is necessary to abandon the word, for the moment. The inhabitants of the British Isles were subjects, not citizens, owing their allegiance to monarchs and not republics or city-states” (Bothwell, 1993: 27). The differences between citizen and subject in North America were debated, specifically through the conflicts involving Loyalists in what would become the United States. World War I and World War II tested Canada’s relationship to the United Kingdom, and at the end “Canadians embraced the overdue notion of an unhyphenated and proud Canada in 1945, it was in part because its greatest rival for the allegiance of Canadians – being a British subject – was no longer either glorious or free” (Morton, 1993: 47). Though Morton is somewhat idealistic when he refers to an unhyphenated Canada (as there are still Canadians today who mix other identities with ‘Canadian’), at the time it was an important moment in the creation of a unique Canadian citizenry. In the years

that followed, *The Citizenship Act* was forged and so began a time when Canadians would define and redefine what it meant to be a part of Canada.

The nation-building that occurred after World War I is something that we are still in the process of doing today, albeit in a different way ideologically. The focus then was on building a healthy welfare state that provided social services for citizens, where now the focus is being more economically viable, which has meant dismantling parts of the welfare state. However, defining nation in Canada has been wrought with difficulty, and it has faced the same problems historically as it does today. Canada has been viewed in the context of its two founding nations, the English and the French, which speaks to the early period of colonization and the settlements made between the French and the English at confederation. Though this may seem like an idea of earlier times, Fulford still uses this description in his article describing the post-modern dominion to differentiate Quebec from the ROC and the perpetuation of the myth of homogeneity in Canada. “English speaking-speaking Canadians, and in particular the articulate elites, are engaged more or less permanently in reinventing their own ideas of Canada, simultaneously discarding outdated concepts and inventing new ones to fit current circumstances” (Fulford, 1993: 110). This perspective gains another dimension when Alan Cairns describes the addition of aboriginal nations to it: “From a non-federal perspective, Canada is home for three sociological nations – Quebec, the rest of Canada (ROC), and aboriginal. Their boundaries are unclear or contested; the extent and nature of their political organization vary; their members belong to and identify with the pan-Canadian community with differing degrees of enthusiasm” (Cairns, 1993: 185-6). Though the

differences between French and English Canada are important, failing to be critical of the exclusionary practice of saying that there are only either French, English or Aboriginal people within Canada further alienates those who are not included in that description, such as more recent immigrants. This diversity of background often causes Canadians to hyphenate, to say that they are Canadian, but also something else.

It has been seen as problematic for some to define a common idea of citizenship for all Canadians because there are some Canadians who hyphenate, giving shared allegiance to Canada and their countries or region of origin. Diversity within Canada is not a new phenomenon, as there were loyalties to both France and England in the colonies, and confederation brought together cultures such as the French, the English, the Scottish, and the Irish. This was further complicated by the settlement of the West, which brought Chinese labourers to complete the railroad and Eastern European immigrants to settle the land. Though this is by no means an exhaustive list of the diversity seen in the early days of British North America and Canada, it points to a theme of diversity that complicates ideas of a shared citizenship that is even more evident today.

As much as it is a legal fact created by legislation, citizenship is a metaphor: for most people, in most countries, it stands for a tangle of human connections, past and future, at the same time that it defines entitlements and responsibilities. In every country the metaphor is complicated by local feeling and frequently called into question by the unfolding surprises of history (Fulford, 1993: 104).

So what about the present situation of citizenship in Canada? We have determined that citizenship has many meanings, some of them legal (like the right to vote) and some of them emotional and grounded in feelings of national community. After WWII, not only

was Canada beginning to define its citizenship, but it was also beginning to define the responsibilities between citizen and state through social programs.

Social entitlements, as embodied in the social policy regimes of postwar welfare states, advanced the bargain between individual citizens and the state beyond formal legal and political rights to include a minimum level of economic security for every member of the national state. Social citizenship rights also promised a new foundation for building social solidarity in advanced capitalist societies by engaging all citizens in a collective project grounded in state-based assurances of citizen quality and social progress (Brodie, 2002: 378).

As is further discussed by Brodie, what has happened over recent decades is that Canadian governments have placed decreasing emphasis on and have allotted less money for social programs that have historically been symbols of Canadian identity and solidarity. These social programs have been put into question because of the need for the country to remain competitive in a global market. This has also brought forward debates on the privatization of social services, which gives financial responsibility of social welfare to the individual rather than the state. Another complication is that though the federal government gives funding for social programs, the administration of these programs in Canada rests with provincial governments, and this separation of powers is always a consideration within a federation. This means that cutbacks with federal spending combined with prospects for privatization could mean the idea of all Canadians having relatively equal standards for social welfare might be at risk, putting the idea of national identity into further jeopardy. But what does this mean for citizenship? Harder (Harder, 2003) answers this question by suggesting that perhaps in the future, citizenship to a country will mean less than citizenship within humanity and the global community.

However, this is not and may never be a reality, and in response to this she offers the following:

Social policy reforms have enhanced the state's discretion in determining who may take advantage of the opportunities it provides and who may not, who is worthy of care, education, and a helping hand and who is not. Hence, the state continues to exert ongoing and significant power over the life chances of the individuals who reside within its boundaries (Harder, 2003: 187).

This confirms that states do indeed still have power over the decisions it makes for its citizenry, and as a result, the citizenry can hold the state accountable for there actions through their active participation. Canadians need to “think seriously about the meaning of our citizenship and our relationships and responsibilities to each other. Most importantly, [this renegotiation] will involve reminding our governments that the economy should be designed to operate for the best interests of the people and that it is through democratic processes that those interests are to be determined” (Harder, 2003: 187). However, the realization of these goals is the difficult if one takes into more detailed consideration the decline of social citizenship as described below.

The Decline of Social Citizenship

Following the creation of citizenship legislation after World War II, there was a “flurry of federal initiatives designed to build up the cultural and symbolic infrastructure of a new pan-Canadian nationalism” (Brodie, 2002 #385). This included the creation of the Canada Council to support the arts and sciences, the creation of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, the recognition and protection of Canadian historic sites, the expansion of national museums and galleries, the enactment of the Canadian Bill of Rights, and the funding of many projects to celebrate Canada's centennial year in 1967.

In recent decades, Canadian governments have progressively abandoned the social covenant upon which the postwar citizenship regime was based. Continental integration and the ascendancy of neo-liberalism, as the dominant philosophy of governance, have been accompanied by the federal government's almost complete withdrawal from the social policy field, the termination of universal settlements, a denunciation of the very idea of social and collective provision, and a widespread erosion and reconfiguration of social programs...The neo-liberal turn in Canada has effectively disenfranchised the social citizen [and] delegitimized group-based claims making on the state in the name of citizen equality (Brodie, 2002: 378).

This has had adverse affects on the ability of all countries, including Canada, to be able to handle issues of inclusion, cohesion, and citizen obligation (Siltanen, 2002: 410). There has been a need to recast citizenship to meet the demands of a globalizing economy, and as a result have given new terms of reference for the national social policy debate.

"Rather than using social policy as a tool for the creation and solidification of a Canadian national identity, linking the country's dispersed population through access to common services, contemporary visions of social policy have abandoned the national project" (Harder, 2003: 176). However, it is important to not romanticize the past so as to find complete fault with the present. Though hindsight is nearly always perfect, measuring the performance of the yardstick of the past will more often than not lead to disappointment, as is described below.

The Social Canadian, as it turns out, was just another member of the aging baby-boomer generation and not, as postwar discourse would have it, the essence of Canadianness. As this generation retires from the forefront of the political stage and as social policy is completely devolved to the provinces, the idea of social citizenship rights as a nationalist project is also likely to fade from the collective imagination. Although this possible scenario challenges the political agenda of progressive nationalists in Canada, it does open political space to redefine the foundations for citizen equality and social solidarity in ways that can stretch beyond increasingly porous national borders (Brodie, 2002: 393).

As with any change, the need for a redefinition of citizenship is a result of environmental factors, and assumptions of citizenship from the past need to be critically questioned and examined in light of the circumstances of the current political environment. Brodie acknowledges this with the sage advice that it is during this time of change, political space is opened so that the redefinition of citizenship can be best manipulated to acknowledge the needs of the present. This may allow for the dialogue of citizenship to be more widely and readily acknowledged, especially as belonging to young voters. However, with the current political environment, this change might be slow in coming.

The social policy reforms undertaken in the last decade represent an attempt to address, in a radically new way, the particularities of life in a resource-based, export-led economy dominated by competitive federalism, a lurking national unity crisis, and increasing social cleavages. Rather than continuing with the fractious and seemingly thankless task of seeking to forge a collective identity and relatively uniform national citizenship thought the construction of national social programs, recent Canadian governments have sought to navigate this rocky political terrain through a strategy of individualization, decentralization, and privatization (Harder, 2003: 186).

Because of the increase on the importance of the individual, those who are often defined by the group that they are a part of (including young people) and whose voice may be more easily heard when it comes in numbers may have a harder time voicing their concern. This is complicated by the fact that because young people have shown a negative propensity to vote, it signals that their ties with traditional forms of political engagement and definitions of citizenship are not as strong as those of previous generations. These links to political engagement and therefore to other citizens are often referred to as social capital.

Gidengil (2004) and others argues that a healthy democracy requires an adequate stock of social capital, and that being involved in the community can let people make their needs and interests known. Gidengil shows a strong correlation between political engagement and the wider involvement in community associations. "Social capital is an umbrella term describing a variety of measures of active participation in the life of the community, as well as attitudes of support for the greater good of that community rather than simply individual gain" (Pammett and LeDuc, 2003: 43). In the *Survey of Non-Voters*, Pammett shows that in the realms of the community, non voters are making less of an overall contribution than voters, and are not participating in other political activities. Instead of participating, they are responding that they do not feel close to their communities, whether they are local, provincial, national or global. "Voting, then, is part of psychological and behavioural involvement with the community. To the extent people are declining the opportunities to vote in Canada, they are also illustrating lowered commitment to the Canadian community" (Pammett and LeDuc, 2003: 43-4).

Respondents who voted in the 2000 election were more likely than non-voters to be part of a political party, a trade union, a religious organization, a recreational club, a charitable organization, a neighbourhood association or a cultural group. Voters were also more likely than non-voters to sign a petition, join a boycott, attend a demonstration, write a letter to a newspaper, call-in to a talk show, attend a political rally or join a politics-related internet discussion or chat group. Voters were also more likely to surf the internet for information, watch the news on television, listen to the news on the radio and

read the newspaper (Pammett and LeDuc, 2003: 45-46). It is with this link between the rise of neo-liberalism and the decline of social capital that the next section begins.

The Decline in Voter Turnout in Canada

Though voter turnout has been in decline in all Western countries, and therefore though Canada may not be unique in this regard, it is still a cause for concern. As is shown below in Figure 2, the period after 1988 has shown a steady decrease in voter turnout.

FIGURE 2 - Voting Turnout in Canadian Federal Elections (1984 to 2004)

SOURCE: Elections Canada.

The causes for this decline in voter turnout have been a topic of much interest. A number of factors have been determined that influence the likelihood of voting, which include having a university education, having a higher income, not being a recent immigrant (Blais et al., 2002: 50). Though some may venture to inquire as to whether feelings of scepticism towards politics have an affect on the vote, this idea has been debunked numerous times.

Increased cynicism among the electorate is a popular argument among the media and commentators for the decline of turnout and especially young people's failure to vote. We are able to debunk this notion. We find no relationship between cynicism and abstaining. Moreover, levels of cynicism in the electorate are actually slightly higher among the older

group than they are among those under 30. Cynicism does not account for the age gap and, in fact, including measures of it have the effect of slightly increasing the gap compared to the model with mobilization and party identification (Rubenson, Blais, Fournier, Gidengil, and Nevitte, 2004: 418).

Along with political cynicism not being an indicator of voting behaviour, other factors such as a general disenchantment with parties do not explain the trend in non-voting either (Blais et al., 2002: 56). It has been shown that without a doubt, age is the number-one predictor of whether someone voted or not (Pammett and LeDuc, 2003: 27). Specifically, the younger cohorts of Canadian society are much less likely to vote than the older cohorts.

From 1984-1993, the election studies focused on why Canadians voted the way they did, rather than on reasons on why they did not vote. Though age was sometimes a consideration in the studies, it was only used as a correlate of voting behaviour, and surely not to define a group of non-voters. During the 1984 election the levels of participation were seen as above average, with 75% of the population turning out at the polls (Frizzell and Westell, 1985: 91). In the election study of that year, no specific mention was made of young voters in regards to voter turnout. In the election study of 1988, the idea of generational trends was brought up in terms of party support rather than voter turnout. In reference to the impact of generation, “younger voters are not greatly different from the older in terms of direction, strength, or stability of partisanship” (LeDuc, 1989: 112). In the 1993 election study, socio-demographic characteristics of the vote were seen as weak, and the age of voters was not taken into deep consideration.

Instead, there was a focus on the major issues of the time, and changes in party loyalty from the last election (Pammett, 1994: 158).

The 1993 election study was the first to identify a downward trend in voter turnout, with the starting point being the previous election. In 1997, with no major election issues at the forefront, the public was especially wary of a majority government calling an election after less than four years, and “public dissatisfaction with electoral politics was palpable during the 1997 election campaign” (Pammett, 1997: 226). The 1997 election study ended with the phrase “the future of the country may depend on whether some improvement [in voter turnout] is forthcoming” (Pammett, 1997: 248). The lowest voter turnout to that date coupled with the fact that a many Canadians felt that there were no issues of importance in the 1997 election created questions around the health of Canadian democracy.

By 2000 the rate of turnout was significantly lower than it had ever been and the most serious issue of concern. It was then that age entered the forefront on the discussion of non-voting, as it was shown to be the strongest correlate of non-voting (Blais et al., 2002). Not only was the low number an issue, but included was an assessment of non-voters. Gradually non-voters were less inclined to abstain for personal or administrative reasons, and more inclined to use the excuse of being uninterested or uninformed (Pammett, 2001: 310). It was the 2000 election that prompted Elections Canada to take action, and as a result the *Survey of Non-Voters* was commissioned. This is further elaborated upon in the forward to the report written by the Chief Electoral Officer:

The Chief Electoral officer is mandated to ensure that the electoral process is as accessible as possible to Canadians. This is key to encouraging voter

participation. Moreover, the Canada Elections Act provides [the Chief Electoral Officer] with the authority to implement public education and information programs about the electoral process. Such programs need to be based on a solid foundation, and where required this entails commissioning research from academics with expertise in electoral matters. In this context, it is beneficial to examine why such a significant number of Canadians stayed away from the polls in the 2000 election (Pammett and LeDuc, 2003: ii).

The report was based on a major survey where both voters and non-voters were asked questions relating to their voting behaviour to best determine what the motivations are for voting. The correlates of not voting used were identified as age, education level, income, gender, place of birth, and mobility.

Most of these socio-demographic factors are expected to relate to not voting. Our hypothesis is that young people, as well as people with less education and lower incomes will be less likely to cast a ballot in any given election. We also expect that people who were born outside Canada will be less familiar with the country's politics, and less likely to vote, and that those who are more geographically mobile will be also less likely to vote, as they may be less familiar with the political situation of the area to which they have recently moved. We have no hypothesis about gender differences, but include that as it may be of interest (Pammett and LeDuc, 2003: 19).

The authors paid particular attention to age because they knew that "age is related to not voting, and always has been: younger people vote at lower rates than older people" (Pammett and LeDuc, 2003: 19). This was shown in a number of ways, one of which being through a discussion of age cohorts. Figure 3 shows a description of the age cohorts, as showing in the *Survey of Non-Voters*.

FIGURE 3 – Distribution of Age Cases by Age Cohort

Age in 2000	Birth Year	First Eligibility	Prime Minister	Percentage of Voters*	Percentage of Non-Voters*
18-20	1980-1982	2000	Chrétien	22.4	77.6
21-24	1976-1979	1997	Chrétien	27.5	72.5
25-29	1971-1975	1993	Chrétien	38.2	61.8
30-37	1963-1970	1984/88	Mulroney	54.2	45.8
38-47	1953-1962	1974-80	Trudeau	66.2	33.8
48-57	1943-1952	1968/72	Trudeau	76.4	23.6
58-67	1933-1942	1957-63	Diefenbaker/Pearson	80.4	19.6
68+	Pre-1933	1953	King/St. Laurent	83.3	16.7

*Weighted to put voters and non-voters in their correct proportions for the election.

SOURCE: (Pammett and LeDuc, 2003: 20)

As can be seen in Figure 3, the generational differences between voters and non-voters are clear. Where between 54 percent and 83 percent of the members of the older cohorts are voters, 61 percent to 77 percent of the members of the younger cohorts are non-voters. The turning point is just after the age of 30. This raises the question of whether the decline turnout is just a matter of age that will fix itself as each generation grows older. “Turnout declined only among the youngest generation. If there had been no generational replacement between 1988 and 2000, turnout would have been 71 percent instead of 61 percent” (Blais et al., 2002: 197). While this is a hypothetical situation, it does serve to show the severity of the impact of a low turnout rate among young people. However, it was concluded by the New Survey of Non-Voters that generational replacement does not have the ability to make up for the decline in turnout.

While ‘life cycle’ effects help to increase the low initial participation rate of all generations, they have not brought those who entered the electorate during the Mulroney or Chrétien years up to the levels of the Trudeau-era entrants. And even those Canadians, now in their 40s and 50s, vote at lower rates than older citizens. There has been a long-term secular decline in the voting participation of successive generations of Canadians, one that

will be difficult to reverse with short-term, small-scale reform measures (Pammett and LeDuc, 2003: 73).

Supplementing the ideas about generational difference put forward by the *New Survey of Non-Voters*, Adsett argues that before 1984, “there were few clear and consistent age-specific patterns in the turnout rates and the spread between the rates by age group was relatively small” (Adsett, 2003: 251), and furthers the conclusion that who entered the electorate during the Mulroney and Chrétien years have the lowest rates of turnout and those who entered the electorate before then had the highest.

As well, those who entered the electorate in the early years of Trudeau have a greater turnout rate than those who entered during the later years of the Trudeau era. Adsett contrasts the emergence of neo-liberal ideology to the popularity of Trudeau and the ideas of his party during this time. “The emergence of neo-liberalism and globalization, which have narrowed the political conversation, could have played a role in reducing voter turnout, especially during the 1990s, but also over the 1980s. The fact that the higher turnout rates of the predecessors of today’s youth (i.e. the baby boomers) occurred in a relatively left leaning period...should also be acknowledged” (Adsett, 2003: 249). Adsett goes so far as to describe the shift in voter decline as the pre-Trudeau and post-Trudeau eras.

It was a society defined by a strong youth culture and by a strong youth counter culture that ‘mobilized’ for change, threatened to ‘drop out’ and questioned adults’ values and authority. Among the changes youth sought were peace, greater equality in society, and individual and human rights, not coincidentally, the very types of issues for which both Pearson and Trudeau became immortalized (Adsett, 2003: 253).

Both Pearson and Trudeau appealed to youth, Pearson because of his focus on peace, and Trudeau because of his popular appeal. This is also the time when the voting age was lowered from 21 to 18 in 1970, because of growing political activity amongst that age group that was supported by politicians and the media. The 1969 throne speech referred to a 'restless youth,' and the only point of contention for the change was whether the age of candidacy should be lowered as well, which it was (Pammett and Myles, 1991: 97).

The analysis presented in the *New Survey of Non-Voters* and this analysis is interesting and helpful in informing us as to why young people are voting at lower rates, however, identifying the problem and attempting to solve it are two different things. The *New Survey of Non-Voters* asked respondents a number of questions regarding how this decline in turnout might be turned around; it was concluded that both electoral reform and better education would be viable options. It is these two options that will be further explored in the following chapters in the context of citizenship.

Conclusion

Though some might argue that a more inclusive idea of child and youth citizenship has already been adopted, this optimism should be greeted with some caution.

While it is now commonplace for adult politicians and advocates for children's rights to parrot aphorisms such as 'children are now social actors, subjects in their own right, and active citizens, merely than objects of adult concern and intervention,' this view is not borne out in Canadian formal policies or governance practices. The rhetoric about the future potential of children and youth 'conceals a more fundamental set of closed-mind attitudes that acts as a barrier to young people who want to get involved in civic life and contribute to policy making (Stasiulis, 2002: 531).

Stasiulis warns of the way the government has used images of children and young people along with its neo-liberal and economic liberalization agenda, however instead of trying to bring youth issues to the forefront and represent the issues of youth better, it has focused on child poverty (Stasiulis, 2002: 517). Though governments might say that they are sensitive to issues of youth, their focus on child poverty is a far cry from those issues that actually affect the younger cohorts of voters, such as the costs of post-secondary education and wages for entry-level jobs (Zeman, Knighton, and Bussière, 2004). This is evident in the Speeches from the Throne, which include the promises of the government to Canadians for each session that they govern. Filled with their plans for the parliamentary session, the government often places emphasis on Canada as a community, and how the needs of the most vulnerable need to be considered. They also emphasize the importance of young people, but do so in providing a rhetoric that shows children as helpless victims.

A country that has decided to invest in its children is a country that is confident in its future. A country that invests in its children successfully will have a better future. One of our objectives as a country should be to ensure that all Canadian children have the best possible opportunity to develop their full potential. We must equip our children with the capacities they need to be ready to learn and to participate fully in our society. While families have the greatest responsibility in the nurturing and development of our children, they are not alone. Developing our children requires a concerted effort and partnership by parents, governments, and the private and the voluntary sectors. It requires focussing on what children need to thrive (Canada, 1997).

Themes present in each throne speech include the importance of youth employment, the reduction of child poverty, and the need to provide for Canadian families who in turn provide for Canadian young people (Canada, 1997; Canada, 1999; Canada, 2001;

Canada, 2002b; Canada, 2004b; Canada, 2004a). The government emphasizes the need for parents, as well as the rest of society to educate and encourage the future of Canada. However, very little mention is made for the inclusion of young adults, which can be attributed to the neo-liberal focus on the fact that individuals should be responsible for themselves. With decreasing emphasis in public policy placed on the role of 'special interests' and instead being placed on individual responsibility, it is no wonder that groups who have common interests, such as young adults, are being lost at the wayside.

This brings to light an important conclusion, which is that if these conceptions of children carry over into the younger age cohorts of voters, there could be negative consequences whereby young voters do not feel as though they have the capability to vote full stop. Though citizenship is more than trends in voting behaviour, the fact that youth are not voting shows that they do not have the same feelings of civic duty and connection to the state as previous generations have had. The fact that this is taking place during a time of decreased emphasis on social policy may be a coincidence. This emphasizes the problem unique to youth citizenship: whether or not those between the ages of 18 and 30 are treated as full citizens by virtue of their being, or whether they have to wait until they are 'old enough' to be responsible for themselves, their houses and their families. This idea of a more inclusive view towards young voters will be the basis for the next two chapters, as Chapter Two speaks of the proposal to change the electoral system to increase youth representation and Chapter Three speaks to increased civic education to those under the age of 18.

Chapter Two – The Influence of Electoral Reform on Representation

When asked why they felt young people were less likely to vote, the most popular response was that young people were distanced from politics by age and were not feeling represented or connected. This feeling is shared by 40.4 percent of respondents under the age of 25 and 36.6 percent of respondents aged 25 or older of the *New Survey of Non Voters* (Pammett and LeDuc, 2003: 50). This was supplemented by the conclusion in this report that electoral reform, though not wholly accepted, is possibly a solution that Canadians are willing to look into. The report states:

When it comes to the subject of electoral reforms, there is no widespread movement for the wholesale replacement of our current electoral system. However, we were impressed in this study with the receptivity of many Canadians to changes in the electoral system, particularly in regard to the introduction of proportional representation. There is an active debate in Canada at the moment on these matters, which is likely to continue and intensify. To the extent that this debate raises issues of the requisites of democratic citizenship, and the most desirable institutional structures to allow its exercise, the possible exists for a rekindling of public interest in electoral participation (Pammett and LeDuc, 2003: 48).

This sort of proposal for a better representation through electoral system reform is by no means a unique solution when it comes to solving democratic problems.

In the context of complex mass politics, a frequently heard complaint of exclusion invokes norms of representation. People often claim that social groups they find themselves in or with which they claim affinity are not properly represented in influential discussions and decision-making bodies, including legislatures, commissions, boards, task forces, media coverage of issues, and so on. Such claims recognize that in a large polity with many complex issues formal and informal representatives mediate the influence people have (Young, 2000a: 121).

There are two things that need to be taken into consideration with any argument for electoral system change. Firstly, the function that representatives provide to their constituents is dependant upon the role to which they are elected and the political culture

in which they are elected. Secondly, the ability with which any electoral reform is able to better represent any group should be questioned in light of the experiences of women in regards to electoral system reform, and how though their numbers in parliament may have increased. There are still substantial cultural barriers to complete representation that are not addressed by the electoral system.

This chapter has three sections: the first will give a background to the foundations of a liberal democracy; the second will outline the challenges to representation that theory brings to light; and the third will examine how electoral reform might be used as a way to mitigate feelings of youth under representation, drawing from the example of women's experience with electoral system reform. Though electoral reform may be a way to alleviate some concern of how democratic and representative Canada's political system is, it will not diminish the important effects of and contributions made by culture and ideology to any democratic problems. As will be shown through the example of women, better representation is not always achieved through systems of electoral quotas or proportional representation, as that sort of reform does not address societal attitudes towards the election of women or the internal party structures that determine at what level women participate through the upper ranks of the party. These sorts of problems may also affect young people, as through the discussion of inclusion and exclusion discussed in the last chapter, as political parties and the electorate may have trouble seeing young adults as adequate representatives. Instead, if the electorate wishes to see more issues represented at the parliamentary level, they should elect members of parliament and

parties that agree with their stance on the issues instead of relying upon individuals with their physical characteristics, whether they are of gender or age, to do so.

The Foundations of Liberal Democracy

“Today, when ‘democracy’ has become the formal banner under which almost all nations march, to whatever tunes, there is a vast literature on democratic political theory” (Whitaker, 1983). Democracy is something that countries fight for at home and abroad, and also go to war to protect. It has been a major part of the dominant political discourse in the time during and since the Cold War, and continues to be a theme of the government of many countries. However, there are “many meanings attached to the word democracy. If there is one true meaning then it is, indeed, as Plato might have said, stored up in heaven; but unhappily it has not been communicated to us” (Crick, 2002: 1). Though the word democracy generally means a theme involving some sort of influence of the people and governing for the greater good, there are many ways in which it can be described. However, it is important that a definition of democracy be established.

Popular sovereignty is the essence of ‘democracy,’ a word that comes from the Greek *dēmokratia*, meaning rule by the people. Democrats believe that people ought to rule themselves, either directly or through the agencies of representative government. Government will then be the instrument of popular opinion; its policies will correspond to the wishes of the people – or at least a majority of those who participate in the selection of political leaders and policy makers (Hanson and Marcus, 1993: 6).

This definition speaks to many texts that refer to democracy as something with roots in ancient times. Crick reifies “this ‘most promiscuous word’ as if a Greek or Roman nymph – or say Democratia, an Athenian minor deity: ‘She is everybody’s mistress and yet somehow retains her magic even when a lover sees that her favours are being, in his

light, illicitly shared by many another” (Crick, 2002: 1). It is important to be reminded of the fact those ancient democracies were exclusionary, and had very little connection to present day conceptions of political representation. In fact, the roots of political representation are in medieval times, when kings would summon clergy members and the nobility to give advice, which has very little connection to present day conceptions of democracy (Ankersmit, 2002: 107-8). This challenges any direct connections to be made between ancient democracy and the democracy of today.

After his more light-hearted remark comparing the word democracy to the prowess of a demigoddess, Crick goes on to define democracy as “a principle or doctrine of a government; there is democracy as a set of institutional arrangements or constitutional devices; there is democracy as a type of behaviour, say the antithesis of both deference and unsociability” (Crick, 2002: 5). This definition fits well with that of Warren, who argues that liberal democracies are those that elect their leaders in a competitive multi-party system, uphold basic definitions of human rights, respect the rule of law, and find alternatives to war for the settlement of disputes (Warren, 2004: 197). In the most straightforward terms, it could be said that “Democracy works best when parliament and government are not remote from the people” (Laundry, 1997: 85). Perhaps the simplest definition is the best of them all.

Though it is important to understand democracy, it is much more relevant to Canada to understand the meaning of liberal democracy, as Canada follows this democratic tradition. For the beginnings of liberal democracy, one can look first to Thomas Hobbes in *Leviathan*. In his description of the formation of the state, he says:

A Common-wealth is said to be Instituted, when a Multitude of men do Agree, and Covenant, every one, with every one, that to whatsoever Man, or Assembly of Men, shall be given by the major part, the Right to Present the person above them all, (that is to say, to be their Representative;) every one, as well he that Voted for it, as he that Voted against it, shall Authorise all the Actions and Judgements, of that Man, or Assembly of men, in the same manner, as if they were his own, to the end, to live peaceably amongst themselves, and be protected against other men (Hobbes, 1985: 228).

The classical liberal tradition depends on the fact that there are principles that rational people agree upon, principles which are referred to as universal reason, moral law or natural law (Ramet, 2001: 48). It is for this reason that “liberal democracy was designed for adults – independent, intelligent and responsible. It’s for women and men in charge of their faculties, able to make decisions prudently with an eye to consequences for themselves and for others, and prepared to act in accordance with their decisions” (Ajzenstat, 2003: 133). This is especially relevant to research on young adults, because it is the idea of responsibility that is often questioned when it comes to new voters.

Though on the surface liberal democracy may be the best possible way of government, it does not mean that the concept is a perfect one. Some authors worry about a growing democratic deficit, where though countries profess to be epitomes of democracy, there is still something to be desired when it comes to the reality of their governing procedures.

While liberal democracy is a significant human accomplishment, the hubris of democratic triumphalism is unwarranted. In Canada, our experience with democracy is short and incomplete and, within the context of neo-liberal globalism, increasingly vulnerable. State power is concentrated within a limited number of executive institutions; new governing practices are undermining the potential of democratic citizenship; national sovereignty is being lost to supra-national governing institutions; and the goals and purposes of the state are being altered in

such a way that the body politic is losing its capacity to act collectively to regulate and improve social and economic life (Patten, 2003: 92).

So though liberal democracy is heralded as one of the crowing achievements of many countries, it should not be accepted without question. One of the greatest contributors to the democratic deficit is a failure of the electoral system to elect representatives in a way that pleases the electorate, and for this reason electoral system reform is usually one of the first suggestions made to correct the deficit. For this reason, the following will be first an examination of what can be constituted as a representative as well as a discussion on how electoral reform can change perceptions of representation.

The Challenges of Representation

“The concept of representation stands at the centre of modern mass democracies. Not all citizens can be present in the actual process of governing, but the interests and concerns of all citizens need to be present if the decisions are to be democratic” (Chambers, 2004: 220). It is obvious that for pure mechanical reasons, democracies such as Canada cannot expect that every citizen have a direct role in every decision in governing. Because not only are citizens busy with other aspects of their lives, in a country such as Canada, geography means that there are great distances not only between citizens, but between citizens and their political institutions. “History teaches us that every political system can or even should be regarded as a response to a particular type of political challenge” (Ankersmit, 2002: 91). Governing a country is certainly a challenge, especially in light of having a population that is diverse and geographically spread out. Ankersmit gives the example of feudalism as a response to a centralized monarchy whose

control was weakening, and points to the parliamentary system as a response to ambitious monarchs.

Every political system must be expected to possess an affinity with a particular type of political problem—that is to say, the sort of problem to which it was supposed to be a response. And if we wish to understand the nature of the possibilities, and the impossibilities of a political system, we will have to examine the sort of political or social problem which that political system was originally expected to deal with (Ankersmit, 2002: 92).

Ankersmit describes early parliaments (specifically those established in France) as having three main functions: (1) they adopted constitutions; (2) they developed parliamentary traditions; and (3) they legitimized gained acceptance as a manner in which to do politics. The state was developed as an arbiter between conflicting groups (primarily religious groups), but soon came to be the reason for conflict, as the varying groups wanted control. With this came the romantic idea of compromise, where states were “governed by a kind of political logic other than consensus, for compromise, unlike consensus, retains the possibility of cooperation even when people hold different views and are also determined to maintain them” (Ankersmit, 2002: 96). Ankersmit also makes an important distinction between continental (mainly French) representative democracies and Anglo-Saxon representative democracies, as the former focused on collective long term success and consensus, while the latter focused on individual success and short term goals. As well, the Anglo-Saxon model was based upon a two party system. These are interesting distinctions to make, because often the ideals of each origin are used interchangeably. However, if one adheres to Ankersmit’s theory that a political system

cannot be expected to do something it was not designed to do, then the two types of parliament are not as interchangeable as some might like.

This is a suitable way of defining how Canada came into their political system, which uses the Westminster parliamentary system inherited United Kingdom combined with the federal system that was the response to the demands for a division of powers by those involved in confederation. Whitaker uses federalism as the solution to the following description of the democratic paradox, because it can deal with multiple identities which are provincial and national in the Canadian context. “It is a democratic paradox that the more exclusionary the definition of the people, the less heterodox, diverse and conflictual the people become and the better democracy works. The wider the definition, the fewer the exclusions, the weaker the putative community constituted by the people, and the more problematic the presence of the people in the politics of the state” (Whitaker, 1983: 45). Though it is not the purpose of this research to examine the various power structures ingrained in a federal system, it is important to understand that the Canadian parliament in Ottawa is only one part of a network of provincial and municipal governing bodies that make decisions for Canadians. Each of these bodies have different concerns in regards to electoral reform, but for the purposes of this research the focus will be on the Canadian federal parliament in Ottawa.

There are a few characteristics of the way the system chooses representatives that need to be considered before we can talk about the nature of representatives in Canada: (1) the electoral system that Canada adopted is used to choose Members of Parliament based on population, one member for each riding that is determined by the number of

people within that riding; (2) the First Past the Post (FPTP) electoral system is used, meaning that the candidate that receives the most votes wins, therefore they win with a plurality of the votes and not necessarily a majority; (3) candidates are chosen through the party nomination process. By realizing these characteristics and purposes of various parts of the system, we are determining the reflexes of the system, referred to as the ‘political psychology of the system’ by Ankersmit. The reason that Canadians (and especially youths) are not voting that is examined in this chapter is attributed to the fact that they are underrepresented in Parliament, and “worries about citizens’ democratic character surface quickly in discussions about how to invigorate the political experiences of ordinary people – and whether that is even a reasonable objective” (Hanson and Marcus, 1993: 2). Hanson goes on to contend that without acceptable rates of participation, the legitimacy of the people in power could be called into question, because “political leaders can hardly be charged with making policies congruent with majority sentiment...Thus, everything depends on public opinion, the greatest strength – and often the chief weakness – of democratic politics” (Hanson and Marcus, 1993: 6). It is the purpose of the following discussion on the theoretical basis of representation to lay the groundwork for a discussion why electoral reform may not be a suitable choice for increasing voter turnout at the present.

Like ideas of democracy, the idea of representation is one that has evolved since the beginnings of democracy¹. Greek states had very little use for the term, as political life was something that each citizen took part in for himself (women and slaves were

¹ For a more detailed explanation of the history of representation, see Pitkin (1969).

excluded). The concept of representation emerged in the Middle Ages, with religious leaders representing their religions and religious institutions and kings and queens representing their realms. Eventually, the kings and popes began to take commoners in advisory roles, and following that parliaments were arranged, and those who served in them acted as agents for their communities. In the seventeenth century, the English Parliament became democratic and the idea of representation became a fundamental right of man.

The problem seems to be either how to select the right representatives or how to control those selected, so that they respond effectively to the people's needs and interests. If the problem is finding a way to assure that people's affairs are well looked after, then representation is a powerful answer to our needs. But if the problem is providing for all, a meaningful share in a joint public life, an enduring common enterprise which perpetuates their achievements and enlarges their vision and their sense of themselves, then the answer is far less clear (Pitkin, 1969: 4)

Though the representation has changed to meet the needs of the society in which it is used and is therefore may have many meanings today, it is important to recognize the classical theories that inform our modern ideas of representation and democracy. There are various problems associated with the choosing of representatives, such as how representative the representatives must be, and how to agree upon the differences in opinion of what the roles of those representatives will be once chosen.

Representation has been categorized in one of three ways: (1) the representative as an agent or delegate who is merely the voice for the views of their constituents; (2) the representative as an elected official or trustee who is not expected to have any connection to their constituents; and (3) the representative as a mirror who is supposed to accurately reflect a segment of society and taken with their representative colleagues needs to mirror

the whole of the country. These three forms of representation presented in this order can be credited to Anthony Birch (1964), though Pitkin, Ankersmit, and Docherty (among others) have adopted formulas similar to his. While the categories of representative as agent or delegate and representative as elected official or trustee can be seen as opposite ends of the same scale, the idea that the representative as a mirror of their constituency can translate into both of the other categories, albeit to different degrees. Therefore, it is more useful to view mirror representation as an underlying question rather than a category in and of itself. For this reason, the idea of mirror representation will be explored first, followed by the two categories of representative as agent or delegate and representative as elected official or trustee after that.

Ankersmit states that “representation is a notion borrowed from the world of aesthetics: the work of art, painting or sculpture will often be a representation of reality” (Ankersmit, 2002: 108). Pitkin also uses various products of representation to describe the varying degrees of mirror representation:

We must distinguish three somewhat different but related ways of bringing [descriptive representation] to bear on political life. The view may suggest that a legislature is like a map or mirror, essentially a passive object so put together that from it a spectator can gather information about the people—that it reflects or resembles the nation by its composition. It may, second, suggest that a representative legislature is like a painter or a ‘maker of representations to someone else,’ representing by its activity rather than its composition, but an activity of a very special kind. Or, third, the suggestion may be that if the representative legislature is a sufficiently accurate copy, a perfect replica, then it may safely and justifiably be allowed to substitute for the whole people, to act in place of the nation. Here the purpose is action by the representative, but that activity itself is not itself representation. Representation is, rather, a matter of accurate resemblance or correspondence, and a precondition for justifying governmental action (Pitkin, 1967: 82).

It is important to fully understand the concept of mirror representation before one can advocate for it to be fully integrated into the electoral system, and Pitkin integrates the degrees of mirror representation into the other two categories of representation. Birch describes mirror representation simply as “a small body is said to be representative of a large one if it mirrors the main characteristics of the larger one” (Birch, 1964: 16).

Docherty points out that for Birch, “the notion that a representative speaks for a group of society is sufficient” (Docherty, 2002: 170). However, Pitkin takes this a step further by saying that descriptive representation, which can be likened to mirror representation, is when the “representative body is distinguished by an accurate correspondence or resemblance to what it represents, by reflecting without distortion” (Pitkin, 1967: 60). So while Birch would see this idea of mirror representation as more passive (which fits Pitkin’s description of the map), there are those who might feel that a more perfect replica is needed. “[This type of representation] suggests that women can only be properly represented, it is argued, when a critical mass of women are sitting and voting in a legislature. Likewise, members of ethnic or racial minorities should expect to have their communities represented in the legislative arena” (Docherty, 2002: 171). However, using this sort of representation assumes that women will represent issues of all women, homosexuals will represent all homosexuals, a visible minority will represent all members of their ethnic or racial group, and a person with a disability will represent all people with disabilities. This is a difficult assumption to make, as the physical characteristics of a representative do not guarantee their political viewpoints, as there is not always congruency between members of the same group.

For this reason, authors like Ankersmit advise the use of caution for those who advocate the of the cause for implementing any sort of mirror representation. Ankersmit give three criticisms of what mirror representation (what he calls the resemblance theory of representation): (1) there are no set guidelines as to what would make someone reflective enough; (2) those who are chosen for their various reflective attributes may not use them in the process of representation; and (3) that the fact that language can represent a reality is not taken into account. Pitkin, like Ankersmit, cautions against the use of mirror representation, because “where the representative is likened to a descriptive representation or a symbol, he is usually seen as an inanimate object an not in terms of any activity; he represents by what he is or how he is regarded. He does not represent by doing anything at all; so it makes no sense to talk about his role or his duties and whether he has performed them” (Pitkin, 1967: 113).

In stating this, Pitkin emphasizes the importance of ideas and actions over physical characteristics. Taking into consideration that the Canadian electoral system is based upon selecting candidates nominated by parties that represent ridings based on population, there is little room for any sort of mirror representation that goes further than merely being a roadmap of Canadian political opinion at the time of the election. Canadian parliamentarians are expected to fulfil many roles once elected, none of which can be based solely on a characteristic of the elected person, whether it is physical or otherwise. Perhaps the only characteristic of the candidate that should be made a topic for discussion is the suitability of the person to parliament and their cheery public disposition, and even then some might argue those characteristics are never needed to

begin with. The most important idea here is one member of a certain group cannot be expected to be a voice for all members of that group, meaning that a woman cannot be expected to represent all women, that a homosexual cannot be expected to represent all homosexuals and that a person with a disability cannot be expected to represent all persons with disabilities.

This conclusion suggests that even if more young people were elected to parliament, that they could not be expected to represent all young people. Instead, it is best to follow the lead of Ankersmit's third criticism, and emphasize that instead of relying on the various physical characteristics that a representative has, it is more important to worry about the sorts of ideas that the representative might relay on the constituent's behalf. But then, what do the other two types of representative bring to the table if representative as mirror is inadequate? The following will be a discussion of the differences between representatives as agents or delegates and representatives as elected officials or trustees. For the sake of simplicity, for the rest of this discussion the former will be referred to as 'representative as delegate' and the latter will be referred to as 'representative as trustee.'

The representative as delegate would be a "person whose function is to protect and if possible advance the interests of the individual or group on whose behalf he is acting" (Birch, 1964: 12). Pitkin refers to this type of representation as 'acting for,' and stresses the importance of viewing the idea of representation not just as an individual representing a group of people, but rather as the act of representation and what that entails. This type of representative was described historically by theorists like Mill, who

believe that “in legislation as well as administration, the only task to which a representative assembly can possibly be competent is not that of doing the work, but of causing it to be done; of determining to whom or to what sort of people it shall be confided, and giving or withholding the national sanction to it when performed” (Mill, 1969: 185). Pitkin assesses more deeply the ideas of Mill, and points to some important characteristics of his theory:

The more, on the other hand, the theorist sees a relative equality of capacity and wisdom between representatives and constituents, the more it will strike him arbitrary and unjustifiable for representatives to ignore the opinions and wishes of the people. The more political issues strike him as involving irrational commitment or personal preference, choice rather than deliberation, the more necessary it will seem that the representative consult the people’s preferences and pursue their choice. The more a theorist thinks of personal or local interests as needing defence against a threatening central power, the more he thinks of the representatives function as critical of government action rather than initiating it, the more likely he is to favour a mandate position. To a considerable extent, although not completely, these positions converge in a writer like Mill. About the relative capacities of represented and representative, Mill is highly ambivalent. On the other hand, he has strong elitist tendencies, stressing the need to bring intelligent men into Parliament, no matter how (Pitkin, 1969: 21).

In the case of Canada, there are difficulties in calling Members of Parliament only delegates. “Members of Parliament often find it difficult to act in a manner that pleases most of their constituents. Particularly in a multi-party system such as Canada’s, often more people vote against a winning candidate than for the individual. Members of parliament are therefore left in the unenviable position of representing a political party plus a riding where more than half of voters would have preferred a different agent” (Docherty, 2002: 170). As well, because of the nature of responsible government, the executive (the ministers within the cabinet) has a great deal of power over the decisions

of the legislative. Docherty also points to the fact that it is very difficult and costly to collect accurate riding data, and therefore has to rely on those citizens who are informed and willing to make phone calls, come to riding offices, or write letters. It is also difficult for MPs to act as direct agents of their constituents, because they have access to important information, especially if they are a part of the governing party, that may not be made available to the public and therefore issues that seem clear cut to the electorate are not so easy for their elected representatives to make.

Those who favour representatives as delegates would see any gap between the agent and the represented as misrepresentation, while those who favour representatives as trustees would see this gap as inevitable. In the latter case, the representative is characterized not by his actions, but the manner by which he was selected. “There can be no doubt that in the prevailing view an MP is regarded as being the Parliamentary representative of his constituency whether or not he takes any notice of the views of his constituents. So long as he has been elected, and is dependent on his constituents for re-election, he is looked upon as their representative (Birch, 1964: 15). Historically, this type of representation has been advocated by Burke. According to him, “representatives should be superior men of wisdom and ability, not average or typical or even popular men. What matters is their capacity for practical reasoning” (Pitkin, 1967: 269). In a letter, Burke first describes what is wrong with being an agent, and then what is right about being a trustee:

It ought to be the happiness and glory of a representative to live in the strictest union, the closest correspondence, and the most unreserved communication with his constituents. Their wishes ought to have great weight with him; their opinions high respect; their business unremitted

attention. It is his duty to sacrifice his repose, his pleasure, his satisfaction, to theirs – and above all, ever, and in all cases, to prefer their interest to his own. But his unbiased opinion, his mature judgement, his enlightened conscience, he ought not to sacrifice to you, to any man, or to any set of men living...Your representative owes you not his industry only, but his judgement; and he betrays, instead of serving you, if he sacrifices it to your opinion (Burke, 1969: 174-5).

This description of a representative as an independent and free thinker (at least, free from the influence of his constituents) is helpful because it shows how always deferring to the opinion of constituents might be damaging. It is important that a representative be acknowledged for their thoughts and opinions, and as mentioned before, they should be chosen for their capabilities to represent in parliament, regardless of other characteristics. However, Burke takes this a step further, and decides that a representative should not take into consideration the opinion of their constituents, which implies that he thinks very little of the ability of 'ordinary people' to make political decisions. Pitkin describes this:

The more a theorist sees representatives as superior in wisdom and expertise to their constituents, the more he will stress the need for independent judgement. The more he conceives of political issues of having correct, objectively determinable solutions accessible to rational enquiry, the more he will incline to independence; there is no point in counting noses accurately among the constituents if the question is a technical one calling for expertise. The more a theorist stresses the national interest, the welfare of the nation as a whole, the more he will object to binding the representative closely to his constituents' demands. All of these positions converge in a writer like Burke. Burke thinks of an elite leadership, essentially representing not individual people but the great, stable, major interests which together make up the national interest (Pitkin, 1969: 20)

To strictly adhere to being only an elected official may cause problems on re-election day. To believe that the opinions 'ordinary people' are unimportant, at least publicly, might mean that the representative could lose their seat. However, this does not mean

that the idea of representative as only elected official can be dismissed. Pitkin describes this as symbolic representation, where “human beings, too, can be thought of as symbols, can under the right circumstances stand for a nation just as the flag does” (Pitkin, 1967: 92). In Docherty’s discussion of Birch, this aspect of representative is what is most relevant to Canada. The problems with the single-member districts and plurality electoral system aside, the fact that Members of Parliament are elected lends them much greater legitimacy in the eyes of the public than their appointed parliamentary colleagues in the Senate (Docherty, 2002: 170). Though it is not the purpose of this research to examine the legitimacy of an elected house over that of an appointed house, as Docherty alludes to, generally the public finds more legitimacy in elected representatives than appointed representatives by virtue of the fact that they were chosen by the people.

For those who may not feel represented by their current Member of Parliament, there might be some satisfaction in knowing that though the person chosen to represent their constituency may not represent them directly, that they are not necessarily expected to represent anyone directly. Though this may seem disconcerting to those who believe that representatives should mirror their constituents, it is a mixture of being connected to and being disconnected from the constituency that will bring the most success.

A politically naive electorate will see all difference between itself and its representatives as an impermissible distortion; a politically lazy and indifferent electorate will not see a distortion even if its representatives have recklessly reneged on all their political promises...whereas a political mature electorate will know how to find the juste-milieu between these two extremes and how to distinguish between mere aesthetic difference on one hand and such a serious thing as (political) misrepresentation on the other (Ankersmit, 2002: 113)

A representative cannot be expected to act only as a trustee to their constituents, because of the permanent diversity that exists within the constituency. In the same breath, a representative cannot only act as independent from their constituency once elected if they wish to remain elected. It is for this reason that Ankersmit's idea that representation can be based upon the words that a representative uses, rather than any other characteristic. Though a representative may not be a woman, they can still bring a feminist perspective to parliament, and though a parliamentarian may not be a young person, they can still bring to parliament issues that concern young people if they choose to do so. The onus then, is on the electorate choosing a representative who chooses to represent the interests that they find important. Whether or not this is done is determined by the electoral system used, and the attitudes of the electorate who elect the representative. In the case of Canadian constituencies, the interests of a territorially based constituency might be more difficult to represent, particularly since representatives are often elected with a plurality instead of a majority of the votes. These characteristics play an important role in seeing who is elected to parliament, and the following discussion of the effects that electoral reform has had on women brings to light many of these concerns.

Though this is the end of the discussion of the different types of representatives, it is important to realize that in the Canadian case, a Member of Parliament at any given time may have to represent three different interests: (1) the constituents who elected them; (2) the party that nominated them; and (3) the cabinet post or critic area they have been assigned to once they get to parliament. Docherty explores these three areas of interest, and compares how parliamentarians feel they should represent these areas versus

how the public thinks that parliamentarians should represent these areas, and finds that there is a large discrepancy between how both groups feel about representation. It is with this in mind that the next section begins.

Electoral Reform as a Solution for Youth Feelings of Underrepresentation

Electoral reform is often one of the first solutions presented when confronted with a problem of democratic nature. Problems of representation not only stem from discrepancies between how citizens view how they should be represented and how they are actually represented, but also by how political parties (the crucial link between citizens and state) represent their interests. “Support for the political regime hinges first and foremost on citizen’s orientations towards the party system, because parties remain the most crucial linkage between the people and the government in a representative democracy. If people think that no party really represents their views, they will feel the political system is fatally flawed” (Blais et al., 2002: 55). This has been identified as one of the explanations for poor voter turnout among youth.

The electoral system has also been targeted as an explanation for declining youth turnout. Unhappiness with an electoral system that unfairly distributes seats across parties is identified as the culprit for reductions in turnout among youth. While Canada’s electoral system may currently be the focus of greater criticism that was previously the case, and notwithstanding the valid arguments for reforming the system, there too one has to point out that evidence has suggested that young people are actually happier with the system than other Canadians. As research has noted, PR systems have experienced similar drops in their turnout levels (O’Neill, 2004: 5).

However, though changes to the electoral system may assist in alleviating some of the concern for representation, there are still barriers that need to be examined that affect how representatives are chosen. Though the formal barriers that used to exclude women

and others from politics are long gone, there are still cultural attitudes that remain the same. As was mentioned earlier, because there has been very little thought given to attempts at electing more young people to parliament, the following discussion will use the example of women as a group and how women's representation has been affected by electoral reform. Though there are no formal legal barriers preventing women from being elected to parliament (just as there are no formal, legal barriers preventing young adults from being elected to parliament), there remain cultural concerns for where the responsibility of women (and young people) should lie, which serve to expose the ideas of inclusion and exclusion from the public sphere, as well as the difficulties that young people face by virtue of their age as discussed in Chapter One. Where women are still primarily seen as caregivers and are primarily responsible for those activities in the home, young people are seen as lacking the maturity to be responsible during the difficult transition period of their 20s. Both are viewed as not the optimal candidates for representation, because their responsibility to their work is put into question because of cultural attitudes towards their ability to participate fully.

One of these barriers for women is the role that women generally play within political parties. Brodie describes women as 'perennial menials' in party politics, as they are excluded from leadership and forced to take supportive roles, making it difficult for them to have upward mobility in the party ranks (Brodie, 1985: 58). When it comes to the differences between men and women entering politics can be seen through a simple examination of the number of female candidates who run and who are elected. Since

Confederation, only 175 women have been elected to parliament.² Over the past four elections, only 11 to 16 percent of women who run win a seat.³

Thirty-four of the sixty-five women elected to the House of Commons were Liberals – a healthy share considering the dismal overall representation of females (21.1 percent of Parliament). The Liberal Party had the third largest percentage of female candidates to run in the election, and the second highest success rate amongst the four. Martin awarded senior posts to women (nine in total to his new cabinet), notably Anne McLellan as deputy prime minister and minister of public safety and preparedness, Carolyn Bennett as minister of state (public health), and Judy Sgro as minister of citizenship and immigration. (Clarkson, 2004: 60).

Of the women elected, there are general characteristics that the group as a whole share. Tremblay and Trimble identify five major qualities that most female parliamentarians in Canada possess: (1) they are born in Canada; (2) they come into politics later than life because of family, or minority stay single; (3) they are on average older than their male counterparts, which can be attributed to family reasons which also affect length of time pursuing an education; (4) they have a university education, which is a key attribute for any politician; and (5) they come from a professional background, few did unpaid work in the home before becoming a politician. Tremblay and Trimble point out the importance of family status to a woman's life:

Family status is a key determinant of women's everyday lives, shaping everything from the division of labour inside and outside the home, to income, leisure time, and social standing. Therefore it may indeed be important that the lives of women legislators do not reflect the family experiences of most Canadian women. The realities and policy demands of single mothers, divorced women seeking custody and maintenance, elderly widows living in poverty, and women in the workplace searching for high-quality child care are far removed from the experiences of most

² See Appendix One for a breakdown of how many women each political party has elected.

³ See Appendix Two for a description of how many female candidates ran for each political party, and what percentages of them won seats.

woman politicians when they enter Canada's legislatures (Tremblay and Trimble, 2003: 52).

It should be noted that this does not take into consideration the experiences of legislators prior to entering politics, or the experiences of their mothers or grandmothers. This is not to say that women in parliament are therefore more representative, but just that the information referred to was collected with regard to what the woman was doing directly before she entered politics. Taking into consideration these characteristics, it shows that women in parliament may have more in common with male parliamentarians than they do with Canadian women as a whole. However, this only emphasizes the conclusion of the last chapter, that there is a need to a look beyond representation by women and look towards representation *for* women, which includes not only having women in parliament, but having men and women in parliament who are concerned with women's issues.

When looking at the aspects of the electoral system that affect how women are represented, the first proposal for change includes the implementation of some sort of proportional representation. There are three categories into which electoral systems can be sorted: (1) majority or plurality, otherwise known as First Past the Post (FPTP), which is what Canada uses; (2) proportional representation (PR); and (3) a mixed member proportional (MMP), which is some combination of the two others. One of the greatest obstacles to reform is choosing what variation of what system is to be used if going with an MMP system, and for this reason this research will concentrate on only FPTP and PR systems. For any system, there are five defining characteristics of an electoral system: (1) the electoral formula, which includes how the votes are collected and counted; (2) the

ballot structure; (3) the district magnitude; (4) the threshold of election, or how many votes it takes to be elected; and (5) the proportionality of the system, or how well the system translates votes into seats. These five characteristics are useful as they provide a means by which to compare the ability of the various types of electoral systems to perform.

Before describing the five elements of the plurality or majority electoral system, it is important to understand that the difference between the plurality and majority is the number of parties that compete to be elected. For example, in a majority system if Candidate A wins 60 percent of the vote, that leaves Candidate B with the remaining 40 percent of the vote. In this scenario, Candidate A would have won with a majority of the vote. In a plurality or multi-party system (like the one used in Canada), if Candidate A wins 40 percent of the vote, that leaves Candidate B with 30 percent of the vote, and Candidate C and Candidate D each with 15 percent of the vote. This means that Candidate A wins the seat by having the most votes, or a plurality of the vote. In respect to the five characteristics described above, the electoral formula for a majority or plurality system is that whoever gets the most votes wins. This is why the system is referred to as 'first past the post,' where the post is representative of the plurality of the votes. In a majority or plurality electoral system, votes are counted quickly and results are known soon, mainly because the ballot for this type of system is simple, as the voter need only mark the box next to the candidate of their choice. In Canada's plurality system, ridings are one candidate per riding per party, which means that the district magnitude is based upon one representative for a fixed population. The threshold of the

election is not fixed, as it depends on how many candidates run in each riding. Finally, a FPTP system does not ensure proportionality, as often the number of votes a party receives is not similar to the number of seats they win.

On the other hand, in a PR system, candidates are not elected individually but by a party list, which is seen as more suited to a multi-party system. In an election under PR, each party would submit a list of candidates for each riding and the number of candidates would be based on what percentage of the vote the party got in that riding. For example, Parties A-D would each submit a list of five candidates for a five member riding. Party A wins 40 percent of the vote and two seats, and Parties B, D, and C each win 20 percent of the vote and one seat each for that riding. Party A would then send to parliament the first two candidates on their list, while Parties B, D, and C would send only the first candidate on their lists. The electoral formula under a PR system would be more complicated, as it would have to take into account how many votes would be considered enough to elect one candidate from a list, and would depend on how many candidates there were per electoral district. The ballot structure could be simple if the voters were only asked to choose a party, but could become more complicated if they were asked to rank the candidates on the list. Depending on whether or not the voters had the opportunity to rank candidates, the results could take several days to tabulate. The district magnitude would be large, as ridings would have to accommodate several representatives if they are to be chosen from a list. The threshold of the election would depend on the number of representatives per riding, but would be equal to a percentage of

the popular vote. For this reason, a PR system would have excellent proportionality, as it would directly translate votes into seats.

Women are often better represented when the electoral system uses party lists, and if there is a substantial amount of leftist seats (MacIvor, 2003: 28) because generally women and other groups with lower representation are more likely to associate themselves with parties on the left (Gidengil, Blais, Nadeau, and Nevitte, 2003). This opens the discussion to the issue of quotas, as it would ensure that women's voices are being heard because there would have to be a certain number of women present. Phillips' main concern with quotas was that questions of democracy are raised if 'special treatment' is given, and it is a matter of injustice and is "patently and grotesquely unfair" to men if women are given an advantage (Phillips, 1995: 63). Nordic countries have implemented quotas, but it was at a party level. Quotas were first introduced in Norway by the Socialist party, and then adopted by the others, even the conservatives. In Canada, the New Democratic Party has also attempted this, but has had limited success because of national scope of the party, which often tends to lose out to more regional interests. It should also be noted that the Nordic countries are more homogenous when compared to a country such as Canada, which means that on the surface there seems to be less difference to represent; meaning actively trying to solve the issue of representing differences may not be as daunting for the parties involved. So how quotas might be introduced? It would need some sort of reform, whether it is at the level of electoral system or parties, which would depend upon the goals and ideals of parties.

In Canada, the Liberal Party of Canada and the New Democratic Party have internal party mechanisms that allow for the representation of women, youth and visible minorities (Cross, 2004: 22), while the Reform Party/Canadian Alliance/Conservative Party has rejected any forms of recognition of 'special interests' since its inception. In regards to the former Canadian Alliance, they argue that "there are not particular women's or youth or immigrant issues, but rather only Canadian issues. The party believes that the recognition of constituent groups of members would only further encourage a politics of special interests...The party refuses to establish internal groups specifically aimed at advancing particular group-defined interests in party decision making" (Cross, 2004: 23). Whether the party ideology allows for mechanisms for greater representation is a key part of whether or not groups will be represented within that party, and therefore has the chance to be represented within parliament.

The FPTP system has a clear problem with electing candidates based on the popular vote, and favours those groups who make up a majority of the population in a specific riding. In the FPTP system described above, a female candidate would be the only one of her party to run in her riding, and therefore she cannot be guaranteed a seat if she does not receive a plurality of the vote. However, under a PR system the larger constituencies and party lists would give female candidates a greater chance to be elected, as the party would only have to win a certain percentage of the vote to be guaranteed a seat. "While the adoption of [some form of PR] would almost certainly increase the numbers of female candidates and MPs, it would be a mistake to assume to treat electoral reform as a panacea...without strong formal or informal incentives for parties to place

women at the top of their lists...most female standard bearers would be ornamental” (MacIvor, 2003: 33). The ranking of the list depends on cultural attitudes, pressures from lobby groups and most importantly internal party rules, all of which are outside of the electoral system. This means that the politics behind who is nominated to ‘winnable,’ ‘battleground,’ or ‘token’ ridings under a FPTP system can be equated to those who are put on the top, middle, or bottom of a party list under PR. In both FPTP and PR systems, the political party has significant amount of control in candidate selection, which means that regardless of what electoral system is used, the representation of women may not change unless the internal structures of parties are considered.

The examination of political parties brings up a whole new set of problems, especially in Canada. There are four main concerns that deal with how women are affected by party structures: (1) there does not seem to be many women interested in running; (2) candidate selection is zero sum, potential candidates either win or lose the chance to win a seat; (3) the centralized nature of party is a weakness, as they have very little control over the choices local riding associations, except when the party leader chooses to parachute someone in; and (4) incumbents are strong in the riding because they have been proven winners, therefore not as many chances for new candidates to come in (MacIvor, 2003: 30). It is the first concern that is the most troublesome, as even if the electoral system were to change to alleviate the other three, unless more women find themselves encouraged to participate within the political system, the changes would be futile. It is more difficult to elect women to parliament if they are not making themselves available to be nominated. MacIvor suggests three reasons as to why this is

occurring: (1) historically women have been relegated to the housekeeping duties of the party, such as providing refreshments at meetings, minding campaign offices and keeping track of memberships; (2) women hold fewer resources, whether they be money, professional contacts, education, or leisure time; and (3) Canadian politics by nature have included intense partisanship and aggressive posturing, both of which have been historically viewed as male behaviour (MacIvor, 2003: 32). Once again, these obstacles are cultural and rooted in historical (and outdated) definitions of gender roles.

This means that there are also that could be made at the level of political parties, instead of looking only at the electoral system. There are four goals for a party to achieve an increased representation: (1) there needs to be gender parity in the elite ranks of the party, either through representational guarantees or because of a social shift in gendered attitudes; (2) over time, half of the caucus should be female, and until then there needs to be a stronger focus on women; (3) there needs to be an equal chance for a male or female to be leader of the party, and when elected, a female leader's failures in the position would not be immediately attributed to her sex; and (4) policy issues would be informed by feminism and women's issues would not just be added on (Young, 2000b: 204). The greatest place for change and the greatest impediment for change is the political party. They have control over candidate selection and legislation, and are unlikely to change a tradition that benefits them. At the moment, public opinion does not seem to favour reform (Pammett and LeDuc, 2003) or quotas (MacIvor, 2003: 33). "If the public is broadly sympathetic toward getting more women into public life, parties may feel more

willing to introduce institutional reforms and affirmative-action strategies to achieve these aims” (Norris and Inglehart, 2001: 138).

Electoral reform is important, but the chances of it happening are few. There is no chance of it helping change representation if citizens continue to use the electoral system as they have been using it. Some authors like Ajzenstat point the finger at the parliamentary reform of government because, they say, “the present situation allows leaders of the party securing the most seats in the House of Commons to govern virtually unchecked between elections. We have ‘cabinet oligarchy,’ it’s said, not democracy. Would changing the electoral system help?” (Ajzenstat, 2003: 14) However, there are authors who believe that even though institutional reform cannot solve all problems, implementing some form of change would be better done sooner rather than later (Nadeau, 2002). Pammett points to citizen movements like Fair Vote Canada as groups that are publicizing the possibilities of implementing a different electoral system in the hopes of energizing those feeling unrepresented (Pammett and LeDuc, 2004: 357). There are also groups such as the Law Commission of Canada (Canada, 2002a) who have studied prospects for reform, and argue that both the historical and present institutions matter, and that there is no one way of going about reform and that it will completely depend on the political climate of the time as to how reform will proceed (Pilon, 2002: 60). The sentiment that might encourage democratic reform is palpable and “people are proud of their province, or of Canada, but they think the way government works is remote, uncaring, unrepresentative of their interests, unnecessarily adversarial, untrustworthy, wasteful, and so on” (Gibson, 2005: 71). Gibson emphasizes the

importance of the Citizens' Assembly on Electoral Reform in British Columbia (British Columbia, 2004) and how its popularity could lead to a wider acceptance of changing the electoral systems of other provinces and even federally (Gibson, 2005: 71).

However, electoral reform does not always guarantee that the transition to better representation will be a smooth one. The New Zealand experience has been that most female MPs are elected from the lists, and though some believe that it doesn't matter how equalization happens, there are others that are worried that it creates two ranks of MPs, with the constituency MPs being connected more directly to the people and the list MPs are only really connected to their party (MacIvor, 2003: 33-4). Though institutional changes will make the system more equitable, without the accompaniment of a cultural shift in attitudes towards politics, the problems of the past could very well remain the problems of the future.

Although a reform such as switching [electoral systems] might change how citizens think about the utility of their vote, slowing the growing tide of anti-government cynicism and distrust is a much bigger task—one that even large-scale electoral system change might not be able to affect...changes in political efficacy produced by such a reform might be most pronounced among citizens having a party attachment. This means that the effect of increased efficacy could elude a sizable (and, in many nations, increasing) proportion of the electorate: non-partisans and independents. Unfortunately, these are precisely the voters with whom many writers are concerned (Banduccia, Donovan, and Karp, 1999: 552).

This idea is reiterated by Pammett: "cultural attitudes involving the apathy of the population towards politics and towards the essential nature of electoral participation present a particularly intractable problem. Because of the circular nature of the relationship with other factors, any [institutional change] might help to reverse this trend"

(Pammett and LeDuc, 2004: 358). Pammett recognizes that change will take time, and that increased emphasis on civic education might help to speed the process up.

These generational problems cannot be seen in a political vacuum, as there are other factors that contribute to feelings of inefficacy. Because of the way that the current party system rewards regionally based parties, “younger people, particularly those newly eligible to vote, have thus perceived a party situation where meaningful choices, even where they existed among party ideologies, did not have a realistic chance of achieving parliamentary representation” (Pammett and LeDuc, 2004: 339). Those who do not feel as though their vote will make a difference are less likely to vote. What needs to be done is that young people need to be viewed not just as citizens-in-waiting, but as political actors and to be encouraged to participate. Hopefully, by bringing this concern into the open, political parties “political parties, governments and education authorities to be more vigilant about the community socialization of young people and the importance of electoral participation, which, it should be mentioned, is the most widespread means of democratically dealing with those issues” (Gauthier, 2003: 274).

Some feel as though the campaign strategies of political parties are at most to blame. “Young people are largely ignored. Political parties, by necessity, are rational, calculating creatures. As such, a vicious cycle has formed as political parties do not want to throw ‘good money after bad’ by courting a youth vote that is unreliable at best” (Sakamoto, 2004). Only over the short period of a few decades, the journey that children take to adulthood has greatly changed as compared to what their parents went through.

Social change has become so fast that slow-changing traditional political institutions are having a difficult time keeping up.

Political parties have failed to effectively respond to these changes. It is therefore vital that we begin to refine our models concerning young people's electoral behaviour in order to fully consider which of these alternative approaches can more adequately understand why more than one-half of all first-time voters decide not to participate at the first electoral opportunity. Failure to do so will mean that we will remain stuck with the existing explanations that suggest young people are either apathetic, or facing start-up difficulties or that they are too concerned with saving the whale to vote (Kimberlee, 2002: 96).

What is important to be understood is that "a new model of democracy is evolving. The contemporary democratic process requires more of its citizens. It also challenges politicians and bureaucrats to figure out what it means to move past a trustee model of politics without abdicating political leadership" (Hooghe, 2004: 340).

Majority plurality electoral systems like the one here in Canada reduce female participation, not necessarily by the fault of the system, but by how the preceding cultural factors limit women's participation within it. "The determining factors are a nation's familiarity with women in positions of power and the socio-political cultural acceptance of women as leaders, governors, and national administrators" (Reynolds, 1999: 572). Though the responsibilities and characteristics of individual MPs may not differ between men and women, if consideration is taken as to what roles within the party, and specifically cabinet, the differences between male and female MPs is more evident. The past Prime Ministers have appointed women to various positions, but the most common ones are those concerning international cooperation, citizenship, communications, labour,

multiculturalism, children and youth, or the status of women.⁴ Often the cabinet work that women do is related to issues of the left, and rarely are women appointed to ministries dealing with defence or finance.

While socio-cultural variables are highly salient when it comes to parliamentarians, the presence of women as cabinet ministers is correlated more closely with the political orientation of the government and the success rate of women in the legislature. In many ways the evidence suggests that the glass ceiling for women in politics has been slowly raised over the last fifty years. Women have made advances in parliaments since the end of the Second World War, but it has been only in the last decade or so that they have assumed a significant number of ministerial cabinet positions. The next glass ceiling to be broken through will be women filling the top jobs—as ministers of defence, finance, home, and foreign affairs. Then will come the highest glass ceiling—women competing on a gender-neutral playing field for the very top job as president or Prime Minister (Reynolds, 1999: 572).

Though the electoral glass ceiling may have to do with the differences policy preference in relation to gender, it also speaks to how Lister (2003) describes the differences between men and women as seen historically, where women are seen as nurturing individuals and men are seen as protectors and more responsible. A shift from these dichotomous descriptions of men and women is important because they create dangerous stereotypes that need to be demolished before a more open definition of ‘politician’ can be offered and before true representation can begin to occur. O’Neil gives another suggestion for change as well, which specifically addresses this need for a redefinition of who is encouraged to be nominated for the role of representative:

If women do have the self-confidence, organizational skills, communication abilities, financial resources, and thirst for intellectual combat that are all required in politics, then, particularly if they have

⁴ See Appendix Three for a complete list of female cabinet members, the cabinet positions they have held, and the amount of time they held them for since 1993.

children they must also have a partner willing to do more than just ‘help out’ at home. They need someone who is really a partner—and there are still not very many men who are interested in playing that role. This is as true for senior public servants and journalists as for politicians, where workdays are routinely twelve hours long and work frequently includes travel. Without changes at home, women in the public sphere must be either without partners or small children—or very rich and with domestic help, like the Queen. Most of us are not (O’Neil, 1993: 330-331).

This shows that the reason that women are not elected to parliament are cultural and not legal or as a direct result of the electoral system (though it does have an effect), and also why other groups such as young people are not being represented by it is cultural and ideological, and therefore even more difficult than an attempt at changing the electoral system.

When looking at how to change these ideas of representation, Ankersmit reminds us that “we are all no less authors of these problems than their victims” (Ankersmit, 2002: 105). Issues of political representation do not lie solely with parliament, but also with the citizens of Canada, as each part of that relationship depends on the other. And this is not without conflict. Docherty points to a difference in opinion between the Canadian public and parliamentarians, where on the one hand, the Canadian public is showing apathy towards politicians and the political system as a whole, while on the other hand parliamentarians think they are doing an adequate job of representing the interests of Canadians (Docherty, 2002: 175). This is not to say that because of conflicts such as this that any idea of change should be abandoned, but that it will take extra vigilance on the part of citizens and their representatives to come to a conclusion that meets the needs of each other, as well as the political environment of the day.

Ultimately, the truth that every individual is responsible from his or her own behaviour is inescapable. Integrity in public life finally rests on the shoulders of the individual, and that individual must be governed by mechanisms which ensure accountability and the exposure of improper conduct. If democratic institutions are to become more responsible to, and representative of, those they serve, and more relevant to their needs, this is unavoidable. Cosmetic changes to the electoral process, parliamentary procedure, administrative structures, party organization, or any other effort to reform the institutions of a political system will prove meaningless unless all those in positions of trust recognize their collective and individual responsibility to uphold [the principles of selflessness, integrity, objectivity, accountability, openness, honesty, and leadership] (Laundry, 1997: 86).

The individuals in positions of trust are those who are most directly affected by the ideology by which Canada is governed, and especially those in government have the power to change if the motivation is there, which in part depends on what party Canadians elect to be in power. Laundry makes an important statement as to how effective any systematic changes will be unless there is some sort of understanding between citizens, parties, and the state as to what problems that these reforms are trying to solve. Though it would be ideal if citizens were the ones seen as most important in this equation are the citizens and their choices, as the primary link between citizens and the state, political parties could prove to be a barrier.

Speaking from the experiences had with the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, Landry states that “political parties are the bedrock of most, if not all, countries which have representative institutions...Some parties are broad coalitions of opinion whose members adhere to certain common ideas and principles; others are formed around narrower and more specific policy schemes, admitting fewer shades of difference among its members. Whatever their form, they were shaped by the necessity

of appealing to an electorate” (Laundry, 1997: 53). Though parties may be in decline, but they still dominate industrialized countries, wield a considerable amount of influence in policy making, there is no general trend in decline of membership, and finally there is no institutional alternative to them in a representative democracy (Tanguay, 1999: 231).

Political parties are the central players in Canadian democracy. Many of us experience politics only through parties. They connect us to our democratic institutions. We vote in elections in which parties choose the local and prime ministerial candidates and dominate campaign discourse. Our legislatures are structured along party lines. Policy debates are shaped by the parties represented in the legislatures, and they determine which interests are heard. Parties are so central to our democratic life that if they are not participatory our politics cannot be participatory, if they are not inclusive our politics cannot be inclusive, and if they are not responsive then our politics cannot be responsive. Parties lie at the heart of Canadian democracy (Cross, 2004: 3).

By looking at how parties have traditionally governed themselves, and having those structures made more democratic may appeal to many Canadians who do not feel as though parties represent them. Though rates of post-secondary education are an indicator of positive voting behaviour, Young and Cross point out that “well educated citizens are apparently unwilling to be involved in [political parties] because their participation has little immediate effect and consequently seems meaningless” (Young and Cross, 2004: 9). Political parties might be viewed as a way in which to get youth more involved in politics, however this may not likely be very successful. “In most liberal industrialised democracies, the same trends [regarding the inability of parties to recruit significant numbers of young people] are apparent. The consensus...is that these organizations are in decline, at least as internally democratic membership organizations. Many of the accounts of declining membership in political parties point to the processes of

modernization as the cause” (Young and Cross, 2004: 9). Young and Cross identify these processes of modernization as: increasing rates of post-secondary education, changing social values, changes in social organization, the increased role of mass media, and a trend toward the professionalization of politics. “The professionalization of politics has substantially reduced political parties’ need for members and their volunteer labour. Many of the functions that party members performed in the past can now be undertaken more efficiently and scientifically by pollsters, advertising executives and the like” (Young and Cross, 2004: 9). This speaks to the fact that just as young people are turning away from traditional political institutions, political institutions are turning away from the traditional ways by which they used to conduct their affairs, which contributes to a cycle where neither party seems to understand the other. This cycle is a dangerous one, because it has the potential to make the distance between political parties and disaffected groups such as young adults even farther.

The [cycle of neglect] is rooted in the fact that political parties rarely placed a heavy emphasis on youth issues in their platforms. In turn, this has tended to give little or nothing to follow or take up as a cause, leading them to be apathetic or disinterested. The result, therefore, is a strengthened sense among political leaders and parties that young people cannot be engaged, and therefore do not represent a valuable source of political support, thereby giving them little motivation to develop policies directed at young voters...[however], this was not always the way. When the demographic weight of young Canadians was high, they were engaged in electoral politics and their turnout rates were not only generally higher than today, but also closer to those of the other life cycle groups (Adsett, 2003: 260).

The power to make many reforms, such as “enhancing constituency control of elected representatives through such devices as referendums, the initiative, and the recall, strengthening local governments, decentralizing and devolving decision making to

localities” (Ajzenstat, 2003: 15), lie with parties. However, due to the nature of how parties interact with themselves and others, there is little incentive for parties to change.

Canada’s federal system can structure political relationships (say within the same party) in such a way as to reduce the likelihood that reform will be adopted. Take the case of reform of the electoral system. There is a clear absence of incentives for virtually any party in Canada to want to modify the current electoral system. In part, this is a result of sheer political self-interest. But in part, it reflects the fact that many parties compete for office at both the federal and provincial levels, and what they do can affect the strength or credibility of the arguments of their partisans can employ at the other (Courtney, 2002: 121).

These conflicts have provided and will provide barriers to any sort of change, whether it is to increase the representation of women, youth or any other disaffected group or to just lessen the Canadian democratic deficit.

After discussing the various methods of parliamentary reform, Docherty concludes that “reforms often have unintended consequences. Offering mechanisms to keep politicians more in touch might make a substantial segment of the population happy, but it may also risk the freedom politicians now enjoy to represent a different, yet no less important, section of the population” (Docherty, 2002: 198). This concern for systematic reform is echoed by Ankersmit, who states “If the nature of political problems changes in the course of time, it is by no means certain that a political system antedating this new type of problem will be able to recognize it as a political problem at all, let alone deal with it in a satisfactory way” (Ankersmit, 2002: 104). Ankersmit asks the questions, is democracy only good at solving easily defined problems? Can it handle democratic problems that it generates itself? Can it even be expected to since that was not the intention? Ankersmit argues that older political problems that were evident at the time of

the creation of our current political systems were between divided segments of society, and now political problems are often associated with divisions of self, which are more difficult for institutions to address (Ankersmit, 2002: 106). These new political problems call for new political answers, it is just that they need a time and place for the debate. There are some, like Pyrcz (2004), who advocate direct democracy (such as through referendums) as a way for the 'ordinary people' to take back politics, however there are also complications that might arise from that as well.

Though it is not the purpose of this research to discuss direct or deliberative democracy, the consequences of these types of reforms are important to understand as they can apply to reform in general. As Ankersmit argues, direct democracy is good for questions that can easily be asked and answered in a public forum; however there are times at which this could be dangerous, particularly if the majority is asked to decide a question regarding a policy that only affects a minority (Eisenberg, 2004). The project of questioning the ability for the majority to make decisions for a minority is not calling into question the legitimacy of the direct democracy and referendums, but "to regulate them in ways that counteract and compensate for their propensity to favour values, such as formal equality and majority rule, that bias proceedings against [minority] groups that seek or appear to be seeking distinctive status and rights" (Eisenberg, 2004: 19). However, parliamentary or electoral reform is not the only possible alternative to increase participation with political institutions, and it will be the purpose of the next chapter to discuss one of these other alternatives, which is political education.

Conclusion

The issues facing sentiments of lack of representation provide many curious and complicated issues that need to be addressed before proposals for reform can even begin to be addressed, which is perhaps why reform has not been (and may very well never be) a topic of discussion at the federal level. However, there is no question that some form of representation is important to any political system.

Representation is necessary because the web of modern social life often ties the action of some people and institutions in one place to consequences in many other places and institutions. No person can be present at all the decisions or in all the decision-making bodies whose actions affect her life, because there are so many and so dispersed. Though her aspirations are often disappointed, she hopes that others will think of situations like hers and represent them to the issue forum (Young, 2000a: 124).

If the idea of representation is purely aesthetic as Ankersmit would have us believe, then the answer lies not in changing the electoral system to we need to focus on the politics of ideas, policies rather than people, what they do rather than who they are. Democracy today depends on some form of successful representation, and some believe that it is the success of liberal democracies such as Canada that is to blame for the fact that fewer young people find importance in voting. “Young people have not had to worry about their material needs and, instead, concern themselves with quality of life issues. For youth, these issues might not be those for which one turns to electoral politics for redress” (O'Neill, 2004: 4). However, O'Neill points out that the evidence of this is still quite limited, and that does not appear that young people have “turned from electoral politics to some other form of formal participation in great numbers. It seems to be more of a tuning out than a turning away” (O'Neill, 2004: 4). This calls into question not only

the ability of young people to engage with the traditional political institutions, but also the idea of the institutions themselves. However, Patten encourages the exercise of caution when trying to blame everything on the whole of current political institutions, and instead encourages the questioning of some of the less savoury parts within those institutions.

The institutions of representative and responsible government are significant human accomplishments that required considerable struggle to achieve. The achievement of greater formal political equality through the extension of civil and political citizenship rights has done a lot to improve the rights of Canadians. All the same, competitive elite democracy is only limited democracy. As such, we should not allow ourselves to become complacent democrats; we should set our sights on extensive democracy as a primary political goal. At this moment in history, however, the dominant approaches to politics and governance are threatening, not extending, democracy. There are enduring anti-democratic features to our electoral system, state power is increasingly concentrated within a limited number of executive institutions, new governing practices are undermining the potential of democratic citizenship, national sovereignty is being lost to supra-national governing institutions, and the goals and purposes of the state are being altered in such a way that the body politic is losing its capacity to act collectively to regulate and improve social and economic life. These trends currently underpin a growing democratic deficit. They are reason for concern, and for vigilance in our struggle to defend democracy's potential (Patten, 2003: 103).

Though electoral reform might solve some of the problems nagging at the idea of Canadian democracy, for the purposes of increasing voter turnout among young people, it might have difficulty as it does not address the cultural and ideological concerns that were discussed both in Chapters One and Two.

Especially with the trend of neo-liberalism that has been increasing over the past two decades, reforms that acknowledge the needs of a collective interest may be made less and less of a priority by government. As well, though this is not an argument for the

abandoning the attempt to have more representative legislative bodies, this is an argument against assuming that just because a certain number of seats are filled by a certain type of representative. And “while electoral system reform is no panacea for increasing turnout, it does have the potential to demonstrate the responsiveness of politicians to public concern about the lack of effectiveness of voting in the current system and to attract the attention of the disaffected and/or young” (Pammett and LeDuc, 2004: 257). However, as is cautioned by both MacIvor and Pammett, electoral reform should not be seen as a universal remedy, because it cannot necessarily deal with the outside issues of culture and ideology, as have been shown through this research as having a potential effect on trends in non-voting, perhaps more so than the electoral system.

Chapter Three – The Importance of Informing Citizens

One of the major concerns for liberal democracy is an uninformed public (Ramet, 2001: 58-59), and when problems with democracy are identified, citizenship education is seen as a solution

Traditional democratic theory asserts that a strong and healthy democracy relies on an alert, attentive, responsive, and informed democracy...In a representative democracy, citizens do not need to be experts on the intricacies of public management, policymaking, [or] federalism. But as designator of who runs government, controls the bureaucracy, and drives the elaboration of public policy, the voter must be aware of some basic political facts. He is supposed to know what the issues are, what their history is, what the relevant facts are, what alternatives are proposed, what the party stands for, what the likely consequences are. Equipped with these facts, citizens become capable of effectively evaluating the respective merit of competing party platforms and selecting the option that best reflects their interests and preferences (Fournier, 2002).

However, what these political facts are, and how they are to be relayed though is a better question perhaps. “Improvements to education and information to prospective voters are the best methods of interesting young people in politics and elections. Increased attentions to civics education in the schools, particularly as it pertains to social and political participation, will convey a positive message about the benefits of interacting with others in the fulfillment of civic duties” (Pammett and LeDuc, 2003: 73). These are some of the efforts put forward by Elections Canada in the last election, as they support educators by providing information, and election-related materials, to schools and to other groups that request it. It will be the purpose of this chapter to explore the idea of civic education, and how some authors believe it will affect voter turnout.

O’Neill (2004) discusses the three determinants of voter turnout, which are motivation, ability, and opportunity. These elements will serve as a framework for this

chapter on means by which youth can be informed to vote, as that along with electoral reform, was a way in which it was thought that youth voting participation could be increased. In the context of motivation to vote, this research will explore the role of civic duty and its relation to the younger cohorts. Then, the ability to vote (which refers to the resources available to inform the vote) will be discussed in the form of civic education. Though there are many forms of civic education, this research will concentrate on two: firstly the use of elections simulations in high schools and secondly the use of the internet as a new communications media. The reason that this research focuses only on the benefits of the internet and high school election simulations for citizenship education is because these are the two areas where effort has been made to provide better information since the 2000 election. Other aspects of civic education such as curriculum changes would be interesting to study, but these other aspects have not been of recent focus. Both of these types of education would benefit those young people in high school, as it is this group that is identified as most in need of better civic education. Finally, though the opportunities to vote are similar to what they have been in the past (there are really no more or no fewer elections than there have been), the idea of meaningful opportunity will be discussed in an age of neo-liberal governance. This chapter will have three main sections: the first will deal with the idea of civic duty and how it influences the motivation to vote; the second will explore the idea of civic education and how it increases the ability of young people to make more informed decisions; and the third will discuss how though the opportunities to vote come at a similar rate as those opportunities of the past, with the rise of neo-liberalism has made it

sometimes questionable as to how many opportunities there are to meaningfully participate within politics.

Civic Duty and the Motivation to Vote

O'Neill's element of motivation refers to the reasons for which youth vote, which provides "perhaps the best possible explanation for dropping turnout rates, but it may also be the hardest to get a handle on" (O'Neill, 2004: 3). Both Lister (2003) and Jans (2004) imply that there is a sense of duty associated with citizenship that is associated with participation. This is often to as a 'civic duty' and as this idea of participating in society because of feelings of obligation to the greater good are not as evident in newer generations than as in older generations.

Civic duty is the feeling that participation is to be valued for its own sake, or for its contribution to the overall health of the polity, and does not need to be justified on instrumental grounds. For the believer in the importance of participating out of duty, neither is it important that the prospective voter be enticed to cast a ballot by a particularly attractive bevy of candidates, parties, or policies, nor is it essential that the race be close and the vote more likely to count in determining the outcome. Rather, the conscientious voter motivated by civic duty feels that voting is important for its own sake (Pammett and LeDuc, 2004: 38).

Positive feelings about the quality of representation, the direction of government, and the relevance of governing to voters are the greatest contributors to a high sense of civic duty, while feelings of political trust and efficacy are also important. "Of the socio-demographic variables, greater age heightens civic duty, suggesting that it grows with time, as does higher education, suggesting it grows with knowledge" (Pammett and LeDuc, 2003: 39).

Some have identified the vote decision as one half of a contractual relationship – voting is seen as a responsibility or duty rooted in the most

basic benefit of citizenship in a democracy: that those who govern may only do so with the consent of who is governed. However, it is easy to point to the dramatic and highly visible failures that have characterized Canadian governments [of the past two decades]: Meech; Charlottetown, Western discontent, the seeming blindness of governments to concerns about the negative impacts of globalization among many citizens; and government scandals. Each, in its own way, may have lead to the severing of the ties that link a citizen's sense of responsibility to vote to the government's responsibility it lead, respond, and succeed. Combine this with the fact that government's greatest success over the past 10 years has been to balance the budget, made possible in large part by scaling back services. Citizenship has been replaced with clientelism. There is, I would argue, little in such a relationship to inspire a sense of civic duty (O'Neill, 2004: 4).

The *Survey of Non-Voters* asked a question about the importance of voting. Figure 4 shows how perceptions of voting as a civic duty for different age cohorts.

FIGURE 4 - Perceived Importance of Voting in Elections, by Age Cohorts (%)

	68+	(58-67)	(48-57)	(38-47)	(30-37)	(25-29)	(21-24)	(18-20)	Total
Essential	40.6	42.9	48.8	37.6	36.3	28.8	22.0	27.6	35.4
Very important	49.3	40.8	34.4	36.5	32.2	37.1	38.4	42.4	37.4
Somewhat import.	6.5	7.6	12.0	20.1	26.4	26.2	31.0	21.8	20.6
Not at all important	2.9	5.4	4.0	5.2	4.7	7.5	7.1	8.2	5.7
No answer	0.0	3.3	0.8	0.6	0.5	0.4	1.6	0.0	0.9

SOURCE: (Pammett and LeDuc, 2003: 71)

As can be seen by Figure 4, the sense of civic duty is felt more strongly by older respondents. "A noticeable drop-off in the belief of civic duty with respect to voting occurs among the cohorts entering the electorate from 1993 onward...it is clear that not as many respondents in the younger age groups share [the views of the older cohorts]" (Pammett and LeDuc, 2003: 71). However, there are those who do not view participation as a whole as very important.

Many citizens believe that having the right to participate in politics imposes a duty to do so. This belief is mistaken. It is true that citizens possess the right in democracy to participate. And rights entail correlative

duties, as my right to life entails your duty not to do me in. The duties correlative to rights, however, falls upon others, not the possessor of the right. My right to participate means that others are duty bound not to hinder me should I choose to participate. It means that government must provide for my participation, but it does not mean that I have a duty to participate...For [some], significantly greater political participation is a good thing, for them, for others, and for democracy. They are little impressed by the realist's pursuit for efficiency, wishing instead that no stone of political opinion remain unturned in the composition of political consensus, no voice unheard, no discussion avoided. Tolerating less leaves democracy vulnerable to those bent on undermining it... [Democracy] is a special sort of relationship among citizens in which reasoned discourse serves as the source of action and authority. Aloofness disconnects and reduces a citizenry, thereby undermining its autonomy (Pyrzcz, 2000: 23).

Some measure of non-voting is always going to be the case (unless there is some form of mandatory voting policy put in place), but caution should be used when attributing the realist's perspective of a widespread problem among a certain group of Canadians to something that is an inevitable part of an electoral system.

Citizenship Education and the Ability to Vote

O'Neill's element of ability refers to the resources available that allow youth to decide whether or not to participate. Though the rate of education has been on the rise, there are still young people who are choosing to abstain from participation. There has also been little change in the actual opportunities to vote, as there are just as many elections to vote in now than there were in the past. When asked why they felt young people were less likely to vote, the second most popular response was that young people had a lack of information, understanding and knowledge to vote. In the *New Survey of Non-Voters*, 33.9 percent of respondents under the age of 25, and 27.1 percent of

respondents aged 25 or older gave that response (Pammett and LeDuc, 2003: 50). These statistics speak to the growing emphasis put on civic education in the literature.

The more interest people express in politics and the better informed they are, the more likely they are to vote. This is not surprising. On the one hand, interest and information are both important indicators of motivation to vote. Political interest represents a person's affective engagement with politics, while political information indicates his or her cognitive engagement. On the other hand, the act of voting requires cognitive resources, and the fact that a person has been able to acquire some politically relevant information is an indication that he or she possesses those resources. And, unless we assume that the choice of party is entirely random, some minimal level of information is required in order to choose not just to vote but which party to vote for. So where cognitive engagement helps to motivate the act of voting, cognitive resources facilitate (Blais et al., 2002: 52).

Though the idea of civic education applies not only to young adults (as literature argues that the whole of the electorate should make educated choices), as was mentioned in the statistics given in the *New Survey of Non-Voters* above, this is a particular concern with young people.

We know that today's youth are less knowledgeable and politically informed than previous generations. They know less about the political system, its processes and its actors. Moreover, it is clear that those who lack political knowledge are increasingly unwilling to vote. The reasons for declining levels of political knowledge remain unclear. Is it a change in curriculum? Has learning about the political system taken a backseat to other learning? Or is it that fewer families chat about politics around the dinner table, or even that many families rarely sit around the dinner table at all (O'Neill, 2004: 2)?

The low level of party identification among those born after 1970 also points to the fact that politics is not as much a part of what families talk about, as the trend suggests a possible breakdown of processes of inter-generational transmission of partisanship within the family (Blais et al., 2002: 55). Though it is not the purpose of this research to

examine the role of the family in voter participation, as that is a topic that deserves its own focus, the theme of how politics is being done differently now than it used to be is important to recognize. Both O'Neill and Blais point to a time when politics was something more readily discussed at home, and when political affiliation and political duty was something that was a part of family life. Though it deserves study of its own, this changing view of the role of the family could also have a wide effect on why young people are less likely to turn out to the polls.

It is because civic literacy is the knowledge and ability to make sense of their political world that makes it such an important focus for change. "There is good reason to believe that civic literacy in Canada is low, and going lower...it would therefore be foolish and extreme for Canada to rest on their laurels. Raising civic literacy – and thus reinforcing the shaky underpinnings of its welfare state – is a matter of urgency" (Milner, 2002: 187). Not all are so pessimistic, as compared to three decades ago, Canadians are better informed and therefore more able to be critical (Kanji, 2002: 95). "Education socializes citizens into norms of civic engagement and equips them with the cognitive skills that active engagement requires. It is much harder to explain why turnout rates have declined even as education levels rise" (Blais et al., 2002: 49). As well, with higher rates of education, especially at the post secondary level, authors like Blais argue that they would have expected the very reverse.

Among the reasons given for this diminished role of democracy is that though there has been a great deal of government resources put into championing the cause of democracy, there has been little connection between democracy and democratic

education, which has in turn contributed to a sense of apathy. Though liberal democracy depends on having a well informed electorate, with the franchise comes very little encouragement to run or participate (Smith, 1991: 4).

Democracy promised to educate individuals for citizenship. Today's democracies, however, are populated by citizens who are apathetic about politics and institutions that provide few if any opportunities for education through participation...the concept of 'apathy' is not an entirely accurate description. Rather, over the past decades, people in developed democracies have become disaffected from their political institutions. They are now less likely to trust their governments, and more likely to judge them incompetent, untrustworthy, and even corrupt (Warren, 2004: 200-1).

Warren argues that along with other failures, this lack of education makes it more difficult than before to keep up with the promises of democracy. Not only is the definition of democracy challenged by this, but is also challenged by neo-liberalism, the different parts of the state other than government (i.e. the market), the new complexity of societies, and finally the multiple identities and affiliations of those who live within the society (Warren, 2004: 206-18).

The issue of low levels of civic literacy among Canadian youth is a significant problem. Many young people do not have the literacy skills to understand how government works or why voting is important. Thus, they feel alienated from such things. Schools need to do a better job of making civics 'live' through experiential learning, discussion, debate, and exposure...Political understanding and awareness lead to informed decision making, one of the elements young Canadians often feel is lacking and a key reason they cite for why they don't vote (Haid, 2004: 22).

As Haid alludes to, it is young people in high school that are the most in need of better political information. There has been a "dramatic decline in voting among youth who have less than a post-secondary education. Attempts to reverse the decline are more

likely to bear fruit, then, if they focus on educational levels and curricula below the university level” (O'Neill, 2004: 2).

One way of showing how young people are in an unusually precarious political place is to see the reaction towards legislation regarding changes to the voting age. Though the ‘right to vote’ is easily defined, it is when the process of defining who has that right that issues of who deserves citizenship come into question. As mentioned before, the voting age was lowered from 21 to 18 in 1970 because of growing political activity in that age group (Pammett and Myles, 1991: 95). The reasons for change were that: (1) young adults did other citizen activities (i.e. fighting for country, earning a living and paying taxes, getting married, driving cars); (2) they were ‘mature’ enough to vote; and (3) it was a way to get young people involved and encourage good citizenship is to give them the responsibility of the vote. The arguments of opposition to the change were that (1) young adults were too immature; (2) they had an inability to make own decisions and were too easily influenced by their parents and others; and (3) that they did not have *enough* of a stake in the community (i.e. paying taxes) (Pammett and Myles, 1991: 97). Though the change was eventually adopted, the debate surrounding the change brought forward some interesting perceptions of young adults, especially on the negative side.

At the present, there is some talk of lowering the voting age to 16, even though it does not gain considerable mentions in the literature. Arguments for and against lowering the voting age was taken from the submission to the Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing in regards to the matter of lowering the voting age to 16 (Pammett and Myles, 1991). Those who are in favour of young people voting argue

the following: (1) age based entitlement is by definition arbitrary; (2) age is no guarantee of knowledge, motivation, or maturity (i.e. informed high school students); (3) taxes are paid by everyone who purchases goods or services with applicable taxes; (4) lowering the voting age will allow for the improvement of education by involving students while still in high school. Though age is no guarantee of knowledge, an age has to be set so that the system can work. As well, even if the age were lowered, elections happen approximately every four years, which means that there are still many young people who would miss out on the education of being able to vote in an actual election during their high school years. The reasons given against lowering the voting age are as follows: (1) there is a need to exclude people from having the right not because all such persons are incompetent or will abuse the right, but because risk of abuse happening is high; (2) young people are more at risk to peer pressure, fads, and 'single issue' politics; (3) it is a slippery slope, lower voting age would mean you'd have to lower the drinking age and the driving age (Pammett and Myles, 1991).

Once again, an examination of the reasons for and against lowering the voting age show how conceptions of young adults (especially negative ones) affect how they are viewed as citizens, and could therefore damage how great their feelings of belonging are. However, the chances of lowering the voting age have been affected by recent statements of public opinion and the Supreme Court. Only 24 percent of respondents to the *New Survey of Non-Voters* felt that lowering the voting age, and "whatever the long-term merits of such an idea, there appears to be a realization that extending the franchise to 16-18 year olds would initially further decrease the voting rate, and that further education

would be needed to pave the way before the majority of the public would be prepared to consider it” (Pammett and LeDuc, 2003: 54). More importantly, the Supreme Court of Canada chose not to hear a challenge made by two young Albertans who wish to see the voting age lowered (Canadian Press, 2005), which means that a change on constitutional grounds is highly unlikely.

Though many young Canadians are unable to participate in elections, through simulations that occur along with official elections, they are able to have an election experience even if they are not old enough. These initiatives are “innovative advertising campaigns employed by the electoral authorities (e.g., Elections Ontario in 2003, and Elections Canada in 2004) can help to draw the attention of those hesitating about voting to the desirability of making their own choice of representatives rather than leaving this choice to others” (Pammett and LeDuc, 2004: 258). The Student Vote 2004 project encouraged more than 2 300 schools across Canada to stage mock elections coinciding with the time of the national election. Each school received all of the necessary items with which they could conduct both an election campaign as well as an election day.

Student Vote was initiated with the Ontario provincial election in October 2003. It was widely praised, and a second project, *Student Vote 2004*, was organized to coincide with the 2004 general election. At the core of the *Student Vote 2004* project was a Parallel Student Vote modelled on a typical election in Canada. Students voted, using ballots and other polling materials, provided by Elections Canada. In the Ontario exercise, students had voted in advance of the provincial election, and these results were tallied and announced on election night. However, in the recent project around the federal election, because the election occurred after most classes had ended for the year, teachers were allowed to hold the Parallel Student Election when convenient (Cook, 2004: 18).

With simulations like these, “young people familiarize themselves with electoral and other political institutions as well as the role citizens can play in a democracy by exercising their right to vote. It gives them the opportunity to structure their opinions, develop their critical sense and participate in public debate. Through their participation, students are able to develop an understanding of election issues, gain familiarity with the programs, candidates and leaders of the political parties” (Verboczy and Giguère, 2005: 85). This sort of program is beneficial because “teachers across Canada need help, not only with classroom-ready materials, but also in professional development to help them redefine the dimensions of true civics education more creatively and substantially. Without this support, youth disengagement from the broad process will continue into the next generation” (Cook, 2004: 20).

In addition to simulations such as described above, it is also important that young people have an awareness of the media, as it has become such an important source of information, especially with the advent of the internet. “The mass media have replaced political parties as a means of conveying information to the public. As a consequence, parties are held in lower regard and party members are less necessary as a means of ‘getting the word out’ for parties” (Young and Cross, 2004: 9). It is important that media literacy be looked at as “social, cultural and political literacy, and a competent understanding of global media as an absolutely vital frontier in redefining what we mean by civic education in modern democratic societies” (Calabrese, 2001: 83). This idea is echoed by Kanji, who points to the importance of the media and internet as educational tools (Kanji, 2002: 95), and Buckingham, who believes that as one of the greatest sources

of political information, “the news media clearly represent a significant means of ‘informal’ political education, both for young people and for adults” (Buckingham, 1999: 172). Though all forms of media are important, this research will concentrate on the newest form, the internet.

The internet, which was not a factor for past generations, is clearly a part of the modern picture. And while the internet provides easily accessible and abundant information on parties, platforms, and leaders, there remain the problems of computer access, information overload and the difficulty of weeding out credible sources. The abundance of information might make it difficult for many to know where to start and how to process it (O'Neill, 2004: 3).

The internet is a very different type of communications media, and is distinguished by the following characteristics put forward by Small (2004): (1) the interactive nature allows both the sender and the receiver can share instantaneous feedback; (2) the internet allows for the inexpensive transmission, sorting and storage of information; (3) the internet brings together various media, which allows for having the same message a variety of ways in a single place; (4) the internet can target niche segments of the population, especially young people and heavy internet users; and (5) the internet is both decentralized and unmediated, allowing both the sender and receiver to have control over the messages, which is especially important to those parties who receive less media coverage.

Political web sites would undoubtedly increase the information available to citizens. What is more, this information would be straight from the horse's mouth, unfiltered by the media. Not only would information be more varied, but also citizens would have greater control over what information they receive. This, according to cyber-optimists, would be beneficial to democratic politics because a more knowledgeable citizen is a more active citizen (Small, 2004: 208).

By encouraging the use of the internet, educators and Canadians in general can promote civic education without even stepping into a classroom, because of the near endless capabilities of the internet to store and catalogue information, as well as present that information in a variety of ways. Internet media is becoming more and more widely available, and with its informed use, could herald a new democratic age.

The Rise of Neo-Liberalism and the Opportunity to Vote

O'Neill's element of opportunity refers to the how often youth are able to exercise voting rights, which she identifies as not being any different from previous generations and therefore a negligible factor. However, as Stasiulis mentions, there has been a rise in the government executive having more decision making power than legislative bodies, which is seen to take power away from elected representatives.

But even if a democratic and civic republican ethos existed in Canadian families that led to the development of children's character consistent with the model of virtuous, informed and active citizens, one would still need to consider the current opportunity structure to exercise democratic political rights. The opportunities for meaningful democratic participation in Canadian public institutions – including governments, schools, and universities – have notably declined with neo-liberal governance and corporate globalization, such that authoritarian structures of power implement the priorities of social spending, now defined as deficit-reduction and 'efficiency' (Stasiulis, 2002: 527).

Therefore, though the opportunities to vote may not be any different, the opportunities for a meaningful vote have been lessened in an age of neo-liberal governance, because there is less emphasis placed on the goals of the community and more emphasis placed upon efficient spending by this dominant governing philosophy.

Conclusion

I think we can agree that the problem of civic disengagement is both deeper and broader than the failure or willingness to vote...If we educate the 'good citizen,' we must grant that giving young people the notion that they are called upon only to be 'personally responsible citizens' without also attending to the broader participatory demands of citizenship, or an engagement with structural inequity and injustice, is to present a false definition of what constitutes the democratic citizen...Citizenship education must involve the posing of real problems or questions associated with our society, challenging students to find real solutions through a recognition that the classroom and society are engaged in the same difficult, messy process of public debate and action (Cook, 2004: 20).

As has been shown in this chapter, it is important that young people have the motivation, the ability, and the opportunity to vote. Though feelings of civic duty decrease in younger age cohorts, the proposal of greater civic education has been discussed in the literature as a means by which to possibly reverse that trend. It has been the purpose of this chapter to show that citizenship education is argued to be the most important for those young people at the secondary level, which speaks to the importance of including those under the age of 18 in a definition of citizenship as shown in Chapter One.

Through supplements such as the ones provided by Elections Canada, high school teachers are given the resources to better educate their students on how elections work without having the restriction of voting age as a problem, and citizenship education can start as early as teachers see fit. Though the issue of lowering the voting age has been suggested as a means by which to even further encourage young people to participate while they are still in high school, this was not seen to be a viable option. Though caution is emphasized when speaking to the information available on the internet as it because of the sheer volume of it there may be problems with navigation and

understanding, the medium as a communications tool holds much promise for the future of educating citizens as it provides a more direct link between citizens and parties without the filter of the media. This is especially important for those minor parties who may not receive as much media attention as the major parties because of their size, which could lead to a greater support for a more diverse party system.

However, all of the civic education in the world, whether it be done in high schools or at home on the internet, will not make as much of a difference if there is little support for participation by the governing institutions, a support which is largely defined by the governing ideology. And because of the low priority given to matters of social policy, and especially since education lies within the provincial jurisdiction, the chances of the federal government doing something about increasing civic education are even less.

Conclusion

It does not seem that young people are not voting just because they are young, as the generational replacement of the older cohorts does not seem to be making up for the tendencies for not voting in the younger cohorts. “If life-cycle effects continue their reduced impact on young citizens, the most likely outcome is that voting rates will continue to decline” (Pammett and LeDuc, 2003: 21). In regards to youth turnout in the last election, Elections Canada is optimistic. “Preliminary results indicate that youth turnout in the 2004 general election increased from what it was perceived to be in 2000. Previous surveys had estimated youth turnout for 2000 to be around 25 percent of the eligible youth population. The current study has shown that it is 38.7 percent for 2004. Further, it indicates that first-time voters participated at a higher rate than did youth who had become eligible to vote in 2000” (Canada, 2004c: 84). Whether this can be attributed to any one particular aspect of the 2004 campaign is too early to say, as sufficient studies have not been done to prove this as fact, however there was an unprecedented amount of money spent by Elections Canada and the media organizations to bring awareness to the idea of youth non-voting, and there were many efforts made in the media and on the internet to inform young people on how to vote and to encourage them to do so (Pammett and LeDuc, 2004).

The younger years of an adult citizen’s life are formative ones, where they establish their habits in relation to society. As is supported by Adsett, their levels of voter turnout at this time determine if they will vote in the future:

As [Canadians] age, [voting] behaviour gradually spreads to the next oldest group, causing the voter turnout rates of the older age groups to also decline. This statement of the problem is consistent with the idea that

voting, like civic participation in general, is a behaviour learned in the formative years; if the behaviour of voting is not acquired by a certain age, it is never 'taken up' (Adsett, 2003: 248)

However, a motivation to increase the number of ballots cast in an election does not address that the broader issues of ideological change have taken place, and this has been demonstrated during the previous discussions on electoral reform and political education. Though electoral reform may provide many benefits to not only young adults but all Canadians, any reforms that are proposed with the purpose of motivating young adults to vote by promising to better represent them should be taken with a grain of salt if anything is to be learned by the example set by women and their participation within reformed electoral systems. Though their representation is sometimes better guaranteed through methods such as quotas, electoral reform does not address the wider cultural impediments that women face when entering public life. And most of all, taking into consideration the limits of representation in a democratic society, young adults and Canadians as a whole cannot expect that parliamentarians with their physical characteristics will be able to represent them any better than parliamentarians without those characteristics. Instead, with the help of a model of youth citizenship like the one presented in Chapter One, young adults can become more involved at the political level if their agency is recognized from the time at which they are able to cast a vote, and though they may not be directly represented within the seats of parliament, if their citizenship and role in society is more widely recognized, there is a better chance that there will be more advocates for youth issues in parliament, regardless of the age of parliamentarians.

What is most important and should be emphasized is that it is through participation within the electoral system that Canadians can ensure that their representatives work for them, as it is the votes of the Canadian people that elect them into office. Though it may not always seem noble, candidates who stand for office need one thing more than anything, and that thing is votes. Though the votes that candidates receive to elect them to office are the most important, new legislation has made it easier for each vote to count, even if it does not go to a winning candidate. As of June 2003, significant reforms of how party financing is governed were made law in the form of Bill C-24: *An Act to Amend the Canada Elections Act and the Income Tax Act (Bill C-24: An Act to Amend the Canada Elections Act and the Income Tax Act (Political Financing)*, 2003). The act has five main components: (1) a ban (with minor exceptions) on political donations by corporations and unions; (2) a limitation on individual contributions; (3) the registration of constituency associations, with reporting requirements; (4) the extension of regulation to nomination and leadership campaigns; and (5) enhanced public funding of the political system, particularly at the level of political parties. These measures are meant to serve as a means of equalization between the parties, as well as to allow for the growth of smaller parties. Most interesting is the fifth component, which allows for greater reimbursement of election period costs, as well as a provision for \$1.75 per vote for registered parties who receive 2 percent of the valid votes nationally, or 5 percent of the votes in the ridings where the party ran candidates. This will decrease the pressure on parties to raise funds and will hopefully allow them to concentrate in areas other than

fundraising, which can hopefully lead to an increased role for political parties to educate the public and encourage all citizens, including youth citizens, to be more active.

As for the subject of political education, anyone would have a difficult time arguing against an increased emphasis on educating young people. Any academically or scholarly oriented individual would be remiss in not advocating making well educated and informed decisions, whether that be in voting or in life. This is especially true for young people, as for the most part, all Canadians under the age of 18 take part in a formal education system. Take for example Figure 5 below that shows one of the questions posed by the *Survey of Non-Voters* regarding increased civic education by having schools ‘do more.’

FIGURE 5 – The Role of Schools in Encouraging Participation

SOURCE: (Pammett and LeDuc, 2003: 53)

In response to the statement ‘Schools should do more to educate children in the benefits of voting and political participation,’ an overwhelming majority of respondents chose strongly agree or agree. It is not difficult to see why, as many Canadians would be hard pressed to advocate less education is better in any situation. The most important conclusion to come away with from the discussion of civic education in Chapter Three is

that there needs to be a more robust definition of Canadian citizenship that includes both children (those under the age of 18) and youth (those under the age of 30) that portrays them as individuals within society that have agency and the ability to make decisions for themselves, as it is during this time that they are most able to benefit from the public education system.

However, voting behaviour is only one aspect of the complex concept of citizenship, and as such, focusing only on voting behaviour runs the risk of ignoring the other aspects of citizenship. The decline in voter turnout among young people has taken place at the same time as the rise of neo-liberal ideology as the dominant governing philosophy of the Canadian government. Though it is assured that the relationship between the decline in voter turnout and the rise in neo-liberal governance will be more clear in the future, there are some interesting connections between how the fall in youth participation in the Canadian political community has taken place at the same time as governments have made wide scale cutbacks to social services that have traditionally been seen as the glue that holds the Canadian community together. It will be interesting to see if there are any further connections between these two phenomena made, though it may take some time for any relationship to be adequately studied and confirmed.

In addition to what has already been discussed, there are two ideas that are important to outline at the conclusion of this research. The first is that it is “increasingly important that as researchers we do not make young Canadians feel as though they alone are to blame for the ‘democratic deficit.’ There is more to be gained by bringing youth on board in an effort to understand the problem than there is in pointing fingers” (O'Neill,

2004: 5). As mentioned earlier in this section, though it is too early to make any definitive conclusions as to the work done by Elections Canada and other organizations during the last election, it was quite obvious that many spent a lot of time identifying youth non-voting as an issue and equal time trying to convince young people to vote. Though the outcomes of this of assertive campaigning are as yet unknown, and in accordance with the previous statement by O'Neill, caution should be used in the forcefulness with which youth non-voting is negatively identified as a 'problem,' as those who are identified as such may not be as likely to help with the solution.

The second and perhaps more lofty conclusion is that there is hope that others take the time not only to study youth non-voting and political participation as a whole, but also youth citizenship. As is demonstrated by this research, though the current literature on Canadian youth citizenship is thought provoking and relevant, there is not much of it. Though the example of women provided a great deal of help in the discussion of representation in Chapter Two, it would be beneficial to see studies of how youth issues could be better represented in parliament without electing them to the House of Commons, or even what the consequences of seeing younger Members of Parliament might be. If more literature on youth citizenship were available and more widely discussed through conferences and other public meetings, perhaps Canadians would come closer to adopting a model of citizenship more inclusive of the needs of children and youth. Perhaps it is best said in the words of Jean-Pierre Kingsley in the forward to the *Survey of Non-Voters*: "the people you leave behind slow you down and the people you cast aside drag you down. Democracy can afford neither. We all need to do a better

job of understanding and addressing the issue [of non-voting] – and research is the only way I know how to do that” (Kingsley, 2004).

Appendix One**Federal Representation of Women – 1867 to Date**

Political Party	Number of Women
Liberal Party	80
Progressive Conservative Party	37
Bloc Québécois	19
New Democratic Party	17
Conservative Party of Canada	7
Reform Party	7
Canadian Reform Conservative Alliance	4
Co-operative Commonwealth Federation	1
Independent Conservative	1
Progressive	1
Unity	1
TOTAL	175

SOURCE: (Library of Parliament, 2004a)

Appendix Two**Women Candidates in General Elections – 28 June 2004**

Party	Candidates	Elected	Elected (%)
TOTAL	391	65	17%
New Democratic Party	96	5	5%
Green Party of Canada	78	34	44%
Liberal Party of Canada	75	12	16%
Conservative Party of Canada	36	0	0%
Marxist-Leninist Party	28	14	50%
Bloc Québécois	18	0	0%
Christian Heritage Party of Canada	15	0	0%
Canadian Action Party	12	0	0%
Communist Party of Canada	11	0	0%
Marijuana Party	8	0	0%
Independent	7	0	0%
Libertarian Party of Canada	2	0	0%
No Affiliation	2	0	0%
PC Party	2	0	0%

SOURCE: (Library of Parliament, 2004b)**Women Candidates in General Elections – 27 November 2000**

Party	Candidates	Elected	Elected (%)
TOTAL	373	62	17%
New Democratic Party	88	5	6%
Liberal Party of Canada	65	39	60%
Progressive Conservative	39	1	3%
Canadian Alliance	32	7	22%
Marxist-Leninist Party	30	0	0%
Natural Law Party of Canada	25	0	0%
Green Party of Canada	21	0	0%
Bloc Québécois	18	10	56%
Canadian Action Party	17	0	0%
Marijuana Party	12	0	0%
No Affiliation	11	0	0%
Communist Party of Canada	10	0	0%
Independent	5	0	0%

SOURCE: (Library of Parliament, 2004b)

Women Candidates in General Elections – 02 June 1997

Party	Candidates	Elected	Elected (%)
TOTAL	408	62	15%
New Democratic Party	107	8	7%
Liberal Party of Canada	84	37	44%
Progressive Conservative	56	2	4%
Natural Law Party of Canada	38	0	0%
Marxist-Leninist Party	28	0	0%
Green Party of Canada	27	0	0%
Reform Party of Canada	23	4	17%
Bloc Québécois	16	11	69%
Canadian Action Party	12	0	0%
Christian Heritage Party of Canada	6	0	0%
Independent	5	0	0%
No Affiliation	5	0	0%

SOURCE: (Library of Parliament, 2004b)

Women Candidates in General Elections – 25 October 1993

Party	Candidates	Elected	Elected (%)
TOTAL	476	53	11%
New Democratic Party	113	1	1%
Progressive Conservative	67	1	1%
Liberal Party of Canada	64	36	56%
Natural Law Party of Canada	57	0	0%
National Party of Canada	35	0	0%
Abolitionist Party of Canada	24	7	29%
Reform Party of Canada	23	0	0%
No Affiliation	23	0	0%
Marxist-Leninist Party	17	0	0%
Green Party of Canada	16	0	0%
Party for the Commonwealth of Canada	11	8	73%
Bloc Québécois	10	0	0%
Canada Party	5	0	0%
Christian Heritage Party of Canada	5	0	0%
Libertarian Party of Canada	5	0	0%
Independent	1	0	0%

SOURCE: (Library of Parliament, 2004b)

Appendix Three

Women in the 27th Ministry - MARTIN, P. (2003.12.12 -)

AUGUSTINE, Jean

Minister of State (Multiculturalism)	2003.12.12 - 2004.07.19
Minister of State (Status of Women)	2003.12.12 - 2004.07.19

BENNETT, Carolyn

Minister of State (Public Health)	2003.12.12 -
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BLONDIN-ANDREW, Ethel Dorothy

Minister of State (Children and Youth)	2003.12.12 - 2004.07.19
Minister of State (Northern Development)	2004.07.20 -

BRADSHAW, Claudette

Minister responsible for Homelessness	2003.12.12 - 2004.07.19
Minister of Labour	2003.12.12 - 2004.07.19
Minister of State (Human Resources Development)	2004.07.20 -

CARROLL, M. Aileen

Minister for International Cooperation	2003.12.12 -
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FRULLA, Liza

Minister of Social Development	2003.12.12 - 2004.07.19
Minister of Canadian Heritage	2004.07.20 -
Minister responsible for the Status of Women	2004.07.20 -

GUARNIERI, Albina

Minister of State (Civil Preparedness)	2003.12.12 - 2004.07.19
Associate Minister of National Defence	2003.12.12 - 2004.07.19
Minister of Veterans Affairs	2004.07.20 -

MCLELLAN, A. Anne

Deputy Prime Minister	2003.12.12 -
Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness	2003.12.12 -

ROBILLARD, Lucienne

Minister responsible for the Economic Development Agency of Canada for the Regions of Quebec	2003.12.12 - 2004.07.19
Minister of Industry	2003.12.12 - 2004.07.19
President of the Queen's Privy Council	2004.07.20 -
Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs	2004.07.20 -

SCHERRER, H C.

Minister of Canadian Heritage	2003.12.12 - 2004.07.19
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SGRO, Judy

Minister of Citizenship and Immigration	2003.12.12 -
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SOURCE: (Library of Parliament, 2004c)

Women in the 26th Ministry - CHRÉTIEN, J. (1993.11.04 - 2003.12.11)

AUGUSTINE, Jean

Secretary of State (Multiculturalism) (Status of Women) 2002.05.26 - 2003.12.11

BLONDIN-ANDREW, Ethel Dorothy

Secretary of State (Training and Youth) 1993.11.04 - 1997.06.10

Secretary of State (Children and Youth) 1997.06.11 - 2003.12.11

BRADSHAW, Claudette

Minister of Labour 1998.11.23 - 2003.12.11

Secretary of State (Multiculturalism) (Status of Women) 2002.01.15 - 2002.05.25

CAPLAN, Elinor

Minister of Citizenship and Immigration 1999.08.03 - 2002.01.14

Minister of National Revenue 2002.01.15 - 2003.12.11

CARSTAIRS, Sharon

Leader of the Government in the Senate 2001.01.09 - 2003.12.11

COPPS, Sheila Maureen

Deputy Prime Minister 1993.11.04 - 1996.04.30

Minister of the Environment 1993.11.04 - 1996.01.24

Minister of Communications 1996.01.25 - 1996.04.30

Minister of Multiculturalism and Citizenship 1996.01.25 - 1996.04.30

Minister of Multiculturalism and Citizenship 1996.06.19 - 1996.07.11

Minister of Communications 1996.06.19 - 1996.07.11

Deputy Prime Minister 1996.06.19 - 1997.06.10

Minister of Canadian Heritage 1996.07.12 - 1997.06.10

Minister of Amateur Sport 1996.07.12 - 1999.08.02

Minister of Canadian Heritage 1997.06.11 - 2003.12.11

FAIRBAIRN, Joyce

Leader of the Government in the Senate 1993.11.04 - 1997.06.10

Minister with special responsibility for Literacy 1993.11.04 - 1997.06.10

FINESTONE, Sheila

Secretary of State (Multiculturalism) (Status of Women) 1993.11.04 - 1996.01.24

FRY, Hedy

Secretary of State (Multiculturalism) (Status of Women) 1996.01.25 - 2002.01.14

MARLEAU, Diane

Minister of Amateur Sport 1993.11.04 - 1996.01.24

Minister of National Health and Welfare 1993.11.04 - 1996.01.24

Minister of Supply and Services 1996.01.25 - 1996.07.11

Minister of Public Works 1996.01.25 - 1996.07.11

Minister of Public Works and Government Services 1996.07.12 - 1997.06.10

Minister responsible for La Francophonie 1997.06.11 - 1999.08.02

Minister for International Cooperation	1997.06.11 - 1999.08.02
MCLELLAN, A. Anne	
Minister of Forestry	1993.11.04 - 1995.01.11
Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources	1993.11.04 - 1995.01.11
Minister of Natural Resources	1995.01.12 - 1997.06.10
Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada	1997.06.11 - 2002.01.14
Minister of Health	2002.01.15 - 2003.12.11
MINNA, Maria	
Minister for International Cooperation	1999.08.03 - 2002.01.14
ROBILLARD, Lucienne	
Minister of Labour	1995.02.22 - 1996.01.24
Minister responsible for the federal campaign in the upcoming Quebec referendum	1995.02.22 - 1996.01.24
Minister of Citizenship and Immigration	1996.01.25 - 1999.08.02
Acting Minister of Communications	1996.05.01 - 1996.06.18
Acting Minister of Multiculturalism and Citizenship	1996.05.01 - 1996.06.18
President of the Treasury Board	1999.08.03 - 2003.12.11
Minister responsible for Infrastructure	1999.08.03 - 2002.01.14
Minister responsible for Crown Corporations	2002.06.02 - 2003.12.11
STEWART, Christine Susan	
Secretary of State (Latin America and Africa)	1993.11.04 - 1997.06.10
Minister of the Environment	1997.06.11 - 1999.08.02
STEWART, Jane	
Minister of National Revenue	1996.01.25 - 1997.06.10
Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development	1997.06.11 - 1999.08.02
Minister of Human Resources Development	1999.08.03 - 2003.12.11
WHELAN, Susan	
Minister for International Cooperation	2002.01.15 - 2003.12.11

SOURCE: (Library of Parliament, 2004c)

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