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ANALOGIES AND THEIR INFLUENCE
ON STRATEGY

By

John Craig McNaughton, B.A.

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A thesis submitted to the Faculty of
Graduate Studies and Research in partial
fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
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The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs

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July 12, 1979

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ABSTRACT

The thesis investigates how analogies may influence debates over military policy. Strategic analogies usually link present or future situations with previous situations (analogues). Analogies shape strategic judgement, not simply because the analogues are known or familiar, but particularly because the analogues have been subjected to simplified normative judgements. The strategist's judgement is influenced less by his current perceptions of the strategic environment than by normative judgements borrowed from analogous situations.

Theoretical support includes Aristotle's work on rhetorical persuasion, and work by Huntington, Beaufre, and Buchan on the political nature of strategy. Empirical support centres on a case study of the 1956 British Commons debates over the prospect of British-French military action in Suez. The use of analogies by Eden hampered adequate analysis of Britain's options. The thesis examines several techniques of rebuttal which may be used to control the use of analogies in strategic debate.

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INTRODUCTION

ANALOGICAL ANALYSIS OF STRATEGY

This Alliance did have a lot of ideology. It also had a lot of rhetorical theory and architecture - involving pillars, dumbbells, concentric circles, bridges, vertical and horizontal integration, and other metaphors and analogies that were meant to describe it.

Thomas C. Schelling¹

INTRODUCTION

1. Analogical Analysis

Analogical analysis of strategy is a relatively recent development. Most analyses of strategy have concentrated on the technological, economic, ideological and political influences on judgements about the use of military force in international relations.² Major studies on the influence of analogies on strategy have only appeared recently: Ernest May's "Lessons" of the Past (1973); Robert Jervis' Perception and Misperception in International Politics (1976). These studies have examined how the analogies or parallels drawn by strategists between current and past historical situations have affected strategic judgements about the use of military force.³

A large number of scholars have observed, along with May and Jervis, the strategic influence of analogies between post-war crises with the Soviet Union and pre-war crises with Nazi Germany. May and Jervis both feel that the 1930s analogy helped to convince the Truman Administration to intervene in the Korean War (on the grounds that Truman and his advisors, seeing a repeat of the sequence of events leading up to World War II, wanted to avoid similar "appeasement" and its presumed consequence - another world war.) In "Red Fascism: The Merger of Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia in the American Image of Totalitarianism, 1930's - 1950's" (1970), Les Adler and Thomas Paterson argue that the 1930s analogy "provided frightened Americans with the assurance that they knew what to expect from Russia, because the analogy taught them and convinced them that the 1940's and 1950's were simply a replay of the 1930's." Bruce Russett has argued that strategic theories of balance of power were re-

inforced by the 1930s analogy. James Chase has written that post-war U.S. policy-makers took "no more Munichs" as an axiom for their behaviour, the corollary being "no more isolationism." J.J. Holst has argued that "Memories and 'lessons' from the Second World War provided a dominant perceptual framework for the main architects of post war policy." Richard Barnet writes that the policy planners of mid-century America "explained and rationalized their choices by constantly using the analogies of Hitler and Munich."⁴

Besides the 1930s analogy, there is a large variety of historical and non-historical analogies in use by strategists in their discussions of the use of military force. Thomas Schelling and Herman Kahn have both highlighted the highway chicken analogy as a way of explaining and describing international confrontation. In On Escalation; Metaphors and Scenarios (1965), Kahn also used analogy to labour relations and ladder rungs to help explain his theories of international crisis management.⁵ Colin Gray has noted the popularity of the Belgian analogy in Canadian defence literature - its argument being that neutrality does not ensure security. Karl Deutsch has commended Anatol Rapoport's critique of nuclear theories based on analogies to insurance and engineering safety limits.⁶

A general survey of material to follow in the thesis reveals that strategists employ analogies to phenomena as diverse as: the French-Indochina War, the Korean War, fire departments, police, the French Revolution, ancient greek wars, landlord-tenant relations, fencing, Tsarist Russia, Finnish-Soviet relations, horses and business.

Analogical analysis of strategy deserves further concerted development for three reasons. Firstly, the frequent and extensive use

of analogies by strategists in their speeches and publications is a phenomenon which invites explanation. Some strategists use analogies intensively in their strategic discussions. Others do not seem to use them much, but all strategists, whether military personnel, academic theorists, politicians, government officials, or journalists, use analogies from time to time in their discussions of the use of military force.⁷

Secondly, there is a wide variety of analogies in use by strategists. Most analysis of the phenomenon to date has concentrated on the 1930s analogy - and by extension, on other analogies to recent historical crises and wars. It is important to broaden the range of inquiry to include the variety of non-historical analogies suggested above.

Thirdly, there is a need to complement the mode of interpretation which has been developed for historical analogies by May and Jervis and most of the scholars mentioned above. These scholars hold that historical analogies "teach lessons" or "instruct" - that is, alter the actual content of strategic thinking. This interpretation - termed "instructive" within this thesis - may be supplemented with a "rhetorical" interpretation of the influence of analogies on strategy.

This "rhetorical" interpretation argues that the instructive features of analogies are not the only elements of analogical influence. In addition, analogies have normative features. That is, the strategist - through his use of analogies - characterizes the moral or intentional content of his strategic judgement in an attempt to secure social approbation. He appeals to his audience's sense of orthodoxy (its standards or norms) about what *ought* to be done in the analogical situations presented.

For example, the 1930s analogy, although it clearly instructs its user and audience about the dangers of appeasing dictatorial adversaries, also claims for its user the very useful political position of being against appeasement (i.e., tough-minded about the unavoidable need to be prepared to use force against certain opponents).

As rhetoric - in the Aristotelian sense of an oral means of persuasion - analogies serve to enhance the analogizer's strategic recommendations. This may be accomplished at the expense of opponents' recommendations. These opponents are placed subtly in what will be termed an "analogical bind" - meaning that they are practically obliged to acquiesce in any analogical argument that successfully appeals to popular notions of which actions are right and which are wrong (notions which they often hold themselves).

Development and presentation of a "rhetorical" interpretation has proved difficult. The word "rhetoric" is ambiguous, having a pejorative meaning (insincere or exaggerated talk) and a classical meaning (the Aristotelian notion of persuasive speech). Perhaps inadvisedly, the thesis has employed both meanings. The pejorative meaning is used to represent criticism of the instructive interpretation (that the analogies used by strategists are mere rhetoric designed chiefly for public consumption and have nothing to do with the real influences on strategy, such as economic and technological factors).

It is impossible to know with complete certainty whether or not a given analogy is rhetoric in the pejorative sense. Non-historical analogies, lacking the serious tones of historical analogies, are most

apt to be regarded as this sort of rhetoric, but there is no guarantee that sincere analogical arguments are authentic, nor is it safe to assume that non-historical analogies cannot have instructive influence.

However, the rhetorical interpretation sets this question of authenticity aside and deals with this hypothetical situation: Would the analogy be capable of influence *even if it were mere rhetoric*? That is, the rhetorical interpretation puts itself at a deliberate disadvantage, taking as its starting point what amounts to the null hypothesis of the instructive interpretation.

Assuming, for the sake of investigation, that analogies only exist as rhetoric in the first sense, the classical meaning of rhetoric is then introduced. As Aristotle developed it, rhetoric is persuasive, partly because it presents the character of the speaker in a favourable light before his audience. Analogies, as rhetoric, seem well-suited to the task of persuading people to adopt, or at least to acquiesce in, particular strategies.

This development of a rhetorical interpretation is not meant to foreclose the possibility of an instructive interpretation. Nor is it meant to deny the possibility that a given analogy could have influence in both instructive and rhetorical senses. In G.M. Graham's words, analogies can have both "proof and persuasion values." Graham observes that analogy, through its associative powers can be employed - for example, by advertising - to "subtly link a thing already approved with one for which approval is desired, to stress a surface resemblance between a circumstance highly disapproved and another which it is the desire to

damn." This persuasive rhetorical dimension of analogy can be combined effectively with analogy's proof value (the inference of like effects from similar causes). As Graham writes, this combination "may call forth the maximum in belief," because the audience will receive causal analysis situated in an effective milieu.⁸ The present thesis, however, concentrates on the importance of the persuasive dimension, leaving the integration suggested by Graham's work to another time.

2. Analogies

Every analogy comprises an object of analogy, an analogue, and relations of correspondence between them. The analogue - usually the more familiar phenomenon - is introduced by the analogizer to represent the object. Analogy is the observation that a given object shares certain features with a given analogue - that because of several similarities, and despite numerous differences, they can be regarded as "analogous" to each other.

In An Introduction to Strategy (1965), General André Beaufre has drawn analogies to fencing manoeuvres, and to military events during World War II, to clarify strategic options in post-war deterrent strategy. "Parry" is a familiar move in fencing, as are "German operations in Normandy 1944," and both analogues are used by Beaufre to clarify the strategic significance of the DEW Line, atomic submarines and Polaris. He admits that the fencing analogue "may at first sight appear to have little to do with modern strategy," but with regard to these analogies, and thirteen other similar parallels, Beaufre insists: "It is of utmost importance that we should realize that these analogies exist if we are to conduct our strategy with a clear idea both of what the manoeuvre in progress is and what the possible reactions are."⁹

Analogies vary in appearance according to the degree of prominence of their components. Some analogies are quite prominent. In "U.S. Policy: An Analogue from History" (1975), R.S. Cline has proposed that the U.S. seek out a "kind of latter-day Athenian League" modelled on "the Athenian League of the fifth century B.C. which defeated the

onslaught of the armies sent by the Persian tyrants to conquer Greece."¹⁰

With such declarations of 'analogy', or with declarations of 'parallel', 'precedent', or 'similarity', the object, the analogue, and most of the intended correspondences are specified.

Figures of speech which are analogies include simile, allegory, and metaphor. Of these, allegory is the most explicit - a parallel in narrative form. Simile expresses the fact that correspondences exist between analogue and object through the words 'like' or 'as', but does not usually specify what these correspondences are. Metaphor is even less specific, leaving the exact nature of the analogue and the correspondences to the imagination. The very existence of a metaphoric analogy is tenuous - discernable only by the impression that some word-choice seems to be out of its usual context.¹¹

Contrasts fall within the study as negated analogies. Negation of analogy is one of the best indications that the analogy has some influence. For example, Malcolm Mackintosh's denial that NATO and the Warsaw Pact are similar organizations - his argument that any apparent similarities in structure or purpose are only superficial - suggests that analogy between the two alliances has some importance, at least in Mackintosh's mind.¹²

All of the above forms of analogy are considered to be *explicit* analogies. These are the analogies being examined in this thesis for their influence on strategy. In a future study, it should be possible to develop an analysis of *latent* analogies - those analogies which may be presumed to exist as assumptions behind non-analogical assertions and

behaviour.¹³ If, as Jean Piaget has written about children, there is a "perpetual tendency to reason by analogy which has been taken as the characteristic of elementary intellectual reactions," then much of adult activity must be built up upon layers of once active (explicit) analogies which are no longer talked about.¹⁴

Explicit analogies are those analogies spoken or written by an analogizer - in this case, a strategist - and heard or read by an audience. Both the strategist and his audience should be aware that an analogy has been used (or be capable of this awareness when the analogy is pointed out) before it can be considered explicit. Consequently, there are actually four active elements involved in every explicit analogy: the analogizer, the object of analogy, the analogue, and the audience.

3. Strategy

The thesis examines the influence of explicit analogues on 'grand strategy', rather than on 'operational strategy'. Grand strategy, as described by Sir Basil Liddell-Hart, is a level of planning situated above the levels of tactics and operational strategy, and one level below that of policy-making. It consists in planning use of a nation's military resources in relation to other national resources (economic, cultural, diplomatic, etc.), and in relation to political or policy directives.¹⁵

Alastair Buchan and General André Beaufre both define (grand) strategy as the art of applying force for the attainment of political objectives.¹⁶ Grand strategy concentrates on the fundamental decision of whether or not force - primarily military, but also economic, psychological and diplomatic forms of coercion - ~~should be~~ employed to secure national political interests. Operational and political considerations interact to evolve strategic policy: thus any prospective resort to force must present itself in politically acceptable terms as well as technically competent terms. The traditional distinction and separation of duties between strategists (in the sense of professional military theorists) and politicians (in the sense of elected officials of government) becomes tenuous and a formality which conceals an interdisciplinary reality.

Samuel Huntington recognizes the political side of strategy - the fact that military policy is "the result of politics not logic, more an arena than a unity." That is, strategy is the product of a political

struggle between government intentions and those of domestic opponents who exercise some control over what Huntington terms the 'structural' elements of strategy (i.e., "the procurement, allocation, and organization of men, money and material").

In periods of "disequilibrium" - when a government's "external and internal environments" conflict - strategy becomes the subject of political debate. It need not be assumed that the government is always trying to sell larger military programs, or that the public or its political representatives are in a strong position of control over government decisions. But the government must nevertheless make a public case for whatever strategy it thinks is appropriate in order to secure public acquiescence and support in the face of vocal opponents. Failure to make such a case gives opponents an opportunity they would not otherwise have to change government policy. A government "must legitimate its action by invoking general values which command broad support."¹⁷ Analogies appear to be one of the best rhetorical devices available to secure this support.

INTRODUCTION

Notes

¹Henry M. Jackson, ed., The Atlantic Alliance; Jackson Subcommittee Hearings and Findings (New York: Praeger, 1967), p. 153.

²See, for example: John Erickson, ed., The Military - Technical Revolution; Its Impact On Strategy and Foreign Policy (New York: Praeger, 1966); Gavin Kennedy, The Economics of Defence (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1975); United States Army War College, New Dynamics in National Strategy (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1975).

³It should be clarified at the outset that analogical analysis focuses on analogies used by strategists, not on analogies used by analysts to interpret strategists or strategy. May argues that Roosevelt's strategy at the end of World War II was based on a World War I - World War II "parallel," but May only infers from Roosevelt's policy actions that he was consciously trying to avoid Wilson's policy "mistakes." He gives no example of Roosevelt actually citing the parallel or analogy he was supposed to be using. May speculates that Roosevelt "probably thought the relationship between himself and Stalin analogous to that between Wilson and French premier Georges Clemenceau," but he is unable to cite any remarks by Roosevelt or his advisors to this effect. Ernest R. May, "Lessons" of the Past: The Use and Misuse of History in American Foreign Policy (London: Oxford University Press, 1973), pp. 7 - 14. Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), chapter 6.

⁴May, "Lessons" of the Past, pp. 81-82. Jervis, Perception and Misperception, pp. 218-219. L.K. Adler, T.G. Paterson, "Red Fascism: The Merger of Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia in the American Image of Totalitarianism, 1930's - 1950's," American Historical Review 75 (April 1970): 1047. Bruce M. Russett, E.C. Hanson, Interest and Ideology; The Foreign Policy Beliefs of American Businessmen (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman, 1975), pp. 8-9. (Also B.M. Russett, No Clear and Present Danger: A Skeptical View of the United States Entry into World War II (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), pp. 83-85.) James Chace, "America's New Strategy of Containment," Harper's (January 1978): 47. J.J. Holst, "Norwegian Security Policy: Options and Constraints," Co-operation and Conflict 2 (1972): 77. Richard Barnet, Roots of War (New York: Atheneum, 1972), pp. 50-51, 67, 274. See also: Harold Molineu, "Foreign Policy by Analogy: The World of Dean Rusk," paper presented to the annual meeting of the International Studies Association in Washington, D.C., February 1978.

- ⁵Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, London: Yale University, 1966), pp. 116-125. Herman Kahn, On Escalation; Metaphors and Scenarios (New York: Praeger, 1965), pp. 9-15, 37-41. Schelling's and Kahn's use of analogies are noted by Philip Green in Deadly Logic; The Theory of Nuclear Deterrence (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1966), pp. 52-53, 146ff.
- ⁶Colin S. Gray, Canadian Defence Priorities: A Question of Relevance (Toronto: Clarke & Irwin, 1972), p. 15. Karl Deutsch in the introduction to A. Rapoport, Strategy and Conscience (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), p. viii.
- ⁷See Introduction, Section 3, for a definition of what is meant by strategy. "Strategist" normally refers to military professionals, but is used more broadly in the thesis to include a variety of other speakers and writers on military issues.
- ⁸Gladys Murphy Granam, "Analogy - A Study in Proof and Persuasion Values," The Quarterly Journal of Speech 14 (November 1928): 537, 541.
- ⁹André Beaufre, An Introduction to Strategy, trans. R.H. Barry (New York: Praeger, 1965), pp. 36-41.
- ¹⁰R.S. Cline, World Power Assessment, A Calculus of Strategic Drift (Washington, D.C.: The Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, 1975), p. 133. See the following for commentary on other analogies used by Cline: Peter Nailor's review in Survival 18 (September-October 1976): 233; Lt. Col. M.V. Cromie, Politechtonic Faults: A Critique of Cline's Calculus for World Power Assessment, Staff Note 77/9 (Ottawa: Operational Research and Analysis Establishment, Directorate of Strategic Analysis, Department of National Defence, July 1977), pp. 2, 16.
- ¹¹In his Poetics, Aristotle writes: "Metaphor consists in giving a thing a name that belongs to something else...." Paul Ricoeur, The Rule of Metaphor; Multi-disciplinary studies of the creation of meaning in language, trans. Robert Czerny with Kathleen McLaughlin and John Costello, SJ (Toronto, Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1977), p. 13.

There is some debate about whether a metaphor is an analogy or an analogy is a metaphor. Metaphor does have an analogical character in that the misplaced "name" suggests that the re-named object is similar to its namesake. As Ricoeur notes, metaphor is an analogy because it involves the "perception of similarity in dissimilars." But analogy has a metaphorical character in that the inter-positioning of any analogue re-names the object of analogy. As Ricoeur notes,

analogy performs the metaphorical function of redescribing reality. And Aristotle did call analogy "proportional metaphor." However, as the thesis focuses on analogical reasoning, metaphors will be considered to be metaphorical analogies which partially conceal their analogues. Simile will be considered to be the transitory stage between metaphorical analogy and formally declared analogy. Ricoeur, The Rule of Metaphor, pp. 23-24, 35, 47, 278-279, 329.

Metaphor, simile, and analogy differ in their literary form, not their content. See: Robert D. Denham, ed., Northrop Frye on Culture and Literature; A Collection of Review Essays (Chicago, London: University of Chicago Press, 1978), pp. 47-48; Joseph Margolis, "Notes on the Logic of Simile, Metaphor and Analogy," American Speech 32 (October 1957): 186-189.

¹² Malcolm Mackintosh, The Evolution of the Warsaw Pact, Adelphi Paper no. 58 (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1969), pp. 2, 3, 13.

¹³ For example, it seems that Liddell-Hart bases his principles of strategy on a large number of historical analogies which remain silent but appear to have suggested strategic principles. Analogies can be abstracted to such a degree that they are unrecognizable. B.H. Liddell-Hart, Strategy; The Indirect Approach (London: Faber and Faber, 1967).

¹⁴ Jean Piaget, The Child's Conception of Physical Causality, trans. M. Gabain (London: Keegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co.; New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1939), pp. 185-186, 285. See also: J. Piaget, The Language and Thought of the Child, trans. M. & R. Gabain (London: Routledge & Keegan Paul, 1959), pp. 46-48, 130-134.

¹⁵ B.H. Liddell-Hart, Strategy; The Indirect Approach, p. 339.

¹⁶ Alastair Buchan, War in Modern Society; An Introduction (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), pp. 81-82. A. Beaufre, An Introduction to Strategy, trans. R.H. Barry (New York: Praeger, 1965), p. 22.

¹⁷ Samuel P. Huntington, The Common Defense; Strategic Programs in National Politics (New York, London: Columbia University Press, 1961), pp. 1-4, 7-8, 218-220, 248-251.

CHAPTER ONE

INTERPRETATION OF THE INFLUENCE OF ANALOGIES

We have all experienced attempts to clarify and understand a phenomenon by making analogies.... in formulating policy goals and responses to conditions abroad, diplomats and government officials frequently characterize a situation and deduce appropriate actions to cope with it by reference to a different, though analogous, set of historical circumstances.

Kal Holsti¹

The appropriateness of your language to the emotion will make people believe in your facts. In their souls they infer, illegitimately, that you are telling the truth, because they, in a like situation, would be moved in the same way as you are; accordingly, even when the facts are not as the speaker says, the audience think he is right.

Aristotle²

CHAPTER ONE

1. Analogy as Instruction

Analogies are by nature instructive because they suggest or draw inferences from observed similarities. Susan Stebbing has observed:

"Inference by analogy consists in inferring that, since two cases are alike in certain respects, they will also be alike in some other respect."³

If the analogue has features a, b, c, and d, and a given object is found to have features a, b, and c, the analogical inference is that the object may, or is likely to share feature d. The four elements a, b, c, and d, may simply be associated characteristics, or they may constitute a causal sequence. It follows that if d is undesirable, then the analogizer should be inclined either to negate one of the earlier features (e.g., c), or to plan to meet d when it materializes.

The legal use of analogies suggests their instructive nature.

Rupert Cross outlines three stages which judges use in analogical reasoning:

- (1) "the perception of relevant likenesses between the previous case and the one before the court";
- (2) "the determination of the *ratio decidendi* (rule of law) of the previous case" (i.e., how the previous judge ruled);
- (3) "the decision to apply that ratio to the instant case."⁴

Also in science, emphasis is placed on the instructive value of analogies. In Models and Analogies in Science (1966), Mary Hesse argues that scientists refer back to simple analogue-models in order to explain

and discover new properties. Examples are the use of billiard balls to understand gas molecules, and the use of water waves to identify characteristics of sound and light "waves."⁵

Kal Holsti supports an interpretation of analogy as instruction. He concludes that analogies, along with attitudes, values, beliefs and doctrines, "give shape and meaning to our perceptions of reality, resulting in images upon which our actions are based." Analogies, he states, are "an important part of the psychological environment of decision makers."⁶

2. The May-Jervis School of Interpretation

The most thorough development of the instructive interpretation of analogies has been made by Ernest May and Robert Jervis. May has produced case studies of American military interventions in Korea and Vietnam. Jervis has developed theoretical underpinnings for the interpretation.

After noting that the United States had, up to 1950, deliberately avoided military involvement in Korea, May offers an hypothesis about analogical influence on the Truman Administration's decision to intervene on behalf of the South Korean government:

[The policy of non-involvement] reversed itself in a moment of crisis, and it did so primarily because the President and his advisors perceived a North Korean attack on South Korea as analogous to instances of Japanese, Italian, and German aggression prior to World War II.⁷

That is, analogy to events of the 1930s instructed Truman and his advisors that a forcible response to North Korean forces would prevent the development of another world war.

May is not able to present much direct evidence that the 1930s analogy figured prominently during the Truman Administration's debate over Korea. However, he is able to rely on Truman's own testimony about what he was thinking at the time of the North Korean invasion, as outlined in his Memoirs:

I had time to think aboard the plane [to Washington] . In my generation, this was not the first invasion when the strong had attacked the weak. I recalled some earlier instances: Manchuria, Ethiopia,

Austria...Communism was acting in Korea just as Hitler, Mussolini, and the Japanese had acted....If this was allowed to go unchallenged it would mean a third world war, just as similar incidents had brought on a second world war.⁸

May's hypothesis hinges critically on the assumption that Truman and his advisors were deeply shaken by the events of the 1930s:

Truman experienced something like a conversion after Pearl Harbour. He felt shame and guilt for his earlier stand [favouring neutrality legislation].⁹

Besides the fact that these years were dramatic ones, May feels that they made "a specially deep imprint on Truman and most of his associates," because they had begun their personal careers during these years. "Acheson, Louis Johnson, Rusk, Jessup, and others in the Truman circle had their first intellectual and emotional engagement with issues in international relations as a result of the succession of crises commencing in 1931." Events earlier than 1930, May feels, were not as meaningful.¹⁰ He reasons that "Truman's set of beliefs about recent history" must have been the key factor in his mind.¹¹ Gaddis Smith is quoted by May to underline the potency of these experiences: "the image of Hitler seared itself on the eyes of all who fought him."¹²

May seems to feel that two assumptions about decision-makers - or strategists - are warranted: (1) that they are impressionable in early years; and (2) that they have a need for consistency. May returns periodically throughout the two case studies to a body of theory built around these assumptions. The theory is that decision-makers function (1) in terms of images imprinted on their minds in formative career years;

and (2) according to an organizing imperative to eliminate "cognitive dissonance."

One assumption serves the other: a presumed stiffening of patterns of experience with maturity satisfies the need to avoid discrepant experience. Historical analogies are suited to this theory of decision-making because of (1) their access to past experience; and (2) their uncomplicated structure. Set within this body of theory, analogies have the power to activate certain memories or images and the simplicity to allow fresh information to be placed loosely within a framework of behaviour.¹³

Robert Jervis' arguments for the influence of analogies on strategy are similar to May's. Like May, Jervis relies on Truman's apparent use of the 1930s analogy during the Korean crisis to suggest that analogy exerts a critical influence on decision-making. He argues, on the basis of Truman's account in his Memoirs, that the 1930s analogy occurred immediately to Truman and so "preceded his analysis and shaped his later perceptions." The analogy encouraged Truman's "view that the aggression was unprovoked" and his "prediction that further attacks would follow if this one was not met by firm resistance."¹⁴

Jervis, even more than May, relies on psychological theory about images and cognitive dissonance to substantiate his general hypothesis that historical analogies influence strategic decisions. Jervis feels that decision-makers have a strong tendency to base their perceptions (and therefore, Jervis argues, their actions) on images derived from past personal experience.

Jervis simply posits the requirements of statesmen (or, strategists) and argues that historical analogies meet them. What the strategist needs is some means of predicting the future. He must be able to anticipate possible and probable scenarios. In the context of these predictions he can then prepare appropriate contingency plans, recommending the acquisition of certain military capabilities over others.

What better way to conceive possibilities and probabilities than by reference to similar circumstances in the past? Analogy is the perfect device for bringing insights from past experience to bear on present conditions. Particularly if the present is complex and confusing, the simple lines of the analogy can provide a framework within which supporting evidence can be arranged. Analogy can provide a semblance of order in the midst of an anarchy of facts and figures.

This is exactly what Jervis argues: "Previous international events provide the statesman with a range of imaginable situations and allow him to detect patterns and causal links that can help him understand his world."¹⁵ Like Arnold Wolfers, Jervis and May both believe that statesmen rely on categories of "analogous cases" in order to interpret developments and to guide responses.¹⁶

Analogies appear to make certain possibilities or developments more likely than others (i.e., increase their probability)? The reason for this, Jervis argues, is that analogies with traumatic historical events which were experienced firsthand and in the early years of a career, over-sensitize strategists to certain possibilities. They become 'perceptually predisposed' towards the recurrence of past failures and successes.¹⁷

3. Differences in Selection

The instructive interpretation relies considerably on the selection of dramatic historical analogies such as the 1930s analogy, and on the widely accepted notion that memories of past experience - particularly traumatic experience - affect current behaviour. It is a basic principle of survival to try to avoid repeating the same mistakes.

But the argument for the influence of analogies should rely less on assumptions about the influence of history or the recollection of past experiences. To show that analogy in itself is influential, it is necessary to consider the significance of non-historical analogies. Can the arguments of Jervis and May account for the use of non-historical analogies by strategists?

What, for instance, is the influence of the following similes, used by George Kennan in his discussion of the strategy of containment in 1947:

Once a given party line has been laid down on a given issue of current policy, the whole Soviet governmental machine, including the mechanism of diplomacy, moves inexorably along the prescribed path, like a persistent toy automobile wound up and headed in a given direction, stopping only when it meets with some unanswerable force.

Like the white dog before the phonograph, they [the Soviets] hear only the master's voice. And if they are to be called off from the purposes last dictated to them, it is the master who must call them off.

Did these analogies alter images of the Soviet Union, or provide a

perceptual framework for analysis of the Soviets? Or, if the analysis used for historical analogies does not apply, should it be concluded that analogies such as Kennan's have no influence on strategy?¹⁸

Prominent use of non-historical analogies by Dean Acheson in testimony before the Jackson Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations on 27 April 1966 suggests the importance of including non-historical analogies within the selection process. Acheson opened his testimony with the following non-historical allegory:

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee: I should like to begin if I may with a fable.

A town suffered a number of disastrous fires. The citizens organized a volunteer fire department, bought some modern fire-fighting equipment, trained some vigorous fellows as firemen, and carried on a thorough fire-prevention campaign. For several years, the town had no serious fires at all, only occasional grass fires, which were quickly put out.

The town prospered. Memories of its past misfortunes dimmed. Some people began to wonder if, after all, the danger of fire had not been exaggerated, and to question whether the trouble and expense of a fire department were necessary. In time, a volunteer resigned, to be followed by others until only a small crew remained. The fire-prevention program lagged; trash accumulated in the backyards and alleys. One day a careless smoker tossed away a cigarette, and in the resulting fire much of the town was destroyed.

Mr. Chairman, NATO is the fire department of the Atlantic Alliance. One of the volunteers is resigning. We have not had a fire recently and unfortunately there is nothing like a fire to make short-sighted mortals appreciate their fire department. The debris of World War II has not been fully cleared away, and is lying there, a fire hazard, capable of being ignited by a spark.¹⁹

Because of the prominence of this analogy, and because it was used again later in the testimony, it must have served some purpose.

Was that purpose to instruct the senators, or to guide Acheson's thinking about the alliance? Or was its purpose merely to illustrate a point in an entertaining way? It seems unlikely that perceptions of the alliance would change in the light of the image of a fire department. It also seems that analogies - at least for Acheson - functioned as serious arguments and not casual asides. Responding to a question by Senator Mundt, he re-used his fable and added another non-historical analogy:

The other day, in speaking to one of the service war colleges, I used another analogy. I said that, as long as the bars are in front of the tiger's cage, women and children can go in the zoo. But if you take the bars away, there would not be much traffic through the tiger house. Here we have the same sort of situation.²⁰

An instructive interpretation of the influence of non-historical analogies could be argued on the grounds that analogies are used to 'enlighten' the public - the assumption being that the public is unable to comprehend complex military realities. Herman Kahn argues that his analogies, while inaccurate, help to explicate his strategic theories. Analogy to the game of chicken, for instance, "emphasizes the fact that two sides can operate in the same way," that is, the "symmetrical character of many escalation situations."²¹ Edward Luttwak also employs analogies to explain strategy. In "Perceptions of Military Force and U.S. Defense Policy" (1977), Luttwak observed that because "successful ballistic missile intercept" was beyond most peoples' experience, expressions such as "like hitting a fly in outer space" and "like hitting a bullet with a bullet" were useful for getting the meaning across.²²

Work by Max Black on metaphor (for present purposes, metaphorical

analogy) in Models and Metaphors (1962), can also be used to defend an instructive interpretation of non-historical analogies. Black writes: "The metaphor selects, emphasizes, suppresses, and organizes features of the principal subject [the object of analogy] by implying statements about it that normally apply to the subsidiary subject [the analogue] ." This corresponds closely with the May - Jervis view of analogies arranging perceptions of objects around images. Black uses the example: "Man is a wolf." The instructive interpretation (what Black calls the "interaction" view) understands the influence of analogues as follows:

The effect, then of (metaphorically) calling a man a "wolf" is to evoke the wolf-system of related common-places. If the man is a wolf, he preys on other animals, is fierce, hungry, engaged in constant struggle, a scavenger, and so on. Each of these implied assertions has now to be made to fit the principal subject (the man) either in normal or in abnormal senses.²³

It is possible, that is, to argue that analogies to everyday experiences - the RCA commercial, toy cars, fire departments, zoos, wolves - are capable of influencing because they introduce familiar patterns of experience. They can be said to impose a conceptual framework, or an expectation of certain behaviour. However, there appear to be other elements at work which are particularly evident in non-historical analogies (which would seem to have minimal cognitive value for strategists) - namely those which constitute the rhetorical or normative dimension of analogy.

4. Analogy as Political Rhetoric

Aristotle defined rhetoric as "the faculty of observing in any given case the available means of persuasion." He identified three kinds of rhetoric: political, forensic, ceremonial. The first kind is relevant to the thesis, as its subject matter included "ways and means, war and peace, national defence, imports and exports, and legislation." The political orator addressed the future and had as his end, "establishing the expediency or the harmfulness of a proposed course of action." The political rhetorician was, in a word, a strategist.²⁴

Aristotle outlined the following "modes of persuasion furnished by the spoken word":

- (1) the first kind depends on the personal character of the speaker;
- (2) the second on putting the audience into a certain frame of mind;
- (3) the third on proof, or apparent proof, provided by the words of the speech itself.

Analogies are able to accomplish all three rhetorical objectives. As instruction, analogy provides proof, or apparent proof. Evoking imagery, analogy is able to excite certain emotional dispositions. But most importantly, as evidence of the quality of the analogizer's character or judgment, analogy is able to provide the speaker with political respectability and credibility.²⁵

Credibility is secured through the analogy's appeal to orthodox notions of virtue and vice.²⁶ Take Acheson's analogy: no one questions the wisdom of maintaining fire departments. As Gaston Bachelard has

observed, fire is the object of "social" and "natural" prohibitions.²⁷ Mention of fire brings into play very basic social taboos. By drawing analogy between a fire department and the alliance, Acheson was in effect asking his audience to accept his judgement about NATO on the grounds that his judgement about fire prevention was orthodox. The instructive inferences of the allegory itself are essential: Acheson must be able to point out convincing points of similarity. But he was introducing more than an image of the alliance - namely a subtle statement about the orthodoxy of his strategic judgement.²⁸

Other strategists have employed fire analogies to underline the worthiness of their strategies. Liddell-Hart argued in 1957 in The Times: "What NATO needs is to reinforce the nuclear deterrent by a non-nuclear 'fireguard' and 'fire extinguisher'." Sir John Slessor wrote in The Great Deterrent (1957): "Our role must be that of fireman or policeman, not of executioner," as regards the use of nuclear weapons.²⁹

Strategists, as Helmut Schmidt has observed, are politicians.³⁰ Periodically at least, they must defend their ideas about weapons acquisition, deployment, and employment before the bar of public opinion. At times of budget review, or military innovation, strategists must make arguments which encourage the general public, and particularly domestic political opponents, to support or at least acquiesce in their recommendations.³¹

A large variety of arguments may be used: economic, legal, ideological, political, historical - all of which may also be explicitly analogical in nature. Each of these arguments, whether analogical or

non-analogical, must surround the policy recommendations with an aura of utility and legitimacy. The policy must in some way be sanctioned, and the use of analogues to represent policy as a comprehensible, and in particular, a responsible phenomenon, is one of the easiest ways of securing public approbation.

Other legitimating analogies include references to standard business and medical procedures. Vice-Admiral Moorer defending the military budget:

The military sees defense spending as a capital investment. Its dividends include national security, influence, trade, and the resultant high standard of living enjoyed in this country.³²

Similarly, various strategists have likened defence expenditures to insurance policies and education.³³ Ronald Steel has used analogy to substantiate his notion of legitimate intervention abroad: "Intervention, like surgery, is not an evil in itself, but it must be applied sparingly and with consummate skill."³⁴

In his article, "The French Revolution and the Russian Revolution: Some Suggestive Analogies" (1951), Isaac Deutscher clearly used analogy to legitimate his views of the Soviet Union. The analogy allowed him to criticize Stalin as another Napoleon I - as one who betrayed "the original spirit of the revolution." Yet he was able to argue with the analogy that the innovations of the Russian revolution (e.g., a planned economy) represented gains which would have been impossible under the Tsars, just as the (widely approved) gains of the French revolution (e.g., the Napoleonic Code) would have been impossible under the *Ancien Régime*.³⁵

Just as strategists appeal to orthodox notions of virtue, so they appeal to their audience's notions of vice, using analogies to dissociate their policies from censured phenomena. In an article criticizing U.S. concessions to the Soviet Union in the SALT II negotiations, Edward Luttwak uses a simile with a "hotel thief" to characterize Soviet "probing tactics" through arms agreements to locate points of American weakness. The analogy is not simply a smear against the Soviets, but a means of enhancing Luttwak's strategic judgement against arms control (i.e., a thief cannot be trusted).³⁶

The American use of analogies during the Cuban missile crisis has been noted by scholars. The Kennedys apparently drew analogies between possible crisis decisions and the errors of judgement leading to both World Wars. The instructive view emphasizes that images and memories of the wars introduced caution into their deliberations. The rhetorical view stresses that the Kennedys were concerned about with whom and with what their decisions would be associated. A good suggestion of this is Robert Kennedy's reluctance to launch a pre-emptive strike against Cuban missile installations because it would have been "a Pearl Harbour in reverse, and it would blacken the name of the United States in the pages of history."³⁷

Precedents of failures or incompetent judgement are often used to enhance strategic recommendations. Eugene Rostow criticized SALT II recently by drawing analogy with the ineffectual naval treaty with Japan in 1922.³⁸ John Gellner's argument against Canadian investment in maritime forces for NATO assignment is strengthened by analogy to misjudgement over having Canadian nuclear strike forces within NATO in 1959. Gellner

clearly uses the negative precedent to enhance the credibility of his own strategic judgement. His statement is that as a strategist, he foresees wastes of time and money:

...Independent analysis in 1959 would have shown - as it did to some unofficial analysts who were not listened to - that this made as little sense then as it did 13 years later. There is a distinct danger now that Canada could be caught out again just as it was almost 20 years ago, only this time an error would be even more expensive.³⁹

Analogies provide strategists with a way of demonstrating their competence without really claiming it for themselves. By introducing a parallel situation in which they can perform well, they can earn their audience's approval. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that historical analogies are popular. The strategist simply conforms to popular standards of behaviour for past situations. And if the historical situation is one in which the strategist actually participated in the proper manner (e.g., he fought against Hitler in World War II), his competence is doubly assured. The tendency to keep returning to past failures or successes (as noted by Jervis) may simply indicate good political judgement (however intuitive) about how best to portray oneself or redeem oneself as a competent decision-maker in the eyes of one's audience. The "learning of lessons" is a good way of reliving the past so as to put oneself forward as a successful and responsible actor.

5. Analogical Binds

Analogies not only bear on the analogizer's political credibility, but the credibility of his political opponents. The analogy which benefits the analogizer places the audience - in particular, any political rivals within the audience - in an analogical bind. There is a tendency for those in the audience to feel manoeuvred towards acceptance of the analogizer's judgement about the object of analogy (that is, the strategy he supports) because of the disadvantages inherent in making an unpopular judgement about the analogue. The intensity of this pressure to conform depends on the analogue's degree of orthodoxy - on how highly sanctioned it is.

Taking the Acheson example: if anyone disagrees with his alliance proposals, they will at the same time appear to be objecting to fire departments (or the principles behind their existence). It depends on how convincing his points of similarity are to the audience and/or the opponent, but just as the analogizer derives political sanction from a correct opinion about the maintenance of fire departments, so opponents may lose political favour by a reverse analogical process: their contrary judgement on the alliance could be likened by the analogizer to an apparently contrary view on the necessity of fire departments.⁴⁰

The analogical bind is an imaginary situation which tests the analogizer's judgement against that of his opponent, with the potential effect of exposing the opponent's incompetence in the hypothetical situation. Conclusions from the imaginary contest are then carried over to the contest in reality. For example, R.E. Badham of the Los Angeles Times has made an argument for the B-1 bomber, the M-X and Minuteman III

missiles, and nuclear aircraft carriers which depends in part on this conjured scenario:

The courses open to today's world powers can be likened to those facing youngsters who grow up in tough neighbourhoods. They can either be so tough that roughnecks dare not attack them, or they can be so weak that they pose no threat that would invite attack. So it is, also in the neighbourhood of nations. As long as the United States remains strong, other countries will not bully it.⁴¹

Who can successfully object to a youngster toughening himself against potential bullies? Who can successfully condone weakness in the face of bullying? Badham not only derives credit for appropriate answers to these questions, he also protects his strategic recommendations with analogical traps. He can always ask opponents what they would do in his imaginary neighbourhood. If asked (the rest of the audience may be curious to know anyway), they could only agree with the need for military strength, or else attempt to rebut the analogy.

The analogizer can rely on subtle forms of analogical binding by giving his audience a choice between association with the analogizer's competence or his adversary's incompetence. Acheson provides a good example of this technique of binding. He once ridiculed Senator Connally for opposing him on Article Five of the North Atlantic Treaty, by making him the object of a horse analogy:

Tom Connally in debate is like an old horse that we used to have when I was a boy and my father used to drive around the parish in a buggy, and when he'd go across the Connecticut River on the old bridge it had loose planks on it, and this quiet old horse would start off walking across

the bridge; then the buggy would rattle the planks and that would worry the horse, so he'd start to trot. That would rattle the planks some more and by the time they got to the other side nobody could handle him.⁴²

Acheson also used a version of this analogy to scorn George Kennan's latter-day surprise that Kennan's notions of 'containment' of the Soviet Union had been taken in a military sense.⁴³ In both cases, his opponents were put directly at a disadvantage through an unflattering association. But those hearing the analogies were also associated with the foibles of the old horse to the extent that they were inclined to share Connally's or Kennan's opinions.

Similarly, popular stereotypes can be used to isolate opponents and secure popular favour. The stereotypic religious fanatic, for instance, is used by Albert Wohlstetter in "Racing Forward? Or Ambling Back?" (1975). He likens those strategists opposing the growth of nuclear weapons technology to "apocalyptic prophets" whose dogmatic beliefs resist empirical refutation. Like the followers of Sabbatai Zevi in 1648 and those of Miller in 1844, arms controllers explain away failed predictions of nuclear apocalypse.⁴⁴

Subtle analogical stigmas can be attached to opposing recommendations. Bernard Brodie has noted how the U.S. Air Force identified Albert Wohlstetter's idea of slightly-below-ground concrete aircraft shelters with the failed French line of defence in World War II - with the "Maginot Line and with excessive defense-mindedness."⁴⁵

Simple metaphorical choices of words achieve the same effect. In the 1949 U.S. Senate debates over the NATO treaty, opponents of the

treaty, such as Senator Donnell, characterized NATO as a traditional European alliance (something unprecedented in American foreign policy). Senator Vandenberg, a supporter, rose to object to the word "alliance," arguing that the treaty in question more accurately resembled the Rio Pact, under which each member nation declares war at its own discretion, and is not forced into war by alliance commitments. The association of the treaty with either disastrous European alliances or the successful Rio Pact (as popularly perceived) seems to have been provocative enough to draw comments from several other Senators: Connally, Lodge, Knowland, Watkins, Thomas. Supporters seemed either concerned to avoid the stigma of alliance or to benefit from association with the pact. Opponents stressed either the inadvisability of alliance - one invoked President Washington's injunction to steer "clear of alliances" - or the inappropriateness of the Rio comparison.⁴⁶

There are two ways of strengthening analogical binds: appealing to a popular truth, or appealing to a personally validated truth. In arguing against unification of American armed forces before the House Committee on post-war military policy in 1944, James Forrestal used both appeals. Relying on popular notions of medical practice:

To use a medical simile, I do not believe that doctors, in making a medical diagnosis, would reasonably be expected to bounce the patient toward the ceiling for exercise while he was still enjoying a high fever.

Relying on personal experience:

There is one analogy which occurs to me out of my own experience in business. In the early years

of the century...the economies gained through consolidation...of administrative functions obviously seemed bound to produce great savings ...[but] in actual practice it is frequently discovered that these probabilities that seemed so clear on paper were often difficult to transform into reality....The point I am simply making is that size is no guaranty of efficiency.⁴⁷

In the first case, the analogue cannot be contested; in the second, the analogue can only be challenged by someone else with equivalent experience in business. In both cases, expertise was invoked to strengthen the authority of the analogue, and by extension, of the principle being imported to decide the question of unification.

6. Analogical Debate

Probably the most convincing evidence of analogical influence is the occurrence of analogical debate between key strategists. May points out a number of such debates contained in the Pentagon Papers, and they are his strongest evidences of analogical influence on Vietnam strategy. The fact that analogies became the objects of serious debate in inter-departmental memoranda strongly suggests that some of those involved in the process of strategy formation were concerned to counteract certain influential analogies. If analogies are not influential or potentially influential, then why bother to rebut them? Even rebuttal of an insignificant analogy, simply because it is being used by an influential strategist, suggests that the analogy is perceived by the rebuttor as capable of having some influence on the minds of those who respect and listen to the strategist.

For example, one of May's hypotheses on why the Johnson Administration decided to bomb North Vietnam in 1965 rather than commit ground troops - that it was influenced by the failure of French troops in 1954 and American casualties during the Korean War - is strongly supported by a written exchange which occurred between William Bundy and a spokesman for the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) on 10 November 1964.

In response to Bundy's statement that an American commitment to maintain a non-Communist South Vietnam "could not be confined to air and naval action but would almost inevitably involve a Korean-scale ground action and possibly even the use of nuclear weapons at some point," the JCS spokesman replied, in part: "Certainly no responsible person pro-

poses to go about such a war [i.e., with North Vietnam and China] , if it should occur, on a basis remotely resembling Korea." Bundy went on to argue that South Vietnam could be relinquished because unlike Korea, "international support" had not developed, and unlike Greece, Turkey, Iran or South Korea, South Vietnam did not have the same degree of national status. The JCS reply:

This is illusory. First, we had no significant support in Korea, other than verbal....And it doesn't seem particularly pertinent...how these countries may compare with Greece etc.

Bundy was recommending that the U.S. salvage its reputation by arguing that South Vietnam was impossible to save, just as the French had found: "To get across these points, there would be much merit to non-government information getting across this picture, primarily of French errors." The spokesman's rebuttal:

French errors also included major political delays and indecisions....Rather than now lamely resurrecting the story of how the French couldn't do the job, it seems to me we should instead make sure we don't repeat their mistakes. (The French also tried to build the Panama Canal.)⁴⁸

May observes: "The [French Indochina] parallel had enough persuasiveness so that those who favoured war felt some compulsion to argue its invalidity."⁴⁹ Resistance to analogical usage is probably the best means available to analogical analysis for identifying which analogies are exerting an influence on the strategic decision-making process. If the analogy is not influential, or potentially influential, then why spend time rebutting it? Why not ignore it?

However, the critical question is: in what way did the JCS find Bundy's analogies persuasive? Was it because they themselves were likely to be persuaded by analogical inference that the introduction of combat troops was likely to be disastrous? Or was it that they recognized that previous disasters in superficially similar situations were placing their strategic initiatives in a very poor light? They were being analogically bound. They clearly had to agree with Bundy that the French Indochina and Korean ground wars were very costly in troops. They had to acquiesce in Bundy's popular judgement on previous strategic failures - to shun the Korean strategy ("Certainly no responsible person...") - and yet they had to struggle to rebut his analogies, to argue that his comparisons were inappropriate and to suggest corrective analogies (e.g., Panama Canal).

It remains optional as to which interpretation - rhetorical or instructive - one pursues. What is important to stress though, is that another reading of the evidence is possible. The rhetorical interpretation advances the hypothesis that analogies are found invalid usually when they are found politically disadvantageous. Debate over validity may well involve discussion of the instructive or empirical validity of the analogy, but this does not mean that the discussion is disinterested or apolitical. The clue that this is the case is the emotional nature of analogical debate, which is usually (assuming that the sanctions being invoked are potent) highly partisan and passionate.

Analogical debate between a number of strategists gathered in 1968 to discuss the "lessons" of Vietnam illustrates the point. Samuel Huntington opened with a plea for the abandonment of analogy to Vietnam:

At one time or another the historical analogies of Munich, Berlin, Cuba, Korea, Algeria, and, not least, the first Indochinese war have all been suggested, and all have been denounced as irrelevant and misleading....If the legacy of misplaced analogies which the past has bequeathed to the Vietnam debates is even half equaled by the misplaced analogies which Vietnam bequeathes to the future, error will compound error....Policy-makers may best meet future crises and dilemmas if they simply blot out of their minds any recollection of this one. The right lesson, in short, may be an unlesson.⁵⁰

The implication that those who intended to use the Vietnam analogy were intellectually incompetent was not lost on those in the audience who intended to oppose Vietnam-like intervention abroad. Hans Morgenthau, who opposed interventions against popular revolutions, responded to Huntington's denial of analogy stressing the inappropriateness of Huntington's denial of historical analogizing:

While listening here, I imagined that in the spring of 1919 an institute, perhaps like this one, might have convened a conference to draw lessons from World War I. To this meeting they would have invited the military and political advisers responsible for the disastrous strategy of the war. All of them would have maintained that World War I was a unique phenomenon, that absolutely nothing could be learned from it for future wars.⁵¹

Daniel Ellsberg's reply to Huntington was an even more overt reproach: "I take it that Professor Huntington's comment that this conference may well begin the formal misreading of the Vietnam experience - unless he was warning us about his own remarks - must be an invidious comment on what he is likely to hear from the rest of us."⁵²

Speaking after Ellsberg, Albert Wohlstetter endorsed Huntington,

noting that officials in charge of the Vietnam decisions based themselves on unreflective analogies with the Korean campaign. But his stronger personal support for Huntington lay in his observation of the "polemical" nature of analogies:

...one precedent that should make us thoughtful is the wrong lessons that were drawn in Vietnam from Korea. And I do not mean the polemical analogies with Korea - mentioned by Sam Huntington, - that were used by one side or the other in debate.⁵³

Stanley Hoffmann, who later in the conference accused Vietnam policy-makers of "an optimistic and simplified reading of reality" based on analogies to Korea, Greece, the Philippines, and Malaysia, placed himself between the "extreme" notion of Vietnam as typical of American policy (i.e., a valid analogue) and an unwise "unwillingness to learn" from mistakes in Vietnam. He needed to protect the validity of analogical thinking, because he himself proposed analogies to China and World War II bombing later in the conference.⁵⁴

At the beginning of his treatment of historical analogies, Robert Jervis disagrees with Hoffmann and others who make the argument that "analogies are seized upon only to bolster pre-existing beliefs and preferences." If this were the case, Jervis argues:

- a) people with different outlooks would not draw the same lessons from events;
- b) people would not disproportionately use as analogies events they experienced firsthand;
- c) and historical experiences, would not alter decision-makers' views.⁵⁵

In contradistinction to these arguments supporting the instructive interpretation, the rhetorical interpretation suggests that people with different political objectives will, despite the cognitive attractions of a given analogy (despite familiarity with the analogue), refuse to use it themselves and oppose its use by others if the analogy is or becomes politically disadvantageous. Those benefitting from an analogy defend the technique of generalization; those placed at a disadvantage condemn analogy as illegitimate reasoning.

The following case study of British strategy in Suez in 1956 is an attempt to show how political discretion seems to have governed analogical debate between Britain's politicians (strategists for present purposes). This attempt is made to improve prospects for a rhetorical interpretation of analogies - in particular, those analogies used by government strategists during the Suez crisis. But again, this attempt is based on the hypothetical assumption that the analogies used were merely rhetoric (talk designed to cover the real strategic factors). An instructive interpretation of these analogies has some credibility (as is outlined), but there are a number of good reasons to question the authenticity and centrality of these analogies. Consequently, it is worth applying the principles for the supplementary interpretation developed in this chapter: the notions of an appeal to social orthodoxy through analogies; the constraints imposed on political opponents through analogical binds; the struggle of these opponents to escape such constraints in order to promote their own strategic alternatives.

CHAPTER ONE

Notes

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⁶Holsti, International Politics, p. 369.

⁷May, "Lessons", pp. 52-53.

⁸May, "Lessons", pp. 81-82.

⁹May, "Lessons", p. 81.

¹⁰May, "Lessons", p. 85.

¹¹May, "Lessons", pp. 72-80.

¹²May, "Lessons", pp. 49-50. See: Gaddis Smith, Dean Acheson (New York: Cooper Square, 1972), p. 424.

¹³May "Lessons", pp. xi, 81, 85, 94, 114.

¹⁴Jervis, Perception and Misperception, pp. 218-219.

¹⁵Jervis, Perception, p. 217.

16. A. Wolters, Discord and Collaboration; Essays on International Politics (Baltimore, London: Johns Hopkins, 1962), pp. xiii-xvii. May uses the phrase, "category of experience." May, "Lessons", p. 85. Jervis, Perception, p. 220.
17. Jervis, Perception, pp. 239-243, 275-279.
18. George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy; 1900-1950 (New York: Mentor, 1951), p. 111. (originally: X, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," Foreign Affairs 25 (July 1947): 547.)
19. Jackson, The Atlantic Alliance, pp. 74-75.
20. Jackson, The Atlantic Alliance, p. 91.
21. Kahn, On Escalation, pp. 10-11.
22. E.N. Luttwak, "Perceptions of Military Force and U.S. Defence Policy," Survival 19 (January-February 1977): 2-8.
23. Max Black, Models and Metaphors; Studies in Language and Philosophy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962), pp. 41, 44-45. For further discussion of interpretations of metaphor see: Warren A. Shibles, An Analysis of Metaphor in Light of W.M. Urban's Theories (The Hague, Paris: Mouton, 1971).
24. Richard McKeon, ed., The Basic Works of Aristotle (New York: Random House, 1941), pp. 1329, 1335, 1337.
25. Aristotle stresses that the audience must have confidence in the orator's character before it can be persuaded to accept the orator's judgement: "the orator must not only try to make the argument of his speech demonstrative and worthy of belief; he must also make his own character look right and put his hearers, who are to decide, into the right frame of mind." McKeon, Basic Works of Aristotle, pp. 1329, 1379-1380.

Aristotle recommends example and enthymeme (rhetorical syllogism) as the chief means of persuasion. The first is inductive, the second deductive. Analogy seems to combine elements of each - having the graphic qualities of an example (illustration) and the abstract qualities of a syllogism. Aristotle does not concentrate on the term analogy, although he discusses the relative persuasive merits of metaphor over simile. He does briefly discuss the use of "illustrative parallel" and fables, and points to the "power of thinking out your analogy" as one of the abilities of a persuasive speaker. His discussion of maxims could be taken as a discussion

of latent analogies. McKeon, Basic Works of Aristotle, pp. 1330-1332, 1412-1415.

Wallace Stevens seems to have been moving towards a similar understanding of the political influence of analogical rhetoric. He notes that analogy, as an "emotional image," is able to communicate an analogizer's (poet's) antipathetic attitude towards a given phenomenon and arouse the same emotions or "feelings of scorn" in his audience. W. Stevens, "Effects of Analogy," The Yale Review 38 (September 1948): 31-32, 43-44.

²⁶ In the Rhetoric, Aristotle discusses how the speaker must praise what his audience feels is praiseworthy in order to earn their trust, and so persuade them to adopt his council. McKeon, Basic Works of Aristotle, pp. 1353-1359.

²⁷ Gaston Bachelard, The Psychoanalysis of Fire, trans. A.C.M. Ross (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964), pp. 7, 10-11.

²⁸ Above p. 24. A version of this analogy is used by James Eayrs to support the idea of a U.N. standing military force: "... just as developed communities do not have to improvise a fire-brigade since the firemen are already on duty at the station and their engines are ready to go. And even the best fireman cannot deter a fire, whereas a standing pacification force is itself conducive to peace." James G. Eayrs, Northern Approaches; Canada and the Search for Peace (Toronto: MacMillan, 1961), p. 108.

²⁹ A.J.R. Groom, British Thinking about Nuclear Weapons (London: Frances Pinter, 1974), pp. 74, 86. (B.H. Liddell-Hart, letters to The Times, 26 March 1957; J. Slessor, The Great Deterrent (New York: Praeger, 1957), p. 184.

³⁰ Helmut Schmidt, Defence or Retaliation, trans. E. Thomas (Edinburgh, London: Oliver and Boyd, 1962), pp. 4-5.

³¹ Admiral Robert Falls, Chief of Canada's defence staff, recently told the Conference of Defence Associations that Cabinet ministers needed to be lobbied by voter pressure to prevent further defence budget cuts: "We can influence them only through their voters and their constituents." See: "Lobby voters to prevent further cuts in the defence budget, Falls urges," Globe and Mail, 19 January 1979, p. 5.

³² Vice-Adm. Joseph P. Moorer, "U.S. Naval Strategy of the Future," Strategic Review 4 (Spring 1976): 75.

³³ In a speech to the Atlantic Treaty Association, Admiral Kidd likened NATO defence expenditures to an "insurance policy"- the issue being how much of a "premium" citizens are willing to pay to cover potential (military) disasters. The Royal Canadian Artillery Association in a submission to the Minister of Defence in October 1976 protested force reductions by asking: "has the situation at home and abroad altered so that we feel we may reduce our already modest insurance policy of defence"?

Current discussions of NATO strategy as one of the "3 R's" (Readiness, Rationalization, Reinforcement) seem to involve an analogy to the currently orthodox notion of getting back to basics in education (i.e., reading, 'riting and 'rithmetic). The analogy has been used by General Haig and has been picked up by: John Gellner, "Can conventional forces deter anybody?" Globe and Mail, 6 September 1977, p. 7; Philip Windsor, "A Watershed for NATO," The World Today 33 (November 1977): 412.

³⁴ Ronald Steel, Pax Americana (New York: Viking Press, 1967), p. 334.

³⁵ Isaac Deutscher, "The French Revolution and the Russian Revolution: Some Suggestive Analogies," World Politics 4 (April 1952): 370, 372.

³⁶ Edward N. Luttwak, "Why Arms Control Has Failed," Commentary 65 (January 1978): 24-25.

³⁷ R.F. Kennedy, Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: W.W. Norton, 1969), p. 40. A.M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), pp. 803, 806-807. May, "Lessons" of the Past, p. xii. T.C. Sorensen, Decision-making in the White House; the olive branch or the arrows (New York, London: Columbia University, 1963), p. 35. Robert Kennedy, listening to proposals for an air strike on Cuba passed President Kennedy a note reading: "I now know how Tojo felt when he was planning Pearl Harbour." Kennedy, Thirteen Days, p. 31.

See also: Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), pp. 197, 203.

³⁸ Eugene V. Rostow, "The Case Against SALT II," Commentary 67 (February 1979): 23.

³⁹ John Gellner, "Hard look needed at Canada's Maritime role in NATO," Globe and Mail (25 June 1978), p. 10.

⁴⁰ Above, p. 24.

- 41 U.S., Congress, 12 September 1977, Congressional Record, p. E5481-2.
- 42 Gaddis Smith, Dean Acheson, pp. 71-72.
- 43 Henry Fairlie, "Mr. X²," The New Republic 177 (December 1977): 10.
- 44 Albert Wohlstetter, "Racing Forward? Or Ambling Back?" in J.R. Schlesinger, ed., Defending America (New York: Basic Books, 1977).
- 45 Bernard Brodie, The Development of Nuclear Strategy, ACIS Working Paper no. 11 (Los Angeles: Centre for Arms Control and International Security, February 1978), p. 5. Sensitivity to the "Maginot Line complex" is also discussed in B. Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University, 1959), p. 395. In August 1977 Senator Hatch drew analogy between the Maginot Line and a "psychological deterrence that exists only in our minds." U.S., Congress, Senate, 94th Cong., 2nd sess., 5 August 1977, Congressional Record, p. 14104.
- 46 U.S., Congress, Senate, 81st Cong., 1st sess., Congressional Record, 95: 1163-1168, 1948-1949, 2844-2845, 3802.
- 47 U.S., Congress, House Select Committee on Post-War Military Policy, Hearings (1944), pp. 122-124.
- 48 May "Lessons", p. 105. Senator M. Gravel, ed., The Pentagon Papers; The Defense Department History of United States Decisionmaking on Vietnam, Vol. 3 (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), p. 625.
- 49 May, "Lessons", p. 104.
- 50 Richard M. Pfeffer, ed., No More Vietnams? The War and the Future of American Foreign Policy (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), pp. 1-2.
- 51 Pfeffer, No More Vietnams?, p. 3.
- 52 Pfeffer, No More Vietnams?, pp. 3-4.
- 53 Pfeffer, No More Vietnams?, p. 4.
- 54 Pfeffer, No More Vietnams?, pp. 5-6, 117-121. Conference members (Sir Robert Thompson, Ellsberg, Hoffmann, Huntington, Chester Cooper) also spent time debating the intellectual merits of the analogy to the Malayan insurrection. See pp. 152, 180-182, 244, 246, 274.

⁵⁵ Jervis, Perception and Misperception, p. 217. Jervis' discussion of spuriousness - the possibility that both "interpretations of past events" and "current perceptions" may be caused by a common third factor - invites the rhetorical interpretation's argument that political preference governs the analogies which strategists select. Jervis, Perception, pp. 217, 225.

CHAPTER TWO

ANALOGICAL ANALYSIS OF SUEZ 1956

Monumental history lives by false
analogy; it entices the brave to
rashness, and the enthusiastic to
fanaticism by its tempting comparisons.

Nietzsche¹

CHAPTER TWO

The following is an analysis of the influence of analogies on the British decision to intervene militarily in Egypt in 1956. The chapter develops a rhetorical interpretation of those analogies used by Prime Minister Anthony Eden during the Suez crisis. In essence, the argument is that Eden used analogies to enhance the political viability of his plan to use force against President Abdul Nasser of Egypt.

The analysis is set out in six sections. The first identifies the strategy in question, the second the analogies in question. The third considers the available evidence for an instructive interpretation of Eden's Suez analogies. The fourth examines analogical binding and the last section offers conclusions on the political value of analogical rhetoric to Eden during the Suez crisis.

1. Suez Strategy

On the evening of 31 October 1956, British Valiant and Canberra bombers began the British - French invasion of Egypt with attacks on four Egyptian airfields. During the following three days, French and British fighter aircraft continued to attack Egyptian airfields and other targets. On the morning of 5 November, British and French paratroops were dropped on Gamul airfield and at Port Fuadi. On 6 November, British and French naval forces attacked Port Said. The following day, after a 23-mile advance by British and French troops down the Suez Canal, a cease-fire was ordered.²

The strategy being examined is the British decision to undertake this seven-day military action against Egypt. The French decision is not examined, although it is clear that analogies may also have played a significant role in their decision to use military force against Egypt. Similarly, the Israeli decision to use force against Egypt in an engagement lasting from 29 October until 5 November, co-ordinated with the British-French invasion, will not be considered.³

Operational aspects of British strategy (the decision to plan the invasion with French, and through them, Israeli leaders; the decisions to adopt the plans "Musketeer" and later "Musketeer Revise") will not be considered.⁴ It is the influence of analogies on the general undertaking to use military force against Egypt (regardless of with whom, with what and when) which is being considered. At some point, the influence of analogies on the operational planning of the Suez invasion could well be undertaken as there is evidence that analogies were used by British

5
military personnel.

There is continuing debate about exactly when British political leaders made the decision to employ military force against Egypt. In his recently published account of the Suez crisis, Selwyn Lloyd, Eden's Foreign Minister, has denied that British leaders "decided to use force against Nasser as quickly as possible " during Cabinet meetings on 26-27 July following Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal Company. Lloyd admits that at the 26 July meeting: "The Chiefs of Staff were asked for a speedy assessment of what military action was open to us." But he argues, in effect, that had economic and political sanctions succeeded in forcing Nasser to reverse the nationalization, the British would have been content not to attack. On Lloyd's version, delays of the invasion date from 15 September (the first possible date for the invasion given the need for the preparation of forces in the Mediterranean) to 19 September, and 26 September, and then into October, were due to a persistent British "hope for a peaceful settlement."⁶

British delays are interpreted much differently by writers such as Kennett Love. Lloyd represents British diplomatic activity during the crisis - the London Maritime Conference (16-23 August), the Menzies mission (3-9 September), the Suez Canal User's Association and its London Conference (19-21 September), referral to the U.N. Security Council (26 September - 13 October) - as sincere efforts to avoid the use of force. Love understands this activity as an effort to create the right "pretext" for military action against Nasser. He feels that Eden, at least, had decided well before the Canal nationalization to "break Nasser" (i.e.,

after the dismissal of Glubb Pasha from Jordan in March 1956). The extended diplomacy was in the first place inevitable until mid-September while sufficient military forces were readied. Beyond that point, it was only a matter of trying to demonstrate before domestic and international opinion that every peaceful alternative to a forceful settlement had been tried and had met with Nasser's rejection. The British employed American diplomatic initiatives (both London conferences) and referral to the U.N. (which the Americans opposed) to try to manoeuvre the Americans and the Egyptians into more belligerent positions (the former from their neutral stance, the latter from their style of counter-negotiation).⁷

To resolve this difference of interpretation, the British strategic decision can be broken into two parts: (1) the decision by Eden and a few others in his Cabinet (e.g., Harold Macmillan) to use force as of 26 July 1956 (or earlier); and (2) the eventual decision by Lloyd and the majority of the Cabinet to acquiesce in Eden's decision to use force.⁸ There does not seem to be much question that Love's interpretation is valid for Eden. Lloyd, on the other hand, does seem to have been reticent about using force.⁹ But Lloyd and others in the Cabinet with an "ambiguous" or cautious attitude towards the use of force nevertheless decided in principle to endorse military action. Lloyd writes that at the Cabinet meeting on 27 July: "It was [unanimously] agreed that political pressure should be backed by the threat of, and in the last resort the use of, force." Similarly, at the 25 October Cabinet meeting, members were asked in principle whether they supported sending British troops into Egypt "if" Israel attacked Egypt. Again, they seem to have gone along with Eden's decision.¹⁰

The question for analysis is two-fold: (1) Did Eden's analogies influence his decision to use force? (2) Did Eden's analogies influence the decisions of his Ministers to acquiesce in the use of force?

2. Eden's Analogies

Following the nationalization of the Canal on 26 July 1956, and preceding the invasion on 31 October, the House of Commons sat on 27, 30, 31 July, 2 August, 12, 13 September, and 30, 31 October. Eden's speeches to the House on all but the two occasions in September were relatively brief and non-analogical in content. They were terse statements of government policy.¹¹ However, Eden's September speeches - notably the one on 12 September - contained numerous analogies bearing on the government's decision to act forcefully against Nasser and his decision to assert Egyptian control over the Suez Canal.

The most well known of these analogies occurred at the end of his speech on 12 September:

I should like to finish, if I may, on this personal note. In these last weeks I have had constantly in mind the closeness of the parallel of these events with those of the years before the war. Once again we are faced with what is, in fact, an act of force which, if it is not resisted, if it is not checked, will lead to others....Of course, there are those who say that we should not be justified in reacting vigorously unless Colonel Nasser commits some further act of aggression. That was the argument used in the 1930s to justify every concession that was made to the dictators....¹²

The concerted use of the 1930s analogy by Eden and others during the Suez crisis has been remarked by most of those writing on Suez.¹³ But Eden used four other notable analogies on the same occasion.

Two of these were historical. To underline the futility of referring the Suez dispute to the U.N. Security Council, he pointed to

the "Abadan precedent." In 1951, Iran's Mohammed Mossadeq had nationalized the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC). Clement Attlee's Labour Government had referred its dispute over this nationalization to the Security Council, which, because of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, referred the matter to the International Court. The Court failed to find jurisdiction over the dispute, and British interests were not supported. Anticipating similar treatment for the Suez dispute, and recalling Labour's opinion that the Security Council's failure to handle such cases would "create a most serious precedent," Eden ruled out similar referral.¹⁴

In response to criticism of his government's military preparations in the Mediterranean, Eden used another historical analogy:

I have not forgotten the appalling massacre of foreigners which took place in Cairo in 1952. Many people of several nationalities not by any means only our own, and including 10 British, were murdered in the most brutal conditions. I happened to be in charge of the Government here at that time....It is quite true that on that occasion the Egyptian Army intervened to stop further bloodshed, but Hon. Members must judge for themselves how much that action was due to the knowledge that we had a plan to intervene by force in the last resort.

Eden also referred to being in Egypt during "the days of terror in 1952" as a way of underlining his lack of confidence in Egyptian leadership.¹⁵

Two non-historical analogies were used. Recommending the Eighteen Nations proposals for management of the Canal, Eden argued that "Egypt should be internationally recognized as the landlord and should draw an income based on the traffic passing through the Canal." Eden seems to have picked up this analogy from Robert Menzies, the Prime Minister of

Australia, who had used it in a 7 September letter to Nasser:

The whole essence of what we have put forward is (to use a homely illustration) that, Egypt's position as the landlord of the canal being completely accepted, she should proceed by international agreement to install a tenant...it cannot be seriously maintained that when a landlord grants a lease of premises that lease derogates from his ownership....Indeed, as the "tenant" in this analogy would be a body which includes Egypt herself, the position of Egypt would be even stronger.¹⁶

Eden also took time to rebut analogy between Egyptian nationalization of the Suez Canal Company, and nationalization of British industries. He argued that the Suez Canal Company, unlike British enterprises, had an international character.

There is really no analogy whatever with the industries which have been nationalized here and which were and are entirely our domestic concern. Nationalization - if I may dare to define it - in the accepted sense of the term, means the transfer of an enterprise from private control to public control. It does not mean the transfer of an enterprise from international control to national control.

This could, of course, be regarded strictly as a contrast, but will be treated as a negated analogy.¹⁷

Eden used other analogies than these five (the 1930s, Abadan 1951, Cairo 1952, landlord-tenant, nationalization) but they had a more latent character. The statement that "any Government" would have had to take the same military measures as the British Government seems analogical, as does the statement that other countries, as well as Britain, would have their economies jeopardized. Eden's references to Swedish opinion on the

nationalization seems to be used as an analogue for the non-militant reasonableness of his government's approach.¹⁸

What can be observed about each of these analogies is that they were arguments favouring Eden's strategy against Egypt (the preparation, threat and eventual use of military force). The analogies did not commit Eden to the actual use of force, but each of them helped substantiate his case that such action was quite warranted. One had to resist dictators "vigorously." The Security Council was unable to enforce a fair settlement. One had to protect one's citizens from massacre. Nasser was rejecting every reasonable arrangement offered (and unreasonable opponents can only be reasoned with forcefully). The nationalization was unlawful (unprecedented) in British practice (forceful seizure merited forceful denial, especially as the seizure was illegal).

Two possible ways of interpreting these analogical arguments for force will be considered:

- (1) Eden was informing his audience of how he decided to employ military action (instructive interpretation).
- (2) Eden was legitimating military action in politically acceptable terms (rhetorical interpretation).

3. Interpretation of Analogical Influence

In his preface to "Lessons" of the Past, Ernest May quotes Eden's use of the 1930s analogy in his memoirs and offers the hypothesis:

"This perception of the situation led Eden and his cabinet to their futile and humiliating effort to retake Suez by force."¹⁹ Reflecting an instructive interpretation of the Suez analogies, this hypothesis does face one major difficulty - the fact that it is not known whether analogies were used during still-secret Cabinet and leadership meetings during the Suez crisis. Analogical analysis must therefore rely on analogies found in public records and in the memoirs of the participants.

As May has argued with Truman's decision on Korea, it can be argued that use of these analogies by others in touch with Eden confirmed Eden's analogical judgement on force. For example, the Herald, Mirror and The Times all used the 1930s analogy.²⁰ There were very few Conservatives who did not use the 1930s analogy.²¹ Two of Eden's chief advisors - Selwyn Lloyd and Harold Macmillan - both used it.²² There was international support for the 1930s analogy: French political and military leaders used it and various diplomats - such as Belgium's Paul Henri-Spaak - also used it in speaking to the British.²³ Significant numbers of Conservatives and foreign leaders also argued against the nationalization analogy.²⁴ It may be loosely inferred that such popular usage confirmed Eden's outlook, or was the basis of a consensus on the use of force.

However, it must be granted that technical factors of capability

significantly determined British strategy during Suez. The invasion was delayed until after 15 September because of the time required to prepare forces on Malta and Cyprus. Also, the invasion seems to have finally taken place when it did because the capabilities which had been built up, and which were being held ready while diplomatic activity took its course, were beginning to decline. Lloyd has indicated that the deterioration in equipment and morale seems to have helped prompt the decision to invade on 31 October. British leaders were aware of this deterioration and also of the fact that *Musketeer Revise* was considered feasible only until the end of October.²⁵

It also seems that Eden's desire to attack Egypt may have stemmed from a variety of non-analogical psychological factors, all of which seem more fundamental than analogical reflections. Both Eden and Lloyd held personal grudges against Nasser. Eden was also in bad health during the crisis with bile duct problems, which are supposed to have an intoxicating effect on judgement. There is speculation that Eden's wife goaded him to use force, and a personal rivalry with Dulles may have helped make the option of a negotiated settlement unpalatable. These and a variety of other unspoken psychological antagonisms may have helped to provoke the British decision.²⁶

In his analysis of Suez 1956, R.W. Cottam mentions analogical factors but does not emphasize them as major determinants. He writes that the "image of Nasser-as-Hilter or Nasser-as-Mussolini...was a determining image for Anthony Eden." But Cottam concludes that the Suez invasion was more "a convulsive effort to reverse British decline from great-power status." Suez reversals suffered by Britain symbolized "a decline which

had yet to be psychologically accommodated." The 1930s analogy, Cottam argues, helped to disguise the real motivational factors, which Cottam ranks in importance as:

- A. National Grandeur
- B. Defence
- C. Economic vested interests: trade and investments
- Participant excitement
- Military vested interests.²⁷

However, the instructive interpretation can rely on theoretical inferences about the psychological susceptibility of Eden and his advisors to analogical images. In the case of the 1930s analogy, the argument works well, as all of the key strategists involved had first-hand experience of Hitler and World War II.

Hugh Thomas argues that the analogical argument from experience in the 1930s was an "emotional" argument which became more dominant as the crisis continued, replacing originally-dominant economic arguments for force. Perhaps, as Eden himself suggests, the 1930s analogy came to be "constantly in mind." Thomas argues that French leaders during the crisis were still living in the days of the Resistance. Perhaps Eden was re-living the dramatic pre-war years leading up to the war.²⁸

A similar case can be made for the Abadan 1951 and Cairo 1952 experiences. Eden was closely involved with both situations and both may have helped confirm a notion that military force was necessary to protect British interests. Eden mentions the Cairo analogy in his memoirs, reasoning that the "belief that we had forces and the conviction that we

were prepared to use them were powerful arguments in prodding the Egyptian army to quell the riots," and in influencing the king to replace Nahas Pasha with Ali Maher. Perhaps Eden was hoping that the same sort of belief in British willingness to use force would bring about a similar replacement of Nasser.²⁹

An instructive interpretation can also accommodate the landlord and nationalization analogies on the grounds that they introduce patterns of behaviour quite familiar within British social and political experience.

The ironic feature of the Suez debate is that Labour Members initiated use of three of Eden's analogies: the 1930s, Abadan, and nationalization analogies. Hugh Gaitskell, leader of the Labour Party, and Herbert Morrison each used all three analogies in their 2 August speeches. This fact throws initial doubt on the instructive interpretation of Eden's analogies. Why is it that Eden did not initiate use of these three analogies, if his mind was indeed pre-disposed to such images of the world? Eden himself refers his usage of the 1930s analogy back to its use by Gaitskell and his use of the Abadan analogy back to Morrison. During an 8 August broadcast, Eden also credited Morrison for rebuttal of the nationalization analogy. However, the instructive interpretation can be supported by arguing that images may need to be reactivated, or that they were in Eden's mind immediately, but were left unspoken until Labour brought them up.³⁰

In any case, the instructive interpretation actually stands to benefit from Labour's use of these analogies. It seems to suggest that Socialists and Conservatives, despite political differences, and because

of similar experiences, arrived at the same analogical perceptions of the Suez crisis. It appears that Labour chose analogies which were not in their best political interests: they did not want to take military action against Nasser and yet chose analogies which supported that conclusion.

However, despite initial impressions, Labour does seem to have been trying to use these analogies for political advantage. Gaitskell, for one, seems to have recognized, after Eden started using the 1930s analogy, that it favoured the Conservative argument for unilateral force more than the Labour argument for international pressure. Gaitskell's speech, following Eden's dramatic use of the analogy on 12 September, makes no mention of it.³¹ Furthermore, Gaitskell's speech on 13 September contains a rebuttal of the analogy.

Gaitskell observed that besides the Members' anxiety at the consequences of letting Nasser "get away with this," it was their comparison with pre-war Germany which was "really the reason why they take a different view from us on the use of force." Granting that he had himself been reminded of Hitler by Nasser's actions, he urged that the emotions stirred up by the comparison must be restrained with the realization that the two situations were significantly different in three ways. Egypt, unlike Germany in the Rhineland, Czechoslovakia and Austria, had not crossed any frontiers with force, nor was Egypt as strong a military power as Germany had been. And whereas the League was already 'moribund' by the time of the Rhineland move, because of its failure over Abyssinia and the non-membership of the U.S., U.S.S.R. and Germany, the United Nations was still in a position to deal with the Suez Canal issue.³²

Despite Gaitskell's attempt to disqualify the pre-war analogy as an emotional justification for prompt military action against Nasser, Eden continued to use it. Eden rose to say that he had listened "with great interest" to Gaitskell's passage about how to analyze the threat of Nasser." But on what he felt to be "part of the most important element of our discussion tonight," he found it appropriate to comment with his words of February 1938, when he had resigned from Chamberlain's cabinet: "I do not believe that we can make progress in European appeasement if we allow the impression to gain currency abroad that we yield to constant pressure....progress depends above all on the temper of the nation, and that temper must find expression in a firm spirit."³³

What accounts for the contours of the Gaitskell-Eden sequence? Eden's persistence could be taken as an indication of how firmly he was held by the images of the 1930s. Gaitskell's fluctuation might suggest that his images of the 1930s were somehow less potent than Eden's. But there is another possibility: that Gaitskell and Eden both used the analogy only when it functioned as a political asset.

The following section pursues a rhetorical interpretation of the Suez analogies on these grounds:

- (1) There is an unavoidable lack of evidence that these analogies constituted the central arguments and perceptions of Suez strategists;
- (2) There is every indication that non-analogical factors played important roles in Suez strategy; and
- (3) There is some indication that these analogies were used for political purposes.

4. Analogical Binding During Suez

A strong suggestion of rhetorical influence - as discussed in chapter one - is the presence of analogical debate which takes the form of partisan debate concentrating on the reputation of the analogizer or his opponents.³⁴ The following section covers Eden's five analogies along with two others used by Eden after 12 September, outlining the possible analogical binds and partisan reactions to these analogical binds by opposing strategists.

Ostensibly, Eden's 1930s analogy likened Nasser (the object of analogy) with Hitler (the analogue). However, the analogy read implicitly: Eden's relation to Nasser is analogous to Eden's relation to Hitler. However inexact historically, the analogy allowed Eden to claim that his judgement in 1956 was as perspicacious as his judgement in 1938 (i.e., opposition to Chamberlain's appeasement policy).³⁵

This by itself was a political gain for his Suez strategy because it enhanced his strategic judgement. But the analogy also contained an analogical bind for his opponents: if they disagreed with his militant policy on Suez, he could, by analogical reversal, accuse his opponents of appeasement in the 1930s scenario. Even if his opponent had actually opposed appeasement in the 1930s, analogical reversal would suggest that the opponent was forgetting a lesson he had apparently once learned. Eden gave his opponents a subtle choice: they could relive the 1930s supporting Churchill's opposition, or Chamberlain's appeasement:

The majority of the country did not agree with me then. My right Hon. Friend the Member for

Woodford (Sir W. Churchill) agreed with me, and he tells me he agrees with me now. But we have, I believe, all of us in all parties learned our lesson since then. Do not let us, I implore the House and I implore the country, unlearn that lesson now.³⁶

If the 1930s analogy did place Eden's political opponents in the bind of having to follow Eden's lead or suffer the political consequences of unorthodoxy, debate in the form of partisan apologetics and accusations should be found. Gaitskell's rebuttal, however, was restrained, although he may have been implying that if Eden found the Suez and pre-war situations completely the "same" he was being irrational (ruled by his "emotions").³⁷ Other Labour rebuttals during the 12-13 September debates were more vigorous.

A. Blenkinsop (Lab.) underlined Sir Victor Raikes' (Cons.) admission of error in having been "one of those who accepted the specious arguments then advanced in order not to oppose unduly the advance of Hitler into the Rhineland." He then accused Conservatives of attempting to destroy the U.N. as they had the League of Nations. Similarly, after Major Beamish (Cons.) had recommended Lord Strang's article on appeasement, Sidney Silverman (Lab.) commented that it had taken Beamish twenty-one years to learn the meaning of appeasement. Beamish replied: "Whatever mistakes were made in the 'thirties, we on this side of the House have learned our lesson." Silverman then drew analogy between Beamish's mistaken support of government policy in 1935 and in 1956. Beamish returned that Conservatives would not make the same mistakes again. Such exchanges suggest the political significance the analogy had for Members.³⁸

Some of the rebuttals were personal attacks on Eden. R.H.S. Crossman (Lab.) commented that the Prime Minister's analogy was not only "dangerous," but "quite ridiculous," accusing Eden of both possible evils: aggression and appeasement. Wedgwood Benn (Lab.) also responded to the analogy by accusing Eden of behaving like a dictator:

We are told the Prime Minister's patience is exhausted. We talk about dictators, but some of us are wondering who is who in this matter.

Reader-Harris (Cons.) picked up the implication of Benn's rebuttal, objecting to the comparison of Eden and Hitler as a "smear campaign."³⁹

The Abadan analogy was formally an observation that Nasser's nationalization resembled Mossadegh's. Like the 1930s analogy, it was used to suggest how the government would not respond. Unlike Attlee, Eden would not rely on mere threats of force - as Labour had done with naval units in the Persian Gulf. Eden's implicit analogy, therefore, was that his relation to the Suez incident was analogous to his relation to Abadan. This analogy was historically reinforced, like the 1930s analogy, by his role as the opponent of government foreign policy at the time of Abadan.

Labour was faced with these two choices: (1) it could acquiesce in Eden's popular judgement about British failures at Abadan and support his divergent policy on Suez; and (2) it could oppose Suez policy at the risk of having that opposition characterized as a repeat of their ineffective Abadan policy. That is, Labour could learn its lesson voluntarily or through political punishment.

The analogical bind facing Labour was made more explicit by three

Conservatives Members. Lt. Col. Brunley-Davenport (first to use the analogy) urged his party to avoid the "shameful policy followed at Abadan" and to pursue instead "quick, decisive action." C.E. Mott-Radclyffe sanctioned the Conservative mobilization of forces over Suez with the observation that Labour had protected British citizens by dispatching forces during Abadan. Beamish used the same sanction, noting that such action was not called "gunboat diplomacy" during the Abadan crisis, and also placed Labour directly in the bind by noting that Mossadeqh had been able to call Labour's bluff, because its forces had been too small.⁴⁰

Morrison's use of the analogy, likening negotiations with Nasser to his own futile negotiations with Mossadeqh as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, was a statement about how he, as a leading Labourite, opposed such coercive nationalizations. He protected himself from public censure of his Abadan policy, attempting at the same time to preserve Labour's credibility. In the midst of this alignment with a pro-force argument, he did suggest that a similar reference to the International Court would be possible, but this was off-set with recognition of the United Nations' inefficacy.⁴¹

Other members of the former Attlee Government addressed themselves to the Abadan analogy. Gaitskell (Attlee's Chancellor of the Exchequer) and E. Shinwell (Attlee's Minister of Defence) both conformed to the analogy, underlining Labour's willingness to take "military precautions." Gaitskell attempted to earn further political credit by likening Labour opposition on Suez to Conservative opposition (led by Eden) on Abadan. Labour leaders clearly avoided the liabilities of defending losses at

Abadan.⁴²

Eden's denial of the nationalization analogy contains the implicit negated analogy: his relation to the Suez nationalization was not to be taken as analogous to his relation to British nationalizations. Why, as a Conservative, he did not reject all nationalizations as analogous political undesirables is not clear, except for the fact that it put Labour in a more difficult position. Eden was able to block legitimization in order to protect the integrity of British nationalizations which were potentially vulnerable to analogical reversal.

Gaitskell took time in his 2 August speech to point out that while he was not against nationalization of the Suez Canal Co. in principle, he did not regard the Egyptian action as legitimate as long as compensation remained unpaid. Also, because the action concerned a waterway of international importance, because the company involved was not an "ordinary" one, and because Nasser was unreliable and a political liability in the Middle East, the nationalization had to be opposed. This statement shows Gaitskell conforming to the government's analogical conclusion, although it does not confirm that there was analogical pressure to do so.⁴³

A virulent response from Morrison to the suggestion that the Labour Party sponsored the nationalization analogy shows more clearly that Labour was aware of the reverse implications of sanctioning Nasser's actions like their own. Morrison responded immediately to John Hall (Cons.), who hinted that Labour practices gave Egypt legal grounds to nationalize: "After all she [Egypt] has had an example set for her by this

country and others...." Morrison rose to ask Hall if it was not "really unwise and rather contrary to the interests of the country to make [the] analogy," and whether "party prejudice" should not be set aside. His heated defence of Labour confirms that the bind was at work:

Sir, anybody who says that this [nationalization of the Canal] has the slightest resemblance to the orthodox beliefs of the British Labour Party as to the process of nationalization - why, if he said it outside, he would be guilty of a libel. This is not our way of doing things....⁴⁴

In theory, both the landlord-tenant and Cairo analogies put Labour in similar binds. Not to endorse government policy- that Egypt as landlord had certain rights but had to allow some rights for tenants (canal users) - meant *by* reverse implication that such principles of social control were as questionable in a domestic context. Not to support military measures - such as those needed to quell riots in Cairo - would mean that Labour was unconcerned about British citizens during the Suez crisis.

The fact that no reaction to these analogies appears to have occurred suggests either that they did not have rhetorical importance or that they were even more difficult to assail than the 1930s, Abadan and nationalization analogies. As mentioned in chapter one, analogies drawing on popular notions of expertise or on areas of personal expertise are hard to challenge.⁴⁵

Two other analogies used by Eden once the invasion had begun should be mentioned. One has been examined in chapter one: the use of fire-fighting analogies. In a broadcast, Eden justified intervention with this statement: "In the depths of our conviction we decided that here was the beginning of a forest fire, of immense danger to peace." He

asked his audience what would have happened if he had referred the matter to the Security Council: "Where would the forest fire have spread in the meantime?"⁴⁶

The other analogy was a similar characterization of the invasion as police business. On 1 November 1956, speaking to the House, Eden argued that as the U.N. was "not yet the international equivalent of our own legal system and the rule of law.... police action there must be to separate the belligerents and to prevent a resumption of hostilities."⁴⁷

It is particularly difficult to believe that these last analogies influenced Eden's strategy - except in their capacity as legitimating rhetoric. They seem to have been used to confront political opponents with arguments for force which were awkward to oppose without at the same time opposing orthodox notions about the necessity of fire and crime control. It might be argued that such simple arguments were designed for public consumption, but the fire analogy, at least, was used in a November 1956 telegram from Eden to Eisenhower.⁴⁸ The public does not have to believe the analogy; along with its political representatives, the public merely needs to be faced with popular approaches to certain analogues.

The fire and police motifs were employed by a number of Conservatives in the House, as well as by Sir Pierson Dixon in the Security Council.⁴⁹ Lloyd's characterization of the situation on 30 October 1956 should be mentioned. Israel was not the aggressor he reasoned: "If a man has said that he is going to cut one's throat is it an act of aggression if one kicks the knife out of his hand?" Further, how could Britain and France wait for the U.N. to act, hampered as it was with Soviet veto?

In a sense, the policeman has his hands tied behind his back. He has to wait a long time before he is allowed to play his part.⁵⁰

Given the fact that both Eden and Lloyd knew about collaboration with the Israelis, these analogies must be taken as rhetoric - but as persuasive rhetoric, because of their power to bind the audience with its own values.

Both of these analogies were met with Labour responses which tried to turn the sanctioning power of the analogies against the government's strategy. Silverman, for instance, argued that it was the government which was trying to "set the Middle East and the world on fire." Gaitskell, responding to ridicule of his recommendation of U.N. referral declared: "There is nothing in the United Nations Charter which justifies any nation appointing itself as world policeman....if we can do this so can anybody else."⁵¹

5. Conclusions

Given that there is at least some evidence that analogies were used during Suez to secure political advantage - individually, and at opponents' expense - one important question concerning Suez strategy can be asked. How important was it for Eden to place his opponents - or to allow his opponents to place themselves - in analogical binds? Could Eden have gone ahead with the invasion without the benefits of analogical rhetoric?

First of all, why was Parliament recalled for the September debates on Suez policy? The Labour Party Parliamentary Committee had requested the recall on 13 August, but could the request have been ignored? Lloyd indicates that the government had originally agreed to the request because it had expected to be able to announce in the light of the failure of the Menzies' negotiations with Nasser, referral of the dispute to the Security Council. But by the time the debate arrived, Dulles had interrupted these plans with his own proposals for a Suez Canal Users' Association (SCUA). Does Lloyd mean that no debate would have taken place if they had anticipated American obstruction? If they had set aside efforts to commit the Americans to their cause against Nasser, would they have simply announced referral to the Security Council? Would Eden have been able to avoid taking his case before Parliament?⁵²

Perhaps, if Eden had had the forces he required for a successful invasion available at the end of July 1956, he could have resorted immediately to military force in the wake of public outrage, without the use of much argumentation - analogical or otherwise. But by mid-September, when British and French forces were finally readied on Malta and Cyprus, domestic

and international pressures were being brought against the option of military action being contemplated by the Conservative government. The Labour Party, which in July and the early part of August could easily have been interpreted as favouring a military reply to Nasser, by September was clearly in opposition to a forceful resolution of the Suez dispute. Gaitskell seems to have been alarmed that his militant speech was being used to suggest bi-partisan support for a strategy of force. Also, by September, the Americans (Eisenhower and Dulles) had had time to head off a military solution with diplomatic manoeuvres (conferences).

The rhetorical interpretation argues that the analogies used by Eden and other Conservatives were used primarily to fill the political vacuum created by planning and political delays. It is strongly based on the assumptions, mentioned in chapter one, that at certain critical junctures, strategies require political support or acquiescence, and that analogies are effective devices for securing this support. The government must address its opposition in order to avoid weakening its authority. It must demonstrate that it has a viable set of arguments for its strategy. When political support for military action is not a concern, then analogies - on a rhetorical interpretation - should be expected to play a less prominent role. But in the Suez crisis, political support and public opinion were important factors.⁵³

Until after the cease-fire of 7 November, public opinion polls in Britain showed Eden with about a third of British voters behind his strategy of force. The majority of voters were either uncertain about or opposed to military action. Within the House itself, Eden had a working

majority, and could rely on party solidarity, despite some dissent on the use of force by about thirty Conservative Members. Apparently, Eden was not concerned to secure bi-partisan support for his strategy.⁵⁴

But could Eden have said nothing and given no explanations in the face of mounting criticism and more or less latent criticism within his own party and the Cabinet? Did he not need a parliamentary opportunity to counter his opposition - to give arguments which would block their criticism and serve to maintain the support he had? If he had not defended his strategy publically, would the opponents of force have gained ground?

If this reasoning is valid, can it be argued that analogical arguments were among the most effective arguments he could have chosen to make his case? Could he have relied solely on non-analogical arguments about the legal, economic and political merits of his Suez strategy.⁵⁵

Eden relied on legal arguments during his 2 August speech, focusing on the international character of the Canal and Egypt's violation of the Anglo-Egyptian agreements of 1954 and 1956, and the 1888 Convention governing access to the Canal. He continued to stress the illegality of Egypt's action, but he knew that the legal case against Egypt was weak, or at best, controversial. Similarly, economic arguments against Nasser - centering largely on the unlikelihood of Nasser paying adequate compensation and investing transit dues in upkeep of the canal - were debatable. Eden recognized that these arguments were not persuasive in a 27 July telegram to Eisenhower:

We should not allow ourselves to become involved in legal quibbles about the rights of the Egyptian

Government to nationalize what is technically an Egyptian company, or in financial arguments about their capacity to pay the compensation which they have offered. I feel sure that we should take issue with Nasser on the broader international grounds.⁵⁶

At any rate, during his 12-13 September speeches, Eden hardly used non-analogical (e.g., strictly legal and economic) arguments - except inasmuch as they were reflected in his outline of how Nasser had unreasonably rejected Menzies' representations. Instead, he relied heavily on analogical arguments to make his case for military action against Nasser. Similarly, Harold Macmillan, when asked how - as Chancellor of the Exchequer - he had justified the financial consequences of intervention, invoked the 1930s analogy. "Appeasement" would have permitted the drift into another world war. Macmillan rendered the meaning of his analogy explicit with the maxim which followed it: "Then it is the brave man chooses, while the coward turns aside." This was the sort of choice facing the opponents of force in each of the analogical contests opened by Labour and sustained by the Conservatives: hero or coward?; patriot or traitor?; competent or incompetent?; consistent or inconsistent?⁵⁷

Politically, British Socialists could not afford to look like appeasers, pacifists or internationalists. They had to demonstrate that they were competent in the use of armed force in international disputes. Perhaps, if Labour had been in the position of the French Communist Party, having voted against Munich, they would have had the credentials necessary to permit stronger disagreement with the government's anti-appeasement argument. But as it was, it could only point to the negative consequences of failing to secure United Nations, Commonwealth, and Allied support.

Eden appears to have taken advantage of Labour's political vulnerability around the question of whether its socialism compromised national interests.⁵⁸

Eden established a language of invasion - a structure of argumentation which served to legitimate hostilities. The language he employed seems to have had less to do with the real motives for attacking Nasser than with the need to generate the impression that there was only one defensible course of action - the government's. Labour's alternatives were compromised as being unworthy and ineffective. His analogies supported the analogical conclusion that force should be used against Nasser. But the force of this argument derived from the analogies' rhetorical aspects. Faced with a series of analogical binds, the opponents of force could not afford to deny the government the formal arguments for force it needed to proceed. Had Eden not been able to find analogical binds which so effectively enhanced the political credibility of his strategic judgement at the expense of his opponents' judgements, he would have had a more difficult time continuing with his military plans. The pretext for invasion would have been reduced largely to that of intervening to separate Israeli and Egyptian forces. But that arrangement was tenuous enough that the absence of persuasive (coercive) rhetoric might have made the invasion too much of a political liability.

CHAPTER TWO

Notes

¹ Friedrich Nietzsche, The Use and Abuse of History, trans. A. Collins (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1957), p. 16.

² For details of the Suez campaign see: A.J. Barker, Suez: Seven Day War (London: Faber and Faber, 1964); A. Beaufre The Suez Expedition 1956, trans. Richard Barry (London: Faber and Faber, 1969).

³ See below, notes 23, 24.

⁴ For details on the decision to collaborate with Israel: Anthony Nutting, No end of a lesson: The Story of Suez (London: Constable, 1967), pp. 90-113. For details of the Musketeer decisions: A. Beaufre, The Suez Expedition, pp. 26-60.

⁵ Hugh Thomas indicates that 'Operation Overlord' in Normandy 1944 was used as a model by military planners. Minister of Defence Walter Monckton and First Sea Lord Mountbatten apparently had reservations about the strategy against Egypt "for no force of this size had ever been assembled by any British Government without the support, much less the knowledge, of the leaders of the Opposition." H. Thomas, The Suez Affair (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1967), 68-69. M.H. Heikal notes that Mountbatten and Field Marshal Templer were instrumental in stopping an immediate intervention because, recalling the failure of the British paratroop attack on Arnhem in 1944, they wanted adequate reinforcements (which were not available at first). M.H. Heikal, The Cairo Documents (Garden City: Doubleday, 1973), p. 96. Eden has indicated in his memoirs that he had to keep urging his commanders not to plan the invasion in terms of World War II: "Action against Egyptians is not militarily comparable with action against Germans." Kennett Love, Suez: The Twice-Fought War (London: Longman, 1969), p. 406.

⁶ Selwyn Lloyd, Suez 1956; A Personal Account (London: Jonathan Cape, 1978), pp. 75, 83-85, 91-92, 134, 170. General Sir Charles Keightley, British Commander-in-Chief of the Suez operation, had reported that military preparations would be completed by 15 September; Terence Robertson, Crisis: The Inside Story of the Suez Conspiracy (London: Hutchinson, 1964), p. 97.

7

Kennett Love, Suez, pp. 207, 213-216, 391, 397, 420, 425, 434-437.

8

Lloyd's account of a Cabinet meeting on 11 September 1956 to discuss the SCUA option indicates a range of opinion on the use of force from Macmillan who saw SCUA as a step closer to the inevitable use of force, through Lord Kilmauir and Lord Salisbury who felt the use of force would/should be compatible with U.N. and international opinion, to Monckton and R.A. Butler who were against the use of force in defiance of domestic and international opinion. Lloyd and the bulk of the Cabinet took a middle road, recognizing that "if we tried SCUA without success, and if we then went to the Security Council without success, the use of force would be the policy." Lloyd, Suez 1956, pp. 133-134.

9

See Nutting's account of Lloyd's role in the decision during October 1956: No end of a lesson, pp. 98-99.

10

Lloyd, Suez 1956, p. 83.

11

Eden's statement of government policy, used on 30 July 1956 and 2 August 1956 in his Commons speeches: "No arrangements for the future of this great international waterway could be acceptable to Her Majesty's Government which would leave it in the unfettered control of a single Power which could, as recent events have shown, exploit it purely for purposes of national policy." Great Britain, Parliament, Parliamentary Debates (Commons) 5th series, 557 (1956): 918-919, 1603. (Subsequent references to the Commons debates on Suez will be shown in the form, Debates 557: 918-919, 1603).

12

Debates 558: 14-15.

13

See for example: Terrence Robertson, Crisis, pp. 88-89, 134, 140, 151, 207; Love, Suez, index under "Hitler."

14

Debates 558: 12.

15

Debates 558: 12, 14.

16

The Eighteen-Nation Proposals are outlined in: Nutting, No end of a lesson, pp. 182-184. Debates: 558: 10. U.K., Foreign Office, British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 162 (1955-1956) (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1965), p. 773. For other analogies used between Menzies and Nasser: pp. 777, 783.

- ¹⁷ Débates 558: 5. Above, p. 9.
- ¹⁸ Above, pp. 9-10. Debates 558: 2-3, 8-9, 12.
- ¹⁹ May, "Lessons" of the Past, p. x. Also Jervis, Perception, pp. 266-267.
- ²⁰ May, "Lessons", p. 82. Thomas, Suez Affair, p. 39.
- ²¹ The following Conservative members used the analogy during the 12-13 September debates: Raikes, Wall, Beamish, Hutchison, Burden, Heald, Mott-Radcliffe, Gresham-Cooke, Longden, Bell. Debates, 558: 36-37, 48-49, 61-62, 65-66, 80, 83-84, 102-103, 186, 200-201, 204, 246, 260, 287.
- ²² Harold Macmillan, Riding the Storm, 1956-1959 (London: Macmillan, 1971), pp. 125-128, 154-156. Lloyd, Suez 1956, pp. 245, 247, 249, 250.
- ²³ The 1930s analogy was used by the following French politicians during debates on Suez policy in the Assemblée Nationale: Jacques Soustelle (28 July); Maurice Shumann, Georges Bidault, Guy Mollet, Pierre de Chevigné, Patrice Brocas (2 August); Christian Pineau, Marcel Naegelen, Charles Lussy (3 August). France, Journal Officiel; Debats Parlementaires, pp. 3722, 3841-3847, 3870, 3873-3874. Premier Mollet made a press statement on 30 July 1956 in which he likened Nasser's The Philosophy of the Revolution to Hitler's Mein Kampf; New York Times, 31 July 1956, pp. 1, 3. Foreign Minister Pineau seems to have been critical of Mollet's use of the 1930s analogy and yet used it himself with U.S. Ambassador Dillon and at the Security Council. Love, Suez, pp. 145, 367. A. Moncrieff, Suez: Ten Years After (New York: Pantheon, 1966), pp. 35-36. The 1930s analogy was popular in the French Defence Department. The Minister of Defence, Maurice Bourges-Maunoury, and his assistants Abel Thomas and Louis Mangin all used the analogy, Mangin as early as May 1956. Thomas, Suez Affair, p. 20. Paul-Henri Spaak used the analogy in a letter to Lloyd: "I do not wish to hide from you that I am haunted by the memory of the mistakes which were committed at the outset of the Hitler period, mistakes which cost us dear." The Times, 11 June 1978, p. 35.
- ²⁴ For example, Pineau: France, Debats Parlementaires, 3 August 1956, p. 3870.

- 25 Lloyd, Suez 1956, p. 170
- 26 Love, Suez, p. 214. Thomas, Suez Affair, p. 162. Heikal, Cairo Documents, pp. 71-76, 116.
- 27 R.W. Cottam, Foreign Policy Motivation: A General Theory and a Case Study (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh, 1977), pp. 297, 299, 305, 309. See Lloyd on the importance of oil, related to gold reserves, and on prestige: Lloyd, Suez 1956, pp. 117, 191.
- 28 Thomas, The Suez Affair, pp. 48, 152, 156, 163. Love, Suez, pp. 652-653.
- 29 Sir Anthony Eden, Full Circle; The Memoirs of Anthony Eden (London: Cassell, 1960), pp. 232-233.
- 30 Eden's earliest use of the 1930s analogy appears to have been in a telegram to Eisenhower on 5 August 1956: "I have never thought Nasser a Hitler....But the parallel with Mussolini is close....
He used the 1930s, Abadan and nationalization analogies during a broadcast on 8 August: Love, Suez, pp. 394-395.
Debates 557: 1610-1613, 1616, 1651, 1654-1658. New York Times, 9 August 1956, p. 1.
- 31 Debates 558: 16-30.
- 32 Debates 558: 293-294.
- 33 Debates 558: 298-299.
- 34 Above, p. 39
- 35 Apparently, Eden resigned from Chamberlain's Cabinet because of a disagreement over British policy on Anglo-American co-operation, as well as differences on British-Italian policy; Ritchie Ovendale, 'Appeasement' and the English Speaking World; Britain, the United States, the Dominions, and the Policy of 'Appeasement' 1937-1939 (Cardiff: University of Wales, 1975), p. 111.

- 36
Debates 558: 299.
- 37
Debates 558: 293-294.
- 38
Debates 558: 36, 55, 65-66.
- 39
Debates 558: 84-85, 93-95, 225-226.
- 40
Debates 557: 920-921 (30 July 1956); 558: 63-64, 203.
- 41
Debates 557: 1655, 1658.
- 42
 Thomas, Suez Affair, p. 183. Debates 558: 189. That there were liabilities in defending Abadan is evidenced in Eden's comment in the House on 27 February 1956: "We had some set-backs in the past. We had the Persian oil trouble, but I will not go into that because I have no wish to make party capital at all." Debates 549: 957.
- 43
Debates 557: 1610.
- 44
Debates 557: 1651, 1656-1657.
- 45
 Above, pp. 35-36.
- 46
 Robertson, Crisis, p. 185.
- 47
Debates 558: 1525. Robertson has argued that Eden picked up the police analogy from Lester B. Pearson to replace the 1930s analogy. Crisis, p. 207.
- 48
 Eden, Full Circle, p. 552.
- 49
 U.N., General Assembly, First Emergency Special Session, 561st meeting, 1 November 1956, pp. 7-8. Robertson, Crisis, p. 187. See Debates 558: 1292, 1361-1363, 1366, 1481, 1485-1486.

50

Debates 558: 1375, 1377.

51

Debates 558: 1347.

52

Lloyd, Suez 1956, pp. 135-136.

53

Above, pp. 14, 109-110. On the concern of the government to secure public and world opinion: Love, Suez, pp. 395-397, 411; Robertson, Crisis, p. 161. There is evidence that Eden faced a growing challenge to his leadership in the Conservative Party: a forceful strategy was one way of meeting any potential challenge; Love, Suez, pp. 206, 219, 371, 395, 401.

54

Epstein, British Politics, pp. 65, 142-143, 170, 203-204. Love, Suez, pp. 371, 424-425.

55

If British diplomatic efforts during the crisis were, as Leonard Mosely puts it, part of "a campaign to prepare the British public for an invasion of Egypt," can the analogies in Eden's September speeches be considered part of the same campaign? L. Mosely, "Eden's inkwell incident during the Suez crisis," Globe and Mail, 8 March 1978, p. 7.

56

Eden, Full Circle, p. 428.

57

Anthony Sampson, Macmillan; A Study in Ambiguity (London: Allen Lane, The Penguin Press, 1967), p. 123. Macmillan, Riding the Storm, pp. 171-172. Nutting, No end of a lesson, pp. 148-149.

58

For indications of Labour sensitivities to being considered pacifists see debates between Beamish and Silverman, Mellish and Shinwell: Debates 558: 64-66, 191. French Communists, evidently in good position with regard to the 1930s bind, were subjected to analogy with Stalin: France, Debates Parlementaires, 2 August 1956, p. 3847; 3 August, pp. 3873-3874.

CHAPTER THREE

THE POLITICS OF ANALOGY

- The analogy is a particularly tricky form of rhetoric when it becomes the basis of an argument rather than
- merely a figure of speech.

Northrop Frye¹

CHAPTER THREE

1. Techniques of Rebuttal

If, by placing political opponents in analogical binds, Eden's analogies were able to function as effective arguments for his strategy of force, then the obverse side of analogical influence on strategy concerns the ability (or inability) of his opponents to counteract or escape the binds in which they were being placed. An examination of the techniques of analogical rebuttal used by the opponents of force is in order. The possibility exists that the use of more effective rebuttals would have deprived Eden of arguments he found politically useful.

To this point, rebuttals of analogies have been taken as some indication of analogical influence - at least the perception of that influence by the rebuttor. The present chapter takes rebuttals as factors of influence in their own right. The interaction between analogies and their rebuttals is a political contest which helps to decide which strategies will be adopted.

Despite the fact that Labourites were politically dependent on the same analogies as the Conservatives, would it have been possible for Labour to respond more effectively to Eden's arguments for force? Could certain techniques of rebuttal have been used rather than others - with greater prospect of success in off-setting the government's analogical advantages?

Drawing on the Suez debates, there appear to have been four

basic techniques of rebuttal available to Eden's opponents: contradiction, substitution, over-extension, and dislocation. Each of these were used at different points in the debate; each appears to have had its own draw-backs.

Gaitskell used the technique of contradiction in his rebuttal of the 1930s analogy during his 13 September speech. He concentrated on showing that there were significant differences between Egypt and Germany - that despite certain similarities between Nasser and Hitler, the object of analogy did not correspond closely with its analogue.²

Richard Crossman used substitution in his rebuttal of the 1930s analogy, suggesting that it was more appropriate to liken Nasser with Kemal Ataturk, the Turkish reformer.³ This technique is a subtler version of contradiction - an implicit argument that the object of analogy does not closely resemble the suggested analogue through the substitution of a preferred analogue.

Ernest May and Robert Jervis recommend these two techniques of rebuttal to strategists trying to off-set the influence of other strategists' analogies. Unlike the traditional logician's rejection of analogical reasoning, this recommendation by May and Jervis recognizes the inevitability of such reasoning. They recommend that analogies be used, but critically, and with a clear view of relevant differences and alternate analogues (or historical lessons).

May argues that if Vietnam planners had scrutinized their own analogies for inaccuracies (i.e., relevant differences) and had sought

out alternate historical analogues (e.g., drawn from nineteenth century, Latin American, Middle Eastern, or European experiences) they might not have pursued the war in Vietnam so confidently.⁴ Similarly, Jervis argues that decision-makers should avoid "superficial and overgeneralized" analogies and "examine a variety of analogies before selecting the one that they believe sheds the most light on their situation."⁵

Based as they are on an instructive interpretation of analogies, these recommendations by May and Jervis seem to assume that if strategists can be shown the inaccuracies of their reasoning, they may adopt more intelligent strategies.

The problem with the first two techniques of rebuttal is that they focus on the analogical argument rather than the analogizer himself which, on the rhetorical interpretation, is where the strength of the analogy lies. The result is that the analogizer remains secure in his analogy despite what may be excellent empirical objections.

For example, Gaitskell's rebuttal interested Eden but did not seem to change his mind. He continued using the 1930s analogy despite its empirical weaknesses. Crossman could well have pursued the Ataturk substitution, given that Eden referred to Ataturk in his memoirs as the "redemptive type of dictator" who could "lead the people and redeem their fortunes within their own land."⁶ But Eden was under no obligation to consider the merits of Crossman's alternate analogy even if it had merit.

Why should Eden be expected to qualify or counter-balance his

1930s analogy? Analogizers can easily meet the charge that over-generalization represents intellectual weakness by allowing that despite obvious differences, the two phenomena are essentially, not exactly, the same. Analogies require only a few correspondences in order to function. Only a few points of similarity are required to transport strategic discussion from the world of the object to the world of the analogue. Empirical forms of rebuttal would have to destroy practically every bridge between analogue and object to prevent continuance of an analogy.

The technique of over-extension involves finding more similarities than the original user intended. Julian Snow, accepting that Nasser was "a small dictator of a smallish country," went on to suggest that, "just as Hitler was the product of the social and economic conditions which followed the First World War, so I believe that Colonel Nasser is logically and inevitably the sort of man to come forward in the social and economic conditions of Egypt." This extension allowed Snow to criticize the government for helping to provoke Nasser's action through its political and economic impositions on Egypt - the "bolstering of a corrupt pasha-dom and a system of land-tenure which in this country could not possibly be justified on humane grounds."⁷

Over-extension, like substitution, is a subtle form of contradiction. It has a good chance of success because it allows the momentum of analogical reasoning to compromise itself. Inclusion of every possible similarity between object and analogue renders the analogy diffuse and often absurd. But again, the analogizer can always retreat to a few

simple and usually invulnerable lines of correspondence.

These first three techniques of rebuttal remained underdeveloped by the Opposition during the Suez crisis. At least three reasons could account for this:

- (1) Labour members only wanted to qualify their fundamental agreement with government analogies;
- (2) they lacked sufficient knowledge to evaluate given analogies and to suggest alternates;
- (3) they somehow realized that the analogies were not vulnerable to empirical criticisms.

The last reason would account for the emphasis in Labour rebuttals upon dislocation - the one technique which does not concentrate on the empirical weaknesses of analogy. Dislocation simply rearranges the elements of a given analogy. Specifically, it moves the analogizer from his favoured position in relation to the analogue to a disfavoured position within the analogy. Benn employed dislocation when he accused Eden of being the dictator. Eden was shifted from his own historical and Churchillian role in the analogy to Hitler's role. Crossman used the same dislocation along with another one which moved Eden into Chamberlain's role.

Dislocation, when it occurs, is the best evidence for a rhetorical interpretation, because it concentrates on the analogizer and his opponent rather than the object of analogy. Dislocation is a potent form of rebuttal. Eden and his advisors were particularly sensitive to being labelled latter-day Chamberlains. Lloyd recounts an incident which occurred on his return from the Security Council sessions in October

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1956. He was placed in the Chamberlain role by being handed an umbrella:

Chamberlain was carrying his umbrella and a piece of paper, an agreement between him and Hitler which proved not to be worth the paper on which it was written. I was going back with my piece of paper, the six principles, agreed to by all, a pious hope about as binding on Egypt as Chamberlain's piece of paper had proved upon Hitler.

Eden had also be caricaturized as another Chamberlain in Punch in 1955. Thomas suggests that such a caricature may have prodded Eden on to the use of force.⁸

Dislocation is demonstrably more potent than the first three rebuttals. But is it more effective in denying analogical supports to strategies? Where the first three are often neutral in effect, dislocation seems to prove counter-productive. Denying an analogizer his chosen position in relation to an analogy may simply provoke him to assert himself more strongly. In relation to the 1930s analogy, it seems particularly unwise to characterize someone who wants to be seen as Churchillian, as being more like Chamberlain. The accusations of "pure appeasement" and "military posturing" made by Crossman and Silverman were the same as those made by the Suez Rebels with a view to goading Eden into military action.⁹

Eden also seems to have been sensitive to the Hitler dislocation. On 13 September, in response to hostile interruptions, Eden declared:

We are not the aggressors now. I have been asked a question by the Leader of the Opposition. Even the aggressor is allowed to reply.

But such hostile counter-characterizations only tended to confirm the Churchill role. As Macmillan put it: "The depreciators and detractors of Churchill in the years 1935 to 1939 were now equally sneering about Eden."¹⁰

2. Substitution-Dislocation as a Technique

Each of the techniques of rebuttal, when used separately, has certain liabilities. But at least one combination of these techniques offers some prospect of effective rebuttal: substitution-dislocation. Dislocation is essential in that it is the one rebuttal which directly challenges the analogizer's binding of his opponents by reversing positions in the analogy. But dislocation needs to be tempered with a substitute analogy which will still provide the analogizer with a favourable political position, but not at the rebuttor's expense. Using both rebuttals together, there is some hope of forcing the analogizer off his preferred analogical ground, and on to the opponents'.

Crossman provided an illustration of this combination technique. Firstly, he dislocated Eden, calling him dictatorial. He then appealed to Eden's successful record as a negotiator, recalling Eden as "the hero of the League of Nations" with regard to Ethiopia.¹¹ This substitution gave Eden a viable alternative to his 1938-style role. Crossman also urged Eden to pursue another "Edenesque settlement of the type which we always regarded in the past as an achievement of such conspicuous skill, as in the case of Indo-China."¹²

There is some indication that this appeal to Eden's personal diplomatic achievements was drawing him at least formally into a more conciliatory position. At the beginning of his 13 September speech, following Gaitskell's recollection of Eden's ardent support of the United Nations in 1945, Eden declared: "A peaceful settlement was our aim in

Korea, in Indo-China, in Trieste and in Persia, and we got them all." The implication was that he was seeking the same over Suez.¹³

One of the analogical debates over Suez which has not been mentioned yet is the one which occurred between the Americans and the British. It could well be the case that Eden used his analogies to attempt to place the Americans, as well as his Labour opponents, in analogical binds. The Abadan analogy introduced the idea of American interference in British crises. The nationalization analogy addressed American concerns over nationalization of the Panama Canal. And the 1930s analogy may have served to remind the Americans of how slow they had been to intervene to assist European allies in the last war.¹⁴

Given British and French absorption with the 1930s analogy, it is curious that the Americans neither endorsed nor rejected use of the 1930s analogy during the Suez crisis.¹⁵ May has argued that the same analogy had an overwhelming impact on the Truman Administration. But if the pre-war analogy had such an influence in the cold war - if it prompted American intervention in Korea - then why did its invocation during Suez not yield American support for the British-French intervention? Were Eisenhower's and Dulles' experiences of the pre-war period somehow different from those of Truman and Eden? Apparently, they were not, given that both of them had previously used the analogy in their arguments against the Soviets.¹⁶

Besides, Eden had adapted the analogy to conform to the American preoccupation with the Soviets, carefully constructing an overlay of

pre- and post-war correspondences. His 6 September telegram to Eisenhower mentioned not only the pre-war analogy, but also an analogy between the Egyptian seizure of the Canal and the Soviet blockade of West Berlin.¹⁷

And his 1 October telegram to Eisenhower contained this subtle argument:

There is no doubt in our minds that Nasser, whether he likes it or not, is now effectively in Russian hands, just as Mussolini was in Hitler's. It would be as ineffective to show weakness to Nasser now in order to placate him as it was to show weakness to Mussolini. The result was and would be to bring the two together.¹⁸

American abstinence from the 1930s analogy during Suez seems to resemble Gaitskell's on 12 September. The possibility exists that they recognized its political implications. The British and French were trying to pull the Americans into the old World War II partnership. More specifically, they were attempting to make the Suez dispute NATO business.¹⁹ And the 1930s analogy is a standard NATO argument against the Soviets.²⁰

This put the Americans in an analogical bind. They could not reject the analogy without weakening the emotional bonds of the western alliance. Neither could they adopt it without involving themselves on the British-French side. They needed a form of rebuttal which would challenge Eden's 1930s rationale, without challenging the analogy *per se*. It seems that they chose substitution-dislocation by means of the colonial analogy. Dulles used the colonial analogy at his 1 October press conference:

The United States cannot be expected to identify itself 100 per cent either with the colonial powers or the powers uniquely concerned with the problem of getting independence as rapidly and as fully as possible.

Eisenhower used the colonial analogy in his 2 October telegram response to Eden.²¹ After recalling that the French "continued to drum on the argument that since we were allies in Europe we were bound to 'stand by' them in any situation they might encounter or create anywhere on the globe," Eisenhower explains in his memoirs why the U.S. did not accept the NATO conclusion:

While as a matter of sentiment, and in many cases as a matter of practicality, this was so, it could not apply in every conceivable circumstance. In the instant case, much as we valued our friendship with France, and as much as we desired solidarity with our principal allies, we could not encourage the unjustified domination of a small nation by foreign armies.²²

It is possible that American use of the colonial analogy did not function solely as a rebuttal of the 1930s analogy and its framework. The Americans may have been competing with the Soviets in aligning themselves with Third World nations sympathetic to Nasser's stand against the West's "collective colonialism." Also, Eden may be right when he notes that Americans had strong feelings against colonialism.²³

Regardless, it seems that the colonial analogy was able to successfully challenge the British argument from the 1930s. Defensive references to the colonial theme in Eden's memoirs are almost as

frequent as those to the pre-war theme. At the end of Full Circle (1960), Eden framed the Suez conflict in terms of its two main analogies: "The difference between the West and Egypt has not been colonialism - it is the difference between democracies and a dictatorship."²⁴

Macmillan has acknowledged in his memoirs that colonial characterizations of the British-French strategy were damaging and required a reply.²⁵ He outlines how, in a speech at Indiana University on 22 September 1956, he attempted to off-set anti-colonial sentiments with pre-war memories.

He knew that in the Mid-West United States, "the old tradition was broadly isolationist with all the memories or prejudices about 'colonialism'," and was determined to argue against this view of British actions over Suez. He argued that Britain's oil supply was threatened and that NATO was endangered along with the European economy. But he recognized that his speech would not convince his audience merely on economic and strategic grounds:

I knew that Munich and appeasement were still dirty words in American opinion. I therefore made as my strongest point my personal experience of the dangers of weakness. Naturally, I quoted Gaitskell's now famous phrase about Mussolini and Hitler....

The analogy served as an effective vehicle for the economic/strategic argument. If Nasser got away with the canal, he would inspire similar seizures of western assets through-out the Middle East:

The determination to seize other property - whether it be British-owned, American-owned, Dutch-owned or what you will - will be too great; and before we know where we are it may well be that the control of vital oil supplies, on which Western Europe at any rate must live, will be in the hands of powers which have in effect become satellites of Russia.

The validity of the analogy was conveyed to the audience by an appeal to shared experience and Macmillan's personal record:

I feel that all of us who went through those years - and I was one who did and can say with truth that I opposed this policy of weakness at every stage - are determined to see that this shall not happen again.²⁶

Macmillan was not only able to use substitution of the 1930s analogy to rebut the colonial analogy. He was also able to parry the analogy with a counter-dislocation. Just as Labourites were vulnerable to their own charges of appeasement, the Americans could be accused of colonialism in Latin American.²⁷ In this instance, then, a substitution with evident dislocating effects failed because of political liabilities of the analogy.

The substitution-dislocation which seems to have finally given the opponents of invasion the analogical advantage was the Hungary analogy. Soviet intervention against the Hungarian revolution on 24 October 1956 gave opponents a way of characterizing leadership of the Suez intervention. Analogy between the two invasions was inescapable despite the best efforts of the protagonists to dissuade people from using it. The mutual accusations

between the Soviets and the British-French of "barbarous" violations of national sovereignty merely tended to "reinforce the impression of symmetry."²⁸

It is sometimes argued that the following portion of Bulganin's 5 November 1956 letter to Eden constituted a veiled nuclear threat which helped persuade Eden to stop hostilities in Egypt:

In what position would Britain have found herself if she herself had been attacked by more powerful states possessing every kind of modern destructive weapon? And there are countries now which need not have sent a navy or air force to the coasts of Britain, but could have used other means such as rocket technique. If rocket weapons were used against Britain and France, you would most probably call this a barbarous action. But how does this differ from the inhuman attack carried out by armed forces of Britain and France against an almost defenceless Egypt?²⁹

But Eden and Macmillan have written that they did not take the apparent Soviet threat seriously because they knew that the Soviets would have had to face superior American forces.³⁰ Perhaps what disturbed Eden about Bulganin's analogical query was not an implied nuclear threat, but a subtle comparison of Britain to the Soviet Union (or other "countries" with rockets). Eden's own bad opinion of the Soviets may have made Bulganin's proportional analogy (Britain is to Egypt as the Soviet Union is to Britain) particularly embarrassing. Eden was able to parry by accusing Bulganin of more heinous crimes in Hungary, but the very business of having to compare himself to the Soviets must have been disconcerting.

At any rate, the Americans were able to take full advantage of

the comparison, devoting equal time to both the Hungary and Suez problems in the U.N. Despite the fact that Ambassador Lodge kept declaring that Suez should not be focused on to the exclusion of Hungary, his even-handed tactic had a significant impact on Eden, who commented in his memoirs that the American refusal to concentrate solely on Hungary in the Security Council "provided a damaging contrast to the alacrity they were showing arraigning the French and ourselves."³¹ That the French took the American use of the Suez-Hungary analogy seriously is clear in Ambassador Alphonse's demand for an immediate retraction from Dulles after the latter had exclaimed that the British-French intervention was just like the Soviet intervention in Budapest.³² That this analogical pressure by the Americans was something more than public demonstration is revealed in the concluding remarks of a briefing given by CIA Director Allen Dulles on 1 November at the White House:

It is nothing less than tragic that at this very time, when we are on the point of winning an immense and long-hoped-for victory over Soviet colonialism in Eastern Europe, we should be forced to choose between following in the footsteps of Anglo-French colonialism in Asia and Africa, or splitting our own course away from their course.³³

Whether or not this change in analogical fortunes helped to force the British-French withdrawal from Suez is debatable. Obviously, the main reason for withdrawal seems to have been American financial sanctions against a weakened British economy.³⁴ Britain and France were also faced with political isolation at the U.N.³⁵

Nevertheless, the Hungary analogy effectively compromised Eden's arguments for force. Their actions were simply too close to those of the Soviets, which had also been characterized by proponents as "police action" and by opponents as aggression against a weaker state.³⁶ But the rebuttal also gave the British a chance to redeem themselves, by allowing them to exit on the grounds that they joined others in condemning Soviet actions. Eden stepped up his argument that the intervention had been a move against Soviet satellization in the Middle East. The Hungary analogy both embarrassed and saved face.

3. The Analogical Case for One Western Strategy

Having applied analogical analysis to Suez strategy, it is perhaps appropriate to conclude the present study with analogical analysis of a current strategy. Will the observations and conclusions on analogical influence generated in a case study of Suez 1956 prove useful in the contemporary strategic setting? In particular, will estimates of the effectiveness of different techniques of rebuttal during the Suez crisis lay the foundation for a politics of analogy? Can the choice of certain rebuttals over others effect strategic outcomes?

A current strategy which deserves attention is the one which involves an increase in western armaments directed against the Soviet Union. In the United States, this strategy has been lobbied for by various organizations and individuals against the Carter Administration. For example, the Committee for the Present Danger and Senator Henry Jackson recommend that the United States and its NATO allies should acquire advanced weapons - such as the MX-1 missile - to counter Soviet military acquisitions. They argue strenuously against any arms reductions or controls - even those found in SALT II - which allow the Soviet Union to improve its military position.

Certainly many of the arguments used in favour of this strategy are non-analogical (no explicit analogies evident). But there are some standard analogical arguments used to support this strategy which deserve attention. The chief analogical argument being used against the Soviets is the 1930s analogy. Morton Kondracke has noted the use of parallels between the Soviet military build-up in the 1970s and German re-armament

in the 1930s by the following: the Committee on the Present Danger, Frank Barnett of the National Strategy Information Centre, General David Jones, columnist Robert Heintz, Edward Luttwak, Lt.-Gen. Daniel Graham. The editors of Strategic Review have used it in an article entitled "Retreat from Freedom" (1976). John Eppstein has suggested that "the Chinese may not be wrong when they call Helsinki a second Munich." James Schlesinger writes in his introduction to Beyond Nuclear Deterrence: New Aims, New Arms (1977): "Our Western world today faces a threat, less blatant than but just as perilous as that of the 1930's."³⁷

In Canada, the analogy has received support from the younger Winston Spencer Churchill who, speaking in Toronto in October 1977, commented that the Russians are engaged in a military build-up which "makes Hitler's in the 1930s look like a tea party." Churchill used this magnified analogy to spur his recommendation that more of the United Kingdom's oil revenues be spent shoring up British defences. John Gellner used the same analogy in arguing for greater defence allocations to conventional forces in Europe to deter the Soviets. "Thoughtful Europeans," Gellner wrote, have been feeling "vaguely uncomfortable about the absence of a solid military deterrent to war, much as we felt uneasy in the Thirties as we watched the seeming insouciance of the Western powers in the face of the growing Nazi-fascist menace." John Diefenbaker picked up Harold Macmillan's comment that the "Soviet Union seems to get away with anything, just like Hitler got away with anything."³⁸

One of the most elaborate renditions of the analogy has been given by Norman Podhoretz, the editor of Commentary, in his article, "The Culture

of Appeasement⁴ (1977). In an extended parallel construction, Podhoretz argues that post-Vietnam America is analogous to post-World War I Britain.

In both periods:

- (1) the preceding war was experienced as a defeat;
- (2) upper-class youth developed anti-patriotic, anti-middle class, pacifist and homosexual sentiments;
- (3) the bellicose speeches of the chief adversary (Hitler and Brezhnev) have been ignored;
- (4) the warnings of domestic opponents of appeasement (Churchill and currently Admiral Zumwalt, Paul Nitze and Senator Jackson) have been ignored.

These points of correspondence provide the foundation for a concluding parallel between Walter Laqueur's history of British responses to German rearmament and Richard Pipes' description of American responses to the Soviet arms build-up. The Americans have allegedly followed in the British pattern: stage one (reports of build-up felt to be exaggerated); stage two (reports true, but they will not catch up); stage three (parity acceptable because of legitimate defence concerns). The analogical implication is that Carter, like Chamberlain, is going to find himself forced by the mood of the nation and Soviet military superiority to resort to stage four (appeasement).³⁹ Nitze, Jackson and Laqueur have all used the term 'appeasement' to characterize current official American strategy against the Soviet Union.⁴⁰

Along with accusations of "appeasement," the Carter Administration faces charges that it is inviting the "Finlandization" of western states. Finnish-Soviet relations since World War II are used as an analogue for what might happen to other states if they allow the Soviets to gain

military superiority. Kenneth Adelman has used the Finlandization analogy in "Fear, Seduction and Growing Soviet Strength" (1978). His argument is that while Finnish-Soviet relations are unique - "formed by historical power relations and the characters of the leaders involved" - nevertheless, they illustrate "the possibility of outside interference without troop presence, economic domination or other formal agents of power." To become Finlandized is to become afraid to offend the Soviets for fear of potential military sanctions.⁴¹

A number of academic strategists use the term "Finlandization": Nils Ørvik, David Vital, Philippe Garigue, Adam Ulam and Hannes Adomeit. Pierre Hassner has employed it in regard to detente strategy, and Robert Whymant has used it in regard to strategy surrounding Japan.⁴²

A third analogy favouring arms acquisition characterizes the Soviet Union as an "expansionist" or "imperialist" nation, by likening it to Tsarist Russia. This imperial motif has been popular throughout the post-war period: George Kennan and Dulles both used it to characterize Soviet foreign policy. More recently, in "Communist Ideology and Soviet Power" (1970), D. Seligman concurs with Senator Jackson (who has compared Soviet involvement in the Middle East to that of Catherine the Great), observing that contemporary correspondents in Moscow make the same observations as did the Marquis de Custine in the 1800s: "secretiveness, suspiciousness of outsiders, intransigence in negotiations." But Seligman carries the analogy further, arguing that unlike other nations: "In Russia, national sentiments have always been inextricably involved with the idea of empire building."⁴³

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Soviet policy in the Mediterranean and Middle East is understood in Tsarist terms. A.Z. Rubinstein feels that the Soviet goal, "dating from Czarist times," is to gain a warm-water port in the Mediterranean Sea and Persian Gulf. A study prepared for the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee also speaks of a "traditional Russian ambition for the warm water outlet" in the Persian Gulf.⁴⁴ Robert Tucker feels that the Soviet aim is to transform "the twentieth century into a greater replica of the nineteenth - with Russia as the new hegemonic centre of the international system."⁴⁵

The Tsarist analogy is often blended with analogy to religion. In "The Lie that Cripples Russia" (1977), Edward Crankshaw has written that the Soviet state reminds him of:

one of those agrarian theocracies of antiquity, standing still for ever, bowed before brazen idols, until swept away by flood, pestilence or barbaric invasion. And Russia is indeed ruled in the name of a God-King, V.J. Lenin, who supplanted an earlier God-King, the Tsar.⁴⁶

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In a similar vein, John Erickson developed an analogy between Soviet diplomatic activity at the Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) and Tsar Alexander's promulgation of the Holy Alliance in 1815. Given this analogy, Russian imperial self-interest is disguising itself in the holy robes of European regional brotherhood (the religious overtones being conveyed by the words "religious fervour," "sublime mysticism," and "sermonizing").⁴⁷ Erickson also writes that "the very device of this grandiose conference with its formalized trappings does

correspond to that Soviet (and traditional Russian) hankering for procedure, documentation and an almost Victorian sense of 'respectability', or perhaps 'legitimacy'."⁴⁸

The strategic argument contained in the Tsarist or Tsarist-religious analogy is more indirect than that in the 1930s or Finlandization analogies. The analogical argument appears to be: that Soviet military and foreign policy actions are just as illegitimate as those of the Tsars. In other words, the West faces opponents who are ambitious and self-serving, and who will not hesitate to advance themselves at others' expense. Consequently, western states should arm themselves to avoid subjugation to a Soviet empire.

In "Moscow's Military Muscle" (1979), John Gellner uses all three of the above analogies. Gellner endorses a letter from 170 senior American officers to President Carter which warns of the Soviet Union's "imperial aims." Gellner also introduces the 1930s analogy, by recalling now no one took Hitler's ideas (by analogy, Soviet ideas) seriously until it was too late to prevent a world war. He also outlines the threat of Western European nations being "finlandized" by the Soviet Union (i.e., having their independence compromised). All three analogies underline Gellner's apparent conclusion that the loss of military advantage to the Soviet Union must be prevented.⁴⁹

4. Interpretation and Response

How should the above analogies be interpreted? Are the Soviets actually perceived by these strategists in terms of the 1930s, Finnish experiences and Tsarist expansion? Are the abstract principles in each of the analogues - appeasement, limited sovereignty, and illegitimate force - major influences on this strategy involving increased armament? Or are such analogical reflections merely illustrations and curious asides, with political, economic and other factors being the major influences? Or, finally, are these analogies functioning as effective political rhetoric for the strategists using them? Are they serving to shift the Carter Administration's strategy as political factors?

James Reston has observed that the 1930s analogy is having some impact on American strategists: "Historical analogies are usually misleading, and one of the problems at the moment is that there is a tendency on Capitol Hill these days to look on the Communist adventure in Africa as if it were as great a menace to freedom as the rise of Hitler."⁵⁰ John Sigler has suggested that the 1930s analogy governs the outlook in Washington and in the Trilateral Commission:

Many who came to maturity in the 'thirties' were deeply marked by the Nazi trauma, and an entire philosophy of international relations has been developed in order to avoid any repetition of the Munich syndrome. What this requires is alliance diplomacy and constant military preparedness in order to deter any actor intent on altering the status quo through the use or threat of force.⁵¹

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But can this analogy be as potent now as it was in the early post-war years? Does the word "propaganda" continue to awaken "automatic memories of Herr Doktor Goebbels," or is the collective memory fading?⁵² As the war recedes in time and as younger leaders emerge, will analogies to the last world war have much impact on strategic thinking?

The answer seems to be that the 1930s analogy will retain its potency in strategy - but not necessarily because of images of the world it may create. The analogy is just as effective with those who came to maturity after the war because of its normative connotations. There is a continuing political disadvantage involved in being characterized as an appeaser of fascism, regardless of one's personal history.

This seems to be the case with the Tsarist and Finlandization analogies even more so. Very few strategists have experienced Tsars or Finnish politics directly. The strength of such analogies seems to rely on something in addition to its instructive features. The rhetorical interpretation of these analogies posits their strength as existing in the political implications they have for the analogizer and his audience.

The importance of distinguishing a rhetorical interpretation of analogical influence emerges in an evaluation of the effectiveness of rebuttals. Rebuttals of the 1930s and Finlandization analogies will serve to illustrate the point.

Representative Les Aspin has introduced an excellent rebuttal of the 1930s analogy, using a combination of over-extension and substitution.

Aspin takes the opinion that the recent expansion in Soviet armament is "reminiscent of Nazi Germany's re-armament in the 1930's" and tests it for accuracy in six military categories.⁵³ He compares the growth of Soviet forces from 1972 to 1976 with the growth of German forces from 1935 to 1939 in terms of:

- (1) defence expenditures;
- (2) manpower;
- (3) tactical aircraft;
- (4) tanks;
- (5) strategic weapons (bombers or warheads);
- (6) modernization.

In each of these areas of correspondence, Aspin discovers that the rate of Nazi expansion exceeds Soviet expansion by extremely wide margins. The technique of over-extension allows Aspin to take the Committee's argument seriously, and yet, through this discovery of significant differences to throw doubt on its opinion that Soviet intentions are analogous to those of the Nazis.

Aspin also uses substitution for the Nazi analogue, comparing across these same force categories, the patterns of expansion in different countries: Egypt and Syria (1968-1972), Israel (1968-1972), China (1967-1971), and North Korea (1971-1975). These comparisons show that the Soviet rate of expansion is "not even the largest since Nazi Germany's" and the comparison to Israel tends to open the possibility

that the limited growth in Soviet capability may reflect their belief that war is imminent.⁵⁴

Whether or not Aspin's effort to counter "rhetoric about 'Nazi-like' buildups" has succeeded in encouraging a more "measured response" to Soviet military activity, is the critical question. Certainly the effort has impressed journalists such as Morton Kondracke and Mark Frankland.⁵⁵ But the real question is whether it has affected those who use the analogy.

An article by Richard Perle, an assistant to Senator Jackson, suggests that Aspin's rebuttal may not be that effective in blocking anti-appeasement analogies. Perle easily grants that the 1930s analogy is only an "imperfect" one. There are many differences to be noted: Brezhnev is not another Hitler; Soviet policies are not Nazi policies; nor is "the massive Soviet arms build-up of the last decade...like German build-up in the decade prior to World War II." Rather, Perle writes, the point of the analogy is that western leaders are "inadequately inoculated against the disease of appeasement that swept through Europe some forty years ago."⁵⁶

It may be that the analogy is significant only as an illustration of the principle "that weakness in armed strength means weakness in diplomacy."⁵⁷ But Perle's use of the analogy relies on more than abstract cognition. The force of the analogy lies in Perle's judgement that Carter's policies resemble those of Chamberlain. Carter and his advisors are

Perle's real target; Brezhnev and his are merely circumstantial. The reader - and particularly Carter - is placed in an analogical bind: either he accepts Perle's judgement (entailing major changes in American arms policies) or he does not, at the risk of having to defend Chamberlain by analogical reversal.⁵⁸

Peter Krosby's rebuttal of the Finlandization analogy similarly concentrates on the overt instructive features of analogy. After noting the popularity of the term with Alastair Buchan, Pierre Hassner, Arnaud de Borchgrave, Franz Joseph Strauss and C.L. Sulzberger, Krosby employs contradiction to show that Finnish - Soviet relations have unique characteristics. He outlines how these relations are the product of the natural history of a small nation located on the Soviet Union's borders. Restrictions on Finnish independence relate only to the security interests of the Soviet Union along the common 800-mile border.

Krosby also employs over-extension, arguing that given past Soviet opportunities to annex or Sovietize Finland, "Finlandization" as a term may represent the success of detente. That is, Finland has been able to retain and increase its independence despite every western expectation of complete absorption into the Soviet Union.⁵⁹

But Hannes Adomeit is able to salvage the analogy by granting that even in the midst of "certain unique and special features in Finland's relationship with the Soviet Union," certain "core elements" of the Finlandization concept are still valid. Any deference to Soviet preferences

- in trade, foreign policy, cultural policy, domestic politics - would constitute "Finlandization." Use of the analogy hinges simply on the possibility that (especially European) states will at some point start taking Soviet preferences into account before making final decisions.⁶⁰

In a word, the Finlandization analogy is not meant, and should not be taken, literally. The vital focus of the analogy does not seem to be the object of analogy - for example, Western European states. Rather it seems to be the analogizer and his audience. Anyone using the analogy is declaring his strategic judgement of Finnish-Soviet relations. Rejection of Soviet constriction of Finnish policies suggests the motivations of the strategist in recommending that more weapons are needed to resist the kind of situation found in Finnish politics. Anyone in the audience rejecting the analogy is vulnerable to the accusation of tacit complicity in the Finnish situation, and his credibility in western eyes is diminished.

The significance of these analogies is often clarified by the minor analogies which are appended to them. Perle used a disease analogy - suggested by the words "inoculated," "disease," and "symptoms" - to emphasize the theme of weakness.⁶¹ Anyone promoting, or not opposing, Chamberlain-style policy is weak, and therefore inappropriate as leader. Adelman uses sexual analogy to supplement his use of the Finlandization analogy. Use of words and phrases like "seduction," "willing surrender to an enticing force," "infatuated," "Soviet courting," and "estrangement" all suggest the stereotypic scenario of female submissiveness to male dominance.⁶² Opposition to the Finlandization analogy carries

the connotation of such submissiveness - an unwillingness to assert one-self against dominant adversaries.

If it is true that those using the 1930s analogy are primarily concerned to establish their Churchillian credentials and to threaten their opponents with Chamberlain's reputation - if the Finlandization analogy is designed as a test of one's mettle - then the technique of rebuttal selected must address these dimensions of the analogy. In some ways the analogizer must be relocated in another less politically advantageous position.

What is needed is a substitution-dislocation which:

- (a) challenges the analogical conclusion; and
- (b) moves the analogizer out of his favoured political position; by
- (c) drawing him onto alternate analogical terrain which provides him with similar political benefits, but not at the opponents' expense, and with different strategic implications.

If such a substitution fails to dislocate, then the only rebuttal with relocating potential left to try is, simply, location. Perhaps this is the most reasonable function for analogical analysis: to identify what exactly analogies are saying - about the objects of strategy, but more importantly, about the strategists themselves. Locating analogizers and their opponents in relation to analogies - outlining apparent political gains and losses - may not be as subtle as the techniques outlined above, but it might help to ensure that the influence of social or cultural innuendo on strategy is recognized and perhaps thereby controlled.

5. Concluding Observations on Analogical Analysis

While preparing this thesis, several avenues of inquiry were tried but found unfruitful. These should be mentioned as a contribution to any further development of analogical analysis:

- (1) An attempt was made to categorize those analogies uncovered in researching strategic documents, with a view to determining relative degrees or types of influence on strategy. Sub-division of the available analogies (stemming largely from materials dealing with East-West strategy) yielded five prospective categories:
 - (a) World War II analogies (including the 1930s analogy);
 - (b) post-war crisis analogies (e.g., references to military events in Korea, Cuba and Czechoslovakia);
 - (c) antiquarian analogies (to more distant historical events such as the French Revolution);
 - (d) everyday analogies (such as to Acheson's fire department);
 - (e) abstract analogies (e.g., relative measures of U.S. and Soviet weapons or defence spending).

However, it became apparent that the more fundamental division should be addressed - between historical analogies (the first three) and non-historical analogies (the last two). This was particularly the case given concentration on historical

analogies in the field.

(2) An effort was made to identify useful criteria of influence:

- (a) biographical confirmation that a particular analogy exerted influence on a given actor;
- (b) use of an analogy in private (the assumption being that what is said away from the public domain is more likely to be authentic);
- (c) confirmation of influence by a third party who was present at some critical juncture of policy formation;
- (d) measure of the frequency of use of particular analogies;
- (e) the number and variety of individuals using an analogy;
- (f) use of an analogy by a key actor;
- (g) subsequent use of an analogy by someone who hears it, and use of the same analogical conclusions;
- (h) specific rebuttal or denial of an analogy.

As indicated above, the last 'criterion' was the one employed in the thesis; the others seemed more ambiguous, although it must be granted that each of them can only suggest rather than confirm analogical influence on strategy.

(3) The original distinction between "instructive" and "rhetorical" interpretations corresponded to the split between private and public domains. The initial research expectation was that analogies would both help

to shape anticipation in strategic planning sessions and generate public opinion. Both sides of the process could simply be added together to produce an estimate of total influence.

However, the two categories became polarized - in part because of the public/private division ~~seemed~~ arbitrary (rhetoric could occur behind closed doors). But the main reason the two interpretations began emerging as competitors was the growing realization that the field of analogical analysis was heavily dominated by the instructive interpretation. The overwhelming tendency was to view analogies as agents of image-alteration, distorting perceptions of strategic reality and thereby affecting strategic judgement. It seemed at the time that it was important not to take analogical arguments made by strategists at face value - to raise the distinct possibility that analogies spoken by strategists for the benefit of any given 'audience' might well prove in some measure to be inauthentic.

However, such polarization over-exposed the rhetorical interpretation by making it seem exclusive of all instructive influences. Certainly in the long run, an approach such as Graham's, combining both "proof" and "persuasion" aspects, must emerge in analogical analysis.⁶³ But it is important not to rush forward without dealing with the problem of authenticity of analogical discourse, without focusing clearly on the normative connotations of analogies and their particular importance in restraining opposition to strategies through analogical binding.

There are several avenues of inquiry which were not fully explored and which deserve attention at some future point:

- (1) One avenue of research would involve study of the lateral interaction between analogies. There is some indication that one of the best defensive techniques against analogical rebuttals is a lateral move to mutually reinforcing analogies. This defensive technique was employed frequently during the Suez debates.⁶⁴ Certain analogies, such as the 1930s, have been highlighted but it is clear that analogies imply and merge into each other and therefore require interpretation of their interaction.
- (2) There is a need to combine analysis of western analogies with analysis of those used in the Soviet Union (for example). This would require some appreciation of the linguistic and cultural background to allow perception of instructive and normative connotations.

The present thesis only considered the impact of analogical debate within a domestic political context and between military allies (the United States and Britain). It is important to develop a broader analysis of analogical debate between military adversaries such as the United States and the Soviet Union. For example, analogical debate between Prime Minister Menzies and President Nasser was briefly noted above and could mark a starting point for another level of analysis of Suez 1956.⁶⁵

- (3) Another avenue of further research stems from the concluding focus on rebuttals. Rebuttals of analogies are themselves analogies. Even contradiction (or contrast) is analogical as a negated analogy. From this, it is reasonable to infer the inverse proposition: that analogies are rebuttals. That is, they are designed to counter previous analogies and contrasts. This suggests the discursive nature of analogies - that they are often arguments directed against preceeding analogical propositions. The political process could be interpreted as a constant struggle for analogical advantage.⁶⁶ The influence of subtle metaphors (analogical innuendo) might be essayed in this connection.⁶⁷

CHAPTER THREE

Notes

- 1
Northrop Frye, The Modern Century (Toronto: Oxford University, 1967), p. 16.
- 2
Above, p. 63.
- 3
Debates 558: 84.
- 4
May, "Lessons" of the Past, pp. 116-120.
- 5
Jervis, Perception and Misperception, pp. 281-282.
- 6
Eden, Full Circle, pp. 431, 539. See also: James Eayrs, ed., The Commonwealth and Suez (London: Oxford University, 1964), p. 182.
- 7
Debates 558: 279
- 8
Lloyd, Suez 1956, p. 169. Thomas, Suez Affair, p. 38. The Chamberlain dislocation came at a critical juncture - when Lloyd was trying to decide whether to acquiesce in the Challe plan to collaborate with the Israelis. Nutting, No end of a lesson, pp. 93-99.
- 9
Debates 558: 84-88, 253, 257. See also Morrison's accusation of "appeasement": Debates 557: 1658. The Suez Rebels must have felt rueful agreement with Crossman's taunting observation: "it is interesting to see the rusty nature of the old sword. It took five weeks to take it out of the scabbard before it

could be waved." Thomas, Suez Affair, p. 37.

If Erskine Childers is correct in understanding Eden's "Hitler-Rhineland image" as a metaphor for resistance to his deteriorating health and declining political authority within the Conservative Party and the Middle East, Eden would have had a vital interest in proving to everyone that his threats of force were not hollow imputations. E. Childers, The Road to Suez (London: MacGibbon and Kee, 1962), pp. 199-207.

10
Debates 558: 306. Macmillan, Riding the Storm, pp. 154-156.

11
Similarly, Henderson, Blenkinsop, Mellish, Benn and Gaitskell all contrasted Eden's previous vigorous support for the League of Nations with his failure to involve the U.N. over the Suez dispute. Debates 558: 45-46, 59, 74, 227-228, 297.

12
Debates 558: 93. Gaitskell also used Dulles as an analogue for Eden: Debates 558: 291, 296-297. How wise was this considering that Eden disliked Dulles' style and was his rival in foreign affairs? See: Thomas, Suez Affair, p. 54.

13
Debates 558: 298.

14
Eden, Full Circle, pp. 435, 437, 499, 566. Robertson, Crisis, p. 169.

15
The Americans were certainly aware of its usage: L.L. Gerson, John Foster Dulles (New York: Cooper Square, 1967), p. 287; Dwight D. Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 1956-1961 (New York: Doubleday, 1965), p. 49.

16
Gerson, Dulles, pp. 45-47, 159. John Foster Dulles, War or Peace (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1950), pp. 7, 24.

- 17 Eden, Full Circle, p. 465; Eden used it again: Debates 558: 306. Also, Robertson, Crisis, p. 204. Analogy to the American-U.N. intervention in Korea was also widely used during the Suez crisis: see Pineau in France, Debats Parlementaires, 3 August, 1956, p. 3870. The British and French apparently used it during their early meetings: New York Times, 9 August 1956, p. 1.
- 18 Eden, Full Circle, p. 498. Robertson, Crisis, pp. 138-139.
- 19 Pineau was the chief architect of this linkage, along with Paul-Henri Spaak of Belgium: Robertson, Crisis, pp. 100, 129-130, 164. France, Debats, 3 August, 1956, pp. 3870-3873. Eden, Full Circle, p. 458. Macmillan, Riding, p. 113.
- 20 See below, pp. 101-103.
- 21 Eden, Full Circle, pp. 498-499, 542. Macmillan, Riding, pp. 138-139. Thomas, Suez Affair, p. 94.
- 22 Eisenhower, Waging Peace, p. 52.
- 23 Eden, Full Circle, pp. 501, 584.
- 24 Eden, Full Circle, pp. 354, 421, 436, 442, 444, 450, 459, 472, 486, 495.
- 25 Macmillan, Riding, pp. 95, 112, 141-142.
- 26 Macmillan, Riding, pp. 129-132. R.A. Butler also used the pre-war motif ("predatory nationalism") to rebut Dulles' charges of British colonialism: Sidney Aster, Anthony Eden (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1976), pp. 153-154.

27

Macmillan, Riding, pp. 118, 140.

28

U.N., Security Council, Official Records, 30 October 1956, 750th meeting, p. 11; 31 October 1956, 751st meeting, p. 7; 2 November, 752nd meeting, pp. 7, 12, 23, 25; 4 November 1956, 754th meeting, pp. 4, 10-13. U.N., General Assembly, Second Emergency Special Session, 4 November 1956, 564th meeting, pp. 2, 12-13, 16.

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United Kingdom Foreign Office, British and Foreign State Papers, 1955-1956, vol. 162 (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1965), p. 680.

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Love, Suez, p. 612. Macmillan, Riding the Storm, p. 65.
Also: Lloyd, Suez 1956, p. 210.

31

U.N. Security Council, Official Records, 2 November 1956, 752nd meeting, pp. 7, 12. Eden, Full Circle, p. 545.
Also: Lloyd, Suez 1956, pp. 204-205.

32

Herman Finer, Dulles over Suez (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1964), p. 6.

33

Eisenhower, Waging Peace, p. 83

34

Love, Suez, p. 625. Lloyd, Suez 1956, pp. 210-211.
Beaufre, The Suez Expedition, p. 122.

35

Wutting, No end of a lesson, pp. 133-134, 145-146, 152.

36

Love, Suez, p. 629.

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M. Kondracke, "The Assault on SALT II," The New Republic 177 (17 December 1977): 21. Editors, "Retreat from Freedom," Strategic Review 4 (Winter 1976): 4-7. J. Epstein,

"Detente as a Weapon of Soviet Policy," East-West Digest (January 1977), p. 9. J.J. Holst, U. Nerlich, eds., Beyond Nuclear Deterrence: New Arms, New Arms (New York: Crane, Russak, 1977), p. xi.

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63

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64

See for example a speech by Conservative Member C.E. Mott-Radclyffe: Debates 558: 198, 200-204. Under pressure from Labour Members, he moved from the 1930s analogy through analogies to the Korean intervention, the Berlin airlift, Abadan, and back to the 1930s analogy.

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